

EARLY BUDDHISM AND PYRRHONISM AS HUMAN WISDOM

Nakako MIYAKE

CONTENTS

PREFACE

I. DIALOGUES IN GION SHŌJA

1. The dialogue between Gotama Buddha (the Lord) and Mālunkyāputta
2. The Dialogue between Gotama Buddha (the Lord) and Vacchagotta

II. SAÑJAYA BELATTHIPUTTA AND GOTAMA BUDDHA

1. The age of Gotama Buddha in Indian history
2. Sañjaya Belatthiputta, sceptic

III. ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION TO INDIA AND PYRRHO

1. Pyrrho and quadrilemma
2. Calanus, the Jain teacher

IV. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS AND PYRRHONISM

1. Sextus Empiricus in Alexandria
2. "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" by Sextus Empiricus

CONCLUSION

PREFACE

The Tale of the Heike (the Tairas) begins as follows:

The sound of the Gion Shōja bells echoes the impermanence of all things; the color of the sala flowers reveals the truth that the

prosperous must decline. The proud do not endure, they are like a dream on a spring night; the mighty fall at last, they are as dust before the wind.⁽¹⁾

“The Tale of the Heike” is that of the rise and fall of the Heike (the House of Taira) for about thirty years. The Heike is a military clan of the earlier warrior class society in the twelfth century Japan. The Heike had a period of prosperity such as no military clan had ever dreamed of, but was overthrown by the Genji, another leading military clan, and disappeared from the pages of Japanese history.

Helen Craig McCullough explains the word Gion Shōja, in Sanscrit Jetavana-vihara, in the glossary attached to her translation of “The Tale of the Heike” as follows:

Gion Shōja: Said to have been the first Buddhist monastery, and to have been built for SĀKYAMUNI by a rich merchant. At the four corners of its Hall of Impermanence (Mujōdo), an infirmary, there were four class bells, shaped like hand drums, which rang when a monk patient was about to die. Their sound is said to have ended the dying man’s suffering and ensured his future happiness by incorporating the word of a Buddhist verse: “All things are impermanent; they appear and disappear. When an end is put to appearance and disappearance, the bliss of nirvana is realized.”⁽²⁾

Sākyamuni is said to have died 554 B.C.. McCullough explains the word as follows:

The historical Buddha: Prince Siddārtha, son of King Suddhodana (sovereign of Kapila at the southern base of the Himalaya Mountains)

and Queen Maya. At around the age of 29 (or 19, according to another tradition), he stole away from his father's palace on a white horse, sent the horse home with the groom Chandaka, and embarked on a life of religious austerities. At around 35 years, he attained enlightenment under a sacred pipal tree at Gaya, in what is now Bihar. He preached for 45 years at the Deer Park, the Jetavana-vihāra monastery (GION), the Bamboo Grove, VULTURE PEAK, and elsewhere, and died at around 80 years in a grove of SALA trees, near Kusinagara in central India.⁽³⁾

On the word Sala flowers, McCullough explains as follows:

The sala, a native of India, is a tall evergreen tree bearing small, pale yellow flowers. According to legend, as the Buddha lay dying in a grove of these trees, their flowers turned white and fell.⁽⁴⁾

Now, as is quoted above, what the author of this tale intended to tell seems to be the impermanence of all things and the decline and the fall of them. This tale is said to be carried out by such a view of impermanence (Mujō-kan). In this tale Mujō means primarily a decline and a fall, which induce feelings of sorrow and resignation. For Gotama Buddha, however, does this view of impermanence mean only a decline and a fall, and is it to be reduced for him to any emotional feeling?

I. DIALOGUES IN GION SHŌJA

Gion Shōja (Jetavana-vihāra) is said to have been the first Buddhist monastery in the Jeta Grove near Sāvattī, capital of Kosala, which was, like Magadha, one of the strongest countries in all India. Sāvattī was also the traffic joint point and a big commercial center.

Now, in the collection of the middle length sayings (Majjhima-Nikāya Suttas) of Gotama Buddha, we can find two similar dialogues. One is with Mālunkyāputta, a new joiner to the Gotama Buddha's Saṅgha, and the other is with Vacchagotta, a wanderer. Both were held in this very Gion-Shōja.

1. The dialogue between Gotama Buddha (the Lord) and Mālunkyāputta

The dialogue goes as follows:

Thus have I heard: At one time the Lord was staying near Sāvathī in the Jeta Grove in Anāthapindika's monastery. Then a reasoning of mind arose to the venerable Mālunkyāputta as he was meditating in solitary seclusion, thus: "Those (speculative) views that are not explained, set aside and ignored by the Lord: The world is eternal, the world is not eternal, the world is an ending thing, the world is not an ending thing; the life-principle is the same as the body, the life-principle is one thing, the body another; the Tathāgata is after dying, the Tathāgata is not after dying, the Tathāgata both is nor is not after dying——the Lord does not explain these to me. That the Lord does not explain these to me does not please me, does not satisfy me, so I, having approached the Lord, will question him on the matter. If the Lord will explain to me either that the world is eternal or that the world is not eternal or that the world is an ending thing...or that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying, then will I fare the Brahma-faring under the Lord. But if the Lord will not explain to me either that the world is eternal or that the world is not eternal...or that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying, then will I, disavowing the training, return to secular life.

Then the venerable Mālunkyāputta, emerging from solitary mediation towards evening, approached the Lord; having approached, having greeted the Lord, he sat down at a respectful distance. As he was sitting down at a respectful distance, the venerable Mālunkyāputta spoke thus to the Lord: “Now, revered sir, as I was mediating in solitary seclusion, a reasoning of mind arose to me thus: ‘Those (speculative) views that are not explained, set aside, ignored by the Lord: The world is eternal...or that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying, then will I, disavowing the training, revert to secular life.’ If the Lord knows that the world is eternal, let the Lord explain to me that the world is eternal. If the Lord does not know whether the world is eternal or whether the world is not eternal, then, not knowing, not seeing, this would be honest, namely to say: ‘I do not know, I do not see.’ If the Lord knows that the world is an ending thing...(*repeated in the case of each views as above*)...If the Lord does not know whether the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying, then, not knowing, not seeing, this would be honest, namely to say: ‘I do not know, I do not see.’”

“But did I ever speak thus to you, Mālunkyāputta: ‘Come you, Mālunkyāputta, fare the Brahma-faring under me and I will explain to you either that the world is eternal or that world is not eternal...or that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying?’”

“No, revered sir.”

“Or did you speak thus to me: ‘I, revered sir, will fare the Brahma-faring under the Lord if the Lord will explain to me the world is eternal or that the world is not eternal...or that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying?’”

“No, revered sir.”

“So it is agreed, Mālunkyāputta, that neither did I say: ‘Come you,

Mālunkyāputta, fare the Brahma-faring under me and I will explain to you either that the world is eternal or that world is not eternal...or that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying'; and that neither did you say: 'I, revered sir, will fare the Brahma-faring under the Lord if the Lord will explain to me the world is eternal...or that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying.' This being so, foolish man, who are you that you are disavowing?

Whoever, Mālunkyāputta, should speak thus: 'I will not fare the Brahma-faring under the Lord until the Lord explains to me whether the world is eternal or whether the world is not eternal...or whether the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying'—this man might pass away, Mālunkyāputta, or ever this was explained to him by the Tathāgata. Mālunkyāputta, it is as if a man were pierced by an arrow that was thickly smeared with poison and his friends and relations, his kith and kin, were to procure a physician and surgeon. He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the man who pierced me whether he is a noble or a brahman or merchant or worker.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the man whether he is tall or short or middling in height.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the man who pierced me whether he is black or deep brown or golden skinned.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the man who pierced me to what village or market town he belongs.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the bow from which I was pierced whether it was a spring-bow or a cross-bow.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the bow-string from which I was pierced whether it was of swallow-wort or of the reed or sinew or hemp or a tree.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know

of the shaft by which I was pierced whether it was of reed of this kind or that.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the shaft from which I was pierced what kind of feathers it had: whether those of a vulture or heron or hawk or peacock or some other bird.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the shaft from which I was pierced with what kind of sinews it was encased: whether those of a cow or buffalo or deer or monkey.' He might speak thus: 'I will not draw out this arrow until I know of the arrow by which I was pierced whether it was an (ordinary) arrow or some other kind of arrow.' Mālunkyāputta, this man might pass away or ever this was known to him. In the same way, Mālunkyāputta, whoever should speak thus: 'I will not fare the Brahma-faring under the Lord until the Lord explains to me either that the world is eternal or that world is not eternal...or that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying?' this man might pass away, Mālunkyāputta, or ever it was explained to him by the Tathāgata.

The living of the Brahma-faring, Mālunkyāputta, could not be said to depend on the view that the world is eternal. Nor could the living of the Brahma-faring, Mālunkyāputta, be said to depend on the view that the world is not eternal. Whether there is the view that the world is eternal or whether there is the view that the world is not eternal, there is birth, there is ageing, there is dying, there are grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair, the suppression of which I lay down here and now. (*The same is repeated for each of the other speculative views: that the world is an ending thing, not an ending thing; that the life-principle and the body are the same and that they are different; that after dying the Tathāgata is, or is not, neither is nor is not*)...The living of the Brahma-faring, Mālunkyāputta, could not be said to depend on the view that the Tathāgata is nor is not after dying.

Whether there is the view that the Tathāgata both is and is not after dying, or whether, Mālunkyāputta, there is the view that the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying, there is birth, there is ageing, there is dying, there are grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair, the suppression of which I lay down here and now.

Wherefore, Mālunkyāputta, understand as not explained what has not been explained by me, and understand as explained what has been explained by me. And what, Mālunkyāputta, has not been explained by me? that the world is an ending thing...that the world is not an ending thing...that the life-principle and the body are the same...that the life-principle is one thing and the body another thing...that after dying the Tathāgata is...is not...both is and is not...neither is nor is not has not been explained by me, Mālunkyāputta. And why, Mālunkyāputta, has this not been explained by me? It is because it is not connected with the goal, is not fundamental to the Brahma-faring, and does not conduce to turning away from, nor to dispassion, stopping, calming, super-knowledge, awakening nor to nibbāna. Therefore it has not been explained by me, Mālunkyāputta. And what has been explained by me, Mālunkyāputta? 'This is anguish' has been explained by me, Mālunkyāputta. 'This is the arising of anguish' has been explained by me. 'This is the stopping of anguish' has been explained by me. 'This is the course leading to the stopping of the anguish' has been explained by me. And why, Mālunkyāputta, has this been explained by me? It is because it is connected with the goal, is fundamental to the Brahma-faring, and conduce to turning away from, to dispassion, stopping, calming, super-knowledge, awakening and nibbāna. Therefore it has been explained by me. Wherefore, Mālunkyāputta, understand as not explained what has not been explained by me, and

understand as explained what has been explained by me.”

Thus spoke the Lord. Delighted, the venerable Mālunkyāputta rejoiced in what the Lord had said.⁽¹⁾

The significant point of the above-mentioned dialogue is the four modes of argument. If we make these four modes simpler, they are reduced to the following; that something exists is 1) affirmative, 2) negative, 3) both affirmative and negative, 4) neither affirmative nor negative. Everard Flintoff explains these modes of argument as quadrilemma. According to Flintoff quadrilemma is the typical Indian mode of argument at that time. From the viewpoint of Aristotelian logic, for example, the number 3) and 4) sound strange. In India at that time, however, the quadrilemma was very popular and people thought it to be the perfect way of argument. Buddha suspended the judgment to those four speculative or metaphysical views accompanied by the use of quadrilemma.

Now we can arrange four metaphysical views about which Mālunkyāputta puts questions to Buddha according to Everard Flintoff as follows; 1) the world is eternal (in time), 2) the world is an ending thing (in space), 3) the life-principle and body are the same, 4) the Tathāgata (human being, the word also and in most cases means the “enlightened”) is after dying.⁽²⁾

Of each view Mālunkyāputta and Gotama Buddha argue in four ways as follows; 1) there is, 2) there is not, 3) both there is and there is not, 4) there neither is nor there is not. Mālunkyāputta thinks that Buddha sets aside and ignores them (suspends his judgment). Buddha says he does not explain what is impossible for him to explain, and he says he explains what he can explain. He explains that the reality beginning with birth and ending in death is more fundamental to the Brahma-faring than those

metaphysical views, showing his basic standpoint “pratitya-samutpāda (dependent co-origination)” and so-called “catur-arya-satya (the Four Noble Truths)”, that is to say; 1) “existence entails suffering”, a clear recognition of the nature of human life; 2) “the cause of suffering is craving”; 3) “craving can be destroyed”; and 4) “the practice of the *Eightfold Noble Paths* is the means for destroying this cause”.⁽³⁾

The Buddha refuses to comment on metaphysical views. He suspends judgment of them. This suspension of judgment is well-known as “epochē” in Greek.

Comparing early Greek philosophy with the Buddha’s thinking in his early period, Everard Flintoff gives us the suggestive comments as follows:

Now of course there were precedents to taking up such a position as this from at least as early as the period of Sophists. I shall be reminded of the “Dissoi Logoi” and the Diogenes Laertius’ testimony that Protagoras was the first person to assert that in every argument there were two sides to the argument exactly opposite to one another. But it would be a mistake to suppose that such a standpoint was confined to Greek thought. For it is interesting that from the time of the earliest Buddhist sutras onwards—material written down after the time of Pyrrho, but incorporating oral material of great antiquity—we find both polarity and antinomies as a *recurrent hallmark* of Buddhist thought. And what is even more interesting is the way the Buddha himself constantly uses these antinomies to take up an agnostic position towards the metaphysical questions that lie behind them. It is worth citing T. R. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London 1960) p.8: “Buddha pronounced some problems to be insoluble or inexpressible (*avyākṛta*). This is the so-called

agnosticism of the Buddha. Criticism is the very essence of the Buddha's thinking. He was aware of the antinomical character of Reason. His refusal to answer questions about the beginning and extent of the world or of the unconditioned existence of the soul (*jīva*) and the Perfect Being (*tathāgata*) was the direct outcome of the awareness of the conflict in reason." The same author writes on pp. 40-41. "The opening dialogue of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*the Brahmajāla Sutta*) indicates the standpoint of Buddha. He characterises all speculations as *ditthi-vāda* (dogmatism) and consistently refuses to be drawn into the net (*jāla*). He is conscious of the interminable nature of the conflict and resolves it by rising to the higher standpoint of criticism. Dialectic was born. To Buddha, then, belongs the honour of having discovered the dialectic long before anything approximating to it was formulated in the West. We contend that Buddha reached a very high level of philosophic consciousness and he did not give an answer to the problem — the only answer possible for a critic of experience. Had he resiled from his position and given a 'yes' or a 'no' answer, he would have been guilty of that very dogmatism (*ditthi*) which he consistently condemned in others. On the opposition of the eternalist and nihilist views (*sāsvatavāda* and *uccheda-vāda*), Buddha erected another and more fundamental opposition — that between dogmatism (both *sāsvata* and *ucchedavadas* are species of dogmatism) and criticism which is the analytic or reflective awareness of them as dogmatic theories. Criticism is deliverance of the human mind from all entanglements and passions. It is freedom itself." ⁽⁴⁾

2. The Dialogue between Gotama Buddha (the Lord) and Vacchagotta

The dialogue goes as follows:

Thus I have heard: At one time the Lord was staying near Sāvattī in the Jeta Grove in Anāthapindika monastery. Then the wanderer Vacchagotta approached the Lord; having approached, he exchanged greetings with the Lord; having conversed in a friendly and courteous way, he sat down at a respectful distance. As he was sitting down at a respectful distance, the wanderer Vacchagotta spoke thus to the Lord:

“Now, good Gotama, is the revered Gotama of this view: ‘The world is eternal, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood?’ ”

“I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The world is not eternal, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ ”

“Now, good Gotama, is the revered Gotama of this view: ‘The world is an ending thing, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood?’ ”

“I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The world is an ending thing, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ ”

“Then, good Gotama, is the revered Gotama of this view: ‘The world is not an ending thing, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood?’ ”

“I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The world is not an ending thing, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ ”

“Now, good Gotama, is the revered Gotama of this view: ‘The life-principle and the body are the same, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood?’ ”

“I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The life-principle and the body are the same, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ ”

“Now, good Gotama, is the revered Gotama of this view: ‘The life-principle is one thing and the body another, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood?’ ”

“I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The life-principle is one thing and the body another, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ ”

“Now, good Gotama, is the revered Gotama of this view: ‘The Tathāgata is after dying, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood?’ ”

“I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The Tathāgata is after dying, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ ”

“Now, good Gotama, is the revered Gotama of this view: ‘The Tathāgata both is and is not after dying, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood?’ ”

“I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The Tathāgata both is and is not after dying... falsehood.’ ”

“Now, good Gotama, is the revered Gotama of this view: ‘The Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood?’ ”

“I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying falsehood , this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ ”

“Now, good Gotama, the revered Gotama, on being asked whether he is of the view: ‘The world is eternal, this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ says: ‘I, Vaccha, am not of this view: ‘The world is eternal...all else is falsehood.’ But, good Gotama, the revered Gotama, on being asked whether he is of the view: ‘The world is not eternal...’ ...on being asked whether he is of the view: : ‘The Tathāgata both is and is not after dying...’ ...on being asked whether he is of the view: ‘The Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying , this is indeed the truth, all else is falsehood.’ says: I, Vaccha, am not of the view: ‘The Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying, this is indeed the truth, all

else is falsehood.' What is the peril the revered Gotama beholds that he thus does not approach any of these (speculative) views? ”

“Vaccha, to think that ‘the world is eternal’——this is going to a (speculative) view, holding a view, the wilds of views, the wriggling of views, the scuffling of views, the fetter of views; it is accompanied by anguish, distress, misery, fever; it does not conduce to turning away from, nor to dispassion, stopping, calming, super-knowledge, awakening, nor to nibbāna. Vaccha, to think that ‘the world is not eternal’ ...to think that ‘the world is an ending thing’... to think that ‘the world is not an ending thing’ ...to think that : ‘the life-principle and the body are the same’ ... to think that ‘the life-principle is one thing and the body another,...’ ... to think that ‘the Tathāgata is after dying’ ... to think that ‘the Tathāgata is not after dying’ ... to think that ‘the Tathāgata is and is not after dying’ ... to think that : ‘the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying——this, Vaccha,’ this is going to a (speculative) view, holding a view, the wilds of views, the wriggling of views, the scuffling of views, the fetter of views; it is accompanied by anguish, distress, misery, fever; it does not conduce to turning away from, nor to dispassion, stopping, calming, super-knowledge, awakening, nor to nibbāna. I, Vaccha, beholding that this is a peril, thus do not approach any of these (speculative) views.”

“But does the good Gotama have any (speculative) view?”

“Vaccha, going to ‘speculative’ view——this has been got rid of by the Tathāgata. But this, Vaccha, has been seen by the Tathāgata: ‘Such is material shape, such is the arising of material shape, such the going down of material shape; such is feeling...perception...such are the habitual tendencies...such is consciousness, such is the arising of consciousness, such the going down of consciousness.’ Therefore I say that by the destruction, dispassion, stopping, giving up, casting

out of all imaginings, all supposings, all latent pride that 'I am the doer, mine is the doer,' a Tathāgata is freed without clinging."

When this had been said, the wanderer Vacchagotta spoke thus to the Lord: "Good Gotama,.....May the revered Gotama accept me as a lay-follower going for refuge from this day forth for as long as life lasts."⁽¹⁾

Comparing above-mentioned two sutras, Vacchagotta seems to be older than Mālunkyāputta, but the issues he discusses is just the same as those Mālunkyāputta discusses. The issues they discuss are the four metaphysical views. And, moreover, the quadrilemma is used by them in the same way. In the process of the dialogues, however, we can recognize some difference. Mālunkyāputta is satisfied with his teacher's long and thoughtful preaching, and pledges to follow his teacher without any suspicion.

Vaccha, on the other hand, keeps on asking sharply. Buddha says that having metaphysical views approaches dogma (dittigata), and then in return Vaccha asks whether Buddha does not resort to dogma. Buddha replies to him that the Tathāgata (the enlightened) can get rid of such a dogma as another (than Buddhism) teachings have. Buddha preaches Vaccha on the so-called five aggregates or factors (skandhas): rūpa (shapes), vedanās (sense impressions), samjñās (concepts), saṃskāra (will), and vijñāna (consciousness).⁽²⁾

In another Sutra (Avyākata-samyutta 44) the Buddha himself questions Vaccha whether these five aggregates are the self (ātman), and the Buddha shows the answer as follows: none of these five are the self and the self is finally nothing but the temporary (impermanent) combination of the five, and does not exist in reality. Preaching thus on five aggregates, Buddha shows also "impermanence" and "anātman". These two are

usually put side by side, and are the fundamental points of the first one of “the Eightfold Noble Pass”, which are as follows: the practice of correct understanding, view or faith (*samyag-drstī*), which is the first one of “the Eightfold Noble Pass”. The following seven Passes according to Dr. Kanakura’s descriptions are:

The practice of correct thinking (*samyak-samkalpa*), the practice of correct speech (*samyag-vāc*), the practice of correct action or conduct (*samyak-karmānta*), the practice of correct livelihood (*samyak-ājīva*), the practice of correct effort or endeavor (*samyag-vyāyāma*), the practice of correct attentiveness or memory (*samyak-smṛti*), and the practice of correct concentration (*samyak-samādhi*). With the practice of the Eightfold Noble Path comes the destruction of craving and hence ultimately the destruction of ignorance: the highest perfect enlightenment is thereby attained.⁽³⁾

Dr. Kanakura, former professor of Indian philosophy at Tōhoku University in Sendai, Japan, also says as follows:

The ātman was inherent in all things, controlling them from within; it possessed eternal nature and its substance was the same as that of the absolute *brahman*. To put it bluntly, Buddha emerged to deny the fundamental principle which the Upanishadic sages had racked their brains to discover, and which they had succeeded in grasping.⁽⁴⁾

And so the anātman is the negative form of ātman. It is against the Upanishadic thinking. It represents the revolutionary meaning of early Buddhism. Anātman has nothing to do with losing or rejecting the self. According to “the Dhammapada 160”, “Oneself indeed is patron of oneself.

Who else indeed could be one's patron? With oneself well restrained, one gets a patron hard to get".⁽⁵⁾

Buddha says he is obliged to suspend the judgment to permanence and absoluteness, because we can not experience them, but we can at least experience birth, becoming sick, old and death, and so he rather says we are in impermanence and anātman.

II. SAÑJAYA BELATTHIPUTTA AND GOTAMA

1. The age of Gotama Buddha in Indian history

According to "Ancient India" by Ram Sharan Sharma, in the age of Gotama Buddha there were many states in India, among which only Kosala and Magadha emerged as powerful. Both of them were ruled by the hereditary monarchs belonging to the kshatriya varna. Kosala included the tribal republican territory of Sakyas of Kapilavastu, the birthplace of G. Buddha. The capital of Kapilavastu has been identified with Piprawa in Basti district, but Lumbini, which lies at a distance of 15km from Piprawa in Nepal, served as another capital of Sakyas.

Magadha came into prominence under the leadership of Bimbisara, who was a contemporary of Buddha. According to the Buddhist chronicles Bimbisara ruled for 52 years, roughly from 544 B.C. to 492 B.C. He was succeeded by his son Ajatasatru (ruled: 492-460 B.C.). Ajatasatru killed his father and seized the throne for himself. Throughout his reign he pursued an aggressive policy of expansion.

There were some other important factors for the expansion of Magadha. It enjoyed an advantageous geographical position in the age of iron, because the richest iron deposits were situated not far away from Rajgir, the earliest capital of Magadha. The easy availability of the rich iron ores in the neighbourhood enabled the Magadhan princes to equip

themselves with effective weapons.⁽¹⁾ Sharma says as follows:

Magadha lay at the center of the middle Gangetic plain. The alluvium, once cleared of the jungles, proved immensely fertile. Because of heavy rainfall the area could be made productive even without irrigation. The country produced varieties of paddy, which are mentioned in the early Buddhist texts. This area was far more productive than the areas to the west of Allahabad. This naturally enabled the peasants to produce considerable surplus, which could be mopped by the rulers in the form of taxes.

The princes of Magadha also benefited from the rise of trade and commerce in north-east India, the princes could levy tolls on the sale of commodities and accumulate wealth to pay and maintain their army.⁽²⁾

The age of Buddha is important because ancient Indian polity, economy and society really took shape in this period. Agriculture based on the use of iron tools in alluvial areas gave rise to an advanced food-producing economy, particularly in eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. It was possible to collect taxes from the peasants, and on the basis of regular taxes and tributes large states could be founded. In order to continue this system the varna order were clearly laid down. According to this system, rulers and fighters were called kshatriyas, priests and teachers were called brahmanas, peasants and taxpayers were called vaisyas, and those who served all these three classes as labourers were called sudras.⁽³⁾

The republican system of government existed either in the Indus basin or in the foothills of the Himalayas in eastern Uttar Pradesh and

Bihar. The republics in the Indus basin may have been the remnants of the Vedic tribes although some monarchies may have been followed by republics. In some cases in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar people were possibly inspired by the old ideals of tribal equality which did not give much prominence to the raja.

In the republics real power lay in the hands of tribal oligarchies. In the republics of Sakyas and Lichchhavis the ruling class belonged to the same clan and the same varna. Although in the Lichchhavis of Vaisali 7707 rajas sat on the assembly held in the motehall, the brahmanas were not included in this group. In post-Maurya times, in the republics of the Malavas and the Kshudrakas, the kshatriyas and the brahmanas were given citizenship, but slaves and hired labourers were excluded from it. In a state situated on the Beas river in Panjab, membership was restricted to those who could supply at least one elephant to the state. This was a typical oligarchy in the Indus basin.

The administrative machinery of the Sakyas and Lichchhavis was simple. It consisted of raja, *uparaja* (vice-king), *senapati* (commander) and *bhandagarika* (treasurer). We hear of as many as seven courts for trying the same case one after another in the Lichchhavi republic, but this seems to be too good to be true.

In any case certain states in the age of the Buddha were not ruled by hereditary kings but by persons who were responsible to the assemblies. Thus although the people living in ancient republics may not have shared political power equally, the republican tradition in the country is as old as the age of the Buddha.

The republics differed from the monarchies in several ways. In the monarchies the king claimed to be the sole recipient of revenue from the peasants, but in the republics this claim was advanced by every tribal oligarch who was known as raja. Each one of the 7707

Lichchhavi rajas maintained his store-house and apparatus of administration. Again, every monarchy maintained its regular standing army and did not permit any group or groups of people to keep arms within its boundaries. But in a tribal oligarchy each raja was free to maintain his own little army under his *senapati*, so that each of them could compete with the other. The brahmanas exercised great influence in monarchy, but they had no place in the early republics, nor did they recognize these states in their law-books. Finally, the main difference between a monarchy and a republic lay in the fact that the latter functioned under the leadership of oligarchic assemblies and not of an individual, as was the case with the former.

The republican tradition became feeble from the Maurya period.⁽⁴⁾

Toward the end of the Vedic period we notice a strong reaction against priestly domination, against cults and rituals, especially in the land of the Panchalas and Videha where, around 600 B.C., the Upanishads were compiled. These philosophical texts criticized the rituals and laid stress on the value of right belief and knowledge. They emphasized that the knowledge of the self or *atma* should be acquired and the relation of *atma* with Brahma should be properly understood. Brahma emerged as the supreme god, comparable to the powerful kings of the period. Some of the kshatriya princes in Panchala and Videha also cultivated this type of thinking and created the atmosphere for the reform of the priest-dominated religion. Their teachings also promoted the cause of stability and integration. Emphasis on the changelessness, indestructibility and immortality of *atma* or soul served the cause of stability which was needed for the rising state power. Stress on the relation of *atma* with Brahma served the cause of loyalty to superior authority.⁽⁵⁾

Numerous religious sects arose in the middle Gangetic basin in the sixth century B.C. We hear of as many as 62 religious sects in this period. Many of these sects were based on regional customs and rituals practiced by different peoples living in north-east India. Of these sects Jainism and Buddhism were the most potent religious reform movements.⁽⁶⁾

Naturally the varna-divided society seems to have generated tensions. We have no means to find out the reactions of the vaisyas and the sudras. The kshatriyas, who acted as rulers, however, reacted strongly against the ritualistic domination of the brahmanas, and seem to have led a kind of protest movement against the importance attached to birth in the varna system. The kshatriya reaction against the domination of the priestly class called brahmanas, who claimed various privileges, was one of the causes of the origin of new religions. Vardhamana Mahavira, who founded Jainism, and Gautama Buddha, who founded Buddhism, belonged to the kshatriya clan, and both disputed the authority of the brahmanas.

But the real cause of the rise of these new religions lay in the introduction of a new agricultural economy in north-eastern India....

In the middle Gangetic basin large-scale habitations began from about 600 B.C.....

The use of iron tools made possible clearance, agriculture and large settlements. The agricultural economy based on the iron ploughshare required the use of bullocks, and it could not flourish without animal husbandry. But the Vedic practice of killing cattle indiscriminately in sacrifices stood in the way of the progress of new agriculture. The cattle wealth slowly decimated because the cows and bullocks were killed in numerous Vedic sacrifices. The tribal people

living on the southern and eastern fringes of Magadha also killed cattle for food. But if the new agrarian economy had to be stable this killing had to be stopped.

The period saw the rise of a large number of cities in north-eastern India. We may refer, for example, to Kausambi near Allahabad, Kusinagar (in the Deoria district of Uttar Pradesh), Banaras, Vaisali (in the newly created district of the same name in north Bihar), Chirand (in the Chapra district) and Rajgir (situated at a distance of about 100 km from Patna). Besides others these cities had many artisans and traders, who began to use coins for the first time. The earliest coins belonged to the fifth century B.C., and they are called punch-marked coins. They circulated for the first time in eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The use of coins naturally facilitated trade and commerce, which added to the importance of the vaisyas. In the brahmanical society the vaisyas ranked third, the first two being brahmanas and kshatriyas. Naturally they looked for some religion which would improve their position.⁽⁷⁾

The merchants, called the *setthis*, made handsome gifts to Gautama Buddha and his disciples. There were several reasons for it. First, Jainism and Buddhism in the initial stage did not attach any importance to the existing varna system. Second, they preached the gospel of non-violence, which would put an end to wars between different kingdoms and consequently promote trade and commerce. Third, the brahmanical law-books, called the Dharmasutras, decried lending money on interest. A person who lived on interest was condemned by them. Therefore the vaisyas, who lent money on account of growing trade and commerce, were not held in esteem and were eager to improve their social status.

On the other hand we also notice a strong reaction against various forms of private property. Old-fashioned people did not like the use and accumulation of coins made certainly of silver and copper and possibly of gold. They detested new dwellings and dresses, new systems of transport which amounted to luxury, and they hated war and violence. The new forms of property created social inequalities, and caused misery and suffering to the masses of the people. So the common people yearned to return to primitive life. They wanted to get back to the ascetic ideal which dispensed with the new forms of property and the new style of life. Both Jainism and Buddhism preferred simple, puritan, ascetic living. The Buddhist and Jaina monks were asked to forgo the good things of life. They were not allowed to touch gold and silver. They were to accept only as much from their patrons as was sufficient to keep body and soul together. They therefore rebelled against the material advantages stemming from the new life in the Gangetic basin. In other words we find the same kind of reaction against the changes in material life in north-eastern India in the sixth century B.C. as we notice against the changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution in modern times. Just as the advent of Industrial Revolution made many people think of return to the pre-machine age life, similarly people in the past wanted to return to the pre-iron age life.⁽⁸⁾

In this section above it has already been said that under the new religious movement of sixth century B.C. there were sixty-two different sects, among which Buddhism and Jainism were the most important. In a Buddhist sutra, six others sages are mentioned. Dr. Kanakura says:

These were Pūrana Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambala,

Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Belatthiputta, and Nigantha Nātaputta. They are usually known as six “heretical teachers”. Here, the term “heretical” indicates those who preached doctrines other than Buddhism.⁽⁹⁾

These sages are also known as “six liberal thinkers”. This sutra is “Sāmaññaphalasutta” of Digha-nikāya.

2. Sañjaya Belatthiputta, sceptic

“Sāmaññaphalasutta” begins with King Ajatasatru of Magadha’s visit to the Buddha in the Mango Grove of Givaka, who was a famous physician, and one of the leading sponsors of Buddhist Samga. In this Mango Grove, an interesting dialogue is held between the king and the Buddha about the fruit of the life of a recluse.

The king begins asking as follows:

‘There are, Sir, a number of ordinary crafts:—mahouts, horsemen, charioteers, archers, standard bearers, camp marshals, camp followers, high military officers of royal birth, military scouts, men brave as elephants, champions, heroes, warriors in buckskin, home-born slaves, cooks, barbers, bath attendants, confectioners, garland-makers, washerman, weavers, basket-makers, potters, arithmeticians, accountants, and whatsoever others of like kind there may be. All these enjoy, in this very world, the visible fruits of their craft. They maintain themselves, and their parents and children and friends, in happiness and comfort. They keep up gifts, the object of which is gain on high, to recluses and Brahmins—gifts that lead to rebirth in heaven, that redound to happiness, and have bliss as their result. Can you, Sir, declare to me any such immediate fruit,

visible in this very world, of the life of a recluse?"⁽¹⁾

Then in return the Buddha asks the king, whether he has put the same question to others, and the king tells how they answered it. Thus being told by the king, these six teachings are introduced and explained. The six teachings are as follows:

Pūrana Kassapa denied morality.

Makkali Gosāla taught a kind of fatalism.

Ajita Kasakambala tells a sensual materialism.

Pakudha Kaccāyana recognized seven fundamental elements.

Sañjaya Belattiputta represents a kind of scepticism denying the objective validity of cognition.

Nigantha Nātaputta represents founder of the Jain religion.⁽²⁾

Of the six teachers it is needless to say that Jainism is the most important. It has so important a point for us that we will have the chance to discuss later. But, first of all, Sañjaya seems to be the most interesting for us in the mode of argument and the themes of it. Everard Flintoff translates Sañjaya's teaching as follows:

"If you ask me whether there is a next world, then if it were to occur to me that there is a next world, I would pronounce that there is a next world. Yet I do not say so, I do not say thus, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials. Similarly with regard to the propositions, "there is no next world", "there is and is not a next world", "there neither is and is not a next world", "there neither is nor is not a next world", "there are beings who survive (death)", "there are no beings who survive", "there are and are no beings who

survive”, “there neither are nor are no beings who survive”, “there is a result and consequence of good and evil actions”, “there is no result or consequence of good and evil actions”, “there is and is no result or consequence of good and evil actions”, “the Perfect One (Tathagato) exists after death”, “the Perfect One does not exist after death”, “the Perfect One both exists and does not exist after death”, “the Perfect One neither exists nor does not exist after death.”⁽³⁾

The themes which Sañjaya argues are as follows; 1) next world, 2) beings who survive death, 3) a result and consequence of good and evil actions, 4) the perfect one (Tathagata) exists after death. Sañjaya argues on each theme in the four (for us now familiar) ways as follows: 1) there is, 2) there is not, 3) there is and there is not, 4) there neither is nor is not.

Making these four ways short, they are as follows: 1) affirmative, 2) negative, 3) affirmative and negative, 4) neither affirmative nor negative.

We need no longer wait for Flintoff's comment. We will soon notice that this mode of argument is nothing else than the same quadrilemma (Tetra-Lemma) as those of the dialogues between the Buddha and Mālunkyāputta or Vacchagotta. Besides, the views or the themes seem to be speculative or metaphysical founding on samsara (transmigration), though they are not exactly the same as those of Mālunkyāputta and Vacchagotta. Using quadrilemma Sañjaya suspends his judgment and tries to attain to “ataraxia”.

Sañjaya had two hundred and fifty disciples. Sāriputta was one of them. He came to know the most important point of Gotama Buddha's teaching:

He eventually left his teacher Sañjaya together with the rest of all the disciples including Moggallana, Sāriputta's intimate colleague, and joined Gotama Buddha's Samga.⁽⁴⁾ Sañjaya, losing all of his disciples, is said to have died because of too much shock.⁽⁵⁾ This historical affair seemed to

have happened before the King Ajatasatru came to Givaka's Mango Grove. Later, both Sāriputta and Moggallana were highly esteemed in the Buddhist Saṅga, Sāriputta by his deep insight and Moggallana by his mystic power. They played there in the Saṅga the leading role. Especially Sāriputta understood not only the scepticism of Sañjaya, but also the revolutionary meaning that Gotama Buddha had in his age. The Buddha showed the way by putting the basis on the scepticism against the metaphysical views which Buddha shared with Sañjaya. In other words, we can say the Buddha showed the way to overcome such scepticism. It is also interesting that Sāriputta studied at Sañjaya's school for some time before joining the Buddhist Saṅga. Sāriputta left his teacher because he could not be satisfied with the second step that his teacher took next to his scepticism. Sañjaya suspended his judgment, only to attain to "ataraxia" in Greek. It was not until Sāriputta met the Buddha's teaching that Sāriputta could probably find a satisfying teaching. So, it seems to be unreasonable to ignore that the Buddha showed the way, having the sword of scepticism in one hand.

By the way, here in a Buddhist scripture titled "The sheaf of reeds (Sanyutta-Nikāya 67)", we can find a dialogue between Sāriputta and Mahā-Kottita. It is held with the quadrilemma, and Sāriputta explains the canon of idappaccayatā (causally connected) or paticca-samuppāda (dependent co-origination), which caused Sāriputta to join the Buddhists.

Sāriputta explains how twelve parts of dependent co-origination link each other by the example of two sheaves of reeds one against the other, and persuades Kottita as follows:

If, friend, I were to pull towards me one of these sheaves of reeds, the other would fall; if I were to pull towards me the other, the former would fall.⁽⁶⁾

III. ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION TO INDIA AND PYRRHO

1. Pyrrho and quadrilemma

"The Pyrrhonian philosophy may well have been the most significant immediate gift that Alexander's expedition brought to Greece from India", says George Woodcock in his book "The Greeks in India". Chapter II of the book begins as follows:

In the spring of 334 Alexander crossed the Hellespont on his great expedition to avenge the wrongs of Greece and to establish his succession to the most powerful empire of the ancient world. By Persian standard his army was minute——a mere 40,000 men——but it was carefully chosen, and Alexander, the pupil of Aristotle, traveled with a staff which comprised not only generals, but also scientists and philosophers of many kinds, including three of the most celebrated sophists of the time, Callisthenes, the nephew of Aristotle, Anaxarchus, and his pupil Pyrrho. Callisthenes did not reach India; he became the scapegoat for a plot against Alexander at Bactra and was either executed or allowed to die from the privations of his imprisonment. Anaxarchus reached India, but he did not live to take back to Greece what he had learnt; returning by boat after Alexander's death, he was shipwrecked on the coast of Cyprus, whose king, Nicocreon, had him pounded to death in a stone mortar in punishment for the past offences of the philosopher's sharp tongue. Only Pyrrho was to survive both the ardours of eleven years of campaigning and the perils of philosophic frankness; he returned to found the Sceptic school whose teachings bore clear signs of his association with the naked Jain teachers who aroused the interest of Alexander and his Greeks at the holy and learned city of Taxila. In

the doctrines of inaction and of indifference to all external things, which are in themselves indifferent and equal in value and non-value, Pyrrho developed in the early third century BC a philosophy nearer in essentials, and even in details, to doctrines current in India among Jain and Buddhist teachers than any Greek system of thought before the neo-Platonists.⁽¹⁾

Who are the naked Jain teachers? What is the sceptic school that Pyrrho founded in his home Greece? To begin with, I treat with the latter question. In “Lives of Eminent Philosophers”, Diogenes Laertius tells us the life and sayings of Pyrrho including some interesting episodes. Pyrrho himself wrote nothing like Socrates. Bertrand Russel begins his “Sceptical Essays” with one of Pyrrho’s episodes as follows:

In his youth, when he was taking his constitutional one afternoon, he saw his teacher in philosophy (from whom he had imbibed his principles) with his head stuck in a ditch, unable to get out. After contemplating him for some time, he walked on, maintaining that there was no sufficient ground for thinking he would do any good by pulling the old man out. Others, less skeptical, effected a rescue, and blamed Pyrrho for his heartlessness. But his teacher, true to his principles, praised him for his consistency. Now I do not advocate such heroic skepticism as that.⁽²⁾

Russell’s next sentences will come later. At the beginning of his book, Diogenes Laertius tells Pyrrho’s sayings and so on as follows:

Afterwards he (Pyrrho) joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian

Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgment. He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust. And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more than that.⁽³⁾

In above quoted sentences, we can find his sayings as these; “He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust. No single thing is in itself any more this than that”.

This passage of Pyrrho’s shows us polarity or antinomy; he opposes A to Non-A, and suspends to judge (epochē) which to take. According to D. Laertius’ following explanation, Pyrrho continued enquiring without finding any truth and tried to attain to “ataraxia”. Pyrrho kept this sceptical way of life so severely and so thoroughly all his life that he was respected by his disciples as well as by people at home. His disciples wrote books unlike their teacher. Later, about two century A.D., Sextus Empiricus wrote “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”, which contains the thought of Pyrrho’s disciples.

Now, we have other source of Pyrrho’s sayings. In “Evangelical Preparation” of Eusebius of Caesarea,⁽⁴⁾ we can find Pyrrho’s sayings told by Timon, one of Pyrrho’s disciples. Everard Flintoff translates them as follows:

We must not say about any one thing 1) that it is or 2) that it is not or 3) that it is and is not or 4) that it neither is nor is not (Translation and numbering by Flintoff)⁽⁵⁾

This mode of argument thus arranged by Flintoff has already been familiar for us in the dialogues between Mālunkyāputta or Vacchagotta and Gotama Buddha. This is nothing else than the quadrilemma, according to Flintoff, a mode of thinking hitherto without precedent in Greek philosophical thinking.

2. Calanus, the Jain teacher

Our next question is Pyrrho in India. We would like to ask whether Pyrrho had a chance to come into contact with any Indian philosopher (s) and such. Both Arrian and Plutarch refer to the contact with some Indian philosophers, most of all a philosopher named Calanus. George Woodcock calls them the naked Jain teachers. Quoting Arrian's book "Anabasis Alexandri" and Plutarch's etc., George Woodcock writes as follows:

Taxila was the first large Indian city that Alexander's men had seen. Here they watched, in shocked surprise, widows burning themselves on the pyres of their dead husbands, and Alexander became interested in the strange life and nihilistic view of 'the Indian sect of Wise Men whose practice it is to go naked'. He sent his attendants, Pyrrho and Onescritus, to discourse with the Jain sages, and he himself listened to their arguments and became fascinated by the endurance which the yogis displayed in carrying out the physical tests that confirmed their spiritual self-control. He tried to persuade one of the leading sages, Dandamos, to return with him to the West as an added ornament to the string of sophists that travelled with the Macedonian army. According to one account Dandamos did not reply directly, but merely asked indifferently why Alexander should have chosen to travel so far.....

One Jain philosopher finally consented to accompany Alexander. This was Calanus, who had insisted that Onescritus should listen naked to his discourses. Calanus returned with the Macedonian army into Persia, where, at Susa, he fell ill, but showed the steadfastness of his Jain beliefs by refusing to obey physicians who wished him to depart from the austerity of his diet and his way of life. Alexander, who had conceived an affection for the Indian ascetic, tried to persuade him out of his obstinacy. Calanus replied that 'he was content to die as he was, which would be preferable to enduring the misery of being forced to alter his way of life'. He asked that a pyre should be prepared for him, and insisted on being carried there in a litter. To the Macedonian generals he bade farewell, but to Alexander he said merely, 'We shall meet in Babylon.' Then he summoned his last energy, mounted the pyre chanting hymns of praise to the Indian gods, and ordered the torch to be applied. As the flames rose around the motionless ascetic Alexander commanded the trumpets to sound and the soldiers to shout out their battle-cries in honour of a courage that came not from physical prowess but from spiritual strength.⁽¹⁾

In 323 B.C., Alexander the Great died in Babylon, as Calanus had prophesied. Pyrrho is said to be always with his teacher Anaxarchus. As for Anaxarchus, he must have always been by the side of the King Alexander. Calanus seems to have pleased the King. And so we can guess that Pyrrho and Calanus must have had a chance to communicate for about two years and a half. From Alexander's arriving in India till Calanus's death, it took about two years and a half.

According to "Sarva-Darsana-Samgrah" by Madhaya Acharya, Chapter III: The Arhata System, the Jain logic is as follows:

Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favorite logic called the *sapta-bhangi-naya*, or the system of the seven paralogsms, “may be, it is,” “may be, it is not,” “may be, it is and it is not,” “may be, it is not predicable,” “may be, it is, and yet not predicable,” “maybe, it is not, and not predicable,” “may be, it is and it is not, and not predicable,”⁽²⁾

IV. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS AND PYRRHONISM

1. Sextus Empiricus in Alexandria

Alexandria built by Alexander the Great at the mouth of the Nile had kept its hegemony by the Greek for about 1000 years until it was put under the Arabic. In its peak age it had one million population, and it was an international city in the true sense of words, very exceptional in antiquity. Many kinds of knowledge and learning as well as trading goods were gathered there from every region, and went out in the same way. China and India were not exceptional.⁽¹⁾

In the second century B.C. Alexandria experienced the second golden age, in which Galen and Ptolemy, astronomer, were the most significant. Galen as well as Aristotle had been authority in the world of learning for over 2000 years. Ptolemy was well-known as the author of “Almagest” under the geocentric system, which has been tumbled by Copernicus. In that period the author of “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”, Sextus Empiricus was alive. He was the contemporary of Galen and Ptolemy. Sextus seemed to be a medical doctor, whose medicine was introduced by Galen in his book.⁽²⁾ At that time Sextus was not so well-known as Galen or Ptolemy. Sextus wrote some more books, but these books as well as “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” seemed to have been as it were “the Sleeping Beauty” in the Arabic woods or somewhere in Europe for over 1400 years until Henri Etienne, a French publisher, found the Greek text in Italy and published it,

translating into Latin in 1562.

One of the persons who could understand the significance of “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” translated into Latin was Montaigne. He digested the important points of the book well and transmitted them to the modern world. It is not too much to say that without Sextus’s this book, the modern world would be another one. That is why George Woodcock said: “The Pyrrhonian philosophy may well have been the most significant immediate gift that Alexander’s expedition brought to Greece from India.”⁽³⁾ Sextus enhanced the value of the gift brought to Greece from India by Pyrrho, who lived just like a Buddhist (or Jainist) monk after coming home, according to Flintoff.⁽⁴⁾

By the way, in his “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” did Sextus argue by quadrilemma, and those four metaphysical views? Originally Alexandria was built as the New World against the Old World of Greece, the center of which was Athens. Needless to say, there in old Greece philosophy played a great role. In Alexandria everything was thought to be new. And so, what Alexandria is to Athens, what New York is to London or Paris after the discovery of American Continent (the New World at that time). Alexander, disciple of Aristotle, liked empiricism and positivism. People of Alexandria found empiricism and positivism important following the founder of the city, Alexander. They brought some models from the Old World to the New World. The philosophy of Aristotle was one of them.

According to Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras was born at Abdera or Teos and studied under Democritus, who was a native of Abdera and was a famous atomist.⁽⁵⁾ Protagoras said as follows: “Man is the measure of all things.”⁽⁶⁾ In these words Socrates and Plato recognized relativism, and criticized it. They thought of “idea” theory. Besides, according to Diogenes Laertius “Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other, and he even argued in this

fashion, being the first to do so.”⁽⁷⁾ The second to do so may be Pyrrho. Aristotle tried to get rid of atomism everywhere in his books.

I have no idea about what Pyrrho learned from Anaxarchus. But we can at least say that Pyrrho had been much influenced directly or indirectly by Protagoras and Democritus⁽⁸⁾ before joining Alexander’s expedition.

During the expedition Pyrrho must have been also influenced by Calanus, Indian philosopher, in returning to Susa, where Calanus died. Pyrrho seemed most of all to try to get rid of dogmatism, only to attain to “ataraxia”.

Aristotle wrote his books, and built the metaphysics of theological world view, carrying out manifold experiments and observing phenomena carefully. Indeed, Aristotle had a high regard for empiricism, but not leaving the phenomena unexplained, he tried to explain them definitively, and often fell into dogmatism. Aristotle’s range of learning was so wide that there seemed to be no objects that he did not treat, as is often said. He built such a magnificent palace of learning that anyone before him had never did. The first man to notice the problem that this palace had may well be Sextus Empiricus.

2. “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” by Sextus Empiricus

Sextus Empiricus wrote nothing about Pyrrho himself. He begins “Outlines of Pyrrhōnism” as follows:

The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators either discover the object of search or deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be inapprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, with regard to the objects investigated by philosophy, this is probably why some have claimed to have discovered the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, while others again go on

inquiring. Those who believe they have discovered it are the “Dogmatists,” especially so called——Aristotle, for example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other Academics treat it as inapprehensible: the Sceptics keep on searching. Hence it seems reasonable to hold that the main typus of philosophy are three——the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic.⁽¹⁾

Of the Sceptic philosophy one argument (or branch of exposition) is called “general,” the other “special.” In the general argument we set forth the distinctive features of Scepticism, stating its purport and principles, its logical methods, criterion, and end or aim; the “Tropes,” also, or “Modes,” which lead to suspension of judgment, and in what sense we adopt the Sceptic formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism and the philosophies which stand next to it.⁽²⁾

Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought to a state of mental suspence and next to a state of “unperturbedness” or quietude.⁽³⁾

The phrase “opposed judgments” we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to “conflicting judgments.” “Equipollence” we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgments takes precedence of any other as being more probable. “Suspence” is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. “Quietude” is an untroubled and

tranquill condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgment we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) “Concerning the End.”⁽⁴⁾

In this way Sextus opposes “essence (logos)” to “appearance (phainomenon)”. He says we can explain the appearance given to our senses, but we can not say anything about its essence itself. We can nothing but suspend the judgment (epochē). Because someone says something about the appearance, and other says the other thing about the same appearance. Someone says A about appearance X. The other says Non-A (or B) about the same appearance. These A and Non-A (or B) have “equipollence” or “equality” (isostheneia). And so, what is fundamental for Sextus is as follows: 1) the opposition of essence and appearance, 2) suspension of judgment to essence, 3) the affirmative judgment and the negative judgment (or another) are equal and compatible, 4) to attain to a state of quietude (ataraxia).

Sextus’ mode of argument is simply affirmative A or the negative Non-A (another judgment B) to an appearance, and no more such as the quadrilemma. And that, Sextus does not refer to those metaphysical views, but he seems to have confronted another metaphysics at that time.

Now, Sextus argues the reason why one judgment and another one are equal, and we must suspend the judgment.

The usual tradition amongst the older Sceptics is that the “modes” by which “suspension” is supposed to be brought about are ten in number; and they also give them the synonymous names of “arguments” and “positions.” They are these: the first, based on the variety in animals; the second, on the differences in human beings; the third, on the different structures of the organs of sense; the

fourth, on the circumstantial conditions; the fifth, on positions and intervals and locations; the sixth, on intermixtures; the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects; the eighth, on the fact of relativity; the ninth, on the frequency or rarity of occurrence; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions. This order, however, we adopt without prejudice.

As superordinate to these there stand three Modes——that based on the subject who judges, that on the object judged, and that based on both. The first four of the ten Modes are subordinate to the Mode based on the subject (for the subject which judges is either an animal or a man or a sense, and existent in some conditions): the seventh and tenth Modes are referred to that based on the subject judged: the fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth are referred to the Mode based on both subject and object. Furthermore, these three Modes are also referred to that of relation, so that the Mode of relation stands as the highest genus, and the three as *species*, and the ten as subordinate sub *species*. We give this as the probable account of their numbers; and as to their argumentative force what we say is this.⁽⁶⁾

In the first mode of argument he shows how there are different kinds of animal (including human being), and how the perceptive impressions are different one another owing to the difference in animals. For Sextus, each perception of different kinds of animal has equal qualification; that is to say, for him the difference of animals does not mean any rank. He simply puts these dissimilar and variant modes of birth (born as eggs like birds; as lumps of flesh like bears and as alive like human beings) side by side, and he never makes hierarchy as Aristotle. Sextus does not think which perception is superior to which. Of course for him human beings are not

specially qualified living things. They are only one of living things. What he wanted to say in the first argument seems to me that we are unable, either with or without proof, to prefer our own impressions to those of the “irrational” animals. Sextus demonstrates how it is not proper to insist that “the irrational animals” such as dogs are inferior to “rational” human beings.⁽⁶⁾

Sextus puts Aristotle at the top of dogmatists. Aristotle built the theological world view constituting a hierarchy from imperfecter ones to perfecter ones, and he put men at the top. Women are imperfecter than men.⁽⁷⁾

Besides, at the beginning of his “Metaphysics” Aristotle says the sense of seeing is the most important. But, for Sextus five senses are equally qualified. He does not treat the sense of seeing as the most important one.

What Sextus says in the first mode of argument is also applied to the second mode. He argues here the difference in body and soul (most of all, the way of philosophical thinking) among human beings. He does not give any ranks to human beings, but he only puts the differences side by side. As a whole, in the other eight modes (tropes) Sextus emphasized “relation (pros ti)” as well as variety, and criticized one-sided dogmatic thinking. We can take the Pyrrhonism by Sextus Empiricus for the caution to manifold dogmatism (scientific, political, religious etc.) into which we are always apt to fall. The Pyrrhonism recognizes no difference between the superior and the inferior, but qualifies them equal. Furthermore, Pyrrhonism tries to attain to “ataraxia”, which is to enable to be liberal in soul. And so Pyrrhonism has both liberty and equality in itself.

In the sixteenth century “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” was awakened from the long sleep. Montaigne interpreted this book in his “Essais” (Volume II, Chapter 12)⁽⁸⁾, where he advised people not to follow the authority such as Aristotle without any criticism. “Essais” of Montaigne, whose essence

was taken over by Pierre Bayle and the Encyclopedists such as Denis Diderot, came to encourage the citizens who had grown up enough to think freely and doubt their traditional thinking. In the Western Europe a series of revolutions——religious, scientific, political——broke up. Especially, politically, this revolutionary movement reached the Colonies in North America. We may well say that “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” had already prepared this modern movement. In the French Revolution the famous phrase “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité” was born.

CONCLUSION

In Assalayanasutta (Majjhima-Nikāya 93) Gotama Buddha preaches the purity of the four castes. “Purity” means homogeneity. The original word for castes is vanna, (in Sanscrit varna, in Pali vanna) which means color (of skin). Here Buddha preaches rather racial homogeneity than social or political equality. A dialogue was held in Anathapindikā’s monastery in the Jeta Grove near Savatthi with a young brahman youth who was chosen as a representative by the other brahmins. The dialogue begins as follows:

“Gotama Buddha, brahmins speak thus: ‘Only brahmins form the best caste, all other castes are low; only brahmins form the fair caste, all other castes are dark; only brahmins are pure, not non-brahmins; only brahmins are own sons of Brahmā, born of his mouth, born of Brahmā, formed by Brahmā, heirs to Brahmā.’ What does the good Gotama say about this?”

“But, Assalāyana, brahman wives of brahmins are known to have their seasons and to conceive and to give birth and to give suck. Yet these brahmins, born of woman like everyone else, speak thus; ‘Only brahmins form the best caste.....heir to Brahmā.’ ”⁽¹⁾

The long dialogue goes on thus, and at last comes to conclusion as follows:

‘But do you, sirs, know how there is conception?’

‘We do know, sir, how there is conception. There is here a coitus of the parents, it is the mother’s season and the *gandhabba* is present; it is on the conjunction of these three things that there is conception.’

‘But do you, sirs, know whether the *gandhabba* is a noble or brahman or marchant or worker?’

‘We do not know, sir, whether that *gandhabba* is a noble or a brahman or a marchant or a worker.’

‘This being so, do you know, sirs, who you are?’

‘This being so, we do not know who we are.’⁽²⁾

The *gandhabba* decides the next life in Samsāra (Reincarnation), dashing into the womb at the sight of a coitus of the parents. Buddha presses the young man for the answer to the caste of the *gandhabba*. The young Brahman remains silent for some time, and begs Buddha to accept him as a lay-disciple.

Maybe the *gandhabba* corresponds to gene or DNA, which is consisted of four organic bases. If we put gene (DNA) or four organic bases instead of the *gandhabba*, and then the argument between Gotama Buddha and the young Brahman is effective even today, and persuasive. He tried to get rid of not only metaphysics, but also making a hierarchy among human beings. He preached, as it were, equality of human beings eagerly, with liberal mind (without prejudice).

After enlightenment, Gotama Buddha decided to release people from suffering. That is Mercy itself (Jihi in Japanese), which needs much passion and energy. Buddha tries to control himself without mercy. And

so, in early Buddhism we can recognize Liberty, Equality, and Mercy. But in our country it is not until the Constitution of Japan enacted in 1947, that the mind of early Buddhism, which seems to have been once brought from India to Greece, may well be realized, so to say, together with the spirit of Western Citizens' Society.

The fundamental point of Gotama Buddha's Enlightenment is Cause-Effect Relation or simply it consists in Relation, which is also the fundamental point of Pyrrhonism. Early Buddhism as well as Pyrrhonism suspend the judgment to permanence or absoluteness such as Brahman, Ātman or Idea. Though Mālunkyāputta and Vacchagotta must have been unsatisfied with Buddha's answer, it was very proper that the Buddha left unanswerable questions unanswered without falling into dogma. Sextus Empiricus suspended his judgment to unanswerable questions, so that he might not fall into dogmatism. This attitude was very effective to the development of modern science.

If Mālunkyāputta and Vacchagotta were to be in this world today, Stephen Hawking would explain to them as follows:

The questions of whether the universe had a beginning in time and whether it is limited in space were later extensively examined by the philosopher Immanuel Kant in his monumental (and very obscure) work, *Critique of Pure Reason*, published in 1781. He called these questions antinomies (that is, contradictory) of pure reason because he felt that there were equally compelling arguments for believing the thesis, that the universe had a beginning, and the antithesis, that it had existed forever. His argument for the thesis was that if the universe did not have a beginning, there would be an infinite period of time before any event, which he considered absurd. The argument for the antithesis was that if the universe had a beginning, there

would be an infinite period of time before it, so why should the universe begin at any one particular time? In fact, his cases for both the thesis and the antithesis are really the same argument. They are both based on his unspoken assumption that time continues back forever, whether or not the universe had existed forever. As we shall see, the concept of time has no meaning before the beginning of the universe.....

When most people believed in an essentially static and unchanging universe, the question of whether or not it had a beginning was really one of metaphysics or theology.....

But in 1929, Edwin Hubble made the landmark observation that wherever you look, distant galaxies are moving rapidly away from us. In other words, the universe is expanding. This means that at earlier times objects would have been closer together. In fact, it seemed that there was a time, about ten or twenty thousand million years ago, when they were all at exactly the same place and when, therefore, the density of the universe was infinite. This discovery finally brought the question of the beginning of the universe into the realm of science.⁽³⁾

Hawking also says as follows:

Any physical theory is always provisional, in the sense that it is only a hypothesis. You can never prove it. No matter how many times the results of experiments agree with some theory, you can never be sure that the next time the result will not contradict the theory.....

Each time new experiments are observed to agree with the predictions the theory survives, and our confidence in it is increased; but if ever a new observation is found to disagree, we have to abandon or modify the theory.⁽⁴⁾

Kant's so-called four antinomies had already begun, as it were, in the Buddha's scriptures, and the argument had gone far enough. Hawking shows us that scientific truth is impermanent, and is in provisional relation or condition. Thus, early Buddhism and Pyrrhonism are also compatible with modern science.

In this way, the impermanence of all things the Buddhism preaches (Mujō in Japanese), which we can often find in ancient Japanese literature such as *The Tale of the Heike*, originally belongs to Gotama Buddha's revolutionary work. It is not right to reduce it to some kind of emotional feeling. We Buddhist country people Japanese may well recognize early Buddhism, and try to understand it properly. As Dr. Gadjin Nagao, eminent Indologist and Professor emeritus of Kyoto University, says, now for the first time we Japanese can meet with the original Buddhism by the scriptures directly translated into Japanese from the Pali texts. We have so far accepted Buddhism by way of the texts translated into Chinese, not from the original text in Sanscrit and Pali languages.⁽⁵⁾

Furthermore it is desirable to recognize also the relationship between early Buddhism and Pyrrhonism. We have seen that early Buddhism rather seems to be able to link to modern European movements. We are sure to say that early Buddhism and Pyrrhonism have left us wisdom——wisdom not to go extreme and not to fall in dogmatism. Bertrand Russell will give us some suggestion in the following sentences after mentioning Pyrrho's episode thus:

I am prepared to admit the ordinary beliefs of common sense, in practice if not in theory. I am prepared to admit any well-established result of science, not as certainly true, but as sufficiently probable to afford a basis for rational action. If it is announced that there is to be an eclipse of the moon on such-and-such a date, I think it worthwhile

to look and see whether it is taking place. Pyrrho would have thought otherwise. On this ground, I feel justified in claiming that I advocate a middle position.

There are matters about which those who have investigated them are agreed; the date of eclipses may serve as an illustration. There are other matters about which experts are not agreed. Even when the experts all agree, they may be mistaken. Einstein's view as to the magnitude of the deflection of light by gravitation would have been rejected by all experts twenty years ago, yet it proved to be right. Nevertheless the opinion of experts, when it is unanimous, must be accepted by non-experts as more likely to be right than the opposite opinion. The skepticism that I advocate amounts only to this: 1. that when the experts are agreed, the opposite opinion cannot be held to be certain; 2. that when they are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a non-expert; and 3. that when they all hold that no sufficient grounds for a positive opinion exist, the ordinary man would do well to suspend his judgment.

These propositions may seem mild, yet, if accepted, they would absolutely revolutionise human life.⁽⁶⁾

This argument of Russell's seems to be more and more effective today everywhere in human life.

NOTES

PREFACE

- (1) *The Tale of the Heike*, Translated with an Introduction, by Helen Craig McCullough (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 1.
- (2) *Ibid.*, p. 478, Glossary: Gion Shōja.
- (3) *Ibid.*, p. 484, Glossary: Sākyamuni.

- (4) Ibid., Glossary: Sala flowers.

I. DIALOGUES IN GION SHŌJA

1. The dialogue between Gotama Buddha (the Lord) and Mālunkyāputta

- (1) *The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikāya)*, Vol. II, *The Middle Fifty Discourses (Majjhimaṇṇāsa)*, Translated from the Pali by I. B. Horner (Published by the Pali Text Society, Distributed by Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1975), I-63, pp. 97-101: Lesser Discourse to Mālunkyā (Putta) (Cūla-Mālunkyāsutta).
- (2) Everard Flintoff, 'Pyrrho and India', *Phronesis*, Vol. 25 (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1980), pp. 92-93.
- (3) Yensho Kanakura, *Hindu-Buddhist Thought in India*, Translated by Shotaro Iida and Neal Donner, Edited by Takao Maruyama and Thomas Quinn (Yokohama: Hokke Journal, Inc., 1980), p.44.
- (4) Flintoff, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

2. The dialogue between Gotama Buddha (the Lord) and Vacchagotta

- (1) *The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikāya)*, Vol. II, *The Middle Fifty Discourses (Majjhimaṇṇāsa)*, I-72, pp. 162-167: Discourse to Vacchagotta on Fire (Aggi-Vacchagottasutta).
- (2) Kanakura, op. cit., p. 40. ; pp. 44-45.
- (3) Ibid., pp. 44-45.
- (4) Ibid., p.39.
- (5) *The Dhammapada*, Translated by Ross Carter and Mahinda Palihanawadana (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1987), p.226: Section 160.

II. SAÑJAYA BELATTHIPUTTA AND GOTAMA BUDDHA

1. The age of Gotama Buddha in Indian history

- (1) Ram Sharan Sharma, *Ancient India* (New Dehli: National Council of Educational Research and Training, 1977), pp. 69-71.
- (2) Ibid., p.73.
- (3) Ibid., p.85.
- (4) Ibid., pp. 83-84.
- (5) Ibid., p.58.
- (6) Ibid., p.60.
- (7) Ibid., pp. 60-61.
- (8) Ibid., p.62.
- (9) Kanakura, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

2. Sañjaya Belatthiputta, sceptic

- (1) *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, Vol. II, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Translated from the Pali by T. W. Rhys Davids, Part I, *Sāmañña-phala Sutta* (The Fruits of the Life of a Recluse), pp. 68-69.
- (2) Kanakura, op. cit., p.28.
- (3) Flintoff, op. cit., p.103.

EARLY BUDDHISM AND PYRRHONISM AS HUMAN WISDOM (Nakako MIYAKE)

- (4) Gen Nakamura, *Gotama Buddha* (in Japanese), (Tokyo: Shunjū-sha, 1992), I, p.625.
- (5) Gen Nakamura, *Genshi Bukkyo no Seiritsu* (The Establishment of Early Buddhism) (in Japanese), (Tokyo: Shunjū-sha, 1986), p.107.
- (6) *The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Sanyutta-Nikāya)*, Translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids (Published by The Pali Text Society, London, Distributed by Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1982), p.81: Chapter 67, The sheaf of reeds.

III. ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION TO INDIA AND PYRRHO

1. Pyrrho and Quadrilemma

- (1) George Woodcock, *The Greeks in India* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 26-27.
- (2) Bertrand Russel, *Sceptical Essays* (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1977), p.11.
- (3) Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, With an English translation by R. D. Hicks, Volume II, revised and reprinted (London: William Heinemann, 1931), p.475.
- (4) Eusèbe de Césarée, *La préparation évangélique*, Livres XIV—XV (Paris: Les Editions du cerf, 1987), p.149. Cf. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, *The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.11. This book and another book: *Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) are very instructive for me. Also instructive for me is: Jonathan Barnes, *The Toils of Scepticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- (5) Flintoff., op. cit., p.92.

2. Calanus, the Jain teacher

- (1) Woodcock, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
- (2) Sāyana Mādhava, *The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu* (Trübner and Co., Ludgate Hill, 1882), p.59.

VI. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS AND PYRRHONISM

1. Sextus Empiricus in Alexandria

- (1) Mostafata El-Abbadi, *Life and Fate of the Ancient Library of Alexandria* (UNESCO, 1990).
- (2) V. Brochard, *Les Sceptiques Grecs*, nouvelle édition conforme à la deuxième (Paris: Librairie philosophique, J. Vrin, 1969), pp. 364-367. Craig B. Brush, *Montaigne and Bayle. Variation on the Theme of Scepticism*, International Archives of the History of Ideas 14 (The Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p.9.
- (3) Woodcock, op. cit., p. 27.
- (4) Flintoff, op. cit., p.88.
- (5) Diogenes Laertius, op. cit., p.463.
- (6) Plato, *Theaetetus and Sophists*, With an English translation by Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library No 123//a (London: Heinemann, 1961).
- (7) Diogenes Laertius, op. cit., p.463.
- (8) Eusèbe de Césarée, op. cit., p.161.

2. "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" by Sextus Empiricus

EARLY BUDDHISM AND PYRRHONISM AS HUMAN WISDOM (Nakako MIYAKE)

- (1) Sextus Empiricus, With an English translation by R. G. Bury, 1. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Loeb Classical Library No 273 (London: William Heinemann, 1933), p.3.
- (2) *Ibid.*, p.5.
- (3) *Ibid.*, p.7.
- (4) *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
- (5) *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
- (6) *Ibid.*, pp. 27-39.
- (7) Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*, With an English translation by A. L. Peck, Loeb Classical Library No 366 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 170-178: 737a20-737b25.
- (8) Montaigne, *Œuvres complètes*, Bibliothèque de la Périade (Paris: Edition Gallimard, 1962), p.487, pp. 569-570.
- (9) Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (Amsterdam etc., 1740), Tome III, pp. 731-736; Donald Rutherford, 'Pierre Bayle and Bishop Huet: The Master Sceptic Pierre Bayle', in: Richard Popkin (ed.), *The Columbia History of Western Philosophy*(New York : Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 404-408.
- (10) Diderot, *Œuvres complètes*, par J. Assézat (Paris: Garnier, 1876), Reprinted by Kraus Reprint (Neudeln, Lichtenstein, 1966), Tome 16, pp. 471-492. Richard Popkin, 'Enlightenment': in Richard Popkin (ed.), *The Columbia History of Western Philosophy*, pp. 462-471.

CONCLUSION

- (1) *The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikāya)*, op. cit., Vol. II, p.341.
- (2) *Ibid.*, p.349.
- (3) Stephen W. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes* (London: Bantam Press, 1988), pp. 8-9.
- (4) *Ibid.*, p.11.
- (5) Gadjin Nagao (chief editor), *Daijō Butten* (Mahayana Scriptures) (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Chūō-Kouron-sha, 1978), p. 65. Nagao's other works in English are: Gadjin Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy*, Translated by John P. Keenan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), and Gadjin M. Nagao, *Madhyamika and Yogacara. A Study of Mahayana Philosophies*, Collected Papers of G. M. Nagao, Edited, collated, and translated by L. S. Kawamura in Collaboration with G. M. Nagao (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).
- (6) Russell, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
- (7) This article is based on some parts of my recent book in Japanese: *Souzou to Kyousei: Pyrrhon, Gassendi, Mach* (Creation and Symbiosis: Pyrrhon, Gassendi, Mach) (Tokyo: Nansou-sha Publishing Co. Ltd., 2003).

(哲学科 非常勤講師)