



THE UNIVERSITY OF
WAIKATO
Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato

Research Commons

<http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/>

Research Commons at the University of Waikato

Copyright Statement:

The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand).

The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act and the following conditions of use:

- Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.
- Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author's right to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be made to the author where appropriate.
- You will obtain the author's permission before publishing any material from the thesis.

**Military Regimes, Political Power
and Human Rights Violations
in Postcolonial Algeria**

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Policy

at

The University of Waikato

by

YASSINE BELKAMEL



THE UNIVERSITY OF
WAIKATO
Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato

2014

Dedication

I dedicate this work to my lovely parents, Omar and Rachida, and to my lovely family: my wife, Dr. Naima, and my kids, Takie and Ilyes

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank Professor Daniel Zirker for his supervision, patience and support over the last few years. I thank him sincerely for the effort that he put into his supervision of this lengthy project. I also extend my gratitude to Professor Allen Simpson, who gave continuous support and followed my work closely, offering many very helpful comments and corrections. I would like to thank my previous supervision panel at the University of Waikato Law School, and especially Dr. Radha D'Souza, as well as Dr. Tom Ryan in Anthropology, and the many other people who offered help, support and encouragement in the completion of this work.

Special thanks must go to the people who participated directly in this research. I was deeply touched by the warm welcome and valuable assistance that I received from them on each occasion that I needed their help in completing part of the research. A special thanks in this regard goes to Professor Abdelhamid Brahimi, the ex-prime minister of Algeria, for his honest and insightful information which I incorporated in this thesis. My gratitude also goes to all the members of the Rachad Organization for Human Rights, in Switzerland, and especially Professor Morad Dhina, Professor Abbas Aroua, and to the former Algerian diplomat, Mohammed Larbi Zitout, in London. My appreciation also goes to members of *Le Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres* (the Algerian Movement of Free Officers) in London, who gave me access to secret files containing vital information regarding the military regime after Independence. Also, Thanks to Dr. Nasser Eddine Haddam (USA), Professor Salah Eddine Sidhum (Human Rights defender - Algeria), and Ahmed Zaoui, former FIS MP, who gave me invaluable testimony, as well as significant time and energy.

I had the great good fortune to speak to former military officers, including Colonel Mohammed Samraoui (DRS), Ahmed Chouchane (special forces), and others too numerous to mention here, who did not hesitate to share their knowledge with me. FIS lawyer Rachid Masli divulged important information regarding the political crisis in Algeria during the 1990s.

I must, of course, thank all of my family for being there when I needed them during the research and writing of this thesis. Most of all, I must thank my parents and my wife for their support, and I must equally apologize to my children, Takie and Ilyes, for the extensive time that I spent away from them, researching and writing this thesis. Additionally, thanks to Professor Stephen Hoadley and Professor George Joffe, my external examiners, for their sympathetic and firm insistence that this work reflect my very best efforts.

Finally, my deep appreciation and thanks go to the staff of Waikato University Library, the Library of the School of Political Science and Public Policy, and the British Archive for great assistance that I received here in Hamilton, New Zealand, and in the UK.

ABSTRACT

Following Algeria's bloody war of independence, a new, revolutionary military establishment gradually formed out of several largely independent revolutionary units, stationed mostly on Algeria's borders. It soon expanded with the addition of revolutionary fighters from within Algeria, and from French-trained forces, many of whom had fought against the revolutionary forces during the Revolution, and had deserted late in the war from the French military to join the new Algerian military. A particularly powerful group of officers emerged from the latter group, the "French Officers," who apparently engaged in a long-term and ultimately successful bid for national political power.

This thesis, which is concerned with the politics behind the massive human rights violations in Algeria, particularly the periods immediately after Independence, and between 1991 and 2002, the "Algerian Civil War," seeks to explore a central question: why did the Algerian military turn against its own people? While not denying the role of other groups (*e.g.*, religious groups, ethnic groups) in the violence, the central focus of this thesis is on the distinctive and effective structure and role of the military, which was apparently the dominant political power in Algeria after Independence, and particularly on the role of the French Officers, who appear to have manipulated the presidency through coups d'état and assassinations, in their struggle to achieve political hegemony in Algeria by the 1990s. Central to this was the role played after Independence by Houari Boumédiène in establishing political and military organisations that were particularly susceptible to the growing influence of the French Officers.

Central topical foci of the thesis include examinations of the possible effects (on the central question, listed above) of: professionalization of the military; civil-military relations; historical influences; ethnic and religious influences; political parties and party formation; corruption and economic opportunism; international relations and continuing French influence; and the unique role of the French Officers in the national politics of Algeria.

Methodologies used in this study included the analysis of elite (non-random) interviews, based upon a questionnaire approved by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, which the author conducted in Europe and via "Skype" with nearly two dozen prominent Algerian expatriates, for the most part in exile, including former civilian leaders and military officers. Historical analysis was also a central part of the methodology, as well as discourse analysis applied to significant memoirs and newspaper accounts.

The thesis concludes that the immediate self-interests of the French Officers had a determinate effect on politics in Algeria, and particularly on the way in which the military turned against its own people after 1991. The continuing support that the French Officers apparently received from France, while not unexpected, is surprising in its extent and continuity, particularly after acts of terrorism thought to be linked to the Algerian government occurred in France. An unexpected finding of this research is the significance of corruption and economic opportunism in the Algerian military regime's long-term strategy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	iv
Table of Contents	v
Glossary and Abbreviations	viii
CHAPTER ONE	2
Introduction	2
1. Preface	2
2. Background	6
3. An Overview of the Case Study	10
4. Comparative Themes and Issues	17
5. Methodology	23
5.1. Historical Method	24
5.2. Qualitative Elite Interviews	24
5.3. Discourse Analysis	26
5.4. International humanitarian intervention: theory and practice	27
5.5. International humanitarian interventions after 9/11	28
CHAPTER TWO	31
A Brief Review of Algerian History	31
Introduction	31
I. Algeria before the War of Independence	32
1. Introduction	32
2. The French Invasion and the Algerian Resistance	34
3. French Rule in Algeria	38
4. The Algerian Political Resistance	44
4.1. The Star of North Africa, the Federation of Elites and the Algerian Popular Union	45
4.2. The Islamic Association of Algerian Scholars (AUMA), 1931	50
5. The Massacres of 8 May 1945	55
6. The Outbreak of the Algerian Revolution, 1954	59
II. The FLN Conferences and the Road to Independence	63
1. The Algerian Nationalists (FLN) and the Revolution of 1954	63
2. The Soummam Valley Congress, August, 1956	66
3. The Algerian Revolution and the Power of General de Gaulle	76
4. The CCE and the GPRA: The Negotiations Approach	81
5. De Gaulles's Plan, and Algerian Independence: 1960 – 1962	83
6. Evian and the Proclamation of the Cease-Fire	86
7. The Proclamation of Independence, 5 July 1962	87
8. Independence	90
CHAPTER THREE	93
The Military and the Structuring of Violence in Algeria	93
1. Introduction	93
2. Historical background of the post-independence era	94
3. The Role of the Military in the Proliferation of Violence	98
3.1. The Conflict among Revolutionary Leaders and the Origin of the Military in Algeria	105
3.2. Military Intervention and Political Algeria after Independence	113
4. The Role of Military in the Clash of October 1988 in Algeria and the formation of FIS	117
4.1. A Fight for Power at the Summit	118
4.2. The Period of Boumédiène and the Structure of the Military	119

4.3. The Process	125
4.4. French Military Officers and their Role in the Violence	131
4.5. The Role of the Professional Army in the Violence in Algeria	135
4.6. Professionalism and the Algerian Military at Independence	139
4.7. Expectations of violence under professional army leadership	154
CHAPTER FOUR	160
FRENCH PENETRATION OF ALGERIA	160
1. Introduction	160
2. Penetration and International Relations	162
2.1. International Penetration of Domestic Systems: Theoretical Studies	165
2.2. International Penetration of Societies	167
3. The French-Algerian Relationship	169
4. French Penetration of Algeria	174
4.1. Algerian Crises and the Franco-Algerian Relationship	176
4.2. The Informal Relationship, Politics and Human Rights Violations	178
4.3. French Penetration of the Cultural and Intellectual Spheres	179
4.4. French Political Mediation and Military Support of the Algerian Regime	182
5. Informative Cases in the Franco-Algerian Relationship	192
6. Human Rights' Organizations and French Policy toward the Algerian Crisis	197
CHAPTER FIVE	204
THE ALGERIAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNISM	204
1. Introduction	204
2. Theoretical Base	204
3. Corruption in Algeria: The Historical Context	209
4. Economic opportunism and decision making	211
CHAPTER SIX	228
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL PARTIES, ELITES, AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ALGERIA	228
1. Introduction	228
2. Political Parties: General Definitions and Theoretical Perspective	229
2.1. Introduction	229
2.2. Definitions and Theoretical Perspectives	230
3. Political Parties in Algeria	238
3.1. Algerian Political Elites and French Colonialism	240
3.2. Political Leadership in Algeria	243
4. The Single Party System and the Military Regime in Algeria	248
5. The Role of the FLN in Human Rights Violations in the Post Colonialism Period	253
6. The Events of October 1988 and Political Changes	255
7. The Multi-Party System and the Response to the Violence	257
8. The Role of the Current Parties in the Decision Making and Structuring of Violence in Algeria	262
CHAPTER SEVEN	265
CONCLUSION	265
Epilogue	282

BIBLIOGRAPHY	289
1. Books	289
1.1. Books in English	289
1.2. Books in French	293
1.3. Books in Arabic	295
1. Interviews	295
2.1 Personal Interviews	295
2.2 Media Interviews	296
2. Journal Articles	297
3. Electronic Source	301
4. Media: Newspapers and TV Channels	304
5. Other Material	306
APPENDICES	308
1. Appendix 1: Maps	308
2. Appendix 2: The Family Tree of the Algerian resistance since its started till the revolution era	310
3. Appendix 3: Algerian National Movements, 1926-1962	311
4. Appendix 4: A Chronology of Key Events	312
5. Appendix 5: The Evian Agreements	315
6. Appendix 6: Algeria's share in France's world imports and exports and France's share in Algeria's world imports and exports, 1960-92	319
7. Appendix 7: Presidents of Algeria since the Independence	320
8. Appendix 8: Interviews Questions	321

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIS:	<i>Armée Islamique du Salut</i> (Islamic Salvation Army)
ALN:	<i>Armée de Libération Nationale</i> (National Liberation Army)
AML:	<i>Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté</i> (Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty)
ANP:	<i>Armée Nationale Populaire</i> (People's National Army)
AUMA:	<i>l'Association des Oulamā Musulmans Algériens</i> (The Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars) 5 May 1931
AW:	Algeria-Watch (Human Rights Organization)
CCE:	<i>Comite de Coordination et Execution</i> (Committee of Coordination and Implementation)
CCN:	<i>Conseil Consulatif Nationale</i> (National Advisory Council)
CNRA:	<i>Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne</i> (National Council of the Algerian Revolution)
CRA:	<i>Centre de renseignement et d'action</i> (Information and Action Centre)
CRUA:	<i>Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action</i> (the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action)
DRS:	<i>Département du Renseignement et de Sécurité</i> (Department of Intelligence and Security)
DSE:	<i>Délégué du Secrétariat Executive</i> (Department of Intelligence and Security)
DST:	<i>Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire</i> (Department of Territorial Surveillance-France)
EEC:	European Economic Community
ENA:	<i>Etoile North-Africaine</i> (North African Star)
ESG:	<i>Ecole Supérieure de Guerre</i> (the French Institute for Military Higher Education)
EMG:	<i>État-Major Général</i> (the General Staff of the Military)
EU:	European Union
FFS:	<i>Front des Forces Socialistes</i> (the Socialist Forces Front)
FIDA:	<i>Front Islamique du Djihad Armé</i> (the Islamic Front for Armed Jihad)
FIS:	<i>Front Islamique du Salut</i> (the Islamic Salvation Front)
FLN:	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i> (the National Liberation Front)
GIA:	<i>Groupe Islamique Armé</i> (Armed Islamic Group)
GIGN:	<i>Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale</i> (the National Gendarmerie Intervention Group)
GPRA	Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria
GSPC:	<i>Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat</i> (the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat)
GSPR:	<i>Groupe de Securite du President de la Republique</i> (the Security Group for the Presidency of the Republic)
HAMAS/MSI:	<i>Mouvement pour une Société Islamique</i> (the Movement for an Islamic Society)
HCE:	<i>Haut Comite' d'Etat</i> (the High State Council)
HCS:	The High Council for Security
HDS:	<i>Houmat al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya</i> (the Guardians of the Salafi Call)
HMS:	<i>Haraka Mujtama' Al-Silm</i> (Movement of Society for Peace)

ICFTU:	<i>Confederation Internationale des Syndicats Libres</i> (the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions)
INA:	<i>Information Nationale d'Algerie</i> (the National Intelligence Agency of Algeria)
KGB:	The Committee for State Security (1988)
MAJD:	<i>Mouvement Algerien pour la Justice et la Developpment</i> (the Algerian Movement for Justice and Development)
MALG:	<i>Ministère de l'Armement, des Liaisons Générales et des Communications</i> (the Ministry of Munitions, General Liaisons and Communications)
MAOL:	<i>Le Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres</i> (the Algerian Free Officers Movement)
MDA:	<i>Mouvement pour la Democratie en Algerie</i> (the Movement for Democracy in Algeria)
MEI:	<i>Mouvement pour un État Islamique</i> (the Movement for an Islamic State)
MIA:	Mouvement Islamique Algérien (the Algerian Islamic Movement), 1982-1987
MIA:	<i>Mouvement Islamique Armé</i> (the Armed Islamic Movement), 1991-1994
MNA:	<i>Mouvement National Algérien</i> (the Algerian National Movement)
MNI:	<i>Mouvement de la Nahda</i> Islamique (the Islamic Renaissance Movement)
MTLD:	<i>Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques</i> (the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, 1946)
NZTV:	New Zealand Television
OAS:	<i>Organisation de l'Armée Sucrète</i> (the Organization of the Secret Army)
OS:	<i>Organisation Spéciale</i> (Special Organisation)
PAGS:	<i>Parti d'Avant-Garde Socialiste</i> (the Socialist Vanguard Party) 25/01/1966
PCA:	<i>Parti Communiste Algerien</i> (the Algerian Communist Party)
PCF:	<i>Parti Communiste Francaise</i> (the French Communist Party)
PPA:	<i>Parti du Peuple Algérien</i> (the Algerian People's Party)
PRS:	<i>Parti de la Revolution Socialiste</i> (the Party of Socialist Revolution)
PT:	<i>Parti des Travailleurs</i> (the Labour Party)
PUP:	<i>Parti de l'Unite Populaire</i> (the Popular Unity Party)
RCD:	<i>Ressemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie</i> (the Rally for Culture and Democracy [a political party])
RFI:	<i>Radio France d'Information</i> (French Information Radio)
RND:	<i>Rassemblement National Démocratique</i> (Democratic National Rally [a political party])
SHC:	The State High Commission
SM:	<i>Sécurité Militaire</i> (the Military Security Agency)
SONATRACH:	<i>Societe Nationale de la Recherche, le Transport, la Transformation, et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures</i> (National Society for Research, Transportation, Processing and Marketing of Hydrocarbons)
SSP:	<i>Service Special de la Prospection</i> (Department of Special Prospecting)
UDHR:	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UDMA:	<i>Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien</i> (the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto)
UGTA:	<i>Union Generale des Travailleurs Algeriens</i> (the General Union of Algerian Workers)
UPA	<i>Union Populaire Algerienne</i> (the Algerian Popular Union)
UNEA	The Independent Student Union
UNFA:	<i>Union Nationale des Femmes Algeriennes</i> (the National Union of Algerian Women)

USTA: *Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs Algeriens* (the Union of Algerian Workers Federation)
VETO: Veto Energex Towers Organisation

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. Preface

Today, after 20 years of one of the bloodiest civil wars *per capita* in history, one that has cost between 100,000 and 200,000 lives, Algeria is sometimes described, perhaps ironically, as “an immense media-generating construction.”¹ Since 1992, the public has been told that the war in Algeria was justified by the fundamentalist attack on the Algerian State and on the nation’s democracy, expressed in the outcome of the elections of 1990. However, the crisis in Algeria did not begin with the fateful elections of the 1990s. Thousands of people had already been arrested, tortured and executed since the country’s independence in 1962. The end of the revolutionary war was quickly followed by a period of protracted conflicts that have persisted, in many respects, up to the present day. From the beginning it was felt that Muslims in Algeria were “barbarians,” and that the only institution that was equipped to deal with these “barbarians” was the Algerian army.

It should not be surprising that the Algerian Army has held the real power in Algeria since independence. It dominates and controls the whole political and bureaucratic system, and after more than forty years of authoritarianism, it still retains unchallenged power. Many observers feel that the institutions and organisations of the country were established primarily to support the military regime, and to give it credibility and legitimacy. Political parties were outlawed until the Constitution of 1989 was promulgated. Algeria’s brief familiarity with political rights and pluralism within a democratic system lasted from 1989 to 1991. This brief taste of democracy impacted the military regime, however, and democracy did not last beyond 1992. The military stopped the elections; even though more than twenty parties competed. The emerging multi-party system had almost ended the military’s hold on political power in Algeria, and the Army resumed its violent governance of the country in order to prevent the Islamists, who won the elections of 1991 by a large majority, from assuming power.

This thesis explores three central questions: **why did the Algerian military turn against its own people? Did structural and organisational changes in the Algerian military influence the pattern of human rights violations in postcolonial Algeria? Did that pattern change in the 1990s?** I examine the different stages that led the Army to use

¹ Lounis Aggoun, Jean-Baptiste, *Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'Etats: histoire secrète de la guerre d'indépendance à la "troisième guerre" d'Algérie* (France: Découverte, 2005).

violence against Algerian civilians. It appears that active revolutionaries and young soldiers, most of whom had taken on the responsibility to protect the country and the civil rights of the Algerian people, were largely innocent of human rights violations.

There has been, however, a group of anti-revolution officers who became involved at the end of the revolutionary war, belatedly switching their allegiance from France to Algeria, and then claiming an increasingly larger share of the power. The ‘French Officers’, so-called because of their training in French military schools, initially supported the French troops, fighting against Algerian revolutionaries during most of the War of Liberation. Most of these ‘French Officers’ were born in Algeria by the late 1930s, received their secondary education in French,² and in the mid-1950s embarked on careers in the French military, only very late in the war choosing to switch to the National Liberation Army.³ After independence they received military training at prestigious institutions, such as the *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre* in Paris, and the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, and they continued to communicate primarily in French.⁴

Their apparent goal, rather than providing training for the young soldiers on Algerian military bases, soon became clear: it was to seize political control of the country by becoming, initially in a *de facto* sense, the primary decision-makers in Algeria. Soon they were able to determine who would become president and prime minister of the country. As my study will demonstrate, this is one of the primary causes of the protracted and massive human rights violations that Algerians have suffered since the liberation war. That violence was, and still is, the most disturbing aspect of the failure of democracy in Algeria, a very brief and limited system change that was only seen in Algeria for the first time after the promulgation of the 1989 Constitution. It is apparently the weakness of the Algerian civilian political elites, especially those in the Islamic movements, that has helped the military (directly and indirectly), and particularly the French Officers, in maintaining their control, and continuing their persistent violations of the human rights in Algeria.

The domination of the armed forces in the Algerian political system began well before independence. In 1957, the future role of the army and the security services was specified in a formal revolutionary declaration. Through the *coup d'état* of 1963 against the Provisional Revolutionary Government (GPRA), and another *coup* in 1965 against Ahmad Ben Bella,

² Perthes Volker, *Arab elites: negotiating the politics of change* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 176, and See Brahim, A. H., “*Aux origines de la tragédie algérienne (1958-2000), Témoignage sur "Hizb França"* (Hoggar, Geneva, 2000)

³ Volker P. (2004)

⁴ Abdelhamid Brahim, Personal interview, London, September 2009.

revolutionaries struggled against the French Officers for political and even military power. With the formation of a military regime to lead the Revolutionary Council, as well as the single political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria faced many changes that affected national security, the political structure and even international relations. This study will examine these changes, which resulted in human rights violations after each of the many military *coups* that took place in the post-independence era.

My central focus is upon the role that the French Officers played in the political system after independence, as well as their interventions into the bureaucratic system, which resulted in the failure of democracy in Algeria, 1989-1992. It was the growing power of the French Officers that explains, more than any other variable, why the Algerian military turned against its own people. There were, of course, other factors, including the development of a distinctive military ethos, the lure of corruption and economic opportunism, the establishment of dysfunctional political party systems, and interference in Algerian politics by high-level authorities in France, among others. The central focus of this thesis, however, is on the emergence of dysfunctional and violent civil-military relations in Algeria, and the principal causes that led to this state of affairs.

This thesis addresses three theoretical questions about the formation of a military ethos and the impact of political parties on human rights violations in post-colonial Algeria. The first question is regarding the fundamental structure of the Algerian military since the creation of this institution after the independence of the country in 1962. This study will look at the formation of the military in Algeria after that liberation war. What was the premise on which the military was structured after independence? What was the objective of the military, or at least of the French Officers, in taking power in Algeria? I will examine in detail the legalization of the different political roles which the military, through the apparent political control of the French Officers, has exercised in Algeria, especially regarding the Constitution of 1989, and the brief period of democratisation, 1989-1992. What were the factors that enabled the development of a military ethos that supported political and military intervention after independence, and particularly during the crisis of 1990s? How did civilian political elites regard the democratisation that took place in 1989-1992? How have they regarded the human rights violations in the post-colonial era? This study is divided into three parts: First, a description and analysis of the structure and the characteristics of the Algerian military from independence to the failure of their political party, the FLN, by 1991; second, the history, patterns and extent of military intervention into political life; third, an analysis of the

situation and principal causal factors that enabled the military to declare a state-of-emergency, and to abort the democratization process, after the election of 1991.

Another question involves the role of political parties in the security arena. The ideologies that drive parties in the domestic political arena also lead them to define the national interest in different ways that are critical for understanding the formation of their particular groups. This is particularly the case in regard to the secular parties, the former national revolutionaries, and the Islamic movements, and is linked to ideological issues as well as to ethnic groups. Domestic politics in Algeria demonstrate that human rights violations during the most violent period, 1991-2001, were influenced by cultural and ideological factors. Under the slogan of the Islamists, "Islam is the only solution," and the slogan of the secularists, "Algeria is not Iran or Afghanistan," conflict involving the military and different ethnic groups, including the Arabs, the Berbers, and the French, became routinized and deeply entrenched, and widespread human rights violations were the inevitable result.

A third primary question will focus on the role of the international communities in Algeria after independence and especially during the period of the most pervasive human rights violations in the 1990s. The relationship of France with the Algerian regime apparently aggravated the insecurity and the instability of the political system after independence, and neo-colonialism, together with the professionalization of the Algerian Army, accompanied and accentuated the violence. This begs the question, were human rights violations a sort of 'tool' brandished indirectly by a former colonial power?

The international factor is crucial to understanding Algeria; a section will focus on international law and the efforts of the international community to intervene in the upheaval in Algeria, and whether these efforts were legitimate and/or desirable. It will also deal with the role of France in the efforts of the international community to resolve the crises. In spite of the catastrophic humanitarian situation, overt and protracted violence, and daily massacres in cities and small villages in Algeria during the 1990s, international human rights organisations satisfied themselves with non-intervention, or at most, with recording mere observations of the often grotesque violations. Most of their reports stated that Algeria was culturally a country of terrorism and Islamic extremism. In fact, at the time that Algerians expected the support of, and a 'firm stand' from, the international community against the human rights violations, a United Nations delegation visited Algeria in 1998, drafted a report to the UN absolving the Algerian military of past crimes and human rights violations, and

essentially gave a green light to the Algerian authorities to deal with Algerian Islamists as “terrorists.” It ignored the massacres, torture, disappearances and arrests.⁵

Algerian elites who gained control over the political processes after the 1992 *coup d'état* found convenient justifications to respond to international critics in the many contradictions between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the “war on terror.” Economic factors also played a part in creating the crises of 1988 and the 1990s. Algeria’s principal source of revenue was based on the export of gas and oil. Agriculture accounted for only a small part of the country’s income. By the 1980s, Algeria, like many third world countries, faced a difficult situation when the international price of oil fell unexpectedly. The fall in oil prices, in turn, affected other sources of income, including agriculture. This economic crisis influenced the political situation. As social divisions widened, Algerian citizens began to demand more political openness as well as fundamental changes in their situation. Algerian youth have been the major victims of the social and economic crisis. Indeed, the control of the economy exercised by unaccountable elites, including senior military officers, has failed to provide the majority of civilians with the means to resolve their problems. Finally, the corruption manifested mostly by the military regime since independence has prevented civilians from participating in the political and economic life of the country.

2. Background

The author of this research is an Algerian in political exile. Some readers of this thesis may accuse me directly or indirectly of a certain lack of objectivity. They might believe that I have taken sides against a particular party among the political organisations in Algeria, all of whom were guilty to some extent of human rights violations by the 1990s. It is difficult, of course, for any Algerian not to support some strand of political thought in Algeria. No Algerian family was safe from the privation and suffering during the worst years of the crisis in the 1990s, or even, for that matter, at the present time. It is indisputable that academic research has to be as objective as possible, maintaining a distance from personal feelings. I have tried my best to keep my background, my thoughts, and my personal feelings apart from any side in the Algerian conflicts. For example, although I use the term “massacre” frequently in this work, I have done so only because this term, while admittedly

⁵ Andrew J. Pierre, William B. Quandt, *The Algerian crisis: policy options for the West* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996)

laden with negative connotations, is preferable to “indiscriminate mass killings” or “indiscriminate mass murders”. The reality is that such mass killings frequently, almost routinely, took place, and use of the term “massacre” actually seems to be less laden with negative semantics in this context. Moreover, it is the term that most of the observers, and all of my interviewees, have tended to use. Nevertheless, it is admittedly not a term that the Algerian military would tend to use except, of course, in reference to alleged killings by Islamists. At any rate, it is impossible to be fully objective in any social science thesis, as Max Weber noted nearly a century ago, although I have done my best.

This research, moreover, is not intended to be a legal report or bill of indictment against any party in Algeria, or elsewhere, but rather an academic study based on unhindered analysis, without pressure from anyone to drive this research towards a specific point of view. I conducted a series of elite, open-ended interviews in 2009-2010 with a range of former Algerian politicians and military leaders in exile. These interviewees expressed a wide range of perceptions of the Algerian crisis. As regards to other key politicians and military officers with whom I could not speak directly, I used their comments in the international media, before the UN, and their writings in their books and memoirs to supplement my extensive elite interviews.

The number of participants in this research from the ranks of the active military was limited simply because of the innate difficulties in interviewing active-duty officers. As the subject of this thesis cannot safely be raised inside Algeria, the only people who can reasonably participate are those who are outside of Algeria, most of whom having sought asylum in different countries worldwide. Likely because of the potential for danger, many officers refused to take part in this research. Some of them refused to attend face-to-face meetings, giving various excuses, and only later, following repeated invitations, agreed to participate in open dialogue over the phone or on-line through “Skype.”

A distinctive feature of this research is its presentation of the views of the participants, some of whom supported the regime, or manifested other views and thoughts from the regime’s perspective. As noted above, it was not possible to communicate with active officers from the military regime in Algeria. They are, in my view, people in the shadows, never seen in the media apart from the highest levels of leadership. Algeria is not a democratic country in which citizens can freely see their MPs or government ministers to share ideas. While the media in Algeria may be supported by strong organisations and even foreign countries, they have failed to transmit ideas other than those of the French media, largely supporters of the regime. The political leaders in Algeria appear to allow only their

supporters' voices from amongst journalists and academics. Even these people were reluctant to participating in my research.

As regards to personal security, it is not acceptable for any researcher to put himself or his participants in danger. The violence of the Algerian military has long been directed at journalists and researchers in Algerian universities and overseas. Nevertheless, there are some limited secondary academic references that support the Algerian military agenda to be found in academic papers and newspaper and magazine articles published inside Algeria and in France. These sources have been used where appropriate, together with documentaries and declarations made by military spokesmen and other political supporters of the regime.

Primarily because of the factors mentioned above, this research has been driven by a political methodology which is based in its primary sources of elite interviews, memoirs of key participants, and a literature review within the fields of political science and international law. This work is a case-study analysis. The subject is intensely political, and constantly changing; frequent updates of Algerian politics in Europe and North African TV interviews have also been helpful in examining the thoughts of politicians, authors and editors. The Algerian crisis was driven by generals and revolutionaries, some of whom are still alive. Some of those who have survived are beginning to write their memoirs, useful sources for my study, especially those of generals and other senior military officers, as it has been impossible to persuade most of them to participate in my research.⁶

Lecturers and supervisors always advise their students to be objective, and to avoid personal and intellectual bias.

...[that] the researcher should remain neutral and “detached” from the research subject tells us that researcher aspires to the goal of “objectivity” in the research process. This framework...is one of many paradigms one can bring to the fieldwork experience.⁷

⁶An early examiner's report raised concerns regarding objectivity. As previously mentioned, every effort was made to include the perspective of the military regime and currently active military in Algeria. In addition to this, a number of military officers are not publically known. These agents work in the shadows, making access even more problematic. Any attempt to contact currently serving generals would raise significant safety issues for my family and me. The opinions of those who have left their posts are reflected in a number of interviews already conducted. That said, very few generals leave their posts, unless required to because of age, and even in these cases, these former military strong-men continue to exert power through familial and professional ties. In late 2009, I arranged three meetings in Algiers, but in the end was only able to speak with one of these appointments, Salah eddine Sidhum. The others simply refused or just ignored me, without any apology or attempt to reschedule. Beyond that, military agents have consistently ignored any attempts to arrange a meeting. Considering that media and human rights organisations face the same problem, there is little incentive for the military to agree to meet with me as a researcher.

⁷ There are some who believe that it is not necessary to maintain distance between the researcher and the researched; See Charlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy, *The practice of qualitative research* (California: Sage Publications Inc, 2006), p. 93. This advice was one of the main remarks that my supervisor made from his reading of my previous drafts. I went through my primary and secondary resources to formulate

With that in mind, the subject and the research questions have been limited to the study and political analysis of the role of the military and its relations with civil society. The study focused on the Algerian regime only, and not on the Algerian opposition. There is little doubt that Algeria has been controlled by the military since independence. There is no doubt that the military regime has been deeply involved in the Algerian violence, and became at several points a virtual killing machine that swept up thousands of civilians. There is also no doubt that opposition militants, Islamic extremists and radical Berbers had a hand in human rights violations after independence. However, because the research question has focused on the role of the military, the only group that has continuously held power in Algeria, I have opted to focus upon the military in power, largely disregarding the role of the Islamic groups and other armed ethnic groups and militias in the human rights violations. Although such groups have periodically gone into revolt against the regime, and thereby spawned at least some of the reactive violence that has taken place, as, for example, in the Kabilya region,⁸ the fundamental question that I have sought to address, why the Algerian military turned against its own people, must remain my primary focus. Military-initiated violence seems to have come first, was far greater, and apparently caused and perpetuated the limited and mostly reactive civilian violence that followed.

Primary to all of this, in my analysis, has been the enduring role of the French Officers. Their intimate relationship with power and violence tended to be hidden from the public and the news media, disappearing behind opaque government agencies and artificial political parties. These latter groups worked as opposition parties with democratic platforms, but in reality were little more than political cover for an authoritarian military regime. Led by military officers who were apparent remnants of French colonialism,⁹ these parties also served as intermediaries between the aspirations of Western countries to promote their

a study which examines the arguments of the regime, but I could not find anyone who was willing to defend it. Hence, this study has been based on the research participants' views, as well as those of the media and published political analysts. Even though there are different subjects, there are many books and articles which have been written lately supporting my research results; I could not find one book defending the military and its massive human rights violations in the 1990s, except in passing in the memoirs of generals, some of which have been released recently. I have used these in my research mostly as secondary resources although they might also be said to represent primary information as regards the attitudes and behaviour of key participants.

⁸ Led by the revolutionary, Ait Ahmed, and his party, FFS, during the early period of Boumédiène. This was followed by violent reaction from socialists in the universities in the East and centre regions of Algeria. Islamic groups, moreover, participated in violence just after the *coup d'état* of 1992.

⁹ Lakhdar, R., *Abdelhamid Mahri: the FLN crisis, a personal Conflicts and faraway of the population interests*, *Echorouk*, Algerian Daily newspaper, Algeria, 26/12/2010. See:

<http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/?news=65121> , Yacin Hamid and Kedadra Atef, "Mahri says that he was expecting a national dialogue about change", *Elkhabar*, daily newspaper (23/04/2011). According to these articles and others, Abdelhamid Mahri, the former FLN president, declared that Algeria has no real opposition in the parliament and the FLN was and still is just the political face of the regime.

economic interests in Algeria, and their own embedded secular-cultural influences there. The ‘decision makers’, the ‘Men of the Shadows’, were the immediate stakeholders in the authoritarian power structure of the state. The French Officers were not themselves influenced by the many executive power transfers that followed independence. While presidents and governments have come and gone, one way or another, mostly in *coups*, the French Officer elites have tended not to be affected, even when the Algerian government shifted its loyalties from the Eastern socialist camp to the Western capitalist camp. Apparently, as long as they have been protected by the French, who have maintained a special trusteeship in Algeria, they have continued as the unseen manipulators of Algerian politics. I have concluded that their continuing presence has explained, more than any other variable, why it is that the Algerian military has violently turned on its own people. These, then, have been the foci of my research.

3 An Overview of the Case Study

The case of Algeria is sufficiently rich and complex that it cannot easily be reduced to a single, grand explanatory scheme. Algeria was the only country in the Arab world that took convincing steps towards liberal democracy in the period from 1989 to 1991.¹⁰ It was, in a sense, a bloody and unsuccessful precursor to the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 and 2012. The short period of democracy in Algeria resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, including students, who were killed mostly in the capital, Algiers, and, in particular, at Algiers University in 1988, when the single political party system theoretically ended, and honest competitive elections were held for the first time. The political and security crisis was not new to the Algerian people; they had experienced similar conditions almost daily since before the independence of the country in 1962. The period of the 1990s was described as the worst era that Algerians have seen since the liberation war, however. Tragically, perhaps, this was Algeria’s only ‘political spring’.

Algeria has been torn by brutal political violence since independence. At the time that the French forces left Algeria, the Algerian revolutionaries had little capacity to build a new government, one capable of driving the country towards development. Because of the conflict, the French authorities further intervened under a program launched by General de Gaulle in Evian in 1961. De Gaulle clearly had his own political interests in the Algerian

¹⁰ William B. Quandt, “Democratization in the Arab World; Algeria’s Uneasy Peace”, *Journal of Democracy* 13, 4 (2002), pp. 15-23 (National Endowment for Democracy and the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

case. Algerian independence had taken on an international dimension which may even have threatened French political stability. Promoting de Gaulle as a hero, it was thought, might stop the crisis, which was rapidly spreading to France. General de Gaulle's attempts to improve relations with the Third World would be (and later were) furthered by the ending of the Algerian war, or, as de Gaulle called it, the advent of 'cooperation'. As de Gaulle emphasized at the time, "No other country has spent a higher proportion of its national income on foreign aid than France."¹¹ The French crisis was effectively ended by an election in Algeria, with the FLN victorious. Both de Gaulle and the Algerian Muslims, in fact, felt that they had been victorious. By March 1962, Algerians seemed to have taken control of their country for the first time in their history.

The Algerian military, which was mostly formed outside the borders, in Ghardemau in Tunisia and in Ouajda in Morocco, was identified as the *L'Armée nationale populaire* (ANP), and took political power in Algeria immediately after independence. Today it continues to dominate and control the political system. Its power seems unchallenged, and is apparently based upon institutions and organisations that were created to support the regime and give it credibility, without regard for the wishes of the Algerian people. Political parties were outlawed until the Constitution of 1989 was promulgated. As noted above, Algeria only became familiar with political rights and pluralism within a democratic system with the Constitution of 1989. Although these changes impacted the military regime, democracy did not last beyond 1992. The military intervened shortly after the elections, despite the fact that more than twenty parties and most Algerians had participated. The new multi-party system had the potential of ending the military's hold on Algeria, and the military was apparently reduced to instituting violence in order to prevent the Islamists, who won the elections by a large majority, from assuming power.

While there is no doubt that the extremists from within the Islamists had a hand in the violence that occurred in the country during the crisis of the 1990s, it was, according to the most reliable evidence, the military regime that ultimately provoked and directed a bloody war against civilians. At the very least, the violence of the 1990s was triggered by the military coup that followed the parliamentary elections of 1991. Many civilian protestors suffered in the widespread violence that followed, and an escalating cycle of violence between the military regime and Muslim armed insurgents was set in motion. Human rights organisations, including NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, spoke of hundreds of

¹¹ Julian Jackson, *Charles de Gaulle* (London, Haus Publishing, 2003), p. 104

thousands of deaths in extensive *massacres* (they used this word). This number was later confirmed by President Bouteflika in 1999.¹² In fact, the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights, Salaheddin Sidhoum, and a range of NGOs have confirmed that the 10 years of crisis claimed the lives of an estimated 100,000–200,000 people, with over 7,000 people arrested by security forces and countless ‘disappeared’.¹³ During the crisis, some 1200 people were reportedly killed each month; victims of massacres, indiscriminate armed attacks and apparently targeted assassinations.¹⁴ The Islamic Armed Group (GIA), notorious for its brutality, was said to be responsible for a significant part of the violence.¹⁵ However, government security forces were most likely the primary agents of direct abuses of human rights, particularly in their repeated failure to protect civilians from the attacks of unknown assailants.¹⁶ Women were often the targets of violence, and suffered abduction, slavery, rape, and summary execution.¹⁷ The activities of self-defence groups, legalised by a 1997 law, also added to the insecurity as some of the leaders of these groups reportedly evolved into local warlords, terrorising local populations. Between 150,000 and 200,000 people joined these militia groups and 80,000 others were recruited as communal guards. It is significant that they were all apparently armed by the military.¹⁸

According to Meziane Ait-Larbi and others, the “condemnation of these abuses is necessary, but not enough.”¹⁹ To understand the nature of these human rights violations and massacres, in particular, there is a need to more closely identify the victimised groups, make progress towards clarifying the responsibilities, and bring increased respect for human rights to Algeria. While the overall blame for the violence tended to be focused by the Algerian government, international media and Western bureaucracies on the Islamist groups, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the Islamic Front for the Armed Jihad (FIDA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and other

¹² Al-Hiwar TV, program “case and dialogue” interview with the formal diplomat ‘Mohammed Arbi Zitout’, See the web. <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6oQ93FShjE&feature=related>>.

¹³ These numbers have been listed by Human Rights Watch, <www.algeria-watch.org>, title: “More than one million internally displaced people ignored by the international community,” The Global IDP Project, 05.03.04, <<http://www.idpproject.org>>. The original sources are (EU 2002; HRW 2003; FIDH 17 March 2003).

¹⁴ ICG. [October 2000] *Executive Summary*, at <<http://www.algeria-watch.org/de/infomap/27/displaced.htm>>.

¹⁵ ICG [October 2000] *Executive Summary*.

¹⁶ Luis Martinez, *Le Cheminement Singulier de la Violence Islamiste en Algérie, Critique Internationale* (July 20, 2003); for the same other, See *La sécurité en Algérie et en Libye après le 11 septembre, Euromesco Papers*, 22, April 2003, *Euromesco*; Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, *the Convergence of Civilisation; Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (University of Toronto Press, 2006) .

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch (2000); Human Rights Watch (2004).

¹⁸ Salaheddin Sidhoum, Report of December 2003).

¹⁹ Ait Larbi, M. Ait Belkacem, M. S. Belaid, M. Nait Redjam, A. and Soltani Y. “An Anatomy of the Massacres”, in: Youcef Bedjaoui, Abbas Aroua, Meziane Ait-Larbi, eds., *An Inquiry into the Algerian Massacres* (Geneva: Hoggar Books, 1999), p. 15.

groups, which were labelled by the US government as terrorists, the evidence continues to point to the Algerian military regime as the fundamental source of the post-independence violence in Algeria. The use of a variety of sources has helped to correct the lack of a comprehensive means of systematically collecting the relevant data. Witnesses, including many of my interviewees, as well as most human rights organisations, have accused the Algerian military of deliberately escalating the violence by using Islam as a scapegoat, wearing Islamic dress during their operations, and attributing deaths to Islamic fundamentalism.

This thesis will outline some of the most credible evidence that points to the military regime and the secret agencies in particular, as those primarily responsible for the violence and human rights violations after independence, and particularly during the crisis of the 1990s. In fact, and as noted above, according to many of my interviewees, were the military regime deemed innocent of propagating the violence, at the very least it would be guilty of a breach of trust and indirect violence in its failure to protect unarmed civilians.²⁰ However, many witnesses have confirmed the direct involvement of the military in the massacres and violence against civilian populations.²¹

Based upon public statements and my own elite interviews, it appears indisputable that the Algerian military officers, and particularly the French Officers, were the primary propagators of the human rights violations after the War of Independence. I will argue that it was this early and consistent history that was the main source of an Algerian military ethos, one that incorporated a propensity for human rights violations, authoritarianism and neo-colonialism. This history actually dated back to the Ottoman era. It is no exaggeration to say that Algerians have lost hope because of the protracted nature of the violence, even as the first of their legitimately indigenous and representative leaders were finally in key leadership positions.²² The liberation war against the French left more than a million Algerians dead, many of them killed in near genocidal actions during the seven years of war. A great number

²⁰ Many of interviewees, such as formal Captain Ahmed Chouchane, formal Colonel Mohammed Samraoui, Rachad Leader Mourad Dhina, and others have confirmed that the Algerian military regime represented by DRS have involved deeply in the crime and the massive Human Rights violations, which heat the country since 1990s.

²¹ Many books have been written on this subject by witnesses, to massacres and the murder of the President Mohammed Boudiaf. The following sources are examples of many others published in different languages. See : Mohammed Samroui, *Chronique des années de sang: Algérie, comment les services secrets ont manipulé les groupes islamistes* (Denoël, 2003); Habib Souaidia, *La Sale Guerre* (Paris: Decouverte, 2001), preface by Italian judge Ferdinando Imposimato; Nesroulah Yous, *Qui a tuk a Bentalha* (Paris: Decouverte, 2000).

²² See Appendix 4, «the Chronology of Key Events in Algerian History » ; and see Belkacem Saadallah, *Abhaath wa Araa' fi Tarikh al-Jaza'ir (Chapter: Taamulat fi Tarikh al-Thawra)*, Vol. 4 (Beirut, Dar al-Ghareb al al-Islami, pub. 1, 1996).

of citizens were jailed, tortured and disappeared, millions of people were forcibly displaced from their farms and properties, and the end of the war in 1962 did not put a stop to this systematic pattern of violence.

Political parties have periodically played important roles in the crisis. The conflict among the revolutionaries themselves ended with the creation of a single political party (the National Liberation Front -FLN-), dominated by revolutionaries who saw themselves as the only group who had the right to hold power in Algeria. These legions of revolutionaries organised themselves to occupy the most favoured positions in the military, in politics and in the emerging social hierarchy. Others positioned themselves within the bureaucracy. The military *coups* of 1963, 1965 and 1991 affected the lives of thousands of innocent Algerian citizens as well as members of foreign organisations; thousands more people were arrested or displaced.

The collapse of the single party, the FLN, was primarily the result of conflicts among elites who held power through this political party. These conflicts ultimately resulted in a massive “population outburst”²³ on 5 October 1988. The violent response of the government resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians and damage that cost the country billions of dollars. Despite the apparent intentions of those behind these events, and of those who were directly responsible for the violence that led to the deaths of hundreds of young people at the hands of the armed forces, significant changes subsequently took place in the political system in Algeria, spread across a variety of the departments of government. These changes, which began after the popular outburst of October 1988, did not happen by chance.²⁴ Within a few months, in 1989, a constitutional amendment provided for democratic elections, and enabled more than sixty political parties, including Islamic movements, and organisations from different ethnic groups across the political spectrum, to participate in the local elections of 1991-1992. This was the first time since independence that Algerians had experienced such political freedom and democracy.

According to General Khaled Nazzar, however, Algeria has never actually been governed by civilians. After independence, Algeria was governed by a military regime that operated behind the façade of a single political party, and apparently controlled most of the

²³ The name given to the 5th October 1988 event. This involved demonstrations and uprisings by citizens, especially youth, in all the large cities in Algeria, put down by the army, with the deaths of more than 500 people and the injury of thousands more. A new control system had been established by the regime, using torture and the raiding of houses at night to kidnap mostly young protestors and put them in prison. Then-President Chadli Ben Jedid promised political and economic reform, and political democracy.

²⁴ Abdelhamid Brahim A. (2000).

elements of government, including the ministries and the presidency.²⁵ This hegemony of the military over the Algerian bureaucracy has affected the social and political ethos of citizens. According to a variety of observers, new divisions were created in Algerian society, structuring the basis of ongoing clashes and contentious relationships among citizens. Those considered nationalists, who believed in the Revolution and/or a ‘holy war’ against French colonialism, were considered supporters of the military regime. Those who did not share these beliefs were branded as ‘traitors’.

The origins of the Algerian Army can be traced back to the liberation war and the National Liberation Army (ALN),²⁶ and evolved out of the specific characteristics of the Liberation Army. The present army was most influenced by the way in which it overcame conflicts among the politicians, and declared armed revolution against the French occupation, establishing the foundation of the contemporary relationship between the military and the political system in Algeria. The first principle governing the new civil-military relations in Algeria became: “While politicians are in conflict and unable to take the initiative and to make decisions, the military will have to take ownership and make critical decisions.”²⁷

Whatever the shortcomings of the Algerian polity since independence, however, virtually all of my interviewees stressed that violence was not an acceptable solution. Tragically, early political figures that put their trust in the emerging political leadership, particularly during the Congress of Soummam Valley in 1956, were often later summarily executed by their colleagues, the products of a bloody and ongoing competition for power. According to Saadallah, throughout the history of Algeria the people have never been led by their peers. At key junctures when they had the opportunity to seize power, competition, jealousy, opportunism and corruption intervened. Many revolutionaries were killed by jealous and selfish competitors; indeed, political selfishness became paramount. Abane Ramdane, the designer of the Soummam Congress and an architect of Algeria’s future politics, was himself killed by his own close colleagues, Abdelhafid Boussouf and Krim Belkacem. At a time when the Tunisian people were led by a single leader, Bourghiba, and the Moroccan people by Mohamed V, and when Egypt and other countries likewise had single, charismatic leaders, the Algerians were unable to agree on a single leader. Rather, the revolutionary leadership was guided by a group of people, the leaders of the Willayas, and later came under the

²⁵ See Khaled Nezzar, *Mémoire de General Khalid Nazzar* (Chihab Editions, Algiers, 1999); French Channel, *Chanal Plus*, “Interview with General Khaled Nazzar,” 1995.

²⁶ See Muslim Baba Arabi, “The military and the path of democratization in Algeria”, *Journal of Human Science*, 5, No. 35 (Autumn, 2007). Translated by the Author.

²⁷ See Muslim Baba Arabi (2007).

control of the three 'Bs'; Boussouf Abdel Hafid, Belkacem Krim, and Ben-Toubal Lakheder.²⁸ The fundamental conflict among the FLN leaders was based on more than misunderstandings or differing viewpoints; it went back to the 1930s, and the time of the French colonial authorities. This was the key moment when Messali Hadj,²⁹ the leader of the Star of North Africa and a former member and leader of the Party of the Algerian People (PPA), was seeking to bring about the complete independence of the country through a revolution against the French. Ferhat Abbas was pursuing the rights of Algerians under French rule for a French Algeria (*Algérie Française*), ignoring Algeria as a historical entity. This conflict of views continued among the leaders of the FLN.

It was the competition for power among the revolutionaries and in the military bases outside of Algeria's borders, then, that ultimately contributed to open conflict and, in a number of cases, massacres. Violence became the only likely way for competitors to seize power. This competition created a kind of contrived ethnic division within Algerian society, with modernity pitted against tradition and regionalism. These factors opened a wide gap between the internal and external revolutionaries; it nearly resulted in a new war between the ANP and the ALN, the military arm of the FLN. Boumédiène later took power by force and illegitimately created a military regime from senior, French-trained officers, the "French Officers", likely because of their close alignment with French foreign policy and their discrete presence as a self-interested group. They later became the leadership cadre of the military associations.

The French Officers, who made up a relatively small group within the Algerian military, largely arose out of the French colonial army, joined the revolutionary forces only at the end of the war, and used the conflict among the FLN leaders to gain political power, which they gradually achieved by establishing an allegedly corrupt network, the "*Algérie Française*."³⁰ They achieved some of their key goals through the presidency of Chadli Benjedid (1978-92), when General Larbi Belkheir became the head of the High Council for Security, Secretary-General of the Presidency, and head of the Cabinet. He attained the rank of major-general. At the time of the elections of 1991-92, Belkheir was the Minister of the

²⁸ Belkacem Saadallah, *abhaath wa araa' fi Tarikh al-Jazaa'ir*, Vol. 4 (Beirut: Dar al-ghareb al-Islami, 1996) , pp. 11-14.

²⁹ Ahmed Ben Messali Hadj (1898- 1974) was an Algerian nationalist politician dedicated to the independence of his homeland from France. He co-founded the '*Étoile Nord-Africaine*,' the '*Parti du Peuple Algérien*' and the '*Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques*' before dissociating himself from the armed struggle for Independence in 1954. He also founded the '*Mouvement National Algerien*' to counteract the ongoing efforts of the '*Front de Libération Nationale*.'

³⁰ Aggoun, L, Jean-Baptiste, *Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'Etats: histoire secrète de la guerre d'indépendance à la "troisième guerre" d'Algérie* (France: Découverte, 2005).

Interior. The French Officers ultimately came to power in 1992 through a *coup d'état* against the president, ending his program of democratisation and free elections. They remain the most important political actors within the regime. They have allegedly built a strong network of secret agents to assist them in exercising authoritarian control over the country, including its politics, economy and even the social life of civilians. Their central means of control, as noted repeatedly above, appears to be violence. But by the election of the most recent president, Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, these French Officers have started to get a bit of a wake-up call, especially after the death of high ranking members of the group such as Arbi Belkheir, Mohammed Lammari, Smain Lammari, Tounsi and others. Nezzar, Zarhouni and a handful of other French Officers went to the retirement. Bouteflika convened a presidential group to examine the role of the military in the government, but, as the military had both the institutional knowledge and experience in decision making, Bouteflika and his group made little headway. The ineffectiveness of their efforts was particularly compounded by the entrenched corruption, which marked the Algerian economy during that period in particular.

4. Comparative Themes and Issues

This thesis is situated within a broad subfield of political science, *comparative politics*. In this capacity it will address the subject of the “Military Regime, Political Power and Human Rights Violations in Postcolonial Algeria.” Algeria is a unique case among the countries of the region, and is notable for a number of reasons. Its colonial experience was longer and more intense than in most of the other comparable cases. This will be explored in the chapter outlining the historical background of Algeria, which examines the era of colonialism and the lives of native born Algerians during different periods prior to independence in 1962.

The French began their colonial venture in Algeria in 1830; they faced strong resistance from the Berbers and the Arabs for decades. The French suppressed the most important resistance movements and encouraged the settlement of millions of Europeans in Algeria. Most of the settlers were French, and came to live in the country during the century that followed, eventually obtaining much of the best land, orienting the economy toward their interests, and establishing a hegemonic Parisian government that undermined existing indigenous political institutions. However, this historical period and the epoch of the liberation war in particular, became a formative influence on the development of Algerian political power and the military regime following independence.

The second chapter, then, emphasises colonial history and the war of liberation. It is noteworthy that Algeria's decolonisation experience was especially traumatic and unique.³¹ After seven years of intense warfare between 1954 and 1962, the Algerians carried out a guerrilla war in an effort to force France to accept Algerian independence and achieve their dream of having an indigenous power base for the first time in the country's history. A million Algerians died in this liberation war, adding to the millions that were killed in the late colonial period.

The third chapter examines the sources and expressions of Algerian political power following independence, including the formation and political role of the military, and the structuring of violence. As described above, there is no doubt that Algeria remains dominated by what is essentially a military regime. Few, if any, civilians have had significant roles in decision making following independence. Perhaps because of significant human losses in war, and difficulties in establishing a new state structure, Algerians in the postcolonial era have struggled with many of the same problems present in the colonial era. Violence, in particular, remains the most egregious problem. The military arm of the ANP competed for power using violence against the revolutionaries of the GPRA beginning soon after independence. This chapter, then, examines the formation of the Algerian regime and its relation to human rights violations in the postcolonial era. The role of the military in political decisions, their intervention in the political crisis, their contribution to human rights violations after 1992, and the political factions within the military introduce the subject of military professionalism, and its implications in Algeria.

It should be added that Algeria has never had a fully professional army, where military service was universally regarded as a profession, enshrined in the Constitution. Rather, the military has consistently resisted the legitimate transfer of power to civilians. Regime legitimacy was said to be based upon its "revolutionary background", a political and emotional standard used to justify what appeared to be the illegitimate retention of power. Power rested in the hands of senior military officers following independence. The supreme irony in this is that these officers are remnants of French colonialism and gave no support to the Revolution, finally joining it just before the cease-fire. Many of the French Officers fought with the French against the Revolution. Their continuing control over the regime appears, in most cases, to be largely based on their tactical and strategic uses of violence, and on their international ties to the Western community, and to France in particular. The

³¹ William, B. Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets, Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1998).

international community appears to have closed its eyes to the illegitimate retention of power since independence and the massive human rights violation carried out by the government. At times, it has appeared to be relieved that military once again intervened in politics, and has lent their active support to authoritarian “solutions”, giving their tacit approval to massacres and violence. France and the international community have even supported the current amnesty law proposed by Bouteflika’s regime,³² ostensibly because they are afraid of the possibility that economic interests will receive government support should the Islamist parties achieve power.

Chapter four discusses the French-Algerian relationship through two points of view. The first focuses on the role of the French, looking at French *penetration* of Algerian politics, culture and economy. Penetration follows two paths: the military penetration into Algerian political, institutional and social organisations; and the French penetration of international relations, the French-Algerian relationship in the postcolonial era. The second perspective examines the relationship between the Algerian military and France, focusing on the difficulties that challenged the two states’ formal relationship in many sectors outside of military and security arrangements. The Algerian relationship with other countries is also discussed, in particular Algeria’s interactions with Russia, China and the United States. These relationships have provided significant support to the Algerian regime. France, perhaps because of its colonial background, has attempted to keep Algeria under its political and economic direction. The obvious way to facilitate this has been to build a strong relationship with the Algerian regime. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that France has been dealing with Algeria according to its most striking bias: for over 130 years it has viewed Islam as the main obstacle to French political and economic control, if not the creation of an acceptable Algerian civilisation.³³ This chapter attempts to provide a brief explanation of the role played by France and other European countries in support of political violence, and to determine whether there are other useful lessons that can be drawn from the Algerian experience in order to better understand current events in the Middle East and North Africa.

In answering the research question, “why does the Algerian Army see the necessity of violence as a security solution to the political crisis in Algeria?”, chapter five examines two other factors that are critical to understanding the military in its violent interventions against civilians: *corruption* and *economic opportunism*. These appear to have contributed

³² The amnesty law (for past human rights violations) is part of the president’s program.

³³ The practice of Islam by Algerian women was seen as the last bastion of resistance to French rule. The veil in particular represented a powerful symbol of defiance to the French. The French consistently supported the Algerian regime in the war against Islam, making it clear that France would never accept an “extremist” Algeria.

significantly to violence and military dictatorship in Algeria. The military, in exercising an authoritarian system, has dominated virtually all sectors of the country, including political and economic power tied to the livelihoods of people through the wealth enjoyed by the state from oil, gas and natural resources. While this resource-based wealth contributed to a fiscal surplus, it has apparently not affected the lives of most citizens positively. They still suffer from poverty, unemployment, lack of housing, and sporadic violence, which have directly affected all aspects of society.

The corruption manifested by the military regime since independence has created an environment in which it is difficult for civilians to participate in the political and economic systems of the country. In the absence of democratic legitimacy of the political regime, laws have little force and regulatory provisions that might otherwise serve to protect the public and private property are essentially unimportant. Rather, decision makers seem to treat them as if they were expressions of their own personal rights. Corruption has become the norm in Algerian society. This chapter, then, examines the behaviour of bureaucrats, and how their activities affect the country's economic system. Key officials have apparently come to use public funds for their own purposes, and to maintain their domination over the population. It is a pattern well-known to Africans, in which:

...bureaucrats attempt to increase their level of compensation by lobbying lawmakers from the military class and politicians and by engaging in other activities to influence the political system and maximise benefits accruing to them.³⁴

Chapter six analyses the interaction of political parties, governance and human rights violations. The main focus of the chapter is the qualified role of political parties, including the FLN as the single party before 1989, and their causal relationship to the violence that has periodically overtaken the country. The FLN has served as the political face of the military regime since the revolutionary era; by national charter, it became part of the military regime headed by Boumédiène, and then by the French Officers. The FLN was the only political party formally part of Algerian politics for decades. Members of opposition parties that challenged “the Revolutionary Party” ran the risk of being arrested, killed or sent into exile.³⁵

The military regime's overt and repeated violation of human rights, especially during the 1990s, have been publicly decried by humanitarian organisations outside the country, although virtually all of the Algerian political parties have preferred to remain silent on this

³⁴ John Mukum Mbaku, “Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups”, *Cato Journal*, 16, No. 1, See. <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-6.html>> .

³⁵ Bouragaa L., *Chaahid 'ala Ightiyaal al-thawarah*, Ed. 2 (Algiers: Daar al-Umma lissinaa wa al-Nasher wa al-Tawzee, 8 Oct. 2000), pp 26-71.

subject, especially after the early 1990s. Some of them clearly supported the 1991 military *coup* and its operations against civilians in the cities and villages. Algerian parties have always been weak; they have had little legitimacy, and most of them were formed by the military intelligence services. Moreover, Algeria had no parliament during Boumédiène's period. A "revolutionary council" served in that role. This council was dominated by French Officers, particularly after the death of Boumédiène in 1978. By the time of the presidency of Benjedid, and after a secret military agency was created by Boumédiène to serve as protection for him and his regime, the French Officers came to dominate most of the highest positions in the country, including military, political and economic positions.

With the Constitution of 1989, which was developed after a violent demonstration in Algiers on October 5, 1988 that resulted in several hundred civilian deaths, a majority of them young, the single party system was ended, and over fifty political organisations emerged to be involved in the political competition of 1990-91. The military *coup* a year later, in January 1992, quickly ended the young democracy. Military intervention immediately suppressed the election results, after a majority of the seats in the parliament had gone to the Islamists. They had been represented by FIS in the first round of the legislative elections. The military argued that they had secured the country against what they called "extremist fundamentalists."³⁶ The military *coup* effectively ended political rights and the right of free speech, while bringing the country under a state of emergency and martial law, which cancelled the laws of the country and suspended the Constitution.

Algeria's civil society, then, is very weak, and its political parties are divided and unpopular, most of them having been created just a year before the 1992 *coup*. The parties that had strong popular voices were destroyed or seriously undermined, including the FIS, FFS and the FLN, whose leadership rejected the *coup* and subsequent civil war in Algeria. According to Cavatorta:

...the civil war that affected Algeria was largely interpreted as the inevitable outcome of the confrontation between the secular and liberal values of many within Algerian society and the inherent anti-democratic and violent nature of political Islam.³⁷

Scholars and some of the participants in this research have held contrasting views regarding the political system of Algeria. The single party, which was the political face of a military authoritarian regime, failed to address the protracted crisis in Algeria. This failure

³⁶ Nazzar Khaled, *Mémoires du Général Khaled* (Algiers: Chihab Editions, 2000), pp: 215-258.

³⁷ Francesco Cavatorta Alternative Lessons from the 'Algerian Scenario,' *Perspective on Terrorism*, II, Issue 1 (January 2008), pp. 7-8.

appears to have been largely due to the regime's lack of legitimacy. Scandals resulting from corruption have been linked to the violence that has beset Algeria since independence. When the multi-party system was launched in the elections of 1989, which were supported by the army, ostensibly because it wished to cease exercising its political role, the incoherence of the political system consequently led to a crisis of violence, which has persisted ever since. Former Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche noted that the multi-party system in Algeria has not proceeded in the way that the regime had wanted and had previously planned:

...they hoped to lead a transition like that which had taken place in the Eastern European countries. But the enormous electoral victories of an Islamist party (FIS) in June 1990 (municipal elections) and in December 1991 (legislative elections) frightened the hardliners, who deprived the Islamists of their electoral victory. Since then, the multi-party system does not assure the participation of the population in the institutions of the state but serves only as a democratic façade for a regime that refuses electoral alternation.³⁸

It is worthwhile to note that this political system was new to Algerians and was practiced just for a short time, beginning in 1990 and effectively ending with the *coup* of January 1992. Since this time, there has been no real political opposition from political or humanitarian organisations in the parliament. Such opposition groups have chosen to express their views from exile in Europe and the US. Moreover, key elements of democracy, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, have been denied by executive orders under the state of emergency that the military declared after the *coup* of January 1992. Since then, the military has dominated virtually all sectors of political power. They have changed presidents and governments, consulting neither with their citizens, their political parties, nor even with nationally-known personalities. The recently established political parties appear to be tools in the hands of the military: the only tangible role that they are apparently playing is legitimizing the authoritarianism and the hegemony of the military.

Chapter six, then, addresses the role played by the political parties to transfer power peacefully to the Algerians after the French colonial era. Why did the peaceful transition from the single-party to multi-party system fail, despite the series of elections that Algerians held during the 1990s? In Algeria, it was the military that established the state. The driving factor in this was a single party, the FLN, which was established back in the revolutionary era when a group of revolutionaries formed a party, the National Liberation Front, in November

³⁸ Quoted in: Addi, L., *The Multi-party system in Algeria*, See the Website: <http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf>.

1954, and then added a military wing, the “National Liberation Army.” Both of these entities became political parties and have essentially played the same role ever since.

Abane Ramdane, the leader of the Coordinating Committee and one of the key figures in the Algerian Revolution, was unsuccessful in his call for the separation of the military from the politics, which he made before the Soummam Congress on 20 August 1956. The assassination of Ramdane in Marrakech in December 1957 assured the victory of the military in taking power from civil society.³⁹ Since independence, the military have been the main source of political change in the Algerian bureaucracy, the political parties, the government and even in the presidency.⁴⁰ Of the seven presidents since independence, five of them have had a military background. Ministers of government have tended to be former (and even acting) military officers. The military authorities have tended to hand over power to the same faces. Senior officers, as they move up in rank, assume progressively more important public offices.

5. Methodology

The research for this project is comprised of primary and secondary sources. First, it examines through, elite interviews, the perceptions of ex-patriot members of the Algerian political elite, mostly regarding the Algerian military and pays special attention to perceptions of the intervention in the 1990s. Second, it examines secondary resources, including the United Nations Charter, United Nations Human Rights Conventions, academic studies and reports of non-governmental organisations, and media reports,⁴¹ to clarify and contextualize the elite perceptions.

I have used the following research methodologies: historical analysis, elite interviews, and discourse analysis. All of these are set in a larger approach to understanding Algerian politics and crises: the case study approach, with an implicit comparative analysis, as is typical in comparative politics. Set out below is an explanation of how I have employed each of these research methodologies in my thesis. Following that is a summary of how I have analysed political and legal material, and a description of how I have applied theory to the case study of Algeria.

³⁹ Sidhum, Salah Eddine, personal interview, Algiers, August 2009. See Addi Lahouari, Aljazeera TV.

⁴⁰ Nazzar Khalid, personal interview by French TVs, TF1, TV5 and ChannelPlus, in a program, “The New History of Algeria,” 1998.

⁴¹ The sources of material for this thesis are discussed further in the final paragraphs of the methodology, under the heading, “Source Documentation”.

5.1. Historical Analysis

I begin with an historical review that forms the basis of my analysis. This part of my research clarifies the formation of the Algerian military since the time of the resistance against the French occupation of Algeria. To understand what happened historically it is necessary to explain why it happened. Historians tend to have contrasting explanations in their analyses. This study relies heavily on the many interviews that I conducted with members of the political elite, including those who were part of various Algerian political transformations, better to understand how the military was formed, and why it engaged institutionally in such massive violations. I have reviewed and analysed the opinions of the interviewees with what scholars have written in relation to my subject. There is a practical, if admittedly somewhat idealistic, side to my analysis. If fundamental misunderstandings are more fully clarified, this may help Algerians to end the violence through dialogue and democratic behaviour, even barring the support of the international communities and human rights organisations.

This part of my thesis focuses on three key interrelated historical questions and concerns: First, what is the effect of colonialism on Algeria, its global implications and, ultimately, the interaction between colonialism and human rights violations in Algeria? Second, what is the relationship between the past, in the context of the paradigm of colonialism, and the present, with its reigning paradigm of globalisation? I compare these two different paradigms and will analyse the links between them, especially in relation to the effects on national identity and culture. Third, I analyse the effects of post-colonialism on subject nations, especially in relation to its effects on the struggle for human rights. I proceed via a definitive account of the history of human rights told from the perspective of those struggling to obtain them. Using a focus on industrialisation, war, national self-determination, and globalisation as lenses through which to look at their evolution, this study will attempt to bring both a historical context and conceptual insight to modern debates about the role of human rights in a multicultural world.

5.2. Qualitative Elite Interviews

The main research component of this project is based on nearly two dozen elite interviews that sought to explore the Algerian military and its role into the human rights violations, especially in the 1990s. These research interviews were conducted between May and October 2009, with key politicians from different political parties and humanitarian organisations in Algeria. Key retired military officers were also interviewed, providing

alternative perspectives. The analysis seeks to compensate for an obvious shortcoming: each of the interviewees expressed opinions, rather than objective analysis; the analysis of these opinions represents my attempt, however imperfect, to construct an objective analysis.

There are many different established interview methods that can be useful to achieve the data that I sought. According to McNamara (1999), “Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a participant’s experiences”.⁴² There are four types of interviews: informal, conversational interviews; the general interview guided approach; standardized, open-ended interviews; and closed, fixed-response interviews. However, the types of interviews most useful for this research were “open-ended” interviews. This kind of interview provides the richest source of information. It is useful in probing for clarity and additional information. Nevertheless, “probing for clarity is often a matter of asking for a more specific response, or an explanation.”⁴³ This, in turn, often redirects our understanding of a political question, and then clarifies it. There are three broad categories of interview methods that differ primarily in the extent to which they are “standardised”, and whether or not the interviews take place in an individual or a group setting. These fundamental types of research interviews are structured, semi-structured and unstructured.⁴⁴ These distinct interview methods are in-depth qualitative interviews.⁴⁵ My research interview methodology focused on structured interviews, standardised questions directed to some interviewees and, where necessary, more specific questions to others, depending on their works and backgrounds as related to my questions.⁴⁶ My questions and process were submitted for approval to the Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of the University of Waikato, and received a rigorous review. The questions are attached in Appendix 8.

⁴² “General Guidelines for Conducting Research Interviews,” Carter McNamara, Authenticity Consulting, LLC., <<http://managementhelp.org/businessresearch/interviews.htm>>

⁴³ This section is adapted from “Introduction to Interviewing: University of Illinois Survey Research Laboratory mimeograph”, 1982.

⁴⁴ The structured interviews are, according to Paul Gill, “verbally administered questionnaires, in which a list of predetermined questions are asked, with little or no variation and with no scope for follow-up questions to responses that warrant further elaboration.” See: Gill, P. K. Stewart, E. Treasure and B. Chadwick, “Methods of data collection in qualitative research: interviews and focus groups”, *British Dental Journal*, Volume 204, No. 6, March 22, 2008.

⁴⁵ James K. Doyle, Chapter 11.

⁴⁶ My interviews were managed in two ways. The first was through formal letters with standardised questions sent to key people. Interviewees chosen for this interview type were university professors, authors and journalists, including politicians who would only agree to respond to my questions in writing and to send me their answers. The other method was ‘face-to-face’ interviews, using open-ended questions, the answers to which were recorded and transcribed. Some of the interviewees declined to be recorded and accepted only the taking of notes by hand. The factual data that emerged from these interviews was helpful in my analysis. The ‘face-to-face’ method represented a type of informal conversation, and interviewees were relaxed and apparently comfortable in their responses. However, standard questions gave interviewees a clear understanding of the study direction and area of my research. Conversational interviews helped me to explore additional matters relevant to my study. See: Appendix 8, “Interview Questions”.

Bias⁴⁷ is an important concern in social science research if only because its manifest presence generally leads to inaccurate estimates.⁴⁸ According to Boehmke, “selection bias occurs when the presence of observations in the sample depends on the value of the variable of interest.”⁴⁹ Boehmke argues that researchers should take special care to design their studies in ways that mitigate nonrandom selection. I tried to remain normatively neutral to the responses that I received from my interviewees. As noted above, the participants were not chosen randomly, but rather from three groups thought to be capable of providing quality primary and secondary information. Additionally, I sent out more than one hundred emails to key figures requesting face-to-face, phone or skype interviews, and even occasionally requested written responses as witnesses or opinion leaders. Unfortunately, I received relatively few responses from these e-mail communications. I discovered that the only people likely to provide quality information on this difficult and dangerous subject were those prominent exiles living in Europe and the US, most of whom were strongly disposed to criticise the military regime. In the end, I could not gain a response from a single prominent exile (or, for that matter, official within Algeria) who would provide information in support of the military regime.

I succeeded in conducting several informal interviews with officials working at the time for either the military or occupying relatively senior positions in the Algerian administration. Their responses were close to those of the prominent exiles in condemning official crimes, massacres and corruption in the past. Moreover, because I could not reach the leaders of the current regime, I had to rely on media interviews, such as those of French TV with General Khalid Nezzar, Prime Minister Belaid Abdessalam, and the DRS’s official outlet and daily newspaper, *El-Nahar*, with President Anis Rahmani. Bias in the responses of these sources, and in my inclusion of these responses, was, at times, unavoidable.

5.3. Discourse Analysis

I have used discourse analysis of the discursive strategies employed by the military and their representatives in power to clarify the debate over the role that government has played in Algeria. This method, as applied to this research, focuses on the problematic

⁴⁷ One of the external examiners, Professor George Joffe, mentioned in his report his concern with bias and the inclusion of “moral judgments” that were, perhaps, unavoidable in parts of this thesis.

⁴⁸ Frederick J. Boehmke, “Selection Bias,” *the sage research methods*, date: 2004 | DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412950589>.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* See: Torsten Wilholt, “Bias and values in scientific research”, the original article is forthcoming in *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* and will be available at <<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00393681>>.

involving assignment of responsibility regarding rampant human rights violations in Algeria. It highlights the role of *discourse* in understanding this problem. It should be noted that the case of Algeria is rich and complex; it cannot easily be reduced to a single, grand explanatory variable, although the reader will note that I have done my best to do so. Any effort to argue economics, or class structure, or cultural values to an explanatory account for all of the major moments in Algeria's political trajectory is bound to be artificial. An emphasis on discourse analysis provides depth in exploring the pattern of the development of protracted human rights violations. Culture, social structure, the economy, and the political institutions are, of course, all contributing factors. Additionally, by consciously comparing the Algerian case to others, I have been able to generate insights that further clarify the Algerian experience.

In a valid, albeit circular fashion, a discourse analysis of the Algerian case has also revealed insights into the struggle for democracy in the Arab world. This is especially the case regarding the Algerian elections. It must be noted that my case study, independent Algeria, included at least ten elections involving the presidency, government and local councils during the ten years of crisis. Discourse analysis has also helped to uncover critical dimensions of the Algerian regime's protracted response to the democratic crisis, and how it dealt with this matter at both internal and external levels, in particular, when security issues became internationalised following the massacres of 1994-1995.

5.4. International humanitarian intervention: theory and practice

The massacres of civilians in Algeria in 1994-95 provided a significant impetus for the international community to intervene in the Algerian crisis. International humanitarian organisations, including the Human Rights Commission, noted that tens of thousands of Algerian civilians had been killed, and publicly lamented the lack of humanitarian intervention.⁵⁰ Legal actions, declarations by United Nations officials, and active support of Algerian human rights by NGOs, stand in stark contrast to the decision by France to exercise its veto power in the United Nations' Security Council to prevent international humanitarian intervention in Algeria in 1995.

⁵⁰ The rationales for political intervention to address human rights violations has encountered strong critics among scholars and politicians. Many academic and judicial scholars look to Humanitarian Intervention as a violation of state sovereignty, something protected by the international law. According to Kelly Kate Pease and David P. Forsythe, "The most fundamental principle of international law is state sovereignty, which is often misconstrued as national sovereignty" [Kelly Kate Pease and David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 290-314]. The Algerian regime has strongly rejected all suggestions of human rights intervention proposed by NGOs, for example, despite clear evidence of hundreds of massacres in small villages and cities since the coup d'état of 1992, and especially during the period of the High Commission of the State, when Algerians killed en masse, apparently (in some cases, at least) for no reason.

Regarding international humanitarian intervention, the legality of international intervention is explained well in the work of John Rawls,⁵¹ who concludes that “the right of a people to settle their own affairs without the intervention of foreign powers” is an international norm that state representatives would consent to if deprived of compelling information.⁵² Many social contract theorists, on the other hand, reject the collectivist assumptions of Rawls’ arguments, especially forceful in his work, *A Theory of Justice*. I have opted to examine the Algerian case from both perspectives– the views espoused by Rawls and by his opponents - and then explore humanitarian intervention in relation to non-humanitarian and self-interested international interventions, such as interventions which are based on the desire to pursue economic and political agendas, a practice that remains all-too-common among the powerful states.

My analysis also extends to the Islamists and Islamic rules and practices in relation to democracy and politics. Islamists in Algeria, as everywhere else in the Islamic world, have distinct ideas regarding the practice of religion, evident in their understanding of practices and political activities that are obligatory or forbidden, in their ideas regarding modernity, and especially in their conceptualisations of human rights and democracy. I have engaged with Muslim scholarship to a limited extent in examining what the West has sometimes called the ‘radicalism, fundamentalism and terrorism of Islamists.’⁵³

5.5. International humanitarian interventions after 9/11

My thesis briefly addresses the changes that have occurred in both the legal and political international climate since the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. From the Algerian perspective, the attacks of 9/11 have systemically changed the world. Simply stated, the concept of humanitarian intervention changed after 9/11. Some of the arguments formerly heard, *e.g.*, that only “disinterested” intervention is permissible, ring hollow as long as terrorism remains a serious security threat to the major

⁵¹ Rawls, J. *Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999) p. 378.

⁵² Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations - Human Rights and Intervention*, Revised edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) pp. 141-157; see also Wicclair, Mark R. “Rawls and the Principle of Non-Intervention”, in Smith, Elizabeth H. and Blocker, H. Gene (eds), *John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1982), pp. 289 – 308; also Beitz, Charles R. “Non-Intervention and Communal Integrity”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 9 (1980), pp. 385-391; there are many references related to this topic, including: Holzgrefe, J. L., Keohane, Robert O., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge University Press, 2003); and: Wheeler, Nicholas J., *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford University Press Inc. NY, 2000); Turton, David, *War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence* (Centre of interdisciplinary research on social stress, San Marino, 1997); and See Stanley, Hoffmann, Robert C. Johansen, James P. Sterba, Raimo, Vayrynen, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

⁵³ Dalacoura Keterina, *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East* (Cambridge University Press, USA, 2011); See: Sharma, D.P., *The New Terrorism: Islamist International* (S.B. Nangia, New Delhi, 2005).

powers. Whether the effects of 9/11 will make humanitarian intervention more or less likely remains to be seen, as the complex Libyan crisis has made clear. It is possible, moreover, that the “war on terror” could entirely eclipse humanitarian intervention as a defining feature of American, French, indeed all of Western foreign policy. It could lead, instead, to more interventions, which rather than being justified on humanitarian grounds, are justified on the need, for example, to remove the threat of terrorism and ‘weapons of mass destruction’. In my analysis, I have explored whether there are presently any signs within the international community that would indicate whether humanitarian intervention is likely to increase or decrease in the Algerian crisis, and whether such intervention would be justified on political, economic or military grounds.

Finally, through this research I have concluded that human rights violations, which have plagued the country since its inception, have been present throughout Algerian history, imbued with personalistic and uniquely opportunistic features. These changed the path of the Revolution and established the authority of an illegal and non-centralized leadership that forced people to accept it through the massive use of violence.⁵⁴ After independence, the military fashioned itself into an authoritarian regime, and dominated civil society under the direction of the French Officers, in what seemed to amount to a new colonial programme.

There is a subjective and frankly applied aspect to this research. The citizens of Algeria have paid a huge price in blood and wealth for their elusive independence. A thorough understanding of the problem, however, has a practical side: it can assist people to seek their rights, reject dictatorship for valid and intelligible reasons, and insist on a reasonable and civil society. The author of this research cannot help but to feel that there must be a demonstrable alternative to military dictatorship in Algeria, to protracted and extensive human rights violations, but in order to identify this alternative, we must understand the root causes of why it is that the Algerian military has turned against its own citizens.

In conclusion this study seeks to address a key question, and to identify an underlying dynamic. Military ethos and the impact of political elites on human rights violations are particularly appropriate foci in the case of Algeria. In my estimate, the intervention of the military in politics has resulted in a protracted dictatorship. This fundamental clash between the tenets of civil society and a military ethos has resulted in extreme human rights violations.

⁵⁴ Bouragaa Lakhdar, “L’affaire Z’biri. Les Hommes de Mokorno,” *La Nation Algerien Newspaper* [in French], [Tuesday 1 Novembre 2011], <http://www.lanation.info/L-affaire-Z-biri-Les-Hommes-de-Mokorno-par-Lakhdar-Bouragaa_a435.html>.

Ultimately, it may be that the weakness of political elites that encouraged the military, or rather a faction within the military, to dominate politics, and to rule the country according to their personal interests. This may substantially answer the central question, ‘why did the Algerian military turn against its own people?’ although the following pages will attempt a far broader explanation.

CHAPTER TWO

A BRIEF REVIEW OF ALGERIAN HISTORY

Introduction

The history of Algeria took place in the fertile coastal plain of North Africa, which is often called the Maghreb (or Maghrib). North Africa served as a transit region for people moving towards Europe or the Middle East. The region's inhabitants were thus deeply influenced by populations from other areas.⁵⁵ In fact, Algeria has been subject to a number of foreign invasions and has been affected by the influence of multiple civilizations. Phoenician traders settled on the Mediterranean coast in the first millennium, B.C. As ancient Numidia, Algeria became a Roman colony, part of what was called Mauretania Caesariensis, at the close of the Punic Wars (145 B.C.). Conquered by the Vandals around A.D. 440, it fell from a high state of civilization to virtual barbarism, from which it partly recovered after an invasion by Arabs in about 650. Christian during its Roman period, the indigenous Berbers were then converted to Islam. They fell under the control of the Ottoman Empire by 1536, after which Algeria was controlled by the Barbarousa brothers and then the Ottoman Khalif for about three centuries.

Most scholars who have written about Algerian history have focused on the Ottoman period, followed by the period of French colonialism, from 1830-1962. They have tended to begin their narratives by analyzing the revolt of Emir Abd al-Qadir in 1832. Others have taken as their starting point the seventh century invasions of the pre-*Hilaliennes*.⁵⁶ Regardless of where one begins an analysis of Algerian history, it is clear that Algeria has existed as a political and social entity for several millennia. This chapter seeks to provide a brief account of that history relevant to the thesis question, one that recognizes the socio-linguistic legacy of Algeria, and that provides some clarity regarding the relevant constituents of Algeria's unique social and cultural history.

A number of phases of Algerian history are briefly discussed in this chapter, with emphasis upon political and military resistance to foreign domination.⁵⁷ French absorption of Algeria in 1848 is, of course, centrally relevant. New laws under Louis Napoleon III that included full citizenship to Algerians opened doors for dozens of political parties and

⁵⁵ *A Brief History of Algeria*, See the web.

http://www.asaralo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=262:a-brief-history-of-algeria&catid=173:algeria&Itemid=3215.

⁵⁶ Al-Mili Mohammed, *Tareekh aljaza'ir fi al-Qadeem wa al-Hadeeth* (Algerian History: in the modern and classic history), Vol. 1-2, library of Algerian Civilization, 2004.

⁵⁷ Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000, A Short History*, Trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 2.

humanitarian organizations seeking basic human rights on behalf of Algerians. This chapter will touch on the more significant parties and organizations that formed in the face of the subsequent colonial politics and the military regimes that have dominated the country since.

This chapter will briefly take into account three eras that were the foundation of modern Algeria, starting from the Ottoman occupation, through to the Barbarousa brothers, the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, and the new generation of Muslim leadership, which emerged from within Algeria during World War I and grew to maturity during the 1920s and 1930s.⁵⁸ Various groups were formed in opposition to French rule, most notably the National Liberation Front (FLN), and the National Algerian Movement. The period that covers the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), in all its brutality and length, is central to this thesis as the most recent, and perhaps most important turning point in the country's history.

I. Algeria before the War or Independence

1. Introduction

Algeria has been subjected to many foreign invasions and has been affected by the influence of multiple civilizations. The most important part of Algerian history for this research, however, started with the French occupation of the country in 1830, when it was still a region that had been contested by Spanish troops and Turkish Ottomans. The French suddenly became interested in colonizing it, mostly for economic and geostrategic reasons. However, by the end of fifteenth century, following the Christian re-conquest of Andalusia in 1429, which had been occupied by Muslims since 711, the Spanish tried to protect their presence in the Mediterranean and North Africa. During the subsequent Spanish occupation of ports on the Algerian coast, the Algerian population of the harbour cities refused to be ruled by Christians, and sought the support of the Turkish Empire in the name of Islam. In 1518, when Algiers and several other ports were besieged by the Spaniards, the Ottoman Turks finally intervened. The temporary settlement with the Turks in Algiers which subsequently transpired did not include other regions on the Algerian coast, however. A number of wars consequently resulted. Aruj (or Baba Arouj), an Algerian leader who was killed in battle with the Spaniards in 1518, provided the reason whereby his younger brother,

⁵⁸ Benjamin Stora. *Algeria 1830-2000, A Short History* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001). See A Brief History of Algeria, See the web. <http://www.asaralo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=262:a-brief-history-of-algeria&catid=173:algeria&Itemid=3215 >

Khair-Eddine, was able to secure military aid from Selim I.⁵⁹ Together they drove out the Spaniards from most of their new territory, and prevented the coronation of Charles V in Algiers in 1541. Under Khair-Eddine's regency, Algiers became the center of Ottoman authority in the Maghrib, from which Tunis, Tripoli, and Tlemcen would be overcome, and Morocco's independence threatened.⁶⁰

Algeria was formally ruled by the Ottomans through a series of 'deys'.⁶¹ Because of its distance from Constantinople, the regency of Algiers was treated as an autonomous province. The assumption of power by the Ottomans in Algeria led to the installation of an elective monarchy and forms of government which ultimately affected Algeria deeply. The dey was chosen by local civilian, military, and pirate leaders to govern for life, and ruled with a high degree of autonomy from the Ottoman sultan.⁶² By the fifteenth century, Algiers was given the power to choose its dey, who then received the nomination of Constantinople.⁶³ Military Proconsuls of Africa, the "Sultans of Algiers", exerted their authority not only on the Mediterranean coastal area of Algeria, but on the Pashas of Tunisia and Tripolitaine.⁶⁴

Politics, the military, and the economy were all based on taxes that the Sultan's government forced citizens and farmers to pay. Piracy in the Mediterranean, and taxes on commercial ships, were the major incomes of the kingdom. Moreover, national and international businesses included trade and exchange, and both imports and exports were controlled by Jewish merchants, and especially by two Jewish families, the Busnach and Bacri,⁶⁵ who had built up a commercial empire that extended from Marseille to Alexandria, and ultimately came to control the finances of the Dey himself.⁶⁶ Additionally, the Bacri and Busnach families loaned money and arranged grain shipments to the Southern provinces of France, and later to Napoleon Bonaparte's armies in Italy and Spain. Bacri and Busnach did not press for reimbursement for their major expenditures until after the Napoleonic wars, by

⁵⁹ See M. Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830–1987* (1988); J. Ruedy, *Modern Algeria* (1991); Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954–1962* (1977, reprinted. 2006).

⁶⁰ Mahfoud. Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830–1987* (1988); Bennoune, M, *The making of contemporary Algeria 1830-1987*; Colonial upheavals and post-independence development (Cambridge Middle East Library, 1988), p. xii.

⁶¹ 'Dey' was the title given to the rulers of the Regency of Algiers (Algeria) under the Ottoman Empire from 1671 onwards. Twenty-nine *deys* held office from the establishment of the delicate until the French conquest; 14 of them were assassinated.

⁶² Bennoune, M. (1988); J. Ruedy (1991); A. Horne (1977).

⁶³ Bennoune, M. (1988).

⁶⁴ Abun-Nasr, Jamil M., *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period* (Cambridge University Press; 3 edition 1987).

⁶⁵ Belkacem Saadallah, *Abhaath wa Araa' fi Tarikh al-Jaza'ir* (Chapter: *Taamulat fi Tarikh al-Thawra*), Vol. 4, *Dar al-Ghareb al al-Islami*, pub. 1, 1996.

⁶⁶ Nikshoy C. Chatterji, *Muddle of the Middle East*, Volume 2, Pub. Abhinav, E-37 Hauz Khas, New Delhi, First Pub. 1973. p. 207.

which time they owed money to the Dey of Algiers, Khodja Husein. The French could not repay the debt, and Bacri and Busnach notified the Dey that they were dependent on French repayment to settle their own debts.⁶⁷

Thus, a private financial affair became an affair of state. Negotiations between the two nations broke down on 29 April 1827, when the Dey struck the French consul with a fan during an argument over the King of France's refusal to respond to his inquiries about the repayment of the debt. The Dey of Algiers insisted that no insult was aimed at the King of France, but the French responded with a military intervention. In mid-July, a French squadron arrived at Algiers and demanded an apology and a hundred-gun salute. The Dey refused these demands, and the French blockaded Algiers. Algerian forces responded by destroying French trading posts at Bône and La Calle. The Algerians and French were at a stalemate until 2 March 1830, when France's domestic politics became settled enough for the government to make an official decision on the matter. Charles X and the French admiralty decided to invade Algiers and occupy Algeria.⁶⁸

2. The French Invasion and the Algerian Resistance

Algeria was far different from other countries under European colonial rule at that time. Even distant India was ruled by the British through local leadership. In that case, all of the major administrative positions were held by ethnic Indians, who dealt directly with their own people in their official functions, including the provision of public services. The British, in this instance, demonstrated significantly more respect, and less belligerence, toward the Indian people than did the French toward the Algerians. The British, in fact, did not even occupy much of India. In the case of Algeria, repeated efforts at French settlement, as if Algeria were part of France, appeared to be designed to ensure that Algeria would forever serve as an extension of France across the Mediterranean, even more than a settlers' colony. Large numbers of Europeans were encouraged to move to Algeria, and to become farmers, shopkeepers, and administrators there. By the twentieth century, a fully articulated European society had taken root, one with an identity of its own.⁶⁹ The *Pieds noirs*' influence in Paris was such that Algeria was considered to be an integral part of metropolitan France, thereby

⁶⁷ Nikshoy C. Chatterji (1973); See also: Saadallah, B. (1996), p. 8.

⁶⁸ For a perspective on French colonialism in Algeria from the Algerian Nationalist point of view, see Saad-Allah, B *al-Haraka al-Wataniya* (al-Munadhamah al-Arabiya li al-Tarbiya wa al-Thaqafa wa al-Uloum, League of Arab States, Cairo, 1977), Vol.1-2; alternatively, for the French perspective, see Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem* (Australia: Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth, 1961).

⁶⁹ See William B. Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets, Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1988), p. 15.

assuring that settlement in Algeria would remain a good opportunity and an assured route to successful business investments.⁷⁰

On 16 May 1830, the French military therefore mobilized their forces, brought together a full range of military expertise and materiel, and prepared to invade Algiers.⁷¹ A few weeks later Algiers fell, and France's supreme military commander, Marshal Louis de Bourmont, took over, landing in Algeria on 14 June 1830,⁷² a few hundred meters from the Peninsula of Sidi Ferruch.⁷³ The Dey's treasury was in French hands, and the fort protecting Algiers finally fell, but not before the Dey had mined it. Three weeks after the capture of Algiers, the French sent a reconnaissance column to nearby cities. Blida (thirty miles south of Algiers) was attacked and almost wiped out. On 5 July 1830, the Algiers Governor, Dey Husayn, capitulated and presented to de Bourmont an act of surrender, officially marking the beginning of French colonial rule in Algeria.⁷⁴ Just 350 km East of Algiers, the Dey of Constantine, Ahmad Hajj, sought to solidify the Ottoman presence. From 1836 to 1837, he stoutly defended his city against the French.⁷⁵ The French invasion of Algeria had been planned well in advance, preying upon the manifest weakness of the Ottoman Empire. The French, for their part, harboured expansionist hopes of opening the long bridge to Africa and the Middle East in this extensive new era of "colonialism with a clear conscience".⁷⁶

The French army nevertheless faced strong resistance. Religious sects and social communities soon called for a holy war.⁷⁷ Although the revolution of July 1830 overthrew Charles X, the French maintained their expeditionary forces, adding another column to Médéa (Southwest of Algiers) in 1831. Subsequent resistance soon forced them to retreat back to Algiers. Indigenous leaders, such as Dey Ahmed in the East, and the old Marabout of the Qadriya of the Mahi Eddin sect in the West, mounted strong opposition. In the western Algeria, not far from Oran, Mahi Eddin's son (Abd al-Qadir) was selected leader (*Emir*) of

⁷⁰ William, B. Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets, Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1988); See Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000, A Short History* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001).

⁷¹ According to Stora, the fleet of French forces consisting of 35,000 men and 600 ships. See: Stora, B. (2001).

⁷² Abdelkader Aoujit, *The Algerian Novel and Colonial Discourse: Witnessing Différent* "Francophone cultures and Literatures," v. 58 (Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York, 2010), pp. 163-164.

⁷³ *Ibid.* Stora, B. (2001); See: "French invasion of 1830 shaped modern Algerian history": http://www.al-djazair.com/articles/The_Washington_Times_The_French_invasion_of_1830.pdf .

⁷⁴ For more information about this part of the history, see Stora B. (2001).

⁷⁵ Phillip C. Naylor, *France and Algeria A History of Decolonization and Transformation* (University Press of Florida, 2000), p. 6.

⁷⁶ Many historical scholars have mentioned the expression "colonialism with a clear conscience."

⁷⁷ The Algerians preached *Jihad* (holy war) against what they called "the infidel invaders". See Ibrahimi. Al-Bashir, *Min athaar albashir al-Ibrahimi* (Dar al-ghareb al-Islami, Beirut, 1997; gathered and presented by his son Ahmed Taleb al-Ibrahimi). Many websites mention Bashir's speeches, e.g.: <http://www.majala-koraan.net/index.php/fadakire/66-2008-10-19-21-19-01.html> .

the western resistance, which had begun in Mascara. The young leader, Emir Abd al-Qadir, quickly became a hero of Algerians, presenting himself as ‘the commander of the faith’, and using the principles of Islam while preaching Jihad. Abd al-Qadir became an inspiration for independent Algeria by creating, through military skills and astute diplomacy, a veritable state in western Algeria in the 1830s, seriously rivaling French territorial ambitions. In the Treaty of Tafna (1837), the French ultimately had to acknowledge his political authority.⁷⁸ Conflicting ambitions between the Algerian emirate and France eventually provoked yet another war that ended with Abd al-Qadir’s surrender in 1847.

In Algiers, the French high command had taken over the administration of the capital, and had decided to clear the country of Ottoman leaders and foreign sympathizers, forcing most of them to return to, or seek refuge in, Turkey. A docile group of ‘collaborating’ Jewish and Moorish merchants was nominated to relatively non-influential positions in the local Algiers municipal office, and soon indulged in gross corruption. A Moorish merchant was installed under French protection as “Dey Titteri”; the Arabs and Berbers in the city quickly revolted against him, and forced him to flee.⁷⁹

The relative status of the Algerians and the French settlers was complicated from the beginning. Under the Constitution of 1848, Algeria was officially declared to be a French territory. Algeria was divided into two sections, one civilian, and the other military. The civilian section was largely European, and centered on Algiers and the ports. The military section was situated in the countryside and was almost wholly native-born, Arabs and Berbers. Algeria was divided into three provinces, the Algerian natives were ruled through local chiefs recognized by the military governors, and these chiefs apparently ruled rather more liberally than the settlers would have preferred.⁸⁰ The rationalist ambitions of Emperor Louis Bonaparte, Napoleon III, for Algeria were evident in the Imperial Decree of 1857, which established a network of railways, and support for the Saint-Simonian socialist Prosper Enfantin’s plans to industrialise the region.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Danzinger: Abdelkader, a *Qadiriyya* leader, considered the struggle against the French to be a *jihad*. After his capitulation and incarceration, the French permitted the emir to live in exile, first in Bursa (Turkey) and then Damascus, where in 1860 he saved many Christians during sectarian violence. Subsequently, Napoleon III honored him in Paris.

⁷⁹ The Duc de Rovigo, Napoleon’s former Chief of Police, violated basic Muslim precepts of hospitality by executing two Muslim notables for whose safety he had made himself personally responsible: see Behr, E. (1961), pp. 14-17.

⁸⁰ James Heartfield, *The Death of the Subject Explained*, Chapter six, entitled “Algeria and the Defeat of French Humanism”, available from the website: <<http://www.marxists.org>>. See Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000, a Short History*, Translated by Jane Marie Todd (Cornell University press Ithaca and London, 2001), p 5.

⁸¹ Heartfield, J. *The Death of the Subject Explained*, Chapter six, entitled “Algeria and the Defeat of French Humanism”, available from the website: <http://www.marxists.org>.

On the other hand, the relationship between the Algerian locals (*al-Ahali*) and the French military regime in Algeria was very weak and quickly resulted in violence against the Algerian Muslims. The unexpected collapse of the Second Empire in the war with Prussia in 1870-1871 was welcomed by the French in Algeria, who had been confirmed republicans, and had been relegated by Napoleon III to settlers in an “Arab Kingdom”. This collapse, moreover, gave the Algerian public the opportunity to assume control over the central administration and local government in Algeria. However, the dreams of many Algerian Muslims of participation in a political system with equal rights and power sharing, as Napoleon had originally promised, were dashed. The power rested in the hands of a military regime, and was only occasionally transferred, if at all, to French immigrants. Local Muslims were excluded from political life, and according their history could not accept this clear discrimination. In an early revolt, the French military ruthlessly killed many of the Muslim civilians in Algiers and Kabilya, the latter governed by a Muslim leader, Ahmed el-Muqrani.

The French government refused to give el-Muqrani control over Bordj Bou Arréridj, as had been promised, and they rejected his offer to install another leader from the *pieds noirs*. El-Muqrani then revolted against the French with his army, holding out against the French until Bordj-Bou-Arréridj, with the assistance of his brother, Boumezreg, his cousin, El Hadj Bouzid, and Sheik El Haddad.⁸² Using his position and influence over the Rahmania brotherhood, El-Muqrani was able to overcome the dissension in his camp and retake Bordj-Bou-Arreridj. He was ultimately successful in his revolt, and the French army was forced to retreat to Algiers in defeat. Local Muslims strongly supported the revolt, and their numbers quickly grew, especially after the proclamation of *jihad* against the French by Sheikh Haddad and leaders of the Muslim community on April 8, 1871.⁸³

However, El-Muqrani was killed on 5 May 1871 at Taouraga. Under the command of his brother, Boumezreg, the uprising continued until 20 January 1872, when he was arrested by the French. The local Muslims in the region subsequently faced severe repression, discrimination, excessively high taxes, and a radically deteriorated quality of life.⁸⁴

⁸² Jamil Abunnasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987).

⁸³ J F Ade Ajayi, *Tarikh Afriqiya al'am: Al-Qarn at-tassi' acahr fi Afriqiya hatta thamaninatih* (UNESCO, 1987), p. 579.

⁸⁴ Naylor, Phillip C. (2000), p. 7-8; See also: Ageron, “De l’insurrection de 1871 au déclenchement de la guerre de Libération” (1954), Vol. 2 of *Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine* (Paris: PUF, 1979), pp. 429, 477–78.

3. French Rule in Algeria

The first colonial settlers established a specific definition of assimilation which never actually meant the assimilation of the colonised people, but rather focused on the expropriation of land. Napoleon III was one of the first French leaders who was seriously concerned about the Algerian crisis. In 1863, he passed a law aimed at “reconciling an intelligent, proud, warlike and agrarian race” in which it was stipulated, *inter alia*, that “France recognises the ownership by Arab tribes of territories of which they have permanent and traditional benefit”.⁸⁵ The settlers attempted to deny the history of the colonised peoples. The *senatus-consulte* of 1865 worked to expropriate land and deny the newly colonised peoples citizen status. This ‘article of special importance’, which followed the abrogation of the Cremieux decree, reads as follows:

The native born Muslim is a Frenchman; nevertheless, he will continue to be ruled by Muslim law. He can be admitted to the army and the navy. He can be appointed to civil posts in Algeria. He can, upon request, be admitted to French citizenship; but in this event he must be governed by the civil and political laws of France.⁸⁶

The French *senatus-consulte* of 1865 institutionalised this deprivation of full French citizenship; it subjected the colonised to French laws while explicitly denying them the political rights that would have been part of French citizenship.⁸⁷ According to Azzedine Haddour, “this fracture manifested itself at the disjunction between public citizenship and private identity, between family and life and the life of the nation, between past and present.”⁸⁸ Haddour noted that the French government had framed the citizenship regulation unfairly, dashing Algerians’ last hopes of reasonable treatment under French rule. Algerians had now been confined politically to very limited and private spheres of domestic and religious life, the sole remaining bases of their identity and cultural belonging. “That is, the political life of the nation forced the colonised to fall back on old cultural practices from a congealed past.”⁸⁹ The new ‘Algerian system’ came to resemble the future apartheid system of twentieth century South Africa. Haddour noted that:

⁸⁵ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (London: MacMillan London Ltd, 1977), p. 31.

⁸⁶ *Contemporary Jewish Record* - April 1945, “Palestine in the Changing Middle East - the Stateless People - Thomas Mann's "Joseph" - Anti-Semitism in Britain,” Bernard D. ; Hannah Arendt; Harold Rosenberg; George Orwell Weinryb, *The American Jewish Committee*, 1945, pp. 115-117.

⁸⁷ Azzedine Haddour, *A Colonial Myths: History and Narrative* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

⁸⁸ Haddour, A. (2000).

⁸⁹ See Memmi, A., *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (London: Souvenir Press, 1974), pp.111-112; and Fanon, F., *Toward the African Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1970), pp. 44 ff.

The ideology of assimilation foreclosed the possibility of a workable political project in colonial Algeria. In fact, this ideology put in place a regime of apartheid, characterised by its Manichaean violence, compartmentalizing and segregating the nation into a French Algeria - which enjoyed the rights of political citizenship - and native born Algerians, to which these rights were denied.⁹⁰

However, the French authorities continued to usurp individual human and property rights. They sold tens of thousands of hectares to settlers and even European countries, and practiced a systematic policy of higher taxes and lower return for agricultural products, which forced local farmers to give up their lands to pay for their mounting debts to the French government. The lands of Muslims Algerians, legally protected by the act of 1873, which was aimed specifically at preventing sub-division of land holdings, had major loopholes, and a wide variety of forms of corruption subsequently took hold throughout the country.⁹¹

The nature of the French colonial regime in Algeria and the theories of assimilation it promoted were thus determined by French colonial laws, especially the *senatus-consulte* of 1863 and 1865, and its underlying ideological function. According to Tocqueville,

...there are two ways to conquer a country, the first is to submit its inhabitants to dependency and rule over them directly or indirectly; such is the English rule in India. The second is to replace the indigenous people by the conquering race.⁹²

However, the patently uncivil relationship between the Muslim community and other (mostly settler) communities and the French government was apparently based upon racism, discrimination and routine deprivation of basic rights. Algerians could not meet publicly to discuss their issues in the community, nor even leave their home districts without permission from the French authorities. French state-sponsored racism kept Algerians at the bottom of society, relegating them to working as servants, or unskilled labourers and peasants, while only French citizens or other settlers were allowed to assume the skilled jobs and positions in social institutions. Muslims were required to obtain police clearance and French

⁹⁰ Haddour, A. (2000), p. 4.

⁹¹ There are many scandals that were reported at the time, such as the following cases, noted by Horne and mentioned by other scholars. For example: "near Mostaganem, a Jewish lawyer's clerk acquired 292 hectares, which had been tenanted by 513 indigenous Algerians, for no more than 20 francs. The cost imposed on the "vendors" somehow amounted to 11,000 francs, and they became the purchaser's labourers at starvation wages." For more details, see Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (London: MacMillan London Ltd, 1977), pp. 31-32; and, see Behr, E. (1961), pp. 14-29.

⁹² A. Tocqueville, quoted in H. Gourdon and J. R Henery-Lorcerie, 'Roman colonial et ideologie en Algerie', *Revue Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques*, II:I (1974), p. 34.

administrative authorization for any meaningful employment, clearances which, in practice, were never given.⁹³

The new emperor disliked the European settlers in Algeria because they had voted against his accession to power, and hence listened sympathetically to the complaints of native born Algerians regarding oppression and land-grabbing. Benjamin Stora noted that Napoleon III refused to inflict on the Arab population the fate that had befallen the Indians of North America, which he described as “an impossible and inhumane thing”.⁹⁴ Napoleon, after his visit to Algeria in 1860, became even more sympathetic with the plight of the Algerian Muslims, and soon implemented the ‘politics of the grand chiefs’ to deal with the Muslims directly through their traditional leaders. In 1863, during another trip of Algeria, he proclaimed that:

Algeria is not a colony...but an Arab kingdom...The natives and the colonists have an equal right to my protection and I am no less the Emperor of the Arabs than the Emperor of the French.⁹⁵

Nevertheless, discontent was rampant among the settlers, who tended to advocate simple attachment of the colony to France.⁹⁶ This discontent intensified as Napoleon III made his respect and sympathy for the Arab population ever more apparent, declaring publicly that he wanted to foster the prosperity of the “[Arab] race - intelligent, proud, warlike, and agrarian.”⁹⁷ He issued two decrees in 1863 affecting tribal structure, land tenure, and the legal status of Muslims in French Algeria, although his plans quickly began to unravel. French officials sympathetic to the settlers took much of the tribal land they surveyed into the public domain. Napoleon kept up his support for native born Algerians’ rights as a counter-balance to the fervently republican settlers.

⁹³ See Belkacem Saadallah, *Al-Haraka al-Wataniya Al-Jaza'irya* (Algerian National Movement) Vol 3 (Algiers: Institute of Social Sciences, University of Algiers, 1977); also, see: Horne A. (1977).

⁹⁴ See Benjamin Stora, *Algeria 1830-2000, a Short History*, Translated by Jane Marie Todd, Cornell University Press 2001, p.5

⁹⁵ Quoted in Stora, B. (2001). Most Algerian historical scholars note that French rule in Algeria was defined by the French conquest of Algeria, conducted against an Arab kingdom that had itself conquered the country earlier. Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte was not particularly interested in colonisation, liked the Saint Simonians, and especially *Enfantin père*, whom he greatly admired, and thought of Algeria as a special case. He also thought that the Arabs were a people worthy of interest. As he has been described, Bonaparte was a man of honour, thought that the July government had broken its word by not freeing the Emir, and that the republicans had done little better by extending his captivity. However, the Emir was freed soon after the elections that gave Napoleon the presidency of the Republic. He maintained a good relationship with Emir Abd al-Qadir, especially through some of the generals, and particularly his uncle, General Bonaparte, who had shown himself to be tolerant and respectful of Islam during the Egyptian expedition. See Anceau Eric , Tr. P.H., *Napoleon III and Abd el-Qadir*, See the website:

http://www.napoleon.org/en/reading_room/articles/files/471391.asp#informations.

⁹⁶ Stora, B. (2001), pp. 5-6.

⁹⁷ Stora, B. (2001). However, some historians discount his vision in this regard, preferring to see Napoleon III as an authoritarian but ineffectual leader who brought France into dubious, and ultimately and disastrous foreign military adventures.

Two laws voted by the Senate on 22 April 1863 and 14 July 1865, known as the ‘*Senatus-Consult*’, defended the native born Algerians’ land rights and granted native-born Algerians the right to citizenship. However, in their application, the *Senatus-Consult* ended up discriminating against Arabs and Berbers, the vast majority of native-born Algerians. In formalising land rights, the courts reduced traditional land-holdings precipitously.⁹⁸ Intended to facilitate the granting of citizenship by a ‘well-meaning Emperor’,⁹⁹ the second *Senatus-Consult* allowed Algerians to apply for French nationality, but only if they allowed their *Statut Personnel* to be French, thus subjecting themselves to French courts in such matters as marriage and inheritance.¹⁰⁰ In reality, the offer of citizenship amounted to little: the Muslims simply could not relinquish their religion and their cultural identity.¹⁰¹ The application procedure, especially, met with a generally hostile response from the Algerian Muslim population. Between 1865 and 1 November 1867 only 56 Muslims and 115 Jews applied.¹⁰² However, under the terms of the law, all Algerians were subjects of the Empire, and therefore subject to its taxes. Similarly, the education system, which had been opened to Algerians with the goal of assimilating them into French culture, taught only in the French language.

In 1870, Muslims chiefs saw the decree as heralding the dissolution of native born Algerian society, and openly declared that they would not accept “settler rules.” The colonists did not care, convinced that the Arabs no longer had the strength or the capacity to revolt.¹⁰³ Algerians in the military zone subsequently revolted. French repression was redoubled, and the ideal of *assimilation* was exposed as fundamentally misleading. Algerians were not being treated as equals with equal rights as the French settlers, but rather as inferiors to both the French and the other Europeans, all of whom enjoyed full rights. Stora noted that France’s aim was “to ensure the absolute and complete subjugation of the population to the

⁹⁸ Ministère de Justice Français, Archive des Cases de France Colonialisme en Algérie, See website : http://www.justice.gouv.fr/archives/_private/niveau%201/intro.htm .

Napoleon III had determined to halt the expansion of European settlement beyond the coastal zone and to restrict contact between Muslims and the colons, whom he considered to have a corrupting influence on the indigenous population. He envisioned a grand design for preserving most of Algeria for the Muslims by founding a royaume arabe (Arab kingdom) with himself as the *roi des Arabes* (king of the Arabs). See Charles Robert Ageron, Michael Brett, *Modern Algeria: a History from 1830 to the Present*, 9th Edition (London 1991), Pp. 37-46.

⁹⁹ Morsy M, *North Africa 1800-1900* (United Kingdom: Longman Group, January 1984), p.160.

¹⁰⁰ Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present* (London: Hurst and Company, 1990), p. 39.

¹⁰¹ Azzedine Haddour, A. *Colonial Myths: History and Narrative* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 5.

¹⁰² Magali Morsy, *North Africa 1800-1900: A Survey from the Nile Valley to the Atlantic* (Longman, 1984).

¹⁰³ Charles Robert Ageron, Michael Brett, *Modern Algeria: a History from 1830 to the Present*, 9th Edition (London, 1991), p. 46.

needs and interests of colonization.”¹⁰⁴ It became obvious that the colonised were ‘subjects’ not ‘citizens’ and were liable to special provisions: they were in effect restricted to the lowest economic and social classes in the colonial society, required to perform menial tasks, literally reduced to the status of slaves in their own homeland, with no standing in the courts, and subject to detention without due process.¹⁰⁵

The debates of the *corps législative* of 1870 favoured the institution of a civil regime because it seemed to be in the best interests of the European settlers and native born Algerians.¹⁰⁶ While the decree of June 1870 provided that the General Councils would be selected by Europeans, Jews, Arabs and Berbers, the right to vote for the latter two categories of people was in fact repealed by the decree of 28 December 1870 on the basis that it violated ‘the principle of public law by conferring the right of suffrage and candidature upon persons who were not native born Algerians or naturalized French citizens.’¹⁰⁷

French policy against Algerians changed every time the French authorities had a change in leadership in Algeria. Algerian Muslims had always fought for their identity, and now the French government suddenly accepted them as French subjects, if not citizens, if they had been born in Algeria.¹⁰⁸ The decree of Crémieux in effect granted French *citizenship* to Jews born in Algeria.¹⁰⁹ According to Azzedine Haddour, the Cremieux decree opened a wedge at the core of native-born Algerians, separating Arabs from Jews.

...It must be stressed that the liberal government which passed the Cremieux decree of 24 October 1870 granting citizenship to the indigenous Jews was essentially racist *vis a vis* the Arabs and Berbers. Whereas the decree of June 1870 allowed Europeans and Jews to select the Conseils généraux the decree of 28 December 1870 denied suffrage for the Arabs and Berbers in the basis that it violated the principle of public law by

¹⁰⁴ Stora, B. (2001), p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ Many sources have had referred to the Algerian society and the modernity that French authority want to practice in the country. See Stora, B. (2001), p. 6. See Charles Robert Ageron, Michael Brett, *Modern Algeria: a History from 1830 to the Present*, 9th Edition (London 1991); also see: Banoune, Mahfoud, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987* (Cambridge University Press, 1988).

¹⁰⁶ Confer, Vincent, *France and Algeria: The Problems of Civil and Political Reform, 1870-1920* (New York, Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 23.

¹⁰⁷ Confer, V. (1966), p. 7.

¹⁰⁸ Confer noted that “at the fall of the second Empire, the Muslim majority in Algeria remained only French subjects under the *senatus consulte* of 14 July 1865, and acquired neither citizenship nor most of the civil rights that pertained to that status.” see Confer, V. (1966), p. 7.

¹⁰⁹ What is important to stress here is that “at the fall of the second Empire, the Muslim majority in Algeria remained only French subjects under the *senatus consulte* of 14 July 1865, and acquired neither citizenship nor most of the civil rights that pertained to that status.”: see Confer Hamoumou, M. *Et ils sont devenue harkis* (Paris: Fayard, 1993), p. 7.

granting the right of suffrage and candidature upon persons who were not French.¹¹⁰

Following what appeared to be a concerted strategy of divide-and-rule, the French had, in effect, created a new category within Algerian society, consolidating a loyal intermediary layer of Jews between the Muslim natives and the French and European settlers, and had forced Muslims to choose between Islamic and French law.¹¹¹ The French had created a system that was, according to Governor General Gueydon, a 'serfdom of the natives'.¹¹² In 1865, the French Government had laid down the principles for the treatment of the native born Algerian population in Algeria regarding their citizenship and their relation to the mother country. Later, the Napoleonic code of 1881 had supplemented this with a special 'native code', which gave more rights to Muslims and Jews, including expanding their possible employment opportunities beyond the lowest and the most difficult jobs in society. This 1881 code revision also gave them significantly more freedom of movement in the country, and abolished the travel permit requirement.¹¹³ Despite the revision of the Napoleonic code, as far as the Muslims were concerned, the basic principles went unchanged until 1919, when they were altered only slightly.

French proposals for Algerian inclusion as part of France were summarily rejected by the French government, principally because the settlers' primary goal was the establishment of a 'good life' in Algeria, with virtually no regard for the wellbeing of the Muslim community. According to General Hanoteau, an officer of the *bureaux Arabs*: "What our settlers' dream of is a bourgeois feudalism in which they will be the lords and the natives the serfs".¹¹⁴ Algerian Jews tended to acquire French citizenship, and thereby came under the control of French authority, while Algerian Muslims consistently refused to be controlled

¹¹⁰ Azzedine Haddour, *Colonial Myths: History and Narrative* (Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 163; Audisio, *Sel de la mer*, pp.107, 113; Camus, *La culture indigene, la nouvelle culture mediterrannienne*, p. 1325 (noted by Haddour, A. (2000)).

¹¹¹ For more details about this decree see Contemporary Jewish Record - April 1945 Palestine in the Changing Middle East - the Stateless People - Thomas Mann's "Joseph" - Anti-Semitism in Britain, Bernard D.; Hannah Arendt; Harold Rosenberg; George Orwell Weinryb, The American Jewish Committee, 1945, pp. 115-117. The first article of the so-called Senatus-consulte of 1865, of special importance after the abrogation of the decree Cremieux, reads as follows: "The native born Algerians Muslim is a Frenchman; nevertheless, he will continue to be ruled by Muslim law. He can be admitted to the army and the navy. He can be appointed to civil posts in Algeria. He can, upon request, be admitted to French citizenship; but in this event he must be governed by the civil and political laws of France."

¹¹² In a letter to the Minister of the Interior, 1877, Magali Morsy, *North Africa, 1800-1900: a survey from the Nile Valley to the Atlantic* (Longman, 1984), p. 286.

¹¹³ See Contemporary Jewish Record - April 1945 Palestine in the Changing Middle East - the Stateless People - Thomas Mann's "Joseph" - Anti-Semitism in Britain, Bernard D. ; Hannah Arendt; Harold Rosenberg; George Orwell Weinryb, The American Jewish Committee, 1945.

¹¹⁴ Ageron, Charles, Robert, *Modern Algeria: a history from 1830 to the present* (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1991), p39

except by their own governors and Islamic law. Following charges of anti-Semitism lodged by Muslim politicians in the election of 1898, Governor Laferrière bent to the colonists' demands for autonomy, granting financial independence and the creation of an elected colonial assembly. Algeria became a 'small French Republic' in which "the voter's card became the title of nobility in this novel feudal system".¹¹⁵

4. The Algerian Political Resistance

Algerian resistance to French rule was continuous over the next century, and included peaceful legal pressures as well as periodic violent attacks on French troops by individuals and organised revolutionary groups. Organisations and political movements also pursued their objectives of attaining and guaranteeing human rights and political independence legally. These goals were pursued both within Algeria and also via international human rights movements. As discussed above, if the early-armed movement was organised by Abd al-Qadir, the earliest movement for political reform was, in fact, an integrationist group, made up of young Algerians. Its members were drawn from the small, liberal elite of well educated, middle-class *évolués* who demanded an opportunity to prove that they were French as well as Muslim.¹¹⁶

A number of political parties and humanitarian organisations were created in both Algeria and France, seeking basic human rights on behalf of Algerians who were dying every day either directly by the bullets and shrapnel of the French army, or as a result of illness and famine that occurred under the oppressive colonial economic system. In the face of the Muslim Algerians' suffering, the response of the French authorities was negative, authoritarian and, according to historians, humiliating.¹¹⁷

Many French leaders were concerned about protecting what they had gained in the colonisation of Algeria, and they did not want to lose ground in the face of claims that they had violated the basic rights of Muslims, although this was plainly evident at the time. They tried to enact a set of reforms to preserve the elite status of the French settlers in Algeria. In 1908, the French government, and its Prime Minister, George Clemenceau, received a strong request from Algerian Muslim leaders to end military conscription of Muslim Algerians. However, the request continued, if the State granted Muslims full citizenship, resistance to

¹¹⁵ Ageron C. R. (1991), p. 53.

¹¹⁶ Metz, Helen Chapan, ed. *Algeria: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).

¹¹⁷ It has been mentioned by many scholars in different sources, such as Belkacem Saadallah, *Al-Haraka al-Wataniya Al-Jaza'irya* (Algerian National Movement), Vol 3 (Algiers: Institute of Social Sciences, University of Algiers, 1977); Stora, B. *Algeria 1830-2000, A Short History*, 2001

conscription would be dropped.¹¹⁸ Demands for reform again intensified in 1911, when the Young Algerians called for an end to unequal taxation, advocated a broadening of the franchise, more schools, and protection of indigenous property. The Young Algerians added a significant voice to the reformist movement against French colonial policy that had begun in 1892, and this continued until the outbreak of World War I. Demands for preferential treatment for ‘the intellectual elements of the country’ were further strengthened by the significant role that Algerians played in WWI, where a great many fought and died for France. Clemenceau appointed reform-minded Charles Jonnart as Governor General of Algeria as the war came to a close. Reforms promulgated in 1919, and known collectively as the Jonnart Law, expanded the number of Muslims permitted to vote to about 425,000 from the total local population of over four million that time.¹¹⁹

The most popular Muslim leader in Algeria after the First World War was Emir Khaled Ibnu Hachim, grandson of Abd al-Qadir, an officer in the French army before entering politics and leading an Algerian political movement in late 1919 under the banner ‘Emir Khaled’.¹²⁰ He disagreed with members of the group over acceptance of the Jonnart Law. Some Young Algerians were willing to work within the framework set out by the reforms, but Emir Khaled, as he was known, continued to press for the complete Young Algerian program. He was able to win electoral victories in Algiers and to enliven political discourse with his calls for reform and full assimilation, but by 1923 he tired of the struggle and left Algeria, eventually retiring in Damascus.¹²¹

4.1. The Star of North Africa, the Federation of Elites and the Algerian Popular Union¹²²

Prior to 1930 there were two kinds of elite organisations operating in Algeria, the first of which was concerned with exploring the future relationship between Algeria and France, and the second, principally of the Muslim Reform Scholars, was concerned with the relationship between Algeria and the Arab and Islamic world. After 1930, two other political

¹¹⁸ Metz, H. C. (ed.), *Algeria: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress), 1994.

¹¹⁹ See: Saadallah, B. (1977); and Stora B. (2001); also: Metz, Helen Chapan (ed.), *Algeria: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).

¹²⁰ The main requests of Emir Khaled were: 1. to have Algerian representation in the French Parliament; 2. Cancel the special law against Algerians; 3. Equality in the French Military Services between French people and Algerians; 4. The right of Algerians to take all the civil and military positions in the country; 5. To practice the same law of education, which gave the compulsory study to the youth in the country; 6. freedom of press and movements; 7. to keep the Islamic Identity and culture for Algerians (this explains why historians have designated his followers as an *Islamic Movement*).

¹²¹ , Helen Chapin Metz (1994); Belkacem Saadallah, *Al-Haraka al-Wataniya Al-Jaza'irya* (Algerian National Movement), Vol 3 (Algiers: Institute of Social Sciences, University of Algiers, 1977).

¹²² The French name is: *Étoile Nord Africaine et La Fédération Des Élus et Union Populaire Algerienne* (UPA).

organisations were created, the first organised movement and widely known political group among Algerians, the Star of North Africa (*Étoile Nord Africaine*) and the Federation of Elites (*La Fédération Des Élités*). Their main objective was to attain basic human rights for Algerians from the French government.¹²³ In addition, there were many smaller organisations founded at this time, based around schools, universities and so forth. But these two particular organisations, discussed below, were the first real political parties that articulated the desires of the Algerian people.¹²⁴ It should be noted that the Star of North Africa eventually was replaced by the Algerian People's Party, or the PPA, discussed below. The Communist party, which had a greater base of support among the lower socio-economic groups in Algeria and France at that time, was also established during this period.¹²⁵

The Federation of Elites was an organisation established in 1930, which sought the right of equality with French citizens. The Federation was committed to achieving two distinct objectives. The first was to work with the French colonial rulers to obtain the rights of integration and equality.¹²⁶ In other words, the goal was to completely integrate all Algerian and European citizens as one society, with each citizen being given the same rights. The second objective was to ensure that the Muslim Algerians, within that integrated society, had the right to attend mosques, religious schools and maintain the Arabic language. Many conferences were held across Algeria from 1930-1936. In each conference, the issue of how Algerians could protect their religion and their culture under the French government was addressed.¹²⁷

The Star of North Africa began in Paris in the 1930s under the leadership of Dr. Mohamed Saleh ben Djalloul, and a pharmacist, Ferhat Abbas. The PPA came later and was established in Algeria. Their representatives, however, were from the upper classes, and included highly educated Algerians, mostly professionals such as journalists and lecturers. These representatives, which the French authorities assisted by providing them with money and positions in order to establish a bridge between the colonial rulers and the labour sector of the population in Algeria and France, worked with France to implement a comprehensive colonial reform proposal by Algerian Governor General, Maurice Violette. Unfortunately, the French Senate, sensitive as ever to pressures from Algerian Europeans, voted down the bill

¹²³ See Appendix 3: the tree of National movements since 1930s

¹²⁴ This observation was made by the French representative in Syria in 1931, as recorded in the *Journal of the UIMA*, November 1931, a copy of which is in the possession of the author.

¹²⁵ Belkacem Saadallah, Vol 3 (1977), p. 61.

¹²⁶ Saadallah, B. (1977); also: Gibson, C. Nigel, *Fanon: The Postcolonial Imagination (Key Contemporary Thinkers)* (Polity Press, July 7, 2003).

¹²⁷ Saadallah, B. (1977).

when it came before the National Assembly. Not long afterwards, the Popular Front and a new government took severe measures, by decree, to prevent “all disorder manifestations against French sovereignty, all active or passive resistance to the laws, decrees, regulations or order of the public authority”.¹²⁸ The failure of the Blum-Violette reforms was a serious blow to Abbas and his supporters.

Abbas’ political career began in 1934 with his election to office as Municipal Councillor of Sétif, as a member of the *Federation des Elutes Musulman*. In *Le Jeune Algerien*, a French newspaper published in Algeria, he clarified his position. He wrote, in his answer to the question of ‘what Nationalism really means’ that “it is the fight for our economic and political emancipation...we have once and for all swept away all dreams which France has achieved in this country.”¹²⁹ And he continued with his oft-quoted phrase:

...if I had discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I would not blush for it as a crime. Men who die for a patriotic ideal are honoured and respected. My life is not worth more than theirs. But I would not die for an Algerian fatherland because such a fatherland does not exist. I cannot find it. I questioned history. I questioned the living and the dead. I searched through the cemeteries: nobody could speak to me of it. You cannot build on air.¹³⁰

However, the the National Union of Algerian Youth (*Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne*-UNJA), soon emerged and launched its program among young Algerians at a time when Violette had started to mobilize French society, calling attention to the dangers of the Algerian political elites’ movements. He gave a memorable speech in the National Assembly, noting that:

These Muslims, when they protest, you become indignant; when they approve, you become suspicious; when they keep quiet, you become afraid. Gentlemen, these men have no political country of their own. They do not even claim their religious country. They crave to be admitted to your country. Should you refuse, you may well fear that they will soon create one.¹³¹

However, UNJA’s most important contribution during this period was the first successful Islamic conference held in 1936. It brought together intellectuals, religious scholars and politicians from across the political spectrum. The Islamic conference was established to return back the self-confidence of the elite members and to unite the various

¹²⁸ Saadallah B. (1977).

¹²⁹ Behr, E. (1961).

¹³⁰ See Behr, E. (1961), pp. 44-45.

¹³¹ Quoted in Behr, E. (1961).

groups that had arisen into one, united organisation that could press the French colonial rulers for the recognition of basic and universal human rights.¹³² In 1938, Abbas created a party called the Algerian Popular Union '*Union Populaire Algerienne*' (UPA), attracting moderates like himself who advocated political emancipation within the French framework. Even though Abbas and the French authority clashed from time to time, Abbas had not lost faith in France: when war broke out, he enlisted in the medical corps and, issued a romantic farewell to his political friends: "If I am killed, someone else will continue my task, *vive la France!*, *vive l'Algerie!*"¹³³

One of the objectives of the UPA was to bridge the gap that had appeared in Algeria between the young and old generations. The young generation had generally struggled to find quality education and employment, had very little French education and thus very little positive experience with France, and was in direct contrast to the older generation. The older Algerians, who had received their education in French schools, who had knowledge of the positive aspects of French humanism, and many of whom had respectable, professional jobs, were much more supportive of retaining ties with France than the younger generation. The attitude of the older generation is best summed up by Ben-el-Haj when he wrote that:

...before everything we are all French people, our Nation is Franceour religion has no intervention in our citizenship...I looked in the history and I couldn't find something named Algeria....¹³⁴

Thus, there was clearly a gap between the elites of the younger generation and those of the older generation. Neither group of elites could reach an agreement that could form the basis of a political party. This fundamental difference of opinion, based on different experiences, meant that both elites were destined to fail. Despite their differences, both groups respected the authority of Ben Badis who signed an agreement at the Islamic conference of 1936, on behalf of all the groups present, that they would support the implementation of the Violette Charter. That document would provide the right to gain French citizenship to those Algerians who studied in French schools and attained a certain level of education, meanwhile allowing them to retain Islam as their religion. The Violette Charter was a step forward in the sense that it guaranteed Algerians the right to retain Arabic as their language and Islam as their religion, to practice their culture and to retain the right to attend mosques for Islamic education, even if they wanted to apply for and obtain French

¹³² See Behr, E. (1961), p. 45; Stora B (2001), p. 19; Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the earth*, translated from French by Constance Farrington, Maggibbon and Kee (London, 1965), pp. 35-37.

¹³³ Behr E. (1961), p. 46.

¹³⁴ Saadallah, B. (1977).

citizenship. Although a step in the right direction, the right to apply for French citizenship under these conditions was not open to all Algerians – only those who were educated in French schools, and who attained a high level of education therein. The Algerian working class, therefore, was essentially excluded from the benefits that the Violette Charter.¹³⁵

Ben-Djalloul, the leader of the elites who had won the local elections of October 1934 in Constantine, received support from Abbas and the reformers of Constantine, including Ben Badis. Relying on this broad base of support, the movement protected its members from conflicts with the French colonisers, but it failed to reach its goals in the citizenship program according to the Charter of Blum–Viollette. Abbas, an important member in the national elite, had been very close to the French colonialists; more than that, he disagreed with anything associated with the word “Algeria”. He introduced himself as the French Representative and would accept nothing except the French flag in Algeria. According to Abbas, the civil war in the cities and the mountains of Algeria was a kind of internal problem that could happen anywhere in world.¹³⁶

After the Russian Revolution, the Algerian Communist Ahmed Messali Hadj began an underground struggle to build a revolutionary movement with the central goal of overthrowing French colonialism. He was the founder of the “*Mouvement National Algérien*,” an early Algerian nationalist group and rival of the “*Front de Libération Nationale*”. By the Second World War, Abbas, once a well-known Algerian social-democratic reformist became a Communist and joined with Hadj to build a militant workers party — *Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty*. In 1947, in the wake of the Second World War and fearful of nationalistic uprisings, the government established a parliamentary assembly in Algeria, made up of half European and Algerian delegates, with the purpose of upholding French colonial rule.¹³⁷

Before concluding this section it is important to note that within the groups mentioned above, there remained an ideological difference of opinion as to whether Algeria belonged to France, or whether Algeria, in fact, even existed.¹³⁸ This conflict was evident in the relationship between Abbas and Hadj. As Hadj organised the migrant labourers, Abbas

¹³⁵ Stora, B. (2001), pp 18-19; Belkacem Saadallah, *Abhaath wa Araa' fi tarikh el-Jaza'ir, Daar al-Ghareb al-Islami* (1996), pp. 141-148.

¹³⁶ Saadallah B. (1996), pp. 141-148.

¹³⁷ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (London: Macmillan London Limited, 1977); Stora, B. (2001).

¹³⁸ See Nelson H. D. (ed.), *Algeria* (4th ed. 1983); Mohammed Bennoune, *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830–1987* (1988); F. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth* (tr. 1988).

organised the middle class.¹³⁹ Abbas' moderate demands were based on his own intuition that there was no coherent national sentiment to awaken. He told *Entente* on 23 February 1936:

If I could find the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist, and I would not blush from it as a crime ... I will not die for the Algerian fatherland, because this fatherland does not exist¹⁴⁰

Hadj disagreed and in that same year *l'Étoile* organised mass demonstrations and published a manifesto demanding independence. The French Communist Party (PCF) attacked Hadj for playing into the settlers' hands by supporting their demands for secession. Without PCF support, *l'Étoile* was easily suppressed by Leon Blum's popular front government in January 1937.¹⁴¹

4.2. The Islamic Association of Algerian Scholars (AUMA), 1931

The Association of the Algerian Muslim Scholars (*Association des Uléma Musulmans Algériens*, or AUMA), was established in May 1931 in Algiers, but it was officially registered with the French authorities and was functioning legally by the end of 1920.¹⁴² Omar Ismail was the organiser who invited scholars and the leaders of Quranic schools to form the association. It brought together 72 Algerian scholars from across Algeria and from various schools of thought. The administrative board consisted of 13 members, and as a result of internal elections, Abdel-Hantomid Ben Badis was elected the head. Under the leadership of Ben Badis, the reformist AUMA organised and shared ideas with the religious scholars as a tactic in order to obtain legal agreement from the colonial authorities. It is important to note that the highest positions in the UPA were occupied by students of Ben Badis.

This religious organisation of scholars and students had a program to promote the purification of Islam in Algeria and a return to the Quran and Sunna (the tradition of the Prophet). Their slogan was: "Islam my religion, Arabic my Language and Algeria my Nation."¹⁴³ Their program was based on teaching the Islamic principles and the rules of Sharia as a foundation of social life.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Neil MacMaster, *Colonial migrants and racism: Algerians in France, 1900-62* (New York, Macmillan Press, 1997); Rabah, Issaoui, *Immigration and national identity: North African political movements in colonial and postcolonial France* (University of Michigan: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009).

¹⁴⁰ Jean-François Lyotard, *Political writings* (Translated by Bill Readings and kaven Paul Geiman) (Regents of the University of Minnesota, 1993), p. 293.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, and also: Horne, A. (1977).

¹⁴² For more details, see Saadallah, B. (1977); Stora, B. (2001).

¹⁴³ Martin Stone, *The agony of Algeria* (United Kingdom: C. Hurst and CO Ltd, 1997), p. 148.

¹⁴⁴ See *Islam and the Algerian State*, ch. 2.

The AUMA succeeded in mobilising Algerians into a strong support base. They were located primarily in the city of Constantine. They did not presume to engage in politics aside from furthering their teaching and disabusing Algerians of non-Islamic practices. Their role was formally limited to schools, mosques, and the teaching of religion and culture, and thus the French authorities welcomed and encouraged their activities.

Although their support was based in the Constantine region,¹⁴⁵ they presented themselves as the voice of Algeria in order to press effectively for their legitimate rights from the French government, which was based in Algiers. The AUMA soon chose to move to Algiers and received a strong response among the Muslim community there as well, with whom it had closer ties than did the other nationalist organisations. Ben Badis accepted the move to Algiers because of the need to be in close proximity to the central administration of the colonial authorities, as well as the practical need to be close to the organisation's sponsor, an old association that had been the basis for AUMA's creation, '*Nadi al-Taraqi*'. Along with this reform-based association, and under the leadership of Ben Badis, for the first time since the colonial invasion, the Algerian movement established a reform-orientated network, with many branches, independent schools and mosques for teaching and preaching in the cities and the smaller villages.¹⁴⁶ Despite this large number of branches, schools and mosques, however, and perhaps because the Islamic reformers had quickly gained popularity and influence, the French authorities refused their applications for permission to preach in official mosques.¹⁴⁷ The French authorities initially looked at Abbas as a good example for Algerians. Abbas's movement never believed that Algeria could be an independent country. Rather, they thought that Islam in Algeria could not survive without France. At the time, the opposition elite, led by Hadj, also looked to France for its ideological model, although Hadj's views did not allow for the possibility of Algerian independence. Abbas summed up the philosophy of the liberal integrationists, in opposition to the claims of the nationalists, when he denied in 1936 that Algeria had a separate identity. Ben Badis responded that he, too, had looked to the past and found that:

...this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not want to be France... [but] has its culture, its traditions and its characteristics, good or bad, like every other nation of the earth.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Constantine is the capital of the East, 500 km from Algiers. See, in this regard, Helen Chapan Metz (ed.) *Algeria: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).

¹⁴⁶ Belkacem Saadallah, *al-Haraka as-Watanyah al-Jaza'irya, 1930-1945*, vol.3, second ed. (Institute of Social Science, University of Algiers, 1977), pp. 61-76.

¹⁴⁷ Helen Chapan Metz (ed.), *Algeria: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).

¹⁴⁸ Quoted in Helen Chapan Metz (ed.), *Algeria: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).

In any case, the French authorities rejected any movement toward reform, whether instigated by integrationist or nationalist organisations. Because of this policy, the government in Paris was ultimately blamed for the political developments in Algeria. In the meantime, the French liberals saw evolution as the only possible route to diffusing political power in Algeria, and attacked Hadj as a demagogue and the AUMA for religious obscurantism. Helen Chapan Metz noted that:

...at all times, however, the French government was confronted by the monolithic intransigence of the leaders of the European community in Algeria in opposing any devolution of power to Muslims, even to basically pro-French sophisticated. The colons also had powerful allies in the National Assembly, the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the business community, and were strengthened in their resistance by their almost total control of the Algerian administration and police.¹⁴⁹

The tolerance of AUMA by the French colonial ministry in 1931 was based upon two factors: first, it filled the gap which had been created by the French authorities in the Arab villages when the movement of Emir Khaled, the Star of North Africa, was disestablished. Another factor may have been the strategy of Ben Badis, who played on both sides, sometimes with France via his family, which had good relations with the French government, and other times with the Algerian community as a scholar, developing a following around the country.¹⁵⁰

At a conference held in Algiers on 7 July 1936, for the first time in the history of Algeria since colonisation, Algerians became unified under one banner, demanding basic human rights for the Algerian community from the French government. The conference brought together different thinkers and parties with their different ideological backgrounds and ideas regarding their situation in relation to French colonialism. This meeting was supported by the wider Algerian community, which was in need of a united voice, a political defender of their rights, and a force capable of putting a stop to military conscription, which the French government had imposed on young Algerians.¹⁵¹

Ben Badis, by virtue of his personality and religious education, was respected by Algerians at all levels of society, and soon adopted a strategy of non-confrontation with the French government. Instead of meeting with their representatives and challenging them

¹⁴⁹ Helen Chapan Metz (1994).

¹⁵⁰ Belkacem Saadallah, *Abhaath wa Araa' fi Tarikh al-Jaza'ir (Chapter: Taamulat fi Tarikh al-Thawra)*, Vol. 4 (Beirut, Dar al-Ghareb al al-Islami, pub. 1, 1996); also: Horne, A. (1977).

¹⁵¹ Saidallah, B. (1977) .

directly, he chose to position himself as a 'mere' religious leader, confining himself to teaching the younger generation and resolving the association's problems within the rules of the religion, through the mosques and Quran schools (*Katateeb*). This approach ensured that Ben Badis and his association were kept apart from the struggle between Algerians and the French government. The French rulers did not see him as a threat, since he seemed only concerned with issues concerning religious education.¹⁵²

Unfortunately for the French, this approach was part of a deliberate strategy to ensure that Algerians would not forget their religion, or their country. Ben Badis was struggling against two equally destructive forces: the French rulers, who wanted to deny Algerians their basic human rights, and the Algerian leaders (such as Hadj and Abbas) who supported the continued rule of France over Algeria. On the other hand, the internal religious sects (such as Sufism and *Tourouqiyah*) were only concerned with practicing their religion, and avoided the question of who should govern Algeria. Ben Badis tried to convince Algerians that both paths were unsatisfactory. It was not until the 1936 conference in Algiers that the French Army began to become concerned with the true agenda of Ben Badis and his AUMA. At that conference, it became apparent that Ben Badis disagreed with the approach adopted by Hadj and Abbas. Hadj, who had said that he could not identify Algeria as a separate entity in history, received a terse response from Ben Badis who, in his article in *Shihab* Magazine wrote: "...if you have not seen it, I have seen it clearly from the earliest centuries and it has been strong by virtue of Islam, and it will be strong in the future..."¹⁵³

Ben Badis had refused France's demand for the support of Algerians against the Germans in World War I. At that time, he had considered revolting against the French Army occupation of Algeria, and using the opportunity provided by World War I to demand human rights for Algerians, in return for their support of France. Ben Badis ultimately died under suspicious circumstances in 1940.¹⁵⁴ In any event, France seems to have demanded the support of the Algerian community against their enemies. After a meeting in 1938, the AUMA decided by a majority of members (16 votes to 12) that it would not provide any support to France. With this decision, the AUMA association faced many difficulties, which made their work impossible, especially in the period between WWI and World War II. Internal conflicts developed among the AUMA's members after they were attacked by the French Army. Most of them were arrested or killed, and their subsequent clashes with other

¹⁵² Saidallah, B. (1977).

¹⁵³ For further details, see Saidallah, B. (1977).

¹⁵⁴ Many leaders in Algeria and some European countries have examined the circumstances surrounding the death of Ben Badis, and have suggested that he may have been killed by French authorities, who hid his death.

movements, particularly with the PPA, effectively separated them from the other elites.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, with all that had happened to the AUMA association, the *Etoile Nord Africain* (ENA) continued its struggle from Paris and Algiers, until Governor-General Lebeau obtained (without major difficulty) a decree from the *Front Populaire* government formally banning the ENA in 1937. On 27 August 1937, Hadj was arrested, along with five leaders of the PPA who had directed the organisation's relationship with France's enemies; Germany and Italy.¹⁵⁶

With the establishment of the Algerian Popular Front in France in 1936, there was a sense of expectation on the part of those Algerians who were seeking political change. It was thought that the climate would now be more favorable towards reform and that this would act as a spur for several different political strands to come together in the first Algerian Muslim Congress. These included the AUMA, the *Fédération des Elus Indigènes* (FEIA), as well as the Algerian Communist Party, which had initially been formed as an offshoot of the French Communist Party, but had achieved independent status in 1936. The ENA, with its radical nationalist agenda, was not included in this Congress, which presented a list of demands to the French Government that included guaranteeing equal rights for all Algerians, but without mentioning independence.¹⁵⁷ The French government responded to these with a decree, known later as the Blum–Viollette proposals.¹⁵⁸

The main thrust of the proposals was to extend French citizenship, with the political rights that this entailed, to about 25,000 Algerian Muslims, focusing on the most highly educated people, and certain categories of army personnel and civil servants, regardless of their religious beliefs. The proposals failed for a number of reasons. On the one hand, while some of the Algerian political elite welcomed them as a step forward, these proposals were too limited in scope to satisfy the growing demand for equality and did nothing to appease nationalist demands for independence. On the other hand, even the modest Blum–Viollette proposals were regarded as a major step forward, one which could give Algerians a first taste of independence. The European colonists and their settlers, the *pièds noirs*, demonstrated against the proposals and ultimately forced their withdrawal. In late 1939, the French authorities formally rejected the policy of assimilation and the exclusive insistence upon French culture as the only tolerated culture in the country.

¹⁵⁵ Stora, B. (2001), See Horne, A. (1977).

¹⁵⁶ Stora, B. (2001).

¹⁵⁷ Stora, B. (2001), see Saadallah (1977), p. 31.

¹⁵⁸ These proposals were named after the leaders of the council who launched these rules, the Prime Minister, Léon Blum, and the Minister of State for Algerian Affairs, Maurice Viollette.

Algerians were further angered by subsequent political changes. They merely confirmed that Algerians would never have the same rights as the French settlers. In 1943, Algerian notables issued a manifesto demanding a new status for Algeria. Hadj was consequently arrested by the French army and jailed in the high security Lambessa Prison in Batna (Southeast of Algiers). Soon thereafter, when he was transferred to the Sétif, he met with Abbas and agreed to a change of political tactics in dealing with the French authorities. He now included the possibility of struggling for independence. In 1944 a new movement, the Friends of the Manifesto and Freedom (*Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberte*, or AML) was recognized by the PPA. According to the PPA at the time:

...at the end of hostilities, Algeria will be set up as an Algerian state endowed with its own constitution, which will be elaborated by an Algerian constituent assembly, elected by universal suffrage by all the inhabitants of Algeria.¹⁵⁹

Abbas subsequently published the *Manifeste du peuple algérien* (Manifesto of the Algerian people, or MPA), demanding the implementation of the principle of self-determination and the creation of an autonomous (not independent) Algerian state. In May, the *Addendum au Manifeste* (Addendum to the Manifesto) included a demand for the sovereignty of the Algerian nation. The French government continued to favour its own very narrowly defined concept of selective ‘assimilation’ and Abbas and the nationalists therefore moved ahead with the AML. The first AML congress pronounced itself opposed to Algerian independence. By April 1945, the French were continuing to abuse human rights in Algeria, and Hadj was arrested and sent to the exile in the Congo Brazzaville. In the midst of this political crisis, a grave economic crisis hit Algeria, causing massive impoverishment and even famine in the countryside.

5. The Massacres of 8 May 1945

The 8th of May 1945 was a defining moment in the history of Algeria. The background to the events of that day, and its repercussions, ultimately defined the political future of the country. The capitulation of Nazi Germany put an end to the appalling cruelty of the war in Europe. While this date, for the Algerian communities of Sétif, Guelma and Kharrata, may have been comparable to other instances of European violence in the past, there was a profound political difference, and it is no exaggeration to regard the importance of this day for the overall direction of Algeria as central. Although it has largely been

¹⁵⁹ Quoted in Stora, B. (2001), p. 21.

undervalued, resigned to a place in history as merely an internal problem, or even little more than a civil clash, subsequent events have identified it as a turning point in the history of Algeria.¹⁶⁰

Lounis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, two major historians of the period, have divided the colonial war in Algeria into three parts.¹⁶¹ The first part began in 1830; the second dated from Sétif in May 1945; and the third part began in November 1954. In May 1945, scuffles broke out in Sétif which resulted in a violent French response with numerous casualties on both sides. This was followed by systematic massacres of Algerians perpetrated by French troops and the colonial militia. It should be noted that the indigenous population had only been allowed to engage in very limited gatherings, *viz.*, peaceful celebrations of the end of WWII. During the celebrations, an Algerian flag suddenly emerged. Furious, the police force intervened, seized some of the marchers (those who had raised the Algerian flag), and a scuffle broke out. Shots were fired, and a riot broke out that quickly spread beyond Sétif into several nearby communities, with significant casualties and property damage. The assessment of the damages is difficult to determine exactly even today, although it is certain that hundreds were initially killed and wounded, and that the level of French repression was significant.

Manfred Halpern gives an account of the events in which it is estimated that 100 Europeans, and 1500 Muslims were killed.¹⁶² As the riots spread from the Sétif area,¹⁶³ so did

¹⁶⁰ *Magazine de le Courrier, l'essentiel Autrement*, Charles Heimberg, "le 8 mai 1945: Europe, Algérie, d'une mémoire à l'autre," 17 mai, 2005 ; see the web. <http://www.lecourrier.ch>.

¹⁶¹ Lounis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, *Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'États* (Paris: La Découverte, 2001).

¹⁶² Halpern notes that the number of people who were killed in May 1945 could be higher than what has been listed by the French authorities. That said, even the figures provided by the French officials were inaccurate and contradictory among themselves. On June 9, M. Tixier, the French Minister of the Interior, released details over the Algerian radio: No more than 50,000, he said, participated in the uprising, which had caused the death of 88 Frenchmen, and the wounding of 150. During the countermeasures, 1,200-1,500 Muslims had been killed, and 2,400 arrested. One day later, on June 10, 1945, the prefect of the Department of Constantine declared that there were "...suggestions which lead to the belief that the repression was applied beyond measure, and that the number of deaths can be counted in the thousands. Such figures can only serve to argue against a generous and humane France, and if true, would dishonor the responsible authorities." According to other sources, there were 40,000 Muslim deaths. The prefect cited no exact figures and it is unknown how many people were killed or wounded during the repression. This is an essential point as it determines the way 'events' of this type were assessed and qualified. Not knowing exactly the number of victims allows all sorts of estimates and figures, either on the down side – such as the official figure given by the French authorities in 1946 of 1,165 people killed, or that of "about 1,500" given by Tixier in 1945. See JORF, 10 et 18 juillet 1945, Assemblée consultative provisoire, *Débats sur l'Algérie*. Even higher estimates (e.g., Foundation of 8 May 1945) put the figure between 45,000, and 80,000 people killed in the few months time following the month of May 1945, in Setif, Guelma and Karrata. See in this regard: the Algerian newspapers *El Moudjahid* (May 8, 2000), and *El Watan* (May 8, 2005). See also: Manfred Halpern, "The Algerian Uprising of 1945", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Apr., 1948), pp. 191-202. Moreover, "In Guelma, the victims accounted for 13.06 % of the adult male population – a quarter of the 25-45 age group." Peyroulou J.P., 2007. *Guelma 8 mai 1945. Une subversion européenne dans le département de Constantine. Algérie Française. Le système colonial à l'épreuve des réformes politiques et du*

the bloodshed. Algerian sources eventually estimated that the number of Algerians killed during the riots as more than 45,000,¹⁶⁴ as opposed to the more conservative French estimate of between 15,000 and 20,000. Regardless of the exact statistics, it is clear that these were mass killings. Most historians today regard the riots and subsequent violence as the prologue to the War of Independence in Algeria.¹⁶⁵ The massacres convinced most Algerians of the need for armed struggle, and the violence and repression primed them to accept the sacrifices that appeared to be necessary to achieve real emancipation for the country. This was not new. Since France had colonized Algeria in 1830, its systematic use of violence to maintain its colonial dominance never waned.¹⁶⁶ Even the author of *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville, noted that there were annoying demands “to which any people who will want to make war against the Arabs will be obliged to confront.”¹⁶⁷ He thus believed it was “of the highest importance not to let remain or raise any city in the fields of Abd al-Qadir,” and “to destroy all that resembles a permanent aggregation of population”.¹⁶⁸ It was thus seen widely as a peculiar war, but a war without mercy, and one which would have to be waged for a long time against most of the Algerian population.

The repression, led by the French Army, but also by European militias, was characterized by high levels of violence resulting in thousands of victims. What occurred during those few days after 8 May 1945 was some of the bloodiest repression in Algeria’s violent history. Significantly, the media was completely missing. The French, along with the other recently victorious European nations, were busy celebrating the end of WWII, and thus no French (or other European) newspapers deemed it necessary to send a special

nationalisme, Thèse de doctorat d’histoire sous la direction de Marc Olivier Baruch, 3 volumes, EHESS.

Peyrourou noted that in the rural areas of Guelma, most of the victims killed were tenant farmers working for French farm owners. The only children and women killed belonged to the families of those tenant farmers. Most of the murders were said to have taken place at Kef-el-Boumba, 4 kilometers north of Guelma, between May 10 and 19. The bodies were buried in common graves. In June, 1945, they were disinterred by the roads department under the orders of militiamen and burnt in a lime kiln belonging to Marcel Lavie and his son Louis, less than 2 kilometers away from Kef-el-Boumba. According to our calculations, 636 people went “missing”. Their bodies were said to have been burned at Héliopolis between early June and June 25 to ensure that Adrien Tixier, the home secretary, would not see them. This was regarded later as the destruction of evidence (Peyrourou, 2007).

¹⁶³ General Tubert, the head of an investigation mission which worked in Sétif in May 1945, advanced the figure of 5,000 people killed. Reggui M., *Les massacres de Guelma, une enquête sur les furies des milices coloniales*, foreword by Jean-Pierre Peyrourou (La découverte, 2006).

¹⁶⁴ Federation of 8 May 1945, Algerian Newspapers, *El Moudjahid* (May 8, 2000), and *El Watan* (May 8, 2005).

¹⁶⁵ This has been mentioned by others, including Stora, B. (2001), Horne A. (1977), Saadallah, B. (1977).

¹⁶⁶ Horne A. (1994) ; Saadallah, B (1977).

¹⁶⁷ Quoted in: Alix Hericord, *Libéral versus colonial, sortir de la contradiction ? Pour une étude positive de la proposition tocquevillienne d’une « colonisation naturelle* (Labyrinthe atelier interdisciplinaire, web : <http://labyrinthe.revues.org/index3423.html> >, pp. 29-40 ; Alexis, de Tocqueville, *voir notamment son Travail sur l’Algérie (1841) et son Voyage en Algérie (1846)* .

¹⁶⁸ De Tocqueville, *voir notamment son Travail sur l’Algérie (1841)* ; and his *Voyage en Algérie (1846)*. These texts and others are cited and commented on by Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, in *Colonization, extermination war and the colonial state*, Paris, Fayard, 2005, at 8 and 101.

correspondent to the Constantine area until long after the repression had ended. However, a wave of summary executions, massacres of civilians, bombardments of small villages by the navy and air force, and lesser human rights violations occurred. The historian Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer noted that:

...the only possible assertion is that the figure passes a centuple of the European losses and that it rests, in the memories of all, as the memory of a massacre, which marked this generation.¹⁶⁹

In Algeria, nothing could ever again be as it had been before the massacres of May 1945. The gap widened between the majority of Muslim Algerians and the European minority, and the conflict became entrenched in the hearts of the two sides. These events were indisputably the turning point. The power of collective action had failed throughout the colonial period, but on that day of 8 May 1945, a new generation was making its entrance, one that would make armed struggle an absolute principle. At the AML congress, the PPA took over. The nationalist leaders' original plan to seek autonomous status in federation with France was scrapped. The majority now opted for a separate state, united with the other Maghreb countries, proclaiming Hadj the undisputed leader of the Algerian people. The administration was aghast and pressed Abbas to dissociate himself from his partners.¹⁷⁰

Almost one year later, French authorities tried to approach Muslim Algerian leaders to gain their cooperation in covering up the events of 1945. Abbas was released from prison and he promptly proclaimed a new federal platform that he had drafted in his prison cell. He announced the formation of the Democrat Union of the Algerian Manifesto (*l'Union Démocrate du Manifeste Algérien*, or UDMA) as a new party. For his part, upon his release from five-year house arrest, Hadj returned to Algeria and formed the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (*Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques*, or the MTLD), which quickly drew supporters from a broad cross-section of society. Committed to unequivocal independence, the MTLD firmly opposed Abbas's proposal for federation. The PPA continued to operate, but clandestinely, always striving for an independent Arab and Islamic Algeria. The Special Organisation (*Organisation Spéciale*, OS) was created within the MTLD by Hocine Ait Ahmed in 1947 to create a new operational front after political protest through legal channels was suppressed by the authorities. Ait

¹⁶⁹ Quoted in Lounis Aggoun, Jean-Baptiste, *Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'Etats: histoire secrète de la guerre d'indépendance à la "troisième guerre" d'Algérie* (France: Découverte, 2005), p. 25, translated from French by the Author.

¹⁷⁰ Mohammed Harbi, "The world at war, Massacre in Algeria," *Le monde diplomatique*, weekly French Newspaper (May, 2005). See the Web <<http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/14algeria>>.

Ahmed was later succeeded as chief of the OS by Ahmed Ben Bella, one of the early Algerian nationalist leaders.¹⁷¹ Within a very few years the Algerian Revolution had begun in earnest.¹⁷²

6. The Outbreak of the Algerian Revolution, 1954

From the beginning of the Sétif uprising to the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion in 1954, Abbas and Hadj experienced political declines, primarily because after Sétif the Algerian population had lost hope in ‘solutions’ that involved the continued rule of France over Algeria. For some of the young religious students from the Ben Badis schools, it was a time of preparation to play a part in changing the situation that they had inherited from their parents. With the war, a new generation of Algerian Muslims had emerged. However, unlike Abbas, who came from a wealthy family and had grown up in an environment of bourgeois liberalism, and Hadj, who had spent his childhood in and around Paris, both of them having had a good education so that they were able to become practical, disciplined, and believers in the efficacy of collective organisation,¹⁷³ many other young Algerians had joined the French Army during the Second World War as volunteer soldiers, nurses and doctors. Some of them were killed fighting for the French, and most appeared to foster the single hope that the French government would eventually give them their rights. As the FLN leader Belkacem, who had fought bravely in the French Army in World War II, observed:

I never had a chance to know adolescence...I belong to the Algerian generation that passed from the total innocence of childhood into the maturity of man.¹⁷⁴

However, Belkacem and his fellow Algerians never imagined that the French authorities would reject them as citizens, and relegate them to nearly the status of slaves on their farms. Past violence and the new French policy, which was hardest on the poorest Algerian workers, ultimately seemed to have conditioned a group of young nationalists. In their early twenties in 1947 and shielding themselves behind the legal status of the MTLN, which was still headed by Hadj, this group of young nationalists conceived of the idea of creating a covert para-military organisation, so that they would be ready at any time to take action. The founders met secretly throughout 1947. The group had no single, recognized

¹⁷¹ Horne A. (1994).

¹⁷² Stora, B. (2001), p. 22.

¹⁷³ Stora, B. (2001).

¹⁷⁴ Quoted in Behr, E. *The Algerian Problem, a Penguin Special* (1961), p. 55.

leader, but its strongest personality was Ben Bella.¹⁷⁵ The other members were well educated and displayed great enthusiasm. They included Ait Ahmed,¹⁷⁶ Mohamed Boudiaf, a French army veteran, Lakhdar ben Tobal, a miller's son from Eastern Algeria, and Abdelhafidh Boussof, also of modest means. Because they had the same goals and interests, they were rapidly able to work together to raise a small clandestine army of around 500 men, and to put them through vigorous training without arousing French suspicions.¹⁷⁷ Because they were part of the MTLD party, they were able to gradually influence the centrist politicians of the MTLD. Hadj, the party leader, implicitly accepted and encouraged the concept of a paramilitary organisation without formally approving of it. As he became the most recognized political personality in Algeria, and very popular among the Algerian masses, the younger activists became increasingly impatient with his autocratic policies.¹⁷⁸

Thus, while the OS conducted preliminary operations, including an event in Mostaganem in 1949, these were limited, essentially exercises and preparation for a future revolution.¹⁷⁹ A few months later, in Oran, Ben Bella himself led a masked raid on the central Post Office (*La Grande Poste*) and, according to Behr, got away with more than three million francs, the first organized robbery in support of the Revolution. The French government was sufficiently worried after they became aware of the OS to appoint as new Governor-General of Algeria, in 1951, a former police director of Paris, Roger Léonard. In March 1952, after they had been captured and before they had been brought to trial, Ben Bella and another member of OS managed to escape from Blida prison and make their way to Cairo through Tunisia and France. With an Algerian liaison, they gradually rebuilt the OS network, which had been shattered by French police raids.¹⁸⁰

According to Ali Agouni, Hadj's friend and a leader of the PPA, most of the early fighters, who took initiative in the field and were among the first to open fire on the French Army, were from Hadj's party. While the MTLD continued its internal haggles in congresses and meetings, nine young men - *le Club des Neuf* - were preparing to get a solid organisation

¹⁷⁵ Ben Bella, who was 28 years-old in that time, was born in a small town near the border of Morocco, Marnia. Ben Bella had fought well with the French army in Italy, and was demobilized with the rank of sergeant-major (he died in Algeria in 2012).

¹⁷⁶ Ait Ahmed Hocine was a Kabyle jurist who had been involved in nationalist movements from his schooldays.

¹⁷⁷ Edward Behr, *the Algerian Problem* (Penguin Books, Australia, 1961), p. 57.

¹⁷⁸ For more details See Behr, E. (1961) p. 57.

¹⁷⁹ The event in Mostaganem, in 1949, involved an underground unit in Mostaganem dynamiting a monument of the nineteenth century Algerian hero, Abdelkader, just before it was due to be unveiled at an official French ceremony.

¹⁸⁰ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962* (1977), pp. 74-76; Edward Behr, *The Algerian Problem* (Penguin Books, Australia, 1961), pp. 57-58.

started.¹⁸¹ In March 1954, the *Club des Neuf* became the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (*Comité Révolutionnaire pour l'Unité et l'Action* CRUA). By July, the CRUA members were warned that a revolt was imminent. In September the CRUA members divided Algeria into six regions (*wilayas*), and selected commanders for each. Meanwhile, the MTLD had openly and permanently split. Some of its members remained with Hadj, while others were drawn into the new secret revolutionary movement.¹⁸² On 10 October the six interior chiefs of the CRUA met for the last time, deciding to start the revolt at midnight on the first of November 1954. The timing of the revolution against French authority was felt to be important to its success, and yet it was a difficult moment for the Algerians: it was winter and a French public holiday. Nevertheless, it was considered the best moment to initiate the revolt.¹⁸³

In Quandt's view, the Algerian revolution was anti-politics and anti-party. Like populists everywhere, these self-appointed fighters for their country's freedom saw themselves in a heroic light, sacrificing all for the people. Those who represented parties were seen as self-interested and divisive; they weakened the common will, playing into the hands of the French, who were skilled at divide-and-rule politics.¹⁸⁴ According to Quandt, if one examines the history of French colonisation of Algeria, one will understand that Algerians had been working diligently for reform in the political arena over the course of many years, and that this peaceful struggle might have ultimately been the decisive factor in eventually attaining their national independence had things worked out differently.

However, the more accurate interpretation of events may be that revolution in Algeria was the only option. The political processes had not brought the results that they had promised – years of creating political parties had resulted in few real material gains. Revolution, in this interpretation, was a last resort, one only undertaken after all other peaceful methods had failed, and prompted by the bloodshed that occurred in Sétif on 8 May 1945 and the days that followed.

¹⁸¹ This group of nine people gathered its members from the OS and the MTLD. They have remained largely anonymous in Algerian history. Six of them have been identified (Ben Boulaid, Didouche, Ben M'hidi, Boudiaf, Bitat, and Krim bel-Kasim). These members were either already in Algeria or returned there from the safety of Cairo. Khider, Ait Ahmed and Ben Bella remained in Cairo, with the task of obtaining Egyptian arms and financial support. By the time of Algerian Independence, Krim Belkacem was the only active survivor of this club of eight: four were under arrest and were later released (at Independence), and the other four were killed. See: Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-62* (Macmillan London Limited, 1977), pp. 76-77. See also: interview, Rachad, TV18/11/2010; and <http://video.rachad.org/>.

¹⁸² Rachad, interview with Agouni (2005), the Web. <http://video.rachad.org/>.

¹⁸³ It has been mentioned in sources as diverse as Horne, A. (1977), Behr, E. (1961) and Laroui, Abdallah, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

¹⁸⁴ William B. Quandt, *Between Ballots and Bullets, Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 1998).

In 1954, from within Hadj's MTLN, Algerian Muslims initiated a revolt against the French colonial administration. After an internecine conflict in Hadj's party between centralists in Algiers and local nationalists, the FLN emerged under the leadership of a group loyal to Hadj. This later divided into a political front, under the leadership of Ben Bella, and a military front, the National Liberation Army (ALN).¹⁸⁵ This latter armed group began to attack French police stations and other government offices in the Batna bases in the Constantine region. In the following months the revolt gradually spread to other parts of the country. The MTLN was reorganised into the Algerian Nationalist Movement, which, led by Hadj, unsuccessfully competed with—and at times fought against—the FLN.¹⁸⁶ Agouni, the President of the PPA, and Hadj's friend, clarified that Hadj had never opposed the revolution. He was, in fact, the first to affirm publicly that violence was the only way to attain Algerians' rights from the French colonial administration. However, the FLN needed a clear identity, one that could help it to prevail in achieving its goals.

Conflict among leaders of the old parties and the new youth organisations soon emerged and intensified after the revolution began. While many revolutionaries were arrested and executed by the French Army in raids at the end of 1954 and early 1955, Algerian political elites nevertheless continued to engage in their internal conflicts, which were especially evident between centralists and Hadj supporters.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, the AUMA Assembly¹⁸⁸ was worried about its lack of control over events, and was concerned at the direction that the struggle for Algerian rights was taking. It was especially concerned that the revolution might be diverted if the FLN became unduly influenced by other political groups and began to abandon the objective of Algerian independence via *jihad*. The AUMA only confirmed their full support of the FLN in January 1956, once it became apparent that the FLN had embraced the reformers' strategy of *jihad*.¹⁸⁹

The FLN relationship with the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) was also an issue that needed to be resolved if the FLN's goal of uniting all Algerian political parties into one strong organisation was to be achieved. The FLN received significant support from the

¹⁸⁵ Rachad TV interview with the PPA leader "Ali Agouni", 13 Novemebr 2010.

¹⁸⁶ See Stora, B. (2001), pp 57-60.

¹⁸⁷ Centralists: a majority group of former members of the central committee of the MTLN; the Messalists: a group who chose to support Messali Hadj. According to Ali Agouni, the conflict that was launched between centralists and Messalists was a major point of contention, and pushed the activist group of nine to speed up the preparations for initiation of the Revolution. See: Rachad, "TV interview with Ali Agouni, the president of the PPA and a close friend of Messali Hadj", November, 2010.

¹⁸⁸ Ulama Assembly: the religious reformist movement that championed the rebirth of Islamic identity in Algeria.

¹⁸⁹ Mohammed Harbi, *Aux origines du FLN: Le populisme révolutionnaire en Algérie*. (Paris: Bourgois, 1975).

AUMA and the centralists within the MTLD, except for Hadj, who controlled much of the countryside, and who was organising frequent attacks in the cities, initiating these from Algiers. The Communist Party, after a lengthy debate, was integrated into the ALN, the military arm of the FLN, in July 1956.¹⁹⁰

1955 was a difficult year for the French army. It faced a growing revolution, and found itself on the edge of a civil war with Algerian Muslims, a large part of the population who had nothing to lose, and everything to gain, in such a conflict. The FLN carried out more extensive attacks on the colonists in the eastern region in particular. The French responded with severe reprisals. The FLN aimed to achieve a unification of Algerian political parties, regardless of their particular agendas, and hoped to convert the old elites to their cause, so that there would be no opposition to their goals within the Algerian society..¹⁹¹ Indeed, the FLN ultimately achieved the primary goals of its original plan during the long years of the revolution. Unexpected events in its relationship with the older parties nearly caused the revolution to falter, however, especially after the Summam congress in 1956. The revolution had by then been taken up by the Algerian population, and was driven now more by popular participation than by political leadership.

II. The FLN Conferences and the Road to Independence

1. The Algerian Nationalists (FLN) and the Revolution of 1954

Algerians were fighting politically for their right to be free of discrimination in employment, education, land ownership and political and economic control of the country. A variety of administrative organisations had been created after 1919, when the French authorities declared that Algeria was constitutionally part of France. Unfortunately, this law provided for the absorption by France of Algerian land, but not of Algerians, who would not be considered, *per se*, as French citizens. The violence committed by the French Army, especially evident in the bloodshed of May, 1945, served to further polarize the European and the Algerian communities, despite numerous concessions that the French administration in Algeria had made towards the Algerians. As Ruedy notes:

...central government concessions to the Muslims had emboldened them to the point of insurrection and the latter, embittered by the low price France

¹⁹⁰ Stora, B. (2001); Horne, A. (1977).

¹⁹¹ Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN: Mirage et réalité--des origines à la prise du pouvoir, 1945- 1962* (Paris: Éditions Jeune Afrique, 1980). Stora, B. (2001).

attached to Algerian life, [were] more determined than ever to push for separation.¹⁹²

According to the revolutionary theorist, Frantz Fanon, colonialism not only expropriated the colonized, but it also appropriated their past in order to distort their history.¹⁹³ The French experience in Algeria confirmed the profound gap that existed between the two societies. The French apparently became convinced that native born Algerians were not quite human, and therefore that their application for human rights must ultimately be denied. Algerians had sought their full and equal rights over the previous hundred years, and had focused not necessarily on achieving national sovereignty, but rather on securing treatment as fellow human beings by the settlers. The French colonial practices pursued in Algeria had the ultimate goal of forcing the native born Algerian Muslims to break with, or at least weaken significantly, their attachment to their culture and religion, which the colonists believed were the main reasons behind Algerian underdevelopment.

In their reaction to the Algerians' aspirations for freedom and equality, the French establishment rejected the essence of their humanity. Faced with this worldview, the political movements in Algeria saw violence as the only workable strategy, the last resort in a seemingly endless crisis with the French government. The FLN saw itself as essentially forced into the open after the rapidly expanding war had taken thousands of lives, mostly of peasants and workers. Moreover, the colonial power had never demonstrated any concern about the loss of life of the Algerian Muslims. This was repeatedly demonstrated. The FLN consequently launched *al jihad*, practicing Islamic rules in forging an indigenous revolution, one that employed religion and culture in its struggle for freedom and national liberation. Their principles included the use of extreme violence against French troops and the destruction of the French economic infrastructure. The latter meant destroying, insofar as possible, factories and commercial bases. However, some revolutionaries resorted to sowing the same sort of terror among European civilians in Algeria as that which had been applied by the French Army against the Muslim villages. According to Islamic principles of war, it is forbidden to kill civilians, be they women, children, the elderly or unarmed. The massacres of August 20, 1955, were a major turning point in Algerian War of Independence. FLN attacks on civilians in various cities and villages in North Constantine had many critics among the intellectuals and Islamic scholars in Algeria, and drew strong criticism from the international

¹⁹² Ruedy, J. *Modern Algeria, the Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 150.

¹⁹³ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth, Penguin book, 1977), p. 169.

community. The French massacres of Muslims, before and after the FLN massacres, tended to legitimize this ‘mistake’ of the FLN, however. The French Army massacres of 1945, for example, which killed thousands of Algerian civilians in a few months,¹⁹⁴ underscored a protracted French security policy that was increasingly based on goals that looked very much like genocide; the eradication of Algerian Muslims from French ‘owned’ lands. This persisted well into the 1950s. Jacques Soustelle claimed that the FLN-led mobs that killed 123 people in August 1955, including 71 Europeans and several Muslim office holders, represented a legitimate response to French policies of the previous decades. In the consequent French revenge attacks, the FLN claimed that at least 12 000 Muslims died in a wild and indiscriminate reaction that involved police, troops and settler vigilantes.¹⁹⁵

Whatever the numbers of victims on both sides, Zighout Youcef, who had replaced Didouche Mourad as the leader of Willaya Two, achieved his apparent goal of moving the war to civilians, and between the two communities.¹⁹⁶ The French government increasingly recruited civilians, and incited revenge killings of native-born Algerians in cities and rural areas. They further intensified segregation and increased the hatred between the two peoples. Thus, most of the children of Algerian farmers were encouraged to join the revolution, if only to defend themselves and their families. The French Army was well practiced in violence. Perhaps the most brutal of the massacres were those of Philippeville in Skikda, and of Constantine. These served as unambiguous evidence of the French willingness to commit the most brutal sort of violence, in clear violation of international law. What was perhaps even worse was the subsequent denial of virtually all human rights, including the rights to investigation and redress of the murder of family members. In so doing, the French authorities, in essence, had denied Algerians even a semblance of a civil society, while depriving them of their fundamental rights and freedoms. James Heartfield and Sheffield Hallam note that:

If France had merely torn up the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as a public demonstration that would have been bad enough, but what they did was apparently even more destructive. They denied Algeria its freedom in the name of the Rights of Man. The republican sentiments of the revolution, universal in their aspiration, were tied down to the narrow and particular interests of French rule. What was truly human was debased into a narrowly chauvinistic ideology that

¹⁹⁴ Manfred Halpern, “The Algerian Uprising of 1945”, *Middle East Journal*, 2; No. 2 (1948), pp. 191-202.

¹⁹⁵ Ruedy John, *Modern Algeria, the Origins and Development of a Nation* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington Indianapolis, 1992), pp. 162-3.

¹⁹⁶ Ruedy, J. (1992).

denied the humanity of the Algerians, even as it pretended to represent all humanity. In Algeria, France debased humanism, and made it into a sham.¹⁹⁷

The French government ultimately denied the rights of the Algerian people to self-determination, despite the best attempts by the political left-wing and nationalist parties in Algeria and France to counter this. As the war became inevitable, the revolution began to organize itself, to consolidate its demands and objectives, and to unite its leaders at home and abroad through the principles that had been enshrined in the Soummam Charter, written in August 1956, when all of the revolutionary leaders from around the country had gathered in a village house in a meeting, later to be called the Congress of Soummam.

2. The Soummam Valley Congress, August 1956

After nearly two years of a revolution that had begun in earnest in November 1954, and after it had expanded to most of the regions of the country, it became necessary to define general political and military strategies. The FLN needed to develop an approach that would clearly outline its direction, and for this reason leaders of the revolution were summoned to a conference in the Soummam Valley on 20 August 1956. It was felt that such a meeting would be able to determine the preferable political goals of the revolution, and to organize the political, military and social life in revolutionary Algeria. The Congress of Soummam changed the course of the revolution and, as noted by Stora, made official “the bankruptcy of the former political organisations of the old parties”. “Grass-roots militants” rallied behind the FLN, while the UDMA and the AUMA were dissolved.¹⁹⁸ Ramdane organised the Congress, directing it to establish centralised leadership, which would ostensibly drive the revolution to achieve its goals. The Congress resulted in the adoption of a forty-page declaration that included the above mentioned principles, but also declared that there would be no cease-fire with France before France recognised Algeria’s independence, that negotiation would begin only on the basis of the recognition of existing Algerian territory, and that there would be no dual citizenship privileges for the *pieds noirs*.¹⁹⁹

Frantz Fanon based his views on the Charter of Soummam and the environment in which the Charter was drafted. He was privy to its internecine battles. At Soummam Valley,

¹⁹⁷ James Heartfield, Sheffield Hallam, Chapter six of *The ‘Death of the Subject’ Explained* (2002); published by: France History Archive, entitled: *Algeria and the defeat of French Humanism*. See the Web. <http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/defeat-french-humanism.htm>.

¹⁹⁸ Stora, B. (2001), p. 60.

¹⁹⁹ Horne A. (1977), p. 145.

the difference between internal and external factions, the military versus the political wings of the FLN, were in full view, albeit only to party intimates. Soummam was also the stage for the struggle involving one of the major theoreticians of the party, Ramdane, a militant opponent of the militarization of the party who justly feared for the future of the Algerian state.²⁰⁰

Fanon noted at the time that “...it evokes little or not enough the danger of the drifts induced by the insufficiency of political control that the Charter of Soummam had...put forward.”²⁰¹ The Charter itself had been drafted in an ‘apologetic tone’. If the political effort was made, it argued, the inherent truth of the liberators’ cause would emerge and prevail. On the ground, the leaders looked to the Charter for direction, and especially to its organisational standards. The military’s efforts to comply with the political regulation contained in the Charter proved to be insufficient, however.²⁰² Within a year, Ramdane and the CCE/CNRA recognised that following the Charter was impossible.²⁰³ From this point on, the revolutionaries derived their principles from precedents set in the revolt of November, 1954.²⁰⁴ The Charter had laid out the approved priorities of the politicians as well as those of the groups fighting from inside the country. It relegated those who were living in Egypt and Tunisia, and those who were still free to move between France and Morocco, to a second level of power, and hence set the stage for the conflict between the military and the politicians, as well as between those fighting inside Algeria, and those outside of the country.²⁰⁵

According to Stora, the Charter of Soummam was the only legal action that the Algerian revolution launched under the leadership of the FLN. It was historic in the ‘legislative’ work that it accomplished; it also initiated a struggle for control at the highest levels of the national organisation. Conflict among leaders broke out as soon as they received news of the Congress, through a letter sent by Ramdane to most of the members of the FLN.

²⁰⁰ Irene L. Gendzie, “Midnight Reflections on Some of the Work of Frantz Fanon,” *Human Architecture: Journal of The Sociology Of Self-Knowledge*, Fa Publication Of Okcir: The Omar Khayyam Center for Integrative Research in Utopia, Mysticism, and Science (Utopystics).
<<http://www.okcir.com/Articles%20V%20Special/IreneGendzier.pdf>>.

²⁰¹ Quoted in Sadek Hadjerès, « La pensée de Fanon: Quelques uns de ses impacts dans la sphère sociopolitique algérienne » Article published by Hoggar, Switzerland, Web.
<<http://www.frantzfanoninternational.org/spip.php?article155>> .

²⁰² See Alice Cherki, Nadia Benabid, *Frantz Fanon: a portrait*, translated from French by Nadia Benabid (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2006), pp. 83-96; See Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, translated from French by Haakon Chevalier, with an introduction by Adolfo Gilly (NY:Grove Press, 1967).

²⁰³ Sadek Hadjerès, *La pensée de Fanon: Quelques uns de ses impacts dans la sphère sociopolitique algérienne*: Article published in *Mouvement SocialAlgerien: Histoireet Perspectives* by Sadek Hadjeres at
<<http://www.socialalgerie.net/spip.php?article7>>.

²⁰⁴ Salah-Eddine Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers, September 2009.

²⁰⁵ Sidhum, S. Algiers 2009, Rachid Masli, personal interview, Geneva, September 2009.

Ben Bella was the first to respond: he immediately rejected the Charter and the Congress of Summam's legitimacy. He composed a three-point response. He insisted that the Congress had been "non-representative".²⁰⁶ He and his associates ignored the Charter and chose, rather, to carry on individually, emphasizing the regionalism that the Congress had initially promoted. He had already noted in his refusal to attend the Congress that the major leaders of the widely disparate Algerian regions, such as Oranie and the Eastern zone, and other areas located outside the country, had been unaware of the meeting and did not attend. Ben Bella, according to Sidhum, was seeing himself as destined to occupy a role far above the one that he was playing in the revolution.²⁰⁷ He attacked "the questioning, once again, of the Islamic charter [regarding] our future political institutions", and rejected the secularism of the emerging state structure. He made it clear that he would forever refuse to take his "place" in the European minority.²⁰⁸ Leaders located outside the country also criticized the letter. Two years later, with Egyptian support, they decided to hold another congress in Tripoli, Libya, which was subsequently referred to as the Tripoli Congress. This meeting was organized by leaders outside the country along with some of those who had missed, or been disappointed by, the Summam Congress.²⁰⁹

The French at this point confronted the revolution with maximum military force while dismissing the revolutionaries as mere terrorists. The forty-page platform drafted in Tripoli, however, clarified the objectives of the revolution, formalized the military structures that had been evolving *ad hoc*, and established, for the first time, a set of authentically revolutionary institutions. Most notable among their objectives was a reaffirmation of the goal of *complete* independence, and the pledge never to accept a cease-fire until France recognized the principle of such independence. The Soummam Congress had created a new organisation, the *Conseil Nationale de la revolution Algerienne* (CNRA), which was in effect Algeria's first sovereign parliament.²¹⁰ The CNRA established legislative power to coordinate and develop the many emerging organisations involved in the revolution. The Soummam coordinators democratically shared membership in the revolutionary council with most of the earlier political leaders. Seventeen members of CNRA came from older organisations, such as the CRUA, UDMA, MTLD and even the reformist AUMA. For the role of executive power, the conferees created another body, the *Comite de Coordination et d'execution*, or CCE. This

²⁰⁶ Stora, B. (2001).

²⁰⁷ Sidhum, S., personal interview, Algiers, August 2009. Chouchane, personal interview, London, June 2009.

²⁰⁸ Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algerie coloniale, 1830-1954* (Paris: La decouverte, 1991), p. 111.

²⁰⁹ Sidhum, S., personal interview, Algiers, August 2009.

²¹⁰ Ruedy, D. J. *Modern Algeria: the origins and development of a nation* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indianapolis, 1992).

committee was the most powerful body among the revolutionary groups, and was comprised of five members, Benyoucef Benkhadda, Saad Dahleb, Belkacem, Larbi Ben M'Hidi and Ramdane.²¹¹ Ramdane had been the principal architect of the Soummam Congress. He was a Kabyle, was well educated and religious, and was a politician who believed in democracy and the sharing of ideas and decisions. Ramdane had risen rapidly in his position among the FLN leadership after 1955, and by the time of the Congress of Soummam had become the most powerful internal FLN member.²¹²

The Soummam Congress also established a military command structure for the Army of National Liberation (ALN).²¹³ The ALN, which was intended to coordinate the revolutionary activities of numerous small, armed bands that developed during the previous two years, quickly became an organized body, was controlled by the central leadership of the CCE, and functioned under the rules and decisions of the military department of the Executive Coordinating Committee of the CNRA.²¹⁴ According to Sidhum, this control was the only way to guide the revolution, and to achieve its aims of independence and the creation of a strong country with a legitimate regime and a well-organized society. This plan, however, was not agreeable to FLN leaders, including Ben Bella, Boussouf and others from the 'second military generation', those who had limited their roles to preparing themselves for after the revolution. Ramdane was killed on December 27, 1957, as the result of a bloody internal competition for power among FLN leadership.²¹⁵ Fanon's investigation into the revolution's problems, and the counter-revolution, or thermidore, that had soon overtaken the radical revolution, confirmed the likelihood that Ramdane had been 'removed' by forces inside the FLN.²¹⁶

Abdel-Hamid Brahimi has spoken of the death of Ramdane, and has added crucial details, based upon the account that he received from his friend, Ben-Tobal, who apparently witnessed Ramdane's murder. Brahimi says that the murder of Ramdane was the result of a bloody competition for power, and the jealousy of his colleagues based upon his growing popularity and political power. In addition to Ramdane's popularity among the Algerian community, he was respected by the French authorities, especially after the Soummam

²¹¹ Sidhum S. (2009).

²¹² Ruedy, John, *Modern Algeria the Origin and Development of a Nation*, second edition (Indiana University Press, 1992 and 2005).

²¹³ Harne, A. (1977); Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de l'Algérie coloniale (1830-1954)* (Paris: Editions La Decouverte, 1991); Belhaj, Saleh, *Taarikh el-Thaura al-djaza'riya, dar-al-Kitaab al-Hadith*, 2008.

²¹⁴ Personal interview, Sidhum, Algiers, September 2009. Also: Ruedy, D. J. (1992) and Stora, B. (2001).

²¹⁵ Ramdane was murdered, allegedly by senior FLN members, because of his rising popularity and likely establishment as the leader of the Revolution.

²¹⁶ Anthony Alessandrini, *Frantz Fanon: critical perspectives* (1999).

Congress. When the first legislative charter of the revolution was announced, Ramdane was the only person who had been able to challenge the FLN members for the top leadership position. His colleagues apparently laid plans to stop him, however. Ben-Toubal, Belkacem and Boussouf decided to jail him outside the country so that he would lose his popularity and legitimacy. This was a risky plan, however, and the conspirators soon came to see the need to remove him completely. They killed him in Nadhour, Morocco.²¹⁷ They had apparently suggested that he visit an FLN installation near there. Although he apparently sensed a trap, he nevertheless went along with the conspirators, and was strangled in a farmhouse. Boussouf and Belkacem were said to have been involved personally in his murder, over the objections of Ben-Toubal.²¹⁸ The three ‘Bs’ announced Ramdane’s death in the *el-Moudjahid* newspaper, saying that he had been shot by French soldiers during a battle on a mountain inside the country.²¹⁹

Meanwhile, the French government struggled to defend French civilians and property. French civilians and military officers had become insecure in their daily lives. FLN operations were mainly focused on military bases and on the economic infrastructure of the French community, targeting business suppliers, factories, telephone lines, power plants, etc.²²⁰ The killing of civilians increased in response to attacks by the French army against Algerians. According to Bachir Boumaaza, the French military had carried out a series of massacres in Muslim villages and farms.²²¹ After February, 1956, the new French socialist government closed the last doors to negotiation, despite the openness of the FLN to this, especially after the Soummam Congress. The French government seems to have blocked any possibility of solving the Algerian problem politically, refusing to enter into any conversation on independence. The FLN leaders had offered to meet in Tunisia with the new socialist Prime Minister of France, Guy Mollet, and were rejected unequivocally.²²² Extensive and

²¹⁷ In the electronic Newsweb. See the original article: Ben Bella : «Boussouf un criminel, Kafi un saoulard, Ait Ahmed un historique, Bentobal un rien” DNA - Dernières nouvelles d'Algérie, 20/03/2012 < <http://www.dna-algerie.com/interieure/ben-bella-boussouf-un-criminel-kafi-un-soulard-ait-ahmed-un-grand-homme-bentobal-un-rien-2>> .

²¹⁸ Aljazeera TV, program on the special visit to Abdelhamid Brahimi, Morocco, on October 3, 2009. Aljazeera archive on special visit: <<http://aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CF6F81B3-3A29-454D-B8E9-07339A59F61C.htm>> recorded on Youtube: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ53kJKDypI&feature=related>>.

²¹⁹ Abdelhamid Brahimi, Aljazeera, *a special visit*; Sidhum, personal interview (2009).

²²⁰ See: Appendix 1, Map 1. This shows the main locations of the ALN bases inside and outside of the Algerian borders, and shows the principle directions of the attacks of the revolutionaries (ALN) against French strategic locations.

²²¹ Bachir Boumaaza (*al’istiamaar, Jarima dhad al-Insaniyah, Jarimat Hareb*), “Colonialism, a Crime against Humanity - a War Crime”, *Journal of sources* No. 3 (2000) National Centre for Studies and Research in the national movement and the revolution of the first of November 54.

²²² Alice Cherki, Frantz Fanon: a portrait, translated from the French by Nadia Benabid (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2006).

secret negotiations with FLN members, which had been ongoing, were brought to a halt by the October 1956 French hijacking of an airplane carrying top Algerian politicians, including Boudiaf, Mohammed Khider, Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella, and Mostafa Lacheraf, an important figure in the intellectual and military leadership of the FLN.²²³

The problems that France was facing in its former Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates were fully apparent in the hijacking of the FLN aircraft.²²⁴ At that time, both of the leaders of the two neighbouring countries believed that a solution was possible through the establishment of a Franco-North Africa Community, one in which both countries would come together, along with an autonomous Algeria, which would then receive its full independence in stages.²²⁵ By October, 1956, the Tunisian leader had prepared a proposal to be discussed in a meeting with the FLN leaders. Both countries had agreed to the plan, and had tried to push the FLN to accept it as the basis of their further discussions with the French. After Ben Bella and his colleagues were arrested at the Algiers Airport, however, the Moroccan/Tunisian plan was scrapped. Amnesty and cease fire based upon partial independence was fully and finally rejected. It is worth noting here that some observers of the incident, including former Algerian politicians, have accused the leaders of Tunisia and Morocco of participating in the hijacking, in the hope that they would be relieved of the costs and threats that they had experienced with their intervention in the Algerian crisis. Moreover, despite the significant support that the Algerian Revolution had received from Morocco and King Mohammed V from the beginning, the Algerian revolutionary leaders had not actually been formally received by the Moroccan King until October 1956, in Rabat. Finally, that the King had chosen to fly in a separate aircraft with some of his entourage, rather than in the company of Ben Bella and his colleagues from the FLN's external affairs branch, and this suggested the likelihood of conspiracy in the minds of many observers. Had the King of Morocco betrayed the Algerian Revolution? Moroccan government officials attempted to

²²³ Alice Cherki (2006).

²²⁴ Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, M. Boudiaf and M. Khider boarded a chartered Air Atlas plane on 22 October. They were accompanied by Mohammed Lacheraf, a former Sorbonne Professor and FLN supporter with no official rank in the FLN hierarchy, by several French reporters and by the North African representative from the New York Times, Thomas Brady. The airplane was piloted by a French team. While in the air, the pilot received orders from the French intelligence authority in Algiers, relayed by the aeronautics staff at Algiers airport, to land in Algiers instead of Tunis. The pilot obeyed, and circled over the Mediterranean until it was time to land. As the plane came to a halt, it was surrounded by armored cars and steel-helmeted French troops. When the news was made public that evening, there was surprise and disappointment in Algiers. For more details, see: Horne, A. (1977).

²²⁵ Cherki, Alice (2006)

allay these suspicions at the time, arguing that the King had to avoid giving offence to France by appearing to give the Algerian mission official recognition.²²⁶

As noted above, this was perhaps the first act of air piracy against a civilian airplane in world history. Of special significance to the future of French-African relations, Ben Bella and his three associates had been the guests of King Mohammed V at the time of their arrest, and the King was therefore compelled to regard their arrest, at least officially, as a personal affront and as a French betrayal. This had long-term diplomatic implications. Moreover, after Ben Bella was arrested, both of the leaders (Bourguiba, the President of Tunisia, and King Mohamed V) resigned themselves to the inevitability of a long war, while the FLN (and many other North Africans) interpreted France's apparent act of air piracy as a sign that no Fourth Republic Government could be trusted, even if its intentions appeared conciliatory.²²⁷ In Tunisia, the message of Ben Bella's "kidnapping" was greeted with consternation.²²⁸ It was clear to all those waiting for the conference in Tunisia to begin that arrangements for the meeting had been made formally by the Tunisian and French officials, further casting suspicion on King Mohammed V and the French Army. Moreover, the French Government had shown that it had neither the authority nor the will to take any steps that could possibly lead to an Algerian settlement.²²⁹

Edward Behr has noted that the French government at the time had to choose between accepting a moderate proposal for change, or rejecting any political solution, and thus becoming responsible for the inevitable outbreak of violence. Even French military victories would have to be followed by some reforms, given that France would face pressure from European and international communities. Moreover, the French army was facing a deep conflict between its own leadership and senior politicians, with the true extent of the rebellion ignored, and much made of overly optimistic army reports.²³⁰

In Paris, Guy Mollet, the socialist premier who was assisting in the negotiations between Morocco, Tunisia and France with the FLN, found that his position had been undermined by the hijacking and briefly wondered whether he should resign.²³¹ General Lacoste himself also claimed that he had been taken unawares, but decided to underwrite his subordinates' initiative. French government leaders were well aware of the Tunisian and Moroccan proposals, and King Mohammed V had even, in guarded terms, discussed them

²²⁶ Behr, E. (1961), pp. 120-122.

²²⁷ For more details: see Horne, A. (1977), pp. 314-348. Behr, E (1961), pp. 117-131.

²²⁸ Behr, E.(1961).

²²⁹ Behr, E. (1961), pp.122-124.

²³⁰ Stora, B. (2001).

²³¹ Behr, E. (1961).

with the French ambassador in Rabat. The hijacking is considered today to have been one of the major events that accelerated and broadened the internationalisation of the Algerian conflict.²³²

The FLN had fallen on hard times by 1956-58. The revolution was going badly, and deep divisions resulted from the death of Ramdane, the arrests of Ben Bella and his close associates, and the two moderately effective lines of defense established by the French military, based around the Morice Line,²³³ which separated the country from Tunisia.²³⁴ The Algerian Revolution appeared at this point to have little chance of succeeding unless the revolutionaries attacked cities and included civilians as targets. They had come to see such attacks as their only possible response to the French army, which had destroyed many of the villages where most of the native born Algerian population lived. The FLN moved the war into Algiers, based on a decision by the CCE. Larbi Ben M'Hidi had been captured and summarily executed after being severely tortured by the French. Survivors of village massacres were increasingly forced into Algiers. Khedda, the head of the Algiers Autonomous Zone, had fled to Tunisia; elsewhere in Algeria the arrival of strong French reinforcements had threatened to reverse earlier FLN successes. Ahmed Zabana, an ALN member, was tried by a French Army court martial and became the first revolutionary to be sentenced to death; he was quickly executed in the high-security prison of Ferhat-Tazoult in Lambeze, Batna (400 South East of Algiers) on June 19, 1956. The French were soon holding massive show trials, resulting in a number death sentences. To compound their difficulties, the FLN units had, in many areas, become unwieldy and more vulnerable as their numbers swelled with untrained volunteers.²³⁵

The FLN's entire connection network was out of action, with the political-administrative section badly mauled, its fund-raising network destroyed, and the entire Muslim population of Algiers cowed beyond belief. The French paratroopers' practice of making extensive use of hooded informers (who pointed out FLN sympathizers as they streamed out to work from the heavily guarded Kasbah precincts), moreover, was to have a lasting psychological effect on the Muslim population of Algiers.²³⁶

²³² Stora, B. (2001).

²³³ See: Appendix 1, Map 2, which shows the main locations of French Military bases and the electrified lines built on the north Algerian borders with Tunisia and Morocco.

²³⁴ The Morice Line that ran from the Sahara to the sea along the common frontier between Algeria and Tunisia was the more sophisticated of the French barriers, combining electrified fences, fields of anti-personal and "jump" mines, radar-guided artillery, and constant air surveillance.

²³⁵ See Stora, B. (2001) p. 53.

²³⁶ Edward Behr, *the Algerian Problem* (Penguin Books Pty Ltd, Mitcham, Victoria, Australia, 1961), pp. 114-115.

The subsequent ‘Battle of Algiers’, which featured what was perhaps the world’s first systematic use of urban terrorism, included the use of crude bombings of bus stops, cafes and soccer stadiums. The rebels hoped to “create a climate of insecurity” among the French, and to provoke reprisals that would turn “moderate Arabs into rebels.”²³⁷ The French responded by using torture to extract intelligence. Morgan notes that the “torture produced immediate results” and the French were slowly able to dismantle urban terrorist cells.²³⁸ By the end of 1957, the French military command felt that the war had been won. Lacoste, the Resident Minister, kept repeating that victory would come to the side that held out for the last quarter hour. As would soon be seen, however, the war was not yet finished.

In April 1958, the French decision to build the electrified ‘Morice Line’ along the Tunisia-Algeria border threatened to cut off Tunisia as a source of supply.²³⁹ A meeting of the CNRA was arranged to take place in Cairo, and the CCE became a nine man affair, a direct precursor to the later ‘Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA).’²⁴⁰ The FLN installed two bases outside the country along the frontiers of Tunisia and Morocco, and even installed electric lines. *Jounud* (Algerian soldiers) managed to establish new connections with the internal revolutionary command, providing significant additional support to the revolutionaries. The FLN then turned to diplomacy to put additional pressure on France in the UN, effectively internationalizing the conflict, and setting the stage for an Algerian *Dien Bien Phu*.²⁴¹ As more information emerged regarding French atrocities in the countryside, the UN demanded that France pursue a more peaceful, democratic and fair solution to the Algerian problem. The US was repeatedly mentioned as a possible participant in a ‘peacekeeping operation’ in Algeria. FLN diplomacy was largely successful in spreading its message that a new Algeria was now emerging, and Lacoste was moderately supportive.

²³⁷ Ted Morgan, *My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir* (HarperCollins Publishers, Australia, 2007).

²³⁸ Ted Morgan (2007).

²³⁹ See: Appendix 1, Map 2, which shows the main locations of French Military bases and the electrified lines built on the north Algerian borders with Tunisia and Morocco.

²⁴⁰ See Edward Behr (1961), p. 115. The key CCE members have since been identified in various historical studies, and in many respects became the key protagonists in the Algerian Revolution after 1956. They included Krim Belkacem, Ferhat Abbas (who had joined the FLN only two months previously), Abane, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal (who had commanded Wilaya No.3 after the death of its former commander, Zighoud Youcef), Abdelhafidh Boussof (who had succeeded Larbi Ben M’Hidi at the head of Wilaya No.5), Lamine Debaghine (who had been persuaded to join the FLN by Abane), Abdelhamid Mahri (who was the head of the FLN before the internal coup staged by the secret service and several members of the FLN party, led by AbdelQadir Hadjar in 1991). Also mentioned were Omar Ouamrane (an ex-Wilaya commander and arms specialist), Muhammad Cherif (a former French Army officer who had fought with distinction in Indo-China), Ben Bella and his political group, which included Mohammed Khidher, Ait Ahmed, Mohammed Boudiaf of the *delegation exterieure*, imprisoned in France. Krim Belkacem, was the only ‘founding member’ still active in the revolutionary struggle—an indication of the tremendous toll taken during the first two years of its existence.

²⁴¹ Horne A. (1977).

The various factions of the French Republican Front were increasingly divided, until gaps had widened between the politicians and the military, among French citizens, and even between the metropole and the *pied Noirs*. The Algerian struggle had even affected leftist parties in France, and the stage was set for a serious conflict within France itself.²⁴² While the French army tried to exploit the growing conflict among French politicians, Lacoste prepared a legal outline for Algerian elections, which would have given the Europeans in Algeria a political monopoly, each one of their votes worth seven times an Algerian vote. This inequality, already embedded in a statute drafted in 1947, was adopted by the Council of the Ministers, but was then withdrawn by Bourges-Maunoury by the end of September 1957. A new legal outline, greatly watered down to reduce the influence of Muslim elected officials, was finally passed on November 29, although its application was postponed until the end of the war. Lacoste remained Resident Minister in Algeria, but without any real authority. General Raoul Salan, former Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Vietnam, and who by 1957 was commander of the Tenth Military Area and Chief Army Commander in Algiers, was reportedly pleased with his new position in Algeria, and “intended to win the war with his spirited colonels.”²⁴³

The FLN continued its policy of pressuring the French government through diplomacy in the UN and with Arab and socialist countries. The international community, and socialist countries in particular, had emphasized the Algerian case in UN debates after 1955, when the UN first placed it on its agenda.²⁴⁴ Internally, the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), a trade union and part of the FLN, was recognized by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) over its competitor, the Union of Algerian Workers’ Federation (USTA), which had been controlled by the Algerian National Militants (MNA) two years before the creation of the GPRA. The GPRA would soon be in charge of all such organisations. The General Union of Algerian Muslim Students also played an important role; it was involved with various international cultural groups, and took an active part in the international propaganda campaign.²⁴⁵ The progress of the FLN, which remained the central revolutionary organisation, was initially guided by the Soummam Congress, even

²⁴² For more details, Stora B., pp. 54-57.

²⁴³ Stora, B. (2001), p. 56.

²⁴⁴ See Hadjeres Sadek, *Movement Social Algerien: Histoire et Perspectives*, the web. Guerre de Liberation, La Guerre Algerienne de Liberation et les Communistes, Extraits d’un Ouvrage Paru Recemment a Budapest, La Guerre Algerienne de Liberation et les Pays Communistes; See the web :

<http://www.socialalgerie.net/spip.php?article286>

²⁴⁵ Perville, Guy, *Les etudiants algeriens de l’universite francaise (1880- 1962)* (Paris: CNRS, 1984).

in its internal conflicts, until it was swept away by the FLN leadership, most notably with the murder of Ramdane in 1958.

In its early stages, the FLN focused upon diplomacy. The initial emphasis was on attaining the fundamental rights of Algerians, including the right to freedom in their own homes, and publicizing the striking degree to which these rights had been denied by the French. Torture, execution and other human rights violations by the French Army had become commonplace. The French in effect were now demonstrating (and the FLN were publicizing) to the world that human rights and international law had been suspended in Algeria. Two events particularly stood out in the international media: the hijacking of the plane and arrest of the FLN leaders, in 1956, and the French bombing of a village on the border with Tunisia, Sakiet Sidi Youssef, on February 8, 1958. These two events had a particularly strong emotional impact on world opinion.²⁴⁶ The French authorities soon came to be seen as guilty of committing atrocities in Algeria by most international observers, from those in the UN to those advocating Atlantic European solidarity.

3. The Algerian Revolution and the Power of General de Gaulle

On 13 May 1958, the French military, under the command of Generals Massu and Salan, went into open insurrection against the French government, establishing a “Committee of Public Safety,”²⁴⁷ and then taking the island of Corsica in a bloodless *coup*. The *coup* was poised to take over the government of France if the conspirators’ principal demand, bringing General de Gaulle back as leader of France, was not met. The Fourth Republic bowed to this demand.²⁴⁸ Mollet’s government fell on 21 May 1957, launching the third phase of the Algerian War, which continued until September 1959 and witnessed the end of the Fourth Republic and the return to power of General de Gaulle in May 1958. After Mollet, the Fourth Republic had entered what was to become a terminal crisis. Successive governments were little more than reshuffling of ministries between socialists, Christian Democrats and Radicals, each of which quickly found that it was overwhelmed by events in Algeria.²⁴⁹ Eventually President Rene Coty tried to stop the crisis by calling upon the Christian Democrat, Pierre Pflimlin, to form the government. But this only brought matters to a head,

²⁴⁶ Stora, B. (2001), p. 68.

²⁴⁷ This name resonated with terror in France. It had been the title of Maximilien Robespierre’s guillotine committee, which directed the ‘Reign of Terror’ in revolutionary France.

²⁴⁸ Stora, B. (2001), p. 71.

²⁴⁹ Martin Evans and John Phillips, *Algeria: anger of the dispossessed* (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007), pp 61-62.

because Pflimlin had already declared his support for negotiations. His appointment on 13 May 1958 provoked demonstrations in Algiers.²⁵⁰ General Salan called an unscheduled meeting of the Committee of Public Safety, presided over by General Massu, head of the Tenth Paratroop division. The committee promptly assigned itself the mission of facilitating General de Gaulle's accession to power.²⁵¹ General de Gaulle was shortly thereafter named by French President, René Coty, to head a government of national unity, invested with extraordinary powers to prevent the "abandonment of Algeria," and General Salan announced that the Army had "provisionally taken over responsibility for the destiny of French Algeria".²⁵² Under the pressure of General Massu, Salan supported de Gaulle's rise to power, and declared '*Vive de Gaulle*' loudly from the balcony of the governor-general's palace in Algiers on 15 May. Two days later, Charles de Gaulle, who returned to government after 10 years of absence, announced that he was ready to "assume the powers of the Republic."²⁵³

From the beginning, the French political crisis was solely the product of French military occupation in Algeria. Public expressions, especially of students and the *pied noirs*, to decline any negotiations with the FLN, and to focus exclusively on the rights of the settlers, came to dominate French military thought. A march of thousands of pro-French demonstrators took place in Algiers on 26 April. Students in Algiers formed shock troops in support of French Algeria, and met in a forum in front of the offices of the governor-general in order to attract attention to an official procession paying tribute to the memory of fallen soldiers. The operation succeeded beyond the wildest hopes of its various protagonists.²⁵⁴

The French Government had in effect hidden the full reality of the Algerian War from the citizens of France, and found in their negotiations with the military a great opportunity to relieve the pressure that the military had brought to bear. Attempting to exploit this, the ALN stepped up the tempo of operations, inflicting in the week of 13 May alone 300 casualties, dead and wounded. Alistair Horn mentions that among the dead that week was the famous paratroop leader, Colonel Jean Pierre, who had earlier escaped with serious wounds during an attack by revolutionaries, led Youcef Amar. It should be noted that while the French had

²⁵⁰ Ruedy, J. (1992).

²⁵¹ Stora B (2001), p 71.

²⁵² John Douglas Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: the Origins and development of a Nation*, p 172.

²⁵³ French: "*prêt à assumer les pouvoirs de la République*".

²⁵⁴ However, the march finished with violence and chaos on the streets of the city. Hundreds of thousands of protestors turned up with paper and old tires, lighting fires in the streets, the square and the courtyard of the government general building. Dozens of cars belonging to government officials were destroyed. Tens of thousands of Europeans committed violent acts against government property, including the library and the government archives. Protesters blocked the airport highway drinking, dancing and singing "*Algerie Française*". See Stora, B. (2001), pp. 70-76.

suffered many casualties that week, “at the same time the ALN’s losses had been twice that number.”²⁵⁵

General de Gaulle soon joined the political battle against the supporters of the French Army in Algeria, and an often violent debate soon centered around the theme of *integration*. Only four months after de Gaulle came to power, the conflict with the generals once again intensified. The army continued to paint its integrationist slogan on walls, pavement and even road surfaces: “*Algérie Française*”. From the first, public opinion in Paris and across France had been convinced that only General de Gaulle could resolve the crisis, eliminate the prospect of civil war, and end the Algerian conflict. On May 26-27, after a frank exchange of views between General Paul Ely, Commander of the Army, and de Gaulle, Ely was persuaded to resign. The next day, the press release from de Gaulle announced that he “was beginning the regular process necessary for the establishment of a republican government capable of ensuring the unity and independence of the country.”²⁵⁶

Two weeks into his position, de Gaulle traveled to Algeria where the situation was increasingly complicated because of growing tensions with the French settlers. His famous declaration in Algiers, “*Je vous ai compris*”, or, “I have understood you”, was quickly followed by a new constitution, which gave de Gaulle far greater powers. He could now dissolve the National Assembly,²⁵⁷ and he possessed dictatorial powers in the case of events that he deemed serious.²⁵⁸ The Constitution ruled that the executive power was placed beyond the reach of Parliament, whose role was now considerably reduced.

²⁵⁵ Alistair Horne, *A savage war of peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, (London: MacMillan London Ltd, 1977), p. 314; and Stora, B. (2001).

²⁵⁶ The European Algerians put out the flags: this time, the General had “spoken” by invitation on May 11 of the former Petainist, Alain de Serigny, in his newspaper *L’Echo d’Alger*. Stora, B. (2001), pp.71-73.

²⁵⁷ Article 12 [Dissolution of National Assembly]

(1) The President of the Republic may, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the Assemblies, pronounce the dissolution of the National Assembly. A General election shall take place not less than twenty days and not more than forty days after the dissolution.

(2) The National Assembly shall meet *ipso jure* on the second Thursday following its election. If this meeting takes place outside the periods provided for ordinary sessions, a session shall *ipso jure* be held for a fifteen-day period.

(3) No further dissolution may take place within a year following this election.

²⁵⁸ Article 16 [State of Emergency]

(1) When the institutions of the Republic, the Independence of the nation, the integrity of its territory, or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under grave and immediate threat and when the proper functioning of the constitutional governmental authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures demanded by these circumstances after official consultation with the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Assemblies, and the Constitutional Council.

(2) He shall inform the nation of these measures by a message.

De Gaulle focused on Algeria, referring to the French-Algerian relationship at every opportunity, attempting to bring Muslims and Europeans in Algeria together while disparaging the concepts of “French Algeria” and “integration”. De Gaulle, based on his experience with both societies, concluded that “the ‘integration’ offer came several years too late, and the last minute adherence to this slogan by the Europeans, who had previously bitterly opposed it, made it even more suspect to the Muslims.”²⁵⁹ Stora and Douglas, along with many other historians, note this rapid political transformation.

On 28 September 1958, the Europeans and the Muslims voted overwhelmingly in favor of the constitution of the Fifth Republic. On 3 October, from Constantine, General de Gaulle announced the future economic and social transformations that the government had committed itself to financing in Algeria: 15 billion francs in public works projects and urban development, and a gradual program for schooling young Muslims. On 21 December 1958 General de Gaulle was elected president of the French Republic and of the French Community.²⁶⁰

The rebellion continued, however, and the FLN continued to demonstrate that it was still a force to be reckoned with in both politics and security in Algeria, and even in French international relations. The FLN was already on the wane at the time of the 13 May uprising, and it suffered a tremendous blow from the warming of Franco-Muslim relations shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, it continued to pressure the new French government diplomatically, despite its own bloody internal competition for leadership. After the borders were sealed by the ‘Morice lines’, most of the battles took place in the cities.

When de Gaulle announced, on 16 September 1958, that he was prepared to grant the Algerians self-determination, there was serious consternation among a majority of French Army officers, and open expressions of fears that the Algerians would be given the right to vote, and would choose the FLN as the single representative party of the revolution. Because of the strong opposition against him among the French military in Algeria, de Gaulle delayed

(3) These measures must be prompted by a will to ensure within the shortest possible time that the constitutional governmental authorities have the means of fulfilling their duties.

The Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures.

(4) Parliament shall meet *ipso jure*.

(5) The National Assembly may not be dissolved during the exercise of emergency powers.

²⁵⁹ See Stora B. (2001); the French generals and the Army in Algeria, along with the *pied noirs*, were against de Gaulle in his plan for Algeria, and when they heard the name “FLN” it was associated in French policy with terrorism, leaving no basis for negotiation. One month after de Gaulle’s return to power, the army resumed painting ‘integrationist’ slogans on walls, pavements, and even road surfaces: “*L’Algerie c’est la France, De Dunkerque a Tamanrasset, 70 millions de Français. La Méditerranée traverse la France comme la Seine traverse Paris*”: these and other catch phrases were seen wherever the French army was active.

²⁶⁰ See Stora B. (2001), p. 73.

implementing his plans for more than two years, during which time he had more than a thousand officers transferred out of Algeria. During this period, de Gaulle approved the independence of Madagascar and much of the rest of French Africa, while consolidating his plans for elections in an independent Algeria. His press conference on 23 October 1958 shocked both sides of the conflict in Algeria, but especially the French Army, which seemed at the time on the verge of winning the war. De Gaulle's plan was becoming reality. The Mostaganem speech, in which he offered "the peace of the brave," with no conditions other than that of leaving the "knife in the cloakroom," was quickly rejected by the GPRA,²⁶¹ in effect widening the gap between the French, and the Muslim majority. This further pressured de Gaulle to end French colonization throughout Africa.

De Gaulle did his best to convince the generals in Algeria that his plan was the only viable option, while he renewed and intensified military force against the FLN both inside and outside the country. General Challe led French military assaults against the FLN and its supporters in civilian villages. The Algerian auxiliary forces, the *Harkis*, fought with the French, using their knowledge of the local terrain to aid the army in locating guerrilla bands, and hitting them again and again until they were broken.²⁶² By the end of 1959 the FLN's mountain strongholds had been largely pacified, and the war turned to French military attacks against civilians in the countryside, and on Muslim villages. Some villages were completely destroyed, acts carried out by the French Army without mercy, and in open violation of the human rights that France had repeatedly defended in international venues. Douglas noted that "the brutality of the French methods, including the relocation of two million Algerians into camps in order to isolate the FLN, alienated the population."²⁶³ The French Foreign Legionnaires and the French Secret Services committed most of the reported criminal acts in the Algerian war. The military successes that General Challe achieved tended to be based upon placing French civilians in the frontlines, fighting alongside the military, including the commission of massive human rights violations, often in public places in cities, while employing the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

Severe international pressure was soon exerted on the de Gaulle government, from countries such as China and Russia, that recognized the FLN as the legitimate government of

²⁶¹ Stora B. (2001).

²⁶² John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria the Origin and Development of a Nation*, second edition (Indiana University Press, 2005).

²⁶³ See Ruedy, D. J. (2005). After a violent struggle against the Algerian army (the *Mudjahidin*), French commandos broke up the *Katibas* of the Wilayas of Kabylia and Aurès, and were responsible for the killing of the FLN's representative to Wilaya III (Kabylia). In addition, Colonels Amirouche and Si al-Haouès, the FLN's representatives in Wilaya VI (Sahara), were killed in battle.

Algeria, and insisted that Algeria immediately be given its formal independence. De Gaulle knew that ultimately the way ahead in Algeria required a political solution, and this led to the final phase of the war, the endgame, which began with de Gaulle's nationwide media address on 16 September 1959. According to de Gaulle, there were three possibilities for Algerians. The first was succession, which he warned would open the door to chaos and communist dictatorship; the second, full integration, whereby Algerians would become part of the French people; and the third, implicitly de Gaulle's preferred choice, was self-government by Algerians in close association with France.²⁶⁴

4. The CCE and the GPRA: The Negotiations Approach

Conflict among the FLN leaders had always been the major flaw in the Algerian Revolution. By the early period of de Gaulle's government, the revolutionaries had nearly lost hope of achieving national independence. Colonel Omar Oumrane described this loss of hope in a letter: "the hour is grave," he wrote. He indicated that the military situation was worrying and that the revolution was losing its way: "the revolutionary spirit has disappeared among leaders, officers and militants alike, to give way to bourgeoisification, bureaucracy and opportunism."²⁶⁵ Oumrane urged his colleagues in the FLN to make a speedy proclamation of provisional government, one that would take responsibility of opening a new political approach in the fight for independence. This new diplomatic offensive would take full advantage of the contentious atmosphere of the Cold War, and open a "second front", promoting instability inside France itself.²⁶⁶ The security emphasis of the French military had to be unmasked and revealed for its basis in human rights violations, and its failure to deal effectively and humanely with the Algerian crisis. In the same vein, Abbas expressed his views in support of Oumrane's ideas to Belkacem and other leaders of the FLN around the *Wilayas* in Algeria, saying that Ramdams's death had left a blot on the CCE, which could only be expunged if it were dissolved and swallowed up in the wider framework of a properly constituted government²⁶⁷

The CCE had proven itself to be ineffective and unable to guide the revolution, "while a government in exile could exert more authority and prestige."²⁶⁸ On 9 September, agreement was reached in Cairo on the principles and structure of a provisional government.

²⁶⁴ Ruedy, D. J. (2005).

²⁶⁵ Horne (1977), pp. 315-16.

²⁶⁶ Horne A. (1977), pp. 315-16.

²⁶⁷ Quoted in: Horne A. (1977), pp. 315-16.

²⁶⁸ Horne A. (1977), pp. 315-16.

A press conference was called to announce the creation of the GPRA. Abbas declared that the new Government would assume its duties from that day on. The new government would be located temporarily in Tunisia, the capital of Algeria's diplomatic representative abroad.²⁶⁹ As to the new government's ministers, there was strong competition among leaders to take part. One of the strongest positions was taken by Belkacem, who insisted on remaining the Minister of the Armed Forces while continuing his CCE function and serving as Vice-President to Ben Bella, who in turn passed the leadership of the new government to Abbas, who had extensive experience in dealing with the French Government.. The position of foreign minister was taken by Dr. Lamine Debaghine; Ben Tobbal took the Ministry of the Internal Affairs; Boussouf kept the Ministry of Communications, as well as the key role of running the intelligence services.²⁷⁰ Most of the ministers were nominated *in absentia*.²⁷¹ The FLN was largely unaffected by the creation of the GPRA, now headed by Abbas. The CCE was disestablished, and Abbas became the first leader of a centralised FLN.

The revolution was now driven by three key powerful men: the “three Bs”, Belkacem, Boussouf and Ben Tobbal, the same men who had brought about the downfall of Ramdane. The military intelligence service, under the leadership of Boussouf, acted energetically in bringing about the exclusion of many capable leaders including Colonel Ouamrane, who was widely thought to have had priority in leadership selection, and especially to have been the most likely candidate to at least share the supreme leadership of the revolution. The GPRA had been his own creation from the beginning. Boussouf, who had occupied a variety of positions in the military and politics of the revolution, departed from his position as commanding general of the Fifth Military Base, leaving Boumédiène in charge. One year later, in December 1959, Boumédiène established an ALN general staff under his direction in competition with GPRA. These two structures, which were ostensibly to be complementary,

²⁶⁹ Horne A. (1977), p. 316.

²⁷⁰ Boussouf was a strong presence in the government, and led the military intelligence services, which quickly developed into the most powerful organisation, and a ‘shadow power’. Rather than serving the expected role of information gathering, investigating unusual events, and preparing and organising military operations and political actions, it developed a spy network to be used against the FLN leaders, creating files on them, and preserving the information for a time when it might be needed. As noted above, Boussouf and Belkacem were accused of murdering Abane Ramdane and many of the other revolutionaries in what became a bloody competition for power. (Sidhum S., personal interview, Algiers, September 2009; Chouchane A., personal interview, London, July 2009).

²⁷¹ The ministerial positions were divided as follows: the former MTLN leader Dr. Lamine Dabaghine, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ben Tobbal, Minister of Interior; Boussouf, Minister of Communications (including the key role of running intelligence services); Yazid; who was successful in his missions in New York, as Minister of Information; Benkhadda, the former member of Hadj's (MTLN), assumed the function of Minister of Social Affairs. In reality, the power still remained in the hands of the “three Bs”: Krim Belkacem, Boussouf and Ben Tobbal. The originator of the new government's idea, Colonel Ouamrane, was apparently dropped on the grounds of being a political “light-weight” and too intolerant of politicians: see: Horne, A. (1977), p. 316.

were soon in conflict with each other. The GPRA had been designed to win the support of the international community and to undertake any eventual negotiations with France regarding Algerian independence.²⁷² The ALN, which had been weakened in 1958-1959 because of its isolation by the French Army, was quartered on the edge of the key neighborhoods, and was soon reorganized.²⁷³

It was significant in the context of the internal power struggle that the GPRA received the support of many of the Arab nations, who hastened to recognize the new government. Communist bloc countries, in particular, welcomed the new government, with countries such as China, Russia and other countries in Eastern Europe and even South America giving moral, if not material, support to the GPRA.²⁷⁴

5. De Gaulle's Plan and Algerian Independence: 1960 - 1962

General de Gaulle apparently already had a plan for resolving the Algerian crisis when he returned to power in late 1958. He had hoped from the first to put an end to the international community's harsh criticism of France. Some of the most strident critics were pushing the French government to settle the crisis in Algeria, whatever the price. De Gaulle revealed his plan to the public immediately after his visit to Algeria in 1958. The timing was not auspicious, however. While the French army was celebrating their victories over the ALN, civilians were struggling with their personal insecurity in Algiers and the other major cities. The FLN, which had been pursuing a policy of integration since 1930s, now insisted on full independence. De Gaulle's plan was effectively derailed, and he found himself waiting for the results of the security operations, the reactive policy which the military in Algeria, led by General Challes, preferred. For their part, the Army experienced some notable successes in their war efforts, but they were not "winning" the war *per se*, and at this juncture seemed unlikely to do so.

By 1960, de Gaulle had come to recognise that the war against the FLN would be never ending, and that he had to put a stop to it. He recognised that peace in Algeria could only take place through the granting of full independence. The primary remaining problem concerned the future status of the almost one million European colonists, many of whom had

²⁷² See Horne A (1977) Stora B. (2001); Sidhum S., personal interview, Algiers 2009.

²⁷³ Stora (2001), p. 83.

²⁷⁴ Khrushchev remained annoyingly aloof. The Russian leader's evident, and excellent, calculation that by not upsetting de Gaulle more mileage could be made in the disruption of the Western community than could be gained in recognizing the GPRA, ultimately paid off. The United States and Britain both played an ambivalent hand, neither recognizing the GPRA, nor supporting French policy in Algeria, an attitude which was enough to mortify and alienate de Gaulle. See Stora B. (2001); Horn A. (1977).

been born in Algeria. Sensing the direction of French policy, the colonists and army, both of whom advocated full integration of Algeria with France, staged major protests in 1960 and 1961. Both were put down by de Gaulle, who had now turned to negotiation as the only way to end the war in Algeria. Abbas had stubbornly sought integration with the French since the mid-1930s and 1940s, only to be repeatedly rebuffed by the French, who would only agree to limited integration of Muslim elites. Between 1958 and independence in 1962, the de Gaulle government tried and failed to win over the Muslim public. By then, however, they could no longer accept the presence of *harkis* and *pieds noirs*, seen as permanent threats, in a future 'peaceful coexistence'. Because of his longstanding support of integration, in mid-1961 Abbas was forced to resign from his position as prime minister of the GPRA and was immediately replaced by Ben Yusuf Benkhedda. Shortly thereafter, negotiations with the French government began, and in March, 1962, an agreement was signed. The accord provided for a ceasefire on both sides and for Algerian independence after a transition period.²⁷⁵

On 8 January 1961, de Gaulle had organised a general vote on the single political question of self-determination for Algeria, a proposal which won the support of 72.25 percent of the votes in France, and 69.09 percent of the votes in Algeria. The public support was a great advantage for de Gaulle, who then faced the wrath of the partisans of French Algeria. A number of military officers in Algeria openly denied the authority of the Head of State, also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and this, in effect, constituted mutiny. Immediately after the referendum, secret discussions took place. On 15 March de Gaulle announced that there would be a meeting with the FLN at Evian.²⁷⁶ At this point, the FLN was prepared to refuse to attend the roundtable discussions. On 22 April 1961, a meeting was held by French Generals Salan, Jouhaud, Challe and Zeller to discuss the possible seizure of power in Algiers to prevent negotiations with the FLN or any other Algerian representatives, and to force France to retain the name of *French Algeria (Algérie Française)*. De Gaulle was directly threatened by this, and exercised his full powers under Article 16 of the Constitution to defend himself and the role of the President of the Fifth Republic.²⁷⁷ He began to appear

²⁷⁵ See Stora, B. (2001), p. 78.

²⁷⁶ Edward Behr (1961), see Appendix 5, "The Evian Agreements".

²⁷⁷ The Article 16 of the French Constitution, which was launched officially on October 4, 1958:

- Where the institutions of the Republic, the Independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfilment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take measures required by these circumstances, after formally consulting the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Houses of Parliament and the Constitutional Council.

in the media in uniform, firmly condemning this attempted putsch, led, officially at least, by retired generals, bringing what amounted to an attempted *coup d'état* to an end after only four days. The supporters of an '*Algérie Française*' then formed a Secret Army Organisation (*Organisation de l'Armée Secrète* - OAS), and embarked on a campaign of terror in mainland France and Algeria. A massive wave of violence was carried out by the military against civilians in both France and Algeria, and numerous assassination attempts were made on de Gaulle, most notably at *Pont-sur-Seine* on 8 September 1961. According to Behr, the OAS was a terrorist organisation created to assassinate de Gaulle and to end the negotiations with the FLN. More than one hundred and fifty plastic bombs were detonated in France and Algeria during March and April, one of which took the life of the Mayor of Evian, Camille Blanc.²⁷⁸ General Challe was said to have been behind the distribution of tens of thousands of sub-machine guns and pistols from the police armory in Algiers to European extremist organisations. These organisations backed the OAS soldiers, committing violence against any civilian who chose to return to France or to support the independence agreement.

[Around fifty thousand members in large units from Algiers and Oran] were needed to prevent further 'activist' outbreaks...The paratrooper units and the Foreign Legion [were] undergoing drastic reorganisation, and large numbers of troops [were] tied up in internal security duties; it was difficult to keep up full-scale operations against the FLN guerrillas.²⁷⁹

The climate was therefore tense when the final phase of the negotiations between representatives of the French government and the FLN began in Evian on 7 March 1962. These negotiations followed on from the meetings at Melun (25-29 June 1960) between the French government and the GPRA, which had been made possible by the French army's total control of the territory, although they produced no conclusive results. Nevertheless, the Evian accords, signed on 18 March 1962, brought an end to the hostilities and gave independence to

-
- He shall address the Nation and inform it of such measures.
 - The measures shall be designed to provide the constitutional public authorities as swiftly as possible with the means to carry out their duties. The Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures.
 - Parliament shall sit as of right.
 - The National Assembly shall not be dissolved during the exercise of such emergency powers.
 - After thirty days of the exercise of such emergency powers, the matter may be referred to the Constitutional Council by the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators, so as to decide if the conditions laid down in paragraph one still apply. The Council shall make its decision publicly as soon as possible. It shall, as of right, carry out such an examination and shall make its decision in the same manner after sixty days of the exercise of emergency powers or at any moment thereafter.

²⁷⁸ Behr, E. (1961), p. 184; John Talbott, *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*. (New York: Knopf, 1980).

²⁷⁹ Behr, E (1961), pp. 184-185.

Algeria. De Gaulle expressed the wish that they would form the basis for Algeria and France to “march fraternally together along the road of civilisation.”²⁸⁰ The Evian accords, discussed in further detail below, were subsequently approved by 90.7% of the population of mainland France, in the referendum of 8 April 1962.

6. Evian and the Proclamation of the Cease-Fire

In May 1961 the French government and the FLN resumed the negotiations broken off at Melun in June 1960. With the internal political difficulties of the French and the FLN, the negotiations had not taken place until the following March, nearly a year after the collapse of the generals’ putsch. The negotiators were able to arrive at a cease-fire and at an agreement ending French sovereignty over Algeria. Talks with the FLN reopened at Evian in May 1961; the subsequent months of negotiation initially failed, with both sides witnessing some of the war’s most horrifying episodes.²⁸¹ The war started again with attacks on civilians carried out on both sides. OAS gunmen were reported to have shot and killed Algerians who were lying helpless in hospital beds.²⁸² Bombs were set off at many targets in Algiers, Oran and Paris. The FLN committed atrocities as well, most notably the shooting of European teenagers sunning themselves on a beach. Since General Challe was in prison, the logical and obvious leader of the OAS was Salan, who had gone into hiding with Robert Martel after the collapse of the putsch.²⁸³ The settlers feared that the failure of the putsch meant they were shortly to be thrown to the wolves. Moreover, the Army now had no way to initiate negotiations with Paris.

After several false starts, which led to the prolonging of the war in the cities and along the borders, the French government announced that a cease-fire would take effect on 19 March 1962. The GPRA made it known that settlers would not be welcome in the new Algeria. At Evian it became apparent how distant the two sides were. The GPRA did not stray from the generalities it had been putting out for public consumption. Its delegates seemed ready, on the main points at hand, to hold out for all of their demands, and willing in

²⁸⁰ See Behr, E.(1961), pp. 184-185; Stora, B. (2001), pp. 81-83; Horne, A.(1977), p. 480.

²⁸¹ See Horne, A. (1977), pp. 452-55.

²⁸² The OAS could be described as the most threatening terrorist organisation against the Algerian Muslims: it was the direct successor of the *pieds noirs* “counter-terrorist” organisations that had flourished ever since 1956. It had begun its use of terrorism with the assassination of the young liberal Algiers lawyer, Maitre Papie, in January 1961, following it up with the even more irrelevant killing of the mayor of Evian on the eve of the first peace talks there. Many leaders in the OAS, who never accepted dialogue with Algerians, clung to the notion of “*Algerie Francais*”.

²⁸³ For more details, see Horne A. (1977), pp. 480-81.

that regard to accept complete failure. They were particularly adamant that two of their demands be met, those regarding the unity of the Algerian territory and the unity of the Algerian people.²⁸⁴ The French dream to keep control of the Sahara, and to continue to rule over French minorities, from Jewish citizens to *Pieds noirs*, faced strong opposition from the GPRA, which based the future economics of this new country on absolute national sovereignty, which, in turn, included complete control over the oil and gas of the desert.

In their final form, the Evian Accords allowed the settlers equal legal protection as Algerians over a three-year period. Those rights included respect for property, participation in public affairs, and a full range of civil and cultural rights. However, after that period Europeans would be obliged to become Algerian citizens or be classified as aliens with an attendant loss of rights.

As noted above, the French electorate approved the Evian Accords by an overwhelming 90.7 percent vote in a referendum held on 8 April 1962. Despite this approval, however, members of the French army in Algeria banded together in the OAS, and launched an armed campaign against Muslims in an attempt to prevent the implementation of the accord. By late April, their leader, General Salan, was captured, and by late June the army revolt ended. During April of 1962 settlers had begun to leave Algeria in large numbers: around 350,000 colonials left Algeria during that month alone. Within a year, 1.4 million refugees, including almost the entire Jewish community and some pro-French Muslims, had joined the exodus to France. By October, less than 30,000 Europeans remained.²⁸⁵ The toll that the war had taken was enormous, and not only in terms of the migration that occurred following the Evian Accords. After more than seven years of fighting, at least 100,000 Muslim and 10,000 French soldiers had been killed; in addition, many thousands of Muslim civilians and a smaller number of colonists lost their lives.²⁸⁶

7. The Proclamation of Independence, 5 July 1962

The resolution of the Algerian war came down to Evian, and intensive negotiations over what was arguably the most complicated case in French political history. The Evian accords represented the most significant change in Algerian history. Independence had been won, but it was difficult for the revolutionaries in the FLN to realize that circumstances had changed and that France was now resigned to the reality of a sovereign Algeria. The victory

²⁸⁴ Roger Le Tourneau, *Evaluation Politique de l'Afrique du Nord Musulmane* (Paris, 1962), p. 308.

²⁸⁵ Algerian National Liberation (1954-1962) <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria.htm>>.

²⁸⁶ For more details, see Stora (2001); also Mohammed Bedjaoui, *La Revolution Algerienne et le droit* (Brussels: 1961); tr. *The Law and the Algerian Revolution* (London, 1961).

had raised the hopes of the Algerian people, especially with the ceasefire of March 19, 1961. It is not an exaggeration to say that the ALN proceeded to dash those hopes in favour of opportunism and selfishness in a bloody competition for power. This behaviour would sow the seeds of the massive of violence that later occurred in the country, and continues to the present day.

It is virtually certain that, had it not been for the large settler community in Algeria, France would never have gone to war to keep Algeria French. Protecting the settlers remained the government's most passionate and worrisome concern. French peace overtures were made when the Sahara had not yet been included as part of the new country. The GPRA had rejected any agreement that did not regard Algeria as it had been before the French occupation, and this necessarily included the Sahara. The FLN saw this as a secondary question, and hence accepted the initial French proposal except for several points, including the French demand that they keep the French minorities then living in Algeria. As noted repeatedly above, however, protecting the settlers remained the French government's most passionate and worrisome concern. Nevertheless, there were strong grounds for agreement, including that:

- Europeans in Algeria would remain French; they would enjoy Algerian civil rights, at least in the interim, and would be permitted to participate in Algerian political, administrative and municipal life without having to make any formal request to do so. Within three years of self-determination they could ask to become Algerian citizens. Algeria would then cease to regard them as French, and thus the unity of the Algerian people would be preserved. France could continue to regard the settlers as French.²⁸⁷ The Algerian negotiators refused the French demand that the Europeans hold dual citizenship as long as they lived in Algeria; after several years France would allow them to renounce their Algerian nationality, if they wished, and remain French. In fact, the settlers quickly found a place for themselves in the rapidly expanding mainland economy; reclaiming farms that had gone to ruin became a common economic pattern. Many settled in the South of France to get the best of both countries, and they became the main political and cultural bridge of the future relationship between the two countries.

²⁸⁷ For more details, See Claude Estier, *La Gauche hebdomadaire, 1914-1962* (1962), pp. 181-206; Benjamin Stora, *Ils Venaient D'Algerie L'immigration Algerienne en France 1912-1992* (France: Librarie Artheme Fayard, 1992).

- The other issue that played a key part in the agreement involved the property rights of the Europeans, and French rights to the petroleum deposits in the Algerian desert, which the French government had already ceded to third parties for the mining and transport of oil and gas. The GPRA agreed to respect the property rights of the Europeans as well as to accord French petroleum companies preferential treatment in the granting of new permits for exploration and exploitation, and to undertake no discriminatory measures against such companies.²⁸⁸
- In essence, the parties agreed that the Algerian people consisted only of non-Europeans. The European settlers could choose to become Algerian citizens within a few years of independence, but if they refused, they would remain foreigners. In either case, their rights with respect to language, religion, and other civil liberties would be respected.²⁸⁹

John Talbott has described what de Gaulle was thinking in his declaration of October 1961 when he noted that de Gaulle envisioned the future relationship between France and Algeria to be one of association, not quite a commonwealth arrangement, but not quite a relationship between sovereign states either. France, the senior partner in this association, would continue to supply the junior member with the technical expertise and economic assistance provided under the Constantine Plan, and would still enjoy certain vestigial rights to the use of defense bases, and so on.²⁹⁰ De Gaulle dropped references to ‘association’ and spoke instead of “France’s co-operation²⁹¹ offered to the new Algeria for its life and development....”²⁹² In other words, France would not take responsibility for Algeria’s well-being, but offered some foreign aid to this new nation. The reality of the situation was now clear: Algeria was to be left in a significantly worse situation, at least initially, than before independence.

²⁸⁸ For more details, see Talbott, J. *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: Knopf, 1980), p. 229.

²⁸⁹ Quandt, *Revolution and political leadership*, pp. 38-39; Jean-Claude Vatin, *L’Algerie politique; Histoire et Societe* (1974), pp. 199-214.

²⁹⁰ Talbott, J., *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*.(New York: Knopf, 1980), p. 227.

²⁹¹ “Cooperation” implied a more remote relationship between the former colonising power and the new state of Algeria.

²⁹² Berque, Jacques, *Le Maghreb enter deux guerres* (Paris, 1962), p. 244.

8. Independence

On 16 March 1962, peace finally, if only temporarily, returned to Algeria's cities. A ceasefire was also proclaimed in the countryside. The Foreign minister of the GPRA, Belkassem, met with his team of negotiators and digned his name next to those of the French negotiators appointed by General de Gaulle. The French Prime Minister, Michel Dibré, declared: "We are reaching the end of a painful ordeal. Malraux spoke of victory, but it is instead a victory over ourselves. Now everything will depend on what France will become."²⁹³ Three days later, the Organisation Armée Secrete (OAS) leaders proclaimed that the French forces would now be considered "occupation troops" in Algiers. The activist supporters of "*Algérie Française*" gathered in Bab al-Ouad (a suburb in Algiers) and seized power against the wishes of their government. Armed protestors attacked the military trucks of the French Army as they began their exodus to France, killing 35 and wounding at least 150.

On 26 March protestors from the more extremist settler groups, along with the OAS, declared a general strike in the region of Algiers. They gathered at Glieres Plateau and at Laferriere Square, appearing at first to be nothing more than peaceful protestors. Their real objective was to break through the encirclement around the district.²⁹⁴ At the same time, other protestors met in the central part of Oran, the second largest city, 500 kilometers west of Algiers. The OAS soldiers then attacked a clinic belonging to Doctor Jean-Marie Larribère, a communist militant who was very well known in the city. After this, they turned on bars and well-known cafés, shopping malls and factories. The violence quickly intensified, with the loss of hundreds of Muslim lives as bombs were detonated in public places such as weekly markets and mosques. Socialists, including scholars and intellectuals, were killed in cold blood. The public library and four schools were destroyed. Hundreds of Oranians left their homes in the city in search of safety with their families in the villages and in the countryside. The violence continued for some time, and the remaining settlers' flight to France accelerated: "it became apparent that the Europeans of Algeria had begun to leave their native land *en masse*, headed for the metropole."²⁹⁵ Most of the *pieds noirs* had left Algeria by May, 1962. The OAS leaders who were still free knew they had lost the struggle.

As a French colonial organisation reflecting the fury and despair of a dying society, the OAS continued in ever more destructive paths as the movement toward independence

²⁹³ Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de L'Algerie Coloniale, 1830 – 1954* (Paris: La Decouverte, 1991).

²⁹⁴ Stora (2001), p. 98.

²⁹⁵ Lacouture, J 1962, *Algerie, Nation et societe* (Paris: Maspéro, 1985).

accelerated, but it had lost hope of changing the regime in France or altering the course of history.²⁹⁶

On 18 June 1962, and after the rejection of an agreement between Jean-Jacques Suisini, in the name of OAS, and the FLN, OAS soldiers attacked Oran, and left behind them a city engulfed in smoke and fire. OAS commandos attacked at least six banks following the announcement of the former leader of the first foreign regiment of paratroopers and head of the Oran's OAS, Colonel Dufour, that "the OAS should lay down its weapons," and make preparations to flee. Most of the OAS commandos were subsequently captured and the last of them went into exile by the end of June.²⁹⁷

On 1 July 1962, 6 million Algerian voters answered "yes" to the question, "Do you want Algeria to become an independent state cooperating with France under the conditions defined by the declaration of March 19, 1962?" A mere 19,534 voters said "No", according to results announced on 3 July. Out of 91.23 percent of registered voters, 99.72 percent participated in the poll.²⁹⁸ July 5th, 1962, was the official end of the war, although the violence continued. Hundreds were wounded in Oran alone on the eve of independence. Nevertheless, this date marked Algeria's full and final independence, and the end of the French military presence in Algeria. The French continued to control key aspects of Algerian life through their agents. Significantly, on 12 July 1962, Ben Bella moved into Oran, and yet another battle for power among FLN leaders began, and in some respects continues, as will be seen in the following chapters.

The Evian Accords signed in March 1962 gave Algeria immediate independence while providing French aid to help reconstruct the country. The French Sahara, with its oil resources, was also handed over to Algeria. In return, the FLN guaranteed protection and civil rights for the French Algerians choosing to remain in the country, and the option of choosing either French or Algerian nationality after three years.²⁹⁹

After almost eight years of war that had shattered Algeria, with over a million Algerian casualties and over two million Algerians who had lost their homes, the trauma continued. For over a century the French had deprived the Algerians of virtually all

²⁹⁶ John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria the Origin and Development of a Nation*, second edition (Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 179-180.

²⁹⁷ Stora, B. (2001), pp. 104-06; see also: the Original Document of the Evian agreements, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3rd April, 1962, Copy NO. 50 (British National Archives), Chapter 9; also: Appendix 5, "The Evian Agreements".

²⁹⁸ For more details see: Stora (2001), pp. 104-06; Talbott, J. *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: Knopf, 1980), pp. 244-49.

²⁹⁹ See: Appendix 5, "The Evian Agreements".

opportunities to become involved in the country's infrastructure and institutions. Algerians had been held in a subclass of servants, unskilled labourers and peasants. The departure of the French left the country without the skilled labour to keep the country running. Literacy, at 70 per cent before the invasion of the French, had dropped to less than 10 per cent by the end of the colonial period. French military officers and administrators had penetrated the highest levels of Algerian government, however, and some observers believe that this de Gualle's plan from the beginning.³⁰⁰ Moreover, internal conflicts within the FLN that had been set-aside during the war soon re-emerged, and power struggles between various factions of the FLN began again in earnest.

³⁰⁰ Zitout, M. A., personal interview, London, 12/2013.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARY AND THE STRUCTURING OF VIOLENCE IN ALGERIA

1. Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the historical background of Algeria, beginning with the French colonial period, exploring the political resistance and the War of Independence and following through to the end of colonialism in 1962 and the formation of a new Algeria for “Algerians”. This chapter examines the post-colonial period and the political phases that Algeria has experienced since, focusing on the political crisis experienced by the new government of Algeria. There was no doubt that France’s departure left behind a massive hole in the country, with a lack of skilled labour, particularly in the education, medical and justice sectors. A majority of the Algerians who took up arms against the French were uneducated. Even the remaining elites and FLN leaders were far removed from the mechanics of politics, lacking the requisite skills in decision making and governing a newly independent Algeria. The few who had the political experience before and during the conflict had either been arrested or killed by the French, or had been killed by their supposed allies. The deaths of Ramdane at the hands of his friend Bousouf, and Chaabanie who was killed by Boumédiène and Ben Bella, robbed the country of political and institutional knowledge. This chapter, then, will focus on the formation of Algeria and its bureaucracies.

At the centre of this new wave of violence that followed the end of the colonial period was an internal conflict that emerged among the FLN members in a bloody competition for power, and an invasion by the ANP army in late 1962, led by Boumédiène and formed outside of Algeria’s borders. These young fighters had been brothers-in-arms with those whom they now attacked. Influenced by the opportunistic leaders of the National Liberation Front, they were now caught up in what became a bloody race for governance without any real professional skills to justify the roles they were trying to claim. The violence that resulted continued, increasingly targeting civilians and intellectuals, until October 1988, when Algerians finally revolted. This virtual *coup* against the status quo resulted in the deaths and injury of hundreds of young civilians, most of them students in high schools and universities, attacked by the Algerian army. It was the new army, then, that attacked civilians in the first significant violence after the *coup d’état* of Boumédiène against GPRA in 1962-63. This wave of discontent assumed a more violent aspect with mass riots and popular demonstrations, shaking the Algerian state to its very foundations. According to Bougherira, the result was to place pressure on the slow process of reforms that had begun in the early

1980s so that by 1989, the state adopted a new constitution, radically transforming the political life of contemporary Algeria.³⁰¹ A number of changes followed. For the first time in the history, Algeria adopted a multi-party democratic system. However, the formation and electoral dominance of FIS, and the coup d'état that followed, put Algeria in a difficult position, with renewed human rights violations and another cycle of terrorism.

This chapter also examines the leadership of Algeria post-independence, tracing the direct and indirect responsibility for human rights violations, especially after the death of Boumédiène in 1978. A majority of the interviewees who have participated in this research, as well as information in secondary sources, point to the French Officers who dominated the political scene during the presidency of Bendjedid and then took power after coup of 1992.

2. Historical background of the post-independence era

After the Algerian War of Independence, Boumédiène and his troops launched a coup from bases on Algeria's borders against the Government of the Provisory Republic of Algeria (GPRA). The establishment of a government of the peoples' choice after seven years of bloody war was difficult, and Algerians had paid a huge price for their independence. Their new leaders, afraid of losing their hard-won independence, had merely avoided conflict of any sort after the departure of the French.

The first government had been established under the new constitution of Algeria, enacted in 1963. Amidst a massive wave of violence against the original revolutionaries, Boumédiène's troops, with some support from the FLN fighters, established a new regime after making a deal with Ben Bella to lead the country against the GPRA. The military had dominated power under the FLN, the only political party with a council of revolutionaries. This was appointed by Boumédiène for the express purpose of giving full support to his regime. This chapter will examine the sources of power in the formation of the military regime in Algeria, although its main focus will be on the violations of human rights that were so much a part of this, and included murder, disappearances, torture and political imprisonment.

³⁰¹Mohammed Bougherira, "Algeria's Foreign Policy 1979-1992: Continuity and / or Change", *PhD thesis, European Studies Research Institute, School of English, Sociology, Politics and Contemporary History University of Salford, Salford, UK*, p.4; there are several studies that have dealt with the 1988 demonstrations and their aftermath. See, for example, Khalid Duran "The Second Battle of Algiers", in Daniel Pipes, *Sandstorm* (New York: University Press of America, 1987), pp. 33-60; Arun Kapil, "L'évolution du régime autoritaire en Algérie: Le 5 Octobre et Les reormes politiques de 1988-89", *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord (AAN)*, vol. 29, 1990, pp.417-457; Martin Stone, *The Agony of Algeria* (C.Hurst and Co.Publishers: London, 1997), pp.64-209; and Michael Willis, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria* (Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd: 1996), pp.107-392.

The Algerian military regime was responsible for structuring violence through dictatorship after seizing power in Algeria after independence in 1962.³⁰² The first regime was dominated by a group of military officers, and soon resorted to massacres and other blatant human rights violations against Algerian citizens. The *coup d'état* of 1962 against the GPRA had disregarded the interests of hundreds, if not thousands, of citizens, including politicians and a large portion of the Algerian elites, who were well educated and the most competent to fill positions at the many levels of governance in Algeria. The competition for power among the revolutionaries and those still stationed at the militant bases outside of Algeria's borders contributed to open conflict and, in a number of cases, massacres. Violence was the only likely way for the militant conspirators to seize power in Algeria. In 1965, the elected President of the Republic, Ben Bella, was arrested and placed under house arrest and then in exile for more than 25 years. Violence became the continuing *modus operandi* after that time.

As noted above, competition among the post-revolutionary leaders was the primary cause of the ensuing violence in Algeria. Tens of thousands of people were killed during and after the war for independence, often by close colleagues. Ramdane, Chaabani and 'Arbi Ben Mhedi, all fell victim to the struggle, and the Algerian people were thus deprived of their potential political contributions. Competition among military officers for power also created a large gap between regional leaders and the central power, as represented by the GPRA; at one point a key meeting in Tripoli in effect represented a *coup d'état* against the Soummam Congress.³⁰³ Moreover, it was this competition that opened the door for French Officers to join the revolution through military bases in the East and outside the borders, and hence they were able to gain influence without having been involved in battles inside Algeria.

French Officers, then, were the other factor responsible for the hegemony of the military against the politicians in this bloody competition. It was this competition that ultimately resulted in massive violence against Algerians in the many subsequent *coups d'état*. It included the jailing of Ben Bella, the first President of the Republic, in 1965, and the murder of Mohamed Boudiaf in 1993, along with the subsequent murders of hundreds of

³⁰² This judgment was repeated frequently in the literature, by many scholars, politicians and former military officers. See, for example, Samraoui, M. *Chronicle of the Bloody years* (Geneva: Hoggar, 2001); Brahim. Abdelhamid, *Aux origines de la tragédie algérienne (1958-2000)* (Geneva : Hoggar & London, Centre for Maghreb Studies, 2000); and Brahim's interview published at: <www.algeria-voice.org>. Also, the Rachad organisation at: <<http://www.rachad.org>> ; and: <<http://www.anp.org>>; all of my interviewees agreed with this opinion; for example: Chouchane, A., personal interview, London, July 2009.

³⁰³ Nine disaffected revolutionary leaders met in Tripoli with Libyan and Egyptian security services officers, all of them in strident opposition to the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA).

politicians and elites. Many questions have been raised about the death of the second president of Algeria, Boumédiène, in 1978. Brahim, one of the revolution leaders and former prime minister confirmed that Boumédiène was poisoned by one of the French Officers.³⁰⁴ The *coup d'état* of 1992 opened a new chapter of violence against civilians, and left thousands of civilians' dead, including President Boudiaf, who was shot in front of the public and the media. Thousands of Algerians were jailed in the process, many of whom are still missing today.³⁰⁵ Many scholars and political analysts have blamed the events of 1992 on the military regime, principally for seizing and retaining hegemony in Algeria following independence. The *coup* of 1992, conducted by a group of French-trained officers, sometimes referred to as 'the deserters',³⁰⁶ against the first fully open and free elections in Algeria, appears to have been directly related to the French agencies and their economic interests in the area.³⁰⁷ This *coup*, which affected the majority of Algerians, was characterised by the regime at the time as a popular liberation from Islamic domination, and hence to protect 'democracy'.³⁰⁸

Stora states that the people who made up Algerian society after 1962 were placed in a unique situation: they had no point of reference during the years of war that might have helped them to develop and improve upon their ethos, or to change their behaviour, and thus they had a sense that they were living in an unpredictable and arbitrary situation. Many of them had apparently begun to think primarily about their personal interests, having been 'up-rooted' with painful memories of their past, with their anxieties exacerbated by the loss of identity.³⁰⁹ To comprehend what is happening today in Algeria, one must consider the historical and ideological foundations of the state as it emerged from the War of Independence. Central to the Algerian state was the army, which had become the country's

³⁰⁴ Aljazeera TV: "Personal Visit", Abdelhamid Brahim, interview, October 3, 2009.

³⁰⁵ See Bedjaoui, Aroua and Ait-Larbi (1999), *Comite Algérien des Militants Libres de la dignité Humaine et des Droits de L'Homme, Livre Blanc sur la Répression en Algérie 1991-1995, les Vérités sur une guerre cache*, Vol. I-II (Geneva: Hoggar, 1995); also: <<http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/links/Links.htm>>; and the Algerian Committee of Free Militants for Human Dignity and Human Rights website: <<http://www.anp.org/frenindex/frentree.html>>.

³⁰⁶ Brahim, A. H. (2000) ; Hamoumou, M. *Et ils sont devenue harkis*, preface de Dominique Schnapper (Paris: Fayard, 1993), p. 46; Brahim, A., Interview, Maroc Hebdo International / 15Fevrier 1998, pub. at <<http://www.algeria-watch.org>>; also: personal interview with Salahuddine Sidhum, in France, September 2009.

³⁰⁷ Interview avec Abdelhamid Brahim, Maroc Hebdo International / 15Fevrier 1998, pub. At <<http://www.algeria-watch.org>>; also personal interview with Abbas Aroua and Dhia in Geneva on September 2009, and personal interview with Anwar Haddam in USA, from Hamilton, NZ, by phone, recorded (21 May 2009).

³⁰⁸ Nezzar, K. La Mémoires, préface de Ali Haroun (Alger: Chihab, 2000), See a film documentary made by Malik Ait-Aoudia and Severine Labat, in French TVs (France 5 and France 3), titled: *Algerie 1988-2000, Autopsie d'une Tragedie*, 2003, published in the web. < <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqEnygWEH6w>> .

³⁰⁹ Stora, B. (2001), p. 119.

legitimacy-granting authority. Leaders remained in intense competition with each other to ascend the pyramid of power in the new Algeria. Lahouari Addi prefaced his comments on *legitimacy* by characterising it as a standard by which to attain high political position.³¹⁰ The legitimacy upon which any system of power rests is fundamentally based upon principles that are forged in the history of each country. In Algeria, legitimacy is inseparable from the struggle that the independence movement waged against French colonial domination in the 1950s and early 1960s.

The intervention of the military into the political system was based upon the legitimacy of revolution. The military acted as the ‘owners’ of the nation by virtue of their victory against the French. While national sovereignty added to the legitimacy gained from the revolution, competition among revolutionary leaders of the ALN, the ANP and economic opportunists in particular, was manifest. This internecine competition, then, brought about a splitting of the state's power that would have deleterious consequences for the state's provision of services and the efficiency of its decision making well into the future. From that time on, most of the political power in Algeria, based upon the “power of legitimation,” has been retained by the army and the executive power that the army cedes occasionally to civilians to run the government and handle the rents from the country’s income, which is based primarily upon energy exports.³¹¹

This legacy plays itself out today. The government's everyday doings are hampered by the clientelistic practices of networks that enjoy the support of high-ranking army officers.³¹² Everyone involved retains a political position or administrative power vested in official responsibilities, but only insofar as a privileged individual relationship with a member of the military hierarchy is preserved. Such relationships in Algeria have become the basis for choosing people for various positions, and successful relationships between state personnel and individuals in society are particularistic rather than universalistic,³¹³ whether they are based on family or tribal bonds or on common material interests. Addi states that

³¹⁰ Lahouari Addi, Interview, *Rachad TV* “Pouvoir Armée DRS” (14 November 08) Pub. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LA4ip75Seuw>.

³¹¹ Addi, L., “Algeria's Tragic Contradictions”, *Journal of Democracy* – Vol. 7, No. 3 July 1996, pp. 94-107. See Brahim, A. H. (2000), pp.117-252.

³¹² Addi, L. (1996), Brahim, A.H. *Aljazeera, TV*, “Special visit” interview, in London, “the background of Algerian Politics”, 5/10/2009, published in the *Aljazeera TV* web. <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CF6F81B3-3A29-454D-B8E9-07339A59F61C.htm>

³¹³ Addi, L. (1996), Joffe G., “The role of violence within the Algerian economy”; *Journal of North African Studies*, 7,1, Spring 2002, pp 6-18. See Brahim, A. H. (2000), p 290, See the Aljazeera TV interview with Brahim A. H. (2009).

...the state, [then,] exists in two dimensions: in one, it is visible, official, obedient to rules; in the other, it is obscure, hidden from public view, guided by a changing balance of forces that only initiates can discern.³¹⁴

Personal security has become extremely tenuous in Algeria. The country continues to face the decay of the military system that was begun by Boumédiène after 1963. Human rights in Algeria remain the last item on the agenda of opportunistic and powerful generals. Human rights are theoretically protected by the constitution of the country, but since the military enjoys a dominant position, there is no real respect for the constitution.

That the regime has been consistently supported by the West is confusing from the context of global democracy. The support for the regime is apparently based on economic interests. It is thus interesting to examine this case through the prism of neo-colonialism; this perspective is useful in sorting through the often-confusing evidence of the Algerian military regime and, particularly, understanding the French who supported the violence and human rights abuses in Algeria. Economic opportunism among people in power, including businessmen and generals, many of whom continue to exercise power in Algeria, will also be taken into consideration in this chapter in an attempt to unravel the causes of violence in Algeria.

3. The Role of the Military in the Proliferation of Violence

Many scholars have analysed the causes of the Algerian crisis with a focus on the nature of the regime itself. According to Brahim Abdelhamid, the absence of democracy, liberty and transparency in the functioning of institutions ultimately caused the crises of Algeria, and particularly the crisis of the 1990s. It was based on the absence of a separation of the powers of the executive, legislative and judiciary, as well as on the regime structure and the internal conflict between members inside the ruling circle during the last four decades. This led to a crisis of confidence, which periodically undermined the Algerian regime before being intensely exacerbated by the political and social explosions of the 1990s.

Abbas Aroua and Anwar Haddam view the changes that have taken place in Algerian politics as a systemic transformation, one which responded to international waves of change and global patterns that fit democracy far better than dictatorship. Nonetheless, the power structure in Algeria had remained the same since independence. Youcef Bouandel states that a comparison with the past is useful in understanding the change of political power from

³¹⁴ Addi, L. (July 1996), p. 2.

dictatorship to a more democratic form of government in Algeria today. The nature of the authoritarian regime is helpful in explaining the “weakness of newly created/legalized political parties in the early stages of the process of transition”.³¹⁵ And while it is helpful in understanding the crisis of Algeria, one must first analyse the current political structure to identify the main protagonists and examine the relationships between them, and the main issues that divide them.

There are two institutions that comprise the power of the contemporary state in Algeria, and both were inherited from the War of Independence (1954-1962): the army and the government. These institutions date back to the dichotomous power of the resistance bases outside of Algeria, which were commanded by general staff of ALN, and the GPRA.³¹⁶ The GPRA was set up in 1958 to represent the FLN abroad, mobilise the funds needed to organise the underground movement, and support the refugees who had fled to Morocco and Tunisia. Stora states “the task of the GPRA was to win support on the international political scene and to undertake any eventual negotiation with France.”³¹⁷ But it was the general staff of the ALN that was actually in charge of the Revolution.³¹⁸ When the war ended, the ALN “dismissed” the GPRA and took over the running of the new state. Almost half a century after independence, the key decision maker in Algeria remains the military, and the government is still seen as the body that executes policies made by the army.³¹⁹

The experience of Algerian politics demonstrates above all that Algeria has never achieved the stability that diverse political opinion and opposing political systems could have brought to the country, and as such, Algerians have never enjoyed peace, neither before nor after independence. Even with 132 years of French colonial presence, including seven years of active warfare at a cost of more than two million lives, Algeria is still paying the “bloody” price of long-term colonialism. Continuing violence remains an integral part of the socialist system of government established after independence. It is alive and thriving today, with the public sector playing a pivotal role.

³¹⁵ Youcef Bouandel, “Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 1 (2003), pp. 1–22.

³¹⁶ Bonner, M. D., Reif M., Tessler, M. A., *Islam, democracy and the state in Algeria: lessons for the western, Mediterranean and Beyond* (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2005), pp. 3-8.

³¹⁷ Stora, B. (2001), p.83; also: Stora, *Histoire de l’Algérie coloniale, 1830-1954* (Reperes. Paris: La découverte, 1991).

³¹⁸ Personal interview with Salaheddine Sidhum, conducted in France on 11 September 2009; also Saadallah, B. *al-Harakaat al-wataniya* (the National Movements), Vol. 4 (Arabic Organisation for education, culture and science, Research Institute and Arabic Studies, ANU, Cairo, Ed. 2).

³¹⁹ General Khaled Nezzar, interview, in a film documentary made by Malik Ait-Aoudia and Severine Labat, in French TVs (France 5 and France 3), entitled: *Algerie 1988-2000, Autopsie d’une Tragedie*, 2003, published in the web. < <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqEnygWEH6w>>.

The regime's legitimacy has rested mainly on historical grounds, particularly regarding the role that the FLN played during the War of Independence. It has also depended on the state's ability to provide for most of its citizens' economic and social needs. The country's economic performance, particularly enhanced by the generation of 'healthy hydrocarbon' revenues, has enabled the state to invest in social programmes such as free education, health care and subsidised housing. While these can be viewed as good and worthwhile achievements, there remains a darker side to this period, where the regime has systematically violated political rights and civil liberties. Under the umbrella of the revolution, the regime has systematically limited political and individual rights, and has targeted freedom of association, in particular.

From an opposing view, Muslim Baba-Arbi wrote in his paper, "The Military Association and the Path of Democratic Change in Algeria," that the history of the Algerian military is tied exclusively to the independence war, while the ALN, in contrast, were the first to re-structure Algerian society after 1963. Baba-Arbi notes the statement of researcher Elias Boukraa that "it is kind of exaggeration to identify the Algeria political system as military...."³²⁰ Elias Boukraa clarified his statement by defining what he meant by a military system: one that is defined five conditions. The first is: the full presence of the military as a leading power; Second is: the full subordination of political power to the military; Third is: the complete domination of military ideology; fourth is: the use of military intervention to control the country's affairs, and its full control over the political space; fifth is the full independence of the military in managing themselves in their own bases.³²¹

According to Boukraa, in applying these five points of the military system's definition to the Algerian power structure, only two conditions are applicable: the independence of the military and its control over the political space.³²² Therefore, Boukraa observes that it is an exaggeration to refer to Algeria as a military regime: the military does not dominate all political positions, and has no any ideology capable of hegemony.

On the other hand, Houari notes that while the military is prominent in the Algerian political system, Algeria is nevertheless not a military regime or a military dictatorship such as those evident in Latin America in the mid – late 20th century. It is, rather, an authoritarian regime that obtains its legitimacy from the army. Even though it now has a multi-party

³²⁰ Muslim Baba Arbi, "almo'assasa al-Askariya wa al-Tahuwal al-Democratey fi al-Djaza'ir", Article published in in the *Magazine of the University Kasdi Marbah*, Ouargla, Algeria, 2002.

³²¹ Boukraa, Elias, *al-alaqat al-madaniya wa al askariya fi aljaza'ir*, [Civilian Military Relationship in Algeria], *Military Magazine*, No. 461 (December 2001), p. 6.

³²² Boukraa, E. (2001).

system, the de facto appointment of all presidents remains with the military, and elections are merely processes to legitimize military options. Addi regards the military in Algeria as a hegemonic political party exercising domination over civilian political parties in ways that are similar to those of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in the past. He adds that the military regime delegates authority to the civilian elites, but does not allow them to exercise real political power: “the Army is the source of power”³²³

Baba-Arbi notes that the contemporary Algerian military is a direct descendant of the revolutionary army, but one that denies all of its revolutionary past. Sidhum, on the other hand, denies that the military has any relation to the ALN,³²⁴ which was essentially the internal force during the war. The military was structured by Boumédiène and supported the continuation of the French Officers. Most of the ALN officers were killed or jailed, and the survivors were later excluded from the military.³²⁵ Boumédiène forced them to retire, albeit with some privileges, such as permitting them to own small businesses, such as coffee shops. Moreover, he allotted free transport to them as well as pensions, an obvious concession to keep them from interfering with his powers and agenda.

Sidhum and Chouchane and others have clarified³²⁶ the formation of contemporary Algeria.³²⁷ Sidhum recounts the background of ten colonels who were commanders of foreign military bases, and who, in a meeting in Tripoli in 1958, changed the principles of the revolution. They assumed the right to change the council members (Council National Republic Algerian -CNRA) as well as the GPRA, and then they created a new group called “*L'état Major des Frantiers*”. Boumédiène became a leader of this group. It was further strengthened by the adherence of French sub-officers, who had deserted from French military bases and joined Boumédiène's bases outside the borders, well beyond the battlefields.

³²³ Lahouari Addi, “L'Armée, La Nation et l'état en Algérie”, *Confluences Méditerranée*, N° 29 (1999), pp. 39-46.

³²⁴ Salah-Eddine Sidhoum, surgeon and defender of human rights in Algeria, decided, after nine years of clandestine writing, a period during which he was the subject successively of a smear campaign, an attempt on his life by a death squad, and a court sentence of twenty years in prison in absentia in Vichyist, to leave hiding and to present himself before the court. Assisted by an international collective of lawyers, he contested the judgment openly.

³²⁵ Personal interview with Salah-Eddine Sidhum, conducted in Algiers on 1 September 2009.

³²⁶ Captain Chouchane is a former officer in the Algerian military, 1978 -1994, and his central role was to train the parachutists, and to serve as a lecturer in the military school of Charchel, Algiers, teaching military ethics and relations between military troops. He fled the country after he was jailed, and narrowly avoided death when an assassination plot was launched against him in 1994.

³²⁷ Personal interviews with many of the participants, conducted in different places in Europe, e.g., Sidhum and Souaidia in France, Chouchane, Zitout and Brahimi in London, Aroua, Dhina and Masli in Switzerland, and others. All of them have shared the same view of the formation of the military regime in Algeria. The history that is closest to these views is that of Stora, B. (2001).

Baba-Arbi expresses a preference for military control in Algeria over that of the politicians, on the grounds that the latter were not capable of exercising real power in Algeria. However, most of the interviewees in this study did not agree with this stance. First, there were capable professional politicians in Algeria after the war, although competition among the military officers for the power during the war had led to the deaths of many of them, including Ramdane, Mohammed Larbi Ben M'hidi and Mustapha Benboulaïd. Others were able to take charge of international affairs. Ben Bella, Aït Ahmed and Brahimi played significant roles as politicians in both local and international events. Second, as Mesli and Sidhum noted, the French authorities were conscious of their interests in the country as they continually sought to adhere to a specific set of policies that ostensibly supported their dealings within Algeria, and especially their economic interests.³²⁸

According to Chouchane, the regime in Algeria after independence depended vitally upon one person: Boumédiène. After his victory over the GPRA, Boumédiène moved to consolidate power quickly. He staged another *coup d'état*, this time against his ally and the person who had supported his rise to prominence (albeit for his own purposes, to seize power and to attain a high position). The then president, Ben Bella was removed without resistance. Boumédiène, who now had complete power, seized the opportunity to reorganize the ministries in December 1964; he considerably reduced the duties of the Minister of Planning and Guidance, Belkacem, who was a member of Oujda group, which controlled the Ministries of Information, National Education, and Youth.³²⁹ As the president of the Republic, head of the government and Secretary General of the FLN, Boumédiène controlled appointments of the Minister of Interior, Finance and Information. Opposition forces thus banded together against Ben Bella.³³⁰ Boumédiène had prepared well for this; indeed, he had been working towards the leadership since independence.³³¹ As Minister of Defence and commander of the military forces, he conducted a large-scale liquidation of revolutionaries and supporters of Ben Bella in particular. He engineered the resignation of Ahmed Medeghri, the Minister of the Interior, by removing the prefects from his authority and linking them

³²⁸ Rachid Mesli, personal interview, conducted in Geneva on 28 August 2009.

³²⁹ Cherif Belkacem, Minister of Orientation and Education in the Ben Bella government and, since June 1965, responsible for reorganizing the party (FLN). Delegate of the Executive Secretariat of the FLN.

³³⁰ Stora, B. (2001), pp. 140-141.

³³¹ Personal interviews with: Anwar Haddam (from Hamilton, NZ, by Skype, recorded, 21 May 2009); Sidhum, Salaheddine, Algiers, 01 September 2009; and Masli, Rachid, Geneva, 28 August 2009.

directly to the presidency. He compelled Kaid Ahmed to leave the Ministry of Tourism by taking away the hostelry management committees, then in conflict with the minister.³³²

Most of the other influential political revolutionaries were killed in bloody conflicts with the military. Colonel Chaabani, the youngest and arguably the best educated of them, someone who had been involved in the revolution from the beginning, and a revolutionary who had won many victories, was killed by his colleagues following a questionable judicial ruling by Boumédiène, signed by Ben Bella,³³³ and fraudulently forced through the legal system. Ait Ahmed, one of nine politicians who represented Algeria extensively during the negotiations with French authorities, was arrested in Kabylia, and sentenced to death, apparently on Boumédiène's orders. Boumédiène was now in a position to launch a *coup d'état* against Ben Bella. After he publicly argued that Ben Bella and his followers represented a danger to Algerians, a case pressed particularly by his supporters in the "Willayas" regions, and in the media, he effectively portrayed Ben Bella as corrupt, someone who must be removed to protect the principles of the revolution. This, then, became his rationale for staging another 'legal' *coup d'état*, this time against Ben Bella. Boumédiène fully consolidated his power in seizing the presidency in May 1965, following the deaths of a number of Algerians, mostly from among Ben Bella's supporters.

The structure of the Algerian military after independence has undergone many changes, particularly during the Boumédiène period. After the *coup d'état* of 1965, Boumédiène built the new military establishment from three groups: revolutionaries, who had supported him and who had helped him in his *coup d'état* against GPRA in 1962; the French Officers - deserters, who had been stationed in the military bases in the East and outside Algeria just before independence; and young Algerians who had joined the military after independence as "professionals".

Chouchane states that the Algerian military before 1967 was not stable. It faced many challenges both within and outside the country. The French government still dominated most of the civilian positions because the revolutionaries had little experience in politics or economics. They were soldiers, and most of them were uneducated. Boumédiène took calculated risks in using people from different backgrounds to support him in his drive to consolidate power. Other revolutionaries, those who wanted to stop him, or otherwise stand in his way, were effectively liquidated by his troops, and either killed or jailed.

³³² François Gèze, « Armée et nation en Algérie: l'irréparable divorce? », *Magazine of 'Hérodote'* (<http://www.herodote.org>) n° 116, « Armées et nations », first Trimester of 2005 (in library in 14 April 2005).

³³³ Chadli Ben-Jedid mentioned this in an interview in the newspaper, 'Elkhabar', no. 3813 Tuesday 24/06/2003, p.3.

After Boumédiène had fully consolidated power, and especially in the period of 1967-1977, military training and executive control over the military troops were placed in the hands of French Officers. This group within the military, despite having good military skills and being well trained, were not professional; these officers had little concern for ethics, and, as French Officers, had had little political and ideological training. They were trained to win wars on the battlefield, with scant regard for ethics. Chouchane has said that they were a military force without political or ideological direction, lacking principles and conditioned to an ethos of violence and absolute obedience.

At the beginning of the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid, and after the death of Boumédiène in 1978, Bendjedid announced that Algeria would be built by its citizens. The first major change that he made was to replace the French and Soviet trained officers, who had come to Algeria to train the army, with others from within the Algerian army trained overseas. During this period religious and political groups, socialists and Islamists emerged, along with competing views of ethics and personality.³³⁴ Bendjedid focused on the economy of the country and its social life to begin to help citizens to remediate the poverty and widespread diseases that had affected Algerians after independence. He was aware of the military cadres that Boumédiène had established, as well as the many French Officers and revolutionaries who had been killed by Boumédiène and his supporters. But Bendjedid occupied a special vantage point: He was the only person who had established strong ties with all of the military leaders. He was thus in a privileged position, one which gave him constitutional protection. He was the only person who had emerged from the original revolutionaries to hold the grade of General, apart from Boutaflika, who had been nominated for the presidency inside the Revolutionary Council, but was rejected by the remaining French Officers. Bendjedid had another advantage: he did not oppose any party within the political or military groups. All these advantages, however, did not prevent the French Officers from staging a *coup d'état* against him in 1992. His fatal mistakes began when he passed the leadership of the military to one of the French Officers, Nezzar, as his Minister of Defence.

Based primarily on the trust that Bendjedid put in the French Officers, especially his close relationship to Arbi Belkhir, the Secretary General of the presidency, and the Minister of Defence, Nezzar, most of the senior positions in both the military and politics were occupied (and, in the view of many observers, corruptly) by the French Officers. They were

³³⁴ Ahmed Chouchane, personal interview, London (10 July 2009).

subsequently involved in politics and were appointed to high positions in the country's bureaucracy. By the late 1980s, after they had pushed the president to create the Military Security Agency (SM), and then effectively destroyed this organisation, they were in command. They finished this rise to the pinnacle of power when they staged another *coup d'état* against president Bendjedid, and put themselves in the top military leadership positions, taking complete charge of the country in 1992, and filling most ministry portfolios with their supporters. It is this group, then, that appears to hold power today and apparently continues to use massive violence against the Algerian people for their own interests.³³⁵

Chouchane had sided with the 'professional group' within the military from the first, and had repeatedly said that the graduates of the military academy between 1978 and the crisis of 1990s were the true 'professionals'. They had no agenda against Algeria and its citizens, he insisted. They were different from the French Officers, whom, he said, retained a plan to keep Algeria under tacit French rule. Professionals, he said, had no interest in politics or the economy; they merely wanted the support of leaders, irrespective of their political programs. Chouchane said:

...I can tell you that if the professionals had been at the top of military leadership at the time of the crisis, I do not think Algeria would have had this crisis, or any human rights issues...and I do not think there would have been any *coup d'état* against any political party, whatever direction the country had taken.³³⁶

3.1 The Conflict among Revolutionary Leaders and the Origin of the Military in Algeria

Algeria's decolonization experience is dramatic and unique. Between 1954 and 1962, Algeria experienced a guerrilla war, and ultimately forced France to accept Algerian Independence. More than a million Algerians were killed in the War of Independence. Following independence, Algerians still experienced extensive violence. Political violence in Algeria actually began during the war. Killing and terror had already made their appearance in the army border camps and within the *Maquis*.³³⁷ Many political leaders and soldiers were assassinated by their own revolutionary colleagues. Other revolutionaries were driven into exile, killed or jailed. Political leaders were threatened and removed from their leadership

³³⁵ Chouchane, personal interview, London, 10 July 2009; Brahimi, his reply letter regarding the declaration of General Nezzar, published in:

<http://www.hoggar.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=841&Itemid=64> aljazeera TV's Interview with Mohammed Samraoui in *Ziyara khassa*, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r530I8TtZqc>>

³³⁶ Chouchane, A (26 September, 2009).

³³⁷ Maquis: this is a French word given to a group of citizens organising and fighting terrorists.

positions. The political competition rampant among military elites had taken a bloody toll on civilians in Algeria, both before and after independence.

The conflict among the leaders of the revolution started in the early years of war. In 1956, the Congress of Soummam had highlighted the principles of the revolution and had tried to limit regional power within the country. However, in some regions leaders found it difficult to demobilize. The triumvirate that initially headed the provisional government was led by experienced politicians and suffered significant disagreement. Brahim and his friend, Yazid Benyazzar, were with Belkacem when an attempt to seize power with the help of Suliman Hothman and Chabou AbdelQadir and others from among the French Officers, particularly in Tunisia, took place. They moved to arrest his colleagues at bases where the GPRA's leaders had located after the Tripoli Congress. Brahim and Nezzar quickly informed the other leaders, who stopped the operation and threatened Belkacem.

Sidhum used the death of Ramdane in March 1958, as an excuse to mobilize military elites to move against some of the key revolutionaries of the Soummam Congress. Ramdane, believed in civilian political control over military power. The Soummam Congress had decided in August 1956 that the political control of Algeria would be held by politicians, not the military, and that the leadership of the Revolution would be drawn from local people inside Algeria. The military bases and any other organisations outside the country would be under the control of the inside national leadership. The Government's leaders subsequently turned against Ramdane, jailed him in Morocco, and then killed him even before he reached the designated prison.

Salah Eddin Sidhum has noted that power in Algeria was literally stolen from the revolutionaries by military officers. These officers were not politicians; they had no legitimacy, and had not been part of the revolution. They were militants, "adventurers", as evidenced by their killing of Ramdane in Titouan, Morocco. The political regime which now led the revolution did not respect the principles of the Revolution as articulated by the Soummam Congress in 1956. These leaders were guiding the Revolution in a very direction different from the one designed in Soummam in 1956. The CNRA was supposed to have held regular meetings in Morocco or Tunisia or Cairo, to debate important political issues and to guide the revolution in the same way as the Soummam Valley Congress. In early September 1956 this Revolutionary Council put an end to these meetings. From then on it would be the military members who decided how to run the Algerian Revolution.

According to Sidhum, competition and conflict among Algerian politicians over national power gave the military revolutionaries a chance to seize control over the country.

Sidhum states that the conflict among civilian politicians in 1962 meant that the civilian revolutionaries inside Algeria suffered intense war casualties in battles against the French, and lacked the necessary support, while the bases in Tunisia and Morocco should have been continuing to supply them with arms and military support. Lakhdher Bouragaa, in his interview published in *Elkhabar*, a prominent newspaper, said that Algerian revolutionaries in Tunisia were living well while people inside Algeria were living in great hardship, engaged in a bloody war without arms or and even the basic necessities.³³⁸ The conflict among regional leaders inside Algeria clashed with the leadership of GPRA in military bases outside Algeria, especially the Eastern base of Ghardimaou, commanded in the early 1960s by Boumédienne, who even then was plotting to seize control over the revolution and the country.³³⁹

Brahimi observed this train of events closely, and said that he met with Ramdane just a day before his death outside the country, and was shocked when he read in the Algerian newspaper '*El Moudjahid*' that Ramdane had been killed in a battle in the Algerian mountains.³⁴⁰ He was deeply confused by the report until he asked one of the three leaders of GPRA, based in Tunisia, about the event. Ben-Toubal (his name in the war was Si Abdellah) told him that they had decided to jail Abane in Morocco in early months of 1958 to remove any possibility of him seizing power, but his colleagues Boussouf and Belkacem had turned against him and killed him in Nadhour, Morocco on May 1958. This murder had profound implications for the political system and the revolution, opening the door to a structuring of systematic violence by the military forces. Thus, they actively joined the competition for political power after independence.³⁴¹ Sidhum noted that this competition among the military elites grew significantly until it led to the outbreak of civil war. Sidhum also observed that the President of GPRA Ben Khadda had mentioned to him that he had resigned his position specifically because he did not want to see Algerians fall back into a war among themselves

³³⁸ Abderrahmane Derradji, *A Concise History of Political Violence in Algeria, 1954-2000, Brothers in Faith, Enemies in Arms*, Vol 1 (Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), p.148.

³³⁹ Hamid A. Qadir, "Revolutionary's leaders in Tunisia put Moujahidin in jail," *Elkhabar*, 19/11/2008 No. 5479; Bouragaa, Lakhdar, "L'affaire Z'biri. Les Hommes de Mokorno", *La Nation Algerien* (Tuesday 1 November 2011), A3, Pub: http://www.lanation.info/L-affaire-Z-biri-Les-Hommes-de-Mokorno-par-Lakhdar-Bouragaa_a435.html.

³⁴⁰ According to the 'El-Moudjahid' newspaper, on May 29th, 1958, Tunis made the announcement, enclosed in a black border: "Abane Ramdane Dies on the Field of Honor!" The article reported that beginning in December 1957, "brother Abane" had been on an important mission in the interior of the country. He had managed to pass through the enemy lines. "His mission was being carried out slowly but surely." Then there is mention of a violent clash between Algerian troops and those of the enemy. See: *El Moudjahid*, 29 May 1958 at the Website: http://www.1novembre54.com/histoire_algerie.php?cat=Presse&id=LA%20MORT%20DE%20ABBANE%20RAMDANE

³⁴¹ Brahimi A. H. (2001).

in a competition for power. Soon Boumédiène, backed by his external military command, attacked Algeria from both Tunisia and Morocco, killing hundreds of Algerian civilians who resisted this *coup d'état* from external military bases.

Bloody resistance and civil war of this sort had been part of Algerian social life for more than forty years before Boumédiène's *coup d'état*. Brahimi, Sidhum and Chouchane had observed and even participated in this history. On the other hand, the military elites who have controlled Algeria since independence have had a very different historical background. The revolution did not legitimize such attacks on internal bases of the ALN. Boumédiène therefore, organized a strong military that was based outside Algeria. The ANP was created not to fight against French troops, but to aid him in his personal quest for power after independence.³⁴² Nonetheless, the external revolutionary groups were formed to break the isolation and encirclement that the French authorities had introduced along the Eastern and Western borders with the Morice Line. Boumédiène recruited young Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco, and then, surprisingly, invited disaffected French Military officers to join the new Algerian military. His rationale was the need to train Algerian soldiers in the use of the new weapons that the revolution was increasingly receiving from communist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. Boumédiène led *D'état major*, which became a strong military establishment soon after independence.

Sidhum has stated that none of these military groups were directly involved in the revolution. Rather, they were engaged in preventing aid from reaching the revolutionaries through Tunisia and Egypt. These external troops grew stronger, were equipped with better weapons than those of the revolutionaries, and eventually increased their numbers to 45 000 soldiers. The revolutionaries inside Algeria never had more than 20 000 troops, and fought mostly with very basic weapons. This situation was largely ignored by the revolutionary leaders in their competition for power. Chouchane mentioned that this competition opened the door to international intervention.³⁴³ Belkacem had already begun to accept the direct participation of French soldiers in his personal competition with Boussouf and Ben-Toubal, and then later with Boumédiène.

Sidhum has also noted that a group of ten Algerian colonels met in Tripoli (Libya) on the 26th of May 1962, to legitimate their quest for power. This flouted national law which, incidentally, was in accordance with international law on this point. This meeting, then, represented an attempt to change the principles of the Algerian revolution, as defined in the

³⁴² Salah Eddin Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (01 August 2009).

³⁴³ Chouchane, personal interview (10 July 2009).

Congress of Soummam. Many politicians and civilian leaders had been removed from their positions in the CNRA on the orders of these colonels. Military members asserted dominance over the CNRA, and in effect replaced national political leaders and civilian administrators who were educated and highly capable in their jobs. Military members soon came to dominate the council, while politicians and civilians became the minority, holding one third of the seats. Following meetings in Tripoli in May and early June 1962,³⁴⁴ civilian politicians were further weakened and ultimately became unable to take any action against the military members, who held the majority and pushed through all their decisions, thus enhancing their control over the revolution. Sidhum notes that this became an integral part of Algerian power, and this, in his view, remains true today that “Algeria is still suffering this assertion of illegal power, which is essentially countered by the principles of independence, and the Tripoli meeting in 1962.”³⁴⁵

According to an interview published online with Boussouf, Boumédiène’s legacy remains the primary source of the problems that Algerians are experiencing today,³⁴⁶ particularly as regards his recruitment of French military officers and administrators after independence. Boussouf clarified that this directly affected the composition of the elites after independence. The main reason for the violence, which cost the lives and freedom of tens of thousands of people, was the elite competition to seize power. Boumédiène disguised his formative role in creating military elite, while Boussouf, who brought Ben Bella to the presidency, sought to show the public and the other leaders that he never wanted to seize power or, for that matter, to be president. Others, he said, were more qualified and had more experience in their struggle against French colonialism.

Who created Boumédiène, in effect, placing him at the heart of post-revolutionary politics? The answer to this question points to the source of the violence in Algeria from independence until the explosion of human rights violations in 1988, and then the civil war of

³⁴⁴ John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: the origins and development of a nation* (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 191.

³⁴⁵ Sidhoum Salah Eddin, personal interview, Algiers: September 2009.

³⁴⁶ Abboud Boussouf is the real name of “Lotfi”, as he was known in the revolution period. He was a combat-hardened militant, a member and one of the ALN leaders in 1962, and maintained a close relationship with Ben Bella. He was one of the rioters and troublemakers opposing the Boumédiène regime, as he chose to oppose the Tripoli Congress and the regime that was created after that, in opposition to Boumédiène. His cousin is Abdelhafid Boussouf, who was the leader and the main person in the information services, “*Service Spécial de la Prospection*” (SSP), and was the principal sponsor of Boumédiène as a member in ALN in 1956, helping to appoint him to positions in the military. Abboud Boussouf was the husband of Jamila Bouassa, one of the first three women “Jamilas” that the French courts sentenced to death. They were known as the Jamilas because their names were Jamila Bouhider, Jamila Boubacha and Jamila Bouassa. In 1966, Abboud Boussouf led a failed coup d’état against the Boumédiène regime, which cost him many years in jail. For more details see: <http://www.algeriashia.com/forums/index.php>.

1992 and its aftermath. Why was Boumédiène chosen? Why choose someone new to the ALN rather than someone who had more political experience and at least some role in revolution? What political or military group seized power to promote to a key leadership position a single personality?

Central to these questions is the history of the military intelligence service in Algeria following the revolution. In the spirit of the adage, ‘he who gains the information, gains power’, the post-revolutionary history of Algeria is filled with the names of revolutionaries, civilian and military, who rose to leadership positions through ties to this hidden power, sometimes called the *power of the shadow*.³⁴⁷ While little is known about this, it is known that many of the struggles and problems faced by the post-revolutionary regimes and the political elites in organising politics, security, economics and even the social issues which the French colonial model had left behind devolved upon the shadowy topic of security. The security apparatus controlled every major change in the country, as leaders or parties had limited capacity in which to play out their roles in the process of change. Assassination threatened anyone who disregarded those tightly controlled limits.

It was ‘security’ and ‘intelligence’, then, that initiated most of Algeria’s fundamental human rights violations. In December 1957, Ramdane,³⁴⁸ was killed as part of a “settlement account”, where special military security units had taken the extraordinary role of guiding the Algerian Revolution. Abane, whose views were deeply influenced by Hadj, was a member of the MNA (*the National Algerian Movement*), and in the ensuing conflict between the FLN and the MNA, he chose to be involved with FLN only as long as they shared a single purpose, which he defined as Algerian Independence. He was aware that this disagreement could lead to his assassination. Abboud Boussouf, in an interview in Aljazeera, Qatar TV, on October 4th, 2005, mentioned this group in a discussion of his cousin, Abdelhafid. Abdelhafid

³⁴⁷ Abdelhamid Brahimi, interview with Aljazeera TV: “The Secret of Algerian Politics,” 3 October 2009; personal interview, September 2009; See Stora, B. (2001), pp. 234-235; also: the website of Algeria Times, *the role of some power of shadow in decision making: Algerian exemplar*, Website: <<http://www.algeriatimes.net/algerianews8174.html>>

³⁴⁸ Abban Ramdane was a principal leader of the Algerian revolution. He was known as the theorist, or the theoretician, of the revolution. He ended his education in the French schools in 1945, at the age of 25, to devote himself to the cause of the student revolution and Algerian independence. In 1950 the French authorities arrested him, and held him for more than four years. He finally secured his liberty in January, 1955. Abban Ramdane became involved with the FLN in the same year, and led many attacks against the French Army. He held onto power by dint of his great intelligence, particularly in his dealings with the political issues, including those involving the colonial authorities.

Boussouf occupied the position of General Principal of the West Region in the 1956 'Wilaya 5'.³⁴⁹ Later he was transferred to Oujda, Morocco, in a reorganisation of the resistance.

Abdelhafidh Boussouf, an early leader of the intelligent services, and the head of the "Bs" group, as French authorities called them, was one of three people who created this "Shadow power"³⁵⁰. At a meeting of the group, information was divulged regarding Ramdane and his growing relations with French authorities, particularly in discussions of independence. They realised that Ramdane had become too powerful based on his international ties and may well have been able to seize the leadership of the revolution, and ultimate power after independence. They started to consider Boumédiène as the figure who might be preferable to Ramdane in such a position.

After the assassination of Ramdane, Boussouf invited Boumédiène to return from Egypt, where he was studying at the Mosque of al- Ashar, and in one of the public schools under the sponsorship of Sheikh Albachir al-Ibrahimi.³⁵¹ Boussouf, who was prominent in the middle period of the Revolution, was running a booming business in arms and information between Eastern and Western countries.³⁵² The competition in this business was principally from another agent and member of the SSP under the leadership of Boussouf. Messoud Seghar was a businessman who had significant success in dealing arms and military equipment. By 1960, Boumédiène began planning to rid himself of the SSP, and of Boussouf, by using secret information from Seghar.³⁵³ He then developed his own relationship with the

³⁴⁹ The Algerian ALN divided the country into six prefectures, called "willayas", corresponding to the largest regions of the country. This was the point of view of many participants in my interviews, including Salaheddine Sidhum, Morad Dhina, Ahmed Chouchane, Anwar Haddam and others.

³⁵⁰ The name "the Bs group" derived from three members whose names started by B: Boussouf Abdelhafid, Belkacem Krim and Ben Toubal Lakhdhar. This organisation was the executive power of the GPRA under the leadership of Benkhedda; It is difficult to get information regarding this "Shadow Power", and perhaps even more difficult to determine how it worked, apart from what I got from media interviews or from the recollections of those revolutionaries who are still alive, or who wrote their memoirs before they died.

³⁵¹ *Elkhabar* newspaper, an Algerian Newspaper in Arabic, May 23, 2006, interview with Dr. Turkey Rabah Amamrah, Member of AUMA, and of FLN during the last years of the war. Article entitled: "Boumédiène put al-Ibrahimi in jail because he rejected socialism".

³⁵² He was successful in that because of the Cold War. His primary tactic was to liaise with generals and ministers in different countries, dealing information, especially in espionage, between the East and the West. He built very strong intelligence and security services. Through his intelligence network, he built strong relations with a number of generals in France and Italy, and with the the head of the Italian Petroleum Company, which was separate from the Italian Government. He linked the Revolution with many business people involved with arms and military equipment, including Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis. The revolution received much needed resources as payments for information. Moreover, Boussouf was a bridge between the Algerian Revolution and ministers in the government of Michael Dobrier, the prime minister of France during the later De Gaulle period, as well as "Vorcade", the minister of Economy, Pirone and "Idgar Pisanier", the ministers of agriculture, as well as other portfolios. He received significant amounts of arms and military materiel, and at least 7 million dollars. Interview with Abboud Boussouf :<http://www.algeriashia.com/forums/index.php>.

³⁵³ Massoud Seghar was a member of the SSP and a businessman dealing in arms and military materials, and was working for Boussouf when he lost his position to Boumédiène . At the time, Boussouf was away in Oujda, Morocco. After Boumédiène seized power, Boussouf was arrested and severely tortured. Saghar gave up

French authorities. Boumédiène seriously considered seizing power through this liquidation and assassination to many formal revolutionaries. He was behind the death of Benali Boudghène, known by “Coronal Lotfi”, head of military region no.5 (Willaya 5), who was killed by the French army with the help of information supplied by Boumédiène.³⁵⁴

Violence among the revolution’s leaders played a major part in diverting the revolution from its original purpose. Individual interests, combined with competition for power, changed the political direction of the revolution that had been in play since the 1930s. The meeting of the fourth CNRA in Tripoli on May 1962, ran for three weeks, and was immediately tainted with suspicion. Boumédiène’s side launched an attack on Belkacem declaring that he and his team had gone to Evian to “liquidate” Algeria. With skill and dignity, Belkacem defended himself, producing the minutes of the talks and proving with resolute firmness that he had stood up to the French. When the vote has taken, the CNRA showed itself almost unanimously in favour of the veteran *Maquisard* –with the exception of Boumédiène and his army supporters. Next came, however, the elections for the supreme leadership of the GPRA, which would, presumably, conduct Algeria at long last towards independence.

Abbas, a moderate nationalist of long standing, who had become a revolutionary, was by then a world figure commanding great respect. In the conflict between Boumédiène’s group and the GPRA, he was cast aside in a humiliating disregard for his past distinction. Belkacem was the logical candidate for succession; Boussouf and Lakhdar Bentobal begged him not to accept the presidency on the grounds that it would inevitably bring conflict with Boumédiène and Ben Bella, possibly leading to internecine bloodshed once the war with France was finished. Under pressure, Belkacem accepted. Instead of Belkacem, Benyoucef Benkhedda³⁵⁵ received the nomination, however.

Together with Ramdane and Saad Dahleb, Belkacem had drafted the famous Soummam Platform of 1956. He had never committed himself to any of the warring factions within the FLN, and was not in conflict with Boumédiène and General Staff. For these

politics around the time of independence and continued in his business until he was murdered, and his money mysteriously taken.

³⁵⁴ Interview with Abboud Boussouf, Rachad TV, July 2009: <http://www.algeriashia.com/forums/index.php>.

³⁵⁵ Ben Benkhedda was forty-one years old, and a former Secretary-General of Hadj’s MTLD, who had come over to the FLN after being jailed by the French in November 1954. He had been the minister of social affairs in the first GRPA of September 1958, had gone on the first expedition to China, but had been dropped in January 1960. After this he had travelled in various FLN delegations to the Third World, had written a series of thoughtful articles for the *El Moudjahid* newspaper, and had never done anything to give the impression that he might be a new focus of power. A doctrinaire thinker with Marxist leanings, he had none of the popular appeal of an Abbas, a Belkacem or a Ben Bella.

reasons particularly there was merit in his selection for the presidency. After his relegation to the lesser function of Minister of the Interior – he was level with Ben Bella – Belkacem was forced to accept the addition of Boudiaf. Boumédiène and his supporters won most of the power at the fourth CNRA, and he withdrew his resignation –“in the name of higher interests of the party.”³⁵⁶ The struggle for power within the FLN was by no means resolved at this point; in fact, the internal conflicts were more acute than they had been at any time since 1954. The “interior” leaders of the GPRA continued to feel abandoned by the General Staff, and by the “exteriors”, Boumédiène and his troops. The violence that Boumédiène apparently planned in his military program, after the Tripoli Congress, included killing another three million people (double the number of deaths since the war had begun in 1954). He was serious in his plan to start another war if the GPRA did not give up its power.

3.2. Military Intervention and Political Algeria after Independence

The case of Algeria exhibits two paths to violence: first, revolution from the bottom up, which began during the period of French colonialism and ultimately brought independence to Algeria. Second, through the implementation of a general theoretical framework that defined a sociological meaning of power, its significance as a cultural value, its relationship to personality, and its relationship to social, economic and political conditions.³⁵⁷ Algeria has experienced waves of drastic change. The creation and development of the Algeria after independence stemmed from very basic measures. The Algerian Army was founded as an army of liberation. Its political base was poor farmers, *fellahin*; and its officer corps was trained in the political aims of a war for independence. The public never got the chance to share power with the colonial power, even at its lowest echelons. 89 per cent were illiterate, had never been to school, except perhaps the families of the farmers’ leaders, and these people tended to have good relations with the French administration, and even occasionally were able to study in the French schools.³⁵⁸

However, Algeria’s new bureaucratic elite had, for the most part, been born in the years of victory, as the French departed. The revolutionaries soon made themselves chief competitors for power with the FLN, and then with its French Officers, but now as a bureaucratic state machine, and not as a popular revolutionary front. The clash between the

³⁵⁶ Horne, A. (1977).

³⁵⁷ *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Ghania Mouffok, L’Immense Continent de la Marge, Algérie, lutte de clans ou lutte de classes? August, 2001.

³⁵⁸ Saadallah Belkacem (1996).

military groups and the FLN outwardly seems to have come suddenly, but there was a deep divide that festered between the two factions throughout their history.³⁵⁹ The government was effectively controlled by the army.³⁶⁰ There was a mass exodus, not only of settlers, but of French administrators as well. Thus, although a major proportion of the technicians and experts in Algeria had been French,³⁶¹ the subsequent vacancies were soon filled by Algerians.³⁶²

In August 1963, the authorities adopted decree No. 63-297, prohibiting the existence of competing political parties and thereby establishing a one-party system in Algeria.³⁶³ The Party of Socialist Revolution (PRS), under the leadership of Boudiaf, and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), were outlawed. Government interference did not stop there, however, as trade union activities and student movements were also subjected to intervention measures, curtailing liberties and controlling the movement of individual citizens. In fact every political organisation in the country came under close scrutiny. The control of independent organisations was relentless, as witnessed in 1963 in the control of the powerful trade union, UGTA, and again in 1969, with the banning of the independent student union (UNEA), because it had insisted on its autonomy. To ensure full control in this area, the regime created its own organisations, including women's and peasant organisations.³⁶⁴

To silence its international critics, the FLN apparently misled the international community regarding human rights violations and the level of political freedom and liberties in Algeria. After banning political parties and establishing a single-party system, the regime then created another party to participate indirectly in political life. Formally called the Communist Party, the (PAGS) *Parti d'Avant-Garde Socialiste*, it has served some of the regime's interests, including bolstering the Council of the Revolution. As Aggoun and Rivoire note:

...While Algeria, in theory, opted for a one-party system in which the FLN would play a vanguard role, in practice the FLN became a rear guard party. Following Boumédiène's *coup d'état* in June 1965, the running of the country was entrusted to the Council of the Revolution.³⁶⁵

³⁵⁹ Brahim, A.H. (2001).

³⁶⁰ General Khaled Nezzar, interview with TF1 ; Brahim Abdelhamid, Personal interview, London, September 2009.

³⁶¹ General Chaliand, *L'Algérie –est-elle Socialiste?* (Paris, 1964), p. 89.

³⁶² See Stora, B. (2000).

³⁶³ Stora, B. (2000); Aggoun and Rivoire (2001), pp. 44-56.

³⁶⁴ Kai Hafez, Kenny, Ann M., *The Islamic world and the West: an introduction to political cultures and International Relations* (Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, NV. Leiden, 2000), p. 107.

³⁶⁵ Lounis Aggoun, and Rivoire, Lounis Aggoun, Jean-Baptiste, *Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'états: histoire secrète de la guerre d'indépendance à la "troisième guerre" d'Algérie* (France: Découverte, 2005), pp. 44-56.

Although, bureaucrats in the army and government were associated with the FLN, it did not play a role in determining the direction of the country's policies. The party neither held any congress nor had any formal organisational structure until Boumédiène's death in December 1978. The army was the real power holder, and the Party was reduced to ceremonial duties.³⁶⁶ The FLN did exercise power over individual interests, even during periods of overt military dictatorship. The suggestion that the FLN was completely passive was a criticism, in fact, of poor policy. On the other hand, perhaps because of its extensive control over most political activity, the FLN found a difficult to maintain discipline and was thus susceptible to charges of corruption and failure. The relative success achieved under Boumédiène's rule notwithstanding, the FLN ultimately failed in its developmental policies. Corruption, 'clientelism,' nepotism and widespread injustice became the currency of Algerian politics under the FLN. Because it was only through party membership, and membership in its mass organisations, that promotion and career development could be obtained, individual initiative was curbed and a conformist attitude took over. Thus, the FLN's decay began. The party no longer represented vital social interests, and factions within the regime, hitherto hidden, surfaced.³⁶⁷ "The struggle between the different clans has been one of the characteristics of the Algerian transition, as each faction has sought to impose its vision of the distribution of power."³⁶⁸

However, the FLN leadership was not fully open and honest in their positions and their promises to their supporters, and were not responsive to the needs and demands of citizens. They were unable to stop the violence or bring a peaceful resolution to their colleagues, who had different perspectives as to the nature and purpose of national policy. Conflict, in this setting, was inevitable. As Bouandel notes, "the Party needed authority to attract political support"³⁶⁹ by any means other than manipulation and obligation, and it became increasingly evident that the leadership's apparent popularity was more myth than

³⁶⁶ However, despite the establishment of the Party's formal structures – the Politburo and Central Committee in which high-ranking military officers were members – and the holding of regular congresses throughout the 1980s, the FLN did not necessarily play its intended vanguard role. It was not only dominated by the executive (and hence the army), but was also relegated to a formal status: that of presenting candidates for 'elections' and acting as 'transmission belts' to mobilise support for a politically bankrupt regime. Youcef Bouandel, "An Algerian Presidential Free-for-All", *Middle East Report* online, April 6, 2004: <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero040604.html>.

³⁶⁷ Bouandel, Y., "Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 1 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 3; Yefsah, AbdelQadir, *La question du pouvoir en Algérie* (Algiers: En.AP, 1990).

³⁶⁸ Yefsah, A. (1990); See: *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 1 (2003), pp. 1–22.

³⁶⁹ Youcef Bouandel, "Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 1 (2003), pp. 1–22.

reality, orchestrated by official agencies in support of the system. For almost three decades of authoritarian rule, party political activity in Algeria was prohibited. The absence of a tradition of pluralism and electoral competition affected not only the nature of the political parties but also their development in the post-1989 period within the multi-party system.

While violence was practiced against political parties in the transition from ‘authoritarianism,’ the army *qua* political regime used more brutal means of liquidation, assassination and even massacres of civilians and revolutionaries in many regions of country, principally to keep elites in power. During independence, the seizure of power by the army border units, led by Boumédiène, took place in phases. The influence of the French in this violence requires some clarification, because it points to its role in maintaining its control over Algeria through indirect and oblique means.

Algeria, as a new state following its independence in the early 1960s, and after 132 years of colonialism, employed the military *coup d'état* to such an extent that it has become recognised in the country as a legitimate method of transferring power. While Algeria has manifested instability in its formal political life, with many different political regimes, only one single military cadre has actually controlled the country since independence. The *coup d'état* of the “external revolutionaries”, called the “Oujda group”, against the interior troops of “GPRA” was organised under the political cover of the FLN and the revolutionary council. Unsuccessful *coups d'état* of 1966, 1967, among others, were launched by individuals, and were easily thwarted by the security services and the SM (*Securité Militaire*). Hence, the successful *coup d'état* of 1991 demonstrated that the army had moved collectively against the democratic elections and the civilian political parties, employing violence, and seizing power under a cover of a new ‘political party’ in order to legitimise its actions internationally, and to give them a democratic patina.

Colonel Samraoui, in his book “*Chroniques des années de sang*”,³⁷⁰ describes the role of the army regime in the Algerian violence after independence and particularly during the political crisis of the 1990s. The author explains the full effect of the SM, which he calls “the heart of the Algerian power”, and “a state inside the state”, and describes how this powerful machine became a monster during the 1990s under the pretext of saving the country from the “fundamentalist peril”, while its real goal was the plundering of the wealth of the country. This was an act, or series of acts, that was accompanied by crimes that spared neither Islamists, nor democrats, nor intellectuals, and not even the military themselves. These

³⁷⁰ Mohammed, Samraoui, *Chroniques des années de sang* (Paris: Denoël, 2003), pp. 3-7 (Trans : ‘Chronicle of the bloody years’).

“predators” broached no protest against their power. The resulting violence cost thousands of lives, came immediately after many years of war against French colonialism, and has never really ended. Civilians seem to have no ability to assume and hold power. Observers continually ask the same basic question in this regard: why can’t the military organise the political system rather than continuing to compete directly for power with civilians’ politicians? Why has the military, in effect, continually seized political power, treating it almost as a hereditary right?

4. The Role of Military in the Clash of October 1988 in Algeria and the formation of FIS

According to Samraoui, the October 1988 events were a decisive point in the contemporary history of Algeria.³⁷¹ Indeed from October 5th to October 10th an unprecedented popular revolt took place, one in which thousands of young people attacked the symbols of the regime in the main cities (FLN branches, ministries, banks and state supermarkets etc.). The subsequent repression was severe, especially after a state of emergency was proclaimed. The army, under the command of General Nezzar, fired on crowds, killing more than 500, with thousands of demonstrators arrested and systematically tortured. Samraoui and his colleagues learned that the uprising was ignited by the army, specifically by General Belkheir’s clan, and stemmed from a planned food shortage meant to provoke the revolt. The ultimate aim was to trigger a much wider political opening. The effect was that numerous high-level political and military figures were singled out for punishment. Subsequently new faces took the reins of power, among those, was the apparently ruthless General Mohamed Médiène, whose alias was ‘Toufik.’

However, these political changes provoked a divergence of opinion among the public. On one hand was the scepticism of the cronies of the old regime, who used the one-party system to accumulate illegal wealth. On the other hand, there were many who really believed in the ideals of the Algerian revolution, and who continued to hope that a new era had begun, one which democracy and prosperity would prevail. Great hopes were placed on the prospect that a competent and honest politician would become prime minister³⁷². Unfortunately, and unknown to these optimists, the regime would accept only a façade of reform; no real power sharing with the emerging political forces would be tolerated.

³⁷¹ Mohammed Samraoui, *Chroniques des années de sang* (Paris: Denoël, 2003), pp. 3-7.

³⁷² Samraoui, M. (2003).

Under the new Constitution of 1989, President Bendjedid opened political power sharing to both sides, as well as to a range of ethnic, religious and nationalist groups and parties. Many parties were now legalized, including the Islamic Front for Salvation (FIS); indeed this party, established in September 6, 1989, and headed by Abbassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, was about to offer itself as an alternative to the FLN. According to Samraoui and Zitout, the FIS party played a positive role in the social life of Algerians. It was clearly the most successful party among more than 40 organisations and political parties. It appealed to religion and the basic needs of the citizens. It directly supported people in their social and economic struggles, in many respects much more effectively than the government had been able to do. The FIS had come to be seen very positively, especially in the aftermath of a major earthquake which struck the Tipaza region; FIS militants distinguished themselves by organising an effective relief programme for the victims, while the political authorities of the region were preoccupied primarily with protecting the property of high ranking generals in the region. The engagement and vitality of FIS militants contrasted sharply with the inertia of the authorities; Samraoui states that the FIS militants, who had previously pursued only electoral gains, further impressed the population by setting up “Islamic markets”, where surplus fruit and vegetables—donated by charitable peasants—were sold at low prices. The puritanical and moralizing FIS political discourse also gained more sympathizers in the face of the poor governance that prevailed, and the serious economic and social conditions that had long existed, and that now confronted younger Algerians. However the secret services actively infiltrated every emerging and potentially influential political party, with special attention devoted to the FIS and the FFS (Socialist Forces Front).

4.1. A Fight for Power at the Summit

Meanwhile an intense internal fight for power and influence was taking place at the highest levels of the army. Samraoui notes that the government at this time, under the leadership of Mouloud Hamrouche, who was struggling to guide the country, confronted by simultaneous crises. Samroui focused in his interview remarks on the economic and political crises of that time, observing that the power struggle, in particular, represented a serious threat to the economic and political reforms undertaken by the Hamrouche’s government. Hamrouche was about to succeed in depriving the established apparatchiks of their power to extract resources from the state’s coffers. This seriously disturbed the “politico-financial mafia”, a small number of generals and their cronies who took 10-15% from every

transaction made by the state.³⁷³ Moreover, the opposition also quickly engaged in this power struggle. A destabilization campaign arranged at the highest levels by the SM was initiated and provoked (principally through leaks) repeated scandals involving the prime minister and his close collaborators in the media.³⁷⁴ Finally the power struggle ended with the fall of the only general who could challenge the “politico-financial mafia”, leaving the prime minister and the Algerian President deprived of any genuine intelligence. Instead they were provided, from that time on, with disinformation.

Samraoui has noted that the role that the SM played during the first free elections in Algeria included investigating any possible transgressions of FIS leaders or any other Islamists and releasing this information to the media, especially after the local elections, where the FIS dominated most of the regions of the country. The SM was providing the falsified information to the public as well as to the presidency and to Bendjedid himself. Most of the reports were designed to create disinformation through erroneous predications regarding the local and parliamentary elections of June 1990 and 1991. An example of this was the report predicting the outcome of the only local elections ever held in Algeria, which took place in June 1990. It was clear that without some sort of intervention the FIS would win. This opinion was shared by many observers as well as by the secret services. Samraoui, who was in charge of that matter, produced a report predicting 40 per cent of the votes to the FIS, 30 per cent to the FLN, 20 per cent to the other parties, and 10 per cent to the independent candidates. However his senior officers were unhappy with this report and gave it to another officer for “review”. This officer simply changed the numbers. He put 80 per cent in favour of the FLN, apparently without reviewing the accompanying analysis. Later on, it became clear to Colonel Samraoui that the generals’ aim was to support the strongest party and to weaken the FLN to some extent (but not too much) while giving way to FIS (and thereby establishing some control over it) in a scheme that would let the generals preserve their privileges. The real results came as a shock to the president, who thus became aware of the dirty tricks being played. At this point, however, it was too late. The FIS won the local elections with a landslide victory, with 4,331,472 votes (54.25 per cent of the votes).

4.2. The Period of Boumédiène and the Structure of the Military

To discuss the military regime in Algeria today, we should go back to the history of Boumédiène and his officers, including the French Officers. According to Chouchane, Boumédiène had joined the revolution by 1956 as a simple soldier at a time when he had

³⁷³ Samraoui, M. (2003), pp. 3-7.

³⁷⁴ Samraoui, M. (2003), p.6.

recently returned to Algeria from Egypt. By most accounts Boumédiène was not a legitimate revolutionary³⁷⁵. He was not invited to any of the high level events or congresses nor did he contribute to the writing of the protocols of the revolution. Participation in these events had been considered essential to establish that participants were eligible for positions of power within the military. The Algerian constitution blocked anyone from power who had not been one of the revolutionaries. Boumédiène was never invited into any of the congresses or internal negotiations with leaders of the revolution such as Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed and Boudhiaf. Boumédiène, rather, had been given a leadership role in the new military bases on the Eastern borders by the GPRA and Boussouf. These bases, which were called the “*Etat Major General*”, were created in 1956 to break the isolation barriers that the French military had set up under Generals Chall and Morris. Electric fences running from north to south on both the eastern and western sides of the country separated Algeria from its neighbours. Boumédiène has claimed that his mission was part of the revolutionary war and that he was conducting his operations under the orders of the GPRA.

The *Etat Major General* was made up of soldiers recruited by Boumédiène himself. They had joined the military during the latter stages of the revolution, or just before independence. These soldiers were originally Algerian citizens trained by the French, and had later deserted and joined the revolution. Sidhum argued that Boumédiène was never involved in the battlefield as a revolutionary, but that he got his position through his personal ties to Boussouf. Boussouf, for his part, had actually transferred his leadership of the Fifth Region military base to Boumédiène, who was still studying in Cairo at that time. Sidhum notes that the leadership of the Fifth Region military base was actually located outside Algeria. The other regions’ leadership was on the battlefield in the war against French troops. Thus Boumédiène was, in many ways, not part of the revolution, and certainly not known to active revolutionaries.

There is evidence that Boumédiène planned early on to take power from the leaders of the GPRA, and to ultimately seize control of Algeria after independence. On the one hand, Boumédiène used his forces against his colleagues, who had vied for the highest office with him. He killed Colonel Chaabani and Mohammed Khidher.³⁷⁶ On the other hand, he made deals with French Officers to help them gain legitimate involvement with the revolutionaries even when they had been refused by most of the regional military base leaders, including

³⁷⁵ This was confirmed by most of my interviewees, including people who were close to him, such as Abdelhamid Brahimi, Salah Edine Sidhum and Abdelhamid Mahri.

³⁷⁶ *Newspaper of the Last Hour (Jaridat Aakher Saa)*, 17/12/2002:
<http://www.colonelchaabani.com/abderahmanechaabani.htm>.

Brahimi. The GPRA's leaders had refused any collaboration with the French Officers as well, except for Belkacem, who wanted to use them in his power struggle against his colleagues and in structured military campaigns against the revolutionaries of the GPRA. Boumédiène could not become involved directly in the political process, so he sought out a politician who was well known to the national military leaders, was prepared to act as his front man, and was willing to allow him to hold the real power. In addition, Boumédiène needed to find someone who would work with the French Officers; they were the only military group who supported his bid for power. The French Officers subsequently gathered together in the border bases under the direction of Belkacem, who was just one of the three leaders of the GPRA at that time. It was his intention to make use of their training and skills to form a strong and professional military. Boumédiène, moreover, made use of this situation by taking control of these soldiers.

The person who was ultimately chosen to give legitimacy to Boumédiène's bid for power was Ben Bella, someone who was seldom in accord with his revolutionary colleagues. To facilitate this move, Ben Bella resigned from the GPRA and joined *Etat Major General*. The evidence suggests that the GPRA would not likely have chosen Ben Bella as leader. There were a number of more experienced and prominent politicians in the organisation, including Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf, who were long-serving and well-respected politicians.

Ben Bella, however, was in a strong position constitutionally. In the first place, he was considered to be a legitimate revolutionary. Moreover, although he knew about Boumédiène's agenda, he nevertheless felt that Boumédiène was the right choice for this key position. He had the support of the French Officers and also had an arrangement with some of the leaders of the military regions that included their support for him in exchange for his support of their ambitions in their own quests for positions of power.

In Brahimi's view, the military under the leadership of the French Officers was principally responsible for the violence in Algeria that followed independence, and intensified significantly in the 1990s. Brahimi's views resonated well during my interviews with other key Algerian figures, all of them now in exile. Haddam, for example, agreed with Brahimi's views and added that the only way Algeria would survive politically and economically would be to dismiss these people from the military and other official positions.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁷ Brahimi was an officer in the military bases of the "*Etat Major General*", working under leadership of Boumadienne, and was in a variety of official positions in the government after Independence. The most

Chouchane stated in his interview that the responsibility for the Algerian tragedy should be shared between the French Officers and the revolutionary leaders, who had, in order to minimise risks to themselves, allowed the officers to gather at the *Etat Major General's* bases. This permitted them to form a powerful military unit. Chouchane said that the good relationship that had existed between Belkacem and the French Officers had allowed them to gain access to the revolutionary leadership, and thus contributed significantly to integrating them into the "*Etats Major General*". This relationship was a prerequisite to Belkacem's seizure of power from his close colleagues, Boussouf and Ben-Toubal. In 1959, the border troops under the leadership of Boumédiène formed a plan to take over the ALN and to dominate political life in Algeria after independence. Because Boumédiène had had considerable success against the French forces using the forces he had gathered at the *Etat Major General's* bases, his profile and standing among the revolutionaries and the Algerian civilians was increased. This gave him the confidence to go ahead with his plan, and to take power from the leaders of the GPRA.

Haddam has advised researchers and historical writers of the Algerian situation to look closely at this stage of Algerian history, and to ask whether there was any international intervention in the country after independence. Haddam thinks that there was an agreement between the French authorities and Boumédiène, through the French Officers, to provide assistance to help Boumédiène take power in Algiers. How else, asks Haddam, could Boumédiène have moved his troops from "Ghardemaou", on the eastern borders, to Algiers, where the GPRA was in complete control. Chouchane, Brahimi and Zitout, however, disagree with Haddam regarding the question of international intervention. It is their view that Boumédiène received support from the French Officers in the East and through an agreement with Ben Bella in the West, as he was very clever in his dealings with some of the regions' leaders. Furthermore, Boumédiène and his officers were willing to use violence and to start a new war if necessary, and to move militarily against anyone who tried to stop them. His French Officers had a great deal of experience in the use of violence against Algerian civilians, stemming from well before their involvement in the revolution, so there was no need for any international support in this regard.³⁷⁸

After striking their deal with Boumédiène, the French Officers officially became a part of the ALN. They then commenced their agenda to take power in Algeria, cooperating

prominent of these was that of prime minister after the death of Boumediene, and during the period of president Chadli until 1988.

³⁷⁸ Chouchane A., personal interview, London (10 July 2009).

with Boumédiène in removing people from the FLN Council. Boumédiène ordered the killing of a number of the FLN members, and even some of his own leaders on the General Staff, as part of his agreement with the French Officers. The French Officers had their own agenda, which they clearly implemented during the period of Boumédiène, and completed during Bendjedid's rule. They now occupied the main positions in the military and held considerable political power. This gave them significant influence in the President's office, and ultimately the power to remove the President in 1992.

The French Officers, as Chouchane and Haddam have noted, had a plan that they prepared and began implementing as soon as they had the opportunity to do so. The first part of this plan was put in place in 1959, with their acceptance into the ALN. The second part began when Boumédiène accepted their proposal to place themselves in positions of power. Boumédiène had effectively revised history in the eyes of the civilian population, and this enabled the French Officers to pose as military heroes and to demand respect. The revolutionary-legitimacy rule (legitimate participation in the revolutionary struggle) was supposed to have been the only way that military figures or civilian politicians would be able to move into positions of power, but Boumédiène overcame this by creating a professional army with skilled soldiers. Other revolutionaries accepted offers of comfortable civilian positions. Their only alternative was to face the likelihood of violence against them as had been carried out against opponents to the French Officers' agenda. This was ultimately the fate of Abbas, Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf.

The French Officers, as Haddam and Zitout have noted, apparently did not feel any responsibility for the well-being of the country or its citizens. Violence was their only strategy, and obtaining power and dominating the politics of the country their only goal. It is vital to add that their success through violence was supported by the French authorities, who were their main protectors against any external intervention. They also prevented the news of what was happening in Algeria from reaching the media, as exemplified in the events of 1994. Chouchane is perhaps more sympathetic to their role in his observation that the French Officers' agenda only came to fruition in 1992, after the *coup d'état*. Moreover, the likelihood of the French Officers holding on to power is no longer likely, as the political situation in Algeria has changed significantly and many of these people have either died, retired or have been transferred to positions outside the military.

Chouchane adds that:

Due to my position in the ANP, I was very close to these people, I knew them personally and most of them were my colleagues when I was an

officer in the ANP; there was only two or three grades between me and them ...These people only believed in violence and massacres, they believed that this was the only way to keep themselves in power.³⁷⁹

These methods had essentially failed with the Algerian people in 1961 when General de Gaulle in his speech said, “*je vous comprends*” (“I understand you”), but the French Officers did not understand that Algerians would not accept rule-by-violence. The result was the rapid and chaotic spread of violence throughout the country; with more than 200 000 killed and more than 50 000 disappearances from the 1960s through the 1990s.

The Algerian Army of today is very different from the ALN of the revolution era. The ALN stood by the wishes of the Algerian population and their goal of liberating the country from French colonialism. The main aim was to protect the principles of the revolution and Algerians, through liberty, legality and equality. But the leadership of the ANP today has a different plan. They are only concerned about their own interests, and not those of Algeria or its citizens. Their project is limited by the interests of France and the Western countries and also their need to be protected against being charged for their crimes against the civilians of Algeria.

The former General Nezzar,³⁸⁰ in his book, *The Memoires of Khaled Nezzar*, puts the full responsibility for the violence of post-revolutionary Algeria on the fundamentalists of the revolution, who, he says, refused to allow Algeria to have a strong professional army. Nezzar believed that a reorganized ALN through the “*Etat Major General*” was one of the core obligations of the post-independence era. Algeria needed a new military that was modern, strong and professional. Moreover, Algeria has a multitude of different ethnic groups formed by religion, region and even language that could endanger the country at any time.

Brahimi, in his book *Aux origines de la tragédie algérienne (1958-2000)*, responded to this interpretation noting that the children of French military schools (the French Officers) ...have no reason to wage violence against Algerians, their only motive has been to take power from the legitimate politicians and to protect themselves from any legal action that could be taken against them for the crimes they have perpetrated on the Algerian people since Independence.³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Ahmed Chouchane, personal interview, London (10 July 2009).

³⁸⁰ General Khaled Nezzar is one of French Officers who joined the Algerian Military at the end of 1959 through the Tunisian Office of the Eastern bases of Etat Major. He is a former Army General and Defence Minister. He was the primary coup conspirator against president Chadli in 1992.

³⁸¹ Brahimi, A.H. (2001).

4.3. The Process

In 1959 the Algerian Military made the first move toward its transformation when it committed itself to the bloody competition for the leadership of the GPRA. By 1965, a second change took place in the military and power in Algeria with the *coup d'état* of Boumédiène against Ben Bella, which put the French Officers in a strong position to hold power after Boumédiène. Political power and senior positions in the new Algerian bureaucracies were determined by the French Officers and their supporters, largely due to their ruthless tactics and the simple fact that they tended to be better educated. Ben Bella exercised authoritarian control over the French Officers because he was a former leader and politician during the revolutionary era. He gained additional power through his position as President of the Republic. French Officers had difficulty achieving the level of power achieved by Ben Bella and as a result his Minister of Defence, Boumédiène, was able to end the political life of Ben Bella and initiate a campaign of massive violence in Algeria.

Chouchane says that it is clear from the first agreement between Boumédiène and Ben Bella to share power together, that Boumédiène had planned this arrangement when he first became part of the ALN. By the end of the revolutionary era, Boumédiène separated his colleagues into supporters and those who opposed his agenda for the country. The first group was given positions of power, and those who opposed him were convinced to accept deals that released them from military positions, or were arrested and either tortured or killed.

After the *coup* of 1965, the French Officers finally obtained political power when Boumédiène allowed them to take part in the Central Council. Entry to the Council was reserved for revolutionaries only. Colonel Zebiri wrote in a newspaper editorial³⁸² that the reason that he attempted the failed *coup d'état* against Boumédiène in 1967 was because the French Officers held more positions and exercised greater control than the genuine revolutionaries, who had been pushed to resign and had lost their positions within the military and/or politics.³⁸³

Boumédiène became the only person who could lead the country after 1965. He appointed French Officers to senior military positions, but he kept for himself the Ministry of Defence, the Presidency of the Central Council and the Presidency of the Republic. Because he knew the French Officers and their agenda, Boumédiène was cautious. In addition to the positions that he retained for himself, he also created another military unit in parallel to the

³⁸² Tahar Zbiri was one of the ALN leaders during the revolution, the Commander of the West Region of Algeria. He failed in his *coup d'état* in 1967 against Boumédiène.

³⁸³ *Elkhabar*, 18/12/2008.

ANP. The purpose of this unit was to provide him with personal security and to protect his position. This new “Military Security” (SM) was outside of the constitution of the country; no one was authorized to control this force apart from Boumédiène.³⁸⁴ Because of its autonomy, weaponry and tactical centrality, the SM, then, gave Boumédiène dictatorial power and dominance over the military. Boumédiène became increasingly strong as he extended control over the military and, especially, the French Officers now in the military.

As noted above, major questions emerged during the Boumédiène period. Even more pressing questions followed it. What was the role of the French Officers after the death of Boumédiène in 1978, and until the *coup d'état* of 1992? Why did such intense violence follow the *coup*? What was the reaction of the SM to this unprecedented violence? These were some of the questions that I put to Chouchane in our interview. He replied that the answers to these questions [regarding the origins of the violence] are complex and the media have not yet asked this kind of question for different reasons...however, the main reason for these events began in 1978 when the French Officers totally dominated the Algerian military. Towards the end of the Boumédiène period, French Officers gave themselves the right, for the first time, to join the Central Council of the Liberation Army; they then also gave themselves the right to membership of the Revolutionary Centre. Before this time, the role of French Officers was limited by the military and their work was kept to the army, but through their membership in the Central Council, they became involved in Algerian politics and took control of the government. These were the most important changes to take place in Algeria after the death of Boumédiène.³⁸⁵

During 1978, French Officers managed to reach a position where they had control of the military, politics and the administration of the state and domination of Algerian society. As they were working together as a team, they were able to upgrade their positions from time to time and to improve their situation with the help of educational assistance from military schools in France, Belgium and Russia, as well as other countries. By the end of 1978, more than 90 per cent of the leadership positions within the Ministry of Defence were held by the French Officers. The General Secretary of the Ministry of Defence was directly influenced by this group, under the leadership of Latrach M. Amin, who was an officer of the French military up to the final stages of the War of Independence.

³⁸⁴ Chouchane, in my interview with him through Skype on (21/12/2008), and my personal interview with him, London (10 July 2009).

³⁸⁵ Chouchane A, personal interview, London (10 July 2009).

After the death of Boumédiène, the ANP came under the control of two opposing powers, neither of which worked for the country or its citizens:

1. The Military Intelligence agency (*Securite Militaire*, SM) under the leadership of Qasdi Merbah: this group was created by Boumédiène from a group of special officers who had no relation to any of the French Officers. The officers of this unit (SM) always stood behind the revolution and did not give support to the ‘Clandestine power’³⁸⁶ or the French Officers.³⁸⁷ Chouchane supported president Bendjedid in 1992 in the *coup d’état* of the French Officers against the emerging democracy, but they could not stop the *coup* because they were simply too weak at this point; the president had just completed a reorganisation and did not have a consolidated power base. Thus the French Officers achieved another key victory, and further enhanced this when they were able to compel the president to reorganize the SM, integrating it directly into the regular military troops. With this action against the SM, the French Officers put themselves in an unassailable position vis-à-vis the leader of the SM, Marbah, or, as they called him, “the files man”. Marbah controlled access to all the confidential files. He was the only leader who was a former soldier in ALN, had legitimate revolutionary credentials, and who held a grade higher than the French Officers. He eventually lost his military job and was given the position of prime minister. This effectively moved him out of the way, and he was later killed.
2. The second power was that of the General Secretary of the Ministry of Defence: the leadership of this unit was under a French officer, Abdel-Hamid Latrach, who gave most of the high positions of the ministry to his French Officer colleagues. These were especially powerful positions, and hence this group became the second most powerful after the President. He sent his mostly French Officers to military education centres overseas, including France, Yugoslavia, Russia and the USA, and built up strong international military relationships in the process. In our interview, Chouchane mentioned the names of some of those who are still in positions of power in Algeria today, including Arbi Belkhir, Guenaizia Abdelmalek and Mohammed Touati. A few of them have retired after being granted amnesty,³⁸⁸ including Nezzar and Lammari. President Bouteflika gave them protection against charges from any court

³⁸⁶ The use of the term “clandestine power” in this sentence refers to the illegitimate power that French Officers exercised with Boumédiène, taking high positions in the military, and subsequently seizing control of key political positions until they became the most powerful group in the Algerian regime.

³⁸⁷ Chouchane A., personal Interview, London, July 2009; Samraoui, M., personal interview, Auckland(12 December 2007); Mohammed Samraoui, *Chroniques des années de sang* (Paris: Denoël, 2003).

³⁸⁸ Adrien Karatnycky, *Freedom in the world* (Freedom House, 20/06/2001).

in the country and thus protected them from being charged for any of their crimes against the Algerian people.

However, the French Officers ultimately failed despite the high positions that they reached in the period of Boumédiène. Both Chouchane and Brahimi note that they specifically failed in their competition with the SM, which was led by legitimate revolutionaries. Their failure affected the election of a new president after the death of Boumédiène in 1978. In effect, there were three candidates from the revolutionaries of the General Staff, *L'état major*, in this competition for the presidency: Bouteflika, who had worked with Boumédiène in the Western bases, and Bendjedid and Mohammed Salah Yahyaoui, who were from the Eastern bases, Ghardimaou. These candidates had no ties with the French Officers, but were not antagonistic to them. The French Officers, initiating a pattern that they were to follow repeatedly in later years, established a set of shared interests with these presidential candidates. They were duly rewarded with new positions. From these new positions the French Officers fostered changes in the country's power base through the repeated use of extreme violence against Algerians and their legitimate leadership. They thus came to dominate the military, politics and administration. By 1990, the Minister of Defence was Nezzar, the head of Etat Major General was General Abdelmalik Gnaizia, the head of the land forces was their colleague Lammari and the General Security of the National Ministry of Defence was Mustapha Chelloufi. All of these men were colleagues from French military schools.³⁸⁹ They were now, in effect, the French Officers in power. The leader of the SM was not a French officer, however, and was in a lower position and as such was under their control. The French Officers systematically prevented the SM leader from rising in his position, so that no 'outsider' would be in a position to challenge them. They thus used President Bendjedid, who had taken up the presidency after Boumédiène.

President Bendjedid knew about the French Officers and their project, but he apparently thought that he was constitutionally protected by his position, and by his revolutionary legitimacy: he had been one of the earliest revolutionaries to join the FLN internally and the ALN in the Eastern bases. But he became vulnerable when he accepted their plan to weaken the SM and to remove from it the only officer who knew their secrets. Their plan was to cast the SM as an illegal organisation, and a danger to Algeria because of its extra-constitutional status and operation. They knew that the SM had been created by Boumédiène to protect him from them as well as from his enemies among the revolutionaries.

³⁸⁹ Ahmed Chouchane, personal interview, London (10 July 2009), part 2; and (26 September 2009), part 3.

They wanted to remove this organisation from the control of the president so that it would not repeat the situation that had transpired under Boumédiène, and had been repeated with Bendjedid. Later they created another security intelligent service, which became a tool in their hands to control the military, politicians, the economy and society.³⁹⁰

Bendjedid evinced greater self-confidence because of his background and his constitutional position. However, because they provided him with a daily stream of (albeit often wrong) information, Bendjedid increasingly trusted the French Officers, eventually appointing them to most of the senior leadership positions in the country. They became closer to him and attached themselves to him socially. When they turned against him and against democracy in a bloody *coup d'état* in the early 1990s, he was justifiably shocked. They allowed him to resign his position or be killed, initiating a pattern that they followed with his colleague, Boudiaf.³⁹¹

In conclusion, the French Officers have been central to the Algerian crisis, from independence until the present. Their role in the major human rights violations and the systematic violence was initiated during the Boumédiène period, when few of them had the legitimacy to lead the country. After the death of Boumédiène in 1978, the French Officers come to dominate the Algerian military institutions and most of society.

1. They were involved in the Central Council of the ANP, which had previously been forbidden to them because they had fought against the Revolution during the liberation war;
2. They played a major role in sidelining their enemies among the revolutionary leaders, who were in competition with them for power;
3. They stopped the SM and carried out the removal of Merbah, who had been the only person who could effectively challenge them due to his background in the military and his power within the SM.

After the death of Merbah, the legitimate leader of the SM, the French Officers had a clear field to achieve their objectives. Indeed, they came to dominate most of the key positions in the country. In 1990, the Minister of Defence was Nezzar, the head of *L'état Major* was Gnaizia, the head of the land forces was Lammari, the general security of the National Defence Ministry was Challoufi, and the general director of the SM was

³⁹⁰ Ahmed Chouchane (21 May 2009), part 1.

³⁹¹ Boudief was a former revolutionary and one of the FLN politicians. He was living in exile in Morocco after Independence because of his conflict with Boumédiène. He returned to Algeria in 1994, when the military invited him to be the President of Algeria. That lasted for a mere 40 days. He was dramatically assassinated by the military during a live speech on Algerian TV.

Mohammed Médiène. All of these men, except for Médiène, were French Officers, and they subsequently became Generals and Major Generals. It is interesting to note that Médiène, who was not a French Officer, remained at the lower rank of colonel.

Speaking on the TV Channel “al-Hiwar”, Brahimî said that most of the violence in Algeria since independence, and especially during the period 1990-2000, was the responsibility of the French Officers, who just prior to independence had participated in the killing of Algerians along with French soldiers in France’s efforts to quash the revolution. They remain fully responsible for human rights violations on an unimaginable scale, and were instrumental in each change in the political system. They were behind the removal of a number of the participants in the revolution, particularly those who were capable of taking up positions of leadership in the country, and those who supported national development and sought to protect the national economy. French Officers were behind all of the *coups d’état* since independence, and apparently ordered the killing of hundreds of thousands of citizens in bloody massacres and disappearances. The evidence suggests that they were almost solely responsible for massive human rights violations against the Algerian people, often executed in the so-called ‘war against terrorism’.

Brahimi noted that he knew the French Officers as deserters from the first day they came to the Algerian revolutionaries in small groups to negotiate joining the ALN. Brahimî was one of the ALN leaders in charge of the negotiations with the French Officers, and he refused to accept them. However, there were some leaders who felt that they should be accepted because of their skills in military technology. They apparently thought that the French Officers would assist them in gaining power after the revolution. The French Officers, however, were driven by their own quest for power, through whatever means necessary. These French Officers may have been responsible for as many as one third of all Algerian deaths in 1990s in order to keep themselves safe and in power. Sidhum has said that the French Officers prepared from the start for their eventual seizure of complete power in the 1990s. They ultimately exercised power at all levels of society. General Larbi Belkhir a French Officer who was in power until he died in Morocco on 28 March 2010, has been described to as the “presidents’ creator.”³⁹²

³⁹²Ahmed Chouchane, personal interview, London (September 2009); Brahimî, A. H., interview, London (September 2009), *Alshareq al-Awsat* (the Middle East), a daily newspaper published in Saudi Arabia: <http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11385&article=554915&feature=>

Samraoui, in his book,³⁹³ states that the French Officers' putsch had, definitely and for the worse, consolidated the power of generals such as Nezzar, Belkheir, Touati, Lamari and their colleagues. All were former members of the French colonial army, who only joined the Algerian fighters for independence a few months before the withdrawal of the French colonial army from Algeria. These officers never fired a single round against their former masters. Riadh Saidaoui wrote that the irregular change of a president or a prime minister or even all of the members of government is no longer a major event in Algeria. It has become commonplace since the *coup d'état* of 1992. There have been many presidents, dozens of ministers and hundreds of MPs since the revolution. Nevertheless, the military, the real power behind all civilian regimes, maintains the same leaders as it had after independence.

Algerians will not accept French colonialism again, although Algeria will never be stable until it regains legitimate political power, and is able to practice constitutional government with full sovereignty and the legitimate actions of the three branches of government without the interference of the military.

4.4.French Military Officers and their Role in the Violence

The term "French Officers" was given to officers born in Algeria who had grown up in French and Jewish communities.³⁹⁴ They studied in French schools and were attached to French military bases, typically to support them in their operations against revolutionaries, especially inside towns and cities. They are sometimes referred to as "*Harkists*"³⁹⁵. Brahimi refers to them as "deserters" because they have admitted that they left their positions with the French military to 'join' the revolutionaries, ostensibly in order to gain a share of the power. These military officers were well trained and had strong training and experience with modern weapons, which they had used with the French army in battles against the Algerian revolutionaries. At the time of independence celebrations, these officers chose to abandon their positions on French military bases and join with revolutionaries in local regions. Some of them were more honest in that they chose to join the revolution as early as 1956 and 1957, and were involved with the revolution earlier than most of their colleagues. Some of them were killed on the battlefield. These deserters had clear political, economic and social

³⁹³ Mohammed Samraoui, "How the secret services manipulated Islamic groups". In: Samraoui, M., *Chroniques des années de sang* (Paris: Denoël, 2003) .

³⁹⁴ Sidhum notes that these people were trained in French military schools as Sub-Officers but had never risen to the level of Officer-grade. Sidhum S., personal interview, Algiers (1 September 2009).

³⁹⁵ 'Harkist' is an Algerian word given to Algerians who chose to fight with the French Army against the Algerian revolutionaries. This word came from "the black feet", or what French called "*les piers noir*".

objectives. Their ostensible goal was to keep the country under French hegemony, albeit under their immediate leadership. They clearly wanted to be sufficiently part of the revolutionaries so that they could share power after independence.

After the declaration of French President de Gaulle proclaiming “Algeria for Algerians”, people began to believe in Algeria as a country, one for which independence was just a matter of time. The French authorities, however, had another plan for Algeria, one that might divert international attention away from the long years of bloody fighting, and hence limit international concern with their system as practiced in Algeria. Such international critics included observers from communist countries, social organisations and political parties abroad. The French strategy played into the hands of Algerians who were fighting with them against the “*Fallaga*” Algerians.³⁹⁶

Many of the French Officers, especially those who were part of the groups of late 1959 and the 1960s that sided with the revolution, were well organized and prepared not to help the revolutionaries, but rather to take power from them. They were involved in the revolution on their own terms, which included a significant share of the power in the military as well as in other more explicitly political positions after independence. Their plans were rejected by regional leaders, including Brahim. He took part in the negotiations with them and witnessed their infiltration of the Algerian military through the border bases after Boumédiène had accepted them as a legitimate component of the revolution, clearly as part of his own plan to seize power.

Former Prime Minister Brahim wrote³⁹⁷ that the most significant changes in the Algerian military ethos took place when these French Officers, or “deserters”, joined the revolution and became part of the ALN. They had, after all, been trained in French military schools and continued to act, albeit covertly, on behalf of French interests. In 1961, towards the end of the war, these officers insisted on staying together as a group rather than being integrated into the new groups within the revolutionary forces. They clearly wished to protect themselves because of their French background and to place themselves in advantageous positions, eventually hoping to gain power.³⁹⁸ Haddam, Zaoui and Zitout believe that the involvement of the French Officers inside the military was prepared and organized by the French authorities to maintain their influence in Algeria and to continue this influence after independence. They were formally accepted into the military by some of the

³⁹⁶ “*Fallaga*” was a name given by French authorities to Algerian fighters, and meant “terrorist” or “outlaw”.

³⁹⁷ Abdelhamid Brahim, *Aux Origines de la tragedie Algerienne 1958-2000* (Hoggar, Switzerland 2001).

³⁹⁸ Brahim, A. H. (2001), p. 63.

leaders of the GPRA who were aiming to seize power in Algeria after independence. These officers, in turn, attempted to use their skills and experience to influence the groups that were competing for power and were sympathetic towards them.

These French-trained officers, sometimes referred to as “deserters”,³⁹⁹ then, made it clear that they were better qualified to assist with the leadership of the country, if only because of their self-proclaimed better education. However, it is important to note that they still believed in *Algerie Française*, that the best system was for the new country to be under the influence of the French authorities through a controlled and manipulated Algerian Army. Using this strategy, this group worked to negate the principles and ideals of the revolution. Haddam has argued that their goal was to change the revolution’s purpose, and thereby to deny the people of Algeria their independence, their practice of Islam, indeed their Arabism.⁴⁰⁰ Chouchane has another view of this: that the French Officers were accepted into the Algerian Army in order to improve the chances of some of the various factions vying for power in Algeria after the revolution. This competition began among revolutionary leaders and inside military regions, and became clearer after de Gaulle declared in his Oran speech of 1958 that independence would become a strong possibility in the near future.

After independence, the Algerian Army, which was supposed to be an extension to the ALN, with the goal of building a secure state by protecting the population from internal and external enemies, was turned against the civilian population, departing from the principles of the revolution. Revolutionaries engaged in a bloody competition for power; violence was the means by which the military sought to achieve power for the “*Etat Major General*” soldiers against the GPRA. The GPRA, the legitimate government, had been the only organisation that represented Algeria internally, with the ALN, and externally in international forums.

Brahimi argues that the Algerian situation today existed before independence as well. The Algerian authorities are mistaken, in his view, in stating that the Algerian crisis began with the cancellation of the elections in January 1990. Rather, the events of 1990 were the products of planning by the French Officers that pre-dates independence, and were specifically designed to achieve the goal of reaching power by *coup d’état*. The involvement of the French Officers in the revolution, then, was part of their plan to take power in Algeria, and it was this plan that was finally realized in the *coup d’état* against Bendjadid in 1992.

³⁹⁹ Brahimi called them « deserters » in his book, *Aux Origines de la tragedie Algerienne 1958-2000* (Temoignage sur Hizeb) (France : Alhoggar, Switzerland, 2001).

⁴⁰⁰ Abdelhamid Brahimi, Aljazeera TV, a personal visit, October 3, 2009.

Brahimi places the blame for the Algerian crisis squarely on the shoulders of these “deserters”, and argues that the instability of Algerian institutions was essentially programmed by French authorities immediately after independence through their Officers. French authorities had organized the infiltration of the ALN through their involvement with affiliated groups, especially during the period of 1958-1961. Brahimi mentions some of them, those who appear to have been sent on a mission to the FLN in Tunisia. Brahimi says that the experience of long years of war meant that some of these deserters had become loyal to the revolutionary principles, loved their country, and reached high positions during the struggle for independence; Mahmoud Charif, who became a member of the GPRA in 1960-62, Abdel-Rahman Ben Salem, who became a leader in the operational region of the north-east in 1960-62, and Belhouchat, who was appointed a member in CRA in 1965, and then the leader of the fifth military region, followed by the leadership of the first military region from 1964 to 1978, until he became the Supreme Commander of the Armed forces in 1987-89.

That said, most of the deserters were conscious infiltrators with the goal of attaining influence in the new Algeria, quietly supporting covert programs of the French authorities. Most of the positions of power in the ALN had been assumed by these French Officers, beginning as early as 1956.⁴⁰¹ The same was true of the new Algerian administration, including its political and social organisations, which were infiltrated by French sympathizers to the point that Algeria was, in some senses, essentially recolonized in the 1980s and 1990s. Even as de Gaulle proclaimed Algeria for Algerians, French military schools opened their doors to “French Muslims”, with enrolments quickly reaching 250 000.

It appears to have been the French plan, then, to infiltrate the leadership in Algeria through the Algerian French, and thus open the door to a form of guardianship and custody, allowing France to use its right of a UN Security Council veto to stop enquiries into the 200 000 deaths of Algerian civilians. Ultimately the French authorities were looking for a way to maintain their control over the country after independence. They essentially used the president of the GPRA, Benyoucef Benkhedda. Sidhum was a witness to the French administration when they offered their help to Benkhedda and his GPRA government, closing both the “Mourise” and “Charle” lines, which were still there under the control of French soldiers. Benkhedda had chosen to give up his position in the GPRA rather than to take the French offer and go to war against the revolutionaries and Algerians. He refused the offer from the French authorities and treated the case as an internal problem.

⁴⁰¹ Abdelhamid Brahimi (2001); Mourad Dhina, personal interview, Geneva (August 2009); Mohammed Larbi Zitout, personal interview, London (September 2009).

Brahimi argues that the “deserters” were involved in Algerian bases in Tunisia as French representatives, claiming to be partners in the military effort until they reached power positions in the 1990s. The “deserters” were supported by the French in these covert activities. Moreover, Chouchane, in his interview, stated that “deserters” not only founded the modern Algerian military, but that many revolutionaries from the Eastern and Western bases soon joined together not to build a strong military force for the country but to support Boumédiène and his regime as a means to reaching the power. They took this power after a *coup d'état* in 1962 against GPRA and then by another *coup d'état* against Ben Bella in 1965. Boumédiène was said to have been incapable of reaching the presidency legitimately. The only route to power that Boumédiène could take was to open the door to the “deserters”. The deserters’ officers trusted and supported Boumédiène for two reasons: first, because they had refused to involve themselves with the revolutionaries inside the country, as had Boumédiène, and they felt that they could rely on him to suppress the revolutionaries inside Algeria. Second, their aim was to attain power. Boumédiène was seen as a direct route to this end.

Chouchane has said that the leaders of the GPRA accepted these French Officers in order to involve them with the proviso that they would not take any position in the FLN, and would not be a member of the CNRA. The intent was that they would have no right to share power after independence. The negotiation with regional leaders inside the country resulted in the demand that they be involved individually rather than involvement as a group, as they had requested. They refused this arrangement based upon their rejection of this condition. This ultimately revealed the true plans behind their move to the side of the revolution. Brahimi, Sidhum and Haddam are agreed that the French Officers were not working for the country; rather they had an assigned mission from the French authorities, and they sought single-mindedly to achieve this mission.

4.5.The Role of the Professional Army in the Violence in Algeria

The third part of the Algerian regime’s structure is: ‘Professional Military Officers’. Before engaging in a discussion of “Professionalism” in the Algerian military, the meaning of the term must be clarified. Let us start with a general understanding, and then move to a more specific discussion relating to the meaning of the word as it is used in the case of the Algerian military.

Generally speaking, professionalism is a key factor required to do any job; it is a fundamental requirement in the military sphere. The nature of war itself, perhaps the most brutal and destructive force facing mankind, requires that those who do the fighting do so with extreme levels of discipline, commitment, and skill. Such things are thought to be the essence of military professionalism. However, there are different views about professionalism in the military; some scholars have refused to accept that the profession of arms is a true profession. Their objections centre around two points – that soldiers are paid to be on military bases, and there are obvious and extreme violations of their duty and professionalism reported with some regularity in combat situations, although “...not in the obvious sense of its practitioners generally being paid for performing their duties.”⁴⁰² Rather, such unprofessional conduct in military establishments usually relates to severe human rights violations, especially in civil war.⁴⁰³

Scholars have specified the definition of military professionalism according to their research area. John Allen Williams stated that the topic of military professionalism is one more often approached from a social science perspective than a military science one.⁴⁰⁴ In this view, providing a definition would be more relevant to scholars of social science than to military strategists. Scholars who have considered the subject of ‘military professionalism’ include Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos and Sam C. Sarkesian.⁴⁰⁵ According to Thomas Young, the term ‘professionalism’ could be defined as “volunteers who choose to serve, as distinct from conscripted soldiers.”⁴⁰⁶ This definition is extensively detailed in many works including those of Huntington, and Janowitz. Janowitz took a more sociological approach to the concept of military professionalism. In his book, *The Professional Soldier*, he argued that the military is a “reflection of the society it serves, although it will not be a carbon copy”.⁴⁰⁷ John Williams noted from Huntington:

[For Huntington], the military was to operate as a conservative institution that “stuck to its knitting” and developed professional values that were consistent with its traditional mission: fighting and winning wars on behalf of its nation, as directed and controlled by the government and legislature.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰² John Allen Williams, “The International Image of the Military Professional”. *African Security Review*, 4, No 5, 1995.

⁴⁰³ Snider, D. M., Major J. A. Nagel, Pfaff M. T. *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21 st Century* (U.S. Army War College, December 1999).

⁴⁰⁴ Williams, J. A. (1995).

⁴⁰⁵ Williams, J. A. (1995).

⁴⁰⁶ Thomas-Durell Young, “Military Professionalism in a Democracy [Chapter 1], Pub: <https://www.ccmr.org/public/library_details.cfm?library_id=5152 > [pdf] n/d.

⁴⁰⁷ Young, Thomas-Durell, Chapter 1 [pdf] n/d.

⁴⁰⁸ John Allen Williams (1995).

According to Huntington's view, the professional work of the military is not concerned with political or social matters, but rather is related to the management of war and the structuring of violence. The military profession, like other professions, develops internally. To achieve success and effectiveness it must determine the most appropriate strategy for the mission. From this perspective, civilian control represents the possibility of additional resources, and this also tends to engender more civilian trust. In this case from Huntington's view, "the military would remain a purely professional, corporate and expert war-fighting entity whose members differed significantly from the population of its host society in terms of values, beliefs and attitudes."⁴⁰⁹

In his book *The Soldier and the State*,⁴¹⁰ Huntington clearly gives a definition of 'professionalism' to simplify the difference between a professional corps as an association, which is professional body, and the military professional officer who is a professional man; he also examines the differences between profession in the military and civilian professions. Professionalism in Huntington's view is a characteristic of the modern officer in the same sense that it is a characteristic of any other profession, such as that of lawyer or physician.⁴¹¹ But, "when the term 'professional' has been used in connection with the military, it normally has been in the sense of 'professional' as contrasted with "amateur" rather than in the sense of profession as contrasted with "trade" or "craft."⁴¹²

Huntington identified three criteria for a profession and indicated that the true military professional has to meet all of these three elements. The first characteristic is expertise: "the professional military officer has to be an expert in the management of violence."⁴¹³ By this definition, the military professional is a soldier who has good ethics to deal with violence while not creating the violence, and that is somewhat different to enlisted personnel, who are experts in the application of violence. According to Thomas, military professionalism is the "systematic creation of a class of people for whom war is a profession, and who pursue general and sub-specialisations in the art and science of conflict".⁴¹⁴

⁴⁰⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957).

⁴¹⁰ Huntington, S. P. (1957).

⁴¹¹ Huntington, S. P. (1957), p. 7.

⁴¹² Huntington, S. P. (1957), pp 7-8.

⁴¹³ Williams noted in: Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

⁴¹⁴ Young, T. D., Chapter 1, [pdf], n/d p.2.

The second characteristic is responsibility.⁴¹⁵ Huntington states there are three basic clients of any real profession, including that of professional military: the society, individuals, and the collective.⁴¹⁶ Huntington, in his statement, connected the three, noting that "...the general character of the service and his monopoly of his skills impose upon the professional man the responsibility to perform the service when required by society"⁴¹⁷. Thomas states that the management of violence, which should be a part of the military officer's duty, can be considered legitimate only in the context of service to the state. Due to the responsibilities that the officer has in front of his civil society, he should employ his skills in arms only in the interests of society. If a professional officer has utilized his skills in arms for his personal benefit, he will be transformed immediately from society's protector into a criminal threat to social stability.⁴¹⁸

A professional officer is he: "who could execute manoeuvres in an effective and disciplined manner on the battlefield."⁴¹⁹ The professional officer is a man in charge of mistakes that could happen under his control, because he is thought to be a practicing expert.⁴²⁰ Professional officers in democratic militaries must be competent across a range of skills, particularly in force and formation management.⁴²¹ Many of these skills have been transformed completely by new technology. This is particularly true in democracies that aspire to deploy forces outside of national borders and participate in high-intensity warfare.⁴²²

The third characteristic is 'corporateness'.⁴²³ By definition soldiers constitute a class who live apart from general society. Soldiers must learn how to give their loyalty to their association first, and to put personal considerations aside for the good of the group with which they serve.⁴²⁴ This observation prompted Janowitz to argue that professionalization of a military establishment actually increased the likelihood that it would intervene in the political processes. There is a sense among professionals themselves that they are a part of a profession, with certain standards for admission to their ranks, and a set of competencies that should be exhibited by its members. In Huntington's view, "...the members of a profession

⁴¹⁵ Huntington used the word 'responsibilities' (1957), p. 9.

⁴¹⁶ Huntington, S. P. (1957), p. 9.

⁴¹⁷ Huntington, S. P. (1957), pp. 9-10.

⁴¹⁸ Thomas-Durell Young, *Military Professionalism in a Democracy*, Chapter 1 [pdf] p.2.

⁴¹⁹ See Hans Delbruck, *History of the Art of War, Volume I: warfare in Antiquity*, Translated by Walter J. Renfro, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), pp 412 – 413; noted by Young, T. *Military Professionalism in a Democracy*, Chapter 1, p.3.

⁴²⁰ Huntington, S. P. (1957), p. 9.

⁴²¹ Thomas-Durell Young, *Military Professionalism in a Democracy*, Chapter 1 p. 4.

⁴²² Morris Janowitz. *Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (NY: Free Press, 1964), pp 21 – 37.

⁴²³ Huntington, S. P. (1957), p. 8.

⁴²⁴ Thomas-Durell Young, *Military Professionalism in a Democracy*, Chapter 1, p 6, [2001] [pdf] <www.ccmr.org/public/library.../bruneau_mil_professionalism.pdf> .

share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen.⁴²⁵ The profession has to have strong ethics and discipline, running in parallel with the training, knowledge and skills that are required. This allegiance is fostered by lengthy training and discipline, and the sharing of their “unique social responsibility.”⁴²⁶

4.6. ‘Professionalism’ and the Algerian Military at Independence

The case of Algerian crisis and the military intervention in politics has many similar factors with many cases in Africa and South America particular. However, indeed, each country has potentially distinct principles and regime structures. According to Amos Perlmutter, the modern military regime is distinctly and analytically a new phenomenon, restricted to the developing and modernizing world.⁴²⁷ However, since 1979, military regimes have controlled over 30 countries around the world. About 20 of these were in Africa and Arab Countries, nine in Latin America and the rest in Asia. During the 1970s, there were also military regimes in two South and South-east European states.⁴²⁸ In the 1980s and 1990s, the military regime ideology spread to neighbouring countries, increasing the total number of military regimes in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Military regimes have different degrees of dictatorship; authoritarian and autocratic. The military in Latin America for example played a key role in the nation-building process immediately after independence from Spanish rule. The intervention of the military in some countries in Africa and South America began as an attempt to fill the leadership vacuum until the arrangement of new elections. But, more often than not, after the military took the power, they found “legal” ways to hold on to it. Wiarda and Howard noted that the competition for power and the wealth of the country among local militia headed by landowners, who took part in the independence wars, caused weak central governments in 19th century Latin America.⁴²⁹ The formal armies, which were then weak and poorly institutionalized had to put down these local militias in the national integration process of Latin American countries.⁴³⁰ By the 19th century, the military regime in Latin America facilitated the expansion of capitalist forces by conquering or securing territories rich in raw materials or maintaining

⁴²⁵ Huntington, S. P. (1957), p. 10.

⁴²⁶ Williams, J. A. (1995).

⁴²⁷ Perlmutter, Amos, *The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievement* (The Trustees of Princeton University, 1980).

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey F. Kline, *Latin American Politics and Development*.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1979.

commercial routes. Examples of such conquests are the wars of Chile with Peru and Bolivia, the war between Ecuador and Peru, and the war between the Triple alliance of Argentina, Uruguay, and Bolivia against Paraguay.⁴³¹

According to Frederick M. Nunn, the professional military in Latin America today has changed and has moved from the dictatorship and political leadership to professionalism and political respect. In Brazil, the coup d'état of 1964 overthrew President Goulart, a populist, who ascended to presidency, as the legal successor of President Quadros after the latter's resignation in 1961. To appease the military's objection to Goulart's ascent to power, the 16 Brazilian state governments compromised by creating a parliamentary system by which Goulart and his cabinet were accountable to the congress. But in the 1961's plebiscite, the full presidential system was restored.⁴³² For the following 20 years,, the country was governed by successive regimes dominated by the armed forces and presided over by army generals, which is the similar to what Algeria has experienced since independence. But the professional officers in Brazil as well as in other Latin American states today are separate from the political civilian regimes.⁴³³ The control of any country by military regimes is claimed under the principles of nationalism and ideology, similar to the claims of revolutionaries as they seek to overturn the political status quo. By 1970 the young officers of Brazil decided to embark on a slow process, to end the military regime and to restore the civilian electoral process.

In "Brazil Shatters Its Wall of Silence on the Past," Eduardo Gonzalez wrote that the establishment of military professionalism was not accomplished without a measure of professional militarism in Brazil. Today's Brazilian military is united, dominated by the political system of the country. Its evolution is inseparable from the political, social and economic evolution, and the army has always been a force to be reckoned with.⁴³⁴ According to Amos Perlmutter, Brazillian elites are professionals who took on the responsibility of the

⁴³¹ Augusto Varus, *Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America* (Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1985), p.7. Varus elaborated three main functions of the Latin American armies in the past: (1) serving as the foundation of the nation; (2) supporting the expansion of dependent capitalist forces; and (3) supporting key private interests.

⁴³² Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America* (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1992), pp. 176-177.

⁴³³ Daniel Zirker, "Rethinking the Failure of Agrarian Reform in Brazil: Social Pacts and Political Elites, 1985-1988." *Martin Journal of Peace Research*, No. 1 (1996).

⁴³⁴ Perlmutter, Amos, "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements." *World Politics*, 33, No. 1 (Oct., 1980), pp. 96-120.

country in difficult times. They “have always been the leaders of the army in time of stress.”⁴³⁵

The professionalism of Brazil’s military regime provided a model, which has been exported for other military regimes and dictatorships around Latin America, systematizing the “Doctrine of National Security” [which justified] the military’s actions as operating in the interest of National Security in a time of crisis, creating an intellectual basis upon which other military regimes relied.⁴³⁶

However, the theory of military professionalism as applied to Latin America countries does not produce the same outcomes in Africa. The military’s approach in Africa has been more complex than simply taking the positions of power; the soldiers’ solution was to abrogate political activity and to rule by administrative approval in cooperation with civil servants.⁴³⁷ According to Edwar Fiet, the military-civil service coalition as one without a consensus or basic legitimacy in which both military officers and civil servants often have a reluctance to assume responsibilities through direct involvement in politics even after a military-civil service alliance has been established.⁴³⁸ Soldiers look to the civil servants to help them establish legitimacy while the civilians look after their own personal and institutional interests.⁴³⁹ In Nigeria for example, the 1963 Republican Constitution of the country was suspended by the military rule. Fiet referred to African armies as the ‘apotheosis of administration’ and saw them as reconstructing an administrative- traditional order.

The Nigerian army is a basic part of the society and is not separated from the community.⁴⁴⁰ Bienen-Fitton and Campbell explain the interesting mechanism of the Nigerian dyarchy.⁴⁴¹ This system of dual-powers (dyarchy) in Nigeria is a result of civil wars, which strengthened the military and established proper constitutional arrangements between federal and regional authorities. Civilians in Nigeria play important roles in consultative and advisory groups, while the political center in Nigeria is not powerful enough to dominate a vast country with a booming oil economy.⁴⁴² Indeed, throughout the civil war and while

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁶ Gonzalez, Eduardo, "Brazil Shatters Its Wall of Silence on the Past". *International Center for Transitional Justice*. (December 6, 2011), retrieved Mar. 18, 2012.

⁴³⁷ Samuel Keith Panter-Brick, *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria* (London, Frank Cass, and Co. 1978), pp 312-325; Daniel C. Bach, “Nigeria's 'Manifest Destiny,'" in: “West Africa: Dominance without Power,” *Africa Spectrum*, GIGA, Page 303.

⁴³⁸ Fiet, *Military Coup and Political Development*, *op. cit.*, p 100.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁰ Panter-Brick, *Soldiers and Oil*, p. 326.

⁴⁴¹ David C. Emelifeonwu, “Anatomy of a failed democratic transition: The case of Nigeria, 1985- 1993,” (Ph.D in political science) *McGill University* [Canada: August 1999].

⁴⁴² Panter-Brick, *Soldiers and Oil*, p. 326.

General Yakubu Gowon presided over the Central Government, Nigeria's political affairs were ruled by a healthy respect for the central tenets of the spirit of the Nigerian constitution that was inherited from the civilian era of governance before the onset of military rule. The military regime imposed a new constitutional framework that sharply revised the doctrine of Nigeria's Independence Constitution. It is that new framework, introduced by an ideologically impassioned military regime from 1975 onwards, which has taken hold in post-military Nigeria.

In applying the different definitions above as well as the case of Brazil to the Algerian case after independence, one central question that might be addressed is whether the Algerian military is a professional military, or rather a loose organisation of military groups periodically brought together in their desire to hold power. How about the soldiers who joined the military after independence in 1962: are *they*, rather, to be counted as professionals? In this case the most important thing to consider is whether there is any relationship between professionalism and the violence that has played such a big part in Algerian life since the independence. To make a clear analysis of the connection between professionalism and the military violence in Algeria it is necessary to clarify the meaning of "professionalism" that has been used in this case study. Using the definition of Riadh Saidaoui, the professional elite of the Algerian Army are the young officers who joined the military after independence in 1962.⁴⁴³ Most of these officers were born during the colonial period, but their age did not allow them to attend military schools; some were born after independence. They made up the majority of the Algerian military, and entered into the military by their own volition and with apparent personal satisfaction about the decision. They apparently chose the Army as their source of upward social mobility.

Zitout, Chouchane and Zaoui have denied that Algeria has ever had a professional military, insisting that the military of Algeria was established from three groups. French trained officers, revolutionary officers and officers commissioned after independence. Soldiers who joined the military straight after independence are not professional soldiers, they insist. Zaoui divided this group into two kinds of officers, the first are soldiers who joined the military voluntarily of their own personal choice and chose it to be their own profession. This group are paid according to their education levels and their work experience, exactly the same as civilians. The second are the officers in the regular military forces. These

⁴⁴³ Reyadh Saidaoui, *Siraa'at al-Nukhab al-Syasiya wa al-Askarya fi al-Djazaa'ir* [the Conflicts among the Political Elites and the military in Algeria] (the Arab association of distribution and publishing, Syria, 2009), pp. 39-54.

men entered the military under general conscription to serve for two years, a law that was later changed at the end of the 1980s to eighteen months.

Zaoui's view has been supported in a speech by president Bouteflika, where he mentions the national army, saying "...Algeria needs a professional military."⁴⁴⁴ The clear meaning here is that the Algerian Army is not professional, in the common understanding of the word, that is: well trained, working with a clear mission, which has been limited by the constitution of the country. In Zaoui's view, a professional military cannot engage in political competition or be part of any kind of organisation or political party. This view has been supported by Anthony Forster, as well as Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, who note that:

[Professional soldiers are these who accept]⁴⁴⁵ that their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian) government of the state (rather than themselves engaging in domestic politics or seeking to determine the overall direction of defence policy.)⁴⁴⁶

They add that:

[Professional soldiers are those]: who focus on conducting their professional military activities in an effective and efficient manner and whose organisation and internal structure reflect these twin assumptions.⁴⁴⁷

Chouchane has a different view, one that links the definition of the professionalism to the case of the Algerian military. Going back to the more nationalist definitions, formulated by revolutionaries such as Lenin, Che-Guevara and Castro, "professional military establishments" are military organisations formed as political parties. They were political movements of armed revolutionaries. They were engaged as military establishments in very different ways. Some of these were successful as movements, such as the People's Liberation Army in China, which limited the role of the military in its duties, defined legally, without any intervention in political or economic life. The political police in China are said to have full independence from the military forces.

The same was true in the Soviet Union, where the Committee for State Security (KGB) was separated completely from the military forces. A clear example of this is the

⁴⁴⁴ For Bouteflika's visit to the military bases in Charchale, Algiers, and the speech of General Qaied Salah, See the Website in Arabic: <<http://bilad-13.maktoobblog.com/380120/>>.

⁴⁴⁵ Young, *Military Professionalism in a Democracy* (2002) Chapter 1

⁴⁴⁶ Young, T.D. (2002), p. 2.

⁴⁴⁷ Young, cited Timothy Edmunds, Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, "Introduction: the professionalization of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe", in: Forster, Timothy and Cottey (eds.), *The Challenge of Military Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 6.

1991 Soviet *coup d'état* attempt, which is known as the August Putsch or August *Coup*. It was an attempt by a group of Soviet government officials to take control of the country from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Although the *coup* collapsed in only two days and Gorbachev returned to government with the help of the KGB, in support of civilian governance, it was then the KGB that determined that Russia would become a 'democracy' under President Yeltsin, who was to be elected formally in June 1991.

Algeria remains locked in a much older pattern, where there is no separation between the military and the secret services. Chouchane compares the Algerian system to that of the Soviet Union in the seventies and to the former Yugoslavia and Cuba. However, the Algerian military of today is different from other military establishments. According to Mohammed Harbi, every country has a military establishment to deal with its security's problems, but in Algeria the military control the country and deal primarily with political problems.⁴⁴⁸

To analyse the case of the Algerian Military we must look at its unique elements.⁴⁴⁹ First, the Algerian military was formed illegitimately, with its two most important elements, its leadership cadre and the secret services, created to serve the personal interests of key politicians like Boussouf, the actual founder of the secret services, and Boumédiène, who formed the ALN. Algeria has no professional military, but rather, an armed political organisation, a factor that was admitted by none other than Boumédiène himself.⁴⁵⁰ Second, although it has been mentioned frequently by observers of Algerian history that the Algerian military was established from a loosely organised army, the Frontier or Borders Military (also sometimes called the Army of Oujda),⁴⁵¹ in reality the new military formed shortly after independence, the ALN, was established on the military base of the Fifth Military Region. This base was effectively controlled by Boussouf, who also established the military secret services, and then he relinquished his position on the base to Boumédiène, who used this powerful platform to become the leader of the ALN, and then the president of the country.

⁴⁴⁸ Mohammed Harbi, *Le FLN Mirage et Realite des Origines a la Prise du Pouvoir: 1945-1962*, Col. *Le Sens de L'Histoire* (Paris : Ed. Jeune Afrique 1980). Harbi is not entirely accurate in this regard : Costa Rica and Panama, for example, do not have military establishments.

⁴⁴⁹ See François Gèze, « Armée et nation en Algérie : l'irrémediable divorce ? » Article publié dans la revue Hérodote (<http://www.herodote.org>) n° 116, « Armées et nations », 1er trimestre 2005 (en librairie le 14 avril 2005); See François Gèze, "Armée et nation en Algérie : l'irrémediable divorce ?" Article publié dans la revue Hérodote (<http://www.herodote.org>) no 116, « Armées et nations », 1er trimestre 2005 (en librairie le 14 April 2005), and Pub. At Algeria-Watch <http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/analyse/geze_herodote.htm>

⁴⁵⁰ Chouchane, personal interview, Hamilton, NZ, by Internet from London, UK, 13/05/10.

⁴⁵¹ Oujda is a Moroccan city on the border with Algeria. They also called it the Border Army, but never apparently referred to it as the army of the fifth military region. The army of the fifth region included most of the military bases in the Western part of the country.

The Algerian military was based on three groups: young Algerian soldiers, senior military leadership, and the secret services. This last had full control over military and civilian personnel. The military leadership after Boumédiène fell under the control of the French Officers, who used the military bases to impose their rules on civilians. Chouchane confirmed this account with references to historical incidents.

As regards to the era of the War for Independence, the founders of the Algerian military had a repeated pattern of turning against their own colleagues, including Belkacem, who was the first defence minister in Algerian history. Belkacem had been discharged from his position in what amounted to a *coup* carried out by his colleagues in the SM. One of the key theorists of the Revolution, Ramdhan, was been killed by his colleagues in the SM; many others suffered similar fates at the hands of this group, which apparently acted without regard for the rights or well-being of others. They were clearly and exclusively driven by personal interests.

Boussouf was the most important of the former leaders of the SM, and held files on many of the revolutionary leadership, reportedly for purposes of removing them from their positions, or even to assure that they would be put to death. He came to be known as the ‘Holder of the death files’.⁴⁵² In April 2010, the French released a letter from their archives that gave more details about the arrests of revolutionary leaders Amirouche Aït Hamouda (commonly called Colonel Amirouche) and Ahmed Ben Abderrazak, named “Si El Haouès”. They were subsequently brutally murdered in public. This letter was given to Amirouch’s son (Ait Hammouda), who has since placed full responsibility on the SM for the death of his father.⁴⁵³

Chouchane has a different view to Samraoui regarding the military officers of the independence era. Chouchane argues that the young officers of that era have gradually established their legitimacy to lead the military, and are close to trumping claims by the SM and the French Officers. Although many of these officers, who have risen to high ranks over the past 40 years, are perhaps not professionals according to Huntington and other scholars of military sociology, on the other hand neither can they be described as clandestine officers like the French Officers. Their professionalism will be proven, he feels, when they reach the top leadership. They will leave the politics to politicians, he believes, and they will work

⁴⁵² Harbi, M. (1980).

⁴⁵³ The letter has been published in a recent book written by Saadi Said, *Amirouche, une vie, deux morts, un testament* (Algiers, 02 May 2010); See: the Algerian Newspaper *al Watan* <<http://www.elwatan.com/Polemique-autour-d-Amirouche-une>> , and <<http://www.youtubealgerie.net/algerie-said-saadi-amirouche-une-vie-deux-morts-un-testament>> .

effectively to defend and protect the country.⁴⁵⁴ Chouchane believes that the officers of the Algerian independence era will be professionals, although until now they have been dominated by the French Officers, who have a self-interested political project as their primary focus.⁴⁵⁵ From this perspective, however, we can infer that the Algerian military has not yet been professional. And because officers of the independence era cannot establish a professional mission because of their leadership, they remain blocked from performing professionally. Moreover, the military establishment in Algeria continues to hold political power, controlling all aspects of the state, including the courts, the government, and even the presidency.

According to Saidaoui, the issue of military professionalism arose within the Algerian military immediately after independence.⁴⁵⁶ Many youths joined the military seeking professions to escape poverty and hunger, conditions that most Algerians faced after years of colonial rule. Another reason that professionalization was inhibited was mentioned by senior military officers in comments to the media. The revolution encouraged people to cheer on the revolutionaries in their nationalism, and to continue building the country to attain victory through force. There was little room for professionalism. The French had left the country in dire straits. Illiteracy was rampant. The percentage of uneducated Algerians before the arrival of the French in 1830 was about 13%; by independence in 1962, that number had reached 95%.⁴⁵⁷ The French administration practiced racial discrimination even for early education programmes, and thus there was virtually no chance for Algerians to qualify for university studies, except, perhaps, for some of the most wealthy, who tended to accept the concept of a French Algeria. Some children of collaborators (*Harkists*) had the chance to go to French schools because their families were working for the French Army, then fighting against Algerians. However, the vast majority of Algerian children had no right to education, or to work, or to become involved in any kind of politics. Moreover, even though the country itself was very rich in primary resources such as oil and gas, and had manufacturing industries, the income from these sources was reserved for French nationals living in Algeria, or controlling Algerian wealth directly from France. Algerians had come to expect a life of poverty and famine, working for the French, if they were fortunate, to attain the barest minimum existence

⁴⁵⁴ Chouchane, personal interview, London (10 June 2009).

⁴⁵⁵ Chouchane, A. (10 July 2009) ; (26 September 2009).

⁴⁵⁶ Saidaoui, R. (2009).

⁴⁵⁷ Saadallah, B. (1977), pp. 134-190.

For these reasons, Algerian youth of the independence era chose to join the military as a profession, a job for life. They had no other options, apart from the grinding poverty of agriculture. Meaningful agriculture jobs were restricted to rich families, who owned the land and/or had signed contracts with the French colonialists. The only agricultural employment available to the poor involved little more than slavery: working for small parcels of wheat, barley, or other foodstuffs in lieu of a paid salary. Hence, employment in the military, which was available in limited form, represented a major opportunity for thousands of young Algerians, and enabled them to have a sense of honour, in particular because so many of them sensed that independence was not far off.

In its earliest establishment, the Algerian army began involving young people, most of them teenagers, who were encouraged to join in the interests of their country. They tended to be oblivious to the private interests of leadership or politics. Their dream seems to have been exclusively to build a strong country, to protect their fellow citizens, and to rebuild and develop the country after the long bloody years of war. Unfortunately, the energy and idealism of these youth appear to have been dismissed by French Officers, and some of the revolutionary leaders. The competition among the revolutionary leadership became paramount, with the separate goals of the French Officers hidden just beneath, however, and the professionalization of the young military personnel was forgotten. This conflict among leaders, and their relentless competition for power, gave the French Officers the opportunity to organize themselves and to create a network linking the military bases, particularly as they became the primary trainers and commanders of the military bases. There were, of course, the only professionally trained officers and soldiers in the immediate post-independence era; these were trained by foreign officers from the Soviet Union or France, who were attached to, and under leadership of the French Officers. As noted above, while many young recruits felt a strong sense of nationalism and idealism, many others at that time had virtually no ideological principles or even goals. They were working for their wages; in the only employment available to them. It is perhaps not surprising that their capacity for ethical conduct and behaviour was limited.⁴⁵⁸

Until 1978, the direct leadership of the professional soldiers in Algeria was in the hands of the French Officers and foreign training missions, mostly French. According to Chouchane and Souaidia, their fellow officers in the profession had little chance of influencing policy; rather, they were engaged in the most demeaning and difficult tasks:

⁴⁵⁸ Chouchane, personal interviews, London (10 July 2009 and 26 September 2009).

torture, and guarding high security prisons. In the relative absence of an ethical framework, corruption flourished. In 1978 a change came from President Bendjedid, who mandated that all political systems would be directed in Arabic; he announced the “Algerianification” of the military, referring to the need for Algerian trainers, without foreign direction. Any weaknesses in military preparedness would be covered by sending troops to study in Eastern Europe.

Between 1978 and 1990, the Algerian military experienced profound changes, as did civilian society. Some fundamental liberties and rights such as the freedom of religion and free speech, forbidden at first, gradually became permissible. The advent of these freedoms led to the legalization of political and religious groups, and varied activists, Islamists, socialists and nationalists came to be accepted. Chouchane argues that he witnessed the military after 1978 absorbing a new generation. Chouchane states that

...before 1978, and when I joined the military school, we were taught only the history of Moscow and Stalingrad and others ...we were studying Russian history with not one word relating to our revolutionary history ...but when I took the position of programming and planning for the special forces projects, I changed the history program to other topics relating to Algerian history.⁴⁵⁹

The changes witnessed by Chouchane point to the relative absence of professional military development during the years of the 1960s and up until 1978; there were no projects or principles to guide it, or even goals to achieve. The military was essentially a machine in the leaders’ hands, a leadership that was increasingly dominated by the French Officers. They were using the soldiers as they wanted, especially in carrying out violence against civilians, mostly for the purpose of protecting themselves, and preserving their positions of power. Samraoui, however, was one of these military professionals, and he has a very different perspective from that of Chouchane. He places the responsibility for protracted unprofessional behaviour on all of the military who were involved in the *coups d’état* or in the frequent killing of civilians, regardless of their positions, Those giving and taking unethical and unprofessional orders were all responsible in his view. Samraoui insisted that professional soldiers had played a major role in committing the crimes that have been committed since independence, and especially during the crisis of 1990s. He assigns greater blame to the French Officers, however, citing the proverb “the responsibility is on he who gave the order”. Although the Nuremburg trials discounted this as a defence, it can

⁴⁵⁹ Chouchane, A. (2009)

nevertheless be said that professional soldiers of the Algerian military who committed crimes of violence on the orders of their leadership, faced severe punishment if they failed to comply, including the likelihood of extra-judicial execution.

In his book, *The Dirty War*, Souaidia noted many cases of human rights violations by the Algerian military against civilians, including massacres, torture and kidnappings, especially in small villages. Most of the massacres were conducted by young soldiers, and many of these were newly admitted students in the military schools. Souaidia was the truck driver, often transporting troops to the scenes of subsequent massacres.⁴⁶⁰ The massacres of Ben-Talha and Raisse that took place in 1994 were the bloodiest in the post-independence era. More than 400 men, women, and children died in less than 6 hours. These massacres were formally *Orders de Mission* from the military leadership, apparently controlled at the time by the French Officers, to the young professional soldiers.

The Algerian soldiers who fought against their own citizens, killing thousands of people in cold blood, were professionals according to Saidaoui's definition of the word. Most had been trained in military schools run by the French Officers, and were systematically taught that their principal enemies were civilians and Islamists. As with professional soldiers everywhere, they had become experts in violence. It should not be surprising, then, that they played a central role in the violence of the 1990s. Boumaarafi, for example, who killed Boudhiaf, was one of these professional soldiers. He killed the president on orders from his leader, Smaïn L'amari.⁴⁶¹ Professional soldiers in Algeria accepted their role as they had been taught, with the exception of a relatively small number of nationalist soldiers, who refused to engage in the killing, and who were consequently killed, arrested, or driven into exile, and sought asylum in Western countries.

The conflict between professional soldiers and civilians in Algeria likely owes its origins to military training, where soldiers are traditionally taught that Islamists are their enemies. If the soldier does not confront (read: 'kill') them, they will likely be killed by them.⁴⁶² Such training conditions encourages soldiers to commit violence against civilians, until it becomes a competition between soldiers as to who can kill the most, and thereby raise his grade and increase his salary and bonuses. The officers who joined the military during the period of the crisis, after 1988, had their training through the civil war, or as many tended to

⁴⁶⁰ Souaidia, M. (2001).

⁴⁶¹ Samraoui M. Interview Aljazeera TV on 'Bila Hudoud'; "Algeria: How the secret services manipulated Islamic groups": http://www.youtube.com/Watch?V=Jvclve0_Zjo&Feature=Related (03 February 2009); also Samraoui, M., *Chronique des années de sang: Algérie, Comment les Services Secrets ont Manipulé les Groupes Islamistes* (Denoël, 2003).

⁴⁶² Chouchane, A. (13/05/2009).

refer to it, “the war on terror”. They learned about their enemies, and faced them every day. They grew up with violence, and practiced it daily. They were encouraged by their leaders and the media, which showed graphic images of massacres and other crimes, describing them as having been perpetrated by ‘Islamist terrorists’ and Algerian Muslims.⁴⁶³ The media⁴⁶⁴ has played a major role in keeping professional soldiers involved in this war between the French Officers and the Algerian people.⁴⁶⁵

From Chouchane’s viewpoint, whatever the atrocities committed by professional soldiers during the crisis of 1990s, they have never equalled those of the French Officers who are in positions of highest leadership in the military.⁴⁶⁶ The French Officers had a program, which was explicitly against the Algerian people, and they have struggled relentlessly to achieve this goal. The professional Algerian officers are still far from decision making, like the “*group de la Coste*.”⁴⁶⁷ The professional officers by all accounts have had no particular goals or interests that would pit them against the Algerian citizens; rather, they have been obedient tools in the hands of their leadership, keen to complete their missions as they receive their orders.⁴⁶⁸

Most of the former military officers who participated in this research⁴⁶⁹ believe that the ‘professional soldiers’ who had their training during and after the violence of 1990 represent a greater danger to the Algerian people. Since 1993, with the encouragement of the military leadership, the *Francophones* from the civilian population, and the media in particular, ‘professional soldiers’ have been convinced of the validity of the war against terrorism, and have been willing to engage in violence against civilians. Based on their training, many civilians are regarded as terrorists, and these soldiers have been meticulously trained to make war against civilians. Such ‘heroics’ can raise their military grades. Moreover, many have faced death daily from armed groups on the battlefields in the mountains and forests, and have seen many deaths. The Algerian civil war has broken apart social relations between civilians, such that there is little trust remaining, even among family members. At this stage, it has become impossible to return to conditions of peace and the trust among civilians and soldiers.

⁴⁶³ Chouchane, A. (13/05/2009).

⁴⁶⁴ The Algerian media is not independent. It has been controlled by the military regime since Independence.

⁴⁶⁵ Mohammed Samraoui, *Chronique des années de sang: Algérie, Comment les Services Secrets ont Manipulé les Groupes Islamistes* (Denoël, 2003).

⁴⁶⁶ Chouchane, A. (26/09/2009).

⁴⁶⁷ *Groupe de la coste* are the French Officers who were trained by General La Coste in French military schools and then joined the ALN just before Independence in 1961-62.

⁴⁶⁸ Chouchane, A. (26/09/2009).

⁴⁶⁹ Samraoui, M. (2003); Chouchane, A. part. 1 (13/05/2009); and Souaidia, M. (2001).

...they [professional soldiers] involved in this war [war on terror] ... have no confidence in any of the civilians or even in their military colleagues, as they have examples from what was happening every day,...thus, it is impossible to convince them of [the importance of] peace and [ending violent ...crime...and from here the danger comes.⁴⁷⁰

Habib Souaidia agreed with the previous views, saying that the Algerian crisis was based on the absence of trust between leaders and followers which has deteriorated since the revolutionary period. This lack of trust has affected civilians and the military, as well the soldiers themselves. However, after the *coup d'état* of 1992, the regime used the special forces within the police and gendarmerie and security services to limit the popular revolt and civil disobedience, which emerged after the reversal of the election of 1991-92. Military establishments have little capacity to deal with popular revolts, not to mention wars on terror, and they tend, rather to respond with wholesale violence against civilians. In this case, the greatest incidence of violence against civilians since independence occurred; thousands of civilians were killed and tortured; houses were attacked without any legal sanctions, and people were arrested (and worse) at all hours in both private and public places.

Human rights violations, then, were commonplace in Algeria in that period. Civilians tended to be treated as terrorists and enemies, especially by the opposing political parties such as the FIS and the FFS. This pushed young people to take action in self-defence, and to avenge their relatives. Their retaliation against the troops further reinforced the negative military ethos regarding the commission of violence: "...this was the main factor in the formation of Islamic terrorism."⁴⁷¹ This in turn became a tool in the hands of the military leadership and some of the political elites who saw this situation as useful in protecting their interests and their positions of power. They seem to have encouraged the clash between the military and civilians, and the continuation of violence in the country.⁴⁷² Elites within the military and politicians spared no effort to protect the secularity of the country from the 'extremist' Islamists. Their argument was that they had to protect democracy in Algeria.⁴⁷³

It was in this way that key military and civilian elites 'turned on' the green light for violence, with the active and tacit consent of the central political and judicial powers. Key governmental decision-makers come from within the military leadership, and are thought to control most aspects of the political system. Souaidia, as an ex-professional officer in the

⁴⁷⁰ Chouchane, A. (10 June 2009).

⁴⁷¹ Souaidia, M. (2001).

⁴⁷² Samraoui, M. (2009); Zitout, L. (2009); and Chouchane, A. (13/05/2009).

⁴⁷³ Nezzar, Khaled. 1999. *Mémoires du Général Khaled Nezzar*, Chihab Editions.

Special Forces for fighting terrorists, had been unaware of the full reality of this struggle, perhaps because his training in military schools took place before the period of crisis in 1990s. He recognized that the violence was directed and had a purpose; later he became aware that the winners in this struggle were opportunists, corrupt self-interested individuals who had seized power and maintained it. There were key military leaders and their supporters who would stop at nothing to retain their power hegemony, and to destroy any attempts to reduce the violence and turn the country to a path of peace and democracy.

In addition, Samraoui stated that there was another power that circumvented the limits on the military detailed (if not enacted) in the Algerian Constitution. This power is neither legislative nor executive nor even judicial. Rather, it is the power of the SM, a dominant national force since the period of Boumédiène, who originally created it to protect himself. After his death, this organisation came under the control of the French Officers. The officers of SM “have the authority to intervene in any political, governmental or civil association in the country. They have the power, moreover, to make changes in legal or legislative provisions.”⁴⁷⁴

According to Samraoui, the SM officers were planning and executing major acts of violence, directing responses to riots, and intervening in popular revolts from the beginning. Their primary instruments were the professional soldiers of the military services. In October 1988, SM officers were involved in triggering major riots in Algiers. A simple march turned into a horrific riot subjected to extreme violence after the military intervened in a clash with civilians. The security services, especially the Department of Intelligence and Security (*Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité - DRS*), were managing the violence by triggering riots in the streets, and then reporting through the media that the situation in Algeria was extremely bad and that the people needed to change the political system. Following this, the next role of the military was to restore peace and calm in the country by using professional military personnel to confront civilians and unarmed people with structured violence that inevitably led to human rights violations.⁴⁷⁵

Chouchane’s views in this matter are in agreement with my other interviewees. He stated that the professional officers of the independence period were not in positions of control, and that decision making in the country during the crisis of 1990s was dominated by the French Officers, who remain dominant today. Chouchane assumes that if these

⁴⁷⁴ Samraoui, M. (2009); Zitout, L., London (2009).

⁴⁷⁵ Samraoui, M. (2009); Brahim, A. H., interview (2009).

professional officers had reached decision-making positions, the crisis would not have reached the levels of crime and violence that were witnessed.⁴⁷⁶

Chouchane expects the imminent (and very significant) retirement of today's military leadership, if only based on their ages, in particular the following three leaders: the Director General of the SM, General Madean-Toufik (75 years old); Leader of the *d'état Major*, General Gayad Saleh (71 years old); and the Minister of Defence, General Abdelmalek Guenaizia (76 years old). He assumes that these retirements will give opportunities to professional officers to lead the military and to become key political decision makers. Indeed, these professional soldiers are likely to hand over many of the political positions to civilians that Chouchane expects will be selected carefully from among politicians and experts. The officers of the independence period may now have reached the penultimate level of power according to their military credentials, Chouchane notes:

...these officers were my colleagues and I knew them since I joined the military. I was working with them...these are the right professional soldiers...they have no projects or any political plans or even problems with civilians stemming from the historical era. They have no specific ideological background,... so, whoever wins the elections will have the right to rule in the country regardless of the political party background or even the political system.⁴⁷⁷

Haddam agrees, noting that any negotiation or amnesty agreement will likely only occur with the first generation of professional officers, because they are the ones who know the historical background of the crisis. The soldiers from the generation of the 1990s crisis had already developed their biases against civilians during their training, based as it was on the war on terror; they will likely continue to view civilians who insist on democracy as terrorists, and it will remain difficult to persuade them that civilians are in any way innocent. Soldiers of the crisis generation have full respect for their leadership, and the Algerian media has supported this enmity.⁴⁷⁸

Soldiers of the independence era do not have an organized cadre, or group, as do the French Officers. They have no particular political or personal designs. Their income has come only from their wages, and they have not developed corrupt economic interests from public revenue. The French Officers were an organized, self-interested group, and they have retained a spokesman who represents them, General Nezzar. He has been prominent in many

⁴⁷⁶ Chouchane Ahmed, personal interview, Hamilton, NZ [Skype-recorded] 13/05/10.

⁴⁷⁷ Chouchane personal interview, London, 10/06/ 2009.

⁴⁷⁸ Haddam A., personal Interview by Skype, Hamilton, NZ / Washington DC, USA, March 2009. See Chouchane, personal interview, London, 10/06/2009.

venues, and is frequently quoted in the media, even though he is retired. He is still the head of the French Officers' group, and continues to defend his cadre from criticism that they confront from time to time. The professional soldiers, on the other hand, have only their professional duties, and are said to lack ambitions for higher office outside the military sector. The military profession for these soldiers is like a civilian job; they assume that the contract can be broken at any time and for any reason. They have a reasonable existence, with scheduled holidays, leave, and retirement provisions, stipulated by the constitution.

The professional army in Algeria is said to be largely unbiased, is not in contention with any of the political parties, any one of which they would allow to attain political power by democratic elections. Chouchane based his conclusions on the professional officers' ethos, with which he is intimately familiar. This ethos, in his view, is nonaligned, independent from other powers, and commits them to their mission as defined and limited by the Constitution. Chouchane believes that when the professional officers reach the highest levels of military leadership, they will likely guide the country successfully. They know how to deal with civil society, and especially with social and economic problems, human rights, political freedom and social justice. When they are in their constitutionally limited decision-making positions, calm and security will return Algeria. He is convinced that when/if this happens, the military will not be involved in or play any role with or against any political party in the country. Civilian democratic leadership will have finally become the dominant political form in Algeria.

4.7.Expectations of violence under professional army leadership

The analyses of Chouchane and Haddam were very different from those of analysts in the Hoggar Organisation.⁴⁷⁹ Dhina, Abbas and Masli agreed that violence in Algeria has reached a critical level, and that the state of the society, institutions and law are still far from reasonable: civil society remains limited and profoundly threatened. Aroua states that currently the President of the Republic, who has the full power constitutionally to disband the parliament, but was unable to change the head of the customs department or the director of the Port of Algiers, has no choice other than to be submissive to the generals who gave him his position. If he fails to do so, he will have the same end as had previous presidents: forced resignation, arrest, or even death.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁹ Hoggar is an organisation specializing in Human Rights and social issues in the Arabic World and North Africa, including Algeria. Mourad Dhina, Abbas Ourwa and Masli have taken part in this research in an interview that took place in Geneva, on 28.08.09 – 07.09.09.

⁴⁸⁰ Abbas Ourwa, interview on 2/09/09, Geneva . Presidents referred to before Boutaflika include Ben Bella, who was arrested by Colonel Boumadiene, Boutaflika and the French Officers. After the death of Boumadiene

Chouchane puts his hopes for the future of Algeria on the professional officers, although history is not on his side. Many observers feel that there is little hope that leadership can make substantial changes in the system. Their views are based on the strong relationships within and among elite groups. It is unlikely, for example, that the French Officers would survive in power without the protection of the professional soldiers. Their involvement in massacres, political assassinations, torture and serious crimes well into the 1990s precludes them from relinquishing their military positions. Simply stated, when they step down from power they are very likely to be facing charges for their crimes in national and international courts. Thus, most interviewees believe that civilian control over the military remains a distant prospect in Algeria.

The profound mistrust amongst the leadership, military, political and civilian administrative groups reveals that there is little chance of a creation of a democratic civil society in Algeria in the near future, Chouchane's views to the contrary notwithstanding. Algerians are virtually without hope that they will become a real democracy while the military leadership, in power since independence, remains the most powerful force in Algeria. Sidhum proposes only one path for Algeria to establish a full democracy: to build a strong unified civilian voice from the many political forces and human rights organisations, and to confront the military regime until the senior officers agree to return to their bases and profession, and respect the limits placed on them by the Constitution.

On the other hand, Aroua states that the Algerian military has grown up with the habit of giving orders to politicians and administrators, and, even more significant, of satisfying their personal financial needs from the public treasury. There is little to suggest that they will ever relinquish these perquisites of power. Corruption, unfairness and injustice have become normal parts of Algerians' lives, and ingrained in Algeria's military ethos. Algeria ranks 112th on Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, well below most other states.⁴⁸¹

Chouchane's view is based on the different elements of power in Algeria. The military, for example, has various sub-divisions. Chouchane seems oblivious to one indisputable fact, however: the elites that are actually controlling the country are the French

Chadli became president. Chadli was forced to resign in the *coup d'état* of 1992. Boudiaf, who was living in exile in Morocco then succeeded him, only to be killed after only a few months in his position. Ali Kafi and others on the High Council of State were dismissed by Boutaflika, who came back from exile to serve again as president. Boutaflika has held this position since 1999, and after two terms he called for a review of the Constitution to allow himself another five-year term.

⁴⁸¹ Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011: <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/>.

Officers. They have dominated power since independence and took all important positions until they achieved the power to appoint presidents. Chouchane argues, however, that this power is transitory. Power in Algeria is not inherited, and this applies to the French Officers as well. Ben Bella's children and relatives did not inherit power, nor did Boumédiène's or Bendjedid's children. It is clear that inheritance of power is not acceptable, and this will apply to the French Officers' children as well.⁴⁸² This authoritarian dominance, Chouchane therefore insists, is not going to exist forever. On the other hand, the difficulties that Algerians are living through today include profound economic and social problems, which appear to be expanding, and could result in a political explosion much larger than that of 1988.

Moreover, some elements of the international community have given up their attempts to rescue the old regime in Algeria.⁴⁸³ Independent human rights organisations have effectively condemned the military regime, blaming it for the massive human rights violations since independence, and especially during the crisis of 1990s.⁴⁸⁴ NGOs have put forward the case of Algeria in high-level discussions at the United Nations and in the media. Other elements of the international community have retained economic interests in the country, so much so that the discussion of human rights becomes an economic matter, and fails because of the ongoing economic competition among the European countries and the US.⁴⁸⁵ However, the resultant isolation of Algeria might assist political parties, who have failed to bring about change in the regime over the past half century, to become more organized and to finally confront the military dictatorship in new attempts to create a democratic state, giving rights to civilians, placing the professional military under civilian control, and beginning, for the first time, to abide by the Constitution.

Chouchane provided examples in his interviews, including the case of General Nezzar, who became the 'president-maker' and spokesman for the French Officers. After he went into retirement, he appeared to become a normal civilian, and played no part in the military or in any exercise of power. He fled France in 2009 after a French court issued an arrest warrant based on legal proceedings that Souaidia brought against him in Paris. Another

⁴⁸² Chouchane, A. (13/5/2009).

⁴⁸³ M. Larbi Zitout, Aljazeera TV, Rachad website: <www.rachad.org> and see the same interview on the website: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBCPWp9JiU0&feature=related>>.

⁴⁸⁴ Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, "Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy: The 1992 Coup, its Consequences and the Contemporary Crisis", *Algeria International Watch*, <http://www.algeria-watch.de/en/articles/1997_2000/paradox_democracy.htm> (November 2000).

⁴⁸⁵ Ahmed Zaoui, Personal interview, Hamilton, NZ, part.2 (2010).

case involved General Belkheir,⁴⁸⁶ who was removed from France by the security services because of a court order, which required him to respond regarding the investigation of mass killings, human rights abuses, torture and the disappearance of thousands of civilians in Algeria, based upon charges brought against him in France by a number of Algerian refugees. He was sent to Rabat as the Ambassador of Algeria in Morocco, and died in late January 2010.

Chouchane concludes that the Algerian leadership are guilty of fomenting and sustaining the crisis, which will only be resolved when they are removed completely from power. He notes that General Lamari was reportedly killed earlier by one of his colleagues in the DRS in Algiers,⁴⁸⁷ although the media announced that he had had a sudden heart attack and was taken to a hospital where he died. Most of the secret files of the crisis have pointed to him as largely responsible for the mass killings of the 1990s, and perhaps directly responsible for as many as 20 000 disappearances. Mohamed Lamari as well, retired at the age of 76, and later died in Morocco, in February 2010. Ali Tounsi, who was killed in his office in early March, 2010, by a close friend of his, Colonel Chouaïb Oultache, was in charge of military helicopters. According to the media,⁴⁸⁸ the case was related to the files on corruption, which has been progressing through the Algerian courts since early January 2010, on the orders of President Boutaflika. The Algerian courts have opened major investigations into financial corruption, particularly in the national associations.

According to Chouchane, the current situation in Algeria is reminiscent of the situation in 1957, and the Soummam Congress, the creation of the revolutionary army, and the creation of the special working group on principles of the Congress, which later became the military secret services of the revolution. The similarity with 1957, he reasons, revolves around the hegemony of the military secret services, which in 1957 had been directed by Toufik, and the secret services of the revolution, led by Boussouf. These organisations essentially had no rules, and were out of control while exercising immediate command over all of the military regions, departments within the military, and the key political groups

⁴⁸⁶ Aljazeera TV, interview with Zitout (who created the Army Islamic Groups in the Arabic Maghrib): <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBCPWp9JiU0&feature=related> .

⁴⁸⁷ News released by Zitout on Rachad TV, and noted by Chouchane in my first personal interview with him, by Skype, in Marsh 2009. The Algerian media released the news of the death of Smain Laamari, describing it as illness followed by a heart attack.

⁴⁸⁸ Aljazeera TV news: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwfn6Z1L-XA&feature=related>.

within the GPRA. Today, he notes, the same organisation exists in the SM.⁴⁸⁹ The SM is still the main and most powerful part of the military regime of Algeria.

At this point, Chouchane believes that there is no other way to gain peace and democracy in Algeria apart from an adoption of a fully legal and constitutional system in which each group fulfils its legal role, as delineated by the Constitution. The Algerian military has to assume an orthodox military role of protecting the country from foreign aggression. The military secret service should be limiting its role inside the military schools, dealing with soldiers, and reporting to military officers as a limited and controlled part of the Ministry of Defence. As Chouchane notes, such changes will not be easy, even if conditions are auspicious for limiting the power of the SM and moving senior military officers to military bases. These changes can only happen, he says, if the senior military officers agree to compelling the SM to operate within the law, and if there is clear punishment for violations of those rules, including the assignment of full responsibility in front of a military court.

Chouchane believes that Algerian political parties are very weak, and that they are therefore incapable by themselves of reaching solutions to major political and security problems.⁴⁹⁰ Moreover, since most of the political parties are working under the SM's orders, and benefitting financially from their subservience to the SM, they are unlikely to refuse such orders. Also significant is the huge price that civilians have paid when they have actively sought change in Algeria. Bluntly stated, people are afraid to demand their rights as defined by the Constitution and by national law. So, Chouchane concludes, only the military can effectively bring about fundamental change at this point. However, on a positive note, most Algerian officers and enlisted men appear unwilling to continue to allow a few elite officers to control them, particularly when the policies that result from this system are obviously taking the country further into instability. It is the right time, Chouchane feels, for the military officers of Algeria to change their situations and the situations of all Algerians.

As I close this chapter it will be useful to mention the words of Zitout. He said Algeria today is paying the price of the counter revolution, which began just before independence and centred on the military and the administrative sectors. By independence, revolutionaries turned their weapons on each other in a bloody competition for power. At that time, the counter revolution (French Officers) seemed dormant, but were in fact establishing themselves and organizing their ranks. Indeed, with the death of Boumédiène, the French

⁴⁸⁹ It had been changed by the time of Boumédiène, later to be opened to public scrutiny and then closed under Chadli, when he dismissed its leader, Qasdi Marbah. Now staffed at the senior ranks with French Officers, the SM today continues to exist unconstitutionally.

⁴⁹⁰ Ahmed Chouchane, interviews, 10 July 2009 and 26 September 2009.

Officers were able to achieve certain important positions, among them Abdul Qadir Shabu and Alahum, who were from the French Army, and the first of this group to reach to the heart of power immediately after the inauguration of Bendjedid as a president. They managed to summon most of their colleagues from within the French Officers to positions of power in the military and the administration of the country. Zitout argues that in 1992, 30 years after independence, Algeria became a French colony again. In fact, Algeria today is governed by a French Officer, French administrator, by French rules and continues to embrace French culture and education. Older Algerians cannot feel the changes fought for in the War of Independence. French penetration of Algeria has become clear, and legitimacy of the regime has been lost on the subsequent Algerian governments, which were dominated by the military straight after the colonial era. To return to a state of legitimacy, Algeria needs a new version of governance led by educated men with the ability to drive the country forward and the willingness to take responsibility for the mistakes of the past “Algeria may call for another revolution in a different way,” said Zitout.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁹¹ Mohammed Larbi Zitout, personal interview, London, 12/2012.

CHAPTER FOUR FRENCH PENETRATION OF ALGERIA

1. Introduction

The recent history of Algeria is defined by the formation and reinforcement of a military dictatorship. The power base in Algeria began to shift in the 1960s towards the French Officers who, to this day, continue to be an important link to the French authorities. Moreover, France has also continued to exert a considerable influence over the political events in Algeria, partly as the result of its colonial past. Some argue that France continues to see Algeria and the rest of its former colonies as its private preserve.⁴⁹² There is little regard in such neo-colonial relationships for the rights and well being of the citizens of these former colonies. All-too-frequent interventions, in fact, are often the primary cause of human rights violations.

It is, perhaps, ironic that the French legal and political discourse is full of references to human rights, liberty, equality, fraternity and humanity. It can be argued that when it comes to its ex-colonies, French authorities do not always live up to those ideals. In Africa, for example, France has openly supported military dictators, some of whom have committed massive human rights violations. Dictators such as Jean Bedel-Bokassa of Central Africa,⁴⁹³ Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (especially in his war against the Front de Liberation in 1977-78),⁴⁹⁴ and armed groups in the first Congo war,⁴⁹⁵ not to mention the Hutu militias, which were responsible for the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda,⁴⁹⁶ all received at least covert, if not overt support from France. The French were also apparently involved in the *coups d'état* in Comoros in August 1975 and May 1978.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹² Salem-Badis L. "French Reactions to the Massacres in Algeria", in: Bedjaoui, Y., Aroua, A. and Ait-Larbi, M. *An Inquiry in the Algerian Massacres* (Geneva: Hoggar, 1990), p 696.

⁴⁹³ Chukwunyere Kamalu, *The little African History Book: Black Africa from the Origins of Humanity to the Assassination of Lumumba in the 20th Century* (London: Orisa Press, 2007), pp. 177-184: "Mobutu was supported by the French and the Americans who continued to arm him and bail him out financially."

⁴⁹⁴ Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, *The path of genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (First Paperback Edition, 2000), p. 178.

⁴⁹⁵ Europa Publications, *Regional Surveys of the World 2004 Africa South of the Sahara 2004*, Ed. 33 (Routledge, July, 9, 2011); Adelman, H., Govind C. Rao, *War and peace in Zaire-Congo: analyzing and evaluating intervention, 1996-1997* (Africa World Press, Inc. 2004), p. 296.

⁴⁹⁶ Mamdani, M. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004).

⁴⁹⁷ Christopher S. Clapham, *Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1996), pp. 92-96.

The network of relationships between France and the Francophone countries seems to be based primarily on French business interests.⁴⁹⁸ As for Algeria, the French were implicated in each *coup d'état* that took place in the country after independence. Salem-Badis supports this interpretation, writing that

The will to maintain a Francophone zone and a French presence in the ex-colonies where there are natural resources and markets for French products has meant a French policy of active support to repressive and corrupt regimes.⁴⁹⁹

The most egregious examples of French involvement in the politics of Africa over the past two decades have indisputably been in Burundi and Rwanda. However, the case of Algeria also figures prominently. After decades of colonialism, a war of liberation, and forty years of “independence”, Algerian politics continue to be dominated by a military regime that traces its origins back to French military schools. When Algerians ultimately voted for an Islamic program in 1991 in spite of the historical animosity of the French towards Islam, France viewed this as an unforgivable challenge and threat, and a violent response was forthcoming.

However, before exploring the Franco-Algerian relationship, it is important to examine the theoretical body of work as it relates to asymmetric political relationships across borders, referred to by James Rosenau as “penetration”, and often resulting in state intervention that pays little regard to matters of sovereignty and international law.⁵⁰⁰ The French penetration of Algeria is not new, and did not grow out of the Algerian political crisis of 1990s. French penetration is best known as part of the post-colonial era,⁵⁰¹ even though its beginnings date back to pre-independence. A number of cases discussed throughout this thesis suggest that France, through formal and informal channels, has had a significant role in what occurred throughout Algeria’s independence, what might be referred to as the French penetration of Algeria.

⁴⁹⁸ The role of the French-Ivorian connection in supporting Charles Taylor’s NPFL insurgency in Liberia was clearly defined by the French presence in the area, which was apparently oblivious to humanitarian or peace-keeping concerns. See: Christopher S. Clapham (1996), pp. 92-96.

⁴⁹⁹ Salem-Badis L., In: Youcef Bedjaoui, Abbas Aroua And Meziane Ait-Larbi, *An Inquiry In The Algerian Massacres* (Hoggar, Geneva, 1990), pp. 696-7.

⁵⁰⁰ See: James N. Rosenau, *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy*, in Barry Farrell, ed, *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, 1966), pp 63-6; also: “Toward the Study of National-International Linkages,” in Rosenau, ed, *Linkage Politics* (New York 1969), pp 44-66.

⁵⁰¹ Brahim, A. (2000); Zitout, personal interview, London, 12/2012.

2. Penetration and International Relations

Security and stability are the main goals in the formation of a state. To achieve these aims there must be a systematic organisation of citizens and their needs, which must be built on a legitimate domination of the institutions. The leadership of the state must be seen as a legitimate government by its population.⁵⁰² In other words, it is widely substantiated that in establishing the security and stability of the contemporary state, governments must be legitimate and be guided by a clear constitution and/or set of regulations. According to Posgate (2012), the principle mechanisms that governments have are, 'force' and 'consent',⁵⁰³ to create the climate and conditions within which they can protect their legitimacy. A legitimate government's responsibility is to protect citizens, to the point of using force to simultaneously bring security, governance and development to a population.

Political legitimacy is a major factor in both the structure and systematisation of states.⁵⁰⁴ Legitimacy can be seen to contribute to the way that states behave toward citizens and outsiders. Governments that come to power illegitimately, devote more resources to maintaining their rule and less to effective governance, which reduces support and makes them susceptible to overthrow or collapse.⁵⁰⁵ By definition, Englebert (2000), for example, holds that: "a state is legitimate when its structures have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions."⁵⁰⁶ The state, which is built on the establishment of legitimate bureaucracy, is thus "a historical, structural condition of the entire state apparatus."⁵⁰⁷ Political legitimacy is a central concept in political science, as it relates to power, and to the ways in which it can be used such that it is accepted. In this sense, it is 'the core of political organization'.⁵⁰⁸ Beetham (1993) called legitimacy

⁵⁰² Major Ian T Posgate, "Legitimacy and Penetration in Stability Operations; setting the conditions for perpetual failure", School of Advanced Military Studies, Monograph (November 12, 2012).

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁴ In simple definition, political legitimacy is a status conferred by the people on a government's officials, acts, and institution through their belief that the government's actions are an appropriate use of power by a legally constituted governmental authority following correct decisions on making policies. "...the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed." Noted by John Dunn, *Political Obligation in Its Historical Context: Essays in Political Theory* (Press of the University of Cambridge 1980), p. 29.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁶ Englebert, P., *State Legitimacy and Development in Africa* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 4, and p.173.

⁵⁰⁷ Englebert, P. (2000), p. 4, pp.173-4.

⁵⁰⁸ Alagappa, 1995, p. 3, noted in: Bruce Gilley, *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy* (Columbia University Press, 2009), p.3.

‘the central issue in social and political theory’⁵⁰⁹, while Crick (1993) said it was ‘the master question of politics’⁵¹⁰.

According to Englebert (2000), new African states often lack legitimacy because they are not the indigenous creations of local history. He argues, however, that this concept of legitimacy is arbitrary and Eurocentric.⁵¹¹ André Mbata B Mangu (2008) writes that “legitimacy entails the acceptance by the people of those institutions that seem to correspond to and promote the values of the society.”⁵¹² In fact, the power of most third world states has been entrusted illegitimately to local agents, at times connected to the colonial power’s continued penetration of their old colonies. Terms such as security, human rights, democracy and anti-terrorism have been used to allow the plunder of natural resources, for example. Increasing state capacity in Africa would require governments to be preoccupied first with national legitimacy and interests, and only very secondarily with the interests of outsiders.⁵¹³

The current world system of sovereign states has grown out of a complex set of rules that developed with and after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.⁵¹⁴ This underlined what is now widely accepted, that the sovereignty of the state should be respected by citizens of that state, and *between* states in the international sphere.⁵¹⁵ Throughout history, relations between countries have been almost exclusively formal. Nations defined themselves by this separateness.⁵¹⁶ Crawford notes that the Westphalia regime⁵¹⁷ established the period of international law and regulation up into the early twentieth century.⁵¹⁸ Even though not all of the international system’s features were intrinsic to the settlement of Westphalia,⁵¹⁹ they were formed through a normative trial in international law that did not receive its fullest articulation until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the balance of power among states changed, and when the norms of sovereignty, the formal equality of states, non-

⁵⁰⁹ Beetham (1991), p. 41.

⁵¹⁰ Crick (1993 [1962]), p. 150.

⁵¹¹ Englebert, P. (2000), p. 276.

⁵¹² André Mbata B. Mangu, *Parcours international de débat et propositions sur la gouvernance*, [International Meeting Processes for debate and proposals on governance],—Institut de recherche et débat sur la gouvernance IRG (Pretoria, 20 juin 2008).

⁵¹³ *Ibid*, pp. 17 -21.

⁵¹⁴ Held, David, [], “The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed? Classic Sovereignty”, in: Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 162.

⁵¹⁵ Held, D. 1977, pp. 162-3.

⁵¹⁶ Andrew M. Scott, *The revolution in statecraft: informal Penetration*(Random, House, NY, 1965).

⁵¹⁷ After the peace treaties of Westphalia of 1648, but that simply refer to the classic regime of sovereignty.

⁵¹⁸ Although elements of it, it can be argued plausibly, still have application today.

⁵¹⁹ Crawford, J. and Marks, S. “The Global Democracy Deficit: An Essay on International Law and Its Limits.” In: D. Archibugi et al. (eds), *Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

intervention in the domestic affairs of other recognized states, and state consent as the basis of international legal obligation, became the core principles of international society.⁵²⁰

This chapter considers the institutionalization of political penetration in Algeria's postcolonial history. Colonialism is a central factor in the instability of the state and human rights violations in the country both during the occupation and after independence. Algerian independence, which laid the way for a new state structure, was the starting point of an internal conflict among revolutionaries based upon what appears to have been international intervention in the nation's political structure. The Cold War also affected Algerian politics, relations and competition among the revolutionaries and political elites, and the political direction of the state. However, the Algerian relationships with European and non-European states appear to have been limited and controlled to some extent by the French government, and this pattern seems to have affected Algeria's external relations.

Allegations of French domination of Algerian politics have been supported by two key factors. The first of these is inside Algeria, where the *French Officers* have appeared to play a leading role in maintaining extraordinary French influence in Algerian affairs. The second factor has been said to have consisted of French political relationships with the West, and in particular France's leadership in Europe, which tended to support French claims against the rights of Algerians. The strong relationship between the Algerian regime and the French government has appeared to impact the former colony's relationship with other states, limiting the flow of information, and even Algerian migration.

Historically, the relationship among states in the world system has been predominantly of a formal nature, which allowed for a clear relationship between governments without unofficial contacts. According to Linklater (1982),⁵²¹ the international political system is an arena of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which "political action is most regularly necessitous" and least "susceptible to a 'progressivist' interpretation."⁵²² International relations cannot be understood solely by the culture, language and legislation of the country, but language and culture appropriate the control of individuals and society is the connection in their social life.⁵²³ While political theory is limited to the theory of continued existence,⁵²⁴ international relations has been based on the moral

⁵²⁰ See: Crawford, J. and Marks, S. (1998).

⁵²¹ Linklater, A. (1982).

⁵²² Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics* (London: [s.n.], 1969), p.26.

⁵²³ *Ibid*, pp. 26-7.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 33.

perspectives present in the structure of the modern state.⁵²⁵ In fact, the sovereignty of state should be, legitimately, the basis of world political organization,⁵²⁶ but illegitimately, the territories of sovereign states are today met by ‘decentralized networks’ through which state and non-state, local and international actors of violence interact.⁵²⁷ What many states today fear, it is argued, is not so much overt armed attack across their territorial frontiers, but rather subversion from within and foreign sponsored *coup d’état*. Indeed, the very loyalty of its citizens may be challenged by trans-national appeals that seek to reach out across national boundaries. At times indeed the notion of the sovereign state as a self-contained decisional unit⁵²⁸ comes to be challenged, whether through the presence of foreign nationals within the decision-making apparatus or through the capacity of an external power to direct the state’s own nationals.⁵²⁹ This is the core concept of *foreign penetration*.

2.1. International Penetration of Domestic Systems: Theoretical Studies

In contemporary global politics, penetration is almost as difficult to define as it is to ignore. James Rosenau (1969) first elaborated the term ‘penetration’.⁵³⁰ It has subsequently been subsumed under the broader categories of ‘linkage’ or ‘transnational’ politics. The process of penetration occurs, according to Rosenau, when members of one polity serve as participants in the political processes of another. Similarly, Andrew M. Scott (1965) sees informal penetration as existing when one country’s agents or instruments come into contact with the people or processes of another country in an effort to achieve certain objectives.⁵³¹ Further explanations of the concept, however, have tended to make it even more broad and vague.⁵³²

Rosenau (1967), in his book *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy*, noted that the penetrative participation of non-members in a given polity is accepted by that target country’s officialdom as well as by its citizenry, so that the decisions to which non-members contribute are no less authoritative and legitimate than are those in which they do not

⁵²⁵ Calhoun Laurie, “Moral Personhood and Human Security”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 10, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2005).

⁵²⁶ Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, p.38.

⁵²⁷ Jutta Bakonyi, & Kirsti Stuvøy, “Violence & Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia & Angola”, *Review of African Political Economy*, Nos.104/5 (2005), pp. 359-382.

⁵²⁸ Ghița Ionescu, “Between Sovereignty and Integration”, *Government and Opposition* (1974), pp. 112-3.

⁵²⁹ Ghița Ionescu (1974), p. 112.

⁵³⁰ James N. Rosenau, “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy”, pp 63-6; “Toward the Study of National-International Linkages,” in Rosenau (ed.) *Linkage Politics*, pp 44-66.

⁵³¹ Scott, *Revolution in Statecraft*.

⁵³² Rosenau, J. N. *Linkage Politics, Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (NY: The Free Press, Macmillan, 1969), p. 45.

participate.⁵³³ The non-members to whom he refers may include many categories of actors, ranging from international forces, to foreign aid personnel and ‘subversive cadres’.⁵³⁴ Theoretically, the idea of these ‘independent organizations’ could be widely accepted if it comes from opposition parties or appeals to the needs of citizens, but almost never as an agreement between the regime and a foreign government to foster legitimacy and to develop policy outside the bounds of legality and the view of the public.

Many examples of penetration offered by Scott (1969) also include military occupation, together with cultural exchange programs aimed aimed at very limited objectives. Further definitions and descriptions of penetration have tended to be even more all encompassing, in particular in relation to Africa and the Middle East.

According to Jan Knippers Black (1977), the competition for power and material gain often appears to render vulnerable countries as effectively stateless polities. She argues that there is utility in reigning in the concept of penetration:

...I would suggest, for example, that while external events and trends and attempts to influence policy through government-to-government interactions may facilitate penetration they fall beyond the bounds of the penetrative process itself. And I suggest that military intervention and occupation indicate a breakdown in the penetrative process.⁵³⁵

The processes, which have been the focus of this study, are those by which France has attempted to modify or perpetuate the internal balance of political forces in Algeria. French policy towards Algeria encompasses, either directly or indirectly, all three of the “linkage processes” identified by Rosenau: “the reactive, the emulative, and the penetrative”.⁵³⁶ In one of his arguments for establishing a conceptual relationship between international and domestic systems, Rosenau (1965) has proposed a different view of the political system: “...to comprehend the fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of issue-areas”.⁵³⁷ He argues that some national societies have become so penetrated by their external environments that the penetrating powers become “the only source of legitimacy or even of the employment of coercive techniques.”⁵³⁸ Wolfram F. Henrieder postulates⁵³⁹ that because

⁵³³ Rosenau, *Pre-theories*.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁵ Jan Knippers Black, 1977.

⁵³⁶ Rosenau, *Pre-theories*, and *Linkage Politics*. Also: Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

⁵³⁷ Rosenau, “Pre-theories”, p. 53; see also his *Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept in the Study of International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Research, Monograph No. 15, 1963).

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*

the “national political systems now permeate, as well as depend on, each other and ... their functioning now embraces actors who are not formally members of the system.”⁵⁴⁰

Hanrieder (1967) in his analysis notes that

Such a system might be called the penetrated political system ... a penetrated political system is one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals. The political processes of a penetrated system are conceived to be structurally different from both those of an international political system and those of a national political system.⁵⁴¹

This builds on Rosenau's (1969) core arguments regarding the penetration of a system and the need to focus on the direct and authoritative participation of non-members of a national system in its value allocation. To further clarify, Rosenau (1969) states:

...no other type of penetrated system can be more all-encompassing than a postwar occupation, it does not necessarily follow that all military occupations constitute penetrated systems. France during the German occupation of 1941-1944, for example, would not be classified as a penetrated system since the French did not accept German participation in their affairs as legitimate and therefore resisted being mobilized in support of values that the Germans had allocated for them.⁵⁴²

Consensus on the allocation of values caused by external events is a crucial element in defining a penetrated system.

2.2. International Penetration of Societies

As mentioned above, international events can impact on a number of strands within a state's societal structure. Culture, customs, traditions, and even religion, can be affected by foreign interference. According to Black (1977), cultural and informational exchanges might be of a penetrative nature.⁵⁴³ Although penetration could possibly involve or result in the mobilization of resources for domestic purposes, or in the integration of the polity, it is more likely to be a factor in the denationalization of resources and the disintegration of the

⁵³⁹ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, “Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy”, *The American Political Science Review*, 61, No. 4 (Dec., 1967), pp. 971-982.

⁵⁴⁰ Rosenau, "Pre-theories", p. 53; see also his *Calculated Control*.

⁵⁴¹ Hanrieder, “Compatibility and Consensus”.

⁵⁴² *Ibid*, p. 66.

⁵⁴³ Black, J. K., 1977.

polity.⁵⁴⁴ The exchange of elites between states, ostensibly for the advancement of science and knowledge, is more likely to result in citizens who return speaking a different language and are engaged in a different culture and way of life. These elites often become the unofficial ambassadors between two countries. Indeed, under the covers of education, science and knowledge, these elites become an example to the next generation. As a consequence, this elite group grows in number becoming a powerful force in the bureaucratic structure of their home country. Indeed, they could not have achieved these positions, without the government's support and that of the countries that they migrated to. A number of cases have shown that the culture and the identity of a society have been significantly impacted because the government could not control the importation of other cultures in the name of globalization, civilization and modernity. Johan Galtung (1971) points out that the elite of the state with hegemonic power characteristically link themselves with the elites of the nations within its sphere of influence in order to contain or control the masses of those nations.⁵⁴⁵

For her part, Black (1977) uses Brazil and like-minded South American states to expound her theory of American penetration. The US presence in the Western Hemisphere post-World II is a response, on one hand, to the inflation of US security interests and on the other, to the acceleration of the structural differentiation of the political systems in the Latin American states. While allowing for a number of variables, the same theory could potentially be applied to the French penetration of Algeria.

The principle of exchange facilitates the development of the society of states, but the reason for states as independent units is a constraint upon the level of sociability, which can be exhibited in their external relations. Because of the structure of political obligation, states cannot allow international obligations that are permanently binding nor can they dismiss out of hand any act of duplicity or violence outlawed within domestic society.⁵⁴⁶

If the states-system is an artifact superimposed upon a given international morality, the attempt to legitimize the division between the two moralities must be denied. The sovereign cannot simply be the trustee for those who have contracted together and who authorized him to promote their interests.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁴ Karl Deutsh, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States, in": Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*.

⁵⁴⁵ Johan Galtung, "A structural Theory of Imperialism", *Journal of Peace Research*, 8, No. 2(1971): 81-117, noted by Black, J. K. (1977), p. xvi.

⁵⁴⁶ William L. Howard, Moorhead Wright, Tony Evans, *A Reader in International Relations and Political Theory* (Canada: UBC Press, 1993), p. 315.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

3. The French-Algerian Relationship

After independence, successive Algerian regimes built strong relationships with France, particularly in the area of security. These relationships are well documented from early in the independence era, when the French authorities signed a treaty with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) in Vienna. After the *coup* of 1962, the Boumédiène regime strengthened their ties to France by initially accepting French-trained officers into the National Popular Army (ANP), which had been formed outside of the country,⁵⁴⁸ thus indirectly facilitating the later rise of the French Officers in Algerian politics.

Ben Bella and Boumédiène also built strong relationships with Arab countries, especially Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, which in turn helped them to take power from the GPRA and other revolutionary groups.⁵⁴⁹ A number of armed groups soon formed to resist the regime. Some of them were involved in an intense armed struggle with the military establishment. Ait Ahmed, the leader of the Socialists' Forces Front (FFS), which organized military resistance to his former friends Ben Bella and Boumédiène, was arrested in Kabilya as a result of violent resistance, and sent into exile. He did not return to Algeria until 1990. Mohammed Khidher was killed in Madrid; Colonel Taher Zbiri was discharged from his position as chief of the general staff after he expressed opposition to French involvement, and soon thereafter took over the command of the National Popular Army (ANP). Zbiri formed a military unit from the Eastern bases and attempted a *coup d'état* against Boumédiène and his regime. Boumédiène responded with air attacks, led by French and Soviet pilots, already in Algeria as military trainers. The attacks left a broad area of destruction and killed a number of soldiers and civilians.⁵⁵⁰

At the same time, the French Officers were promoted rapidly, taking up high positions within the military and civilian political structures linked to improving relations with France. France, for its part, appeared continually to be influencing the economic and political decisions of Algeria. By the security crisis of 1988, which was followed by the *coup* against a democratically-elected government in 1992, the French had apparently become increasingly involved in the human rights violations carried out by the Algerian security services in both France and Algeria. After the hijacking of a French Airbus in 1994,⁵⁵¹ and the bombing of

⁵⁴⁸ Salah Eddin Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers 01/09/2009; Chouchane, personal interview, London 13/05/2009.

⁵⁴⁹ Amazit Boukhalfa, "La Crise De L'été 1962 : La '2ème Mort' Du Congrès De La Soummam," *El Watan* (Algerian daily newspaper), Thursday, July 8th, 2004. See: <<http://www.algerie-dz.com/article868.html>>

⁵⁵⁰ Salah Eddin Sidhum, personal interview, 01/09/2009; Anwar Haddam, USA, May 2009 phone interview from Hamilton, New Zealand, 21 May 2009.

⁵⁵¹ Thomas Sancton, "Anatomy of a Hijacking", *Time*, Paris, Sunday, Jun. 24, 2001.

metro stations in Paris in 1995,⁵⁵² France finally came under pressure from the European Union regarding its support of the military regime in Algeria.

Two of the most significant scandals relating to possible French penetration of Algeria involved the cases of Ali Touchent,⁵⁵³ who was working in France for the Algerian Military Secret Services (DRS) under the supervision of the French Intelligence Service, and of the Christian monks of Tibhirine in Algeria, who were brutally killed after they were kidnapped in 1996. The latter case has recently been re-opened in a French court, after testimony by a former general in French military implicated the military intelligence services of both countries. Algerian witnesses maintain that the monks were killed by Algerian soldiers after the failure of long negotiations with French intelligence, much of which took place in the French Embassy in Algiers.⁵⁵⁴ The testimony of one witness led to the cross-examination in French court of the former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, who had been the Minister of Internal Affairs at the time.⁵⁵⁵ These are only a few of the examples of the

<<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,163487,00.html>>

⁵⁵² According to an article published by the British newspaper, *the Observer*, on 9 November 1997, the “French Reactions to the Massacres in Algeria”, “The bombs that outraged Paris in 1995- blamed on Muslim fanatics- were the handiwork of the Algeria secret service. They were part of a sophisticated black propaganda ‘psy-ops’ war aimed at galvanizing French public opinion against the Islamists.” [Noted in the paper of Salem Badis, “French relations to the massacres in Algeria”, *In Study of Saint-Simon Foundation, Notes de la Fondation Saint-Simon, Comprendre l’Algerie* (July 1995)]. Two high officials, one French and the other Algerian, provide the keys to understanding the Algerian crisis. An editorial in the *Financial Times*, published in August 1995, “Chirac’s Algerian puzzle”, mentioned this document and suggested that the export of violence might be a tactic of the military regime aimed at providing an anti-Islamist reaction in France.

⁵⁵³ The case of Ali Touchent was highly publicized in the French and European media. However, most of the questions raised by journalists and academic researchers involved the identity of the perpetrators. Why did the French justice system not move to clarify the relationship between perpetrators and police, while several people, apparent scapegoats of mainly French North African backgrounds, were found guilty of ‘association with terrorism’? The masterminds of the main attack were never apprehended. Despite being publicly identified by the Algerian authorities as the European ringleader of the GIA, and named by French investigators as the key person who organized the murders and had been known to them since 1993, Ali Touchent amazingly managed to escape the police and what seemed like certain imprisonment, and returned to Algeria, where he settled publicly in a high security area near the Algiers police station. “The inability of France’s authorities apparently to drag to justice those genuinely responsible for the 1995 attacks is now known by the public as more than just an accident.” Salem Badis. For more details for this case, see: <http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/gia_sm.htm>. According to Mohamed Samraoui, a former colonel in the Algerian secret service, “French intelligence knew that Ali Touchent was a DRS operative charged with infiltrating pro-Islamist cells in foreign countries.” In return for supplying the French with valuable information, Ali Touchent was granted protection by the French Intelligent Services, the DST, “which explains why Ali Touchent was never bothered on French soil.”

⁵⁵⁴ George Joffe, in Interview by France 24 (“Who Killed the French Monks of Tibhirine in Algeria?”) on Aug 28, 2009; Armand VEILLEUX, « The death of the monks of Tibhirine: facts, questions, and hypotheses; » <<http://users.skynet.be/bs775533/Armand/wri/hypothesis.htm>>.

⁵⁵⁵ Khelfaoui Benaoumeur, ‘L’armée algérienne mise en cause pour la mort de moines français’, Monday, July 06, 2009 at. <http://amms-saida.com/tahtaha/viewtopic.php?f=26&t=494>.

questioning of France by the European Union regarding its dealings with, and likely penetration of, the Algerian military regime.⁵⁵⁶

According to at least some of the Algerian officers in exile, the Algerian military and French intelligence agents were working together as a team in planning and executing violence in the two countries after the *coup* of 1992.⁵⁵⁷ Relations between France and Algeria have always assumed a dual character: public and private, especially after the military *coup* of 11 January 1992. In public, the French call for democracy and the respect of human rights. In private, the French authorities appear to be consistent in supporting military rulers who serve their interests, regardless of the levels of human rights violations. This dual, and perhaps even disingenuous, face of French foreign policy was especially evident in French President Jacques Chirac's speech of October 1995, when he said that "France helps the people and not the military who are in power; it does not seek to interfere in this conflict, but encourages the Algerians to find answers to their own problems."⁵⁵⁸ During a meeting with the French press regarding the value of co-operating with Algiers in matters of anti-terrorism, the French Minister of Internal Affairs, Jean-Louis Debré, declared that "Algerian Military Security would have us go on the wrong track...so that we would eliminate people who bother them."⁵⁵⁹ Debré's statement was unintentionally revealing, perhaps, clarifying the type of relationship that the Algerian regime expects to have with France. Claude Angeli and Stephanic Mesnier (1997) have noted that the Algerian Secret Service is not the only agency suspected of involvement in bombings in France. The Parisian authorities have also been implicated. An officer in the French Secret Service suggested as much when he admitted that "We are paying for promises made from 1993 to 1995, and especially by Charles Pasqua."⁵⁶⁰ We are paying for the help granted to the Algerian regime in terms of arms and intelligence."⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁶ Joffe, G. (Aug 28, 2009) ; V. Pellizzari, « confirme : L'armée algérienne a tué les moines », <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAg7xq7wCG8>.

⁵⁵⁷ Samraoui, M., *Chronique des Annees de Sang Algerie: Comment les Services Secrets ont Manipule les Groupes Islamistes* (Paris, 2003).

⁵⁵⁸ Angeli C. and Mesnier, S. *Sale Temps Pour La Republique 1995-1997*(Bernard Grasset, 1997).

⁵⁵⁹ Bonora-Waisman, Camille, *France and the Algerian conflict: Issues in Democracy and Political Stability, 1988-1995* (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p.131.

⁵⁶⁰ Charles Pasqua was Interior Minister from 1986 to 1988, under Jacques Chirac's government, and also from 1993 to 1995, under the government of Edouard Balladur. Externally, he was president of the Union of European Nations at the European Parliament from 1999 to 2004. Pasqua has been involved in various political scandals, including the 'Angolagate' arms trafficking scandal. In October 2009, Pasqua was convicted for his role in illegal arms sales to Angola, was fined 100,000 Euros, and received a one year prison sentence. See Le Figaro, 27/10/2009 (French daily newspaper).

⁵⁶¹ Angeli C. and Mesnier, S. (1997), Bernard Grasset, 1997. Salem Badis, in his paper "French relation to the massacres in Algeria", referred to a study of the Saint-Simon Foundation, published in July 1995, in *Notes de la Fondation Saint-Simon, Comprendrel'Algerie*. According Badis, there were two high officials, one French and

According to Brahimi, the French president was pressurized to discuss the issue of terrorism with Algiers after the Algerian Secret Service tried to eliminate members of opposition parties living in France, including ex-patriate members of the the FIS and FFS. Chirac apparently knew about the provocateurs in Paris. After he finished his official visit to Algiers, during which he pledged support to the military regime to oppose terrorism, he quietly asked Prime Minister Brahimi to stop his agents from committing violent acts in France.⁵⁶² A witness to this added that

...the bombs that outraged Paris in 1995 –blamed on Muslim fanatics- were the handiwork of the Algerian secret service. They were part of sophisticated black propaganda war aimed at galvanizing French public opinion against the Islamists.⁵⁶³

On 14 September 1995, a note from the DST had once again raised a warning flag for Debre, who was quietly concerned by the activities of the Algerian Secret Service. According to Angeli and Mesnier, the minister later (during a lunch with the regional press on 15 September 1995) said that “the Algerian Secret Service is not only suspected of manipulating some of the bombers, but also the French authorities.”⁵⁶⁴ He later denied having said this after a scandal erupted involving the Paris bombings; the minister declared that “the Algerians are pushing us in the direction of persons of interest to them.”⁵⁶⁵

History tends to repeat itself, however, and the massacres of civilians and the systematic bombings that took place in Algeria by the *Organisation de l'armée secrete* (OAS) against General de Gaulle's policy in Algeria in 1961 had been designed to force the French administration to give up any negotiations with the FLN, and to continue the war against the 'terrorists'. The signing of the Evian accords provoked renewed opposition by the OAS. The Chief Commander of the OAS, Gen Raoul Salan, launched attacks against the Muslim population and even against political headquarters in an attempt to provoke a general breach of the cease-fire. De Gaulle, however, decided to allow the country to have an election, and

the other Algerian, who provide keys to understanding the Algerian crisis. An editorial in the *Financial Times*, published in August 1995 under the title, “Chirac's Algerian puzzle”, mentioned this document and suggested that the export of violence might be a tactic of the military regime aimed at provoking an anti-Islamist reaction in France.

⁵⁶² Aljazeera, Qatar TV, Program: “Special visit” interview with Brahimi in London, the background of Algerian Politics, 5/10/2009, published in the Aljazeera web. <<http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CF6F81B3-3A29-454D-B8E9-07339A59F61C.htm>>.

⁵⁶³ Quoted in the British newspaper, *the Observer*, 9 November 1997; Noted By Salem-Badis in “French Relation to the Massacres in Algeria”, Bejaoui, Y, Aroua A. and Ait-Larbi, Mezziane (1999), pp. 696 – 701.

⁵⁶⁴ Salem- Badis, “French Reactions to the Massacres in Algeria”, in: Youcef Bedjaoui, Abbas Aroua and Ait Larbi M., *An Inquiry into the Algerian Massacres* (Geneva: Hoggar, 1999).

⁵⁶⁵ Angeli C. and Mesnier, S. *Sale Temps Pour La Republique 1995-1997* (Bernard Grasset, 1997).

the results graphically demonstrated that a majority of Algerians wanted freedom. The same kind of covert operation occurred in both countries in the 1990s. The Algerian Secret Service and their allies in the French Secret Service were working hard to push the French government into the arms of those who wanted war and violence. Two journalists learned that Jean-Charles Marchiani, a close advisor to Minister of Internal Affairs Charles Pasqua, knew of the military's willingness to respond violently to the election results of 1991, and possibly even proposed it. He confirmed that, for security reasons, he had demanded that "the operation should not be entrusted to uncontrollable Islamists, but to DRS agents."⁵⁶⁶ For their part, the Algerian authorities demanded that the French authorities arrest the FIS officers who had fled to France. A list of 162 individuals to be deported to Algeria was produced.⁵⁶⁷ In the end, over 180 people were taken into custody in November 1993, and some of them were deported to Burkina Faso, including the FIS MP, Ahmed Zaoui.⁵⁶⁸

The main reason for accepting this apparently penetrative relationship, from the standpoint of the Algerian regime, was to gain support for their internal war in Algeria, and to ensure the protection of their dictatorship.⁵⁶⁹ France's rationale, on the other hand, appeared to be purely economic. Algeria is one of the main suppliers of gas and oil to France, and a significant importer of its products. According to François Gèze of *La Découverte*, one of the first French publishers to expose the involvement of the Algerian secret services in the 'dirty war', at the heart of this strong economic relationship, moreover, is political corruption that ultimately implicates a significant part of France's political establishment. "French exporters generally pay a 10 to 15 per cent commission on their goods," explained Gèze.⁵⁷⁰ "Part of this revenue is then 'repaid' by the Algerians as financing for the electoral campaigns of French political parties."⁵⁷¹ John Sweeney from the Observer put it indelicately in 1997, quoting a political analyst: "*e pouvoir* [the Algerian military junta] has the French government... by the

⁵⁶⁶ Lounis Aggoun. and Rivoire, J. B., *Françalgérie, Crimes and Lies of the State* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004), p. 344.

⁵⁶⁷ Aggoun L. and Rivoire, J. B. (2004), pp. 344 -45.

⁵⁶⁸ According to an interview by NZTV in a documentary shown in NZTV –TV1 about the case of Ahmed Zaoui, the Director of the Immigration Department declared that they had no proof of any charges against Zaoui, that he would not be guilty of anything in the courts of most countries, but that France wanted him to stay in Algeria, ostensibly for purposes of reprisal.

⁵⁶⁹ Mohammed Samraoui, *Chronique des Annees de Sang Algerie: Comment les Services Secrets ont Manipule les Groupes Islamistes* (Paris, 2003) ; Samaraoui, personal interview, Auckland (2006) ; Chouchane, personal interview, London (10 June 2009).

⁵⁷⁰ See Gèze F. (2005).

⁵⁷¹ See Gèze F. (2005).

balls. They have made secret donations to French parties and politicians, so that they can blackmail them.”⁵⁷²

In 2001, a group of scholars and intellectuals from France and Algeria urged France to distance itself from the military-backed authorities in Algiers.⁵⁷³ They said that French foreign policy amounted to complicity in crimes against humanity. This group chastised France for supporting a regime which they described as determined to silence its opponents, to the point of killing them. They cited an Algerian army officer, Habib Souaidia, who had published a book in France describing the army’s involvement in massacres and torture.⁵⁷⁴ They also revived calls for an international commission of inquiry into the violence in Algeria. Such calls put intense pressure on the relations between the two countries.⁵⁷⁵ The French Foreign Ministry said only that France would discuss the calls for an inquiry with its European partners. However, European diplomats said that France has always blocked attempts and stopped any form of intervention into the Algerian crisis, including investigations into human rights violations in Algeria.⁵⁷⁶

International Human Rights Organisations have failed to investigate these massacres of civilians between 1994 and 1998. After a meeting of most of the political opposition to the Algerian government, including the FIS, the Human Rights commission, along with a number of NGOs and, in particular, Human Rights Watch, in Sant' Egidio, Italy, there was an attempt by these groups to stop the violence in Algeria by initiating contacts with political elites from the opposition living in the exile. The Algerian Military regime and the French authorities have refused to engage in any intervention, however, stating that the case is internal and that there is no right to external intervention of any kind. France has threatened to use its Security Council veto against any intervention in Algeria.⁵⁷⁷ This alone should call into question the character of continuing French involvement in Algeria.

4. French Penetration of Algeria

Penetration has two sides, the military penetration into Algerian politics, societies and social life of Algerians, and the broader penetration of international relations. Scholars have

⁵⁷² Gèze F. (2005).

⁵⁷³ Heba Saleh, “Algeria and France: a Tense Relationship, Violence Continues Despite”, *BBC News*, A Reconciliation Program (13 February, 2001).

⁵⁷⁴ Souidia, H., and Ferdinando, Imposimato, *La Sale Guerre* (Paris: La Découverte, 2001).

⁵⁷⁵ Souidia and Ferdinando (2001).

⁵⁷⁶ Salem- Badis, “French Reactions”, pp. 698-706.

⁵⁷⁷ Abbas Aroua, personal interview, Geneva (July 2009).

discussed both forms of penetration, with these debates relevant to the case of Algeria in particular.

Linklater (1982) refers to what he calls 'ethical particularism' and 'ethical universalism'. Each of these, Linklater maintains, is a way of defining the proper relationship between the members of a particular society and these persons or groups, which collectively form the outside social world. According to Linklater (1982), these policies could take two forms: they may either be ongoing social moralities whose imperatives make explicit the rules of conduct which ought to be observed by members in the area of their external relations, or they may be theories which seek to legitimize, or criticize, the postulates underlying these social moralities. The initial sections of this chapter make some observations about the general properties of the two points of view in practice. To discuss the case of Algeria through this theory, the main connection between the French penetration of Algeria and the human rights disaster in the country, which has destabilized the country since independence, should be identified.

These political developments correspond to what Coleman (1994) and others have called 'political penetration.' According to Coleman (1994), political penetration occurs when:

...state power penetrates, or seeks to penetrate, a society through a variety of structures which schematically would include the following ... executives, bureaucracies, armies, courts, police, parastatal agencies, public enterprises, etc. the ensemble of which constitutes the state apparatus through which the centre endeavours to establish and maintain its presence, exact compliance, extract resources and evoke a supportive response.⁵⁷⁸

Political penetration is thus assumed to include not only the increased presence and/or influence of nationally centered bureaucracies on the local scene but also courts and police, presumably responsive to and controlled by the center. Coleman (1994) and others associate political penetration with the process of state formation. He argues that, with regard to state building, "internally the penetration by the centre of state power to their peripheries - everywhere and throughout history has involved varying degrees of modes of coercion."⁵⁷⁹ One commonly accepted means of applying such coercion has been the imposition of codified laws by courts through police power, often involving foreign penetration, particularly in post-colonial settings.

⁵⁷⁸ James S. Coleman, *Nationalism and Development in Africa, Selected Essays* (University of California Press, California-USA, 1994), pp. 194-5.

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p.198.

4.1. Algerian Crises and the Franco-Algerian Relationship

The Algerian crisis affects the French state on a number of levels, at the centre of which is the historically unstable Franco-Algerian relationship. However, this relationship comprises various elements which may be summarized as being made up of the French view of their colonial empire: the changing nature of demand within the French economy for foreign immigrant labor; the attitude of a republication secular state to the political potential of religion; and the belief that this republican and revolutionary state provides a universal model of political behaviour, to name only three. At the same time, each of these in fact can be said to represent an aspect of French identity in Algeria.⁵⁸⁰ The French have never been blamed for the Algerian crisis, neither after independence nor after the *coups d'état* of the military regime, but, according to Adamson (1998), a series of responses exist which both illustrate the failure of the French state to extricate itself from the legacy of empire in general, and colonial Algeria in particular.⁵⁸¹

Lucile Provost, in her book, *la seconde guerre d'Algerie: le quiproquo franco-Algerien*⁵⁸² (1996), explains that the French war in Algeria has hindered the opportunity for development of the country to the level found in Europe. The conflict, started by Algerian leaders after the departure of the French, left the country in a competition for power that was the main reason for the most recent political crisis. She begins from the view that the Algerian War not only profoundly influenced, but also marked, the generation which found itself engaged in the conflict. Indeed, the effect of the Algerian war had not ended in the first years after independence. The questions the war itself raised about post-war France, the election of de Gaulle, and the inauguration of the Fifth Republic, were such that by the time Algerian independence came in 1962, popular opinion in both societies called for the complete separation of France and Algeria. Conflict among Algerian leaders was an internal issue, one that the society could have potentially dealt with. However, the continued exchanges between personnel at all levels meant that France was to retain major influence within Algeria itself, if

⁵⁸⁰ Kay Adamson, "La Seconde Guerre d'Algerie: The Ambivalent Nature of the French State's Response to the Algerian Crisis", Working Paper No. 2, the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 11, Issue 2 (February 1998).

⁵⁸¹ Adamson, 1998.

⁵⁸² Provost L. *la seconde guerre d'Algerie: le quiproquo franco-Algerien* (Paris: Flammarion, 1996); Cf. Mèrazi, "Arabité agraire ou pastorale ?", *LA NATION* (lundi 27 juillet, 1992).

The same has been noted by Provost, « France – Algérie, les liaisons dangereuses », *LE POINT*, n°1352 (samedi 15 août, 1998); Grand guillaume, *Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb* (collection Islam d'aujourd'hui, Editions Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris, 1983).

only through the presence of technical personnel, French investment in new industries, and the awarding of contracts to French firms by consecutive Algerian regimes.⁵⁸³

In an interview, Zitout says that the French never planned to totally divorce themselves from Algeria. It can be argued, in fact, that the strategy of de Gaulle was to shift the traditional colonial system from inside the country to a system of control from a distance. The military have always been a key actor in the Algerian political system, a legacy of the call to arms to gain independence.⁵⁸⁴ French Officers were key this control, and slowly, in the 1990s, through their penetration of the most important government positions in the country, the French came to dominate the Algerian political, economic and even military bureaucracies. Indeed, more than 50 years after independence, Algeria has not left France and France has not left Algeria. This 'neo-colonialism' has affected a majority of the population of Algeria. France again played a leading role in the Algerian crisis of the 1990s.

Algeria apparently views its relationship with France as critical, and one which has to differ from its relationships with other countries. Boumédiène became famous for his fiery speeches, which were always aimed at marketing his politics through his declarations against imperialism, totalitarianism and fascism, showing himself to be a revolutionary hero in Algeria and in the third world. He was the first to accept, however, the French Officers into his army, using them for the first coup d'état after Algerian independence, the blow against the GPRA. These Officers, along with a number of French administrators, chose to stay in Algeria, not because of their good reputation and their positions, nor to build a new Algeria, but apparently because of de Gaulle's plan, which came to fruition 30 years after independence when the French Officers led a coup d'état and began their full domination of power in 1990's.

Moreover, while Algeria's relationship with the United States was severed after Algerian involvement in the war of 1967, with Arab nations lining up against Israel, there is evidence that the US supported the nationalization of hydrocarbons in Algeria by the French, resources which were under French control until 1971. This US support reinforced the notion that Algeria was of primary economic interest to the wider group of Western states.

President Boumédiène, who was described as a man of radical, anti-colonialist sentiments, once declared that "Relations between France and Algeria may be good or bad, but in no way can they be trivial."⁵⁸⁵ Boumédiène's policies, in fact, appeared to depend on a

⁵⁸³ Lucille Provost, "La seconde guerre d'Algérie. Le quiproquo franco-algérien" (Paris, Flammarion, 1996), p.199, bibliography, par [Marie-Blanche Tahon *Anthropologie et Sociétés*, vol. 20, n° 2, 1996], p. 161-162.

⁵⁸⁴ Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second Algerian War", *Middle East Journal*, 50, No. 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 18-39.

⁵⁸⁵ Zoubir, Yahia H., "French-Algerian Relations: The Weight of History", *Aljazeera Network*, 7/07/2011.

strong relationship with France. He suggested that history “cannot be torn up”⁵⁸⁶ and that the willingness to turn the page has to be based on looking to the future of Algeria. Indeed, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Boumédiène’s foreign minister and, 26 years later, Algeria’s President, declared in 2000 that, “Algeria seeks to have extraordinary, non-trivial, not normal, [but] exemplary and exceptional relations with France.”⁵⁸⁷ Under Jacques Chirac it seemed that the two countries were heading toward a historic treaty of friendship in 2005. Even after the breakdown of their relationship under Sarkozy, the presidency of Hollande has ushered in a new stage in France’s relationship with Algiers. France continues to believe that to dominate Algeria economically, they have to keep the French language and culture at the core of Algerian identity.

In his speech to the Algerian parliament in December 2012, French President Francois Hollande mentioned the special relationship of Algeria with France, based on language, culture and education. Hollande argued that this relationship had been affected during recent years by a “brutal and unfair” history. Moreover, Algeria is one of the richest countries in Africa, holding huge reserves of oil and natural resources. Algeria has continued to represent a significant market for France since independence, and has offered France a privileged opportunity to invest in Algeria, especially after the visit of President Hollande in December 2012.⁵⁸⁸

4.2. The Informal Relationship, Politics and Human Rights Violations

As already outlined, the French-Algerian formal relationship was marked by peaks and troughs. *Le Monde* (29/03/1996) described it as reflecting on the one hand, a “famous love-hate relationship” between two countries or, on the other hand, the failure of the two countries to surmount the old colonial relationship. A third element is conveyed by the image of Algeria not having left France and France not having left Algeria. That these are not simply metaphorical images painted by the newspaper is clear when viewed within the context of the political and economic realities of the relationship.⁵⁸⁹

If this description characterizes the formal relationship between the two countries, the informal relationship has been built on solid ground and is still very strong.⁵⁹⁰ The informal

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid*; also: Taher Zbiri Memories (2000); Salah eddin Sidhum, personal interview, 01/09/2009.

⁵⁸⁷ Bouteflika speech in front of French MPs in 2000. See the video at:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JVq_wSuuog

⁵⁸⁸ According to the economic figures, Algeria is a major market for France (See Chapter 5).

⁵⁸⁹ *Le Monde Diplomatique*, French Newspaper, Paris, 29/03/1996; Adamson (1998), p. 2.

⁵⁹⁰ Zitout, personal interview, 2012.

Franco-Algerian relationship was developed in the shadows, partly to drive the formal political and economic connections, as well as to push politicians in Algiers, and in Paris particularly, to accept the status quo of both countries. During the war of independence, de Gaulle's claim of "Algeria for Algerians"⁵⁹¹ hid another, very different meaning than what may be superficially understood. De Gaulle's plan was not to stand in the way of democracy and the elections of March 1962: the result was clear with 6 million of a total Algerian electorate of 6.5 million casting their ballots in the referendum on independence. The vote was almost unanimous. De Gaulle had pronounced Algeria an independent country on July 3, 1963. However, behind the scenes, France was apparently preparing for its new form of colonialism, entering the halls of power via the 'back door'. Hundreds of officers were recruited and trained for this eventuality.⁵⁹² Indeed, the officers were Algerian born, but loyal primarily to France. These officers, the French Officers as I have called them, have come to occupy the highest positions of the country, not only in the military, but also the civil services. The Evian accords had already constructed a platform for this plan. The French Officers seem to have tacitly represented French authorities in Algeria and in France. They were capable, and able to protect French interests in Algeria while undertaking and advancing their own public positions in the new Algerian bureaucracy.

4.3.French Penetration of the Cultural and Intellectual Sphere

France's attempt to control Algeria through the integration of Algerians into French culture was no more clearly demonstrated than in the field of education. The imposition of French educational norms and the denial of Algerians to access and practice their own cultural identity revealed the colonialist policy at its most destructive. The French supplanted Arab educational values, and moved to effect and maintain Algerian subordination through structural changes in the pre-colonial educational system. Algerians resisted French inroads into their own principally Islamic culture. This resistance, at times passive, and at other times violent, as well as continuing French efforts to dominate the field, exercised a major influence over the course of the social and intellectual history in colonial Algeria. In addition to changes in the fundamental educational structure, the French never built enough schools to educate more than a small minority of school-age Algerian children.

⁵⁹¹ Brahim, A. (2001).

⁵⁹² Platform of Evian, British Archive, London.

Throughout this research, the focus has been on the French Military Officers, who appear to have been part of de Gaulle's program of subversive domination.⁵⁹³ The French Civilian Officers similarly seem to have played a large role in the French plan, however. Zitout discussed this group, noting that Boumédiène's apparent apathy towards the French was only a matter of pragmatism. For example, he never followed through on these speeches against French interests in Algeria. Boumédiène, rather, made Arabism a central focus of his speeches, allowing him to be feted later as a hero in the Arab world, while at the same time he not only used the French Military Officers to support his army against the GPRA, but he used the French Administration Officers to protect French culture and language in guiding the Algerian bureaucracy. Most of the Algerian administration retained the same rules as those of their counterparts in France. Indeed, Arabism actually came much later, and is not yet complete. In the 1960s and 1970s, the language of the Algerian administration and schools was French. Arabic courses in primary schools consisted of only one hour of study per week – the same as any other “additional course”. The same commitment to French could be seen in the political and economic bureaucracies. All official documents in Algeria were in French, including legal documents, and even the Constitution of the country.

The goal of these French Administrators was clear according to Zitout. The impact of the French Administrators, then, was no less than that of the French Military Officers. Indeed, the Algerian regime was based on a military background, but it was also supported by civilian elites. Missoum Sbih, the current Algerian ambassador in Paris, was one of the French Administration Officers trained during the 1950s. He was given the position of Algerian education advisor. He was, moreover, the founder of the Advanced School of Administration (*l'école supérieure de l'Administration*), which includes in its alumni most of the Algerian political elite, including ministers and even the previous and current prime ministers. Zitout, himself a graduate of this school, says that it is a copy of the French school of administration in Paris, not only in the way it was built, but also in its programme of study. Everything is taught in French, with little relating directly to Algeria and its unique culture and identity. There is little there that gives the feeling of being situated in Algeria or grounded in Algerian political or administrative culture.⁵⁹⁴

This school is one of hundreds of schools in Algeria which did not see the influence of Arabic until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Alf Andrew Heggoy in his paper “Education in

⁵⁹³ Chouchane, A., personal interview, Birmingham (2012).

⁵⁹⁴ Zitout, personal interview, London, 28/11/2012.

French Algeria”⁵⁹⁵ pointed out that the Algerian educational system was established by the French during its occupation of Algeria. But, there were always challenges from the anti-colonial groups, who set their own programme, which tended to emphasize Algerian identity.⁵⁹⁶

Quantitative and qualitative progress for Algerian education usually only occurred as a result of Arab and Berber pressures on the French government. Until the 1880's, little progress was made because the Algerians themselves refused to send their children to French schools. Then, France gave control over local affairs in Algeria to the European settlers. These colonists were generally antagonistic to any reform in favor of the natives. When Algerians changed their minds and began wishing for access to modern education, they found change difficult to achieve. Colonists resisted their demands and the government in Paris was generally weary of challenges to the dominant Europeans.⁵⁹⁷

Moreover, according to Chouchane, the French penetration of Algeria has continued after independence. “I am a military officer, I can be a witness to the progress of work inside the ministry of defense, which has never [adopted] the national identity, nor our language and culture.”⁵⁹⁸ Chouchane identified most of the post-independence leaders, past and present, of the Secretariat of the Ministry of National Defense as *French Officers* in the sense that we are using this term. General Chabou, General Abdel-Hamid Latrach, General Belloucif (the last of these was not from the *French Officers*, but they pushed him to resign after just two years in the position), and yet another French Officer, General Challoufi, not to mention many others who remain part of the French-influenced elites.⁵⁹⁹

Benjedid, the president of Algeria for 13 years (until January 1992), now says that he regrets his support of the French Officers when they joined the FLN just before independence.⁶⁰⁰ As mentioned in the previous chapters, the account of president Chadli and French Officers was a clear illustration of French penetration of Algerian bureaucracy. General

⁵⁹⁵ Alf Andrew Heggoy, “Education In French Algeria: An Essay on Cultural Conflict”, *The University of Chicago Press*, 17, No. 2 (Jun., 1973), pp. 180-197.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid*; Heggoy, in his essay, noted “The imposition of French educational norms and the denial to the Algerian of his legitimate cultural identity through controls of language, curriculum, and methods of instruction revealed the colonialist policy in its most destructive aspect. The French supplanted Arab educational values and moved to effect and maintain Algerian subordination through structural changes of pre-colonial education and implicit challenges to the spirit and direction of this education. Naturally enough, Algerians resisted French inroads into their own Islamic civilization.” Algerian resistance to French penetration in a cultural and intellectual sense is clearly explained in the following studies: Yvonne Turin, *Affrontement culturels dans l'Algérie coloniale: écoles, m&decines, religion--1830-1880* (Paris: Maspero, 1971); Saadia-et-Lakhdar, *L'alienation colonialiste et la resistance de la famille alge'rienne* (Lausanne: La Cite, 1961); and Mostefa Lacheraf, *L'Algérie: nation et societe* (Paris: Maspero, 1965).

⁵⁹⁷ Heggoy, “Education in French Algeria”.

⁵⁹⁸ Chouchane, A., personal interview, Birmingham, UK, 28/11/2012.

⁵⁹⁹ Chouchane, A. (28/11/2012).

⁶⁰⁰ Abdul Aziz Kahil, “Chadli Benjedid, the oppressed president”, *The Algerian Chanel*, 09/10/2012 <<http://www.algeriachannel.net/?p=9226>> .

Belkhir, sometimes referred to as a “president maker”, was a close friend of President Chadli despite the fact that he was a French Officer and, along with his colleague General Lamari, frequently worked together with French Security Agents.⁶⁰¹

4.4.French Political Mediation and Military Support of the Algerian Regime

The political relationship between France and Algeria has never been straightforward. It has been shaped by memories of a brutal war which led to Algeria's independence from France in 1962, and the subsequent exodus of French settlers. On the other hand, Stora has observed that there were hundreds of thousands of Algerians who chose to leave Algeria and to move with the French soldiers to France.⁶⁰² These Algerians, ‘*Piers Noirs*’ and ‘Harkists’, have retained their love of their motherland, and through the years they have formed themselves into a large community of Algerians living and working in France. Some of the Algerian elites have reached high political positions in a variety of countries, while maintaining strong links to their home country.

France is thought to have aggressively used its contacts to take the lead in maintaining a close relationship with Algeria, to keep its guardianship over the Algerian political system, and its hegemony over the economic and investment sectors in the country. Even if this relationship at the level of political governance were ended today, however, it is unlikely that the close fraternal relationship between the two national military establishments would be weakened.⁶⁰³ French remains the dominant language in Algeria, and the country's elite looks

⁶⁰¹ The other pillar of the current regime is the Algerian secret service. The MALG (Ministère de l’Armement, des Liaisons générales et des Communications), founded in 1958, laid the foundation for the later Sécurité militaire (Françalgérie, p. 42), which in 1990 was named the Département de Recherche et de Sécurité (DRS). Characteristic of all three is the all-encompassing ‘control machine’ with which they penetrated all areas of political and military life within the country and abroad. Since the restructuring of the secret service on the eve of the coup, the powerful Mohamed Mediene, head of the DRS, and Smaïn Lamari, head of counter-espionage, took control of all “security-relevant” areas. Their particular deftness is revealed in their ability to empty every political and societal structure and to employ or neutralize all political opposition through base manoeuvres. A close collaboration with the French DST developed when Yves Bonnet took over its leadership. (Françalgérie, p. 96). He got to know the former commandant, Smaïn Lamari, with whom he would have the opportunity to work together often in the following years. The prelude to collaborative efforts between the two secret services in France occurred in conjunction with the execution of Ali Mecili, a close colleague of Hocine Aït-Ahmed, the head of the FFS (Front des forces socialistes), in April 1987. Amellou, who was hired by the Algerian secret service to commit the murder, was smuggled out of Algeria with help of the French DST, so that the investigations could not be concluded. (Françalgérie, p. 10). During the 1990s, Smaïn Lamari used his excellent connections to the DST to serve his Machiavellian projects. “In order to infiltrate and monitor the Algerian opposition in France, M’hamed Tolba, head of the DGSN (Algerian police) was allegedly advised by the French secret service to offer up some agents to the French...Of the dozen police officers who were sent to France by M’hamed Tolba, some allegedly began to work for the DRS as ‘double agents’” (Françalgérie, p. 135-6).

⁶⁰²Stora, 1992.

⁶⁰³ George Joffe, Interview, France 24 TV (“Who killed the French Monks of Tibhirine in Algeria?”).

to Paris as a cultural reference point.⁶⁰⁴ Added to this, France remains Algeria's key economic partner. Joffe argues that while the Algerian and French political and business factions and lobbies in both countries often seem to be pulling in opposing directions, the reality is that they fit closely together.

The violence in Algeria, however, has strained this relationship. There was resentment when it became more difficult for Algerians to obtain French visas, and when Air France stopped its flights to the country after a hijacking in 1994. Statements by French officials were condemned in Algiers as interference in Algeria's internal affairs. However, throughout this matter, the French government backed the military regime in Algeria and supported Algeria's case with international lending institutions, shielding it from criticism based upon its human rights record.⁶⁰⁵

Human rights abuses, particularly during the 1990s, have upset Algerian relations with countries in the region, however. Some countries have even tried to intervene through their human rights organisations. The Algerian regime has tended to use language laden with terms of violence against citizens and tourists in the country. The way that the Algerian regime communicates, in fact, has encouraged resistance to the regime within Algeria and among Algerian elites living in exile. Some of these elites have urged international human rights organisations to clarify the reality of this ten year civil war in the international media.

According to Anis Rahmani, Algeria's relationship with France has grown stronger since independence, although from time to time this relationship has been interrupted. While exile groups have attempted to indict the Algerian military in the ICC, Algeria has been able to maintain strong international relationships, especially with France, and in cases in which there have been strong indictments of the regime, both countries have worked together to find a political solution.⁶⁰⁶ Jack Mayer, of the Committee of International Affairs in the French Parliament, declared that the relationship between the two countries is akin to those of a family, and cannot be broken. A powerful example of this is the well-known case of the Tibhirine's monks, who were kidnapped and later killed by the GIA, or perhaps the military, supposedly by mistake.⁶⁰⁷ Mayer said that France stood behind the Algerian regime,

⁶⁰⁴Gèze François (2005).

⁶⁰⁵*Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁶ According to Chouchane, Anis Rahmani is a journalist working for the military secret service. He is in charge of the media, filtering reports and news. Rahmani had an interview on the TV program, 'France24', and defended the claim that a French general had pointed to the DST and the DRS as perpetrators of the massacre of the Monks of Tibhirine: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=if8csjfvenco&feature=related>>.

⁶⁰⁷ "Maa Waraa' al-Khabar" (Trans.: "What is behind the news"), *Aljazeera TV* (11 July 2009): <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yg_v-jHyfFM&feature=related>

supporting it in its war on “terrorists.” These incidents were deemed “occasional disagreements”, not capable of affecting the long-term relationship with Algeria. The relationship between these two states, in fact, is often compared to a stable marriage, unlikely to end in divorce.⁶⁰⁸

Many of the Algerian elites living in exile confirmed in interviews that the Algerian military regime and the French authorities had this strong relationship, supported primarily by the French Officers in positions of power. That said, Joffe believes that a fundamental disagreement between the countries regarding human rights could become irreparable. However this has never happened, primarily because of strong French financial interests in Algeria.⁶⁰⁹ In many cases, one would expect that the French government would have at least investigated human rights violations in Algeria and even in Paris during the years of terrorism, including the cases of the plane hijacking from Algiers to France in December 1994, the bombing in the Paris Metro in October 1995, and the murders of the Christian monks of Tibhirine in March 1996. Joffe has emphasized, however, that there was little damage to the relationship between France and Algeria. The significant French interests in the Mediterranean region, and the security alliance between the French and Algerian security services, may explain why the Algerian military regime continues to receive what appears to most observers to be the full support of France.

The attitude of French president Nicolas Sarkozy regarding the massacre of the monks in 1996 is particularly instructive. According to a witness, Armand Veilleux, the monks were killed by Algerian military forces. Joffe predicted that this information would not damage the French Algerian relationship. France apparently wants to maintain a close relationship with Algeria as an integral part of its foreign policy.

Joffe’s view of the French-Algerian relationship is that it is based primarily on economic interests. France has long planned to develop its industrial economy based on primary resources from Algeria. Algerian natural gas has been a main focus of French economists and political leaders.

what the French president wants is just a good relationship with Algeria as it is part of his policy there...and the question about the union of the Mediterranean, which is a key French policy there, is based in part on Algerian cooperation with France. What the French authorities want is to

⁶⁰⁸ It was a declaration by Jack Mayer to al-Jazeera tv: www.aljazeera.net/nr/exeres/4135d313-88b4-4522-94a3-914d45a54e56.htm - 175k - 2009-07-14.

⁶⁰⁹ Many scholars supported Joffe’s view, including Brahimi, Dhina, Mesli and Haddam (personal interviews with these figures, July – August 2009); also: Alex Lefebvre, “Chirac promotes French interests in Algeria”, 15 March 2003 at <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/mar2003/alge-m15.shtml>.

reinforce the relationship with Algeria, and there is no need to allow stories of crimes to damage the relationship between the two countries.⁶¹⁰

President Chirac was embarrassed by the bombing of the Paris Metro, especially after the French authorities failed to indict the security services in Algeria, which were at the time linked to the DRS in Algeria and hence implicated the French Secret Service.⁶¹¹ Salem Badis notes that “France has always sought a regime in Algeria with which it can do business...this regime should also be underpinned by generals sympathetic to French interests.”⁶¹² The French Minister of Internal Affairs, Jean- Pierre Chevenement, clarified the importance to France of the relationship with Algeria in particularly revealing language: “Let us have the frankness to say that if Algeria fell into an Islamist regime, the interests of France would be directly affected.”⁶¹³ *Le monde diplomatique*, the French newspaper, published an article by specialist on Algerian affairs and military regime supporter, Olivier Roy, who noted:

We support the undemocratic forces because they are secular, hence more susceptible, in our minds, to democracy one day [...] we cannot eradicate [the extremists] in a democratic way.⁶¹⁴

Lonis Aggoun, in his book ‘*Françalgérie*’, explores France’s role in a war the Algeria military leadership conducted against its own civilians.⁶¹⁵ It is clear that without the support of French politicians and the media, the Algerian military regime would not have been able to stay in power for long, and may even have failed in their attempt. Chouchane’s view is that the *coup d’état* of 1992 was planned and organised by Algerian generals [French Officers] and French agencies.⁶¹⁶ Support from the French was clearly based on interests and the power and influence that the French Officers (with the Algerian military) exerted upon the French

⁶¹⁰ Joffe discussed the death of the seven French Monks in Algeria and the kidnapping of French tourists, as well as a number of cases that preceded these. *France24 TV*, “Interview With George Joffe From Cambridge University in London”.

⁶¹¹ See Samraoui interview by *Aljazeera TV* in ‘BilaHudoud’, on 03 February 2009, recorded on YouTube <http://www.youtube.com/Watch?V=Jvclve0_Zjo&Feature=Related>; also:

“Algerian Army Under Pressure for the Slaughter Of Tibhirine's Monks”, *France 24 TV* : <http://www.Youtube.Com/Watch?V=X4jj85nx1eg>; also the documentary by *Chanel Ina, Info France* and *French Tv2*: <<http://www.Youtube.Com/Watch?V=I61j3kmfirc&Feature=Related>>.

⁶¹² Salem- Badis (1999), pp. 698-706.

⁶¹³ Luis Martinez “Algérie, la décennie sanglante” *L’express*, 22 January 1998:

<http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/algerie-la-decennie-sanglante_884481.html>

⁶¹⁴ *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 14 April 1997.

⁶¹⁵ Aggoun and Rivoire,(2004).

⁶¹⁶ Chouchne, personal interview, London July 2009; Chouchane confirmed that the Algerian generals had meetings in Algiers with the election’s winner. General Nazzar was elected to lead them in this project; “...these contacts were recorded and saved somewhere”, according to Chouchane.

government. Many more questions remain as to this complicated relationship, which has existed for decades between the two countries.⁶¹⁷

The *coup* directly impacted not only the Algerian people. Foreign tourists and French officials were also affected by the subsequent ‘dirty war’, especially early on in the crisis. On October 24, 1993, three employees of the French consulate were abducted. The GIA (*Groupe Islamique Armé*) later claimed responsibility. The GIA threatened foreign agencies in Algeria, calling for the release of its leader, Abdelhak Layada, who was arrested in June of the same year in Morocco. Many foreigners felt deeply threatened. A French embassy employee, Lucile Schmid, described the fear saying: “We had the impression that the [Algerian] State was our biggest ally. This resulted in us working more closely with the Algerian authorities.”⁶¹⁸ In fact, as it turned out, the cooperation stretched far beyond this: even some of the abductions carried out by the Algerian secret service (DRS) are thought to have been conducted in collaboration with the French interior secret service (DST).⁶¹⁹

Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire meticulously trace the most significant stages of the hidden war in Algeria, conducted under the title of “war on terror.” The Algerian regime of the 1990s used the methods and the model which were developed and tested by the French during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), including ‘anti-terrorism’ tactics, to fight against opposition. However, “the students outperformed their teacher in terms of manipulation and perversion”.⁶²⁰ "*Françalgérie*" clearly summarises an account of the particularly entangled relationship between France and Algeria during this difficult period. As regards the economy, politics, and the military, they note that “...this closeness [between France and Algeria] is shaped by clientelism, corruption, secret agreements and parallel diplomacy, which have trapped both countries in an inextricable net of mafia-esque ties”.⁶²¹ Aggoun and Rivoire document the promotion of the French Officers into senior military and political positions through the different eras of the country since independence. Aggoun and Rivoire agree with Brahimî’s view that it was the French Officers and their relation to France that ultimately structured the violence in post-independence Algeria. Samraoui and Chouchane agree that the Algerian crisis of the 1990’s was organized by the French Officers

⁶¹⁷ George Joffe, May 2006; Aggoun and Rivoire (2004).

⁶¹⁸ Aggoun and Rivoire (2004), p. 343.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid* ; also: Algeria-Watch, July 2004 (Translation From German) Website: <<http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/francalgerie.htm>>

⁶²⁰ Aggoun and Rivoire (2004), p.42.

⁶²¹ Aggoun and Rivoire (2004), pp.42-44.

and aided by the support that they received from France and the West.⁶²² The French Officers gradually attained power as they established a network of corruption and elitism in “*Françalgérie*.”

While the French Officers and their *coup* represent the first pillar in the power structure of the current regime in Algeria, the second pillar has had perhaps even worse implications for Algerians. The Algerian secret service (DRS), the MALG (*Ministère de l’Armement, des Liaisons générales et des Communications*), founded in 1958, laid the foundation for the later *Sécurité militaire* (SM).⁶²³ The DRS (*Département du renseignement et de la sécurité*) is legally just a small unit within the Algerian military structure, and has the role of collecting information for the security of the country. As with other revolutions, agencies were formed and quickly entered into a competition for power. It was the formation of the SM that initiated this competition among newly emerging secret services in Algeria. Later, the French Officers were successful in their demand that President Chadli break up this unconstitutional organisation, which by then was clearly out of control. According to Brahim and Chouchane, it became a kind of sport for the French Officers to disestablish this agency and to cover their tracks by murdering Kasdi [Marbah](#), the formal leader of the SM. After the restructuring of the secret service, which took place on the eve of the 1992 *coup*, powerful figures, Mohamed Médiène, head of the DRS, and Lamari, head of counter-espionage, took control of all “security-relevant” areas. Their particular deftness was revealed in their ability to empty every political and societal structure and to employ or neutralize all political opposition through political manoeuvres. A close collaboration with the French DST developed when Yves Bonnet took over the leadership of the agency.⁶²⁴

Aggoun and Rivoire note that the prelude to collaborative efforts between the two secret services in France coincided with the murder of Ali Mecili, a former revolutionary and close friend to Aït-Ahmed, the leader of the FFS political party (*Front des Forces Socialistes*), in April 1987. However, a shadowy figure named ‘Amellou’ was hired by the Algerian secret service to commit the murder, and was smuggled into Algeria with help of the French DST, so that the investigations were stopped.⁶²⁵ During the 1990s, Lamari used his strong connections with the DST to serve his own civil war “projects”. Aggoun and Rivoire brought a large number of cases forward as proof of the deep relationship between the two

⁶²² Chouchane (10 June 2009); Samraoui (12 December 2007); and Salah Eddin Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (1 August 2009).

⁶²³ Aggoun and Rivoire (2004), p.42.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 96.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 109

countries.⁶²⁶ As France became increasingly entangled in the Algerian Crisis, the DST illegally joined with the Algerian DRS in committing violence and covering up criminals acts of the DRS inside France. According Souaidea and Samraoui, Islamist agents, who were trained by the DRS among others, were committing crimes with the full support and protection of the French authorities.⁶²⁷

Moreover, according to Aroua and Haddam, who were part of the Sant' Egidio meeting, the focus of that meeting was to stop the killing machine that had got out of control, with massacres taking place in villages and cities every night. These further attacks put pressure on French politicians, particularly as the Algerian opposition agreed to measures to solve the crisis by the beginning of January, 1995. To the displeasure of the Algerian junta, some French politicians and intellectuals welcomed the initiative. Besides an extraordinary campaign against the meeting participants, who were characterized as accomplices to terrorism, France increasingly became the target of violence: in July, 1995, Cheikh Sahraoui, the 85 years old Imam of a mosque in Paris, was murdered. He was one of the founding members of the FIS and, as a moderate Islamist, was a contact person for French authorities. This murder displeased the radical faction of the Algerian regime.

The murder, moreover, was a prelude to further attacks, including six bombs, which were placed in Paris metro stations and terrorized France for three months. Eight people were killed and 200 were injured in these incidents.⁶²⁸ The GIA was soon identified as responsible for the attacks, though the investigations stalled. According to Brahimi, Chirac knew at that time who had carried out the attacks in the Paris Metro, and he sent a letter to Algerian president Lamine Zaroual, telling him to stop Algerian violence in France.⁶²⁹ Perhaps not surprisingly, this is what subsequently happened: there has been virtually no Algerian-related violence in Paris since that time. Moreover, the man primarily responsible for the attacks, Ali

⁶²⁶ Aggoun and Rivoire (2004).

⁶²⁷ At the end of 1994, when the Algerian opposition met for the first time in Rome under the patronage of the Sant' Egidio Community to draft a platform to provide a solution for the crisis, the opposition had the support of President Francois Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Alain Juppé. Supposedly, Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl were also interested in the initiative. The Algerian military leadership was very concerned about the likelihood of France's future support of the regime. Pressure was then placed on the French government with the hijacking of an Air France plane on Christmas Day, 1994. Countless inconsistencies accompanied this strange affair, in which three hostages were executed by a commando unit and all of the hijackers were killed by French special forces (GIGN). French investigative efforts were blocked by the Algerian authorities. Aggoun and Rivoire, who collected an abundance of evidence and conducted numerous interviews, came to the conclusion that "the hijacking was orchestrated by the Algerian secret service". Aggoun and Rivoire (2004).

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁹ Brahimi has given as a source of this information that he met with someone in London in a high-level position in the military secret service of France, and was told about the letter. Brahimi did not give the name of that person in my personal interview with him. For more details, see: *Aljazeera TV*, "A Special Visit", 5 October 2009, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r530I8TtZqc>>.

Touchent, an agent who was known to have worked for the Algerian secret service, was able to leave for Algeria unobstructed, though he was well known to French authorities. Others who were involved in the attacks were arrested, however, and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The court adeptly evaded the question of Algerian secret service involvement in the violence. In hindsight, the series of attacks appears to have been a successful means of silencing the French politicians.

The attacks of the summer of 1995, which were systemically attributed to “GIA Islamists” by the media, made things difficult for the Juppé government and made his nuanced position vis-à-vis Algerian politics intolerable.⁶³⁰

The French government continued to support the regime discretely, as it had always done. It is important to note that many French officials and business people, as well as members of the secret service, knew that the attacks were ordered by the DRS. For many, the attacks appeared to go too far: the former French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debré decided to make it clear to Algerian officials in mid-September 1995 that the French government knew who had conducted the attacks and that a line had been crossed. He organized a press conference in order to pose the question of whether Algerian authorities stood behind the terrorist acts. Despite the French warning to Algeria,⁶³¹ and the consequent cooling of the relationship between the two governments, the military leadership had achieved its goal: France’s politicians continue to be reluctant to voice criticism of Algerian political ‘methods’. French penetration of Algeria has apparently tied their hands.

Zitout noted in interview that there was little difference between the three agencies - the French security services, the Algerian security services, and the GIA, created by military security officers with the collaboration of some Islamists. A failure or lapse by any one of these would clearly have affected the other groups in both countries.⁶³² An Ex-Colonel of the DRS, Mohamed Samraoui, was a witness to the relationship that resulted in crimes against French and Algerian citizens. He elaborated over many pages how the Algerian agencies tightly controlled the Algerian community in France, to the extent that in 1993 at least 100 officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) belonging to the DRS, along with hundreds of other informants, were operating in France.⁶³³ In the view of Samraoui, this is one of the rare cases where a sovereign state accepts such a huge foreign policing presence in its territory. The author further elaborates on the details of the partnership linking the French and

⁶³⁰ Aggoun and Rivoire (2004), p. 453.

⁶³¹ *Ibid*, p. 458.

⁶³² Zitout, personal interview (London, July 2009).

⁶³³ DRS: Department of Research and Security (New Appellation since 1990 of the old Military Security SM).

Algerian services, which he regards as “complicity”, adding that “this relationship has undeniably played a major role in this war,” costing Algeria thousands of lives. For him, the primary responsibility rests on the shoulders of his former chief, Lammari, who deliberately manipulated the Islamist violence in order to attain his personal goals. Samraoui primarily gave his testimony to make this plot public.⁶³⁴

The strong relationship between the French authorities and the Algerian military regime, as it has figured in this research, is illustrated in the many cases that have been reported in the media as well as in government reports and academic research articles that support these conclusions. The French Algerian war, which essentially began in 1830, led to the gradual development of ruthless methods, which were also used during the War of Independence. This systematic and long term violence, including the egregious human rights abuses, which French military officers used against civilians in Africa, and in particular in Algeria, has had a long history. It was inherited from previous generations of French-trained officers, including those who killed forty-five thousand people within few days in the massacres of May 1945.⁶³⁵ French **generals** Bigeard, Aussaresses and Massu led French resistance to the bloody War of Independence, 1954-1962, leaving behind over a million of Algerian deaths and millions more tortured and sent into exile. In their support of the military regime in Algeria, and their continued success in cutting off investigations of the violence by human rights organisations, the French authorities were, in effect, still intervening in the Algerian crisis and hence contributing directly to hundreds of thousands of deaths. The French government declined to support the ‘platform’ of Sant-Egedio,⁶³⁶ which was the only agreement that the Algerians had agreed to capable of stopping the bloodshed. The French government appears, rather, to be taking an active role in continuing to silence human rights organisations in their calls for investigations of the massacres and the thousands of disappearances. The responsibility of the French government, media, economy and military extends even beyond what happened to Algerian and French civilians, over 200,000 people

⁶³⁴ Samraoui, personal interview, Auckland, 2007; Samraoui, interview on *Aljazeera TV*: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0P3xhZPOEVA>.

⁶³⁵ The number of people killed in these massacres was noted in a variety of accounts, including: Saadallah, B (1977) ; Manfred Halpern, “The Algerian Uprising of 1945”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Apr., 1948), pp. 191-202; as well as in Algerian newspapers: *El Moudjahid* (May 8, 2000); *El Watan* (May 8, 2005). Scholars in Algerian History have differing views as to the specific numbers. Some argue that the number of deaths was less than 1500, while the Algerian authorities claim 45,000; others, including some Algerian writers, have put the number at about 80,000 people within Algerian territory.

⁶³⁶The Platform of Sant Egedio is an agreement signed at a meeting of most of the independent political parties of Algeria. The meeting was organised by the Catholic Church of Sant Egedio, Rome, on November 21-22, 1994.

dead, “...but also to French leniency, which amounts to complicity in crimes against humanity”.⁶³⁷

According to Zitout, by the time of the revolution day celebrations in 1984, Algerian soldiers graduated to General positions for the first time, positions that had been dominated by French Officers. Belkhir, who was nicknamed the presidents creator, was the real president of the state at the time. He strengthened his position amongst his colleagues within the well-placed French Officers, leading the group to dominate the state by the late 1980s and through the 1990s. This was all according to the plan as laid out by the French government, right from the days of President de Gaulle.⁶³⁸

From the beginning of the crisis in Algeria in the 1990s, the Generals of January, as they are often called, waged war against their opposition in the FIS, who dominated the parliamentary elections by winning the majority of seats in 1991. The war crossed Algeria’s borders and took on an international dimension. In France, after the end of the electoral process, the French political class almost unanimously condemned the coup, at least at first. The ‘Franco-Algerian regime,’⁶³⁹ and others hostile to the Islamists coming to power, could not publicly authorise the overthrow of a democratic election by military coup. The first announcement condemning the halting of the electoral process came from French President Mitterrand, calling the situation “an act at least abnormal.”⁶⁴⁰ Shortly after this, the military *coup* in Algeria was a *fait accompli*, and people awakened to roads choked with heavily armed military vehicles. According to Chouchane, the Algerian military regime did not have the power to undertake a *coup d’état* against democracy in 1991 without French support. In December 2012, in an interview recorded with French media, the ex-vice president under Francois Mitterrand, Jean-Charles Marchiani, SDECE (1962-1970), declared that

...between the first and the second round [of Algerian elections], we were contacted to participate between the generals and the French and I have said previously, and Mitterrand, in his way, has been very clear, not in a formal way, but very clear, that the second round had no place [in the election].⁶⁴¹

The Algerian courts, in many cases, were key sources of information. Legal statements made by a number of French generals in the military regime opened a gulf

⁶³⁷ Aggoun and Rivoire (2004).

⁶³⁸ Zitout, personal interview, London (12/2012).

⁶³⁹ This refers to the Algerian military regime and its supporters in the French government (which created a group to guide the politics of Algeria, omitting the participation of the Algerian population).

⁶⁴⁰ Widely quoted on French TV, and even quoted on Algerian TV.

⁶⁴¹ Quoted in *Le monde diplomatique*, “L’Annulation du processus électoral en Algérie” (Monday 14 January 1992).

between revolutionaries and the French Officers. The bridge of trust, the confidential relationship between the Algerian regime and the French administration, had been in effect announced in court in Algiers. In 1992, General Moustafa Bellossif faced the French Officers, who accused him of corruption, saying that he was not beholden to France. He noted that had not come out of French schools, and certainly did not take orders from France. The director of the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST) from November 1982 July 1985, Yves Bonnet, noted however that the Algerian Services maintained a close relationship with the French Services. “They are my friends and I defend them”,⁶⁴² he concluded.

5. Informative Cases in the Franco-Algerian Relationship

The central issue in the Algerian crisis after the departure of the French state is the historically contradictory Franco-Algerian relationship. This relationship, comprised of various elements, may be summarized as follows:

1. *The French state’s view of their colonial empire.* France sees itself as the guardian of the newly independent states. The independence of these countries does not mean a complete separation from the French empire. Rather, it may be more like governance under an “Emirate” of the French Empire;

2. The changing nature of demands within the French economy for foreign immigrant labor as well as the European crisis, which has meant that France remains in need of the new states' resources;

3. The attitudes of a republican secular state to the political potential of religion. This has meant that the French have ignored their own human rights principles as outlined in the French constitution;⁶⁴³ and,

4. A belief that France, a republican and revolutionary state, could provide a universal model of political behavior. Considering French history, this belief should be respected, but when it comes to revolts against its own empire, the French have apparently chosen to define these as forms of *terrorism*, or at least unacceptable acts of disobedience. They have seemingly forgotten that revolution represents a key part of French identity.⁶⁴⁴

⁶⁴² *French TV5-Direct*, program entitled: “who is really Mohammed Merah”?
<<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sw-RFrY0DpU>>.

⁶⁴³ Article 1 - Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be based only on considerations of the common good. *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*:
<<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france/institutions-and-politics/the-symbols-of-the-republic>>.

⁶⁴⁴ Kay Adamson, “La Seconde Guerre d’Algerie: The Ambivalent Nature of the French State’s Response to the Algerian Crisis”, *Centre for Contemporary Political Issues, Working Paper No. 2* (February 1998).

Adamson (1998) notes that the main issue that could be raised between France and Algeria in relation to colonisation and post-colonial relationships is the impact of Algerian emigration and the role this plays in shaping not only the image of Algeria and the Algerian emigrant but also the particular dualities of French state policy with regard to immigration and the immigrant. The dualistic nature of this relationship is well illustrated by the events that have taken place in Algeria since the 1990s. In Provost's (1996) view, France was seen as a place of refugees in the minds of some Algerians. Indeed, because immigration between both countries was not new, thousands of French-Algerians and Algerian *Harkist's* who left the country in the independence days are regarded as immigrants. Many are still seeking to go home, with the Algerian government now having to accept them as Algerian citizens. The government will also have to provide an apology, which may come in the form of restoration of lost property, as well as recognition of their decades as refugees in France and other European countries.⁶⁴⁵

Other contentious issues in Franco-Algerian relations relate to immigration, the restriction of visitor visas granted to Algerians, the debate in France on "national identity", which in effect targets French citizens of Algerian origin, as well as Muslims in general, France's threat to no longer recognise dual-citizenship, thus forcing people to choose one or the other, as well as other actions disadvantaging French people of Algerian origin. Algeria is also resentful of France paying ransoms to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to free French hostages.

The idea that France was a place of refuge for Algerians fleeing the turmoil in Algeria in the 1990s was necessarily tacit and unrecognized (at best) during the Juppe administration, with its enactment of increasingly restrictive measures on immigration. After the defeat of Juppe's government, a new government had a more progressive view of the refugee situation. French immigration and asylum laws were subject to review by a Commission set up by Jospin in June 1997, headed by Patrick Weil, who was a known reformer. Most important, however, the formerly covert reception of Algerian refugees was transformed into new and broader policies, in which the statute on asylum was rewritten so that it encompassed more than only the people who faced immediate threats on their lives from government actions, but also those who were threatened by non-governmental organizations. This allowed the French

⁶⁴⁵ *El Chorouk* (an Algerian daily newspaper), "Algeria has to apologize for its crimes against *Harkis* and *Piers Noirs*" (03/04/2013) < <http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/articles/145646.html>>; in *Le Point.fr* (a French newspaper): Pyrénées-Orientales, "Hollande aux harkis: La France a abandonné ses propres soldats", *Le Point.fr* - Publié le (25/09/2012); "The President sent a message to the *harkis* and their descendants on the day of national homage devoted to them".

Government to treat Algerians, when required, not as immigrants, but as asylum-seekers, an important departure from international law.⁶⁴⁶

The Franco-Algerian relationship was also impacted by the ‘Air France’ crisis of the 1990s. After December 1994, the French-owned airline, Air France, stopped flying to Algerian cities for security reasons. The French government made this decision after the hijacking of Flight 8969 in December 1994, which left 3 passengers and 4 terrorists dead. The hijacking, and concern with terrorism in general, became a rationale for isolating Algeria and Algerians from the rest of the world. Most European airlines followed the French in their policy, thus making it increasingly difficult for Algerians to visit their families in Europe, and in France in particular.⁶⁴⁷ This case, according to many analysts, was proof of the break in the French-Algerian relationship over the issue of terrorism, even though at the same time, French agencies had participated in the staging of the *coup d'etat* (against the Islamists) in 1992. Islam was apparently considered the basis of the terrorism. France's abandonment of the Algerian regime at that time was mandated by French-Algerian intelligence regarding potential violence in the heart of Paris, thus forcing France to support their allies in the Algerian military regime, particularly as President Chirac visited Algeria in 1999.⁶⁴⁸

A further contentious issue relates to the nuclear weapons tests conducted by France in the Sahara during the 1960s. In May 2009, Algeria's foreign minister Mourad Medelci declared that France should not just pay compensation to those Algerians whose health may have been affected by the tests, but that it should also take measures to decontaminate the area where the tests were undertaken. France's response to this declaration clearly came a few months later when, in January 2010, France decided to add Algeria to a list of countries whose citizens were deemed to represent a threat to French national security: visitors arriving in France from Algeria were henceforth to be subject to increased security measures.

The decision prompted strong protests within Algeria and resulted in the postponement of a planned visit to Algiers by the French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Bernard Kouchner. In an attempt to alleviate the crisis, in February 2010, President Sarkozy dispatched the Secretary-General of his Presidency, Claude Guéant, for talks with Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia and Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci, along with

⁶⁴⁶ Adamson (2/1998), p.7. President Bouteflika interview with French *Channel INA*: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7a6Z4qBEpE>.

⁶⁴⁷ See: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7a6Z4qBEpE>; and *Le Telegraph*: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/algeria/9810282/Algeria-hostage-crisis-live.html>.

⁶⁴⁸ Chouchane (2010): “Who killed whom in Algeria?” *ANP Web. Les Generaux et le GIA, Iere Partie*: <http://anp.org/fr/LesGenerauxEtLeGIA/LesGenerauxEtLeGIA1.html#p14> >.

other high-level officials in an attempt to resolve the issue. In June 2010 Claude Guéant again travelled to Algeria to meet with President Bouteflika and other senior officials for the same purpose. An absolute break in the French-Algerian relationship was apparently not an option for France. Any significant breach would leave the security forces of both nations, and particularly France, open to formal reprimand for crimes against humanity committed since independence and in the 1990s, in particular.⁶⁴⁹ French penetration of Algeria at this juncture seems to have been profound.

Despite both sides' willingness to turn the page, which, as Boumédiène suggested, "cannot be torn up", relations have often been marred with misunderstandings, conflicts, mutual suspicions and mistrust. Following a promising start under the presidency of Sarkozy, relations quickly went from bad to worse, at least up until the last months of his presidential period, which seem to have brought yet another hopeful development through economic channels, although one that reminds us of the exigencies of foreign penetration. Recently, France has moved forward in its relationship with Algeria, in an effort to protect its interests in the area. However, a legacy of issues over the years has continued to complicate relations between the two nations. The kidnapping and murder of the French monks in 1996 in turn led to a number of issues, particularly when, in 1999, a French officer suggested that they had been killed accidentally by the Algerian army in a failed rescue operation.⁶⁵⁰ Even President Sarkozy who, at that time was looking for "the truth and only the truth",⁶⁵¹ found that when it came to French special interests in Algeria, especially with an economic crisis heating up in Europe, the truth was not entirely convenient. A similar scenario took place in January 2013.

According to Algerian media, the Azawat tribe in northern Mali took hostages of mostly foreign laborers in the middle of the Algerian desert as retribution for a French offensive.⁶⁵² The Algerian military intervention was unprofessional, resulting in the death of a number of the hostages. Sarkozy had, at that time, called on the Algerian government to cooperate with the French authorities, arguing that "relations between great states are based on truth, not on lies". It was a tacit requirement of the French government to defend the rights

⁶⁴⁹ Chouchane, personal interview, Birmingham, UK (12/2010).

⁶⁵⁰ *Algeria-Watch*, "Tibhirine : ce qu'écrivaient en 2004 les auteurs de Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'États": < http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/just/moines/extraits_francalgerie.htm >.

⁶⁵¹ Sarkozy speech in 1998 on the massacres of the French Monks in Algeria: "Monks of Tibhirine 7 July 2009; Sarkozy wants 'truth' on French monk massacre in Algeria": < <http://nunraw.blogspot.com.au/2009/07/monks-of-tibhirine-7-july-2009.html> >.

⁶⁵² *El Watan* (Algerian Newspaper, in French), 18/01/2013: <http://www.elwatan.dz.com/akhbar_adjilah/7212.html>; *Le Soir d'Algerie* (In French) and In-Aminas, *Echoroukonline* (In Arabic): < <http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/articles/154370.html> >; see also: M. Kranz, "With French Intervention and Algerian Hostage Crisis, Northern Mali Conflict May Envelope Region", *The Political Students*, 17 January, 2013: < <http://thepoliticalstudent.com/?p=616>>.

of the foreign laborers. Their inadvertent killing by the Algerian forces complicated matters, especially considering the need for quiet resolution of the problem rather than having the case taken to court, and thus allowing the full truth of the events to come out. French newspapers derided the fact that France had appeared to have become the lawyer for the Algerian regime. The French Minister of External Affairs advised the media not to blame the Algerian military for the attack. France then declared what amounted to a weak justification for the brutal intervention, arguing that because the Algerian regime had suffered from terrorism for the previous 20 years, they had to protect their natural gas installations from terrorism coming from Mali, who seemed bent on provoking a conflict with Algeria.⁶⁵³ This serves as yet another illustration of the French penetration of Algeria.⁶⁵⁴

Politically, the Algerian government was against the war in Mali. They engaged in negotiations until the end of the crisis, viewing it as an internal issue. But, just two days after the French soldiers started bombing the northern villages of Mali, the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, told Algeria to close its border to the neighbouring country. "What we have in mind is that if African troops move into the north of the country, the Algerians will have to close their border."⁶⁵⁵ A few hours later, Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesman Amar Belani confirmed that Algeria was closing its borders due to "the events in Mali." Indeed, he had little choice thanks to the formal and informal penetration of the French. He ordered the military bases to allow French troops to cross domestic air space without taking any action.⁶⁵⁶ According to the Guardian newspaper, the Algerian army made numerous mistakes in its handling of the hostage crisis, as admitted by the country's foreign minister. However, this case is only the most recent example of many that illustrate the depth of French penetration in

⁶⁵³ Algeria's decision to refuse foreign offers of help in handling the crisis, and to send the army to fire on vehicles full of hostages, drew widespread international criticism. At least 81 people are now believed to have died during the siege, including British, American, French, Japanese, Norwegian and Romanian workers. The crisis began on 16 January when a group of militants crossed the border from Mali, travelling to In-Aminas (1550 Km south-East Algiers), and attacked the facility run there by BP, Statoil and the Algerian state oil company (SONATRACH). Some foreign workers were killed in the initial assault, but scores of others hid around the plant and its residential compound. The gunmen searched the plant and tied up those they found and rigged them with explosives. Algeria claimed that it did not sustain heavy losses in the operation to end the Saharan gas plant siege, and that only eight soldiers suffered minor wounds during the four-day siege. The militants, armed with explosives and automatic weapons, had threatened to blow up the entire complex. Algerian troops tried twice to end the crisis, first by firing from attack helicopters before finally launching a ground assault. The Defense Ministry condemned what it called "insinuations" that it took heavy losses: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/we-are-not-messengers-of-death-in-mali-says-french-colonel-8463926.html>; Said Tamsamani, "Algeria's Refusal For Foreign Help Drew Widespread International Criticism," OpEd, *Eurasia Review*: (January 26, 2013), <<http://www.eurasiareview.com/26012013-algerias-refusal-for-foreign-help-drew-widespread-international-criticism%E2%80%8F-oped/>>.

⁶⁵⁴ Zitout, personal interview, London (29/11/2012).

⁶⁵⁵ French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, *Trend Newspaper*, "Algeria closes border with Mali" (15 January 2013): <http://en.trend.az/regions/met/arabicr/2108041.html>.

⁶⁵⁶ Hocine Haroune and Chouchane, A., Interview with *al-Magharibyya* TV channel.

Algerian politics.⁶⁵⁷ France was apparently accustomed to issuing orders to the Algerian administration in crisis situations, with the Algerian political leadership facing little choice but to obey, even when those orders went against the interest of their citizens, such as happened with the elections of 1992.

According to Zitout, Algerian politics have not changed very much since Independence. Regimes have changed, of course, but the basic patterns remain the same. Although politics in Algeria are built around the military, the early military revolutionaries and later the French Officers apparently were not struggling on behalf of Algerian interests, but rather were competing for the positions of power in the country. Without the support of the people, they necessarily depended upon the support of Western, and particularly French, interests. France played a significant role in protecting the military regime in Algeria because of its own economic interests there. This, then, was the basis of French penetration of Algeria.

In an opinion piece published on 28 February 2013 in the weekly *Marianne*, a French general, Henri Poncet, declared that Algeria is the “best ally” of France.⁶⁵⁸ According to French military reports discussing the conflict in Mali, “Algeria has courageously committed to the side of France to support its commitment to Mali.” For the security of the Mediterranean, “Algeria and France should work together” it concluded. General Poncet concluded that it was important for both parties to forget the events of over fifty years ago. Instead, he argued, it is finally time to build relationships that are part of a shared strategic vision and partnership. He suggested that that based on a common history, geography, and the complementarity of their economies, both countries could and should take decisive roles in their mutual future, shaping the current order and ensuring that the Mediterranean ceased to be a hostile frontier, dividing two worlds.⁶⁵⁹ France, of course, would have to serve as the leading partner.

6. Human Rights Organizations and French Policy Regarding the Algerian Crisis

It is useful to paint a summary picture of the formal French-Algerian relationship, and the response of human rights organizations in France and Algeria to what was happening daily in Algeria after the coup d’etat led by the French Officers and supported by successive

⁶⁵⁷ “Colonel Urquhart Algeria made mistakes over hostage crisis, foreign minister admits”, guardian.co.uk (Saturday 26 January 2013).

⁶⁵⁸ See *Channel d’Algerie*, <http://www.tsa-algerie.com/diplomatie/un-general-francais-considere-l-algerie-comme-le-meilleur-allie-de-la-france_23948.html>.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

French governments. Independent organizations in Algeria as well as in France have strongly opposed the controlling policies of French governments in dealing with the Algerian crisis. In essence, the French provided significant support to the military regime in opposition to democracy, and the results of the elections of 1992. Moreover, French NGOs have failed to change French governments' views on the crisis, or crises, over the past decades. According to Camille Bonora-Waisman, "Democracy and Human Rights became principles of secondary importance."⁶⁶⁰ In contrast, the EU government put pressure on Paris regarding human rights violations in Algeria. US President Bill Clinton followed Algerian events sympathetically, showing concern for the victims of the coup, and then unexpectedly adopted the French approach, particularly France announced that it would veto any UN intervention in Algeria, ostensibly proposed to investigate massacres and other crimes that had allegedly occurred the countryside in 1995.⁶⁶¹

It is critical to consider the impact of French political change on Algerian political and social life. According to Peter J. Schraeder, among the European countries that occupied African countries, France is the only former colonial power that has continued to support and intervene in its former colonies (and, indeed, in former Belgian colonies) throughout Africa.⁶⁶² Whether socialists such as Francois Mitterrand or the more conservative partisans of Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Chirac, have been leading the French government, and even in the extraordinary case of Nicolas Sarkozy, the French have persisted in dealing with Africa as an extension of its "empire". Algeria, however, occupies a special place in French international policies, perhaps because of its geographic location, although more likely because of significant economic interests.⁶⁶³

In any event, the French-Algerian relationship has undergone dramatic shifts over time, according to the varying and shifting interest of the two countries. French governments have manifested very different and changing views regarding Africa and, in particular, Algeria. Algerian Independence in 1962, at least for French President Charles de Gaulle, was based on a contingent premise—that Algeria would remain in a special relationship with France. Nicole Grimaud notes in this regard that:

This tolerance shown by General de Gaulle toward Algeria was deliberate; he made it a point of honor that there should not be a rupture in the two

⁶⁶⁰ Camille Bonora-Waisman, *France and the Algerian Conflict: Issues in Democracy and Political Stability, 1988-1995* (Leeds Studies in Democratization, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England and USA 2003), p. 216.

⁶⁶¹ Anwar Haddam, personal interview (USA, 2010).

⁶⁶² Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*

countries' relations. ... De Gaulle saw cooperation as an exemplary act which he hoped would alleviate the painful feelings of the French over the loss of Algeria.⁶⁶⁴

A short time after Algerian Independence, under the leadership of Georges Pompidou, the French government established a new “special-relationship” with Algeria. The issue at that time was oil, and the subsequent oil negotiations resulted in the nationalisation of the oil industry by Algerian President Boumédiène on 24/02/1971. Pompidou expressed his desire for normalization the relationship with Algeria, saying officially that “We will not give Algeria priority in our relations, but neither will we exclude it from the number of states with which we cooperate closely . . .”⁶⁶⁵ President Boumédiène answered that: “Between us and the French state, there is no longer any problem of interests. The only one that could still exist would be, perhaps, that of permanent relations.”⁶⁶⁶

President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was the first French chief-of-state to visit Algiers, April 10-12, 1975, after four decidedly frosty years. He unsuccessfully tried to improve France's relationship with Algeria, to the great disappointment of Algerians. His somewhat trite motto, “Historic France greets Independent Algeria”, did little to improve relations. The Algerian media responded in kind: “The liberty (Independence) of Algerians was taken not given [by France]”. As a practical matter, however, the Algerian government gave its endorsement to France in its support of the takeover by Morocco of the Western Sahara, and thus chose to ignore the interests of thousands of Western Saharan refugees in the Algerian city of Tindouf.

The May 1981 French election results surprised Algiers; Francois Mitterrand, of the French Socialist Party (PS), proposed that France be the motherland of its former colonies, especially in North Africa and the Mediterranean, and hence a guardian of their internal problems, a policy that recalled the thinking of de Gaulle. This, in effect, encouraged French society to accept a multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural society, at a time when most French considered immigrants, and especially North African immigrants, as a threat to France, particularly in regards to a possible eventual dilution of national identity. “This attitude explains (even if not excusing) reactions of rejection and racist violence which [were] encouraged by the extreme right”.⁶⁶⁷ However, with a growing number of economic and social problems in French and Algeria, as well as the large gap between Algeria and Morocco

⁶⁶⁴ Nicole Grimaud, “Algeria and Socialist France,” *Middle East Journal*, 40, No. 2 (Spring, 1986), pp. 252-266.

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

because of the involvement of France in support of Morocco, the Algerian regime soured on Mitterrand, ultimately seeing him as the worst French president ever.

Conciliation with the Islamic opposition in effect broke the silence of the Algerian military regime regarding the special role of the French Officers, who were actively collaborating at the time with French intelligent services in attempting to undermine the Islamists in the elections of 1990/1991. With the January 1992 *coup d'état* in Algeria, the French-Algerian relationship lost its vitality, although it continued on in a dormant state, awaiting the outcome of the next French elections. It can be said, however, that French relations with Algeria on the question of Islamists, especially after their victory in the elections, remained decidedly unstable, varying at times between conciliation, on the one hand, and eradication, on the other.⁶⁶⁸ In general, the French did not regard violence (the “eradication approach”) as an optimal way to assure the safety of French interests. In Algeria, the eradication strategy consisted of directly countering, with violence, any violence committed by the Islamist armed groups; it also involved undermining the political project of Islamism of the FIS party.⁶⁶⁹ Under Jacques Chirac’s presidency, it seemed that the two countries were heading toward a historic treaty of friendship in 2005, and this was especially evident after Chirac’s speech in Algeria in 2003.⁶⁷⁰ While the military regime in Algeria was mired in problems of state security and Islamists, the French government was studying the case, trying to save their relationship with Algeria.

French governments had always backed the military regime in Algeria, however. The French socialist government led by Bérégovoy (April 1992-March 1993) preferred peaceful solutions as a formula for ending conflict in Algeria, although it also favoured the use of force after its formula for compromise was rejected by the opposition and the FIS. Six months after the coup, in the midst of a significantly cooled relationship, at a trade meeting in Algiers in July 1992, the French minister of agriculture and his colleagues prepared a platform designed to improve the relationship between the two countries. This was a limited overture, however. The absence of top-level French officials indicated that the French government would only accord limited approval of the policies of the Boudiaf regime. At Boudiaf’s request, Mitterrand agreed to meet with him in Paris on July 16, 1992. The meeting never occurred, however: Boudiaf was assassinated just a couple of weeks before the

⁶⁶⁸ Camille Bonora-Waisman, *France and the Algerian Conflict: Issues in Democracy and Political Stability, 1988-1995* (Leeds Studies in Democratization, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England and USA, 2003).

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁰ Michael R. Shurkin, *Chirac In Algeria* (The Brookings Institution, U.S.-France Analysis Series, August, 2003).

meeting.⁶⁷¹ Significantly, the visit was to have been secret.⁶⁷² Dumas eventually went to Algiers in order to attend Boudiafs funeral, and promised that “France [would] not economize on its help to Algeria,” and that “this [would] be visible in the days that follow[ed]”.⁶⁷³

By the end of 1992, the French-Algerian relationship was particularly strained, so much so that it threatened to affect significant components of French aid and support. Just before the French parliamentary elections of March, 1993, the socialists, anticipating defeat, initiated a process of reconciliation with Algerian regime. Increased economic aid was granted, and the PM designate, Abdesselam, was invited formally to Paris. Pundits predicted success of the right, and Abdesselam made a point of meeting with members of that opposition, as well as with Georges Marchais, whose Communist Party had called since January 1992 for strong French support for the Algerian regime, including the provision of arms and military technology to confront “terrorism”, and support for the Algerian media, at a time when the only media allowed in Algeria was state-sponsored.⁶⁷⁴ Camille Bonora adds that:

... it is worth emphasizing that,...the French media tend to affirm that France's Algeria policy has been one of unconditional support to the Algerian regime since the January 1992 *coup d'état*.⁶⁷⁵

In September, 1994, under the right-wing government of Balladur (March 1993-May 1995), which was supported enhanced security rather than conciliation, France supported Algeria's refusal to sign any accords with the Islamists in Algeria. Balladur apparently did not have a specific policy regarding events in Algeria, but was generally directed in his thinking by the basic idea that while an FIS take-over would be ‘a catastrophe’, it was not ineluctable. Upon this consideration, it was decided, in the words of Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, that everything had to be done in order to avoid the risk of an FIS take-over.⁶⁷⁶

In October 1995, under the Juppé government (May 1995- June 1997), France suddenly called for conciliation with Algeria, and urged the Algerian authorities to democratize their political system. This was typical of French responses to the Algerian crisis, and had been noted from the beginning. The Gaullist president, Jacques Chirac, during his visit in Algeria in 2003, emphasized a new, multiculturalist image of France. The

⁶⁷¹ Camille Bonora-Waisman (1995), p.64.

⁶⁷² *Ibid*, p.64.

⁶⁷³ Camille Bonora-Waisman (2003), p. 51.

⁶⁷⁴ Camille Bonora, “France's Algeria Policy (1988-1995), Discourse, Motives and Means”, *The University of Leeds, Department of Politics*, September 1995, p. 70.

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶⁷⁶ Camille Bonora-Waisman (2003), p. 137.

Algerian president bragged that “Together, Algerians and French, we are beginning to write the contours of a common destiny on a new page, without bitterness and without regret.”⁶⁷⁷

Unfortunately as is often the case, an incident was created in Paris by the opposition parties to sabotage reconciliation between the two countries. Nicholas Sarkozy’s (then-Minister of the Interior) new minorities policy, while continuing to attract Arab voters in France away from the Left, pressed the case of the *Pied Noir*, and particularly their right to be accepted by Algerian regime. Part of this involved trying to exorcise the lingering bad feelings and resentment left over from the war and the pains of decolonization, important inspirations of France’s extreme right party, the *Front National*.⁶⁷⁸ Indeed, following a promising start under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, relations quickly went from bad to worse, at least up until the next elections, to which Algeria committed its resources in a desperate attempt to get a leftist victory.

The victory in May, 2012, of Francois Hollande signaled a renewed focus on Algeria, with an apparent vision to bring French-Algerian relations to the same level of amicability and cooperation as existed with French-German relations. Hollande’s address to the Algerian MPs was well received, but was not enough for their requirements. Algerians simply wanted more: they wanted his apology for the French-led massacres, during and after the war of independence. Bouteflika, however, did not push Algeria’s case with Hollande, and sought only to reinforce the existing “conciliation plan”. It was obvious that his primary concern at the time was to avoid being victimized by the “Arab Spring”. He made no request for reparations, as had been expected.

Hollande did pledge a one billion euro investment in a joint venture with the Algerian government to build a car factory (Renault) in Algiers. At a time when France’s automobile industry was shedding jobs and market shares, and when trade unions were screaming bloody murder about outsourcing, this initiative had domestic consequences for Hollande.⁶⁷⁹

The informal security relationship between France and Algeria was stable, and encouraged France to support a political plan in Algeria. France was looking at the Algerian situation as part of its security and economic stability. There were two ways to achieve enhanced security in Algeria, it was argued: conciliation with the Islamists, or re-launching a security war, giving significant support to the Algerian military regime so that they might destroy the Islamist parties and organisations.

⁶⁷⁷ Elaine Sciolino, “Chirac Sees New Day for France and Algeria,” *The New York Times* (March 4, 2003): <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/04/world/chirac-sees-new-day-for-france-and-algeria.html>.

⁶⁷⁸ Yahia H. Zoubir, “French-Algerian Relations: The Weight of History,” *Aljazeera Network* (07/07/2011).

⁶⁷⁹ Bonora-Waisman, *France and the Algerian Conflict*, p.213.

In conclusion, various French governments have oscillated between support of the eradication of Islamists, and conciliation. Islamists have subsequently lost power and public support. The media has portrayed them as terrorists, most of their leaders have been killed or arrested, and the international community has tended to criticize what is often described as bland French support for the Algerian regime. France continues to look to Algerian authorities to find a “better solution” for the future of politics in Algeria.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ALGERIAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNISM

1. Introduction

This chapter further explores one of the hypotheses introduced earlier, that the authoritarianism experienced by the Algerians is largely based on economic opportunism. The main supports of the military regime in Algeria, especially in the context of the “Arab Spring”, are petroleum deposits, oil and gas, which have increased the country’s cash reserves to over 200 billion dollars. According to *Comp. Econ*,⁶⁸⁰ the most important channel through which corruption affects economic growth is political instability. In Algeria, political and administrative positions are sought not for the honour or responsibility of the jobs, but rather for their remuneration without oversight. This chapter will focus on this broader topic of *economic opportunism*, which in most cases is expressed by powerful elites within the military, or by their partners in politics and administration. In most cases this is expressed in blatant corruption, and it has apparently squandered a significant part of the the wealth of the country, leaving behind a hungry, poor, jobless, homeless, and undereducated people. Algerian oil-based wealth has helped to protect the regime from the “Arab Spring”, which has affected the stability of most of Algeria’s neighboring states, although it has also opened the door to opportunism and broad-scale corruption. Public funds have been far too easily accessible, with regime members suspected of syphoning off most of the country’s wealth with little accountability or responsibility.

2. Theoretical Base

In 1990, Tiihonen described the nature of the corruption that often exists within and between countries, outlining some of its humanitarian implications.⁶⁸¹ Human rights organisations, seeking to ameliorate conditions leading to war and internal crises affecting most third world countries, have placed the issue of corruption high on their agendas. Corruption remains a difficult subject to analyse. Tiihonen noted that the main reason for the

⁶⁸⁰ Data, G. F. *Algeria 3-Month Treasury Bill Yield*:

<https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/index_tabs.php?action=detailedinfo&id=8468> ;

Also: <<http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/332-algeria-gdp-country-report.html#axzz2XJtYETd>>.

According to BBC news (“Mourad Mahmoud Reports”, 15/05/2012), the Algerian budget has recorded a financial surplus that has meant a rise in foreign currency reserves of more than \$200bn, according to authorities. This is expected to rise over the coming year to reach \$225bn.

⁶⁸¹ Tiihonen, Seppo, *The History of Corruption in Central Government Cahier D'histoire de L'Administration*, No.7 (IOS Press, Netherland and Library of Congress, 2003).

difficulties inherent in considering corruption as a *crime* against the population is, in a global world, the complex phenomenon of *economic development*, dependent as it is in a neo-liberal world on big money and risk-taking. Most forms of corruption, it is argued, undermine the legitimacy of the political system and limit the delivery and quality of public services,⁶⁸² however, and therefore require the concerted attention of authorities if a rapid descent into underdevelopment is to be avoided.

Most countries today are suffering from an epidemic of corruption, through administrative mismanagement, underfunded bureaucracies, poor leadership, or the impact of an elite-centered institutional ethos.⁶⁸³ In fact, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, one of the only reliable international indices of corruption, has shown a steady decline in raw country scores over the past decade, suggesting that perceptions of corruption, at least, are on the rise. Political and economic corruption have no clear and agreed-upon definition, although bribery and influence peddling are usually included, and evidence of corruption is thus exceedingly hard to find. Additionally, the secretive nature of corruption further complicates the collection of evidence, especially where financial dealings may be the product of what appears to be normal trading among skilled government officials and businessmen. Corruption can be disguised as an economic opportunity, and in many cases a corrupt interaction may also be a reflection of economic opportunism.

Scholars have differing definitions of corruption, and guilty parties in one case may, from another perspective (or set of national rules), be innocent. It is evident that corruption tends to be embedded in economic activity.⁶⁸⁴ The United Nations' statistics on the relative levels of criminality of its members have never included political or economic corruption as categories, principally because corruption appears only sporadically in national statistics on criminality,⁶⁸⁵ and hence the relative reliance of researchers on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index over the past two decades.

Cases of corruption first appeared in the UN's criminality statistics in this past decade, and international judicial proceedings and legislation had not focused on corruption *per se* until early in this century, when the UN Convention against Corruption was signed and

⁶⁸² Tiihonen, Seppo (2003), pp. 2-5.

⁶⁸³ See Jon S.T. Quah, "Corruption in Asia with Special Reference to Singapore: Patterns and Consequences", *Asian Journal of Public Administration*: <http://www.jonstquah.com/images/Corruption%20in%20Singapore%20AJPA.pdf>.

⁶⁸⁴ Jacquemet N. *Microéconomie de la corruption CIRPEE* (Université Laval), CREST (INSEE) & GATE (Université Lyon 2, Décembre 2005), manuscript of the author, published in *Revue Française d'Economie* XX, 4 (2006) 118-159.

⁶⁸⁵ Tiihonen Seppo, *The History of Corruption in Central government, Cahier D'histoire de l'Administration* No.7 Published at IOS Press, Netherland and Library of Congress, 2003.

then ratified by most of the members of the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, the reality in most countries is not encouraging. Those charged with corruption are seldom punished. They tend not to lose positions of trust, and are almost never tried for breach of trust. Developing countries often mix public duty with personal interests, resulting in economic opportunism that easily shades into corruption. Some regard corruption as excusable in context, that is, as a kind of free trade conducted through a transparent agreement signed by all parties. In these cases, corruption is personal business conjoined with the duties of a public position.⁶⁸⁶ Nicolas Jacquemet defines corruption in the following terms:

Corruption is understood as the diversion of a discretionary ability for the benefit of a third party, which is in remuneration offers. Any delegation of discretionary powers is thus *a priori* likely to be the object of it.⁶⁸⁷

In another place he avers that “corruption is this rather uncommon agreement in which trustworthiness involves legal sanctions.”⁶⁸⁸ Cooper Drury has defined corruption in other terms “as the abuse of public office for private gain,”⁶⁸⁹ whether this has occurred financially or in terms of status. Most definitions state that the gain and profit may accrue to an individual or group, or may be to another party which is closely associated with such an individual or group, adding that: “Corrupt activity includes bribery, nepotism, theft and other misappropriation of public resources”.⁶⁹⁰ Whether corruption has dominated the political and the economic system exclusively or not, it is a phenomenon that is regarded as damaging economic performance, whatever the sources of a country’s income. It represents both a tax on productivity, and a market distortion.⁶⁹¹

Mauro finds that “corruption reduces private sector investment even in countries featuring cumbersome economic regulations, where corruption might be expected to spur investment.”⁶⁹² Shleifer and Vishny suggest that one reason for this is that corruption is more than simply a tax on economic activity, primarily because there is no central mechanism for

⁶⁸⁶ Abdelhamid Brahim, interview by *Aljazeera* TV, ‘Program of Personal visit’, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WtElmZDrdOE>>.

⁶⁸⁷ Nicolas Jacquemet, “Microéconomie de la corruption CIRPEE”, manuscrit auteur, publié dans *Revue Française d’Economie*, XX, 4 (2006), p. 118. Corruption here is defined exclusively by the economic relations of individuals, without sector distinction.

⁶⁸⁸ Nicolas Jacquemet, “Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence” (March 2007), *University of Paris 1 Panthéon–Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics*; B Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Bureau 420, 106 Bd. de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris, France.

⁶⁸⁹ A. Cooper Drury, Jonathan Kriekhaus and Michael Lusztic, “Corruption, Democracy and Economic Growth”, *Journal of International Political Science Review*, 27, No. 2 (2006), pp. 121- 136.

⁶⁹⁰ Drury, *et al.* (2006), 121.

⁶⁹¹ Jacquemet, « Microéconomie », p. 118.

⁶⁹² Noted by Drury, *et al.* (2006), Mauro Paolo, “Corruption and the composition of government expenditure” (International Monetary Fund, 700, 19th Street, N.W., Washington D.C. USA), Received 1 November 1996, pub. 23 January 1999.

collection.⁶⁹³ They believe that this stems from the fact that corrupt agreements – between a briber and an agent, for example – cannot be enforced by third parties, due to illegality.⁶⁹⁴ However, Mauro clarifies that economic opportunism starts from political corruption. In a world in which governments do not always look after their workers and do not act in their citizens' best interest, “corrupt politicians may be expected to spend more public resources on those items on which it is easier to levy large bribes and maintain them in secret.”⁶⁹⁵

Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra argues that corruption refers narrowly to the exercise of public power for private gain. Public corruption is that which is undertaken by government officers through their positions, especially by decision makers, whereby a public employee, elected or not, uses his position corruptly in government in order to obtain private benefits. “The existence of corruption indicates a lack of respect for the rules and regulations that govern economic interactions in a given society”.⁶⁹⁶ People tend to engage in corruption to cover their needs, and often consider that the government should be covering them. The objective of people engaging corruption may only be to seek food and the basic necessities of life. According to Ackerman and others corruption, in some cases at least, is narrowly based on needs, especially when an official has discretion over the distribution of a good or the 'avoidance of a bad' vis-à-vis the private sector.⁶⁹⁷ The official has an incentive to ask for a bribe to increase his/her income in exchange for a good that has little cost to them.⁶⁹⁸ A business firm has an incentive to offer a bribe and obtain benefits to which it would not otherwise have access, such as being granted a contract without competitive tender.

Cuervo-Cazurra identifies two views of corruption, one positive and the other negative. Although corruption is rarely justified on ethical grounds, some scholars view corruption in positive terms, as the ‘grease in the wheels of commerce’.⁶⁹⁹ Huntington and Leff state that “corruption is seen as facilitating transactions and speeding up procedures that

⁶⁹³ Schleifer, A., and Schleifer, R. (1995). “Corruption”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CIX, 599–617. Noted by Drury and others (2006).

⁶⁹⁴ Jacquemet (2006): <<http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/membre/jacquemet/Corruption.pdf>>.

⁶⁹⁵ Mauro P., “Corruption and the composition of government expenditure”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 69 (1998), pp. 263–279.

⁶⁹⁶ Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, “Who cares about corruption?” *Journal of International Business Studies*, 37 (2006), pp. 807-822.

⁶⁹⁷ Rose-Ackerman, S. “The economics of corruption”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 4, No.2 (1975), pp. 187-203. See the same definition noted in Abbink, “Laboratory experiments on corruption”, in Rose-Ackerman (ed.), *Handbook of Economic Corruption* (London: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2005).

⁶⁹⁸ Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., ‘Corruption’, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108, No.3 (1993), pp. 599-617.

⁶⁹⁹ Cuervo-Cazurra (2006), pp. 807-822.

would otherwise occur with more difficulty, if at all”.⁷⁰⁰ Leff states: “Corruption is a way to bring market procedures into an environment of excessive or misguided regulation, introducing competition into what is otherwise a monopolistic setting.”⁷⁰¹ Corruption is a part of undeveloped countries, usually generated among most of the population within their different positions and duties, and practiced in their daily life. Corruption enables free markets to emerge in situations of limited freedom. Thus, the markets in these countries are closely guided by the government or agents in the country and that closed economic system would not be able to encourage free trade investment and commerce. Investors who value time or access to an input more than others will pay more for it.⁷⁰²

Most scholars have a negative view of corruption, because it is rarely restricted to areas where it could conceivably add to the public welfare. Scholars tend to see corruption as ‘sand in the wheels of commerce’, indicating that it has a negative effect on economic resources.⁷⁰³ They argue that such resources could be invested far more profitably in other ways. Moreover, corruption does not ensure that the promised goods are even delivered. Investors do not have recourse in the courts to demand fulfilment of agreements, because bribery, a major form of corruption, is illegal, and thus secret. Even when the bribe results in fulfilment of a promise, the party affected faces increased costs.⁷⁰⁴ The official exacting the bribe, for example, can withhold approval of a permit until the bribe is paid, thus increasing costs to the bribe-paying firm. Government officials have a monetary incentive to create additional regulations with the sole purpose of generating opportunities for bribery.⁷⁰⁵ “Corruption also results in the inefficient allocation of resources.”⁷⁰⁶ Nicolas Jacque notes another type of corruption: a second agreement on a primary contract, whose objective is to incorporate an additional reason for divergence from the original agreement, thanks to the payment of a bribe.⁷⁰⁷ Such an illegal agreement is a corrupt pact, creating a new support framework, but directed towards diverting the discretionary ability entrusted to the agent, in

⁷⁰⁰ Huntington, S., *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Leff, N. H. “Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption”, in A.J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston and V.T. Le Vine (eds.), *Political Corruption: A Handbook* (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books, 1989), pp: 389-403.

⁷⁰¹ Leff (1989); Cuervo-Cazurra, “Who Cares about Corruption”? *Journal of International Business Studies*, 37, No. 6 (Nov., 2006), pp. 807-822.

⁷⁰² Lui, F.T., “An equilibrium queuing model of bribery”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 93, No.4 (1985), pp. 760-781.

⁷⁰³ Kaufmann, D., “Corruption: the facts”, *Foreign Policy*, 107 (Summer, 1997), pp. 114-131.

⁷⁰⁴ Shleifer A., and Vishny R. W., “Corruption”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108, No. 3 (1993), pp. 599-617.

⁷⁰⁵ De Soto, H., *The Other Path* (Harper & Row: New York, 1989); Donaldson, T., “Values in tension: ethics away from home”, *Harvard Business Review*, 74, No. 5 (1996), pp. 4-12.

⁷⁰⁶ Paolo Mauro, *Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund and Elsevier Science, S.A, 1998).

⁷⁰⁷ Jacquemet, *Microéconomie*.

favour of the corrupt practitioner. John Girling states that the concept of corruption goes back to Aristotle's distinction concerning political constitutions.⁷⁰⁸ As Aristotle points out, each member hopes to attain a share of the good life.

3. Corruption in Algeria: The Historical Context

It is argued by many observers that a culture of corruption has infected the Algerian state since independence. It is said to have affected state institutions, weakening them and subjecting them to undue central control. United Nations reports classify Algeria, along with many of Arab countries, as being behind the newly industrialized countries regarding political and economic development. Algeria holds the dubious record of having the lowest level of physical capital productivity.⁷⁰⁹ It ranks 111th in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, 2011, and 105th in the 2012 CPI, well below most countries in the CPI. France, in contrast, ranked 25th in 2011, and 22nd in 2012, the most recent results.

Lahouari Addi locates the beginning of the economic crisis in Algeria, which appears to be inextricably bound up with violence and corruption, at independence. In 1962, the state, which was essentially public, was privatised, while commercial activities, which were essentially private, were made public. At that time the Algerian revolutionary elites, like others in third world countries, believed that faith alone was enough to develop the country, by using the state without establishing institutions guaranteeing free expression for social groups organised as parties, trade unions, and other interests, thus denying them the ability to participate in the political process.⁷¹⁰ One of the revolutionary leaders, Ait Ahmed, had a clear answer to Bouteflika when he urged him to share power with Boumédiène by supporting the *coup d'état* against the provisional government. He said that the role of revolutionary leaders should be to finish their mission of bringing independence to the Algerian people, so that the youth of Algeria would take responsibility and continue building their country according to the revolution's principles.⁷¹¹ Ait Ahmed wanted to pass Algerian political power on to the new generation after independence, but when he saw that

⁷⁰⁸ John Girling, *Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1997), p.1.

⁷⁰⁹ United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, Vienna, 2004, *Industrial Development Report 2004, Industrialization, Environment and the Millennium Development Goals in Sub-Saharan Africa: The new frontier in the fight against poverty*. Also: Victor, David G., Hulst, David R., and Thurber, Mark C., *Oil and Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 559.

⁷¹⁰ Lahouari Addi, and Victoria Bawtree, *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 33, No. 108; *North Africa: Power, Politics and Promise* (Taylor & Francis, 2006), pp. 207-217.

⁷¹¹ Belkacem Saadallah, *al-harakat al-wataniyyah aljaza'a'iria 1930-1945*, Institute of Research and Arabic Studies. Also: Mohammed Harbi, *Le F.L.N, documents et histoire, 1954-1962* (Gilbert Meynier, Pub. Fayard, Paris, 2004).

Boumédiène was corrupting the principles of the revolution, by using Ben Bella's name and position in Algeria to rob the citizens of power, he stood against him in trying to stop him through the use of violence.⁷¹² Ait Ahmed then faced a violent reprisal from Boumédiène's military regime. Although he fought against political corruption, he was eventually arrested and spent the next 30 years in exile. As a new state, the corruption of the Algerian Constitution would have a devastating effect: the spread of corrupt political and economic practices.⁷¹³

The economic sector, which was expected to absorb all commercial activities from large-scale steel industry down to small local bakeries, effectively prevented the different social groups from enjoying any economic autonomy.⁷¹⁴ Because of his unsuccessful economic policies, Ben Bella, the first president, afforded the military the opportunity to seize his position through *coup d'état* in June 1965. The military, which already dominated local political power in the country with the support of French Officers, used authoritarian means to cut off the opposition's legal pathways to power. In 1992, when the French Officers reached the peak of their power through a *coup d'état*, the only political party, the FLN, had been reduced from political activity to ignoring professional military revolutionaries, sending them into retirement with some financial assistance, including permits for small businesses such as taxi and coffee shop licences. Meanwhile, the new military representative in the political wing of the National Rally for Democracy (*Rassemblement National Démocratique* – RND) became the only guarantor of legitimacy.

Maâmar Boudersa states that a discussion of corruption in Algeria is simply too broad a subject. The reasons for corruption in Algeria must be analysed through the legal definition of the state in international law. Any country, to be so legally classified, has to have at least three elements: people, land, and organisation. According to Boudersa, Algerian communities have been corrupted by a military regime dominated by the military secret service (DRS) and, as noted repeatedly throughout this thesis, the French Officers. This corruption is the main reason why economic opportunism in most levels of the society was

⁷¹² He was one of the early leaders of the *Organisation Spéciale* (OS), a secret paramilitary structure created in 1947 for the purpose of exploring the possibilities for revolutionary action. He is included among the nine "historic leaders" of the Algerian nationalists who in 1954 founded the FLN and began the eight-year war of independence against France. He fought as a rebel leader in his Kabylia Mountains and with the rebel high command abroad, in Egypt and Tunisia, until he was captured by the French in October 1956 (with four other leaders, in a commercial airliner the French forced to land). He was imprisoned in France until the 1962 agreement on Algeria's Independence.

⁷¹³ Salah Eddine Sidhoum, personal interview, Algiers (25 September 2009); also: Anwar Haddam, personal interview, from Hamilton NZ by skype, recorded 21 May 2009.

⁷¹⁴ Addi and Bawtree.

originally able to gain a foothold.⁷¹⁵ Corruption had become a part of the Algerian leaders' lives. It is not new for Algerians to see their leaders using public trust and the wealth of society to build their own interests and power. In 1964 there was a major scandal concerning the collection of funds and jewellery from ordinary Algeria citizens, often Algerian women, to fund the building of the new country. It is emblematic of the post-independence period that the major collection that resulted from these donations was stolen, and is still missing today without any investigation or charges pressed against anyone in power.⁷¹⁶

4. Economic opportunism and decision making

According to Boudersa, the Algerian government is dealing with corruption through legal indictments, as it has the perfect right to do so. Joffe states that the nature of independent of Algeria and its claim to revolutionary legitimacy has been to mask the arbitrary power of the army at its core, which has systematically undermined other institutions.⁷¹⁷ Algerian political groups have no legal legitimacy. Legal processes are often strangely missing from the courts, and because there is no separation of powers among the legislature, judiciary and executive, ultimately there is no control over contracts and trade, as well as a lack of transparency at any level.⁷¹⁸ A clear example mentioned by Boudersa concerns constitutional law, which has clear rules and articles regarding control over public agencies. These articles, in place since the first Constitution of 1963, have never been acted upon.⁷¹⁹ Moreover, the government has never reported back to the parliament on expenses and the way in which the budget has been spent. In 1990, an international bank published a report saying that more than 60% of the Algerian debt at that time stemmed from smuggling public money out of the country.⁷²⁰

Under martial law and de facto military dictatorship since 1992, economic opportunism by public officials and corruption has been widely evident without legal indictment or redress.⁷²¹ Brahim stated that the military leaders have used this period, the 'red decade', a period of rampant insecurity, lack of civic order coupled with freedom of

⁷¹⁵ Boudersa, Maâmar, *Rachad TV* interview. Also: al Watan, Algerian daily newspaper, article written by Nadjia Bouaricha, "Maâmar Boudersa, Chercher et Universitaire Algerien; 'L'Algérie est soumise à un pouvoir royal'": <http://www.elwatan.com/Maâmar-Boudersa-chercheur-et>.

⁷¹⁶ Boudersa, M. (27/01/2010).

⁷¹⁷ Joffe G. , "The Role of Violence Within the Algerian Economy", *Journal of North African Studies*, 7, No. 1 (Spring 2002).

⁷¹⁸ Boudersa, Interview with *Rachad TV*, Geneva: 27/01/2010.

⁷¹⁹ *Algerian Constitution*, 1996, ACT. 159-162.

⁷²⁰ *Rachad TV*, Boudersa (27/01/2010).

⁷²¹ Brahim, A.H., interview (28 September 2009); Chouchane, A. (10 June 2009); Haddam, A. (May 2009); Aroua, A. (27 August 2009); Dhina, M. (26 September 2009); Msili, R. (28 Aug. 2009).

elites from legal sanction, to sell public property to themselves and their relatives at scandalously low prices. Brahimî divided the corruption and economic opportunism in Algeria into two parts: the first stemmed from the local departments and administration services, which affected virtually everyone directly. According to a publicized comment of the Minister of Internal Affairs, between 1997 and 1999 the Algerian courts investigated 83 cases of alleged corruption concerning elected members in local government, including mayors, members of social committees and regional executive leaders (Willaya chiefs).⁷²² As with most incidents of corruption in the world, these cases of corruption are difficult to control, or even detect. Indeed, many of the people involved with corruption of this kind regard their actions as legitimate, part of their work, or their businesses, and even as their personal right.⁷²³

The expression of corruption became clear after the *coup d'état* of 1992, when politicians and leaders of public companies began functioning without oversight. Government intervention was limited by the emergency rules of Martial Law, which were directly administered by the military regime. This allowed officers and people in charge of public administration and finance companies to breach the public trust and in effect, to organize themselves in what amounted to a financial mafia. Thousands of people become very wealthy, holding billions of dollars of public money, and smuggling it into European banks. In the last decade, the Algerian media has claimed that billions of dollars were lost simply in the delay of major projects such as the Algiers Metro, the sea face of Algiers, and the East-West motorway.⁷²⁴

Brahimi refers to many incidents of corruption and economic opportunism during his time as prime minister. Many government projects were suspected of involving corruption. At the top were the leaders and military generals, allegedly using the public funds without oversight or responsibility.⁷²⁵ "Corruption was a taboo subject until 1990" says Brahimî. Indeed, it is interesting to note that before 1990, any reference (even in private speech) to corruption within the government was forbidden. It was at this time that Brahimî was placed on a 'wanted list' by the military and the Court of Algiers. He had made a

⁷²² Salima Tlemçani, "Affaire des magistrats faussaires: Mellouk appelle Berraja à témoigner", *El Watan*, 03/02/201; "Algeria: corruption with impunity" <<http://slimaneboussoufa.wordpress.com/>>.

⁷²³ Brahimî, A. H. (2001).

⁷²⁴ *Alhiwar TV*, interview with director of Transparency International in Algeria, program "La Corruption en Algérie", Toufik Rabbahi, London, 27/05/2010: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=jLRn9xfbfBU>>

⁷²⁵ Abdelhamid Brahimî, interview *Aljazeera TV*, "Special visit": <<http://aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CF6F81B3-3A29-454D-B8E9-07339A59F61C.htm>> . Also: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ53kJKDypI&feature=related>>.

statement to the effect that more than 26 billion dollars was missing from the national treasury because of large-scale corruption and economic opportunism present throughout the public bureaucracy, including the military and the government ministries.⁷²⁶ He states that:

Indeed, corruption has been raised publicly by myself and estimated at 26 billion dollars for the past 20 years, all sectors. We had then attended an outcry. The various public media and "private" were mobilized by the government in tackling not to corruption and corrupt, but he who speaks and denounces it. Even the President of the Republic and Head of Government and the Secretary General of the FLN of the time are on the frontlines to deny the existence of corruption by focusing their attack against whoever denounces. In this context, I said publicly that my "statement is in line with the wishes of the grassroots has been denouncing the scourge of corruption" and that he had started when he was Prime Minister, procedures and mechanisms to prevent and control the award of major contracts with the outside. I said "it is true that certain provisions were not absolutely effective, they (the procedures and mechanisms) were not less punitive and sometimes reported very significant gains the country. One can indeed find cases in these controls have significantly reduced the price of services and foreign supplies." But these details did not mitigate the vehemence of the attacks focused for two years on my person by the press and various prime ministers who succeeded between 1990 and 1992, namely: Mouloud Hamrouche Ghazali and Belaïd Abdeslam Ahmed. It would have been to wait until May 1999 to see the daily *El Watan* estimated 30 to 35 billion dollars "money of dubious origin" held by the migrant Algerians in banks.⁷²⁷

This public statement was sufficient for him to be indicted and placed on the military regime's most wanted list. Brahimi was one of the best-known leaders of the war against the French, and had occupied important positions in the political and economic spheres. He had

⁷²⁶ Brahimi notes in his book that "At a public lecture at *l'Institut des sciences économiques du Caroubier de l'Université d'Alger*, given on 20 March 1990, and in response to a question about the economic recovery and corruption, I stated the conditions this stimulus stating that they were necessary but not sufficient as the confidence crisis that has shaken the company is not exceeded. I added that one of the essentials to restoring confidence and faith in justice that animates the Algerian people political factors. I said it was conducting a relentless struggle at all levels, in all forms corruption, which generated a sense of injustice and do not end up undermining, like a cancer throughout the company in its vital to know its strengths and values corruption resulting from improper commissions earned abroad:

- The creation of billionaires and generally fortunes in a very short time and by all sorts of tricks and illegal processes thereby exacerbating inequalities and social tensions,
- Influence peddling and corruption generated by bureaucratic practices at various levels and in all sectors".

Abdelhamid Brahimi, *Stratégies de développement pour l'Algérie: 1962 - 1991* (1992), p. 190 ; translated from French by the author.

⁷²⁷ Abdelhamid Brahimi's statement was published by the Algerian Newspaper (in French) *El Moujahid* on 3 May 1990. In its issue of 25 May 1999, *El Watan* wrote: "Since the case of \$ 26 billion, paved (sic) launched into the pond by the former Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi had estimated this amount - in 1990 - the money commissions and poorly negotiated contracts, the question of the assets held by the Algerians and dormant abroad back shivering on the carpet, on a recurring basis. As money of dubious origin for most, the exact amount will never be known. Between speculation and approximations, including the assessment of the World Bank, the range most commonly chosen to between 30 and 35 billion." *El Watan* (Algerian daily Newspaper, in French) 20/11/1999.

served as prime minister from 1984-1988. By the crisis of 1990s, Brahimi was sent into exile in England, and lost his right to return to Algeria. He also lost his Algerian citizenship.⁷²⁸ According to his comments, the Algerian media played a major role in covering up incidents of corruption, focusing, rather, on showing only a favourable view of the military regime.⁷²⁹ Brahimi is considered to have been one of the few honest military revolutionaries and civilian leaders, and it is not surprising that he risked everything to reveal the extent of the corruption in Algeria.

Brahimi's declaration against corruption was based on his experience of leading different administrations, and especially his period as prime minister. Brahimi's government was well organised, and made the safeguarding of public funds a top priority. He placed foreign contracts and trade with public associations under the control of specialists, and punished anyone consequently charged with corrupt practices. Brahimi's government was, by all accounts, successful, and was said to have saved more than five billion dollars during his time in office. After his statement, however, the Algerian media was relentless in characterizing him as having violated the trust of the Algerian people.⁷³⁰ In 1999, the *El-Watan* newspaper reported that there were between 30 and 35 billion dollars owned by Algerians in foreign banks. Senior military refuted these numbers, however, as the product of presidential elections, and in support of Bouteflika.

During his electoral campaign, Bouteflika promised citizens a focus on economic investments and an end to the corruption in the country. In October 1999, at the opening of the international exhibition in Algiers, Bouteflika's speech in front of foreign and local

⁷²⁸ Brahimi held a number of positions in the political sector. He became director of the *Organisme de Coopération Industrielle*, an institution established by the Hydrocarbons Algiers Accords of 1965 to stimulate French-Algerian economic cooperation. He also represented the national hydrocarbon enterprise, SONATRACH, in the United States. President Bendjedid appointed Brahimi minister of planning and organisation of the national territory in 1979. Brahimi then served as prime minister beginning in 1984 until he was replaced by Kasdi Merbah after the October 1988 riots. Brahimi was held responsible for the decline of the economy, and he became increasingly alienated. He charged that the cost of the corruption within the FLN amounted to \$26 billion - coincidentally, the size of the foreign debt. This damaged the party's already tarnished image and consequently its performance in the subsequent elections. Brahimi left the FLN and remains very critical of the Pouvoir - the military-civilian power establishment. He believes that the military was responsible for the assassination of President Mohamed Boudiaf in June 1992. He remains an outspoken critic of the Algerian political establishment. Brahimi is the author of *Stratégies de développement pour l'Algérie: 1962 - 1991* (1992; Development strategies for Algeria) and *Justice sociale et développement en économie islamique* (1993; Social justice and development in an Islamic economy). Brahimi has been living in exile London since 1992. The Algerian authorities have refused to renew his passport and to accept him back to the country.

⁷²⁹ According to all participants, the Algerian media has never been independent, as their slogans and watchwords show in their reports. There is no article, program or show that will take action without the military (especially the DRS) agreement. Chouchane, personal interview; Samraoui Mohamed, personal interview, 2007; Hoggar Organisation (Masli, Dhina and Aroua), personal interviews (August – September 2009).

⁷³⁰ Brahimi Interview by *Aljazeera TV* <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrElmZDrdOE>> .

business investors was focused on corruption and economic opportunism. He said that “the corruption has hurt the county’s economy more than it has been affected by terrorism”. He argued that the only way to stop this phenomenon was to educate people and to put ethics as a priority within public administration and economic bureaucracies.⁷³¹ No action has been taken by the subsequent presidents or even the government since then, however.

As noted above, political corruption is dynamically linked to economic opportunism. Bouteflika, who came to power at the invitation of the generals, could not turn against them over corruption. He had three terms in the presidency and would not have been able to win these elections without the support of the military regime. He is thought to have used public funds from the primary source of funding in the country, petroleum funds through SONATRACH.⁷³² According to Karim Moulay, Bouteflika has a long and sordid history with the military secret service, and was involved in many cases of corruption before he occupied the presidency, including using public lands in the desert (Adrar) for the princes from the Gulf countries to go hunting.⁷³³

Those responsible for the corruption are said to be in positions hidden from the public, and use the state security apparatus to work outside the law. They use civilian sub-contractors or lower rank officers to front their operations, and are primarily concerned with protecting themselves from public scandals. Should a scandal occur, blame can easily be transferred to third parties, the contractors or junior officers. In fact, there has never been a conviction in the courts; instead files are changed or lost, and investigative committees tend to lose track of the original evidence, with fabricated evidence often substituted and doubts cast on its validity, usually resulting in the ‘freezing’ of the dossiers and the end of prosecution. In a report published by the Algerian newspapers on 27 March 1992, and which

⁷³¹ *Al-Watan Newspaper*, *El-Khabar Newspaper*; Brahim (2000).

⁷³² According to comments by Faouzi Larbain, an MP and president of a small political party, “Front of 54”. Maâmar Boudersa “Alger, : <http://www.rachad.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=311:le-mediocre-bilan-du-meilleur-president&catid=75:articlesfr&Itemid=104>, 8 April 2009.

⁷³³ Karim Moulay is allegedly a former spy working for the Algerian military secret service (DRS) since 1992. He resigned his position in 2001 and fled through Malaysia to London, where he was given asylum. He was witness to many crimes which took place in Algeria and outside the country by the DRS. And he was also witness to many operations of corruption by military officers of the DRS. According to Moulay, there were many methods used by military officers to corrupt public societies and citizens by using the security services or the threat of terrorism to frighten citizens. Human rights abuses were also employed in the interests of corrupt practices. Moulay witnessed, for example, an extortion operation conducted against the female owner of a private school. This person received a phone call from someone who represented himself as an Islamist terrorist, demanding a specific amount of protection money, AD 500.000. According Moulay this person was an officer from DRS, identified as Abd al-Qadir Abbas. This officer used Moulay to arrange this operation and to kidnap one of the children who was studying in her school. This school specialized in educating the children of diplomatic families and of the military generals. *Al-Hiwar TV*, interview with Karim Moulay, London, July 2010; and *Rachad TV*, interview through skype with Moulay, Geneva, 10 August 10 2010.

the French Officers have used expediently, a charge of squandering public funds was made against a retired general, Mostapha Belloussif, when he was military attaché in the Algerian embassy in Paris. Belloussif was accused of owning illegal properties and using public funds in illegal transfers, amounting to approximately 70 million French francs. He had an apartment in Paris and another house in Annaba in Algeria dating back to the 1980s. Charges were only levelled against him in 1992, which caused some confusion within the investigative committee of the court as well as in the understanding of then Prime Minister Brahimi, who saw the case as an individual conflict between French Officers and revolutionaries in the military regime.⁷³⁴ Corruption in the military has been allowed, and Belloussif's purchase of properties was not unusual. In fact, the co-optation of lower ranking officers and public officials was the norm, with levels of corruption apparently rising with rank and stature.⁷³⁵

Brahimi was asked how many civilian leaders and military officers above those charged had benefited from illegal operations such as the preferential awarding of import and export contracts, critical components of public finance, the misuse of which had already bankrupted many public companies.⁷³⁶ Were there any charges or claims against them? While there are no charges against incidents of corruption, charges have been laid for “forgery and falsification.”⁷³⁷ However, corruption is not a phenomenon at only the leadership level; it has become a part of the public life of most of Algerians today. Because of the weakness of the justice system in Algeria, which, as noted above, is closely tied to the military regime, corruption charges tend not to touch those mainly responsible, particularly those in high positions. Rather, when contractors very occasionally in these corruption cases

⁷³⁴ According to Brahimi, Belloussif was an honest person, doing his job in a professional way; he always put the country's interests over any personalities, and before he agreed to any contract he always sought assistance from experts. He was in conflict with corrupt business people from the military departments and the French Officers, in particular, regarding the use public funds for personal purposes. He refused to sign off on contracts which might damage the country's economic program. One of these flawed contracts was from French Air Force Officers, who applied to purchase new radar and the latest technology for the Air Force from France. This contract would have cost the country 63 billion French Francs (six billion American dollars at the time), but Belloussif (who in 1980 had been the Chief of the Secretariat-General in the Ministry of Defense, then the head of the *Army d'Etat Major* in 1984), spoke with Prime Minister Brahimi and an expert in economics, trade and exchange, and stopped the contract. Needless to say, corruption has been rampant in Algeria. The list that of corrupt practices that the ANP has on its website has included many names from the military regime. Some of them were conveniently assassinated during the crisis of 1990s, and others have chosen retirement in Algeria and Europe. See <<http://www.anp.org/apelbanques/appelaulxbanques.html>>.

⁷³⁵ Chouchane, personal interview, from Hamilton through Skype, 13 May 2010.

⁷³⁶ Brahimi (2001), pp.159-163.

⁷³⁷ Rowena McNaughton quotes from an interview with the anti-corruption activist Dr Djilali Hadjadj, following his arrest in November 2010 (“Corruption Algerian Style”), saying that the prevailing attitude is: “he who is not with me is against me, and he who is against me must be neutralised”. Tuesday, 30 November 2010: <<http://www.everyhumanhasrights.org/component/content/article/10-general/148-corruption-algerian-style-he-who-is-not-with-me-is-against-me-and-he-who-is-against-me-must-be-neutralised>>.

face charges, they tend to be helped to escape the country. A trial would run the risk of revealing potentially awkward information.

Brahimi has referred to the crisis in Algeria as an ethical crisis across all levels of the regime, transforming itself into a public catastrophe. Most citizens have attempted to take whatever they can from areas of the economy under public ownership.⁷³⁸ Moreover, according to many participant interviewees, the military regime is also responsible for the grinding poverty, which continues to ravage society.⁷³⁹ The prevailing ethos in society appears to be the result of the corruption and injustice. Political corruption and economic opportunism have developed in the regime from the beginning, and Djilali Hadjadj noted that “petty corruption has spread throughout society and large-scale corruption has eaten away at state institutions.”⁷⁴⁰ Hadjadj, in an academic article, gives a brief history of corruption in Algeria after independence, and then outlines the corruption that took place in most of the country’s economic associations. His work represents an examination of the development and functioning of the mafia-like systems that grew up in the regime. He underscores the ‘Khalifa group’ case as the most extensive example of corruption in Algerian history, one that is well worth further examination.

The ‘Khalifa affair’ was an enormous corruption scandal with international implications; the Algerian government has been compelled to deal with it over the past five years.⁷⁴¹ Rafik Abdel-Mouman Khalifa is the son of Laroussi Khalifa, a revolutionary leader and government minister.⁷⁴² Rafik Khalifa began his career with a small pharmacy in Algiers. In 1998 he founded a bank (Khalifa Bank), which managed the interests of small private shareholders and institutional shareholders related to the Algerian government. Continuing his activities in France, he soon created an empire that eventually employed 14,000 people. Using his political relatives in Algeria and France, Khalifa expanded his business and dealt in a wide variety of areas. He owned a luxury car rental business before founding Khalifa TV in France, as well as Khalifa Airways, and buying a private hotel in Cannes, which had

⁷³⁸ Brahimi, personal interview, London (25 September (2009)).

⁷³⁹ All participants in this research are agreed that major responsibility for the Algerian political and economic crisis rests with the military.

⁷⁴⁰ Djilali Hadjadj, “Algeria: A Future Hijacked by Corruption: Le Soir d’Algerie,” *Mediterranean Politics*, 12, Issue 2 (July 2007), pp. 263 – 277.

⁷⁴¹ Rafik Khalifa’s trial involved more than 100 defendants and 200 witnesses. On 22 March 2007, Khalifa was convicted in Algeria, in absentia, and sentenced to life in prison. The charges included criminal association, corruption, abuse of trust, and forgery. A few days earlier, on March 5, 2007, the French justice system also issued a European arrest warrant against him. The Court of Nanterre had opened an investigation of Khalifa in 2003, charging him with fraudulent bankruptcy, abuse of social assets (*abus de bien sociaux*; i.e. corruption) and money-laundering. London authorised Khalifa’s extradition at the end of August 2000. Algeria also issued an international arrest warrant against him.

⁷⁴² See *echourouk al-youmi*, [Algerian daily news paper], 12 December, 2009.

belonged to the eccentric billionaire, Môme Moineau.⁷⁴³ He owned three villas in Cannes, and wanted to create a new city, *la ville nouvelle*, which he planned to name ‘Algeria’. This caught the attention of the French media. He associated with French film stars Gerard Depardieu and Catherine Deneuve. Khalifa built up a €1 billion business empire that extended into banking, construction, aviation, media and the sports industry. He maintained a high-profile sponsorship of the French football club, Olympique de Marseille. However, in 2003, a judicial liquidation of his indebted parent company began.

The Khalifa scandal began as a banking scandal. An Algerian investigation revealed the disappearance of 50 million Euros from the Khalifa Bank of Algiers. He was accused of large-scale embezzlement from his customers. Khalifa rejected this charge, saying that the amount, which was in cash in the bank, was more than enough to cover what he owed his customers. He declared he had spent the money on figures close to Algerian President Bouteflika. Khalifa represented the case as an historical and personal conflict between him and his father and the president, Bouteflika.⁷⁴⁴ The Algerian court opened 17 judicial investigations against Khalifa, who took refuge in London in 2003. The Khalifa Bank was closed on orders of Bouteflika. One of Khalifa’s trials began in January 2007, and the Algerian authorities soon became caught up in a complex legal battle with the UK in their attempts to extradite him.

Dhina and Chouchane note that Khalifa was a small businessman who could not have reached the levels of power and wealth that he attained without the knowing support of the military and major international investors.⁷⁴⁵ According to Chouchane, Aroua and Zaoui, the Khalifa case is a classic example of competition, conflict and corruption at the highest levels in Algeria. Most of my interviewees believe that the Khalifa Empire was formed by key people from the military regime, with the major support of French agents. Khalifa’s downfall likewise stemmed from opposing military officers, and their political supporters in the regime, using corruption and economic opportunism in business as pretexts to bring down Khalifa in a dirty competition for power.⁷⁴⁶ Chouchane clarified that corruption and economic opportunism has little use in high-level competition among the ruling cadre

⁷⁴³ Leela Jacinto, “The rise and fall of Rafik Khalifa, Algeria’s golden boy,” (text and video) 28/04/2010: <<http://www.france24.com/en/20100428-rafik-khalifa-rise-fall-algeria-golden-boy-uk-fraud>>.

⁷⁴⁴ *Aljazeera TV*, Program: “Tahta al-Midjehar” [under the loop]: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qq2kOC4qiM>>.

⁷⁴⁵ Mourad Dhina (26/08/2009); Chouchane, A. (10/06/2009).

⁷⁴⁶ Chouchane, personal interview, London (September 2009); Dhina, personal interview, Geneva (September, 2009); Zaoui, personal interviews, Hamilton, New Zealand (2009 -2010).

because it is a common practice for all of them. It does have its uses against politicians and people in the presidential bureaucracy, however.

The Khalifa case is similar to other major cases of corruption, theft, embezzlement and economic opportunism. These include the SONATRACH scandal and the East-West Motorway scandal. Before that there was widespread corruption in major projects such as the Algiers Airport and the Metro of Algiers.⁷⁴⁷ The Khalifa case, which is still working its way through the court system in Algiers, has uncovered a treasure trove of secret information that the Algerian media has refused, or not been allowed, to report on in public. Billions of dollars from public funds have been taken without even an apology to the Algerians who routinely suffer from hunger in what should be a very rich country.⁷⁴⁸ By late 2009 and early 2010, the Algerian regime proposed to make a new start with untainted personnel and a broad-scale policy of transparency in public administration. Files dealing with allegations of corruption have been opened, and implicate some of the leadership and their partners from amongst the international investors. This policy was used first as a tool in the chaotic competition among the political and the economic elites of the country, rather than in the interests of legality and legitimacy.

In Turkey, when the opposition wanted change, they used hundreds of researchers to determine the best approach to exit their protracted political crisis, and they successfully moved on to a more thorough going democracy - largely without violence. The opposition in Algeria has not yet achieved this foresight, according to Chouchane.⁷⁴⁹ In Chouchane's view, corruption and economic opportunism cannot be the main factors supporting the hegemony of the military regime. Economic opportunism, for example, is just a secondary element, one that is significantly less important than the larger issue of corruption, which, in turn, pales in comparison to what he regards as the betrayal of the Algerian people.

The Algerian Military is in charge of massive crimes, massacres and genocide against Algerians since Independence, and in the 1990s particularly. Corruption and economic opportunism has never been sufficiently evident to charge... problem of corruption among the military leaders has never been raised.... The military regime has been involved in massive human rights violations and massacres of civilians; their hegemony in power is a much bigger [concern, and would be a priority in any] charges...well before corruption or any financial malfeasance.⁷⁵⁰

⁷⁴⁷ Chouchane (26 September, 2009); Haddam (21 May, 2009).

⁷⁴⁸ Aroua and Masli (27-28/08/ 2009).

⁷⁴⁹ Chouchane (June and September 2009).

⁷⁵⁰ Chouchane (September 2009).

Boumédienne was the first leader to replace civilian political leaders with military officers after independence, but he is thought to have been largely free of corruption and economic opportunism. His legacy was political dictatorship and military hegemony in Algeria.⁷⁵¹ In Chouchane's view, the main factor in military hegemony, which the Algerian crisis was based upon, was the formation of the Algerian military. There was no central political or military leadership and that was, in his view, the primary mistake made by the early revolutionary leaders. The revolution had no legislation or legal rules that could organise the military secret service, or define and limit its work and its interventions. Thus the military took power in 1956 with little resistance, and continue to hold power today. For Lahouari Addi, corruption became a part of the system within the military regime. He notes that:

Corruption is the general rule, involving not just individuals but whole networks that reach up to the very highest levels of the state and are tough to dismantle.⁷⁵²

Addi and Bouandel based their view of the Algerian crisis on the domination of the military in all facets of the country. The military regime created a political face, the single party allowed in national politics, and so took political power. The FLN, created as a single political party, was guided directly by presidents who were also ministers of defence. Potentially, they had unlimited power, closing the door to democracy, pluralism and opposition. From this point on, corruption, nepotism and widespread injustice became the reality of Algerian politics.

In Algeria, every Member of Parliament, every government minister, even judges and directors of national companies, know that they have only a limited period in their positions. This tends to be seen as a chance to raise themselves and their relatives out poverty for the rest of their lives. In the absence of any oversight, except (for reasons of internal competition) from the military regime, economic opportunism and corruption appear to be tacitly encouraged. According to Chouchane the military regime controls all parts of the public sector including the political and economic administration through their agencies, which are introduced as political parties or ministers and executive leaders of the state. These agencies have nothing to argue with or to disagree about apart from following the orders of

⁷⁵¹ Harbi, M., and Meynier Gilbert, *Le F.L.N, documents et histoire, 1954-1962* (Paris: Fayard, 2004); Chouchane, London (13/05/2009); and Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (1 Sep. 2009). Also: Harbi, and Gilbert (2004) ; Chouchane, London (August 2009); and Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (01/09/ 2009).

⁷⁵² Lahouari Addi, "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions", *Journal of Democracy*, 7, No. 3 (July 1996), pp. 94-107.

the shadow power of the military secret services, and they are paid from the public finances.⁷⁵³ Any of them refusing to follow orders will find himself out his position with a large file collated by the secret services released to the media under the title of ‘Corruption’.

Many examples of corruption were raised early in 2010, when the military secret services opened a large number of files against leaders in the government and national companies, and even compromised the standing of President Boutaflika. Chouchane clarified this, saying the main reason the military secret service opened the corruption files to the public media was as a warning to the presidential administration, and to send a message to the president. When Boutaflika first came to the presidency he was virtually ignored by the generals and the senior officers of the secret service. The generals only agreed to his limited power for purposes of legitimacy: he had the constitutional and electoral support that they so badly lacked. After he won election to a second term, he was confident enough to move on with his project of amnesty for corruption because he felt he had legitimised his position from both sides. He was the only person in power to enjoy full legitimacy in front of the generals. From his position as an elected president, he had the right constitutionally to make any changes in any public institution. He had come from the ranks of the revolutionary leaders who had established their political positions early in the formation of the state in 1962. Emboldened, Boutaflika tried to use his power to make changes in the military. The military secret service, as noted above, has attempted to protect itself by gathering detailed files against any politician wanting to turn against them. When the DRS’s leader, Tewfik Median, received his termination notice from the president, he announced to the public that there was a serious issue of corruption involving the national oil company (SONATRACH), which related directly to the Minister of Oil, and indirectly to the president himself. This case involved billions of dollars lent unofficially and surreptitiously to Dubai to help it out of its financial crisis, on the orders of the president, and without notification of the parliament or the public.

The SM has a long history of using these kinds of files, dating back to its founder, Boussouf, who developed a corruption case against Ramdane, prior to participating in his assassination. He used confidential files against other colleagues as well. Belkacem and Bentoubal were threatened with disclosures until they were removed by political means from the revolutionary leadership. Files were used against President Chadli, involving information about his son and his brother. Corruption was the charge that removed President Zaroual, as

⁷⁵³ Chouchane, personal interviews, London (13/05/10 and 08/12/2012).

well as his supporter, General Batchine. While human rights organisations and the international community have welcomed transparency policies in Algeria, questions need to be asked about which part of the regime has instigated legal proceedings against elites in Algeria's expanding civil society. Why have such files not been opened against the military? It is common knowledge in the Algerian public that the military regime is the most corrupt organisation in the country. Chouchane claims to have witnessed this when the SM senior officers offered him billions of dinars in his office. His refusal to accept this co-optation, he says, led to his subsequent exile.

Needless to say, the investigation that the DRS opened after the corruption scandal of SONATRACH did not stop corruption or improve the economy, as Chouchane notes, and its example has not been applied to institutions or even by the president to his major projects.⁷⁵⁴ Its cause was likely the result of a conflict between the DRS and the president.⁷⁵⁵ Hammoud Salhi and Akram Belkaid in their interview with Aljazeera TV said that the corruption in SONATRACH is not unique among the national economic administrations, and it has already touched some other ministries, such as the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Public Services.⁷⁵⁶ It is not, for that matter, a new situation for the Algerian government. The case of SONATRACH has been a major story in the media because it goes to the heart of the state's economy. Because of the rising price of oil in international trade, the Algerian government has been able to cover its fiscal deficit and foreign debt to the extent that it now has a financial surplus in the treasury. Due to corruption and the waste of public money, however, the Algerian government has been unable to provide a decent life for its citizens, especially young people, who are mostly unemployed and live in deprivation so much so that they look for a better life in the developed countries through illegal immigration, and risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean.

In the discussion on financial corruption and economic opportunism, this research has focused more on the case of SONATRACH over other companies. But it is important to note that almost no company in Algeria is innocent from accusations of corruption. The focus is on SONATRACH because it takes centre stage in the revenue gathering of Algeria. SONATRACH was established in 1963, and is responsible for the exploration, production, distribution and marketing of hydrocarbons and downstream products. Since hydrocarbons

⁷⁵⁴ French TV, *France24* (18/01/2010), "Energy giant Sonatrach hit by corruption scandal": <<http://www.france24.com/en/20100118-energy-giant-sonatrach-hit-corruption-scandal>>.

⁷⁵⁵ Chouchane (2009).

⁷⁵⁶ Hammoud Salhi, Akram Belkaid and Ismail Dabbach, interview by *Aljazeera TV*, "Inside Story - Algeria's oil corruption scandal": <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgoG79gRgNg>>.

account for 97.5 per cent of Algeria's export earnings, SONTARCH is the mainstay of the country's economy. With over 120,000 employees, Algeria's state-owned energy giant is the largest company in Africa. Through the investments of SONATRACH and its partners, Algeria has grown to become the world's third largest exporter of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), the fourth largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, the fifth largest natural gas exporter and the ninth largest exporter of oil. SONATRACH is ranked sixth among the world's natural gas companies in terms of reserves and production.⁷⁵⁷

As recently in February and March 2013, after the letter from the former SONATRACH vice president Hocine Malti, the French-language Algerian daily *El Watan* broke the silence surrounding the company. Addressing the shadowy leader of Algeria's intelligence service, the newspaper asked if he was really serious about investigating new bribery scandals involving SONATRACH and Italian and Canadian companies. This scandal was covered by international media, pointing to this case as an example of corruption and “breach of trust” by the former Algerian Minister for Energy and Mines and the head of the SONATRACH. When Italian prosecutors announced in January an investigation into the oil company ENI and subsidiary SAIPEM for allegedly paying €197 million (\$256.1 million) in bribes to secure an €11 billion contract with SONATRACH, it provoked a firestorm in the Algerian media, until the country's own justice system finally announced its own inquiry on February 10, 2013. Investigations have been opened in Italy as well as in USA and the UK. The Italian court has accused both the Italian and Algerian sides of bribery and corruption.⁷⁵⁸

In 2006, Algeria passed a law giving SONATRACH a minimum 51% share in all oil and natural-gas exploration contracts signed with foreign companies, but that measure and other tough contract terms have stunted investor appetite. In late 2009, the country's oil ministry awarded just three out of 10 oil and natural-gas exploration permits on offer in a state licensing round. That doesn't bode well for Algeria's ambitions to bring more gas to Europe. Algeria, the third-biggest gas supplier to Europe after Russia and Norway, sends most of its gas to Italy, Spain and France, via pipeline or tanker. SONATRACH has also experienced delays of several months in completing a new gas pipeline to Spain. Some

⁷⁵⁷ Richard Nield, “Sonatrach; contract awards will grind to a halt as the corruption probe continues at the state energy firm (OIL & GAS)(Company overview)”, *MEED Middle East Economic Digest* (April 9, 2010); <<http://business.highbeam.com/409213/article-1G1-225857783/sonatrach-contract-awards-grind-halt-corruption-probe>>.

⁷⁵⁸ Reported to the Press: Paul Schemm, Karim Kebir contributed to this report from Algiers. “Algerians outraged over latest corruption accusations against state oil and gas behemoth,” *Associated Press* (March 03, 2013).

foreign companies that are working in-country say bureaucratic delays in the Algerian oil ministry are one of their main sources of frustration there.⁷⁵⁹

Samraoui has mentioned in his book⁷⁶⁰ the extent of military opportunism and clarified how the military authorities have tended to deal with public assets. There is no oversight of military officers, and thus they spend as much as they want for their own missions against terrorism and conducting their own international trade. They care primarily about their positions and their own interests, looking to protect themselves rather than being concerned about public finances. The corruption and economic opportunism files that the secret service have periodically disclosed apparently have less to do with mismanagement or corruption, and more to do with political score-settling.

It may seem as though the factions and interest groups give the regime its logic and dynamic. But, in fact, those factions are an effect of the political regime; there is not one of the groups in any of the factions that could thwart the regime's logic in using the power.⁷⁶¹

According to the Algerian Movement of Free Officers, MAOL (*Le Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres*), corruption in the military sector is not a crime or even regarded as poor deportment. Most senior military officers are wealthy, with their accounts in European banks said to be swollen with public funds. They built their wealth from their interventions in public contracts with international companies, especially in the contracts with the oil companies. A military group of 'free officers' recently posted a list of generals and other high-ranking officers who are said to have sizeable assets, in some cases equal to the GDP of some sub-Saharan African countries.⁷⁶² Chouchane has clarified that the military officers had started focusing upon their personal wealth by the 1990s, when they realised that their domination over Algeria could easily be lost at any time. The political crisis that pushed the country to the verge of instability allowed the generals free reign to do whatever they wanted, without oversight. No one was able to stop them, especially under martial law.

Helen Chapin Metz noted that the control of one single party, the FLN, led to the creation of an authoritarian system that proved impossible to overcome, and that resulted in the rise of religious extremists, "particularly in the form of the FIS" and the Islamic groups in

⁷⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Also: <<http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/03/algerians-outraged-over-latest-corruption-accusations-against-state-oil-and-gas/>>.

⁷⁶⁰ Samraoui, M. *Chronique des années de sang: Algérie, Comment les Services Secrets ont Manipulé les Groupes Islamistes* (Denoël, 2003).

⁷⁶¹ Addi, Lahouari, "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions", *Journal of Democracy*, 7, No. 3 (July 1996), pp. 94-107.

⁷⁶² See the website of the *Military Movement of Free Officers*, based somewhere in Europe <<http://www.anp.org/arabindex/arabanques/araparadis.html>>.

general.⁷⁶³ The failure of the economic system after independence, when the regime disbanded a number of large government enterprises and state farms, and the drop in world oil prices in 1986, together with poor domestic economic management, aggravated the already depressed economic situation.⁷⁶⁴ Social life was affected, resulting in social unrest that stemmed from the discontent of those youths who were either jobless and had no hope for their future, or were facing the fact that even with their high qualifications, many of them would remain unemployed or in dead-end jobs, and would continue to suffer from food and housing shortages. By the end of September and early October 1988, business income in the major industrial areas across the country, including Algiers, was significantly down with the subsequent unrest culminating in a series of labour strikes. The strikes were repressed by the military with considerable force and a loss of life estimated in the hundreds.⁷⁶⁵

In this case, Samraoui noted that the rise of the Islamists in the heart of the Algerian political arena began during the early 1980s, when economic difficulties in Algeria were giving rise to social depression and corruption. The military regime had failed to care for the social life of the citizens, which opened the door for Islamists to create the space that they needed as they tried to minimize the large gap between the rich and poor calling on Islamic ethics and Sharia law. With the relative absence of the government in social projects, Islamists found the space to fill the socio-economic gap that had opened. They were successful in managing social work, which gave them the support of the majority of citizens. Charities in the name of Islam offered less corruption (corruption is forbidden). Muslim clerics criticised the military regime and its policies, the political hegemony, corruption and economic opportunism of the military, and presented a challenge to the ruling powers which ultimately drove the country to violent confrontations. The only solution the military regime could think of was to appeal to security, and to stop the growth of the Islamists by opening fire on civilians, most notably in October 1988.⁷⁶⁶

The *Armée nationale populaire* (ANP) movement⁷⁶⁷ has revealed many cases of military trading and investment, for which the Algerian public has paid billions of dollars without their consent or knowledge. False information has been spread by the media, which

⁷⁶³ Helen Chapin Metz (October 27, 1994): < <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-314.html>>.

⁷⁶⁴ Despite some attempts at diversification, the oil industry and especially natural gas remained major sources of national income. The economy was characterized by high unemployment, particularly among younger males in the cities. About 70 percent of Algerians are under thirty years old, and 44 percent of the total population are under age fifteen.

⁷⁶⁵ Helen Chapin Metz (October 27, 1994); (December 1993).

⁷⁶⁶ Mohammed Samraoui (Auckland 2006); Chouchane and Zitout (London 2009); Aroua, Dhina (Geneva: 2009); Anwar Haddam (USA, from Hamilton, 2009).

⁷⁶⁷ See the Web: <http://anp.org/en/index.html> .

has long been thought to be working under military orders. A classic case of this took place between the Algerian secret service (DRS) and the French secret service (DST). A meeting of Lamaari from the DRS and Yves Bonnet from the DST in Paris in 1993 resulted in an investment contract worth millions of francs to support an ‘extremist right’ political party against the socialists in the French presidential elections. The quid pro quo was supposedly French help in the Algerian war against Islamists. The Algerian military regime was annoyed by publicity surrounding cases of human rights violations, and particularly the question of “who is killing whom in Algeria?”, which was the central question of the Socialist Party in France. This was clearly a case of corruption, but could not be considered in the Algerian courts because money had been spent on a fake contract, in reality a trade between the military and some of the French agencies to support military technology. However, the Algerian military investment was a success and the French, who had strenuously defended human rights in Algeria in recent years, found themselves supporting the military against democracy, and cutting off aid to the victims of the military in the villages.

Another major case that reached the heights of debate among politicians and academic researchers was that of President Boudiaf.⁷⁶⁸ The relationship between the generals and the new president turned sour with Boudiaf wanting to deal with high level corruption. However because the generals were the main beneficiaries of that corruption, a clash was predictable. Suddenly most of the competent people investigating matters of corruption under Boudiaf’s orders were mysteriously assassinated.⁷⁶⁹ And so the pre-eminence of corruption continued, and continues, in Algeria.

It is clear that corruption in Algeria is endemic and tearing at the fabric of society. An official human rights group said in a report published in June 2013, calling for punitive

⁷⁶⁸ This historical personality, who was one of Ben Bella’s group of political revolutionaries and one of the top four leaders of the revolution against the French, had been sent to exile in Morocco when he refused to play a part in Boumédiène’s coup, and sided with the opposition. He came back to Algeria after 40 years of exile on invitation from the military to be the president of Algeria. Not long after returning to Algeria, he was assassinated, apparently by the military, in a public place. The reason for his assassination was elucidated by Samraoui, who was a colonel in the DRS department at the time.

⁷⁶⁹ Other matters weighed in the balance. President Boudiaf independently moved to close concentration camps where thousands of Islamists were detained in the desert; he wanted to build his own party; and he was willingly to make a deal with Morocco about Western Sahara. The French Officers were thought to have planned to kill him, and stop his plan, before the beginning of the process. From Samraoui’s view, corruption remained the *raison d’être* of the system. The predatory control over oil and gas revenues was thought to be the only true ideology of the generals. This corruption was and is further enhanced by the international business community, which accepts suspicious deals with the generals to the detriment of the Algerian population. For example, Commandant Msiref was “mistakenly” killed in a pub by a policeman who imagined he was an Islamist terrorist... Samraoui was ironic about this incident: “since when are Islamists frequenting...” Samraoui, *Chronique des années de sang: Algérie, Comment les Services Secrets ont Manipulé les Groupes Islamistes* (Denoël, 2003).

measures against corrupt officials. The information presented above indeed, is not going to shock Algerian citizens. They are living the corruption daily. Nor will this information surprise the international community including human rights' organizations whom never fell short in their responsibility to report the corruption to President Bouteflika. In 2011, the National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, an official body, wrote in its annual report that the disease of corruption had "spread throughout the country," impacting on all classes and "undermining the social fabric". Their report clearly noted that:

The pervasive corruption and the impunity that facilitates it risks thwarting all attempts at enabling the economy and society to flourish...The operations of state institutions have become a source of enrichment and a way of serving private interest...It is time... to combat, effectively and tirelessly, all civil servants who seek only to enrich themselves.⁷⁷⁰

The commission, whose chairman is appointed by the president, said "exemplary and preventative sanctions" were needed to stop "corrupt officials from enjoying the proceeds of corruption, once they have served their sentences."⁷⁷¹ Algerian society is still suffering, while the government and the public sectors become paralyzed and unable to meet the needs of citizens. Poverty is widespread in Algeria, despite its vast natural resources, and many Algerians remain deeply disillusioned with the country's ruling elite, the unemployment, which has exhausted young Algerians. While this is the case for most of the citizens, there is a part of the society who has the advantage of the membership in the regime; military and administrative officers, governors and their relatives, officials and those who are supposed to maintain public funds but who have rather used their power of the public positions for their private interests.

⁷⁷⁰ *Agence France-Presse*, "Corruption in Algeria is pervasive", August 24, 2012.

⁷⁷¹ *Ibid*; also: *The Raw Story*, Agence France-Presse Report: "Corruption in Algeria is pervasive" (Friday, August 24, 2012): < <http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/08/24/report-corruption-in-algeria-is-pervasive/>>.

CHAPTER SIX

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL PARTIES, ELITES, AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ALGERIA

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to consider Algeria's experience with political parties, which became a reality with the constitution of 1989. This chapter examines the impact of political parties and leaders on human rights violations after Algerian independence. To understand the political foundation of Algeria and its relationship to the violence that overtook the country, particularly in the 1990s, it is useful to focus on the political elites. The previous chapters explored sources of government-led violence, especially in the context of a military regime led by the *French Officers* and accepted by political parties and politicians as elites. Algeria today continues to suffer from opportunism, corruption and political decay. Political parties have become the principal vector of these problems.

The military regime that opened the door to political parties and democracy by way of the Constitution of 1989, and then to the multi-party elections of 1991, has shown its other face with the bloody *coup d'état* against President Chadli and his program of change in Algeria. This chapter will attempt to explain the complex relationship between political parties, the military, and politically inspired violence in Algeria. At the heart of this complex relationship are the national intelligence services. Boucheir discusses the relationship between the military and the intelligence services and the institution of the Presidency after 1963, noting that the position of the army in political life began declining from 2004, while those who could be described as members of the army dressed in mufti in order to remain in control of the political decision making processes. Bouteflika freed himself from direct military pressure when he embraced his constitutional powers. Boucheir argues that

There is no doubt that the victory of President custody again in 2004, is considered the beginning of the end for his opponents in various sectors, including defence, after only several military leaders, led by Chief of General Staff (Major General Mohammed Iammari) and the first commander of the military side (Major General Faudil Sharif), and others, and...[adds Boucheir, that] ...the adoption of the policy of President harmony and dragged it from the amnesty for members of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and the possibility of dealing with the leadership of this organization, befuddled many officials in the army known by their secularism thoughts and anomies to Islam and Islamism.⁷⁷²

⁷⁷² Said Boucheir, *Algerian Political System: An Analytical Study of the Nature of the Algerian regime in light of the 1996 Constitution; Part 4, legislative power and control* (Daywaan al-Matbouat aljamiya, April 2013). Also:

In previous chapters, the core argument has been that the authoritarianism of the military regime has dominated Algerian politics, administration and the economy. President Bouteflika has challenged the military and French Officers by winning a second term in 2004, and inviting the French president to make an historic speech in the Algerian Assembly. How do political parties fit in this new setting?

2. Political Parties: General Definitions and Theoretical Perspective

2.1. Introduction

To study the relationship between democracy and violence in Algeria it may be useful to understand the political face of power after independence. Algeria had a single-party system before the events of October 1988. A revision of the Constitution was consequently launched in 1989 to create a fully democratic country. No political parties, formal or informal movements, or other political organisations had been allowed to emerge in the competition for power prior to that year. From the 1930s, the French government had permitted only elite politics: democracy was no more than an oblique topic for speeches. Whatever the reasons and the justifications of the regime, the Algerian people would not accept their marginalization in the political arena. This had been one of the main reasons for the frequent outbursts of violence in the country.

After living under a single-party system for close to three decades, Algeria opened itself up to a multi-party system with the Constitution of 1989, in order to ensure the participation of a large proportion of the population after the violent riots of 1988. After parties were legalized, however, the country was confronted with political violence more extensive than it had experienced previously. In order to understand the causes of this violence and instability, one must analyse the specific elements of the multi-party system in Algeria in relation to the features of the political system. It is useful in this regard to examine the link between the regime and the military, particularly the military's subgroups and supportive political parties. This study cannot be considered independently from the historical era, and since it has been undertaken well after the early 1990s, must confront certain challenges involving perspective. As noted repeatedly above, the domination of the military in all economic and political areas of the society prior to the 1990s created a situation in which the Algerian population had come to realize the full extent of its exclusion from all

elkhabar, Algerian daily newspaper, in Arabic, No. 335705, interview with Said Bouchair (Algiers, May 13, 2013): < www.elkhabar.com/ar/politique/335705.html>.

areas of decision-making. The new political parties of the late 1980s were immersed in this social and institutional culture of co-optation and violence. At this juncture, then, the hegemony of the regime was maintained primarily through the threat and use of violence. The use of violence had obviously been adopted from the beginning as a central tactic and strategy, and by the late 1980s was deeply entrenched in military policies. Political party behaviour was determined in large measure by this reigning socio-political culture.

A recent definition of a political system in the Algerian context is a system constituted by all the forces, formal or informal, institutionalized or not, that help to either sustain the central power or call it into question.⁷⁷³ From this point of view, the army, the police, and the administration were all components of the political system in the late 1980s, but not political parties, nor other groups from ethnic, regional and religious associations. The concept of *political opposition*, which mainly presented itself in Algeria in the form of political parties in the late 1980s, was severely limited in this case.

2.2. Definition and Theoretical Perspective

Political scientists have had difficulty in defining parties because of the different functions that they perform in various kinds of governments.⁷⁷⁴ It is useful for purposes of this thesis to examine definitions relating to North African and Middle Eastern systems. Souad al-Sherqaoui defines a political party as: “any organisation or group of people working together for the benefit of certain general interests according to special principles that have been agreed upon.”⁷⁷⁵ A political party is an organised group of people with at least roughly similar political aims and opinions seeking to influence public policy by getting its candidates elected to public office. A party has a program, organisational structure, and an administrative apparatus that brings together its members, including its leadership, to seek effectively to widen its circle of supporters. Political parties are one of the major tools of political development in the modern era.⁷⁷⁶

The multi-party system in Algeria established clear roles that related directly to political bureaucracy by the late 1980s. Political parties, as they emerged, served to identify and train promising future leaders, to prepare them for political positions and, on a more sinister note, to expose their weaknesses and the points on which they were unwilling to

⁷⁷³ Lahouari Addi, “The Multi-Party System in Algeria, conference at Yale University”, 20-22 February, 2009: <<http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf>>.

⁷⁷⁴ Kayden X. and Mahe, E., J. (1985), pp 5-8.

⁷⁷⁵ Souad Al-Sherqaoui, *al-Ahzaab al-Syasya, Ahamyatuha, Nash'atuha wa Nashaatoha* [trans. by author: “the Political Parties, Importance, Formation and their roles], Faculty of Law, the Centre of the parliament’s research, 2005.

⁷⁷⁶ Alsherqaoui, S. (2005).

compromise and/or be co-opted. In theory, political parties should play key roles in well-functioning democracies. “They aggregate and represent citizen’s interests, formulate policy agendas that respond to those interests, and form governments and oppositions,”⁷⁷⁷ and they represent the democratic system, which gives the right to share power and to transfer the political leadership peacefully.⁷⁷⁸ Algeria in the late 1980s was far from being a ‘well-functioning democracy’, however.

Some scholars disparage political party systems because of the instability they potentially cause, and their effective opposition at times to government strategies and programs. In more democratic countries, political parties are seen as barriers to the government in passing its projects. David Mayhew has a deeply critical view of the Congress of the United States in this regard. According to Mayhew, it is easiest to think of members of Congress, and their respective parties, as “single-minded seekers of re-election.”⁷⁷⁹ The role of parties is just to help mobilize voters in this context.⁷⁸⁰ Mayhew noted that winning parties do not make many changes in their political platforms once they get their politicians into Congress, for example. According to Mayhew, “members can successfully engage in electorally useful activities without denying other members the opportunity to successfully engage in them”.⁷⁸¹

Maurice Duverger noted that political parties in developed democracies have, as their primary goal, the conquest of power, or at least a share in its exercise. They try to win seats at elections, to name deputies and ministers, and to take control of the government.⁷⁸² These goals in democratic countries are achieved by way of elections, which have to be related to their work on the citizens’ needs to solve their life problems. In this view the political parties are chosen by the electorate, in many cases, according to the benefits that they promise to afford if they win the election. Academic analysis of the nature of party systems is changing, however. In the first half of the last century, when people referred to parties, they were thinking primarily of ideologies rather than the people who subscribed to them.⁷⁸³ With the

⁷⁷⁷ Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Briefing Paper, “Support to political parties, A missing piece of the governance puzzle”, December 2010: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6321.pdf>.

⁷⁷⁸ Alsherqaoui, S. (2005); Schwartzberg, R.G., *Sociologie Politique* (Montchrestien, Political Science, 1988), p. 329.

⁷⁷⁹ Seth E. Masket, *The Modern Political Parties*, Chapter: “No Middle Ground, How Informal Party Organisations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislature”.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸¹ David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 82.

⁷⁸² Duverger, M., *Party Politics and Pressure Groups, a comparative introduction*, trans. David Wagoner (NY: Thomas Y. Growell Company, 1972) .

⁷⁸³ Duverger (1972).

rise of global communism, emphasis in the analysis of parties was placed on their underlying social foundations: “parties were viewed as the expression of social classes in a nation’s political life.”⁷⁸⁴ Ideologies, social foundations, structure, organisation, participation, strategy – all of these aspects were in focus in analyses of party systems in the first half of the last century. Since then, much greater emphasis has been placed on the characteristics of party members, their religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status, and political and individual interests. My analysis, perhaps not surprisingly, conforms to this latter view: my research focus is on the pro-military secular parties, and the Islamic parties of Algeria.

Kayden and Mahe describe political parties, whether in power or in opposition, as organisations and processes, as they are sometimes part of identity-making for individuals, groups, and ideas. In a parliamentary system, a party has a clearer path to governance than a party in a system of separated powers such as that of the US.⁷⁸⁵ A party in a communist country does not contest elections, but does legitimate the regime in power.⁷⁸⁶ “All parties appear to serve as a mechanism for integrating citizens into government.”⁷⁸⁷ Most analysts agree that parties are usually (but not always) structured as large groups, representing divisions in the society.⁷⁸⁸ Edmund Burke developed this understanding nearly 250 years ago, describing a political party somewhat idealistically as a “body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.”⁷⁸⁹ Again, this is far from the contemporary analysis of political parties based upon the socio-economic characteristics and the needs of individual party members. Many political scholars consider that the term ‘political parties’ does not apply to any political organisation that is in opposition and/or does not share power in some way. According to Huntington, political party formation is based on adaptation, independence, cohesion and organisational complexity.⁷⁹⁰ Political parties do not follow one form, but differ according to the reasons for their formation, and their structure tends to reflect this.

⁷⁸⁴ Duverger (1972), p. 5.

⁷⁸⁵ Xandra Kayden and Eddie Mahe, Jr., *The party goes on: the Persistence of the two-Party System in the United States* (NY:Basic Books, Inc., 1985), p. 6.

⁷⁸⁶ Kayden and Mahe (1985). Also: Youcef Bouandel, “Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria”, *J. of Modern African Studies*, 41, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1–22.

⁷⁸⁷ Kayden and Mahe (1985).

⁷⁸⁸ Goodman, Paul, “The First Party System”, in William Nisbet Chambers and Burnham, W. D., *The American Party Systems, Stages in Political Development* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.63.

⁷⁸⁹ Cited by Kayden and Mahe (1985).

⁷⁹⁰ Huntington, S. (1968), pp. 1-39.

Political parties began to emerge nearly two centuries ago, but did not evolve to the modern form until a century ago.⁷⁹¹ The different goals of parties and the varied causes and reasons for their formation mean the parties in general are one of the most important mechanisms for political participation, and one of the most important instruments of political socialisation in many communities.⁷⁹² This is in spite of what was said about them at their origins, that they would be a tool of division and political corruption, that they would practically open the door to foreign intervention, that they would be a source of political instability and would lack administrative efficiency, according to the description of George Washington, the founder of the United States of America.⁷⁹³

The Constitution drafted and ratified by the founders of the US in 1787 did not mention political parties or their role in politics. The constitutional arrangements laid down a number of key features, such as the separation of powers amongst the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The transfer of power was set out, based on the policy of federalism and indirect election of the president by an Electoral College, seen as a means to insulate the new republic from parties and factions.⁷⁹⁴ Political parties are often described as institutionalised mediators between citizens and those who decide and implement decisions.⁷⁹⁵ They are the bridge whereby civil society can reach the power managers and decision makers. In this way the demands of members and supporters are represented in the general assembly and in government. In a democratic society the “nomination and presentation of candidates in the electoral campaign is the most visible function to the electorate [of political parties]”.⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹¹ Alsharkaoui, S. (2005), pp. 193-239.

⁷⁹² Alsharkaoui, S. (2005), pp. 213 – 219.

⁷⁹³ George Washington was describing what he saw in the US, although this view seems to describe some of the worst problems with political parties in most democratic countries, and is especially accurate regarding democracy in developing countries. See: L. Ali Khan, *A Theory of Universal Democracy, Beyond the End of History* (the Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2003), p. 153; Alsharkaoui, S. (2005).

⁷⁹⁴ Including, perhaps surprisingly, majority factions, as James Madison noted in his *Federalist Paper* Number 10. In the election of 1800, the United States became the first nation to experience a competitive party competition. In that year, Thomas Jefferson and the “Democratic Republican Party” decisively defeated the “Federalists”, which was more of an association than a modern political party. In fact, neither of the “parties” were similar to modern political parties. The Democratic Republicans completely dominated US federal politics for the next 28 years, with competing factions within the party acting as separate interest groups. In 1828, Andrew Jackson, the first charismatic and widely popular presidential candidate in the US, and his campaign manager, Martin van Buren, established the first modern political party in the US, based on their “Democratic Party”, and thereby anticipated the modern two-party electoral system. *The American Government Archive*, “The role of Political Parties, Two major parties control the executive and legislative branches”:
<<http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2008/April/20080423223737eaifas0.6480067.html>>.

⁷⁹⁵ ACE Electoral Network: <<http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/pc/pca/pca01/pca01a>>.

⁷⁹⁶ ACE Electoral Network: <<http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/pc/pca/pca01/pca01a>>.

Huntington focused on the place of modernity in politics, describing political parties as part of the modernization of a country.⁷⁹⁷ One potential role of political parties is to close the gap between citizens and their leadership, transmitting the citizens' needs to the government, a process which can take place in the face of competition for power across the country. "Political parties in many developing democracies have faced the imposition of non-competitive regimes."⁷⁹⁸ Huntington attributes the political gap between developed and developing countries to the fact that: "The economic gap is well reported but the political gap is not."⁷⁹⁹ He argues that this political gap is not due to economic reasons but rather because these countries are moving from traditional societies to modern societies which will place them at a disadvantage when compared to societies which have already gone through the transition.

Brahimi presents a different view. He argues that economic crisis is the major element shaping the political system and the stability of Algeria. It is clear that the political problems that many countries were/are struggling with, including third world countries, are because of economic crises. France and Algeria are good examples, where strikes and demonstrations became a daily feature of the lives of labourers, and the political system and government have to deal with these. The main reasons citizens are pushed out onto the streets are frustrations with the failure of the system to provide the basic amenities of life, and the resulting anger.⁸⁰⁰ Brahimi's view has been supported by many scholars whom look to the formation of the new state, which was shaped by the French revolution and has been based on the economic theory. This economic theory was the main factor that drove the politics in France as well as in the West. The source of this drive could be justified by the aspirations of a rising bourgeoisie, linked with indignant peasants, wage-earners, and individuals of all classes who were influenced by this theory, which has been applied to the fall of the old French regime.⁸⁰¹

⁷⁹⁷ Huntington, S., *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp.7-11.

⁷⁹⁸ James C. Franklin, 'Political Party Opposition to Non-competitive Regimes: A Cross-National Analysis', *Political Research Quarterly*, 55, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 521-546.

⁷⁹⁹ Franklin (Sep., 2002).

⁸⁰⁰ The case of 5 October 1988 is a good example of this: the DRS used the economic crisis against then-President Chadli Bendjedid and his government, with massive strikes and demonstrations. See: Brahimi Abdelhamid, personal interview (London September 2009); Brahimi Abdelhamid, interview *Aljazeera TV*, "Special visit": <<http://aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CF6F81B3-3A29-454D-B8E9-07339A59F61C.htm>> [3 October 2009] Pub. [6 Oct. 2009] <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ53kJKDypI&feature=related>>. As Brahimi later put it, "the government settlement in such countries will be based on its economic successes." Brahimi (London 2009); Mourad Dhina, personal interview (Geneva, September 2009).

⁸⁰¹ "French Revolution Major Causes." *Globover* on March 29, 2010 in France, French Revolution, <<http://globove.com/france/french-revolution-major-causes/1059>>.

African countries need economic transformation, “to sustain pro-poor growth, to cope with population increases, to become competitive in the global economy and – last but not least – to create the conditions for better governance.”⁸⁰² Since the late 1980s, the World Bank and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member governments have been telling Africans to foster ‘good governance’ as a necessary first step in development. Thus, good governance in this context broadly refers to clearly formed politics structured according to the economic needs of the state, which have priority over social-culture base, but, which mean following the institutional arrangements that have proven their worth in OECD countries since the Second World War.⁸⁰³

However, current global political preferences have been based on democratic systems, allowing for the fact that democracy as a concept is understood differently across the world. In nascent multi-party systems, political parties are in a state of near crisis. Certain political behavior is indicative of a society that largely views political parties as ineffective, corrupt, and as failing the social needs. Young people become hesitant to join or become associated with politics generally. In Algeria, as well as in many other countries politics has become the interest of older generations.⁸⁰⁴ The youth view politicians and political parties as opportunistic, running for their own interests. Arguably, the same view is taken of the regimes and the governments that dominate these countries. At the same time, support has risen for independent candidates, special interest parties, and anti-party movements. In fact, the right to vote has become a national service and obligatory for eligible citizens in many countries, with those who refuse to vote facing punishments that may include a restriction of services or incarceration.⁸⁰⁵

Political parties in a number of countries have lost their mandate and standing in the country’s politics and even lost their members through their own mismanagement of the political system. In Pakistan, for example, political parties effectively frittered away their credibility to the point where the military’s overthrow of the established political order was accepted, if not welcomed, by the citizenry.⁸⁰⁶ In Peru and Venezuela, the collapse of

⁸⁰² Eveness Zuze and David Booth “The political economy of development in Africa: A joint statement from five research programmes” (April 16, 2012): < <http://differenttakeonafrica.wordpress.com/> >.

⁸⁰³ *Ibid.*: < <http://differenttakeonafrica.wordpress.com/> >.

⁸⁰⁴ Kenneth Wollack, President of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs: “Political Parties in Developing and Developed Countries”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & China Reform Forum*, Beijing (December 17, 2002).

⁸⁰⁵ Mohammed L. Zitout, personal Interview (London, 12/2012).

⁸⁰⁶ Wollack (2002).

political parties that were viewed as corrupt and elitist, created a political vacuum that was quickly filled by populist leaders with authoritarian tendencies. These leaders rose from the ashes of discredited parties and they sought to further weaken their country's party system, including legislatures, as a means to maintain power.⁸⁰⁷ The same scenario has taken place in many other countries. In Bangladesh, the recurring partisan political stalemate consigns the country and its citizens to abject poverty. Their frequent political shift from military authoritarianism to civilian democracy and popularly elected governments over the past decade has had little effect on the well-being of citizens. "Both of the main political forces in Bangladesh have contributed to the continuing political impasse".⁸⁰⁸

Since the early years of African independence in the 1960s, most of the continent's leaders have rejected liberal democracy and the values and principles on which it is based, arguing that the democratic system is not compatible with African traditions while at the same time they describe their regimes as democratic. They claim to have an essentially African democracy or a kind of indigenous democracy, which is different from western liberal democracy.⁸⁰⁹ According to Uwizeyimana, only a very small number of African states in the post-colonial era have adopted unmediated liberal democratic values. Attempts on the part of African leaders to subvert the principles of western liberal democracy, has led most African regimes to become what this paper calls "pretend democracies".⁸¹⁰

Kenneth Wollack states that centralized decision making in a number of African states "the lack of well-institutionalized rules and procedures, and the decline of ideology or unifying principles have eroded public support and discouraged participation in political party activities."⁸¹¹ In fact, today's political parties have lost a level of their legitimacy in the face of their supporters and the wider population; experience has shown voters that whether in power or in the opposition, the political elite are self-interested, turning their backs on the needs of the people in favour of doing business and holding on to their positions of power for as long as they can. But when votes are needed, the politicians hit the streets. In states ruled by military regimes, the pretense of electioneering is unnecessary and if a vote is taken, the

"Political Parties in Developing and Developed Countries" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & China Reform Forum*, Beijing (December 17, 2002).

⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

⁸⁰⁹ Uwizeyimana, Dominique E., "Democracy and pretend democracies in Africa: Myths of African democracies", *Law, Democracy & Development*, 16 (2012).

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁸¹¹ *Ibid.*

questionable results released are 90 percent in support of the current leadership. This has been a common experience in many, if not most, African and Middle Eastern states.

In a number of countries, the role of political parties is limited to being a simple front for the regime rather than as a political organisation fighting for their people's rights. They have tended to act without transparency, taking positions of power for their own interests. Citizens don't know how parties make decisions; flying in the face of the democratic ideals of openness, accessibility and accountability, Political development literature in third world countries, especially in the late sixties and early seventies, came under fire for both the orientation of ideology, the methodology, and ultimately the usefulness of the process. In terms of ideological orientation, the literature is driven by the Western model of capitalist development; with the ultimate goal of orientating third world states towards westernization, with the ultimate goal of turning these countries into modern Western societies.

In his report on political parties in Africa, Mohamed Salih stated that the democratic content of African political parties is still fragile and the prospects of genuine democratic consolidation vary from country to country.⁸¹² He noted a list of factors that he believes support his proposition:

- The unclear relationship between parties and government, which privileges the governing party because it tends to rely on the state resources as patronage in order to maintain the party organization and management.
- The African private sector is too small to support the establishment of strong and vibrant civil society organizations and a non-political middle class that are autonomous from the state.
- "The weakness of the private sector is not only detrimental to civil society's ability to make demands on the state and protect the interests of its membership;" which means that civil society is incapable of creating coalitions of interests with the political parties.
- Political parties often only look to seize power and the control of the resources of the state for their own interest as a source of wealth, therefore politics itself

⁸¹² M. A. Mohamed Salih, "Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty Democracy", *Africa Regional Report Based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties*, International IDEA, Institute for Democracy and electoral Assistance.

becomes a means to an end, devoid of any idea of protecting public interests vis-à-vis private gains.

- The weakness of African opposition parties and the inability of their leaders to aggregate interests, with the governing political parties denying them the opportunity to play their oversight role.

However, according to Salih, if African political parties want to play their positive role, they have to build on what is uniquely African and seek bold changes informed by African reality. “In the absence of such a vision based on what African societies could offer to promote democracy, externally-driven blueprints will always result in the status quo being maintained.”⁸¹³

3. Political Parties in Algeria

Politics in Algeria is indisputably different from the politics of most other countries. Mohammed Harbi, a historian, has clarified that democracy in Algeria, based on elections after 1962, has been driven and guided by the government and has no meaning to the general public. Algeria has long lived under a set of unwritten rules in which democracy was just a word in politicians’ speeches, and had little to do with practice.⁸¹⁴ Saadallah agrees with Harbi’s statement that democracy is new for Algerian society. The first era of democracy in the 1930s was nothing more than speeches, with the practice of government far from democratic principles. Violence had become a part of the Algerian social culture, and especially directly before and during the war for independence.

To understand the current situation in Algeria it is necessary to focus on the reasons for its violent environment, and how that might be changed. Many Algerian observers look to democracy, which they view as a successful method of governance in the West. However, they sense that even an implanted democratic system in contemporary Algeria could only achieve a minimum level of justice which, even then, would be at the expense of ethnic, religious and social minorities. According to Youcef Bouandel, the process of democratisation must be based on the development of political parties and political awareness within society. Political parties, through their activities and performance throughout the transition to democracy, would provide a strong basis for assessing both the nature of, and the

⁸¹³ *Ibid.*, and Salih (2003).

⁸¹⁴ Harbi M., paper presented at a special conference organized by *Elwatan*, Algerian daily newspaper, in French on the 17th April 2009 at Riadh al-Fateh, Algiers: “The intelligentsia and its relation by the political systems in Algeria.” <<http://aintedles.yoo7.com/montada-f79/topic-t10168.htm#15351>>.

prospects for, the new democracy.⁸¹⁵ The natural role of political parties should be to guide the political system while emphasizing the practices of democracy, and so to provide insights into the quality and stability of the political system as a whole.⁸¹⁶ In the case of Algeria, the transition from an authoritarian military regime to a more democratic system has had many shortcomings. Algeria's political parties did, in fact, play a part in the structuring of violence in the post-colonial era, and particular the period of the 1990s. This gives rise to questions as to whether parties in Algeria have played a traditional party role, or whether they have been mere puppets in the hands of the regime, serving only to 'legitimise' the government.

Scholars of political science and law have noted the changes to Algeria's multi-party system since independence, and especially after the launch of the 1989 Constitution, followed by the political structure introduced by President Bouteflika during his presidential term after 1999. According to Roberts:

[Political parties in Algeria] are far too weak and divided and accordingly are too vulnerable to manipulation by the various factions of the Algerian army...that we should be concerned with the country's political institutions, and consider how these might be strengthened.⁸¹⁷

While this view of political parties in Algeria represents one perspective,⁸¹⁸ a more recent history of Algerian politics and its parties seeks to clarify the role of French colonial rule in the political structure of the country, including the party structure, and its involvement in human rights violations. The political history of Algeria is relatively recent. Before the French, the Algerians were mostly labourers and farmers under what was nearly a 'feudal' system, with a taxation system that was dominated by two Jewish families (Busnach and Bacri).⁸¹⁹ The people of Algeria have never really had a tradition of self-governance, power

⁸¹⁵ Bouandel noted that: "political parties tend to be deeply and durably well-established in specific substructures of the specific society in a sustainable and well functioning democracy. They can link the governmental institutions to the elements of the civil society in a free and fair society and are regarded as necessary for any modern democratic system". Bouandel, Y., "Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, No. 1 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1–22.

⁸¹⁶ Chouchane, personal interview, London (13/05/2009). Also: Katz R. S., *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).

⁸¹⁷ Roberts, H., 'The struggle for constitutional rule in Algeria', *Journal of Algerian Studies* 3 (1998), pp. 19–30, noted by Youcef Bouandel, "Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria", *J. of Modern African Studies*, 41, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1–22.

⁸¹⁸ According to Dhina, in reality there is no multi-party system in Algeria, and what they call the 'opposition' is just a fabrication by the military regime to show the international community that Algeria has a democratic system, and that they have political parties, which are, in reality, created by them. Dr. Dhina, M. personal interview, Geneva (26 September 2009).

⁸¹⁹ For more details See: Belkacem Saadallah, who states that "these families were the bridge between Algeria and Europe through businesses and their close relationship to the Dey Hocine in Algeria. The family was the

sharing, or even of participation in the conduct of state affairs.⁸²⁰ There was no royal family or kingdom, and power in Algeria was not shared with community members. The Ottoman Empire dominated the country through dictatorship under the principles of the Caliph in Islam.⁸²¹ After the Ottomans, the French colonised Algeria and occupied the country by force for more than 130 years. Algerian citizens were deprived of even their minimal rights as human beings. They were classified by the French government at that time as sub-citizens, referred to as ‘Locals’, ‘Labours’ and ‘Farmers’. By the 1930s, the French government allowed some rights to Algerian elites, but these rights were very limited, and there was no right to criticise or even disagree politically with the French government. These elites could only request assistance in personal matters, and had no right to complain.⁸²² Algerians could not engage in politics or, for that matter, vote in elections, as the French citizens in Algeria could. Nevertheless, socially at least, the Algerian elites considered themselves a superior minority separated from an inferior majority of ignorant peasants (*fellaheen*), superstitious people (*Murabits*) and reactionary holy men (*Ulama*), who, in fact, were scholars of Arabic literacy and Islamic studies. Some writers took the ‘elite’ to include interpreters, lawyers, doctors, teachers, magistrates, journalists, a few merchants, agricultural workers, and students.⁸²³ The difference seems to be a misunderstanding of the term of ‘elite’.

Those who included some merchants and agricultural workers were talking about the Algerian middle class in general, while those who defined the elite as a few doctors, lawyers, and journalists were describing the Algerian French-educated class.⁸²⁴

3.1. Algerian Political Elites and French Colonialism

As noted above, according to many scholars specialising in Algerian history, Algeria has never been ruled by her own people and the citizens of Algeria have never shared power or been involved in any political events through the long years of occupation. Saadallah states

main link to French colonialism in Algeria.” Belkacem Saadallah, “ideas and research on Algerian History” (*Araa wa Abhaath fi Tareikh al-Jazair*), *Dar al-Gharab al-Islami*, Alexandrina, 1996, Pr. 1, Vol. 4, p.11.

⁸²⁰ *Rached TV* interviewed Agouni, the head of a political movement (PPA) before the revolutionary war. He became the leader of the party after the death of his friend and the founder of the PPA movement, Messali Haj. Saadallah, B. *Abhaath wa araa’ fi tareekh al-Jazaa’ir* (research and ideas in *Algerian History*), vol. 4, *Daar al-ghareb al-Islami* (Beirut, Lebanon, 1996), p. 13.

⁸²¹ The Caliph, by the rules of Sharia Law, has to be respected and must be obeyed by all citizens, as an obligation under Islamic Law.

⁸²² Saadallah, B. (1996).

⁸²³ Others preferred to give the title only to the first six categories. Belkacem Saadallah quoted on Benhabiles, op. cit. pp. 109-110. The authors of the Algerian Manifesto of 1943 estimated the elite at 1,655 people classified as follows: 1000 specialised workers, 41 doctors, 22 pharmacists, 9 dentists, 3 engineers, 7 lawyers, 10 high school teachers, and 500 instructors. See Paul-Emile Sarrasin, *La Crisea lgerienne* (Paris, 1949), p. 184.

⁸²⁴ Saadallah, Belkacem, “The Rise of the Algerian Elite, 1900-14”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5, No. 1 (May, 1967), pp. 70-77.

that, whatever the term politics means, it is vastly alien to most Algerians' lifestyles. If the meaning of the term 'politics' is to share power or to gain political rights in forming parties, or taking political actions, then it must be observed that these phenomena have never occurred for the Algerians under colonialism, or under earlier political systems dating to the dawn of history.⁸²⁵ The first group who tried to hold a political role in Algeria were from Morocco, formed by elites, educated and wealthy people, who attempted to gain the same rights for Algerian Muslims as those afforded the citizens in their home country.⁸²⁶ A few years later, the French authorities arrested them on charges of terrorism and they were jailed and tortured.

The French controlled the country through occupation at all levels of government, sharing at some stages low administration positions with a few local Algerians who were educated in French schools, because their families were wealthy or land owning, and because they accepted Western culture in place of Islam and their traditional customs.⁸²⁷ These people were never organised to play a part in the government or to share political power. By the end of the 1880s, many voices from amongst the rich people and landed classes, in the East and the West of Algeria, started questioning the French authorities about the rights of Algerians in terms of equality with French residents. The elites started asking the French to put into practice what was mandated under French law,⁸²⁸ because Algeria was a French territory and the Third Republic, at least, had made it clear that the complete assimilation of this territory with metropolitan France had been decreed; the elite demanded that these concepts be applied to Algeria in spirit and in letter.⁸²⁹

According to Sarrasin, the elites at that time had not only adopted the ideas of the West and its technical methods of work, but they were completely saturated in Western culture through their education.⁸³⁰ "They also wanted to transform Algerian society into a European one."⁸³¹ But they were struggling with the complex condition of their double personality, caught between a sense of superiority in regards to Algerian society, and

⁸²⁵ Saadallah, research and ideas, p 141.

⁸²⁶ Saadallah stated that the first elite's attempt to democratize politics on behalf of Algerians consisted of a few people from Morocco like Hamdaan Khuja and Ahmed Boudherssa and others.

⁸²⁷ Algerians are still talking about the few families who supported the French in their relations with Algerian communities like Bachagha, Alkhalifa, and others. See Saadallah, *Union de Ulama Musulman*, a paper at a conference of the Islamic Cultural center, Algiers (24 February 1990) also: *al Monqidh* Newspaper (FIS), July 1991.

⁸²⁸ Stora, B. (2001).

⁸²⁹ Saadallah, "The Rise of the Algerian Elite".

⁸³⁰ Paul-Emile Sarrasin, *La Crise algerienne* (Paris, 1949), p. 184, from the text of the Algerian Manifesto of 1943.

⁸³¹ Saadallah, "The Rise of the Algerian Elite".

inferiority as regards to French society. Consequently, as Jean Jaures noted, they lost themselves between the two tasks,⁸³² and thus failed to achieve their separate identity in the face of the French government. They lost the support of Algerians, who felt there was no difference between these elites and the French. On the other hand their expectations of equality with the French, political rights, containment of the *Code de L'indigenat* and other exceptional measures, parliamentary representation for Algerians, and equal education, taxation, and opportunities, were not supported by the French government. In short, the elite had chosen total naturalisation, assimilation, and all other measures that would help Algerian-French integration.⁸³³ “The elites made only one condition to France – that she not ask them to give up their personal status as Muslims”⁸³⁴.

In a more positive light, the elites had helped to developed the wider Algerian mentality, encouraging people to look after their rights and to choose their own way, whether as French or according to their own identity. Before the formation of the Association of Algerian Muslims (named in Arabic *Ulama*), which become AUMA and the North African Star, the native born Algerian elites continued searching for a solution to their dilemma through French civilization. Losing their language, customs, respect, and the friendship of their society, they turned to the European way of life. In many cases they mixed with the French, married French women, spoke the French language, lived with the French community, and sent their children to French schools, trying to bring them up on the French model.⁸³⁵ It is not an exaggeration to say that they played a major role in changing Algerian identity, which had always been Arab-Islamic, to one more reflective of a Western civilization: “...they [Algeria elites] were anxious to play a national role which would change Algeria's traditional and backward society into a modern and progressive one.”⁸³⁶

According to Saadallah, a close look at the development of this Francophone Algerian elite can help Algerians to appreciate their national role.

During the first decade of the Twentieth Century, this class was still weak and small. Faced with countless handicaps, including the nature of Algerian society, misunderstandings, the colonisers' prejudices, and the

⁸³² Quoted by Octave Depont, *Les Berbères en France, in L'Afrique française -supplément* (Paris: September 1925), p. 444. Noted by Saadallah, “The Rise of the Algerian Elite”, pp. 70-72.

⁸³³ Saadallah “The rise of the Algerian Elite”, pp. 69-77.

⁸³⁴ Saadallah (1967), p. 70.

⁸³⁵ Saadallah (1967), p. 71.

⁸³⁶ Saadallah (1967): he noted that the Algerian elite rejected not only the colonial logic, but their own people's logic. They wanted to build a new Algerian society. Their education and their transcendent outlook made them apostles of a utopia that never saw the light. Their moderate stand made them look weak and undetermined in the eyes of the French administration. The same stand isolated them from their own people. It never even gained them the confidence of the colonisers.

administration's repressive measures, the elite revolted against this situation. In their revolt they did not preach violence and extremism, but justice, equality, and tolerance.⁸³⁷

Since the beginning of the 19th century, politics in Algeria has been at least semi-organised, and has included strong positions against discrimination, high taxes, the right to education and work. It was in this background that the revolutionary movement, in the form of the FLN, formed.

3.2. Political Leadership in Algeria

The formation of Algeria's political system differs from those of other Arab countries and former French colonies. At the same time that the Tunisians gathered to support their leader, Bourguiba, Moroccans gathered to support King Mohammed V, the Vietnamese, their leader Ho Chi Minh, and the Egyptians, their leader Nasser, Algerians were rejecting virtually all of the personalities that had the potential to be national liberators. After the *coup* against Masali Hadj and Bachir al-Ibrahimi, there was the assassination of Ramdane by colleagues. Later they accepted Abbas, apparently because he had a weak background, as a member of the Francophone elite he was seeking equality with the French in Algeria. Revolutionaries like Abbas were seldom accepted as leaders for this reason. The unique path of the Algerian Revolution, then, is one without charismatic leadership. In fact, Algerians do not believe in a single leader; it is not part of their political civilization. Rather, they proclaim the slogan "[it is the] people who are the protagonists".⁸³⁸

Saadallah developed three hypotheses to explain why Algerians do not follow a single, charismatic leader. First there is the old phenomenon that Algerians have exhibited throughout their history.⁸³⁹ The people will not accept a single, charismatic leader because they are determined never to be governed as a family kingdom. Thus the revolution has never been guided by just one person; the decision-making is always reserved for a group of people, such as the 'three Bs', who controlled the revolutionary power together. Although some voices among the revolutionary leadership were fighting for democracy and the parliamentary system, they were rejected in part for this reason. As Belkacem put it, the most important thing for a new country like Algeria, with its deep conflicts among elites and the revolutionary leadership, and its long period of colonialism and war, is for Algerians to be

⁸³⁷ Saadallah (1967), pp. 69-77.

⁸³⁸ Saadallah's ideas and research on Algerian History (*Araa wa Abhaath fi Tareikh al-Jazair*), *Dar al-Gharab al-Islami*, Alexandrina, 1996, Pr. 1, Vol. 4, pp13-18.

⁸³⁹ Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (1 September 2009); See Harbi, M. *le FLN Mirage et realite, des origins a la prise du pouvoir (1945- 1962)*; Stora B. (2001).

united to protect their revolution's principles from any internal and external enemies, and to build their country at all levels.⁸⁴⁰ Single charismatic leadership is notably absent from this assessment.

According to Saadallah, and Sidhum, single leadership was rejected after the death of Ramdane and the later *coup d'état* against Ben Bella. The *coup* of 1962 against the Benkhedda government (GPRA), in fact, was planned specifically to stop any single person from taking power as an independent president. The reason Boussouf and later Boumédiène gave for their interventions was their overwhelming feeling of responsibility for preventing a single party or personality from seizing power, and the likelihood that such a person would not share power with the central committee of FLN, which was formed by the military and revolutionaries. But the reality, as Chouchane states, was that no such fear of a revolutionary figure should be used as a pretext to stop citizens from sharing power, and at that time these leaders of the military had no conscience regarding the well-being of their country and their citizens. The main goal of French Officers was to integrate Algeria into the French neo-colonial system. This goal could be achieved only by their use of the legitimacy of the revolution.⁸⁴¹ This was the only reason most of revolutionary heroes were excluded from power at independence.⁸⁴² Sidhum notes that the responsibility had to be taken, and the decision of Ben Khadda to leave his position and to transfer power to the military and the French Officers was not acceptable. However, the eruption of violence among the revolutionaries lasted for some time, and took many lives. The hope of independence was to be free of any trace of colonialism.⁸⁴³

For the same reason, many dissidents from the revolutionary elites consider Ben Bella to be the first personality among the political elites to lead the country in the history of

⁸⁴⁰ Cherif Belkacem in an interview by *Algerian French TV*: <[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbHU-jd_4Ak>](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbHU-<u>jd_4Ak</u>>).

⁸⁴¹ Chouchane, personal interview, London (13/05/2009).

⁸⁴² The exclusion of Colonel Chaabani is a good example of the political corruption and competition for power among revolutionaries. A number of revolutionary leaders were killed for violating the "bridge of trust", a charge given to someone that they needed to "look the other way" in a given case. President Chadli Benjedid allegedly witnessed the death of Chaabani, and later said that Ben Bella and Boumédiène had charged Colonel Chaabani with violating this "bridge", which was enough to have him sentenced to death. In reality, as was made clear in many of the revolutionaries' memoirs, Chaabani was against Boumedene's plan to include the French Officers in the Algerian National Army, and to give them key positions in building a strong and professional army. Chaabani and some of his colleagues were looking at this inclusion as French penetration into Algerian power structures through occupation of key military positions. This alleged decision by Boumedene would have been helpful to the French Government and to De Gaulle's plan. In this regard, see: *Elkhabar* (newspaper), 4 December 2008, "Chadli Benjedid in very interesting witness, Ben Bella gave order to kill Chaabani and requests urgent attention to his order," p. 2.

⁸⁴³ Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (01/09/2009).

Algeria.⁸⁴⁴ Because single leaders had been rejected many times in the past, opposition to his continuing leadership mounted, and Ben Bella failed to remain in the presidency for more than two years (1963-65). In 1965 his Defence Minister, Boumédiène, carried out a *coup d'état* against him. Boumédiène justified his *coup* on the grounds of maintaining the principles of the revolution, and rejecting the dictatorship that Ben Bella was developing. Thus, he argued that Ben Bella was an incipient dictator, and that he wanted to change the revolutionary principles into a monarchy, as had happened in Morocco.⁸⁴⁵

The second reason why Algerians have never accepted a single leader (as Saadallah described it), may be due to the democratic sensibility that Algerians have; their belief that no one person should monopolize the responsibility of decision making in Algeria. Leaders who transgress this thinking tend to receive a heavy punishment, including exile, as in the case of Ben Bella, or death, as was the case for Boudiaf. This democratic sensibility means Algerians will tend to rebel against their authorities and reject all forms of leadership, whether patriarchal, political or religious. Under the right to strike, which was legal through the Constitution of 1989, Algeria almost stopped working in May and early June of 1991, after calls from the FIS for action. More than 80% of general and private companies were totally blocked, and the economy of the country dropped to less than 50% of the average income of previous years.

Saadallah's third explanation is that the Algerian system has always been controlled by a small cadre of leaders because of the country's national identity, causing the citizens to refuse to obey individual leaders.⁸⁴⁶ This phenomenon runs throughout the history of the country, and it has been observed by many scholars and travellers for centuries.⁸⁴⁷ Before and since the revolutionary era, Algerians have never gathered under a single leadership; power has to be in hands of a group of people. Decisions have to be taken by a committee, and any person in a leadership position who wants to make any changes in the country's system of

⁸⁴⁴ Many military groups and political movements were behind the crisis of 1962-63, opposing the leadership of Ben Bella. Saadallah notes that one political leader, Ait Ahmed, was removed and sent to jail for life, escaping into exile and only returning to the country when democracy was achieved in 1990. Chaabani had been excluded on the order of Ben Bella and Boumédiène. Bachir al-Ibrahimi, the leader of Muslim's Ulama Foundation, was arrested, and detained in his home until he died in 1965. Boudhiaf was sent into exile in Morocco, and returned in 1993 as president of the country for only three months, after which he was killed in front of live cameras, likely by the DRS, as Mohamed Samraoui noted in a personal interview, Auckland NZ (February 2008).

⁸⁴⁵ Personal interview with Sidhum Salah Eddin, Algiers (25/09/2009); the same view was expressed by Haddam Anwar (USA), personal interview by Skype, Hamilton, NZ (21 May 2009).

⁸⁴⁶ Saadallah (1996).

⁸⁴⁷ Saadallah (1996), pp. 140-144.

governance will soon be labelled a dictator,⁸⁴⁸ someone who has to be stopped by other members of the leadership team.

Politics in Algeria began in 1871 when the French government changed their policy in Algeria and moved from military control through the Ministry of Defence, to a kind of civilian system, for the purpose of eliminating traditional economic and political ties, which were in the hands of the military at that time.⁸⁴⁹ In 1871, the French government completely dominated Algeria under French rules, which declared that Algeria was part of France according to the French Constitution. According to this legislative decree, Algerian lands and properties were transferred to the French migrants under the rules of “public land and general interests for the public”. The French army was no longer allowed to enforce its own policies. The consequent Algerian insurrections failed in the face of the French military, which was then one of the strongest armies in the world. Stora stated that the failure of these revolutions, including Muqrani’s insurrection in Kabylia, pushed the case of settlement forward into a legal statement, the native born Algerian Code of 1881 (*Code de l’Indigenat*), which was established to regularise colonialism. Algeria became a part of France on the other side of the Mediterranean, attached to the Internal Ministry in Paris. Legislation passed in 1898 and 1900 accepted that the country had a civil identity and an elected colonial assembly of delegates, rather than a military colonial system and its state-of-emergency, which had ruled Algeria since the French invasion in 1830.⁸⁵⁰

The gap between the French and the Algerian citizens was wide. Algerians who were identified as farmers (*Fellaheen*) could not own land apart from a very few wealthy families, whereas the legislation the French administration adopted included the right to own whatever land they wanted, as long as it had been controlled by the Ottoman Empire in Algeria before 1830. The French settlers used their full rights to take as much land as they could. Many French business people bought huge estates and used Algerians as labourers on their farms, receiving a part of the agricultural crop in lieu of a salary. Algerians responded by forming unions and organizing to seek their rights from the French administration. The first Algerian political movement, the Star of North Africa (*Étoile Nord Africaine*), was formed by **Messali**

⁸⁴⁸ This was the thinking that confronted Ben Bella. Boumédiène later shared power with the French Officers (as Brahimi noted, although many scholars have argued that Boumédiène was a dictator who took power by force and did not accept any opposition). See Lahouari Addi, “The Multi-Party System in Algeria”, conference at Yale University between February 20 and February 22, 2009:

<<http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf> >

⁸⁴⁹ Saadallah, B., “The Rise of the Algerian Elite, 1900-14”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5, No. 1 (1967), pp. 69-77.

⁸⁵⁰ Stora (2001), pp. 4-7.

Hadj in 1925, launched and agreed to by the French authorities. Many young Algerian supporters joined this movement, from Algerian workers to intellectuals in Paris. After experiencing difficulties with the French administration, Hadj formed another movement in 1939 inside Algeria, the Algerian People's Party (*Parti Populaire Algérien—PPA*), with strong support from students and workers. Just two years later, the Vichy regime which came down strongly against Muslim Algerians, withdrew the PPA's permit, making it an illegal party under French law.⁸⁵¹

Abbas had a slightly different approach to that of Hadj in fighting for Algerian rights as French citizens. He did not believe Algeria was in any way independent from France. In 1944, Abbas formed the Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty (*Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté—AML*), a moderate reform group that was later transformed into the 'Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto' (*Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien—UDMA*). By the end of the Second World War, and after the massacres of 8 May 1945, Algerians lost confidence in French authority and started looking seriously for independent representation.⁸⁵² Many members of the AML joined the PPA, under the leadership of Hadj. They formed a small movement, the 'Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties' (*Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques—MTLD*), which maintained the same program as the PPA, known as the MTLD program. It was focused on specific goals, including working toward the elimination of colonialism and implementing a system of national sovereignty, organising a general election without racial or religious restriction, establishing a democratic and social Republic of Algeria, and linking Algeria to its extended Arab-Islamic and African affiliates. In addition, the structure and organisation of the MTLD covered the entire Algerian territory intelligently and comprehensively.⁸⁵³ According to Bouandel, Abbas' movement was destroyed by those who believed in French authority. Under the MTLD program, which was called "the return of the Algerian people to national sovereignty", the MTLD won five of the fifteen elected seats in the National Assembly elections of 1 November 1946, but in 1948 the MTLD lost all its seats and was reduced to semi-legality. Two years later, it was suppressed by the police.⁸⁵⁴

⁸⁵¹ Belkacem Saadallah, "The Rise of the Algerian Elite, 1900-14", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5, No. 1 (1967), pp. 69-77; also: Stora, B. (2001).

⁸⁵² Saadallah (1996); Harbi (1980); and Stora (2001).

⁸⁵³ See: the "Movement Program" of *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques 1900-1954* website: <<http://www.algerian-history.info/templatepage.htm>>.

⁸⁵⁴ See Youcef Bouandel, "Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-22; also: Saadallah, B., "The Rise of the Algerian Elite, 1900-14", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5, No. 1 (1967), pp. 69-77; Masli and Sidhum, personal interviews (1 September 2009).

By 1951, Algerian movements dominated popular thought in Algeria. The MTLD members formed other political groups such as the UDMA, the Algerian Communist Party (PCA), and the Society of 'Ulema', a political-cultural organisation. In the following years, the conflicts between elites, who failed to organise themselves as a group despite many meetings, resulted in three groups launched with different ideologies: the supporters of Hadj, who had a strong belief in Algerian independence under the slogan of "Take and ask for more", centrists, who hoped to obtain constitutional advances by cooperating with the French administration, and a militant group that proposed violent action as the only suitable solution for Algerians.⁸⁵⁵ In 1954 there was an open split when a majority of the centrists repudiated Hadj's leadership. An activist group of nine members formerly associated with an MTLD splinter group called for armed rebellion, and then established the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (*Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action*—CRUA) with its headquarters in Cairo. Action was taken on the 1st of November 1954, after they organised themselves to work together and, quite literally, to start a war. They divided Algeria into six military zones, appointed commanders for each, and then launched a war against the French troops.

4. The Single Party System and the Military Regime in Algeria

The FLN was started by a few young revolutionaries taking action against the French military troops in the countryside, declaring by their actions the commencement of the war for independence. In less than two years, the FLN members grew in numbers and were guided, to some extent, by members of the formal political parties. They succeeded in establishing political-military structures and extending a series of guerrilla bases in the countryside.⁸⁵⁶ The political leadership was soon arrested and jailed by the French Army's pre-1954 urban middle class nationalist politicians, who had made their careers in the MTLD,

⁸⁵⁵ The crisis within the movement appeared prominently in the conduct of its Second Congress in April 1953, in which the key issues of conflict between the Central Committee and Hadj on the one hand, and their supporters, on the other. Members of the Special Organisation adopted a position opposed to the conflict, stressing the need to safeguard the unity of the movement and ensure its stability, although by the final motion of the Second Congress, a decision stipulating the definition of the prerogatives of the President of the movement, the establishment of a sort of democracy in the direction of movement, and the adoption of majority decisions, were approved. Hadj had insisted on absolute power over the movement. The second decision was to remove the most important contributors from Hadj's political bureau, including Mezghenna and Moulay Ahmed Merbah, to elect Benyoucef Benkhedda as secretary general of the movement, and to choose Hocine Lahouel and Abderrahmane Kiouane as assistants. But Hadj rejected the decisions of the Congress, and in a letter written to his activists he urged the withdrawal of its confidence from the Central Committee. The struggle between Hadj and the Central Committee intensified as each party camped on its positions. See *Rachad TV* interview with the PPA leader "Ali Agouni", 13 November 2010. And: *Rachad TV* Interviews with Abbassi Madani, 19 October 2010, and 4 November 2010.

⁸⁵⁶ Mahfoud Abdelhafid Bannoune, "Algerian Peasants and National Politics", *MERIP Reports*, No. 48 (June 1976), pp. 3-24.

the UDMA and the Ulama, and included Benkhedda (Secretary General of the MTLN since 1951), Ferhat (president of the UDMA), and el-Madani (leader of the Ulama). According to Bannoune, the subsequent successes of the FLN were made possible by the political and ideological content of the FLN platform, published on November 1 1954, which reflected much of the thinking of the members of the CRUA.⁸⁵⁷ “The first task of the Front was to obtain the popular support necessary to continue, and to develop its military action.”⁸⁵⁸

Offering a different view, Saadallah stated that the revolution was started by anonymous people and guided by a group of revolutionaries. This group opened the door to the members of the other parties. This offer was a tactic to prevent the other political parties and national movements from engaging in revolutionary activities individually. Leaders from different parties took part in the revolution, beginning modestly. Hadj and Abbas, the former leaders of various parties and national movements, found themselves out of the game, as previously anonymous people started the revolution without consulting the political elite, who had decades of experience in politics, and knew how to deal with the French authorities. The Algerian political elites were unprepared for war, and found themselves reduced to little more than lowly recruits.⁸⁵⁹ Revolution against the colonial system in Algeria was in essence a popular movement, and it would have come sooner or later, with or without the participation of the political elites.

The formation of political institutions in Algeria came about after independence and the official recognition of Algeria’s first Constitution in 1963. Revolutionaries who had fought the French throughout the war insisted on retaining power through the FLN. According to Henry F. Jackson, “the FLN in Algeria is a political history of the period of 1954 to 1965”.⁸⁶⁰ But it was never a political party, as understood in other parts of the world. It was not until the declaration of the National Charter by Boumédiène that FLN moved from its anonymous revolutionary organisation to the creation of a single political party. This change was part of a *coup* against the Algiers’ Charter of Ben Bella, held in early 1964. Jackson argues that the Boumédiène *coup* of 1965 caused a change in the FLN’s platform, and brought about the

⁸⁵⁷ Appendix 3 is a graphic tree of the national movements formed before and during the Algerian War of Independence.

⁸⁵⁸ Mahfoud Bannoune (June 1976), pp. 3-24; Cherif Belkacem, interview with *French TV*, 1966, published on YouTube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbHU-jd_4Ak>.

⁸⁵⁹ Belkacem Saadallah, “Abhaath wa araa’ fi tareekh al-Jazaa’ir” (“Research and Ideas in Algerian History”), Vol. 4, *Daar al-ghareb al-Islami* (Beirut, Lebanon, 1996).

⁸⁶⁰ Henry F. Jackson, *The FLN in Algeria: party development in a revolutionary society* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 255.

demise of the revolutionaries' 'empire', hidden as it was behind the title of 'revolution', and the structure of the FLN. In reality,

...the FLN... never truly functioned as a political party. It has existed on paper and in organisational form. It has been the subject of considerable thought, both in and outside the country. It has recruited members, employed organisers, printed pamphlets, generated an endless and mostly repetitive stream of position papers about its proper operation, but at no time has it filled roles of policy formation, leadership recruitment, mass mobilisation, or guardian of ideological standards.⁸⁶¹

For the tenth anniversary of the *coup d'état*, on June 19th 1975, the Boumédiène regime announced the drafting of the National Charter and elections for the National Assembly and the President of the Republic. On April 26th 1976 the first draft of the National Charter was made public. Later in the same year, another draft of the constitution was drafted by the Boumédiène regime and put forward in a lengthy and detailed ideological reference statement for Algeria. The Algiers Charter adopted by the FLN in 1964 criticized the state institutions and the bureaucracy of the country, asserting the pre-eminence of "[an] avant-garde party profoundly linked to the masses". In contrast, the National Charter of 1976 asserted:

To restore national sovereignty, construct socialism, struggle against underdevelopment, build a modern and prosperous economy, and be vigilant against external dangers requires a solid and constantly fortified state, not a state invited to die out, when it has barely re-emerged from the void.⁸⁶²

One of the seven sections of this Charter was entitled 'The Party and the State', and in it appeared statements concerning Algeria's sole political party, the celebrated FLN. The Charter stated that "The FLN is an avant-garde party which is both 'the guide of the revolution' and the 'directing force of the society'. Working through the mechanism of 'democratic centralism', the party 'controls the overall policy of the country' and is, in theory, the single most important political institution in Algeria."⁸⁶³ The Charter did admit, indirectly, that the FLN had become ineffective since independence and was not in a position to assume a policy leadership role. The Charter suggested that these difficulties were

⁸⁶¹ John Nellis, "The FLN in Algeria: party development in a revolutionary society", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 153-156; Jackson, *The FLN*, p. 255.

⁸⁶² *Algerian National Charter* (1976); Stora (2001), pp. 147-148.

⁸⁶³ Nellis, J. "The FLN in Algeria: party development in a revolutionary society", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 153-156.

temporary, however, adding that it “must modify its modes of organisation and adapt them to new situations”.⁸⁶⁴

According to Belkacem, a former minister in Ben Bella’s government, the single party system started in Algeria during the war and continued during the post-independence period because the Algerian people of that time needed to be unified to achieve their goal of independence from France. Within the different ideologies and viewpoints of the Algerian elites, the principles of the revolution were eventually shaped and the goal of independence, while distant and difficult to achieve, would be won. However, at the time the prospect of building the country, in view of the conflicts among the Algerian elite, was bleak. Belkacem noted:

For us then in 1954 to 62, the facts were posed in terms of ‘units of action’, and this action could be taken only under one party’s policy, which was the FLN, and I am currently asking, what would have happened to the country with the crisis of 1962 if they had accepted a multi-party policy, for example? The political leadership of the FLN comes from different political backgrounds, and every one of them could have his own party, so maybe the conflict will grow into a new war between Algerians.⁸⁶⁵

From the opposite view, Zitout argued: “For most of Algerian post-revolutionary history, the FLN can scarcely be characterised as anything more than a front organisation for a government ultimately controlled by the military.”⁸⁶⁶ Chouchane regarded the FLN after independence as similar to the communist party in Russia, and this was especially true during the period of Boumédiène. More than 70 per cent of the members in the central committee of the party were military officers. The period of Chadli’s leadership involved a number of changes in the FLN, some of which were geared to make it more like a political party, mostly by releasing military members and opening membership to a new civilian generation.⁸⁶⁷ The FLN was strong because it was the only party allowed, and most of its members had occupied positions in the political structure. They tended to have close relations with the military power holders, as well as externally through the country’s international relations. The FLN,

⁸⁶⁴ Nellis (1979), pp. 153-156.

⁸⁶⁵ Interview in French with Cherif Belkacem, Minister of Orientation and Education (l’orientation et de l’éducation) in the government of Ben Bella, and after June, 1965, in charge of the reorganisation of the party (FLN). He was the executive secretary of FLN (Délégué du Secrétariat executive). This interview took place in 1966 by *French TV INA*. The question was: “Why did Algeria, after Independence, choose the single party system? What was the birth and development of the FNL, and after 1962, what happened to socialism in Algeria under Ben Bella”?

⁸⁶⁶ Zitout, personal interview, London (04/07/2009).

⁸⁶⁷ Chouchane, A., personal interview, London (August 2009); Haddam, N., Skype personal interview, USA, from Hamilton, NZ (May 2009). Zitout espouses another view: After 5 October 1988, in particular, the FLN became increasingly autonomous.

in Chouchane's view, was the face the military regime used to establish itself in power, although the FLN became more independent through the multi-party system from late 1989 to early 1992. Under the leadership of Mahri, the FLN began to openly oppose the regime on some issues. The secret services were very active at this time, however, and Mahri was fired from his position as head of the FLN at the beginning of Boumédiène's regime. The same thing occurred in other parties. In fact, the intervention of the Military Secret Services in the Islamic movements such as Nahdha (MNI), which soon fired their leader, Abdellah Jaballah, and who later formed another party, al-Islaah, had long-term consequences. A few months later, with conflict between members and opposition to Jaballah, they fired him and took him to court on charges of corruption. Jaballah pointed out in his statement against the military regime that they did not want him to be in a leadership position, especially after his success with both of his previous parties.⁸⁶⁸ The collapse of Nahdha and later al-Islaah was precipitated by Jaballah's sacking. According to Abdelhamid Remita, one of the formal founders of the Nahdha movement, the party failed because of the dictatorial style of the leader. In the meantime certain members were directed by government agencies to undermine the party, and they were successful.⁸⁶⁹ A similar role was played by the DRS with regards to the FLN. They organised a *coup* against Mehri after he managed to go through a politically legitimate process to get the party out of the control of the military regime.⁸⁷⁰ However, "military control was re-established in 1996, when the intelligence services forced Mr. Mehri to abdicate his position as party leader."⁸⁷¹

According to Chouchane, Dhina and Samraoui, the Algerian military secret service was involved in most of the new political parties, and played a major role in some of them, albeit with different levels of focus and interest, depending upon how popular the party was with the population at large. In some instances they had their own members planted inside the executive committee of a party, and they would direct its policies and planning, often against the wishes of the other committee members, and sometimes in contention with other parties, or even in attacking government officials. Ben-Fliss was the political face of the military secret service for a long time, was in the FLN, and by all accounts was the representative of the French Officers.⁸⁷² Along with Abd al-Qadir Hadjar and many others, he would break up

⁸⁶⁸ Chouchane (10 June 2009); Zoubir, Yahia, H., "Algerian Islamists' conception of democracy", *Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)* (Summer, 1996).

⁸⁶⁹ Remita Abdelhamid, personal interview, Mila, Algeria (19 August 2009).

⁸⁷⁰ Chouchane, personal interview, London (2009).

⁸⁷¹ Zitout, M. Arbi (24/07/2009).

⁸⁷² Chouchane based his views on his understanding of Ben-Fliss's power base in the FLN. Ben-Fliss later paid dearly for challenging the generals by running against the military's candidate for president, Bouteflika. Bluntly

any party program that did not suit his own interests. The power of these operatives was not unlimited, however. Chouchane argued that “Hadjar can do nothing to the formal [party] leader, Abdelhamid Mahri, without the support of the Military Secret Service”. Mahri had a strong position in the FLN, mostly because of his record in the revolution, which gave him legitimacy. He was elected to various positions in the government, and was a respected personality among the other leaders and revolutionaries. This put Hadjar on a higher level than any other member of the FLN, making it harder to sack him, even if the military regime wanted to do so.⁸⁷³

5. The Role of the FLN in Human Rights Violations in the Post Colonialism Period

The historical background and the formation of the FLN as a popular party, and its success in developing political power and a strong military wing, which became the ALN, explain why it was that the FLN was able to become the single legitimate political party in Algeria. It soon directed many of the country’s developments in politics, the economy and especially international relations. But, as has been shown earlier, the country was unstable politically and weak economically in the years following the revolution. It also suffered from deep ethnic, racial, regional and ideological divisions, which severely complicated the process of planned change. In short, the FLN should have been governed by civilian politicians, and ideally would have been able to exercise control over the military. It was the military, however, that ultimately used the FLN to control civilian politicians.⁸⁷⁴

In the view of many observers, the FLN should have been able to complete the Algerian revolution, and lead Algeria to stability and prosperity. Some have said that Algeria would become the nation to traverse history.⁸⁷⁵ The FLN rejected external programs from *Arabo-Musliman*, according to the meetings of the central committee of the FLN.⁸⁷⁶ Ben

put, Ben-Fliss was used to complete the French Officers program against the FLN’s revolutionary members, and his mission ended with their dismissal from the party. The same thing happened to former president Liamine Zeroual, who was appointed president when he agreed to work for the French Officers, but failed to follow their instructions regarding the ‘war on terror’. He was sacked, and when the officers later attempted to enlist him to undermine Bouteflika, he refused. See: Chouchane, personal interview, London (23/05/2009).

⁸⁷³ Chouchane, personal interview, London (10/06/2009).

⁸⁷⁴ Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (01/09/2009); Chouchane, personal interview, London (13/05/2009).

⁸⁷⁵ The original expression in French was: “*l’Algerie devient une personne traversant l’histoire*”. Around that was the major belief of Algerians, in which the media played a major role in guiding them, that they were unique and that their country was the greatest, but needed strong leadership to protect them and their revolutionary principles from internal and external factors.

⁸⁷⁶ Even their statements on the Jewish community were just concessions, no more than theory. Harbi, M., *Le FLN Mirage et Realite des Origines a la Prise du Pouvoir: 1945-1962, Col. Le Sens de L’Histoire* (Paris : Ed. Jeune Afrique, 1980) ; Stora (2001).

Tobbal, one of the ‘three Bs’, was definite on this point.⁸⁷⁷ Throughout a key speech, delivered only one year before independence, Ben Tobbal indicated that the military would not be a part of the civilian power structure and democratic system after independence.

The formal role of the FLN during the revolution was to bring independence to the Algerian people, and that was why even during open conflict between party leaders, the assumption was that they would stay together under one party, and allow other parties to develop after independence was achieved. The FLN was successful in its primary goal, but appears to have failed Algerians in its socio-political legacy. For example, the ‘settling of accounts’ within the FLN leadership led to assassinations. Violence, in fact, took a major toll among the FLN leadership. Henry Jackson argues that the Boumédiène *coup* of 1965 put an end to the FLN’s revolution. From 1954 to 1965 the FLN was a revolutionary movement charged with securing independence and initiating the country on an apolitical path to democracy.⁸⁷⁸ Events after that *coup* demonstrate that the FLN was never truly functional as a political party.⁸⁷⁹ In fact, it served varied functions: it was the political arm of the liberation movement, for example, after independence, it became the country’s legislative power and its executive power at the same time; it controlled the judiciary and the media. Jackson notes:

...its offices provided numerous patronage posts. It has been used as a means of diffusing demands and programme decisions from the top down to the masses but not the reverse. And repeatedly since 1962, as waves of popular discontent have risen against bureaucratic excess or indifference, or against the personalisation and centralisation of rule, the leadership has asserted that party reorganisation – leading to mass popular control – was now the first priority of the state.⁸⁸⁰

Moreover, violence as usual was the first solution the military used in the name of the FLN, and by the summer of 1962, FLN members from the military and economic interest groups clashed. With the difficulties of keeping the country running without the Europeans, the internal and external migrations affecting thousands of people, and the sudden rise of rural people in the revolution, the trend toward the autonomy of the Willaya system,

⁸⁷⁷ “We will be persuaded that the Algerian people will not agree to place a European or a Jew in the government or a position of responsibility, for reasons of confidence [which are] easy to understand.” Ben Tobbal conference at the FLN cadres in Tunisia, March 1960. The original text in French was: “*Nous pouvons, affirme Bentobbal, être persuades que le peuple algerien n’acceptera pas de placer un europeen ou un juif au sein du gouvernement ou a un poste de responsabilite, ceci pour des raisons de confiance faciles a comprendre.*” Harbi (1980); Stora (2001), p.118.

⁸⁷⁸ Hocine Ait Ahmed interview, MEDI1 SAT, “Moroccan Kingdom and the Algerian Revolution” <www.dailymotion.com/maghrebb> (25/05/2008).

⁸⁷⁹ John Nellis, Review of Jackson (1979), pp. 153-156.

⁸⁸⁰ Jackson (1977).

factionalism, and regionalism began. Of the Willayas, three and four decided to maintain their councils. Boudiaf resigned from the political bureau when the general staff wanted to intervene. The commandos' base attacked Willaya Unit Four, and killed several people. In 1963 the nation adopted a single-party system, which had not really been put forward at the Tripoli Congress, and this gradually took root. The party of Revolutionary Socialists, headed by Boudiaf, was destroyed and outlawed as an organisation. Every party organisation other than the FLN was denounced as representing divisive tendencies, and fissures developed in the foundations of a state under construction.

By 1964 the Algiers Charter was designed to restructure the party. This followed Boumédiène's *coup d'état* of June 1965, when the country was being run by a sub-committee of the Council of the Revolution. While top officials in the army and government were associated with it, the French Officers intervened effectively in the council,⁸⁸¹ which meant that the party would not ultimately play a role in determining the direction of the country's policies.⁸⁸² The army was the real power holder; the party just held formal status, which was respected because of its revolutionary legitimacy. By the time of Boumédiène's death in December 1978, and just after the National Charter was launched,⁸⁸³ the establishment of the FLN as a formal structure of government was terminated, and the FLN ceased to play its originally intended vanguard role.⁸⁸⁴

It was not only dominated by the executive (hence the army), but was also relegated to a formal status: that of presenting candidates for 'elections' and acting as 'transmission belts' to mobilise support for a politically bankrupt regime.⁸⁸⁵

6. The Events of October 1988 and Political Changes

According to many scholars, the original cause of the events of October 1988 was an economic crisis. It must be added that also significant was the failure of a system that did not tolerate transparent debate.⁸⁸⁶ A majority of Algerians knew nothing of the real financial

⁸⁸¹ Chouchane (June 2009).

⁸⁸² Bouandel (2003).

⁸⁸³ The Politburo and Central Committee, of which high-ranking military officers were members.

⁸⁸⁴ Bouandel (2003).

⁸⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁶ Many scholars, such as Abdelhamid Brahimi, Addi Lahouari, Sidhum and others, have mentioned that the government failed to achieve its promises to provide jobs, basic housing, and even the most basic necessities, such as food and water. Chouchane in his statements has cited these as the primary causes of the subsequent events, but he includes the Military Secret Services as culpable because they managed policies in their own interests, and thereby changed the country's political and social systems. Chouchane, personal interview; Brahimi, interview by *Aljazeera TV* (special visit); Sidhum, personal interview (01/09/2009); and Addi, L. "In The Dark Shadow of Terror, The Algerian army holds the levers of power," *le monde diplomatique* (2/2/1998).

situation of the country. For many years, the country pursued policies to ensure social peace by ensuring that the essential needs of the population were met, but these policies eventually failed. Sociologist Lahouari Addi, in the *Impasse of Populism*, explains this, noting: “The deficit of the state’s enterprises is not an accident of accounting; it reflects the inability of the renter state to achieve a satisfactory rate of return in the production system to cover expenses.” According to Addi, the regime was paying the political price of power, covering the people’s needs through means such as manipulation of the price system. The accumulation of defective and economically unsupportable policies led to an acute crisis. The trigger was a drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s.⁸⁸⁷ The uprising of 5th October 1988 was the most significant event since the independence in 1962, and provided the authorities with the opportunity to embark on a program of liberalisation.⁸⁸⁸

Algeria took a different political pathway at this time, and underwent an important transformation in the 1989 Constitution. It was a date marking the “beginning of the transition from authoritarianism with the opening of political space to previously excluded groups.”⁸⁸⁹ The tragic riots of October 1988 were orchestrated by rival clans inside the regime, and they marked the end of the FLN’s hegemony over Algerian political life.⁸⁹⁰ These events shocked the country, as they clarified many misunderstandings regarding the nature of political control. The reform process was the product of individual need, the need of the authorities to legitimise themselves and to hang onto power.⁸⁹¹ Hundreds of thousands of civilians took part in the subsequent events, which were regarded as the first approach of liberty in Algeria. The regime had been forced by popular demand to initiate the democratization process.

With the political reforms of the Constitution of 1989, many political and social organisations were recognised for the first time, and were able to take part in the new political system. Before this, the FLN had been the only party that was officially recognised. Following the political reforms, Algerians had started to practice their rights by openly opposing the military regime. Almost fifty political parties and hundreds of social, religious and workers’ trusts and organisations were formed. The lack of elite cohesiveness and legitimacy became graphically evident in the failure of the Algerian state to articulate a clear ideological direction. The president, Benjedid, sought to move the Algerian state on to a new

⁸⁸⁷ Ait Benali, *Boubekeur, La révolte d’octobre 1988 et les enjeux démocratiques*, Hoggar, Geneva, nd.

⁸⁸⁸ Bouandel (2003).

⁸⁸⁹ Bratton & van de Walle, 1997, 1 noted by Bouandel.

⁸⁹⁰ Yahia H. Zoubir, Algeria's Multi-Dimensional Crisis: The Story of a Failed State-Building Process, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 741-747.

⁸⁹¹ Bouandel (2003).

pathway towards democracy, but without affecting the principles of his party, the FLN. According to Samraoui and Chouchane, the DRS was giving him incorrect information about what was happening in the country, and then sacked him in 1992.⁸⁹²

The failure of the FLN to lead the regime was probably due to its illegitimacy in the eyes of most Algerians. It had simply become unacceptable to young Algerians. This, combined with a chronically weak economy, and insecurity in social life and income,⁸⁹³ led to a precipitous decline in trust between the government and population. The government became useless to citizens, and this was accentuated by widespread bureaucratic corruption in most of the government services.

The government and political sectors remained under the domination of the French Officers. The economic, social, and cultural landscape of Algeria had been radically transformed, the population had grown and become urbanized, and the demand for jobs, education, and housing was growing exponentially. The government failed to provide for these needs of its citizens and the system became a virtual time bomb, just waiting to explode. Indeed, in the face of these factors, the military secret service, who wanted to shift the basis of the political economy from socialism to capitalism, began to play a major role in driving the population to violence.⁸⁹⁴ Regardless of who started the major riots that followed,⁸⁹⁵ the result led to reform. A number of measures were introduced, partly because of pressure from the street, but mainly because the current authorities needed them to legitimise themselves and hang on to power.⁸⁹⁶ The costs included hundreds of civilian deaths and thousands of arrests, imprisonments, and torture.⁸⁹⁷

7. The Multi-Party System and the Response to the Violence

The changes in the political system after President Bendjedid announced that there would be a referendum to revise the Algerian Constitution triggered another important principle: the government's responsibility to the National Popular Assembly. The referendum took place on October 10, 1988. The FLN, as a single political party, had three main points in its platform: the separation of the state and the FLN, free selection of candidates in municipal

⁸⁹² Chouchane (10/06/2009); Samraoui (2001).

⁸⁹³ The single ruling party in Algeria had forgone the one thing that ensured some measure of ideological cohesiveness and legitimacy, its claims to be the winner of Independence for the country. There are more factors such as population growth, housing shortages, a declining national income, especially after the drop in oil prices in 1986, etc. Many workers went without salaries for months at a time, and massive corruption overtook society.

⁸⁹⁴ Chouchane, personal interview, London (13/05/2009).

⁸⁹⁵ The tragic riots of October 1988 were likely orchestrated by rival clans inside the regime, and marked the end of the FLN's hegemony over Algerian political life.

⁸⁹⁶ Bouandel (2003).

⁸⁹⁷ Abbas Aroua, personal interview, Geneva (27/08/2009).

and legislative elections, and the independence of “mass organisations.”⁸⁹⁸ The new constitution was approved in the election, with a majority of 92.27% of the vote and a participation rate of 73.08%. The separation of the FLN from the state did not affect the trust that FLN members had in President Bendjedid. The final report of the FLN included the goals of re-electing Bendjedid and transforming the mass organisation into part of the FLN party structure, thus attempting to protect their interests and retain their domination of the power structure.⁸⁹⁹

Some parties formed opposition coalitions against the government and the military regime. Other parties, such as the RCD, a movement representing the Berber culture, had adopted principles such as the separation between the religious sphere and the society. Islamists had dominated the political ground, using sermons in mosques, universities and other public places to drive home their message. The FLN, after its separation from the military regime, was supported by former revolutionaries and children of *Mujahideen*,⁹⁰⁰ and the *Abnaa al-Chouhada*. These movements believed in the revolution’s legitimacy as the only acceptable route to political power in Algeria. In November 1989, Ait Ahmed, who was known for his opposition to the FLN after independence, returned from exile in Europe to reform his social political party, the FFS (*Front des Forces Socialistes*). In September 1990, and after ten years of exile, the former first president of Algeria, Ben Bella, returned to the country and launched his program by leading a new party, the MDA (*Mouvement pour la Democratie en Algerie*). These parties, as well as others, were built around personalities, typically a famous person who had been involved in the War of Independence, such as Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed and former President Benkhedda, who created the *El Oumma* Party. Former Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah, who had been the *de jure* president of the SM during the period of Boumédienne, led “the Algerian Movement for the Justice and the development” (*Mouvement Algerien pour la Justice et la Development*), the MAJD.⁹⁰¹

Many parties were involved in this political competition, some with just a few members. In creating a party, individuals gained support from the government and charities.⁹⁰² The creation of political parties was made easier by the minimalist requirements:

⁸⁹⁸ Stora (2001).

⁸⁹⁹ Stora (2001), pp. 197-199

⁹⁰⁰ Children of revolutionaries who were killed in the liberation war while were fighting against the French: Stora (2001); Sidhum, personal interview, Algiers (1 September 2009).

⁹⁰¹ Stora (2001).

⁹⁰² Ahmed Zaoui, personal interview.

only fifteen members were required to form a political party.⁹⁰³ The main focus of the government at that time was to divide the population's support between many small parties, and so create conflict among the opposition parties themselves rather than with the military regime.⁹⁰⁴ The regime succeeded in this plan, which intensified the conflict between Islamists and anti-Islamists, such as the RCD and the *Tahaddi* against the Movement for an Islamic FIS, Nahdha and Hamas. Conflicts arose as well between Islamists (FIS and Hamas for example), and between anti-Islamists, such as the FFS and the RCD. Bouandel noted that while "the new law formally prohibited the creation of parties on a regional, ethnic or religious basis; its wording effectively permitted such parties."⁹⁰⁵

Even the legislation relating to political party formation noted that parties comprised of religious, regional or ethnic groups would not be allowed.⁹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, religious parties such as the FIS, the Movement for an Islamic Society (Hamas), the Islamic Nahda Party, and the mainly ethnic parties such as the RCD and the FFS, were legalised. While the FIS based its program on the application of Sharia (Islamic Law), the RCD proposed the complete secularisation of the state, to the point of opposing Islamic rules in some of its opinions.⁹⁰⁷ It was evident that:

[The] regime was deliberately encouraging the formation of political parties which, instead of canvassing alternative programs for government, were canvassing alternative, indeed diametrically opposed and totally irreconcilable, conceptions of the state.⁹⁰⁸

Within one year of the open political system in Algeria, forty-four parties had secured their status with the Internal Affairs Ministry. Hundreds of social organisations started working legally in the country, including human rights leagues, independent women's organisations and cultural movements. A new political dimension coalesced; a widespread belief in the need to minimise military authoritarianism.

⁹⁰³ Stora (2001); Lahouari Addi, "The Multi-Party System in Algeria", conference at Yale University between February 20 and February 22, 2009: <<http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf>>

⁹⁰⁴ Anwar Haddam, personal interview (phone), USA (21 May, 2009); Ahmed Chouchane (10/06/2009); and Mohammed Samraoui,(2001).

⁹⁰⁵ Bouandel (2003).

⁹⁰⁶ See the Algerian legislation regarding rules for forming a political party.

⁹⁰⁷ The Islamic movements were described as extremist (*Ussulist*) by secularist movements and any person who had a beard or was dressed in long clothing (*Qamis*), and women who were wearing religious dress that covered the whole body (*Jilbaab*), were denounced as terrorists. Some other parties trained their focus on the military's political and economic corruption over their fifty years of control.

⁹⁰⁸ Roberts, H., "The Algerian state and the challenge to democracy", *Government and Opposition* 27, No. 4 (1992), pp. 442-449.

These conflicts between parties, fed by the media and the DRS, exploded at times, ending in violence, deaths and arrests. Because free speech had been encouraged among citizens through their parties, politicians were subjected to public scandals as part of the DRS plans against the democratic system. The leader of the Labour Party, the PT (*Parti des travailleurs*) Louisa Hannoune, the socialist leader Ait Ahmed, Ali Belhaj, the vice-leader of the FIS, and Mahri from the FLN, became increasingly angry about the way in which agencies of government used the FLN and its revolutionary legitimacy for their own purposes. The consequent violence that was generated after the elections led to the arrest and punishment of these leaders and their supporters.

The FIS quickly emerged as the most powerful opposition group in the country. It carefully prepared for the elections, using sermons in mosques and speeches at Islamic events, and practised a new economic system based on charities, Zakat and the Islamic market, to assist directly in the well-being of Algerians, providing food and shelter. The FIS, FFS and PT were more outspoken in their criticisms of the military regime than the other parties. The military regime responded by creating other parties to dilute these criticisms. Examples of these included Islamists such as the RCD, and the MSP (formerly Hamas). Later, the regime created its own party, the National Rally for Democracy (RND),⁹⁰⁹ which eventually became the political face of the French Officers and the military regime in general.

According to Addi, the results of the elections of January 1992 had not been anticipated by the military regime and the army was not ready to accept successful autonomous parties forming a government that it would not necessarily control.⁹¹⁰ Party conflict became the pretext of the violence and *coup* of 1992. Former General Nazzar confirmed that the army had confidence that the winner of these elections would be from the nationalists, and there would be a narrow gap among the parties.⁹¹¹ The unexpected success of FIS triggered the violent crisis of 1992. The military was launched into action, using the DRS, led at the time by Khalida Massaoudi,⁹¹² against the FIS, taking advantage of a demonstration by the anti-Islamic FFS in opposition to the FIS and its electoral victory. While some protestors were seeking to reverse the elections, this was never an aim of the FFS

⁹⁰⁹ RND: *Rassemblement National pour la Democratie*; from the birth of this party, the RND had attracted numerous adherents apparently motivated more by personal interests than by political convictions.

⁹¹⁰ Lahouari Addi (2009).

⁹¹¹ Khalid Nazzar, interview by French TVs, *TF1*, *TV5* and *Channel +*, in a program on the new History of Algeria, 1998.

⁹¹² Khalida Massaoudi, known these days as Khalida Toumi, was famous for her anti-Islamist approach. She was a member of RCD (1996-2001) and became Minister of Culture in the government of Ouyahia.

leadership.⁹¹³ The military regime was seeking any support it could find to justify its intervention in cancelling the elections and stopping the Islamists from gaining power.⁹¹⁴

Mourad Dhina has argued that the dictatorship in Algeria had the ability to use elections to protect themselves from critics by creating political parties and humanitarian organisations to redirect attention away from their government. It is not surprising that the military regime created political parties, trusts, and organisations, and was involved in some way or another with most of the political parties, including the major parties.⁹¹⁵ The military regime has never agreed to the principles of democracy: decision making positions were conceived and designed to remain in military hands, with the political parties providing legitimacy and additional options to control the political arena. That, at least, was the military perspective.

Addi's views reinforce the argument that the military had a serious problem with its own legitimacy, and switched to a multiparty system precisely to gain electoral legitimacy. After the *coup* of 1992, the opposition was effectively removed. The military regime stopped the FIS by arresting its leadership and killing or jailing many members. In doing this, however, the military regime had to resort to more drastic tactics. They cited the global war on terrorism to justify their *coup*, and the human rights violations that followed over the next two decades. The state of emergency that they declared in 1992 is still in effect. No party or civilian organisation has reached the level of effective opposition during these decades.⁹¹⁶ To gain legitimacy in power, the regime has created the caricature of a political system for an international audience. It has allowed the formation of limited parties and organisations, beginning with the FLN and the EGTA, then the RCD and the RND. The military has three parties, the FLN, the RND, and the MSP, instead of the one party, the FLN, that it had previously. According to Addi:

...functioning with two legitimacies, the political system in Algeria is confronted by three major contradictions: the first is relative to the antagonism of two legitimacies (historic and electoral), the second is linked to the inevitable competition between the real power (the army) and the formal power (the president), and, finally, the third results from the weak representation of the elected officials owing to the stuffing of ballot boxes. In order to survive these three contradictions, which risked proving fatal to it, the regime indirectly fashioned a singular typology of parties, in corrupting their respective leadership. It is known that the managements of

⁹¹³ Chouchane (10/06/2009); Samraoui (2001).

⁹¹⁴ Anwar Haddam, personal interview (21/05/2009).

⁹¹⁵ Dhina, personal interview, Geneva (26 September 2009); Chouchane, personal interview, London (10 June 2009).

⁹¹⁶ Chouchane (10 June 2009); Abbas and Dhina, personal interviews (26-27/09/2009).

the FLN, the RND, and the MSP are not autonomous and obey the instructions of the administration.⁹¹⁷

8. The Role of the Current Parties in the Decision Making and Structuring of Violence in Algeria

Since the War of Independence, Algeria has not had civilian control in the political leadership of the country. According to General Nazzar, the military always chooses the president and the government.⁹¹⁸ Chouchane concludes his observations on the role of political parties by saying that the multi-party system in Algeria is a “big lie”. It is generally agreed that most political parties, and certainly those that are represented in the legislature, are tools in the hands of the military, and have no independent policies. Such political parties present a democratic face for the military regime.⁹¹⁹

Under emergency rule, political parties have been formed, but many have failed to secure their licencing agreements from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The regime has taken the lesson of the FIS to heart. Former Prime Minister (and strong supporter of the military regime) Sid Ahmed Ghuzali failed to get approval of his new party, formed in 2009, following intervention by the military in the political sector. The same thing happened to Ahmed Taleb al-Ibrahimi, who wrote in his memoirs of his struggles with his father, Bashir al-Ibrahimi, against the military regime until they refused his attempts to form a new political party. Since 1992, Algeria has had four presidents, eight prime ministers and hundreds of ministers, with many ministers dismissed after only a few months in office, whereas the main military leaders responsible for the violence in the country since independence, and the *coup* of 1992, appear to be secure in their positions.⁹²⁰ The Algerian regime requires that the president of the republic is determined by the military and elected by 90 per cent of electors. This system applied to the terms of Bendjedid in 1978, Zérroual in 1995, and Bouteflika in 1999. If the voters do not agree on a candidate, the system goes into crisis. “The presidential election does not inform on the influence of the parties, but rather on the influence of institutions or of clans in such institutions.”⁹²¹

⁹¹⁷ Addi (2009).

⁹¹⁸ Khaled Nazzar, interview with *Aljazeera TV* (2001).

⁹¹⁹ Chouchane interview, London (13/05/2009).

⁹²⁰ Abdelhamid Brahim, “Algeria on the Brink of an Abyss, an Attempt of Legitimacy through Massive Fraud” (18/07/1997): <<http://archive.tribunemagazine.co.uk/article/18th-july-1997/6/algeria-on-the-brink-of-an-abyss> .

⁹²¹ Brahim, *Algeria on the Brink*; Lahouari, “The Multi-Party System”: <<http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf>>.

Brahimi stated that the military regime is suffering from the internal and external isolation that it experienced after the *coup* of 1992.⁹²² The only way for the government to survive and gain time, in the absence of legitimacy, has been to improve its political image on the one hand, while continuing to pursue its policy of violence to terrorism on the other.

There always was massive fraud by stuffing ballot boxes by government officials, because the turnout was very low, and mainly because the overwhelming majority of the Algerian people do not trust the regime.⁹²³

Indeed, the long-term lack of legitimacy, including the legitimacy of political parties, in Algerian politics has demonstrated that violence is a deliberate policy of the regime. The violence has been fed by the regime itself to justify its existence and to survive in power.

The legitimacy of the regime through fraudulent elections serves also as a political cover to continue its policy of terror in the name of secularism against ‘fundamentalism’.⁹²⁴

To conclude this chapter, it is clear that the democratic system in Algeria, established by a general election for the Constitution in 1989, has not been accepted by the military regime. Indeed, the regime that remains in place since independence enjoys power without legitimacy. The only legitimacy available to them is the legitimacy that came out of the revolution, and this appears to have lost its meaning for the present generation in the face of the constant and continuing failures of the regime. The only way to achieve political legitimacy is to create a new political environment, with political parties and social organisations that enable the general population and the international community to have confidence in a democratic system. At present, citizens have been given the right to vote, but not the right to choose their leadership and their constitution. Addi has noted that political science attempts to explain:

...a multi-party system without electoral alternatives! The populations have the right to vote, but not the right to choose leaders other than the ones designated by the administration.⁹²⁵

Dhina, Aroua and Massli have supported Addi’s observation that Algeria has not chosen a president or even leaders in parliament by election, and that the regime does not accept the fact that the electorate does not support it. According to Addi, after the *coup* of 1992 the government routinely rigged the electoral results to prevent having to resort to

⁹²² Brahimi, personal Interview, London (September 2009); and *Algeria On The Brink* (18/07/1997).

⁹²³ Brahimi (1997).

⁹²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹²⁵ Addi (2009): <<http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf>>.

annulment. All political parties, whether government or ‘opposition’, are involved in a game that is controlled by the military. These parties are just a façade that their sponsors from the military and the DRS approve of.⁹²⁶ Addi analysed the sources of military power in Algeria, concluding that:

...the regime makes use of three resources: the administration, which fixes the results; the legal system, which is incapable of annulling falsified polls; and finally, the police, which suppress every violent protest.⁹²⁷

⁹²⁶ Chouchane, personal interview, London (26 September 2009).

⁹²⁷ Addi (2009): <<http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf>> .

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This study has explored the central question of why the Algerian military turned against its own citizens after independence. The research has been focused mainly on the protracted military intervention in the political system and its relation to the demise of democracy and the rise of human rights abuses in Algeria. As discussed in the first chapter, scholars and other observers have continually questioned the causes and consequences of this violence and, in particular, the civil war of the 1990s. This thesis has focused on the unique role of the Algerian military after independence and examined whether structural or organisational changes in the Algerian military caused the massive human rights violations in Algeria, especially those of the 1990s. Of central interest were the military actions during the Algerian political crisis immediately after independence, and later during the democratic period of 1989-1991. There is no doubt that violence by Islamic extremists resulted in significant human rights violations. According to interviews undertaken for this research, the FIS, at the time that it was formed, was not part of the violence that took place after the *coup d'état* following the election of 1991-92.⁹²⁸

Violence in Algeria is the most disturbing aspect of a much larger problem, the failure of democracy, which was only instituted for the first time in Algeria in the 1989 Constitution. The weakness of the political elites, including the Islamic movements, helped the military, directly and indirectly, in their violations of civil and human rights. From this key issue, three theoretical questions follow regarding the formation of a military ethos and the impact of political parties on human rights violations in post-colonial Algeria. The first question is about the fundamental structure of the Algerian military after independence in 1962. This study examines the formation of that military establishment. The domination of the armed forces in the Algerian system took root even before independence, however. It is argued that after 1957, the Congress of Soummam, established the future role of the army and the security services.⁹²⁹

⁹²⁸ This question has been clearly answered by FIS leaders through the media and many members have taken part as participants in this research, including Dr. Haddam Anouar, FIS Parliament chief, personal interview, Washington DC, May 2009, Ahmed Zaoui (Former MP), Hamilton, New Zealand, personal interview, November 2009; Dr. Dhina Morad (Former MP responsible for international relations), Geneva, personal interview, September 2009. Rachid Masli (Former FIS lawyer), personal interview, Geneva, September 2009.

⁹²⁹ See Belkacem Saadalla, *al-Haraka al-Wataniya* (Algerian National Movement), Part 4, Pub. 2, Institute of Research and Arabic Studies, Egypt (n/d). See also: the interview questions noted at appendix 10.

Algeria has had an unstable political system since its independence. Of major significance were the *coup d'état* of 1962 against the Provisional Government (GPRA), another *coup* against the first president of the country, Ben Bella, in 1965, and ongoing revolutionary struggles for political and military control over the country. With the formation of a military regime heading the Revolutionary Council, and the single political party, the FLN, Algeria faced changes that affected national security, the political structure and even international relations. This study has discussed and analysed these changes and the human rights violations that followed every military *coup* in Algeria.

I have attempted to clarify and outline the performance of the political system in Algeria, following the course of its history right through to the present era. Algeria is a case study that can be seen as an informative example of the challenges and dangers facing other countries in the region. It raises many of the issues recently uncovered in the “Arab Spring”. However, we should not underestimate the wide the differences among the countries of North Africa and the Middle East in terms of history and political systems. While many of the countries in this large region have similar problems, they are vastly different from each other as well. The central focus of this research is based on the analysis of the specific and varied sources of violence that Algerians were (and are) subjected to before and after independence.

Several historical factors were precursors to the widespread human rights violations, which destroyed over 200,000 lives in less than a decade. The questions arising from this research have been covered in earlier chapters, drawing on information from the media and the comments of participants, observers and scholars. The information included in this analysis has been referenced with the help of key political and military people. Through face-to-face interviews, as well as phone and written interviews, participants have comprehensively discussed the nature of the apparent illness that seems to beset the regime, and the dysfunctional nature of Algeria’s political system.

Military regimes and their intervention in political parties, and particularly their human rights violations, are central concerns of this research. The history of the revolutionary war provides strong evidence regarding the basis and origins of the Algerian political crisis, and the widespread violation of human rights that has hurt the country so deeply, especially in the 1990s.

According to the observations of the people who participated in this research, the main cause of the Algerian crisis after independence involved the French-trained military officers, to whom I have referred as the “French Officers.” They have, by all appearances, owed their allegiance and their policies to France and, as regards their apparent need to hold

power, to themselves. Some of my interviewees were revolutionaries of the War of Independence (1954-62) and some were witnesses to the many crimes that took place in Algeria during the crisis of 1990 in the name of fighting terrorism. The breakdown of the remnants of civil society that remained after the independence struggle probably stemmed from internal competition for the highest positions of power in the country. Brahimi, one of the revolutionary leaders who had occupied a number of positions in different governments, including the office of prime minister during the presidential period of Bendjedid (1984-88), witnessed the rise of the French Officers, and continues to blame them for the crisis. Brahimi's evidence is supported by Samraoui and Chouchane who were witnesses to the human rights violations perpetrated against Algerians during the crisis of the 1990s.

The violence in Algeria is ultimately a legacy of the French colonial regime, although it was unleashed in a far less controlled form against civilians during the post-colonial era. However, the conflicts among the leaders of the revolution started in the early years of the liberation conflict. In 1956, the Congress of Soummam highlighted the principles of revolution and included the proposal that Algeria be controlled by civilian politicians, not by the military, and that local people have priority in taking positions of power over people living outside the country. While the revolutionary elites saw the politicians' role in the revolution as controlling the new military forces, with the murder of Ramdane, the political designer of the Soummam process, the military assumed full political power.

A few months after achieving independence, the country was divided into regions, and the discord among the leaders and their supporters erupted in a bloody competition for power. Before the last troops of the French military left the country, Algerians were confronted by another war which started between the internal revolutionaries and the military commands of the East and West borders, led by Boumédiène, including officers from the French military schools. The French Officers had begun their rise to power. The Leader of the GPRA, Ben Khadda, refused to engage in combat against his own citizens at the end of the war, and chose rather to relinquish leadership, leaving it in Boumédiène's hands. Ben Bella accepted Boumédiène's offer to become the first independent Algerian president, based on Boumédiène's sense that he did not have sufficient legitimacy, and his lack of a war record. He knew, of course, that at that time the real power of the revolution was in the hands of the three 'Bs', Boussof, Ben Toubal and Belkacem. Soon Boumédiène was able to disestablish the GPRA, including its military divisions, and arrest its leaders. He then replaced it with a Military Secret Service (SM) under the leadership of Marbah, to function

under his immediate command. The role of the SM was to protect him and his position against threats from his colleagues and from other revolutionaries.

The second question considers the formation and the structure of the military regime in Algeria. Eventually Boumédiène succeeded in his plan, using the support of the French Officers on the one hand, and the legitimacy of Ben Bella on the other. He was thus able to rule the country from the shadows, that is, until he decided to seize full leadership through a *coup d'état* in 1965. Many people were arrested, and subsequently tortured and killed. The competition for power continued along these lines during Boumédiène's reign, thanks to the personal security that he had found through the protection of the most powerful organisation within the security services, the SM. The SM was faithful to Boumédiène until he died, and this weakened resistance from other revolutionaries and regional leaders who often found themselves in discord with him. In fact, there were *coup* attempts against Boumédiène and his government, but they were typically crushed by the SM, which functioned outside the country's legislation, and thus could do whatever their leader asked. According to Brahim, Boumédiène was closer to the French Officers than any other post-revolutionary leader, and may have suffered the ultimate consequences, although he is thought to have died from a rare blood disease.⁹³⁰

The French Officers, who for the most part only became involved in the revolution (on the side of the Algerians) a few months before the ceasefire, apparently developed a neo-colonial project over the 30 years following independence, and used this to empower and enrich themselves. During the difficult Boumédiène years, the French Officers played a major role in developing a strong military establishment, training young soldiers to reliably obey their orders and preparing them to be used strategically. The Benjedid presidency was an auspicious moment for them to claim key positions in the different sectors of the administration, military, politics, media and the economy. Pressure was mounting on the president to close the SM because of the narrowness of its original role to protect Boumédiène and his regime, and because its power had come from Boumédiène, and not from the Constitution. The SM leader, Marbah, who was thought to have confidential files exposing the intentions of the French Officers, was appointed prime minister as a matter of convenience, and then was assassinated with his family in a bloody accident during the democratic period in 1991. After this, the French Officers were able to occupy the highest levels of power in the Ministry of Defence, which was controlled by General Nazzar, the

⁹³⁰ Brahim, interview with *Aljazeera TV*; Chouchane (13/05/2009).

spokesman of the French Officers group and reportedly the designer of the *coup d'état* of 1992, which ended the brief democratic period.

The background to that *coup* is highly instructive, and points to elements of the “Arab Spring” by way of comparison. After a massive wave of violence, which took hundreds of lives in October 1988, President Benjedid’s government responded by introducing sweeping democratic reforms that brought the Islamists, led by FIS and an anti-military coalition, which was led by the FFS, to power. The French Officers were clearly unwilling to relinquish their grasp on power, and awaited a chance to reverse the democratic processes. With the support of anti-Islamist organisations, which were thought to have been formed and/or controlled by the intelligence services (DRS), they intervened in January 1992, sparking a bitter and bloody civil war that lasted for the remainder of the decade. The military ignored the legislative and judicial rules, and violated the principles of the country established after the revolution.

Although the state-of-emergency began immediately after the *coup d'état* of 1992, it was extended repeatedly over the next dozen years. Thus, although the regime had to hold on to legitimacy in a way that retained democracy and protected itself from the violence that it encouraged and fomented after the events of October 1988, it continued to act illegitimately, conceding only in establishing a range of organisations, and political parties such as the GTA, women’s organisations and ‘protective organisations’. They organised pro-government and anti-Islamic demonstrations and marches, such as the march of the FFS and the RCD in 1991, which allowed these groups to raise their collective voices in a war against Islamists. The respective positions of power occupied by the French Officers allowed them to unleash levels of violence not seen since the days of the Algerian War, and served to radicalise elements on both sides. Consequently, terrorist organisations increased the intensity of their attacks against civilians and officials alike. Military security agents (DRS) apparently used this situation to create more chaos in the country’s political, economy and security systems. The number of state security forces also increased, with the establishment of militia forces that further intensified the level of human rights abuses. It was in the midst of this extreme violence that the Algerian authorities engaged in a transition to democracy. The regime established the National Consultative Council (*Conseil Consultatif Nationale* (CCN), to take the role of parliament and to legitimise decisions taken by the authorities. Several political parties, created by security agents or guided by them, took part in this council, and supported the military in the fight against what was referred to as ‘the Islamic Danger’, while others abstained from being represented in what they perceived to be an illegitimate body.

Year after year, the violence continued to destroy lives. The prolonged instability and insecurity of social life in most regions of the country eventually began to concern the military regime, however. There was now the growing possibility of a spontaneous revolution against them, and this encouraged them to attempt to unite the country behind their leadership, and to bring the regions, communities, and ethnic groups more closely together, apparently not for purposes of social reform or in the spirit of amnesty, but rather to gain legitimacy in the national and international settings.

On the international level, many of the human rights organizations have received positive responses from countries around the world supporting intervention in Algeria and investigation of the massacres and other alleged crimes that occurred in Algerian villages. The truth behind the assassination of as many as 200,000 people during ten years of crisis remains buried, and the alleged perpetrators have not been tried. The French penetration of Algeria was underscored in the United Nations in 1995 when the French representative vetoed intervention in Algeria. It is apparent that the French still consider that Algeria is not only an ex-French colony, but in some respects at least, an extension of French territory.

However, Algerian national identity did not blend well with the socio-cultural backgrounds of the French Officers and their supporters. For the most part, these elites were deeply immersed in Western culture and French customs, and contrasted sharply with most Algerians, who were Arabs, who spoke Arabic, and who practiced Islam as their religion. Regionalism, moreover, complicated matters for the French Officers. Regional and ethnic differences, then, made it very difficult for the French Officers to plan some sort of national integration that would be accepting of their own identities. Algeria's multi-faceted national identity, moreover, made it very difficult to select a single, popular leader. The French Officers and, indeed, much of the military establishment, were thus further encouraged to identify themselves as Francophone and anti-Islamist, particularly after the death of Boumédiène. Efforts by the military establishment to guide the identity of Algerians, through the education system, media and social organisations, largely failed; the reality of Algerian society and culture, and interpersonal relations, was based upon an ideology and rules that were clearly different from those of the leadership (viz., the Francophone elite). This fundamental conflict was mostly hidden, but grew in the mosques and universities and with the support of other various factors, such as social, economic and the political confrontations, until it was dramatically highlighted by the advent of democracy in the early 1990s.

The second part of the hypothesis, involving the spread of military intervention into political life, focuses on the subject of military professionalism, which supposedly affects the

role that the Algerian military should take to become politically subservient to civilian government, to avoid clashes with civilians, and to cease committing human rights violations. Whenever the question of “who kills whom in Algeria?” was raised during the height of violence, by scholars, politicians and through the international media, the question was typically reduced to two possible answers: the military regime or groups from the Islamist fundamentalists. Ill-defined “terrorists” were sometimes included as well. The analysis has tended to be focused on the military regime and how they view the issue. The question increasingly arises as to whether the Algerian military is professional enough to guide culture and politics sufficiently to support the well-being and fundamental interests of Algerians, or will it simply continue to institutionalise violence for the purposes of furthering its immediate self-interest. Most of the evidence presented herein points to a conclusion that by now is obvious: the main interest of the military in Algeria has been to stay in power and maintain its hegemony over the administration of the country, and the economy, and control of all political groups. The Algerian military, it will be recalled, was originally formed on the frontiers of Algeria by Boumédiène in 1962, and officers have never been selected based on professional military qualifications. For officers in the Algerian military, military service meant (and continues to mean) upward social mobility, power, and participation in the rewards of economic hegemony, opportunism, and much more. There is a wide gap between the Constitution of 1976, which explicitly defined the role of the military as political and ideological, and the Constitution of 1989, which reflected the need for a professional, less politicised military, defined in Article 24 as an institution responsible solely for defence.

It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the Algerian military has never practiced military professionalism, but has instead played the role of a clandestine political actor holding power positions in the highest levels of bureaucracy. The military relies on armed power and through this has gained political power. Indeed, most of my sources have indicated that it is only through violence that this regime could survive for any length of time. After the *coup d'état* of 1992, when chaos spread throughout the country, violent military responses became a standard reaction from the regime. French Officers had a simple solution to political unrest, and they applied it to civilians without hesitation. We know, for example, that the Defence Minister at that time, Nazzar, justified the military-directed violence of October 1988 by saying that the army had not received “the white bullets, so we used the black ones”. The same solution was suggested against the democratic elections in 1991, and to justify the subsequent *coup d'état*, implying that democracy had “opened the door” to

Islamist terrorists. Thus, violence was the standard solution of the military dictatorship to most threats.

By the end of the war and the immediate post-war period, the ALN evolved into the nation's military forces. In the process, the leadership of these military forces became the key source of power in Algeria and the ultimate cause of most power struggles, *coups*, and *coup* attempts in Algeria.⁹³¹ Boumédiène, who built a modern military outside the borders of the country and was involved in initiating the protracted violence, moved to play a central political role with Ben Bella at a time when the country was under Arab socialism. A political transformation took place, with the *coup* of 1965 against the Ben Bella government. Algeria's first president, Ben Bella, was overthrown and Boumédiène, who was regarded as a political moderate, and not identified with any particular group or faction. He commanded wide support from the military establishment.⁹³²

Boumédiène immediately dissolved the National Assembly and suspended Algeria's 1964 Constitution. The Council of the Revolution became responsible for policymaking and political decisions in the country. It was predominantly a military body intended to foster cooperation among the various factions in the army and the FLN. The original 26 members of the Council included former internal military leaders and senior officers closely associated with Boumédiène's *coup*. Through this Council, supported by French Officers, Boumédiène practiced authoritarian methods against national associations, leaving the army to become the country's legitimacy-granting authority. The flaw that led the military regime to begin relying on violence in the postcolonial period was its inability to endow itself with legitimacy. According to Addi, this inability "propelled the Islamists into the resulting gap, which has existed ever since the death of President Boumédiène in 1978."⁹³³ Violence was the only political tactic of the military regime, and the only way that it could survive in power. The *coup* against the first free elections in the early 1990s was a *coup* against democracy in Algeria. It was the most strident example of Algeria's lack of military professionalism. As the political font of constitutions, presidents, prime ministers, and governments, the Algerian military would appear to be unable to establish itself as a professional military.

Competition for power and the other factors that led to the establishment of the military institution has perpetuated the deep conflicts among the different military groups.

⁹³¹ Cordesman (2002), p.109.

⁹³² *Ibid.*

⁹³³ Addi, "Algeria's Tragic Contradictions".

Three separate types of military officers developed within the National Popular Army (ANP), especially during the last decade. As has been mentioned previously, revolutionaries, who retained their military ranks after independence, were mostly incapacitated by Boumédiène's policies. Boumédiène preferred the French Officers, and brought them into high-level decision making. The French Officers were the strongest group during the period of President Bendjedid, rising to the highest ranks within the military. As explored at length in previous chapters, their spokesman, Nazzar, became the Minister of Defence, and then a member of the High Council of State, the *Haut Comité d'Etat* (HCE), under Presidents Boudiaf and Ali Kafi. The third group was comprised of the youth officers, the 'children of independence'. This group began their military experience conscripted into the national service, which was compulsory for all young Algerians. In the early years of national independence, these young people chose to be involved in the military and to be soldiers in the ANP, striving for a position in administration or in one of the national parastatal companies because, as discussed in Chapter Five, corruption was part of the administrative ethos. The French Officers, then, continued to hold onto power, and to control all rival groups based upon the success of their strategies, and strong support from the international community and from France in particular.

This thesis has also attempted to answer the third hypothesis, the role of the international communities in enabling the Algerian military to turn against its own people. The strong and supportive international relationships that the military regime and the French Officers enjoyed, particularly with the French government, date back to the early years of independence. Boumédiène and Ben Bella were the first leaders to emphasize a partnership with France. They did so for a number of reasons. The treaty of Evian, the issue of the '*Pied Noirs*' and '*Harkists*', and extensive French economic interests in Algeria established sound bases for exchanges of goods and expertise between the two countries. The French government gave (and, by most accounts, continues to give) valuable assistance to the military regime, and in exchange for this it was allowed to penetrate deeply into the Algerian political establishment. France conveniently overlooked Algeria's abysmal human rights record, and the *coup* of 1992. It is worthwhile to mention that French support has been approved by at the highest levels of the French government, and reinforced by former French president Chirac when he said that France would never accept a 'Taliban government' on its borders.⁹³⁴ A casual observer might be excused for thinking that this was a condemnation of

⁹³⁴ Aggoun and Rivoire (2001), p. 520.

Algerian democracy. It certainly seemed so. However continuing French support is based on other factors as well. French and Algerian cultures coexisted for many decades. And France has major economic interests in Algeria, not the least of which involved petroleum in an age of growing scarcity.⁹³⁵ These dynamic interests would likely be challenged by a transformation of the political system in Algeria. A shift to democracy in Algeria, seen in this context, might be seen as threatening to French interests.

In 1992 the relationship between the French government and the Algerian military regime had reached a point where the Algerian and French security services were working together against civilians, arguably in both countries. Their aim was to convince French policy makers of the Islamist danger to French political power, and to force them to accept that violence was the only adequate response to the situation in Algeria, as support for what they called the ‘war on terror’. The conflict between the French military and their political leaders in the middle 1990s, mostly over the Algerian crisis, ultimately pushed the French government to intervene to protect the French Officers and their regime in Algeria. Indeed, after the French Airline hijacking, the bombs in the Paris metro, and the murder of the monks of Tibhirine, as well as a series of crimes in France involving Algerian political opposition organisations and refugees, the French government hurried to accept all of the proposed French-Algerian security arrangements. French support for the Algerian military regime has been criticised in recent years by the European Union and other Western countries, including the USA. The French security services were ultimately successful in involving France diplomatically in the Algerian crisis.

After 2004, the French authorities changed their relationship with Algeria as they looked for an acceptable civilian to support in the presidency. The French Officers were increasingly isolated, some were assassinated, and many were retired or demoted to lower positions overseas. The system was undergoing a drastic, if gradual, change. While the French relationship did not radically change its direction in Algeria, once they had established full protection for their brokers, and assurances that no judicial or political pressure would be applied against them in or outside the country, the relationship shifted. This was noted in the national amnesty, which had been announced by President Bouteflika. The amnesty was supported by most Algerian citizens; they simply wanted peace after many long years of dictatorship and violence.

⁹³⁵ See Appendix 6, “French- Algeria economic relationship”.

In September 2005, Algerians voted in an unprecedented referendum to approve a charter for “peace and national reconciliation,” offering amnesty to Algerian insurgents in exchange for laying down their arms. The charter also extended the same offer of clemency to the military officers, police and security agents involved in crimes during Algeria’s turbulent civil war. However this charter was rejected by opposition organisations, key personalities, the FIS, communist organisations and the families of the disappeared, who thought that there should be reparations paid to the relatives of those who had suffered from the violence.

The unexpected finding of this research is the significance of corruption and economic opportunism in the Algerian military regime’s long-term strategy. The political opposition had long sought to determine the reason for the military’s continuing economic and political hegemony. According to the participants in this research from the military sector, corruption, at least on the scale that it achieved, was a new phenomenon among the military leadership, evident only after the crisis of the 1990s. Before that crisis, there were no accusations of corruption against any of the generals, or even the president, and their hegemony on power was thought to come from their despotism and autocracy. The first military leader who abused power and established dominance over all sectors of the state was Boumédiène with his creation of the SM. But Boumédiène would not have been charged with corruption or economic opportunism, nor would the French Officers after him. Human rights’ violations before the crisis of the 1990s were apparently unrelated to economic opportunism and corruption. The primary charges that the military regime of that era would have faced would have been breach of trust and violence against their own people, and perhaps their involvement in crimes against civilians outside their borders. Corruption was not a relevant concern.

After the *coup d’état* of 1992, the military regime used all its strength to stay in power and to protect itself from rebellion against their security policies. They used public funds to reinforce public security and their war against ‘terrorists’. Because of the global war against terrorism, the international community approved of the *coup*, and the consequent human right violations of 1992, which have continued on into the present. Corruption and economic opportunism, however, are relatively recent concerns, and probably should not be regarded as key elements in the structuring of violence in Algeria. On the other hand, the DRS, which is said to control the country ‘from the shadows,’ is reportedly using corruption files to pressure any politicians or political parties who threaten to oppose the government’s policies. This tactic has been practiced repeatedly and successfully many times since the

revolutionary period. In fact, the same sorts of corruption files have threatened revolutionaries and leaders of the state during the revolutionary era and after independence. Ramdane, Abbas, Belkacem, Ben Bella, and even Bouteflika before he went to his exile, were all charged at some point with corruption and economic opportunism. In 2010, the corruption files were again opened, this time to allow for the regulation of general associations, in this case providing for longer terms for directors. Many cases have since been opened for the express purpose of reducing levels of corruption in Algerian society. Conflict between the presidency and the military regime has caused the president to withdraw his intervention into the military sector, with the resignation of the Minister of Energy.⁹³⁶

However, corruption remains a plague in Algerian society, mostly because of the poverty resulting from the protracted authoritarian regime. The generals failed in their attempts to restore civil peace and to provide the basic needs of Algerians. Rather, they put citizens at the mercy of almost random bullets in a brutal dictatorship. The country was plunged into chaos, and injustice, poverty, corruption and self-interest, all introduced during the War of Independence, proliferated. All were consequences of the military character and its puzzling ethos, sacrificing the citizens that they were pledged to protect. The final injustice is that the senior military officers, including the remnants of the French Officers, and the FLN leadership, have granted themselves immunity from prosecution for what are some of the worst war crimes committed in the past century.

At the end of this study, it seems important to draw conclusions regarding the analyses and observations of scholars and participants on the Algerian military regime's hegemony, and the consequences of their interventions into both the political and economic spheres. The many human rights violations are frankly baffling. They were often carried out in front of the international community, with little or no constructive response. Through it all has been the single, political party, the FLN, which can scarcely be characterised as anything other than a front organisation for a government ultimately controlled by the military. The FLN has been used as the political face for the military regime to lend it a degree of legitimacy. The new generation of Algerians does not appear to accept any kind of legitimacy apart from that of democracy, however, and thus the impact of the political party has been negligible. With the advent of a multi-party system in Algeria, ideologies that drive parties in the domestic political arena must now begin to lead them to define the national interest in

⁹³⁶ Chakib Khalil, the minister of Energy, resigned under pressure from President Bouteflika in 2010, after a scandal involving 3 billion dollars that implicated the President. See Chapter 4 of this thesis; also: Chouchane (10/06/2009).

constructive and collective ways. This is just as true in regard to secular parties, former revolutionary and Islamic movements, which are linked to ideological issues on the one hand and to ethnic groups on the other. Domestic politics in Algeria demonstrate that the human rights violations during the period 1991-2001 were also influenced by cultural and ideological factors. Under the Islamists' slogan, "Islam is the only solution," and the slogan of secularists, "Algeria is not Iran or Afghanistan", some compromise had to be reached. The different ethnic groups, including the Arabs, the Berbers, and the French, contributed to some extent in forcing Algeria into fundamental conflicts that resulted in the human rights violations during the 1990s. Inexperienced parties and new political communities, in fact, failed to deal with the complicated problems facing the country.

Political parties are key actors in the process of democratisation and the consolidation of new parliamentary democracies, but Algeria has little practical experience with democratic parties or, for that matter, with democracy. The Constitution was corrupted and replaced with seemingly arbitrary rules of a state of emergency after the *coup d'état* against the FIS, who had won the first free election in Algerian history. Thus, the multi-party system ended in some senses even before it began to function. The military never accepted any changes through free elections, which, in any case, threatened their hegemony. The military had never accepted any party apart from those few that had been established by them, or had sworn allegiance to them, and for this reason, they refused to abide by the platform of San-Egidio, which was promulgated in Rome at the end of 1994, when the Algerian opposition met for the first time with international support to draft a solution to the Algerian crisis.

Politically, the multi-party system practiced in Algeria after the *coup d'état* of 1992 was based on an authoritarian regime that controlled the government and the populace through violence. The open democracy of 1990s was a lesson to the military, particularly when the electoral competition came to include over forty political parties. Most of these parties were quickly dismissed after the *coup d'état* of 1992. The only parties that survived were those that pledged their support of the military and abided by its security policies. Moreover, following the *coup*, the multi-party political system in Algeria has not included political positions in the parliament, or even allowed citizens to protest in the street. The military secret services were involved in most of the new parties in order to monitor and control them.

The opposition can be considered as comprising only two parties, the FIS which chose violence as a strategy to regain their rights after losing them to the military *coup d'état*

just when they had almost succeeded in gaining power through democratic election in 1991. The FFS is an older party of the opposition, but has been ignored by the media and the government, which had always rejected their political activities. The other two parties, the RCD and the Labour party (PT), were somewhere in between, passively supporting the regime in its fight against the Islamists under the name of ‘war on terror’. The RCD gave its full support to the military services in the *coup* against democracy, in part because at the time they were in the process of protesting against the election results of 1991. They deviated from outright loyalty to the military when they began to see that the regime was being criticised by the presidency and prominent countries in the international community. Hannoun, the leader of PT and a strong personality among Algerian politicians in the parliament, has come to represent the cause of democracy in Algeria, and thus receives considerable international support and attention for the regime, albeit indirectly, which is why most of her activities are covered by the media. This party is not a threat to the military regime. For one thing, its program is not acceptable to most of the Algerian people. As Addi has noted:

...the Algerian regime will never accept any opposition parties which are able to win a free election and able to make any changes which could affect it. The Algerian multi-party [system] is just a pluralist form unrelated to reality.⁹³⁷

In summary, the Algerian political processes before 1962 represented a stunning revolution, unique in the third world and Arab countries, ousting the French colonials at a moment of French hegemony. However, since then Algerian politics have searched in vain for legitimacy, beset with an ongoing and self-perpetuating authoritarian regime, using force and practicing violence against its own people to preserve its power, while attempting to broadcast the image that it is a democratic, multi-party government, supportive of human rights and freedom, a beacon for the best principles of the Algerian people. The regime did not expect the events of 1991, when the Islamists almost achieved power through election. The military coup that ousted democracy in 1992 became an undesired international scandal, and lost prestige with the International community and with countries that had been regarded as sympathetic with the Algerian revolution.

Most of international secular political parties at the time declared that Algerians were not ready for democracy, although they were reluctant to criticize the trappings of

⁹³⁷ Lahouari (2009): <http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf>.

democracy that Algeria still, barely, retained: elections, attempts to maintain through other policies that Algeria was still a stable country with a democratic government, which has been formed from different political parties. Nevertheless, as careful and restrained observers have repeatedly noted, “The 2012 elections [for example] are devoid of any significance”. Unable to restore revolutionary legitimacy, political leaders tend to look back at the Boumediane era, a testament to their inability to redeem their “democracy”.⁹³⁸ They were graphically dissatisfied with democracy in 1991, however, and thus they have apparently organized subsequent elections *without* democracy. Indeed, that was a successful method for Algerians during the previous elections of 2007, which demonstrated in the eyes of some academic observers that a multi-party system that does not confirm the participation of the population in the institutions of the state serves only as a democratic façade.⁹³⁹

Algeria's elections of 2012, which selected 462 members of Parliament from about 26 political parties, ultimately established a “new” government led by the regime’s party, the FLN, and the RND, the military’s party.⁹⁴⁰ In view of this, many observers have argued that the multi-party system in Algeria has been little more than a political façade, catering to a single group, the French Officers, “*Hizeb Franca*.” The democracy and free elections that brought the FIS to power, and a sense of freedom to Algerians, faded quickly, and has never re-emerged.⁹⁴¹ Consequently, Algerian elections, except, perhaps for 1991, have apparently not represented the interests of Algerians. It is difficult to see the forthcoming elections as representing a change from these previous patterns. Perhaps, at the most, they will offer themselves as a sort of barometer by which to gauge the flavor of politics in Algeria after the rapid decline (health, presence) of the current president, Bouteflika.

Finally, through this research we can conclude that human rights violations, which have troubled Algeria since its inception, stem from historical factors and causes, but are also attributable to the particular features and opportunistic nature of the political environment. Of major causal significance was the path that the revolutionaries ultimately chose, establishing illegitimate and non-centralised leadership, which people were forced to accept through waves of violence. The authority structures formed by the military were largely apolitical, or simply operated through violence, and the fomenting of violence, which became functional and part of a mission during the revolutionary era. Later, after independence, the

⁹³⁸ Larbi Sadiki, *Aljazeera* (Opinion), [Algeria: Elections without democracy], 10/05/2012: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/05/201251011038530582.html>.

⁹³⁹ Addi: <www.yale.edu/macmillan/africadissent/addi.pdf>.

⁹⁴⁰ See the table of Political parties in Appendix 10.

⁹⁴¹ Mohammed A. Zitout, personal interview, London (December, 2011).

military became an authoritarian regime, and their dominance of the society was supported by the French Officers, who had remained faithful to their principles and their neo-colonial program and to Western thought. The result was the weakening of all of the national institutions, including the presidency.

All of these changes experienced by the Algerian regime were couched in the glorious revolution's principles. The public sector, including political and economic groups, was targeted by these officers, using support from local extremists and from outside the country, especially neighbouring countries and across the Mediterranean. All of these voices seemed to oppose the Algerian identity, based as it was in religion and a traditional expression of patriotism. Algerian citizens have paid a very high price in blood, rights and wealth, and continue to do so. However, hope still remains as long as people continue to struggle for their rights, and reject the dictatorship of a military regime with their daily demonstrations and strikes. As the "Arab Spring" has graphically demonstrated, the day may soon come when they will rise up in a revolution against pervasive French influence, which ultimately supports military dictatorship and violence in Algeria. It is, of course, hoped that such an uprising will be peaceful. In the past, violence has only served to extend the life of the military regime, and to strengthen French influence in Algeria. The arrival of peace in Algeria would, of course, render moot many of the questions explored in this thesis. However, in the end, an understanding of violence, and the creation of agreements to end violence, will never seriously answer the fundamental and haunting question that underlies this thesis: why did the Algerian military turn against its own people?

However, the regime's clan-like system makes change unlikely. The president's legal position is different from the actual role played by the president of the republic, especially at the decision-making level. True power resides with the military regime, able to invite a person to take on the role of president and powerful enough to limit his job and/or to fire him at will regardless of the cost to the public in monetary terms or in loss of life. So, the president is not the system's master and his resignation or change does not undermine the regime. The power structure is impersonal and is not in the hands of one strongman and his family, but rather several dignitaries who are themselves divided into rival cliques. Algeria is unique among its neighboring countries. Moroccans gathered behind their king, while the people of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were able to lay hands on the source of pain and removed it in the 'Arab Spring'. But in Algeria, the situation is different. There is no controversial political figure to attack, like Ben Ali, Mubarak or Gaddafi. The figures of decision-making in Algeria are known by their aliases, working in the shadows, almost as if they were a Mafia.

They cannot be seen on the public stage so how can be rooted out and removed to allow the citizens to heal after decades of pain?

Moreover, Algerians have learned from the events of the 1990s, although there are signs of fatigue in the Algerian public. They have little interest to the "Arab Spring", violent protests, or more violence of any kind, for that matter. According to Larbi Sadiki, the Algerian public is highly politicised, they have learned from the past, and feel that they have led the way in rolling back Arab authoritarianism in the early 1990s: "first through bread riots and then through the ballot. And when democracy atrophied, they turned to the bullet."⁹⁴²

The success of the Islamists and Islamic parties in modestly free elections in 1991 was the result of many years of suffering the authoritarianism. Although Islamists were part of the Revolution, as part of Algerian society, they were never accorded political influence, reminiscent, perhaps, of Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt, banned with their leaders exiled or jailed. Many Algerian Islamists have been tortured and executed since Independence, and particularly in the 1990s. "Moderate" Islamists in Algeria played a major role in supporting the military regime, were part of the presidential majority, and were given four ministerial portfolios in the government just before the elections of 2012. Their participation has not been supported by a majority of citizens, however, who apparently see them as support groups for the military regime, which has used them to complete its program, and to demonstrate to the international community that their intervention in the politics has not been against Islamists, the majority in Algerian society, but rather against radicalism and terrorism.

It is difficult at this juncture to envision a political future for the Islamists, after a decade of severe violence following the 1992 elections. For the Algerian regime, Islamists are associated with violence and radicalism. The same scenario is about to be repeated in Tunisia and Egypt: the tensions between Islamists and other political groups in these countries only reinforce this view. Anwar Haddam, a former spokesperson for the FIS, draws similarities between Egypt in 2013 and Algeria in 1992, saying that:

An Algerian scenario is now a possibility with a very broad campaign of repression against the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters, thousands of its members in prisons, more than a thousand killed and suicide bombings are becoming at least a weekly reality in Egypt ... In both cases the army was the arbiter and unfortunately resolved the political dispute in its favor against democracy.⁹⁴³

⁹⁴² See Larbi Sadiki, Aljazeera, *Algeria: Elections without democracy*, 10/05/2012; Larbi Sadiki, *Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy* (Oxford University Press, 2009); and Larbi Sadiki, *The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses* (Columbia University Press, 2004).

⁹⁴³ Mohamed Elshinnawi [News / Middle East], *Is Egypt Heading Down Algeria's Path?* January 13, 2014: <http://www.voanews.com/content/is-egypt-heading-down-algerias-path/1829063.html>.

Algerian history has shown that a president can be sacrificed if the military deems it necessary. Hence, one possible scenario for transition would be an internally instigated regime change, especially at the end of Bouteflika's mandate in 2014. But if change comes from within the ruling circle, as per usual, the system will continue to be impenetrable by democratic forces; the military junta benefits from the opacity and complexity of its clan-like structure to control the means of power and in particular, the oil revenues. Leaders have no incentive to renounce to their privileges. Furthermore, the military regime and the economic opportunists from the French Officers and DRS in particular, will not be safe in a democratic state. If Algerians are given the opportunity to participate in free elections, the outcome could mean the ascension of a civilian president dedicated to cleaning up the corruption in the political and economic sectors and to stopping the international intervention and the French penetration in particular, not to mention the redressing of past wrongs. A change in leadership to someone who might not be controlled or trusted by the military regime could heighten insecurities, and this could lead in turn to renewed military involvement in politics and potentially renewed violence to protect the armed forces from being held accountable for past crimes. There is no strong political opposition that could be penetrated and driven to disrupt the democratic process behind the scenes, as was the case in the past.

All said, regime change and democracy seem unlikely, however. If the spirit of the 'Arab Spring' were to touch Algeria, the results would likely be more violent and prolonged than the current crisis in Syria. Fortunately for the regime, the government retains access to wealth from oil deposits, allowing it to alleviate the immediate suffering of most Algerians at the first sign of discontent. "The country re-injects ten billion dollars in social transfers—unemployment insurance, the health care system, subsidies and food price reductions—every year."⁹⁴⁴ One can only imagine the developmental potential of an Algerian democracy.

EPILOGUE (2013/2014)

The Algerian media broke precedent on April 27, 2013, in becoming the first among foreign media in its announcement of the illness of President Bouteflika, and his transfer to the Val-de-Grace French military hospital in Paris. The president had apparently suffered a blood vessel blockage that caused a mini-stroke. After his treatment, he was transferred

⁹⁴⁴ Benakcha Narrimane "The Algerian Regime: An Arab Spring Survivor," *Journal of International Affairs*, Columbia, SIPA, School of International and Public Affairs, 03/07/2012: <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/algerian-regime-arab-spring-survivor> .

again, this time to “Les Invalides hospital” in Paris to continue his recovery. His escorting doctors stated publicly that the stroke incident was temporary and “will not affect the body’s vital functions.” Bouteflika had been treated in the same hospital in 2005 for a bleeding stomach ulcer. Returning to official protocol, the Algerian authorities remained silent about Bouteflika’s health. There was public and political discontent regarding how the government managed the health reports of the country’s president. Rachid Bougherbal, the director of the National Center of Sports Medicine, told the state news agency that “His excellency the President of the Republic must observe a period of rest for further examinations,”⁹⁴⁵ adding that “there was no reason for worry.” Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal said that the president was hospitalized, “but the situation is not serious.”⁹⁴⁶

According to an Algerian daily newspaper, *le Quotidien d’Oran*, the president has moved his brother, Said, from his position as President advisor. The reason for this, according to the same source, was a “personal conflict”, which was said to have nothing to do with corruption files, mentioned in other sources, which suggest that the President’s brother is deeply involved in high level corruption.⁹⁴⁷ Millions of dollars were found to have been missing from the general treasury from the time that Said Bouteflika was Director-General of Electricity and Gas.⁹⁴⁸ Following disclosure of this information, Adel Charef told *Aljazeera TV* that the changes that took place in the pyramid of power was no coincidence, but rather revealed plans to prepare for a fourth presidency of the ailing President. According to Charef, there is a conflict among decision-makers in power regarding the fourth team. This dispute has become public only recently.⁹⁴⁹

After his visit to Bouteflika in the hospital, French president Francois Hollande mentioned Bouteflika’s health, suggesting that although he seems to be recovering to some extent, he would not be able to resume his presidency. These comments were received quietly by the Algerian media, except for some elements of the opposition, inside and outside of the

⁹⁴⁵ *Express News*, “Algeria president taken to hospital”, April 28, 2013:

<http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/395363/Algeria-president-taken-to-hospital> .

⁹⁴⁶ According to the American Stroke Association, a TIA, as it is known, is caused by a temporary blood clot and lasts just a short time. It “usually causes no permanent injury to the brain.” A third of those suffering from TIA, also known as “warning strokes,” go on to have a full stroke within the next year, according to the website of the association. Also: Paul Schemm, “Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian President, Hospitalized After Mini-Stroke: Report”, *the World Post*, 27/04/2013.

⁹⁴⁷ Salem Ferdi, “Le régime, le statuquo et le «risque» de l’ouverture Une présidentielle sans bouteflika n’est pas un gage de changement”, *le Quotidien d’Oran*, 29/04/2013.

⁹⁴⁸ *France24 TV* 27/04/2013, “Bouteflika removes his Brother from his position as Presidential advisor”.

⁹⁴⁹ *Aljazeera TV* (Arabic), 27/04/2013.

country, who criticised the source of the information, arguing that in a democracy such news should come from the Algerian government, not from an ex-colonial metropole.⁹⁵⁰

On 16 July 2013, after 80 days of treatment in Paris, the Presidential Office announced that the President had returned to Algeria. According to an official statement, “after finishing his treatment and rehabilitation in France, Bouteflika will find comfort and rehabilitation here in Algeria.” No announcement specified when Bouteflika would resume his presidential duties. Moreover, the public and governmental agencies speculated on his return to his office as president and the effects of a potential leadership vacuum. This was in contrast to the French declaration about the President health. France, it seems, had a very different message, that “[Bouteflika] would conclude his recovery period and leave Paris in early July to head to Algeria.”⁹⁵¹

Logically, the Algerian opposition parties were calling for the invocation of Article 88 of the Constitution, the filling to the presidency because of Bouteflika’s long-term disability.⁹⁵² In this context, Bouteflika surprised the political community in and outside the country with his major p[olitical changes in the government and the military structure, which were quickly implemented. In September 2013, the Minister of External Affairs, Mourad Madelsi, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dahu Waled Qablya were removed. One week later, on September 12, 2013, Bouteflika turned to high-ranking military officers. In a major

⁹⁵⁰ *Rachad.org*, See: Zitout interview on *almagharibia TV*, 28/04/2013.

⁹⁵¹ Lamine Chikhi and Patrick Markey, “With Bouteflika back in hospital, what next for Algeria?” *Reuters* January 16, 2014: <http://news.yahoo.com/bouteflika-back-hospital-next-algeria-151924032.html>.

⁹⁵² **Article 88 of the Algerian Constitution:**

(1) If the President of the Republic, because of serious and long-lasting illness, happens to be unable to carry out his functions, the Constitutional Council meets de jure, and after having verified the reality of the impediment by the appropriate means, proposes, unanimously, to the Parliament to declare the state of impediment.

(2) The Parliament sitting, in both chambers convened together, declares the state of impediment of the President of the Republic, with a majority of two-thirds (2/3) of its members and charges the President of the Council of Nation, to stand for the Head of State by interim for a maximum period of forty five (45) days and carry out his prerogatives in accordance with the provisions of Article 90 of the Constitution.

(3) If the impediment continues at the expiry of the forty- five (45) days period, a declaration of vacancy by resignation de jure is made in accordance with the procedure mentioned in the above paragraphs and the provisions of the following paragraph of the present Article.

(4) In case of resignation or death of the President of the Republic, the Constitutional Council meets de jure and ascertains the permanent vacancy of the Presidency of the Republic.

(5) It, immediately, communicates the permanent vacancy declaration act to the Parliament which meets de jure.

(6) The President of the Council of Nation assumes the charge of Head of State for a maximum period of sixty (60) days, during which presidential elections are organized.

(7) The Head of State, thus designated, cannot be candidate to the Presidency of the Republic.

(8) In case the resignation or the death of the President of the Republic comes in conjunction with the vacancy of the Presidency of the Council of Nation whatever the cause may be, the Constitutional council meets de jure and ascertain, unanimously, the permanent vacancy of the Presidency of the Republic and the impediment of the President of the Council of Nation. In this case, the President of the Constitutional Council assumes the function of the Head of State in accordance with the conditions defined in the preceding paragraphs of the present Article and Article 90 of the Constitution. He cannot be candidate for the Presidency of the Republic.

shift, DRS investigations, led by Major-General Mehena Djebbar, now fall under the authority of the Chief-of-Staff and Vice Defense Minister, Brigadier-General Gaed Salah.⁹⁵³ Bouteflika has also terminated two heavyweight intelligence generals, General Bachir Tertag, in charge of counter-espionage, and an officer in charge of security abroad, Major-General Mehena Djebbar, who is considered to be among the most prominent military figures in Algeria, and close to General Médiène, known as "Toufik", arguably the most powerful man in the country.

Following these changes, which have affected people at the pinnacle of power, Bouteflika has announced a series of changes in the structure of the military bureaucracy itself. Beginning with the Military Intelligence Services (DRS), the most powerful department in the military, and in the country for that matter, and previously known as Military Security (SM), Bouteflika, as President and Minister of Defence, has limited the role of the DRS to military matters only, and thus has moved this agency out of politics, further away from the media, and separated it as well from the judicial police, a former source of its authority.

According to an interview with journalist Faisal Metaoui, on *France TV*, Bouteflika launched these changes in preparation for the next elections, which will take place on April 17, 2014. Faisal Metaoui noted that

Bouteflika and all those close to him are afraid of prosecutions in the future, because of the corruption cases [that] occurred during his three terms, which involved his brother Said and members of his family, as well as senior ministers, such as former oil minister Chakib Khelil.⁹⁵⁴

On 2 February 2014, the new FLN leader, Ammar Saâdani, publicly criticized the head of the DRS, accusing him of mismanagement and negligence.⁹⁵⁵ He blamed General Médiène for the precarious political and security situations in Algeria. It was the first time that the head of the official political party had leveled charges against someone at the highest level in the power structure, someone ostensibly responsible for his own appointment and, indeed, likely that of the President.⁹⁵⁶ Saâdani's fierce criticism of General Mohamed

⁹⁵³ Confirmed by Capitan Chouchane to *almagharibia TV, elkhobar, elwatan* and *echorouk* (Algerian newspapers), 22/09/2013: < <http://www.elkhabar.com/ar/politique/356262.html> >; also: <<http://www.tsa-algerie.com/actualite/item/58-lutte-contre-la-corruption-bachir-tartag-le-general-du-drs-aux-commandes-de-l-operation-mains-propres>> .

⁹⁵⁴ *France24*, "Changes in the pyramid of power in Algeria, Bouteflika 'holed up' beyond 2014": <http://www.france24.com/ar/20130913/>.

⁹⁵⁵ *Echoroukonline* Algerian daily newspaper, 10/02/2014.

⁹⁵⁶ General Médiène (who reportedly called himself "the God of Algeria") has been the most powerful and feared figure within the shadowy world of Algeria's military establishment. See the letter of ex-CEO of

Médiène came as a shock to an Algerian public “trained” to fear the notorious DRS. According to Mr. Saâdani, the DRS “has [had a] role in major political assassinations and terror attacks against Algerians, [which] remains hard to corroborate and yet too genuine to discard.”⁹⁵⁷ He charged them with a failure to protect President Boudief in July 1992, when he was assassinated while delivering a speech live on TV. The terrorist attack against Bouteflika in Batna (400 KM south-East Algiers) was said to be the result of the failure of the DRS agency to protect him, and he noted a long list of failures of the DRS since the crisis of 1990s.⁹⁵⁸

The Algerian public likely knew that Saâdani’s declaration was not, per se, a courageous and honest act, but rather had much to do with who was behind Mr. Saâdani in this attack against the heart of the “system”. “People know that the head of the FLN does not have the guts” to bash the DRS without solid support from within the military establishment,” according to Ahmed Chaoui, freelance journalist based in Washington DC.⁹⁵⁹ According to some observers who analyzed Saâdani’s criticism of General Médiène, the FLN leader was conciliatory toward potential presidential candidates, especially Bouteflika’s brother, Said. Saâdani led some Algerians to believe that the attacks on the DRS were in fact authorized by the FLN in direct support of Said Bouteflika, in the case that Abdelazziz Bouteflika is unable to run for a fourth mandate.

Some Algerians described Saâdani’s attack the DRS as a smoke screen, protecting Generals Gaid Salah and Bey in their alleged scheme to remove General Médiène from power. By discrediting Médiène and the DRS, the door is left open for Said Bouteflika to present his prospective candidacy as viable. This view would suggest a pattern that runs counter to Algerian political tradition, in which political “dynasties” have been forbidden. The recent arrest of General Hassan, a senior DRS officer and strong supporter of General Médiène, signals that General Gaid Salah has declared an all-out war against the DRS. According to the Algerian daily, *Echorouk*, General Hassan is accused of forming a criminal group (a gang) to attack civilians, engage in arms trafficking, and commit serious security

Algerian Oil Company ‘Hocine Malti’ to General Médiène; Hocine Malti, Algeria-Watch, General Toufik: Algeria's God. An Open Letter to Mohamed “Toufik” Médiène 16 february 2013 < http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/articles/2013/malti_open_letter.htm >.

⁹⁵⁷ Ahmed Chaoui, “Algeria Military Rift over Presidential Elections Turns ‘Nasty’”, *Morocco World News*.

⁹⁵⁸ Azzeddine Bensouiah, “Le DRS poursuit Saâdani en justice,” *Liberté*, 5 février 2014, Algeria-watch: < http://www.algeria-watch.de/fr/article/pol/anp_presidence/drs_poursuit_Saâdani.htm>.

⁹⁵⁹ Ahmed Chaoui, “Algeria Military Rift”.

blunders, one of which led to last year's bloody terrorist attack on the Tiguentourine gas complex in Amenas in Southern Algeria.⁹⁶⁰

As the three pillars of the Algerian system continue to undermine each other's plans, the political status becomes unsustainable. In the "brawl" to install an ally as the next president, the Algerian military is gambling with the security and stability of North Africa and Southern Europe. Meanwhile, it is clear that the Algerian voters will have little direct say in the outcome of the polls.⁹⁶¹

One week after Ammar Saâdani's declaration, publicly accusing the powerful military intelligence chief of interfering in politics to the detriment of the country's security, the ex-General Hocine Benhadid, who was security advisor for President Liamine Zeroual, returned to Algeria after 20 years of retirement to object to the Saâdani's accusations and to accuse the President's inner circle, publicly, of "treason." He declared to *El watan* and *El Khabar* newspapers that

Here is what I'm asking from President Bouteflika: He came to power with the slogan 'pride and dignity'... so he should retire... with dignity and let Algeria catch its breath.⁹⁶²

Benhadid, who once commanded one of Algeria's military regions, said he was speaking on behalf of others in the armed forces, without naming anyone, "because we cannot let this situation continue." He specifically pointed to the group around General Qaid Saleh, saying that: "The chief-of-Staff has no credibility, and no one is fond of him,"⁹⁶³ In the midst of these attacks and counter-attacks, in his first official response to Saâdani's declaration, Bouteflika strongly backed the army, offering condolences to the families of 77 people killed when a military aircraft crashed in the mountainous northeast region of Oum El Bouaghi, saying that "No one has the right, whatever their position, to attack the People's National Army and other state institutions."⁹⁶⁴

On February 22, 2014, the media reported that Algeria's President, who has not publicly addressed the country for nearly three years, and has not even been seen in public for much of that time, will be running for a fourth term on April 17, 2014.⁹⁶⁵ On 24 February

⁹⁶⁰ Ahmed Chaoui, "Algeria Military Rift over Presidential Elections Turns 'Nasty'" (12/02/2014).

⁹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶² "Retired Algeria general urges Bouteflika to step down", *Wind Daily, Democracy*, Algiers (AFP) Feb 12, 2014: http://www.winddaily.com/reports/Retired_Algeria_general_urges_Bouteflika_to_step_down_999.html .

⁹⁶³ *Elwatan* and *Elkhabar* newspapers: the response of the military: <http://elkhabar.com/ar/politique/387156.html> .

⁹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶⁵ "Algeria's President Bouteflika to run for re-election", *BBC News Africa*, 22 February 2014: (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26306778>).

2014 a screen caption said that the presidency had confirmed that Bouteflika had informed the Interior Ministry of his intention to run in the April 17 poll, and to collect the appropriate documents for signature.⁹⁶⁶ We seem to know even less than ever as to whether or not the Algerian military will again, in the near or distant future, turn against its own people.

⁹⁶⁶ *Aljazeera TV*, BBC news, Euro News, February 24, 2014.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. BOOKS

1.1.English Books

Abbink K. "Laboratory experiments on corruption", in Rose-Ackerman S. (Ed.), *Handbook of Economic Corruption*. (London: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2005)

Abun-Nasr, Jamil M., *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period* (Cambridge University Press; 3 edition 1987)

Adelman, H., Govind C. Rao, *War and peace in Zaire-Congo: analyzing and evaluating intervention, 1996-1997* (Africa World Press, Inc. 2004)

Ageron C.R., Brett M., *Modern Algeria: a History from 1830 to the Present*, 9th Edition (London 1991)

Ait Larbi, M. Ait-Belkacem, M. S. Bedjaoui Youcef, Aroua, Abbas, Meziane Ait-Larbi, *An Inquiry into the Algerian Massacres* (Geneva: Hoggar, 1999)

Alessandrini A., *Frantz Fanon: critical perspectives* (Psychology Press, 12 Feb.1999)

Baum, Richard, *The Origin of Politics: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Evolution of Command and Control in Human Collectivities, Social Evolution & History*. Vol. 3, No. 2 (September 2004)

Behr, E *The Algerian Problem* (Australia: Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth, 1961 and Rep. 1976).

Beitz, Charles R. *Non-Intervention and Communal Integrity* (philosophy and Public affairs-9, 1980)

Beitz, Charles. R. *Political Theory and International Relations - Human Rights and Intervention*, Revised edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)

Bennoune M., *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830–1987* (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1988)

Bernard, D., Arendt, H.; Rosenberg, H.; Weinryb O., G. (Author), "Contemporary Jewish Record- April 1945 Palestine in the Changing Middle East - the Stateless People", in Thomas Mann's "Joseph" - *Anti-Semitism in Britain* (The American Jewish Committee, Vol. 8, 1945)

Bonner, M. D., Reif M., Tessler, M. A., *Islam, democracy and the state in Algeria: lessons for the western, Mediterranean and Beyond* (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2005)

- Chukwunyere Kamalu, *The little African History Book: Black Africa From the Original of the Humanity to the Assassination of Lumumba and the Turn of the 20th Century* (London: Orisa Press, 2007)
- Cherki, A., Benabid, N., *Frantz Fanon: a portrait* [trans. from French: Nadia Benabid] (Coronel University Press, Ithaca and London, 2006)
- Chevalier H., *Frantz Fanon, A Dying colonialism* [trans. from French] (Grove Press, 1967).
- Christopher S. Clapham, *Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1996)
- Confer, Vincent, *France and Algeria: The Problems of Civil and Political Reform, 1870-1920* (New York, Syracuse University Press, 1966)
- Dalacoura, Keterina, *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East* (Cambridge University Press, USA, 2011)
- Duverger, M., *Party Politics and Pressure Groups, a comparative introduction* [Trans. David Wagoner Maritime College of the city University of the University] (Thomas Y. Growell Company, New York, Inc. 1972)
- Estier, Claude *La Gauche hebdomadair, 1914-1962* (Paris A. Colin 1962)
- Europa Publications, *Regional Surveys of the World 2004 Africa South of the Sahara 2004*, Ed. 33 (Routledge, July, 9, 2011)
- Evans, M., and Phillips, J. *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, John Simpson, BBC, 2007)
- Fanon Frantz, *Wretched of the Earth* [transl. Constance Farrington. 1988] (London: Maggibbon and Kee, 1965)
- Forster A., Edmunds T. and Cottey, A. "Introduction: the professionalization of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe", in Forster, Timothy and Cottey, eds., *the Challenge of Military Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, forthcoming 2002)
- Horne, A., *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (London: MacMillan London Ltd, 1977)
- Howard Adelman, and Astri Suhrke, *The path of genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (First Paperback Edition 2000)
- Huntington, S. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957).
- Huntington, S. *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)

- Issaoui, R., *Immigration and national identity: North African political movements in colonial and postcolonial France* (the University of Michigan: Tauris Academic, Studies 2009, 30 June, 2010).
- Jackson, J., *Charles de Gaulle* (London: Haus Publishing, 2003)
- Janowitz, M. *Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Free Press, 01/01/1964)
- Karatnycky, A, *Freedom in the world* (Freedom House, 20/06/2001)
- Katz R. S., *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 13/09/2007)
- Kayden X. and Mahe, E., J. *The Party Goes on: The Persistence of the Two-Party System in the United States* (New York, 1985)
- Khan, A. L. *A Theory of Universal Democracy, Beyond the End of History* (the Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2003)
- Laroui, A. *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- Leff, N. H. "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption", in: A.J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston and V.T. Le Vine (eds.) *Political Corruption: A Handbook* (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books, 1989)
- Lyotard J. F. *Political writings* [Trans. Bill Readings and kaven Paul Geiman] (the regents of the University of Minnesota, 1993)
- MacMaster N., *Colonial migrants and racism: Algerians in France, 1900-62* (New York, Macmillan Press, 1997)
- MacQueen B. *Political Culture and Conflict Resolution in the Arab world, Lebanon and Algeria* (Melbourne University Press, 2009)
- Mamdani, M. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York : Pantheon Books 2004)
- Memmi A. *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (London: Souvenir Press, 1974)
- Metz, H. C., ed. *Algeria: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).
- Morsy M, *North Africa 1800-1900* (United Kingdom: Longman Group, January 1984)
- Nelson, H. D. [Public Affairs Information Service, H.W. Wilson Company] *Bulletin of the Public Affairs Information Service: annual cumulation*, Vol. 73 (Public Affairs Information Service., 1986) ed., Algeria 4th ed. 1983

- Paolo Mauro, *Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure International Monetary Fund, 700* (N.W., Washington D.C. USA, Elsevier Science S.A, 1998)
- Goodman, Paul, "The First Party System", in William Nisbet Chambers and Burnham, W. D., *The American Party Systems, Stages in Political Development* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1967),
- Quandt, W. B. *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 1969)
- Quandt, William, B. *Between Ballots and Bullets, Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism* (Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
- Ruedy, J. *Modern Algeria, the Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992).
- Salem Badis, "rench relations to the massacres in Algeria" In Study of Saint-Simon Foundation, *Notes de la Fondation Saint-Simon, Comprendre l'Algerie* (July 1995).
- Salem-Badis L. "French Reactions To The Massacres In Algeria", In Bedjaoui, Y., Aroua, A. and Ait-Larbi, M. *An Inquiry in the Algerian Massacres* (Geneva: Hoggar, 1990).
- Schraeder, P. J. *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
- Sharma, D.P., *The New Terrorism: Islamist International* (S.B. Nangia, New Delhi, 2005).
- Snider, D. M., Major J. A. Nagel, Pfaff M. T. *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21 st Century* (U.S. Army War College, December 1999)
- Stone, Martin, *The Agony of Algeria* (United Kingdom: C. Hurst and CO Ltd, 1997)
- Stora B. *Algeria 1830-2000, a Short History*, Trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2001)
- Talbott, J. *The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962*. (New York: Knopf, 1980)
- Turner, S. P., *Max Weber and Political commitment: Science, politics, and Personality* (Edward Bryan Portis, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
- Ted Morgan, *My Battle of Algies: A Mémoire* (Harper Collins Publishers, Australia, 2007)
- Wicclair, M. R. "Rawls and the Principle of Non-Intervention", In Smith, Elizabeth H. (ed) and Blocker, Gene, H. (ed) *John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1982)
- Waisman, C. Bonora, *France and the Algerian Conflict: Issues in Democracy and Political Stability, 1988-1995* (Leeds Studies in Democrtizaton, Ashgate Publishing Limited, England and USA 2003).

1.2. Books in French

Adler, E., Crawford, F. B., Del Sorta, R. *The Convergence of Civilizations Constructing a Mediterranean Region* (University of Toronto Press incorporated, 2006)

Aggoun, L. Jean-Baptiste, *Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges d'Etats: histoire secrète de la guerre d'indépendance à la "troisième guerre" d'Algérie* (France: Découverte, 2005)

Andre Mandouze, *Un Chrétien dans son Siècle, de Résistance en Résistances*, [textes choisis et présents par Olivier Aranche et Martine Sevegrand] (Karthala, 2007)

Angeli C. and Mesnier, S. *Sale Temps Pour La Republique 1995-1997* (Bernard Grasset, 1997)

Bedjaoui, M. *La Revolution Algerienne et le droit* (Brussels: 1961)

Berque, J. *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres* (Paris, 1962).

Brahimi, A. *Aux origines de la tragédie algérienne (1958-2000), Témoignage sur "Hizb França"* (Geneva: Hoggar & London, Centre for Maghreb Studies, 2000)

Camille B. W., *France and the Algerian conflict: Issues in Democracy and Political Stability, 1988-1995*, Pub (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003)

Chaliand G., *L'Algérie –est-elle Socialiste?* (Paris, 1964)

Comite Algérien des Militants Libres de la dignité Humaine et des Droits de L'Homme, *Livre Blanc sur la Répression en Algérie 1991-1995, les Vérités sur une guerre cache*, Vol. I-II (Geneva: Hoggar, 1995)

Depont, O., *Les Berbères en France, in L'Afrique française -supplément* (Paris: September 1925)

Derradji, Abder-Rahmane, *A Concise History of Political Violence in Algeria, 1954-2000, Brothers in Faith, Enemies in Arms*, Vol 1 (Edwin Mellen Press, 2002)

Fanon, F. *Toward the African Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1970).

Gourdon H. Henry, J. R., Françoise Henry-Lorcerie, "Roman colonial et ideologie coloniale en Algerie," *Revue (Algeienne des sciences juridiques, economiques et politiques*, 11 1974): 7-252; and Jean Dejeux, *La litterature algerienne contemporaine* (Paris, 1975).

Grandmaison, Olivier, *Le Cour, Coloniser Wxterminer sur la Guerre et L'état Colonial* (Fayard, 2005)

Haddour, A. *Colonial Myths: History and Narrative* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000)

- Hamoumou, M. *Et ils sont devenue harkis* (Paris: Fayard, 1993)
- Harbi, M. Meynier Gilbert, *Le F.L.N, documents et histoire, 1954-1962* (Paris: Fayard, 2004)
- Harbi, M. *Le FLN Mirage et Realite des Origines a la Prise du Pouvoir: 1945-1962, Col. Le Sens de L'Histoire* (Paris : Ed. Jeune Afrique 1980)
- Harbi, M. *Aux Origines du FLN: Le Populisme Révolutionnaire en Algérie.* (Paris: Bourgois, 1975).
- Jacquemet N. *Microéconomie de la corruption CIRPEE* (Université Laval), CREST (INSEE) & GATE (Université Lyon 2, Décembre 2005)
- Kai Hafez, Kenny, Ann M., *The Islamic world and the West: an introduction to political cultures and International Relations* (the Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, NV. Leiden, 2000)
- Lacouture, J. *1962, Algérie, Nation et société* (Paris: Maspero, 1985).
- Le Tourneau R., *Evaluation Politique de l'Afrique du Nord Musulmane* (Paris, 1962)
- Martinez, L. *Le Cheminement Singulier de la Violence Islamiste en Algérie, Critique Internationale* (July 20, 2003)
- Nesroulah Yous, *Qui a tuer a Bentalha* (Paris: Decouverte, 2000)
- Nezzar Khaled, *Mémoires du Général Khaled* (Algiers: Chihab Editions, 2000),
- Perville, G. "les étudiants Algeriens de V. Université Française", In Stora, B. (2001) (Paris: CNRS, 1984)
- Saadi Said, *Amirouche, une vie, deux morts, un testament* (Algiers, 02 May 2010)
- Samraoui, M. *Chronique des années de sang: Algérie, Comment les Services Secrets ont Manipulé les Groupes Islamistes* (Denoël, 2003);
- Sarrasin P. E., *La Crise Algérienne* (Paris, 1949), [the text of the Algerian Manifesto of 1943].
- Schwartzberg, R.G. *Sociologie Politique* (Montchrestien, Political Science, 1988)
- Stora B *Ils Venaient D'Algerie L'immigration Algerienne en France 1912-1992* (France: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1992)
- Stora B. *Histoire de l'Algérie colonial, 1830-1954* (Reperes. Paris: La découverte, 1991)
- Souaidia H., *La Sale Guerre*, préface by Ferdinando Imposimato (Paris: Decouverte, 2001)
- Tiihonen, S. *The History of Corruption in Central Government, Cahier D'histoire de l'Administration No.7* (Netherland and Library of Congress: IOS Press, 2003)
- Vatin J. C., *L'Algérie politique; Histoire et Société* (Paris, 1974)

1.3.Books in Arabic

Iben Taymiyya, *Assiyaasah al-Shar'iyah* [Trans. Politics in the Islamic Law] (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Arabiyah, 1966)

Bouragaa L., *Chaahid 'ala Ightiyaal al-thawarah*, Ed. 2 (Algiers: Daar al-Umma lissinaa wa al-Nasher wa al-Tawzee, 8 Oct. 2000)

Saadallah, B. *Abhaath wa Araa' fi Tarikh al-Jaza'ir (Chapter: Taamulat fi Tarikh al-Thawra)*, Vol. 4 (Beirut, Dar al-Ghareb al al-Islami, pub. 1, 1996)

Saadallah, B. *Al-Harakaat al-wataniya*, Vol. 1,2 and 4 (Arabic Organisation for Education, Culture and Science, Research Institute and Arabic Studies, ANU, Cairo, Ed. 1, 1977), ed.2 (1993)

Saidaoui, R., *Siraa 'at al-Nukhab al-Syasiya wa al-Askarya fi al-Djazaa'ir*, Trans. [the Conflicts among the Political Elites and the military in Algeria] (the Arab association of distribution and publishing, Syria, 2009)

Souad Al-Sherqaoui, *al-Ahzaab al-Syasya, Ahamyatuha, Nash'atuha wa Nashaatoha*, Trans. [The Political Parties, Importance, Formation and its Jobs] (Faculty of Law, the Centre of the parliament's research, 2005)

2. INTERVIEWS

2.1.Personal Interviews

Anwar Haddam (Washington DC) Personal Interview, from Hamilton NZ by Skype recorded (21 May 2009)

Aroua, Abbas Personal Interview, Geneva: (27 Aug. 2009)

Brahimi Abdelhamid, Personal interview (London 25 September 2009)

Chouchane Ahmed, Personal interview, from Hamilton, NZ [Skype-recorded] 13/05/10

Chouchane, Personal Interview, London (13 May, 10 June and 26 September 2009)

Dhia Mourad, Personal Interview, Geneva: (26 August 2009)

Masli, Rachid, Personal Interview, Geneva (28 August, 2009)

Remita Abdelhamid, Personal Interview, Mila, Algeria (19, August 2009)

Samraoui, M., Personal Interview (Auckland, 05/12/2007)

Sidum, Salaheddine, Personal Interview, Algiers (01 September 2009)

Zaoui, Ahmed, Personal Interview, New Zealand: Hamilton, New Zealand (03 March 2009)

Zitout, M.A. Personal Interview, London (4 July 2009)

2.2. Media Interviews

Addi, Lahouari Interview, Rachad TV “Pouvoir Armée DRS” (14 November 08) Pub.
<<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LA4ip75Seuw>>

Agouni Ali, [the president of PPA and the close friend of [Messali Hadj](#)] interview, Rachad TV (13 Novemembr 2010)

Aljazeera, interview in program Tahta al-Midjehar “under the loop”
<<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qq2kOC4qiM>>

Amamrah Turky Rabah [Member of AUMA], Interview, Elkhobar, [trans. “Boumédiène jailed al-Ibrahimi because he refused the socialism”]. (May 23, 2006)

Benjedid Chadli [Algerian ex-President 1978-1992], Interview by ‘Elkhobar’, No. 3813 (Tuesday 24/06/2003)

Boudersa, Maâmar Interview Rachad TV, “Corruption Algérie SONATRACH” (27/01/2010)

Boudersa, Maâmar, Interview Rached TV, “Alger, Le médiocre bilan du meilleur président”.
<http://www.rachad.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=311:le-mediocre-bilan-du-meilleur-president&catid=75:articlesfr&Itemid=104>, 8 April 2009.

Brahimi Abdelhamid, Interview Aljazeera TV, “Special visit”, on:
<<http://aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/CF6F81B3-3A29-454D-B8E9-07339A59F61C.htm>> [3 October 2009] Pub. [6 Oct. 2009] <
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQ53kJKDypI&feature=related>>

Cherif Belkacem (ex-minister of Orientation and Education 1963-1965), Interview (INA-Fr) in 1966, pub. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbHU-jd_4Ak> n/d

Hocine Ait Ahmed Interview MEDI1 SAT, “Moroccan Kingdom and the Algerian Revolution” <www.dailymotion.com/maghrebb > 25/05/2008

Joffe George, “Algerian army under pressure for the slaughter of Tibhirine's Monks”, Interview, France24 TV, from Cambridge University, London, Pub.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4jj85nX1eg>, 28 Aug. 2009

Karim Moulay, Interview, Hiwar TV, London, Pub. <
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Oc5NukH-pM> > 31 July 2010

Khalid Nazzar, Interview, Paul Aussarresse Algerien, France 5 and France 3 (2003), Uploaded by Rachad TV on <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqEnygWEH6w>> 19 May 2008

Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, in Coloniser, exterminé. “Sur la guerre et l'Etat colonial”, *Le Monde diplomatique* Paris, Fayard (January 2005) < http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2005/01/LE_COUR_GRANDMAISON/11822>

Rabbahi Toufik (Director of Transparency International in Algeria), Interview, Alhiwar TV, program “La Corruption en Algerie” London, Pub. <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=jLRn9xfbfBU>> 27/05/2010.

Rachad TV, Interview through skype with Moulay, Geneva, in 10 August 2010.

Salhi, Hammod and Akram Belkaid and Ismail Dabbach, Interview Aljazeera English TV (program: Inside Story - Algeria's oil corruption scandal, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgoG79gRgNg>> 19/02/ 2010

Samraoui M. Interview Aljazeera TV in a Program of ‘Bila Hudoud’, Pub. http://www.youtube.com/Watch?V=Jvclve0_Zjo&Feature=Related 03 February 2009

Samraoui, Interview in Aljazeera TV, <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0P3xhZPOEVA>> 2/8/2010

Samraoui, M., Interview, Aljazeera, “How the secret services manipulated Islamic groups” Pub. <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fu5V7N0jkoc>> 3 December 2009

Zitout, M. A., interview on *almagharibia TV*, 28/04/2013

3. JOURNAL ARTICLES

“Introduction to Interviewing” (1982) *the University of Illinois Extension Service-Office of Program Planning and Assessment*

“Three Lenses on the Multinational Enterprise: Politics, Corruption and Corporate Social Responsibility” (November 2006) *Palgrave Macmillan Journals*,

Addi L. and Bawtree V., “Review of African Political Economy”, Vol. 33, No. 108, North Africa: Power, Politics and Promise, *Taylor & Francis, Ltd.* (Jun., 2006)

Addi, L. “In The Dark Shadow of Terror, The Algerian army holds the levers of power” *le monde diplomatique* (2/2/1998)

Addi Lahouari, “L’ Armée, La Nation et l’état en Algérie”, *publication at: ‘Confluences Méditerranée,’* N° 29 (1999)

Addi, Lahouari, “1949- Algeria's Tragic Contradictions”, *Journal of Democracy* - Volume 7, Number (3 July 1996)

Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra , Who Cares about Corruption? *Journal of International Business Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 6

Ladrech, R., "Europeanization and Political Parties, Towards a Framework for Analysis", [July 2002] SPIRE, Keele University, Staffordshire ST5 5BG), United Kingdom, *Sage Journals, Party Politics*, Vol. 8, 4: pp. 389-403

Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) "Academy of International Business" *Journal of International Business Studies*, 37

Anceau Eric, Tr. P.H., "Napoleon III and Abd al-Qadir": *Napoleonica. La Revue*, 2009/1 N° 4, p. 111-143.

<http://www.napoleon.org/en/reading_room/articles/files/471391.asp#informations>

Bannoune, M., A. H., "Algerian Peasants and National Politics", *MERIP Reports*, No. 48 (Jun., 1976)

Blechinger Verena, "Corruption and Political Parties", Sectoral Perspectives on Corruption (November 2002), Original paper "Corruption Through Political Contributions in Japan" Sub. for a *TI workshop on corruption and political party funding in La Pietra, Italy*. [October 2000)

Bouandel, Y. "Political parties and the transition from authoritarianism: the case of Algeria" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 1 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Boukraa, Elias, "Al-alaqat al-madaniya wa al askariya fi aljaza'ir", [Civilian Military Relationship in Algeria), *Military Magazine*, No. 461 (December 2001)

Coorer A. Drury, Kriekhaus, J., Michael Lusztic, "Corruption, Democracy and Economic Growth", *Journal of International Political Science Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Sage Publication Ltd, 2006),

De Soto, H. (1989), "The Other Path", *Boston College Third World Law Journal*, In *United Nations Human Settlements Programme*, "The challenge of slums: global report on human settlements (2003)

Deeb, Mary-Jane. "Islam and the State: The Continuity of the Political Discourse of Islamic Movements in Algeria from 1832 to 1992." (November 1992) *Paper delivered at conference on "Islam and Nationhood," Yale University*,

François Gèze, "Armée et nation en Algérie : l'irrémissible divorce? *Publisher in the Magazine of 'Hérodote'* <http://www.herodote.org> n° 116, 'Armées et nations', first Trimestre of 2005 (Library in 14 April 2005)

Elshinnawi, M., "Is Egypt Heading Down Algeria's Path?" *News / Middle East* (January 13, 2014): <<http://www.voanews.com/content/is-egypt-heading-down-algerias-path/1829063.html>>

Franklin, C. J. "Political Party Opposition to Noncompetitive Regimes": *A Cross-National Analysis: Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 3, Sage Pub., Inc. *on behalf of the University of Utah Stable URL* <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088029> > (September, 2002)

- Gendzie, Irene L., "Midnight Reflections on Some of the Work of Frantz Fanon, Human Architecture" *Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, F. a Publication of Okcir: The Omar Khayyam Center for Integrative Research in Utopia, Mysticism, and Science (Utopystics)*. <<http://www.okcir.com/Articles%20V%20Special/IreneGendzier.pdf>>
- Gill, P. K. Stewart, E. Treasure and B. Chadwick, "Methods of data collection in qualitative research: interviews and focus groups," *British dental Journal*, 204, No. 6 (March 22, 2008)
- Grimaud N., "Algeria and Socialist France", *Middle East Journal*, 40, No. 2 (Spring, 1986)
- Hans Delbruck, "History of the Art of War", Vol. I: Warfare in Antiquity, Trans: Walter J. Renfro, Jr. Lincoln, Nebraska: *University of Nebraska Press* (1975)
- Harbi M. & Meynier Gilbert "L'Algérie: des origines à nos jours" In *Conférence à deux voix, Lyon: Maison des Passages* (25 Jun 2007)
- Harbi M. "The Intelligentsia and its Relation by the Political Systems in Algeria" *special conference organized Elwatan, Riadh al-Fateh, Algiers*, <<http://aintedles.yoo7.com/montada-f79/topic-t10168.htm#15351>> (17 April 2009)
- Harper & Row: (1996) "Values in tension: ethics away from home", *New York. Donaldson, and T. Harvard Business Review* 74(5).
- Heimberg Charles, "le 8 mai 1945: Europe, Algérie, d'une mémoire à l'autre," *Magazine de le Courrier, l'essentiel Autrement Pub.* <<http://www.lecourrier.ch.>> (17 May, 2005)
- Jackson, Henry, F. "The FLN in Algeria: party development in a revolutionary society" *Westport, Conn, Greenwood Press* (1977)
- Joffe G., "The role of violence within the Algerian economy", *Journal of North African Studies*, 7,(1 April 2002)
- Joffe, G. "The political crises in Algeria 1990s and the Case of Ahmed Zaoui", *Free Zaoui Organisation, Lecturer in Auckland* (May 2006)
- Joffe, G. "The Role of Violence within the Algerian Economy" *Journal of North African Studies*, 7, 1
- Kaufmann, D. "Corruption: the facts", *Foreign Policy* 107 (1997)
- Labreche, Cherif "Algeria: Causes of Conflict 1992", Unpublished MPhil Thesis, *Department of Peace Studies (TrinityCollege, Dublin: (2000)*
- Ladrech, Robert, "Europeanization and Political Parties, Towards a Framework for Analysis, SPIRE", *Keele University, Staffordshire ST5 5BG, United Kingdom, Sage Journals*, Vol. 18. 1. <<http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/8/4/389.short>> (January 2012)
- Lui, F.T. "An equilibrium queuing model of bribery", *Journal of Political Economy* (1985), 93 (4)

- Luiz, M. “La sécurité en Algérie et en Libye après le 11 septembre”, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40.2: 235–58, *Euromesco Papers* (22, April 2003)
- Mauro P., “Corruption and the composition of government expenditure”, *Journal of Public Economics* 69 (1998)
- Muslim Baba Arabi, “The military and the path of democratization in Algeria”, *Journal of Human Science*, 5th Year: Issue 35 Autumn- 2007 in Arabic
- Muslim Baba Arbi, “almo’assasa al-Askariya wa al-Tahuwal al-Democratey fi al-Djaza’ir”. *Magazine of the University Kasdi Marbah*, (Ouargla, Algeria (2002).
- Nadjia Bouaricha (Maâmar Boudersa: Chercher et Universitaire Algerien) “L’Algérie est soumise à un pouvoir royal” *El-Watan*, <<http://www.elwatan.com/Maamar-Boudersa-chercheur-et>> (09July 2006)
- Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, “Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy: The 1992 Coup, its Consequences and the Contemporary Crisis”, *Algeria International Watch*, <http://www.algeria-watch.de/en/articles/1997_2000/paradox_democracy.htm> (November 2000)
- Nellis, R. J. “The Algerian National Charter of 1976: content, public reaction, and significance”, *Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University* (1980)
- Nellis R. J., A. “Comparative Assessment of the Development Performances of Algeria and Tunisia”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 3, *Middle East Institute* (1983)
- Nellis. R. J. “The FLN in Algeria: party development in a revolutionary society”, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), Pub. Cambridge University Press
- Nicolas J., “Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence”, March 2007, Paris: *University of Paris I Panthéon–, B Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne*,
- Nikshoy C. Chatterji, “Muddle of the Middle East”, Vol. 2, *Abhinav, E-37 Hauz Khas*, New Delhi (1973)
- Pease K. K. and Forsythe D. P., “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15, No. 2 (May, 1993)
- Quah, Jon S.T., “Corruption in Asia with Special Reference to Singapore: Patterns and Consequences” (18 Dec 2011) *Asian Journal of Public Administration* <<http://www.jonstquah.com/images/Corruption%20in%20Singapore%20AJPA.pdf>>
- Reverend Mbayu Ilunga Watete, “Can Political Parties in Africa Contribute toward National Peace Building?”, *Africa University* (8 March 2010)
- Roberts, H., “The struggle for constitutional rule in Algeria”, *Journal of Algerian Studies* 3 (1998)

Roberts, H. "The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy" Vol. 27, [Issue. 4), online pub. (27/4/ 2007), *Government and Opposition* (October 1992),

Rose-Ackerman S. "The economics of corruption" (1975), *Journal of Public Economics*, 4 (2)

Saadallah, "Union de Ulama Musulman", In *conference of the Islamic Cultural center*, Algiers (24 February 1990), paper pub. *Al-Mounqidh (FIS)* (July 1991).

Saadallah, B., "The Rise of the Algerian Elite, 1900-14", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, *Cambridge University Press* (May, 1967)

Schleifer, R., "Corruption", In Coorer A. Drury and others, "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure International Monetary Fund", *Quarterly Journal of Economics CIX* (2006)

Shleifer A., Vishny R. W. (1993). "Corruption", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108 (3).

Thomas Sanction, "Anatomy of a Hijack, *Time Magazine*, Paris
<<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,163487,00.html>> (24 Jun 2001)

Tiihonen, S., "The History of Corruption in Central Government, Cahier D'histoire de L'Administration" No.7, *Netherland IOS Press, and Library of Congress* (2003)

Wilholt, T., "Bias and values in scientific research", *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 40, Issue 1, March 2009 <<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00393681>>.

Williams J. A., "The International Image of the Military Professional", *African Security Review* Vol 4 No 5, 1995

Yahia H. Zoubir, "Algeria's Multi-Dimensional Crisis: The Story of a Failed State-Building Process", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1994)

Yahia, H. Zoubir, "French-Algerian Relations: The Weight of History," *Aljazeera Network* (07/07/2011)

Young, Thomas-Durell, "Military Professionalism in a Democracy, [Chapter 1], Pub. <https://www.ccmr.org/public/library_details.cfm?library_id=5152 > n/d

4. ELECTRONIC SOURCES

"Algerian National Liberation" [1954-1962]
<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria.htm>>

"Algeria president taken to hospital," *Express news (home daily and Sunday express)* (April 28, 2013): < <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/395363/Algeria-president-taken-to-hospital> >

“British Anthropologist Jeremy Keenan on the Dark Sahara America's War on Terror in Africa” [22 February, 2011] <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dnKPimzibnY>>

“An Open Letter to Mohamed “Toufik” Mediène “*Algeria-watch Website*, 16 February 2013 <http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/articles/2013/multi_open_letter.htm>

“GIA: Armed Islamist Groups Serving the Algerian Sécurité militaire? [March 2003], Translation from German, <http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/gia_sm.htm>

“Kaid Salah speech, for the visit of the President Bouteflika to the military base in Charchale, Algiers” [24 July 2007] <<http://bilad-13.maktoobblog.com/380120/>>

“Roles and Definition of Political Parties” the Electronic knowledge Network (ACE) [n/d] <<http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/pc/pca/pca01/pca01a>>

“The Algerian Committee of Free Militants for Human Dignity and Human Rights”, [n/d] <<http://www.anp.org/frenindex/frentree.html>>

“The role of Political Parties, Two major parties control the executive and legislative branches” [2 April 2008], <<http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2008/April/20080423223737eafas0.6480067.html>>

A Special International Report Prepared “French invasion of 1830 shaped modern Algerian history” (July 2, 1999) *The Washington Times Advertising Department* <http://www.al-djazair.com/articles/The_Washington_Times_The_French_invasion_of_1830.pdf>

Alex Lefebvre, “Chirac promotes French interests in Algeria” [15 March 2003] <<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/mar2003/alge-m15.shtml>>

Alexis de Toqueville et l'Algérie, “Voir Notamment Son Travail Sur L'Algérie (1841) et son Voyage en Algérie (1846)” [11/2/2010] <<http://forums.bladi-dz.com/histoire/11210-alexis-de-toqueville-et-lalgerie.html>>

Algeria Watch: <<http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/links/Links.htm>>

Algeria-Watch, [July 2004] <<http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/francalgerie.htm>>

Algeria-Watch, [July 2004] <<http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/francalgerie.htm>>

Bouandel, Y. “An Algerian Presidential Free-for-All”, Middle East report online, [April 6, 2004] <<http://www.merip.org/mero/mero040604.html>>

Boubekeur, Ait Benali, , “La révolte d’octobre 1988 et les enjeux démocratiques”, [5 Octobre 2010] *Hoggar*, Geneva.

<http://www.hoggar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1220%3Aalgerie-revolte-doctobre-1988-et-les-enjeux-democratiques&catid=169%3Aait-benali-boubekeur&Itemid=36>

Brahimi in his reply letter about the declaration of General Nazzar, [1 November. 2009]
<http://www.hoggar.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=841&Itemid=64>

Brahimi, A. “Algeria on the Brink of an Abyss, an Attempt of Legitimacy through Massive Fraud”, [18/07/1997] < <http://archive.tribunemagazine.co.uk/article/18th-july-1997/6/algeria-on-the-brink-of-an-abyss> >

Doyle James K., “Introduction to interviewing Techniques Prepared for the Interdisciplinary and Global Studies Division” (4 November 2006) Worcester Polytechnic Institute,
<<http://www.wpi.edu/academics/GPP/Students/ch11.html>>

Gèze, F. Mellah, S. “Algeria: The impossible transitional justice” Algeria-Watch, [22 December 2010] < http://algeria-watch.org/en/analyses/impossible_transitional_justice.htm >

Hadjerès Sadek, “La pensée de Fanon: Quelques uns de ses impacts dans la sphère sociopolitique algérienne”, Hoggar (24 May 2009),
<http://www.hoggar.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=743&Itemid=64>

Human Rights “More than one million internally displaced people ignored by the international community” Watch (05 March 2004) <<http://www.algeria-watch.org/de/infomap/27/displaced.htm>>

Human Rights Watch (2000) < <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Mena-01.htm>> Pub. In (2004) <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/4.htm#_Toc58744953>

Khelfaoui B., “L’armée algérienne mise en cause pour la mort de moines français”, [06 July 2009] < <http://amms-saida.com/tahtaha/viewtopic.php?f=26&t=494>>

Lefebvre Alex, “Chirac promotes French interests in Algeria” [15 March 2003]
<<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/mar2003/alge-m15.shtml>>

Ministere de Justice Francais, Archive des Cases de France Colonialisme en Algerie (n/d)
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/archives/_private/niveau%201/intro.htm>

Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Briefing Paper, Support to political parties, “A missing piece of the governance puzzle”, [December 2010],
<<http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6321.pdf>>

Pellizzari V. “L’armée algérienne a tué les moines”, [20/09/2009],
<<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAg7xq7wCG8>>

Schemm, P., “Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian President, Hospitalized After Mini-Stroke: Report”, *World Post*, 27/04/2013

Sidum Salahuddine. Human Rights’ Report (December 2003) <http://www.algeria-watch.de/fr/mrv/mrvrepr/Sidum/ai_acquittement.htm>

Sweeney, John and Doyle Leonard “We bombed Paris for Algeria” *The Observer*, [9 November 1997] <http://algeria-watch.org/en/articles/1997_2000/bombed_paris.htm>

The Military Movement of Free Officers”, based somewhere in Europe [n/d]
<<http://www.anp.org/arabindex/arabanques/araparadis.html>>

Transparency International, “Corruption index 2010: Find out how each country compares” [26/10/2010] <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/oct/26/corruption-index-2010-transparency-international>>

“Retired Algeria general urges Bouteflika to step down,” *Wind daily, Democracy, Algiers* (AFP) Feb 12, 2014:
http://www.winddaily.com/reports/Retired_Algeria_general_urges_Bouteflika_to_step_down_999.html

Veilleux, Armand “The death of the monks of Tibhirine: facts, questions, and hypotheses” [31/12/2002] <<http://users.skynet.be/bs775533/Armand/wri/hypothesis.htm> >

5. MEDIA: Newspapers and TV Channels

“Algeria's President Bouteflika to run for re-election,” *BBC News Africa*, 22 February 2014:
(<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26306778>)

“Africa Is Our Future: Says Sarkozy At Nice Summit”, *Radio France d'Information (RFI) Report France - Africa – 31/05/2010- Pub.* <<http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20100531-french-president-nicolas-sarkozy-addresses-france-africa-summit>> (Tuesday 01 June 2010)

“Bouteflika removes his Brother from his position as presidential advisor,” *France 24 TV*, 27/04/2013

“Deces de Mahfoud Kaddache, un grand historien s'en va”, *Le soir d'Algerie, Actualités*, 1 August 2006,
<http://www.lesoirdalgerie.com/articles/2006/08/01/article.php?sid=41739&cid=2>

“Histoire d'Algerie 1830-1962, La Mort de Abane Ramdane”, *Newspaper of El Moudjahid*, 29 May 1958,
<http://www.1novembre54.com/histoire_algerie.php?cat=Presse&id=LA%20MORT%20DE%20ABBANE%20RAMDANE>

“Maa Waraa' al-Khabar” Trans. “what behind the news” *Aljazeera TV* (11 July 2009)
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yg_v-jHyfFM&feature=related >

Abderrahman Chaabani, “Ben Bella and the Death of Colonel Chaabani”, *Jaridat Aakher Saa*, [trans. Newspaper of the last hour], 17/12/2002,
<<http://www.colonelchaabani.com/abderahmanechaabani.htm>>

Chikhi, L. and Markey, P., “With Bouteflika back in hospital, what next for Algeria?” *Reuters*, January 16, 2014 See <<http://news.yahoo.com/bouteflika-back-hospital-next-algeria-151924032.html>>

Benjedid Chadli [ex-President of Algeria], “Ben Bella gave order to kill Chaabani and asks the urgent practice his order” (4th December 2008), *Newspaper of Elkhobar*.

Bensouiah, A., “Le DRS poursuit Saâdani en justice,” *Liberté*, 5 février 2014, Algeria-watch: <http://www.algeria-watch.de/fr/article/pol/anp_presidence/drs_poursuit_Saâdani.htm>

Boukhalfa Amazit, “La Crise De L’été 1962: La 2ème Mort Du Congrès De La Soummam” *El-Watan* [Algerian daily newspaper], Thursday, July 8th, 2004 <<http://www.algerie-dz.com/article868.html>>

Bouragaa, Lakhdar “L'affaire Z'biri. Les Hommes de Mokorno”, *La Nation Algerien*, [Tuesday 1 November 2011], A3, Pub. <http://www.lanation.info/L-affaire-Z-biri-Les-Hommes-de-Mokorno-par-Lakhdar-Bouragaa_a435.html >

Brahimi, A. H., Rahil al-Arbi Belkhir, saaniu al-Ruasaa fi al-Jaza’ir [The Death of Larbi Belkhir, the Presidents’ Creator in Algeria], No. 11385, 19/02/2010, *Alshareq al-Awsat* [the Middle East Newspaper], Souidi Arabia, <<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11385&article=554915&feature>>

Chanel INA Documentary, Info France and French TV2
<<http://www.Youtube.Com/Watch?V=I61j3kmfirc&Feature=Related>>

Chouchane, A. Déclaration series at youtube website:
<<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=if8csjfvenco&feature=related>>

“Changes in the pyramid of power in Algeria; Bouteflika ‘holed up’ beyond 2014,” *France24 TV*, <http://www.france24.com/ar/20130913/>

Djilali Hadjadj, “Algeria: A Future Hijacked by Corruption”, *Le Soir d’Algerie: Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 12, 2 July 2007

Ferdi, S., “Le régime, le statuquo et le «risque» de l’ouverture Une présidentielle sans bouteflika n’est pas un gage de changement,” *le Quotidien d’Oran*, 29/04/2013

France 2 “Algerie,Said Saadi du RCD,representant du DRS aupres des medias Français et du lobby juif” Pub in youtube 27/02/2011 <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2xHsRDd2Ihw> >

France Info TV: <<http://www.youtubealgerie.net/algerie-said-saadi-amirouche-une-vie-deux-morts-un-testament>>

Girlinging John, “Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy” *Questia Media America, Inc.* <www.questia.com> Contributors (London: Rout ledge 1997)

Hamid A. Qadir, “Revolutionary’s leaders in Tunisia put Moujahidin in jail” *Elkhobar*, 19/11/2008 No. 5479.

Harbi M., “The world at War, Massacre in Algeria”, 14/05/2005, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, <<http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/14algeria>>

Harbi, Mohammed, “The world at war, Massacre in Algeria”, *Le monde Diplomatique*, 14 May 2005, <<http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/14algeria>>

Jacinto, Leela [text and video], “The rise and fall of Rafik Khalifa, Algeria’s golden boy”, *France24 TV Channel*, 28/04/2010, <<http://www.france24.com/en/20100428-rafik-khalifa-rise-fall-algeria-golden-boy-uk-fraud>>

Martinez Luis “Algérie, la décennie sanglante” *L’express*, 22 January 1998, Pub. At <http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/algerie-la-decennie-sanglante_884481.html>

Mayer J. Zitout M. A. Bougettaya, S. “Interactions of killing French monks in Algeria” *Aljazeera TV* [program: from behind the news], 14/07/2009, <www.aljazeera.net/nr/exeres/4135d313-88b4-4522-94a3-914d45a54e56.htm>

Saleh, Heba “Violence Continues Despite a Reconciliation Program, Algeria and France: a Tense Relationship”, *BBC News* Tuesday, 13 February, 2001 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1168430.stm >.

Sadiki, L, *Aljazeera* (Opinion), [Algeria: Elections without democracy] *Aljazeera TV* 10/05/2012: <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/05/201251011038530582.html>>

Sadiki, L., “The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses,” *Columbia University Press*, 2004.

Transparency International, “Corruption index 2011 from Transparency International: Find out how each country compares 2012” The Gardian news-datablog: Guardian News and Media Limited *or its affiliated companies*, <<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/>>

6. Other Material

Algerian Constitution 1996, Article 88

Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (UIMA), *Journal of al-chihab*, Vol. 25 (November 1931)

Boehmke, F. J., “Selection Bias,” Sage Research Methods” (2004)’ DOI: <<http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412950589>>

Chaoui, A., “Algeria Military Rift over Presidential Elections Turns “Nasty” Washington - The pre-election fever in Algeria threatens to morph into a full blown confrontation between powerful political clans” (12/02/2014): <http://www.morocoworldnews.com/2014/02/122396/algeria-military-rift-over-presidential-elections-turns-nasty/?print=print>>

Echorouk, El khaber (Algerian Daily Newspapers -Arabic), *El Watan* (Algerian Daily newspaper - French) 22/09/2013: < <http://www.elkhabar.com/ar/politique/356262.html> >; and: <<http://www.tsa-algerie.com/actualite/item/58-lutte-contre-la-corruption-bachir-tartag-le-general-du-drs-aux-commandes-de-l-operation-mains-propres>>

Dissolution of National Assembly, “Constitution of October 4, 1958” <
<http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp>>

Global IDP, Profile of Internal Displacement: “Algeria, Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP” *Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council*, 4 March, 2004

Heartfield, J. “The Death of the Subject Explained”, Chapter six, “Algeria and the Defeat of French Humanism” 19/02/2011 < <http://www.marxists.org>>

Ibn Badis Abdelhamid “ Principles of Governing in Islam” (Usul Al Wilaya fi al Islam), [January 1938] *Chihab Journal*

Jacquemet Nicolas. “Micro-économie de la corruption” In: *Revue française d'économie. Ministère de la jeunesse, de l'éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l'enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation, Volume 20 N°4, 2006. pp. 117-159.*

McNamara, C., “General Guidelines for Conducting Research Interviews, Authenticity Consulting,” LLC., <<http://managementhelp.org/businessresearch/interviews.htm>>


The foundation Saint-Simon, comprendre L'Algerie” [July 1995]

The Global IDP Project, *EU 2002; HRW 2003; FIDH* (17 March 2003)
<<http://www.idpproject.org/>>

APPENDICES

APPENDIX: 1


MAP 1



- Circles in the map show the main locations of the ALN bases in and out the Algerian borders
- Arrows show the principle attacks' directions of the revolutionaries (ALN) against French strategic locations
- Lines show the main ALN roads to the battlefield during the Liberation War 1954-1962.

Source: Emmanuel GRANGE *la guerre d'Algérie au cinema*, Magazine "L'Algérie de 1954 à 1962" 4 April 2013

MAP 2




■ **Wilaya 1:** Aures; **Wilaya 2:** the North of Constantine; **Wilaya 3:** Kabyle; **Wilaya 4:** Algiers; **Wilaya 5:** Oran; **Wilaya 6:** Sahara

Map of Algeria at the time of the war: shows the approximate borders of all six Wilayas, which have been divided according to the Soummam Platform of 1956. The Map shows as well the approximate borders of all six Wilayas, and the most important French airfields, French military bases, and the Morice lines. The Information has been taken from WESTERN & NORTHERN AFRICA DATABASE: http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_354.shtml


APPENDIX: 2

The family tree of the Algerian resistance from the beginning to the revolutionary era
Source: Le FLN, Mirage et Réalité: des origines à la prise du pouvoir (1945–1962). Par Mohammed Harbi. Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique 1980.



APPENDIX: 3

Algerian National Movements thoughts 1926-1962



APPENDIX: 4

A Chronology of Key Events in Algerian History

YEAR	EVENT
1830	French Invasion to Algeria
1834	France invades Algeria and takes over the Algerian coast. The "Moderne Algeria " is created with new borders.
1839	Algerian resistance organized by Abd-al-Qadir against the French occupants
1840	The number of French settlers surpasses 100,000
1847	Abd-al-Qadir is arrested and exiled to Syria. The french colonization can start exploiting Algeria for its only benefit
1847-1897	Conflicts between Muslim groups and the colonist. Muslims are considered an inferior class of people and have few civil rights.
1879	Northern Algerian is declared part of France. Algerians can apply for full citizenship only after renouncing Islam
1920s	Tension within the Algerian population Algerians are disappointed not to seen equal with the French Nationalism raises among Muslim Algerians
8 May 1945	The massacres in the Sétif and Guelma regions on 8 May 1945, described at the time as events or troubles in north Constantine, marked the beginning of the Algerian war of independence. Algerian sources eventually estimated that the number of Algerians killed during the riots as more than 45,000.
1954	Front de Liberation National, FLN, announced the revolution began from Ouras Mountains.
1959	Referendum called by Charles de Gaulle that allows Algeria to chose between independence or continued anociation with France.
1960-1961	Revolts against de Gaulle in France. French feel insulted and betrayed by the government.
18 March 1962	The agreement of Evian: independent is going to be given to Algeria after a transitional period
1 July 1962	99.7% of Algerians vote for independence
3 July 1962	Independence of Algeria is proclaimed
5 July 1962	Algerian ceremony for the Independence (Algeria gains independence from France.)
18 and 25 November 1962	Legislative elections in France produce a pro-Gaulist majority and the reemergence of a "Popular Front" style alliance on the Left

1963	Ahmed Ben Bella elected as first president.
1965	Col Houari Boumédiène overthrows Ben Bella, pledges to end corruption. (Coup d'état 1965)
1976	Boumédiène introduces a new constitution which confirms commitment to socialism and role of the National Liberation Front (FLN) as the sole political party. Islam is recognized as state religion.
1978	Boumédiène dies/killed and is replaced by Col Chadli Bendjedid, as the compromise candidate of the military establishment.
1986	Rising inflation and unemployment, exacerbated by the collapse of oil and gas prices lead to a wave of strikes and violent demonstrations.
1988	Serious rioting against economic conditions.
1989	The National People's Assembly revokes the ban on new political parties and adopts a new electoral law allowing opposition parties to contest future elections.
1989	Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) founded and over 20 new parties licensed.
1990	The FIS wins 55 per cent of the vote in local elections.
1991	Government announces parliamentary elections in June 1991 and plans changes to electoral system including restrictions on campaigning in mosques. FIS reacts by calling general strike. State of siege declared, elections postponed. FIS leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj arrested and jailed.
1991	December - In the first round of general elections the FIS wins 188 seats outright, and seems virtually certain to obtain an absolute majority in the second round.
4 January 1992	The National People's Assembly is dissolved by presidential decree and on 11 January President Chadli, apparently under pressure from the military leadership, resigns. A five-member Higher State Council, chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf, takes over. Street gatherings banned, violent clashes break out on 8 and 9 February between FIS supporters and security forces. A state of emergency is declared, the FIS is ordered to disband and all 411 FIS-controlled local and regional authorities are dissolved.
29 June 1992	Boudiaf assassinated by a member of his bodyguard with alleged Islamist links. Violence increases and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerges as the main group behind these operations.
1994	Liamine Zeroual, a retired army colonel, is appointed chairman of the Higher State Council, then a five-year term as president of the republic with a comfortable majority in 1995.
26–27 March 1996	seven monks from the monastery Notre-Dame de l'Atlas of Tibhirine in Algeria were kidnapped during, held for two months and were found dead in late May 1996.
1996	Proposed constitutional changes approved in a referendum by over 85 per cent of

	voters.
1997	Parliamentary elections won by the newly created Democratic National Rally, followed by the moderate Islamic party, Movement of Society for Peace.
1998	President Zeroual announces his intention to cut short his term and hold early presidential elections.
1999	Former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika elected as president after all opposition candidates withdraw from race, saying they had received inadequate guarantees of fair and transparent elections.
1999	Referendum approves Bouteflika's law on civil concord, the result of long and largely secret negotiations with the armed wing of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Thousands of members of the AIS and other armed groups are pardoned.
2000	Attacks on civilians and security forces continue, and are thought to be the work of small groups still opposed to the civil concord. Violence is estimated to have claimed over 100,000 lives in Algeria since 1992.
2003 June	Leader of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Abassi Madani and his deputy Ali Belhadj are freed after serving 12-year sentences.
2004 April	President Bouteflika is re-elected to a second term in a landslide poll victory.
2005 March	Government-commissioned report says security forces were responsible for the disappearances of more than 6,000 citizens during the 1990s civil conflict.
2007 May	Parliamentary elections: dozens are killed in the run-up, in a wave of fighting between the military and armed groups. Pro-government parties retain their absolute majority in parliament.
2007 September	At least 50 people are killed in a series of bombings. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb claims responsibility for the attacks. (Al-Qaeda's second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri urges north Africa's Muslims to "cleanse" their land of Spaniards and French.)
2008 November	Parliament approves constitutional changes allowing President Bouteflika to run for a third term. President Bouteflika wins third term at the polls in April 2009
2011 January	Major protests over food prices and unemployment, with two people being killed in clashes with security forces. The government orders cuts to the price of basic foodstuffs. Inconclusive protests continue into 2012.
2012 May	Parliamentary poll: Ruling FLN wins 220 out of 463 seats, followed by its ally the National Democratic Rally with 68 seats. Islamist alliance comes third with 48 seats. Some opposition MPs allege FLN fraud.
2012 September	President Bouteflika appoints water minister and key ally Abdelmalek Sellal as prime minister, ending post-election uncertainty.
2012 November	Security alert levels raised over planned foreign intervention against Islamists in neighboring Mali.

2012 December	French President Francois Hollande acknowledges suffering caused by France's colonisation of Algeria but stops short of an apology.
2013 January	The In Amenas hostage crisis: Dozens of foreign hostages are killed by the Algerian military special forces when a militant group attacks the GAS complex and kidnaps over 800 workers, most of them foreign engineers and technicians, during a four-day siege at a remote gas complex. Algerian special forces storm the site. PM Abdelmalek Sellal says the attackers entered Algeria from northern Mali.
April 2013	President Bouteflika suffers a stroke and spends three months in France in treatment.
14/01/2014	83 officers from different departments, including 50 of them from the DRS, are sent into retirement by the military, under the direction of the Minister of Defence, General Kaid Saleh

Source: BBC News Africa, Algeria Profile, 13/06/2013: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14118856>

APPENDIX: 5

THE EVIAN AGREEMENTS

**(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT)**

C. (62) 58

COPY NO.50

3rd April 1962

CABINET

THE EVIAN AGREEMENTS

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

My colleagues may like to have a summary of the main provisions of the agreement between the French Government and the "Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne" (G. P. R. A.) signed at Evian on 18th March, 1962.

2. The Cease-Fire. This came into effect on 19th March and has been followed by the declaration of an amnesty and the release of all prisoners within 20 days. Civil liberties will be restored "as soon as possible" and the "Front de Liberation Nationale" (F. L. N.) will be considered a legal political organization.

3. The Transitional Period. This will last until the referendum, to be held in all the Algerian and Saharan departments not less than three months and not more than six months after the cease-fire. During this period French sovereignty will continue and France, which will be represented by a High Commissioner, M. Fouchet, will remain directly responsible for foreign affairs, security, defense, justice, currency, economic relations and, "in the last resort", the maintenance of order.

Otherwise the country will be run by a 12-member French-nominated Provisional Executive under a Moslem President, M. Fares, and helped in its task by a local security force of up to 60, 000 French-officered Moslem auxiliaries and a mixed "Tribunal of Public Order".

4. Algerian refugees abroad (who number some 300,000) will be helped to return. But all Algerian armed forces now in Tunisia and Morocco (about 30,000 in all) will remain where they are until after the referendum, in which they will therefore not vote.

5. The Referendum. The population of Algeria will be offered three choices:-

- (i) Maintenance of Algeria as a French department.
- (ii) Independence by breaking all links with France.
- (iii) Independence in co-operation with France.

Both the French Government and the G. P. R. A. favor the third choice. If this is adopted,

independence will be immediately recognized by France and responsibility immediately transferred. Within three weeks the Provisional Executive would organize elections for an Algerian National Assembly, to which it would remit its powers.

6. Independence and Co-operation (if the third alternative is chosen, which seems likely owing to the discipline exercised by the F. L. N. over the Algerian Moslems).

(i) Individual Rights. There will be no reprisals for acts committed or opinions expressed up to the date of the referendum.

Settlers will then have three years in which to decide whether to assume Algerian nationality or remain French (in which case they may continue to live in Algeria as privileged foreigners, even to the extent of enjoying the present French legal system). Their participation at all levels of the Government and Administration will be guaranteed in relation to their numbers, their property and employment will be safeguarded, and special courts will ensure that their rights are respected.

France will maintain the French nationality of all who now possess it in Algeria and do not wish to renounce it, and those French citizens, Moslem or European, wishing to leave Algeria will be free to go, taking their goods and money with them.

(ii) Economic Co-operation. Algeria will remain in the Franc Zone and will receive, for three years in the first instance, full economic and technical aid at the level at present provided under the Constantine Plan.

Algerian markets will remain open to France and vice versa.

In the Sahara existing rights will be respected and oil and mineral resources exploited on an equal basis under the direction of a joint technical co-operation agency. French companies will have a privileged position for six years. Algeria will retain full sovereignty, grant all future concessions and promulgate legislation covering exploitation of the Sahara.

(iii) French Military Installations. French forces will be allowed to remain in Algeria for three years after independence, but they will be progressively reduced, 80, 000 only remaining after the first year.

France will retain the Mers-el-Kebir naval base for 15 years and the lease can be renewed. She will also retain the use of other bases and installations (including the nuclear testing centre in the Sahara) for five years. Use of certain airfields may be further renewed thereafter.

7. Settlement of Disputes. Disputes will, in the last resort, be referred to the International Court of Justice.

8. There is little doubt that this agreement represents a considerable triumph for General de Gaulle. Many of its provisions - e.g. over military bases and guarantees for European settlers - are much better than could at one time have been expected and have only been wrung from the Algerians *after* a great deal of bargaining. Indeed, in agreeing to allow France to retain the *use* of her nuclear testing ground, the G. P. R. A. acted in the full knowledge that they would be likely to incur the odium of their fellow Afro-Asians. According to the United Arab Republic Ambassador in Moscow, the Soviet Government have been as surprised as his own by these far-reaching concessions on the part of the Algerians.

9. On the other hand, it is possible that the G. P. R. A. were forced to make these concessions

through fear of partition and it may well be that the extremer elements among the Algerian nationalists have agreed to this settlement with the mental reservation that they can go back on their word when they have achieved complete independence. There must always be a doubt whether the safeguards wrung from the G. P. R. A. on paper will prove worth the year of delay during which the Organization de l'Armde Secrete (O. A. S.) grew from nothing to its present strength, especially since the French claim that the G. P. R. A. will now cease to function as such.

10. The main obstacle to the application of the agreement is the O. A.S. which will presumably continue to sabotage it with every means at its disposal. But now that the French Army has at last moved decisively against the O.A.S. and, providing that the military impetus can be maintained, there is every reason to expect that its resistance will soon be broken, though not without further bloodshed.

11. There have been signs that the O. A, S. have been losing the confidence of the Europeans (on whose continued support the O.A. S's position ultimately rests) because of:-

- a. Loyalty of the Army.
- ii. Absence of any effective O. A. S. counter-action following the siege of Bab-el-Oued and the massacre of over 50 civilians by Moslem troops in Algiers on 26th March.
- iii. Discipline shown by Moslems in the face of provocation.
- iv. Capture of General Jouhaud and other O. A. S. leaders.

12. Reactions in France to the cease-fire have been restrained and its terms appear to have been accepted by the French people. There is little doubt that General de Gaulle will get another large majority in the referendum to be held in Metropolitan France on 8th April to approve the Evian agreement.

13. As sovereignty over Algeria remains vested in France until the referendum, there is no question, for the time being, of our recognizing any Algerian Government and our contacts with the F. L. N. leaders and "representatives" will continue to be on an informal basis.

H.

**Foreign Office, S.W. 1.
30th March, 1962. -**

APPENDIX: 6


1. Algeria's share in France's world imports and exports and France's share in Algeria's world imports and exports, 1960-92 (in %)

France	1960	1970	1980	1990	1992
Imports from Algeria	8.0	3.4	1.3	0.8	0.8
Exports to Algeria	16.0	2.9	2.4	1.3	1.0

Algeria	1960	1970	1980	1990	1992
Imports from France	83.0	42.0	23.2	23.1	24.2
Exports to France	92.0	53.5	13.4	17.3	18.3

Source: I. Brandell (1981), a. 168 and UN, International Trade Statistics Yearbook Noted in Bonora-Waisman, Camille, France and the Algerian Conflict Issue in Democracy and Political Stability, 1988-1995. England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003

2. Algeria - Imports - million US\$



Source: <<http://algeria.opendataforafrica.org/wxmujcg/algeria-imports-major-trade-partners>>

APPENDIX 7

Presidents of Algeria since Independence

President	Political party	Term of Office		
Ferhat Abbas	FLN - GPRA	19 September 1958	27 August 1961	Resigned
Benyoucef Benkhedda	FLN - GPRA	27 August 1961	27 September 1962	Coup d'état
Ahmed Ben Bella	FLN - civilian	27 September 1962	20 September 1963	Coup d'état
Mohammed Boukharouba (Houari Boumédiène)	FLN - ANP	19 June 1965	12 December 1976	Died / Killed 27/12/1978
Chadli Benjedid	FLN - ANP	9 February 1979	11 January 1992	Coup d'état
Mohamed Boudiaf	FLN - civilian	14 January 1992	29 June 1992	Killed
Ali Kafi	FLN - ANP	2 July 1992	31 January 1994	Resigned
Liamine Zéroual	General - ANP	31 January 1994	27 April 1999	Forced to resign
Abdelaziz Bouteflika	FLN – ANP	27 April 1999	Present	His third term finish in April 2014

APPENDIX 8

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Department of Political Science and Public Policy
School of Arts & Social Sciences
Te Kura Kete Aronui
The University of Waikato
Private Bag 3105
Hamilton, New Zealand 3240



THE UNIVERSITY OF
WAIKATO
Te Whare Wānanga o Waikato

PhD Research Project

“Military Regimes, Political Power and Human Rights Violations in Postcolonial Algeria”

- Question 1.** What is the principle on which the military was structured in 1963 after GPRA was dismissed?
- Question 2.** What changes took place within the military following the coup against Ben Bella in 1965?
- Question 3.** What was the involvement of the professional officers in the military regime from 1975 to 1992?
- Question 4.** Was the coup of 1991 the inevitable result of democracy in Algeria?
- Question 5.** Scholars have divided the Algerian army into three categories of officers, revolutionary officers, French-Trained Officers and Post-revolutionary recruits. What have been the differences among them regarding power, responsibilities and decisions taken?
- Question 6.** In your view, will the Military ever accept civilian control and regulations?
- Question 7.** To what extent has the FLN been a political party? (Please clarify)
- Question 8.** Why did the military regime reject the platform of Rome?
- Question 9.** What is the principal cause of the violence and Human Rights violations in the 1990s?
- Question 10.** To what extent does the current military regime depend for its existence on the support of other countries?