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**BECOMING-CHILD AS IMAGISTIC PROCESS**

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## **Resumo**

### **O Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético**

Essa tese, ao procurar definir a noção operativa que anima o conceito de Devir-Criança como processo imagético, apresenta um duplo propósito: postular a infância como devir e não como ser individualizado; e, subseqüentemente, elaborar a predicação processual da infância como Devir-Criança e, em seu sentido mais amplo, como emergência processual. Desse modo, deseja-se deslocar a compreensão da infância e seu desdobramento conceitual para uma formulação heterogênea, aberta e indeterminada, que se expressa ao longo de linhas processuais e imagéticas, a fim de indicar o seu movimento. Colocamos o processo como imagético, baseando-o no pensamento cinematográfico de Henri Bergson e Gilles Deleuze, que identifica a imagem como um conjunto dinâmico de ações e reações, em que o cinematógrafo intervém como produtor da diferença, tanto como diferenciação quanto diferença. O processo imanente que emerge da interação imagética é, simultaneamente, encarnado e perceptivo, sendo denominado devir. Quando dissocia-se os dois termos de Devir-Criança, produz-se dois problemas: primeiro, o de explicar o devir; e, segundo, o de associar a criança, como um agente epistêmico, ao devir. Como uma solução especulativa para a primeira aporia, com fundamentação em Gilbert Simondon, criamos uma ontogênese transindividual heterogênea e concreta, que vai além do indivíduo e produz um devir processual associado incorporado. O segundo problema consiste em desdobrar o aspecto processual da infância, identificando o movimento epistêmico que ele oferece e que designamos como noção comum em termos espinosistas. O aspecto final do trabalho trata das implicações imagéticas de uma dinâmica materialista do processo como expressão pragmática.

**Palavras-chave:** Devir-Criança, processo imagético, diferença, percepção, Noção Comum.

## **Abstract**

### **Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process**

We look to define the operative notion that animates the concept of Becoming-Child as imagistic process. Our purpose is twofold: to posit childhood as a becoming rather than an individualised being and subsequently to elaborate the processual predication of childhood as becoming-child in its most general sense as processual emergence. As such, we wish to displace the understanding of childhood and its conceptual unfolding to a less stable, open-ended and indefinite heterogeneous formulation which is expressed along processual, imagistic lines in order to be able to indicate the movement. We posit process as imagistic by basing it on the cinematic thought of Bergson and Deleuze which ideates the image as a dynamic assemblage of action and reaction where the cinematograph intervenes as the producer of difference, both as differentiation and differenciation. The immanent process which emerges from imagistic interaction is simultaneously embodying and perceptual and is termed becoming. When dissociating the two terms in conceptualizing becoming-child, we perceive that we produce two problems: first, that of explicating becoming; and second, what the child represents as an epistemic agent when applied to becoming. As a speculative solution to the first aporia, we create a transindividual ontogenesis that is heterogeneous and concrete and bypasses the individual to produce an embodied associated processual becoming. The second problem consists in coming to terms with the processual aspect of childhood by identifying the epistemic movement that it affords and which we label the Common Notion. The final aspect of the work deals with the imagistic implications of a materialist dynamics of process as pragmatic expression.

**Key Words:** Becoming-Child, imagistic process, difference, perception, Common Notion.

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## Introduction

Our thesis *Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process* offers an alternative approach to the understanding of being in the world. Basing itself on imagistic process, it proposes to define the Spinozist Common Notion that animates the concept of Becoming-Child.

We posit process as imagistic by basing it on the cinematic thought of Bergson and Deleuze which ideates the image as a dynamic assemblage of action and reaction where the cinematograph intervenes as the producer of difference, both as differentiation and differentiation. The immanent process which emerges from imagistic interaction is simultaneously embodying and perceptual and is termed becoming. The presupposition of constancy implicit in the classification of knowledge and experience which allows the predication of difference is not applicable to the child as, by definition, its *sine qua non* is change as unceasing non-specific, generic difference—there is no repetition to speak of, no memorial base, to be inhabited by difference (DELEUZE, 1994). The difference that emerges from a becoming-child's becoming has no foundation upon which to articulate repetition and must therefore express its becoming in terms of a child's 'pure' intentions: pure creation, pure immanence, pure perception and pure memory—as the creation of pure difference.

Our thesis has all to do with childhood and the child and nothing to do with them. It seeks to understand childhood and the child in processual terms in such a way that they are seen not as a simple aggregation of processes which produces a model of the child or of childhood in a can. Our intent is not a reformulation of the sociology of childhood, nor a critique of child psychology or psychoanalysis, nor a refashioning of a developmental model of childhood, nor a mirroring of an individual psychology as opposed to a collective psychology. Childhood for us is not the indirect object of the process, nor the pushing of process towards a goal, it is processual predication itself. It is not against anything, but seeks to construct an alternative proposition.

Our purpose is twofold: to posit childhood as a becoming rather than an individualised being and subsequently to elaborate the processual predication of childhood as becoming-child in its most general sense as a processual emergence. As such, we wish to displace the understanding of childhood and its conceptual unfolding to a less stable, open-ended and indefinite heterogeneous formulation which is expressed along processual lines.

More recent interdisciplinary processual approaches express process *through its effects* in social, political, cultural, educational and legal milieus as opposed to process in itself being the object of study. In the traditional model, the child is seen through its social agency, or more directly as a social agent and as a member of a minority group. These are relevant engagements with the concept of childhood and defining its manifestation in the world, but they are far from offering a holistic comprehension of the childhood experience in itself not only of the child's engagement with the world as experiencing but of the internal experiencing of the processual constitution of experiencing as heterogeneous event.

The above-mentioned approaches to childhood provide models and representations which define childhood, describe it, measure it, circumscribe it, define its limits, its parameters, legalise it, monetise it, profile it as a market or consumer base. But none of these gives an account of the underlying movement that marks the procession of advancement. The child, by virtue of what its body can and cannot do, does not have the subjective heft, the critical mass, the expressive wherewithal, to define its own subjectivity, having had no choice but to let others carry out the task—most usually by well-intentioned adults. Who the child is, what the child is and why the child is has been defined and constructed by external subjectivities which only recently have begun to take into consideration the child's subjective experience. The child and childhood are the contained within a state of tension between the various models which theorise and conceptualise it, and there is always a gap between the child as the known, as the object of study, and the knower and the knowledges which define it.<sup>1</sup> From these facets of childhood, we can go on to develop the concept of becoming-child as imagistic process—as an immanent, heterogeneous, interactive dynamic which manifests itself as encounter with the world. And so, our approach seeks to express those activities which are identified as child-like and articulate them as purely processual within the unfolding of the advancement of becoming.

To carry this out, we need to first consider various aspects of how the concepts of child and childhood can be deconstructed so that we can reconstitute them and express them in processual terms. The work of Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) will prove indispensable here as his entire philosophy has been constructed processually: at every turn, we encounter the elaboration of his thought understood and expressed in processual terms. This applies

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<sup>1</sup> Bunge (2009) writes that cause and effect can be perceived, but their relation must be guessed, for only events and processes can be causally related.

not only to the articulation of his key concepts, such as process of differentiation, process of becoming, process of actualisation, or process of subjectivation, but to the entirety of his writings—most any operational concept which could stand on its own appears prefaced by the words ‘process of’, as process of totalisation, process of transmission, process of recognition, etc.<sup>2</sup>

Although the concept of becoming-child has been identified and named by Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1930-1992) in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) and elaborated upon by various thinkers (KASTRUP, 2000; OLSSON, 2009; BOGUE, 2010; HICKEY-MOODY, 2012; ROMAGNOLI, 2016) we don’t feel that the concept is being handed down to us ready-made and “exhaustively formulated”, precluding any possible development. There is work to be done here in terms of a general elaboration of its processual philosophical functions, but the point is not to present what becoming-child can be in molar terms once again, but to present it as a molecular becoming and as a Common Notion of imagistic process.

The child as a singular individuation, as a functional entity that performs as a child and carries out those activities that identify the becoming-child as a functional coherence is a process composed of an agglomeration of subsidiary processual activity which gains heft durationally and eventually suffers cessation through its own undoing. It is through this activity and its relational implications that allows that processual becoming to be cognised as a subjective entity in the world that acquires definition through specific doings. From a Spinozist perspective, the body of the becoming-child processually composed through activity, undergoes modifications, and, through affective “joy” and “sadness”, becomes materially defined. The activities that this becoming-childing undergoes leave impressions and traces which will in turn impregnate its becoming with the promise of futurity, with new potentials, what the different affects will in time enable it to express through their realisation. Thus, the body of becoming-child is a durational accretion by way of the experiencing of the world and the interactive encounters as imagistic process—one which at first can only be understood as pure perception but which, with time, will come to convert experience into archival holdings. It is a Spinozist proposition as to what a body can do, what can be done to a body and how a body is composed, de-composed and re-composed, and re-concretised along divergent dynamic trajectories. They in turn generate patchworked

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<sup>2</sup> We have compiled an itemised list of instances throughout Deleuze’s works where he qualifies his concepts with the expression ‘process of’ that goes on for more than 10 pages.

cartographies as the mutual enrichment of Spinoza's thought on bodies and affect and Bergson's ideas of perception and the incipient production of memory as becomings.

Our work here is a disavowal not only of science but also of a certain philosophy. This disavowal is not a repudiation of science or philosophy, but a renunciation of a certain manner of thinking them. It is a manner of reconsidering how we can rethink and express experience. It is an attempt at postulating being-in-the-world as process and to describe what this could entail. We wish to "go back to things themselves" as Husserl stated but return from there not along a phenomenological route, but on an alternate path which reestablishes the nature of experience along processual and durational lines, which thrives on the indeterminacy of becoming and follows a line of thinking which goes against the grain of the Laws of Thought. Our intention is to renounce constancy, permanence, universality and stability of concepts and adopt a mode of thought which subscribes to change, impermanence, and contingency as the hallmark of processual thought. We take at face value Deleuze's and Guattari's assertion that any statement—our thesis included—is a *mot d'ordre*, an order-word which commands and structures language through its presuppositions rather than through its express statements. In this sense, we notice an arrest of movement in the linguistic forms of Romance languages and throughout the thesis we undertake a short research for the lost time that evades us in the linguistic translation of dynamic conceptual Greek terms into their Latinised forms, for if we are to investigate imagistic process then we must also express it according to a language that expresses the implicit movement.<sup>3</sup>

To counteract the effects of the stilling of processual Greek thought, the processes themselves will be expressed through an interactive imagistic dynamic which in turn go on to constitute assemblages which function coherently as associated milieus which have duration. This leads to explain childhood as processual in a molecular sense. The intuitions behind this understanding bring us back to Bergson's understanding of perception as foundation for imagistic process which is elaborated as cinematic thought and the cinematograph. Thus, we can present our understanding of these dispositifs as a processual mode of naturing, where mode is understood through its Spinozist articulation as modality

and modification. Both modes of seeing process are aspects of the same processual understanding.

In this sense, when we consider the nature of the dispositifs as processual, the child in the world is no longer a binary dynamic, but a relational encounter where everything participates concretely<sup>4</sup> in a non-hierarchical unprivileged relation. Its naturing becomes an occupation as a body and as a bodying, as the extensive taking place of the ambient environment of the becoming and as the becoming of the process as its vocational emergence in terms of its doing. There is only one process in nature as a process of production which is both a consumption and a recording process, a production of productions and consumptions (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1983). Thus, process produces the child and nature simultaneously not as “two opposite terms confronting each other—not even in the sense of bipolar opposites within a relationship of causation, ideation, or expression (cause and effect, subject and object, etc.); rather, they are one and the same essential reality” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1983, p. 4-5).

The processual of becoming-child is therefore not a goal or end in itself—it is both an open-ended and a durational becoming. This may at first sight appear contradictory in that how can something which has no pre-established boundaries be limited temporally? On the one hand, becoming-child is never pre-constituted, its potential is never exhausted by any transversal cut that attempts to determine it, and as a desiring-machine, as an appetitive concrescence, the production of production is a flow-producing stuttering machine of “and, and, and...” or “and, then...” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987). And, on the other, the dynamic of becoming perdures while the conditions or constitutive affordances<sup>5</sup> allow its actualisation. The duration implicit in becoming-child combines a multiplicity of human and non-human components—the very same constituent elements indicated above by the various models of childhood—themselves made durational and, hence, also capable of being broken-down infinitely into constituent durational multiplicities, which in turn can also participate processually in other durational assemblies.

When we go back to things themselves, we don't mean the objects of perception or of science but to the experience of perception as imagistic process. For this we look at

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<sup>4</sup> In the technical sense developed by Simondon in *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques* (1969).

<sup>5</sup> Affordance is a term coined by James J. Gibson in *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (1979) which he defines as the information made available to us by the environment by which events in the world can be perceived (GIBSON, 2014, p. 94).



seeing itself and the activity that seeing entails because sight is the dominant sense and the sense which informs much of the thinking on our interaction with the world. If we define function as an assemblage of movements and follow Deleuze in defining science as a creation of functions, then science is the practice or activity of predicating assemblages of movement. These assemblages that we create or conceive through positivist 'observation' which Peirce calls *Idioscopy*, and Bergson *reflection*, and others *mindfulness* are the internal observation which determine a system of movements that are well-coordinated in fulfilling a specific function. This would make this activity pragmatic. But as soon as we invoke the term fulfilling we are appealing to rendering that specific system of movement as having a lesser or greater perfection, making this activity Spinozist. Thus, we wish to propose a scientific description of an assemblage of movement which *follows the flux of vision as psychological fact* that cannot be characterised as absolutely physiological. It is a science which is not positivistic in a Comtian sense; it is not a Wundtian psychology that attempts to rationalise thought through the calculus of absolute measurement, but seeks instead to rationalise thought through the relative calculus of the differential within an empirical practice.

To look at looking, particularly through the experimental work of Russian psychologist Alfred L. Yarbus (1914-1986), shows that the anatomy of the eye and the scrutiny of eye movement bring to light insights as to what an image can be which traditional conceptions disregard. Yarbus attached reflecting mirrors on small rubber suction cups to the surface of the eye of his research subjects to allow him to track their eye movements as they studied complex objects. From this, we are able to discern how imagistic experience navigates the encounter and articulates the discovery by indicating exactly how the eye moves. More specifically, we can discern how a viewer formulates the problematisation of the encounter as perceptual experience which combines sensori-motor intuitions with intra-perceptive imagination. Yet, because the process is stop and go and consciousness is continuous, Yarbus leads us to consider the cinematographic aspects of perception.

This is of course the predilective territory of French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and his iconoclastic conception of imagistic process. It is a complex ideation in that it is based on a non-intuitive concept of the image—one that is non-pictorial, dynamic and interactive all at the same time and which he defines as an assemblage composed of a stimulus, an indeterminate interval and a reaction. His theories are anchored within a

processual, biological panpsychism<sup>6</sup> which engages the encounter with the world and in so doing changed the relation between the objective and subjective register of the knower-known relation. Thus, Bergson not only presents a new theory of perception, he lays the foundation for a deeper enquiry into the nature of the subject-object relation as heterogeneous and the understanding of what constitutes experience as imagistic process.

In order to be able to posit process as imagistic interactivity based on the cinematic thought of Bergson and Deleuze, we need to define the interactive image. In spite of the super-abundance of imagistic offerings, we have still have difficulty grasping what an interactive image is and how to differentiate it from other image types. As conceived by Bergson and elaborated by Deleuze, in terms of their most elemental nature, images can be thought of as beings of light which “act and react upon one another in all their elementary parts according to constant laws which I call laws of nature” (BERGSON, 1988, p. 1). Thus, an image is anything and everything that acts and reacts on all its faces and through all its parts. It is an existence placed halfway between the “thing” and the mental image or “representation”, where the body is an image among many that interposes itself between the excitations that it receives from without and the movements which it is about to execute (BERGSON, 1988). The body (which includes the brain) becomes the common ground between the perception of stimulus and the resultant action—thus, Bergson can write that he *perceives* “afferent nerves which transmit a disturbance to the nerve centres, then efferent nerves which start from the centre, conduct the disturbance to the periphery, and set in motion parts of the body or the body as a whole” (BERGSON, 1988, p. 18). “...The complete process of perception and of reaction can then hardly be distinguished from a mechanical impulsion followed by a necessary movement” (BERGSON, 1988, p. 32). This reflective dynamic of action and reaction is made up of stimulus, the indeterminate interposition of the brain, and the reaction constitutes the concept of the image and serves as the foundation for an imagistic processual ideation of life. In contradistinction, inorganic entities forego the indeterminacy which separates the action and reaction, and their interaction is immediate and automatic. But critical to this ideation is that the perceived image is not reproduced in the brain as consciousness but exists as a projection where it

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<sup>6</sup> Panpsychism, the theory that all matter, or all nature, is itself psychological, or has a psychological aspect; that atoms and molecules, as well as plants and animals, have a rudimentary life of sensation, feeling, and impulse which bears the same relation to their movements. *Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy* (1901). II. 256/1

appears to be — outside our body — so that every perception is produced where it occurs (BERGSON, 1988). Thus, Bergsonian imagistic process associates the perceptual encounter not only as an interactive dynamic but as what is traditionally referred to as the inside of consciousness and the outside of experience to simultaneously emerge as a singular becoming.

Bergson (1988) conceived the interactive image as cinematic both in the sense of kinetic movement but also in the sense of filmic as operative in the cinematograph. The idea was taken up and elaborated by Deleuze but in a different direction than the one originally proposed by Bergson. The cinematograph as a model of becoming is a conceptual device which allows the distinction to be made between difference in kind and difference from itself within pure process — between *differentiation* and *differenciation*.<sup>7</sup> By virtue of its placement, its presential location and privileged position, the cinematograph transforms the chaotic undifferentiated welter of spacetime as pure process into discernible images of change. The ‘cinematograph of becoming’ intervenes within pure, yet-undifferentiated, pre-individual process by introducing a transversal cut which on one side provokes the appearance of the production of continuous difference in kind and, on the other, mobile sections or slices of framed, sequential, equally-spaced photograms. The two aspects of the image as beings of light are integrated in the same way that light can be described as wave-like and particular at the same time. And so when applied to the *universal becoming of spacetime*, Bergson calls this transversal cut the Plane of Matter as an aggregate of images (BERGSON, 1896) and which Deleuze calls the Plane of Immanence (DELEUZE, 1970).

Much of the conceptual development in the elaboration of this project is banked on the question of categorisation not only in terms of taxonomy but through an alternative reading of what categorisation is and how it functions. The categories theorise the necessary conditions for experience (without which there would be no experience), and at the same time they express how we can articulate conceptually what is. Images reveal experience to us while at the same time they articulate that very same experience. Thus, a typology of imagistic process is not only necessary to understand reality, but it also spells out how reality

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<sup>7</sup> We call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea *differentiation*; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts *differenciation*. It is always in relation to a differentiated problem or to the differentiated conditions of a problem that a differenciation of species and parts is carried out, as though it corresponded to the cases of solution of the problem. DELEUZE, 1994, p. 207.

comes to be by way of images. Deleuze's imagistic materialism might be based on Bergson but he also elaborates a good part of his typology of cinema images on categories based on American philosopher Charles S. Peirce's (1839-1914) Theory of Signs.<sup>8</sup>

As affective material, they dovetail cleanly with Deleuze's perceptual semiotics. For Peirce, the sign "is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 99). Peirce's signs are a triadic construct whose components<sup>9</sup> are bound together, integrated concretely, into an indecomposable or indissoluble unit. As such, Peirce's thought on signs is highly pertinent because they allow us to predicate conceptual bodies as a triadic build, they give us insight into the functioning of affect as creative of concepts and they aid us articulate Deleuze's cinematic images. This constitutes the gist of a more elaborate understanding of what images conceived as action and reaction can be but also how the transformation of static sections into movement constitutes a cinematographic apparatus that temporalises perceptual experience.

Deleuze elaborates a taxonomy of imagistic process based on these two aspects of imagistic becoming in his two volumes of *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1983, trans. 1986) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985, trans. 1989). Deleuze's image classification runs throughout our work and is not given a detailed individualised treatment as we are not so much interested in the varieties of images as we are in the procession of advancement that takes place in perception. If Bergson's cinematograph is a representation of perception, Deleuze will use that as foundation upon which to predicate the cinema as a representation of philosophy. Deleuze's problem in the cinema books consists in composing a philosophy of perceptual experience based on Bergson's theory of the image and theory of the cinematograph. The cinematographic of Deleuze's cinema books, as opposed to the cinema, is a perceptual semiotics, perhaps a more specific and technical exposé than *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980, trans. 1987) but nevertheless mining and smelting the same ore. Many of the same problems discussed in *ATP* are reprised in *Cinema 1* and *2* and some of the problems that arise in these two volumes are dealt with in *What is philosophy?* (1991, trans. 1994) — for if Deleuze's cinema books present a philosophical program based on the image,

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<sup>8</sup> We are reluctant to provide dates for the creation of these ideas as they undergo continuous development under various guises throughout Peirce's career. In *The Philosophical Writings of Peirce* (1955), Justus Buchler offers topics as edited selections presented according to their historical elaboration.

<sup>9</sup> Peirce's signs are made up of a representamen, an interpretant and ground.

the philosophy behind the imagistic scheme itself must at some point also be articulated. Thus, Deleuze bases his image taxonomy around four commentaries on Bergson's theses on movement, and in the cinema books, he goes beyond the technical and moves into the ontological, the epistemological and the metaphysical implications of the technical apparatus. If "everything is vision, becoming" (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1994, p. 169), then the taxonomy of images is a catalogue of modes of becoming as imagistic process, which as a triadic semiotic process is constitutive of bodies as cartographies of triangulated planes of composition, reticulated recollection images.

The body as infinite folds to infinity articulates the modification between the action and the reaction, between the efferent stimulus and the afferent gesture. The jointed interaction of the fold is governed by the laws of nature which can be expressed through projective geometry to reveal how perceptual process can in turn become a continuity which undoes the binary split between the knower and the known as well as establish the extensive continuity between the external and the internal as predicated by Bergson in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* (1896, trans. 1912). We do this by way of a historical deployment of the optical perspective models of the Renaissance of Brunelleschi, Alberti and Viator, Johannes Kepler's explorations of continuity through the generalised understanding of conics and perspective, as well as the implications of French mathematician Gerard Desargue's projective geometry and a final resolution through topology as a development of the Möebius strip into a Klein bottle. This extensive continuity taken from a privileged point of view is a monadic conception which can also be understood as Deleuze and Guattari's Plane of Consistency (1983, 1987, 1994). What is usually seen as the principal significance of perspectival depictions is the rendering relative of objects within the visual field as an extensioned system of relations which concur with the pictorial geometric relativity of our visual system. However, as important as this is, perspective as relational is overshadowed by further development of the ideas of the projective in terms of a time-based, emergent, unfolding which produces an infinite, continuous, surface as a plane of becoming.

In contrast to Bergson's model of the image, French philosopher of technology and psychologist Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) predicated a theory of the image founded on imagination as a faculty. His conception allows us to not only to gain insight into the processes of the intra-perceptive image, but provides a cyclical four-phased conception of the image which can be construed as an informational or energetic model which synthesises

the co-existence of imagistic processes into an operational assemblage which he calls an associated milieu. The associated milieu, whether in terms of a molar or molecular regime, brings together the human and non-human, the natural and the artificial, and the material and the organic, into a functional durational multiplicity which expresses a subjective completeness that is closed yet open. We seek to consider the experiential milieu itself as the conditioning environment for the subjective entity and locate it at the junction of the site of activity, where the material and non-material elements, the human and the non-human which constitutes the becoming, where the virtual and the actual coincide and become pure experience.

We can thereby qualify these associated milieus as the spacetime of Becoming-Child, as extensions of potential, of territorializations by means other than the occupation or inhabitation of volumetric space. They are conceived as extensive expanses, but these are usually only background for the mental occupation of thought, the benevolence of emotional or affective intensities, of expansive narratives of fabulation, of mystical temporalities of contemplation, or symphonic creative attunements, of empathic communication, of the common space of the excluded middle of educational complicity. These assemblages are infinitely dimensioned—they are fractal—in their composition, but they are conveniently termed planes because they present topologically as a selection, as a surface-that-gathers according to a particular quality, as specific change, as the class of becoming of a particular state of imagistic process—the selection is bounded but infinite in extent in that its being is asymptotic to its becoming.

Becoming-child thus produces machinic assemblages of bodies, of forces, of language, of actions and gestures, of materialities and virtualities which compose the interlocked meshings of the associated milieus of becoming-childhood. The qualities, substances, powers and events which constitute these milieus and produce a patchwork, a field, a common ground of experiential exposition, a temporal rhizome from which emerges the creation of a territory and the bodies which together temporalise the becoming of that territory. And these territories manifest themselves not only in terms of space but in terms of language, clothing, games, music, dance, leisure and rest, levels of intensity, of sexual expression, of artistic freedom, modes of communication, of temporalisation, of racial profiling, of social interaction which codify and channel, which begin the habituation of

restrictions, limitations and closing produced by disciplinary and institutional confinement and the imposition of close-quarter socialization.

By remapping the experiential milieu as durational and associated, participants become one with the event-world within which they are enveloped. The participants themselves, being of a heterogeneous nature—material and non-material, human and non-human, actual and potential—can be construed as process and assemblages of processes and their interaction as imagistic interaction. What is required here is both an understanding of the perceptual causal chain per se within the animate organic and the inanimate non-organic and an explanation of how aggregates of images can be construed as material expressed processually. We call on Bergson and Deleuze to theorise the image as interactive, durational and processual, and appeal to Simondon to explicate its phasings and the formation of the associated milieu.

### **Breakdown by Chapter**

Our thesis, *Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process*, is broken down into four chapters. The first chapter indicates how the thesis informs the author's own becoming-doctor and how symptomatology and intuition as methodological strategies advance clinical and critical practices which not only define the endeavour of the thesis but also mark my own path as a becoming-doctor. The initial chapter describes how the thesis loosely subscribes to a logic that illustrates Spinoza's Three Types of Knowledge (Chapter 2: Observational, Chapter 3: Rational, Chapter 4: Common) as an intuitive progression where each chapter uses the method of intuition—problematizing, differentiating and temporalizing—as posited by Bergson and elaborated by Deleuze. The epistemological movement of the thesis—both in the parts and in the whole—look to converge at the end of the thesis into Common Notions of generating difference and time.

After presenting the motivations of the thesis as a becoming-doctor and how it is structured methodologically and epistemologically, we began, in chapter two, the specific theme of this thesis "Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process".

The second chapter presents an overview of the concept of childhood as it is currently understood in the social sciences and how we look to transform the concept from a static conception to a processual becoming. We begin by defining what childhood and

being a child means in terms of developmental psychology, as a sociological construct, and as a transdisciplinary model all the while moving towards expressing it as process. This chapter is the conceptual contrast between the traditional static conception of the child and childhood and the becoming-child as a descriptive conceptualization of the child as becoming. We posit that there is no clear understanding of the processual becoming-child and we formulate the need for a more adequate understanding through imagistic thought. As such, the expression of childhood as an interactive processual becoming requires that we consider process in its molar and molecular manifestation — these are not necessarily evocative of relative size, as in macro and micro, but descriptive of the level or scalar mode of relational interaction under consideration.

We will be predicating both through an imagistic perceptual model as postulated by Bergson and so in Chapter 3 we examine imagistic process in detail. In this chapter, which constitutes the bulk of our research, we move from a general, traditionalist, common sense definition of the image usually understood as pictorial, and its five categories as postulated by Mitchell (1986), to complexify what the image can be in terms of the dynamics of vision as revealed by Russian experimental psychologist Alfred L. Yarbus's eye movement experiments. We contrast his findings with Bergson's concept of the image as the basis for a semiotic process that integrates Bergson, Peirce, and Deleuze and problematises the processual advancement of becoming. And we place the becoming-child within this nexus of understanding as imagistic movement.

Bergson's model of perception is a processual conception based on a baffling definition of the image. In its simplest expression, the image is a triadic assemblage which comprises a stimulus, an interval of indeterminacy, and a response. It is an unconventional and unintuitive definition in that he defines the image not as a pictorial depiction—a picture—but as an existence, or more correctly, as a becoming, which is simultaneously experiential, embodied, and projected and which finds expression in the gap between a "thing" and its "representation" (its mental image) and corresponds directly to the object. For Bergson, an image is anything and everything that acts and reacts on all its faces and through all its parts as a perpetual, universal vibratory variation exemplified and illustrated through energy and light. Matter is no longer a physical, permanent and static entity but a material aggregate of images as Bergson conceives it. Bodies are no longer physical but abstract selections of energies understood as a 'massification' of forces, of substanceless



reciprocity of action and reaction, of processual give and take where there is no physical substance, only the systematic assemblage of energies as processual interaction in order to propose Simondon's associated milieu as the mode and location of the becoming.

The fourth chapter presents the intuitive "reward" of what a becoming-child can be in terms of common notions, in terms of time, and potential and conclusions about what becoming-child means as an epistemological construct. Thus, we present the concept of becoming-child in general terms and elaborate the concept in itself as a distinguishable process of imagistic advance. This chapter articulates the molecular of becoming-child to express becoming in terms of pure process—process as ceaseless dynamism where bodies are no longer material entities but selections of qualities, assemblages of functions, sets of forces, aggregations of associated purposes. Its location becomes Deleuze's plane of composition where immanence's emergence becomes the local site of becoming. As a common notion of what Becoming-Child is we indicate instances where we recognise its operability in various academic activities and offer an alternative reading of the Oedipus myth.

## Chapter 1

### Becoming-Doctor

In recent years, as a result of getting older, I have had to deal increasingly with physicians, with medical doctors, and seeing how I have been pursuing a doctorate for some time now I came to ask myself why they were called Doctors when many of them don't have a doctorate proper. In pursuing these ideas, I do not wish to detract from the prolonged, intense and difficult path of study of medicine or from the quality of their professional organisation and administration, the ethical enforcement, their professed calling and the practical vocation which incorporates a truly exemplary professional body. I wanted to understand the difference between the professional title of Doctor of Medicine and what is traditionally considered an academic doctorate, a Doctor of Philosophy or PhD. The M.D. degree (from the Latin *Medicinae Doctor*) represents the conclusion of a protracted path of study towards the acquisition of a high degree of proficiency in the arts of healing bodies, but Medical Doctors are not called upon to present nor defend a thesis and are awarded their degree after a lengthy residency—still, a period of lengthy study does not necessarily grant one the doctoral degree.

From a purely academic point of view, whether in the hard sciences or the humanities, a doctorate is usually only awarded upon completion and successful defence of a thesis presented before a board of examiners after a period of intense learning. And like the physicians with their professional organisation or college, these Doctors of Philosophy which profess or claim to have an exalted knowledge in some art or science also usually affirm allegiance to some scholarly corporation, a college of peers or body of thought to which they subscribe. This society of scholars incorporated for the purposes of research, study and instruction constitutes the faculty which, by virtue of being composed of Doctors, theoretically ought to be capable of healing itself, of doctoring themselves back to the “great health” as Nietzsche might say. I am invoking the proverb “Physician, heal thyself”, which comes to us from the Greek *Iatre, therapeuson seauton* in use since the time of Aeschylus (c. 525-456 BC), translated into Latin as *Medice, cura te ipsum*, which was reportedly used by Jesus Christ himself as recounted in the New Testament in Luke 4:23, and more recently

recycled through Foucault's concept of *Souci de soi*, of care of the self, by way of the relational embodiment of subjectivity and truth.

The term doctor, from Medieval Latin *doctor* and derived from *docere*, to teach, was first and foremost a term used for an eminently educated individual, a *doctor* whose academic and practical attainments entitled him to express an authoritative opinion, to profess knowledge as a teacher or tutor. The denomination of *doctor*, which is now used predominantly to describe a member of the medical profession, a medical practitioner or physician, goes back to the Medieval universities and their division of knowledge as bodies of expertise and learning as the liberal professions of Theology, Law and Medicine. In contrast, *medicina* is etymologically derived from *med-* the Proto-Indo-European root meaning to "take appropriate measures". It builds on the Sanskrit *midur*, I judge, estimate; the Greek μέδομαι *mēdomai*, to be mindful of, *medesthai*, to think about; *medein*, to rule; *medon*, a ruler; the Latin *meditari*, think or reflect on, consider; *modus*, measure, quantity, or extent; *mederi*, to heal, give medical attention to, cure.<sup>10</sup> So that we have an evolutive etymological foundation which means to judge, to ponder, to consider, to rule and to heal. In her comprehensive study of the etymology of Medicine, Charen indicates that in tracing the historical unfolding of the etymology of "the ancient Indo-European root MA and MAD and its more familiar hypothetical form MED, meaning to think or to reflect, to give consideration or care to" one can appreciate the crystallisation of the iatrical function from thinking and judging, to considered rationalisation, and to clinical interest and concern (Charen, 1951). However, she disclaims the interpretation of *medicus* as "mediator" or "intermediary" as derived from *medius*, but we feel that there is quite a bit of the *medius* in the *medicus* as we will show below. Taking some poetic license, one could also say the Latin *medice* is simply *me-dice* or you-tell-me.

We can feel these various ideas gravitating around the notion of the body relative to *doctor*, but a couple in particular more intensely: one, whose meaning tended in the direction of an individual who clinically tends to bodies in the widest sense of the term, or, two, an individual who could lay claim to a proficiency in a branch of learning and was sufficiently learned to function as a pedagogue or tutor. Both sides articulate what Whitehead calls concern, an attunement with the caring and tending of the attention, the

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<sup>10</sup> [https://www.etymonline.com/word/\\*med-#etymonline\\_v\\_52693](https://www.etymonline.com/word/*med-#etymonline_v_52693)

inclination or leaning as the predisposition of interest and curiosity. The presupposition here is always the fulfillment of the Hippocratic oath, towards the ethical care of the body as the clinical entity and as such, one is oriented towards the arts of healing and setting right of bodies whereas the other indicates the guiding or training, the tutoring of the ‘unfolding’ of bodies by a custodian or ward: two aspects of medicine, two ways of maintaining health, two aspects of dealing with bodies—the curative/restorative or therapeutic of the *medicus* or *iatre* and the pedagogically preventative of the *docente*. This medical concern for the patient body demonstrated by the inclination over that which requires attention as doctors and the modalities this interest can adopt is what the doctor finds of interest, what attracts them and affects them, and which in fact defines the vocation.

This double aspect of exercising the practice of being a medical doctor, the therapeutic and the pedagogically preventative, are necessary for the maintenance of health: a physician can restore a body to health but the patient must also follow the instructions of the doctor in order to learn to maintain well-being. Health is “not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” but an-going durational pursuit “of complete physical, mental and social well-being” (W.H.O., 2006, p. 1). Health is not and cannot be a unchanging proposition; it must be dynamic for if it is rendered as a changeless and invariable position it is only a relative supposition to norms set by others. Together, the curative/therapeutic and the preventative are the movement of operational coherence and functional unity as durational processual advance that enable the expression of health as that which sustains the life of a body. Daniel Smith in the introduction to Deleuze’s *Essays: Critical and Clinical* (1993) asserts that *health*, in both its ontological and ethical aspects, is the question which links literature and life—the critical and the clinical—through its “vitality”, its “tenor” of Life (DELEUZE, 1997). And it is this vitality, this Life Force which Bergson identifies as *élan vital*, which wends itself through bodies which seeks to animate our discussion.

If the medical doctor is defined by its professional practices and body of knowledge, then the activities it performs, namely, symptomatology, therapy, etiology and prevention constitute its essence. Symptomatology is the entry point which allows every other aspect to take form in that it is through the determination of the ailment that the doctor formulates the course of action as a therapy. Thus, the *διάγνωσις* (*diagnosis*)—from the Greek term signifying the activity of distinguishing or discerning, as well as resolving, deciding and evaluating, particularly in a medical setting (LIDDELL & SCOTT, 1883)—consists in the

determination of illness by virtue of close observation, identification and studied interpretation of a patient's symptoms. Ascertaining the condition of the patient, interpreting the symptoms, and determining the true nature of the disease is thus of primary importance to a medical professional. The modern physician has a variety of means at his disposal to identify and expose disease, including highly sophisticated technological and scientific tools, but what is of interest to us here is the most preliminary or exploratory encounter when the physician confronts the patient for the first time. It is at this point that the medical doctor exercises the art of diagnosis at its most rudimentary and immediate. The task is to map out the correspondence between what the patient is letting him know of his disorder, verbally and non-verbally, and the doctor's own medical body of knowledge. To do this the doctor relies on the Symptomatology Method, the Method of Intuition and a processual understanding of things in the world.

### **Clinical and Critical: The Symptomatology Method**

"Critical and Clinical" are labels used by Deleuze in *Coldness and Cruelty* (1967) to refer to opposed approaches or modes of comprehension. It is an early work of Deleuze's which predates *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and so in hindsight it can be read as annunciative of a body of work to come—as such we can already identify this work as "mythic" for reasons we shall outline below. As he points out, "Medicine distinguishes between syndromes and symptoms, a symptom being the specific sign of an illness, and a syndrome the meeting-place or crossing-point of manifestations issuing from very different origins and arising within variable contexts" (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 13-14). There is nothing overly untoward in these two definitions, except that Deleuze equates the symptom with sign—the symptom is a subjective phenomenon that belongs to the patient, whereas a sign is an objective manifestation that is objectively observable by others, and more specifically objectively perceived by a physician. And although the symptom and the sign are often used interchangeably, there is a difference of intension. In the language of Peirce and his theory of signs, a symptom is recognised objectively as an interpretant-becoming-representamen, as an affect belonging to the patient as a sign not yet appropriated by the physician, in that

it is indeterminate, whereas the sign as representamen is abstractly affective and determinate through its interpretant.<sup>11</sup>

In the case of illness, the patient's body is suffused with disease that has no definite provenance, extent, intent, or cause: the patient is inhabited by a malaise which manifests as an ill-being that diminishes him and reduces his power of acting. It is an invasive and all-encompassing feeling that colours being and has no fixed or determinate correlate as indicative of an adequate cause. The patient, who having a very nebulous image of the inside of his body and even a more unclear understanding of its functioning, has no (or very limited) cogent upstream causal comprehension as to the cause of his diffuse indisposition—any cause can only be ascribed to chance or to 'a bug' for he has no clear picture of its nature. The physician's problem in diagnosis is to translate the stated qualities of these nebulous sensations as symptoms, as the inadequate knowledge of the body by the patient, to a sign in an adequate body of knowledge possessed by the doctor.

The term symptom, as derived from the Greek σύμπτωμα (*symptoma*), is a subjective indication perceptible to the patient, of a change of condition arising from and accompanying a disease or affection (O.E.D.), and thus constituting an indication or evidence of something that has befallen one, a chance, casualty, and sometimes in a bad sense a mishap or mischance (LIDDELL, 1883, p. 1467). Syndrome, derived from the Greek σύνδρομον (*syndromon*) means a running together, a tumultuous concourse of people (of bodies), and specifically in medicine a concurrence of symptoms (LIDDELL, 1883, p. 1481-1482); today, we could perhaps translate it literally as a social event, as a *flash mob* of symptoms. A syndrome is only recognised as such when retroactively identified as a collective concrescence once it has been cognised as a specific territorialisation, as the concept of a pathological cartography. Deleuze points out that illnesses are sometimes named after typical patients even if more often it is the doctor's name which is given to the disease. He writes that "the doctor does not invent the illness, he dissociates symptoms that were previously grouped together, and links up others that were dissociated. In short, he builds up a profoundly original clinical picture" (DELEUZE 1991, p. 15) in that he decomposes the aesthetic portrayal and creates a composite portrait where, as Daniel Smith asserts, the

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<sup>11</sup> The representamen has the interpretant that it deserves given the object that articulates it and the ground that supports them, which ought to make one think of the pithy Deleuzian dictum which serves as a footing to the method of intuition which states that we end up with the solution we deserve to the problem we pose.

doctor does not “invent” the disease, he “isolates” it as a faciality, as the facade of the signifier. It seems only right that the illness, as an unhealthy condition of the body, as a condition that risks annihilating the body, be identified with the patient who most adequately expressed or observed the specific manifestation of his *malaise*, subsequently identified as a disease—something of a memorial in honour of the patient!

However, the symptomatology of the condition as a collection of the patient’s affective subjective facts is almost without value, even if it means everything—it is the pre-individual of the intuitive. The symptoms are a private matter, known absolutely only to the individual who suffers them but who is unable to make them relative or rational in the sense of measured because, usually, there is no adequate common ground between the experience of the patient and the knowledge of the physician that generalises the cause of the symptoms; this is why the symptom is said to be a mishap or a situation that befalls one as a chance occurrence. To say “my back hurts” is different from pinpointing the pain to the 3rd lumbar vertebra and reproducing the acute discomfort by having the patient angle forward and to the left 30 degrees in order to conclude the diagnosis as a partially herniated disc with nerve root compression. The patient’s statement of symptoms are of little useful value, for they are vague, indeterminate, inadequate expressions of an affective condition that colours subjective experience and as such cannot be readily made common or relative to a body of knowledge. The patient’s subjective impressions acquire value when they are translated into objective clinical observations of the body’s disfunction by way of the language of signs whose ground is the medical body. The meaning or significance contained in the patient’s expression of their condition is often so vague, that the physician critically requires all his clinician’s skills to make sense of them—hence the inclination to hear better what the patient is telling the physician towards the information of understanding.

In order to not diminish his aura of professional omniscience, the medical doctor’s initial diagnostic attitude and speculative approach is usually deemed scientific. However, this science is of a different ilk than what we usually now call science. It is a science derived from the Stoic’s theories of perception and from the somewhat illegitimate translation of Ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*) into science (LLOYD, 1974)<sup>12</sup>, a conversion which entrains confusion

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<sup>12</sup> The historical shift in meaning here reflects the change in understanding of Ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*) or Knowledge, *Sapientia* in Latin. As Preus (2015) points out, *epistēmē* is derived from the verb Ἐπίστασθε, *epistasthai*—to stand upon—and which, of course, has important implications in terms of

between a 'soft' perceptual empiricism termed science and a hard systematic science. The doctor's epistemic<sup>13</sup> movement from initial encounter with the patient suffering symptoms as the manifestation of an ailment to a certain and conclusive diagnosis of disease needs to be seen as composed of two parts: first, a rendering of the symptom as an adequate perception as a differentiation, as cognising the distinction between two ideas or two representations, between a representation and an idea, or between nothing and something; and second, the perception needs to be integrated into the system of signs of a body of knowledge.

The encounter is clinical and the diagnosis critical. Deleuze states that "Symptomatology is always a question of art" (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 15) which is another way of saying that the clinical possesses both systematic method and practices and an element of guesswork. Following Bergson (1991), it is a way of describing perception as composed of an adequate component and an indefinite affective component and if one is to derive fact from perception one needs to understand both sides of the divide differently. The clinical is what Peirce would refer to as the observational aspect of science, a science which is more of an attitude towards knowledge-creation, of discernment rather than strict subjection to a philosophy of exact methodicalness. This nomadic scientism of immanent organization to the relations composing it can both be a *coenoscopic* science, a mode of philosophical enquiry that rests on trained observation to identify and discern that which often goes unperceived, or *idioscopic*, a special mode of observation conducted with some technological assistance to the senses, either instrumental or given by training (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 66). This generates its own peculiar problems which stem from exclusively considering the '*scopic*' as a thinking through pictorial images as the specific to perception even if this is ultimately what lends the greatest impulse behind imagistic thought.

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*hypokeimenon* (substrate), if anything because the substratum or under-lying sub-stance or the under-standing is what one stands upon. In one key fragment, Heraclitus states that "Wisdom is one thing: it is to know (*epistasthai*) the thought that steers all things through all things." Haxton translates it as "Wisdom is the oneness of mind that guides and permeates all things." Waterfield (2000) as "The one wise thing is to know, in sound judgement, how everything is guided in every case." What is key for us here is that the *epistēmē* is considered active and imbued with movement and change. Later thinkers such as Plato, predicated knowledge on the Ideas as static and unchanging, and Aristotle on syllogistic deduction as the movement of thought—when translating Aristotle, *epistēmē* now becomes science. Further, elemental Earth, the location of *sema*, and the notions of ground and territory.

<sup>13</sup> The epistemic movement of intensification of perception will be examined in the next chapter.



The encounter as critical is often more akin to literary or artistic criticism than to scientific enquiry—it is based on the aesthetic, as the ancient science which treats of the conditions of sensuous perception as maintained by Kant. It is critical because it is through the constitution of critique as an act of thought and as construction of knowledge that the generic constitution of bodies both as embodiment and as embodying occurs. But why is the integrative aspect of the “critical and clinical” called critical? Because, in pragmatic terms, it must pull things together and interpret affects in order to construe the certainty implicit in the determination of contraction in the movement of thought. And because, in going beyond the concern of inclination in the clinical, it adequately formulates determination in the advance of semiosis, it conjures the answer to the question “what to do next?” or “what happens next?”<sup>14</sup> It is a Cartesian move, for if we follow Descartes’s determination of certitude through the positing of doubt, then that certitude of thought which is constitutive of being is also affirmation of semiotic procession, it is testament of affective flow made adequate as constitutive of bodies.

A patient’s statement of what ails is the most important and at the same time the least important. What is most important in what ensues in the event is the affirmation that what the patient is evincing is a symptom, a passive affection of the body; without the faltering enunciation of disjointed words and diffuse gestures, knowledge, adequate or inadequate, of causes cannot be ascertained; and it is the least important in that it is irrelevant to the experiential itself—the words are not the discomfort. The words are a representation twice-removed from the experience: the formulation of the mental image of the experience of the pain introduces one layer of inexactness, and the formulation of the expression as verbal expression introduces another layer of uncertainty in the indetermination. So that the patient’s response to the physician’s “show me where it hurts” as a vague circular motion of the index finger indicating the general area of the abdomen, accompanied by a wrinkling of the face as expression of discomfort, and the statement “my

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<sup>14</sup> Renowned Spanish physiologist and physician Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852-1934) also roots scientific inquiry on criticism. In his *Advice for a Young Investigator* (1999) he writes “Sometimes the inquiry itself is not based on personal observation, but on a feeling rooted in criticism—an a priori dislike for a rather widely held tenet” (RAMON Y CAJAL, 1999, p. 111). The sentiment is much richer and stronger in the original Spanish, *Consejos para jóvenes científicos* (1897), where the dislike is actually repugnance and insatisfaction, “En algún caso, la indagación misma tiene como precedente, no la observación personal, sino un acto de crítica, una repugnancia sentida *a priori* por nuestro espíritu respecto de ciertas doctrinas más o menos generalmente admitidas.”

stomach hurts” are of limited use to the clinician even if they mean the world. This is not to infantilise the very real experience of a person’s pain, but of the difficulties of foregrounding ‘something’, of differentiating affect, by saying what it is. In fact, that is where both the mind of the patient and that of the doctor converge. As the physician palpates the abdomen and the patient winces in pain, the same preoccupation comes to mind in both and simultaneously expressed: “What is it?—I was hoping you could tell me what it is...”. The patient is seldom in a position to describe the ineffable mysteries of the ‘what-it-is’ of pain and the physician needs to ascertain the ‘what-it-is’ before pronouncing judgment as credible ideation. To the undefinable, hazy manifestation of pain that is so palpable yet so indefinite of the patient’s experience whose pragmatic response is “Stop!” when the hurtful spot is struck, the physician’s answer can hardly be “After a great pain, a formal feeling comes” or “Your pain is the breaking of the shell that encloses the understanding” even if there is much truth in these poetic pronouncements by American poet Emily Dickinson or Lebanese-born Khalil Gibran.

The physician has no absolute, direct knowledge of what the patient is suffering. He relies on the patient’s diffuse and inexact narrative presentation of a symptomatology, a complex representation, which more than likely produces an inadequate image of the sick body. The physician must then translate that picture of (mal)function, by way of his understanding and knowledge of the human body, as a rationalised image of thought. It is through this rational picture as comparative to the *corpus* of knowledge, that the doctor can determine “the actions and reactions of this body with regard to all the others” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 199). Thus, the physician uses a *méthode raisonnée* to come to a conclusive diagnosis, which is not only logical in its *démarche*, but reasoned through rationality, reasoned through the *ratio* of contrast and comparison: it is the territorialisation of the symptoms as the measured determination of comparison, of numbered number, that makes it rational. The exercise is to perspectivise and relativise them, and subsequently translate them into signs as part of a rational science.

The initial moment of diagnosis is neither a soft or instinctual scientific knowledge nor a hard scientific approach and it is in the first encounter with the patient and his illness that is best described as artistic or literary. Strictly speaking, the physician’s method towards diagnosing disease cannot be called scientific, not out of reticence to adopt a hard scientific method, but because the data being offered by the patient is inadequate—it is non-data

because it is partial and ambiguous: it is the patient's private knowledge which he or she does not know how to make adequate and thereby communicable other than by literary or theatrical means. Before the patient's own impressions can take on the form of quantifiable fact or hard data for the doctor, the examination is conducted as a soft science in order to transform inadequate affect into adequate perception. This occurs through a process of perceptual intensification as the art of diagnosis which is usually characterised as a science even if traditionally it was known as *sapientia*. It is the medical doctor's knowledge of bodies in general which allows him to intensify the acuteness of his observations, to read the condition and render the nebulous expression of symptoms into adequate perceptions. An adequate picture of the symptom or the assemblage of symptoms can eventually take shape thanks to the doctor's proto-scientific approach that an intervention can take on form as a clinical concept of the disease and a positive, active relation can emerge towards increasing the power of action of the ailing body.

Although we have been considering the symptoms as the expressed affects of the body, we need to project our understanding to ancient times and see the symptom as a body itself. In Ancient Greece, it was customary to consider anything that could be given a name, material or ideal, actual or virtual, a body. For one thing, it was a way for the Ionian corporeal monistic philosophers to come to terms with the flow of agency in the world:<sup>15</sup> in their way of thinking, things could not animate themselves, they could not acquire or produce movement of their own accord, and so they need some kind of motive push to make them move. This impulse is imparted from one body to another, so the movement of the universe is due to the occupation of bodies of all types—as both a making and a taking up of space—acting and reacting to each other in mechanical terms. So for example, a stomach ache was understood as an animate external entity wreaking havoc inside the patient body.<sup>16</sup> This mode of expressing thought as a body often attempts to represent the animate body in its human expression, but the body can take on a different configuration than the human as any medieval bestiary can demonstrate or any science fiction depicting alien forms will attest. The human body is but one manifestation of Body-Idea or Form and as doctors, and not necessarily as physicians, we can conceive the idea of body and

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<sup>15</sup> It is worthwhile pointing out that these early philosophers were thinking in terms of agency in terms of flux.

<sup>16</sup> This type of animistic understanding of agency is alive and well today as evidenced by pharmaceutical advertising which illustrate heartburn as a devil in the hell-pit of the stomach.

embodiment in non-human terms, in order to de-anthropomorphise the work of thought. Yet, in carrying out this task, what conception of the body are we bringing to life? How are these bodies being constituted? What dynamic of existence, of becoming, of life is being activated? So when Spinoza asks “What can a body do?” the first answer we ought to give is a question: “What body are you speaking of?” But, if in fact everything that can be named is a body, then we need to understand how these bodies act and react with one another. We need to understand all things, material and ideal, as constituted by, and constitutive of bodies interacting without cease; an alternating reciprocal consecution of active and passive retribution, not as the activity of two different processes, but a singular positive or negative intensification of durational qualities. This is an endless intercourse characterised by the attraction and repulsion of bodies as the movement of interaction as either producing harmony or disharmony. The dynamic here can be referred to as Spinozist where the affective is a manifestation of harmony as constitutive or destructive of bodies in terms of joyful affects which augment and intensify bodies or as sad affects which diminish and attenuate them. But they can also be seen as signs in the manner described by Peirce where agency a corporeal substance can be equated to semiotic flow and the territorialising function of signs as fields of semiosis.

The flow of affect through the “methodic” path<sup>17</sup> or art of diagnosis follows the process by which an inadequate impression is projected onto the patient body, where it happens. Initially, the symptom already exhibits the components of a sign—it stands for something to someone, as Peirce would assert—but expressed inadequately: there is both a imprecise meaning associated with the symptom and to its indefinite physical manifestation. Thus, the symptom is not a determinate fully-fleshed perception but an inadequate, and diffuse unincorporated affect, literally. But if, in fact, clinical diagnosis is an art, then the practicante must be an artist, whose task, as Deleuze asserts, is to produce percepts, just like the task of the philosopher is to create concepts and the scientist to produce functions. The physician as doctor must take the patient’s expression of affect and translate it into an objective adequate perception constitutive of a factual finding as a determinate sign of the disease, as a stand-in for a specific aspect of the disease. The exchange happens as a

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<sup>17</sup> The methodic here refers to the Greek translation of Method as the perambulation of the method of memory which allows for the systematic reconstitution of knowledge through the discursive unfolding of territory as the narrative of memorial revelation. Method: from *meta*- "after" and *hodos* "a traveling, way" constitutes the organization of knowledge REBOLLEDO (2013).

projective superposition or mirroring of the patient's body as a diffuse body-image onto the doctor's ultra-defined body of scientific knowledge, as a comparative rationalisation so that the doctor can transduce the affective symptom into an adequate sign. Spinoza spells out how it happens in *Ethics* VP1, "In just the same way as thoughts and ideas of things are ordered and connected in the Mind, so the affections of the body, or images of things are ordered and connected in the body" (SPINOZA, 1994). And so in this fold of projective mirroring, which maps out the inadequate body-image of the patient onto the scientific body-model of the physician, the affective symptoms of the patient become rational through the sign.<sup>18</sup> But if the doctor would not be helping the patient, this would be sacrilege! Is he not doing what D&G urge us not to do in *Anti Oedipus*? He is taking the body without organs of the patient's affective articulation of malaise and disciplines that affect by projecting it onto a body of knowledge, importing it into the realm of production and extracting qualitative difference as a persecution of the desiring-machine of illness (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1983, p. 9). The determination of the illness is not a creative endeavour in the sense that the physician wants to arrive at a determination of the symptoms as quickly as possible and not embark on a speculative nomadism of conjectural creativity.

The determination of the sign by aligning the symptom with the causal flow systemic to the body's processes has pragmatic consequences. To do this provides "a perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object" so that we may state "what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve" (JAMES, 1943, p. 43). This turns the physician "towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power" (JAMES, 1943, p. 45)—a very Spinozist endeavour indeed! So that by rendering the affective symptom into an adequate perception recognised within a field of signs, the body of the disease becomes defined and transformed into an adequate actant which empowers the physician and capacitates his power to act. Transforming the affective symptom into a sign harmonises the nebulous symptomology with a body of knowledge thus heightening its power to act and be acted upon, and this knowledge as an enhanced potency or resonance allows the physician to act positively with the body and make it more joyful. The physician

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<sup>18</sup> In the language of Peirce, the doctor must arrange the signaletic mediation between the patient's statement as representamen, and an imprecise and hypothetical interpretant as Third, even as "a degenerate Secondness merely" (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 100) for the understanding of the patient of his own body is often marginal at best and wholly inadequate as an Object with which to articulate the triadic fix.

*de facto* functions as the perceptual faculty of the patient's body, for whatever affective impression is being inadequately conveyed by the patient must be transformed into adequate perception by the physician's observational craftiness and scientific artistry.

The task of the doctor consists of effectuating a transformation in the patient body and its unfavourable disposition from a passive attitude of suffering symptoms to the active body and a favourable bodily disposition whose power of action is increased as a will to power, as willful activity in the world. The clinical task of the physician is thus to transform the passive affection of the symptom into the active power of the sign, and the activity of the doctor is to mediate the transformation of the patient's passive attitude to disease as something that befalls the body into a subjective active willful care of the self—the role of the doctor is thus to moderate the processual of the encounter from the clinical into the critical and to guide the concordance of the empirical and the theoretical. It is tantamount to guiding the unformed impression from the inexact and indeterminate affect to the adequate perception and then translating that into a sign integrated into a body of knowledge which allows certain action, which endows it with a certain pragmatism. In fact, the translation is a reconciliation of the two halves of ascertaining knowledge—the empirical and the rational—which is also the meshing of the material and the ideal, the harmonising of the 'two sciences' and the establishing of *détente* as the relaxation of the tension between the two opposites and their reconciliation.

But a determination is not given in the instant. No matter how short the diagnosis takes, the doctor analytically hunts for the disease in the same way that a servo-mechanism hunts for its setting with feedback loops which monitor its self-regulation. Arriving at a determination is a machinic recursive feedback loop where the physician serves as controller of a cyclical analytical process of determination between between the observation and the theoretical or ideal predication, iteratively juxtaposing tentative comparisons of the two until a concordance is established, until an exhaustive conclusion is reached which is ascertained both by deductive observation and by theoretical induction. And the path the doctor must take is methodical in that the determination and resolution of the problematic situation is based on intuition as the method of intuition itself.

## The Method of Intuition<sup>19</sup>

In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze claims that intuition as a method is one of the most fully developed methods in philosophy (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 13). Yet, many still see intuition as an irrational, mysterious faculty. Mario Bunge, the Argentinian/Canadian philosopher of science, goes so far as to write in his book *Intuition et raison* (2001) that, in contrast to mathematical and scientific intuition, philosophical intuition winds up becoming a philosophy concocted by perverts for the irrational. There's obviously a wide gap between the two camps and we seek to reconcile and align various understandings of intuition under Bergson's ideation and Deleuze's expression of intuition as method. It is significant to note where and how intuition happens as depending on its siting, it signifies differently.

The first meaning that comes to mind when discussing intuition is the spontaneous understanding of a situation or problem as a hunch or gut feeling—an innate intelligence or instinct that unconsciously and directly produces insights. From the standpoint of common sense, intuition is seen as the immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of reasoning and where “an intuition” is the particular result of such apprehension as an occurrence of mind. Thus, intuition is commonly understood as knowledge acquired directly, immediately, self-referentially, non-conceptually, without the intercession of the intellect, unmediated by academic or scientific methodologies, or formal, disciplined, logical discourse. If intuition as an epistemic method that somehow directly articulates sensory perception, then knowledge thus acquired is often deemed to have no lasting value or academic validity—if anything, because the immediacy of unmediated intuitions is a direct derivation from subjective inner experience impossible to discipline. Even if the spontaneous insights of intuition bypass traditional methods of knowledge production deemed systematic, intuition's direct access to the production of understanding constitutes a method.

For us, the term method means both a special procedure for attaining a result but also the reason a process acquires as a mode of thought, the *reasoning* in its advance. The procession of advance is *the* method, where method—from the Greek μεταχδος

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<sup>19</sup> This section draws extensively from a paper presented at the Dark Precursor Conference in Ghent, 2015 which was subsequently expanded to “A Philosophical Perspective on Intuition as a Method within Artistic Process”, a paper which appeared in *Studies in Visual Arts and Communication – an international journal*. (ISSN 2393 – 1221. Volume 5 – Nr 1, 2018).

(metahodos), *meta-* "after" and *-hodos* "a traveling, way"—constitutes knowledge as simultaneously spatially unfolded and performatively revealed. The transition within advance is the mode or modification which the causal agency and logical impulsion of method bring to bear. As such, the method does not exist a priori to the process of creation, since it is constituted in the process itself and is only apprehended as a difference discerned *a posteriori*.

Bergson mainly presents his ideas on intuition in his books *Creative Evolution* (*L'Évolution créatrice*, 1907, trans. 1944) and *A Study in Metaphysics: The Creative Mind* (*La Pensée et le mouvant*, 1934, trans. 1970). For him, intuition is the direct vision of the mind by the mind; it "signifies first of all consciousness, but immediate consciousness, a vision which is scarcely distinguishable from the object seen, a knowledge which is in contact and even coincidence" (BERGSON, 1970, p. 32). But the consciousness is not a consciousness as awareness of the instant, but of identifying the manifestation of the inflection in the automatic deviation of the stimulus into a response as consciousness—this is at the core of Bergson's and Deleuze's anti-phenomenalism as participative heterogeneity: not a conscience of something but an immanent becoming experiential as advance into novelty. The intuition thus defined as method has different pragmatic implications depending on its functional application. If the method is used by a doctor to determine a diagnosis, he will proceed according to a certain procedure which will lead to the ascertainment of a known disease or to the proposition of a new disease as a result of the method's propositioning of novelty through the assemblage of difference as a new syndrome. In its most general expression, the advance of intuition can be generalised into what Deleuze calls the Method of Dramatization (1967) emphasises the production of difference as constitutive of novelty in the advance. It is dramatic in that it identifies the inevitability and surprise from Greek tragedy as the character of intuition of processual advance in the commitment of procession as differentiation, as the production of difference in kind, which as such expresses the passage of time as feeling.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Here, we use the term feeling as defined by Whitehead in *Process and Reality* (1929, 1978) as "the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question" (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 40).



In the grasping of the difference between ‘a this’ and ‘a that’, we discern the functioning of the *démarche*<sup>21</sup> of intuition which is guided by an unknowable operative logic that inflects the reconciliation of the ideal and the material as the *clinamen* towards a specific actual doing: “from this centre of force, which is moreover inaccessible, there springs the impulse which gives the impetus, that is to say the intuition itself” (BERGSON, 1970, p. 120). This distinction between the *démarche* of intuition and a systematic method is significant because in the former, we have a doing as a ‘*manière d’agir à sa façon*’—one’s own way of acting as subjectivity—versus a prescribed way of doing as compliance to a predetermined protocol in the latter. Further, *démarche* in its secondary meaning, as ‘*commencer à marcher*’, as a starting to walk, also ties in to the classical depiction of the classical methods of the art of memory as a walked path, as a making way (YATES, 1966). So the insight of intuition is the direct vision of the mind by the mind in the perceptual cognition of its functioning as the incipency of memory which through repetition becomes the memory of the way to doing something as its cognition: a method.

What is philosophical in this way of proceeding forward, of becoming as a method? Deleuze is categorical in stating that “intuition is neither a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but a fully developed method [...] constituting that which Bergson calls “precision” in philosophy” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 13). Thus, following the ideas of Bergson and Deleuze, the philosophical method of intuition consists in the advance of knowledge as a creative evolution. It is a mode of thought which is impelled by what came before towards a future which draws us towards it in terms of an inescapable progression actualised in the present—but not any present whatever, but in a ‘now’ that is inevitable yet often surprising. And this inevitability is decisive, free of doubt, certain, undeniable, completive yet open.

The method, in all its determinateness, is indeterminate—the cause of the movement is not determinable even if the outcome is inevitable and definite. The multiplicity which constitutes becoming is so complex and has so many degrees of freedom, that to establish a causality can be likened to a chancy probabilistic determination. It is interesting to note that the Greek πρόβλημα [*problema*]<sup>21</sup>—literally, a thing thrown or put forward—encompasses the conceptual constellation of things that are

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<sup>21</sup> (<http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/démarche>) We use the French term *démarche* because we cannot find an equivalent English term that conveys the double meaning required.

cast or thrown and includes dice, nets and fishing lines punctuated by lures. And perhaps the purest of problems, as Brazilian philosopher Peter Pal Pelbart posits, lies in casting one's net where there are no fish in order for them to appear (Pelbart, 2015). How does one channel the indeterminate into methodological certitude or the indeterminable into a methodical pursuit?

In *Bergsonism* (1991), Deleuze reformulates the method of intuition as gleaned from Bergson. In the chapter entitled 'Intuition as Method', Deleuze lays out the method in terms of "three distinct sorts of acts that in turn determine the rules of the method" (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 14). The way he does this is by a progressive application of discursive carving away or reduction of possibilities to determine what is ultimately operative as a guiding principle. Deleuze determines what is ultimately productive in intuition by following the same 'intuitive' method which Bergson himself uses to analyse what is essentially operative in the four theses which emerge from Berkeley's thought on intuition:<sup>22</sup> Deleuze, like Bergson before him, uses the method he is prescribing to do what he is prescribing as a self-referencing use of the method.

The three rules of the method stipulated by Deleuze consist of adequate problematisation, differentiating, and temporalizing.<sup>23</sup> This involves, a critique of false problems and the invention of genuine ones; narrowing and convergence; and thinking in terms of the multiplicity of duration. As such, we are served a panoply of possibilities in the encounter which must be whittled down into a pointed end which indicates and prods us towards an unavoidable adequate contraction. Intuition represents the movement of the realisation of passage to the adequation of the contraction as the completion of the Bergsonian image. This is not a step-by-step protocol towards the correct use of intuition as method but an offering of strategies or possible approaches towards the positing of a precise and unambiguous problem through the almost formulation of its exacting and fitting solution. Deleuze cites Bergson: "the stating and solving of the problem are here

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<sup>22</sup> Bergson finds in Berkeley four "fundamental theses" which lead to the revelation of truth: "The first is the *idealism*; the second, the *nominalism*; by the third Berkeley affirms *the reality of spirits and their analysis in terms of will*; the last defends his *theism*". ARMSTRONG, A. C. (1914). "Bergson, Berkeley, and Philosophical Intuition". In *Philosophical Review* Volume 23 issue 4 1914 p. 430

<sup>23</sup> Deleuze expands on Bergson's rules by intercalating two more complementary rules to the method. One enhances the first rule, and deals with the statement of problems. The second, deals with the production of the real as differences in kind reconciled as perception-recollection. Deleuze, 1988, p. 17 & 29). We deal with these issues, but independently of the method of intuition.

very close to being equivalent: the truly great problems are set forth only when they are solved” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 16). A quote from Michelangelo about sculpture comes to mind which illustrates the intuitive method as stated in Bergson: “Every block of stone has a statue inside it and it is the task of the sculptor to discover it”—the sculptor chips away at the block of stone to release the statue within; she proceeds intuitively, carving away what the stone is informing her to do never without actually knowing where the process is leading her. Only once the sculptor is done does she know what the statue within the stone is. For our clinician doctor, this means that the correct diagnosis is made when the correct diagnosis is posited: when the observed functioning of the body as object in the world concurs with the movement of thought in the body of knowledge as the functive production of truth.

One needs to distinguish between the process of intuition and its payoff. The intuition is not the outcome—it is the movement of thought that happens in a particular way. *The moment of intuition is in the motive conditions of action as the making time of difference in the time of its making, in the feeling of the transition as inevitable outcome.* Thus, the moment of intuition is the interval between the what comes before and the what comes after, the scansion (DELEUZE, 1977) of the movement’s direct realisation. And it’s the surprising certitude and celerity of passage which produces the affective flash that leaves us breathless or leads us to the pronouncement of the interjection of discovery. Yes, the ‘Aha!’ moment—“the joy of the artist who has realized his thought, the joy of the thinker who has made a discovery or invention” (BERGSON, 1920, p. 30). The joy is Spinozist and cathartic: it is the emotional release which comes from the breaking of the surface tension of the problem as object which does not allow passage, of the dissolution of the complication as solution. The surprise emerges in the unexpectedness of the result as outcome, where the reasoning of the process, the advance of the signifying function as thought, leads to a conclusion that is surprisingly and unexpectedly *clever* as solution.<sup>24</sup> And in the medical diagnosis it happens when all the differences of the contrast with the expected taken as a whole, yield the totally unexpected as a coherent process that explains the only thing that the syndrome is revealing itself to be.

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<sup>24</sup> The term clever is interesting in this context in terms of perception and cognition. As the OED points out, early usage suggests relation to ‘claws, talons, clutches’, in the sense ‘nimble of claws, sharp to seize’, and the 16–17th c. examples show it connected with the use of the hands, as having ‘the brain in the hand’.

The method gets underway with the casting of a speculative positing of a preliminary position-question as a tentative problem seeking solutions. But not just any kind of problem, a proposition which expects a follow-through and finds it in terms of a true problem as movement into novelty. The question seeks to answer the simple question of ‘what now?’ as resolution of the moment of crisis of the ‘What next?’. To know how to answer this question decisively, without prevarication, without doubt, to know the ‘why’ in the ‘how’ of the present is the exercise of subjective freedom as the expression of intuition. The “power to decide, to constitute problems themselves” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 15) is what constitutes true majority and it is this complete knowledge of the ‘why’ in the ‘how’ that Simondon (1969) postulates in the relation between humans and the world. We maintain that this is not a formulation of the problem by attempting to contain it, by rendering it determinable by categorically delimiting it from the outside, but of working with it to render the problem productive of a necessary, inevitable truth within and without—the truth is in the productivity of the operational coherence of the problem as a restatement of its premises, conditions, situation, implications, through to its possible outcomes and a decisive adequate solution. However, that path to truth is non-linear, tortuous and surprisingly devoid of logic—it has a guiding intelligence all its own. So we often find ourselves in the throes of the quest asking where is this digressive and capriciously willful productive operational coherence taking us? The taking us is already indicative of method—its drive is to advance conditions which complexify the production of solutions. Complexification is not a rendering of the problem more complicated but of unravelling the knotty reciprocal implication of ideas through the progressive refinement of the statement of the problem by the advancement of partial solutions. This is tantamount to saying “let intuition do its work by the where it is taking us!”. We find ourselves with the solution we deserve to the problem we have been able to pose, yet, if we don’t like that solution we can always continue to cast until we land a solution we like better. In terms of the diagnosis, the doctor will proceed by positing what the condition might be and proceed to contrast the observed with the theorised until the signifying chain of the morbidity corresponds with the conceptual chain of the clinical disease.

The rediscovering of “the true differences in kind or articulations of the real” is Deleuze’s second rule of intuition as method and this is the foundation to its being considered “a method of division” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 21-2). If experience offers us

“nothing but composites” (*mixtes*), we must unbraid the multiplicity of the whole into its articulations and tease out the meshing of qualitative and qualified tendencies. If we see the event as a concretised assemblage, division is here understood as a divergent parting out, as the analytical abstraction of eventual process. Thus, we can come to discern that which is in truth operative, that is productive of difference in kind according to the way in which the moment combines “duration and extensity as they are defined as movements, directions of movements (hence duration-contraction and matter-expansion [*détente*])” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 23).

The invisible progress of time as processual advancement is inferred from the movement of affective tonality as a direct presentation of the qualitative change of time as temporality as opposed to measured time. The ‘answer’ of intuition becomes ‘time will tell’ and time becomes the transformational transition as the expression of subjectivity along a new line as experience. This constitutes the third rule of intuition as method: “State problems and solve them in terms of time rather than of space” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 31). Intuition, as distinctly operative, is durational. It is imbued with movement and change—as method, it is the way that experience is integrated into the advance of being as differential becoming. Intuition is what allows us to take notice of the deflection, the divergence, the deviation, the digression which constitutes the marked difference as temporality, as differentiated moments, as difference in kind and not a difference in degree, not as what happens in extension but in duration. It is the determination of the movement creative of change. Individuation, as processual advance, is an unceasing subjective production of the ‘now’ as coextensive of past, present, future and actual which is always different, deviant, and always other. At every moment in the continuity of becoming of a processual advance, the availability and offering of potential is different: the ‘now’ of the present is not a placeholder in time but the passing as process to the what’s coming ‘next’ as the choice become actual between potential available to potential realisable or possible or potential relinquished. And that hidden, indeterminate quality guiding the attentiveness within the passing of potential from activation, actualisation and relinquishment of potential is the activity of intuition.

Intuition is indicative that what is taking place is within the realm of duration as ‘now’, as the creation of time: to last is the repetition of the production of time and continuity as perduration emerges in time’s creation as vital duration. Intuition is implicit in

‘the now’ as the immediacy of transition as time-making and where ‘the not-now’ is extensive and spatial. Transcendence looks to arrest time to establish ‘the now’ as spatial, as ‘a here’, as representational. ‘The now’, as the modality of time’s creation, as the moment of change, of transformative transition, as the present of the giving of difference, as the moment of inflection in becoming, is always a creative more-than, a surplus value, because it is different in kind from whatever came before as an add-on to processual advance. As Deleuze affirms, intuition presupposes duration. However, without intuition as the decisiveness subtending the change-over, the making of temporality would only be a psychological experience. It is through intuition that creative innovation as difference in kind as change can become known as how time advances.

Different doctor types will use the method differently. In diagnosis, the method of intuition works towards the convergence of a specific determination. When it comes to the quest of research, Deleuze’s method of intuition as a method is not what most people are looking for: the method is not a guarantee towards the production of inspiration, nor is it a machine towards the producing of Aha! moments non-stop, even though it is both, just not how intuition is normally imagined. The inspiration comes from discerning difference in repetition and not from turning on a divine guiding light within. The method’s systematicity is not a protocol but a *modus operandi* in thought. The m.o. of the method is set up as a recursive process where the three rules of the Method of Intuition need not happen sequentially as a formal program of execution—they play off each other as interactive affective modulation. But what needs foregrounding as fundamental to the method is the degree of commitment that goes into the development of intuition in practice as differential repetition integrated into the iterative practice that it is. We see this in the profuse precursory notes and preliminary drafts of writers, of exploratory sketches and *bozzetti* of artists, the staged readings and rehearsals in theatre, the tuning that goes into devising an experimental series of scientific research, of the recursive dialing-in of the diagnosis of clinicians... it can be characterised as the faith-driven iterative impulse behind the expression “if at first you don’t succeed, try, try, again”. Still, it is more an expression of determinative convergence as the progressive attenuation of disparity between the observation and the interpretation.

Doctors and patients, writers and readers, artists and publics, scientists and scholars—thinkers in general—end up with the solution they deserve to the problem they

are able to pose, because “What you get, is what you asked for”. The answer proffered is always the appropriate answer to the posing of the problem. If one does not obtain the correct answer, in terms of expectation, it is because the question is wrong. But in non-medical pursuits, the method of intuition works not so much towards the convergence of specific determination, but as the reconciliation over time between thought and expression, between theory and practice, between perception and gesture, between action and reaction. There is a difference between art as a creative pursuit and art as aesthetic research. In the first, intuition emerges immanently as a making the artwork function. The solution to an artistic problematization can be a single, inevitable solution; a multiplicity of solutions; or a non-solution as a paradox, enigma or a recursive iteration of the problematization as its own problematization. Deleuze would say that the superior *récit* is the ‘poetic’ text that makes one think. But we can interpret this and reproblemate it in a variety of ways, depending on our subjective approach to investigation and what one values in research. One could say that the text that allows multiple solutions, that is open to many interpretations, is the superior text; or that the text that has no implicit solution because that jives better with the indeterminate nature of experience is an even better text; and if you like, that the single, surprising, inevitable intuitive solution is the regressive species because it is the most limiting. In the non-medical clinical context, the intuition encompasses all these outcomes as expression of the inevitable conclusion derived from the way that one problematizes the text, situation or event given the conditions in which one is able to posit the problem. It is undeniable that the text is a multiplicity of material and non-material possibility, but the precision and exactness implicit in the selection or expression of the statement is the resultant intuitive inevitability of the question posed. The non-medical doctor’s work is the problematizing of research-creation as the problematizing of the doctor’s practice not to attain intuitive closure, but in the perpetuation of intuition within signification as the creative moment of repetition. Intuition is productive, not in a willy-nilly manner, but through an exacting decisiveness: intuition is unhesitating, resolute and determined in its taking action—intuition is a threshold moment in the advance into novelty that is not chancy in itself but absolutely necessary in its outcome. A doctor involved in research may not be fully aware of the misdirection in the problem she thinks she is pursuing, but an answer that takes her by surprise can become a moment of revelation that informs her that her problem is incorrectly posed. As the turning

insight that sums up years of work, she can now re-establish the configuration of compositional conditions that will inevitably yield the expected 'correct' result.

The bad news here for a clinician of any type is that in order to attain this clarity of expression in the posing of the problem, this directness and immediacy which precipitates the intuition of the Aha! is based on the proverbial 99% perspiration to lubricate the honing and polishing of the proposition so that it unfalteringly repeatedly produces the repetition of the surprising and inevitable. This work entails the manifold repeated repositioning, realignment, reconfiguration of the conditions and circumstances, of compositional elements which are in fact signs, for them to produce the partial solutions that will eventually take us to the concretizing, totalizing experience of the intuitive synthesis. It is this crafting of the signification into a narrative of that which is essential that demands effort. Thus, the two modes of thought, the empirical and the rational, concur and converge on the same conclusion from both sides, from the experiential and the rational by the advancement of partial solutions as iterative differentiation so as to determine the differential.

Is this dramatic? It is dramatic as a synecdoche of the method of intuition when the final synthetic determination of the Aha! Moment is both surprising and yet inevitable. One sees this in Greek tragedy as a mode of representing procession where the elements of action "occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another" (Aristotle, 1941, p. 1465). The tightening spiral of inevitability as the determinate outcome of the drama is satisfying because nothing seems left to chance. But this is also what is dramatic in the expression of the drama which emerges from the theatre of memory of renaissance philosophers as their representation of the "universe expanding from first Causes through the stages of creation" (YATES, p. 145). It is an understanding that looks to explain knowledge through finding the adequate causes that are hidden in the effects and which sought man's return to God as the realm of Ideas, a goal common with Spinoza's guiding quest, except that for him God is all around us.

Seeing truth as productive of operative coherence is significant here because it sidesteps the moral problem of ascertaining a functional veracity as opposed to ascertaining integrity as concreteness within the unfolding of actuality. It is a repositioning of the problem from the normative moral logic of a problem's being true or false to the ethical knowledge of how things actually function coherently—of how the solution is territorialised



functionally, how it produces. Through its functioning we can discern whether what is being produced i.e. what is being considered as new, is distinctly innovative and inventive or simply a difference of intensity: are we wetting our foot in a 'different stream' or simply splashing about in the same puddle? is the moment a circular (re)collection of the same or is it composing through a different multiplicity altogether and diverging from the tangent of the status quo? In carrying out this differentiation, we come to see whether in fact what we are advancing is a problem or a non-problem: are we creating difference and innovation? Or are we generating indifference and ?

We cannot confuse a line of flight of making-other and the tangent as determination of status quo—it is a question of coming to terms with the tension within the determination of what is at play, i.e. the resolution of intensities as the time pressure of affect. If the tendency is actualised, one is no longer within the parameters of the former operative potentials but activating a new series of potentials opened up by digressing as a line of flight of the perpetual unfolding of the event into difference. And the difference is not constituted by the tangent which is often mistaken as the digression, but an advance into novelty as difference in itself. What we cannot dismiss is that this synthetic determination as outcome constitutes novelty, as the ascertainment of novelty as *differenciation*. The certitude of creation lies in the manifestation of difference in kind as a progressive contrast in hindsight, as a comparative rationalization which produces difference as determinant of what constitutes differentiation. It is a rationalization because it is a contrastive differentiation relative to some other as criterion and which together constitute a differential relation, a differentiation. The differential is an intuitive determination in that the method of differentiation of the calculus also finds its solution recursively as a method of exhaustion and determines it at the disappearance of the terms, so that the expression of change as a deviation is pure relation. This deviation is a moment of truth in that it tests to the smallest detail the commitment of the advance into novelty. And at this point, the expressed relation is pure change because we can disregard the terms of the relation and consider the movement of deviation as the excursion into novelty independently of any specifics.

Intuition, as distinctly operative, is durational. It is imbued with movement and change—it is the method of Bergsonism. But, as method, it is the way that experience is integrated into the advance as differential becoming. Intuition is what brings about the deflection, the divergence, the deviation, the digression which constitutes the marked

difference as the durational in temporality, as differentiated moments, as difference in kind and not a difference in degree. Becoming as singularity, as processual advance, is an unceasing subjective production of the 'now' as coextensive of past, present, future and actual which is always different, deviant, and always other. At every moment in the continuity of becoming of a processual advance, the availability and offering of potential is different: the 'now' of the present is not a placeholder in time but the passing as process to the what's coming 'next' as the choice become actual between potential available to potential realised or potential relinquished. And that hidden, indeterminate quality guiding the attentiveness within the passing of potential from activation, actualisation and relinquishment of potential is the activity of intuition.

Intuition is indicative that what is taking place is within the realm of duration as 'now', as the creation of time: to last is to continue the production of time. Intuition is implicit in 'the now' as the immediacy of transition as time-making and where 'the not-now' is extensive and spatial. Transcendence looks to arrest time to establish 'the now' as locative, as 'a here', as representational. 'The now', as the modality of time's creation, as the moment of change, of transformative transition, as the present of the giving of difference, as the moment of inflection in becoming, is always a creative more-than, a surplus value, because it is different in kind from whatever came before as an add-on to processual advance. As Deleuze affirms, intuition presupposes duration, but without intuition as the decisiveness subtending the change-over, the making of temporality would only be a psychological experience. It is through intuition that creative innovation as difference in kind as change reveals itself as the advance of time.

The Method of Intuition, in its unmediated, immediate, directness, provides us with the truth and nothing but the truth. It is not a partial truth; it is not an abstraction and it does not lie by omission. The method yields exactly the proper response to what was asked of it—it offers the correct answer to the problem that was posed. But before examining how an intuitive determination as a production of knowledge can be used in our thesis, we wish to delve into the nature of this final reconciliation as end-game of our epistemic quest. An 'intuition' and the method of intuition are not the same type of entity and cannot be confused. For too long, the implicit belief of constancy and permanence of the entities which constitute our understanding of the world has lulled us into believing in the immutability and perdurability of things whether they be material or ideal. We suppress what our senses

ceaselessly tell us and obstinately refute the logical conclusions which our everyday experience and observations lead us to infer. We know that nature natures, that life is flux and that the only thing that is constant is change itself. Still, in spite of these affirmations, we persist in construing existence in terms of determinate constancy and ideatic immutability. We interpret being in the world according to terms that are unchanging and impute an identitary fixity onto things as if they retained essential characteristics as transcendently unvarying and permanent. The same goes for ideal constructs such as concepts, ideas, theories, laws and judgments—even those we determine intuitively—we use them as permanent, stand-alone, unchanging postulations which permit us to identify and classify things in the world according to Procrustean categories. For us these conceptions are processual entities, machinic assemblages which are characterised by their openness and movement and occupy the dreaded excluded middle as becoming.

### **The Stilling of Conceptual Thought and the Critical Forward Movement**

The two methods just described need to be paired to an ontology and an epistemic approach based on the shifty understanding of a philosophy of process and difference. Medical doctors know that every system, every organ, every tissue, every cell in the body is associated—and despite their living this reality daily, their professional practice still seeks to compartmentalize the body into stand-alone, independent structures. The human body is all about change and adaptation and movement, inside and outside and trans-individually. And like any body, it has an uncertain duration and a built-in coming-to-being and perishing—but as cessant in transformation and not because of death. The human (body) is all about the impermanence, movement and change implicit in “everything flows”. And if everything flows, we can only explain the world in terms of process and interaction. This would mean that if everything is changing, continually becoming other, our thought needs to reflect that distinction. The advance which we characterise as the movement of bodies not as surficial and accidental but as internal and transformative.

Within the distinction between static being and dynamic becoming, there exists a wide ontological and epistemological rift whose identification is of decisive importance to our endeavour. For as Whitehead writes in *Modes of Thought* (1938) “Philosophic truth is to be sought in the presuppositions of language rather than in its express statements”

(WHITEHEAD, 1966, p. vii). And the principal presupposition of language we take issue with is its tenacious hold on our minds to render thought in terms that invoke the static, the changeless, the permanent, the unchanging, the stable... A close second is how language steers us into knowing nature objectively, homogeneously, rather than as a heterogeneous imbrication: simply engaging the world in terms of who? what? when? where? and why? and how?<sup>25</sup> positions us vis-à-vis 'knowledge and knowing' as a binary split of knower and known and leads to formulate thought according to the limitations of static categories in identitary terms.

For example, we readily perceive this stilling of movement in the adding of the suffix -ion to verbals to "perfect" them, to produce the effect of a *fait accompli*, and render them a done thing as if the activity in question has less value than its completive determination. Many words such as redaction, connotation, simplification etc which terminate in -ion halt the activity being carried out to transform it into a noun. In terms of formulating and conveying processual thought, we note a decided conceptual degradation in the transition from Greek to Latin. Romance languages are rife with words whose conceptual underpinnings are made up from Greek terms once imbued with processual movement which when rendered into Latin become static and devoid of movement. We see this in the translation of the Heraclitean verb *ἐπίστασθε* *epistasthai*, to stand upon, translated as Wisdom or the Latin *Sapientia*, even when the source is permeated by process and exudes movement. It would be unfair to wholly blame the Latin philosophers of Rome for this stilling of Greek thought, for it had already been carried out much earlier in Greece itself, principally in the hands of Plato and Parmenides. The difference is that even if the Greeks were thinking of immobility in terms of the conception of the universe, the Latins integrated the transcendental immobility into the dynamic of the language itself. The Latin translation of Greek thought—including Aristotle's which originally was imbued with a processual dynamic—presents a serious stumbling block to the understanding of early processual thought that inhabits perception. As per Heidegger, "any translation of a Greek philosophical term by a Latin term involves the destruction of the 'actual philosophical force of the Greek word'" (BENJAMIN, 1989, p. 39) and Glazebrook (2000) characterises it as a matter of conceptual reduction. But the wholesale diminution of Greek philosophy by its Latin

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<sup>25</sup> The interrogative adverb how is different from the other five in that it demands a processual explanation as Deleuze points out in *The Method of Dramatization*.

Romanization by the Stoics and subsequent interpretation by the Scholastics went beyond the dampening of its force. In the analysis of process, in considering process as process as the activity of process or the content or object of the process—the Latinised version of a Greek processual concept will invariably opt for a static nominal which will satisfy and conform to the Laws of Thought<sup>26</sup> to the detriment of the dynamic conceptual of the processual, whether it be ideations, formulations, positings, conceptions, apprehensions. Whether it is thought rendered through Romance languages or the expression of Roman languages as thought that is at work constitute a chicken and egg aporia which either way conspires to arrest movement in what was originally dynamic.

Romance language translations as such make the ideation of processual Greek thought nearly impossible to articulate, for not only are the original texts rendered lifeless, and devoid of their dynamism, but the conduct of thought can only be carried out using the conceptualisation of Romance languages which structurally prevent the ideation of processual movement because they are not predisposed to express thought dynamically or construct thought in terms of processual movement. Heidegger saw this in the Latin translation of Φύσις (*phusis*) as ‘nature’, where Φύσις is not simply nature “but the power by which things come to be, by which they are available to be encountered in their presence for human being” (GLAZEBROOK, 2000, p. 178). This attempts to posit the discussion in the camp of becoming as a relational encounter as opposed simply to being, but it falls short of its goal by trying to bring the conclusion in terms of ‘to be’ as opposed to a continual becoming. Also, to become X seems to imply that the aim is to become X and that the process is concluded once X has been attained. This debasement is not lost on Agamben (2000) who recognises the degradation in the action word αἴσθησις, *aisthesis*, as having been transformed into Latin as a nominal, *sensatio*, which in Greek expresses activity by ending in the suffix *-sis*, much in the same way that *phusis* is diminished when translated as *natura*. This is why the on-going of a future coming-to-being of Becoming-woman, Becoming-animal, Becoming-child are all predicated as present participles of the infinitive ‘to become’ rather than as a simple future. The present participle affords an open-endedness to the becoming which the future tense in itself does not necessarily guarantee.

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<sup>26</sup> The Laws of Thought—namely, the Law of Identity (if a thing is P then it is P), the Law of Noncontradiction (a thing P cannot be P and not P at the same time) and the Law of the Excluded Middle (a thing P is either P or not P).

For example, *Essentia* is Cicero's translation of Aristotle's phrase, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, *to ti ēn einai*. The Greek phrase literally means something like "the what it would be to be (something)" or "the to be what is." Cicero's translation takes the infinitive *esse* of the Latin verb meaning "to be" and its participle *-ens*, getting *essens*, and adds the abstract ending *-tia* to make an abstract noun meant to convey the sense of Aristotle's phrase (Preus, 2015). This notion of making essence static emerges explicitly in Santayana's *The Realm of Essence* (1927) in which he refers to ethereal essences: "Essences are Platonic Ideas relieved of their dynamic and existential meanings, and welded with *qualia* in immediate experience" (DUNHAM, 1938, p. 100). Santayana identifies essences as the perceptual endpoints of experience made adequate as significant, as giving definition to a body. Now, *to ti ēn einai* is not what something is as such but *our report, our account, our narrative* of that which we perceive something to be. This would be nothing other than what is said of it per se as a result of our interactive encounter with it—it is our relating of the perception as reason, our subjective perception expressed, our profession of it. And here we see the gist of the issue quite clearly: *to ti ēn einai* is not our report, but our *reporting, our accounting* of that which we perceive as event—it is our testimony of the event as fact because "we are telling it like it is". And the etymology of testimony confirms it: from Latin *testimonium* "evidence, proof, witness, attestation," from *testis* "a witness, one who attests" + *-monium*, suffix signifying action, state, condition.<sup>27</sup> It is the testament of our subjectivity, both as ocular witness and testifier of what constitutes the event. It is fact because it has happened, and is inscribed in the record through its account—it is now unchangeable because what is done is done, and is now triangulated in the public record. This fixing as a rendering immobile by its relational triangulation in being out in the world is the becoming-embodied as a body of knowledge, as a conceptual entity that is grasped jointly. As Deleuze and Guattari write in *What is Philosophy?* "The concept speaks the event, not the essence of the thing—Pure Event, a hecceity, an entity" (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1994, p. 21). So that the social communication of our experience, the very thing that Benjamin (1969) writes about in *The Storyteller* (1936), as the critical core of what is to be transmitted as essentially pragmatic, is that which is related, that which is recounted and narrated and made fast to tradition. The being-made-relative through relation is thus what constitutes our subjective body of knowledge as expressive of

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<sup>27</sup> [https://www.etymonline.com/word/testimony#etymonline\\_v\\_10685](https://www.etymonline.com/word/testimony#etymonline_v_10685)

perceptive experience—“What you say, is what you see” because they both articulate the that which is in front of us<sup>28</sup>—but it is the saying of the seeing that immanently shows us the way to proceed forward as the answer to the critical question “What to do next?”.

But *to ti ēn einai* is not a matter of determining the essence, as specific being, or a manner of existing, but the expressing of our subjectivity as that which is essentially relevant and pragmatic in the moment. But to say that *to ti ēn einai* is the predication as a making common knowledge that allows one to categorise in terms of its conceptual constitution as identity is a misrepresentation of the phrase’s original intent. The social construct arises not in terms of language as social but as common knowledge of a categorisation that is shared in a social sphere in order to distinguish, to evaluate, or to differentiate something by making it ascertainable in a public forum. To categorise comes from the Greek Κατηγορία (*kategoriari*—categories) which means to accuse or make known publicly. It is formed of Κατα (Kata-down) and the verb ἀγορεύειν (*Agoreuein*—to accuse or to speak in public [in the Agora<sup>29</sup>]), thus, we have to take ‘it’ down to the Agora and address the public from a position of knowledge of truth—to profess—which if it is also an accusation, it is in order to pass judgment on its veracity.

The philosophical is an extension of legal disputes and litigation, to ascertain blame, i.e. determine cause, for some action based on past facts that can be traced both forward and backwards to comprehend an event. The past is unchanging in its facticity: what happened, happened and cannot be altered—so facts are fixed, immobile because they are in the past, triangulated by the facticity of other deeds. Pastness predicates the present. And as such its truth is buried under the sediments of time, as strata

To come to the Agora was to come to answer to an accusation, to a complaint of having found fault with, and to offer an account of, or account for, a defect, an inadequacy, a incongruity, a difference—towards setting the record straight. Thus, the accusation is a calling to account for the divergence of the history.

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<sup>28</sup> This will be demonstrated formally through projective geometry in the next chapter in dealing with perspective.

<sup>29</sup> “The agora—market, assembly place, muster point, home to a wide concentration of public activities—has often been thought of as the heart of the ancient polis. It was here that the Greeks came together on a daily basis to shop, socialise and exchange news and gossip” (DICKENSON, 2017, p. 1). The Athenian Agora was also the legal centre of the polis: “Most trials were held somewhere in the Agora” (LANG, 1994, p. 3). The Agora was also the site for public philosophising: the trial of Socrates was conducted in the Stoa of Attalos which also gave its name to the Stoics.

The Agora was where someone's character would be examined and put to question, where an enquiry would be carried out into the character of an individual. But to have one's character questioned by public examination in the Agora was often a debasing event. To make something known "down in the Agora", in the world of the common, is a degradation—both in process and in outcome—for to have one's character examined in public was degrading. We can speculate that *kategoriai* represents a fall from grace, from the exalted pantheon of the Gods of the Parthenon and their lofty Ideas atop the Acropolis brought down to the Agora at the foot of the mountain below to share it with the multitude as a making common knowledge. Further, to round out the metaphor, the Agora not only included the Peristyle where many courts met, but comprised the Stoa Poikile which gave its name to the Stoics who gathered there and who preached a philosophy of immanence and change (Lang, 1994). So to go down to the Agora was not only a downward movement, but a movement towards the expression of the world as flux, of immanence and change.

The key movement here is to bring down: the bringing down of facts to a public arena in order to answer to an accusation, to an imputation of fault, and to be judged, hopefully by peers qualified with knowledge to pass judgment,<sup>30</sup> is only an exemplar—"You are not what you claim to be, i.e. innocent."<sup>31</sup> To bring down is a euphemism; Ideas are brought down because God resides in the topmost circle of heavens above, for if these facts understood as concepts are historically ascertained, then their meaning has to have been fixed in the past, which when traced back to the beginning of time we can only assume that they are made by a supreme being who does not deceive, God himself. But this downward movement is the causal fall which informs change and becoming—for cause, from the Classical Latin *causari* "to plead, to debate a question" so as to find the "reason or motive for a decision, grounds for action; motive". For whatever predicates our present has an implicit truth to it because the proof is in the pudding. The past has yielded the present, therefore whatever was actant in the past was a true agent because what has been is true—whatever is in the past has occurred. And it is that agency which must be determined as the how of that thing as what informs us of what that body is as a predication. The reasoning would imply that the ideal past was degraded by being made material, made impure and deficient,

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<sup>30</sup> Is this not also the activity of presenting a thesis? Of questioning, of analysing, of determining cause, and professing it in the open court of the academic hearing as arguments from the defense?

<sup>31</sup> One can also make the same accusation about the child's coming to being.



lacking in the perfection that the Ideal heavenly Forms enjoy. But in bringing these facts which are now fixed and immobilised in the past, as a network of associated and related truths, the truth is to be found in the unchanging factual past and not in the changing and mobile present or the unknown future. So that to categorise is defined by the bringing down of Ideas to a common forum to be openly debated and judged in the court of public opinion in the public arena of discourse, in the marketplace of ideas.<sup>32</sup>

But if we seek the cause of some event as activity, we are looking for a dynamic agency, which if we detect in one instance we should be able to detect in others. But what is it about one event that is detectable in others? What is that which predicates our present, what we have here before us? But what is it that is being in fact predicated? What is the movement that is being produced which is articulated in all exemplars which participate in an Idea? The varieties of predicates are the categories and these are what allow us to distinguish, differentiate, discriminate the Τύπος (*typos*), the various impressions which are being produced as accounting for perception of change from which we can infer time.

Many of the Ancient categories, including the Aristotelian and the Stoic, are based on the stem Ποι- (*Poi*). For example: Ποιεῖν (*poiein*—to actively make or do), such as ποιήσις (*poiesis*—a making), ποιητική (*poietike*—giving or taking a certain quality), Ποῖον (*poion*—to make of a certain quality), Ποιότης (*poiotēs*—quality), Πόσον (*poson*—to reckon the quantity of, to count), Πότε (*pote*—when, as made relative to now), Ποῦ (*rou*—where, as made relative to here), πῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τί (*pōs echōn pros ti*—how disposed in relation to something) (Preus, 2015). We underline two aspects of these categories: one, the recurrence of the how as requiring an answer in processual terms as an active making or doing, or as an expression of time; two, the voiding of the activity involved in the determination in favour of a simple nominative.

The distinction here is that there is an intellectual predisposition to think of report as a noun, as a complete, closed, self-contained summation of what originally was a discursive, open-ended, emergent processual stating of a processual understanding based on explication. By defining through spoken speech, by discursively giving definition to a hidden concept as a body, by stating openly what something is and thereby making it observable,

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<sup>32</sup> The feeling illustrates Empedocles fragment 119, “From what large honor and what height of bliss / Am I here fallen to move with mortal kind! This section resonates with Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals* (1887) and the philological drive of the First Essay, Sect. 2, parts 4-6.

visible, discernible and therefore cognisable, we discover and disclose that which satisfies the 'common sense' and makes knowledge available to all. So to identify the essence, or "the what it is to be x," would be to give definition, to flesh the conceptual body as a grasped together. By defining it, i.e. by giving definition, by giving heft to the body, as opposed to giving a definition to its external form, there's a political openness in openly stating what something really is: we state what the nature of its core is as opposed to its accidental surface changes, we offer an account of that which satisfies the "common sense" and make its knowledge available to all. By stating τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, *to ti ēn einai*, of something, we make it visible and comprehensible to all—it becomes the *technē* of revelation—it is a full disclosure which goes on the record as an open communal ledger as a page in the book of accounts—in today's crypto language, it would be like a holochain. The Ciceronian stilling of Aristotle's phrase, *to ti ēn einai*, into *Essentia*, renders a static nominal of a processual dynamic twice removed. As Benjamin writes in *The Task of the Translator* (1923), "All purposeful manifestations of life, including their very own purposiveness, in the final analysis have their end not in life, but in the expression of its nature, in the representation of its significance" (BENJAMIN, 1969, p. 72), which when read in processual terms acquires a different character: the manifestation of life as a becoming is not an analysis of end-points but the discursive unfolding of its processual emergence through the exposition of its meaning-making as semiotic value. There is no discrepancy between the practice and the vocation; the act of voicing knowledge is in essence the vocation of profession. "In all these respects, eternal return is the univocity of being, the effective realisation of that univocity. In the eternal return, univocal being is not only thought and even affirmed, but effectively realised. Being is said in a single and same sense, but this sense is that of eternal return as the return or repetition of that of which it is said. The wheel in the eternal return is at once both production of repetition on the basis of difference and selection of difference on the basis of repetition" (DELEUZE, 1994, pp. 41-2).

If there is a systematic voiding of the dynamic or processual content of Greek thought in favour of a static and stable conception of things as still-born Latinised mimesis, then we could do well to return to the original sources and read these ancient Greek texts afresh in terms of a processual interpretation as a going back to the source—a return to the infancy of thought. These ideas have been processed by the Scholastics in the service of a Judeo-Christian God and as a result are still read and interpreted as devoid of all movement.

However, until processual thought becomes second nature to us, we would need to be cautious in our readings for our reading of the Greek would constantly be reverting to our stilted, stilled Latinised translations which constitute the conceptual structures to which our mind automatically reverts to. In pursuing this line of thought, we often find that ‘contemporary’ processual thinkers have rather tight relations and share conceptual affinities with the Ancients, for that is the common foundational archive to thought. They read and understand the philosophy in processual terms and express themselves ‘correctly’ but when we read them through our Latinised thinking, it becomes difficult to reconcile the dynamic intentions of the texts with the static interpretations the texts are given. As such, if we are to interpret the world according to processual thought, then we must learn to read, to think and to live in terms of processual thought. And for that we need to reposition along processual lines our thinking and the concepts we use to interpret our experience, not only in the way we read the concepts but in the way we imagine life—for how are we to think movement and change with an ideation of concepts which only think the static, the unchanging and the permanent, or at best think the processual in static terms?

But why have we opted to understand life and explain it in terms of immobile sections, of static transversal cuts, which not only misrepresent the nature of the event but distort its understanding? Because the stimuli that affect us are known to us as static (or at least the visual are) and because to know something with certainty, it cannot be changing or moving—what we would usually say is that it needs to be static so as to be able to ascertain what it is. The material gospel states that only unchanging things have being, anything that changes is existentially compromised. If Nature is to be known as “the world as interpreted by reliance on clear and distinct sensory experiences, visual, auditory and tactile” (WHITEHEAD, 1966, p. 128), for something to be fully known and determinate, it cannot be in motion, changing, varying from one moment to the next. This is why language relies on the Laws of Thought as underpinnings to the creation of logic to proceed with certainty into knowing: thus, the thinking goes, the multiplication of endlessly proliferating distinctions must be arrested (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 47) in order to know things in themselves with certainty. Our knowledge of Nature is rendered static—*natura naturans* is transformed into *natura naturata*—the processual is translated into static ideation. Thus, rather than understanding nature’s naturing as process, as immanent emergence, as becoming-other that is ecologically sustained, the continuity of becoming is abstracted into discrete

motionless stages of development, which in terms of the assemblage we call a human body translates into the phases or stages of life of infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and old-age.

Those stages which lead up to the plateau of adulthood or away from it are neither significant in themselves nor imbued with value except in terms relative to adulthood. In the stages leading up to adulthood, the significance is in the value-adding propositions of the activation of potentials, the tutoring of development, the establishing of constraints and the inculcation of habits. In the stages leading away from adulthood, we usually see the diminution of potential, subsequently the slackening of possibility, the enfeeblement of faculties, decrepitude and ultimately death. On the ascending side, we have the creation of possibles which produce tangible value; on the stage of adulthood, we have the actual production of value and the cumulation of surplus value; and on the descending side, we have the diminution of productivity and the extraction of value. This process is of course stated in terms which reflect a productivity and a cumulative heft to which a 'cash' value can be ascribed. What is the cash value we invoke here in terms of process? It is the truth-value generated by the experience, where truth's cash value in experiential terms are, in the words of William James, those ideas which "we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify" (JAMES, p. 573), which turned into bodies become real. And which as Spinoza asserts in *The Ethics* VP40D, the more clear and distinct, "the more each thing is perfect, the more reality it has" (SPINOZA, 1996, p. 179) .

### **The Epistemological Advance of Method in the Doctoral Thesis**

We have described in detail the method of Symptomatology and the Method of Intuition as well as the need for expressing thought as process because they constitute the fundamental or primitive common notions which define the activity that for us constitutes being a doctor. And because one cannot be concerned with, cannot care for that which one does not know needs caring, the Symptomatological Method and the Method of Intuition are the two instrumental activities which constitute the ground floor for the professional practice of the doctor. To be a doctor is to profess the care for bodies, but what makes a doctor "good" is not that she has a good bedside manner, or a good profession backing him up, or a vocation to cure bodies—it is because she knows how to read bodies and knows

how to do the right thing: she knows how to work the clinical and the critical of that which she professes as a knowing of how to proceed—she knows what is to be done in the doing of the seeing. And for this she needs to know about bodies, how bodies function, how to care for them, how to bring them back to health and how to prevent bodies from deteriorating into ill health. All of these qualities are requisite, but none of these functions unless there is good diagnosis and good interpretation. Above all, the physician must be able to read signs and produce signs—which is what constitutes the literary or artistic crux of the practice—what Deleuze calls the poetic as a militancy against Plato’s own militancy against the poets in the *Republic*.

For me, as a Becoming-Doctor, the bodies I contend with are different from those which occupy the medical doctor. I render the critical and the clinical into modes of thought or bodies of knowledge to see what we can make of them, to see what they can do. In contrast to the work of the medical clinician, rather than produce a diagnosis, my thesis as a self-imposed problem must proceed from the somewhat indistinct and vague propositioning of Becoming-Child in Deleuze and Guattari and subject it to the workings of the method of intuition as a move towards generalisation, towards the common—which would mean that I need to develop my principal concepts in order to express them in terms of time. As a concept, Becoming-child is given to us as an inadequately discerned entity, as a concept which has not been fully fleshed and as such in need of unfolding and articulation as both an empirical concept derived from observation and interpreted as processual, and as idea made adequate as a common notion.

If the method of intuition traces an advance which brings us ineluctably and decisively towards a specific solution which is both open-ended yet resolute, one must know how to apply the method and adapt it to the task before us. The movement that is alluded to in the method of intuition when applied by the medical doctor to an ailing body as a symptomatology is a specific movement of ascertainment of knowledge which is different from the intuition which advances creation or invention and it is also different in the hands of the academic doctor. Even if the general movement is the same, the use of the method of intuition requires modification when applying it to the writing of a thesis. As mentioned earlier, the three rules are not the law. They are a code of ethics to which thought subscribes as a particular mode of conduct of its affairs towards the attainment of adequate knowledge expressed in its most inclusive and general terms as common notions.

How to provide an account of the movement of ideas from their lesser perfection to a greater perfection is the proposition that Spinoza sets for himself in the *Ethics*. It is the original “ethico-aesthetic” paradigm in that it traces the movement of the affects as esthetic, as bodies feeling, and transforms them into Ideas through the ethics of intuition, as a movement from the material to the Godly or beatific as the progress of our intellect towards freedom. Spinoza chose to systematise geometrically this movement of understanding as knowledge, as *sapientia* which is both comprehension and wisdom as a sustainable pragmatism, not so much because of the ineluctable facticity of geometric proof but from a geometricity which is not in the method but in the underlying substance. And so we need another way of explicating the idea that transforms the vortical spiral of the movement of convergence of ideas and attenuate the interactive modulation to a more linear approach which identifies with a more familiar epistemological *démarche*. In keeping with the Deleuzian ‘tradition’, if we can call it that, Spinoza proposes a cognitive program or method in *The Ethics*, based on the Three Kinds of Knowledge. The three types are designated as Imagination (*imaginatio*), Reasoning (*ratio*) and Intuition (*intuitio*)—the first is an empirical mode of knowledge, the second a rational mode and the third a “common” mode of cognition. This framework linearises the movement of thought from the haphazard to the adequate, from the passive to the active, and dovetails with Bergson’s and Deleuze’s method of intuition, for it is itself a method of intuition as progressive adequation.<sup>33</sup> Thus, Spinoza’s system serves not only to understand how the modes of thought work and to articulate how each one obtains, but to be able to differentiate between the types according to the degree of adequacy, to the species of clarity and distinctness each Kind of Knowledge can generate.

Unlike the physician’s diagnosis which only seeks to render the symptoms adequate and correlate them to a body of knowledge, the thesis must not only flesh out the nebulous concept and render it adequate, but it must produce a document which is not only an unfolding of the method as a record of the process but it must also serve as a path which others can follow in order to reach the same intuition, hopefully, with the same intensity of

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<sup>33</sup> Spinoza does not systematically present his program of Three Kinds of Knowledge in *The Ethics*, leaving one commentator to characterise it as an “unmotivated disaster” (Bennet, 1984, p. 357) even if Spinoza (*Ethics* IIP40S1) spares himself by setting this task aside for another subsequent treatise identified by Curley as the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* (1677), which the editors of the *Opera posthuma* (1677) characterised as unfinished (and defective).

understanding as that garnered by the author. The working of the thesis must be a pragmatic affirmation of William James's postulation of "how two minds can know one thing" and as such would fulfill the pedagogic aspirations of the doctoral vocation. The thesis exists as an attractor, a point of encounter, a fold to thought, a point of arrival and a point of departure—it is the movement of prehension. The thesis exists as a self-contained monadic object which provides the hinge of encounter between the ideations of the proponent and the intellect of the readers. As a product of the writer's research and synthesis of thought, the thesis represents a specific movement which will hopefully translate itself into a similar movement of thought in the readers.

In terms of my own research and the exposition of the expression of Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process this requires that we integrate the circularity of the adequation of thought through the method of intuition—by problematising, differentiating, and temporalising—as a rendering adequate of the common notion that allows the expression of Becoming-Child in general terms. Thus, we need to express what Becoming-Child can be according to the first and second Kinds of Knowledge through the filter of Imagistic Process in order to render it as an idea that articulates time. This requires us to posit Becoming-Child according to what is traditionally understood as a child or childhood, and then articulate this in terms of becoming as process. So that as we adapt the method of intuition to reflect the various modes of knowledge and explore the different ways of exposing the problem, of examining the differences and articulate the "how" this concept creates time-images as different facets of the crystal of time, the conclusion must be a general expression which brings out the common notion which allows all these facets or modes of thought to express the concept univocally as their singular nature. This is Spinoza's third Kind of Knowledge, that which he calls intuitive, the common notion. "And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things" (SPINOZA E II.40s2.IV, 1996, p. 57). And so the thesis is the demonstration that the doctoral candidate can in fact bring about this transformation in knowledge from the first or second kind to the third and be able to convey it as a structured defense. In theory, the title of doctor would confer upon the candidate a publicly recognised ability to transcend the second kind of knowledge and allows us to legitimately engage in the third kind. The thesis must hopefully demonstrate this movement of thought in an intuitive way in all its senses.

But here we encounter an aporia when we combine the exigencies of the doctor's 'restorative' knowledge with the necessary movement of the production of 'joyful' signs. This is what brings us to the third mode of thinking intuition, one that articulates creativity, that makes the leap from innovation to invention, that expresses the uncommon of the common. The restorative can neither be a rendering static of knowledge nor a normative repair of what's wrong with education, nor a dismissive repudiation of the observation that things need fixing, and its archival preservation cannot be its embalming. What is needed is a vigorous and rigorous maintenance of policies and institutions which uphold the spirit of freedom which bluntly stated go hand in hand with the intuitive and pragmatic program of Spinoza's *Ethics* that sets the course that will ultimately accord us "the power of ordering and connecting the affections of the body according to the order of the intellect" (SPINOZA, 1996, p. 166).

As a becoming-doctor, I also have to develop those academic and professional qualities which will define me as a doctor, as a poet, as a δημιουργός as a *demiurgos*, a craftsman of signification. I have to become a doctor by way of the same criteria posited for the physician: someone who knows how to care for bodies, one who can work the clinical and the critical, one who can discern, read and interpret signs. As Deleuze writes in *Proust and Signs* (1964), it is an apprenticeship of a "man of letters" as that which transcends recollection as a research for lost time, because the quest as search is more than a memorial recitative of where things are at or an account of Truth: it is an apprenticeship to signs and the creation of time itself. The academic doctor, like the medical doctor, must be adept at both the clinical and the critical, the curative/therapeutic and the preventative aspects of the profession. This means ability to integrate this knowledge but also ability to profess it. Thus, the academic doctor must be able to safeguard and defend knowledge through its adequate production, by integrating it to existing knowledge, by its archival memorial preservation and through its dissemination. The clinical safeguards knowledge by identifying, defining and producing new knowledge, which is adequate and functional while demonstrating a general concern for it. The critical safeguards knowledge by integrating and correlating it with the existing. The pedagogic, propagates knowledge by teaching, by imparting it to others, by preventing its waywardness in its dissemination, by preserving it and extending it into the future. But in carrying out these conservationist undertakings, we need to make sure than the preservation of knowledge does not become expression for a



normative unprogressive dogmatism as to what is legitimate, or what constitutes knowledge that should be preserved and what is to be conserved. Its focus is open-ended and its impetus affirmative, joyful and creative. At some point it must also become anarchival and break with the past, carry out its functions in a purely speculative manner so as to become unreservedly creative.

But in keeping with the openness of the critical and the clinical, the ceaseless mobility of the signifying function, and the supposition of a processual underpinning to the outlay of ideas, we betray our findings and undermine our knowledge and methods because we break faith with the Laws of Thought. We understand the quandary we place ourselves in when we conduct our thought according to the impermanence and inconstancy of the processual and the immanent. The academic doctor's knowledge, which now takes on overtones of *epistemē*, of *sapientia*, of a 'scientific' wisdom, acquired through a long and arduous education, looks to make good on the promise of a proper working knowledge of the body of knowledge. This education gives one ability to compose with, through and together with it in order to impart its joyful affects. This education also permits one to be able to guide others whose body of knowledge needs tutelage, tutoring or guidance. This knowledge, which in principle predicates the core of things, to the essential, allows the doctor to define, identify, and integrate knowledge and profess it through the vocation—both in the sense of professional calling and through its public articulation of it: this rendering public entails the publication of articles, or books or as part of the public profession of this knowledge. And this profession as ethical vocation is also what propels forward the constitution of knowledge as desire that sustains it as a body. The vocation becomes the answer to our professional calling.

This public articulation of knowledge as the vocation, of the professor's profession has significant implications for the body of knowledge, and for the *collegium*—the teaching body as the faculty—as the social intelligence that guides the unfolding of knowledge, as the state of the art and the maintenance of the archive. There is no room for incompatibility between the preservation for the body of knowledge as the academic corpus, a machinic assemblage comprised of the individual, the knowledge, the professors, the *socius* and the common. The public articulation of knowledge as the essence of a doctor's profession makes the knowledge publicly accountable through its public account that is related and related, meaning that is held accountable to society. And because it is knowledge that is publicly

proclaimed, it becomes common knowledge: everyone can attest to the openness of its truth value, to the veracity of its facticity. It is the truth value inherent in the public accounting and commonly held attestation of the holochain of the academic intellect as a *Concordia facultatum* where common notions, common sense and good sense are cogredient and philosophical (DELEUZE, 1994, p. 133).

This is a highly political move in that by making public these notions common, we make knowledge widely available and its promulgation beneficial to all as a shared resource. These words have a double meaning which link the various aspects of what making knowledge essential can mean as the narrative divulgence of knowledge. To profess, to account, to relate apart from their vocation as oral presentation all present a different aspect of what it means to disseminate knowledge in terms of its wider social implications. Particularly, to make knowledge relatable which means to relate, to give an account of, and refers to the capacity to orally convey knowledge but also to make it rational, related to the rest of the body of knowledge, and also the listener to identify with the knowledge, of becoming one with the body of knowledge. In this respect, the narration is a making of common knowledge in terms of common notions.

So through the idea of the body I define my course and my method of work as intuitive—first as a methodology proposed by Bergson and Deleuze and then tempered by Spinoza's understanding of intuition as an ethical practice. This allows us to transform the non-linear deployment of Bergson's and Deleuze's intuition and to express it linearly as a method providing the thesis with a linear narrative arc.

The first chapter is the conceptual contrast between the traditional static conception of the child and childhood and the becoming-child as a descriptive conceptualization of the child as becoming. We make the point that we do not have a very clear understanding of the procedural of what it is to become child and we formulate the need for a more adequate understanding—which we will provide through our explanation of imagistic process.

Thus, in the second chapter, we first quickly examine the image through its traditional definitional taxonomy and then explore Yarbus's (1967) eye movement experiment. We contrast his findings with Bergson's concept of the image as the basis for a semiotic process that integrates Bergson, Peirce, and Deleuze (with a bit of James and Whitehead) and provides an explanation of the procedural advancement of becoming. And we place the becoming-child within this nexus of understanding as imagistic movement.

The third chapter presents the intuitive "reward" of what a becoming-child can be in terms of common notions, in terms of time, and potential and my conclusions about what becoming-child means as an epistemological construct.

Thus, the thesis advances a logic that illustrates Spinoza's 3 Types of Knowledge (Chapter 1: observational, Chapter 2: rational, Chapter 3: common) as an intuitive progression where each chapter uses the method of intuition as posited by Bergson and elaborated by Deleuze to impulse machinic of thought. The epistemological movement of the thesis is intuitive in the sense that it is grounded in the intuitive method—problematizing, differentiating and temporalizing—both in the parts and in the whole and both intuitive impulses converging at the end into common notions of generating difference and time.

## Chapter 2

### The transformation of Childhood into Becoming

Becoming-child has everything and nothing to do with childhood and the child. There are days that I feel that the child and childhood provide the empirical foundation that informs becoming-child and on other days I feel that the child of becoming-child is a red-herring which distracts us and looks to make an aspect of processual becoming more understandable. Does 'child' provide the intuitive foundation to describe becoming-child or is it the concept of becoming that provides the key to understand what becoming-child can be? I tend towards the latter, but by the same token I don't think we could have called the concept 'becoming-child' if there are no children upon which to foist this specific aspect of becoming. In terms of conceptualising becoming-child, perhaps one could say that becoming-child is more easily unfolded as an aspect of processual becoming than as the experiential occupation of the child. And the reason I say this is that in describing process at least we have an intellectual predisposition towards understanding things as impermanent, unstable, changing; if we begin to unpack becoming-child through the child, immediately we get bogged down in the static of conceptual stability, permanence and perduration.

For too long, possibly from as early as the Ancient Greeks, the implicit belief of constancy and permanence as foundation to our understanding of the world has lulled us into believing in the immutability and perdurability of things whether they be material or ideal. We suppress what our senses ceaselessly tell us and obstinately refute the logical conclusions which our everyday experience and observations lead us to infer. We know that nature "natures", that life is flux and that the only thing that is constant is change itself. Still, in spite of these affirmations, we persist in construing existence in terms of constancy. We interpret being in the world according to terms that are unchanging and impute an identity stasis onto things as if they retained essential characteristics as transcendently unvarying and permanent. The same goes for ideal constructs such as concepts, ideas, theories, laws and judgments—we use them as permanent, stand-alone, unchanging postulations which permit us to identify and classify things in the world according to Procrustean classifications. But if a better understanding is available to us, why do we persist in seeing life in terms of static images and in using language which articulates experience in immobile terms?

As Bergson asserts, the existence of which we are most assured and which we know best is unquestionably our own, but even when we actually consider our own existence, we conceive of ourselves as discrete states where change somehow takes place in between the states, in the passage from one state to the next. I gaze at myself in the mirror and perceive myself not as a changeling, but as an image that affirms that it is indeed 'me' peering at myself. I point at myself—my index finger actually making contact with its reflection in the mirror—and assertively utter the word 'me'. And no matter how intently I gaze at myself in the mirror, I fail to see any change occur—there is a persistent insistence of static permanence in the present where any change is relativised to another static image but other one rendered static in memory. I ascribe the fact that I am becoming different to the same logic that befalls a cloud shapeshifting in the sky-blue of the atmosphere, even if I can't see myself changing any more than I can perceive the cloud's continuous shapeshifting or, for that matter, paint drying. Since the last time I gazed at myself in the mirror—whether it was 10 minutes ago, 10 days ago, 10 months ago, or 10 years ago—I know I have undergone change and understand that I am no longer who I have been, but I still attest in the present that the individual peering back at me in the mirror is myself, who in spite of all the internal changes and the experiences which have marked me and resulted in the image peering back at me in the mirror, that manifestation of change as external is still me—different, yet the same.

The individual peering back at me in the mirror is still me—still, static me—who in spite of all the internal changes and the experiences which have marked me, have made me progressively different, and resulted in the image peering back at me in the mirror: that manifestation of change as external is still me—always different, yet always the same. Yet, as I gaze at myself in the mirror and try to ascertain visually the instantaneous fact of change, I come to the conclusion that it is a futile undertaking, no more so than trying to see a cloud's continuous shapeshifting or perceive paint drying. I cannot see change in the instant, nor can I see it as a moment of duration. I can only compare two discrete states and from there infer that change has taken place—though I know that change is taking place I cannot ascertain it directly, I must deduce it. There's a facticity to change in itself that can only be ascertained from static sections, from photograms, which are then recomposed through the logic of the Bergsonian cinematograph and then there's the facticity of

durational change as change in itself that goes by unperceived but is totally experienced: Bergson's renowned duration.



Figure 2.1: Felix Rebolledo on a merry-go-round, ca. 1962.

There's a photograph of a three year-old boy hanging beside the mirror; a head-to-toe full-shot astride a make-believe motorcycle on a carousel in a park (Figure 2.1), who I believe might be me. I don't remember the circumstances of the photograph or who the photographer might have been. I only have a hazy memory of the tawdry wooden panels of the frieze of the merry-go-round. I take it for granted that it is me, but when I study the photograph I feel a certain distance between the me as subjective observer and the me as a child-object peering back at me through time. Looking at myself in the mirror is somehow different from looking at myself in the snapshot: and it is not only that the photograph is static—I have the same feeling when watching home movies of myself—but that there is an insurmountable distance between the two of me, a distance which is temporal yet somehow understood spatially. I find it difficult to reconcile the images in the mirror and the photograph. I ought to identify with the child in the picture, seeing that it is me, but in my mind it could very well just be the childhood photograph of someone else: two black holes for eyes and a quizzical look between bemusement and befuddlement crosses the face—I

don't physically recognise myself except perhaps in the expression which I have to read into the image and project back into the photo as an interpretation.

There would be nothing more obvious than saying the child in the picture has grown up and become older—that the potential of the child in the photograph is all used up, has become exhausted. I don't subscribe to that way of thinking, but isn't that what we usually think? The two images are of the same sack-of-bones that was born, has grown, gotten old, and now has one foot in the grave. The young me and the present me are connected by a continuous, unbroken line, a line that is temporal but that is not time itself. The line is a figurative expression of the continuity that holds together my corporeal existence from before I was born to the final dissolution of my body and beyond. Between the initial meiotic division and the eventual scattering of components, the constituent elements which aggregate as an individualisation, perdure as an assemblage for a span of time prior to their dispersal and participation in other individuations elsewhere. What is key here is the continuity, the seemingly unbroken and consistent existence that extends between the two images and the me writing these sentences. The significance of these two static images which 'depict' our artificially chosen end points can be understood in two ways: the two images mark the difference that constitutes the separation, or the two images identify the separation within which difference has occurred—from these two pictorial images we can qualify and ascertain that change happened. That which separates the two images is indeterminate and easily discounted: it is the bottom line that counts. One's personal experience is redundant, inessential, because what really counts is not the experience in itself but the outcome, the legacy, the value accrued as end-point, the difference between the in and the out as the bottom line.

That perduration as a discrete whole is not so obvious to define and neither is the constitution of the assemblage itself as a unity—the question “what is a body?” is not so readily answered! This perduration which must be seen as a duration, as a multiplicity, as an unceasing becoming is what is at stake here. Is it simply that contained by the limiting envelope of skin? Or is it the organisation of components into a coherent whole? Or is it perhaps, as Spinoza once asked, what a body can do?

I had never really stopped to think about the picture; I simply took it at face value that it was me when my sister gave me the picture, “Here I found this picture of you in a box”. Not having a certain memory of having my picture taken that day, I am not certain as

to whether or not the child in the photograph is the the same 'entity' gazing back at me today in the mirror, but there is something in the mien that makes me identify with his facial expression. I have always thought of myself as having had a happy childhood, and of being an outgoing, cheery child. I never considered myself as a morose or particularly thoughtful or introspective child, so I don't fully recognise myself in the child's facial appearance. As a three year-old on a merry-go-round, the child in the picture ought to have at least a happy countenance or a semblance of a smile, and not an expression of discomfited *cogitatus interruptus*. If anything, the sullenness came later, and perhaps it is a foreshadowing of a far-off future: the photograph is simply premonitory of the image in the mirror! It is not so much the physiognomy I identify with but with the ambiguous scowl that will break into a full-fledged look of quizzical concern. Today, I still recognise that expressive thresholding which emerges in photographs of me, so that what I identify with is the out-of-focus transiency of the expression. So I reluctantly accept that it is me gazing into the future from the stasis of the past; that for the instant the snapshot is taken, life, the movement of the planets, the carousel, and myself, have come to a standstill. My dubitative interpretative recognition is not so readily satisfying as a direct recognition of physical semblance might have been or if I had a specific memory of the event. But it is the indefinite uncertainty of the fleeting flux of expression which offers a more compelling certitude. Perceptually, in front of the photograph and in front of the mirror, I am in possession of two static visual images of the same individual 'thing', yet I cannot fully reconcile nor dynamise the rift in order to find the continuous movement that unites the two — it would be impossible to trace the experiential connection which reconciles the two. There is no memorial trail of the event other than the photograph and no coherent, continuous narrative in my mind between then and now. In one I am young and in the other I am old: polar opposites of a processual continuum which find reconciliation in the plateau of adulthood of middle-age or in the inevitable resultant dissolution—yet I persist in considering the two images as the same objective entity or 'thing', as the same human *being*.

The two images are manifestly connected; the corporeal me peering at the two images is clearly that which articulates the relation between the two. There is an insurmountable distance between the two of me, (or perhaps it is three of me now) a distance which is temporal yet somehow understood spatially, yet we remain connected. The comparison between the here and now and the there and then is always between static



points, between fixed images which demarcate a more or less definite passage of time, but it is a passage that takes place through the me which is a body. It is through the body that these images are linked and which establish a line of time. The mediation of the 'through' is of another order.

Now, in describing these images as 'the same human being', we can interpret the word being as a noun or as a verb. Both types of 'being' can be construed as perduring entities, but the way they go about it is different: one is a perduring individual, an individualisation—a being as an object which does not pass—and the other an ongoing durational activity, an individuation—a being as experiential existence. Both can be understood as bodies, as the essence expressive of human nature, as the general inherent character or disposition of mankind. They are both the transcendent me but the difference in the way these two aspects of being "body" and express being is what is at the heart of my thesis. To pose the question of whether or not the child in the photograph is the the same 'entity' gazing back at me in the mirror today is to improperly posit the problem, unless we are solely interested in ascertaining that that child in the photograph is indeed the author. Neither the child nor the man are perfect realities — and by identifying the individuation before us, first as Felix, then as child and then as man, we are only eradicating the production of difference, the creation of movement, the facticity of process. We negate the reality of change, the machinic truthfulness of flux by applying seemingly rigid labels to an event whose nature is characteristically mutable. Bergson (2018) would say that these labels are not realities per se, but designations of points of view or perspectives our mind takes on a reality which is changing. The same goes for all phases of development — infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood and old age — immobile sections which the mind has of a reality which is objectified and passes. We will see that this immobilisation is not only perceptual and that the perspectivization is not only visual but that both are directly participate in the production of memory as imagistic process.

Traditionally, the perduration which is deemed a life is seen as a succession of developmental stages which define phases of compositional consistency or plateaus of operational coherence—seldom is it studied as an organic continuity in the social sciences. The phases or stages of a life are defined by seemingly strict categorisations which are too easily applied and not always readily discharged. And these stages which seem natural, stable and universal, are in fact quite arbitrary, unstable and culturally self-serving

and with these categorisations it becomes difficult to accommodate the possibility of portraying the continuous changing nature of flux—perhaps this is the reason that Bergson predicated much of his vitalistic philosophy on the study of biology? But it must be one of the main tenets of biology that it is not the individual specimen which has value through the repetition of the creation of the same entity but the repetition of the process as the recurrent sustainability of the organism—the end product as an individualisation is relevant, but only when seen as the outcome of the repetition of an anonymous process which finds its sustainability in its ability to reproduce itself anew. It's never a matter of perpetuating the individual, but of sustaining the sustenance.

The child is an annunciation of sorts that heralds a future, a potential to be actualised, and the person before the mirror is the manifest fulfilment of the possibilities which were actualised. Similarly, the photograph of the child is a pictorial depiction of that potential embodied and the image in the mirror is the record of the accrual of the traces left behind by the actualisation of the possibilities of that potential. The image of the child serves as a benchmark or ground with which we can compare and determine subsequent difference. Any future picture will be compared to this one, and so we can proceed from one static image to the next so that theoretically, if we had enough photographs, we could reconstitute my personal history as a serial superposition of images. There is no extant trail that traces the experiential connection which reconciles the two; there is no continuous trace as a record that unfolds, only the breaking crest of the wave of becoming whose face is peering out of the mirror.

Yet, if we take the me out of the loop, and look at this 'being' in terms of anonymous process, as a generic recycling dynamic of its atomic or molecular components, an infant emerges from the potential of the undifferentiated 'nothingness' of the pre-individual welter, becomes a child, reaches adulthood and remains there for a number of years, "enjoying" the maturity of adulthood and the fulfillment of the potentials of childhood, gradually passes into old-age, declines and becomes decrepit, dies and returns to a common pool of undifferentiated pure potential. The circle is anchored at the bottom in pure potential and diametrically opposed at the top, is adulthood, the expression of the pinnacle of what it means to be human. For the sake of being consistent with the convenient convention of the passage of time as 'clockwise', we express our processual cycle in terms of a recurrent broken circularity where we place the child-to-adult transformation at the left as

ascendant, adulthood at the apogee, and on the descending right-side the return to potential. So that in terms of the flow of potential of the organism, we have the full potential inherent in infancy at the bottom; on the ascendant, left-hand side, the transformational development of actualisation of potential into the possibility of childhood, the progressive consummation of potential as an on-going cashing-out of possibility of adulthood which yields to the machinic perduration of possibility and segues into a diminishing return on expectations and fulfillment. But now, where forty is the new sixty and sixty is the new forty, there comes a point where potential and possibility are sold short and considered to have become exhausted even if in fact this only occurs at death, for one's entire life is a becoming and thus the exercise of actualisation of potentials. These potentials that pop up immanently with our becoming might not be the potentials we wish to actualise but they are what is available to us as we fulfill our destiny as a biological entity that has a beginning, a middle and an end.

However, this conception of the human being takes as a model that the child is a pool of untapped potential, which becomes exhausted, used up, consumed through life—as if that potential is some kind of currency that can be squandered or capitalized. What matters is the actualisation of potential, the body is its immediation and not the other way around. Bob Dylan only gets it half right when he sings in *It's Alright, Ma (I'm Only Bleeding)* that “he not busy being born is busy dying” (Dylan, 1965). We all somehow forget that the process of decline, decrepitude and dissolution is what empowers the coming into existence of novelty. And it is this changeover from the business of being born to the business of dying is the corollary movement from the busyness of dying to the busyness of being born that is the same movement of processual passage, of the prehensive changeover from the objective to the subjective of Whiteheadian feeling we will looking at in Chapter 3 as part of imagistic process.

The ‘aspects of being body’ can also be read as how an aspect of being embodies, *becomes* a body. That perduration as a discrete whole is not so obvious to define and neither is the constitution of the embodied assemblage itself as a unity—the question of what a body is is not so readily answered! Is it simply that contained by the limiting envelope of skin? Or is it, as Spinoza once asked, what a body can do? Or is it the organisation of components into a coherent whole? Or possibly, an immanent selection that composes an assemblage of coherent machinism having a certain perduration? Or is it just a fold upon

fold to infinity of projections? We can also look the other way and ask what has a body done with that potential hidden in the what can a body do? What transpired between the photograph of the child on the merry-go-round and the older man peering into the mirror?

Why do we think that the potential implicit in the child will exhaust itself in the actualisation of an indeterminate future, and not in terms of opening potentials, of producing new potential? Why do we measure change according to a subjective unfolding, to an external subjectivity which gazes at us and transforms us into objects, and not in terms of the actualization of possibilities which bring about novel potentials and different realizations? The Spinozist body informs the differential in a body according to what the body can (or cannot) do! The difference produced by a body's change would still be a deduction, but now an intuition derived from the difference between what a body could not do beforehand and what it can now do and vice-versa.

One way I can reconstitute the intervening experiential procession is to go back in search of lost time and produce tableau upon tableau which together constitute a cinematic montage of my life. Or I can go back to the shoebox of memory-images and imagistically recreate a cinematic montage of a pictorial history of my life. Either way, my quest to reconstitute the past becomes a search, a research, a research-creation of the past: "Chercher? Pas seulement: créer" (PROUST, 1987, p. 143). The result of this search is often a sequential narrative of this, that and the next thing, a historical reconstruction of static tableaux: A happens and then B and then C... and arranged serially, we end up with a reconstitution of time's passage as ordinal passage of counted moments. But if we take Proust at his word and search for the lost time that has transpired, we are left with a different undertaking—the search for the intervening experiential procession as transformational event. We are not searching for a what? or a why? but a how?

Thus, we seek to understand continuous processual becoming in terms founded on the dynamics of interaction characterised as imagistic. For Bergson, bodies are images and images are defined as an action-reaction dynamic separated by an indetermination. Thus, bodies are the result of a cumulation of action and reaction and the world is likewise composed of images derived from infinite interactivity. The child designates a specific modality of bodying and it is this becoming that we are looking to investigate. *Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process* proposes an alternative approach to the understanding of the concepts of the child and childhood through the operative concepts of becoming and of

Becoming-Child. Its purpose is, first of all, to come to terms with experience as a processual becoming and express it in imagistic terms; secondly, to flesh out the concept of the experience of becoming-child in processual terms as molar, molecular and as a general phase of processual becoming; and, thirdly, to show how aspects of becoming-child surface in the films of Andrei Tarkovsky. We seek to show what imagistic process is and how it constitutes processual experience. To do this, we seek to construct these concepts through a philosophy of process and a philosophy of difference articulated as durational. We posit process as imagistic interactivity by basing it on the processual thought of Bergson and Deleuze which ideates the image as a dynamic assemblage of action and reaction. The immanent process which emerges from imagistic interaction is simultaneously embodying and perceptual and is termed becoming.

### **Becoming-Child as Concept**

Deleuze states repeatedly throughout his work that the task of the philosopher is to create concepts. Yet he does not leave us with a systematic plan as to how to go about it. And neither does he specify a precise location as to where to site the creation of concepts. However, we do have a detailed description of what a concept is for him (and for Felix Guattari) in *What is Philosophy?* (1994) and an intuitive development of what a concept could be otherwise throughout *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987). Despite the profuse production of thought on concepts, the concept is still considered a unit of thought which allows the organisation of knowledge about a field in question (CABRÉ, 1999). Traditionally, we would be satisfied with apprehending a concept's intension—its internal quantity or content as the sum of the attributes contained in it—so that “we can get its number” or *chiffre* in order to categorise it—is the concept ordinal or cardinal?<sup>34</sup> Is it relative or absolute? Is it atomic or substantial? Discrete or continuous? This operation usually represents a listing of those qualities which posits propositionally *what* perception allows us to discern and the internalised concept allows us to grasp. In terms of *Becoming-Child*, we wish to look at *how*

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<sup>34</sup> The informal phrase “To have someone's number” means to understand someone's motivations completely; to have an insight into their thoughts, actions, and character but it also can have a philosophical meaning which is invoked throughout the work of Deleuze as part of his mathematization of philosophy. The concept's number harkens back to the Pythagorean philosophy and Platonic number theory.

the concept *conceptualises* so that we can ascertain that what our processual definition of becoming-child is in fact as substantial and robust as any traditional, non-processual ideation of what a concept can do. If the imagistic model of Becoming-Child we wish to develop is going to mean something, then we must define what it is as a concept.

We can break-down the word concept into two parts—‘con/com’ and ‘cept’—and readily understand that the explication of the word ‘concept’ is predicated on the ‘togethering’ prefix ‘con/com’ and the root ‘cept’ as a capture. This presents the concept as perceptual both in a visual and tactile sense. So that the concept is the entity that captures together, that seizes jointly. Each variation we introduce to the characterisation of togethering will allow us to conceive capturing-together differently not only because the variation produces difference in the mode of togethering but also in the creative association of togethering and capture: “the inseparability of variations is the distinctive characteristic of the unconditioned concept” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1994, p. 126). We could take a common sense approach to the analysis of each word and problematise them infinitely by asking six simple questions: who? what? when? where? why? and how? Yet this would represent a naive way to analyse the concept of concept—we would need a more systematic and technical approach, but we still would need to satisfy these questions.

The old adage stating that “familiarity breeds contempt” was possibly referring the question of what is a concept. Our relation to the concept is very much like our relation to time as explained by St. Augustine: “What then is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know.” There is a familiarity to the use of concepts which obfuscates what exactly a concept is or does. As the fundamental construct in theories of mind and cognition, the concept qua concept is put to use as an idea that is triangulated within idiomatic usage as a term whose definition is too often neither distinct nor adequate. An ill-defined concept cannot be stated precisely or determinately—its essential nature lacks resolution. Traditionally, this lack of definition is understood in spatial terms and refers to poorly defined limits which result in poorly delimited and delineated boundaries and an indeterminate extension. But this lack of distinction can also be understood in optical terms as a lack of focus and deficient resolution. In the former, the image is unclear and indefinite and in the latter, the analysis too coarse, so that when the concept is not distinct, it is confused in two ways: its component elements are mixed up and indistinguishable from each other amongst themselves and it is not resolved, determined or

defined as a conceptual entity in itself and in relation to others. The concept extends over or through a series of constituent elements of notions under it which explain its essential nature and participates in series above it as a constituent element. The syntheses are adequate if they can propositionally enumerate the constituent notions and explain them recursively as they in turn become a series of their own. This kind of serial recursive analysis is almost interminable because “we call a notion adequate, not when the enumeration of subordinate marks has been carried to the farthest, but when they have been enumerated sufficiently for our present purpose” (THOMSON, 1866, p. 92). Today, we might rephrase this in terms of a level of tolerance as to what we might consider adequate in gauging the degree of primitivity of a concept’s constituent notions.

In terms of conceptualising becoming-child, perhaps one could say that becoming-child is more easily unfolded as an aspect of processual becoming than as the experiential occupation of the child. In describing process at least we have an intellectual predisposition towards understanding things as impermanent, unstable, changing; if we begin to unpack becoming-child through the child, immediately we get bogged down in the static of conceptual stability, permanence and perduration of what a child or childhood might be.

In this chapter we wish to explore what becoming-child is about in terms of the child. We begin by positing a conventional definition of childhood and demonstrate it as inadequate. As an offshoot of the received conception of the human, we show this definition to be deficient in terms of content and in terms of its formal constitution in relation to the world. Further, we indicate epistemological and linguistic issues which belay the possibility of proposing alternative-other conceptions. In response, we give definition to the idea of becoming through the composition of the child as the immanent co-arising of bodying and experience and come to the conclusion that the best way to explain this process is imagistically.

Even as late as 2008, in an introduction to *Childhood Studies*, we encounter that a growing body of the literature “points to the importance of childhood as a conceptual category and as a social position for the study of a previously overlooked or marginalized group—children” (KEHILY, 2008, p. 1). To consider children overlooked and marginalised is an unsettling assertion: the historical lateness in realising and acknowledging disenfranchisement within sociocultural approaches and institutional initiatives is unconscionable but not surprising. Like many concepts of the same ilk which accompany the

progressive concerns of what human experience can be as other to the dominant social and cultural categories of being, too much time has gone for the child and childhood to be recognised in their own right. The relative disinterest in children has diminished as the relevance of dominant categories and universal concepts have fallen into disrepute. As Samantha Frost (2016) asserts, “the characteristics, qualities, and capacities that heretofore have been taken to define and distinguish a human, humanity—the human—have been so profoundly discredited through historical, social, and scientific analysis that the notion itself seems to be bankrupt, with very little left to recommend it” (FROST, 2016, p. 1). But it is within this discredited framing that the concept of the child and childhood have come to be defined.

### **A variety of conceptual models**

The concept of childhood is complex not only in its definition as a contended category of experience but also in its historical explication and its cross-cultural comparisons (DINTER & SCHNEIDER, 2018; STEARNS, 2016; GRAY & MACBLAIN, 2015; KEHILY, 2008; GAITÁN-MUÑOZ, 2006; PROUT, 2004; JAMES & JAMES, 2004). Childhood is a constructed concept which exists at the intersection of a variety of disciplines and research fields and cannot be understood or interpreted through a single disciplinary lens, epistemological perspective, or historical outlook. Yet, to offer a definition of childhood that satisfies the criteria imposed by the various disciplines and approaches having a stake in the concept would merely reduce it to its simplest and most common sense denominator as the stage of human life between birth and puberty—but even then, there is disagreement as to whether infancy should be excluded and whether puberty is too early to call an end to childhood.

There is also no consistent conception of childhood that can be traced through history or from one culture to the next (STEARNS, 2016; WYNESS, 2012; JENKINS, 1998) and thus one cannot proffer a conception consistently handed down over time or common to all cultures: there is no homogeneous understanding of childhood that can be applied to describe the experience within one culture, never mind cross-culturally. It is only in the late 20th century that Western-formulated paradigms of childhood have been developed by various multi-national institutions—governmental, academic and media—and widely disseminated and imposed top-down as standardised global norms of what the experience



of childhood is or ought to be. This uniform conception of childhood leads to the obliteration of child cultures globally which diverge from the Western norm—whether it seeks to do so or not. It judges the childhoods of other-Western cultures as lacking or inferior, homogenises the understanding of the experiencing of childhood and effaces difference by the replacement of indigenous local cultures by mass-marketing imagery and consumerism to render them receptive to Western cultural product. But this colonisation of childhood and homogenisation of experience is not reserved for non- or under-developed nations, it is liberally dosed upon the hyper-developed West as a commercial and corporate uniformity of an idealised consumerist vision of the world.

Childhood has been mostly defined prescriptively by ‘adults’ and by institutions. Yet any of these definitions is always contentious not only because of the disciplinary boundaries and the imperatives of research, but because childhood is also a very personal fundamental experience. Like the Cartesian formulation that states that we all know what thinking is, everyone has an idea of what childhood is for we have all have been children at some point, have had children, and have observed, interacted, and related with children. This reflects the rift between the various theoretical conceptions of childhood and the experience of childhood itself which defies normalisation or codification. In response, childhood as a concept has been more recently constructed as an aggregate of representative characteristics or attributes of what being a child entails experientially *in itself* which tries to satisfy a theoretical formulation and personal experience (JAMES & PROUT, 1997; JENKS, 1996; FRAME & MATSON, 1987).

Woodhead (2008) maintains the paradigm of the construction of childhood as a social phenomenon but emphasises an interdisciplinary approach which calls for greater consideration of children’s roles in its formulation. For him, children’s development is also a social and cultural process which requires coping with multiple versions of childhood in different settings and dealing with often conflicting demands of social relation and shared activities which involve their own codes, languages, economies, societies, rituals and celebratory rites. For Woodhead, childhood is overtly and intensely political and thrives within discourses of power, of regulation, of media, of class, of control, of health, of gender and of gender non-conformity which now includes LGBTQ discourses, substance abuse, violence, sexuality, delinquency, communication, entertainment, cognition and the commercial monetisation of all aspects of life. And these themes need to be somehow

addressed not only as aspects of the child's experiential ecology which condition experience and affect children's lives but which constitute their own immediate personal experience.

Institutional definitions of childhood are usually predicated along the primary needs of children, basic rights and best interests. Although according to Woodhead (1997) the "basic needs" discourse provides a powerful rhetorical device to construct versions of childhood, it has been discredited for inculcating Western prescriptive models and has in due course been replaced by a child-centred discourse of children's rights. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNITED NATIONS, 1989) bases its legally binding principles designed to protect and promote children's welfare in areas such as health, education and the family articulated in terms of rights to protection, provision, prevention and participation towards a gauging of childhood in terms of quality of life (KEHILY, 2008). The UNCRC provides a wide scope for the application of laws towards the construction of childhood in legal terms. Thus, legislation has been put in place in narrower jurisdictions to use the law towards the drafting and application of site-specific regulation and enforcement of children's rights and the control and prevention of child abuse, exploitation, domestic violence and the oversight of juvenile justice that reflects local customs and culture, history, religion, or any other imperative.

Children are still portrayed in terms that perpetuate prescriptive *norms of being* articulated within strict, static normalised categorisations. Within developmentalism, childhood is compared to procrustean norms and evaluated according to benchmarked developmental milestones and pre-set structures, which compartmentalise physical development, motor skills, cognitive capacities, linguistic abilities, behavioural norms, social strictures, sexual dispositions and gender identity. Development refers both to the process and the concrete result of this process as well as to intermediate steps towards the fuller unfolding of the embodiment or its realisation. Development represents the process or movement towards the production of a natural force, energy or new form of matter—a body—as a dynamic undertaking which leads to something or is compared to an idealised attainment. It is characterised as an evolution from an elementary condition containing certain latent potentials or capabilities which emerge from within, grow over time and culminate in perduring stasis. The development thus has a genetic origin which unfolds organically as a gradual advancement through progressive stages marked by benchmarks and standardised criteria according to pre-established norms and goals.

As a programmed series of developmental specifications and milestones towards an abstract objective, childhood is divided into discreet ontogenetic stages or phases which qualify every aspect of a child's life according to quantifiable norms: physical, motor, cognitive, language, gender expression, emotional and social skills as a way of controlling and disciplining its indeterminable nature. These norms thus standardise childhood in terms of studied statistical 'normalcy' which define typical social forms, what is average, healthy and acceptable not only as measures or indicators but as a regimentation to which public and social domains subscribe towards social intervention and regulation (TURMEL, 2008). Thus, through its observation, recording, measuring, comparison and codification, the child-body is evaluated and assessed and becomes a commodity for various institutions: educational, social, political, pharmaceutical, medical, judicial, psychoanalytical, mediatic, commercial.

Although the heyday of the developmental paradigm lasted from 1850 to 1945 (TURMEL, 2008), it is still an influential mode of thinking childhood because it ties-in with thought in the social sciences which understands all manners of societal progress as developmental. But even if it is at present a generally outmoded theory, developmentalism is undergoing a resurgence thanks to the work of Gray & MacBlain (2015) who are bring on a paradigmatic change to how developmentalism is understood by way of process. Different aspects of development demand different approaches. And although psychology prefers an eclectic approach to explain the process, there are various developmental theories which address specific issues: Behavioural theory; Psychoanalytic theories; Humanistic Theory; Cognitive Theory; Ecological Theory; Sociocultural Theory. Each of these developmental models or theories can in turn be classified according to criteria which characterise them according to conceptual frameworks which foreground salient features, compositional make-up, qualities, functions, behaviours, or expression but do not attempt to offer a complete, systematic explanation of childhood. Developmental theory represents an appealing point of departure from which to predicate the processual expression of becoming-child because as a jump-off point into the processually 'uncharted', it is already conceived in dynamic terms. The work of Jean Mater Mandler (2004) (and with Cristobal Pagán Cánovas, 2014) on dynamic cognitive structures and their introduction of spatial primitives, imagistic schemas and schematic integrations represents a rapprochement between received ideas of development and what a processual theory of development could

possibly look like. More recently, Lerner and Overton (2014, 2017) have been working within a process-relational developmental systems (RDS) framework which moves towards the expression of development as process.

In order to move away from prescriptive, adult-framed conceptual definitions imposed from above, James and Prout (1997) propose a paradigm built around an actively negotiated set of social relationships within which the early years of human life are constituted, not as an adult-in-the-making but as a child-centred conception. In this model, which distances itself from other possible informing outlooks, childhood is understood as a social construction and as a variable of social analysis. It asserts that children’s social relationships and cultures are worthy of study in their own right, in that they are independent of the perspective and concerns of adults because they are not just the passive subjects of social structures and processes. The paradigm endorses an ethnographic methodology for the study of childhood as a phenomenon in relation to which the double hermeneutic of the social sciences of the reconciliation of structure and agency is acutely present—which is to say, to proclaim a new paradigm of childhood sociology would be also to engage in and respond to the process of reconstructing childhood in society.

H maturity								ego integrity v. despair
G adulthood							generativity v. stagnation	
F young adulthood						intimacy v. isolation		
E puberty and adolescence				identity v. role confusion				
D latency				industry v. inferiority				
C locomotor-genital			initiative v. guilt					
B muscular-anal		autonomy v. shame, doubt						
A oral sensory	basic trust v. mistrust							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Figure 2.2: Erikson's Eight Ages of Man. *Childhood and Society* (1993).

## Becoming-child as diagrammatic or the diagram of Becoming-child

In his classical study, *Childhood and Society* (1950), Erikson proposes a diagram (Figure 2.2) which illustrates the functioning of childhood stages as the normative sequence of psychosocial gains made at each stage (ERIKSON, 1993). It is an 8 x 8 grid where the abscissa is labelled 1-8 to denote his eight stages of human life and the ordinate identifies the eight corresponding controversies. His framework, which relies heavily on psychoanalytical theory, is predicated upon a sequence of developmental stages which he calls the “Eight Ages of Man”.<sup>35</sup> Arranged as a series, these span the entire human life-cycle and each articulates a specific “essential strength” as controversies. These include: Basic Trust v. Basic Mistrust (Hope), Autonomy v. Shame and Doubt (Willpower), Initiative v. Guilt (Purpose), Industry v. Inferiority (Competence), Identity v. Role Confusion (Fidelity), Intimacy v. Isolation (Love), Generativity v. Stagnation (Care), and Ego Integrity v. Despair (Wisdom).<sup>36</sup> Each cell of the diagonal, ascending progression as an individual phase “comes to its ascendance, meets its crisis, and finds its lasting solution” in the subsequent stage as an integrative subsumption. The conflict to be resolved within each stage occupies a square in a left-to-right ascending diagonal as the prescribed sequence towards the attainment of ego-integrity as an ideal of teleological fulfilment and all other squares are left blank. But the individual must master each phase or forego it forever: for example, if an individual does not master basic trust in the first phase they will be forever mistrustful. Erikson is quite straightforward in admitting its shortcomings: “All of this should make it clear that a chart of epigenesis suggests a global form of thinking and rethinking which leaves details of methodology and terminology to further study” (ERIKSON, 1993, p. 246). The blank cells would seem to demonstrate the inability of the conception to deal with any variance or deviation from the upwards and onwards understanding of existence as a sequence of closed-off blocks, even if “the chart formalizes a progression through time of a differentiation of parts” (ERIKSON, 1993, p. 244).<sup>37</sup> The remaining blocks represent a virtual

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<sup>35</sup> These are identified variously as: Birth-2 years, 2–3, 3–5, 6–12 (Puberty), Puberty–18/19, 19/20–30s, 35-65, 65–death.

<sup>36</sup> This was later refined as the Nine Stages of Psychosocial Development, where the last stage is divided into Integrity v. Despair and Despair v. Hope and Faith.

<sup>37</sup> However, in describing the inner progression from one stage to the next, Erikson, uses quite interesting language which resonates with the writings of Deleuze and Guattari: “...the diagonal

landscape looking to be populated by aberrant individuals which have no discernible status or definable identity. For us, the blank spaces represent the tip of the iceberg in terms of what constitutes possibilities for alternative existences. And it is these areas that we seek to articulate alternative modes of possibility.

In contrast to Erikson's linear development paradigm, the list of developmental criteria proposed earlier—physical attributes, motor skills, cognitive capacities, linguistic abilities, behavioural norms, social strictures, sexual dispositions and gender identity—can just as easily be applied to adolescence, adulthood and old age or to track an entire lifespan. To list them as qualities allows us to conceive of intensive assemblages because they provide components through which diversity of human existence is discerned. The disciplinary imposition of certain ranges to each criterion begets certain fundamental relational constraints or affordances as favourable ratios in combining with other criteria to produce combinatorial limitations of possibility as categories. Together these criteria can produce infinite degrees of variation and infinite degrees of possibility to create a limitless variation of assemblages which can populate the blank spaces of Erikson's developmental scheme. Some of these will fall within the range of parameters that are considered normal<sup>38</sup> and thereby constitute a recognised category; others will fall within prescribed ranges and constitute wayward variants yet recognisable as being within a category, e.g. an adult with low-level linguistic abilities which are child-like; and others will have a minority of parameters within prescribed ranges and thereby constitute aberrant variants completely outside of the norms as atypical individuations. Yet, once these individuations are rendered as individualisations, we cannot fall in the trap of committing to these combinations as static and pre-defined categories but need to continue to affirm them as changing fluxes of movement constantly territorialising and deterritorialising. Seen in this manner, these criteria become forces and their relation constitutes the creation of larger unities which express political, disciplinary, institutional lineages which direct unfolding and steer the production of subjectivity.

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indicates the sequence to be followed. However, it also makes room for variations in tempo and intensity. An individual, or a culture, may linger excessively over trust and proceed from A1 over to A2 to B2, or an accelerated progression may move from A1 over B1 to B2. Each such acceleration or (relative) retardation, however, is assumed to have a modifying influence on all later stages." (ERIKSON, 1993, p. 246).

<sup>38</sup> Which would indicate that normalcy is also intensive.

Becoming is marked by change that is discernible as qualitative difference. So if becoming is marked and expressed by movements and rest, slowness and celerity, passage and change, the difference that arises within advance as discernible change cannot be constituted by atoms—as discernible finite elements endowed with form, they are too physical and also too Ideal and overly-well defined in their constitution. The materiality of becoming relies on elements and particles of a nondescript identity, whose agency as a capacity to act and to be acted upon cannot be dismissed. They are the dark matter between integers that can produce infinite gradation of transition, of passage, of a gradual intensification, whose presence we predicate despite their imperceptibility. We can appreciate the marked difference within becoming as populated by an infinity of appreciable differences which mediate the procession of the advance.

The affirmation of variety introduces turbulence into categories and can render them useless or invalid, but it is not up to us to prescribe limits that curtail the possibilities of their respective combination. The interaction of these uncensored criteria produces infinite, 'immanent' variation "that no longer depends on a structure or development, but on the combination of mutating fluxes, on the production of speed and the combination of particles" (DELEUZE & PARNET, 1987, p. 119). And if children are always drawing-up maps, it is because becoming-child is plagued by an unstable and fluid unfolding, which never gels as a cartography or is cursed by a tracing over and over with divergences, stutters and lines of flight which demonstrate the non-closure of understanding: for children, the repetition is always novel—and that is the reason behind their incessant refrain 'are we there yet?'. However, the combination of criteria with others happens within certain ranges of interaction to constitute and produce the diagrammatism of becoming. "Every society has its diagram" (DELEUZE, 1988, p. 35), and it is incorporated, imprinted onto becoming-child as constitutive of its modelling of reality and its machinic understanding of truth as an operative functionality. The combinatory latitude of the criteria of childhood is a reflection of the display of the relations between forces which constitute power by concretising these assemblages as a vertical integration (DELEUZE, 1988) which deviates the becoming and it is this progressive concretisation into aberrant pathways of becoming which differentiates this conception from Erikson's.

It is affect internalised and cast outwards as imagistic impressions of intensity not quite rendered adequate, not quite imprinted, not quite memorial. If anything it reflects

“the pure function of imposing a particular taste or conduct on a multiplicity of particular individuals” (DELEUZE, 1988, p. 72). Concepts are described as bundles of features without which the entity would be unable to exist. In contrast to the environments which reify the artificial reproduction of alienating molar social illusions imbued with false consciousness, we consider Deleuze and Guattari’s text anew to pursue those dynamic trajectories which point to new horizons and lead to wayward territorialisations as landscapes of creation. These spaces of becoming-child are extensions of possibility, of territorialisations by means other than the occupation or inhabitation of volumetric space. They literally are physical locales, but these are usually only background for the mental occupation of thought, the extension of emotional or affective intensities, of expansive narratives of fabulation and empathic communication, or of the common space of the excluded middle of educational complicity. The qualities, substances, powers and events which constitute these milieus and produce cartographies built-up of patchwork, a field, a common ground of experiential exposition from which emerges the creation of a territory and the bodies which together temporalise the becoming of that territory. And these territories manifest themselves not only in terms of space but in terms of language, clothing, games, music, dance, leisure and rest, levels of intensity, of sexual expression, of artistic freedom, modes of communication, of temporalisation, of racial profiling, of social interaction which codify and channel, which begin the habituation of restrictions, limitations and closing produced by disciplinary and institutional confinement and the imposition of close-quarter socialization. From the youngest ages, children are coded into a striated childhood as opposed to the smooth becomings of being brought differently in alternative milieus. The time-spaces to which children are being relegated to such as creches, kindergartens, child-start nursery schools, preschools, day cares, grade-schools, and after-school activities are artificial milieus of limited subjectivity. They do give children a chance to socialise and widen their communal horizons and are put in place with “the best interests of the child at heart” but these artificial environments allow the socio-economic machine of productivity to function untrammelled and provide for public order and safety. It is these grounds of common existence that eventually also give way to molar territories of childhood which are territorialisations of the static, idealised, commercial conceptions of what childhood is supposed to be. So that the settings of becoming-child tend to be other than the spaces



coded for the realisation of preconceived, prescribed, predetermined experiences as actualisations of molar beings.

Gaitán-Muñoz (2006) develops the sociological paradigm further in terms of a full-blown New Sociology of Childhood that seeks to reveal the real position of children in societies in their own right. She builds on the work of James and Prout (1997, 1978), Jenks, (1996), as well as MAYALL (2002) and ALANEN (2001) who focus child studies on a sociology of children, the deconstructive sociology of childhood, and a structural sociology of childhood. These are articulated through detailed (and useful) relational, constructivist and structuralist breakdowns, yet, surprisingly, stops short of a post-structuralist analysis. This triadic cartography is then further systematically classified according to childhood, children, society, sociology in order to foreground the nuances between the various approaches. Gaitán-Muñoz repeatedly invokes process as a constructive activity which is practical and material, and which functions as a consistent practice towards a generation-making (*hacer generación*), or alternatively as an ensemble or aggregate of practices which contribute towards the creation of sense and the generational (hierarchical) content of order (2006, p. 23).

The New Sociology of Childhood promotes a fashioning of childhood which focuses on the top-down codification of childhood (GAITÁN-MUÑOZ, 2006) whereas the developmental psychology approach and its ancillary technics is intent on establishing benchmarks and the numeric evaluation of “performance” according to statistically preset normative values (BRACKEN & NAGLE, 2007; DAVIS, 2011; KRANZLER & FLOYD, 2013; GARGIULO & METCALF, 2017). But none of these provide a justification for the underlying movement that marks the procession of advancement—what drives childhood are transcendent causes which produce changes upon or in the child in accordance with an Aristotelian breakdown of material, formal, efficient or final causes which emphasise a linear or serial cause and effect relation. The child is the subjective entity under study as both suffering the “causes” of its being but also as the object upon which childhood is predicated. The child has not had the subjective heft, the critical mass, the expressive wherewithal, to define its own subjectivity, leaving it to others to carry out the task of giving voice to their being, most always by adults. Who the child is, what the child is and why the child is has been defined and constructed by external subjectivities which only recently have begun to take into consideration the child’s subjective experience into consideration (FREEMAN &

MATHISON, 2008). The child and childhood are thus in a perpetual state of tension between the various models which theorise and conceptualise it, and there is always a gap between the child as the known, as the object of study, and the child as the knower and articulator of the knowledges which define it.

If the theoretical complexification of childhood, its application towards the description and the interpretation of childhood, and the concordance with the experience of being a child, it is inevitable that discussions transgress disciplinary boundaries. Childhood as a heterogeneous, constructed concept presently exists at the intersection of a variety of disciplines and research fields (psychology, sociology, anthropology, literature, law, education, medicine, geography etc) and cannot be understood or interpreted through a single disciplinary lens. Concepts acquire generality and depth through the insights of a range of disciplines which not only elucidate the concept from different angles, but in a variety of milieus and through an assortment of scales implicated through the agency of various players. The various approaches used to describe childhood move beyond eclecticism by accepting that concepts are not homogeneous entities and require a different ideation of their conceptual make-up. By submitting to the ideation of the concept as heterogeneous, discussions of childhood are no longer contained within strict singular disciplinary limits because all discourses are neither fully-explanatory of the phenomena they study nor can they preclude the inevitable disciplinary cross-overs. Further, the complexity cannot repudiate the effects of descriptive or explanatory cross-contamination (or enrichment) between one discipline and others. This is a weightier issue than disciplinary or departmental turf wars or individual egos<sup>39</sup> in that it speaks to the epistemological challenges that are implicit to all academic discourses which are brought on by the circumscription of knowledges.

We agree that the interdisciplinary approach is a sophisticated comprehension of childhood (JAMES & JAMES, 2008; WOODHEAD & MONTGOMERY, 2002; GARVIS & MANNING, 2017). We advocate this approach not only as a superior understanding of childhood which seeks to provide a more sound clinical approach towards the provision of care and services grounded on the needs of the child. Multidisciplinarity represents a highly pertinent engagement with the concept of childhood and defining its manifestation in the

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<sup>39</sup> Cf LATOUR, Bruno (1987). *Science in action: how to follow scientists and engineers through society*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

world, but despite its disciplinary heterogeneity it is far from offering a holistic comprehension of the childhood experience in itself not only of the child's engagement with the world as experiencing but of the internal experiencing of the processual constitution of experiencing. Yet their approach relegates process to a secondary status in relation to the analytical outcome and resultant conception—the interactivity of childhood as process is still studied but understood *through its effects* in social, political, cultural, educational and legal milieus as opposed to being the object of study itself. The child is seen through its social agency or more directly as a social agent and as members of a 'minority' group. As Mittelstraß asserts, a transdisciplinary approach would here move towards a different apprehension of childhood and its issues by transcending disciplinary boundaries to address and solve it as a problem related to the life-world (HADORN et al. 2008).

### **The Demise of the majoritarian conception of the Adult Male**

Despite the shortcomings of these conceptual propositions, children and childhood are still invariably portrayed in terms that perpetuate the traditional ways in which concepts are presented within strict, static normalised categorisations. Childhood is still compared to pre-set procrustean norms and its being quantified according to benchmarked developmental milestones dictated as pre-set developmental structures, which compartmentalise physical development, motor skills, cognitive capacities, linguistic abilities, behavioural norms, social strictures, sexual dispositions and gender identity. As a programmed series of developmental specifications and milestones, childhood is divided into discreet ontogenetic states or phases which classify every aspect of a child's life according to quantifiable norms: physical, motor, cognitive, language, gender expression, emotional and social skills as a way of controlling and disciplining its indeterminable nature. Whatever a child's standing in the world might be, its only purpose, social or ontological, is to not stay a child (JENKS, 2008) but to ultimately fulfil its destiny as an adult—which within patriarchal culture is referenced to the male adult.

Male adulthood is still too often accepted as the full and only realisation of human potential, and anything that has not attained that status is dismissed as being of little consequence and therefore irrelevant and not worthy of attention. And it is Childhood is still seen as an inferior mode of being which as a yet-to-be-something cannot claim full status as

a fully-fledged adult-male identity. Although still seen principally as raw capital as potential adults, children are often considered insignificant and defined negatively with respect to the adult, male standard—physically they are small, uncoordinated and weak; they are immature of judgment and experience; emotionally, they are dependent and vulnerable; they have no power, recognised rights, no definite knowledge, ability or skills; their utterances, gestures and doings are deemed meaningless—they are beings of very little substance. Ontologically, on account of the inordinate growth and change they undergo from birth until maturity, children present a major problem in terms of seriously being considered entities: they are almost dismissed as non-beings and only grudgingly accepted in the world of men and things. In some contexts, they are invisible and voiceless—neither seen nor heard. Their status is similar to the status of women prior to feminism except that children do not have the standing, means or political heft women can muster (Oakley, 1994). As Qvortrup (1999) points out, childhood has been suffering a paradoxical division between where children have been “encompassed with a growing concern” by their familiars and friends as well as psychological sciences, and simultaneously “exposed to an increasing indifference as a collectivity” which Hardman (1973) has called “muted voices”. The prejudice and mistrust is never explicitly stated but subtly hinted at—Greene and Hogan, for example, point out that “there is still a wariness of relying on children’s views on their own lives and therefore on their experience” and further “children’s individual experience is typically not valued as a focus of research since it is perceived as unreliable and idiosyncratic” (GREENE & HOGAN, 2005, p. xii).

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) advocate the wilful embracing of any mode of existence other than the proscribed model of Being and Identity exemplified by the ideal of a white, Western, urban, Christian male. If the system of thought which theorises and ideologically subtends Being and Identity specifically appoints its teleology towards this dominant, patriarchal ideal, any existence predicated on change and difference which opposes Being and Identity cannot be granted existential status and is termed a non-being—this is not to say that it is non-existent, but that it is neither here nor there, that it is indeterminate. By endorsing the non-being, we do not choose death or non-existence, but an existence that has no clear provenance and no distinct destination in its perpetual becoming neither this nor that: it is neither A nor B and is caught in the middle as a becoming-other. By virtue of its becoming, it does not have “being”, it only perdures as an indefinite, indeterminate and

uncertain expression through its sustained becoming different. Even the general or common notion is the seed crystal which predicates a mode of specific replication but which is incapable of predicting an outcome, product or end result. For no one, not even God, can say in advance whether one given multiplicity will allow its heterogeneous components to entertain a transformative, consistent or cofunctioning machinic symbiosis.

Why do we consider children as indiscernible and unsubstantial when they are so obviously visible in the world? For the same reason that women, blacks, aboriginals, gays, lesbians, transgendered, the mentally ill, the foreign, the homeless, the unemployed and the Other are invisible. When we say that they are invisible or indiscernible, we don't mean that we cannot see them only because they are under-represented in power structures and institutions and have no impact on the decisions of consequence in social and political matters. What we mean is that they are non-beings. "To be" is pegged to being white, male and adult—so that if we cannot associate our actual being or our potential to somehow being male, then we cease to exist.

In making the split between being and non-being, Deleuze and Guattari multiply or pluralise non-being as an opposition to being in terms which are traditionally opposite to the paradigmatic ideal model of the white Western male: the becoming which to them most defines the diametrical opposite of being male is female, hence becoming-woman is usually invoked as the prototypical mode of becoming. "There is no becoming-man because man is the molar entity par excellence" (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 292). So continuing this train of thought, we have a number of oppositions to the white, Christian, Western, urban, human man which are expressed as infinite Others, as possibilities which express difference as becoming-black, becoming-Jewish, becoming-black, becoming-animal, becoming-cyborg, becoming-child, etc.

"A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, an imitation or, at the limit, an identification" (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 237). It is not a simile or metaphor. It is the explication of the account or the relation of difference as an and, and, and, and... that allows the accrual of understanding as an intuitive montage through the becoming itself and not through the repetition of the supposedly fixed terms. And so we need to indicate how the movement from potential to actualisation takes form: how can the mattering of childing as differentiable from other forms of mattering, of material modification be expressed as the passage of time, as temporal creation? Becoming-

Child is not a filiation, but a mode of relation, of association into assemblages, so that the conceptual unfolding of Becoming-Child is not a listing of properties or characteristics, but their molecular socialisation of — the functional interaction of dynamic elemental masses as constitutive of bodies. How do these modes of relation, of assemblage, of composition express “expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, peopling”, which is nothing more than an affective aggrandisement? (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 239). Becoming-Child spreads by these modes of proliferation as an unknowing and unwitting repetition. Not as a filiation that is genetically passed on, but an acquired penchant, a learned predisposition that comes to inhabit us like an illness, hence, the need for a symptomatology and a clinical approach to understanding Becoming-Child. If we wish to categorise the becoming of the child as opposed to classifying it or defining it, then we must become-child with it through our capacity of what we can say of it as essential and as the specific cartography that is being mapped out as a circuit of affects, as a symptomatological diagram of contagion.

A childing is a phenomenon of bordering, of pushing the limits and crossing of thresholds of becoming—always going beyond the boundaries that seek to delimit his possibilities. It is this transcending of limits as the activation of potentials that produces the inconstancy and anomalous of the Becoming-Child as the facilitation of change. To become is the unfolding of anomaly, of existing as outstanding not only as exceptional or singular, but as outside the rules or against the rule of the Laws of Thought. Not as abnormal as outside the norm, but as differential and without a norm. It is the affectual of the event as a singular expression that cannot be ascertained or rendered perfectly adequate as a precise definition, even if it can somehow be grasped as an individuation at the limit of determination of possibility.<sup>40</sup> At this limit, at the fringes of the known and the unknown, space and time are being simultaneously produced as occupation—as a doing and as extension—as differentiation and diferenciación: both aspects are integrated through their processual co-arising in the becoming.

Thus, the annals of orthodox philosophy seek fixity and persistence in Being, Essence and Identity as opposed to process philosophy’s multiplicitous becoming and duration within the distinction of things versus events. Official philosophy predicates the concept according to a series of characteristics which look to maintain the objective integrity of an entity. This

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<sup>40</sup> In Spain, there are two popular expressions that acknowledge this limit condition, of not behaving “normally”, within the normal curve of social norms: “No te pases!” and “Que borde!”

includes discrete individuality, separateness, the fixity of nature, individualised specificity, descriptive fixity, classificatory stability and passivity (RESCHER, 1996). Together, these ideas establish the ground rules for the belief in things as independent, distinct and self-contained entities which are always compared to Ideal Forms—which are legitimately existent and possess Being—which are directly implied by the static ontology behind Being and a *sine qua non* of the currently dominant Substance Philosophy. To sustain this system, the Scholastic scholars of the Middle Ages codified these ideas into the Principles of Thought not so much for postulating philosophical clarity but for theological certainty. Hence, in order for a thing to be, that thing has to subscribe to the following Laws: The Law of Identity: If a thing is A then it is A; the Law of Noncontradiction: A thing A cannot be A and not A at the same time (at the time it is A ); the Law of Excluded Middle: A thing A is either A or not A. And if something does satisfy these Laws, its being is denied and therefore cannot be. Through these Principles or Laws of Thought one can ascertain the ontologically real, the cognitively necessary and what can be taken as direct, uninferred, unmediated knowledge. These three laws set the ground rules for the determination of subjective and objective entities with precisely defined borders and predicates the foundation for coherent thought, logical systems, causality and universals.

With these qualities, it becomes possible to conceive change-exempt entities endowed “with the permanence of perduring substances over time, supposing that things remain self-identical through time on the basis of their possession of certain essential features or properties that remain changelessly intact across temporal changes” (Rescher, 1996, p. 49). Clearly, these are not the most optimal descriptors for children or childhood, for the only enduring quality in childhood is change plied onto a changing substratum.<sup>41</sup> In childhood, we would be hard pressed to define a ‘material thing’ or ‘substantial entity’ that we can say is the essential nature (*natura naturata*) that endures through the changes of its properties within advance. Becoming-child occupies those median regions (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 248) described by the inconsistencies revealed by becoming being unable to satisfy the Laws of Thought. If the child-body A constantly undergoes internal change, it is never a perduring A and therefore is itself never A, and because it is always

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<sup>41</sup> To articulate the concept of the child this way is tantamount to subscribing to a hylomorphic scheme where change as form is plied onto a substrate as matter. We will see that both are immanent and simultaneously co-arising as becoming. However, the change that we are invoking here is a change to how this multiplicity changes in its capacities to interact with the world.

undergoing change, the changing entity A is always both A and not A simultaneously. Hence, the child-body 'A' does not subscribe to the Laws of Thought because A constantly undergoes internal change, it is never a perduring A and therefore is itself never A, and because it is always undergoing change, A is always A and not A at the same time or both A and not A simultaneously. Thus, the child as an entity which is undergoing internal change and suffering external change simultaneously cannot have a descriptive fixity because none of the properties, attributes, qualities or features persist through the advance. For these same reasons, the child in childhood defies pigeonholing as a substantial being because there is no identitary stability to it and its coherence in terms of its unity of being is questionable at best.

Becoming is a rhizome: it is not a classificatory or genealogical tree and so to understand becoming, we map out how its taproots combine with the elemental, earth, wind, and air that it engages with, that coax its advance into the unknown beyond its limits. But to come to terms with becoming we can resort to a categorisation that permits the articulation of processual difference-making and transformation.

Traditionally, for anything to be intelligible, we resort to categorisation. Aristotle's categories cognise the necessary conditions for comprehensibility: namely, substance (*ousia*), quantity (*poson*), quality (*poion*), relation (*pros ti*), place (*pou*), time (*pote*), disposition—position or condition—(diathesis *keisthai*), possession (hexis or *echein*), passion or affection (*paschein*) and action\_or activity (*poiein*). Similarly, for Kant, the categories are the logical functions in all possible judgments which as a priori concepts constitute pure understanding (KANT, 1993). These concepts are catalogued under four triadic classes—*quantity* (unity, plurality, totality), *quality* (reality, negation, limitation), *relation* (inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and reciprocal community) and *modality* (possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence, necessity-contingence)—which conjointly provide the necessary structure for *human understanding* to perceive and conceive what is given in experience (KANT, 1993).

Processual Thought militates against this a priori, transcendental knowledge attained independently of experience or even of all sense impressions and the way that these are expressed by Kant run counter to Bergson's ideation of how we come to understand experience. Aristotle's categories, as aleatory and unsystematic as Kant made them out to be, are already close to a processual understanding of experience and can be tempered



more readily into a processual expression which Kant's re-positing cannot allow. We can propose processual categories not as a systematic correlative translation of the fore-mentioned categories but as concepts that can liberate the expression of experience according to processual terms and not have the description fall back onto dualistic or substance-based ideations. Ultimately, the process is nothing else than the experiencing subject itself and these concepts, together, will allow us to understand experience as the complex and interdependent accretion of 'actual occasions' (WHITEHEAD, 1978). The main one, substance, is directly translatable into process because this is what for us underlies all experience of the world. Other concepts we could use to describe the processual of becoming are quantitative features of intensity, thematic nature, interconnections, processual location, aionic temporality, immanent organisation, disposition, space-time, duration, affect and poiesis.

Becoming is a mode *categorisation* that allows us to speak the event in its unfolding—not the essence or the thing in itself—but as a pure event, as a perceptual semiotic in the making of its telling as testimony. As a telling, the accounting is of the pure event as happening, as a hecceity, as a worlding entity. As a rhizome, we can allow for non-homogeneous or heterogeneous conceptual entities that embody otherwise—but how to flesh out the concept of Becoming-Child? Its principal problem deals with the potentiality becoming actual without any inherent or innate criterion to direct it. Not that any other type of becoming can be labelled directed, but Becoming-Child is even less so as it does not have any memorial habituation to fall back on. It is an affective involution of a singular un-heard of becoming that produces nothing other than itself and which has nothing other than itself as outcome and which has no term.

As we stated earlier, many of these categories are based on the stem Ποι- (Poi) which articulates the 'how' of a thing as the dynamic or processual manifestation of an entity. Presented this way, the object of categorisation is not a fixed static entity but a moving or coming to being, which by definition is a non-being. If categorisation is in movement, then it cannot be said to be adequate. Further, our objects of perception are composed of adequate and inadequate components, thus having compositional gradations of more or less adequacy—Bergson defines the inadequate of perception the affective, and so in describing these objects of perception, we are dealing with degrees of affective impressions. These constitute intensive assemblages, which are more or less, this or that—we can only

characterise the objects of association as indefinite relative intensities that contribute towards a comparative rationality. Thus, the only conclusive determination that can be made from this observational intensification is a statistical determination which is always qualified as a probability, as always have a contingent existential value.<sup>42</sup>

### **The experiential child—WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO HAVE EXPERIENCE**

Becoming-Child is not about how to become a child. It is about how specific modes of becomings traverse a body. When we invoke the concept of Becoming-Child, we need to understand that the same becoming is at play whether we are referring to a child Becoming-Child, or an adult Becoming-Child, or the general problematique of Becoming-Child. What is at issue is how the conceptual attributes, the accidental characteristics, the symbolic understanding, of what a child is said to be are expressed as actual becoming. An adult human being cannot become a child because “there is no transformation of essential forms—they are inalienable and only entertain relations of analogy” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 252). It is not an acting-out of resemblance—Becoming-Child is not about about a representation or a mimetic aping of the gestures of the child, but of engaging the underlying dynamic of the actualisation of potentials as a specific mode of creating difference which can be categorised as the infinitive of *childing*. To do so we need to articulate the categorical as temporal: if the child as a processual multiplicity is to be seen as the processual activity of *childing*, we end up thinking about a Becoming-Childing as a tale that provides an accounting—a narration that finds the right number.

In *What Children Say* (1997), one of Deleuze’s last texts, he wrote that “children never stop talking about what they are doing or trying to do: exploring milieus, by means of dynamic trajectories, and drawing up maps of them” (DELEUZE, 1997, p. 61). Normally, when we encounter a sentence such as this, we take it at face value and never stop to give it a second thought. We read it as ‘children are chatterboxes which enthusiastically look to share their experiences and impressions with others’. We read into the quote that children are curious, restless explorers of (what is to them) the unknown and produce irregular diagrams of lopsided, misshapen characters populating environments which are seemingly illogical

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<sup>42</sup> This conclusion vindicates the moderate form of Hume’s Consequent Skepticism.

and fanciful. From an adult perspective, which has been disciplined over time and conditioned to interpret the world in terms of the definite and the adequate, we only grasp the deficient and imperfect comprehension of the child. We don't realise that children are Spinozists. Their world is the realm of the immediate, of the affective, of a tenuous materiality whose relative rationality makes for a very fluid and unstable scaffolding. If Spinozism is the becoming-child of the philosopher, and the task of the philosopher is to create concepts, the child is the consummate philosopher because they are free of the archive that hobbles their experiential encounter with nature which conditions and directs their perceptions. A child left to his or her own devices to make sense of the world will conceptualise the world according to his or her own imagination—both in the sense of the faculty of fanciful phantasy but also by the affective give and take that imagistic thought entails.

The children are expressing their essence in processual terms—it is a improvised categorisation that narrates “the to be what is” of their engagement with the world articulated as experiential being-doing as an immediacy, which has no latency, no interval, no premeditation. It is asking us to consider the concept not as a method—a static perambulation, but a a nomadic exploration where the features spew forth like the writing that Deleuze and Guattari invoke. The heterogeneity of the conceptual construct is urging us to consider the concept formally under the guises of a different set of ontological considerations. We appear to be moving away from defining the child or childhood according to an indispensable quality or a unique identitary characteristic which marks it with its very own specific difference as a homogeneous individuation so as to predicate it as a multiplicity of heterogeneous components—all knowledge cannot nor need be represented the same way. Immediately, in this relatively short quote from Deleuze, we can extract subjectivities, ontologies, fields of research, methods, epistemological concerns and problems of metaphysics which very quickly question a material substance ontology approach and require that we interpret them in terms of abstract processual qualities. If children never stop talking it is because they are ceaselessly *categorising*. They are relating to, interacting with and about what they are experiencing, they are giving their accounting of their experience and finding the number to that which they are perceiving, and establishing their memorial cartographies.

Deleuze's quote brings up the question of children's experience as foundational to his ideation of becoming-child. Yet, we need to remind ourselves that experience is one of those concepts that has been stilled when translated to Latin from the Greek—like *essentia*. Experience translated to Greek, becomes ἐμπειρία, (*empeiria*) bare empiricism, an acquaintance with, a practice not based on knowledge or principles, but also a craft or an art (LIDDELL & SCOTT, 1883, p. 462). It goes from the activity of experimentation, of the active putting to the test, a tentative or speculative procedure in the encounter, to the activity one has performed, to the actual observation of facts or events, considered as a source of knowledge, which can then be accumulated and archived. And it is this fundamental empiricism which Becoming-Child seeks as anterior to any scientism. It is the material processual encounter with the world made practice — pragmatic, which operates in opposition to the transcendental of idealism as a thinking-doing.

In looking to advance theoretical underpinnings and methodological strategies for researching children's experiences, Freeman and Mathison (2008) offer two basic definitions of what experience can be: the apprehension of an object through the sense of mind or an event one has just participated in. The nexus of possibility comprised by experience thus points towards the encounter of the child with the world as event and to perceptual process as acquisition of knowledge. This brings us back to the assemblage, multiplicity and the intensification of *epistemē*, of minor science, in perception as what Deleuze refers to in Foucault's thought as the "pragmatics of the multiple" (DELEUZE, 1988, p. 84). And this is the ground zero of imagistic thought which Bergson elaborated in *Time and Free Will* (1889), *Matter and Memory* (1896) and *Creative Evolution* (1907).

### **Childhood as intensification**

Becoming is marked by change that is discernible as qualitative difference. So if becoming is marked and expressed by movements and rest, slowness and celerity, passage and change, the difference that arises within advance as discernible change cannot be constituted by atoms—as discernible finite elements endowed with form, for they are too physical and also too Ideal and overly-well defined in their constitution. The materiality of becoming relies on elements and particles of a nondescript identity, whose agency as a capacity to act and to be acted upon cannot be dismissed. They are the dark matter between

integers that can produce infinite gradation of transition, of passage, of a gradual intensification, whose presence we predicate despite their imperceptibility—the *materia prima* behaves more like potential waiting to be actualised than a physical matter waiting to be used to compose some thing. We can appreciate the marked difference within becoming as populated by an infinity of appreciable differences which mediate the procession of the advance.

Intensification is a process that occurs over time and is marked by thresholds to infinity. For example, take the event of night giving way to day. We all have an innate common-sense understanding of what night is and what day is but the transition from night to day is also usually understood as an indefinite gradation which varies in intensity over time. But when we are in the grip of the moment, we are fully implicated in the becoming as a being-doing, where being is mediated by the mediation itself and therefore transparent and invisible to its own becoming—the progression is imperceptible in itself—pure duration. We can arbitrarily define a time of day, an intensity of light, some measurable quality, some quantitative value as threshold whose crossing defines the end of night and the start of day—for example, we can designate 6:30 a.m. as the time it happens. But specifying the criteria to determine when night actually yields to day is difficult to define, although objectively we can usually state with certainty when it is no longer night and day has actually come: we can categorically state that “from now on, daytime will be understood to be one hour after dawn and one hour after sunset” and produce hard-and-fast, artificial thresholds.

In the event of night becoming day, no aspect of the advance can ever be understood as a black or white determination. First of all, it is always a varying gradation of intensities, not only of luminosity, but of the cumulative progression of subsidiary events which constitute the changeover in the event. Becoming day as an event, as a multiplicity is not only a light level, but is made up of street light turning off, chickens crowing, dogs barking, alarm clocks ringing, the laziness of enjoying the warmth of being in bed, barely opening one’s eyes to the realisation of light in the room, the smell of coffee brewing, waiting for the washroom because someone else is taking a shower, hearing the intensification of traffic on the street, getting one’s briefcase ready for work, bagging one’s lunch, tying one’s shoes, walking to work, checking one’s emails... The complexity as a concrete imbrication of the accumulating eventual becoming make experience an ecology of thresholds: one activity allows another one to happen along co-existent manifold critical paths. As the gradual

intensification of daytime overwhelms the quietude of night, we realise—but only if we stop and take pause—that a multitude of gestures and activities have been taking place, that manifold thresholds are being crossed, none of them obvious or critical—except if the sun did not rise—which mark the advance into the actualisation of virtual potential as a progressive, invisible, transparent normality. Without the execution of these small happenings, the advance cannot take place and give way to what comes next.




Figura 2.3: Hypothetical duration of Some Life as an assemblage of multiplicity exhibiting intensification over time. Abscissa in years. Image by the author.

In our depiction of Some Life of Figure 2.3, the intensities which constitute it as compositional events are actual: actual in that they are potentials activated. Thus, the intensities are less numerous, smaller and more fragmented in infancy and childhood, and become more numerous and protracted with age so that in middle age, we have the more numerous actualised intensities, and then they become fewer into old age until they become extinguished. Each of these subsidiary assemblages as intensities exist concretely for other assemblages as components but by the same token can exist as buds as potential offshoots into new directions of becoming. These can be understood as lines of flight which can take the dominant assemblage into unexpected dimensions of becoming where its occupation as both a becoming-doing and a taking up of space simultaneously de-territorialise the becoming-past and re-territorialise the becoming-future of the event along a new line of emergence. In wanting to determine some continuous line which subtends an entity's perduration as that without which an entity cannot be recognised as defining the machinic

disposition that can be labelled as some child or childhood, we need to keep in mind that it will always be an intensive, heterogeneous multiplicity and never a substantial homogeneity.

Thus, if we reconsider afresh the child and childhood as an assemblage, we have intensities as gradated differential becomings constitutive of that which we can discern as childhood as event. Each sub-assemblage which individually and together emerges as an assemblage become other by imperceptible grades. If we consider the rhizomic tuber shown above as the concept of childhood itself instead of Some Life, we can understand the coming to being of the concept as part of an actual event of a child's life as a gradated intensification. The concept can be applied gradually as a designation of what is occurring as it occurs, if the intensification satisfies the conditions of becoming which constitute becoming-child. The rhizomic tuber represents the operativity and applicability of the concept as descriptive of the event. In terms of constitutive elements, the intensive sub-assemblages are heterogeneous in nature as noted above. If we accept that childhood is made up of human and non-human intensive qualities, of organic and non-organic components, of forms, features, relations, applications, and capacities that are bundled together into the rhizome of becoming-child, together, these intensive qualities function to produce the child's body without organs as a becoming where transversal sections offer us planes of content and expression. This functioning together is machinic because the functional operativity of this machine is the production of its own perduration.

So how can we see a flesh-and-blood child as a becoming-child as a manifestation or expression of childhood as a processual entity in the world? We can examine the compartmentalised features of developmental criteria listed earlier—physical attributes, motor skills, cognitive capacities, linguistic abilities, behavioural norms, social strictures, sexual dispositions and gender identity—as intensive heterogeneous processual assemblages and understand them as expressive of an improvisational functionality that sees the child as an experiential other. We call into use the word improvisational because the process is seemingly aleatory, apparently without premeditation or preparation—it is *extempore*, out of time, external to time—because it is mostly a non-conscious, non-reliance on memory, and is particularly given to invention. It emerges from, through and within the conditionings which occasion the event as dictated upon the spur of the moment as immanent and durational. It is not a matter of fixing “numerically” the parameters within each criterion but of understanding them as productive of an ensemble that is singularly creative of difference

and novelty and that the combined variations are capable of constituting childhood differently from one instance to another and still be called childhood.

We can see how each of these categories constitutes its own intensive assemblage that serves as a compositional element within the rhizomic assemblage of childhood as an aggregation of fluctuating, gradating intensities. But we can also appreciate how the various components interact with each other to constitute a generic machinic assemblage of childhood which can be understood as a singular individuation productive or expressive of singular experience. Traditionally this is seen signifier and signified, as form and content, which the child articulates outward within the encounter with the world. The child as signifier, identified iconically as such, carries out activities in the world which are understood according to the various developmental criteria as the signified. In this hylomorphic scheme, matter and form are divorced as a binary construct which constitutes a double articulation: on one side, the disciplinary imposition of standards, norms, and frames of reference which impose patterns of recognition and codes that substantiate observation; on the other, the manifestation of expression of bodies to be perceived, indicated and appraised. This double articulation indicates a plane of consistency as the expression of a surface of becoming which we plainly see as the child—a body performing various acts and gestures, and certain gestures and certain acts understood as a bodying or embodiment of an event.

The unity of becoming as process is the unity of lawful order that need not be fully determinative but is at least delimitative (RESCHER, 1996). This echoes Bergson's idea of passage as durational, as a processual multiplicity that preserves a certain self-identity while undergoing change: How can we understand becoming-child as a duration when we define the child as a non-being? First off, becoming-child is not a filiation—all filiation is imaginary but imagistic. It is not a derivation from, an originating from, a transmission from—it is not a being descended from some anterior parentage. It is not a coming-to-being-of-a-child in the world as the begotten progeny issuing from an established lineage. If anything it is an alliance, a symbiosis, a creative involution of densification, of enrichment and intensification: it is a band or pack of multiplicities, both subsidiary and overriding, durational assemblages, superior and inferior to any specific becoming.

In macro-terms, we can say that childhood is characterised as “the life period during which a human being is regarded as a child, and the cultural, social and economic characteristics of that period” (FRONES, 1994, p. 148). In this definition, the duration of



childhood is built-in principally as a subsumed duration to the life period of a human being encompassed between birth and death. It's a hard and fast, one-size fits all determination which defines childhood as a time span between infancy and adulthood and which is subdivided according to developmental stages. These are categorical divisions which are, like all other categorical divisions, imperfect in that they never manage to fully or duly categorise experience. These imposed divisions are artificial (but not wholly arbitrary in that the durations represent a classification which is putatively a clean cut developmental phase limited by an artificial threshold as productive of a clear and distinct break but where the underlying instead presents itself as a fuzzy, frequency distribution of data. Thus, the strictly temporal divisions of childhood are variable and so defining them according to strict borders does violence to childhood itself.

If we look at the quote not in terms of form or content, not semantically or syntactically, but epistemically—as an intuited repurposing we can appreciate that he juxtaposes children's speech with milieus, trajectories and maps to urge us to characterise the nature of childhood differently: in activity as expression. He is prompting us nonchalantly to adopt a dynamic definition of childhood by redefining its essence. But the essence he is looking to articulate is not a list of representative characteristics or attributes but a shared discursive narrative of what childhood is about: it is more than a phenomenological awareness of their own cognitive activities, more than an indication of children's social experience as informing children's conceptual understanding of cognition (PILLOW, 2011). This experiential relation, both as the child's connection of their inner self with the outside world and the action of narrating the experience, locates the experience where it is happening and gives it a temporal dimension through the making common. It is an encounter with the world where inner experience is confused with external doings which juxtaposes the definition of the child as a closed set of fixed, objective, formal attributes to a self-defining becoming emerging from the midst of the shared or associated experiential.<sup>43</sup> And this creative advance into novelty as difference is marked by a break from constancy, a dissolution of habit, a breach of protocol, a wandering away from routine and a wilful refusal to participate in the alienating and exploitative machine of fascism. This all serves to bring

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<sup>43</sup> In these two differing understandings of what a 'child' is, we can define the the child in terms of a transcendental qualities which are permanent and static and which qualify an identitary being or in terms of an experiential becoming.

down the walls of containment produced by institutional identitary structures of hierarchy and categorisations so that the maintenance of life happens through ceaseless invention and a constant appeal to the exercise of our creative energies.

In our case, the analysis of childhood is significant not only as a way of understanding the becoming of a certain type of body in a specific phase of its existence in the world but in terms of contemplating the metaphysics of becoming in general as a subsidiary process within nature's naturing. If we redefine childhood according to positive, active attributes articulated processually, the discourse of the active participation in the idea of childhood as becoming-child takes on a different character: wherein, as Deleuze and Guattari state, they cease being subjects and become events (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987). To see becoming-child this way involves seeing it as an epiphenomenon immanently arising from the chance confluence of molar becomings composed of institutions, languages, disciplinary knowledge, legal structures, social movements, laws, parenting methods, culinary styles and so on and the molecular becomings of others. So that what is of interest is not a predicated model of childhood that articulates molar concerns such as honesty, courage, kindness, gratitude and hope but one which deals with becoming-child running on the beach, or becoming-child of an alien mind on earth, or becoming-child detritus of war, or becoming-child stuttering on tv, or becoming-child bending spoon with mind—all aspects of becoming-child arising in the films of Andrei Tarkovsky. To do this moves the argument from a striated, metricised understanding of childhood to one predicated onto a smooth space of always becoming-other. We must dispel the contradiction inherent in becoming-child as an impossibility of existence and accept the articulation of its possibility as its speculative realisation, as theoretically and empirically feasible, as the discernible incipency of a constantly changing assemblage of forces, of intensities and of a becoming-child of the child as a non-entity.

### **Childhood as an Assemblage**

Thus, we can already identify in the quote a number of concepts which bear teasing out as constitutive of a heterogeneous assemblage. The principal one is the seeing of 'child' not as a static and lifeless category, but as a becoming, a becoming-child, through its various articulations. And one can't ffective em that because in asking about the who? what? when? where? and why? of some child we realise that the outcome of the enquiry requires that it

be articulated heterogeneously and temporally contrary to its traditional definition as a homogeneous, static form. To answer any of these questions adequately without equivocation can be extremely easy or impossibly difficult. Each question engages the concept of 'child' according to frameworks which articulate different regimes of thought: the temporal, the extensive, the causal, the compositional, and the identitary cannot be regarded as constituent elements of the same type or of a uniform nature upon which we can found an understanding of the 'child' as univocal. This breakdown immediately informs us that the child's is a heterogeneous multiplicity, not of things, but of "determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature" (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 8): this multiplicity is neither subjective nor objective, but what they call rhizomatic and durational.

In Deleuze and Guattari, the molar assemblage is termed manifold because it can assume diverse appearances, forms or characters which it does as a result of its concrete existence. This concreteness, which is defined by Simondon (1965) as the capacity of one specific assemblage to assume various roles simultaneously as participant in a variety of other contiguous assemblages or milieus. For example, a painting on the wall can pull together a room, hide a safe, act as a sign of aesthetic taste or wealth, or stand as a trophy of divorce, as a symbol of status, etc—it can perform these duties and more simultaneously without the painting changing in any way. The aspect under consideration affords it various features, relations, applications, and capacities as qualities, modes, and degrees.

The assemblage as a rhizome is characterised by Deleuze and Guattari as an multiplicity of intensities which in terms of molar entities is a counter-intuitive conception, particularly, if we consider intensity as an instantaneous pressure as opposed to a temporal gradation of coming to being or transformation. An intensity is usually defined as a degree or amount of some quality, condition, property, or state that is readily measurable, but here some becoming or event takes on heft as a processual intensification that is not measurable—it is relative and non-metric. If we consider Figure 2.2, the illustration depicts a human life as an assemblage, as a durational multiplicity demonstrating intensification.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> When speaking of intensifications we need to keep in mind that an intensification can be either positive or negative. A positive intensification gives heft to it, a negative one diminishes it. In Spinozist language, this represents a joyful or sad affection by which the power of acting of a body is increased or diminished (EIP7). In terms of difference, it is not positive or negative but an addition of difference.

Here we see the tuber of some Life as a whole, as a given, which is never given as such: at any given instant we have but a slice, a transversal section, depicted by the circles above the tuber. The horizontal axis denotes time in years and there is no scale on the vertical axis—the girth of the ‘tuber’ as its transversal section, denotes intensity, its reality. When we cut transversally through the rhizomatic tuber of some Life as a durational event, we cut across the machinic assemblages of bodies, of forces, of language, of actions and gestures, of materialities and virtualities which compose the interlocked meshings of some associated milieu of becoming. The Life as an event has a duration delimited by the two thresholds of birth and cessation, but the ends of the tuber extend beyond the thresholds because some constituent elements of the body<sup>45</sup> perdure beyond those limits. The casing that envelops the assemblage is as artificial and subjective as the thresholds; it contains a multiplicity of multiplicities, where each subsidiary component is also an assemblage of intensifications which is constituted as an infinite series of concrete multiplicities. The rhizomatic tuber is not only the envelope for a specific individuation it is also a concrete component in a series where it is a subsidiary component. Further, the subsidiary components are not exclusive to this becoming-event and can contribute concretely to the constitution of another event that may have occurred before, concurrently or after the event in question.

Assemblages present as a univocity which is characterised in terms of two modes of understanding, two modes of conceptualising the assemblage: the plane of expression and the plane of content. Each describes the same event as a regime of selection which gives definition to the processual entity through what can be considered either content or expression. Each order of selection is deemed a plane because it presents topologically as a manifold surface-that-gathers according to a particular quality or dimension. This allows Deleuze and Guattari to say that “all multiplicities are flat” and that “they fill or occupy all of their dimensions” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI ,1987, p. 9).<sup>46</sup> The two planes are in reciprocal supposition, in clear and absolute opposition, as the regime of bodies and the regime of signs that emerge immanently, simultaneously, as a local singularity: the constitution of the body is what permits the signification to take place and, inversely, the signification gives rise to the body. The assemblage as an abstract machine does not distinguish the plane of

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<sup>45</sup> If we were dealing with something else other than a human life, the envelope would represent the envelope of some Body without Organs.

<sup>46</sup> The language here comes from topology and its use of set theory and the mapping of functions as a cartography.

expression and the plane of content, for together they constitute the plane of consistency as asignifying and asubjective as an ethical position. But as a machinic assemblage, there is not product as outcome other than its own production.

### **The immediation of the durational child**

Every becoming constitutes a multiplicity that concretely associates its elemental components<sup>47</sup> and so it becomes imperative to be able to express the bonding relations which allows the becoming to function as a durational machinic assemblage. Those components which exist concretely within our indefinite being which participate in other assemblages demonstrate our durational, concrete existence with everything else in the world and our inability to distinguish or differentiate ourselves from other beings nor from all of the other becomings running through us (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 240).

By virtue of their being a durational multiplicity, these assemblages we call entities, cannot have a unique identity because they are replete with virtual, hidden potential. Given the opportune conditions to actualise and functionally realise those potentials, the assemblage can have a greater or lesser degree of reality in terms of the relations it can entertain. These durational multiplicities, which are partially adequated durational entities are infinitely associated. By virtue of being a durational entity, any of these bodies are composed of infinities of differentials, of gradations which not only differentiate internally as a difference in itself, as transformative difference, but also as an external difference as difference in kind. These affective indiscernibles, in that they have no “real” status on account of their inadequate nature, are nonetheless constitutive of assemblages which are actant and reactant. “A degree, an intensity, is an individual, a Haecceity that enters into composition with other degrees, other intensities, to form another individual!” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 253). Each individual is thus an infinite multiplicity, and each multiplicity participates in an infinite number of multiplicities through its concrete association to the universe of multiplicities as the Plane of Immanence.

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<sup>47</sup> The Ancients had four Fire, Water, Air and Earth and Quintessence. Contemporary science has 118 elements with two empty spots within the transition metals for two as yet undiscovered possibilities. We consider elemental primitives those Spinozist Common Notions as described in the Ethics.

The duration we wish to consider combines these various models and understandings as a multiplicity of human and non-human components, actual and virtual, ideal and material themselves durational and, hence, also capable of being broken-down infinitely into constituent durational multiplicities, which in turn can also participate in other durations. These components cluster around and along the timeline of an individual assemblage in accordance with how they ingress chronologically into the life of the subject and how they participate in the emergent happening—they follow a critical path of their own devising that does not exhaust the potentials of what a becoming can be. Although processual thought does not discount the possibility of things in themselves, what process considers as constitutive are relational processes and not stand-alone things. So that the child is not considered as a material continuity per se, but a shifty clustering of doings, of activity, of functions whose integrity is not only dictated by internal organismic processes but by an interactive intermingling with externally conditioning constraints and institutional milieus. The child is not only a child because the body and the immature mind dictates it, but because there are social, political and cultural conditionings in place which value whatever that not-fully developed body represents to the social and consequently sets up safeguards to maintain its duration.

Specifically, these are the durations that are given to the concept of childhood as a concept in itself when considered within various models from psychology and sociology. The explanatory validity has a limited shelf-life and so does whatever is comprised in their explanations: “The socially developing model is not attached to what the child naturally is so much as to what the society naturally demands of the child” (JENKS, 2008, p. 102). So that the various social constructs of what the child is supposed to be—the socially developing child, the socially constructed child, the tribal child, the minority group child, the social structural child—constitute different assemblages of how the child and childhood are supposed to unfold in the world, and their validity grows or decreases, or is constructed differently in accordance to how they concord with the dominant historical, economic, social, legal, political, religious spectrum of ideas. Each model brings to bear different aspects of childhood as assemblages of relations, of encounters and contractions, made up of “transversal communications between heterogeneous populations” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 239). What this looks to do is to understand childhood and the child in

processual terms in such a way that they are both seen as an assemblage of what will ultimately be considered as processes.

From a Spinozist perspective, the body of the becoming-child processually composed through activity, undergoes many changes as modifications, and, through joy and pain, becomes affectively defined. The activities that this becoming-childing engages or suffers leave impressions and traces which constitute its becoming through what the different affects will in time permit it to express. *The child as a unity, as a functional entity that performs as a child and carries out those activities that define child as an entity in the world is made up processually as a becoming-doing, as an agglomeration of subsidiary processual activity which gains heft durationally and eventually breaks-down and becomes (de)composed.* Thus, the body and mind as one compose the becoming-child by way of the experiencing of the world and the interactive encounters as imagistic process. Here, we need to emphasise the great reciprocal enrichment of Spinoza's thought and Bergson's ideas of perception and affect and the incipient production of memory.

Processual duration incorporates and embodies the affects which it amasses and harmonises as the powers of the becoming-child to affect and be affected. It is these intuitions which inform various pedagogies towards varied experience in order to expand the repertoire or gamut of affectual possibility. This multiplication of affects opens the process and widens the possibilities of the becoming and renders it a topology of multiplicities: it is open-ended, multi-dimensional, deformable, continuous in its phasings, and makes it "pregnant with the duration of the future" as Leibniz asserted in his *Letter of 21 January 1704 to Burcher De Volder* and which Bergson echoed two hundred years later when describing the temporality of a future-projecting memory. The continuity we are describing here is not a physical entity, although it could be construed as one, but as an identifiable, discrete, coherent assemblage whose functionality (or dysfunctionality) attests to its actuality as its veracity. Thus, all the subsidiary processual components which participate and contribute to the experience of becoming-child mesh together to compose one singular instance of becoming-child. Yet, this subset of all possibilities is different from one exemplar to the next, in that we all participate in childhood, yet it does not exhaust the possibilities of all becoming-children and neither is it identical to any other. Becoming-child is always unique and different—a singularity—even if all other instances go by the same denomination—they all harness a subset of these possible affects available to a becoming-

child and freely compose the durational entity. The components that do end up participating do so progressively and never appear as a given or as an instantaneous coming-into-being. There is a snap-to of the coalescence into the associated entity, but the propitious conditions and participants amalgamate as an organisational convergence whose nature is intuitive and when the quorum of components enters into relation the becoming perdures as long as the operational coherence can be upheld.

Although we seem to be dealing with things that are definite and certain, we are very much much in the realm of the indefinite and the tenuous. The bodies we invoke here are composed of elements which have neither definite form nor function. They are assemblages of relative movement and rest, of slowness and celerity, of infinite gradations and intensities, which puts us in the realm of the affective, of the inadequately discerned, which subtends a material mode of existence where bodies emerge as degrees of adequacy. Despite their not being fully determined, we persist in referring to them as entities, and consider them as a this or a that, to which we ascribe a fixed identity and a name. We insist that they are partially adequate, in that they are discernible but never in their complete possibility. We say that they are inadequate or imperfect because we compare them to an Ideal form which in comparison will always be found lacking or deficient. However, the entity we have in question needs to be perceived as what it is, as a differential proposition, and if our perfection of it is deficient it is because we fail to see the full panoply of possibility that the multiplicity before us is capable of realising. The inadequateness is not in the object as a deficiency in comparison to some undefinable Idea, but in our cognitive ability to appreciate the singular difference of what a body can do. Our habitual relational engagement with an entity is never the unique existential proposition as identitary essential nature, for there is more to presentational immediacy than the reductiveness of an entity's "thingness".



## Chapter 3

### Imagistic Process



Figure 3.1: “Behold! The Image!” — Times Square at Night.  
Courtesy of <http://wallpapercave.com/w/4AmjRsr>

#### 3.1 The ubiquitousness of images

The ubiquitous presence of images besieges our experience of everyday life: we not only live in constant exposure to images, but we are also subjected to their constant scrutiny. Images surround us, engulf us and constitute the environments we live in; we allow them to rule over us and compose our desires; they occupy our dreams, fantasies and memories; we think, feel, see and speak through images; and as objects of satisfaction, we compare ourselves to them. But in this imagistic proliferation as a simulacrum of life, where the world of appearances leads us to believe that to see is to know, that to know is to understand, and to understand is to control, the universality of the facile heroic formulation of the “I came, I saw, I conquered” would also seem to serve as adequate presupposition to thought and suffice as foundation to disregard the need for adequate understanding. This imagistic immersion leads us to believe in an image-world of choice and self-determination where we are free to act, to decide, and to determine our destiny.

This type of common-sense thinking of objectivised experience has been a perennial problem for thinkers of all stripes in that different image types and modes of understanding the image are conflated so that there is no expositional consistency and no possible interpretative coherence to what are often private matters. In the same way that “we all know what thinking is”, “we all know what images are”—we can even paraphrase St. Augustine along these lines: “What then is an image? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know”. And for many, being able “to see images” is enough to refer all their presuppositions about the image back to sensible, concrete empirical being (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1994, p. 129).

But in an environment such as Times Square at night (Fig. 3.1) in New York City, one can appreciate the “shock and awe” affective power of light as the brute image of our immersion in glow and glitter. Anyone can stand in front of the gaudy spectacle and with a grand gesture of showmanship, cry out unashamedly: “Behold! The Image!” and no one would be able to question the truthfulness of the assertion—if anything, this represents a perfect realisation of the conceptual demonstration of what an image can be in all its complexity and in all of its intuitive splendour. Anyone standing in the median of Broadway at 44th St. can take in the total spectacle and become immersed in a myriad of image types—whether mental, pictorial, linguistic—without needing to distinguish between the different types while being swallowed up by the overwhelming power of this spectacle of images. In fact, we would be hard pressed to show such a concentrated demonstration of image types anywhere else: from the most material to the most ideal and abstract, the various types of images are here presented simultaneously to interact with each other and with us as spectators. Taken as a whole these images create an immersive experiential environment of coloured light as an imagistic ecology where images blend with each other, with image sources and with spectators, into a spectacular whole where any attempt at categorisation would be frustrated by the difficulties in trying to indicate the lines of demarcation between the various exemplars.

To stand in Times Square at night and experience it for what it is and to look at a picture of Times Square at night is not the same thing. The presential imagistic experience of the most representative zone of the Great White Way involves a multiplicity of sensorial impressions not only visual but involving images arising from our other senses as well. Taken as an experiential environment, the effect of the spectacle on a viewer is a unique aesthetic

proposition, a singular affective landscaping for which there is no possible replication or substitute. But if we limit our considerations to visual impressions, being present in the spectacle of light of Times Square offers us the immediate experience as a temporal unfolding of imagistic movement—consciousness not only of something as experience of the world, but as unmediated being in the world. We are firstly struck by the interplay and interference of variegated coloured light as indeterminate affective intensities; we perceive things which can be 3-dimensional objects or 2-dimensional pictorial images; we are attracted by reflections and diffractions of light in shop windows and mirrored surfaces; we read the lettering on marquees and advertising displays; we understand the traffic signs that alert us to hazards or advertisings which indicate opportunities. And all these ocular images are haphazardly intercut with mental images composed of our flights of fancy, day-dreams, wishful thinking, memories, fantasies, desires, projections, and our subjective interpretations and responses to this affective furor.

But simply looking at the photograph of Times Square presented in Figure 1, we are drawn—pulled in and wilfully duped—into the absent imagistic world of Times Square as a representation of the immediate presential experience. First off, we perceive the image depicted by the photograph which we internalise not as the real thing but as a pictorial representation, and we understand this, without necessarily coming to this realisation as a conscious conclusion, by what our body tells us, by the way our body reacts to our sensorial experience of the image.<sup>48</sup> The perspectival depiction captured by the photographic image conforms to the image we conjure in our minds as a result of the ocular image projected onto our retina.<sup>49</sup> We can see within the photograph a pictorial likeness of what we perceive directly when we occupy the point of view established by the camera, which are both pictorial and mental. In spite of this super-abundance of imagistic offerings, we still have difficulty stating what an image-as-such is and what constitutes the essential difference between one image type and another: What is the imagistic common ground between the mental imagery of experiential consciousness, the pictorial imagery of a photograph, the perceptual visual image which is optically derived, the verbal imagery of language that is used to describe it or the sensorial impression of non-visual phenomena which complement

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<sup>48</sup> The eyes inform the brain by a constant parallax angle that the imagery being perceived is displayed on a flat screen and not moving 3-D objects.

<sup>49</sup> Or at least, this is what is widely believed.

vision and round-out experience? Or stated more simply, what is the quality or qualities shared by all these experiences which allows us to call them images? To answer this question, we must first come to terms with what an image is.

### **3.2 An Attempt through Classification**

The multitude of image types and manifestations leads to discordance within imagistic taxonomies which presents a serious stumbling block towards conceptualising the image beyond a common sense ideation. For example, in “What is an Image?” the American art historian and critic W.J.T. Mitchell (1984) proposes a family tree, an arborescent taxonomy, of image types: graphic, optical, perceptual, mental, and verbal and posits a parent concept of the image “as such” (Fig. 2). There is nothing surprising here. Each category specifies a type of image which is germane to the particular discourse of some intellectual discipline: the graphic pertains to the visual and plastic arts and belongs to the art historian; the optical to optics and physics; the mental is pertinent to epistemology and psychology and therefore belongs to the psychologist; the verbal to the literary critic; and the perceptual which is made up of a border region “where physiologists, neurologists, psychologists, art historians, and students of optics find themselves collaborating with philosophers and literary critics” (MITCHELL, 1984, p. 505). This category is a catchall occupied by Aristotle’s species and sensible forms; sense data or percepts; and appearances or impressions—a veritable dog’s breakfast of difficult to classify imagistic phenomena. Perceptual images share some of their complications with Mental Images in that the former rely on processes which depend upon the physiological circumstances and receptive conditions of perception. And presiding above this panoply of image types Mitchell locates “a parent concept, the concept of the image “as such”, the phenomenon whose appropriate institutional discourse is philosophy and theology” (Idem). But curiously, none of the images appears to “belong” to image-makers—whether they be artists, writers, readers, thinkers, dreamers, readers or people just like you and me—images would seem to belong exclusively to disciplined discourse.

Thus, the image “as such” would be the parent concept to the specific images as offspring that populate the categorical as a taxonomic classification. As Mitchell writes, the conception of the image is primarily pictorial and based on sensory experience, so that

whether we speak of images on the right side of the spread or on the left, their ideation falls within a spectrum of imagistic abstraction which governs representational theories of the mind by means of a picture theory of meaning where “consciousness itself is understood as an activity of pictorial production, reproduction and representation” (MITCHELL, p. 509). As we move from left to right on Mitchell’s discontinuous<sup>50</sup> spectrum of classification, we can discern: an increasing degree of abstraction as to how images can be understood; a move away from a vernacular or common-sense understanding of the image towards a more conceptual and subjective definition of image; that the image types all rely on the graphic image as foundational; that an image type to the left of another implies presupposition or conceptual antecedence.<sup>51</sup>

The word image is derived from the Latin *imāgo*, which reflects the same root as *imitārī*, to imitate and has various aspects: imitation, copy, likeness, statue, picture, phantom; conception, thought, idea; similitude, semblance, appearance, shadow. The Latin definitions encompass many of the meanings which shape the conceptual predication and predicaments<sup>52</sup> of the image and we can pick out Mitchell’s classification amidst this panoply of meanings.<sup>53</sup> The word *imago* conveys a plurality of meanings: it expresses the externality of the image as an object that exists in the world and interacts with our senses; it expresses the relational immediacy of the face to face encounter through the idea; it alludes to the

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<sup>50</sup> The precision here explicated by the word discontinuous is important because for Mitchell, unlike Hume (1740) who holds that impressions and ideas are intensive and differ only in degree of vivacity, the spectrum of image types is characterised as differing in kind.

<sup>51</sup> It would seem that the image is a two-way mediating operator, an interface, between that which can be designated as something and that which it is not, between A and ~A. An experiential threshold which demarcates the A from the ~A which works both ways, for the two entities in relation which articulate or serve as hinge between “*Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde*” (Didi-Huberman, 1992).

<sup>52</sup> Here we use predicament as aporia but also in its more technical sense towards categorisation. The ten ‘categories’ or ‘predicaments’ of Aristotle are: 1 Substance or being (οὐσία), 2 Quantity, 3 Quality, 4 Relation (πρός τι), 5 Place, 6 Time, 7 Posture (κεῖσθαι), 8 Having or possession (ἔχειν), 9 Action, 10 Passion.

<sup>53</sup> If the reader finds this vernacular approach to the image offensive to their sensitivity as to what is appropriate academic discourse, we are simply appealing to the social nature of language where any term acquires definition through its social dimensions as Saussure posits. Our interest here is not so much to build upon established scholarship as it is to build from an anarchival dissolution in an ideational blender. It is more a laying down a loose patchwork of possibility which constellates around the concept as genesis for analysis. Further, academically, the concept of the image does not exist as a singular, univocal expression and this cursory analysis hopefully imparts a plurality to the ideation at any level of ideation. Like Russell and Whitehead, I seek “a construction rather than an inference” (RUSSELL, 1945, p. xvi)

correlation and correspondence of the mental image with the external world; and suggests its functioning as a rhetorical trope, semiotic sign or symbol.




Figure 3.2: Mitchell’s (1984) arborescent imagistic classification-

### 3.3 Mitchell’s Typology of Images: Graphic, Optical, Perceptual, Mental, Verbal

For our purposes, we have chosen to develop the image concept through the visual and the pictorial, primarily, because these are considered to be the dominant modes of encounter with the world and of representation of the encounter. As such, the image is considered a representation of the external form of any object in the world, as a resemblance, an imitation or copy as a rendering of likeness; this can be a physical object or a mental one. The objectile nature of the image is amply articulated through Mitchell’s typology of image types.

The Graphic image and includes the product of pictorial and sculptural representation. The world itself and things which populate the world as objects of our attention proffer themselves to the senses according to forms that are befitting the receptivity of the senses. Hence, for the common sense, images would result from sensorial experience predicated upon the idea of impression—of aesthetic impact—so that “most everyone” understands as operative the mechanistic scheme of sensorial stimuli transduced into neural impulses which are imprinted on the mind as grounds for active reaction, cognition or reason. This is what is usually understood as the Cartesian model. Taking vision as an example of this old-school mechanistic scheme, what this means is, say we ‘see’ an arrow before us, the lens of the eye projects an optical field (which includes the arrow) as a

pre-constituted planar whole onto the retina and the effects of that luminous impression make their way through the optic nerves to imprint themselves onto the theatre of the mind as a visual image of the arrow, where the mind cognises it as something most everyone calls an arrow, and therefore as an exemplar of our generic mental image of an arrow, which allows us to state with certainty and indicate that what is before us<sup>54</sup> is an arrow: “Behold! An arrow!”.<sup>55</sup>




Figure 3.3: Descartes’ theory of vision as a circular proposition featuring the pineal gland. Woodcut from his 1664 *L’Homme* (*Treatise on Man*).

Optical images are those which are produced by rays of light projected by optical devices onto a surface, or appearing on a smooth, polished light-reflecting surface such as a mirror, or appear after passing through a small aperture as that which is produced by a

<sup>54</sup> *Epideixis*. Ἐπίδειξις. Demonstration. *Epideiktikos*. Ἐπιδεικτικός. Demonstrative.

<sup>55</sup> Descartes image is ambiguous in that the arrow is shown as composed of three points, ABC, which are conveyed inwards via the optic nerves correctly shown coming together at the Optic Chiasm to end up at two points which now would be called the Lateral Geniculate Nuclei. The anatomical depiction of the visual system becomes imprecise as the tissues here become too undifferentiated and would require technologies not yet available to differentiate between the fibres and where they eventually lead to. There is an unclear connection here to the pineal gland across an indefinite chasm or interval and then relayed across another interval to the muscular fibres in the arm to produce muscular contractions which designate the arrow as having an extension composed of points. However, Descartes intuition of an infinite number of channels conveying elemental fire was quite insightful even if not completely accurate. This shows the consistency of Descartes’s atomic or pointillist conception of nature as explicated in his analytical mathematics.

*camera obscura*, or as the focused convergence of light rays on a surface such as a retina, or as a holographic free-standing 3-D image. Also, an image produced by reflexion or refraction is called in Optics a real image when the rays from each point of the object actually meet at a point, a virtual image when they diverge as if from a point beyond the reflecting or refracting body.

Perceptual images are those which traditionally fall under the study of psychology and which anchor metaphysics of mind (NOË & THOMPSON, 2002). Perceptual images are those through which we know of the world as phenomena of consciousness and which give way to consciousness. The orthodox theory of perception relies on visual theory and “tries to explain how the the brain bridges the gap between what is given to the visual system and what is actually experienced by the perceiver” (THOMPSON, 2002, p. 2). Thus, visual perception images are those that are offered to the mind through the optic nerve, but it is important to note that these are different from the optical images that are produced by the eye on the surface of the retina as a result of the convergence of light rays by the lens. The structure of the retina and the transduction of luminous impressions into nervous impulses offers the mind a totally different experience than what alights on the retina. In the past decades, the visual perceptual model has come under criticism on a number of fronts, particularly because of the exclusivity of vision at the expense of a holistic sensorial approach to the encounter with the environment, the understanding of the image as interactive, enactive and embodied, the proposals of animate vision which counter the established model of the abstracted stationary retinal image, and the repositioning of the subjectivity of the process of vision from the brain to direct environmental interaction as described by the sensorimotor contingency theory.

Mitchell is quite taken by Wittgenstein’s early philosophical problem “to examine the ways we put those images “into our heads”” (MITCHELL, 1984, p. 508). And we find this attention quite interesting for its emphasis on analytical division, for its expression of processual movement, and for the repeated appeal to put things into containers, whether they be taxonomic categorisations or crania. This type of statement usually hides the learning which goes into the understanding of words as a learned cumulation and agglomeration of conceptual attributes which are amalgamated into an identitary unit to which we give a name and forget its progressive acquisition. This states that cognition is progressive processual learned perception. But if we consider the statement “the way that



we put images into our heads”, and look at “the way” not in a categorical analytical manner or system of division, but as a path that is followed—as a *meta hodos*—as a method, as a means or art of seeing, there is also a narrative encounter or discourse that engages the ancient art of memory. It is a black box model of cognition with which we try to understand how that which is presented to our eyes is consistently and correctly cognised as what it is and indicated by speech and gesture. We subscribe to the idea, more or less, that sensorial stimuli transduced into neural impulses travel through nervous pathways much too convoluted and complex to be in any way absolutely determined to result in an apperception—in the Cartesian example above where the visual perception of the arrow finds its way to the pineal gland which activates the muscles in the arm to gesture and move the finger so as to indicate the arrow: the path is indeterminate, but determinate and determined in its self-determination to arrive at the correct determination that what we have before us is an arrow. As we will see this is a very Bergsonian way of describing the image, and one we will be able to corroborate through perspective and projective geometry.

In contrast, the Mental image refers to quasi-visual phenomena which arises as consciousness but not caused by sense impressions. These entail the representations that occur as a result of thought, dreams, memories, ideas or the workings of inventive and creative imagination and which derive from causes other than the immediately perceptive. The distinction between Perceptual images and Mental images is that the former result from the associative relation between subjects and objects in the world and the latter are derived from the abstract activity of subjective mental activity. Both are private and internal and the distinction reflects the epistemological approach to knowing between immediate observational cognition of the world as direct experience and the conscious activity of the mind that engages immediate and direct sensorial data as the object of consideration or the concern with the phenomena of mind not derived from immediate sensorial data. Perceptual images and Mental images are linked, but not necessarily by continuous or extended means. Perceptual images are usually understood to be antecedent, causal or logically prior to Mental images within processes of Mind. And at the same time, the Mental Image is closely linked to thought and the concept of the Idea in ways which are not totally obvious. Descartes points out repeatedly that ideas are *tanquam* (as it were) images, neither pictorial nor optical, and one of the big problems of psychology, even before being

considered philosophically, is to ascertain what exactly is imagistic in thought and in our conceptual understanding of the idea.

As Hampton and Moss assert, “Conceptual representation is arguably the most important function in humans” (HAMPTON & MOSS, 2003, p. 6). Yet, the guiding intuition that makes the Verbal Image imagistic in the sense of being pictorial would seem to exist only metaphorically, as that which exists in the mind as a perfectly transparent mode of expression that directly represents objects, concepts and ideas. For Plato, the chief and true purpose of words is *tó diloma* or *dilosis* (NEHRING, 1945, p. 15), a means of making known or a pointing out, a manifestation, explaining or shewing (LIDDELL & SCOTT, 1883, p. 338) for the purpose of communicating. But this communicative aspect is controversial in that it can be interpreted as the link between minds, which can itself be predicated as a type of relational or common image, yet, while establishing this communicative link, the sign and symbol are conjured as the degradation of meaning, of falsity and deceptiveness in representation through words: “A communication comes from me to you through something different from what I mean by my speech”. Thus, through the mechanism of language, the working of words and language becomes imagistic in terms of sign and symbolic function in communication through rhetorical tropes, as metaphoric, metonymic, onomatopoeic or synecdochal. Nehring observes that “In stressing the heterogeneity of the expression and the thing expressed, Plato brings out what is a basic characteristic of every sign: It always stands for something different from itself. At least in the *Sophist*, Plato expressly calls nouns *simeia*<sup>56</sup> (NEHRING, 1945, p. 15)—very close to Peirce’s definition of the sign as the foundation to his semiotics. However, for us, the linguistic aspect of the image is irrelevant to our concerns. Perhaps irrelevant is too strong a word; the verbal image is beside the point of our imagistic conceptual construction within which the linguistic can be subsumed under the more general concerns of a semeiotics based on the image.

One of the implications of Bergson’s ideation of the image, is that the image is not exclusively, necessarily visual. As he defines it, the image is a triadic assemblage which comprises a stimulus, a centre of indetermination, and a response—any stimulation-response couple that passes through the center of indeterminacy is an image, so that the efferent response to a visual stimulus does not have to be an ocular movement exclusively.

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<sup>56</sup> *Semeion*. Σημεῖον is an interesting choice of words for the activity of words. Loosely translated

It is important to underline here that the stimulus travels inward on one neural circuit referred to as the afferent nerves, is processed within the centre of indetermination where a response or reaction is produced which travels outwards through a different neural system called the efferent so as to produce a muscular contraction. In terms of the eyes, the luminous excitation is conveyed inwards through the optic nerves to the lateral geniculate body from where they are projected to the occipital lobes. From there a response is generated which travels outwards through the oculomotor pathway to the oculomotor nucleus to innervate and cause contractions in the oculomotor, trochlear and abducens nerves and produce eye movement, so that the actual gesture of response takes place on another neural circuit or plane than the stimulation. Independently of whether or not a pictorial image is formed somewhere in the brain, the response to a visual stimulus is therefore a muscular contraction as expressive of thought. Hence, the movement as an arc is stimulus, the transitive activity of determination equated to thought, and the muscular contraction as the objective determination. Separating the stimulus and the muscular contracting as response is some kind of 'thought process' which guides the determination as to what contraction is to be produced from the stimulus.

Thus, if we know the image is that stimulates the brain, and we know the result of the outcome of the muscular contraction as a new image, then perhaps one can gain some insight into the thought processes that take place between stimulus and reaction. As William James writes in *Pragmatism* (1921), "To develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance" (JAMES, 1921, p. 46).<sup>57</sup> We feel the possibility of equating the image and thought, sensation and meaning, through an image-of-thought mediated/immediated by ocular performance. If images work this way, this line of thought can be applied to other actions or activity in the world: one can reverse-engineer vision to get inside the subject's thinking process through the replication of eye movement as indicative and designative of thought's content.

The empirical practice that surrounds optical tracking is germane to physiological and psychological concerns and in this paper we examine a classic line of experiments carried out by Russian psychologist Alfred L. Yarbus (1914-1986) who studied eye movements in the

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<sup>57</sup> Although this is the point we wish to make, James emphasises the need for context in his 1905 essay "How two minds can know one thing" which appeared as part of his collection *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (JAMES, 1912, p. 123)—both for the subject and the image under study.

1950s and 1960s and attempt a relation between his experimental findings and concepts from imagistic thought and the philosophy of process. Although, current experimentation with digital eye-tracking technology goes technically beyond Yarbus' work, we find that the analog methods used by Yarbus are in keeping with our intellectual aesthetics and perfectly capable of illustrating of our ideas. In stating this, we wish to move away from the binary understanding of consciousness as 'consciousness of something' to the *temporal* expression of 'consciousness as whatever is present to the mind'. One of our aims is to reposition eye movement as the expression of a subjectivity guided by a relational, perceptual co-arising which emerges as an immanent becoming—one that arises from, by, within, and through the synthesis of relation in processual advance as an aesthetic logic of sensation.

This switchover requires that we understand the image differently. As such, we use Henri Bergson's conception of the image as "a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a *representation*, but less than that which the realist calls a *thing*—an existence placed halfway between the 'thing' and the 'representation'" (BERGSON, 1998, p. 9). Siting the image this way dissociates us from the common sense ideation of the image as object existing independently of the consciousness which perceives it and from the understanding that the object is that which is perceived. To do so offers us a very different conception of image structure, a conception at the heart of Bergson's thought: "I perceive afferent nerves which transmit a disturbance to the nerve centres; then efferent nerves which start from the centre, conduct the disturbance to the periphery, and set in motion parts of the body or the body as a whole" (BERGSON, 1998, p. 18).

When we adopt Bergson's conception of the image to interpret Yarbus' experiments, we can come to understand them differently. The recordings of eye movements translated onto photosensitive paper become documentary traces that can be studied as a diagram. following Deleuze in *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* (1981), we consider the diagram according to its aesthetic aspects as the underlying operative backing which merges and dynamises the presentational field of vision as the coherent, univocal catastrophe of fact. In terms of perceptual and mental images, much attention is placed on the the aspect of likeness and similitude, of direct conformity between a selected aspect of the world and the perception image that ensues so that the veracity of the internal representation is ideated around a strict correspondence between the image that is projected onto the retina by the lens of the eye and the perception image offered to the mind. It is our contention that this

preoccupation or fixation on pictorial likeness and similitude is inadequately articulated and improperly modelled. For the most part, the pictorial proposition of perspective as re-discovered in the early 15th century, putatively by Brunelleschi, is not as obvious and self-evident as it might appear at face value. The apparent verisimilitude of the perspectival image is deceptive in that it is widely believed that what is offered to the eye is that which manifests itself in the mind, seeing that a pictorial rendering by a competent draftsman offers us a correct representation of what the mind has processed and relayed back as a representation. We take for granted that this representation of a mind state conveyed to paper conforms not only with observational perception, but perhaps more significantly, with what other individuals 'see' and can corroborate as the correctness of the drawing. To position the pictorial graphical likeness on a transparent glass within a perspectival projectional scheme, satisfies the oft repeated definitional tenet of the image as existing between the subjective entity and the objective entity. Further, a graphic image of a scene or object produced by means of the impersonal objectivity and technical independence of an optical device such as a photographic camera or mirror, if rendered and fixed onto a transparent surface such as a sheet of glass or plastic, can be placed between a spectator and the object at a distance which will establish direct correspondence and projective conformity between the image on the transparent surface and the scene: the graphic image as a mechanical representation of a mental process offers a scalar isomorphism which maintains angular congruence with the presentation of the optical field onto the retina<sup>58</sup>. The mind translates and accepts the projective scalar similitude as a true<sup>59</sup> likeness which stands-in<sup>60</sup> between the subject and the object, between the seer and the seen, between the knower and the known: this is how we can understand a close-up of a face on a 10m high cinema screen and perceive it as an enlarged likeness and not the face of a giant peering at us, or why we can substitute a photograph of Times Square at Night for the experienced real event.

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<sup>58</sup> This is what is presented to the retinal field not "what we see".

<sup>59</sup> Truth here refers to the machinic nature of the relation.

<sup>60</sup> Which not only is positioned in the separation between the subject and the object but also serves the function of substitute, surrogate or body-double. In contrast to Bergson, where the image happens half-way between the subject and the object and occupies the interval of determination both as the busy-work of determination and as its temporal and spatial inhabiting. This busy-ness of determination is what imbues the operation with value.

So that we have a perceptual consciousness which is constituted by three imagistic components. First, we have the optical image which is composed of the rays of light focused by the eye's lens onto the retina; second, the process of perception where the retina welcomes, receives, and collects the rays of light in its own way and transduces the focused luminous energy into neural impulses; third, the production of a mental image as consciousness. And no matter whether we choose to elaborate on this processual nexus from a philosophical or a psychological vantage point, the two planes of consistency must somehow intersect on the observable functioning of vision. We propose now to examine a series of experiments carried out by Russian scientist Alfred E. Yarbus which we can use to problematise one aspect of the woodcut of the Cartesian model of perception. Although research on eye movement has been pursued subsequently to Yarbus's experimentation, the research carried out seems to be preoccupied with those aspects of saccadic eye movements and fixations that can be quantified and very little work has been done on the imagistic implications of eye movement in areas outside of psychology—most social science researchers still operate under the premise that the optical image that lands on the retina is the operative perceptual image that is ultimately processed as a mental image. Although Yarbus presents a factual anatomy of the retina, he is factual, non-conceptual and uncritical. Researchers such as Noe and Thompson (2002) cite the work of Ernst Mach who reports on the limitations of the retina as a receptive screen. What we wish to pursue here, is to try to establish speculatively a correspondence between eye movement and the types of information the eye is producing and what it could mean for us in terms of our philosophical concerns on the image. Throughout this exposé of the work of Yarbus, we will be pointing out the links between Yarbus' work as illustrative of Bergson's exposition in chapter 1 in *Time and Free Will* of the dynamic between sensation and affect.

### **The Eye Movement Experiments of Alfred E. Yarbus**

Yarbus's landmark experiments on eye movement study "the perception of images which are strictly stationary relative to the retina, the principles governing human eye movements, and the study of their role in the process of vision" (YARBUS, 1967, p. ix). His work is described in detail in his book *Eye Movements and Vision* (1967) translated from the Russian language and reports his observations of micro- and macro-movements of the eyes

and accompanying fixations directed at a stationary object. To carry out his studies, Yarbus employed specially-designed ocular ‘caps’ which cover the cornea to record and measure eye movement.<sup>61</sup> These caps are sophisticated, small rubber cups which entirely cover the cornea, are held by suction to the eyeball, and were individually fitted with a tiny lens and planar mirror which used reflected light to write a continuous record of eye movement onto photo-sensitive paper. The caps were small and light-weight enough that they did not significantly hamper ocular movement or inhibit its celerity. Yarbus would set up his subjects in the test apparatus—a heavy stand equipped with a chin rest and head brace, two lights and a control panel—and instruct them as to how to examine the images, both with and without conditioning instructions. Yarbus then asked his test subjects to visually examine a complex object for a predefined period and the apparatus would record the movement of the eyes. Here, complex objects are deemed to be for the most part, flat 2-dimensional pictorial images with several characters or points of interest—the images used by Yarbus were photographs of faces and photographic reproductions of figurative paintings from the 19th century.

One significant series of experiments reported by Yarbus and carried out on his eye movement recording apparatus were conducted on I.E. Repin’s painting, *An Unexpected Visitor*, (1884), shown in Figure 3.4. Yarbus designed his experiments around seven different tasks or conditionings given to test participants (YARBUS, 1967, p. 174). The subjects were asked to:

- 1) Examine the picture freely;
- 2) Estimate the material circumstances of the family in the picture;
- 3) Give the ages of the people;
- 4) Surmise what the family had been doing before the arrival of the “unexpected visitor”;
- 5) Remember the clothes worn by the people;
- 6) Remember the position of the people and objects in the room;
- 7) Estimate how long the “unexpected visitor” had been away from the family.

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<sup>61</sup> Over the years, Yarbus, and other experimenters, devised various caps as outlined in chapter 1 of *Eye Movements and Vision* (YARBUS, 1967). Some were affixed to the sclera but most covered the cornea. For the experiments on macro-movements during perception of complex objects Yarbus used the P<sub>4</sub> cap (YARBUS, 1967, p. 202).



Figure 3.4: Ilya Repin, *An Unexpected Visitor*, (1884).

One key aspect of Yarbus' work is the demonstration of how preconditioning the gaze orients the performance of seeing and the outcome of what will be seen. His experiments show that when a test subject is asked to seek specific information within a complex scene, eye movements are conditioned by the nature of the information the viewer is asked to cognise. The result of the different codings—the different ways assigned to read a scene—offer alternative visual narratives or readings of the same scene. Although the given remains the same, the content is articulated differently depending on how the encounter is conditioned. Depending on what the subject is asked to cognise, the order, rhythm and duration of fixations will vary, a variety of narratives will ensue.

The free examination of the image by different subjects revealed that all observers examined the painting differently. This reflects the subjects' individuality in terms of their subjectivity which expresses their past personal experience in terms of encountering and establishing relation with the world. Each subject would focus on the elements they deemed most "attractive"—in the sense of being drawn to them—and on establishing a coherent narrative that would satisfactorily interpret the depicted content of the image, that would



“draw a likely or probable conclusion” to the initial speculation of what was occurring in the featured complex object.




Figure 3.5: Seven records of eye movements of the same subject demonstrating the changing patterns resulting from different tasks. The numbers on the bottom right corner of each frame correspond to the seven tasks listed above. (Fig. 109 in Yarbus (1967, p. 174)).

The different patterns shown on Figure 3.5 express the different tasks assigned to the subjects. They represent the traces of the gaze on the surface of Repin’s reproduced image. Each point or change of direction of a line represents a fixation and the line joining

these points indicate the jerky, saccadic<sup>62</sup> movements the eye makes to get from one point to the next. The records resulting from the subsequent six problems or tasks revealed that “depending on the task in which a person is engaged, i.e., depending on the character of the information which he must obtain, the distribution of the points of fixation on an object will vary correspondingly, because different items of information are usually localised in different parts of an object” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 192). Each task seemed to have its own signature pattern of examination reflecting the information to be gained (Figure 3.5). The records of eye movement resulting from each task were so different in character, that each pattern could be deemed an identifiable relational structure for the particular task at hand which mark out the possibilities of a determination, but not the determination itself.

When repeated over a period of days, Yarbus’ recordings demonstrate<sup>63</sup> that the eye movement patterns from free examination resemble each other: it would seem that once the subject had concluded his determination, i.e. made up his mind, of what ‘the painting was about’,<sup>64</sup> subsequent examinations would be similar to the initial determination and trace over the path of determination. This would suggest that rather than explore the image afresh from a new perspective over time, i.e. (re)problematise the image and ascertain a new system of relation between the elements, the subject would look at the painting to corroborate the original conclusion by adding ‘reinforcing’ saccades to the various existing paths. After the conclusive first viewing, repetitions would serve to *habituate* the viewing of the painting according to the original pattern and would render the ocular visual gestures a habit and drive towards a confirmative repetition. The pattern of repetition of a prescribed path to be traced over implies a memorial method of (re)cognition not towards a (re)newed creative reading, but as a (re)reading of the picture to ascertain and confirm that nothing had changed and to (re)enforce the memory of the relativised positional attraction between one element and another. These two attitudes or temperaments of repetition would intimate intuitions as to seeing memorial process as a (re)enforcing repetition and as a system of relational position based on muscular memory as *loci*.

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<sup>62</sup> Saccadic: From the French, a jerk or jerky movement. Derived from Old French *saquer*, to pull.

<sup>63</sup> The rubric for Figure 108 “Seven records of eye movements by the same subject, examining Repin's picture freely with both eyes. The records, arranged in chronological order, lasted 3 minutes. The interval between records was 1 or 2 days” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 173).

<sup>64</sup> Usually within the first 30 seconds of the first examination (DeAngelus and Pelz, 2009).




Figure 3.6: Record of the eye movements for 3 minutes during free examination, divided into seven interrupted consecutive parts. The duration of each part is about 20+ seconds. (Fig. 110 in Yarbus (1967, p. 175)).

Yarbus uses the word “cycle” to describe the subjects’ gazing, but it is an unhappily imprecise term as it can either mean a “period through which anything runs in order to its completion” or a “series which returns upon itself” (O.E.D.). Each has serious implications as to how the eye movement diagrams are to be interpreted. When the three minute free examination was broken down into a series of 20+ second blocs, the subjects would compose different patterns of discovery within each bloc (Figure 3.6). Each bloc had its own distinct pattern of visual exploration, of combining the various elements as stand-alone montages, as partial determinations which could tentatively be called exploratory relational

figures. Here the word “cycle” would seem to adopt the former definition in that there is no significant pattern of repetition from one bloc to the next. It is important to emphasise that this series of ocular movements refers to a free examination of the painting for as Yarbus asserts, “The cyclical pattern in the examination of pictures is dependent not only on what is shown on the picture, but also on the problem facing the observer and the information that he hopes to gain from the picture” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 194).




Figure 3.7: The panel on the left is a record of the eye movements for 35 seconds during free examination. The recording is divided into seven consecutive parts of 5 seconds each. The right side shows the fixations from the records covered by a black dot representing the coverage of the *fovea centralis* on the series of records on the left.

The breakdown into blocs of the free examination is significant because they show individual subjectivity at work trying to ascertain what is to be determined from the painting through numerous, distinctly different, tentative problematisations. Each bloc as a cycle would result in a partial determination which would condition the reading of the next bloc as a progressive (re)tasking which both changes the understanding of the past and conditions

future examinations—by drawing a different (picture of the) set of possibles for the future: we understand our memorial past differently as the enabling of potential other-futures. From each repetition of the free encounter, the difference—the change of outlook between a subsequent reading and the last—allows us to draw a different future from the different understanding of the past. It is as if the subjects are looking for different meanings through alternative combination of picture elements within each bloc, as if they were conditioning their own viewing as part of thought by composing alternative explorations. This can be interpreted as the viewing subject chunking or aggregating new readings of the past or of testing different ways of reading the painting, as an exhaustion of readings towards the “correct” or most “coherent” reading as the “true” reading whereas all we can aspire to in each cycle is a metastable reading ready to be destabilised by new information for a different cycle of discovery to commence afresh. This would seem to intimate that the “examination of objects evidently reflects some special features of our perception and thought” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 194).




Figure 3.8: A possible shot-by-shot cinematic decoupage of the Repin painting of Figure 3.4 that renders it into a linear sequence which overtly narrativises the picture plane and temporalises it.

However, in DeAngelus and Pelz's (2009) repetition of Yarbus' experiments, they find that *when given a task*, the subjects would come to a determination of their task in much less time than the 3 minute duration imposed by Yarbus: when subjects were allowed to self-terminate the task, the average determination was 24.4 seconds<sup>65</sup>, with the longest

<sup>65</sup> This average does not represent a “true” average as we’re averaging determinations to different problems. Our intent is merely to affirm that conditioned determinations take significantly less time than the 3 minutes accorded by Yarbus.

average at 50 seconds. The residual time offered ample time to repeat and (re)confirm the determination as a “cycling” in terms of the latter definition above emphasising iteration. This would account for the pronounced repetition in the retracing of the gaze lines and the more ‘distinct’ character of the recordings of the tasked viewings.

Comparison of the two approaches—with instruction and free of instruction—seems to imply that conditioning the encounter leads to a prompt solution and to subsequent iterative corroboration (the well-trod ‘furrows’ or channels of the patterns of Figure 2); the unconditioned encounter remains creative and open to invention within the repetitions (as revealed through the different patterns in each bloc of Figure 3). Further, we can say, that each record derived from free examination in Figure 3 ‘represents’ an image of thought, in that each bloc is distinctly different from the others, and reflects a different thought pattern as narrative discourse: each pattern on the photo-sensitive paper has documented an imagistic progression of thought that was productive of meaning yet remains unnamed except as Eye Pattern  $x$  and identified as the initial element of a series of related patterns, i.e. Repin Eye Patterns  $n$ , as an empty form of thought. There is no repetition in the 7 patterns, so we can surmise that a definite conclusion, an exhaustion of possible interpretation, as to what the painting is about has not been attained and so creative examination towards an operationally coherent reading remains open—perhaps, as stated earlier, each bloc presents a hypothetical determination which is tested in the subsequent bloc? The conditionings give the subject a definite task, whereas the free examination invites the subject to visually explore the image so as to determine what is happening in the image. And in Repin’s image, there is too much interpretive leeway for the subject to ascertain a definitive interpretation when viewed without the painting’s title.

The eye movement patterns would seem to indicate that there are two non-mutually exclusive approaches to seeing: there’s a mode of seeing which is creative and exploratory and another which is recognitive and confirmatory. The first is a mode that seeks to problematise the encounter and complexify creatively, whereas the second seeks to resolve the problematisation and repeat the determination towards ascertainment and habituation. Each mode seems to find its satisfaction differently: the first seeks to exercise desire and novelty in an open creative evolution the second seeks certainty within a progressive teleological advance towards perfection in the recognition of the solution.

## Eye Movement as the Montage of *Montrage*

Montage in cinema is designed to guide the unfolding of vision so that it composes narrative linkages from one frame to the next. The découpage and the editing of a film work together to constitute the visual flow which guides the logic of ocular movement so the viewer can formulate a coherent unfolding of the visual understanding of the scene. So that the Repin painting can be broken down into a series of shots which linearise the unfolding as a sequence of frames where each frame serves as a logic hinge from the objective to the subjective, as the switchover which propels the desire for the next shot (Figure 3.8).



Figure 3.9: What a single fixation is actually like (cf Footnote 11). The area immediately around the woman's head in the doorway is approximately the area covered by a single black dot in Figure 4 and represents the area of the retina comprised by the *macula lutea* at the subject-object distance and image size used in Yarbus's experiment.

In order to better understand what is at stake in vision in terms of eye movement, Yarbus took the records of free, unconditioned exploration shown in the left-side panel of Figure 3.7 and superposed black circles corresponding to the coverage of the *fovea centralis* on each fixation as shown in the right side panel. As per Yarbus (1967), the part of the retina which offers the clearest vision is the *macula lutea* which lies on the temporal side of each eye, slightly above the point of entry of the optic nerve and is occupied mainly by cones. The

angular dimension of the *macula lutea* is approximately 6-7°. Within the *macula lutea* lies the *fovea centralis*, the part of the retina with the highest resolving power. The diameter of the *fovea centralis* is about 0.4 mm, i.e., about 1.3°. For the sake of comparison, the monocular field of view overall (measured from central fixation) is 160° (horizontally) x 175° (vertically). The total binocular field of view is 200° (h) x 135° (v). The region of binocular overlap is 120° (h) x 135° (v).

As we saw earlier in Figure 3.6, each record shows a distinct bloc of seeking understanding. Figure 3.7 takes this analytical method one step further by decomposing a 35 second bloc into seven 5 second mini-blocs of free exploration so we can gain some insight into how the individual larger blocs are constituted. Yarbus wants to show how the coverage of the foveal fixations happens and in what order they occur seeing how “Foveal vision is reserved mainly for those elements containing essential information needed by the observer during perception” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 196). Thus, We can also characterise this cognitive serialisation as a montage of tiny, highly-focused static points, where according to this break-down, vision proceeds as a montage of concentrated, highly-focused points of fixations on attractors, where each fixation is “replaced” by a subsequent fixation: the progression would be fixation, saccade, fixation, saccade... where the impression of each saccade is maintained as persistence of vision while the eye repositions itself onto a new point of fixation, settling directly on top of the fixation that preceded it.<sup>66</sup> However, this only states in part what is happening: the visual data from the rod-rich part of the retina must be superimposed around the cone-rich, circular, high-focus foveal zone. The right side of Figure 4 shows that in every fixation, the black dots only cover a very small part of the field of view, but neglects to show that the vast greater periphery of the image is not quite so well defined—the composition of the retina is such that outside the *macula lutea* the distribution of cones and rods is much different, and so we’ve produced Figure 3.9 to illustrate what a single fixation is actually like.<sup>67</sup> Where the *macula lutea* is populated by colour sensitive cones, the rest of the retina is predominantly composed of rods and has a progressively

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<sup>66</sup> Vision ‘hides’ the saccade from consciousness through a process called Saccadic masking or visual saccadic suppression.

<sup>67</sup> To be a truer illustration of a single fixation, the high-focus foveal area would occupy the central position and the remainder of the retinal impression would map outwards from there onto the larger field of view.



diminishing concentration of cones and rods the further away from the fovea; thus, each field of view is composed of a relatively small circular area of high focus corresponding to the *macula lutea*, surrounded by a retinal expanse of rods and cones which produces lesser quality, but faster processed visual sense data that is distorted, blurred and unfocused, colour diffracted and less saturated. The field of view we produce as what we believe is our consciousness is in actuality a highly-focused dot surrounded by blur. As Yarbus posits,

In this connection, we cannot help thinking how important and biologically desirable is this heterogeneous structure of the retina, particularly, the fact that a fovea is present. By means of the *fovea centralis*, man sees many details only around the point of fixation, i.e., around a point which, as a rule, provides essential information. The lower resolving power of the eye periphery is useful because it enables less essential information to be obtained and facilitates the differentiation between the useful and useless information (YARBUS, 1967, p. 196).



Figure 3.10: Tentative reconstruction of the sequential order of foveal fixations in record #1 shown in both sets of panels of Figure 3.7.

Figure 3.10 shows a tentative reconstruction of the sequential order of foveal fixations in record #1 in both sets of panels of Figure 3.7. It shows the 18 fixations of the “spots” of useful information during a 5 second free examination of the Repin reproduction. Figure 3.10 shows us the dramatic attraction, or draw, the sharp-focus foveal areas exert on our attention. Yet, we must keep in mind that the peripheral out-of-focus sense data from the adjacent retinal area prepares the way for subsequent saccades. It would appear that the fovea is receptive to iconic information whereas the macula preconditions subsequent ocular movement by mapping out surrounding zones of possible interest to be explored. It might say that what is presented to the mind has an adequate component as the sharp-

focus area of the *fovea centralis* and an inadequate, or affective component, as the the peripheral out-of-focus sense data—as consistent with Bergson’s ideation of the image in *Matter and Memory*.

The gaze pattern that seems to be produced in the free examination is the result of what we can script as a highly logical problematising progression—the fixation produces a question which inevitably results in eye movement as response:

1. Shoes. Big boots, legs lead upwards... *How tall is that body?* Tilt up...
2. Elbow. Nothing in arm. Heavy coat. *How far is that head?* Tilt up...
3. Man’s head. Face gazing camera right. *What is he looking at?* Follow eye-line. Pan right.
4. Wallpaper. He’s not looking at wallpaper. *What’s to the right?* Pan right.
5. Women’s heads. They are smaller than man’s head. Hence, behind him and to the right but not matching the man’s eye-line. *What’s to the right?* Pan right.
6. Woman’s big head. She’s closer to us. Facing left. Eye-lines match. The dramatic loop with the man seems closed. Let’s see how close she is to the middle women. She’s super intense, but I can’t see her face. *What’s on the left?* Pan Left.
7. Wallpaper and side of door. The woman was standing in the light, possibly of an open door. *Where is she?* Pan left.
8. Women in doorway. Two women. *Why are they looking at the man?* Follow gaze... Pan left.
9. Man’s head. *Why is he looking at the woman that is intently looking at him?* Hold on.... what’s with the wallpaper? Pan right.
10. Man’s head with more wallpaper. Both sides of head have different wallpaper. *What was the wallpaper behind the woman in the doorway?* Pan right.
11. Women in doorway. They have a window behind them. They don’t look happy. *What can the man tell us about why they are so unhappy?*
12. Man’s head. He’s intense. And not too talkative. *What can the women facing us tell us?* Pan right.
13. Women in doorway. They’re intense too and looking apprehensive. *What’s on the other side of the man’s head?* Pan left.
14. Wallpaper. That’s the same paper between the women in the doorway and the woman in black. Man must have walked into the room from outside. *What’s with those*

women in the doorway? Why are they looking apprehensive? What did the man do? Pan right.

15. Etc.<sup>68</sup>

The foveal fixations represent the narrative intelligence of the brain as a faculty as associative movement which produces narrative and not as aleatory. This first bloc of the seven shown, is aligned horizontally and follows a logic established by the eye-lines of the adult figures. In DeAngelus and Pelz's article, they present a 5 second Freeview exploration (DEANGELUS & PELZ, 2009) which is quite similar to Yarbus's, also very much horizontally aligned, following the eye lines of the characters in the scene.<sup>69</sup> In Yarbus's example an exploratory move in any direction proceeds haltingly in that, for example, in the initial move from the shoes to the head, the viewer's eyes don't go all the way to the head, they stop somewhere in between as if to evaluate the spatial character of the interval between two attractors. In assessing these records, we need to keep in mind that the peripheral out-focus sense data is available to inform the eyes as to where to move next and that there is a difference between the work the eyes do in a 3-D world and on a 2-D surface.<sup>70</sup>

It bears emphasising that Yarbus's experiments were carried out at a fixed distance between non-moving subjects and 2-D static images thus producing a very specific and controlled relation with the seen. His experimental set-up does not reflect the experience of how one would normally approach a painting, or any other object, for depending on our relative distance to the object, the foveal area's projected coverage on the object will be different. The eye is not a zoom lens, and it cannot alter the 'black-dot' coverage of the *macula lutea* because the eyes cannot increase or decrease their focal length.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> This reads very much like a transcript of Deckart using the analytic image viewer on the replicant's snapshots in the feature film *Bladerunner* by Ridley Scott (1982).

<sup>69</sup> To produce a series of these discrete images would constitute what is normally termed a 'montage'. This sequential assemblage of juxtaposed "images" articulate a unity which is usually understood as a narrative, or in this case as an attempt at composing a narrative scene. One could characterise each 5 second bloc a scene and the ensemble of scenes a sequence. A sequence, as a term borrowed from cinema aesthetics, is a series of scenes that form a distinct narrative unit which is usually connected either by unity of location or unity of time. We could tentatively say that the organisation of the records in Yarbus' experiments produce visual narratives which initially recast the seen as scenes and ultimately sequences imbued with a sense of closure, of unity, of singularity or identity as the conclusion—the various blocs of exploratory gazing as the onset of the machinic assemblage which renders the ensemble operational as a multiplicity that is open yet self-contained.

<sup>70</sup> This fixation in-between significant attractors might be a habit from living in a 3-D world that always looks for depth cues through the eyes parallax angle.

<sup>71</sup> The eyes change focal length when they focus but it is a minimal change, nothing like a zoom lens.




Figure 3.11: Simon Stålenhag. *By\_dust*. (2015). Various selective framings from the top image. There is no compression of perspective from one frame to the next, only enlargement. Each frame represents a rapprochement of the observer to the objectual field, but no change of focal length. On the right, we suggest the “foveal unit” for each distance as black dots.

Change of coverage—and therefore the information that can be gleaned—only happens through a change in the field of view and this occurs only by changing the relative distance through translation, as a change of scale, by getting further or closer to the object.<sup>72</sup> As we approach objects, we initially have in focus a wider span of the field of view which progressively becomes narrower and more detailed as we get closer to the object: the closer we get to an object, the less we see of it, though what we come to see of it gets larger and gains in detail.

Table 1: Field of view in focus for 2 foveal angles (deg.) vs. distance from subject (m)

<b>Distance from object</b>	1000 m	100 m	10 m	1 m	0.10 m
<b>6.0° <i>macula lutea</i></b>	104.8 m	10.48 m	1.048 m	10.48 cm	1.05 cm
<b>1.3° <i>fovea centralis</i></b>	22.7 m	2.27 m	22.7 cm	2.27 cm	2.27 mm

Table 1 shows how the width of the field of vision narrows as the viewer gets closer and closer to the object: at 100 metres away, the *macula lutea* remains focused on a width of 10.48 m; but at 10 cm from the object, the *macula lutea* is 1.05 cm across and the *fovea centralis* only covers 2.27 mm in optimal focus. The relative areas of foveal versus peripheral acuity always remain the same; what changes is the arc length, the width, covered on the object as angular projection on our retina resulting from our distance to the object. The angular coverage of the *macula lutea*—the size of the black dot—at a particular distance becomes the unit of understanding, the scale of comprehension, for that visual situation or environmental conditioning.

Thus, in Figure 3.11, if we imagine Simon Stålenhag’s science fiction painting *By\_dust* (2015) as a real world encounter and use the coverage of the *macula lutea* as our unit of measurement, we are faced with a multitude of scales of understanding every step of the way when moving in. In the top frame, the ‘foveal units’ will be the unidentifiable human figure in the distance, a part of a bush, a sneaker, and a car tire. In the second frame, the foveal units will be the torso and a tail light. In the third, it will be the tip of a human foot. In the bottom frame, the ‘foveal unit’ will be the face of the hooded character<sup>73</sup>. As we move towards the seen and become immersed in the scene, the encounter is relativised differently

<sup>72</sup> In cartography, this consideration is of the utmost importance in that the scale defines the size of the grid of determination.

<sup>73</sup> But not a close-up.

as the scales of relation change: it is always a relativised durational multiplicity but the nature and character of the relations are always other—the scene problematises differently and we, as subjective individuals, in turn cannot but problematise it differently. The encounter becomes the durational multiplicity of the milieu as problematisation. In filmic terms this is the mode of exposition of classical Hollywood decoupage: establishing shot, wide shot, medium shot, close shot, close up, insert.

This maintains that no decisional adjustment occurs without a conditioning context, apart from a decisional midst, from which the object of the saccade is resolved from the problematic of encounter. As an individuation which becomes individualisation, in the separation of the object from the background,<sup>74</sup> the decision resolves the “very meaning of actuality” of the potential as the actualisation of potential in the present as the given. As Whitehead asserts, the word ‘decision’ does not here imply conscious judgment but is used in its root sense of a selective ‘cutting off’ (WHITEHEAD, 1929, p. 43) which in fact becomes framing and selection. In scripting the decisional flow above as a logic of *montage* which opposes a logic of *montrage*<sup>75</sup> we have two important misgivings: that within the centres of indetermination there are no clear laws which determine the mode of advance as an inferential logic as opposed to pure aberrant movement and that the images which fall within the scope of the *macula lutea* are somehow identified as the active agents of the determination at any scale.

Contrary to its illogical demeanour, the saccadic movement of the eyes is not random and arbitrary—it is the determining operation of conjunction, of comparison, of contrast, of relation and possibly most importantly of difference itself expressed as embodied: it is the actualisation of pronominal activity in the service of the indicative, and not of the nominative: “this<sub>A</sub> is to that<sub>B</sub>” and “this<sub>B</sub> is to that<sub>C</sub>”.... we can follow our index finger pointing to one thing ‘this’ and then to another thing ‘that’ as where the saccade is instrumental as the gesture of resolution in the determination. But there is a double process

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<sup>74</sup> Hence, the act of focusing results in the drawing of the object both as a delimitation and as a pulling towards us, as we shall see later.

<sup>75</sup> *Montrage* is a term coined by David Lapoujade and taken up by Deleuze in *Cinéma 2; The Time-Image*. “montage has changed its meaning, it takes on a new function: instead of being concerned with movement-images from which it extracts an indirect image of time, it is concerned with the time-image, and extracts from it the relations of time on which aberrant movement must now depend.

of subjectivisation at work here, a double moment<sup>76</sup> of Whiteheadian feeling where the objective becomes subjective and vice versa. There is a prehensile move in the saccadic switch-over from ‘this-to-that’ and a subsequent one within the fixation as a movement of thought from the objective ‘that’ to the subjective becoming of ‘this’. The function of the saccadic movement is relational and temporal whereas the fixation is determinative and spatial. Yet within that relational milieu, the terms that enter into associative proposition are revealed to us in the fixations. But these images that are given to us in the fixations are given to us complete and fully-fledged. There is the fixation as landing site and the subsequent shift from the movement of territorialisation to a movement of deterritorialisation, from the objective to the subjective as a hinge, articulation or fold.

Deleuze writes in *Cinema 2: The Time-image*, that “montage itself which constitutes the whole, and thus gives us the image of time” (DELEUZE, 1989, p. 34). But as we have just seen, this whole is a very partial whole: partial in the sense of its subjectivity and partial in the sense of incomplete and fragmentary. When Walter Benjamin writes in *The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility* (1935) on the difference between camera perception versus ocular perception and the incongruity between the visible and the real, the discordance is not as Rudolf Arnheim claims because of “the mechanical faithfulness of a camera, which records everything impartially” (ARNHEIM, 1954, p. 43). The planar projection of the field of view of the camera onto film, whether static or in movement, is different from the serial movement-and-fixation dynamic of the human eye. Lens perception is limited by lens diffraction and sensor resolution yet allows a certain extensive continuity on the plane of projection; ocular perception is additionally limited by the variegated composition, the gestural dynamic of perception, and the field and geometry of its retinal sensorium. The *macula lutea* and the out-of-focus peripheral neighbourhood give ocular perception special added qualities—primarily movement detection—but these are neither continuous nor fractal. The entire field of vision is undefined as a blank stare<sup>77</sup> until the centres of indetermination designate, through the hyper-specific, high-focus acuity of the *fovea centralis*, the resolution of one point relative to another through the machinic production of desirous semeiosis of saccadic movement.

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<sup>76</sup> “it is in this double turning-away, in the divergence of faces, that the *ligne de fuite*—that is, the deterritorialization of man—is traced” (DELEUZE & PARNET, 1987, p. 40).

<sup>77</sup> Which when one becomes aware that the brain is on idle, there is a rapid saccadic adjustment of the eyes to focus the fovea on some thing.

But given the image from Figure 3.11, we need to reconsider Deleuze's formulation of exactly what whole is being created. If we understand the unit of montage as the full-frame, we end up with one whole; if we consider the *macula lutea* as our unit of montage, we have another type of whole when we consider the *lutea* as our unit of montage, then we end up with a different problem. The conjunctive composition of a montage of 'things' as 'and, and, and...' is a different beast if it is composed of alternating full-frame close-ups, from a foveal montage composed on a full-frame close-up of a face. For Deleuze, the aesthetic distance between the observer and the observed, the intensive impact of distance as that which establishes the shot size problematises the image differently. A CU—CU interaction would constitute an affection image; a MS—MS or CS—CS interaction would constitute the action-image; and a WS-WS or LS—LS interaction would constitute a perception-image (DELEUZE, 1986, p. 70) being constituted through saccadic eye movement and fixations. So that when Deleuze proposes the perception-image, the action-image and the affection-image as avatars, as components of the movement-image, we have to ask ourselves whether he is using the cinematic full-frame directly projected onto the retina as the basic unit of montage. If he is, which his discussion of the different framings seems to affirm—that a wide shot in the camera is the same wide shot image that goes directly into the brain—then we need to think anew the constitution of the image in that a full-frame close-up as our unit of montage is different from the consideration of the coverage of the *macula lutea* as the unit imagistic agent. Deleuze actually goes further here and ascribes a linguistic order to each avatar as expressive of a different type of movement: the perception-image is the noun because perception relates movement to 'bodies'; the action-image is the verb because action relates movement to 'acts'; and the affection-image is the adjective because it relates movement to a 'quality' as a lived state (DELEUZE, 1986, p. 65).

It is interesting how Deleuze separates the movement-image into component avatars, as if the movement-image is an indivisible movement which cannot be decomposed yet it is composed of subsidiary processual steps or phases which constitute threshold concepts both as sites of passage and as passage itself. Deleuze seeks to identify modes of expressing time not directly within the movement-image itself but through the avatars as constitutive of a durational relational multiplicity. It would appear that Deleuze shifts gears here to present his concepts in terms of the experience of time and advance and not in spatial or pictorial terms. But if we consider the cinema as a pictorial imagistic form and



reconcile Bergson's and Deleuze's conception of the image with Yarbus' studies of saccadic movements and fixations, the Deleuzian conception of montage still stands but with some revisions. However, one always needs to be cognisant of what we are assembling and which flux we are immersed in to know where we are venturing.

When we define or determine the *macula lutea* as our unit of montage, the 'black dot' will cover a specific area within the optical field where the eye will stop and fixate on something. If the area of the black circle covers the full-head-to-toe figure of a man, the man is identified as such, without any kind of montage: what you see is what you understand. If we truck into the scene, the area of the black circle covers the torso of a man.... we move in some more, the area of the black circle covers the chest and head; and again, the black circle covers the head; we move in one last time and we end up with the black circle covering an eye. When the eyes fixates on one of these items as an identifiable, stand-alone entity, there is no montage—we know implicitly, that what is landing on the *macula lutea* is a readily discernible, distinguishable, distinct and nameable something. In the top image of Figure 7, we have a wide shot, the black-dot covers the diminutive head-to-toe stature of a man. The eye does not have to move around in any way, as the entire significance of that figure is contained in that static hold. We truck in some more and finally the *macula lutea* is only covering the face of the actor. This allows us to identify the character, right then and there, directly without montage. At any scale then, the eye is presenting a high-focus, stand-alone image, seemingly isolated, which is not built-up conceptually through montage or through a variety of components but must be identified as a static whole for what it is: as a diminutive full-figure of a man, as a torso of a man, as a face, as a mouth. These 'things' are identified and named for what they are as such, on their own terms—as signs which directly convey that which is: that is that idea of what they are, as the outward and visual aspect which stands for the inwards and spiritual aspect of the object as how it manifests itself. It is this dynamic, from identifiable entity to identifiable entity, that we must distinguish *montage* as advance as a logic of *montrage*. And thus, quoting Benjamin citing French silent-film director Abel Gance, we inflect his surprise differently: "By a remarkable regression, we are transported to the expressive level of the Egyptians....Pictorial language has not yet matured, because our eyes are not yet adapted to it. There is not yet enough respect, not enough *cult*, for what it expresses" (BENJAMIN, 2008, p. 29). Yet, in regressing to the Egyptians, we cannot remain there, for we cannot dismiss that the perceptual hieroglyph is

itself a becoming, a durational multiplicity, an individuation, even if it can be coded, designated and indicated as an individualisation. Further, we cannot forget that what appears to be a “stand-alone” entity is always attached to a background which sustains it and associates it to the world not only serially but concurrently. To paraphrase Deleuze, seeing always combines with something else which is its own becoming. “There is no assemblage which functions on a single flux” (DELEUZE & PARNET, 1987, p. 44). And even if the entity in question is clearly visible, appears as if it is totally resolved from the background, and seems to stand proud from the milieu to which it is associated, it is that attachment which concretises it and makes it an object which does not pass.

The last three pages of chapter 4 in *Cinema 1* are landmark. Deleuze takes us from what is a dynamic of action-reaction and brings it into the realm of Bergsonian life through the involvement of the centre of indetermination as the creation of a rift between the objective consideration of the world as a concern, its transformation into desire and its expression as subjective enaction. This interval of deliberation between the afferent perception of the stimulus and the efferent expression of the efferent reaction, denote the advance of process, of thought, of the transpiration of logic. Here, Deleuze transforms the unitary moment of the indivisible movement-image into the realm of living bodies now become bodies-without-organs, of avatars, as a relational multiplicity, as a duration composed of three (or possibly more) subsidiary imagistic processes. The ‘concrete duration’ of the movement-image thus is composed of the perception-image, the action-image and the affection-image as images which identified as such produce immobile sections which when presented in succession constitute a montage. This montage composes an indirect image of time where the durational components contribute towards the aggregation of duration as the passage of the event and resolved through Bergson’s Method of the Cinematograph.

In this confluence of Yarus and Deleuze, we find the writings of Sergei Eisenstein as elucidative of how we can understand the process by redefining the “technical (optical) basis of cinema” (EISENSTEIN, 1949, p. 49). For Eisenstein and the theoretician of montage Vsevolod Pudovkin, montage is not a blending of images but “the means of *unrolling* an idea with the help of single shots” (EISENSTEIN, 1949, p. 48). But the operative dynamic behind the perception of movement is not from side-by-side comparison, but from superposition as Bergson’s Method of the Cinematograph intimates. This concurs with the saccadic eye

movement and fixation of Yarbus in that the retinal impression of one fixation is supplanted by the superimposition of a subsequent one. But Eisenstein wrongly asserts that this principle of an aggregation of superimposed images as a dynamic of dialectical resolution is the general principle which informs the process: according to this account, the layering of supplanted impressions would be responsible for the phenomenon of spatial depth, since out of the superposition of two images a third one arises that supersedes the other two. Eisenstein claims that this layering as superimposition is what allows stereoscopy to come to the fore, but we know that changes in the eyes' parallax angles as a simultaneous resolution on a point as well as visual size cues, colour shifts, relative size, perspective, etc, are what indicate distance between the observer and the observed. Yet, the subjugation of distance to dialectics is not what is of interest here. The statement that "the superimposition of two elements of the same dimension always arises a new, higher dimension" (EISENSTEIN, 1949, p. 49). Here, Eisenstein would seem to be referring to the emergence of depth from the superimposition of two ocular fields to produce the stereoscopic effect of depth as a new, higher dimension of experience. "The superimposition of two non-identical two-dimensionalities results in stereoscopic three-dimensionality" (EISENSTEIN, 1949, p. 49). But what this in effect does is to produce resolution, the individualising separation of an object in space as differentiated from its surroundings. But again, this process of resolving the object as a depth perception in space is not given as instantaneous but given in time as intuitive. The overlapping of two out-of-focus images leads to a refocus as parallax correction or adjustment so that the two high-focus foveal centers concur on the same point and there is no out-of-focus indeterminateness in the resolution. This optical relationship to the world retains the stereoscopic reconciliation which informs depth perception and is by definition sensory-motor.

But when we situate ourselves in the real world, produce an overlapped retinal impression of a resolved depth perception as a 3-D image, an object resolved from its field, and superimpose that with a subsequent retinal 3-D image, these two non-identical overlapping three-dimensionalities would combine to result a four-dimensional image composed of the three dimensions of space and the additional dimension of time, 3-D+T. This does not give us a time-image for itself but an indirect time-image which can have all types of varieties from the combination of the three varieties—perception-images, action-images and affection-images (DELEUZE, 1986, p. 68).



Figure 3.12: *Birch Grove*, (1885-1889). Oil painting by Russian Impressionist painter Isaac Ilyich Levitan.




Figure 3.13: Record of eye movements during free examination of the reproduction of *Birch Grove* with both eyes for 10 minutes. (Yarbus, 1967).

### Eye movement and the Deleuzian Diagram

There is a similarity between the saccadic lines laid down by the eyes in the halting determination of a scene in Yarbus's free exploration recordings (Figures 3.12 and 3.13) and the tentative laying down of lines on paper that Hockney (2006) identifies in the new-awkwardness-draughtsmanship as drawing with one's eyes. The common thread that ties these two parallel determinations of the line lies in their errant, grope-y, grasp-y, nature of the 'cept' as manual and tactile. The word root 'cept' comes from the Latin *ceptus*, a derivation of *capio*, which means to take into the hand, or take hold of. It also means to be drawn in, or taken in in the sense of delude, to take for oneself or appropriate, and also to accept what is offered (GLARE, 1968). This is a similar to the definition of the English verb to

draw, which means to pull towards oneself; to pull a covering of some kind over an object to conceal it; to deduce or infer a conclusion; to trace (a line or figure) by *drawing* a pencil across a surface; to cut (a furrow) by drawing a ploughshare through the soil (O.E.D.).<sup>78</sup> We can discern here the conceptual kernel, the common notion, which delimits various aspects of our problematising of the gaze and the line. The prefix 'per-' unleashes the power of the root-word -cept through its meaning of through, in space and time; throughout; through and through, to completion; and away entirely, to destruction (O.E.D.). Thus we come to understand the imagistic percept and perception through the gestural manifold of the production of lasting imprints through repeated impression and the creation of traces in a variety of ways: as a process which "draws" both as a pulling an object towards us and making it ours as an object to mind; to channel the afferent visual signal towards its efferent expression as the gesture of leaving discernible and legible traces; the creation of a furrow for planting seeds or '*arche*'; and as a process of a logic of inference that results from the reconciliation of crisis and intuition; and as a process of selection which results in the complete assimilation of that which is discerned externally.

Deleuze differentiates these various aspects of lines in terms of hand-eye subordinations so that "there are several aspects in the values of the hand that must be distinguished from each other: the digital, the tactile, the manual proper, and the haptic" (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 124). The digital of the digits is where the hand is totally subordinated to the indexical function of the already discerned line-figure so that sight develops an "ideal" optical space which contains the fully drawn figure. The tactile is the tentative groping of the halting and experimental advance of discovery both in the free, unconditioned, exploratory gaze and the awkwardness of line of eyeballed drawings as emergent within sensation as a taking hold, as the possessive grasping of perception. The manual corresponds to what we call the continuous, confident, untrammelled line of the tracing, of the preconstituted, mentalised line which leaves nothing to be discerned. It is an a priori that is given and as such there is no travail here to generate the image. The haptic is when "sight discovers in itself a specific function of touch that is uniquely its own, distinct from its optical function" (DELEUZE, 2003. p. 125). Alois Riegl describes the haptic as a synaesthetic visual discernment of an object's accidental qualities which are usually only available to the sense of touch, but

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<sup>78</sup> And furrow is also related to the cutting of a groove for planting seeds as well as a rut impressed upon the ground by repeated passage.

Deleuze spins it into a logic of sensation, where the logic as progression is ruled by the unruly intelligence of semiotic's desirous advance.

The digital or indicial subordination as passive requires the language of pictorial reference to indicate the quality that is being designated or appointed. In terms of diagrammatic thought, we have been reticent to call Yarnus's records of saccadic eye movements diagrams because, technically speaking, in terms of how Deleuze has theorised the diagram, the records cannot be so considered. The record of eye movements in the relatively short (2 minutes) free examination of Queen Nefertiti's head (Figure 3.14) is already demonstrating the eyes' aptitude for figural draughtsmanship where the correspondence of the saccadic movements of the eyes scanning the photo and the lines on Yarnus's photographic paper become the containment which delimits the object and composes a figure. The gaze as composed of a series of eye movements imposes the Figure while ultimately striving towards Form as the outside or accidental form of identity, so that if we allowed the ocular examination to continue indefinitely, something like a perfectly rendered drawing of the statue might emerge.

The tactile subordination constitutes the perception-image. And it falls in line with the idea of impressions as bodies which can be actively grasped or somehow '-cepted' by our visual apparatus and offered the mind. The active gesture of grasping can also be construed as a grasping of what is at hand to ascertain truth by corroborating the information garnered visually by the sense of touch—one knows something visually as certainly or as truthfully as if it had been grasped, held in the hand. Additionally, one could also say for the sense of sight, something is clearly discernible to me because it is near me, at arm's length or within reach, and can be clenched or clasped readily by the mind. This act of grasping demonstrates the active nature perception as well as its practical character.

The manual refers to the Mental Image which refers to quasi-visual phenomena which arises as consciousness but not caused by sense impressions. These entail the representations that occur as a result of thought, dreams, memories, ideas, phantasmata, or the workings of inventive and creative imagination and which derive from causes other than the immediately perceptible.

The haptic process in vision is tactile the way that chiselling marble is visual. We can illustrate this by studying the saccadic jerkiness of Picasso's drawing of Jacqueline (Figure 9) are complex in that the movement of the pencil on the paper constitutes an assemblage of

marks or traces which are tactile in the sense of sculptural. The pencil marks carve out the negative space which allows the positive white space to emerge: the process is intuitive, it demonstrates the method of intuition as already discussed in the Preface. These marks and traces on paper are “no longer either significant or signifiers: they are asignifying traits. They are traits of sensation, but of confused sensations. And above all, they are manual traits” (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 82). But here, instead of calling them manual, perhaps we ought to call them efferent traits resulting from the mind’s centre of indetermination, no different from the eyes’ saccadic responses in the eye movements of the unconditioned, free examinations which can only be characterised as “irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random” (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 82).

Yet, in Picasso’s *Jacqueline* (1956) (Figure 3.14), something altogether different is happening. We discern two sets of striking similarities: on the one hand, we have the two “drawings”—the eye movement record and Picasso’s drawing of *Jacqueline*; and on the other, the photograph of the statue of Queen Nefertiti and the figure on paper of *Jacqueline Roque*. Although both drawings show a profusion of jerky, saccadic lines, the Yarbus image is more like a line drawing where the eye movements are intent on establishing relative location of the various points of interest in order to delimit and contain the object; the jagged, jerky lines in Picasso’s drawing also accomplish that but the end result is more similar to the photograph of Queen Nefertiti even if the eye movement record could very likely be applied to *Jacqueline*. Even if Picasso’s drawing is replete with lines, there are really very few definite, continuous ‘lines’, everything else is haphazard saccadic hatching, some blending and, significantly, some zones of white. Picasso’s drawing is more akin to a painting even if the entire image is executed as a superposition of jagged, saccadic lines as zones of dark, juxtaposed with zones of light, much as a colourist would in establishing tonal relations between blocs. As Deleuze writes, “‘Colourism’ means not only that relations are established between colours but that colour itself is discovered to be the variable relation, the differential relation, on which everything else depends” (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 112).<sup>79</sup> Thus in giving the accumulation on paper of these saccadic lines a different treatment, the subject matter reveals itself differently and also fulfils a different purpose. This qualitative difference

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<sup>79</sup> As Deleuze asserts on the same page, “Colourists can indeed make use of black and white, light and dark; but this is because they treat light and dark, black and white, as colours and establish tonal relations between them” (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 112).

in the way the lines are being drawn is what makes the Picasso a diagrammatic image and not simply a drawing—the drawing of *Jacqueline* breaks free from pictorial concerns, the reproduction of figurative givens and the optical organisation of representation, not to render the visible of the woman’s visual traits but to render visible the interplay of light as the determinant factor (in)forming our seeing. We see this in how *Jacqueline* resembles the photograph of Nefertiti as a continuous tonal arrangement of light and shadow which tells the whole story, as opposed to Yarbus’s eye movement record which tries to delineate the shape. Picasso’s drawing builds on the cross-hatching of saccadic lines to build up relations of haptic, broken zones to produce “a more profound resemblance, a non-figurative resemblance, for the same form, that is a uniquely figural Image” (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 127).

We can discern a positive/negative dynamic here at play, where the lightest part of a pictorial image receives the greatest amount of visual attention and at the same time produces the densest concentration of ocular movement, so that the diagram produced by the ocular saccades tends towards the tonal negative of the pictorial image. This is saying that the eye is spending more time looking at areas that are well lit and in comparison the shadows receive very little attention. This is repeatedly demonstrated in other eye movement tests carried out by Yarbus (1967) and anchors the cognitive scientific bias of the “streetlight effect” in physiological function. The “streetlight effect” or the “drunkard’s search” is an observational bias in scientific research that occurs when a researcher looks for something not where it’s most likely to be found, but where it’s easiest to look, where they think they will find positive results, or where observations can be most easily recorded. This observation appears to be based on an apocryphal tale “Looking for the Missing Ring” told by the 13th century Sufi satirist, Mulla Nasreddin, and recycled as a joke where the first English instance appears in an American newspaper:<sup>80</sup> “On May 24, 1924 a Massachusetts newspaper printed an instance with a Boston setting. A police officer saw a man on his hands and knees “groping about” around midnight and asked him about his unusual behavior: “I lost a \$2 bill down on Atlantic avenue,” said the man. “What’s that?” asked the puzzled officer. “You lost a \$2 bill on Atlantic avenue? Then why are you hunting around here in Copley square?” “Because,” said the man as he turned away and continued his hunt

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<sup>80</sup> 1924 May 24, *Boston Herald*, Whiting’s Column: Tammany Has Learned That This Is No Time for Political Bosses, Quote Page 2, Column 1, Boston, Massachusetts. (GenealogyBank). <http://listserv.linguistlist.org/pipermail/ads-l/2013-May/126975.html>



on his hands and knees, “the light’s better up here.”<sup>81</sup> From the point of view of the formal context of scientific enquiry, it would appear that the mode of cognition based upon observation would have a predilection for convenience. Rather than explore the ‘darkness’—the plausibly unknowable—it would seem that enquiry based on vision seeks to complexify the obvious rather than look to venture into the unknown.

In comparing the diagram of the eye movements of Queen Nefertiti to Picasso’s *Jacqueline*, the two systems produce two ways of characterising the differential: Picasso’s diagrammatic image is imbued with the interplay of light and colour, as an emergent vibrational quality of colour-becoming-light as space-becoming-time (and vice-versa) as immanent creation of difference in itself, whereas the record of eye movement reveals the linear progressive production of time and space as independent variables in terms of difference from itself. We are struck by their similarity and by their difference. We cannot deny the similarity of the drawing of Jacqueline and the the photo of the profile of the Nefertiti sculpture—the lighting in the two images is very similar and both bring out the features of their subjects in distinctly similar ways. On the other hand, Yarbus’s eye movement diagram is very much the negative image of the Picasso drawing. It is the negative in the photographic sense as the figural reversal of the photograph; and we can also say that it is negative in that it allows the positive space of the light blocs to emerge relative to the negative space of the dark blocs. The marks depicting the saccadic eye movements as depiction of negative extension, it allows the identification of the positive embodiment; it identifies the passive intellection versus the active poetic.

We readily take at face value that the mark is that which conveys meaning. But Yarbus’s eye movement image seems to indicate otherwise. On the Picasso drawing, the marks constitute zones of shadow which liberate zones of light, and it is exactly to these zones of light to which the eyes are drawn and where meaning is sought. There is virtually no interest in areas of darkness in observing the photograph; if the photograph were a text, it would be like looking at the white space between the letters, words and lines to understand the content of the text—and to add insult to injury, on the drawing, all of the artist’s creative energy is being devoted where the viewer will be virtually disinterested! The two images are about ‘producing’ images, but the two are engaged in the ποιήσις (poiesis) in

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<sup>81</sup> <http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/04/11/better-light/#return-note-5967-1>

two different ways. The contrast of the two images distinguishes the Πάθος (pathos) as the passive capacity to receive God's active wisdom as opposed to the haphazard active invention of the imparting of form onto passive material of ποιητική (poietike) as operations on potential.

The gestures that produce meaning are those that produce marks, that produce inscriptions, that produce signs, whether they are pen marks on the drawing or the eye movements which leave mental traces. They both produce semiosis—signification.<sup>82</sup> The root of the word, Σημα (sema), is a bi-polar enigma in that it indicates a futurity while attesting pastness: it is a token of futurity that exists as a mark on a field indicating the location of an entity that is dead and buried and it is also that which characterises signeletic primacy. The marker might be on the surface but the significant meaning is buried in the earth, beneath the surface of the ground—and to know exactly what the hidden signification of the marker is, in order to find out what it stands for, one must dig. And in digging one finds the Чернозём, *chernozem*, the fertile, rich organic soil which can be interpreted as elemental Earth expressive of material transformation. But to make this relevant to our discussion of imagistic becoming in terms of Yarus's eye movement diagram and the Picasso drawing we need to take this a step further looking at the manifestation of anger as an example.

### **The Peircean Sign**

For Peirce, the semeiotic is called a Sign and it is a triadic entity. It is composed of three parts where each component has a specific function relative to the whole and to the other components. The Sign is a functive (functional, pragmatic) movement of thought and by virtue of its being a movement it is indivisible. That which comes first in the movement is called a First; that which mediates the movement is referred to as a Second; and that which completes the movement is termed the Third. The First is called the *Representamen*; the Second is the *Object*; and the Third, the *Interpretant*. The Object or Second serves as fulcrum or hinge to the relation between the First and the Third, between the Representamen and

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<sup>82</sup> Σημείωσις, (sēmeiōsis), a derivative of the Greek verb Σημειῶ, (sēmeiō), which means to mark, and Σημεῖον, (semeion) a sign, token, indication, a mark by which a thing is known, are both derived from Σημα (sema), an omen, a sign by which a grave is known, or a constellation (LIDDELL and SCOTT, p. 1383).

the Interpretant and mediates the transfer of signification which constitutes processual advance as logical inference. In terms of describing a movement of thought, it is difficult to convey the 'change-over', the difference-making, that semiosis produces as a movement of thought, but in being a movement 'forward', as a making meaning. The movement constitutes the advance, the procession of signification, the forward movement of consciousness as meaning-making as inferential. This is also why this movement is also referred to as a logic and as propositional.

Peirce's theory of signs can be encapsulated in a few lines: "A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. [...] It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the representamen" (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 99). As a group, the triad or representamen, interpretant and ground, are bound together, integrated concretely, into an indecomposable or indissoluble unit (DELEDALLE, 2000, p. 55), so that no binary relation between members can take place excluding a third: the Sign is a relational assemblage, a machinic triadic assemblage, where the term Sign is a metonymy which is not only a term for the triadic relation as a unit of movement, but also indicates the Representamen as an actual Sign and the Interpretant as a resultant sign.

This definition of the Sign, as succinct as it is, is deceptively straightforward. In working with Peirce's semeiotic, one always has to be aware of the functional rôles each element assumes, despite their ordinal positional in the movement of meaning-making. To begin with, the Representamen itself, as the 'thing' which sets off the process, is itself called a sign because it is a thing which presents itself to another body according to some aspect or potential which it does not itself embody. The Interpretant, as concluding or perfective terminal of the movement, turns into a Representamen, as a commencement to a new movement of thought, as a First through the articulation of another Object that indicates the production of a new Third. By carrying out this operation, the Interpretant becomes a Representamen within another triadic assemblage thus establishing a relational concrescence, a continuity of meaning with other entities, thus producing an operative functionality of truth as a logic. In establishing this cogency as a triangulated entity, the

Interpretant becomes a Representamen calling out for another Third. The Third becomes a First—a Representamen to a subsequent formation of meaning production—where the original Representamen becomes the Object for the Second formation. The switch-over where the Interpretant transforms into a Representamen is what Whitehead calls in his categorial scheme a feeling in *Process and Reality* (1927): “‘feeling’ is the term used for the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question” (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 40). The machinic replication of the triad arises when the Third becomes a First and becomes capable of “determining a Third of its own” (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 100). Thus, we use the term machinic because the sign as process transforms these semiotic units and perpetuates the movement of signification making chain even if the sign function is evocative of processes that are less determinate than the mechanical, that are quasi-necessary, and which are conceived as a conception of functional coherence between what could be material and non-material causal agents. Thus, the triad becomes a machinic relational assemblage which maintains the generic character of the three modes of being but articulates them in terms of meaning as the common relation that constitutes the triadic unity. The triadic conception of the modes of being is therefore a model for the advance of consciousness as an on-going production of meaning.

In postulating his triadic theory of signs, Peirce might have been inspired by Plato’s dictum from the *Timaeus* [31] that “it’s impossible for any two things to form a proper structure without the presence of a third thing; there has to be some bond to mediate between the two of them and bring them together. [...] and nothing does this better than correspondence” (PLATO, 2008, p. 20). But this is not only a functive correspondence between a this and a that, but a harmonic resonance, a rational congruence which produces a concordant whole as a Pythagorean harmonic ratio, a musical and numerical rationalisation.

But this correspondence is the binding force which gives Peircean signs their coherence. The Representamen is to the Object like the Interpretant is to both the Representamen and the Object. In creating this trifold entity of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, the process does not come to a stop. Peirce does not understand semiosis as a static thing describable in terms of a finished completion, but a feeling of satisfaction which produces desire which impulses forward movement—it is a processual waypoint as a threshold of advance. And as Whitehead observes, this feeling of fulfillment is similar to

Samuel Alexander’s ‘enjoyment’ and to Bergson’s ‘intuition’—both in keeping with our Spinozist ideation and the generation of joyful affects as increasing a body’s power of acting and evoking advancement towards ‘perfection’.

But what is the common Idea here? What is the intuition if we extend it, take it to its logical extrapolation and express the idea-problem in terms of time? of the composition of the triangle stated in terms of time? It is the feeling where the third becomes a Third and the passage is when the Third becomes a First. So the movement-image here is one that has both extension and advance: in forming a new triangulated addition of Thirdness to a First and a Second, we have a processual advance of embodiment, of body-creation as desire embodied in signification itself, in the machinic advance of its propagation. The polyvalence of each semeiotic object allows each element to contemplate semiotic relations with other entities thereby constituting a concretised web of semeiosis. This produces a plane of consistency where truth becomes an extended operative functionality and the created web of meaning a cartography of correspondences.




Figure 3.15: Anger and its Hypothetical Diagram.

### Affective Signification and its Diagrammatic Expression

Anger is defined as a hostile response to a perceived provocation. Aristotle analysed it at length in Rhetoric Bk. II Ch. 2 but mostly as to how we become stirred to anger. He understood it as arising as a reaction to some slight or opposition and which results in a directed vengeful response towards a particular individual. Spinoza saw it as an affect which he defined in the *Ethics* (III Def Aff XXXVI) as “Desire by which we are spurred, from hate, to do evil to one we hate” (SPINOZA, 1996, p. 111). We can combine these two

definitions to see anger as an action-reaction dynamic driven by affects. If we come upon someone who is displaying anger, we will recognise the affective state by a number of observable traits one would call the signs of anger. These would include: tightness of the brows, squinty eyes, pale cheeks, pursed lips or bared teeth, flaring nostrils, tense jaw, the shoulders are squared and pulled back, clenched fists, the body poised for action. Together, these signs together represent anger and thus constitute a perceptual concept of anger. Yet, I do not perceive all of these signs together at once: I constitute a signifying chain where one sign leads to the next, as if I were checking off a list of signs which constitute anger. And once I have checked them all off, I repeat the process as an affirmation of what I have ascertained and also to make sure that none have changed, or been added or deducted.

The individual features themselves are not the signs, they are the objects that signify, and the signification is conveyed by the affective emanation of the object—whatever signifying value each object has, it is an inadequate idea and so it is labelled an affect—and we consider the object exhibited to the mind the *representamen* as per its traditional definition without necessarily invoking Peirce’s semeiotic. Spinoza affirms that affects beget affects, and so an affect that affects is apt to produce an affect within us; and Bergson affirms that an image is by definition a stimulus, a delay within the black box of the centre of indetermination and a reaction. So that what we have signs or representamina/objects as follows:

- |      |                |                     |
|------|----------------|---------------------|
| R1:  | tight-knit     | brows <sup>83</sup> |
| R2:  | right squinty  | eye                 |
| R3:  | left squinty   | eye                 |
| R4:  | left pale      | cheek               |
| R5:  | right pale     | cheek               |
| R6:  | bared          | teeth               |
| R7:  | tense          | jaw                 |
| R8:  | left squared   | shoulder            |
| R9:  | right squared  | shoulder            |
| R10: | right clenched | fist                |
| R11: | left clenched  | fist                |

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<sup>83</sup> Any of the *representamina* here listed are perceived within one fixation.

Each representamen has an interpretant which in this example is the movement of the eyes from the present representamen to the next on the list. So that if we begin with R1 as the affective signification of tight-knit brow, the imagistic reaction as interpretant is the movement to R2, to right, squinty eye. From this, the eyes move to R3, and so on, until the eyes go first to one fist and then to the other and then back up to R1: tight-knit brow. The sequence is then repeated to ascertain that what we are witnessing is in fact anger. We need to point out that there is a shift in neuronal circuitry from the afferent nerves carrying the stimulus of the representamen affect to the efferent nerves carrying the interpretant affect as a muscular contraction. Further, the response as the determination of the representamen as incoming stimulus is the result of a subconscious process, at present unknowable or undeterminable, that produces movement according to an intelligence or logic beyond our comprehension. That shift which occurs in the rift between the incoming representamen and the outgoing interpretant is what constitutes the movement of thought mediated by the centre of indetermination.

So if we phrase this in terms of questions, we obtain:

What is the interpretant to R1: tight-knit brows? Right squinty eye.

What is the interpretant to R2: Right squinty eye? Left squinty eye.

What is the interpretant to R3: Left squinty eye? Left pale cheek... etc

Tantamount to saying:

I see tight-knit brows. What is my interpretative response: go to Right squinty eye.

I see Right squinty eye. What is my interpretative response: go to Left squinty eye.

I see Left squinty eye. What is my interpretative response: go to Left pale cheek...etc

But if I ask 'What is that "Desire by which we are spurred, from hate, to do evil to one we hate"?' And you answer "tightness of the brows, squinty eyes, pale cheeks, pursed lips or bared teeth, flaring nostrils, tense jaw, the shoulders are squared and pulled back, clenched fists", I might say that there is something wrong with you even if this is how anger is cognised. The eyes travel from R1 to R2 to R3 to R4... to R8 to R9, R10, R11 and then back again to R1 and then repeat the cycle. Thus, the diagram is the series of movements as assemblage that traces out the 'complete' logic of sensation which determines the cognition. Thus the diagram of anger will be 'drawn' by the series of movements from R1 to

R11—this does not exist as a diagram on paper but as the pattern of cognition as a designation, as a territorialisation that denotes specific activities. The diagram is not the movement of the eyes that generate the cognition but the path made by the understanding as it cycles through the cognition of anger as it draws out the anger. The entire landscape of anger as possible generator of diagrams is the Perceian ground as the semeiotic cartography of the potential territorialisation of the concept. The eye movement drawing of anger will thus be a representation of the flow of signification of my understanding of anger, and indicate the flow of determination as it happens, as the chain of signification. But because we can never exhaust the fractal potential of signification, one can never represent the entirety.

In Figure 3.13, the diagram of that image will be a single tracing of the cycle the eyes make as the record of movement from representamen to representamen until one cycle of cognition is closed. In Figure 3.14, the diagram of the tracings of eye movement will be the singular cycle which traces out the pattern of cognition on the photograph of the head of Queen Nefertiti. Picasso's drawing, also in Figure 8, represents a more complex situation. First, one can appreciate it for its documentary value, not for the depiction of Jacqueline Roque on 04/12/1956, but as a direct record of Picasso's own intuitive progress as the creation of signification towards the production of the portrait and then we need to understand it as a possibility of our own understanding. Picasso's entire drawing is one big diagram. It is the record of the cumulative construction or creation of semiosis as an imbrication of micrometric signs—each line constitutes a unit of signaletic matter which documents the emergence of another world, the world of the depiction of *Jacqueline*. For on their own, "these marks, these traits, are irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random. They are nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, nonnarrative. They are no longer either significant or signifiers: they are asignifying traits." (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 82). To see Picasso draw or paint, like in Henri-Georges Clouzot's 1956 documentary *Le Mystère Picasso*, is to witness the hand's creative independence as testimony of the hidden intelligence that is at work in the gestural propagation of signification as a mode of thought. In the continuity of the recurring sequence of R1-R2-R3...R10-R11 as the ascertainment of the concept of anger, we can attest to this intelligence is at work as that which impulses and guides the movements of the eye as a manifestation of thought. The move from R1 to R2 demonstrates that a determination has taken place and that the move is the resolution to the crisis at R1



as to 'What's next?' which inevitably leads to catastrophe. Further, the repeatable pattern as a closed grouping is unique and cognisable as an empirical concept which can be named Anger. And as a closed series, one can count on the resultant of this series in terms of its external production will be a violent attack and that our response will either be fight or flight. So that the outcome of cognising the sequence of R1+R2+R3+....R10+R11 is fight or flight—and hardly a conscious intellectual conception of Anger but the performative reaction of Fear. Whereas the serial performance of R1+R2+R3+....R10+R11 is the affective state of Anger as hostile response but nowhere to direct it at:

But what is to be drawn from this as conclusion that the angry man of Figure 9 is an image, we can understand it as a sign where the Representamen can be called Anger and the Interpretant compels us to choose between Fight or Flight. In terms of the Bergsonian image, to the cognised concept as an assemblage that can be understood as a stimulus, the response emerges immanently as a progressive determination that is conveyed efferently as a thresholding which results in a muscular contraction as Fight or Flight. The pictorial image might represent Anger but its affective result is Fear, just as Anger may have been the affective result to a taunting peal of laughter.

As incredible and unbelievable as it appears, this is the kind of determinations that Picasso unconsciously, intuitively carried out in penning the hatching on the paper vertiginously quickly. This is the same activity that happens between one fixation and the next in the eye movement images, but when the hands carry out the operation of shading. Through the zigging and zagging of the hands or the eyes, thought is being produced as serial determinations which in one case terminates in the drawing of Jacqueline Roque and the other as the diagram of the determination of the visual study of the photograph of Egyptian Queen Nefertiti.

But in Picasso's *drawing* the speed of thought, as Deleuze might say, leaves no time to think things through; it is as if the draughtsman's agency was only the mediation of the catastrophe which overcomes the drawing. "The painter's hand intervenes in order to shake its own dependence and break up the sovereign optical organization: one can no longer see anything, as if in a catastrophe, a chaos" (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 83). We don't perceive the lines individually, we perceive them through their effect as an assemblage of asignifying traits. The word drawing has a double meaning here. It can refer to the gestures of laying down marks on paper or it can refer to the marks already on the paper itself as attraction.

Picasso's signification-creation is so rapid that the movement is a blur. The lines on the paper, if one takes them for what they are, are pure chaos, one catastrophe after another without end. The gestures which have now become a system of marks on a paper amount to a drawing, a depiction which magnetically pulls our gaze to the catastrophe before us because we cannot avert our eyes from disaster.

When our attention is drawn to acts of violence, degeneracy, and death we call that a morbid curiosity—yet this interest for that which is marked by death is none other than the attraction we feel towards Σημα (*sema*). The sight of morbidity—whose root is the Latin *morī* to die—of death, of violence, of disease is the site of violence as the site of creation, of a primal scene of agitation that produces thought in the Χώρα (*Chōra*) as the site for emplaced invention, for where there is violence and destruction there is always a possibility of the creation of something new. As Rickert points out, “as deployed in the work of Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida, and Gregory Ulmer, the *chōra* transforms our senses of beginning, creation, and invention by placing them concretely within material environments, informational spaces, and affective (or bodily) registers” (RICKERT, 2007, p. 252). This is at the core of the ideation of transformation, of the movement from static ideas to vital activity which as Rickert contends represents a rhetorical shift in the understanding of creative invention as heterogeneous activity. And this transforms the *chōra* into the ὄχημα, the *ōchema*, literally, carriage or conveyance, the vehicle which conveys reason, an image of which is portrayed in the opening of the plateau on Becoming-Intense in *A Thousand Plateaus* and the study of Oedipus in Chapter 4.

### **Bergson's Theory of the Image**

We have encountered Bergson's theory of the image in the opening pages of this chapter as a triadic conception of stimulus, a centre of indetermination and a reaction, but we feel that it needs further development in order to allow us to articulate the ideas of the cinematograph, perspective and the associative milieu down the line. Bergson developed his theory of the image in his *Matter and Memory* (1896). In French, the book's subtitle is *Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit* (Essay on the relation of body and spirit), and so the work presents an analysis of the classical philosophical problem concerning duality through the concept of the image as core concept featured in all four chapters. *Matter and Memory* was

Bergson's reaction to the book *The Maladies of Memory* (1881) by French psychologist Théodule Ribot who claimed that the findings of brain science proved that memory is a faculty lodged within a particular part of the nervous system, localized within the brain and thus being of a purely physical nature.

For Bergson, the image is a dualistic conception in that it maintains a separation between the spiritual and the material (BERGSON, 1991, p. 9). But unlike Descartes who is a substance dualist who understands the world as matter and spirit, Bergson's conception is more Spinozist in that the spiritual and the material are attributes of one substance—even if he maintains the distinction between matter and spirit. As Bergson writes in *Matter and Memory*, "This book affirms the reality of spirit and the reality of matter" (BERGSON, 1991, p. 9) and so they may be autonomous but he allows them to coexist heterogeneously—to think with Bergson is to abandon the common sense approach to understanding matter, memory, and the image: matter is to be understood as material process and not as physical or solid. Bergson pushes us to think of existence differently, in a way that sets us from the everyday, common understanding of things. He installs himself at the intersection of two axes which explore the basic dualism between matter and spirit: on one axis, he sets up the polar extremes of realism and idealism, and on the other axis he sets up Epiphenomenalism and Parallelism.

Bergson's conception of matter is very modern. Essentially, we are dealing with beings of light. The entire system of imagistic thought is predicated upon perpetual, universal vibratory variation exemplified and illustrated through energy and light as wave function. This is perhaps a very abstract way of thinking about matter and the world, but we can understand this through Einstein's formula which equates energy with qualities which we can deem physical, such as mass. For example, if one can characterise an atom as an expression of wave function and energy as massive, of naming that property or relational mode as massive, then any object can be thought of as a hyper-complex expression of interacting meshings of energies and wave function. Because any object can be construed as made up of atoms, then everything is materially substanceless energy and vibration but having relational heft. From a common-sense point of view one can speak of the reciprocal action and reaction of bodies on one another as imagistic interaction on a dynamic field.

For Bergson, Cartesian dualism, or the Ordinary dualism of mind and body, is too sharp. It postulates two systems, but cannot explain why there are two, and in one form

(subjective idealism) it tries to derive one of these systems from the other, the world of science from the world of consciousness, while in its other form (materialistic realism) it does the opposite. For Bergson, actuality exists as the reconciliation, the making one of these opposites (BERGSON, 1991, p. 14 -16). But his reconciliation is not a making one of the extremes but an expression of the possibility of the two orders being operative simultaneously. And it is this possibility of simultaneity, of co-existence which goes against the basic laws of thought, which state that a thing is either A or not A, that a thing A cannot be a thing B at the same time, it is either A or B but cannot be both. Bergson's conception of matter and memory is what makes it so appealing to Deleuze. And simultaneously so repulsive to so many others. This conception puts the image in the realm of the affective, of the impermanent, the changing, the non-being, because they are neither fully adequately formed or Ideas.

The first two chapters deal mainly with pure perception and the image—and he invokes 'pure' to signify that memory does not enter into the equation. The aim of the first chapter of the book is to show that pure realism and pure idealism both go too far, that they are too extreme, and that it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception which we have of it, as a solid, physical thing, and a mistake also to make of it a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature (BERGSON, 1991, p. 9). Realism claims that the world exists independent of the mind, as opposed to anti-realist views which deny the existence of a mind-independent world. Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality. In contrast, idealism is a philosophy which asserts that the real is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. In contrast to *materialism*, idealism concedes the primacy of consciousness, which means consciousness predicates the material, that consciousness creates and determines the material, not vice versa. Idealist theories believe consciousness is the originary cause of the world and aims to explain that which is by mental causes.

Bergson also contrasts Epiphenomenalism and Parallelism as positions which end up with the same outcome—particularly because of how he defines the nervous system itself as a heterogeneous system of images. In Psychology, Epiphenomenalism means that consciousness is exclusively regarded as a by-product of the material activities of the brain and nerve-system. In comparison, psycho-neural Parallelism contends that mental (psychic)

and physical processes are concomitant and that any change in the one will be correspondingly reflected in the other. The former is the theory of choice for scientists who maintain that neural correlates derive from mental process, whereas the latter, also known as the identity hypothesis, reflects the Spinozist position of mind and matter as expressive of one substance. This is of epistemological significance for Spinoza because it allows him to contemplate the identity of thought with its object (Hoffding, 1912, p. 74). So on one side we have the polarity between Berkeleian idealism and Cartesian materialism, and on the other of Epiphenomenalism and Parallelism which contend that "thought is regarded as a mere function of the brain and the state of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the state of the brain, or whether mental states and brain states are held to be two versions, in two different languages, of one and the same original" (BERGSON, 1991, p. 12).

Bergson distinguishes two different forms of memory. On the one hand memories concerning habitude, replaying and repeating past action, not strictly recognized as representing the past, but utilizing it for the purpose of present action. This kind of memory is automatic, inscribed within the body, and serving a utilitarian purpose. "It is habitude clarified by memory, more than memory itself strictly speaking." And so the question for us becomes "How does habitude or the learned cognitive repetition arise from the reciprocal interactive imagistic process?" Pure memory, on the other hand, registers the past in the form of "image-remembrance", representing the past, recognized as such. It is of a contemplative and fundamentally spiritual kind, and it is free and unconstrained. And here again, we need to come to see how we can build this structure of the past from the traces laid down in the encounter as imagistic interaction and the question of access to these memory-images as interactive process. Memory is just at the intersection of mind and matter (BERGSON, 1991, p. 13). And if the image is an "existence" placed halfway between the "thing" and the "representation" or mental image, how does this idea fit in with the idea of memory as an expression of between-ness? As expression of relation?

Bergson was already thinking perception as a processual event in his doctoral thesis, translated into English as *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* (1889). In engaging Bergson's processual thought, even if it appears to be articulated in the language of vision or neurophysiology in terms of the eyes, the nerves and the brain, one must be careful in rendering the processual activity as things in the world: these concrete things which exist in actuality and which have 'everyday' names need to be

seen as processual entities. For example, given the brain, which Bergson repeatedly refers to as an aggregate of images, needs to be understood as a 'massification' of forces, of substanceless reciprocity of action and reaction, of give and take where there is no substance, only the systematic assemblage of energies as a processual interaction of selected functions. Sensorial impressions are then construed as informational data immediate and present to receptive processes which engage the offered as surfaces of selection, and the receptor as senses. Perception then becomes a function of molecular movements (BERGSON, 1991, p. 22) which in philosophical terms embrace the atomic or organic molecules of molar forms but which express tensional properties which can be interpreted as taking place between "the Mechanical and the Chemical". Within the process of selection of images in terms of perception as discriminatory cognition—which can be expressed as what will be the next perception as a movement of a logic of sensation and subsequently of sense and memory—the molecular introduces a dynamic of thresholds or quanta as part of micro-becomings (DELEUZE 1987, p. 124) where "everything is involved, our perception, our actions and passions, our regimes of signs" (DELEUZE 1987, p. 138). Even though Bergson and Deleuze emphasise the non-human, the impersonal and the dissolution of the ego, the individual is defined by Deleuze as "concentration, accumulation, coincidence of a certain number of converging preindividual singularities" (DELEUZE 1993, p. 63) and it is within this definition of the singular individual, or of the individually singular as difference, that we must locate what perception can mean. We know the world through our senses and perception is the operative process or activity which enables cognition, but as Bergson underscores, echoing Plato, perception and cognition are not equivalent. Perception is a function of the molecular movements of the image and translates the external to the internal, transduces our material experience of the world into the mental experience of mind as machinic, not as mechanical, but as abstract process.

Bergson conceives the perceptual image in living beings as a triadic construction comprised of a stimulus, a centre of indetermination and a reaction (BERGSON, 1991). In human perception, any which way we wish to understand the presentation of immobile sections to the mind as a stimulus, a movement results which is experienced as continuous in consciousness. There is no flickering to our perception of the 'exterior' world even if what is offered to the mind is a series of static sections or snapshots. Bergson understood this dynamic as operative within perception when he wrote *Time and Free Will*, while the

technological development of the cinematographic apparatus was taking place in the world: it was an idea whose time had come. However, when he does recognise it, he labels perception cinematographic more for the front-end decomposition into static photograms of the perceptual than for the back-end synthesis where abstract movement is imparted onto the static sections and the production of time.




Figure 3.16: Bergson's Theory of the Image

He understands what is happening in the back end of the perception process in terms of synthesis and projection but rather as seeing it as the 'device' which gives continuity to the static cuts he externalises and "projects" back into the world to explicate matter and change in the world (BERGSON, 1991, p. 42). This projection of perception into the world is not normally understood as cinematographical, but we feel that it is an aspect of cinematic process that has gone unstudied as part of the cinematic trope in both Bergson and Deleuze. Yet, this enlarged conception will have implications for the front-end breakdown into static-frames and will allow Deleuze to theorise the shot, framing and eventually montage. But what is of utmost importance for Deleuze is the movement produced internally and the continuous abstract time which ensues. In *The Movement-Image*, he delves on the externalising sensory-motor link, but in *The Time-Image*, he will enfold the movement into

itself, as an internalisation of processual advance to offer a panoply of image types that articulate durational becoming.

Bergson's theory of perception as spelled out in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* (1896) identifies a type of procession of consciousness which was to a large extent already mapped out in *Time and Free Will* (1889) but which will only be identified as cinematographical in *Creative Evolution* (1907) and whose full implications will only be teased out nearly a century later by Deleuze (1983 and 1985) in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Deleuze will flesh-out this ideation of perceptual process in terms of the perception-image, the action-image and the affection-image in accordance with the image phases of Bergson's movement-image. Initially, in *Matter and Memory*, Bergson develops the concept of perception as what he calls 'pure perception', a theoretical mode which he uses to elaborate the concept in itself as an autonomous process of imagistic advance. He does this so as not to implicate memory in his elaboration of perception, which for him is a necessary and inalienable component of perception as apprehension—"there is no perception which is not full of memories" (BERGSON, 1991, p. 33). In subsequent chapters, he will develop two types of memory, both dependent on perceptual process, but which engage different functional modalities of memory: habit memory and integral or pure memory. In terms of developing the cinematographical method in Bergson, memory per se has no primary relevance even if it will be useful for Deleuze when he develops the memory-image in *The Time-Image* (1989).

But in reading Bergson's text, we are shaken by the statement that "these images act and react upon one another". And likely, the image that one have selected as oner vaguest image probably doesn't react with any other image in the same way that we may interact with each other. But earlier, Bergson defined an image as "a certain existence that is located halfway between the "thing" and the "representation". And now, he invokes an image that is distinct from all others—the human body—and asks us to examine our consciousness and consider the affections that are produced.

Bergson is being less than clear here and making it difficult for us to understand what he is positing. But perhaps the reason it seems unclear to us today, is that 150 years ago perhaps the mainstream discourse as to what constitutes psychological causality was different. So that contrary to how we understand the word affection today, we should be understanding it as the action of affecting, acting upon, or influencing which when viewed



passively, as an existence, it becomes the fact of being affected. When applied to the mind, an affection is an affecting or moving of the mind in any way; a mental state brought about by any influence; an emotion or feeling and more specifically, to make a material impression on; to act upon, influence, move, touch, or have an effect on. So for vision, we have an intensity of light striking our retina, causing an impression—such as when a rubber stamp makes an impression on a piece of paper—and produces an impulsion conveyed inwards to the brain. Thus, when Bergson asks us to consider the affections that are being produced, he is being very contemporary in that he is asking us to be mindful, to practice mindfulness, and examine how the impressions of the world on our body are affecting us. He is asking us to examine what happens to our body when we perceive the world, when we enter an air-conditioned room from a hot exterior, when we take a step, how one gaze leads to another, when we taste a Madeleine after dipping it in tea, and consider how we are affected. And, “it seems that each of them contains an invitation to act” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 17).

Yet, when we are affected and we perceive the incipience to act, we understand that there is a change that has happened within our mind. That whatever it is that affects us, in this case the sensorial impression, is being processed in the mind, and that the brain processing is formulating the invitation to act in a certain way: for every stimulation there is a reaction. And this is the key to understanding the image for Bergson. If we consider what happens when we put our hand into a hot churrasqueira, we begin to feel a mounting sensation of discomfort originating in our hand and subsequently an increasingly insistent invitation from within us to pull our hand out. When we first put our hand into the heat, we perceive an intensification of the sensation of heat. Then a very short, some would say in this case instantaneous, delay, and the subsequent immediate withdrawal of the hand from the fire. This is a pure response to a stimulation because we don't need ratiocination or memory to formulate the response. No matter how young we are, the response will be the same.

But if we reconsider this sequence of gestures, of actions involved when we our hand hand is first in the fire, and start at the middle, as Deleuze would say, because the how and why of how the hand finds itself in the churrasqueira is here irrelevant. So the gesture is already taking place of my hand going into the churrasqueira, the radiant heat of the fire makes contact with the surface of my skin, and the impression of heat, the intensification of sensation is conducted to the brain by the afferent nerves to some region of the brain,

where something indeterminate happens, some kind of thought processing takes place, and a response is formulated automatically, so that a neural impulse is transmitted by the efferent nerves to the muscles of the arm and a gesture of response occurs.<sup>84</sup> One can consciously fight that impulse to withdraw the hand, but a threshold will be reached where our resistance will be surpassed. And here, when the response happens, we note.

First, that the response represents a reversal of the stimulus.

Second, that the process that occurs in our brain that determines the reversal is unknown to us and indeterminate—we don't know how the formulation of the reversal takes place and we don't know what went into the formulation.

Third, as Bergson points out, the affection—the change, the modification or alteration in the mind brought on by the sensorial impression conveyed inwards—produces an invitation to act but not of choice. The affection brings the process of stimulation—indetermination—response to a point of resolution, of crisis, which exacts a simple yes or no to proceed from the process of resolution. But here it is not really a question of deciding between various outcomes. The naive or obvious action of our example called upon in the moment of crisis is derived from the formulation of what Bergson and Deleuze will call an intuition, meaning the inevitable response formulated by the indeterminate invisible reason of the mind from a panoply of stimuli. Or as Bergson writes “The necessary action will take place automatically, when its hour strikes” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 20).

Fourth, that the response as a reversal occurs along a different channel of nerves, the efferent nerves, which conduct said response to the muscles as a gesture—the afferent nerves carry the stimulation from the periphery of the nervous system. In our example, the nerves which carry the sensation of heat to the brain are not the same nerves that convey the reaction to move our arm. Likewise, the nerves which convey transduced luminous energy to the brain are not the same that convey the reaction of ocular adjustment.

Fifth, that the sensorial impression as objective becomes subjective within and through the indeterminate reversal that produces the response, and that it will in turn reverse itself in the world and subsequently become objectile as a foundation for the next cycle of stimulus—indetermination—response.

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<sup>84</sup> The Ancient Greeks would say that there is no reaction without an actant, an agent body responsible for any movement. So that the heat as a first cause of the pain and discomfort that will eventually lead to my moving my arm is constitutive of a body.

Sixth, the affection as referred to by Bergson is that change that occurs in the centre of indetermination between the stimulus and the response which is active yet indeterminable.

Seventh, depending on how we conceive matter, on the material foundation of what we consider matter to be, we can understand matter as an “aggregate of images” a welter of interactivity, of a system of reciprocity of action and reaction between all things in the Universe. For example, if we consider the tension of attraction and repulsion that takes place between all things in the Universe, we have a dynamic system of reciprocal action and reaction as marking the relational existence of things in the Universe.

Eighth, that all images are dynamic interactions in the happening: whether they are being suffered passively or inflicted actively, images represent the receiving and giving back of movement, The difference between inanimate and animate existences, between the organic and the inorganic, between the living and the non-living is that there is a delay between the stimulus and the response. In humans the difference lies in the difference that the “body appears to choose, within certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives’ (BERGSON, 1991, p. 19). Thus, when a billiard ball strikes another billiard ball, the billiard ball that is struck does not process ‘psychically’ being struck by another ball but reacts mechanically, immediately, without prevarication and responds according to the movement that is transmitted to it according to the laws of mechanics.

Nine, that there is a memory of some kind here at work which is not habitual but which will repeat itself given the same conditions.

Now, this serves as the foundation for Bergson’s conception of an imagistic universe. And here again we need to remind ourselves again that the images that we are working with are not pictorial images, or photographs or paintings, but actions and reactions as productive of affective impressions, because as a causal nexus we know the stimulus or the response but very inadequately. And that when we think of impressions we can think of them in terms of the motions of an impression and the effect produced as impression. So that most everyone is interested in the final effect produced by the activity of impression, in the residual of impression, in what is left behind as a trace, a mark, as impression as image object because that is ascertainable and evident. What Bergson will rail against as the “difficulty of the problem that occupies us (which) comes from the fact that we imagine perception to be a kind of photographic view of things, taken from a fixed point by that

special apparatus which is called an organ of perception” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 38). Bergson is more interested in the movements of impression, in the interactivity of action and reaction, as the reciprocal dynamic which defines the universe, than in the outcome as objective, as a perception of something.

Why does Bergson believe in this on-going system of action and reaction? Because to arrest the ceaseless process of interactivity on the impression as residual makes no sense. One cannot divorce what we are calling the residual of the impression from the processual movement that leads up to it or from the processual movement which ensues. And this is what the first chapter of Deleuze’s *Movement-Image* is about. And if one read Deleuze’s *The Fold* one can glean that it examines this movement of passage within and through this process of interactivity. Now, this on-going change-over, this conversion from action to reaction, is the fold, what Whitehead calls prehension and which we call the threshold. Each one describes the change-over differently, but they are essentially addressing the same thing. But, it is very important that we not understand any of these conceptions as a static place, as a fixed location, but as experience. We can sit along the processual chain of production but not as an end product of process. For even if one wishes to extract the residual impression from process, one can appreciate that if we consider it as an image of action-reaction, there is already consequent action-reaction process being produced. As a spectator, one is being changed by the cognition of the image and as a result the way that one re-cognises the pictorial image changing before us. But what most of science is trying to tell us is that the image before us is what is, no more and no less, that what is before us is an isolatable object—even if “my perception of the universe” appears to depend upon the internal movements of the cerebral substance, [and] to change when they vary” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 24) or in terms of the observer effect, the fact that simply observing a situation or phenomenon necessarily changes the phenomenon.

Now, before going further, what we have to come to terms with is how Bergson divides his system of images into two regimes. Let’s consider the Universe as a whole. According to the way we have been defining Universe, that is, as a system of reciprocal ceaseless action and reaction, as a system of images, we need to think about how process happens. We are going to imagine that there are no humans in this universe, so the process of interactive action and reaction goes on for ever and ever for some reason unknown and likely unknowable reason. We usually say that outside of the Universe, there’s a God which

is the subjective entity that creates the universe, that animates it, that keeps it going... so we say that the Universe is closed but infinitely big. If it weren't closed, there would be no place to sit and watch over his creation and give it order. But now, we are much more modern and because we have read Nietzsche, we can say that God is dead and that the universe is immanent to itself in an infinite yet closed immanent space-time where both time and space are simultaneously created out from and through processual advance. Either way, there are no privileged points in the Universe. It is a very democratic system in that all points are equally valuable, and if one point did not exist neither could the rest. The process of the Universe is therefore ceaseless and let's assume continuous. So that process or the creation of change is ongoing and un-impeded.

And if change is happening, then difference is being created, and therefore, time as well. And here, it doesn't matter whether one believe in God or not, or subscribe to an immanent Universe without a God: Everything that happens is happening under one register of time. So that the entire Universe is ruled by one time signature. We don't need to specify in what units but only that change is happening and as a result we have time. This system of time which rules the entire Universe is called Aion and the process of difference-making under this regime of time is called differentiation. This is pure difference, a difference produced immanently within, where change simply happens from what we would call an external point of view onto the system.

So within this imagistic universe of ceaseless action and reaction, we now designate one singular point. We indicate a certain location in the universe and call that point X, and we assume the situation of that point X. We are not going to make the point a human being just yet, only a tiny point like a tiny island in the middle of the universe. All of a sudden everything changes. The Universe now organises itself relative to that point: it becomes the centre of its own Universe. The entire Universe becomes perspectivised and reflects images differentially from that point. And we call it privileged because it is a privilege to have the universe arrange itself or unfold relative to that one point. So what is the problem here? Well, if we are beings of light as is everything else in the Universe, as Bergson asserts, we know that it takes time to travel. So that when we look at the world, or the night sky for example. We are faced with a very big problem. When we look at the moon, we see something that happened 1.3 seconds ago; when we look at Mars, we see something that happened between 3 and 21 minutes ago; when we look at the Sun, we are perceiving

something that happened 8.3 minutes ago; when we look at Pluto, we are perceiving something that happened 5 hours ago; The Ring Nebula, about 5000 l.y. in the constellation Lyra; M51 The Whirlpool Galaxy, located about 15 million light-years from Earth. We are not seeing what is happening there today. We are now waiting for 15 million light-years for that light, for that information to travel all that distance before it can reach our eye. So from our point of view relative to the remainder of the Universe, we are living in an infinite number of time perceptions which we synthesise relative to the rest of the Universe. This is the problem that Bergson addresses when he asks: “how can these two systems coexist, and why are the same images relatively invariable in the universe and infinitely variable in perception?” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 25).<sup>85</sup>

So what we have here is a system of ceaseless reciprocal interactivity of action-reaction, which when a privileged or relationally complex nexus of interaction—an infinitely complicated network of refraction, a knot of interactivity—enters into the mix and enters into the process of interaction, of mixing it up, it is the becoming-perceptible of the body relative to the universe. “Here is a system of images which I term my perception of the universe, and which may be entirely altered by a very slight change in a certain privileged image—my body” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 25). So that any body has to be thought of differently than as flesh and bones. It is an image that represents an infinite multiplicity of possible images: it is the durational record of traces, the account of the infinite series of stimulus-decision-reaction that constitutes my life in the universe. Given a particular stimulus within a different context, whether spatial or temporal, this aggregate of stands for an infinite possibility of responses even if it is only a single one is actualised. And this reticulation of actualised singularities that progressively and sequentially recedes into the past, distances itself from the present and constitutes expanses of consistency that composes and accounts the facticity of history. These expanses, fields or planes have an implicit truth value because they happened and are now unalterable—as the croupier is wont to say, “*rien ne va plus!*” Yesterday happened and so did last year and these facts are unchangeable and irrevocable—

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<sup>85</sup> Now, one of the characteristics of point X is that we have specified it as inorganic; it is a piece of inanimate matter, and one of the qualities of inanimate matter is that in our world of interactive action and reaction, when inanimate matter is acted upon, is impressed by some force or other, is that it reacts immediately without delay. There is no prevarication between the action and the reaction. And for Bergson, this is what separates the non-living from the living. In the animate life-forms, there will always be a delay between the action and the reaction. There is a moment of hesitation between the registering of the stimulus and the elicitation of the response.

and this is the accounting record the holochain capitalises on. We may interpret their significance or trace various causal paths but the facts themselves are non-negotiable.

Now if my body can only grasp things in the form of images, of interactive impressions of action and reaction, we must state the problem of the encounter in terms of images, and of images alone: on action and reaction as the production of modification, on difference itself. Deleuze transposes this to its most general terms “we must only express problems in terms of time, and time alone”, in terms of the affective modifications as creative of difference that a material body suffers and reacts to. And so we have an interesting conceptual linkage between the difference produced by our interactive action-reaction dynamic of imagistic process and the passage of time.

We need to clarify conceptually what these words signify not only to understand what it is that we are doing with them, but also to understand what we are doing relative to other systems of philosophy. And the distinction between the two regimes of images we just spoke about is what sets things apart epistemologically between two modes of knowing: between what is called realism and idealism. “The question raised between realism and idealism then becomes quite clear: what are the relations which these two systems of images maintain with each other?” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 26) We need to provide an answer....

Bergson’s imagistic system, and by extension, Deleuze’s, is thus neither a realist proposition nor an idealist proposition. If the two systems try to mesh “the brain appears to us to be an instrument of analysis in regard to the movement received and an instrument of selection in regard to the movement executed” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 30). And here we need to define brain as instrument of analysis as an instrument of conceptual decomposition into components, or as the breaking up of any complex object of perception into its various simple elements, the opposite process to synthesis; and an instrument of selection, of framing the response. We only need examine our optical perceptual system to see how this statement functions in the real world. Our gaze is constituted of small ocular movements which compose the experience of vision guided by a seemingly indeterminable exercise of desire and choice.

Therefore, cognitively, the function of the brain and nervous system is limited to the transmission and division of movement. By its movement of analytical division, the brain and nervous system complexify the encounter, allow a fuller density, a greater number of possibilities, as to the resolution of the stimulus. In the progressive “growing richness of

perception” the nervous system is “entirely directed toward action, and not toward pure knowledge” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 31). We are dealing with a pure moment of experience as movement, one which does not engage memory and is entirely directed towards action. “These movements appear to us to concern action, and action alone; they remain absolutely foreign to the process of representation” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 33). They have nothing to do with the process of mental imagery or memory because the intellect is not engaged. Our concern with the world at this point is only one of movement, like when we drive our car without thinking, or wash the dishes, or drive our bicycle downtown. It might be entirely directed towards action, but as part of a moment which receives, transforms and redirects impressions—because what results is action and not an internal mental image of what is being cognised. And contrary to the simple reactivity of non-animate matter, which reacts mechanically, automatically, without hesitation or deferral, as the automatic response to an impression, “perception appears at the precise moment when a stimulation received by matter is not prolonged into a necessary action” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 32). Perception arises at the incipency of the production of the interval in the fold, prior to the redirection of the stimulus travelling through the afferent nerve and its reversal as response delivered by the efferent nerve. Perception is thus the realisation of what’s at hand, as evaluative of the possibility of the reaction. Through the perspectivation of the privileged point, perception thus becomes master of space to the extent that it aligns and relativises the responsive action as master of time.

“How is it that this perception is consciousness?” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 33). Bergson here affirms that “there is no perception which is not full of memories”. But in this imagistic world of stimulus-response where the brain is one image among many, that is “entirely directed toward action, and not toward pure knowledge”, memories must be understood as other than representations, as other than pictorial representations within the mind. Instead, memories need to be seen as the neural pathways that guide our impressions towards resolution. Memories as neural pathways are the result of repetition of the same resolution of similar conditions of imagistic process. Consciousness is thus the affection of creating pathways towards the formulation of a response or the affection of transiting pre-established neural pathways towards the re-formulation of the response—the affection of the travel [of the translation] along pre-established neural pathways to the brink of the interval prior to reversal. And so, consciousness and awareness are different in that



awareness is always “of something”, it is the subject-object split. This re-cognition as memorial supplants our actual perceptions because the affirmation of similarity through the perceptual satisfies the pre-established pattern of the cognition. This is exactly what happens in the pictorial depiction of the world through perspective.

For Bergson, the movement-image, which eventually he will call cinematographic, emerges from a multiplicity of ideas which support how imagistic process produces movement from seemingly static sections: his reading of Ancient Greek philosophy, namely Lucretius; his processual understanding of biological knowledge via Spencer; his thought on the philosophy of science; the relation between religion, mysticism, and science; and the connection between imagistic thought, biology and art of Félix Ravaisson. Underlying these ideas is a mathematical subtext which informs the concepts and the movement of ideas but which lives in the background and does not often surface—much like Deleuze’s tick waiting to pounce on the right opportunity. Bergson was not renowned as a mathematician, but he was well versed in the subject and understood it beyond its disciplinary constraints to the extent that he could debate publicly with Einstein on the philosophical implications of relativity. Still, we need to keep in mind that many of the technological component ingredients which allowed Bergson to equate the movement-image to the cinematograph had been in place for almost 20 years.

### **Bergson’s Cinematograph as a Method of Perception**

Henri Bergson’s theory of the cinematograph emerges from his elaboration of theories of time and movement that were just coming into their own in European thought at the end of the 19th century. Bergson was an original thinker but he was also very much a product of his time—many of the concepts he elaborates and articulates were part of ongoing matters of interest being debated intensely by scientists, by mathematicians, philosophers, academics of all types, and artists in the vibrant intellectual milieu of the transition from the Second Empire to the Troisième République in France. Despite the unbridled success of science in the latter half of the nineteenth century, progress in all areas of knowledge came to shake the very foundations of science. The advent of Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity in 1905 superseded the Euclidian-Newtonian paradigm: the continuous explanatory understanding and applicability of science from the infra-atomic to

the cosmic, became no longer operational, or at least not in the way that science had predicated it. Until then, the entirety of nature was explainable through a mechanistic-geometrisation of experience and understood as distinctly separate from human intellect.

Deleuze (1986) writes that Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (1896) represented the diagnosis of an imminent crisis in psychology, a crisis which was finally proclaimed in 1897 in a three-part paper by the little-known Swiss philosopher Rudolf Willy and then augmented in his book *Die Krisis in der Psychologie* (1899). For Willy, the crisis was the result, first, of the "embarras de richesse", of the wealth of novel approaches and research pursuits which precluded the possibility of a unified program for psychology and, second, the insistent problem of theoretical speculation into the defining of psychology as a natural or human science based on pure experience (STURM and MÜLBERGER, 2011; MÜLBERGER, 2012; TEO, 2005). This crisis in psychology was an anomaly in that in the last decades of the 19th century a triumphalist outlook prevailed throughout the sciences which manifested itself as a strict rationalism, a doctrinaire positivism, which rejected all ontological or metaphysical theoretical consideration in science. The Kantian transcendental structure of the human mind which embodied a Newtonian and Euclidian universe as the perfected adjustment to the objective order of nature had come to be seen as completed. Whether it was called the "third positive stage" by Auguste Comte or "the complete adjustment of inner to outer relations" by Herbert Spencer, this was seen as the last stage in the cultural development of mankind (ČAPEK 1971). As Deleuze asserts, "What appeared finally to be a dead end was the confrontation of materialism and idealism, the one wishing to reconstitute the order of consciousness with pure material movements, the other the order of the universe with pure images in consciousness" (DELEUZE 1986, 56). This was the main assertion of the first chapter and the conclusion of *Matter and Memory* and from here Bergson was able to posit a new type of movement of thought which puts into question the epistemological optimism of *fin-de-siecle* science which had even allowed Alfred North Whitehead to avow, "We supposed that nearly everything of importance about physics was known. Yes, there were a few obscure spots, strange anomalies having to do with radiation which physicists expected to be cleared by 1900." (PRICE 1954, p. 6-7).

As a follower of the philosopher Herbert Spencer and Ernst Mach, Bergson envisaged a study of nature through the imbrication of our sense-awareness directly as an ingredient of nature. This is what Whitehead (2004) calls 'heterogeneous' thought about nature—

where we think about nature in conjunction with thinking about thought or about sense-perception—and to think of nature in this way is a radical shift from the ‘homogeneous’ approach which sees nature as closed to mind so that a teleology of humanity (if there is one) is not involved in the understanding of nature. Paraphrasing Whitehead, Bergson’s innovation still retains attention to the natural sciences—to the sciences whose subject-matter is nature—but switches emphasis from the production of *natura naturata* as the static terminus of sense-perception to the consideration of a processual *natura naturans* as a dynamic continuity: nature ceases to be what’s out there and is replaced by nature as the character of the flux of becoming.

By doing this, Bergson was transgressing the long-held doctrine that nature should be only an account of what the mind knows of nature through what nature discloses to sense-awareness: by bringing in relations of mind to the study of nature, he was shifting the balance away from a static “nature apprehended in awareness” to a processual “nature which is the cause of awareness” (WHITEHEAD, 2004). Yet Bergson’s book was also indicating the direction towards another, perhaps more consequential, sea-change that would rock the underpinnings of the study of the structure and the understanding of the behaviour of the physical and natural world. His theories are anchored within a processual, biological panpsychism which engages the encounter with the world and in so doing changes the relation between the objective and subjective register of the relation. Thus, Bergson is not only presenting a new theory of perception, he is laying the foundation for a deeper enquiry into the nature of the subject-object relation. Čapek understands the problem as two-fold: as one that involves the dynamics of perception towards natural selection in the mind and as a positioning of the scale of operational validity of the theory of perception—Bergson was not only reformulating the how of perception, but questioning the nature, extent and adequacy of the correspondence between cognitive forms and the objective features of nature.

### **The Bergsonian cinematograph**

The concept of the cinematograph enters somewhat unsystematically into Bergson’s writings just as the technology came to light in a rather confused manner. Even though chronophotography and other components of motion picture technology had been around

since the 1870's, by the 1880's the cinematograph was a technology whose time had come and by the end of the decade various inventors had offered demonstrations of their motion picture devices so that by 1895 the medium began to be worked commercially in Europe and America. The operative contention of cinematographic technology is the projection onto a blank screen of static photograms on strips of celluloid film in order to produce the illusion of moving pictures. The cinematograph is a label which comprises a variety of technical processes that function together as an assemblage to constitute the cinematographic experience as a milieu—it is not a singular device but an associated technicity which relies on the persistence of vision, the rotating shutter, the movement of the pull-down claw and static images on spooled, sprocketed transparent film; in the absence of any one of these 'preconditions' the magic of the cinematographic will not work.

The question of the possibility of constituting movement out of immobilities was not only a technological problem but a philosophical problem that goes back to the ancient Greeks and it was this philosophical problem that came to preoccupy Bergson's thought when he wrote his doctoral thesis. Even though he did not label it as such, Bergson had already described a "cinematographic" process within perception as a closed loop in what he would later designate as the perception-image and the memory-image of *Matter and Memory* (1896). This dynamic, which Deleuze recognises as operative in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (and also articulated by Michel Serres), is elucidated through projective geometry and topology, so that the chasm or rift between the knower and the known is dissolved and a continuity produced between the two. Of these two image types, the perception-image proper is the one that is more readily conceived as a cinematographic image in that it analytically breaks down perception into static photograms and reconstitutes them into continuous movement; the memory-image, less intuitively articulated as a cinematographic image, is also thoroughly elaborated but it must be conceived together with the perception-image to constitute the cinematographic movement-image in full. Deleuze points out in his first commentary on Bergson in the opening pages of *The Movement-Image* (1983) that there is change in Bergson's thought in how he thinks the image between the time he writes *Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution*—according to Deleuze, it is as if Bergson after having described the workings of the movement-image in perception had fallen prey ten years later to the mechanism of the cinematographical device and had forgotten the true nature of the solution to the problem

of how motion is produced (DELEUZE, 1986). But even if we fully appreciate and embrace Deleuze's rich commentary of Bergson, there are additional intuitions within the Bergsonian conception of perception which can also be understood as contributing to the cinematographical model.

The technicity which encompasses the cinematograph goes beyond the mechanism which endows movement to static photograms and to say that this is what comprises the extent of Bergson's cinematic conception represents a too-limited reading of what constitutes the cinematograph. Like the perception process, the cinematograph is composed of a series of sub-assemblages which constitute a whole, where the removal of one component sub-assemblage would diminish the process or destroy it outright. In the twenty years or so prior to the publishing of *Creative Evolution*, Bergson had already devised many of these constituent ingredients to the process chain of perception which find analogous expression as components of the cinematographic as an extended associated technicity. These components can be material and non-material but are nevertheless conditionings of the process, constituent of the process or outcomes of the processual movement itself.

### **The Cinematograph as a technological assemblage**

When we first encounter the expression "the cinematographical method" in Bergson's *Creative Evolution* (1907), there is a natural penchant to associate it directly with a particular line of activity which involves the technical apparatus. From where we sit historically, the cinematograph is now an all too-familiar technology, somewhat *déclassé* in favour of the digital. In his day, Bergson invoked technological devices to associate his ideas to the forefront of progress and to render them more accessible to his readership—where today we have writers stating that the brain is like a computer, Bergson made allusions to the eye as a photographic camera, and claimed that the brain is like a "central telephonic exchange", that our symmetrical engagement with the world functions like a kaleidoscope, and perceptive process is akin to the cinematograph. In comparison to the organic and the artistic, Bergson is said to have disliked the cinematograph (FLAXMAN, 2000; ELDER, 2011; STEWART, 2016). Yet, Mullarkey contends that cinema for Bergson was not a *bête-noire* but instead appreciated it in philosophical terms and as a model of consciousness (MULLARKEY 2009). Nevertheless, whether he voiced them or not, there are reasons for Bergson not to

like the cinematograph: it not only went counter to his ideas of continuity in becoming and retarded them into an artificial mechanism at the service of commercialism, but more significantly, it was a reversal to the perceived perfection of the adjustment of the cognitive faculties to the objective order of things put forward by Herbert Spencer and Ernst Mach (ČAPEK, 1971). Bergson predicated the perception-image within imagistic processual thought based on an assemblage of tightly woven intuitions of a philosophical nature—as a whole, the perception-image has been equated to the cinematograph: however, the various philosophical components which constitute perception need to be fleshed out under this guise.

The geometry of film projection is based upon the reflection of a stream of light projected onto a screen and reflected towards the audience. However, when that reflected stream of light strikes the retina of the viewer, the light as stimulus produces a series of indeterminable modifications within the body which ultimately results in a reaction: our brain brings to bear a change in direction in the path of activity, a differential inflection, between the stimulus and the reaction. The beam of light which strikes the retina is broken down into myriad neural stimuli which in turn produce an infinite cascade of reactions, 'of folds to infinity' as a series of intensity, and constitute the activity of affect as the indeterminacy of the more-than which modulates the adequate perception. For Bergson (1991), this reflective dynamic of stimulus, indetermination, and reaction constitutes the concept of the image and serves as the foundation for an imagistic processual ideation of life. But critical to this ideation is that the perceived image is not reproduced in the brain as a static pictorial image but is 'projected' back to where it appears to be—outside our body—so that every perception is produced where it occurs (BERGSON, 1991). Thus, Bergsonian imagistic process associates the perceptual encounter not only as an interactive dynamic but as what is traditionally referred to by Deleuze as the inside of consciousness and the outside of experience to simultaneously emerge as a singular becoming.

### **Imagistic movement and the cinematograph**

One of the big stumbling blocks in coming to terms with Bergson's thought is his definition of the image and his conceptualisation of the body's encounter with the world as imagistic. In its simplest expression, the image for Bergson is a triadic assemblage which

comprises a stimulus, a centre of indetermination, and a response. It is applicable to bodies, big and small, and to that scale where the non-substantial reigns as forces or qualities. In its most general expression, an image is anything and everything that acts and reacts on all its faces and through all its parts as a perpetual, universal vibratory variation of energy and light. It is a curious definition in that he refers to the image not as a pictorial depiction—a picture—but as an existence, or more correctly, as a becoming, which is simultaneously experiential and embodied, and which finds expression in the gap between a “thing” and its “representation” (its mental image). In Bergson, we find that matter, and therefore the universe, including the body and the brain, are aggregates of images, assemblages of interactive action and reaction, where images can be thought of as beings of light which “act and react upon one another in all their elementary parts according to constant laws which he calls laws of nature” (BERGSON, 1991).

Bergson explains that the mechanism of the perception-image is constituted by an external stimulus reaching the organs of sense, modifying the nerves, and propagating their influence in the brain. Bergson writes, “I perceive afferent nerves which transmit a disturbance to the nerve centres, then efferent nerves which start from the centre, conduct the disturbance to the periphery, and set in motion parts of the body or the body as a whole” (BERGSON, 1988, p. 18). The external stimulus has a motricity attached to it which ‘motivates’ the sense organs. But it is considered a static cut in that the stimulus is not a material ‘thing’ but a closed selection—a conception which perhaps might be better expressed as an energy packet, a quantum, or a monad of configured energy or forces. By limiting the amount of “static image” that is allowed to enter the eye in one fixation between two saccades, we have the function of the rotating shutter and the pull-down claw which provide the instantaneity of the section plus the interval of indetermination. The rotating shutter working in tandem with the pull-down claw produce the ‘slices’ which constitute/reconstitute the evenly-spaced immobile sections of a chronological time. Thus, if cognition is not in play and memory is struck from the equation, “...The complete process of perception and of reaction can then hardly be distinguished from a mechanical impulsion followed by a necessary movement” (BERGSON, 1988, p. 32). Thus, the transduced stimulus passes through the cerebral substance, where it tarries, and then expanded into voluntary action (BERGSON, 1991, p. 41). The image that wends its way through the cerebral matter along lines of indetermination in turn create myriad imagistic interactions of their own as

they course through the neural pathways which will be subsequently aggregated, integrated or condensed as an externalisation, as an outward action. So that if the stimulus which 'enters' the brain is a series of static images and what emerges through the efferent nerves is the continuous movement of consciousness, we have the functionality of the movement-image. Thus, "the centrifugal movements of the nervous system can call forth a movement of the body or of parts of the body, so the centripetal movements, or at least some of them, give birth to the representation [i.e. a mental image] of the external world" (BERGSON, 1991, p. 18-9). The passage of the image as movement produces a marked difference, a significant trace of modification, that expresses the procession of the stimulus through the body as a multiplicity that is both affective and temporal.

### **Filmic introjection**

Although the cinematograph as a technological device uses a reversible mechanism both to render actuality into static images as to give motion to static images, the apparatus of image capture—the camera—is not the same as the apparatus used for image projection—the projector—and there's an indeterminate separation between the two processes. The front-end of the process—the image-capture—is differentiated from the back-end of the process—the projection—in that the front-end is involved in introjection and the selection and breakdown of actuality before the lens, where the back-end of the movement-image is more about integration, contraction and projection. In the Bergsonian movement-image, the process of image acquisition is of paramount importance because it is where selection happens—the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* is named 'On the Selection of Images' so selection presents itself as an overriding concern of perceptual process. As early as 1879, William James showed that human knowledge is essentially selective even in its apparently most passive form, that of the level of sensory perception. The principle of selection is a hinge concept in Bergson's theory of perception in that it articulates a subjective move in how we mesh with the world and how knowledge of the world is acquired: it describes the discrimination of objective data (the discernible object of perception) from the initial data (the penumbral welter of alternatives) towards its subjective appropriation and subsequent cognition (WHITEHEAD, 1978).



The problem of how an object is singled out from the multitude of images in the world or from the background itself is the crux of the chapter as what is at stake is the efficacy of the perception as a determination which indicates the objective choice or selection. Bergson understands the material object as an image which can be transformed into a representation, as that which we can *retain* of an object as that which we can grasp as if it were an external crust, a superficial skin “that instead of being encased in its surroundings as a thing, should detach itself from them as a picture” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 36-37). In this passage from *Matter and Memory*, Bergson is not telling us that Lucretius has his ear. In *The Nature of the Universe* Bk. IV, Lucretius elaborates on “the existence of what we call ‘images’ of things, a sort of outer skin perpetually peeled off the surface of objects and flying this way and that through the air” (LUCRETIUS, 1951, p. 131). He calls these thin, airborne skins, *pelliculae*, or ‘films’, which move through the ether in straight lines with a certain celerity and thereby conceiving the first cinematographic theory. These surficial peels, these films of atomic matter, emanating from the centre of things constitute a perpetual stream of material images which provoke sight and touch. Lucretius likens these films to the moultings of snakes or the caul of newborn calves as well as to the casting off of flimsy material films by inanimate objects. These invisible lifeless crusts or superficial skins are the invisible action of the wind that “while the individual films that strike upon the eye are invisible, the objects from which they emanate are perceived” (LUCRETIUS, 1951, p. 138). As naive as Lucretius’s conception might seem at first sight, these superficial skins cast into space not only support the theory of images striking specific surfaces of sensation as impressions and provide a material entity that can be grasped from the air, but these films, these cast-off crusts, can also be seen as static snapshots of their source objects and as such set down the character of cinematographic thought. Lucretius’s films which emanate without interruption as continuous atomic streams can be rendered intermittently static through the stop and go activity of fixations and saccades of human eye movement to predicate the production of sequential immobile imagistic sections that constitute the analytic function of the cinematographic apparatus. Bergson looks to isolate the presentational existence of objects as a shell, as an exterior ‘surface’ of selection that offers itself to the senses and through which we can interpret or express our intuitions, or sensorial inductions. For Bergson to call this film, a *picture*, in the visual sense, is to move away from where we want to go in terms of understanding the image as non-pictorial process. But what

the Lucretian film does do is to simplify the question of the problem of determination, of selection, of discernment, for the airborne skins exist as individualisations or at least as individualised images as species which need no determination on the side of the subject for they come fully packaged.

Once a crust strikes the retina and is transduced into neural stimuli to be conveyed into the brain, Bergson finds recourse in Descartes theory of optic neural channels (which echoes Aristotle's) as the conduits which convey the atomic film-image inwards to the brain—the greater the number of neural channels activated within the cerebral matter in the service of conveying the percept, the greater the intensity of the resulting imagistic response. Thus, the intensity of the response within the brain as an affective intensity is in direct proportion to the efficacy of the perception. For even if cerebral movement—the action of the neural stimuli coursing through the channels creating affective modification—is in concordance with conscious perception, this does not mean that the perception is wholly 'subservient' to a pre-determined will or to a willed determination. The perception is subservient or channeled along a pathway whose active coursing gives rise to the perception's representation where the number and diversification of channels making themselves available to the stimuli is what defines the adequacy of the perception—but this, we must accept, is an obvious reference to a pre-existing memorial given. These ideas can be said to be what is operative in film size and sensitivity which translates as granularity of the filmic image in the cinema in that the larger the film format, the greater the adequacy of the image and the greater the number of channels conveying the stimulus, the better the resolution.

### **Imagistic selective diminution**

If we widen the scope of the cinematographical trope even more, within Deleuze's more comprehensive conception of the cinema, the selection process would include the framing, the shot size relative to the object, the discrimination and depth of lens focus, size or angle of the framing of the shot as selection as part of the cinematographic illusion of consciousness. For Čapek (1971), the selection process within perception as described by Bergson also has wider repercussions but not towards where Deleuze takes it. Čapek sees it as part of an ampler project which understands Bergson as implicating his biological thought

in the repositioning of the relation of humanity to nature at its proper scale: by redefining the relation in terms which express vital pertinence to the human organism, we return to the selectivity of selection at a scale of relevance that is proper to the human. By choosing one object over another, there is a definition of values of nature as “the key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence” (WHITEHEAD, 2004, p. 5).

Thus, Bergson elaborates the pure perception as a theoretical conception in that it is made to disregard memory which all perception must include. He places the perception as the privileged centre of an aggregate of images which offers a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous (BERGSON, 1991). “Conscious perception signifies choice, and consciousness mainly consists in this practical discernment” (BERGSON, p. 1991, 49). And in the discernment of the selection from its presence as an external-there to its mental image as an internal-here always entails a diminution. The object loses some of its character features or attributes by virtue of its specific relation to me in terms of an individualisation because it can only present a part of what it can mean relationally to the entire universe as the expression of its full potential. But even so, we would be unable to get the full picture, so to speak, because our perceptual apparatus, our vantage point, is dimensionally deficient: the transformation of matter into a representation will always entail a diminution, so that which distinguishes an objective reality from a representational image, is the limiting of its dimensionality, not only as a 4-D (3-D+Time) object into a 2-D projection on the retina, but a curtailment of its overall possibilities.

That which is available to me as a potential is the revelation of what that object before me represents in terms of available potential through a very specific means of encounter which is a sense. My perceptions of the object will reflect only those characteristic features which can engage with practical consequences or useful functionality at that moment. So that things come together before me as perceivable, as discernible entities, when the propitious conditions for their appearance materialise as somehow useful, as having value, as pragmatic. The perceptive diminution of the object-other can be construed as the expression of perceptual limitations but only as the dismissal of attributes which are not relevant to the exigencies of the present situation. This is not to say that other potentials or attributes of the object are lost or not perceivable, it would just require other conditionings to actualise them and render them perceptible—but this also requires that the subjective entity have the perceptual capacity to connect on that axis or dimension. The

perception of the object is never total or complete: any reciprocal interchange of perception will always be limited, for nothing other than God can perceive all things at once in actuality as the expression of their full potential—it is only God that can perceive the entirety of the universe as homogeneous and heterogeneous simultaneously. So that given the conditions of encounter, what distinguishes a present objective reality from a represented image is the completeness of the expression of its potential as available to the Universe in contrast to the limitations as a partial set of relational possibilities between the knower and the known.

To convert the object from the actual to the representation would not be a question of expunging its qualities or relational attributes in order to isolate it, but of realising the limitations that are being imposed upon the relational interaction by the terms being presupposed upon the encounter—the pre-conditionings or anticipatory constraints can be said to be enabling of conditions which allow the adequate perception as a specific apparition as ‘a picture’. The pictorial image does this all too well, by contextualising and presenting the object in a specific way thereby conditioning the interpretation. It carries this out through the wholesale discarding of the irrelevant aspects of the object which are functionally irrelevant within that specific context—to wit, not making available the visual information which is hidden from the ocular sensor, such as the rear side of the object which is not visible (BERGSON, 1991). For example, a baseball cap presented as an alms basket in the hands of a panhandler shows an aspect of the cap and a series of contextual indications that will help us engage the cap experientially as a beggar’s tool-of-the-trade rather than as a head-covering: we will see the interior of the cap and not the top. The cinema does this as well by adjusting the incidence of the lens through framing, focus and camera movement as continuous modification of the parameters of the imagistic encounter. And similarly, we engage an encounter through constraints which condition the event in a specific way but do not obliterate potentials; to bring these virtualities into play, one must reconfigure the encounter to permit their actualisation.

There is another aspect of selection, a diminution of sorts, couched in the imagistic movement that happens in the mediating shift-over between the afferent nerves and the reaction conveyed by the efferent nerves. From the eye’s momentary fixation, an impression results which produces a centripetal neural impulse. As a consequence, a movement of thought, a decision proper, takes place within the centre of indetermination which induces the reaction—the automatic, reflexive decision to shift the attention of the eye from here to

there expresses a choice and therefore a selection whose mechanism is unknown to us. Subsequently, there is another movement within the afferent nerves when a stimulus is replaced by a subsequent one as the new stimulus is taken up into the preceding one, as an occupation of the past by the present as persistence of vision yields to the passage of novelty.

When Bergson writes that he understands sensation as an internal state, he means that it arises within the body as an internal perception, which as William James (1952) intimates, is equated to time. Our perception of outer reality corresponds to the time-succession of phenomena—events take place in time, so that our sense-perceptions of them furnish a true copy of their unfolding. But because events take place where they happen, and not in our head, what we understand as representations of reality, of mind images, constitutes an illusion of some kind. In *Creative Evolution*, in chapter IV, in which Bergson deals with the cinematographical mechanism, Bergson asserts that there are two theoretical illusions as to how consciousness arises. Both are illusions because they are suppositions as to how the yet unknowable actual processes, the indeterminate centre, within perception function. In speculating on the nature of the real, in trying to think the process between an object and its representation, we surmise a specific theoretical functioning based on a coherent ontology and epistemic understanding of the encounter with the world visually ascertained by correct perspectival relation. The approach is materialist but not physiological in that it is an expression of a philosophical understanding of the world as process and the bodies which occupy it as selections of relational operational functions. Now, these bodies are not human bodies but actants having permanent attributes, that compose the aggregate conception which can be a variety of things, but they must be construed as bodies because bodies and bodies alone have causal efficacy.

We are thus brought to think of perception as a processual event, where even concrete things which have 'everyday' names need to be seen as processual entities which exhibit configurative appetites. For example, the brain, which Bergson repeatedly refers to as an aggregate of images, needs to be understood as a massification of forces, of substanceless reciprocity of action and reaction, of give and take, where there is no substance apart from the systematic assemblage of energies as processual interaction. It is important to make this distinction because the general philosophy of perception has

different imperatives, implications and repercussions from the establishment of a purely mechanistic or functional physiological causal chain which still remains undefined.

In thinking these illusions we must keep in mind that they are not static “images” or “concepts” which can be pictured as one pictorial image, such as Descartes’s woodcut from his *Principles of Philosophy* (1644) which illustrates a woman indicating an arrow. We need to see this processual event as a moving succession of interpenetrating still frames. As Bergson points out, it is a succession that culminates in a sum, but the sum is always in movement. This movement can be characterised as a succession of immobile sections, but depending on how we wish to understand the coursing of the stimuli through the brain in terms of the cinematograph of imagistic perception, can be posited in a number of ways—what is important here is the realisation of movement from static impressions. The simplest and least satisfactory explanation is that the stimuli course through the brain as immobile sections, as the transduced neural pulsations arising from the stop-and-go movement of saccades and fixations. Each fixation projects a ‘complete’ neural pulsation—a static photogramme, so to speak—into the brain as a closed packet, followed every so often by another imagistic packet of neural excitation as a succession of independent, stand-alone percepts, as a sequence of frames, where each one is ‘pushed out of the way’ to yield the next percept, thereby producing movement. A more refined approach would have the imagistic packet of neural excitation broken up into a multiplicity of ducts, of neural channels, conveying the imagistic packet of neural excitation through the brain as a simultaneous occurrence. Each individual packet would be pushed out of the way by an incoming packet to create movement or, alternately, we can subject the individual packets to the decay of the persistence of vision, so that as their intensity fades as they course through the brain, the subsequent packet takes over, thus creating the change-over necessary for successive movement.

Now, we can combine all three and introduce slight differentials between the different channels to account for the different distances the content of each ‘channel’ must travel, so that we end up with a multiplicity of multiplicities as a *durational* proposition, where each channel is subject to the decay of the persistence of vision and its subsequent substitution as differential cogredience. The simultaneous holding together of these durations gives the packet a temporal extension inseparable from a ‘mnemic’ simultaneous multiplicity of pasts as continuity as a differential relativity so that an illusion of movement is

produced by the overlapping of simultaneous multiplicitous asynchrony. Each packet is constituted of the adequate determination and an affective colouration, but never is the actual perceptual entity fully formed as a complete, or perfectly adequate, entity—it is on-going movement as a becoming.

In this last conception, “we can thus conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnection and organisation of elements” (BERGSON 2001, p. 101) as passage. This allows for a becoming which contradicts the Laws of Thought. As such, the Law of Identity, the Law of Noncontradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle which define the what and how of things as having identities and characters whose properties, attributes, qualities and features are stable, determinate, and free of ambiguity can only be seen as unchanging in the rear-view mirror because “*rien ne vas plus*” only applies to the past—no more change enters the equation in what has been. The progressive adequation of an object of perception is a progressive intuitive aggregation of determinacy which identifies becoming as a multiplicity of change and movement. The accrual of adequacy is immanent to procession but it can only be cashed out at the end for one cannot subdivide the movement. But this ascertainment is only a matter of course, a qualitative heterogeneity which goes by unnoticed until we stop and look back at what has transpired.

Thus, in these three ideations of procession, whenever we stop to ascertain our progress, we adopt an observer’s stance and spatialise a heterogeneous event as a homogeneous outlay. This represents another aspect of the cinematographical apparatus, where if nature is pure differentiation, when we introduce the camera as a privileged point, that which appears before the lens as nature’s flux offers itself as qualitative difference and that which appears behind the cinematographical apparatus (shutter and pull down) can offer itself to synthesis as quantifiable difference from itself—immobile sections and the abstract time of the technical apparatus. And it is in this move that the two differential modes arise: in the heterogeneous advance of the multiplicity of durational becoming as qualitative difference, whereas the extensive homogeneous permits the infinite division into quantitative difference as difference from itself.

What Bergson finds is a common connection between biology, physics and mathematics in the apparatus of the cinematograph is the generation of experiential continuity as durational which looks to be expressed temporally as extension. Through this

binary differentiation, one introduces the distinction between a durational passage and a temporal advance, between the evental and the situational. The distinction we wish to make here is that although both are descriptive of the event, in the first, the durational is composed of simultaneities as an implied subjectivity, whereas in the other it has become perspectivised as a relation between objects which has itself become an object for consciousness—this object is no longer the event but an intellectual abstraction (WHITEHEAD 2004). The durational passage of procession expressed as the intensity of change is a non-metricised creative time, whereas the other is a chronological lapse of time as a measurable serial quantity ascertained by an apparatus that mechanises passage. Hence, duration cannot have set limits, even if it suggests a mere abstract stretch of time, and requires the establishment of thresholds which delimit the event as discernible permanences of what Whitehead calls abstractive sets (WHITEHEAD 2004).

### **Projection within imagistic movement**

The projective dynamic within perception is evinced in a number ways: in the preliminary perceptual engagement as a proposition, within the centre of indetermination as an amplificative process, and lastly, as the projection of the internal determination onto the external world. This would be beyond the scope of this paper as it would entail a discussion of how the encounter is problematised, perspective and its extension into projective geometry proper as informing of the dissolution of the internal/external duality. and provide the intuitions behind Bergson's Plane of Matter and subsequent elaboration by Deleuze (and Guattari) of the concepts of the Plane of Immanence and the Plane of Consistency. In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, Deleuze picks-up where Bergson leaves off and develop the implications for philosophy of the movement that arises within the cinematographical apparatus of thought.

In *Imagination et invention (1965-1966)*, Gilbert Simondon writes that "it is not movement, but the intuition of all projection towards existence and the multiple" that is the most complete and the most radical, the most anterior to any mode of being (SIMONDON, 2008, p. 59). Simondon even refers to an amplificatory projection within the process of imagistic creation. For Bergson, projection is not as significant a concept as for Simondon but it nevertheless occupies various sites in the processual expression of perception and



imagistic process. In terms of the cinematograph as a metaphor for the cinematic apparatus, projection is key in that it is through projection that the cinematograph cashes out, pays off, and allows the fulfilment of the promise of the technical assemblage. The concept of projection only arises sporadically throughout the work of Bergson, but it is not distinctly linked with the cinematograph except peripherally: the intuition behind projection would seem to lie in the ancient emission theory of vision and the interplay of intromission and extromission of light. Intromission seems to be operative in the 'front-end' of the visual process, whereas extromission would seem to play the principal role in the assent of the perception, in the siting of the perception where it happens. This final aspect of perception as extromission is to be understood metaphorically—yet, when reading Bergson, the projection of the representation onto the object is a necessary conception to ascertain the functive correspondence as a mapping between the external and the internal, between the object of perception and the internal representation as a subconscious process. The projection refers to the correlation between the object of perception and the routing of sensation through the neural system, where a specific routing corresponds to the specific coursing an object produces by way of the intra-perceptive image. However, we must keep in mind that the representation or mental image is not a pictorial event. It is a protracted sensation which follows a specific and repeatable pre-determined neural path whose qualitative experience as a determined path, circuit or unfolding constitutes the representation or mental image. There is no pictorial production here, simply the affirmation of the repeated unconscious cognisance of the self-same stimulation of the same neural pathway, of the circularity of the determination, from the selection, to the determination, to the affirmative assent, that the representation in the brain concurs with the stimulus yet again.

Apart from the extromissive theory of vision, there is a projection also set up as a speculative pre-destination of the perception, a virtual teleology, that lures and orients the sensitivity and attention of the perceiver in the encounter which limits and speculatively predetermines the determination of the perception as the problematisation of the encounter. Further, there is another projective possibility when the Deleuzian fold is articulated through perspective and projective geometry as the production of a closed perceptual loop which undoes the knower/known rift and constitutes knowledge as heterogeneous. This is posited by Bergson in *Matter and Memory*: "Our distinct perception

is really comparable to a closed circle, in which the perception-image, going toward the mind, and the memory-image, launched into space, careen the one behind the other” (BERGSON, 1991, p. 103). Deleuze makes a cursory remark in *Cinema 1* as to the kind of projection which the Bergsonian model entails: “movement will always occur in the interval between the two, in other words behind your back” (DELEUZE 1986, p. 1). What Bergson and Deleuze refer to is a mapping of the 3-D world as a 2-D image of the unit plane which in turn is projected onto the retina, i.e. cast backwards and inwards, to create impressions which can be grasped and made available for storage, i.e. integrated as a memory image. But given the continuity in which the line between the eye and the object extends perspectively to plus-infinity before us and to minus-infinity behind us as a projected circle of infinite radius, at the juncture of the two extremities we have a laterally reversed and vertically inverted image, we end up with an imagistic Moebius strip, which when extended laterally ‘on both sides’ and joined at the seam, gives us a Klein surface which satisfies the strictures of the extensive continuum as an emergent monadic closed surface of infinite extent (REBOLLEDO, 2014).

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Bergson’s cinematograph is not only significant because it is descriptive of the process of perception and is a cogent method explanatory of preferring movement to immobile sections, but because it serves to predicate the entire system of imagistic thought as differential. We have to keep in mind that the cinematograph is a model and not process itself: pointing at the moon is not the moon. We must be vigilant of refining our understanding of ‘finger pointing’ to such an extent that one loses sight of what one is pointing at and confuses the process of description, the description itself and the object of description. But what needs to be retained is that the adventitious intervention of the cinematograph in the universe of undifferentiated process sets in motion a privileged, local/localised alignment of virtual energies, and selects and actualises potentials while instigating the simultaneous co-emergent production of individuated becoming and its resultant generation of difference. It is the placement and orientation of the cinematograph which produces the Deleuzian Plane of Immanence as a selective cut on universal becoming. So that if one carries Bergson’s and Deleuze’s cinematograph metaphor further, the

directionality of the apparatus perspectivises the event; the optics of the lens focalises the temporal point of interest and resolves the depth of implicated temporality of that moment; the film gate effectuates the decision of selection; and the rotating shutter produces the 'slices' which constitute the evenly spaced sections of a chronological time. The selections of spatialised time are decisively framed at the film gate to immanently and simultaneously produce the two aspects of difference: difference in itself (*differentiation*) in front of the gate and difference as difference from itself behind the gate (*differenciation*). The ability of the cinematograph to produce such an elegant solution to illustrate both aspects of difference is what sets it apart as a valuable analogue for imagistic process.

### **Deleuze's Imagistic Cinematographic System**

Thus far we have been describing a variety of image types without identifying or naming them. We recognise and register their functional operativity but have not properly positioned them relative to one another as part of a coherent system of operation. Much like Bergson describing the functional operativity of the cinematograph and elaborating its peculiarities in *Time and Free Will* (1889) and allowing a few years to go by before legitimately calling it "cinematograph" in *Creative Evolution* (1906), we seem to have done somewhat the same thing by describing a variety of imagistic movements without labelling them as such or integrating their functioning as a coherent machinic assemblage. We have not forgotten that we needed to integrate these processual entities within a larger (pre-existing) theoretical system.

If Bergson's cinematograph is a representation of perception, Deleuze will use that as foundation upon which to predicate the cinema as a representation of philosophy. Deleuze's problem in the cinema books consists in composing a philosophy of perceptual experience based on Bergson's theory of the image and theory of the cinematograph. He rethinks philosophy using the cinematograph as a technical device, not in terms of a mechanical contraption, but as a machinic assemblage that exhibits, expresses, and productive of *technē*. But if one were to rethink perceptual philosophy with and through the cinema, what aspects of philosophy could we work with and what concepts could be translated? What concepts could be interpreted cinematically? We began to answer these questions in our discussion of Bergson's cinematograph, but in the cinema books, Deleuze goes beyond the

technical and moves into the ontological, the epistemological and the metaphysical implications of this technical object.

Gilles Deleuze and Gilbert Simondon have similar conceptions of the image, as we will see later, but even if Simondon elaborated his system earlier, we give Deleuze's subsequent formulation precedence in our presentation by virtue of its greater generality, or at least what we perceive to be its greater generality. Like Peirce stating that semeiotics is more general than linguistics (PEIRCE, 1965, pp. 66-68)—a similar sentiment also held by Deleuze relative to Saussurian semiology (DELEUZE, 1987, p. ix)—we feel that Deleuze's processual imagistic scheme is anterior to Simondon's phenomenalist outlook. Even if Deleuze uses a "light touch when it comes to his Simondon references" (Iliadis 2013, p. 85), Simondon is critical in an understated way for Deleuze in that in translating the operative functionality of the cinema and the cinematograph into philosophical operators, the concept of the technical object is a useful heuristic but not a necessary one to engage with the technicity of cinema which has been broached in the discussion of Bergson's cinematograph.

But perhaps one can also discern a second unstated presence in the handling of the technological of the cinema—we perceive a Heideggerian being-there concerning three issues: the insistent question of the cinema as a technology of *technē*, the way of the image as the substitution of language, and the memory of montage as what calls for thinking (HEIDEGGER, 1977).<sup>86</sup> This is not to say that Deleuze's cinema books are derived from Heideggerian thought—they are stand-alone propositions which are incorporative and transformative of some of Heidegger's ideas but we will not elaborate on except when Heidegger's writings can be used to clarify some ideas.

Although these are weighty elements, what is at stake for Deleuze in *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* is a larger concern. The books propose a schema towards the description of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality and existence. But contrary to other systems, it is a philosophy that cannot keep the experiential and the empirical apart. For Deleuze, the two

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<sup>86</sup> We can cite three examples. The essay *The Question Concerning Technology* (1953) is seminal in understanding the instrumentality of the cinematographic to think the causal in cinema, the dynamic of revelation and concealment *technē* as the bringing-forth of *poiēsis*, the affective economics of indebtedness and the saving power of interest, and the revealing that orders through *gestell* (enframing). Heidegger's book *What is called thinking?* (1952) builds on the notions of thought as having ideas or pictures before the mind and memory as the gathering of thought as that which calls on us to think Mnemosyne as what is most thought-provoking yet is concealed within. And *The Way to Language* (1959) leads us to "bring language as language to language" as an imagistic construct.

go hand in hand as the heterogeneous relation of the knower and the known that is presupposed by Bergson's theory of the image and its projection into the world. Although Deleuze's *Movement-Image* and *Time-Image* are too often interpreted as a theory of the cinema, or as an exposition of the philosophy *in* cinema, it is more of an enquiry into a philosophy of intensity and duration as the logic of imagistic process. His theory of the image combines Peirce's Theory of Signs, Bergson's Theory of the Image and of the Cinematograph with some Spinoza thrown in for good measure and **uses the cinema brilliantly to** illustrate or provide examples that substantiate psychological processes and philosophical concepts pertaining to imagistic activity. Like the other books of the Deleuzian cannon, the two cinema books offer sophisticated metaphors which 'stand in' for what they refer to. But first and foremost it is a thinking of thought with and through the cinematograph as a foundational dispositif. If categories are the instruments with which we can resolve or excise (*découper*) bodies as things in the world, what categories does Deleuze invent to help us in our determinations? What are the principal philosophical concerns and concepts that are translated into cinema notions in C1 and C2? How does Deleuze interpret thought and thinking in order to articulate it as cinematographical? How do we relate to the world as entities?

The fact that Deleuze situates his discourse within the dispositif of cinema shows the significance he affords to the cinematographical apparatus of the mind. But the expansion that he gives the cinematographical broadens the scope of the cinema beyond its meager initial scientific prospects or anything that has been proposed about it since. For Deleuze, the cinema provides an answer to some of the oldest problems of philosophy and so he seems somewhat incredulous that Bergson did not exploit that vein of thought more adequately. At the very opening pages of *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze writes "The discovery of the movement-image, beyond the conditions of natural perception, was the extraordinary invention of the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*. Had Bergson forgotten it ten years later?" (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 2). What Bergson had forgotten was not the switch-over from the afferent to efferent circuitry as pure perception, but his exposé of the cinematographic figure as function (without actually naming it) which he had worked out by 1887 and presented in *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* (*Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, 1889). It is only in *Creative Evolution* that

the term cinematograph is introduced and its technological implications fully developed.<sup>87</sup> As we saw earlier, the movement-image is the affirmation that the image constitutes a transfer of circuitry from the passive reception of stimulus conveyed inward by the afferent nervous system to the transmission of an active reaction conveyed outwards by the efferent nervous system to create the contraction as the elemental dynamic of the image. But this is not what Bergson forgets—what he forgets is the device, the function, that produces movement out of seemingly static sections: the primacy of the cinematographic apparatus.

Deleuze elaborates his imagistic typology according to two main types, the movement-image and the time-image and serves as commentary on three thinkers: Bergson, who serves as the theoretical foundational background, Peirce who serves as second reference, and Spinoza who is exceedingly present yet remains unmentioned. Spinoza is more or less implicit in the thought of Bergson, Peirce and Deleuze and so ought to be considered a presuppositional presence which informs and inflects the imagistic ideations of the three. Spinoza is principally present through the theorisation of affect but also through his elaboration of the ‘upwards and downwards’ movement of the adequation and perfection of thought which appears in the *Ethics*. This is of course not a Spinozist invention as it was ideated by Ancient Greek thought in general through *Mnemosynē* and specifically by Plato through his Ideas and through Aristotle through his theory of Forms. Most importantly for us, what Spinoza brings forth is the adequation of affect’s movement as immanent and the various levels of knowledge. Deleuze is able to synthesise the ideas of these three thinkers and run them through Bergson’s cinematograph to create his very own conception of imagistic process.

The cinematograph is a useful heuristic in that according to Deleuze this is simply history reworking one of philosophy’s oldest problems: Zeno’s paradoxes and the reconstitution of movement from static sections (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 2). Thus, Deleuze’s

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<sup>87</sup> Bergson himself writes in a footnote to Chapter IV of *Creative Evolution (L'Évolution créatrice, 1907)* that the concept of the cinematograph had already been a part of his lectures on the *History of the Idea of Time (1902-1903)* at the Collège de France in which he “compared the mechanism of conceptual thought to the cinematograph” (BERGSON, 1944, p. 296). But this is not demonstrated in the manuscripted record explicitly as cinematographic but only in terms of the abstract production of time which had been a philosophical problem to the Ancient Greeks. The concept of the cinematograph was an important concept for Bergson who made reference to it throughout his career, most notably in *Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe (Durée et simultanéité, 1922)* and *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics (La Pensée et le mouvant, 1934)*.

*Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* are not books about the cinema but a philosophical system built around the functioning of the cinematograph. The problem of the cinema books is to create a problem to the solution the cinema affords, in that the cinema produces a solution in practice to a philosophical problem that has been difficult to resolve. Perhaps Deleuze's work is a reverse engineering of the cinema as a philosophical method to determine the causal source of the solution. Deleuze is fond of saying as a corollary to the method of intuition that the true nature of a problem is only determined when the adequate answer is found. Normally, in a scientific endeavour, one begins by posing the problem to determine a solution, but with the cinema, for Deleuze, the opposite appears to be the case: "It works in practice, but does it work in theory?" And so Deleuze seeks a philosophical problem to satisfy the cinema as solution. Or perhaps he knows the problem already, but needs to link it to the actuality of the cinema as a system. Perception presupposes the cinema, but the cinema accomplishes the task which the black-box of the mind carries it out quite well.

The cinema proper is an art whose currency is movement and time, so it is no surprise that Deleuze breaks down his his ideas along these two lines. But it is not because they are primitive distinctions of the cinema but because they represent primitive distinctions in philosophy. As ancillary problems which are no less significant than the main problem of movement from static sections, we can mention individuation and selection as differentiation, the formation of categories as conditioning to processual becoming, the creation of concepts within and through imagistic process, the articulation of memory through montage, and perhaps most significantly the construal of time in terms of the processual inferential logic that informs change within imagistic movement.

The problems of selection are at the core of the cinema philosophy for through it one can define the semantic units through which change manifests itself as difference in the making as experience at different scales. We need to keep in mind that Deleuze is developing the foundation for a philosophy of experience towards the description of the unfolding of the event of encounter as an empirical doctrine which does not rely on language but on life as imagistic. It is based on a mode of science which is perceptual in its epistemological foundation and anterior to language. Thus, when reading the cinema books we need to see how the traditional breakdown of the understanding of experience can be understood through the pragmatic signification the cinema gives to its technological components. A shot is therefore a sequence of frames, of stand-alone images, as a selected

set of activity which together compose a conceptual unit of experience with an inherent duration. The suffix -cept serves as hinge between the percept and the concept as the perceptual activity which is grasped as an ensemble or set. Thus, the concept here ceases to be a listing of attributes but an abstract machinic assemblage which produces a coherent functionality within itself and participates in the duration of the whole. The conceptualisation of the shot as a set of frames is what will allow us to proceed to philosophy proper through selection, not exclusively through the framing as the selection of the film frame, but through the limitation of the extent of a shot, sequence or of the whole—in terms of the content as a durational entity and of the evolving relation of the parts to the whole.

The problem of selection and individuation is paramount, not only because it is the foundation of a taxonomy, but because it represents perhaps a more fundamental problem of dealing “with the chaos as undifferentiated abyss or ocean of dissemblance” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1991, p. 207). It’s not only a problem that challenged Deleuze, but also called upon Bergson who generously bestowed attention by devoting his first chapter of *Matter and Memory* to this issue “On the Selection of Images” as a precondition to being able to define the cinematographic image. The image that is construed as cinematographic is not only what appears on screen, or even the cinema of the mind, but what transpires in the cinematographic apparatus, whether we describe it in terms of the technical object itself or as the mental process of transformation. For both, the expression of selection constitutes their Degree Zero, but it is also that of technology qua technology as conceived by Heidegger in *The Question Of Technology* (1953). This activity which Heidegger refers to as *Gestell* (frame) as the apparatus of enframing is that which organizes and provides the scaffolding by which we can name what precisely is not and never will be perceivable with the physical eyes: it reveals the actual, the causal, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Thus, the cinema books articulate these concerns as an expression of the essentially technological by definition of the cinematographic apparatus as “the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where *alētheia*, truth, happens” (HEIDEGGER, 1993, p. 319) 24 frames a second, as Goddard is wont to say. What makes the cinema archetypical of technology is that the cinematographical is technology in essence as described by Heidegger. The question concerning the cinematograph’s technology “is the question concerning the constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the essential unfolding of truth



propitiates” (HEIDEGGER, 1993, p. 338) through its operative functionality. If the cinematographic technology can bear the name *technē*, it does so by “the revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearance” as a *poiesis* of the fine arts, and as “a holding sway and the safekeeping of truth” as an archival medium (HEIDEGGER, 1993, p. 339). There are many common points here between Heidegger and Deleuze. And it is through Mnemosyne that we shall be able to constitute a point of contact

The cinematographic of Deleuze’s cinema books, as opposed to the cinema, is a perceptual semiotics, perhaps a more specific and technical exposé than *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) but nevertheless mining and smelting the same ore. Many of the same problems discussed in *ATP* are reprised in *Cinema 1* and *2* and some of the problems that arise in these two volumes are dealt with in *What is philosophy?*—for if the cinema books present a philosophical program based on the image, the philosophy behind the philosophical scheme itself must at some point also be articulated. Deleuze bases his image taxonomy around four commentaries on Bergson’s theses on movement.

The first three appear in *Cinema 1* and deal with the Bergsonian movement-image and its three main figures and the fourth in *Cinema 2* reflects on the memory-image in terms of the passing present as an infinitely contrasted past. The books are somewhat of a confusing numerical jumble in that there are four commentaries on Bergson, three types of movement, two types of illusion emerging from the second thesis, three levels of operativity for the third thesis, the simultaneous insertion into the system of Peircean firstness, secondness and thirdness and as a result the ensuing different varieties or figures within each image type. Yet, we remain within the semiotic realm at all times: “One might conceive of a series of means of translation (train, car, aeroplane...) and, in parallel, a series of means of expression (diagram, photo, cinema)” (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 4).<sup>88</sup>

Because much of the books is a classificatory overview of image types, the most succinct expressions of the two aspects of the taxonomy are found in the glossaries to both books. In the Glossary to *Cinema 1*, Deleuze offers an unabashedly Bergsonian definition of the Movement-Image as “the acentered set [*ensemble*] of variable elements which act and react on each other as foundational.”<sup>89</sup> The other image types are subsidiary movements or

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<sup>88</sup> In the *Petit Robert* French dictionary, the first definition of *translation* is the activity of transporting (the remains, the body of a person).

<sup>89</sup> This is the Bergsonian definition of the image as articulated in *Matter and Memory* (1896).

characterisations of the Movement-Image. The principal ones, namely, the Perception-Image, the Affection-Image, the Action-Image, the Impulse-Image and Mental-Image, are given a trichotomous treatment which produces a triad of signs for each characterisation of movement as First, Second and Third, except for the Impulse-Image which is obviously only provided with a First and Second. One thing to keep in mind when interpreting these image types is that the terms which qualify the term image are words that for the most part end in the -ion suffix, indicating that they denote both a process and its outcome. Hence the need to define each image as the over-arching movement which he calls *ensemble* or set in the English translation and the associated specific signs he calls *things*—which Peirce might call objects. In the original French, Deleuze separates the ensembles from the things—literally keeps them typographically apart by spacing them on the printed page—plausibly for the reason just stated, but the translation does not respect the presentational logic of the French and places them in alphabetical order as two non-separated divisions. This might seem like petty nit-picking at the expense of the translators, but the ordinal presentation of the original and their flow of logic seems to indicate they should be read and understood in that order as a heuristic towards the understanding of the movement of throughput in the chain of signification.

The Glossary of *Cinema 2* is not as forthright in that it only offers up succinct definitions of a few terms, generally chronosigns, or signs which “point and sheet”, which indicate and provide a relative consistency to time’s formal unfolding. Only two images are defined, and only then they are presented as signs: the Crystal-Image or Hyalosign and the Recollection-Image or Mnemosyne. Of the definitions of images presented, most notable is the absence of a definition of the Time-Image. But as to the chronosigns he does present, all articulate the form, or rather the force, of time in the image. Here the images are produced on an internal, purely mental, material spectrum which presents a movement which oscillates between the material and the ideal as pure thought, as the production of time. It is decidedly a semiotic concern in that these chronosigns reveal “the hidden ground of time” (DELEUZE, 1989, p. 98). The *sema* marks the spot where the processual earth as elemental transformation identifies what is at hand as the passage of time as transformative internal experience and also activates the Peircean sign.

In the Preface to the English Edition of *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze asserts that “time remains the object of an indirect representation in so far as it depends on montage

and derives from movement-images” (DELEUZE, 1986, p. ix). To say that time depends on montage is huge and runs counter to what montage theory usually asserts that montage articulates time and so there’s more there than meets the eye in terms of perception or what is being put forth as a montage theory in *Cinema 1* chapter 3—namely, that which emerges in *Cinema 2* in terms of the time-image. For example, is flicker, as the simple alternation of blackness and whiteness, montage? Where does the meaning as montage aesthetics enter into flicker? Is it at the most primitive or fundamental of interpreting opposition “as the internal motive force by which the divided unity forms a new unity on another level”? (DELEUZE 1987, p. 33) Or is it in the articulation of the creation of a positive desire versus the production of a negative loss as driver of advance as affective flow where we can say that montage is happening as another level of signification? It becomes an unlimited series of montages of montages. But then to assert that time derives from the movement-image is to make time experiential as felt and ultimately intensive or differential and ultimately pragmatic even if it is always intuitively inferential. This requires that we distinguish between the montage that results from the physicality of movement and the mentality of translation, and the durational flow of montage—they all have movement but the movement is of a different nature and requires qualification and not simply broken down analytically as constituent of images in themselves, as micro-images. And if we allow ourselves to do this, are these micro-intervals, which Massumi (2015) calls micro-perceptions, are simply indicators of passage which allow us to inferentially discern the procession of time? Or can it be reduced to thresholding and its liminal expression as differential relation?

It is Deleuze who labels this movement within his perceptual semiotics a movement-image, for it is not found within Bergson. Nor any of the other fundamental types. The term perception-image occurs only one in *Matter and Memory* and only in terms of pure perception, as an hypothetical or suppositional conception to illustrate what would happen in the interval if memory would not be brought into the picture, so to speak. It would seem that Bergson never followed through on giving a name to the movement-image even if he had discerned the movement (DELEUZE 1987, p. 28). The memory-image is another matter and Bergson often equates it with perception, which makes sense, for Bergson does not believe that perception can exist independently of memory (BERGSON: Key Writings p. 20). But if we break down the Deleuzian movement-image—which Deleuze credits Bergson for

its invention—into its subsidiary component movements, we have the perception-image, the action-image and the affection-image as its three key varieties and the impulse-image. We are in the realm of pure perception which Bergson elaborates in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*. It is pure perception in that this mode of movement does not engage memory, or at least not in any consciously cogent way. The movement exists non-consciously in the sense that one is conscious yet does not need to be thinking about the activity itself as an act of conscious will or understanding, like driving a car or walking down the street or cognising anger. The resulting images as perceptive, affective, impulse and action have a life of their own, which do not require conscious ratiocination or reflection and carry out the task as useful activity from stimulus to reaction.

In thinking about these image types, we also need to keep track of the type of stimulus that the body is receiving in order to determine what type of image is being generated. It would be more appropriate to ascertain the nature of the impression as opposed to characterising it, not in terms of whether the stimulus affects one sense or another, but whether the stimulus is predominantly working in the physical realm or in the psychological realm. Humans know the world materially, as a heterogeneous experiential intensification which has both extension and duration: Bergson writes that we know things dualistically, physically and mentally, as body and mind, as having a physical or physiological dimension and a psychological dimension on a polar spectrum which is purely material on one end and ideal on the other—they are material in that they are not pure Ideas and are not pure Chaos. Deleuze understands these imagistic components of movement as virtual actants, potentialities, that transcend or surpass the elemental and function on a level of their own, even if they need a body for expression.

Those aspects of things in the world which can be known better in terms of extension are material predominantly in a physical sense, known directly through the senses and produce movements of thought which occupy the realm of the movement-image. Those aspects of things in the world which have no extensive properties and can be known better in terms of introspection are material in a psychological manner and cannot be directly known by the senses and require a special faculty of inward or internal observation, of contemplation, which is called the mind and are known affectively. (BERGSON, 2014, p. 7). Thus we say that impressions are material because they have both extension and duration but perhaps more importantly because they are not fully adequate, perfect Ideas. On the

one hand, the greater the duration, the greater the reality, the greater the adequacy in terms of Idea; on the other hand, the more a thing is determined by extensive properties, the less adequate it is as an idea, to the point that it can descend to a pure becoming as a chaos that has no duration. Thus, the affection-image tends to be more psychological, more mental, and the the action-image more physical, more sensorial. The perception-image describes the synthesis implicit in the movement and the impulse image is the composition of the contraction which drives the movement of projection outwards and onwards. Thus, the movement-image describes the image as a whole from the impression as stimulus occurring through the afferent circuit to its transformation in the centre of indetermination and the subsequent switching to the efferent circuit and the production of a contraction. However, the movement that takes place within the centre of indetermination is more complex than the throughput the movement-image would have us sustain. The faculty contained by the centre of indeterminacy is characterised as a delay, as a system of deferral, in which the movement of thought takes place as a self-contained dynamic which cycles, alternates, oscillates between the ideal and the physical as the mental process of thought which is represented as a vertical ascending and descending motion. If the movement is more informed by the ideal as a more adequate or perfect notion, the movement is said to be upward. If the movement is more informed by the physical senses and the impermanence of non-being, the movement is said to be downward. Thought, as an ongoing mental process is thus kept in motion as the material movement upwards and downwards as the creation of time as the acknowledgment of change. Traditionally this has been described as Mnemosyne, the daughter of Uranus and Gaea, and mother of the nine Muses.

The First Thesis on movement which appears in *Matter and Memory* states that “movement is distinct from the space covered. Space covered is past, movement is present, the act of covering. The space covered is divisible, indeed infinitely divisible, whilst movement is indivisible, or cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided” (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 1). And it brings out three types of movement: the Bergsonian image of stimulus and reaction separated by the centre of indetermination; the obvious movement which is produced when a subsequent frame replaces the extant frame; the change which results from the montage of accretion where every new, incoming frame

transforms the duration of what immediately preceded it as well as of the the existing assemblage as a whole.

The Second Thesis on movement which is elaborated in *Creative Evolution*, states that movement arises from the rationalisation or comparison of the incoming with the extant as discernments of qualitative change (BERGSON, 1944). The thesis elaborates on a distinction Bergson makes in a comparison between Zeno's argument to qualitative becoming in contrast to evolutionary becoming, where in the first proposition becoming is a verb of indeterminate meaning as activity, in the second proposition, becoming is a subject, a noun. Bergson uses the concept of Εἶδος (*Eidos*), which he defines as "the stable view taken of the instability of things" (BERGSON, 1944, p. 342) as what furnishes the criterion from which movement can be gauged. Deleuze shifts this from the intelligible Ideas or Forms of Plato and Aristotle to the any-instant-whatever of the snapshot, and rightly tones down the juxtaposition of terms to the actualisation of Ideas within the movements of matter-flux. This downgrades the Forms into forms and their movement as privileged instants—which Deleuze characterises as 'pathetic'—where, through the reference to Eisenstein, the pathetic becomes Πάθος (*pathos*) and transforms the movement into the affectual of montage of *Nonindifferent Nature* (EISENSTEIN, 1987).

The Third Thesis, also from *Creative Evolution*, states that "not only is the instant an immobile section of movement, but movement is a mobile section of duration, that is, of the Whole, or of a whole" (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 8). It brings out **three levels of selection that predicate the unit of operability** based on the equation of illusion and reality according to the formula: immobile sections are to movement what movement as mobile section is to qualitative change. These are:

- (1) the assemblages or closed systems which are defined by discernible objects or distinct parts;
- (2) the movement of translation which is established between these objects and modifies their respective positions relative to each other as affective entities;
- (3) the duration or the whole, a spiritual reality which constantly changes according to its own relations. (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 11)

This demonstrates the difference between translation and transformation, of *erfahrung* and *erlebnis* in terms of transition and passage (Rebolledo & Galli, 2017), when speaking of change as two aspects of movement. The first level of movement is a translation

of space and the other effectuates a durational change. The move here is subtle because the translation as spatial involves the sensory as extensive and that the change occurs in this realm as a difference from itself. The transformation addresses the durational as temporal as the creation of time through the production of pure difference as difference in itself. The third movement as the outcome of montage as a durational entity produces a mobile section which in itself constitutes “time-images, that is, duration-images, change-images, relation-images, volume-images which are beyond movement itself” (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 11). In our analysis of the production of duration in Ruttman’s 1927 *Berlin: Symphony of a Great City* we will see how it arises out of the closed openness which duration permits as a system of relation.

Thus, the first level is a mode of selection which Deleuze calls framing. It entails the delimitation of an ensemble as a closed system of relations; it is an individualising delimitation or distinction within a larger set. Framing is a selection which delimits that which amounts to the ensemble, the set of inclusion as the content of the framing. It is a dynamic construction in act, in that it is linked and delimited as a spatial set in the making: this is why in the cinema the set is where the film is not only made but where all the components and creative elements are present for its realisation. The framing identifies that which defines the content as that which is included as essential to the conception. The activity of framing need not be cut and dry or necessarily continuous: the constituents of a set can be extensive or intensive and requiring a threshold but the frame provides delimitation for both instances. The selection can thus be topological in its definition as it is transmitted through the ensemble as a set which does not need to be physically or temporally set and thus the ensemble is *dividual*. This property of the selective framing as capable of being seen as constituted of parts allows the constituents to exist as components of other sets, of other ensembles and assemblages, a property which complements Simondon’s concept of concreteness.<sup>90</sup> There is also a negative aspect to the selection in terms of a ‘negative space’ which allows the framing to subsist within it. The fact that there is a selection in a space implies that it is a part of a larger ensemble which contains the both the space of selection and the space of non-selection. Hence, framing selects as much

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<sup>90</sup> Concreteness expresses that a component in an assemblage can assume a variety of roles simultaneously depending on the pragmatic aspect of the cut. This will be seen in the section of Simondon’s theory of the image and the associated milieu.

through selection as through rejection and exclusion. The off-screen refers to what is neither seen nor included, but is nevertheless present in an absent way because it has conditioned or conditions the presence of that which is on-screen as the selection of the framing. Framing in this respect ties it to the *découpage* as the selective process where focal length, lens aperture and focus work together to resolve an object from a background so that the object appears as *découpé*, as cut away, or separated, distinct and distinguished from the background. In a filmic sense, this idea of *découper* was taken up by Béla Balázs in the contrasting of *Ausschnitt* (cutouts) and *Bildausschnitt* (image section) as part of his theorisation of *découpage* in *Die Einstellung* (filmic attitude or stance, what Deleuze calls the angle of framing), as a hinge to think the sectioning of the profilmic (BARNARD, 2014).

The second level of selective differentiation is *découpage*, which the English translation erroneously has down as cutting. As Deleuze points out, *découpage* “is the determination of the shot, and the shot, the determination of the movement which is established in the closed system between elements or parts of the set” (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 18). Deleuze has an interesting conception of the shot in that in comparison to film theory he defines it as a conceptual entity in terms of its production of movement rather than define it in terms of length: the shot is the intermediary between the framing of the ensemble and the montage of the whole, sometimes tending toward one or the other (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 19) and he articulates the shot by defining what it can do as opposed to what it is. The movement of the shot arises internally as the translation of the parts of an ensemble which are spatially consistent, but also as the change of a whole which is transformed in duration internally and in relation to the whole. The shot divides and subdivides duration according to the objects which make up the set; it reunites objects and sets into a single identical duration. This double functional aspect of the shot makes it act like a conceptual experience. As such, the shot can both immobile and mobile in terms of the ‘contiguity’ that it produces as a closed set of filmic continuity. As a unit of engagement with reality, the shot functions like a concept except that its content articulates change and movement as the content of the closed set and delimits not only through what it actively selects between the time the camera is turned on and turned off, but through what it fails to select as a passive selection. In reference to the concept of concept, of the thought of thought, a shot would represent a selection of perceptual activity as constitutive of thought-in-the-making as productive of change as well.



*Découpage* is a technical term in filmmaking which can mean two things: *découpage* refers to the technical breakdown of the film script into its component scenes as shooting elements and then it refers to the actual breakdown of the shooting in terms of actual shots as the shot-by-shot breakdown: “the *découpage technique* is the treatment of the script for the camera, *découpage* is the treatment of pro-filmic reality by the camera” (BARNARD, 2014, p. 5). As Timothy Barnard (2014) points out in his book *Découpage* foregrounds the understanding by French critics that a film’s sequencing is conceived before and during the shooting of a film, and not in the editing. But also, that the camera plays an important part in the formal treatment and sequencing of the *mise-en-scène*. And so the shots are conceived and designed prior to shooting even if they are ultimately blocked off on set. What this means is that quite often a film has been edited prior to its being shot, and that the editor’s job is merely assemblage and not the fundamental organisation of the filmic material.

These are significant considerations that are at the root of the filmic problematic, for it is in these determinations that the elemental constituents are decided upon—as the passage from the Zeroness to the Firstness of the image (DELEUZE, 1989, p. 31). If we separate the filmic into saccades and fixations, into individual frames, into shots, into sequences and then into the film itself it has serious implications as to how to conceive the various imagistic ‘pre-individual’ entities within each and how imagistic process functions when we use the cinematograph as the driving mechanism. It is a matter of determining where movement, difference and, at some point, time, creep into the process as an indivisible (complete) movement. Deleuze asserts that the Bergson-based imagistic scheme does not coincide ‘even at the level of distinct images’ (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 69)—the engines that drive both dynamics are different—yet, they deal with the same subject matter, so they must coincide on some points, most importantly on the question of signification, no matter its underlying mechanism. The arc of the arrow’s flight in Zeno, the indivisible movement in Bergson and the necessity of drama in the most commercial of narrative film structures of Sidney Lumet’s narrative arc or Syd Field’s paradigm are all predicated on change as the movement of the whole. They spouse the idea of intensification, of duration and of intuitive drama and spouse the idea of montage in some form or other.

Thus, the third level of selective individuation refers to wholes. And montage is “the determination of the whole by means of continuities, cutting and false continuities”

(DELEUZE, 1987, p. 69). If the first level looked at the excision of a part from a larger whole, and the second level at the relation between parts with movement constituting a larger whole which together produces an over-riding movement, the third level is the overarching movement which ties the subsumed constituents into a coherent machinic whole which is closed yet open.

In postulating the experiential this way, Deleuze is changing the location of conceptualisation from Cartesian intellection as a faculty and moving it to the empirical, to the sensory and the perceptual as the site of creation. This leads us to posit that a cinematic philosophy based on imagistic movement which invokes the faculty of perception at the expense of the intellectual faculty in the creation of concepts. This would be one reason to label Bergson anti-intellectual (RUSSELL, 1914; BENDA 1927/2006; HUGHES, 2008; PILKINGTON, 1976). Thus, in considering this breakdown, we look at the first part of the movement, that which takes place on the out-facing incoming side of the transformation, prior to its being taken in by the mind as a mental phenomenon.

## **Duration**

We can express this perceptual conception of the threshold as experience as a durational construction. Deleuze repeatedly states, as we also have throughout our text, that we need to express problems in terms of time. The concepts we have been engaging all have a temporal dimension in that they take time to be accomplished, just like walking here to there takes time — it takes time to walk the walk to then be able to talk the talk. The time taken to do something in English is usually imagined in spatial terms, as extension, and “how long did it take?”. We respond in terms of years, days, hours, minutes, seconds but the underlying intuition of the temporal rationalisation is spatial. Duration would be the truly temporal expression of the event as intuitive convergence, but in order to express perduration in temporal terms, we need to present the event as concrescent associated assemblage which takes into consideration the concepts we have developed thus far and exude difference as a

Take the event of night giving way to day. We all have an innate common-sense understanding of what night is and what day is but the transition from night to day is also usually understood as an indefinite gradation which varies in intensity over time. But when

we are in the grip of the moment, we are fully implicated in the becoming as a being-doing, where being is mediated by mediation itself and therefore transparent and invisible to its own becoming — the progression is imperceptible in itself. We can arbitrarily define a time of day, an intensity of light, some measurable quality, some quantitative value as threshold whose crossing defines the end of night and the start of day. But specifying the criteria to determine when nighttime actually yields to daytime is a difficult task, although objectively we can usually state with certainty when it is no longer night and day has actually come: we can categorically state that “from now on, daytime will be understood to be one hour after dawn and one hour after sunset” and produce hard-and-fast, artificial thresholds. In the event of night becoming day, no aspect of the advance can ever be understood as a black or white determination. First of all, it is always a varying gradation of intensities, not only of luminosity, but of the cumulative progression of subsidiary events which constitute the changeover. Becoming day as an event, as a multiplicity is not only a light level, but is made up of street light turning off, chickens crowing, dogs barking, alarm clocks ringing, the laziness of enjoying the warmth of being in bed, barely opening one’s eyes to the realization of light in the room, the smell of coffee brewing, waiting for the washroom because someone else is taking a shower, hearing the intensification of traffic on the street, getting one’s briefcase ready for work, bagging one’s lunch, tying one’s shoes, walking to work, checking one’s emails... The complexity as a concrete imbrication of the accumulating eventual becoming make experience an ecology of thresholds.<sup>91</sup> As the gradual intensification of daytime overwhelms the quietude of night, we realize — but only if we stop and take pause — that a multitude of gestures and activities have been taking place, that manifold thresholds are being crossed, none of them obvious or critical — which mark the advance into the actualization of virtual potential as a progressive, invisible, transparent protocol. Without the execution of these small happenings, we cannot undertake whatever ought to come next.

To see the event compose itself in this way is very similar to the cinematic mode of creating narratives through the accretion of meaning in audio visual productions. This is what Walther Ruttmann's classic documentary *Berlin, Symphony of a Great City* (1927) does

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<sup>91</sup> Many of these activities can occur linearly but they could just as well occur out of sequence and out of temporal continuity and simultaneously. I can tie my shoes before I get my briefcase ready for work, and I could have bagged my lunch the night before and chickens could have been crowing and dogs barking all the time to announce morning.

in presenting a day in the life of the German capital. The film could just as easily be called *A Symphony of Thresholds* — the film abounds with images depicting thresholds. Yet, none of the depicted activities can claim to designate the definitive moment which actually marks the exact moment of the waking of the city — it is the accumulating effect of the completion of various gestures, movements and activities which actually compose the accumulating facts which characterise the city's unfolding during a 24 hour cycle of its life. The film is a reconstitutive montage in five acts of the everyday experience of a typical day in Berlin when Benjamin might have possibly been at work on his *Arcades Project*: Act 1, Berlin awakens; Act 2, Berlin gets to work; Act 3, Berlin in motion; Act 4, The People of Berlin; Act 5, Berlin at Night. It is reconstitutive because it was shot over many days; some of the scenes look like they may have been staged by the filmmakers; and the editors “cut-together” representative fragments, snippets of activity, “select passages”, to recreate a semblance of temporal logic and coherent order to the images — as objective as it attempts to be, the film is a fabulation which can be said to rely on the powers of the false. The documentary effectively uses many strategies of classic montage aesthetics to convey movement and to articulate cinematic tropes relying on visual dynamics to create meaning on various levels. For example, we can identify an Eisensteinian montage aesthetic by the use of metric, rhythmic, tonal, overtone, and ideological or intellectual montage; we can also categorise his editing by the use of a Pudovkian aesthetic of relational editing techniques which rely on contrast, parallelism, symbolism, simultaneity and the recurring leitmotif — both of these aesthetics are manifest but they are not so much concerned with the establishing of temporal continuity and rational coherence between the shots, but work relationally to let the film work at the level of irrational cuts whose continuity is provided by the music track. The concern is not so much establishing fluid continuous connections between the shots but of building the experience as a logical presentation in a sequential order which replicates the likely order of these events in ‘real life’. This involves the presentation of a multiplicity of subsidiary events each with their own processual advance of imbricating concretisations which constitute the univocity of becoming and contribute to the overall effect of conveying the ordering of the unfolding images according to the pictorial themes explored in each act.

For example, the vast majority of shots depicting the movement of Berlin awakening which constitute Act 1 either act as thresholds or illustrate them according to the logic of thresholds and experience. This opening act starts out at dawn and in broad strokes is

composed of four sequences: the entrance into the city by train; empty shots of Berlin streets at dawn; Berliners making their way to work; and the start of the work day in industry. After a short shot of water which dissolves into an abstract graphic animation, the first scene opens with a railway-crossing gate closing which is immediately followed by a frenetically paced montage which rhythmically intercuts images of train tracks, train wheels, and subjective point of view shots of the landscape racing by. This yields to a metric montage of peripheral urban landscapes punctuated by shots of the steel girders of railway bridge trusses. Throughout these images, thresholds of all kinds repeatedly mark the passage of the camera through the urban scenery: light posts, markers, traffic signs, train switches, distinctive features, bridges, trestles, railroad service buildings, prominent landmarks, and finally a large archway which marks the entrance into the station and a large painted sign which announces Berlin. After a short visual interlude of static detail shots of the train, the viewer is presented with a sequence of panoramic views of the city from a very high vantage point which show the variegated architectural chaos of the urban environment emphasizes the inactivity of the city at dawn. Sundry industrial, commercial and residential architectural details images of the sleeping city appear... desolate images of shuttered residential windows and storefront windows showing female mannequins displaying various undergarments remind us of Atget's documentary photographs of similar subject-matter. A lengthy overtone montage repeating the motif of Berliners walking to work, slowly builds up in intensity as more and more individuals mass together to constitute the undifferentiated working class going to work. Ruttman inserts shots of cattle, of soldiers marching in formation, of an organ grinder busking in the street, of cattle drivers whipping cattle into a gated enclosure, of a guard standing in front of a barred fence, over a dark ominous bass line which is broken by an alarming high-pitched flute — the images break up the overtone montage by creating "intellectual montage" juxtapositions which comment critically on the working class' plight. Finally, a switch lever is thrown and the whole of Berlin industry comes to life: we see images of industrial machinery becoming operational, the measured mechanical movements, the robotic procession, the accurate predetermination of all gestures, the relentless march of industrial progress to which the working class is subjected to. There is a feeling of hectic inevitability in the buildup of industrial and commercial activity and the uniformity and homogenisation that the gestures and movement that 'modern times' brings on — both in products and in those who make them.

Thus if we follow Ruttman in defining the 'concept' Berlin Awakens, we could understand it through the images that he shows. There are a multitude of others which could have been shown to depict morning but not everything falls into that category: 5 o'clock tea would not fall into the category of Berlin Awakens so it is not shown. But if one were to ask what is the duration of Berlin Awakens, one would see that it is an open-ended question that is closed: Berlin Awakens in the morning but it is not indefinite. We could artificially block it between 4:45 am and 10 but it can have a variable duration depending on what activities we decide to include. Ruttman decided to include a variety of activities, but we could have added people getting dressed, or having breakfast, or brushing their teeth.

These are activities which legitimately belong to Berlin Awakens and had Ruttman showed these, his conceptual depiction might have had more reality, or as Spinoza might say more perfection. We understand that Berlin Awakens is a multiplicity, that is heterogeneous, that it is rhizomatic, that reconciles a variety of temporalities, that gives a limited extension to the event of Berlin Awakening but which all the time remains open. These events as underlying components do not have to be spatially jointed; they can be spatially and temporally separated. The 6:15 train arriving at the station need not be linked to an alarm clock ringing at 7:15 halfway across town, but the two events are nevertheless linked through the agency of Berlin Awakens. Thus, the event Berlin Awakens which we could artificially define as lasting 5 hours and 15 minutes could have a duration which can include more or less time depending which activities we wish to add or subtract.

The Idea of Berlin Awakens as a Platonic Form, the idea which would have the greatest reality, would be the one that includes all the possible activities which Berlin Awakens could include. Ruttman's idea of the concept of Berlin Awakens is what he has chosen to include in the film and which for him shows the movement in time which demonstrates the perduration of the event. Berlin Awakens is also a form whose creation in our mind is informed by the Idea of what it can be as a potential but also by how it expresses itself in the world, not only today, but in its different manifestations as it is repeated from one day to the next and embodying the concept differently from one day to the next.

Every day that Berlin awakens, there is a facticity to its actualisation in the world. It follows a protocol which is reified, which immanently emerges and conditions experience with out any specific orders: it seems to just happen by the reciprocal co-conditioning which develops immanently in the becoming of the event. Berlin Awakens has a certain truth value

because it happens and because we can name it, identify it, indicate its functional operativity. Its participating constituents which combine together to create an event do not just agglutinate to form a substantial amalgam, but constitute a machine which produces an experiential consistency that constitutes Berlin Awakens. This operational operativity as experiential consistency emerges from the darkness of night of Berlin Sleeps as a progressive intensification as those activities which define it begin to happen or take place. As such, the body of the composed by what all that activity signifies gains operative heft as all of Berlin manifestly becomes active. And then as those activities which mark Berlin's rousing begin to cease and are gradually replaced by those activities which denote Berlin Gets to Work. Once the activity of the city has been transformed from Berlin Awakens to Berlin Gets to Work, we have effectuated the changeover from one to the other and the city has been transformed as a qualitative change through and through; the feeling of Berlin Awakens passes and gives way to Berlin Gets to Work. The indefinite interval which is open yet closed between Berlin Sleeps and Berlin Gets to Work is the duration of Berlin Awakens — but that interval is as vague and non-homogeneous in its duration as any other event in that activities which could be said to other classifications are taking place simultaneously.

It is a One and Many simultaneously and what it exhibits depends on how we wish to understand what we perceive and how we participate in the event or in how define the event we wish to participate in. Berlin Awakens is a multiplicity composed of an infinite number of component elements which are both material and non-material, human and non-human, spatial and temporal; each component, no matter its scale or compositional make-up is a durational intensification in its own right, having a truth value all its own; now we may understand it as a linear unfolding as an unspooling and projection of life before us, but while the scene/seen that occupies us keeps us immersed in its experiential hooks, there is an infinity of activity which is simultaneously taking place and which bonds our singular experiencing to the rest of the world and ultimately to the universe as a whole.

As we mentioned, each activity that contributes or participates in defining Berlin Awakens as a body plays infinite roles in the happening of the world whether we perceive it, know it, understand it, remember it, feel it, or image it or not. The components of Berlin Awakens create a concretised whole, just like it is concretised in machinic assemblages which are larger than itself, serially upwards and downwards ad infinitum. Further each component effectuates change either as a result of its relations with other components or

non-components, or even as a positional change of potential — something which may be as anodyne and inconsequential as having access to a future it did not have before — the change that comes with waiting.

### **The Recollection-Image**

Surprisingly, memory appears to play a relatively small part in imagistic process as articulated by Deleuze. While working on this concept, we were surprised by the cursory treatment Deleuze gives this idea, particularly in view of its key role in the determination of perception, of thought, and as fundamental in the operational mediation of movement through the system. The theorisation of imagistic memory indirectly occupies a large portion of *Cinema 2: The Time-Image (C2)* and offers depth to the cursory initial presentation of the recollection-image in chapter 3 but also through its participation in the ideation of crystals of time based on Bergson's thought on memory as presented in *Matter and Memory (Matière et mémoire, 1896; trans. 1911)*, *Creative Evolution (L'Évolution créatrice, 1907; trans. 1911)* and *Mind-energy (L'Énergie spirituelle, 1919; trans. 1920)*. Originally a term from *Matter and Memory*, the French *image-souvenir* has been unhappily translated to recollection-image and, as such, conceptually leads us astray as to how to understand this important concept. In Bergson's book, it is translated as memory-image and perhaps the translators of *C2* should have followed the lead from the established terminology in Bergsonian scholarship. In terms of expressing the movement that is effectuated by this image, the mnemonic-image might have been a more salutary translation, even if less user-friendly, but it would have also echoed the operational function of the Peirce-inspired neologism *mnemosign*. Curiously, the term *mnemosign* appears only twice in *C2*, in the conclusion and the glossary, and then only as a homonym for recollection-image. The manner in which Deleuze interprets Peirce and makes use of his sign concepts calls out for a more detailed examination particularly where the imagination of imagistic process works differently from how Peirce predicated his semeiotics as what he calls the architecture of time.

To develop the recollection-image in full is not a simple concept and requires the *(re)collection* of the many of the concepts we have thus far developed in order to reconstitute it, not only the Deleuzian and Bergsonian concepts around the image and memory, but Yarbus's eye-movement diagrams and the model of perspective that we have



elaborated. We invoke the term *recollection* here as one of the ways that Deleuze understands memory, but this is not a memorial reconstitution proper as commonly understood but an aggregation of concepts that we developed earlier and are now presenting as a descriptive elaboration. The result will be a closing of the loop of perspective through the projection of point of view rendered temporal which articulates both memory as extensive and time.

In the development of the Deleuzian recollection-image and its subsequent revelation as a mnemosign, we need to keep in mind that the Bergsonian image is always predicated as a movement-image: there is an afferent stimulation, a center of indetermination and an efferent reaction whenever the image arises. As Bergson and Deleuze often repeat, the brain is an image, but it is not just one type of image. As the various faculties indicate there are many different functions which can come into play in the interval between the afferent and the efferent. And the recollection-image can take on a variety of senses. Deleuze is quite specific as to how and where the recollection-image operates but we feel that there are other memorial functions which come into play at the pre-individual level which Deleuze does not appear to want to indulge. He is aware of these partial entities but does not seem to entertain them as pre-individual constituents that need to be taken into consideration as memorial. For example, when speaking of the shot, he refers to the film, he refers to the internal variation within the shot, the movement in the relation shot-to-shot, and in the movement of the whole, but what seems to count is the framed selection, the photogram, as the primitive entity to be considered. But within the frame, there are also similar movements which presuppose the movement of the shot in terms of fixations and saccadic eye movements within the frame, the image-movement from one frame to another and through the shot overall. These micro-movements of perception rely on durational process in order to remain coherent for if we do not take this into consideration we fall afoul of the first commentary on Bergson.

To illustrate our ideas we wish to consider a fictional example: we take an aboriginal from the deepest of the Amazon rainforest, who in 2003 traveled to Brasilia and saw anger expressed in Congress for the very first time in his life. He is a cultural anomaly in that he has never seen anger expressed and has never had to call up anger as an emotional response to a life situation—but he will learn what anger is by creating a cognitive pattern of his own. His cognition of Anger does not begin as knowledge of anger. It is a temporal

development and does not happen in the moment and so he will figure out what the (representamina) signs are, what the result looks like and what his response should be. He not only learns what the signs of anger as a totality look like, but understands its gradual intensification and the aggregation of representamina so that he not only knows the individual constituents which make up anger but can cognise the Whole as anger. As we have seen, the eye-movement diagrams constitute repeatable patterns which identify and allow the cognition of a particular finding, ultimately as a Whole. The Anger diagram is predicated on the cognitive movement from one point to the next, from one representamen to the next, as a serial movement of the eyes which as aggregation constitute the objective expression of anger and the subjective production of a certain contraction or movement on the part of the viewer. So that not only will the aboriginal visitor see anger as anger in itself as a display of affective energy, and constitute a cognitive-memorial circuit called Anger, but will remember the circumstances, the location, the other people involved and their emotions, how other people behaved, what was being said, how it was being said, the flow of intensity of the event, how everyone reacted to the anger, and all this will be tied to a time of day, a day of the week, a month and a year in which his conception of Anger first took place. A plane of consistency, a memorial region, will be created in his mind which will create an associated relational network as a rhizomic entity called Anger located somewhere in time and space in a self-contained region, between strata or regions representing 2002 and 2004. Now, in 2010, he leaves his village for a second time and sees anger displayed for a second time in Rio. He hears angry words spoken, sees the clenching of fists and immediately his mind makes the association to the events in 2003. He jumps back in time and retraces the circuit of anger from the region of memory of his trip to Brasilia in which he first experienced and cognised anger. He does not need to cognise the exchange anew as Anger but only needs to engage that region from 2003 afresh and trace the motions of anger in his mind. Similarly, in 2018, he watches a dramatic film on tv and sees someone act out in anger. He is still not accustomed to anger in his life, so in trying to interpret the affective situation, he moves from 2018, to 2010 and from there to the region of 2003 which comprises the circuit of anger. He retraces the anger circuit, and his mind formulates the impulse which will guide the nervous impulse to the efferent circuit as a response which produces the right contraction.

We thus have four different modes of memory-image: there is the memory which produces the contraction from one representamen to the next and remembers the partial results as intermediate stop-overs until the first constitution of the concept of Anger; second, the primary closed conception as a closed loop which constitutes the cognition of Anger for the first time as constitutive of the primitive circuit for its (re)cognition, (re)collection and (re)membrance; third, the creation of a region of time and space which constitutes the relational plane of consistency within which the primary conception of anger is located as a present past; the entire movement in the present which encompasses the movement-image which has semiotic movement through the mnemosign. As such, the various memory movements produce horizontal regions of association as triangulated planar lattices of relation which are concretely interlinked vertically in time. In this way, the past is conserved as layers of present, as cartographies of functional consistency. The consistency is among layers of presents, in that any determination as imagistic movement effectuated on a constituted plane is consistent and in the moment. For these reasons, Deleuze asserts that the present is preserved and conserved as layers of pastness, but it is never destroyed (Cours Cinema II p. 129). This is why he refers to the past as a conservatory, a repository or archive of presentness, where each layer is waiting to be (re)activated in the present. If Foucault is an archivist it is not because he safeguards old documents, but because through his documentary reconstitutions of the past, he reconstructs the historical past as movements of words and images in the present as operational truth. Thus, it is through the truth as functional operativity that the time-image functions—not time, but the time-image.

In terms of Yarbus's experiments, we need to remember that the Soviet experimenter differentiated between the non-conditioned and conditioned examinations of the Repin painting. The non-conditioned free examination imposed the challenge on the viewer to find a solution to the painting's proposition, whatever it may be; whereas the conditioned or task viewing sought to find a particular answer to a specific question or problem. Nevertheless, no matter how much we espouse the idea of objectivity, when the viewer encounters the painting, they already have a built-in interpretive disposition in that the elements in the painting are already cognised. The viewer knows what a shoe is, what a hat is and what a coat is. There is no need to explain the function of a door, or the concept of the room or the idea of children. So that even though all viewers are presented the same propositional object, their technologies of interpretation are all different in that each one

will understand differently what a shoe is and what a coat's function is and how to occupy a room. And if they all interpret the objects differently, the relational cartography that they will come up with individually will likely be different for each viewer—perhaps the interpretations might not be overly divergent, in that if the viewers all come from a homogeneous pool, their cultural references might be very similar and so their interpretations will also be very similar, in the same way that words are the repository of social thought (BERGSON, 1965) and permit communication. Further, the imagistic interpretation is two-faced in that on one side we want to understand what the painting means as a semiologic object, as a signifier, that vehicles a certain meaning as conclusion and we also want to understand it as a semeiotic circuit that repeats as its own conclusion. Both modes depend on ocular movement—on the movement-image—to reach their own conclusive interpretations: one mode of interpretation allows us to comprehend the painting as a sequential series of movements which provides the description of the object and the other as a mode that ascertains the repetition of that very same cognition as a sequential series of movements. This is an idyllic idea for never do we encounter the same object twice: I may have sat and gazed at Velazquez's *Las Meninas* (1656) for a week in 1998 and come to a profound understanding of that painting, but twenty years later I may have a somewhat different approach which deposes and delegitimises my own past understanding reperformed in the present but which unfortunately does not take.

The free exploratory examination of the Repin painting will seek to find a pattern or diagram which will satisfy the cognition as a closed system of signs (*representamina*) which will somehow end up making logical sense. The logic here is not one of formal logic, but a flow of sign function where one representamen will start off a concatenation of signs, where the last of the chain will indicate movement to the first representamen. The total movement, the closed circuit constitutes a concept and the circuit as a whole is understood as a movement of thought. We need to underscore that the movement from one representamen to the next is (possibly) indeterminable but even so, the internal intelligence of the mind ensures the logic behind the movement as a faculty which informs the hidden guidance even if it is unknown to us or unknowable. This conclusive closing of the circle of determination itself constitutes semiological closure within a semiotic system.

The ocular-movement diagrams produced by Yarbus show that when a test subject engages the Repin painting that the movement of the eyes shows that they are seeking a

solution to a problem, perhaps an unstated problem or one that is as simple as “getting it”, and once they have gotten it, the eyes appear to fall into a pattern of repetition. The initial engagement with the painting is both chaotic and inconclusive, and will require a certain amount of brute aberrant ocular movement on the canvas in order to get all the movements to click together as a determination. Once a closed circuit is established as the determination of the canvas the eyes repeatedly examine and (re)view the painting according to the same pattern, in what we stated earlier was a pattern of affirmation and ratification. Yet in terms of memory theory, the repetition of this pattern is the establishment of a memory-circuit by cutting the groove which guides the determination which will enable the viewer to ascertain the cognition in the future. This repeated cognition thus establishes the cognitive protocol or intelligence to be able to (re)cognise the event and its elements and understand what is occurring. The original determination establishes the relation between the various terms as a whole and then iterates the repetition to commit the relational assemblage to memory as the deepening impression of a set of movements as an archival diagram of ocular saccades and fixations as the account of that event. The truth of that event as a relational assemblage lies in the perceptual conglomeration of the participants, the space and their movements as a machinic entity.

In Deleuzian terms, a scene or object is cognised in terms of a “region” within which everything is associated. In the Yarbus’s experiments with the Repin painting, the region is the painting and our determinations are based on the relations between the elements of that painting. Our life is equally archived. Our existence is predicated in terms of superposed regions, of stratified planes of operational consistency where the elements are triangulated as an associative relational network horizontally and vertically. The recollection-image informs us that everything cognised as relation has a position that is locatable with respect to time: all concepts which we have determined in the past, all of our experience which we have ‘taken in’ and integrated to our unfolding are relativised to each other and constitute layered sheets of past that are associated and concretised with everything in the universe. Thus, our lives are organised as layered regions of consistency, where the layers are communicate with each other through the concrete relation of the constituents as co-temporal extension and as durational. What produces the consistency of a strata or region is its operative coherence as truth, as a machinic assemblage. An associative network that is produced around an object, such as a Madeleine dipped in bergamot tea, is a machinic

assemblage whose operational functioning is the truth that sustains the operational coherence of a region and seeks to extend linkages outwards away from the horizon. These machinic assemblages are machinic because they are productive technologies in both the Heideggerian sense of functions of revelation and in the Simondonian sense of technical objects as generator of *technē*. The regions as relational networks are rhizomatic in that the terms under relation and the links that bond them are not of a homogeneous nature. In this way, Proust can (re)produce a memorial region which can be self-sustaining as imagistic movement. As such, the (re)collection-image in that the memorial region is reconstituted through the re-collection of that which is contained within that region of memorial coherence. These machinic assemblages not only serve the purpose of cognising things in the world, they serve as epistemic modes of encounter, as personal methodologies of engaging the world. These methodologies as machinic assemblages can be called back, (re)called into service, to streamline the cognition, the validation and creation of the connecting movement.

A “Region” establishes the triangulated network lattice upon which an answer or solution will emerge to the problem at hand. If a region as a selection, as a slice, or enframing can be had, it will be inherently functional in some way: a region always obtains a correct answer because it is functional and coherent in its operativity. What we do not always know is the sense in which it is functional. The region always proffers a correct answer to the question that is actually being posed: if the answer we are receiving to the problem does not concur with our expectations, it is that the problem is wrongly formulated or the question is inadequately posed from our vantage point—the issue is not the answer, it is the question that is at fault. The associated regions are what they are, rightly or wrongly; they are associated as they were created when they were created given the what-with that was at hand when they were created. And if that The memory-object is associated within a specific network lattice of connections/relations which constitute the consistency of a particular layer established as operative within a particular historical time.

From what we saw earlier, the logic that a series of observations, the pattern of ocular movement, brought forth depended on the problem assigned. A viewer that confronted a complex pictorial image, the Repin painting for example, would study the image, eyes moving here and there in an attempt to ‘get it’—whatever ‘getting it’ can mean in terms of understanding what the painting might signify. The viewer is not entering into

relation with the painting 'purely', in that he already has a predetermined personal manner of engaging novelty, his own private methodology as a making way in the world, which can either be a systematic approach or a nomadic errancy, with which he can *figure* out the image. We don't use the word 'figure' off-handedly here,<sup>92</sup> but in the sense of numerical comparison, of the *ratio*, of harmonising novelty with the past, with the past of experience, of using the past of experience as memorial as criterion for our present experience.<sup>93</sup> And it is through this image of the past as a Whole and through its parts, that we approach a novel situation.<sup>94</sup> This encounter with the novel is not a protocolled method but a mode, a modification, of encounter which modifies what is past, modifies in the present and modifies the future through its conditioning as a reformulation of the proposal, of the problem of the examination.

However, Yarbus's demonstrations shows us that initially there is a nomadic ocular wandering over the complex scene until a determination is made, and that once the determination of the signification is fixed, once we have determined the truth of the painting, the viewer tends not to re-problematise the encounter, but seeks to repeat the findings and affirm the machinic functionality of the determination. A fixity to the pattern of ocular investigation instills itself as the cognition of the whole, as a conditioned predisposition of the experience through the categorisation of the encounter. The encounter shifts from an active observation, inspection and examination to the passive affirmation, verification and corroboration—one shifts from a 'look-to-see' attitude to a 'look-to-get', which is repeated. The viewer shifts the attention from the clinical to the critical. Attention as expressive of the character of the relation offer us various aspects: to touch, to hit in tilting, to ascertain, to convict, to sully, to prove and to infect. It would seem to imply that the attention expresses the affective of the symptom as the forceful or impressive in the encounter and which affords the judgment of testimony with the conviction of a true determination. Thus, we can discern a variety of movements taking place there is a

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<sup>92</sup> A Pythagorean rationalisation as a getting the number of the painting.

<sup>93</sup> As much as we like to think that we can enter into a relation cleanly, we cannot: as a viewer, we all have a compounding interest in that to which we have an inclination. Thus we take in an image filtered through our private prejudices as an enlightened objectivity which is the worst kind of subjectivity, for as is popularly said in French Canada a "fou qui sait qu'il est fou, est moins fou qui ne le sait pas encore"—a crazy who knows he's crazy is less crazy than one who doesn't yet know he's crazy.

<sup>94</sup> It is exactly the child that can enter into relation cleanly with the world for he has no preconceived notions or criterion upon which to base the rationalisation of experience.

movement of ocular procession, a cognitive procession and then a (re)cognition of that which is at hand.

As we saw earlier in our presentation of anger and in the examination of Yarbus's plates which demonstrated ocular movement, we were able to see how a diagram is created as a representation of the movement image. We saw that the mind guided the body through a series of movements, a series which became a whole, a determination, a cognition which repeated itself. In the case of anger, we presented an artificial composition of those expressive features, the attributes or qualities, which together compose what we understand to be anger. So that once we understand the diagram of anger, we repeat that cognition as a determination of 'a state of being' and repeat that cognition until a variation in the pattern demands that we (re)examine our judgment. As such, we would do not interpret the individual elements, the representamina, as the complete determination as a linear description but aggregate a series of representamina as an intensification of signification. So that in our example of Anger, if we have eleven representamina (cf Image 3.15) as the composition of Anger, normally we would say that our concept, our grasping-together of the eleven representamina is the serial listing which is a sum which can be represented as  $R_1 + R_2 + R_3 + R_4 + R_5 + R_6 + R_7 + R_8 + R_9 + R_{10} + R_{11} = \text{Anger}$ . But the levels of montage would imply that the procession of the composition of Anger as a closed system of signification, the determination of that which is considered to be the expression of Anger, is a movement of agglutinative intensification as a circulation between the three levels of composition: "that of the determination of closed systems, that of the movement which is established between the parts of a system, and that of the changing whole which is expressed in movement" (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 29). So that the movement would be more appropriately expressed as a progressive intensification:

$R_1$	Representamen 1
$R_1 + R_2 = IM_1$	$R_1$ plus $R_2$ yields Intermediate Montage 1
$IM_1 + R_3 = IM_2$	Intermediate Montage 1 + $R_3$ yields Intermediate Montage 2
$IM_2 + R_4 = IM_3$	
[...]	
$IM_9 + R_{11} = C_1$	Montage of the Whole as the Concept of Anger



What this says is that change is happening: in the change from  $R_1 \Rightarrow I_1/R_2$ ; in the understanding of the commencement of the new change,  $IM_1$ ; and in the overall change that occurs in the movement that the Concept creates as the completion of the series as the effectuation of the arc of the movement.




Figure 3.17: Movement from A to B with intermediate stops a, b, g, d, e.

If we were to explain this in terms of a movement from point A to point B—a distance made up of segments identified by their termination points, a, b, g, d, e—the first movement happens from pt. A to a, where we stop and consolidate the distance travelled. Now, the new trip will be AB-Aa; we now travel to b and consolidate that distance; the new trip will be AB-Ab; etc. Each subsequent departure will be qualitatively different in terms of the origin and the destination. We can also understand this as a trip from Rio de Janeiro to Hong Kong, where that movement as a direct flight is qualitatively different to one involving two stop-overs, say one in London and a second in Dubai. Each stop-over changes qualitatively the experience of the translation from Rio to HK, in terms of the space covered, the covering and the movement of the whole. This is the First commentary on Bergson.

So that if  $R_1 + R_2$  represents a sensory-motor schema of a representamen yielding to an interpretant/new representamen as a feeling, the change-over represents a movement from a perception-image to a movement-image through the affection-image, as an agent of abstraction in that the consolidation is the abstraction that yields the temporal movement as duration. There is still a reliance on the Bergsonian cinematograph for the production of continuity but the continuity happens on different terms. Thus,  $IM_1 + R_3 = IM_2$  as a partial product is of a different type than the simple sum of  $R_1 + R_2 + R_3$  as that which constitutes the movement. Similarly, in our example of Anger,  $IM_9 + R_{11} = C_1$  as Anger is of a different nature than  $R_1 + R_2 + R_3 + R_4 + R_5 + R_6 + R_7 + R_8 + R_9 + R_{10} + R_{11} = Anger$ . Thus, we see that the description, the constitution of the concept as a single addition of its component qualities is inadequate to explain the movement. However, both modes are necessary to complete the picture of Anger. We need the description as a list of attributes and we also need it expressed in processual terms as the incremental outcome as a progressive intensification of

determination of the semiotic function. The determination concludes at the same point, but for the first it needs to be closed—the circuit must close in on itself as a conceptual determination, but for the second, in terms of image, it remain opens helicoidly—it must jump to the reaction as production of movement, difference and change in the world: the experiential tracing of the circuit in one mode leads to the determination of a conceptual judgment and in the other it leads to a leads to a contractive reaction.

If we consider once again the Yarbus experiment with the free examination of the Repin painting of Figure 3.4, we see that the viewer tries different approaches to figure out the meaning of the painting, each one producing a different pattern of engagement. The viewer is looking for the experiential circuit, or diagram, which will provide a coherent reading as a logical explication, as a unfolding logic of a sequential narrative, which identifies the machinic movement within that which appears before him. What the viewer is seeking is the coherent movement within the painting that demonstrates the mechanism that is operative as the production of change. As with any narrative, the viewer seeks to know what the dynamic of change is because this is what indicates the passage of time. Notice that we are not looking for a listing of the attractors or points of interest which draw our attention and delimit the ensemble or set of selection as that which defines the signified of the concept, but a sequence of signs where the serial concatenation of representamina to interpretant/representamina eventually leads back to the initial representamen as a closed, repeatable circuit. The determination is not time, but a time-image. It is a (re)presentation of movement, a facsimile that identifies, demonstrates and indicates how time passes. And so, the movement of the painting is not time, but a (re)production of its procession. In the world, time passes as the coherent imbrication of the reciprocal semeiotic interactivity of everything in the universe. This functioning obtains everywhere and at all scales a processual passage which identifies as change, as difference-in-the-making, as differentiation. What needs to be determined is the mechanism which is responsible for the change not only in its most primitive or general terms but how it manages to do so within the world the machinic assemblage entails.

If we take the different approaches which emerge from the free examination within the allotted time and superpose them as one image, we see a chaotic diagram that has no beginning and no end, no coherence, no determinate repeatable pattern. As the experiential trace of engagement it can tell us much about the different ways the painting can be

approached, thought or interpreted, but not one specific reading which explains it as a totality—before it can mean variously, it needs to mean something adequately. In the initial encounter, the viewer produces a helter-skelter diagram which does not produce any coherent or adequate explication of the painting. But let us assume that the viewer “discovers” a path which produces a coherent explanation. Each sign element propels the “reading” from one sign to the next so that a closed, repeatably recognizable and reproducible circuit can be had. The diagram thus produced identifies the specific mechanism that is responsible for the production of change. The diagram thus created is the “smallest circuit that functions as internal limit for all the others” (DELEUZE, 1989, p. 68). This closed circuit demonstrates or expresses the differentiation and differentiation for which it is responsible as a movement of thought, a duration, a monad.




Figure 3.18: Bergson’s Cone of Memory

This smallest, most succinct circuit which identifies the movement and fully articulates it is the seed for a crystal of time and from it a world can be produced. The movement here isolated and expressed, when articulated in its most primitive and general form is a common notion. The movement is indivisible and homogeneous even if its

constitutive elements or their aggregation is not. The determination of the painting produces a plane of consistency through which courses the interpretative movement of determination. If instead of a painting, we were to deal with a “real life” event, the plane of determination as a plane of operative functionality would be creating a plane in Bergson’s cone of time (Figure 3.18). And the movement that the assemblage obtains would be associated up and down the cone with the various other occurrences of that determination as a concreteness that spans through time as associations of transversal planes.

A determination of an object or scene-as-object is only complete or concluded once a series of sign-movements produces a circuit that closes on itself. If a singular representamen in a particular setting can be counted on to consistently produce the same movement, the mind will try to establish a diagrammatic circuit which will integrate the salient attractors within a scene—the representamina—into a closed chain/loop of imagistic process as signification, where one sign (representamen) points the way to another, and so on, etc until a circuit of signification closes on itself as a repeatable circuit as the *logos orthos* of the determination. Some of the imagistic components might exist on different memorial strata and so the a conceptual determination might require some travel from one strata to another in order to provide the correct determinative path for the movement-image or sign function required for a specific determination. So let’s say, for the sake of an example, that I am working on the concept of the attribute. I know that the notions that constitute the thinking of attribute requires a conception of characteristic, of property, of predicates. Let’s say that my conception of characteristic emerges in 1998 as part of an investigation on typology; that of property in 2005 from a translation of a text from the French which dealt extensively with classification theory; that of predicates in 2013 from research into Aristotle. We can locate these concepts temporally on Bergson’s Cone of Memory as follows: Predicates (2013) lives on plane A” B”, Property (2005) on plane A’ B’, and finally Characteristic finds itself on plane AB (1998), furthest from the point S and the memory plane of the present (2018). So the Perception-Image of this particular determination leads the determination to the threshold of the centre of indetermination where it is at some point on the path of determination “kicked upstairs” by association in the mind’s attempt to constitute a coherent circuit. The path of determination in the nascent circuit hits upon the concept of Predicate in 2018 but is moves upwards to level A” B” to effectuate the determination in the present as inhabiting the past. Once it has completed its circuit of determination on level A”B”, it moves back

down to 2018 and continues on its joyful way to a node that requires another jump upwards to Characteristics and a 'stroll' through that concept's determination within a system of links created in 1998. Thus the determination finds itself through a series of operations which are sequential on a plane of present which involves the past as memorial images which participate in the overall movement-image of the determination.

As Deleuze indicates in *The Time-Image*, the recollection-image is both the reproduction and representation of a foregone present in the actual present. All past is a past of a present that once was... all past is past relative to an actual present... "But the past is not to be confused with the mental existence of recollection-images which actualise it in us" (DELEUZE, 1989, p. 99): the representations are not time itself. These cross-cuts cognise the seen/scene as a selection, as an enframing, as a photogram or cross-section in time as a static representation constitutive of a functional assemblage, much like the film frames are static photograms of the world of continuous movement. The pictorial information contained in the frame is coherent in that its content is organised temporally as part of a sequence of photograms, but by virtue of its being a cross-section of a point of view in which the world finds its unity, the image is instilled with order by being subjected to the imagistic rigor which perspective gives it at a point. The cone and particularly its apex represents a point of view which spatialises the relations of things in the world in conformity to how we see them in terms which concur with our sensory apparatus. But it also establishes a temporal relativity between the events that it organises spatially. The perspective maintains their proper ordinal sequentiality in terms of distance much like gazing at the cosmos offers us a perspective on the universe as a relativised concrescence. This is most important, because this perspectivalised relativity establishes the past as an unchangeable given—it may be interpreted infinitely but the past is a reticulated fractal truth which organises fact in terms of temporal depth and transversal planes as relativised simultaneities. Thus, vision as imagistic process organises our experience of the world as a processual order which triangulates our cognition of the world into extensive bodies that are imbued with a temporality as duration expressed as distance. The cone of memory is juxtaposed end-for-end to the visual cone of perspective where both are integrated in the mind, at the centre of indetermination as that which we see in the world and that which the mind cognises: the cone of memory is also the perspectival cone of the point of view. Whatever is on the outside is simultaneously on the inside because they are one and the same. The projective

geometry of perspective shows us that these two cones extend to infinity they join together to create one continuous projective system where space and time conjoin.

The crystal of time is not only the smallest circuit, it is the circuit as machinic assemblage which perpetuates the functioning of the circuit and extends its functionality through the intermediation of associative extension and concreteness. Thus, the circuit is the seed from which a reality can be organised and structured on its terms as a horizontal and vertical integration as a durational continuity. The smallest, most succinct circuit as determinant is indicative of a singular mode of temporal procession, becomes iconic when it comes to be seen as an indivisible Whole. This movement is what montage as an imagistic assemblage produces. This production of a signifying entity which does not exist in the parts and different in nature from the sum as an additive ensemble or set of extensive properties creates a virtual world where thought happens in terms which are common to everything in the world but not of this world.

The cone shows us that everything happens within time, where time is the form of interiority and space the form of exteriority. Our task is to understand the movement of time not only in a singular entity, a “thing” or body of some kind, but as the movement that concretely characterises all. Thus, we may identify the form of movement in one thing as the expression of that thing’s temporal essence as its capacity to accept or incur change or produce change as its capacity to affect or to be affected. But change does not exist as an isolated movement in that “thing” but as a relational durational multiplicity that is common to all things. Time is the expression of the interpenetrated machinism of change that links every entity in the universe as the concreteness that suffuses all. Thus, in the way that each element of the Repin painting in the Yabus experiments assumes a different rôle depending on how it is called upon to contribute semiotically in the specific production of sense which a problem requires of it, each element is identified as an instance of difference-making of change production, as a common notion. Each element, as a node of infinite concreteness, is necessary to the functioning of the Whole, and to its holding together as an assemblage. We seem to be speaking here of “elements” in terms of physical bodies, but the same principle is operative at the scale where the physical breaks down into the elemental substantial composition. If movement expresses change and difference-making, time is the expression of the concrete aggregation of change as the infinite relational reciprocity of everything in the universe working as One.

## Simondon's Theory of the Image<sup>95</sup>

The heterogeneous conception of our being in the world which imagistic process posits maintains that the polarised relation between human and world is no longer tenable. The flow of semiosis as the movement of thought through sense and sensation, the fold of perception and projection of monadic perspective, the production of difference and the production of experiential continuity within the Bergsonian cinematograph, radically pushes us away from an anthropomorphic scheme. The direction it pushes us towards is a homogeneity that remains decidedly process-based but requires a synthetic integration as a hybrid and expanded world as conceived by Gilbert Simondon or as a plane of consistency as developed by Deleuze and by Deleuze and Guattari.

We advance that imagistic process occurs as an associative concretization that integrates a hybrid actuality which is reciprocal, interlinked, and universal and which integrates experience in its four dimensions pragmatically. Here, hybrid refers to the acknowledgement of the simultaneous co-existence of the natural and the artificial in Gilbert Simondon and Jean-Luc Nancy, of the actual and virtual in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, of the human and non-human in Bruno Latour, and of physical space and cyberspace in Roy Ascott. To develop the thought of imagistic process in all these directions is unfeasible within the scope of the present work but we do not blindly dismiss the hybrid realities of the post-human which informational territories, digital identities, cyberspace, telematics, mixed and augmented realities, expanded systems, alter-organised systems, ecosystems, artificial life, nano-art, neuro-art, the semantic web, biological software, evolutive hardware, bio-art, the internet of things, etc. transform experience into modes of becoming which have very little in common which has traditionally been considered being human. That unmediated, direct, interactive, experience with the world as mechanical doing in the realm of the movement-image is a primitive mode of engaging the external as fodder for sensation. It is increasingly difficult to maintain the division which differentiates the human from replicants, cyborgs and crosses the animal, human, the vegetal, the micro and nano-biological, and the machinic and the digital, the impressionistic of the physical body

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<sup>95</sup> This section builds from a variety of published work and presentations at conferences including a paper co-authored with Andreia Machado Oliveira presented at ISEA 2016.

and the sensorial of the mind, to create expanded minds and hybrid bodies which if they are not fully human, must be something else. It is a playground which permits new life-forms to arise where to distinguish the human from the non-human is contentious and ultimately unproductive. It usually reduces the discussion to issues of identity, possibility and definition rather than potentials, invention and creation. Humanity's relation with the world, its experiential existence, has always been technological—the body being the first and ultimate piece of technology that theorises human potential. Technologies are assemblages which produce hybrid modes of thought, of being, of communicating, of conducting existence as a composition which composes through, with and along the understanding of the encounter as hybrid, as rhizomatic. To see our encounter with the world, (which Heidegger understands as thinking) is one of Simondon's main tasks as a psychologist and as a philosopher, but our interest does not lie in the expanding on the possibilities of human experience or what a human body can do or become, or in the technologies of sensorial existence, but in following the procession of visual impressions as origination and conclusion, as a closing of the circle, of imagistic process. Thus, our problem becomes one of breaking the dichotomy of the human nature and nature's nature as a joint naturing, as a machinic assemblage which accommodates the monadic becoming we have so far developed and give it pratique to deal with the rest of creation as nature's naturing.

For Simondon, becoming is expressed in terms of processual individuation and individualisation. The two processes work hand-in-hand and represent the subjective and objective vibrational dynamic of the world. Things exist as a polymorphic, evolutive and temporal diversity in a interactive, co-conditioning relationship between the co-existent memory-image of the past, the perception-image and motor-image of the present and the invention-image of the future. The image appears in the directed interaction between participants and the environment they are not just produced by a subject, the image is the process of subjectivation itself within the general association within the milieu. The image produces and develops the subjective pole simultaneously as the objective is being created as conditionings of sensorial semiotic and allows it to manifest itself as an immanent function of creation while being relatively independent from it. We live in a world of images: they inhabit us and create our worlds; they actualize us and virtualize us according to different realities.



Simondon presents concepts of the image that leave the image open to a process to its own individuation. Understanding the process of individuation directs us towards an ontogenesis of being, of individuals and milieus, of the human and the non-human—towards a genesis of the image concerned with how things become rather than what they are or what their final configuration will be. It is a way to understand experience as a way of individuation and not as personal experience. When it comes to experience, these are not the experiences of individuals but of a process of individuation that does not focus on what “is”, but on its emergent becoming. We can refer to this as an ontogenesis that goes beyond the human. Thus, we consider that the human and the milieu are a compounded mixt. They compose a multiplicity of individuations within the habitat as they actively incorporate parts of the world in an autopoietic assemblage as an animate becoming-world. We become contaminated by these images and are entrained and drawn into the creative milieu of images by the constant flux, by the rhythm of the milieus, by the mixture of human and non-human elements.




Fig. 3.19: Simondon’s theorization of the image’s four co-existing phases.

Simondon's conception of the image is similar to Bergson's and Deleuze's in that it has similar components. Like Bergson, Simondon's ideation of the image is non-pictorial, non-visual and also steers away from an anthropocentric static conception. It is understood as a transductive, 4-phased, cyclic process which includes: the motor-image, the perception-image, the mental-image, and the invention-image. Through these phases, one can modulate the relation between the human, non-human and the milieu and thus eliminate any polarising hierarchical importance between constitutive elements in the genesis of the image. The image is thus understood as a transient, intermediate processual reality between individual individuations and milieus existing within an evolutive technological multiplicity. Echoing Bergson, Deleuze (1987) points out that we don't perceive things in our mind, we perceive things where they are, in the world. Thus, within the speculative approach, image is not restricted to the usual visual perception of objects, but is directly related to systems of relationship within the milieu—to experience itself.

Traditional Models of perception are based on a mechanical causal chain which originates with the art object and which through a linkage of waves, receptors and nerve impulses results in brain activity in the subjective entity, i.e. in the viewer. The stream of sensorial data is transformed by the brain into an imagistic representation that the audio-visual center in our heads plays back to us live as consciousness in the Cartesian theatre of the mind. In terms of the experiencing of the world, i.e. in the relation that ensues between the viewer and the object, a divide emerges between the unitary "I" that does the processing and the "Other" that is processed: the knower and the known—the me subject and the it-object—that exist as fully-determined, static, stand-alone entities where viewers passively take in the experience. According to Whitehead: "This structure has been identified with the bare relation of knower to known. The subject is the knower, the object is the known. Thus, with this interpretation, the object-subject relation is the known-knower relation" (WHITEHEAD, 1967, p. 175). Even in the model we are trying to develop in order to undo this linearity requires that we maintain this linear chain as criterion in order to undo it.

As an alternative, we propose a relational perceptual causal chain that underlies a machinic experiential interpretation of the interactive process where viewers become one with the world in the experiential milieu of spacetime as event. We seek to consider the experiential milieu itself as the *conditioning* environment for the becoming-subjective entity

that constitutes the event and locate it at the junction of the site of the encounter and the viewer function where the virtual and the actual coincide and become pure experience.

We have alluded to this a number of times throughout our work, but in order to do that what we need is not a perceptual causal chain per se but a remapping of the experiential milieu where viewers become one with the experiential world within which they are immersed. Tamsin Lorraine asserts that what is at stake is a consideration of “how things connect rather than how they ‘are’... of things as assemblages or multiplicities rather than substances” and of “focusing on things in terms of unfolding forces—bodies and their power to affect and be affected—rather than their consideration as static entities” (LORRAINE in PARR, 2005, p. 144).

Invariably, we like easily cognised ideas as concepts—such as ‘field’, for example—because we have an intuitive grasp of them based on a certain familiarity that is based on experience. We can look at a farmer’s field or a football field, and understand it as a territorial expanse and an activity that takes place on it. Immediately, we see the obvious, implicit division between the surface of the happening and the happening itself. But if we change the scale of our perception, we see that the surface of happening is a changing, mutating site of passage, of synthesis, of being-doing that is difficult to separate from the participants as activities taking place and which are themselves also metamorphosing entities. We no longer speak of the activity as differentiated from the field as location nor from the occupation of the participants. There’s no longer a hierarchical distinction of value between the farmer or the players, the plow or the ball, the crops or the grass and consider them equally as participant bodies. More abstractly, the unfolding of the event incorporates actual and virtual participants. It involves forces, intensities and their potentials into an intuitive becoming where the event is guided by an immanent intelligence which orients the creative process and its advance into novelty as invention. The movement of these forces, intensities and potentials does not subscribe to a neatly definable line of causality but is more akin to a turbulent flow of energies, to an unresolvable infinitely complex give and take, to a multiplicity of action and reaction on infinite fronts as imagistic process, whose sum total manifests a resultant direction as becoming.

So that we come to understand the field of play as a territorialization of forces and intensities constitutive of meta-stable bodies in movement and not one of objects—yet, this field of activity does not happen in space as a temporal unfolding but arises immanently in

space-time: it is not space plus time but space-time. The individuated event as an emergent amalgam of territories and bodies acquires and expresses its own spacetime within which participants become associated as one in the experiential ecology that involves them. We see this in the eye movement diagrams, not the drawings on paper, but the movement produced behind the apparent movement which instead of expressing the processual unfolding of the event as a field, as a flat surface, we consider it as a “more-than a planar surface” which is neither the players or the pitch which fuses time, space and participants into what Simondon will call in his book, *The Mode of Existence of the Technical Object*, a milieu, an associated milieu.

In French, the term milieu does not only refer to a physical environment or setting, it means “surroundings,” or a “medium” as in biology, or “middle” as amidst. The milieu is normally understood as the ensemble of external conditions within which a living being lives and develops or as the assemblage of material objects and physical circumstances which surround and influence an organism. “Milieu” can also be seen as an environment in the widest ecological sense of the term, i.e. as the locus of the dynamic interaction of all the factors and mechanisms that participate in the sustenance of an ecosystem. To paraphrase Brian Massumi (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. XVII), the term milieu should be read as a technical term combining all these meanings.

The concept of the associated milieu is a useful model to analyze the reciprocal and recurrent co-arising causal relationships that take place between the individual participants and territorialities and imagistic process. The descriptive term "associated" when applied to describe milieu refers to a specific mapping of an ensemble made up of constitutive elements and conditioning environmental modalities which come together to create a concretized individuation through the ongoing exchanges of energy that take place within that specific interaction which combines various elements as a conditioning assemblage of relation we call a milieu. The associated milieu sustains, unites and brings together the actual and the virtual, the human and the non-human, animate and non-animate individuations: it is not a stage upon which a scene unfolds, or a play where only the actors perform, or a canvas upon which the pigments run into each other, or a manuscript where the words follow each other in sequence. The milieu is the setting and environment of concretion, of aggregation, where things condition each other in order to form something which in turn, simultaneously, allows these very same things to take form themselves. In

other words, the milieu allows for a non-static, dynamic form as an event of images taking-form as experience (OLIVEIRA, 2010).

The human is not only a subject that acts in the milieu, but the milieu provokes and arouses the subject as a being-doing and which in turn becomes modified by the occupation of the animal; the milieu incites the body into action while the subjective is being simultaneously, reciprocally composed by the milieu—the bee seeks out the flower just as much as the flower rouses and attracts the bee in a simultaneous, reciprocal, interdependent co-arising. These are the qualities of the milieu, of the intensities of beings which seduce and affect sensitive becomings as localised being-doings. As modes of relation, of association, between the qualities of bodies and of milieus, they are states of being, of consciousness, of awareness they constitute the continuum of being. The milieu as constitutive of this continuum of relation allows for the reciprocal conditioning that is non-human or not even not-yet-human, but animate and cognitively different as expressive of its being and of what it can do. Michel Serres poses a very relevant and contemporary question, “How can we forget the elementary, animal relation with the world?” (SERRES, 2008, p. 11). To learn with the animal, to become-animal as Deleuze would say, is to learn through experiences of a non-human body, a body produced in different forms—through the animal, the vegetal, the technological—in a life which affirms itself through the milieu through which it transits and the relations that are woven.

What about the human participants? How does the “me” enter into experiential relation in the seminar as an event? In order to answer these questions, instead of preserving the “I” as an entity, as an unchanging, objective identity, we need to think in terms of activities of relations. The words “I” or “me” refer to a continual re-inventing of the self, to the continuous production of new relational entities, as that which create new modes and states of relation not only with each other, but with the environmental inductions of the event by dynamically (actively in motion) engaging each other. Although we have been referring to the human participants as preconstituted entities, the preconstituted “I” as a participant in the event does not per se exist. Instead, the seminar-participating “me” can be seen as the dynamic, indeterminate plurality of the continuous reconstitution of relations as an individualization within fields of experience. This indeterminate plurality of relations is deemed a body, not in terms of a human body, nor in its “simple materiality, by its occupying space (‘extension’), or by organic structure. It is

defined by the relation of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speed and slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and its internal milieu” (BAUGH, 2005, p. 31). And for each and every participant in the seminar, human and non-human alike, we can say the same thing. Whether human or not, they carry the same democratic participatory heft in establishing the event qua event. Territorialities entrain, captivate and entrance bodies into relation by “grounding” or “preconditioning” the reciprocal recursive causality of relations that are setting up the incipient experiential event taking hold as an individuation, as a body at the level of species. It becomes a “system of individuations, an individuating system and a system individuating itself” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 7). The event becomes an immanent, dynamic, coherent whole, a body composed of a multiplicity of bodies conditioned into existence through its own characteristics as much as by other bodies which constitute enabling constraints, inflected by disparate physical and non-physical inductions through their effects and their abilities to enter into relation. Here, participants are environmental, human, material or affective: they are physical and non-physical alike where “Participation... is the fact of being an element in a greater individuation...” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 9).

Usually, the event as a significant occasion is defined as a happening taking place at a particular location and at a particular time, where entering the designated location and starting the event at the scheduled time serve as thresholds that must be “crossed” for the event’s coming-into-being as an individuation. However, it is not only the approach to the designated location at the designated time that cue us to the incipient event. In the same way that experiential inductions guide and inform the gradual formation of the event, environmental and architectural inductions gradually prepare us for what awaits us. For example, if we take a large, spacious room with high ceilings and a wooden floor and we annex a room containing lockers, showers and toilets, we will likely guess what kind of activities, behaviours and relations will be “permitted” once we enter the big room. If instead we annex a room whose walls are lined with counters and mirrors surrounded by lights, our relation to the adjoining space will be conditioned in a different way. An annex of this type that conditions our expectations as to what to expect in the next contiguous space is a transition: it is a portal that announces what is about to happen and serves as an indication of potential relations on the verge. Crossing the doorway between the hallway outside the TML into the contained volume of the lab at the designated time can be said to

perform the same function but in a more generic and nondescript way. This “instantaneous” crossing of the threshold that fails to consider the gradual coming-to-being of the event is part of the conception of the objectified event and of the inside/outside duality. At best, it can be said to stand-in or symbolise the crossing from that which gradually conditioned and built-up the relational potential and its expression beyond—as in the time-worn cliché where the groom carries the bride through the threshold. A gate or arch is more descriptive, i.e. a richer expression, of that which constitutes crossing the threshold in terms of what can be expected beyond as often illustrated by the “Gates of Chinatown” in Montreal, San Francisco, Incheon or Manchester. Their **ornamental** narrativity provides the gradual transition from one environment to the next. But by the same token, all experience is threshold experience in that as we pass through the now, as a transitive reconciliation of past and future, the change in our experiential consciousness is a ceaseless information of the transformative passage from past to future, mediated by the present as transition, the present is simultaneously a leaving behind and a becoming. By being linked to both past and future, the present incorporates the reconciliation of the double asymptotic relation to the past and to the future as two irreconcilable opposites, that of leaving what is past and of arriving at what is to come. Thus, the now, as a present which has no extension and no duration because it is ceaselessly being pulled apart by the past and the future has no existence and no being—as the difference between past and presence goes to zero, we are left with the expression of the differential tendency of becoming.

In our seminar example, wending our way through the crowds of the main floor of the EV building, taking the elevator to the seventh floor, knocking at the door of the TML, waiting for someone to open the door, greeting the researcher that has opened the door, and making our way to the conference table constitute transitional territorialisations and de-territorializations which in themselves constitute mini-events contributing to the coming-to-being of the seminar-event as one line of convergence among many: for example, the territorialisation of the shaking hands mini-event inside the TML is feasible as a result of the de-territorialization, of the disbanding, of the standing-in-the-hallway-waiting event. As such, the succession of convergent territorialisations (and prior and subsequent de-territorializations) of moving bodies is a better expression of the constitution of the event—a process that “conserves within itself a permanent activity of perpetual individuation” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 7).

The process of coming-to-being requires the concurrent coming together, the spatio-temporal convergence, of territories and bodies as constitutive subsidiary events. In the Deleuzian conception of the event qua event, the event is more than just a noteworthy happening, even though it does work in this sense as well. The coming-to-being of the event as the dynamic becoming-conjunction of specific environmental, social and intellectual bodies and inducements we have to keep in mind that the equation is not a simple sum, it is not  $a + b + c + d = \text{the event as one}$ , but where the variables' participation in the relation is what dynamically defines them as they simultaneously instigate their own becoming and create an individuation that is different and greater than the sum of its parts—the event is a unity that is more than one, “more than unity and more than identity” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 6). Yet, the event as such, as an individualization, is a process of limitation which is characterised as a gradation. (WHITEHEAD, 1985, p. 162) The gradation is a relational intensification where its heft in terms of a palpable actualisation can only be felt as a threshold. As the gradual intensification, we realize that a threshold has been crossed when the feeling is felt. We can arbitrarily define a measurable threshold through a measure of the intensity, but in terms of the event, once territorialities and bodies actually engage and interpenetrate, they can be said to enter into relational participation in the event as an overwhelming, as a beyond the threshold. At the intersection of overlapping territorializations and bodies, thresholds must be crossed in order that the individualization can be deemed accomplished. At each juncture, the threshold “interposes itself between two diversities, whose discontinuity it marks by a change in intensity accompanied by a qualitative change in the defining properties of the system.” The threshold is both spatial and temporal: it marks “that moment at which the system makes the leap into operative-self-solidarity” (MASSUMI, 2009, p. 12). And once the experiential threshold has been crossed, in that the participants have come into relation and the event is in full formation, “we must recognize not only the genesis of what participates, but also of what is participated itself, which accounts for the fact of its being participated” (DELEUZE, 1992, p. 171).

The event as an emergent amalgam of territorialities and bodies acquires and expresses its own spacetime within which participants become associated as one in the experiential milieu that involves them. In French, the term milieu does not only refer to a physical environment or setting, it means “surroundings,” or a “medium” as in chemistry, or



as “middle.” The milieu is normally understood as the ensemble of external conditions within which a living being lives and develops or as the assemblage of material objects and physical circumstances which surround and influence an organism. Conceptually, “milieu” can also be seen as an environment in the widest ecological sense of the term, i.e. as the locus of the dynamic interaction of all the factors and mechanisms that participate in the sustenance of an ecosystem. To paraphrase Massumi (DELEUZE & Guattari, 2007, p. XVII), the term milieu should be read as a technical term combining all these meanings.

The concept of the associated milieu, conceived by French philosopher Gilbert Simondon in his book *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques* (SIMONDON, 1969), is a useful model to analyze the co-arising relationships that take place between the participants and the conditioning territorialities as an environment. The descriptive term “associated” when applied to describe milieu refers to a specific mapping of an ensemble made up of constitutive elements and conditioning environmental modalities which come together to create an individuation through the ongoing exchanges of energy that take place within that specific milieu (SIMONDON, 1969, p. 57).

The milieu allows for a reciprocal recursive relational causality to take place between the elements so that we may conceive of spacetime as the immanent plane from which the subject and object arise as the generic activity of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity as a process. The associated milieu is the setting and environment of concretion, of aggregative attunement, where participants condition each other in order to form something which in turn, simultaneously, allows these very same things to take form themselves. In other words, the milieu allows for a non-static, dynamic coming-to-being as an event of taking-form as experience. According to Deleuze and Guattari: “The notion of the milieu is not unitary: not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another; they are essentially communicating” (DELEUZE & Guattari, 1987, p. 313).

The taking place of the event is a conditioned coming-into-being that is pre-disposed by the order-word or label applied to the event, though the event is up to a point predefined by the label, the event in its entirety is not definable as the constituting relata are not totally knowable. This label provides causal traction and gives direction to the event although its shape, its body is only determinable in the event’s unfolding. Whitehead calls the active, relational process of fulfilling the label’s telos the “satisfaction” — “The notion of

'satisfaction' is the notion of the 'entity as concrete' abstracted from the 'process of concrescence'; it is the outcome separated from the process... which is both process and outcome" (WHITEHEAD, 1985, p. 84). Although the processual unfolding of the event is preconditioned by the satisfaction as a "lure", its actual unfolding is anything but determined and its final outcome will be the expression of the event. The label that we accord to the event and its unfolding is not only the name of the event as an objectified entity but serves as the attractor or seed—Whitehead's lure for feeling—as that which incites "the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question" (WHITEHEAD, 1985, p. 40). The move towards satisfaction allows concrescence within the super-saturated environment of relational potential and results in the "intensification of 'formal immediacy'" (WHITEHEAD, 1985, p. 88). This super-saturation, this over-concentration, of potential-coming-together at the intersection of inter-penetrated myriad territorialities and bodies results in the event expressed as a manifestation of excess, of coming-together-brimming-over the containment of inclusion.

In order to think the event in this way, as an emergent interconnected relationality, we would need to think its spatial container differently as well as its process of becoming in a different way: what would an immanent spacetime be like? It would be just like the actual "reality" we live in now except that the way we would speak ontologically about it would be different. We would need for the "space" aspect to be self-contained, so that there is no interior/exterior duality to the conception of space; the "time" aspect would need to be incorporated as an expression of space, so that there's no need for its expression as an independent dimension. It is a spacetime in which we can speak in terms of objects and subjects where they interdependently co-arise immanently in the event so that there's no me-subject over here and an it-object, i.e. an event, over there that exist as fully-determined, stand-alone entities: their immanence is based on an interdependent causality where the intensities of relation within each territoriality expresses their own temporality.

In the 300 years since Newton, mathematics and geometry have proposed new conceptions of space which have been corroborated by the empirical findings of physics. The principal breakthrough in this regard is Riemmanian non-Euclidian geometry. It allows us think of space as four dimensional and allows for the inter-penetration of space and time into a self-contained, unbounded expanse. Space and time become spacetime where events

can be described not as static points as in the Newtonian conception of space but as a field of tensors or directed lines of intensity which incorporate time. For example, one can propose a flat 4-D sphere of infinite diameter upon which actuality can be mapped as the relation and interaction of intensities that can manifest themselves as localized compressions and distensions of spacetime which as topological mappings can be resolved as individuations. This is one half of the story that the projective properties of perspective allows us to adopt. The other half is the durational that this allows us to articulate.

The event as an open, yet bounded, set of participative relations defines itself in terms of an association of gradated intensities as an immanent causality of becoming which allow us to speak of a fuzzy-bounded cloud as the body of the event. This type of mapping allows us to ask afresh Spinoza's question "what can a body do?"—not necessarily in human terms, but in the non-human terms of the event. This would require a topological conception of the event and it would allow us to consider the geometry of location, place and space in a new way: as a cohesive, though not necessarily continuous, multidimensional grouping of relations that can be variously mapped according to homotopic correspondences where concepts such as cohesion, proximity, neighbourhood, ingression and continuity can be applied with greater precision.

In *Le mode d'existence des objets techniques* (1958), Simondon posits the idea of the associated milieu as the *midst* of individualisation of bodies. The individualisation is made possible by a recurrent causality within a milieu that technical being creates around itself, which it conditions as it in turn is conditioned by it. This milieu is both technical and natural, yet not fabricated (or at least for the most part). It is technical in that it is a manifestation of *technē*, as the external existence or life of these bodies which we have thus far been calling internal facts but which have an external dimension as bodies and which allows their revelation in the world. The milieu is the mediator of the relations between the technical elements which exist externally and the poietic elements which function within in us as a machinic imbrication or meshing which is productive and generative. As such, this assemblage is concretised and individualised by the recurrent energetic exchanges within it. In the introductory passage prefacing the discussion of the associated milieu, Simondon is quite circumspect in writing about technical being and avoids the technical object. The change in regime between a 'being' and an 'object' compels us to interpret this passage as a trope much in the same way that Bergson or Deleuze use technological devices as analogies

for philosophical concepts to illustrate metaphysical or ontological process. To do so brings the exegesis of technical to a different level, where the thermodynamic premiss of the exchange in Simondon's illustrative example becomes a reciprocal perceptual give-and-take. We thus posit technical being and the technical object as objects of *technē* so that we can interpret the associated milieu along a different set of criteria in order to justify using the concept as an imagistic concept and not just as a 'technical' or 'technological' one. To associate technicity with *technē* and then extend it to perceptual and imagistic process allows us to think of the machinic assemblage that is produced between the strata of their semeiotic. If we understand *technē* as applied science, as a skill or craft of the acquisitive arts<sup>96</sup>—as acquisition of knowledge which exercises the faculty of sense perception (aisthetikon)—then the technical object and technical being can be understood respectively as the existential product and manifestation of the acquisition of knowledge, of an *epistemē* acquired by practical or applied means which can be said to be a technique of existence as process.<sup>97</sup> The interpretation is easily made as it already has the elements of Zeno the Stoic's theory of perceptual apprehension: according to Cicero (Academica II.145), Zeno explained the various facets of apprehension by a series of hand gestures which echo the theme of tactility: Zeno spread out the fingers of one hand and said, "An impression is like this"; then he brought his fingers together a little and said, "Assent is like this." Then, making a fist, he said that this was *comprehensio*, comprehension, and characterises it as καταληψιν (*katalēpsin*); and bringing his other hand and wrapping it strongly around his fist, he said that this was *epistēmē*, and that only the wise man possesses it.<sup>98</sup>

If we examine the constituent components of becoming retrospectively, as a rear-view of the Angel of History, we come to realise that life's unfolding is one threshold being

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<sup>96</sup> As presented by Plato in the Sophist (219) dialogue. Deleuze and Guattari also make reference to the associated milieu as a capture of energy sources (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 51).

<sup>97</sup> Technique of existence is a concept developed by Brian Massumi in *Semblance and Event* (2011). "A technique of existence is a technique that takes as its "object" process itself, as the speculative-pragmatic production of oriented events of change. Techniques of existence are dedicated to ontogenesis as such. [...] They are inventive of subjective forms in the activist sense: dynamic unities of events unfolding." (MASSUMI, 2011, p. 14).

<sup>98</sup> "Et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, 'visum,' inquebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum digitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, **comprehensionem** illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, **καταληψιν** imposuit. Cum autem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, **scientiam** talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem." (CICERO, Academica II.145).

crossed after the other, one passage after another. The finer we break down this unfolding, we come to understand that the rescue and reconstitution of historical life is a continuous activity of crossing thresholds—*erfahrung*—whereas the implicit transition of the now into future as becoming is one perpetual thresholding where the only threshold is the transition of change as pure, non-subjective, invisible and transparent experience which is in fact the subjective experience of the univocity of immanence—*erlebnis*. Under one facet of becoming, one is leaving behind the objectified present as instants of difference and under the other facet, the now is being created as present as a concretising emergent becoming of pure undifferentiated difference... one tries to hold on to the present, until one realises that the present eventually creates an overflow which must be let go, which must be forsaken and forgotten, because in and of itself it has no inherent value—becoming is just transition and we cannot stop the emergence of becoming as change: we are embroiled in its machinery and as such we cannot extricate ourselves from it—the processual advance of *erlebnis* is the ceaseless act, operation, and effect of “crossing the threshold from the non-existent to the existing world” (BOURASSA, 2002, p. 67). The transformative aspect of the perpetual actualization of the virtual as such implicates becoming concretely with actuality while abstracting itself as measurable, quantifiable instants of difference. “The actualization of the virtual does not resemble the virtuality from which it springs because, in actualizing, it crosses the threshold within which it is identical to itself” (BOURASSA, 2002, p. 74). The equating of the thresholds of passage as *erfahrung* and the equating of the threshold of perpetual transition with *erlebnis* transports us to Deleuze’s reading of the “still Schopenhaurian Nietzsche of *The Birth of Tragedy*” and align *erfahrung* with the Apollonian—which moves according to measure, who represents “the whole indirectly, mediately”— and align *erlebnis* with the Dionysian—as “a direct presentation, of an ‘immediate image’ incommensurable with the first, and this time musical, Dionysian: closer to an inexhaustible Will than to a movement” (DELEUZE, 1989, p. 239).

### **Concretisation**

The milieu crosses through bodies, simultaneously existing within them and outside of them like the air which one breathes, or the water that permeates our body, or the earth that nurtures and nourishes us. To think of the milieu is to think of individuation, of the

production of the individual proper, its modes of functioning and perceiving, and its pre-established connections and relations. In this way, the milieu is active and defines itself as a source of energies, perceptions and actions. According to Deleuze and Guatarri [5], the notion of the milieu is not unitary: not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another; they are essentially communicating and (in)forming. And here it should be emphasized that milieus communicate not only in the sense of being connected machinically as a matter-forming, but in the sense of exchanging information through the action-reaction dynamic which is constitutive of the production of images. And it is in the way that information is communicated that the different modalities of imagistic process is articulated.

Simondon predicates the associated milieu on the technical object, which for him are mediators between nature and man. He defines the technical object as “a type of coherence which arises from the properties conferred upon the components in action by the fact that the problem is supposedly solved; a reciprocity of causal actions and exchange of information engaged or disengaged (explicitly) between the operative whole and its parts constitute the technical object as a reality possessing its own mode of existence; invention is the mental or psychological aspect of this mode of existence” (SIMONDON, 2008, p. 84). One can "define the technical object in itself by the process of concretisation and functional overdetermination that confers its consistency to the end-product of an evolution, proving that it can not just be a pure implement or utensil" (SIMONDON, 1969, p. 15). There is a specific genesis to the technical object which proceeds from the abstract to the concrete: it is a concretisation—this is the prime character of its mode of existence—it exists in a certain way. Its mode of existence is therefore, firstly, of being more or less abstract or less concrete, of being a genesis towards the more concrete. (CHATEAU, 2008, p. 79).

As Brentari (2015) writes, the concrete relation between animal and environment is firstly perceptive. And this is also a material relation if we go along with Bergsonian thought as laid out in *Matter and Memory*. Although we described the perceptual relation as a loop that encompasses the two participants in the perceptual interactivity, this relational exchange is concretised along with the rest of the elements which constitute the environment or milieu. Beyond being an expression of solidity and actuality, Simondon expresses concrete as opposed to abstract in terms of the mode of individuation of entities and how they related to others. For Simondon, concrete is a mode of existence where an object fulfils different functions or operative purposes and can simultaneously entertain

relations of interdependency with numerous others which participate in the associated milieu within which they thrive. The example that he offers are the cooling fins on the cylinder heads of a motorcycle engine. The fins carry out different tasks, such as cooling the engine to make it more efficient; to cool the engine more effectively by increasing the surface area to be exposed to the air; to make the motor lighter; for aesthetic purposes. Each function works coincidentally, independently of the others, but they are all *concretised* in the cooling fin. The same objectives could have been attained 'linearly' or as semi-detached systems: an internal water-cooled system could have been proposed; a thicker and heavier cylinder wall could have been designed to stiffen the walls; a special heat resistant paint could be applied to heighten the aesthetic effect, etc. Each aspect of its usefulness ties the fins to different functional systems: the structural, the cooling, the aesthetic, etc. But more significantly, the 'concrete' function operates as a glue which binds together actuality as the relational bridging which unites participants.

Thus, in the associated milieu, the togetherness which associates the component elements is the concreteness of the relational and the establishment of the perceptual loop. This is very significant ontological position, in that the very existence of things in the world is predicated in terms of relation, in non-substantial terms, as the interdependent, simultaneous, co-arising of becoming of an ecologically coalesced subjectivity that is open, widely connected to many aspects through a concreteness which spans different systems or milieus. The other aspect of the associated milieu which defines it is the causal scheme which gives rise to it. The constituent elements which exist as relationally associated to each other through the mediation of the associated milieu as the zone of conditioning which allows themselves to take form. But as individuations in the world which have a duration as both as a speciated individual and as a processual entity, by virtue of being complete, unitary, perfect in its existence, it is the expression of a common notion which has a concretised functionality in the world beyond its intensional usefulness. This is the pragmatic aspect of the common notion which finds expression not only through the essence of its obvious identitary expression as an intentioned individual, but as a multiplicitous existence which can have elements participating in other milieus or durational entities.

The constitutive participants as monadic entities have components which can participate in other assemblages without deteriorating the conception of the first milieu. We are not only one thing, but a multiplicity that allows many occupations at once. Thus while

being a university student, simultaneously I can also participate in a number of other milieus which engage some qualities while neglecting others; I can be a member of the local yacht club, and I can be the owner of a VW Bug, and be a vegetarian without changing the essential me or affecting the other qualities.

In the same way that attractors on a painting can signify different things depending on what they are called upon to constitute without changing their nature or pulling away from the original assemblage, objects in nature can be conjured to fill in different roles without changing what they are. Also, these constituent components which participate machinically in these assemblages of semiosis are not obliterated or destroyed, their significance is not diminished by participating in other assemblage. This is what we saw in Yarbus's eye movement diagrams when the encounter with Repin's *An Unexpected Visitor* was problematised in different ways. The same attractors to ocular fixations were able to articulate different meanings: the man's scarf could be used to determine his financial status, the nature of his activity, his aesthetic taste, his relation to the others, what his age was... the man's scarf is concretised into the associated milieu of the painting as experience in a variety of ways without the scarf changing in any cogent way. For all intents and purposes the scarf remains the same but it engages reality differently depending on how we are asked to relate it to the assemblage, to engage its pragmatic aspect.



## Chapter 4

### Becoming Becoming-Child as a Common Notion

I remember the moment well. I had stayed to work overnight on a Saturday and when I finally decided to leave the office, it was either very late into the night or very early in the morning... that moment which is neither night nor day. It was so indeterminate that it was overtly determinate... its completely unspecific character is what made it stand out, precisely a neither here nor there. When I stepped out of the building and crossed the street towards my car, I was taken aback by the stillness. It was cold and penumbral. I was overwhelmed by an odd feeling which surpassed my powers of discernment. I remember an article in a psychology magazine featuring a classification of emotions into 27 types and as I ran through the list in my head, I could not designate any of them as what I was feeling. It was maybe all of them rolled into one. It was like an unknown scent, a smell I had never experienced before, whose individual essences I could not identify. The feeling had a viscosity to it, a slow-motion, fluid fogginess whose modulation implied that maybe one emotion would intensify to the point of colouring the entire event, but none rose to the occasion. It wasn't sadness, or melancholy or depression or loneliness, and it wasn't happiness, or joy or freedom. And it wasn't sleepiness or fatigue for the crisp winter cold had cleared away any of the cobwebs of sleepiness I had been feeling at my desk.

I was so struck by this barrage of affective minimalism that I took pause by propping myself on the front wing of my car and took notice of the nothingness that was so glaringly demanding my attention. Had I been a smoker, it would have been the moment of all moments to fire one up. I just let myself be propped up by the side panel of my car, neither sitting nor standing, figuring out this affective quandary in which I found myself in this no man's land of neither here nor there whose most present quality was absence. Absence of traffic, of people walking the sidewalks, of cars, of delivery trucks, of bike messengers, of pedestrians crossing the street mid-block, not bothering to make it to the corner. The salient absence of noise allowed me hear other noises which the city makes ceaselessly but which go largely unnoticed as they are drowned out by the noise of everything else that happens in the city and which is now curiously mute. It was those noises of in the distance which allowed me to hear that the usual commotion was absent. I listen intently to the various

compressors in the offing which I never hear when I go out for a sandwich at lunch during the week. I can discern the metallic percussive clatter of a distant cargo train and the soft drone of the vehicles on the elevated highway. I can distinctly make out every so often the rhythmic staccato clicking of the relays in the traffic light control boxes and I can feel the hum of the orange halogens overhead. There's a soft rustle to my left: a fat raccoon waddles across the roadway. As I gaze over, I am impressed by the sheer openness of the street. It is not an urban canyon by any stretch of the imagination, but it isn't the crowded and compact denseness of movement of any day midweek whatever.

As I pondered over this vacuous disquietude, I asked myself what was happening with my life that I found myself alone, parked on my car, contemplating the whirring of fans of heating systems in the middle of the night, the cool air burning my lungs. I think of the business and the ceaseless interruptions interspersed by never-ending meetings and the peal of money calling. Hello vacuum land. Office life provides the centre of inertia to my existence as that which informs and structures outwards every other aspect of my being in the world. It is still quiet on the street. It is not yet dawn. The sun's glow hasn't materialised the horizon yet. The asphalt takes on the hues of the traffic lights at the intersection down the street. Green, orange, red, green orange red greenorangered. Everything flows, all things change, but while they do, some endure.

Just the other night, I was watching the Antonioni film *La Notte* (1961), and I was transported to that time, years ago, late at night that allowed me to feel the recurrence of *kenopsia*<sup>99</sup> in my life. I did not travel in time to the past but was enveloped in the unfolding of an affective drama which drew me deeper and deeper into a scenario whose finality I did not know, of a movement that was being built up but unknown as to how it would play out.

*Kenopsia* is an invented word which means "the eery forlorn atmosphere of a place that is usually bustling with people but is now abandoned and quiet" (Koenig, 2018). It describes the discernment of absence, of lack, of existential void. The story I have just narrated allows us to see how becoming can happen. The story produces an event that has an experiential consistency that was not there previously but is now discernible and exhibits identifiable properties: it distinguishes first and later determines. *Kenopsia* has a logical coming to being as an intensive movement, that has duration, that gains heft as the affective

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<sup>99</sup> *Kenopsia* is an invented word conceived by John Koenig. Forthcoming in *The Dictionary of Obscure Sorrows*. <http://www.dictionaryofobscuresorrows.com/post/27720773573/kenopsia>

gains meaning and adequation, and can be understood in terms of time and can be rationalised. The narrative of the event produces an abstract machine which foregrounds a perceptual process and the essential qualities which allow us to compose it, recollect it and recognise it. The narrative draws attention to the metaphysical processes of onto- and morphogenesis, as well as provides aesthetic knowledge of these processes (ASKIN, 2016, p. 4). And with it, it has brought all the problems which a discerning becoming entails.

*Kenopsia* is a machine that it is discerned *ex post facto* in the recollection of the experienced as given. Not many of us are so aware of our existence in the world so as to be able to discern becoming on the fly. We might be able to pick up on it as a production of difference but just exactly what that difference is only revealed in the past tense. We may be able to perceive an emergent feeling of difference, but if the event in which we are participating is truly novel, then there is nothing in the event to pick up on as happening, and so its recognition is only effectuated as a past tense. But as our discernment of *Kenopsia* demonstrates, the rear-view mirror of discernment is at odds with the presential of the lived-in present of the immediate experiential—the logic of sense of the event only appears as an interpretative backwards recollection or reconstitution which is not readily cognisable at the moment of its production.<sup>100</sup> What we have recounted here is an accounting of preconstituted ingredients which have been narratively woven to produce a specific effect, a representation of becoming through a relational assemblage of pre-givens that exist in the world. What we would like to get at is the fundamental coming to being which foregoes the preexisting underlying entities from which the preconstitution of various events arises to produce the difference of novelty. It is a serial progression which ultimately leads to the differential as a disappearance of the terms of relation and to the expression of pure relation in terms of change. This would lead us to the expression of the event in terms of time through primitive entities which function as the underlying ground of generic process—generic as both genetic and general. This generic process is what constitutes the Third Level of Knowledge in Spinoza's *Ethics* as a mode of describing the procession through non-specific assemblages towards a plug-and-play system of machinic entities which are the common constituents of everything in the Universe.

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<sup>100</sup> Whether we experience a peak moment of total immersion and a forgetting of the self, or a moment of mind-numbing boredom where the self does not deign to participate, the constitution of the event takes place after its having been experienced as a back-gridding of experience. Mindfulness brings to the fore this paying attention to the here and now as presence.

How could we have presented this as a repetition and not as a recollection? By the affective conveyance of the event, by making it into a musical poem or an impressionistic symphonic movement. If we take Vivaldi's *Four Seasons* (1723), Beethoven's *Sixth Symphony* (1802–1808), Holst's *The Planets* (1914-1916), Brian Eno's *Music for Airports* (1978), or Hildegard Westerkamp's *Breathing Room* (2005), as examples, what would *Kenopsia* be like as a purely affective musical narrative? The recognition of the repetition of the event would acknowledge the different, but every moment of its repetition would spur us afresh to "let oneself be stirred by everything that is fleeting and new, which ever newly delights the effeminate soul?" (Kierkegaard, p. 6). There is no melancholia or nostalgia in repetition for the movement is not reminiscent of pastness, it is suggestive and expectant, a full-frontal future-gazing. The repetition we seek is a calling forth, a rallying cry for a movement of Spinozist Joy and not an amassing of what has been acquired out of fear of loss. It is not a retention of the movement but an affirmation of the procession of the now-becoming as creative power of "a movement which would directly touch the soul, which would be that of the soul" (DELEUZE, 1994, p. 9).

### **Becoming as**

Becoming is the processual activity which reveals how something comes into being, comes to be, transforms itself into something else it was not before and keeps coming into being as something else. If one can consider change as productive, becoming is how change obtains: becoming expresses the doing of immanence as creation of difference as other. Becoming (in)forms process as to a discernible coherence which is intensive, multiplicitous and durational: becoming is how change obtains. The pithy expression immediately takes us away from the world of things into the realm of process, the inconstancy of change, and the obtention of objective fact from movement. The Greek philosophical term for becoming is Γένεσις (*genesis*) and in reference to physical bodies both its "meanings of "birth" and "beginning in being" are intertwined in the pre-Socratic texts" (PETERS, 1967, p. 67) where the *genesis* of perceptibles always involves a separation, a differentiation as a *partum*. But the emphasis in the articulation of genesis is change and differentiation as individuation. We

can link this back to Heraclitus<sup>101</sup> and his key idea of *panta rhei*, “everything is flux”, where *ῥοή* (*rhoē*) as meaning flow, stream, or flux. As Haxton points out in paraphrasing Heraclitus, “things change, all things flow. The world is revealed only in quick glances. There can be no completion” (Heraclitus, 2001). This summarizes what is at stake here for us in terms of imagistic process and a mode of thought that philosophers have denigrated for 2,500 years—starting with Parmenides who denied both change and the validity of sensory perception as knowledge.

Even if the concepts of becoming, change and difference have been perennially disparaged, as Whitehead observes “the elucidation of meaning involved in the phrase ‘all things flow’ is one chief task of metaphysics” (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 208). If we define becoming as the mode of being of transition, of in-betweenness, of passage between being and non-being, then we can get a feel for what Heraclitus referred to as a reality where everything is change, movement and transformation. And for Parmenides who formulated the Law of non-contradiction which states that a thing A cannot be A and not A at the same time, denied existence to that which changes—there is no in-between, the only real things are the Ideas and these exist because they are unchanging. But that which is can only be known by that which it is not, and if that which it is not prevents something that is from being everything, then that not-being must also be something, a some-thing which is not perceived or cognised.

If “as far as the technical language of philosophy was concerned, *rhoē* was never more than a striking image” (PETERS, 1967, p. 178), it is also of interest to point out the hidden connection to memory. The use of the idea of the ‘striking image’ is ambiguous here in that we can understand it in terms of the impression that begets Bergsonian imagistic process or as a technology of memory. Striking images were a technique that aided rhetoricians remember things, where by making strong imagistic associations—shocking montages, so to speak—a thing’s place in the order of creation could be ascertained by where it made its impressive mark.<sup>102</sup> In their plateau on *Becoming*, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate the concept of becoming through a variety of “memories” which towards the end

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<sup>101</sup> Peters (1967) remarks that Heraclitus and his followers were referred to as “flowers” on account of their beliefs in genesis and *phthora*. This has interesting connotations in terms of the philosophy they professed as the processual coming to being as a durational intensification.

<sup>102</sup> By placing things in the middle of a stream gives Thales elemental water a dimension it might not have had.

of the plateau they disown and re-construe as “becomings”. This would indicate that becoming is never the coming into being of a singular, stand-alone entity but as part of an individuation from a ‘nothingness’ that is participated in an associated milieu or plane of consistency around a saliency or intensification. The French text has memories as *souvenirs*, which in Deleuze’s *The Time-Image* is translated as recollections and which makes us think of how these becomings are constituted, their position within the assemblage as well as their role in imagistic process—are memories re-collections of disparate entities into a coherent consistency? And *souvenir*, literally translated as under-coming, would be nothing other than the Ὑποκείμενον (*hypokeimenon*), the under-standing, the substantial substratum, upon which everything is predicated as the manifestation of beingness, of Οὐσία (*ousia*), the really real of the wealth of real estate, as representative of the value of the territorialised entity, which in turn is linked to elemental Earth. This assemblage as a montage would seem to be guided by some subjectivity, some intelligent faculty that directs the (re)collection, as a (re)tracing of memorial circuits which manages the flow of potentials. But that intelligent subjectivity is not in the individual human but in the event as the immanent arising of the happening where the flow does not singularly happen in the human subject but in the coming to being of the event as a fluxional composition. We like to think that it is the physical assemblage that is determinant but it is the outcome which is decisive.

Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) advocate the willful embracing of change and difference in order to re-invent thought as anything else other than the proscribed model of static being and identity. To avoid the constraints to life and the limitations to the actualisation of potential, D&G advocate an existence predicated on change which discounts being by valuing everything that being is not, i.e. becoming—so that by adopting non-being, we do not choose death or non-existence, but a chronic, indefinite existence, expressed through creative invention or participation in the world as the creative temporality which is expressed through becoming. In this respect, we do not oppose or contradict being to death, but to a non-being expressed as creation, difference and change. By virtue of becoming, a “thing” does not have “being”; it becomes within flux, perdures as an indefinite, indeterminate and contingent expression through its sustained becoming different. And this creative advance into novelty as difference is marked by a break from constancy, a dissolution of habit, a wandering away from routine and a wilful refusal to participate in the

alienating and exploitative machine of totalitarian fascism.<sup>103</sup> This all serves to bring down the walls of containment produced by institutional identitary structures and categorisations of hierarchy so that the affirmation of life happens through ceaseless invention, a constant appeal to the exercise of our creative energies, and an incessant application of subjectivity. In redefining the split between being and non-being, D&G pluralise non-being as an opposition to Being in terms which are opposite to the paradigmatic ideal model of identity as Oneness as what Whitehead describes as “the current philosophical notion of an individualized particular substance (in the Aristotelian sense) which undergoes adventures of change, retaining its substantial form amid transition of accidents” (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 55).

Becoming offers a creative divergence from rationality towards an un-archival re-composition at a molecular level. This dissolves the archive and drives towards a becoming-other that undermines the molecular morphing to become-whatever outside a capitalist value-producing order.<sup>104</sup> What becomes operative is a mode-of-existence that places everything into question and radically alters the mode of engaging with the world. What was a reliable and dependable empiricism, a progress-directed advance towards a certain Τέλος (telos), becomes tenuous and contingent nomadism which neither has the desire nor the inclination to make experience certain, methodical, or necessary in its experimentation. The movement of becoming as creative deployment leads one to wander away from the oppressive and repressive drudgery of discipline and allows one the freedom to carry-on in life making good on the ludic being in the world. The errant non-methodical molar becoming in the world of the child reflects the nomadic molecular becoming of the mental as creative, experimental and inventive in contradistinction to the applied investor and speculative inventor and their businesslike approach. Becoming-Child can only be understood in contrast to other modes of becoming, such as becoming-intense or becoming-animal, or becoming-woman which are not necessarily more fundamental, primitive or general modes of becoming, but that express becoming according to other blocs to be activated or actualised of its many-faceted manifestations as opposition to Being-Man as Ideal. Becoming is the

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<sup>103</sup> But not the totalitarian Fascism of political sciences. The fascism of the *fascio* of the bundle, of the sheaf, where any distinctive trait or difference is subsumed to the identity of the whole.

<sup>104</sup> One of its distractions as a philosophical conception is to not have synthesis embrace the micro-fascistic of the bundling of synthesis.

engine which drives the machine; just what it drives depends on what aspect of its functioning as creation of difference and change we focus on.

The movement of becoming is neither an evolution that manifests descent nor filiation—it is not one entity that changes and produces offspring. It is an altogether different body which is produced and has distinct properties and composes a different entity altogether: it is an *involutionary rhizome*. This describes the constitution of the advance of the present which in itself is not changing but is completely modified by the movement of passage. By the same token, a *true* becoming is not imitating or acting-like or identifying-with: it is not an acting like an animal, a woman, a child; or seeing oneself in the other; neither is it a regression or progression or an establishing of corresponding relations (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 239). But in order to allow their revelation, the intermediate material forms of becoming will be represented in ways that imitate, act-like, identify-with, etc—they cannot be reduced to a totemic or symbolic correspondence (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 246). We emphasise the word *true* because any becoming is always a more-than repetition of the Common Notion as its primitive, most general operational crystal. Where the actual of an Idea is always considered in terms of lack or of diminishment because the actual cannot exhaust the potential of the Idea, the actualised Common Notion is always a more-than repetition of the primitive notion. The Common Notion might be the most clearly adequate and succinct expression of the movement, but any repetition will include the primitive notion as core plus a multiplicity of add-ons. The Common Notion as an identifiable stand-alone entity cannot exist on its own and will always be a multiple more-than-one.

Deleuze and Guattari theorise becoming through a variety of modes of experience which follow the passage of process. The most basic mode of becoming is what they call a becoming-animal, but this is not so much about animals qua animals but about the primordial animation of bodies, about the movement which springs from the life of the elemental substance as its constitutionary nature. The ancient Greeks considered visible bodies as the manifestation of invisible forces by which the divine could come to be known. “When a creature is chosen, therefore, to symbolize the concrete human mind some concealed abstract principle it is because its characteristics demonstrate this invisible principle in visible action” (HALL, 2003, p. 261). Animal bodies are animate because they have *anima*, *Ψυχή* (*psychē*), a soul, and they are of interest because self-referencing and



self-reflecting humanness does not get in the way of examining their 'movement' and consciousness: "while man is an equivocal, 'masked' or complex being, the animal is univocal, for its positive or negative qualities remain ever constant, thus making it possible to classify each animal, once and for all, as belonging to a specific *mode* of cosmic phenomena" (CIRLOT, 1965, p. 10). But the *anima* does not just flow through the fish individually, it flows throughout them, as that movement which animates the school as a whole. When Deleuze and Guattari say that animals become a body as a pack it is as an expression of this animation that emerges within them, through them and throughout them, as an infinite series of multiplicities as a social movement. The movement occurs individually but every movement affects the whole which nevertheless moves as a whole.

The Epicureans believed that the soul was composed of atoms, and the Stoics that the soul was governed by Πνεῦμα (*pneuma*), as the breath of life which God breathes into creation and as the intelligence which guides the coherence of bodies and permeates them. Most importantly for us, the animating *pneuma* "carries information from the sense organs to the central governing part, and back again to the parts involved in moving the animal from place to place" (Preus, 2015, p. 311).<sup>105</sup> Interestingly, Preus points out in discussing *pneuma* quotes Aristotle's *Generation of Animals*, "It is reasonable that nature should perform most of her operations using pneuma as a tool, for as the hammer and anvil in the art of the smith, so pneuma in the things formed by nature." This directly links *pneuma* to a technology of revelation and to creative activity as semiotics of the Pythagorean underground metal smiths and therefore to the theory of numbers and harmonics which connects to the War Machine and to imagistic process. And so, rather than concentrate on the 'whatness' of the animal, Deleuze & Guattari focus their sights on the 'howness' of the animate, on how sentient entities become other from one moment to the next, in their most general aspect.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, the 'biography' of becoming-animal is related, narrated and accounted through the lore of the band or pack as modes, as modalities and modifications, rather than as characteristics; these modes are not additive modes of accretion, of single aggregation but modes of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, peopling... a becoming as the conception of individuation is not a pile-up, or a list of characteristics that

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<sup>105</sup> This sounds very similar to the definition of the Bergsonian image.

has anything to do with anthropomorphism of any kind: if anything, the coming-together is a mash-up whose individual components become indiscernible in their singular effect to yield a hybrid novelty as affective expression of a something else. The activity of becoming as aberrant compiling is a movement which in unison produces the advance as an unspoken, open coordination that acts and reacts as an organic whole. It is a multiplicity that takes on unnatural forms, through a “fearsome involution” that has no predetermined focus or *telos* as payoff or final causation. Becoming is an outpouring of the doing traversed by forces which are not grounded in experience as a procession of typical rational responses. It is a feeling of being unsettled, deterritorialised, and ungrounded which provokes a nomadism which is both errant and outside the System and brings us to unheard-of creations and inventions.<sup>106</sup>




Figura 4.1 Fish in a becoming-fish vector of “Say what?” as interest.

These becomings as individuations can take on various dispositions. They can be tame and docile conceptions which toe the line, which don’t venture far from the disciplinary home which they inhabit and are content to affirm the established order; the second are transcendental ideas couched as eternal truths with characteristics and attributes which serve as foundations for series and semiotic structures of rational thought; and the third are transformative ideas which encompass the wildness of nature’s naturing as

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<sup>106</sup> Modern-day migrants as displaced individuals from their territories of habit are forced to become animals. They move as packs.

an exploration of what a body can do—and this nature-naturing can be natural or artificial, though Simondon might tell us now that there is not much of a difference. These bodies which are pack-like, band-like multiplicities, where the individual components have their own movement but move together as whole that has nothing to do with the individual components, are like those images depicting a fish-form made up of a multitude of smaller fish. With these bodies we are not so much interested in characteristics but in qualities and intensities and we can readily understand that these forms are not filiations. And neither is it an interactive confabulation between animals which connects them through “a mechanism dominated by the automatism of instinct” (MASSUMI, 2014, p. 1). The transformations that these ‘bodies’ negotiate, guided by a swarm intelligence, as to how movement and coordination is to take place as a machinic assemblage as a trans-individual savviness, works at the level of affects and invisible forces which are only rendered visible as the indeterminate movements of these unspecific bodies. These “unnatural participations or nuptials are the true Nature spanning the kingdoms of nature” (DELEUZE & Guattari, 1989, p. 241) which have an intelligence of their own which surpasses the mechanical sociality and cultural homogeneity of language-based communication. When we compare the movement of a school of fish, or of flock motion with the well-rehearsed and millisecond-timed acrobatics of air display teams we can see that another intelligence is at play. Information is not an exchange of tokens of fact but a contagion and transformation that the movement affective exchange of (in)formation affords. These exchanges are not productive of myth in the sense of the cascading filiation of the sign as the progeny of signified and signifier as predicated by Barthes (1983), if anything they serve as narratives of a peopling to come. These images are readily translated to the tenuous understanding of mass-movements of economics where it soon becomes obvious that to predict movement with any kind of certainty is futile and the closest one can get to a predictive determination is statistical guesswork. D&G adroitly call these heterogeneous multiplicities *agencements*, translated to English as assemblages. It is *le mot juste* in French. *Assemblages* has the togethering social aspect of the collectivity as a machinic entity but the French term has the additional property of agency, of embodied intermediation and instrumentality. Further, the French *agencement* signifies the resultant arrangement of a combination of elements of an organism that gathers and centralises information.

But what is the becoming that we are referring to? Is it the becoming of an entity as a body? Or is it the event as a body? The assemblage? Or simply the body as becoming and whose different aspects produces different becomings? What are we referring to in speaking about becoming? Why do we need to formulate it as a repetition? And why must difference be involved?

The image of the fish concentrating around the scuba diver demonstrate the cohesion of movement, but its goal is obvious and both sides resolve the focus of the relation just as pointedly on either side of the divide. We could indicate the movement that takes place every morning where people go to work and take public transit. The movement takes the form of going from home to the workplace, but what animates that movement as an *agencement* is something other that is non-physical and impossible to locate, that is affective even if we can trace back and ascribe an abstract cause which may partially or in some way explain more or less adequately the movement. But as a multiplicity, these forces which are immediated through the social as a collective movement, constitute a body in some ways more interesting than the bodies that are created out of physical stuff and are readily discerned. And when Spinoza asks “What can a body do?” the doings of these abstract bodies are truly a metaphysical research into the quest for the production of time as an ever-shifting topological manifold. As an example, we can simplistically say that all the people going to the workplace are motivated by money, and leave it at that. But we know that money is the hinge of the fold to infinity, and if money is the ultimate sign, in that it stands for anything and everything as the crux of concrete relation, as the infinite nexus of Capitalism, we can say that money is time. If we say for example, that it is Capitalism that animates that movement, what body does Capitalism assume and what are its ways? The movements of that body are time itself but because we cannot see that body we can only allude to the presence of time by the movement of capital, and of money and to that activity which produces money.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) juxtapose this movement of contagion with the pact of the anomalous as exceptional being, as the exception which makes the rule, even if as they develop the concept of becoming the distinction progressively fades. The exceptional being is the affective anomaly which registers as the outstanding feeling, which allows entry into the secret society of the pre-individual and get to know it as an operative assemblage which has gone by unidentified, unnamed, and unrecognised, lurking on the sidelines, or the limits

of acceptability, as an unidentified body whose doings are felt but whose agency is discounted.

These becomings-imperceptible are found at the threshold of the what can be known; they people the *apeiron*, the limits of the known universe, the horizon of creation which the Ancient Greeks considered to be the origin of all things. As the limit, the *apeiron* straddles the limited and the unlimited, the known and the unbounded unknown—but not the yet to be known, because that would make the universe bounded. It is a two-faced threshold in that it is a processual place-holder that shows everything but reveals nothing. Time passes through it but it has no extension: it has movement but nowhere to go. Supposedly, it has material substrate but no discernible (or discerned) characteristics, which would make it the empty set, the receptacle as the topos of becoming. But simply to discern this bordering is sufficient to reveal the multiplicity hiding in the intension that outliers generate as an outward pressure of affective augmentation, of intensification that goes by unnoticed.

These becomings as a progressive rendering visible are brought forth as if by magic, by a sorcery which cannot properly at this point be called philosophy, science or art. They are a transductive movement within engagement where “on the near side, we encounter becomings-woman, becomings-child” and “on the far side, we find becomings-elementary, -cellular, -molecular, and even becomings-imperceptible” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 248). It is what goes on before anything really happens—but not in the sense that nothing is happening but in how it has not been felt as such: it is like a forethought that has not been thought yet as a judgment.

### **Becoming as Category**

The plateau which deals with Becoming is not only an explication of what Becoming signifies, it is also a revisitation of categories through the categorical treatment of the concept of becoming. Where the categories represent the logical structuring that corresponds to the existence of things and serves as the foundation of analysis as to how something can be described. Deleuze and Guattari over-code these divisions with their own understanding of the types of movements that each aspect of categorisation implies as the common characteristic as a predicate. As we saw earlier, this moves it into the expression of

the essence as a movement that is publicly affirmed, that is not private knowledge in that it has literally “been taken down to the Agora”<sup>107</sup> to be publicly professed and ascertained. Various philosophers will have different categorial schemes depending on how they understand the ontology of things and how they describe their being. Plato has five (Being, rest, motion, identity, difference); Aristotle, ten (substance, quantity, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, action, affection); the Stoics four (subject, quality, state, and relation); Kant has four main types (quantity, quality, relation, and modality), each one composed of three subtypes, but different if one refers to the Categories of the Understanding or to the Categories of Logic or of Aesthetics; Tarde, repetition, opposition and adaptation; Whitehead, four main types of categories (categories of the Ultimate (Creativity or novelty, One and Many), of existence, of explanation, of obligations) for a total of 38. In contrast, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari present a critique of the categories as part of their philosophical alternative to representation in thought as “identity, causality, finality”, and to the transcendental in becoming, for “Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis” (DELEUZE, 1983. p. 91).

Categories constitute general laws which reduce experience to its common denominators as a group of characteristics, as surface effects which assume its understanding. But categories are in fact different than classifications in that their method is one of differentiation as opposed to identification, of establishing what is what by in the court of public opinion in the Agora and not by a compilation of characteristics or attributes. Taxonomies differentiate between bodies or things by virtue of their order, or arrangement, in other words, by their relative location — which in our scheme represents their perspectivisation as memorial method. The categorisation proceeds by defining the essential as a singularity which can be accounted for in public as the relation which removes all doubt as to being what something is by relating how they are, an exposition or articulation of their character as individuals. Deleuze and Guattari find them constraining and reductive and negative in that they not only function according to exclusion, but in that they only allow us to form knowledge according to the constituted a priori specifications as ground for an

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<sup>107</sup> This figurative interpretation of Κατηγορίαι builds on the upper and lower levels of discourse where the discourse of the Agora was of a low and popular nature and the discourse of the Acropolis was of a more illustrious and edifying nature.

evaluative rationalization—they only allow us to grasp according to that which is already known. And this is why Kierkegaard's positing repetition as a category is so enthusiastically adopted by Deleuze. Rather than postulate newness in the encounter as a going beyond what a body can possibly do, categories always curtail potential by falling back on what the body has already done, so that "we can determine the object of an Idea only by supposing that it exists in itself in conformity with the categories" (DELEUZE, 1984, p. 18). This makes the understanding the legislator of nature as both representations of the unity of consciousness and, as such, predicates of the object in general. Categories stabilise the acquisition of knowledge and serve as the gates which control the power and the access to reality.

Deleuze and Guattari make use of the categories but they present them in such a way that they do not reduce the possibility of movement or restrict the degrees of freedom the articulation of the encounter with the world as event can generate. Becoming engages all the terms which describe process as creative and its advance—starting with the original opposition of that which is and that which is not as the most fundamental reality, and which for us translates as the problem of how that which is not comes to be as the affirmation of to become. We cannot simply define becoming as the mode of being of passage or transition, because becoming is a somewhat different modality of in-betweenness between being and non-being. It is not a mediation of more or less, or bigger or smaller. Becoming is a transformative process of the in-between being and non-being that articulates the processual existence of the production of difference in kind. As an activity, becoming institutes a temporal movement of difference-making of coming-to-being as a perpetual genetic operation of emergence, of engendering of transformation, of contrast and differentiation and not of gender identities. The movement may be immanent, contrastive or transformative, but the key development is the production of ἕτερον (*heteron*—difference) in terms of oppositional contrast of ἑναντία (*enantia*—opposites). As a verb, as a predicate, becoming expresses genesis in the midst as a specific consistency in that it effectuates a movement which is all its own multiplicity, but that cannot be divided and cannot be reduced or led back to "appearing" "being" "equaling" or "producing" (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 239). Becoming is a movement which characterises the on-going, ceaseless advance as the process of coming-to-be—difference. When we say that becoming is a multiplicity, we mean that the unity of process is made up of many, where each of these

constitutive many are also multiplicities. The advance, the procession, the succession within and through flux as the inexorable ‘march of time’ is unitary and at the same time multiple. Duration, simply defined, is the processual fact<sup>108</sup> of insistence, of lasting, of continuance in time as expressive of change. “It is the time during which a thing, action, or state continues” (OED). But while presenting it in this way, duration has to be seen as a oneness which is consistent with the univocity of the march of time and at the same time inclusive and respectful of the multivariate difference-making that multiplicity permits. In its expression of durational multiplicity, the entity as event can simultaneously express difference from itself and immanent difference within as a participant in becoming. It is not a movement of the intension of the concept as identity but a movement of the naturing of the nature of the entity, of how the becoming is effectuated and how the animate flows with it and through it. For reasons explained forthwith, any entity thus manifests its durational continuity horizontally as part of the extensive continuum of the plane of consistency and vertically as part of processual advance and its expression of time within imagistic process.

The plane of immanence and its attendant cartography of longitudes and latitudes is an analogy that enables us to ideate becoming without having to explain the aporia of making the jump from nothingness to something—the conception of the plane of immanence is as close as substance can get to its asymptote of nothingness. It is a reconciliation of opposites, of conflictive juxtapositions that figure throughout the conception and not of polarities on the same qualitative spectrum. But there is no getting away from an integrative process from which unity arises, that is subject to the logic of the immanence of difference as novelty which emerges as duration. It would not be appropriate to characterise it as montage, as hylomorphic or dialectical: the composition is not a montage in that the frame of selection is not given whole, but as a frame of selection composed of a multiplicity of different speeds and flows each with their own singular self-determination;<sup>109</sup> neither is it hylomorphic, in that there is no passive recipient (container or matter) of impressions, as molding, or as a formal shaping; nor is it dialectical as novelty emerging from the mutual annihilation of contraries of thesis, antithesis. We would need to see the montage as the series of frames of a photo-finish and not as a smear at the finish;

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<sup>108</sup> Fact is here used as “known to be true”, which in processual terms can be translated as coherent operativity in that the machinic assemblage of becoming is functioning.

<sup>109</sup> This was explicated earlier in the previous chapter as the dynamic that takes place in the apparatus of Bergson’s cinematograph.



hylomorphic as a mutual, co-arising conditioning of non-existent particles of power and potential; and dialectical as the transgressive violation of the Law of Contradiction.<sup>110</sup> Thus, we can understand becoming as durational, material and as the middle term on which the subject and attribute are grounded.

But the oppositions that they produce are not so much irreconcilable juxtapositions but mirrored reflections—impressions of sensation where principles intervene to produce impressions of reflection—plausibly separated by a hinge or fold, so that whenever the concept of categories arises, it always comes up in pairs that would presuppose a logical or even ontological, priority of content over form (Bensmaïa in D&G, 1986, p. xvii). Their categories do not refer exclusively to Ideas but rather to material movements which have some ‘being’ to them as well as some virtual potentials looking to be actualised. Thus, they can refer to political power, or social forces of knowledge, or psychiatric perceptions, or literary or linguistic categories as systems of formal differentiation, as expressive modes of becoming and which are not necessarily singular attributes but can exhibit that multiplicity of characteristics of an ensemble or class. But in predicating these sets of properties there is never an effort to close them or limit them in such a way that identity integrity is punctiliously preserved. The opposition of becoming as a different other to being presents opposition to conceptual identity integrity as well as to the dominant conception of what static transcendental being is all about. Becoming problematises major aspects of understanding change and difference, namely, the question of genesis and the problem of what happens when a thing becomes something else—or more generally, how does one state become another? How does one developmental stage move to the next? If change does happen, how does difference occur? As change takes place, how does a thing’s constellation of potential change? And how in fact do we discern this change and the newness that is being produced? The answers have to be expressed in terms of intensities, duration, non-simple singularities, associated multiplicities, rhizomatic assemblages, heterogeneities, the primacy of difference and becoming.

The primary categorial distinction that becoming might discern is between a potential and a ground, such as between Being and non-being, the Ideal and the material,

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<sup>110</sup> If the dialectical is predicated as Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis and the logic of the advance is the reconciliation of Being, Non-being, as Synthesis, in the transformation of A to B, the subject is always an AB and not either A or B.

between Being relative to becoming — or for Deleuze's thought, extension-intensity in difference and repetition, or molar and molecular, and major and minor. When compared to Being, any Becoming constitutes the portrayal of the materiality of the Other: becoming-animal, becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-elemental... a becoming-anything-else-other-than-man because there is no becoming-man since it is the transcendental Idea to which all becoming is referenced—much the same way that there is no becoming-God. Man as a conceptual entity is as close as one can get to the infinite being of an Idea—it is the material reflection, the equating of Man as the material image of God. The other becomings predicate similar oppositions, not as interpretations of natures but as rallying points or lures. We can thereby understand becoming-woman as the movement that predicates what a body that is the antithesis of that which the male principle represents with respect to the Idea of God; or becoming-animal as the material movement of the anima embodied; or Becoming-Child as the material movement of becoming that is not guided by a criterion. These becomings as discernible modes of encounter and productive of machines of desire are the *true* categories that mediate the assemblages and allow their discernment. For it is in this production of producer-product as immanent desire-affect that the joyful composition of becoming 'something' happens.

It is often said that only imbeciles expect different outcomes from blind repetition. It reflects the belief in causal constancy and the permanence of things—the assumption being that similar physical conditions will always produce the same results. It is the implicit faith we have in recipes where if we gather the same ingredients, reproduce the original conditions and combine them according to a protocol, we can expect the same results. But anyone that has replicated the same recipe a few times knows that the outcome is never alike. The results can be more or less similar but there is always a variance that emerges, a difference that is produced. Recipes are also called directions and this implies the methodic of the *meta-hodos* of the Ancient memory techniques as the path that must be taken to arrive at a particular destination, in order to find what we seek, for everything has its singular location in the World.

However, we also know that the outcome of a montage as an association produces something of a different nature than the components. So that the cake that results from carrying out the protocolary sequence of a recipe and the combination of ingredients is of a different nature than its substrate. The same for the composition of anger, of the affect that

results from an event, or from the conceptual assemblage of ideas—or from the combination of examples we have just carried out to make our point. Further, the combination of components into an assemblage does not always guarantee the expected outcome. Any of the Soviet filmmakers or theoreticians of montage would likely attest to this interpretative variation from one viewer to the next. As we have seen, the subjective baggage every viewer brings to the table is always composed of different appetites! The relational possibilities that are produced between viewing subjects and a signifying object (a signifier) is never definite nor certain. So that the composition of what is perceived and the cognitive associations made with a signifier are more divergent, loose and open than the social theories of language would lead us to believe. Thus, the coming together can be seen as a probability or a predictability of an outcome.

When we write of projection in a Bergsonian sense, it is not in the sense of extromission of light rays from the eyes, but in terms of the location of things in the world where they ought to be, in and of themselves, and in relation to others as part of the co-arising relativity of the mind's projection. This is a restatement of the ancient memory arts which defines the Memory of the World in terms of striking images and their *loci*: all things in the world can be known by where they can be known to be, or as perceived where they are.<sup>111</sup> If we know what things are and where, then we would know their what, how and why in and of themselves and in relation to others. In the Bergsonian sense of the movement image, we can triangulate perceptually everything we “observe”, everything we perceive, everything we can ascertain through “science”. And this seeing is the logical flow of the immanent informing of things relative to one another perspectively as serial contractions which continuously affirm and confirm these relations through their transformations and translations over time. The projection is the “throwing of glances” as the outcome of the representamen-interpretamen switch, the prehension of feeling of the object-subject-subject which moves us from one revelation to the next as the serial affirmation/confirmation that things are where they ought to be. This is saying that memory is integral to the process of (re)cognition and the decisive dynamic of projection. The process of cognition sets up the conceptual diagram which through repeated cognition creates the memory circuits which facilitate the (re)cognition: over time and through cognitive iteration,

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<sup>111</sup> Which is also the guiding premiss behind surveillance.

repeated interaction habituates the cyclic diagrammatic response which affirms and confirms the cognition as the pre-conceived gestures or movements which direct the saccadic movement, the representamen-interpretamen switch and the prehension of feeling. From this line of reasoning, are we compelled to assume a memorial process which somehow stores the likeness of things in the brain as an imagistic pictorial signifier? Or is an infinite repertoire of scaled diagrammatic concepts and their aspects perspectively conceptualised somehow sufficient to produce our knowledge of the World? The work of Fei-Fei Li at Stanford University<sup>112</sup> points to a vast storage of pictorial signifiers stored in the brain but other researchers such as Joseph Redmon and Ali Farhadi in (2015, 2018)<sup>113</sup> have designed a predictive statistical model based on acquired pattern recognition associated to the relational which anchors and guides the visual intelligence behind our cognitive diagrams of object (re)cognition. The two models are memory dependent and demonstrate the philosophical rift between the two approaches to imagistic thought. The first is simpler and more in keeping with the pictorial approach than the second, but is that not an expression of our epistemic prejudice to think in terms of pre-constituted pictorial images as opposed to the immanent production of relational processual images? The two lines of research indicate the rift in how we conceive the encounter with the World: is it constituted by independent, stand-alone objects or is it an immanent relational processual concretisation?

## **Becoming as**

Deleuze and Guattari offer a complex and convoluted unfolding of Becoming which combines a variety of modes<sup>114</sup> and aspects on the process. The sixteen 'memories' or becomings which constitute the plateau together present the various modes by which the components of becoming produce difference not as a coherent throughput of creation or transformation but as a rhizomatic assemblage. Given the various conceptual natures understanding becoming, Deleuze and Guattari do not select one as the correct method but

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<sup>112</sup> Her TED talk <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40riCqvRoMs> provides an introduction to her work with vision and AI.

<sup>113</sup> YOLO (you only look once), the open-code software predictive protocol is a "is a state-of-the-art, real-time object detection system". <https://pjreddie.com/darknet/yolo/>

<sup>114</sup> Different English translations of Spinoza's *Ethics* refer to modes differently. Some translate mode as modification while others maintain the mode as modality as in modal, as the qualification of expression.

opt to offer elements from different models and traditions to give a heterogeneous picture of what is involved. The most significant feature is the notion of one substance individuated by relations within multiplicities of movement and rest. This appears in the section “Memories of a Spinozist” in the Plateau on becoming in *A Thousand Plateaus*, which describes becoming in terms of a “pure plane of immanence, univocality, composition, upon which unformed elements and materials dance that are distinguished from one another by their speed and that enter into this or that individuated assemblage depending on their connections, their relations of movement” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 255). It articulates the classical components of matter, form and movement under the guises of undifferentiated potential, relation and a circular or vortical movement of causality, where the movement is not powered by an external power to the system but is immanent to the plane of immanence to produce a universal machinism.

Becomings are predicated as corpuscular and as multiplicities, but the component entities are not atoms. They are made up of finite elements of potential, endowed with form and as such are the ultimate parts of an actual infinity which together constitute a multiplicity. Thus, there are larger and smaller assemblages populating the plane of immanence as an abstract machine of infinite interconnected relations.<sup>115</sup> The image that comes to mind is an infinite field of differentials where the terms of relation go to zero and what remains is the differentiating relation held together by the associative propensity of the terms of the relation to participate themselves concretely in infinite number of other relations, so that what constitutes the being is the infinity of differentials as creative of distinction between the various elementary terms and the duration they produce through their production of aionic time. “It is a plane upon which everything is laid out, and which is like the intersection of all forms, the machine of all functions; its dimensions, however, increase with those of the multiplicities of individualities it cuts across” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 254).

Every singularity on the plane of immanence is located by its longitude and latitude according to its Τόπος (*Topos*—place) as an ordered pair where the longitude represents the extensionless aggregates of particles and the latitude, affect, as a capacity to act and be

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<sup>115</sup> These are relative infinities as opposed to absolute equal numbers. Infinite here refers to uncountable quantities of entities whose size tends towards the dimensionless, as extensive without extension, as the empty set.

acted upon. Thus, each *topos* on the plane of immanence is constitutive of a composite, of an integration of the characters as an assemblage which composes a cartography of distributions of intensity which together constitute bodies. The *topos* specifies and defines a body as a corpuscular extent, and is associated to the Platonic *Khôra* as the site where genesis takes place as occupation—in both senses of the word—and which plays a role analogous to *hylē* in Aristotle where the unfolding is undergirded by *kinesis*.

The schema nevertheless appears as a hylomorphic system, but of a different ilk than what is understood today. Aristotle's original conception did in fact combine matter and form, but in dynamic processual terms where both entities were inseparable and could not be conceived apart from each other. The composite of matter and form can only be apprehended as a unity: matter was conceived as a pure potential, and form as *eidos*, as a substantial or essential form, in unison with *μορφή* (*morphē*—shape), as actualisation of material form. Despite being repeatedly ascribed to Aristotle, hylomorphism as commonly referred to now is a more recent notion, conceived by the Scholastics (CONLEY, 1978) and revived in the 19th century. Contemporary scholars do not normally point out this distinction, and the medieval insistence on 'matter' exclusively understood as static, empty and passive is wedded to 'form' interpreted as *shape* as a molding of physical matter. The criticism is improperly foisted on Aristotle when in fact it should be directed at Aquinas's modification of Aristotle (BROWER, 2014; MADDEN, 2013; PETERSON, 2008).

If the Common Notion of Becoming-Child is the processual definition of the primitive cognisable regularity which a child presents as an exemplar, then we would posit that Becoming-Child is a durational assemblage whose principal activity is the actualisation of potential as a pure empiricism exercised through imagistic process. Becoming-Child repositis the history of science by a return to a more primitive conception of science. By undertaking the institution of a plane of reference through its perceptual plane of consistency, the primitive sciences (of Stoic perception) bring to the fore a subjectivity that sets up its own referents, that are in the service of the individual. This does not mean that they are not to be tested, but that they are not Laws handed down a posteriori and become Word of God to be obeyed without question or divergence. The empiricism that Deleuze urges us to adopt is based on the acceptance of our own subjective, heterogeneous observations and conclusions as well as affirm the changing nature of nature. The minor science is one that has no referents or foundations other than our personal empiricism. But it is not founded on

a phenomenological understanding, for it is not a consciousness of something but an immanent co-arising.

But what exactly is the underlying ground for the experiential if not phenomena? If there is something about becoming which is real, which has being, which perdures as that without which a body would not exist or have the capacity to become other and endure change, it is not physical. If it changes and produces difference it is a material becoming. The substrate which would allow predication but which is nor predicated upon anything else is often called substance.<sup>116</sup> Depending on the ontological model with which a philosopher composes, the ultimate reality or what exists primarily will be defined in consequence. It is a concept from traditional metaphysics which has fallen into disuse and we invoke it here to bring out some of the peculiarities of a philosophy based on process and difference. The predication of reality on a material foundation is a perennial difficulty in that the quest for the building blocks of nature's naturing are in fact *the* search for lost time, for as we chase after that which constitutes that which constitutes that which constitutes *ad infinitum*.... we are left with a paradoxal serial progression to a *proto hylē* or *materia prima* that must be asymptotic to nothingness. And this raises the problem of generation from nothingness, that some subjective agency must be responsible for creation, that we cannot produce movement from immobile sections, etc.

And since nothing cannot emerge from nothing, this *proto hylē* was conceived variously depending on the ontological foundations spoused by some school of philosophy, but a general description was compiled by Poortmann (1978) in *Vehicles of Consciousness: The Concept of Hylic Pluralism (Ochēma)*<sup>117</sup> but the foundation is Aristotelian, if we go by his primitive of *hylē*. Poortmann distinguishes between six types of matter, which he names from Alpha to Zeta, which he traced back to Far Eastern, Near Eastern and Hermetic religious traditions including the Brahman and Buddhist, as well as Egyptian Theurgy. These six types represent the different possible substrate which can offer foundation from which becoming can take form:

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<sup>116</sup> The Ancient Greeks referred to the underlying substratum as ὑποκείμενον (hypokeimenon—underlying) and to that which perdures through change as Οὐσία (ousia—beingness) which Preus (2015) refers to “the beingly being” or “the really real” as that which exists primarily. But the previous statement should be qualified as “some” for not all Greeks thought this way. We tend to impute to the Greeks foundational ideas which have been

<sup>117</sup> This will prove relevant in our discussion of Laius in relation to Oedipus later on.

Alpha: monistic materialism, the view that only one kind of stuff, i.e. matter, ultimately exists in this universe. [Spinozist and Deleuzian]

Beta: the view that only matter exists, but that there are different kinds of matter (hylic pluralism), specifically that God and other spiritual beings are created of a finer kind of matter, not visible to our scientific instruments.

Gamma: that only matter exists, with the exception of one single entity which is not material. This entity may be God, Brahman, etc. This is the view held by Poortman himself.

Delta: the view that two separate kinds of material and one kind of spiritual, immaterial entity exists, for example the early Christian and Gnostic belief that man was made of body, soul and spirit, where the first two are different forms of matter and the spirit is immaterial.

Epsilon: a view in which matter and mind are totally separate things. This view was for example held by René Descartes in his *cogito ergo sum* statement, see mind dualism.

Zeta: monistic idealism or illusionism, where matter is seen as some kind of emanation of God or another spiritual being. Especially this classification applies to the Brahman of the Hinduism.<sup>118</sup>

In a critique of *Vehicles of Consciousness*, Onimus writes that Poortmann “is unaware of modern conceptions derived from current models in nuclear physics or biology, which have completely refashioned the issues he deals with” (Author’s translation. ONIMUS, 1983, p. 431).<sup>119</sup> The problem is as aporetic now as it was then but rendered more complex due to the advances in mathematical, scientific and philosophical thought—for to ground materially becoming as process is a complicated, non-obvious mode of understanding coming to being as a productive activity. It is not only convoluted as a determination of genesis of being from a non-existence, but it also refers to the activity of transformation and to the result or outcome of that activity, which is never actually an outcome because no sooner is it produced that it is taken up as the medium or vehicle for subsequent transformation. We cannot even write pretext here for the coming to be, because there is no pretext, no pre-existing entity: there is no pause in the transformational change-over.

We like to think of this participation in the world as the experiential participation of the self with the environment we inhabit as the interaction of an independent, stand-alone bodies in terms of the action-reaction mechanical causality between physical entities. Our being in the world is ascertained sensorially as the correspondence between our aesthetic

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<sup>118</sup> ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes\\_Jacobus\\_Poortman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Jacobus_Poortman))

<sup>119</sup> “[Poortmann] n'est pas au courant des conceptions modernes qui résultent des modèles en cours en physique nucléaire et en biologie — et qui ont complètement renouvelé la problématique dont il s'occupe”.



perception, empirical attestation, and intellectual determination and backed up by scientific facts based (up to a certain point) on atoms and their constituent particles as foundation. This manner of thinking is highly seductive because feedback to our determinations are so immediate: what you see, is what you get, and then there are the other senses which corroborate the initial determination. In reading this, one is likely already thinking up examples to prove this incorrect. But who is to say that what our knowledge, understanding, comprehension is not just another paradigmatic crisis at a Ptolemaic scale? For unless the reader is a believer in Creationism, our conception of the Universe is not an a priori, God-given, transcendental Truth—unless one wishes to think that it is. It might be a truth in that there is a studied operational coherence to the whole conception—but that does not say that but as with any lie, the biggest lie makes for the bestest truth—until that truth is credibly and convincingly put into question.




Figure 4.2: Diagram of the Material Movement of Becoming between Chaos and God.

The distinction Aristotle makes between Ideas and Forms is relevant for us, for if we trace the circle of becoming of Figure 4.2, we see that there is a threshold separating the material and the Ideal realms. The Ideal realm is populated by Ideas, or transcendental

Forms, which according to Parmenides are the ones that have real being. Below this threshold, is the material realm which is bounded at the lower extreme by another threshold which separates it from the realm of the pre-individual Chaos. We see becomings as taking place between two thresholds which separate the actual from the virtual. These thresholds are neither present nor absent, but they demarcate a limit, boundary or divide where beyond these divides are virtual Beings or existences which are of a different nature than the material actual. Traditional conceptions (and not so traditional) depict becomings as vertical representations which set God at the apex and Chaos at the bottom. Becoming is sandwiched between the zone of transcendental Forms at the top and a zone of pure matter at the bottom; as such, the becoming is the zone of convergence, of interpenetration of Matter and Form as a coalescence of dynamic activity and not as an add-on of Form to Matter which would make it a hylomorphic scheme as per the Scholastics.

That which we are calling God in our Diagram of Material Movement is nothing else than the repository of all Ideal Forms, of Platonic Ideas, of Transcendental Ideas, which by virtue of being perfect, unchanging, exhaustive of all potential, reside above the zone of the actual, of the changing, of the modes of modification, of flux, impermanence and creation of difference. The zone of Becoming overlays the Zone of Chaos, as the welter<sup>120</sup> of the pre-individual, of pure potential, of random movement and chance encounters. Unlike the realm of Forms which is separated from the Zone of Becomings, Chaos participates in Becoming by providing the *Prima Materia* with which to compose bodies and also serves as the *depotoir* of becoming where the the depleted, the exhausted, the decomposing of bodies as a disintegration of duration as a cessation of the operability of a machinic assemblage. Thus, the primary activity of partial aggregations at the boundary of Chaos and the Zone of Becoming, is called the Plane of Immanence and depending on the scale and the point of view, a Plane of Consistency or the Plane of Matter—“The Plane P of my representation of the universe” (BERGSON, 19, p. 152).

Deleuze and Guattari write in *What is Philosophy?* that the Plane of Immanence is like a sieve, allowing some things to pass while some remain. The implicit metaphor serves as hinge between the concept of the plane as the immanent plane of Nature, as *Khôra*, as

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<sup>120</sup> The welter is more technical than the usual definition as “A state of confusion, upheaval, or turmoil” (O.E.D.). We use it throughout our text in the Whiteheadian sense of a jumble of forms of various levels of definiteness which are to be discerned in order to compose.

the surface upon which *Proto Hylē* as the substrate of potential and its immanent aggregation and actualisation as the discriminative selection of relation as associative process. We refer to the movement that takes place in the Plane of Immanence as the violence of the conception of the Material Forms that shakes the pre-individual constituents and produces the aggregation of bodies. This perpetual chaotic movement produces and results from movement and creates the interaction of moving bodies whose collision constitutes imagistic flow. These aggregates that constitute bodies are "imagistic objects" endowed with duration, where an image is anything and everything that acts and reacts on all its faces and in all its parts. If we express ourselves according to an ontology that disregards becoming and difference, which we call pictorial image is the object that does not pass. This object, formed on a screen as a plane of selection, is the pictorial image which results from the process that creates imagistic appearances on canvases, screens, surfaces or planes, is simply a technology that seeks to produce the arrest of flux and the reduction of imagistic mobility.

The production of the image as an object or body on a screen comes from Plato's *Timaeus* where the *Χώρα*, *Khôra*, serves as a container, a basket or sieve upon which the various elements are shaken together, subjected to a winnowing movement by the Demiurge where what remains constitutes an aggregation towards the creation of Material Forms. The Platonic conception is a very rich proposition which activates a wide spectrum of concepts which have gone on to serve as intuitions for a variety of concepts in D&G. In the *Timaeus*, we have been able to discern "sources" or possible "inspiration" for various key concepts:

- The *Khôra* as a plane of immanence and plane of consistency and as a point of departure for thinking with Deleuze about planes, fields and plateaus.
- The process sustained on the *Khôra* as intuition for territorialization and deterritorialization and the distinction of *sol* (ground) and *territoire* (territory) in *A Thousand Plateaus*.
- The aggregative process located on the *Khôra* as perceptual and memorial and productive of bodies of various natures and constitutive of imagistic process.
- The existence of a pre-individual chaos that is, or can be made to be, ontologically productive.

- The appearance of selection and decision within crisis (DELEUZE, 2004, p. 21; DELEUZE, 1991, p. 15).
- The clinical inclination, solicitousness and concern (in Whitehead) of the *Khôra* as the nurse of becoming.
- The constitution of the elements as Platonic solids, as crystals, which express states of genesis as formation, mutation and transformation as effects of different processes of time. (COLMAN, 2005, p. 61).

By way of bringing thought into the realm of minoritarian becoming, Deleuze urges us to return to become-child or become-woman or become-animal to get away from the identitary fascism of daily life and the constraints imposed by patriarchy to all spheres of existence. We rescue the immanent aspect of durational becoming from the closed cyclical, circular dynamic of an eternal return without exit. The circle of becoming needs to be seen as a helicoidal movement where the loop never closes and never forms — it is differentially offset as spacetime emerges immanently, always as a becoming which never produces itself. As such, this circular cycle represents the material cycle of creation of Forms, first as a perceptual entity which becomes a notion and is progressively adequated through repetition to become a Form within the mental realm. The Form, as an idealised perfection of a concept derived empirically, remains open: although the concept gradually acquires consistency and definition and dons the guises of a perfected object, it is still an unfinished entity. This means that this body that acts and can be acted upon in Spinozist terms can acquire or lose component attributes. But what draws our attention here, is that if we interpret these movements symbolically as representations of conceptual formation, we can understand the process of idea formation in different ways.

To understand the concept of the body as it applies to materiality means dodging the mostly common-sense ideation of the body as a human body: a body is whatever acts or reacts. As explained by Zeller (1892), Stoic Materialism was in agreement with the Platonic definition of a real thing as “anything possessing the capacity of acting or being acted upon” (ZELLER, 1892, p. 126). For the Stoics, nothing real exists unless it can act in a palpable sense, in that it constitutes a causal agent productive of an elemental effect as the consumption in Fire, or the flow of Water, or the pervasiveness of Air, or the ceaseless transformative agency of Earth so in order to give grounds for the existence of non-material things in the

world, their conception of matter and corporeality tended to be more extensive. Thus, they consider all substances, properties or forms as material bodies.

In reading these lines, we need to keep in mind that here material does not mean physically hard or dense or offering tactile resistance. A thing, object or body is material because it is composed of matter and therefore something which is always undergoing modification and change. As such, virtues and vices as modifications, emotions and impulses insofar that they are caused by material causes are also material. Through this interactive material causality individual actions were considered corporeal and constitutive of the phenomena of life: the artistic, the cognitive, the scientific activity coupled to logic are also materially embodied so that “everything which makes itself felt, [is] considered to be corporeal” (ZELLER, 1892, p. 130)—that which produces the impression on the eye is a body, just as the voice is, and everything else which directly impresses upon the senses. The Stoic epistemology based on sensation as mechanical action and reaction to impressions can only be caused by bodies because of their necessary reliance on material causes. Cicero asserts that Zeno “thought it totally impossible for anything to be effected by what lacked body [...] and indeed that whatever effected something or was affected by something must be body” (LLOYD, 2008, p. 86).

These bodies undergo change, constant development through their interactive agitation. Development refers both to the process and the concrete result of this process as well as to intermediate steps towards the fuller unfolding of the embodiment or its realisation. Development represents the process or movement towards the production of a natural force, energy or new form of matter—a body—as a dynamic undertaking which leads to something or is compared to an idealised attainment. It is characterised as an evolution from an elementary condition containing certain latent potentials or capabilities which over time emerge from within. The development thus has a genetic origin which unfolds organically as a gradual advancement through progressive stages.

Even if the developmental conception of the child is locked into stages, it still represents the child and childhood in dynamic terms. There’s an implicit movement in the transformative development of the child from infancy to maturity which allows us to predicate change within growth not through its effects or through experience in the world, but in terms of psychological development. This is usually expressed as the child’s mental development which involves a spectrum of changes that entail the growth of mind and the

burgeoning of its conceptual foundations. These changes in the child-body which involve analogically the various faculties and powers of the mind reflect processes of how conceptual entities come into their own. Intelligence, language acquisition, judgment and reasoning, etc in the growing child can be understood as running parallel to the creation of these faculties in themselves. When we inquire as to intellectual growth, growth of logical thinking, growth of reason or ethical judgment, as qualitative development in the child, we are inquiring as to the coming into being of these faculties. Hence, any theory which addresses the construction of reality by the child must be accompanied by a generic explanation of the actual, and how it is constructed or comes into being.

There are numerous theories which we can apply to phenomena in order to understand the development of the child and childhood. Each one offers a different take on the same set of phenomena and explains each of the others in different ways than how they explain themselves. Becoming-child is no different in that it must also entertain the same phenomena, but the interpretation is different because of the way that becoming thinks the the concept. When contrasting becoming to any of the developmental models, one must be able to distinguish between becoming and the various conceptions of development. Significantly, the expression becoming-child in itself implicates development. The first interpretation of becoming-child in a common sense approach is towards a becoming something, an activity that culminates in the fulfilment of whatever imperatives the word-concept child entails. This draws the discussion into developmental territory so that any of the manifestations through which development is cognised can be articulated through conceptual explication. This in turn poses its own set of problems, as the concept itself is not always coherently explained and then one has to adequately define the concept of concept: what it is, how it functions, when and how it comes into being.

Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school,<sup>121</sup> characterises the encounter with the world as an intensive gradation. Cicero, in *On Academic Scepticism* relates a rich anecdote of how Zeno used gestures to demonstrate the stages of acquiring knowledge:

“When he had put his hand out flat in front him with his fingers straight, he would say: ‘An impression is like this.’ Next, after contracting his fingers a bit: ‘Assent is like this.’ Then, when he had bunched his hand up to make a fist, he

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<sup>121</sup> Not Zeno of Elea, member of the Eleatic School, inventor of dialectic and postulator of the paradoxes.

would say that that was an ‘apprehension’ or ‘grasp’. (This image also suggested the name he gave to it, *katalêpsis* [lit. ‘grasp’], which hadn’t been used before.) Finally, when he had put his left hand on top, squeezing his fist tight with some force, he would say that scientific knowledge was like that: a state none but the wise enjoyed—though as for who is or ever was wise, even they aren’t in a rush to say” (Cicero, 2006, p. 84).<sup>122</sup>

In retracing Zeno’s Stoic epistemology, Diogenes asserts the truth of fact is ascertained through a perception which results in a judgment which expresses the belief, comprehension and true understanding of a thing as Ἐπιστήμη (*Epistēmē*), the knowledge of necessarily true propositions, a term often translated as science, particularly in translations of Aristotle (Preus, 2015). Diogenes Laertius defines it as either a “secure cognition or a tenor in the reception of impressions which is unchangeable by reason” (JEDAN, 2010, p. 67) and serves as the criterion for truth.<sup>123</sup> The use of the hand as the enabling constraint which focuses the concept is an interesting choice for it directly ties in to the sense of touch as source and foundation of truth for the Stoics. But, in gazing at the hand, we cognise the image in its most abstract depiction as a double articulation. For Zeno of Citium, the hand as a Φαντασία (*Phantasia*)—defined by Lidell and Scott as “Appearance or presentation to consciousness, whether immediate or in memory, whether true or illusory”—comes to us formed as what it is, but not yet identified or determined as a hand. It produces a *Phantasia*, an impression on the soul, which as Diogenes Laertius writes in *The Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (first half of the third century A.D. Trans. 1835) leads to τύπωσις (*Typosis*), an imprinting and delineation, through the modification of Ἀλλοίωσις (*Alloiosis*), a production

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<sup>122</sup> Jedan offers a Latin translation: “It seems that Zeno taught a cognitive hierarchy ranging from impression (*visum*), assent (*adsensus*), and cognition (*comprehensio* = Κατάληψις) to knowledge (*scientia*) as the highest level” (JEDAN, 2010, p. 69).

<sup>123</sup> This is a key concept which plays a big role in the understanding of the distinction D&G seek to make in the War Machine plateau and bears further definition. “The following definitions of *Epistēmē* are listed by Stobaeus (2.73.19–74.3, trans. LS 41H, modified): (According to the Stoics) (1) *Epistēmē* is a cognition (Κατάληψις) which is certain and irrefutable by argument. (2) Secondly, *Epistēmē* is a system of *epistēmai*, for example the specific argumentative [*Epistēmē*] which is present in the good agent. (3) Thirdly, *Epistēmē* is a system of expert *epistēmai* which has firmness by itself, like the virtues. (4) Fourthly, it is a tenor for the reception of impressions, which is irrefutable by argument, consisting, as some people say, in a tension and power” (JEDAN, 2010, p. 79).

of qualitative change.<sup>124</sup> Laertius cautions us not to interpret the *phantasia* as resembling the impression left by a seal-ring but as “that which is impressed, and formed, and imprinted by a real object, according to a real object, in such a way as it could not be by any other than a real object” (LAËRTIUS, 1853, p. 277).

**The notion of Κατάληψις (Katalepsis) which is articulated in the quote** needs to be examined because it brings out a number of important notions which shed light on Deleuzian thought. Where Deleuze urges us to create concepts, Zeno was renowned for neologisms and conceptual invention. Zeno creates one such concept, Katalepsis, subtraction, from the abstract noun form of the verb καταλαμβάνειν (*Katalambanein*—to take down: *Kata*, down; plus *lambanein*, take) which the Stoic Chrysippus uses to mean “grasp, understand, cognise” (Preus, 2015) as explanatory of conceptual intensification and adequacy. The action which underlies *Katalepsis*—‘to take down’—is derived from Pythagorean doctrine which states that reason flows downwards from the cosmos above which contains the static Ideas of Forms (depending on Plato or Aristotle). This represents a complex of ideas which combine to produce a variety of notions which rotate around the concept of the production of difference in becoming that takes place through subtraction, a being pulled downwards of *Katalambein*, as the diminution of the material to form in relation to its corresponding Idea. In contrast to the upward flow of elementary Fire predicated by Heraclitus, the idea of downward flow arises from Thales who predicated that Water is the elementary substance of the world. Thus, because water flows downward because of its weight, the atoms of water substance which constitute the Ideas must stream downwards. This downward flow of atoms is the same as the one which accompanied the notion of the *clinamen* which causes the atoms of matter to deviate. So the ‘taking down’ can either mean to grasp Ideas from the heavenly realm of the cosmos and take them down to the earthly domain of humans; it can also mean to grasp them on the fly from the flow of becoming; devalue, demean, debase, degrade, denigrate, disparage as the adequate, discernible Ideas are plucked from the *noumenon* and brought down to the realm of the material, or from the material world lose their duration and become undone, to complete the fall from grace in their dissolution in chaos.

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<sup>124</sup> In fleshing out the philological ideas of this section, we have relied on Liddell and Scott’s *Greek-English Lexicon (7th Ed.)*; Peters’s (1967) *Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon*, and Preus’s (2015) *Historical Dictionary of Ancient Greek Philosophy (2nd Ed.)*.



Starting from the unidentified and innominate impression of a Φαντασία (Phantasia), progressing to the Συγκατάθεσις (*Synkatathesis*) of assent of a preliminary contraction as perception, the Κατάληψις (*Katalepsis*) of perceptually grasping the impression as full cognitive contraction and culminating in the ‘scientific knowledge’ of Ἐπιστήμη (*Epistēmē*), offers insight into the sometimes hermetic Deleuzian metaphysics. The heterogeneous science which is invoked here as a soft-empiricism, as non-systematic and non-methodic experiential experimentation (a roaming or nomadic *meta-hodos*), plays off against the rigid systematicity of what Deleuze and Guattari call State Science in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987). The end result of the contracted fist within the tight containment of the hand providing a forceful constraint and an envelope of delimitation defines what constitutes the concept and safeguards its integrity. Further, the idea of contraction will play an important part in Bergson’s theories of perception and imagistic process.

If we understand perfection as activity and ask ourselves, as Spinoza does, “What can a body do?”, we can only answer that we don’t know outright. But what we do know is that the more a body does, that the more active it is, the greater its capacity-to-do becomes, the greater the pleasures, the more satisfying the fulfillment and satisfaction, the greater the perfection or completion. Not a perfection in terms of a conclusive self-satisfaction but a greater capacity, a greater potential-to-do. For all activity, all doing, is semiotic—it produces signification. Not only does it produce meaning, there is mediation involved and the advance cannot not communicate. The activity of signification is a machinic assemblage that produces the perpetuation itself of signification but as the production of signetic subjectivation. To attain greater perfection is not to attain perfection, as in being complete and totally free of defect or fault, but to attain greater (heights of) understanding and which thereby increases our scope to do as an articulation of a pragmatic ethics. This finds us in a quandary: “To do things where?” for one can carry out one’s work internally in the sense of perfecting one’s ideas or one can apply this heightened understanding to things in the world. The choice is between the cultivation of the mind, what Deleuze and Guattari might refer to agrarian domesticity, or to engage the world with new-found vigor and enhanced vitality and become a nomad. The difference is between intellectual and sensual knowledge. Between two types of knowledge, two types of *epistemē*—two modes of conducting science, two modes of conducting thought. These are not mutually exclusive modes of thought—as Whitehead in *Process and Reality* affirms they are polar extremes on a spectrum delimited

by the mental and the physical. This also corresponds to the traditional polar juxtaposition of the ideal and the material, of the transcendental and the transitory, of ideas and of sensation, of the intellectual and the esthetic. The two poles might be separated, but they are linked. Further, they inform each other in a circular movement where one complements the other by enhancing its capacities and abilities—the movement is ideally a feedback loop of progressive improvement, even if there are setbacks which can also occur.

Traditionally, the ideal, intellectual or mental pole is spatially positioned “at the top” and the material, sensorial, or physical is placed at the bottom: the head, which does all the thinking and is always in the clouds, is up; the feet, which does all the walking and constantly in touch with the earth, is down. Also, the realm of the ideal is the more real, because it is the more adequate, the more perfect, in that they have attained a degree of perfection that they exist. At the bottom is the realm of chaos, of difference and change, where there is no existence possible because it is pure becoming. In Spinoza, these activities are referred to as *maiozem* and *minorem perfectionem*<sup>125</sup>, as greater and lesser perfection, where God can be found atop everything as the being of infinite perfection. But in opposing the greater perfection and the lesser perfection as the activities which pertain to the the ideal and the material, and consider that juxtaposition and each term individually in comparison to the other, we can understand that this might be at the core of Deleuze’s thought. And so we can widen the inclusiveness of that bipolarity which pits being and (non)being in terms of existential opposition to each other, as well as notions which can be derived from that contrast. First and foremost, the Major and the Minor, the truth and the powers of the false, the state and the nomad, the clinical and the critical, thinking versus doing.

If the Ideal is “on top” and the material is “on the bottom”, the perfective intention or proclivity of the “top” accords it with a heightened ability to affect, to action, to perfection, to the experiencing of the world, also heightens the capacity of the “bottom” to better suffer “perfection” from the “top” to be affected—it allows it to assume a more active disposition in its passiveness, in its receptivity of active perfection as correctives. And this heightened activeness of the passive improves its perfection and allows it to move

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<sup>125</sup> For example: *Ethics* IP11: “We see, then, that the Mind can undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection. These passions, indeed, explain to us the affects of Joy and Sadness”. “Videmus itaque mentem magnas posse pati mutationes, et iam ad maiorem, iam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quae quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus laetitiae et tristitiae”. <http://users.telenet.be/rwmeijer/spinoza/works.htm>

upwards into the realm of greater adequacy and greater perfection. This is the move at the core of intuition, the essential dynamic, the machinic in the assemblage with drives the transformation of affect from lesser to greater perfection, from less to more adequacy, from lesser to greater reality.

The Minor as the activity of the Lesser Perfection, of the material, of the powers of the false, of sensation of the nomadic, brings us into the realm of greater agitation and violence, of movement and transformative change, of the physical bodily interaction with the world. This activity is the activity of becoming and of interacting with the world. And it is towards this region that Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari seek to send us in order to heighten our subjectivity, immediate our encounter with the world, adopt a primitive empiricism which is the foundation of Becoming-Child.




Figure 4.3: Bergson's Cone of Memory as Cone of Possibility and its Temporal Outlay.

### **Bergson's Cones of Possibility**

Bergson's Cone presented in *Matter and Memory* has a corollary cone which is produced diametrically opposite to the axis which denotes time. As every high-school student knows, a cone is a surface of rotation, produced by a traversing line rotated at a fixed angle around an axis at a point, in our case around Point S, which produces equal and opposite mirrored cones. If the axis represents a time line, and we select Point S to be the present, then to one side we would have the past and the Cone of Memory predicated by Bergson and on the other side another cone, the Cone of Possibility, predicated by modern physics, which encapsulates the possibility of future eventuality at point S. Transversally, the Plane of Consistency emerges immanently as representing the specific modality of the Movement of Materiality at Point S as the conjunction with the Cone of Perspective which

produces the associated milieu. Thus, Point S is the present which solidifies the junction as both axis of the perceptual semiosis developed in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the vertical system of materiality sandwiched between Grace and Chaos, and the horizontal system of perspective as the relative *agencement* of the advancement of process.

To understand how becoming as material movement meshes with process, we need to remember that the cone of Figure 4.3 is not a static construction, neither motionless nor unchanging—which, as representing the present, must be interpreted in terms of movement through the welter of space-time. All depicted constituent elements are ceaselessly undergoing change: the Point S is moving, the attitude of the cones is variable, and the orientation of the plane P is changing—the entire assemblage is in flux, simultaneously exhibiting all the modes of elemental process, yet only revealing what is to be seen depending on how we choose to problematise the event of the encounter. It is constant transformation; the Cone of Memory and the Cone of possibility do not constitute points or individualised instants. As we saw in the last chapter, imagistic process is not linear and it is not continuous; it is sequential, but not serial; it is closed and monadic yet open and multiplicitous. It is iterative, relational, reticular, concrete and durational. The movement of materialism is what establishes the Plane of Consistency and its particular modality of becoming is what characterises the specific becoming. As such, Becoming-Child is the modality of becoming that informs the plane of selection as it problematises the present in terms of the zone of interest predicated by the perspective of the present as a privileged point. Further, the plane of consistency is not a plane as we have already mentioned earlier, but representative of the selection and an expression of the modality of engagement that the immediate encounter calls for. If the plane of consistency is in fact a representation of becoming, then its mode of processual production illustrates the production of time as an expression of differentiation and the cone as an expression of imagistic process as perspectival and cinematographic, we end up producing time as differentiation. Finally, none of this structure exists outright. The construction of the Cones and the Plane of Consistency only appear as traces over time and are never revealed as such; they are not snapshots.

For Descartes, duration is “in each thing, only a mode under which we conceive of that thing as long as it continues to exist” (DESCARTES, 1982, p. 24)—the thing is a definite static, unchanging, material reality which has a definite inception date and a definite expiry date. The thing here has a stable identitary existence during its duration as a ‘substance’, as

extensive homogeneity understood as “nothing other than a thing existing in such a manner that it has need of no other thing in order to exist.” (DESCARTES, 1982, p. 192).

In contrast, Bergson’s vision of duration gets rid of the substance and replaces it by a multiplicity which perdures as an entity as long as the entity maintains its operative coherence as fulfilment of its processual function over time. Duration is thus considered as a coherent, logical continuity of a confused multiplicity of elements which can be material objects, non-material objects, or states of consciousness considered as a oneness which analysis alone can distinguish (BERGSON, 1960, p. 87). This multiplicity can in turn be discerned for what it is as a profusion of qualities and intensities composed of accretions of reciprocal perceptual outlooks within becoming. Contra Kant, Bergson’s duration endows space an existence which interpenetrates its content but which also unfolds in time: each component of the entity is dependent on every other component and is therefore extensive, durational within the maintenance of the operative coherence of the whole. As Bergson wrote in 1915, “The representation of a multiplicity in the form of ‘reciprocal penetration’, is quite different from numerical multiplicity—the representation of a heterogeneous, qualitative and creative duration—is the point from which I set out and to which I have constantly returned” (LACEY, 1989, p. 25)<sup>126</sup>. What is key here is that the entity be seen as a unified process, as an indivisible movement, as a coherent operative whole which demonstrates the existence of time as creation without actually invoking it. The durational entity not only produces itself within and through time without being time itself but instead creates temporalities and time pressures as affective expression which suggest abductively the existence of time through its expression as discernible signs.

To think interactivity within duration is a question of considering the qualities and intensities that are brought out by the experience elicited by the creative process. But if an event is a multiplicity—a pluralism of heterogeneous components—characterised as a composite function involving a plurality of constituent elements (both actual and virtual and of a variety of natures), their interaction is conditioned by a process of selection which emerges from the becoming by an immanent discernment, a perceptual operation which is befitting to the elements present and constitutive of bodies. To think becoming is to think the encounter, the event, the conceptual through a different paradigm of the constitution of

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<sup>126</sup> The reciprocal penetration mentioned here will be of significance later when discussing Simondon’s concreteness within the Associated Milieu.

bodies. It requires a letting go of the past, of the security that recollection and the *Déjà*-had of experience gives us, a leaving behind of the archive of memorial habit and custom and what is known. But it is not only to forget the past, it is an active forgetting of those structures and tried-and-true methods which offer consistent cognitive and intellectual stability. It is a creativity which activates potentials when most everyone else is content with the *status quo* or with facilitating permanence to thought and its scaffoldings. To engage this kind of creative thought as a practice requires that one truly engage the unarchival in such a way that allows the temporality of these entities to come through. The disinterested cleverness of the *flâneur* where time is of no consequence is a good point of entry, a methodic first step, towards acquiring insight into the knowledge which is invisible or at best not so readily accessible and which eludes the swifter, more directed denizens of the world. But going unarchival requires deeper work than leisured observation; it demands a reconditioning of how we interpret our engagement with the world and a putting into question of those structures by which we organise experience and consolidate the certainty of repetition and recollection. The rationality of thought which Deleuze identifies in *Difference and Repetition* as the identity of the concept which is reflected in a *ratio cognoscendi*, the opposition in the predicate which is developed in a *ratio fiendi*, the analogy of judgement which is distributed in a *ratio essendi*, and the resemblance of perception which determines a *ratio agendi*, need to be freed (DELEUZE, 1994, p. 262).

But this we call change or difference or modification which often goes by inadequated—not unnoticed, but unidentified—as an affective tampering which has caused a specific response in us. And we can say, paraphrasing Deleuze, that the most curious thing about becoming as an image of thought is how it conceives of itself as an abstract universal. We never refer back to the real forces that *form* becoming as thought; thought itself is never related to the real forces that presuppose it *as thought*. Becoming is never related to what presupposes it. But there is no becoming that, before being a becoming, is not the bringing into effect of a sense or the realisation of value. Becoming, as a concept, is in itself entirely undetermined and self-contained. We always have the becomings we deserve as a function of the sense of what we conceive, of the value of what we believe (DELEUZE, 1983, p. 97).<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> In this last paragraph, we have replaced the word truth with the word becoming, which could have been also replaced by movement to equally satisfactory results. Substituting becoming by time yields an interesting proposition of thinking time as thought. To do this type of substitution is unduly

This processual unfolding of the world as becoming, as an immanent durational emergence of itself for itself which undermines the pre-eminence of the human and deactivates many of the categories which guarantee understanding, precludes our seeing nature's naturing as the supposedly fixed terms which are the putative objects of perception. The consideration of becoming in non-human terms reduces us, diminishes us into participant individuations in the processual imagistic machinery which drives all—we lose our privileges not only as being the chosen creatures of Creation but we also lose our exalted status as subjects and as the only makers of signification. As such, we lose our existential certitude as beings to inhabit the no-man's land of non-being. Becoming refers to activity of mind, and how that activity *unfolds* or occupies the encounter, how activity fashions the flow on the *moëbius* strip of the mind. A becoming as an activity of mind is to become something other than what the norms of discipline and rationality enforce it to be. The becoming of mind is at its most wildly creative, at its most animal and animate, when it has to fight for its survival within the war machine.

If our perceptual process is cinematographic, we must acknowledge the genetic nature of a becoming anchored in perception, for every time the shutter goes black, whatever emerges in the light must do so from darkness, from non-being as a non-existence. Something must arise or emerge from the immobility of pure darkness or pure lightness, from the primordial blindness of infinity. But is there something here or is there a nothingness, a void? Or is this a container of some sort which serves as the empty set of creation? Do we actually begin from zero or is there a residual that allows for the advance as transformation or translation? The residual as persistence is the objectivity of the image and it is different or of a different nature from the difference that emerges as the excedent that distinguishes one instant from the next.

Within the orthodox construction of reality, one could initially position becoming at the bottom rung of the morally desirable ascension from Chaos to the beatific realm of God, where we can position the Child at the bottom and the Adult Man at the top, just this side of the threshold of the material to the spiritual. But if we remove ourselves from the moralistic striving towards the Godly and goodness, we see that Becoming is not only the movement upwards, but any movement whatever towards the availing of potential in the creation of

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inaccurate even if, ultimately, the concepts which constitute the conceptual nexus around becoming are so concretised that they all seem to express different aspects on the same movement.

difference towards whatever it is not as infinite openness—Becoming-Child situates itself within this creative dynamic of openness to infinite potentials. There is no implied *telos* or finality in the actualisation of becoming, only durational metastabilities within dynamic process and the opening of the field of experience to new potential. And it is because there is no moralistic *telos* that we have an ethics as descriptive of intensification. For Spinoza, the greater the adequacy, the greater the power of action, because the greater the commonality, the greater the number of participations.

We have been arguing the processual side, and so the diagram provides the essential constituents which guide the intelligence within perceptual cognition as the neural pathways which create the “closing” concept as the moment of crisis which impels advance and not as the production of objects. As we saw earlier, the result of ascertaining Anger is not one of proffering the label “Anger” to the event but the pragmatic formulation of the resolution to the question “Fight or Flight?”. This formulation happens on another level—just like the imagistic contraction happens on a different neural circuit. We can think of this jump to another level as an upward move, an “ascension”, which in French would be *monter* or in Portuguese *subir*, so that the operation could be characterised as a *montage*. In terms of our research, we would repose this question in terms of a machinic assemblage being created through the abrupt juxtaposition of images? This would offer grounds to re-examine the theoretical foundations of montage, particularly the Kuleshov effect, and reconsider how its dialectical and associative principles are actually formulated — a concern which unfortunately is beyond the scope of this thesis.

We seem to be using perception and cognition interchangeably, but we draw the distinction at perception as not yet dependent on memory, whereas a cognition is a repeatable and repeated perception which is memorially conditioned and ascertained through repetition. Children are better illustrative examples of perception than of cognition in this respect. In Bergsonian terms, as presented in *Matter and Memory*, the child is more preoccupied with pure perception, a mode of perception which does not rely on memory, and is more intent on producing primitive closed diagrams as concepts than in ascertaining or determining the pragmatic consequences. These primitive diagrams emerge experientially and serve as seed crystals towards subsequent future aggregation—as such, they are producing or laying down the memorial circuitry which will become permanent as habituation and will become entrenched as a pattern of cognition. Once this pattern of



cognition is established, it becomes difficult to undo because the relational linkages that constitute the body are not only pertinent to the constitution of that singular body, but reticularly link it to other bodies and milieus as concrete associations with myriad other assemblages.

For adults to go into Becoming-Child mode, they would have to engage the World according to this mode of empirical discovery which entails an active mode of forgetting, a willed destruction of the archive which contains all the pre-composed circuitry of habitual memory. This requires the pursuit of novel techniques of engagement, and unconventional practices relation, of ontological understanding, of perception, of conditioning the encounter, in order to undo the habitual... to make the familiar, unfamiliar... the known, unknown... in order to engage our quotidian creatively. This willful pursuit of the obliteration of memory, of empirical innocence, and of reverting to the minoritarian for creative purposes and by creative means constitutes the unarchival practices which permit Becoming-Child to take hold.

### **The epistemological implications of combining Becoming and Imagistic Process**

If we consider the historical progress of Ancient Greek thought in wide terms we can discern a shift to the modes of understanding through which the Greeks understood and expressed their understanding of nature. The history of thought is no other than the history of its representation. Over a period of 30 years, from 500 b.c.e. to 470 c.e. (ORTEGA Y GASSET, 1960), Greek thought progresses from myth to science—its infancy emerges in the stories of titans, of mythical beings, which symbolically express the forces of nature in terms of superhuman entities and whose maturity is exhibited by the predication of the understanding through what we now understand as science. What is key to this historical understanding of thought is that that thinking needs to be understood as the encounter with the world and how we express that which enters in the encounter. When early Greek thinkers—individuals who ponder what the world is about but are not yet philosophers—begin to describe the functioning of the world, they do so by way of anthropomorphised bodies. They understand the functioning of the world in terms of ‘bodies’ but lack the means to express the constitution of these bodies. The only bodies they know are plant bodies, animal bodies and human bodies which express their character through their activity or

actions in the world: the Greeks understand that bodies act in the world and as a result produce change. Thus, they express Nature's nature through its naturing nature—change is understood as resulting from the agency of bodies, bodies which can only be characterised as living beings and whose most familiar form is that of the human. But before we dismiss these metaphors as primitive and infantile, why are many still wont to elaborate Spinoza's "what can a body do?" only in terms of "what can a human body do?" Or understand "On the third day, Jesus rose again"? Or understand the Freudian drama of Oedipus? Or God as a heavenly body sitting on a cloud?

Later, the Greeks come to express the causal order of Nature by way of tragedy through the dramatic understanding of Nature's naturing as a relentless, inexorable happening, a manifestation of the intuition of time which crushes everything in its advance through its uncompromising progression as an inescapable inevitability. This necessary causality is understood ultimately in terms of human bodies in the world despite the intercession of the Gods behind the scene.

The working of Nature is understood through natural elements which are not human bodies but substances which allude to the functional understanding of the processes of nature by the use of "natural" non-human bodies. Thus we have the expression of the nature of the world expressed through the elementary substances of Fire, Water, Air, Earth, Quintessence, *apeiron*, the interval, etc. which are not direct attributions but metaphorical expressions. So if Heraclitus writes "All is Fire" or if Thales writes "All is Water", to interpret these at face value as everything in the world is composed of fire or of water is likely an erroneous rendition. Perhaps, a happier interpretation would be an expression of processual understanding as 'The composition of everything in the world is akin to the combustive or consumptive action of fire' or 'Things in the world subscribe to a way of being akin to the flow of water'... the conclusion is based on the empirical observation of nature but there is no reasoned explanation because the physical understanding of is simply not there. Without the general understanding of a theoretical underpinning, the explanation falls back on a metaphoric or allegoric explanation. In this allegorical explanations, the presence of God is relegated to an external position which He occupies as creator of all, yet dissociated from creation which functions independently of him. Eventually this will lead to a scientific thought of Archimedes which in its style and methods subscribes to modern scientific thought.

In discussing the Idea in Plato and the Form in Aristotle, Bergson treats the idea of Plato's falling back on God as mediator between the Idea which ought to serve as model and processual becoming in general as an explanation predicated on myth. To us this expository device represents a regression to early Greek thought where ideas (metaphysical or otherwise) are understood as bodies, anthropomorphised and presented as human bodies exhibiting human characteristics and conduct. Thus, when Deleuze and Guattari describe Becoming-Child in terms which rely upon the imagery of children but refrain from explaining the neologism in 'processual' terms, they are adopting the method of Becoming-Child. This would consist in giving human form to abstract concepts in order to describe their functioning in the world. This is not a matter of making concepts accessible to children, as an infantilisation of concepts, but of regressing in the epistemic progression of explication to the representation of undefinable forces and processes in human terms, much like the Greeks did in the infancy of the historical outlay of their thought. Thus, the Method of Becoming-Child is a rhetorical device which seeks to explain abstract ideas from processual thought through the metaphorical/allegorical use of human agents as essentially explicatory. The movement here is akin to a truncated generalisation where the frame of reference consists of a human Form as opposed to a more general primitive as effective agent. Thus, the postulation of the War Machine in Deleuze and Guattari would be derived by way of application of a Becoming-Child as Method to express the abstract process of thinking as an encounter with the world in terms of the behaviour of nomadic peoples and a State machine putatively made up of human beings, etc.

The Becoming-Child is a return to the infancy of thought, a return to the origins of pre-conceptual impressions, to nascent notions which are pre-rational. They are pre-rational, though not necessarily non-reasonal, because in the child, thought can be logical yet non-rational — there is no memorial conceptual basis through which the child can compare and contrast, i.e. rationalise the encounter, to ascertain the truthfulness of his impressions. To Become-Child is to go back to the pre-conceptual of pure experience as foundation for re-conceptualising, to conceptualise the encounter with novelty like a child. But the key aspect of Becoming-Child is the production of concepts without a rationale for comparison and contrast—children are philosophers par excellence because they thrive on the production of concepts from pure perception and recurrence or repetition in experience. They are by nature philosophers and naturally unarchival.

By carrying out this method, we are creating a movement which takes us from the Being-Man as an Male Adult as a Form, as a transcendental static idea and 'degrades' it to that of the Becoming-Child. What is most obvious here is the production of a majoritarian-minoritarian split as reflective of the adult-child split but also of the adulthood-nonage split. In terms of *Aufklärung*, of Enlightenment, as defined by Kant, amplified by Simondon, and then transformed by Deleuze and Guattari into minoritarian becoming, Deleuze and Guattari's project of Becoming-Minor represents a counter-Enlightenment. Contrary to what Kant proposes in his renowned *An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"* (1784), Deleuze and Guattari encourage us perhaps not to *remain* in nonage, but to embark on the path of becoming minor. Kant and D & G might use the same term 'minor' but to differently significant effect. Kant uses it as a pejorative that he defines as the "indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind without another's guidance". He sees nonage as rooted in a self-imposed laziness and cowardice that resists independent thought.

Why does one take the path of Becoming-Child? Because it endows us with an unhampered, creative subjectivity. In describing these possibilities, we are not specifically speaking of children per se as individuals in the world but as functions and practices which condition becomings according to the mode of Becoming-Child. By doing so, we are not weighing in on the virtues or the failings of these methods, simply attesting to their being at hand towards the activation of experience in specific ways which are identified as being counter to what we have identified as the human counterpart of God in the realm of the material: Man. These modes of being are not specific to Becoming-Child in that it is not only children exploit these practices; any becoming can make use of them but what really sets them apart and makes them specific to Becoming-Child is how the weak, immature, dependent body of the child in development theory with its various capacities to affect and be affected interacts with the world as 'pure', without criteria, references, or morality to ostensibly guide it. We offer Becoming-Child here as a 'pure' ideation which it would not normally have in the 'field' just like any other rhizomatic conceptual construct—it, of course, does not live 'on its own' on an island, separate from the rest of the world.

## **Memories of a Theologian**

A theme which we have come across repeatedly in our research is the affable and welcoming posture of Christian Churches towards children through their Theology of Children and the exegesis of Jesus's concern for children. Even if the Old Testament tends to be disciplinarian, there are references to a favourable disposition towards children, it is in the New Testament that we find various references to Jesus's tender heart for children. Possibly the best known of these quotes is "Let the children come unto me, and do not stop them... For it is for such as these that the kingdom of heaven belongs" (MATTHEW 19:14). It is a phrase that has been repeated by cynical politicians of every stripe to signify that they are indeed endowed with human feelings, understand the Holy Family and have the same interests and hopes at heart as the parents-citizens. The children are the mythological signifiers of a people to come: they articulate the fold<sup>128</sup> that aligns the interests of the state as vehicled by the politician with those of the parents.



Figure 4.4: *Jesus calls the children to him, Gospel of Mark*. Julius Schnorr von Carolsfeld, (1794-1872).



Figure 4.5: Adolf Hitler at the Berghof, his Alpine home of choice (No date, public domain).

In the case of Jesus, one must differentiate between Jesus of flesh and blood and Jesus Word of God. Christian doctrine understands them simultaneously, hence the significance of the rites of the Mass as the principal sacramental service which combines the Liturgy of the Word with the Liturgy of the Eucharist as the resolution of the mystery of faith. We also see Jesus as the Word of God embodied and so have no problem

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<sup>128</sup> Here we mean in the sense of the Deleuzian Fold and not in the sense of a congregation of sheep.

understanding this in terms of Jesus as the message of God articulated through Word and Deed. To do this allows us to understand and interpret his Life, his Acts and Death and Resurrection as Peircean signs—as standing for something to someone. If Jesus is the Body which expresses or mediates the *Logos*, Word of God as a body of knowledge through the narrative accounts of the New Testament as related by the four Apostles, then we can see that He is literally a semiotic body—Σῶμα-Σημα, a soma-sema— who as the Son of God, is a material body, Σῶμα (soma) that is of this world but mediates God the Father through the Holy Spirit. It is for this reason that when the Gospel is read the phrase “Word of God” is said. As we pointed out earlier, the root of the word, Σημα (sema), is a bi-polar enigma in that it indicates a futurity while attesting pastness: it is a token of futurity that exists as a mark on a field indicating the location of an entity that is dead and buried and it is also that which characterises signeletic primacy. The marker might be on the surface as the grave stone but the significant meaning is buried in the earth, beneath the surface of the ground. The physical body of Jesus might have died on the cross, but the Word will live on without the physical body of Christ as signified by the Resurrection. Thus, the power of the Word as Logos blows open the tomb and casts the stone aside which is both sealing and marking the presence of the Word, so it can make its way anew in the world.

The manner in which Jesus is characterised as a human being in the Gospels is different from the attributes that he will later be assigned when used as an instrument of the Church. His ministry consisted of teaching and healing — of playing the part of doctor — and he embraced the Other in the form of the child, the prostitute, the ill and the elderly, the dead, the poor of spirit and the destitute—all indicators of becomings. Specifically with children, these healings included curing diseases (John 4:46–52), exorcising demons (Mark 7:24–30; 9:14–27) and raising at least one child from the dead (Luke 8:40–56).<sup>129</sup> We can also understand His relation with these becomings as aspects of the perceptual semeiotic of imagistic thought and interpret each of them as material becomings that articulate worldly figurations of deficient, sick or sinful embodiments of the body of the Logos of God, in a word, differences to be repudiated rather than accepted. Jesus as the supreme healer of deficient bodies can then be seen as the pre-eminent teacher, the first Doctor of the Church, that would “correct” these inadequate material manifestations of God’s creation.

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<sup>129</sup> <https://www.gotquestions.org/Jesus-and-children.html>

The Scene depicted in the Carolsfeld image (Figure 4.4) is from a Gospel story in Matthew (19:13-14) which relates how the people brought children to be blessed by Jesus. The gesture is called “Imposition of the Hands” or the “Laying-on of the hands” and is a sacred rite which has come down from patriarchal times and has come to designate an essential Catholic doctrine as spelled out in Hebrews 6:2 as a mediation of the descent of the Holy Spirit.<sup>130</sup> It represents the supreme act of the doctor as teacher and healer, the direct transmission of the Logos as healing. The sacrament survives to this day in the Rite of Ordination, Confirmation, Baptism and the Coronation of Kings (CROSS and LIVINGSTONE, 1997). Hitler represents the secular version of the sacrament of χειροτονία, (*cheirotonia*), of the laying-on of hands, as a practice that the royalty of England and France, acting as a conduit for God’s grace, engaged in as a form of hybrid scientific faith-healing predominantly in the early modern period, but practised until the early 18th century in England and until 19th century in France (BROGAN, 2015): hybrid in that, as we shall presently see, part of the healing is based on faith in the power of God and part of it on the healing powers of the gold amulet given during the ceremony.



Fig. 4.6: *The royal gift of healing*—Charles II touching a subject with scrofula. By R. White. Public Domain, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=27892324>

But to us these seem like grounds to ask if there is not an implicit acceptance by the King as supreme stand-in for the State that they are responsible for the illness in their

<sup>130</sup> <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07698a.htm>

realm?<sup>131</sup> That there is a direct relation between the health of people and their material well-being as welfare? Is there not a religious and scientific conflation that has not yet been resolved? The giving of the amulet as part of the cure is not only pharmaceutically medicinal but also an admission of the State's responsibility for the welfare of the people. The symbology at play here would indicate the expression of culpability and shame on the part of the State for their shortcomings in assuring the welfare of its charges: the State must actively participate in and contribute to the well-being of the people by directly investing in their welfare.

When we compare the images depicting the laying-on of hands, we are struck by their similarity and at the same time we are somehow repulsed by their comparison. Yet, we need to acknowledge that Figure 4.4 has some of the insidiousness of Figure 4.5 in that it crosses a line which, amidst the goodwill of Jesus towards the children, allows us to discern the active hidden presence of the dogmatic militancy of the Church. Figure 4.6, which depicts English King Charles II touching a patient afflicted with scrofula,<sup>132</sup> lies somewhere in between the two other figures in that Royalty assumes its rôle as healer by Divine Right through an Ordination of sorts during Coronation. But the King's Touch as faith healing is more complex than meets the eye in that along with the transference of healing and Divine Grace there is an admission by the State for the direct responsibility of the well-being of the people as well as acknowledgement that their subjects' mundane afflictions result from poverty—spiritual, moral, physical, and material.

During the administering of the King's Touch each individual was given a touch-piece, a gold coin called a Gold Angel, (BROGAN, 2015), which was tied to a white ribbon which enabled it to be worn as an amulet. On one side, the coin depicted the Archangel Michael slaying the dragon, and on the other, the ship of state emblazoned with the royal arms sustained by the holy cross, and an inscription: *Per Crucem Tuam Salva Nos Christe Redemptor* ('By thy cross save us, Christ Redeemer') (YOUNG, 2016).<sup>133</sup> The gold piece is also significant for another reason. It would seem that on account of the metallurgical advances

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<sup>131</sup> This theme will be taken up in our discussion of Oedipus in the next section.

<sup>132</sup> Scrofula, otherwise known as the King's Evil (malady) or the King's Touch, is "an infection of the lymph nodes by the tubercular bacillus, known in the modern world as tubercular adenitis; its symptoms include painful and disfiguring abscesses and suppurations on the face and neck" (BROGAN, 2015).

<sup>133</sup> <https://drfrancisyoung.com/2016/01/21/the-gold-angel-legendary-coin-enduring-amulet/>



brought on by the alchemical sciences, the quality of the gold was finer and more effective medically. “The idea that gold was a sovereign remedy was a familiar one in iatrochemistry and Paracelsan/astrological medicine, and it is possible that one reason for belief in the effectiveness of touchpieces was the correspondence between gold as the metal of the Sun and royalty, which corresponded astrologically with the Sun” (YOUNG, 2016). Thus, the rite of the King’s Touch articulated a complex sacrament with a circular argument which stated that the king could heal because he was ordained king and he was king because he could heal. Apparently, Divine Grace was able to flow both ways but it was helped by the faith in the medicinal power of the superior alchemical gold contained in the Angel which worked in unison with the *virtus* of the King’s Touch to increase the *seignorage* of the coin and opened the value spread of the coins between their face value and their commodity value.

Still, by the time these ideas are picked up in modernity, we see how they have been transformed. Where Jesus was truly concerned by the deficient and destitute, driven by the acceptance of difference and the ministration of succor and compassion, the concern for the Other was transformed into a question of legitimising the Divine power of royalty as a conflation of Church and State and subsequently the political preoccupation towards the recruitment and maintenance of future followers, prevention of errancy and the discipline and punishment for trespasses against the dictates of the dogma—laying-on of hands has become a cynical publicity stunt and the Golden Angel is today nothing other than purchasing of votes.

The children featured in the Gospels are treated by Jesus with respect, dignity and appreciation. In the few scriptural records which give accounts of the encounters with children, Jesus is always welcoming and shows them kindness and love, even to the disparagement of the adults present. In Mark 10:13-16, this heightened goodwill is manifestly prominent: “People were bringing little children to Jesus for him to place his hands on them, but the disciples rebuked them. When Jesus saw this, he was indignant. He said to them, “Let the little children come to me, and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of God belongs to such as these. Truly I tell you, anyone who will not receive the kingdom of God like a little child will never enter it.” And he took the children in his arms, placed his hands on them and blessed them”. This is one of the key teachings of the Gospels: Matthew (19:13-14), Mark (10:13-16), and Luke (18:15-17) report on the event in very similar ways and all emphasise the direct transmission by his blessing which is indicative of Jesus’s

affirmation of the spiritual capacity of children. But if one heeds the teachings of the Christian Church, the child's openness is not because of "the wondrous subjective states we often find in children such as trustfulness, receptivity, simplicity, or wonder, beautiful as these are", but because of their "*helpless dependence*" (HUGHES, 2015)<sup>134</sup>—and it is the humility, faith and trust in the child which colours the helplessness and natural wonder that produces the pristine untrammelled receptivity the Church covets.

Jesus, as mediator of the Word, understands that the children must be cared for and valued for what they are and how they are, not because they are the *materia prima*, the pre-individual potential, upon which a future ecclesiastical community will be predicated. When Jesus states "I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because You have hidden these things from the wise and learned, and revealed them to little children" (Matthew 11:25–26) one seems to feel that the message that he is looking to convey is different from the message being received. The message hinges on the Becoming-Child so that when states, "Truly I tell you, unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, whoever takes the lowly position of this child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. And whoever welcomes one such child in my name welcomes me"(Matthew 18:1-5), one wonders about the nature of the teachings he is looking to impart. What is the learning that children have that is hidden to the wise and the learned? How can children be simple, ignorant, and inexperienced, yet cannot be fooled by the teachings of the chief priests and teachers? What knowledge or ways of knowing do children have that is no longer intellectually available to adults? It is not a pre-ordained, received knowledge, but the unarchival of the Becoming-Child. It is the inquisitive method of the child as a quest for the true analytical account which only a series of whys to infinity can provide.

If the Word of God is going to inform the eventual people to come of Christianity, one ought to begin with aligning that future with the potential expressed by children. The child of the actual world as a body of flesh and blood represents the pure potential that can take on heft and which can also embody the subjective mission of the Word. Jesus's understanding of the child is in terms of the Word as conditioning and *agencement* of the becoming-child and not as behavioural constraints or disciplinary channeling of future adults. The teachings of Jesus on children seem at odds with the degrading patronising

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<sup>134</sup> <https://www.crossway.org/articles/what-jesus-thinks-about-children>

attitude of some Christian Churches and their outlook on children founded on sin, deficiency and requiring salvation, which preach that “just as children need discipline and correction in order to stay on the right path, God tells us in Scripture that we are His children and He corrects us as a father” (Bible Study Tools, 2019).<sup>135</sup> Nothing is more explicit than Proverbs 13:24, “Whoever spares the rod hates their children, but the one who loves their children is careful to discipline them”. It would seem that the disciples attitude of rebuking children survived Jesus’s admonishments so that today, for example, we have the Bethlehem Baptist Church speculating on the nature of children and concluding that they have a sinful nature, that they are immature and are to be made accountable. Similarly, a policy paper from the Mennonite Church interprets the Gospels as Jesus calling for the “childlike submission and dependence by those who wish to be part of his kingdom” and interprets the apostles repudiation of the children as “indicating that after all the examples and lessons, they still did not understand” (WIEBE, 1993). These are perverse interpretations that can only be said to be self-serving to the interests of the institution. Yet, they interpret verse Matthew 18:3-4, “Truly, I say to you, unless you turn and become like children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven”, as Jesus demanding a conversion/new birth from adults. This feels like an advocacy for becoming-child to the adults, but, in the eyes of the Church, not towards the acceptance of philosophy of difference that Jesus seems to be preaching, but of a subservience, a childlike submission and dependence to the will of God channeled by the ecclesiastical machine (WIEBE, 1993, p. 3). What is interesting about this is the implicit understanding within the Gospels of what is at stake in Becoming-Child and what it entails. A paradigm shift in thought can only take place through a becoming-child where the existing epistemological and mnemonic structures are dissolved through anarchival practices and are permitted to indulge a pure empiricism of processual becoming.

What can we take from this? The concept of the child as a becoming in conjunction with Jesus produces a complex assemblage of possibility which retraces many of the paths laid down by our foregoing analyses. In the relation of Jesus as healer and teacher, we perceive the relation of the doctor and the body of knowledge and its articulation in the world; in His relation with children, we can see aspects of transmission and contagion that are at play with becoming; we see the what Becoming-Child entails in terms of the

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<sup>135</sup> <https://www.biblestudytools.com/topical-verses/children-bible-verses>

transformation and conversion and why the characterological attributes usually assigned to the child are necessary in order to be able to effectuate the particular type of becoming that Becoming-Child as a processual concept presupposes. What becomes of importance for us here is the movement that occurs in the Resurrection where the body of Jesus might have died on the cross, but the Word will live on as the body of Christ. It allows us to understand a historical personage as the embodiment of a system of beliefs without having to tread the path of literature.

### Memories of Oedipus

We would like to consider another semi-mythical character and situate that discussion within our paradigm of imagistic process and becoming. *Même si ça crève les yeux*,<sup>136</sup> Deleuze and Guattari do not engage in this type of interpretation of Oedipus even if the signaletic content of becoming as concept, elaborated as Becoming-Child or Becoming-Woman, is already doing much of the work for us.

The Oedipus complex emerges from two scant pages (in my edition) of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1931) from Freud's own dream analysis. In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud writes, "A single idea of general value dawned on me. I have found, in my own case too [the phenomenon of] being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood" (MASSON, 1985, p. 272).<sup>137</sup> French psychoanalyst Juan-David Nasio discounts Freud's discovery of the Oedipus complex through self-analysis as related in the later editions of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, dispels the idea that Freud might have conceived the idea from examining children, and instead speculates that the invention of Oedipus was the result of listening to his adult patients (NASIO, 2005). But Nasio does ask the highly pertinent question, "For what problem, then, is Oedipus a solution?" For him, "Oedipus is the response to two questions: First, what gives form to the sexual identity of a man and a woman, and second, how does a person become a neurotic?" (NASIO, 2005, p. 43). This is a very serious proposition for if we simply reverse the problem, the answer that should surge forward without hesitation when someone asks "What gives

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<sup>136</sup> Even if it gouges one's eyes out...

<sup>137</sup> Masson, Jeffrey M. (ed.). (1985). *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904*. (Trans. Jeffrey Masson). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p. 272.

form to the sexual identity of a man and a woman?” should be unreservedly: Oedipus! If this is not the reflex, top-of-mind response, psychoanalysis has a serious foundational problem. Similarly for “how does a person become a neurotic?”, one simply realises the circularity of the proposition: I become a neurotic because of my inability to reconcile my Oedipality, and because Oedipus, I am a neurotic — by aiming to disprove my neuroticism, I only prove it. Freud’s interpretation feels more like a private matter than a *bona fide* interpretation of the Sophoclean tragedy rendered universal truth, a Word of God, as the conception of a generalised Oedipus. If, as Nasio asserts, Oedipus is the most crucial concept in psychoanalysis, to us it feels like a flimsy foundation for the momentous edifice of psychoanalysis—unless, of course, it’s goal is oedipalisation. The interpretation of the myth in psychoanalytic terms neither adequately interprets the myth, nor does it adequately ground the process it seeks to identify: it should find a different moniker. One should begin by asserting that the Oedipus myth predates Sophocles version and that the Freudian interpretation is peripheral to the original story and its dramatisation. Despite this criticism, our intent is not to review or render more profound the psychoanalytical interpretation or critique its significance but to offer a somewhat different interpretation of the myth, one that incorporates some of the ideas and concepts we have developed around becoming and imagistic movement.

But in Nasio’s questions we already see the rift with Deleuze and Guattari. They understand that the question is not about sexual identity as gendering of man and woman, but in the expression of the production of difference that is not solely dependent on sexuality, identity or gender, but is derivative of the ontological seismic fault of *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus as Man versus Becoming-Woman, Becoming-Child or Becoming-Animal*. What is the problem for which Oedipus is the solution? What is the movement of thought that is identified within the Oedipus myth? If we try to express the myth as problem in terms of time, what truth as machinic assemblage issues forth? For how can the story be about unbridled competition with the father and sexual desire for the mother when there is no associative connection between Oedipus and his parents other than fate? We contend that the Oedipus story is telling us a different tale and that Sophocles understands what is at play in his narrative despite the focus on the more lurid aspects of the story. Sophocles appears to concur with the underlying logic of the narrative as independent of the tragedical single-mindedness which motivates the play as a vehicle. The movement of thought which

flows through the three-play cycle has more to do with cognition and knowing than with competition and incest or self-knowledge. As such, Sophocles may be an unnamed and absent from the exposition of the drama, but he is agent in the unfolding of the narrative because he seems to have an axe to grind vis-à-vis Oedipus and condones the heavy price the King of Thebes will have to pay through no fault of his own—it is not only the Gods but the muses as well that are vengeful towards the parvenu King of Thebes. As what we will end up understanding as a symbolic sign of a failed epistemological “experiment”, Oedipus is derided by the playwright in the same way that conservative economists take delight in predicating the failure of a socialist country’s economy or government in which they have been complicit in dismantling.

For us, the generality or universality of the Sphinx riddle is questionable. The Sphinx is an oracle whose pronouncements test the individual not through a one-size-fits-all riddle but through a specific singular challenge that addresses the unique circumstances of the suppliant. The Sphinx produces pronouncements that test the individual on his own terms according to his state of affairs — it is a means of establishing the mettle of the individual being tested as to ascertain his soundness and integrity. And like any test that looks to ascertain the reality of something, its Beingness, so to speak, the trial tests the individual’s unique is-you-is-or-is-you-ain’t. It qualifies the passage from nonage to majority: the test is that which has the dynamic effect on the individual of transforming him into a full-fledged adult (SIMONDON, 1969, p. 92). So that by passing the test formulated by the Sphinx, Oedipus is considered as having Being; he has passed the test that transforms him from a minor into a man, from the minor as non-being to an individual that is considered to have Being and can be a full-fledged citizen. But in analysing this story, critics seem to assume that the singular problem presented to Oedipus represents *the* universal problem that seeks to provide *the* answer to the one question which plagues all men’s deepest queries about their being in the universe. If Oedipus was the only one capable of answering the riddle, there would not have been too many people left in Thebes. The earliest vase painting depicting the Theban Sphinx “show her pursuit or capture of Theban youths” (EDMUNDS, 2006, p. 78).<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Edmunds, Lowell. (2006). *Oedipus*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Oedipus is able to answer the Sphinx's riddle because he knows from where she comes and he also has an innate predisposition to understand the problem she is posing. The morphology of the Sphinx informs us that she in itself is the problematic enigma and that the riddle is our own private, subjective take on it. The posing of the riddle is how our subjectivity chooses to give form to the encounter with the Sphinx as an enigmatic proposition: enigmatic because she characterises the nature of our encounter with the world. The Sphinx represents the *problema* of existence thrown before us as we make our way in the world and encounter the novelty of experience as a rhizomatic, schizo proposition. The Greek Sphinx, as opposed to the Sphinxes of the Egyptian and the Mycenaean, Assyrian, Persian and Phoenician civilizations, has the head and chest of a woman, the body of a lion, the wings of a bird of prey, and a serpent-headed tail. She seems to embody a variety of becomings: the becoming-woman, the becoming-animal, the becoming-mortal and is associated by numerology to the netherworld. Lore has it that after Oedipus vanquishes the Sphinx, she kills herself by jumping off the Acropolis of Thebes into the river Ismenus—a categorical repetition of the downward movement from the Ideal to the materialism of flux.

We interpret the Oedipus myth as a cautionary tale which is telling us that any epistemic becoming seeking to pull away from the domination of the male principle and trying to set up a minoritarian haven as a move of Becoming-Child, is nothing other than the killing of the patriarchal Godhead of transcendental knowledge as tantamount to patricide, and the conjugation of thought with the female principle of difference implicit in the becoming-female is equivalent to an incestuous union. We see the Oedipus story in terms of a straightforward substitution of the characters by becomings so that Laius is the transcendental male; Jocasta material movement—the polar opposite to the molar male as a becoming-woman; Oedipus is the unsuccessful challenger to the majoritarian man, which as a nomadic becoming ends up as a minoritarian becoming as an assemblage with the becoming-woman with whom he produces various minoritarian offspring. The one says is that Truth and Understanding is to be found within, interiorly, and the other approach states that Truth is to be found in the world, where the nomadic empiricism will reveal its proper order through the method of memory.

But there is also a warning to the dominant majoritarian Man: any material offspring resulting from the unholy union of the thesis, as that which has Being — the Ideal, and its

anti-thesis, as that which has no Being — the Material, and which yields a dialectical synthesis, as a heterogeneous union of the Ideal and the Material, will annihilate or usurp that which had Being: a dialectical synthesis given free rein to get creative with the material, will usurp transcendental knowledge and end up producing chaos. Or in other words, a philosophical re-statement of Gresham's Law: bad money drives out good, the counterfeit coin will drive out the pure. The plague and blight which besieges Thebes perhaps is more an indication of the chaos that Oedipus brings to the epistemological order of things by being the child of Laius and Jocasta than from the so-called crimes he has committed.

The understanding is that the combination of the thesis as that which is with the antithesis, as that which is not, will produce an offspring, a synthesis which can only result in strife and chaos, and what results is a blind empiricism, a nomadic wandering guided by the weakest type of judgment, bereft of experience, wisdom, and potential—a strange inversion of Freud's relation with his daughter, Anna. Sophocles is not an impartial observer and he does not offer us an unbiased reading of the motive forces activated by the story: the myth turns two blind eyes to the play's drives to allow ourselves to be Oedipalised (DELEUZE & Guattari, 1983, p. 56). It is also pertinent to point out that Freud downplayed the paternal toxicity of Laius, both as doctor (tutor) to Laius and as father to Oedipus—both bolstering our characterisation of the Oedipal drama as the obliteration of descendance or filiation brought on by the father's perception of challenge to the established order. In this respect, the Anti-Oedipus is the assertion that "I will not be oedipalised!" as resistance to the inhibition or obstruction to Becoming-Child, and which resonates with "I will not be lobotomised!". Further, knowing the prehistory of *Oedipus Rex* and the backstory of Laius supports our understanding of experience as becoming through imagistic procession, for according to Ross, one can better understand the motivation of the Sophoclean Theban plays by being acquainted with Laius's history. The audience was familiar with Laius and when they went to see *Oedipus Rex*, they "knew of his genealogy and legacy, his own history of expulsion and suffering, the misdeeds which he committed long before Oedipus's appearance on the scene, the hubris or trespass for which the oracle was his punishment" (ROSS, 1981, p. 175). Perhaps, the story of Oedipus is more about Freud's own insecurities and his anxiety of being a failed father towards his sons—by shifting the onus of the analysis to Laius's culpability, Oedipus would not have had to assume the entire burden of guilt,



thereby exculpating the father of all responsibility—for in the patriarchal belief system the father figure can never be wrong.

This interpretation of the Oedipus story also gains traction from the similarities to the constellation of happenstance motifs which orbit around the myth of Poseidon and seem to conflate the themes that emerge in *Oedipus Rex*. Like Laius, Poseidon rides a chariot pulled by four horses and can be identified to the ternary through his three-pronged trident. Further, when Poseidon was courting the Nereiad Thetis, it was prophesied that any son born to Thetis would be greater than his father; Poseidon desisted (GRAVES, 1955, p. 59). Hall also refers to him as the Lord of Dreams, but we have not found corroboration for this epithet—perhaps, Lord of the Subconscious might be more *à propos*? There is also the discussion in Plato's *Cratylus* (402-403) about the name Poseidon—which, depending on how one interprets its etymology, can either mean “the chain of the feet” or that “the God knew many things” or “being the shaker of the earth” (PLATO, 1952, p. 95). Being the shaker of the earth links the symbolism to the Khōra and to the elemental transformative dynamic of Earth, or more modernly to the creation of notions through territorialisation-deterritorialisation, where the ocean is also a type of Elemental Earth.

The drama of Oedipus is in the discovering and remembering towards the unveiling of a long-forgotten past not towards a revelation of identity to be able to answer ‘who am I?’, but of his realisation that he in fact might be responsible for the plague and blight afflicting Thebes. The scourge predates the murder of Laius and possibly have something to do with the tentative infanticide committed by Laius and Jocasta and the rape of Chryssipus by Laius. Whether or not the abandoning of the child in the wild was justified on account of the oracle's prognostication — and seemingly somewhat condoned by Sophocles — the symbolism of the play according to our interpretation would have to do with Sophocles's claim that Oedipus's materialism is responsible for the destruction of the order that relies on the Father King of transcendental knowledge to keep chaos at bay. The strife represents the discord and antagonism between two schools of thought, between the pre-Socratic Ionian philosophy of Thales of Miletus (624 BC - 546 BC), Anaximander of Miletus (610 BC - 546 BC), Anaxamenes of Miletus (586 BC - 526 BC) and Heraclitus (535 BC - 475 BC) and the Italian Eleatic philosophers such as Pythagoras of Samos (570 BC - 495 BC), Xenophanes of Colophon (570 BC - 475 BC), Parmenides of Elea (515 BC - 440 BC), and Zeno of Elea (495 BC - 430 BC). To locate the play relative to the philosophical timeline, Sophocles (497 BC - 406

BC) premiered *Oedipus Rex* in 429 BC. We agree with Kitto that Oedipus “is contrived in order to enforce Sophocles’ faith in this underlying λόγος (logos); that is the reason why it is true to say that the perfection of its form implies a world-order” (Kitto, 1990, p. 144). Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) devotes a chapter in *The Origin of Philosophy* (1960) to the Parmenides and Heraclitus divide that addresses the historiological process to reconstruct the origins of the paradigm shift. In his short application of a positivist historical method, he identifies the radical break in the modes of thought from the mythic tradition and its bifurcation into Orphic theology and the Dionysian mysteries as the origin of philosophy proper. He does this by analysing the formal aspects of expression rather than the philosophical content *per se*. Ortega y Gasset does in fact point out that the mythic form had become superseded by the newer forms of discourse even if Parmenides used it as a *vehicle of expression*. “Parmenides uses the mythological-mystical poem without any longer believing in it, as a mere instrument of expression—in short, as a vocabulary” (ORTEGA Y GASSET, 1962, p. 80).

As such, Sophocles’s play was traditional in form by remaining within the mythological literary mode while discussing affairs of the mind as the dramatic hand-wringing which results from the rivalry between the idealist and the materialist—quite a difference with our empty diet of good policeman, bad robber moralist drama we are served today. If *Oedipus Rex* does in fact imply a dramatic personification of philosophical conflict, a dramatization of the classical enmity between Parmenides and Heraclitus, to us it represents one of the inadequate forms of Becoming-Child as an infantilization of the discourse, where the more adequate predication of the essential theme of the drama, i.e. the formulation of a more abstract, albeit more pointed, expression of what is at work in the play is presented as human characters, we understand that as an infantilization of Becoming-Child. The rhetorical structure of the play makes us think of the recent feature in a conservative American news show which tries to warn its viewers of the dangers of communism by citing Sweden as an example of the sinister excesses of socialism by showing examples of free socialised health care, free university education, lower criminality and the success of their social safety net. Sophocles seems to be warning the public by saying permit ‘materialisms’ to take hold in the community and you will end up with moral mayhem, plague and strife in your succession.

The theme of perambulation plays a significant rôle in the play in that mobility and the imagery of feet are significant details. In Greek, the suffix *-pous* mean foot, so it is

interesting to note that Laius's toxic fathering is linked to the feet of his pedagogic charges: Laius is the tutor of Chrysippus (Golden-footed) and the father of Oedipus (Swollen- or Club-footed). Laius is traveling by chariot when Oedipus is first encounters him; the riddle of the Sphinx plays itself as a problem whose problematic kernel has to do with feet; and of course, Oedipus himself is the swollen foot, club-footed, uni-footed baby left to die on some barren hillside; and also how he becomes a "hybrid" body that propels itself on four legs: a fusion of the old man and his child-daughter. It would seem that Oedipus is too smart for his own good: if the Sphinx's riddle involves the deciphering of four-legged ambulation of the infant, the two legged-striding of the adult, and the three-legged hobbling of the old-aged,<sup>139</sup> Oedipus's understanding surpasses all expectations for he also knows the immobility of the pinned feet of the abandoned infant as one or as a deformed 2, and then hybrid 'irrational' number of the two feet of the old blind man moving in unison with the two feet of the inexperienced "un-seeing" child, which together add up to some number resembling four—of an irrational number of the blind leading the blind. So he "knows" 4, 3, and 2 where no one has been able to see the connection, but also sees 1 and more than 2 but not quite 4. And what the return to a hybrid four indicates is a return to the infancy of four as an infantilization or a Becoming-Child, depending on which side you agree with. A "numerical", pythagorean Oedipus would say that the riddle's answer can be based upon 4 plus 2 plus 3, equals 9 as the natural number of man, so Oedipus could have come to the same conclusion via numbers—which given the philosophical premiss of the play would have constituted a "better" answer though it shows the empiricist or pragmatic bent of Oedipus's mindset. The combination of 'numerology' and perambulation are also evident in the encounter with Laius and both consistent with our philosophical reading of the myth. The facts that Laius represents a particular type of Ideas (rationality), enters on an ὄχημα (ochēma), the chariot as the vehicle of consciousness, and that the encounter with Oedipus takes place at a three-pronged junction in the road, are all significant details. Even the number of horses drawing the chariot is worthy of attention in that if it is 4 then it is drawn by the Four Elements, and if 2 by the dual aspects of the *psychē* towards the three roadways which lead to the Three

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<sup>139</sup> Jesus also suffers a symbolic inversion: where a wooden staff or cane is given for support, he is ironically given the wooden cross as a "third leg" and is made to support the weight of the world.

Worlds.<sup>140</sup> The three pronged junction of the roadway where Laius tries to drive Oedipus off the road can mean variously and likely signifies differently to interpreters aligned with Laius and those aligned with Oedipus—the supreme riddle as *problema* posed in terms of a triadic proposition. The triadic conception of Heaven, Earth and Hell teaches that God dwells in the heavens above, the intermediate Earth is the dwelling place of the materially realm, and Hell the realm of the chaotic pre-individual. But it can also be synonymous with the intellect of the Triune Divinity.

For if Sophocles, or for that matter the logic of the myth, would have required that Oedipus be castrated outright, the playwright would not have hesitated in featuring without having to allude to it symbolically, in the same way that they not pussy-foot about incest or infanticide. Through a contrary reading, we can say that Oedipus is disgusted by what he comes to see and it is to never have to come to witness and to have to give testimony of what he sees, or does come to see, as the what we earlier indicated as the *to ti ēn einai* as the relating or the giving account, of the reporting of what he comes to see, as the essence of his being as a source of perennial disillusionment that he blinds himself.<sup>141</sup> Within the Sophoclean logic, it is as a preventative measure and out of disgust that he blinds himself—it is a prophylactic measure, much like Angelina Jolie subjecting herself to a double radical mastectomy and the removal of her ovaries and fallopian tubes as prophylactic. It is not as punishment for incest, for there is no proportionality to the punishment if all Oedipus gets for killing his father is banishment. Freud conflates the testimony of the eyes with the testes and it becomes a pronouncement — this would be saying that empirical truth does not emerge from the eyes but from the Male Principle. According to Freud, “the blinding in the legend of Oedipus, as well as elsewhere, stands for castration” (Interpretation of Dreams, SE V.398nl). But why should Oedipus ‘castrate’ himself? Figuratively or literally? It feels like Freud has been peer-pressured into introducing a self-serving interpretation and conflating the activity of attesting, as a witness as a *testis*, with the *testis* as testicles, which modern philology states are unrelated even if there is a similarity of shape and number. As an

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<sup>140</sup> Depending on the interpretation, the chariot can be drawn by either four or two horses. Preus writes: “In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates describes the immortal soul (*psychē*) as a chariot with a charioteer driving two horses, one noble, representing the “spirited” part of the soul, the other ignoble, representing the “appetitive” part of the soul. The charioteer is of course reason. This vivid image may have its roots in the introductory section of the poem of Parmenides” (Preus, 2015, p. 271)

<sup>141</sup> He blinds himself out of no longer wanting to exercise his perceptual semiological essence.

alternative reading of the play as a reading of the Oedipus story, Jewish mystics might say that the gouging of the eyes is Sophocles taking poetic license with the underlying drives of the myth. For them, Oedipus's blinding is a misrepresentation of his closing his eyes to the controversy, to the empty polemic that the drama offers us. To them, "the inscrutable NOTHING conveyed to the mind by the closing of the eyes suggests the eternal unknowable and indefinable nature of perfect being" (HALL, 1984, p. 5).

The poetic justice that Sophocles delivers to Oedipus as retribution for the epistemic infraction of seeking to destroy the patriarchal Godhead of transcendental knowledge is to gouge out his eyes out of shame. Oedipus blinds himself to preclude the empiricist witnessing of any more disparagement of material initiatives. The eyes are the sense that is most significant and contributory to the perceptual semiotic and so it is only fitting that Oedipus destroy the sense that is most responsible for the cognitive infraction, the epistemological transgression, against God the Father,<sup>142</sup> that according to the workings of the myth ultimately results in intellectual parricide and conceptual incest. It is therefore not surprising that after Oedipus destroys his eyes as his primary cognitive apparatus, that he should embark upon a nomadic odyssey to a foreign realm that will be more tolerant and accepting. As a destitute, nomadic beggar, Oedipus is offered to the world as a deposed moribund king who is dependent on the most dependent of beings to guide him through the world as the most ignominious form of humiliation.<sup>143</sup> And it is this destitution which is the real castration. Despite his blinding himself, Oedipus remains a foot-borne nomad — he cannot escape from his methodological proclivity of walking as the direct experience and cognition of the world through the direct encounter combined with the memorial method. And is it not curious that once he takes to roaming about the country-side, as a groping blind person, (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 150) his guide is his daughter? A girl, literally, a becoming-woman? The man that is no longer able to see, or no longer willing to see, is cast out of society for his outrageous conduct, becomes a humiliated nomad, dependent on the most dependent, whose way is informed by his daughter as the very embodiment of the

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<sup>142</sup> Symbolically, can we not say the same about Christ's crucifixion? It represents the destruction of Jesus's empiricism as nomad truth-seeking and his hands as organs of semiotic truth-finding. In the Bible it is the sense of touch which ascertains and not the eyes. The witness accounts are always discounted but touching supplies veracity, as in Thomas's using the sense of touch to ascertain Jesus's presence.

<sup>143</sup> Not much different from Jesus having to ride an ass into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday.

most polarised opposite of manhood, both becoming-child and becoming-woman combined into its weakest possible expression? And through the belittlement of the once-great king to a status lower than that of child, we can understand yet again the Becoming-Child of Oedipus.

### **Memories of an Anti-Fascist: Becoming-child in Tarkovsky's *Ivan's Childhood* (1962)**

The cinema of Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky (1932-1986) ideates childhood without passing through concepts traditionally formulated and does so instead through imagistic interaction and its production of affects and percepts. And so it is through the screen-child that the concept of the becoming-child can be constructed, built-up, complexified, by demonstrating what a child-body can do. These demonstrations, affirmations, substantiations allow one to point out those childish, childlike, child-gestures which Tarkovsky offers us through the “there is” out there in some fabulated world with which to build up the various depictions as participations in the concept of childhood. Tarkovsky cannot be, nor need be, nor pretend to be “exhaustive” of what becoming-child is or can be—what he does offer are possibilities for the thinking of childhood differently, as different worldings of the concept of child, as various affirmations of childhoods which exist only in their expression and which go beyond the pail of Jack and Jill’s quest. These children exist as singular solutions to specific conditionings which defy reproduction, representation, replication, but within which we can understand difference in otherness and affirm our difference as participant in the creation of our own conceptual persona as a formulation of the concept of difference itself in ways that depart from the saccharine idealisation which clamours for its unfulfillable attainment through commercial means. These children exist as vapour trails, as footprints in a field of drifting snow, or as the turbulent slipstream behind a speedboat. The becoming-child exists as an ephemeral, evanescent, transient experiential passing which leaves few lasting traces because their undying, indelible, lasting legacy is the impermanence of becoming. This is what makes becoming-child of prominent importance: it expresses so emphatically in human terms the processual “becoming” aspect of change.

The experiences that children are made to suffer in his films truly push beyond the boundaries of the intolerable in childhood and test the limits of “That which does not kill us makes us stronger”. Perhaps we are exaggerating unduly in our description of Tarkovsky’s

dramas for the situations he deals with in most of his films are not Wagnerian *sturm und drang* dramas but more subtle expositions of quotidian crisis which leave his characters naked and vulnerable to face the harsh elements of life's contingent unfolding. With Tarkovsky, childhood is placed in crisis in order to actualise the full extent of its potential for survival in the world and it is in this actualisation that the becoming-child emerges – there is no memory to fall back on, no criteria upon which to found experience, only a raw empirical interaction that guides the becoming-child through life's pitfalls. The demands placed upon survival can be physical and psychological, spiritual even, but they indubitably mete fate's cruel and unusual punishments as exacting life lessons. As Bollnow writes, "The human being actualizes his authentic existence only in the crisis and only through the crisis. The critical moments are the only moments which really count in human life. To exist means to stand in crisis" (BOLLNOW, 1987, p. 5). And in this respect, Tarkovsky does not spoil the child... By exploiting the frailty, inexperience and lack of knowledge of his children protagonists, Tarkovsky forces his characters to swim or sink in the chaotic unarchives of becoming-child. Yet to call them archives would be to ascribe a certain order, structure and systematicity to the primeval soup of potential in which the children must provide for themselves. These depositories of chaos are anarchic situations of choice which have no "rhyme or reason"—they are exemplary in their unfettered availability of decision and freedom of decision as to what to do next—there are few enabling constraints to help form an intuitive resolution to this inherently problematic situation which doesn't even allow a proper formulation of the difficult problem they find themselves in.

In presenting us with images which go against the grain of idealised commercially palatable and socially desirable representations of candied depictions of childhood, Tarkovsky offers us a twilight unfolding of unexpected, uncommon and hidden potentials within a childhood becoming other, of the crises which mould quotidian events and reveal the dark banalities which can ever to be so life-changing. His spatio-temporal cinematic constructs compose the landing sites for becomings which serve as milieus of catalysis which prompt the emergence of a people-to-come as a historical efflorescence. If anything, the experience of becoming-child is the threshold on the path which identifies a rite of passage into the incipience, the emergence, the heralding and annunciation of a people to come as the extension of becoming-child. At the same time, Tarkovsky's characters are often his aesthetic conceptual persona and it just so happens that many of them are children. "The

conceptual persona is the becoming or the subject of a philosophy, on a par with the philosopher” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1994, p. 64) and in Tarkovsky’s films we often get to witness first-hand this simultaneous becoming-child of the characters on the screen and the filmmaker’s as well.

The films of Andrei Tarkovsky (1932-1986) are fraught with images of children which allow us to examine the conceptual interplay between the cinematic depiction of children in the world and the cinematic expression of becoming. Tarkovsky’s vision offers singular understandings of childhood as an otherness to childhood itself that constitutes a very local knowledge of what becoming-child can be as well as an exacting testing-ground for the concept itself. The analysis of Becoming-Child as imagistic process in the films of Andrei Tarkovsky is significant and relevant in its specific formulation of becoming-child as an alternative understanding of childhood, but also, more generally, it conceives the possibility of an epistemological continuity which bridges the division between the knower and the known by elaborating the relation as a concretised durational meta-stability.



Figure 4.7: Screen grab of the opening shot of *Ivan’s Childhood*. Ivan played by Nikolai Burlayev.

A perfect example is *Ivan’s Childhood* (1962), Tarkovsky’s first feature film, which was shot two years after his student diploma film *The Steamroller and the Violin* (1960) at the State Institute of Cinematography (VGIK) in Moscow. The film tells the story of Ivan, a 12 year-old orphan played by Nikolai Burlayev, and his experiences as an intelligence scout on the Russian-German front during World War II. The film won Tarkovski instant critical



acclaim and made him internationally known. It won the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival in 1962 and the Golden Gate Award at the San Francisco International Film Festival in 1962.

The film is a wartime story set in the arduous Eastern Front where the decisive battles were being fought which depleted the German war machine. The Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June, 1941, taking the suicidal Nazi war machine to the furthest reaches of its expansionist wars across Europe. The Soviet Army responded with a scorched-earth strategy where they would raze the land as they retreated further and further into the Russian countryside leaving nothing for the Germans to revitalise their exhausted resources and provisions. Ultimately, 13.7 million Russian civilians, a full twenty percent of the 68 million persons in the occupied USSR,<sup>144</sup> paid the price at the hands of the Nazis and indirectly at the hands of Stalinist strategy.

Tarkovsky's depiction of war rejects the grand narratives, cataclysmic battles and the clashes of larger-than-life titans of warfare in favour of minor *events*, of unimportant individuals, of happenings which are not marked by the spectacular or the grandiose, by the time-killing busy-work which occupy one in-between moments of significance, of events charged with momentousness. Tarkovsky writes in *Sculpting Time* that this interstitial being-doing was one of the qualities that attracted him to Vladimir Bogomolov's 1957 story *Ivan*. This aesthetic direction also worked in his favour financially in that as an untried novice director inheriting a disowned project, he could not dispose of outlandish production budgets to carry out this project (TARKOVSKY p. 33). Some present *Ivan's Childhood* as a subversion of the war genre (RENFREW in DUNNE, 2008, p. 104) but the film's adaptation is more of a social drama dressed as a war film. If there's any subversion within the film, it would be how Tarkovsky undermines Socialist Realism in a subtle way with a foundational mythology which transcends the class nature of Communism. He offers us an alternative paradigm to the Socialist Realism that would normally express the class ideology at work in Soviet art.

His presentation is poetic and transcends the bounds of class ideology—his work is of social significance because of the depth of his psychological analysis and of the themes and

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<sup>144</sup> Евдокимов, Ростислав, ed. (1 January 1995). *Людские потери СССР в период второй мировой войны: сборник статей* (Human Losses of the USSR during the Second World War: a collection of articles). Ин-т российской истории РАН (Russian Academy of Sciences).

conflicts portrayed in his films. He presents us here with another way of positing the historical truth of war not as an examination of economic forces, or political strivings or the clash of political ideologies or religions, or strife between larger-than-life warriors but through the relational encounter that shifts historical process to the personal level and replaces it with the micropolitical of the quotidian. It is an unfolding of the event as a becoming that emerges from everyday life as a historical drama, as a period piece, that deals with life and its rhythms at the scale of the human amidst the wholesale inhumanity of war at the cross-roads of the encounter of an orphaned boy and the dire vicissitudes of war. In this film, the fight against fascism and the fight for survival occur in the small stuff of everyday life, in the relations and interactions between the inhabitants at a small encampment of the Soviet Army on the Eastern front and their special guest, the young orphan Ivan.

The story of *Ivan's Childhood* is mythic in the same way, or at the same scale, that Tarkovsky depicts war as history in this film. The movement of history is durational but not at the scale usually envisioned by historiography. And it is not durational in the sense of a closed event, that has a definite start and end. It is a micro-history of minor movements, or a history of micro-movements, of molecular activations and attunements, which occur at the scale of the individually personal and of the pre-individual. Tarkovsky encloses "history within the 'lived' of human sense and experience" and relates Ivan's story as a narrator, as a storyteller and not as a historian. It is a narration that contains its own truth without appealing to those historical features Marxist aesthetics normally foreground, such as the ideological-economic-material conditions of emergence. Instead he seeks out a poetic truth which also becomes the disclosure of a poetic injustice as the operative dynamic behind this presentation of historical process. Even if it is told cinematically, the story feels more like the transmission of an oral tradition, as a story that was handed down to him for him to pass on.

On the other hand, myth has to work in the other direction to create and elaborate what that genesis amounts to and spells out how that subjective entity deals with life in its becoming. *Ivan's Childhood* is a mythic narrative in that it deals with the foundational of a people to come, or perhaps of a people lost who once again find an opportunity to put their hands on their land, who have found their native territory once again, and lose it at the hands of others. The "problem" of *Ivan's Childhood* is usually posited as an exposition of the horrors and the suffering of civilian populations, specifically children, during times of war. It

is difficult to go against the grain of this assessment but in our view, Tarkovsky goes beyond that interpretation. What is at stake here is the identity of the Rus Slavic people and a subtle drama of sacrifice and betrayal. It is the story of Ivan, a young orphan, a Partisan, who free-lances as a reconnaissance scout for the Soviet Army within Nazi-held territory. He is of exceptional character: he is fearless and plucky, dedicated to his task, committed to the cause, diligent and conscientious, mature beyond his years, conscious of the importance of his work, proud of his exploits and expertise, willing to sacrifice his life for the rest of his people, unwavering in his beliefs, and defiant to the end. As an orphaned child soldier, a *сын полка* or "son of the regiment", Ivan is loved by everyone in the camp and the darling of the superior officers who want to pull him away from the Front and enrol him in a military school because "War is a man's business... the Front is no place for a child... or a girl". A reconnaissance mission has to be carried out which everyone believes could prove to be too dangerous for the boy but Captain Kholin (Valentin Zubkov) nevertheless goes ahead and accedes to Ivan's insistence. Despite Senior Lieutenant Galtsev's (Yevgeni Zharikov) opposition, Kholin sends the boy on the mission knowing full well that the child will probably not return. Years later, when the Red Army captures Berlin in 1945, a battle-scarred Galtsev finds himself in a prison facility in which Russian child-prisoners were held, tortured and killed and discovers that Ivan had been hanged to death.

*Ivan's Childhood* is thus set amidst a no-man's land of destruction and desolation where Nature has stopped making sense: water, air, fire and earth are all present to compose the worst of possible worlds—the trees arise out of water, bits of fire sizzle from above; air bubbles up from the depths of the water, and Ivan and his fellow soldiers creep through this elemental magma, this primeval soup of chaos and destruction in a penumbra which is never fully night nor day, but always a foggy twilight. We see that within the confrontation of war an encounter of diverse forces occurs where the conflict, as devastatingly ruinous as it is, is also creative in that it produces the conditions that afford the emergence of novelty through destruction. It is a zone of space-time where deterritorialisation and territorialization follow each other at speeds where it is difficult ascertain which one is operative. One can only surmise that the "civilisation" that will emerge from this sunless, dank swamp will likely be of a different ilk than the one announced in the opening shots of the carefree child and mother. And in order to tell his

story, Tarkovsky has to move from the reality of war to a fictionalised version of war to be able to tell the real story of sacrifice and betrayal that he wanted to tell.

*Ivan's Childhood* is the first film of the Tarkovskian oeuvre<sup>145</sup> and from its first shot we can already discern the visual concerns, thematic preoccupations and aesthetic strategies which will recur throughout his work. The opening shot of a film often tweaks our expectations as to what we can anticipate from a film and this one does not disappoint. *Ivan's Childhood* opens with a close up of Ivan, his face veiled on the left by a spiderweb and on the right partly hidden by a slender, straight-grained Siberian fir (Figure 4.7). Just that image is sufficiently evocative to get us started... each element within that opening frame is imbued with a symbolism sufficient to direct or inflect our reading of the film. The spider web that veils and fractures the boy's face is an annunciation of the tangling of the fragmented nature of the young boy's life and the deception and treachery that he will be subjected to within the ensuing problematisation of Ivan's life at the front... the presence of the sapling echoes back to a complex symbolism of the fir tree within Russian myth and literature as emblematic of the Slavic people and countryside, as analogue to the character of the young Soviet nation which Ivan somehow embodies, and as a stand-in for Ivan himself as a being personified by growth and change as a becoming-child substance of some sort. And in between the spiderweb and the tree, in the midst, so to speak, is Ivan—what tangled narrative can one weave about a boy at the semeiotic junction of these signs? This opening image locates us already within the dynamic of myth-making, of youth and growth and future potentials. Tarkovsky positions the film as the telling of a people to come, of a poetic truth, of a fabulation that speaks the truth “where the veracity of the story continued to be grounded in fiction” (DELEUZE, 1989 p. 149).

Ivan is a pre-pubescent boy who both looks younger and older than he is. Like the slender fir tree, he is thinner and taller than he ought to be, yet he has the bearing and attitudes of someone much older and more mature. It is an adult mind occupying an emaciated child's body, where the childishness embodied by the flesh of the child has not yet left. He is neither a child nor an adult but a youthful-becoming that shifts from childishness to adulthood without warning. But these shifts from childishness to adulthood which could easily be ascribed to the survival strategies of an orphan at the front-lines of

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<sup>145</sup> As a professional filmmaker out of school.

war is significant not only because they characterise the boy but also what he stands for—as indicated by the tree—i.e. his sign-function as embodying the essential qualities of the Slavic Russian people. What is of consequence here is that the child's being in the world is never fixed as a prepubescent boy but always as a becoming other, as a becoming-other, even if it is a becoming older, than what a child ought to be. One can of course call these changes the character development necessary to all drama. Rather than simply being defined as a pre-teenage boy that plays soccer and hide and go seek on the beach with other kids his age, he is a multiplicity of unstable existences, of meta-stable becomings which articulate the specific responsive adaptations that extreme situations and trauma-inducing circumstances the experiences of war can come up with: Ivan is always other than what the developmental textbooks tell us a child should be. Instead, we are faced with a serial becoming-other which leaves no stability by which we can really refer to him: His character is as flighty as the butterfly that accompanies him in the opening scene. We can say that the entity before us is Ivan, but this is just a convenience—Ivan changes before our very eyes from ex-prisoner of war to boy soldier, to child in need of affection and care, to seasoned reconnaissance scout, to supercilious infantry officer, to runaway from military college, to hardened Partisan orphan bent on revenge, to war hero to his battalion, to betrayed by his superior for the greater good, to a lost soul in the tally of countless other children prisoners killed by the Nazis... He is never one of these existences individually and never all of them at the same time, because he is constantly becoming-other—any emergent property is plowed back into the becoming-Ivan qualified as a becoming-child. Circumstances and environments change so quickly that he adapts to them instantly, plastically, so that there is no stability at any place or time for his organism to acclimatise or adjust with any kind of durable permanence. What is transcendent is the immanent adaptability as a refrain to the shiftiness of the milieus which become associated to him and which associate themselves around him. But the shifty landscaping with which this serially meta-stable becoming has to contend with is only half of the equation. Ivan is also an unstable, changing existence in his own right by virtue of being a child. As a becoming that finds its duration as the imprecise status of the human being between birth and adulthood, the child is not a non-existent being, but a not-being because the child is a changeling that has no permanent or fixed status as a being-thing.

Deleuze and Guattari write of becoming as involving a pack and contagion (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987). And on a macro-level, Young Ivan is a member of a soldier-pack and presents all the traits of the anomalous—he is the ultimate insider and the ultimate outsider. he is not the standard-issue soldier in that he’s a child, he is not conscripted, does not have the body of a soldier. But he is a natural-born leader in that he demonstrates all the qualities that make him an exemplary soldier and therefore a leader by example. The profession of arms is guided by a code called "The Army Values": Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honour, Integrity, and Personal Courage.<sup>146</sup> And all good soldiers must possess a set of qualities which include honesty, courage, self-control, decency, and conviction of purpose.<sup>147</sup> By possessing these traits and professing the Code, Ivan is the preferential element of the pack, but, as Deleuze and Guattari write, it is not simply because he is exceptional, or “the bearer of a species presenting specific or generic characteristics in their purest state; nor is it a model or unique specimen; nor is it the perfection of a type incarnate; nor is it the eminent term of a series” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 244). Rather, Ivan is exemplary and combined with his youth, size and pluck make him anomalous, where even his mandated occupation is to define the borderline, to draw limits, to scope the periphery. He haunts the fringes as a phenomenon of bordering. His exemplarity is contagious, and his supervising officers would like to see it productively channeled by sending him to military college.

*Ivan’s Childhood* defines the first components of an archival menagerie, a repertoire of signs, of visual elements whose components will repeat themselves throughout Tarkovsky’s cinematic oeuvre as motifs, as content, as narrative elements—as matters of expression—which recur within the single film and from one film to the next as characteristic movements and rhythms. If we consider films as assemblages of signs, as composed of subjective entities that convey meaning, as *agencements*, then these figures can be said to be matters of expression both as part of the intra-assemblage of the film itself and as part of an inter-assemblage of films. But these are not passive machinic assemblages that produce meaning as a matter of course, but *agencements* which express subjectivity. Thus, this extended meaning-creation of motifs and figures articulated within the single work or through a number of works as an extended marker helps to align subjectively the

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<sup>146</sup> <https://www.rallypoint.com/command-post/characteristics-of-a-real-soldier>

<sup>147</sup> <https://www.artofmanliness.com/2016/10/01/manvotional-character-soldier/>

forces within chaos, of the earth and of the cosmos into coherent expanses of meaning, as planes of consistency. These recurring figures do not appear as identical repetitions of the same, but as repeating themes, subjects and motifs which are the content of refrains. They simultaneously deterritorialise and reterritorialise blocks of content as variegated iterations of the same preoccupations which delineate the cartography of Tarkovsky's ideas. As assemblages, they compose the abstract machines that mesh together and constitute modes of understanding of how the director construes the world in terms of memorial operators or patterns of cognition rendered narrative. These are not necessarily Big Ideas or momentous events heralded by trumpets and kettle drums, but solitary shots, or background settings, camera movements, subtle visual effects, dramatic situations, and imagery or visual symbolism.

In music, we recognise a refrain as a musical theme that recurs, and recognise it as such when the rhythm, speed, register, timbre, instrumental or harmonic arrangement, etc are altered within the same work as a theme and its variations or whenever it occurs in different works as appropriations or references. In this work, the returning theme of childhood from one film to the next is obviously key, but we cannot dismiss the recurrence of the imagery of the tree, of rain, of levitation, of art and culture as things, of the work of memory, of wading through water, of the need for the mother's affection and the withholding of it, of the absent father, of the proliferation of Christian crosses, of icons depicting Mary and the child Jesus, of the family *dacha*, of dreams, of wells, of submerged objects in water, of horses, of return, of youthful love and infatuation, of the word *человек* (*chelovek*: person, human being in Russian), and of mirrors, of sacrifice and nostalgia—both of which eventually become films in their own right. We can also say that this also applies to the rôles of recurring actors in different movies that even when interpreting other characters they inevitably carry over some affective tonalities of their previous incarnations onto other films—for example, Ivan will become the young bell-maker Boriska in *Andrei Rublev* (1966), Tarkovsky's second feature, where it is very difficult to dissociate the two characters from the actor which incarnates the two rôles: Boriska is only a slightly older, more grown-up Ivan transposed to another historical past. Another even more significant

example is Anatoly Solonitsyn as the most consequential recurring performer<sup>148</sup> in Tarkovsky's work who appears in four key rôles out of seven feature-length films. But to acknowledge these recurrences and repetitions is not to say that the reappearances always invoke meaning the same way or express an identical or fixed meaning: the recognition of a player in their various incarnations leads us to unexpected misperceptions such as (possibly) believing that it is Anatoly Solonitsyn playing in *Nostalgia* instead of Oleg Yankovsky or creative interpretations by association which might not otherwise arise.

For example, the idea of annunciation, of foretelling, of forewarning is paramount in the film and the character of Ivan is largely predicated around this theme. As a guide, or scout his job is to alert or warn his battalion of impending dangers but, as we will see later, but also to apprise his people of the loss of future. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) write about the refrain, the *ritornello*, as developing from annunciatory territorialising marks which "simultaneously develop into motifs and counterpoints, and recognise functions and regroup forces" (DELEUZE & GUATTARI 1987, p. 322). They lay out how the refrain constitutes a territorial assemblage/*agencement*—a landscape-ing—and in keeping with "traditional doctrines which hold that sound was the first of all things to be created" (CIRLOT, 1962, p. 300). In turn, they use the example of how birds use song to mark a territory, not in terms of staking out a delimited extension of land but in terms of announcing the bird's presence thereby conditioning any impending experiential encounter. The bird's song transforms the space through which the sound is carried from extensive to intensive within the range it can be heard, and obviates the affective inflection produced in any subsequent encounter by a presence which cannot be disregarded. This function is annunciatory, like placards or signposts which indicate or alert us to unexpected novelty. A lion's roar in the savannah, or a wolf's howl in the steppe, has the same effect: our body's response to the environment will be altered by the warning. Thus, birds and their songs serve the purpose of an annunciation and embody the announcement of a threshold being crossed. In the opening sequence of *Ivan's Childhood*, we hear a cuckoo warbling its song over a left-to-right tracking shot which switches from lush foliage to dry, barren earth

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<sup>148</sup> Nikolai Grinko who is also a great actor in his own right appears in more films but not in roles as weighty.



showing the exposed roots of vegetation as backdrop to a profile of Ivan.<sup>149</sup> Tarkovsky offers us the cuckoo's song to announce and inform that Ivan is entering a new domain—that he is being landscaped differently: the filmmaker wants to alert us not only to the fact that the cuckoo is a bird of the forest, but that the song is somehow defining or conditioning the operative occupation of a particular space-time through the cuckoo's song as a signaletic marker. The shot which immediately follows Ivan's intent listening to the cuckoo is a superfluity of sunlight streaming through the trees—but what exactly is being conditioned here with this imagery? Is it perhaps to make the link between Ivan and the landscape? Is Tarkovsky preconditioning us, preparing us to accept Ivan as an underground agent, as a clandestine reconnaissance scout as we will soon learn? Or is it purely a directorial conceit?<sup>150</sup> Or is it to make us pay attention to the images encompassed by the camera movement? For even if Ivan is plausibly very much alive, the travelling shot transforms him into another type of underground agent, perhaps as in dead, and serving as compost for the roots that surround him, or more poetically as mediating between life and death, between the earth of the living and the underground of the dead? Or perhaps he is alluding to “a remark Trotsky had once made to Lenin in private, saying that the 'cuckoo would soon sound the death knell for the Soviet Republic’”? (DEUTSCHER, 2003, p. 72). Does Ivan somehow represent the death knell of the Soviet people? And if he does, how does he accomplish this?<sup>151</sup> Tarkovsky seems to be strengthening the conditioning of our equating Ivan with the Soviet people. Here Tarkovsky underscores the camera movement with the song of the cuckoo which urges us to literally territorialise the event, to organise extension as an assemblage which produces machinic expanses of meaning-making as a temporalisation of expression through the affective changes created by the camera movement from lush vegetation to earth and root systems. Later, we will see a second bird, a rooster, who will

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<sup>149</sup> In this shot, the travelling ends so that we barely see Ivan's face but his ear is prominently the feature of attention. This might seem like a meaningless detail except that in *Solaris* Tarkovsky treats us to a close-up of the protagonist's ear as well.

<sup>150</sup> Tarkovsky writes in *Sculpting in Time* that “from start to finish, right up to the words, ‘Mum, there's a cuckoo!’ is one of my earliest childhood recollections. It was at the time when I was just beginning to know the world. I was four” (TARKOVSKY p. 29).

<sup>151</sup> Ivan will be seen in the latter part of the film in an anxiety filled fantasy depicting his state of mind prior to leaving the encampment on a mission. The imagery is a nightmarish depiction of terror and dread, the desire for revenge and the inability of the boy to process the trauma of war. In this fantasy sequence, Ivan will feverishly ring a cast bell to alert others of his plight but it falls on deaf ears as there is no sound that is produced in his fantasy.

crow to rouse Ivan from his dozy daydreaming to the reality of the wasteland around him and to pay heed to what is left of his land and his people: Ivan wakes to a village in rubble, a demented old man in tatters, and the land scorched and bare. The rooster is also a bird imbued with temporality in that his crowing announces the break of a new day, the emergence of first light, the dawn of possibility. But instead, this cockcrow only announces the indeterminate duration of devastation, destruction and ruin. The new dawn is a featureless grey fog devoid of temporality, and the territorialising elements compel us to ask: what is the duration that is encompassed (rhythmed) by this multiplicity? Where have the sun and the fertile fields replete with grain of the good, old happy days of Socialist Realism gone? Perhaps Tarkovsky is introducing the rooster for its sacred quality in Russian literature “for the cockerel is both talisman and avenger of wrongdoing”? (HOISINGTON, 1992, p. 29). Or is the rooster a satiric jab at the establishment, as in the Pushkin tale *The Golden Cockerel* “where the cockerel serves the tsar by safeguarding his kingdom, and subsequently the cockerel punishes the tsar for his moral blindness and his certainty that might makes right”? (HOISINGTON, 1992, p. 29). Tarkovsky seems to be reinforcing his message of coming retribution for the excessive use of force or coercion by Stalinism in getting the people to suffer destruction yet again.

In the penultimate closing scene, where the victorious Red Army enters into Berlin, we see a third bird—one that has lost its song—the Imperial Eagle of the Nazi’s Third Reich, clutching an olive-branch wreath enveloping a swastika cross. Whenever we see the eagle, it appears as a static effigy, devoid of potential, as part of the ruins and debris of fascist architecture which will be relegated to the dustbin of history as testimony of the German defeat. Here the bird’s silence speaks of the loss of potential and reminds us of the destruction that eventually befalls imperious leaders that disregard and disrespect the people. The bird song as a sonorous refrain “carries earth with it” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI 1987, 312), in that even if it deterritorialises what was there before, and then territorialises something else in its place, here each bird carries this out by announcing a what-is-to-come and preparing us to what can be expected next in the becoming unfolding as a milieu. In *Ivan’s Childhood*, we hear other birds though they remain unseen. In the scene with the old man and the rooster, we hear a woodpecker which alerts the old man and foretells the arrival of Ivan’s search party. We never see the bird, but we understand the bird’s signature tapping as an expression of their fondness of dead wood as they are usually infested with

insects. Is this what Tarkovsky is alerting us to? Trying to tell us that the vehicle is transporting dead wood infested with insects?<sup>152</sup> What is important about the bird song is not the song itself, but its power to announce that which is to come as a conditioning enclosing or encompassing dynamic which colours the imminent becoming-other.

Similarly, if we permit ourselves to consider visual elements in the same way, as refrain, as *ritornello*, the tree in *Ivan's Childhood* is possibly the most important visual element that recurs in the film. Although the theme of war sets the tone for the story, the semiotic relation between the events in the film and the tree, or more to the point, that which the tree allows to make visible through its presence and attributes, qualities which make the tree tree-like and recognisable as such, is the recurring motif which most informs the action and the characters and is expressed through wood and trees. We identify this recurrent motif as ὕλη (*hylē*), Aristotle's preferred term for "matter" whose direct translation is the Latin *materia* which translates directly to wood or lumber. Aristotle's ontology describes οὐσία, (*ousia*) or "being" as a compound of matter and form and has been translated and adapted to a dualism which separates body and soul. *Hylē* is an unusual concept to be activating here by adopting a reading that is at odds with the way the Aristotelian concept was being interpreted in Greek and Medieval philosophy—namely, by estranging it from the words μορφή, (*morphē*) or "form" and Πνεῦμα, (*pneuma*) or "spirit"—but we feel that it bears exploring. The concept-word *hylē* has become "stilled" over time, rendered static for the epistemological convenience of being able to conceive of discrete objects composed of matter and form as static entities and conforming to the Laws of Thought. ὕλη (*hylē*) was understood by Aristotle as a "bare potentiality", as a pure or physical potentiality for any elemental transformations (MARMODORO, 2017). As a quality of the vegetative or the sylvan that is en-mattered, *hylē* is different from the *litho* or the liquid, or the gaseous, as that faculty which permits qualitative change in a particular way—as the growth, change or movement which we perceive in wood or lumber and which acts through *proto-hylē*, the generic material wood which has not been doted with form nor spirit. *Hylē* would then be the becoming quality that characterises and affords processual

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<sup>152</sup> Later, when the three soldiers are walking towards the river through some sparse brush, we hear two different types of birds, one a water bird of some kind and the other a woodland warbler. Perhaps they are commenting on the character of the soldiers or alerting us that the ground they're entering is both solid and liquid?

change. If being is the Existence, the fact of belonging to the universe of things material or immaterial as a definite entity with identity, etc then *hylē* is the changing existencing of substance as becoming-other. But rather than being understood as transcendent qualities or aspects, these are immanent to the becoming as emergent properties. In this reading, the tree and its myriad plications are a stand-in, the indicative sign for the becoming quality that characterises processual change. In relation to the Rus people, the tree is an affective indicator of emergent properties which colours the expression of Ivan's childhood both as a child, as a child of his society and as a stand-in for the *potentia*, "of that principle of diversifiability of being-in-act" (FITZGERALD in MCMULLIN p. 65) of the people to come which this mythical story announces.

Uncharacteristically for Russian cultural product, the earth, the native soil, the Russian Zemlya here takes on a supporting role to wood. We see a fair amount of earth and topsoil in pitiful condition throughout the film, and it would be sensible perhaps to elaborate on the idea of territorial dynamics—of giving duration to extension as a becoming—through the concept of the soil. However, the expressive possibilities of this idea are not as developed as those of wood as an image-concept and Tarkovsky seems satisfied with showing us how bankrupt, how devoid of value, how poor the soil has become without developing that idea further. As refrains, and like all trees, the trees in *Ivan's Childhood* carry earth with them in their roots... the *terra* not only as source of life, or as material earth as medium for growth and indicative of a patent territorialising medium. Instead, we will be positing the tree as the decisive expressive feature within the film and equating the refrain of the tree as expressive of the becoming-child of a people to come, of a society which Tarkovsky seems to be promulgating through Ivan and his circumstances in the war-torn Russian country-side. In contrast, for Tarkovsky the tree is both part of the intra-assemblage and interassemblage<sup>153</sup> of expression as meaning-creation. It is an extended marker which helps to arrange the components of narrative and align the forces of chaos, of the earth and of the cosmos into coherent territorialisations. Thus, this recurring territorialising element and its myriad manifestations which we identify as a tree is a refrain. The refrain tells us that

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<sup>153</sup> We use the word assemblage even though Deleuze and Guattari use *agencement*. Clearly, assemblage does not convey the expression of implicit subjectivity, of agency, that is conveyed by the French term.

this assemblage is repeated as an *agencement* that articulates through the idea's enactment in all its manifestations.



Figures 4.8 and 4.9: Ivan in nature.

The wizened twisted trees appearing in *Ivan's Childhood* and in *The Sacrifice* might both be gnarled, malformed and desiccated but they convey different meanings; the robust leafy trees of *Solaris* and *The Mirror* full of immortality, fertility and wealth have different affective tonalities which differentiate one from the other in the two films; and it is the same with the plant in the steel box and the references to the garden to which Berton refers to in *Solaris*: "I saw miniature trees, living hedges, acacias, pathways—and it was all made from the same substance" (TARKOVSKY and GORENSHTEIN, 1999, p. 139)... they are all tree-like in appearance and spirit but their contexts invests them with different expression of tree potentials: out of one *substance* (identified by the tree quality) can be presented through its attributes. It bears examining various images from the film to illustrate the dynamic at play between Ivan, the tree-like and the landscape.



Figures 4.10 and 4.11: Ivan in the land of the “Golden Cockerel”.

Figures 4.8 and 4.9 present screen grabs from the opening scenes of *Ivan’s Childhood*. In Figure 4.8, as the camera cranes up, following the straight-grained verticality of the fir tree, as emblematic of the Russian people, we see Ivan in the distance, dwarfed by nature, surrounded by a variety of trees: Ivan stands tall and proud amidst this open landscape of natural beauty and harmony. Suddenly, Ivan wakes from his reverie and his reality is other: he makes his way cross-country, the land littered with corpses and destruction to end up in a dense swamp of crowded trees and barbed wire (Figure 4.9). He no longer stands proud, but crouches and hunkers down as he wades his way across the wetland. The land which just seconds before was solid and fertile has become marshy and liquid—it is no longer the firm foundation upon which to base a future. Ivan blends with the miasmatic time of creation, with cosmic time, and the time of nature. The temporality of Figure 4.8 feels like he can count on the natural progressions of day giving way to night, of spring to summer with a regularity that invests his life with a semblance of dependability. In contrast, Figure 4.9 is a penumbra which lies between night and day, a twilight of indeterminacy which instills uncertainty, insecurity and apprehension. The temporality here is vague, as if time has come to a standstill—not as a dead stop but as interminable suspense as to what will happen next. Here, time is out of joint, there’s the unsteady pulsed time of Ivan walking through the swamp and the time in suspension of the world around him which seems poised to advance but never does.

The imagery in Figures 4.10 and 4.11 depict a different relation of the tree-like to Ivan and the landscape. In Figure 4.10, Ivan is at the receiving end of the qualities of wood that are now no longer trees but lumber: trees that have been milled to perform a certain function in the architectures of existence of the people, in the quotidian rhythms of the villagers who have abandoned their lodgings and livelihoods. The lumber which would normally constitute the structure for homes and farm buildings is now shattered and burnt and aimed threateningly at Ivan. In the background, as a common feature to both photograms, we see the ground, bare earth, the *Zemlya* of the Russian people, stripped of all vegetation and rutted and liquified by war. Again, a foggy haziness engulfs the landscape, which homogenises time and renders it indeterminate and diffuse: a temporality which has no past or future, only an uncertain present which does not pass, a perpetual thresholding

of suspension or deferral. The only things left standing in this village of devastation are the hearths of various homes. They serve as gravestones that mark where families once lived but now designate absence, abjection and death. In the background of both images, we can perceive the decimated remnants of large trees which have been splintered and broken. In Figure 4.11, a broken rafter on the roof of the well (another key recurring sign) points in the direction of the demolished hulk of a large tree which curiously stands in the direction of where the vehicle carrying Ivan and the military officers is headed. And this massive hulk of tree will reappear in other scenes in the film, most significantly in the last scene, as an elusive destiny which Ivan strives for or reaches out to but never attains.

The birch tree, as we can see in Figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14, is invoked whenever “love is in the air” and in Tarkovsky’s world it exudes pheromones and is always associated with the attractive Senior Nurse Masha (Valentina Malyavina). The birch tree is a traditional symbol in the Baltics and is the sacred tree of Russia—it is their most beloved tree, where it is known as “*bereza*” or “*berezka*”. Traditionally, the birch tree was central to the rites of Kumstvo prior to the Semik festival, in which the birch consecrated the fertility of the woman “which they would retain unsullied until they married” (DIXON-KENNEDY, 1998, p. 254).



Figures 4.12 and 4.13: Birch wood as symbol: Lieutenant Masha and love.

Lieutenant Masha is diligent, hard-working and attractive, but vulnerable, timid and winsome—or as Tarkovsky describes her, “naive, pure and trusting” (TARKOVSKY, 1962, p. 34). Perhaps she illustrates the character of the idealised typical Rus woman? Masha finds herself in the middle of a war, at the centre of a triangle of men that vie for her attention: the suavely rapacious Captain Kholia (Valentin Zubkov), the immature Senior Lieutenant

Galtsev (Yevgeni Zharikov), and the enlisted man (Andrei Konchalovski). There's chemistry between Galtsev and Masha, and Galtsev is very protective of Masha, but he cannot make it happen between the two of them; Captain Kholin is more enterprising and makes a move, but ultimately understands that it wouldn't be right to take advantage of the naive nurse or infringe on Galtsev's ineffectual attraction. When Galtsev scolds Masha as a misguided expression of concern for her, he does so in a cabin made out of birch-tree logs; the entire scene of seduction with Captain Kholin or when she meets the soldier who is infatuated with her the romance plays itself out in a birch forest.



Figures 4.14 and 4.15: Capt. Kholia and wood.

The birch tree speaks primarily of love, but for the defenceless and guileless Masha, it also says protection: in the image with Galtsev and Masha, the trees express sanctuary and shelter, whereas in the sequence of Kholin and Masha, or of the soldier and Masha, happens in the open as free and unbounded but also common as in everywhere birch trees. As we can see in Figure 4.13, the birch tree becomes a safeguarding obstacle that stands in the way and protects Masha from the untoward and inappropriate advances of Kholin. But the association between Masha and the birch tree identifies something larger that exceeds what Tarkovsky refers to as the "dance of the birches" which culminates in the iconic image of Kholia kissing Masha, holding her in suspension above a trench in the ground (Figure 4.14). For Tarkovsky, love is the ultimate manifestation of mutual understanding and the kiss is that clasp that demonstrates the contract. As Tarkovsky reminisces, "The kiss over the trench, in my opinion, is remotely and quite indirectly associated with a graveside kiss. And this is another tragic image, at least to my mind. There is the pre-marital joy at a waltz and another kind of joy, one Pushkin described as "on the edge of a gloomy abyss"" (in



TARKOVSKY, 1962).<sup>154</sup> What is the abyss that subtends the relation between Kholin and Masha? Why is she suspended in mid-air by him? Are we to interpret that as an affective gesture that describes the precariousness and tenuousness of their amorous embrace? Is the gloomy sadness due to Kholin's unfair seduction of Masha? But if the drama that is being represented is larger than the couple's embrace, perhaps it is an inversion of Tkachëv's<sup>155</sup> assertion that "the powers in Russia had no class supporting them and were therefore 'hanging in mid-air', Tkachëv saw the coming revolution as a seizure of power by a minority" (VAUGHN JAMES, 1973 p. 27) and Tarkovsky's characters are indicating that history is repeating itself. Masha, here as a naive and gullible youthful Mother Russia, is being held in mid-air by Kholin to demonstrate that her life depends on the petulance of Party apparatchiks. This would represent the death knell of the Slavic Rus heralded by another "bird" which will be ultimately confirmed by Ivan's death.

It is only to be expected that traditional forms of social organisation will fall prey to the chaos and disorder brought on by war and in *Ivan's Childhood*, Tarkovsky dispenses with the family as the basic form of social structuring. Ivan is an orphan and care and concern for the boy involves a band of warrior-brothers where even if the film is located in a military camp, the usual soldierly hierarchy is loosely operative. In keeping with the social order of the new Socialist Republic, orders never seem to be followed directly and are replaced by power interactions based on snarly exchanges that are based on an extended social logic of legitimacy that is horizontally extended rather than a vertically structured artificial hierarchy; it is more a pack-like ascendancy of legitimacy than a top-down enforcement of authority. A familial paternalism appears after Ivan runs away and is brought back by Colonel Gryaznov (Nikolai Grinko) who tells the boy he will be spanked if he doesn't do as he's told. In a run-in between Capt. Kholin and Lieut. Galtsev, Kholin wants to make Galtsev comply to his

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<sup>154</sup> <http://people.ucalgary.ca/~tstronds/nostalghia.com/TheTopics/Betwtwofilms.html>


<sup>155</sup> Pyotr Nikitich Tkachev, (1844 – 1886) was a Russian writer, critic and revolutionary theorist who formulated many of the revolutionary principles that would later be further developed and put into action by Vladimir Lenin (Wikipedia). Interestingly, Aleksandr Karlovich Tarkovsky, Andrei Tarkovsky's grandfather was "librarian" of the local cell of the most ultra of contemporary terrorist factions, the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), was a nineteenth-century revolutionary political organisation in the Russian Empire which based on the writings of Tkachev (among others) advocated an indigenous socialism based upon the massive Russian peasantry. It was this organisation that, three years previously, in March 1881, assassinated Tsar Aleksandr II.

demands by threatening to report him to the Committee. The only time a formal military hierarchy is applied happens between the male Senior Lieutenant Galtsev and the female Lieutenant Masha who are deeply attracted to each other but unable to consummate their mutual desire: Galtsev scolds Masha out concern for her safety and keeping her out of harm's way, but it ends up sounding like a patronising paternalistic rant which infantilises the woman.

Apart from Ivan, Captain Kholin is the most complex role in that if Ivan mirrors the qualities of his people, Kholin reflects some of the internal “personality conflicts” of the Soviet Revolution—he is a slithery Party bureaucrat who relishes in the dispassionate application of scientific Marxist theory. His character is more nuanced and conflicted—Captain Kholin is Ivan's nemesis and opposite for even if he appears to “love” Ivan and be affectionate towards him, he is the one that ultimately betrays and sacrifices Ivan. It is because of Kholin's dispassionate devotion to duty that Ivan ultimately is captured: Kholin sends Ivan on the dangerous reconnaissance mission not only because it is what he feels *must be done* for the war, for the Revolution, the Party and the People, but also because there is a hubris that needs flattening in the natural Rus character that runs through Ivan that puts into question the legitimacy of the Revolution as embodying the character of the Soviet People as the True character of a people to come. Kholin is a blindly devoted official, a devious believer, or perhaps more accurately a true functionary of the Party; he is calculating and manipulative, deceitful and expediently bureaucratic at the expense of a concern for real people. One cannot say with certainty what drives him. Perhaps he is driven by blind ambition as the personified Ockham's Razor of Party expediency? Or perhaps he's a gambler where he is willing to play the odds of success and survival in the carrying out of the scouting mission? Or perhaps he is a shameless bureaucrat in that he is willing to sacrifice Ivan even if he knows better? But although Tarkovsky treats his Kholin's persona cinematically with a certain consideration and respect, Kholin is not as wholesome as he appears. Images of him lighting a cigarette under the icon of Mary and Jesus might illustrate certain disrespect; or the way he carries one of the canoes on his shoulder seems like he is carrying a coffin rather than an inverted boat. And then when he throws the boat into the water, he falters, trips and steps on the gunwale of the boat and almost falls in (Figure 4.15). It becomes clear that compared to Ivan, Kholin is no saviour... where he can barely maintain

his balance on the water's edge, Ivan will be seen in the final scene, not walking on water like Jesus Christ, but running outright on the surface of the water.

Tarkovsky demonstrates that he understands the character of the people when he identifies Kholin as a “problem” for a humanist development of the social. Ivan’s freedom to act emerges from within according to the principles that he naturally understands as necessary for the revolution as his Rus character. Even if he is blinded by revenge for what the Nazi’s have done to his village and to his family, Ivan carries out his work out of an emergent sense of duty and an innate knowledge of what has to be done. He is guided by the natural inborn character of the Russian people not as a passive follower of what’s dictated from above, but as immanent-to-the-event—as embodying the qualities which wood seems to convey.



Figures 4.16 and 4.17: Ivan’s Mother at the seashore and as a reflection at the bottom of the well.

The relation of Ivan with his mother (Irma Raush)<sup>156</sup> is depicted within dream sequences or fantasy imagery (Figures 4.16 and 4.17). The mother is associated with lush vegetation and brush but also with the sea. As Cirlot explains, “Its symbolic meaning corresponds to mediation between life and death. “The sea, the oceans, are considered as the source of life and the end of the same. Return to the sea is like a return to the mother, to die” (CIRLOT, 1962, p. 281). This imagery of linking mother and seashore to Ivan bookends the film, frames its tragic outcome and serves as the dramatic arc which subtends the drama of the film. In the opening sequence we see Ivan with the fir sapling and in the closing scene we see Ivan at the beach playing hide and go seek with his friends around a huge dead tree

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<sup>156</sup> Irma Raush was Tarkovsky’s first wife and were together from 1957 to 1970.

(Figure 4.18). But when we see Ivan in the final scene with his mother and the sea shore (Figure 4.16), we read it differently from how we understood it in the opening scene. The scene is replete with the symbolism of death but has a most indefinite narrative voice, in that it is relating a mental image of a being who is dead. In Tarkovsky's words, "Of especial importance is the final dream, which we the viewers see after we find out about Ivan's execution. The viewer sees a protagonist who no longer exists and absorbs into himself elements of his real and possible fate" (TARKOVSKY, 1962).<sup>157</sup> In the high-key light of the bright, sunny day, time seems to have come to a standstill. It is an idyllic paradise of childhood without a care in the world, populated by those he is closest to: his mother, his young girlfriend and other children his age.



Figures 4.18 and 4.19: Ivan at the seashore with the tree as death imagery.

Ivan is also linked to his mother through the image of the well. As a hole that is dug deep into the earth, it reaches far down into the interior of the Zemlya where the land of promise, the palace of the centre, is hidden, and in a telling dream-image (Figure 4.17), Tarkovsky shows Ivan and his mother peering into a well... deep inside, at the bottom of the well, they see their reflection on the surface of the water and, interestingly, the wall of the well is lined with wood. By virtue of peering into the deep well, we are made to realise that when mother and child peer deep into the well, into the depths of the Zemlya what they see reflected there is an image of themselves—deep down, the Zemlya is only a reflection of mother and son, in other words, the people that they represent symbolically. This image synthesises the network of symbolism into one compact frame which ties together Ivan,

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<sup>157</sup> Iskusstvo kino 11 (1962) 82-4

mother, the people, wood, and Zemlya—and initiates Ivan as a mediator to the well as the threshold between life and death. The well is both an element of the intra- and inter-assemblages of Tarkovsky’s imagery and recurs in the scene with the old man and the rooster (Figures 4.10 and 4.11) and in several other films by Tarkovsky, such as *Andrei Rublev* and *Stalker*, but, most significantly, in *The Mirror*. In Figure 4.20, we see a frame of a subjective point-of-view aerial shot from high above while Ivan is flying ecstatically over the seashore as part of a dream sequence early in the film. Already from the beginning of the film, Tarkovsky splays out the cartography of death that guides or determines the narrative of the film. From the aerial image (Figure 4.20), we see the seashore, a somewhat denuded tree, the well, and Ivan’s mother. When we first encounter this image, we fail to understand the full implications of what is being depicted until we let the final images of the film inform the narrative and allow us to grasp the full intent of the imagery.



Figures 4.20 and 4.21: Unexpected and uncommon visual symbols

The scene of Ivan riding in the box of the truck depicted in Figure 4.21 brings out the negative dynamic, the antithetical movement which undoes the becoming-child and pulls him away from ever becoming a child. Perhaps this scene depicts the most striking and enigmatic images within *Ivan’s Childhood*, in that, even if it is a dream sequence which contributes to the opening dream-sequence, it feels stylistically and narratively unmotivated and out of place. It involves both Ivan and the theme of wood with other visual symbols in unexpected and unusual ways which will return throughout Tarkovsky’s career. We have important recurring elements here that will appear in *Andrei Rublev*, *Solaris*, and *Stalker* as imagery or symbolism that will be repeated and differently contextualised and articulated.

The scene in question is a dream-sequence Ivan is having after he dozes off after his “last supper” before leaving on his mission. Ivan and his young girlfriend (Vera Miturich) are riding through a thundershower in the back of a truck that is carrying apples. The rain and the lightning is very intense but the sun is shining nonetheless. The lightning flashes repeatedly, and during one flash, the background of trees which cover the road remain as a negative reversal. The truck is making its way down a tree covered road that will eventually lead to the seashore. Once there, the truck careens dizzily on the sand and spills much of its load of apples onto the sand where several horses hungrily pick off the apples. As they approach the seashore, the children are enjoying themselves immensely and are revelling in each other’s company. Ivan offers the girl an apple which she refuses; Ivan offers her a second, even nicer, apple which she also refuses. Ivan then selects the choicest apple, holds it out for the rain to wash and she accepts. Tarkovsky then offers us three very similar close-ups of the girl reacting to Ivan—happy and amused, melancholy forlorn, and defiantly troubled—unconcernedly getting drenched by the rain while the moving background of trees (in negative) races by behind her. Amidst these expressions of fertility, future and possibility, death is in the air, making itself known through the inversion of the presentation of the tree background as a rear-projection plate. Thus, what we would usually read as the life-giving and purifying attributes of rain which falls from the heavens as a “symbol of the ‘spiritual influences’ of heaven descending upon earth” (CIRLOT, 1964, p. 272) must be seen through its inversion, as the contrary. Ivan’s dream is premonitory of impending death, and is therefore an inverted annunciation depicted as threshold experience, as passage. The return to the sea is a return to the mother—it is the opposite of incarnation as a spiritualisation of self—and like all annunciations which require an archway, portal, or passage that announces the upcoming event of transition, the canopy of trees which covers the roadway and the truck as it approaches the seashore dynamically fulfils that purpose. And the apples, which as seed articulate the future possibility of ‘wood’ and forthcoming trees of knowledge, are scattered on the roadway and later on the sand where they will be eaten by horses.



Figures 4.22 and 4.23: The Nazi tree of death. Oak trees adorning the AH monogram in the photograph on the left. Goebbels's assassinated children spread out on the ground under the shade of tree branches.

The seashore, by being tied to the unknown of water, is one type of death image. But the imagery of wood is also directly tied to death. Figures 4.22 and 4.23 show two attributes of wood that evoke the association of Nazism with death. Figure 4.22 shows the polished keystone to a doorway amidst the ruins of the Reichstag emblazoned with the monogram “AH” (Adolf Hitler) adorned with sheafs of oak branches. It is an ironic image in that the doorway acts as threshold but here inscribed with the initials AH as contextualised in the montage of ruin would mean that to cross that threshold will bring one to perdition and death. Figure 4.23 shows Goebbels’ dead children splayed out on the ground next to the entrance to the bunker where they were hiding in Berlin with their parents and other members of the Nazi High Command, including Adolf Hitler and Eva Braun, during the final days of World War II. As the Red Army entered Berlin, the children were murdered with ampules of cyanide at their parents request. When the Russians opened the bunker, the dead children were brought up to the courtyard and laid out on the ground under the shadows of the trees. The Goebbels children as the future of the Third Reich, echoing Ivan’s temporal position as the future of the Russian people, are here associated with wood through its material absence as privation, as completely devoid of that quality which is so present and operative in the Russians’ life force—as *élan vital*—to the point that we don’t even see trees as a first hand presence, but as absent and only present as a phantom, or as a shadow of their former actual selves.



Figuras 4.24 e 4.25: A árvore e os soldados.

In contrast to the overarching tragedy of the story of the annihilation of the becoming-child and the recurring theme of death, Tarkovsky compensates the inevitable destiny of treason/sacrifice with images of hope. This hope is presented by the tree imagery in both a weak form and a strong form as a concerned care or support for the soldiers, as wood transformed into the Cross of the Orthodox Christians and ultimately as an abstract symbol of unity, of cohesion and community and of love. Christian religion is represented in the film as a proliferation of crosses and their association to the sun and to wood as a new beginning. The trees shown in Figures 4.24 and 4.25 show two depictions of the weak evocation of hope by way of wood through the relation of trees to the soldiers at the front. In Figure 4.24, a column of soldiers is leaving the encampment, presumably to do battle as if under the aegis of the gnarly and deformed tree branch overhead; in Figure 4.25 we see two dead Russian soldiers, stripped of their footwear and uniforms being held up by nooses tied to the main branch of another gnarly and deformed tree. Here, in both images, the soil appears dry and bare, lifeless, as if stripped of all future potential. In these conditions, it is difficult for any type of tree to flourish, never mind have any kind of outlook towards the future. Yet the trees serve a purpose. In spite of these shortcomings, the tree is still providing sustenance to the soldiers through their presence as affirmation of the life force that is still there and, literally, as a physical support for the dead soldiers to keep their heads up high. Again, the expressed temporality of these images is indeterminate in that they could be taken in Spring, Summer or Fall—we can only read an indeterminate flux of day giving way to night repeatedly as pure repetition of the same without reprieve or end in sight.





Figures 4.26 and 4.27: The Orthodox Christian cross as a new dawn.

Figures 4.26 and 4.27 present the strong evocation of hope through a steel Christian cross as a displaced metaphor for wood. Jesus's cross was made of wood and but here it is featured as a physically stronger and more lasting material that will survive the war despite the strife. The combat zone of war is an area of processual engagement between forces, where confrontation is at its most intense and focused as brutish conflict towards total annihilation. But this head-to-head, all-or-nothing engagement which converts matter to energy is the simultaneous production of destruction and a movement of creation. Destruction affords the conditions which allow the emergence, albeit forced, of novelty: deterritorialisation and territorialisation follow each other at infinite speeds in a manner where it is difficult to ascertain which one is operative. Out of the nothingness of what is left, amidst the chaos and destruction of war, the cross of the Christian Orthodox religion appears to survive as associated to hope, as premonitory to a new dawn as heralding a new day: the spirit embodied by the Christian Orthodox religion emerges as a possibility for the people to come through its relation to wood symbolism. And in the "dialectical" opposition between two socialisms as models for a people to come, Tarkovsky would seem to be offering us Ivan as a synthesis whose character is articulated through the various attributive attributes of wood which are now tied to the spiritual aspirations of the Christian Orthodox religion of the Slavic Rus people. Figure 4.26 shows us the cross, skewed and shaken, but still standing after an artillery attack. And through the dust and powdered soil, we see the morning sun shining through the cross as a montage of the sun of a new day and the cross as the hope towards the future of a people to come. That this sunlight which shines through the cross is the light of Christian Orthodoxy which emanates through the Slavic Rus character

spills over into the next scene: massive sunbeams pour into the church cellar where the soldiers are billeted and illumine with sunlight an interchange between Ivan and Galtsev where the conversation is conducted by way of a mirror on the wall: Galtsev appears in the mirror as a reflection of Ivan; in contrast, in a subsequent scene, Kholia is shaving at the wash basin and the only reflection captured by the mirror is his own. In Figure 4.27, we see the steel Christian cross in silhouette as Ivan leaves the encampment before sunup towards the execution of his fateful final mission.



Figures 4.28 and 4.29: The cross of the Russian Orthodox Church as articulation of wood.

Figures 4.28 and 4.29 pursue this line of thought through a more or less subtle line of repetition. Figure 28 shows us four posts which ostensibly communicate the unification of the people through a common line of communication that territorialises by using four cross-shaped electricity poles as the crosses which identify Jesus and the three thieves.<sup>158</sup> Figure 29 associates the Orthodox Christian cross (inclusive of the footrest!) to what could be a random object of destruction or a grave marker with the symbolism of the birch tree as love, as pureness of spirit, and as home even though the Zemlya is fractured underneath.

In revealing the different meanings that the tree is expressing throughout the film, the elusive quality we are after is something akin to the soul of tree-ing. But not in terms of essence—what we seek is that which gives expression to the actual, to the gestural, to the performative in its subjective movement—it would not be the *essentia* as classically defined because that concept as traditionally conceived imbues existence with a constant, static,

<sup>158</sup> It feels a somewhat farfetched association but there are no additional power poles to disclaim this interpretation. Still, as Petrie and Johnson posit, once one starts looking for crosses, they are found everywhere.

permanent quality which entities do not possess and which are always variable in their intensity and never as identified—that double articulation of change of the thing itself and the changing nature of the qualities which also change in themselves and in their application to the changing thing. The quality we seek would articulate Aristotle’s phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (*to ti ēn einai*), which literally means something like “the what it would be to be (something)” or “the to be what is” as its becoming. In *Metaphysics* VII.4, 1029b14, Aristotle defines *to ti ēn einai* as “the what-being-is of each thing is said to be in its own right”. So that τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is not “what something is as such” but our report of that which we perceive the object to be. It is the expressive account of the subjective changing nature, of the cognised *natura naturans*, in relation to the possessive, to that which it has as the that it performs in the relations with one another and the territory—“expressive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and constitute a having more profound than being” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 316)—meaning that what we are looking for is the internal externally-expressed as appearance and not only the external as expression: the “internal” tree that taps directly into the soil as the life force which sustains the slavic people through the hardships of the war and the treacherousness of the Party. The entity that articulates, that mediates, this “woodness” in terms of the Russian people is Ivan. He is to the Russian people what the tree is to the earth as symbol. Ivan demonstrates the character and qualities that are traditionally embodied and expressed by the Russian people, whereas the tree expresses the relationship of the character as a function of the relation to the land. And Ivan expresses this character as a constantly becoming other, as a multiplicity which is always something else as different attributes of this life substance which Tarkovsky has identified as wood and which we identify as the different qualities of becoming-child expressed by Ivan. And so the nature of “wood” allows Tarkovsky to locate *Ivan’s Childhood* within chronological time, within a historical time frame, but at the same time outside of time in a temporal no man’s land where the narrative is outside of a linear and coherent unfolding of time where past and present are sacrificed and annihilated as the emergence of a perpetual present. If for Tarkovsky a film is a mosaic of time, then the wood element in *Ivan’s Childhood* is the parquetry of time. Ivan’s story as related by Tarkovsky is a poetical narrative of an event which by definition has no fixed temporal metric by which it can be measured: the question is not to determine if the story that transpires in the movie takes place in three days, one week, three months, a year or three years but how Tarkovsky

produces new temporalities, new rhythms in the progression of singularities as the meta-narrative of the film towards a specific resolution. The narrative time-line is elastic and rhythmically durational in that it combines the disjointed temporalities and rhythms of various scenes and produces a space-time that functions as a coherent, functional assemblage/*agencement*: it combines Chronos and Aion as a mixture of pulsed and non-pulsed time, both as succession and as interpenetrated under the singular time signatures of the indivisible movements.

Thus far, we have been developing our concepts through an ontological system that is based on inconstancy, difference and process where entities are characterised by impermanence, transiency, and change and so we continue in this direction predicating our understanding on the idea that what is being portrayed by the film is always a becoming-other and more specifically as a becoming-child. Everything depicted in the film is not a static thing but a becoming-other caught within the dynamic of process and change. We seek to see the world of *Ivan's Childhood* not populated by objects, by nominatives, by entities that can be given names, but by derivatives which become nouns of action, where nouns, both subjects and predicates become activities, actions, gestures which entail change and are never conclusive or perfective as imagistic entities which act and react incessantly. It is the opposite move Cicero makes when he takes the Aristotelian phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and translates "the infinitive *esse* of the Latin verb meaning "to be" and its participle *ens*, getting *essens*, and adds the abstract ending *-tia* to make an abstract noun meant to convey the sense of Aristotle's phrase" (PREUS, 2015, p. 153). Thus, Ivan is an Ivaning, a becoming-Ivan which is always different from whatever he was before and whatever he will be; childhood is not a state of being between the ages of 6 and 12 but a becoming-other within a duration which encompasses certain changes in a body, which *survol*s "the bundle of rhythms, which are different but in tune" (LEFEBVRE, 2004, p. 20) involved and implied in the performance of certain gestures and the articulation of certain attitudes towards the world; the mother is not an unchanging, permanent individual but a body that mothers through the gestures and activities of mothering and as incessant becoming-mother. In *Ivan's Childhood*, the mother is spared the demands of progeniture or filiation. In that as becoming, as an assemblage, as an *agencement*, her rôle becomes abstract, and her presence does not imply being Ivan's mother but of embodying certain landscaping functions.



Figures 4.24 and 4.25: Tree and soldiers.

The tree as a living being which is constituted of wood, is a vegetal body imbued with life, with its own characteristic rhythms, that reaches up towards the sky, grows branches, sheds leaves, produces fruit, etc and whose multiple activities are rendered as one gesture or activity or occupation as treeing. What we are trying to do here is to peg the changing nature of Ivan as a changing thing to another visual sign, the tree, as a multiplicity that stands for something to something else, and whose nature is also variable as the changing inherent quality as matter and as matter of expression is to change. Ivan, by virtue of being a body, undergoes change, but because he is also a child he undergoes change doubly: he changes because he is a becoming but also as a child. The change of becoming-child has to be articulated doubly. occurs as a double articulation. If the first changing nature of the boy called Ivan is the first derivative, the changing nature of that boy in terms of being a child is the quality of change of change, the second derivative. Being a child is a non-being; it is to experience the threshold, to live the differential, to be absorbed by process. It is not a not-being in the sense that the child has being or existence (albeit a changing one), but it is a non-being because it is always changing in terms of any quality which seeks to afford him a stable identity as a being—the only stable characteristic of the child is that it is always changing, growing, becoming-other towards a putatively stable identity—an adult—even if in our epistemology of difference that goal is non-existent. So because he does not have that stable identity that affords him the quality of being, he is a non-being, the contrary to being, not as a not-being or that which does not express being as such, but a becoming.<sup>159</sup> “Instead of the motif being tied to a character who appears, the appearance of the motif itself

<sup>159</sup> This is the essence of the argument in Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* 10.19<sup>b</sup> 10-20.

constitutes a rhythmic character” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 319)—it is an element that territorialises by its encompassing action. To use the word encompasses to describe rhythm as a word that envelops, that aggregates or integrates individual movements or gestures, is compelling because as the act of encompassing occupies us, we are overtaken by the event’s dynamic. So that in the pacing-together (predicating the Latin *compassus*, as a stepping-with), a common temporality emerges which entrains the multiplicity into a synchronicity as an immanent choreography to the movement of the event. It not only gives the measured *ratio* of the operative rationality to the movement of the strides of the open legs of the geometric compass, but also a unity and continuity as an intuitive direction. “But the rhythm, precisely, is caught up in a becoming that sweeps up the distances between characters, making them rhythmic characters that are themselves more or less distant, more or less combinable (intervals)” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 320). Also, the singular open-legged stride as an encompassing, as a movement that encompasses, as what Deleuze refers to in an interview with Richard Pinhas as a scansion (DELEUZE 1977), as a space staked out by our stride as a concrete duration, brings us directly to the first paragraph of the first chapter of Deleuze’s *Cinema 1: The Movement Image* and the first, and most importantly, of Bergson’s theses on movement which states: “Movement is distinct from the space covered. Space covered is past, movement is present, the act of covering. The space covered is divisible, indeed infinitely divisible, whilst movement is indivisible, or cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time it is divided” (DELEUZE, 1986, p. 1). And it is precisely here in the movement of the becoming-expressive of rhythm—in the emergence, in the proper qualities that are perceived and therefore accountable as expression, in the indivisible moment of the cadenced expression of deterritorialisation and territorialisation—that Art emerges. (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1987, p. 316). But the emergence of Art does not happen out of the encompassed space as testament to the act of covering but in the affective, in the modification to feeling as thought-experience that occurs in the movement.<sup>160</sup> And by putting the rhythmic of Art in these terms, we can conceive of Art as the solution to problems that can be stated in temporal terms.

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<sup>160</sup> We see this movement in Tarkovsky’s films time and time again, and if we call this movement artistic, we can safely label him an artist. And when this movement recurs under different guises as inter-assemblage refrains it becomes easy to extend the label of auteur to

*Ivan's Childhood* exemplifies how cinema can simultaneously be painting and music. Not only in the sense of giving movement immobile sections called frames or static photograms and the movement of time. But in how it can articulate the pictorial problematic of painting and the temporal problematic implicit in music at the junction of the face-landscape and the refrain. "The aim of painting has always been the deterritorialization of faces and landscapes" (DELEUZE & GUATTARI 1987 p. 301) and the aim of music has been the appropriation of pulsed time by the marking of a territory, by its encompassing rhythms. The encompassing gesture of rhythm imparts duration in that it envelops multiplicity and unifies time through the indivisible movement which is both one and many. The refrain "is the formula that evokes a character or landscape" as the a priori form of time, as a crystal of space-time.

Tarkovsky links together dreams, fantasies and daydreams, trauma induced hallucinations, events which inform each other (and our understanding) out of sequence, scenes which are pieced together having a temporality that is different from the way they unfold in life, which combine with the fixed temporality of the archival documentary footage, and the jump forward to an indefinite future which gives a unifying closure to the narrative as an account of the negative spiral of the becoming-child that can be called Ivan's childhood. In the film adaptation of Ivan's story, Tarkovsky adds certain scenes which "attain central significance in the film's ideas and composition" (Idem). These striking scenes which for the most part are not continuous with the surrounding action in that they represent internal states or depict mental imagery which compel us to redirect or refocus our understanding of the story. The film works without these scenes, but the experience is not as consequential or as rich. The main narrative line of the film for the most part remains intact, but the sidebar scenes give us insight into the psychological causes which motivate the forces behind Ivan's actions. Tarkovsky offers us seven sequences which depart from naturalistic representational conventions to depict Ivan's constructions of private matters and wayward internal states:

The opening dream sequence: the annunciation

The dream sequence of the well: the revelation of who he is

The day-dream in the village of the old man: realisation and reconciliation

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the artist that gives voice to these refrains that continually emerge throughout the creative output of that very same individual.

Trauma-induced hallucinations: the internal conflict

The dream sequence with the apples: The scene of contagion and diffusion

Galtsev's visualisation of Ivan's death: the beheading

The closing sequence: Liberation

If becoming-child can be defined processually as the expression of the changing nature of changing nature itself, then the milieu in which Ivan's becoming-child individuates is drawing him away from his own best interests. It's an enigmatic situation. Does Ivan's freedom constrain his actions? Is he enslaved by the desire to contribute to something that is larger than he is? Does he sacrifice himself for the greater good because he has a deeper native insight? Ivan's freedom to act emerges from within according to principles that he naturally understands as necessary to the safeguarding of his people and not necessarily for the Soviet Revolution. His mission is to avenge his people first, the Revolution second. Even if he is blinded by revenge for what the Nazi's have done to his village and to his family, his revenge is out of an instinct for self-preservation which informs him of what has to be done and how to go about it. He is guided by the congenital character of the Russian people not as a leadership from above, but as immanent to the war-event as the *mnemosyne* of his land. He cannot sit idly as a passive bystander or as a student in a military school knowing that others are actively fighting the good war, sacrificing their own lives in order to do good for the common welfare. Ivan's natural becoming is imbued with the true temperament and qualities of a Socialism natural to the Slavic Rus, as a character that predates the proletarian character of the Revolution. These inherent qualities may have been coopted through Socialist Realism and aligned to function with the ideals of the Communist Party, but the True character of the Revolution resides in the character of the Slavic Rus guided by their fervour and faith in the Christian Orthodox Church. The tragic side of Ivan is that his devotion, his feeling of responsibility towards the defence, protection and safekeeping of his people, and his single mindedness in avenging them will be what ultimately leads to his demise. Captain Kholia will take advantage of the child's steadfastness and betray his trust by deliberately putting him in harm's way and acting in the child's worst interest. To paraphrase Benjamin (1996), Ivan's death is an ironic immortality—he must die in order to become immortal.



As Tarkovsky writes, Ivan is “a character created and absorbed by war”<sup>161</sup> but by a war that goes beyond the material attributes of the machinery of war as a machinic assemblage. Ivan emerges as war itself, as the internal war of becoming-child as a conflict doing battle within, through and with its own becoming. Ivan’s becoming-child is a combat zone, an area of processual engagement between forces, where serial confrontation produces total annihilation towards the liberation of the conditions of creation and novelty. Ivan’s story is an account of a thwarted development, an arrested becoming, where negative affects overwhelm the becoming and lead to his dissolution. Yet, as Deleuze and Guattari posit in *A Thousand Plateaus*, every becoming produces nothing other than becoming itself—not as an individual but as a multiplicity, as a becoming population. We are encouraged to read the character of Ivan as representing a people and not to see him only as a solitary exemplar that represents only himself and his actions. As a more-than-what-appears, Ivan and the other characters in the film look to be seen as forces that occupy bodies, as occupations that take up space, as occupations that do and which take up time in doing so, and thus create temporalities. But these bodies that have extension, intention, intension and therefore duration ought not be seen as one-substance exemplars, but as metonymic types that represent multiplicities as assemblages of assemblages, as representatives and as representative of a people, a nation, a social group, a pack, an army... as becomings that have multiplicitous durations which form and inhabit a milieu as a precarious minor becoming that can contaminate the rest. “We believe only in totalities that are peripheral. And if we discover such a totality alongside various separate parts, it is a whole of these particular parts but does not totalize them; it is a unity of all those particular parts but does not unify them; rather it is added to them as a new part fabricated separately” (DELEUZE & GUATTARI, 1983, p. 6). The fact that they are representative does not make them representations but allows them to articulate difference and give expression to their individuations as unique individualisations. As Delanda (2010) asserts, the key is not to reduce to the whole that composes it nor fusing them into a totality where their individuality is lost. Ivan channels the forces that embody him as a continuous entity that has followed a unique path of singular experiences, just like any of the other characters in the film and any and all others that are not in the film but are represented. As such, it is

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<sup>161</sup> <http://people.ucalgary.ca/~tstronds/nostalghia.com/TheTopics/Betwtwofilms.html>

Tarkovsky's unique way of telling the story of *Ivan's Childhood* as a foundational myth, a narrative account of a becoming, and not simply a folk tale of a heroic saga.

The war, as conflict, is a series of encounters of diverse forces that occurs where the conflict, as devastatingly ruinous as it is, is also creative in that it produces the conditions that afford the emergence of novelty within destruction. It is a zone of space-time where deterritorialisation and territorialization follow each other at vertiginous speeds where it is difficult ascertain which dynamic of the two is in play. In comparing war to what goes on processually in becoming-child, one can compare the two: becoming-child as a war with the becoming-self where every step of the way undoes what what was there before to fashion afresh a new milieu of becoming and open wide the possibilities of where becoming might go.

The story of betrayal and sacrifice and the religious overtones which subtly colour the story also allow one to construe the Ivan story as a fabulated martyrology of a young Russian 'prophet' or 'saint'. If we compare some of Ivan's traits to the hagiography of a cherished church father of the Eastern Orthodox Church such as John the Baptist, we notice some similarities and parallelisms. The name Ivan is the Slavic relative of the Latin name Johannes, corresponding to English John.<sup>162</sup> John the Baptist was known as the forerunner, or the precursor, which means that "runs before"—the task Ivan fulfils as a runner, as a reconnaissance scout that clears the way for those who follow and alerts them to danger; this can be understood in terms of this functions as a son of the regiment in the Red Army at war or in the sense of his paving the way for the acceptance of the Slavic Rus as the real Russian people. There's also the deep association of Ivan with water as element and sign, and most telling, Galtsev's imagining of Ivan's death as a beheading in the guillotine and not shot as stated in Ivan's prison record which identifies Ivan with the martyrdom of John the Baptist, and a death experienced as the death of a martyr by the betrayal by Kholia, his understanding of his imminent capture as sacrifice, and his execution at the hands of the Nazis as the consummation of his life which gives meaning to the betrayal and the sacrifice. Yet, there are other symbolic indications which compel us to follow this line of thought

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<sup>162</sup> This Slavic version of the name originates from New Testament Greek Ἰωάννης (Iōánnēs) rather than from the Latin Io(h)annes. The Greek name is in turn derived from Hebrew יְהוָה (Yôhānān), meaning "YHWH (God) is gracious". The name is ultimately derived from the Biblical Hebrew name יְהוֹחָנָן (pronounced [joħanan]), short for יְהוֹחָנָן (pronounced [jəħoħanan]), meaning "God is merciful".

towards seeing Ivan's exemplary character as a supernatural being, as a deity of another kind. When we see Ivan in the last shots of the film, running on the water, we see this as a demonstration of his fleet-footedness as expressive of his unearthly abilities which when tied to his vocation as scout, as messenger, as bringer of news, draws us to associate him to the Greek deity Hermes, known as Mercury in Roman mythology. The droopy ear-flaps on Ivan's *ushanka*-cap lightly mimic the wings on Mercury's *petasos*; and the ram or goat (which we see associated to Ivan in the opening sequence) and the rooster with the old man point towards this interpretation. So, if we allow ourselves to see Ivan as a latter-day Hermes, the scene of Ivan in the truck with the apples becomes more understandable. One of the incarnations of Hermes is that of the psychopomp—from the Greek word ψυχοπομπός, *psuchopompos*—literally meaning the "guide of souls" (Lydell), whose responsibility is to escort the newly deceased souls from Earth to the afterlife... beings associated with horses and cuckoos. In Ovid's *Fasti*, Mercury is assigned to escort the naiad nymph<sup>163</sup> Larunda to the underworld. For betraying his trust, Jupiter cuts out Larunda's tongue and orders Mercury, the psychopomp, to conduct her to Avernus, the gateway to the Underworld. Mercury, however, falls in love with Larunda and makes love to her on the way. Traditional lore has it that these Nymphs as Devine creatures who animate nature could give birth to fully immortal children if mated to a god and so, in this scene, the seed that is imparted to the girl is the apple of knowledge of good and evil, the *logos spermatikos*, which here is indiscriminately dispersed on the infertile shores of the waters of the underworld; in the Ovid myth Larunda is spared death and gives birth to twins. Thus, the horses, which are also creatures aligned with the *psuchopompos*, "which Neptune with his trident lashes up out of the waves, symbolise the cosmic forces that surge out of the Akasha—the blind forces of primigenial chaos" (CIRLOT 1962, p. 152), gobble up so hungrily the apples strewn on the sand.

The final sequence of *Ivan's Childhood* shows Ivan playing blind man's buff with other children, including the girl of the truck, on the beach-shore at the foot of a large, gnarly, decimated tree-trunk. Ivan, assuming the role of psychopomp, points at children encircling him who summarily fall "dead" to the ground—presumably, the same children that were tortured and killed with him jail and that will continue on to Hades. Ivan finds himself

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<sup>163</sup> Johnson and Petrie (1994) identify the girl as Ivan's sister. Other than confusing Ivan with Andrei Tarkovsky, I cannot understand how they came to identify the young girl.

wandering around, puzzled to find himself alone next to the wizened, gnarled tree trunk (Figure 4.16). The girl unexpectedly jumps out from behind a clump of dead vegetation and races away from him. Ivan gives pursuit as the girl runs on the sandy beach, and chases her onto a spit which breaks into the water. The sequence of shots is the expression of pure joy: the two are running on the surface of the water laughing and giggling in exaltation. But in catching up to her, Ivan sprints past the girl, and the last images of the film show Ivan running on the water (Figure 4.30),<sup>164</sup> extending his arm, reaching for the dead tree trunk backlit by the sun (Figure 4.17).



Figure 4.30: Ivan running on water. One of my favourite images of all times.

The final scene closes the loop of Ivan as a martyr of the people and informs the legitimacy of the myth with the viewer. It converts the fabulated story from an account of an event during the war into a self-contained monad which can be passed on as the heritage of myth of a people to come. It severs the umbilical cord that reduces *Ivan's Childhood* as a story about a boy that suffers the horrors of war, into a story that is tied down to a time and place but is now allowed to occupy an indefinite pervasiveness, a generality which is neither here nor there but nowhere and everywhere at the same time. Ivan's becoming is what defines him subjectively and gives him definition as a body, as an assemblage, an

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<sup>164</sup> Walking on water is also an image which recurs throughout Tarkovsky's work. The closest association is to Jesus walking on water and whom Ivan undoes by running at top speed on the water! Tarkovsky also offers us walking through water, walking besides water in *Andrei Rublev*, *Solaris*, *Stalker*, and *Nostalghia*.

*agencement*, understood analogically as the body of the people. The story of Ivan is a tragedy in that he represents the future of the Soviet Rus people, but it is a story of hope in that through his sacrifice his story can be known and disseminated and understood as a more-than Ivan and a more-than of the people as an all-pervasive quality that infuses the whole assemblage of assemblages and gives definition to the socius. Usually, a people's territory is marked by physical limits which establish boundaries of containment or delimitation. But in aligning wood as a physical marker which identifies the qualities of becoming a people, Tarkovsky opens wide what the body social of the the Slavic Rus people can be and links them directly to the land, to Zemlya. Ivan's quintessence, or the diffuse and open set of ideas of the potentials that he embodies and expresses through his experiences as a becoming-child in the world, becomes an intensive monadic substance which lives pervasively in the world as time—as the rhythms and temporalities which mark the becoming-child as the becoming of a people. In terms of the duration of the people, no one can really say what that spirit is that identifies Ivan as the true soul of the Russian people but Russian Slavs everywhere recognise themselves when they encounter it: Tarkovsky seems to be implying that this invisible spirit transcends the physical and exists outside of time according to a duration all its own. Ivan's spirit is as free as the joyful freedom that generates itself in his running on the water towards the sun, reaching out towards the infinity of possibility that defines becoming-child as ever-youthful, ever-creative, ever-open-ended even if his death is the only mark that can extend that hope and all its potential into the future.

## Conclusion — Preface

In the Preface to *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze writes that “it is often said that prefaces should be read only at the end. Conversely, conclusions should be read at the outset” (DELEUZE, 1994, p. xix). The reasoning behind this statement is that, classically, the conclusion summarizes the thesis and, as an objective condensation of the findings, serves to orient the reader in terms of establishing the relevance of the study and contextualizing the movement of thought within the larger scope of knowledge.

I do not know how useful it will be to read this final installment without having accompanied the process of Becoming-Child exercised in the exposition of the text. In terms of the conclusion, my thesis *Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process* has sought to present an alternative approach to the understanding of being in the world, an approach which breaks away from the established and seeks to posit epistemology otherwise. I leave it to the reader after having read the thesis to judge whether or not I have been successful. And in walking away from the work, I hope that the reader is taking away something of substance irrespective of the success of my endeavor, and that they have enjoyed engaging with the text.

*Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process* has everything and nothing to do with the child and childhood in that the child is the least of our concerns because I see these as stand-in descriptors for a specific modality of process and detractors from the processual understanding I wish to engage. My thesis seeks to understand childhood and the child in processual terms in such a way that they are seen not as a simple aggregation of processes which produces a model of the child or of childhood in a can. Our intent is not a reformulation of the sociology of childhood, nor a critique of child psychology or psychoanalysis, nor a refashioning of a developmental model of childhood along processual lines, nor a mirroring of an individual psychology as opposed to a collective psychology. Childhood for us is not the indirect object of the process, nor the pushing of process towards a goal, it is processual predication itself. It is not against anything, but seeks to construct an alternative proposition.

Our purpose is to posit childhood as a becoming rather than a being and subsequently to elaborate the predication of childhood as becoming-child in its most general

sense as a processual emergence. As such, I wish to displace the understanding of childhood and its conceptual unfolding to a less stable, open-ended and indefinite heterogeneous formulation which is expressed along processual lines. In terms of Imagistic Process within becoming, the thesis is about finding the material movement and creating the loop between what Gilles Deleuze calls in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, the two positions of infinity and tracing the movement which occurs between the two. Our analysis is grounded on the experimental work on eye movement of Russian psychologist Alfred E. Yarbus and interpreted through Henri Bergson's conception of a processual, non-iconic theory of the image described in *Matter and Memory* and the cinematographic apparatus developed in *Creative Evolution* as a trope for consciousness. I close the loop and generalise it through Simondon's associated milieu which he theorised in *The Mode of Existence of the Technical Object*.

But what is the becoming that I am referring to? Is it the becoming of an entity as a body? Or is it the event as a body? The assemblage? Or simply the body as becoming and whose different aspects produces different becomings? In understanding how becoming as material movement meshes with process, the movement of materialism is what establishes the Plane of Consistency and its particular modality of becoming is what characterises the specific becoming. The intersection of the Plane of Consistency and the Cone of Memory at a privileged point of view is not static and represents but one channel of becoming. It represents the timeline of the mode of becoming of the event. However, every monadic body that inhabits or occupies every region of the Universe has its own Cone of Light which subsists within the processual advance of the Universe. However, in the same way that the circumference of an infinitely large circle can be understood as a straight line, the line of time can be understood as a highly concentrated cone of projection which subscribes to the laws of perspective and the relational mandates that relativity entails. Further, each cone pair exists concretely as Simondon defines it, and relatively, at different scales and different levels of engagement and organisation as fractal series composing infinite possibilities of associated milieus.

As such, Becoming-Child is the modality of becoming that informs the plane of selection as it problematises the present in terms of the zone of interest predicated by the perspective of the present as a privileged point. The figure which illustrates material cycle of Becoming as a vertical movement allows us to predicate material origin according to a chaos

Because becoming is predicated in contrast to the transcendental idea of Man, the realm of the ideal is the more real, because it is the more adequate, the more perfect, in that they have attained a degree of perfection that they exist. At the bottom is the realm of chaos, of difference and change, where there is no existence possible because it is pure becoming. In Spinoza, these activities are referred to as *maiozem* and *minorem perfectionem*, as greater and lesser perfection, where God can be found atop everything as the being of infinite perfection which I associate to Deleuze and Guattari's minor movement.

So when I consider Becoming-Child as movement, as translation, as producer of difference, and not in terms of the molar activity of a child, I have presented the concept in three ways: as a Common Notion as the processual ground-zero of what that concept does and not what it is; secondly, as a mode of thought which strips concepts of their archival baggage in order to indicate its workings in the world; thirdly, as a more figurative manner of expressing concepts, as a downward movement of a concept and making it less abstract, less general and make the movement more apparent.

If I am true to the notions that I have developed within our thesis, the conclusion should be a more-than or other-than the restatement of its main points or simply the end or close of a text. If anything, I would want that our thesis do exactly the opposite. The anarchival, minoritarian regression that Becoming-Child encourages us to adopt as a method and the self-perpetuating, dynamic inventive advance of imagistic process both prompt us to see a conclusion not as end, finish or termination but as a threshold of passage into advancement, into the uncharted of pure creation. If anything it should facilitate the switchover in the movement of thought from the objective to the subjective to effectuate the jump of the fold of advance into novelty. As such, given the materially processual nature of our project, it would be disingenuous for us to posit our work in terms of a thesis statement to be proven and a closing as an objectification of the result. From my vantage point, I do not see closure. I can only discern the tentativeness of our assertions and new directions for exploration and research.

One thing that I would wish to impress is that the conceptual regression of concepts I predicate repeatedly is not the arrogant outright dismissal or repudiation of twenty-five hundred years of history or development of Western thought. If within my thesis I frequently engage in digging up the past or going back to Greek sources it is for two reasons — neither of them being reductionism. Contrary to writers who return to antiquity and



remain there because they imagine the present as a decadent version of an illustrious golden past from which we have progressively fallen, my return to the past, my regression to the infancy of philosophy is motivated otherwise. The principal reason for this return is the division I mentioned between the Ionian and the Italian schools of thought of Ancient Greece which takes place between 500 and 470 BCE (ORTEGA Y GASSET, 1960) and is characterised as the split between Heraclitean processual thought and Parmenidian idealism. The latter is what has come to represent the dominant and exclusive realm of thinking transcendental Being and the former the stunted and derided mode of thinking of immanent Becoming. I have chosen the Heraclitean mode because I cannot escape the idea that everything is undergoing change and that this fact is what must undergird our understanding of nature and its naturing.

The second reason has to do with memory and translation. My task has been to understand the concepts at their inception not as a fetishization of genesis but to ascertain the movement of thought that a concept generates. The point is subtle but significant to our way of understanding and identifies the need for the detective work which leads to the Common Notion. I cannot escape the facticity of concepts, but I can understand differently their constitution, articulation and variegated iteration. However, I also appreciate the production of difference that repetition entails and how I can lose track, literally, of what a concept was understood as being able to do. I am aware that every iteration of the expression of a concept, which includes its conception as a repetition, is a differential proposition, yet I am very sensitive to the deformation of concepts as they are handed down from one thinker to the next and which sometimes enriches them but at other times renders them meaningless and incoherent. It is like the story of the twenty soldiers seated in a circle and asked to repeat a message from one sitter to the next only to find that having closed the loop, the message sent forth at the origin is nothing like the message received at the return to the source. This illustrates why it is critical that I carry out our genealogies not for the purpose of fascistic preservation but as machinic cartographies. The use of the term fascistic is not intended as an attack on transcendentalism but to describe the identitary binding of concepts as the mummification of their glorious pastness as opposed to the processual multiplicity of imagistic *agencement*. At play here is the *fascia*, as the membranous sheath that covers and bundles the underlying multiplicity, which informs Figure 2.3 as a depiction of duration, where the exterior appearance which holds everything together becomes what

something is as opposed to the associative concretion of immanent becoming. Benjamin's aura seeks to render this surficial effect as dynamic and affective, as that which the photograph can only allude to. And it is exactly this static representation of the external appearance of the fixed image in time which works with the transcendental Idea to superficially identify, individualize, name, and categorize, which allows the readily apparent rendered static to become the foundation for the authoritarian, the disciplinarian, the archival as Law and leads to the despotic, repressive and totalitarian.

My writing engages thinkers from antiquity as a Becoming-Child of sorts, in that I am seeking to shed the archival baggage these concepts have acquired as constitutive of the memory that preconditions their potential as to the possible development available as a what can that body do. A good example is the word authoritarian, where its usual current usage as "favoring imposed order over freedom" is a movement of subjection, an infantilization of sorts. But one can trace this word to its Proto-Indo-European root meaning "to increase" which serves as foundation for augment, author, inaugurate, august, augur, etc. And it would seem that it is derived from the Sanskrit *ojas*- "strength" and *vaksayat* "cause to grow" which give us the Greek *auxo*, "increase" and the Latin *augmentum* "an increase, growth", the primary activity of childhood. But is this not the Whiteheadian feeling of Spinoza's joyful affect as that which expands the power of action of a body? There is an irrefutable movement of affirmation and growth here, some would say love, so how does this sentiment become the "Power to enforce obedience"? (O.E.D.). This conceptual modification is what I wish to articulate in our research and which serves as foundation of our method — it is our Proustian endeavor as a quest for lost time. But not as a "Where has the time gone?" Or "How has my life-time been dissipated?" Or "What is the historical development?" The quest is to indicate the movement of time as derivative of activity, as the differential in the life force, in the Bergsonian *élan vital*, which flows, animates, informs, transforms and consumes, the appearance of things and events. The task is to trace memory to get a feel for the action that has begotten the particular reaction I have detected.

Stated as a problem, if the concept as body, as *soma-sema*, is a crystal of time, then what is the the defining movement, its moment, which serves as Ἀρχή (*archē*), as the source or origin to which things return? In Aristotelian terms: what is the *archē* or Ἀρχή κινήσεως (*archai kineseos*) which will yield the Σύνθετον (*syntheton*)? (PETERS, 1967). The movement is material, but in an old-school sense of material, not as physical or mechanical, but as a

description of the Leibnizian machinic movement of creation at its limits, where the terms of the relation disappear and only the differential quotient remains as the material which subtends creation (DELEUZE, 1993) as immanent from the 'formless void' of primordial matter. As William James writes, "material facts, understood in terms of their materiality, are not experienced, undergone or suffered per se, are not objects of experience, do not relate to each other. For them to take on form within the system in which I feel ourselves live, they must appear, and this fact of appearing, as an add-on to raw experience, is called its consciousness I have of it, [...] their consciousness of self" (JAMES, 1912, p. 207). It is the revelation of thought as the identification of the differential as a function — exactly that which Deleuze and Guattari identify in *What is Philosophy?* as the task of science. I still don't know how the potential becomes actual, how the indiscernible, indeterminate, amorphous material of the pre-individual becomes physically material, but this is the movement I am attempting to come to grips with. It is expressed in the Bible as "ashes to ashes, and dust to dust" and with Deleuze I trace that material movement from chaos to chaos, as *Aion* and the plane of immanence, and in terms of difference and the plane of consistency. It is the perceptual movement that yields Ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*) or in Latin *sapientia*, as the foundation of the ancient empirical science postulated by Zeno.

But *archē* is also the Rule, which can be the rule of Law that dictates action as normative and moral or as criterion as the rule of comparison which not only yields the *ratio* of rationalisation but the scales of justice and the measure of *Chronos*. In our example I could readily see the dualistic contrasting aspects of the concept as perceptual process where I could treat anger as an Idea and elaborate it into its abstract attributes or I could indicate its pragmatic production as the feeling of passage as interactive reciprocity, as a translative transference from the subjective to the objective and to the subjective again — the Whiteheadian movement of prehension — as processual and imagistic. Further, I know from the bodily contractions which depict movement of thought, that there is a subconscious intelligence at work which guides the production and narrativises the interpretation of signaletic formations.

This in essence constitutes our working method of understanding the concepts and constructing the system. It consists of finding the key terms and understanding them processually, of tracing them back to their historical plateau to understand the circumstances which led to their positing. With some of our concepts this consisted in

following accompanying the return to the source of a term's usage and trying to understand the function or the movement of thought, of translating the intent of a concept from a static figure to predicating its function within the cycle of materialist process but also of coming to terms with the countermanding of their genetic intention. I see this in words we mentioned above, authority, discipline, doctrine, pedagogue, essence, category... This is similar to the kind of trans-disciplinary work that Agamben carries out in tracking the lineage of concepts by using a hybrid method which makes him half philosopher, half historian, half philologist, and allows him to assert occasionally that deeply established concepts need to be "rethought from scratch" (AGAMBEN, p. 11).

## Findings

The primary question that a conclusion seeks to answer is "What are the findings?". A simple enough question but difficult to answer, yet seldom are I told from what point of view are I to respond, for depending on the vantage point, the outcome will be different. From a personal, non-academic standpoint, I can straight-away reply that I have found insight into myself. And this is a curious finding in that the thesis was not intended to be grounded on personal introspection, even if it does somewhat reflect, as Hoffding (1912) relates in reference to his own academic methodology, the work of an empirical introspectionist, which follows the method of Descartes or Peirce or Bergson, which can be traced back to an inscription on the architrave of Apollo's temple in Delphi inscribed with the words γνῶθι σαυτόν (*gnōthi sauton* — Know Thyself). Writing the thesis first and foremost has offered me, as an individual, a retrospective explanatory interpretation of my epistemological outlook on life. In writing the thesis, I have come to see myself in the cognitive and epistemic outlook of Becoming-Child but not as the end-all and be-all of my existence. I fully understand that I am not exclusively a Becoming-Child but a multiplicity of other becomings, of other bodyings, which participate in the unfolding of the world as informed by other processes of individuation, other concretizations in other milieus.

As a personality type, or a mode of existence in the world, Becoming-Child fits ill with me, not in the sense that I have adopted a belief system or that I am a devoted follower of a faith or prophet, but in the sense that my being in the world embodies Becoming-Child where the symptoms align themselves with the disease. The naïveté of the pronouncement

serves as proof of the diagnosis. I mention this in passing not as an exercise or exorcism of a rendering public of a personal psychoanalysis, but to underscore the empirical introspection of my work. The photograph which shows me as mistrustful or perhaps philosophically skeptical already shows me as refractory to authority and discipline, not in the sense of being a bad child but in the sense of questioning and refuting any attempt at diminishing my subjectivity. It is not an assertion of subjectivity at the expense of others but the insistence of my own.

The thesis in itself, perhaps as an extension of my thought, is epistemologically informed or guided by Becoming-Child. This means that its mode of exposition as a methodology implicitly expresses Becoming-Child. This has meant constant attention to the dialectical interaction of “form and content” lively throughout the entire process of writing the thesis, from the thesis proposal to the writing of this presentation, and a sustained commitment in the construction of the concepts and the elaboration of the structure of the thesis as a project overall as expressive of the epistemological movement taking place in the discursive content. I did not begin the thesis from a preconceived idea of what Becoming-Child is could be for I had no knowledge of the concept other than its limited exposition in *A Thousand Plateaus*.

Over the past four years, I have strived to activate the concepts in themselves and articulate them with each other according to the dictates of a philosophy of difference, and have tried to push the envelope of epistemological exposition in that I have tried to activate the concepts through their expressive form. For example, an article which explores stuttering within Tarkovsky's *The Mirror* would embody the form of the stutter itself by engaging in divergent or expansive repetition; a text which deals with the collection of textual fragments in Benjamin is completely composed of fragments from other texts; a paper which challenges the traditional structure of the concept uses the rhizome as structural scaffolding. Simply paying lip service to deviant concepts within traditional academic expository forms, without activating them in practice is not only an inadequate expression of the concept but undermines it epistemically and sells short the movement it is trying to activate — as Bergson asserts and often echoed by Deleuze, one cannot produce continuous movement out of immobile sections. Thus, I have sought to articulate becoming as imagistic processual movement, I have sought to salvage the dynamism and regain the movement of thought in the language that describes the concepts, and I have tried to impart

expressive movement to the form.

In trying to push formal academic expression in this direction, I have been repeatedly surprised and often disheartened by the pervasive resistance to engage texts that deviate from the traditional forms of academic discourse. What is curious is that journal evaluators often correctly identify the strategy, but seldom make the leap to see it as a conscious epistemic mode of unfolding the ideas, and inevitably fall back on established established structures and modes of thought. In composing our thesis project, I very deliberately began with what one reader correctly identified as a mishmash, a liquefaction of concepts, a Deleuzian primordial chaos, but did not recognize it as the fundamental precondition of the deterritorialization of concepts and structures as an anarchival strategy prior to providing any kind of order to our ideas. The intention of the project was to liberate, restore the degrees of freedom concepts might have had, and to eliminate the preconditioning structural presuppositions to the ideation of the thesis and offer free rein to the constitutive elements to see what kind of conception they could facilitate in their free-floating form as what I would later determine as a *Becoming-Child*. The epistemology of my project began from an aboriginal chaos and and sought to create a body of meaning which was simultaneously empirical and material. And so its process of discovery is a nomadic hodology where the revelation is not objective but happens in the movement of thought as an intuitive progressive advance. The writing does not readily offer up ready-made bits to be picked off, but requires the poietic participation of the reader as a collaborator in the production of meaning, as protagonist in the intuitive immanence of understanding that emerges from the reading. The reading is to accompany the writer in the production of the text as opposed to finding everything ready-made. This possibly puts undue stress on the reader who expects the material to be systematically laid out and who must walk the path to understand what is at play. The insights that arise within the reading are the manifestation of the intuitive transmission of the text which allow the reader to arrive at their own private montage of subjective realizations.

If I look at the thesis from the point of view of its possible intellectual contribution, I can foreground the development of the two guiding concepts of *Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process* and the articulation of their convergence with materialist movement. The title takes for granted that *Becoming* is processual and that process can be ideated as imagistic and that some quality designated as child-like informs *Becoming*. In using the comparative

conjunction “as” I create a simile which equates the two terms and predicates an analogy as a resemblance of attributes or, in our case, of operational equivalence. Despite their apparent dissimilarity, the two terms have been shown to share a common quality or functional aspect that allows us to indicate that the movement proportioned by imagistic process is also germane to Becoming-Child. It is not simply a matter of establishing correspondence between Becoming-Child and Imagistic Process but of identifying the processual movement that is at play and how the understanding of that process is inflected by the idea of the child expressed as a specific problem.

The specificity of the concern as an expression of process, of change, of movement grants the thesis the status of a problem, not in terms of seeking proof for a specific position as the attainment of scholarly truth but in the manner in which Deleuze characterises problems as an explication of how time is articulated as a specifically designated modality of becoming. The problem’s quest for time within the unfolding of the problem is very much *à propos* here for to anchor becoming in childhood is to foreground its temporality. If time can be said to be metricised difference or rationalised change, then childhood as unbridled material becoming is expressive of pure temporal creation and diametrically opposed to the timelessness of male adulthood as transcendental being. The problem appears as punctual on the image of the cone of memory, which is in fact the cone of , but instead it immanently generates a timeline, and that is why I have presented it side-by-side with the. The move here is significant because the temporality at play is not one of succession or filiation as development but of an aberrant modality of creation of difference that is out of joint with the teleological predestination of progress, transformation and evolution. The child is irrational in that it is beyond the pale of comparison, its number is not rational. It has no criteria for judgement, and has no basis for comparison — it has no memory because it is unformed as yet and has no experience. The non-being of childhood is outside of time because its mode of being is pure creation, pure in the Bergsonian sense of pure perception, which is pure because memory is not involved in its determination. The child is closer to undifferentiated chaos and diametrically opposed to the timelessness of the transcendental God which is beyond the rational and the material and to which male adulthood is apparently its best stand-in on Earth. And so every time I advance into the novelty of creation, when I push the limits and prompt the threshold moments are I not in the realm of Becoming-Child? If the Kingdom is the child’s, it is because the child’s realm is the the realm

of pure creation.

The convergence of Becoming-Child as a modality of material movement and of Imagistic Process is what produces the spacetime of the event. One term spatializes time and the other temporalises extension, one term differentiates and the other differentiates, one produces difference from itself and the other difference in itself — together they create the machinic truth that produces duration as a the creation of a body and its temporal dimension: embodiment as a temporal manifestation. The Point S of Bergson's Plane of Matter or of Deleuze's Plane of Consistency locates the process of embodiment in relation to the Cone of Memory and its concomitant Cone of Possibility (Figures 3.18 and 4.3). Thus, I have on the plane the material dynamic localised and bound to the temporal line of causality. As I mentioned in the text, the plane is a representation of selection, a transversal set that reticulates, that produces a triangulated network of that which is participated in the becoming as a material dynamic. I can also understand the cones as a surface of delimitation, of selective funneling where the cone of memory's pastness conditions, orients and singles out the set of future possibilities available to becoming. The cone and plane dispositif is only the vehicle, the *ochema*, everything else is variable. Depending on the orientation of the cone and its incidence of the plane, what is available as a projection into the future will be a projection of the triangulation of the past and relativised in the perspective projection. This is one of the lessons to be learned from the projective geometry of the conic: the temporal advance relativises the past and reticulates history. It is this process which gives history its fixity — not its interpretative invariability but its facticity in its relations.

Here I cannot ideate memory in terms of pictorial images, of imagistic postcards, or documentary testimony in the mind. Memory needs to be seen as that which mediates imagistic process as the experiential traces, the cognitive pathways, the neural conduits, which relate the outside world of experience to our interior ability to cognise these very same things as what Bergson, or Michel Serres would call projections in the world. It engages what Peirce calls "optically active" bodies which allow us to give processual meaning to Didi-Huberman's *Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde* (1992). This is translated as *What We See Looks Back at Us* (1997) but the French *double-entendre* of *ce qui nous regarde*, that which regards us, is often lost. The phrase can also mean that which concerns us, a very Whiteheadian sentiment which can also be related to his concepts of concern and the *lure for feeling*. Didi-Huberman's double-meaning is telling us that the



relation is not alternatively one-sided as a subject-object of the knower-known, but an interactive heterogeneous reciprocity where its unfolding arises immanently from the encounter, an experiential which Heidegger characterises as foundational for thought in *What is Thinking?*. This is all visual, imagistic, perceptual, and bypasses the linguistic. It expresses the logic of advance with a Peircean semiotic and not a Saussurrean semiology, and positions the interactive imagistic process as foundational, anterior and more general than the linguistic or the pictorial and realigns science according to the Stoic idea of science as *sapientia* and to the positivistic observational.

Despite the shortcomings of my thesis, I am pleased to be able to point out some of the successes of my investigation:

1. The development of Becoming-Child as a method of cognitive becoming.
2. The discernment of the imagistic difference between the pictorial and the ocular.
3. The identification of the pragmatic turn which makes imagistic movement “useful” in Bergson, Peirce and James.
4. A descriptive conceptualisation of what a concept is as based on a perceptual empiricism.
5. The elaboration and fleshing out of the theory of the Bergsonian cinematograph.
6. The formulation of Becoming-Child as a Spinozist Common Notion in general processual terms and determining its location on the materialist cycle.
7. The association of the minor movement in Deleuze and Guattari to the Spinozist *maiolem* and *minorem perfectionem*, as greater and lesser perfection, indicated within the materialist cycle.
8. A processual-material reading of the Oedipus myth.

In outlining these successes, I am not claiming to have invented these ideas as, obviously, they are already out there in the world. One aspect of this work is that in fleshing out these ideas, I can be criticized for belabouring the already known. However, I find that usage of the concepts often leads to a false familiarity conditioned vaguely by the facile reticulation language affords to discourse. By this I mean that it is easier to employ concepts than to elaborate them — as St. Augustine avers, he knows what time is until someone asks him what it is. And so as part of my philological adventure of ideas, my work hopefully challenges the trivialisation of these concepts and rescues their true epistemological movement and reverses their degradation.

Possibly the most important conclusion of the research is a substantiation for the need to understand that cognition is not only efferent contraction. Cognition and contraction can be understood independently of each other in that they are different modes of knowing, but in order to understand our existence in the world I must reconcile the transcendental aspects of images as Ill as their material aspect. As I saw in the analysis of eye movement, one cannot dismiss the iconic: the individual thing which exists under various guises, under various scales in relation to us, is perceived alone but always in relation to us and to its milieu. Its being is ascertained as a conjunction of the iconic individualization and its relative perspectivation through projection. However, each requires a different type of memory to affirm the perception: in the moment of cognition they function in unison, and to complicate things there is the afferent impulsion between ocular fixations guided by a subconscious intentionality but I need to do more work on the process of recollection to understand how mind-images engage these memories as non-existent pictorial visualization in the mind and how they animate themselves. The work of computer vision cognition into the digital recreation of mind images as brain activity can perhaps offer insight into these processes. The work of Dr. Li Fei-Fei at Stanford University or Dr. Adrian Nestor at the University of Toronto-Scarborough, to name just two, could be of use.

### **What would I have done differently?**

If the thesis is the final chapter in terms of the over-tending arc of my doctoral studies, I don't know how I would have done it differently. As an adherent to the philosophy of difference and a partisan of processual thought, to research something is to an advance into discovery. But with my take on subjectivity, there was no foreseen outcome to the positioning of the project, no clear cut path or direction for the project to take. I don't know what form or method a systematic advance into uncharted novelty might be.

If the question is posed in the sense of "if I were to write the thesis again", I would have liked to read some of the forbidden authors — those authors which are systematically dismissed from the tradition of Bergson, Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari and I would have read more outside the confines of this tradition. I would have also devoted more time to the history of philosophy and the philosophy of science, particularly biology and psychology. This exclusionary attitude emerges from a pervasive belief within the Deleuzian academic

tradition that philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant and Heidegger are anathema and are dangerous. I agree that when improperly contextualized they can be, but what I never read is that without these references and a proper historical perspective, many of the concepts articulated as processual are incomprehensible and prone to misinterpretation because they are rationalised to those authors.

The idiosyncratic nature of my writing is an aspect of my research which I don't see altering. The method of discovery as an intuitive advance is implicit in the writing and so while it embraces a methodology of Becoming-Child there is a resistance within it which challenges the entrenched conservative expectations and habits of mind of those who pursue "normal science" (Baehr, 2002). In hindsight, I also feel that my writing is more like the studio practice of an artist than the systematic scribbling of the scientific academic. And so I am not surprised if reviewers have reservations for the methodological unfolding that orients the work. However, the more significant realisations of my work came late in the process and so parts of the early writing could use some sharpening up and some of the later parts could have used a more coherent development.

### **What surprised me**

The method of tracing-back ideas as a kind of regression methodology in my research has often lead me to unexpected places. The method of regression as used in statistical analysis which seeks to model the relation between variables as a continuous prediction usually leads to the positing of what is called a Law by reducing the total deviation between points of empirical observations and the line which ultimately will define the relation.

The Law is not concerned with trifles — it is designed to pave over them so as to produce a best-fit representation independent of experience even if its formulation is based on experience and its representational value is applicable to experience.

In writing the thesis there were three things which surprised me: the conservative stance of academe, the entrenchment of the archive, and the reluctance to move away from a homogeneous anthropocentric paradigm. The conservatism of academe was not something I usually encountered in the program itself or the courses, but during the submission process of papers to journals for publication. And when I invoke the term conservative, the point I am trying to make is not a critique of totalitarianism but of

entrenched habits of mind and of thought — it does not address an authoritarian or totalitarian mindset, and apply it to both Left and Right sides of the political spectrum.

### **Where does the research of Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process lead?**

The intended open-endedness of the thesis allows us to take the research into various areas. I have identified ten possible avenues for research.

1. The development of Becoming-Child as a full fledged method.
2. The idea of play within Becoming-Child as a processual practice of discovery.
3. The pursuit of Imagistic processual thought.
4. The expansion of the idea of imagistic projection as solution to iconicity.
5. The elaboration of the idea of the body as material entity
6. The consideration of Aion in Deleuze as becoming and as duration.
7. The application of imagistic thought to the digital realm.
8. Re-reading of Aristotle as processual
9. A project in the history of science would consist in processually re-reading or re-interpreting the conception of the concept in science.
10. The iconicity of the image and how that becomes a syntheised whole.
11. The narrative intelligence of the subconscious revealed imagistically.
12. A processual reading of the concept within the history of science.

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Anexo: Tradução da Tese em Português

Porto Alegre, RS

2019



FELIX REBOLLEDO PALAZUELOS

**O DEVIR-CRIANÇA COMO PROCESSO IMAGÉTICO**

Tese apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia Social e Institucional, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, como requisito para obtenção do título de Doutor em Psicologia Social e Institucional.

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## **Resumo**

### **O Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético**

Essa tese, ao procurar definir a noção operativa que anima o conceito de Devir-Criança como processo imagético, apresenta um duplo propósito: postular a infância como devir e não como ser individualizado; e, subsequentemente, elaborar a predicação processual da infância como Devir-Criança e, em seu sentido mais amplo, como emergência processual. Desse modo, deseja-se deslocar a compreensão da infância e seu desdobramento conceitual para uma formulação heterogênea, aberta e indeterminada, que se expressa ao longo de linhas processuais e imagéticas, a fim de indicar o seu movimento. Colocamos o processo como imagético, baseando-o no pensamento cinematográfico de Henri Bergson e Gilles Deleuze, que identifica a imagem como um conjunto dinâmico de ações e reações, em que o cinematógrafo intervém como produtor da diferença, tanto como diferenciação quanto diferença. O processo imanente que emerge da interação imagética é, simultaneamente, encarnado e perceptivo, sendo denominado devir. Quando dissocia-se os dois termos de Devir-Criança, produz-se dois problemas: primeiro, o de explicar o devir; e, segundo, o de associar a criança, como um agente epistêmico, ao devir. Como uma solução especulativa para a primeira aporia, com fundamentação em Gilbert Simondon, criamos uma ontogênese transindividual heterogênea e concreta, que vai além do indivíduo e produz um devir processual associado incorporado. O segundo problema consiste em desdobrar o aspecto processual da infância, identificando o movimento epistêmico que ele oferece e que designamos como noção comum em termos espinosistas. O aspecto final do trabalho trata das implicações imagéticas de uma dinâmica materialista do processo como expressão pragmática.

**Palavras-chave:** Devir-Criança, processo imagético, diferença, percepção, Noção Comum.

**Abstract**  
**Becoming-Child as Imagistic Process**

We look to define the operative notion that animates the concept of Becoming-Child as imagistic process. Our purpose is twofold: to posit childhood as a becoming rather than an individualised being and subsequently to elaborate the processual predication of childhood as becoming-child in its most general sense as processual emergence. As such, we wish to displace the understanding of childhood and its conceptual unfolding to a less stable, open-ended and indefinite heterogeneous formulation which is expressed along processual, imagistic lines in order to be able to indicate the movement. We posit process as imagistic by basing it on the cinematic thought of Bergson and Deleuze which ideates the image as a dynamic assemblage of action and reaction where the cinematograph intervenes as the producer of difference, both as differentiation and differenciation. The immanent process which emerges from imagistic interaction is simultaneously embodying and perceptual and is termed becoming. When dissociating the two terms in conceptualizing becoming-child, we perceive that we produce two problems: first, that of explicating becoming; and second, what the child represents as an epistemic agent when applied to becoming. As a speculative solution to the first aporia, we create a transindividual ontogenesis that is heterogeneous and concrete and bypasses the individual to produce an embodied associated processual becoming. The second problem consists in coming to terms with the processual aspect of childhood by identifying the epistemic movement that it affords and which we label the Common Notion. The final aspect of the work deals with the imagistic implications of a materialist dynamics of process as pragmatic expression.

**Key Words:** Becoming-Child, imagistic process, difference, perception, Common Notion.

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## Apresentação

A tese, *O Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético*, expõe uma abordagem que problematiza o processo de ser no mundo, baseando-se no processo imagético e na noção de comum que anima o conceito de Devir-Criança.

Esse processo é colocado como imagético a partir do pensamento cinematográfico de Henri Bergson (1859-1941) e Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), que identifica a imagem como um conjunto dinâmico de ação e reação no qual o cinematógrafo intervém como produtor da diferença, tanto como diferenciação quanto como diferenciação. O processo imanente que emerge da interação imagética é simultaneamente encarnado e perceptivo e é denominado devir. A pressuposição de constância implícita na classificação do conhecimento e da experiência que permite predicar a diferença não é aplicável à criança, pois, por definição, o *sine qua non* da criança é mudar em termos de diferença genérica incessante — não há repetição, nem base memorial a serem colocados como suportes à produção da diferença (DELEUZE, 2000). A diferença que surge a partir do Devir-Criança de uma criança não apresenta nenhuma base sobre a qual se possa articular a repetição e, portanto, deve expressar o devir em termos das intenções puras da criança: criação pura, imanência pura, percepção pura e memória pura — como a criação da diferença pura.

Essa tese tem tudo a ver com a infância e a criança e nada a ver com elas. O estudo busca entender a infância e a criança em termos processuais de tal maneira que elas são vistas não como uma simples agregação de processos que produz uma forma da criança ou da infância “enlatada”. A intenção não é uma reformulação da sociologia da infância, nem uma crítica à psicologia infantil ou à psicanálise, nem uma remodelação de um modelo de desenvolvimento infantil ao longo de linhas processuais, nem um espelhamento de uma psicologia individual em oposição a uma psicologia coletiva. A infância não é o objeto indireto do processo, nem o impulso do processo em direção a um objetivo, é a própria predicação processual. Não é contra nenhuma proposta, mas procura construir uma proposição alternativa.

O propósito é duplo: postular a infância como devir e não como ser e, subsequentemente, elaborar a predicação processual da infância como Devir-Criança em seu sentido mais geral como emergência processual. Como tal, queremos deslocar a compreensão da infância e seu desdobramento conceitual menos estável para uma

formulação heterogênea, aberta e indefinida, expressa ao longo de linhas processuais. Abordagens interdisciplinares e processuais mais recentes expressam o processo *através de seus efeitos* nos diferentes meios — social, político, cultural, educacional ou legal —, em oposição ao devir mesmo como objeto de estudo em si. A criança é vista através de sua agência social ou mais diretamente como agente social e como minoria. Esses são compromissos relevantes com o conceito de infância e definem sua manifestação no mundo, mas eles estão longe de oferecer uma compreensão holística da experiência da infância em si não só do envolvimento da criança com o mundo como um *experimental*, mas do *experimental* interno da constituição processual da experiência como evento heterogêneo.

As abordagens da infância acima mencionadas fornecem modelos e representações que definem a criança, medem-na e traçam seus limites e parâmetros; legalizam-na e monetizam-na como mercadoria. Entretanto, nenhuma delas fornece uma prestação de contas do movimento subjacente que marca a procissão de avanço. A criança, em virtude do que seu corpo pode ou não pode fazer, não tem o peso subjetivo, a massa crítica, os meios expressivos para definir sua própria subjetividade, sendo obrigada a deixar que outros realizem a tarefa — geralmente adultos bem-intencionados. O que a criança é e por que a criança é foram definidos e construídos por subjetividades externas que, atualmente, já levam em consideração a experiência subjetiva da criança. A criança e a infância são os conteúdos de um estado de tensão entre os vários modelos que as teorizam e as conceitualizam, e há sempre uma lacuna entre a criança como o conhecido, como objeto de estudo, e o conhecedor e os saberes que a definem.<sup>165</sup> A partir dessas facetas de abordagens já mencionadas, pode-se desenvolver o conceito de Devir-Criança como um processo imagético, uma dinâmica heterogênea, interativa, imanente, manifestado em um encontro com o mundo, procurando expressar as operações identificadas como infantis e articulá-las puramente como processuais dentro do desdobramento do avanço do devir.

Para essa realização, é necessário considerar vários aspectos de como os conceitos de criança e infância podem ser desconstruídos e reconstruídos a fim de expressá-los em termos processuais. O trabalho de Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) se mostrará indispensável, pois toda a sua filosofia foi construída processualmente: a cada passo, encontra-se a

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<sup>165</sup> Bunge (2009) escreve que causa e efeito podem ser percebidos, mas sua relação deve ser adivinhada, pois apenas eventos e processos podem ser causalmente relacionados.

elaboração de seu pensamento entendido e expresso em termos processuais. Isso se aplica não somente à articulação de seus conceitos-chave, como processo de diferenciação, processo de transformação, processo de atualização ou processo de subjetivação, mas à totalidade de seus escritos — a maioria dos conceitos operacionais que pode aparecer por si só prefaciada pelas palavras “processo de”, como processo de totalização, processo de transmissão, processo cognitivo, etc..<sup>166</sup>

Embora o conceito de Devir-Criança tenha sido identificado e nomeado por Deleuze e Félix Guattari (1930-1992) em *Mil Platôs* (1997) e elaborado por vários pensadores (KASTRUP, 2000; OLSSON, 2009; BOGUE, 2010; HICKEY-MOODY, 2012; ROMAGNOLI, 2016) não se entende que o conceito esteja sendo transmitido como conceito-pronto e ‘exaustivamente formulado’, impedindo qualquer desenvolvimento possível. Há trabalho a ser feito em termos de uma elaboração geral de suas funções filosóficas processuais, mas o ponto não é apresentar mais uma vez em termos molares o que um Devir-Criança pode ser, mas apresentá-lo como um devir molecular e como uma Noção Comum.

A criança como uma individuação singular, como uma entidade funcional que atua como criança e realiza as atividades que identificam o Devir-Criança como uma coerência funcional é um processo composto de uma aglomeração de atividade processual subsidiária que se encorpa de forma duradoura e eventualmente sofre a cessação através do seu próprio desfazer. Através dessas atividades e suas implicações relacionais como constituintes da sua ocupação, esse devir processual é percebido como uma entidade subjetiva no mundo que adquire definição através de fazeres específicos. De uma perspectiva Espinosista, o corpo do Devir-Criança processualmente composto por meio de fazeres, sofre modificações e, por meio de afecções de “alegria” e “tristeza”, torna-se materialmente definido. As atividades que esse Devir-Criança sofre deixam impressões e traços que, por sua vez, impregnam o seu devir com a promessa de futuro, com novos potenciais, através dos quais, na sua realização, os diferentes afetos se expressarão. Assim, o corpo do Devir-Criança é um acréscimo *duracional*<sup>167</sup> por meio da experiência do mundo e dos encontros interativos como processo imagético — que, a princípio, só pode ser entendido como percepção pura, mas que, com o tempo, virá a converter experiência em

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<sup>166</sup> Compilamos uma lista detalhada de instâncias ao longo dos trabalhos de Deleuze, nos quais ele qualifica seus conceitos com a expressão ‘processo de’ que têm mais de 10 páginas.

<sup>167</sup> Duracional no sentido de relativo à duração na filosofia de Bergson e não somente duradouro.

acervos arquivísticos. É uma proposta espinosista sobre o que um corpo pode fazer, o que pode ser feito com um corpo e como um corpo é composto, decomposto e recomposto e reconcretizado ao longo de trajetórias dinâmicas divergentes. Essas, por sua vez, geram cartografias de retalhos como enriquecimento mútuo do pensamento Espinosista sobre corpos e afetos e o pensamento Bergsoniano sobre percepção e produção incipiente de memória como devires.

A proposição é elaborar uma recusa não só da ciência, mas também de certa filosofia. Essa recusa não é um repúdio à ciência ou filosofia, mas a renúncia a determinada maneira de pensar a ciência e a filosofia. É uma forma de reconsiderar a possibilidade de repensar e expressar a experiência; uma tentativa de postular estar no mundo como processual e descrever o que isso poderia implicar. Husserl reclamava que desejava “voltar às coisas em si”, e esse é o objeto desse trabalho, porém voltar não por um caminho fenomenológico, mas por um caminho alternativo restabelecendo a natureza da experiência ao longo das linhas processuais e duracionais, que medra na indeterminação do devir e segue uma linha de pensamento que vai a contrapelo das Leis do Pensamento. A intenção é renunciar à constância, permanência, universalidade e estabilidade dos conceitos e adotar um modo de pensamento que associa a mudança, a impermanência e a contingência às marcas do pensamento processual. Considera-se de antemão a afirmação de Deleuze e Guattari de que qualquer declaração — essa tese incluída — é um *mot d'ordre*, uma palavra de ordem que comanda e estrutura a linguagem através de seus pressupostos, em vez de, e através de suas declarações. Nota-se uma imobilização nas formas linguísticas em línguas românicas e empreende-se uma breve busca pelo tempo perdido na tradução de termos dinâmicos gregos conceituais para suas formas latinizadas, a fim de expressar o movimento do processo imagético, de acordo com uma linguagem consciente deste movimento.

A fim de contrariar os efeitos no pensamento processual do arresto do movimento, os próprios processos serão descritos em termos de uma dinâmica imagética interativa que, por sua vez, passa a constituir agenciamentos que funcionam coerentemente como meios associados duradouros. Isso leva a explicar a infância como processual em uma escala molecular. As intuições por trás dessa compreensão trazem de volta para a compreensão da percepção baseada no processo imagético de Bergson elaborado segundo o pensamento cinematográfico e do cinematógrafo. É possível apresentar a compreensão de seu modo de articular a natureza desses dispositivos como processual, em qual modo é entendido através

de sua articulação espinosista como modalidade e modificação: ambos modos de ver o processo são aspectos da mesma compreensão processual.

A criança no mundo não é mais uma dinâmica binária, mas um encontro relacional em que tudo participa concretamente<sup>168</sup> numa relação sem privilégios não hierárquica. A natureza torna-se uma ocupação: a extensão produzida no meio pelo devir e o fazer do processo como seu surgimento vocacional. Tem-se apenas um processo na natureza que se mostra como processo de produção e de consumo quanto de gravação: uma produção de produções e consumos (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 2010). Esse processo produz criança e natureza não simultaneamente como “dois termos postos um em face do outro, mesmo se tomados numa relação de causação, de compreensão ou de expressão (causa-efeito, sujeito-objeto etc.), mas são uma só e mesma realidade essencial do produtor e do produto” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 2010, p. 15). O Devir-Criança não é, portanto, uma meta ou fim em si mesmo — é um devir em aberto, mas duradouro (*durational*). À primeira vista, isso pode parecer contraditório, pois, algo que não tem limites pré-estabelecidos como pode ser limitado temporalmente? Por um lado, Devir-Criança nunca é pré-constituído, seu potencial nunca é esgotado por qualquer corte transversal que tente determiná-lo, e como uma máquina desejante, uma concrecência apetitiva inesgotável; uma produção da produção é um fluxo-produtor maquínico gaguejante do “e, e, e...” ou “e, e, e depois,...” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997). E, por outro lado, a dinâmica de devir perdura enquanto as condições ou *affordances*<sup>169</sup> constitutivas permitem sua atualização. A duração implícita no Devir-Criança combina uma multiplicidade de componentes humanos e não-humanos — os mesmos elementos constituintes indicados acima pelos vários modelos da infância — eles próprios tornados duradouros e, portanto, também capazes de serem decompostos analiticamente e infinitamente em multiplicidades de durações constitutivas, que, por sua vez, também podem participar processualmente em outras montagens de duração.

Quando se volta às coisas, não se refere aos objetos da percepção ou da ciência, mas à experiência da percepção como processo imagético. Para isso, olha-se para o olhar mesmo

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<sup>168</sup> No sentido técnico desenvolvido por Simondon em *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques* (1969).

<sup>169</sup> *Affordance* é um termo cunhado por James J. Gibson em *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (1979, A abordagem ecológica da percepção visual), que ele define como a informação que nos é disponibilizada pelo meio ambiente através da qual os eventos no mundo são percebidos (GIBSON, 2014, p. 94.).

e a atividade que a visão implica, porque a visão é o sentido dominante, e o pensamento sobre a interação com o mundo. Definindo a função como um conjunto de movimentos e seguindo Deleuze ao definir a ciência como uma criação de funções, então a ciência consiste das práticas ou atividades de predicar agenciamentos de movimentos. Criam-se esses agenciamentos, criam-se ou concebem-se através da 'observação' positivista que Peirce chama de *Idioscopia* e Bergson *reflexão*, e os budistas *mindfulness*. É a observação interna que determina um sistema de movimentos bem coordenados no cumprimento de uma função específica — o que tornaria essa atividade pragmática. Mas ao invocar-se o termo cumprimento, apela-se para tornar esse sistema específico de movimento como tendo uma menor ou maior perfeição, tornando essa atividade espinosista. Assim, pretende-se propor uma descrição científica de um agenciamento de movimentos que segue o fluxo da visão como fato psicológico que não pode ser caracterizado como absolutamente fisiológico. Baseia-se na ciência que facilitou e informou a psicanálise antes de se tornar uma crítica literária estereotipada. É uma ciência que não é positivista num sentido Comtiano, não é uma psicologia Wundtiana que tenta racionalizar o pensamento como o cálculo da medição absoluta, mas procura racionalizar o pensamento através do cálculo relativo do diferencial dentro de práticas empíricas.

Olhar o olhar, particularmente através do trabalho experimental do psicólogo russo Alfred L. Yarbus (1914-1986), mostra que a anatomia do olho e o escrutínio do movimento dos olhos trazem à luz *insights* desconsiderados por concepções tradicionais do que uma imagem pode ser. Yarbus afixou espelhos refletores em pequenas ventosas de borracha sobre a superfície do olho de seus sujeitos de pesquisa para permitir rastrear os movimentos oculares enquanto estudava objetos ou imagens complexas. A partir desses experimentos, é possível discernir como a experiência imagística navega pelo encontro e articula a descoberta, indicando exatamente como o olho se move. Mais especificamente, pode-se discernir como um espectador formula a problematização do encontro como uma experiência perceptiva que combina intuições sensório-motoras com a imaginação intra-perceptiva. Ainda assim, porque o processo visual está composto de fixações e movimentos oculares aparentemente erráticos e a consciência é contínua, Yarbus nos leva a considerar a experiência visual como um desdobramento cinematográfico da percepção.

Este é, naturalmente, o território predileto do filósofo francês Henri Bergson e sua concepção iconoclástica do processo imagético. É uma ideia complexa na medida em que

se baseia em um conceito não óbvio da imagem — um que é não-pictórico, dinâmico e interativo ao mesmo tempo e que se define como um agenciamento composto de um estímulo, um intervalo indeterminado e uma reação. Suas teorias estão ancoradas dentro de um panpsiquismo<sup>170</sup> processual que engaja o encontro com o mundo e, assim, fazendo a mudança da relação entre o objetivo e o registo subjetivo da relação conhecido-conhecedor. Bergson não só apresenta uma nova teoria da percepção, mas também estabelece as bases para uma investigação mais profunda da natureza da relação sujeito-objeto e a compreensão do que constitui a experiência como processo imagético.

Para poder postular o processo como interatividade imagética, baseado no pensamento cinematográfico de Bergson e Deleuze, precisa-se definir a imagem interativa. Apesar da superabundância de imagens de todo tipo, persiste a dificuldade em entender o que seria uma imagem interativa e como diferenciá-la de outros tipos de imagem. Como concebidas por Bergson e elaboradas por Deleuze, nos termos mais elementares, as imagens podem ser consideradas como seres de luz que “agem e reagem umas sobre as outras em todas as suas partes elementares segundo leis constantes, que chamo leis da natureza” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 11). “Elas apresentam reciprocamente, umas às outras, todas as suas faces ao mesmo tempo, o que equivale a dizer que elas agem e reagem entre si por todas as suas partes elementares” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 34). “E por "imagem" entendemos uma certa existência que é mais do que aquilo que o idealista chama uma representação, porém menos do que aquilo que o realista chama uma coisa — uma existência situada a meio caminho entre a "coisa" e a “representação”” (BERGSON, 1999, pp. 1 e 2), e onde o corpo é uma imagem entre muitas “que vêm sempre se intercalar entre estímulos que recebo de fora e movimentos que vou executar” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 11). O corpo (que inclui o cérebro) torna-se o terreno comum entre a percepção do estímulo e a ação resultante — é um efeito de vibração que se propaga e se estende e que nunca encontra descanso: a ação-reação local ondula para fora para criar séries de ação-reação que se emanam no universo e que voltam para suas "causas" para gerar ainda mais ações-reações *ad infinitum*. E em termos do cérebro, Bergson escreve: “Percebo nervos aferentes que transmitem estímulos aos centros nervosos, em seguida nervos eferentes que partem do centro, conduzem

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<sup>170</sup> Panpsiquismo: a teoria de que toda a matéria, ou toda a natureza, é psíquica ou tem um aspecto psíquico; átomos e moléculas, assim como plantas e animais, têm uma vida de sensação, sentimento e impulso rudimentar relacionada com seus movimentos. *Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy* (1901).



estímulos à periferia e põem em movimento partes do corpo ou o corpo inteiro” (BERGSON 1999, p. 13). “...o processo completo de percepção e de reação mal se distingue então do impulso mecânico seguido de um movimento necessário” (BERGSON 1999, p. 29).

Toda a sua dinâmica reflexiva da ação e reação é composta de estímulo. A interposição indeterminada do cérebro e a reação constitui o conceito da imagem e serve como base para uma ideação processual imagética da vida. Em contraposição, as entidades inorgânicas precedem a indeterminação que separa a ação e a reação, e sua interação é imediata e automática. Mas crítico para essa ideação é que a imagem percebida não é reproduzida no cérebro como consciência, mas é projetada de volta para onde parece estar — fora de nosso corpo — de modo que toda percepção é produzida onde ocorre (BERGSON 1999).<sup>171</sup> Assim, o processo imagético bergsoniano associa o encontro perceptual não apenas como uma dinâmica interativa, mas como o que é tradicionalmente chamado de interior da consciência e o exterior da experiência para emergir simultaneamente como um devir singular.

Bergson (2005) concebeu a imagem interativa como cinemática tanto no sentido do movimento cinético como também no sentido de filme como operativo no cinematógrafo. A ideia foi retomada e elaborada por Deleuze, mas em uma direção diferente da originalmente proposta por Bergson. O cinematógrafo como modelo de devir é um dispositivo conceitual que permite fazer a distinção entre diferença de gênero e diferença entre si no processo puro — entre diferenciação e diferenciação.<sup>172</sup> Em virtude de sua localização, sua localização presencial e posição privilegiada, o cinematógrafo transforma a confusão caótica e indiferenciada do espaço-tempo como puro processo em imagens discerníveis de mudança. O 'cinematógrafo do devir' intervém dentro de um processo pré-individual puro, ainda indiferenciado, através da introdução de um corte transversal que, por um lado, provoca o

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<sup>171</sup> “No que concerne à percepção pura, ao fazer do estado cerebral o começo de uma ação e não a condição de uma percepção, lançávamos as imagens percebidas das coisas fora da imagem de nosso corpo; recolocávamos portanto a percepção nas próprias coisas” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 212). E “Mas toda percepção atenta supõe de fato, no sentido etimológico da palavra, uma reflexão, ou seja, a projeção exterior de uma imagem ativamente criada, idêntica ou semelhante ao objeto, e que vem moldar-se em seus contornos” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 116).

<sup>172</sup> Nós chamamos a determinação do conteúdo virtual de uma diferenciação de Ideia; chamamos a atualização dessa virtualidade em espécies e diferenciação de partes distintas. É sempre em relação a um problema diferenciado ou às condições diferenciadas de um problema que se realiza uma diferenciação de espécies e partes, como se correspondesse aos casos de solução do problema (DELEUZE, 2000, p. 207).

aparecimento da produção de diferenças contínuas em espécie e, por outro lado, secções móveis ou fatias de espaços emoldurados, fotogramas sequenciais e igualmente espaçados. Os dois aspectos da imagem, como seres de luz são integrados na mesma maneira que a luz pode ser descrita como em forma de onda e como partículas ao mesmo tempo. E assim, quando se aplica ao devir universal do espaço-tempo, Bergson chama esse corte transversal de Plano da Matéria como um agregado de imagens (BERGSON, 1999); Deleuze chama de Plano da Imanência (DELEUZE, 2010).

Grande parte do desenvolvimento conceitual na elaboração desta tese está apoiado na questão da categorização não apenas em termos de taxonomia, mas através de uma leitura alternativa do que significa a categorização e como ela funciona. As categorias teorizam as condições necessárias para a experiência (sem as quais não haveria experiência) e, ao mesmo tempo, expressam como é possível articular conceitualmente o que é. As imagens revelam a experiência, enquanto articulam essa mesma experiência. Assim, uma tipologia do processo imagético não é apenas necessária para compreender a realidade, mas também explicita como a realidade passa a ser por meio de imagens. O materialismo imagético de Deleuze está baseado em Bergson, mas ele também elabora uma boa parte de sua tipologia das imagens em categorias com base nas ideias do filósofo americano Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) sobre a Teoria de Signos.<sup>173</sup>

Para Peirce, o signo “é algo que significa algo para alguém em algum aspecto ou capacidade” (Peirce, 1955, p. 99).<sup>174</sup> Os Signos de Peirce são uma construção triádica cujos componentes estão unidos, integrados concretamente, em uma unidade indissolúvel. Como tal, a filosofia semiótica dos Signos de Peirce é altamente pertinente, porque permite predicar corpos conceituais como um esquema triádico, dá uma visão sobre o funcionamento do afeto tão criativo de conceitos e ajudam a articular as imagens cinematográficas de Deleuze. Isso constitui a essência de uma compreensão mais elaborada do que imagens concebidas como ação e reação podem ser, mas também como o

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<sup>173</sup> Estamos relutantes em fornecer as datas da criação dessas ideias, pois elas passam por um desenvolvimento contínuo sob vários aspectos ao longo da carreira de Peirce. Em *The Philosophical Writings of Peirce* (1955 — Os escritos filosóficos de Peirce), Justus Buchler oferece os vários conceitos temáticos como seleções editadas apresentadas de acordo com sua elaboração histórica.

<sup>174</sup> For Peirce, the sign “is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity” (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 99).

movimento produzido na transformação de seções ou molduras estáticas em movimento constitui um aparato cinematográfico que temporaliza a experiência perceptual.

Deleuze elabora uma taxonomia do processo imagético baseada nesses dois aspectos do devir imagético em seus dois volumes de *Cinema 1: A Imagem-Movimento* (1983, trad. 1985) e *Cinema 2: A Imagem-Tempo* (1985, trad. 1990). As imagens de Deleuze foram trabalhadas ao longo da tese e elas não recebem uma análise individualizada aprofundada, pois o interesse está na procissão do avanço do processo imagético que ocorre na percepção e não nas variedades de imagens. Se o cinematógrafo de Bergson é uma representação de percepção, Deleuze vai usá-lo como base sobre a qual vai predicar o cinema como uma representação da filosofia. O cinematográfico dos livros de cinema de Deleuze, em oposição ao cinema, é uma semiótica da percepção, talvez mais específica e técnica do que ele expôs em *Mil Platôs* (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1995-1997), no entanto, a mineração e a fundição é tudo do mesmo minério. Diversos problemas discutidos no *Mil Platôs* são reprisados no *Cinema 1* e *Cinema 2* e alguns dos problemas que surgem nesses dois volumes são tratados em *O que é filosofia?* (1994) — porque, se os livros de cinema de Deleuze apresentam um programa filosófico baseado na semiótica da imagem, a filosofia por trás do próprio esquema imagético deve ser, em algum momento, também articulada. O problema nos livros de cinema de Deleuze consiste em compor uma filosofia da experiência perceptiva baseada nas teorias de Bergson sobre o movimento e o tempo, a teoria da imagem e do aparato cinematógrafo. Assim, Deleuze vai além da técnica e da estética do cinema e se move para o ontológico, epistemológico e as implicações metafísicas do aparato cinematográfico em torno de quatro comentários sobre as teses de Bergson. Se tudo é visão/devir como afirmam Deleuze e Guattari (1992), então a taxonomia das imagens que surge da pesquisa cinematográfica de Deleuze é um catálogo de modos de devir como processo imagético. Mas como processo semiótico baseado no movimento triádico dos signos perceianos é constitutivo de corpos que povoam cartografias retalhadas de planos de composição triangulados através de imagens-lembrança reticuladas.

O corpo como dobras ao infinito articula a modificação, o desvio entre a ação e a reação, entre o estímulo eferente e o gesto aferente. A interação na dobra é governada pelas leis da natureza que podem ser expressas através da geometria projetiva, e especificamente através das seções cônicas, para revelar como o processo perceptivo pode, por sua vez, tornar-se uma continuidade heterogênea que desfaz a divisão binária entre o conhecedor e

o conhecido, bem como estabelecer a continuidade extensiva entre o 'externo e o interno', como predicado por Bergson no primeiro capítulo de *Matéria e Memória* (1992). Isso também foi aludido por Deleuze nas primeiras páginas de *A Imagem-Movimento*. Esclarecemos essas ideias por meio de uma implantação histórica dos modelos de perspectiva ópticos da Renascença nas práticas de pesquisa-criação quase-científicas de Brunelleschi, Alberti e Viator, dos estudos matemáticos sobre a continuidade de Johannes Kepler através da compreensão generalizada de cônicas e da perspectiva, bem como as implicações da geometria projetiva do matemático francês Gerard Desargues e uma resolução final através da topologia e o desenvolvimento da fita de Möebius como garrafa de Klein. A perspectiva é uma concepção monádica que oferece uma continuidade extensiva feita a partir de um ponto de vista privilegiado que pode ser compreendido por plano de consistência. O que geralmente é olhado como o principal significado de uma representação perspectivista é a relatividade fixa dos objetos dentro do campo visual como um sistema de relações que coincide com a concordância geométrica pictórica de sistema visual. Entretanto, por mais importante que seja, a perspectiva como relacional é ultrapassada pelo desenvolvimento da geometria projetiva em termos de um desdobramento emergente, baseado no tempo, que produz uma superfície infinita, contínua, como um plano de devir.

Em contraste com o modelo da imagem de Bergson, o psicólogo e filósofo da tecnologia francês Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989) formula uma teoria da imagem baseada na imaginação como faculdade. Sua concepção da imagem cíclica e polifásica produz uma coexistência de processos imagéticos num agenciamento operacional que ele chama de ambiente associado. O meio associado, tanto no regime molar quanto molecular, harmoniza elementarmente o humano e o não-humano, o natural e o artificial, o material e o orgânico, numa multiplicidade funcional que expressa uma completude subjetiva que é fechada, mas aberta na duração. Procura-se considerar o próprio meio experiencial como o ambiente condicionador da entidade subjetiva e que permite localizá-lo na junção do agenciamento dos elementos materiais e imateriais, do humano e do não-humano, onde o virtual e o atual coincidem e se tornam pura experiência a fim de constituir o devir.

Pode-se qualificar esses meios associados como os espaços-tempos do Devir-Criança ou extensões no tempo de possibilidade, de territorializações por outros meios que não ocupação ou a ocupação do espaço volumétrico. Eles são concebidos como expansões extensivas, mas estas são geralmente apenas o pano de fundo para a ocupação mental do

pensamento, a generosidade de intensidades emocionais ou afetivas, de narrativas expansivas de fabulação, de temporalidades místicas de contemplação ou sintonizações criativas sinfônicas, de comunicação empática, do espaço comum do excluído meio de cumplicidade educacional. Esses conjuntos são infinitamente dimensionados em sua composição — eles são fractais — mas são convenientemente denominados planos porque eles apresentam topologicamente uma seleção, uma superfície que se associa de acordo com uma qualidade particular, como uma modalidade de mudança específica, como a forma particular e conhecível do devir dentro do processo imagético — a seleção é limitada, e sempre o será porque seu ser é assintótico ao seu devir. Devir-Criança produz conjuntos maquínicos de corpos, de forças, de linguagens, de ações e gestos, de materialidades e virtualidades que compõem as malhas entrelaçadas dos meios associados dos devires da infância. As qualidades, substâncias, poderes e eventos que constituem esses meios produzem uma colcha de retalhos, um campo, uma cartografia comum de expressão experiencial, um rizoma duracional do qual emerge a criação de um território e de corpos que, conjuntamente, temporalizam o devir dessa territorialização dinâmica. E esses territórios se manifestam não apenas em termos de espaço e níveis de intensidade, mas concretamente em termos de linguagem, roupas, jogos, música, dança, atividades de lazer, de expressão sexual, de liberdade artística, modos de comunicação, de temporalização, de perfilhação racial, de interação social que codificam e canalizam, que iniciam a habituação de restrições, limitações e fechamentos produzidos pelo confinamento disciplinar e institucional e a imposição de uma socialização de curto prazo.

Ao remapear o meio experiencial como duracional e associado, os participantes se tornam um com o mundo do evento no qual estão envolvidos. Os próprios participantes, sendo de natureza heterogênea — material e imaterial, humano e não-humano, atual e virtual — podem ser interpretados como montagens de processos e sua interação como interação imagética. O que é necessário aqui é tanto uma compreensão da cadeia causal perceptual *per se* dentro do orgânico animado e inanimado não-orgânico e uma explicação de como os agregados de imagens podem ser interpretados como matéria expressa processualmente. Com Bergson e Deleuze, teoriza-se a imagem como interativa, duracional e processual para que Simondon explique suas fases e a formação do meio associado.

## **Repartição por capítulo**

*Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético* é dividido em quatro capítulos. O primeiro capítulo expõe o próprio devir-doutor do autor e a sintomatologia e a intuição como estratégias metodológicas para o avanço das práticas clínicas e críticas que não apenas definem o esforço da tese, mas também marcam o próprio caminho do autor como um devir-doutor. Este capítulo inicial descreve a forma que a tese folgadoamente subscreve-se em uma lógica exemplificadora dos Três Tipos de Conhecimento de Spinoza (capítulo 2: observação; capítulo 3: raciocínio e análise; capítulo 4: o Comum) como uma progressão intuitiva em que cada capítulo usa o método da intuição — problematização, diferenciação e temporalização — conforme postulado por Bergson e elaborado por Deleuze. O movimento epistemológico da tese — tanto nas partes, quanto no todo — procura convergir no final da tese em noções comuns de geração de diferença e de tempo.

O segundo capítulo apresenta uma visão geral do conceito de infância, ou seja, a forma como esse é atualmente entendido nas ciências sociais e humanas e a maneira de transformar o conceito de uma concepção estática para um devir processual. Inicia-se definindo o que a infância e a criança significam em termos estabelecidos nas ciências sociais e nas humanas, através da psicologia do desenvolvimento e da sociologia como um modelo transdisciplinar ao mesmo tempo em que se move para expressá-lo como processo. Faz-se o contraste conceitual entre a concepção tradicional estática da criança e da infância e o Devir-Criança como uma conceituação da criança como devir. Aponta-se que não se tem uma compreensão muito clara do devir e formula-se a necessidade de um entendimento mais adequado — o que será fornecido por meio da explicação, do autor da tese, do processo imagético.

A expressão da infância como processo de transformação interativo requer que se considere o processo em seus dois modos ou escalas: na sua manifestação molar e molecular. Conforme mencionado anteriormente, esta divisão não é necessariamente evocativa de tamanho relativo, como macro e micro, mas descritiva da modalidade de tamanhos relativos da interação relacional em consideração. Predicaremos ambos através do modelo perceptivo imagético interativo postulado por Bergson, e assim, no capítulo 3, examina-se o processo imagético. Passaremos da definição geral postulada por Mitchell (1984) — mais bem tradicionalista e de bom senso — e os cinco tipos usualmente entendidos mais ou menos como pictóricos. Imediatamente complexifica-se o que a imagem

pode ser em termos da dinâmica da visão revelada pelo psicólogo experimental russo Alfred L. Yarbus através de seus experimentos do olhar e movimento ocular. Contrasta-se suas descobertas com o conceito da imagem de Bergson como base para um processo semiótico que integra os pensamentos de Bergson, Peirce e Deleuze (com um pouco de James e Whitehead) e fornece-se uma explicação do avanço processual do devir. Assim, coloca-se o Devir-Criança dentro desse nexo de entendimento como movimento imagético.

O modelo de percepção de Bergson é uma concepção processual baseada numa definição desconcertante da imagem. Em sua expressão mais simples, a imagem é um conjunto triádico que compreende um estímulo, um intervalo de indeterminação e uma resposta. É uma definição não convencional e não intuitiva na medida em que define a imagem não como uma representação pictórica — uma imagem, como se diz comumente — mas como uma existência, ou mais corretamente, como um devir, que é simultaneamente experiencial, encorpado e projetado e que encontra expressão na separação ou no intervalo entre uma "coisa" e sua "representação" (sua imagem mental) que corresponde diretamente ao objeto. Para Bergson, uma imagem é tudo e qualquer coisa que age e reage em todas as suas faces e em todas as suas partes como uma variação vibratória perpétua e universal, exemplificada e ilustrada através da energia e da luz. A matéria não é mais uma entidade física, mas um agregado de imagens, no qual corpos já não são escolhas abstratas de energias entendidas como uma "massificação" de forças, de reciprocidade de ação e reação processuais onde não há substância, somente o agenciamento sistemático de energias como interação processual de funções escolhidas, a fim de propor o meio associado de Simondon como o modo e a localização do devir.

O quarto capítulo apresenta a "recompensa" intuitiva do que um Devir-Criança pode ser em termos de noções comuns, em termos de tempo e de potenciais e conclusões sobre o Devir-Criança como um construto epistemológico. Desse modo, apresenta-se o conceito de Devir-Criança em termos gerais e elabora-se o conceito em si como um processo distinto de avanço imagético. Este capítulo articula o molecular do devir-criança para expressar o devir em termos de processo puro — processo como dinamismo incessante, em que os corpos não são mais entidades materiais, mas seleções de qualidades, assembleias de funções, conjuntos de forças, agregações de propósitos associados. Sua localização se torna um plano de composição, onde o surgimento da imanência se torna o local do devir. Como uma noção comum do que é Devir-Criança, indicam-se instâncias nas quais se reconhece sua

operabilidade em várias atividades acadêmicas e se oferece uma leitura alternativa do mito de Édipo e uma interpretação do filme do cineasta russo Andrei Tarkovsky, *A Infância de Ivan* (1962).



## Capítulo 1

### Devir-Doctor

Nos últimos anos, como resultado do natural envelhecimento,, passei a consultar mais médicos. Pensando nisso e no fato de que estou cursando um doutorado por algum tempo, questionei-me como teria sido a trajetória deles para a conquista do título de doutor. Observo essas ideias, sem o desejo de depreciar o caminho prolongado, intenso e difícil dos estudos da medicina, nem a qualidade da organização e administração profissional, o cumprimento ético, a vocação professada e a prática que incorporam um corpo profissional verdadeiramente exemplar. Gostaria de determinar a diferença entre o título profissional de Doutor em Medicina e o que é tradicionalmente considerado um doutorado acadêmico, um doutor em filosofia ou, simplesmente, um doutorado, que a maioria dos médicos não possui. O diploma de MD representa a conclusão de um longo caminho de estudo para a aquisição de um alto grau de proficiência nas artes de curar, enfermidades porém nem todos os médicos são convocados a apresentar e defender uma tese. O diploma lhes é concedido após uma longa residência — ainda assim, estudos demorados não garantem necessariamente um doutorado. É sabido que não são poucos os médicos que também são doutores acadêmicos, grandes pesquisadores e professores.

Do ponto de vista puramente acadêmico, nas ciências exatas ou humanas, o doutorado é concedido após a conclusão de um período de aprendizado intenso e a defesa bem-sucedida da tese apresentada diante de uma banca examinadora.. E, como os médicos em sua organização profissional ou faculdade, esses Doutores que professam ou reivindicam ter um grande conhecimento em alguma arte ou ciência geralmente afirmam lealdade a alguma corporação acadêmica, um colégio ou corpo de pensamento no qual eles se inscrevem. Essa sociedade de estudiosos incorporados para fins de pesquisa, estudo e instrução constitui a faculdade que, em virtude de ser composta de doutores, teoricamente deveria ser capaz de curar-se a si mesma, de se dedicar à "grande saúde" como diria Nietzsche. Eu estou invocando o provérbio "Médico, cure-se a si mesmo", que nos vem do grego *latre, therapeuson seauton* em uso desde o tempo de Ésquilo (c. 525-456 ac), traduzido para o latim como *Medice, cura te ipsum*, que foi supostamente usado pelo próprio Jesus Cristo como relatado no *Novo Testamento* em Lucas 4:23, e mais

recentemente reciclado através do conceito de *Souci de soi* de Foucault (1985), do cuidado de si, por meio da incorporação (*embodiment*) relacional de subjetividade e verdade.

O termo doutor, do latim medieval *doctor* e derivado de *docere*, que quer dizer ensinar, foi antes de tudo um termo usado para um indivíduo eminentemente educado, douto, um *doctor* cujas realizações acadêmicas e práticas lhes conferem o direito de expressar uma opinião abalizada ou professar o conhecimento como professor ou tutor. A denominação de médico, que agora é usada predominantemente para descrever um membro da profissão médica, um médico ou doutor, remonta às universidades medievais e sua divisão de conhecimento remete aos corpos de especialização e aprendizagem como as profissões liberais de Teologia, Direito e Medicina. Em contraste, a palavra medicina é etimologicamente derivada do prefixo *med-* a raiz proto-indo-europeia que significa "tomar medidas apropriadas". Ela se baseia no sânscrito *midiur*, julgo, estimar; no grego μέδομαι *mēdomai*, ser consciente de, *medesthai*, pensar sobre algo; *medein*, governar; *medon*, governante; no latim *meditari*, pensar ou refletir, considerar; *modus*, medida, quantidade ou extensão; *mederi*, curar, dar atenção médica.<sup>175</sup> De modo que temos uma fundação etimológica evolutiva que significa julgar, ponderar, considerar, governar e curar. Em seu abrangente estudo da etimologia da palavra medicina, Charen indica que, ao traçar o desdobramento histórico da etimologia "da raiz MA e MAD", pode-se apreciar a cristalização da função iátrica de pensar e julgar, para racionalização considerada, e para interesse e preocupação clínica (CHAREN, 1951). No entanto, ela nega a interpretação de *medicus* como derivado de *medius* para significar "mediador" ou "intermediário", mas sentimos que há um pouco do *medius* no *medicus* como mostraremos a seguir. Tomando licença poética, pode-se dizer também que o *medice* do latim é simplesmente o *me-dice* ou o você-me-diga do médico para o paciente.

Já podemos sentir as várias noções gravitando em torno da ideia de corpo em relação a *doctor*, mas um par delas em particular se destaca: uma constelação cujo significado tende na direção de um indivíduo que clinicamente atende a corpos no sentido mais amplo do termo, e, outra, um indivíduo que pode reivindicar um conhecimento profundo sobre um sujeito específico e ser suficientemente erudito para funcionar como pedagogo ou tutor, alguém que domina o *logos* dos corpos. Ambos articulam o que

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<sup>175</sup> [https://www.etymonline.com/word/\\*med-#etymonline\\_v\\_52693](https://www.etymonline.com/word/*med-#etymonline_v_52693)

Whitehead (2010) chama de preocupação (*concern*), uma sintonia (*attunement*) com o cuidado e a atenção, a propensão ou inclinação como predisposição de interesse e curiosidade. A pressuposição aqui é sempre a realização do juramento hipocrático, para o cuidado ético do corpo como entidade clínica, e como tal, é orientado para as artes da cura e de “arrumar” corpos enquanto o outro indica a orientação ou o treinamento, tutoria do 'desdobramento' de corpos por um custódio ou tutela: dois aspectos da medicina, duas maneiras de manter a saúde, dois aspectos de lidar com corpos — o curativo/restaurativo ou terapêutico do *medicus* ou *iatre* (e.g. de psiquiatra ), e o *logos* pedagógico, preventivo do *docente* (e.g. do cardiologista ). Essa preocupação médica pelo corpo do paciente demonstrada pela inclinação sobre o que precisa atenção e as modalidades que esse interesse pode adotar é o que o médico acha de interesse, o que o atrai e o afeta, e o que de fato define a vocação.

Esse duplo aspecto de exercer as práticas de ser médico, as artes médicas do terapêutico e do pedagogicamente preventivo são necessárias para a manutenção da saúde: o médico pode restabelecer o corpo à saúde, mas o paciente também deve seguir as instruções do “doutor” para aprender e manter o bem-estar. A saúde é “não apenas a ausência de doença ou enfermidade”, mas uma busca duradoura “do completo bem-estar físico, mental e social” (W.H.O., 2006, p. 1). A saúde não é e não pode ser uma proposta imutável; deve ser dinâmica, pois, se for apresentada como uma posição imutável e invariável, é apenas uma suposição relativa às normas estabelecidas por outros. Juntos, o curativo/terapêutico e o preventivo, o movimento de coerência operacional e unidade funcional como avanço processual duradouro que possibilita a expressão da saúde como aquilo que sustenta a vida de um corpo, sua duração. Daniel Smith, na introdução da versão inglesa de *Crítica e Clínica* (1997) de Deleuze, afirma que a *saúde*, tanto em seus aspectos ontológicos quanto éticos, é a questão que liga literatura e vida — a crítica e a clínica — através de sua “vitalidade”, seu tenor de “Vida” (DELEUZE, 1997, p. xvi). E é essa vitalidade, essa força vital que Bergson identifica como *élan vital*, que se propaga através dos corpos que animam nossa discussão.

Se a profissão de médico é definida por suas práticas profissionais e seu corpo de conhecimento, então as atividades que realiza, ou seja, a sintomatologia, a terapia, a etiologia e a prevenção, constituem sua essência. A sintomatologia é o ponto de entrada que permite que todos os outros aspectos tomem forma, pois é através da determinação da

doença que o médico formula o curso de ação como terapia. Assim, o *διάγνωσις* (*diagnósis*) — do termo grego que significa a atividade de distinguir ou discernir, bem como de resolver, decidir e avaliar, particularmente em um ambiente médico (Liddell e Scott, 1883) — consiste na determinação da doença em virtude de observação atenta, identificação e interpretação estudada dos sintomas de algum paciente. Verificar a condição do paciente, interpretar os sintomas e determinar a verdadeira natureza da doença é, portanto, de importância primordial para um profissional médico. O médico moderno tem uma variedade de meios à sua disposição para identificar e expor doenças, incluindo ferramentas tecnológicas e científicas altamente sofisticadas, mas o que nos interessa aqui é o encontro mais preliminar ou exploratório quando o médico confronta o paciente pela primeira vez. Nesse ponto, o médico exerce a arte do diagnóstico em sua forma mais rudimentar e imediata. A tarefa consiste em mapear a correspondência entre o que o paciente está lhe indicando de seu distúrbio (por meio do verbal e do não verbal) e o próprio corpo do conhecimento médico. Para fazer isso, ele depende no Método Sintomatológico e no Método da Intuição.

### **Crítica e Clínica: O Método Sintomatológico**

"Crítica e Clínica" são termos usados por Deleuze em seu livro *Sacher-Masoch: o frio e o cruel* (2009) para se referir a abordagens complementárias de modos de compreensão. É um texto inicial de Deleuze que antecede *Diferença e Repetição* (2000) e assim, em retrospectiva, pode ser lido como anunciador de um corpo de trabalho por vir — como tal, já podemos identificar esse trabalho como “mítico” por razões que esboçaremos abaixo. Como ele assevera “A medicina faz distinção entre síndrome e sintoma: os sintomas são *signos* específicos de uma determinada doença, enquanto as síndromes são unidades de junção, ou de cruzamento, remetendo a linhagens causais bem diferentes, a contextos variáveis.” (Trad. modificada. Deleuze, 2009, p. 13).<sup>176</sup> Não há nada excessivamente desfavorável nessas duas definições, exceto que Deleuze iguala o sintoma ao signo — o sintoma é um fenômeno subjetivo que pertence ao paciente, enquanto um signo é uma manifestação objetiva que é objetivamente observável por outros e mais especificamente percebida objetivamente por

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<sup>176</sup> “La médecine distingue les syndromes et les symptômes : les symptômes sont des signes spécifiques d’une maladie...” (DELEUZE, 1967, p. 13). Substituímos “signais” por signos e adicionamos o itálico. A versão inglesa traduz *signe* como *sign*, assim como a espanhola, *signo*.

um médico. Embora o sintoma e o signo sejam frequentemente usados de forma intercambiável, há uma diferença de intenção. Na linguagem de Peirce e sua teoria dos signos, um sintoma é reconhecido objetivamente como um interpretante tornando-se *representâmen*, como um afeto pertencente ao paciente como um signo ainda não apropriado pelo médico, na medida em que é indeterminado, enquanto que o signo como *representamen* é abstratamente afetivo e determinado através de seu interpretante.<sup>177</sup>

No caso de doença, para o paciente, o corpo está permeado de doença que não tem nenhuma proveniência determinável, nem extensão definida, intenção ou causa definitiva: o paciente é habitado por um mal-estar que se manifesta como um afeto que o diminui e reduz seu poder de atuação. É uma sensação invasiva e abrangente que se adentra na sua existência e não tem um correlato fixo ou determinado como indicativo de uma causa adequada. O paciente, que tem uma imagem muito nebulosa do interior do seu corpo, e até uma compreensão menos clara de seu funcionamento, não tem (ou se tem é muito limitada) uma compreensão causal a montante sobre a causa de sua indisposição difusa — qualquer causa só pode ser atribuída ao acaso ou a um "vírus", pois ele não tem uma imagem clara de sua natureza. O problema do médico no diagnóstico é traduzir ou mediar as qualidades ditas, declaradas, dessas sensações nebulosas como sintomas, que apresentam um conhecimento inadequado do corpo, a um signo que faz parte do funcionamento do corpo de conhecimento adequado.

O termo sintoma, como derivado do grego σύμπτωμα (*symptoma*), é uma indicação subjetiva perceptível ao paciente, de uma mudança de condição decorrente e acompanhante de uma doença ou afecção (O.E.D.), constituindo assim uma indicação ou evidência de algo que se abateu sobre uma casualidade e, às vezes, num mau sentido, um infortúnio (LIDDELL e SCOTT, 1883); síndrome, derivada do grego σύνδρομον (*syndromon*) significa uma corrida em conjunto, um concurso tumultuoso de pessoas (de corpos), e especificamente em medicina uma concorrência de sintomas (LIDDELL e SCOTT, 1883): hoje talvez pudéssemos traduzi-lo como um evento social, como uma *flash mob*<sup>178</sup> de sintomas.

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<sup>177</sup> O *representâmen* tem o interpretante que ele merece dado o objeto que o articula e o fundamento (*ground*) que o sustenta, o que deve fazer-nos pensar no ápice deleuziano que serve de base ao método da intuição que afirma que acabamos com a solução que merecemos para o problema que colocamos.

<sup>178</sup> “Uma *flash mob* é um grupo de, ao menos, 10 pessoas que se reúnem repentina e instantaneamente em ambiente público, realizam uma performance atípica por um certo período de

Uma síndrome só é reconhecida como tal retroativamente, quando é apontada uma concrecência coletiva uma vez que ela é conhecida por uma territorialização específica, como o conceito de uma cartografia patológica. Deleuze ressalta que as doenças, às vezes, são nomeadas por pacientes típicos, mesmo se mais frequentemente seja o nome do médico que é dado à doença. Ele escreve que “O médico não inventou a doença. Mas separou sintomas até então associados, agrupou outros antes dissociados. Ou seja, constituiu um quadro clínico profundamente original” (DELEUZE, 2009, p. 15), no qual ele decompõe a remissão estética e cria um retrato composto, no qual, como Daniel Smith afirma, o médico a “isola” como rostidade, a fachada do significante. É justo que a doença, uma condição não-saudável do corpo, uma condição que arrisca aniquilar o corpo, seja identificada com o paciente que expressou ou observou mais adequadamente a manifestação específica de seu mal-estar, subsequentemente identificado como uma doença — algo de um memorial em homenagem ao paciente!

No entanto, a sintomatologia da condição como uma coleção de fatos subjetivos afetivos do paciente é quase sem valor. Mesmo que isso signifique tudo — são apenas impressões privadas, conhecidas absolutamente só pelo indivíduo que sofre os sintomas, incapazes de ser tornadas relativas ou racionais no sentido de uma comparação medida porque não há um território comum adequado entre a experiência do paciente e o conhecimento do médico que possa generalizar a causa dos sintomas. Por isso, pode-se dizer que o sintoma é um infortúnio ou uma situação que se abate como uma ocorrência contingente. Dizer “minhas costas doem” é diferente de identificar a dor na 3ª vértebra lombar e reproduzir o desconforto agudo fazendo com que o paciente se incline para frente e para a esquerda 30 graus para concluir o diagnóstico como um disco parcialmente herniado com compressão da raiz nervosa. Por conta deles, a declaração dos sintomas pelo paciente é de pouco valor útil, pois são expressões vagas, indeterminadas e inadequadas de uma condição afetiva que colore a experiência subjetiva e, como tal, não podem ser rapidamente tornadas comuns ou relativas a um corpo de conhecimento. Essas impressões subjetivas podem adquirir valor — que temos de caracterizar de significância, importância como signo, efeito presencial elevado, ou distância estética reduzida — quando são traduzidas em observações clínicas objetivas da disfunção do corpo por meio da linguagem

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tempo e rapidamente se dispersam do ambiente como se nada tivesse acontecido”.  
[https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash\\_mob](https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_mob)

de signos cuja base é o corpo médico ou biológico. O significado ou significado contido na expressão do paciente de sua condição é tão tênue e vago, que o médico criticamente exige que todas as habilidades de seu clínico façam sentido para elas — daí a inclinação de ouvir melhor o que o paciente está dizendo ao médico em relação à informação da compreensão.

Para não diminuir sua aura de onisciência profissional, a atitude diagnóstica inicial do médico e sua abordagem especulativa são geralmente descritas como um encontro “científico”. No entanto, essa ciência é diferente do que normalmente chamamos de ciência. É uma ciência derivada das teorias estoicas da percepção e da tradução um tanto ilegítima de Ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*)<sup>179</sup> como ciência (LLOYD, 1970), uma conversão que arrasta a confusão entre um empirismo perceptivo “frouxo” denominado ciência e uma ciência sistemática dura. O movimento epistêmico no médico, desde o encontro inicial com o paciente, que sofre sintomas como a manifestação de uma doença, até um diagnóstico certo e conclusivo da doença, precisa ser visto como composto de duas partes: primeiro, a representação do sintoma, a percepção adequada de uma diferenciação, a distinção entre duas ideias, ou duas representações, ou entre uma representação e uma ideia, ou entre nada e alguma coisa; e segundo, a percepção precisa ser integrada ao sistema de signos de um corpo de conhecimento.

O encontro é clínico, e o diagnóstico é crítico. Deleuze afirma que “A sintomatologia diz sempre respeito à arte”<sup>180</sup> (DELEUZE, 2009, p. 14) para dizer que o clínico possui métodos e práticas sistemáticas e um elemento de adivinhação. Segundo Bergson, seria uma maneira de descrever a percepção como composta de um componente adequado e de um componente afetivo indefinido e, para derivar o fato da percepção, é necessário entender os dois lados da divisão de maneira diferente. O clínico é o que Peirce se referiria como o

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<sup>179</sup> A mudança histórica no significado aqui reflete a mudança na compreensão de Ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*), Conhecimento, ou *Sapientia* em latim. Como PREUS (2015) aponta, *epistēmē* é derivado do verbo *epistasthai* — ficar em pé sobre alguma coisa — que tem implicações importantes em termos de *hipokeimenon* (substrato), porque o substrato é o que está abaixo do que ficamos sobre. Em um fragmento chave, Heráclito afirma que “A sabedoria é uma coisa: é saber (*epistasthai*) o pensamento que orienta todas as coisas através de todas as coisas”. O que é fundamental para nós aqui não é somente que o *epistēmē* é considerado ativo e imbuído de movimento e mudança, mas a direção do pensamento. Pensadores posteriores como Platão predicaram o conhecimento sobre as Ideias estáticas e imutáveis, e Aristóteles na dedução silogística como o movimento do pensamento — ao traduzir Aristóteles, *ēpistemē* se tornou ciência. Veja o Capítulo 4. Além disso, a *ēpistemē* pode ser associada à Terra elementar, à localização da *sema* e às noções de solo e território.

<sup>180</sup> “La symptomatologie est toujours affaire d’art” (DELEUZE, 1967, p. 14). “A sintomatologia é sempre questão de arte”.

aspecto observacional da ciência, uma ciência que é mais uma atitude em relação à criação do conhecimento, de *ēpistemē*, de discernimento e não a sujeição estrita a uma filosofia da exatidão metódica. Este cientificismo nômade da organização imanente às relações que o compõem pode ser para Peirce tanto uma ciência *coenoscópica*, um modo de investigação filosófico que repousa na observação treinada para identificar e discernir aquilo que muitas vezes passa despercebido, ou *idioescópico*, um modo especial de observação conduzido com alguma assistência aos sentidos, seja instrumental seja dado por treinamento (PEIRCE, 1955). Isso gera seus próprios problemas peculiares que derivam de considerar exclusivamente o "escópico" como pensamento através de imagens pictóricas como o específico à percepção, mesmo que seja, em última instância, o que dá maior impulso ao pensamento imagético.

O encontro como crítico é frequentemente mais parecido com a crítica literária ou artística do que com a investigação científica — está baseado no estético. É crítico porque é através da constituição da crítica como um ato de pensamento e construção de conhecimento que ocorre a constituição genérica de corpos, tanto a incorporação quanto a corporificação. Mas por quê o aspecto integrador do "crítico e clínico" é chamado de crítico? Porque, em termos pragmáticos, deve reunir ou re-coletar, re-colher,<sup>181</sup> e interpretar afetos para construir a certeza implícita na determinação da contração no movimento do pensamento. E porque, indo além da preocupação de inclinação, formula adequadamente a determinação no avanço da semiose; conjura a resposta à pergunta "o que fazer a seguir?"<sup>182</sup> ou "o que acontece a seguir?" Isso traz a determinação para a crise e tira o coelho do chapéu como determinação ativa. É um movimento cartesiano, pois se seguirmos a determinação de certeza de Descartes por meio da colocação da dúvida, então essa certeza de pensamento que é constitutiva do ser é também afirmação da procissão semiótica, é testamento do fluxo afetivo adequado como constituinte de corpos.

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<sup>181</sup> Em inglês, a imagem-lembrança é traduzida a *recollection-image*, que nos leva introduzir ideias relacionadas à memória através da integração sintética.

<sup>182</sup> O renomado fisiologista e médico espanhol Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852-1934) também tem raízes na investigação científica sobre a crítica. Em seu "*Consejos para jóvenes científicos*" (1897), ele escreve, "En algún caso, la indagación misma tiene como precedente, no la observación personal, sino un acto de crítica, una repugnância sentida a priori por nuestro espíritu respecto de ciertas doctrinas más o menos generalmente admitidas", em que a repugnância é, na verdade, insatisfação e antipatia a ignorância.



A declaração de um paciente sobre o que o aflige é o mais importante e, ao mesmo tempo, o mais irrelevante. O mais importante no que segue em um acontecimento é a afirmação de que o paciente está evidenciando um sintoma, uma afecção passiva do corpo; sem a falsa enunciação de palavras desarticuladas e gestos difusos, o conhecimento, adequado ou inadequado, das causas não pode ser determinado; e é o menos importante porque é irrelevante para o próprio experiencial — as palavras não são o desconforto; as palavras são uma representação duas vezes distanciada da experiência: a formulação da imagem mental da experiência do mal-estar introduz uma camada de inexatidão, e a formulação da expressão como expressão verbal introduz outra camada de incerteza na indeterminação. De modo que a resposta do paciente ao médico “mostre-me onde dói” como um movimento circular vago do dedo indicador indicando a área geral do abdômen, acompanhada por um enrugamento do rosto como expressão de desconforto, e a afirmação “meu estômago dói” são de uso limitado para o médico, mesmo que signifiquem o mundo. Não se trata de infantilizar a experiência real da dor de um paciente, mas das dificuldades de colocar em primeiro plano o "algo", de diferenciar o afeto, dizendo o que é. De fato, é nesse ponto que tanto a mente do paciente quanto a do médico convergem. À medida que o médico palpa o abdômen e o paciente estremece de dor, a mesma preocupação vem à mente de ambos e simultaneamente expressa: “O que é isso? — Esperava que você pudesse me dizer o que é...”. O paciente raramente está em posição de descrever os mistérios inefáveis do que é a dor e o médico precisa determinar o que é antes de pronunciar o julgamento como uma ideia credível. Para a indefinível e nebulosa manifestação da dor que é tão palpável, mas tão indefinida da experiência do paciente, cuja resposta pragmática é “Pare!” quando o ponto doloroso é atingido, a resposta do médico não pode ser “Depois de uma grande dor, um sentimento formal vem” ou “Sua dor é a quebra da concha que encerra o entendimento” mesmo que haja muita verdade nesses pronunciamentos poéticos da poeta americana Emily Dickinson ou do libanês Khalil Gibran.

O médico não tem conhecimento direto e absoluto do que o paciente está sofrendo. Ele confia na apresentação narrativa difusa e inexata do paciente de uma sintomatologia, uma representação complexa, que muito provavelmente produz uma imagem inadequada do corpo doente. O médico deve então traduzir essa imagem do (mau) funcionamento, por meio de sua compreensão e conhecimento do corpo humano, como uma imagem racionalizada do pensamento. É através dessa imagem racional, comparada ao *corpus* do

conhecimento, que o médico pode determinar “as ações e reações desse corpo em relação a todos os outros” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 199). Assim, o médico usa um método para chegar a um diagnóstico conclusivo, que não é apenas lógico em sua *démarche*, em seu procedimento, mas raciocinado pela racionalidade, raciocinado através da *ratio* do contraste e comparação: é a territorialização dos sintomas como a determinação de comparação, de número numerado, que o torna racional. Precisamos perspectivá-los e relativizá-los e, posteriormente, traduzi-los em signos como parte de uma ciência racional.

O momento inicial do diagnóstico não é nem um conhecimento científico frouxo ou fraco nem uma abordagem científica dura, e é no primeiro encontro com o paciente que sua doença que é melhor descrita como artística ou literária. Estritamente falando, o método do médico para diagnosticar a doença não pode ser chamado de científico, não por reticência em adotar um método científico puro e duro, mas porque os dados oferecidos pelo paciente são inadequados — não são dados porque são parciais e ambíguos: é o conhecimento pessoal do paciente que ele ou ela não sabe como tornar adequado e, portanto, comunicável, a não ser por meios literários ou teatrais. Antes que as próprias impressões do paciente possam assumir a forma de fato quantificável ou de dado concreto para o médico, o exame é conduzido como uma ciência instintiva, a fim de transformar afeto inadequado em percepção adequada. Isso ocorre através de um processo de intensificação perceptiva como a arte do diagnóstico, que geralmente é caracterizada como uma ciência mesmo se antigamente foi conhecida de *sapientia*. O que permite ao médico intensificar a agudeza de suas observações é o conhecimento que ele tem dos corpos em geral e o poder ‘ler’ a situação e tornar a expressão nebulosa dos sintomas em percepções adequadas. É graças à abordagem e à intervenção proto-científica do médico que um quadro adequado do sintoma ou conjunto de sintomas pode finalmente tomar forma, pode assumir a forma, como um conceito clínico da doença e uma relação positiva e ativa pode emergir no sentido de aumentar o poder de ação do corpo enfermo.

Embora tenhamos considerado os sintomas como os efeitos expressos do corpo, precisamos projetar nossa compreensão para os tempos antigos e ver o sintoma como um corpo em si. Na Grécia Antiga, era costume considerar um corpo qualquer coisa que pudesse receber um nome, material ou ideal, real ou virtual. Por um lado, era uma maneira para os

filósofos corpóreos da Jônia<sup>183</sup> chegarem a uma compreensão do fluxo da agência no mundo.<sup>184</sup> na sua maneira de pensar, as coisas não poderiam se animar, eles não poderiam adquirir ou produzir movimento por conta própria, e então eles precisavam de algum tipo de impulso para fazê-los se mover. Esse impulso é transmitido de um corpo outro e, nesse caso, o movimento do universo se deve à ocupação de corpos de todos os tipos — como atividade e ocupação do espaço — agindo e reagindo uns aos outros em termos mecânicos. Uma dor de estômago, por exemplo, é entendida como uma entidade animada forânea que causa estragos no interior do corpo do paciente.<sup>185</sup> Esse modo de expressar o pensamento como corpo animado muitas vezes é apresentado de maneira antropomórfica, mesmo se um corpo vivo pode assumir uma configuração diferente da humana — qualquer bestiário medieval demonstra ou qualquer alienígena da ficção científica atesta. O corpo humano é apenas uma manifestação do Corpo-Ideia ou Forma e, como doutores — e nem necessariamente como médicos — podemos conceber a ideia de um corpo e a incorporação em termos não humanos, a fim de des-antropomorficar o que pode ser um corpo conceitual no pensamento. No entanto, quando realizamos essa tarefa, que concepção do corpo estamos trazendo à vida? Como esses corpos estão sendo constituídos? Que dinâmica de existência, de devir, de vida estamos ativando? Então, quando Spinoza pergunta “O que um corpo pode fazer?” a primeira resposta que devemos dar é uma pergunta: “De qual corpo você está falando?” Mas, se de fato tudo ao que se pode dar um nome é um corpo, então precisamos entender como esses corpos agem e reagem uns com os outros. Precisamos entender tudo, todas as coisas, físicas e ideais, como constituídas e constitutivas de corpos que interagem sem cessar; uma consecução recíproca de retribuição ativa e passiva, não como a atividade de dois processos diferentes, mas uma intensificação singular de mais ou de menos das qualidades duracionais. Este é um interminável intercurso caracterizado pela atração e repulsão dos corpos como o movimento vibrátil de interação que, segundo Pitágoras, produziria harmonia ou desarmonia. Podemos chamar espinosista a esta dinâmica

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<sup>183</sup> Os quatro filósofos mais conhecidos da escola jônica foram Tales de Mileto (c. 624 — 546 a.C.), Anaximandro (610 — 546 a.C.), Anaxímenes de Mileto (588-524 a.C.), Heráclito de Éfeso, (c. 535 a.C. — 475 a.C.)

<sup>184</sup> Vale a pena ressaltar que esses primeiros filósofos já estavam pensando em termos de agência subjetiva em termos de fluxo.

<sup>185</sup> Este tipo de compreensão animista da agência de um corpo forâneo ainda é popular hoje, como evidenciado pelas propagandas farmacêuticas que ilustram azia como um demônio no poço infernal do estômago.

em que o afetivo é uma manifestação de uma harmonia constitutiva ou destrutiva dos corpos em termos de afetos alegres que aumentam e intensificam corpos ou como afetos tristes que os diminuem e atenuam. Mas também podem ser vistos como signos peirceianos, nos quais a agência de um corpo substancial pode ser igualada ao fluxo semiótico e a função territorializadora dos signos como campos de semiose.

O fluxo do afeto através do caminho nômade “metódico”<sup>186</sup> ou da arte do diagnóstico segue o processo pelo qual uma impressão inadequada é projetada no corpo do paciente, onde acontece. Inicialmente, o sintoma já exhibe os componentes de um signo — significa ou representa<sup>187</sup> algo para alguém, como Peirce afirmaria — mas é expresso de maneira inadequada: há tanto uma imprecisão ao significado associado ao sintoma quanto à manifestação física indefinida. Assim, o sintoma não é uma percepção totalmente determinada, mas um efeito inadequado e difuso dificilmente incorporado, literalmente. Mas se, de fato, o diagnóstico clínico é uma arte, então o praticante deve ser um artista, cuja tarefa, como Deleuze e Guattari afirmam, é produzir perceptos, assim como a tarefa do filósofo é criar conceitos e a do cientista é produzir functivos. O médico como doutor deve ter a expressão do afeto do paciente e traduzi-lo em uma percepção objetiva adequada constitutiva de um achado factual como um signo determinado da doença, como um substituto para um aspecto específico da doença. A troca acontece como um espelhamento projetivo do corpo do paciente, como uma imagem corporal difusa e o corpo de conhecimento científico ultra-definido do médico, para que o médico possa transduzir o sintoma afetivo em um signo adequado. Spinoza explica como isso acontece na *Ética* VP1: “É exatamente da mesma maneira que se ordenam e se concatenam os pensamentos e as ideias das coisas na mente que também se ordenam e se concatenam as afecções do corpo, ou seja, as imagens das coisas no corpo.” (SPINOZA, 2010, p. 216). Nesta dobra do espelhamento projetivo, que mapeia a imagem corporal inadequada do paciente no modelo científico-corporal da medicina, os sintomas afetivos do paciente tornam-se racionais

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<sup>186</sup> Aqui o metódico se refere à tradução grega do Método como a perambulação do método da memória que permite a reconstituição sistemática do conhecimento através do desdobramento discursivo do território como a narrativa da revelação memorativa. Método: de *meta-* “além de, depois” e *hodos* “um deslocamento de um lugar para outro, ou a via mesma” constitui a organização do conhecimento; cf REBOLLEDO, 2013, p. 77.

<sup>187</sup> O Peirce utiliza a expressão “*stand in place of*” que quer dizer ficar de pé por ou em vez de como substituto. Na produção cinematográfica, um *stand-in* é um ator substituto.

através do signo.<sup>188</sup> Aqui temos que esclarecer que, se o médico não estivesse ajudando o paciente, isso seria um sacrilégio. Ele não está fazendo o que Deleuze e Guattari nos pedem para não fazer no *Anti-Édipo*? Ele está pegando o corpo sem órgãos da articulação afetiva do mal-estar do paciente e disciplinando esse afeto, projetando-o em um corpo de conhecimento, importando-o para um campo da produção e extraindo a diferença qualitativa como uma perseguição da máquina desejante da doença (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 2010). A determinação da doença não é um esforço criativo — o médico quer chegar a uma determinação dos sintomas o mais rápido possível e não embarcar num nomadismo especulativo de criatividade conjetural.

A determinação do signo pelo alinhamento do sintoma com o fluxo causal sistêmico aos processos do corpo tem consequências pragmáticas. Fazer isso fornece, segundo William James, uma perfeita clareza em nossos pensamentos sobre um objeto, de modo que possamos afirmar que efeitos concebíveis de um tipo prático o objeto pode envolver.<sup>189</sup> Isso torna o médico voltado para a concretude e a adequação, em direção aos fatos, em direção à ação e ao poder<sup>190</sup> — um esforço muito espinosista! Assim, ao transformar o sintoma afetivo em uma percepção adequada reconhecida dentro de um campo de signos estabelecido, o corpo da doença se torna definido e se transforma em um atuante que capacita o médico e capacita seu poder para agir. Transformar o sintoma afetivo em um signo adequado harmoniza a sintomatologia nebulosa como um corpo de conhecimento, aumentando assim seu poder de agir e de deixar-se agir, e esse conhecimento como uma potência ou ressonância aumentada permite ao médico agir positivamente com o corpo e torná-lo (mais) alegre. O médico funciona, de fato, como a faculdade perceptiva do corpo do paciente, pois qualquer impressão afetiva que esteja sendo inadequadamente transmitida pelo paciente deve ser transformada em percepção adequada pela astúcia artística e científica do médico.

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<sup>188</sup> Na linguagem de Peirce, o médico deve organizar a mediação signoética entre a afirmação do paciente como representamen e um interpretador impreciso e hipotético como Terceiro, mesmo como “uma segundidade degenerada apenas” (Buchler, 1955, p. 100) para a compreensão de o paciente de seu próprio corpo é frequentemente marginal na melhor das hipóteses e totalmente inadequado como um objeto com o qual articular a correção triádica.

<sup>189</sup> “A perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object [so that we may state] what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve” (JAMES, 1943, p. 43).

<sup>190</sup> “Towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power” (JAMES, 1943, p. 45).

A tarefa do médico consiste em efetuar uma transformação no corpo do paciente, ou seja, substituir a disposição desfavorável de uma atitude passiva de sintomas de sofrimento pelo corpo ativo e uma disposição corporal favorável, cujo poder de ação é aumentado como uma vontade de poder, uma atividade intencional no mundo. A tarefa clínica do médico é, portanto, transformar o afeto passivo do sintoma no poder ativo do signo, e a atividade do médico é mediar a transformação da atitude passiva do paciente em relação à doença como algo que atinge o corpo em um cuidado deliberado subjetivo ativo do self — o papel do doutor é assim moderar o processual do encontro do clínico para o crítico e dirigir a concordância do empírico e do teórico. É equivalente a guiar a impressão não formada do afeto inexato e indeterminado para a percepção adequada e determinada e depois traduzi-la em um signo integrado em um corpo de conhecimento que permite certa ação, o que lhe confere um certo pragmatismo. De fato, a tradução é uma reconciliação das duas metades do conhecimento — o empírico e o racional — que é também o entrelaçamento do material e do ideal, a harmonização das "duas ciências" e o estabelecimento da *détente* na Máquina de guerra de Deleuze e Guattari.

Mas uma determinação não é dada no instante. Não importa quão curto seja o diagnóstico, o médico analisa, 'caça' a doença analiticamente da mesma forma que um servo-mecanismo 'caça' seu regulamento com ciclos de feedback que monitoram sua autorregulação. Chegar a uma determinação é um processo de feedback recursivo em que o médico atua como controlador de um processo analítico cíclico de determinação entre a observação e a predicação teórica ou ideal, comparando iterativamente as tentativas de concordância entre as duas até que um acordo seja estabelecido para chegar a uma conclusão exaustiva, alcançando-se o que é determinado tanto pela observação dedutiva quanto pela indução teórica. E o caminho que o médico deve tomar é metódico, na medida em que a determinação e resolução da situação problemática se baseia na intuição como método da própria intuição.

### **O Método da Intuição<sup>191</sup>**

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<sup>191</sup> Esta seção é extensivamente extraída de um artigo apresentado na Dark Precursor Conference em Ghent, na Bélgica, em 2015 que foi posteriormente expandido para "Uma perspectiva filosófica da intuição como um método dentro do processo artístico", PALAZUELOS, Felix Rebolledo; MACHADO OLIVEIRA, Andreia, e FONSECA, Tania Mara Galli. A Philosophical Perspective on Intuition as a

No livro *O Bergsonismo*, Deleuze afirma que a intuição é “um método elaborado, e mesmo um dos mais elaborados métodos da filosofia” (DELEUZE, 1999, p. 7). No entanto, muitos ainda veem a intuição como uma faculdade irracional e misteriosa. Mario Bunge, o filósofo da ciência argentino/canadense, chega a escrever em seu livro *Intuition et raison* (2001) que, em contraste com a intuição matemática e científica, a intuição filosófica acaba se tornando uma filosofia inventada por pervertidos para o irracional. Há obviamente uma grande lacuna entre os dois campos e procuramos conciliar e alinhar vários entendimentos da intuição sob a ideiação de Bergson e a expressão de intuição de Deleuze como método. É importante notar onde e como a intuição acontece. Dependendo da localização, significa diferentemente.

O primeiro significado que vem à mente quando se discute a intuição é a compreensão espontânea de uma situação ou problema como um pressentimento ou instinto — uma inteligência ou um instinto inato que, inconscientemente e diretamente, produz *insights*. Do ponto de vista do bom senso, a intuição é vista como a apreensão imediata de um objeto pela mente sem a intervenção do raciocínio e em que “uma intuição” é o resultado particular de tal apreensão como uma ocorrência da mente. Sendo assim, a intuição é comumente entendida como conhecimento adquirido de forma direta, imediata, de maneira autorreferencial não-conceitual, sem a intercessão do intelecto, sem mediação de metodologias acadêmicas ou científicas, ou discurso formal, disciplinado e lógico. Sendo a intuição um método epistêmico que, de alguma forma, articula diretamente a percepção sensorial, então o conhecimento adquirido dessa maneira é frequentemente considerado como não tendo nenhum valor duradouro ou validade acadêmica — pelo menos, porque o imediatismo das intuições não mediadas é uma derivação direta da experiência interna subjetiva impossível de disciplinar. Mesmo que os *insights* espontâneos da intuição contornem os métodos tradicionais de produção de conhecimento considerados sistemáticos, o acesso direto da intuição à produção de compreensão constitui um método.

Para nós, o termo método significa um procedimento especial para alcançar um resultado, mas também a razão pela qual um processo ‘adquire’ um modo de pensamento, o *raciocínio* em seu avanço. A procissão do avanço é o método, onde o método — do grego

μεταχodus (*metahodos*), de *meta-* “além de, depois”<sup>192</sup> e *-hodos*, “um deslocamento de um lugar para outro, ou a via mesma” — consiste em um conhecimento simultaneamente desdobrado espacial e performativamente revelado. A transição antecipada é o modo ou modificação que a agência causal e o impulso lógico do método exercem. Como tal, o método não existe a priori ao processo de criação, uma vez que se constitui no próprio processo e é apreendido apenas como uma diferença discernida *a posteriori*.

Bergson apresenta principalmente suas ideias sobre intuição em seus livros *A evolução criadora (L'Évolution créatrice, 1907)* e *O Pensamento e o movente (La Pensée et le mouvant, 1934)*. Para ele, a intuição é a visão direta da mente pela mente, do espírito pelo espírito; "significa primeiro consciência, mas consciência imediata, uma visão que mal se distingue do objeto visto, um conhecimento que é contato e mesmo coincidência" (BERGSON, 2006, p. 29). A consciência não é uma consciência da consciência do instante, mas do identificar a manifestação da inflexão no desvio automático do estímulo em uma resposta como consciência — isso está no cerne do antifenomenismo de Bergson e Deleuze como heterogeneidade participativa: não uma consciência de algo, mas um devir imanente experiencial à medida que avança para a novidade. A intuição, assim definida como método, tem diferentes implicações pragmáticas, dependendo de sua aplicação funcional. Se o método for usado por um médico para determinar um diagnóstico, ele agirá de acordo com um determinado procedimento que levará à averiguação de uma doença conhecida ou à proposição de uma nova doença como resultado da proposição de novidade do método através do conjunto diferencial como uma nova síndrome. Em sua expressão mais geral, o avanço da intuição pode ser generalizado no que Deleuze (2004) chama de Método de Dramatização (1967), que enfatiza a produção da diferença como constitutiva da novidade no avanço. É dramático na medida em que identifica a inevitabilidade e a surpresa gerada na tragédia grega como o caráter da intuição do avanço processual no compromisso da procissão como diferenciação, como a produção da diferença na espécie, que expressa a passagem do tempo no sentir.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> É interessante ressaltar por razões que veremos na próxima seção sobre o esfaqueamento do pensamento conceitual que “meta” quer dizer “um objetivo “almejado” que pode ser mensurado e claramente definido”: <https://www.dicionarioinformal.com.br/meta/>

<sup>193</sup> Aqui, usamos o termo sentimento como definido por Whitehead em *Processo and Realidade* (1929, 2010) como “a operação genética básica de passagem da objetividade dos dados para a subjetividade da entidade actual em causa” (WHITEHEAD, 2010), p. 62.



Na apreensão da diferença entre "um presente" e "um aquilo", discernimos o funcionamento da *démarche*<sup>194</sup> da intuição que é guiada por uma lógica operativa incognoscível que (in)flexiona a reconciliação do ideal e do material como *clinâmen* em direção a um específico gesto atual: “desse centro de força, aliás, inacessível, parte a impulsão que dá o elã, isto é, a própria intuição” (BERGSON, 2006, p. 139). Essa distinção entre a *démarche* da intuição e um método sistemático é significativa porque, na primeira, temos um fazer como uma “*manière d'agir à sa façon*” — o próprio modo de agir como subjetividade — *versus* um modo prescrito de fazer em conformidade com um protocolo predeterminado no segundo. Além disso, *démarche* em seu significado secundário, *commencer a marcher*, um começo para andar, também se liga à representação clássica dos métodos clássicos da arte da memória como um caminho percorrido, um caminho para fazer (YATES, 2007). Dessa forma, a intuição da intuição é a visão direta da mente pela mente na cognição perceptiva de seu funcionamento como a incipiência da memória que, por meio da repetição, torna-se a memória do modo de fazer a sua cognição: um método.

O que é filosófico nesta maneira de avançar, de - tornar-se um método? Deleuze é categórico ao afirmar que “A intuição não é um sentimento nem uma inspiração, uma simpatia confusa, mas um método elaborado, e mesmo um dos mais elaborados métodos da filosofia. Ele tem suas regras estritas, que constituem o que Bergson chama de “precisão” em filosofia” (DELEUZE, 1999, p. 7). Assim, seguindo as ideias de Bergson e Deleuze, o método filosófico da intuição consiste no avanço do conhecimento como uma evolução criativa. É um modo de pensamento impulsionado pelo que veio antes em direção a um futuro que atrai em termos de uma progressão inescapável atualizada no presente — mas não em qualquer presente, em um “agora”, que é inevitável e frequentemente surpreendente. Essa inevitabilidade é decisiva, livre de dúvidas, certa, inegável, completa, mas aberta.

O método, em toda a sua determinação, é indeterminado — a causa do movimento não é determinável, mesmo que o resultado seja inevitável e definido. A multiplicidade que constitui o devir é tão complexa e tem tantos graus de liberdade, que estabelecer uma causalidade pode ser comparado a uma determinação probabilística arbitrária. É interessante notar que o grego πρόβλημα [*problema*] — literalmente, uma coisa lançada ou

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<sup>194</sup> (<http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/démarche>) Usamos o termo francês *démarche* porque não podemos encontrar um termo equivalente em inglês que transmita o duplo significado necessário.

avançada — engloba a constelação conceitual das coisas que são lançadas, tiradas ou apresentadas e inclui dados, redes e linhas de pesca pontuadas por iscas. E talvez o mais puro dos problemas, como postula o filósofo brasileiro Peter Pál Pelbart, seja lançar a rede onde não há peixes para que apareçam (PELBART, 2015). Como canalizar o indeterminado em certeza metodológica ou o indeterminável em uma busca metódica?

Em *Bergsonismo* (1999), Deleuze reformula o método da intuição como compilado de Bergson. No capítulo intitulado "Intuição como método", Deleuze expõe o método em termos de "três espécies de atos, os quais determinam regras do método" (DELEUZE, 1999, p. 8). A maneira como ele o faz é por meio de uma aplicação progressiva de esculpimento discursivo, uma redução de possibilidades para determinar o que é, em última instância, operacional como princípio norteador. Deleuze determina o que é finalmente produtivo na intuição seguindo o mesmo método "intuitivo" que o próprio Bergson usa para analisar o que é essencialmente operativo nas quatro teses que emergem do pensamento de Berkeley sobre a intuição:<sup>195</sup> Deleuze, conforme Bergson, usa o método que é prescrever para fazer o que ele está prescrevendo como um uso de autorreferência do método.

As três regras do método estipuladas por Deleuze consistem em problematizar, diferenciar e temporalizar adequadamente:<sup>196</sup> "A primeira espécie concerne à posição e à criação de problemas; a segunda, à descoberta de verdadeiras diferenças de natureza; a terceira, à apreensão do tempo real" (DELEUZE, 1999, p. 8). Ou seja, uma crítica de problemas falsos e a invenção de problemas verdadeiros; estreitamento e convergência; e um pensar em termos da multiplicidade de duração. Como tal, somos servidos de uma panóplia de possibilidades no encontro que deve ser reduzido a um fim pontiagudo que nos indique e nos impulsione a uma contração adequada inevitável. A intuição representa o movimento da realização da passagem para a adequação da contração como a conclusão da imagem bergsoniana. Este não é um protocolo passo-a-passo para o uso correto da intuição para ser método, mas uma oferta de estratégias ou possíveis abordagens a fim de colocar

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<sup>195</sup> Bergson descobre em Berkeley quatro "teses fundamentais" que levam à revelação da verdade: "A primeira é o *idealismo*; a segunda, o *nominalismo*; a terceira Berkeley afirma a *realidade dos espíritos e sua análise em termos de vontade*; a última defende seu teísmo". ARMSTRONG A.C. (1914). "Bergson, Berkeley, and Philosophical Intuition". *Philosophical Review* Volume 23 issue 4 1914 p. 430.

<sup>196</sup> Deleuze expande as regras de Bergson intercalando mais duas regras complementares ao método. Uma aprimora a primeira regra e lida com a declaração de problemas. A segunda, trata da produção do real como diferenças de espécie reconciliadas como percepção-recordação. DELEUZE, 1988, p. 17 e 29). Nós lidamos com essas questões, mas independentemente do método da intuição.

um problema preciso e sem ambiguidade através da quase formulação de sua solução exata e apropriada. Deleuze cita Bergson: “Colocação e solução do problema estão quase se equivalendo aqui: os verdadeiros grandes problemas são colocados apenas quando resolvidos” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 16). Uma citação de Michelangelo sobre escultura vem à mente, o que ilustra o método intuitivo como afirma Bergson: “Cada bloco de pedra tem uma estátua dentro dele e é a tarefa do escultor descobri-la” — o escultor cinzela o bloco de pedra para liberar a estátua dentro; ele prossegue intuitivamente, esculpindo o que a pedra está lhe informando, sem realmente saber onde o processo o está levando. Só quando o escultor termina, dá-se conta do que é a estátua dentro da pedra. Para o médico, isso significa que o diagnóstico correto é feito quando o diagnóstico correto é colocado: quando o funcionamento observado do corpo como objeto no mundo coincide com o movimento do pensamento no corpo do conhecimento como a produção funcional da verdade.

É preciso distinguir entre o processo de intuição e seu retorno. A intuição não é o resultado — é o movimento do pensamento que acontece de um jeito particular. *O momento da intuição está nas condições motrizes de ação como o momento de criação de tempo da diferença, no sentir da transição como resultado inevitável.* Assim sendo, o momento da intuição é o intervalo entre o que vem antes e o que vem depois, a escansão da realização direta do movimento. E é a surpreendente certeza e celeridade de passagem que produz o clarão afetivo que nos deixa sem fôlego ou nos leva ao pronunciamento da interjeição da descoberta. Sim, o ‘Aha!’ nas “alegrias excepcionais, a do artista que realizou seu pensamento, a do cientista que descobriu ou inventou” (BERGSON, 2009, p. 23). A alegria é espinosista e catártica: é a liberação emocional que vem da quebra da tensão superficial do problema semelhante a um objeto que não permite a passagem, da dissolução da complicação em solução. A surpresa surge na imprevisibilidade do resultado como consequência, onde o raciocínio do processo, o avanço da função significativa do pensamento, leva a uma conclusão surpreendente e inesperadamente *inteligente* como solução. E no diagnóstico médico acontece quando todas as diferenças do contraste com o esperado, como um todo, produzem o inesperado em um processo coerente que explica a única coisa que a síndrome está revelando.

O método começa com o lançamento de uma posição especulativa de uma questão de posição preliminar em uma tentativa de solução de problemas. Mas não apenas qualquer tipo de problema, uma proposição que espera um *follow-through* e o encontra em termos

de um verdadeiro problema como movimento para a novidade. A questão procura responder à pergunta simples de "e agora?" " como resolução do momento de crise do 'What next?'. Saber responder a essa questão de forma decisiva, sem prevaricação, sem dúvida, conhecer o "porquê" no "como" do presente é o exercício da liberdade subjetiva como expressão da intuição. O "poder de decisão, de constituição dos próprios problemas" (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 15) é o que constitui a verdadeira maioria e é esse conhecimento completo do "porquê" no "como" que Simondon (1969) postula na relação entre os seres humanos e o mundo. Sustentamos que não se trata de uma formulação do problema tentando contê-lo, tornando-o determinável, delimitando-o categoricamente do lado de fora, mas trabalhando com ele para tornar o problema produtivo de uma verdade inevitável e necessária dentro e fora. A verdade está na produtividade da coerência operacional do problema como uma reafirmação de suas premissas, condições, posicionamento, implicações, até seus possíveis resultados e uma solução adequada e decisiva. No entanto, esse caminho para a verdade é não-linear — é tortuoso e surpreendentemente desprovido de lógica — ele tem uma inteligência norteadora própria. Muitas vezes, encontramos-nos no meio da indagação perguntando para onde esta coerência operacional produtiva, digressiva e caprichosamente voluntariosa está nos levando? O 'levando-nos' já é indicativo de método — sua motivação é promover condições que complexifiquem a produção de soluções. A complexificação não é uma representação do problema mais complicada, mas de desvendar a nodosa implicação recíproca de ideias através de um refinamento progressivo da posição do problema pelo avanço de soluções parciais. Isso equivale a dizer "deixe a intuição fazer o seu trabalho pelo caminho para onde ela está nos levando!". Encontramos-nos com a solução que merecemos para o problema que pudemos posicionar, mas, se não gostarmos da solução, podemos continuar a (re)lançar o problema até encontrarmos uma solução que melhor agrade. Em termos do diagnóstico, o médico procederá colocando uma condição especulativa e seguirá a contrastar o observado com o teorizado até que a cadeia significativa da morbidade corresponda à cadeia conceitual da doença clínica.

A redescoberta de "as verdadeiras diferenças de natureza ou as articulações do real" é a segunda regra de intuição de Deleuze como método e este é o fundamento para que ela seja considerada "um método de divisão" (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 14). Se a experiência nos oferece "nada mais que compósitos" (*mistos*), devemos destrinchar a multiplicidade do todo em suas articulações e desatar a formação de tendências qualitativas e qualificadas. Se

vemos o evento um conjunto concretizado, a divisão é aqui entendida uma divergente, a abstração analítica de um processo eventual. Dessa forma, podemos chegar a discernir o que é, na verdade, operativo, que é produtivo de diferenças no tipo de acordo com a maneira em que o momento combina “a duração e a extensão definidas como movimentos, direções de movimentos (como a duração-contração e a matéria-distensão)” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 15).

O progresso invisível do tempo em um avanço processual é inferido do movimento da tonalidade afetiva em uma apresentação direta da mudança qualitativa que fornece o tempo como temporalidade em distinção ao tempo medido. A "resposta" da intuição torna-se "o tempo dirá" e o tempo torna-se a transição transformadora como a expressão da subjetividade ao longo de uma nova linha experiencial.. Isso constitui a terceira regra da intuição como método: “Colocar os problemas e resolvê-los mais em função do tempo do que do espaço” (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 22). A intuição, como distintamente operativa, é duracional. Ela está imbuída de movimento e mudança — como método, é a maneira pela qual a experiência é integrada ao avanço do ser em devir diferencial. A intuição nos permite perceber na hora a deflexão, a divergência, o desvio, a digressão que constitui a diferença marcada como temporalidade, momentos diferenciados, diferença de gênero e não diferença de grau, não como o que acontece em extensão, mas em duração. É a determinação do movimento criativo da mudança. A individuação, como avanço processual, é uma produção subjetiva incessante do "agora" um coextensivo do passado, presente, futuro e atual, que é sempre diferente, desviante e sempre outro. A cada momento na continuidade do devir de um avanço processual, a disponibilidade e oferta de potencial é diferente: o 'agora' do presente não é um espaço reservado no tempo, mas a passagem em forma de processo para o que vem 'próximo' como a escolha do devir real entre potencial disponível para potencial realizável ou possível ou potencial renunciado. E essa qualidade oculta e indeterminada que guia a atenção na passagem do potencial da ativação, realização e abandono do potencial é a atividade da intuição.

A intuição é indicativa de que o que está ocorrendo está dentro do reino da duração como "agora", a criação de tempo: a duração é a repetição da produção do tempo e a continuidade como perduração emerge na criação do tempo como duração vital. A intuição está implícita no "agora", no imediatismo da transição como tempo e onde "o não-agora" é extenso e espacial. A transcendência procura deter o tempo para estabelecer "o agora"

como locativo, "um aqui", uma representação. 'O agora', na forma de uma modalidade de criação do tempo, momento de mudança, de transição transformativa, o presente da doação da diferença, o momento de inflexão no devir, é sempre mais criativo que uma mais-valia, porque é diferente do que veio antes como um complemento ao avanço processual. Deleuze afirma, a intuição pressupõe duração. Embora sem a intuição como a determinação que subjaz a mudança, a construção da temporalidade seria apenas uma experiência psicológica. É por meio da intuição que a inovação criativa — uma diferença em si, uma mudança — pode se tornar conhecida como o avanço do tempo.

Diferentes tipos de médicos usarão o método de maneira diferente. Na diagnose, o método da intuição busca a convergência a fim de uma determinação específica. Quando se trata da busca da pesquisa, o método de intuição de Deleuze como método não é o que a maioria das pessoas está procurando: o método não é uma garantia para a produção de inspiração, nem uma máquina para a produção de momentos Aha! ininterruptos, embora seja ambos, mas não apenas a intuição normalmente imaginada. A inspiração vem da diferença que sabe discriminar na repetição e não na ligação de uma luz orientadora divina. A sistematicidade do método não é um protocolo, mas um *modus operandi* do pensamento. O modo do método é configurado como um processo recursivo no qual as três regras do Método da Intuição não precisam acontecer sequencialmente como um programa formal de execução — elas se desempenham como modulação afetiva interativa. Mas o que precisa de primeiro plano de forma fundamental para o método é o grau de comprometimento que entra no desenvolvimento da intuição na prática como uma repetição diferencial integrada à prática iterativa que é. Vemos isso nas profusas notas precursoras e rascunhos preliminares de escritores, de esboços exploratórios e *bozzetti* de artistas. As repetições e ensaios no teatro, a afinação na elaboração de uma série experimental em uma pesquisa científica, a espiral recursiva do diagnóstico dos médicos clínicos... podem ser caracterizadas como o impulso da fé que estimula a iteratividade da expressão “se a princípio você não tiver sucesso, tente, tente de novo”, mas é mais uma expressão de convergência determinante do que a atenuação progressiva da disparidade entre a observação e a interpretação.

Médicos e pacientes, escritores e leitores, artistas e públicos, cientistas e estudiosos — pensadores em geral — acabam com a solução que merecem para o problema que são capazes de posicionar, porque “o que ganharam é o que pediram”. A resposta oferecida é sempre a resposta apropriada para a posição do problema. Se não obtiver a resposta correta

é por que a pergunta foi mal formulada. Em atividades não-médicas, o método da intuição não exerce sua função nem para a convergência da determinação específica, nem para a reconciliação ao longo do tempo entre pensamento e expressão, teoria e prática, percepção e gesto e ação e reação.

Existe uma diferença entre a arte em uma busca criativa e a arte como pesquisa estética. A intuição emerge imanentemente como uma função do fazer a obra de arte. - Sendo assim, a solução para uma problematização artística pode ser uma solução única e inevitável; uma multiplicidade de soluções; ou uma não solução como um paradoxo, enigma ou uma iteração recursiva da problematização em sua própria problematização — Deleuze nos diria que a *resposta superior* é o texto "poético" que faz pensar. Mas podemos interpretar isso e reproblematicizá-la de diversas formas, dependendo de nossa abordagem subjetiva à investigação e do que se valoriza na pesquisa. Pode-se dizer que o texto que permite múltiplas soluções, o que está aberto a muitas interpretações, é o texto superior; ou que o texto que não tem solução implícita, porque combina melhor com a natureza indeterminada da experiência, é um texto ainda melhor; e se você quiser, a solução intuitiva única, surpreendente e inevitável é a espécie regressiva, porque é a mais limitante. No contexto clínico não-médico, a intuição engloba todos esses resultados como expressão da conclusão inevitável derivada da maneira que o texto é problematizado, a situação ou o evento, mas cada uma responde diretamente às condições nas quais se articulou o problema. É inegável que o texto é uma multiplicidade de possibilidades materiais e não-materiais, mas a precisão e exatidão implícitas na seleção ou expressão da afirmação é a inevitabilidade intuitiva resultante da questão proposta. O trabalho do não-médico é a problematização da pesquisa-criação como a problematização da prática do médico não para alcançar o fechamento intuitivo, mas na perpetuação da intuição dentro da significação do momento criativo da repetição. A intuição é produtiva, não de uma maneira amalucada, mas através de uma determinação exata: a intuição atua sem hesitação, é resoluta e determinada em sua ação — a intuição é um movimento limiar no avanço para a novidade que não é contingente em si mesmo, mas é absolutamente necessário no seu resultado. Um médico envolvido em pesquisas pode não estar totalmente ciente da má orientação do problema que pensa estar buscando, mas uma resposta surpreendente pode se tornar em um momento de revelação informando que seu problema está incorretamente posicionado. Esta visão transformadora que resume anos de trabalho, permite agora restabelecer a

configuração das condições de composição que inevitavelmente produzirão o resultado "correto" esperado.

A má notícia aqui para um clínico de qualquer tipo é que, a fim de alcançar essa clareza de expressão no posicionamento do problema, essa fluidez imediata, desencadeia a intuição do Aha! e baseia-se na verdade do provérbio que fala 1% de inspiração e 99% de transpiração. É esse suor que lubrifica o afilamento e o polimento da proposição, de modo que repetidamente produz a repetição do surpreendente e inevitável. Este trabalho implica o múltiplo reposicionamento, realinhamento, reconfiguração das condições e circunstâncias, de elementos compositivos que são, de fato, signos, para eles produzirem as soluções parciais que eventualmente nos levarão à experiência concretizadora, totalizadora, da síntese intuitiva. Essa elaboração da significação em uma narrativa daquilo que é essencial exige esforço. Dessa forma, os dois modos de pensamento, o empírico e o racional, coincidem e convergem sobre a mesma conclusão de ambos os lados, do experiencial e do racional pelo avanço de soluções parciais como diferenciação iterativa a fim de determinar o diferencial.

Isso é dramático? É dramático como uma sinédoque do método da intuição quando a determinação sintética final do momento Aha! é surpreendente e, no entanto, inevitável. Vemos isso na tragédia grega como um modo de representar a procissão em que os elementos da ação "ocorrem inesperadamente e, ao mesmo tempo, em consequência um do outro" (ARISTÓTELES, 1941, p. 1465). A espiral da inevitabilidade que se conclui em uma determinação dramática é satisfatória, porque nada parece ser deixado ao acaso. Mas isso é também o que é dramático na expressão do que emerge do teatro da memória dos filósofos renascentistas como sua representação do "Universo que se expande a partir das causas primeiras através dos estágios da Criação" (YATES, 2007, p. 184). É um entendimento que procura explicar o conhecimento encontrando as causas adequadas existentes por trás dos efeitos e que buscaram o retorno do homem a Deus no o reino das Ideias, uma meta comum, compartilhada com a busca que norteava Spinoza, exceto que, para ele, Deus está em tudo ao nosso redor.

Ver a verdade como produtora de coerência operativa é significativo aqui porque ela evita o problema moral de averiguar uma veracidade funcional em oposição a verificar a integridade como concretude dentro do desdobramento — da realidade. É um reposicionamento do problema da lógica moral normativa de um problema ser verdadeiro



ou falso para o conhecimento ético de como as coisas realmente funcionam coerentemente — de como a solução é territorializada funcionalmente, como ela produz. Através do seu funcionamento, podemos discernir se o que está sendo produzido, ou seja, o que está sendo considerado novo, é claramente inovador e inventivo ou simplesmente uma diferença de intensidade: estamos molhando nosso pé em um "riacho diferente" ou simplesmente chapinhando na mesma poça? é o momento uma (re)coleção circular do mesmo ou está compondo uma multiplicidade completamente diferente e divergindo da tangente do *status quo*? Ao realizar essa diferenciação, chegamos a ver se, de fato, o que estamos avançando é um problema ou um não-problema: estamos criando diferença e novidade? Ou estamos gerando indiferença e representações miméticas?

Não podemos confundir uma linha de fuga com a tangente como a determinação de *status quo* — é uma questão de chegar a um acordo com a tensão dentro da determinação do que está em jogo, ou seja, a resolução de intensidades na forma de pressão de tempo do afeto. Se a tendência é atualizada, já não mais fica dentro dos parâmetros dos ex-potenciais operativos, mas ativando uma nova série de potenciais que se mostram na linha de fuga do perpétuo desdobramento do evento na diferença. E a diferença não é constituída pela tangente que, muitas vezes, é confundida com a divergência, mas é um avanço para a novidade como diferença em si. O que não podemos descartar é que essa determinação sintética como resultado sempre está criando novidade na averiguação da novidade como *diferenciação*. A certeza da criação está na manifestação da diferença no gênero como um contraste progressivo na retrovisão, uma racionalização comparativa que produz a diferença determinante do que constitui *diferençação*. É uma racionalização porque é uma diferenciação contrastiva relativa a outra como critério e juntas constituem uma relação diferencial, uma diferenciação. O diferencial é uma determinação intuitiva em que o método de diferenciação do cálculo também encontra sua solução recursivamente em um método de exaustão e o determina no desaparecimento dos termos, de modo que a expressão de mudança como desvio é pura relação. Esse desvio é um momento de verdade na medida em que testa, ao mais ínfimo detalhe, o compromisso do avanço com a novidade. E neste ponto, a relação expressa é pura mudança porque podemos desconsiderar os termos da relação e considerar o movimento do desvio como a excursão à novidade independentemente de quaisquer detalhes.

A intuição, distintamente operativa, é duracional. Está imbuída de movimento e mudança — é o método do bergsonismo. Mas, como método, é a maneira pela qual a experiência é integrada ao avanço do devir diferencial. A intuição é o que provoca a deflexão, a divergência, o desvio, a digressão que constitui a diferença marcada pelo duradouro na temporalidade, momentos diferenciados, diferença de gênero e não como diferença de grau. O devir manifestado por singularidade, avanço processual, é uma produção subjetiva incessante do "agora" como coextensivo do passado, presente, futuro e atual, que é sempre diferente, desviante e sempre outro. A cada momento na continuidade do devir de um avanço processual, a disponibilidade e oferta de potencial é diferente: o 'agora' do presente não é um marcador de posição no tempo, mas a passagem do processo para o que vem 'a seguir' como o devir atual da escolha entre potencial disponível para potencial realizado ou potencial renunciado. E essa qualidade oculta e indeterminada que guia a atenção na passagem do potencial da ativação, realização e afastamento do potencial é a atividade da intuição.

A intuição é indicativa de que o que está ocorrendo está dentro do domínio da duração do "agora", da criação do tempo: durar é continuar a produção do tempo. A intuição está implícita no "agora", no imediatismo da transição, um fazer-tempo e onde "o não-agora" é extenso e espacial. A transcendência procura deter o tempo para estabelecer "o agora" em forma de locativo, "um aqui" representacional. 'O agora', como a modalidade de criação do tempo, momento de mudança, de transição transformativa, como o presente da doação da diferença, o momento de inflexão no devir, é sempre criativo de uma mais-valia, porque é diferente do que veio antes, ou seja, um complemento ao avanço processual. Deleuze afirma que a intuição pressupõe a duração, mas sem a intuição como a determinação subjacente à mudança, a construção da temporalidade seria apenas uma experiência psicológica. É através da intuição que a inovação criativa, na diferença genérica, na mudança, pode se trevelar no avanço do tempo.

O Método da Intuição, na sua imediatez e exatidão sem mediação, fornece-nos a verdade e somente verdade. Não é uma verdade parcial; não é uma abstração e não mente por omissão. O método produz exatamente a resposta adequada ao que foi pedido — oferece a resposta correta para o problema que foi colocado. Mas antes de examinar como uma determinação intuitiva, a produção de conhecimento pode ser usada em nossa tese, desejamos aprofundar a natureza dessa reconciliação final como o fim da nossa busca

epistêmica. Uma "intuição" e o método da intuição não são o mesmo tipo de entidade e não podem ser confundidos. Por muito tempo, a crença implícita de constância e permanência das entidades que constituem nossa compreensão do mundo nos levou a acreditar na imutabilidade e perdurabilidade das coisas, sejam elas materiais ou ideais. Suprimimos o que nossos sentidos nos dizem incessantemente e refutamos obstinadamente as conclusões lógicas que nossa experiência cotidiana e nossas observações nos levam a inferir. A natureza é natural, sabemos disso; a vida é um fluxo e a única coisa constante é a própria mudança. Ainda assim, apesar dessas afirmações, persistimos em construir a existência em termos de constância determinada e imutabilidade idiomática. Interpretamos estar no mundo de acordo com termos que são imutáveis e imputamos uma fixidez identitária às coisas como se elas retivessem características essenciais transcendentemente invariáveis e permanentes. O mesmo vale para construções ideais tais como conceitos, ideias, teorias, leis e julgamentos. Usamos, mesmo aqueles determinados intuitivamente, como postulações permanentes, autônomas e imutáveis que nos permitem identificar e classificar as coisas no mundo de acordo com categorias onde "um tamanho serve para todos". Para nós, essas concepções são entidades processuais, conjuntos maquínicos caracterizados por sua abertura e movimento e ocupam o temido terceiro excluído como devir.

### **Voltando o pensamento conceitual estacionário e o movimento crítico para a frente**

Os dois métodos que acabamos de descrever precisam estar emparelhados com uma ontologia e uma abordagem epistêmica baseada na compreensão mutante de uma filosofia de processo e diferença. Os médicos sabem que os sistemas, os órgãos, os tecidos e todas as células do corpo estão associados, mas, apesar de viverem essa realidade diariamente, sua prática profissional ainda procura compartimentalizar o corpo em estruturas autônomas e independentes. O corpo humano é todo sobre mudança e adaptação e movimento, dentro e fora e de modo trans-individual. E, como qualquer corpo, tem uma duração incerta e um vir-a-ser e perecer incorporados — mas tão necessários à transformação e não à morte. O humano (corpo) é tudo sobre a impermanência, movimento e mudança implícita em "tudo flui". E se tudo flui, só podemos explicar o mundo em termos de processo e interação. Isso significaria que, se tudo está mudando, tornando-se continuamente outro, nosso pensamento precisa refletir essa distinção. O avanço que caracterizamos como o movimento

de um corpo precisa ser entendido não como superficial e acidental, mas como interno e transformador.

Dentro da distinção entre o ser estático e o devir dinâmico, existe uma ampla fenda ontológica e epistemológica cuja identificação é de importância decisiva para o nosso empreendimento. Como escreve Whitehead em *Modes of Thought*<sup>197</sup> (1938), “a verdade filosófica deve ser buscada nos pressupostos da linguagem, e não em suas afirmações expressas” (WHITEHEAD, 1966, p. vii). E o principal pressuposto da linguagem com o qual nos debatemos é sua tenaz sustentação em nossas mentes para tornar o pensamento em termos que invoque o estático, o imutável, o permanente, o imutável, o estável... Um segundo próximo é como a linguagem nos guia para conhecer a natureza, objetivamente, de forma homogênea, ao invés de uma imbricação heterogênea: simplesmente engajar o mundo em termos de quem? quê? quando? onde? por quê? e como?<sup>198</sup> posiciona *vis-à-vis* “o conhecimento e o saber” como uma cisão binária de conhecedor e conhecido e leva a formular o pensamento de acordo com as limitações das categorias estáticas em termos identitários.

Por exemplo, percebemos prontamente essa paralisação de movimento na terminação com o sufixo -ção<sup>199</sup> aos verbais para “aperfeiçoá-los”, para produzir o efeito de um fato consumado e torná-los uma coisa feita como se a atividade em questão tivesse menos valor do que a sua determinação completa. Muitas palavras como redação, conotação, simplificação, etc., que terminam em -ção levam a atividade para uma paralisação que está sendo realizada para transformá-la em um substantivo. Em termos de formular e transmitir o pensamento processual, notamos uma degradação conceitual na transição do grego para o latim. As línguas românicas estão repletas de palavras cujos fundamentos conceituais são feitos a partir de termos gregos imbuídos de movimento processual; quando traduzidas para o latim, entretanto, tornam-se estáticas e desprovidas de movimento. Isso se pode discernir na tradução do *verbo* heraclitiano επίστασθε, (*epistasthai* — se colocar em pé), traduzido como Sabedoria no latim, mesmo quando a fonte é permeada pelo processo e emana movimento. Seria injusto culpar totalmente os filósofos latinos de Roma por esse apagamento do pensamento dinâmico grego, pois já havia

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<sup>197</sup> Modos do Pensamento.

<sup>198</sup> O advérbio interrogativo ‘como?’ é diferente dos outros cinco na medida em que exige uma explicação processual, como Deleuze aponta em *O método da dramatização*.

<sup>199</sup> Em inglês seria o sufixo *-tion*

sido realizado muito antes na própria Grécia, principalmente pelas mãos de Platão e Parmênides. A diferença é que, mesmo que os gregos pensassem a imobilidade em termos da concepção do universo, os latinos integraram a imobilidade transcendental à dinâmica da própria linguagem. A tradução de conceitos gregos para o latim pelos filósofos romanos e medievos escolásticos — incluindo o pensamento de Aristóteles, que originalmente esteve imbuído de uma dinâmica processual — representa um sério obstáculo para a compreensão do pensamento processual inicial que habita a percepção. Segundo Heidegger, “qualquer tradução de um termo filosófico grego por um termo em latim envolve a destruição da 'verdadeira força filosófica da palavra grega'” (BENJAMIN, 1989, p. 39) e Glazebrook (2000) a caracteriza como uma questão de redução conceitual. Mas essa diminuição generalizada, da filosofia grega por sua romanização latina, e subsequente interpretação pelos escolásticos, foi além do amortecimento de sua força. Na consideração do processo como processo, como a atividade do processo ou conteúdo ou objeto do processo — a versão latinizada de um conceito processual grego invariavelmente optará por um nominal estático que satisfaça às Leis do Pensamento<sup>200</sup> em detrimento de ideações processuais dinâmicas, sejam formulações, postulados, concepções ou apreensões. Seja pensamento realizado através das línguas românicas ou expressão das línguas romanas como pensamento que está em jogo constitui uma aporia de galinha e ovo que, de qualquer forma, conspira para deter o movimento do que era originalmente dinâmico.

As traduções a línguas românicas tornam quase impossível a articulação do pensamento grego processual, pois os textos originais não somente foram desprovidos de dinamismo, mas também a conduta do pensamento só pode ser realizada usando a conceituação das línguas românicas, que impedem estruturalmente a ideação do movimento processual, porque elas não estão predispostas a expressar dinamicamente o pensamento ou a construir o pensamento em termos de movimento processual. Heidegger viu isso na tradução latina de *Φύσις* (*phusis*) como "natureza", onde *Φύσις* não é simplesmente natureza "mas o poder pelo qual as coisas vêm a ser, pelo qual elas estão disponíveis para serem encontradas em sua presença para o ser humano" (GLAZEBROOK, 2000, p. 178). Isto tenta posicionar a discussão no campo do devir como um encontro

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<sup>200</sup> As Leis do Pensamento — ou seja, a Lei da Identidade (se uma coisa é P então é P), a Lei da Não-Contradição (uma coisa P não pode ser P e não P ao mesmo tempo) e a Lei do Meio Excluído (uma coisa P é P ou não P).

relacional em oposição simplesmente ao ser, mas fica aquém do seu objetivo, tentando trazer a conclusão em termos de ser. Além disso, devir X parece implicar que o objetivo é devir X e que o processo seja concluído uma vez que X tenha sido atingido. Agamben (2000) reconhece essa degradação na palavra de ação *αἴσθησις*, *aisthēsis* (sensação), que, uma vez traduzida para o latim, é transformada a um nominal, *sensatio*, que, em grego, expressa atividade pelo sufixo *-sis*, muito da mesma maneira que *Φύσις*, *phusis* (natureza) é diminuída quando traduzida como *natura*. Por isso, a vinda de um futuro próximo por ser de um Devir-Mulher, Devir-Animal, ou Devir-Criança são todos predicados como participípios presentes do infinitivo 'devir' e não como um simples futuro. O participípio presente proporciona uma terminação aberta ao devir que o futuro em si não garante necessariamente.

Similarmente, *Essentia* é a tradução de Cícero<sup>201</sup> da frase de Aristóteles, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, *to ti ēn einai*. A frase grega literalmente significa algo como “o que seria ser (alguma coisa)” ou “O ser o que é.” A tradução de Cícero considera o infinitivo *esse* do verbo latino que significa “ser” e seu participípio *ens*, obtendo *essens*, e adiciona a terminação abstrata *-tia* para fazer um substantivo abstrato destinado a transmitir o sentido da frase de Aristóteles (PREUS, 2015). Essa noção de tornar a essência estática surge explicitamente no *The Realm of Essence* (1927) de Santayana, no qual ele se refere a essências etéreas: “Essences are Platonic Ideas relieved of their dynamic and existential meanings, and welded with *qualia* in immediate experience” (DUNHAM, 1938, p. 100).<sup>202</sup> Santayana identifica as essências como os pontos finais perceptuais da experiência feita adequada e significativa, dando definição a um corpo. Agora, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* não é o que algo é como tal, mas nosso relato, explicação, narração daquilo que percebemos que algo é. Isso não seria outra coisa que o que é dita em si como resultado de nosso encontro interativo com ele — é nosso *relatar* da percepção como razão, o *perceber* subjetivo expresso na hora, é nosso *professar* dele. E aqui vemos claramente a manifestação da questão: *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* não é o nosso relatório, mas o *dar*

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<sup>201</sup> Marco Túlio Cícero (106–43 a.C.; em latim: Marcus Tullius Cicero) foi um advogado, político, escritor, orador e filósofo. Cícero introduziu os romanos às principais escolas da filosofia grega e criou um vocabulário filosófico latino (inclusive com neologismos como “*evidentia*”, “*humanitas*”, “*qualitas*”, “*quantitas*” e “*essentia*”), destacando-se como tradutor e filósofo. (<https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/C%C3%ADcero>); Conte, G.B. (1987). *Latin Literature: A history*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

<sup>202</sup> “Essências são ideias platônicas liberadas de seus significados dinâmicos e existenciais e soldadas com *qualia* na experiência imediata”.

*contas* como *compte-rendu* daquilo que percebemos — é o *testemunhar* do acontecimento como um fato, porque “estamos contando como é”.<sup>203</sup> E a etimologia do testemunho o confirma: de *testimonium* em latim “evidência, prova, testemunho, atestado”, do *testis* “uma testemunha, alguém que atesta” + *-monium*, sufixo significando ação, estado, condição.<sup>204</sup> É o testamento de nossa subjetividade, tanto como testemunha ocular, testemunha oral do que constitui o evento. É verdade porque aconteceu, e está inscrito no registro através de ser narrado — agora é imutável porque o que é feito é feito, e agora está triangulado no registro público. Tornar imóvel pela sua triangulação relacional, estando fora no mundo, é devir encarnado como um corpo de conhecimento, de modo que a comunicação da experiência, a mesma que Benjamin (2008) escreve em *O Narrador* (1936), como o núcleo crítico do que deve ser transmitido como essencialmente pragmático, é aquilo que está relatado, recontado, narrado e soldado à tradição. O ser-relativizado através do relato é, portanto, o que constitui nosso corpo subjetivo de conhecimento como expressivo de experiência perceptiva — “O que você diz, é o que você vê”, mas é o dito do visto que nos mostra de forma imanente o caminho para avançar como a resposta para a pergunta crítica “O que fazer a seguir?”.

Mas *to ti einai* não é uma questão de determinar a essência, como ser específico, ou uma maneira de existir, mas a expressão de nossa subjetividade como aquela que é essencialmente relevante e pragmática no momento. Mas dizer que *to ti en einai* é a predicação como um fazer-comum do conhecimento que nos permite categorizar em termos de sua constituição conceitual como identitário é uma deturpação da intenção da frase original. A construção social não surge em termos de linguagem como social, mas como conhecimento comum de uma categorização que é compartilhada numa esfera social a fim de distinguir, avaliar ou diferenciar algo, tornando-o verificável num fórum público. O verbo categorizar vem do grego *κατηγορία* (*kategoriar*-categorias), que significa acusar ou dar a conhecer publicamente. É formado por *κατα* (*Kata*-baixo) e o verbo *ἀγορεύειν* (*Agoreuein* — acusar ou falar em público [na *Ágora*<sup>205</sup>]), portanto, temos que levá-lo até a

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<sup>203</sup> O “dar contas” e “contando” seria também encontrar o número certo do evento ou da coisa.

<sup>204</sup> [https://www.etymonline.com/word/testimony#etymonline\\_v\\_10685](https://www.etymonline.com/word/testimony#etymonline_v_10685)

<sup>205</sup> “A *ágora* — mercado, local de reunião, ponto de encontro, lar de uma ampla concentração de atividades públicas — tem sido frequentemente considerada o coração da antiga polis. Foi aqui que os gregos se reuniam diariamente para fazer compras, socializar e trocar notícias e fofocas” (DICKENSON, 2017, p. 1). A *Ágora* ateniense também era o centro legal da polis: “A maioria dos

Ágora e dirigir-nos ao público a partir de uma posição de conhecimento da verdade — professar — que, se é também uma acusação, é para julgar sua veracidade. O filósofo foi uma extensão de disputas legais e litígios, para averiguar a culpa, determinar a causa, por uma ação baseada em fatos passados que podem ser rastreados tanto para frente quanto para trás a fim de compreender o evento. O passado é imutável em sua facticidade: o que aconteceu, aconteceu e não pode ser alterado — então os fatos são fixos, imóveis porque estão no passado, triangulados pela facticidade de outros atos. A plasticidade predica o presente.

A Ágora era o lugar onde o caráter de alguém seria examinado e colocado em questão, onde uma investigação seria realizada sobre o caráter de um indivíduo. Mas ter seu caráter pessoal questionado num exame público na Ágora era muitas vezes um evento de rebaixamento. Tornar algo conhecido na Ágora, no mundo do comum, era uma degradação — tanto no processo quanto no resultado. Podemos especular que *kategoriai* representa uma queda da graça, do panteão exaltado dos deuses do Parthenon no topo da Acrópole e das Ideias elevadas trazidas para baixo, para a Ágora no sopé da montanha a fim de compartilhá-las com a multidão como um fazer-comum do conhecimento. Além disso, para completar a metáfora, a Ágora não só incluía o Peristilo onde muitos tribunais se reuniam, mas compreendia a Stoa Poikile, que dava seu nome aos estóicos que ali se reuniam e pregavam uma filosofia de imanência e mudança (LANG, 1994).

O raciocínio implicaria a degradação do passado ideal ao ser materializado, tornado impuro e deficiente, carente da perfeição que as Formas Celestes Ideais desfrutavam. Mas, ao trazer esses fatos que agora estão fixos e imobilizados no passado, como uma rede de verdades associadas e relacionadas, a verdade deve ser encontrada no passado factual imutável e não no presente em mudança e móvel ou no futuro desconhecido. De modo que categorizar é definido pela derrubada de Ideias, em um fórum comum, abertamente debatidas e julgadas no tribunal da opinião pública, na arena pública do discurso, no mercado de ideias.<sup>206</sup>

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julgamentos foi realizada na Ágora” (LANG, 1994, p. 3). A Ágora também foi o local para o filosofar público: o julgamento de Sócrates foi realizado na Stoa de Átalo, que também deu seu nome aos estóicos.

<sup>206</sup> Esse sentimento é ilustrado pelo fragmento 119 de EMPEDOCLES, “De que grande honra e que altura de felicidade / Eu estou aqui caído para me mover com a espécie mortal!” Esta seção ressoa



Ao buscarmos a causa de algum evento como atividade, estamos procurando uma agência dinâmica, que, ao detectarmos em um caso, poderemos detectar em outros. Mas o que é sobre um evento que é detectável em outros? O que é aquilo que predica nosso presente, o que temos aqui diante de nós? O que está sendo de fato predicado? Qual o movimento que está sendo produzido, articulado em todos os exemplos que participam de uma Ideia? As variedades de predicados são as categorias e são elas que nos permitem distinguir, diferenciar, discriminar os *τύπος* (*typos*), as várias impressões que estão sendo produzidas para dar conta da percepção da mudança a partir da qual podemos inferir o tempo.

Muitas das categorias antigas, aristotélicas ou estóicas, são baseadas no radical Ποι- de Ποιεῖν (*poiein* — fazer ou fazer ativamente), como em ποιήσις (*poiesis*-), ποιητική (*poietike* — dar ou receber certa qualidade), Ποῖη (*poiōn* — fazer de uma certa qualidade), Ποιότης (*poiotēs* — qualidade), Ποσον (*posōn* — calcular a quantidade de, contar), Πότε (*pote* — quando feito em relação a agora), Ποῦ (*rou* — onde, feito em relação a aqui), como um fazer, πῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τί (*pōs echōn pros ti*) — como dispostos em relação a algo (PREUS, 2015). Destacamos dois aspectos dessas categorias: um, a recorrência do ‘como’, como exigir uma resposta em termos processuais, em termos de fazer ativamente ou como expressão de tempo; dois, a anulação da atividade envolvida na determinação em favor de um nominativo simples.

A distinção aqui feita é que existe uma predisposição intelectual para pensar o relato como um substantivo, como a soma completa, fechada e autocontida do que originalmente foi: uma fala processual emergente, discursiva e aberta. Ao definir o relato através de uma fala falada, oferecendo definição discursivamente a esse conceito como um corpo, declarando abertamente o que algo é, descobrimos e divulgamos aquilo que satisfaz o "senso comum" e torna o conhecimento disponível para todos. Assim sendo, identificar a essência, ou “o que é ser x”, seria dar definição, encarnar o corpo conceitual como um ‘prender-junto’, um conceito — é a escolha ou seleção da espécie, o εἶδος (*eidos*), de um *genos*. Ao defini-lo, ou seja, ao dar definição, em vez de dar uma definição, há uma abertura política ao declarar abertamente o que é algo: oferecemos um relato daquilo que satisfaz o “senso comum” e disponibilizamos o conhecimento para todos. Ao declarar o *to ti ēn einai*,

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com a *Genealogia da Moral* de Nietzsche (1998) e o impulso filológico do Primeiro Ensaio, Seção 2, partes 4-6.

de alguma coisa, tornamo-na óbvia e, assim, tornamo-na disponível e fazemo-na visível para todos. É uma revelação total que aparece no registro 'civil' do livro de contas do arquivo comunal. O arresto ciceroniano da frase de Aristóteles, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, na sua tradução a *Essentia*, produz um substantivo estático de uma dinâmica processual que emerge na fala. Como Benjamin escreve no texto *A Tarefa do Tradutor*, "Todas as manifestações da vida, bem como sua própria meta, têm por fim não a vida, mas sim a expressão de sua essência, a apresentação (*Darstellung*) de seu significado" (BENJAMIN, 2008, p. 54). Esse, quando lido processualmente, adquire um caráter diferente: a manifestação da vida como um devir não é uma análise de pontos finais, de termos, mas o desdobramento discursivo da emergência processual através da exposição da criação de significado, de valor semiótico. Não há discrepância entre a prática e a vocação; o ato de expressar conhecimento é, essencialmente, a vocação da profissão. "Sob todos estes aspectos, o eterno retorno é a univocidade do ser, a realização efetiva desta univocidade. No eterno retorno, o ser unívoco não é somente pensado, nem mesmo somente afirmado, mas efetivamente realizado. O Ser se diz num mesmo sentido, mas este sentido é o do eterno retorno, como retorno ou repetição daquilo de que ele se diz. A roda no eterno retorno é, ao mesmo tempo, produção da repetição a partir da diferença e da seleção da diferença a partir da repetição" (DELEUZE, 2000, p. 51).

Se há um esvaziamento sistemático do conteúdo dinâmico ou processual do pensamento grego em favor de uma concepção estática e estável do mimesis natimorto latinizado, então poderíamos fazer bem em retornar às fontes originais e ler novamente esses antigos textos gregos em termos de uma interpretação processual — um retorno à infância do pensamento. Essas ideias foram processadas pelos escolásticos a serviço de um Deus na tradição judaico-cristã e ainda são lidas e interpretadas como desprovidas de todo movimento. No entanto, ainda precisaríamos ser cautelosos em nossas leituras até que o pensamento processual se torne uma segunda natureza para nós. Sem essa atenção, nossa leitura do grego estaria constantemente revertendo-se para traduções do latim que constituem as estruturas conceituais para as quais nos voltamos automaticamente. Ao perseguir essa linha de pensamento, descobrimos que os pensadores "contemporâneos" que pensam em termos de processo têm relações bastante estreitas com os antigos filósofos gregos com os quais compartilham afinidades conceituais, pois deles deriva todo o arquivo fundacional comum do pensamento. Eles leem e entendem a filosofia em termos

processuais e se expressam "corretamente", mas quando os lemos através do nosso pensamento latinizado, torna-se difícil conciliar as intenções dinâmicas dos textos com as interpretações estáticas que recebem. Assim, se quisermos interpretar o mundo de acordo com o pensamento processual, devemos reaprender a ler, a pensar e a viver em termos de pensamento processual. E, para isso, precisamos reposicionar nosso pensamento e os conceitos que usamos para interpretar nossa experiência ao longo de linhas processuais, não apenas na maneira como lemos os conceitos, mas na maneira como imaginamos a vida — pois como pensar em movimento e mudar uma ideação de conceitos que só estabelece o estático, o imutável e o permanente, ou no melhor dos casos pensa o processual em termos estáticos?

Por que optar por entender a vida e explicá-la em termos de seções imóveis, de cortes transversais estáticos, que não apenas deturpam a natureza do evento, mas distorcem o entendimento? Porque são conhecidos os estímulos que afetam os estáticos (ou pelo menos os visuais o são) e, para saber algo com certeza, não podem estar mudando ou se movendo — o que normalmente se diria é que eles precisam ser estáticos para serem capazes de determinar o que é. O evangelho material afirma que somente coisas imutáveis são; qualquer coisa que mude é existencialmente comprometida. Se a natureza deve ser conhecida como “o mundo como interpretado pela confiança em experiências sensoriais claras e distintas, visuais, auditivas e táteis”<sup>207</sup> (WHITEHEAD, 1966, p. 128), para que algo seja plenamente conhecido e determinado não pode estar em movimento, variando de um momento para outro. Por isso, precisamos das Leis do Pensamento a fim de proceder com certeza para o conhecimento: devemos arrestar a multiplicação de distinções infinitamente proliferantes (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1995) para saber com certeza as coisas em si. Nosso conhecimento da natureza é tornado estático — a *natura naturans* é transformada em *natura naturata* — o processual é traduzido em ideação estática. Assim, em vez de compreender ‘naturação’ da natureza como processo contínuo, como uma emergência processual imanente, como um devir-outro que acredita numa teoria ontogênica do organismo que é ecologicamente sustentada, a continuidade do devir é abstraída em passagens discretas, as quais, em termos humanos, traduzem-se nas fases da vida da infância, adolescência, idade adulta e velhice.

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<sup>207</sup> “the world as interpreted by reliance on clear and distinct sensory experiences, visual, auditory and tactile” (WHITEHEAD, 1966, p. 128).

Os estágios que conduzem ao platô da idade adulta ou que se afastam dele não são significativos em si nem imbuídos de valor, exceto em termos relativos ao adulto. Nos estágios que levam à idade adulta, a significância se encontra nas proposições de agregação de valor da ativação e atualização de potenciais, na orientação do desenvolvimento, no estabelecimento de restrições e na inculcação de certos hábitos. Nos estágios que se afastam da idade adulta, geralmente vemos a diminuição de potencial, subseqüentemente o afrouxamento da possibilidade, o enfraquecimento das faculdades, a decrepitude e, por fim, a morte. No lado ascendente, temos a criação de possíveis que produzem valor tangível; no planalto da idade adulta, temos a produção real de valor e a acumulação de mais-valia; e do lado descendente, temos a diminuição da produtividade e da extração de valor. Este processo é, obviamente, declarado em termos que refletem uma produtividade à qual um valor “efetivo” pode ser atribuído. Qual é o valor em efetivo que invocamos aqui em termos de processo? É o valor da verdade gerado pela experiência, na qual o valor em efetivo da verdade, em termos experienciais, são, nas palavras de William James, aquelas ideias que “podemos assimilar, validar, corroborar e verificar” (JAMES, 1952, p. 573) e, que, transformadas em corpos, tornam-se reais. E, como afirma Spinoza na *Ética* VP40D, “Quanto mais uma coisa é perfeita, tanto mais realidade ela tem” (SPINOZA, 2010, p. 236).

### **O avanço epistemológico do método na tese de doutorado**

Descrevemos detalhadamente o método da Sintomatologia e o Método da Intuição, bem como a necessidade de ultrapassar o pensamento imóvel e expressar o pensamento como processo, porque constituem as noções comuns fundamentais ou primitivas que definem a atividade que, para nós, constitui as práticas do doutor. E porque não se pode estar preocupado com o que não se conhece, o Método Sintomático e o Método da Intuição são as duas atividades instrumentais que constituem o andar térreo para a prática profissional do médico. Ser médico é professar o cuidado com os corpos, mas o que torna um médico “bom” não é que ele tenha um bom comportamento com o paciente, ou uma boa profissão apoiando-o, ou uma vocação para curar corpos. Ele sabe como ler corpos e sabe como fazer a coisa certa: sabe como trabalhar o clínico e o crítico daquilo que ele professa como um saber de como proceder; ele sabe o que deve ser feito no momento. E para isso ele precisa saber sobre corpos, como os corpos funcionam, como cuidar deles,

como-devolver-lhes a saúde e como evitar que os mesmos se deteriorem em problemas de saúde. Todas essas qualidades são necessárias, mas nenhuma delas funciona a menos que haja bom diagnóstico e boa interpretação. Acima de tudo, o médico deve ser capaz de ler signos e produzir signos — que é o que constitui o cerne literário ou artístico da prática — o que Deleuze chama de poética como uma militância contra a própria militância de Platão, contra os poetas na *República*.

Para mim, como *doctor*, os corpos com os quais brigo são diferentes daqueles que ocupam o médico. Transformo o crítico e o clínico em modos de pensamento ou corpos de conhecimento para ver o que se pode fazer deles, bem como o que eles podem fazer. Em contraste com o trabalho do clínico, em vez de produzir um diagnóstico, esta tese, como um problema autoimposto, deve proceder da proposição um tanto indistinta e vaga de Devir-Criança em Deleuze e Guattari e submetê-la ao funcionamento do método da intuição como um movimento em direção à generalização e ao comum — o que significaria a necessidade de desenvolver meus conceitos principais para expressá-los em termos de tempo. Conceitualmente, o Devir-Criança é dado como uma entidade inadequadamente discernida, um conceito que não foi totalmente desenvolvido e, como tal, necessita de desdobramento e articulação como um conceito empírico derivado da observação, bem como ser interpretado processualmente e transformado em ideia adequada em termos de uma noção comum.

Se o método da intuição traça um avanço que nos leva inelutável e decisivamente a uma solução específica que é, ao mesmo tempo, aberta e resolutiva, é preciso saber aplicar o método e adaptá-lo à tarefa diante de nós. O movimento aludido no método da intuição quando aplicado pelo médico a um corpo doente como uma sintomatologia é um movimento específico de determinação do conhecimento que é diferente da intuição que avança a criação ou invenção e também é diferente da intuição nas mãos do doutor acadêmico. Mesmo que o movimento geral seja o mesmo, o uso do método da intuição requer modificação ao ser aplicado à redação de uma tese. Como mencionado anteriormente, as três regras não são a lei. Eles são um código de ética ao qual o pensamento se inscreve como um particular modo de conduta dos seus assuntos para a obtenção de conhecimentos adequados, expressos nos seus termos mais inclusivos e gerais, como noções comuns.

A maneira de fornecer um relato do movimento de ideias de sua menor perfeição para uma maior perfeição é a proposição que Spinoza define para si na *Ética*. É o paradigma original “ético-estético” que traça o movimento dos afetos como estéticos, corpos sentindo, e os transforma em Ideias através da ética da intuição, em um movimento do material para o divino ou beatífico como o progresso do nosso intelecto norteado pela liberdade. Spinoza optou por sistematizar geometricamente esse movimento de compreensão como conhecimento, sapiência, que é tanto compreensão quanto sabedoria e um pragmatismo sustentável, não tanto por causa da inevitável facticidade da prova geométrica, mas de uma geometricidade que não está no método, mas na substância subjacente. E assim precisamos de outro modo de explicar a ideia que transforma a espiral vortical do movimento de convergência de ideias e atenuar a modulação interativa para uma abordagem mais linear que se identifica com uma *démarche* epistemológica mais familiar. De acordo com a “tradição” deleuziana, se podemos chamá-la assim, Spinoza propõe um programa ou método cognitivo na *Ética*, baseado nos Três Tipos de Conhecimento. Os três tipos são designados como Imaginação (*imaginatio*), Raciocínio (*ratio*) e Intuição (*intuitio*) — o primeiro é um modo empírico de conhecimento; o segundo é um modo racional; e o terceiro é um modo “comum” de cognição. Esse arcabouço lineariza o movimento do pensamento do aleatório ao adequado, do passivo ao ativo, e se insere no método de intuição de Bergson e Deleuze, pois ele próprio é um método de intuição como adequação progressiva.<sup>208</sup> Dessa forma, o sistema de Spinoza não serve só para entender como os modos de pensamento funcionam, bem como a articulação que cada um obtém, mas para diferenciar entre os três tipos de acordo com o grau de adequação, com as espécies de clareza e distinção de cada tipo de conhecimento gerado.

Ao contrário do diagnóstico do médico, que procura apenas adequar os sintomas e correlacioná-los a um corpo de conhecimento, a tese não deve apenas encarnar o conceito nebuloso e torná-lo adequado, mas deve produzir um documento que não seja apenas um desdobramento do método como um registro do processo, mas também sirva como uma trilha que outros possam seguir para alcançar a mesma intuição, com a mesma intensidade

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<sup>208</sup> Spinoza não apresenta sistematicamente seu programa de Três Tipos de Conhecimento na *Ética*, deixando um comentarista para caracterizá-lo como um “desastre desmotivado” (BENNET, 1984, p. 357), mesmo que Spinoza (*Ética* IIP40S1) se poupe ao deixar de lado essa tarefa para outro tratado posterior identificado por Curley (1985) como o *Tratado sobre a Emendação do Intelecto* (1677), que os editores da *Opera posthuma* (1677) caracterizavam como inacabado (e defeituoso).

de entendimento que o autor. O trabalho da tese deve ser uma afirmação pragmática da postulação de William James sobre “como duas mentes podem conhecer uma coisa”<sup>209</sup> e, como tal, cumpriria as aspirações pedagógicas da vocação doutoral. A tese existe como um atrator de ideias, um ponto de encontro do conhecimento, uma dobra para o pensamento, um ponto de chegada e um ponto de partida — seria um movimento de apreensão. A tese existe como um objeto monádico autocontido que fornece a articulação do encontro entre as ideias do proponente e o intelecto dos leitores. Como produto da pesquisa e síntese do pensamento do escritor, a tese representa um movimento específico que, esperamos, traduzir-se-á em um movimento semelhante de pensamento nos leitores.

Em termos de minha própria pesquisa e da exposição da expressão de Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético, isso requer que integremos a circularidade da adequação do pensamento por meio do método da intuição — através da problematização, diferenciação e temporalização — como uma prestação adequada da noção comum que permite a expressão de Devir-Criança no mais geral dos termos. Sendo assim, precisamos expressar o que o Devir-Criança pode ser de acordo com o primeiro e segundo Tipos de Conhecimento, a fim de poder expressá-lo como ideia que articula o tempo. Isso requer que consideremos o Devir-Criança de acordo com o que é tradicionalmente entendido como criança ou infância e, então articulemo-no em termos de processo imagético. Dessa forma, ao adaptarmos o método da intuição para refletir os vários modos de conhecimento e explorar as diferentes maneiras de expor o problema, examinar as diferenças e articular o “como” esse conceito cria imagens temporais em diferentes facetas do cristal do tempo, a conclusão deve ser uma expressão geral que traga à tona a noção comum permitindo a todas essas facetas ou modos de pensamento expressarem o conceito univocamente como sua natureza singular. Este é o terceiro tipo de conhecimento de Spinoza (E II.40s2.IV), o que ele chama de intuitivo, a noção comum. “E esse tipo de conhecimento procede de uma ideia adequada da essência formal de certos atributos de Deus para o conhecimento adequado da essência das coisas” (SPINOZA, 2010, p. 78). E assim, a tese é a demonstração de que o doutorando pode, de fato, produzir essa transformação do conhecimento do primeiro ou do segundo tipo para o terceiro e demonstrar ser capaz de transmiti-lo como uma defesa estruturada. Teoricamente, o título de doutor conferiria ao candidato uma capacidade publicamente

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<sup>209</sup> “How two minds can know one thing” é um texto do William James (1943) que apareceu no seu livro *Pragmatism* (1943).

reconhecida de transcender o segundo tipo de conhecimento e permitiria legitimamente engajar-se no terceiro tipo. A tese deveria então demonstrar este movimento de pensamento de uma forma intuitiva em todos os seus sentidos.

Mas aqui encontramos uma aporia quando combinamos as exigências dos saberes "restorativos" do doutor com o movimento necessário da produção de signos "alegres". Isso nos leva a um terceiro modo de pensar a intuição, aquele que articula a criatividade, faz o salto da inovação para a invenção e expressa o incomum do comum. A restauração não pode ser uma tradução estática do conhecimento, nem um reparo normativo do que está errado na educação, nem um repúdio desdenhoso à observação de que as coisas precisam ser consertadas, e sua preservação arquivística não pode ser seu embalsamamento. O que precisamos é uma manutenção vigorosa e rigorosa de políticas e instituições que sustentam o espírito de liberdade que, sem rodeios, anda de mãos dadas com o programa intuitivo e pragmático da *Ética* de Spinoza (VP10), que define o rumo que nos dará "o poder de ordenar e concatenar as afecções do corpo segundo a ordem própria do intelecto" (SPINOZA, 2010, p. 220).

Como um *devir-doctor*, também tenho que desenvolver aquelas qualidades acadêmicas e profissionais que me definirão como *doctor*, como poeta, como um *δημιουργός* (*demiurgos*), um artesão de significação. Tenho que me tornar um doutor por meio dos mesmos critérios postulados para o médico: alguém que sabe como cuidar de corpos, alguém que pode trabalhar o clínico e o crítico, aquele que pode discernir, ler e interpretar os signos. Como Deleuze aponta em *Proust e os Signos* (1964), é um aprendizado de "um homem de letras" como aquele que transcende a recordação, a (re)coleção, em uma busca do tempo perdido, porque a busca como pesquisa é mais do que um memorial recitativo que conta onde as coisas estão ou um relato da Verdade: é um aprendizado de signos a fim de poder criar o próprio tempo. O doutor acadêmico, como o médico, deve ser adepto tanto do aspecto clínico quanto do crítico, do curativo/terapêutico e o preventivo da profissão. Isso significa capacidade de integrar esse conhecimento, mas também capacidade de professá-lo. Assim, o médico acadêmico deve ser capaz de salvaguardar e defender o conhecimento através de uma produção adequada, integrando-a ao conhecimento existente por meio de sua preservação memorial arquivística e através de sua disseminação. O conhecimento clínico salvaguarda, identificando, definindo e produzindo novos conhecimentos. É adequado e ceiani ao demonstrar ao mesmo tempo uma preocupação



geral por ele. O conhecimento crítico de salvaguardas, integrando e correlacionando-o com o existente. A pedagogia propaga o conhecimento ensinando, transmitindo-o a outros, impedindo a sua obstinação na sua disseminação, preservando-o e estendendo-o para o futuro. Mas, ao realizar esses empreendimentos conservacionistas, precisamos ter certeza de que a preservação do conhecimento não se torna expressão de um dogmatismo normativo não progressivo quanto ao que é legítimo, ou o que constitui conhecimento que deve ser preservado e o que deve ser conservado. Seu foco é aberto e seu ímpeto afirmativo, alegre e criativo. Mas em algum momento, também deve se tornar anárquico e romper com o passado, e exercer suas funções de maneira puramente especulativa para ser criativo de novidade sem reservas.

Mas, de acordo com a abertura do crítico e do clínico, a incessante mobilidade da função significativa e a assunção de uma base processual para o desembolso de ideias, traímos nossas descobertas e minamos nossos conhecimentos e métodos porque quebramos a fé no conhecimento, nas Leis do Pensamento. Entendemos o dilema em que nos colocamos quando conduzimos nosso pensamento de acordo com a impermanência e a inconstância do processual e do imanente. O conhecimento do médico acadêmico, que agora se apropria de tons de *ēpistemē*, de sapientia, de uma sabedoria "científica", adquirida através de uma educação longa e árdua, busca cumprir a promessa de um conhecimento adequado do funcionamento do corpo de conhecimento. Esta educação dá a capacidade de compor com, através e com ela, a fim de transmitir suas afeições alegres. Essa educação também permite a aplicação de orientações a outras pessoas cujo corpo de conhecimento precisa de tutoria ou orientação. Esse conhecimento, que em princípio prega o cerne das coisas, ao essencial, permite ao doutor definir, identificar e integrar o conhecimento e professá-lo através da vocação tanto no sentido da vocação ética quanto na sua articulação pública, a qual implica a publicação de artigos, livros ou como parte da profissão pública deste conhecimento. E essa profissão/vocação é também o que impulsiona a constituição do conhecimento como um desejo que o sustenta como um corpo. A vocação se torna a resposta para o nossa vocação chamada profissional.

Essa articulação pública do conhecimento como vocação, da profissão do professor tem implicações significativas para o corpo de conhecimento, e para o colégio — a faculdade docente como faculdade — como a inteligência social que norteia o desdobramento do conhecimento, como o estado da arte e a manutenção do arquivo. Não há espaço para

incompatibilidade entre a preservação do corpo de conhecimento e o corpus acadêmico, uma montagem maquina composta pelo indivíduo, conhecimento, professores, sócios e o comum. A articulação pública do conhecimento como a essência da profissão do doutor torna o conhecimento público por meio de sua conta pública que está relacionada, ou seja, que é responsável perante a sociedade, em conhecimento comum: todos podem atestar seu valor como verdade, a veracidade de sua facticidade. É o valor da verdade inerente à contabilidade pública e comumente atestado pelo *blockchain*<sup>210</sup> do intelecto acadêmico como ac *Concordia facultatum* onde noções comuns, o senso comum e o bom senso são cogredientes e filosóficos (DELEUZE, 2000).

Este é um movimento altamente político, pois ao tornar públicas essas noções comuns, tornamos o conhecimento amplamente disponível e sua promulgação benéfica para todos como um recurso compartilhado. Essas palavras têm um duplo sentido e, ligando os vários aspectos do que fazem saber essencial, podem significar a revelação narrativa do conhecimento. Professar, contabilidade, relacionando-se separadamente de sua vocação como uma apresentação oral, todos apresentam um aspecto diferente do que significa disseminar o conhecimento em termos de suas implicações sociais mais amplas. Em particular, para tornar o conhecimento relacionável, o que significa relacionar, contabilizar e referenciar a capacidade de transmitir oralmente o conhecimento, mas também torná-lo racional, relacionado ao resto do corpo de conhecimento, e também permitir ao ouvinte identificar-se com o conhecimento, para se tornar um com o corpo do conhecimento. A este respeito, a narração é uma visão comum do conhecimento em termos de noções comuns.

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<sup>210</sup> “A *blockchain* (também conhecido como “o protocolo da confiança”) é uma tecnologia de registro distribuído que visa a descentralização como medida de segurança. São bases de registros e dados distribuídos e compartilhados que têm a função de criar um índice global para todas as transações que ocorrem em um determinado mercado. Funciona como um livro-razão, só que de forma pública, compartilhada e universal, que cria consenso e confiança na comunicação direta entre duas partes, ou seja, sem o intermédio de terceiros”. <https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain>

## Capítulo 2

### A Transformação da Infância em Devir

Devir-criança tem tudo e nada a ver com a infância e a criança. Há dias em que sinto que a criança e a infância fornecem a base empírica que informa o Devir-Criança e, em outros, sinto que o conceito da criança que se articula no Devir-Criança é somente uma metáfora com o fim de ilustrar um aspecto do devir processual. A “criança” simplesmente nos fornece a base intuitiva que permite descrever o “Devir-Criança” ou é o conceito do devir que fornece a chave para entender o que poderia ser o Devir-Criança? Eu tenho uma tendência a pensar que seja o segundo caso, mas também penso que não poderíamos ter chamado o conceito de "Devir-Criança" se não houvesse crianças com as quais pudéssemos articular esse aspecto específico do devir. Em termos da conceitualização do Devir-Criança, talvez se possa dizer que o Devir-Criança é mais facilmente desdobrado como um aspecto do devir processual do que como a ocupação experiencial de uma criança. E a razão pela qual escrevo isso é que, ao descrever o processo, pelo menos, no começo, temos que adotar uma predisposição intelectual para entender as coisas como impermanentes, instáveis, mutáveis; se começarmos a desconstruir ou desmontar o conceito de Devir-Criança através da criança, imediatamente nos afundamos na estabilidade, permanência e perduração estática do conceito “criança”.

Por muito tempo, possivelmente a partir dos gregos antigos, e pelo menos, desde a idade Média, a filosofia investe na ideia do conceito de uma crença de constância e permanência como base para nossa compreensão do mundo. Essa crença nos levou a uma falsa credibilidade na imutabilidade e perdurabilidade das coisas, sejam elas materiais, espirituais ou ideais. Suprimimos o que nossos sentidos nos dizem incessantemente e refutamos obstinadamente as conclusões lógicas que nossa experiência cotidiana nos leva a inferir a partir de nossas observações. Sabemos que a natureza “natureza”, que a vida é um fluxo e que a única coisa constante é a própria mudança. Ainda assim, apesar dessas afirmações, persistimos em idear a existência e a interpretar a experiência em termos de constância. Não é uma questão de aceitar ou não a mutabilidade das coisas — interpretamos nossa ocupação vital em termos que afirmamos de imutáveis e imputamos uma estagnação identitária nas coisas como se elas retivessem características essenciais

transcendentemente invariáveis e permanentes. O mesmo vale para nossas ferramentas-ideais tais como conceitos, ideias, teorias, leis e julgamentos – usamo-nas como postulações permanentes, autônomas e imutáveis, que nos permitem identificar e classificar as coisas no mundo de acordo com categorias procustianas. Se sabemos que há um entendimento melhor, por que persistimos em ver a vida em termos de imagens estáticas?

Como Bergson afirma, a existência da qual estamos mais seguros e que conhecemos melhor é inquestionavelmente a nossa. Mas, mesmo quando consideramos nossa própria existência, concebemo-nos como estados discretos em que a mudança acontece de alguma forma entre um estado e outro, na passagem de um estado para o outro. Olho-me no espelho acima de minha cômoda e não me vejo como uma mudança, mas como uma imagem que afirma que sou de fato "eu" quem está olhando para mim mesmo. E não importa o quão atentamente eu olhe para mim mesmo, não vejo a mudança ocorrer — o que percebo é a insistência de permanência estática no presente, momento em que qualquer mudança é relativizada em relação a essa imagem de mim que tornei estática na memória. Eu atribuo o fato de que estou me tornando diferente pela mesma lógica que se produz quando olho uma nuvem que muda de forma no céu: não consigo perceber a mudança contínua da nuvem mais do que posso me ver mudando. Desde a última vez que me olhei no espelho — seja 10 segundos atrás, 10 minutos atrás, 10 dias atrás, 10 meses atrás, ou 10 anos atrás — sei que tenho mudado e entendo que não sou mais quem eu tenho sido. E também posso afirmar no presente que o indivíduo olhando de volta para mim no espelho ainda é o mesmo que fui, sou e serei — conjunção de passado, presente, futuro — um eu que, pode-se dizer, é contido nessa entidade olhando-me, apesar de todas as mudanças internas e as experiências que me marcaram e resultaram em traços que diferenciam uma imagem de outra. A imagem olhando-me de volta no espelho, aquela manifestação de mudança e a rostridade afetiva em movimento, ainda sou eu — diferente a todo instante, mas ainda o mesmo.

Mas, quando me olho no espelho e procuro verificar visualmente o fato instantâneo da mudança, chego à conclusão de que é um empreendimento frívolo não mais do que tentar olhar a mudança contínua de uma nuvem. Não vejo a mudança no instante em que se produz e, sendo assim, não a percebo no momento de duração. Eu só posso comparar visualmente ou taticamente dois estados discretos e daí inferir que a mudança ocorreu, como dito anteriormente. Embora saiba que a mudança ocorreu, que está ocorrendo, e

tenho fé que ocorrerá, não posso percebê-la diretamente, devo deduzi-la. Há uma facticidade para mudar em si mesma que só pode ser averiguada a partir de seções estáticas, de fotogramas, que são então recompostas pela lógica do cinematógrafo bergsoniano e depois há a facticidade da mudança como mudança em si que passa despercebida, mas é totalmente experimentada: a renomada duração de Bergson.



Figure 2.1: Felix Rebolledo em um carrossel, ca. 1962.

Ao lado do espelho, há uma fotografia de um menino de três anos pendurada na parede (Fig. 2.1); creio ser uma foto minha... uma imagem que me captura da cabeça aos pés, montado em uma motocicleta de fantasia em um carrossel, em um parque. Aproprio-me da ideia de que sou eu na foto, mesmo que não me lembre das circunstâncias da fotografia ou de quem foi o fotógrafo. Eu só tenho uma memória nebulosa dos painéis de madeira do friso do carrossel e uma reminiscência afetiva e vaga ligada ao parque onde o carrossel se encontra. Não sei mesmo se esse afeto vago vem de uma lembrança verdadeira ou de ter olhado a foto várias vezes e querer acreditar que sou eu imortalizado. Quando estudo a fotografia, sinto uma certa distância entre o eu como observador subjetivo e o eu objeto-criança olhando para mim através do tempo. Olhar-me no espelho é, de certa maneira, diferente de olhar-me na foto: e não é só porque a fotografia é estática — tenho a mesma sensação ao assistir filmes caseiros —, mas há uma distância insuperável entre os

dois eus, uma distância que é temporal, mas que é de algum modo compreendida espacialmente. Acho difícil reconciliar as imagens no espelho e na fotografia. Eu deveria me identificar com a criança na foto, vendo que sou eu, mas na minha mente poderia ser apenas uma fotografia da infância de outra pessoa. Não me reconheço fisicamente, exceto, talvez, na expressão que tenho que ler na imagem e projetar de volta na foto com a seguinte interpretação: dois buracos negros para os olhos e um olhar interrogativo entre a perplexidade e a confusão cruzam o rosto de uma criança.

Não haveria nada mais óbvio do que dizer que a criança na foto cresceu e ficou mais velha — que o potencial da criança na fotografia está todo esgotado, se esgotou. Eu não me inscrevo nesse modo de pensar, mas não é isso o que geralmente pensamos? A imagem que olho no espelho e a imagem na foto são do mesmo saco de ossos que nasceu um dia; que um outro dia foi ao parque e teve sua foto tirada no carrossel e que cresceu, ficou velho, e agora tem um pé no túmulo. O eu jovem da foto e o eu no presente estão conectados por uma linha contínua e ininterrupta; uma linha que é temporal, mas não é o próprio tempo. A linha é uma expressão figurativa da continuidade que mantém a minha existência corpórea como uma individuação desde antes de nascer até a dissolução final do meu corpo e além. Entre a divisão meiótica inicial e a dispersão final dos componentes constitutivos, estes elementos que se agregam em uma *individualização* perduram como conjunto por um período de tempo, uma duração, até sua dispersão e participação em outras individuações. O fundamental aqui é a continuidade — a existência aparentemente ininterrupta que se estende entre as duas imagens e o eu que escreve estas frases. A significância dessas duas imagens estáticas que "representam" os pontos finais se entende de duas maneiras: as duas imagens marcam a diferença que constitui a separação, ou as duas imagens identificam a separação dentro e através da qual a diferença ocorreu e, a partir dessas duas imagens pictóricas, podemos qualificar e quantificar essa mudança ocorrida. Aquilo que separa as duas imagens é preenchimento indeterminado, facilmente descartável: o que conta é a linha de fundo. A experiência pessoal é irrelevante, redundante, não essencial, porque o que realmente importa saber não é a experiência em si, mas o resultado, o legado, o valor acumulado como atestação final da conclusão.

Essa perduração como um todo autônomo não é tão óbvia para definir e nem é a constituição do agenciamento em si mesma como uma unidade — a questão "o que é um corpo?" Não é tão prontamente respondida! Essa perduração, que deve ser vista como

duração, como multiplicidade, como um devir incessante é o que está em jogo aqui. É simplesmente aquilo contido pelo envelope limitante da pele? Ou é a organização de componentes em um todo coerente? Ou será que, como Spinoza certa vez perguntou, o que um corpo pode fazer?

Eu nunca parei para pensar na foto. Simplesmente interpretei que era eu quando minha irmã entregou-me a foto: "Encontrei esta foto sua em uma caixa de sapatos". Não tendo uma certa lembrança de ter tirado a foto naquele dia, não tenho certeza se a criança na fotografia é ou não a mesma 'entidade' olhando para mim hoje no espelho, mas há algo no rosto dela, sua expressão facial, que permite identificar. Eu sempre pensei em mim mesmo como tendo tido uma infância feliz, e de ser uma criança extrovertida e alegre. Eu nunca me considerei uma criança rabugenta ou particularmente pensativa ou introspectiva, então eu não me reconheço totalmente na aparência facial da criança. Aos três anos de idade em um carrossel, a criança na foto deve ter pelo menos um semblante feliz ou um semblante de sorriso, e não uma expressão desconcertada de *cogitatus interruptus*. A fotografia é simplesmente premonitória da imagem no espelho! Não é tanto a fisionomia com a qual me identifico, mas a carranca ambígua que se entrelaça em uma aparência de inquietante preocupação. Hoje, ainda reconheço o limiar expressivo que surge em fotografias minhas, de modo que com o que me identifico é a transitoriedade fora de foco da expressão. Então, aceito com relutância que sou eu olhando para o futuro da estase do passado; que, no instante em que o instantâneo é tirado, a vida, o movimento dos planetas, o carrossel e eu chegamos a um impasse. Meu reconhecimento interpretativo dubitativo não é tão prontamente satisfatório quanto um reconhecimento direto da semelhança física poderia ter sido ou se eu tivesse uma memória específica do evento. Mas é a indefinida incerteza do fluxo fugaz de expressão que oferece uma certeza mais convincente. Perceptivamente, em frente à fotografia e diante do espelho, eu possuo duas imagens visuais estáticas da mesma "coisa" individual, mas não consigo reconciliar totalmente a fenda para encontrar o movimento contínuo que une os dois — seria impossível traçar a conexão experiencial que reconcilia os dois. Não há trilha memorial do evento além da fotografia e nenhuma narrativa coerente e contínua em minha mente entre o passado e o agora. Em uma imagem, sou jovem e, na outra, sou velho: pólos opostos de uma continuidade processual que encontra reconciliação no platô da meia-idade da idade adulta ou na inevitável dissolução final resultante — ainda assim, persisto em considerar as duas

imagens como representações pictóricas da "mesma" entidade objetiva como fases diferentes do mesmo *ser* humano.

As duas imagens estão manifestamente conectadas; o eu corpóreo no presente é claramente aquilo que articula a relação entre as duas imagens. Há uma distância intransponível entre as duas imagens visuais, uma distância que é temporal mas que, de certo modo, é compreendida espacialmente, mas, por enquanto, permanecemos conectados através da continuidade do espaço-tempo proporcionada pela concretude da experiência. A comparação não é 'entre' o aqui e agora e o lá no passado — a comparação acontece em termos de polaridade de pontos estáticos, de imagens fixas que demarcam um antes e um depois de uma passagem de tempo mais ou menos definida. É uma passagem que ocorre através do eu que é um corpo; é através do meu corpo que essas imagens estão ligadas e que estabelecem essa linha de tempo. Esse 'entre' é de outra ordem.

Agora, ao descrever essas imagens como "o mesmo ser humano", podemos interpretar a palavra "ser" como substantivo ou como verbo. Ambos tipos de "ser" podem ser interpretados como entidades perduráveis, mas o modo como o fazem é diferente: um é um indivíduo que perdura, uma entidade humana, uma *individualização* — um ser como objeto que não passa — um ser que é, porque o que indica o que é, não muda; e o ser como atividade contínua que aceita essa dimensão de mudança, não uma coisa que existe, mas uma existência de tipo humana, uma *individuação* — uma existência, um fato de ser, um fato de viver, um ente processual que continuamente experiencia mudanças através da transição contínua na sua duração. Ambos podem ser entendidos como corpos, como a essência expressiva da natureza humana, como o caráter inerente geral da humanidade. Ambos são o "eu transcendente", mas a diferença na maneira como esses dois aspectos do ser incorporam-se e expressam-se é o que está no cerne de minha tese. Colocar a questão de saber se a criança na fotografia é ou não a mesma 'entidade' olhando para mim no espelho hoje é erroneamente postular o problema, a menos que estejamos unicamente interessados em verificar se aquela criança na fotografia é de fato o autor. Nem a criança nem o homem são realidades perfeitas — e identificando a individuação diante de nós, primeiro como Félix, depois como criança e depois como homem, estamos apenas erradicando a produção da diferença, a criação do movimento, a facticidade do processo. Negamos a realidade da mudança, a veracidade maquínica do fluxo, aplicando rótulos aparentemente rígidos a um evento cuja natureza é caracteristicamente mutável. Bergson (2018) diria que esses rótulos



não são realidades em si, mas designações de pontos de vista ou perspectivas que nossa mente assume uma realidade que está mudando. O mesmo vale para todas as fases do desenvolvimento — infância, adolescência, idade adulta e velhice — seções imóveis que a mente tem de uma realidade que é objetivada e passa. Veremos que essa imobilização não é apenas perceptiva e que a perspectivação não é apenas visual, mas que ambas participam diretamente da produção da memória como processo imagético.

Tradicionalmente, a perduração que é considerada uma vida é vista como uma sucessão de estágios de desenvolvimento que definem fases de consistência composicional ou platôs de coerência operacional — raramente é estudada como uma continuidade orgânica nas ciências sociais. As fases de uma vida são definidas por categorizações aparentemente rígidas que são facilmente aplicadas e nem sempre prontamente descartadas. E estes estágios que parecem naturais, estáveis e universais, são na verdade bastante arbitrários, instáveis e culturalmente egoístas e com essas categorizações torna-se difícil acomodar a possibilidade de retratar a contínua mudança de natureza do fluxo — talvez essa seja a razão que Bergson predicou muito de sua filosofia vitalista no estudo da biologia? Mas deve ser um dos principais dogmas da biologia que não é o espécimen individual que tem valor através da repetição da criação da mesma entidade, mas a repetição do processo como a sustentabilidade recorrente do organismo — o produto final como um todo. A individualização é relevante, mas somente quando vista como o resultado da repetição de um processo anônimo que encontra sua sustentabilidade em sua capacidade de se reproduzir de novo. Nunca é uma questão de perpetuar o indivíduo, mas de sustentar o sustento.

A criança na foto é uma espécie de anúncio que prenuncia um futuro — um potencial a ser atualizado — e a pessoa diante do espelho é o cumprimento manifesto das possibilidades que foram atualizadas. Da mesma forma, a fotografia da criança é uma representação pictórica desse potencial encorpado e a imagem no espelho é o registro do acúmulo dos traços deixados pela atualização das possibilidades desse potencial. A imagem da criança serve como referência ou base com a qual podemos comparar e determinar a diferença subsequente. Qualquer imagem futura será comparada a esta, e assim poderemos passar de uma imagem estática para outra, de modo que, teoricamente, se tivéssemos fotografias suficientes, poderíamos reconstituir minha história pessoal como uma superposição serial de imagens — um filme documentário de minha vida. Não há rastro

existente que trace a conexão experiencial reconciliando os dois; não há um traço contínuo como um registro que se desenrola, apenas a crista quebrada da onda do devir cuja rostidade está espiando para fora do espelho.

No entanto, se nos tirarmos do laço, e olharmos para este "ser" em termos de processo anônimo, como uma dinâmica de reciclagem genérica de seus componentes atômicos ou moleculares, um bebê emerge do potencial do "nada" indiferenciado da confusão pré-individual, torna-se criança, atinge a idade adulta e permanece lá por vários anos, "curtindo" a maturidade da vida adulta e a realização dos potenciais da infância, gradualmente passa para a velhice, decai e torna-se decrépita e retorna a um conjunto comum de potencial puro indiferenciado. O círculo é ancorado no fundo em potencial puro e diametralmente oposto no topo, é a idade adulta, a expressão do auge do que significa ser humano. Para ser coerente com a convenção conveniente da passagem do tempo como 'horário', expressamos nosso ciclo processual em termos de uma circularidade quebrada recorrente onde colocamos a transformação de criança para adulto na esquerda como ascendente, idade adulta em o apogeu, e no lado direito descendente o retorno ao potencial. Assim, em termos do fluxo de potencial do organismo, temos todo o potencial inerente à infância no fundo; no ascendente, lado esquerdo, o desenvolvimento transformacional da realização do potencial na possibilidade da infância, a consumação progressiva do potencial como uma contínua retirada da possibilidade da idade adulta, que produz a perduração maquínica da possibilidade e segue um retorno decrescente das expectativas e realização. Mas agora, onde quarenta são os novos sessenta e sessenta são os novos quarenta, chega um ponto em que o potencial e a possibilidade são vendidos a descoberto e considerados exauridos, ainda que, na verdade, isso só ocorra à morte, para toda a vida, é um devir e, assim, o exercício da atualização dos potenciais. Esses potenciais que surgem imanentemente com nosso devir não podem ser os potenciais que desejamos realizar, mas são o que está disponível para nós quando cumprimos nosso destino como uma entidade biológica que tem começo, meio e fim.

No entanto, essa concepção do ser humano toma como modelo que a criança é um reservatório de potencial inexplorado, que se exaure, se esgota e é consumido pela vida — como se esse potencial fosse algum tipo de moeda que pode ser desperdiçada ou capitalizada. O que importa é a atualização do potencial. O corpo é seu imediatismo e não o contrário. Bob Dylan só compreende pela metade quando ele canta em *It's Alright, Ma (I'm*

*only Bleeding*<sup>211</sup> que "ele não está ocupado em nascer está ocupado morrendo" (Dylan, 1965). Todos nós de alguma forma esquecemos que o processo de declínio, decrepitude e dissolução é o que fortalece o surgimento da novidade. E essa mudança do nascer para o morrer é o mesmo movimento de passagem processual, da mudança preensiva do objetivo para o subjetivo, do sentimento whiteheadiano que veremos no Capítulo 3 como parte do processo imagético.

Estes aspectos de ser-corpo também podem ser lidos como um aspecto do devir de um corpo. Essa perduração como um todo independente e autossuficiente não se pode definir tão obviamente — a questão 'o que é um corpo?' não é tão prontamente respondida! É simplesmente aquele contido pelo envelope limitante da pele? Ou é, como Spinoza perguntou, o que um corpo pode fazer? Ou é a organização de componentes em um todo coerente? Ou, possivelmente, uma seleção imanente que compõe um conjunto maquínico com certa perduração? Ou é apenas uma dobra após outra ao infinito? Também podemos olhar para o lado oposto e perguntar o que um corpo fez com esse potencial que se esconde no que um corpo pode fazer? O que aconteceu entre a fotografia da criança no carrossel e o velho olhando para o espelho? Por que pensamos que o potencial implícito na criança se esgota em um futuro indeterminado no ser adulto, e não em termos de potencial aberto sempre nos oferecendo novos potenciais? Por que medimos a mudança a partir de um desdobramento subjetivo, de uma subjetividade fora de nós que nos olha e que nos transforma em objeto, e não através da atualização de possibilidades que nos trazem novos potenciais e realizações diferentes? O corpo espinosista nos informaria da diferença em um corpo através do que esse corpo pode ou não pode fazer! A diferença produzida pela mudança de um corpo ainda seria uma dedução, mas agora uma intuição derivada da diferença entre o que o corpo não podia fazer anteriormente e o que o corpo agora pode fazer e vice-versa.

Uma forma de reconstituir a procissão experiencial interveniente às duas imagens é voltar em busca do tempo perdido e produzir uma série de quadros proustianos, um acima do outro como camadas memoriais que se fundem uma à outra, constituindo uma narrativa baseada na fala do essencial da minha vida. Ou posso voltar para a caixa de sapatos das imagens-lembrança e literalmente recriar uma história pictórica da minha vida como

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<sup>211</sup> "Está bem, mãe (estou apenas sangrando)", (Tradução do autor).

montagem cinematográfica. Mas sabemos que essa montagem cinematográfica perceptual, linguística ou imagética, precisaria de outra montagem a fim de garantir o movimento do avanço da imagem do pensamento. De qualquer maneira, minha reconstituição do passado torna-se uma busca, uma pesquisa, uma pesquisa-criação do passado: “Chercher? Pas seulement: créer” (Proust, 1987, p. 143). O resultado dessa busca é, muitas vezes, uma narrativa sequencial disso, que é depois, uma reconstrução histórica de tableaux estáticos: A aconteceu, depois B, e depois C... e assim organizados em série, acabamos com uma reconstituição da passagem do tempo. E se passamos esses tableaux de maneira suficientemente rápida, ainda podemos continuar a pensar que a passagem de tempo é construída assim. Mas se tomarmos Proust em sua palavra e buscarmos como o tempo se perdeu, tornamos o problema deleuziano e ficamos com um empreendimento diferente — a busca pela procissão experiencial como processo genérico. Buscamos não um quê?, nem um porquê?, mas um como?

Dessa forma, procuramos entender o processual em termos fundados numa dinâmica de interação caracterizada como imagética e contínua. Para Bergson, as imagens são definidas como uma dinâmica de ação-reação separada por uma indeterminação; os corpos estão compostos de imagens; e os corpos são o resultado de uma agregação de ação e reação. O Devir-Criança designa uma modalidade imagética desse incorporamento subjetivo processual e é esse devir que estamos procurando investigar. Esta tese, O Devir-Criança como processo imagético, propõe uma abordagem alternativa para a compreensão dos conceitos da criança e da infância através de uma interpretação processual do devir e do Devir-Criança. O objetivo desta tese é, sobretudo, chegar a uma compreensão da experiência como devir processual e expressá-la em termos imagéticos; em segundo lugar, expressar o conceito da experiência do Devir-Criança em termos processuais segundo três modalidades: molar, molecular e como fase geral do devir processual. Procuramos mostrar o processo imagético e como ele constitui a experiência processual. Para fazer isso, construímos esses conceitos no meio de uma filosofia do processo e de uma filosofia da diferença articulada como duracional. Colocamos o processo como interatividade imagética, baseando-nos no pensamento processual de Bergson, Deleuze e Simondon que identifica a imagem como um conjunto dinâmico de ação e reação. O processo imanente que emerge da interação imagética é simultaneamente incorporado e perceptivo e é denominado devir.

## O Devir-criança como conceito

Deleuze afirma repetidamente ao longo da sua obra que a tarefa do filósofo é criar conceitos. No entanto, ele não nos deixa uma maneira sistemática de como fazê-lo. E também não especificou onde localizar uma criação de conceitos. No entanto, temos uma descrição detalhada do que é um conceito para ele (e para o Felix Guattari) em *O que é a Filosofia?* (1992) e um desenvolvimento intuitivo do que um tema poderia ser de outra forma em *Mil Platôs* (1980). Apesar do profuso desenvolvimento do pensamento sobre conceitos, o conceito ainda é considerado, habitualmente, como uma unidade de pensamento que permite a organização do conhecimento sobre um campo em questão (CABRÉ, 1999). Tradicionalmente, estaríamos satisfeitos em apreender a intenção de um conceito: sua quantidade ou conteúdo interno como a soma dos atributos contidos nele — a fim de que “possamos obter seu número”,<sup>212</sup> ou *chiffre*, para que possamos categorizar o devir do conceito — o conceito é ordinal ou cardinal? relativo ou absoluto? atômico ou substancial? fragmentado ou contínuo? É uma representação que permite que se faça uma distinção entre as que são postuladas propositalmente. Em termos do Devir-Criança, desejamos averiguar como o conceito conceitualiza, a fim de que possamos verificar que nossa definição processual de Devir-Criança, é, de fato, tão alentada quanto qualquer ideação tradicional, não processual. Se o modelo imagético de Devir-Criança, que desejamos desenvolver vai significar algo, então devemos definir o que é em termos de um conceito.

Podemos dividir a palavra conceito, do latim *conceptus*, em duas partes — "con/com" e "ceptus" — e prontamente entender que a explicação da palavra "conceito" se baseia no prefixo "juntos" de "con/com" e a raiz '-ceptus', que significa captar. Isso apresenta o conceito como perceptual, tanto no sentido visual quanto no manual ou tátil. De modo que o conceito é a entidade que captura em conjunto, que se apropria em conjunto. Nesse caso, o relato tradicional nos permitiria elaborar o conceito de conceito como uma expansão do tema radical e a dilatação da amplitude da variação nas descrições de juntar e capturar “a inseparabilidade das variações é o próprio do conceito

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<sup>212</sup> Em inglês, a frase informal “*To have someone’s number*” (Ter o número de alguém) significa entender completamente as motivações de alguém, ter uma visão de seus pensamentos, ações e caráter. Mas também pode ter um significado filosófico que é invocado em toda a obra de Deleuze como parte de sua matematização da filosofia. O número do conceito remonta à filosofia pitagórica e à teoria dos números platônicos.

incondicionado” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1992, p. 163). Poderíamos adotar uma abordagem de senso comum para a análise de cada palavra e problematizá-la infinitamente, simplesmente fazendo seis perguntas simples: quem? quê? quando? onde? por quê? e como? No entanto, isso representaria uma maneira ingênua de analisar o conceito de conceito — precisaríamos de uma abordagem mais sistemática e técnica, contudo ainda precisaríamos responder a essas questões.

O velho ditado afirmando que "familiaridade gera desprezo", possivelmente estava se referindo à questão do que é um conceito. Nossa relação com o conceito é muito parecida com a nossa relação com o tempo, como explicado por Santo Agostinho: “O que então é o tempo? Se ninguém me perguntar, eu sei o que é. Se eu quiser explicar para quem pergunta, eu não sei”. Existe uma familiaridade no uso de conceitos que ofusca o que exatamente um conceito é ou faz. Como o construto fundamental nas teorias da mente e da cognição, o conceito enquanto conceito, é colocado em forma de uma ideia que é triangulada dentro do uso idiomático da linguagem, como um termo cuja definição não é frequentemente nem distinta nem adequada. Um conceito mal definido não pode ser definido com precisão ou determinação — sua natureza essencial carece de resolução. Tradicionalmente, essa falta de definição é entendida em termos espaciais e refere-se a limites mal definidos que resultam em limites mal delimitados e uma extensão indeterminada. Mas essa falta de distinção também pode ser entendida em termos ópticos como uma falta de foco ou como uma resolução deficiente. No primeiro, a imagem não é clara nem indefinida e, no segundo, a análise é muito grosseira, de modo que, quando o conceito não é distintivo, ele é confuso de duas maneiras: seus elementos componentes são misturados e indistinguíveis entre si e através deles mesmos e não são nem resolvidos, determinados, definidos como entidades conceituais em si mesmas e em relação aos outros elementos. O conceito se estende sob ou através de uma série de elementos constitutivos, de noções, que explicam sua natureza essencial e participam em outras séries como elemento constituinte. As sínteses são adequadas se puderem enumerar propositalmente as noções constituintes e explicá-las de forma recursiva à medida que se tornam uma série delas. Esse tipo de análise serial recursivo é quase interminável porque “nós chamamos uma noção de adequada, não quando a enumeração de marcas subordinadas foi levada para o mais distante, mas quando elas foram enumeradas suficientemente para nosso propósito atual” (THOMSON, 1866, p. 92). Hoje, poderíamos reformular isso em termos de um nível de

tolerância quanto ao que poderíamos considerar adequado para aferir o grau de primitividade das noções constituintes de um conceito. Em termos de conceitualizar o Devir-Criança, quicá se possa afirmar que o Devir-Criança é mais facilmente desdobrado como um aspecto do devir processual do que como a ocupação experiencial da criança. Ao descrever o processual, pelo menos, temos uma predisposição intelectual para entender as coisas como impermanentes, instáveis, mutáveis.

Neste capítulo, desejamos explorar o que é tornar-se criança em termos da criança. Começamos por postular uma definição convencional de infância e demonstrá-la como inadequada em uma abordagem processual. A partir de um desdobramento da concepção recebida do humano, mostramos essa definição como deficiente em termos de conteúdo e em termos de sua constituição formal em relação ao mundo. Além disso, indicamos questões epistemológicas e linguísticas que impedem a possibilidade de propor concepções alternativas. Damos a definição do devir através da composição da criança como o co-surgimento imanente da organização e da experiência e chegamos à conclusão de que a melhor maneira de explicar esse processo é de modo imagético.

Em 2008, em uma introdução aos Estudos da Infância, encontramos um crescente corpo da literatura que “aponta para a importância da infância como uma categoria conceitual e como uma posição social para o estudo de um grupo anteriormente negligenciado ou marginalizado — crianças” (KEHILY, 2008, p. 1). Considerar as crianças ignoradas e marginalizadas é uma afirmação inquietante: o atraso histórico em perceber e reconhecer a privação de direitos dentro de abordagens socioculturais e iniciativas institucionais é inconcebível, mas não surpreendente. Do mesmo modo que muitos conceitos preocupam aos progressistas de que a experiência humana pode ser como outra, passou muito tempo para a criança e a infância serem reconhecidas por si mesmas. O desinteresse relativo às crianças diminuiu, à medida que a relevância das categorias dominantes e dos conceitos universais caíram em descrédito. Como Samantha Frost (2016) afirma, “as características, qualidades e capacidades que foram tomadas para definir e distinguir um humano, a humanidade — o humano — foram tão profundamente desacreditadas através de análises históricas, sociais e científicas que a própria noção parece estar falida, com muito pouco para recomendar” (2016, p. 1). Mas é nesse enquadramento desacreditado que o conceito de criança e infância passaram a ser definidos e permanecem ainda validados em diversos campos do saber.

## **Uma variedade de modelos conceituais**

O desdobramento conceitual da infância é complexo não só na sua definição como categoria de experiência, mas também na sua explicação histórica e na sua comparação intercultural (DINTER, e SCHNEIDER, 2018; STEARNS, 2016; KEHILY, 2008; GAITÁN-MUÑOZ, 2006; PROUT, 2004; JAMES e JAMES, 2004). A infância é um conceito construído que existe na interseção de uma variedade de disciplinas (psicologia, sociologia, antropologia, literatura, direito, educação, medicina, geografia, artes, etc.) e campos de pesquisa, não podendo ser entendido ou interpretado através de uma única lente disciplinar. Oferecer uma definição de infância que satisfaça os critérios impostos por tais disciplinas que têm uma participação no conceito, simplesmente o reduz ao seu denominador mais simples e à sua ideação ao mais comum do senso: como o estágio da vida humana entre o nascimento e a puberdade — há desentendimento como se a infância devesse ser excluída e a puberdade fosse cedo demais para pôr fim à infância.

Também não há uma concepção consistente da infância que possa ser traçada através da história ou de uma cultura para outra (STEARNS, 2016; WYNESS, 2012; JENKINS, 1998) e, assim, não se pode oferecer uma concepção consistentemente transmitida ao longo do tempo ou comum a todas as culturas: não há compreensão homogênea da infância que possa ser aplicada para descrever a experiência dentro de uma cultura, nem mesmo se for transcultural. Foi apenas no final do século 20 que os paradigmas da infância formulados no ocidente foram desenvolvidos por instituições governamentais, acadêmicas e de mídia e amplamente divulgados e impostos 'de cima para baixo' como normas, padrões globais do que a experiência da infância é ou deveria ser. Esta concepção uniforme da infância leva à obliteração das culturas infantis globalmente: julga a infância de culturas não-ocidentais como insuficiente ou inferior, homogeneiza a compreensão da experiência da infância e diminui a diferença, pela substituição de culturas locais indígenas por imagens de propaganda de massa e consumismo. Mas essa colonização da infância e da homogeneização da experiência não é reservada a nações não desenvolvidas ou subdesenvolvidas, é liberalmente doada ao Ocidente hiperdesenvolvido como uma uniformidade comercial e corporativa de uma visão consumista idealizada do mundo.



A infância tem sido principalmente definida pelos adultos e pelas instituições, mas qualquer definição é sempre tênue e polêmica não só por causa das barreiras disciplinares e dos imperativos de pesquisas, mas também porque a infância é uma experiência fundamental muito singular. A formulação cartesiana, por exemplo, afirma que todos sabemos o que é pensar, temos uma ideia do que é a infância, pois todos fomos crianças em algum momento, tivemos filhos e frequentemente observamos, interagimos e nos relacionamos com as crianças. Isso reflete a fenda entre as várias concepções teóricas da infância e a experiência da própria infância que desafia a normalização ou a codificação. Para superar este dilema, a infância como conceito vem a ser construída como um agregado de características representativas ou atributos do que envolve o ser criança em si mesmo, de maneira que tenta satisfazer uma formulação teórica com as experiências pessoais (WOODHEAD, 2008; JAMES e PROUT, 1997; JENKS, 1996; FRAME e MATSON, 1987).

Woodhead (2008) mantém o paradigma da construção da infância como um fenômeno social, mas enfatiza uma abordagem interdisciplinar que exige uma maior consideração dos papéis das crianças em sua formulação. Para ele, o desenvolvimento das crianças também é um processo social e cultural que exige lidar com várias versões da infância em diferentes contextos e lidar com demandas conflitantes de relações sociais e atividades compartilhadas que envolvem seus próprios códigos, línguas, economias, sociedades, rituais e ritos de comemoração. Para Woodhead, a infância é abertamente e intensamente política e prospera dentro de discursos de poder, de regulação, de mídia, de classe, de controle, de saúde, de gênero e de não-conformidade de gênero, que agora incluem discursos LGBTQ, abuso de substâncias, violência, sexualidade, delinquência, comunicação, entretenimento, cognição e monetização de todos os aspectos da vida. E esses temas precisam ser estudados não apenas como aspectos da ecologia experiencial da criança que condicionam a experiência e afetam a vida das crianças, mas que constituem sua própria experiência pessoal imediata.

As definições institucionais da infância são geralmente baseadas nas necessidades primárias das crianças, seus direitos básicos e seus melhores interesses. Embora de acordo com Woodhead (1997), o discurso sobre essas "necessidades básicas" forneça um poderoso dispositivo retórico para construir versões da infância, ele foi desacreditado por inculcar modelos prescritivos ocidentais e foi devidamente substituído por um discurso centrado nas crianças e nos direitos das crianças. A Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre os Direitos da

Criança (UNCRC — UN 1989) baseia seus princípios juridicamente vinculativos destinados a proteger e promover o bem-estar das crianças nas áreas da saúde, educação e família articulados em termos de direitos à proteção, à provisão, à prevenção e à participação — a fim de poder avaliar a infância conforme a qualidade de vida (KEHILY, 2008). A UNCRC oferece ampla margem para a aplicação de leis para a construção da infância em termos legais. Assim, foi implementada legislação em jurisdições mais restritas que se servem destas iniciativas jurídicas para a elaboração e aplicação de regulamentação específica ao cumprimento dos direitos das crianças: o controle e prevenção de abuso infantil, exploração laboral, violência doméstica e supervisão da justiça juvenil que reflete costumes e cultura, história, religião ou qualquer outro imperativo local.

As crianças ainda são retratadas em termos que perpetuam *normas prescritivas* articuladas dentro de classificações estáticas estritas e normalizadas. No desenvolvimentismo, a infância é comparada com normas procrustianas<sup>213</sup> e avaliadas de acordo com marcos de desenvolvimento e estruturas predefinidas, que compartimentalizam desenvolvimento físico, habilidades motoras, capacidades cognitivas, habilidades linguísticas, normas de comportamento, restrições sociais, disposições sexuais e identidade de gênero. O desenvolvimento refere-se tanto ao processo como ao resultado concreto deste processo, bem como aos passos intermediários para o desdobramento mais completo da forma de realização. O desenvolvimento representa o processo ou movimento em direção à produção de uma força natural, energia ou nova forma de matéria — um corpo — como um empreendimento dinâmico que leva a algo ou é comparado a uma realização idealizada. É caracterizada como uma evolução de uma condição elementar que contém certos potenciais latentes ou capacidades que emergem de dentro, crescem com o tempo e culminam na permanência da estase. O desenvolvimento, portanto, tem uma origem genética que se desdobra organicamente como um avanço gradual através de estágios progressivos marcados por *benchmarks* e critérios padronizados de acordo com normas e objetivos pré-estabelecidos.

Como uma série pré-programada de especificações e de marcos de desenvolvimentos destinada a um objetivo abstrato, a infância é dividida em fases ou etapas

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<sup>213</sup> Do personagem da mitologia grega, Procrustes (Προκρούστης *Prokroustes*) que visava produzir uniformidade por métodos violentos e arbitrários; impondo uniformidade ou conformidade sem levar em conta a variação natural ou individualidade.

ontogenéticas dissociadas que qualificam todos os aspectos da vida de uma criança de acordo com normas quantificáveis: física, motora, cognitiva, linguagem, expressão de gênero, habilidades emocionais e sociais, como maneira de controlar e disciplinar sua natureza indeterminável. Essas normas padronizam a infância em termos de "normalidade" estatística estudada que define formas sociais típicas, o que é saudável e aceitável não apenas como medidas ou indicadores, mas como uma arregimentação à qual os domínios públicos e sociais se inscrevem para a intervenção e regulação social (TURMEL, 2008). Dessa forma através de sua observação, registro, mensuração, comparação e codificação, o corpo da criança é avaliado e medido e se torna uma mercadoria para várias instituições: educacionais, sociais, políticas, farmacêuticas, médicas, judiciais, psicanalíticas, midiáticas, comerciais, desportivas, etc.

Embora o apogeu do paradigma desenvolvimentista tenha durado de 1850 a 1945 (TURMEL, 2008), ainda é um modo influente de pensar a infância, porque está ligado ao pensamento nas ciências sociais que compreende todas as formas de progresso social como desenvolvimentista. Porém, mesmo que seja atualmente uma teoria fora de moda, o desenvolvimentismo está passando por um ressurgimento graças ao trabalho de Gray e MacBlain (2015), que traz uma mudança paradigmática para a forma como o desenvolvimentismo é entendido por meio do processo. Diferentes aspectos do desenvolvimento exigem diferentes abordagens. E, embora a psicologia prefira uma abordagem eclética para explicar o processo, existem várias teorias do desenvolvimento que abordam questões específicas: Teoria Comportamental; Teorias psicanalíticas; Teoria Humanística; Teoria Cognitiva; Teoria Ecológica; Teoria Sociocultural. Cada um desses modelos ou teorias de desenvolvimento pode, por sua vez, ser classificado de acordo com critérios que os caracterizam conforme estruturas conceituais que enfatizam características salientes, composição, qualidades, funções, comportamentos ou expressões, mas não tentam oferecer uma abordagem completa e sistemática como explicação da infância. A teoria do desenvolvimento representa uma maneira de pensar quase atraente a partir da qual predicar a expressão processual do Devir-Criança, porque, como um ponto de partida para o processo "não mapeado", já é concebido em termos dinâmicos. O trabalho de Jean Mater Mandler (2004) (com Cristobal Pagán Cánovas, 2014) sobre estruturas cognitivas dinâmicas e sua introdução de primitivos espaciais, esquemas imagéticos e integrações esquemáticas representa uma aproximação entre as ideias do desenvolvimento recebidas e

o que uma teoria processual do desenvolvimento poderia possivelmente ser. Mais recentemente, Lerner e Overton (2014, 2017) têm trabalhado dentro de uma estrutura de sistemas de desenvolvimento relacional (*Relational Development Systems*) que se move em direção à expressão do desenvolvimento como processo.

<b>VIII</b>	<b>MATURIDADE</b>								<b>INTEGRIDADE DO EGO VS. DESESPERO</b>
<b>VII</b>	<b>IDADE ADULTA</b>							<b>GENERATIVIDADE VS. ESTAGNAÇÃO</b>	
<b>VI</b>	<b>IDADE ADULTA JOVEM</b>					<b>INTIMIDADE VS. ISOLAMENTO</b>			
<b>V</b>	<b>PUBERDADE E ADOLESCÊNCIA</b>				<b>IDENTIDADE VS. CONFUSÃO DE PAPEL</b>				
<b>IV</b>	<b>LATÊNCIA</b>			<b>INDÚSTRIA VS. INFERIORIDADE</b>					
<b>III</b>	<b>LOCOMOTOR-GENITAL</b>		<b>INICIATIVA VERSUS CULPA</b>						
<b>II</b>	<b>MUSCULAR-ANAL</b>	<b>AUTONOMIA VS. VERGONHA E DÚVIDA</b>							
<b>I</b>	<b>ORAL SENSORIAL</b>	<b>CONFIANÇA BÁSICA VS. DESCONFIANÇA</b>							
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>

Figura 2.2: As oito idades do homem de Erikson. *Infância e Sociedade* (1971).

Para se afastar de definições conceituais prescritivas, enquadradas pelos adultos e impostas verticalmente, James e Prout (1997) propõem um paradigma sociológico construído em torno de um conjunto de relações sociais dentro das quais os primeiros anos da vida humana são constituídos, não como uma formulação de um adulto em construção, mas como uma concepção centrada na criança. Neste modelo, que se distancia de outras concepções possíveis, a infância é entendida como uma construção social e como uma variável da análise social. Ele afirma que as relações sociais e culturas das crianças são dignas de estudo em termos próprios, no sentido de que são independentes do olhar e das preocupações dos adultos porque não são apenas os sujeitos passivos de estruturas e

processos sociais. O paradigma apoia uma metodologia etnográfica para o estudo da infância como um fenômeno em relação ao qual o duplo hermenêutico das ciências sociais da reconciliação da estrutura e da agência está agudamente presente — proclamar um novo paradigma da sociologia da infância também seria se engajar a um processo de reconstrução da infância na sociedade.

### **Devir-criança como diagrama ou o diagrama do Devir-criança**

Em seu estudo clássico *Infância e Sociedade* (1950, trad. 1971), Erikson propõe um diagrama epigenético (Figura 2.2) que ilustra o funcionamento dos estágios da infância como a sequência normativa dos ganhos psicossociais feitos em cada estágio (ERIKSON, 1971). É uma grade de 8 x 8 em que a abcissa é rotulada de 1-8 para denotar seus ‘oito estágios da vida humana’ e a ordenada identifica as ‘oito controvérsias correspondentes’. Sua estrutura, que se baseia fortemente na teoria psicanalítica, baseia-se em uma sequência de estágios de desenvolvimento que ele chama de "Oito Idades do Homem".<sup>214</sup> Organizadas como uma série, elas abrangem todo o ciclo de vida humana e cada uma delas articula uma “força essencial” específica como controvérsia. Estes incluem: Confiança Básica vs. Desconfiança (Esperança), Autonomia vs. Vergonha e Dúvida (Força de Vontade), Iniciativa vs. Culpa (Propósito), Indústria vs. Inferioridade (Competência), Identidade vs. Confusão de Papel (Fidelidade), Intimidade vs. Isolamento (Amor), Generatividade vs. Estagnação (Cuidado) e Integridade do Ego vs. Desespero (Sabedoria).<sup>215</sup> Cada célula da progressão diagonal ascendente, como fase individual, “cada um atinge seu auge, enfrenta sua crise e encontra sua solução perdurável” (ERIKSON, 1971, p. 250) no estágio subsequente, como uma subsunção integrativa. O conflito a ser resolvido dentro de cada estágio ocupa um quadrado numa diagonal ascendente da esquerda para a direita como a sequência prescrita para a obtenção da integridade do ego como um ideal de realização teleológica e todos os outros quadrados são deixados em branco. Mas o indivíduo deve dominar cada fase ou renunciar a ela para sempre: por exemplo, se um indivíduo não dominar a confiança básica na primeira

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<sup>214</sup> Estas são identificados variadamente como: Nascimento — 2 anos, 2 — 3 anos, 3–5anos, 6 — 12 anos (Puberdade), Puberdade — 18/19, 19/20–30 anos, 35-65 anos, 65 — morte.

<sup>215</sup> As divisões foram mais tarde nomeadas os Nove Estágios do Desenvolvimento Psicossocial, em que o último estágio tornou-se dividido em Integridade versus Desespero, e Desespero versus Esperança e Fé.

fase, será para sempre desconfiado. Erikson é bastante direto em admitir suas deficiências: "Tudo isso deixaria claro que um diagrama da epigênese sugere uma forma global de pensar e repensar que deixa os detalhes da metodologia e da terminologia para um estudo posterior" (Idem, p. 246). Os blocos em branco pareceriam demonstrar a incapacidade da concepção de lidar com qualquer variação ou desvio da compreensão ascendente da existência como uma sequência de bloqueios fechados, mesmo que "o diagrama formaliza uma progressão através do tempo de uma diferenciação das partes" (Idem, p. 249).<sup>216</sup> Os blocos restantes vazios representam uma paisagem virtual que é povoada por indivíduos aberrantes que não têm *status* nem identidade definíveis. Para nós, os espaços em branco representam a ponta do *iceberg* em termos do que constitui possibilidades para existências alternativas. É nessas áreas que procuramos articular modos alternativos de possibilidade.

Em contraste com o paradigma de desenvolvimento linear de Erikson, a lista dos critérios de desenvolvimento propostos anteriormente — desenvolvimento físico, habilidades motoras, capacidades cognitivas, habilidades linguísticas, normas de comportamento, restrições sociais, disposições sexuais e identidade de gênero, podem ser tão facilmente aplicadas à adolescência, à idade adulta ou à velhice ou para acompanhar uma vida toda. Listá-los como qualidades nos permite concebê-los como agenciamentos intensivos, porque eles fornecem componentes através dos quais a diversidade da existência humana é discernida. A imposição disciplinar de certas faixas a cada critério gera certas restrições ou *affordances* relacionais fundamentais como proporções favoráveis na combinação com outros critérios para produzir limitações combinatórias de possibilidade como categorias. Juntos, esses critérios podem produzir graus infinitos de variação e infinitos graus de possibilidade para criar uma variação ilimitada de agenciamentos que podem preencher os espaços em branco do esquema de desenvolvimento de Erikson. Algumas delas estarão dentro do intervalo de parâmetros que são considerados normais<sup>217</sup> e, portanto, constituem uma categoria reconhecida; outros irão situar-se dentro de

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<sup>216</sup> No entanto, ao descrever a progressão interior de um estágio para o seguinte, Erikson usa uma linguagem bastante interessante que ressoa com os escritos de Deleuze e Guattari: "a diagonal indica a sequência a ser obedecida. Contudo, também deixa lugar para variações no ritmo e na intensidade. Um indivíduo ou uma cultura, pode-se demorar excessivamente na confiança e passar de I 1 pulando I 2, para II 2, ou, em uma acelerada progressão, pode-se deslocar de I 1, pulando II 1 para II 2. Entretanto, supõe-se que cada uma dessas acelerações ou retardamentos (relativos) tenha uma influência modificadora sobre todas as etapas posteriores" (ERIKSON, 1971, pp. 250-51)

<sup>217</sup> O que indicaria que a normalidade também é intensiva.

intervalos prescritos e constituem variantes rebeldes, mas reconhecíveis como pertencentes a uma categoria, e um adulto com habilidades linguísticas de baixo nível que são infantis; e outros terão uma minoria de parâmetros dentro dos intervalos prescritos e, portanto, constituem variantes aberrantes completamente fora das normas como individualizações atípicas. No entanto, uma vez que essas individualizações sejam traduzidas como individualizações, não podemos cair na armadilha de nos comprometermos com essas combinações como categorias estáticas e predefinidas, mas precisamos continuar a afirmá-las como fluxos variáveis de movimento constantemente territorializados e desterritorializados. Visto dessa maneira, esses critérios tornam-se forças e sua relação constitui a criação de unidades maiores que expressam linhagens políticas, disciplinares e institucionais que direcionam o desdobramento e norteiam a produção da subjetividade.

A afirmação da variedade introduz a turbulência nas categorias e pode torná-las inúteis ou inválidas, mas não cabe a nós prescrever limites que restrinjam as possibilidades de suas respectivas combinações. A interação desses critérios sem censura produz uma variação infinita e imanente que “já não depende de uma estrutura ou de um desenvolvimento, mas da conjugação de fluxos mutantes, de suas composições de velocidade, de suas combinações de partículas” (DELEUZE, 1998, p. 96). E se as crianças estão sempre elaborando mapas, é porque o Devir-Criança é atormentado por um desdobramento instável e fluido, que nunca gelifica como uma cartografia ou é amaldiçoado por um traçado repetidamente com divergências, gaguejos e linhas de voo que demonstram o não fechamento da compreensão: para as crianças, a repetição é sempre nova — e essa é a razão por trás de seu incessante refrão “já chegamos?”. Entretanto, a combinação de critérios com outros acontece dentro de certas faixas de interação para constituir e produzir o diagramatismo do devir. “Toda sociedade tem o seu ou os seus diagramas” (DELEUZE, 1988, p. 45), e ela é incorporada, impressa no Devir-Criança como constitutiva de sua modelagem da realidade e sua compreensão maquínica da verdade como uma funcionalidade operativa. A latitude combinatória dos critérios da infância é um reflexo da exibição das relações entre forças que constituem o poder pela concretização desses agenciamentos como uma integração vertical (DELEUZE, 1988) que desvia o devir e é essa progressiva concretização em aberrantes caminhos de devir — o que diferencia esta concepção de Erikson.

Em contraste com os ambientes que reificam a reprodução artificial de ilusões sociais estranhas molares imbuídas de falsa consciência, consideramos o texto de Deleuze e Guattari novamente para perseguir aquelas trajetórias dinâmicas que apontam para novos horizontes e levam a territorializações rebeldes como paisagens da criação. Esses espaços de Devir-Criança são extensões de possibilidade, de territorializações por outros meios que a ocupação ou o habitar do espaço volumétrico. Eles são literalmente locais físicos, mas geralmente são apenas um pano de fundo para a ocupação mental do pensamento, a extensão de intensidades emocionais ou afetivas, de narrativas expansivas de fabulação e comunicação empática, ou do espaço comum do meio excluído da cumplicidade educacional. As qualidades, substâncias, poderes e eventos que constituem esses meios e produzem cartografias como um terreno comum de exposição experiencial a partir do qual emerge a criação de um território e corpos que, juntos, temporalizam o devir desse território. E este território se manifesta não apenas em termos de espaço ou extensão, mas em termos de linguagem, roupa, jogos, música, dança, lazer e descanso, níveis de intensidade, de expressão sexual, de liberdade artística, modos de comunicação, de temporalização, de perfilhação racial, de interação social que codificam e canalizam, que iniciam a habituação de restrições, limitações e fechamentos produzidos pelo confinamento disciplinar e institucional e a imposição de uma socialização de curto prazo. perfilhação, de interação social que codificam e canalizam, que iniciam a habituação de restrições, limitações e fechamentos produzidos pelo confinamento disciplinar e institucional e a imposição de uma socialização intensa. As crianças são codificadas numa infância estriada, em oposição aos devires amenos ocasionados em meios alternativos. Os espaços-tempo aos quais as crianças estão sendo relegadas, que sejam creches, pré-escolas, escolas primárias e secundárias e atividades extra-escolares são ambientes artificiais de subjetividade limitada. Eles dão às crianças uma chance de socializar e ampliar seus horizontes comuns com “os melhores interesses da criança no coração”, mas esses ambientes artificiais permitem que a máquina de produtividade socioeconômica funcione sem entraves e forneça para a ordem pública e segurança. São esses campos de existência comum que eventualmente também dão lugar aos territórios molares da infância que são territorializações das concepções estáticas, idealizadas e comerciais do que a infância deveria ser. De modo que os contextos que condicionam propiciamente o Devir-Criança tendem a ser outros que não os espaços



codificados para a realização de experiências preconcebidas, prescritas e predeterminadas como realizações de seres molares.

Gaitán-Muñoz (2006) desenvolve o paradigma sociológico ainda mais em termos de uma Nova Sociologia da Infância que procura revelar a posição real das crianças nas sociedades *em seu próprio direito*. Ela baseia-se no trabalho de James e Prout (1997), Jenks (1996), bem como Alanen (2003) e Mayall (2013) que focam estudos da infância numa sociologia das crianças, na desconstrução sociológica da infância e em uma sociologia estrutural da infância. Estes são articulados através de análises detalhadas (e úteis) relacionais, construtivistas e estruturalistas, mas ainda assim, surpreendentemente, deixa de fazer uma análise pós-estruturalista. Sua cartografia triádica posteriormente decompõe analiticamente de forma sistemática estas categorias segundo a infância, as crianças, a sociedade e a sociologia, a fim de aprimorar as nuances entre as várias abordagens. Gaitán-Muñoz invoca repetidamente o processo como uma atividade construtiva que é prática e material, e que funciona como uma prática consistente para um fazer geração (*hacer generación*) ou, alternativamente, como um conjunto ou agregado de práticas que contribuem para a criação de sentido e o conteúdo geracional (hierárquico) da ordem (GAITÁN-MUÑOZ, 2006, pág. 23).

A Nova Sociologia da Infância promove uma construção do conceito da infância que se concentra na codificação de cima para baixo da infância (GAITÁN-MUÑOZ, 2006), enquanto a abordagem da psicologia do desenvolvimento e suas técnicas auxiliares têm como objetivo estabelecer marcas de referência (benchmarks) e a avaliação numérica do “desempenho,” conforme valores normativos estatisticamente pré-definidos (Bracken e NAGLE, 2007; DAVIS, 2011; KRANZLER e FLOYD, 2013; GARGIULO e METCALF, 2017). Porém, nenhuma delas fornece uma justificativa para o movimento subjacente que marca a procissão do avanço — o que impulsiona a infância são causas transcendentais que produzem mudanças na criança de acordo com as causas aristotélicas, materiais, formais, eficientes ou finais, que enfatizam uma relação de causa e efeito linear ou seriada. A criança é simultaneamente a entidade subjetiva em estudo que sofre as “causas” do seu ser, e também o objeto sobre o qual a infância é predicada. Nesta abordagem, a criança não teve o peso subjetivo, a massa crítica, nem os meios expressivos, para definir sua própria subjetividade, deixando aos outros, mais frequentemente aos adultos, a tarefa de dar voz ao seu ser. Quem é a criança, o que a criança é e por que ela é definida e construída por

subjetividades externas que só recentemente começaram a levar em consideração a experiência subjetiva da criança (FREEMAN e MATHISON, 2008). A criança e a infância estão, portanto, em um perpétuo estado de tensão entre os vários modelos que a teorizam e a conceitualizam, e há sempre uma lacuna entre a criança como o conhecido, o objeto de estudo e a criança conhecedora e articuladora dos saberes que a definem.

Se há complexificação teórica da infância, sua aplicação na descrição e interpretação da infância e a concordância com a experiência de ser criança, é inevitável que as discussões ultrapassem os limites disciplinares. A infância como um conceito heterogêneo e construído atualmente existe na interseção de uma variedade de disciplinas e campos de pesquisa (psicologia, sociologia, antropologia, literatura, direito, educação, medicina, geografia etc.) e não pode ser entendida ou interpretada através de uma única lente disciplinar. Os conceitos adquirem generalidade e profundidade através dos *insights* de uma série de disciplinas que não apenas elucidam o conceito a partir de diferentes pontos de vista, mas em uma variedade de meios e através de uma variedade de escalas implicadas por meio da ação de vários atores. As várias abordagens usadas para descrever a infância vão além do ecletismo, aceitando que os conceitos não são entidades homogêneas e requerem uma ideação diferente de sua constituição conceitual. As discussões sobre a infância não podem ser contidas dentro de limites disciplinares singulares estritos, porque nenhum discurso pode ser totalmente explicativo dos fenômenos que eles estudam, nem podem impedir os cruzamentos disciplinares inevitáveis. Além disso, a complexidade não pode repudiar os efeitos da contaminação descritiva ou explicativa (ou enriquecimento) entre uma disciplina e outras. Este é um problema mais abrangente que as guerras territoriais disciplinares ou departamentais ou os egos individuais<sup>218</sup> na medida em que fala dos desafios epistemológicos que estão implícitos em todos os discursos acadêmicos que são provocados pela circunscrição de saberes.

Concordamos que a abordagem interdisciplinar é uma compreensão sofisticada da infância (JAMES e JAMES, 2008; WOODHEAD e MONTGOMERY, 2002; GARVIS e MANNING, 2017) e defendemos essa abordagem como uma compreensão superior da infância, que busca fornecer uma abordagem clínica mais sólida para a prestação de cuidados e serviços com base nas necessidades da criança. A abordagem interdisciplinar articulada através do

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<sup>218</sup> Cf Latour, Bruno. (2000). *Ciência em Ação: Como seguir cientistas e engenheiros sociedade afora*. (Trad. Ivone C. Benedetti). São Paulo: Editora UNESP.

processual é uma compreensão aprimorada da infância, mas a abordagem que eles escolherem relega o processo a um *status* secundário em relação ao resultado analítico e à concepção resultante baseada numa construção predominantemente substancial na qual a substância tem *prioridade* sobre o processo. Nesta concepção, a interatividade da infância como processo ainda é estudada, mas entendida *através de seus efeitos* nos meios sociais, políticos, culturais, educacionais e jurídicos, em oposição a ser o objeto do próprio estudo. A criança é vista através da agência social ou mais diretamente como agente social e como membro de uma minoria. Mittelstraß aponta uma abordagem transdisciplinar que nortearia uma apreensão mais completa da infância ao transcender limites disciplinares a fim de abordá-la e resolvê-la como um problema relacionado o mundo-vida (MITTELSTRAß, 1992 apud HADORN et al., 2008).

### **O fim da concepção majoritária do homem adulto e o vir do não ser**

Apesar das iniciativas que retratam as crianças e a infância de forma dinâmica, elas ainda são retratadas em termos que perpetuam as formas tradicionais nas quais os conceitos são apresentados — como um *modo prescrito do ser* articulado dentro de categorizações normalizadas, estritas e estáticas. Adentro das teorias que pensam o desenvolvimento, a infância é comparada às normas pré-definidas de ‘tamanho único’ e avaliadas de acordo com marcos de desenvolvimento comparados, ditados como estruturas de desenvolvimento pré-estabelecidas, que categorizam o desenvolvimento físico, as habilidades motoras, as capacidades cognitivas, as aptidões linguísticas, as normas comportamentais, as restrições sociais, as disposições sexuais e a identidade de gênero. Como uma série programada de especificações e marcos de desenvolvimento, a infância é dividida em estados ou fases ontogenéticas discretas que categorizam todos os aspectos da vida de uma criança de acordo com normas quantificáveis: física, motora, cognitiva, linguagem, expressão de gênero, habilidades emocionais e sociais como forma de controlar e disciplinar sua natureza indeterminável, uma das razões pelas quais a infância é considerada indiscernível. Qualquer que seja a posição de uma criança no mundo, seu único propósito, social ou ontológico, é não permanecer uma criança (JENKS, 2008), mas cumprir seu destino como adulto — que, dentro da cultura patriarcal, é referenciada ao adulto masculino.

A maioria masculina é ainda aceita como a plena e única realização do potencial humano, e qualquer indivíduo que não tenha alcançado esse status é descartado como sendo de pouca consequência e, portanto, irrelevante e não digno de atenção — de muitas maneiras, é de importância menor e minoritário. Em comparação com a idade adulta masculina, a infância é vista como um modo inferior de ser, que ainda não tem status completo em comparação com a idade adulta masculina. Além de ser capital social em termos de adultos potenciais, as crianças são consideradas insignificantes e definidas negativamente em termos de queda e fraqueza em relação ao padrão masculino adulto — fisicamente são pequenas, não coordenadas e fracas; elas são imaturas de julgamento e experiência; emocionalmente, são dependentes e vulneráveis; elas não têm poder, direitos reconhecidos, nenhum conhecimento definitivo, habilidade ou capacidades; seus enunciados, gestos e ações são considerados sem sentido — elas são seres de muito pouca substância ou consequência. Ontologicamente, devido ao crescimento rápido e à mudança não-sistemática que elas sofrem desde o nascimento até a maturidade, há dificuldades em como considerá-las em termos coerentes: elas são quase descartadas como não-seres e apenas aceitas no mundo dos homens e das coisas. Em alguns contextos, elas são invisíveis e sem voz, nem vistas nem ouvidas. O seu status é semelhante ao status das mulheres antes do feminismo, exceto que as crianças não têm o *standing*, ou os meios políticos disponíveis às mulheres (OAKLEY, 1994). Como escreve Qvortrup (1999), a infância tem sofrido uma divisão paradoxal entre onde as crianças foram "englobadas com uma preocupação crescente" por seus familiares e amigos, bem como pelas ciências psicológicas, e simultaneamente "expostas a uma crescente indiferença como coletividade" que Hardman (1973) chamou de "vozes silenciadas". O preconceito e a desconfiança nunca são explicitamente declarados, mas insinuados de forma sutil — Greene e Hogan, por exemplo, ressaltam que "ainda há uma desconfiança de confiar nas opiniões das crianças sobre suas próprias vidas e, portanto, sobre sua experiência" e mais "experiência individual das crianças" é tipicamente não validada como um foco de pesquisa, pois é percebido como não confiável e idiossincrático" (GREENE e HOGAN, 2005, p. xii).

Deleuze e Guattari (1997) advogam a adoção voluntária de qualquer modo de existência que não seja o modelo prescrito de Ser e Identidade, exemplificado pelo ideal de um homem branco, ocidental, urbano, cristão. Se o sistema de pensamento que teoriza e ideologicamente subentende o Ser e a Identidade especificamente aponta sua teleologia

para esse ideal patriarcal dominante, qualquer existência baseada na mudança e na diferença que se opõe ao Ser e à Identidade não pode receber status existencial e é chamada de não-ser: não é para dizer que é inexistente, mas que não é nem aqui nem ali, que é indeterminado. Ao endossar o não-ser, não escolhemos a morte ou a inexistência, mas uma existência que não tem proveniência clara e nenhum destino distinto em seu perpétuo devir, nem isto nem aquilo: não é nem A nem B e é pego no meio como um devir-outro. Em virtude de seu devir, não tem “ser”, só perdura como uma expressão indefinida, indeterminada e incerta, através de sua possibilidade tornar-se diferente. Mesmo a noção geral ou comum é o cristal semente que predica um modo de replicação específica, mas que é incapaz de prever um resultado, produto ou resultado final. Afinal, ninguém, nem mesmo Deus, pode dizer antecipadamente se uma dada multiplicidade permitirá que seus componentes heterogêneos entrem em uma simbiose maquínica transformadora, consistente ou co-funcional.

Por que consideramos as crianças como indiscerníveis e insubstanciais quando são tão obviamente visíveis no mundo? Pela mesma razão que mulheres, negros, aborígenes, gays, lésbicas, transgêneros, doentes mentais, estrangeiros, sem-teto, quilombolas, desempregados e outros são invisíveis. Quando dizemos que são invisíveis ou indiscerníveis, não queremos dizer que não podemos vê-los, mas porque estão sub-representados nas estruturas e instituições de poder e não têm impacto nas decisões de consequência em questões sociais e políticas: Eles são não-seres. O "Ser" está atrelado a um ser branco, homem e adulto — de modo que, se não podemos associar nosso ser real ou nosso potencial a ser de algum modo ao masculino, então deixamos de existir.

Ao fazer a divisão entre o ser e o não-ser, Deleuze e Guattari multiplicam ou pluralizam o não-ser como uma oposição a estar em termos que são tradicionalmente opostos ao paradigmático modelo ideal do homem branco ocidental: o devir que mais define diametralmente o oposto do ser masculino é o feminino, portanto, devir mulher é geralmente invocado como o modo prototípico de se tornar. “Não há devir homem porque o homem é a entidade molar por excelência” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 89). Assim, continuando esta linha de pensamento, temos um número de oposições ao homem humano branco, cristão, ocidental, urbano, que são expressas como infinitos outros, como possibilidades que expressam diferença como devir negro, devir judeu, devir animal, devir cyborg, devir criança, etc.

“Um devir não é uma correspondência de relações. Mas tampouco é ele uma semelhança, uma imitação e, em última instância, uma identificação” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 18). Não é um símile ou metáfora. É a explicação do relato ou da relação da diferença como um e, e, e, e... que permite o acúmulo do entendimento como uma montagem intuitiva através do próprio devir e não através da repetição dos termos supostamente fixos. E, portanto, precisamos indicar como o movimento do potencial para a atualização toma forma: como pode a importância do filho diferenciar-se de outras formas de importar, de modificação material ser expressa como passagem do tempo, como criação temporal? Devir-Criança não é uma filiação, mas um modo de relação, de associação em agenciamentos, de forma que o desdobramento conceitual do Devir-Criança não é uma lista de propriedades ou características, mas sua socialização molecular da interação funcional de massas elementares dinâmicas como constitutivo de corpos. Como esses modos de relação, de agenciamento, de composição são expressões “de expansão, de propagação, de ocupação, de contágio, de povoamento”, nada mais é do que um engrandecimento afetivo? (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 20). O Devir-Criança se espalha por esses modos de proliferação como uma repetição inconsciente e involuntária. Não como uma filiação que é geneticamente transmitida, mas uma propensão adquirida, uma predisposição aprendida que vem a nos habitar como uma doença, daí a necessidade de uma sintomatologia e uma abordagem clínica para entender o Devir-Criança. Se desejamos *categorizar* o devir da criança em oposição a classificá-lo ou defini-lo, então devemos nos tornar Devir-Criança em si através de nossa capacidade de dizer o que é essencial e como a cartografia específica está sendo mapeada como um circuito de afetos, como um diagrama sintomatológico de contágio.

O devir de uma criança é um fenômeno de fronteirização, de empurrar os limites e cruzar os limiares do devir — sempre indo além dos limites que procuram delimitar suas possibilidades. É essa transcendência de limites como a ativação de potenciais que produz a inconstância e a anomalia do Devir-Criança como a facilitação da mudança. Devir é o desdobramento da anomalia, de existir como notável não apenas como excepcional ou singular, mas como fora das regras ou contra o domínio das Leis do Pensamento. Não tão anormal quanto fora da norma, mas como diferencial e sem norma. É o afetivo do evento como uma expressão singular que não pode ser apurada ou tornada perfeitamente adequada com uma definição precisa, mesmo que possa de alguma forma ser compreendida

como uma individuação no limite da determinação da possibilidade.<sup>219</sup> Nesse limite, à margem do conhecido e do desconhecido, o espaço e o tempo estão sendo simultaneamente produzidos como ocupação — como fazer e como extensão — como diferenciação e diferenciação: ambos os aspectos se integram por meio do co-surgimento processual no devir.

Dessa forma, os anais da filosofia ortodoxa buscam fixidez e persistência no Ser, na Essência e na Identidade, em oposição ao de multiplicar o devir e a duração da filosofia processual dentro da distinção entre coisas e eventos. A filosofia oficial prediz o conceito de acordo com uma série de características que visam a manter a integridade objetiva de uma entidade. Isto inclui individualidade, separação, fixidez da natureza, especificidade individualizada, fixidez descritiva, estabilidade classificatória e passividade (RESCHER 1996). Juntas, essas ideias estabelecem as regras básicas para a crença nas coisas como entidades independentes, distintas e autossuficientes que são sempre comparadas às Formas Ideais — que são legitimamente existentes e verdadeiramente possuem Ser — que são diretamente implicadas pela ontologia estática que respalda o Ser e uma condição *sine qua non* da Filosofia Substancialista atualmente dominante. Para sustentar esse sistema, os eruditos escolásticos da Idade Média codificaram essas ideias nos Princípios do Pensamento não tanto por postular clareza filosófica, mas por certeza teológica. Assim, para que uma coisa seja, essa coisa tem que se inscrever nas seguintes Leis: A Lei da Identidade: Se uma coisa é A, então é A; a Lei da Não-Contradição: Uma coisa A não pode ser A e não A ao mesmo tempo (no momento em que é A); A Lei do Meio Excluído: Uma coisa A é A ou não A. E se algo satisfaz estas Leis, seu ser é negado e, portanto, não pode ser. Através destes Princípios ou Leis do Pensamento, pode-se averiguar o ontologicamente real, o cognitivamente necessário e o que pode ser tomado como conhecimento direto, não-inferido, não-mediado. Essas três leis estabelecem as regras básicas para a determinação de entidades subjetivas e objetivas com limites precisamente definidos e predicam a base para o pensamento coerente, sistemas lógicos, causalidade e generalidades universais.

Com essas qualidades, torna-se possível conceber entidades isentas de mudança dotadas “da permanência de substâncias perduráveis ao longo do tempo, supondo que as

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<sup>219</sup> Em espanhol, há duas expressões populares que reconhecem essa condição limite, de não se comportar “normalmente”, dentro da curva normal das normas sociais: “No te pases!” E “Que borde!”.

coisas permaneçam idênticas no tempo com base em sua posse de certas características ou propriedades essenciais que permanecem imutáveis em todos os aspectos através de mudanças temporais” (RESCHER, 1996). Claramente, estes não são os descritores mais adequados para crianças ou infância, pois a única qualidade duradoura na infância é a mudança aplicada a um substrato em mudança.<sup>220</sup> Na infância, seria duramente pressionado para definir uma "coisa material" ou "entidade substancial" que podemos dizer é a natureza essencial (*natura naturata*) que perdura através das mudanças de suas propriedades com avanço. O Devir-Criança ocupa as regiões medianas (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 32) descritas pelas inconsistências reveladas por se tornar incapaz de satisfazer as Leis do Pensamento. Assim, o corpo infantil 'A' não pode adotar as Leis do Pensamento porque A sofre constantemente mudanças internas, nunca é um A perdurante e, portanto, nunca é A e, por estar sempre passando por mudanças, A é sempre A e não A ao mesmo tempo ou ambos A e não A simultaneamente. Assim, a criança como uma entidade que está passando por mudanças internas e sofrendo mudanças externas simultaneamente não pode ter uma fixidez descritiva porque nenhuma das propriedades, atributos, qualidades ou características persistem através do avanço. Por essas mesmas razões, a criança na infância desafia a classificação como um ser substancial, porque não tem estabilidade identitária para ela e sua coerência em termos de sua unidade de ser é questionável na melhor das hipóteses.

O devir é um rizoma: não é uma árvore genealógica ou classificatória e, portanto, para entendermos o devir, mapeamos como suas raízes se combinam com o elemental terra, vento e ar com os quais se engaja, que persuadem seu avanço para o desconhecido além de seus limites. Mas, para chegar a um acordo com o devir, podemos recorrer a uma categorização que permita a articulação entre a transformação e a transformação processual.

Tradicionalmente, para que tudo seja inteligível, recorreremos à categorização. As categorias de Aristóteles constituem as condições necessárias para a compreensibilidade: substância (*ousia*), quantidade (*poson*), qualidade (*poion*), relação (*pros ti*), lugar (*pou*), tempo (*pote*), disposição — posição ou condição — (*keisthai*), posse (*hexis*), paixão ou

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<sup>220</sup> Articular o conceito de criança desta maneira equivale a subscrever-se a um esquema hilomórfico no qual a mudança como forma é aplicada a um substrato como matéria. Veremos que ambos são imanentes e simultaneamente co-surgindo como devir. No entanto, a mudança que estamos invocando é uma mudança em como essa multiplicidade muda em suas capacidades de interagir com o mundo.



afeição (*paschein*) e ação ou atividade (*poiein*). Da mesma forma, para Kant, as categorias são as funções lógicas em todos os juízos possíveis que, como conceitos *a priori*, constituem pura compreensão (KANT, 1993). Esses conceitos são catalogados sob quatro classes triádicas: quantidade (unidade, pluralidade, totalidade), qualidade (realidade, negação, limitação), relação (inerência e subsistência, causalidade e dependência, comunidade recíproca) e modalidade (possibilidade-impossibilidade, existência-inexistência, necessidade-contingência) — que fornecem conjuntamente a estrutura necessária para a *compreensão humana* de perceber e de conceber o que é dado na experiência (KANT, 1993).

O Pensamento Processual milita contra esse conhecimento transcendental *a priori*, obtido independentemente da experiência ou mesmo de todas as impressões sensoriais, e a maneira como são expressas por Kant contradizem a ideia de Bergson de como chegamos a compreender a experiência. As categorias Aristotélicas, por mais aleatórias e não sistemáticas que Kant as tornasse, já estão próximas de uma compreensão processual da experiência e podem ser temperadas mais prontamente em uma expressão processual que o reposicionamento de Kant não pode permitir. Podemos propor categorias processuais não como uma tradução correlativa sistemática das categorias mencionadas anteriormente, mas como conceitos que podem liberar a expressão da experiência de acordo com termos processuais e não fazer com que a descrição recaia sobre ideações dualistas ou baseadas em substância. Em última análise, o processo não é mais do que o próprio sujeito que experiencia e esses conceitos, juntos, nos permitirão entender a experiência como o acréscimo complexo e interdependente de “ocasiões reais” (WHITEHEAD, 2010). A principal delas, a substância, é diretamente traduzível em processo, porque é isso que para nós está subjacente a toda a experiência do mundo. Outros conceitos que poderíamos usar para descrever o processo de devir são características quantitativas de intensidade, natureza temática, interconexões, localização processual, temporalidade aiônica, organização imanente, disposição, espaço-tempo, duração, afeto e poiesis.

Devir é um modo de *categorização* que nos permite falar o evento no seu desdobramento — não a essência ou a coisa em si — mas como um evento puro, uma semiótica perceptual na produção de sua narração como testemunho. Na forma de um relato, a contabilidade é do evento puro um acontecimento, uma hecceidade, uma entidade no mundo. Porque o devir é um rizoma, podemos permitir entidades conceituais não homogêneas ou heterogêneas que encorpam o contrário — mas como concretizar o

conceito de Devir- Criança? Seu principal problema lida com a potencialidade de se tornar real sem qualquer critério inerente ou inato para direcioná-lo. Não que qualquer outro tipo de devir possa ser rotulado ou dirigido, mas Devir-Criança é ainda menos, já que não tem nenhuma habituação memorável a que recorrer. É uma involução afetiva de um singular não ouvido tornar-se não produtivo, além da produção de si mesmo e que nada tem além de si mesmo como resultado sem termo.

Como afirmamos anteriormente, muitas dessas categorias são baseadas no radical Ποι- (Poi), que articula o "como" de uma coisa como a manifestação dinâmica ou processual de uma entidade. Apresentado desta forma, o objeto de categorização não é uma entidade estática fixa, mas um movimento, ou virá a ser, que, por definição, é um não-ser. Se a categorização está em movimento, não se pode dizer que ela seja adequada. Além disso, nossos objetos perceptuais estão compostos de componentes adequados e inadequados, com gradações composicionais de maior ou menor adequação — Bergson define o inadequado da percepção como afetivo e, ao descrever esses objetos de percepção, estamos lidando com graus de impressões afetivas — então se eles são não-seres, toda experiência no mundo material é, por definição, afetiva. Estes constituem agenciamentos intensivos, que são mais ou menos, isto ou aquilo — só podemos caracterizar os objetos da associação como intensidades relativas indefinidas que contribuem para uma racionalidade comparativa abstrata. Assim, a única determinação conclusiva que pode ser feita a partir dessa intensificação observacional é uma determinação estatística que é sempre qualificada como uma probabilidade, sempre tendo um valor existencial contingente.<sup>221</sup>

### **A criança experiencial**

O Devir-Criança não trata de como se tornar uma criança. Trata dos modos específicos de como os devires atravessam um corpo. Quando invocamos o conceito de Devir-Criança, precisamos entender que o próprio devir está em jogo, que estamos nos referindo a uma criança tornando-se criança, ou ao Devir-Criança de um adulto, ou à problemática geral do Devir-Criança. O que está em questão é como os atributos conceituais, as características acidentais, o entendimento simbólico do que uma criança é

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<sup>221</sup> Esta conclusão justifica a forma moderada do Ceticismo Consequente de Hume.

ditas são expressos como devir atual. Um ser humano adulto não pode se tornar uma criança porque “não há transformação das formas essenciais, essas são inalienáveis e só mantêm entre si relações de analogia” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 37). Não é uma *performance* da semelhança — o Devir-Criança não consiste em uma representação ou uma imitação mimética dos gestos da criança, mas em engajar a dinâmica subjacente da realização de potenciais em um modo específico de criar diferença que pode ser categorizado como um *childing* — uma criação. Para tanto, precisamos articular o categórico como temporal: se a criança, uma multiplicidade processual, é vista como a atividade processual da criança, terminamos pensando em um Devir-Criança na forma de um conto fornecedor de uma contabilidade — uma narração que encontra o número certo.

Em *O que as crianças dizem* (1997), um dos últimos textos de Deleuze, ele escreve que “A criança não para de dizer o que faz ou tenta fazer: explorar os meios, por trajetos dinâmicos, e traçar o mapa correspondente” (DELEUZE, 1997, p. 73). Normalmente, quando deparamos com uma frase como essa, tomamo-la ao valor nominal e nunca paramos para pensar duas vezes. Lemos da seguinte maneira ‘crianças são tagarelas e buscam entusiasticamente compartilhar suas experiências e impressões com os outros’. Interpretamos a citação pensando em crianças curiosas, inquietas, exploradoras do (o que é para elas) desconhecido e que produzem desenhos irregulares de personagens desequilibrados e disformes habitantes de ambientes aparentemente ilógicos e fantasiosos. Da perspectiva adulta, que tem sido disciplinada ao longo do tempo e condicionada a interpretar o mundo em termos do definido e do adequado, captamos apenas a compreensão deficiente e imperfeita da criança. Nós não percebemos que as crianças são Spinozistas. O mundo deles é o reino do imediato, do afetivo, de uma materialidade tênue, cuja racionalidade relativa contribui para um andaime muito fluido e instável. Se o espinosismo é o Devir-Criança do filósofo, e a tarefa do filósofo é criar conceitos, a criança é o consumado filósofo porque está liberado do arquivo que dificulta seu encontro experiencial com a natureza que condiciona e direciona suas percepções. Uma criança deixada a seus próprios recursos para compreender o mundo, conceberá o mundo de acordo com sua própria imaginação — tanto no sentido da faculdade da fantasia fantasiosa, como também de emitir e receber afetos que o pensamento imagético acarreta.

As crianças estão expressando sua essência em termos processuais — é uma categorização improvisada que narra “o ser do que ela é” em seu envolvimento com o

mundo articulado como ser experiencial de um imediatismo, que não tem latência, nem intervalo, nem premeditação. Ele está nos pedindo para considerar o conceito não como um método — uma perambulação estática, mas uma exploração nômade na qual as características se espalham de acordo com a escrita que Deleuze e Guattari invocam. A heterogeneidade do construto conceitual nos estimula a considerar o conceito formalmente segundo um conjunto diferente de considerações ontológicas. Estamos nos afastando de definir a criança ou a infância de acordo com uma qualidade indispensável ou com uma característica identitária única que a marca com sua própria diferença específica como uma individuação homogênea para predicá-la na forma de uma multiplicidade de componentes heterogêneos — todo conhecimento não pode, nem precisa, ser representado da mesma maneira. Imediatamente, nesta citação relativamente curta de Deleuze, podemos extrair subjetividades, ontologias, campos de pesquisa, métodos, preocupações epistemológicas e problemas da metafísica que rapidamente questionam uma abordagem de ontologia de substância material e exigem a interpretação em termos de qualidades processuais abstratas. Se as crianças nunca param de falar é porque estão *categorizando* incessantemente ; relacionando-se e interagindo com suas experiências e dando a contabilidade de sua experiência e encontrando o número certo do que estão percebendo e estabelecendo suas cartografias memoriais.

A citação de Deleuze traz a questão da experiência das crianças como fundamental para o conceito de Devir-Criança. No entanto, precisamos nos lembrar de que a experiência é um daqueles conceitos que tem sido silenciado na tradução do grego para o latim — como aconteceu com a essência. Experiência traduzida para o grego torna-se *ἐμπειρία*, (*empeiria*), empirismo puro, uma prática não baseada em conhecimento ou princípios, mas também um ofício ou uma arte (LIDDELL e SCOTT, 1883). Passa da atividade de experimentação, do colocar ativo à prova, de um procedimento provisório ou especulativo no encontro, para a atividade realizada, para a observação real de fatos ou eventos, considerados como uma fonte de conhecimento empírico, podendo então ser acumulado e arquivado. E é esse empirismo fundamental que o Devir-Criança procura, anterior a qualquer cientificismo. É o encontro processual material com o mundo transformado em práticas, em pragmática, que opera em oposição ao transcendental do idealismo como um fazer pensante.

Ao procurar avançar fundamentos teóricos e estratégias metodológicas para pesquisar as experiências das crianças, Freeman e Mathison (2008) oferecem duas

definições básicas do que a experiência pode ser: a apreensão de um objeto através do sentido da mente ou um evento no qual acabamos de participar. O nexos de possibilidade compreendido pela experiência aponta, assim, para o encontro da criança com o mundo como evento e para o processo perceptivo e a aquisição de conhecimento. Isso nos remete ao agenciamento, multiplicidade e intensificação do *epistemē*, da ciência menor, na percepção conforme o que Deleuze refere-se no pensamento de Foucault como a “pragmática do múltiplo” (DELEUZE, 1988, p. 91). E este é o grau zero do pensamento imagético que Bergson elaborou no *Ensaio Sobre os Dados Imediatos da Consciência* (1889), *Matéria e Memória* (1896) e *Evolução Criadora* (1907).

### **A Infância como intensificação**

O devir é marcado por alterações que são perceptíveis como diferença qualitativa. Sendo assim, o devir é expresso por movimentos e descanso, lentidão e celeridade, passagem e mudança: a diferença que surge com antecedência, uma mudança perceptível, não pode ser constituída por átomos — como elementos finitos discerníveis dotados de forma, são *físicos* demais e também excessivamente Ideal e bem definidos em sua constituição. A materialidade do devir depende de elementos e partículas de uma identidade indefinida, cuja agência como uma *capacidade* de agir não pode ser descartada. Eles são a matéria escura entre os números inteiros que podem produzir uma gradação infinita de transição, de passagem continua sem estar totalmente predicada infinitamente, de uma intensificação gradual, cuja presença predicamos apesar de sua imperceptibilidade. Podemos apreciar a diferença marcante dentro do devir como povoada por uma infinidade de diferenças apreciáveis que se agregam para abrir caminho e fazer ponte à procissão do avanço.

A intensificação é um processo que ocorre ao longo do tempo e é marcado por limiares ao infinito. Por exemplo, consideremos o evento da noite dando lugar ao dia. Temos todos uma compreensão senso comum inata do que é a noite e o dia, mas a transição da noite para o dia também é geralmente entendida como uma gradação indefinida que varia em intensidade ao longo do tempo. Mas, quando estamos nas garras do momento, estamos totalmente implicados no devir como um ser-fazer, onde o ser é mediado pela própria mediação e, portanto, transparente e invisível a seu próprio devir — a progressão é

imperceptível em si mesma — pura duração. Podemos definir arbitrariamente uma hora do dia, uma intensidade de luz, alguma qualidade mensurável, algum valor quantitativo como limiar cujo cruzamento define o fim da noite e o começo do dia — por exemplo, podemos designar as 6:30 da manhã como a hora que isso acontece. Mas especificar os critérios para determinar quando a noite realmente rende o dia é difícil de definir, embora objetivamente possamos afirmar com certeza quando não é mais a noite, e o dia realmente veio: podemos afirmar categoricamente que “de agora em diante, o dia será entendido como uma hora após o amanhecer e uma hora após o pôr do sol” e produzir limiares artificiais rígidos e rápidos.




Figura 2.3: Duração como um agenciamento de multiplicidade exibindo intensificação.

Imagem do autor.

No caso da noite tornando-se dia, nenhum aspecto do avanço pode ser entendido como uma determinação negra ou branca. Em primeiro lugar, é sempre uma gradação variável de intensidades, não apenas de luminosidade, mas da progressão cumulativa de eventos subsidiários que constituem a transição do evento. O Devir-dia como evento e multiplicidade não é apenas um nível de luz, mas um composto pela luz da rua desligando, galos cantando, cachorros latindo, despertadores tocando, a preguiça de sair da cama, o cheiro de café, a espera pelo banheiro, a intensificação do trânsito na rua, o preparar a pasta para o trabalho, o preparar o almoço, amarrar os sapatos, caminhar para o trabalho, checar e-mails... A complexidade como uma imbricação concreta da acumulação eventual torna a experiência em uma ecologia de limiares: uma atividade permite a outra acontecer ao longo

de múltiplos caminhos críticos coexistentes. À medida que a intensificação gradual do dia sobrecarrega a quietude da noite, percebemos — mas apenas se paramos e fazemos uma pausa — o acontecimento de uma infinidade de gestos e atividades, o cruzamento de múltiplos limiares, nenhum óbvio ou crítico — exceto se o sol não se elevasse — o que marca o avanço na atualização do potencial virtual como uma normalidade progressiva, invisível e transparente. Sem a execução desses pequenos acontecimentos, o avanço não pode ocorrer e dar lugar ao que vem a seguir.

Em nossa representação da Duração de uma Vida da Figura 2.3, as intensidades que a constituem como eventos composicionais são reais: reais, na medida em que são potenciais ativadas. Dessa maneira, as intensidades são menos numerosas, menores e mais fragmentadas na infância, e se tornam mais numerosas e prolongadas com a idade, de modo que na meia idade, temos intensidades atualizadas mais numerosas, e então elas se tornam menos velhas até se tornarem extintas. Cada um desses agenciamentos subsidiários, também compostos por intensidades, existe concretamente para outros agenciamentos como componentes, mas, da mesma forma, podem existir como botões, como possíveis ramificações, para novas direções de transformação de devir. Estas podem ser entendidas como linhas de fuga, que podem levar o agenciamento dominante a dimensões inesperadas, onde sua ocupação como devir e a tomada do espaço simultaneamente desterritorializa o devir-passado e re-territorializa o devir-futuro do acontecimento ao longo de uma nova linha de emergência. Ao querer determinar alguma linha contínua que subtende a perduração de uma entidade sem a qual uma entidade não pode ser reconhecida como definidora da disposição maquínica que pode ser rotulada como alguma criança ou infância, precisamos ter em mente que ela sempre será uma multiplicidade intensiva, heterogênea e nunca uma homogeneidade substancial.

Assim sendo, ao reconsiderarmos de novo a criança e a infância um agenciamento, teremos intensidades como devires diferenciados graduais constitutivos daquilo que podemos discernir tal como infância e acontecimento. Cada subconjunto, individualmente e em conjunto, surge como um agenciamento, que se torna outro por graus imperceptíveis. Ao considerarmos o tubérculo rizomático do tubérculo mostrado anteriormente como o conceito de infância em si, em vez de Uma Vida, podemos entender o devir implícito no conceito por parte de um evento real da vida de uma criança como uma intensificação gradativa. O conceito pode ser aplicado gradualmente como uma designação do que está

ocorrendo à medida que ocorre, se a intensificação satisfizer as condições do devir que constituem o devir-filho. O tubérculo rizomático representa a operatividade e aplicabilidade do conceito como descritivo do evento. Em termos de elementos constitutivos, as submontagens intensivas são de natureza heterogênea, como observado acima. Ao admitir-se que a infância é composta de qualidades intensivas humanas e não-humanas, de componentes orgânicos e não-orgânicos, de formas, características, relações, aplicações e capacidades que são agrupadas no rizoma do Devir-Criança, estas qualidades intensivas funcionam para produzir o corpo sem órgãos da criança como um devir em que seções transversais nos oferecem planos de conteúdo e expressão. Este funcionamento em conjunto é maquínico porque a operatividade funcional desta máquina é a produção de sua própria perduração.

Então, como podemos ver uma criança de carne e osso como um Devir-Criança tal como uma manifestação ou expressão da infância em termos de uma entidade processual no mundo? Podemos olhar as características compartimentadas dos critérios de desenvolvimento listados anteriormente — atributos físicos, habilidades motoras, capacidades cognitivas, habilidades linguísticas, normas comportamentais, restrições sociais, disposições sexuais e identidade de gênero, etc — como os agenciamentos processuais, heterogêneos, intensivos e entendê-los como expressivos de uma funcionalidade improvisional que vê a criança como um outro experiencial. Invocamos a palavra improvisação porque o processo é supostamente aleatório, aparentemente sem premeditação ou preparação — é improvisado, *extempore*, fora do tempo, externo ao tempo — porque é principalmente uma falta de consciência, uma não-confiança na memória, e é particularmente propícia à invenção. Ela emerge, através e dentro dos condicionamentos que ocasionam o evento ditado no impulso do momento como imanente e duracional. Não se trata de fixar “numericamente” os parâmetros dentro de cada critério, mas de compreendê-los como produtivos de um conjunto que é singularmente criativo de diferença e novidade e que as combinações das variações são capazes de constituir a infância diferentemente de uma instância para outra, mas ainda poder ser chamado de infância.

Podemos ver cada uma dessas categorias constituindo seu próprio agenciamento intensivo e servindo de elemento de composição dentro do agenciamento rizômico da infância como uma agregação de intensidades flutuantes e gradativas. Mas também



podemos apreciar os vários componentes interagirem entre si para constituir um agenciamento maquínico genérico da infância que pode ser entendido como uma individuação singular produtiva ou expressiva da experiência singular. Tradicionalmente, isso é visto como significante e significado, como forma e conteúdo, que a criança articula para fora no encontro com o mundo. A criança como significante, identificada iconicamente como tal, realiza atividades no mundo que são entendidas de acordo com os vários critérios do desenvolvimento como o significado. Nesse esquema hilomórfico, a matéria e a forma são divorciadas em uma construção binária constituinte de uma dupla articulação: de um lado, a imposição disciplinar de padrões, normas e quadros de referência impondo padrões de reconhecimento e códigos que substanciam a observação; por outro, a manifestação da expressão dos corpos a serem percebidos, indicados e informados. Essa articulação dupla indica um plano de consistência, ou seja, a expressão de uma superfície de transformação que vemos claramente como a criança — um corpo realizando vários atos e gestos, e certos gestos e certos atos entendidos como um corpo ou incorporação de um evento.

A unidade do devir como processo é a unidade da ordem legal que não precisa ser totalmente determinada, mas que é pelo menos delimitadora (RESCHER, 1996). Isso ecoa a ideia de passagem de Bergson como duracional, e uma multiplicidade processual que preserva uma certa autoidentidade enquanto sofre uma mudança: como podemos entender o Devir-Criança como uma duração quando definimos a criança um não-ser? Em primeiro lugar, Devir-Criança não é uma filiação; não é uma derivação de uma origem, de uma transmissão, não é um ser descendente de algum parentesco anterior. Não é uma criança que está prestes a nascer no mundo como a progênie de uma linhagem estabelecida. No mínimo, é uma aliança, uma simbiose, uma involução criativa de densificação, de enriquecimento e de intensificação: é uma banda ou pacote de multiplicidades, um agenciamento duracional, superior e inferior a qualquer devir específico.

Em macro-termos, podemos dizer que a infância é caracterizada como “o período de vida durante o qual um ser humano é considerado como uma criança, e as características culturais, sociais e econômicas daquele período” (FRONES, 1994, p. 148). Nesta definição, a duração da infância é embutida principalmente em uma duração subsumida ao período de vida de um ser humano englobado entre o nascimento e a morte. É uma determinação nítida e sem prevaricação, de tamanho único, que define a infância como um período do tempo entre a infância e a idade adulta e que é subdividida de acordo com os estágios de

desenvolvimento. Essas são divisões categóricas que, como todas as outras divisões categóricas, são imperfeitas, uma vez que nunca conseguem categorizar completamente ou devidamente a experiência. Essas divisões impostas são artificiais (mas não totalmente arbitrárias), onde as durações representam uma classificação que é supostamente uma fase de desenvolvimento limpo limitada por um limiar artificial como produtivo de uma ruptura clara e distinta, mas em que o subjacente se apresenta como uma frequência difusa. Nesse caso, as divisões estritamente temporais da infância são variáveis e defini-las de acordo com fronteiras estritas violenta a própria infância.

Se olharmos para a citação de Deleuze de *O que as crianças dizem* não em termos de forma ou conteúdo, não semanticamente ou sintaticamente, mas de maneira epistêmica — como um redirecionamento intencional, podemos apreciar que ele justapõe a fala das crianças com meios, trajetórias e mapas para nos incitar a caracterizar a natureza da infância de maneira diferente: na atividade como expressão. Ele está nos induzindo, despreocupadamente, a adotar uma definição dinâmica de infância redefinindo sua essência. Mas a essência que ele procura articular não é uma lista de características ou atributos representativos, mas uma narrativa discursiva compartilhada sobre o que é a infância: é mais do que uma “consciência fenomenológica de suas próprias atividades cognitivas” e mais de uma indicação da “experiência social infantil” que informa a compreensão conceitual das crianças sobre a cognição (PILLOW, 2012).

Essa relação experiencial, tanto como a conexão da criança de seu eu interior com o mundo exterior quanto com a ação de narrar a experiência, localiza a experiência em que ela está acontecendo e lhe dá uma dimensão temporal através da construção comum. De modo que, o interessante não é um modelo predicado da infância que articule preocupações molares como honestidade, coragem, bondade, gratidão e esperança, mas uma que lide com o Devir-Criança correndo na praia, ou o Devir-Criança de uma mente alienígena terra, ou Devir-Criança detritos da guerra, ou criança que se gagueja na televisão, ou criança que pode dobrar uma colher com a mente.<sup>222</sup> Para fazer isso, move-se o argumento de uma compreensão estriada e métrica da infância para uma predicada em um espaço suave de sempre tornar-se outra. Devemos dissipar a contradição inerente ao Devir-Criança como uma impossibilidade de existência e aceitar a articulação da possibilidade de sua realização

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<sup>222</sup> Aspectos do Devir-Criança que acontecem nos filmes de Andrei Tarkovsky.

especulativa, como teórica e empiricamente viável, como a incipiência discernível de agenciamentos de forças em constante mudança, de intensidades e de um Devir-Criança da criança como uma não-entidade.

### **Infância como agenciamento**

Podemos, nesse momento, identificar na citação de Deleuze (cf p. acima) sob a criança tagarela uma série de conceitos que se destacam como constitutivos de um agenciamento heterogêneo. O principal deles é a visão de "criança" não como uma categoria estática e sem vida, mas como um devir, um Devir-Criança, através de suas várias articulações. E não podemos reter-nos disso, por que perguntar sobre o quem? quê? quando? onde? e por quê? de alguma criança. Percebemos que o resultado da investigação exige que ela seja articulada heterogênea e temporalmente contrária à sua definição tradicional como uma forma estática e homogênea. Responder a qualquer uma dessas perguntas adequadamente, sem equívocos, pode ser extremamente fácil ou difícil. Cada questão envolve o conceito de "criança" de acordo com estruturas que articulam diferentes regimes de pensamento — o temporal, o extenso, o causal, o composicional e o identitário não podendo ser considerados como elementos constituintes do mesmo tipo ou de natureza uniforme sobre a qual podemos basear uma compreensão da "criança" como unívoca. Essa análise informa-nos imediatamente que a criança é uma multiplicidade heterogênea, não de coisas, mas de “determinações, grandezas, dimensões que não podem crescer sem que mude de natureza (as leis de combinação crescem então com a multiplicidade)” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1995, p. 16): essa multiplicidade não é subjetiva nem objetiva, mas o que Deleuze e Guattari chamam de rizomático e duracional.

Em Deleuze e Guattari, o conjunto molar é chamado de múltiplo porque pode assumir diversas aparências, formas ou caracteres que ele faz como resultado de sua existência concreta. Essa concretude, é definida por Simondon (1965) como a capacidade de um agenciamento específico de poder assumir vários papéis simultaneamente como participante em uma variedade de outros agenciamentos ou meios associados. Por exemplo, uma pintura na parede pode decorar uma sala, esconder um cofre-forte, servir de expressão de sentido de gosto estético ou riqueza, ou ser um troféu de divórcio, um símbolo de *status*, etc. — pode desempenhar essas funções e mais simultaneamente sem a pintura mudar de

nenhuma maneira. O aspecto em consideração fornece vários recursos, relações, aplicações e capacidades como qualidades, modos e graus.

O agenciamento como rizoma é caracterizado por Deleuze e Guattari como uma agregação de intensidades que em termos de entidades molares é uma concepção contra-intuitiva, particularmente, se considerarmos a intensidade como uma pressão instantânea em oposição a uma gradação temporal de vir a ser ou transformação. Uma intensidade é geralmente definida como um grau ou quantidade de alguma qualidade, condição, propriedade ou estado que é prontamente mensurável, mas aqui algum devir ou evento assume o peso como uma intensificação processual que não é mensurável — é relativa e não métrica. Ao considerarmos a Figura 2.3, a ilustração mostra uma vida humana como um agenciamento, uma multiplicidade duradoura demonstrando intensificação.<sup>223</sup> Aqui vemos o tubérculo de uma Vida como um todo, um dado, mesmo se nunca é dada como tal: em qualquer instante, temos apenas uma fatia, uma seção transversal, representada pelos círculos acima do tubérculo. O eixo horizontal denota o tempo em anos e não há escala no eixo vertical — a circunferência do "tubérculo" como sua seção transversal, denota intensidade, realidade. Quando cortamos transversalmente através do tubérculo rizomático de alguma Vida um acontecimento de duração, cortamos através de agenciamentos maquínicos de corpos, de forças, de linguagem, de ações e gestos, de materialidades e virtualidades que compõem as malhas interligadas de algum meio associado do devir. A Vida, como evento, tem uma duração delimitada pelos dois limiares de nascimento e cessação, mas as extremidades do tubérculo rizomático se estendem além dos limites porque alguns elementos constituintes do corpo<sup>224</sup> perduram além desses limites. O invólucro que envolve o agenciamento é tão artificial e subjetivo quanto os limiares; contém uma multiplicidade de multiplicidades, onde cada componente subsidiário é também um conjunto de intensificações que é constituído como uma série infinita de multiplicidades infinitas. Da mesma maneira, o tubérculo rizomático não é apenas uma individuação específica, ele também é um componente concreto de uma série em que ele é um

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<sup>223</sup> Ao falarmos de intensificações, precisamos ter em mente que uma intensificação pode ser mais ou menos. Uma intensificação positiva a encorpa, uma negativa a diminui. Na linguagem spinozista, isso representa uma afeição alegre ou triste pela qual o poder de agir de um corpo é aumentado ou diminuído (EIP7). Em termos de diferença, não é positivo nem negativo, mas sempre um acréscimo de diferença.

<sup>224</sup> Caso estivéssemos lidando com outro assunto que não uma vida humana, o envelope do salsichão representaria o envelope de algum Corpo sem Órgãos.

componente subsidiário. Além disso, os componentes subsidiários não são exclusivos para este devir-evento e podem contribuir concretamente para a constituição de outro evento que possa ter ocorrido antes, concorrentemente ou após o evento em questão.

Agenciamentos apresentam-se como uma univocidade que é caracterizada em termos de dois modos de compreensão, dois modos de conceituar o agenciamento: o plano de expressão e o plano de conteúdo. Os dois descrevem o mesmo evento como um regime de seleção que dá definição à entidade processual através do que pode ser considerado conteúdo ou expressão. Cada regime de seleção é considerado um plano porque se produz topologicamente como uma superfície múltipla que reúne e colhe de acordo com uma qualidade ou dimensão particular. Isso permite a Deleuze e Guattari dizer que “todas as multiplicidades são planas uma vez que elas preenchem, ocupam todas as suas dimensões” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1995, p. 17).<sup>225</sup> Os dois planos acontecem em suposição recíproca, em clara e absoluta oposição, em regime de corpos e em regime de signos que emergem imanente e simultaneamente, como uma singularidade local: a constituição do corpo é o que permite que a significação aconteça e, inversamente, a significação dá origem ao corpo. O agenciamento como uma máquina abstrata não distingue o plano de expressão e o plano de conteúdo, pois juntos constituem o plano de consistência simultânea como significativo e subjetivo, uma posição ética. Considerando-se uma montagem maquínica, não há produto como resultado a não ser sua própria produção.

### **A imediação da criança duracional**

Todo devir constitui uma multiplicidade que concretamente associa seus componentes elementares<sup>226</sup> e, assim, torna-se imperativo poder expressar as relações de ligação que permitem ao devir funcionar como um agenciamento maquínico duracional. Aqueles componentes que existem concretamente dentro de nosso ser indefinido e que participam em outros agenciamentos mostram nossa existência duracional com tudo o mais

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<sup>225</sup> A linguagem aqui vem da topologia e sua utilização da teoria dos conjuntos e o mapeamento de funções como uma cartografia.

<sup>226</sup> Os Antigos Gregos tinham quatro: Fogo, Água, Ar e Terra e Quintessência. A ciência contemporânea tem 118 elementos com dois pontos vazios nos metais de transição para duas possibilidades adicionais ainda não descobertas. Consideramos primitivos elementares aquelas Noções Comuns Espinóticas como descrito na *Ética* (2010).

no mundo e indicam a nossa insuficiência de distinguir-nos ou diferenciar-nos de outros seres e de todos esses devires que nos atravessam (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997).

Por serem uma multiplicidade de duração, esses agenciamentos que chamamos de entidades não podem ter uma identidade única, porque estão repletos do virtual, potencial oculto. Dadas as condições oportunas para tornar-se atual e realizar funcionalmente esses potenciais, o agenciamento pode ter um grau maior ou menor de realidade em termos das relações que pode manter. Essas multiplicidades de duração, que são entidades duradouras parcialmente adequadas, são infinitamente associadas. Em virtude de ser uma entidade duracional, qualquer um desses corpos é composto de infinidades de diferenciais, de gradações que não apenas diferenciam internamente uma diferença em si, uma diferença transformadora, mas também uma diferença externa como diferença de gênero. Os indiscerníveis afetivos, na medida em que não têm status “real” devido à sua natureza inadequada, são, não obstante, constitutivos de agenciamentos que são atuantes e reagentes. “Um grau, uma intensidade, é um indivíduo, *Hecceidade*, que se compõe com outros graus, outras intensidades, para formar um outro indivíduo!” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 39). Cada indivíduo é, portanto, uma multiplicidade infinita, e cada multiplicidade participa em um número infinito de multiplicidades através de sua associação concreta ao universo das multiplicidades como o Plano da Imanência.

Do ponto de vista espinoziano, o corpo do Devir-Criança, processualmente composto pela atividade, sofre muitas modificações e, através da alegria e da dor, torna-se afetivamente definido. As atividades que esse devir envolve ou sofre deixam impressões e traços que constituem seu devir através do que os diferentes afetos a tempo permitirão expressar. A criança como uma unidade, uma entidade funcional que atua como uma criança e realiza as atividades que definem a criança em uma entidade no mundo, é feita processualmente como um devir, uma aglomeração de atividade processual subsidiária que ganha peso duracional e, eventualmente, decompõe-se e torna-se (de)composto. O corpo e a mente como um só compõem o Devir-Criança por meio da experiência do mundo e dos encontros interativos em um processo imagético. Aqui, precisamos enfatizar o grande enriquecimento recíproco do pensamento de Spinoza e as ideias de percepção e afeto de Bergson e a incipiente produção de memória.

A duração processual incorpora e encorpa os afetos que acumula e harmoniza como forças do Devir-Criança de afetar e ser afetado. Essas intuições informam várias pedagogias

em relação à experiência variada, a fim de expandir o repertório ou a gama de possibilidades afetivas. Essa multiplicação de afetos abre o processo e amplia as possibilidades do devir e o torna uma topologia de multiplicidades: é aberto, multidimensional, deformável, contínuo em seus escalonamentos e se torna “grávido da duração do futuro” como Leibniz afirmou em sua *Carta do 21 de janeiro de 1704 a Burcher De Voïder* e que Bergson ecoou duzentos anos depois ao descrever a temporalidade de uma memória projetada para o futuro. A continuidade que estamos descrevendo aqui não é uma entidade física, embora possa ser interpretada como uma, mas um agenciamento identificável, singular e coerente cuja funcionalidade (ou disfuncionalidade) atesta a sua atualidade tanto como sua veracidade. Dessa maneira, todos os componentes processuais subsidiários que participam e contribuem com a experiência do Devir-Criança combinam-se para compor uma instância singular do Devir-Criança. No entanto, esse subconjunto de todas as possibilidades é diferente de um exemplar para o seguinte, na medida em que todos participamos na infância, mas não esgota as possibilidades de um Devir-Criança e não é idêntico a nenhum outro. Devir-criança é sempre único e diferente — uma singularidade — mesmo que todas as outras instâncias passem pela mesma denominação — todas aproveitam um subconjunto desses possíveis afetos disponíveis para um devir-criança e compõem livremente a entidade duracional. Os componentes que acabam participando fazem-no progressivamente e nunca aparecem como um dado ou um vir-a-ser instantâneo. Há um encaixe da coalescência na entidade associada, mas as condições e participantes propícios se amalgamam como uma convergência organizacional cuja natureza é intuitiva e quando o quórum de componentes entra em relação, o tornar-se perdura, desde que a coerência operacional possa ser mantida.

Embora pareçamos estar lidando com coisas que são definidas e certas, estamos muito no reino do indefinido e do tênue. Os corpos que invocamos aqui são compostos de elementos que não têm forma definida nem função. São conjuntos de movimento e repouso relativos, de lentidão e celeridade, de gradações e intensidades infinitas, que nos colocam no campo do afetivo, do insuficientemente discernido, que subtende um modo material de existência onde os corpos emergem como graus de adequação. Apesar de não serem totalmente determinados, insistimos em nos referir a eles como entidades e em considerá-los isto ou aquilo, atribuindo uma identidade fixa e um nome. Insistimos que eles são parcialmente adequados, pois são discerníveis, mas nunca em sua completa possibilidade.

Dizemos que são inadequados ou imperfeitos porque os comparamos com uma forma ideal que, em comparação, sempre será considerada em falta ou deficiente. No entanto, a entidade que temos em questão precisa ser percebida da forma que é, como uma proposição diferencial, e se nossa perfeição é deficiente é porque falhamos em enxergar toda a panóplia de possibilidades de que a multiplicidade diante de nós é capaz de ser percebida. A inadequação não está no objeto de uma deficiência em comparação a alguma ideia indefinível, mas em nossa capacidade cognitiva de apreciar a diferença singular do que um corpo pode fazer. Nosso compromisso relacional habitual com uma entidade nunca é a proposição existencial única como natureza essencial identitária, pois há mais para o imediatismo da apresentação do que a redutividade da "coisidade" de uma entidade.

A duração combina esses vários modelos e entendimentos como uma multiplicidade concreta de componentes humanos e não humanos, reais e virtuais, ideais e materiais, adequados e afetivos, eles mesmos também duracionais e, portanto, também capazes de serem decompostos infinitamente em multiplicidades concretas constituintes de duração, que por sua vez também podem participar de outras durações. Esses componentes se agregam ao redor e ao longo da linha do tempo de um agenciamento maquínico de acordo com a forma como chegam a participar cronologicamente na vida do sujeito e participam do acontecimento emergente — seguem um ‘caminho crítico’ de sua própria elaboração que não esgota os potenciais do que um devir pode ser. Embora o pensamento processual não desconsidere a possibilidade das coisas em si, o que o processo considera constitutivo são processos relacionais e não coisas independentes. De modo que, em nosso caso, a criança não é considerada como uma continuidade material em si, mas um aglomerado de ações, de atividade, de funções cuja integridade não é ditada apenas por processos orgânicos internos, mas por uma interação com restrições condicionantes externas e meios institucionais. A criança não é apenas uma criança, porque o corpo e a mente imatura a ditam, mas porque existem condicionantes culturais que valorizam o que o corpo e a mente não totalmente desenvolvido ou realizado representa para o social e, conseqüentemente, cria salvaguardas para manter sua duração.

Especificamente, essas são as durações dadas ao conceito de infância como um conceito em si, quando considerado dentro de vários modelos da psicologia e da sociologia. A validade explicativa tem vida limitada e o que quer que esteja incluído em suas explicações: “O modelo socialmente desenvolvido não está ligado ao que a criança



naturalmente é tanto quanto ao que a sociedade naturalmente exige da criança” (JENKS, 2008, p. 102). De modo que as várias construções sociais do que a criança deve ser — a criança socialmente desenvolvida, a criança socialmente construída, a criança tribal, a criança do grupo minoritário, a criança estrutural social — constituem conjuntos diversos de como a criança e a infância deveriam desdobrar-se no mundo, e sua validade cresce ou diminui, ou é construída diferentemente segundo como eles concordam com o espectro dominante das ideias históricas, econômicas, sociais, legais, políticas e religiosas. Cada modelo frutifica diferentes aspectos da infância como conjuntos de relações, de encontros e contrações, constituídos por “comunicações transversais entre populações heterogêneas” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 19). O que buscamos fazer é compreender a infância e a criança em termos processuais de tal maneira que ambas sejam vistas como um conjunto do que será, em última análise, expresso em termos de processos. Mas para compreender como isso pode acontecer, precisamos explicar o que seria um processo imagético, porque como veremos, os corpos criados processualmente são imagens.

## Capítulo 3

### Processo Imagético



Figura 3.1: “Olha! A Imagem!” — Times Square, NYC de noite.  
Courtesy of <http://wallpapercave.com/w/4AmjRsr>

A expressão da infância como um devir processual interativo, em um Devir-criança, requer que consideremos o processo em suas manifestações molares e moleculares — essas não são necessariamente evocativas do tamanho relativo, como em macro e micro, mas descritivas do nível ou grau da interação relacional sob consideração. Predicaremos ambas através de um modelo perceptivo imagético, como postulado por Bergson, e assim, aqui, examinamos detalhadamente o processo imagético.

#### 3.1 A onipresença das imagens

A presença ubíqua de imagens importuna nossa experiência de vida cotidiana: não só vivemos em constante exposição às imagens, mas estamos sujeitos ao seu constante escrutínio. As imagens nos cercam, envolvem-nos e constituem os ambientes em que vivemos; permitimos que elas nos governem e componham nossos desejos; elas ocupam

nossos sonhos, fantasias e memórias; pensamos, sentimos, vemos e falamos através de imagens e, como objetos de satisfação, comparamo-nos a elas. Percebemos o mundo através de imagens produzidas pelos dados sensíveis da percepção e associados à memória e à imaginação. Mas, nesta proliferação imagética como simulação de vida, em que o mundo das aparências nos leva a crer que ver é conhecer, que conhecer é compreender e compreender é controlar, a universalidade da formulação heroica "Eu vim, eu vi, eu conquistei" também parece servir como premissa adequada para o pensamento e desconsiderar a necessidade de uma compreensão adequada sobre as imagens. Essa imersão imagética nos leva a crer em um mundo-imagem de escolha e autodeterminação, no qual somos livres para agir, decidir e determinar nosso destino.

Este tipo de pensamento objetificador da experiência, baseado no senso comum, tem sido um problema perene para pensadores de todas as faixas em que diferentes tipos de imagem e modos de compreensão são confundidos de maneira em que não há consistência na apresentação das ideias e nenhuma coerência interpretativa possível para o que são, muitas vezes, assuntos particulares. Da mesma forma que "todos sabemos o que é o pensamento", "todos sabemos o que são imagens" — podemos até mesmo parafrasear Santo Agostinho em: "O que é então, uma imagem? Se ninguém me pergunta, eu sei o que é. Se eu quiser explicar àquele quem pergunta, eu não sei". E para muitos, ser capaz de "ver imagens" é o suficiente para referir todas as suas pressuposições acerca da imagem em relação ao ser sensível, concreto e empírico (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1992).

Mas em um ambiente como a Times Square durante a noite (Fig. 1), em Nova York, pode-se apreciar o poder afetivo do "Shock and Awe" da luz como imagem pura e bruta de nossa imersão de resplendor e brilho. Qualquer um pode ficar em frente a este espetáculo espalhafatoso e por meio de um grande gesto de espetáculo, clamar sem vergonha: "Vejam! A imagem!" e ninguém seria capaz de questionar a veracidade da afirmação de que esse espetáculo representa uma realização perfeita e fiel da demonstração conceitual do que é uma imagem em toda a sua complexidade e em todo o seu esplendor intuitivo. Qualquer pessoa que esteja no canteiro central da Broadway na rua 44 pode absorver o espetáculo e ficar imerso em uma miríade de tipos de imagens — sejam elas mentais, pictóricas, óticas ou linguísticas — sem a necessidade de distinguir entre os diferentes tipos, ao mesmo tempo em que é engolido pelo poder esmagador deste espetáculo totalmente imagético. Na verdade, teríamos dificuldade em mostrar tamanha concentração de imagens em qualquer

outro lugar: do mais material ao mais ideal e abstrato, os vários tipos de imagens são apresentados aqui simultaneamente para interagir uns com os outros e conosco, como espectadores. Tomadas como um todo, essas imagens criam um ambiente experiencial imersivo de luz colorida como uma ecologia imagética onde imagens se misturam umas com as outras, com suas fontes e seus espectadores, em um todo espetacular em que qualquer tentativa de categorização seria frustrada pelas dificuldades em tentar indicar as linhas de demarcação entre os vários exemplares.

Estar na Times Square à noite e experienciá-la pelo que ela é e olhar para uma foto sua não é a mesma coisa. A experiência imagética presencial da zona mais representativa da Broadway envolve uma multiplicidade de impressões sensoriais não apenas visuais, mas envolve imagens que surgem de nossos outros sentidos também. Tomado como um ambiente experiencial, o efeito do espetáculo sobre o espectador é uma proposta estética única, um paisagismo afetivo singular do qual não há replicação ou substituição possível. Mas, se limitarmos nossas considerações às impressões visuais, estar presente no espetáculo de luz da Times Square nos oferece uma experiência imediata como um desdobramento temporal do movimento imagético — conscientização não apenas de algo como experiência do mundo, mas como um ser não-mediado no mundo. Em primeiro lugar, somos impactados pelas interações e interferências da luz colorida variada como intensidades afetivas indeterminadas; percebemos coisas que podem ser objetos tridimensionais ou imagens pictóricas bidimensionais. Somos atraídos por reflexões e difrações de luz de vitrines e superfícies espelhadas; lemos as letras em marquises e *displays* de propaganda; entendemos os signos de trânsito que nos alertam para perigos; somos seduzidos por anúncios que apelam a nossa vaidade. E todas essas imagens visuais são intercaladas aleatoriamente com imagens mentais compostas por nosso sonhar acordado, pensamentos desejosos, lembranças, fantasias, desejos, projeções, interpretações subjetivas e respostas a esse furor afetivo.

Mas, simplesmente olhando para a fotografia da Times Square apresentada na Figura 3.1, somos atraídos — nos envolvemos e nos deixamos enganar — por intermédio do mundo imagético ausente da Times Square como uma representação da experiência presencial imediata. Primeiramente, percebemos a imagem representada pela fotografia que internalizamos não como a coisa real, mas como uma representação pictórica, e a entendemos, sem necessariamente chegar a essa realização como uma conclusão

consciente, pelo que nosso corpo nos diz e pela sua reação frente à experiência sensorial da imagem.<sup>227</sup> A representação da perspectiva capturada pela imagem fotográfica concorda com a imagem que conjuramos em nossa mente como resultado da imagem ocular projetada sob nossa retina.<sup>228</sup> Podemos ver dentro da fotografia uma semelhança pictórica do que percebemos diretamente quando ocupamos o ponto de vista estabelecido pela câmera, tanto de maneira pictórica quanto mental.

Apesar desta superabundância de imagens que nos são oferecidas, ainda temos dificuldade em afirmar o que é uma imagem como tal e definir o que constitui a diferença essencial entre um tipo de imagem e outro: qual é o fundamento imagético comum entre as imagens mentais experienciais da consciência, a imagem pictórica de uma fotografia, a imagem visual perceptiva derivada opticamente, a imagem verbal da linguagem que é usada para descrevê-la ou a impressão sensorial de fenômenos não visuais que complementam a visão e completam nossa experiência? Ou, de maneira mais simples, qual é a qualidade ou quais são as qualidades compartilhadas por todas essas experiências que nos permitem chamá-las de imagens? Para responder a esta pergunta, é preciso primeiro chegar a uma compreensão sobre o que é uma imagem.

### **3.2 Uma tentativa por intermédio da classificação**

Os muitos tipos de imagens e suas manifestações levam à discordância na taxonomia imagética, apresentando um sério obstáculo para a conceitualização da imagem além da concepção do senso comum. Por exemplo, em "O que é uma imagem?" (1984), o historiador e crítico de arte americano W.J.T. Mitchell propõe uma árvore genealógica, uma taxinomia arborescente, de diferentes tipos de imagem: gráfica, óptica, perceptual, mental e verbal e postula um conceito parental da imagem "como tal" (Fig. 3.2). Não há nenhuma surpresa nisto.

Cada categoria especifica um tipo de imagem que pertence ao discurso particular de alguma disciplina intelectual: a imagem gráfica refere às artes visuais e plásticas e pertence ao historiador de arte; a imagem óptica à óptica e à física e pertence ao cientista; a mental

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<sup>227</sup> Os olhos informam o cérebro por um ângulo parallático constante de que a imagem que está sendo percebida é exibida em uma tela plana e não se move objetos em 3D.

<sup>228</sup> Ou pelo menos, isso é o que é amplamente acreditado.

refere à epistemologia e à psicologia e, portanto, pertence ao psicólogo; a verbal, ao crítico literário; e a imagem perceptual, que é composta de uma região limiar "onde fisiologistas, neurologistas, psicólogos, historiadores de arte e estudiosos de óptica colaboram com filósofos e críticos literários" (MITCHELL, 1984, p. 550). Esta última categoria abrange as espécies de Aristóteles e as formas sensíveis; dados sensoriais ou perceptos; e as aparências ou impressões visuais — uma verdadeira diversidade de fenômenos imagéticos difíceis de classificar. Imagens perceptuais compartilham algumas de suas complicações com Imagens Mentais de maneira que aquelas dependem de processos que se apoiam em circunstâncias fisiológicas e condições receptivas de percepção. E presidindo desse espectro variado de imagens, Mitchell localiza "um conceito parental, o conceito da " imagem como tal ", o fenômeno cujo discurso institucional apropriado é a filosofia e a teologia" (MITCHELL, 1984, p. 550). Mas, curiosamente, nenhuma das imagens parece "pertencer" aos próprios criadores das imagens — sejam eles artistas, escritores, leitores, pensadores, sonhadores, ou pessoas como você e eu. Imagens parecem pertencer exclusivamente ao discurso disciplinado.

Dessa forma, a imagem "como tal" seria o conceito padrão para as imagens específicas como filiações que povoam a arborescência da classificação taxonômica. Como Mitchell escreve, a concepção da imagem é primariamente pictórica e baseada na experiência sensorial, de maneira que, se nos referimos às imagens do lado direito da figura ou às do lado esquerdo, sua ideação recai dentro de um espectro de abstração imagético que governa as teorias representacionais da mente através de uma teoria pictural do significado, em que "a consciência em si é entendida como uma atividade de produção, reprodução e representação pictórica" (MITCHELL, 1984, p. 509). Enquanto nos movemos da esquerda para a direita no descontínuo do espectro de classificação de Mitchell<sup>229</sup> (Figura 3.2), podemos discernir: um grau crescente de abstração de como as imagens podem ser entendidas; um afastamento de uma compreensão vernacular ou de senso comum em direção à definição mais conceitual e subjetiva da imagem; que os tipos de imagem

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<sup>229</sup> A precisão aqui explicitada pela palavra descontínuo é importante porque, para Mitchell, ao contrário de Hume (1740), que sustenta que as impressões e ideias são intensivas e diferem apenas no grau de vivacidade, o espectro dos tipos de imagem é caracterizado como diferindo em espécie.

dependem da imagem gráfica como fundamental; que um tipo de imagem à esquerda de uma outra implica pressuposição ou antecedência conceitual.<sup>230</sup>

A palavra imagem é derivada do latim *imāgo*, que reflete a mesma raiz que *imitārī*, imitar, e seus vários aspectos: imitação, cópia, semelhança, estátua, imagem, fantasma; concepção, pensamento, ideia; similitude, aparência, sombra. As definições do latim abrangem muitos dos significados que moldam a predicação conceitual e os predicamentos<sup>231</sup> da imagem e podemos discernir a classificação de Mitchell em meio a essa panóplia de significados.<sup>232</sup> A palavra *imago* transmite uma pluralidade de significados: expressa a externalidade da imagem como um objeto que existe no mundo e interage com nossos sentidos; exprime o imediatismo relacional do encontro face a face através da ideia; alude à correlação e à correspondência da imagem mental com o mundo externo; e sugere seu funcionamento como um tropo retórico, signo ou símbolo semiótico.

### 3.3 A Tipologia das Imagens de Mitchell: Gráfica, Óptica, Perceptual, Mental, Verbal

Para os nossos propósitos, optamos por desenvolver o conceito de imagem através do visual e do pictórico, principalmente, porque estes são considerados os modos dominantes de encontro com o mundo e de representação dentro desse encontro. Como tal, a imagem é considerada, inicialmente, uma representação da forma externa de qualquer objeto no mundo, como uma semelhança, uma imitação ou cópia que pode ser um objeto

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<sup>230</sup> Parece que a imagem é um operador de mediação bidirecional, uma interface entre o que pode ser designado como algo e o que não é, entre A e ~ A. Um limiar experiencial que demarca o A do ~A que funciona nos dois sentidos, para as duas entidades em relação que articulam ou servem como articulações do “ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde” (Didi-Huberman, 1992).

<sup>231</sup> Aqui usamos a situação como aporia, mas também em seu sentido mais técnico em relação à categorização. As dez 'categorias' ou 'predicamentos' de Aristóteles são: 1 Substância ou ser (οὐσία), 2 Quantidade, 3 Qualidade, 4 Relação (πρός τι), 5 Lugar, 6 Tempo, 7 Postura (κείσθαι), 8 Ter ou posse (ἔχειν), 9 Ação, 10 Paixão.

<sup>232</sup> Se o leitor achar essa abordagem vernacular da imagem ofensiva à sua sensibilidade quanto ao que é discurso acadêmico apropriado, estamos simplesmente apelando para a natureza social da linguagem na qual qualquer termo adquire definição através de suas dimensões sociais como Saussure postula. Nosso interesse aqui não é tanto nos basear na erudição estabelecida, mas construir uma dissolução anarquista em um liquidificador ideacional. Trata-se mais de estabelecer uma colcha de retalhos de possibilidade que se configura em torno do conceito como gênese para análise. Além disso, academicamente, o conceito da imagem não existe como uma expressão singular e unívoca, e esta análise superficial, esperançosamente, dá uma pluralidade à ideação em qualquer nível de ideação. Como Russell e Whitehead, eu procuro “uma construção e não uma inferência”(Russell, xvi)

físico ou mental. A natureza objetivada da imagem é amplamente articulada através da tipologia de imagens de Mitchell.




Figura 3.2: Categorização arborescente dos tipos de imagem postulada por MITCHELL (1984).

A imagem gráfica inclui o produto da representação pictórica e escultural. O mundo em si e as coisas que o povoam como objetos de nosso interesse se entregam aos sentidos de acordo com formas que são adequadas à receptividade dos sentidos. Assim, de acordo com o senso comum, as várias imagens aqui apresentadas resultam de experiências sensoriais baseadas na ideia de impressão — de impacto estético — de modo que “quase todos nós” entendemos o esquema mecanicista cartesiano de estímulos sensoriais transduzidos em impulsos neurais que, de alguma maneira, estão impressos na mente como fundamentação de uma reação ativa, cognição ou razão, o que é normalmente entendido como Modelo Cartesiano.






Figura 3.3: A teoria da visão de Descartes como uma proposta circular que destaca a glândula pineal. Xilogravura de seu livro *L'Homme* (1664, *Tratado sobre o homem*).

Desse modo, tomando a visão como um exemplo desse esquema mecanicista cartesiano tradicional, “vemos” uma flecha diante de nós, a lente do olho projeta um campo óptico, que inclui a flecha, totalmente composto como um conjunto planar pré-constituído sob a retina e os efeitos dessa impressão luminosa atravessam os nervos ópticos para serem impressos no teatro da mente como uma imagem visual da flecha, a qual a mente reconhece como algo que quase todos nós chamaríamos de flecha, e portanto, como um exemplar da nossa imagem mental genérica de uma flecha o que nos permite afirmar com certeza e indicar que o que está diante de nós<sup>233</sup> é uma flecha: “Olhem! Uma flecha!”.<sup>234</sup>

As imagens ópticas são aquelas que são produzidas por raios de luz projetados por dispositivos ópticos sob uma superfície, que aparecem em uma superfície polida e refletora, como um espelho; ou que aparecem após passar por uma pequena abertura como aquela de

<sup>233</sup> *Epideixis*. Ἐπίδειξις. Demonstração. *E pideiktikos*. Ἐπιδεικτικός. Demonstrativo.

<sup>234</sup> A imagem de Descartes é ambígua na medida em que a seta é mostrada como composta de três pontos, ABC, que são transmitidos para dentro através dos nervos ópticos mostrados corretamente juntos no Quiasma Ótico para terminar em dois pontos que agora seriam chamados de Lateral. Núcleos Genuculados. A representação anatômica do sistema visual torna-se imprecisa, pois os tecidos aqui se tornam excessivamente indiferenciados e exigiriam tecnologias ainda não disponíveis para diferenciar entre as fibras e para onde elas eventualmente levariam. Há uma conexão incerta aqui com a glândula pineal através de um abismo ou intervalo indefinido e então retransmitida através de outro intervalo para as fibras musculares no braço para produzir contrações musculares que designam a flecha como tendo uma extensão composta de pontos. No entanto, a intuição de Descartes de um número infinito de canais transmitindo o fogo elementar foi muito perspicaz, mesmo que não completamente correta. Isso mostra a consistência da concepção atômica ou pontilhista de Descartes sobre a natureza, explicitada em sua matemática analítica.

uma *câmera obscura*; ou como a convergência focalizada de raios de luz em uma superfície, como uma retina; ou como uma imagem holográfica 3D.<sup>235</sup> As imagens perceptuais são aquelas que tradicionalmente se enquadram no estudo da psicologia e que ancoram a metafísica da mente (NOË e THOMPSON, 2002), aquelas por meio das quais conhecemos o mundo como fenômenos e que dão lugar à consciência. A teoria ortodoxa da percepção na qual a teoria psicológica do paralelismo se baseia, apoia-se na teoria visual e “tenta explicar como o cérebro faz a ponte entre o que é dado ao sistema visual e o que é realmente experimentado pelo observador” (NOË e THOMPSON, 2002, p. 2). Assim, as imagens de percepção visual são aquelas que são oferecidas à mente através do nervo óptico, mas é importante destacar que elas são diferentes das imagens ópticas que são produzidas na superfície da retina como resultado da convergência de raios de luz pela lente. A estrutura da retina e a transdução de impressões luminosas em impulsos nervosos oferecem à mente uma experiência totalmente diferente daquela que se encontra na retina. Nas últimas décadas, o modelo perceptivo visual passou a ser criticado por várias frentes, devido particularmente à exclusividade da visão em detrimento de uma abordagem sensorial holística ao encontro com o ambiente, a compreensão da imagem como interativa, enativa e incorporada, as propostas de visão animada que contrariam o modelo estabelecido da imagem retiniana estacionária e abstraída, e o reposicionamento da subjetividade do processo de visão do cérebro para a interação ambiental direta.

Mitchell tornou-se interessado pelo antigo problema filosófico de Wittgenstein "para examinar as maneiras em que colocamos essas imagens "em nossas cabeças"" (MITCHELL, 1984, p. 508). Acharmos o ponto de atenção de Mitchell bastante interessante por sua ênfase na divisão analítica, por sua expressão do movimento processual e pelo apelo repetido de colocar as coisas em “contêineres”, sejam eles categorias taxinômicas ou crânios. Esse tipo de afirmação geralmente esconde o aprendizado que está por trás do entendimento das palavras como uma acumulação e aglomeração de atributos conceituais aprendidos que são amalgamados em uma unidade identitária a qual nomeamos e esquecemos sua aquisição progressiva. Isto indica que a cognição é a expressão da atividade cumulativa, progressiva, processual da percepção. Mas se considerarmos a afirmação “a maneira como colocamos

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<sup>235</sup> Além disso, uma imagem produzida por reflexão ou refração é chamada na óptica de uma imagem real quando os raios de cada ponto do objeto realmente se encontram em um ponto, uma imagem virtual quando divergem como se de um ponto além do corpo refletivo ou refratário.

imagens em nossas cabeças”, e analisarmos “a maneira”<sup>236</sup> não de modo classificatório analítico ou sistema de divisão, mas um caminho que é seguido — como *meta hodos* — um método, um meio ou arte de ver, há também um encontro narrativo ou discursivo envolvendo a antiga arte da memória. É um modelo caixa preta da cognição por meio do qual tentamos entender o que é apresentado aos nossos olhos. Há o reconhecimento do que é de maneira consistente e correta. A fala e o gesto auxiliam na indicação. Subscrevemos a ideia, mais ou menos, de que os estímulos sensoriais transduzidos em impulsos neurais viajam por meio de vias tortuosas e complexas demais para serem absolutamente determinadas a resultar em uma ideia — no exemplo cartesiano anterior, onde a percepção visual da flecha encontra seu caminho para a glândula pineal e ativa os músculos do braço a fim de gesticular e mover o dedo de modo a indicar a flecha: o caminho é indeterminado, mas determinável e determinado em sua autodeterminação para chegar à determinação correta de que temos diante de nós uma flecha. Como veremos, esse é um modo muito bergsoniano de descrever a imagem, e que poderá ser corroborado por meio da perspectiva e da geometria projetiva.

Em contraste, a imagem mental se refere a fenômenos quase-visuais que surgem como consciência, mas não causados por impressões sensoriais. Estes fenômenos resultam em representações psicológicas que ocorrem como resultado de pensamentos, sonhos, memórias, ideias ou do funcionamento da imaginação inventiva e criativa, e derivam de outras causas que não o imediatamente perceptível. A distinção entre imagens perceptuais e imagens mentais é que as primeiras resultam da relação associativa entre sujeitos e objetos no mundo e as últimas derivam da atividade abstrata do processo mental subjetivo. Ambas são privativas e internas e a distinção reflete a abordagem epistemológica do conhecimento entre a cognição observacional imediata do mundo como experiência direta e a atividade consciente da mente que envolve dados sensoriais imediatos e diretos como o objeto de consideração dos fenômenos da mente não derivados de dados sensoriais imediatos. Imagens perceptuais e imagens mentais estão ligadas, mas não necessariamente por meios contínuos ou estendidos. As imagens perceptuais são geralmente entendidas como antecedentes, causais ou logicamente anteriores às imagens mentais dentro dos processos da mente. E, ao mesmo tempo, a imagem mental está intimamente ligada ao

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<sup>236</sup> E não de uma maneira analítica categórica ou sistema de divisão.

pensamento e ao conceito da Ideia de maneiras não totalmente óbvias. Descartes ressalta repetidamente que as ideias são *tanquam* (por assim dizer) imagens, nem pictóricas nem ópticas, e que elas são um dos grandes problemas da psicologia, mesmo antes de ser consideradas filosoficamente..

Como Hampton e Moss afirmam, “a representação conceitual é indiscutivelmente a função mais importante em humanos” (HAMPTON & MOSS, 2003, p. 505). No entanto, a intuição orientadora que torna a Imagem Verbal imagética, no sentido de ser pictórico, parece existir apenas metaforicamente, conforme o que existe na mente, um modo de expressão perfeitamente transparente que representa diretamente objetos, conceitos e ideias. Para Platão, o principal e verdadeiro propósito das palavras é δήλωσις, *dilosis* (NEHRING, 1945), uma maneira de tornar conhecida ou uma indicação, uma manifestação, explicação ou demonstração (LIDDELL & SCOTT, 1883) com a finalidade de comunicar. Mas esse aspecto comunicativo é controverso na medida em que pode ser interpretado como o elo entre mentes, pode ser predicado em um tipo de imagem relacional ou comum, entretanto, ao estabelecer esse elo comunicativo, o signo e o símbolo são conjurados em termos de degradação de significado, de falsidade ou enganação representada por meio das palavras: “Uma comunicação vem de mim para você através de algo diferente do que quero dizer com o meu discurso” (Platão). Assim sendo, por intermédio do mecanismo da linguagem, o funcionamento das palavras e da linguagem torna-se imagético em termos de signo e função simbólica na comunicação através de tropos retóricos, como metafórico, metonímico, onomatopéico ou sinédico. Nehring observa que “ao enfatizar a heterogeneidade da expressão e da coisa expressa, Platão ressalta o que é uma característica básica de todo signo: ele sempre significa algo diferente de si mesmo. Pelo menos no *Sofista*, Platão chama expressamente os substantivos de *simeia*<sup>237</sup> (NEHRING, 1945) — muito próximo da definição de Peirce do signo como fundamento de sua semiótica. No entanto, para nós, o aspecto linguístico da imagem é irrelevante para as nossas preocupações. Talvez irrelevante seja uma palavra muito forte; a imagem verbal não é pertinente a nossa construção conceitual e a linguística pode ser incluída sob as preocupações mais gerais da semiótica.

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<sup>237</sup> Semeion. Σημεῖον é uma interessante escolha de palavras para a atividade das palavras. Traduzido livremente

Uma das implicações da ideação da imagem de Bergson é que a imagem não é exclusivamente, necessariamente visual (BERGSON, 1991). Como ele a define, a imagem é um agenciamento triádico que compreende um estímulo, um centro de indeterminação e uma reação — qualquer par estímulo-resposta que passa pelo centro da indeterminação é uma imagem, de modo que a reação eferente a um estímulo visual não tem que ser um movimento ocular exclusivamente. É importante ressaltar que o estímulo é transmitido para dentro por um circuito neural chamado aferente, ou centrípeto. É processado dentro do centro de indeterminação onde uma reação é produzida e transmitida para fora por meio de um sistema neural diferente, chamado centrífugo ou eferente, de modo a produzir uma contração muscular. Em termos dos olhos, a estimulação luminosa é transmitida para dentro, através dos nervos ópticos, até o corpo geniculado lateral, de onde são projetados até os lobos occipitais. A partir daí, é gerada uma reação que se movimenta para fora através da via oculomotor até o núcleo oculomotor para inervar e causar contrações nos nervos oculomotores e produzir movimento ocular, de modo que o gesto real de resposta ocorre em plano neural diferente daquele da estimulação. Independentemente de se formar ou não uma imagem pictórica em algum lugar do cérebro, a resposta a um estímulo visual é, portanto, uma contração muscular expressiva do pensamento. Separar o estímulo e a contração muscular como resposta é um tipo de "processo de pensamento" que orienta a determinação de qual contração deve ser produzida a partir daquele estímulo específico.

Desse modo, se sabemos que a imagem é o que estimula o cérebro, e compreendemos o resultado da contração muscular como uma nova imagem, então talvez se possa obter alguma percepção dos processos de pensamento que ocorrem entre o estímulo e a reação. Como William James escreve em *Pragmatism* (1943), “Para desenvolver o significado de um pensamento, precisamos apenas determinar que conduta é destinada a produzir; essa conduta é para nós seu único significado” (JAMES, 1943, p. 46).<sup>238</sup> Sentimos a possibilidade de equacionar a imagem e o pensamento, a sensação e o significado, através de uma imagem-pensamento mediata/imediata pelo desempenho ocular. Se as imagens trabalham desta forma, esta linha de pensamento pode ser aplicada a outras ações ou atividades no mundo: podemos pôr em prática uma engenharia reversa

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<sup>238</sup> Embora este seja o ponto que desejamos fazer, James enfatiza a necessidade de contexto em seu ensaio de 1905 “Como duas mentes podem conhecer uma coisa” que apareceu como parte de sua coleção *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (JAMES, 1912, p. 123) — tanto para o sujeito quanto para a imagem em estudo.

(*reverse-engineer*) da visão para entrar no processo de pensamento do sujeito através da replicação do movimento dos olhos como indicativo e designativo do conteúdo do pensamento.

A prática empírica que envolve o rastreamento óptico é pertinente às preocupações fisiológicas e psicológicas e aqui examinamos uma linha clássica de experimentos realizados pelo psicólogo russo Alfred L. Yarbus, que estudou cientificamente os movimentos oculares nas décadas de 1950 e 1960 e tentou uma relação entre suas descobertas experimentais e conceitos do pensamento imagético e a filosofia do processo. Embora a experimentação atual com a tecnologia de rastreamento ocular digital vá tecnicamente além do trabalho de Yarbus, descobrimos que os métodos analógicos usados por Yarbus estão de acordo com nossa estética intelectual e são perfeitamente capazes de ilustrar nossas ideias. Ao afirmar isso, afastamo-nos da compreensão binária da consciência como uma "consciência *de* algo" que substituímos com a expressão *temporal* da consciência do que se apresenta a mente. Um de nossos objetivos é reposicionar o movimento ocular como expressão de uma subjetividade guiada por um surgimento perceptivo mútuo, que emerge como devir imanente — aquele que surge de, por, dentro, e através da síntese da relação no avanço processual como uma lógica estética da sensação.

Essa alternância exige que entendamos a imagem de maneira diferente. Como tal, usamos a concepção de Henri Bergson da imagem como “uma certa existência que é mais do que aquilo que o idealista chama uma representação, porém menos do que aquilo que o realista chama uma coisa — uma existência situada a meio caminho entre a "coisa" e a “representação”” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 2). A localização da imagem dessa maneira nos dissocia da ideação do senso comum da imagem como objeto existente independentemente da consciência que a percebe e do entendimento de que o objeto é aquilo que é percebido. Isso nos oferece uma concepção muito diferente da estrutura da imagem, uma concepção no coração do pensamento de Bergson: “Percebo nervos aferentes que transmitem estímulos aos centros nervosos, em seguida nervos eferentes que partem do centro, conduzem estímulos à periferia e põem em movimento partes do corpo ou o corpo inteiro” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 13).

Quando adotamos a concepção da imagem de Bergson para interpretar os experimentos de Yarbus, podemos entendê-los de maneira diferente em termos das gravações dos movimentos dos olhos traduzidas ao papel fotossensível tornam-se traços

documentários que podem ser estudados como um diagrama. Segundo Deleuze em *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* (1981), consideramos o diagrama de acordo com seus aspectos estéticos como o suporte operativo subjacente que funde e dinamiza o campo de visão como a catástrofe do fato coerente e unívoco. Em termos de imagens perceptuais e mentais, muita atenção é dada aos aspectos de semelhança e similitude, de conformidade direta entre um aspecto selecionado do mundo e a imagem de percepção que se segue, de modo que a veracidade da representação interna é idealizada em torno de uma estrita correspondência entre a imagem que é projetada na retina pela lente do olho e a imagem percepção.<sup>239</sup> Nossa convicção é que essa preocupação ou fixação na semelhança pictórica e similitude é inadequadamente articulada e indevidamente modelada. Na maior parte, a proposição pictórica da perspectiva como redescoberta no início do século XV, supostamente por Brunelleschi, não é tão óbvia e evidente quanto possa parecer à primeira vista. A aparente verossimilhança da imagem-perspectiva é enganosa, pois acredita-se amplamente que o que é oferecido ao olho é o que se manifesta na mente, visto que uma representação pictórica de um desenhista competente nos oferece uma representação correta do que a mente tem processado e retransmitido como uma representação. Tomamos como certo que esta representação<sup>240</sup> transmitida ao papel está em conformidade não apenas com a percepção observacional, mas talvez mais significativamente, com o que os outros "veem" e podem corroborar como a correção do desenho. Produzir a semelhança gráfica pictórica sobre um vidro transparente dentro de um esquema projetivo perspectivo, satisfaz o costume de pensar a definição da imagem frequentemente repetida como existente entre a entidade subjetiva e a entidade objetiva.

Além disso, uma imagem gráfica de uma cena ou objeto produzida por meio da objetividade impessoal e da independência técnica de um dispositivo óptico, como uma câmera fotográfica ou um espelho, se for renderizada e fixada numa superfície transparente, como um vidro de janela, pode ser colocada entre um espectador e o objeto a uma distância que estabelecerá correspondência direta e conformidade projetiva entre a imagem na superfície transparente e a cena: a imagem gráfica como uma representação mecânica de um processo mental oferece um isomorfismo escalar que mantém congruência angular com

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<sup>239</sup> Que precisamos ler de maneira bergsoniana.

<sup>240</sup> Veremos mais tarde que essa representação não é uma imagem pictórica *per se*, mas relacional.

a apresentação do campo óptico para a retina.<sup>241</sup> A mente traduz e aceita a similitude escalar projetiva como uma verdadeira<sup>242</sup> semelhança que se encontra<sup>243</sup> entre o sujeito e o objeto, entre o vidente e o observado, entre o conhecedor e o conhecido: é assim que podemos entender um *close-up* de um rosto em uma tela de cinema de 10m de altura e percebê-lo como uma imagem ampliada e não o rosto de um gigante nos observando, ou por que podemos substituir uma foto da Times Square à noite pelo evento real.

Sendo assim, concordamos com Bergson em *Matéria e Memória*, que temos uma consciência perceptiva constituída por três componentes imagéticos. Primeiro, temos a imagem ótica que é composta pelos raios de luz focalizados pelas lentes do olho na retina; segundo, o processo de percepção em que a retina acolhe, recebe e coleta os raios de luz a seu jeito e transduz a energia luminosa concentrada em impulsos neurais; terceiro, a produção de uma imagem mental daquilo que percebemos onde se encontra e a contração. Mas agora propomos examinar uma série de experimentos realizados pelo cientista russo Alfred E. Yarbus que podemos usar para problematizar um aspecto da xilogravura do modelo cartesiano de percepção (Figura 3.3). Embora a pesquisa sobre o movimento ocular tenha sido seguida subsequentemente da experimentação de Yarbus, a pesquisa realizada parece estar preocupada com os aspectos dos movimentos oculares sacádicos e fixações que podem ser quantificados. Pouco trabalho foi feito sobre as implicações imagéticas do movimento ocular em áreas fora da psicologia — a maioria dos pesquisadores nas ciências sociais ainda operam sob a premissa de que a imagem ótica que pousa na retina é a imagem perceptual operativa que é finalmente processada como uma imagem mental. Desejamos aqui tentar estabelecer especulativamente uma correspondência entre o movimento dos olhos e os tipos de informação que o olho está produzindo, bem como o que isso poderia significar para nós em termos de nossas preocupações filosóficas sobre a imagem.

### **Os experimentos do movimento dos olhos de Alfred E. Yarbus**

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<sup>241</sup> Isto é o que é apresentado ao campo da retina não "o que vemos".

<sup>242</sup> A verdade aqui se refere à natureza maquínica da relação.

<sup>243</sup> Que não só está posicionado na separação entre o sujeito e o objeto, mas também serve à função de substituto, substituto ou corpo-duplo, em contraste com os estudos de Bergson, para quem a imagem acontece a meio caminho entre o sujeito e o objeto e ocupa o intervalo de determinação, tanto como trabalho ocupado de determinação quanto como seu habitar temporal e espacial. Esse ocupado de determinação é o que imbui a operação com valor.



Os experimentos marcantes de Yarbus sobre o movimento ocular estudam “a percepção de imagens que são estritamente estacionárias em relação à retina, os princípios que governam os movimentos dos olhos humanos e o estudo de seu papel no processo da visão” (YARBUS, 1967, p. ix). Seu trabalho é descrito em detalhe no seu livro *Eye Movements and Vision* (1967), traduzido da língua russa, e relata suas observações dos micro — e macro-movimentos e as fixações consequentes dos olhos sobre um objeto estacionário. Para realizar seus estudos, Yarbus empregou “ventosas” oculares especialmente projetadas que



Figura 3.4: Ilya Repin, *O Visitante Inesperado*, (1884).

cobrem a córnea para registrar e medir o movimento dos olhos.<sup>244</sup> Estas ventosas são copinhos de borracha que cobrem completamente a córnea, afixados por meio de sucção ao globo ocular, cada um equipado com uma pequena lente e um espelho planar que utilizam luz refletida para gravar um registo contínuo do movimento do olho sobre papel

<sup>244</sup> Ao longo dos anos, Yarbus e outros experimentadores inventaram várias ventosas descritas em *Eye Movements and Vision* (YARBUS, 1967). Alguns foram afixados na esclera, mas a maioria cobriam a córnea.

fotossensível. As ventosas eram pequenas e leves para não prejudicarem significativamente o movimento ocular ou inibirem sua celeridade. Yarbus instalava seus sujeitos no aparato de teste — um suporte pesado equipado com um apoio para o queixo e uma braçadeira para a cabeça, duas luzes e um painel de controle — e os instruía sobre como examinar as imagens: com e sem condições problematizantes. Yarbus então pedia aos seus sujeitos para examinarem visualmente um “objeto complexo” por um período pré-definido e o aparelho registraria o movimento dos olhos. Aqui, objetos complexos seriam, em sua maior parte, imagens pictóricas planas bidimensionais com vários caracteres ou pontos de interesse — as imagens usadas por Yarbus eram fotografias de rostos e reproduções fotográficas de pinturas figurativas do século XIX, com gráficos em preto e branco.

Uma série significativa de experimentos relatados por Yarbus e realizada em seu aparato, foi realizada sobre a pintura de Ilya Yefimovich Repin (1844-1930), *O Visitante Inesperado* (1884), mostrada na Figura 3.4. Yarbus projetou seus experimentos em torno de sete tarefas ou condicionamentos diferentes dados para testar os participantes (YARBUS, 1967). Os sujeitos foram solicitados a:

- 1) Examinar a imagem livremente;
- 2) Avaliar as circunstâncias materiais da família na pintura;
- 3) Determinar as idades das pessoas;
- 4) Supor o que a família fazia antes da chegada do “visitante inesperado”;
- 5) Lembrar-se das roupas usadas pelas pessoas;
- 6) Lembrar-se da posição das pessoas e objetos na sala;
- 7) Determinar quanto tempo o “visitante inesperado” esteve longe da família.

Um aspecto fundamental do trabalho de Yarbus é a demonstração de como o pré-condicionamento do olhar orienta o desempenho da visão e o resultado do que será visto. Seus experimentos mostram que, quando um sujeito de teste é solicitado para buscar informações específicas dentro de uma cena complexa, os movimentos oculares são condicionados pela natureza da informação que o espectador é solicitado a descobrir. O resultado das diferentes codificações — as diferentes maneiras de ler uma cena — oferecem leituras ou narrativas visuais alternativas da mesma cena. Embora o dado permaneça o mesmo, o conteúdo é articulado de maneira diferente dependendo de como o encontro é condicionado. Dependendo do que o sujeito é solicitado a conhecer, a ordem, o ritmo e a duração das fixações variarão, e uma variedade de narrativas ocorrerá.

O exame livre da imagem por diferentes sujeitos revelou que todos os observadores examinaram a pintura de maneira diferente. Isso reflete a individualidade dos sujeitos em termos de sua subjetividade como expressiva de sua experiência pessoal do passado em termos de encontrar e estabelecer relações com o mundo. Os sujeitos se concentraram nos elementos que eles consideraram os mais “atraentes” e no estabelecimento de uma narrativa coerente que interpretasse satisfatoriamente o conteúdo representado da imagem, que “traçaria uma conclusão plausível ou provável” à especulação inicial do que estava ocorrendo no objeto complexo estudado.




Figura 3.5: Sete registros de movimentos oculares do mesmo sujeito demonstrando os padrões de diferentes tarefas. Os números no canto inferior direito de cada quadro correspondem às tarefas listadas acima. (Fig. 109 em Yarbus (1967, p. 174)).

Os diferentes padrões mostrados na Figura 3.5 expressam as diferentes tarefas atribuídas aos sujeitos. Esses padrões representam os traços do olhar na superfície da

imagem reproduzida de Repin. Cada ponto ou mudança de direção representa uma fixação e a linha que une esses pontos indica os movimentos sacádicos<sup>245</sup> que o olho faz para ir de um ponto ao outro. Os registros resultantes dos seis problemas ou tarefas subsequentes revelaram que “dependendo da tarefa em que uma pessoa está envolvida, ou seja, dependendo do caráter da informação que ela deve obter, a distribuição dos pontos de fixação em um objeto irá variar correspondentemente, porque diferentes itens de informação são geralmente localizados em diferentes partes de um objeto” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 192). Cada tarefa parecia ter seu próprio padrão, refletindo as informações a serem obtidas (Figura 3.5). Os registros dos movimentos oculares resultantes de cada tarefa tinham um caráter tão diferente, que cada padrão poderia ser considerado uma estrutura relacional identificável para a tarefa específica em questão, que indica as possibilidades de uma determinação, mas não a determinação em si.

Quando repetidos durante um período de dias, as gravações da Yarbus demonstraram<sup>246</sup> que os padrões de movimento ocular do exame livre se assemelham: é como se uma vez que o sujeito tivesse concluído sua determinação do que 'a pintura quer dizer',<sup>247</sup> exames subsequentes seriam semelhantes à determinação inicial e traçariam repetidamente ao longo do caminho de determinação. Isso sugeriria que, em vez de explorar a imagem novamente de uma nova perspectiva ao longo do tempo, ou seja, (re)problematizar a imagem e determinar um novo sistema de relação entre os elementos, o sujeito examinaria a pintura para corroborar a conclusão original acrescentando sacadas que 'reforçam' as trilhas já traçadas. Após a primeira visualização conclusiva, as repetições serviriam para habituar a visualização da pintura de acordo com o padrão recém-criado e tornariam os gestos visuais oculares um *hábito* e conduziriam a uma repetição confirmativa. O padrão de repetição de um caminho prescrito a ser traçado implica um método memorável de (re)cognição não para uma leitura criativa (re)nova, mas como uma (re)leitura do quadro para averiguar e confirmar que nada teve mudado nas relações internas e reforçar a memória da atração posicional relativizada entre um elemento e outro. Essas duas atitudes de repetição seriam como uma intuição quanto a ver o processo memorial como








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<sup>245</sup> Sacádico: Do francês, um movimento brusco. Derivado do antigo francês *saquer*, puxar.

<sup>246</sup> A rubrica da Figura 108 “Sete registros de movimentos oculares do mesmo sujeito, examinando livremente a imagem de Repin com os dois olhos. Os registros, organizados em ordem cronológica, duraram 3 minutos. O intervalo entre os registros foi de 1 ou 2 dias” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 173).

<sup>247</sup> Geralmente dentro dos primeiros 30 segundos da primeira olhada (DeAngelus e Pelz, 2009).

uma repetição reforçadora e como um sistema de posição relacional baseado na memória



muscular como *loci*.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> *Loci* aqui é o termo técnico que indica a localização de uma coisa dentro de um sistema memorial. Veja YATES, Frances (2007) *A Arte da Memória*. (Trad. Flavia Becker). Campinas: Editora da Unicamp.

Figura 3.6: Registro dos movimentos oculares por 3 minutos durante o exame livre, dividido em sete partes consecutivas interrompidas. A duração de cada parte é de cerca de 20 segundos.

Yarbus usa a palavra "ciclo" para descrever o olhar dos sujeitos, mas é um termo impreciso e infeliz, pois pode significar um "período pelo qual qualquer coisa corre para completar" ou uma "série que retorna sobre si mesma" (O.E.D.). Cada definição tem sérias implicações sobre como os diagramas de movimento ocular devem ser interpretados. Originalmente, os experimentos foram concebidos como períodos de três minutos de observação, alguns condicionados por problemas e outros simplesmente livres de restrições, mas quando o exame livre de três minutos foi dividido numa série de blocos de 20+ segundos, Yarbus notou que os sujeitos comporiam diferentes padrões de descoberta dentro de cada bloco (Figura 3.6). Cada bloco tinha seu próprio padrão de exploração visual distinto, sua maneira de combinar os vários elementos como montagens autônomas, como determinações parciais que poderiam, provisoriamente, ser chamadas de figuras relacionais exploratórias. Aqui a palavra "ciclo" parece adotar a primeira definição, pois não há um padrão significativo de repetição de um bloco para o outro. É importante enfatizar que esta série de movimentos oculares se refere a um exame livre da pintura, pois, como afirma Yarbus, "o padrão cíclico no exame das imagens depende não apenas do que é mostrado na figura, mas também do problema diante do observador e da informação que ele espera obter do quadro" (YARBUS, 1967, p. 194).

A divisão em blocos do exame livre é significativa porque eles mostram a subjetividade individual em ação tentando averiguar o que deve ser determinado a partir da pintura através de numerosas, distintamente diferentes, tentativas de problematização. Cada bloco como um ciclo singular resultaria em uma determinação parcial que condicionaria a leitura do próximo bloco como uma (re)problematização progressiva que tanto modifica a compreensão do passado como condiciona exames futuros — desenhando uma figura do conjunto (do quadro) de diferentes possíveis para o futuro: entendemos nosso passado memorial diferentemente em termos de uma capacitação de outros futuros potenciais. De cada repetição do encontro livre, a diferença — a mudança de perspectiva entre uma leitura subsequente e a última — nos permite traçar um futuro diferente da compreensão diferente do passado. É como se os sujeitos estivessem buscando diferentes

significados através da combinação alternativa de elementos de imagem dentro de cada bloco, como se estivessem condicionando sua própria visão como parte do pensamento, compondo explorações alternativas. Isso pode ser interpretado como se o sujeito da visualização estivesse *chunking*<sup>249</sup> ou agregando novas leituras do passado, ou estivesse testando diferentes maneiras de ler a pintura, a fim de esgotar os resultados para concluir a investigação com uma leitura "correta" ou mais "coerente" como a leitura "verdadeira". Portanto podemos ambicionar, em cada ciclo, uma leitura metaestável pronta para ser desestabilizada por novas informações para que um ciclo diferente de descoberta comece de novo. Isso parece intimar que o "exame de objetos evidentemente reflete algumas

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<sup>249</sup> Verbo inglês usado em informática, psicologia ou análise linguística que significa agrupar itens para que possam ser processados como conceitos únicos.




Figura 3.7: O painel à esquerda é um registro dos movimentos oculares por 35 segundos durante exame livre. A gravação é dividida em sete partes consecutivas de 5 segundos cada. A imagem do lado direito mostra as fixações cobertas por um ponto preto representando a cobertura da fóvea centralis na série de registros à esquerda. (Fig. 111 e 112 de Yarbus (1967, p. 176-7)).

características especiais de nossa percepção e pensamento” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 194). Na repetição dos experimentos de Yarbus de DeAngelus e Pelz (2009), eles descobriram que, *quando dada uma tarefa*, os sujeitos chegavam a uma determinação de sua tarefa em muito menos tempo do que a duração de 3 minutos imposta por Yarbus: quando os sujeitos foram permitidos autoterminalar a tarefa, a determinação média foi de 24,4 segundos<sup>250</sup>, com a maior média de 50 segundos. O tempo residual ofereceu tempo suficiente para repetir e (re)confirmar a determinação como um “ciclo” em termos da última definição mencionada,

<sup>250</sup> Esta média não representa uma média “verdadeira”, pois estamos calculando a média de determinações para diferentes problemas. Nossa intenção é simplesmente afirmar que as determinações condicionadas levam significativamente menos tempo que os 3 minutos acordados por Yarbus.



enfazando a iteração. Isso explicaria a pronunciada repetição no retraçar das linhas do olhar e o caráter mais "distinto" das gravações das visões tarefaadas.




Figura 3.8: Uma possível decupagem cinematográfica, passo a passo, da pintura de Repin, que a torna em uma sequência linear que claramente narra o plano pictórico e o torna temporal.

A comparação das duas abordagens — com tarefas e livre de tarefas — parece sugerir que o condicionamento do encontro nos leva a uma solução imediata e à subsequente corroboração iterativa (os "sulcos" ou canais bem trilhados dos desenhos da Figura 3.5); o encontro incondicionado permanece criativo e aberto à invenção dentro das repetições (como revelado pelos diferentes padrões em cada bloco da Figura 3.6). Além disso, podemos dizer que cada registro derivado do exame livre na Figura 3.5 'representa' uma imagem do pensamento, em que cada bloco é distintamente diferente dos outros e reflete um padrão de pensamento diferente como discurso narrativo: cada padrão no papel foto-sensível documenta uma progressão imagética do pensamento que foi produtiva de significado, mas ainda permanece não identificado, excepto como Padrão Ocular X e identificado como o primeiro de uma série de padrões relacionados, que poderíamos nomear de Padrões Oculares Repin  $n$ , como a forma vazia de pensamento. Não há repetição nos 7 padrões, de modo que podemos supor que uma conclusão definitiva, um esgotamento de interpretações possíveis da pintura ainda não foi alcançada e assim o exame criativo para uma leitura operacionalmente coerente permanece aberto — talvez, como mencionamos anteriormente, cada bloco apresenta uma determinação hipotética testada no bloco subsequente. As tarefas dão ao sujeito um problema definido, enquanto o exame livre convida o sujeito a explorar visualmente a imagem, a fim de determinar o que está acontecendo na imagem. E, a imagem de Repin, tem uma margem interpretativa

excessivamente solta para o sujeito determinar uma interpretação definitiva quando vista sem o título da pintura.

Os padrões do movimento dos olhos parecem indicar que existem duas abordagens não mutuamente exclusivas para o olhar: existe um modo de ver que é criativo e exploratório e outro que reconhece e confirma. O primeiro é um modo que procura problematizar o encontro e complexificar criativamente, enquanto o segundo busca resolver a problematização e repetir a determinação para a averiguação e a habituação. Cada modo parece encontrar sua satisfação de maneira diferente: o primeiro, busca exercer o desejo e a novidade em uma evolução criativa aberta; o segundo busca a certeza dentro de um avanço teleológico progressivo em direção à perfeição no reconhecimento da solução.

### **Movimento dos olhos como a montagem de *montage***

A montagem no cinema guia o desdobramento da visão de modo que ela compõe as ligações narrativas de um quadro para o outro. A decupagem e a edição de um filme trabalham juntas para constituir o fluxo visual que orienta a lógica do movimento ocular para que o espectador possa formular um desdobramento coerente da compreensão visual de uma cena. De modo que a pintura de Repin pode ser decomposta em uma série de tomadas que linearizam o desdobramento como uma sequência de quadros em que cada quadro serve como uma articulação lógica do objetivo ao subjetivo, como a transição que impulsiona o desejo pelo próxima tomada (Figura 3.8).

A fim de entender melhor o que está em jogo na visão em termos de movimento dos olhos, Yarbus registrou a exploração livre e incondicionada mostrada no painel esquerdo da Figura 3.7. De acordo com Yarbus (1967), a parte da retina que oferece a visão mais clara é a *mácula lútea* que fica no lado temporal de cada olho, ligeiramente acima do ponto de entrada do nervo óptico e é ocupada principalmente por cones. Há círculos pretos superpostos correspondentes à cobertura da *fóvea centralis* da retina em cada fixação como mostrado no painel do lado direito. A dimensão angular da *mácula lútea* é de aproximadamente 6-7°. Dentro da *mácula lútea*, encontra-se a *fóvea centralis*, a parte da retina com o maior poder de resolução. O diâmetro da *fóvea centralis* é de cerca de 0,4 mm, isto é, cerca de 1,3°. Em termos de comparação, o campo de visão monocular em geral (medido a partir da fixação central) é de 160° (horizontalmente) x 175° (verticalmente). O

campo de visão binocular total é de 200° (h) x 135° (v). A região de sobreposição binocular é de 120° (h) x 135° (v).



Figura 3.9: A cobertura real dum fixação (veja a nota de rodapé 11). A área imediatamente em torno da cabeça da mulher na porta é aproximadamente a área coberta por um único ponto negro na Figura 3.7 e representa a área da retina composta pela mácula lútea com o tamanho estabelecido pela distância sujeito-objeto com a imagem usada pelo Yarbus.

Como vimos anteriormente na Figura 3.6, cada registro de exame mostra um bloco distinto de busca de compreensão. A Figura 3.7 leva esse método analítico a um passo adiante, decompondo um bloco de 35 segundos em sete miniblocos de 5 segundos de exploração livre, para que possamos compreender melhor como os blocos maiores individuais são constituídos. Yarbus quer mostrar como acontece a cobertura das fixações *foveais* e em que ordem elas ocorrem, observando como “a visão *foveal* é reservada principalmente para aqueles elementos que contêm informações essenciais necessárias ao observador durante a percepção” (YARBUS, 1967, p. 196). Assim, também podemos caracterizar essa serialização cognitiva como uma montagem de pontos estáticos minúsculos e altamente focalizados, na qual, de acordo com esse desmembramento, a visão procede como uma montagem de pontos concentrados e altamente focados das fixações, em que cada fixação é “substituída” por uma fixação subsequente: a progressão seria fixação, sacada, fixação, sacada... e a impressão de cada sacada é mantida como persistência de

visão enquanto o olho se reposiciona em um novo ponto de fixação, diretamente em cima do ponto de fixação que a precedeu.<sup>251</sup>

No entanto, isso apenas indica em parte o que está acontecendo: os dados visuais da parte rica em bastonetes da retina devem ser sobrepostos ao redor da zona *foveal* rica em cones, circular e de alto foco. O lado direito da Figura 3.7 mostra que, em cada fixação, os pontos pretos cobrem apenas uma parte muito limitada do campo de visão, mas deixam de mostrar que a vasta periferia da imagem não está tão bem definida — a composição da retina é tal que, fora da *mácula lútea*, a distribuição de cones e bastonetes é muito diferente e, por isso, produzimos a Figura 3.9 para ilustrar como são as fixações.<sup>252</sup> Onde a *mácula lútea* é povoada por cones sensíveis à cor, o restante da retina é predominantemente composto de bastonetes e tem uma progressiva diminuição da concentração de cones e bastonetes mais distante da *fóvea*; dessa forma, cada campo de visão é composto de uma área circular relativamente pequena de foco alto correspondendo à *mácula lútea*, circundada por uma extensão retiniana de bastonetes e cones que produz menor qualidade resolutive, mas um processamento mais rápido dos dados de percepção visual, distorcidos e desfocados, com cores difratadas, e menos saturados. O campo de visão que produzimos mentalmente e que constitui o que pensamos ser nossa consciência é, na verdade, um ponto altamente focalizado, cercado pelo borrão. Como Yarbus postula,

Desta maneira, não podemos deixar de pensar em quão importante e biologicamente desejável é essa estrutura heterogênea da retina, particularmente, o fato de que uma *fóvea* está presente. Por meio da *fóvea centralis*, o homem vê muitos detalhes apenas em torno do ponto de fixação, isto é, em torno de um ponto que, via de regra, fornece informações essenciais. O menor poder de resolução da periferia do olho é útil porque permite que informações menos essenciais sejam obtidas e facilita a diferenciação entre as informações úteis e inúteis (YARBUS, 1967).

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<sup>251</sup> A visão "esconde" a sacada da consciência através de um processo chamado em inglês *Saccadic masking* ou *Visual Saccadic Suppression*.

<sup>252</sup> Para ser uma ilustração mais verdadeira de uma única fixação, a área *foveal* de alto foco ocuparia a posição central e o restante da impressão retiniana seria mapeada para fora de lá para o campo de visão maior.



Figura 3.10: Reconstrução provisória da ordem sequencial das fixações foveais no registro 1 mostrada em ambos painéis da Figura 3.7.

A Figura 3.10 mostra uma tentativa de reconstrução da ordem sequencial das fixações *foveais* no registro nº 1 em ambos os conjuntos de painéis da Figura 3.7. Ela mostra as 18 fixações dos “pontos” de informações úteis durante um exame livre de 5 segundos da reprodução do *tableau* de Repin. A figura 3.10 mostra-nos a atração dramática, ou o interesse, das áreas *foveais* de foco nítido que exercem nossa atenção. No entanto, devemos ter em mente que os dados dos sentidos periféricos fora de foco da área adjacente da retina preparam o caminho para as subsequentes sacadas. Parece que a *fóvea* é receptiva à informação icônica, enquanto a *mácula* pré-condiciona o movimento ocular subsequente mapeando as zonas vizinhas de possível interesse a serem exploradas. Pode-se dizer que o apresentado à mente tem um componente adequado como a área de foco nítido da *fóvea* central e um componente inadequado ou afetivo, como os dados sensoriais periféricos fora de foco — de maneira consistente com a concepção de Bergson da imagem em Matéria e Memória.

O padrão do olhar que parece ser produzido no exame livre é o resultado do que podemos chamar de roteiro visual como uma progressão problematizadora altamente lógica — a fixação produz uma questão que inevitavelmente resulta no movimento ocular como resposta:

1. Cotovelo. Nada no braço. Casaco pesado. *Quão longe estão os sapatos?* Tilt para cima...

2. Sapatos. Botas grandes, pernas levadas para cima... *Quão alto é esse corpo?* Tilt para cima...

3. Cabeça do homem. Cara olhando para direita da câmera. *Que está olhando?* Siga a *linha do olho*. Pan para direita.

4. Papel de parede. Ele não está olhando para papel de parede. *Que temos à direita?*  
Pan para direita.

5. Cabeças das mulheres. Eles são menores que a cabeça do homem. Por isso, atrás dele e à direita, mas não combinando com a linha dos olhos do homem. *Que está à direita?*  
Pan para direita.

6. A cabeça grande da mulher. Ela está mais perto de nós. De frente para esquerda. Correspondência de linhas oculares. *O laço dramático com o homem parece fechado. Vamos ver o quão perto ela está das mulheres do meio. Ela é superintensa, mas não consigo ver o rosto dela. O que está à esquerda?* Pan para esquerda.

7. Papel de parede e lado da porta. A mulher estava em pé na luz, possivelmente na frente de uma porta aberta. *Onde ela está?* Pan para esquerda.

8. Mulheres na porta. Duas mulheres. *Por que eles estão olhando para o homem?*  
Sigamos o olhar... Pan para esquerda.

9. Cabeça do homem. Por que ele está olhando para a mulher que está olhando para ele? *Que há com o papel de parede?* Pan para direita..

10. A cabeça do homem com mais papel de parede. Ambos os lados da cabeça têm papel de parede diferente. *Qual foi o papel de parede atrás da mulher na porta?* Pan para direita.

11. Mulheres na porta. Eles têm uma janela atrás deles. Eles não parecem felizes. *O que o homem pode nos dizer sobre por que eles são tão infelizes?* Pan para esquerda.

12. Cabeça do homem. Ele é intenso. E não muito falador. *O que as mulheres diante de nós podem nos dizer?* Pan para direita.

13. Mulheres na porta. *Eles são intensos também e parecem apreensivos. O que há do outro lado da cabeça do homem?* Pan para esquerda.

14. Papel de parede. Esse é o mesmo papel entre as mulheres na porta e a mulher de preto. O homem deve ter entrado no quarto do lado de fora. *O que há com aquelas mulheres na porta? Por que eles estão parecendo apreensivos? O que o homem fez?* Pan para direita.

15. Eu ainda não entendo o que está acontecendo aqui. Vamos voltar para a cabeça do homem caminhando em nossa direção... Etc.<sup>253</sup>

As fixações *foveais* representam a inteligência narrativa do cérebro como uma faculdade, um movimento associativo não aleatório que produz narrativa.. A mostra do primeiro bloco dos sete está alinhada horizontalmente e segue uma lógica estabelecida pelas linhas do olho das figuras adultas. No artigo de DeAngelus e Pelz, eles apresentam uma exploração visual “tarefada” da imagem de Repin, *O Visitante Inesperado*, que é bastante similar à de Yarbus (DEANGELUS e PELZ, 2009).<sup>254</sup> No exemplo de Yarbus, um movimento exploratório em qualquer direção procede hesitante, conforme podemos observar no movimento inicial dos sapatos para a cabeça, cujos olhos do espectador não vão até a cabeça; eles param em algum lugar na possibilidade de avaliar o caráter espacial existente entre dois atratores significativos. Ao avaliar esses registros, precisamos ter em mente que os dados do sensor de foco externo estão disponíveis para informar aos olhos aonde ir em seguida e que há uma diferença entre o trabalho que os olhos fazem em um mundo 3D e em uma superfície 2-D.<sup>255</sup>

Tab. 3.1: Campo de visão em foco para 2 ângulos foveais (gr.) Vs. distância ao sujeito (m)

<b>Distância ao objeto</b>	1000 m	100 m	10 m	1 m	0.10 m
<b>6.0° macula lutea</b>	104.8 m	10.48 m	1.048 m	10.48 cm	1.05 cm
<b>1.3° fovea centralis</b>	22.7 m	2.27 m	22.7 cm	2.27 cm	2.27 mm

<sup>253</sup> Se eu não tivesse escrito isso, teria pensado que era uma transcrição de Deckart usando o visualizador analítico de imagens nos instantâneos do replicante no longa-metragem *Bladerunner* realizado pelo Ridley Scott (1982).

<sup>254</sup> Produzir uma série dessas imagens dissociadas constituiria o que normalmente é chamado de 'montagem'. Esse conjunto sequencial de “imagens” justapostas articula uma unidade que é usualmente entendida como uma narrativa, ou, neste caso, como uma tentativa de compor uma cena narrativa. Pode-se caracterizar cada bloco de 5 segundos por cena e o conjunto de cenas por uma sequência. Uma sequência, como um termo emprestado da estética do cinema, é uma série de cenas que formam uma unidade narrativa distinta que geralmente está conectada ou por unidade de localização ou unidade de tempo. Poderíamos dizer, experimentalmente, que a organização dos registros nos experimentos de Yarbus produz narrativas visuais que inicialmente remodelam o visto como cenas e, em última análise, sequências impregnadas de um senso de fechamento, de unidade, de singularidade ou identidade como conclusão — os vários blocos de olhar exploratório como o início do ageciamento mecânico que torna o conjunto operacional como uma multiplicidade que é aberta e independente.

<sup>255</sup> Essa fixação entre os atratores significativos pode ser um hábito de se viver em um mundo 3D que sempre busca signos de profundidade através do ângulo paralático dos olhos.




Figura 3.11: Simon Stålenhag. *By\_dust*. (2015) com vários enquadramentos escolhidos da imagem superior. Não há compressão de perspectiva de um quadro para o outro, apenas ampliação. Cada quadro representa uma reaproximação do observador ao campo objetual, mas nenhuma mudança de distância focal. À direita, sugerimos a “unidade foveal” para cada distância como pontos pretos afim de ilustrar como a distancia ao sujeito muda que e como olhamos.



Vale ressaltar que os experimentos de Yarbus foram realizados a uma distância fixa entre sujeitos não móveis e imagens estáticas em 2-D, produzindo assim uma relação muito específica e controlada com a vista. Sua configuração experimental não reflete a experiência de como alguém normalmente se aproximaria de uma pintura, ou qualquer outro objeto. Por depender da distância relativa ao objeto, a cobertura projetada da área *foveal* no objeto será diferente. O olho claramente não é uma lente de zoom e não pode alterar a cobertura de "pontos negros" da mácula, porque os olhos não podem aumentar ou diminuir sua distância focal.<sup>256</sup> A mudança de cobertura — e, portanto, a informação que pode ser obtida — ocorre apenas através de uma mudança no campo de visão, e isso ocorre apenas mudando a distância relativa através da tradução, como uma mudança de escala, ao objeto.<sup>257</sup> À medida que nos aproximamos dos objetos, temos inicialmente em foco uma extensão mais ampla do campo de visão que se torna progressivamente mais estreito e mais detalhado quanto mais nos acercamos do objeto. Ao aproximarmos-nos de um objeto, menos o vemos, embora o que nós visualizamos seja maior e mais detalhado.. A Tabela 1 mostra como a largura do campo de visão se estreita à medida que o observador se acerca do objeto: a 100 metros de distância, a *mácula lutea* permanece focalizada em uma largura de 10,48 m; mas a 10 cm do objeto, a *mácula lútea* mede 1,05 cm e a *fóvea* central cobre apenas 2,27 mm no foco ideal (ver Tabela 1). As áreas relativas da acuidade *foveal versus* periférica sempre permanecem as mesmas; o que muda é o comprimento do arco, a largura, coberta no objeto como projeção angular em nossa retina, resultante de nossa distância ao objeto. A cobertura angular da mácula lútea — o tamanho do ponto preto — a uma distância específica torna-se a unidade de compreensão, a escala de compreensão, para aquela situação visual ou condicionamento ambiental.

Assim, na Figura 3.11, ao imaginarmos a pintura de ficção científica de Simon Stålenhag *By\_dust* (2015) sendo um encontro no mundo real, no qual estamos imersos, e usarmos a cobertura da *mácula lútea* como nossa unidade de medida, estaremos diante de uma multidão de escalas de compreensão a cada passo do caminho ao penetrar no encontro. No quadro 1 da Figura 3.11, as "unidades foveais" serão a figura humana não identificável à distância, uma parte de um arbusto, um tênis e um pneu de carro. No quadro

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<sup>256</sup> Os olhos mudam a distância focal quando focalizam, mas é uma mudança mínima, nada como uma lente zoom.

<sup>257</sup> Na cartografia, essa consideração é da maior importância, pois a escala define o tamanho da grade de determinação.

2, o tamanho das unidades foveais serão o tronco e a luz traseira do carro. No quadro 3, será a ponta de um pé humano. No quadro inferior, a "unidade foveal" será a face do personagem encapuzado.<sup>258</sup> À medida que avançamos em direção ao visto e mergulhamos na cena, o encontro é relativizado diferentemente à proporção que as escalas da relação mudam: é sempre uma multiplicidade relativizada, mesmo se a natureza e o caráter das relações são sempre diferentes. A cena se problematiza de maneira diferente e nós, como indivíduos subjetivos, não podemos deixar de problematizá-la diferentemente: o encontro torna-se a multiplicidade do meio como problematização. Em termos cinematográficos, a cena representa o modo de exposição da *decoupage* clássica de Hollywood: plano geral, plano de conjunto, plano médio, plano próximo, *close-up*, plano detalhe.

Isto sustenta que nenhum ajuste decisional ocorre sem um contexto de condicionamento, além de um meio decisional, a partir do qual o objeto da sacada é resolvido a partir da problemática do encontro. Como uma individuação que se torna a individualização, na separação do objeto do fundo,<sup>259</sup> a decisão resolve o "muito significado da atualidade" do potencial como a atualização do potencial dado no presente. Whitehead afirma, a palavra "decisão" não implica aqui julgamento consciente, mas é usada no sentido de raiz, de um "corte" seletivo (WHITEHEAD, 1929) tornando-se de fato enquadramento e seleção. Ao escrever 'fluxo decisional' anteriormente como uma lógica de montagem que se opõe a uma lógica de *montrage*<sup>260</sup>, temos duas apreensões importantes: dentro dos centros de indeterminação, não há leis claras determinantes do modo de avanço de uma lógica inferencial em oposição ao movimento aberrante puro; e as imagens caídas dentro do escopo da *mácula lútea* são de alguma forma identificadas como os agentes ativos da determinação em qualquer escala.

Ao contrário de sua conduta aparentemente ilógica, o movimento sacádico dos olhos não é aleatório e arbitrário — é a operação determinante da conjunção, da comparação, do contraste, da relação e possivelmente mais notavelmente da própria diferença expressa de

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<sup>258</sup> Mas não um *close-up*.

<sup>259</sup> Assim, o ato de focalizar resultados no desenho do objeto, tanto como uma delimitação e como um puxando para nós, como veremos mais adiante.

<sup>260</sup> *Montrage* é um termo cunhado por David Lapoujade e retomado por Deleuze no *Cinéma 2*; A imagem do tempo. "A montagem mudou de sentido, assume uma nova função: em vez de se preocupar com imagens de movimento das quais extrai uma imagem indireta do tempo, ela se preocupa com a imagem do tempo e extrai dela as relações de tempo sobre qual movimento aberrante deve agora depender.

forma corporificada: é a atualização de atividade pronominal a serviço do indicativo, e não do nominativo: “este A é para aquele B” e “este B é para aquele C”....podemos seguir nosso dedo indicador apontando para uma coisa 'isto' e depois para outra coisa 'que' onde a sacada é instrumental como o gesto de resolução na determinação. Mas há aqui um duplo processo de subjetivização, um duplo momento<sup>261</sup> de Whitehead, onde o objetivo se torna subjetivo e vice-versa. Há um movimento preênsil na mudança sacádica de "isso-para-aquilo" e um movimento subsequente dentro da fixação como um movimento de pensamento, do objetivo "aquilo" para o devir subjetivo de "isso". A função do movimento sacádico é relacional e temporal, enquanto a fixação é determinante e espacial. No entanto, dentro desse meio relacional, os termos que entram na proposição associativa são revelados a nós nas fixações. Mas essas imagens dadas nas fixações são dadas completas e plenas. Há a fixação como local de pouso e a mudança subsequente do movimento de territorialização para um movimento de desterritorialização, do objetivo para o subjetivo como articulação ou dobra.

Deleuze escreve em *Cinema 2: A Imagem-Tempo*: “é a própria montagem que constitui o todo, e nos dá a imagem *do tempo*” (DELEUZE, 1990, p. 48). Mas, como acabamos de ver, esse todo é um todo muito parcial: parcial no sentido de sua subjetividade e parcial no sentido de incompleto e fragmentário. Quando Walter Benjamin (1985) escreve em *A Obra de Arte na Era da Sua Reprodutibilidade Técnica* (1935) sobre a diferença entre a percepção da câmera *versus* a percepção ocular e a incongruência entre o visível e o real, a discordância não é como Rudolf Arnheim afirma em razão da “fidelidade mecânica de uma câmera, que registra tudo com imparcialidade” (ARNHEIM, 1954, p. 43). A discordância é porque a projeção planar do campo de visão da câmera para o filme, seja ela estática ou em movimento, é diferente da dinâmica serial de movimento e fixação do olho humano. Na câmera, a percepção é limitada pelas características óticas da lente, o tamanho do enquadramento e a resolução do sensor, mas ainda permite uma certa continuidade extensa no plano de projeção; a percepção ocular é adicionalmente limitada pelo funcionamento do aparato visual, a dinâmica gestual de percepção, e o campo e a geometria do sistema sensorial da retina. A *mácula lútea* e a vizinhança periférica fora de foco dão à percepção ocular qualidades adicionais — principalmente a detecção do movimento — mas não são

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<sup>261</sup> “é neste duplo desdobramento, na divergência de faces, que se traça a linha de fuga — isto é, a desterritorialização do homem” (DELEUZE, 1998, p. 40).

nem contínuas nem fractais. Todo o campo de visão é indefinido, um olhar vazio<sup>262</sup> até que os centros de indeterminação através do foco específico hiper-da *fovea centralis*, de alta acuidade, dá a resolução de um ponto em relação ao outro por meio da produção de *machinic semeiosis* desejoso de movimento sacádico.

Mas, dada a imagem da Figura 3.11, precisamos reconsiderar a formulação de Deleuze sobre o que exatamente está sendo criado. Se entendermos a unidade de montagem como o quadro completo, acabamos com um todo; se considerarmos a *lútea* como nossa unidade de montagem, temos um outro tipo de todo; se considerarmos o conjunto da *mácula lútea* como nossa unidade de montagem, problematizamos o todo de outra maneira. De modo que, quando Deleuze propõe a imagem-percepção, a imagem-ação e a imagem afetiva como avatares, como componentes da imagem-movimento, temos de nos perguntar se ele está usando o enquadramento cinematográfico diretamente projetado na retina como a unidade básica de montagem. Se ele é, o que sua discussão sobre os diferentes enquadramentos parece afirmar — que um grande plano na câmera é a mesma imagem de grande alcance que entra diretamente no cérebro — então precisamos pensar de novo a constituição da imagem em uma imagem completa. Para Deleuze, a distância estética entre o observador e o observado, o impacto intensivo da distância como aquele que estabelece o tamanho do disparo problematiza a imagem de maneira diferente. Uma interação CU-CU constituiria uma imagem de afeto; uma interação MS — MS ou CS — CS constituiria a imagem de ação; e uma interação WS-WS ou LS-LS constituiria uma imagem de percepção (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 94). Deleuze, na verdade, vai mais além e atribui uma ordem linguística a cada avatar como expressivo de um tipo diferente de movimento: a percepção-imagem é o substantivo, porque a percepção relaciona o movimento a "corpos"; a ação-imagem é o verbo porque a ação relaciona o movimento a "atos"; e a imagem do afeto é o adjetivo porque relaciona o movimento a uma "qualidade" como um estado vivido (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 90).

É interessante como Deleuze separa a imagem-movimento em avatares componentes, como se a imagem-movimento fosse um movimento indivisível que não pode ser decomposto, mas composta de etapas processuais subsidiárias ou fases constituintes de conceitos limiaries tanto de locais de passagem como passagem em si. Deleuze procura

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<sup>262</sup> Quando alguém fica ciente de que o cérebro está ocioso, há um rápido ajuste sacádico dos olhos para focalizar sobre alguma coisa.

identificar modos de expressar o tempo não diretamente dentro da própria imagem-movimento, mas através dos avatares como constitutivos de uma multiplicidade relacional duracional. Parece que Deleuze se desloca aqui para apresentar seus conceitos em termos da experiência do tempo e do avanço, e não em termos espaciais ou pictóricos. Mas se considerarmos o cinema como uma forma imagética pictórica e reconciliarmos a concepção da imagem de Bergson e Deleuze com os estudos de movimentos e fixações sacádicas de Yarbus, a concepção deleuziana de montagem ainda permanece, mas com algumas revisões. No entanto, sempre precisamos estar cientes do que estamos reunindo e em que fluxo estamos imersos para saber onde estamos nos aventurando.

Quando definimos ou determinamos a *mácula lútea* como nossa unidade de montagem, o 'ponto preto' cobrirá uma área específica dentro do campo ótico onde o olho irá parar e fixar em alguma coisa. Se a área do círculo negro cobre a figura da cabeça aos pés de um homem, o homem é identificado como tal, sem qualquer tipo de montagem: o que você vê é o que você entende. Se entrarmos em cena, a área do círculo negro cobre o tronco de um homem... nos movemos um pouco mais, a área do círculo negro cobre o peito e a cabeça; e novamente, o círculo negro cobre a cabeça; nos movemos uma última vez e acabamos com o círculo negro cobrindo um olho. Quando os olhos se fixam em um desses itens como uma entidade autônoma identificável, não há montagem — sabemos implicitamente que o que está pousando na *mácula lútea* é algo facilmente discernível, distinguível, distinto e digno de nota. Na imagem superior da Figura 3.11, temos uma visão ampla, o ponto preto cobre a estatura diminuta da cabeça aos pés de um homem. O olho não precisa se movimentar de forma alguma, já que todo o significado dessa figura está contido naquele domínio estático. Nós transportamos mais alguns e finalmente a *mácula lútea* está apenas cobrindo a face do ator. Isso nos permite identificar o personagem, ali mesmo, diretamente, sem montagem. Em qualquer escala, o olho está apresentando uma imagem autônoma de alto foco, aparentemente isolada, que não é construída conceitualmente através de montagem ou através de uma variedade de componentes, mas deve ser identificada como um todo estático pelo que é: como uma figura diminuta de um homem, um torso de um homem, um rosto, uma boca. Essas "coisas" são identificadas e nomeadas pelo que são como tais, em seus próprios termos — como signos que transmitem diretamente aquilo que é: essa é a ideia do que elas são, como o aspecto exterior e visual que representa o interior e o exterior. Aspecto espiritual do objeto como ele se manifesta. É

essa dinâmica, de entidade identificável a entidade identificável, que devemos distinguir a montagem como avançada, como uma lógica da *montrage*. E assim, citando Benjamin quando menciona o diretor de cinema mudo francês Abel Gance, expressamos sua surpresa de maneira diferente: “Por uma notável regressão, somos transportados para o nível expressivo dos egípcios.... A linguagem pictórica ainda não amadureceu, porque nossos olhos ainda não estão adaptados a ela. Ainda não há respeito suficiente, culto insuficiente, pelo que expressa” (BENJAMIN, 1985, p. 176). No entanto, ao regredir aos egípcios, não podemos permanecer ali, pois não se descarta que o hieróglifo da percepção é, em si mesmo, um devir, uma multiplicidade duracional, uma individuação, mesmo que possa ser codificado, designado e indicado como uma individualização. Além disso, não se pode esquecer que o que parece ser uma entidade “autônoma” está sempre ligado a um pano de fundo que a sustenta e a associa ao mundo não apenas em série, mas simultaneamente. Parafraseando Deleuze, ver sempre combina com outra coisa que é seu próprio devir. “Não existe agenciamento que funcione sobre um único fluxo” (DELEUZE, 1987, p. 36). E mesmo se a entidade em questão é claramente visível, aparece como se fosse totalmente resolvida a partir do pano de fundo, e parece se orgulhar do meio ao qual está associada; é esse apego que a concretiza e a torna um objeto que faz não passar.

As últimas três páginas do capítulo 4 do *Cinema 1* são marcantes. Deleuze nos leva do que é uma dinâmica de ação-reação para o reino da vida bergsoniana através do envolvimento do centro de indeterminação, a criação de um racha entre a consideração objetiva do mundo como uma preocupação, sua transformação em desejo e sua expressão como enação subjetiva. Esse intervalo de deliberação entre a percepção aferente do estímulo e a expressão da reação eferente denota o avanço do processo, do pensamento, da transpiração da lógica. Aqui, Deleuze transforma o momento unitário da imagem-movimento indivisível no reino dos corpos vivos, tornando-os corpos sem órgãos, avatares, uma multiplicidade relacional, como uma duração composta de três (ou possivelmente mais) processos imagéticos subsidiários. A "duração concreta" da imagem-movimento é, portanto, composta da imagem-percepção, da imagem-ação e da imagem-afeto, enquanto imagens identificadas como tais produzem seções imóveis que, quando apresentadas em sucessão, constituem uma montagem. Esta montagem compõe uma imagem indireta do tempo em que os componentes da duração contribuem para a agregação da duração como a passagem do evento e são resolvidos pelo Método do Cinematógrafo de Bergson.

Nesta confluência de Yarbus e Deleuze, encontramos os escritos de Sergei Eisenstein como elucidativos de como podemos entender o processo redefinindo a “base técnica (ótica) do cinema” (EISENSTEIN, 1949, p. 49). Para Eisenstein e o teórico da montagem Vsevolod Pudovkin, a montagem não é uma mistura de imagens, mas "o meio de desenrolar uma ideia com a ajuda de tiros únicos" (EISENSTEIN, 1949, p. 48). Mas a dinâmica operativa por trás da percepção do movimento não é da comparação lado a lado, mas da superposição, como sugere o Método do Cinematógrafo de Bergson. Isto coincide com o movimento ocular sacádico e a fixação de Yarbus, na medida em que a impressão retiniana de uma fixação é suplantada pela superposição de uma fixação posterior. Mas Eisenstein erroneamente afirma que este princípio de uma agregação de imagens sobrepostas como uma dinâmica de resolução dialética é o princípio geral que informa o processo: de acordo com essa explicação, a sobreposição de impressões suplantadas seria responsável pelo fenômeno da profundidade espacial, já que da superposição de duas imagens surge uma terceira substituindo as outras duas. Eisenstein afirma que essa estratificação como superposição é o que permite que a estereoscopia venha à tona, mas sabemos que mudanças nos ângulos paraláticos dos olhos como uma resolução simultânea em um ponto, bem como sugestões de tamanho visual, mudanças de cor, tamanho relativo, perspectiva, etc., indicam a distância entre o observador e o observado. No entanto, a subjugação da distância à dialética não é o que interessa aqui. A afirmação de que “a superposição de dois elementos da mesma dimensão sempre surge uma nova dimensão superior” (EISENSTEIN, 1949, p. 49). Aqui, Eisenstein parece estar se referindo ao surgimento de profundidade a partir da superposição de dois campos oculares para produzir o efeito estereoscópico da profundidade como uma dimensão nova e mais elevada da experiência. “A superposição de duas bi-dimensionalidades não idênticas resulta em tridimensionalidade estereoscópica” (EISENSTEIN, 1949, p. 49). Mas o que isso faz é produzir resolução, a separação individualizante de um objeto no espaço como diferenciada de seu entorno., Novamente, esse processo de resolver o objeto como uma percepção de profundidade no espaço não é dado como instantâneo, mas dado no tempo como intuitivo. A sobreposição de duas imagens fora de foco leva a um novo foco como correção ou ajuste paralático, de modo que os dois centros *foveais* de alto foco concordem no mesmo ponto e não haja uma indeterminação fora de foco na resolução. Esta relação óptica com o mundo mantém a

reconciliação estereoscópica que informa a percepção de profundidade e é, por definição, sensório-motora.

Mas quando nos situamos no mundo real, produzimos uma impressão retiniana sobreposta de uma percepção de profundidade como uma imagem 3-D, um objeto resolvido a partir de seu campo, e sobrepomos isso a uma subsequente imagem 3-D da retina. Sobreposições tridimensionais combinariam a resultar uma imagem composta de quatro dimensões das três dimensões do espaço e a dimensão de tempo adicional, 3-D + T. Isso não nos dá uma imagem do tempo, mas uma imagem de tempo indireta que pode ter todos os tipos de variedades a partir da combinação das três variedades — imagens percepção, imagens-ação, imagens-afecção. (DELEUZE, 1985).



Figura 3.12: *Birch Grove*, (1885-1889, bosque de bétulas). Pintura a óleo pelo pintor impressionista russo Isaac Ilyich Levitan.




Figura 3.13: Registro de movimentos oculares durante o exame livre da reprodução da pintura *Bosque de Bétulas* com ambos olhos por 10 minutos (Yarbus, 1967).



## Movimento ocular e o diagrama deleuziano

Discernimos uma semelhança entre as linhas sacádicas estabelecidas pelos olhos na determinação hesitante e interrompida de uma cena nas gravações das explorações livres dos experimentos de Yarbus (Figuras 3.12 and 3.13) e as tentativas de marcar traços sob um papel que Hockney (2006) identifica como *'the new-awkwardness-draughtsmanship'* ou o novo estilo inábil e desastrado de desenhar como um desenhar com os olhos. O laço comum compartilhado por essas duas determinações da linha reside na natureza errante, tateante, agarrante do *"-cept"* (da percepção e da conceitualização), como tátil e manual. A palavra-raiz *"-cept"* vem do latim *ceptus*, uma derivação de *capio*, que significa pegar na mão, ou agarrar. Também significa atrair (trazer para si), ou enganado no sentido de iludido, para tomar para si mesmo ou apropriado, e aceitar o que é oferecido (GLARE, 1968). Isso é semelhante à definição do verbo inglês *draw*, desenhar, que significa puxar para si mesmo; mas a palavra *draw* é também utilizada no sentido de puxar uma cobertura sobre um objeto para escondê-lo, de deduzir ou inferir uma conclusão; de traçar (uma linha ou figura) puxando um lápis sobre uma superfície; ou se refere também ao sulco traçado por um arado através do solo.<sup>263</sup> Podemos discernir aqui o núcleo conceitual, a noção comum, que delimita vários aspectos de nossa problematização do olhar e da linha. O prefixo *'per-'* libera o poder da palavra-raiz *-cept* por meio de seu significado de *através*, no espaço e no tempo; ao longo; através e até a conclusão; até a destruição (O.E.D.). Assim, chegamos a compreender o *percepto* e a percepção imagética através da multiplicidade gestual da produção de marcas duradouras pela ação da impressão repetida e da criação de traços como uma atividade que podemos compreender de várias maneiras: um processo que "puxa para nós" tornando-se nosso o objeto ou um objeto para a mente; ; a canalização do signo visual aferente para sua expressão eferente como o gesto de deixar vestígios discerníveis e legíveis; a criação de um sulco para o plantio de sementes ou "*arche*"; um processo da lógica na inferência que resulta da reconciliação entre crise e intuição; e um processo de seleção resultante na assimilação completa daquilo que é discernido externamente.

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<sup>263</sup> O sulco também está relacionado com o corte de um sulco para o plantio de sementes, bem como com uma rotina impressa no solo por passagens repetidas.




Figura 3.14: Justaposição de um registro de movimentos oculares durante o exame livre de uma fotografia da cabeça esculpida da rainha egípcia Nefertiti por dois minutos (YARBUS, 1967, p. 181) e *Jacqueline* (1956), um retrato de perfil de tinta e grafite de Pablo Picasso.

Deleuze diferencia esses vários aspectos das linhas em termos de subordinação mão-olho, de modo que “Será necessário distinguir outros aspectos no valor das mãos: o digital, o tátil, o manual próprio e o háptico.” (DELEUZE, s/d, p. 83). O digital dos dígitos é aquele em que a mão está totalmente subordinada à função indexical da já existente figura de linha, de modo que a visão desenvolve um espaço óptico “ideal” contendo a figura totalmente desenhada. O tátil é a tentativa de tatear o avanço hesitante e experimental da descoberta, tanto no olhar exploratório livre e incondicionado quanto no constrangimento da linha de desenhos com olhos emergentes dentro da sensação como um agarramento, um agarramento possessivo da percepção. O manual corresponde ao que chamamos de traço contínuo, confiante e desimpedido do traçado, da linha preconizada, mentalizada, que não deixa nada para ser discernido. É um a priori dado e, como tal, não há trabalho aqui para gerar a imagem. O háptico é “quando a própria visão descobre em si uma função de tocar

que Ilhe é própria, e que só pertence a ela, distinta de sua função óptica" (DELEUZE, s/d, p. 90). Alois Riegl descreve o háptico como um discernimento visual sinestésico das qualidades acidentais de um objeto que geralmente só estão disponíveis para o sentido do tato, mas Deleuze o transforma em uma lógica da sensação, na qual a lógica como progressão é governada pela inteligência indisciplinada do avanço desejoso da semiótica.

A subordinação digital ou indicial passiva requer que a linguagem de referência pictórica indique a qualidade designada ou apontada. Em termos do pensamento diagramático, temos sido reticentes em chamar de diagramas os registros de movimentos oculares sacádicos de Yarbus porque, tecnicamente falando, em termos de como Deleuze teorizou o diagrama, os registros não podem ser assim considerados. O registro dos movimentos oculares no exame livre relativamente curto (2 minutos) da cabeça da Rainha Nefertiti (lado esquerdo da Figura 3.14) já demonstra a aptidão dos olhos para a compreensão figurativa da modalidade do desenho (*draughtsmanship*). O registro do movimento ocular é documentário da atividade relevante aos processos de atração, do que motiva os olhos, anima a visão, como a articulação do método do desejo, o nomadismo empírico da visão. Os traços de movimento registrados por Yarbus representam não apenas o movimento dos olhos, mas equivalem ao movimento do pensamento como um registro do desejo agarrador. O movimento dos olhos delimita e transmite significado e é a contra-distinção do conteúdo — de modo que, se permitíssemos o exame ocular continuado indefinidamente, algo como um desenho perfeitamente renderizado da estátua poderia emergir.

A subordinação tátil constitui a imagem-percepção. E isto fica certo com a ideia de impressões como corpos que podem ser ativamente 'agarrados ou apreendidos' ou, de alguma forma, percebidos ativamente por nosso aparato visual para oferecê-los à mente. O gesto ativo de apreensão também pode ser interpretado como uma apreensão do que está à mão para averiguar a verdade pela corroboração da informação visual através do toque — podemos conhecer algo visualmente tão certo, verdadeiro, como se tivesse sido apreendido, realizado através da mão. Além disso, podemos dizer também que, para o sentido da visão, algo é claramente discernível porque o objeto está perto do sujeito, ao alcance, ao comprimento do braço, e pode ser agarrado prontamente pela mente. Este ato de apreender demonstra a percepção da natureza ativa, bem como seu caráter prático. O manual refere-se à Imagem Mental que diz respeito a fenômenos quase-visuais que surgem

como consciência, mas não causada por impressões sensoriais. Isto implica representações ocorridas como resultado de pensamentos, sonhos, memórias, ideias, fantasmas ou o funcionamento da imaginação inventiva e criativa, as quais derivam de outras causas que não o imediatamente perceptivo.

O processo háptico na visão é tátil da mesma maneira que talhar mármore é visual. Podemos ilustrar isso estudando a sacudidela sacádica do desenho de Jacqueline de Picasso (Figura 3.14). Os meneios da mão são complexos, pois o movimento do lápis sobre o papel constitui uma montagem de marcas ou traços que são táteis no sentido escultural. As marcas de lápis esculpem o espaço negativo que permite que o espaço branco positivo surja: o processo é intuitivo: demonstra o método da intuição como já discutido. Essas marcas e traços no papel “são não representativos, não ilustrativos, não narrativos. Mas não são significativos nem significantes de antemão: são traços assignificantes. São traços de sensação, mas de sensações confusas. E são sobretudo traços manuais” (DELEUZE, s/d, p. 51). Mas aqui, em vez de chamá-las de manuais, talvez devêssemos chamá-las de traços das contrações eferentes resultantes do centro de indeterminação da mente, não diferentes das respostas sacádicas dos olhos nos movimentos oculares dos exames livres e incondicionados que só podem ser caracterizados como “irracionais, involuntários, livres, ao acaso” (DELEUZE, s/d, p. 51).

No entanto, na *Jacqueline* de Picasso (1956) (Figura 3.14), algo completamente diferente está acontecendo. Podemos discernir dois conjuntos de semelhanças impressionantes acontecendo entre as duas imagens: por um lado, temos os dois “desenhos” — o registro do movimento dos olhos sobre a foto da Rainha Nefertiti e os traços da mão do desenho de Picasso; e, do outro, a fotografia da estátua da Rainha Nefertiti e a figura no papel de Jacqueline Roque. Embora ambos os desenhos mostrem uma profusão de linhas espasmódicas e sacádicas, o registro de Yarbus se parece mais a um desenho em que os movimentos oculares têm a intenção de estabelecer a localização relativa dos vários pontos de interesse a fim de definir, delimitar e conter o objeto; as linhas irregulares e tremelicasses do desenho de Picasso também fazem isso, mas o resultado final é mais semelhante à fotografia da rainha Nefertiti, mesmo que o registro do movimento ocular pudesse ser aplicado a *Jacqueline*. Ainda que o desenho de Picasso esteja repleto de linhas, há realmente muito poucas “linhas” definidas e contínuas; todo o resto é uma eclosão sacádica aleatória, alguma mistura e, significativamente, algumas zonas de branco.

O desenho de Picasso é mais semelhante a uma pintura, mesmo se toda a imagem é executada como uma superposição de linhas sacádicas irregulares que produzem zonas de escuro, justapostas com zonas de luz, assim como um colorista faria ao estabelecer relações tonais entre blocos. Como escreve Deleuze, “O ‘Colorismo’, não são somente as cores que entram em relação (como em toda pintura digna deste nome), é a cor que é descoberta como a relação variável, a relação diferencial da qual depende todo o resto” (DELEUZE, s/d, p. 73-4).<sup>264</sup> Assim, ao dar à acumulação no papel dessas linhas sacádicas um tratamento diferente, a coisa se revela de maneira diferente e também cumpre um propósito diferente. Essa diferença qualitativa na maneira como as linhas estão sendo traçadas é o que faz de Picasso uma imagem diagramática e não simplesmente um desenho — o desenho de *Jacqueline* se liberta das preocupações pictóricas, da reprodução de dados figurativos e da organização ótica da representação, não para renderizar o visível dos traços visuais da mulher, mas para tornar visível a interação da luz como o fator determinante (em) formando nossa visão. Vemos como *Jacqueline* se parece com a fotografia de Nefertiti, um arranjo tonal contínuo de luz e sombra contando toda a história, em oposição ao registro do movimento ocular de Yarbus que tenta delinear a forma. O desenho de Picasso baseia-se na hachura de linhas sacádicas para construir relações entre zonas hápticas e quebradas para liberar “uma semelhança mais profunda, uma semelhança não figurativa para a mesma forma, ou seja, uma imagem unicamente figural” (DELEUZE, s/n, p. 85).

Podemos discernir uma dinâmica positiva/negativa aqui em jogo, em que a parte mais luminosa de uma imagem pictórica recebe a maior quantidade de atenção visual e, ao mesmo tempo, provoca a concentração mais densa de movimento ocular, de modo que os diagramas produzidos pela sacada ocular tendem para a reprodução do negativo tonal da imagem pictórica. Isso quer dizer que o olho está gastando mais tempo olhando para áreas bem iluminadas em comparação às áreas pouco iluminadas, as quais recebem pouquíssima atenção. Isso é repetidamente demonstrado em outros testes de movimento ocular realizados por Yarbus (1967) e ancora o viés científico cognitivo do “efeito de iluminação de rua” na função fisiológica. O “efeito de iluminação de rua” ou a “busca do bêbado” é um viés observacional na pesquisa científica que ocorre quando um pesquisador pesquisa algo onde

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<sup>264</sup> Como Deleuze afirma na mesma página, “Os coloristas podem muito bem usar o preto e o branco, os claros e os escuros; mas precisamente eles tratam o claro e o escuro, o branco e o preto, como cores, e põem entre elas relações de tonalidade” (DELEUZE, s/n, p. 73).

não é mais provável encontrar, mas onde é mais fácil buscar, encontrar possíveis resultados, ou onde observações podem ser mais facilmente registradas. Essa observação parece basear-se em um conto apócrifo “Procurando o Anel Perdido”, contada pelo satírico Sufi do século 13, Mulla Nasreddin, e reciclada como uma piada em que aparece o primeiro caso inglês em um jornal americano:<sup>265</sup> “Em 24 de maio de 1924, um jornal de Massachusetts publicou uma ocorrência em Boston. Um policial viu um homem de joelhos “tateando” por volta da meia-noite e perguntou-lhe sobre seu comportamento incomum: “Eu perdi uma nota de 2 dólares na avenida Atlântica”, disse o homem. “O que é isso?”, perguntou o intrigado oficial. “Você perdeu um bilhete de US \$ 2 na avenida Atlântica? Então, por que você está buscando aqui na praça Copley?” “Porque” — disse o homem enquanto se virava e continuava a caçada de joelhos, “tenho melhor luz aqui”.<sup>266</sup> Do ponto de vista do contexto formal da investigação científica, parece que o modo de cognição baseado na observação teria uma predileção pela conveniência. Em vez de explorar a “escuridão” — o plausivelmente incognoscível — parece que a investigação baseada na visão procura complexificar o óbvio, em vez de aventurar-se no desconhecido.

Ao comparar o diagrama dos movimentos oculares sobre a foto do busto da rainha Nefertiti com a desenho da *Jacqueline* de Picasso, os dois sistemas produzem duas formas de caracterizar o diferencial: a imagem esquemática feita por Picasso é permeada pelo jogo de luz e sombra, como uma qualidade vibracional emergente de escuro-devir-luz como espaço-devir-tempo (e vice-versa) como criação imanente de diferença em si mesma, enquanto o registro do movimento ocular sobre Nefertiti revela a produção progressiva linear de tempo e espaço como variáveis independentes em termos de diferença de si mesmo. Ficamos atingidos pela semelhança e pela diferença entre as duas imagens: não podemos negar a semelhança do desenho de Jacqueline e a foto do perfil de Nefertiti — a iluminação nas duas imagens é muito semelhante e ambas revelam as características de seus sujeitos de maneiras distintamente semelhantes. Por outro lado, o diagrama do movimento ocular de Yarbus parece ser a imagem negativa do desenho de Picasso. É o negativo no sentido fotográfico, a inversão figurativa da fotografia; e também é a reversão negativa que permite que o espaço positivo dos blocos de luz emerja em relação ao espaço negativo dos

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<sup>265</sup> 1924 May 24, *Boston Herald*, Whiting’s Column: Tammany Has Learned That This Is No Time for Political Bosses, Quote Page 2, Column 1, Boston, Massachusetts. (GenealogyBank). <http://listserv.linguistlist.org/pipermail/ads-l/2013-May/126975.html>

<sup>266</sup> <http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/04/11/better-light/#return-note-5967-1>

blocos escuros. As marcas que descrevem os movimentos oculares sacádicos como representação de extensão negativa, permitem a identificação da forma de realização positiva, ou seja, identificam a inteligência passiva em oposição à poiesis ativa.

Assumimos prontamente que o traço ou a marca são aqueles que transmitem significado. Mas a imagem do movimento ocular de Yarbus parece indicar o contrário. No desenho de Picasso, os traços constituem zonas de sombra que liberam zonas de luz, e são exatamente para essas zonas de luz que os olhos são desenhados e onde o significado é procurado. Não há praticamente nenhum interesse nas áreas de escuridão ao observar a fotografia; se a fotografia fosse um texto, seria como olhar para o espaço em branco entre as letras, entre as palavras e as linhas para entender o conteúdo do texto — e para adicionar insulto à injúria, no desenho, toda a energia criativa do artista está sendo dedicada onde o espectador será virtualmente desinteressado! As duas imagens são sobre 'produzir' imagens, mas as duas estão engajadas na ποιήσις (*poiesis*) de duas maneiras diferentes. O contraste das duas imagens distingue o παθήσις (*pathos*) como a capacidade passiva de receber a sabedoria ativa de Deus em oposição à invenção ativa aleatória da transmissão da forma ao material passivo de ποιητική (*poietike*) como operações em potencial.

Os gestos que produzem significado são os produtores de marcas, de inscrições, que produzem signos, sejam eles marcas de caneta sobre um desenho ou os movimentos dos olhos que deixam traços mentais. Ambos produzem semiose — significação.<sup>267</sup> A raiz da palavra μῆμα (*sema*) é um enigma bipolar que indica um futuro enquanto atesta o passado: é um signo de futuridade que existe como uma marca em um campo indicando a localização de uma entidade sepultada e é também aquilo que caracteriza a primazia signetética. O marcador pode estar na superfície, mas o significado significativo está enterrado na terra, abaixo da superfície do solo — e para saber exatamente qual é a significação oculta desse marcador semiótico, a fim de descobrir o que ele significa, é preciso cavar. E escavando encontra-se o Чернозём, *chernozem*, o solo orgânico fértil e rico que pode ser interpretado como a terra elementar expressiva da transformação material e por outra parte expressiva

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<sup>267</sup> Σημείωσις, (*sēmeiōsis*), um derivado do verbo grego Σημειῶ, (*sēmeiō*), que significa marcar, e Σημεῖον, (*semeion*) um signo, símbolo, indicação, uma marca pela qual uma coisa é conhecida, ambos são derivados de Σημα (*sema*), um presságio, um signo pelo qual uma sepultura é conhecida, ou uma constelação (LIDDELL E SCOTT, p. 1383). Isso também é interessante na interpretação da mensagem de Cristo. Se Cristo é a Palavra de Deus, seu significante físico pode ter sido morto, mas o espírito do significado como a palavra viva não morre e sai da sepultura como o corpo vivo de Cristo ressuscitou, encarnando o corpo do cristianismo como a palavra viva de Deus.

da geologia da estratificação. Mas para tornar isso relevante para a nossa discussão sobre o devir imagético em termos do diagrama do movimento ocular de Yarus e do desenho de Picasso, precisamos levar isso um passo adiante olhando a manifestação da raiva como um exemplo.

### **O signo Peirceano**

Para Peirce, o semiótico é chamado de signo e é uma entidade triádica. É composto de três partes, onde cada componente tem uma função específica em relação ao todo e aos outros componentes. O Signo é um movimento funcional (pragmático) do pensamento e, em virtude de ser um movimento, é indivisível. Aquilo que vem primeiro no movimento é chamado Primeiro; o que medeia o movimento é chamado de segundo; e o que completa o movimento é denominado Terceiro. O Primeiro é chamado de *Representamen*; o Segundo é o *objeto*; e o Terceiro, *Interpretante*. O Objeto ou Segundo serve como fulcro ou articulação da relação entre o Primeiro e o Terceiro, entre o Representamen e o Interpretante e medeia a transferência de significação que constitui o avanço processual como inferência lógica. Em termos de descrever um movimento de pensamento, é difícil transmitir a "mudança", a diferença, que a semiose produz em um movimento de pensamento. O movimento constitui o avanço, a procriação de significação, o movimento de avanço da consciência como significado e inferencial. É por isso que este movimento também é referido como uma lógica e proposicional.

A teoria dos signos de Peirce pode ser resumida em poucas linhas: “Um signo, ou *representamen*, é aquilo que, sob certo aspecto ou modo, representa algo para alguém. Dirige-se a alguém, isto é, cria, na mente dessa pessoa, um signo equivalente, ou talvez um signo mais desenvolvido. Ao signo assim criado denomino *interpretante* do primeiro signo. O signo representa alguma coisa, seu *objeto*. [...] Representa esse objeto não em todos os seus aspectos, mas em referência a um tipo de ideia, que eu, por vezes, denominei de *fundamento do representamen*” (PEIRCE, 2005, p. 46). Como um grupo, a tríade composta pelo *representamen*, interpretante e fundamento, estão juntas, integradas concretamente, em uma unidade indecomponível ou indissolúvel (DELEDALLE, 2000), de modo que nenhuma relação binária entre membros possa ocorrer excluindo a terceira: O Signo é um agenciamento relacional, triádico maquínico, em que o termo Signo é uma metonímia e não



apenas um termo para a relação triádica, uma unidade de movimento, mas também indica o *Representamen* como um signo atual e o Interpretante como resultante.

Esta definição do Signo é tão sucinta quanto enganosamente direta. Ao trabalhar com a semiótica de Peirce, deve-se sempre ter consciência dos papéis funcionais que cada elemento assume, apesar de sua posição ordinal no movimento de criação de significado. O próprio *Representamen*, como a "coisa" que desencadeia o processo, é chamado de signo porque é uma coisa apresentada a outro corpo de acordo com algum aspecto ou potencial que ele mesmo não incorpora. O Interpretante, como terminal conclusivo ou perfectivo do movimento, transforma-se em um *Representamen*, ou seja um começo para um novo movimento de pensamento, como Primeiro através da articulação de outro Objeto indicativo da produção de um novo Terceiro. Ao realizar esta operação, o Interpretante torna-se *Representamen* dentro de outro conjunto triádico, estabelecendo assim uma concrecência relacional, uma continuidade de significado com outras entidades, produzindo, com isso, uma funcionalidade operativa da verdade como lógica. Ao estabelecer essa convicção como uma entidade triangulada, o Interpretante se torna um *Representamen* chamando por outro Terceiro. O Terceiro se torna um Primeiro — um *Representamen* para uma formação subsequente de produção de significado — onde o *Representamen* original se torna o Objeto para a Segunda formação. A comutação na qual o Interpretante se transforma em um *Representamen* é o que Whitehead chama em seu esquema de categorização de sentir (*feeling*) em *Processo e Realidade* (1927): “‘sentir’ é a designação usada para a operação genética básica de passagem da objetividade dos dados para a subjetividade da entidade actual em causa” (WHITEHEAD, 2010, p. 62). A replicação maquínica da tríade surge quando o terceiro se torna um primeiro e se torna capaz de "determinar um terceiro próprio" (PEIRCE, 1955, p. 100). Utilizamos o termo ‘maquínico’ porque o signo como processo transforma as unidades semióticas e perpetua o movimento de significação, mesmo que a função ‘signo’ seja evocativa de processos menos determinantes que os mecânicos, necessários, e que sejam concebidas em forma de uma concepção de coerência funcional entre o que poderiam ser agentes causais materiais e não materiais. Dessa maneira, a tríade torna-se um agenciamento relacional maquínico que mantém o caráter genérico dos três modos de ser, mas os articula em termos de significado como a relação comum constituinte da unidade triádica. A concepção triádica dos modos de

ser é, portanto, um modelo para a passagem da consciência como uma produção contínua de significado.

Ao postular sua teoria triádica dos signos, Peirce possivelmente foi inspirado pelo *Timeu* de Platão no que “não é possível que somente duas coisas sejam compostas de forma bela sem uma terceira, pois é necessário gerar entre ambas um elo que as una. O mais belo dos elos será aquele que faça a melhor união entre si mesmo e aquilo a que se liga, o que é, por natureza, alcançado da forma mais bela através da proporção” (PLATÃO, 2011, p. 100). Mas isso não é apenas uma correspondência funcional entre um isto e aquilo, mas uma ressonância harmônica, uma congruência racional que produz um todo concordante como uma razão harmônica pitagórica, uma racionalização musical e numérica.

Mas essa correspondência é a força de ligação que dá aos signos peirceanos sua coerência. O *Representamen* é para o Objeto como o Interpretante é tanto para o *Representamen* quanto para o Objeto. Ao criar essa tríplice entidade de primeiridade, segundidade e terceiridade, o processo não chega a cessar. Peirce não entende a semiose como uma coisa estática descritível em termos de uma conclusão acabada, mas um sentimento de satisfação produtor do desejo que impulsiona o movimento para a frente — é um ponto de partida processual, um limiar de avanço. E, como observa Whitehead, esse sentimento de satisfação é semelhante ao "prazer" de Samuel Alexander e à "intuição" de Bergson — tanto em consonância com nossa ideação espinosista quanto na geração de afetos alegres, aumentando o poder de agir do corpo e evocando a perfeição.

Mas qual é a ideia comum aqui? Qual é a intuição, se a estendemos, seria levar à sua extrapolação lógica e expressarmos a ideia-problema em termos de tempo? Da composição do triângulo declarado em termos de tempo? É o sentimento em que o terceiro se torna um terceiro e a passagem é quando o terceiro se torna um primeiro. Assim, a imagem do movimento aqui é aquela que tem extensão e avanço: ao formar uma nova adição triangular de Terceira a Primeira e a Segunda, temos um avanço processual da corporificação, da criação do corpo como desejo incorporado na própria significação, o avanço maquínico de sua propagação. A polivalência de cada objeto semiótico lhes permite a cada elemento contemplar relações semióticas com outras entidades, constituindo assim uma teia concretizada de semiose. Isto produz um plano de consistência onde a verdade torna-se uma funcionalidade operativa estendida e a teia criada de significado de uma cartografia de correspondências.




Figura 3.15: A Raiva e seu Diagrama Hipotético.

### Significação Afetiva e sua Expressão Diagramática

A raiva (ou a cólera ou a ira) é definida como uma resposta hostil a uma provocação percebida. Aristóteles analisou longamente na *Retórica*, Livro II Cap. 2, sobre como nos tornamos agitados para a raiva. Ele entendeu a raiva como algo que surge como uma reação a alguma oposição e que resulta em uma resposta vingativa para um indivíduo em particular. Spinoza viu como um afeto que ele definiu na *Ética* (III Def Aff XXXVI) como “A ira é o desejo que nos incita, por ódio, a fazer mal a quem odiamos” (SPINOZA, 2010, p. 207). Podemos combinar essas duas definições para ver a raiva como uma dinâmica de ação-reação impulsionada por afetos. Se nos depararmos com alguém que esteja demonstrando raiva, reconheceremos o estado afetivo por uma série de traços observáveis que alguém chamaria de sinais de raiva. Estes incluem: aperto nas sobrancelhas, olhos apertados, bochechas pálidas, lábios franzidos ou dentes à mostra, narinas dilatadas, mandíbula tensa, ombros arqueados e puxados para trás, punhos cerrados, corpo pronto para a ação. Juntos, esses sinais representam raiva e, portanto, constituem um conceito perceptivo de raiva. No entanto, não percebo todos esses sinais juntos de uma só vez: constitui uma cadeia significativa onde um signo leva ao seguinte, como se eu estivesse checando uma lista de sinais que constituem a raiva. E depois de verificar todos eles, repito o processo para uma afirmação do que verifiquei e também para ter certeza da não alteração, adição ou dedução de nenhum deles.

As características individuais em si não são os signos, são objetos que significam, e a significação é transmitida pela emanção afetiva do objeto — seja qual for o valor significativo de cada objeto, é uma ideia inadequada e por isso é nomeado de afeto — e este é o *representamen*. Spinoza afirma que o afeto gera afetos, e assim um afeto que afeta é capaz de produzir um efeito dentro de nós; e Bergson assegura que uma imagem é, por definição, um estímulo, um atraso dentro da caixa preta do centro de indeterminação e uma reação. Então, o que temos são signos ou *representamens*/objetos da seguinte maneira:

R1:	sobrancelhas	apertadas <sup>268</sup>
R2:	olho	direito semicerrado
R3:	olho	esquerdo semicerrado
R4:	bochecha	esquerda pálida
R5:	bochecha	direita pálida
R6:	dentes	descobertos
R7:	mandíbula	tensa
R8:	ombro	esquerdo quadrado
R9:	ombro	direito quadrado
R10:	punho	direito fechado
R11:	punho	esquerda fechado

Cada *representamen* tem um interpretante que neste exemplo é o movimento dos olhos do atual *representamen* para o próximo da lista. Assim, se começarmos com R1 como a significação afetiva das sobrancelhas apertadas, a reação imagética, como interpretante, é o movimento para R2, para o olho direito semicerrado. Disso, os olhos vão para R3, e assim por diante, até que os olhos vão primeiro para um punho e depois para o outro retornando para R1: sobrancelhas apertadas. A sequência é então repetida para verificar se o que estamos testemunhando é, de fato, o circuito definidor da raiva. Precisamos salientar que há uma deslocação do circuito neuronal aferente que transporta o estímulo do afeto do *representamen* para o circuito neuronal eferente condutor do afeto do interpretante para a contração muscular. Além disso, a resolução contratual como determinação do *representamen*, estímulo aferente é o resultado de um processo subconsciente, atualmente

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<sup>268</sup> Qualquer dos *representamens* aqui listados são percebidos dentro de uma fixação.

incognoscível ou indeterminável, que produz movimento de acordo com uma inteligência ou lógica além de nossa compreensão. Essa deslocação que ocorre na fenda entre o *representamen* de entrada e o interpretante de saída é o que constitui o movimento do pensamento mediado pelo centro de indeterminação.

Então, se nós expressamos isso em termos de perguntas, obtemos:

Qual é o interpretante de R1, as sobrancelhas apertadas? Olho direito.

Qual é o interpretante de R2, o olho direito semicerrado? Olho esquerdo.

Qual é o interpretante de R3, o olho esquerdo semicerrado? Bochecha esquerda.

... etc

É o mesmo que dizer:

Vejo sobrancelhas apertadas. Qual seria a resposta interpretativa? A contração necessária eferente? Vá encontrar o olho direito semicerrado.

Vejo o olho direito semicerrado. Qual é a minha resposta interpretativa? Vá encontrar o olho esquerdo semicerrado.

Vejo o olho esquerdo semicerrado. Qual é a minha resposta interpretativa? Vá encontrar a bochecha esquerda pálida.

... etc

Mas se eu o pergunto 'O que é esse 'desejo que nos incita, por ódio, a fazer mal a quem odiamos'?' E você responde: "sobrancelhas apertadas, olhos semicerrados, bochechas pálidas, dentes descobertos, mandíbula tensa, ombros arqueados e puxados para trás, punhos cerrados", possivelmente diria que há algo errado com você, mesmo que seja assim que a raiva é percebida. Os olhos viajam de R1 para R2 para R3 para R4.... para R8 a R9, R10, R11 e, em seguida, novamente para R1 e, para em seguida, repetir o ciclo. Sendo assim, o diagrama é a série de movimentos como agenciamento que traça completamente a lógica da sensação que determina a cognição. Desse modo, o diagrama da raiva será "traçado" pela série de movimentos de R1 a R11 — isso não existe como um diagrama no papel, mas como o padrão da cognição, uma designação, uma territorialização que denota atividades específicas. O diagrama não é o movimento dos olhos que gera a cognição, mas o caminho feito pela compreensão enquanto circula pela cognição da raiva quando ela extrai ou puxa a raiva. A paisagem toda da raiva como possível gerador de diagramas é o que constitui a base peirceana como a cartografia semiótica da territorialização do conceito. O

registro do movimento dos olhos que desenha a raiva será, portanto, uma representação do fluxo da significação da minha compreensão da raiva e indica o fluxo de determinação, como acontece, ou seja, a cadeia de significação. Mas como nunca podemos esgotar o potencial fractal da significação, nunca se pode representar o conceito em sua totalidade.

Na Figura 3.13, o diagrama dessa imagem será um traçado único do ciclo que os olhos fazem como o registro de movimento de *representamen* para *representamen* até que um ciclo de cognição esteja fechado. Na Figura 3.14, o diagrama dos traçados do movimento ocular será o ciclo singular que traça o padrão de cognição na fotografia da cabeça da rainha Nefertiti. O desenho de Picasso, também na Figura 3.14, representa uma situação mais complexa. Primeiro, pode-se apreciar pelo seu valor documental, não pela efígie de Jacqueline Roque em 04/12/56, mas como registro direto do próprio progresso intuitivo de Picasso na criação de significação na produção do retrato que subsequentemente precisamos entendê-lo como uma possibilidade de nosso próprio entendimento. O desenho inteiro de Picasso é um grande diagrama. É o registro da construção cumulativa ou criação de semiose como uma imbricação de signos micrométricos — cada linha constitui uma unidade de matéria sinalética que documenta o surgimento de outro mundo, o mundo da representação de *Jacqueline*. Ver Picasso desenhar ou pintar, como no documentário de 1956 de Henri-Georges Clouzot, *Le Mystère Picasso*, é testemunhar a independência criativa da mão como testemunho da inteligência oculta em ação como modo de pensamento na propagação gestual da significação.

Similarmente, na continuidade da sequência recorrente de R1-R2-R3...R10-R11 como a determinação do conceito de raiva, podemos atestar que esta inteligência está em ação como aquela que impulsiona e guia os movimentos do olho em uma manifestação de pensamento. O movimento de R1 para R2 demonstra uma determinação ocorrida e que o movimento é a resolução da crise em R1 como resposta à pergunta "Que acontece agora?", e que inevitavelmente resulta em catástrofe — mas conforme mostramos anteriormente, não é tão fortuito quanto somos levados a acreditar. Além disso, o padrão repetitivo como um ciclo fechado é uma única e cognoscível regularidade em forma de um conceito empírico que pode ser chamado de raiva. E como uma série fechada, pode-se tomar quase por certo que o resultado maquínico desta série em termos de sua expressão, será um ataque violento sendo nossa resposta de luta ou fuga. De modo que o resultado de literalmente compreender a sequência de R1 + R2 + R3 +...R10 + R11 é luta ou fuga, e dificilmente uma

concepção intelectual consciente da Raiva: seria a reação performativa do Medo. A *performance* gestual em série de R1 + R2 + R3 +... R10 + R11 resulta no estado afetivo da raiva como uma resposta hostil, mas vazia de possibilidades, pois não tem para onde a direcionar.

Mas o que podemos concluir é que o homem raivoso da Figura 3.15 é uma imagem, sendo possível entendê-lo como um signo onde o *Representamen* pode ser chamado de Raiva e o Interpretante nos obriga a escolher entre lutar ou voar. Em termos da imagem de Bergson, se o conceito cognisado como um agenciamento, por vezes entendido como um estímulo, a resposta emerge imanentemente como uma determinação progressiva transmitida pelos nervos eferentes e resultando num limiar que deve ser ultrapassado para obter uma contração muscular tipo lutar ou voar. A imagem pictórica pode representar a raiva, mas seu resultado afetivo é o medo, da mesma forma como a raiva pode ter sido o resultado afetivo para uma gargalhada zombeteira.

Por mais incrível e inacreditável que pareça, esse é o tipo de determinação que Picasso inconscientemente, intuitivamente, vertiginosamente esboçou a hachura no papel. Esta é a mesma atividade que acontece entre uma fixação e a sequência nas imagens do movimento dos olhos, mas quando as mãos de um artista hipercriativo realizam a operação, isso é o que resulta. Através do zigue-zague das mãos ou dos olhos, pensamentos estão sendo produzidos como determinações seriadas, intuitivas, que, em um caso, termina no desenho de Jacqueline Roque e, no outro, como o diagrama da determinação do estudo visual da fotografia da Rainha Nefertiti.

Mas refletindo sobre o *desenho* de Picasso, como Deleuze poderia dizer, a velocidade do pensamento não deixa tempo para pensar as coisas; é como se a agência do desenhador fosse apenas a mediação da catástrofe que supera o desenho. “A mão do pintor é interposta, para socorrer sua própria dependência e para quebrar a organização óptica soberana: não vemos mais nada, como em uma catástrofe, um caos” (DELEUZE, 2003, pp. 51-2). Não percebemos as linhas individualmente, percebemo-nas através de seus efeitos como um conjunto de traços de significação. A palavra *drawing* (desenho em inglês), tem um duplo significado aqui. Pode se referir aos gestos de estabelecer marcas no papel ou pode se referir às marcas já existentes no papel como atração. A criação de significação de Picasso é tão rápida que o movimento é um borrão. As linhas no papel, se as considerarmos como o que são, são puro caos, uma catástrofe atrás da outra sem fim. Os gestos que agora se

tornaram um sistema de marcas num papel equivalem a um desenho, uma representação que atrai magneticamente nosso olhar para a catástrofe diante de nós, porque não podemos desviar nossos olhos do desastre.

Quando nossa atenção é atraída para atos de violência, degeneração e morte, chamamos isso de curiosidade mórbida — mas esse interesse pelo que é marcado pela morte não é outro senão a atração que sentimos por Σημα (*sema*). A visão da morbidez (cuja raiz em latim *mori*, significa morrer), da morte, da violência, da doença é a localização da violência como o lugar da criação, de uma cena primal de agitação que produz pensamento na Χώρα (*Chōra*) como a localização da invenção, porque onde há violência e destruição há sempre uma possibilidade de criar o novo. Como Rickert aponta, “como implantado no trabalho de Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida e Gregory Ulmer, a Chōra platônica transforma nossos sentidos de começo, de criação e invenção, colocando-os concretamente dentro de ambientes materiais, espaços informacionais e registros afetivos (ou corporais)” (RICKERT, 2007, p. 252).<sup>269</sup> Este é o cerne da ideação da transformação, do movimento das ideias estáticas para a atividade vital que, como afirma Rickert, representa uma mudança retórica na compreensão da invenção criativa como atividade heterogênea. E isso transforma o chora no ὄχημα, o *ōchema*,<sup>270</sup> literalmente, carruagem ou transporte, o veículo que transporta a razão, uma imagem a qual é retratada na abertura do platô do Devir-Intenso de *Mil Platôs*.

### **A Teoria da Imagem de Bergson**

A teoria da imagem de Bergson foi discutida nas páginas iniciais deste capítulo como uma concepção triádica de um estímulo, um centro de indeterminação e de uma reação, mas precisa de mais desenvolvimento para nos permitir articular as ideias processuais do cinematógrafo, da perspectiva e do meio associado. Bergson desenvolveu sua teoria da imagem em seu livro *Matéria e Memória* (1896). O subtítulo do livro é *Ensaio sobre a*

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<sup>269</sup> “as deployed in the work of Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida, and Gregory Ulmer, the *chōra* transforms our senses of beginning, creation, and invention by placing them concretely within material environments, informational spaces, and affective (or bodily) registers” (Rickert, 2007, p. 252)

<sup>270</sup> Que, como veremos mais adiante, o *ōchema* é o que transporta o Rei Laius na sua fatídica excursão quando se encontrou com Édipo.



*relação de corpo e espírito*, e o texto apresenta uma análise dos problemas filosóficos clássicos relativos a essa relação. O livro foi publicado pela primeira vez em 1896 em reação ao livro *As doenças da memória* do psicólogo francês Théodule Ribot, que apareceu em 1881. Ribot afirmou que as novas descobertas da ciência do cérebro provaram que a memória é uma faculdade localizada dentro do cérebro e, portanto, de natureza puramente material.

O livro de Bergson afirma a realidade do espírito e a realidade da matéria e procura determinar a relação entre eles (BERGSON, 1999). Mas ao contrário de Descartes que acredita em duas diferentes substâncias que se articulam como matéria e espírito, a concepção de Bergson é mais espinozista, na medida em que o espiritual e o material se parecem mais aos atributos de uma única substância — mesmo se ele mantém a separação entre matéria e espírito. É uma concepção dualista, mas o gênio dele reside em como lhes permite conviver de forma heterogênea. Pensar com Bergson é abandonar a abordagem do senso comum para compreender a matéria, a memória e a imagem, de outra maneira. A matéria precisa ser entendida como processo material e não como física ou sólida. Bergson nos leva a pensar na existência material de maneira diferente, de um modo que nos diferencia da compreensão cotidiana e comum das coisas. Em um eixo, Bergson configura os extremos do realismo e do idealismo e, no outro eixo, ele configura o epifenomenalismo e o paralelismo.

A concepção da matéria em Bergson é muito contemporânea. Essencialmente, estamos lidando com seres de luz. Todo o sistema de pensamento imaginário baseia-se em variações vibratórias perpétuas e universais exemplificadas e ilustradas através de energia e luz como função de onda. Possivelmente isso seria uma maneira muito abstrata de pensar sobre a matéria e o mundo, mas podemos entender isso através da fórmula de Einstein que equivale à energia com qualidades que podemos considerar físicas, como a massa. Se qualquer objeto pode ser considerado como constituído de átomos, poderíamos dizer que tudo é energia e vibração materialmente substancial, mas tendo peso relacional. Assim pode-se falar da ação recíproca e da reação dos corpos uns pelos outros como interação imagética em um campo dinâmico.

Para Bergson, o dualismo cartesiano, ou dualismo ordinário da mente e do corpo, é nítido demais. Ele postula dois sistemas, mas não pode explicar por que há dois, e de uma forma o idealismo subjetivo tenta derivar um desses sistemas do outro, de derivar o mundo

da ciência do mundo da consciência, enquanto em sua outra forma, derivar o primeiro sistema do segundo, e o realismo materialista em tirar o segundo do primeiro (BERGSON, 1999). Então parece que, para Bergson, a atualidade existe como a reconciliação desses opostos. Mas sua reconciliação não é fazer um dos extremos, mas uma expressão da possibilidade de as duas ordens operarem simultaneamente. E é esta possibilidade de simultaneidade, que encontramos como forma básica do devir, sendo interessante porque essa coexistência vai contra as leis básicas do pensamento tradicional, que afirmam que uma coisa é A ou não A, uma coisa A não pode ser uma coisa B ao mesmo tempo, uma coisa pode ser A ou B, mas não pode ser ambas. Penso que essa concepção de Bergson sobre a matéria e a memória é uma das coisas que torna tão atraente sua filosofia para Deleuze. E simultaneamente tão repulsiva para tantos outros. Essa concepção coloca a imagem no reino do afetivo, do impermanente, da mudança, do não-ser, porque eles não são adequadamente formados nem constituem Ideias.

Os dois primeiros capítulos de *Matéria e Memória* tratam principalmente da percepção 'pura' e da imagem — e para significar que a memória não entra na equação da imagem-percepção, Bergson designa a imagem de 'pura'. O objetivo do primeiro capítulo do livro é mostrar que o realismo puro e o idealismo puro vão longe demais, que eles são muito extremos, e que é um erro reduzir a matéria à percepção que temos dela, como uma materialidade física sólida; e é um erro também de fazer da matéria uma coisa capaz de produzir em nós percepções, mas que seria de uma natureza diferente delas (BERGSON, 1999). O realismo afirma que o mundo existe independente da mente, em oposição aos pontos de vista antirrealistas que negam a existência de um mundo independente da mente. Filósofos que professam a filosofia do realismo afirmam que a verdade consiste numa correspondência entre representações cognitivas e realidade. Em contraste, o idealismo é uma filosofia que afirma que o real é fundamentalmente mental, mentalmente construído ou, imaterial. Ao contrário do materialismo, o idealismo admite o primário da consciência, o que significa que a consciência existe antes do material, a consciência cria e determina o material, não vice-versa. As teorias do idealismo acreditam que a consciência é a origem do mundo e visam explicar o mundo existente por causas mentais.

Bergson também contrasta o epifenomenalismo e o paralelismo como posições que terminam com o mesmo resultado — particularmente por causa de como ele define o próprio sistema nervoso como um sistema heterogêneo de imagens. Na Psicologia, o

epifenomenalismo significa que a consciência é considerada exclusivamente como um subproduto das atividades materiais do cérebro e do sistema nervoso. Em comparação, o Paralelismo psico-neural sustenta que os processos mentais (psíquicos) e físicos são concomitantes e que qualquer mudança em um será correspondentemente refletida no outro. A primeira é a posição teoria da escolha para cientistas que afirmam que os correlatos neurais derivam do processo mental, enquanto a segunda, também conhecida como a hipótese da identidade, reflete a posição espinosista da mente e da matéria como expressiva de uma substância. Isto é de significado epistemológico para Spinoza porque lhe permite contemplar a identidade do pensamento com o seu objeto (HOFFDING, 1912). Assim, de um lado, temos a polaridade entre o idealismo berkeleiano e o materialismo cartesiano, e, do outro, o epifenomenalismo e o paralelismo, que afirmam “o pensamento como uma simples função do cérebro e o estado de consciência como um epifenômeno do estado cerebral, quer se tomem os estados do pensamento e os estados do cérebro por duas traduções, em línguas diferentes, de um mesmo original” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 4).

Bergson distingue duas formas diferentes de memória: por um lado, lembranças baseadas no hábito, como uma repetição inconsciente de ações passadas, não reconhecidas estritamente como representando o passado, mas utilizando-a para fins de ação atual. Esse tipo de memória é automático, inscrito dentro do corpo e serve um propósito utilitário. “É o hábito esclarecido pela memória, mais do que a memória propriamente dita”. E assim a questão torna-se ‘Como o hábito ou a repetição cognitiva aprendida surgem do processo imagético interativo?’ A memória pura, por outro lado, registra o passado sob a forma de “imagens-lembrança”, situada dentro de uma série imagética de planos de consistência que a posiciona no passado e lhe permite ser reconhecida como tal. É de um tipo contemplativo e fundamentalmente espiritual, livre e irrestrito. E aqui novamente, precisamos ver como podemos construir essa estrutura do passado a partir dos traços estabelecidos no encontro entre a interação imaginária e a questão de acesso a essas imagens de memória como processo imagético interativo. A memória está apenas na interseção da mente e da matéria (BERGSON, 1999). E se a imagem é uma “existência” colocada a meio caminho entre a “coisa” e a “representação” ou imagem mental, como essa ideia se encaixa com a ideia de memória como uma expressão de interdependência? Como expressão de relação?

Bergson já pensava na percepção como um evento processual em sua tese de doutorado, traduzida para o português e intitulada: *Ensaio Sobre os Dados Imediatos da*

*Consciência* (1889). Ao envolver o pensamento processual de Bergson, mesmo que pareça estar articulado na linguagem da visão ou neurofisiologia em termos dos olhos, dos nervos e do cérebro, deve-se ter cuidado ao tornar a atividade processual como coisas no mundo: essas coisas concretas que existem na atualidade e que têm nomes 'cotidianos' precisam ser vistas como entidades processuais. Por exemplo, dado o cérebro, ao qual Bergson repetidamente se refere como um agregado de imagens, precisa ser entendido como uma "massificação" de forças, de reciprocidade sem substância de ação e reação, de dar e receber onde não há substância, apenas o agenciamento sistemático de energias como uma interação processual de funções selecionadas. Impressões sensoriais são então construídas com dados informacionais imediatos e presentes em processos receptivos que envolvem o dado como superfícies de seleção, e o receptor como sentidos. A percepção torna-se então uma função dos movimentos moleculares (BERGSON, 1999) que, em termos filosóficos, abrangem as moléculas atômicas ou orgânicas das formas molares, mas que expressam propriedades possivelmente interpretadas na ocorrência entre "o Mecânico e o Químico". Dentro do processo de seleção de imagens em termos de percepção de cognição discriminatória — que pode ser expressa na forma do que será a próxima percepção como um movimento de uma lógica de sensação e subsequentemente de sentido e memória — o molecular introduz uma dinâmica de limiares ou quanta como parte de micro-devires (DELEUZE e PARNET, 1998) onde "tudo está concernido, nossa percepção, nossas ações e paixões, nossos regimes de signos" (DELEUZE e PARNET, 1998, p. 112). Embora Bergson e Deleuze enfatizem o não-humano, o impessoal e a dissolução do ego, o indivíduo é definido por Deleuze como "concentração, acumulação, coincidência de um certo número de singularidades pré-individuais convergentes" (DELEUZE, 1991, p. 99) e é nessa definição do indivíduo singular, ou do singular individualmente como diferença, onde devemos localizar o que a percepção pode significar. Sabemos que o mundo através dos nossos sentidos e percepção é o processo operativo ou a atividade que permite a cognição, mas como ressalta Bergson, ecoando Platão, percepção e cognição não são equivalentes. A percepção é uma função dos movimentos moleculares da imagem e traduz o externo para o interno, transforma nossa experiência material do mundo na experiência mental da mente como maquinária, não mecânica, mas na forma de processo abstrato.

Bergson concebe a imagem perceptual nos seres vivos como uma construção triádica composta por um estímulo, um centro de indeterminação e uma reação (BERGSON, 1999).

Na percepção humana, de qualquer maneira, queremos entender a apresentação de secções imóveis à mente como um estímulo, um movimento que é experimentado de maneira contínua na consciência. Não há oscilação em nossa percepção do mundo "exterior", mesmo que o oferecido à mente seja uma série de secções estáticas ou instantâneas. Bergson entendia essa dinâmica como operativa dentro da percepção quando escrevia o *Ensaio Sobre os Dados Imediatos da Consciência*, enquanto o desenvolvimento tecnológico do aparato cinematográfico estava ocorrendo no mundo: era uma ideia cuja hora havia chegado. No entanto, quando ele a reconhece, ele rotula a percepção cinematográfica mais para a decomposição inicial em fotogramas estáticos da síntese perceptiva do que para a síntese em que o movimento abstrato é transmitido às secções estáticas e à produção do tempo.




Figura 3.16: A teoria da imagem de Bergson

Ele entende o que está acontecendo no final do processo de percepção em termos de síntese e projeção como o "dispositivo" que dá continuidade aos cortes estáticos que ele externaliza e "projeta" de volta ao mundo para explicar a matéria e a projeção (BERGSON, 1999). Essa projeção da percepção no mundo não é normalmente entendida como cinematográfica, mas sentimos que é um aspecto do processo cinematográfico que não foi estudado como parte do tropo cinematográfico de Bergson e Deleuze. No entanto, essa concepção ampliada terá implicações para o colapso do *front-end* em quadros estáticos e

permitirá que Deleuze teorize a tomada, o enquadramento e, eventualmente, a montagem. Mas o que é de suma importância para Deleuze é o movimento produzido internamente e o tempo abstrato contínuo que segue. Na *Imagem-Movimento*, ele investiga a ligação sensório-motora externalizante, mas na *Imagem-Tempo*, ele envolverá o movimento em si mesmo, como uma internalização do avanço processual para oferecer uma panóplia de tipos de imagem que articulam o devir duracional.

A teoria da percepção de Bergson descrita no primeiro capítulo de *Matéria e Memória* (1896) identifica um tipo de procissão de consciência que já foi em grande parte mapeada no *Ensaio Sobre os Dados Imediatos da Consciência* (1889), mas que só será identificada como cinematográfica em *A evolução criadora* (1907) e cujas implicações totais só serão reveladas quase um século depois por Deleuze (1983 e 1985) em *Cinema 1: A Imagem-Movimento* e *Cinema 2: A Imagem-Tempo*. Deleuze vai concretizar essa ideação do processo perceptivo em termos da imagem-percepção, da imagem-ação e da imagem-afetiva de acordo com as fases da imagem da imagem-movimento de Bergson. Inicialmente, em *Matéria e Memória*, Bergson desenvolve o conceito de percepção conforme o que ele chama de "percepção pura", um modo teórico usado para elaborar o conceito em si como um processo autônomo de avanço imagético. Ele faz isso para não implicar a memória em sua elaboração da percepção, que para ele é um componente necessário e inalienável da percepção como apreensão — “não há percepção que não seja cheia de lembranças” (BERGSON 1991, p. 33). Nos capítulos subsequentes, ele desenvolverá dois tipos de memória, ambas dependentes do processo perceptual, mas que envolvem diferentes modalidades funcionais da memória: memória do hábito e memória integral ou pura. Em termos de desenvolvimento do método cinematográfico em Bergson, a memória em si não tem relevância primária, mesmo que seja útil para Deleuze quando ele desenvolve a imagem-memória em *A Imagem-tempo*.

Mas ao ler o texto de Bergson, ficamos abalados com a afirmação de que “essas imagens agem e reagem umas sobre as outras”. E, provavelmente, a imagem que selecionamos como imagem mais vaga não reaja com qualquer outra imagem da mesma forma que podemos interagir uns com os outros. Mas antes, Bergson definiu uma imagem como “uma certa existência que está localizada a meio caminho entre a “coisa” e a “representação”. E agora, ele invoca uma imagem que é distinta de todas as outras — o

corpo humano — e nos pede para examinar nossa consciência e considerar as afeições produzidas.

Bergson não está sendo muito claro aqui e se torna difícil entender o que ele está postulando. Mas talvez a razão para que isso pareça pouco claro para nós hoje, seja que há 150 anos atrás o discurso dominante sobre o que constitui a causalidade psicológica fosse diferente. Então, ao contrário do entendimento da palavra afeto hoje, devemos entendê-la como a ação de afetar, agir ou influenciar, pois quando vista passivamente, como uma existência, torna-se o fato de ser afetado. Quando aplicado à mente, um afeto é um afeto ou movimento da mente de qualquer maneira; um estado mental provocado por qualquer influência; uma emoção ou sentimento e, mais especificamente, para causar uma impressão material; para agir, influenciar, mover, tocar ou influenciar. Dessa forma, para a visão, temos uma intensidade de luz que atinge nossa retina, causando uma impressão — da mesma maneira que um selo de borracha faz uma impressão em um pedaço de papel — e produzindo uma impulsão transmitida para dentro do cérebro. Assim sendo, quando Bergson nos pede para considerar as afeições produzidas, ele está sendo muito contemporâneo, pois solicita para sermos conscientes, praticarmos a atenção plena e examinarmos como as impressões do mundo sobre o nosso corpo estão nos afetando. Ele está nos pedindo para examinar o que acontece em nosso corpo ao percebermos o mundo, ao entrarmos, por exemplo, em uma sala com ar condicionado, ao darmos um passo, como um olhar leva a outro, quando provamos uma Madeleine depois de mergulhar no chá, e considerarmos como somos afetados. E, “parece-me que cada uma delas contém, à sua maneira, um convite a agir” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 17).

Quando somos afetados e percebemos a incipiência de agir, entendemos que uma mudança aconteceu em nossa mente. Seja o que for que nos afeta, neste caso a impressão sensorial, está sendo processada na mente, e o processamento cerebral está formulando o convite para agir de uma certa maneira: para cada estimulação, há uma reação. E esta é a chave para entender a imagem de Bergson. Considerando o que acontece quando colocamos a mão em uma churrasqueira quente já que começamos a sentir uma sensação crescente de desconforto originada em nossa mão e, subsequentemente, um convite cada vez mais insistente de dentro de nós para tirar a mão. Esta é uma resposta pura a uma estimulação, pois não precisamos de raciocínio ou memória para formular a resposta. Não importa quão jovens somos, a resposta será a mesma.

Mas ao reconsiderarmos essa sequência de gestos, de ações envolvidas quando a mão se encontra no fogo, e ‘começarmos no meio’, como diria Deleuze, a questionar a razão pela qual a mão se encontra na churrasqueira é aqui irrelevante. Nesse caso, o gesto da minha mão indo para a churrasqueira já está acontecendo: o calor intenso do fogo faz o contato com a superfície da minha pele e a impressão de calor, a intensificação da sensação, é conduzida ao cérebro pelos nervos aferentes para alguma região do cérebro, onde ocorre algo indeterminado, algum tipo de processamento de pensamento, havendo uma resposta formulada automaticamente, de modo que um impulso neural é transmitido pelos nervos eferentes para os músculos do braço a fim de produzir um gesto de resposta.<sup>271</sup> Pode-se resistir conscientemente contra esse impulso de retirar a mão, mas um limiar será alcançado onde nossa resistência será superada. E aqui, quando a resposta acontece, notamos:

- Primeiro, a resposta representa uma inversão do estímulo.

- Segundo, o processo que acontece em nosso cérebro que determina a reversão é desconhecido para nós e indeterminado — não sabemos como se produz a formulação da reversão e não sabemos o que entrou na formulação.

- Terceiro, como observa Bergson, o afeto — a mudança na mente provocada pela impressão sensorial transmitida à mente — produz um convite para agir, mas não de escolha. O afeto traz o processo imagético de estimulação — indeterminação — resposta à beira da resolução, de crise, que exige um simples sim ou não para proceder do processo de resolução. Mas aqui não é realmente uma questão de decidir entre vários resultados. A ação ingênua ou óbvia do nosso exemplo invocado no momento da crise é derivada da formulação do que Bergson e Deleuze chamam de intuição, ou seja, a resposta inevitável formulada pela indeterminada razão da mente a partir de uma multiplicidade de estímulos. Ou como Bergson escreve "A ação necessária se cumprirá por si mesma, quando sua hora tiver chegado" (BERGSON, 1999, p. 15).

- Quarto, os nervos aferentes levam à estimulação da periferia do sistema nervoso centrípeto e a resposta como uma inversão centrífuga ocorre ao longo de um circuito neural diferente, por meio dos nervos eferentes, que conduzem a resposta aos músculos para uma contração. No nosso exemplo, os nervos que levam a sensação de calor ao cérebro não são

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<sup>271</sup> Os gregos antigos diriam que não há reação sem um actante, um corpo agente causador por qualquer movimento. De modo que o calor como primeira causa da dor e do desconforto que acabará levando ao movimento do meu braço é constitutivo de um corpo.



os mesmos nervos que transmitem a reação para mover o braço. Da mesma forma, os nervos que transmitem energia luminosa transduzida para o cérebro não são os mesmos que transmitem a reação do ajuste ocular.

- Quinto, a impressão sensorial como objetiva torna-se subjetiva dentro e através da reversão indeterminada que produz a reação, e que, por sua vez, se reverte no mundo e posteriormente se tornará objeto como base para o próximo ciclo imagético de estímulo-indeterminação-reação.

- Sexto lugar, o afecto referido por Bergson é aquela mudança que ocorre no centro da indeterminação entre o estímulo e a resposta ainda indeterminável.

- Sétimo, dependendo de como concebemos a matéria, ou o fundamento material do que consideramos a matéria, podemos entender a matéria como um "agregado de imagens", uma mistura de interatividade, de um sistema de reciprocidade de ação e reação entre todas as coisas no universo. Por exemplo, se considerarmos a tensão de atração e repulsão que ocorre entre todas as coisas no Universo, temos um sistema dinâmico de ação e reação recíproca marcando a existência relacional das coisas no Universo.

- Oitavo, todas as imagens são impressões no devir: sejam elas sofridas passivamente ou infligidas ativamente, as imagens representam o recebimento e o retorno do movimento, a diferença entre existências inanimadas e animadas. Entre o orgânico e o inorgânico, entre o vivo e o não-vivo há um atraso entre o estímulo e a resposta. Nos seres humanos, a diferença reside na diferença de que o "meu corpo parece escolher, em uma certa medida, a maneira de devolver o que recebe" (BERGSON, 1999, p. 19). Assim, quando uma bola de bilhar atinge outra,, esta ao ser atingida não processa psicologicamente ao ser atingida por outra bola, mas reage mecanicamente, imediatamente, sem prevaricação e responde de acordo com o movimento que se transmite conforme as leis da natureza, e especificamente neste caso, segundo as leis da mecânica.

- Nove, há uma memória não habitual aqui no trabalho I, mas que se repetirá dadas as mesmas condições.

Agora, isso serve como base para a concepção de Bergson de um universo imagético. Novamente precisamos nos lembrar que as imagens com as quais estamos trabalhando não são imagens pictóricas, nem fotografias ou pinturas, ou palavras, mas ações e reações como produtivas de impressões. Quando pensamos em impressões, podemos pensar nelas em termos de movimentos de uma impressão e o efeito produzido como impressão. Mas o que

parece interessar além de tudo é o efeito final produzido pela acção de impressão, no resíduo da impressão, no que é deixado para trás como um traço, uma marca, uma impressão como objeto de imagem, porque isso é verificável e visivelmente “permanente”. Bergson denuncia a atitude equivocada que imagina “a percepção como uma visão fotográfica das coisas, que seria tomada de um ponto determinado com um aparelho especial, no caso o órgão de percepção, e que se desenvolveria a seguir na substância cerebral por não se sabe qual processo de elaboração química e psíquica” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 36). Bergson está mais interessado nos movimentos de impressão, na interatividade de ação e reação, com a dinâmica recíproca que define o universo do que na produção de imagens como entidades estáticas, como a percepção de algo.

Por que Bergson acredita neste sistema de ação e reação como processo, como fluxo? Porque não faz sentido arrestar o incessante processo de interatividade sobre a impressão como efeito residual. Não se pode divorciar o que chamamos o residual da impressão do movimento processual chegado até ele do movimento processual que segue. E é isso que trata Deleuze no primeiro capítulo de *Imagem-Movimento*. E o movimento de passagem dentro e por meio desse processo de interatividade Deleuze o explica no livro *A Dobra: Leibniz e o Barroco*. (1991). Agora, essa mudança contínua, essa conversão da ação para a reação, é o que Whitehead chama de preensão, o que Peirce descreve como a mudança de *representamen* para *interpretamen* e a qual nos referimos como o limiar. Cada um descreve a mudança de forma diferente, mas eles estão essencialmente apontando o mesmo trecho no fluxo. Mas, é muito importante que não entendamos nenhuma dessas conversões como um lugar estático, um local fixo, mas como experiência. Podemos localizá-lo ao longo da cadeia de produção processual, mas não como um produto final do processo, pois, mesmo se quisermos extrair a impressão residual do processo, estamos tratando com uma imagem de ação-reação, com um movimento contínuo de mudança, no qual o espectador está sendo alterado pela cognição da imagem e, como resultado, está mudando a maneira de reconhecer a imagem pictórica diante dele. Mas o que a maioria da ciência está tentando dizer é que a imagem a sua frente somente é o que é, não mais nem menos, que o que está diante de você é um objeto isolável — mesmo “que minha percepção do universo” pareça depender dos movimentos internos da substância cerebral, mudando quando eles variam” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 19) ou, para aqueles que gostam da física, como o

efeito do observador, o fato de que simplesmente observar uma situação ou fenômeno necessariamente muda o fenômeno.

Nesse caso, o que temos aqui é um sistema de impressões produzidas por uma interatividade recíproca em curso de ação-reação, A teoria da percepção de Bergson como descrita no primeiro capítulo de *Matéria e Memória* (1896) identifica um tipo de procissão de consciência que já foi em grande parte mapeada no livro *Ensaio Sobre os Dados Imediatos da Consciência* (1889), mas que só será identificada como cinematográfica na obra *Evolução Criadora* (1907) e cujas implicações totais só serão reveladas quase um século depois por Deleuze (1983 e 1985) em *Cinema 1: A Imagem-Movimento* e *Cinema 2: A Imagem-Tempo*. Deleuze vai concretizar essa ideia do processo perceptivo em termos da imagem-percepção, da imagem-ação e da imagem-afetiva de acordo com as fases da imagem da imagem-movimento de Bergson. Inicialmente, em *Matéria e Memória*, Bergson desenvolve o conceito de percepção como o que ele chama de "percepção pura", um modo teórico que ele usa para elaborar o conceito em si na forma um processo autônomo de avanço imagético. Ele faz isso para não implicar a memória em sua elaboração da percepção, que para ele é um componente necessário e inalienável da percepção como apreensão — “não há percepção que não seja cheia de lembranças” (BERGSON 1999, p. 33). Nos capítulos subsequentes, ele desenvolve dois tipos de memória, ambas dependentes do processo perceptual, mas que envolvem diferentes modalidades funcionais da memória: memória do hábito e memória integral ou pura. Em termos de desenvolvimento do método cinematográfico em Bergson, a memória em si não tem relevância primária, mesmo que seja útil para Deleuze quando ele desenvolve a imagem-memória em *A imagem-tempo*.

Mas ao ler o texto de Bergson, ficamos abalados com a afirmação de que “essas imagens agem e reagem umas sobre as outras”. E, provavelmente, a imagem que selecionamos como imagem mais vaga não reaja com qualquer outra imagem da mesma forma que podemos interagir uns com os outros. Mas antes, Bergson definiu uma imagem como “uma certa existência que está localizada a meio caminho entre a “ coisa ” e a “ representação”. E agora, ele invoca uma imagem que é distinta de todas as outras — o corpo humano — e nos pede para examinar nossa consciência e considerar as afeições que são produzidas.

Então, o que temos aqui é um sistema hiper-complexo de interatividade recíproca incessante de ação-reação produtora de imagens e corpos. “Há um sistema de imagens que

chamo minha percepção do universo, e que se conturba de alto a baixo por leves variações de uma certa imagem privilegiada, meu corpo” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 20). De modo que qualquer corpo tem que ser pensado de forma diferente do que carne e ossos. É uma imagem que representa uma multiplicidade infinita de imagens possíveis: é o registro duracional de traços, o relato da série infinita de estímulo-decisão-reação que constitui minha vida no universo. Dado um estímulo particular dentro de um contexto diferente, seja espacial ou temporal, esse agregado de uma possibilidade infinita de respostas, mesmo que seja apenas uma única, é atualizado. E essa reticulação das singularidades atualizadas que progressiva e sequencialmente retrocede ao passado, distancia-se do presente e constitui extensões de consistência que compõem e explicam a facticidade da história. Essas extensões, campos ou planos têm um valor de verdade implícita porque aconteceram e agora são inalteráveis — como o *croupier* costuma dizer, "*rien ne va plus!*" Ontem aconteceu e assim no ano passado e esses fatos são imutáveis e irrevogáveis — e este é o registro contábil que o *holochain* capitaliza. Podemos interpretar seu significado ou traçar vários caminhos causais, mas os fatos em si não são negociáveis.

Agora, se meu corpo só pode compreender as coisas sob a forma de imagens, de impressões interativas de ação e reação, devemos afirmar o problema do encontro em termos de imagens, e de imagens somente: na ação e reação como a produção de modificação, na própria diferença. Deleuze transpõe isso para seus termos mais gerais "devemos apenas expressar problemas em termos de tempo e tempo somente", em termos das modificações afetivas como criadoras da diferença que um corpo material sofre e reage. Desta maneira temos uma ligação conceitual interessante entre a diferença produzida pela dinâmica de ação-reação interativa do processo imagético e a passagem do tempo.

O sistema imagético de Bergson e, por extensão, o de Deleuze, não é, portanto, uma proposição realista nem uma proposição idealista. Se os dois sistemas lidarem com a imagem da mesma maneira, então "o cérebro nos parece um instrumento de análise com relação ao movimento recolhido e um instrumento de seleção com relação ao movimento executado" (BERGSON, 1999, p. 27). Precisamos definir o cérebro como instrumento de análise, um instrumento de decomposição conceitual em componentes, ou como a ruptura de qualquer objeto complexo de percepção em seus vários elementos simples, o processo oposto à síntese; e um instrumento de seleção, de enquadrar a resposta. Só necessitamos examinar o nosso sistema perceptivo óptico para ver como esta afirmação funciona no

mundo real. Nosso olhar é constituído por pequenos movimentos oculares que compõem a experiência de visão guiada por um exercício aparentemente indeterminável de desejo e escolha.

Portanto, cognitivamente, a função do cérebro e do sistema nervoso é limitada à transmissão e divisão na determinação do movimento. Através de seu movimento de divisão analítica, o cérebro e o sistema nervoso complexificam o encontro, permitem uma densidade mais completa, um maior número de possibilidades, quanto à resolução do estímulo. Na progressiva crescente riqueza de percepção, o sistema nervoso é “inteiramente orientado para a ação, e não para o conhecimento puro” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 27). Estamos lidando com um momento da experiência pura como movimento, que não envolve a memória e é inteiramente direcionado para a ação. “Tais movimentos nos pareceram interessar a ação, e a ação somente; eles permanecem absolutamente estranhos ao processo da representação” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 36). Eles não têm relação com o processo de imagens mentais ou com a memória porque o intelecto não está envolvido. Nossa preocupação com o mundo neste momento é apenas uma questão de movimento, da mesma forma quando dirigimos nosso carro sem pensar em cada etapa ou quando lavamos a louça. Essas atividades podem ser inteiramente direcionadas pelas ações mesmas, mas como parte de um arco de movimento que recebe, transforma e redireciona impressões — porque o que resulta é ação e não uma imagem mental interna do que está sendo percebido. Ao contrário da simples reatividade da matéria não animada que reage mecanicamente, automaticamente, sem hesitação ou diferimento, como resposta automática a uma impressão, “essa percepção aparece no momento preciso em que um estímulo recebido pela matéria não se prolonga em reação necessária” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 28). A percepção surge da incipiência da produção do intervalo na dobra, antes do redirecionamento do estímulo viajando pelos nervos aferentes e sua reversão como reação pelos nervos eferentes. Percepção é, portanto, a realização do que está à mão, como avaliação de possibilidade da reação. Através da perspectivação do ponto privilegiado, a percepção torna-se então mestre do espaço na medida em que alinha e relativiza a ação responsiva como mestre do tempo.

Bergson pergunta, “Como se explica que essa percepção seja consciência?” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 30), e afirma que não há percepção que não esteja impregnada de lembranças. Mas neste mundo imaginário de estímulo-resposta, onde o cérebro é uma

imagem entre muitas, que é "inteiramente direcionado para a ação, e não para o conhecimento puro" (BERGSON, 1999, p. 27), as memórias devem ser entendidas além de representações pictóricas dentro da mente. Em vez disso, as memórias precisam ser vistas como os caminhos neurais que orientam nossas impressões em direção à resolução. Memórias como trilhas neurais são o resultado da repetição da mesma resolução de condições semelhantes de processo imagético. A consciência é, portanto, o afeto de criar caminhos para a formulação de uma resposta ou a afeição de trilhas neurais pré-estabelecidas em transição para a re-formulação da resposta — o afeto da passagem [da tradução] ao longo de caminhos neurais pré-estabelecidos para à beira do intervalo antes da reversão. E assim, consciência e sentido são diferentes na medida em que a consciência é sempre "de alguma coisa", é a separação objeto-objeto. Essa re-cognição como memorial suplanta nossas percepções reais porque a afirmação da semelhança através da perceptiva satisfaz o padrão pré-estabelecido da cognição. Isso é exatamente o que acontece na representação pictórica do mundo através da perspectiva.

Para Bergson, a imagem-movimento, que eventualmente ele chamará de cinematográfica, surgirá de uma multiplicidade de ideias, recolhidas de uma variedade de fontes, e que sustentam como o processo imagético produz movimento a partir de seções aparentemente estáticas: suas leituras de filosofia grega antiga, especificamente, Lucrécio; sua compreensão processual do conhecimento biológico via Spencer; seu pensamento sobre a filosofia da ciência; a relação entre religião, misticismo e ciência; e a conexão entre o pensamento imagético, a biologia e a arte através de seu amigo Félix Ravaisson.<sup>272</sup> Subjacente a essas ideias está um subtexto matemático que informa os conceitos e o movimento de ideias, mas que se encontra no segundo plano e não aparece com frequência — muito parecido com o carrapato de Deleuze esperando para se lançar na oportunidade certa. Bergson não era renomado como matemático, mas era bem versado no assunto e o compreendia além de suas restrições disciplinares como filósofo, na medida em que ele podia debater publicamente com Einstein sobre as implicações filosóficas da relatividade. Ainda assim, precisamos ter em mente que muitos dos componentes tecnológicos que

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<sup>272</sup> Jean Gaspard Félix Ravaisson-Mollien (1813-1900) foi um filósofo e arqueólogo francês e curador do Departamento de Antiguidades do Louvre desde 1870. Ele foi um participante-chave nos importantes debates de "olho e mão" em torno de questões pedagógicas na arte dentro do sistema educacional público francês no final do século XIX (Marin, 2003). Ele foi uma influência para Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Deleuze e Derrida, entre outros (Ravaisson, 2008).

permitiram a Bergson equiparar a imagem do movimento ao cinematógrafo estiveram em vigor por quase 20 anos. E, na seção seguinte, damos vida a toda a metáfora tecnológica do aparato cinematográfico como expressivo do processo perceptivo.

### **O cinematógrafo bergsoniano**

O conceito do cinematógrafo entra de forma não sistemática nos escritos de Bergson, assim como a tecnologia veio à luz de uma maneira bastante confusa. Mesmo que a cronofotografia e outros componentes da tecnologia do cinema existissem desde a década de 1870. Na década de 1880, o cinematógrafo era uma tecnologia cuja hora havia chegado e no final da década vários inventores ofereceram demonstrações de seus aparelhos cinematográficos para que em 1895 o meio começasse a ser utilizado comercialmente na Europa e na América. A proposta operativa da tecnologia cinematográfica é a projeção de fotogramas estáticos sobre uma tela em branco a partir de tiras de filme de celulóide transparente, a fim de produzir a ilusão de imagens em movimento. O cinematógrafo é um designativo que compreende uma variedade de processos técnicos funcionando em conjunto para constituir a experiência cinematográfica como ambiente — não é um dispositivo singular, mas uma técnica associada baseada na persistência da visão, no obturador rotativo, no movimento da garra de transporte e os fotogramas estáticos impressos sobre filme transparente cumprido e bobinado; na ausência de qualquer uma dessas "condições prévias", a magia da cinematografia não funcionaria.

A questão da possibilidade de constituir um movimento a partir da imobilidade não foi apenas um problema tecnológico, mas um problema filosófico que remonta aos antigos gregos e foi esse problema filosófico que veio a preocupar Bergson quando escreveu sua tese de doutorado. Apesar de não tê-lo classificado como tal, Bergson já havia descrito um processo “cinematográfico” dentro da percepção como um circuito fechado no que ele designaria mais tarde a imagem-percepção e a imagem-memória de *Matéria e Memória* (1896). Essa dinâmica, que Deleuze na obra *A Imagem-Movimento* reconhece como operativa (e também articulada por Michel Serres), é elucidada através da geometria e topologia projetiva, de modo que o abismo ou a fenda entre o conhecedor e o conhecido é dissolvida e uma continuidade se produz entre os dois. Destes dois tipos de imagem, a percepção-imagem propriamente dita é aquela mais prontamente concebida como uma

imagem cinematográfica na medida em que analiticamente divide a percepção em fotogramas estáticos e reconstitui-os em movimento contínuo; a imagem-memória, menos obviamente articulada como imagem cinematográfica, também é minuciosamente elaborada, mas deve ser concebida junto com a imagem-percepção para constituir a imagem-movimento cinematográfica integral. Deleuze aponta em seu primeiro comentário sobre Bergson nas páginas iniciais de *A Imagem-Movimento* que há uma mudança no pensamento de Bergson em como ele pensa a imagem entre o tempo em que escreve *Matéria e Memória* e *A Evolução Criadora*. Segundo Deleuze, é como se Bergson, depois de ter descrito o funcionamento da imagem-movimento da percepção, tivesse esquecido tanto o mecanismo por trás do dispositivo cinematográfico dez anos depois e como a verdadeira natureza da solução para o problema de como o movimento é produzido (DELEUZE, 1985). Mas mesmo se apreciarmos e abraçarmos o rico comentário de Deleuze sobre Bergson, existem outras noções dentro da concepção bergsoniana de percepção que também podem ser entendidas como contribuindo para o modelo cinematográfico.

A tecnicidade que engloba o cinematógrafo vai além do mecanismo que dá o movimento aos fotogramas estáticos e, para dizer que é isso que compreende a extensão da concepção cinematográfica de Bergson, representa uma leitura demasiadamente limitada do que constitui o cinematógrafo. Como processo de percepção, o aparato cinematográfico é composto de uma série de sub-agenciamentos que constituem um todo, em que a remoção de uma subcomposição de componentes diminuiria o processo ou o destruiria completamente. Nos vinte anos anteriores à publicação de *Evolução Criadora*, Bergson já havia concebido muitos desses ingredientes constituintes da cadeia processual da percepção que encontra expressão análoga como componentes da cinematografia, uma tecnicidade associada estendida. Esses componentes podem ser materiais e não materiais, mas são, no entanto, condicionantes do processo, constituintes do processo ou dos resultados mesmos do próprio movimento processual.

### **Movimento imagético e o cinematógrafo**

Um dos grandes obstáculos para chegar a um acordo com o pensamento de Bergson é sua definição da imagem e sua conceituação do encontro do corpo com o mundo como imagético. Em sua expressão mais simples, a imagem de Bergson é um agenciamento, um



conjunto triádico, que compreende um estímulo, um centro de indeterminação e uma reação. É um conceito que se pode aplicar a corpos, grandes e pequenos, e àquela escala ~~onde~~ em que o não substancial reina como forças ou qualidades. Em sua expressão mais geral, uma imagem é tudo e qualquer coisa que age e reage em todas as suas faces e através de todas as suas partes como uma variação vibratória perpétua e universal de energia e luz. É uma definição curiosa na medida em que ele se refere à imagem não como uma representação pictórica — uma imagem — mas uma existência, ou mais corretamente, um devir, simultaneamente experiencial e corporificada, e que encontra expressão na lacuna separadora de uma “coisa” e sua “representação” (sua imagem mental). Em Bergson, encontramos essa matéria e, portanto, o universo, incluindo o corpo e o cérebro, agregados de imagens, montagens de ação e reação interativas, onde as imagens podem ser pensadas como seres de luz que “agem e reagem umas sobre as outras em todas as suas partes elementares segundo leis constantes, que chamo leis da natureza” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 11).

Bergson explica que o mecanismo da imagem-percepção é constituído por um estímulo externo que atinge os órgãos dos sentidos, modifica os nervos e propaga sua influência no cérebro. Bergson escreve: “Percebo nervos aferentes que transmitem estímulos aos centros nervosos, em seguida nervos eferentes que partem do centro, conduzem estímulos à periferia e põem em movimento partes do corpo ou o corpo inteiro” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 13), como mencionado anteriormente. O estímulo externo tem uma motricidade ligada a ele que “motiva” os órgãos dos sentidos. Mas é considerado um corte estático em que o estímulo não é uma “coisa” material, mas uma seleção fechada — uma concepção, talvez, melhor expressada como um conjunto de energia, um quantum ou uma mônada de energia ou forças configuradas. Ao limitar a quantidade de “imagem estática” que é permitida, a entrada do olho em uma fixação entre duas sacadas, temos a função da persiana rotativa e da garra de transporte que fornecem a instantaneidade da seção mais o intervalo de indeterminação. O obturador giratório trabalhando em conjunto com a garra de transporte produz as “fatias” que constituem/reconstituem as seções imóveis uniformemente espaçadas num tempo despregue cronológico. Assim, se a cognição não está em jogo e a memória é apagada da equação, “o processo completo de percepção e de reação mal se distingue então do impulso mecânico seguido de um movimento necessário” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 29). Com isso, o estímulo transduzido passa através da substância cerebral, ~~onde~~ demora-se e depois se expande numa ação voluntária. A imagem que

percorre a matéria cerebral ao longo de linhas de indeterminação, por sua vez, cria uma miríade de interações imagéticas próprias à medida que elas traçam caminhos neurais que serão subsequentemente agregados, integrados ou condensados como uma externalização, uma ação dirigida pelo exterior. Desse modo, se o estímulo que "entra" no cérebro é uma série de imagens estáticas e o que emerge através dos nervos eferentes é o movimento contínuo da consciência, temos a funcionalidade da imagem-movimento. Assim sendo, "os movimentos centrífugos do sistema nervoso podem provocar o deslocamento do corpo ou das partes do corpo, os movimentos centrípetos ou, pelo menos, alguns deles [ou seja, uma imagem mental] fazem nascer a representação do mundo exterior" (BERGSON 1999, p. 13). A passagem da imagem como movimento produz uma diferença marcante, um traço significativo de modificação, que expressa a procissão do estímulo através do corpo como uma multiplicidade que é afetiva e temporal.

### **Introjeção fílmica**

Apesar de o cinematógrafo como dispositivo tecnológico utilizar um mecanismo reversível tanto para tornar a realidade em imagens estáticas quanto para dar movimento a imagens estáticas, o aparelho de captura de imagens — a câmera — não é o mesmo que o aparelho usado para projeção de imagens — o projetor — e há uma separação indeterminada entre os dois processos. A aparelhagem de captura de imagens — é diferenciada da aparelhagem de projeção de imagens — em que a parte de captura está envolvida na introjeção, na seleção e fracionamento da realidade diante da lente, e a aparelhagem de projeção da imagem-movimento trata da integração, contração e projeção. Na imagem-movimento bergsoniana, o processo de aquisição de imagens é de suma importância porque é onde a seleção acontece — o primeiro capítulo de *Matéria e da Memória* (1999) é intitulado 'Da Seleção de Imagens', portanto a seleção se apresenta como uma preocupação primordial do processo perceptivo. Já em 1879, William James mostrou que o conhecimento humano é essencialmente seletivo, mesmo em sua forma aparentemente mais passiva, a do nível de percepção sensorial. O princípio da seleção é um conceito dobradiça na teoria da percepção de Bergson, na medida em que articula um movimento subjetivo que expõe a maneira como nos entrosamos com o mundo bem como adquirimos conhecimento do mundo: descreve o discernimento de dados objetivos (o

objeto discernível da percepção) do conjunto de dados iniciais (a multidão penumbral vibrátil) para a apropriação subjetiva e a subsequente cognição (WHITEHEAD, 2010).

O problema de como um objeto é destacado da multidão de imagens no mundo ou do próprio plano de fundo é o ponto crucial do capítulo, pois o que está em jogo é a eficácia da percepção como uma determinação que indica a escolha ou seleção objetiva. Bergson compreende o objeto material como uma imagem que pode ser transformada numa representação, aquilo que podemos *reter* de um objeto, que podemos apreender como se fosse uma crosta externa, uma pele superficial em forma de resíduo, que “em vez de permanecer inserido no ambiente como uma *coisa*, destaque-se como um *quadro*” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 33-34). Nesta passagem da *Matéria e da Memória*, Bergson não nos informa que está a escuta de Lucrécio. No livro IV de *De rerum natura* (LUCRETIUS, 1951) Sobre a natureza das coisas), Lucrécio elabora sobre “a existência daquilo que chamamos de 'imagens' das coisas, uma espécie de pele externa perpetuamente descascada da superfície dos objetos e voando para lá e para cá através do ar”<sup>273</sup>. Ele chama essas finas peles aerotransportadas, *pelliculae* películas ou “filmes”, que se movem pelo éter em linhas retas com certa celeridade e, assim, Lucrécio concebe a primeira teoria cinematográfica. Essa descamação superficial, esses filmes de matéria atômica, emanando do centro das coisas, constituem um fluxo perpétuo de imagens materiais que provocam a visão e o tato. Lucrécio compara esses filmes às mudanças das cobras ou às membranas fetais de bezerros recém-nascidos, mas também o que ele caracteriza de vazamentos de filmes materiais frágeis por objetos inanimados. Essas crostas invisíveis sem vida, essas peles superficiais, são a ação invisível do vento que, segundo Lucrécio, “enquanto os filmes individuais que atingem os olhos são invisíveis, os objetos de onde eles emanam são percebidos”.<sup>274</sup>

Por mais ingênuo que a concepção de Lucrécio possa parecer à primeira vista, essas peles superficiais lançadas no espaço não somente apoiam a teoria das imagens que atingem superfícies específicas da sensação como impressões e fornecem uma entidade material que pode ser captada do ar, mas esses filmes, essas crostas, também podem ser vistas como instantâneos estáticos de seus objetos de origem e, assim, definem o caráter do pensamento cinematográfico. As películas de Lucrécio que emanam sem interrupção como

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<sup>273</sup> “The existence of what we call ‘images’ of things, a sort of outer skin perpetually peeled off the surface of objects and flying this way and that through the air” (Lucretius, 1951, p. 131).

<sup>274</sup> “while the individual films that strike upon the eye are invisible, the objects from which they emanate are perceived” (Lucretius, 1951, p. 138).

correntes atômicas contínuas podem ser tornadas intermitentemente estáticas por meio da atividade “pare e vá” das fixações e sacadas do movimento do olho humano. Desta maneira, pode-se predicar a produção de quadros imagéticos imóveis que constituem a função analítica do aparato cinematográfico. Bergson procura isolar a existência de objetos como se fosse uma casca, uma "superfície" externa, selecionada e oferecida aos sentidos e através da qual podemos interpretar ou expressar nossas intuições, ou induções sensoriais. Para Bergson chamar esses filmes, imagens, no sentido visual, é afastar-se de onde queremos ir em termos de compreensão da imagem como processo não-pictórico. Mas o que o filme lucretiano faz é simplificar a questão do problema da determinação, da seleção, do discernimento, pois as peles transportadas pelo ar existem como individualizações ou, pelo menos, como imagens individualizadas, espécies que não precisam de determinação pelo sujeito, pois vêm totalmente empacotadas.

Quando uma crosta atinge a retina e é transduzida em estímulos neurais para ser transportada para o cérebro, Bergson encontra na teoria de Descartes os canais neurais ópticos (que ecoam os de Aristóteles) como os conduítes que transmitem a imagem atômica para dentro do cérebro — quanto maior o número de canais neurais ativados dentro da matéria cerebral a serviço da transmissão da percepção, maior a intensidade da reação imagética resultante. Dessa maneira, a intensidade da reação dentro do cérebro como uma intensidade afetiva é diretamente proporcional à eficácia da percepção. Isso porque, mesmo que o movimento cerebral — a ação dos estímulos neurais percorrendo pelos conduítes que criam modificações afetivas — esteja em concordância com a percepção consciente, isso não significa que a percepção seja totalmente "subserviente" a uma vontade predeterminada ou a uma determinação delimitada. A percepção é subserviente ou conduzida ao longo de um caminho cuja rota ativa dá origem à representação da percepção em que o número e a diversificação de conduítes disponíveis para os estímulos é o que define a adequação da percepção — mas isso, devemos aceitar, é uma óbvia referência a um pré-existente dado memorial. Pode-se dizer que essas ideias são o que é operativo no tamanho e na sensibilidade do filme, tradutor da granularidade da imagem fílmica no cinema, pois quanto maior o formato do filme, maior a adequação da imagem e maior o número de conduítes transmitindo o estímulo, ficando melhor a resolução.

### **Diminuição seletiva imagética**

Se ampliarmos ainda mais o alcance do tropo cinematográfico, a fim de poder atuar com a concepção mais ampla de Deleuze com o cinema, veremos que o processo de seleção inclui o enquadramento, o tamanho do plano relativo ao objeto, a resolução e a profundidade de campo, distância focal ou ângulo de visão, enquadramento do plano como seleção fazendo parte da ilusão cinematográfica da consciência. Para Čapek (1971), o processo de seleção dentro da percepção, como descrito por Bergson, também tem repercussões mais abrangentes, mas não para onde Deleuze o leva. Čapek o vê como parte de um projeto mais geral do Bergson que implica seu pensamento biológico no reposicionamento da relação da humanidade com a natureza na sua apropriada escala: redefinindo a relação em termos que expressam pertinência vital ao organismo humano, retornamos a seletividade da seleção numa escala de relevância que é própria ao humano. Ao escolher um objeto em detrimento de outro, há uma definição de valores da natureza como a chave para a síntese metafísica da existência (WHITEHEAD, 2004).

Bergson elabora a percepção pura como uma concepção teórica na medida em que é feita para desconsiderar a memória que toda percepção deve incluir. Ele coloca a percepção como o centro privilegiado de um agregado de imagens que oferece uma visão da matéria imediata e instantânea. “Perceber conscientemente significa escolher, e a consciência consiste antes de tudo nesse discernimento prático” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 49). E no discernimento da seleção de sua presença como um externo-lá para sua imagem mental como um interno-aqui sempre implica uma diminuição. O objeto perde algumas de suas características ou atributos em virtude de sua relação específica com o espectador em termos de uma individualização, porque só pode apresentar uma parte do que pode significar relacionalmente para o universo todo como a expressão de seu potencial integral. Mas, mesmo com isso, seríamos incapazes de obter o quadro completo, por assim dizer, porque nosso aparato perceptivo, nosso ponto de vista, é dimensionalmente deficiente: a transformação do material em representação sempre implicará uma diminuição, de modo que o que distingue a realidade objetiva de uma imagem representacional, é a limitação de sua dimensionalidade, não apenas pela projeção de um objeto 4-D (3-D + Tempo) sobre a superfície 2-D da retina, mas uma redução de suas possibilidades gerais.

Aquilo que está disponível como potencial é a revelação do que esse objeto diante de mim representa em termos de potencial disponível, através de um meio de encontro muito

específico. Minhas percepções do objeto refletirão apenas os recursos característicos que podem envolver consequências práticas ou funcionalidade naquele momento. Sendo assim, as coisas se juntam diante de mim como entidades perceptíveis, discerníveis, quando as condições propícias para sua aparência se materializam de forma útil, com valor, pragmáticas. A diminuição perceptiva do objeto-outro pode ser interpretada como a expressão de limitações perceptivas, mas apenas como a rejeição de atributos que não são relevantes para as exigências da situação presente. Isso não quer dizer que outros potenciais ou atributos do objeto sejam perdidos ou não perceptíveis, exigiria apenas outros condicionamentos para atualizá-los e torná-los perceptíveis — mas isso também requer que a entidade subjetiva tenha a capacidade perceptiva de se conectar nesse eixo ou dimensão. A percepção do objeto nunca é total ou completa: qualquer intercâmbio recíproco de percepção será sempre limitado. Dadas as condições de encontro, o que distingue uma realidade objetiva presente de uma imagem representada é a completude da expressão de seu potencial como disponível para o Universo em contraste com as limitações como um conjunto parcial de possibilidades relacionais entre o conhecedor e o conhecido.

Converter o objeto do atual para a representação não seria uma questão de extinguir suas qualidades ou atributos relacionais para isolá-lo, mas de perceber as limitações impostas à interação relacional pelos termos que estão sendo pressupostos sobre o encontro. Pode-se dizer que as pré-condicionantes ou restrições antecipatórias são condições que permitem a percepção adequada como uma aparição específica em forma de "uma imagem". A imagem pictórica faz isso muito bem, contextualizando e apresentando o objeto de uma maneira específica, condicionando dessa maneira a interpretação. Isso ocorre através do descarte dos aspectos irrelevantes do objeto que são funcionalmente não pertinentes dentro daquele contexto específico — a saber, não disponibilizar a informação visual que está escondida do sensor ocular, como o lado de trás do objeto que não é visível (BERGSON 1999). Por exemplo, um boné de beisebol apresentado como uma cesta de esmolas nas mãos de um mendigo mostra um aspecto do boné e uma série de indicações contextuais que nos ajudarão a engajar o boné experiencialmente como uma ferramenta do ofício de mendigo ao invés de uma cobertura de cabeça: vamos ver o interior do boné e não a superfície exterior de cima. O cinema faz isso também, ajustando a incidência da lente através de enquadramento, foco e movimento da câmera como modificação contínua dos parâmetros do encontro imagético. E da mesma forma, envolvemos um encontro por meio

de restrições que condicionam o evento de uma maneira específica, mas não obliteram os potenciais; para trazer essas virtualidades em jogo, é preciso reconfigurar o encontro para permitir sua atualização.

Há outro aspecto da seleção, uma espécie de diminuição, expressa no movimento imagético que acontece na mudança mediadora entre os nervos aferentes e a reação transmitida pelos nervos eferentes. A partir da fixação momentânea do olho, resulta uma impressão que produz um impulso neural centrípeto. Como consequência, um movimento de pensamento, uma decisão propriamente dita, ocorre dentro do centro de indeterminação que induz a reação — a decisão automática e reflexiva de mudar a atenção do olho daqui para lá expressa uma escolha, portanto, uma seleção cujo mecanismo é desconhecido para nós. Posteriormente, há outro movimento dentro dos nervos aferentes quando um estímulo é substituído por um subsequente, à medida que o novo estímulo é absorvido pelo precedente, como uma ocupação do passado pelo presente, na proporção que a persistência da visão cede à passagem da novidade.

Quando Bergson escreve que ele entende a sensação como um estado interno, ele quer dizer que ela surge dentro do corpo como uma percepção interna, que, como William James (1952) sugere, é equiparada ao tempo. Nossa percepção da realidade exterior corresponde à sucessão temporal dos fenômenos: os eventos ocorrem no tempo, de modo que nossas percepções sensoriais fornecem uma cópia verosímil, ou seja, verdadeira na sua coerência funcional, através do desdobramento. Mas por que os eventos ocorrem onde eles acontecem, e não em nossa cabeça? O que entendemos como representações da realidade, das imagens mentais constitui uma ilusão. Na *Evolução Criadora*, no capítulo IV, no qual Bergson lida com o mecanismo cinematográfico, ele afirma que existem duas ilusões teóricas sobre como a consciência surge. Ambas são ilusões porque são suposições de como os processos reais ainda incognoscíveis — o centro indeterminado — funcionam dentro da percepção. Ao especular sobre a natureza do real, tentando pensar o processo entre um objeto e sua representação, supomos um funcionamento teórico específico baseado em uma ontologia coerente e em uma compreensão epistêmica do encontro com o mundo visualmente acertada dentro duma relação de perspectiva. A abordagem é materialista, mas não fisiológica, na medida em que é uma expressão de uma compreensão filosófica do mundo como processo e dos corpos que o ocupam como seleções de funções operacionais relacionais. Ora, esses corpos não são corpos humanos, mas agentes com atributos

duradouros, que compõem a concepção agregada, contudo devem ser interpretados como corpos, porque corpos, e só corpos, têm eficácia causal.

Sendo assim, somos levados a pensar na percepção como um evento processual, onde mesmo as coisas concretas que têm nomes "cotidianos" precisam ser vistas como entidades processuais que exibem apetites configurativos. Por exemplo, o cérebro, ao qual Bergson repetidamente se refere como um agregado de imagens, precisa ser entendido por uma massificação de forças, de reciprocidade de ação e reação sem substância, de dar e receber, onde não há substância à parte do agenciamento sistemático de energias como interação processual. É importante fazer essa distinção porque a filosofia geral da percepção tem diferentes propósitos, implicações e repercussões do estabelecimento de uma cadeia causal fisiológica puramente mecanicista ou funcional que ainda permanece cientificamente não-definida.

Quando consideramos essas ilusões, devemos ter em mente a negação de "imagens" estáticas ou "conceitos" que podem ser retratados como uma imagem pictórica, um quadro único. Precisamos ver esse evento processual como uma sucessão de quadros estáticos interpenetrados em movimento. Como Bergson aponta, é uma sucessão que culmina numa soma, mas a soma está sempre em fluxo. Esse movimento pode ser caracterizado como uma sucessão de seções imóveis, mas dependendo de como desejamos entender o curso dos estímulos através do cérebro em termos do cinematógrafo da percepção imagética, pode ser colocado de várias maneiras — o que é importante aqui é a realização do movimento a partir de impressões estáticas. A explicação mais simples e menos satisfatória é que os estímulos percorrem o cérebro como seções imóveis, como as pulsações neurais transduzidas que surgem do movimento para-e-vai dos movimentos e fixações oculares. Cada fixação projetaria uma pulsação neural "completa" — um fotograma estático, por assim dizer — no cérebro como um conjunto fechado, seguido, de vez em quando, por outro conjunto imagético de excitação neural em uma sucessão de percepções independentes e autônomos como uma sequência de quadros, em que cada um é "afastado do caminho" para produzir o próximo percepto, e assim produzindo movimento. Uma abordagem mais refinada teria o conjunto imagético de excitação neural dividido em uma multiplicidade de canais, de dutos neurais, transmitindo o conjunto imagético de excitação neural através do cérebro como uma ocorrência simultânea. Cada conjunto individual seria afastado para fora do caminho por um conjunto de entrada para criar movimento ou,



alternativamente, podemos submeter os conjuntos individuais ao enfraquecimento da persistência da visão, de modo que à medida que sua intensidade se esvai enquanto eles percorrem o cérebro, o conjunto subsequente assume, criando a mudança necessária para o movimento sucessivo.

Agora, ao substituir os conjuntos entre si, introduzimos ligeiros diferenciais entre os diversos dutos nervosos para explicar as diferentes distâncias que o conteúdo de cada 'duto' deve percorrer, para a finalização em uma multiplicidade de multiplicidades como uma proposta de duração, em que o conteúdo de cada duto é sujeito ao enfraquecimento da persistência da visão e sua subsequente substituição como cogredência diferencial. A combinação simultânea dessas durações dá ao conjunto uma extensão temporal inseparável de uma multiplicidade simultânea "mnêmica" de passados como continuidade, relatividade diferencial, de modo que uma ilusão de movimento é produzida pela sobreposição de assincronia simultânea e múltipla. Cada conjunto é constituído da determinação adequada e de uma coloração afetiva, mas nunca é a entidade perceptual 'real' totalmente formada como uma entidade completa, ou perfeitamente adequada — é um movimento contínuo em um devir.

Podemos assim conceber “uma matéria que certamente tende à espacialidade, cujas partes, no entanto, ainda estão no estado de implicação e compenetração recíprocas” (BERGSON, 2005, p. 206) como passagem. Isto permite um devir que contradiz as Leis do Pensamento. Como tal, a Lei da Identidade, a Lei da Não-Contradição e a Lei do Meio Excluído que definem o quê e o como das coisas como tendo identidades e personagens cujas propriedades, atributos, qualidades e características, são estáveis, determinadas e livres de ambiguidade, só podem ser vistos como imutável no espelho retrovisor, porque "*rien ne vas plus*" só se aplica ao passado — não há mais mudança na equação do que foi. A adequação progressiva de um objeto de percepção é uma agregação intuitiva progressiva de determinação que indica o devir como uma multiplicidade de mudança e movimento. O acúmulo de adequação é imanente ao avanço, mas só pode ser 'extraído' no final, pois não se pode subdividir o movimento. Mas essa constatação é apenas uma questão, é claro, uma heterogeneidade qualitativa que passa despercebida até que paramos e olhamos para o que aconteceu.

Estas três ideações de avanço, sempre que paramos para averiguar nosso progresso, adotamos a postura de um observador e espacializamos o evento heterogêneo como

extensão homogênea. Isso representa outro aspecto do aparato cinematográfico,, se a natureza é pura diferenciação, quando introduzimos a câmera como ponto privilegiado. Àquilo que aparece diante da lente como o fluxo da natureza se oferece como diferença qualitativa e àquela que aparece na parte detrás do aparelho cinematográfico (detrás do obturador e da garra de transporte) pode-se oferecer a síntese como diferenciação, seja a diferença quantificável de si mesma — seções imóveis e o tempo abstrato do aparato técnico. Nesse movimento, surgem os dois modos diferenciais: a diferenciação como avanço heterogêneo da multiplicidade do devir duracional, como diferença qualitativa; e a diferenciação enquanto homogeneidade extensa que permite a divisão infinita em diferença quantitativa.

Bergson encontra uma conexão comum entre a biologia, a física e a matemática no aparato do cinematógrafo, que é a geração de continuidade experiencial como duração que busca ser expressa temporalmente como extensão. Através desta diferenciação binária, introduz-se a distinção entre uma passagem duracional e um avanço temporal, entre o devir do acontecimento e o situacional. A distinção a ser salientada é que, se ambos são descritivos do evento, no primeiro, a duração é composta de uma subjetividade insinuada e de simultaneidades e, no outro, tornou-se perspectivada de uma relação entre objetos que se tornou um objeto para a consciência. A passagem duracional do avanço expressa como a intensidade da mudança é um tempo de criação não-métrico, enquanto a outra é um lapso cronológico de tempo em uma quantidade serial mensurável verificada por um aparato que mecaniza a passagem. Assim sendo, a duração não pode ter limites estabelecidos, mesmo que sugira um simples trecho abstrato de tempo e requeira o estabelecimento de limiares que delimitem o evento como permanências discerníveis conforme Whitehead chama de conjuntos abstratos (WHITEHEAD, 2004).

### **Projeção no movimento imagético**

A dinâmica projetiva dentro da percepção é evidenciada de várias maneiras: no engajamento perceptual preliminar, uma proposição, no centro da indeterminação, um processo amplificador e, por último, a projeção da determinação interna no mundo externo. Isso será tratado em uma seção subsequente deste capítulo, na qual mostraremos o encontro problematizado dentro da perspectiva e resolvido pela topologia e geometria

projetiva. Também veremos como a perspectiva informa a dissolução da dualidade interna/externa e fornece as noções por trás do Plano de Matéria de Bergson e subsequente elaboração por Deleuze (e Guattari) dos conceitos do Plano de Imanência e do Plano de Consistência. No *Cinema 1: O Movimento-Imagem* e *Cinema 2: A Imagem-Tempo*, Deleuze retoma no ponto em que Bergson deixa de lado e desenvolve as implicações para a filosofia do movimento que surge dentro do aparato cinematográfico do pensamento.

Em *Imagination et invention (1965-1966)*, Gilbert Simondon escreve que “não é o movimento, mas a intuição de toda projeção em direção à existência e ao múltiplo” que é o mais completo e o mais radical, o mais anterior a qualquer modo de ser (SIMONDON, 2008). Simondon se refere a uma projeção amplificadora dentro do processo de criação imagética. Para Bergson, a projeção não é um conceito tão significativo quanto para Simondon, mas, mesmo assim, ocupa vários lugares na expressão processual da percepção e do processo imagético. Em termos do cinematógrafo como metáfora do aparato cinematográfico, a projeção é fundamental, pois é através da projeção que o cinematógrafo permite o cumprimento da promessa (*cashes out, pays off*) do agenciamento técnico. O conceito de projeção só surge esporadicamente ao longo do trabalho de Bergson, mas não está distintamente ligado ao cinematógrafo, exceto perifericamente: a intuição por trás da projeção origina na antiga teoria da visão de emissão e nos efeitos recíprocos da intromissão e do extromissão da luz. A intromissão parece ser operativa no "front-end" do processo visual, enquanto a extromissão parece desempenhar o papel principal no assentimento da percepção, na localização da percepção onde ela ocorre. Este aspecto final da percepção, caracterizado como extromissão, deve ser entendido metaforicamente — ainda, ao ler Bergson, a projeção da representação no objeto é uma concepção necessária para averiguar a correspondência funcional como um mapeamento entre o externo e o interno, entre o objeto de percepção e a representação interna em forma de um processo subconsciente. A projeção refere-se à correlação entre o objeto de percepção e o roteamento da sensação pelo sistema neural, onde um roteamento específico corresponde ao curso específico que um objeto produz por meio da imagem intra-perceptiva. No entanto, devemos ter em mente que a representação ou imagem mental não é um evento pictórico. É uma sensação prolongada que segue um caminho neural pré-determinado, específico e repetível, cuja experiência qualitativa como um caminho, circuito ou desdobramento determinado constitui a representação ou imagem mental. Não há produção pictórica aqui, simplesmente

a afirmação do conhecimento inconsciente repetido da autoestimulação da mesma trilha neural, da circularidade da determinação, da seleção, para a determinação, para o assentimento afirmativo, de que a representação no cérebro concorda com o estímulo mais uma vez.

Além da teoria da extromissão da visão, há uma projeção também configurada como um pré-destino especulativo da percepção, uma teleologia virtual, que atrai e orienta a sensibilidade e a atenção do observador no encontro que limita e de maneira especulativa predetermina a determinação da percepção em uma problematização do encontro. Além disso, há outra possibilidade projetiva quando a dobra deleuziana é articulada através da geometria perspectiva e projetiva como a produção de um laço fechado perceptivo que desfaz a fenda entre o conhecedor e o conhecido e constitui o conhecimento como heterogêneo. Isso é colocado por Bergson em *Matéria e Memória*: “Nossa percepção distinta é verdadeiramente comparável a um círculo fechado, onde a imagem-percepção dirigida ao espírito e a imagem-lembrança lançada no espaço correriam uma atrás da outra” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 117). Deleuze faz uma observação superficial no *Cinema 1: A Imagem-Movimento* quanto ao tipo de projeção que o modelo bergsoniano implica: “o movimento se fará sempre no intervalo entre os dois, logo, às nossas costas.” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 9). Bergson e Deleuze estão se referindo a um mapeamento do mundo 4-D como uma imagem 2-D do plano unitário que por sua vez é projetado na retina, ou seja, lançado para trás e para dentro, a fim de criar impressões que podem ser capturadas e disponibilizadas para armazenamento, ou seja, integrado como imagem de memória. Mas dada a continuidade na qual a linha entre o olho e o objeto estende-se para o infinito-mais diante de nós e para o infinito-negativo atrás de nós como um círculo projetado de raio infinito, na junção das duas extremidades temos um reverso lateral e imagem verticalmente invertida, o que resulta numa fita de Moebius imagética, que estendida lateralmente “em ambos os lados” e unida numa linha de junção nos dá uma superfície monádica fechada de extensão infinita que emerge no tempo, ou seja, uma garrafa de Klein satisfazendo as restrições do extenso *continuum*.

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O cinematógrafo de Bergson não é apenas significativo porque é descritivo do processo de percepção e porque é um método convincente, explicativo da produção de movimento a partir de seções imóveis, mas porque serve para predicar todo o sistema de pensamento imagético como diferencial. Temos que ter em mente que o cinematógrafo é um modelo e não um processo em si: apontar para a lua não é a lua. Devemos estar atentos para refinar nosso entendimento analítico, nosso apontar do dedo, a tal ponto que não percamos de vista o que se está apontando e não confundamos o processo de descrição, a descrição em si e o objeto de descrição.

Mas o que precisa ser mantido é que a intervenção do cinematógrafo no universo do processo indiferenciado põe em movimento um alinhamento localizado / local, privilegiado de energias virtuais, que seleciona e atualiza potenciais enquanto instiga a produção simultânea e co-emergente da individuação do devir e sua resultante geração de diferença. É a colocação e orientação do cinematógrafo que produz o Plano Deleuziano de Imanência como um corte seletivo no devir universal. De modo que, se levamos adiante a metáfora cinematográfica de Bergson e Deleuze, a direcionalidade do aparato perspectivará o evento; a ótica da lente focaliza o ponto temporal de interesse e resolve a profundidade da temporalidade implicada daquele momento; a janela efetua a decisão de seleção; o obturador rotativo produz as "fatias" que constituem as seções uniformemente espaçadas de um tempo cronológico; e a garra de transporte produz a *katalepsis*<sup>275</sup> da percepção. As seleções do tempo espacializado são decisivamente enquadradas na porta do filme para produzir imanente e simultaneamente os dois aspectos da diferença: a diferença em si (diferenciação) na frente do portão do obturador do cinematográfico e a diferença como diferença de si mesma por trás do portão do obturador (diferenciação). A capacidade do cinematógrafo de produzir uma solução tão elegante para ilustrar os dois aspectos da diferença é o que o diferencia como um análogo valioso para o processo imagético.

### **O Sistema Cinematográfico Imagético de Deleuze**

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<sup>275</sup> Κατάληψις, *katalepsis* é um termo filosófico grego usado pelos estóicos em sua concepção de percepção. *Katalepsis* significa literalmente "puxar para baixo", e o termo foi usado para descrever o ato de captar uma impressão.

Até agora temos descrito uma variedade de tipos de imagem sem identificá-los ou nomeá-los. Reconhecemos e registramos sua operatividade funcional, mas não os posicionamos adequadamente em relação um ao outro como parte de um sistema coerente de operação. Assim sendo, Bergson descreve a operatividade funcional do cinematógrafo e elabora suas peculiaridades no *Um Ensaio sobre os Dados Imediatos da Consciência* (1889) e permite alguns anos antes de legitimamente chamá-lo de “cinematógrafo” em *Evolução Criadora* (1906 parece que fizemos um pouco a mesma coisa, descrevendo uma variedade de movimentos imagéticos sem rotulá-los como tais ou integrando seu funcionamento como uma assembleia maquinaica coerente. Não nos esquecemos de que precisávamos integrar essas entidades processuais dentro de um sistema teórico maior (pré-existente).

Se o cinematógrafo de Bergson é uma representação da percepção, Deleuze usará isso como base sobre a qual predicar o cinema como uma representação da filosofia. O problema de Deleuze nos livros de cinema consiste em compor uma filosofia da experiência perceptiva baseada nas teorias Bergsonianas da imagem e do cinematógrafo. Ele repensa a filosofia usando o cinematógrafo como um dispositivo técnico, não em termos de um aparato mecânico, mas como um agenciamento maquinaico que exhibe, expressa e produz *technē*. Contudo, se alguém fosse repensar a filosofia perceptual com e através do cinema, com que aspectos da filosofia poderíamos trabalhar e quais conceitos poderiam ser traduzidos? Quais conceitos poderiam ser interpretados cinematicamente? Começamos a responder a essas questões em nossa discussão sobre o cinematógrafo de Bergson, mas, nos livros de cinema, Deleuze vai além do técnico e parte para as implicações ontológicas, epistemológicas e metafísicas desse objeto técnico.

Gilbert Simondon e Gilles Deleuze têm concepções semelhantes da imagem, como veremos mais adiante, mas mesmo que Simondon tenha elaborado seu sistema anteriormente, damos precedência na formulação subsequente de Deleuze em nossa apresentação em virtude de sua maior generalidade, ou pelo menos o que percebemos como sua maior generalidade. Como Peirce afirma, a semiótica é mais geral do que a linguística (ROSA, 2007; CHANDLER, 2004) — um sentimento semelhante também defendido por Deleuze em relação à semiologia saussuriana (DELEUZE, 1985; DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1995) — percebemos que o esquema imagético processual de Deleuze é anterior à visão fenomenista de Simondon.

Mas talvez se possa também discernir uma segunda presença não declarada no manejo do tecnológico do cinema. Percebemos uma presença heideggeriana — sob três pontos: a insistente questão do cinema como uma tecnologia de *technē*, o modo da imagem como a substituição da linguagem e a memória da montagem como ‘o que exige pensamento’ (HEIDEGGER, 1993).<sup>276</sup> Isso não quer dizer que os livros sobre cinema de Deleuze são derivados do pensamento heideggeriano — eles são proposições autônomas, incorporativas e transformadoras de algumas das ideias de Heidegger, mas não vamos nos aprofundar, exceto quando os escritos de Heidegger podem ser úteis para algum esclarecimento futuro.

Embora estas sejam considerações importantes, o que está em jogo para Deleuze nos seus dois livros de cinema, *Cinema 1: A Imagem-Movimento*) e no *Cinéma 2: A Imagem-Tempo*) é uma preocupação maior. Os livros propõem um esquema para a descrição da natureza fundamental do conhecimento, realidade e existência. Mas, ao contrário de outros sistemas, é uma filosofia que não pode manter o experiencial e o empírico separados. Para Deleuze, os dois andam de mãos dadas como a relação heterogênea do conhecedor e do conhecido que é pressuposta pela teoria da imagem de Bergson e sua projeção no mundo. Embora *A Imagem-Movimento* (1985) e *A Imagem-Tempo* (1990) de Deleuze sejam muitas vezes interpretadas como uma teoria do cinema ou uma exposição da filosofia *no* cinema, é mais uma investigação de uma filosofia de intensidades e duração do que uma lógica do processo imagético. Sua teoria da imagem combina a Teoria dos signos de Peirce, as Teorias da Imagem e do Cinematógrafo de Bergson com alguns toques de Spinoza e usa brilhantemente o cinema para ilustrar ou fornecer exemplos que substanciam processos psicológicos e conceitos filosóficos relativos à atividade imagética. Como os outros livros canônicos deleuzianos, os dois livros de cinema oferecem sofisticadas metáforas que “stand in” para o que eles se referem — isto os tornaria complexos sistemas de significação que procuram fornecer orientação intuitiva para a aquisição da compreensão conceitual em

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<sup>276</sup> Podemos citar três exemplos. O ensaio *Questão da técnica* (1953) é seminal na compreensão da instrumentalidade do cinematográfico para pensar o causal no cinema, a dinâmica da revelação e do encobrimento tecnológico como o surgimento da *poiēsis*, a economia afetiva do endividamento e o poder salvador de interesse, e a revelação de ordens através de *gestell* (*enfraing*). O livro de Heidegger *Que Significa Pensar?* (1952) baseia-se nas noções de pensamento como tendo ideias ou imagens diante da mente e da memória como a reunião do pensamento como aquilo que nos chama a pensar que *Mnemosine* é o que é mais instigante ainda. E *O Caminho da Linguagem* (1959) nos leva a “trazer a linguagem como linguagem para a linguagem” como uma construção imagética.

outros níveis de significação. Mas, acima de tudo, é um pensamento do pensamento com, e através do, cinematógrafo como um dispositivo fundacional. Se as categorias são os instrumentos com os quais podemos resolver ou extirpar (*decouper*) corpos como coisas no mundo, que categorias Deleuze inventa para nos ajudar em nossas determinações? Quais são as principais preocupações e conceitos filosóficos que são traduzidos em noções de cinema em *Cinema 1* e *Cinema 2*? Como Deleuze interpreta o pensamento e o pensamento do pensamento para articulá-lo de maneira cinematográfica? Como nos relacionamos com o mundo como entidades?

O fato de Deleuze situar seu discurso dentro do dispositivo do cinema mostra o significado que ele confere ao aparato cinematográfico da mente. Mas a expansão que ele dá ao cinematográfico amplia o escopo do cinema além de suas perspectivas científicas iniciais ou qualquer coisa proposta desde então. Para Deleuze, o cinema fornece uma resposta para alguns dos problemas mais antigos da filosofia e, assim, ele parece um tanto incrédulo por Bergson não ter explorado essa tendência de maneira mais adequada. Nas primeiras páginas de *A Imagem-Movimento*, Deleuze escreve: “A descoberta da imagem-movimento, para além das condições da percepção natural, constituía a prodigiosa invenção do primeiro capítulo de *Matière et Mémoire*. Devemos acreditar que Bergson a havia esquecido dez anos depois?” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 11). Bergson esqueceu não a mudança do circuito aferente para o eferente como pura percepção, mas sua exposição da figura cinematográfica como função (sem nomeá-lo), que ele havia elaborado em 1887 e apresentado no *Um Ensaio sobre os Dados Imediatos da Consciência* (*Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, 1889). É somente na *Evolução Criadora* que o termo cinematógrafo é introduzido e as implicações tecnológicas totalmente desenvolvidas.<sup>277</sup> Como vimos anteriormente, a imagem-movimento é a afirmação de que a imagem constitui uma transferência de circuitos neurais do sistema nervoso aferente para o sistema nervoso eferente a fim de produzir uma contração como a dinâmica elementar da imagem. Mas não

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<sup>277</sup> O mesmo Bergson escreve em uma nota de rodapé do Capítulo IV da *Evolução Criadora* que o conceito do cinematógrafo já fazia parte de suas palestras sobre a *História da Ideia do Tempo* (1902-1903) no Collège de France, em que ele “comparou o mecanismo do pensamento conceitual com o cinematógrafo” (BERGSON, 1944, p. 296). Mas isso não é demonstrado explicitamente no registro manuscrito como ‘cinematógrafo’, mas apenas em termos da produção abstrata de tempo que tinha sido um problema filosófico para os gregos antigos. O conceito do cinematógrafo foi um conceito importante para Bergson e fez referência a ele ao longo de sua carreira, principalmente em *Duração e Simultaneidade: Bergson e o Universo Einsteiniano* (*Durée et simultanété*, 1922) e *A Mente Criadora: Uma Introdução à Metafísica* (*La Pensée et le mouvant*, 1934).



é isso que Bergson esquece — o que ele esquece é o dispositivo, a função, que produz movimento a partir de seções aparentemente estáticas: a primazia do aparato cinematográfico.

Deleuze elabora sua tipologia imagética de acordo com dois tipos principais: a imagem-movimento e a imagem-tempo; e se utiliza da teoria de três pensadores: Bergson, que serve como fundação teórica principal, Peirce como segundo referencial, e Spinoza que está extremamente presente, mas permanece sem ser mencionado. Spinoza está mais ou menos subentendido no pensamento de Bergson, Peirce e Deleuze e, portanto, deve ser considerado uma presença pressuposicional que informa e influencia as ideias imagéticas dos três. Spinoza está presente principalmente através da teorização do afeto, mas também através de sua elaboração do movimento "ascendente e descendente" da adequação e perfeição do pensamento que aparece em *Ética*. Obviamente, esta não é uma invenção espinosista, pois foi conceitualizada pelo pensamento grego antigo através de *Mnemosynē* e mais tarde especificamente por Platão através da Ideia e depois por Aristóteles através de sua teoria das Formas. Mais importante para nós, o que Spinoza traz é a adequação do movimento do afeto como imanente e os vários níveis de conhecimento. Deleuze é capaz de sintetizar as ideias desses três pensadores e passá-las por meio do cinematógrafo de Bergson para criar uma classificação própria do processo imagético.

O cinematógrafo é uma heurística útil na medida em que, segundo Deleuze, trata-se simplesmente de uma história que retrabalha um dos problemas mais antigos da filosofia: os paradoxos de Zenão e a reconstituição do movimento a partir de seções estáticas (DELEUZE, 1985). Desse modo, o *Cinema 1* e o *Cinema 2* não são livros sobre o cinema, mas um sistema filosófico construído em torno do funcionamento do cinematógrafo. A questão central dos livros de cinema é criar um problema para a solução que o cinema oferece, na medida em que o cinema produz uma solução na prática para um problema filosófico que tem sido difícil de resolver. Talvez o trabalho de Deleuze seja uma engenharia reversa (*reverse engineering*) do cinema como um método filosófico para determinar a fonte causal da solução. Deleuze gosta de dizer como corolário do método da intuição que a verdadeira natureza de um problema só é determinada quando a resposta adequada é encontrada. Normalmente, num esforço científico, começa-se por colocar o problema para determinar uma solução, mas com o cinema, para Deleuze, o oposto parece ser o caso: "Funciona na prática, mas funciona em teoria?" Deleuze procura um problema filosófico para satisfazer o

cinema como solução. Ou talvez ele já conheça o problema, mas precisa vinculá-lo à realidade do cinema como um sistema. A percepção pressupõe o cinema, mas o cinema realiza a tarefa que a caixa-preta da mente realiza muito bem.

O cinema propriamente dito é uma arte baseada no movimento e no tempo, por isso não nos surpreende que Deleuze decompõe suas ideias ao longo dessas duas linhas. Mas não é por que são distinções primitivas do cinema, e sim por que representam distinções primitivas na filosofia. Como problemas secundários que não são menos significativos que o problema principal de gerar movimento de seções estáticas, podemos mencionar a individuação e a seleção como diferenciação, a formação de categorias como condicionamento do devir processual, a criação de conceitos dentro e através do processo imagético, a articulação da memória através da montagem, e talvez mais significativamente a interpretação do tempo em termos da lógica inferencial processual que informa a mudança dentro do movimento imagético.

Os problemas da seleção estão no cerne da filosofia do cinema, pois, através dela, pode-se definir as unidades semânticas através das quais a mudança se manifesta como diferença no fazer como experiência em diferentes escalas. Precisamos ter em mente que Deleuze está desenvolvendo os fundamentos para uma filosofia da experiência para a descrição do desdobramento do evento de encontro como uma doutrina empírica que não depende da linguagem, mas da vida como imagética. Baseia-se num modo de ciência perceptivo em sua base epistemológica e anterior à linguagem. Dessa maneira, ao ler os livros de cinema, precisamos ver como o colapso tradicional da compreensão da experiência pode ser entendido através da significação pragmática que o cinema dá aos seus componentes tecnológicos. Uma tomada é, portanto, uma sequência de quadros, de imagens independentes, um conjunto selecionado de atividades que, juntas, compõem uma unidade conceitual de experiência com uma duração inerente. Em nossa análise, o sufixo -cept serve para a articulação entre o percepto e o conceito como a atividade perceptiva compreendida na forma de um agenciamento ou conjunto. O conceito aqui deixa de ser uma listagem de atributos, mas uma montagem maquínica abstrata que produz uma funcionalidade coerente dentro de si e participa da duração do todo. A conceptualização da tomada em um conjunto de quadros/enquadramentos é o que nos permitirá avançar para a filosofia propriamente dita através da seleção, não exclusivamente através do enquadramento como a seleção do quadro fílmico, mas por meio da limitação da extensão

de uma tomada, sequência ou de um todo — em termos do conteúdo como uma entidade duracional — e da relação em evolução das partes com o todo.

O problema da seleção e da individuação é primordial, não apenas porque é a base de uma taxonomia, mas porque representa talvez um problema mais fundamental de lutar “com o caos, com o abismo indiferenciado ou oceano da dissemelhança” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1992, p. 266). Não é apenas um problema que desafiou Deleuze, mas também chamou a atenção ao Bergson, que dedicou o primeiro capítulo de *Matéria e Memória*, “Sobre a Seleção de Imagens”, a este problema. A imagem que é interpretada como cinematográfica não é apenas o que aparece na tela, ou mesmo ao cinema da mente, mas o que sucede no aparato cinematográfico, quer o descrevamos em termos do objeto técnico em si, quer como o processo mental de transformação. Para ambos, o expresso na seleção constitui o Grau Zero, mas é também o da tecnologia enquanto tecnologia concebida por Heidegger em seu ensaio *A Questão da técnica* (1953). Essa atividade à qual Heidegger se refere como *Gestell* (armação)<sup>278</sup> ou aparato de enquadramento é aquele que organiza e fornece o arcabouço pelo qual podemos nomear o que precisamente não é e nunca será perceptível aos nossos olhos: revela o real, o causal no modo de ordenar. Desta maneira, os livros de cinema articulam essas preocupações como uma expressão do essencialmente tecnológico por definição do aparato cinematográfico em “o reino onde a revelação e o desocultar acontecem, onde *alêtheia*, a verdade, acontece” (HEIDEGGER, 1993, p. 319) 24 quadros por segundo, como Goddard costuma dizer. O que torna o cinema arquetípico da tecnologia é que o cinematográfico é a essência do tecnológico, como descrito por Heidegger. A questão sobre a tecnologia do cinematógrafo “é a questão concernente à constelação na qual revelar e esconder, o desdobramento essencial da verdade propicia” (HEIDEGGER, 1993, p. 338) através de sua funcionalidade operativa. Se a tecnologia cinematográfica pode portar o nome *technē*, ela o faz pela “revelação que traz a verdade ao esplendor da aparência radiante” igual uma *poiesis* das artes visuais, e “uma dominação e segurança da verdade” como um meio --- arquivístico (HEIDEGGER, 1993, p. 339).

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<sup>278</sup> Aqui temos um duplo sentido no quadro de palavras, pois em inglês pode significar um quadro estrutural ou um quadro de imagem. Mas há aqui uma implicação mais sutil no texto de Heidegger, na medida em que a estrutura como estrutural remonta ao grego *hylē*, geralmente traduzido como matéria, mas que, na verdade, em seu significado original, refere-se à madeira estrutural ou o quadro.

A cinematografia dos livros de cinema de Deleuze, em oposição ao cinema, é uma semiótica perceptual, talvez uma exposição mais específica e técnica do que *Mil Platôs*, mas mesmo assim, minerando e fundindo o mesmo minério. Muitos dos mesmos problemas discutidos no *Mil Platôs* são reprisados no *Cinema 1* e *2* e alguns dos problemas que surgem nesses dois volumes são tratados em *O que é filosofia?* — pois se os livros de cinema apresentam um programa filosófico baseado na imagem, a filosofia por trás do próprio esquema filosófico deve, em algum momento, ser também articulada.

Deleuze baseia sua taxonomia da imagem em torno de quatro comentários das teses de Bergson sobre o movimento. Os três primeiros aparecem em *Cinema 1* e lidam com a imagem do movimento bergsoniano e suas três figuras principais. O quarto aparece em *Cinema 2* e reflete sobre a imagem da memória em termos do presente passageiro como um passado infinitamente contrastado. Os livros são um tanto confusos numericamente e há quatro comentários sobre Bergson, três tipos de movimento, dois tipos de ilusão emergindo da segunda tese, três níveis de operatividade para a terceira tese, a inserção simultânea no sistema de Peirceian de primeiridade, segundidade e terceiridade e, como resultado, as diferentes variedades ou figuras que se seguem dentro de cada tipo de imagem. No entanto, permanecemos no reino semiótico em todos os momentos: “Poderíamos conceber uma série de meios de translação (trem, carro, avião...) e, paralelamente, uma série de meios de expressão (gráfico, foto, cinema)” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 13).

Como grande parte dos livros é uma visão geral classificatória dos tipos de imagem, as expressões mais sucintas dos dois aspectos da taxonomia são encontradas nos glossários de ambos os livros. No Glossário do *Cinema 1*, Deleuze oferece uma definição surpreendentemente bergsoniana da Imagem-Movimento como “o conjunto mais amplo de elementos variáveis que agem e reagem um ao outro como fundamentais” (DELEUZE, 1987, p.).<sup>279</sup> Os outros tipos de imagem definidos são movimentos subsidiários ou caracterizações da Imagem-Movimento. As principais, ou seja, a Imagem-Percepção, a Imagem-Afeto, a Imagem-Ação, a Imagem-Impulso e a Imagem-Mental, recebem um tratamento tricotômico que produz uma tríade de signos para cada caracterização do movimento como Primeiro, Segundo e Terceiro, exceto pela Imagem de Impulso, que obviamente só é fornecida com a Primeira e a Segunda. Uma coisa a ter em mente ao interpretar esses tipos de imagem é que

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<sup>279</sup> Esta é a definição bergsoniana da imagem como articulada em *Matéria e Memória* (1896).

os termos que *qualificam* o termo imagem são palavras que, na maior parte, terminam no sufixo *-ção*,<sup>280</sup> (imaginação, percepção, concepção, etc) indicando que denotam um processo e seu resultado. Daí a necessidade de definir cada imagem como o movimento abrangente que ele chama conjunto (*ensemble*) ou *set* na tradução inglesa, e os signos específicos associados que ele chama de coisas — e que Peirce poderia ter chamado de objetos. No livro francês original, Deleuze separa os conjuntos das coisas — literalmente os separa tipograficamente, espaçando-os na página impressa no Glossário — de maneira plausível pela razão que acabamos de afirmar, mas a tradução não respeita a lógica de apresentação dos franceses e os coloca em ordem alfabética como duas divisões não separadas. Isso pode parecer insignificante em detrimento dos tradutores, mas a apresentação ordinal do original e seu fluxo de lógica parece indicar que eles devem ser lidos e compreendidos nessa ordem como uma heurística para a compreensão do movimento da procissão na cadeia de significação.

O Glossário do *Cinema 2* não é tão terminante nas definições sucintas de alguns termos, geralmente signos cronológicos, ou signos que indicam e fornecem uma consistência relativa ao desdobramento formal do tempo. Apenas duas imagens são definidas, e somente elas são apresentadas como signos: a imagem-cristal ou *Hyalosigno* e a imagem-lembrança ou *Mnemosyne*. Das definições de imagens apresentadas, a mais notável é a ausência de uma definição para Imagem-Tempo. Aqui as imagens são produzidas em um espectro material interno, puramente mental, que apresenta um movimento oscilante entre o material e o ideal como pensamento puro, a produção do tempo — quanto aos cronosignos que ele apresenta, todos articulam a forma, ou melhor, a força do tempo na imagem. É decididamente uma preocupação semiótica na medida em que esses *cronosignos* revelam “o terreno oculto do tempo” (DELEUZE, 1990, p. 98). A *sema* marca o ponto em que a Terra processual como transformação elementar identifica o que está à mão em termos da passagem do tempo como experiência interna.

No Prefácio à edição em inglês de *A Imagem-Movimento*, Deleuze afirma que “o tempo permanece o objeto de uma representação indireta na medida em que depende da

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<sup>280</sup> Em inglês o equivalente deste argumento acontece com o sufixo *-ion* (representation, transfiguration, multiplication, constellation).

montagem e deriva de imagens de movimento”.<sup>281</sup> Dizer que o tempo depende da montagem é uma grande coisa e contraria o que a teoria da montagem geralmente afirma, isto é, que a montagem articula o tempo e, portanto, há mais ali que a primeira vista revela em termos de percepção ou o apresentado como uma teoria de montagem no Cinema — ou seja, aquilo que surge no *Cinema 2* em termos da imagem do tempo. Por exemplo, a tremulação ou a cintilação, como a simples alternância de negritude e brancura, é montagem? Onde o significado da estética da montagem entra na tremulação ou na cintilação? É a mais primitiva ou fundamental interpretação da oposição “como a força motriz interna, através da qual a unidade dividida refaz uma nova unidade num outro nível”? (DELEUZE 1985, p. 48). Ou será na articulação da criação de um desejo positivo versus a produção de uma perda negativa como impulsionadora do avanço do fluxo afetivo, onde podemos dizer que a montagem está acontecendo como outro nível de significação? Torna-se uma série ilimitada de montagens de montagens. Mas, então, afirmar que o tempo deriva da imagem do movimento é tornar o tempo experiencial como sentido e, por fim, intensivo ou diferencial e, em última análise, pragmático, mesmo que seja sempre intuitivamente inferencial. Isto requer que distingamos entre a montagem resultante da fisicalidade do movimento e a mentalidade da tradução, e o fluxo duracional da montagem — todos eles ~~terem~~ têm movimento, mas o movimento é de natureza diferente e requer qualificação e não simplesmente discriminação analítica constituinte de imagens em si, como micro-imagens. E se nos permitirmos fazer isso, os microintervalos produzidos, que Massumi (2015) chama de micropercepções, são simplesmente indicadores de passagem que nos permitem discernir inferencialmente a procissão do tempo? Ou podem ser reduzidos ao limiar e sua expressão liminar como relação diferencial?

É Deleuze quem nomeia esse movimento dentro de sua semiótica perceptual uma imagem-movimento, pois não se encontra em Bergson, nem qualquer um dos outros tipos de imagens fundamentais. O termo imagem-percepção ocorre apenas uma só vez em *Matéria e Memória* e apenas em termos de percepção pura, como uma concepção hipotética ou suposta para ilustrar o que aconteceria no intervalo se a memória não fosse envolvida na discussão. Bergson nunca deu continuidade em seus estudos a fim de nomear a imagem-movimento, mesmo que tivesse discernido o movimento. A imagem-lembrança é

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<sup>281</sup> “time remains the object of an indirect representation in so far as it depends on montage and derives from movement-images” (DELEUZE, 1986, p. ix).

outra questão que Bergson frequentemente equipara à percepção, o que faz sentido, pois Bergson não acredita que a percepção possa existir independentemente da memória (PEARSON e MULLARKEY, 2002). Mas se analisamos a imagem-movimento deleuziana — que Deleuze credits a Bergson para sua invenção — em seus componentes subsidiários de movimento, obtemos a imagem-percepção, a imagem-ação e a imagem-afecção como suas três variedades principais com a imagem-impulso. Estamos no reino da percepção pura que Bergson elabora no primeiro capítulo de *Matéria e Memória*. É pura percepção, pois esse modo de movimento imagético não envolve nenhum tipo de memória, ou, pelo menos, não de maneira consciente e convincente. O movimento existe inconscientemente, no sentido de que a pessoa está consciente, mas não precisa estar pensando na atividade em si como um ato de vontade ou compreensão consciente, como dirigir um carro ou andar pela rua ou reconhecer a raiva. As imagens resultantes, como perceptivas, afetivas, impulsivas e de ação, têm uma vida própria, que não requer raciocínio ou reflexão consciente e realiza a tarefa como atividade útil do estímulo até a reação.

Ao pensar sobre esses tipos de imagem, também precisamos acompanhar o tipo de estímulo que o corpo está recebendo para determinar o tipo de imagem gerada. Seria mais apropriado averiguar a natureza da impressão em vez de caracterizá-la, não em termos de se o estímulo afeta um sentido ou outro, mas se o estímulo está predominantemente trabalhando no reino físico ou no campo psicológico. Os seres humanos conhecem o mundo materialmente, como uma intensificação experiencial heterogênea que tem extensão e duração. Bergson escreve que conhecemos as coisas dualisticamente, fisicamente e mentalmente, como corpo e mente, como tendo uma dimensão física ou fisiológica e uma dimensão psicológica em um espectro polar que é puramente material de um lado e ideal do outro — elas são materiais, pois não são Ideias puras e não são um Caos homogêneo. Deleuze entende esses componentes imagéticos do movimento como actantes irtuais, potencialidades que transcendem ou ultrapassam o elementar e a função em um nível próprio, mesmo precisando de um corpo para expressão.

Os aspectos das coisas no mundo que podem ser melhor conhecidos em termos de extensão, são materiais predominantemente num sentido físico, conhecido diretamente pelos sentidos e produtores de movimentos de pensamento que ocupam o domínio da imagem-movimento. Aqueles aspectos das coisas no mundo que não têm propriedades extensas e podem ser conhecidas de melhor maneira por meio da introspecção, são

materiais de uma maneira psicológica e não podem ser diretamente conhecidos pelos sentidos e, como tal, requerem uma faculdade especial de observação interna, de contemplação, que é chamada mente e são conhecidas pelos afectos (BERGSON, 2014). Sendo assim, dizemos que as impressões são materiais porque têm extensão e duração, mas talvez mais importante, porque não são Ideias perfeitas e plenamente adequadas. Por um lado, quanto maior a duração, maior a realidade, maior a adequação em termos de Ideia; por outro lado, quanto mais uma coisa é determinada por propriedades extensas, menos adequada é como Ideia, até o ponto de descer a um devir puro como um caos que não tem nem duração e nenhum tipo de existência. De tal modo, a imagem-afetiva tende a ser mais psicológica, mais mental, e a imagem-ação mais física, mais sensorial. A imagem-percepção descreve a síntese implícita no movimento e a imagem-impulso é a composição da contração que impulsiona o movimento de projeção para fora e para frente no sentido de procissão. Podemos dizer então que a imagem-movimento descreve a imagem em termos bergsonianos, como um todo a partir da impressão, estímulo ocorrendo através do circuito aferente para sua transformação no centro de indeterminação e a subsequente mudança para o circuito eferente e a produção de uma contração. No entanto, o movimento que ocorre dentro do centro da indeterminação é mais complexo do que a da procissão que a imagem-movimento nos faria sustentar. A faculdade contida pelo centro da indeterminação é caracterizada como um atrasamento, um sistema de diferimento, no qual o movimento do pensamento se dá em uma dinâmica autocontida que circula, oscila entre o ideal e o físico como um processo mental de pensamento representado como um movimento vertical, uma animação ascendente e descendente. Se o movimento é mais informado pelo ideal como uma noção mais adequada ou perfeita, diz-se que o movimento é ascendente. Se o movimento é mais informado pelos sentidos físicos e pela impermanência do não-ser, diz-se que o movimento é para baixo. O pensamento, um processo mental em andamento, é mantido em movimento como o movimento material para cima e para baixo da criação do tempo, como o assentimento da mudança.<sup>282</sup>

A primeira tese sobre o movimento que aparece em *Matéria e Memória* afirma que “o movimento não se confunde com o espaço percorrido. Este é passado, o movimento é presente, é o ato de percorrer. O espaço percorrido é divisível, e até infinitamente divisível,

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<sup>282</sup> Tradicionalmente isso tem sido descrito como Mnemosyne, a filha de Urano e Gaia. Com Zeus, ela concebeu as nove musas.



enquanto o movimento é indivisível, ou não se divide sem mudar de natureza a cada divisão” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 9). Dessa maneira, a translação processual traz três tipos de movimento: a imagem bergsoniana de estímulo e reação separada pelo centro de indeterminação; o movimento óbvio produzido quando um quadro subsequente substitui o quadro existente; a mudança resultante da montagem de agregação, em que cada novo quadro de entrada transforma a duração do imediatamente precedido, bem como do conjunto existente como um todo.

A Segunda Tese sobre o movimento, que é elaborada na *Evolução Criadora*, afirma que o movimento surge da racionalização ou comparação do entrante com o existente como discernimento de diferença qualitativa (BERGSON, 2005). A tese elabora uma distinção que Bergson faz em uma comparação entre o argumento de Zenão para o devir qualitativo em contraste com o devir evolutivo. Na primeira proposição, o devir é um verbo de significado indeterminado como atividade; na segunda proposição o devir é um sujeito, um substantivo. Bergson usa o conceito de Εἶδος (*Eidos*), que ele define como “a vista estável tomada da instabilidade das coisas” (BERGSON, 1944, p. 340) do jeito que fornece o critério a partir do qual o movimento pode ser medido. Tais noções surgem a partir das Ideias ou Formas inteligíveis de Platão e Aristóteles para o *instante qualquer* do instantâneo, e retifica corretamente a justaposição de termos com a atualização das Ideias dentro dos movimentos do fluxo de matéria. Isso rebaixa as Formas a formas e seu movimento como instantes privilegiados. O que Deleuze mais tarde caracteriza de “patético” — através da referência a Eisenstein, o patético se torna Πάθος (*pathos*) e se transforma o movimento do afeto da montagem da Natureza Não-Indiferente (*Nonindifferent Nature* — Eisenstein, 1987).

A Terceira Tese, também da *Evolução Criadora*, afirma que “não só o instante é um corte imóvel do movimento, mas o movimento é um corte móvel da duração, isto é, do Todo ou de um todo” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 17). Ele traz três níveis de seleção que predicam a unidade de operabilidade baseada na equação de ilusão e realidade de acordo com a fórmula: seções imóveis são para o movimento como uma seção móvel é para a mudança qualitativa. Esses níveis são:

- 1) Os conjuntos ou sistemas fechados que se definem através dos objetos discerníveis ou das partes distintas;
- 2) O movimento de translação que se estabelece entre esses objetos e modifica suas respectivas posições relativas entre si como entidades afetivas;

3) A duração ou o todo, uma realidade espiritual que muda constantemente de acordo com suas próprias relações. (Trad. modificada. DELEUZE, 1985, p. 21)

Isso demonstra a diferença entre tradução e transformação, de *erfahrung* e *erlebnis* em termos de transição e passagem (REBOLLEDO e GALLI, 2017), quando se fala de mudança como dois aspectos do movimento. O primeiro nível de movimento é uma tradução do espaço, e o segundo efetua uma mudança duracional. O movimento aqui é sutil porque a tradução como espacial envolve o sensorial como extenso e a mudança ocorre neste reino diferentemente de si mesma. A transformação aborda a duração como temporal, criação do tempo através da produção da diferença pura como diferença em si mesma. O terceiro movimento como o resultado da montagem, uma entidade duracional, produz uma seção móvel constituinte de “imagens temporais, isto é, imagens de duração, imagens de mudança, imagens de relação, imagens de volume que estão além do próprio movimento” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 11). Na próxima seção, vamos fazer uma análise da produção de duração na *Berlim de 1927* de Walter Ruttmann: *Sinfonia de uma Grande Cidade*, e veremos como ela surge da abertura fechada que a duração permite como um sistema de relação.

Assim sendo, o primeiro nível é um modo de seleção chamado por Deleuze de enquadramento. Implica a delimitação de um conjunto como um sistema fechado de relações; é uma delimitação ou distinção individualizante dentro de um conjunto maior. O enquadramento é uma seleção delimitadora do que corresponde ao agenciamento, o conjunto de inclusão como o conteúdo do enquadramento. É uma construção dinâmica em ato, na medida em que é vinculada e delimitada como um conjunto espacial em construção: é por isso que, no cinema, o cenário é onde não somente o filme é feito, mas onde todos os componentes e elementos criativos estão presentes para sua realização. O enquadramento identifica aquilo que define o conteúdo como o que é incluído essencialmente para a concepção. A atividade de enquadramento não precisa ser cortada e seca (*cut and dry*) ou necessariamente contínua: os constituintes de um conjunto podem ser extensos ou intensos e podem exigir um limiar, mas o quadro fornece a delimitação para ambas. A seleção pode, portanto, ser topológica em sua definição, uma vez que é transmitida através do conjunto como um conjunto que não precisa ser fisicamente ou temporalmente definido e, portanto, o conjunto é *dividual*. Essa propriedade do enquadramento seletivo capaz de ser visto como constituído de partes permite que os constituintes existam como componentes de outros conjuntos e agenciamentos, uma propriedade que complementa o conceito de concretude

de Simondon. Há também um aspecto negativo na seleção em termos de um 'espaço negativo' permitindo que o enquadramento subsista dentro dele. O fato de haver uma seleção em um espaço implica ser parte de um conjunto maior que contém tanto o espaço de seleção quanto o espaço de não-seleção. Dessa maneira, o enquadramento seleciona tanto através da seleção quanto através da rejeição e exclusão. O fora da tela se refere ao que não é visto nem incluído, mas está presente de maneira ausente porque condiciona ou condicionou a presença daquilo que está na tela como a seleção do enquadramento. O enquadramento neste aspecto o vincula à decupagem como o processo seletivo em que a distância focal, a abertura da lente e o foco trabalham juntos para resolver um objeto a partir de um plano de fundo, de modo que o objeto apareça como *découpé*, cortado ou separado, distinto e distinto do fundo. Em um sentido cinematográfico, essa ideia de *découper* foi adotada por Béla Balázs no contraste de *Ausschnitt* (recortes) e *Bildausschnitt* (seção de imagens) como parte de sua teorização da decupagem em *Die Einstellung* (atitude ou postura fílmica, o que Deleuze chama de ângulo de enquadramento), como uma forma de pensar o seccionamento do profílmico (BARNARD, 2014).

O segundo nível de diferenciação seletiva é a decupagem, que a tradução inglesa erroneamente tem como corte (*cutting*). Como Deleuze aponta, decupagem “é a determinação do plano, e o plano a determinação do movimento que se estabelece no sistema fechado, entre elementos ou partes do conjunto” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 31). Deleuze tem uma concepção interessante do plano e, em comparação com a teoria do cinema, ele o define como uma entidade conceitual em termos de sua produção de movimento, em vez de defini-lo em termos de comprimento: o plano é o intermediário entre o enquadramento do conjunto e a montagem do todo, algumas vezes tendendo a um ou outro e ele articula o plano segundo o que ele faz em oposição ao que ele é. O movimento do plano surge internamente como a tradução das partes de um conjunto espacialmente consistentes, mas também como a mudança de um todo que é transformado em duração internamente e em relação ao todo. O plano divide e subdivide a duração de acordo com os objetos que compõem o conjunto; ele reúne objetos e define em uma única duração identitária. Esse duplo aspecto funcional do plano faz com que ele aja como uma experiência conceitual: o plano pode ser tanto imóvel quanto móvel em termos da "contiguidade" produzido como um conjunto fechado de continuidade fílmica. Como uma unidade de engajamento com a realidade, o plano funciona igual a um conceito, exceto que seu conteúdo articula mudança

e movimento como o conteúdo do conjunto fechado e delimita não apenas o selecionado ativamente entre o momento em que a câmera é ligada e desligada, mas através do que não consegue selecionar como uma seleção passiva. Em referência ao conceito do conceito, ao pensamento do pensamento, um plano representaria uma seleção de atividade perceptual como constitutiva do pensamento-em-formação, produtivo da mudança também.

Decupagem é um termo técnico no cinema que pode significar duas coisas: a análise técnica do roteiro do filme em suas cenas compostas em elementos de filmagem e também a real divisão da filmagem em planos de maneira verdadeiras e tomadas: “a *técnica de decupagem* é o tratamento do roteiro para a câmera, a *decupagem* é o tratamento da realidade pró-fílmica pela câmera” (BARNARD, 2014, p. 5). Como Timothy Barnard aponta em seu livro, *Découpage* (2014), a decupagem enfatiza o entendimento da crítica francesa e da prática profissional de que o sequenciamento de um filme é concebido antes e durante a filmagem de um filme, e não exclusivamente na edição, mas também que a câmera desempenha um papel importante no tratamento formal e no sequenciamento da *mise-en-scène*. E assim os planos são concebidos e planejados antes de serem filmados, mesmo que sejam definidos no set. Isso significa que muitas vezes um filme foi ‘editado’ antes de ser filmado, e que o trabalho do editor é meramente juntar planos e não a organização fundamental do material fílmico.

Essas são considerações significativas que estão na raiz da problemática fílmica, pois são nessas determinações que os constituintes elementares são decididos. Ao separarmos o filme em sacadas e fixações, em quadros individuais, em cenas, em sequências e depois no próprio filme, ele tem sérias implicações sobre como conceber as várias entidades imagéticas “pré-individuais” dentro de cada um e como o processo imagético funciona quando usado o cinematógrafo de forma a impulsionar o maquinismo processual. É uma questão de determinar onde o movimento, a diferença e, em algum momento, o tempo, informam-se no processo como movimento indivisível (completo). Deleuze afirma que seu esquema imagético baseado em Bergson não coincide perfeitamente com a classificação de Peirce, porém, mesmo ao nível de imagens distintas (DELEUZE, 1985) — os motores que impulsionam ambas as dinâmicas são diferentes — elas lidam com o mesmo assunto, então eles devem coincidir em alguns pontos, mais importantemente na questão da produção de significação, não importando o mecanismo subjacente. O arco do voo da flecha em Zeno, o movimento indivisível em Bergson e a necessidade de movimento no drama nas estruturas

narrativas do filme como evidenciado formalmente no arco narrativo de Sidney Lumet ou no paradigma de Syd Field, são todas baseadas na mudança como o movimento do todo. Eles se servem das ideias de intensificação, de duração e de drama intuitivo e adotam a ideia de montagem de alguma forma ou de outra.

Assim, o terceiro nível de individuação seletiva refere-se aos todos. E “Através dos *raccords*, dos cortes e dos *falsos raccords*, a montagem é a determinação do Todo (o terceiro nível bergsoniano)” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 44).<sup>283</sup> Se o primeiro nível olhou para a excisão de uma parte de um todo maior, e o segundo nível para a relação entre partes com movimento constituindo um todo maior que, em conjunto, produz um movimento de sobreposição, o terceiro nível é o movimento abrangente que liga os componentes somados em um todo maquínico coerente que é fechado ainda aberto.

Ao postular o experiencial desta maneira, Deleuze está mudando a localização da conceptualização da inteligência cartesiana como uma faculdade e movendo-a para o empírico, para o sensorial e o perceptivo como o local da criação. Isso nos leva a postular que uma filosofia cinematográfica baseada no movimento imagético invoca a faculdade de percepção em detrimento da faculdade intelectual na criação de conceitos — este seria um motivo pelo qual Bergson foi acusado, em sua época, de ser anti-intelectual (RUSSELL, 1914; BENDA 1927/2006; HUGHES, 2008; PILKINGTON, 1976). Ao considerarmos esse colapso, observamos a primeira parte do movimento, aquela que ocorre no lado de entrada da transformação, antes de ser tomada pela mente como um fenômeno mental.

## Duração

No último capítulo, falamos da formação de corpos como multiplicidades, mas aqui queremos reprisar a ideia da multiplicidade em termos de tempo e a criação de duração através do evento. De fato, estamos formulando o corpo como uma entidade duracional pela constituição do evento. Deleuze afirma repetidamente, como também temos feito no texto todo, a necessidade de expressar problemas em termos de tempo. Os conceitos que temos engajado têm uma dimensão temporal na qual eles levam tempo para serem

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<sup>283</sup> Podemos traduzir esta citação de maneira alternativa: montagem é “a determinação do todo por meio de continuidades, cortes e falsas continuidades” (Trad. Pelo autor do inglês. Deleuze, 1987, p. 69).

cumpridos, assim como caminhar daqui para lá leva tempo. Na língua inglesa, o tempo do evento geralmente é expresso com locuções espaciais, em termos de extensão. Mas, na língua portuguesa também acontece — damos lugar a um evento e quando fazemos algo, dizemos que estamos ocupados, e perguntamos “que sucedeu?” como se um acontecimento fosse uma série linear que se prolonga no espaço. Respondemos em termos de anos, dias, horas, minutos, segundos, mas a intuição subjacente da racionalização temporal é espacial. A duração seria a expressão verdadeiramente temporal do evento como convergência intuitiva, mas para expressar a perduração em termos temporais, precisamos apresentar o evento como um agenciamento associado concrescente que leva em consideração os conceitos desenvolvidos até agora.

Ver o evento se compor dessa maneira é muito parecido com o modo cinematográfico de criar narrativas através do acréscimo de significado em produções audiovisuais. É isso que o documentário clássico de Walter Ruttmann, *Berlim, Sinfonia de uma Grande Cidade* (1927),<sup>284</sup> faz apresentando um dia na vida da capital alemã. É um filme que se situa esteticamente no cinema experimental de vanguarda entre *O Encouraçado Potemkin* de Sergei Eisenstein (1925) e *The Man with a Movie Camera* (Um Homem com uma Câmera) de Dziga Vertov (1929) e *Chuva* de Joris Ivens (1929). O filme poderia facilmente ter sido chamado *A Sinfonia dos Limiares* — a curta metragem está repleta de imagens representando limiares. No entanto, nenhuma das atividades descritas pode reivindicar a designação do momento definitivo que realmente marca o momento exato do despertar da cidade — é o efeito cumulativo da realização de vários gestos, movimentos e atividades compondo os fatos que caracterizam o desdobramento do drama urbano durante um ciclo de 24 horas na sua vida. O filme é uma montagem reconstitutiva em cinco atos que trata sobre a experiência cotidiana de um dia típico em Berlim, quando Walter Benjamin poderia estar trabalhando em seu Projeto das Passagens: Ato 1, Berlim se Desperta; Ato 2, Berlim começa a trabalhar; Ato 3, Berlim em movimento; Ato 4, o povo de Berlim; Ato 5, Berlim à noite. Classificamos o filme de reconstitutivo por alguns motivos: foi filmado ao longo de muitos dias; algumas das cenas parecem ter sido encenadas pelos cineastas; e os editores “juntaram” fragmentos representativos de atividades, imagens selectas, para

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<sup>284</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kf7mq3uAgA&t=207s> Esta versão tem uma gravação da trilha sonora de Edmund Meisel que substituiu a trilha original.

recriar uma aparência de lógica temporal e impor uma ordem coerente para as imagens. Por mais objetivo que seja, o filme é uma fabulação que abraça os poderes do falso.

O documentário usa efetivamente muitas estratégias da estética de montagem clássica para transmitir movimento e articular tropos cinematográficos dependentes de dinâmicas visuais para criar significado em vários níveis. Por exemplo, podemos identificar uma estética de montagem Eisensteiniana pelo uso de montagem métrica, rítmica, tonal, atonal e ideológica ou intelectual; podemos também categorizar sua edição pelo uso de uma estética pudovkiana das técnicas de edição relacional baseadas no contraste, no paralelismo, no simbolismo, na simultaneidade e no leitmotiv recorrente — essas duas estéticas são manifestas, mas não se preocupam tanto com o estabelecimento da continuidade temporal e da coerência racional entre os planos, mas funcionam relacionalmente para deixar o filme funcionar no nível de cortes irracionais cuja continuidade é fornecida pela faixa musical. A preocupação não é tanto estabelecer conexões fluidas e contínuas entre os planos, mas construir a experiência como uma apresentação lógica numa ordem sequencial que replica a ordem provável desses eventos na "vida real". Isso envolve a apresentação de uma multiplicidade de eventos, cada um com seu próprio avanço processual de concretizações imbricadas que constituem a univocidade do devir e contribuem para o efeito geral de transmitir a ordenação das imagens em desdobramento de acordo com os temas pictóricos explorados em cada ato.

Por exemplo, a grande maioria dos planos que descrevem o movimento do “despertar em Berlim”, que constituem o Ato 1, atuam como limiares ou os ilustra de acordo com a lógica dos limiares e da experiência. Esse ato de abertura começa ao amanhecer e, em amplas pinceladas, compõe-se de quatro sequências: a entrada na cidade de trem; fotos vazias das ruas de Berlim ao amanhecer; Berlinenses fazendo seu caminho para o trabalho; e o início do dia de trabalho na indústria pesada. Após uma curta tomada de água dissolvida em uma animação gráfica abstrata, a primeira cena começa com o fechamento de um portão de travessia imediatamente seguido por uma montagem frenética que intercala ritmicamente imagens de vias ferroviárias; rodas de trem e cenas filmadas de um ponto de vista subjetivo mostrando a paisagem decorrendo. Isso resulta numa montagem métrica de paisagens de zonas urbanas periféricas pontuadas por cenas das vigas de aço das treliças da ponte ferroviária. Em todas essas imagens, limiares de todos os tipos repetidamente marcam a passagem da câmera pelo cenário urbano: postes de luz, marcadores, sinais de

trânsito, interruptores de trem, características distintivas, pontes, cavaletes, prédios de serviços ferroviários, marcos proeminentes e finalmente uma grande arcada que marca a entrada na estação e uma grande placa pintada anunciando Berlim. Após um breve interlúdio visual de cenas estáticas de detalhes do trem, o espectador é apresentado a uma sequência de vistas panorâmicas da cidade a partir de um ponto de vista bem elevado, que mostra o caos arquitetônico variegado do ambiente urbano a fim de enfatizar a inatividade da cidade ao amanhecer. Olhamos diversos detalhes arquitetônicos industriais, comerciais e residenciais indicadores de que a cidade ainda está adormecida... imagens desoladas de janelas residenciais fechadas e vitrines de lojas exibindo manequins femininos vestidos de roupas íntimas nos fazem lembrar das fotografias documentais de Atget<sup>285</sup> sobre temas semelhantes. Um longa montagem atonal, repetindo o tema dos berlinenses caminhando para o trabalho, cresce em intensidade à medida que mais e mais indivíduos se juntam para formar a classe trabalhadora indiferenciada indo para o trabalho. Sobre uma sinistra linha de baixo quebrada por uma alarmante flauta aguda, Ruttmann apresenta cenas de gado, de soldados marchando em formação, de um tocador de realejo na rua, vaqueiros chicoteando o gado em um cercado fechado, de um guarda parado em frente a uma cerca metálica — o desenvolvimento da montagem atonal é interrompido por justaposições imagéticas produtoras de uma “montagem intelectual” que comenta criticamente a situação da classe trabalhadora. Finalmente, uma palanca de interruptor é acionada e toda a indústria de Berlim parece ganhar vida: vemos imagens de maquinaria industrial tornando-se operacional, os movimentos mecânicos medidos, a procissão robótica, a predeterminação precisa de todos os gestos, a marcha implacável do progresso industrial ao qual a classe trabalhadora está sujeita.

Dessa forma, ao seguirmos Ruttmann definindo o "conceito" de Berlim Desperta, poderemos entendê-lo através das imagens mostradas. Há uma infinidade de outros que poderiam ter sido mostrados para retratar a manhã, mas nem tudo está nessa categoria: o chá das 5 da tarde não entraria na categoria de Berlim Desperta, por isso não é mostrado. Mas se alguém perguntasse qual seria a duração do Berlim Desperta, veria que se trata de uma questão em aberto que está fechada: Berlim Desperta pela manhã, mas não é indefinida. Poderíamos bloqueá-lo artificialmente entre as 4:45 e as 10 da manhã, mas

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<sup>285</sup> Eugène Atget (1857–1927) flâneur e fotógrafo francês.



também poderia ter uma duração variável dependendo de quais atividades decidimos incluir. Ruttmann faz uma escolha das atividades que ele quis mostrar, mas poderíamos ter acrescentado pessoas se vestindo, tomando café da manhã ou escovando os dentes.

Estas são atividades que legitimamente pertencem a *Berlim Desperta* e que Ruttmann mostrou. Sua representação conceitual pode ter tido mais realidade, ou como Spinoza poderia dizer, mais perfeição, e Bergson, mais adequação. Entendemos que o *Berlim Desperta* como evento é uma multiplicidade, heterogêneo, rizomático, que concilia uma variedade de temporalidades e de atividades e, desta forma, procura uma extensão limitada ao evento do *Berlim Desperta*, mas que permanece o tempo todo aberto. Esses eventos como componentes subjacentes não precisam ser articulados de maneira contínua, um traz o outro na trama cinematográfica; eles podem ficar separados visualmente no espaço e no tempo. Deste modo, o evento *Berlim Desperta* que poderíamos definir artificialmente como de 5 horas e 15 minutos poderia ter uma duração que pode incluir mais ou menos tempo, dependendo de quais atividades desejamos adicionar ou subtrair.

A ideia de *Berlim Desperta* como uma ideia platônica ou como uma forma aristotélica, teria a maior realidade, seria aquela que inclui todas as atividades possíveis que o *Berlim Desperta* poderia incluir. A ideia de Ruttmann do conceito de *Berlim Desperta* é o que ele escolheu e decidiu incluir no filme e o que mostra para ele o movimento no tempo indicando a perduração do evento. *Berlim Desperta* é também uma forma cuja criação em nossa mente é informada pela ideia do que ela poderia ser potencialmente, mas também pela forma como se expressa no mundo, não apenas hoje, mas em suas diferentes manifestações de um dia para outro e encorpando o conceito de forma diferente através de sua procissão temporal.

Todos os dias que *Berlim Desperta*, há uma facticidade a sua realização no mundo. Segue um protocolo que é reificado, que emerge imanentemente e condiciona a experiência sem nenhuma ordem em particular: parece acontecer apenas pelo co-condicionamento recíproco que se desenvolve imanentemente no devir do acontecimento. O *Berlim Desperta* tem um certo valor em termos de verdade porque acontece e porque podemos identificá-lo, verificá-lo, indicar sua operatividade funcional. Os participantes constituintes, que se combinam para criar um evento, não apenas se aglutinam para formar um amálgama substancial, mas constituem uma máquina que produz uma consistência experiencial que constitui o *Berlim Desperta*. Esta operatividade como consistência experiencial emerge da

escuridão da noite de Berlim Dorme como uma intensificação progressiva à medida que as atividades definidas começam a acontecer ou a dar lugar. Como tal, o corpo composto pelo que toda essa atividade significa ganha força operativa como toda a cidade de Berlim torna-se manifestamente ativa. Então, as atividades que marcam a atividade de Berlim Desperta começam a cessar e são gradualmente substituídas por aquelas atividades que denotam o Berlim Vai Trabalhar. Uma vez que a atividade da cidade foi transformada de Berlim Desperta para Berlim Vai Trabalhar, realizamos a mudança de uma para a outra e a cidade foi transformada por uma mudança qualitativa através de e através de; o sentimento de Berlim Desperta passa e dá lugar a Berlim Vai Trabalhar. O intervalo indefinido ainda aberto entre Berlim Dorme e Berlim Vai Trabalhar é a duração do Berlim Desperta — mas esse intervalo é tão vago e não homogêneo em sua duração quanto qualquer outro evento nas atividades que poderiam ser ditas a outras classificações e que estão ocorrendo simultaneamente.

É Um e Muitos simultaneamente e o que exhibe depende de como queremos entender, o que percebemos e como participamos do evento ou como definimos o evento que desejamos participar. Berlim Desperta é uma multiplicidade composta de um número infinito de elementos componentes, tanto materiais como não materiais, humanos e não humanos, espaciais e temporais; cada componente, independentemente de sua escala ou composição, é uma intensificação duracional em si, com um valor de verdade próprio; podemos entendê-lo como um desdobramento linear, como o descarretel e projeção da vida diante de nós, mas enquanto a cena vista e a cena filmada dentro de nós que nos ocupa e nos mantém imersos em suas garras experienciais, há uma infinidade de atividade ocorrendo simultaneamente e que liga nossa experiência singular para o resto do mundo e, finalmente, para o universo como um todo.

Como mencionamos, cada atividade contribui ou participa na definição de Berlim Desperta como um corpo desempenha papéis infinitos no acontecimento do mundo, quer o percebamos, o conheçamos, compreendamos, imaginemos, sintamos ou lembremos. Os componentes de Berlim Desperta criam um todo concretizado, tal como é concretizado em montagens mecânicas maiores do que elas mesmas, em série para cima e para baixo *ad infinitum*. Além disso, cada componente efetua mudanças como resultado de suas relações com outros componentes ou não-componentes, ou mesmo como uma mudança posicional

de potencial — algo que pode ser tão anódino e inconsequente quanto ter acesso a um futuro que ele não tinha antes — a mudança que vem com a espera.

### **A imagem-lembrança**

Surpreendentemente, a memória parece desempenhar um papel relativamente pequeno no processo imagético articulado por Deleuze. Enquanto trabalhamos nesse conceito, ficamos surpresos com o tratamento relativamente superficial que Deleuze lhe dá, particularmente em vista do papel fundamental da memória na determinação da percepção, do pensamento e como fundamental na mediação operacional do movimento através do sistema. A teorização da memória imagética ocupa indiretamente uma grande porção do *Cinema 2: A imagem-tempo* e oferece profundidade à apresentação inicial da imagem-lembrança no capítulo 3, mas também através de sua participação na concepção de cristais de tempo do pensamento de Bergson sobre a memória como apresentado em *Matéria e Memória, Evolução Criadora e Energia Mental (L'Énergie spirituelle, 1919)*.

Originalmente o termo francês *image-souvenir*, em português imagem-lembrança, cunhado em *Matéria e Memória*, foi infelizmente traduzido para o inglês *recollection-image* (imagem-recordação) e, como tal, conceitualmente nos leva a desviar-nos de como entender esse importante conceito. No livro de Bergson, ele é traduzido como imagem-memória e talvez os tradutores de *C2* devessem ter seguido o exemplo da terminologia estabelecida pelos estudiosos em Bergson. Em termos de expressar o movimento efetuado por esta imagem, a imagem mnêmica poderia ter sido uma tradução mais salutar, mesmo de maneira menos amigável ao usuário, mas também teria ecoado a função operacional do neologismo *mnemosign* inspirado em Peirce. Curiosamente, o termo *mnemosign* aparece apenas duas vezes em *C2*, na conclusão e no glossário, e apenas como um homônimo para a imagem-lembrança. A maneira pela qual Deleuze interpreta Peirce e faz uso de seus conceitos de *signos* exige um exame mais detalhado, particularmente onde a imaginação do processo imagético funciona de maneira diferente de como Peirce predicou sua semiótica como o que ele chama de arquitetura do tempo.

Desenvolver a imagem-lembrança integral não é um conceito simples e requer a (re)coleta de muitos dos conceitos que desenvolvemos até agora para reconstituí-la, não apenas os conceitos deleuzianos e bergsonianos em torno da imagem e da memória, mas os

diagramas de movimento dos olhos de Yarbus e o modelo de perspectiva que vamos elaborar na próxima seção. Invocamos o termo recordação aqui como uma das maneiras pelas quais Deleuze entende a memória, mas isso não é uma reconstituição memorial propriamente dita como comumente entendida, mas uma agregação de conceitos que desenvolvemos anteriormente e agora estamos apresentando como uma elaboração descritiva. O resultado será um laço fechado produzido pela perspectiva através da projeção do ponto de vista ao infinito processado temporal que articula tanto a memória como extensão e como tempo.

No desenvolvimento da imagem-lembrança deleuziana e sua subsequente revelação como mnemosigno, precisamos ter em mente que a imagem bergsoniana é sempre predicada como uma imagem-movimento: há uma estimulação aferente, um centro de indeterminação e uma reação eferente sempre que surge uma imagem. Como Bergson e Deleuze costumam repetir, o cérebro é uma imagem, mas não é apenas um tipo de imagem. Como as várias faculdades indicam, há muitas funções diferentes que podem entrar em jogo no intervalo entre o aferente e o eferente, e a imagem-lembrança pode assumir uma variedade de sentidos. Deleuze é bastante específico sobre como e onde a imagem-lembrança opera, mas sentimos que há outras funções memoriais que entram em jogo no nível pré-individual, no quais Deleuze não parece querer mexer. Ele está ciente dessas entidades parciais, mas não parece entretê-las como constituintes pré-individuais que precisam ser levados em consideração como memorial. Por exemplo, ao escrever a cena, ele se refere à variação interna dentro da cena, o movimento na relação cena a cena, e ao movimento do todo, mas o que parece importar-lhe é a seleção no enquadramento, o fotograma, como a entidade primitiva a ser considerada. Mas dentro do quadro, há também movimentos parecidos que pressupõem o movimento imagético em termos de movimentos oculares dentro do quadro, a imagem-movimento de um quadro para outro e através da cena geral. Esses micro-movimentos da percepção dependem do processo de duração para permanecerem coerentes, pois, se não levarmos isso em consideração, entramos em conflito com o primeiro comentário sobre Bergson.

Para ilustrar nossas ideias, gostaríamos de considerar um exemplo fictício e estereotipado: pegamos um indígena do mais profundo da floresta amazônica que, em 2003, viajou para Brasília e viu a raiva expressa no Congresso pela primeira vez em sua vida. Ele é uma anomalia cultural que nunca viu a raiva expressa e nunca precisou chamar a raiva como

uma resposta emocional a uma situação da vida — mas aprenderá o que é a raiva criando um padrão cognitivo próprio. Sua cognição da raiva não começa como conhecimento da raiva. É um desenvolvimento temporal e não acontece no momento e assim ele descobrirá quais são os signos (de representamens), qual é o resultado e qual deve ser sua resposta. Ele não apenas aprende como são os signos de raiva como uma totalidade, mas compreende sua gradual intensificação e a agregação da interpretamens para que ele não apenas conheça os constituintes individuais que constituem a raiva, mas possa reconhecer o Todo como raiva. Como vimos, os diagramas de movimento ocular constituem padrões repetitivos que identificam e permitem a cognição de um determinado achado, em última análise, como um Todo. O diagrama de raiva se baseia no movimento cognitivo de um ponto para o outro, de um representamen para o próximo, como um movimento serial dos olhos que, agregados, constituem a expressão objetiva da raiva e a produção subjetiva de uma certa contração ou movimento a parte do espectador. Assim, não apenas o visitante indígena verá a raiva como uma raiva em si mesma, uma demonstração de energia afetiva, e constituirá um circuito cognitivo-memorial chamado Raiva, mas lembrará as circunstâncias, a localização, as outras pessoas envolvidas e suas emoções, como as outras pessoas se comportaram, o que estava sendo dito, como estava sendo dito, o fluxo de intensidade do evento, como todos reagiam à raiva, e tudo isso estaria ligado a uma hora do dia, um dia da semana, um mês e um ano em que sua concepção de Raiva ocorreu pela primeira vez. Um plano de consistência, uma região memorial, será criado em sua mente que criará uma rede relacional associada como uma entidade rizomática chamada Anger localizada em algum lugar no tempo e espaço em uma região independente, entre estratos ou regiões representando 2002 e 2004. Agora, em 2010, ele deixa sua aldeia pela segunda vez e vê a raiva exibida pela segunda vez no Rio. Ele ouve palavras furiosas, vê o cerrar dos punhos e imediatamente sua mente faz a associação aos acontecimentos de 2003. Ele pula no tempo e refaz o circuito de raiva da região de memória de sua viagem a Brasília na qual ele experimentou pela primeira vez a raiva conhecida. Ele não precisa reconhecer a troca de novo como a raiva, mas só precisa engajar essa região de novo de 2003 e traçar os movimentos da raiva em sua mente. Da mesma forma, em 2018, ele assiste a um filme dramático na TV e vê alguém agir com raiva. Ele ainda não está acostumado com a raiva em sua vida, por isso, ao tentar interpretar a situação afetiva, ele passa de 2018 para 2010 e de lá para a região de 2003, que compreende o circuito da raiva. Ele refaz o circuito da raiva e

sua mente formula o impulso que guiará o impulso nervoso para o circuito eferente como uma resposta que produz a contração correta.

Temos assim quatro modos diferentes da imagem-lembrança: primeiro, há a memória que produz a contração de um representamen para o próximo e lembra os resultados parciais como paradas intermediárias até a primeira constituição do conceito de Raiva; segundo, a concepção fechada primária como um circuito fechado que constitui a cognição de Raiva pela primeira vez como constitutiva do circuito primitivo para sua (re)cognição, (re)coleção e (re)memoração; terceiro, a criação de uma região de tempo e espaço que constitui o plano de consistência relacional dentro do qual a concepção primária de Raiva está localizada como um passado presente; quarto, o movimento todo no presente que engloba a imagem-movimento que produz movimento semiótico através do mnemosigno. Como tal, os vários movimentos de memória produzem regiões horizontais de associação como redes planares trianguladas de relação que estão concretamente interligadas verticalmente no tempo. Desta forma, o passado é conservado como camadas de presente, como cartografias de consistência funcional que orientam a cognição. A consistência está entre camadas de presentes, em que qualquer determinação como movimento imagético efetuado num plano constituído é consistente e na hora do momento. Por estas razões, Deleuze afirma que o presente é preservado e conservado como camadas de passado, mas nunca é destruído (DELEUZE, Cours du 14/12/82). É por isso que ele se refere ao passado como um conservatório, um repositório ou arquivo de um presente associado a si mesmo, em que cada camada está esperando para ser (re)ativada no presente. Se Foucault é um arquivista, não é porque ele protege documentos antigos, mas porque, através de suas reconstituições documentais do passado, ele reconstrói o passado histórico como movimentos de palavras e imagens no passado, ele reconstrói o passado histórico como movimentos de palavras e imagens no presente como verdade operacional. Assim, é através da verdade como operatividade funcional que a imagem do tempo funciona — não o tempo, mas a imagem do tempo.

Em termos dos experimentos de Yarbus, precisamos nos lembrar de que o experimentador soviético diferenciava entre os exames não-condicionados e condicionados da pintura de Repin. O exame livre não-condicionado impôs ao espectador o desafio de encontrar uma solução para a proposta da pintura, seja ela qual for; enquanto que a visualização condicionada ou tarefa procurava encontrar uma resposta particular para

uma questão ou problema específico. No entanto, por mais que tenhamos a ideia da objetividade, quando o observador se enfrenta com a pintura, ela já possui uma disposição interpretativa pronta, na qual os elementos da pintura já são conhecidos. O espectador sabe o que é um sapato, um chapéu e o um casaco. Não há necessidade de explicar a função de uma porta, ou o conceito da sala ou a ideia de crianças.

Mesmo que todos os espectadores sejam apresentados ao mesmo objeto proposicional, suas tecnologias de interpretação serão diferentes — pois cada indivíduo entenderá diferentemente o que é um sapato, qual é a função de um casaco e como ocupar um quarto, e dessa forma terminará com uma interpretação significativamente diferente. E se todos eles interpretarem os objetos de maneira diferente, a cartografia relacional que eles propõem individualmente provavelmente será diferente para cada espectador — talvez as interpretações possam não ser excessivamente divergentes, pois se os espectadores vêm de uma proveniência cultural homogênea, suas referências poderão ser muito semelhantes e, portanto, suas interpretações também serão muito semelhantes, da mesma forma que a linguagem e as palavras servem como repositórios do pensamento social (BERGSON, 2006) e permitem a comunicação.

Além disso, a interpretação imagética tem duas caras, no sentido de que de um lado queremos entender o que a pintura significa como objeto semiológico, um significante que veicula um certo significado, conclusão própria e também queremos entendê-lo como um circuito semiótico repetido em sua própria conclusão. Ambos os modos dependem do movimento ocular — na imagem-movimento — para alcançar suas próprias interpretações conclusivas: um modo de interpretação nos permite compreender a pintura como uma série sequencial de movimentos fornecedores da descrição do objeto e o outro como um modo que verifica a repetição dessa mesma cognição como uma série sequencial de movimentos. Esta é uma ideia idílica, pois nunca nos encontraremos com o mesmo objeto duas vezes: eu posso ter sentado e olhado para *As Meninas* de Velázquez (1656) por uma semana em 1998 e chegar a um profundo entendimento dessa pintura, mas vinte anos depois eu posso ter uma abordagem um tanto diferente, que depõe e deslegitima a compreensão do meu próprio passado, que se reflete no presente, mas que, infelizmente, não mais concorda com ele.

O exame exploratório livre da pintura de Repin procurará encontrar um padrão ou diagrama que satisfaça a cognição como um sistema fechado de signos (*representamens*)

que, de algum modo, acabará fazendo sentido lógico. A lógica aqui não é uma lógica formal, mas de um fluxo de função de signo no qual um *representamen* começará uma concatenação de signos, onde o último da cadeia indicará movimento ao primeiro *representamen*. O movimento completo constitui um conceito e o circuito fechado, como um todo, é entendido como um movimento de pensamento. Precisamos ressaltar que o movimento de um *representamen* para o próximo é (possivelmente) indeterminável, mas, mesmo assim, a inteligência interna da mente assegura a lógica por trás do movimento como uma faculdade que informa a orientação oculta, mesmo sendo desconhecida para nós ou incognoscível. Esse fechamento conclusivo do próprio círculo de determinação constitui um fechamento semiótico dentro de um sistema semiótico e vemos isso prontamente nos experimentos de Yarbus.<sup>286</sup>

Os diagramas de movimento ocular produzidos por Yarbus mostram que, quando um sujeito de teste engaja a pintura de Repin, o movimento dos olhos mostra que estão buscando uma solução para um problema, talvez um problema não declarado ou um que seja tão simples como captar o que está acontecendo, e uma vez que eles captam, os olhos parecem cair num padrão de repetição. O engajamento inicial com a pintura é, ao mesmo tempo, caótico e inconclusivo e exigirá um certo número de movimentos oculares aberrantes imoderados na tela, até obter a concordância dos movimentos e constituir uma determinação. Uma vez que um circuito fechado é estabelecido como a determinação da tela, os olhos repetidamente examinam e (re)visualizam a pintura segundo esse mesmo padrão, o que já afirmamos, conforme um padrão de afirmação e ratificação. No entanto, em termos da teoria da memória, a repetição desse padrão é o estabelecimento de um circuito de memória que corta o sulco guiando a determinação que permitirá ao observador constatar a cognição no futuro. Essa repetição da cognição estabelece, assim, o protocolo cognitivo ou a inteligência inata permitindo e (re)conhecer o evento e seus elementos e entender o que está acontecendo. A determinação original estabelece a relação entre os vários termos como um todo e depois reitera a repetição a fim de memorizar o agenciamento relacional como a impressão aprofundada de um agenciamento de movimentos de um diagrama arquivístico de sacadas e fixações oculares como a explicação desse evento. A verdade desse evento como agenciamento relacional reside no

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<sup>286</sup> Somos tentados a dizer o mesmo sobre nosso modelo de raiva, mas ele não foi empiricamente determinado como os diagramas de Yarbus.



conglomerado perceptivo dos participantes, o espaço e seus movimentos como uma entidade maquínica.

Em termos deleuzianos, uma cena ou objeto é conhecido em termos de uma “região” na qual tudo está associado. Nos experimentos de Yarus com a pintura de Repin, a região é a pintura e nossas determinações são baseadas nas relações entre os elementos dessa pintura. Nossa vida é igualmente arquivada. Nossa existência é predicada em termos de regiões superpostas, de planos estratificados de consistência operacional, em que os elementos estão triangulados numa rede associativa, numa rede relacional, horizontal e vertical. A imagem-lembrança nos informa que tudo o que se conhece como relação tem uma posição que é localizável em relação ao tempo: todos os conceitos determinados no passado, toda a nossa experiência "capturada" e integrada ao nosso desdobramento são relativizados uns aos outros e constituem camadas de passado em camadas que são associadas e concretizadas com tudo no universo. Assim sendo, nossas vidas são organizadas como regiões de consistência em camadas, onde as camadas se comunicam entre si através da relação concreta dos constituintes como extensão co-temporal e duracional. O que produz a consistência de um estrato ou região é sua coerência operativa como verdade que funciona como um agenciamento maquínico. Uma rede associativa produzida em torno de um objeto, como uma Madeleine mergulhada em um chá aromatizado com óleo essencial de bergamota, é um agenciamento maquínico cujo funcionamento operacional é a verdade que sustenta a coerência operacional de uma região e procura estender as ligações além do horizonte. Esses agenciamentos maquínicos são maquínicos porque são tecnologias produtivas tanto no sentido heideggeriano de funções de revelação quanto no sentido simondoniano de objetos técnicos como geradores de *technē*. As regiões como redes relacionais são rizomáticas na medida em que os termos em relação e os elos que os ligam não são de natureza homogênea. Deste modo, Proust pode (re)produzir uma região memorável que pode ser autossustentável como movimento imagético. Como tal, é uma imagem-(re)coleção no sentido de que a região memorial é reconstituída através da re-coleção daquilo que está contido dentro daquela região de coerência memorial. Estes agenciamentos maquínicos não servem apenas ao propósito de conhecer as coisas no mundo, eles servem de modos epistêmicos do encontro, como metodologias pessoais de engajamento do mundo. Essas metodologias como agenciamentos maquínicos podem ser

chamadas de volta, (re)colocadas (*recalled*) em serviço, para agilizar a cognição, a validação e a criação do movimento de conexão.

Uma “Região” estabelece a rede triangulada na qual uma resposta ou solução surgirá para o problema em questão. Se uma região como uma seleção ou um enquadramento puder ser obtida, ela será inerentemente funcional de alguma maneira: uma região sempre obtém uma resposta correta porque é funcional e coerente em sua operatividade. O que nem sempre sabemos é qual o sentido em que é funcional. A região sempre oferece uma resposta correta para a questão que foi formulada: se a resposta recebida ao problema não está de acordo com nossas expectativas, é que o problema está formulado erroneamente ou a questão está inadequadamente colocada do nosso ponto de vista — a questão não é a resposta, é a questão que está errada. As regiões associadas são o que são, com ou sem razão; elas são associadas como elas foram criadas quando elas foram criadas, dado com o que estava a mão na criação das mesmas.

Pelo que vimos anteriormente, a lógica que emergiu de uma série de observações reveladas pelo padrão do movimento ocular dependia do problema dado ao observador. Um espectador que confrontasse uma imagem pictórica complexa, a pintura de Repin, por exemplo, estudava a imagem, os olhos se movendo de um lugar para outro na tentativa de "captá-la" — o que pode significar "captá-la" em termos do que a pintura poderia significar. O espectador não está entrando em relação com a pintura "puramente", inocentemente, já que ele tem uma predisposição pessoal para engajar a novidade. Ele já tem sua própria metodologia privada, pois sabe como agir no mundo, podendo ser uma abordagem sistemática ou uma errância nômade, com a qual ele pode figurar a imagem-mundo. Não usamos aqui a palavra “figurar” livremente, mas no sentido de figura numérica, de comparação numérica, e também de dar-se conta dela, da *ratio* numérica de racionalidade que permite harmonizar a novidade com o passado, com o passado da experiência memorial como critério para a experiência atual. E é através desta imagem do passado, como um Todo, e através de suas partes, que é possível a aproximação de uma nova situação. Esse encontro com a novidade não é um método protocolizado, mas um modo, uma modificação, do encontro que modifica o que já passou, modifica o presente e modifica o futuro através de seu condicionamento como reformulação da proposta, do problema que vem.

No entanto, as demonstrações de Yarbus nos mostram que, inicialmente, se produz uma perambulação ocular nômade sob a cena complexa até que uma determinação seja

feita, e que uma vez que a determinação da significação seja fixa, uma vez que tenhamos determinado a verdade da pintura, o espectador tende a não re-problematizar o encontro, mas procura repetir os resultados e afirmar a funcionalidade maquínica da determinação. Uma fixidez ao padrão de investigação ocular instila-se como a cognição do todo, como uma predisposição condicionada da experiência através da categorização do encontro. O encontro muda de uma observação ativa, inspeção e exame para a afirmação passiva, verificação e corroboração — muda-se de uma atitude "olhar-para-buscar" para uma "olhar-para-obter", que é repetida. O espectador desloca a atenção do clínico para o crítico. A atenção como expressiva do caráter da relação oferece-nos vários aspectos: tocar, bater na inclinação, averiguar, condenar, manchar, provar e infeccionar. Parece implicar a atenção expressa no afetivo do sintoma como vigoroso ou impressionante no encontro e que permite o julgamento do testemunho com a convicção de uma verdadeira determinação. Deste modo, podemos discernir uma variedade de movimentos ocorrendo: há um movimento de procissão ocular, uma procissão cognitiva e, em seguida, uma (re) cognição daquilo que está à mão.

Como vimos anteriormente em nossa apresentação de raiva e no exame das placas de Yabus que demonstraram o movimento ocular, foi possível ver um diagrama criado como uma representação da imagem-movimento. Vimos a mente guiar o corpo através de uma série de movimentos, uma série que se tornou um todo, uma determinação, uma cognição que se repetia. No caso da raiva, apresentamos uma composição artificial dessas características expressivas, os atributos ou qualidades, que juntos compõem o que entendemos como raiva. Uma vez compreendido o diagrama da raiva, repetimos essa cognição como uma determinação de "um estado de ser" e repetimos essa cognição até que uma variação no padrão exija que (re)examinemos nosso julgamento. Como tal, não interpretaríamos os elementos individuais, os *representamens*, como a determinação completa em termos de uma descrição linear, mas agregamos a série de *representamens* como uma intensificação da significação. De modo que, em nosso exemplo de Raiva, se temos onze *representamens* (cf. Imagem 3.15) como a composição de Raiva, diríamos que nosso conceito, nosso agarramento ou compreensão, dos onze *representamens* é a listagem

da série que é uma soma<sup>287</sup> que pode ser representada como  $R_1 + R_2 + R_3 + R_4 + R_5 + R_6 + R_7 + R_8 + R_9 + R_{10} + R_{11} = \text{Raiva}$ . Mas os níveis de montagem implicariam que a procissão da composição da Raiva como um sistema fechado de significação, a determinação daquilo que é considerado a expressão da Raiva, é um movimento de intensificação aglutinante como uma circulação entre os três níveis de composição: “a determinação dos sistemas fechados, a do movimento que se estabelece entre as partes do sistema e a do todo cambiante que se exprime no movimento” (DELEUZE, 1985, p. 44). O movimento seria mais adequadamente expresso como uma intensificação progressiva:

$R_1$	Representamen 1
$R_1 + R_2 = IM_1$	$R_1$ mais $R_2$ da Montagem Intermediária 1
$IM_1 + R_3 = IM_2$	Montagem Intermediária1 + $R_3$ da Montagem Intermediária 2
$IM_2 + R_4 = IM_3$	
[...]	
$IM_9 + R_{11} = C_1$	Montagem do todo como conceito de raiva

O que isto diz é que a mudança está acontecendo: na mudança de  $R_1$  para  $R_2$ ; na compreensão do início da nova mudança,  $IM_1$ ; e na mudança geral ocorrida no movimento que o Conceito cria como a conclusão da série, a efetuação do arco do movimento.




Figura 3.17: Movimento de A para B com paradas intermediárias  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon$

Se fôssemos explicar isso em termos de um movimento do ponto A para o ponto B — uma distância formada por segmentos identificados pelos seus pontos de terminação,  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon$  — o primeiro movimento acontece a partir de pt. A a  $\alpha$ , onde paramos e consolidamos a distância percorrida. Agora, a nova viagem será a distância total AB menos a distância A  $\alpha$ . Nós agora viajamos para  $\beta$  de  $\alpha$  e consolidamos essa distância. A nova viagem será AB menos A  $\beta$ ; etc. Cada partida subsequente será qualitativamente diferente em termos de

<sup>287</sup> Apontamos que a palavra *soma*, pode significar uma totalidade numérica, uma soma, e também uma suma, uma reunião de coisas ou de partes que formam um todo, uma totalidade, mas também corpo.

origem e destino. Também podemos entender isso como uma viagem do Rio de Janeiro a Hong Kong, onde esse movimento como um vôo direto é qualitativamente diferente de um envolvendo duas paradas, digamos uma em Londres e uma segunda em Dubai. Cada parada muda qualitativamente a experiência da translação de Rio para HK, em termos do espaço coberto, da cobertura e do movimento do todo. Este é o primeiro comentário sobre Bergson.

Dessa maneira, se  $R_1 + R_2$  representa um esquema sensório-motor de um *representamen* que rende um interpretante/um novo *representamen* como um sentimento<sup>288</sup>, a mudança representa um movimento de uma imagem-percepção para uma imagem-movimento através da imagem-afeto, como um agente de abstração em que a consolidação é a abstração produtora do movimento temporal como duração. Há ainda uma dependência do cinematógrafo bergsoniano para a produção de continuidade, mas a continuidade acontece sob termos diferentes. Assim,  $IM_1 + R_3 = IM_2$  como produto parcial é de um tipo diferente da soma simples de  $R_1 + R_2 + R_3$  como aquilo que constitui o movimento. Similarmente, no nosso exemplo de Raiva,  $IM_9 + R_{11} = C_1$  como a Raiva é de uma natureza diferente que  $R_1 + R_2 + R_3 + R_4 + R_5 + R_6 + R_7 + R_8 + R_9 + R_{10} + R_{11} = Raiva$ . Assim, vemos que a descrição, a constituição do conceito como adição simples de suas qualidades componentes é inadequada para explicar o movimento. No entanto, ambos os modos são necessários para completar a imagem da Raiva. Precisamos da descrição, uma lista de atributos e também precisamos dela expressa em termos processuais como o resultado incremental, uma intensificação progressiva da determinação da função semiótica. A determinação conclui no mesmo ponto, mas para a primeira, ela precisa ser fechada — o circuito deve se fechar sob si mesmo como uma determinação conceitual, mas para o segundo, em termos de imagem, ele permanece aberto como uma espiral ou uma mola — ela deve saltar para a reação como produção de movimento, diferença e mudança no mundo: o traçado experiencial do circuito de um modo leva à determinação de um julgamento conceitual e, no outro, leva a uma reação contrativa.

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<sup>288</sup> No sentido que da Whitehead a esse conceito. Veja pagina 162.




Figura 3.18: O Cone da Memória de Bergson

Se considerarmos mais uma vez o experimento de Yarbus com o exame livre da pintura de Repin da Figura 3.6, vemos que o espectador tenta diferentes abordagens para descobrir o significado da pintura, cada uma produzindo um padrão diferente de engajamento. O espectador está procurando pelo circuito experiencial, ou diagrama, que fornecerá uma leitura coerente como uma explicação lógica, uma lógica de desdobramento de uma narrativa sequencial, que identifica o movimento maquínico dentro do que aparece diante dele. O que o espectador está procurando é o movimento coerente dentro da pintura que demonstra o mecanismo que é operativo como a produção de mudança. Como acontece com qualquer narrativa, o espectador procura saber o que é a dinâmica da mudança, porque é isso que indica a passagem em termos de tempo. Observe que não estamos procurando uma listagem dos atratores ou pontos de interesse que chamam nossa atenção e delimitam a agregação ou conjunto de seleção como aquele que define o significado do conceito, mas uma sequência de signos em que a concatenação serial de representamen para o interpretante/representamen eventualmente nos leva de volta ao inicial como um circuito fechado e repetitivo. A determinação não é tempo, mas uma imagem-tempo. É uma (re)apresentação de movimento, um fac-símile que identifica,

demonstra e indica como o tempo passa. Nesse caso, o movimento na pintura não é tempo, mas uma (re)produção da procriação. No mundo, o tempo passa como a imbricação coerente da interatividade semiótica recíproca de tudo no universo. Esse funcionamento obtém, em todos os lugares e em todas as escalas, uma passagem processual identificada como mudança, diferença no fazer (*difference-in-the-making*), diferenciação. O que precisa ser determinado é o mecanismo responsável pela mudança não apenas em seus termos mais primitivos ou gerais, mas também como ela consegue fazê-lo dentro do mundo que a montagem maquínica implica.

Se tomarmos as diferentes abordagens que emergem do exame livre dentro do tempo designado e as sobreusermos como uma imagem, vemos um diagrama caótico que não tem começo nem fim, nenhuma coerência, nenhum padrão repetitivo determinado. Com o traço experiencial do engajamento, ele pode nos dizer muito sobre as diferentes maneiras pelas quais a pintura pode ser abordada, pensada ou interpretada, mas não uma leitura específica que a explica como uma totalidade — antes de poder significar várias coisas, precisa significar alguma adequadamente. No encontro inicial, o espectador produz um diagrama caótico que não produz qualquer explicação coerente ou adequada da pintura. Vamos supor que o espectador “descobre” um caminho que produz uma explicação coerente. Cada signo impulsiona a “leitura” de um signo para o outro, de modo que um circuito fechado, repetível, reconhecível e reproduzível possa ser obtido. O diagrama assim produzido identifica o mecanismo específico responsável pela produção da mudança. O diagrama assim criado é o “menor circuito, que funciona como limite interior de todos os outros” (DELEUZE, 1990, p. 87). Este circuito fechado demonstra ou expressa a diferenciação e a diferenciação pelas quais é responsável tal como um movimento de pensamento, uma duração, uma mônada.

Este menor circuito e mais sucinto, que identifica o movimento e o articula completamente, é a semente de um cristal do tempo e, a partir dele, um mundo pode ser produzido. O movimento aqui isolado e expresso, quando articulado em sua forma mais primitiva e geral, é uma noção comum. O movimento é indivisível e homogêneo, mesmo que seus elementos constitutivos ou sua agregação não o sejam. A determinação da pintura produz um plano de consistência através do qual corre o movimento interpretativo da determinação. Se, em vez de uma pintura, estivéssemos lidando com um evento da “vida real”, o plano de determinação como um plano de funcionalidade operativa criaria um plano

no cone de tempo de Bergson (Figura 3.18). E o movimento que o agenciamento obtém estaria associado ao cone com as várias outras ocorrências dessa determinação como uma concretude que se estende ao longo do tempo, formas de associações de planos transversais.

A determinação de um objeto ou cena-como-objeto é apenas completa ou concluída, uma vez que uma série de signos-movimentos produz um circuito fechado em si mesmo. Se podemos contar com um *representamen* específico em um determinado ambiente para produzir consistentemente o mesmo movimento, a mente tentará estabelecer um circuito diagramático que integrará os atratores salientes dentro de uma cena — os *representamens* — em uma cadeia/ciclo fechado de processo imagético como criação de significação, onde um signo (*representamen*) aponta o caminho para o outro, e assim por diante, etc, até que um circuito de significação se feche sobre si mesmo como um circuito repetitivo, como o *orthos logos*<sup>289</sup> da determinação. Alguns dos componentes imagéticos podem existir em diferentes estratos memoriais e, portanto, a determinação conceitual pode exigir alguma translação de um estrato a outro, a fim de fornecer o caminho determinativo correto para a imagem de movimento ou a função-signo necessária para uma determinação específica. Então, digamos, por exemplo, que estou trabalhando no conceito do Atributo. Eu sei que as noções que constituem o pensamento do Atributo requerem uma concepção de Característica, de Propriedade, de Predicados. Digamos que minha concepção da Característica surge em 1998 como parte de uma investigação sobre tipologia; o da Propriedade advém em 2005 de uma tradução de um texto do francês que tratava extensivamente da teoria da classificação; a de Predicados em 2013 numa pesquisa sobre causalidade em Aristóteles. Podemos localizar esses conceitos temporalmente na imagem do Cone da Memória de Bergson (Figura 3.18) da seguinte forma: o conceito de Predicados (2013) vive no plano A'' B'', Propriedade (2005) no plano A'B' e finalmente Característica (1998) encontra-se no plano AB, mais distante do ponto S e do plano de memória do presente (2018). Assim, a Imagem-Percepção dessa determinação particular conduz a determinação para o limiar do centro de indeterminação, onde ela está em algum ponto no “caminho” da determinação onde é “impulsado para cima” pela associação na tentativa da mente de constituir um circuito coerente. O caminho da determinação no circuito nascente

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<sup>289</sup> Segundo Aristóteles, o *orthos logos* determina o que é certo a fazer numa determinada ocasião.



atinge o conceito de Predicado em 2018, mas se move para cima ao nível A”B” a fim de efetuar a determinação no presente como habitando o passado onde o conceito foi formulado. Uma vez completado seu circuito de determinação no nível A”B”, ele volta para 2018 e continua em seu caminho alegre até um nó requerer outro salto para cima até Característica e um “passeio” através da determinação desse conceito dentro de um sistema de ligações criadas em 1998. Dessa maneira, a determinação se encontra através de uma série de operações que são sequenciais em um plano de presente que envolve o passado como imagens memoriais participantes da imagem de movimento geral da determinação.

Como Deleuze indica em *A Imagem-Tempo*, a imagem-lembrança é tanto a reprodução quanto a representação de um presente passado no presente real. Todo o passado é um passado de um presente que uma vez foi... todo o passado é passado em relação a um presente atual... "O passado não se confunde com a existência mental das imagens-lembrança que o atualizam em nós" (DELEUZE, 1990, p. 121): as representações não são o tempo mesmo. Esses cortes transversais reconhecem o visto e o que é visto como uma seleção, um enquadramento, um fotograma ou seção transversal no tempo, uma representação estática constitutiva de um conjunto funcional, do mesmo modo como os quadros de filme são fotogramas estáticos do mundo do movimento contínuo. A informação pictórica contida no enquadramento é coerente, na medida em que o seu conteúdo é organizado temporalmente como parte de uma sequência de fotogramas, mas em virtude de ser um corte transversal de um ponto de vista em que o mundo encontra a sua unidade, a imagem é cheia de ordem na medida que é subjugada ao rigor imagético que a perspectiva lhe dá desde um ponto.

O cone, e particularmente seu ápice, representa um ponto de vista que espacializa as relações entre as coisas no mundo em conformidade com a forma como as vemos em termos coincidentes com nosso aparato sensorial. Mas também estabelece uma relatividade temporal entre os eventos que ela organiza espacialmente. A perspectiva mantém a sua sequencialidade ordinal própria em termos de distância, muito semelhante à contemplação do cosmos que nos oferece uma perspectiva do universo como uma concrecência relativizada. Isto é muito importante, porque esta relatividade perspectivada estabelece o passado como um dado imutável — pode ser interpretado infinitamente, mas o passado é uma verdade fractal reticulada que organiza o fato em termos de profundidade temporal e planos transversais como simultaneidades relativizadas. Assim, a visão como processo

imagético organiza nossa experiência do mundo como uma ordem processual que triangula nossa cognição do mundo em corpos extensos imbuídos de temporalidade como duração expressa em distância. O cone da memória é justaposto de ponta a ponta ao cone visual de perspectiva, onde ambos estão integrados na mente, no centro da indeterminação como aquilo que vemos no mundo e aquilo que a mente conhece: o cone da memória é também o cone perspectivo do ponto de vista. O que quer que esteja do lado de fora está simultaneamente no interior porque eles são um e o mesmo. Como veremos na seguinte seção, a geometria projetiva da perspectiva nos mostra que esses dois cones se estendem até o infinito e se juntam para criar um sistema projetivo contínuo onde o espaço e o tempo se unem.

O cristal do tempo não é apenas o menor circuito, é o circuito como montagem maquina que perpetua o funcionamento do circuito e amplia sua funcionalidade através da intermediação da extensão associativa e a concretude. Assim, o circuito é a semente a partir da qual uma realidade pode ser organizada e estruturada em seus termos como uma integração horizontal e vertical de acordo com uma continuidade duracional. O menor circuito, mais sucinto e determinante é indicativo de um modo singular de procissão temporal, torna-se icônico quando se trata de ser visto como um Todo indivisível. Esse movimento é o que a montagem como um agenciamento imagético produz. Esta produção de uma entidade significativa que não existe nas partes e é diferente na natureza da soma como um conjunto aditivo ou conjunto de propriedades extensivas cria um mundo virtual onde o pensamento acontece em termos que são comuns a tudo no mundo, mas não a este mundo.

O cone nos mostra que tudo acontece dentro do tempo, onde o tempo é a forma da interioridade, e o espaço, a forma da exterioridade. Nossa tarefa é entender o movimento do tempo não apenas numa entidade singular, numa "coisa" ou corpo de algum tipo, mas como o movimento que concretamente caracteriza tudo. Desta maneira, podemos identificar a forma do movimento em uma coisa como a expressão da essência temporal dessa coisa em termos de sua capacidade de assumir a mudança ou gerar transformação, conforme sua capacidade de afetar ou de ser afetada. Não obstante, a mudança não existe como um movimento isolado nessa "coisa", mas como uma multiplicidade relacional comum ao todo. O tempo é a expressão do maquinismo da mudança interpenetrada que liga todas as entidades no universo como a concretude que implica o todo. Na maneira que cada

elemento na pintura de Repin (Figura 3.5) dos experimentos de Yarus assume um papel diferente dependendo de como ele contribui semioticamente na produção específica de sentido que um problema requer dele, cada elemento é identificado como uma instância de fazer diferença de produção de mudança, como uma noção comum. Cada elemento, como um nó de concretude infinita, é necessário para o funcionamento do Todo, e para o seu conjunto como um agenciamento. Parece que estamos falando de “elementos” em termos de corpos físicos, mas o mesmo princípio é operativo na escala em que o físico fraciona-se na sua decomposição substancial elemental material. Se o movimento expressa a mudança e a diferenciação, o tempo é a expressão da agregação concreta da mudança como a reciprocidade relacional infinita de tudo no universo funcionando como Um.

### **Imagem e Meio**

A concepção da imagem de Simondon é semelhante à de Bergson e Deleuze, por terem componentes parecidos. Como Bergson, a ideia da imagem de Simondon é não-pictórica, não-visual e também se afasta de uma concepção estática antropocêntrica. A imagem é entendida como uma realidade processual transitória e intermediária entre indivíduos, individuações e meios existentes dentro de uma multiplicidade que Simondon chama tecnológica evolutiva. Entende-se como um processo cíclico transdutivo de 4 fases que inclui: a imagem-motor, a imagem-percepção, a imagem-mental e a imagem-invenção. Através dessas fases, pode-se modular a relação entre o humano, o não-humano e o meio, eliminando assim qualquer importância hierárquica polarizadora entre elementos constitutivos na gênese da imagem. Como acabamos de olhar na examinação da perspectiva, não percebemos as coisas em nossa mente, percebemos as coisas onde elas estão, no mundo. Dentro da abordagem imagética, a imagem não se restringe à percepção visual usual dos objetos, mas está diretamente relacionada aos sistemas de relacionamento dentro do meio — para a experiência mesma.




Figure 3.26: As quatro fases co-existent da conceição da imagem de Simondon.

A existência experiencial da humanidade, sua relação com o mundo, sempre foi tecnológica — o corpo sendo a primeira e última peça de tecnologia que teoriza o potencial humano. Tecnologias são agenciamentos que produzem modos híbridos de pensamento, de ser, de comunicar, de conduzir a existência como uma composição que compõe, com e ao longo do entendimento do encontro como híbrido, como rizomático. Ver nosso encontro com o mundo (que Heidegger entende de pensamento — vide, Heidegger *Que Significa Pensar?*) é uma das principais tarefas de Simondon como filósofo e professor de psicologia. Mas nosso interesse aqui não está na expansão das possibilidades da experiência humana ou do que um corpo humano pode fazer ou devir, ou nas tecnologias da existência sensorial, mas em completar a imagem de procissão das impressões visuais como origem e conclusão, como uma reconciliação das bases do cone do processo imagético. Com isso, nosso problema torna-se como harmonizar a dicotomia que separa a natureza humana e a natureza da natureza e integrá-las como uma natureza processual heterogênea, como um agenciamento maquínico que acomoda o devir monádico desenvolvido até agora e lhe dá licença para lidar com o resto da criação como a natureza da natureza.

Para Simondon, o devir é expresso em termos de individuação processual e de

individualização. Os dois processos trabalham lado a lado e representam a dinâmica vibracional subjetiva e objetiva do mundo. As coisas existem como uma diversidade polimórfica, evolutiva e temporal em uma relação interativa e co-condicionante entre a imagem de memória coexistente do passado, a imagem de percepção e a imagem motora do presente e a imagem de invenção do futuro. A imagem se produz e se revela através da interação dirigida e condicionada entre os participantes e o ambiente. Não são apenas produzidos por um sujeito, a imagem é o próprio processo de subjetivação dentro da associação integrativa do meio. A imagem produz e desenvolve o pólo subjetivo simultaneamente à medida que o objetivo está sendo criado como condicionamento da semiótica sensorial e permite que ele se manifeste como uma função imanente da criação, enquanto é relativamente independente dela. Conforme mostramos no início deste capítulo, vivemos em um mundo de imagens: eles nos habitam e criam nossos mundos; nos atualizam e virtualizam de acordo com diferentes realidades. Mas como o circuito fechado monádico da heterogeneidade subjetiva constitui a máquina como meio de existência?

Modelos tradicionais de percepção estão baseados numa cadeia causal mecânica que se origina no objeto e resulta em atividade cerebral na entidade subjetiva, ou seja, no espectador, e ao fim de uma serialização processual constituída de ondas, receptores e impulsos nervosos produz uma imagem mental. O fluxo de dados sensoriais é transformado pelo cérebro em uma representação imagética que o centro audiovisual em nossas cabeças reproduz para nós como consciência no teatro cartesiano da mente na glândula pineal. Em termos da experiência do mundo, seja, na relação que se estabelece entre o observador e o objeto, surge uma divisão entre o “Eu” unitário que processa e o “Outro” que é processado: o “Eu” conhecedor e o “Outro” conhecido — o “Eu” sujeito e o “Outro” objeto — que existem como entidades autônomas, estáticas e totalmente determinadas, onde os espectadores absorvem passivamente a experiência. De acordo com Whitehead: “Essa estrutura foi identificada com a relação nua entre conhecedor e conhecido. O sujeito é o conhecedor, o objeto é o conhecido. Assim, através dessa interpretação, a relação entre objeto-sujeito é a relação do conhecedor com o conhecido” (WHITEHEAD, 1933/1967, p. 175). Mesmo no modelo que estamos tentando desenvolver a fim de desfazer essa linearidade, é necessário que mantenhamos essa cadeia linear como critério para desfazê-la.

Como já temos feito, propomos uma cadeia causal perceptual relacional que fundamenta uma interpretação experiencial *maquinica* do processo interativo em que os

espectadores se tornam um com o mundo no meio experiencial do espaço-tempo como evento. Agora procuramos considerar o próprio meio experiencial como o ambiente que condiciona o devir da entidade subjetiva constituinte do evento e a localizamos na junção do local do encontro e da função de observador onde o virtual e o real coincidem e se tornam experiência pura. Fizemos alusão a isso várias vezes ao longo da tese, mas para fazer isso o que precisamos não é uma cadeia causal perceptual por assim dizer, mas um remapeamento do meio experiencial onde os espectadores se tornam um com o mundo experiencial dentro do qual eles estão imersos. Tamsin Lorraine afirma que o que está em jogo é uma consideração de “como as coisas conectam-se mais do que como elas são [...] de coisas como agenciamentos ou multiplicidades em vez de substâncias” e de “focalizar nas coisas em termos de forças que se desdobram — corpos e seus poderes de afetar e de ser afetados — ao invés de sua consideração como entidades estáticas” (LORRAINE in PARR, 2005, p. 145).

Invariavelmente, gostamos de ideias facilmente reconhecidas como conceitos — como "campo", por exemplo, a invés de conceitos como superfície, plano ou platô — porque temos uma compreensão intuitiva delas com base numa certa familiaridade fundeada na experiência sensorial. Podemos olhar para o campo de um fazendeiro ou para um campo de futebol e entendê-lo como uma extensão territorial e uma atividade que ocorre sobre ele. Imediatamente, vemos a óbvia cisão entre a superfície e o próprio acontecimento que parece se desenvolver sobre ela. Mas, se mudarmos a escala de nossa percepção, vemos que a superfície do acontecimento é um lugar mutável, mutante, de passagem, de síntese, e que é difícil separar os participantes da atividade que está acontecendo e que eles mesmos também são entidades em metamorfose. Já não falamos da atividade como diferenciada do campo nem da ocupação dos participantes. Não há mais uma distinção hierárquica de valor entre o agricultor, o arado, e os cultivos ou dos jogadores, a bola, e a grama: os consideramos igualmente como corpos participantes. Mais abstratamente, o desdobramento do evento incorpora participantes reais e virtuais. Envolve forças, intensidades e seus potenciais em um devir intuitivo, onde o evento é guiado por uma inteligência imanente que orienta o processo criativo e seu avanço para a novidade como invenção. O movimento dessas forças, intensidades e potenciais não adota uma linha de causalidade perfeitamente definível, mas é mais semelhante a um fluxo turbulento de energias, a um dar e receber infinitamente infinito e insolúvel, a uma multiplicidade de ação

e reação em frentes infinitas como processo imagético, cuja soma total manifesta uma direção resultante como devir.

Dessa forma, chegamos a compreender o campo como uma territorialização de forças e intensidades constitutivas de corpos subjetivos meta-estáveis em movimento e não de objetos — no entanto, esse campo de atividade não acontece como um desdobramento temporal no espaço, mas surge imanentemente associado no espaço-tempo: não é espaço mais tempo, mas espaço-tempo no qual não podemos diferenciar entre as 4 dimensões. O evento individualizado como um agenciamento emergente de territórios e corpos adquire e expressa seu próprio espaço-tempo dentro do qual os participantes se associam em termos de uma ecologia experiencial na qual estão envolvidos. Vemos isso nos diagramas de movimento ocular, não nos desenhos em papel, mas o movimento produzido por trás do movimento aparente que, em vez de expressar o desdobramento processual do evento como um campo, uma superfície plana, o consideramos “mais de uma superfície plana”, que não são nem os jogadores nem o campo de jogo individualmente, mas um conjunto interativo imagético que funde tempo, espaço, participantes e ambiente no que Simondon chamará um meio associado.

O conceito de meio associado, concebido pelo filósofo francês Gilbert Simondon em seu livro *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques* (SIMONDON, 1969), é um modelo útil para analisar as relações de co-surgimento ocorridas entre os participantes e o condicionamento. Territorialidades como ambiente. O termo descritivo “associado” quando aplicado para descrever o meio refere-se a um mapeamento específico de um conjunto constituído de elementos constitutivos e condicionantes de modalidades ambientais unidas para criar uma individuação através das trocas de energia em curso naquele meio específico (SIMONDON, 1969). Em francês, o termo *milieu*, meio não se refere apenas a um ambiente ou localização física, e significa "entorno", ou "meio" como na biologia, ou "meio", como no meio. O meio é normalmente entendido como o conjunto de condições externas dentro das quais um ser vivo vive e se desenvolve ou como o agrupamento dos objetos materiais e circunstâncias físicas que envolvem e influenciam a vida de um organismo. O “meio ambiente” também pode ser visto como um ambiente no sentido ecológico mais amplo do termo, ou seja, como o locus da interação dinâmica de todos os fatores e mecanismos que participam da sustentação de um ecossistema. Paraphrasing Brian Massumi (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1987), o termo meio deve ser lido como um termo técnico que combina todos

esses significados.

O conceito de meio associado é um modelo útil para analisar as relações causais recíprocas e recorrentes que ocorrem entre os participantes como corpos individualizados e processos de territorialização e desterritorialização expressa em termos de interatividade imagética. O termo descritivo "associado" quando aplicado para descrever o meio refere-se a um mapeamento específico de um conjunto constituído de elementos constitutivos e modalidades ambientais condicionantes que se juntam para criar uma individuação que será concretizada através das trocas de energia em curso acontecido dentro dessa interação específica que combina vários elementos em um agenciamento, um conjunto condicionador de relações. O meio associado sustenta, une e integra o atual e o virtual, o humano e o não-humano, o animado e o não-animado: "O meio é o cenário e o ambiente da concreção, da agregação, onde as coisas se condicionam para formar algo que, por sua vez, permite simultaneamente que essas mesmas coisas tomem forma. Em outras palavras, o meio permite uma forma dinâmica e não estática, um evento de tomada de imagens como experiência" (OLIVEIRA, PALAZUELOS, GALLI, 2017, s / p).

Um aspecto importante a ter em mente é que o meio não é uma imagem interativa única e homogênea. Embora o meio associado possa ser visto como um processo imagético subjetivo unitário, o meio é composto de uma multiplicidade de processos imagéticos subsidiários e superintendentes simultâneos em diferentes estágios de fases, tornando-se interativos entre si, imageticamente. O meio associado não é um faseamento imagético puro, singular e homogêneo, mas uma multiplicidade de fases co-temporais interativas.. Cada tipo de imagem é produtora de resultados específicos que servem como matéria prima imagética objetiva para a produção de novas imagens. Dependendo do que eles fazem e como eles se relacionam com o tipo de imagem que está sendo produzido, esses híbridos imagéticos intermediários vão por nomes diferentes: objetos, motricidade de excitação nervosa, signos, símbolos... E, como será visto mais adiante, estas imagens híbridas intermediárias são as dobradiças que permitem a transição de uma fase para a próxima — de um nível de animação informativa para a próxima.

O humano não é apenas um sujeito que atua no meio, mas o meio provoca e aviva o sujeito através do ser-fazer da ocupação e que, por sua vez, é modificada pela ocupação; o ambiente incita o corpo à ação enquanto o subjetivo está sendo simultaneamente, reciprocamente composto pelo meio — a associação do, através, com o ambiente é um co-



surgimento recíproco e interdependente — não é uma composição hilomórfica. Essas são as qualidades do meio, das intensidades das entidades que afetam e são afetadas pelos devires como ocupações localizadas. Conforme os modos de relação, de associação, de agenciamento entre as qualidades dos corpos e dos meios, são estados de ser, de consciência, que constituem o *continuum* do fluxo. O meio como constitutivo desse *continuum* de relação permite o condicionamento recíproco que é não-humano ou ainda não-ainda-humano, mas animado e cognitivamente diferente como expressivo de seu corpo e do que pode fazer através do que está fazendo em termos de um corpo não-humano, de um corpo produzido em diferentes formas em uma vida que se afirma através do meio pelo qual transita e das relações tecidas.

E como participante humano, como entraria o “eu” nessa relação experiencial no encontro com a vida como evento? Para responder a essas perguntas, em vez de preservar o “eu” como entidade, como uma identidade objetiva imutável, precisamos pensar em termos de atividades de relações. A palavra “eu” refere-se a uma reinvenção contínua do eu, à produção contínua de novas relações, igual as que criam novos modos e estados de relação não apenas uns com os outros, mas com as induções ambientais do evento dinamicamente (em movimento imagético recíproco) envolvendo uns aos outros. Embora estejamos nos referindo aos participantes humanos como entidades preconstituídas, esclarecemos que esse “eu” preconstituído em forma de participante do evento não existe por si — é como a garrafa de Klein, que se faz no momento, mas que não se construiu, não tem existência, porém tem duração. Em vez disso, o “eu” participante na sua experiência interativa com o mundo pode ser visto como a pluralidade dinâmica e indeterminada da reconstituição contínua das relações, uma individualização dentro dos campos concretizados da experiência. Essa pluralidade indeterminada de relações é considerada um corpo, não em termos de um corpo humano, nem em sua “materialidade simples, por seu espaço ocupante ('extensão'), ou pela estrutura orgânica. É definida pela relação de suas partes (relações de movimento relativo e repouso, velocidade e lentidão) e por suas ações e reações com respeito tanto a seu ambiente ou ambiente quanto a seu meio interno” (BAUGH, 2005, p. 31). E para todos os participantes no agenciamento, humanos e não humanos, podemos dizer a mesma coisa. Seja humano ou não, eles possuem a mesma relevância participativa democrática ao estabelecer o acontecimento como evento. Territorialidades arrastam, cativam e entram os corpos em relação, “aterrando” ou “precondicionando” a causalidade

recursiva recíproca das relações que estão estabelecendo o incipiente evento experiencial tomando posse como uma individuação, uma multiplicidade encorpada no nível das espécies. Torna-se um “sistema de individuações, um sistema de individuação e um sistema que se individualiza” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 7 Trad. do autor).<sup>290</sup> O evento torna-se um todo imanente, dinâmico e coerente, um corpo composto de uma multiplicidade de corpos condicionados à existência através de suas próprias características e por outros corpos adjacentes ou superiores que constituem as restrições capacitadoras, que inflexionam através de induções físicas e não físicas díspares através de seus efeitos e suas habilidades para entrar em relação. Assim, os participantes são ambientais, humanos, materiais ou afetivos: são físicos e não físicos, onde “Participação... é o fato de ser um elemento numa maior individuação...” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 9 Trad. do autor).<sup>291</sup>

Usualmente, o evento como uma ocasião significativa é definido como um acontecimento ocorrendo em um determinado local e num tempo definido, em que entrar num local designado e iniciar o evento no horário agendado serve como limiares, que devem ser “cruzados” para dar consistência ao vir-a-ser como a individuação do evento. No entanto, como vimos anteriormente na análise do filme *Berlim, Sinfonia de uma Grande Cidade*, não é apenas a abordagem para o lugar designado e o horário convindo que nos leva a realizar o evento incipiente. Da mesma forma que as induções experienciais guiam e informam a formação gradual do evento, as induções ambientais espaço-temporais gradualmente nos preparam para o que nos espera como limiar. Este passar através “instantâneo” do limiar que não leva em consideração a intensificação gradual do vir-a-ser do evento é parte da concepção do evento objetivado e da dualidade interior/exterior. Na melhor das hipóteses, pode-se dizer que ela representa ou significa a travessia daquilo que gradualmente condicionou e construiu o potencial relacional e sua expressão além — como no clichê gasto pelo tempo em que o noivo carrega a noiva pelo limiar. Um portão ou arco é mais descritivo, isto é, uma expressão mais rica, daquilo que constitui o cruzamento do limiar em termos do que pode ser esperado além do que muitas vezes ilustrado pelos “Portões de Chinatown” em Montreal, São Francisco, Incheon ou Manchester. Sua narratividade ornamental indica a transição gradual de um ambiente para o outro. Da

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<sup>290</sup> It becomes a “system of individuations, an individuating system and a system individuating itself” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 7).

<sup>291</sup> “Participation... is the fact of being an element in a greater individuation...” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 9).

mesma maneira, toda experiência é experiência liminar na medida em que passamos no agora, como uma reconciliação transitiva do passado e do futuro. A mudança em nossa consciência experiencial é a informação incessante da passagem transformadora do passado para o futuro, mediada pelo presente como transição, o presente é simultaneamente meio e mediação e um devir. Estando ligado ao passado e ao futuro, o presente incorpora a reconciliação da dupla relação assintótica com o passado e o futuro como duas polaridades opostas irreconciliáveis, o de deixar o que fui do passado e o de chegar ao que está por vir. Assim, o agora, como um presente que não tem extensão, nem duração, e por que está sendo continuamente desconjuntado simultaneamente do passado e do futuro, não tem existência nem ser — à medida que a diferença entre passado e presente chega a ser inexistente, ficamos com a expressão da tendência diferenciada do devir.

O processo de vir-a-ser requer que a concorrência agregária, a convergência espaço-temporal de territórios e corpos constitua tanto eventos subsidiários constitutivos quanto como oportunidades de integrar-se com eventos maiores. Na concepção deleuziana do evento como tal, o evento é mais do que apenas um acontecimento digno de nota, embora também funcione nesse sentido. O vir-a-ser do evento como a dinâmica de um devir-agenciamento de corpos e induções ambientais, sociais e intelectuais, temos de ter em mente que a equação não é uma soma simples, não é  $a + b + c + d =$  o evento como um, como já temos visto várias vezes de diferentes maneiras, mas onde a participação das variáveis na relação é o que as define dinamicamente, à medida que elas instigam simultaneamente seu próprio devir e criam uma individuação que é diferente e maior que a soma de suas partes — o evento é uma unidade que é mais de um, “mais que unidade e mais que identidade” (SIMONDON, 2009, p. 6 Trad. do autor).<sup>292</sup> No entanto, o evento como tal, como uma individualização, é um processo de limitação caracterizado como uma gradação (WHITEHEAD, 1985, p. 162). A gradação é uma intensificação relacional cujo peso, em termos de uma atualização palpável, só pode ser sentido como um limiar de intensidades. Conforme a intensificação gradual, percebemos que um limiar foi ultrapassado quando o sentimento é sentido, mas em termos do evento, uma vez que as territorialidades e os corpos realmente se engajam e se interpenetram, pode-se dizer que eles entram na participação relacional no evento como algo esmagador, além do limitar. Na interseção de

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<sup>292</sup> a process that “conserves within itself a permanent activity of perpetual individuation”

territorializações e corpos sobrepostos, os limiares devem ser cruzados para que a individualização possa ser considerada cumprida. Como Massumi afirma, em cada conjuntura, o limiar “interpõe-se entre duas diversidades, cuja descontinuidade marca uma mudança de intensidade acompanhada por uma mudança qualitativa nas propriedades definidoras do sistema”; o limiar é tanto espacial quanto temporal: marca “aquele momento em que o sistema dá o salto para a auto-solidariedade operativa” (MASSUMI, 2009, p. 12). E uma vez ultrapassado o limiar experiencial, em que os participantes entraram em relação e o acontecimento está em plena formação, “não devemos apenas falar de uma gênese do participante, mas de uma gênese do próprio participado, que dá conta do fato de que ele é participado” (DELEUZE, 2017, p. 117).

O evento como um amálgama emergente de territorialidades e corpos adquire e expressa seu próprio espaço-tempo dentro do qual os participantes se associam entre eles no meio experiencial que os envolve. O meio permite que aconteça uma causalidade relacional recíproca recursiva entre os elementos, para que possamos conceber o espaço-tempo como o plano imanente a partir do qual o sujeito e o objeto surgem como a atividade genérica de passar da objetividade dos dados para a subjetividade do sujeito. O meio associado é o cenário e o ambiente de sintonização agregativa, em que os participantes se condicionam mutuamente para formar algo que, por sua vez, permite simultaneamente a tomada de forma dessas mesmas coisas. Em outras palavras, o meio permite um vir-a-ser dinâmico, não-estático, como um evento de tomada de forma como experiência. De acordo com Deleuze e Guattari: “A noção de meio não é unitária: não é apenas o vivo que passa constantemente de um meio para outro, são os meios que passam um no outro, essencialmente comunicantes.” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 119).

A ocorrência do evento é um condicionamento de vir-a-ser, que é pré-disposto pela palavra-ordem ou rótulo aplicado ao evento, embora o evento seja até um ponto predefinido pelo rótulo, o evento em sua totalidade é não definível como os relatos constituintes não são totalmente cognoscíveis. Esse rótulo fornece tração causal e dá direção ao evento, embora sua forma, seu corpo seja apenas determinável no desdobramento do evento. Whitehead chama o processo ativo e relacional de cumprir o *telos* do rótulo de “satisfação” — “A ideia de 'satisfação' é a ideia de 'entidade como algo de concreto' abstraída do “processo de concrecência”; é o resultado separado do processo, [...] que é ambas as coisas, processo e resultado” (WHITEHEAD, 2010, p. 108). Embora, o

desdobramento processual do evento seja pré-condicionado pela satisfação como uma “atração”, seu desdobramento real é tudo menos determinado e seu resultado final será a expressão do evento. O rótulo que atribuímos ao evento e seu desdobramento não é apenas o nome do evento como uma entidade objetivada, mas serve como atrator ou semente — a isca pelo sentimento de Whitehead — “como a designação usada para a operação genética básica de passagem da objetividade dos dados para a subjetividade da entidade actual em causa” (WHITEHEAD, 2010, p. 62). O movimento em direção à satisfação permite condescence dentro do ambiente super-saturado do potencial relacional e resulta na “intensificação do 'mediação formal” (WHITEHEAD, 2010, p. 112). Essa super-saturação, essa super-concentração da agregação potencial na interseção de uma multiplicidade de territorialidades e corpos interpenetrados resulta no evento expresso como uma manifestação de excesso, do supérfluo da agregação da contenção da inclusão.

Para pensar o evento dessa maneira, como um agenciamento relacional emergente e interconectado, precisaríamos pensar seu envólucro extenso de maneira diferente, assim como seu processo de devir de maneira diferente: como seria um espaço-tempo imanente? Seria como a atual "realidade" quotidiana que vivemos agora, exceto que a maneira como falaríamos ontologicamente sobre ela seria diferente — nossa maneira de problematizar o encontro com o mundo seria outro. Precisaríamos que o aspecto “espacial” fosse auto-contido, de modo que não houvesse dualidade interior/exterior para a concepção da extensão; e o "tempo" precisaria ser predicado numa expressão incorporando o espaço, de modo que não falaríamos do espaço e do tempo em termos de dimensões independentes. Seria um espaço-tempo do qual não podemos falar em termos de objetos e sujeitos, mas de um imanente interdependente co-surgindo como um acontecimento heterogêneo, de modo que não há sujeito-eu aqui e um objeto-lá existente em termos de entidades autônomas e totalmente independentes, separadas do observador.

### **Concretização**

O meio atravessa os corpos, existindo simultaneamente dentro deles e fora deles, como o ar que se respira, ou a água que permeia nosso corpo, ou a terra que nos nutre e nutre. Pensar no meio é pensar em individuação, na produção do próprio indivíduo, em seus modos de funcionar e perceber e em suas conexões e relações preestabelecidas. Dessa

maneira, o meio é ativo e se define como fonte de energias, percepções e ações. Segundo Deleuze e Guatarri (1995, 1997), a noção de meio não é unitária: não só o vivo passa continuamente de um meio para outro; eles estão essencialmente se comunicando e (in)formando. E aqui deve ser enfatizado que os meios se comunicam não apenas no sentido de estarem conectados mecanicamente como formadores de matéria, mas no sentido de trocar informações através da dinâmica ação-reação, que é constitutiva da produção de imagens. E é no modo como a informação é comunicada que as diferentes modalidades do processo imagético são articuladas.

Simondon predicou o meio associado ao objeto técnico que, para ele, são mediadores entre a natureza e o homem. Ele define o objeto técnico como “um tipo de coerência que surge das propriedades conferidas aos componentes em ação pelo fato de que o problema é supostamente resolvido. Uma reciprocidade de ações causais e troca de informações engajadas ou desengajadas (explicitamente) entre o todo operativo e suas partes constituem o objeto técnico como uma realidade possuindo seu próprio modo de existência; invenção é o aspecto mental ou psicológico deste modo de existência” (SIMONDON, 2008, p. 84). Pode-se “definir o objeto técnico em si pelo processo de concretização e sobredeterminação funcional que confere sua consistência ao produto final de uma evolução, provando que não pode ser apenas um implemento ou utensílio puro” (SIMONDON, 1969, p. 15). Há uma gênese específica para o objeto técnico, que procede do abstrato para o concreto: é uma concretização — este é o caráter primordial de seu modo de existência — existe de uma certa maneira. Seu modo de existência é, portanto, em primeiro lugar, de ser mais ou menos abstrato ou menos concreto, de ser uma gênese para o mais concreto (CHATEAU, 2008, p. 79).

Como Brentari (2015) escreve, a relação concreta entre animal e ambiente é, em primeiro lugar, perceptiva. E esta é também uma relação material se seguirmos com o pensamento bergsoniano como exposto em *Matéria e Memória*. Embora tenhamos descrito a relação perceptiva como um *loop* que engloba os dois participantes da interatividade perceptual, essa troca relacional é concretizada junto com o restante dos elementos que constituem o ambiente ou meio. Além de ser uma expressão de solidez e atualidade, Simondon expressa concreto em oposição a abstrato em termos do modo de individuação das entidades e como elas se relacionam com as outras. Para Simondon, o concreto é um modo de existência em que um objeto cumpre diferentes funções ou propósitos operativos

e pode, simultaneamente, entreter relações de interdependência com numerosas outras que participam do meio associado no qual elas prosperam. O exemplo que ele oferece são as aletas de refrigeração nas cabeças dos cilindros de um motor de motocicleta. As aletas realizam diferentes tarefas, como resfriar o motor para torná-lo mais eficiente; para refrigerar o motor mais eficazmente aumenta-se a área da superfície a ser exposta ao ar; faz-se o motor mais leve; para fins estéticos. Cada função funciona coincidentemente, independentemente das outras, mas todas são concretizadas na aleta de resfriamento. Os mesmos objetivos poderiam ter sido atingidos "linearmente" ou como sistemas semi-independentes: um sistema interno arrefecido à água poderia ter sido proposto; uma parede cilíndrica mais espessa e mais pesada poderia ter sido projetada para endurecer as paredes; uma tinta especial resistente ao calor poderia ser aplicada para aumentar o efeito estético, etc. Cada aspecto de sua utilidade vincula as aletas a diferentes sistemas funcionais: o estrutural, o resfriamento, o estético, etc. Mas, mais significativamente, a função 'concreto' opera como uma cola que liga a realidade com a ponte relacional que une os participantes.

Assim sendo, no meio associado, a união que associa os elementos componentes é a concretude do relacional e o estabelecimento do laço perceptual. Esta é uma posição ontológica muito significativa, na medida em que a própria existência das coisas no mundo é predicada em termos de relação, em termos não-substanciais, como o surgimento interdependente, simultâneo e simultâneo de uma subjetividade ecologicamente unida que é aberta, amplamente conectado a muitos aspectos através de uma concretude que abrange diferentes sistemas ou ambientes. O outro aspecto do meio associado que o define é o esquema causal que dá origem a ele. Os elementos constituintes existem como associados relacionalmente uns aos outros através da mediação do meio associado como a zona de condicionamento que se permite tomar forma. Mas como individuações no mundo que têm uma duração tanto como indivíduo especiado quanto como entidade processual, em virtude de ser completo, unitário, perfeito em sua existência, é a expressão de uma noção comum que tem uma funcionalidade concretizada no mundo além de sua utilidade intensional. Esse é o aspecto pragmático da noção comum que encontra expressão não apenas através da essência de sua expressão identitária óbvia como indivíduo intencional, mas como uma existência multiplicada que pode ter elementos participantes de outros meios ou entidades duracionais.

Os participantes constitutivos como entidades monádicas têm componentes que podem participar de outros conjuntos sem deteriorar a concepção do primeiro meio. Não somos apenas uma coisa, mas uma multiplicidade que permite muitas ocupações de uma só vez. Assim, embora sendo um estudante universitário, simultaneamente, eu também posso participar de vários outros meios que envolvem algumas qualidades enquanto negligenciam outras. Eu posso ser um membro do clube de iate local, posso ser o dono de um VW Fusca e ser vegetariano sem mudar o essencial ou afetar as outras qualidades.

Da mesma forma que atratores em uma pintura podem significar coisas diferentes dependendo do que eles são chamados a constituir sem mudar sua natureza ou se afastar do agenciamento original, objetos na natureza podem ser conjurados para preencher diferentes papéis sem mudar o que eles são. Além disso, esses componentes constituintes que participam mecanicamente nestes agenciamentos de semiose não são obliterados ou destruídos, sua significância não é diminuída pela participação em outros agenciamentos. Isso é o que vimos nos diagramas de movimento dos olhos de Yarbus quando o encontro com *An Unexpected Visitor* de Repin foi problematizado de maneiras diferentes. Os mesmos atratores das fixações oculares eram capazes de articular diferentes significados: o lenço do homem podia ser usado para determinar seu *status* financeiro, a natureza de sua atividade, seu gosto estético, sua relação com os outros, sua idade... o lenço do homem concretizou-se no meio associado à pintura como experiência de várias maneiras sem que o lenço mudasse de maneira convincente. Para todos os efeitos, o cachecol permanece o mesmo, mas envolve a realidade de maneira diferente, dependendo de como nos pedem para relacioná-lo ao agenciamento, para engajar seu aspecto pragmático.

Desta forma, o encontro como uma proposição imagética é uma multiplicidade duracional de possibilidades heterogêneas. Nosso encontro com o mundo como processo imagético nos engolfa, nos submerge, nos arrasta em direção a participar do tornar-se imanente da experiência como um meio associado em que todos os componentes como entidades individuadoras se concretizam juntos, interagindo reciprocamente, enquanto triangulam relacionalmente sua incorporação comum, não como um para muitos, mas como tudo de uma vez. Ficamos na Times Square à noite e não somos mais um espectador no espetacular desdobramento diante de nós, mas um participante imerso em um imaginário imanente, que nos torna um pela experiência que flui através de nós como imediatos no devir.



## Capítulo 4

### Devir-criança como uma noção comum

Recordo-me bem do momento. Eu tinha ficado para trabalhar durante a noite em um sábado e quando finalmente decidi deixar o escritório era muito tarde da noite ou muito cedo da manhã... aquele momento que não é nem noite nem dia. Era tão indeterminado que era claramente determinado... seu caráter completamente inespecífico foi o que o destacou, precisamente nem aqui, nem ali. Quando saí do prédio e atravessei a rua em direção ao meu carro, fiquei surpreso com a tranquilidade. Tudo estava quieto e penumbral. Fiquei impressionado com o sentimento estranho superando minhas habilidades de discernimento. Lembrei-me de um artigo em uma revista popular de psicologia que apresentava 27 tipos de emoções e, enquanto eu passava a lista pela minha cabeça, não conseguia relacionar nenhuma delas com meu sentimento.. Talvez todas juntas em um mesmo instante.. Era como um perfume desconhecido, um aroma nunca antes experimentado, cujas notas individuais não conseguia identificar. A sensação tinha uma viscosidade, uma neblina fluida em câmera lenta, cuja modulação implicava que, talvez, uma emoção se intensificaria a ponto de colorir todo o evento, mas nenhuma elevou-se à ocasião. Não era tristeza, melancolia, depressão ou solidão, e não era felicidade, alegria ou liberdade. E não foi a sonolência ou o cansaço porque o frio do inverno canadense havia limpado todas as teias de aranha que não me deixavam trabalhar.

Fiquei tão impressionado com essa barragem de minimalismo afetivo que me apoiei no para-lamas dianteiro do carro e finalmente consegui perceber o nada chamando minha atenção com tanta clareza. Caso eu fosse um fumante, teria sido o momento de acender um cigarro. Apenas me apoiei no painel lateral do carro, nem sentado nem de pé, imaginando esse dilema afetivo em que me encontrava nesta terra de ninguém, nem aqui, nem ali, cuja qualidade mais presente era a ausência. Ausência de trânsito, de pessoas caminhando pelas calçadas, de carros, de caminhões de entrega, de mensageiros de bicicleta, de pedestres atravessando a rua, meio quarteirão, sem se incomodar em chegar à esquina. A ausência saliente de barulho permitiu-me ouvir outros ruídos que a cidade faz incessantemente, mas que passam despercebidos quando são afogados pelo barulho de tudo o que acontece na cidade e que agora fala outro idioma. Foram aqueles ruídos à distância que me permitiram perceber a ausência da comoção habitual. Eu escutei atentamente as exalações dos vários

compressores industriais que nunca ouço quando saio para um sanduíche no almoço durante a semana. Consigo discernir o ruído percussivo metálico de um trem de carga distante e o zumbido suave dos veículos na estrada elevada. Posso distinguir de vez em quando os estalos rítmicos dos relés nas caixas de controle de semáforos e posso ouvir o zumbido dos halogênios acima de nós. Há — um farfalhar suave à minha esquerda: um racum gordo atravessa a rua. Ao olhar, fico impressionado com a absoluta abertura da rua. Não é um *canyon* urbano em qualquer extensão da imaginação, nem a densidade populacional compacta e cheia de movimento de qualquer dia no meio da semana.

Enquanto refletia sobre essa inquietude vazia, perguntei a mim mesmo o que estava acontecendo com a minha vida ao ver-me sozinho, parado no carro, contemplando o zumbido dos ventiladores de sistemas de aquecimento no meio da noite; o ar frio queimando meus pulmões. Penso na negociação comercial e nas intermináveis interrupções intercaladas por reuniões intermináveis. Olá, terra de vácuo! A vida no escritório fornece o centro de inércia à minha existência como aquele que informa e estrutura para fora todos os outros aspectos do meu ser no mundo. Está quieto na rua. Ainda não é amanhecer. O brilho do sol ainda não se concretizou no horizonte. O asfalto assume os matizes dos semáforos no cruzamento da rua. Vermelho, laranja, verde; alaranjando, avermelhando, verdejando; alaranjandoavermelhandoverdejando. Tudo flui, tudo muda, mas enquanto o faz, perdura.

Na outra noite, enquanto estava assistindo ao filme de Antonioni, *La Notte* (1961), fui transportado para aquela época, no meio da noite, que me permitiu sentir de novo essa *kenopsia*<sup>293</sup>. Não viajei no tempo para o passado, mas fui submergido no desenrolar de um drama afetivo, de um movimento que estava surgindo, que me puxava cada vez mais fundo num cenário cuja finalidade eu não conhecia.

A *Kenopsia* é uma palavra inventada cujo significado é “a atmosfera sombria e desoladora de um lugar que geralmente está lotado de pessoas, mas agora está abandonado e quieto” (KOENIG, 2018 veja nota de rodapé 136). Descreve o discernimento da ausência, da falta, do vazio existencial. A história narrada r permite-nos ver como pode acontecer o devir. A história produz um evento que tem uma consistência experiencial não existente anteriormente, mas que agora é perceptível e exibe propriedades identificáveis: distingue

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<sup>293</sup> Kenopsia é uma palavra inventada concebida por John Koenig. Proximamente no *The Dictionary of Obscure Sorrows (Dicionário das tristezas obscuras)*.

<http://www.dictionaryofobscuresorrows.com/post/27720773573/kenopsia>

primeiro, e depois determina. A *Kenopsia* tem uma lógica de vir a ser um movimento intensivo, que tem duração, se encorpa à medida que o afetivo ganha sentido e adequação, e pode ser entendido em termos de tempo, bem como ser racionalizado. A narrativa do acontecimento produz uma máquina abstrata que fundamenta um processo perceptivo e as qualidades essenciais que nos permitem compô-lo, lembrá-lo e reconhecê-lo. A narrativa chama a atenção para os processos metafísicos da onto- e da morfo-gênese, além de proporcionar um conhecimento estético desses processos (ASKIN, 2016, p. 4). E com isso, trazer todos os problemas que um devir implica ao fazer-se discernível.

A *Kenopsia* é uma máquina discernida *ex post facto* na memória do evento experienciado, um dado. A maioria de nós não está suficientemente consciente de nossa existência no mundo, *mindful*, para sermos capazes de discernir o devir no momento presente. Podemos ser capazes de perceber isso como uma produção de diferença, mas exatamente o que é essa diferença somente é revelada no passado. Podemos perceber um sentimento emergente de diferença, mas se o evento no qual estamos participando é verdadeiramente novo, então não há nada no evento que podemos perceber como acontecimento, e assim o reconhecimento do evento é apenas efetuado como um pretérito. Entretanto, como nosso discernimento de *Kenopsia* demonstra, o espelho retrovisor do discernimento está em desacordo com o presencial do vivido no presente do experiencial imediato — a lógica do sentido do evento somente surge como uma lembrança ou uma reconstituição interpretativa para trás, que não é prontamente cognoscível no momento de sua produção.<sup>294</sup> O que contamos aqui é uma contabilidade dos ingredientes pré-constituídos que foram narrativamente tecidos para produzir um efeito específico, uma representação do devir através de um conjunto relacional de pré-dados que existem no mundo. O que gostaríamos de obter é o surgimento fundamental que antecede as entidades subjacentes preexistentes, das quais a pré-constituição de vários eventos surge para produzir a diferença da inovação. É uma iteração em série que, em última análise, leva ao diferencial como desaparecimento dos termos de relação e à expressão da relação pura em termos de mudança. Isso nos levaria à expressão do evento em termos de tempo por meio de entidades primitivas que funcionam como base subjacente do processo genérico — em

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<sup>294</sup> Quer experimentemos um momento de pico de imersão total e um esquecimento de si mesmo, ou um momento de tédio entorpecente em que o eu não se digna a participar, a constituição do evento ocorre depois de ter sido experimentada como uma retaguarda de experiência. Mindfulness traz à tona esta atenção prestada ao aqui e agora como presença. ¿ <º){{{{{><

ambos sentidos de genético e geral. Este processo genérico é o que constitui o Terceiro Nível de Conhecimento na *Ética* de Spinoza como um modo de descrever o avanço processual através de agenciamentos não específicos em direção a um sistema *plug-and-play* de entidades maquínicas que são os constituintes comuns de tudo no Universo.

De que maneira poderíamos ter apresentado isso como uma repetição e não uma lembrança? Pelo porte afetivo do evento, transformando-o num poema musical ou num movimento sinfônico impressionista. Se tomarmos *As Quatro Estações* (1723) de Vivaldi, a *Sexta Sinfonia* (1802–1808) de Beethoven, *Vltava* (1882) de Smetana, *Os Planetas* (1914–1916) de Holst, o *Música para aeroportos* (1978) de Brian Eno, ou *Breathing Room* (2005) de Hildegard Westerkamp (2005), como seria a *Kenopsia* como um exemplo de narrativa musical puramente afetivo? O reconhecimento da repetição do evento confirmaria o diferente, mas cada momento de sua repetição nos estimularia novamente a “deixar-se agitar por tudo que é passageiro e novo, o que sempre encanta a alma efeminada?”.<sup>295</sup> Não há melancolia ou nostalgia na repetição, uma vez que o movimento não é uma reminiscência de um passado — é sugestivo e expectante, um olhar frontal para o futuro. A repetição que buscamos é uma solicitação, um grito de guerra para um movimento de Alegria Espinosista e não uma acumulação daquilo que tem sido adquirido pelo medo da queda. Não é uma retenção do movimento, mas uma afirmação do avanço processual do Devir-Agora como poder criativo de "um movimento que viesse atingir diretamente a alma e que fosse o movimento da alma" (DELEUZE, 2000, p. 18).

## Devir

Devir é a atividade processual que revela como algo vem a ser, torna-se de alguma maneira, s transforma-se em outra coisa que não era antes e continua surgindo como outra coisa. Se alguém pode considerar a mudança como produtiva, o devir é o modo através do qual a mudança se concretiza: o devir exprime o ‘fazer’ da imanência como criação de diferença em outro. O devir (en)forma o processo tanto a uma coerência discernível que é uma multiplicidade intensiva e duracional: Devir é como a mudança se produz. A expressão incisiva nos tira imediatamente do mundo das coisas para o reino do processo, a

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<sup>295</sup> “Let oneself be stirred by everything that is fleeting and new, which ever newly delights the effeminate soul?”(KIERKEGAARD, 1946, p. 6).

inconstância da mudança e a obtenção do fato objetivo do movimento. O termo filosófico grego para o devir é Γένεσις (*genesis*) e se utiliza em referência aos corpos físicos, como os “significados de “nascer” e “começo do ser”. Estes estão entrelaçados nos textos pré-socráticos” (PETERS, 1967, p. 67), nos quais a gênese dos corpos perceptíveis sempre envolve uma separação, uma diferenciação como um *partum*. Mas a ênfase na articulação da gênese é a mudança e a diferenciação como individuação. Podemos ligar isso de volta a Heráclito<sup>296</sup> e sua ideia-chave de *panta rhei*, “tudo é fluxo”, em que ῥοή (*rhoē*) significa fluxo, corrente ou sucessão. Como Haxton aponta, parafraseando Heráclito, “as coisas mudam, todas as coisas fluem. O mundo é revelado apenas em olhares rápidos. Não pode haver completude” (HERACLITUS, 2001). Isso resume o que está em jogo aqui para nós em termos de processo imagético e um modo de pensamento que os filósofos têm rebaixado há 2.500 anos — começando com Parmênides, que negou tanto a mudança quanto a validade da percepção sensorial como conhecimento.

Mesmo s os conceitos de devir, mudança e diferença tendo sido perenemente desacreditados, como Whitehead observa, “a elucidação do significado envolvida na frase “todas as coisas fluem” é uma das principais tarefas da metafísica” (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 208). Ao definirmos o Devir como o modo de ser da transição, da intermediação, da passagem entre o ser e o não-ser, podemos sentir a que Heráclito estava se referindo: uma realidade em que tudo é mudança, movimento e transformação. E para Parmênides, que formulou a Lei da não-contradição, que afirma que uma coisa A não pode ser A e não-A ao mesmo tempo, negou a existência a tudo que muda — não há intermediários, as únicas coisas que existem realmente são as Ideias e estas existem porque são imutáveis. Mas aquilo que é só pode ser conhecido por aquilo que não é, e se aquilo que não é impede algo que é de ser tudo, então esse não-ser também deve ser alguma coisa, algum corpo que não é percebido nem conhecido.

Se “no que diz respeito à linguagem técnica da filosofia, *rhoē* nunca foi mais do que uma imagem impactante” (PETERS, 1967, p. 178), também é interessante apontar a conexão oculta com a memória. O uso da ideia da imagem impactante é ambíguo aqui, na medida em que podemos entendê-la em termos da impressão geradora do processo imagético

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<sup>296</sup> Peters (1967) observa que Heráclito e seus seguidores foram referidos como “flores” por conta de suas crenças na gênese e na *phthora*. Isso tem conotações interessantes em termos da filosofia, que eles professam, como o processo vindo a ser como uma intensificação duracional.

bergsoniano ou como uma tecnologia da memória. As imagens impactantes formaram uma técnica que ajudava os retóricos a lembrarem-se das coisas, em que fazendo fortes associações imagéticas — montagens chocantes, por assim dizer — o lugar de uma coisa na ordem da criação podia ser determinado por onde ela deixava sua marca impressionante.<sup>297</sup> No platô sobre o Devir, Deleuze e Guattari elaboram o conceito de Devir através de uma variedade de “lembranças” que, no final do platô, rejeitam e re-apresentam em termos de “devires”. Isso indicaria que o Devir nunca é o vir a ser duma entidade única e singular, mas somente uma parte de uma individuação de um “nada” que participa de um meio ou plano associado de consistência em torno de uma saliência ou intensificação. O texto original em francês tem lembranças como *souvenirs*, que em *A imagem-tempo* em inglês são traduzidas como *recollections* (re-coleção) e que nos fazem pensar em como esses devires são constituídos, sua posição dentro do agenciamento e seu papel no processo imagético — são recordações de coleções entidades díspares em uma consistência coerente? E o *souvenir*, traduzida literalmente como sub-vir, não seria outra coisa senão a ὑποκείμενον (*hypokeimenon*), o subjacente, (*hypo*, sob; *keimenon*, deitado), o substrato substancial, sobre o qual tudo é predicado como a manifestação do estado de ser, de Οὐσία (*ousia*), que por sua vez está ligada à Terra elementar. Esse agenciamento como uma montagem parece ser guiado por alguma subjetividade, alguma faculdade inteligente que dirige a (re)coleção, como um (re)traçado de circuitos memoriais que gerenciam o fluxo de potenciais. Essa subjetividade inteligente não está no indivíduo humano mesmo, mas no evento como o surgimento imanente do evento no qual o fluxo não ocorre singularmente no sujeito humano, mas no fato do vir a ser do acontecimento como composição fluxional. Gostamos de pensar que é o agenciamento físico que é determinante, mas é o resultado que é decisivo.

Deleuze e Guattari (1983, 1987) defendem a adoção voluntária da mudança e da diferença a fim de reinventar o pensamento como qualquer outra coisa que não seja o modelo proscrito do ser estático e da identidade. Para evitar as restrições à vida e as limitações à atualização do potencial, Deleuze e Guattari advogam uma existência baseada na mudança que desvaloriza o Ser a fim de valorizar tudo o que o ser não é, ou seja, o Devir — assim, adotando o não-ser, não escolhemos a morte ou a não-existência, mas uma

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<sup>297</sup> Colocar as coisas no meio de um fluxo dá à água elementar do Thales uma dimensão que talvez não tivesse.

existência crônica, indefinida, expressa através da invenção criativa ou a participação no mundo como uma temporalidade criativa que é expressa através do devir. A este respeito, não opomos ou contradizemos a morte, porém a um não-ser expresso como criação, diferença e mudança. Em virtude do devir, uma “coisa” não tem “ser”; devir-se dentro do fluxo, perdura como uma expressão indefinida, indeterminada e contingente através de seu Devir-Diferente sustento. E esse avanço criativo na novidade como diferença é marcado por uma ruptura com a constância, uma dissolução dos hábitos, um afastamento da rotina e uma recusa deliberada de participar da máquina alienante e exploradora do fascismo.<sup>298</sup> Tudo isso serve para derrubar os muros de contenção produzidos por estruturas identitárias institucionais e categorizações de hierarquia, de modo que a afirmação da vida se dê por meio da incessante invenção, um apelo constante ao exercício de nossas energias criativas e uma aplicação incessante da subjetividade. Ao redefinir a divisão entre ser e não-ser, Deleuze e Guattari pluralizam o não-ser como uma oposição ao Ser em termos que são opostos ao modelo paradigmático ideal da identidade como *Oneness* que Whitehead descreve como “a noção filosófica corrente de uma substância particular individualizada, no sentido aristotélico, que passa pelas aventuras da mudança, mantendo a sua forma substancial através da transição dos acidentes” (WHITEHEAD, 1990, p. 78).

O devir oferece uma divergência criativa da racionalidade para uma re-composição não arquivística em um nível molecular. Isso dissolve o arquivo e o leva a um devir-outro que mina a transformação molecular para se tornar qualquer coisa fora de uma ordem produtora de valor capitalista.<sup>299</sup> O que se torna operacional é um modo de existência que coloca tudo em questão e altera radicalmente o modo de se envolver com o mundo. O que era um empirismo confiável, um avanço direcionado pelo progresso em direção para um certo Τέλος (*telos*), torna-se um nomadismo tênue e contingente que não tem o desejo nem a inclinação para tornar a experiência certa, metódica ou necessária em sua experimentação. O movimento do Devir como um desdobramento criativo que nos leva a afastarmos do opressivo e repressivo trabalho disciplinar e permite a liberdade de continuar na vida focado no lúdico do mundo. O devir molar errante e não metódico da criança no mundo reflete o devir molecular nômade do mental como criativo, experimental e inventivo

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<sup>298</sup> Mas não o fascismo totalitário das ciências políticas. O fascismo do *fascio* do feixe em que qualquer traço distintivo ou diferença é subsumida à identidade do todo.

<sup>299</sup> Uma de suas distrações, como concepção filosófica, é não ter a síntese abrangendo o micro-fascismo do feixe da síntese.

do Devir-Criança em contraposição ao investidor aplicado e ao inventor especulativo nas suas abordagens interessadas. O Devir-Criança somente pode ser entendido em contraste com outros modos de Devir, como Devir-Intenso ou Devir-Animal, ou Devir-Mulher, que não são necessariamente modos mais fundamentais, primitivos ou gerais do devir, mas que expressam o devir de acordo com outras manifestações multifacetadas, como oposição ao Ser-Homem como Ideal. Devir é o motor que conduz a máquina; apenas o que ele dirige depende de qual aspecto de seu funcionamento, como criação de diferença e mudança.

O movimento do devir não é nem uma evolução que manifesta descendência nem filiação — não é uma entidade que muda e produz descendentes. É um corpo totalmente diferente e produzido, que tem propriedades distintas e compõe uma entidade completamente diferente: é um rizoma involutivo. Da mesma forma, um *verdadeiro* devir não está imitando ou agindo como uma identificação: não é agir como um animal, como uma mulher, ou como uma criança; ou ver-se no outro; nem é uma regressão ou progressão. “Devir não é certamente imitar, nem identificar-se; nem regredir-progredir; nem corresponder, instaurar relações correspondentes; nem produzir, produzir uma filiação, produzir por filiação” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 19). Para permitir a sua revelação, as formas materiais intermediárias do devir serão representadas de maneira que imitam, atuam, olham a identificar-se, etc. — elas não podem ser reduzidas a uma correspondência totêmica ou simbólica (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 31). Enfatizamos a palavra *verdade* porque qualquer devir é sempre mais do que a repetição da noção comum como seu cristal operacional primitivo. O real de uma Ideia é sempre considerado em termos de carência, de queda ou de diminuição, porque o real não pode esgotar o potencial da Ideia, a noção comum atualizada é sempre mais do que a repetição da noção primitiva. A noção comum pode ser a expressão mais clara, adequada e sucinta de um movimento, mas qualquer repetição incluirá a noção primitiva como núcleo e mais uma multiplicidade de complementos. O conceito comum como uma entidade independente identificável não pode existir por si só e sempre será um múltiplo mais que um.

Deleuze e Guattari teorizam o Devir através de uma variedade de modos de experiência que acompanham a passagem do processo. O modo mais alicerçador do devir é o que eles chamam de Devir-Animal, porém isso não é tanto sobre animais, mas sobre a animação primordial de corpos, sobre o movimento que surge da vida da substância elementar como sua natureza constitucional. Os antigos gregos consideravam os corpos



visíveis como a manifestação de forças invisíveis pelas quais o divino poderia vir a ser conhecido. “Quando uma criatura é escolhida, portanto, para simbolizar a mente humana concreta, algum princípio abstrato oculto, é porque suas características demonstram esse princípio invisível na ação visível” (HALL, 2003, p. 261). Corpos animais são animados porque têm *anima*, *ἔυχή* (*psychē*), uma alma, e eles nos interessam porque não são constrangidos por uma consciência baseada em si próprios : “enquanto o homem é um ser equívoco, “mascarado” ou complexo, o animal é unívoco, pois suas qualidades positivas ou negativas permanecem sempre constantes, tornando possível classificar cada animal, de uma vez por todas, como pertencendo a um modo específico de fenômenos cósmicos” (CIRLOT, 1962, p. 10). Mas a *anima* não flui apenas através do peixe individualmente, flui através deles, como aquele movimento que anima o conjunto de peixes como um todo. Quando Deleuze e Guattari escrevem que os animais se tornam um corpo como um conjunto, é como uma expressão dessa animação que emerge dentro deles, através deles e com eles, como uma série infinita de multiplicidades como movimento social. O movimento ocorre individualmente, todavia todo movimento afeta o todo que, no entanto, se move como um todo.

Os epicuristas acreditavam que a alma estava composta de átomos, e os estóicos que a alma era governada por Πνεῦμα (*pneuma*), como o sopro de vida que Deus produz na criação e como a inteligência que guia a coerência dos corpos. O mais importante para nós, o *pneuma* animador, “transporta informação dos órgãos dos sentidos para a parte central do governo, e de volta para as partes envolvidas em mover o animal de um lugar para outro” (PREUS, 2015, p. 311).<sup>300</sup> Interessantemente, Preus, ao discutir *pneuma*, cita a *Geração de Animais V.8* de Aristóteles: “É razoável que a natureza desempenhe a maior parte de suas operações usando o *pneuma* como ferramenta, pois como martelo e bigorna na arte do ferreiro, também *pneuma* nas coisas formada pela natureza” (Tradução do autor).<sup>301</sup> Isso liga diretamente o *pneuma* a uma tecnologia da revelação e à atividade criativa como semiótica dos ferreiros de metais subterrâneos pitagóricos e, portanto, à teoria dos números e harmônicos que se conectam à Máquina de Guerra e ao processo imagético. E assim, em vez de se concentrar no “que” do animal, Deleuze e Guattari concentram suas atenções no

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<sup>300</sup> Isso consta de uma definição da imagem Bergsoniana.

<sup>301</sup> “It is reasonable that nature should perform most of her operations using pneuma as a tool, for as the hammer and anvil in the art of the smith, so pneuma in the things formed by nature.”

"como" do animado, em como entidades sencientes se tornam outras de um momento para o outro, em seu aspecto mais geral.



Figura 4.1 O devir vetor de peixe "Que quê?"

Em *Mil Platôs*, a "biografia" do Devir-Animal é relacionada, narrada e explicada através do conhecimento do bando ou matilha como modos, modalidades e modificações, e não como características; esses modos não são modos aditivos de acréscimo, de agregação única, mas modos de expansão, propagação, ocupação, contágio, povoamento... um devir como concepção de individuação não é um acúmulo, ou uma lista de características que tem algo a ver com antropomorfismo de qualquer tipo: a união é um *mashup*, cujos componentes individuais tornam-se indiscerníveis em seu singular efeito de produzir uma novidade híbrida como expressão afetiva de uma outra coisa. A atividade do Devir como compilação aberrante é um movimento que, junto, produz o avanço como uma coordenação aberta e não verbalizada que age e reage como um todo orgânico. É uma multiplicidade que assume formas não naturais, através de uma "involução temível" que não tem um *telos* ou foco predeterminado na forma de recompensa ou causalidade final. Devir é um derramamento do fazer atravessado por forças não baseadas na experiência como um avanço processual de respostas racionais típicas. É um sentimento de ser incerto,

desterritorializado e não ancorado, o que provoca um nomadismo que é ao mesmo tempo errante e fora do sistema e nos leva a criações e invenções inéditas.<sup>302</sup>

Esses devires como individuações podem assumir várias disposições. Podem ser concepções mansas e dóceis que não ultrapassam as normas, não se arriscam muito longe do lar disciplinar em que habitam e se contentam em afirmar a ordem estabelecida; as segundas são ideias transcendentais expressas como verdades eternas, com características e atributos que servem de fundamentos para as séries e estruturas semióticas do pensamento racional; e o terceiro são ideias transformadoras que abrangem a natureza selvagem da natureza como uma exploração do que um corpo pode fazer — e essa natureza pode ser natural ou artificial, embora Simondon possa nos dizer que não há muita diferença. Esses corpos, que são multiplicidades, que se comportam como um bando, em que os componentes individuais têm seu próprio movimento, mas se movem juntos como um todo, que não tem nada a ver com os componentes individuais, são como aquelas imagens representando uma forma de peixe feita de uma multidão de peixes menores (Figura 4.1). Com esses corpos, não estamos tão interessados em características, mas em qualidades e intensidades, e podemos facilmente entender que essas formas não são filiações. E também não é uma confabulação interativa entre animais que os conecta através de “um mecanismo dominado pelo automatismo do instinto” (MASSUMI, 2014, p. 1). Mas que pode fazer um corpo assim? As transformações que esses “corpos” agenciam, guiados por uma inteligência de enxame, sobre como o movimento e a coordenação devem ocorrer na forma de um agenciamento maquínico, como um espírito trans-individual, funcionam no nível de afetos e forças invisíveis que somente são visíveis como os movimentos indeterminados desses corpos inespecíficos. Essas “participações, as núpcias anti-natureza, são a verdadeira Natureza que atravessa os reinos” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 23) que possui uma inteligência própria que ultrapassa a socialidade mecânica e a homogeneidade cultural da comunicação baseada na linguagem. Quando comparamos o movimento de um cardume de peixes, ou com as acrobacias de equipes de exibição de ar bem ensaiadas e em milissegundos, podemos ver que outra inteligência está em jogo. A informação não é uma troca de *tokens*, de signos simbólicos de fato, mas um contágio e transformação que a troca afetiva de movimento que a (in)formação proporciona. Como predicado por Barthes (1983),

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<sup>302</sup> Os migrantes modernos, como indivíduos deslocados de seus territórios de hábitos, são forçados a tornar-se em animais. Eles movem-se como bandas ou matilhas.

essas trocas não são produtivas de mitos no sentido da filiação em cascata do signo como a progênie do significado e do significante; se é que servem como narrativas de um povo que está por vir. Essas imagens são prontamente traduzidas para a tênue compreensão dos movimentos de massa da economia, em que logo se torna óbvio que prever o movimento com qualquer tipo de certeza é fútil e o mais próximo possível de uma determinação preditiva é a adivinhação estatística. Deleuze e Guattari habilmente chamam esses agenciamentos heterogêneos de multiplicidades, traduzidos para o inglês como agenciamentos. É *le mot juste* em francês. Agenciamentos têm o aspecto social de união da coletividade como uma entidade maquínica, contudo o termo francês tem a propriedade adicional de agência, de intermediação e de instrumentalidade incorporada. Além disso, o agenciamento francês significa o arranjo resultante de uma combinação de elementos, de um organismo que reúne e centraliza a informação.

Mas qual é o devir a que estamos nos referindo? É o devir de uma entidade como um corpo? Ou é o evento como um corpo? Ou o agenciamento? Ou simplesmente o corpo como devir e cujos diferentes aspectos produzem diferentes devires? O que estamos nos referindo ao falar sobre o devir? Por que precisamos formular isso como uma repetição? E por que a diferença deve estar envolvida?

A imagem dos peixes que se concentram em torno do mergulhador demonstra a coesão do movimento em um único corpo, sendo que tal movimento encontra-se em relação direta com o movimento do corpo do mergulhador. Mas o objetivo desse movimento é visível e resolve o foco da relação igualmente de um lado e outro da divisão. Poderíamos indicar o movimento que ocorre todas as manhãs, em que as pessoas vão trabalhar e tomar o transporte público. O movimento toma a forma de ir de casa para o local de trabalho, mas o que anima esse movimento como um agenciamento é algo que não é físico e impossível de localizar, que é afetivo mesmo se pudermos rastrear e atribuir uma causa abstrata que pode parcialmente ou de alguma forma explicar mais ou menos adequadamente o movimento. Mas, como uma multiplicidade, essas forças que são imediatas através do social como um movimento coletivo, constituem um corpo de certa forma mais interessante do que os corpos que são criados a partir de material físico e são prontamente discernidos. E quando Spinoza pergunta “O que um corpo pode fazer?”, os feitos desses corpos abstratos são realmente uma pesquisa metafísica na busca pela produção do tempo como uma variedade topológica em constante mudança. Podemos

simplisticamente dizer que todas as pessoas que vão para o local de trabalho são motivadas por dinheiro. Mas sabemos que o dinheiro é a dobradiça das dobras o infinito, e se o dinheiro é o signo supremo, na medida em que representa tudo e qualquer coisa como o cerne da relação concreta, como o nexo infinito do capitalismo, podemos dizer que o dinheiro é Tempo. Se dissermos, por exemplo, que é o capitalismo que anima esse movimento, que corpo o capitalismo assume e quais são seus caminhos? Os movimentos desse corpo são o próprio tempo, mas, como não podemos ver esse corpo, só podemos aludir à presença do tempo pelo movimento do capital e do dinheiro e àquela atividade que produz dinheiro.

Deleuze e Guattari justapõem este movimento de contágio com o pacto do anômalo como ser excepcional, como a exceção que faz a regra, ainda que ao desenvolverem o conceito de Devir a distinção se desvanece progressivamente. O ser excepcional é a anomalia afetiva que registra como o sentimento marcante, que permite entrar na sociedade secreta do pré-individual e conhecê-lo como um conjunto operativo que passou incognita, sem nome e não reconhecido, à espreita, à margem ou os limites da aceitabilidade, como um corpo não identificado cujos atos são sentidos, mas cuja agência é desconhecida.

Esses devires imperceptíveis são encontrados no limiar do que pode ser conhecido; eles povoam o ἄπειρον, (*apeiron*), os limites do universo conhecido, o horizonte da criação que os gregos antigos consideravam ser a origem de todas as coisas porque delimita o que tem existência. Como limite, o *apeiron* se situa entre o limitado e o ilimitado, o desconhecido conhecido e ilimitado — mas não o ainda a ser conhecido, porque isso tornaria o universo limitado. É um limiar de duas faces, pois é um *placeholder* processual que mostra tudo, mas não revela nada. O tempo passa por ele, mas não tem extensão: tem movimento, mas não tem para onde ir. Supostamente, ele tem substrato material, mas não possui características discerníveis (ou discernidas), o que tornaria o conjunto vazio, o receptáculo como o *topos* do devir. Mas simplesmente discernir essa fronteira é suficiente para revelar a multiplicidade escondida na intenção de que os *outliers*, os forasteiros que habitam os limiares fronterizos, geram uma pressão externa de aumento afetivo, de intensificação que passa despercebida.

Esses devires, como uma representação progressista visível, são trazidos como que por magia, por um feitiço que não pode ser adequadamente chamado de filosofia, ciência ou

arte. Eles são um movimento transdutor dentro do engajamento, no qual "aquém deles encontramos devires-mulher, devires-criança" e "para além deles, ainda, encontramos devires elementares, celulares, moleculares, e até devires-imperceptíveis" (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 32). É o que acontece antes que algo realmente aconteça — mas não no sentido de que nada está acontecendo, mas de como não foi sentido como tal: é como uma premeditação que ainda não foi pensada como um julgamento.

### **Devir como Categoria**

Deleuze e Guattari fazem uso das categorias, mas as apresentam de tal forma que não reduzem a possibilidade de movimento nem restringem os graus de liberdade da articulação do encontro com o mundo gerado por um evento. O devir engaja todos os termos que descrevem o processo em termos de sua criação e do avanço — começando com a oposição original daquilo que é e daquilo que não é como a realidade mais fundamental, e que se traduz como o problema de como aquilo que não é seja a afirmação do devir. Não podemos simplesmente definir o devir como o modo de ser da passagem ou transição, porque o devir é mais que uma modalidade intermediária entre o ser e o não-ser. Não é simplesmente uma mediação entre mais ou menos, ou maior ou menor. O devir é o processo de transformação do ser, que intermedia e articula a existência processual da produção de diferenças em espécie. Como atividade, devir institui um movimento temporal de diferenciação do vir-a-ser como uma operação genética perpétua de emergência, de transformação, de contraste e diferenciação, de engendramento, entretanto não de identidades de gênero. O movimento pode ser imanente, transformador e produtor de contrastes, mas o andamento evolutivo chave é a produção de ἕτερον (*heteron*), de diferença em termos de contraste da ἑναντία (*enantia*), de opostos. Como verbo, como predicado, devir expressa gênese imanente de uma consistência específica na medida em que efetua um movimento que é sua própria multiplicidade, contudo não pode ser diminuído ou reduzido a "aparecer" "ser" "igualar" ou "produzir" (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997). O devir é um movimento que caracteriza o avanço contínuo e incessante como processo de vir a ser sempre diferente — diferença. Se dizemos que o devir é uma multiplicidade, queremos dizer que a unidade do processo é composta de muitos, em que cada um desses muitos constitutivos também são multiplicidades. O avanço processual, a

sucessão dentro e através do fluxo como a inexorável "marcha do tempo", é unitário e ao mesmo tempo múltiplo. A duração, simplesmente definida, é o fato processual da insistência, da persistência, da continuidade no tempo como expressão da mudança: é o tempo durante o qual uma coisa, ação ou estado continua. Mas enquanto apresentarmos desta forma, a duração também deve ser vista como uma unidade que é consistente com a univocidade da marcha do tempo, inclusiva e, simultaneamente, respeitosa da diferenciação multivariada que a multiplicidade permite. Em sua expressão dessa multiplicidade duracional, a entidade como evento pode simultaneamente expressar a diferença de si mesma e a diferença imanente. Como participante no devir, não é um movimento da intensão do conceito como identidade, todavia um movimento da natureza da entidade, de como o devir acontece e como o animado flui com e através dele. Por razões apontadas adiante, qualquer entidade manifesta sua continuidade duracional horizontalmente como parte do *continuum* extenso do plano de consistência e verticalmente como parte do avanço processual e sua expressão do tempo dentro do processo imagético.

O plano de imanência e sua cartografia de longitudes e latitudes é uma analogia que nos permite pensar o devir sem ter que explicar a aporia de dar o salto do nada para algo — a concepção do plano de imanência é tão próxima quanto a substância pode chegar à sua assíntota do nada. É uma reconciliação de opostos, de justaposições conflitivas entre o que é e o que não é que aparecem ao longo da concepção e não de polaridades de um mesmo espectro qualitativo. Não há como fugir desse processo integrativo sujeito à lógica da imanência da diferença como novidade que emerge como duração. Não seria apropriado caracterizá-lo usualmente como montagem, como hilomórfica ou dialética: a composição não é uma montagem em que o quadro de seleção não é dado inteiro, mas como um quadro de partículas com diferentes velocidades e fluxos com seus próprios "autodeterminação singular". Tampouco é hilomórfico, pois um de seus componentes não é um recipiente passivo do outro como impressão, moldagem ou modelagem formal; nem é dialética como novidade emergindo da aniquilação mútua de contrários de tese, antítese e síntese. Precisamos ver a montagem como a série de molduras de uma foto-acabamento e não como uma mancha no acabamento; hilomórfico como um condicionamento mútuo e co-emergente de partículas inexistentes de poder e potencial; e dialética como a violação transgressora da Lei da Contradição. De tal modo, podemos entender o Devir como duracional, material e como o termo médio no qual o sujeito e o atributo são

fundamentados.

Entretanto, as oposições que eles produzem não são justaposições irreconciliáveis, e sim reflexões espelhadas — impressões de sensação em que os princípios intervêm para produzir impressões de reflexão — plausivelmente separados por uma dobradiça ou dobra, de modo que sempre que surge o conceito de categorias, surge em pares que pressupõe uma prioridade lógica ou mesmo ontológica do conteúdo sobre a forma (BENSMAÏA in DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1986, p. xvii). Suas categorias não se referem exclusivamente às ideias, mas sim a movimentos materiais que têm algum "ser" para eles, bem como alguns potenciais virtuais que pretendem ser atualizados. Assim, eles podem se referir ao poder político, a forças sociais, de conhecimento ou percepções psiquiátricas, ou categorias literárias ou lingüísticas como sistemas de diferenciação formal, como modos expressivos de vir a ser e que não são necessariamente atributos singulares, mas podem exibir essa multiplicidade de características de um conjunto ou classe. Ao predicar esses conjuntos de propriedades, nunca há um esforço para fechá-los ou limitá-los de tal maneira que a integridade identitária seja meticulosamente preservada. A oposição de devir como um outro diferente ao ser apresenta uma oposição à integridade identitária conceitual, bem como à concepção dominante do ser transcendental estático. Devir problematiza aspectos importantes da compreensão da mudança e da diferença, a saber, a questão da gênese e o problema do que acontece quando uma coisa se torna-se outra coisa — ou, mais genericamente, como uma metaestabilidade torna-se outra? Como um estágio de desenvolvimento se move para o próximo? Se a mudança acontecer, como ocorre a diferença? Conforme a mudança acontece, como a constelação de potencial de uma coisa muda? E como, de fato, discernimos essa mudança e a novidade que está sendo produzida? As respostas têm que ser expressas em termos de intensidades, de duração, de singularidades que não são simples, de multiplicidades associadas, de agenciamentos rizomáticos, de heterogeneidades, da primacidade da diferença e do devir.

A principal distinção categorial que o devir pode fazer é entre um potencial e um fundamento, tal como entre o Ser e o não-ser, o Ideal e o material, entre o Ser em relação ao devir — ou para o pensamento Deleuze, em termos de extensão-intensidade na diferença e repetição, ou molar e molecular, ou maior e menor. Quando comparada ao Ser, qualquer Devir constitui a figura da materialidade do Outro: Devir-Animal, Devir-Mulher, Devir-Criança, Devir-Elementar... Devir-qualquer-coisa-outra-que-homem porque não há devir-



homem, uma vez que a Ideia transcendental é ao qual todo devir se refere, da mesma maneira que não temos devir-Deus. O homem como entidade conceitual é o mais próximo que se pode chegar do Ser infinito da Ideia — é a reflexão material, o equacionamento do Homem como a imagem material de Deus. Os outros devires predicam oposições semelhantes, não como interpretações de naturezas, mas como pontos de reunião ou iscas. Podemos, desse modo, entender o Devir-Mulher como o movimento que predica o que consiste um corpo que é a antítese daquilo que o princípio masculino representa com respeito à Ideia de Deus; ou Devir animal como o movimento material do anima encarnado; ou Devir-Criança como o movimento material do devir que não é guiado por um critério. Esses devires como modos discerníveis do evento do encontro e produtivos de máquinas de desejo são as verdadeiras categorias que medeiam os agenciamentos e permitem seus discernimentos. Pois é nessa produção de produto-produtor heterogêneo, como afeto-desejo imanente, que a alegre composição de devir "alguma coisa" acontece.

Costuma-se dizer que apenas os tolos esperam resultados diferentes da repetição cega. Repetir significa (re)peticionar à existência de algo por meio de (re)invocar e (re)coletar componentes que, quando combinados, criam a montagem desejada como o efeito da associação. A repetição também reflete a crença na constância causal e na permanência das coisas — a suposição sendo que as mesmas condições físicas sempre darão os mesmos resultados. É a fé implícita que temos nas receitas que se reunirmos os mesmos ingredientes, reproduzirmos as condições originais e combiná-las de acordo com um protocolo, podemos esperar os mesmos resultados. Mas quem reprisar a mesma receita algumas vezes sabe que o resultado nunca é igual. Os resultados podem ser mais ou menos semelhantes, mas sempre há uma variação que surge, uma diferença que emerge na atualidade. As receitas também são chamadas de direções e isso implica o método do *metahodos*, das técnicas de memória antiga como o caminho que deve ser tomado para chegar a um destino específico a fim de encontrar o que buscamos, porque tudo tem lugar único no Mundo.

No entanto, também sabemos que o resultado de uma montagem como uma associação produz algo de natureza diferente dos componentes. Assim, um bolo é o resultante da execução da sequência protocolar de uma receita e da combinação de ingredientes, é de natureza diferente do seu substrato. O mesmo acontece com a composição da raiva, do afeto que resulta de um evento, ou da montagem conceitual de

ideias, ou da combinação de exemplos que acabamos de realizar para enfatizar nosso ponto. Além disso, a combinação de componentes que parecem iguais num conjunto nem sempre garante o resultado esperado — porque na semelhança tudo é singular. Qualquer dos cineastas soviéticos ou teóricos da montagem provavelmente atestaria essa variação interpretativa de um espectador para o outro. Como vimos, a bagagem subjetiva que todo espectador traz para a interpretação é sempre composta de diferentes apetites e pontos de vista! As possibilidades relacionais que podem se criar entre um sujeito e um objeto significativo nunca são definidas, nem certas. Desse modo, a composição do que é percebido e as associações cognitivas feitas com um significante são mais divergentes, soltas e abertas do que as teorias sociais da linguagem nos levariam a acreditar. Desse modo, no melhor dos casos podemos falar de uma verdade interpretativa, sempre qualificada por uma porcentagem de erro, como uma probabilidade ou uma previsibilidade de um resultado.

Quando tratamos da projeção num sentido bergsoniano, não é no sentido da teoria da extromissão dos raios de luz dos olhos, mas em termos da localização das coisas em que deveriam estar no Mundo, por si mesmas, e em relação com outras como parte do co-surgindo relativo da projeção. Esta é uma reafirmação das antigas artes da memória que definem a Memória do Mundo em termos de imagens marcantes e seus *loci*: todas as coisas no mundo podem ser conhecidas por onde elas podem ser conhecidas ou percebidas onde estão. Se soubermos quais são as coisas e onde, saberíamos o que, como e por que, em si e em relação as outras. No sentido bergsoniano da imagem-movimento, podemos triangular perceptualmente tudo o que “observamos”, tudo o que percebemos, tudo o que podemos averiguar através da “ciência”. E esse olhar é o fluxo lógico da informação imanente das coisas em relação umas pelas outras, perspectivadamente como contrações seriadas que continuamente afirmam e confirmam essas relações através de suas transformações ao longo do tempo. A projeção é o “lançar de olhares” como o resultado da mudança do representamen-interpretamen, a apreensão do sentimento do objeto-sujeito-superjeto que nos move de uma revelação para a seguinte como a afirmação/confirmação serial de que as coisas estão onde elas devem estar. Isso indica que a memória é parte integrante do processo da (re)cognição e da dinâmica da projeção que dirige o olhar. O processo de cognição configura o diagrama conceitual que através da cognição repetida cria os circuitos de memória que facilitam a (re)cognição: ao longo do tempo e através da iteração cognitiva, a interação repetida habitua a resposta diagramática cíclica que afirma e confirma a

cognição como gestos ou movimentos pré-concebidos que direcionam os movimentos sacádicos, que comutam a troca representamen-interpretamen e a apreensão do sentimento em Whitehead. Segundo esta linha de raciocínio, necessitamos assumir um processo memorial que, de algum modo, armazena a semelhança das coisas no cérebro como um significante pictórico imaginário? Ou podemos nos satisfazer com um repertório infinito de conceitos diagramáticos escalonados e seus aspectos perspectivamente associados de alguma forma para produzir nosso conhecimento do mundo? O trabalho de Fei-Fei Li na Universidade de Stanford aponta para um vasto armazenamento de significantes pictóricos armazenados no cérebro, mas outros pesquisadores como Joseph Redmon e Ali Farhadi (2015, 2018) projetaram um modelo estatístico preditivo baseado no reconhecimento de padrões adquiridos associados ao relacional que ancora e orienta a inteligência visual por trás de nossos diagramas cognitivos de (re)cognição de objetos. Os dois modelos dependem da memória e demonstram a divisão filosófica entre as duas abordagens do pensamento imagético. A primeira é mais simples e mais coerente com a abordagem pictórica do que a segunda: mas não é uma expressão do nosso preconceito epistêmico pensar em termos de imagens pictóricas pré-constituídas em oposição à produção imanente de imagens processuais relacionais? As duas linhas de pesquisa indicam a ruptura na forma de conceber o encontro com o mundo: seria constituído por objetos autônomos independentes ou através de uma concretização processual relacional imanente?

### **Devir como...**

Deleuze e Guattari oferecem um desdobramento complexo e complicado do Devir que combina uma variedade de modos e aspectos para o processo. As dezesseis "memórias" ou devires que constituem o plano, juntos, apresentam os vários modos pelos quais os componentes do devir produzem diferença, não como um fluxo coerente de criação ou transformação, mas como um agenciamento rizomático. Dadas as várias naturezas conceituais que compreendem o devir, Deleuze e Guattari não escolhem uma delas como o método correto, todavia optam para oferecer elementos de diferentes modelos e tradições para dar uma imagem heterogênea do que está envolvido. A característica mais significativa é a noção de uma única substância individuada por relações dentro de multiplicidades de movimento e descanso. Isso aparece na seção *Memórias dum espinosista*, no platô que trata

sobre o devir em *Mil Platôs*, que descreve o devir como um “puro plano de imanência, de univocidade, de composição, onde tudo é dado, onde dançam elementos e materiais não formados que só se distinguem pela velocidade, e que entram nesse ou naquele agenciamento individuado de acordo com suas conexões, suas relações de movimentos.” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 255). O plano articula os componentes clássicos da matéria, forma e movimento sob as formas de potencial indiferenciado, relação e um movimento circular ou vórtico de causalidade, no qual o movimento não é alimentado por um poder externo ao sistema, mas é imanente ao plano de consistência para produzir um maquinismo universal.

Os devires são predicados como corpusculares e como multiplicidades, mas as entidades componentes não são átomos “físicos”, compostos de matéria sólida. Eles são compostos de elementos finitos de potencial, dotados de forma e, como tal, são as partes últimas de um infinito real que juntos constituem as multiplicidades. Assim sendo, há agenciamentos maiores e menores povoando o plano da imanência como uma máquina abstrata de infinitas relações interconectadas. A imagem que nos vem à mente é um campo infinito de diferenciais em que os termos de relação vão a zero e o que resta é a relação diferenciadora unida pela propensão associativa dos termos da relação, para participar concretamente em um número infinito de outras relações, de modo que o que constitui o ser é a infinidade de diferenciais como criadores de distinções entre os vários termos elementares e a duração produzida por meio de sua produção de tempo do *aion*. “É um plano de extensão, que é antes como a secção de todas as formas, a máquina de todas as funções, e cujas dimensões, no entanto, crescem com as das multiplicidades ou individualidades que ele recorta” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 254).

Toda singularidade no plano da imanência é localizada em termos de longitude e latitude de acordo com seu *Tóπος* (*Topos* — lugar) como um par ordenado em que a longitude representa os agregados sem extensão de partículas do devir e a latitude afeta como capacidade de agir e agir em cima. Desse modo, cada *topos* no plano da imanência é constitutivo de um composto, de uma integração dos caracteres como um conjunto que compõe uma cartografia de distribuições de intensidades que juntas constituem corpos. O *topos* especifica e define um corpo como uma extensão corpuscular, e está associado a *Khôra* platônico como o local onde a gênese ocorre como ocupação — em ambos os sentidos da palavra — e que desempenha um papel análogo ao *hylē* em Aristóteles, em que

o desdobramento está sustentado pela *kinesis*. Possivelmente esta visualização é a mais difícil de conceber, porque os dois eixos são de caracteres muito diferentes.

O esquema, no entanto, se revela como um sistema hilomórfico, contudo de uma maneira diferente do que se entende hoje. A concepção original de Aristóteles combinava matéria e forma, mas em termos dinâmicos, de maneira que ambas as entidades eram inseparáveis e não podiam ser concebidas separadas uma da outra. O composto de matéria e forma somente pode ser apreendido como um agenciamento: a matéria foi concebida como um potencial puro e se forma como *eidos*, uma forma substancial, em uníssono com *μορφή* (*morphē*, forma), como atualização. Apesar de ser repetidamente atribuído a Aristóteles, o hilomorfismo, é comumente referido atualmente, é uma noção mais recente, concebida pelos escolásticos (CONLEY, 1978) e revivida no século XIX. Estudiosos contemporâneos normalmente não apontam essa distinção, e a insistência medieval na "matéria" entendida exclusivamente como estática, vazia e passiva é ligada à "forma" interpretada como a aparência física da matéria. A crítica é indevidamente aplicada a Aristóteles quando, de fato, deveria ser dirigida à modificação feita por Aquino (MADDEN, 2013; PETERSON, 2008).

Se a noção comum de Devir-Criança é a definição processual da regularidade cognitiva primitiva que uma criança apresenta, então postularíamos que o Devir-Criança é um agenciamento duracional cuja atividade principal é a atualização do potencial como empirismo puro exercido através do processo imagético. O Devir-Criança reposiciona a história da ciência. Ao empreender a instituição de um plano de referência através de seu plano perceptivo de consistência, as ciências primitivas (da percepção estóica) trazem para o primeiro plano uma subjetividade que configura os próprios referentes para que eles estejam a serviço da subjetivação do indivíduo. Isso não significa que eles não devam ser testados, mas que não são Leis transmitidas *a posteriori* e se tornam Palavra de Deus a ser obedecida sem questionamentos ou divergências. O empirismo que Deleuze nos impele a adotar, baseia-se na aceitação de nossas próprias observações e conclusões subjetivas, além de afirmar a natureza mutável da natureza. A ciência menor é aquela que não tem referências ou fundações além dos nossos sentidos, de nosso empirismo pessoal. Contudo não se baseia em um entendimento fenomenológico, pois não é uma consciência de algo, mas um surgimento imanente.

Entretanto o que exatamente é a fundação subjacente do experiencial, se não o

fenômeno? Se há alguma coisa no devir que é verdadeiramente real, que tem Ser, e que perdura como aquilo sem o qual um corpo não existiria ou teria a capacidade de devir outro e sofrer mudanças, não é físico. Se muda e produz diferença, é um devir material. O substrato que permitiria a predicação, e não é predicado a partir de qualquer outra coisa é chamado de substância. Dependendo do modelo ontológico com o qual um filósofo compõe, a realidade última ou o que existe primariamente será definida em consequência. É um pensamento da metafísica tradicional que caiu em desuso e nós o invocamos aqui para destacar algumas das peculiaridades de uma filosofia baseada na imanência, no processo e na diferença. A predicação da realidade sobre um fundamento material é uma dificuldade perene na medida em que a busca do elementar da natureza é, de fato, a busca do tempo perdido, pois nós perseguimos aquilo que constitui o *ad infinitum* e ficamos com uma progressão seriada paradoxal para um *proto hylē* ou *materia prima* que seria assintótico ao nada. E isso levanta o problema da geração que surge do nada, que alguma agência subjetiva deve ser responsável pela criação, que não podemos produzir movimento a partir de seções imóveis, etc.

E como nada pode emergir do nada, esse *proto hylē* foi concebido de diferentes maneiras dependendo dos fundamentos ontológicos da escola de filosofia particular. Uma descrição geral foi compilada por Poortmann (1978) no livro *Veículos da Consciência: O Conceito do Pluralismo Hílico (Ochèma)*, com fundamento aristotélico, nos baseamos sobre a noção primitiva de *hylē*. Poortmann distingue seis tipos de matéria, que ele nomeia de Alfa a Zeta, que remontam às tradições religiosas do Extremo Oriente, do Próximo Oriente e das Herméticas, que incluem o Brahman e o Budismo, assim como a Teurgia Egípcia. Estes seis tipos representam os diferentes substratos possíveis que podem oferecer a fundação no qual o devir pode tomar forma:<sup>303</sup>

Alfa: materialismo monista, a visão de que apenas um tipo de matéria existe no universo (Spinozista e Deleuziano).

Beta: a visão de que só existe matéria, mas que existem diferentes tipos de matéria (pluralismo hílico), especificamente que Deus e outros seres espirituais são criados de um tipo mais refinado de matéria, não visível com nossos instrumentos científicos.

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<sup>303</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes\\_Jacobus\\_Poortman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Jacobus_Poortman)

Gama: só existe matéria, com exceção de uma única entidade que não é material. Essa entidade pode ser Deus, Brahman, etc. Essa é a visão mantida pelo próprio Poortman.

Delta: a visão de que existem dois tipos distintos de material e um tipo de entidade espiritual, imaterial, por exemplo a crença cristã primitiva e gnóstica de que o homem é composto de corpo, alma e espírito, sendo que os dois primeiros são formas diferentes de matéria e o espírito é imaterial.

Epsilon: matéria e mente são coisas totalmente separadas e independentes como no dualismo de René Descartes.

Zeta: idealismo monista ou ilusionismo, onde a matéria é vista como um tipo de emanção de Deus ou de outro ser espiritual — aplica-se ao brâmane do hinduísmo.

Em uma crítica de *Vehicles of Consciousness*, Onimus escreve que Poortmann "não está ciente das concepções modernas derivadas de modelos atuais em física nuclear ou biologia, que reformularam completamente as questões com as quais ele lida" (Tradução do autor. ONIMUS, 1983, p. 431). O problema é tão aporético hoje como era então, porém mais complexo devido aos avanços no pensamento matemático, científico e filosófico — pois o devir materialmente como processo é um modo complexo e complicado de explicar o surgimento imanente como atividade produtiva. Não é apenas complicado como uma determinação da gênese da existência a partir de um não-ser, mas também se refere à atividade de transformação e a decorrência ou resultado da atividade, que nunca é realmente um resultado porque, tão logo é produzido, é tomado como meio ou veículo para transformação subsequente. Não podemos sequer referir-nos aqui concretamente ao vir a ser, porque não há pretexto nenhum, não há entidade fixa, definida, pré-existente na qual se baseia o processo: não há pausa na mudança transformacional. Somente sabemos que o acontecer do acontecimento, do evento, está acontecendo.

Gostamos de pensar nessa participação no mundo como a participação experiencial do eu com o ambiente em que vivemos, como a interação de um corpo independente e autônomo em termos da causalidade mecânica da ação-reação entre entidades físicas. Nosso ser no mundo é avaliado sensorialmente como a correspondência entre nossa percepção estética, atestação empírica e determinação intelectual e apoiada por fatos

científicos baseados (até certo ponto) em átomos e suas partículas constituintes como fundamento. Essa maneira de pensar é altamente sedutora porque o *feedback* para nossas determinações é tão imediato: o que você vê, é o que você colhe e, depois, há os outros sentidos que corroboram a determinação inicial. É provável que alguém já esteja pensando em exemplos para provar que isso está incorreto. Mas quem pode dizer que o nosso conhecimento, compreensão e entendimento não representa uma crise paradigmática por vir de escala ptolemaica? Pois, a menos que o leitor seja um crente no Criacionismo, nossa concepção do Universo não é uma Verdade transcendental *a priori*, dada por Deus — a menos que se queira pensar que é. Pode ser verdade que há uma coerência operacional na concepção toda, mas, como acontece com qualquer mentira, a maior mentira é a melhor das verdades — até que essa verdade seja questionada de maneira convincente e concludente.

A distinção que Aristóteles faz entre as Ideias e Formas é relevante para nós, porquanto, se traçarmos o círculo de devir da Figura 4.2, vemos que existe um limiar que separa o material e os domínios Ideais. O domínio Ideal é povoado por Ideias, ou Formas transcendentais, que de acordo com Parmênides são aquelas que têm o ser real e verdadeiro. Abaixo deste limiar, está o reino material que é limitado no extremo inferior por outro limiar que o separa do domínio do Caos pré-individual. Os devires ocorrem entre os dois limiares que separam o atual do virtual aos extremos. Estes limiares não estão presentes nem ausentes, mas demarcam uma divisa, limite ou divisão em que além dessas divisões são Seres virtuais ou existências que são de natureza diferente do material atual. As concepções tradicionais (e não tão tradicionais) descrevem os devires como representações verticais que colocam Deus no ápice superior e o Caos no inferior. O Devir se encontra imprensado entre a zona das Ideias na parte superior e uma zona da matéria pura na parte inferior; como tal, o devir é a zona de convergência, de interpenetração da Matéria e da Forma como uma coalescência da atividade dinâmica, e não como um acréscimo de Forma e Matéria, o que o tornaria um esquema hilomórfico de acordo com os escolásticos.






Figura 4.2: Diagrama do Movimento Material entre o Caos e Deus. Imagem do autor.

Aquilo que chamamos de Deus em nosso Diagrama do Movimento Material da Figura 4.2 nada mais é que o repositório de todas as Formas Ideais, de Ideias Platônicas, de Ideias Transcendentais, que em virtude de serem perfeitas, imutáveis, exaustivas de todo potencial, residem acima da zona do atual, da mudança, dos modos de modificação, de fluxo, impermanência e criação de diferença. A zona de Devir sobrepõe-se à Zona do Caos, como a confusão do pré-individual, de puro potencial, de movimento aleatório e encontros fortuitos. Ao contrário do domínio das Formas que é separado da Zona de Devires, o Caos participa no Devir fornecendo a *Prima Materia* com a qual os corpos se compõem e também serve como a reciclagem do Devir em que o exausto, o esgotado, a decomposição de corpos, a desintegração da duração como cessação da operabilidade de um agenciamento maquínico. Portanto, a atividade primária de agregações parciais no limiar entre o Caos e a Zona de Devir, é chamada de Plano de Imanência e, dependendo da escala e do ponto de vista, um Plano de Consistência ou o Plano da Matéria — a que Bergson se refere como “o plano móvel P de minha representação atual do universo” (BERGSON, 1999, p. 178).

Deleuze e Guattari escrevem em *O que é Filosofia?* que o Plano da Imanência é como uma peneira, permitindo que algumas coisas passem enquanto outras permaneçam. A

metáfora implícita serve como articulação entre o conceito de plano, o plano imanente da natureza, onde acontece um evento, e a *Khôra* Platônica, a superfície sobre a qual o *Proto Hylē* um substrato do potencial e sua agregação e atualização imanentes como a seleção discriminativa da relação, um processo associativo. Referimos-nos ao movimento que acontece no Plano da Imanência como a violência da concepção das Formas materiais que sacode os constituintes pre-individuais e produz a agregação de corpos. Esse movimento perpétuo caótico produz e resulta do movimento e produz a interação dos corpos em movimento cuja colisão constitui o fluxo imagético. Esses agregados que constituem corpos são “objetos imagéticos” com duração em que uma imagem é qualquer coisa e tudo o que age e reage em todas as suas faces e em todas as suas partes. Expressando segundo uma ontologia que desconsidera o devir e a diferença, poderíamos dizer que a imagem pictórica é o objeto que não passa. Esse objeto, que dizemos, que se forma sobre uma tela, num plano de seleção, é a imagem pictórica como o resultado de um processo que cria aparições imagéticas sobre telas. A imagem pictórica é simplesmente o resultado de tecnologias que buscam produzir o arresto do fluxo e a redução da mobilidade imagética.

A produção da imagem como objeto ou corpo em uma tela vem do *Timeu* de Platão, cuja *Χώρα*, *Khôra*, serve como um recipiente receptor, uma cesta ou peneira nos quais os vários elementos são agitados juntos, sujeitos a um movimento de filtragem ou seleção pelo Demiurgo onde o que permanece constitui uma agregação para a criação de Formulários Materiais. A concepção platônica é uma proposta muito rica que ativa um amplo espectro de conceitos que serviram de intuição para uma variedade de conceitos em Deleuze e Guattari. No *Timeu*, somos capazes de discernir “fontes” ou possíveis “inspirações” para vários conceitos-chave:

- A *Khôra* como plano de imanência ou plano de consistência e como ponto de partida para pensar com Deleuze sobre planos, campos e platôs.

- O processo sustentado na *Khôra* como intuição para os processos de territorialização e desterritorialização e a distinção de *sol* (terra) e território (território) em *Mil Platôs*.

- O processo agregativo localizado na *Khôra* como perceptivo e memorial e produtivo de corpos de várias naturezas e constitutivo do processo imagético.

- A existência de um caos pré-individual que é, ou podemos torná-lo, ontologicamente produtivo.

- O aparecimento da seleção e decisão dentro da crise (DELEUZE, 2004, p. 19; DELEUZE, 1999, p. 15).

- A inclinação clínica, a solicitude e a preocupação (em Whitehead) da Khôra como a enfermeira do devir.

- A constituição dos elementos em termos de sólidos platônicos, de cristais, que expressam estados de gênese como formação, mutação e transformação como efeitos de diferentes processos do tempo. (COLMAN, 2005, p. 61).

A fim de trazer o pensamento para o domínio do devir minoritário, Deleuze nos incita a voltar ao Devir-Criança ou Devir-Mulher ou Devir-Animal para fugir do fascismo identitário da vida cotidiana e das restrições impostas pelo patriarcado a todas as esferas da existência. Resgatamos o aspecto imanente da dureza tornando-se da dinâmica circular cíclica fechada de um eterno retorno sem saída. O círculo do devir precisa ser visto como um movimento helicoidal em que o laço nunca se fecha e nunca se forma — é diferencialmente deslocado à medida que o espaço-tempo emerge imanentemente, sempre como um devir que nunca se produz. Como tal, este ciclo circular representa o ciclo material de criação de Formas, primeiro como uma entidade perceptual que se torna em uma noção e devir progressivamente adequado através da repetição para se tornar uma Forma dentro do domínio mental. A Forma, como uma perfeição idealizada de um conceito derivado empiricamente, permanece aberta: embora a noção gradualmente adquira consistência e definição e tom e aparência de um objeto aperfeiçoado, mesmo sendo ainda uma entidade inacabada. Isso significa que esse corpo que age e reage, em termos espinosistas ainda pode adquirir ou perder atributos de componentes. Mas o que chama a atenção aqui é que, ao interpretarmos esses movimentos simbolicamente como representações da formação conceitual, poderemos entender o processo de formação de ideias de diferentes maneiras.

Compreender o conceito do corpo através de como se aplica à materialidade significa evitar a ideação do corpo como um corpo humano: um corpo é o que atua ou reage. Como explicado por Zeller (1892), o materialismo estoico estava de acordo com a definição platônica da coisa real como “qualquer coisa que possua a capacidade de agir ou de se deixar passivo” (ZELLER, 1892, p. 126). Para os estóicos, nada real existe a menos que possa agir num sentido palpável, na medida em que constitui um agente causal produtivo de um efeito elementar como o consumo no Fogo, ou o fluxo da Água, ou a penetração do Ar, ou a incessante agência transformadora da Terra. Dessa maneira, eles consideram todas as

substâncias, propriedades ou formas, materiais e não materiais, como corpos.

Ao ler estas linhas, precisamos ter em mente que aqui o material não significa fisicamente duro ou denso ou oferecendo resistência tátil. Uma coisa, objeto ou corpo é material porque é composto de matéria e, portanto, algo que está sempre passando por modificação e mudança. Como tal, virtudes e vícios como modificações, emoções e impulsos, na medida em que são causados por causas materiais, também são materiais. Por meio dessa causalidade material interativa, as ações individuais foram consideradas corpóreas e constitutivas dos fenômenos da vida: o artístico, o cognitivo, a atividade científica acoplada à lógica são materialmente incorporadas para que “tudo o que se faz sentir seja considerado corpóreo” (ZELLER, 1892, p. 130) — o que produz a impressão no olho é um corpo, assim como a voz, e tudo o mais que impressiona diretamente os sentidos. A epistemologia estoíca baseada na sensação como ação mecânica e reação de impressões só pode ser causada por corpos por causa de sua dependência necessária de causas materiais. Cícero afirma que Zenão “achava totalmente impossível que algo fosse afetado pelo que faltava ao corpo [...] e, de fato, o que quer que tenha afetado algo ou tenha sido afetado por alguma coisa deve ser corpo” (LLOYD, 2008, p. 86) — que nos faz pensar a definição da palavra afeto!

Esses corpos passam por mudanças, pelo desenvolvimento constante através de uma agitação interativa. O desenvolvimento refere-se tanto ao processo como ao resultado concreto deste processo, bem como aos passos intermediários para o desdobramento mais completo da forma de realização. O desenvolvimento representa o processo ou movimento em direção à produção de uma força natural, energia ou nova forma de matéria — um corpo — como um empreendimento dinâmico que leva a algo ou é comparado a uma realização idealizada. É caracterizado como uma evolução de uma condição elementar que contém certos potenciais latentes ou capacidades que, com o tempo, emergem de dentro. O desenvolvimento, portanto, tem uma origem genética que se desdobra organicamente como um avanço gradual através de estágios progressivos.

Mesmo que a concepção de desenvolvimento da criança esteja encerrada em estágios metaestáveis, ela ainda representa a criança e a infância em termos dinâmicos. Há um movimento implícito no desenvolvimento transformador da criança desde a infância até a maturidade, o que nos permite pregar a mudança dentro do crescimento, não através de seus efeitos ou através da experiência no mundo, mas em termos de desenvolvimento

psicológico. Isso geralmente é expresso como o desenvolvimento mental da criança, que envolve um espectro de mudanças que implicam o crescimento da mente e o florescimento de seus fundamentos conceituais. Essas mudanças no corpo-criança, que envolvem analogicamente as várias faculdades e poderes da mente, refletem processos de como as entidades conceituais criam-se e formam-se. O desenvolvimento da inteligência, da aquisição de linguagem, do julgamento e do raciocínio, etc, na criança em crescimento podem ser entendidos como paralelos à criação dessas faculdades em si mesmas. Quando perguntamos quanto ao crescimento intelectual, crescimento do pensamento lógico, crescimento da razão ou juízo ético, como desenvolvimento qualitativo na criança, estamos indagando sobre o surgimento dessas faculdades. De tal modo que, qualquer teoria que aborde a construção da realidade pela criança deve ser acompanhada por uma explicação genérica do atual, e como ele é construído ou surge.

Existem inúmeras teorias que podemos aplicar aos fenômenos para compreender o desenvolvimento da criança e da infância. Cada uma oferece uma visão diferente sobre o mesmo conjunto de fenômenos e explica cada um dos outros de maneiras diferentes do que eles explicam. Devir-Criança não é diferente, pois também deve alimentar os mesmos fenômenos, contudo a interpretação é diferente por causa da forma como se pensa o conceito. Ao contrastar com o Devir em qualquer um dos modelos de desenvolvimento, devemos ser capazes de distinguir entre o devir e as várias concepções de desenvolvimento. Significativamente, a expressão Devir-Criança implica o desenvolvimento em si mesmo. A primeira interpretação do Devir-Criança em uma abordagem de senso comum é em direção para um Devir algo, uma atividade que culmina no cumprimento de quaisquer imperativos que o conceito da palavra criança implica. Isso leva a discussão ao território desenvolvimentista, de modo que qualquer das manifestações através das quais o desenvolvimento é conhecido pode ser articulada através da explicação conceitual. Por sua vez, tal abordagem coloca seu próprio conjunto de problemas, já que o conceito em si nem sempre é coerentemente explicado e então é preciso definir adequadamente o conceito de conceito: o que é, como funciona, quando e como surge.

Zenão de Cítio, o fundador da escola estóica, caracteriza o encontro com o Mundo como uma gradação intensiva. Cicero, em *Sobre ceticismo acadêmico*, que vem do grego σκέψις, *skepsis*, (investigação), relata uma rica anedota de como Zeno usou gestos para demonstrar os estágios de aquisição de conhecimento:

Quando ele colocou a mão na frente dele com os dedos retos, ele disse : 'Uma impressão é assim'. Próximo, depois de contrair os dedos um pouco: 'O consentimento é assim.' Então, quando ele tinha ajeitado a mão para fazer um punho, ele dizia que aquilo era uma "apreensão" ou "segurar". (Esta imagem também sugeriu o nome que ele deu a ela, *katalêpsis* [lit. 'agarrar'], que não tinha sido usado antes.) Finalmente, quando ele colocou a mão esquerda em cima, apertando o punho com força, ele diria que o conhecimento científico era assim: um estado que ninguém conhecia, mas o sábio gostava — embora quanto a quem é ou sempre foi sábio, nem mesmo eles estão com pressa de dizer (CICERO, 2006, p. 84. Trad. Do autor).<sup>304</sup>

Refletindo a epistemologia estoica de Zenão, Diógenes afirma que a verdade é verificada através de uma percepção que resulta em um julgamento que expressa a crença e verdadeira compreensão de uma coisa através da *Επιστήμη*, *Epistēmē*, ou seja, a Sabedoria, o conhecimento de proposições necessariamente verdadeiras, um termo frequentemente traduzido como ciência, particularmente nas traduções de Aristóteles (PREUS, 2015). Diógenes Laércio define-a como “uma cognição segura ou um tenor na recepção de impressões que é imutável pela razão” (JEDAN, 2010, p. 67) e serve como critério para a verdade. O uso da mão como a restrição de habilitação que enfoca o conceito está diretamente ligado ao sentido do tato como fonte e fundamento da verdade para os estoicos. Mas, na mão conhecemos a imagem em sua representação mais abstrata como uma dupla articulação. Para Zenão de Cítio, a mão como um *Φαντασία* (*Phantasia*) — que Lidell e Scott definem como “Aparência ou apresentação à consciência, imediatamente ou na memória, se verdadeiro ou ilusória” — vem para nós formado como o que é, mas não ainda identificado ou determinado como uma mão. Isso produz uma *Phantasia*, uma impressão na alma, que, como escreveu Diógenes Laércio em *Vidas e Doutrinas dos Filósofos Ilustres* (primeira metade do século 3 d.C.), leva a *τύπωσις* (*Typosis*), uma impressão e delineação, através da modificação de *Ἀλλοίωσις* (*Alloiosis*), uma produção qualitativa de mudança. Laércio adverte-nos para não interpretar a *phantasia* como semelhante a

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<sup>304</sup>“When he had put his hand out flat in front him with his fingers straight, he would say: ‘An impression is like this.’ Next, after contracting his fingers a bit: ‘Assent is like this.’ Then, when he had bunched his hand up to make a fist, he would say that that was an ‘apprehension’ or ‘grasp’. (This image also suggested the name he gave to it, *katalêpsis* [lit. ‘grasp’], which hadn’t been used before.) Finally, when he had put his left hand on top, squeezing his fist tight with some force, he would say that scientific knowledge was like that: a state none but the wise enjoyed—though as for who is or ever was wise, even they aren’t in a rush to say” (CICERO, 2006, p. 84).

impressão deixada por uma junta de anel, mas como “aquilo que está impressionado, e formado, e impresso por um objeto real, de acordo com um objeto real, de tal forma que não podia por qualquer outro que não seja um objeto real” (DIOGENES LAËRTIUS, 1853, p. 277).

Enquanto Deleuze nos incita a criar conceitos, Zeno foi famoso pelos seus neologismos e invenções conceituais. Zeno cria o conceito de *Katalepsis*, subtração, a partir da forma substantiva abstrata do verbo *Καταλαμβάνειν* (*Katalambanein* — derrubar: *Kata*, para baixo; mais *lambanein*, puxar) que o estóico Crísipo de Solos (281-208 a.C.) usa para “apreender, entender, conhecer” (PREUS, 2015) como explicativo da intensificação e adequação conceitual. A ação subjacente à *Katalepsis* — “derrubar” — é derivada da doutrina pitagórica que afirma que a razão flui para baixo a partir do cosmo superior que contém as Ideias estáticas das Formas (segundo Platão ou Aristóteles). Isto representa um complexo de ideias que se combinam para produzir uma variedade de noções que giram em torno do conceito da produção da diferença no devir que ocorre através da subtração, de um ser puxado para baixo pelo *Katalambein*, como a diminuição do material a se formar em relação a sua ideia correspondente. Em contraste com o fluxo ascendente do Fogo elementar predicado por Heráclito, a ideia de fluxo descendente surge de Thales, que afirmava que a Água é a substância elementar do mundo. Dessa forma, como a água flui para baixo devido ao seu peso, os átomos da substância da água que constituem as Ideias devem fluir para baixo também. Este fluxo descendente de átomos é o mesmo que acompanha a noção do *clinâmen* que faz com que os átomos da matéria se desviem. Desse modo, a “derrubada” pode significar apreender Ideias do reino celestial do cosmos e levá-las ao domínio terrestre-material dos humanos; também pode significar apreendê-los rapidamente do fluxo do devir. A tendência seria para baixo: desvalorizar, rebaixar, degradar, denegrir, desacreditar à medida que as Ideias adequadas e discerníveis são arrancadas do *noúmenon* e trazidas para o reino do material, ou do mundo material perdem sua duração e se desfazem, para completar a queda da graça em sua dissolução no caos. O fluxo descendente da razão de uma virtualidade cósmica / celestial de Ideias (como potencial e mais adequada) para a realidade terrestre da transformação incessante.

Partindo da impressão não identificada e inominada de uma *Φαντασία* (*Phantasia*), progredindo para a *Συγκατάθεσις* (*Synkatathesis*) do assentimento de uma contração preliminar como percepção, a *Κατάληψις* (*Katalepsis*) de perceber perceptivelmente a

impressão como contração cognitiva total que culmina no 'conhecimento científico' da Ἐπιστήμη (*Epistēmē*), oferece uma visão da metafísica deleuziana. A ciência heterogênea que é invocada aqui como um empirismo frouxo, como experimentação experimental não-sistemática e não-metódica (um *meta-hodos* nômade), joga contra a sistematicidade rígida do que Deleuze e Guattari chamam de Ciência Estatal em *Mil Platôs*. O resultado final do punho contraído dentro da contenção apertada da mão, que fornece uma restrição contundente e um envelope de delimitação, define o que constitui o conceito e protege sua integridade. Além disso, a ideia de contração terá um papel importante nas teorias de percepção e o processo imagético de Bergson.

Se entendermos a perfeição como atividade e nos perguntarmos, como Spinoza, “O que um corpo pode fazer?”, só podemos responder que não sabemos de imediato. Mas o que sabemos é que quanto mais um corpo faz, quanto mais ativo ele é, maior é sua capacidade de fazer, quanto maiores os prazeres, mais satisfatória a satisfação, maior a perfeição ou conclusão. Não é uma perfeição em termos de uma autossatisfação conclusiva, mas uma capacidade maior, um potencial maior para poder fazer. Toda atividade, todo fazer, é semiótico — produz significação. Não só produz sentido, há mediação envolvida e o avanço não pode não comunicar. A atividade de significação é um agenciamento maquínico que produz a própria perpetuação da sua significação, como a produção de subjetivação em termos de signo. Alcançar uma maior perfeição não é atingir a perfeição, como sendo completa e totalmente livre de defeitos ou falhas, mas alcançar maiores graus (alturas) de compreensão e adequação da noção. Assim, aumentar o escopo de fazer como uma articulação de uma ética pragmática. Isso nos coloca num dilema: "Fazer as coisas aonde?" Pois um pode realizar seu trabalho internamente no sentido de aperfeiçoar as ideias de alguém ou pode-se aplicar esse entendimento elevado às coisas do mundo. A escolha é entre o cultivo da mente, a que Deleuze e Guattari podem se referir à domesticidade agrária, ou engajar o mundo com vigor recém-descoberto e aumentar a vitalidade e devir um nômade. A diferença é entre o conhecimento intelectual e sensorial. Entre dois tipos de conhecimento, dois tipos de *epistemē* — dois modos de conduzir a ciência, dois modos de dirigir o pensamento. Esses não são modos de pensamento mutuamente exclusivos — como Whitehead (2010) afirma em *Processo e Realidade*, eles são extremos polares num espectro delimitado pelo mental e pelo físico. Isso também corresponde à tradicional justaposição polar do ideal e do material, do transcendental e do transitório, das ideias e da sensação, do




intelectual e do estético. Os dois polos podem estar separados, mas estão ligados. Além disso, eles informam um ao outro num movimento circular em que um complementa o outro aumentando suas capacidades e habilidades — o movimento é idealmente um ciclo de realimentação de melhoria progressiva, mesmo que haja contratempos o que pode ocorrer.

Tradicionalmente, o polo ideal, intelectual ou mental está posicionado espacialmente “no topo” e o material, sensorial ou físico é colocado no nível inferior: a cabeça, que faz todo o pensamento e está sempre nas nuvens, está em alta; os pés, que fazem toda a caminhada e constantemente em contato com a terra, estão em baixo. Além disso, o reino do ideal é o mais real, porque é o mais adequado, o mais perfeito, em que eles atingiram um grau de perfeição que eles existem. No fundo está o reino do caos, da diferença e da mudança, onde não há existência possível porque somente há puro devir. Em Spinoza, essas atividades são referidas como *maiolem e minorem perfectionem*, como maior e menor perfeição, nas quais Deus pode ser encontrado sobretudo como o ser da infinita perfeição. Mas, contrariando a maior perfeição e a menor perfeição como as atividades que pertencem ao ideal e ao material, e considerando essa justaposição e cada termo individualmente em comparação com o outro, podemos entender que isso pode estar no cerne do pensamento de Deleuze. E assim podemos ampliar a inclusividade dessa bipolaridade que opõe ser ao não-ser em termos de oposição existencial entre si, como noções que podem ser derivadas desse contraste. Em primeiro lugar e acima de tudo, o Maior e o Menor, a verdade e os poderes do falso, o estado e o nômade, o clínico e o crítico, pensar versus fazer.

Se o Ideal está “no topo”, o material está “no meio”, e o Chaos esta “no baixo”, a intenção ou a propensão perfeita do “topo” confere-lhe uma capacidade aumentada de afetar, de ação, a perfeição, a experiência do mundo, também aumenta a capacidade do “fundo” de aproveitar melhor da “perfeição” do “topo” a ser afetado — permite assumir uma disposição mais ativa em sua passividade, em sua receptividade de perfeição ativa como corretivos. E essa atividade aumentada do passivo aumenta sua perfeição e permite que ele se mova para o reino da maior adequação e maior perfeição. Esse é o movimento no centro da intuição, a dinâmica essencial, o maquínico no agenciamento, que impulsiona a transformação do afeto de menor para maior perfeição, de menos para mais adequação, de menor para maior realidade.

O Menor como a atividade da Perfeição Menor, do material, dos poderes do falso, da sensação do nômade, nos remete ao campo de maior agitação e violência, de movimento e

mudança transformadora, da interação corporal o mundo. Esta atividade é a atividade de devir e de interagir no mundo. E é em direção a essa região que Deleuze e Guattari buscam nos direcionar para aumentar nossa subjetividade, ao encontro imediato com o mundo, a adotar um empirismo primitivo que é a base do Devir-Criança.



Figuras 4.3: Cone de Memória de Bergson e Cone de Possibilidade. Imagem do autor.

### **Cones de possibilidade de Bergson**

O Cone de Bergson (Figura 3.18) apresentado em *Matéria e Memória* tem um cone corolário que é produzido diametralmente oposto ao eixo que denota o tempo. Como todo estudante do ensino médio sabe, um cone é uma superfície de rotação, produzida por uma linha transversal girada em um ângulo fixo ao redor de um eixo, em nosso caso em torno do Ponto S, que produz cones espelhados iguais e opostos, um para o passado (P) e outro para o futuro (F). Se o eixo representa uma linha do tempo, e nós selecionamos o Ponto S a ser o presente, então para um lado teríamos o passado como o Cone da Memória predicado por Bergson no passado e, no outro lado, outro cone, o Cone da Possibilidade, predicado pela física moderna, que encapsula a possibilidade de eventualidades futuras no ponto S. Transversalmente ao eixo de rotação, o Plano de Consistência (PC) emerge imanentemente como representando a modalidade específica do Movimento da Materialidade no Ponto S como a conjunção com o Cone de Perspectiva que produz o meio associado. Desse modo, o Ponto S é o presente que solidifica a junção como os dois eixos da semiose perceptiva desenvolvida em *Mil Platôs*, o sistema vertical de materialidade impressado entre a Graça e o Caos, e o sistema horizontal de perspectiva como o agenciamento relativo do avanço do processo.

A fim de compreender como o movimento material se entrelaça com o processo, precisamos nos lembrar de que o cone da Figura 4.3 não é uma construção estática, nem imóvel nem imutável — que, como representando o presente, deve ser interpretado em termos de movimento através da confusão pré-individual de espaço-tempo. Todos os elementos constitutivos representados estão constantemente mudando: o ponto S está se movendo, a atitude dos cones é variável e a orientação do plano P está mudando-se também — o conjunto todo está em fluxo, exibindo simultaneamente todos os modos dos processos elementares, apenas revelando o que será visto, dependendo de como escolhermos problematizar o evento do encontro. É transformação constante; o Cone da Memória e o Cone da possibilidade não constituem pontos ou instantes individualizados. Conforme vimos no último capítulo, o processo imagético não é linear e não é contínuo; é sequencial, mas não serial; é fechado e monádico, mas aberto e multiplicado. É iterativo, relacional, reticular, concreto e duracional. O movimento do materialismo é o que estabelece o Plano de Consistência, e sua modalidade particular de devir é o que o caracteriza o devir específico. Como tal, Devir-Criança é a modalidade de devir que informa o plano da seleção, uma vez que problematiza o presente em termos da zona de interesse, predicada pela perspectiva do presente como ponto privilegiado. Além disso, o plano de consistência não é um plano como já mencionamos anteriormente; ele é representativo da seleção que vai participar e uma expressão da modalidade de engajamento que o encontro imediato exige. Se o plano de consistência é de fato uma representação do devir, então seu modo de produção processual ilustra a produção do tempo como expressão da diferenciação e o cone como expressão do processo imagético como perspectivo e cinematográfico, acabamos produzindo tempo como diferenciação. Finalmente, nenhuma dessas estruturas existe. A construção dos Cones e o Plano de Consistência só aparecem como rastros ao longo do tempo e nunca são revelados como tais; eles não são fotogramas instantâneos.

Para Descartes, a duração esta “em cada coisa, apenas um modo sob o qual concebemos essa coisa enquanto ela continua existindo” (DESCARTES, 1982, p. 23) — a coisa é uma realidade material estática, imutável e definida, que tem uma data de início definida e uma data de expiração definitiva. A coisa tem uma existência identitária estável durante sua duração como uma 'substância', como uma extensa homogeneidade entendida como “nada além de uma coisa que existe de tal maneira que ela não precisa de outra para existir”

(DESCARTES, 1982, p. 23).

Em contraste, a visão da duração de Bergson elimina a substância e a substitui por uma multiplicidade que perdura como uma entidade, desde que a entidade mantenha sua coerência operativa como o cumprimento de sua função processual ao longo do tempo. A duração é assim considerada como uma continuidade coerente e lógica de uma multiplicidade confusa de elementos que podem ser objetos materiais, objetos não-materiais ou estados de consciência considerados como uma unicidade que somente a análise pode distinguir (BERGSON, 1960, p. 87). Essa multiplicidade pode, por sua vez, ser discernida pelo que é como uma profusão de qualidades e intensidades compostas de acréscimos de perspectivas perceptuais recíprocas dentro do devir. Contrário a Kant, a duração de Bergson confere ao espaço uma existência que interpenetra seu conteúdo, mas que também se desdobra no tempo: cada componente da entidade depende de todos os demais componentes e, portanto, é extensa, durável na manutenção da coerência operativa do todo. Como Bergson escreveu em 1915, “A representação de uma multiplicidade na forma de 'penetração recíproca' é bem diferente da multiplicidade numérica — a representação de uma duração heterogênea, qualitativa e criativa — é o ponto a partir do qual eu me propus e a qual eu tenho retornado constantemente” (LACEY, 1989, p. 25). O que é fundamental aqui é que a entidade seja vista como um processo unificado, como um movimento indivisível, como um todo coerente operativo que demonstra a existência do tempo como criação sem realmente invocá-lo. A entidade duracional não se produz apenas dentro e através do tempo sem ser o próprio tempo, mas cria temporalidades e pressões no tempo como expressões afetivas que sugerem a existência do tempo através de sua expressão como signos discerníveis.

Pensar a interatividade dentro da duração é uma questão de considerar as qualidades e intensidades que são trazidas pela experiência provocada pelo processo criativo. Mas se um evento é uma multiplicidade — um pluralismo de componentes heterogêneos — caracterizado como uma função composta envolvendo uma pluralidade de elementos constituintes (tanto reais quanto virtuais e de uma variedade de naturezas), sua interação é condicionada por um processo de seleção que emerge do Devir por um discernimento imanente, uma operação perceptual que é adequada aos elementos presentes e constitutivos dos corpos. Pensar o devir é pensar o encontro, o evento, o conceitual, através de um paradigma diferente da constituição dos corpos. Requer o

desapego do passado, da segurança que a recordação e o resultado da experiência nos dão, um deixar para trás do arquivo, do hábito e dos costumes memoriais e do que é conhecido. Todavia não é apenas esquecer o passado, é um esquecimento activo daquelas estruturas e métodos testados e comprovados que oferece uma estabilidade cognitiva e intelectual consistente. É uma criatividade que ativa potenciais quando a maioria das pessoas está contente com o *status quo* ou com a facilitação da permanência no pensamento e seus andaimes. Engajar este tipo de pensamento criativo como uma prática requer que alguém realmente envolva o desarranjo de tal maneira que permita que a temporalidade dessas entidades venha para frente. A esperteza desinteressada do *flâneur*, em que o tempo é inconsequente, é um bom ponto de entrada, um primeiro passo metódico para adquirir a percepção do conhecimento invisível ou, na melhor das hipóteses, não tão acessível e que escapa aos habitantes mais espertos e direcionados do mundo. Adotar o método requer um trabalho mais profundo do que a observação desocupada; exige um condicionamento de como interpretamos nosso compromisso com o mundo e colocamos em questão as estruturas pelas quais organizamos a experiência e consolidamos a certeza da repetição e da lembrança. A racionalidade do pensamento que Deleuze identifica em *Diferença e Repetição* como a identidade do conceito que se reflete num *ratio cognoscendi*, a oposição no predicado que se desenvolve em uma *ratio fiendi*, a analogia do juízo que se distribui num *ratio essendi*, e a semelhança da percepção que determina uma *ratio agendi*, precisa ser liberada (DELEUZE, 2000).

O desdobramento processual do mundo como devir, como uma emergência duracional imanente de si mesmo para ele mesmo, que mina a preeminência do humano e desativa muitas das categorias que garantem a compreensão, nos impede de ver a natureza da natureza em termos fixos que serão os supostos objetos de percepção. A consideração de devir em termos não-humanos nos reduz, nos diminui a individualidades participantes na máquina imagética processual que impulsiona tudo — perdemos nossos privilégios como as criaturas escolhidas da Criação, mas também perdemos nosso *status* exaltado como sujeitos prediletos e como os favorecidos criadores de significação. Como tal, perdemos nossa certeza existencial como seres para habitar a terra do não-ser de ninguém. O devir se refere à atividade mental e como essa atividade se desdobra ou ocupa o encontro, como a atividade modela o fluxo na fita *moëbius* da mente. O Devir como atividade mental é um Devir-outro diferente das normas de disciplina e racionalidade impostas. O devir da mente

está ao seu mais descontroladamente criativo, está ao máximo grau animal e animado, quando precisa lutar por sua sobrevivência dentro da Máquina de Guerra.

Se o nosso processo perceptivo é cinematográfico, quase precisamos reconhecer a natureza genética de um Devir ancorado na percepção, pois cada vez que o obturador escurece, o que surge na luz deve fazê-lo das trevas, do não-ser como uma inexistência. Algo deve surgir ou emergir da imobilidade da pura escuridão ou pura leveza, da cegueira primordial do infinito. Mas há algo aqui ou há um nada, um vazio? Ou isso é um recipiente de algum tipo que serve como o agenciamento vazio da criação? Nós realmente começamos do zero ou existe um resíduo que permita o avanço como transformação ou tradução? O residual como persistência é a objetividade da imagem e é diferente ou de uma natureza diferente da diferença que surge como o excedente que distingue um instante do seguinte.

Dentro da construção ortodoxa da realidade, podemos nos posicionar inicialmente no degrau mais baixo da ascensão moralmente desejável que nos leva do Caos ao reino beatífico de Deus, onde podemos posicionar a Criança no fundo e o Homem Adulto no topo, deste lado do limiar do material para o espiritual. Mas, se nos afastarmos do moralismo que busca o divino e o bom, vemos que devir não é apenas o movimento para cima, entretanto qualquer movimento para o aproveitamento do potencial na criação da diferença em direção a tudo o que não é abertura infinita — o Devir-Criança se situa dentro dessa dinâmica criativa de abertura a potenciais infinitos. Não há um *telos* implícito ou finalidade na atualização do devir, apenas metastabilidades duracionais dentro do processo dinâmico e a abertura do campo de experiência a novos potenciais. E é porque não há um *telos* moralista que temos uma ética de intensificação. Para Spinoza, quanto maior a adequação, maior o poder de ação, pois quanto maior a comunalidade da noção, maior o número de participações.

Temos discutido o lado processual, e assim o diagrama fornece os constituintes essenciais que guiam a inteligência dentro da cognição perceptiva como os caminhos neurais criadores do conceito de “fechamento”, como o momento de crise que impulsiona o avanço e não a produção de objetos. Conforme vimos anteriormente, o resultado da determinação da Raiva não é o de conferir o rótulo “Raiva” ao evento, mas *determinar a formulação pragmática da resolução da questão “lutar ou fugir?”* Essa formulação acontece em outro nível — assim como a contração imagética acontece em um circuito neural diferente. Podemos pensar nesse salto para outro nível como um movimento ascendente, uma

“ascensão”, que em francês seria *monter* ou em português subir, de modo que a operação pudesse ser caracterizada como uma montagem. Em termos de nossa pesquisa, repousaríamos essa questão em termos de uma montagem maquina sendo criada através da justaposição abrupta de imagens? Isso ofereceria fundamentos para reexaminar os fundamentos teóricos da montagem, particularmente o efeito Kuleshov, a fim de reconsiderar como seus princípios dialéticos e associativos são realmente formulados — uma preocupação que infelizmente está além do escopo desta tese.

Parece que estamos usando os termos percepção e cognição de forma intercambiável, mas distinguimos a percepção pela falta da memória, enquanto uma cognição é uma percepção repetida e repetível que é condicionada pela memória e averiguada através da repetição. A esse respeito, as crianças são exemplos mais ilustrativos da percepção do que da cognição. Em termos bergsonianos, como apresentado em *Matéria e Memória*, a criança está mais preocupada com a percepção pura, um modo de percepção que não depende da memória, e está mais interessada em produzir diagramas fechados primitivos como conceitos do que em averiguar ou determinar as consequências pragmáticas. Os diagramas primitivos surgem experimentalmente e servem de semente de cristal para a agregação futura — como tal, eles estão produzindo ou estabelecendo o circuito memorial que se tornará permanente como habituação e se entrincheirá como um padrão de cognição. Uma vez que esse padrão de cognição é estabelecido, torna-se difícil desfazê-lo porque as ligações relacionais que constituem o corpo não são apenas pertinentes à constituição daquele corpo singular, mas o vinculam reticularmente a outros corpos e meios como associações concretas com uma miríade de outros agenciamentos.

Para que os adultos entrem no modo Devir-Criança, eles teriam que engajar o mundo de acordo com esse modo de descoberta empírica que implica um modo ativo de esquecimento, uma destruição voluntária do arquivo que contém todos os circuitos pré-compostos da memória habitual. Isto requer a busca de novas técnicas de engajamento, e relações práticas não convencionais, de compreensão ontológica, de percepção, de condicionamento do encontro a fim de desfazer o habitual. O que precisamos fazer é transformar criativamente nosso cotidiano do familiar, ao estranho... do conhecido, ao desconhecido a fim de poder conhecê-lo novamente de um ponto de vista empírico inocente e anarquívico. Esse rastreamento pela obliteração da memória, da inocência empírica e da reversão de nossa madurez adulta para o minoritário de afins criadores e por meios

criativos constituem as práticas desinteressadas que permitem que o Devir-Criança possa vir a instalar-se.

### **As implicações epistemológicas do processo de devir imagético**

Ao considerarmos o progresso histórico do pensamento grego antigo em termos amplos, podemos discernir uma mudança nos modos de compreensão através dos quais os gregos entenderam e expressaram sua compreensão da natureza. A história do pensamento não é outra senão a história da sua representação. Durante um período de 30 anos, a partir de 500 b.c.e. até 470 b.c.e., (ORTEGA Y GASSET, 1960) o pensamento grego, progride do mito para a ciência filosófica — sua infância emerge nas histórias dos titãs, dos seres míticos, que simbolicamente expressam as forças da natureza em termos de entidades sobre-humanas e cuja maturidade é exibida pela predicação do entendimento por meio daquilo que agora entendemos como ciência. O que é fundamental para essa compreensão histórica do pensamento é que ele precisa ser entendido como o encontro com o mundo e como expressamos aquilo que entra no encontro. Quando os primeiros pensadores gregos — pessoas que refletem sobre o que é o mundo, mas ainda não são filósofos — começam a descrever o funcionamento do mundo, o fazem por meio de corpos. Eles entendem o funcionamento do mundo em termos de "corpos", mas não têm meios para expressar a constituição desses corpos cientificamente ou conceitualmente. Os únicos corpos que eles conhecem são corpos de plantas, corpos de animais e corpos humanos que expressam seu caráter através de suas atividades ou ações no mundo: os gregos entendem que os corpos agem no mundo e, como resultado, produzem mudanças. Assim, eles expressam a natureza da Natureza através da natureza natural — a mudança é entendida como resultante da interação de corpos, corpos que só podem ser caracterizados como seres vivos e cuja forma mais familiar é a do humano. Entretanto, antes de descartar essas metáforas como primitivas e infantis, por que ainda elaborarmos a ideia Spinozista de “o que um corpo pode fazer” apenas em termos de “o que um corpo ‘humano’ pode fazer”? Ou pensamos que no terceiro dia Jesus ressuscitou, ou interpretamos o drama freudiano de Édipo; ou imaginamos Deus como um corpo celeste sentado em uma nuvem, como se fossem pessoas humanas dotadas de corpos físicos?

Mais tarde, os gregos passam a expressar a ordem causal da Natureza por meio da



tragédia através da compreensão dramática da natureza da natureza como um acontecimento implacável e inexorável, uma manifestação da intuição do tempo que esmaga tudo em seu avanço através de sua inflexível progressão como uma inescapável inevitabilidade. Essa causalidade necessária é entendida, em última análise, em termos de corpos humanos no mundo, apesar da intercessão dos deuses por trás da cena.

O funcionamento da natureza é entendido através de elementos naturais que não são corpos humanos, mas substâncias que aludem à compreensão funcional dos processos da natureza pelo uso de corpos “não-humanos” naturais. Dessa maneira, temos a expressão da natureza do mundo expressa através das substâncias elementares do Fogo, Água, Ar, Terra, Quintessência, *apeiron*, o intervalo, etc., que não são atributos diretos, mas expressões metafóricas. Portanto, se Heráclito escreve “Tudo é Fogo” ou se Thales escreve “Tudo é Água”, e dizer que para os antigos gregos tudo no mundo é composto de fogo ou de água, é provavelmente uma interpretação errônea. Talvez, uma interpretação mais feliz seria uma expressão de uma compreensão processual como "A composição de tudo no mundo é semelhante à ação combustiva ou consumista do fogo" ou "As coisas no mundo se associam a um modo de ser semelhante ao fluxo de água"... a conclusão é baseada na observação empírica da natureza, mas não há explicação racional porque a compreensão processual simplesmente não está lá. Sem a compreensão geral de uma base teórica, a explicação recai sobre uma explicação metafórica ou alegórica. Nessas explicações alegóricas, a presença de Deus é relegada a uma posição externa que Ele ocupa como criador de tudo, embora dissociada da criação que funciona independentemente dele. Eventualmente, isso levará a O pensamento científico de Arquimedes que, em seu estilo e métodos, subscreve o pensamento científico moderno.

Ao discutir a Ideia em Platão e a Forma em Aristóteles, Bergson (2018) trata a ideia da volta de Platão a Deus como mediador entre a Ideia que deve servir como modelo e processo em devir em geral como uma explicação articulada através do mito. Para nós, esse dispositivo retórico representa uma regressão ao pensamento grego anterior, no qual ideias (metafísicas ou outras) são apresentadas como corpos antropomórficos, como corpos humanos exibindo características e condutas humanas. Assim, quando Deleuze e Guattari descrevem Devir-Criança em termos que confiam nas imagens das crianças, ou mulheres, ou animais, ou personagens conceituais, mas se abstêm de explicar o neologismo em termos "processuais", eles estão adotando um aspecto do Método de Devir-Criança. Isso consistiria

em dar forma humana a conceitos abstratos para explicar e explicitar seu funcionamento no mundo. Não se trata de tornar os conceitos acessíveis às crianças, uma infantilização dos conceitos, mas de regredir na progressão epistêmica da explicação na representação de forças e movimentos processuais indefiníveis em termos humanos, pois é muito parecido com o que os gregos fizeram na infância do desdobramento histórico do pensamento. Desse modo, o Método de Devir-criança mais acessível seria um dispositivo retórico que procura explicar ideias abstratas do pensamento processual através do uso metafórico / alegórico de agentes humanos como essencialmente explicativos. O movimento aqui é semelhante a uma generalização truncada em que o quadro de referência consiste de uma forma humana em oposição a um primitivo mais geral como agente efetivo. Sendo assim, a postulação da Máquina de Guerra em Deleuze e Guattari seria derivada por meio da aplicação de um Devir-Criança como Método para expressar o processo abstrato de pensamento como um encontro com o mundo em termos do comportamento dos povos nômades e de um Estado, de uma máquina putativamente composta de seres humanos, etc.

O Devir-Criança pode ser caracterizado pelo retorno à infância do pensamento, um retorno às origens das impressões pré-conceituais, a noções nascentes que são pré-rationais. Eles são pré-rationais, embora não necessariamente não-rationais, porque na criança o pensamento pode ser lógico mas não-racional — não há base conceitual memorial pela qual a criança possa comparar e contrastar, isto é, racionalizar o encontro, averiguar a veracidade de suas impressões. Devir-criança é voltar ao pré-conceitual da experiência pura como base para re-conceitualizar, para conceitualizar o encontro com a novidade como uma criança. Mas o aspecto chave de Devir-criança é a produção de conceitos em uma justificativa para comparação e contraste — as crianças são filósofos porque eles prosperam na produção de conceitos a partir da percepção pura e recorrência ou repetição na experiência. Eles são por natureza filósofos e naturalmente desarchiveados.

Ao executar este método, estamos criando um movimento que nos leva do Ser-Homem como um Adulto Masculino como uma Forma, uma ideia estática transcendental, e "a degrada" para a do Devir-Criança. O que é mais óbvio aqui é a produção de uma cisão majoritária-minoritária como reflexo da cisão adulto-criança, mas também da cisão entre adultos e **menores**. Em termos de *Aufklärung*, do Iluminismo como definido por Kant, retrabalhado por Simondon, e então transformado por Deleuze e Guattari como devir minoritário. O projeto de Deleuze e Guattari de Devir Menor representa um contra-

Iluminismo (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 2003). Ao contrário do que Kant propõe em sua renomada *Resposta à pergunta: "O que é esclarecimento (iluminação)?"* (KANT, 1996), Deleuze e Guattari nos encorajam a não permanecer no mundo antigo, mas a embarcar no caminho de devir menor. G pode usar o mesmo termo "menor", mas com efeito significativamente diferente. Kant o usa como termo pejorativo que ele define como "indecisão e falta de coragem para usar a própria mente sem a orientação de outra pessoa". Preguiça e covardia que se impõem e que resiste ao pensamento independente.

Se trazemos o pensamento para a esfera do Devir minoritário, Deleuze nos incita a voltar para o Devir-Criança ou Devir-Mulher ou Devir-Animal para fugir do fascismo identitário da vida cotidiana e as restrições impostas pelo patriarcado a todas as esferas da existência. Resgatamos o aspecto imanente do Devir duracional da dinâmica cíclica e circular fechada de um eterno retorno sem saída. O círculo do devir precisa ser visto como um movimento helicoidal em que o traço nunca se fecha, nunca se forma — na medida que avança no espaço-tempo, está sempre em devir e nunca se produz. Como tal, este ciclo circular representa o ciclo material de criação das Formas, primeiro como uma entidade perceptual que se torna conceito e simultaneamente em uma noção e é progressivamente aperfeiçoada através da repetição para devir uma Forma aperfeiçoada dentro do reino mental. A Forma, como uma adequação idealizada de um conceito derivado empiricamente, fica aberta: embora o conceito gradualmente adquira consistência e definição e seja usado como um objeto aperfeiçoado, ele ainda é uma entidade aberta. Isso significa que esse corpo que age e pode ser usado em termos espinosistas ainda é permeável, pode adquirir ou perder atributos de componentes. Mas o que chama a atenção aqui é que, se interpretarmos esses movimentos simbolicamente como representações da formação conceitual, poderemos entender o processo de formação de ideias de maneiras diferentes.

Porque alguém tomaria o caminho do Devir-Criança? Porque nos dota de uma subjetividade sem entraves e que é criativa. Ao descrever essas possibilidades, não estamos falando especificamente de crianças *per se* como indivíduos no mundo, mas como funções e práticas que condicionam o avanço processual de acordo com o modo de Devir-Criança. Ao fazer isso, não estamos avaliando as virtudes ou as falhas desses métodos, simplesmente atestando que estão à mão para a ativação da experiência de maneiras específicas que são identificadas como sendo contrárias àquilo que identificamos como a contraparte humana de Deus no reino do material: homem. Esses modos de ser não são específicos ao Devir-

Criança, pois não são apenas as crianças que exploram essas práticas; qualquer devir pode fazer uso deles, mas o que realmente os separa e os torna específicos para o Devir-Criança é como o corpo fraco, imaturo e dependente da criança em desenvolvimento confronta o mundo com suas várias capacidades de afetar e ser afetado e interage com o mundo como "puro", sem critérios, referências ou moralidade para guiá-lo. Nós oferecemos ao Devir-Criança uma posição homogênea que normalmente não teria no "campo" uma construção rizomática conceitual e, é claro, que não vive "por conta própria" em uma ilha, separada do resto do mundo.

### **Memórias de um teólogo**

Um tema que encontramos repetidamente em nossa pesquisa é a afável e acolhedora postura das Igrejas cristãs em relação às crianças por meio de sua Teologia das Crianças e da exegese da preocupação de Jesus pelas crianças. Mesmo que o Antigo Testamento tenda a ser disciplinador, embora existam referências para uma disposição favorável em relação às crianças, é no Novo Testamento que encontramos várias referências ao coração terno de Jesus para com as crianças. Possivelmente, a mais conhecida destas citações seja: "Deixai as crianças e não as impeçais de virem até mim, pois delas é o reino dos céus" (Mateus, 19:14). É um pensar que foi imitado por políticos cínicos de todas as tipos para significar que eles são de fato dotados de sentimentos humanos e têm os mesmos interesses e esperanças no coração que os pais-cidadãos. As crianças são os significantes mitológicos de um povo por vir: eles articulam a dobra que alinha os interesses do estado como veiculado pelo político com aqueles dos pais.



Figura 4.4: *Jesus chama as crianças para ele, Evangelho de Marcos.* (1852-1860). Julius von Carolsfeld.

Figura 4.5: Adolf Hitler chama as crianças para ele no Berghof, sua casa Alpina preferida (Sem data, domínio público).

No caso de Jesus, deve-se diferenciar entre o Jesus de carne e osso e a Palavra de Deus de Jesus. A doutrina cristã compreende-os simultaneamente, daí o significado dos ritos da Missa como principal serviço sacramental que combina a Liturgia da Palavra com a Liturgia da Eucaristia como a resolução do mistério da fé. Também vemos Jesus como a Palavra de Deus encarnada e, portanto, não temos problema em entender isso em termos de Jesus como a mensagem de Deus articulada através da Palavra e Ação. Fazer isso nos permite entender e interpretar sua Vida, seus Atos e Morte, e sua Ressurreição como signos peirceanos — como algo que significa alguma coisa a alguém. Se Jesus é o Corpo que expressa ou media o *Logos*, a Palavra de Deus como um corpo de conhecimento, através dos relatos narrativos do Novo Testamento narrados pelos quatro “narradores Benjaminos” apostólicos, então podemos ver que Ele é literalmente um corpo semiótico — Σῶμα-Σημα, uma *soma-sema* — que como o Filho de Deus, é um corpo material, Σῶμα (soma), que é deste mundo e faz a mediação de Deus Pai através do Espírito Santo. É por esta razão que quando o Evangelho é lido, a frase “Palavra de Deus” é invocada pela longa lista de personagens conceituais que a pronunciam através do tempo. Como apontamos anteriormente, a raiz da palavra, Σημα (*sema*), é um enigma bipolar no sentido de que indica um futuro enquanto atesta o passado: é um signo de futuridade que existe como marca num campo que indica a localização de uma entidade que está enterrada, que se encontra no processual da terra elementar, na riqueza orgânica do *chernozem*, e é também aquela que

caracteriza a primazia do signo. O marcador pode estar na superfície como a pedra sepulcral, mas o significado significativo está enterrado no miolo do poder transformador da Terra como substância elementar, abaixo da superfície do solo. O corpo físico de Jesus pode ter morrido na cruz, mas a Palavra viverá sem o corpo físico de Cristo, como é indicado pela ressurreição: a ressurreição não é a volta do corpo físico de Jesus, mas a volta à vida da Palavra. À vista disso, o poder da Palavra como Logos abre a tumba e pula para a pedra ao lado, que é o selo e a marca da presença da Palavra, para que ela possa se fazer caminho no mundo.

A maneira pela qual Jesus é caracterizado como um ser humano nos Evangelhos é diferente dos atributos que ele será mais tarde designado quando será usado como instrumento da Igreja. Seu ministério consistia em ensinar e curar — em assumir os dois papéis de doutor — e ele abraçava o Outro na forma da criança, da prostituta, dos doentes e dos idosos, dos mortos, dos pobres de espírito e dos destituídos — todos indicadores de devires. Especificamente com crianças, essas curas incluíam curar doenças (João 4: 46–52), exorcizar demônios (Marcos 7: 24–30; 9: 14–27) e ressuscitar pelo menos uma criança dentre os mortos (Lucas 8: 40–56). Podemos também entender sua relação com esses devires como aspectos da semiótica perceptual do pensamento imagético e interpretar cada um deles como devires materiais que articulam figurações mundanas de incorporações deficientes, doentes ou pecaminosas do corpo do Logos de Deus, em uma palavra, diferenças a serem repudiadas em vez de aceitas. Jesus como o supremo doutor de corpos deficientes pode então ser visto como o professor preeminente, o primeiro Doutor da Igreja, que iria “corrigir ou disciplinar” essas manifestações materiais encorpadas, porém inadequadas da criação de Deus.

A cena ilustrada na imagem de Carolsfeld (Figura 4.5) é da história do Evangelho em Mateus (19:13-15), que relata como as pessoas trouxeram crianças para serem abençoadas por Jesus. O gesto é chamado de “Imposição das Mãos” e é um rito sagrado que veio dos tempos patriarcais e chegou a designar uma doutrina católica essencial, como enunciada em Hebreus 6:2 como uma mediação da descida do Espírito Santo. Representa o ato supremo do doutor como professor e curador, a transmissão direta do Logos como cura para o corpo doente que serve de mediação da relação docente-discente. O sacramento sobrevive até hoje no Rito de Ordenação, Confirmação, Batismo e Coroação dos Reis (CROSS e LIVINGSTONE, 1997). A foto do Hitler representa a versão secular do sacramento da

χειροτονία, (*cheirotonia*), da imposição das mãos. Isso foi uma prática que os reis da Inglaterra e da França, agindo como *medium* para a graça de Deus, praticavam uma forma híbrida de cura pela fé — que ao mesmo tempo era ‘científica’ — no início do período moderno, até o início do século XVIII na Inglaterra e até o século XIX na França (BROGAN, 2015): híbrido no sentido que, como veremos a seguir, parte da cura é baseada na fé no poder de Deus e parte dela nos poderes curativos do amuleto de ouro dado durante a cerimônia. Mas para nós estes parecem ser motivos para perguntar se não há uma aceitação implícita do rei como supremo representante do Estado, de que ele será responsável pela doença no seu reino? Que existe uma relação direta entre a saúde das pessoas e seu bem-estar material com a saúde e a prosperidade? Não há uma confluência religiosa e científica que ainda não tenha sido resolvida? A doação do amuleto como parte da cura não é apenas farmacêutica, mas também uma admissão da responsabilidade do Estado pelo bem-estar das pessoas. A simbologia em jogo aqui indicaria a expressão de culpabilidade e vergonha por parte do Estado por suas deficiências em assegurar o bem-estar de seus cargos: o Estado tem que participar ativamente e investir devidamente no bem-estar das pessoas.



Figura 4.6: *O Dom Real da Cura - Charles II tocando um paciente com scrófula.* (1684). Por Robert White. Domínio público.

Quando comparamos as imagens que descrevem a imposição das mãos, ficamos impressionados com a semelhança entre as imagens de Jesus e do Hitler e ao mesmo tempo somos repelidos pela comparação. No entanto, precisamos reconhecer que o contraste das duas imagens na Figura 4.5 exibe algumas detrações que nos repelem, na medida em que

cruza uma linha que, apesar da boa vontade de Jesus em relação as crianças, nos permite discernir a presença ativa e esconsa da militância dogmática da Igreja. Na Figura 4.6, que retrata o rei inglês Charles II tocando um paciente afligido pela escrofulose, encontra-se entre as duas outras figuras em que a realeza assume o papel de curador outorgado pelo direito divino através da ordenação durante a coroação. Durante a administração do Toque do Rei, cada indivíduo recebeu uma peça de toque, uma moeda de ouro chamada Anjo de Ouro (BROGAN, 2015), que estava amarrada a uma fita branca que permitia que fosse usada como um amuleto. De um lado, a moeda mostrava o Arcanjo Miguel matando o dragão e, do outro, o navio do Estado brasonado com as armas reais sustentadas pela cruz sagrada, e uma inscrição: *Per Crucem Tuam Salva Nos Christe Redemptor* (YOUNG, 2016). A peça de ouro também é significativa por outro motivo. Parece que, por causa dos avanços metalúrgicos trazidos pelas ciências alquímicas, a qualidade do ouro era mais fina e mais eficaz do ponto de vista médico. “A ideia de que o ouro era um remédio soberano era familiar em iatroquímica e medicina paracelsana / astrológica, e é possível que uma das razões para acreditar na eficácia dos toques é a correspondência entre o ouro como o metal do Sol e a realeza, que correspondia astrologicamente ao Sol” (YOUNG, 2016). Por isso, o rito do Toque do Rei articula um sacramento complexo através de um argumento circular que afirma que o rei pode curar porque ele foi ordenado rei e ele é rei porque ele pode curar. Aparentemente, a Graça Divina foi ajudada pelo poder medicinal do ouro alquímico superior contido no Anjo que trabalhava em unísono com a *virtus* do Toque do Rei para aumentar o *senhoriagem* da moeda e supervalorizá-la além do seu valor como mercadoria. Mas o Toque do Rei como expressão das obrigações sociais da coroa é mais complexo do que parece, visto que, junto com a transferência da cura real e da Graça Divina, com o presente do Anjo de Ouro há um reconhecimento da parte do Estado pela responsabilidade direta do bem-estar dos súditos: se os seus súditos sofrem de aflições mundanas — espiritual, moral, física e material — não são o resultado da pobreza individual, mas da fraqueza do corpo social. Eles são sintomas do mal-estar de um corpo social do qual o rei não pode se separar.

Ainda assim, no momento em que essas idéias são apanhadas na modernidade, vemos como elas já foram transformadas. Se Jesus estava realmente preocupado com os deficientes e indigentes, impulsionado pela aceitação da diferença e da ministração de socorro e compaixão, a preocupação com o Outro foi transformada em uma questão de



legitimar o poder Divino da realeza como uma fusão de Igreja e Estado e, posteriormente, a preocupação política com o recrutamento e manutenção de futuros seguidores, a prevenção da errância e punição por transgressões contra os ditames do dogma — a imposição de mãos tornou-se um gesto cínico de propaganda e o Anjo Dourado é hoje nada mais que uma propina, uma compra de votos.

As crianças apresentadas nos Evangelhos são tratadas por Jesus com respeito, dignidade e gratidão. Nos poucos registros apostólicos que dão conta dos encontros com as crianças, Jesus é sempre acolhedor e mostra-lhes bondade e amor, até mesmo ao menosprezo dos adultos presentes. Em Marcos (10:13-15), essa elevada benevolência é manifestamente proeminente: “E traziam-lhe meninos para que lhes tocasse, mas os discípulos repreendiam aos que lhes traziam. Jesus, porém, vendo isto, indignou-se, e disse-lhes: Deixai vir os meninos a mim, e não os impeçais; porque dos tais é o reino de Deus. Em verdade vos digo que qualquer que não receber o reino de Deus como menino, de maneira nenhuma entrará nele”. Este é um dos principais ensinamentos dos Evangelhos: Mateus (19: 13-14), Marcos (10: 13-16) e Lucas (18: 15-17) relatam o evento de maneiras muito semelhantes. Todos enfatizam a transmissão direta pela sua bênção que é indicativa da afirmação de Jesus sobre a capacidade espiritual das crianças. Mas se alguém atende aos ensinamentos da Igreja Cristã, não é por causa dos “estados subjetivos maravilhosos que freqüentemente encontramos em crianças, tal como confiança, receptividade, simplicidade ou maravilha, por mais bonitas que sejam”, mas por causa de sua “dependência desamparada” (HUGHES, 2015) — e é exatamente a humildade, fé e confiança inocente da criança que colora a maravilha natural que produz a receptividade imaculada e pura que a Igreja cobiça.

Jesus, como mediador da Palavra, compreende que as crianças devem ser cuidadas e valorizadas pelo que são e como são, e não porque sejam a *materia prima*, o potencial pré-individual, sobre o qual uma futura comunidade eclesíástica será predicada. Em Mateus (11: 25–26), quando Jesus declara, “Graças te dou, ó Pai, Senhor do céu e da terra, que ocultaste estas coisas aos sábios e entendidos, e as revelaste aos pequeninos” parece que a mensagem que ele está transmitindo é diferente da mensagem que está sendo recebida. A mensagem depende do Devir-Criança, de modo que, quando afirma: “Em verdade vos digo que, se não vos converterdes e não vos fizerdes como meninos, de modo algum entrareis no reino dos céus. Portanto, aquele que se tornar humilde como este menino, esse é o maior

no reino dos céus. E qualquer um que receber em meu nome um menino, tal como este, a mim me recebe.” Com Mateus (18:3-5), perguntamo-nos sobre a natureza dos ensinamentos que ele pretende transmitir. Qual é o aprendizado que as crianças têm, que está oculto para os sábios e eruditos? Como as crianças podem ser simples, ignorantes e inexperientes, mas não podem ser enganadas pelos ensinamentos dos principais sacerdotes e mestres? Que conhecimento ou formas de conhecimento as crianças têm que não estão mais disponíveis intelectualmente para os adultos? Não é um conhecimento pré-ordenado e recebido, mas a desarquivação do Devir-Criança. É o método inquisitivo da criança que segue uma lógica própria como uma busca pela verdadeira explicação analítica que é apenas uma série de “porquês?” ao infinito poderia proporcionar.

Se a Palavra de Deus vai informar o povo por vir do cristianismo, deve começar por alinhar esse futuro com o potencial expresso pelas crianças. Uma criança atual no mundo como um corpo de carne e sangue representa o potencial puro que pode assumir peso e que também pode incorporar a missão subjetiva da Palavra. O entendimento de Jesus da criança é em termos da Palavra como condicionamento e agenciamento do Devir-Criança e não como restrições comportamentais ou canalização disciplinar de futuros adultos. Os ensinamentos de Jesus sobre as crianças estão em desacordo com a atitude paternalista degradante de algumas Igrejas cristãs e sua visão sobre as crianças fundadas no pecado, deficiência e necessidade de salvação, que pregam que “assim como as crianças precisam de disciplina e correção para permanecer no caminho certo, Deus nos diz na Escritura que somos Seus filhos e Ele nos corrige como um pai” (BIBLE STUDY TOOLS, 2019). Nada é mais explícito do que Provérbios 13:24: “O que não faz uso da vara odeia seu filho, mas o que o ama, desde cedo o castiga”. A atitude dos discípulos de repreender as crianças sobreviveu às advertências de Jesus para que hoje, por exemplo, tenhamos a Igreja Bethlehem Baptist americana especulando sobre a natureza das crianças e concluindo que elas têm uma natureza pecaminosa, que são imaturas e devem ser responsabilizadas. Da mesma forma, um documento de política da Igreja Menonita, também americana, interpreta os Evangelhos como se Jesus reclamasse a “submissão infantil e dependência daqueles que desejaram fazer parte de seu reino” e interpreta o repúdio dos apóstolos às crianças como a “indicação de que depois de todos os exemplos e lições, elas ainda não entendiam” (WIEBE, 1993). São interpretações perversas que só podem ser consideradas de interesse próprio como instituição do poder. No entanto, eles interpretam o versículo Mateus 18:3-5, “Amém vos

digo, a não ser que volteis a ser como as crianças, não entrareis no reino dos céus. 4 Aquele que se fizer humilde como criança, esse é o maior no reino dos céus. 5 E quem receber uma criança como esta em meu nome, recebe a mim”, de maneira estranha. Eles o interpretam como Jesus exigindo uma conversão, um novo nascimento nos adultos como se fosse uma reivindicação do Devir-Criança nos adultos. Mas, aos olhos da Igreja, não para a aceitação da filosofia da diferença que Jesus parece estar pregando, mas de uma subserviência, uma submissão e dependência infantil à vontade de Deus canalizada pela máquina eclesiástica (WIEBE, 1993). O que é interessante sobre isso é a compreensão implícita nos Evangelhos do que está em jogo no Devir-Criança e no que isso implica. Uma mudança de paradigma no pensamento só pode levar a um lugar através de um Devir-Criança onde as estruturas epistemológicas e mnemônicas existentes são dissolvidas através de práticas anarquivas e são permitidas a entrar num empirismo puro do devir processual.

Que podemos tirar disso? O conceito de criança como devir em conjunção com Jesus produz um conjunto complexo de possibilidades que traça de novo muitos dos caminhos estabelecidos por nossas análises precedentes. Na relação de Jesus como curador e professor, percebemos a relação do doutor com o corpo de conhecimento e sua articulação no mundo; na sua relação com as crianças, podemos ver os aspectos de transmissão e contágio apontados por Deleuze e Guattari que estão em jogo no devir; vemos o que o Devir-Criança implica em termos de transformação e conversão e porque os atributos caracterológicos geralmente atribuídos à criança são necessários para poder efetuar o tipo particular de devir que o Devir-Criança pressupõe como um conceito processual. O que se torna importante para nós aqui é o movimento que ocorre na ressurreição, onde o corpo de Jesus poderia ter morrido na cruz, mas a Palavra viverá com o corpo de Cristo. Permite-nos compreender um personagem histórico como a personificação de um sistema de crenças sem ter que justificar esse raciocínio, sem ter que traçar o caminho da literatura.

### **Memórias do Édipo**

Gostaríamos de considerar outro caráter semi-mítico e situar essa discussão dentro de nosso paradigma de processo e devir imagéticos. *Même si ça crève les yeux*, Deleuze e Guattari não se envolvem neste tipo de interpretação de Édipo, mesmo que o conteúdo signalético de Devir como conceito, elaborado como Devir-Criança ou Devir-Mulher já esteja

fazendo muito do trabalho para nós.

O complexo de Édipo emerge publicamente em *Die Traumdeutung (A Interpretação dos Sonhos)* (1900) da análise de um sonho de Freud, mas foi estabelecida anteriormente em uma carta a Wilhelm Fliess em 1897: “Uma única idéia de valor geral me ocorreu. Eu também descobri, no meu próprio caso, [o fenômeno] de estar apaixonado por minha mãe e com ciúmes de meu pai, e agora o considero um evento universal na primeira infância” (MASSON, 1985, p. 272). O psicanalista francês Juan-David Nasio desconsidera a descoberta freudiana do complexo de Édipo por meio da auto-análise, conforme relatado nas edições posteriores de *A Interpretação dos Sonhos*, descarta a idéia de que Freud concebeu a idéia ao examinar crianças e especula que a invenção de Édipo foi o resultado da escuta de seus pacientes adultos (NASIO, 2005). Mas Nasio faz a pergunta altamente pertinente: “Para que problema seria Édipo uma solução?” Para ele, “Édipo é a resposta a duas questões: primeiro, o que dá forma à identidade sexual de um homem e uma mulher, e segundo, como uma pessoa se torna um neurótico?” (NASIO, 2005, p. 43). Esta é uma proposta muito séria para simplesmente invertermos o problema, a resposta que deve surgir sem hesitação quando alguém perguntar “O que dá forma à identidade sexual de um homem e uma mulher?” Deve ser sem reservas: Édipo! Se esta não é a resposta reflexa, a psicanálise tem um sério problema fundamental. Semelhantemente para “como uma pessoa se torna um neurótico?” A pessoa simplesmente percebe a circularidade da proposição: eu me torno um neurótico por causa da minha incapacidade de reconciliar minha edipalização e, porque Édipo, eu sou um neurótico — tentando refutar meu neuroticismo só o provo. A interpretação de Freud se parece mais a um assunto privado do que com uma interpretação fidedigna da tragédia de Sófocles que produz uma verdade universal, a Palavra de Deus, como a concepção de um Édipo generalizado. Se, como Nasio afirma, Édipo é o conceito mais crucial da psicanálise, parece-nos uma fundação frágil para o imenso edifício da psicanálise — a menos, claro, que sua tarefa seja de edipalizar. A interpretação do mito, em termos psicanalíticos, não interpreta adequadamente o mito, nem fundamenta adequadamente o processo que ele busca identificar: ele deveria encontrar um nome diferente. Deve-se começar afirmando que o mito de Édipo é anterior à versão de Sófocles e que a interpretação freudiana é periférica à história original e à sua dramatização. Apesar dessa crítica, minha intenção não é rever ou aprofundar a interpretação psicanalítica ou criticar seu significado, mas oferecer uma interpretação um tanto diferente do mito, que incorpore algumas das idéias e conceitos que

desenvolvemos em torno do devir e do movimento imagético.

Mas nas perguntas que Nasio (2011) faz já vemos a ruptura com Deleuze e Guattari. Eles entendem que a questão não é sobre a identidade sexual como gênero no homem e mulher, mas na expressão da produção de diferença que não depende apenas da sexualidade, identidade ou gênero, mas é derivada da falha sísmica ontológica do *Anti-Édipo* e *Mil Platôs* como Homem versus Devir-Mulher, Devir-Criança ou Devir-Animal. Qual é o problema para o qual o Oedipus é a solução? Qual é o movimento do pensamento que é identificado dentro do mito de Édipo? Se tentarmos expressar o mito como problema em termos de tempo, que verdade como agenciamento maquínico construir? Pois como pode a história ser sobre competição desenfreada com o pai e desejo sexual pela mãe quando não há conexão associativa entre Édipo e seus pais biológicos além do destino? Na história que Édipo conta, uma história diferente, afirmamos que Sófocles entende o que está em jogo em sua narrativa, apesar do foco dramático nos aspectos mais chocantes da história. Sófocles parece concordar com a lógica subjacente da narrativa com o único objetivo da mentalidade trágica que motiva a obra como veículo. O movimento de pensamento que flui através do ciclo de três obras tem mais a ver com cognição e conhecimento do que com competição e incesto ou autoconhecimento. Como tal, Sófocles pode ser um agente anônimo e ausente na exposição do drama, mas ele é o impulsionador do desdobramento da narrativa, porque ele parece querer olhar o sofrimento de Édipo e permite o preço pesado que o rei de Tebas terá que pagar sem culpa nenhuma — não são apenas o escritor e os deuses, mas também as musas que são vingativas para com ele. Como o que acabamos por entender, um signo simbólico de um “experimento” epistemológico fracassado, Édipo é ridicularizado pelo dramaturgo, da mesma forma com que os países socialistas derrotados pelas economias colusivas e intervencionistas se deliciam em pregar o fracasso de uma economia ou governo em que eles foram cúmplices no seu desmantelamento.

Para nós, a generalidade ou universalidade do enigma da Esfinge é questionável. A Esfinge é um oráculo cujos pronunciamentos testam o indivíduo não através de um enigma único, mas através de um desafio singular específico que aborda as circunstâncias únicas do suplicante. A Esfinge produz pronunciamentos que testam o indivíduo em seus próprios termos de acordo com seu estado de coisas — é uma maneira de estabelecer o valor do indivíduo que está sendo testado a fim de determinar sua solidez e integridade. E como qualquer teste que procura determinar a realidade de algo, seu *Beingness*, por assim dizer, o

teste testa o que é ou não é. Qualifica a passagem da menoridade para a maioridade: o teste é aquele que tem o efeito dinâmico no indivíduo de transformá-lo num adulto de pleno direito (SIMONDON, 1969). Assim, passando o teste formulado pela Esfinge, Édipo é considerado como sendo Ser; ele passou no teste que o transforma de um menor a um homem, do menor como não-ser para um indivíduo considerado como Ser e pode ser um cidadão de pleno direito. Mas ao analisar essa história, os críticos parecem supor que o problema singular apresentado a Édipo representa o problema universal que procura a resposta para a única questão que aflige todos os homens sobre sua existência no universo. A mais antiga pintura em vaso representando a Esfinge de Tebas "mostra sua perseguição ou captura de jovens tebanos" (EDMUNDS, 2006, p. 78), mas se Édipo fosse o único capaz de responder ao enigma, não restaria muita gente em Tebas.

Édipo é capaz de responder ao enigma da Esfinge porque sabe de onde ela vem e também tem uma predisposição inata para compreender o problema que está apresentando. A morfologia da Esfinge nos informa que ela, em si mesma, é o enigma problemático e que o enigma é nossa própria abordagem subjetiva e privada. A colocação do enigma é como a nossa subjetividade escolhe dar forma ao encontro com a Esfinge como uma proposta enigmática: enigmática porque ela caracteriza a natureza do nosso encontro com o mundo. A Esfinge representa o problema da existência que nos é lançado à medida que nos aproximamos do mundo e encontramos a novidade da experiência como uma proposta esquizo e rizomática. A Esfinge Grega, em oposição às esfinges das civilizações egípcia, micênica, assíria, persa e fenícia, tem a cabeça e o peito de uma mulher, o corpo de um leão, as asas de uma ave de rapina e a cauda de uma serpente. Ela incorpora uma variedade de devires — o Devir-Mulher, Devir-Animal, Devir-Mortal — e segundo a simbologia tradicional dos arquétipos é associada ao mundo inferior. Segundo o folclore, depois de Édipo vencer a Esfinge, ela se suicida pulando da Acrópole de Tebas para o rio Ismenus — uma repetição categórica do movimento descendente da queda para o fluxo caótico do materialismo.

Interpretamos o mito de Édipo como um conto preventivo que está nos dizendo que qualquer devir que busca se afastar da dominação do princípio masculino e tenta estabelecer um refúgio minoritário como um movimento do Devir-Criança, não é nada além do assassinato da Divindade patriarcal do conhecimento transcendental equivalente ao patricídio e a conjugação do pensamento com o princípio feminino da diferença implícito no

devir feminino, é equivalente a uma união incestuosa. Vemos a história de Édipo em termos de uma substituição direta dos caracteres pelos devires, de modo que Laio representa o homem transcendental. Jocasta o princípio feminino do movimento material oposto ao racionalismo masculino — a polaridade oposta ao macho molar como Devir-Mulher. Édipo é o malsucedido desafiador do homem majoritário, que, como um nômade insistente, termina como um devir, como um agenciamento com um Devir-Mulher com quem ele produz vários descendentes minoritários. Uma abordagem afirma que a Verdade e o Entendimento devem ser encontrados dentro, interiormente, e a outra afirma que a Verdade deve ser encontrada no mundo, onde o empirismo nômade revelará sua ordem apropriada através do método da memória.

Mas há também uma advertência ao homem majoritário dominante e a epistemologia tradicional: qualquer filiação material resultante da união profana da tese, (o Ideal, como aquilo que tem Ser), e sua antítese, (o Material, aquilo que não tem Ser), e que produz uma síntese dialética (a união heterogênea do Ideal e do Material), aniquilará ou usurpará aquilo que tem Ser: uma síntese dialética, que fica a vontade a ser criativa com o material, usurpará o conhecimento transcendental e acabará produzindo o caos. Ou, em outras palavras, seria uma re-declaração filosófica da Lei de Gresham: dinheiro ruim sai bem, a moeda falsa expulsará o puro. A praga e a maldição que afligem Tebas talvez sejam mais uma indicação do caos que Édipo traz para a ordem epistemológica das coisas sendo filho de Laio e Jocasta do que dos chamados crimes que cometeu.

O entendimento é que a combinação da tese como aquela que é com a antítese, como a que não é, produzirá uma descendência, uma síntese que só pode resultar em conflito e caos, e que o resultado é um empirismo cego, uma errância nômade guiado pelo tipo mais fraco de julgamento, privado de experiência, sabedoria e potencial — uma estranha inversão da relação de Freud com sua filha, Anna. Sófocles não é um observador imparcial e não nos oferece uma leitura objetiva das forças motrizes ativadas pela história: o mito faz dois olhos cegos para os impulsos da obra teatral para se deixarem edípianos (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 2010). Também é pertinente salientar que Freud minimizou a toxicidade paterna de Laio, tanto como doutor (tutor) para Laio tanto como pai para Édipo — ambos reforçam nossa caracterização do drama edípico como a obliteração da descendência ou filiação por causa da percepção do pai de um desafio à ordem estabelecida. Neste respeito, o grito do *Anti-Édipo* é a afirmação de que “não serei edipalizado!” como

resistência à inibição ou a obstrução ao Devir-Criança, e que ressoa com “não serei lobotomizado!”. Além disso, conhecer a pré-história de Édipo Rei e o passado de Laio sustenta nossa compreensão da experiência como devir através do avanço imagético, pois, segundo Ross, pode-se entender melhor a motivação do Ciclo de Tebê de Sófocles ao se familiarizar com a história de Laio. O público estava familiarizado com Laius e quando eles foram ver *Édipo Rei*, eles já “conheciam sua genealogia e legado, sua própria história de expulsão e sofrimento, os erros que ele cometeu muito antes da aparição de Édipo em cena, a arrogância ou transgressão pela qual o oráculo pronunciou sua punição” (ROSS, 1982, p. 175). Talvez, a história de Édipo trate mais as próprias inseguranças de Freud e sua ansiedade de ser um pai fracassado em relação a seus filhos — mudando o ônus da análise para a culpabilidade de Laius, Édipo não teria que assumir todo o fardo da culpa, assim desculpando o pai de toda responsabilidade — pois, no sistema patriarcal de crenças, a figura paterna nunca pode ficar errada.

Essa interpretação da história de Édipo também ganha força das semelhanças com a constelação de motivos de casualidade que orbitam em torno do mito de Poseidon e parecem se fundir aos temas que emergem em Édipo Rei. Como Laius, Poseidon monta uma carruagem puxada por quatro cavalos e pode ser identificada ao caminho ternário através de seu tridente de três pontas. Além disso, quando Poseidon estava cortejando a Nereida Thetis, foi profetizado que qualquer filho nascido de Thetis seria maior que seu pai; Poseidon desistiu (GRAVES, 1955). Hall também se refere a ele como o Senhor dos Sonhos, mas não encontramos corroboração para esse epíteto — talvez, o Senhor do Subconsciente possa ser mais proposital? Há também a discussão no *Crátilo* de Platão (402-403) sobre o nome Poseidon — que, dependendo de como se interpreta sua etimologia, pode significar “a cadeia nos pés” ou que “o Deus sabia muitas coisas” ou “ser o agitador da terra” (PLATO, 1952, p. 95).<sup>305</sup> Ser o agitador da terra liga o simbolismo de Poseidon ao Khōra e a dinâmica elementar transformadora da Terra porque o oceano é também um tipo de terra líquida que

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<sup>305</sup> “the chain of the feet”, “the God knew many things” (πολλὰ εἰδότης) e “shaker of the earth”. O πολλὰ εἰδότης é mais complexo do que apenas “muitas coisas”, pois o eidos aponta para especiações visualmente diferenciadas que, quando justapostas ao tremor da transformação elementar da terra, é bastante sugestivo de outras coisas. The πολλὰ εἰδότης is more complex than just “many things”, for *eidos* points to visually differentiated speciations which when juxtaposed to the shaking of elemental transformation is quite suggestive. Compare com a tradução ao espanhol da Mársico (2006): “nudo en los pies” e dios “sabe muchas cosas”, “el que conmueve”.



se move e que não nos deixa caminhar, e ainda mais modernamente à criação de noções através da territorialização-desterritorialização ou simplesmente de transformação.

O drama de Édipo está na descoberta e na lembrança do desvelamento de um passado esquecido por muito tempo, não em direção a uma revelação de identidade para poder responder "quem sou eu?", mas de sua percepção de que ele, de fato, poderia ser responsável pela praga e a mangra social que aflige Tebas. A maldição antecede o assassinato de Laio e possivelmente tem algo a ver com a tentativa de infanticídio cometido por Laio e Jocasta e o estupro de Crisipo por Laio. Que o abandono da criança na natureza fosse ou não justificado por causa do prognóstico do oráculo — e aparentemente um tanto tolerado por Sófocles — o simbolismo da peça fica de acordo com a nossa interpretação, teria a ver com a alegação de Sófocles de que o materialismo de Édipo é responsável pela destruição da ordem que depende do Pai Rei do conhecimento transcendental para manter o caos à distância. Os infortúnios representam a discórdia e o antagonismo entre duas escolas de pensamento, entre a filosofia jônica pré-socrática de Thales de Mileto (624 aC — 546 aC), Anaximandro de Mileto (610 aC — 546 aC), Anaxágoras de Mileto (586 aC — 526 aC) e Heráclito (535 aC — 475 aC) e os filósofos italianos Eleáticos da Magna Grécia como Pitágoras de Samos (570 aC — 495 aC), Xenófanes de Cólofon (570 aC — 475 aC), Parmênides de Eléia (515 aC — 546 aC) e Zeno de Elea (495 aC — 430 aC). Para localizar a obra de teatro em relação à linha do tempo filosófica, Sófocles (497 aC — 406 aC) estreou *Édipo Rei* em 429 aC. Concordamos com Kitto que Édipo “é inventado para impor a fé de Sófocles neste subjacente λόγος (*logos*); essa é a razão pela qual é verdade dizer que a perfeição de sua forma implica uma ordem mundial” (KITTO, 1990, p. 144). O filósofo espanhol José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) dedica um capítulo em *Origen y epílogo de la filosofía* (1960) à divisão de Parmênides e Heráclito que aborda o processo historiográfico para reconstruir as origens da mudança de paradigma. Em sua curta aplicação de um método histórico positivista, ele identifica a ruptura radical com os modos de pensamento da tradição mítica e sua bifurcação na teologia órfica e nos mistérios dionisíacos com a origem da filosofia propriamente dita. Ele faz isso analisando os aspectos formais da expressão, em vez do conteúdo filosófico em si. Ortega y Gasset, de fato, assinala que a forma mítica havia sido substituída pelas mais novas formas de discurso, mesmo que Parmênides a empregasse como veículo de expressão. “Parmênides usa o poema mitológico-místico sem acreditar mais nele, como mero instrumento de expressão — em

suma, como vocabulário” (ORTEGA Y GASSET, 1962, p. 80).

Como tal, a peça de Sófocles era tradicional na forma, permanecendo dentro do modo literário mitológico, enquanto discutia assuntos da mente como a dramática manipulação de mãos que resulta da rivalidade entre o idealista e o materialista — uma grande diferença com nossa dieta vazia moralista de bom policial/mau ladrão que somos servidos hoje. Se *Édipo Rei* implica, de fato, uma personificação dramática do conflito filosófico, uma dramatização da inimizade clássica entre Parmênides e Heráclito, para nós, desempenha uma das formas inadequadas de Devir-Criança. A tragédia encena uma infantilização do discurso, em que a predicação mais adequada do tema essencial da história de Édipo seria uma expressão mais abstrata, embora mais precisa, do que está em ação na obra. Quando esse tema é apresentado em termos de personagens humanos, entendemos isso como uma infantilização do Devir-Criança. A estrutura retórica da obra teatral nos faz pensar em um recente noticiário conservador americano que tenta alertar seus espectadores sobre os perigos do comunismo, citando a Suécia como um exemplo dos sinistros excessos do socialismo, mostrando exemplos de cuidados de saúde gratuitos, educação universitária gratuita, melhor segurança e o sucesso da rede de proteção social. Sófocles parece estar alertando ao público dizendo que se os "materialismos" se estabelecem em uma comunidade isso resultará no caos moral, a peste e discórdia na sua sucessão de ideias.

O tema da perambulação desempenha um papel significativo na obra dramática em que as imagens dos pés e o tema de mobilidade são detalhes significativos. Em grego, o sufixo *-pous* significa pé, (Οἰδίπους — *Oídipous*), por isso é interessante notar que a paternidade tóxica de Laio está ligada aos pés de suas cargas pedagógicas: Laio foi o tutor de Crispos (pés dourados) e pai de Édipos (pés tortos). Laio está viajando de carruagem quando Édipo o encontra pela primeira vez; o enigma da Esfinge se apresenta como um problema cujo núcleo problemático tem a ver com os pés; e Édipo está ligado ao pé: o nome, o destino do bebê de pés tortos e dos pés unidos deixado para morrer em alguma encosta estéril; e também como corpo “híbrido” sobre quatro pernas na fusão do velho e de sua filha caminhando como nômadas em Colono. Parece que Édipo é esperto demais para o seu próprio bem: se o enigma da Esfinge envolve a decifração da deambulação de quatro “patas” do bebê, as duas pernas do adulto e as três pernas trêmulas dos idosos, a compreensão de Édipo supera todas as expectativas, pois ele também conhece a

imobilidade dos pés imobilizados da criança abandonada como “um” ou como um número “dois” deformado; o número híbrido "irracional" dos dois pés do velho cego movendo-se em unísono com os dois pés da inexperiente criança "desavisada", que juntos somam um número parecido com quatro — um número irracional que apresenta os cegos liderando os cegos. Então ele "conhece" 4, 3 e 2 onde ninguém foi capaz de ver a conexão, mas também vê 1 e mais de 2, mas não exatamente 4. E esse retorno ao híbrido “quatro” indicaria um retorno à infância de quatro patas, que se pode olhar como uma infantilização ou um Devir-Criança, dependendo com qual lado você concorda. Um Édipo “numérico”, pitagórico, diria que a resposta do enigma da esfinge pode ser baseada em 4 mais 2 mais 3, é igual a 9 como o número natural do homem, então Édipo poderia ter chegado à mesma conclusão via números — o que, dada a premissa filosófica da obra, teria constituído uma resposta “melhor”, embora mostrasse a inclinação empirista ou pragmática da mentalidade de Édipo. A combinação de "numerologia" e perambulação também é evidente no encontro com Laio e é consistente com a nossa leitura filosófica do mito. O fato de que Laius representa um tipo particular de Idéias (racionalidade), chega em um "Ὀχημα (*ochēma*), a carruagem como o veículo da consciência, e que o encontro com Édipo acontece em uma junção tripla na estrada, são todos detalhes significativos. Até mesmo o número de cavalos que puxam a carruagem é digno de atenção, pois, se for 4, indica os Quatro Elementos, e se for 2 indica os aspectos duais da *psychē* em direção das três estradas que levam a fazer a escolha dos Três Mundos. A junção das três faixas da estrada, onde Laio tenta afastar Édipo do caminho, pode significar varias coisas e provavelmente significa diferentemente para intérpretes alinhados com Laio e aqueles alinhados com Édipo — o enigma supremo como problema colocado em termos de uma proposição triádica. A concepção triádica do Céu, da Terra e do Inferno ensina que Deus mora nos céus acima, a Terra intermediária é a morada do reino material e o Inferno, o reino do pré-individual caótico. Mas também pode ser sinônimo do intelecto da Divindade Triúna.

Pois, se Sófocles, ou, a lógica do mito, tivesse exigido que Édipo fosse castrado de imediato, o dramaturgo não teria hesitado em apresentá-lo sem ter que aludir simbolicamente, da mesma forma que eles não se importariam com a questão do incesto ou infanticídio. Uma leitura a contrapelo revelaria que Édipo fica aborrecido com o que vem a ver e é para nunca mais ter que testemunhar e ter que dar testemunho do que ele vê, ou vem a ver, como fonte de perene desilusão, ele se cega-se. Dentro da lógica de Sófocles, é por

repugnância de si mesmo que Édipo cega-se, mas também como uma medida profilática, muito parecida com Angelina Jolie, que é submetida a uma mastectomia radical dupla e a remoção de seus ovários e trompas de falópio como profilática. Não é como punição pelo incesto, pois não há proporcionalidade à punição se tudo o que Édipo consegue por matar seu pai é banimento. Freud confunde os olhos com os testículos e o afirma como um pronunciamento — isso seria dizer que a verdade empírica não surge dos olhos, mas do Princípio Masculino. Segundo Freud, em uma nota de rodapé adicionada em 1911 a *Interpretação dos Sonhos*, "a cegueira na lenda de Édipo, assim como em outros lugares, significa a castração" (Freud, 2010, p. 408). Mas por que o próprio Édipo se "castraria"? Figurativamente ou literalmente? Parece que Freud foi pressionado pelos colegas a introduzir uma interpretação auto-interessada (self-serving) e confundiu a atividade de atestar, do testemunho da *testis*, com os *testis* como testículos, que os filológicos modernos insistem que não são etimologicamente relacionados mesmo se houver uma similaridade de forma e número. Uma leitura alternativa da obra teatral como uma leitura da história de Édipo, os místicos judeus podem dizer que a fissão dos olhos é de Sófocles tomando a licença poética com os impulsos subjacentes do mito. Para eles, a cegueira de Édipo é uma deturpação de fechar os olhos à controvérsia, à polêmica vazia que o drama nos oferece. Para eles, "o inescrutável NADA transmitido à mente pelo fechamento dos olhos sugere a eterna natureza incognoscível e indefinível do ser perfeito" (HALL, 1984, p. 5).

A justiça poética, que Sófocles entrega a Édipo, como retribuição pela infração epistêmica de tentar destruir a Divindade patriarcal do conhecimento transcendental, é de arrancar-se os olhos por vergonha. Édipo cega-se para impedir que testemunhe empiricamente mais depreciações de iniciativas materiais. Os olhos são o sentido mais significativo e contribuinte para a semiótica perceptual e, portanto, é apropriado que Édipo destrua o sentido que é o maior responsável pela infração cognitiva, a transgressão epistemológica, contra Deus o Pai, que de acordo com o funcionamento do mito acaba resultando em parricídio intelectual e incesto conceitual. Portanto, não é surpreendente que, depois de Édipo destruir seus olhos como seu aparato cognitivo primário, que ele devesse embarcar em uma odisseia nômade para um reino estrangeiro que será mais tolerante. Assim, Édipo deve mendigo nômade e destituído, e é oferecido ao mundo como um rei moribundo deposto, dependente do mais dependente dos seres, para guiá-lo pelo mundo como a mais ignominiosa forma de humilhação. E é essa destituição que é a

verdadeira castração. Apesar de cegar-se, Édipo continua sendo um nômade desprovido e degradado — ele não pode escapar de sua propensão metodológica de caminhar como método memorial e cognição direta do mundo através do encontro direto como experiência. E não é curioso que, uma vez que ele passa a perambular pelo campo, como um cego que está “tateando” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1996, p. 10), seja a sua filha seu guia? Uma garota — literalmente, um Devir-Mulher? O homem que não é mais capaz de ver, ou não está mais disposto a ver, é expulso da sociedade por sua conduta ultrajante, torna-se um nômade humilhado, dependente do mais dependente, cujo caminho é informado por sua filha como a própria personificação dos opostos mais afastados da masculinidade, o Devir-Criança e o Devir-Mulher? E através do menosprezo do grande rei a um status mais baixo que o da criança, podemos compreender mais uma vez o Devir-Criança do Édipo.

#### **Memórias de um antifascista: Devir-criança em *Infância de Ivan*, de Tarkovsky (1962)**

O cinema do cineasta russo Andrei Tarkovsky (1932-1986) concebe a infância sem ter que passar por conceitos tradicionalmente formulados e o faz através da interação imagética e sua produção de afetos e percepções. E é por meio do criança-de-tela que o conceito de Devir-Criança pode ser construído, complexificado, demonstrando o que um corpo infantil pode fazer. Essas demonstrações, afirmações e fundamentos permitem apontar os gestos infantis que Tarkovsky nos oferece por meio do “existe” em algum mundo fabulado com o qual construir as várias representações como participações no conceito de infância. Tarkovsky não pode ser, nem precisa ser, nem fingir ser “exaustivo” do que o ser-criança é ou pode ser — o que ele oferece são possibilidades para o pensamento da infância de forma distinta, como diferentes concepções do conceito de criança, como várias afirmações de infâncias que existem apenas em sua expressão e que vão além da infância banalizada de alguns contos. Essas crianças existem como soluções singulares para condicionamentos específicos que desafiam a reprodução, a representação, a replicação; e dentro das quais podemos entender a diferença na alteridade e afirmar nossa diferença como participante da criação de nossa própria persona conceitual, como formulação do próprio conceito da diferença. Maneiras que partem da idealização sacarina que clama por sua realização não realizável através de meios comerciais. Essas crianças existem como trilhas de vapor, como pegadas em um campo de neve à deriva, ou como a turbulenta

correnteza por trás de uma lancha. O Devir-Criança existe como uma passagem experiencial efêmera, passageira, que deixa poucos traços duradouros, porque seu legado imortal, indelével e duradouro é a impermanência do devir. É isso que torna o Devir-criança de importância proeminente: expressa enfaticamente, em termos humanos, o aspecto processual do “devir” na mudança.

As experiências as quais as crianças são submetidas nos seus filmes realmente ultrapassam os limites do intolerável na infância e testam os verdadeiros limites do "Aquilo que não nos mata, torna-nos mais fortes." Talvez estejamos exagerando indevidamente — as situações que ele aborda na maioria de seus filmes não são dramas wagnerianos do tipo *Sturm und Drang!* Suas exposições são apresentações mais sutis das crises cotidianas que deixam seus personagens nus e vulneráveis para enfrentar os elementos duros do desdobramento contingente da vida. Em Tarkovsky, a infância é colocada em crise a fim de atualizar toda a amplitude do potencial para a sobrevivência no mundo e é nessa atualização que o Devir-Criança emerge. As exigências colocadas sobre a sobrevivência podem ser físicas e psicológicas, espirituais mesmo, mas elas não atenuam as punições cruéis e incomuns do destino. Como Bollnow (1966/1987) escreve: "o ser humano atualiza sua existência autêntica apenas na crise e somente através da crise. Os momentos críticos são os únicos que realmente importam na vida humana. Para existir significa estar em crise". E neste respeito, Tarkovsky não arruína a criança. Ao explorar a fragilidade, inexperiência e falta de conhecimento dos seus protagonistas infantis, Tarkovsky obriga seus personagens a nadar ou a afundar nos arquivos caóticos do Devir-Criança. No entanto, chamá-los de arquivos seria atribuir uma ordem certa à sopa primordial de potenciais em que as crianças devem lutar para si mesmas. Estes acervos de caos são situações de escolha anárquicas que não têm nenhuma "rima ou razão" — eles são exemplares na sua disponibilidade de liberdade de decisão sobre o que fazer a seguir — existem alguns constrangimentos que permitem ajudar a formar uma resolução intuitiva desta situação inerentemente problemática que nem sequer permitem uma formulação adequada do problema difícil em que se encontram.

Ao apresentar-nos com imagens que vão contra a corrente das representações da infância socialmente desejáveis, idealizadas e cristalizadas, e comercialmente palatáveis, Tarkovsky nos oferece um desdobramento de potenciais inesperados, incomuns e sombrios dentro de Devir-Criança outras e das crises que modelam os eventos cotidianos e nos fazem conhecer as banalidades escuras da vida. Suas construções espaço-temporais

cinematográficas compõem os locais de pouso para os devires que servem como meios de catálise que solicitará o surgimento de um povo por vir como uma eflorescência histórica. A experiência do Devir-Criança, possivelmente, seja o limite no caminho que identifica um rito de passagem para a insipiência, o surgimento, a anunciação de um povo por vir como a extensão do Devir-Criança. Ao mesmo tempo, os personagens de Tarkovsky são sua personalidade estética conceitual e acontece que muitos deles são crianças. “A persona conceitual é o devir ou o sujeito de uma filosofia, a par do filósofo” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1994, p. 64) e nos filmes de Tarkovsky muitas vezes conseguimos testemunhar em primeira mão esse devir infantil simultâneo aos personagens na tela e aos do cineasta também.



Figura 4.7: Imagem de abertura do filme *A Infância de Ivan* (1962) de Andrei Tarkovsky.

Os filmes de Andrei Tarkovsky estão repletos de imagens de crianças que nos permitem examinar a interação conceitual entre a representação cinematográfica das crianças no mundo e a expressão cinematográfica do devir. A visão de Tarkovsky oferece entendimentos singulares da infância como uma alteridade para a própria infância, que constitui um conhecimento muito específico do que o ser-criança pode ser, bem como um campo de testes preciso para o conceito em si. A análise do Devir-criança como processo imagético nos filmes de Andrei Tarkovsky é significativo e relevante em sua formulação específica do Devir-Criança como uma compreensão alternativa da infância, mas também, mais geralmente, concebe a possibilidade de uma continuidade epistemológica que faça a

divisão entre o conhecedor e o conhecido, elaborando a relação como metaestabilidade duracional concretizada.

Um exemplo perfeito é o filme *A Infância de Ivan* (1962), o primeiro longa-metragem de Tarkovsky e foi filmado dois anos depois do seu filme de conclusão de estudos *O rolo compressor e violino* (1960) no Instituto Estatal de Cinematografia (VGIK) em Moscou. O filme conta a história de Ivan — interpretado por Nikolai Burlyayev — um órfão de 12 anos e suas experiências como escoteiro de inteligência na frente russo-alemã durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. O filme ganhou aclamação crítica assim que apareceu e tornou Tarkovsky internacionalmente conhecido. Ganhou o Leão de Ouro no Festival de Cinema de Veneza em 1962 e o Golden Gate Award no San Francisco International Film Festival em 1962.

O filme é uma história de guerra situada na árdua Frente Oriental onde as batalhas decisivas que esvaziaram a máquina de guerra alemã estavam sendo travadas. Os alemães atacaram a União Soviética em junho de 1941, levando a máquina de guerra suicida nazista para os alcances mais distantes na Europa. O exército Soviético respondeu com uma estratégia de terra queimada, em que eles arrasariam tudo à medida que se retirassem do campo russo, deixando absolutamente nada para os alemães revitalizarem seus recursos e provisões exauridas. Em última análise, 13,7 milhões de civis russos, vinte por cento dos 68 milhões de pessoas na URSS ocupada,<sup>306</sup> pagaram o preço nas mãos dos nazistas e indiretamente nas mãos da estratégia estalinista.

A descrição da guerra de Tarkovsky rejeita as grandes narrativas, as batalhas cataclísmicas e os confrontos entre titãs guerreiros em favor de eventos menores, de indivíduos sem importância, e de acontecimentos que não são marcados pelo espetacular ou grandioso. Talvez isso tenha sido devido a considerações financeiras da produção, e não por preferência estética, na medida em que, como um diretor iniciante não experimentado que herdou um projeto destituído, ele provavelmente não poderia dispor de orçamentos de produção extravagantes para realizar este projeto. Alguns apresentam *A Infância de Ivan* como uma subversão do gênero de guerra (RENFREW in DUNNE, 2008), contudo o filme é mais um drama social vestido de filme de guerra. Se houver qualquer subversão dentro do filme, seria que Tarkovsky socava o Realismo Socialista de maneira sutil com uma mitologia

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<sup>306</sup> Евдокимов, Ростислав, ed. (1 de janeiro de 1995). *Humanские потери Сторой мировой войны: сборник статей* (Perdas Humanas da URSS durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial: uma coleção de artigos). Ин-троссийской истории РАН (Academia Russa de Ciências).



fundamental que vai além da natureza de classe do comunismo. Ele oferece-nos um paradigma alternativo ao Realismo Socialista que normalmente expressaria a ideologia de classe na arte soviética.

Sua apresentação é poética e transcende os limites da ideologia de classe — sua obra é de significância social por causa da profundidade de sua análise psicológica e dos temas e conflitos retratados em sua obra. Neste filme, ele nos apresenta outra maneira de posicionar a verdade histórica da guerra — não como um exame de forças econômicas, ou rivalidades políticas ou de choques de ideologias ou religiões, ou conflitos entre guerreiros maiores que a vida, mas através do encontro relacional que muda o processo histórico em nível pessoal e o substitui pelo micropolítico do cotidiano. É um desdobramento do evento como um devir que surge da vida cotidiana como um drama histórico, como uma peça de época, que lida com os fluxos da vida e seus ritmos na escala do humano em meio à desumanidade da guerra no cruzamento do encontro de um menino órfão e as terríveis vicissitudes da guerra. Neste filme, a luta contra o fascismo e a luta pela sobrevivência ocorrem nos pequenos assuntos da vida cotidiana, nas relações e interações entre os soldados que habitam em um pequeno acampamento do exército soviético e seu convidado especial, o jovem órfão Ivan.

A história de *Infância de Ivan* é mítica da mesma maneira, ou na mesma escala, que Tarkovsky retrata a guerra como história. O movimento da história tem duração, mas não na escala usualmente imaginada pela historiografia, e não é duração no sentido da história como evento fechado, com um começo e um final bem definido. É uma micro-história de movimentos menores, ou de uma história de micro-movimentos, de ativações moleculares e sintonizações, que ocorrem na escala pessoal do individual e do pré-individual. Tarkovsky inclui "a história dentro do 'vivido' do sentido e da experiência humana" e relata a história de Ivan como um narrador e não como um historiador. É uma narração que contém sua própria verdade, sem apelar para essas características históricas, a estética marxista, normalmente de primeiro plano, como as condições ideológicas-econômico-materiais de emergência. Em vez disso, ele busca uma verdade poética que também se torna uma divulgação da injustiça poética como a dinâmica operacional por trás dessa apresentação do processo histórico. Mesmo a história sendo contada cinematograficamente, *A Infância de Ivan* parece mais a uma transmissão de uma tradição oral, uma história que foi transmitida a Tarkovsky para que ele a passasse.

Por outro lado, o mito tem que funcionar de outra maneira a fim de criar e elaborar o drama da gênese desse povo e como essa entidade subjetiva lida com a vida no seu devir. *A Infância de Ivan* é uma narrativa mítica, uma fabulação, na medida em que trata do fundamento de um povo a vir, ou talvez de um povo perdido, que mais uma vez encontra seu território nativo e o perde de novo nas mãos dos outros. O "problema" de *A Infância de Ivan* é geralmente postulado como uma exposição dos horrores e do sofrimento das populações civis, especificamente crianças, em tempos de guerra. É difícil ir ao contrário dessa avaliação, mas, em nossa opinião, Tarkovsky vai além dessa interpretação! O que está em jogo aqui é o Devir-Criança do povo Russo-eslavo através de Ivan acompanhado de um sutil drama de sacrifício e traição. *A Infância de Ivan* é a história de Ivan, um jovem órfão, um clandestino, que subsiste como escoteiro furtivo de reconhecimento para o exército soviético dentro do território nazista. Ele é de caráter excepcional: destemido e corajoso, dedicado a sua missão, comprometido com a causa, diligente e consciente, maduro além de seus anos, consciente da importância do seu trabalho, orgulhoso de suas façanhas e experiência, disposto a sacrificar sua vida para o seu povo, inabalável em suas crenças e desafiadora até o fim. Como um soldado-criança órfão, um сын полка ou "filho do regimento", Ivan é amado por todos no acampamento, é o querido dos oficiais superiores que querem afastá-lo da Frente e inscrevê-lo em uma escola militar porque "A guerra é um negócio de homem... a frente não é um lugar para uma criança", como dirá um oficial. Uma missão de reconhecimento deve ser realizada, que todos acreditam que pode ser perigoso demais para o menino, mas o capitão Kholin (Valentin Zubkov) consente, devido à insistência de Ivan. Apesar da oposição do tenente Galtsev (Yevgeni Zharikov), Kholin envia o menino na missão, sabendo muito bem que a criança provavelmente não retornará. Anos mais tarde, quando o Exército Vermelho captura Berlim em 1945, Galtsev encontra-se em uma prisão em que prisioneiros-crianças russos foram detidos, torturados e mortos e descobriram que Ivan tinha sido morto por um tiro.

*A Infância de Ivan* está localizada em uma terra de ninguém e de desolação, onde a Natureza parou de ter sentido: água, ar, fogo e terra estão presentes para compor o pior dos mundos possíveis — as árvores surgem da água; pedaços de fogo caem do céu; o ar borbulha das profundezas da água, e Ivan e seus companheiros serpenteiam através deste magma elementar, através de uma sopa primordial de caos e destruição, em uma penumbra que nunca é inteiramente noite ou dia, mas sempre um crepúsculo nebuloso.

Compreendemos que dentro da guerra ocorrem encontros de diversas forças em que o conflito, tão devastadoramente ruinoso como é, também criativo na medida em que produz as condições que proporcionam o surgimento da novidade através da destruição. É uma zona de espaço-tempo em que a desterritorialização e a territorialização seguem a velocidades em que é difícil determinar qual é operacional. Pode-se apenas supor que a "civilização" que surgirá deste pântano úmido e sem sol, provavelmente será de uma classe diferente daquela anunciada nos planos iniciais da criança e da mãe na natureza. E para contar esta história verdadeiramente, Tarkovsky deve passar da realidade da guerra para uma versão ficcional, para poder relatar o que acontece de verdade nesta história de sacrifício e traição que ele quer contar.

*A Infância de Ivan* é o primeiro filme da obra de Tarkovsky<sup>307</sup> e, a partir do primeiro plano, já podemos discernir suas preocupações visuais, temáticas, estéticas e as estratégias cinematográficas que se repetem em todo o seu trabalho. O plano de abertura de um filme muitas vezes ajusta nossas expectativas quanto ao que podemos antecipar dele, e aqui este não decepciona. *A Infância de Ivan* começa com um *close-up* de Ivan (Figura 4.7), o rosto velado por uma teia de aranha à esquerda e à direita parcialmente escondido por um abeto Siberiano delgado e de grão direto. Apenas essa imagem é suficientemente evocativa para começar... cada elemento dentro desse quadro de abertura é imbuído de um simbolismo suficiente para orientar ou flexionar a nossa leitura do filme. A teia de aranha que viola e fratura o rosto do menino é uma advertência do enrolamento da natureza fragmentada da vida do jovem e do engano e traição que ele será submetido dentro da problematização da vida de Ivan na frente de guerra... a presença do galho de árvore volta a um simbolismo complexo do abeto dentro da mitologia e da literatura russa, como emblemático do povo eslavo e do campo, como análogo ao personagem da jovem nação soviética que Ivan encarna de maneira problemática, e como um signo que implica o próprio Ivan como um ser personificado pelo crescimento e mudança como uma substância de devir. E, entre a teia da aranha e a árvore, no meio, por assim dizer, é Ivan: que narrativa emaranhada pode se tecer a partir de um menino na junção semiótica desses signos? Essa imagem de abertura nos localiza já dentro da dinâmica da criação de mitos, de fabulação deleuziana da juventude e crescimento e potenciais futuros. Tarkovsky posiciona o filme como o relato de um povo por

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<sup>307</sup> Como cineasta profissional fora da escola.

vir, de uma verdade poética, de uma fabulação que fala a verdade na qual "era na ficção que a veracidade da narrativa continuava a se fundar" (DELEUZE, 1990, p. 182).

Ivan é um garoto pré-pubescente que ao mesmo tempo parece mais novo e mais velho do que ele é. Como o arbusto abeto, ele é mais fino e mais alto do que ele deve ser, mas ele tem o porte e as atitudes de alguém muito mais velho e maduro. É uma mente adulta que ocupa um corpo de criança emaciado, onde a infância encorpada pela criança ainda não sumiu. Ele não é nem uma criança, nem um adulto, mas um Devir-Criança que se transforma de uma infância para a adultez sem aviso prévio. Todavia estas mudanças que lhe transportam da infância à idade adulta, que poderiam ser facilmente atribuídas às estratégias de sobrevivência de um órfão na linha de frente da guerra, são significativas não somente porque caracterizam o menino, mas também o que ele representa — como indicado pelo abeto — ou seja, sua função de signo incorporando as qualidades essenciais do povo eslavo russo. O aspecto importante, aqui, é que o ser criança nunca é fixo em termos de um menino pré-púbere, mas se move em um sentido de devir-outro, mesmo que seja um envelhecimento diferencial, do que deveria ser uma criança. Naturalmente, essas mudanças podem ser necessárias para o desenvolvimento do personagem, o que nos permitem construir um drama. Em vez de simplesmente ser definido como um menino pré-adolescente que brinca de esconder-se na praia com outras crianças de sua idade, ele é uma multiplicidade de existências instáveis, de devires metaestáveis que articulam as adaptações específicas em situações extremas e circunstâncias indutoras de trauma que as experiências de guerra podem fazer surgir: Ivan é sempre um outro diferente do que os manuais de desenvolvimento da criança nos dizem que deveria ser. Em vez disso, somos confrontados com uma série de devires-outro que não deixam nenhuma estabilidade pela qual podemos realmente nos referir a ele: seu personagem é tão flítico quanto a borboleta que o acompanha na cena de abertura. Podemos dizer que a entidade que está diante de nós é Ivan, mas isso é apenas uma conveniência — Ivan muda diante de nossos próprios olhos de ex-prisioneiro de guerra para o menino soldado, para o filho que precisa de carinho e cuidado, para o experiente escoteiro de reconhecimento, parasupercilioso oficial de infantaria, para fugitivo da faculdade militar, para o órfão endurecido inclinado à vingança, para o herói de guerra a seu batalhão, para o menino inocente traído por seu superior pelo bem maior, para uma alma perdida no recorde de inúmeros outros meninos prisioneiros mortos pelos nazistas... Ele nunca é somente uma dessas existências isoladas e nunca todas

elas ao mesmo tempo, porque constantemente ele está devindo-se-outro — qualquer propriedade emergente é reabastecida no devir-Ivan qualificado como um Devir-Criança. As circunstâncias e os ambientes de sua existência mudam tão rapidamente que se adapta a elas instantaneamente, plasticamente, para não dar tempo do seu organismo se aclimatar ou se ajustar com qualquer tipo de permanência durável. O transcendente é a adaptabilidade imanente como refrão para a mudança dos ambientes aos quais se associa, que se associam a ele ou ao seu redor. Contudo a mudança do paisagismo com o qual este devir metaestável tem que lidar é apenas a metade da equação. Ivan também é uma existência instável e mutável em seu próprio direito em virtude de ser uma criança. Como um devir que encontra a sua duração como o estado indefinido e impreciso do ser humano entre o nascimento e a idade adulta, a criança não é um ser inexistente, mas um não-ser porque a criança é uma mudança serial que não tem status permanente ou fixo como entidade.

Deleuze e Guattari escrevem sobre o envolvimento com a matilha e o contágio (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 25). E em nível macro, o jovem Ivan é um membro de um bando de soldados e apresenta todos os traços do anômalo — ele é o *insider* supremo e o *outsider* final. Ele não é o soldado padrão, pois é um filho, não é recrutado, não tem o corpo de um soldado. Mas ele é um líder natural em que ele demonstra todas as qualidades que o tornam um soldado exemplar e, portanto, um líder pelo exemplo. A profissão de armas é guiada por um código chamado "Os Valores do Exército": Lealdade, Dever, Respeito, Serviço Desinteressado, Honra, Integridade e Coragem Pessoal.<sup>308</sup> E todos os bons soldados devem possuir um conjunto de qualidades que incluem honestidade, coragem, autocontrole, decência e convicção de propósito.<sup>309</sup> Ao possuir essas características e professando o Código, Ivan é o elemento preferencial da matilha, mas, como Deleuze e Guattari escrevem, não é simplesmente porque ele é excepcional, ou “o anômalo não é tampouco um portador de espécie, que apresentaria as características específicas e genéricas no mais puro estado, modelo ou exemplar único, perfeição típica encarnada, termo eminente de uma série, ou suporte de uma correspondência absolutamente harmoniosa” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 27). Em vez disso, Ivan, exemplar e combinado com sua juventude, tamanho e coragem, torna-se anômalo e sua ocupação é definir o limite, traçar limites, percorrer a periferia. Ele

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<sup>308</sup> <https://www.rallypoint.com/command-post/characteristics-of-a-real-soldier>

<sup>309</sup> <https://www.artofmanliness.com/2016/10/01/manvotional-character-soldier/>

assombra as franjas como um fenômeno de fronteira. Sua exemplaridade é contagiante e seus oficiais supervisores gostariam de vê-lo produtivamente canalizado enviando-o ao colégio militar.

*A Infância de Ivan* define os primeiros componentes de um repertório arquivístico, uma coleção de signos, cujos componentes se repetirão em toda a obra cinematográfica de Tarkovsky como *motifs* ou temas, como conteúdo, elementos narrativos — como matérias de expressão — que se repetem não somente neste filme, mas de um filme para outro como movimentos e ritmos característicos da obra de Tarkovsky. Se considerarmos filmes como conjuntos de signos, compostos de entidades subjetivas que transmitem significado, como agenciamentos, então esses temas podem ser considerados questões de expressão tanto como parte do intra-agenciamento do próprio filme, quanto parte de um inter-agenciamento de filmes. Mas estes não são montagens maquínicas passivos que produzem significado por assim dizer, mas agenciamentos que expressam subjetividades. De tal modo, estes agenciamentos que criam extensões de significação-criação de temas e figuras articulados dentro da obra singular ou através de uma série de obras, ajudam a alinhar subjetivamente as forças dentro do caos, da terra e do cosmos em extensões coerentes de significado, como planos de consistência. Essas figuras recorrentes de marcadores estendidos não aparecem como repetições idênticas do mesmo, mas como temas que ressurgem, sujeitos e sujeitos de sujeitos, que são o conteúdo dos refrãos. Eles simultaneamente desterritorializam e reterritorializam blocos de conteúdo como iterações variadas das mesmas preocupações que delineiam a cartografia das ideais de Tarkovsky. Como agenciamentos, eles compõem as máquinas abstratas que se juntam e constituem as modalidades específicas de como o diretor constrói seu mundo expressivo em termos de operadores memoriais ou padrões de cognição. Essas não são necessariamente grandes ideias ou eventos importantes anunciados por trombetas e tambores, contudo tomadas solitárias, configurações de fundo, movimentos de câmera, efeitos visuais, situações dramáticas ou simbolismos visuais.

Na música, reconhecemos um refrão como um tema musical que se repete e que reconhecemos como tal quando o ritmo, a velocidade, o registro, o timbre, o arranjo instrumental ou harmônico, etc. são alterados dentro do mesmo trabalho como variações ou sempre que reaparece em diferentes trabalhos como apropriações ou referências. Neste trabalho, o retorno do tema da infância de um filme para o outro é obviamente chave, mas

não podemos descartar a recorrência da imagem da árvore, da chuva, da levitação, da arte e da cultura como objetos expressivos, da memória, de caminhar pela água, da necessidade e da retenção do carinho da mãe, do pai ausente, da proliferação de cruzeiros cristãos, de ícones que representam Maria e a criança Jesus, da *dacha* (casa de campo) da família, dos sonhos, dos poços, de objetos submersos em água, de cavalos, de retorno, de amor e paixão juvenil, da palavra *человек* (*chelovek*: pessoa, ser humano em russo) e de espelhos, de sacrifícios e nostalgia — os quais voltaram como filmes com esses nomes. Também podemos dizer que a repetição temática se aplica aos atores recorrentes em diferentes filmes que, mesmo quando interpretam outros papéis, eles inevitavelmente transportam algumas tonalidades afetivas de suas encarnações anteriores para outros filmes — por exemplo, Ivan tornar-se-á o jovem fabricante de sinos Boriska em *Andrei Rublev* (1966), o segundo longa-metragem de Tarkovsky, no qual é difícil dissociar os dois personagens do ator que encarna os dois papéis: Boriska é apenas um Ivan pouco mais velho, transposto para outro passado histórico. Outro exemplo ainda mais significativo seria Anatoly Solonitsyn como o artista mais recorrente<sup>310</sup> na obra de Tarkovsky, que aparece em papéis principais em quatro dos sete longas-metragens. Mas reconhecer essas recorrências e repetições não é dizer que as reaparições sempre invocam o mesmo significado ou que expressam um significado idêntico ou fixo: o reconhecimento de um ator em suas várias encarnações nos leva a percepções errôneas inesperadas, como acreditar que é Anatoly Solonitsyn jogando em *Nostalghia* em vez de Oleg Yankovsky ou interpretações criativas por associação que de outra forma não surgiriam.

Deleuze e Guattari (1987) escrevem sobre o refrão, o *ritornello*, como desenvolvido a partir de marcas de territorialização anunciadoras que "desenvolvem-se em motivos e contrapontos, reorganizam as funções, reagrupam as forças" (DELEUZE e GUATTARI 1997, p. 130). Eles descrevem como o refrão constitui um agenciamento territorial — uma paisagem — e, de acordo com as "doutrinas tradicionais que sustentam que o som foi a primeira de todas as coisas a serem criadas" (CIRLOT, 1962, p. 300). Eles utilizam como exemplo os pássaros que usam sua canção para marcar um território, não em termos de estabelecer uma extensão delimitada de terra, mas em termos de anunciar a presença do pássaro, condicionando assim qualquer encontro experiencial iminente. A canção do pássaro

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<sup>310</sup> Nikolai Grinko, que também é um grande ator, aparece num maior número de filmes, mas não em papéis tão importantes.

transforma o espaço através do qual o som é transformado do extensivo ao intensivo dentro do alcance que pode ser ouvido e impõe uma inflexão afetiva sobre qualquer encontro subsequente com essa presença que não pode ser desconsiderada. A função da canção é anunciadora, como cartazes ou sinalizadores que nos indicam ou nos alertam para novidades inesperadas. Um rugido de leão na savana, ou um uivo de lobo na estepe, tem o mesmo efeito: a resposta do nosso corpo ao meio ambiente será alterada pelo aviso. Assim sendo, os pássaros e suas canções têm o propósito de uma anúncio e incorporam o aviso como um limiar que está sendo cruzado. Na sequência de abertura de *A Infância de Ivan*, ouvimos um cuco que canta sua música em um *travelling* da esquerda para a direita que troca como pano de fundo para um perfil de Ivan-folhagem exuberante para terra seca e estéril, mostrando as raízes da vegetação expostas.<sup>311</sup> Tarkovsky nos oferece a canção do cuco para anunciar e informar que Ivan está sendo introduzido em um novo domínio — que ele está sendo “paisagado” de forma diferente: o cineasta quer nos alertar não somente do fato de que o cuco é um pássaro da floresta, mas que a canção está de alguma forma definindo ou condicionando a ocupação operacional de Ivan em um espaço-tempo particular através da canção do cuco como um signo marcador. A tomada que imediatamente segue a intenção de Ivan, de ouvir o cuco, é uma superfluidade de luz do sol atravessando as árvores. Porém o que exatamente está sendo condicionado aqui com essa imagem? É talvez para fazer a ligação entre Ivan e a paisagem? Tarkovsky está nos pré-condicionando, nos preparando para aceitar Ivan como um agente clandestino, como um batedor de reconhecimento clandestino? Ou é puramente um conceito diretorial? Ou é para nos fazer prestar atenção às imagens abrangidas pelo movimento da câmera? Pois, mesmo que Ivan esteja plausivelmente muito vivo, o *travelling* transforma-o em outro tipo de agente subterrâneo, talvez como um cadáver, e serve como fertilizante para a terra que o cerca, ou mais poeticamente, como mediador entre a vida e a morte, entre a superfície da terra dos vivos e do subterrâneo dos mortos? Ou talvez ele esteja aludindo a “uma observação que Trotski tinha feito uma vez a Lênin em particular, dizendo que o “cuco” em breve soaria o sino da morte para a República Soviética”? (DEUTSCHER, 2003, p. 72). Ivan, de alguma forma, representaria a morte do povo soviético? E se a resposta é afirmativa, como ele

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<sup>311</sup> Nessa cena, a viagem termina de modo que mal vemos o rosto de Ivan, mas seu ouvido é proeminentemente a característica da atenção. Isso pode parecer um detalhe sem sentido, exceto que, em *Solaris*, Tarkovsky trata também de um close-up do ouvido do protagonista.



consegue isso?<sup>312</sup> Aqui Tarkovsky sublinha o movimento da câmera com a canção do cuco que nos impõe literalmente territorializar o evento, e organizar a extensão como um agenciamento que produz extensões maquínicas de fazer-significado como a temporalização da expressão através das mudanças afetivas criadas pelo movimento da câmera. Mais tarde, veremos um segundo pássaro, um galo, que cantará para despertar Ivan de seu sonhar acordado para a realidade do pouso ao redor dele e prestar atenção para a queda de sua terra e seu povo: Ivan acorda em uma aldeia em escombros, um velho demente demorado, e a terra ardida e desnuda. O galo também é um pássaro imbuído de temporalidade em que seu canto anuncia a chegada de um novo dia, o surgimento da primeira luz, o alvorecer da possibilidade. Mas, em vez disso, este galo somente anuncia a duração indeterminada da devastação, destruição e ruína. O novo amanhecer é uma névoa cinzenta sem característica desprovida de temporalidade, e os elementos territorializantes nos obrigam a perguntar: qual é a duração que é abrangida (rítmica) por essa multiplicidade? Onde fugiu o sol e os campos férteis repletos de grão dos velhos e felizes dias do Realismo Socialista? Ou talvez Tarkovsky esteja introduzindo o galo por sua qualidade sagrada na literatura russa "porque o galo é tanto talismã quanto vingador de transgressão"? (HOISINGTON, 1992, p. 29). Ou é o galo um soco satírico aos dirigentes da sociedade, como no conto de Pushkin *O galo dourado*, "onde inicialmente o galo serve o tsar, salvaguardando seu reino e, posteriormente, o galo pune o tsar por sua cegueira moral e sua certeza que a força sempre dará certo"? (HOISINGTON, 1992, p. 29). Tarkovsky parece estar reforçando sua mensagem de retribuição vinda do uso excessivo de força ou coerção pelo stalinismo em levar o povo a sofrer destruição novamente.

Na penúltima cena do encerramento do filme, quando o Exército Vermelho entra em Berlim, vemos um terceiro pássaro — um que perdeu sua canção — a Águia Imperial do Reich Nazista agarrando uma grinalda de oliveira envolvendo uma cruz de suástica. Sempre que a águia é apresentada, aparece como uma efígie estática, desprovida de potencial, como parte das ruínas e detritos da arquitetura fascista que serão relegados ao lixo da

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<sup>312</sup> Ivan será visto na última parte do filme em uma fantasia cheia de ansiedade retratando seu estado de espírito antes de deixar o acampamento em uma missão. As imagens são uma representação de pesadelo de terror e pavor, o desejo de vingança e a incapacidade do menino de processar o trauma da guerra. Nesta seqüência de fantasia, Ivan vai febrilmente tocar um sino de elenco para alertar os outros de sua situação, mas cai em ouvidos surdos, pois não há som produzido em sua fantasia.

história como testemunho da derrota alemã. Aqui, o silêncio do pássaro fala da perda de potencial e nos lembra a destruição que eventualmente pertence a líderes imperiosos que ignoram e desrespeitam as pessoas. A canção do pássaro como um refrão sonoro "carrega a terra com ele" (DELEUZE e GUATTARI 1997, p. 118), na medida em que mesmo se desterritorializa o que teve lá, ele territorializa outra coisa em seu lugar. Aqui cada pássaro faz isso anunciando o que é por vir e nos prepara para o que se pode esperar a seguir no devir do desdobramento como meio. Na *A Infância de Ivan*, ouvimos outros pássaros, embora eles permaneçam invisíveis. Na cena com o velho e o galo, ouvimos um pica-pau que alerta o velho e anuncia a chegada do partido em busca de Ivan. Nunca vemos o pássaro, mas entendemos a canção característica do pica-pau como uma expressão de sua predileção pela madeira morta, pois geralmente estão infestadas de insetos. É isso que Tarkovsky nos está alertando? Tentando nos dizer que o veículo está transportando madeira morta carcomida por insetos?<sup>313</sup> O que é importante sobre a canção do pássaro não é a própria canção, mas é o poder de anunciar o que está por vir como um condicionamento que encerra ou engloba uma dinâmica que colora o iminente devir-outro.

Da mesma forma, se nos permitimos considerar elementos visuais do mesmo jeito, como refrão, como *ritornello*, a árvore na *Infância de Ivan* é possivelmente o elemento visual mais importante que se repete no filme. Embora o tema da guerra estabelece o tom da história, a relação semiótica entre os eventos no filme e a árvore, ou mais ao ponto, o que a árvore permite tornar visível através de sua presença e atributos, qualidades que tornam a árvore arboreal e reconhecível como tal — é o *motif*, o tema recorrente que mais informa a ação e os personagens está expresso através de madeira e árvores. Identificamos este *motif* recorrente como  $\Upsilon\lambda\eta$  (*hylē*), o termo preferido de Aristóteles para "matéria", cuja tradução direta do latim é matéria que se traduz diretamente em madeira ou madeira serrada. A ontologia de Aristóteles descreve οὐσία, (*ousia*) ou "ser" como um composto de matéria e forma e foi traduzido e adaptado a um dualismo que separa corpo e alma. *Hylē* é um conceito incomum que estamos ativando, adotando uma leitura que está em desacordo com a forma como o conceito aristotélico tem sido interpretado na filosofia grega e medieval —

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<sup>313</sup> Mais tarde, quando os três soldados estão caminhando em direção ao rio através de uma escassa espiga, ouvimos dois tipos diferentes de pássaros, um deles um tipo de ave aquática e o outro um toutinegra da floresta. Talvez eles estejam comentando sobre o caráter dos soldados ou alertando-nos de que o solo em que eles estão entrando é sólido e líquido?

ou seja, divorciando-a das palavras μορφή, (*morphē*) ou "forma" e Πνεῦμα, (*pneuma*) ou "espírito" — mas sentimos que o conceito de Hylē vale a pena ser explorado.

A palavra conceito *hylē* tornou-se "detida ou acalmada" e tornada estática pela conveniência epistemológica de poder conceber objetos discretos compostos de matéria e forma como entidades estáticas que se conformam às Leis do Pensamento. Ὑλη (*hylē*) foi entendido por Aristóteles como *uma "potencialidade nua", como uma potencialidade pura ou física que permite qualquer transformação elementar* (MARMODORO, 2017) — mas não como matéria física. Como qualidade do vegetativo ou do arboreal que é na matéria, *hylē* é diferente do sólido ou do líquido, ou do gasoso, como a faculdade de atuação que permite mudanças qualitativas de uma maneira particular — é o potencial da mudança como o crescimento, ou o movimento que percebemos na madeira ou na madeira serrada e que atua através do *proto-hylē*, a madeira material genérica ainda não dotada de forma nem de espírito. Hylē seria o devir-qualidade caracterizador de mudanças processuais. Se o ser é a Existência, o fato de pertencer ao universo das coisas materiais ou imateriais como uma entidade definida com identidade, etc., então, Hylē é a possibilidade de mudança na existência das substâncias como devir-outro. Mas ao invés de ser entendido como qualidades ou aspectos transcendentais, estes são imanentes ao devir como propriedades emergentes. Nesta leitura, a árvore e suas miríades desdobramentos são um *stand-in*, de um substituto, o signo indicativo para o devir-qualidade que qualifica a mudança processual. Em relação ao povo Russo, a árvore é um indicador afetivo de propriedades emergentes que colore a expressão da infância de Ivan tanto como criança, como filho de sua sociedade e como *potentia* realizada, "desse princípio de diversidade do ser-em-ação" (FITZGERALD in MCMULLIN p. 65), do povo por vir que esta história mítica anuncia.

Estranhamente para um produto cultural soviético, a terra, o solo nativo, a *Zemlya* russa, neste filme somente assume um papel de apoio à madeira. Vemos bastante terra e vegetação em condições lamentáveis ao longo do filme, e seria sensato elaborar sobre a ideia de dinâmicas territoriais — de dar duração à extensão como devir — através do conceito de terra. No entanto, as possibilidades expressivas dessa ideia não são tão desenvolvidas como as da madeira como uma imagem-conceito, e Tarkovsky parece satisfeito de nos mostrar a *Zemlya* como falida, desprovida de valor, quão pobre a terra tornou-se sem desenvolver essa ideia ainda mais. Como refrão, e como todas as árvores, as árvores na *Infância de Ivan* carregam terra com elas nas raízes... a terra não apenas como

fonte de vida, como terra material, ou como meio de crescimento e indicativo de um meio como territorial. Em vez disso, estaremos elaborando o tema da árvore como a característica expressiva decisiva dentro do filme e equiparando o refrão da árvore como expressivo do Devir-Criança de um povo por vir, de uma sociedade que Tarkovsky parece estar promulgando através de Ivan e suas circunstâncias experienciais. Em contraste, para Tarkovsky, a árvore faz parte da integração do intra-agenciamento<sup>314</sup> e do inter-agenciamento da expressão como criação de significados. É um marcador estendido que ajuda a organizar os componentes da narrativa e alinhar as forças dentro do caos, da terra e do cosmos em territorializações coerentes, em que podemos identificar a árvore como um refrão. Portanto, o refrão nos diz que essa subjetivação é repetida como um agenciamento que se articula, que se expressa através da promulgação da ideia em todas as suas manifestações.



Figuras 4.8 e 4.9: Ivan na natureza.

As árvores retorcidas que aparecem na *A Infância de Ivan* e no *Sacrifício* podem ser enrugadas, desformadas e dissecadas, mas elas transmitem diferentes significados; as árvores frondosas e robustas de *Solaris* e *O Espelho* cheias de imortalidade, fertilidade e riqueza têm diferentes tonalidades afetivas que diferenciam uma da outra nos dois filmes; e é o mesmo com a planta na caixa de aço e as referências ao jardim a que Berton se refere em *Solaris*: "Vi árvores em miniatura, sebes vivas, acácias, caminhos — e tudo estava feito da mesma substância" (TARKOVSKY e GORENSHTEIN 139)... elas todas possuíam a qualidade

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<sup>314</sup> Usamos a palavra *assemblage* apesar de Deleuze e Guattari usarem o agenciamento. Claramente, *assemblage* não transmite a expressão da subjetividade implícita, da agência, que é transmitida pelo termo francês.

de árvore de maneira diferente, e seus contextos fazem sair diferentes expressões de potenciais de árvores: essas entidades que reconhecemos como árvore são apresentadas através de seus diferentes atributos. Dessa maneira, vamos examinar várias imagens do filme para ilustrar a dinâmica imagética em jogo entre Ivan, a árvore e a paisagem, porque através das imagens de árvores compreendemos esse devir contínuo no devir que chamamos de Devir-Criança.

As Figuras 4.8 e 4.9 apresentam imagens das cenas de abertura de *A Infância de Ivan*. Na Figura 4.8, à medida que a câmera realiza o movimento grua, seguindo a verticalidade do abeto, como emblemática do povo russo, vemos Ivan a distância, enfezado, diminuído pela natureza, cercado por uma variedade de árvores: Ivan fica de pé e orgulhoso em meio a essa paisagem aberta de beleza natural e harmonia. De repente, Ivan se acorda de seu devaneio e sua realidade é outra: ele caminha furtivamente no campo, a terra repleta de cadáveres e destruição para acabar num denso pântano lotado de árvores e arame farpado (Figura 4.9). Ele não parece orgulhoso de si mesmo, mas agachado ele atravessa a zona úmida. A terra que apenas alguns segundos antes era sólida e fértil tornou-se pantanosa e líquida — não é mais a base firme sobre a qual basear um futuro. Ivan passa de uma paisagem a outra, cada uma com uma temporalidade distintiva, expressando qualidades de criação de tempo diferentes. A temporalidade da Figura 4.8 pode contar com as progressões naturais do dia dando lugar à noite, da primavera ao verão com uma regularidade que investe sua vida com uma aparência de regularidade e confiabilidade. Em contraste, a Figura 4.9 é uma penumbra que se encontra entre a noite e o dia, um crepúsculo de indeterminação que infunde incerteza, insegurança e apreensão. A temporalidade aqui é vaga, como se o tempo estivesse parado — não como uma parada morta, mas como um suspense interminável sobre o que acontecerá depois. Aqui, o tempo está fora das dobradiças, há o tempo instável de Ivan caminhando pelo pântano e o tempo em suspenso do mundo, que parece estar pronto para avançar, mas nunca o faz.



Figuras 4.10 e 4.11: Ivan na terra do Galo Dourado.

As imagens das Figuras 4.10 e 4.11 representam uma relação diferente da árvore, do arboreal com Ivan e a paisagem. Na Figura 4.10, Ivan está no ponto de mira da recepção das qualidades de madeira que agora não são mais árvores, mas madeira serrada: árvores que foram serradas para desempenhar uma determinada função nas arquiteturas da existência das pessoas, nos ritmos cotidianos dos aldeões que abandonaram seus alojamentos e meios de subsistência. A madeira que normalmente constituía a estrutura para casas e edifícios das fazendas agora é quebrada e queimada e apontada ameaçadoramente a Ivan. No fundo, como característica comum para ambos os fotogramas, vemos o chão, a terra nua, a *Zemlya* do povo russo, despojada de toda vegetação e arruinada e liquidificada pela guerra. Novamente, uma neblina nevoenta engloba a paisagem, que homogeneiza o tempo e torna-o indeterminado e difuso: uma temporalidade que não tem passado, nem futuro, apenas um presente incerto que não passa, um limiar perpétuo de suspensão ou adiamento. As únicas coisas restantes nesta aldeia de devastação são o lar de várias casas. Eles servem como lápides que marcam onde as famílias já viveram, mas agora designam ausência, abjeção e morte. No fundo de ambas as imagens, podemos perceber os restos dizimados de grandes árvores que foram quebradas e quebradas. Na Figura 4.11, uma viga quebrada no telhado do poço (outro signo recorrente chave) que aponta na direção do tronco demolido de uma grande árvore está curiosamente repetindo o gesto de apontar a madeira na Figura 4.10 — aí aponta a Ivan, e na Figura 4.11 aponta a árvore e o combina na direção de onde o veículo que leva Ivan e os oficiais militares está indo. E este enorme tronco reaparecerá em outras cenas do filme, mais significativamente na última cena, como um destino que Ivan procura ou quer alcançar, mas nunca atinge.



Figuras 4.12 e 4.13: O álamo como símbolo: Masha e o amor

O álamo, como podemos ver nas Figuras 4.12, 4.13 e 4.14, é invocado sempre que "o amor está no ar" e no mundo de Tarkovsky, exala feromônios e sempre está associado à Tenente Enfermeira Masha (Valentina Malyavina). O álamo é um símbolo tradicional no Báltico e é a árvore sagrada da Rússia — é a árvore mais amada, onde é conhecida como "*bereza*" ou "*berezka*". Tradicionalmente, o álamo era central para os ritos de Kumstvo antes do festival Semik, no qual o álamo consagrou a fertilidade da mulher "que eles manteriam maculada até casarem" (DIXON-KENNEDY, 1998, p. 254).



Figuras 4.14 e 4.15: Cap. Kholia e a madeira.

o caráter da mulher idealizada típica da Rússia? Masha encontra-se no centro de um triângulo de homens que competem pela sua atenção: o rapinante Capitão Kholia (Valentin Zubkov), o paternalista Tenente Senior Galtsev (Yevgeni Zharikov) e o soldado alistado (Andrei Konchalovski). Há química entre Galtsev e Masha, e Galtsev é muito protetor de Masha, mas ele não consegue que as coisas aconteçam entre eles; o Capitão Kholin é mais

empreendedor, mas entende que não seria correto aproveitar-se da enfermeira ingênua ou infringir na atração ineficiente de Galtsev. Quando Galtsev repreende Masha por preocupar-se com ela, ele faz isso em uma cabana feita de troncos de vidoeiro; toda a cena de sedução com o Kholin ou quando ela encontra o soldado que está apaixonado por ela, o romance se desenrola em uma floresta de vidoeiros. A árvore de vidoeiro sempre fala de amor, mas na imagem com Galtsev e Masha, as árvores expressam proteção e abrigo, enquanto que na sequência de Kholin e Masha, ou do soldado e Masha, acontece num espaço aberto sem limites, mas também comum demais. Como podemos ver na Figura 4.13, a árvore de álamo se torna um obstáculo de salvaguarda que protege Masha e bloqueia os avanços do Kholin. Mas a associação entre Masha e a árvore de álamo identifica algo maior que excede o que Tarkovsky se refere como a "dança dos vidoeiros" que culmina na imagem icônica de Kholia beijando Masha, segurando-a em suspensão acima de uma trincheira no chão (Figura 4.14).

Para Tarkovsky, o amor é a manifestação final da compreensão mútua e o beijo é aquilo que demonstra o contrato fechado. Como Tarkovsky lembra: "O beijo sobre a trincheira, na minha opinião, é indiretamente associado a um beijo de sepultura. E esta é outra imagem trágica, pelo menos para minha mente. Existe a alegria pré-marital em uma valsa e outro tipo de alegria, uma alegria que Pushkin descreveu como "à beira de um abismo sombrio" (TARKOVSKY, 1962).<sup>315</sup> Qual é o abismo que subtende essa relação entre Kholin e Masha? Por que ela é suspensa no ar por ele? Devemos interpretá-lo como um gesto afetivo que interpreta a precariedade do abraço amoroso? A tristeza sombria seria devida à sedução injusta de Masha por Kholia? Mas se o drama que está sendo representado é maior do que o abraço do casal, talvez seja uma inversão da afirmação de Tkachëv<sup>316</sup> de que "os poderes na Rússia não tinham classe para apoiá-los e, portanto, estavam "pendurados no meio do ar", Tkachëv viu a revolução que veio como uma conquista do poder por uma minoria" (VAUGHN JAMES, 1973, pág. 27) e os personagens de Tarkovsky estão indicando que a história está se repetindo. Masha, aqui como uma invejosa

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<sup>315</sup> <http://nostalghia.com/TheTopics/Betwtwofilms.html>

<sup>316</sup> Pyotr Nikitich Tkachev, (1844 — 1886) foi um escritor russo, crítico e teórico revolucionário que formulou muitos dos princípios revolucionários que mais tarde seriam desenvolvidos e postos em prática por Vladimir Lenin (Wikipedia). Curiosamente, Aleksandr Karlovich Tarkovsky, avô de Andrei Tarkovsky foi "bibliotecário" da célula local da mais ultra das facções terroristas contemporâneas, o Narodnaya Volya (vontade do povo), foi uma organização política revolucionária do século XIX no Império Russo, que com base no escritos de Tkachev (entre outros) defendiam um socialismo indígena baseado no maciço campesinato russo. Foi essa organização que, três anos antes, em março de 1881, assassinou o czar Aleksandr II.



e crédula jovem Mãe Rússia, está sendo mantida no meio do ar por Kholin para demonstrar que sua vida depende da petulância de um *apparatchik* do Partido. Isso representaria o elo de morte do povo russo-eslavo anunciado por outro "pássaro" e que será finalmente confirmado pela morte de Ivan.

É de se esperar que as formas tradicionais de organização social caíssem presas ao caos e desordem provocados pela guerra e em *A Infância de Ivan*, Tarkovsky dispensa-se da família como forma básica de estruturação social. Ivan é um órfão e o cuidado e preocupação com o menino envolve uma banda de "irmãos guerreiros" onde, mesmo que o filme esteja localizado num acampamento militar, a hierarquia militar comum é frouxamente operacional. De acordo com a ordem social da nova República Socialista, as ordens nunca parecem ser seguidas diretamente e são substituídas por interações de poder baseadas em confrontações que se baseiam em uma lógica social de legitimidade que se estende horizontalmente, ao invés de uma hierarquia artificial estruturada verticalmente; é mais uma ascendência de legitimação em uma alcateia de lobos que uma imposição de autoridade de cima para baixo. Um paternalismo familiar aparece depois que Ivan foge e é trazido de volta pelo Coronel Gryaznov (Nikolai Grinko), que diz ao menino que ele será espancado se ele não fizer o que lhe disse. Em um enfrentamento entre o Kholin e o Galtsev, Kholin quer fazer Galtsev cumprir suas demandas, e o ameaça denunciá-lo ao Comitê... A única vez que uma hierarquia militar formal é aplicada acontece entre o Galtsev e a Masha que são profundamente atraídos um pelo outro, mas que são incapazes de consumir seu desejo mútuo: Galtsev repreende Masha preocupado com sua segurança e em mantê-la fora de perigo, mas acabou soando como um discurso paternalista que infantilizou a mulher.

Além de Ivan, o capitão Kholin é o papel mais complexo em que, se Ivan espelha as qualidades de seu povo, Kholin reflete alguns dos "conflitos de personalidade" internos da Revolução Soviética. Ele é um burocrata do Partido que sente satisfação na aplicação desapaixonada da ciência marxista. Seu personagem é mais matizado e conflitado. O Capitão Kholin é o nêmesis de Ivan e seu oposto, mesmo que ele pareça "amar" Ivan e ser carinhoso com ele. Kholin é aquele que em última análise trai e sacrifica Ivan — e por causa de sua devoção desapaixonada ao "dever" Ivan será capturado e morto: Kholin envia Ivan na missão perigosa, não só porque é o que ele sente que deve ser feito para a guerra, para a Revolução, o Partido e o Povo, mas também porque ele acha que Ivan tem um hubris como *Partisan* que põe em questão a legitimidade da Revolução; ele precisaria de achatamento

porque o verdadeiro caráter do povo por vir não seria o caráter do povo russo-eslavo, mas o povo soviético definido pela Revolução. Kholin é um oficial cegamente devotado, um crente desvairado, ou talvez mais precisamente um verdadeiro funcionário do Partido. Ele é calculista e manipulador, enganador e convenientemente burocrático à custa de uma preocupação com as pessoas reais. Não se pode dizer com certeza o que o impulsiona — talvez ele seja conduzido pela ambição cega? Ou talvez ele seja um jogador onde está disposto a jogar as chances de sucesso e sobrevivência na realização da missão de escoteamento? Ou talvez ele seja um burocrata sem vergonha que está disposto a sacrificar Ivan, mesmo que ele saiba mais? Mas, embora Tarkovsky trate a personalidade de Kholin com certa consideração e respeito, Kholin não é tão inteiro quanto ele parece. As imagens dele iluminando um cigarro debaixo do ícone de Maria e Jesus pode indicar um certo desrespeito; ou a maneira como ele carrega uma das canoas em seu ombro parece que está carregando um caixão em vez de um barco invertido. E então, quando ele joga o barco na água (outra manifestação de madeira), ele vacila, percorre e pisa na calçada do barco e quase cai (Figura 4.15). Torna-se claro que, em comparação com Ivan, Kholin não é um salvador... ele mal consegue manter o equilíbrio à beira da água, Ivan será visto na cena final, não andando sobre a água como Jesus Cristo, mas correndo livremente na superfície da água (Figura 4.30).



Figuras 4.16 e 4.17: A Mãe de Ivan à beira do mar e a reflexão no fundo do poço.

Tarkovsky demonstra que ele entende o caráter das pessoas quando ele identifica Kholin como "problema" para um desenvolvimento humanista do social. A liberdade de agir de Ivan emerge de dentro dos princípios que, naturalmente, ele entende como necessários para seu povo através do seu caráter russo. Mesmo que ele seja cegado pela vingança, pelo

que os nazistas fizeram a sua aldeia e a sua família, Ivan realiza seu trabalho com um senso de dever emergente e um conhecimento inato do que deve ser feito para o bem de todos. Ele é guiado pelo caráter inato natural do povo russo, não como um seguidor passivo que papagueia o que é ditado de cima, mas como imanente-no-evento, como incorporando as qualidades que a madeira parece transmitir.

A relação de Ivan com sua mãe (Irma Raush)<sup>317</sup> é retratada dentro de seqüências de sonhos ou imagens de fantasia. A mãe está associada com a vegetação exuberante, mas também com o mar. Como Cirlot explica: "Seu significado simbólico corresponde à mediação entre a vida e a morte. O mar, os oceanos, são considerados a fonte da vida e o fim da mesma. Retornar ao mar é como um retorno à mãe, para morrer" (CIRLOT, 1962, p. 281). Esta imagem de ligar mãe e litoral fecha os dois extremos do filme, enquadra o trágico resultado e serve de arco dramático que subtende o drama do filme. Na seqüência de abertura, vemos o Ivan com a árvore de abeto e, na cena de encerramento, vemos Ivan na praia jogando com seus amigos em torno de uma enorme árvore morta (Figura 4.18 e 4.19). Mas quando vemos o Ivan na cena final à beira do mar com sua mãe, vemos isso de forma diferente da forma como entendemos isso na cena de abertura. A cena está repleta do simbolismo da morte, mas tem uma voz narrativa indefinida, na medida em que relaciona uma imagem mental de um ser que agora está morto. Nas palavras de Tarkovsky, "De especial importância é o sonho final, que os espectadores veem depois que descobrimos a execução de Ivan. O espectador vê um protagonista que não existe mais e absorve em si elementos de seu destino real e possível" (TARKOVSKY, 1962). Na luz brilhante e ensolarada, o tempo parece ter parado. É um paraíso idílico da infância sem preocupação nenhuma, povoado pelos seus mais próximos: sua mãe, sua jovem namorada e outras crianças de sua idade.

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<sup>317</sup> Irmã Raush foi a primeira esposa de Tarkovsky e ficaram juntos de 1957 a 1970.



Figuras 4.18 e 4.19: Ivan à beira do mar.

Ivan também está ligado a sua mãe através da imagem do poço. Como um buraco escavado profundamente na terra, ele alcança até o interior da *Zemlya*, onde a terra da promessa e o palácio do centro, encontram-se. Em uma imagem de um sonho reveladora (Figura 4.20 e 4.21), vemos Ivan e a sua mãe olhando para dentro do poço... no fundo, na profundidade do poço, eles veem seu reflexo na superfície da água (curiosamente, a parede do poço é revestida de madeira). Assim realizamos que, quando a mãe e o filho se olham nas profundezas da *Zemlya*, o que eles veem reflete uma imagem de si mesmos — no fundo, a *Zemlya* é apenas um reflexão de mãe e filho, ou seja, as pessoas que a representam simbolicamente. Esta imagem sintetiza a rede de simbolismo em um quadro compacto que liga Ivan, mãe, povo, madeira e a *Zemlya* — e “inicia” Ivan como mediador do poço como o limiar entre vida e morte. O poço é tanto um elemento do intra como do inter-agenciamento das imagens prediletas de Tarkovsky e repete-se na cena com o velho e o galo (Figuras 4.10 e 4.11) e em vários outros filmes, como *Andrei Rublev* e *Stalker*, mas, mais significativamente, no *O Espelho*. Na Figura 4.20, vemos um enquadramento de um ponto de vista subjetivo aéreo, de Ivan voando estaticamente sobre o litoral como parte de uma sequência de sonho no início do filme. Já, desde o início do filme, sem que o espectador soubesse, Tarkovsky explode a cartografia da morte que guia ou determina a narrativa do filme. A partir da imagem aérea (Figura 4.20), vemos o litoral, uma árvore um pouco desnudada, o poço e a mãe de Ivan. Quando olhamos essa imagem pela primeira vez, não conseguimos entender as implicações completas do que está sendo representado até que as imagens finais do filme informem a narrativa e nos permitam compreender a intenção total da imagem.



Figuras 4.20 e 4.21: Imagens demonstrando símbolos visuais inesperados e incomuns

A cena de Ivan na parte traseira do caminhão representada pela Figura 4.21 traz a dinâmica negativa, o movimento antitético que desfaz o Devir-Criança e o afasta da possibilidade de ter uma infância, de ter uma continuidade ao devir. Talvez essa cena retrate as imagens mais marcantes e enigmáticas dentro de *A Infância de Ivan*, na medida que, mesmo que seja uma sequência de sonhos que contribua para a sequência de abertura, ela parece estilística e narrativamente fora de lugar. Envolve Ivan e o tema da madeira com outros símbolos visuais de formas inesperadas e incomuns que retornarão ao longo da carreira de Tarkovsky. Temos importantes elementos recorrentes aqui que aparecerão em *Andrei Rublev*, *Solaris* e *Stalker* como imagens ou simbolismos que serão repetidos, contextualizados e articulados diferentemente. Na cena em questão, Ivan está sonhando em uma soneca após a cena da sua "última ceia" antes de partir em missão. No sonho, Ivan e sua jovem namorada (Vera Miturich) estão passando por um temporal de chuva montados na parte de trás de um caminhão carregado de maçãs. A chuva e os relâmpagos são muito intensos, mas o sol está brilhando, no entanto, temos uma disjunção entre o temporal e o sol vibrante que nos avisa que algo não está certo. Os relâmpagos piscam repetidamente, e durante um flash, no plano de fundo, as árvores que cobrem a estrada, que nos sinalizam a passagem de um limiar, permanecem como uma inversão negativa. O caminhão dirige-se à estrada coberta de árvores e eventualmente chega ao litoral. Uma vez à beira do mar, o caminhão se precipita descontroladamente na areia e derrama grande parte de sua carga de maçãs, onde vários cavalos as apanham com fome. Mas à medida que se aproximam do litoral, as duas crianças estão se divertindo imensamente e gostando da companhia uma da

outra. Ivan oferece à menina uma maçã que ela recusa; Ivan oferece uma segunda maçã mais gostosa, que ela também recusa. Ivan seleciona então a melhor maçã de todas, lava-a na chuva e ela aceita. Tarkovsky nos oferece três grandes planos da reação da menina muito semelhantes nos seus aspectos, mas cada um com uma expressão diferente — divertida, melancólica e desafiadoramente preocupada. As duas crianças, encharcadas pela chuva, divertem-se enquanto o fundo móvel das árvores (em negativo) passa a toda velocidade atrás delas. Em meio a esse simbolismo de fertilidade, de futuro e de possibilidades, a morte está no ar, Devir visível através da inversão do fundo das árvores em negativo. Assim, o que normalmente lemos como os atributos vivos e purificadores da chuva que cai dos céus, como um "símbolo das influências espirituais do céu descendente sobre a terra" (CIRLOT, 1962, p. 272), aqui devem ser vistos através da sua inversão, como o contrário. O sonho de Ivan é premonitório da morte iminente e, portanto, é uma advertência invertida representada como experiência limiar, como passagem. O retorno ao mar é um retorno à mãe — é o oposto da encarnação como uma espiritualização do ser — e como todas as anunciações, precisam de uma arcada, portal ou passagem que anuncie a transição para o próximo evento, o dossel das árvores que cobre a estrada e o caminhão à medida que se aproxima da praia, cumpre dinamicamente essa função. E as maçãs, que como sementes articulam a futura possibilidade da "madeira", e as árvores da sabedoria futuras, estão espalhadas na estrada e mais tarde na areia, onde serão comidas pelos cavalos famintos.



Figuras 4.22 e 4.23: As árvores nazistas da morte: folhas de carvalho adornam o monograma AH e as crianças de Goebbels assassinadas espalhadas no chão nas sombras dos galhos de árvores.

O litoral, ao estar ligado ao desconhecido da água, é um tipo de imagem-transição para a morte (Figuras 4.18 e 4.19). Mas a imagem da madeira é ligada ainda mais diretamente à morte. As Figuras 4.22 e 4.23 mostram dois atributos da madeira que associam o nazismo com a morte. A Figura 4.22 mostra a pedra angular de uma porta em meio das ruínas do Reichstag, com o monograma "AH" (Adolf Hitler) adornado com galhos de ramos de carvalho. É uma imagem irônica na medida em que a porta funciona como um limiar, mas aqui inscrito com as iniciais AH, contextualizada na montagem das ruínas, significaria que atravessar esse limiar nos levaria para a perdição e a morte. A Figura 4.23 mostra as crianças mortas, do Ministro da Propaganda Nazi, Joseph Goebbels, espalhadas no chão ao lado da entrada do bunker onde elas estavam se escondendo com seus pais e outros membros do Comando Alto Nazista, incluindo Adolf Hitler e Eva Braun, durante os últimos dias da Segunda Guerra Mundial na Europa. Quando o Exército Vermelho entrou em Berlim, as crianças foram assassinadas com ampolas de cianeto a pedido dos pais. Quando os russos abriram o bunker, os filhos mortos foram levados para o pátio e colocados no chão sob as sombras das árvores. As crianças de Goebbels como o futuro do Terceiro Reich, ecoando a posição temporal de Ivan como o futuro do povo russo, estão aqui associadas à madeira através das sombras no chão, ou através da ausência material como privação, completamente desprovida dessa força vital, dessa qualidade tão presente e operativa na cultura russa.



Figuras 4.24 e 4.25: A árvore e os soldados.

Contrastando com o *motif* abrangente de tragédia no conto como a aniquilação do Devir-Criança e do tema recorrente da morte, Tarkovsky compensa o destino inevitável da

traição/sacrifício com imagens de esperança. Esta esperança é apresentada pelas imagens da árvore, e até certo ponto pelas imagens de Ivan, tanto em forma fraca como forte, como apoio ou preocupação para os soldados, como madeira transformada na Cruz dos Cristãos Ortodoxos e, finalmente, como um símbolo abstrato da unidade, da coesão, da comunidade e de amor. A religião cristã é representada no filme como uma proliferação de cruzes e sua associação ao sol e à madeira como um novo começo. As árvores mostradas nas Figuras 4.24 e 4.25 mostram duas representações da evocação fraca da esperança através da madeira, na relação das árvores com os soldados na frente. Na Figura 4.24, uma coluna de soldados está deixando o acampamento, presumivelmente para combater os Nazis, como se estivesse baixa a proteção do galho deformado. Na Figura 4.25, vemos dois soldados russos mortos, despojados de suas botas e uniformes pendurados ao galho principal de uma árvore deformada. Aqui, em ambas imagens, o solo está seco e nu, sem vida, como se estivesse despojado de todo o potencial futuro. Nestas condições, é difícil para qualquer tipo de árvore prosperar, e menos ainda ter qualquer tipo de perspectiva para o futuro. No entanto, as árvores aqui servem para um propósito. Apesar das deficiências, as árvores ainda estão fornecendo sustento aos soldados através de sua presença como afirmação da força vital que ainda está presente nelas e, literalmente, como um apoio físico para os soldados mortos a fim de que eles possam manter a cabeça erguida. A temporalidade expressa dessas imagens é indeterminada, na medida em que elas podem ser tido tomadas na primavera, no verão ou no outono; só podemos ler um fluxo de tempo indeterminado onde o dia dá lugar à noite como pura repetição do mesmo sem adiamento ou fim à vista.



Figuras 4.26 e 4.27: A cruz dos Cristãos Ortodoxos.



As Figuras 4.26 e 4.27 apresentam a forte evocação da esperança através de uma cruz cristã de aço como metáfora deslocada da madeira. A cruz de Jesus foi feita de madeira e, aqui, é apresentada como um material fisicamente mais forte e duradouro que sobreviverá à guerra, apesar da destruição. A zona de combate da guerra também pode ser vista como uma área de engajamento processual entre forças, onde o confronto está mais intenso e focado na aniquilação total, mas esse engajamento no conflito produz a destruição e, simultaneamente, um movimento de criação potencial. A destruição proporciona as condições que permitem o surgimento, embora forçado ou, às vezes, deferido ou adiado, da novidade. No meio do caos e dos detritos da guerra, a cruz da religião cristã ortodoxa parece sobreviver como associada à esperança, como premonitória para um novo amanhecer, como um novo dia: o espírito encorpado pela religião Cristã Ortodoxa surge como uma possibilidade para que o simbolismo da madeira articule sua relação com o povo. E na oposição "dialética" entre dois socialismos como protótipos de um povo por vir, Tarkovsky nos oferece Ivan como uma síntese, cujo caráter é articulado através dos vários atributos da madeira, que agora estão ligados às aspirações espirituais da religião Cristã Ortodoxa do povo russo-eslavo. A Figura 4.26 nos mostra a cruz, distorcida e abalada, mas ainda em pé após um ataque de artilharia. E através da poeira e do solo em pó, vemos o sol da manhã brilhando através da cruz anunciando um novo dia, e a cruz como a esperança para o futuro de um povo por vir. Esta luz do sol que brilha através da cruz é a luz da Ortodoxia Cristã que resplandece através do caráter russo que se espalha para a próxima cena: raios maciços despejam na adega da igreja, onde os soldados são alojados e iluminam um intercâmbio entre Ivan e Galtsev, onde a conversa é conduzida por meio de um espelho. Galtsev aparece no espelho como um reflexo de Ivan como se Tarkovsky quisesse transferir o caráter de um no outro; em comparação, em uma cena subsequente, Kholia está no mesmo lugar barbeando-se na frente do mesmo espelho rodeado de seus camaradas e o único reflexo capturado é o dele próprio. Na Figura 4.27, vemos a cruz de aço cristã em silhueta, enquanto Ivan deixa o acampamento antes do amanhecer para a execução de sua fatídica missão final.



Figuras 4.28 e 4.29: Mais cruzes.

As Figuras 4.28 e 4.29 seguem essa linha de pensamento através de uma linha de repetição mais ou menos sutil. A Figura 4.28 nos mostra quatro postes de eletricidade — em forma de cruz como as cruzes que identificam Jesus e os três ladrões<sup>318</sup> — que ostensivamente comunicam a unificação das pessoas através de uma linha comum de comunicação que territorializa o sentimento de devir de um povo. A Figura 4.29 associa a cruz Cristã Ortodoxa (inclusive o apoio para os pés característico da cruz Ortodoxa!) ao que poderia ser um objeto aleatório da destruição ou um túmulo com o simbolismo do vidoeiro como amor, como pureza de espírito e como lar, mesmo que a Zemlya seja fraturada por baixo.

Ao revelar os diferentes significados que a árvore está expressando ao longo do filme, buscamos identificar o que poderia ser o *Hylē* que possibilita as qualidades das árvores. Mas o que buscamos expressar não é a essência — o que buscamos é o que dá expressão ao real, ao gestual, ao performativo em seu movimento subjetivo — não seria o essencial como definido tradicionalmente, porque esse conceito como concebido imbui a existência com uma qualidade constante, estática e permanente, que as entidades não possuem e que são sempre variáveis em sua intensidade e nunca identificadas — a dupla articulação da mudança da própria coisa e a natureza mutável das qualidades que também mudam em si mesmas, e na sua aplicação para o que mudou. A qualidade que buscamos articularia a frase de Aristóteles τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (*to ti ēn einai*), que literalmente significa algo como "o que seria ser (algo)" ou "ser o que é" como um devir. Na *Metafísica* VII.4, 1029b14,

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<sup>318</sup> Parece uma associação um pouco forçada, mas não há postes de energia adicionais para rejeitar essa interpretação. Ainda assim, como Petrie e Johnson postulam, uma vez que alguém começa a procurar por cruzes, elas são encontradas em todos os lugares.

Aristóteles define *to ti ēn einai* como o que-é-o-ser de cada coisa como algo dito no seu próprio jeito. Então, *to ti ēn einai* não é "o que é algo como tal", mas o nosso relatório sobre o que percebemos do objeto. É o relato expressivo da natureza mutante subjetiva, da *natura naturans* conhecida como tal, em relação ao possessivo, ao que tem como o que executa nas relações no entre si e com o território — “as qualidades expressivas ou matérias de expressão são forçosamente apropriativas, e constituem em um ter mais profundo que o ser” (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997 p. 107) — o que procuramos é o interno expresso como externo, como aparência e não apenas o externo como expressão: a árvore interna que busca furar diretamente na terra com a força vital que sustenta os povos eslavos mesmo através das dificuldades da guerra e a traição do Partido. A entidade que articula, que medeia, essa "madeira" em termos do povo russo é Ivan. Ele é para o povo russo o que a árvore é para a terra como símbolo. Ivan demonstra o caráter e as qualidades tradicionalmente incorporadas e expressas pelo povo russo, enquanto a árvore expressa a relação do personagem como uma função da relação com a terra. E Ivan expressa esse personagem como um ser constantemente outro, como uma multiplicidade que sempre é outra coisa, como atributos diferentes desta substância da vida que Tarkovsky identificou como madeira e que identificamos como as diferentes qualidades de Devir-Crianças expressadas por Ivan. E assim a natureza da "madeira" permite que Tarkovsky localize *A Infância de Ivan* dentro do tempo cronológico, dentro de um período de tempo histórico, mas ao mesmo tempo fora do tempo, em uma terra de ninguém, temporal, onde a narrativa está fora de um desdobramento linear e coerente do tempo, em que passado e presente são sacrificados e aniquilados como o surgimento de um presente perpétuo. Se, para Tarkovsky, um filme é um mosaico de tempo, o elemento da madeira na *Infância de Ivan* é a parqueteria do tempo. A história de Ivan, relatada por Tarkovsky, é uma narrativa poética de um evento que, por definição, não possui uma métrica temporal fixa, pela qual ela pode ser medida: a questão não é determinar se a história que acontece no filme ocorre em três dias, uma semana, três meses, um ano ou três anos, mas como Tarkovsky produz novas temporalidades, novos ritmos na progressão das singularidades como meta-narrativa do filme para uma resolução específica. A linha narrativa do tempo é elástica e ritmicamente duradoura na medida em que combina as temporalidades e os ritmos desconectados de várias cenas e produz um espaço-tempo que funciona como um conjunto coerente e funcional, como agenciamento de agenciamentos: combina Chronos e Aion como uma

mistura de pulsos e tempo não pulsado, tanto como sucessão, quanto como interpenetrada pelas assinaturas singulares do tempo de movimentos indivisíveis.

Assim, desenvolvemos nossos conceitos através de um sistema ontológico que se baseia na inconstância, na diferença e no processo em que as entidades são caracterizadas pela impermanência, transição e mudança, e continuamos nessa direção, pregando nossa compreensão sobre a idéia de que o que está sendo retratado pelo filme é sempre um devir e, mais especificamente, como um Devir-Criança. O que está representado no filme não é uma coisa estática, mas um processo de devir atrapalhado pela dinâmica do processo e da mudança. Buscamos ver o mundo da *Infância de Ivan* não povoado por objetos, por nominativos, por entidades que podem ser nomeadas, mas por derivativos que se tornam substantivos de ação, onde substantivos — sujeitos e predicados — se tornam atividades, ações e gestos que implicam mudanças, e nunca são conclusivos ou perfeitos como entidades imagéticas que atuam e reagem incessantemente. É o movimento oposto ao que Cícero faz quando ele toma a frase aristotélica τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι e traduz *esse*, o infinitivo do verbo latino que significa “ser”, e seu particípio *ens*, obtendo *essens*, e adiciona o final abstrato *-tia* para fazer *Essentia* um substantivo abstrato destinado a transmitir o sentido da frase de Aristóteles” (PREUS, 2005, p. 153). Assim, Ivan é um Ivan-predicando-se, um devir-Ivan que é sempre diferente do que era antes e do que ele será; a infância não é um estado de estar fixo entre as idades de 6 e 12 anos, mas um devir-outro dentro de uma duração que abrange certas mudanças em um corpo. Esse devir sobrevive a “um pacote de ritmos, que são diferentes, mas que estão em sintonia” (LEFEBVRE, 2004, p. 20) envolvidos e implicados na realização de certos gestos e na articulação de certas atitudes em relação ao mundo. A mãe não é um indivíduo imutável e permanente, mas um corpo-sem-órgãos, devir-mãe, através dos gestos e atividades de ser mãe e como incessante devir-mãe. Em *Infância de Ivan*, a mãe é poupada das exigências da progeneritura ou da filiação, na medida em que, como agenciamento, como processo, seu papel torna-se abstrato, e sua presença não implica ser a mãe de Ivan, mas de encorpar certas funções de paisagismo.

A árvore também é um devir vivo que é constituído de madeira, é um corpo vegetal imbuído de vida, com seus próprios ritmos característicos, que busca o céu, cresce ramos, perde folhas, produz frutos, etc. e cujas atividades múltiplas são representadas como gesto, atividade ou ocupação em termos de árvore. Assim, buscamos assinalar a natureza de Ivan como uma coisa em mudança para outro signo visual, a árvore, como uma multiplicidade

que representa algo para outra coisa e cuja natureza também é variável como a qualidade intrínseca como Hylē é matéria de expressão, é mudança. Ivan, em virtude de ser um corpo, sofre mudanças, mas porque ele também é uma criança, ele sofre mudanças duplamente: ele muda porque ele é um devir, mas também porque ele é uma criança — é tudo o mesmo devir, mas precisamos de fazer essa distinção. A mudança do Devir-Criança deve ser articulada duplamente, porque ocorre como uma articulação dupla. Se a primeira natureza em mudança do menino chamado Ivan é o primeiro diferencial; a mudança da natureza desse menino em termos de ser uma criança é a qualidade da mudança de mudança, o segundo diferencial. Devir-Criança é um não-ser; é experienciar o limiar de maneira contínua, é viver o diferencial, ser absorvido pelo processo. Não é um não-ser no sentido de que a criança é ou tem existência (embora seja uma mudança), mas é um não-ser porque está sempre mudando em termos de todas as suas qualidades que procuram dar-lhe uma identidade estável como um ser — a única característica estável da criança é que ela está sempre mudando, crescendo, se tornando outra para uma identidade supostamente estável — um adulto — mesmo que em nossa epistemologia da diferença esse objetivo seja inexistente. Então, porque ele não tem essa identidade estável que lhe permite a qualidade de ser, ele é um não-ser, o contrário do ser, não como um não-ser ou o que não expressa ser como tal, mas um devir. "ao invés de o motivo estar ligado a um personagem que aparece, é cada aparição do motivo que constitui ela própria um personagem rítmico," (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997 p. 111) é um elemento que territorializa por sua ação abrangente.

Usar a palavra “englobar” para descrever o ritmo como uma palavra que envolve, que agrega ou integra movimentos ou gestos individuais, é atraente porque, à medida que o ato de englobar nos ocupa, somos superados pela dinâmica do evento. De modo que no ritmo — juntos (predicando o *compassus* do Latino, como um pisar-com), surge uma temporalidade comum que arrasta a multiplicidade para uma sincronia como uma coreografia iminente no movimento do evento. Não só dá a proporção medida da racionalidade operativa no movimento dos passos como os braços abertos de um compasso geométrico, mas também uma unidade e continuidade como direção intuitiva. "Mas, justamente, o ritmo é tomado num devir que leva consigo as distâncias entre personagens, para fazer delas personagens rítmicos, eles próprios mais ou menos distantes, mais ou menos combináveis (intervalos)" (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997 p. 112). Além disso, o passo singular das pernas como abrangente, como movimento que cobre, como a que Deleuze

refere-se como uma escansão (DELEUZE, 1991), como um espaço marcado pela cobertura do passo, como uma duração concreta, nos leva diretamente ao primeiro parágrafo do primeiro capítulo do *Cinema 1: A imagem Movimento* de Deleuze e o primeiro, e o mais importante, comentário das teses de Bergson sobre o movimento, que afirma: "o movimento não se confunde com o espaço percorrido. O espaço percorrido é passado, o movimento é presente, é o ato de percorrer. O espaço percorrido é divisível, e até infinitamente divisível, enquanto o movimento é indivisível, ou não se divide sem mudar de natureza a cada divisão." (DELEUZE, 2004, p. 9). E é precisamente aqui no movimento do devir-expressivo do ritmo — no surgimento, nas qualidades adequadas que são percebidas e, portanto, responsáveis como expressão, no momento indivisível da expressão cadenciada de desterritorialização e territorialização — que a Arte emerge. (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 123). Mas o surgimento da arte não acontece fora do espaço abrangido como testamento ao ato de cobrir, mas no afetivo, na modificação do sentimento como experiência de pensamento que ocorre no movimento.<sup>319</sup> E ao colocar o rítmico da Arte nestes termos, podemos conceber a Arte como solução para problemas que podem ser definidos em termos temporais.

A *Infância de Ivan* exemplifica como o cinema pode ser simultaneamente pintura e música. Não só no sentido de dar movimento a seções imobilizadas chamadas quadros ou fotogramas estáticos e ao movimento do tempo. Mas em como pode articular a problemática pictórica da pintura e a problemática temporal implícita na música, na junção do rosto-paisagem e do refrão. "A pintura nunca terá deixado de ter como meta a desterritorialização dos rostos e paisagens" (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 1997, p. 102) e o objetivo da música tem sido a apropriação do tempo pulsado pela marcação de um território, por seus ritmos abrangentes. O gesto abrangente do ritmo dá duração na medida em que envolve a multiplicidade e unifica o tempo através do movimento indivisível que é tanto um quanto muitos. O refrão "é a fórmula que evoca um personagem ou paisagem" como a forma a priori do tempo, como um cristal de espaço-tempo.

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<sup>319</sup> Vemos esse movimento nos filmes de Tarkovsky repetidas vezes, e se chamarmos esse movimento de artístico, podemos rotulá-lo de artista com segurança. E quando esse movimento recorre sob diferentes disfarces, à medida que a intercomunidade se abstém, torna-se fácil estender o rótulo de autor ao artista que dá voz a esses refrões que emergem continuamente através da produção criativa desse mesmo indivíduo.

Tarkovsky vincula sonhos, fantasias e devaneios, alucinações induzidas por trauma, eventos que se informam mutuamente (e nossa compreensão) fora de sequência, cenas que são reunidas com uma temporalidade diferente da forma como elas se desenvolvem na vida, que se combinam com a temporalidade das imagens de arquivo do documental, e o salto para um futuro indefinido que dá um fechamento unificador à narrativa como um relato da espiral negativa de um Devir-Criança que podemos chamar de *A Infância de Ivan*. Na adaptação cinematográfica da história de Ivan, Tarkovsky acrescenta certas cenas que "alcançam um significado central nas idéias e composição do filme" (Tarkovsky). São cenas marcantes porque na sua maioria não são contínuas com a ação circundante, na medida em que representam estados internos ou representam imagens mentais que nos obrigam a reorientar ou realinhar nossa compreensão da história. O filme funcionaria bem sem essas cenas, mas a experiência não seria tão consequente ou tão rica. A principal linha narrativa do filme, na sua maioria, poderia ficar intacta, mas as cenas acrescentadas nos dão uma visão das causas psicológicas que motivam as forças por trás das ações de Ivan. Tarkovsky nos oferece sete sequências que se afastam das convenções de representação naturalistas para retratar o que acontece na mente de Ivan. E na continuação, as indicamos como sequências críticas para esboçar a vida interna de Ivan, como um ser sobrenatural:

A sequência de sonhos de abertura: a anunciação.

A sequência dos sonhos do poço: a revelação de quem ele é.

O sonho do dia na aldeia de O velho: a realização e a reconciliação.

Alucinações induzidas por trauma: o conflito interno.

A sequência dos sonhos com as maçãs: A cena da fertilização e difusão.

A visualização da morte de Ivan pelo Galtsev: o martírio.

A sequência de encerramento: Libertação.

Se o Devir-Criança pode ser definido processualmente como a expressão da natureza mutável da própria natureza em mudança, então o meio em que o indivíduo Ivan torna-se pessoa o afasta dos seus próprios interesses. É uma situação enigmática. A liberdade de Ivan restringe suas ações? Ele é escravizado pelo desejo de contribuir com alguma causa maior que ele? Ele se sacrifica pelo bem maior porque ele tem uma visão nativa mais profunda? A liberdade de agir de Ivan surge de dentro de acordo com princípios que ele naturalmente entende como imprescindíveis para a salvaguarda de seu povo e não necessariamente para

a Revolução Soviética. Sua missão é vingar seu povo primeiro, a Revolução em segundo lugar. Mesmo que ele seja cegado pela vingança pelo que os nazistas fizeram a sua família e a sua aldeia, sua vingança sai de um instinto de auto-preservação social que o informa sobre o que deve ser feito e como fazê-lo. Ele é guiado pelo caráter congênito do povo russo não como uma liderança de cima, mas como imanente no evento da guerra como o *mnemosyne* de sua terra, como memória coletiva que abrange mais que o povo. Ele não pode sentar-se como um espectador ocioso ou como um estudante em uma escola militar sabendo que outros estão lutando ativamente, sacrificando suas vidas pelo bem comum. O desenvolvimento natural de Ivan é imbuído do verdadeiro temperamento e das qualidades de um socialismo natural do povo russo, como caráter inato que antecede o caráter proletário da Revolução. Essas qualidades inerentes podem ter sido cooptadas pelo Realismo Socialista e alinhadas aos ideais do Partido Comunista, mas segundo o filme, o verdadeiro caráter da Revolução reside no caráter do povo russo-eslavo guiada pelo seu fervor e fé na Igreja Ortodoxa Cristã. O lado trágico de Ivan é que a sua devoção, seu sentimento de responsabilidade para a defesa, proteção e guarda de seu povo, e seu foco de vingar sua família é o que finalmente conduz à sua morte. O Capitão Kholia aproveitará da firmeza da criança e trairá sua confiança, colocando-o em perigo de maneira deliberada e prejudicando o futuro da criança.

Como Tarkovsky escreve, Ivan é "um personagem criado e absorvido pela guerra"<sup>320</sup> (Tarkovsky, 1962), mas por uma guerra que ultrapassa os atributos materiais da maquinaria da guerra como um dispositivo mecânico. Ivan emerge como a própria guerra, como a guerra interna do Devir-Criança como um conflito que faz batalha dentro, através e com seu próprio devir. O Devir-Criança de Ivan é uma zona de combate, uma área de engajamento processual entre forças, onde o confronto em série produz aniquilação total para a libertação das condições de criação e novidade. A história de Ivan é um relato de um desenvolvimento frustrado, um devir detido, onde os afectos negativos ultrapassam o devir e conduzem à sua dissolução. No entanto, como Deleuze e Guattari postulam em *Mil Platôs*, cada devir não produz nada além do devir mesmo — não como indivíduo, mas como uma multiplicidade, como um devir população. Dessa forma, vemos o personagem de Ivan como representante de um povo e não apenas como um exemplar solitário que representa apenas

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<sup>320</sup> <http://nostalghia.com/>



ele e suas ações. Como um a mais que aparece, Ivan e os outros personagens do filme são forças que ocupam corpos, como ocupações que ocupam espaço, e que demoram em fazê-lo, e assim criam temporalidades. Mas esses corpos que têm extensão, intenção, intensão e, portanto, duração não devem ser vistos como exemplos de uma substância, mas como tipos metonímicos que representam multiplicidades como agenciamentos de agenciamentos, como representantes e como representativos de um povo, uma nação, um grupo social, um exército... como devires que têm durações múltiplas que formam e habitam um meio como devires menores precarizados. "Só acreditamos em totalidades ao lado. E se encontramos uma totalidade ao lado das partes, ela é um todo dessas partes, mas que não as totaliza, uma unidade de todas essas partes, mas que não as unifica, e que se junta a elas como uma nova parte composta à parte." (DELEUZE e GUATTARI, 2010, p. 62). O fato de serem representativos não faz representações, mas permite articular a diferença e expressar as individualidades como individualizações únicas. Como afirma Delanda (2010), a chave não é reduzir um todo ao que o compõe, nem amalgamar os componentes em uma totalidade onde se perdem as individualidades. Ivan canaliza as forças que o encorpam como uma entidade que seguiu um caminho único de experiências singulares — assim como qualquer um dos outros personagens do filme e todos os demais que não estão no filme mas são representados. Como tal, é a maneira única de Tarkovsky de contar a história da *Infância de Ivan* como um mito fundacional, um relato narrativo de um devir e não simplesmente um conto de uma saga heróica.

A guerra, como conflito, é uma série de junções de diversas forças, onde os encontros, tão devastadoramente ruinosos que podem ser, também são criativos na medida em que produzem as condições que proporcionam o surgimento da novidade dentro da destruição. É uma zona de espaço-tempo onde a desterritorialização e a territorialização se seguem a velocidades vertiginosas, onde é difícil determinar qual dinâmica dos dois está em jogo. Ao compararmos a guerra com o que se passa processualmente no Devir-Criança, pode-se comparar os dois: o Devir-Criança como uma guerra com o devir de um si-mesmo associado, onde cada passo do caminho desfaz e destrói o que havia antes a fim de poder gerar um novo meio e abrir as possibilidades de onde esse devir poderia ir.



Figura 4.30: Ivan correndo sobre a água.

A história da traição e do sacrifício e os sentimentos religiosos que coram sutilmente a história também permitem interpretar o conto como o martírio mítico de um jovem "profeta" ou "santo" russo. Se compararmos alguns dos traços de Ivan com a hagiografia de um pai querido da igreja ortodoxa como São João Batista, notamos algumas semelhanças e paralelismos. O nome de Ivan é a forma eslava do nome latino Johannes, correspondente ao João em português.<sup>321</sup> João Batista era conhecido como o arauto, ou o precursor, que significa que "corre antes" — a tarefa que Ivan cumpre como corredor, como um escoteiro de reconhecimento que abre caminho para aqueles que seguem e alerta para o perigo; isso também pode ser compreendido em termos de sua função como "Filho do Regimento" no Exército Vermelho ou no sentido de anunciar e abrir o caminho para a aceitação do povo russo-eslavo como o verdadeiro povo russo. Há também a profunda associação ao martírio de São João Batista na maneira que Galtsev imagina a morte de Ivan como uma decapitação na guilhotina e não fuzilado como indicado no registro da prisão de Ivan. Essa identificação de Ivan com o martírio de São João Batista e uma morte vivida como a morte de um mártir pela traição do Judas Kholia, a compreensão de sua iminente captura como sacrifício e sua execução nas mãos dos nazistas como a consumação de sua vida que dá sentido mais amplo

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<sup>321</sup> Esta versão eslava do nome é originária do grego do Novo Testamento Ἰωάννης (Iōánnēs) e não do latim Io (h) annes. O nome grego é por sua vez derivado do hebraico יוֹחָנָן (Yôhānān), que significa "YHWH (Deus) é gracioso". O nome é em última análise derivado do nome hebraico bíblico יוחנן (pronunciado [joχanan]), abreviação de יהוהחנן (pronunciado [jəhəχanan]), que significa "Deus é misericordioso".

à traição e ao sacrifício. No entanto, existem outras indicações simbólicas, como a relação de Ivan com a água, que nos obrigam a seguir esta linha de pensamento para olhar o caráter exemplar de Ivan como um ser sobrenatural, como uma divindade de outro tipo. Quando vemos Ivan nas últimas cenas do filme, correndo sobre a água (Figura 4.30), vemos sua leveza como expressão de suas habilidades sobrenaturais que, quando ligado à sua vocação de escoteiro, como mensageiro, como portador de notícias, nos trai para associá-lo à deidade grega Hermes, conhecida como Mercúrio na mitologia romana. As abas da orelha caídas do seu gorro, do *ushanka* russo, de Ivan imitam as asas no *petasos* de Mercúrio; e a cabra (que vemos associado a Ivan na sequência de abertura) e o galo com o velho também apontariam para essa interpretação. Então, se nos permitimos ver Ivan como Hermes, a cena de Ivan no caminhão com as maçãs torna-se mais compreensível (Figura 4.21). Uma das encarnações de Hermes é a do *psycopompos* — da palavra grega ψυχοπομπός, (*psuchopompos*) — que significa literalmente o "guia das almas" (LYDELL e SCOTT, 1883), e cuja responsabilidade é acompanhar as almas recentemente falecidas da Terra para a vida após a morte... estes "guias" ao submundo são associados ao cavalo e aos cucos! No conto *Fasti* de Ovídio, Mercúrio é designado para escoltar a ninfa náíade<sup>322</sup> Larunda para o submundo... Por trair sua confiança, Júpiter corta a língua de Larunda e ordena a Mercúrio, como psicopompo, conduzi-la a Avernus, a porta de entrada para o submundo. Mercúrio, no entanto, se apaixona por Larunda e faz amor com ela no caminho. A tradição diz que essas ninfas como criaturas divinas que animam a natureza podem dar luz a crianças imortais se acasaladas com um Deus. E, aqui neste cenário, a semente que é transmitida à menina é a maçã do conhecimento do bem e do mal, o símbolo do *logos spermatikos*, que aqui está indiscriminadamente disperso nas margens inférteis das águas do submundo. No mito de Ovídio, Larunda é poupada da morte e dá origem a gêmeos. Assim, os cavalos, "que Netuno com o seu tridente espalha das ondas do mar, simbolizam as forças cósmicas que surgem da Akasha — as forças cegas do caos primordial?" (CIRLOT 1962, p. 152), engolem com tanta fome as maçãs espalhadas na areia.

A sequência final de *A Infância de Ivan* mostra Ivan brincando, o "homem cego", com outras crianças, incluindo a garota do caminhão, na praia ao pé de um grande tronco de árvore deformado. Ivan, assumindo o papel de *psychopompo*, aponta para as crianças que o

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<sup>322</sup> JOHNSON E PETRIE (1994) identificam a menina como irmã de Ivan. Além de confundir Ivan com Andrei Tarkovsky, não consigo entender como eles identificaram a jovem.

cercam e apontando o dedo a cada uma delas as transforma em mortos e caem o chão — presumivelmente, estas crianças são as mesmas que foram torturadas e mortas com ele na cadeia alemã, e que vão seguir seus caminhos para Hades. Ivan encontra-se vagando por aí, intrigado por encontrar-se sozinho ao lado do tronco de árvore (Figura 4.18). A menina salta inesperadamente por trás de uma pequena mata de vegetação morta e corre para longe dele. Ivan a persegue enquanto corre na areia e a segue para um cuspo de areia que entra na água. É uma sequência de cenas que expressa pura alegria: os dois estão correndo na superfície da água rindo. Mas, ao aproximá-la, Ivan ultrapassa a menina, e as últimas imagens do filme mostram Ivan correndo sozinho sobre a água (Figura 4.30),<sup>323</sup> estendendo o braço, alcançando o tronco da árvore morta iluminado por trás pelo sol (Figura 4.19).

A cena final encerra o laço de Ivan como um mártir das pessoas e informa a legitimidade do mito com o espectador. Converte a história fabulada de um relato de um evento durante a guerra em uma mônada autônoma que pode ser transmitida como a herança do mito de um povo que virá. Ele corta o cordão umbilical que reduz a Infância de Ivan como uma história sobre um menino que sofre os horrores da guerra, em uma história amarrada a uma hora e lugar, mas agora é permitido ocupar uma invasão indefinida, uma generalidade que não está aqui nem aí, mas em nenhum lado e em todos os lugares, ao mesmo tempo. O devir de Ivan é o que o define subjetivamente e dá-lhe a definição como um corpo, como uma assembléia, um agenciamento, entendido analogicamente como o corpo do povo. A história de Ivan é uma tragédia na medida em que ele representa o futuro do povo russo soviético, mas é uma história de esperança na medida em que, através do sacrifício, sua história pode ser conhecida e disseminada e entendida como mais do que Ivan e mais, do que as pessoas como uma qualidade omnipresente que infunde todo o conjunto de agenciamentos e dá definição ao *socius*. Geralmente, o território de um povo é marcado por limites físicos que estabelecem limites de contenção ou delimitação. Mas ao alinhar a madeira como um marcador físico que identifica as qualidades de devir de um povo, Tarkovsky abre o que o corpo social das pessoas da Rússia eslava pode ser e as liga diretamente à terra, para Zemlya. A quintessência de Ivan, ou o conjunto de idéias difusas e abertas dos potenciais que ele encarna e expressa através de suas experiências como uma

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<sup>323</sup> Andar sobre a água é também uma imagem que se repete ao longo do trabalho de Tarkovsky. A associação mais próxima é com Jesus andando sobre a água e quem Ivan desfaz correndo em alta velocidade na água! Tarkovsky também nos oferece caminhar pela água, andando além da água em *Andrei Rublev*, *Solaris*, *Stalker* e *Nostalghia*.

criança Devir no mundo, torna-se uma substância monádica intensa que vive de forma generalizada no mundo como o tempo — como os ritmos e temporalidades que marcam o Devir-Criança como o devir de um povo. Em termos da duração das pessoas, ninguém pode realmente dizer o que esse espírito que identifica Ivan com a verdadeira alma do povo russo, mas os eslavos russos em todos os lugares se reconhecem quando o encontram: Tarkovsky parece implicar que esse espírito invisível transcende o físico e existe fora do tempo de acordo com uma duração própria. O espírito de Ivan é tão livre como a alegre liberdade que se gera em sua corrida na água em direção ao sol, alcançando a infinidade de possibilidades que definem o devir — criança como sempre — jovem, sempre criativa, sempre aberta, mesmo que Sua morte seja a única marca que pode prolongar essa esperança e todo seu potencial para o futuro.

## Conclusão — Prefácio

No prólogo de *Diferença e Repetição* (1968), o filósofo francês Gilles Deleuze escreve que “É frequentemente dito que os prefácios devem ser lidos apenas no fim e que as conclusões, inversamente, devem ser lidas no início.” (Deleuze, 1994, p. xix). O raciocínio por trás dessa afirmação aplicado para uma tese seria que, classicamente, a conclusão resume e, como uma condensação objetiva dos achados, serve para orientar o leitor em termos de estabelecer a relevância do estudo e contextualizar o movimento do pensamento dentro do escopo maior do conhecimento. Minha tese *Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético* procura apresentar uma abordagem alternativa para a compreensão do ser no mundo, uma abordagem que rompe com o estabelecido e busca postular a epistemologia de outro jeito.

*Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético* tem tudo e nada a ver com a criança e a infância. A criança é a menor das preocupações, porque as vejo como descritoras sucedâneas para uma modalidade específica de fluxo e detratoras da compreensão processual que desejo desenvolver. Minha tese procura entender a infância e a criança em termos processuais de tal maneira que elas sejam vistas não como simples agregações de processos que produzem um modelo enlatado da criança. A intenção não é uma reformulação da sociologia da infância, nem uma crítica da psicologia infantil ou da psicanálise, nem uma reformulação de um modelo de desenvolvimento infantil ao longo de linhas processuais, tampouco um espelhamento de uma psicologia individual em oposição a uma psicologia coletiva. A infância não é o objeto indireto do processo, nem o impulso do processo em direção a um objetivo, é a própria predicação processual. Não é contra nada, mas procura construir uma proposição alternativa.

O objetivo foi postular a infância como um devir em vez de um ser e, subsequentemente, elaborar a predicação da infância como um devir-criança em seu sentido mais geral em termos de uma noção comum como emergência processual. Como tal, desejo deslocar a compreensão da infância e seu desdobramento conceitual para uma formulação heterogênea menos estável, aberta e indefinida, expressa ao longo de linhas processuais. Em termos de Processo Imagético dentro do devir, a tese busca desdobrar o movimento material e criar o laço entre o que Deleuze chama no *Cinema I: A Imagem-Movimento* (1983) as duas posições do infinito e traçar o movimento que ocorre entre os dois polos e como se encontram. A análise baseia-se no trabalho experimental sobre o

movimento dos olhos efetuado pelo psicólogo russo Alfred Yarbus (1967) que interpretamos através de uma teoria processual e não icônica da imagem, concebida pelo filósofo francês Henri Bergson e descrita em *Matéria e Memória* (1896), em conjunto com o dispositivo do cinematográfico também conceitualizada por Bergson em *A Evolução Criadora* (1907) e desenvolvida por Deleuze nos livros sobre cinema como analogia da consciência. O circuito é fechado através de geometria projetiva e da topologia e generalizada através do ambiente associado do filósofo e psicólogo francês Gilbert Simondon, que ele teorizou em *O modo de existência dos objetos técnicos* (1958).

Mas a qual devir me refiro? Ao devir de uma entidade como um corpo? Ou ao evento como um corpo? Ou agenciamento? Ou simplesmente o corpo tornando-se em diferentes aspectos e produzindo diferentes devires? Na compreensão de como o devir se faz processual, o movimento materialista é o que estabelece o Plano de Consistência e sua modalidade particular de devir, sua localização no ciclo, sendo o que especificamente caracteriza o devir. A interseção do Plano de Consistência e do Cone da Memória Bergsoniano em um ponto de vista privilegiado não é estática e representa apenas um canal de transformação. Como tal, representa o modo de devir do evento. Por enquanto, todo corpo, monádico ou composto, que habita ou ocupa o Universo tem seu próprio Cone de Luz que subsiste no avanço processual do Universo. Por outro lado, da mesma forma que a circunferência de um círculo infinitamente grande pode ser entendida como uma linha reta, a linha do tempo pode ser entendida como um cone de projeção altamente concentrado que subscreve as leis da perspectiva e os mandatos relacionais que a relatividade implica. Além disso, cada par de cones existe concretamente como Simondon define, e relativamente, em diferentes escalas e diferentes níveis de engajamento e organização, como séries fractais que compõem as possibilidades infinitas de ambientes associados.

Como tal, Devir-Criança é a modalidade de devir que informa o plano da seleção, uma vez que problematiza o presente em termos da zona de interesse, predicada pela perspectiva do presente como ponto privilegiado. A figura 4.2 que ilustra o ciclo material do devir como um movimento vertical (que pode ser para cima e para baixo) permite predicar a origem material de acordo com um caos. O transcendental, que se predica no mundo através da ideia do Homem, faz que a dupla do reino do ideal ligado ao Homem como acima da criação seja o mais real, o verdadeiramente existente, que atinge um grau de perfeição que se aproxima à perfeição da criação divina. No fundo está o reino do caos, da diferença e

da mudança, onde não há existência possível porque é puro devir. Entre os dois está o movimento material, dito vertical, e as velocidades de um mundo instável, precário, e inadequado dos afetos. Em Spinoza, essas atividades são referidas como *perfectionem maiorem e minorem*, como maior e menor perfeição, onde Deus pode ser encontrado acima de tudo como o ser de infinita perfeição, completude e adequação e o caos do pré-individual por debaixo de tudo que eu associo ao movimento menor de Deleuze e Guattari.

Então, quando considerei Devir-Criança como movimento, como produtor de diferença, e não em termos da atividade molar de uma criança, eu apresentei o conceito de três maneiras: uma noção comum, o *ground-zero* processual do que esse conceito faz; em segundo lugar, um modo de pensamento que retira a bagagem do arquivo memorial do conceito para indicar seu funcionamento no mundo; em terceiro lugar, uma maneira mais figurativa de expressar conceitos, como o movimento descendente de uma infantilização falsa pode torná-lo numa repetição.

Sendo eu fiel às noções que desenvolvi nesta tese, a conclusão deve ser mais do que a reafirmação de seus pontos principais ou simplesmente o fim ou o fechamento de um texto. A regressão anárquica e minoritária que o Devir-Criança nos encoraja a adotar como método e o avanço inventivo dinâmico e auto-perpetuante do processo imagético leva-nos a ver uma conclusão não como fim, meta ou término, mas como um limiar de passagem do avanço, no desconhecido da pura criação. No mínimo, deve facilitar a transição do movimento do pensamento do objetivo para o subjetivo no avanço para a novidade. Como tal, dada a natureza materialmente processual deste projeto, seria incoerente colocar este trabalho em termos de uma afirmação de uma tese a ser comprovada e um fechamento como uma objetivação do resultado. Do meu ponto de vista, não vejo fechamento. Somente posso discernir a fragilidade das afirmações e novas direções para pesquisa.

Uma coisa que gostaria de ressaltar é que a regressão conceitual dos conceitos que invoco repetidamente não é um retrocesso nem constitui um repúdio direto e arrogante aos mais de dois mil e quinhentos anos de história ou desenvolvimento do pensamento ocidental. São duas as razões, nenhuma reducionista, que me levam, frequentemente, a desenterrar o passado e voltar às fontes gregas. Ao contrário dos escritores que retornam à antiguidade e permanecem ali porque imaginam o presente como uma versão decadente de um passado de ouro no qual caímos progressivamente, meu retorno ao passado, minha regressão à infância da filosofia é motivada de outra maneira. A principal razão para esse



retorno é a divisão já mencionada entre as escolas de pensamento jônicas e italianas da Grécia Antiga, que ocorre por volta de 450 a.C. e é caracterizada como a cisão entre o pensamento processual heraclítico e o idealismo parmenidiano. O último é o que veio a representar o domínio dominante e exclusivo do pensamento do Ser transcendental e o primeiro, o modo de pensar atrofiado e ridicularizado do devir imanente. Escolhi o modo heraclítico porque não posso escapar da ideia de que tudo passa por mudanças e que esse fato é o que deve reforçar a compreensão da *natura naturata* e a *natura naturans*, a natureza criada e a natureza criadora.

A segunda razão tem a ver com memória e tradução. Minha tarefa consistiu em entender os conceitos em seu início não como uma fetichização da gênese, mas para averiguar o movimento de pensamento que um conceito gera. O ponto é sutil, mas significativo para a nossa maneira de compreender, e identifica a necessidade do trabalho de detetive que leva à noção comum Spinozista. Não posso fugir da facticidade dos conceitos, mas posso entender diferentemente sua constituição, articulação e iteração variegada. Por outro lado, também aprecio a produção de diferenças que a repetição implica e a possibilidade de perder a noção, literalmente, do que um conceito foi entendido como sendo capaz de fazer. Tenho consciência de que toda iteração da expressão de um conceito, que inclui sua concepção como repetição, é uma proposição diferencial, no entanto, sou muito sensível à deformação dos conceitos à medida que eles são transmitidos de um pensador para o seguinte e que às vezes enriquece-os, mas em outras ocasiões torna-os sem sentido e incoerentes. É como a história dos vinte soldados sentados em círculo e solicitados a repetir uma mensagem de um soldado para o próximo, apenas para descobrir que tendo fechado o ciclo, a mensagem enviada na origem não é nada parecida com a mensagem recebida no retorno. Isso ilustra por que é crítico que eu realize genealogias não com o propósito de uma preservação fascista, mas como cartografias maquínicas. O uso do termo fascista não pretende ser um ataque ao transcendentalismo, mas descrever a ligação identitária de conceitos como a mumificação de seu passado glorioso em oposição à multiplicidade processual do agenciamento imagético. Em jogo, aqui está a fásia, como a capa membranosa que cobre e agrupa a multiplicidade subjacente, que informa a figura 2.3 como uma representação da duração, onde a aparência exterior que mantém tudo unido torna-se o que algo é em oposição à concreção associativa do devir imanente. A aura de Benjamin procura tornar esse efeito superficial dinâmico e afetivo, como aquilo que a

fotografia só pode aludir. E é exatamente essa representação estática da aparência externa da imagem fixa no tempo que trabalha com a ideia transcendental de identificar, individualizar, nomear e categorizar superficialmente; é o que permite que se torne a base para o autoritário, o disciplinador, o arquivista como Lei e leva ao despótico, repressivo e totalitário.

Minha escrita envolve pensadores da Antigüidade como uma espécie de Devir-Criança, na medida em que estou buscando lançar a bagagem arquivica que esses conceitos adquiriram como constitutiva da memória que pré-condiciona seu potencial quanto ao possível desenvolvimento disponível como o que esse corpo pode fazer. Um bom exemplo é a palavra *autoritário*, em que seu uso corrente aparece como "favorecer a ordem imposta sobre a liberdade" e é um movimento de sujeição, uma espécie de infantilização. Mas podemos traçar essa palavra para sua raiz proto-indo-européia que significa "tornar maior", e serve como fundação para: aumentar, autor, inaugurar, augusto, augur, etc. E aparentemente é derivado do sânscrito *ojas-* "força" e *vaksayat* "causa para crescer" que dão o *auxo* grego, "aumento" e o latim *augmentum* "um aumento, crescimento" — uma palavra ainda não desprovida de sentido processual, mesmo no português, que significa, acrescentar, tornar maior, tornar melhor, tornar mais intenso, tornar mais rápido — todas qualidades que podemos atribuir a atividade primária da infância. Mas este não é o sentimento whiteheadiano do afeto alegre de Espinosa como aquele que aumenta o poder de ação de um corpo? Há um movimento irrefutável de afirmação e crescimento aqui, alguns diriam amor, então como este sentimento torna-se o "Poder para impor a obediência"? (O.E.D.). Esta modificação conceitual é o que desejo articular em nossa pesquisa e que serve como base do nosso método — é o nosso esforço proustiano como uma busca pelo tempo perdido. Contudo não como "Para onde foi o tempo?" ou "Como a minha vida dissipou-se?" ou "Qual é o desenvolvimento histórico?" A busca é indicar o movimento do tempo como derivado da atividade, como diferencial na força vital, no bergsoniano *elã vital*, que flui, anima, informa, transforma e consome a aparência das coisas e dos acontecimentos. A tarefa é rastrear a memória para ter uma ideia da ação que gerou a reação específica que detectei.

Expresso como um problema, se o conceito como corpo, como *soma-sema*, é um cristal do tempo, então qual é o movimento definidor, o momento, que serve como *Ἀρχή* (*archē*), como a fonte ou origem para a qual as coisas retornam? Em termos aristotélicos: o

que é o *archē* ou Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως (*archai kineseos*) que produz o Σύθητον (*syntheton*) a síntese? (PETERS, 1967). O movimento é material, no sentido da maneira clássica de pensar, não como físico ou mecânico, mas como retomado na descrição do movimento leibniziano diferencial em seus limites, onde os termos da relação desaparecem e somente o quociente diferencial permanece como o material que subentende a criação (Deleuze, 1993) como imanente do "vazio sem forma" da matéria primordial. Conforme William James escreve, "os fatos materiais, entendidos em termos de sua materialidade, não são experimentados ou vivenciados, não são objetos da experiência, não se relacionam uns com os outros. Para eles assumirem a forma dentro do sistema no qual me sinto vivo, eles devem aparecer, e esse fato de aparecer, como um acréscimo à experiência crua, é chamado de consciência que eu tenho dela, [...] sua consciência do eu mesmo (*self*)" (JAMES, 1912, p. 207). É a revelação do pensamento, a identificação do diferencial como uma função — exatamente aquilo que Deleuze e Guattari identificam em *O que é a Filosofia?* como a tarefa da ciência. Eu ainda não sei como o potencial torna-se real, como o material indiscernível, indeterminado e amorfo do pré-individual torna-se fisicamente material, mas este é o movimento com o qual eu estou tentando lidar. Ele é expresso na Bíblia como "cinzas a cinzas e poeira a pó" e, com Deleuze, traço esse movimento material do caos ao caos, como *Aion* e o plano de imanência, e em termos de diferença e plano de consistência. É o movimento perceptivo que produz Ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*) ou em latim *sapientia*, como a base da antiga ciência empírica postulada por Zenão.

Mas *archē* é também a Regra, que pode ser a regra da Lei que dita a ação como normativa e moral ou como critério da regra de comparação que não apenas produz a razão de racionalização, mas as escalas de justiça e a medida de *Cronos*. Em nosso exemplo, eu pude ver prontamente os aspectos dualistas contrastantes do conceito como processo perceptivo, onde eu poderia tratar a raiva como uma ideia e elaborá-la através de seus atributos abstratos ou eu poderia indicar sua produção pragmática como o sentimento de passagem para a reciprocidade interativa, como transferência translacional do subjetivo para o objetivo e de novo para o subjetivo — o movimento de apreensão whiteheadiano — como processual e imagético. Além disso, pelas contrações corporais que descrevem o movimento do pensamento, sei que existe uma inteligência subconsciente em ação que orienta a produção e narra a interpretação de formações sinaléticas.

Em essência, isso constitui nosso método de trabalho para entender os conceitos e construir o sistema. Consiste em encontrar os termos-chave e compreendê-los processualmente, de localizá-los de volta ao seu patamar histórico para compreender as circunstâncias que levaram à sua posição. Com alguns de nossos conceitos, isso consistiu em acompanhar o retorno à fonte do uso do termo e tentar entender a função ou o movimento do pensamento efetuado, de traduzir a intenção do conceito de uma figura estática para prever sua função dentro do ciclo do processo materialista, mas também de chegar a um entendimento da contra-ordenação de sua intenção genética. Eu vejo isso em palavras como autoridade, disciplina, doutrina, pedagogia, essência, categoria, etc. Isto é similar ao tipo de trabalho transdisciplinar que Agamben realiza no rastreamento da linhagem de conceitos usando um método híbrido que o torna meio filósofo, meio historiador, meio filólogo, e permite que ele afirme ocasionalmente que conceitos profundamente estabelecidos precisam ser “repensados do zero” (AGAMBEN, p. 11).

## **Resultados**

A primeira pergunta que uma conclusão procura é: “Quais são os resultados?”. Uma pergunta bastante simples, mas difícil de responder, pois raramente nos é dito de que ponto de vista deve-se contestar, uma vez que dependendo do ponto de vista, o resultado será diferente. De um ponto de vista pessoal e não acadêmico, posso responder imediatamente que descobri uma visão de mim mesmo. E este é um achado curioso em que a tese não se destina a ser fundamentada em introspecção pessoal, mesmo que reflita um pouco, como Hoffding (1912) relaciona em referência à sua própria metodologia acadêmica, o trabalho de um introspeccionista empírico, que segue o método de Descartes ou Peirce ou Bergson, que pode ser rastreado até uma inscrição na arquitrave do templo de Apolo em Delfos com as palavras γνῶθι σαυτόν (*gnōthi sauton* — Conhece a ti mesmo). Escrever a tese, em primeiro lugar, ofereceu-me, como indivíduo, uma interpretação explicativa retrospectiva de minha perspectiva epistemológica de vida. Ao escrever a tese, cheguei a me ver na perspectiva cognitiva e epistêmica do Devir-Criança, mas não como o fim de tudo e o ser de toda a minha existência. Compreendo perfeitamente que não sou exclusivamente um devir criança, mas uma multiplicidade de outros devires, de outras corporações, que participam do

desdobramento do mundo como informado por outros processos de individuação, outras concretizações em outros meios.

Como um tipo de personalidade, ou um modo de existência no mundo, Devir-Criança se encaixa comigo, não no sentido de que eu adotei um sistema de crenças ou que sou devotado seguidor de uma fé ou profeta, mas no sentido de que meu ser no mundo encarna o Devir-Criança, onde os sintomas são alinhados com a doença. A ingenuidade do pronunciamento serve como prova do diagnóstico. Eu menciono isso de passagem não como um exercício ou exorcismo de uma publicação de uma psicanálise pessoal, mas para enfatizar a introspecção empírica do meu trabalho. A fotografia que me mostra desconfiado ou talvez filosoficamente cético já me mostra refratário à autoridade e à disciplina, não no sentido de ser uma criança má, mas no sentido de questionar e refutar qualquer tentativa de diminuir minha subjetividade. Não é uma afirmação da subjetividade à custa dos outros, mas a insistência da minha própria.

A tese em si, talvez como uma extensão do meu pensamento, é epistemologicamente informada ou guiada pelo Devir-Criança. Isso quer dizer que seu modo de exposição como metodologia expressa implicitamente o Devir-Criança. Isso demanda de uma constante atenção à interação dialética de “forma e conteúdo” ao longo de todo o processo de redação da tese, desde a proposta até a redação desta apresentação. É um compromisso sustentado na construção dos conceitos e na elaboração da estrutura da tese como expressivo do movimento epistemológico ocorrendo no conteúdo discursivo. Eu não comecei a tese de uma ideia preconcebida do que poderia ser o Devir-Criança, pois eu não tinha conhecimento do conceito além de sua exposição limitada em *Mil Platôs* (1980).

Nos últimos quatro anos, tenho me esforçado para ativar os conceitos em si mesmos e articulá-los uns com os outros de acordo com os ditames de uma filosofia da diferença, e tentei empurrar o envelope da exposição epistemológica na medida em que tentei ativar os conceitos através de sua forma expressiva. Por exemplo, um artigo que explora a gagueira dentro de *O Espelho*, de Tarkovsky (1975), incorporaria a forma da própria gagueira ao envolver-se em uma repetição divergente ou expansiva; um texto que trata da coleção de fragmentos textuais em Benjamin é completamente composto de fragmentos de outros textos; um artigo que desafia a estrutura tradicional do conceito usa o rizoma como andaime estrutural. Simplesmente fingir que discorda de conceitos dentro de formas expositivas acadêmicas tradicionais, sem ativá-los na prática não é apenas uma expressão inadequada

do conceito, mas enfraquece-o epistemicamente e desconsidera o movimento que está tentando ativar — como Bergson afirma e frequentemente faz eco de Deleuze não se pode produzir movimento contínuo a partir de seções imóveis. Assim, procurei articular o tornar-se como movimento processual imagético, busquei resgatar o dinamismo e recuperar o movimento do pensamento na linguagem que descreve os conceitos, e tentei transmitir um movimento expressivo à forma.

Ao compor nosso projeto de tese, comecei deliberadamente com uma miscelânea, uma liquefação de conceitos, um caos primordial deleuziano, sendo uma pré-condição fundamental da desterritorialização de conceitos e estruturas como uma estratégia anarquiva, antes de fornecer qualquer tipo de ordem para as minhas ideias. A intenção do projeto era liberar, restaurar os conceitos de graus de liberdade que poderiam ter tido, e eliminar os pressupostos estruturais de pré-condicionamento para a ideação da tese e oferecer rédea livre aos elementos constitutivos para ver que tipo de concepção eles poderiam facilitar em sua forma flutuante como o que eu determinaria mais tarde como um *Devir-Criança*. A epistemologia do meu projeto começou a partir de um caos aborígene e buscou criar um corpo de significado que fosse ao mesmo tempo empírico e material. E assim seu processo de descoberta é uma hodologia nômade onde a revelação não é objetiva, mas acontece no movimento do pensamento como um avanço progressivo intuitivo. A escrita requer a participação poética do leitor como colaborador na produção de sentido, como protagonista da imanência intuitiva da compreensão que emerge da leitura. Em contrapartida, a leitura serve para acompanhar o escritor na produção do texto, em oposição a encontrar tudo pronto. Isso possivelmente coloca uma pressão indevida sobre o leitor, que espera que o material seja sistematicamente exposto e que deve percorrer o caminho para entender o que está em jogo.

Ao olhar para a tese do ponto de vista de sua possível contribuição intelectual, posso colocar em primeiro plano o desenvolvimento dos dois conceitos norteadores de *O Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético* e a articulação de sua convergência com o movimento materialista. O título dá como certo que o devir é processual e que o processo pode ser imaginado como imagético e que alguma qualidade designada de criança ou infantil informa o devir. Ao usar a conjunção comparativa “como”, eu crio um símile que equaciona os dois termos — *Devir-Criança* e *Processo Imagético* — e predica uma analogia como uma semelhança de atributos ou, no nosso caso, de equivalência operacional. Apesar de sua

aparente dissimilaridade, os dois termos mostraram compartilhar uma qualidade ou aspecto funcional comum que permite indicar que o movimento proporcionado pelo processo imagético também é pertinente ao Devir-Criança. Não é simplesmente uma questão de estabelecer correspondência entre o processo de Devir-Criança e o processo imagético, mas de identificar o movimento processual que está em jogo e como a compreensão desse processo é influenciada pela ideia da criança expressa como um problema específico.

A especificidade da preocupação como expressão de processo, de mudança, de fluxo confere à tese o *status* de um problema, não em termos de buscar uma prova para uma posição específica como a obtenção da verdade acadêmica, mas da maneira pela qual Deleuze caracteriza os problemas, ou seja, como uma explicação de como o tempo é articulado como uma modalidade de devir especificamente apontada. A busca do problema pelo tempo dentro do desdobramento do problema é, em grande parte, proposta aqui para ancorar o devir na infância, é colocar em primeiro plano sua temporalidade. Pode-se dizer que o tempo é uma diferença métrica ou uma mudança racionalizada, então a infância como devir material desenfreada é expressiva da pura criação temporal e diametralmente oposta à intemporalidade da idade adulta masculina como ser transcendental.

O problema aparece como pontual na imagem do cone de memória, que é na verdade o cone de luz dos físicos e o cone de possibilidade dos estudos de antecipação, mas que gera de forma imanente uma linha de tempo, e é por isso que o apresentei lado a lado como uma sequência de cones ligados conforme vimos na figura 4.3. A mudança aqui é significativa porque a temporalidade em jogo não é a sucessão nem a filiação como desenvolvimento, mas de uma modalidade aberrante do movimento da criação de diferença que está desalinhada com a predestinação teleológica do progresso, transformação e evolução. A criança do devir é irracional porque está além do limite da comparação. Não tem critérios para julgamento e não tem base para comparação — não tem memória porque ainda não está formada pela falta de experiência. O não-ser da infância está fora do tempo, porque seu modo de ser é pura criação, puro no sentido bergsoniano da percepção pura, que é pura porque a memória não está envolvida em sua determinação. A criança está mais próxima do caos indiferenciado e diametralmente oposta à atemporalidade do Deus transcendental, que está além do racional e do material, e à qual a idade adulta masculina é, aparentemente, sua melhor posição na Terra. E assim, toda vez que eu avanço para a novidade da criação, quando eu empurro os limites e incito os momentos limiares, não estou

no reino do Devir-Criança? Se o Reino é da criança, é porque o reino da criança é o reino da criação pura.

A convergência do Devir-Criança como uma modalidade de movimento material e do Processo Imagético é o que produz o espaço-tempo do evento. Um termo espacializa o tempo e o outro temporaliza a extensão, um termo produz diferenciação e o outro diferenciação, produz-se a diferença de si mesmo e a outra diferença em si — juntos criam a verdade maquínica que produz duração como a criação de um corpo e sua dimensão temporal — encorpamento como manifestação temporal. Na Figura 4.3, o Ponto S do Plano de Matéria de Bergson ou o Plano de Consistência de Deleuze localiza o processo de encorpamento em relação ao Cone da Memória e seu Cone de Possibilidade concomitante. Assim, tenho no plano a dinâmica material localizada e ligada à linha temporal da causalidade. Como mencionei no texto, o plano é uma representação da seleção, um conjunto transversal que reticula, que produz uma rede triangular daquilo que é participado do devir como uma dinâmica material — mas como diz Deleuze é uma transversalidade da soma vectorial da dimensão temporal e da dimensão espacial. Eu também posso entender os cones como uma superfície de delimitação, de canalizações seletivas, onde o cone do condicionamento memorial da memória, orienta e destaca o conjunto de possibilidades futuras disponíveis para o devir. O dispositivo de cone e plano é apenas o veículo, o *ochema*, tudo ao redor é variável. Dependendo da orientação do cone e a incidência do plano, o que está disponível como uma projeção para o futuro será uma projeção da triangulação do passado e relativizado na projeção em perspectiva para o futuro. Essa é uma das lições a serem aprendidas da geometria projetiva cônica: o avanço temporal relativiza o passado e reticula a história. É esse processo que dá à história sua fixidez — não sua invariabilidade interpretativa, mas sua facticidade em suas relações.

Aqui não consigo ver mentalmente a memória em termos de imagens pictóricas, de cartões postais imaginários ou testemunhos documentais na mente. A memória precisa ser vista como aquela que medeia o processo imagético como os traços da experiência, as trilhas cognitivas, os condutos neurais, que relacionam o mundo externo da experiência à nossa capacidade interior de conhecer essas mesmas coisas como o que Bergson, ou Michel Serres, chamaria de projeções no mundo. Ela envolve o que Peirce chama de corpos “ópticamente ativos”, que permitem fazer uma leitura processual do livro *Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde*, de Didi-Huberman (1992). O título é traduzido como *O que*



vemos, o que nos olha, mas o duplo sentido francês do “*ce qui nous regarde*”, o que olha para nós, é muitas vezes perdido. A frase também pode significar aquilo que nos preocupa ou nos interessa, um sentimento muito whiteheadiano que também pode estar relacionado aos seus conceitos de preocupação (*concern*) e a isca (*lure*) do sentimento (*feeling*). Esse duplo sentido está nos dizendo que a relação não é alternadamente unilateral como um intercâmbio do conhecedor e do conhecido, mas uma reciprocidade heterogênea interativa onde o desdobramento surge imanentemente no encontro experiencial que o filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger caracteriza em *Was heisst Denken?* (1954 — O que é pensar?) como fundacional para o pensamento. Tudo isso é visual, imagético, perceptivo e não contempla a linguística. Expressa a lógica do avanço com uma semiótica peirceana e não uma semiologia saussuriana, e posiciona o processo imagético interativo como fundacional, anterior e mais geral que o linguístico ou o pictórico e realinha a ciência de acordo com a conceitualização estóica da ciência como *sapientia* e para o observacional positivista.

Os pontos centrais da minha investigação que gostaria de assinalar seriam:

1. O desenvolvimento do Devir-Criança como um método do devir cognitivo.
2. O discernimento da diferença imagética entre o pictórico e o ocular.
3. A identificação da virada pragmática que torna “útil” o movimento imagético em Bergson, Peirce e James.
4. Uma conceitualização descritiva da formação de um conceito é baseada em um empirismo perceptivo.
5. A elaboração da teoria do cinematógrafo bergsoniano.
6. A formulação do Devir-Criança como uma Noção Comum espinosista em termos processuais gerais e a determinação de sua localização no ciclo materialista.
7. A associação do movimento menor em Deleuze e Guattari ao *maior et minorem perfectionem* da *Ética* de Spinoza, como maior e menor perfeição dentro do ciclo materialista.
8. Uma leitura processual-material do mito de Édipo.

Possivelmente, a conclusão mais importante da tese é uma comprovação da necessidade de entender que a cognição não é apenas uma contração eferente. A cognição e a contração podem ser compreendidas independentemente uma da outra, na medida em que são modos diferentes de conhecer. Mas, para entender nossa existência no mundo, precisamos conciliar os aspectos transcendentais das imagens, tanto como o aspecto

material quanto o aspecto ideal. Como vimos na análise do movimento ocular, não podemos descartar o icônico: a coisa individual que existe sob vários disfarces, sob várias escalas em relação a nós, é percebida sozinha, mas sempre em relação a nós e ao seu meio. Seu ser é determinado como uma conjunção da individualização icônica e sua perspectiva relativa através da projeção. Por outro lado, cada um dos aspectos requer um tipo diferente de memória para afirmar a percepção: no momento da cognição eles funcionam em uníssono, e para complicar as coisas há a impulsão aferente entre as fixações oculares guiadas por uma intencionalidade subconsciente. Mas eu precisaria aprofundar a compreensão do processo memorial da recordação para entender como as imagens mentais envolvem as memórias como visualização pictórica inexistente na mente e como elas se animam. Quiçá isso pode ser explicado pela dinâmica da projeção. A pesquisa sobre a cognição da visão computacional na recriação digital de imagens mentais como atividade cerebral talvez possa oferecer uma visão desses processos. O trabalho do Dr. Li Fei-Fei na Universidade de Stanford ou do Dr. Adrian Nestor na Universidade de Toronto-Scarborough, para citar apenas dois, poderia ser útil.

### **Onde é conduzida a pesquisa de Devir-Criança como Processo Imagético?**

Ao compreender que o movimento da tese continua aberta, identifico dez caminhos possíveis para seu desdobramento.

1. Desenvolvimento de uma teorização mais completa do processo imagético transindividual como modelo da comunicação.
2. A exploração do lúdico dentro do Devir-Criança como uma prática processual da descoberta.
3. Averiguar se a iconicidade pode ser explicada pela projeção Bergsoniana.
4. A iconicidade da imagem e a inteligência narrativa do subconsciente revelada imageticamente.
5. A expansão da ideia de projeção imagética como solução para a iconicidade.
6. A elaboração da ideia do corpo como entidade material intensiva.
7. A consideração de *Aion* em Deleuze como devir e como duração.
8. Desenvolver o pensamento imagético como teoria do digital.
9. A re-leitura de Aristóteles como processual.

10. A iconicidade da imagem e como isso se torna um todo sintetizado.
11. A inteligência narrativa do subconsciente revelada imagisticamente.
12. Reinterpretar de maneira processual a concepção do conceito na história da ciência.

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