Movement Literacy:

Creating a Healing Encounter in Physical Education

Edward Ravenhill

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Edward Ravenhill

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ABSTRACT

Modern Physical Education (PE) administered systemic models of teaching crafts. It atrophied the play element in human nature, and shaped a single-lens attitude to the treatment of bodies. Framing minds, it veiled the conditions of learning processes and thus "instituted" the sovereignty of subjective concerns. It created many unexplained "gaps" between abstract concerns and pragmatic issues.

Following language's poststructural analysis, PE's professional communication practices were exposed to alternative methodological refocusing *from* conforming to move *to* personalise the agent's experience in moving to learn.

In the wake of poststructuralism came Whitehead's Physical Literacy (PL) which I adopt as "leitmotif" to reform PE's teacher preparation and schooling practices. PL addresses children up to 14 years. For older pupils, PL's language needs to constitute versions of human purposes voiced by the introduction of a new development called "Movement Literacy" (ML). ML acknowledges that language and movement are very different forms of "self-expression". By itself however, self-expression is inadequate when it comes to learning *how* to learn. Critical dialogue needs to be brought in to facilitate meaningful innovation in the PE world. By employing the philosophies of phenomenology and hermeneutics I make a case that expression in languaging movement [subjecting the agent's account to hermeneutic treatment] *is* expression for others, and in exchange with others the expression is redefined, and changes the way one sees and talks about movement and about oneself.

In its reflective practice, reverentially, ML will also unpack pedagogy's hidden protocol, hoping to reclaim PE's authentic purpose. It connects secular matters with sacred implications by reconciling the polemic differences between "techne" [purpose] and "phronesis " [prudence]. With limited reference to Eastern "selflessness" ML advances teaching, through pedagogy and andragogy as a life-time mission. Not providing answers, the thesis offers a manifesto attempting to facilitate new questions such as: how can language and movement communicate? and how can movement educators "minister" to their learner's sense of well-being?

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of the University of Gloucestershire and is original except where indicated by specific reference in the text. No part of the thesis has been submitted as part of any other academic award. The thesis has not been presented to any other education institution in the United Kingdom or overseas.

Any views expressed in the thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University.

Signed   ………………………………………………….…

Date   ………………………..

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Signed   …………………………………..

Date   ………………………………..

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to Toby James, my grandson. His few months'

Presence amongst us was pure joy. Toby cascaded us with his laughter.

God Bless you my little one. You are always in our thoughts.

Signed   …………………………………………………

Date   …………………………..

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Introduction

This dissertation's opening Chapters show why modern Physical Education (PE) specialists were institutionally prepared to become "movement proponents" but not educators. Quantitative aspects of learners' movement were promoted through the application of scientific knowledge. PE's schooling responded to the question, "How do I exercise?" Historically and rationally, its rationale advanced from physical instruction, to training and eventually to physical education. The dissertation's first half demonstrates that whilst modern PE's institutional curricula adequately addressed methodical teaching management, nevertheless, it failed to educate its apprenticing professional specialists into appreciating what it means to be pedagogically "fit".

The dissertation's second half shows how and why, at the turn of this century, the profession began to enter another transformative phase; that of Whitehead's (1992-2002) Physical Literacy (PL). PL was a response to change occurring outside the profession during the closing half of the twentieth century. It was a change attributed to intense linguistic analysis known as poststructuralism. Throughout the thesis I interchange poststructuralism with postmodernism, since both philosophical and linguistic movements pose a very different question for the PE profession. Consistently, PL asks "Why should I exercise?" Following this reorientation of its rationale, PE began to be addressed under the auspices of its meaning for its advocates and participant clients.

This change occurred as the profession's gradual response to the on-going academic, intellectual debate between rationalism and postmodernism during the 1980s and 1990s (Fernandez-Balboa 1997, Falhberg and Falhberg 1991). The outcome of this debate influenced the profession to question its educational credibility and professional validity, as well as to re-examine both its professional institutional preparation programmes and the manner its schooling curriculum, which is a form of socially organised knowledge, could be exercised. Physical Literacy

according to Whitehead (1992), describes the motivation, "physical" competence, knowledge and understanding that individuals develop in order to maintain physical activity at an appropriate level throughout their life. It was her response to change PE's systemic practices through the use of more inter-relational communications between teacher and learner by encouraging critical pedagogical practices and the adoption of new modes of thinking. PL, for Whitehead, held promise for a more personally attentive approach to address contemporary modes of learning about one's own "physical" competence and aspire to enhance and strengthen human movement experiences for a wider constituency.

Physical Literacy

I adopt and further explain Whitehead's Physical Literacy (PL) in Chapter 3 as a postmodern innovative leitmotif informed approach and renewed foundation for PE's institutional curriculum planning. More specifically, physical literacy helps to counter modern PE's 1950s to 1980s dualistic thinking about mind and body as an impediment, limiting the process of learning. PL aspires to promote "meaning making" experiences nurturing one's selfhood, the twofold adherence of one's body to the domain of things and to that of self, or the essential qualities that make one person distinct from all others. The self is the idea of a unified being that is the source of consciousness. Moreover, this self is the agent responsible for the thoughts and actions of an individual to which they are ascribed.

Physical Literacy attends to learners and more as individuals than was the case during the 1950 to mid 1980s by deliberately cultivating and consciously encouraging PE teachers to share their compassion for learning about movement and their inhabitants with their learners. With the advent of PL the professional's daily practices began to explore the forensic communicative realm of partnership in judgment with their learner-interlocutor (Berliner 1986; Bain 1990; Beckers 1996; Harris 1983).

Movement Literacy

Drawing largely from its foundation in PL and involving the described experiential event of movement, I introduce Movement Literacy (ML) in Chapter 3 as my innovative aspiration to extend PE's professional practice from pedagogy into andragogy [on page 5].

A *modus operandi,* ML is not an application understood as the act of putting something to a special use. ML involves unequivocal conversational dialogue between PE teachers and Key Stage 4 students [beyond years 10-12] able to introspect and interchange views during classroom talk and its allied extra curricular sport "discussion". ML's practitioners co-deliberate on their own and each other's account of what PE encounters may meaningfully offer them. ML is also concerned to nurture:

(a) the professional's *nous* or reason especially regarded as governing all things within the education field such as knowing when to create and "*apply*" the most suitable of learning "conditions" which, under the rigor of hermeneutc critique, help to nurture a PE professional's vocational posture and circumspect behaviour and

(b) unequivocal and ambiant relations with one's participant learner-movers, and *vice-versa.*

ML's professional educators' eventual onus is to locate a better understanding of the nature of our humanity. By cultivating a more resilient openness towards one's self dependence and self-initiated identity, these professional educators may re-convene modern PE's lost earthly, ecological posture. ML aspires to help all PE learners to cope with linking cognitive issues with felt concerns, infusing factual knowledge about motion with curiosity about emotion.

In effect, this study profiles three core phases and modes [and moods] of professional communication from formal class/mass monologue teaching's transmission and imposed authority into

(i)   the *transactional* phase of Physical Literacy [founded on phenomenology] conveying pedagogy as an initiation into

(ii)   the realm of discursive practice inviting collegiality, and eventually into

(iii)   informal transformational andragogy involving collaborative learning on "how to learn" and changing perception of one's personhood when inter and intra-personal dialogue can begin to flourish.

That is, teaching undergoes transmission to pedagogical transaction and eventually involves andragogical transformation.

Chapters 1-3 address Phase One. They trace systemic teaching as an initiation and an institutional prologue issuing instructions into the movement profession and its learners. I argue that the formal act of teaching tends to direct *information* to the learner who is then lead towards following the "knower's" version of PE, thereby harnessing educational learning conditions. I demonstrate the way modern PE's communication delivery was anchored in the technical objective of "learning to move". Chapter 3 offers a working definition of PL and a diverse description of ML's aspiring function, a praxis which defies its end-condition or outcome as being definite and innovative notion that andragogy is also further explained.

Chapters 4-5 trace progressive modes of communication into the intermediary phase of pedagogy [nursing correspondents into the subtle dynamics of dialogue]. This means enticing and reflecting on *personal* experience, and thus calls on a phenomenological approach which is a way of escorting or opening out the learner's private, inhabited encounters. Pedagogical practice enables PE specialists to begin to corroborate and co-validate or question how one interprets one's movement.

In contrast to PE's communication in Phase One, Phase Two follows a poststructural "turn". Adopting hermeneutic phenomenology's treatment of PE's linguistic depiction in Chapters 6-7, PE's communicative language can better help its correspondents to locate the culturally rich origin of human movement and identify its lost rituals connected to sacred or sentient meanings.

The third communicative phase is then more explicitly addressed in Chapters 6-8. They explain ML as a procedure deeply invested in respecting sublime levels of

inter-relational protocol. ML tries to evoke an appeasing social context between its interlocutors wherein the leaven of learning is mutually shared between each participant correspondent, when both acknowledge that they are mutually dealing with unpredictable and unfinished outcomes. Judiciously, ML also deals with speaker/learner realising alterations of the "self" during discursive dialogue. In Chapters 7 and 8, ML is proposed as "leitmotif" for re-planning Physical Educators Institutional preparation programmes. ML's radical innovation may also offer a cathartic way of reconstituting one's constellation of self through engaging in intimate PE knowledge "settings" which may create indifference, or enthralling ways about what movement "does" to us. Movement encounters may come to matter to us, not simply in biophysical terms, but also in the construct of our self image. They also hold the tendency to dislocate one's sense of self-assurance so that PE specialist interpreters need to know movement's effect and affect for each learner.

In Chapter 8 and the study's unfinished closure I explain how the application of ML's reflexive praxis is advanced through pedagogy to indulge in a sublime form of learning by engaging in "andragogy" which is an engagement in a culture of critical dialogue. ML informed professionals, I propose, can therapeutically "search" in the mover's authored "event " for tangential evidence of lack of "self-value", and morally restore one's "self-image" by clarifying the notion of "self" and "other than self". ML communicates PE's Key Stage 4 concerns with "moving to learn" about one's life skills. Conversing with 15 year old students, qualified movement literates need to be or become well versed in "languaging-movement" to converse with their more senior teenage learners and more accomplished movers in what Knowles refers to as "andragogy" (1980, 1984).

Andragogy

Andragogy may be practiced by PE career movement literates especially with its Key Stage 5 pupils. As well apprenticed learners, they are facing a crucial transition between schooling and the outside world and have become intimately acquainted with human inspired forms of movement. Andragogy aspires to forefront various sources of human agency when both speaker and listener in partnership can freely

attend to both the speaker agent's negative and positive movement benefits in the give and take of a critical culture of discourse and dialogue. In the study's ML collation of its tenuous visions for future PE interpreters (pages 212-13), I list most of andragogy's characteristic features which movement professionals need to appreciate and employ to entice openness to matters of certain significance and thus play a crucial role to unwrap both its correspondent's development of personhood.

Languaging movement

By "languaging movement", I refer to moments when the PE specialists must know when to evoke [elicit meaning] from the "resident" agent's post movement account. PE specialist need to know when to offer a friendly but critical ear to movement's "insider commentator/participant" who, inevitably, is destined to remain the sole actor in one's performed PE event. Unlike Modern PE, contemporary learners are encouraged to talk about their enactment in a confidential setting and in a companion- like designed set of circumstances. Languaging movement means posing questions about experiential movement's revelations, and about the taken-for–granted communicative ways in which its speaker-commentator makes sense of the world. ML implies each correspondent helping to define/locate one's social or relational situatedness with another speaker/listener. Intimately, it attends to linguistic communication's nuances. It endeavours to enter into an ill-defined locality of meaning(s) bounded by enigmatic subtleties of how we embrace words which matter to us. In PE we need to talk about ourselves and about our performed encounters.

If perceived in this confessional sense, ML is understood as a benign enactment of critique, the very questioning of the assumptions of understanding of personal movement experiences. It may evolve as a more intricate and intimate transformative process which advances designated teaching styles to the more versatile and flexible realm of pedagogy and eventually, to an engagement in andragogy's conversational strategies involving more mature and articulate movement learners. The idea behind ML is that it's critical linguistic practices, rather than displace the self, reverentially endeavour to keep in touch with its correspondent's featured sense of self. Crucially,

and benevolently, what ML attempts is to surface the "hidden-features", the unaware unconscious "elements" of one's self that its speaker has not yet realized, but which need to be made "known" to its movement performer. Essentially, ML serves a number of discrete purposes of which the two major concerns are that of (1) transforming PE's modernism's (1950-1980) structural teaching through pedagogy (1980-2000) into contemporary 21st century andragogy and that of (2) healing PE movers who have become alienated from the act of moving.

Vitally, ML begins to address not movement learners but rather, the learner *in* movement. I propose that, in tandem with PL, ML will become a necessary feature for all PE institutions universally to begin to examine and implement into their trainees' personal and professional consciousness. Early in this thesis what I wish to make significant is that experienced PE specialists are placed in a privileged "educational" position. Human movement's "patrons", "consumers" and potential disciples are privileged in the sense that they can actually talk about such encounters; in particular, those who have encountered a strange, perhaps even profound sense of alienation when their attention becomes immersed or distracted in movement. For some, PE encounters can be exhilarating and engaging, but for others, it may transpire to be agonisingly lonely, disorienting, and confusing. I intend to convey ML as a pedagogy which consistently aspires to exercise linguistic improvisation and connoisseurship dealing with connotations and intimations of putting meaning in the world, but not "a meaning". It is a praxis [the practise of a field study, as opposed to the theory] which involves an astute interpretation of a process of engaging thoughtful youths and adults with the hidden structure of learning experience. In Chapters 6-8, I explain ML as a way to help apprenticing professional movement specialists to develop their discrete level of pedagogical "fitness".

In Chapters 4 and 5, I shall identify and then link together modern PE's (pre-1980s) models of teaching adopted from the field of education theory and practice, upon and from which PL evolved. I then suggest that PL's PE philosophy can be employed as a 21st contemporary educational platform. In short, ML voices what we are made familiar in PL but rarely able to speak about in the context of PE: our human nature. When speaking of our human nature in general, we all too casually refer to those

distinguishing features of human characteristics. Such observed characteristics include the way we walk and talk, and the way we play, or conduct ourselves whilst climbing, dancing, or playing games. However, it is with detecting the unobserved, "domesticated" and "inner" embodied nature of another that ML aspires to unveil. It traces another's uttered suggestions which give clues about its speakers' particular way(s) of thinking, such as can be hinted at in the degree of attentiveness that another appears to pay to one's comments. ML may develop as a practice which seeks out signs of another's feelings, perhaps glimpses of their intuitive or rational embodied sensations and emotions, especially emotions that are not divorced from matters of consciousness and articulated reasoning which is a hallmark of personhood. It is not impossible for a Movement Literate sensitively to interview the mover, or its agency [understood as the capacity of an agent as a person to act in the world by deliberated means] in order to discover the alleged reason why this performance was conducted, or interpret tangential meaning(s) in the reflected "commentary" about what the participation felt like for its mover.

Dealing with such personally intimate concerns, though "avoided" by modern PE proponents, is a key focus of interest for contemporary movement educationists. Contemporary movement professionals need to raise questions to find what the mover's characteristics are; what causes them; how this causation works; and how fixed or flexible our "human nature" is. Such questions have ethical, political and theological implications for its correspondents. This is partly because human nature can be regarded as both a source of norms of conduct or ways of life, as well as presenting obstacles or constraints on living a good life. In other words, I conceive future PE specialists as professionally and personally duty bound to become engaged in increasingly forensic processes of decoding their clients' and their own source of meaning, of unpacking their understanding of self, of not acting from a technologised desire to move, but attributing the appeal to move to their own personal sense of reasoning. Tracking, trailing, and scouting for information, ML is a practice which is on the look out for overt and covert clues gathered from a range of perspectives which cross different theoretical and pragmatic disciplines.

Movement Literacy is an innovative mission, which I conceive as PE's most silent, animating lodestone transforming seemingly mundane experiences into something extraordinarily serious. I interpret human movement as a bridging and synergizing of the conditioned processing of learning about different human schemes of knowledge into life skills. Maintaining that we exist in an ever changing state of "happenings" which we tend to understand "paradigmatically", ML may become important as a tentative way to unfold a conversation, to create and gather in new meanings often beyond our state of intent, willingness, or doing.

My ML premise is that its participants' agents may be placed by way of meeting one's "transient" and "unattended-self". Interminably, an ML informed specialist hunts for clues carried in the *way* a participant's movement commentaries are communicated. Tracking, trailing, and scouting for information, ML gathers overt and covert clues from a range of perspectives to cross different theoretical and pragmatic disciplines. It creates a working meaning between its correspondents. The use of words provides the only means to make public similar meanings encountered between epistemological or cognitive knowledge and practical or lived-though wisdom. Paradoxically, however, ML presses on reflective silence in order to resurrect the severed voices which both regulate and change our lives.

Movement Literacy ventures into the gap between the pursuit of theory and practical involvement. It aspires to connect explicit issues with implicit concerns. Through ML, I link abstract thoughtfulness with embodied encounters by manifesting a tactful professional practice in order to generate trust between its involved correspondents. I redeem PE's generic appeal to playfully creating a desire to learn how-to-learn, in a compulsory curriculum subject. In effect then, ML is an attempt to provide a critical foundation for discourse in order to professionally extend its advocates' and clients' educational concerns and commitments. It offers alternative ways of looking at human movement by countering modern PE's traditional role of body management. It represents the body merely as an agent of social and cultural reproduction.

What is important for contemporary PE's apprenticing specialists to appreciate is that modern PE is now held responsible for shaping physical activities in schools and

communities in disempowering ways. Adversely, it influenced how its "movers" came to view their bodies, thus failed to apply physical activities to their lives, and use and understand the potential knowledge in this experiential field (Kirk 1986; Schön 1983; Sage 1989; Rintala 1991; and Crum 1993).

ML is about drawing another's attention not to what a PE specialist is but rather to what it is *like* to be a movement-educator from the "insider's perspective". I reveal the unspoken traditional discipline which I shall come to refer to variously as PE's "rite de passage", or its "human contract". A human contract can be thought of as a kind of "self and another's" just or ethical sound participation in life skills which are encountered in PE's play-like activities, when one's independence is viewed through the "good" one can do for another. Interminably, ML praxis unveils one's own, as well as another's hitherto unrealised facets of inner-self, one's "otherness" by deconstructing the opposition between reason and feeling; not enticing alienation but rather eliciting benign kinship between its speakers and listeners, and vice-versa.

As a child

For example, as a child I did not think in terms of my body as an object. It was an integral part of me. But, I did not think of my body as playing a part as if it was linked to my conscious awareness. My intended thinking, that is, my deliberations, set aside my bodily concerns. I asked my body to perform for me, to allow me to swim. I swam more through the power of will and determined degree of desire. I told my body what it had to do. Today it tells me what to do. Throughout my four decades of trying to invite others into my world of movement, I have become more compelled to rely upon my corporeal messages which "talk" to me, but only in mute silence. My embodied state of being, ageing by the day, ever more sensitively monitors my changing state of being, reassuring me at times, cautioning me sometimes. Nevertheless, it always urges me to story-tell, especially with my grandchildren what little wisdom I have gathered on my way to becoming an elderly reader-interpreter of life's text and its texture.

Teacher-training

My lifetime's vocational calling was to be one of PE's many spokespersons. PE, if treated in a certain way, is not a peripheral curriculum subject. Rather, I view its rightful place as an education enterprise. This is because PE holds the capacity to unpack immanent messages for what is always a partial unveiling of a personal and communal meaning of life. Life remains a mystery, and yet blossoms at certain times to reveal glimpses of its obscure nature. My contention is that life emerges within us and surfaces through our sentient schemes of understanding through movement's coded experiences. I believe that, whilst engaged in movement's transient encounters, our awareness of being is revealed and that we come to occupy a state of mind during which we can recall what befalls us in the use and experience of movement and language.

I view PE's movement disciplines as enterprises designed for its advocates to be able to place its movers by way of certain experiences that others may have encountered before them. New experiences lead them to want to speak about their PE encounters. This is what ML is about. It seeks to bridge what appears to be indistinguishable links. It muses on connections by bringing into our awareness our embodied sense of belongingness, only by interweaving explicit issues with implicit concerns.

Movement encounters, be they for beginners or for accomplished movers, need to be articulated, and subsequently, subjected to critical decoding. And, importantly, as explained from Chapter 6 onwards, a movement literate becomes increasingly entwined in a perpetual process of contextualization and amplification, and much less with structural essentialisation. Eventually, a movement literate informed educator deals with suggestive concerns. ML seeks to avoid its learners falling into an unenlightened life by making room for movement enterprises to be interpreted in a new way, a way potent for the act of learning. Its practices are intended to evoke all movers to encounter their own "embodied-belongingness" to life through the medium of words. That is, words in themselves can serve not to inhibit, not to condemn us into misunderstandings, nor "sentence" us to some form of personal

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alienation, but to free us. ML seeks to link the expression of the *event* of moving with, and by means of the personal resources that allow its resident-author/commentator to witness and draw testimony from one's own lived reservoir of experiences. ML evolves as a praxis to express one's current mode of response to what seems to be happening to him or her during the act of moving. Beyond teaching's management, the pedagogue's primary role is to translate the learner's "moving" descriptions into that of a communal theatre of concern.

ML seeks to bring Whitehead's (2002) Physical Literacy into its learners lives, to learn not just about movement but to learn something about life's essential skills by clarifying a number of assumed theoretical premises that transforms PL's philosophical ambition into a pragmatic practice. For example, ML embraces Mosston and Ashworth's (1966-2002) systemic "spectrum" for teaching, but only because of the soundness of its managerial organisation and its overt aim to establish predetermined objectives. The spectrum is not without its critics (Sicilia-Camacho and Brown 2008). For example, lessons are planned by the "teacher", with the intent to improve the body's serviceability. Plans are then implemented and subsequently critically embellished by rather "superfluous", "prefabricated" and "inconsequential claims", as was highlighted by John Andrews during the 1976 Federation Internationale d'Education Physique conference in Taipei, Taiwan. I presented a paper there on PE lesson evaluations in England and Wales expressing my concern about lesson evaluation criteria. They were weighed too heavily towards observed causal accounts (with what went wrong during the lesson] and too little concerning issues which more directly affected its learners' long term human condition and lived affairs in that PE lesson's movement content.

Iago

I recalled the trauma both my student, whom I shall refer to as "Iago" and I, suffered for several weeks. I supervised his final school experience He claimed that his "pupils achieved social cohesion through games-playing" or, "pupils became responsible by observing another pupil's throwing technique". His lesson criticism offered untenable claims, far removed from that of a critique. Criticism *implies*

applying one's judgment to the merit and faults of the lesson. Critique, very differently, is understood as fault finding and negative judgment but it also involves merit recognition. My concern about lesson evaluation was that whilst "Iago" was capable of implementing lesson methods, his strict adherence to methodical practices left him unprepared when it came to coping with the lesson's unexpected turns of events and surprises.

Unable to execute his lesson plan, "Iago's" totalitarian presence quickly collapsed. "Iago's" significance to the lesson, and its movers, was exaggerated by his sudden "absence". The point I was stressing during the Taipei conference was that it is one thing to use another's rationalised teaching methods, but it is quite another to be able to hold a sound philosophical/ methodological position when it comes to processing another's conditions to learn about learning. Learning contours our life skills. For "Iago" there was a split between his lack of vocation and his professional aspirations. There was a gap between applying his "institutional methods" to what he perceived himself to be as a human being. Harsh as it may seem, "Iago", will serve throughout this thesis as a "modernist manifestation" of my concerns. It must be noted, however, that he was "trained" at St Paul's College in the early 1970s, even *before* the institution adopted its module programme for teacher "preparation" studies, and prior to the infusion of postmodernist ideas into its career professional's "temperament".

Modernism's lost touch

Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate how unprepared modern PE "teaching" took refuge under the cover of the unchallenged authority of the language of science. The essential effect of engaging scientific speech served to compose the profession's self-appointed, dualistic identity as both "Physical" [and] "Educational". Under the bifurcation of two dimensions, the material and the abstract, PE wrestled with two seemingly incompatible realms of knowledge as if being "physical" was the most natural way to become educated. Modern PE specialists used natural science based on a kind of empirical language as its prime mode of communication, but did not appreciate the crucial fact that "science" is neither more nor less than patient and detailed attention to the world. Natural science is integral to our understanding of it

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[the world] and of our selves. But, the unavoidable consequence for PE's client-participants, however, was that they, as human beings, were not given such detailed attention. Movers were denied license to claim "ownership" for their own "subjective" experiences, [which bring "profit" with respect to the formation of character since experience is rendered in this thesis as the child of thought in action.]

Parasite PE

Whereas natural sciences tend to fragment into specialized, compartmentalized information and knowledge, human sciences present PE by way of gathering its "hidden knowledge", by collating what other curriculum disciplines can say about movement. Modern PE's field of "knowledge" was drawn from the external world. Very differently, contemporary PE begins with what the agent experiences, from an embodied sensuous posture, requiring its advocates to know how to elicit movement's insider stories and hence to better know the story-teller.

Story-telling is what PE needs. PE is designed to elicit different forms of life experiences through selecting certain traditional or cultic recreational activities that others have already valued and extolled. Currently, movement's emissaries and participants need to retrace the fast disappearing pathways of its meaning by re-creating those past ritualised links between the secular and the sacred in which our ancestors learned how to communicate with each other and with their many deities. They coded meaning into movement. They preserved sentient beliefs by re-presenting sacrosanct forms of earthly actions, transforming spiritual values into games in which the original, inexpressible values could be manifested through physical, symbolically rich gestures. They coded movement, they coded sounds. Today, we have to decode both. And this is why poststructuralism's decoding of a language, as accounted for in Chapter 5, helps its emissaries and learners to keep in touch with their own moving accounts.

Polemic Paradigms

From the 1970s onwards PE's professional teaching "research" fell largely between two polemical paradigms; the "anatomized" and the "animated"; between what Nietzsche (1920) was to classify as Dionysian and Apollonian perspectives, between considering the *functions* and structure of the living, human organism, and, the material, causal *effects* [as well as the adverse *affects*] of experiencing human motion for its participants.

The Apollonian perspective is primarily concerned with the spectator/observer view. It characterized PE as attending to its cognitive objectivity, as focused on the idea that knowledge does not reflect personal concerns, but is true for everybody. From this Platonic perspective, any criticism or rational logic engaged in by the observer is strictly guided by the systemic means of *limiting* one's talk to a language which refers exclusively to the realm of experimental "proof" via scientific methods addressing material world.

What Plato (in Adler, 1978) argued was that, as the body is resourced from the material world, the soul is from the world of ideas and is thus immortal. He believed the soul was temporarily united with the body and would only be separated at death, when it would return to the world of Forms. Since the soul does not exist in time and space, as the body does, it can , like deities, access universal truths. For Plato, as Davidson (1997) in his chapter "*Gadamer and Plato's Philebus*" points out, ideas are the true reality [when real is the unnameable; that which resides beyond the reach of the signifier, the sound, image, written shape, object, practice, or gesture invested with meaning] , and are experienced only by the soul. The body is, for Plato (1961), empty in that it can not access the abstract reality of the world; it can only experience shadows. This view is determined by Plato's essentially rationalistic epistemology.

The organization and presentation of "reality" within technocentric PE profoundly affected the worldview of all participants (Charles, 1979), claiming that, (a) the intrusion of technological consciousness tends to mould human reason almost exclusivey to the service of instrumental rationality, and (b) the "ends" or purposes of

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instruments are not subjected to intensive rational analysis and scrutiny by those purporting to speak in the name of its incumbent's interest. Rather, "ends" are either taken for granted, left from "private" determination, or articulated at a mundane level. Novice PE-career students were confonted with a hierachy of single-disciplined academics invested with disseminating the dual power of knowledge and institutionally sanctioned authority, wherein lies the tension between economic imperative and democracy. An implication of this hierarchy of "power" characterised by mechanism's components and reproduction was the separation of means and ends. Skills taught in PE lessons offered no personal relationship between a particular sequence of isolated actions and ends to which these actions were ultimately employed. For example, combat skills were taught with only passing reference to a framework of values to govern their usage outside the sporting arena. There was little inclination to examine PE enterprises in relation to its generic purpose: that of empowering self-initiative and enhancing principled respect for one's sovereign, communally influenced selfhood and well-being through movement.

By distinct contrast, the Dionysian perspective is that which becomes the concern of the *performer's* orientation, characterized by Western philosophy's *influential* mediation of subjectivity [compared to Eastern *confluent* meditation]. That is, an experience which PE's "teacher-technicians" would claim was simply an irrational analysis of the *performance.* Their mode of teaching was with modifying movement, through manipulating another's body only. Teachers, in a sense, divorced themselves from communicating with the performer as a fellow human being. In all chapters, I show how "Iago", nick-named "stiff" by his alumni, and not yet "blessed" with a convivial temperament to life, was amongst the first of student-teachers I supervised. He conveyed teaching in the same way he perceived himself.

The Apollonian/Platonic perspective stems from the notion that the spectator's ability to remove him or herself from the *actual* experience in order to analyse the quantitative and 'some' of the qualitative aspects of the whole experience as it unfolds before him or her, represents what I characterise as Modern PE's perspective *on* movement. They, like "Iago", maintain an 'outside-in' view. The Platonic orientation is possible only *for* the performer who is involved in what is

called the "lived-experience". It is an 'inside-out' reflected/contemplated view, what is now called an "excentrated" view. Expressed differently, contemporary PE is more about liberating the private world of the mover. The act of moving and its hidden deeds need to be made known.

I explain ML as evolving by way of committing oneself to a recurring style of self-reflection. I conceive it in collective terms, as a bio-ethic pedagogy of life; a shift from an ego-pedagogy to that of an eco-pedagogy. Amongst its ambition is the pursuit of altruism, of moral qualities wherein the Dionysian perspective, "I", is not left as an unquestioned presupposition. In short, ML's *practice becomes a* praxis which includes asking oneself "What does it mean to be human?" This is an impossible task, you declare. But, it is not impossible to engage in this most ultimate of our sentient quests. Indeed, what may be revealed in its venture can serve to open out our shared understanding of language, of movement, of ourselves, our relationships with others, and with that of the "Big Other": our cosmic existence.

With intent, I adopt a Dionysian version of one's subjective "I", because in explaining its posture, its way of seeing and understanding the world, it can be compared and contrasted, with what I eventually wish to reveal in this thesis; these are the essential but covert or key ingredients which *make* pedagogy into a principled practice. It is a practice which is not directly referred to at the institutional level of PE career professional's preparation, neither in the Western nor the Eastern world.

Movement experiences, like language in its use of words and new genres, are invented as the use of old ones is discontinued. Movement *means* change. It is through movement and through language use that we come to identify ourselves at different moments in time, and in different spaces. Indeed, because we live through interminable states of instability, we learn to cope with different mood changes. We try to keep in touch with our different forms of life or our "*Lebensform*" which is a non-technical term used by Wittgenstein (2001) to connote the sociological, historical, linguistic, physiological and behavioural determinants that comprise the matrix within which a given language both sustains and loses meaning. One's culture, for example, is associated with shaping and flavouring our meanings. It can "cultivate"

one's excellence of taste, or deny it. Culture can extend or constrain understanding of one's own and another's world through an integrated pattern of knowledge, belief, and actions, depending upon that culture's capacity to perceive the world in terms of its symbolic thinking and its social learning, and, the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes its institutional organizations.

Initially, this dissertation calls on PE professionals to undo modernism's fixation with a linear hierarchy of learning, with conserving the professional's authority and its canonizing of physical achievements. Its teaching was type-cast by adhering too strictly to criteria which were performable and observable, and traded this evidence to the public as a way of validating PE's educational status. Pedagogy, however, is something one practices. It comprises acts that cannot be measured. They can only be realised on the basis of one's learners' responses to another's initiative. Inherent in this ML effort is its aim to enhance both the movement potentials of individuals *and* their understanding of the personal, political, and social implications *for* moving. Contemporary movement proponents need to be able to "read" into movement, just as much as they need to "read" into language use.

Educational "blood" infusion

Modern PE's convention to convey its curriculum content, its "regulated knowledge" and "skill-techniques", employed only a science based, instrumental mode of communication. In so doing, however, it created a detachment from the pupils' participant act to learn *as* a meaningful process. Pupils gained information *about* movement. But, they were not given an opportunity to talk *of* their moving encounters. Indeed, during the last 150 years, PE's "educational" bloodline underwent a series of major changes (Crum, 1988). Nevertheless, the undue haste with which these changes occurred served only to by-pass the profession's attention to its clients' lived experiences *during* the act of movement. Teachers did; learners were done to. Even as late as the 1950s, the immanent focus of these hurried changes can be identified by the profession's conventional use of such terms as "school drill". This "drill" was designed to help in the "production and maintenance of health in body and mind" (1933:9, Board of Education)

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Over a half a century later, as noted by Rink (1985; 1993) PE's communication style continued to show evidence of teaching as a mode of instruction, pointing to the fact the relations between curriculum and *instruction* must be clearly defined and programmes must be oriented toward clearly stated goals. Lesson planning and end results called for compatible complements. The standard of knowledge exercised here was not that of the learner's but of the teacher's. Even in the late 1970s PE's "teaching" mode of language carried within it strong traces of words promoting a way to use "tools" for the analysis of instruction. Method "teaching" was the "in-word". Many PE specialists supplemented their income by "coaching" sport-teams during their after-school evenings. There was no difference here. Both schooling and coaching was a matter of treating bodies alike.

PE writers like Sparkes (1992), Fernandez-Balboa (1997), and Rink (1993) however, were predicting PE's long term "orientation" as "having to come to rely" more upon drawing responses *from* its students. Rink encourages teachers to "use student's words and expressions", where expressions are to be thought of as an "attire" of thought, so that the student will expand on the "meaning" of his or her movement response. She encourages the "use of silence" to allow the student time to collect his or her "thoughts". Rink calls on the teacher to ask the student to "describe in detail what he or she was "thinking", "feeling" or doing in the "event". And, most importantly, she asks students, for their PE *meaning* (1985:316), by:

> …bringing student responses *back* to what the [spoken about] ideas mean to the student.
> [my emphasis]

Promoting PE's "value" in terms of its meaning, she calls for its professionals to "bring" the student responses "*back*" to what their own movement encounters may reveal to themselves. PE was beginning to return to its roots, to its "fleshy" sense of being. That is, back to the world of nature and the idea that Merleau-Ponty (1965) turned towards, that of conceiving the body as a "subjective being", one which constructs representations of itself. In a way Merleau-Ponty's notion of an embodied, subjective-being was taken up by Ricoeur's (1981; 1992) aspiration to broaden the discourse of human science's idea of rationality to include the bonding of bodies and persons. When it comes to interpreting language, amongst Ricoeur's altruistic

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ambitions was that its correspondents should be able to manifest care for participants by more fully acknowledging and appreciating each utterance, respecting each person as a "basic" or "particular being" in their own right. Ricoeur, through the protocol of employing appropriate words [observational statements] and judging when to appropriate silence, encourages us to qualify our sayings; to philosophize through our use of language [and our bodies] by means of critical hermeneutic interpretive clarification; to posit the "self" in order to be better positioned treat others empathetically. In short, Ricoeur encourages us to keep respect and nurture others' self-respect, as we would wish them to treat us, to say something not casually but with care and sensitivity.

Evolving thresholds of discovery

This thesis sets out a simple map of some key ideological markers to enable the reader to see the profession, not in a vacuum, but as a politically voiced movement of diverse communities. It acts as a forum for opening "discussion" about our similar or different corporeal resources, embracing our call for equality and personal freedom to present movement under the auspice of its generic meaning. Education in PE is a designated process. It first teaches to train the body. Differently, pedagogy, the art of teaching, is engaged in for the sake of being placed in touch with various schemes of human understanding. A pedagogue enables one's correspondents to be educated to enable one's listeners to think of themselves, to shape their own personal images in their own manner, style, and become immersed in unpacking the meaning of their own questions.

One of ML's objectives is to unearth PE's inherent but lost and now hidden meaning of which I shall exploit by juxtapositioning three differently valued themes in this thesis. These are (i) PE's established epistemology, a technical analysis of movement which offers a broad "anatomy" of its material events; (ii) the more recent value of poststructurism's contemporary use of language in ML, which (iii) enables an ontological focus, or schemes designed to understand human-agency. ML endeavours to use language to link aspects of conscious, self-awareness to that of one's unaware or unconscious sense of "otherness". ML, when taught and well

learned, searches for the "stranger within me" and my learners whom I seek to meet in myself and in others and to come to know anew, through all the ageing seasons of my life.

PE teaching spectrum

I acknowledge, rehabilitate and extend Mosston and Ashworth's (1966-2002) five editions of "Teaching Physical Education". This series focused on shifts of teaching paradigms. It served as an incentive to categorize teaching *styles* by constructing a coherent linear, developmental progress of learning about movement, though not about the acts of learning. These re-modified teaching "spectra" were oriented towards establishing the ground rules for *managing* teaching. Differently, I bring the mover's personalized experiences into the public arena of language. I move *beyond* their systemic spectrum of teaching framework. ML explains why individuals and groups should to talk about themselves as if they were movement's commentators and as mature "movers" capable of engaging in andragogical dialogue (Chapters 7 and 8). This involves expressing their internal motivation, and which in turn, provides testimony to their self-actualization.

Rightfully acclaimed during its inception, Mosston and Ashworth's initiation into PE's teaching spectrum left the more intricate process of "teaching-to-learn" independently to that of each professional's idiosyncratic nature. Each movement advocate was left to resolve "contradictions" in their own minds; to excavate and to deal with their own subjectivity. Their philosophical grounding of PE's practices could not bridge the two "eras" between modernism's transmission of knowledge and post-structuralism's art of teaching to learn, which this dissertation addresses. The logic of their spectra could not reach the level of teaching *as* pedagogy in which pedagogy's traditional, but unspoken guiding principles are presented in the last three chapters as the vitalizing architects of learning. Here I am referring to such foundational features of education as "techne" and "phronesis".

Axial changes

My thesis' metanarrative or conceptual axle revolves around the evolution of postmodernism's radical rethinking of language and its application to understanding PE. Postmodernism, in particular, its poststructural linguistic analysis brought with it both a raft of advantages and disadvantages into reconvening different exercises of education-learning. Postmodern theorists embraced two main ideas: that of subjectivity [the personal is political] and that of knowledge as power (Foucault, 1980). ML takes account of the use of tropes which are special for human movement's discursive arena, where civic competence and the admission of different moral affirmations are brought to bear upon one's process of learning. What Postmodernism informs PE is that language features concerned with personal identities, meanings, and relations are not to be seen as fixed and constant, but rather, as Lyotard (1979 p. xxiv) sums up:

> …finite, locally determined language games, each with specific pragmatic criteria of appropriateness or valence.

Can Movement Literacy help "Iago" to appreciate the complexity of both teaching and learning to educate rather than manipulate others? ML sets the ultimate tone of PE's professional institutional programmes as a sustained effort to infuse the *meaning* of movement by identifying its learning virtues. It identifies how teaching becomes a pedagogy, largely by contrasting *techne* with *phronesis* when the latter's experience enables one to proceed from the impediment of using a fixed perception of teaching to begin to practice pedagogy's hidden ethics designed to manifest movement's human "contract". PE's pedagogy is a fascinating way in which in the drama that is movement, our thoughts and feelings of ourselves and of others are first objectified, and then, partially returned to us afresh via language's slippery nature.

Others' responses and protocol

Others' responses to my questions, or rather, to my questions to their questions, as is the way of both phenomenology and hermeneutics, form the general mode of

enquiry orientating this PE dissertation centered on the art of transposing abstract and tangential information into knowledge about life skills. ML involves creating a pedagogic act which morally entices the client-learner to be introduced into the largely immanent traditions [protocol] of creating the most opportune conditions to help animate and cultivate our own knowledge as clinical PE specialists, and as caring persons.

Protocol refers to the formal etiquette and convention of procedure, to the courtesies, or "good form" that lies within the heart of many human deeds, especially that of pedagogy. The notion of "protocol" has not yet been mentioned in this opening chapter. It is, however, with opening pedagogy's protocol, its accepted but unquestioned practices, to which I orientate the reader's attention. I am referring to the unwritten, but commonly understood code of human behaviour guiding a kind of treaty-like mutual agreement to a silent negotiation that emerges between oral correspondents, *as if* they were adhering to a Rousseau-like (1973) "social contract", or "*Principles of Political Right*": not one person is divinely empowered to legislate, or as Rousseau asserts, only the people, in the form of a sovereign, have that all powerful "right".

Importantly, the teaching "act" involves embracing such a code of behaviour. Indeed, it was towards this code that Mosston and Ashworth's "Spectrum of Teaching" was eventually striving but never arrived at. The "Spectrum" could not incorporate its learners' undisciplined knowledge into the classroom's unpredictable matrix where "questioning questions" about PE's meaning was left untouched. For whose sake, and the meaning(s) of movement were destined to remain out of reach of the Spectrum's boundaries. My thesis intends to extend their "Spectrum" by closely examining education's most begging of burdens: that of keeping open what passes between the experienced and the experiencing, the notion of how meanings control us, and how transient meanings inculcate us into following the persuasive discipline inscribed in them, often without our knowing.

The fascinating feature here is that movement has always served to evoke something hitherto unknown from the realm of my inner-self. I have come to know

me, eventually, through my response to movement, and only much later in my career have I sought out what others have to say about and *of* movement.

Fitting conditions and pedagogical fitness

From the mid 1950s to 1970s, PE's institutional preparation courses stalled at the point where its Ministerial approved content left its trainees stranded (Andrews, 1976). Signs of good teaching, however, were much in evidence by PE student teachers who displayed sound, principled, and consistent testimony to their professional classroom composure. Flexibly exercising their lesson planning, they readily coped with unexpected "classroom incidents". They had reached a professionally versatile stage when they could gather evidence and "feel" that a mover was "disturbed" whilst moving, or take note of a learner's sense of unease with a certain situation. Promising movement advocates were spotted early by their "supervisors". Their formal lesson planning was adjusted, and blended by their very presence, by their eagerness to give of "themselves", to open relationships with their learners, in a way that "Iago's" dispositional nature could not.

This is what I portray through ML. It calls for an embodied skill, an improvisation of tact, when lives, tacitly, can be touched. This is when pedagogy becomes animated and begins to connect education practices with life, and eventually evolves into andragogy (Knowles, 2005). Briefly, andragogy is when one can "hear", "feel", and "respect" the essence or the full presence of another. Andragogy is when the most profound form of learning occurs when its initiator is able to connect with its receptor, when, as Ricoeur (1992) would say , a connection is made with the "otherness", the "unveiled self" of its listener, who in turn, notices the "otherness" of its speaker. ML comes to rely upon shaping the teachers disposition towards another's education and self image. It is about nurturing compassion, benevolence, and even meekness. It counters arrogance and animosity. The dissertation's closing phase shows the act of learning is beautiful and noble because it is a uniquely human enterprise.

In-habiting movement

ML acts as a sign-post. It is orientated to fascinate all PE's listeners to think more thoroughly about what the meaning of words [and their corruption] may, indeed, reveal in one's self. It is about what residing in and doing movement can tell us; indirectly. Movement, I believe, holds the capacity to let us know something about ourselves and others. The moving agent is signalled into an awareness of an impressive phenomenon which is both obscure but also lasting in its impact. The paradox I shall look into (Chapter 2) is that of the realm of play. I shall reverse its treatment from something that is ordinary and mundane into something quite the opposite, into something that is serious and extraordinary. The primacy of playful experience in brought into perspective when I stress on its capacity to communicate similar, but not the same meaning between the knower mover, the PE advocate, and the naïve-mover, between the experienced and the inexperienced learner. My premise is that once correspondents can establish a working relationship, exchange pedagogic devices such as analogies and tropes, and especially employ metaphors between each other, then learning can occur. Yet, it is a learning that depends on unearthing PE's traditional guiding pathways. Pathways offer signs helping us to follow how our predecessors have learned what it is like to be human and share their knowledge of the world. I promote ML partly as a way of making public the silent deed that can be attained through what is referred to as a "social contract", which then is extended from a cultural relationship into a "human" contract: a mute, consensually shared form of understanding that which cannot be said.

For example, what I gained from movement is what I want to share with others. My wanting to be a PE teacher stemmed from my Redcoat days at Butlin's Holiday Camp. I wanted others to share the very thrills that I encountered diving from rocky headlands into the swirling sea, running over the light and heavy texture of sand-dunes, chasing the wind and battling against it. I wanted to see the world, a world seen through other eyes, a mutual world, where each of us can reach out to care more for others. I am talking about what political philosophers have long referred to as the "social contract": the theory that individuals, by nature free and equal, agree to renounce part of their natural liberty by entering into civil society and constituting a

political authority to which they subject themselves for the sake of the advantages provided by civil society. Middle East's most recent "Arab Spring" is the most telling of examples in how people value the ideal of a "social contract." The right to rule and the obligation to obey derive from the agreement; such an agreement is called a "social contract", and establishing something like this "contract" becomes the dissertation's foundational bed-rock. It anchors the processing conditions required for learning-to-learn to begin.

Summary

The thesis's opening three chapters explain that one's performance *descriptions* take the form of generalizations. In contrast, its remaining chapters point out the way in which one's personal *expressions* fasten onto the individual and the particular when schooling's movement technique is talked about less in quantitative data and more in imaginative, qualitative terms. In Chapters 2 and 3, I discuss how, by employing different paradigm lenses, one is lead to perceive different lesson priorities. For example, sometimes objective issues shape lesson planning. Other times, subjective concerns dominate teaching approaches. But there is no fixed hierarchy to determine how one exercises a lesson.

Both chapters illustrate how unprepared modern PE "teaching" took refuge under the cover of the unchallenged authority of the language of science impotent to reveal what learning was like. The essential effect of engaging scientific speech served to compose the profession's self-appointed, dualistic identity as both "Physical" and "Educational". Under the bifurcation of two dimensions, the material and the abstract, PE wrestled with two seemingly incompatible realms of knowledge as if being "physical" was the most natural way to become educated.

Modern PE specialists used natural science based on a kind of empirical language as its prime mode of communication, but did not appreciate the crucial fact that "science" is neither more nor less than patient and detailed attention to the world. Natural science is integral to our understanding of it [the world] and of our selves. But, the unavoidable consequence for PE's client-participants, however, was that

they, as human beings, were not given such detailed attention. Movers were denied license to claim "ownership" for their own "subjective" experiences, [which bring "profit" with respect to the formation of character since experience is rendered in this thesis as the child of thought in action.]

From Chapter 4 onwards, I seek to raise the reader's awareness to the innovative possibilities of postmodernism's deconstruction of the enigma and fallibility that I show language-experience to be. Also, I expose the beguiling ambiguity of movement's encounters. I synergize movement with speech-acts. I hinge their co-existent contribution to consensually understand our human affairs.

In Chapters 5-7, however, I argue that, because of poststructuralism's linguistic radicalising insight, contemporary PE's communication can be exercised in such a way that its speaker can seek out certain moments when loss of self awareness may be encountered.

Movement experiences are unaccountable for in terms of the austere nature of individual subjectivity, and which modern PE, as diagnosed in Chapter 5 through examining its "structuralist-bound" interpretation of language use, tended to undercut. My response to this problem is to turn to the perceptive reflection that arose from the poststructural linguistic movement which appeals strongly to the notion of reflection of the dialectic. I see speech and movement as being rooted in and continuous with a public language of total bodily gesture.

Chapter 5 explains modern PE's structural linguistics. It was a mode of communication which constrained treatment of the body by making it possible to nurture the belief that people could stand outside of the "natural" pragmatic realm of knowledge. Structuralism served to lock in one's knowledge as contained and portrayed through a single frame of reference, but, in so doing it also locked out how others viewed the world. I hold modern PE's directive language to be the root cause for its communication practices becoming divorced from its mover's subjective concerns. Modern PE was unable to convey movement's silent meaning. Its instrumentalist's isolating communicative practice was impotent to the process of

learning because it could neither address embodied resource of self-identity nor entertain other's responses.

In Chapter 6, I explain how I find myself re-entering a "hermeneutic circle" of witnessing, responding to, reframing, and re-wording my world of adventure. My lifespan has now reached its penalty-shoot time and edges ever closer to hearing that final whistle blast. But, before this whistle blows, I want to share with others how I have come to discern subtle configurations of meanings for simple expressions that will do justice to the integrity, complexity, and essential being of life.

In Chapter 7, I turn to Ricoeur's (1992) thoughts about language, narrative and discourse. Ricoeur develops a hermeneutics of the self that charts both its epistemological path and ontological status. Ricoeur clarifies significant differences between applying cognitive description of the self and that of engaging in expressive accounts which link us to what Sheehan (1978) refers to as our "floating–self".

ML invites its participants to reconsider fundamental issues about movement and language usage and their potential consequences for the process of learning and understanding the human condition. These four knowledge forms are presented as co-existent, each field contributing a different lens to enhance our understanding of human affairs. Furthermore, I join Western influential goals with Eastern confluencial styles of contemplation to reveal that pedagogy is an ethical practice for educating self-responsibility to value human flourishing. Pedagogy nurses our way into learning and *is* an educational enterprise, standing in stark contrast to a 10 year old pupil's comment to me after my first lesson observation. Casually, he remarked that he felt he had no part to play in PE because "Nobody said nuffink about de learnin bit."

The study's major plot is to convey ML as a dedicated way to alleviate as many impediments to learning as possible, whilst the sub-plot is to introduce professionals to PE's communication protocol.

Chapter Two   A Historical Overview of PE

Introduction

In this chapter, I note how PE's post-war excitement in the 1950s and 1960s, its appeal to novel teaching methods was productive in terms of creating new styles of classroom practices, based on educational theories, but problems did arise when they were exposed to the delightfully unpredictable cauldron that inspires learning between the teacher, the experienced "knower" and the learners, the innocent and inquisitive searchers for knowledge. I issue a recall for the vitalizing experience of play in our PE learning encounters, and draw on the thoughts of both Barthes (2007) and Ricoeur (1992), as well as Csordas (1999) and Abram (1996), whose unselfish thought about human movement, language, and one's embodied perception embraces something more than a human world.

This chapter sends out a crucial message to the movement profession to be wary of first impressions of others and to be patient and serene to establish a two-way, communicatively-clear, relationship between "knower" and "learner". Play, because of the triviality of its nature which serves to hide the depth of its seriousness, is to be conceived not simply as a *physical* activity but also as holding the capacity to assimilate one's *attitude* in its flights from concrete ideas, to bring into synergy the inner experience of the body, and the fact of the body as a "thing". This chapter anticipates somatic [of the body] understanding as preceding all others, and persists *while* our symbolic forms of understanding develop (Abram, 1996). Somatic understanding shapes those symbolic forms of understanding in profound and subtle ways (Csordas 1994; 1999).

A performer turned commentator

PE's communication is identified as a pointer, a directive in which its main arterial contour lines of thought sometimes run parallel, or cross over, and sometimes seem to be held at a distance apart. It is a communication between insights into (i) the philosophy of education [knowledge and its learning], (ii) language [constructing different versions of human purposes] and, (iii) the nature of our human condition,

the sentient agent who resides in movement. Rather than keeping modern PE's different discourses and paradigm-inspired learning apart, ML begins to reconvene different discourses in a way that all its speakers can communicate with the lost voices of the past and the silenced and disenfranchised in modern PE.

Broadly speaking, a paradigm is a philosophical or theoretical framework of a worldview, and many paradigms form the core of a belief system. Scientific inquiry dominated the 20th century PE (Martens, 1987), hence, the most striking elements of this positivitic world view imposed the belief that reality is best understood through the use of systematic, experimental methodologies (Dewar and Horn 1992; Sparkes 1992). Its key doctrine was objectivity based on the concept that it is possibe to gain knowledge about the world by maintaining a detached, emotion and value-free posture regarding the study of PE as a scholarly discipline. The use of paradigms established a strong foothold in movement studies (Harris, 1983). However, it led the profession to hold a naïve belief that the epistemological and methodologies of natural science could be:

> …transported unproblematiclly into social and cultural settings.
>
> [McKay,Gore and Kirk,1990:55]

PE's orthodox and almost exclusive reliance on quantitative paradigm were both limited and limiting in the sense that they were incapable of explaining human movement "behaviour" in relation to personal, social, cultural and contextual forces. Harnessing critical reflection, they rendered impotent the experiential process of learning. With the advent of qualitative paradigms in the 1980s and 1990s (Fraleigh 1990; Kirk 1993; Vanderwerken and Wertz 1985), PE's professional practices were exposed to interpretive paradigms as an addition to merely describing events/ happenings by analysing critical classroom interactions (Bain 1990; Krane 1994). Sport researchers like Placek and Locke (1986), Hoberman (1988;1992), and Osterhoudt (1991) were promoting critical and transformative theoretical perspectives into studying movement and began to direct their primary attention towards "understanding" the social philosophical nature of power relations that exist within a community setting. Such critical and transformative research aspired to reach beyond *described* sporting events and began to examine the use of *expressive*

knowledge [a strong, sympathetic and eloquent language inviting further thought] as a means to engage, induce and enhance the quality of movement experiences for its movers.

The need for a close consideration of different contextual influences to help the profession to better understand human *movement-behaviour*, was interestingly reflected in Gergen's (1987: 63) observation that:

> …just as words cannot be understood out of a linguisitic context, the understanding of individuals requires comprehension of social context.

Understanding the interactive nature of our culture related movement is one thing. This dissertation centres more on delving beyond the nature of our socially influenced movement disciplines. It considers what happens to the sentient being when one's conscious awareness is seemingly immersed entirely in the act of moving. On the one hand, we can become beguiled and absorbed into, and within, the world of movement. On the other hand, the austere, embodied and interactional experience in one's single-seated and single spectator theatre of movement needs to be outwardly delivered [excentrated] and made public, in terms of personal experience and one's interaction with the world of language; otherwise, PE encounters are condemned to remain "meaning-less".

PE's advocates must hear, critically examine, and transform the learner's physical and spoken gestures, as they co-exist, co-subscribe, and bear witness to the speakers dispositional character. Only in this way, by examining the learner's expressed account of movement in the discipline of a dialogic discourse can the ambition of PL then be clarifed as a benign way to open-out each other's private "ghetto" of existence. A "ghetto" of which "Iago" was oblivious. To learn from PE, its participants cannot remain mute performers. Rather, they need to become movement's narrators.

The critical issue I highlight here is that the singular resourced self-experience of movement, in itself, does not guarantee that movement interpreters can then enhance the quality of movement experiences for its learners. PE's advocates must

be able to hear, critically examine, and transform the learner's gestured and spoken-through attitudes and practices, which may serve to re-orient and improve PE enterprises towards a more democratic and inclusive mode of learning. Learning is a complex process involving many overt and covert relational interchanges between one human and another, between a human and an inanimate object, and between different forms of knowledge. One key objective in this thesis is to focus in on the bare essential ingredients that inexperienced PE student teachers need to be made aware of, not as a "quick-fit" tool-kit, but rather as necessary "fall-back" principles upon which one can turn to in order to resource one's thoughts, ideas, and direct one's actions in unpredictable situations; a kind of Automobile Association rescue reliance for the bewildered education apprentice.

Clearly, one's mode of communication skills will be a vitalizing feature for beginner movement interpreters, who need to be precise in their "instructions", and vesatile, compassionate, and altruistic when it comes to treating their movers' personal concerns. In Modern PE (post war- pre 1970s) its proponents, myself included, tended to think of one's class as an "audience". I followed "Ministerial" guidelines and serviced my "institutionalised" thinking to orient my planning and my lesson conduct. Differently, today the audience, the learners are given their say in the way they, the clients of movement, feel they can be best "treated".

Only in this way, I argue, and only by examining the learner's expressed account of movement in the discipline of a dialogic discourse can PL be volitionally nurtured for its learner as a commitment to a daily "movement" routine. In an important way, I seek to reorganize the established power relations between PE's established quantitive parent disciplines, and its more recent infusion of qualitiative "disciplines", in order to widen PE's teaching "spectrum" to embrace pedagogy and, eventually andragogy, which I perceive as a benign way to open-out each other's private "ghetto" of existence. By "ghetto", I mean that when we do play, we tend to drop our guard; we become ourselves as unrestrained and unresticted persons. Our "public" self is given free access to meet our "private" inner being. This is a priviledge, as I shall explain in the thesis's closing chapters, when our public self perception may, or may not come into harmony with our own sense of "comfort", our relaxed state of

being. And, it is with helping movement learners to better cope with this perplexing experience that one encounters in PE enterprises, between the "illusion" of technique learning and what they "think" they learn from experience.

Play is a privileged ghetto

The point of anything, so Barthes (2007) claims, *is* to open one's "privileged" ghetto of knowledge by grappling with its multi-rooted meaning. For example, in a complicated way, but much simplified in this dissertation, Barthes believes that, linguistically, the author is never more than the instance of writing. In effect, *as* we speak, *as* we feel at a certain moment in time, is how we perceive or make of ourselves, we adopt a certain preferred image in which we wish others to perceive us.

Movement Literacy involves creating a connecting series of crossovers, switchbacks and interchanges as a way to help PE's future profession to maintain a middle line, half way between science and nature. It sustains a link between nature and our human affairs, connecting what we say with what we do. It aspires to harmonise others' gestures and deeds with those of our own. It reaches beyond Mosston's first "teaching spectrum", by investing a primacy in the experience of play and the experience of language use.

The necessary retrieval of play

The act of playing has suffered serious atrophy during the past few decades (Deem 1986; Grondin 2001; Feezell 2004; Torres 2003). It is a non-instrumental form of activity. Play can be perceived to be a lighthearted way to express emotions. It also holds a serious side. This is because the nature of one's play symbolises one's striving, one's restless dissatisfactions with one's conditions, one's strenuous and uncertain efforts to attain the best one can. Riven by one's contradictions, by desire and its frustrations, one struggles to articulate one's self in words, in the language of gesture, or both. In other words, play can be interpreted as an act with rich potential for surfacing evidence illuminating the ontological nature of the being of its agency.

In Chapter 6, I clarify distinctions between conscious and unconscious issues. For instance, some aspects of play may have "fixed rules", and are engaged in, in an "orderly manner". But then, how does Caillois (1958:123) explain that play "proceeds within its own proper boundaries?" Play itself, seems to be portrayed as having "no" boundaries, and yet is described as proceeding within its "own" boundaries. Caillois never tries to wedge open his ideas about play, and very little in terms of its potential consequences for the player. In his examination of play, Caillios (1958:124) is tentative about its nature and purpose. Huizinga (1944: ii) is similarly cautious, claiming that play is essentially a:

> …separate *occupation,* carefully isolated from the rest of existence and generally occurring within precise limitations of time and space…In any event, the domain of play is a universe apart. Closed and protected, a pure space. [*my emphasis*]

Play; a "universe apart?", "closed and protected?", a "pure space?". As Caillois would have it, I shall portray play in a very contrary way. That is, as "universal", as "open and unprotected", and, not as "pure physical space", but rather, in terms of a certain powerful sense of presence, usually encountered in the space of "silence". For Caillois, play is encountered in "boundaries", but then that was his intent. He wanted to dissect life into convenient "categories. He "framed", or attempted to set definable edges to play. Differently, play as I conceive it, is something that befalls us at any time and as a completely unrestrained, or incredibly fluent and porous "happening".

With Caillois (1944), and Huizinga (1980), we can agree that fixed rules *belong* to games. However, when it comes to viewing play, Huizinga's earlier text "*The Waning of the Middle Ages*" considers play located as a kind of nursery preparation for the more demanding fixtures that apply to the playing of a game. Caillois tries to set aside his understanding of play. He identifies play as a separate "occupation". Yes, play occupies us in a certain way. But it is an occupation that he clearly sets aside in contrast to occupational work. It is an occupation which, according to Huizinga, is carefully "isolated" from the rest of existence, "closed" and "protected", indeed, even conceived as "a pure space".

The isolation Huizinga may have had in mind was due to his understanding that play occupies us in the sense that it engages our ideas, our thoughts and our imagination; where small things attract us because through imagination, large things can materialize in them, as Bachelard (1964; 1969) leads us to believe. But, at the same time, Caillois' "isolation" or separation of play from that of our day-to-day experiences, reflected a Cartesian view of an "ego-centered" individual mover, and, thus, referred to a person who held a unitary notion of one's "logical-self". A version of the self, that is, conceived as unattached, or displaced from the body, a self that modern PE teachers also came to view as a unitary entity, [or, as expressed in more contemporary terms, an "I" with no reference to an "other"]. For both Caillois and Huizinga there existed only one, solitary version of *the* moving self.

However, there is little doubt that following play, one may encounter a profound sense of well-being. But then, what of Caillois' idea about play in terms of its separation of time and space? Although we can conceptualise a universe in which the utilitarian and nonutilitarian are totally compartmentalised, in which work and play are distinct realms which never interpenetrate, nevertheless, we often *experience* work and play *as if* we were constantly on the transient borders of each. We play during work, no doubt. But we continue to question if we "work" during play.

When involved in the act of playing, in its undertaking, what seems to be removed, or temporarily put aside, is our own conscious awareness of what we are doing. Why we play does not occur to us, when we are playing. But, more importantly, what can the potential consequences of "playing" hold out for its resident-dwellers? Play, I argue, reminds its players that, as human beings, they are more than rational thinkers. Play is testimony to the fact that human beings are meaning-seeking creatures. It keeps the world fresh and interesting and helps keep its players unique and unpredictable. Play produces "givers" and allows its players to reap the many benefits of uncalculated, spontaneous commitment. It preserves human capriciousness and helps individuals to appreciate their unique possibilities. Most importantly, play allows meaning to matter, without asking about its value. We experience values and celebrate them simply because they speak to us. And it is with this silent feature of play, with the suspension of one's presumed or prejudiced

and displayed attitude and the adoption of a beginner-like open, unbiased, and playfully receptive mind that I wish to pursue in the closing chapters. This is because play, in its primordial unfettered sense, is a medial enterprise between a presence and an absence which offers a clue to ontological explanation, the "event" of being that occurs in "happenings/incidents", because it blurs the distinction between life and no-life.

Movement into language

Modern PE proponents tended not to talk a language of "relationship". They did talk of matters like bending words into things to serve their *own* use, as in the directing and manipulation of another's body, or its parts. Rarely, however, did they talk of a language in terms of their own relationship with movement, like the relationship we have with the world. We need to listen to ideas *emerging* from language's usage, rather than speak *through* it, which, in effect, is to impose ideas *on* language. In the early 1970s PE institutions had not yet fully embraced philosophy's examination about the notions of reflection and logic. Then, it was a profession that was unencumbered from the realm of lingering doubts. It had not yet responded to Merleau-Ponty's (1962) analytical philosophy of perception. Merleau-Ponty, whose work is featured in Chapter 4 onwards, wanted to illuminate descriptions of our relationship with our own bodies in perception and action. He attempted to re-attach the felt concerns of the person's subjective being to the world of nature and to our human affairs. He wanted to redeem the perceived endorsement of movement for and with others, to embrace our embodied being not as an austere and isolated phenomenon, but as a talked about account. This is part of what ML seeks to achieve. PE is about doing movement, and yet, rarely is PE discussed as a curricular subject's contribution to education.

So, what is PE?

One can describe PE pedagogy. Its physical health function is unquestioned. Nevertheless, all its constituents must re-explore what lies behind it, within it, and what stays with us having gone through its enactment and its consequences. We can

do so by using words to describe what it may be *like* for both its comparing correspondents when action and words are interchanged during a conversation. But what guarantee is there that one's meaning is what the other also takes it to be? This dissertation is not about me speaking of my own voice alone, but of my many voices blending in with those of more authoritative standing than mine. I wish to help students like "Iago" to be able to become sensitive to, aware of, and be in touch with "*how*", "*when*", and "*why*" a class can co-exist as human beings under the convivial guidance of one's personal and professional way of being, of acting, and of speaking. I deconstruct "Iago's" rigid disposition to unravel the hidden paradox that creates a fault-line, a conceptual "gap" between PE's proponents interpreting their curriculum-subject not in the mundane image of play, but rather, in its seriously exotic playfulness of words.

For example, whilst addressing movers as an audience in a formal "teaching-mode", the context calls for its speaker to decide which style of communication best fits the situation. Addressing the entire class invites a "blanket-approach" because the teacher's intent is to issue information which is applicable to them all. Alternatively, the professionals need to be aware of when to change one's language style and when to focus more on conversing with an informal gathering that constitutes a group within the class. One's accumulated experience and one's nous "knows" when to change the mode and the mood of the language in order to treat person-to-person relationships. Commandeering language use is more often applied to the lower schooling PE pupils. It "hails" the class together as a unit. For the more accomplished and older aged "performers", however, a quieter, more intimate and changed language style is necessary to invite, or signal some reciprocal response from others in a less formal, more cordial and collegial conversational engagement. Such a nous "Iago" lacked either because of his dispositional nature, or because he had not yet been made aware of the professional teaching skills that lie beyond his landscape of understanding. Nor did I understand enough to help him.

In-house adjustments

How best one can create a space both during and out of lesson time for conversations to generate mutual interchanges of values, beliefs, and ideas about life, comes with experience, sometimes extensive experience (Andrews, 1976). An analogy can be drawn here between promoting modern PE and that of advancing the more nuanced understanding of human movement that is the contemporary PE of this century. I refer to the internet revolution. Its digital yet global form of e-communication, has, with the recent Arab Spring (Times: April 201l) demonstrated the profound effect of public speech, and its denial, in some countries. Modern PE tended to deny its lower schooling pupils discussion about movement, until, that is, the arrival of Mosston and Ashworth's series of teaching "spectrum". However, with the advent of pupil to pupil discussion, comparing each other's efficient or indifferent technique, what remained unaddressed was the actual personal meaning of movement and its relation to or alienation from its performing clients. PE's experiences were not made understandable.

On a much smaller scale, but serving this very purpose, ML entertains such a revolution, in the sense that it seeks to encourage a robust level of freedom of speech amongst its participants, and those who interpret movement as an overture to life and its living. As an educational enterprise, my untried and untested ML's ambition is that of trying to re-portray PE more as a mission, a calling which sets out its project in the astute use of words. It is a way of engaging movers, be they whilst hiking, sailing, or dancing, by their advocates, to express and manifest their professional and ethically correct mode of caring for one's novice learners of movement and of life. It nurtures independence when its correspondents acknowledge that their own priority is to think about and manifest more care for the other, rather than for oneself.

Voicing concerns

No matter what love may be, it can be intense. It may be "incomparably-wonderful", but, like human movement, its experience remains hidden beyond the boundaries of

words. In our expression of movement, in the gathering-in of words, in our uttered sentences we are also structuring an edifice of ourselves, in addition to what we mean when describing movement. Our expressions construct a kind of helpful image of ourselves, as well as the encountered vision that we have in movement that we wish to convey to others.

How an aspiring and apprenticing PE specialist begins to change one's role from that of a "teacher" to a "pedagogue" centres on one's capacity to engage others in conversation. Teaching is a telling process, pedagogy is a talking event. Pedagogy is an invitation to speak. But then it is much more than merely conversing with another. As I show in Chapters 6 onwards, to speak is to fight, to protect, to maintain, and even to advance one's mode of existence. At the same time, it is also, paradoxically, a fight to preserve our sense of playfulness. Playing and fighting together is a paradox. Nevertheless, it is one that I intend to sustain and promote logically in response to postmodernism's philosophical movement, which evolved in reaction to modernism, the tendency in contemporary culture to accept only "objective truth". Postmodernist thought is an intentional departure from the previously dominant modernist approaches. The term "postmodernism" comes from its critique of the "modernist" scientific mentality of "objectivity", and which characterized PE's science reverence during the last century. Amongst its many radical innovations was that of poststructuralism's linguistic analysis, qualifying the distinction between that of a conscious self and an unconcious "otherness" which are implicity interchnaged in the sometimes benign and sometimes painful skirmishes of speech. Describing movement is one thing. Living through it is quite another.

Mosston's initial "spectrum" described movement. But so far as embracing its experiences, the "spectrum" did not extend to this depth. And this is where I foresee ML as providing a helpful guideline. "Iago", for all our discussions, could not respond to my asking him, why, at the end of the day, PE should be one, if not *the* most highly valued of all curriculum subjects. Whatever his classroom issues turned out, the final court of appeal for resolving his lessons not merely stemmed from the limitations of his institutional "training", but evolved from the manner in which he "perceived" his professional role.

For example, Barthes (1972; 1975; 1986) is one of the most accomplished of emotional and literate commentators on the world of sport, and its contemplation. His excitement as elicited from the world of sport, and his eagerness to capture and share the very essence of his fascinated excitement with others, tells us much about literature's capacity to unravel the nature of our being   In 1968, Barthes wrote an essay called "*The Death of the Author*". His argument depends on the fact that the signifier "I" is a "shifter": it moves from speaker to speaker as each lays claim to it. Its linguistic terms, the author is never more than the figure produced by the use of "I", just as we constitute ourselves subjects of the sentences we speak by the same means. If I say "I am exhausted", I may be all sorts of other things too, but as far as the meaning of my words are concerned, I am no more at that moment than an exhausted person. "Linguistically", the author is never more than the instance in writing, so Barthes insists.

Barthes wants us to read the written text itself, not something else that we imagine would provide a clue to it or a guarantee of the correctness our interpretation. He is not arguing for subjectivism, the view that the text's personal associations for me, and an individual reader, whatever they happen to be, will do as an account of its meaning. Instead, his reader in not an individual, not a real person at all, but the "space" in which all the quotations that make up the writing are inscribed without any of them being lost. Such a "space" does not exist, except as an ideal type; a timeless, utopian, model reader. In practice, some of us will see some of the possibilities, some others, and the text itself keeps its secrets about which is "right". Indeed, it becomes unclear just what "right" would mean [though it is still possible, if we do not know the words, or we pay insufficient attention to them, or we miss a citation, or mistake the genre, to be wrong].

I shall show that the underside, unspoken about, virtue of PE's designated movement is actually about communication, or, to be more correct, to relating the hidden modes, its long ritualized but now immanent features of communication between oneself and others. This is what PE's pedagogy should be about. It should be concerned with opening the conditions for one to learn about not quite the meaning, but rather, a collaborative meaning one endeavors to covey to another.

A key message I wish PE professionals to convey to their clients is that PE experiences can offer its practitioners a mode of learning by way of creating arena-like spectacles. The early origins of the Olympics, for instance, served as a religious function collecting its congregation into sharing something of a passionately and emotionally rich experience. This is what Barthes does. He stimulates readers by exciting them from his viewpoint about the Tour-de France. He is of the opinion that such sport-like activities can become symbolic actions, regardless of whether or not there are spectators to allegorise the activity as he does.

In Chapter 7, Ricoeur (1992) shows that a powerful sense of seduction arises from the way words are employed, manipulated, and uttered. The speaker engages in a series of something deliberated and sometimes unintended linguistic moves, tacking in one direction and then another, always searching for clues to confirm whether or not the listener is following this or that line of thought. My student "Iago's" use of language, for example, resembled that of a laser beam. It was exclusively concerned with what he had in mind, to adhere to his words, to conform with his questions and expected response. In addition, "Iago" could not appreciate the fact that there are many movement "disciplines", both outdoors, in the ring, and in the pool, when the PE pupils ardently wish to act in absolute solitude. Movement teachers do need to know when to say something, when to accompany one's listener's thoughts, or, when best to indulge in silence. They need to be able to cross many of PE's playful or "Ludic Rubicon" by mulling over the classroom situation almost instantaneously, whilst keeping company in the refuge of one's own thoughts and expressions.

Pedagogy is like this. It is a form of art and a form of play. Both appeal to our aesthetic sense of being. But then, perhaps it is the case that the distinction between play and art may lie only in the "theory" of expression, when an utterance expresses a thought, a cry expresses grief or pain, and a poem may express nostalgia or energy. The simplest view of this theory would be that any action which makes public or communicates a state of mind thereby expresses something in public. Nevertheless, a mere signal seems not to express what it signals, and a mere statement, "I am ecstatic with the result" does not express ecstasy in the way a poem does. It seems that expression requires some concept of the action being an

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adequate or successful rendering of what is expressed. The words or other actions should somehow fit into the state of mind they express. The problem is to understand the conception of this fit.

For instance, a language is more than a grammar and its vocabulary; it embodies a distinctive worldview, and it is that which constitutes the common culture underlying the diversity of individuals within it. When we speak, we do so by borrowing words from *their* public "understanding", and here is hidden a significant problem. All movement-literates need to be able to trace in the author the residue in the speaker/signifier, or the mover-agent's intended mode of meaning. But much is to be resolved before the listener can come to share, in part, something like the meaning the speaker thinks that he or she is conveying to another. What we are dealing with are those features of an utterance, or a work, which contribute to its success and "meaning" in its satisfying qualities: its aesthetics.

Embodied resource

According to Merleau-Ponty, it is not "I" who speaks "it", my-body object, but rather, it is my body-subject "who/that" speaks to me. The profession had neither incorporated his viewpoint [nor postmodernism's "radical ideas"] steadfastly to protect the subjective view of experience as a necessary part of any full understanding of the nature of knowledge.

In this dissertation ML is introduced as an endless endeavor to help "movers", who may come to feel alone *in* the act-of-moving, not to *be* alone in movement. There is much tracking and trailing of the origin of words and that of movement by the teacher, whose vocation is exercised entirely on behalf of the learner. The professional is asked to "scout", to "escort", and accompany the learner from movement, through words, into a state of being. It is a state of being during which self-revelation is cultivated, eventually adopted or adapted to, depending on the realised preferences of that person who is journeying into adulthood. It is a process which can only be initiated during the inter-changes that befall both its interlocutors. The process of conditioning pedagogic situations, of employing the first principles of

learning how-to-learn, require educators to know and appropriately apply the astute knowledge, the *nous* or the mental faculty that perceives when to open portals to the subjective world.

Exclusion of the self

What modernism's PE carried with it was a story, a narrative, which conveyed a sense of social conformity, a cultural loyalty and an unwitting adherence to a language which conspired to "externalize" perceptions (Albright 1989, Almond 1983, Bain 1985). In its modernist, rationalist discourse, in its lack of treatment of body/subject, its learners suffered the effects of self-alienation because self-concerns such as that of one's embodied sensual existence and concrete social experience were not deemed to fit into one's lesson arrangement. Serendipity has no place in PE's philosophy in the 1970s; target completion was objective number one, even if the experience did alienate its clients. "Alienation" is Hegel's word (1977) for what happens when people and ideas are cut off from unified reality. It takes place when the act of thinking falls into conflict and fails to be resolved, as when movement-learners are placed into movement disciplines, and find the entire experience utterly confusing, losing touch, as it were, with their conscious sense of being; fracturing their relationship with their own sense of embodiment, and becoming distanced from that of others. Experiencing alienation led to what could be a loss of confidence in themselves and as a consequence, this negative encounter led them to separate themselves even from their own bodies.

Harnessed by its technical language, last century's PE's sanctioned communicative language served to dislodge, stifle, and fragment knowledge. In Chapter 3, I show how the use of its sterilized speech falsely lead its clients to create doubts about themselves, encounter disaffection, endure humiliation, and become alienated even from their own bodies. Countering this negative, and isolating trend, ML, by not placing our passion or subjectivity under siege, can be a way to generate a more ambient atmosphere of closeness, to appreciate what honourableness means through judging one another's manner of behaviour and actions. And how such pedagogic features as collegiality, trust and care between its experienced and

inexperienced participants can be engendered, and how aesthetics comes to play a significant part in our processing of meaning and its subsequent understanding.

Aesthetics

In aesthetic theory, a popular view is that a work of art derives its *effect* by expressing the feelings of its creator, conveyed to that of a viewing public. The view that this work expresses the artist's own value was forcibly presented by Collingwood (1960) in his text "*The Idea of Nature*", and may strike many artists as correct. Yet, it raises the problem of existence and nature of these feelings before they take shape in words on paintings. As Barthes (1986) argues, feelings are often regarded as the "surfacing touchstone" of each player in the flesh and blood world of sport-like activities. By using the term "surfacing touchstone," Barthes (2007) was referring to the intriguing way the cultic [magnetic and mesmeric] nature of sport and recreation seems to well up from the depth of our deepest emotions and, uninhibited, displays these "innermost" feelings in public. Collingwood also insisted that true artistic activity takes place "in the head", *before* anything is embodied in the actual medium of the artist. The creation of an art "work" is then just a matter of "craft", following on that realised "eureka" moments.

This is a romantic theory since the artist is now singled out as the person of extraordinary feeling and sensibility (expounded on in Chapter 3), rather than the person of particular skills. This view can be seen as a vindication of "expressionism" in art, [seen, for example, in the use of exaggeration and distortion for emotional effect.] Notwithstanding its leaning towards romanticism, the articulation of one's inner feelings requires its speaker to have undue confidence in the idea of a determinate, and interesting, inner life with its own properties, existing independently of any actual externalization. If expression is to retain a central place in aesthetic theory, a closer connection is needed between what is expressed and the nature of the work, and more so, when it comes to expressing the nature of life itself: expressing oneself to reveal hidden facets of oneself.

As with Collingwood, Ryle (1949) also spoke of this "intellectualist legend", of the Cartesian mind "before" body. Descarte's dualism made a neat incision between physical and metaphysical reality. He thought up a logical process of induction in which he perceived the body as mindless, which implied that the practical experience of physical skills is independent of the theory of its embodied enactmentImportant to clarify in this chapter is the assumed idea of a person that Cartesianism carried with it: that of the singular notion of being, a human being, that is, of not acknowledging another person's mode of existence, of not being treated as a noun. Contrary to Cartesianism, the nature of the human person can be made accessible and assessable by what one hears, does, and sees of that person. The dissertation stresses that we are all made up of different modes of ourselves and our unconscious selves, about which we may know little. There is always a conundrum in our effort to understand what comes into play when we move.

Summary

The loneliness that is movement needs not to be encountered in austere isolation, but rather celebrated in its splendour. This is why I call upon the discipline of phenomenology in Chapter 4 so that the mover is encouraged to become a story teller of one's PE enterprises. A story teller must not be inhibited and prohibited to make one's inner feelings known in a public forum.

Movement can be an encounter that makes us feel alone. Sometimes we dread participating in one movement discipline or feel disregarded, or austerely unaccompanied in that form of movement. To cope with this austere isolation, in part, accounts for the reason why PE needs an inclusive and "caring" language as well as the language of science. PE needs to be treated by way of *a* therapy, of a "compassionate pedagogy", pursuing positive courses of action that empower the resident mover, searching for the best features of another's self. This is where Movement Literacy steps in. ML can be exercised in a way which allows us not to *be* alone. But then how can one share something that is "incomparably wonderful" when one is "zoned" into the enigma that is movement? Movement actions, I argue, are something we can indulge *in*, because, strange as it may seem, movement holds the

capacity for one to indulge in what is unfamiliar, but which makes contact with our intuitive, gut, feelings.

In our schooling experiences, with the exception of literature study, it is rare, if ever, that our inner sense of "otherness", our inner-stranger, or our mindless selves can be stirred to our conscious awareness. PE enterprises were designed to be of this nature (Abbs 1994, Barone 1978), and modern PE had "forfeited" this eventual end for the sake of its immediate objective rewards. Then, PE's "selling point" to the public was its advancement in movement performances. Today, I contend PE's "selling point" is its potential to create life skills through its playfulness.

As will be acknowledged in this thesis, the manner of one's engagement in play can also be a display of one's dispositional nature. For example, I know my grandchildren. I have followed their growth into the world. They each show very different styles of behaviour. They show sibling connections. But, when it comes to their world of play, they do so as if "I" existed half in and half out of their world. They all address play as if they are looking into what they are playing with, or playing at, and yet keeping an eye on me (but as an outsider), turning to give me sorts of sideways-on-looks, not face-to-face, when they initiate tangential hints, and clues. They are playing with me, with words. They do so in a way which places or locates my present sense of being as if I am existing on the borders of two close domains of lived experiences, and leaves me hesitant as to which orientation holds the most promising outcome for me.

Moments of play, my grandchildren might imply in years to come, appear unpredictably in the most unlikely of places, even during the most crucial of moments arising during a job interview, and the most ecstatic flights of child's play may suddenly drop into dull compulsion. "Let's keep swinging on the ropes", says my grandchild Lucy. J.J., my grandson, standing nearby, agrees. Yet, the style of his movement towards the ropes suggests a certain lack of enthusiasm on his part. Lucy is eager. J.J. looks bored. They both swing on the ropes. Ballet-like in style, nimble and lithe, Lucy "climbed-with a sense-of-purpose", an intent of which only she had insight. It was clear in her movement that she wanted to reach different parts of the

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scaffold that supported the swinging ropes. Her face blossomed bright and almost sparkled. Head drooping, tying his body into a smaller shape by knotting the rope around him, J.J. pulls funny faces at me. I watch them both. Were they both involved in the act of climbing?

Clearly, we all appear to hold a remarkable ability to transform almost any tedious or unpleasant task into a game. It was a game J.J. my grandson was playing with me. But, at the same time, he was also telling me that he was playing in company with Lucy. We do have the capacity to corrupt Caillois' pure play. We can step into the realm of play. Equally, we can retreat out of play. Our ulterior and often well hidden motives to engage our "self" in play or games may be frivolous or profound. It can vary from the innocent intent to maintain our state of physical fitness to that of a more sinister motive: to maim an opponent in order to secure a winner's share of the spoils. We can be seen to do one thing, but the "intent" in the doing is only occasionally available to the "doer".

In the film "*Cool Hand Luke*", for instance, a group of convicts bewilder the guards by increasing the tempo of their road work, by running back and forth in eager performance of their imposed task, by laughing, by turning punishment into play. There is in this situation no formal contest because the guards are not included among the "players", but their bewilderment is in fact the rational point of the apparently irrational game played by the prisoners. Had the prisoners begun the game purely for their own amusement, like my grandchildren, one of whom was captivated by a whim, the activity would have been nonutilitarian, one phenomenologically indistinguishable from the utilitarian work that was done previously in their compulsory task to repair the road. The prisoners cleverly exploited the diffuse meaning they held between themselves as they injected a playful element, (a flight of fancy,) into *their* version of an activity, labelled as work by others [the guards] not privy to the implicit motive of the participant players, and who could only interpret the same activity as a display of work.

Phenomenologically speaking, there is both a "unity", a "single entity" when Descartes (in *Meditations IV; xi:* 1673 1968) wrestled with the real problem that:

> ...I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but...am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I form with it a single entity.

The point Descartes makes here is that when we come to realize that there exists a most profound disparity in our inability to cope with different realms of knowledge, then any account that fails to do full justice to both the unity *and* the disparity cannot be taken seriously. There may be just one "whatness" here, a body labelled Ted. Though a thing, a quantity, a material whatness can be reduced to another; that is, accounted for in terms of its constituent parts. Differently, my being Ted has more than one howness. But then, how do "I" come to know "Ted"? This matters because my attention to my "self" changes who "*I*" am, the "I" who is doing the attending. Attention, however, is not a thing, nor a brute fact, but rather, an intrinsic *way* in which Ted is able to relate with the "Big Other" (Belsey 2002), with others and their world.

Phenomenology is not a conceptually easy philosophical movement to understand. For instance, in giving his vague expression to the notion of lived-experience as an immediate awareness of what he called "sensibility", Merleau-Ponty (1968:215), posits quite a tangled argument about his understanding of sensibility which he describes as:

> ...that medium in which there can be a being without it having to be posited: the sensible appearance of the sensible, the silent persuasion of the sensible is Being's unique way of manifesting itself without positivity, without ceasing to be ambiguous and transcendent... The sensible is that; this possibility to be evident in silence, to be understood implicitly.

As we can note, Merleau-Ponty's view of lived experience and sensibility is mired in the mulch in what is generally referred to as "thick–descriptions". He uses philosophy's own "in-house" language, an ever emerging kind of language requiring specialist, key-terms, and thus a special kind of knowledge The kind of knowledge that arose out of the early study of phenomenology by Husserl (1920), a mathematics-inspired philosopher, and Heidegger (1971), an existentialist and social critic, whose thoughts and ideas about the intrinsic nature of the mental state, and nature respectively, will be further explained in Chapters 4 and 5.

In this chapter I have given a brief historical summary of play because the act "playing" allows one to be indulgent in understanding. Playfulness is an essential pedagogical ingredient. Adopting a pedagogic temperament or disposition must rely upon, for its freedom of thought, not thought directed from an external source, but because as Montaigne in his "*Essair*" writes:

> …It should be noted that children at play are not playing about; their games should be seen as their most serious-minded activity.
>
> [1580, ed. M. Rat, cited in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 1998: 480]

I identify play as a concept with rich potential for "self" illumination, a sphere in which well being rather that subjective exclusion can be achieved through the practice of contemplation. I point to the significance of play in a process of learning. Play is not something that is an add-on bonus, utilized as a relief from a PE lesson. It is not an injection of pleasure and enjoyment to sweeten and close a lesson. Rather play *is* one of pedagogy's universal features. Play tended to be underplayed in PE's modern, professional culture. It was a teaching culture dealing with binary oppositions between subject and object as unbridgeable connections. It was a culture conveying the belief that human beings are the result of structures that escape their self awareness, disguising rather than exposing their core dispositional meaning.

ML is about tracing whatever residue of meaning that lies in the signifier, in order for its initiator and receptor to be placed in communicative touch with each other. It demands careful interpretation and transposing of their respective key tenets and compelling premises. The dissertation's opening phase focuses on archeologically digging into some crucial limitations to learning in PE's past profession. Its critique of modern PE's systemic approach is completed in the next chapter. The dissertation's closing phase offers a more comprehensive direction for movement educators to be able to validate their profession as a *bona fide* education discipline in its own right. It conveys PE in the light of its inherently responsive survival to live a healthy and reverential life style, by not trivializing movement and by attending more closely to language's subtle nuances.

In essence, then, I am moving attention away from the *physical* in Physical Education, to the *education* in PE. I focus on unpacking the learning resources that can be made realizable when a person performs a physical action and then reflects upon that "event". Moving acts can be studied cognitively [epistemology] and emotionally [ontology]. And it is with the understated interplay between these two domains of learning that the thesis's introductory chapters reveal. I want my 10 year old "friend" who said "nobody said nuffink about de learnin bit" to be able to live inside movement, and tell others what it was like for him.

This is what pedagogy is about. It is about folklore storytelling, but the advantage here is that the author and narrator has a live gathering of listeners who are benevolently invited to contribute to that changing of that story. We, PE's missionaries, need to set out our private "wares", our personalities, our posture towards life, our blessing in being physically fit, in a playful manner which does not cause offence. We offer an array of symbols, gestures, or sounds which represent exchange currencies with another being. Our "commodities" are left open for another to ponder about, prefer and profess about, or reject. The decision making, the choosing or options opened by one participant speaker to another is left open. Such are the animating links which connect signifier-knower with those "to-be" signified-learners.

Pedagogy is about linking many forms of relationships. Some of which are simple and easy to understand. Others are obscure and perplexing. It is with the concealed links of pedagogy that ML unveils. In its bridging or connecting process, there lies a delicate, interminable balancing act. It is an act during which an addressor is invested with the responsibility to know what mode of knowledge one should disseminate, when one is "au fait" with what is morally correct to attend to, whilst simultaneously leaving other relevant issues concealed from one's listener. How does one begin to cope with adjusting to such an imbalance of knowing what, when, and why one should say something, or better remain silent, in one's lesson, and with one's learner? There is no prescribed system that can serve as a recipe to become a pedagogue, as "Iago" seems to have expected. One must either be blessed with a certain dispositional nature, or, become familiar and intimately acquainted with the

use of pedagogy's vitalizing elements, which I identify in Chapter 6 as bringing into harmony the purpose and prudence of the arts of educating. To study and inhabit the arts of how one can become pedagogically fit is one of ML's ambitions.

Chapter Three   New Modes of Learning

Introduction: Forms of teaching

This chapter interlaces early educational models with the three progressive phases of PE's professional linguistic development. In the decades between 1950 and 1980, the study of educational theory and practice enjoyed intense academic research (Bollnow 1982; Bolin 1988; Martens 1987). This upsurge of scholarly interest in "education" and "learning" was to benefit the PE profession who copied a number of prototype teaching models that resulted from this intellectual growth. I shall explain three of these models, (i) the impression; (ii) the child-centred; and (iii) the rule model. The PE profession too readily adopted all three forms of these models, so that eventually there came a need to discard the professional disadvantages and limitations of these models and then to synthesise their benefits to enhance both the process of teaching and its reciprocal dependency, in order to become more integral to the art of learning-to-learning. Kantian (1781; 1998) ideas of categories of understanding will also be reviewed briefly. That is, his concepts of how the mind organises reality, enabling us to make sense of experience. These include space, time, causality and substance, which he called "a priori concepts".

My first two chapters have claimed that modern PE's ratiocination was assumed to justify practices and beliefs associated with such definitive charactertistics of "human nature" and activities as philosophy, science, language, art and movement, due to its over reliance on a particular conception of "reason" and on verifying facts to plan regimented routines. It conveyed our human existence in terms of the application of brain or intellect. It aligned its professional consciousness with Kantian categories of knowledge, but without regard to emotion or sensibility of any kind of consideration for embodied sensuousness, as is the emerging trend in contemporary PE (Austin 2007; Bain 1992; Zakus & Malloy 1996; Qualley 1997).

These introductory chapters identify ML's aims are to gain a better understanding to their own and to each correspondent's different PE experiences. I conceive ML as an untested approach to learning about how to learn in PE. I suggest it triggers a

readiness to learn when each observed and performed encounter becomes the source of self-identity. It ventures to move beyond the boundaries of the *methodology* [a guideline system for solving a problem, with specific components such as phases, tasks, methods, techniques and tools] of the human sciences by reaching out for embodied insights into the conduct of life. ML tries to correct false thinking about what false thinking *is*: a tenuous, tangential realm of revelations which always seem to lie beyond their methodological self-consciousness, but which implicitly "*connect*" one's emerging selfhood to the totality of our experiences. This connection is partly manifested in language, which, in Chapters 4-7, is not in any sense characterised as personal or private; we merely borrow others' words. But then, individuals can alter language. Language comes alive to accompany us and place us in company with others, as long as others adopt their changes. What after all do great poets, philosophers, and scientists do but change our vocabulary? But then, language can also die. The professional issue PE comes to confront is how far its practices should let its modern language impose limits on what it is possible to think, hence, what it is possible to do and be.

Significantly, movement educators who lack the capacity for critical reflective thought and informed judgment are unable to confirm their own professional status as educators. They also leave exposed their own sense of vulnerability to others, including their "learners". In Chapter 8, I view the process of teacher education as an initiation, an overture into teaching, pedagogy, and beyond, as a *rite de passage* into a deeper awareness of the phenomenon of PE. Continuing to live with my own guilt, with the shallowness of my philosophical background, my naïve inadequacy as a supervisor was put to the test when I was unable to help "Iago", at that time, to understand why his lessons demonstrated how easy it is for the oppressor to become the oppressed.

In this chapter, and unswervingly throughout this thesis, intense caution is called for PE professionals who rely only on replicating the use of established teaching models. The use of teaching "models" tend to deceive us to construct all "relations" between subordinate ends and an ultimate end on the basis of a relation which remains essentially instrumental. They tend to stifle the vibrant energy required to

animate learning processes. In the opening two chapters I began to call on PE specialists to help learners to find a way into understanding the "meaning" of movement, with the resolve to try to place themselves, as experienced movers by way of treating others, in the caring way one wishes to be treated. In its eventual effect, I want to use PE enterprises as a language's medium through which I place myself by way of imagining being another being. I forward PE as a way of attuning one's self awareness to movement by comparing similarities and differences which may resonate or contrast with another's description of movement.

This is the key task facing educators. Modern PE educators generally learnt about themselves and their professional skills as they devoted their lived-through and judicious knowledge of movement and life for the benefit of those who follow them. Modern PE tended to treat its active learners in a "passive" way, that is to say, passive to activating the thinking, experiencing beings, beings that is who exist in a state of happenings. We all fall into different moods (Freud, 1961). We assume we all perceive the world through a spectrum of lenses as Fetters (1978) claims when the mixing of sport and myth offers participants opportunities to imagine themselves as heroes. We ourselves nurture different frames of thought (Leach & Moon, 1999). The idea of "ourselves" is perceived as existing in an ever changing experience of transition and transformation is the premise that Scheffler (1973) adopted to map out the early prototypes of teaching's education models.

In this chapter, for the reader to get the flavour of what PE teaching was like some decades ago, I summarise some of these models' strengths and weaknesses, their conventions and limitations as Scheffler (1973) reviewed them. They were adopted unchallenged and digested whole by the PE profession. It was a teaching set against an orthodox backcloth dominated by "technicism's" ideology. Critics accused its teaching of being knowledge-bound but wisdom-bare, because it had disdain for the unpredictable, and invested a premium on the harsh ambition of detached objectivity (Place 1956; Bain 1989; Dewar and Horn 1992; Sparkes 1992; Crum 1997). Modern PE teachers, subordinated to institutional bureaucracy and abstract theories, seldom spoke the language of transcendence as occurs between the act of *inscription* and

that of *description*. It created an *impasse* between unexplained series of gaps separating pedagogic idealism from technical realism.

Technicism reflects not scientific thinking but scientific "misunderstandings" of the nature of science. Such misunderstandings, which were widely perpetrated in PE, stem from a more or less Baconian (1996) view of science as a matter of observing nature with a pre-suppositionless mind, spotting irregularities, hypothesising that they are laws and testing them empirically, so that in due course a body of generalisations about nature accumulates which both explain phenomena and afford us control over them. By its very nature, technicism cuts knowledge off from experience by producing generalizations and technical principles abstracted from the early attempts to analyse the processing of experience.

Empiricism and Rationalism

Technicism is an over reliance or overconfidence in technology as a benefactor of society. Put differently, empiricism is a way of looking at the world which construes human understanding as confined within the limits of human experience. Straying outside those limits one falls victim to scepticism or, eventually, loses oneself in nonsense. However, empiricism began to come of age as a philosophy when it was able to align itself with a comprehensive theory of language, when theory brings to speech our unreflective self-absorbed understanding of movement, unaware of itself, until pointed out by significant others. It was only in this merging, when it felt able to determine what can and cannot be *said* that empiricism was able to challenge rationalism in what was proved to be its weakest spot. Rationalism must assume that humans possess ideas the significance of which outstrips the limits of experience which might provide their *content*. Among such ideas were those of "God", "substance" and "self", upon which the rationalist world view had raised its foundations. It is this assumption that the new philosophy of language, [its poststructuralist version] was to deny.

A falling out over unity

According to both Gadow (1982), and Geertz (1988), prior to the introduction and radical views of the new philosophy of language into PE's schooling practices, its founding philosophical "conscious temperament" relied heavily upon Kantian thinking. Kant (1963) was interested in what experience of reality can tell us about metaphysics and the area of knowledge that lies beyond physical reality, forwarding the belief that we cannot trust our senses to tell us directly about reality.

Basically, what Kant believed in was that the mind and the rest of reality are part of the same unified picture. His mind and reality vision conceived as two sides of the same coin inspired a number of other philosophers like Fichte (2000), Hegel (1977), Schelling (1936), and Schopenhauer (1999) to look at things in terms of a transcendental unity, an idea of a synergy of understanding relating the mind to the word, linking what may befall us as something of which we are unaware which impacts upon us beyond that of our direct experience.

Hence, Kant described categories of thought as "concepts" enabling us to understand the phenomenal world. For Kant, our experience of "reality" can tell us about the area of knowledge that lies *beyond* physical reality. By contrast, Hume (1975) strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. Hume argued that even though we must depend upon our senses to gain knowledge, we cannot trust them very far. Hume was sceptical of the mind's abilities, whilst others like Leibniz (1989) were too confident in it.

Kant attempted to show that even though we cannot trust our senses to tell us directly about reality, our senses do tell us much of how reality "appears" to us. And the appearance of reality is not just guess-work as Hume suggested. Reality, for Kant, points beyond experience to a transcendent unity of the way the world seems and what the world actually is. Kant distinguished between what the world is and the way it appears. The appearance of things he called "*phenomena".* The actual world he called the "*noumena*": the "thing in itself." Kant said we cannot know the noumena

directly, but we can apprehend it, based on the way we perceive the phenomenal world.

On the one hand, Kant maintained that we judge reality by its cover. Hume, on the other hand, said that nothing can be known *without* experience, and that we need to make judgments about our experience in order to make sense of it. These judgments, though, are not reliable, since they do not come from experience, but from habit, convention and human nature. These judgments depend on the position from which we make them. They are not true independently of who sees them and how they are seen. Hume suggested that even though we cannot prove these ideas, we cannot do without them. He argued that the mind has to rely on "*connections*" it makes on its own that are not simply based on real objects.

Kant tried to solve this problem by *reversing* Hume's "empirical attitude" towards knowledge. Rather than saying knowledge must conform to objects, he said objects [the noumenal world] must conform to knowledge [the phenomenal world]. According to Kant, objects get organized by the mind. By analogy, we can think of the noumenal world as the yeast and the phenomena we experience as bread. Kant says we can never experience the yeast directly. For example, all we can know directly is the bread, which we have sliced up by our understanding. The bread "slicers" of understanding are "concepts" including space, time, substance, and causality, and, for Kant, these bread slicers are called "categories of understanding". We do not have direct experience of these concepts. Instead, *through* them, we experience that things that we *say* have substance, exist in time and so on. Kant called these "*a priori* concepts", which, he claimed, come before experience. They make experience possible. As a result, they are not concepts that people have made up; they existed before our own existence, before we ever gave them any thought. But they are necessary in order for us to be able to understand them.

Kant asserted that what actually happens to us is that we get experience *from* knowledge, and later, proceed to think about ethical questions or issues to do with morality. He tried to find an objective basis for moral ideas. This debate continues as to whether there can be an objective basis for morality, and also whether objectivity

is possible at all. Many believe morality, like everything else, depends on one's own perspective. Kant adopted the distinction Hume made between ideas and about what exists, and ideas and what ought to be. Hume said that we cannot draw conclusions about what ought to be, based on our knowledge of what exists. To deal with this problem, Kant came up with the view that there are objective categories or moral thought. He referred to moral thinking as practical reason or reasoning about how we *should* act. He contrasted practical reason or the act of reasoning about what exists, and came up with the idea of a moral law called the "categorical imperative", which according to Kant, holds true for everybody and forms the basis of our "practical reason," or moral understanding.

Kant's magnum opus, the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" (1781), aimed to unite mind, nature, and morality, or reason with experience [our lived through perceptions] to move beyond what he took to be failures of traditional philosophy and metaphysics. He hoped to end an age of speculation where objects outside experience were used to support what he saw as futile theories, while opposing the scepticism and idealism of thinkers such as Descartes (in Bloom 2003) , and Hume (1975). Kant maintained that one ought to think autonomously, free of the dictates of authority. His work reconciled many of the differences between rationalists and empiricist traditions of the 18th century.

Broadly speaking, Kant sought a mid-line position between a "two-world" interpretation, he held the view that epistemology had serious limitations, but humans are able to transcend the bounds of our own mind, meaning that we can acccess the "thing-in-itself". We have two contrasting interpretations of the thing-in-itself. One is the dual-object view, according to which the thing-in-itself is a distinct entity from the phenomena it gives rise to. The other is the dual-aspect view, according to which the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it-appears to us are two "sides" of the same thing. This view is supported by the textual fact that most occurrences of the phrase "things in themselves" are shorthand for the phrase, "things considered in themselves". Although we cannot *see* things apart from the way we do see them, we can think of them apart from our mode of senisibility [perception], thus making the

things themselves a kind of noumenon or object of thought: closing the gap between what people think and the way the world actually is.

Kant, however, also speaks of the thing in itself or *"transcendendal object"* as the product of the human-rooted understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters have argued that the thing in itself does not represent a separate "ontological" domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of understanding alone and is known as the two-aspect view. Kant himself did not like this conception of reality, but it had the advantage of closing gaps between what people think and what the world actually is. The idealists after Kant tended to see mind and the world as one and the same.

Hegel (in Plant 1983) drew on Kant's conception of categories of understanding that give shape to reality. For Hegel though, unlike Kant, the categories keep changing and tend to conflict with one another. Moreover, Hegel suggested these categories work themselves out through time. They are constantly developing and constantly in a state of flux with their opposites. Hegel refers to this process as "dialectic". He gives an example that shows how his dialectic works. He gives "being" as an example of a thesis. Being's antithesis is "nothingness". As being and nothing work out their differences, they resolve into synthesis, "becoming". Hegel modified Kant's idealism by taking history into account in trying to describe ideal [rational] reality.

The study's first two chapters claim that modern PE's ratiocination, its over reliance on "reason", on verifying facts to plan regimented routines, was assumed also to justify practices and beliefs closely associated with such definitive charactertistics of "human nature" and activities such as philosophy, science, language, art and movement. It conveyed our human existence in terms of the application of brain or intellect. It aligned its professional conscious with Kantian categories of knowledge, but, without regard to emotion or sensibility of any kind of consideration for embodied sensuosuness, as is the emerging trend in contemporary PE (Austin 2007; Bain 1992; Zakus & Malloy 1996; Qualley 1997).

In contrast with Kant

Sensuousness is when we participate in the spontaneous rhythms and responses of the body and are open to the joys and delights, pain, suffering and stress of bodily experiences. It implies an ability to relax, where too much thinking about a decision makes that decision more difficult to resolve, that the nature of play, its passive frivolousness allows our "otherness" to meet its active seriousness, its ecological side of self, suspending the controlling and driving impulse-impetus of the rational mind and will. Sensuality, in contrast, is what happens when the body is driven by the mind and used as an instrument of pleasure for reasons found in one's "mood", or mental presence of mind. Sensuality, the state or quality of being sensually gratified, is the submission of the body to the driving, straining consciousness of the mind alienated from its embodiment. It is *not* the subjection of the mind to bodily impulses.

On the other hand, sensuousness refers to the "appreciativeness" of qualities perceived by the senses, and accompanies a mystical view of the world which attributes meaning and grace to matter. The opposed view of matter is seeing matter as a "thing-in-itself", so to speak, as a collection of physical "facts" and their interrelationships. It results from the segregation of the so-called "scientific" objective way of looking at things from our subjective perceptions. It resulted from the "scientific revolution" whose success stemmed from its ability to manipulate nature, to medically heal the human body, to render the body fit for movement.

In other words, when the body is reduced to physical "facts", as was happening in "Iago's" treatment of movement, then, his learner's sense experiences were also treated as mere physical objects and events, split off from "Iago's" own conscious awareness. Constantly depriving the moving act of any meaning or significant import for their experiential selves, his learners soon began to pose questions, to ask what was the "reasoning" behind their being directed to move in one way rather than another? The eventual consequence for learning to move was never discussed. "Iago" did not [could not] present the "content" of PE *as* an educational enterprise. He did not conceive movement actions as an act of learning, *as* an assisted

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guidance to fulfilling one's potential *as* a responsible person. He was unable to extend PE's experiences to his "movers'" life projects. Such altruistic concerns had not yet become a matter for "Iago", nor had the PE profession during the 1970s and early 1980s started to infuse these ambitions into its professional preparation programmes (Tinning 1985; Williamson 1986; Walker Pick and Macdonald 1991; Talbot 1998 b).

This is why Whitehead's (1992) launching of Physical Literacy was so vital. When we begin to align ourselves with the "Big Other", with other people and our ecological world, our mode of understanding is seen as "*related*" to human living [sentient being as the "point" of the world], sensuousness that which happens to us and not sensuality [that which we seek-out], becomes the appropriate key to changing our Kantian attitude from that of a separated mind and body and to that of our monist conception of embodiment.

Federation Internationale d'Education Physique (FIEP)

This monist view complements that of the Federation Internationale d'Education Physique's (FIEP) 1978 conference "theme". It called for a fusion between Western attitudes' design on identifying causal influences, with the Eastern confluencial temperament, which is oriented to accept that with which befalls us, to cope with fate. Pierre Seurin, in his Presidential Speech, held in Taipei and in my personal discussion with him later that evening, and subsequently with my colleague John Andrews, FIEP's next President from 1978 to 1984, was calling for a convergence of ideas between what he referred to as Western "selflessness", and Eastern "groundlessness". And it is with combining their global vision for delivering PE with "Iago's" lack of personal perception that I turn to ML to unmask pedagogy's traditional but still hidden protocol.

There are parallels here between PE facing a dilemma parodied in Jane Austen's *(1962)* "Sense and Sensibility, in which two of three sisters manifest starkly different personalities. One epitomises prudence and self-control, the other embodies emotion and enthusiasm. They all experience love, romance, and heartbreak. The

philosophical resolution of the novel is ambiguous: the reader must decide whether sense and sensibility [sensitivity] have truly merged. The novel's ambiguity is somewhat akin to that faced by the PE profession towards the closing half of last century. That is, should it maintain its stark distinction between natural and humanistic science, or merge sense and sensitivity?

Sense and sensitivity

Sensuality is the result of objectifying the body as a physical "thing" to be "used" and thus deprived of its mythical meaning, dimly held between the sacred and the secular. Consonant with this issue were the teaching method approaches and their early models I next refer to in this Chapter. Teaching methods were primarily concerned with how the body and how teaching "works", rather than addressing what was seriously at stake, learning about human nature through PE, and to what "meaning" these models subscribed. Consequently, teaching was viewed in quantitatively good mechanical terms rather than in those qualities that render others as good human beings, appreciated as human communicators and communicants.

What I pursue in this thesis is unlike the concept of objectivity as defined from a modern, positivistic perspective. I seek to expand on the notion of objective reasonableness which fosters a capacity for commitment, for altruistic caring, and shared feelings which are sympathetically viewed to protect and nurture the learner's sense of well-being: respecting another's position. Striving for reasonable objectivity is the process of considering another's opinions and demonstrating tolerance for another's viewpoint. Objectivity, in this sense, involves an examination of our *own* biases and capacities to exercise restraint. It is the ability to realise our own limitations to fully understand an alternative position while also attempting to meet another's meaning in the very act of conversation and to reconsider its merits.

Trawling for knowledge

By scanning through three key education models, called the impression, insight, and role model, I begin to set the foundational structure for my ML practice which is not a

procedure answerable to theory, but rather, an accumulation of different ways to exercise one's experienced professional experiences. For example, whilst Mosston and Ashworth's "Spectrum of PE Teaching" became more learner-oriented, nevertheless, its teaching practices failed to answer certain critical questions *of* the teacher. For example, what sort of quality learning should one aim to achieve? In what does such learning consist? How shall one strive to achieve it? Such questions are, respectively, "normative", "epistemological", "ontological", and empirical in import. And the answers that are provided for them give point and substance to the emerging shape of education in terms of progressively meaningful enterprises as delivered *by* PE professionals *for* its incumbent learners.

Rather than address all such three questions separately, dealing directly with each abstractly and explicitly, I shall employ a more succinct, collective and genealogical [or ontological] approach through a brief consideration of these three prototype teaching models that were to emerge from the 1970s onwards In all three models, the primary purpose is to trace in each the respective model's features, which are deemed as the grounding which helped to reshape and re-*think PE's* professional practice. More importantly, from the mid 1970s to the present day, these innovative teaching models and ideas served to change PE's own conscious temperament as a teaching profession. These models promote patterns of thinking which *direct* others' source of knowledge.

Impression model

The desired end result of this "impression" model led to an accumulation in the learner of basic elements fed in from without, organised and processed in standard ways, but, in any event, *not* generated by the learner. The strength of this position is that it encouraged collection of information by providing accumulative growth of knowledge as a public and recorded impression.

At best, it was a method to *transmit informative* knowledge. Such a learning enterprise does not however, qualify as an "*educational*" encounter. It precludes an explanation of the way the learner is able to use that information or objective

knowledge, let alone innovate with it. Perhaps more to the point, this teaching model discouraged the recipient from doing so. Aptly described in the realm of PE as a "body-engineering" model, it was essentially designed to produce teacher-dependent pupils, rather than independent learners.

Nevertheless it has certain educationally legitimate points. For example, in some way or other knowledge is acknowledged to rest upon the gathering of experience. Therefore, in the process of educational planning, the richness and variety of the beginner's relatively unadulterated experience should be attended to as a critically important consideration. In other words, when it came to teaching movement, the teacher also had to try to bear in mind how the movement "dweller", its resident, might be guided into a thoughtful description of that encounter. The embodied, felt, difficulties one is likely to encounter when performing a disciplined action, [a swim, a climb, a dance, for instance,] in addition to commenting about its potential fascination, indifference, or alienation was becoming addressed from the learner's point of view (Kretchmar 1994; Talbot 1998 a).

This mode or style of teaching however, suffered from fatal difficulties. It was considered impossible to substantiate. As Dewey (1916) claimed, the notion of receiving absolutely simple ideas and then transforming these abstractions through one's own "raw", mental powers, and then somehow improved upon them to achieve some means of understanding through physical exercise, implementing ideas in the play of physical movement. Dewey viewed this claim as "mythical", and myth, he argued, "converts history into nature". He said:

> …the supposed original faculties of observation, recollection, willing, thinking, …etc. are purely mythical. There are no such ready–made powers waiting to be exercised and thereby trained.
>
> (1916: 80)

This simplicity of the transformation of ideas is a "relative", not an absolute concept. It reflects a particular way for a particular person to analyse experience. In other words, the analyses of experience in terms of simplistic ideas are not given, but *occur* to us and are understood [re-made] in the manner by which we are able

individually to invest meaning in them. Whatever the learning in this teaching approach, it was not perceived to be generated by the learner.

A more fundamental criticism of this impression model is that the implicit conception of the growth of knowledge is "false". However conceived, knowledge is not achieved through any mind-exclusive operations for the processing of sensory particulars. Rather, knowledge is eventually embraced and variously relayed in language-use. I shall show that different forms of knowledge involve a convoluted conceptual network not derivable from sensory data alone, but, in the PE context of this thesis, knowledge is *imposed* upon our embodied senses. By its very nature, knowledge unpredictably emerges from conversations held between educator and learner. [I shall focus on this supposition from Chapter 5 onwards.] But, dialogue is *not* a characteristic of this impression model. Its style of communication is largely instructional in nature, directed as a monologue almost exclusively from teacher to pupil. In this model, only the PE teacher would be fully conversant with what he or she chooses to say, but the "impressed" meaning of the speaker's words was likely to offer little meaning to its audience.

This was a vital problem which Strawson (1970: 38) pointed out regarding education in general:

> …They both (teacher and pupil) need to be able to fit together each other's reports and stories into a single picture of the world.

Part of the knowledge gathering and filtering process is a creative and individualistic enterprise, and takes its agent's thoughts and ideas beyond the realm of simply collecting informative data. It involves gathering information not at random, but rather, in quite distinctive ways. Knowledge gathering involves such thoughtful concerns as the need for generalization, and for the postulation of entities. These substantial matters, as explained in Chapter 7, can only be brought to one's understanding by means of the astute deployment of analogies, similes, tropes, and metaphors. This "impression" model cannot be impressive in the general sense of the word since this term "impression" literally implies a capacity to excite, to entice the pupil's inclined feelings and attachments, all of which are deemed necessary for

creative and individualistic learning encounters. Clearly, in this teaching model, this is never the case.

All versions of this impression theory of teaching have this defect: they fail to make adequate room for radical innovation by, and on behalf of the incumbent movement learner. This is not surprising. As professionals, PE teachers find little time during their lesson [duty of care responsibilities] to feed into the pupil's mind all that we hope our pupils will learn as an eventual outcome of their own, accrued and enlightened, movement encounters. Furthermore, no career specialist can afford to construe, or translate word for word, the critical faculty as generated in standard ways out of the generally objective language they exercise. More to the point, they cannot set forth insight, understanding or new applications of their own accepted theories, nor propose new theories.

This, again, highlights the enormity of professional and personal issues that seem to arise, almost like a subterfuge, trapping the uninitiated career missionaries in the world of teaching, learning and its pedagogy in this large "chiasm" which I shall refer to as PE's "ludic-Rubicon". The unpacking of PE's "ludic-Rubicon", for now, can be thought of in general terms as something which happens to us during the act of movement, be it in an informal, playful, recreational, or a competitive and formal sporting context or, what occurs unexpectedly during our implementing a lesson plan. To better qualify and promote PE's educational credibility, closer attention to PE's striking encountered incidents was called for by Stones (1981), Woods (1985), and Sparkes (2002). All three writers aspired to infuse "researched knowledge" from different academic disciplines into PE's professional arena, including attempts to account for its unexplained "ludic-Rubicon".

Ludic Rubicon

I shall constantly draw the reader's attention to PE's unique "ludic-Rubicon" because I believe that the profession should be more serious in its education development. PE's education, I argue, is located by crossing this "Rubicon": the gap between natural and human science. I believe the profession should be more concerned with

delving further into the spectre of these series of "gaps", gaps which educationalists Witherall and Noddings (1995) and Winch (1998) began to address. In PE's context, these are "gaps" located between PE's parasitic necessity to gather theories from different academic disciplines, and those which inform its practice in how to deliver different forms of knowledge. They are gaps into which subjective concerns and objective issues had fallen (Whitson 1976; Jauss 1982; Turner 1992; Weiss 1999; Talbot 1998a; Torres 2003), and remained untouched. The most ambiguous of these gaps is that which disconnects subjective concerns from objective issues. To unpack this gap demands exploration and a re-planning of the curriculum input (Kirk 1989; Stones 1981; Ross 1994; Rink 1993) to which the impression model of teaching cannot begin to donate. By introducing ML's "literary inspired" linguistic praxis, I show how PE's human ideals, its potential values and learning benefits for the individual need not linger suppressed and concealed, as was the case in modern PE.

The insight or the child-centred model

The second model is called the "insight" teaching model. It is affiliated to the child-centred ideology. As opposed to the impression model, it denies the very possibility of conveying ideas and bits of knowledge to the pupil's mind. For the insight model, knowledge in this public "container" sense has nothing to do with the *process* of learning and teaching. As a consequential outcome to this educational enterprise [primarily concerned with nurturing the pupil's own expressive process of learning], the model represents a radically different approach to modernism's teacher focus. The model is centred almost entirely on 'behavioural objectives' mode of teaching. For PE specialists, its appeal involved the systematic analysis [and investigation] of human behaviour through controlled and naturalistic observation employing disciplined scientific application of mechanics to the body. It served PE well since it attempted to accomplish legitimate, objective conclusions through rigorous formulations and observation. It was favoured, but not critically reflected on, by the profession from the late 1930s to the 1970s. As Inoue (1987) and Hoyle and John (1995), as well as Harris (1983) were to note, the world of play, PE, and sport was not yet attuned to the "idea" of looking back upon its encounters.

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The premise of the "insight" teaching model is that insight defines and organises particular experiences. Insight points up significance for the beholder's awareness. Insight implies dealing with something within reach, intimately felt by the learner-agent and entails exploring one's *insight* into the very core values of one's understanding: one's meaning. This mode of "teaching" places understanding as its foundation. The model attends to the contextual setting and the proper occasions in terms of when to speak, or not. Knowledge, so this mode portrays, is such that it does not dismiss lightly the power of one's alleged vision. It more willingly pursues and guide's one's insightful reach into the open sphere, or cosmos of meaning.

The learner's or beholder's insight, in itself, however, cannot be dissected into simple sensory or verbal units that may be easily conveyed from one person to another. It can either be stimulated or prompted by much of what the teacher *does*. For example, the professional can display a technically complicated movement, and, by silent demonstration, the teacher's performed act may provide its "observing-audience" with information for their own consumption and benefit. Perhaps observers break up that movement into various "sections" and thus cue in their *own* perceived insights to try to interlace together their interpretation of the technique. With the onus falling upon a science-informed and calculated technique, movement's "meaning" is left to the mover's own insight and subsequent contemplation. The performer's encounter may have been mulled over, but later, whatever the revelations for its agent, they were still left aside, or outside the teacher's concern. The learner's own appraisal on one's own behalf could equally be acquired by reading about it, or be in Tokyo televiewing its performance at London's 2012 Olympics. In this teaching mode, if indeed any *insight* does occur, it extends beyond what is thus merely seen to be done. There is a difference between an event and its doing, and one's agency being "done-to".

Teaching in this mode is an attempt to simplify how one can learn "to move". It is a legitimate way of highlighting what are thought to be movement skill's important features and weaknesses. Nonetheless, this model again serves only to repeat the same weakness and limitations of the behavioural mode of teaching.

The expressive-process model

The "rule-model", is strong where the behavioural model is weakest. In its concern for the conservation of knowledge, the latter fails to do justice to innovation. The former addresses itself to the problem of *new* knowledge resulting largely from the teaching encounter. The latter emphasises flexible and manipulative fragments [micro/nano levels] at the *expense* of understanding; the former stresses primarily the acquisition of insight. The latter paid inordinate attention to externalised information; the former attached importance to first-hand inspection of different versions of "realities" by more fully acknowledging the necessity for the pupil to earn one's knowledge by one's own efforts. The central position held in this expressive-processing teaching style rests on the psychosomatic phenomenon, the mentally and embodied felt emotion of vision or glimpsed images of insightful knowledge. Encountering this teaching mode enables the learner to become involved in the knowledge's acquisition in terms of a more corroborated and insightful grasp, in knowledge's immanent nature.

According to this expressive "model", the learning process is concerned with taking up, or treating the pupil *as* a person, as another living "being, a being almost akin to the mature PE advocate; but who is less exposed to conflict between what is claimed to be "the known" and that which is yet to be "made known". Inevitably, therefore, as beginner-learner, the learner creates nothing less than a situation of conflict. A conflict always lies in need of resolution and thus involves wrestling with conceptual innovation. Certainly, my student teacher "Iago" found this aspect of inter-personal engagement disturbing. His inner sense of unease, manifested as a tense reaction, suggested that his *private* perception, his own image, his self-perception of his own being, should be concealed from others. The possibility here is that by over-revealing what happens to us during these excessive moments of austere loneliness, or exuberance and companionship, the teacher might find oneself in a state of mind to say more than one would like to say to another person.

Reviving the insight mode of teaching

Denied the insight that was to be revealed in post structuralism's linguistic analysis, modern PE found itself trying to bridge its professional concerns between the inexplicable realm of play and that of the beguiling world of sports whilst employing the language of science. The playful act was perceived only as an overture, a nursery phase offering individuals a menu of movement disciplines which they enjoyed or rejected.   At the turn of this century, delivering PE encounters faced a confusing state of affairs (Saunders & Oliver 2003; Rossi & Cassidy 2001). PE encounters left many unexplained "links" for its "mover". The "insight" model however, laid the grounding for what was later to be labelled the "expressive-process" model. During its prototype testing time, however, the learner's curiosity about one's movement experiences was left unattended to; regardless of whether it was dampened, or raised as to what movement may come to mean for him or her.

Pre -1980s PE sidelined the phenomenon of "curiosity", laid to one side its attention to movement's oddity, its ambiguous *affect* on us. But, for Berlyne (1966: 889) the notion of "human inquisitiveness" suggests that movement's affect occurs when the subject finds oneself exposed to novel, surprising, ambiguous, problem-raising or otherwise conflict-inducing experience, as is ever the case in movement. The very distraction, or, the allure of curiosity, he says, impels the subject to:

> …seek external stimulation containing the information that he needs to remove his uncertainties and resolve his problem or else to engage in *ideational processes* that will lead to the solution of the problem.

It was his play on Berlyne's "ideational process", that William Taylor, (1986) in St Paul's and St Mary's annual professional lecture entitled, "*Improving Teaching – Can We*?" that caught my imagination.

Drawing on the use of imagination not only invites intuition, it also exalts personal expression, and enables one to experience delight in the eloquence with which the learner's vision has been re-presented, both in the gesture of the movement, and subsequently, in the use of one's language to describe how to convey that gesture.

Clearly, this teaching model does not specify the behaviour which the pupil is to acquire after engaging in such a learning enterprise. Nevertheless, it invites both teacher and learner to explore, defer, or focus on issues that are of peculiar interest or import that serve to illuminate their mutual inquiries. Such an educational encounter may lead both teacher and pupil into a discussion that is undertaken not for the sake of coming to some conclusion, but rather, as Hampshire (1960: 165) says:

> …for the sake of what one might see on the way.

Associated with this type of insightful learning is knowledge gained, but, which is *also* understood in the form of a striking insight, a sudden eye-opener, like a surprising infusion of thought, or feeling: an inspiration. Foe me, inspirations come more when I am running, rather than when I am imprisoned between chair and computer. A moment ago I did not realize, but, now I do. I am indeed a slow learner.

After my retirement from the University of Gloucestershire, I had time to read such text as Tanner's (1999) "*Schopenhauer*", Suzuki's (2006) "*Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind*", and Frayn's (2007) "*The Human Touch*". I became over-involved in the author's text. Condensing and recomposing others' knowledge for the sake of squeezing their wisdom into my thesis, led me to fall into a deeper quagmire, out of which I am now trying to re-surface: to make their knowledge as that of my own. Importantly, what I do sketch in this thesis is a profile of how learning comes about. I cannot learn by myself. Others before me have done most of the hard work. They have already trodden the path of education, and, as I now "see", have made the process of crossing into the realm of knowledge more accessible for their followers.

And this is what the introduction of ML into PE's practices tries to put on offer. I conceive ML as unpacking the notion of pedagogy and as a guide to move beyond the systemic sphere of teaching to enter into that of the more diverse and challenging realm of offering experiences from which learning can be realized. ML is my way of coping with the hitherto hidden realm of crossing from modern PE's recipe to teach to that of contemporary PE's search making movement more accessible as a form of knowledge.

The evaluative mode is still evolving

Also referred to as the "rule-mode", this evaluative-process model of teaching reaches back, as it were, to enquire of the mover how moving "events" may have *affected,* or influenced him or her, and what impressions did these acts reveal*.* This processing–model of teaching touches on the solitude and confidentiality of one's emotions which can either improve trust in its participants, or inhibit interpersonal-relations; this is what Westerners casually refer to as subjective concerns.

Subjective concerns are personal concerns. Personal concerns are always vulnerable to preconceived notions [entrenched but unconscious bias] we all seem to possess. But, our personal apprehensions, our anxieties are susceptible to hidden prejudice which may lead to further confusion, rather than help lead us towards more indicative answers. Disquiet and dismay lead to consternation. Worry leads to divergent speculation [panic] rather than to convergent conclusions. Such is the nature of learning. Learning is accounted for, eventually, only by *giving way* to what Thomas (1983: 34) refers to as "certain leaps of faith". According to this ascertaining model, the distinctiveness of knowing is characterised in terms of a simplistic vision, or unsubstantiated insight into meaning, which, in itself, lacks credibility. This is because it is impossibly simple. In other words, the notion that what is crucial in knowledge relies on the gift of a vision of all underlying versions of "realities", an unending process of consulting what is found in leaps of faith in the mind. It is far too straight-forward and reveals this teaching mode at its *weakest.*

Too reliant on reason?

The primary philosophical emphasis of the rule model is on *reason*, and reason is always a matter of abiding by general rules or principles. The concepts of principles, reasons and consistency go hand in hand and apply both in the cognitive judgement of beliefs, and, the moral assessment of conduct. They define a general concept of rationality. A rational person is one who is consistent in thought and in action, adheres to impartial and generalisable principles, freely chosen as binding upon oneself. On this position, rationality is an essential aspect of human dignity. In its

deed, in its intended use, the rational goal of humanity is to construct a society in which such dignity shall blossom into a society, so ordered, as to adjudicate rationally the affairs of free rational agents. From this specifically Kantian point of view, [that the derivation of God emanates from the human desire for the existence of moral values], Kant held the idea that it is the mind that organises knowledge or reality. That is, the mind, exclusively, enables us to make sense of experience. Our body plays no part in how we make sense. It follows, therefore, that the principal purpose of education is to develop character in the broadest sense, namely principled mind-induced thought and action, in which the dignity of the human being is manifest.

Beyond the impression model, the mere receiving and the stringing together of information, and beyond the insight model, the exercise of cognitive judgement, the pupil must satisfy a further condition in order to know the proposition expressed by the teacher's statements or the belief in question. This condition involves the capacity for a principled assessment of reasons bearing on justification of the belief in question. That is, the pupil must *earn* the right to attain confidence in their own belief by acquiring the capacity to make a reasonable case for the belief in question. However, as a condition of knowledge it is not yet sufficient for the listener to have been explicitly taught. What is generally expected of the pupil is that their making and course of actions are evidenced in the ability to construct fresh or alternative arguments. The pupil should manifest their capacity to generate one's reasoned argument, to advance innovative argument, rather than replicate stale arguments earlier stored, and merely inculcated.

According to this rule mode of PE delivery, teaching should be geared not simply to the transfer of *information,* nor even to the development of *insight*, that is, to the hidden *inculcation* of principled judgement and conduct. Mosston and Ashworth's positivistic and epistemological teaching "spectrum" was founded on the logic that eventually its advocates could gradually retreat, "distance oneself" and in time, even be removed from the mover's learning-of-movement enterprises. In this way, teachers assumed to an overseer position, whilst "movers" attained sufficient knowledge to teach themselves about movement. The classroom interaction was

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systematically and strategically simplified in order to construct an irreducible "objective" set of causal relationships between teaching styles and learning outcomes. Unwittingly, therefore, it uncoupled personal concerns from movement's cultural settings, largely because the entire "scheme" stalled when it came to the level of *a communiqué*, of issuing statements only. It did not reach the level of inter-communication: how to do things with words, and thus to engage in critique. In this case it is not sufficient for PE "communicators" to simply tell pupils what to do by giving out an informative message as if it is a statement released by a public agency, sent from an anonymous source to an anonymous receiver. Nothing is exchanged since it is a request or an order between what effectively remains: two strangers who remain unfamiliar with each other and their respective worlds.

Proposed differences between PL's connections and ML's sharing

Physical literacy is PE's most recent response to postmodernism's initiatives was that of the highly acknowledged introduction of Whitehead's emerging concept of Physical Literacy (PL) (2010: 64-66). She described PL as:

> …a capability [competence and aptitude] the understanding of which demands an appreciation that spans both pre-reflective and reflective aspects of human embodied functioning; that is, both the embodiment-as-lived and the concrete embodied form.(p.64)

> …A new discourse is needed to move on from language forms commonly used in Western culture that seem only to refer to our embodied dimension, that is, as an object.(p.66)

PL calls on PE's profession to come to an understanding that humans do have an "embodied dimension" that functions on at least two "levels" of perception, but that these "levels" are not, as yet, part of everyday language in Western culture. Westerns are not used to referring to certain aspects of our human condition, to what, for example, can be spoken about in terms like "being the body". The "body", Whitehead points out, is classified as a noun, a thing, an "it", and it will be a huge task to change both the appreciation of our embodied dimension and the habitual way in which "it" is referred to in our common parlance.

PL was conceived as a guide for parents and children [0-14 years] to become more acquainted to "read" the environment and make appropriate decisions. Its advocated practices proactively seek to encourage novices to move confidently and with some control in a wide range of physical activity situations. Its prime ambition is to nurture a foundational PE philosophy for a life-long participation and a committed belief to attain the best of one's ability. PL offers a sense of harmony between participation and excellence in sport-like activities. Ideally, the notion of physical literacy is developed *prior* to the adolescent growth spurt (Higgs C., Balyi, I. & R. Way 2008).

PL's multi-disciplined professional learner treatment tries to prepare all its participants with an imaginary and attractive panoramic "*concept*" of physical activity as differently encountered through the many phases of one's life-course. PL is conceived as a novice mover confidently sharing with experienced knower a search for something that is "appropriate" to each learner's physical endowment. Whitehead defines PL (2012:11-12) as:

> … the motivation, confidence, physical competence, knowledge and understanding to maintain physical activity throughout the lifecourse.

The coming to understand something about all the above features is considered to be of vital importance to the individual if, as Whitehead maintains, one is to grow and develop as a physically and morally "well-balanced" embodied being.

PL explores for significant meaning(s) by "languaging movement". For now, "languaging movement" refers to PE specialists subjecting their mover agent's phenomenological [personal] account to hermeneutic treatment addressing the speaker's unconscious and social [deprived or prospering] "situatedness". Languaging movement is a notion critical to this thesis to which I shall refer and further develop throughout the ensuing chapters.

As praxis, PL further seeks to rationalise *why* one's allegiance to daily exercise should be perceived as a lifelong commitment. Purposefully adopting close attention to our embodied dimensions, PL invites a "reading" into as a literary form of

movement interpretation; as a way of linking a caring empathy with others and the local environment.

For example, Whitehead perceives a physical literate either as being blessed with a dispositional trait and/or having achieved a nurtured ability to capitalize on one's self and another's innate movement potential to contribute to the quality of life. When exposed to PL's personal treatment practices, the participant movement learner is encouraged to develop (a) one's own ability to identify and *articulate* the essential qualities that influence the effectiveness and appeal of their personal physical performance, and (b) an understanding of the principles of embodied health, with respect to the basic aspects such as exercise, sleep and nutrition.

On the other hand, and in direct contrast, "physical illiteracy" is a concept which, according to Whitehead (2012: 7), perpetuates a dualistic *attitude* in those who tend to minimize their physical task. A "physical illiterate" finds little attraction to perform what is perceived as extraneous and intimidating activities. Hence, one avoids any involvement in physical activity in all situations whenever alternatives are possible in order to guard against failure or humiliation which negatively creates a sense of low-esteem.

PL's underdeveloped guidance

As conveyed by Whitehead, to become physically literate is possible "irrespective" of one's motile capacity or practical body-proficiency so that ultimately, one may still develop an appetite for PE's potential linkage to life. PL aspires to expose some educational deficiencies in Modern PE's "hidden curriculum" and acknowledges the professions' need to understand and respect new "literary" forms of knowledge operating in speech acts as veiled injustice and inequitable learner treatment by PE's missionaries. Nevertheless, these linguistic knowledge impediments and learning restrictions are not explicitly publicised and challenged as a way of conveying PL's message to understand human actions which nurture self confidence.

My thesis differs from PL because ML aspires to nourish one's self-value and propositional knowledge, *and* emphasizes the necessity for learners to be able to *cope* with and gain *respect* for one's own "motile capacity. Furthermore, what PL has not been addressed is the veiled way language "itself" operates. To appreciate one's physical capacity compels PE's language to be revivified. It is to clarify PL's underdeveloped "literary" and tangential messages that I introduce ML. The role of language use in PL is to advance PE as an educational and personally beneficial enterprise. This ambition is repeatedly stressed by Whitehead. Yet, what has not been addressed is the potential ambiguity which language use may create to hinder its correspondents' learning experiences.

As professional communicative practices, both PL and ML appreciate the need to generate empathy with one's learner's "motile-capacity". Complimenting the learner for one's physical prowess is one thing. Even so, when it comes to a learner's "limited-motile" skills, then, as Whitehead's PL acknowledges, PE enterprises can create non-receptive experiences of social and personal alienation. I proffer ML as a refined linguistic way to alleviate movement as a self-negation enterprise.

In effect, PL's practices do not attempt to "more directly" address what I have labeled as PE's "ludic Rubicon". Again, what I mean by referring to PE's "ludic Rubicon" is when, (i) in the act of moving, its resident "in-dweller" finds oneself swamped in an ambiguous experiential state of mind, (ii) one can temporarily encounter a telling loss of "self awareness". Seemingly one is showered with endless signals by one's thoughts, ideas, values, impressions and perceptions, all obscured by many as yet unexplained "knowledge gaps". These gaps may befall us in PE encounters. They hovering in-between theoretical and practical knowledge. They become vaguely apparent to us as residing in-between abstract, subjective concerns and material, objective issues. Trying to cope with their overwhelming nature can hinder [dislodge and fragment] self learning and learning between experienced addressor and naïve addressee. Whilst PL strongly *informs* and *orientates* its movers towards PE's potential meaning for each participant individual, it does not offer some key guidance as to how to best *tackle* PE's own Achilles heel, that is, the task of how to "manage" cognitive and emotionally touching words which pass between signified and signifier.

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ML differs from PL

ML holds a higher aspiration for the use of language. ML's quest for teacher and learner is to be reflective and reflexive about PE *and* self. Its praxis includes enhancing one's ability to know how and when PE professionals may apply one's maturing professional "*nous*". ML aspires to convey PE enterprises by guiding and comforting movers especially when traumatized or disoriented from self following physical encounters. ML also helps those who seek to become more intrigued about their entranced, exhilarated PE moments.

What ML generates is mover's acknowledgment for all PE correspondents to consensually raise awareness to PE's many unexplained cognitive *and* emotional "gaps". By venturing into PE's ambiguous "ludic Rubicon", ML seeks to accompany its resident mover(s) out of many "knowledge gaps" by offering each other an interpretation of the movement-event. ML exploits this accessible testimony to formulate an identity of the human nature of PE's agent commentator. ML's key ambition is to render PE experiences as meaningful and therapeutic for all its participants. In addition, its "*sub-plot*" is to explain the necessary but ill-defined protocols which allow pedagogy to develop from teaching to "andragogy" stemming *from* pedagogic practice.

ML's onus is to engage in a critical, interpretive, and imaginatively moving language. Its task is to generate speakers' and listeners' versatile and imaginatively fluent conversational language. ML readers are invested with responsibility to exercise their literary capacity to detect and address each other's ontological nature which may arise between one's conscious and unconscious awareness. Effectively and affectively, ML tries to engage its correspondents in a dialogic discourse which offers a different mode of understanding movement and one's "self" from the way in which Modern PE was taught. As an "entrée" into "andragogy", ML openly discusses the communicative problems of interpretation, and the goal towards which interpretation moves.

Andragogy for 15 year-old and beyond

Both ML and andragogy can infuse PE experiences with aspects of lived-encounters, but the latter's practice is the hardest for physical educationalists to attain. Andragogy is orientated towards adult language and is best understood not in terms of a "direct application" of a series of pre-determined ploys [strategies]. It is not, for example, the act of applying something to "fit" a particular use. Rather, andragogy evolves as a discrete and sensitive process of knowing more when to employ defensible reasons why one should follow traditional but now lost tangential and unwritten educational-learning procedures. Andragogy is a deliberated process of "languaging movement".

Andragogy alludes to the kind of learning knowledge that resides in-between words, or to imaginative ideas that strike us during purposeful moments of silence. Whilst PL is a philosophy and a means of learning *about* movement and certainly draws attention to one's self as resourced from the act of moving, PL also helps to translate/ transform systemic teaching into pedagogy's invitational realm of debate. Located beyond PL's published agenda, however, ML's deep-seated mission is to transcend pedagogy into andragogy's more consummate form of describing/discussing moving encounters *as* a way to learn. ML embraces the speaker's response to movement's task as well as examines meaning immanent in the speaker's reply to human resourced rhetoric.

Further featured from Chapter 7 onwards, andragogy involves calling upon the uttered but only partially fettered voices and conscious temperament of professional specialists to act as benign co-explorers into PE's unavoidable and yet unexplained knowledge "gaps". From PL's experiential grounding in dialogue, ML's praxis serve as a prelude to andragogy which I conceive as an intimate way to accompany the suspension of the learner's self during awesome PE encounters. Incessantly, via ML, andragogy searches for the mover's own reasoned sense of alignment with movement, or desire to move.

My thesis is that simultaneously, ML establishes the grounds for being interested in PE's lifeworld and simultaneously detects hints into the mover's "consciousness intent" as made retrospectively available in its correspondents' mode of language.

Reflective thinking is used to make qualitative decisions about movement

Qualitative movement account aims to gather in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons that govern such behaviour. Qualitative approaches explore the why and how of decision making, not just what, where and when. They pose questions like, "What is learning to move like?" "When should one employ PL?" "Why and how does ML share in the potential act of learning?" "How does ML offer someone a sense in which the speaker is seen as the author of one's words or alternatively is a product of one's words?" "Can PE nurture a sense of self, develop relationships with others?" and "Can one begin to philosophise conceptual and definitional issues as emanating from the body?"

Conventionally viewed, qualitative concerns tend to produce information only on a particular person, or a single incident, and that any more conclusions are only propositions [informed assertions]. Assertions are used for hypothesing, for testing, and for generlaizing beyond particular case studies. A case study is a strategy of reflexive learning which can evolve into an agency-membership network, a network which can develop its own speech community, as modern PE did.

Differently, ML's informed practitioner is called upon to deliberate on a range of physical experiences and openly debate about such enterprises. ML's rationale is concerned with nurturing a PE professional's vocational posture and deliberated behaviour when interacting with one's participant learner-movers. ML subjects PE's daily language to critical and interpretive hermeneutic treatment. It is a treatment of words which, in their astute usage, are then capable of evoking an empathetic "feeling" for transformative pedagogy. This altering pedagogy is explained in Chapter 7 as craft wisdom blended with experiencial wisdom. ML offshoots from a pedagogy which is artistic in the manner which participants present and represent themselves, neither marginalising the self nor the other person; a process which constitues a risk-

taking enterprise. In tandem, both practices attune its participants to the lifeworld of movement and allows both correspondents to perceive different glimpses whilst being located/dislocated in the moving act.

In its unending fruition, ML challenges Modern PE's discourse of "domiation" to produce a more just and "liberating" education. Theraputically, through tact and thoughtfulness, ML aspires to "heal" learners who have become privately traumatised in movement and perhaps alienated from their embodied identity, as well as having experienced a fragmented sense of social and personal isolation. Whilst physical competence is not prioritized as a concern for the professional educator to comment on, ML fully acknowledges one's performative skills to be of vital significance to the moving-agent. ML attends to physical skills particularly in terms of their qualitiative potential to enhance, fragment or distance one's self-image. This is because self-assurance and appreciation of one's movement endowment affect physical confidence.

ML becomes PL's underpinning project to "voice" movement to life. It draws the profession's fundamental re-orientation to PE's generic but now immanent processing conditions which allow learning to occur. ML locates and interprets human movement as a vitalizing and precious source of finding who we are, our ontological standing. It aspires to value movement as a refreshing way to resource our selves, which we must care for with unremitting attention, and not deal with ourselves only when we malfunction, or feel dispirited. Somewhat differently, what PL does is to bring our bodies into discussion under the subject of PE and tries a balancing act to focus on PE enactment through a vast range of other curriculum subjects' academic lenses.

Balancing act

For movement's "educator/translator", however, "teaching" is always a balancing act sustained between the world of technique and that of expression, between the knowing body and the moving mind; a mind that consumes our awareness when it is immersed either in the playful mode (Bresler 2004), or in the deeply contemplative

realm of meditation and when boundaries disappear in a deep flow of being and "joy". It is from within such a state of mind, in the unfolding of what Suzuki (2006: 18) enigmatically refers to as an "unrestricted mind", or "Buddha" mind that we encounter both doubt and possibility. Meditating grants us the ability to see things anew.

Buddha was not interested in some metaphysical existence, but in his own body and mind, in the here and now. Immersed in this so called "beginner's" mind is the practice of a Zen mind. A Zen mind is a workable religion and discipline about posture and breathing. Zen is about reaching the basic attitudes and understanding all of which make Zen practice possible. Similar to what play can bestows on us, the notion of non-duality [monism], Zen achieves an empty mind and enlightenment [learning]. Such learning is conceived as a partial revelation only, since this form of learning retains concealment at the same time. Zen helps us to realise the deepest expression of our own nature when we teach ourselves, when our practices, attitude and understanding roughly correspond to body, feeling and mind, all sythesised as a "locale of tranquility". This is a condition during which Buddhists consider the wise may seeks for wisdom, and the experiencing human may approach enlightenment.

In Chapter 7, I draw from Ricoeur's text (1992) " *Oneself as Another*", on his account of philosophical "ethics," which lays the groundwork for a metaphysics of morals, pressing on the need for us all not to shut ourselves off from the insights available in alternative traditions of knowledge and topics. ML serves as a stepping stone linking PL to Knowles's "andragogy" (1980; 1985; 2005). Already mentioned and partially explained, ML's informed andragogic practice specifically shows what intricate exchanges and interchanges of potential meaning occur when speakers and listeners engage in mature conversation.

For example, through ML, linking PL to "andragogy", andragogy can evolve only if its correspondents participate in a conversation that treats both its interlocutors with mutual respect and dignity. PE's silent mode of learning to flourish cannot be conducted by the knower's efforts *alone* since learning is a co-dependent act, relying on both its participant's responses, when each appreciates that the other person is both a knower and a learner.

Summary

This chapter has shown modern PE had responded too quickly to adopt scientific "ideas" and too slow to adopt notions of "playful imagination" into its practices. In tandem, ideas and imagination mutate radically from one epoch to another and the history of teaching models is more like a saga and less like a linear progression. PE's evolution actually reads as history of *human* nature, a story that is well worth telling in more than one way, but PE's meaning and significance remain untold by its profession. For example, alongside a history of "nature" there is a corresponding history of ideas *about* human self-knowledge. My proposal for advancing ML is that through this un-deciphered mutation *between* nature and human nurturing, between the subjective abstractions and knowledge as objective facts, knowledge itself has become ever more intangibly and inextricably linked through non-transformative e-language. It is not a kind of information ladder "Information Technology" (I.T.). I.T. is information which gives form to the mind and is of a nature that *transforms* the social practices which make certain forms of knowledge possible. Currently, ML is a kind of "Luddite" analysis of movement and language countering PE's rigid communication mode which dehumanizes PE's consequences.

For instance, I agree with the limits of artificial knowledge criticized by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). They argue that human intelligence and expertise depend primarily on unconscious instincts rather than conscious symbolic manipulation, and that these unconscious skills could never be captured in formal rules. Their critique was based on the insights of modern continental philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty (1962), whose early philosophy is examined in the next chapter and interpreted through a range of others who have examined Merleau-Ponty's (1964-2003) work on the phenomenology of the body. These thinkers include Kwant (1963), Edie (1973), Olkowski and Morley (1999) and more recently, Shusterman (2005).

They all claim that "technology", which I have denigrated in the context of PE's teaching, among other things acts as an amplifier to expand our boundaries of human understanding. For instance, Mosston and Ashworth's "Spectrums" and technology's strength lie in an approach which makes action *possible*. Their weakness, however, is that the very *reason* for action is hidden in the unquestioned

assumptions of a theory or paradigm, so that we see the world around us and each other in different ways. Separating facts from values implies the separation of the cognizing "subject" from the "object" of cognition. Eventually, the PE profession must acknowledge that different discourses produce different "truths". It needs to free itself from paradigmatic mind-sets, to become more localised and personalised.

One should not forget that movement "disciplines" are, in themselves, paradigms of lived experiences concepts wrapped up in language's bureaucracy. But, language can have the hermetic effect of sealing formulaic models of teaching which give the illusion of bringing everything under control, confining the teacher's attention to their overt technical framework, without informing one that other covert and personal factors relating to human interaction are left unattended. In order to alleviate self-sabotage and promote self-enhancement, I turn to reveal some of PE's covert [phenomenological] modes of personal knowledge in the next chapter.

Chapter Four   Phenomenology

Introduction

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Transferring and transforming private experiences into public knowledge

This chapter centres on Merleau-Ponty's (1962; 1964a; 1973) radical notion of a "body-subject". Understanding his enfleshed or "fleshly world" helps inexpereinced PE specialist students to begin to "feel" what it is like to become a pedagogue.

By bringing the constitution of the body under critical review, Merleau-Ponty's embodied attention to movement and, later, to language awareness brings the body even more into the direct concern to the PE profession in terms of one's ethical treatment of another. Following Merleau-Ponty's embodied conceptions, learner's movements now need to be understood by its advocate and agent as an interchange of located places and dispositional postures. Acording to Merleau-Ponty, a change befalls its agent as a consequence both in physical terms [medical health] and emotionaly [sensitivity and self-confidence] as one becomes aware of a reconstitued "self".

This chapter aims to explain how a movement educator invites the participant to construct an animating and evocative description [anecdotal text] of one's action, and the experiential consequences met in those "events". The professional's purpose is to make use of words, because it is through the experience of the performance, in conjunction with its agent's utterance that aspects of the sentient nature of the mover can be found. The description situtates the speaker by providing testimony to one's own innner sense of being. In this chapter I also refer to my experience of being "inside" movement through Eastern thought.

In pursuit of meaning

In its broadest sense the meaning of an "object", or the "meaning of meaning" as Cassirer (1944:112) puts it, is meaning's multiple positioning of *relatedness,* or attachment to all other objects with which it is associated with the experience of its incumbent agent. In our bodily presence, we both reveal something about ourselves

and we always conceal something at the same time – not necessarily consciously or deliberately, but rather in spite of ourselves. This is because the direct impetus of our embodied kinaesthetic feeling seems to shade the clarity of our thinking at the time into a kaleidoscopic encounter, startling enough to leave its most impressive of impressions, but also overwhelming enough not to allow the minute details of its glimpses to be caught.

I continue to construct ML by interpreting PL as a conjectural curriculum which is stimulated by recognizing the shift from structuralist language that PE needs to acknowledge to that of a poststructuralist linguistic analysis. The latter focuses on expression which fastens on to the individual speaker and his or her associated or dispositional characteristics. Voicing PL, ML seeks opportunities and a cause for reflection, on the basis of a study of language itself which is more useful in prompting the uncertainty of questions than in delivering the finality of answers: at once, sceptical towards inherited authority and affirmative about future possibilities. In Chapter 6 I bridge the gap between last century's transformations from the realm of teaching into those of its pedagogic philosophy of engaging others in a hermeneutic critique of dialogue. I advance ML as a way of nurturing PE's contemporary communication processing via the immanent discipline of a dialogic discourse [a now hidden code which I show to be pedagogy's protocol and is rich in its correspondents' displays for independence].   Independence is the capacity of one to think with a mature caring awareness for another, discretely placing the other's interest ahead of one's own.

Modern PE was exercised as if professional practices could be resolved into analysis. As a form of action, then, teaching was not seen as embedded in particular contexts or within cultural, linguistic, or political traditions which may be at work in all kinds of tacit and nuanced ways in teachers and pupils as persons. It was assumed that everything essential to teaching could be removed from such concerns, as well as from the urgencies and contingencies of the "classroom". Constantly, PE needs to look more seriously into the unity of experience in knowledge, expression, and action of the agent learner and see the educative task, [which is the actualization of certain preferred dispositions].   I exhibit who I am by what I do and say, and the witnessed

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evidence bears testimony as a form of open texture of who I am and how I think about the world.

Public knowledge, private experiences

I show what I can do in PE, but I also need to account for my actions. This is why "teaching" needs to embrace the philosophical movement of phenomenology, to allocate speaking time to learners to gain access to the kind of person one is, behind the teaching role, and behind the learning role. Phenomenology is an attempt to reconcile and combine opposing perspectives, such as empiricism and rationalism. Although it originally responded to problems in scientific thinking, arbitrating over the confusion between abstract and material substances, it can now be used as a form of confessional therapy (Becker, 1992). Phenomenology came to be seen as a way to help stabilize [re-settle, and comfort] individuals who felt the sense of loss, of having encountered meaninglessness in their lives. One of the most important branches of 20th century thought, phenomenology, like all new philosophical movements, opened new dimensions, one of which was existentialism. Phenomenology with existentialism offered people a way of facing the cold realities of life without despairing, by saying, in effect: take responsibility for your own world and work to realize the potential of your existence in your own terms, because this is the way I am dealing with my life; I, who offer this advice, am advising myself. In an important way, advisors, therapists, counselors and, today, life-coaches, are who and what they are, largely because they themselves have either experienced life at its edges, or come into contact with others who have. It is with the "I was there significance" that seems to endorse one's own reminiscence. Teaching is like this. It brings into one's presence the past of its knower. It should also bring into focus the nature of the knower, something "Iago" found impossible to cope with, indeed, seriously avoided.

Experiential roots of phenomenology

Phenomenology was developed by philosopher/psychologist Husserl (1954; 1970 and cited in Buytendijk, 1967) as a "movement", which took on the task to study the

relation between the world, on the one hand, and the senses that experience the world on the other. For Husserl, [whose ideas I discuss later in this chapter] phenomenology is the necessary preliminary to any science of the mind, since it locates, prior to any description, classification, or explanation, the individual mental acts which psychology [and, currently, neuro-psychology] must investigate, since movement is now accepted and interpreted as capable of placing its inhabitant agent into some delirium-like but also vivid, state of being (Devine, 1984). Moreover, embodied movement and its languaged [articulated] epiphanies may be regarded as the most profound resourced access to meaning (Abrams 1996; Allbright 1989; Bain 1990; Bresler 2004). Meaning is created by mental acts, and the world becomes present through consciousness only through those acts. Hence, it is our understanding that determines the essence of things, by fixing the manner in which they are known. Phenomenology is about yielding a form of knowledge, not of facts, but of essences, the core fundamental nature of holding together the experience of a memory, or a meaning, such that, objects are only what individuals "make of them".

Physical Literacy; from its inception

It was to draw more attention towards movement experiences that PL was introduced in the 1990s. Under the guidance of its originator, Dr Whitehead (1990; 2001; 2005; 2010), PL ultimately asks from its movers "Movement for the sake of…?" It is an attractive schema in which its advocates use particular modes of "teachings and pedagogies", that are "unrelated" to physical ability, and which require the adoption of new modes of thinking about what happens to us in the act of moving. Rather, PL and its astute, deliberated, singled-out and differentiated voicing through ML opens movement's experience to its schooling of life, as a "*rite de passage*", not as a disposable ritual ceremony marking one's individual change of status [as at puberty and marriage] but as undergoing change in the immediacy of its doing. Unlike many other curriculum subjects, you cannot set PE as homework. One can study the body's workings in biological, physiological or mechanical terms; the laws of the conservation of motion. One can study life *in* psychological, sociological and philosophical terms. One can study language, one can study sport. But, most of the time, their discrete study remains discrete in the sense that the "reader" cannot

display their acquired cognitive knowledge unless he or she is able to transfer that knowledge to correctly answer a question, or to manifest that knowledge in how they present themselves.

Most of the time, the language we speak is barely visible to us. We are more concerned with what it can do: buy a cup of tea; remonstrate with the referee to plead our innocence; or, using blatant deception, to feign innocence to lie. And yet, [outside the malaise that is contemporary sport] few issues are more important *in* life. After food and shelter, which are necessary for survival, language and its symbolic analogues are the most crucial determinants in our social relations, our thought processes, and our understanding [realization] of who and what we are. But, at the same time, language intervenes between human beings and their world. Language-use leaves us to rely not on causal facts, but on tenuous guesses.

PE puts life's characteristics on display

Importantly, PL tries to accompany its participants' moving encounters from its learner's enterprising sense of "presence". By presence, here, I am drawing attention to the kind of "charismatic" uplift that I encountered whilst swimming in the Indian Ocean, noted from my diary. I use my diary to remind myself of such memorable experiences and then, in its reading, I approach what I have written with a refreshed mind, asking questions upon questions, endeavoring to find new angles, new visions, new interpretations which help me to see this "incident" differently each time I think about it. This is what Movement Literacy "does" to one. It asks questions from questions. For instance, when after two days travel, utterly exhausted and disheveled, I quietly slipped into the serenity of the Indian Ocean, off the Malaysian coast, and later wrote the following diary-notes:

"Incredible… surreal warmth of the sea-water… exhilaration… elation…excitement…I remember …suddenly… my entire body felt as if …dissolved … I'm dancing with a piece of sea-weed swaying so deliciously calm in the elegant flow of the sea-water…were these *my* thoughts? I drifted away … where was I?... I imagined a sense of falling into my self…a kind of intrusive look …Did I really glimpse an image of a little me?

What PL aims for, eventually, is to help its movers better understand that movement really is a healthy activity, as well as to appreciate that tangentially our bodies also speak to us in their silence. I listen to my body each day. Perhaps this is a sign of insanity? But then, is it so strange that when I am tired then my body "tells" me to sleep? Who tells me to run, when I am alone? Who tells me to stop moving?

Stirring new ideas into forgotten modes of pedagogy

It was the profession's innovative response to new initatives about meaning that were being challenged and changed as a consequence of phenomenological initiatives, and quickly followed by postructuralism's language analysis, which, in turn, was subjected to hermeneutic's forensic-like interpretation (Beckers 1996; Bernstein 1988; Bleicher 1980; Caputo 1987; Dostal 1987; Drumm 1992; Gallagher 1992; Harris 1983).

On the threshold of the 21st century, the profession faced the task of trying to relocate itself between languages, our human affairs, its flourishing, and the world consigned to silence. For me, PE is now called upon to reposition its *ultimate* focus by searching for the conditions which may reveal that which is "human" in us, as unveiled through "movement". It is a PE which aspires to ignite/induce the mover's self-interest. ML *is* a quest for creating a repository, to make available for others to compare and contrast PE's hidden cache of experiences, experiences made available for comparison with that of their own. Speaking about these experiences is useful for others to be able to relate to, for others' movement images to be made more readily accessible and pondered over. This is because movement is the readiest expression of individuality. It is a rare encounter, since it is lived incessantly as a spectacle between its public representation, and the private version of its experiences.

If, as poets maintain, "experience *is* the child of thought", then, it is in this direction I am trying to orientate the profession's ambitions. I want to help others understand PE as a series of education enterprises; it is as much about how we talk and what we think, as much as what we do and think about what we have done, or what has

befallen us. PE, as I wish it portrayed, is about the voiced, as much as the silent language of pedagogy.

Body-Subject: a co-constitution of meaning

According to Husserl (1995), we are already predisposed to understand our experiences in terms of the way that we *relate* to "reality" or "truth". Our relationship with reality, so Husserl maintained, is strongly influenced by the manner in which we come to comprehend the very nature of our relationships with others naturally by way of our *Lebenswelt,* how we think about people and things grow from our social connections. In coming up with the ideas of the *Lebenswelt*, Husserl tried to correlate his phenomenology [which focussed on individual consciousness] with other philosophies that emphasized social influences [like Marxism] as an attempt to see the world with fresh eyes and provided a starting point for the existentialists such as Kierkegaard (2000) and Nietzsche (1992; 1995) who held that we need to rethink, or isolate for inspection as it were, not only what science says about the world, but also what religion and even philosophy say too. Globally, the way we think differs. Western philosophy, for instance, is strongly influenced by religion [when sacredness interprets the secular], whereas, it is the other way round in the Far East, religion is strongly influenced by philosophy [the secular seeks interest in the sacred].

Existentialism is one of the most important philosophical views of the twenty century. And it is no coincidence that a student of Husserl's, Heidegger (cited in Breivik, 2007), was one of the first of such philosophers. Heidegger built on Husserl's thinking by shifting from consciousness to "being". What was important for Heidegger was not so much our experience of "reality" but our existence itself. Just as Husserl said that artificial attitudes interfere with our ability to appreciate our consciousness, Heidegger believed that the whole tradition of ideas about "being" actually interferes with our ability to appreciate our being. For Heidegger, the fact that things, including ourselves, exist is incredible and inexplicable, in spite of centuries of philosophical attempts to explain it. We need to see through these past explanations, says Heidegger, in order to see being for what it is. His word for "being," is *dasein*, of "being there." *Dasein* is open to the possibility that you may need to create your *own*

meaning for life, in order to achieve, not a fake, delusional existence, but that of an "authentic" existence.

Simultaneously, we also "experience" our experience in a special way; a representational version of it, containing now static, separable, bounded, but essentially fragmented entities, grouped into classes upon which predictions can be based. This kind of attention isolates, fixes, and makes each thing explicit by bringing it under the spotlight of our attention. However, in doing so, it renders things "inert", mechanically lifeless. Yet, it also enables us, for the first time to know, and consequently to "learn to make things", to give us power.

For Heidegger, interpreting our existence is everything. Nothing lies outside, before, or beyond being, and being takes place in time. The fact that we exist in time means that we are always changing. We are no longer what we used to be; on our entry into the gymnasium we are not the same as when we leave it. It is by revealing the fundamental nature of each person's discrete *Da-sein,* of the kind of existence we have, that we come to understand other kinds of existence, [that is, other senses of "being"] and thus begin to answer what Heidegger calls "the question of being". He perceived knowledge as a process of growing through the world, where a certain foresight guides the Dasein towards gaining an authentic perspective on living.

Part of what Heidegger took from phenomenology and applied to existentialism was the idea that you cannot separate knowledge from experience; they are both part of the same "reality". You can not have an experience without in some sense knowing about it, and you can not have knowledge without experiencing the knowledge. In fact, says Heidegger, we *can* "know" before we even realize it. In other words, we develop attitudes and assumptions toward things without necessarily thinking about them. It was Sartre (cited in Kaufmann, 1975), however, who guided Heidegger's and Husserl's ideas in a new direction to show that "reality" is inherently meaningless. The problem, according to Sartre, is that we would all like just to exist independently of a made-up meaning, be we cannot: it is impossible. Sartre says that in addition to being what we are, we are also conscious *of* being. This is a problem because we cannot simply be conscious of ourselves being, without bringing in some

kind of meaning along with our consciousness. Whatever meaning we *add* is not necessarily better than any other meaning we could have added instead. As a result, we get lost in our own freedom to come up with resolutions and possible meanings. In Sartre's words (1992) "We are condemned to be free".

Merleau-Ponty

Modern PE was well set to place learners into its science informed and rule-bound realm of movement. But, as Merleau-Ponty (1962) revealed in his understanding of soccer, a mover's body-training is one thing, whilst an existential understanding of the game becomes the privileged knowledge only of those who play the game, not merely study it from the outside as an armchair voyeur. His point was that we can study the history of soccer, from its documented accounts, however, to "know" the game one must become involved in exploring its ancient traditions from the "inside":

> …The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of the life, and accordingly, it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these as primary actions and moving from their *literal* to the *figurative* meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true of motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes, finally the *meaning* aimed at cannot be achieved by the body's natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world. (1962:146)

By literal [factual, in word by word] and figurative [metaphorical, or symbolic] meaning, Merleau-Ponty was trying to bring into harmony movement's "technical make-up", with that of its capacity to draw our attention to the fact that we become familiar with physical events, both as spectators, and, via our embodied experience and perceptual structures, our powers of sensibility.

In Merleau-Ponty's core ideas about the human body, he acknowledges the deep connections between biology and civic culture which arise because the human body, itself, is a communicative body whose upright posture and audiovisual articulation open up a symbolic world that enriches our experience beyond any other form of life. It is with this form of philosophical movement, phenomenology, of which Husserl (1970) says that "intentionality" or attitude always goes along with consciousness, that I am seeking to nurture into the profession, so as to become more receptive and

open to its own thinking and imagination; to shift from the mundane nature of viewing the body through the microscope to that of looking into movement through the lens of one's own life.

Merleau-Ponty first toyed with the idea that, somehow, humans held an internal, bodily but immanent, capacity to become conscious of the seductive appeal of the desiring self. In short, he conceived of the idea that human effort and resistance went hand-in-hand, and somehow, our becoming aware of our consciousness of this sensuous experience emanated deep from within the body's centre of gravity. Modern and Western trained PE specialist struggled with this idea. In fact, they avoided confronting it. There was no place in Modern PE teaching for a forum discussing mind-body issues. That was left to other thinkers to solve, thinkers outside the profession. But then, the mind-body issue is not simply a mind-body *non-relation.* That is, in this study's opening phase, I have explained how the mind-body issue was left aside for others to speculate about in theory only.

PE's contemporary delivery centres on how we can muster, or "relate" others' abstract theories to our reflection of movement, especially when we meet movement's potential meaning hovering between our own intended efforts, and those of unknown resistances. Indeed, Oriental PE specialists, especially Buddhists, should not be surprised by this "gap", this idea in our understanding of movement: the idea that whatever it is that animates our livingworld is "located", [as described to me in 2006, when I shared almost a full day in compelling discussion with a "Zen-Master", during which I talked and searched, while "Master" merely listened]. His extraordinary calming, and inordinately patient, "silence" resonated so powerfully through me that he was able to make effective his profound presence by his personal tranquillity. His silence invited me to think through the very nature of my own questioning. Having studied the Chinese anthropology of "Tai Chi," at Shaolin Temple, he viewed it as a disciplined mode of self-learning, as an art of mental as well as a physical preparation for understanding better the unpredictable nature of life. He did not conceive movement as *informing* the mind, or vice-versa. He did not portray the idea that whilst the mind is occupied, as it is during exam-time the body is "forgotten", nor the idea that if we suffer an injury, the nature of the pain comes to

preoccupy our thinking; that our thoughts are somehow omitted, blanched out of our sense of awareness.

Largely *because* he was silent, he made me think into my own questions, to what I held in my own rhetoric. With a few words, he suggested to me that somehow, my inner most feelings were centred somewhere deep within my abdomen, in my "gut" feeling. Gently, he pressed one finger against my midrift. What he later said was perfectly true. He declared that I had been exceptionally unsure about how I envisioned our meeting. That, despite my slightly gestured smile, and calm but deceptively postured stance, my hesitation, my nervousness was echoing inside of me. Through his finger touch, he could detect these echoes, their tactile vibrations. His parting words to me, late into the night, came when my talking had ceased. My asking had become exhausted. My "thinking" capacity had reached its limits. I had arrived at the state when I had no mind to think with. His parting words were "It is not what I say that you will hear from me. It is what *stays* with you".

Only then did I realise that I had fallen victim to my Western interpretation of what his ancient Eastern *pensive* idea was all about, and is now explained. When we feel confused by what is happening to us, or perplexed by what others might be doing to us, deliberately or otherwise, we tend to turn our thoughts inwardly, mystically perhaps, trawling blindly, scrambling to find a sanctury in the realm of reason, to purchase a footing for protection from an outside interference. Occidental thinking is that of a *calculating hunter*, sent out to fix, to achieve, to resolve, to control, whereas Oriental realization is founded on gathering that which comes to one.

Oriental insight accepts revelations in the indissoluable quietude of meditation, in the stillness of the body. In contrast, Occidental thinking comes about from the rhythmicity of embodied mediation and the dynamics of dialogue, and, as I shall explain in Chapters 7 and 8, such thinking can be re-threaded into PE's communicative modes of teaching. The western tradition of education has split and impoverished both bodily and mental education by demeaning the former [the body] and disembodying the latter [mental education]. From my many visits to the Far East, and five years lecturing at Neipu University in Taiwan, my concern is that Eastern PE

senior schooling, much of which is dedicated to teaching baseball, athletics, and swimmimg, follows this Western trend in its modern version.

Absolute thought

In his early work, Merleau-Ponty battled against absolute thought, that is, the idea of an unrelated, unrestricted and unconditioned thought. He was constantly stressing the insurmountable ambiguity and contingency of all meaning and truth. An arch opponent of Cartesian rationalism, he was an early and ardent spokesperson for that position now called anti-foundationalism: the doctrine that knowledge is ultimately based on beliefs that require no further justification.

His major work, "*Phenomenology of Perception",* is best known for its central thesis concerning "the primacy of perception". In his *magnum opus* (1945;1962), Merleau-Ponty developed the concept of the body-subject as an alternative to the Cartesian "cogito", the declared idea that if "I think, therefore I am". Merleau-Ponty perceives the essences of the world *existentially*. In effect, he was of the opinion that consciousness, the world, and the human body were all intimately fused as a unified, perceiving thing, intricately intertwined and mutually "engaged."

Founded on this viewpoint of mutual engagement between sentient beings and the material substance of the earth, what becomes of importance to those who subscribe to this kind of thinking is that PE's professional practice is focused not on the unchanging objective realm of the natural sciences, but rather, on its more contemporary requirement: to perceive a correlation between that of our body and that of our sensory motor functions. Based on Merleau-Ponty's idea of a "body-subject"; conceived as a kind of pre-programmed, thinking body, the body is conveyed as an intelligent body capable of responding appropriatey to certain actions imposed upon it, and of taking up and "communing with" those of our sensible qualities. He characterised the body as capable of using its *pre-conscious* sensibilites, that is, inherited sensitivities, and thus, granting its perceiver with an understanding of the world's makeup. This elaboration of the body as resourcing

human meaning, however, is "inexhaustible" and, for Merleau-Ponty, the body is the *hallmark* of all our perceptions.

Perceptions

According to Merleau-Ponty, perception is not an inner representation of an outer world. He maintains that there is no "inner" theatre of the mind where "shows" from the outside are projected on its surface. Perception occurs in the world rather than in the mind. It is an opening onto rather than an opening within "being". The visual perception of an object, a learner's body for example, forms between that mover's body and the body of the perceiver [the advocate]. There are not two bodies, one in the world and one in the professional's mind but rather one which is seen first, and then subjected to observation within the parameters of a specific context.

To see, in this sense, is to be "decentred" in relation to the visible world. The perceptual field, which is constitutive of the perceiving subject [PE specialist/learner], stretches out and around the subject for literally as far as the eye can see. Furthermore, this implies that perceiver and perceived are relational beings. Perception does not involve the convergence or correspondence of two distinct order of things [that of the perceiving subject and that of the perceived object]. It involves one order, perception or the visible, which may be subdivided [by means of theoretical reflection] into two derived, interdependent and relational aspects [i.e. perceiver and perceived].

In this respect, for Merleau-Ponty, the body has two facets, the sentient and the sensible. It sees and can be seen, hears and can be heard, touches and can be touched. These sides are not separate from each other, as are Descartes's mind and body. They are reversible aspects of one and the same "being". The human body is a visible seer, a tangible toucher, and audible listener. Moreover, the body's visible-tangible "*presence*" is central to its [the body's] perception. One perceives always from somewhere, and it is one's visible, tangible presence which provides this somewhere. The perceptual field, in this respect, is constituted through the articulation of body and others and the world.

The problematic of perception is no longer centred around the attempt to pull distinct substances together [body/mind, subject/object] or reconcile distinct realms ['inner' and 'outer']. Such distinctions, insofar as they are recognized as having any phenomenological validity, are redefined as *relational*, fused and reversible aspects of a single fabric, which Merleau-Ponty (1968) refers to as the "flesh". He refers to both the "*flesh of the body*", which includes the reversibilities of sentience and sensible, and the "flesh of the world", which includes the relational intertwining of seer and seen. The perceiving subject, from this point of view, forms part of the visible world. It constitutes a convergent point within the visible world where that world becomes visible.

From this understanding, we encounter the first move of a "rethinking" of embodiment. Accepting that the body has an object side[i.e. a sensible side, a sentient or subject side which can be seen and touched], he adds to this in that it possesses another side, a sentient or subject side which sense touches, and which thereby experiences its world meaningfully. The flesh of the body, consists in sensible sentience. The body's being-in-the-world is at once mediated through physical presence *and* perceptual meaning, indicating the body is more than "an object". It is a sentient being whose primary relation to its environment should be understood in terms of this meaningful sentience, the "body-subject" as Merleau-Ponty understands it; each body has a generic responsive power to discriminate its relationship with the world and with others.

In addition, his rethinking of perception is that it is based in behaviour; that is, in looking, listening and touching, acquired as culturally habituated forms of conduct. The perceiving body constitutes itself as such, by implementing acquired perceptual schemas. It does not passively receive messages from the world but actively "interrogates" the world in terms of its cultural schemas [to which it has been exposed and acquired]. These "Gestalt images" of what we see depend on the way we look and the way that we organize our visual field, and on our perception of written and spoken language. When reading or listening to linguisitic utterances, in a language that we are trained in, we actively [though unwittingly] apply our acquired

skills of reading or listening (Chapters 5 and 6). We apply perceptual schemas that will make what we see or hear immediately meaningful to us.

Following on from his intriguing notion of body-subject, Merleau-Ponty claims that things are those upon which our body has a kind of "grip" [*prise*], and that this "grip" itself is a function of our instinctive resonance with the world's things. He holds that we belong to the world outside us. The world and the sense of self are emergent phenomena in an ongoing "becoming." In other words, we are born into the world, and [as shown in the next chapter] our carnal knowledge is evoked from us by our felt need to become accepted by our siblings, our family, our location in the world, by our felt actions to become related to others, and to cope with and know how to preserve our ecological world.

Merleau-Ponty believed that all the "higher" functions of consciousness, for instance, intelligence, volition and deliberation, are rooted in and depend upon the subject's pre-reflective, bodily existence, i.e., perception: all consciousness is perceptual, even the consciousness of ourselves. His principal goal, however, was to try to get beyond the intellectual constructs of traditional philosophy such as sense data and its effect, to find a way of returning to the phenomena of the world as we actually experience it, as embodied subjects *prior* to all theorizing. For him, the body is, *itself*, the original knowing *subject* [albeit a "non", or, pre-personal, "anonymous" subject], from which all other forms of knowledge derive.

Merleau-Ponty argues that whilst "I" do not actually know myself, nevertheless, my body is me and it is from within me that "I" emerge to engage with the world of others, and beyond this social domain we have a deeply endowed, interminably rich ecological sense of resonance. He accepted the Cartesian primacy of the thinking self and also Husserl's (1929) belief that experience is the source of all knowledge. Husserl worked on a method of phenomenological reduction, the act of suspending judgement about the natural world that precedes phenomenological analysis by which a subject may come to know directly an essence. Differently, Merlau-Ponty claimed that the phenomenological reduction led back not to a separated transcendental consciousness or ego but to the "lived-experience" of the "body-

subject". In perception, for Merleau-Ponty, we find ourselves *already* embodied and active in the "life-world" which, for him, is the domain of *inter*-subjectivity. Knowledge of the self and of the other are thus intimately connected in a "dialectic of ambiguity," by which he meant that knowledge is never complete.

What I shall show in the thesis' second phase is that the act engaging in movement was regarded as "trivial" but somehow beneficial for pupils as a form of relaxation from academic study. But in reality, by falling into a playful mood, as is often the case in games-playing, its incumbent resident's attention is not harnessed into a concentrated focus on a minute detail. Rather, its "agent's" thoughts are distracted, and can encounter a release of attention from contending with the minutiae of details and fall into an unrestrained freedom of mind. And, what may initially appear to its agent as trivial may well, in time, turn out to be quite an epiphanic but immanent revelation about one's self and about life in the world at large.

Immanent knowledge

It is faith in this "immanent" knowledge that allows phenomenologists to make recourse to P.E. since, like play in sport movement, phenomenology brings fresh and invigorating aspects of reality through the impressive moments in movement closer to our awareness of reality; a reality which is heightened, uplifted, and sensitive to one's "*own*" sense of resurgence, closer to meeting the illusive, inner self that lurks within us. Merleau-Ponty "*suspected*" that we appropriate new words and phrases through their expressive tonality and texture, through the way they feel in the mouth, roll the tongue, to relieve our inner tension or passion. It is in this direct felt significance, the *experience* of a word or phrase, the way it influences or modulates the body that provides the polyvalent source of fermentation for all the more refined and obscure meanings which in time may come to hold for us. However, the meaning of words, for Merleau-Ponty (1962: 184):

> …must be finally induced by the words themselves…their conceptual meaning must be formed from their *gestural* meaning which is immanent in speech.

His unfinished approach to examine language from a structuralist's understanding and to interpret language in terms of its systemic meaning, he predicted, discloses meaning's generic source in a carnal field of participation. However, Merleau-Ponty tended to emphasize the gestural significance of spoken sounds. Linguistic meaning, for him, is rooted in the *felt* experience induced by specific sounds and sound shapes as they echo and contrast with one another, each language a kind of song which serves as a "raft" of emotional meanings from which, sadly, our embodied being has taken many centuries to drift from its anchorage with nature. Because Merleau-Ponty viewed language from a structuralist's viewpoint, he was unable to offer a wider panoramic semantics, the study of changes in meaning of embodied and resourced action. He first maintained that a thought was limited to existing for itself independently of speech and communication, but later came to perceive thought as incarnated in speech.

Being

In philosophy, being is the object of study of metaphysics, and more specifically ontology. The term "being" is typically understood as one's "state of being," and hence its common meaning is in the context of human personal experience that involves expressions and manifestations coming from a being's innate *being*, or personal character. The visual perception of an object, a soccer ball, for example, forms *between* the ball and the body of the perceiver: both ball and body inter-relate. That is to say, there are not two balls, one in the world and one in the mind but rather one ball which is seen. To see is to be "decentred" or aware of oneself being dispersed in relation to the visible world. The perceptual field, which is constitutive of the perceiving subject, stretches out and around the subject for [literally] as far as the eye can see; a world exists for me within the parameters of the visible boundaries that surround me.

In a teaching context, however, and especially for the learner beginner, this *decentring* experience implies that the perceiver and the perceived, or the player and the referee, or the offensive and defensive player, constitute a fresh series of totally new and ever changing situations between their "relational being". Perception does

not involve the convergence or correspondence of two distinct orders of things that of the perceiving subject and that of the perceiving object. It involves one order, perception or the visible, which may be subdivided [by means of theoretical reflection] into two derived, interdependent and relational aspects. For example, the perceiver and the perceived think of the offensive penalty deliverer, and then think of the defensive goalkeeper receiver. Both are involved in the same match, but each is playing a different kind of mind game with the other.

Clearly, Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion that the mind [*qua* perceptual consciousness] is a separate substance from the body. Rather, for him, perception is both inseparably sensational and meaningful. Expressed in another way, perception consists in a meaningful configuration of the power of perceiving *through* the senses. And these sensations, these impressive but transient revelations belong to [and are resourced from] the body: our sensations make us what and who we are as a sentient being.

For Merleau-Ponty, the body has two *intra*dependent sides: sentient and sensible. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, sentience is used in the study of consciousness to describe the ability to have sensations or experiences, known to Western philosophers as "qualia", a feature raised again in Chapter 7. In Eastern philosophy, sentience is a metaphysical quality of all things that requires respect and care.

What Merleau-Ponty was trying to deal with in his early work was that one never perceives from nowhere. One always perceives from somewhere. For example, take a diver in an underwater cave, or a single sailor in the epicentre of a vast ocean. For both explorers, it is one's visible, tangible presence which provides the only anchoring, core as it were, of this ill-defined loction. One of his most fundamental premises was that the embodied senses are crucial to the "presence" of being, to our apprehension of an *is* in things that no analytic dissection or verbal account can isolate. Who and whatever "I" am, it is the "I" that is at the centre of all my perceptions. My seeing things, my making sense of things, eventually comes to rest upon how "I" come to conceive myself. I am my final court of appeal. Nevertheless, I can not exist alone. I have to rely on what others can reveal to me. One's perceptual field, in these instances, is constituted through the articulation of the *body* with and in

the world. This form of perception is that of an interminable interplay between myself constantly having to adjust to the vagaries of another person, e.g., the penalty taker, and to that of nature.

Being a body

Unable to examine views about the concept of movement's behaviour or conduct from its *agent's viewpoint,* early educational theorists created a problem of mind/body dualism through their tendency to abstract human meanings and ideas *from* their situation in embodied and engaged action, rather than within it. The concept of "behaviour", providing that it is understood as "meaningful behaviour", allows us to avoid this abstraction. In "behaviour", mindedness and embodiment are aspects of a single structure [as constructed by Oriental thinkers]. The active body embodies meanings and ideas.

In dealing with the concept of "behaviour", the term behaviour tends to have the effect of defining the body as an *active* body, a body which is always already engaged with its environment, and behaviour is a word which suggests that the "form" of that engagement is derived from an ever expanding reservoir of cultural skills and techniques [in PE's case, the motile perceptual schemas in particular, such as the way soccer is played in the U.K. is usually characterised as "physical " and "robust", whilst continental play is described as "artistic" and "tactical"]. For Merleau-Ponty, then, it is the perceiving [intelligent] body that takes up and uses externalised-to-internalised information and is shown to be an "agent" in its own right, an agent able to absorb cultural practices, and, conversely, cultural practices are resourced from an active body-subject. According to Merleau-Ponty, body/culture dualism collapses as it does with mind/body dualism, rendering the primary function of perception *not* as a form of Oriental contemplation but *practical* involvement. He holds perception as an *instrumental* mode always relating to our other ongoing projects and which is not usually a project in itself: a number of traffic islands clustered together, rather than a more conventional cross-road (Haag 1982; Greene 1991).

For example, what is reflected in our experience of playing soccer is the simple or complex way in which we survey a pitch, the players, the conditions. George Best, for example, excelled in picking out fine details from within the milieu of a game. His talent was in spotting "openings" and "opportunities", and exploiting them before others stopped him. His visual field was structured through his practical involvements, without any reflective process taking place. Hence, his movement to action and perception interwined and mutually informed each other in the context of a single project. He "read" the playing situations ahead of his opponents.

Merleau-Ponty's early phenomenological account should not be read as an account of our experience *of* embodiment. Embodiment is not experienced in this account; it is, rather, the foundational resource of experience. We experience *by way of* our "sentient" embodiment. Our body is our way of being-in-the-world, of experiencing and belonging to the world. It renders possible our "*point of view*" on the world. As Merleau-Ponty argues :

> …I am not in front of my body, I am in it or rather I am it …If we can still speak of interpretation in relation to the perception of one's own body we shall have to say that it interprets itself.
> (1962:150)

A helpful illustration of the "body" interpreting itself, is found in Merleau-Ponty's (1962:93) discussion of pain and the *language* of pain. To say that one's foot hurts is a qualitatively different form of statement to saying that a player's boot hurts. In the first case, where a body part, e.g. the leg, is referred to, what is being identified is not a *cause* of pain but rather a "pain manifested space". In the second statement, by contrast, it is a cause of pain, i.e., "player's boot", that is being identified. As will be shown in chapter 6, it is enigmatic "grammar" of the *language* of body experiences that identifies the body as a "composite location" rather than an *object* of experience.

This is not to say that we do not and cannot achieve an experience *of* our bodies. Merleau-Ponty is clear that we can and do. For example, he notes (1962:434) that our interaction with others affords us an outside perspective of ourselves, such that we can become objects for ourselves, and can experience ourselves [*qua* embodied beings] as something or other; e.g., tall, fragile, stick-like or rounded. It does not imply a *separation* of body and subject. They involve the body subject turning back

on itself to experience itself, described as a "carnal reflexivity". Merleau-Ponty's aim was to constuct an anti-sceptical account of knowledge and reality, or what amounts to one's learned sense of valued meaning, neither monist nor dualist, and which has, as its basis, the world of perceptual experience.

Merleau-Ponty's early interpretation of a radical embodied-subject was reliant on a socially constructed "self". However, in his unfinished text "*The Visible And The Invisible*" (1968), he drew attention to the second kind of knowledge we are endowed with, by exercising skills, and which signaled our reliance on interpersonal meaning as being dependent upon the manner we use, understand, and interpret language: by meticulously and benignly excavating what can be detected in the diction or pronunciation of the speaker's language. Movement, he maintained, granted us our first intermediary mode of experience, but it was language that allowed us to develop a communal sense of sharing our human affairs, and it was Steiner (1978:366) who noted the unvoiced or internal components of speech as spanning a wide arc:

> …all the way from the subliminal flotsam of word or sentence fragments…to the highly defined, focused and realized articulacy of the silent recitation of a learned text or of the taut and analytic moves in a *disciplined* act of meditation. Quantitatively, there is every reason to believe that we speak inside and to ourselves more than we speak outward and to anyone else. Qualitatively, these manifest modes of self-address…test and verify our "being there".

The act of movement can no longer be conceived as a "singularly-possessive" encounter as was portrayed by modernist PE. Denied from saying what we want to say, modern PE was an ascetic encounter because it referred to the delivery of locked knowledge, rendering docile the act of thinking. Its learners were denied their basic human rights, the privilege to bring their own presuppositions into full view, or, equally, decide not to exercise this dispensation. Essentially, learning is a process of give and take, of being given and of receiving opportunities suitable to flesh out one's own thought processes.

Phenomenology serves to remind us that our early experience of the world *is* inter-subjective and does not include an awareness of self as distinct from another. There is, instead, an immediate flow of experiences, undifferentiated between mine and

"thine", which actually contains both our own and others' experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another. Understood in this sense, we rely on the knowledge of others, we must realise this: we fit into others' mode of learning. Neither can we reject the premise that the person of practical wisdom inhabits the human world but cannot attempt to rise above it but can make their own ideas [ideals secular, sacred and scientific] more visible, by not losing touch with the sort of open texture that pervades movement and conversation. This is because we perceive and understand human behaviour in a manner different from how we perceive and understand the ecological world. We explain human behaviour by giving reasons, not causes. We *address* ourselves to our future by making decisions, not predictions. We understand the past and present of humankind through our aims, emotions and activity, and not through predictive theories.

All these distinctions seem to create the "idea", if not of a specifically human world, at least of a specifically human way of seeing things. By contrast, contemporary PE seeks to nurture one's astuteness to unlock knowledge through pursuing differentiation, creating divergence and thus, seeking innovation by becoming a speaking subject. And, this is possible only by conforming one's speech not to the system of language prescription, as was the case for modern PE, but taken as a systematic medium that opens its speaker's or reader's realised understanding of differences.

Summary

In this chapter, "phenomenology", has been explained as a feature of PE's daily practice because it searches into the margins of language for "fleshy" concepts, which themselves are plunged into the imperceptile shifts of meaning. And whatever meaning happens to surface in dialogue, itself, emerges from the deep structure and living experience of language. This is why modern PE's communicative, instrumental and logical language cannot carry any substantive commitments with respect to educational values located at the personal level. Its science-bound language tries "clinically" to remove personal affairs from its dissection of objective matters.

A physically "literate" movement interpreter, I have started to establish, needs to be able to read movement as a native speaker, which requires one to be able to describe encountering its "moving" events in terms of its phenomenal revelations; that is, by blending cognitive issues with emotional concerns, so that existentially, one can begin to appreciate one's responsibility for giving meaning to what one comes to understand as reality for oneself and for others. Much is involved in PE's professional practices. If the profession follows the PL philosophy as an invitation to its participants to become involved in physical activity, to view one's embodied presence from different perspectives, then, it eventually falls upon ML to know how to differentiate between "effect" and "affect". ML is portrayed as an infinite practice benignly sharpening physical competence whilst reinvigorating self-esteem.

From this chapter onwards, I identify some of the inherent difficulties with which listeners *fail* to connect with the intended meaning of other speakers and are unsuccessful in detecting and thus miss reading or even fail entirely to detect the latent tendencies of its speaker-beholder. Detected in the phenomenological description of movement, one discovers something unfamiliar as if its meaning is stalking on both the lived edges of movement and on the margins of its speaker. ML is an intellectual journey. It aspires to elicit our inner voice expressing our embodied belongingness to the words which can serve to sentence us [pass judgment] or free us. This is the difference between a decree and a request. This is the difference in the way we choose to convey such encounters, when the self can place its mark on those events that constitute its action. We come to philosophise with our bodies, and hence, poetize as we speak and live in it. Our body constantly monitors our physical health, which is a medical concern, but it also monitors our state of well-being, our emotional balance (Edie 1973; Abram 1988; Butler 1993; Cooper 1997; Shapiro 1999). In so doing we become more willing to explore the less explicit reaches of the affective, unconscious mind, to actually extend the scope of our *possible* self-awareness (Hildebrandt 1987, Heshius 1994, Stinson 1995). In movement, we tend to connect the "betweenness" of things, as is the way of phenomenology, before we reflect, and isolate them. The learning of an art form is always a balancing act between technique and expression. Technique being the knowledge of skills,

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material, history, and usage in the context of practice and expression the context of evaluation, meaning, and significance in which technique is displayed.

Phenomenology calls for a more eloquent way of speaking, a style of language which, by virtue of its fluidity, its carnal resonance, draws us into the sensuous depth of the life world, and indeed evolves as a story we tell ourselves about ourselves. Conceptual definitions continue to be employed so that we can learn *about* movement. Contemporary PE specialists need to be able to talk *of* movement. My thesis is that conceptual *guidance* is what is required by PE's professionals if they are to learn what movement can reveal about its resident-agent, to become conversant with listening to the body's "telling" kinaesthetic language in order to bring movement into life through the understated arts of pedagogy. I address this delicate issue in the remaining chapters. I explain in the next chapter why poststructuralism's decoding of language helps its emissaries and learners to keep in touch with their publicly held epistemological knowledge [cognitive] and ontologically private [self identity] "moving" accounts.

At a phenomenological level, learning-to-learn evolves as a process which is as much about our way of speaking about *our* orientation, commitment, and presence of mind as it is about procedures by which we have come to understand what we do. Learning is an attitude of attentitiveness to the things of immediate experience-understood retrospectively. Whilst in one sense the body is the most abiding and inescapable presence in our lives, it is also characterised by absence. That is, one's own body is rarely the thematic object of experience. The body, as a ground of experience tends to recede from direct experience.

ML redeems this lived experience, and I so doing can provide a feeling for pedagogy, which carries within it a moral sense of what ought to be, rather than a set of procedures. To better cope with this moral issue is the reason why the movement profession should attend more closely to the use of descriptive anecdotes. It is ethics or moral understanding that helps us to conform to the guidelines for lifeworld description which van Mannen (1982; 1990; and 1995) has developed. Ethical praxis draws us closer to living relations and situations of the lifeworld. This moral practice transforms thought into a more thoughtful praxis. It is the cyclical process of

reflection-action-reflection that changes the world and concretises and subjectivises our deepened understanding in practical action.

Because of hermeneuticism's sensitivity to inter-relational communication, ML can more astutely voice PL's ambitious philosophical stance. In tandem, they transform as well as transcend Modern PE's language *from* its intensive care to create physical conditions in order to learn how-to-move, *to* that of manifesting care for creating the more apt participant conversational discourses and experiential listening conditions. Such conditions are required to better understand movement as a meaningful form of learning. Importantly, whilst Modern PE tended to "apply" [implement] movement *to* the body, its function was to fit all bodies to conform to various physical "event-techniques", largely to become physically fit. Differently, through inviting phenomenological descriptions of movement enterprises, an interchanging-form of pedagogy evolves as a transition into initiating a "process" of probing dialogue into either disturbing, banal, or sublime and responsive experiences. While negative movement experiences can distort one's interpretation, (as explained in Chapters 7 onwards) positive encounters can enervate its practioner to find out more about their PE enterprises and thus vitalise the necessary conditions for learning more for themselves about their own and others' human resources. How we treat ourselves in the way we talk or the way we experience the many PE "gaps" we encounter is influenced by what we do ourselves, what appeals to us, but we need to converse in company with significant others in order to validate our claims.

I propose that offering to commentate on one's experiences helps its speaker to articulate and redeem their lived "moving" encounters, and in so doing may provide its correspondents with a shared *feeling* for pedagogy. This is because a good phenomenological description is one in which what is described carries within the description a moral sense of what *ought* to be, rather than a set of precedures to follow in our pursuit of knowledge. Indeed, the PE profession must remind itself that Kant's criticism of metaphysics had concluded that all we can ever know with any degree of certainty is the phenomenal world of sense experience, the state of appearances, but never the noumenal world of things as they "really are".

Phenomenology's introduction to PE institution's launched an attempt to answer the question of "what is it?" we are experiencing when we experience something. Phenomenology is not a propositional discourse. Rather, it constantly reminds us that there is no phenomenology of "passivity", but there is a phenomenal "mood". It is by engaging in phenomenology's voicing of one's experiences that teaching can begin to be transformed into pedagogy.

Engaging in pedagogical and phenomenologically rich descriptions orientates us to what is carried *within* lived experience with and volitionaly accepted [or rejecteded] by others. Educators must bear in mind that phenomenology is a philosophical movement which concentrates on the detailed description of "*conscious*" experience. Phenomenology is understood as the science of phenomena as opposed to the science of "being", calling for an interest in the nature of PE experiences. Exercising phenomenology also helps us capture those beautiful moments when the heightened awareness of our experience somehow becomes lifelong lasting impressions. Furthermore, such phenomenal encounters can evolve into moral and personal concerns that can be shared in conversation *and* in one's actions. It is the immanent consequences of conversation that comes under hermeneuticism's analytic review in the next three chapters. This is because it is through hermeneuticism's treatment that one's *social* situatedness, the location of the beholder's austere sense of "I" is serially reconstitutued afresh in a cultural community, like PE. For the PE specialist, what hermeneutics calls for is an interest in the person, the subject of experiences.

Chapter Five   Structuralism, Poststructuralism and Innovations in PE

Introduction

In this chapter, I sketch PE's pivotal shift *from* unwittingly employing Saussure's (1977) language as viewed from a structural perspective conveying the previous chapter's "framed" models of teaching *to* employing poststructuralism's open dialogue; unravelling its dynamics to relocate and revere the subjective "self". I continue to refer to Merleau-Ponty as one of PE's early associates. His work provided the movement profession with a monistic, rather than a dualistic philosophical grounding which enabled the parasitic make-up of PE as a curriculum subject in its own right to begin to collate together the fields of language communication, the study of human movement, and the educational potential of PE's daily practices. This professional transformation took place through three fairly distinct eras. The first stage occurred from 1950 -1970. The second stage ran from circa 1970 -1990, and the current stage from the early 1990s onwards.

PE's historical sketch

I review in this chapter the study's evolving narrative about PE's patchwork-like growth and signal the watershed changes to their daily practices and forms of knowledge that currently, its professionals and future specialists need to come to terms with.

I have explained why modern PE's profession needed to change its image *from* that of its parasitic reliance to sustain its curriculum credibility by "referencing" its content of knowledge to the objective field of science and overt results data. It created a sense of completion by drawing lines where we cross into and out of, *to* what embraces a more covert, subjective form of knowledge. Contemporary PE rejoices in both endorsing similar movement encounters and delights in welcoming "differences" in qualitatively covert experiences. For this purpose, all movement interpreters need to have a clear understanding of the inseparable "physical", "cultural" and "personal" education goals. However, to fuse these triple objectives, rather than compartmentalise them, is one of the sharpest challenges of cutting-edge

thinking, especially when it comes to endorsing the understanding of PE's meaning "on the move" as it were.

For instance, coping with their hostile environment consumed the energies of our early ancestors (Van Dalen & Bennett, 1971). Their young generation were trained in "collective security" skills and "conformity conduct", "group consciousness" and "group solidarity" were emphasised more than individuals' rights in ancient tribal societies. Formal education arose with the development of writing, and education's main objective was to read and write, for such knowledge gave one "power". The expression of religious ideas and the preservation of national identity followed. Dance and hygiene practices, for Jews, were directed towards worship.

Greek Spartan PE was designed to develop a "man of action" (Van Dalen & Bennett 1971: 40) who possessed brute strength, physical endurance, unflinching courage and fighting skill. The Athenian educational ideal was to unite the "man of action" with "the man of wisdom". Early Roman education was geared to train youths to be citizen-soldiers who would serve the state, industriously conduct their individual businesses and consciously revere their gods and elders. The middle age and early modern times saw education largely in terms of social and moral disciplining, more related to dealing with life's earthly and verbal realities. Verbal realists believed that comprehending the ethical precepts and meaning of the classics were more important than analysing their grammar and literary forms, or their logic and dialectics (Van Dalen, 1965). There then followed the theory that ideas are acquired through the senses, which naturally refocused attention on the body. Curiosity about the physiological laws governing the body and mind opened the "pedagogical" swing-door. The 17th century was an age when "men" were still trapped in religious and civil turmoil and engaged in a dramatic struggle between reason and authority, liberty, and despotism. The 18th century, the "Age of Enlightenment" marked a philosophical rebellion against enslavement of the individual. The great secret of education, Rousseau (1936: 237) declared:

> …is to make exercises of the body and of the mind always serve as a recreation for each other.

As summarised in International Council of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation (ICHPER) "Physical Education in the School Curriculum" in its 1969 International Questionnaire Report part 1 p27, the major objectives for PE were:

> …to develop normal physical growth, body control and fitness, personal skills, social accomplishments, and character training and social behaviour.

From this succinct historical sketch intertwining the evolution of its parasitic survival with educational roots, contemporary PE, I next argue, needs to acknowledge the very integrity of PE's genesis, which includes the nursing of its maturing, upper schooling learners via the use of movement and language [having acquired and become familiarised to their own movement potential and an extended linguistic vocabulary] as a *rite de passage* into a disciplined form of adulthood. Recently, PE's professional practices have undergone a transition from modern teaching, characterised as a way to point in to the subject content's "*referenced*" movement skills.

It was during the latter part of the 1990s that some of the key influences from the broad philosophical movement of postmodernism, which I interchange with poststructuralism, began to be infused into PE's professional "consciousness" by bringing communication, movement experiences, and their professional treatment under a more cohesive mode of scrutiny. Their collective effect upon PE was to help make known movement's immanent meaning for its resident mover. In the wake of poststructuralism's indirect patronage, PE came to be re-viewed, and re-presented more under the auspices of its "meaning" (Schempp 1987, Shulman & Bowen 2002, Taylor 1991, Tinning 1985). It was at the turn of the last century that PL (1992) was introduced to the profession by Whitehead. And it was a year or two later that I began to think of ML as a way forward to promote PL's philosophy to try to highlight and advert the hidden/unmentioned values and meanings of PE and human movement to its future generation's participant and conscious awareness. ML however, focuses not on "teaching" the human in the movement, which is an impossible task. Rather, it seeks to engage movement's inhabitants and correspondents in the more complex realm of pedagogy, where its professional onus

is to place more on a collaborative search for meaning. It is a meaning if it comes to exist between its interlocutors and less on the basis of an initiation into theory.

How an apprenticing PE specialist begins to change one's role from that of a "teacher" to a "pedagogue" centres on one's capacity to engage others in conversation. Teaching is a telling process; pedagogy is a talking event. Pedagogy is an invitation to speak. But then it is much more than merely conversing with another. As I show in Chapters 6 onwards, to speak is to fight, to protect, to maintain, and even to advance one's mode of existence. At the same time, it is also, paradoxically, a fight to preserve our sense of playfulness. Playing and fighting together is a paradox. Nevertheless, it is one that I intend to sustain and promote logically in response to postmodernism's philosophical movement which evolved in reaction to modernism, the tendency in contemporary culture to accept only "objective truth". Postmodernist thought is an intentional departure from the previously dominant modernist approaches. The term "postmodernism" comes from its critique of the "modernist" scientific mentality of "objectivity", and which characterized PE's science reverence during the last century. Amongst its many radical innovations was that of poststructuralism's linguisitc analysis, qualifying the distinction between that of a conscious self and an unconcious "otherness" which are implicity interchanged in the sometimes benign and sometimes painful skirmishes of speech.

Whilst following Whitehead's (2002) PL philosophy promoting movement's unquestioned physical benefits as a universal encounter, I introduce ML as a way to further discriminate, to point out and celebrate the perceived "differences" its "agent-residents" volitional expression s about following their transitory immersion in movement. I want PE to be valued in its own right by converting its physical educationalists to become interpreters of personal epiphanies. Importantly, I want PE's life meaning attributes to be resurfaced, to be reintroduced and refreshed so that its participants can once again begin to address its generic roots, to collate the sciences with the arts of human movement. It involves exploring not simply the different possibilities of movement, but the "human potential" of each person, to value what is familiar, like play, as something ordinary but now made to be perceived as something unfamiliar.

PE allows us to live in and out of movement. Its language should also be of a kind that allows us to live in and out of words, to venture in and out of our streams of consciousness, in and out of ourselves, to enable its specialists to improve their learner's life through engaging in its original vocational, missionary calling.

It attends closely to its agent's enacted and reflected commentary about and in movement. In short, PE's professional focus is undergoing a seminal shift *from* issuing details *about* the fact of the movement to the mass class *to* becoming more involved with interpreting the potential meaning and understanding of the personal effect of the act *fo*r individual movers. Movement Literacy endeavours to put to practice the effects of this shift from dealing with the "grammar" of technical movement to that of discussing Barthes' distinction between text and textuality. The former is a material object that occupies space in a bookshop; the latter is a "methodological" field that is experienced as activity and production (Csordas, 1999). ML addresses the textured literature, its PE advocate converses with each mover's narrated tales enacted *within* movement. As a movement literate, one addresses familiar topics, like "healing", "emotion", "elation" or "confusion" but it is a different perspective from that of another's embodied account. Essentially, then, I advance ML as a way to convert movement specialists from the notion that PE stands for physical education, but rather, for "personal epiphanies". To begin to feel a strong sense of conviction in the potential of movement to reveal who we are. We all live in a state of constant change; however, stability comes to rest in the imagination of one's belief in the healing power of movement.

Seeking endorsement

PE enterprises, as I interpret them, cannot be a one-person philosophy. PE can never be "As you like it". Movement can be schooled in public but it is encountered in solitude and complete isolation from others. You need to compare and contrast your experiences with others in order for your account to be granted any credibility. Your particular, private encounter needs to be corroborated, compared and contrasted with public, universal accounts. To educate "movers" from approximately 14 years of age and onwards, whether they have an established skill threshold or not, PE's professional focus needs to shift to become life-coaches. That is, to be able to

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encode the immanent [inherent] terms of engagement between its conversing interlocutors, paradoxically, while masking the very process of learning. PE's professional "preparation programme" needs to be reconceived as an initiation into the disciplined rituals of dialogic discourse. The "craft" of teaching movement was addressed at institutions preparing professional PE specialists, but the diverse "arts" of creating dialogue as a human skill was not closely examined, neither was the connoisseur nature of engaging in pedagogic as acts discussed. PE's contemporary practices must become familiar with postmodernism's *criticism*, its censure of knowledge, and its different versions of deconstructive and reconstructive *critique* as critical appraisal of knowledge; [benevolently and adroitly using resourceful techniques to elicit and compassionately help others to realize their own human qualities].

While ancient Platonism (in Chapter 1) and modern Western philosophy have been most critical of the body, ML recalls philosophy's central aims of knowledge, self-knowledge, right actions, justice, and the quest for the "good" [morally sound] life. Though Kant (in Chapter 3) is right that incessant attention to one's bodily sensations is harmful, the problem is not somaesthetic attention *per se* but rather extreme one-sidedness of attention. One-sidedness unfortunately affected "Iago's" self perception, his view on PE, on "teaching", and toward the conduct of "his" lessons. This one-sidedness seemed to reside beneath his threshold of consciousness. Firmly, he held bodies of knowledge. His knowledge of the body, however, was stark.

Guiding Motif

Voicing PL, ML serves as a guiding motif for PE's mentors and missionaries to move beyond the rigid paradigms of Modernism and into the more flexible arena of postmodernism's critique. In the dissertation's opening phase, modern PE was not yet fully cognizant with poststructuralism's radical and critical reflection on the limits, on the immanent influence and consequences of language to, and for its users. Poststructuralism names a theory, or a group of theories, concerning the relationship between human beings, the world [the Big Other], and the practice of making and reproducing meanings. This is why this chapter focuses on the fundamental

differences between structuralism and poststructuralism as the latter's innovative viewpoints and innovative ideas came to permeate and impact upon the practice of education in general. This was largely because at the heart of poststructuralist strategies and forms of analysis lies the dismantling or deconstruction of stable conceptions of subjectivity.

What this study's leading critical interpreters, primarily Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Ricoeur (1992) insist on as unavoidable is that in our efforts to understand others and oneself, the necessity of surrendering to a teacher-learner interaction always puts one at some kind of risk. There is a requirement for "situated reflection", for which no indemnity can be provided, by many methods of technique claiming some independent security *outside* the interaction itself. In Chapters 7 and 8, I shall convey pedagogy as heavily governed by immanent contingencies which I seek to identify for preparing movement educators to become PE emissaries capable of reading movement as a conversation of humankind by using more prudent, demonstrative and less scientific language.

PE's enterprises, as I interpret them, cannot be a one-person philosophy. Nevertheless, it *is* an exploration of thought, and an encoding of the immanent [inherent] terms of engagement between its corresponding, conversing interlocutors. Its professional preparation needs to be conceived as an initiation into the disciplined "rituals" of dialogic discourse which is constantly oriented toward the personal art of a pedagogic act. I maintain that PE's contemporary practices need to become familiar with a critique of knowledge. Ultimately, the pedagogic act which is brought under focus needs to be understood as reaching beyond the realm of theory.

Philosophical moves from the rigid paradigms of modernism to postmodernism's flexible implication for PE *qua* education reveal that neither human subjects nor the conceptual or material objects among which they live are any longer thinkable in their previous distinctness. Furthermore, there is a separation from among the dynamic, correlated, multiple systems within which they arise, seeing new connections and alliances that cut across the monolithic certainties of the Western logos. Following

the radical impact of postmodernity, PE's professional understanding of the human being has been irrevocably de-centred.

Established at this midpoint in the thesis is that professional knowledge within and beyond that of "teaching" can be clinically "evacuated" to that of a supervening "method" which, insulated from the idiosyncrasies and contingencies of the professional person's being, can provide a secure vantage point from which directives can be issued in his or her "classroom practice". In effect, professional educators can now bring together all of the most important themes and indications of 19th and 20th century philosophy. Consequently, these traditional learning processes as featured in a learning-to-learn dialogue may be revisited, re-elaborated, re-interpreted and critically examined in order to return PE's science-bound language to its literary communicative origin.

For example, modern PE's communication lacked the use of metaphor, whereas it is largely via the use of metaphor that contemporary PE's language differs from that of the last century, in order to reveal the reality in language's use, and in the act of moving as a chosen location, but also revealing a reality. Whilst we cannot manipulate reality, we can interpret it in diverse ways to orientate our understanding towards a coherent meaning. The reflective practice of ML draws upon certain immanent but transient qualities of language, which makes of us what we are, a being in transformation.

Structuralism

Structuralism is the linguisitic and anthropological theory that different aspects of thinking, language,and culture are already related to one another in a logical pattern. It identifies universal structures underlying cultures, usually as binary oppositions. Structuralism creates beliefs that human beings are the effect of structures that escape their awareness. Not missing linkages of potential meaning is the key hazzard that is inbuilt into all languages. This is because any purely private language does not permit dialogue, and thus hardly qualifies as a "language". Structuralism's weakest link was that it did not create linkages in its language.

Crucially, structuralism's instigator, Saussure (2004) contended that meaning is *structured* and therefore does not stem from individual choice but from the system of language itself. This remains controversial. For instance, it clearly undermines the existentialist notion that people are responsible for making their own meaning. Furthermore, it is contrary to the empirical way of looking at things. Rather than separating language into isolated events and studying them as distinct entities, Saussure's (2004) structuralism was founded on analysing how things [*not humans*] *connect* to one another. At the extreme, a structuralist theory of language omits relation to entities outside the system, and stresses coherence rather than correspondence.

Structuralism held that language is a self-contained, non-referential system, and that the philosophical task was to seek out language's necessary and universal structural features, those features taken to underlie and be *prior* to the empirical, contingent features of language. In effect, "structuralists" were seeking subjective noumenal categories, viewing the world as it actually is. Although we cannot know the "noumena", we know it's there, based on the way we understand the phenomenal world. However, phenomenologists were content with describing the phenomena encountered without asking, or, not drawing attention to what *connection* to an external reality those experiences might have. This is where the work of hermeneutics steps in. In the next chapter I explain that hermeneutics concerns, being ever more critical of methods of human interpretation and its subsequent understanding first, of text, and secondly of the whole social, historical, and psychological world and the purpose of life.

Structuralism, in particular, can be held responsible for the *demise* and distortion of PE's public image. This is because structuralists saw the world organized into interlocking systems, allied to *unaccountable*, but genetic "deep structures", with their own mode of "grammars", their own self-contained explanations. Thus, if one could disseminate these structures, then, they would be made open to analysis. On this structural mode of understanding, therefore, it was assumed that a methodical study of PE's modernist language, that is, its structures, when conceived as sign systems, would eventually prove to be a scientific study of the nature of humankind. Yet, when

viewed as a system, structuralism entirely rejected such concepts as human freedom and choice and focused, *instead*, on the way that human behaviour was *determined* by various sentient-inspired structures, which, inevitably, led to the danger of collapsing all knowledge difference; common denominators rule its [movement's] language. Structuralism is like the snowman trying to understand itself by breaking itself into bits and pieces to be examined, useful to isolate and analyse movement, but detached [dislocated] from subject-referencing.

What Saussure maintained was that language should be regarded as a structure, *independent* of the things that it refers to; words held their own self-standing meaning. This line of thinking led to some controversial ideas, not least of which was that the individual is essentially a complex fabric of meanings, intricately woven together. Meaning, however initiated, was thought of as emanating *out* of language. Contrary to structuralism's construct of meaning, however, I intend to show that we do not simply speak a language, but, very differently, that language speaks itself through us, through our essential nature of being in the world. We have no option but borrow other speaker's words, if we are to inhabit and thus rightly use any meaning at all.

Turning our inside experiences outside

Saussure's approach led to a new way of *thinking* about meaning. He said it is not individuals who give language its meaning, but rather it is the way words *relate* to one another. These words "*already*" have meaning, even before people speak them, and this meaning does not simply depend on what words refer to.

This is why I introduce Movement Literacy as about untangling the essential but elusive qualities of pedagogy's nature. By interpreting another's version of PE as one's own encounter, ML is composed in such a way as to transform movement enterprises into that of a therapeutic healing encounter. It does so, largely by constantly acknowledging one's "self-identity". Implicitly, Movement Literacy links what is heard by and affects the listener, but such utterances may also remain unrealised by its speaker. ML informs apprenticing PE professionals in how to

exercise changing perspectives about reflecting upon and expressing rational and emotionally moving enterprises; an on-going dialectical analysis, not separating, but rather connecting relationships during educational praxis.

ML's critical and interpretive praxis can help PE missionaries to narrate their story as to why they have committed their career to advocating movement to others. The mystery of PE, that is, its "silent deed", its "covenant-of-hope", its "forgotten" linkage between the materialising of secular rituals to represent sacred abstractions, cannot be taught when learning is conceived to be analogous to that of a form of training, as "Iago" held it to be. Rather, teaching's art, its pedagogy becomes apparent when having deconstructed the act of teaching in terms of its limitations to the act of learning, I unveil some of its key, but hidden features into it what amounts to the art of practicing pedagogy to learn, in the closing chapters.

I propose to raise the reader's awareness of radical ideas emergent from the innovative possibilities of postmodernism for better valuing the fuller richness of human movement's contribution to the realm of education. In particular, I encourage movement's schooling advocates to employ a critical poststructural conceptualization of its own profession. The profession, for ever, needs to explore the hidden conflicts in the orthodoxy of its practices. It needs to constantly ask itself how one can strengthen and investigate professional relations and meanings, as they can be constructed within an ever changing realm of justice, freedom, and equity. Individuals should discuss the professional and moral principles which PE and its emissaries are morally bound to nurture.

This axial phase of the thesis profiles the shift from teaching to pedagogy, to placing another person by way of similar experiences that others have encountered before them, coming to terms with the discipline of dialogue; coping with the dialectic between a mode of knowledge [techne] which refers to a reasoned novice as capacity to make / perform movement but not to its agent-maker. Put differently, contemporary PE deals with a mode of knowledge founded on the experiential realm of "phronesis" which is more fully addressed in Chapter 7. Phronesis is something which remains on the level of a speculative experiential quality and refers to one's

capacity to act judiciously, since the universals within its grasp are always modifiable in the light of its continuing exposure to particular classroom happenings. For example, gifted physical performers may be found among the very young, as indeed one occasionally finds gifted teachers. On the other hand, both movement performers and professional educators need a kind of foil against which they can begin to compare their experiences. There are activities such as gymnastics or the playing of a musical instrument, which we might want to describe as "performative" rather than productive since they do not leave behind them deposits or reified products. Predictable performances, rather than elements of opportunity such as games playing, lessen the factor of luck and reduce the play of cavalier spirit. Performative concerns deny personal attribution, preventing the mover agent from conspicuously claiming one's resourcefulness and opportunism [subtlety of mind]. In effect, facing a predicament in the realm of play or sport is very much like facing a predicament in classroom teaching. The more one plays a sport the more adaptable they become to its challenges. The same applies to teaching PE, or any other curriculum subject.

I argue that different intellectual excellences, precisely insofar as they depend on different degrees of experience, correspond to different stages or phases of schooling and eventually life's changing seasons. I equate the primacy of how we learn to move to that of how we learn to speak. There is an illuminating parallel between language as the act of interpretation and speech, and the practical field in which one acts, when the messenger is not detached from one's message. There is a tension between closure and openness, and an ever renewed, never antecedently guaranteed, mediation between universal and particular.

Relationships

I seek to explain how to bind oneself to the web of human relationships by the astute use of language, especially speech. The infinity of language, its interventions and its inexhaustible capacity for new utterance itself is deeply historical and becomes what it is through a wayward development over time, a process of gathering, combining, profiling, recessing, discarding, and layering meanings, interests, perceptions, and

values; all of this directed by no higher logic or plan than what can be reconstructed of the life of the particular language itself. What is important here is not just the way in which language is bound to the past, so that it is the dominant mode of being of tradition. Language's history, its pastness, signifies our particular encultured upbringing. More especially, language offers signs of the way in which it binds those who use it [everyone] to the past.

In a sense, no one *uses* language; no one that is, constructs thoughts within his or her subjectivity and *then* employs words which can best convey these thoughts to the public. Rather thinking is already itself within language; as creative or radical thinking, it does not fall into the obvious pathways of the language [its clichés] but strains to cut fresh paths.

It is with cutting fresh pathways of thinking about movement, and in the process, the thinking about one's self in movement, that the voicing of PL comes under focus. What I propose is that when voiced through ML's disciplined guided pathways, the presenting of PL may then help its professionals to treat one's sense of "sovereignty" one's own and that of one's learners with the rightful reverence that we all deserve as fellow human beings. The crucial point is that language, be it for the sake of learning what PE originally means or appreciating literature in its own right, needs to be perceived and accepted as a kind of buoyancy that language gives to thought. Thinking is a tension-filled activity which is already detached from language, whilst interminably all thinking tries to find poise and direction in it. Modern PE's profession had to navigate its participants' attention through scientific terms which escape from their culture's history and spoken dialect, hence lose touch with their ancestors' traditional meanings, rituals and beliefs.

Perspectives

Movement pedagogy embraces many different perspectives which serve as a dynamic and fluent interplay amongst different fields of knowledge and between different personnel aspiring to turn movement into something which seriously interests and affects the commitment of our lives with the outside world. For

example, all movement participants need to examine our performances as we live them, as well as how we conceptualize them, so that we can reflect on the essential "lasting impressions" which characterize the "event", by acknowledging that we "author" our own descriptions. Such self authored commentaries about movement establish a strong and orientated *relation* between movement and ourselves as abiding concerns. This relationship balances the movement context by considering its conscious glimpses [epiphanies] as set against its whole encounter, and by being placed in touch with innovative aspects of one's indwelt-self (Abram; 1996) as set against its habituated self.

PE becomes familiar to us only by our volitionally adopting a posture to being-given-over or losing ourselves to some quest of being restored to an original sense of what it means to be a mover, a thinker, or to be a listener to another's words [suggesting an act of recovery which is uplifting as a form of self renewal and a settling into a newly restored self]. PE is a way of re-learning how to look at the world by turning to a renewed but transformed and re-awaked generic-experience, which is given another turn of meaning by the infallible use of a public language. Understood in this sense and sequence, then, PE's pedagogy is always a project *of* someone; a real person who sets out to make sense of a certain aspect of a certain context. This real person is located in a certain set of particular circumstances, in a communal cultural setting and historical life-circumstance, but always in a one-off situation.

Movement is learning on the move; it is about placing oneself in a novel, partly expected and partly unexpected position. Similarly, language moves us as we speak; rendering us vulnerable to the quirks, the spin and turns of linguistic reasoning, the experiences of which constantly help us to become sensitive to what lies unexpressed.

Poststructuralism

Unlike structuralism, poststructuralism is a label formulated by American academics to denote the heterogeneous works of a series of French intellectuals who came to international prominence in the 1960s and 1970s. It is best explained as a theory of

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knowledge *and* language. It helps us to understand the broad concerns articulated in postmodernism, which is associated with a playful acceptance of a culture's surface and superficial style, self-conscious quotation and parody, and a celebration of the ironic, the transient, and the contradictory. In its poststructuralist aspects postmodernism includes a denial of any fixed meaning, or any correspondence between language and the "Big Other", the world, or any fixed reality, or truth, or fact, as the "object of enquiry". Yet, for me, it is how poststructuralism critically looks at the question of locating one's subjective-being in the process of education that I want to begin to disentangle, in order to disentangle the nature of pedagogy, and not that of teaching.

In the first place, if the mover-agent, or the "learner-subject" is an *effect* of culture, a result of the circulation of meanings in the symbolic order, rather than their origin, subjectivity is more likely to reproduce the uncertainties and the range of beliefs we encounter, than to resolve them. This cannot be education. In the second place, the distinction between the subject "in here", in me, and the object "out there" is itself the consequence of the old view of the relationship between human beings and language. If, in the Cartesian tradition of Enlightenment, my consciousness is what exists unconditionally, and language is no more than the "instrument" it makes use of in order to communicate about the world with other consciousnesses, we may conceive of knowledge in terms of a subject contemplating the objects it knows about. On the other hand, if our consciousness is itself brought into being by borrowing meanings from the "Big Other", and if the world itself is differentiated by language, we cannot any longer think in terms of a binary opposition between a knowing subject *in here*, and the objects of its knowledge *out there*.

Language, according to poststructuralism, can intervene between human beings and their world. It suggests that the distinctions we make are *not* necessarily given by the world around us, but are instead produced by the symbolizing systems we learn which comes in structrualism. We learn our native tongue at such an early age that it seems *transparent*, a window onto a world of things, even if some of those things are imaginary, no more than ideas of things, perhaps derived from children's play or heard during the fast disappearing habit of story reading.

To emphasize, knowledge that befalls us in phenomenology is founded on one's personal encountering a movement's "moving" experience itself by its perceiver. In structuralism, knowledge, it was held, was to be founded on the "structures" that make experience publicly possible and thus subsequently accessible for verification and validation: by sharing what was assumed to be mutually understood concepts in a communal language or signs. Poststructuralism, in turn, argued that founding knowledge either on pure experience [phenomenology] or on systematic structures [structuralism] was impossible. This impossibility, however, was meant not to be understood as a failure or loss of meaning, but rather, conceived as a cause for "celebration and liberation."

Poststructuralism's linguisitic analysis served to shake PE's professional complacancy away from its science-bound style of communication. PE's communication was deeply immersed in the language of target setting, scheduled programmes, repetitions, prescribed outcomes, time-measurement, points systems and finite numerical data. Such overwhelming concerns with objectivity shaped not only their lesson planning and content material, but also the manner in which movement was presented under the *presumption* that its movers were learning something akin to what the specialists themselves had been privileged to encounter.

Learning movement was assumed to relay a closeness, or homogenous similarity to what had happened-upon and encompassed its career-minded "teachers" during their unexpected moving encounters, at their personal level of awareness. The strong supposition was that if PE's designated movement-disciplines placed me by way of certain curriculum-proclaimed human learning experiences [granting largely sociological and psychoanalytic insights], such as that of team-building, rule following, fair play and their impact on moral learning; then likewise, the opportunity to become immersed in movement acts could be left to "that-physical-action", and that action alone, [to assimilate its "performers" to the beguiling and bewitching nature of movement.] What poststructuralism's approach to literature maintains is that words have no absolute meaning, and that *any* text is open to an unlimited range of interpretations. On interpreting what is differently conceived by others, when both language and movement are placed under the microscope of this new

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perspective, new notions of learning and meanings take on very different consequences for movement educators.

Unwitting but disempowering ways

With technology's penetrating eyes, its cameras, its internet, its mobile phones, sport technology becomes addictive to intimate intrusive scrutiny, addictive to the fear of failure, disempowering self-image and self-identity, to physical perfection. Nevertheless, it has failed to address emotional health (Allenbough 1967; Abbs 1994; Becher 1989; Gore 1987; 1990; Kirk 1992a; Novak 1976).

It failed to address the unexplained gap between physical and emotional health. By elevating one's own life into that of what others expect of you and that when one's public image fails to complement one's private sense of being, it is possible for one to undergo exaggerated versions of one's personal existence. On the one hand, the public sees you as an idol; on the other hand, you see yourself as a fragile being. If this is the case, paranoia can set in, as was the case for John Kirwan (2010). In his text "*All Backs Don't Cry*", he writes with candour about how he was finally able to escort others out of this downward spiralling gap, a gap of confusion and depression, because he felt unable to balance his own sense of well-being with the demands the public made upon him. Many learners felt alienated in PE because they, also, could not resolve their own personal problems in failing to deal with the challenges, both overt and covert, that modern PE imposed upon them. It is with alleviating this problem that I offer this thesis on the therapeutic nature of ML.

PE's communicative approach failed to divulge its silent realm of knowledge, because its conventional practices could not convey, or articulate the profession's immanent "covenant of hope", a silent deed which I shall unwrap as movement-interpreters' true burden in the next few chapters. For now, this "covenant of hope" can be thought of in terms similar to that which political philosophers refer to as an other's "social contract"; a promise, or an endeavour from a collective group, e.g., PE's proponents as a kind of undeclared pledge to try to employ the best and most ethical possible means to enable its movers to better understand what the act of

moving may come to mean for them. My enduring concern is that when movers' conscious attention become immersed "into" the beguiling realm of movement, they may encounter a rather alarming sense of alienation (a body/mind separation) or an exhilarating experience both of which can leave a lasting impression on that individual. ML can be a constructive therapeutic healing for movement advocates to employ to help their "traumatised", or "confused", or "astonished" learners to be ushered from the "unconscious" encounters in movement, and eventually, begin to come to terms with what might be implied from such enactments.

Kinaesthesis

For instance, in the case of our private, inner-felt sensations, our kinaesthetic encounters [or proprioceptive awareness] refer to the flow patterns the mover partially attends to as one is engaged in the process of moving. It is an acute awareness of something embodied which we regard as that of "one's own" and its perception, and yet which is something that stubbornly remains alien to us. Kinaesthesis is the sense of the relative position of neighbouring parts of the body and strength of effort being employed in the movement. It is distinguished from exteroception, by which we perceive the outside world and interoception, by which we perceive pain, hunger and the movement of internal organs. Kinaesthesis was discussed some time ago by Arnold (1979), and even earlier by Best (1974), and again (1990), as something that is tacit, tangential, tantalising, and yet, seriously provokes differing modes of personal experience. It is with further surfacing the "personal" experience of PE that I initiate ML in a language which, importantly, we choose for ourselves.

Vague designation of words

In the act of speaking *of* such experiences, for example, my running on Cleeve Hill, when, with a following warm breeze, and a slight down-slope that extended over five kilometres, I suddenly felt intensely elated, lost touch with my bodily sensations, and, even felt as if I was not touching the ground, yet my surroundings became brighter than usual. The yellow of the gorse bushes was luminous, the grass greener, the soil

shimmered in a brighter shade of gold. And I lost touch with time, indeed, I lost touch with myself. This loss of self was exhilarating for me but it can be depressing for others because they may not be able to cope with or fully recover from this disorientation.

It is with such loss of self in both forms that in these closing chapters I try to surface. I try to make public what being engaged in its pedagogy is *like* - its spectral role. I seek to bring the reader's awareness to PE's hidden contemporary pedagogic communicative-ingredients. The coming PE profession needs to be made aware of the potential enlightening nature of clarifying its previously insular concerns about the way we learn. It needs to cope with the ambiguity of PE's many conceptual cognitive and abstract emotional "gaps" to manage its connections between theory and practice, and *vice-versa*. It needs a professional willingness to venture into more panoramic but indistinctive and more qualitative realms of enquiry.

Encoding

In essence then, the thesis takes a distinctive semantic turn to address how meaning is encoded in language, and then examine its pragmatic practice, the actualised consequences of listening, understanding, and responding to all its speakers' perspectives. In particular, I want to draw attention to the ambiguous but compelling sensuous feeling that one may encounter whilst engaged in movement, the nature of which *may* be made public for others to reject or to part endorse, validate and lend further credibility to its account. This is not an easy task, because of the vague designation of word usage, and its un-signified meaning.

Most words, we assume, carry meaning, or at least, the general idea of its current meaning as exercised in the unpredictable dynamics that arise during movement-disciplined activities. Words help define different concepts, and they also refer to different forms of experienced phenomena. They also hold the power to interflow, to cross-fertilize meanings, ideas, and beliefs, and offer a temporary bridge-head as linking part meanings when different individuals try to exchange their own intended

meanings with another person who also employs perhaps similar, but possibly very differently *intended* meanings.

Merleau-Ponty welcomed structuralism's attempt to go beyond the "subject-object correlation" (Signs 1960: 123), though he criticised the overuse of the term "structure" in contemporary writings. Even so, Merleau-Ponty (1968) did not view language as an anonymous system [as the structuralists did]. Although he agreed with Heidegger (1958) that "language speaks man", he nevertheless always interpreted language grounded in perception. Our employment of language is like our use of a new sense organ, which itself retreats from view and presents us only with world. As in the visual field, what is seen slips out of focus into a blur, so also in language there is an indefinite boundary to our linguistic domain, where language shades off into innuendos, murmurs and eventually, into silence (Signs, 1960).

Phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty, proceeds by suspending the natural attitude in a special form of reflection: overcoming the natural attitude is not a matter of installing us in "a closed, transparent milieu" (Signs 1960a:162), but of recognizing the manner in which thought arises out of its immersion in the natural attitude. Things are not merely pure extended objects in the Cartesian manner, but are disclosed in their properties precisely because of the nature of the body and its sensory and motor capacities. Whatever is revealed to its agent-encounter, the thing is:

> …caught up in the context of my body.　　　　　(Signs: 168)

Moreover, "I" do not discover myself as an isolated consciousness, rather

> …Cogito must reveal me in a situation, and it is on this condition alone that transcendental subjectivity can…*be* an intersubjectivity.　　　　　(1945, 1962 xiii)

Merleau-Ponty thinks it revelatory that only in conversation with others, in the act of intersubjective exchanges, can one's ego become fully itself. He views the complexity of our bodily relations as a paradigm case for better understanding the nature of our self-reflection. We can not experience touching and being touched at the same time, rather we pass from one role into the other. We engage with others,

in a special intertwining relation. Our conscious activity and our unconscious passivity are different "moments" and this leads to us pass over the activity of our bodies in perception, and to attend more carefully to what we need to say.

Living utterances

My speaking act clearly takes place, in the now, in the immediate moment of my utterances, but sustained only on the unpredictable play of my words as received and understood by my listener. I am trying to help another person to share, to take turns, to be in the "know" of the nature of my experiences. During this talking process, I am trying to reproduce the imaginary relations of individuals to their realized conditions of existence, be it mythological or ideological. This *live-performance* entails my relaying across my own insights to that of another, and then carefully observing his or her gestured and/or verbal evidence as testimony of the listener's acceptance to align, or approximate with what I am trying to portray.

This is what ML should be about. It examines the alternating process of counselling meaning from one person to another. It involves a dual connoisseurship in an intimate acquaintance *with* and *in* movement, and an ability to communicate meaning oriented towards another. The other in PE is one's learners who occupy a different experiential background, and is approaching not the early stages, but rather, the maturing phases of conceptual and physiological growth: PE's senior pupils. The assumption is made here that their maturing communication expression and more accomplished motile capacity is such that their description of enacted experiences as swimmers or as hockey players is uttered in terms consistent with their internalised personal self-perception [self-description] and their evaluative statements about one's unappreciated, insensitive orientation towards human movement. This carries implications towards commitment to movement, or divorce from it. I seek to harmonise the emerging components of the self, to nurture a learner who becomes competent to self-orchestrate one's self-being to cope with multi-dimensional portraits of life and its unpredictable interactions. PE's communication, I argue, varies according to the theoretical frame of reference employed and the stress placed on certain aspects of the total process, but which all include five

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fundamental factors: an initiator; a recipient; a mode or a vehicle; a message; and an effect.

Reaching into the zone

I am especially interested in extending Mosston and Ashworth's (1992-2002) incomplete "spectrum" of teaching". It was largely focused on planning pre-lesson tactics to consider post-lesson consequences for all its participants, its professional deliverer as well as its agent recipients. Classroom interaction was systematically and strategically simplified in order to construct an irreducible "objective" set of causal relationships between teaching styles and learning outcomes. Styles of teaching were developed and disseminated as neutral personal issues, since its technical devices reflected no particular value position, no significant shift in equating power relationships; did not address the complex politics embedded in pedagogy.

I am also interested in promoting and refining PL's onus upon the qualitative modes of communication, linking its agent's "moving-experiences" with those who may have an inspired passion to pursue epiphany-like enactments [which coaches and athletes now refer to as being "in the zone"]. This is the kind of experience that I associate with my run on Cleeve Hill, or my parachuting, or running amongst the sand dunes in Wales. Clearly, not all PE learners may encounter such privileges. However, if a person wishes to dedicate one's life to become a movement missionary, she or he should be able to spread the word of movement and appreciate PE's movement images who we are. PE *is* made to "speak" the human contract (Chapters 6-8), but its immanent rules of engagement are veiled and not easily surfaced. This is a bold claim which I justify in these closing chapters by referring to "being-in-the zone". I hold the view that most, if not all, aspiring PE interpreters will have encountered what I label as a "locale of tranquility" (Chapters 7 and 8). ML is all about encouraging apprenticing PE specialists to be human movement's witness, to bear testimony to others about what it is like to be human, and to encounter moment in a caring compassionate mode of communication. It is to share PE with its missionaries who may have become dedicated to it, to share the admirable serenity and equanimity

and humility manifested in movement, as it can only be replicated in one's words and actions during the most testing of circumstances.

For now, reference to the "zone" can be thought of as a kind of suspension of one's sense of "being and time", a penetrating loss of a sense of presence and of time, as if my very being has been temporarily removed from within my bodily framework, and somehow taken out to transiently occupy another state of being, [another "Ted" stepping outside of me "the familiar "Ted" and seen in a different light, somehow.] This is the kind of removed "self" that phenomenologists tried, but failed to catch a glimpse of the personalised person inside the person and, endeavoured to surface for public reference and reviewing. Phenomenologists aspired to step into the gap between my familiar conscious self and that of my unfamiliar, unconscious self which Ricoeur refers to - as my "otherness".

Locale of tranquility

PE's "locale of tranquility" is a kind of upgraded version from "being-in-the-zone". In a simplistic sense, the transient "moments" are when a person suddenly feels ecstatic because one has scored a goal, made a telling tackle, finished the school's cross-country run, or completed a first length of the pool, thus, becoming labelled by one's PE teacher as a "swimmer", rather than a "non-swimmer". But, I am more concerned with how a professional movement proponent begins to examine and utilize one's mover's enacted experiences, with eliciting what it was like for that person to move and to meet with, in the process of moving. Eventually, to attain ML's realistic goal through its reflective and reflexive practice, I want all movers [especially those who may wish to become professional PE specialists themselves, or work in its allied, sporting field] to be able to share with me what it was like for them to move. I want all PE "insider encounterers" to tell me their lived story, so that I may gain an insight into what kind of person they are, to know better their evolving dispositional nature. I seek to find what it is that makes them feel passionate about movement, or makes them feel alienated from it, in the manner in which they volitionally "comment" about movement, and their involvement in or exclusion from it. This is why I now consider

some fundamental difference between modern PE's reliance on a "structured" language; the fact that language is *not* a transparent medium of thought.

Modern PE's physical science language dismissed implicit meanings. Its science bound communication mode tended to repeat and exaggerate "technicism's" clinical search for stipulated terms which fix instrumental "methods". PE's "classroom communication" seriously needed refreshing not by displacing mechanical language, but rather, by engaging in the language of human science not dislodged from the realm of a caring and righteous language.

This pivotal linguistic adjustment came as the profession slowly responded to poststructuralism's hermeneutic introduction. Hermeneutics serves to address crisis in criticism, and examines the function of interpreting constructive critique. It was to this kind of treatment that PE's language, its correspondents' utterances was to be subjected.

Contemporary PE educators and interpreters need to unwrap the language of "thought" embracing ethical concerns in order to access and better examine what the processes of learning is "like" in order to dialogue with the kinesthetic texture of movement, to bring movement and ourselves into speech. To be noted here is the difference between eastern and western human science's aim. The latter is to acquire understanding about concrete lived experiences by means of language, when "talk" is the concrete stuff of human discourse. But differently, eastern methods may practice other non-script orientated reflective contemplation; a more preoccupied and manifested concern ministering for the welfare of another's self.

Because people of different groups and different nations see, interpret and disseminate their version of the world differently, we are compelled to conclude that either some languages misrepresent the way things are, while our own describes the world accurately, or that in the past, structuralism's version of language, which seemed to name units given in nature, did not in practice depend on reference *to* things, or even to our ideas of things. Instead, the units seemed to exist so that un-problematically meanings may be differentiated from one another by language *itself*;

therefore, we think of them as natural. A language re-presents, hence represents a way of understanding the world of *differentiating* between things and *relating* them to one another, and for ever, remains as an interplay between acknowledging subtle differences whilst sustaining relations.

Connection

Authentic individual gestures, however, cannot be described in their generality. They can only be seen in their individuality, in the free act whereby the individual creates both oneself and one's world together, by casting the one into the other, of finding oneself at once a free and a harnessed subject in one's own eyes, and, simultaneously perhaps a determined object in the eyes of others. I stand in my own balanced and familiar sense of being, and yet, I feel unbalanced, disturbed even when I am in the presence of another person. Unsure of myself, I try to reach for a delicate balancing act which novitiate movers find difficult to cope with, because of the impossibility of ascertaining the nature of that obscure posture. What is its intellectual or its relational status? Is it a status which seems both true to experience something meaningful during its enactment, and yet, irritatingly paradoxical following its seemingly meaningless reflections?

I can remove myself by not looking at this other person. Better still, I turn my back to him or her, so that I am sending out a signal that I wish to have no contact, no communication and no connection with that individual, whom I deem best avoided altogether. If there is an attraction to someone or something, then, by contrast, it is not a "detachment" that I seek, but rather, an "involvement" with another [or a thing] to which I can attach my [self-assigned] participant contribution.

Summary

In this chapter I have qualified that "structuralism was a linguistic version of Kantianism without transcendentalism, that of holding knowledge to be exclusively "discursive". That is, the opposite of intuition. According to Kant, one's knowledge is realised in the act of comparing, examining, relating, distinguishing, abstracting, deducing, demonstrating, all of which are forms of intellectual effort. Knowledge,

one's spiritual, intellectual knowledge is activity. Knowledge in general, and more especially philosophical knowledge, as Kant (in Chapter 3) maintained, is certainly quite impossible without the work, without the unpredictable effort of discursive thought. Kant's error is confusing primacy with exclusivity. If our attention needs to be mostly directed outward, this does not mean that we should not look inward at times.

What the PE profession needs to recognize is the new capacity of post-modernity's critical field to discriminate between novel possibilities about embodied experiences which can be developed on the basis of an astute dissection of post-modernity that might capture some of PE's own innate characteristics and *modus operandi*. With the introduction of PL in the early 1990s, and in the wake of postmodernism, contemporary movement interpreters are better informed and thus able to appreciate what it means to *be* a human being, a sentient being whose field of possibility exists in a state of happenings, a being in transformation (Chapters 6-8).

Through poststructuralism's language, PL expressed new and related ideas in how to enhance PE's delivery as a more meaningful enterprise for all its participants. There followed a seminal shift from theories of "movement teaching" which attributed credit or blame to the *movement*-agent to that of an "eco-minded", or a "bio-conscious pedagogy". What the former placed under focus for both teacher and mover was the quality of performance. Incorrect movement was equated with a poor person-performer, hence, negative feedback led to self-alienation. The latter "bio-pedagogy" seeks to appropriate all evidence available which best benefits its *agent-mover.* It is a search by the educator-minded professional to glean something positive for the benefit of the performing person.

What poststructuralism offers PE is an opportunity and a cause for reflection. It proposes a lexicon and a syntax, which is to say a vocabulary and an indication of the way words legitimately relate to each other. It is useful in prompting the uncertainty of questions, but not in delivering the finality of answers.

This chapter's critical message for the PE profession is that raw minds tend to be vulnerable to the use of raw words. Raw, unrefined actions like sneezing, coughing

are reactionary, unprocessed, undeliberated, and undisciplined in nature, to which we are all involuntarily vulnerable.

Somewhat differently, raw but *reponsive* reactions like blushing refer to the "involuntary" reddening of a person's face causally attributed to embarrassment or emotional stress, though blushing has also been known to come from being lovestruck, or some kind of romantic stimulation. Blushing is thought to be the result of an overactive nervous system. Severe blushing is associated with those who suffer intense, delerious anxiety, in which the person experiences extreme and persistent apprehension in social and performance situations as perhaps encountered in any PE context.

Importantly, PE specialists need to empathise with something akin to another's "experienced emotions". Emotion is the most human of all expressions. It involves encounters of self-attention, shame, and modesty, as well as understanding experiences which leave one flushed with success, with an ecstatic sense of elation. Self alienation may well be attributed to the physiological rebound of one's basic fight/flight "mechanism", when raw emotions are displayed and physical action is *not* possible. Self affiliation can be silently signalled between its experiencers by an acknowledged "wink" of the eye.

From Chapter 7 onwards, I argue that those who can mediate PE's nuanced meanings via ML and have experienced the fascination of transcendental moments may begin to address contradictions between self and others. In effect, for PE specialists to become "educators" about self and others, it is necessary to hear the mover's residential experiences. PE interpreters are expected to become familiar with the learner character. This is because they need to deal with transient moments when conscious awareness of our being seems to disappear, when there seems to be a momentary loss of time and space, when one's solitary mind falls into extravegant reaches and new latitudes of imagination in PE's "ludic Rubicon".

Andragogy, towards which ML aspires, is vitalised socially by the experienced "knower", shepherding the listener through the unseen tacit inferences of

"processed" decision making. If PE encounters are deliberated and reflected upon, ML, I show in Chapter 7 and 8, acknowledges that there is no return to our original state of being: we learn to "reconstitute" ourselves afresh.

What has already been pointed out it that whilst modern PE teaching was primarily concerned with "principles" such as authority and certainty, postmodernism's pedagogic acts will be shown as associated with indentifying "difference[s]", acknowledging pluralism, and becoming sensitive to the textuality of words and of movement, as well as maintaining a critically informed sense of scepticism.

As re-viewed in the remaining chapters, pedagogy which, like all truly artistic activity, like all authentic living, must confront the paradoxical ambiguity of its existence in the world. It can be neither purely objective in its approach to subject matter nor purely subjective in its interpretation, for if Kant, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur are right, perception inevitably colours the perceived fact. Nevertheless, movement educator's task is to convey a certain set of information, and entertain a range of potential meanings. But then, pedagogy cannot afford to surrender to routine, neither can it be unscheduled to the point of disorder.

Chapter Six   Hermeneutic "Conscious Self" and "Unconscious Otherness"

Introduction

This chapter explains why language refracts our awareness in the delivery of PE experiences and is of critical concern to its interpreters and their agents. I show that the *purpose* of hermeneutics is both a search for the speaker's "intentional" meaning and a radically interpretive gesture. It also consists not in finding meaning but in dealing with the "breakdown" of meaning. It is not a hermeneutic that conveys fixed meaning and truth, once and for all, but a hermeneutic fired by the dissemination and trembling murmur of meaning and the notion that its speaker is somehow clearing the way toward nearing somewhere closer to a truth.

Here I also justify why and how PE's modern professional practices had to be transferred from its "structural" informed language to that of a poststructural mode of communication as inspired by some of its leading "thinkers" such as Austin (1962), who took ordinary language approaches to issues of scepticism and led those approaches in how to "do" things with words, to be subjected to scrutiny. Briefly, I refer to Levinas's work (1963; 1973), based on the "ethics" of "the Other" or in his terms, "on ethics as first philosophy". For Levinas, the "Other", the unconscious stranger within us, is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics, which Levinas called "ontology".

Featured also will be Gadamer's (1960; 1975; 1981; 1986) theory of interpretation according to which, the meaning of a text is never a function purely of facts about the author and his or her original public; it is equally a function of the historical situation of the interpreter. Habermas' (1975; 1984; 1993) attack on the problems of the nature of communication and self-consciousness, and their role in the causation of social action will also be referred to. Whilst Ricoeur's (1965; 1971; 1992) welcomed stress on the humility necessary to the pursuit of "truth", and that different "meaningful actions can be read as text" (1971: 529-562) will be highlighted. In this chapter I bridge the gap between last century's transformations from the realm of teaching into

those of its pedagogic philosophy by engaging others in a hermeneutic critique of dialogue.

Learning to read PE's "hidden language" and engage in its "immanent protocol" is what I aspire ML's ambition to be. It transforms movement's philosophical mode into a practical approach to learn about the nature of one's point of origin about one's self and about some desired and some unavoidable qualities of life. We live in a language which serves to widen our concepts of life and its different modes of living; where the organic function of thought is carried on for the most part *unconsciously,* in the *shadows,* as it were, of the luminous circle of consciousness. This shimmering, consciously aware realm of knowledge and understanding is explained in this chapter, whilst its "shadowy" realm, its subliminal counterpoint, is further discussed in Chapter 7.

In view of such recent radical changes to its meaningful understanding and its interpretive linguistic portrayal, PE, I suggest can be relabeled as Movement Education to emphasise that movement is initiated by me (ME) but evolves into consensual meaning. ML brings cognitive and emotional responses together. It tries to marry physicality with sensuousness. It attempts to align moments when its agent begins to speak about themselves on behalf of their own "moving" encounters. This communicative "move" was left on the substitute's bench by modern PE, until post-structuralism's newly generated ideas served to change certain views about the generic resources of meaning which were thought to arise *solely* from its linguistic background. Meanings are at work during the very *usage* of their own creation. Our understanding of human movement, like the use of language, is more fully realized when a person encounters insights and images in both their usages, in their play and in their supreme and sublime moments of achievements. By analogy, language holds the capacity to create new impressions during its writing or speaking acts. Enacting movement and its commentary attune us not only to others, to ourselves, but also to those hidden parts of ourselves, as being placed in touch with our unconscious [presuppositionless] self. Modernist versions of PE teaching employed structuralism's language, which I show to be impossible to use as a way to unravel

different versions of the self and hence, harnessing the process of learning because it is insensitive to the multiple subtleties of life.

Today, hermeneutics can be shown to be a widely defined and thoroughly reasoned discipline of interpretation theory that embraces the entire framework of the interpretive process. It is a process which encompasses all forms of communication and expressive gestures: written, verbal, artistic, geo-political, physiological, sociological and much more. In general terms, hermeneutic-informed debate centres on such issues as whether "pre-judgments" can be eliminated and an "objective-truth" attained through understanding the nature of our life skills, or as Gadamer (1962) points out, our human interpretation of "*Verstehen*": the current understanding we have of human activities, and their underpinning motivations and deliberations. Gadamer would argue that PE's preoccupation with objective methods of teaching would be anthithetical to the spirit of *Lebenswelt* scholarship, that the profession should be on guard against technique's seductive illusions when it comes to understanding and coping with meaning.

Language use can be thought of as operating in different forums, peeling back physical identities, creating spectacles of social obedience, demonstrating compliance and the unquestioned following of rules. Language has the power to posit the body as a surface onto which groups and mainstream society inscribe their political and social ideologies and against which "Iago's" student inmates carved their resistence.

If learners are placed in a movement encounter, or are positioned to confront knowledge with some sense of reasoning, as Habermas (1981; 1984) calls for, learning involves rational deliberation and critical judgment. Learning evolves into the ability to discriminate, and thus presuppose general and impartial principles governing the assessment of reasons bearing upon issues. Indeed, without such "guiding" principles the very conception of deliberation collapses. In short, Habermas (1993) suggests the concepts of rational conduct lose their meaning, which is always context-bound and mutually interdependent with values.

ML employs a probing language to maximise and connect the most accommodating of conditions which allow the understanding of movement to be conceived as the genesis of learning. In this generic PE context, learners are involved in the act of "*moving*". They are invited to consider options and consequences revealed through the heightening awareness of their moral agency. According to Greene (2002), movers develop a more conscious choice to engage with emerging facets of one's inner "sensory-self", one's "otherness", recognizing their connectedness between the inner somatic sense and the social consciousness. The body has been the explicit focus of instruction in the dance studio, centuries of training have perfected a language, a method and a kinaesthetic response system for shaping and remaking the musculature, posture, expressiveness and speed-in-action of our physical selves. Kinaesthesis, is the consciousness of specific qualities of movement, the sensing of weight and of the ways in which muscles, tendons and joints coordinate to achieve a particular action. Others, including myself, became aware of a "felt" knowledge, a "rightness" in our movements that would manifest through the accuracy of swinging a golf-club, the pitch of a musical sound, the dynamics of sound as a form of kinaesthetic feedback.

The history of the body has been paradoxical because as the body has been targeted as a means for indirectly controlling and changing the movement learner intellectually and morally, institutionally it has been ignored except when it is seen as a pathway for an academic end. I next argue that the instructed body shapes us at a susbconscious level. PE *is* the performing of an understanding, or a confusion, when one become consciously aware of monitoring the body as my state of well-being. The irony here is that the metaphors used to descibe a well functioning mind are all words of the physical body, such as "vital," "active," and "alive," metaphors not separating or dividing them.

Eventually, then, it is with bridging this "gap" between "Iago's" ascribed language of teaching and that of the attribution language of pedagogy that today's PE specialist are now professionally and morally obliged to engage in. They need to locate, to surface, to question, to address and offer a comforting or therapeutic insight into coping better with both movement and language's usage, with both of their intriguing

enigmas, their as-yet unexplainable allure, their beguilement, and how to transform their abstract mystery into something more "fleshy": between our primordial existence and our adulterated [prejudiced] understanding of the word.

If educated into a healthy scepticism about language, and hence, become more aware of its riveting power, I foresee PE as *the* curriculum discipline which can venture into nurturing self-esteem and human thinking, via ML. This is because it seeks explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame of the participant as opposed to the observer of action. If realities only exist in respondents' minds, then, subjective interaction seems to be the only way to access them. The knower and the process of knowing need not [cannot] be separated from what is known, just as facts cannot be separated from values.

Pedagogy, which is the art of sustaining and creating innovation, focuses on our dealing with a "pre-cognitive" aspect of the existing world, which is neither purely subjective [whatever I take it to be], nor purely consensual [whatever we agree it to be]. The art of teaching, pedagogy is not a conventionally-referring language, such that, whatever meaning it has will not be expressible in any terms other than those of its particular context [that "incident", in the "*now*" of that moment, as it were]. It is not, however, an *arbitrary* meaning, because its correspondents cannot give a "correct" translation into some other medium, it does not follow that we can give the "happening" between speaker and listener any meaning we care to. Both speakers set off on a journey to press their viewpoint, but the motivation originally held behind each utterance might stem from very different perspectives.

Modern PE's discordance with learning (identified in Chapter 5) lacked critical reflection. Critical reflection shakes the dogmatism of life practices. Yet what was forgotten by modern PE specialists was that PE's original purpose was to construct experiences which can symbolise belongingness between sentient and sacred concerns. I show how language's infinite use and experiences, as with practical movement's limitless meaning, paradoxically, hold the inexplicable power to acknowledge the absence of what both language and movement obscure: subjective concerns. PE must not banish subjective concerns from the court of

knowledge nor dismiss the moral obligation of interest of human reason and emancipation, which hold our assumptions in place. Our human flourishing depends on keeping in touch with sentient inspired schemes of understanding movement vindicating practical wisdom as pedagogically constructing traditional learning contracts in both movement's and language's silent deeds. PE learners require contemplative silence to become more reflective and allowed the time to become more reflexive about their movement enterprises. They need time to think not so much about the *product* of the activity, but more about the intricate *processes* that are involved in encountering movement in order to learn more about the nature of physical activity and about their own ontological selves. Movers need space to move *and* to think, and this is where hermeneutics steps in to guide its learner's perceptions about physical events and their personal agency.

Mapping connections

Hermeneutics is concerned with locating the traditional history and tracing the emergence of language and the elusive delivery of a passing meaning for its user. Hermeneutics seeks meaning based on the assumption that there is meaning. It also deals with separating how the speaker's language use "appropriates" the act of setting apart the "fact" of the act, its scientific analyses, from that of the person who inhabits movement as its agent–speaker.

Applying this philosophical movement to that of embodied actions, by posing questions into questions, what is revealed about PE's contemporary mode of communication is that it is profoundly invested with a moral obligation to do one's best to explore movement as a twofold project. First, PE can be presented by "teaching" its epistemological path or grounding, its technical shaping of the body and of learning how to move. Secondly, PE is advanced by pedagogically exploring its ontological provenance; that of moving to learn who one is. ML is concerned with learning *about* movement and with learning *of* one's inner-self as revealed during and post involvement in the act. In addition, ML deals with human-movement as was originally devised by our ancestors; first as physical but silent gestures such as finger placed across the mouth [signifying to keep quiet] as noted by Van Dalen (1965) in

his article "*Dynamics of Change in Physical Education*". Much later, such gestured movement was coded as sounded gestures, using signs and signals to convey certain forms of consensual meaning, for instance, a frown or a nod of the head. Currently, PE's professional practice continues in its ancient quest to unravel the twofold adherence of one's own body to the domain of things *and* to that of the self, or as Ricoeur (1992) would put it, to the unfolding of the dialectic of the self and the "other than self".

Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics serves to compliment and at the same time address the narcissistic limitations of phenomenology. Central to hermeneutics is that knowledge of context and background is essential for any interpretation to take place and that meaning exists and is worth seeking. The process is circular in that any part of a text of social-historical event requires the rest of the text or event to make it intelligible. ML is designed to promote PE under the auspices of its emerging meaning. It sensitizes its correspondents' treatment of the other so that its advocate should act in ways which are not brought to the attention of one's recipient but reciprocating learner. ML's practitioners may be more richly endowed with a strong sense of humility and modesty, rendering its professional educators as those who wear and display their learning unnoticed in the midst of others. Be that as it may, one can do this only by knowing how to orchestrate the silent deeds that reside in the profound depths of language's hidden devices.

Hence, I now recruit hermeneutics into the hidden ways: the use of words shapes the opening and the closing of meanings in the realm of pedagogy. Hermeneutic-informed pedagogy clarifies and acknowledges the need to identify the potential consequences of what one says to another. A pedagogue needs to carefully monitor the many differential hermeneutical movements, the subtle shifts in meanings that occur between myself and the text, between one's use of theory and one's academic and personal subject matter. Hermeneutics is a way of blending old perceptions with new ones in a unique expression of what has stayed true along with what has changed, with what has been gauged sometimes by the corresponding participants

in their dialogic critiqué which serves to filter out novel meanings. Rather than confine talk to the stilted language of science, Movement Literacy invites emotional presence and personal involvement so that movement encounters, in their success or failures may be ventured into, and subsequently provide experiential pathways for its incumbent residents, its acting agents, to be granted a transient glimpse into how to unravel the cutting-edge of human existence.

Making things happen

But then, words are difficult to manage. They do not always mean the same thing all the time. "Learning" for instance, is a word which has no term. It is only possible, therefore that *nature* and *genetics,* or one's innate disposition towards learning-to-learn, which is what ML is trying to deal with, is about displaying one's versatile interplay between what is deemed as terminable fixtures, and that which can be thought of as interminable changes. ML deals with the ontological interpretation of its agent-speaker whose movement's commentary serves to reveal something(s) about its mover. The posing of questions is brought into prominence in PE's praxis largely because it is in the use of rhetoric/response which underlies the contemporary understanding of language that renders language as a field of action. I am trying to catch the sense of action as an *arrangement* and *effect* within the rhetoric of texts and lived lives, the worldly effect of movement and language for its resident-person.

The other person, the PE specialist, is better placed to locate or be positioned to read and interpret my "hidden-otherness" which she or he may detect and take note of, but to which I can merely re-act through without being sensitive to my current irrational or "gob-smacked" existence. In movement's beguiling state of existence, momentarily, I can experience a loss of contact with myself. I encounter a feeling of being consciously removed from myself as initiating control of me to that which somehow occupies a transient state-of-being. Professional education is the laying open of a question that may reveal some knowledge forms [theories, concepts] which gloss the overlay of our understanding of movement and of ourselves, but in so doing, also nurtures a radical allegiance to the subjective I perception. It courts a

phenomenological dimension whilst education is about celebrating what others perceive of the world, and is able to talk about their perceptions.

Language and PE

I next clarify how PE's commitment to modern "structuralist" language deceived the PE specialists' belief that they could analyze systems, including the body from an external, objective viewpoint. And then, differently, how poststructuralists argued that this understanding is *incorrect,* that one cannot transcend fixed-gathering-in of various perspectives that others hold about other people or that of our "Big Other", our cosmological surroundings.

Structural thinking is just that; it establishes a base and then merely adds categories onto that base, as Mosston and Ashworth (1966-2002) did for their "teaching-spectrum", as "Iago" was felt compelled to do for his "teaching". In other words, "structuralist" thinking assumes that once the "foundation" of teaching has been established, what automatically follows is that the assumed objective claims of movement for its movers once anchored to such objectives, also served to anchor the resources of meaning. Pursuing the established movement objectives became the prime concern for its specialists, who then assumed that movement's potential meaning would strike its learners, just as it did its specialists, hence the specialists' "special-meaning" would also hold all other meanings in place.

Modernist PE teachers held the view that analysis is itself determined by what it examines. What it failed to consider was the nature of the personnel who exercised that analysis. Its language was confined to the delivery of instructions, and no more. It did not question the nature of movement's consequences for its performing-doers as discrete individual persons, bearing in mind that as persons we are "incomparable", and "irreplaceable" (Auden, 1967). Modern PE did not differentiate between statements and rhetoric, commands, suggestions and promises. PE did not question the hidden implications that its structured language carried for its learners. In Austin's (1962) ground-breaking theory of "Illocutionary forces", there was no direct link between what the teacher did and what the student learnt; there was little

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personal engagement with the philosophy behind each teaching style, whereas contemporary pedagogy and personhood became central rather than peripheral considerations (Fernandez-Balboa 2006). In effect, the quality of the mover's experience was not brought under consideration, because the dynamics of dialectic dialogue was hermetically sealed from the learning process.

Illocutionary act

Austin (1962) distinguished a number of different kinds of "speech-acts" as characterizing our utterances. Take for example, the sentence: "The ball is in the court." When I, the PE specialist, utter this sentence I am sending out a sequence of noises. This is called a "phonetic act". As an utterance, it is made in conformity with appropriate rules of grammar. It is said to be a "phatic act". The utterance, considered as having a specific sense and referring to a particular object, is called by Austin, a "locutionary" act. However, in saying "The ball is in the court." it may be that *my* aim, *qua* speaker, is to get a pupil to collect the ball. Maybe, I am pointing out to the entire class about a specific rule in a game which claims that one can actually be positioned outside the court and still continue to play the game. Perchance, even, I am exclaiming a surprise that the ball has remained on court, to be understood as an expression of amazement. In this respect, my utterance is called an "illocutionary act". If, in my speaking through the utterance, my language [articulation] actually brings it about that a player responds to my words, then, this consequence is called the "perlocutionary" act.

The hidden process of being alerted to such discretionary refinement of linguistic distinctions, to one's need for open transparency in qualifying the speaker's intention, and to that of the listener's receptive range of potential meanings and consequences for impressing that listener, is largely attributed to political language and hermeneutic analysts. For this dissertation I draw on the thought of Habermas (1968), and astute rhetoricians as Gadamer (1960), and Ricoeur (2002). Their analyses of language, (in Chapters 6, 7 and 8) show how to help educators to employ a democratic, hence, empowering, embodied rules of engagement into the education of the learner-in-movement.

Rhetoric

Phenomenology was shown to be as much about asking questions which generate more questions (see Chapter 4). Questions serve both its instigator and its responder to delve deeper into the inner throes of their own thoughts and ideas about their personal viewpoints, about their personal posture towards themselves, orientated either towards or away from others and towards their local landscape. Education, I contend, is about how we can delve deeper into the cognitive and emotional gaps that occur in the many interchanges of one and another's coordinating sets of ideas, values, and beliefs. Correspondents may meet and align with, but never share their absolute meaning with another's. Education is not about avoiding these obscure realms of differentiated forms of knowledge, where their links are tenuous to say the least, and of which the Modernist PE profession was aware but felt uninformed about how best to cope with in their practices, until rhetoric, once more, began to take its rightful place in the presentation of movement.

What is redeemed and made relevant to teaching movement is that, in ancient times, rhetoric was divided into three kinds: (i) *judicial*, with justice in view; (ii) *political/deliberative*, arguing in terms of expediency or *utility*; and (iii) *epideictic*; practised in eulogies, attributing praise and blame where the key concept was graciousness, decency and gallantry (Ricoeur 2002). What is featured about rhetoric is that justice, deliberation, and distribution of emotional feelings and their consequences for others is brought into play when one asks questions, reminding us that words go with their associated meanings.

Impersonal to personal

It is not impossible to "teach" another via the internet, since the internet is impersonal and its correspondents can exchange neutral, and factual or fabricated information. What is absent here is the "human presence" of another's interpersonal relationship, which, in the words of education may range from fleeting, detached interchanges of words, to that of an enduring attachment between its speakers. Important to bear in mind is the fact that PE specialists' professional context in which this relationship

either flourishes or not, is regulated by law, custom or mutual agreement, and is the contextual framework or basis of this interaction which gives or denies access to human bonding.

To advance from modernism's systematic-delivery of epistemological knowledge role of a movement-teacher, one needs a much more versatile manner and style of communication in which the dispositional character of the person who ever aspires to become a learner-pedagogue, needs a great deal more personal qualities and professional knowledge to accommodate the constant reversal roles for learner to pedagogue, and from pedagogue to learner. PE specialists have to live the life of their curriculum-subject, be a person who epitomizes what he or she preaches. That is, for example, to be able to display a compatibility of interests and share mutual preferences in physical activities with their learners; to be fit, to look the part, to manifest PE's objectives in practice. To demonstrate that games-playing teaches one the principles of moral integrity; then, it follows that a PE professional is one whose trust and respect as a person is made readily available for one's learners.

Unlike a chemistry teacher who has no personal link with the chemical compositions and liquid substances that he or she comes into contact, a PE specialist's personal composition, one's attitude and general demeanor form an integral ingredient in the advocacy of the subject. In short, when a PE specialist is exercising one's educational skills, he or she, at the same time, needs to tread a very fine line between the many gaps that we come to feel between, for instance, intrusive thinking, between the fear of rejection, between our hope and our ambition, between realizing our actual competence and the limitations of our physical effects. ML is about replicating life. It is about acknowledging life's needs and fragility as best as possible and making public the nature of one's movement experiences, not in a pompous, flaunting, self-aggrandizing manner, but rather in a way that showers the learner with empathy, with understanding, with just and comforting words.

Rhetoric and response entice action

Rhetoric, or discourse theory shares with both structuralism and poststructuralism an interest in the formal devices of language. But rhetoric is also concerned with how these devices are actually effective for its users at the point of "contact" and "consumption". If, at this crucial stage of the thesis, one accepts that identifying this point of contact where meaning occurs, or where its ignition is fused and actually takes place, is an impossible task, then what remains accessible and thus partially open to examination is the point of "consumption".

Discourse is the point for both speaker and listener's "consumption" of information and knowledge, of social and personal impact. It can be a humanely transformative affair, because it is a complex process during which its incumbent participants are asked to confront something strange within a familiar context. Discourse is that which produces an experience of the unfamiliar, a sense of something or someone other than oneself. For example, Mohammed Ali became supremely competent through his self-proclaiming and self-aggrandizing poetry, whilst mountain climbing heroes like Everest's Hillary and Tensing both downplayed their extraordinary feat.

What poststructuralists maintain is that the concept of "self " as a separate, singular, and coherent entity is a fictional construct. Instead, and interminably, a moment-upon-moment evolving individual comprises tensions between conflicting knowledge claims, for example, of gender-role, race-acquisition, class conformity, and professional growth, as adopted by its beholder. Therefore, to properly study a living role or a fabricated role [as is created in a novel's text], its reader-interpreter must understand how the role, or the work, or the narrative is *related* to his or her own personal concept of self. One's malleable and ever-changing self-perception plays a critical role in one's interpretation of meaning. While different thinkers' views on the self [or the subject] vary, meaning for Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur is constituted by the thinker in the process of reading, or by the hearer in the process of being engaged in discourse with another person.

Of course, the fiction author's intended meaning, such as it is [for the author's identity as a stable "self" with a single, discernible "intent" is *also* a fictional construct], is

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always secondary to the meaning that the reader perceives. In other words, poststructuralism rejects the idea of a literary text having a single purpose, a single meaning, or one singular existence. Instead, every individual reader creates a new and individual purpose, meaning, and existence for a given text, and can do so, even when reading this same text at another time.

Incessantly, pedogogy deals with destabilized meaning

A poststructuralist-informed movement-literate adopts a critique of one's own criticism, and hence, must be able to use a variety of perspectives to create a multifaceted interpretation of a text (which is referred to in Chapter 7), even if these interpretations conflict with one another. What is particularly important and thus illuminating to the reader who I am trying to escort into the realm of pedagogy is poststructuralism's linguistic analyses (Derrida 1984; Foucault 1983; Deluze and Parnet 1987; Kristeva 1980; 1984) to divulge how meanings of a text shift in relation to certain variables, usually involving the identity of the reader.

In the poststructuralist approach to "textual analysis" for example, the reader replaces the author as the primary subject of inquiry. This displacement is often referred to as the "destabilizing" or "decentering" of the author, though it has its greatest effect on the text itself. Without a central fixation on the author, poststructuralists examine not the author's, but rather, the source of other sources for meaning [e.g., readers, cultural norms, other literature, etc.]. These alternative sources are never authoritative, and promise no consistency. In the process of reading, the reader follows the general orientation that words provide, so in a sense their imagination is carried on the effect and affect these words have for the reader. The author, one must remember, is dealing with the "traditional explanation" of the text, a means of imposing limits on the proliferation of meaning. The reader, the listener, differently, allows oneself to to be led down the path the author is creating. His or her chosen words are such that it seems as if the reader's mind is taken in tow, and without having to actively "think", the reader's attention slides in the direction of the author's orientation.

It was Lévinas (2003:11-120) who remarked on this new field of semantic inquiry that has arisen from poststructuralism's ideas. Levinas claims that:

> ...language refers to the position of the listener and the speaker, that is, to the contingency of their story. To seize by inventory all the contexts of language and all possible positions of interlocutors is a senseless task. Every verbal signification lies at the confluence of countless semantic rivers. Experience, like language, no longer seems to be made of isolated elements lodged somehow in a Euclidean space... [Words] signify from the "world" and from the position of one who is looking.

Contemporary PE, re-routed by poststructuralism's radicalized ideas, offers a way to understand how knowledge is produced and raises the hidden-nature of the learning-to-learn act to the surface by means of critique of structuralist premises. It argues that because history and culture *condition* the study of underlying structures it is subject to biases and misinterpretations. To understand an object [e.g. a movement, or one of the many meanings of a text], a movement-literate approach always argues, that it is necessary to study both the object itself and the systems of knowledge that produced the object. In effect, poststructuralism now claims that descriptive language can be converted from an out-of-awareness tradition into matters of conscious, sub-liminal or unconscious aspects of dialogic debate.

Another's spoken/written words, the text of a conversation or a book, cannot be grounded on something stable and fixed beyond the sign system in which it occurs. We shall also note that certain texts include what is not written, but, nevertheless, produces shifting and decentred meanings in its reader's/listener's interpretation and understanding. This is because certain texts include traces of words and concepts not present, and, I argue, what is not present makes possible what is present.

Structuralists also seek to understand the historical interpretation of cultural concepts, but focus their efforts on comprehending how those concepts were understood by the author in his or her *own* time, rather than how they may be understood by the reader in the present. Indeed, by criticising structuralism, literary theorists such as Bachelard (1989) Bakhtin, (1990) and Kristeva (1980; 1984) claim that it it not a question of the reader reading the book, but of the book reading the reader, not what we see in movement, but what undergoing movement encounters evoke from within us.

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PE specialists who understand both the philosophical movements of structuralism *and* poststructuralism, *as well as* the obscure nature of "movement-encounters", have come to scrutinize what lies in between the use of words as they are viewed at that time, and the use of movement, as it has impacted on its agent at that time. Grasping the physical consequences of engaging in PE enterprises, I have argued, is only part way to becoming a movement-educator. It is by venturing into the personal agent encounters and interpreting the potential meaning of their commentaries that allows a movement teacher to become a pedagogue to learners who wish to learn from movement.

Key premise

Contemporary PE's delivery, I argue, is not about interpreting the learner outsider's laser version or her or his physical experiences. Rather, it is about analysing the *manner* in which that enactment is conveyed in the words of its beholder, whose presence is touched in the process of describing the insider's actions [movement's lived-through experiences]. In the use of language and in the use of movement, words and movement come into interplay; they both contribute to the surfacing of a meaning. Both movement and language, in their usage, hold the capacity to generate meaning in their combined synthesis by its user/speaker/author. If this is the case, then, my ML thesis proposes that PE is designed to immerse its "movers" in certain forms of experiences, during which occurs the removal of the self from the beginning of knowledge. Encountering the transient removal of the "self" is made necessary in this dissertation so as to return it in an enriched and more completed form at the end.

At the heart of poststructuralism's linguistically informed educational learning-to-learn strategy lies the dismantling or the deconstruction of stable conceptions of subjectivity, identity, and truth. Subjectivity means that one needs to be as perceptive, insightful, and discerning as one can be in order to show or disclose the object [movement] in its full richness and in its greatest depth. Subjectivity means that we are "strongly-committed" in our re-orientation to movement as the object of study in a *unique* and personal way, while avoiding the danger of becoming arbitrary,

self-indulgent, or carried away by our unreflected preconceptions when we language movement.

"Languaging" movement in this thesis refers to the act of transposing silent movement into words, followed by the raising of questions about communication, about the taken-for-granted ways in which we attempt to make sense of the world, as posited by Sparkes (1992: 273). Languaging movement holds the potential to provide us with insights into our own engagement in the learning process because in its wording, what is foregrounded is its speaker's and listener's raw, unhindered human relationship. It is a relationship which hovers in between their own discrete embodied resourced language, its surfaced meaning and the realization of one's power to influence the interpretation of any text.

In effect, poststructuralism comprises a body of work that has developed from Saussure's move to prise the signifier away from direct reference to the world, investing language with its own momentum, in its independent determinations. Countering this stance, poststructuralism argues that one cannot lay claim to a single, authorized meaning based on an ultimate reality of truth. Poststructuralism, is a kind of double- edged sword. On the one hand, it questions the view that consciousness is an *origin*, treating it rather as an "effect" of signification. In short, one of poststructurailism's key messages to the PE profession is its radical claim that in the composition and understanding of my ever emerging "I", it is an "I" which is owed and attributed to the "Big Other" [other people and nature]: the meanings and differences that *permit* me to think at all.

Unveiling PE's grounding principles

To unveil the nature of movement-pedagogy's grounding principles, then, I have adopted the combination of both phenomenological descriptions and those of hermeneuticism's critically interpreted and informed understanding of a human expression. I am trying to profile the manner in which certain insights which befall us in movement are impressive. But, in their transformation into words their finer details slip out of the focus of our immediate concern.

I want to nurture a refreshingly playful mode of movement conceived as a kind of bio- or eco-pedagogy. ML orientates its corresponding practitioners towards an eco-pedagogy because of its interdisciplinary nature. Discretely, it advances an ethical and critical temperament in its purposeful praxis to better understand what we need to do to enhance our bodily health, and simultaneously, to become more robustly decisive when it comes to coping more comfortably with the unpredictable relations that constitute our human affairs. Most of the time, a movement educator needs to be very subtle in the way one conducts one's mode of speech, since humans can often hurt other human beings simply by means of their deliberated or, more usually, their unthinking use of words. It is about bringing movement into one's daily life, in a way that its movers can begin to appreciate what movement can reveal to us about ourselves, and in its ostensible social, psychological and science-bound benefits.

PE brought to life

I hope Movement Literacy can become the metaphorical *lodestone* between the physical and the educational. I want learners to create their own version of themselves, and PE's professionals to perceive themselves as movement interpreters and counsellors able to engage in a dialogue-upon-dialogue. I am trying to encourage PE institutions to prepare their novice "educators" to be able to move *beyond* the point of movement-performance criticism, beyond the level of knowledge which allows them to point out their learner's technical restrictions. My ambition for ML is to prepare its graduate scholars to be able to reach beyond the level of conducting a critique, beyond merely pointing out to its incumbent mover one's physical–body limitations [segregating, or alienating body from self] into that of *wanting* to understand the essential nature of movement and language, in a way that "Iago" could not. I present a form of PE dialogue, which is not opposed to an "objective" scrutiny of movement, but one which, paradoxically, encourages a special form of "disinterest", a kind of "emptying" of the mind in its correspondents. I am trying to expose how one either comes to depend upon, adapt to, or initiate and indulge in a non-equivocal, conversational dialogue where neither of its interlocutors' vantage points is held over another listener.

Habermas communication

Habermas's critical theory of communication is recruited into this PE thesis which answers the question "Critique in the name of what?" For instance, he developed a theory of "communicative *action*" and an accompanying "discourse ethics". In conjunction, these theories allow a critique of ideology a fuller scope of investigation into the underlying dogma, unveiling the hidden creed that underpins certain ideologies, e.g. PE's scientism – and thus open discussion on its wider, more panoramic scope of potential meanings. In effect, Habermas's critical philosophy [which he did not relate to human movement] was an attempt to restore and redeem the basic worthiness to the lost practice [a feature of language and of education]; of *consensual agreement*. This is a practice which inherently seeks to combine those dignified of features in a philosophical account that offers an *emancipatory* mode of human action. In short, he attempted to distinguish the rationality which characterizes emancipatory action *from* the rationality of technical control.

Borrowing such liberating features from Habermas's work (1975; 1993) helps to put forward the case for advancing this thesis's core conception: to exercise and incorporate the principle of *communicative-reasoning* into all pedagogic acts. It is an extension from that of an instrumental or technical reasoning to what can be imagined as reasonable. Habermas proposed that the following four requirements must be present in any serious attempt to communicate in a way that might alleviate misrepresentation; (i) *comprehensibility* - that the articulations of each communicant are understandable [made lucid] in the language being used, (ii) *truth* – that what is articulated corresponds to what is the case, according to the best available criteria of evidence, (iii) *truthfulness* – that each participant reign sincere in making one's own and in responding to another's contribution; and (iv) *righteousness* – that the contribution of each is in accord with the norms of moral righteousness held by each dialogical partner, each respectfully inquiring from and seeking to understand the other correspondent.

Morality relates to Rhetoric

Rhetoric is the art of "discourse", the study of how to discretely use language well or judiciously [in contrast to grammar]. It aims to improve the facility of speakers who attempt to inform, persuade, or motivate particular listeners in specific situations like PE. Roughly described, rhetoric is the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of inviting others to begin to acknowledge differences in its correspondents' understanding by following certain [often undeclared] rules.

If any genuine attempt to reach a working level of understanding is to be achieved, disciplining oneself to follow these unwritten "rules" of procedure is necessarily *personified* in material form. In the pursuit for social emancipation, Habermas, for example, wanted to make these "rules" as core features for the "transitional-link" from philosophy which stops short of critique [*assessing* critically] to one that not only *includes* a constructive *practical* dimension, but also incorporates some substantive virtues in the form of procedural requirements. In the context of teaching movement, what Habermas was asking for from its communicating participants was that their uttered interchanges were pursued in a way that sheds light on the virtues of the good qualities of life and that in our speech we should be alert to and try to convey and spread a communal sense of understanding.

Furthermore, he distinguished between the soundness or accuracy of validity claims as related to the above four requirements, and those claims embodied in less transparent kinds of communication. For PE teachers, this would imply that the professional proponent should be involved in explaining not merely what PE *is*, but also *why* it is beneficial to its movers.

Prejudice

Primarily concerned with developing a "*social* critique" of repressive ideology through a public critical-discourse ethics, Habermas believed we can reason in order to understand each other. However, he also singled out the notion of *prejudice* as something to which we are all vulnerable, but should be made aware of. Prejudice,

Habermas maintained, is ineliminable. Hence, objective truth is attainable only through rational debate. Indeed, realizing and acknowledging one's prejudicial point of view constitutes a process and signifies a transformation in the landscape of one's learning. It is particularly interesting, for example, and praiseworthy to note that Mosston and Ashworth (1999) made public that *his* and *her* prejudices caused them to overlook the primary point that teaching and learning constitutes a distinct *human-communicative* practice. and it is in this uniquely sentient, communicative practice, rather than in any battle of social forces, or the micro-categorizing of pre-planned lesson organizations, that the source of meaning is generated and that the very integrity of education and its sincere claims of sharing a sense of ownership to learning eventually comes, to be located.

Gadamer: PE's early communicating collaborator

For Gadamer (1960), two quintessential hermeneutic themes centre on language and play. He introduces play as the concept which, he argues, can most deeply *subvert* the instrumentalist bias of modernism's thought-process. Here, I hold modern PE's professional consciousness to think of movement-learners in the strict, singular term of an "ego-subject." That is to say, each PE learner came to be perceived as capable of achieving his or her own pre-planned "ends" through the exclusive efficacy of methodological "means" which they, the learners themselves, are able to put at their disposal. Feed the mover with technical information, and that individual will then process the information as she or he will "automatically" be able to interpret and utilize that information without question, just like the "teacher".

Furthermore, hermeneutics, for Gadamer (1977), is more than merely the gathering together of a set of techniques for interpreting another's written or articulated transcripts. Hermeneutics, rather, is concerned with the deeper issue of how human understanding is *made* possible. In Chapter 7, I show that hermeneutics has something in common with Aristotle's concept of practical deliberation or "*phronesis*", and that "*phronesis*" refers to such human characteristics as wisdom, good sense, or good judgment, as well as prudence which are the four cardinal virtues one is either blessed with, or can, to some extent, be nurtured into, but which modern PE largely

left aside: the ability to make the right decision in difficult circumstances. Educators learn to educate partly by learning from experiencing their learners' own unpredictable modes of behaviour and gestured actions, when it comes to transforming enhancing, and applying one's abstract [textbook-bound] theory of teaching to the more practical realm of learning-to-learn, that is, of learning about different forms of knowledge which shed light on one's hoped-for style and quality of life, just as movement-learners learn by doing movement.

Gadamer (1992) sees language as an exceptionally absorbent and all-encompassing "reality" which, to the extent that we succeed in reflecting on it, demonstrates more deeply and with more universal import than anything else the limits of all instrumentalist or method-based rationality. In the use of language, and especially in the distracting context of play, he maintains, neither activities may seem to be central issues in Aristotle's work. But the perspective which Gadamer (1997; 2001) develops through his own reflection of them has a great deal of affinity with Aristotle and Ricoeur (cited in Hahn 1995, Chapter 7), focusing on one's personalized, subjective "effect" and "affect" of transformation to coexist with embodied awareness.

Gadamer (1984) elaborates the conscious sense of one's awareness emanating from the process of engagement in what is called a "hermeneutic rhetoric". He concedes to the ideas that each of us undergo: a personally-felt way of seeking understanding into what forms the basis of our own interest in a text, or in what another says. For example, when we want to elucidate a relatively familiar but also stubborn kind of knowledge that remains embedded in one's practice of reading or listening to another speaker, we engage our thoughts in a hermeneutic circle. Crudely expressed, we put ourselves through the recurring process of posing questions upon questions, and continue until we have lost touch with the very reason of why are asking ourselves such questions in the first place. For example, when asked to rephrase a question, we seem to call upon ourselves to begin to detect some resonating inner-signals, some signs, which also serve the dual purpose of pointing to what was previously unconscious testimony of ourselves.

Gadamer (1997) forwards the notion that, in the manner in which we pose the questions themselves, we tend to excentrate: we point *out* something that is drawn deep from something that has long resided within us. When we are invited to conduct ourselves in a conversation, for Gadamer this participant act of ours, [when we need to be flexible and alert in our thinking and choice of words] switches from a collective and co-participant "we" to that of a singular reception of an "I" *unwittingly*. One allows oneself to be conducted by the object to which the correspondent is directed [by a significant other]. In conversation with a significant other, the PE teacher, the polarity of subject and object is not clearly underlined, or made distinct. This subject/object differentiation that featured in modern PE is one of many conceptual gaps that I aspire to make more transparent as a professional issue in this thesis.

I want movement advocates to be educators, to make it clear that in his or her PE role, one moment he or she is occupying that of a technical-instructor role, or a sport-coaching role, the next, a counseling role, and at another time, becomes the learners' "life-coach". And that when the PE professional communicates with a learner, that learner is being treated not at an objective level, but as an other person, respected democratically in one's own human-rights. I want to focus the attention of future PE apprenticing career-professionals to the unwritten, undeclared, and indirect mode of addressing their learners, checking, comparing and relating each other's comments set in detail against their own personal experiences.

Transformation

Pedagogy, I argue, is a reciprocal interchange of suggestive ideas as one thinks of what one hears in words. It is a praxis, the practice or the doing of a field of study [as opposed to the theory], something occupying one's entire being, *"absorbed"* into a word game, during which a kind of ecstatic self-forgetting is experienced. It is not a *loss* of self-possession, of which "Iago" was fearful. Rather, it is a freed sense of enthusiasm: a stimulating, thrilling encounter which serves to alert one's awareness with a vigorous sense of eagerness. The latter, in turn, serves to elevate and transpose one's stale sense of self into a more invigorating and refreshed self

outlook. Such transformative change holds equal relevance for engagement in a conversation. As Gadamer (1986: 57) comments:

> …it cannot be denied…something of the character of accident, favour and surprise – and in the end of buoyancy, indeed, of elevation – that belong to the game is **present**.
>
> [my emphasis] (1986:57)

Tracing this "presence" which belongs to the act of participating in a play or a game is what eventually ML is about. On the other hand, *vis-a-vis* the teaching profession, Gadamer's hermeneutic view calls for one to decipher one's own pre-understandings, prejudices, effective historical consciousness, the ignorance of which serves only to limit possible meanings.

As Gadamer insists, one's understanding involves mediation between the interpreter's immediate and emerging horizons [one's inner theatre of knowledge], and this in turn requires the interpreter to "distance" himself from the text. What Ricoeur (1992) does is to adopt a stance of "critical self-understanding" similar to that proposed by Habermas's critique of ideology. At the same time, he thinks that the critique of ideology cannot be separated from tradition.

Gadamer's view that the process of understanding [learning] is limited because we cannot transcend established information is countered by Ricoeur (1992) who maintains that to create new concepts we rely on not setting aside a human-devised ontology of tradition of knowledge. We need to be familiar with our past linguistic history, its roots and routes of linguistic growth, to be more open to possible ways we can develop our understanding of how meaning emerges and be significant in shaping and reshaping our knowledge and guiding our lives. We are tied for ever to our past; our past knowledge determines our ways of understanding, and cannot be distanced and separated from us. Habermas (1993) argues that these constraints of tradition *can* be transcended [a view with which Ricoeur agrees] and perceives understanding as involving the process of mediation between the interpreter's immediate and emerging horizon of knowledge. We need to have our subjective thoughts carried into the written and spoken text, and yet we need to be able to step

outside of the text so that we can be unbiased and objective in our evaluating the credibility and quality of that text.

Summary

In this chapter I have argued that it is in the synthesising of critical, hermeneutic interpretation with phenomenological descriptions that constitutes the essential elements of PL which, in itself, aspires to search for and test the "grounding" of intentional meaning. This shows us that in separating language from speaking, we are at the same time separating: (i) what is social from what is individual, and (ii) what is essential from what is an accessory and more or less accidental.

The PE specialist is an experienced mover and has lived a certain style of life. The mover is inexperienced in movement, and stands at the threshold of life. How the professional can share one's posture to life and the role of movement to that life can be partially achieved in two ways. One is by trying to place the mover by way of similar experiences which the "expert" has already encountered, by climbing, parachuting, sailing or dancing. In spite of this, there is no degree of certainty that the mover will, indeed, be capable of replicating another's experience. The other alternative is to phenomenologically create a vocal and articulated image of one's experiences, which then become the manifested testimony that its listener makes available for hermeneutic treatment. And, here in the exchanging of one's meaningful word for another's meaningful version of that same word, lie a number of inherently operative but immanent issues which need to be made public. And this is where my three rhetoricians come to my aid: Habermas (1975; 1993), Gadamer (1960; 2003) and Ricoeur (1965; 1992; 2002).

We must be wary of models

Importantly, in the next chapter, I concur with Wittgenstein's (1953, 2001) mistrust of deceptively clear "models". This is especially the case when it comes to the multiple acts of teaching. For example, Waismann (1994: 134) also expressed concern that any psychological explanation is ambiguous, cryptic, and open-ended, because:

> … we ourselves are many-layered, contradictory, and incomplete beings, and this complicated structure, which fades away into indeterminacy, is passed into all our actions.

In this evolving view of our "being", our physical and intellectual growth can be seen as a "venture" into relatively new territory as time allows us to enter into what has never existed until that moment. This poststructural idea of our existing in a constant state of change is not our human failure, but an indication of the nature of what we are learning to handle better by our living in the realm of language's movement.

For its most credible and just portrayal as an "educational enterprise, then, and to better realize movement's riddle, its "ludic-Rubicon", contemporary PE requires a profound assimilation of the resources of language. This is essential, because the "other-self" within us that "I" am, and as Ricoeur assures me, "we" constantly search for can only be expressed in a common language. And this is what Merleau-Ponty's emerging thoughts about the use of language (1965: 175) were pointing towards. Language, he says:

> …is a project, and constitutes an act of pursuit.

Movement, for Merleau-Ponty is an action, and this notion is not difficult to appreciate, but to suggest that language is also an action is what I clarify in these closing chapters.

Featured in some detail in the next chapter will be one of pedagogy's most vital of foundational stakes, that of the "*Verstehen*" tradition. *Verstehen* deals with matters such as pre-judgements and objective-truth as they come to be understood from within our own view-points. It refers to a kind of knowledge we come by, by means that are opposed to knowing something by objective observation, or by placing it in a network of scientific regularites but, then, the exactness of this difference between internalized intuition [empathic understanding] and externalized factual information [rational understanding] remains constroversial.

We need to be able to let ourselves go, to be carried away, to allow movement, to allow language, to allow learning to carry us into this strange realm that I have

labeled PE's "ludic-Rubicon", its "locale of tranquility", in order to be able to study the "subject" of moving. In the next chapter, I offer the case that language and movement, in their experiencing, in their usage, share their similar features, such as their co-adherence to rule systems and signs which are read as visible gestured meanings, in addition to its user having the option [power] to voluntarily enter or withhold oneself from particular games or from employing a certain form of language.

To quote Gadamer (1960; 1975: 93):

> …all playing is **being** played…The real subject of the game…is not the player but instead the game itself. The game is what holds the player in its spell, draws him into play and keeps him there"
> [my emphasis]

Gadamer's most telling of messages is that all communication practices should call on the speaker's responsibility to converse with judiciousness and care. Speech, after all, is an action usually carrying human significance and consequences. And, it is through action, all our actions, including speaking, listening, and moving, as Ricoeur makes clear in the next chapter, that a person discloses "who" rather than "what" he or she is. He suggests that the very structures and content of thought itself exits in the body *prior* to their utterance in language.

Communicative meaning, as Ricoeur (1992) will show us in Chapter 7, is always in its depths, affective. It remains rooted in the sensual dimension of experience, born of the body's organic capacity to resonate with other bodies and with the ecological landscape as a whole. In other words, linguistic meaning is not some ideal and bodiless essence that we arbitrarily assign to a physical sound or word and then pitch into the "external" world. Rather, meaning sprouts in the very depths of the sensory world, in the unpredictable dynamism and emanates from the very heart of the sensory world.

To harmonise contemporary PE's professional practices by identifying its educational credibility in Chapters 4 – 6, the study's PE language focussed roadmap is described by referring to its three critical phases. They are re-profiled to that of (i) an initiation into teaching, a class addressing act which only fragmentarily and obliquely deals with the issue of education; (ii) a pedagogy which attends to small group gatherings

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and constitutes a dramatic performance which is called upon by PL's phenomenological descriptions by giving voice to all its correspondents, and (iii) andragogy which is richly interpreted via exposing resident commentator's described comments about movement to hermeneutic treatment [a way of talking about and being talked about].

What is brought to attention in ML is what has been *made* noticeable by hermeneutics' critical interpretive practice, when we all need to capture and cherish impressively beautiful moments. For example, a nod of approval from a significant other [PE professional, a colleague, or an adversary] implies we are sharing what words cannot express: a sense of "fellowship".

In this chapter, a hermeneutic engagement has been shown to deal with bringing clarity to indirect, tangential, or immanent communicated meaning. It is meaning which the speaker may not be aware of, nor would its listener be able to share unless both its correspondents are sensitised to hermeneutics. Importantly, in phenomenology's existential mode of thought, embracing knowledge is founded on experience rather than on reason. As Merleau-Ponty stressed, it initiates responsible demands on the individual.

PE's emerging PL culture of dialogic discourse is of a nature that begins to root out hermeneuticism's original study of human behaviour. Hermeneutics involves discussing the diverse purposes of life. It uses a language which shapes emotions we experience and through which we learn to express a person's hidden reservoir of human attributes. PL, via ML's reflective and reflexive praxis, [eliciting non-instrumental acts and enticing post decision making,] is shown in the closing chapter to create a professional PE "*nous*" conveying PE's later schooling concerns about self learning.

Chapter Seven   Hermeneutics as the Foundation for Pedagogy

Introduction

A code of practice has ethical and moral principles that need to be preserved, respected and refined constantly; may it be pedagogy, the practice of justice, or medicine. They also need to be spelled out. A jury's code of duty, for instance, will be explained to them before they enter court. When the law becomes an obscure and complex issue, calling for a clearer interpretation for the jury, the presiding judge will take responsibility to unravel the intricacies and consequences of law for both prosecuting and defending counsels, and the jury. By the same token, PE learners find themselves wondering about what they are expected to do and to learn; then it is their PE mentor who is invested with the responsibility to invite them to "dwell in" and "inhabit" movement experiences. In diverse situations, in the public arena as well as on the playing fields, the relation of thought to word is a process and an unending interplay emphasising that there is nothing else which has the "inwardness" that consciousness has.

In Chapter 6, I explained the *purpose* of hermeneutics is that of a radically interpretive gesture. It consists not in finding meaning but in dealing with the breakdown of meaning. Indeed, what attracts me to Ricoeur's way of thinking about language and its users is the fact that, in his writing he aspires compassionately to accompany his reader through the thicket of language. His endeavour is to qualify the worthwhileness, to identify, preserve and acknowledge respect for the human appeal that befalls us all in our particular [private] and universal [global] efforts to search for meaning, whatever this might be.

Hermeneutics can not finally convey "fixed meaning" and "truth" once and for all. Neither of these phenomena is of a nature that can be "pinned down". Ricoeur's (1975; 1992) altruistic inspired hermeneutic, however, is fired by his sense of conviction. He maintains that we cannot deny or ignore the dissemination and trembling of meaning, and the notion that its speaker is somehow clearing the way toward nearing somewhere closer to "truth". A truth that allows its corresponding speaker / listener to express their venture into different modes of meaning and even

into the realm of movement, and in so doing, expresses hidden aspects of one's self. A shared meaning becomes apparent to its conversing participants when they become mutually engaged in the élan vital, the vital force or fermenting impetus of a conversation.

Ricoeur's modern work on hermeneutics encompasses his insightful understanding of interpersonal relationships that are immanently created during dialogical interchange. This embraces everything in the interpretive process including verbal and non-verbal forms of communication, such as presuppositions, pre-understanding, the meaning and philosophy of language, and semiotics. Semiotics (Chapter 5) was explained as the study of "signs" and sign processes indication [suggestive clues], designation [described terms], likeness, analogy, metaphor, signification, and communication. In "*Oneself as Another*" he, like Merleau-Ponty, qualifies his understanding of the body as both a "fact" belonging to the world and the "organ" that does not belong to the objects of which it speaks. Essentially, Ricoeur maintains the tenuous understanding of our embodied existence, the bridging of the many gulfs that exist between subjectivity and objectivity, between referencing and explaining and appreciating one's own capacity to differentiate from another's viewpoint and accommodate another's mode of understanding, comes to rest largely on our use of "word".

Ricoeur's tenth study in his text "*Oneself as Another*", in which he poses the question "*What Ontology in View*?", qualifies especially the distinction and inevitable tension that exists [and must necessarily be sustained] between one's familiar self identity and the novel understanding of one's self. It is a conscious self which can be played out against the emerging backcloth of one's awareness of an emerging self: the "free floating", "unconscious stranger", the "other than self" that lurks within me.

In effect, I transpose and re-contextualise his questions about the construct of one's selfhood by asking PE educators the most crucial of all professional and philosophical of questions, "Which self is in your speaking: the coach, the counsellor, the educator, the therapist?" Indeed, the list of such roles continues almost endlessly because they are related to the matter of enhancing another's mode of learning.

What ML aspires towards is for the PE missionary to keep in mind the learner's awareness of one's own and others' commended qualities of our humanity. Importantly, PE encounters should not leave its learners in a vacuous state of austere loneliness.

Ricoeur (1975; 1978) shows how contradiction facilitates meaning. He points out that, in the speech-making or posing questions, both correspondents initially take their *own* meaning of the "word" as its anchored unit of reference. Metaphor, following Ricoeur, is therefore classed among the single-word "figures of speech", a subtle kind of linguistic cross-over device. A metaphor is conceived as a "trope", an indicator turning towards something or a suggested developmental affinity in the direction of something with which it resonates or resembles. As figure, metaphor constitutes a displacement and an extension of the meaning of word, its explanation is grounded in the "theory of substitution". This theory sets out the idea that if we cannot understand one complex concept, then its explanation can be deconstructed and retraced by offering other explanations as an atonement, a satisfied substitution, an instead of analogy of what we cannot otherwise understand.

Ricoeur is concerned with an explanation of intent in word and deed. His famous phrase "the symbol gives rise to thought" becomes the basic premise of hermeneutics, meaning symbols carry messages which may be uncovered by philosophic interpretation - deciphers indirect meaning - a reflective practice of unmasking hidden meanings beneath apparent ones. Ricoeur claims meaning is always mediated through culture, linguistics and social signs.

For Ricoeur, objective reality is the contemporary equivalent of Kantian noumena: although it can never itself become an object of knowledge, it is a kind of necessary thought, a limiting concept, implied in objects of knowledge. His hermeneutical analysis of history, of ideology, of language and action is a rigorous science that can be applied equally to good science. First, Ricoeur sets out to understand the nature of selfhood: to understand the being whose nature it is to enquire into itself. In this endeavour, his philosophy is driven by the desire to provide an account that will do justice to the tensions and ambiguities which make us human, and which underpin

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our fallibility. He attends to the "Ambiguity of my Body": embodied subjectivity. As an embodied person in action it is in and through my kinaesthetic feelings that I live, move and have my being. 'Whatever my being may be', says Ricoeur (1965:156), 'feeling attests that we are part of it.'

Arrogance of critique

Like Gadamer, Ricoeur upholds the view that human understanding is inescapably "interpretive" in nature. But as against Gadamer, he seeks to establish that any understanding is also possible and can arise *independent* of presuppositions or preconceptions. Ricoeur believes that *absolute* meaning cannot possibly be attained by humans. He emphasizes that the failure to make the acknowledgement, the unattainable of certainty, gives an unwarranted scope to critical enquiry's faith in its own ability to surmount limitations of perspective and to provide the autonomous critiques and commanding overviews. In this connection he speaks of the "arrogance of critique", and of the necessity of renouncing such arrogance in favour of an enquiry characterized by more modest aspirations, by more self-criticism, and by more joint endeavors (1981: 244-6). In an important way, then, my student "Iago" could be said to have been leaning heavily towards this uncritical posture. "Iago" was unable to "step" outside of himself, to see himself as others did. He was *unaware* that he isolated and absented his presence from his pupils, who perceived him as, in their words, "conceited", "egotistical", and "unapproachable".

What Ricoeur points out is that rather than relying on an objective truth or method to prove certain claims, philosophers tend to legitimize their truths by reference to a story about the world which is inseparable from the age and system the stories belong to. In this instance, he endorses Gadamer's view (1986) that we cannot gain access to any truth since we are tied to the unreachable realms of our past, thus, stuck to our fixed traditions and conventions. His contribution for the PE profession is that when one is engaged in rhetoric, the essence of posing a question, is the opening-up, and keeping open, of possibiliites (1975: 266). But, we can only do this if we can keep ourselves open in such a way that in this abiding concern of our questioning we find ourselves deeply interested, as standing in the midst of

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something, in that it makes the question possible in the first place. To sincerely question something is to interrogate something from the heart of our existence, from the centre of our being, we need to live, as it were, and become this question. The professional must be able to invite, or even evoke the learner into questioning their own questions, to align the very thing that is being questioned within the question, nurturing the art of thinking. Contemplation is to be silenced by the stillness of reflection, the art of testing.

Ricoeur's (1967; 1981; 1992) panoramic treatment of language, however, addresses its ambiguous nature in which he widens notions of "textuality" to any human action or situation. "Textuality" is a concept in linguistics and literary theory that refers to the attributes that distinguish the text [a technical term indicating any communicative content under analysis] as an object of study in those fields, and associated with structuralism and poststructuralism, but which seriously influence the manner in which the act of teaching can be elevated to that of a pedagogy.

Fragile and fallible

Ricoeur's favourite themes are the "fragility" and "fallible" nature of each human. We struggle to find meaning in past action, current state and future options. We also reflect on the terrible tragedies of history. Knowing our history makes available a rich vein of practical knowledge that is found in the moment between the memory and the intent, expectation and outcome, what we know and what we hope for. Explaining and understanding, according to Ricoeur, are vital features of our human conduct 'It is at the very heart of reading that Explanation and Understanding are indefinitely opposed and reconciled' (1981:164). He perceives explanation and understanding not as friction, but as areas for increasing mutual understanding, as commentaries on the multiplicities of meaning believing 'we should explain more in order to understand better' (Hahn 1995: 31).

Importantly for this thesis, Ricoeur brings verbal presence to our attention. He views the generative power of the symbol as originating from its nature as an opaque "sign" whose first literal meaning evokes further meanings by analogy. Unlike a technical

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"cipher" the meaning of which remains fixed and thus transparent, the true symbol expands enigmatically in meaning. This multiplicity allows the symbol to communicate all the ambiguity of a "living-experience" or "avowal" of reality; it also charges the symbol with creative power. For as one meaning gives way to another, the mind is led to more abstract levels of thought. Thus Ricoeur calls attention to those "primary symbols" of thought which, after first thickening into myth through narrative, may have ultimately flowered into abstract philosophy.

What movement interpreters need to search for is the *objective* process of the agent's descriptive text of the movement, which would be the act *of* the text [the words]. This goes beyond the *subjective* process of interpretation as an act *on* the text (Ricoeur 1981:165). A professional discourse is strong in its *silent persuasiveness* which does not make unbridgeable distinctions between explicit issues from implicit concerns. It makes discerning use of metaphor as the inherently hermeneutical character of the psychoanalytic *interactions*. According to Ricoeur, the central argument of Max Black's (1962) thesis on "*Models and Metaphors*" is that, with respect to the relation to reality, metaphor is to poetic language what the model is to scientific language. Commenting on one's inexhaustibility of knowledge and its relations to the limitations of human understanding, Ricoeur (1981:197) remarks:

> …It is because absolute knowledge is impossible that the conflict of interpretations is insurmountable and inescapable.

Ricoeur (1975) frequently uses the mute power of metaphor to re-describe the world, a prime way to "weave", "tissue", "strand", "affiliate", and "fabricate" when talking about the structure of texts. Both Ricoeur, and Merleau-Ponty suggest that manifested "text" can be thought of as an intermediary which the mover is plunged into. Describing the event encounter is resurfaced by its agent so that the PE interpreter can examine diligently over the mover's text. They both believe that meaning emerges in a number of ways that the text itself permits. Ricoeur argues that it is ultimately poetics [exemplified in narrative] rather than philosophy that provides the structures and synthetic strategies by which understanding and a coherent sense of self and life is possible. "Let the word flower to perfume its fullest

meaning" this is the kind of metaphor that, according to Ricoeur, is a process to liberate the capacity of fiction to re-describe the reality.

In oblique ways, PE's curriculum movement disciplines symbolize or make a metaphor of essential life skills. They prefigure the shape of social and personal life. It is not quite enough to say PE is a "metaphor" for life; narrowly taken, a metaphor signifies a linguistic gesture in which properties not usually ascribed to certain things are so ascribed either in order to give concrete life to what is normally abstract [an idea or feeling, for instance] or in order to change our perception of something whose special details we would never have seen without the metaphor. For example, boxing is a metaphor for the reality of aggression, a realization for the master-symbols of courage, endurance, quickness, grace, and victoriousness. Tennis is a metaphor for many of the same values. But both activities also *enact* in their gestures these values. They give them *real* life, and hence move from metaphor to immediate experience; the actual and the desired come together.

Ricoeur develops the concepts of 'appropriation' [*aneignung*] that allows the reader to follow the '*direction*' – *sens* – as well as – *sens* meaning (sense) and thereby distance themselves and draw closer to the meaning of the text (1981: 161). Similarly, in the context of movement, I have argued that when one is immersed in the play attitude, or encounters supreme moments called "peak experiences", its resident agent is granted either a "locale of tranquility" or epiphanic elation, during which the self is temporarily "lost" in awe. During these "loss of self" moments, what "befalls" us, as Ricoeur suggests, is a blending of our sedimented conscious state of being with that of our unconscious, immanent and inner state of existence. This can be either a temporarily tense moment of disturbing "insecurity", but it can also be a "haptic", harmonising incident of touching something *and* being touched.

The tensive style is in keeping with what Ricoeur regards as basic, ontological tensions inherent in the peculiar being that is human existence, namely, the ambiguity of belonging to both the natural world and the world of action [through freedom of the will]. We necessarily regard ourselves from two perspectives: as the author of our actions in the practical world, and as part of, or passive to, cause and

effect in the natural world. Ricoeur places "ethics, at the heart of learning, at the heart of pedagogy.

Along with Gadamer, Ricoeur is a hermeneutic phenomenologist calling for non-manipulative concerns, concerns which one is made aware of, and thus, begins to celebrate the recognition of similarities and especially of differences between oneself and another. Both search for meanings hidden under the surface as subversive influences. Also, both agree that these influences are not innocuous because they reflect hidden drives and affinities. Ricoeur is faithful to an open-ended '*conflict of interpretations'*. Ricoeur (1981: 203) concluded that 'action' itself, action as meaningful, may be an object of science, without losing its character of meaningfulness, through a kind of objectification, similar to the fixation which occurs in writing's meaning: the texts which we hermeneutically interpret may be either written or cultural.

Meaning in intention

The intentional nature of posture and body use is significant to us because intentions and posture have *meaning.* They are philosophic statements. On a gross level, it is obvious that a given posture will be better or worse as a starting place for a particular action. If I am kneeling I am in a better position to talk with my six year old grandson than I am to another adult. On a subtle level, given ways of carrying oneself will be more or less appropriate as starting places for different kinds of interactions with oneself, other people and the world; this constitutes the meaning in body use. Posture is really a manifestation and transmission of an intention to relate to life in a given way, and that is exactly what a philosophy is.

ML's evolving story is that of shaping the contours of PE. However, its purpose, agenda, and its mode of delivery were and continue to be formally governed via ministerial policies. This official "menu" can only be read as an edict, or an announcement for its PE institutions to follow. In turn, each institution is assumed to be equipped with professional expertise to identify the curriculum subject's more refined academic/professional categories, or "recipe" for preparing its movement-

education professionals. Each institution follows the prevalent political line, and each identifies their version of PE's essential ingredients, in terms of its content and its manner of communication. Set against this political scenario, what I have argued is that institutions have not yet reached a consensual stage of agreement about what constitutes the difference between analytic teaching and its excellence; between dissecting the body and disseminating its bodily sensuousness via the implicit art of eco-pedagogy. I maintain that these programmes have been too sport-orientated, and competitive. They are indifferent to perception and embodied action which form the basis of meaning (Burkitt, 1999), failing to address the intricate circular processes of "learning", synergising the elusive body with language's illusion and fallibility.

I advance the notion of an eco-pedagogy, an understanding which allows one to become an indulgent educator when one is well versed in the philosophy of language and familiar in critical hermeneutic interpretation of which Zaner (1964) was first suspicious, referring to it as the "revenge of the intellect upon arts". Vitally, what we must bear in mind is the crucial fact that interpretation is not an isolated activity but the basic structure of experience. Experience is inserted into the history and ideology of a specific moment, and carries with it our unaware meeting with traces of residual images of past realities. Experience stirs our conscious subjectivity and touches our sub-consciousness [which, unwittingly, modern PE has held under siege.] Ricoeur aspires to "pool" together the transient revelations glimpsed at during experiential enactment, by combining the fuller resources of language with those of phenomenological insights. Constantly, however, he is concerned about doubt and suspicion over the imprecise manner in which we seek understanding when we are actively engaged in the use of language.

In his earlier work, for example, Ricoeur was concerned particularly with the notions of freedom and nature and with their "descriptive phenomenology" which would partially resolve the seeming oppositions between that of a participant's "inhabited-perspective in movement" and that of another's "observed-action". Ricoeur distinguishes the notion of "intent" in one's use of considerate language. He maintains that the speaker is exercising a morally delicate balance in their

conversation. Hence its participants are made aware of and can detect critical differences between a language which expresses one's freedom of the will and those features of human nature which appear to constrict or condition our *state* of willingness or otherwise.

Mindful engagement

Ricoeur plays a key role in this thesis because he addresses many linguistic issues to demonstrate his committed care for others. What and how Ricoeur conveys in his writing is evidence of his own reconciliatory nature towards others and the world. Constantly, Ricoeur (1992) seeks to resolve the seeming opposition between "incidental movement" and "action-with-intent", or wilful "intent". Interminably, he treads a fine line, as should all educators, to distinguish between discourse [written text] and dialogue [spoken and heard]. In short, what Ricoeur brings to life in his thoughts and in his writing are the very characteristics that I am campaigning for and that PE specialists should adopt into their own practices of educating learners in their own understanding of movement. PE specialists should revere movement's value in order to better cope with their understanding of themselves throughout their lives.

Professional pedagogues require a hermeneutic ability to make interpretive sense of the phenomena of the lifeworld: (1) to allow for textual reflection, (2) to contribute to one's pedagogic deliberations and practical tact as the purposeful *activity* of teaching, and (3) to describe how one interprets the "texts" of life. Modern conceptions of PE's theorizing were more often guided by the useful, the manageable, the pragmatic and the efficacious, whereas, Heidegger (1968) and Ricoeur (1992) show us that our conception of knowledge and rational thinking has been detached from its traditional affiliation with the conception of the "good". PE's educator needs to enter into each learner's life, and eventually, must be held accountable amongst educators for prompting, fostering and guiding the learner's emancipatory growth into selfhood; the essential qualities that makes one person distinct from all other.

In a pedagogic context, subjectivity means that one needs to be as perceptive, insightful and discerning as one can be in order to disclose the object [movement] in its full richness and in its greatest depth. Subjectivity means that we are "strongly committed" in our reorientation to movement as the object of study in a *unique* and personal way, while avoiding the danger of becoming arbitrary, self-indulgent or of getting captivated and carried away by our unreflected preconceptions. Sometimes, we need to speak more pointedly of *theorizing* when the main aim is to bring our reflective understanding of movement to our speaking; at other times the emphasis is on gathering the mover's internalized "impressions", now made public in order to create a sketch of that person's situated disposition towards the world at that moment. For both correspondents it is a situation that is less susceptible to the effective management of control of the professional operating on the principle of recognition of the existence of *freedom* in human life. It is under such circumstances that the PE advocate becomes an interpreter who is consciously participating in one's own action-senstitive field of professional knowledge.

Perhaps in the end, PE's most compelling of passions that are never satisfied, is the desire for knowledge; the longing to push back the limits imposed by the symbolic order of our structured language and our structured movement disciplines. This reciprocity, the circular manner in which a nuanced sense of self emerges can only occur through a deepening relation with other beings, a relation that is acknowledged in Buddhism as the "dependent co-arising of self and other".

Movement and language can be studied separately. But, it is in synergizing their usage that their consequential significance, their leaven of learning is fermented for its user only if its correspondents can mutually arrange to meet each other's meanings in their respective use of words. Both correspondents need to share some alignment between their silent meanings. The overall movement of thought can then be conceived as interplay between spoken and unspoken "conversation". A movement literate is called upon to commentate on an interminable shifting notion of meaning that ferments a "communicative action". Meaning is recovered from one's experiential background by qualifying and re-qualifying one's habituated cognitive distinctions. Discovering new meanings serve to reform problems and refocus on

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inter as well as intra-personal relations and identity. Interminably, this process implies that pedagogy is a performed "act", and following Husserl (1969), that one's identity is a difference between perspective levels [indicative sign] and an expressive level [expressive sign] in states of consciousness.

If education occurs when the speaker is related to the speaking, the messenger with the message, then what is to be established is that what we feel to be our true self needs the constant endorsement [affirmation] of significant others in order for us to continue to esteem that self, then educational communication implies imparting and exchanging information, ideas or feelings. This why pedagogy has the task of integrating the monologic language of the natural sciences into the communicative consciousness of movement's missionaries and their followers, of embracing the task of exercising and vindicating practical knowledge, personal identities, social concerns and political reasonableness of emerging ideas; semi law-like conditions which do not cease to be constitutive of our human mode of being. The fact remains that language is like picking up the norms of a game whilst not being aware of the rules which enshrine moral values. The critical theme I have been enlarging upon through this thesis is that we rely on the others to know ourselves.

Pedagogy to Andragogy

In effect, when applied to the widening remit of contemporary PE, under the sponsorship of its meaning, ML can come to be re-labelled as "andragogy". Leading into andragogy, ML consists of employing specific learning strategies focused on mature learners or young adults. Andragogy is often interpreted as the process of engaging experienced learners with the "structure", or *conditions*, which apply to animate learning experience. Being experienced, of course, is a wisdom of the practice of the living which results from having lived life at a profound, indeed a scintillating [sporting life] or deeply contemplative [Buddhist / Christian / Muslim / Hindu, and also atheism] level of understanding. Introduced by Kapp, a German educator in 1833, "andragogy" was developed into a theory of adult education by the American educator Knowles (2005). Knowles asserted that andragogy [Greek: "man-

leading"] should be distinguished from the more commonly used pedagogy [Greek: "child-leading"].

As applied to ML, Knowles' theory can be stated with six assumptions related to motivation of accomplished movement learners who wish to pursue a career in movement-education:

1. Senior pupils need to know the reason for learning something and come to experience an astute feeling of *needing* to know.
2. Experience, including mishaps and errors, provide the basis for learning activities; their enactment provides the foundational points of contact upon which learning is energized.
3. Senior PE schooling learners need to be more responsible for their decisions on education; to become more directly involved in the planning and evaluation of their own learning-experiences, hence, become more immersed in outing, or "eventing" their emerging bricolage of "self-concepts"; to know how to listen to the descriptions of their own embodied experiences [which is exercised daily by the specialist movement-interpreter].
4. Accomplished movement-experiencers are most interested in learning about academic disciplines which have immediate and life-long relevance to their work and hence their personal lives and well-being and to appreciate the readiness of being able to apply this new knowledge to their daily lives.
5. This reflexively thoughtful mode of learning is *problem*-centred rather than *content*-oriented and thus, helps to map out the different forms of knowledge required for the sake of composing a holistic approach to their professional practices and growing posture towards life.
6. Mature learners respond better to internal rather than external motivators.

In effect, andragogy's, or ML's, eventual practices allow discussion of the *contrast* between self-directed and "other-directed" education to surface, in order for self-and other-directed learning to be made distinct. In an important sense, it is here in dialogue that the very kernel of conversation is located and from which pedagogy emerges. This is because there is no unmediated experience, neither can there be any form of interpretation taken to be a politically neutral act.

A guardianship, not a custodial learning

Knowing ourselves implies that we aspire to that of a protective guardianship about different modes of knowledge. Knowledge is not custodial conception of learning. It involves a "code" of learning about conventions and policies, all of which require deciphering and translation. We wish to garner and embrace significant others' profound experience of life by being placed in touch with their presence, their voice and their thoughts. Learning is about being placed by the way others have coped with their lives. What lies in this hidden code are the following features, which have already been referred to are "*Techne*," "*Lebenswelt*," "*Verstehen*" and "*Phronesis*", to which I now add the notion "*Alterity*".

"Alterity" is a philosophical term meaning "otherness", strictly being in the sense of the other of two [Latin: alter]. "Alterity" is basically synonymous with "otherness". It deals with radical differences between a conscious "self" and an unconscious "other". I maintain that there can be no self-enclosed "now" moment because "temporal-time" always has a reflexive aspect that is aware of itself, and that opens us to experiences beyond our particular horizons of significance. It is because of the temporal nature of "Alterity" that Merleau-Ponty (1968) claims that we humanize our location. He emphasises the role of the body in one's power of communication, claiming that we contextualise our relations with our environment by coating it with dimensions of our "Selves". Reciprocally, we are enveloped by the 'world.' Radically, his project, that of a persuasively embodied-reliant means, accounts for how we come to perceive multi-versions, and an ensemble of our "Selves", but always in *relation* to the "otherness" of another person. Merleau-Ponty's thoughts, however, anticipated poststructuralism's radical linguistic revelations about the possible existence of a "bricolage of selves", and his philosophical principle of exchanging one's perspective for that of the "other" did not come to fruition.

What ML brings to the "structure" of experience is the advantage of postructuralism under critical consideration. Experience's initial aim (Weber, 1958) was to reach at the deeper acquaintance in understanding or "*Verstehen*", which is an interpretive or participatory examination of social phenomena. More recently, Dilthey (1985) interpretes experience as a concept and a method central to the rejection of

positivistic social science. Experience, for Dilthey, endeavours to bridge the gap between theory and practice in the immanent textured framework of the lifeworld or "*Lebenswelt*". *Lebenswelt* may be conceived as a universe of what is self-evident, what is "given" or "befalls" us in a world that subjects may experience together.

The concept of "*Lebenswelt*" is another cardinal imperative of pedagogy. This is the concept which emphasizes a "state of affairs" in which the world is experienced, the world is lived [German: *erlebt*]. The lifeworld is a pre-epistemological stepping stone for phenomenological analysis in the Husserlian tradition. "*Lebenswelt*" or lifeworld may be conceived as a universe of what is self-evident or given, a world that adheres many experiences together.

Merleau-Ponty emphasises the way in which our experiences do not form a shut off, private domain, but a way of being-in-the-world, emphasizing that we live our lives in a particular milieu of a human world, or "Lebenswelt", but for him, "Lebenswelt" is irreducible to pure or private consciousness. The life world comprises the world of objects around us as we perceive them and our experience of our "Self", through our embodied encounters and relationships. For Merleau-Ponty, this lived world is pre-reflective: it takes place before we think about it, and, before we put it into language. The very idea of "life world" is that we exist in a day-to-day world that is filled with complex meanings which form the backdrop of our everyday actions and interactions. According to Merleau-Ponty, the term life-world immanently, directs attention to the individual's lived situation and social world rather than some inner world of introspection. After all, "There is no inner man [sic]," Merleau-Ponty famously explains, "man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself." (1962: xi). His thoughts replicate those of Zen Buddhism.

Pedagogy's indispensable ingredients

What these indispensable components contribute to the act of pedagogy becomes clearer in a moment. Activating such components serves to incorporate these essential ingredients. These ingredients are profoundly immersed in a language endowed with learning's enabling and inescapable features, or in the invariant

aspects of what I shall refer to as an "eco-pedagogic" conversation. Eco-pedagogy is the exercise of these necessary features which constitute a panorama or "perspectival thinking" mode of understanding. This professional vision is versatile, and can accommodate different temperaments which include the universal principles of dialogic conduct or key notions such as "*Verstehen*", [the procedure by which we infer something internal from external signs.] "*Verstehen*" is an "attributive noun" identified as the understanding of intentional meanings, values and purposes; a grasping of, or noting anew, the sense of what is going on in human activities which, when seen through the refraction of many prisms, can only be partially expressed in word-bound thoughts.

"*Verstehen*" was introduced into philosophy and the human sciences [*Geisteswissenschaften]* by Dilthey (1978) to describe the first-person participatory perspective that agents have on their individual experience as well as their culture, history, and society. In this sense, it is developed in the context of the theory and practice of interpretation [hermeneutics] and contrasted with the external objectivating third-person perspective of explanation [Erklärung] in which human agency, subjectivity and its products are analyzed as effects of impersonal natural forces in the natural sciences and social structures in sociology. In other words, interpersonal understanding is attained through a process of interpreting the "objectificiations of life", the external expressions of human or gestural manifestaions of thought and action. Understanding is shared through these common "objectifications" and not, as was widely believed, through empathy. Moreover, to fully understand myself I must analyse the expressions of my life in the same way that I analyse the expression of others. Our reflective expressions about ourselves and about life, receive their fullest expression in world-views, which are overall perspectives on life encompassing the way we perceive and conceive the world, evaluate it aesthetically and respond to it in action.

"*Verstehen*" holds a visionary [and missionary] mode of understanding which takes as its source of information – its data – all the languages, myths and traditions that are handed down, interpreted not in terms of a fixed idea of a universal human nature, but by that which is granted by an imaginative capacity for re-entering the manner of thought, the modes of consciousness that they represent.

For instance, if it is phenomenologically plausible that in practical situations theory always arrives late, too late to inform praxis in a technical or instrumental way, then in the daily practice of living we are for ever at a loss for theory. Yet in another less technical sense we are usually not really so helpless because theory has already seeped into our primitive experiences to help prepare our bodies or "Being" to act, so to speak. And this is the unseen, un-thought of preparation referred to as the process of "*Bildung*". The concern of "*Bildung*", a German term, that Dilthey (1978; 1985) spans a range of meanings including "acculturation" and is the equivalent of the English term "formation" or "upbringing" concerned with "the properly human way of developing one's natural talents and capacities" (Gadamer 1960: 8), refers to "education" in its broadest sense. It points out any act or experience that has a formative effect on the mind, character or physical ability of an individual. In its technical sense "education" is the process by which society deliberately transmits its accumulated knowledge, skills and values from one generation to another.

Phronesis

Crucial also amongst the bare essentials of pedagogy is the notion of "*Phronesis*". *Phronesis* is concerned with the uncertainties of human circumstances with what Aristotle (1941) calls the "variable", to distinguish it from the "unvariable" with which science episteme deals. *Phronesis* can be described as the act of judicious deliberation over alternatives with a view to practical action. But, gaining *Phronesis* requires maturation. It is linked to the predisposed and/or nurtured excellence of character since its principles are in accordance with the moral excellences and rightness in the moral character.

The essential point here lies in the implication that the mover or agent will always be the vehicle of form which, when it acts, will be the life-giving, vitalizing, or animating source of the change. From this it follows that whenever it is true to say that a certain universal form exists potentially, there must have been an earlier exemplification of the same universal actually existing. The point here is that during the experience of change, a reordering of one's emotions is involved when recurrent perceptions and actions consolidate into *dispositions* of character. It does so in the sense that the

specifically ethical knowledge acquired through this development i.e., *Phronesis* can be brought into play not only in situations in which one has to act oneself, but also in situations in which "others" have to act (Dunne 1985; 1988; 1993).

Aristotle's (1941) unifying vision of moral virtue as an overall view of human judgment [from particularity to generality of theory as deliberated pedagogy], in effect, speaks about dimensions of "*Phronesis*" and rhetoric primarily in terms of "collaborative activity". Pedagogy, as Aristotle would have it, is a rhetorical form of deliberation which is "brought to life" by the twin roles of "desire" and "display". "*Phronesis*" implies one's capacity to be prudent, concerned with particulars as well as universals, and particulars become known from experience. But, a young person, like "Iago" lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce and sensitively become aware of it.

We are accustomed to looking at "*Phronesis*" as knowledge that will guide action; but what phenomenological hermeneutics has shown us is that it is a kind of cyclic process that resides in the fact that "*Phronesis*" also arises from sound action. It is something to which we are already habituated, but may not have realized its process or its consequences. In other words, we cannot have the knowledge to help us become good pedagogues unless we are already fully aware of what is happening in-situ; in a pedagogical communicative praxis, where practical wisdom is called upon to reconcile knowledge with moral gestures guiding judgment and decision-making as intended actions all of which carry meaning, value and purposes, and help to make visible the bridging relationship between experience, judgment and character of its correspondents. But then, what has the wisdom of *Phronesis* to do with PE?

Clearly we need to differentiate between the patterns of decision-making within a teaching episode. We need to be concerned with replication and reliance, extending to creating new conditions and being versatile to call upon one's reservoir of lived interrelations. We need to interact with care. *Phronesis* is a knowledge of one who knows how to live well. It is acquired and deployed not in the making of any product separate from oneself but rather in one's actions with one's fellows; it is an inimately

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personal knowledge in that it characterises and expresses the kind of person one is, in the living of one's life. Deprived of *Phronesis's* insight, which views knowledge as both the means and the product of human endeavour, it is not possible to be virtuous, nor without virtue to be phronetic. Aristotle held the belief that gifted with innate endowment, or nurtured in the course of experience, we build our character not merely through knowledge but through action, through exercising a virtue, rather than simply possessing a theoretical construct of it.

Citing what is ex-citing

What I find exciting is something to which I respond. What I have suggested is that perhaps it is my inner-most fibers and floating facets of my unconscious self that comes into being, into my conscious sense of awareness, by seeping into the many "gaps" in which my unknown, sub-liminal self, can be surfaced from within PE's multitude of gaps, in its "ludic-Rubicon" but only made manifest in the moment of entry into language's symbolic order. The genus of language is created in the tension between the *interchanges* of signs and signals. But, these signs and signals are themselves resourced from within our embodied state of being. They come from our raw [impulsive] emotions which are then, subjected to, infused in, and become seriously diluted from their embodied values. These signs and signals are transplanted into a symbolic linguistic system of words. Their living nature is transformed into that of a mere kernel of their encountered personal meanings. Hence, the lived and meaningful experiences are left behind and only their remnant worded images are carried over to another. Like the use of internet, one creates a "virtual" synthetic event removed from the directly lived process.

Interminably, ML searches to identify all available but covert messages about movement's messenger in order to reinforce our resonance and reverberation with others and to avoid weakening each other's *interoceptive* senses, senses which inform individuals of the "state" of their own embodied dimensions and which, I maintain, are linked to moral judgement. We forget that we have to learn our emotions through sharing cultured forms of social behaviour, and that behaving socially is something that the whole body takes part in, with all its senses. To "act" for

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example, is to go through the motions of behaviour without really feeling it, lacking the appropriate experience. Furthermore, "literature" we must remind ourselves is not a constructed institution but an expression of the way the world *is perceived and interpreted*, offering possible images of reality into life's understanding.

For both Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, "reading" into physical action and hearing spoken words are complimentary ways, each inviting a better understanding of possible meaning. Both philosophical thinkers emphasise the importance of recalling experiential outcomes which enables one to anticipate a better course of action. Reading is a reflexive processing of thoughtful decision making, a literary feature which is again raised on pages 215-219.

By applying hermeneutics to spoken language, we interweave our comprehension between formal text and its informal texture through understanding the structure of one form of experience in terms of another of a different kind. A serene crossing over happens possibly from a forgotten state of harmonious self to that of a vibrantly novel state of existence, when it seems our embodied being [mind in synchrony with body] encounters an existence; when neither dominates nor distracts from the other.

I and otherness

In poststructuralism's linguistic analysis, Ricoeur, inspired by his own sense of humbleness, humility and modesty, (1981; 1992) shows the individual person is not taken to be, in reality, the harmonious and coherent totality of technicism's misrecognition of an ego-self. The entry of an "*I*" into language necessitates a division which reinforces a split between the "*I*" of discourse, the subject of the utterance, and the "I" who speaks, the subject of the enunciation. There is thus a contradiction between the conscious self, the self which appears in its own discourse, and the self which is only partly represented there, the self which speaks. In other words, the subject is, in the first instance the subject of a sentence, the agent of a verb, and the figure that says "I". I reproduce [or challenge] the ruling ideology when I speak or write, and I am in that sense a source of initiatives, actions, decisions, choices. But, at the same time, the subject is subjected to the meanings

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and sentence structures that language permits. As a movement-learner I communicate *subject to* my reproductions of my accepted signifier, my PE mentor. The nature of my learner-existence in PE lessons is dependent upon the manner in which my significant-advocate, the PE teacher, decides to conduct his lessons, during which my personal experiences are either positively or negatively affected.

The "I-lessness" of language means that language is never "mine" and yet this very fact allows me to share the boundless expansiveness of this "we" to whom the world, in language, is ever disclosing itself. "We" meet our subjectivity, literally by bringing life to the role that one has created for one's "self". I have willed something vague and abstract, and which appeals to me, and with which I want to be associated, to become part of my public image. I begin to speak about what I hope will also become a part of me, and for others to be able to take note of, as an integral part of my desired public image.

However, what is felt and meaningfully constituted, though sometimes hinted at in words like ephemeral, and evocative, or sad and anaesthetizing are not reducible to words. Movement's meaning remains immanent in the act which creates it, in its undergoing; in the pursuit of its objectivity, transiently glimpsed at during quintessential moments. PE, if it is to be understood through the spectral lenses of ML, through its multiple disciplined treatment, holds the potential to suspend the habituated identification of ourselves. In movement, and in language, in their respective usage, "I" am rendered capable of encountering experiences which are of a different nature to that "I" have previously encountered. "I" identify something that offers me glimpses of something different *from* my "self", and, a difference *with* my "self". If this is the case, then, I have the capacity to deconstruct conceptions of my "self" as one with another phenomenon, volitionally, to be embraced by, and resonate with it, or to dismiss it and prefer to be without it. In addition, my "self" can adopt the position of being excepted [set aside] from my conscious and conscience awareness. As physical movers we need to accept the notion that we both act upon and are acted upon at the one and the same time.

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The "knowing" pedagogue, the fit, experienced pedagogue, however, can never quite catch up with how he or she "knows". In the thesis opening phase, I explain that in gaining knowledge one is always beholden or indebted not only to assumptions, but also to antecedent interests and tacit procedures which are not in themselves known. To be known as a person, as an educator, as a role model means PE proponents need to make themselves fully available for their learners' quizzical rhetoric. Interminably, they must pose questions and monitor their own changing state of "personhood" [next chapter].

PE is the inevitable creativeness of ordinary everyday life. At its greatest moments, like a linguistic creation, a dance movement, a stage of a game, or a run across the sand-dunes, human movement dramatizes the continuing elements of real social, personal life and beliefs in such a way as to present themselves and change themselves. And, if we can come to see PE not in its ordinariness but rather in its extraordinariness, then we have to talk about it differently. It is important to appreciate that PL's new modes of professional thinking and practices promote a broader conception of physical activity as "unrelated to ability". I repeat my claim in Chapter 3 that ML is called for to clarify the complex relation between language and personal identity, in order to give refuge to those movers who encounter withdrawal symptoms from PE's playful world. ML is intended to gently foreground the self "out" of their "unexplained" encounters in movement. Alternatively, skilled movers might encounter something like an overwhelming sense of ecstasy in movement. And it is with trying to account for this "unexplained gap" between conscious and unconscious embodied sensation that Movement Literacy is also concerned with; that is, with making some meaningful sense of PE.

Summary

In closing Chapter 7, pedagogy's core ingredients render public and transpose the private features encountered in the acting of the event by conveying words which tangentially relay aspects of the inner self or serve to extrapolate evidence which the listener, the significant other in the conversation can detect. Pedagogy aspires to connect the manner of movement with the moral behaviour evidenced in one's

actions, with one's "floating-self". The latter is partially surfaced and gently introduced to its agent mover. One's ontological stance is composed by a kind ML synthesis via a range of educational traditions. ML is intended to compose a micro-political understanding of one's learners and or one's self as a person and an educator, an experiential process which is pedagogical or tutorial in its doing.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I have explained that language is possible only because each speaker sets oneself up as *subject* by referring to oneself as *I* in one's discourse, that human understanding cannot escape the network bounds of perspectives and interpretation, and that the "art" of pedagogy is to conceal "teaching" in the learning, in the unforced engagement of the self.

Founding my thesis is the premise that critical, transformative education can begin to be nourished in the disciplined praxis of ML. The true burden of teaching, I maintain, lies with what passes [unquestioned, and unchallenged] between the signified knower and the to-be-made significant listener. This process stresses the need to develop a sense of intimate familiarity to the deep kind of shivering, vibratory essence that puts the world of sound into motion. ML reminds us that we are alive, sentient, and experiencing the world and other in the "bloom" of each individual's entire corpus. ML is a sound that is etched in the voice. It is a voice that is able to convey overt and covert meanings with an assured fluency and sense of conviction in its belief.

ML is a versatile and flexible voice, and can be finely adjusted to the ensemble of the circumstances, a ministering to the spontaneity with cognitive-based thoughtfulness and manifested in the practical act of tactful humility. It cultivates trust and maintains a shared sense of dignity. Significantly it is a voice which carries a moral force by always trying to acknowledge the fullness of the "otherness of the other", and in the process may come across insights to one's own "other" "Self". We all learn to teach as we teach.

In an important sense, through a disciplined discourse of dialogue [strongly interlaced with the concerns of "*Techne*", "*Lebenswelt*" and "*Phronesis*"], ML employs

a kind of technology of the "self", by being given license to sketch, weave, interlace and embroider words into the texture of the PE interpreter's voice. And, herein lies the irony of a profound contradiction. The language with which teachers are encouraged to interpret themselves and reflect on their daily lives with children is thoroughly imbued by hope. And yet, it has been almost exclusively a language of doing; it lacks "being". This lack of "being" is what ML attempts to counter, a subtle strategy which is further explored in the final chapter and in the study's closing but unfinished remarks.

Pedagogy flourishes only when it can filter through the sieve-like network of language to reach beyond the fixed boundaries of *Techne* and only when it begins to rely on certain experiential flexible features that emerge in the exercise of *Phronesis*, *Lebenswelt,* and *Verstehen* which constitute pedagogy's unifying principles, to engage its interlocuters to prepare for change in the understanding of experiences which may be recruited and preferably applied to change their own lives. This is because life is about change. Understanding PE also should be all about understanding change since we all need to be able to cope with change by exercising the full potential of our human resources.

The unfinished remarks about pedagogy's kernel, its unfathomed but creative "ludic Rubicon" should not remain a solitary journey. The process of education itself is shown to be generated between what can be described as "terminal references" [formal teaching] and "interminable differences" [andragogy]. The link between the former and the latter is pedagogy, and the link between pedagogy and the latter is addressed by its interlocutors being able to engage in ML. Whilst non-coercive, non-tormenting, and non-repressive, ML is yet to be tested out.

Chapter Eight   Pedagogy Cannot Be Understood in a Propositional Sense

Introduction

This chapter qualifies how ML might have helped "Iago" to appreciate the complexity of both teaching and learning, to openly educate rather than covertly manipulate others. ML sets the ultimate tone of PE's professional institutional programmes as a sustained effort to infuse the *meaning* of movement by identifying its learning virtues. Whilst PL identifies how teaching becomes pedagogy, ML communicates pedagogy into androgogy. "Metaphorically" ML contrasts pedagogy's core ingredients *techne* with *phronesis*. The pedagogue's "teaching" experience enables him/her to proceed from the impediment of using a fixed perception of teaching to begin to practice pedagogy's hidden ethics designed to manifest movement's human "contract". Ethics, we remind ourselves, involves experiences but its procedure is not put to words. PE's pedagogy is a hidden code of values intended to guide actions in a fascinating way. Pedagogy is a drama in which movement, our thoughts and feelings of ourselves and of others are first objectified and then partially returned to us afresh via language's slippery nature.

ML is orientated to learn how to interrelate practices from across the entire schooling curriculum with the world of exercise, health and physical leisure. Its eventual hope is that novice movers can be informed to recognize the art of understanding playful leisure as the very serious basis of understanding one's culture and themselves. Movement advocates need to know and appreciate movement from the "inside", to be familiar with its ritualised sources inspired by our ancestors. Many generations have toiled with idea of trying to "know" what learning and education might "look like". Words and their floating meaning have proven to be inadequate to resolve this dilemma. Knowledge can be contextually and appropriately understood and applied as well as misinterpreted, distorted, and applied erroneously or painfully, yet no knowledge can be supported or "carried forward" by one alone. Language can both inform and misinform its users and receptors. Certain facets and features of human movement however, can be interpreted almost universally. The exchanging of one's smile in response to another's smile, for instance, suggests a moment of shared

cordiality. A smile is a gestured, silent deed. And it is with revealing this kind of immanent message that PE can offer to its mover learners. It can offer a lodestone connection between the naiveté of youthfulness, and the wisdom of adulthood.

Coping with this crossing-over or bridging PE's unexplained gaps in schooling's education to apply new knowledge to their lives is what I see as PE's profound mission. It is so important that I have claimed it should "orientate" its epistemologies and professional approaches, not the other way round. This is because learning is organized not around PE as a curriculum subject, a matter of units and modules, and the consequences of failure, which deconstructs the self, but around life/work situations praising what reconstructs the self image, like initiating one's belief, self-reliance, and self- assurance [confidence] in public. The point here is that without understanding the possibilities of *deriving* the deeper, affective meaning from movement, it is difficult to construct a meaningful curriculum where the act of running is only marginally about exercise, as Boyer (1989: 20) well recognised.

Pedagogy itself is a way of exposing hidden hegemonic ideology by attending to that of emancipation. It is not knowledge of ethical ideas as such, but rather a resourcefulness of mind that is called into play in, and responds uniquely to, the classroom situation in which these ideas are to be realized. Professional educators are required to know what is prudent, just and trusting in one's call to another, and render this deliberated thinking in a way that its listener may be placed in touch with the humane feeling of one's collegial being for another's. Pedagogy, when understood in terms of its non-instrumental character emerges in its mediation of Techne with Phronesis [in the universal and the particular]. It puts a premium on Merleau-Ponty's inspired call for phenomenological description of one's experience and perceptiveness, which can then be subjected to Ricoeur's hermeneutic interpretive critique or consciousness. The act of interpretive critique has a *practical interest* to act, rather than to address already formulated knowledge.

Techne is teachable in terms of its demonstrable knowledge, but insufficiently dialogical. It imprisons us within a monologic tradition, because its universal [others'] knowledge is already enshrined, and its best laws have been repeatedly tried and tested in it. It cannot leap over the interpreter's relationship to tradition nor that of its

listener's. The need to affirm further judgment has been satisfied, whereas it is the cultivation of rational and moral judgment as understood by another that pedagogy is concerned with.

Pedagogy requires its advocate to lay the seedbed foundation of judgment not through theoretical reason, but rather through benign jousting of words in the sincerity and the dynamism with which one searches for "meanings" that freely come and go and may be rooted in its agent's lived experiences. In a sense, the relationship between experience, judgment, and character take precedence over, and necessarily replace "pure" theory when it comes to the realm of playful pedagogy [the life breath of culture when the certainty of the unexpected always lurks] as it emerges into andragogy - not orphaned from each other's learning. The real deficiency of theory is that it brings no profit with respect to the formation of character.

Healing encounter

In examining the content of PE's movement lifeworld, its participants are compelled to reflect on one's own and others' commentaries upon the event and one's occupancy as its agent. ML's eventual ambition is to enable novice PE advocates to create movement as a healing encounter. PE's human movement carries meaning which has been driven out of their more central embodiment and realizations; out of the tradition containing transcendental meanings such as heroic exhaustion, honourable continuity of ritual, style, grace and truthfulness, which are gathered into the web of PE's authentic form of life. It is PE's delicate membrane, its in-between "gaps" that ML haptically aspires to touch.

Social and personal identity

With the advent of postmodernism / poststructuralism, there followed a pivotal change in social and personal identity, a shift from institutional loyalties and responsibilities to personal sincerity and authenticity as a focus of allegiance. The forms of imaginative and actual "relationships" came to express "individuality" or

distinctiveness, rather than collegiality as the core of "being", where the ideals of communal "honour" and "loyalty" have been supplanted by those of "self-integrity" and "self-dignity", where pride out manoeuvres prejudice. This new focus on "individuality" however means that one has to assert oneself more as a spectacle. PE is the readiest expression of all schooling's curriculum "disciplines" of individuality lived as a spectacle. In other words, I as Ted the "school athlete", the "soccer captain", the "international rugby" player, the visible resident in the world of movement, and portrayed under the conditions of movement, was all too easily transformed into a public "representation" of Ted. The uncertainty of knowing my "self" as an artifice for a popular sport-imaged person, or a Red Coat, contrasted sharply and alarmingly with how I directly experienced and lived my life in earnest.

Movement Literacy better than modern PE

Early in the thesis I identify PE as a source of personal struggle, and then portray PE and its contemporary mode of communication as a powerful, but benign force for change, when the lesson's entire ambiance, its interpersonal dynamics can be tweaked by the professional's astute use of language communication, thus, changing the tenor, tone, and the timbre of learning. Modern PE (Chapter 1) was guilty of, for example, trying to justify its educational status solely on the grounds that it achieved the *objects* of its technical disciplines. Its technical ends were elaborated with reference to science-bound fields of study, supposedly *as* an education encounter. The philosophy of education itself however, seeks to guide educational practice through examining the assumptions about the structure of specific knowledge domains and minds of learners. "Iago's" self-detachment, his worldly perception hermetically sealed, could teach only to the "oppressed".

Bad old PE

PE's early prototype teaching models were largely practised as if its agents were experiencing a cessation of their vital functions, suspending the self or portraying an unoccupied, servile mind. When it comes to the processing of learning, I have accused modern PE of treason. I accuse it of pursuing a scheme of thinking, of

imposing a conventionally fixed arrangement of thought upon its participating correspondents. It cultivates and nurtures the unquestioned acceptance of general theoretical assumptions and rigid laws and techniques for their [theory and laws] application. It portrayed PE's movement enterprises as an experience which could captivate their [movement disciples] involvement and satiate or even develop a reliance on movement's consumptive and compulsive attraction.

In effect, it left what was assumed to be the "self-sufficient" mind well alone, and thus, debilitated movement's process of learning. It harnessed personal growth largely because it inflated one's conception of the autonomy of consciousness. Therefore, modern definitions of its teaching "styles" shifted to mean almost the opposite of teaching's original education conception. The very notion of education to learn, of moving PE's professional practices actually served to move *away* from the individual and towards more objectified and universal claims of what it means to educate and be educated. Such practices either denied or excavated the learners' mode of subjective concerns.

Old Cartesian PE

In the absence of embodied concerns, PE's professional practices were considered uncongenial to nurture educational learning (Crum 1993; Schemp 1993; Tinning 1991). Committed to its technocratic ideology, its practices were shown to be recursive and regularized, hence "rule governed" components of human agency (Bourdieu, 1976; 1992; Giddens 1979; 1986). PE's modern consciousness was dominated by a Cartesian schizoid dualism, body dislocated from mind. It employed teaching styles founded on an ideology immunised against rational critique. Its professional onus was placed on the point of the activity; to move effectively. PE was an externalized inscription of information. It developed a legion of silent witnesses with severed voices. It created movers rendered incidental, perhaps even immunised against learning. These are some of the reasons why this thesis is called upon to qualify the fact that the process of learning to learn disappears when there is no response to it.

Iago and Mosston and Ashworth

We cannot afford to view "Iago" independently as an "idiosyncratic being", as Mosston (1966:7) originally conceded. Mosston's systemic approach required teachers to engage in calculative thinking which served to place oneself [the thinker's thoughts] under compulsion to master everything in the logical terms of Mosston's procedure. It was a conception of teaching which Mosston and Ashworth (2002) themselves acknowledged to have *prevented* the construction of a unified and universal theory. The methodical "spectrum" did *not* constitute a:

> …a cohesive framework that can serve as a broad, integrated guide for teaching future teachers
>
> [Mosston and Ashworth 1994: vii]

"Iago" was enamored by methods' routinised and recursive procedures. Iago is neither able to examine his lesson content from a critical perspective, nor call for an alternative methodological dimension to his teaching. It was out of the question for Iago to entertain notions of democracy and egalitarian relations of power. The pursuit of humanness and emancipation eluded him and the possibility of the movers own "authoring" of their learning (Tappan & Brown, 1989) could not be entertained. "Iago" did not wish to challenge the "status quo", but this is exactly what a critical pedagogue must risk, they need to be committed to celebrate "communities of difference" (Tierney, 1993).

Methodology and methods

ML's non-assertive and rhetorical praxis can help to guide movement advocate's practical solutions, but does not necessarily resolve classroom "issues". Rather, it is to "awaken" the meaning of the text of movement and language that might not have been envisaged by its participants. Under such circumstances, one's committed sense of beliefs, values, and ideas, are called upon to make fluid and subtle the abstract determinations of thought. This means dissolving and remoulding logic into the procedures of language, and discussing the issue under consideration by means of the power of words; words which ask questions and suggest answers.

ML is a methodological stance, the inherited or postured attitude towards addressing PE's contemporary rationale that entices its participants to attain a better deliberation about one's self-understanding of the lifeworld [*Lebenswelt*]. PE's array of disciplined physical activities is intended to put its movers by way of certain forms of lived experiences. Understood in this deliberate sense, PE can be conceived as a conditioned rehearsal to learn about life, when the themes of play, of games, of meditation and of language, are transformed into the self-presentation of one's being. PE seeks an engagement of the self with others and the surrounding landscape. It seeks a reaction, a response. It is a process of learning in the company of others. It evokes talk with one's embodied words, language and movement as two prime vehicles of unconscious knowledge when learning is conceived as a way to know oneself and the letting of oneself be educated.

If this eventual aspiration is what PE advocates have in mind, then, the selection of one's planning phases, the choosing of one's organizational tasks, the application of teaching methods, and options of skill techniques can be orientated towards serving this ambition; to hone its participant's life skills. ML embraces the analysed principles of educational *methods*, rules, and postulates employed by a number of disciplines. It involves systematic study of methods that may be applied within a number of disciplines, as well as the study or description of methods. Nevertheless, ML does not *describe* specific methods despite the attention given to the nature and kinds of processes to be followed in a given procedure or in attending to its necessary objective targets.

When proper to study alternative methodology, which is what its "professional training" institutions were originally set up to do, such programmes were founded on constructive generic frameworks, meaning that the so-called programme construction was understood as a logical arrangement of connected elements. Because of the very complexities which all apprenticing PE interpreters encounter during their education careers, and currently, in view of drastic reduction to their professional study times, the life shaping philosophy of PL can be conceived as a connecting leitmotif, linking what are disparate module structured programmes.

In Mosston and Ashworth's 1976-2002 series of "method teaching", teaching's cardinal practices were well defined. But this was because teaching was conceived as a "telling" mode. It was an administrative craft, a recipe for technical "grip" makers designed to control skill, to mould bodies into behavioural performances following the logic of a linear method of development. Its autocracy and tyranny camouflaged a mode of coercive teaching. Modern PE's practices conformed its learners to a public procedure, that of memorising knowledge. It paraded its results, its data, its most distanced, fastest and most impressive of achievements ever known to human kind, as believable evidence to its record of progress. Modern PE nurtured a conforming creed for technical perfection by enforcing allegiance to imposed knowledge (Kirk, 1993). It introduced well grounded theory and applied it unchallenged with regard to enhancing the efficiency of the body, but with disregard to the knowledge of "human" condition. It first dislodged, and then annexed the ensemble notion of selfhood. Attention to the "self" was uncared for. "Self" became subdued knowledge, feeble and deserted. Self concerns became marginalized and left as redundant issues when it came to professionally conducting a lesson (Maude, 2001). Self resists its location and identity in any "methodology", as I shall further explain.

Put differently, contemporary PE's practices involve processing the principled conditions of learning. It attends to personal development, nurtures motivation, and cares about the nature and manner of its communication and acquisition of knowledge and understanding (Goodland 1992; Fernandez-Balboa & Marshall I994). Currently, its practices take as its point of departure the lived experiences and the declared and felt needs of its upper schooling's movers. Philosophy of science and mathematics first informed the design of PE's curriculum, as well as its teaching and evaluation in the "education" of movement (Kleinig, 1982). Philosophy of mind, of language and of psychology then began to bear on the contractual foundations of PE's understanding in how learning occurs, and thus how innovative professional practices may best promote it. Education, under these new transformative perspectives, came to be understood as what distinguishes other words for wisdom, such as insight, perception, astuteness and acumen, as the virtue of "practical wisdom" or "prudence", as well as loyalty and ethical decisions. Movement Education becomes a matter of attuning universal knowledge to particular situations and

particular beings. It holds the potential to extend its agent's thinking into movement by dwelling in it, not as visitors, but as activists (Hellison 1988; Hellison & Templin 1991).

Movement missionaries do need to dedicate their vocational commitments to caring for the fragile, fallible, and sometimes desolate nature of each human, each struggling but ever unable fully to understand themselves. This is because each one of us balances on the brink of what we confidently claim to "know" and what we aspire for which may blend or reciprocate together and initiate one to adopt a practical position a practical knowledge for which science cannot be held accountable. This is why phenomenology has a vitalizing part to play in PE's future professional praxis.

Phenomenology and structuralism revisited

With the introduction of the phenomenological "movement" into the teaching of PE, its professional efforts came to attune one's self with one's conscious attitude, and heralded a search to collapse the dualistic distinctions between subjective concerns and objective issues. Relativity physics shifted descriptive emphasis from "reality" to measurement. The arts moved away from realism. Consensus politics confronted totalitarianism and genocide. These and related cultural and technological events arose from seismic changes in the way we register the world and communicate with each other, orally or digitally. Phenomenology, when thought of as a current in philosophy, takes intuitive "experience" [what presents itself to us in conscious experience] as its starting point and tries to extract the essential features of experience and essence of what we experience. The task of PE's philosophy came to describing a phenomenon of captured moments in movement, the objects of experience, accurately and independently of all assumptions derived from science, yet craving knowledge also through science's many lenses (Davis 1994; Davidson 2002; Fahlberg & Falhberg 1994).

Phenomenology teases its agent commentator to point out what was encountered within the act of moving, in order to be able to "think aloud" to make public one's

private enactment. Phenomenological description of movement is an attempt to translate sensuous seamless experiences from the inside out, but in the unaware authoring of our own sayings, we offer an "entrée"; an unfettered description as a way of coping with our doubts about the "human condition": we implicate ourselves in our own sayings. Engaging in this philosophical movement grants license to the learner [participant-commentator] to word-sketch, to represent or symbolize something of what a particular lived-through exercise is "like". Such a description is not a tenuous account. On the contrary (see Chapters 5-7), it is an elevated gripping feeling urged in a heightened sense of alertness, un-distracted by the "self" which modern PE conceived as a biased and inhibiting impediment to learning.

More recently, "heterophenomenology", which implies "phenomenology" of *another*, not oneself, is a term coined by Dennet (1996) to describe the explicitly third-person scientific approach to the study of consciousness and other mental phenomena. It consists of applying the scientific method with an anthropological bent, combining the subject's self-report with all other available evidence to determine the speaking subject's mental "state". The goal is to see how the subject sees the world around him / herself without taking the accuracy of the subject's view *for granted*, or considers the subjects authoritative only about how things *seem* to be. Heterophenomenology opens possibilities to identify different categories of minds, and further differentiate multiple kinds of subjective "I" interpretations.

Ego-centred, "Iago" could not see himself as confirmed from outside, by others, by his learners, or his fellow teachers. He was intransigent, a dictator to himself because he was closed and eclipsed within the confines of his own narcissistic futility. Under the new perspectives of ML's principled guidance, his vision of independence might take on a pivotal change and be transformed and understood as one's ability to think of others whilst being critical but humble in mentoring one's self, yet be careful not to become overwhelmed by too much Derridian-like (1984) tendency of personal deconstruction. "Iago's" self-detachment, unable to manage his "pride" by acknowledging his "prejudices", inevitably, pursued a unilinear approach to his lesson planning, its exercise, and thus, evaluated lessons by means of what was achieved from an objective viewpoint. "Poor" consumers of information, "Iago"

pointed to his "weak" learners as the major, causal consequence to his lesson "breakdown".

The thesis accounts for pedagogy as a special way one talks about the world which involves ontological commitments, such that talking is one way of acting in the world, whilst learning and practicing, a physical activity is another way of acting in the world. Chapter 5 onwards trace a *relational shift* from PE's *"s*tructuralist language". It was a language which systematically "removed" the subjective "I" and prioritised the "third-person" in its objective directives. It was a PE language not conversant with its current "semiological" meanings and insights. A semiological approach was explained as the study of relations between signs and things to which they refer: their meaning, and sign processes, indication, designation, analogy metaphor and symbolism, or relations among signs in formal structures. In addition, a semiological approach involves the analysis of pragmatics, the relation between signs and the "effects" they have on people who use them; their rhetorical signification, expectation, and communication consequences.

Significantly, what follows from Saussure's theory of language as a system of "differences" is that the world is intelligible *only* in discourse; hence, according to Saussure, there is *no* unmediated experience, no access to the raw reality of self and others. Saussure's structuralist's position holds that if the subject [the incumbent speaker/writer] was *constructed* in language and in discourse, and since the symbolic order in one's discourse was closely related to ideology, one's subjective construct emanated from within the dominant ideology shaping that person's schooling, community or culture. It is in this sense that ideology [PE's technicism] has the imposing effect of constituting individuals *as* subjects. Saussurian linguistics insisted on the arbitrary nature of language's signs, a fascinating and counterintuitive move, designed to emphasise the "freedom" of language as far as possible from the trammels of the body and of the ecological world it describes.

Poststructuralism refreshes language's world-weariness

For PE's education practices, adopting poststructuralist's language served to activate a language more as a form of social networking. PE's communication practices came to be one which was politically more sensitive to transforming and transcending social class into individual concerns in motion, in commonality of tasks and in movement boundaries. As a form of social networking PE's language also began to attend to diverse practices at group level of focus and individual personal concerns (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Sparkes, Nigels, Swan, and Dowling (2003), for example, by turning to poststructuralism's language, believe that the movement profession's "conscious temperament" experienced a massive shift in its conception of where and how people, culture and beliefs are produced.

To grasp what is at stake in postmodernism's PE it is necessary to think historically and broadly, in the kind of complex terms that inevitably involve multidisciplinary effort. This multilingual impetus, this bringing together of "methods" and ideas long segregated both in academic disciplines and in practical life, particularly characterises postmodernism and largely accounts for such resistance it has generated (Harvey, 1992). Diverse in its searches, and eclectic in its concerns, postmodernism can be recognized by two key assumptions. First, the assumption that there is no common denominator in "nature" or "truth", in "God" or the "future", guarantees neither the Oneness of the world nor the possibility of neutral or objective thought. Second, the assumption that all human systems operate like language, being self-reflexive rather than referential systems: systems of differential function are powerfully finite, but construct and maintain meaning and value, misleads us to think in set ways. The exercise of reflexivity significantly puts within the concept of dialogue the possibility of renegotiating, and acknowledges that silence and withdrawal from dialogue are possible moves within it in the sense that they may constitute necessary steps for extending dialogue.

From a postmodern point of view pedagogy is neither the theory we have of teaching nor is it its application. Theoretical scholarship does not vouch for pedagogical fitness. One may be steeped in education theories and yet be a poor educator. The

meaning [essence] of pedagogy does not reside in theory. But neither is pedagogy located in the application of theory. One may be an expert on translating learning theory into particular curriculum modules. By contrast, the inanimate curriculum cannot possibly be sensitive to the way a particular person learns. Modernist PE specialists equated the meaning of pedagogy with the aims of teaching or with the activity of teaching. But the postmodernist, or poststructuralist informed advocate would say that pedagogy can be neither the intention nor the action. Pedagogy, as Ricoeur emphasises, operates "in between" its correspondents' respective intention and action. And, as Ricoeur also clarifies, there can be no "absolute" exchange of meanings between one person and another.

If there has to be a "linear" process for novice PE teachers to follow, then as far as possible the way to deal with it is to catch a portion of one's experience, and then create an episode in that experience, which can then become a dialogical "conversational event". But the whole nature of such a dialogue is that in this shared corner of each other's experience the world is interpreted through the temperament of the personalities, one of the many "selves" that reside in movement at that present moment.

Conciliation

Maintaining a temporary conciliation between physical posture and personal poise is one the underlying themes of this thesis. Importantly, this is why ML is to be thought of in terms of a pro-active process. An "action" involves a broad field of philosophy concerned with the processes causing intentional human movement. ML is concerned with the conditioned processes causing wilful human bodily movement of more or less complex kind. For example, Habermas used one version of an "action theory" to describe cooperative action undertaken by individuals based upon mutual deliberation and argument. ML embraces a kind of "construct theory"; it employs a psychological approach to make good predictions about what learners and others will do when confronted by new situations.

Pedagogues must think of themselves in a monistic way, as knowing bodies and moving minds, as one in interplay with the other interminably rehearsing and reinvigorating the act of thinking. Movement pedagogues need to become immersed in their own professional and embodied text. They need to become good storytellers, to make public their own and their learners' movement inspired surprises.

This thesis does not give detailed prescriptions about how future human movement "specialists" are "compelled" to conduct themselves as educators, therapists, counsellors, and guides. Rather, it explains that when phenomenology philosophises from action to agent with the body, paradoxically, the self is "lost" from the beginning of knowledge in movement, but is then retrieved anew by the subtle use of hermeneutics' ethical and metaphorical linguistic interplay between its correspondents. Hermeneutics unpacks the weight bearing characteristics of language's medium. In other words, Hermeneutics' critical interpretive practice brings its telling "movers" out of the shadows of tacit knowledge into the public arena, thus, retrieves the silent, disenfranchised voices of others by acknowledging others' "otherness" and their own self designation.

ML acknowledges that when we interpret systematic or regulated human behaviour, we do so by adjusting and extending our descriptions of what we say, and this applies to our movement descriptions. At the same time, these descriptions take in judgments of value, as our description implies approval and criticism. The more we try our description for accuracy and agreement, the more we give the behaviour an "interpretation". We try to "make sense" of what is going on. Here, making sense "means" something like "meeting the coherence of" the process whereby in the name of pattern and order, we interpret the life around us. In a sentimental kind of education, what one learns in one's movement description is what one's private sensibility *looks* like when spelled out externally in a collective text. A text in which its texture can be read into so that all can listen more closely to what PE can tell us, a text in which its texture is created in the high tension of its languaging commentary. This languaging process does not suggest a passivity of natural sciences rather it is to embrace the latter as a co-conduit in the formation of creating knowledge. Interpreting enacted movement means attending closely to what it (movement) says

to us. Tangentially, PE's discipline movement manifests some of the key meanings that are available to us, and at a time of deep moral confusion, it may, at best, permit a clash of moralities, the contradiction of moral imperatives, to be known and understood and balanced.

The old opposition between subjective concerns and objective issues, these irreconcilables, rather than remaining as polemic oppositions, can live in the spontaneous ebb and flow, the high tension of creative imagination and engage in new potentialities in the playful mind. We come to see *ourselves* "clearer", as measured against different frames of consciousness, enticed in different moods and evoked within transient temperaments; temperaments which fluctuate freely between being touched by one's novelty of imagination and yet, also harnessed by the mystique of tension created by the unknown.

What is highlighted in the thesis's closing phase is the phenomenon of "transiency", which I take to mean the "quality" of being. When one does something, if one fixes one's mind on the activity with some confidence, the quality of that state of mind *is* the activity itself. When one is concentrated on the quality of one's being, one is prepared for the activity. There is harmony in our activity, and where there is harmony, when there exists an undivided "self" there is calmness. PE comes to be located between Eastern meditation and Western mediation, and which can be seen as the history of successive periods of Western humanity's cultivation of its own "mind" and thus, bodies became submerged as the Western mode of thought developed.

Western mediation implies that its speakers must weave the material tissue of words with the meanings hanging on to their edges. PE specialists are also movement translators, voicing movement into life. They need to know how to exercise PE's hidden "protocol" its silent deed, its pedagogical arts to open out an elaborate cognitive and emotional mapping practice which are concerned with issues of sovereignty and kinship, alienation and emancipation

PE's pedagogue must deal with embodied minds by using language in ways which the professional advocate is familiar with, and simultaneously maximises its effects and affects. For example, we turn the tenor of life into experience by giving it names. However, language is not just names-for-things; it is a porous membrane filtering the meaningless torrent of life. Before life is named, it is vast, potential, and inane. We name it, we seek to command it. We utter spells to tame it and bring it under our reach and grip of our imagination. Language is gesture which seeks to order chaos and command vacancy. Gesture transiently defines and gives meaning to "space", to "silence". But gesture is not impromptu. It takes its meaning from the dense, compacted rituals of a long history. In some cases, as in PE, the longer the history, the more sacred will be its ritual meaning.

Teaching via pedagogy into andragogy

Importantly, I have argued that ML's pedagogy actually stems from its confrontation with the impossibility of teaching. But the shift from modern teaching via pedagogy to contemporary PE's practices [andragogy] is complex and yet to be more fully realised. Much is involved when changes are required in its teaching transfer from "habituated" or "domesticated" participation to pedagogical "transformation", from superimposed functional directives to expressive implications. To become pedagogically "fit" PE's prospective, professionals and movement believers must be able to communicate in the idiom of both movement's and language's tacit nature.

Play transforms teaching into pedagogy. PE professionals' modus operandi must be both serious and yet playful. Play, after all, is "the life breaths of culture" (Pieper 1952; 1965). We all need play both to keep the world fresh and interesting and to keep ourselves unique and unpredictable. It produces "givers" and allows people to reap many benefits of uncalculated, spontaneous commitment. It preserves human creativity; most important of all, play allows meaning to count. Playfulness with words underpins the way of ML. These deliberated words are intended to be radically disruptive, and reinforce Chapter Two's message: pedagogy is instituted on rhetoric. Rhetoric helps to make understanding a playful way to pose new modes of questioning [intended to subvert the most fundamental structures of seriousness]

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that are also a new relation to language and tradition, a new "*affirmation*" and new, just ways of giving and taking responsibility between its interlocutors.

The point I have pressed on in this thesis is that if movement learning enterprises can be rendered as commensurate with the meanings of life, then, PE must come to terms with the dynamics or force of suggestive dialogue. Expression differs from description in that it is never a repetition nor a rehearsal but always in itself a real actualization, both of a new meaning and rooted in the person's sense of "Being" in a new way. When the learner is in a position to *describe* movement there is no work for the imagination to do; relationships are being formulated between ideas which are already clear to the mind of its interlocuters. What occurs is that in probing the descriptive statements, each correspondent will express an inner-felt emotional dimension, and, in the normal sense this will be the emotion attendant precisely on performing an intellectual operation for that which one has routine competence. Crucially, however, what each is trying to capture is the "aboutness" of the presence of the indicating statements as they impresses themselves upon the agent-speaker, and this "capturing" would be the latter's becoming conscious of, and at the same time expressing both one's impression and the emotion engendered in the learner by it.

Progressive sequences

The thesis has attempted to link 19th and 20th century's "physical training" with what evolved into "physical instruction". The latter was then labeled as "physical education", which presented its professionals with a recipe to teach, to inscribe a muscular memory upon each learner's body. Though granted license to "educate", modern PE deluded itself [and its movers] in its efforts to initiate learning. Education, I have argued, arises only when there is a strong and collaborated testimony and a sharing of tacit processing in the hidden act of learning. The transparent and the most abiding qualities of learning (Chapter 7) are those that are encountered in movement's "ludic Rubicon", its unexplained theoretical and pragmatic gaps, linking knowledge, morality, and traditions into life, but does so only through semantic tensions in the linguistic "net", when self-cultivation changes as we talk.

What PL achieves is the gathering in of different disciplined routes of human movement's tradition: its continuity of friendship, its relation to historical rituals, its admiration for grace and courage. These and many other meanings are gathered into the web of PL's many "gaps". And it is this delicate membrane I try to touch, to render PE in its transition to PL as significantly meaningful to all its learners' lives through engaging in ML, because meanings live in movement transformed [transmuted] into language as a form of poetry which may function to produce equilibrium among painfully conflicting impulses and thereby provide fictive solutions to real psychological problems.

ML attains an elemental basis with the "*ministering*" responsibility inherent to all pedagogic actions. Pedagogy is not a single art. Rather, it is the cohesion of different art forms. It assimilates different perspectives. It is not what PE institutions can provide for its clients. This is because pedagogy requires an educator to be experienced in many encountered classroom situations and to accumulate a seasoned gestation to be versatile and flexible. In addition, pedagogy needs to be able to borrow insights from others, and to become a connoisseur performer turning from movement agent to performer analyst, to therapist or counselor, without declaring one's role.

To become pedagogically "fit", one must be devoted to PE's original stance, that of tracing its mover's effort to ascribe subjective concerns. Pedagogy emerges and transpires into "andragogy" only when its interlocutors, its partnering enquirers become familiar with and able to adjust and assimilate with their own experiential ensemble of self, clinging to their own cluster of selves [different roles] bound together with the most impressive string of memories. Under these settled and mature personal "conditions", what is made understood is not clarified out of fear but by falling into trust in others. This is why life is, in good part, about trust and the retaining of an interest in the self and one's otherness. Modern PE compelled an air of seduction under its worldless appeal. Nevertheless, one must also more fully acknowledge that science is the art of the soluable but without any egoistic idea. The conditioned process of learning-to-learn is not just a detached matter of intellectual understanding. Our understanding arises from within reflection on the act of thinking,

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and thinking again, or in Eastern philosophy, "non-thinking". Revelation comes to us. We do not go to it.

Transience comes when we find perfect existence or "tranquility" through imperfect existence (Suzuki 2006: 102), not by reading or contemplating philosophy, but only through practicing meditation itself. Inherent in this *andragogical* approach is its conversational focus to enhance both the movement potential of individuals and their understanding of the enacted [tried and tested] medical, psychologically personal, and social political implications for wanting to move.

This thesis does not provide the answers, but attempts to facilitate new questions, such as: "How can language and movement communicate?" ML opens new ways in how professional relations and meanings can be constructed within a benign realm of justice, freedom and equity when its advocates and practitioners discuss the personal, professional and civic principles to which the PE, its personal epiphanies and its activities were originally dedicated. It helps to shift PE concerns *from* an "event" analysis and portraying a single lens perception of an ego-self, when our unconscious inner being remain as strangers to ourselves, *to* its resident agent's "identity", to meet that which is "other" than self as perceived by others. ML voices our reading of moving actions from the "inside-dweller's" viewpoint.

It is pedagogy that invites the transformation of PE experiences by disclosing movement's generic source and meaning in a carnal field of participation and thus presenting movement as a valued gestural deed that is made known tangentially through its metaphorically rich and playful words. PE offers many lateral signs which are hinted at in the flowing dynamics of dialogue. Following its PL philosophy, ML seeks and voices shared-meaning by using ethical and imaginative language.

In essence, ML is a concentration on key pedagogical facets linking experiences to life. It draws from a range of disciplines and is applied in a finely nuanced evocative manner. Pedagogy needs to be clarified in terms of the distinct differences that exist between "techne" and "phronesis", when phronesis is animated in the doing of each movement learner's own sense of life world. An educator is thus required to be

committed to inviting, orientating and trekking others' personal posture to their own lived enterprises, and attuning to that of others' state of well-being. In its emotionally "moving" encounters, its agent can reveal hidden aspects of themselves, their "otherness" which significant others like movement literates can detect, interpret, and encode their possible meanings better than its occupant agent can.

Becoming philosophical

When one pursues the wisdom of altruistic love, then one realizes that self-identity is resisted when it comes to applying systemic methodology. ML is not a matter of one person validating what another says. Initiating dialogue, as Ricoeur explains (1992), serves as a mapping out of the individualizing or alienating nature of language. The understanding of language as a dialogue helps the PE profession to unharness the concealed "conditions" under which we learn-to-learn, and also brings into better focus the distinction between notions of "self" and "other than self".

Ricoeur's missionary call for the PE profession would be that for a collegial sense of humility in relation to communicating knowledge, where he argues, the use of metaphor is an example of an example. A metaphor offers its speaker a generous allowance of deviation from the "norm", yet suggestive enough to maintain its original "gesture". Ricoeur maintains that the unattainability of certainty is an inescapable feature of human experience and that the failure to make this acknowledgement gives an unwarranted scope to critical enquiry's faith in its own ability to surmount the limitations of perspective and to provide autonomous critiques and commanding overviews. Rightly, his plea in clarifying meaning via language communication is for more joint endeavours, which, like movement, takes the form of a performative art capable of connecting the intricate woven web that corroborates to mutually compose a consensus of meaning.

His version of "teaching" is that it can only be understood as an immeasurable task, interminably held between immanence and transcendence. Thinking about the most appropriate styles of communication can be seen to be similar to the P.E. advocate trying to place the learner by way of some designed "experiences" with a view to

eliciting what is perhaps the most altruistic parts of us. When addressing the human concerns of the learner, as opposed to the technical issues of one's movement, a sensitive language is called for. This is because the mover's internalized concepts of movement are brought into account in terms of the making or the neglect of a human kindness.

Hermeneutics, an unending process of revisiting

Ricoeur's hermeneutics searches for intelligible clarity of meaning; the art of finding something in the text that is not there; messages hidden under the surface. He clarifies the intricate problem of getting beyond the letter to the spirit interpretation of all bearers of meaning. He points out the innocuous but subversive tendencies such as those of the speaker's psychic drives or social interests need to be brought into consideration if we are to offer each other trustworthy interpretations of meaning. Educators need to have the capacity to detect and demystify searches for underlying motivations.

Neither teaching nor pedagogy, however, is a measured task. Rather teaching is an impossible task, whilst pedagogy is a more a matter of being encouraged to "confess", of being encouraged to "invite", to share common criteria to "authenticate" the ambivalent nature of movement, and "endorse" what movement and its education is *like* for others.

What ML hopes to provide is an account of the importance of our intuition and our emotion. It acknowledges that we are the authors of our moral decisions. It brings out the multiplicity of decisions that encircle our moral stance and suggest that in many cases we are capable of accepting the responsibilities in view of unforeseen but anticipated eventualities. In authoring our own sayings, we offer the listener an "entrée"; an unfettered description as a way we cope with our doubts about or fail to appropriate the understanding of our own "human condition".

Words and metaphors assert a common life that is experienced in the body of the one who makes it, and the separation is only present at the linguistic level. The gap

across which the metaphor carries us is one that *language itself creates*. Metaphor which designates relations not objects is language's cure for the ills and the revelations entailed on us by language. If the body/mind separation exists at the level of language, it is not at the level of embodied experience. Metaphors derive from our experience of living as embodied creatures in the everyday world. The body is, in other words, the necessary context for all human experience.

All humans must listen to an echo of themselves before he or she may hear or come to know hidden aspects about themselves. And all humans must listen with a sense of commitment to the words others use in their exchanged meaning in conversation with us. This attentiveness is called for because in their utterances they open out their version of the world with us, and shower us with hints and clues about how they feel they can treat us, confide in us, press their views onto us, or leave us exhausted and inadequate in their presence by their absence of our presence. Language and movement, as all PE missionaries must remind themselves, are used as signs of duration and continuity. Both time and a false but comforting sense of permanence can commemorate and express our present actions which have purpose and possibility into the future. The process of learning how to educate unveils itself when pedagogy's silent coded protocol bares its essential features [techne and phronesis] when each feature interchanges tension for a fluent relation between fixed and mobile points, between actuality and possibilities. That which we admire most, we move towards. That which we abhor, we condemn.

Personhood

Personhood is the status of being a person. Defining personhood is a controversial topic in philosophy, education, and law, and as Ricoeur makes clear, is intimately tied to legal and political concepts of citizenship, equality, and liberty. As Frankfurt claimed, the criteria for being a person are designed to:

> … "capture" those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concerns with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most ambiguous in our lives.   (1971: 5-7)

Ricoeur, however, qualifies the more subtle distinction between "selfhood" and "otherness" which have personal identity, or "ontological" awareness at stake (1992: 317), and which he contrasts with "selfhood" and "sameness" (1992: 36). Our "otherness" Ricoeur maintains, is not something added on to selfhood from an externalised source. Our "otherness" is something inherent to us, and which belongs to the tenor of, and cross-fertilizes our understanding another's and one's own meaning. Selfhood and "sameness", he argues, maintains an "annexed", "disjunctive" character. Although it is impossible to consider what it means to be a "conventional" person, as qualified by (Braddon-Mitchell & Miller, 2004), PE's silent human relational "deeds" need to be made more specific and highlighted as a means of personally supportive educational strategies (McNamee, 1992).

Educators are not only lovers of wisdom but also ones who value the love of wisdom. They need to have passion to share the world not only as they see it, but to be able to share what others have come to understand about their life world. All PE's participants need to be able to experience "losing" one's "self" in the "selfless" realm of play, as we do when we become immersed in games, or consumed in the reading of a narrative which shed insights into another's world. Or similarly we may delve further into our own mode of existence when we can indulge in deep East Asian like contemplation. Following such encounters, we all need to be accompanied out of these "selfless" experiences in a way that does not leave us in a state of helplessness.

As a movement specialist, I need to meet my learner in his or her weakness, vulnerability or innocence, when we both experience an undeniable presence of a mutually-felt caring responsibility: a responsibility which calls upon me to act only in the behest of my learner. To become immersed in pedagogy is to construct a partially interpretive description of some aspects of the life-world, and yet remains aware that lived life is always more complex than any explication of meaning can reveal. "Iago" denied himself the privilege to learn from his learners.

Both subjectively concerned and orientated to objective issues, ML constantly moves towards and in between what actually happens in the PE lesson and not towards the

aspirations hidden in the systemic methods constructed and generalised prescriptions or dictums of official curriculum declarations. Declarative language is where the pedagogic act to learn is neglected and the process of teaching *as well* as the curriculum content becomes an instrument of surveillance. Ostensibly, it assumes its applicant exists in a state of "absolute knowledge". However, repeatedly, I contend that any "teaching" or any "model" that attempts to universalise and objectify will necessarily have to separate personhood from pedagogy, and thereby devalue and suppress the important issue of subjectivity.

This final chapter qualifies PE's "meaning" and its experiences no longer remain one's own. It not only acknowledges one's distinct nature, but also aligns one to similarities with which others interpret the world. Like Eastern contemplation, it also provides for its participants the confirmation and forgetfulness of self which is the experience of value. Value or meaning, that is, is the ultimate justification of activity. ML is an activity which ventures to get "in touch", or relate with the effect of our consciousness [and our unconscious] not upon our bodies, nor on the effect of discourse; but with our *whole* self "immersion", the core of our dwelling. ML offers *a* possible solution to an impoverished self alienation and an acceptance of an ever divergent, palpitating sense of being. This is because the lacunae in experience can only be understood from one's lived embodied conjunction, not in body and mind disjunction.

"But then, can Movement Literacy qualify PE's meaning?"

Movement Literacy: Tentative Promises and Visions

Throughout the thesis I have shown that what is at stake in PE's dialogue is not performance discourse anchoring learning through inhibiting and applying raw force, but rather by mediating an openness to thoughtful exploration of affective harmony and embodied enervated meaning. Meaning that is, which links the broader collective meaning of life with social bonding, with cultural appreciation, with challenge, and with the fine grained detail of self expression. I have maintained that the education of circumstances remains "superior" to tuition. My premise is that students can evolve a deep sense of empathy and a rapport with movement if PE educationalists detect and utilize another individual's immanent movement testimony. This testimony is not a spurious assertion. It constitutes spontaneous "languaging" of movement from a private account to what can be publicly scrutinised and supported. Languaging movement is a way to account for one's movement encounter which may be more substantial, sophisticated and richer in terms of offering a wide range of meaning for the listener to corroborate, align with, be indifferent to, or reject. Languaging movement is when the utterer and listener both perform in a speech act which is a subtle way one may come to understand discourse as a form of power.

ML's benign aspiration may entice movers/speakers into a sublime, communicative site of intelligible feelings and a potential way to open a deliberated commitment towards exercise for a more "hopeful", "fit" and "fitting life". It is not only conveyed tangentially in post-structuralism's posturing, probing and righteous language but ML is also validated socially and personally, while participating in a historical, dialectic and respectful oral tradition. ML's basic ambition is to collate PE's enterprises by tactfully employing creative and "synesthetic metaphors" [stirring a visual hearing as antedating language] and "synæsthetic metaphors" [replicating our neurological, tactile, sensory, and embodied modes] by which we live. The professional's astute arranged usage of both forms of metaphors may possibly evoke learners to articulate what their innate sense of being is "like".

ML's representation

I next highlight the gist of PL and andragogy. Each phase is linked by ML's practice as represented in table 1. Here I feature their discrete and allied educational conditions as a potentially restorative therapy. ML may enable PE's interminable learners to better "cope" with the ambiguity involved in understanding the "self" and "other-than-self" that may befall us in movement, alongside cultivating a more positive commitment to exercise through life.

Mapping PE's Communicative Evolution

Phase 1

Teaching, a speech act, via phenomenology is a transiting and transposing of shared meaning which grounds PL. PL is the professional catalyst which can lead to pedagogy as interplay of relationships.

Pivotal Phase 2

Pedagogy, when interpreted via hermeneutic phenomenology animates ML which may become capable of inaugurating andragogy's intended orientation towards epistemological understanding and ontological transformation. Via ML's transactions andragogy helps to clarify the essential differences and eventual synthesis between techne and phronesis. Andragogy is the mutual exercise to accept a working agreement.

TABLE 1

The following table identifies PE's potential educational progression through its three communication phases, and some of ML's key potential claims.

Physical Literacy	Movement Literacy	Andragogy
	Age Group	
inferred meaning up to c.14 years old	young (15yrs+) adults need to look back over their life experience	presupposes adult experience
	Philosophical Movement	
phenomenological description vividly dramatises movement encounters	subjected to hermeneutic treatment, rigor of critique personalises PL and generates altruistic commitment concerns agent-mover rather than movement	Synthesises phenomenology with hermeneutics
	Role of Language	
initiates language use as dialogue involving more than one person needs more subtle language	Vigilant about non-neutral features of dominant discourse compares,contrasts, analyses, synthesises and applies divergent thinking alludes to speech acts links acted movement to worded language	entertains tangential, unexpected outcomes of discursive thought acknowledges first person claims awakens selfhood
	Pedagogy	
initiates communal praxis non-intrusive, non-doctrinal, non-impulsive	understands movement as a language transposes familiar experience into unfamiliar novelty	reveals pedagogy's hidden protocol
	Potential Learning Consequence	
reciprocates philosophy of PE's meaning as a lifetime commitment	invites self constructed knowledge qualifies signifier and signified learner	brings PE into life potential leitmotif for career programme planning

Physical Literacy	Movement Literacy	Andragogy
	Potential Learning Consequence	
	mutual negotiation self-therapeutic restoration	attends to self implication in knowledge construct identifies hallmark of personhood evolves kinship through sensing humility, honour, equanimity and compassion blends pragmatism with nature-nurture accrues life-skills by not dislocating learning traditions advocates education as an unending quest acknowledges dynamics of learning as politics of knowledge with no closure, whilst learning "itself" has no term deliberates on experience to anticipate potential consequences for learning conceives literature's goal as putting "meaning" into the world, but not "a" meaning views PE as human laboratory of moral judgment adverts literacy by encouraging impromptu, conjectural dialogue

Interminably, andragogy evolves as the unpacking of Merleau-Ponty's and Ricoeur's seminal message to PE's interpreters and educationalists. That is, both movement and language complement each other because they can be interpreted as actions, and can be read as forms of communication and self-expression. The coalescent act of "languaging movement" depicts PE's core value as "a game of relationships", or even "a journey into life", and qualifies PE as (i) a musing praxis ever seeking to motion the illusive self and (ii) the learning of this ambiguity of "selflessness" is when we realise that we can only partially understand ourselves as another being. As praxis ML reconstitutes the subject-object relationship within a dialectical rather than a dualistic framework. It alleviates some potential confusion between the dualistic interplay in "conversation" and the "monist" reception of theory.

Having explored the inherent *relationship*s between human emotion [necessarily subject-referring and thus implies profoundly ethical concerns] and bio-technology [scientific objectivism], I have advanced ML as a way to help others to transform their bodies *from* the textbook of anatomy and physiology *into* a cultural creation appropriating a body as one's own, nurturing a positive physical and emotional posture. ML deliberates on collating self identity and restoring self confidence of those who may have suffered PE enterprises in their lonely silence, or become better acquainted with the obscure nature of one's self. Furthermore, ML offers to make tenable distinguishing the dancer *in* the dance and the mover *from* the movement. Significantly, ML may reinforce claims that an embodied philosophy can be sensuously conveyed by means of post-structuralism's "telling" messages, messages which sometimes require an overt political stance professionally and personally; issues which, *prima facie*, are educational.

Radically, via ML's praxis, what is revealed is that it is the "participant-mover" who eventually creates a self-constructed case for engaging in movement, for engaging in the act of tolerance and respect for others, and in sabotaging one's self denial or subscribe to self awareness. Movement Literacy may foster one's ability to "read" movement and do things with words, both conceived as human resourced acts. Such acts operate in language as complementary forms of communication and self-expression, thus help covey PE *as* a curative encounter.

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Proposals for the future of Movement Literacy

In view of current (2012) drastic financial cuts in university funding, and the likely reduction of study time at PE teacher initiation programmes, I envision less time for apprenticing movement educators to be initiated into this profession. Learning *about* movement can be studied from outside resources, written/digital information. Learning *from* movement, however, calls on the knowledge and insight from its agent mover's account of the event, which needs to be communicated to a significant other who has both observed and listened to the performer's comments. The relational connection between speaker and listener needs to be conducted at a sensitive and intricately complicated level of dialogue. ML aspires to qualify the fundamental differences that arise between the field of epistemology [public knowledge and responsibilities] and that of ontology [private concerns and responses].

To philosophize with the body, which is what ML offers us, is a voicing of connections, a freedom to characterize human life, an unwritten covenant of hope. ML is an act of meeting a meaning in PE's encounter. It is meeting with a "presence" that can never coincide with our own, the confrontation with an enigma that can not be dispelled by thought, an otherness that can never be overcome. However, in movement we do not act *out* of character. In the silence of our actions we express the belongingness to ourselves as we wish to express to others. We express our human condition not from uttering arresting words but rather, from our unencumbered, undisturbed, calm sense of embodiment.

ML is about sharing those murmurs transiently caught in the margins of one's own musings and, subsequently, in the joy of sharing with each other a *critique* of thoughts, ideas and beliefs, as is the way in andragogy, in order to (i) motion compassionately another's "otherness", and (ii) appreciate the need to acknowledge our own implication in the construct of knowledge and meaning. ML is about inviting others to emulate the people and the world we love, and the making of ourselves as an infinite student of the other's knowledge. ML holds that an action is social in virtue of its intrinsic character, and the alleged interactive affinities between nature and convention occur to those who think about humankind and its development. Thus,

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ML's reflective praxis unveils, presents and then, re-presents PE under its original auspices, as that of a human laboratory of moral judgment.

ML is a vocation; it tries to avoid self-enclosure. It is about helping each other to better realise that we all are a versatile self ensemble, a floating signifier. PE's pedagogy is not a matter of expressing a value, as such. It is a pedagogy which offers a sense of concern from its speaker who knows when to leave space and time to contemplate about meaning and life, in what exceeds expression in a constantly changing life. What have changed during my lifetime are the unquestioned assumptions about our bodily "structure". Questions have arisen about our identity, about our dispositional nature, about transcendence and particularity, about the nature of time and space, and recognition of our human possibilities. From physics to philosophy, from politics to art, the description of the word has changed in ways that upset some basic beliefs of modernity. For example, in the opening chapters, the advent of phenomenology saw a search to collapse the dualistic distinctions between subjective concerns and objective issues. Relativity physics shifted descriptive emphasis from "reality" to measurement. The arts moved away from realism. Consensus politics confronted totalitarianism and genocide. These and related cultural and technological events arose from seismic changes in the way we register the world and communicate with each other gesturally, orally or digitally.

To grasp what is at stake in postmodernism's PE it is necessary to think historically and broadly, in the kind of complex terms that inevitably involve multidisciplinary effort. This multilingual impetus, this bringing together of "methods" and ideas long segregated both in academic disciplines and in practical life, particularly characterises postmodernism and largely accounts for such resistance it has generated (Harvey 1992). Diverse in its searches, and eclectic in its concerns, postmodernism can be recognized by two key assumptions. First, the assumption that there is no common denominator in "nature" or "truth" , in "God" or the "future", that guarantees either the Oneness of the world or the possibility of neutral or objective thought. Second, the assumption that all human systems operate like language, being self-reflexive rather than referential systems; systems of differential function which are powerfully finite, but construct and maintain meaning and value.

Tactfully, I predict that ML treats learners as individuals and allows learning to happen by its addressing, guiding, and testing the meaning of PE subjectively in the "*labor improbus*" of discursive thought. ML's prospective professionals need to lend their lives to pupils, since it is well versed in pedagogy's unifying principles that are conducive to become acquainted with the "moral skills" of a good life. ML traces one's strong commitment to professional and personal journey into educating an understanding of movement whilst educating the undivided self. It is a pedagogy which aspires to invest movement's significant ontological revelations into life, from the viewpoint of those who have lived through them. Importantly, it places a strong sense of self-conviction in its resident movers, enabling movement literates and their learners to place themselves and their knowledge at risk in unfinished remarks in what PE *does* to us.

All language originates as an embodied expression of emotion that is communicated by one individual "inhabiting" the body, and therefore, can be conceived in shared or assimilated terms partly aligned with the emotional world of another. Language is a bodily "skill" that is acquired by each of us through imitation, by the emotional identification and intuitive harmonisation of the bodily states of the one who learns with the one from whom it is learnt. ML's language is a means of reaching out to another's "otherness" distinguishing the humanness of each other's characteristics, not the other way round. This is why ML looks to "*minister*" responsibility inherent to all pedagogic actions. In its benign "ministering", ML "reconnoiters" for the values and attitudes which touch upon the sort of person one is. It traces (i) the sort of outlook one takes towards life and its possibilities; (ii) personal qualities that are shaped much more by one's experiences in reading literature or history; by looking at art; by learning a language; and by encountering the act of moving. In short, ML informs physical educationalists of how to use *literature* as a kind of "equipment" for living. It can help its correspondents to recognize the boundaries around which one takes for granted, and to see what lies beyond them. It helps prepare a person to accept the difficulty, and the fallibility of human practices. It assists movement specialists to better cope with the unpredictability of educational settings, where there will always be the residue of the unsolved, the curious accepting of the perpetually unlearned and flawed states of one's own understanding. ML can

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heighten one's appreciation of human "differences". It fosters a broader understanding of the social, cultural and political contexts of one's actions. And finally, it perceives one's position within these contexts as an ethical/political agent-deliverer and interminable student receptor of learning.

PE specialists need to protect the pilgrimage of their learner's sense of "otherness". Whilst movement study is an etymological issue, its encountered ontological concerns need to be surmounted by counselling because movement is no longer the simple "object" of teaching; rather, it is our pedagogical and andragogical [subjective] reading of it. Physical activities are valued and made intelligible to the work they do and the effects they have on those who participate in them.

ML's mission is to extend PL to nurture and develop our compassionate, boundless minds as ever open to others. ML retains a connection between its authentic genesis and the route of its professional practice, that is, to direct expression of our true nature. Strictly speaking, each of us is both a dependent and an independent being. To become human, we must continually try to change our domesticated and all too familiar posture with that of others, who are unfamiliar to us. There is no other practice to being human than to examining one's self in comparison with those whom you consider to be both significant and insignificant. This is life's existence. One can not simply practice life. There is no other way of learning about life than to live it and engage oneself in each other's world upon whom, eventually, we have to rely for their meanings and world views.

Movement's residents need to appreciate that language and movement are very different forms of knowledge and hold different hierarchical values. Both forms of action convey self-expression, but they need to be brought into some sort of dialogue in order to facilitate real innovation in the PE world. Clearly, this thesis does not provide the answers, but attempts to facilitate new questions, such as: "How can language and movement communicate?" Indeed, without the possibilities of deriving meaning from movement, it is difficult to delve into PE's juncture, its "unsolved gaps", let alone construct an intersection between movement and that of a meaningful curriculum.

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The significance of ML's pedagogic insight is that today's movement proponents may become more aware of the experienced *conditions* of effective learning-to-learn and be held accountable for the education of critical thinking. ML also carries a warning that professionals should metaphorically try to stand in the midst of the learner's activity and call upon their own ability to respond to what they see, and hear what is happening. Future PE professionals are expected to interpret not only the language of behaviour, but also the behaviour of the listener to language which is not judged against some "external" criterion, but rather, as a function of the learner's intensity of activity.

Rather than experience solitude, ML seeks meaning that palpitates or murmurs from the creative pulse following embodied experiences. It offers solace to its learners who have encountered PE's as yet unravelled and deep labyrinth of connections, thus, exercising one's responsibility to bring PE into life. This is because in the austere but temporary loss of self, a self and the "other than self" are neither exiled nor neglected. One's learners' corporate shifting "I's" are not left out of their own cited account of moving enterprises. ML may help each movement participant to better realize the importance of being more than one "I".

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