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Appendices to:

**Acts of reference and the miscommunication of referents by first
and second language speakers of English**

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1 Introduction

This document comprises appendices for the doctoral thesis *Acts of reference and the miscommunication of referents by first and second language speakers of English* (Ryan, 2012).

The appendices are numbered here to match the chapters (but not necessarily the sections) they correspond most closely to in the main thesis. As such, Chapter 2 presents a review of additional literature leading to the theoretical framework of the main study. Chapter 3 presents reviews further literature relating to SLL use of RE types. Chapter 4 provides a number of further details relating to the methods used in the study. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present material in support of the findings presented in the corresponding chapters of the main study. In some cases, these are extended extracts for the examples discussed in the main body of the thesis; in other cases additional examples are presented. Chapters 8 and 9 present supporting material and ideas for the points raised in the main body of the thesis.

2 Appendix to Chapter 2: Review of literature

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents further details of issues raised in Chapter 2 of the main body of the thesis. Section 2.1 presents a review of a few key issues in definitions of reference from the philosophy literature, while Section 2.2 presents a similar review for definitions of reference in the linguistics literature. Section 2.3 provides additional details in relation to the concept of common ground. Section 2.4 reviews alternatives to Accessibility Theory (Ariel, 1990, 2001). Finally, Section 2.5 provides an overview of the factors identified in the literature as affecting referent accessibility. This discussion provides the basis for the accessibility coding system outlined in Chapter 4.

2.1 Reference in philosophy

The body of philosophical work on reference is extensive and diverse, and only a very selective range is discussed here. It should be noted, for example, that the term *reference* is typically used in a much broader sense in discussions of the philosophy of mind (Neander, 2006, p. 374).

In the philosophy of language, underlying the notion of reference is the issue of how language relates to the world. It has been argued that certain expressions (semantic reference), or uses of expressions (speaker reference), refer to a real world entity in a way that has been variously described as *pointing* (Martin, 1987, p. 38), *indicating* (Lycan, 2000), *picking out* (Carlson, 2004), or *enabling the audience to pick out* (Donnellan, 1966) a specific *real-world* entity. That is, in discussions of semantic reference, a referring expression is said to bear a relation to an entity in the real-world in so far as it ‘stands for’, or is a ‘sign’ for, that entity. For example, in certain contexts, the expression ‘Barack Obama’ may be said to bear a direct connection with the real-world person elected in 2008 as the

President of the United States: the expression ‘stands for’ the person. In speaker reference (the focus of the present study), the speaker indicates a real-world referent to the hearer.

The following discussion concentrates on some of the background issues relevant to the discussion of speaker reference in the present study. As discussed in the main thesis, the definition of reference and the starting point for the discussion is the view put forward by Bach (2008).

2.1.1 Referents and existence

Many philosophers have discussed the requirement that a referent must exist in an ontological sense in order to be referred to. In a widely discussed example, Russell (1905) argued that the proposition *The present King of France is bald* is logically false, as it is based on a referring expression that does not refer to anything (p. 491) (Russell uses the term *denoting phrase*). Strawson (1950) argued against the idea that such propositions were false, but agreed that existence is a precondition of reference, arguing that, in relation to the King of France sentence “we simply *fail* to say anything true or false because we simply fail to mention anybody by this particular use of that perfectly significant phrase” (p. 331). The sentence *fails to refer* because there is no such real-world entity to refer to.

A consequence of this precondition of existence means that uses of language to indicate mythical figures (e.g. Santa Claus) and fictional characters (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) are often considered in philosophy to be non-referential, or at least not genuinely referential. These have been labelled a *parasitic* form of reference (Searle, 1969, p. 79), *feigned reference* (Bach, 1987, p. 215) or *pseudo-reference* (Bach, 2008, p. 31). Searle (1969, p. 78) argued that one can only refer to fictional characters in the very limited sense of referring to a character *as* a fictional character:

In normal real world talk I cannot refer to Sherlock Holmes because there never was such a person. If in this ‘universe of discourse’ I say “Sherlock

Holmes wore a deerstalker hat” I fail to refer But now suppose I shift into the fictional, play acting, lets-pretend mode of discourse. Here if I say “Sherlock Holmes wore a deerstalker hat”, I do indeed refer to a fictional character (i.e. a character who does not exist but who exists in fiction) and what I say here is true.

Carlson (2004, p. 82) cites a rare dissenting voice in Meinong , who argued that such expressions *do* refer, and that non-existence is merely a property. Carlson comments that this position “strikes many as ontologically a bit bizarre”. Carlson (p. 95) cites an alternative in the *possible worlds* approach of Hintikka (1983), in which such objects do exist “but in other possible worlds from our own. So when we make reference to them, we are doing so in those worlds where they do exist, just not this one.”

This type of reference to a fictional character can be distinguished from the type of reference that occurs *within* a text when the author makes repeated mentions of a character (Bach, 2008, p. 31). In the latter case, Bach (1987, pp. 215-216) argues that such reference is intended to be treated by the reader (in the act of reading) in much the same way as reference to real-world people, yet is merely feigned reference.

2.1.2 Singular thoughts and singular expressions

A further feature of philosophical accounts is an analysis of the *conditions* under which a speaker may refer to a real-world entity and a hearer may resolve that reference. The crucial concept here is the notion of *singular thoughts*. A singular thought is a mental representation of a particular entity that is formed through perceiving it, being informed of it, or remembering it (after it has been perceived) (Bach, 2008, p. 18). After encountering an entity, one is in a position to make an internal representation of that entity, and to think of it as a distinct, specific individual. Similarly, entities that other people have encountered can be held as a singular thought through a “chain of communication” in which there is “a representational connection, however remote and many-linked, between thought

and object” (2008, p. 18). Thus, in this account, one cannot hold a singular thought about an entity that is only understood through description, such as:

1. The inventor of the wheel
2. My great-great-great-grandchildren

Such people are not in any sense *known to* or *known of by* the speaker. They exist only as descriptions that the hearer understands, rather than knows. Therefore they cannot be thought of except in terms of a description. Thus, in this account, *descriptive reference* is a misnomer and is not truly referential.

The linguistic counterpart of singular thoughts is *singular terms*. Singular terms are expressions which indicate particular individuals (e.g. *Barack Obama*, *my first cat*), rather than *general terms* (*cat*, *men*). Singular terms include proper nouns (*Barack Obama*, *New Zealand*), definite descriptions (*the red pencil*, *the President*), singular personal pronouns (*you*, *she*), and demonstrative pronouns (*this*, *those*) (Lycan, 2000, p. 13). Philosophical discussions of reference tend to take singular terms as a starting point, and may further restrict the set of referring expressions. It is important to note, however, that reference occurs in *particular instances* of these linguistic being used; all referring expressions may also be used in non-referring ways. For example, most philosophical accounts would agree that the underlined expressions in the following examples do not refer:

1. What is the origin of the name ‘Ryan’?
2. When I retire, I will get my first cat.

In most accounts, Example 1 is not referential because the proper name ‘Ryan’ is not used to refer to any individual by that name. The utterance merely *presents* the word in order for it to be commented on (Searle, 1969, pp. 75-76). Example 2 is a case of ‘descriptive reference’: here the referent is known only descriptively and not through any experiential connection, so one cannot form a singular thought about it.

2.1.3 Events

As discussed in the main body of the thesis, many linguistic approaches to reference include uses of NPs that relate to events (*the accident, the wedding, Hurricane Katrina*), while approaches from philosophy generally appear to hold that this is not a matter of reference (e.g. Bach, 2008). The present study follows the latter view, and this subsection briefly outlines why.

It is, perhaps, not immediately clear why events cannot qualify as referents. However, the obvious ontological differences between events and physical objects may, in themselves, be sufficient to treat reference to entities as being communicatively different to the use of NPs to indicate events. In particular, the existential status of events is fundamentally different from that of entities. In Bach's (2008) view, referents are always entities that exist (or previously existed) 'out there' in the world; events do not exist, as such, and are (informally) discussed in terms of 'happening' and 'occurring'.

A more important issue may be that reference involves individuation. (Here, I draw upon arguments made by Boersma, 2009 but reach conclusions that are fundamentally different from his). In referring to an entity, the speaker singles out that entity. Such singling out presupposes that the individual can be individuated. As Boersma states, it seems that we can "clearly individuate one event from another" (p. 174), particularly in many of the types of examples Boersma provides, such as 'this coin toss' or 'that die roll'. However, unlike our perception of people and most objects, Boersma notes that:

We decide what counts as an event and hence what events there are. This can be seen (somewhat, at least) on an intuitive level by considering the difficulty of saying what the parameters of a given event are. Exactly when was the 1948 Presidential election? When did it begin? On election day? On the day that the first candidate is nominated? In asking, 'When did it begin?', to what does the *it* refer? (The answer cannot be: to the 1948 Presidential election, because that is circular and vacuous in this context.) Or, when was the battle of Waterloo? Did it start when the first shot was fired? When Napoleon advanced his troops past a certain point?

The point of these examples and questions is that the individuation of events is not a clear-cut, straightforward notion even at an intuitive level. (2009, pp. 174-175)

Boersma's observations suggest a problem in discussing the miscommunication of events. As Boersma's examples suggest, a question such as 'How many people died at the Battle of Waterloo?' could elicit a range of correct answers, depending on when the perceived boundaries of the event. In some cases, it even seems that two people could be ostensibly thinking of the same event, yet they could be very little overlap (perhaps no overlap) between the event-elements that each individual is thinking of. Therefore, if successful reference involves interactants identifying the same referent, then it is not entirely clear how to distinguish some successful and unsuccessful 'references' to events.

2.1.4 Anaphors

There is some discussion in the philosophy literature over the relationship between *anaphora* and reference, although as Bach (1987, p. 221) notes, it has been a focus for linguists far more than philosophers. Anaphora (or anaphoric reference) occurs when a stretch of discourse involves second and often subsequent mentions of an entity. These are generally through the use of a more attenuated noun phrase, such as a pronoun.

Anaphoric pronouns are considered *semantically underdetermined* in that they generally require the presence of an expression in another part of the text – its antecedent – to disambiguate its reference. However, the nature of this connection is a matter of some dispute. One view, developed in linguistic theories such as binding theory and apparently assumed in some philosophical accounts, is that there is a strong syntactic (as well as semantic) element to the relationship between an anaphora and its antecedent (e.g. Büring, 2005). As Bach notes, "conventional wisdom has it that an anaphoric pronoun refers to whatever its antecedent refers to and that this is a matter not of speaker intention but of sentence grammar" (1987, p. 221). Geach (cited in Lycan, p.31), for example, suggests that such an expression "merely abbreviates a boilerplate repetition of

the antecedent phrase”, so that an anaphoric pronoun has a meaning “precisely equivalent to” its antecedent; Brown and Yule (1983) discuss the inadequacy of such a view, demonstrating the role of antecedent predicates in determining how anaphors are interpreted (also Yule, 1982).

An alternative view in philosophy, argued by Bach (1987), is that anaphora is based on pragmatic rather than syntactic principles. To Bach, the presence of a referential expression (the pronoun’s antecedent) simply means that the repetition of that entity is possible with a less explicit referring expression (i.e. a pronoun). As he argues, “being mentioned elsewhere in a sentence is just one way of being salient” (1987, p. 221). This view appears to be similar to that of some linguists working in pragmatics, such as Ariel (1990) and Gundel et al (1993). Bach acknowledges that there must be some sort of rule governing some forms of anaphora, but argues that “whatever its precise formulation, it must be a pragmatic rule, even though it adverts to intra-sentential structural relationships” (1987, p. 235). Ariel (1990) raises the possibility that the cognitive principle behind sentence-level anaphora is accessibility, although she argues for a weaker version in the work cited.

2.2 Linguistic approaches to reference

As discussed in Chapter 2, reference is usually defined much more broadly in linguistics than in philosophy. The purpose of this section is, firstly, to outline the range of phenomena that may be considered referential in linguistic studies, and to more closely consider the notion of reference in a few key studies, including those by Gundel et al. (1993) and Ariel (1990, 2001).

The term reference, as it is discussed in the present study, relates only to people and physical entities (although, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is acknowledged that reference may also be possible to some abstract entities). Within linguistics and its subfield, reference is typically treated much more broadly. Under the classification used by Perdue (1984), for example, the term reference encompasses spatial relations (e.g. below, in), temporal relations (e.g. before,

ago), distances (e.g. five meters, very far), durations (five metres, very far), and social relations as encoded in politeness forms (1984, p. 138). Chini (2005, p. 67) identifies referents as belonging “to one of the following five domains: persons and objects (= entities), times, places, actions-events, modalities.” Similarly wide definitions are used in some studies of L1 and SLL referential communication (e.g. Bongaerts, Kellerman, & Bentlage, 1987; Glucksberg & Krauss, 1967). Similarly, Chafe (1994, p. 69) sees events and states as being transformed into referents through the process of nominalization.

Although conceptions of reference from both the linguistics and philosophy literature are fairly diverse, there are a number of general observations which can be made indicating general divergence in the two fields. Firstly, as the discussion has suggested, linguistic definitions of reference are nearly always very broad (e.g. Ariel, 1990; Chafe, 1996; Du Bois, 1980; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993). Secondly, linguistic definitions typically encompass both descriptive reference and most (and often all) anaphora. Thirdly, linguistic accounts tend to privilege mental representations of entities over the actual existence of real-world entities and related criteria such as ontological existence. These points will be elaborated in the discussion that follows

However, despite certain features common to many accounts of reference, there is a suggestion that there may be a lack of clarity and consistency across the various accounts: many works of linguistic reference do not define their use of key terms, and this extends to not explicating the basis on which they distinguish referential and non-referential noun phrases, nor defining key terms such as *referential* and *referent*. This may obfuscate key positions on issues such as the relationship between speaker reference and semantic reference, whether existence is a requirement, whether descriptive reference qualifies as reference, whether singular thoughts are required, and generally where to draw the distinction between reference and non-reference. For example, Clancy’s (1980) landmark study of reference in English and Japanese includes a footnote noting “the noun phrases in this paper include only those which were referential” (p. 132), but there is no clarification of how this distinction is made (although, in fairness, Clancy’s work does appear in the same volume as Du Bois (1980), who spends

considerable time defining reference). In other works, for instance Ariel (1990, 2001), positions become clear only through extensive and intensive reading. Studies in L2 reference often neglect to clarify these terms (e.g. Hendriks, 2003; Kang, 2004; Swierzbis, 2004), although they may clarify related distinctions. Hendriks (2003), for example, focuses on reference maintenance and defines this as “all linguistic expressions referring to a protagonist after the first act of referring to that particular protagonist” (p. 299).

In neglecting to clarify their use of the term referential, it seems that many linguists and applied linguists appear to assume that there is a shared, and non-problematic linguistic definition of reference. Even before examining and comparing different linguistic studies, there is a problem with this assumption. Specifically, considering the number of key debates within the field of philosophy, and the frequency with which linguists cite philosophical sources, it seems likely that various philosophical positions, as well as perspectives from psychology, computational linguistics, and cognitive science, may have influenced individual linguists.

Nevertheless, some landmark linguistic works on reference (Ariel, 1990; Du Bois, 1980; Gundel et al, 1993; Karttunen, 1976) and some broader-based linguistic works (Bickerton, 1981; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Huebner, 1983) do provide varying degrees of information regarding key terms from which various assumptions can be examined. These reveal certain areas of commonality suggesting a general ‘linguistic approach to reference’, as well as areas of divergence. This appears to be partly due to the varying extents to which linguists follow philosophical traditions, and partly due to the formative influence to linguistics of Saussure’s (1966) notion of *signs*.

2.2.1 The influence of Saussure

While Saussure’s (1966) work is not about reference, it appears to have influenced the way in which linguists approach reference. Whereas philosophy has looked at the connections between language and the world, interest among

linguists has traditionally tended to reflect Saussure's (1966, pp. 11-13) *speaking circuit*. The speaking circuit is a model of conversing and is represented graphically as the to and fro of communication between two or more speakers, in which mental concepts in the brain are transmitted by speech organs to the receiver's ear, and on to the brain. Thus the focus is on interactants and how they communicate through a combination of physiological and psychological means. In other words, it is a focus on language *in relation to speakers and communication*, rather than language in relation to the outside world.

For considerations of reference, the most relevant aspect of Saussure's work is the argument that language consists of *signs*. A sign is a two-part whole, consisting of a 'sound-image' (the *signifier*) and concept (the *signified*) which are "intimately united, and each recalls the other" (p. 66). A sign can be thought of as the combination of a lexical unit and its meaning. Saussure argues that a sign is a concrete linguistic entity, but when taken alone, each of its constituent parts (the signified and the signifier alone) is "a mere abstraction" (p. 103). He argues that "a succession of sounds is linguistic only if it supports an idea", and concepts (when considered alone) "belong to psychology" rather than linguistics (p.103).

Crucially, "the linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound image" (1966, p. 66). The second part of this equation ('name' vs. 'sound image') has important implications for the Saussurian system, but it is the first part that is of particular interest here: *thing* as opposed to *concept*. Therefore it would seem that genuine words (rather than nonsense words or babbling) are connected to internal representations that are shared by speakers. However, Saussure does not discuss reference: the connection between a concept and a singular thought (the individuating of that concept into a mental representation for a particular individual) is not discussed, nor is the connection between a singular thought and a real-world referent.

Nevertheless, what is relevant in Saussurian linguistics is that the utterance of a word signifies a *concept*. This emphasis on a mental dimension appears to have been adopted by many linguists working with reference. For example, Piwek & Cremers (1996, p. 837), specifically define referents as being "mental

representations of objects”. As discussed in the following subsections, such a view is also strongly apparent in the works of Gundel et al (1993) and Du Bois (1980).

2.2.2 Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski, 1993, 2005

Although brief, Gundel, Hedberg, Zacharski (1993) provide one of the more explicit position statements defining their use of the term reference or referent, (mainly in a footnote, pp. 276-277). Further details are provided in a later work (2005) where they discuss referential pronouns without NP antecedents, where the antecedent was a “non-nominal . . . that evoked a fact, proposition, activity, situation, etc.” (p. 352). Vague uses of *they* are identified as being “only loosely referential” (p. 355), and may relate, for example, to “people in in general” (p. 356). Gundel et al. state that, as a consequence of focusing on speaker reference, “we believe that indefinites may be used either referentially or nonreferentially” (1993, p. 276). They provide the following example as one which could be used in either way:

3. A student in the syntax class cheated on the final exam.

In this view, a referential use of an indefinite is when the speaker knows, and is speaking of, the student who cheated, while a non-referential use is when the speaker expresses the meaning ‘one unknown student cheated’. In this account, then, speakers perform an act of reference when they use a linguistic expression to encode a particular referent. In contrast to Bach’s (2008) conception of speaker reference, there need be no attempt to disambiguate the referent for the intended audience. Rather, it is enough to merely signal to the audience that the speaker has a particular referent in mind. To the extent that the addressee is required to access a referent, this referent may simply be a general concept, such as when meeting the minimum criteria for the cognitive status category *type identifiable*. As Gundel et al explain, the criteria for the use of the indefinite article is met when “the addressee is able to access a representation of *the type of object* described by the expression” (1993, p. 276, emphasis added). However, all higher statuses require

that the addressee be able to “retrieve an existing representation of the speaker’s intended referent *or construct a new representation* by the time the sentence has been processed” (p. 276, emphasis added).

Another notable position outlined by Gundel et al. (1993, p. 276) regards the use of definite expressions. Their position is that:

Definite expressions are *always* [emphasis added] used referentially in the sense that speakers intend to refer to a particular entity in using them – either one they are acquainted with and intend to refer to irrespective of whether the description actually fits (Donnellan’s ‘referential’ use), or one which the description actually fits, irrespective of whether the speaker is directly acquainted with it (Donnellan’s ‘attributive’ use).

This is a major departure from Bach’s (2008) definition of speaker reference adopted in the present study. To Bach, speaker reference involves the speaker referring the addressee to an entity, so that the addressee can identify it. However Gundel et al.’s use of the term referential is much broader, and includes most uses of NPs. The attributive/referential distinction is not discussed at all by a number of linguists such as Du Bois (1980) and Huebner (1983) but it would seem that both Du Bois and Huebner’s accounts would consider both types to be referential.

2.2.3 Time

Before reviewing reference as it is defined in other linguistic studies, it may be useful to firstly address the issue of time (adding to the discussion in Chapter 2.1.4 of the main body of this thesis), which is included in Gundel et al.’s (1993, 2005) Givenness Hierarchy approach to reference. One example is the expression *in the morning* presented by Swierzbin (2004, p. 87):

It’s like he’s sleeping in this little thing on the side of the house
and, and then, hm, in the morning he wakes up
and he decides to go swimming

Swierzbin argues that “one could perhaps argue in the case of *the morning* that the next morning after he slept was to be inferred” (p. 87). However, Swierzbin also

points out that this expression has quite different uses in examples such as *what time do you get up in the morning?* or *she wakes up during the night* “when no specific morning or night is meant” (p. 47). Like a number of others (Gundel et al., 2005; Lyons, 1999), Swierzbis proposes that these examples are cases of definiteness through inference. For example, a particular situation (e.g. entering a bookstore) may invoke a number of expected entities and roles (e.g. sales assistant, cash register, bookshelves) which can be referred to using the definite article (Sanford & Garrod, 1981). However, it is not clear that this provides a plausible account of *in the morning*. For example, it is not clear on what basis *in the morning* in 4 could be considered definite unless definiteness is also attributed to 5 in the following examples:

4. Our vervet monkey is most active *in the morning*.
5. Our vervet monkey is less active *at night*.

It seems more likely that such cases are best accounted for as conventional uses of the definite article (independent of the definite/indefinite distinction) rather than being explicable through a scenario or inferential-based account. This has been previously argued for by Abbott (2006) in relation to pairs of examples which show conflicting rules from use, such as:

I heard it on *the radio*.

I saw it on *TV*.

Overall, even in the broadest possible notion of reference, it seems illogical to ask on which morning or mornings vervet monkeys are active in. The conclusion, then, seems to be that not all uses of definite expressions (or, at least, nouns modified by *the*) are referential. Having rejected the possibility that all definite expressions are referential, the question is raised of where exactly to draw the line.

2.2.4 Discourse referents

A notion that is similar to Gundel et al's conception of reference, is Karttunen's notion of *discourse referents* (Karttunen, 1976). A discourse referent is an entity that is raised in discourse, in such a way that it may be referred to by a referring expression such as a pronoun or definite NP. Karttunen illustrates the concept with the following examples:

- (1) a. Bill has a car.
b. It is black.
c. The car is black.
d. Bill's car is black.
- (2) a. Bill doesn't have a car.
b. *It is black.
c. *The car is black.
d. *Bill's car is black.

Example (1a) introduces a discourse referent that can subsequently be referred to, since it "implies the existence of a specific car" (p. 366). However no car is introduced by (2a), and so (2b-d) "are inappropriate, since they presuppose the existence of something that is not there" (p. 366). Discourse referents must, therefore, must be presupposed to exist, yet this existence need not relate to an existence independent of discourse. Karttunen presents the following examples to illustrate this point:

- (1) Bill saw a unicorn. The unicorn had a gold name.
(2) Bill didn't see a unicorn. *The unicorn had a gold mane.

The notion of discourse referents is further developed by Heim (2002), who re-phrases it as metaphorical *file-keeping*: expressions that introduce entities into a discourse (some indefinite expressions) create a new *file card*, while references to existing entities (definite expressions) prompt the hearer to *update its old file card*.

2.2.5 Du Bois, 1980

A particularly clear account of the referential/non-referential distinction in the linguistics literature is provided by Du Bois (1980). Du Bois' account is grounded very strongly in linguistic data, and there is only very brief acknowledgement of, and little concern for, the issues that have been debated in philosophical approaches to reference. The result is a conception of reference that appears strong in its internal coherence, and which is quite distinct from those of philosophy, and very similar to that of Gundel et al. Du Bois states that a "noun phrase is *referential* when it is used to speak about an object as an object, with continuous identity over time" (1980, p. 208). Like Gundel et al, this has much in common with Karttunen's (1976) idea of discourse reference. Indeed, Du Bois introduces the metaphor of a mental *file* that Heim (2002) also adopted in her adaption of Karttunen's concept. Indefinite referential noun phrases activate a mental file for an object, while definite expressions typically refer back "to a previously opened file" (Du Bois, 1980, p. 209).

Among the linguistics works reviewed here, Du Bois (1980) provides perhaps the clearest position statement on the nature of the referent. As noted, to Du Bois, a referent may be any object with an enduring identity. This includes a very broad range of entities, both concrete and abstract:

The *object* here may be a physical object or an objectified concept; it may be specifically known or it may be unknown; it may exist in the real world or in some hypothetical world; there may be one or more than one object. As long as a noun phrase is used to speak about such objects and the objects are conceived as having continuity of identity, the noun phrase is referential. (pp. 208-209)

Thus a referent is a mental representation of an entity or concept. These representations can be of the most basic form, being simply the nomination of a token (or tokens) of a general concept, without any particular distinguishing feature. From another perspective, referents are the individuated entities mentally generated by a hearer in processing discourse.

Just as the range of possible referents is very broad, so is the range of possible referring expressions. An expression “may be identifiable or nonidentifiable, specific or nonspecific, generic or particular, and it may exhibit various phoricity features. Most of these feature contrasts are applicable only to referential mentions, not to nonreferential mentions” (Du Bois, 1980, p. 217). As mentioned, Du Bois’ account appears similar to that of Gundel et al. (1993) although Du Bois appears to extend the concept of reference further in his treatment of indefinites. As discussed (p. 12), Gundel et al consider ‘a student’ in the following utterance to have both a referential and a non-referential reading, with the latter meaning *one unknown student*.

6. A student in the syntax class cheated on the final exam.

However, Du Bois appears to consider both readings to be referential. The crucial matter is not that the speaker has a particular student in mind, but that the expression prompts the creation of a new mental file that can later be referred to.

There are, however, a number of indefinite expressions that Du Bois (pp. 209-217) considers to be non-referential. Although not always explicitly stated in other works, it is likely that most of these would also be considered non-referential in nearly all other linguistic accounts. These include predicate nominals (e.g. *He is a policeman*), noun modifiers (*a pear tree*), nouns within negative scope in a sentence (e.g. *I don’t have a car*), certain speech acts (e.g. *I now pronounce you man and wife*), and what Du Bois calls *predicate conflation*, in which a verb and object are conflated to “express a unitary predicate concept rather than to refer to an actual object”. An example of this is:

7. They went out pear-picking yesterday.

Here, the word ‘pear’ does not refer, but helps to express the concept of pear-picking. A further example presented by Du Bois is:

8. I only wear one in my left when I’m wearing my lenses.

For this example, Du Bois points to the insensitivity of the expression ‘wearing one’s lenses’ to semantic number (i.e. in the example text, the expression is plural, even though there is only one lens) and argues that this is because ‘wearing one’s lenses’ is non-referential as it expresses a ‘monolithic concept’. Although some linguists would likely consider many examples of predicate conflation to be non-referential because no particular entity (e.g. no particular haircut) is indicated, it appears that Gundel et al. would consider ‘[wearing] *my lenses*’ to be referential since a definite expression is used and it appears clear which pair of glasses is indicated. This likely difference in position seems to arise because Du Bois’ appears to take the linguistic data as his starting point, while Gundel et al. perhaps take a broader view that accounts for more of the cognitive processing aspects of communication.

In summary, Du Bois’ concept of reference is very far from the view expressed by Bach (2008) and is very broad in terms of the possible referents and referring expressions it allows. Its motivation is to provide an account of linguistic reference in discourse, and in these terms, provides a clear and seemingly sound argument.

2.2.6 Ariel, 1990, 2001

Compared to the linguistic approaches discussed so far, Ariel (e.g. 1985; 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 2001, 2004) appears more heavily influenced by philosophical approaches to reference. However, his departure from standard linguistic approaches to defining reference is not explicitly stated, and Ariel’s position on some of issues is only discerned through extensive reading of her work. For example, that Ariel distinguishes referential from attributive use is directly stated as an aside in a later work (Ariel, 2001, p. 38), but is not directly stated in her major work on reference (1990). Similarly, a footnote relating to Givon’s topic hierarchy states that she excludes indefinites and generics from her analysis “since I find them irrelevant to the point I am making” (1990, p. 225). As such, it appears

that Ariel has at least partially adopted a framework from the philosophy of language.

As with the Givenness Hierarchy, there is an emphasis in Accessibility Theory (AT) on references being made to the mental representations of referents. If a mental representation does not currently exist for the hearer, then an expression which introduces the referent to the discourse (e.g. a presentative, such as *voilà*) is not referential (1990, p. 47). Ariel argues that “[s]ince it is naive to assume that referring expressions directly refer to physical entities (be they linguistic or other kinds of objects), we must assume that in all cases an addressee looks for antecedents which are themselves mental representations” (1990, p. 6).

Ariel discusses the matter of existence (*the existential presupposition*), and argues that the type of context retrieval is of crucial importance in this regard.

Encyclopedic context (accessing a referent from one’s long-term memory) and *physical context* (a mental representation connecting to one’s sensory perception) both carry an assumption of existence based on trust in memory and senses.

However, entities that are invoked through discourse (relating to the context of linguistic data, which Ariel labels *linguistic context*), do not commit one to the belief that they exist. One may, for example, believe that one’s interlocutor is indulging in fantasy or simply lying. It is not clear what Ariel’s standpoint is on reference in fiction, although it could be presumed that it is similar to her view on real-world linguistic reference. Ariel’s position on existence, then, is much more liberal than what is proposed by many philosophers (e.g. Bach, 2008; Russell, 1905; Searle, 1969; Strawson, 1950).

2.2.7 Bickerton, 1981, and Huebner 1983, 1985

Another linguistic work presenting a definition of reference is Huebner’s (1983, 1985) adaptation of Bickerton’s (1981) treatment of articles. In his study of creole languages, Bickerton claims to discern the human *genetic program* or *bioprogram* that enables language development to take place. On the topic of reference, Bickerton (pp. 221-234) introduces the notions of *percept* and *concept*, in which

the former relates to the perception of an individual (e.g. *a mosquito*) and the latter relates to the generic notion (e.g. *mosquito*). He argues that these are fundamentally different cognitive processes, and this is reflected in linguistic systems as the distinction between specific and generic. Concerning English articles, Bickerton (pp. 248-249) distinguishes two relevant variables, +/- presupposed, and +/- specific, that combine into four semantic combinations that correspond with the use of articles in English. Huebner (1983, 1985) applies slightly different terminology to Bickerton's distinctions, and presents the four categories as:

- (1) Generics: non-specific, assumed known to the hearer
- (2) Referential definites: specific, assumed known to the hearer
- (3) Referential indefinites: specific, assumed unknown to the hearer
- (4) Non-referentials: non-specific, assumed unknown to the hearer

The term specific is used when a noun phrase signifies a particular entity. The distinction between specific and non-specific is behind the ambiguity in some uses of indefinite noun phrases, and also behind the subsequent range of possible pronouns. For example:

- (5) I am looking for *a hammer*. (*later*) I found *it*. (specific indefinite noun phrase)
- (6) I am looking for *a hammer*. (*later*) I found *one*. (non-specific indefinite noun phrase)

While Huebner considers categories (1) and (4) to be non-referential (as they do not individuate an entity or entities), Bach's (2008) position is that (3) is also non-referential, and so are some uses of definite NPs categorized as (2).

Unlike many, Huebner, provides the following gloss for the category 'non-referentials' (1983, p. 133):

- a. Equative noun phrases [nouns in the predicate nominal position]
- b. Noun phrases in the scope of negation

c. Noun phrases in scope of questions, irrealis mode [hypothetical]

Overall, then, the positions of Huebner (1983, 1985) and Bickerton (1981), are also markedly different from the philosophic tradition exemplified by Bach (2008). To Bach, speaker reference requires that the referent be known by the hearer, and thus the category of ‘referential indefinites’ would be considered a contradiction in terms. It appears that, to Huebner (1983), reference does not involve the four-place relation described by Bach in which a speaker refers an audience to an entity via a referring expression (2008), but a three way relation in which the hearer’s role is outside the act of reference. In philosophical terms, then, it appears that this conception of reference is a matter of the speaker having a singular thought, and expressing that thought, but without necessarily intending the audience to identify the referent.

2.3 Common ground

In the definition of reference adopted from Bach (2008), an act of reference requires that the speaker indicate an entity for which the hearer holds a singular thought. To do so requires, firstly, that the speaker and hearer both hold singular thoughts about the referent, and importantly, that they recognize that this is true of each other. Secondly, in choosing an appropriate RE, the speaker must make judgments relating to the hearer’s current cognitive state in relation to the referent.

Both of these concerns relate to closely related concepts that emphasize the known overlap in the interlocutors’ knowledge, such as *common knowledge* (Lewis, 1969), *mutual knowledge* (Schiffer, 1972), *shared knowledge* (e.g. Gundel, 1985), *mutual manifestness* (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), or *common ground* (Stalnaker, 1978, cited in Clark, 1996). Although these concepts vary in crucial ways, they all emphasize that such knowledge is “a necessary condition for performing an act of communication” (Schiffer, 1972, p. 30). Following Clark (1996), the term *common ground* is used in the present study, although in the very restricted sense relating to knowledge of the referent (unless otherwise indicated).

In relation to reference, it is crucial for the felicitous introduction of new referents into discourse that the speaker and the hearer not only both know the referent, but that they are aware that this knowledge is part of their common ground. This can be illustrated by considering the use of widely held names, such as, in the New Zealand context, *David* or *Stephen*. It is likely that many hearers will know several Davids, yet when a speaker uses this name, the hearer will attempt to identify a bearer of that name who is known to both parties. In a study of the use of demonstrative reference, Clark, Schreuder and Buttrick (1983) argue that interlocutors “must weigh every part of common ground that might be pertinent” (p. 257). Clark et al. show that at least four elements of common ground are involved: salience, assumptions about the speaker’s goals, what has been asserted by the speaker, and what the speaker has presupposed.

Common ground also plays an important role in determining what counts as a felicitous RE in a particular context. Firstly, interlocutors judge each other’s cognitive state in relation to referents. For example, if speakers consider referents to be dimly recalled by their addressees, then more semantic content will typically be used to single out the referent. Similarly, if the hearer knows that a speaker’s attention is directed towards a particular referent, then they may interpret semantically vague expressions (such as pronouns) as referring to that entity.

In a second, broader sense, common ground also restricts which REs are felicitous in relation to a particular hearer. For example, the use of a nickname or a definite description will not serve to identify the referent unless the hearer knows (or can work out) that this RE relates to the intended referent.

2.4 Referring expressions as a system

In Chapter 2 of the main thesis, the main claims of Accessibility Theory (AT) are reviewed. As discussed in Chapter 2, AT is just one of several theories accounting for the use of referring expressions (REs) in discourse. This subsection reviews the main competing theories, focusing on the Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel, 2010; Gundel et al., 1993, 2005), theories of topic marking (e.g. Givón, 1983c), Chafe’s

discussion of discourse ‘flow’ (1994), neo-Gricean approaches (e.g. Levinson, 2007) and post-Gricean approaches (e.g. Wilson, 1992).

2.4.1 The Givenness Hierarchy

The Givenness Hierarchy (GH) proposed by Gundel, Hedburg, and Zacharski (1993) is often closely identified with AT, but differs in a number of key respects. This subsection focuses on differences between the two theories and draws heavily on Gundel (2010).

Like Accessibility Theory, the GH proposes that different noun phrase forms “serve as processing signals to the addressee” (1993, p. 276). This enables the addressee to restrict the parameters of their search for a referent. However, unlike Accessibility Theory, GH accounts for the use of pronouns and determiners rather than noun phrase types. The Givenness Hierarchy makes a clear distinction between the procedural information encoded in pronoun/determiner choice and the conceptual information that is lexically encoded, focusing only on the former (Gundel, 2010). Similarly, names are also excluded from most accounts of GH, although Mulkern (1996) proposes to incorporate them into an expanded GH. Unlike Accessibility Theory, therefore, the GH does not include all definite expressions, although it does include indefinite expressions. The hierarchy is presented in Figure 2.1:

Figure 2.1: The Givenness Hierarchy, Gundel et al. 1993

in focus >	activated >	familiar >	uniquely > identifiable	referential >	type identifiable
<i>it</i>	<i>that</i> <i>this</i> <i>this N</i>	<i>that N</i>	<i>the N</i>	indefinite <i>this N</i>	<i>a</i>

As indicated, the six *cognitive statuses* (e.g. ‘in focus’) are conventionally related to one or more determiners or pronouns (e.g. *it*). Although similar, the term

cognitive status is not to be equated with accessibility. Rather, pronouns and determiners are said to encode cognitive statuses that “provide procedural information about the *manner* of cognitive accessibility, i.e. where and how a mental representation of the intended interpretation is to be accessed, thereby guiding the addressee in restricting possible interpretations” (Gundel, 2010, p. 152, emphasis added). The individual statuses are based on a number of general distinctions derived from linguistic and psycholinguistic research. For example, referents that are *in focus* are the current focus of attention; referents that are *activated* are in working memory; referents that are familiar have a representation within memory (Gundel, 2010).

Importantly, the GH is an implicational scale. That is, by using an expression from this scale, the speaker is indicating to the listener that all of the cognitive statuses to its right (but not to its left) on the scale are met. Thus an entity that is familiar is also, by definition, uniquely identifiable, referential, and type identifiable. This means that an entity could be referred to using a form associated with a lower cognitive status, but not by using a form associated with a higher status. For example an entity that has the cognitive status ‘familiar’ may be referred to with an expression associated with ‘uniquely identifiable’, but not by expression associated with the status of ‘activated’.

This feature would seem to leave open the possibility of speakers frequently using an expression for lower status. Indeed, the GH is, overall, tolerant of over-explicitness. However, Gundel et al. (1993) argue that use of the scale interacts with Grice’s Maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1989, p. 26):

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

In short, speakers should say as much, and only as much, as required and, therefore, the expression signalling the highest cognitive status should ordinarily be used. By selecting an expression for a particular status, the speaker implicates that this is the highest status that applies.

Gundel et al. (1993, pp. 302-303) also propose that the interaction of Q1 and Q2 can account for the distribution of NPs, including the relative scarcity of demonstrative forms reported in various studies. Because pronouns and demonstrative pronouns encode very little semantic information, Q1 requires either being precise with pronoun choice (i.e. select he/she/it whenever applicable), or using a lexical expression. Nouns typically contain sufficient lexical content for identification, and so evoke Q2, discouraging the use of a demonstrative determiner.

In the present study, a key focus is to investigate SLL competence in the use of REs, and in this regard three aspects of the GH make it a less suitable framework than Accessibility Theory. Firstly, Accessibility Theory holds that each RE type conventionally encodes a different degree of accessibility, while the GH focuses only on pronouns and determiners. Secondly, in considering the felicity of NP-cognitive status mapping (i.e. form-function mapping) in SLL speech, adoption of the GH framework would effectively limit the analysis to just three or four distinctions (in focus, activated, familiar, and perhaps uniquely identifiable) as the remaining distinctions conventionally relate to referents that are hearer-new. Thirdly, Accessibility Theory appears to make stronger predictions than the GH in relation to over-explicitness. Specifically, whereas Accessibility Theory proposes that referents are conventionally encoded according to their accessibility, the GH makes its strongest predictions only in relation to which determiner and pronoun types indicate a cognitive status that is too high for the referent (although Gricean principles also constrain the use of forms that indicate a lower status). As such, the GH is generally tolerant of over-explicitness.

2.4.2 Topic marking

Givón (e.g. 1983a; 1983b, 1984) proposes a hierarchy of topic marking, in which linguistic forms are associated with more or less predictable topics. One of the clearer statements outlining Givón's approach was made by Hinds (1983, p. 47):

[Givón] claims that discourse is built of clause-level units which (a) comprise the same theme, and (b) tend to repeat the same participants/topic continuity. In this view, topic continuity, those instances in which the same topic extends over numerous clauses, is the unmarked form. Topic change is the marked form.

Thus, Givón's proposal is that the signalling of topic maintenance is most readily achieved through attenuated forms such as zero anaphora and unstressed pronouns; predictable shifts in topic require some degree of signalling in the noun phrase; less predictable changes in topic require more explicit noun phrases. Brown (1983) provides the following hierarchy (slightly adapted from Givon, 1981), with zero anaphora associated with the most predictable topics and cleft/focus constructions with the least predictable topic shifts:

- Zero anaphora
- Clitic pronouns/verb agreement
- Unstressed pronouns
- Stressed/independent pronouns
- Left dislocation
- Definite NP
- Right dislocation
- (Passivization)
- Y-movement ('topicalization')
- Cleft/focus constructions

Among researchers working within the topic-marking framework, this general order of items in the hierarchy is widely agreed, although there is some minor variation in the forms that are included. For example, Givón (1983a) adds the additional category of 'referential indefinite NP's' as the final last category on his list.

Unlike AT, the topic-marking approach also considers the order of sentence constituents. These include the categories of left dislocation (LD) and right dislocation (RD), both of which are features of spoken English and involve the

specification of an element elsewhere in the clause. Examples from Brown (1983) are:

LD: The cheese they made there, they sold most of it to the miners.

RD: It bothered her for weeks, John's smile.

Similarly, the hierarchy includes Y-movement, which occurs when a NP is moved from its standard sentence position to front of the clause:

1. The cheese they sold mainly to the miners.

There are, then, obvious overlaps as well as substantial divergences between Givón's theory and AT: the latter distinguishes among a broader range of RE types, while the former applies to some grammatical structures and some indefinite NPs. More notable is the focus within Givón's approach on marking specifically for topic rather than attempting a broad account of NP use. This approach has its origin in considerations of how speakers organize the delivery of information. For the purposes of the present study, then, Givón's framework is not entirely suitable as it does not fully account for RE selection (e.g. the distinctions between *this* + N, *that* + N, *the* + N).

2.4.3 Information flow

Like Givón's approach to topic, a number of approaches to discourse consider the way that coherence is maintained through considerate delivery of information. Chafe (1994) uses the term *flow* to describe how the structure of information affects the relative ease with which the mind processes discourse. Chafe uses the term *activation cost* to describe the relative cognitive demands of recovering information. He distinguishes between three degrees of consciousness in relation to information at a particular time in conversation: *given* information is activated in consciousness; *accessible* information is semi-active; *new* information is inactive. Chafe explains NP selection in terms of the effort involved in moving information that is in an active/semi-active/inactive state at time t_1 to an active

state in time t_2 (the succeeding point in the discourse). Information that is activated at t_1 requires less effort to activate at t_2 than semi-active information, which in turn requires less effort than inactive information. In short, “[g]iven information is typically verbalized in English with a weakly accented pronoun, new and accessible information with an accented noun or noun phrase” (p. 81).

This account (Chafe, 1994) represents the development of a full theory that incorporates distinctions presented by Chafe in earlier work (1976). For the purposes of the present study, a disadvantage of Chafe’s three-way distinction between active, semi-active and inactive is that it appears to make weaker predictions in relation to RE selection, and also leaves unclear the issue of how to account for differences between similar forms (e.g. *that man* vs. *the man*).

2.4.4 Neo-Gricean and post-Gricean approaches to reference

This subsection summarizes those pragmatic approaches to reference associated with neo-Gricean and post-Gricean theory. These approaches contrast with those presented in previous subsections by arguing that RE selection and resolution are entirely pragmatic matters, and that there is no need to suppose that there are partially grammaticised form-function relations holding between RE types and degrees of accessibility. Thus, while Ariel (1990) and Gundel et al. (1993) have specifically associated their theories with Relevance Theory and Gricean maxims respectively, Relevance theorists (particularly Reboul, 1997; Scott, 2008) have argued that their accounts need no recourse to AT or the Givenness Hierarchy.

Although it appears that Grice wrote little about reference, a number of neo-Gricean accounts of reference have been proposed. For example, Geluykens (1994) suggests that RE selection results from the interaction of two conflicting pragmatic principles arising from Grice’s Quantity Maxim. These are a principle of economy (or E-principle) and principle of clarity (C-principle) (1994, pp. 14-15):

The Clarity (C-) Principle

‘say as much as you must to avoid ambiguity’

i.e. use of full NP whenever you have to

The Economy (E-) Principle

‘say as little as you can get away with (given C)’

i.e. use a PRO-form whenever you can

These two principles are in conflict, and Geluykens argues that it is this tension that generates appropriate RE selection. Geluykens supports this hypothesis through evidence of repairs indicating that the speaker has erred in balancing these principles. Related principles and arguments are presented by Huang (2000).

More recently, Levinson (2007) has proposed a system in which three conflicting principles operate. These are defined by Levinson (p. 31) as follows:

Recognition: Restrict the set of referents so as to achieve recognition.

Economy: Don't over-restrict the set of referents explicitly.

Circumspection: Show circumspection by not over-reducing the set of referents explicitly.

Levinson finds that speakers try “to satisfy all of the constraints concurrently, thus optimizing person-reference” (p. 68), but when a reference fails, there is a clear order of precedence: recognition is prioritized over the other principles, and circumspection is prioritized over economy (p. 66).

Other researchers have taken a Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) approach to accounting for RE selection and resolution (e.g. Scott, 2008; Wilson, 1992). Relevance Theory (RT) is a cognition-based account primarily concerned with how hearers/readers interpret language and replaces Grice's cooperative principle and conversational maxims with a single principle of *relevance*.

Underlying RT is the idea that language is under-determined in the sense that utterances have many potential meanings, but that these potential interpretations are more or less relevant within the local context of language use. A key characteristic of human cognition is to arrive at the most relevant of these interpretations without entertaining other possibilities (Wilson, 1992). A central

feature of RT accounts of reference is that speakers avoid being over-explicit and under-explicit because these result in processing costs to the hearer that result in no additional cognitive/communicative benefit. For example, Scott (2008) argues that a felicitously used RE such as *this black cat* is interpretable because the RE carries conceptual information (i.e. *I refer to one cat which is black*) and procedural information (e.g. proximal/distal distinction in *this/that*), and that the role of REs “is to guide the hearer not just to the intended referent but to an overall interpretation” (p. 284).

It remains somewhat unclear whether neo-Gricean or Relevance approaches can account for reference without recourse to some version of Accessibility Theory. While Scott (2008) and Reboul (1997) have argued that it can, Ariel (2008, pp. 48-53) provides a number of examples that she argues do require an AT-type explanation. Ariel presents two main forms of evidence for the AT account. Firstly, a number of examples are purported to show that the choice between some RE types cannot be explained by the semantics of the REs. For example, Ariel cites *it*, *this* and *that* as being equivalent in informational content. Although it is may be countered that *this* and *that* are semantically marked as proximal and distal respectively, Strauss (2002) has argued that this traditional distinction fails to account for the use of demonstratives. Strauss proposes an alternative, more pragmatic account that is perhaps closer to Ariel’s position.

A second, related, form of evidence presented by Ariel (2008) is examples of speakers repairing references through a substituted RE that provides no additional semantic information. This argument was, it seems, first raised by Ziv (1991) and is perhaps most clearly exemplified in data from Jucker and Smith (2004, pp. 157-158) in which *he* is repaired with *the man*, with substantially improved clarity. However, relevance and Gricean theorists may not be convinced. In various guises, pragmatic theorists have argued that the greater effort required to produce (and process) fuller forms such as *the man* comes with a guarantee of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986).

In summary, a number of entirely pragmatic accounts of reference have been proposed, and it remains unclear whether these need support from a theory of

conventional use of RE types to mark accessibility or cognitive status. However, what is clear is that, in practical terms, although Gricean and RT accounts have explanatory power, they appear to have limited predictive power and, further, they suggest no practical way of analyzing large data sets. In contrast, AT suggests that if accessibility can be accurately measured, then RE selection can be accurately predicted. The Givenness Hierarchy also has predictive power, particularly insofar as predicting the highest cognitive status marker that can be felicitously used.

2.5 Cognitive accessibility

This section summarizes a broad range of findings relating to the factors that contribute to an entity's accessibility. Nine key factors are identified and discussed in the following subsections. These are distance, syntax, competition, salience and topicality, episodes and boundaries, parallelism, genre and mode, speaker internal factors, and animacy. In addition, Subsection 2.5.10 briefly discusses issues in determining overall accessibility. These factors are relevant to the development of the coding system for accessibility discussed in Chapter 4, and to further discussion of the findings in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9.

2.5.1 Distance

One of the most intuitively obvious factors influencing NP selection is the distance between a RE and the most recent previous reference to that entity. This presumably reflects general facts about memory decay and changes in focal attention. Studies confirm the hypothesis that when the distance between references is small then high-accessibility markers are typically used, and the use of low-accessibility markers increases with greater distances (Ariel, 1990; Arnold, Bennetto, & Diehl, 2009; C. Brown, 1983; Givón, 1983b; Schiffrin, 2006). This linguistic evidence for a distance effect is supported by experimental evidence relating to language processing. For example, Ariel (1990) cites Clark and Sengul (1979) who show that readers comprehended pronouns and definite descriptions

more quickly when the referents of those REs were previously referred to in the preceding clause.

The concept of distance is typically measured in terms of either the number of intervening clauses (C. Brown, 1983; Clancy, 1980), sentences (Clancy, 1980), lexical items (Ariel, 1999), or propositions (Toole, 1996), although it also seems possible that temporal distance between references (e.g. substantial pauses before resuming a discourse) could be a factor.

The occurrence of pronouns at a lengthy distance from its antecedent means that distance alone cannot account for RE selection, and this has led some researchers to reject the distance hypothesis (e.g. Fox, 1987b; Tomlin, 1987). However, from an AT perspective (Ariel, 1990, 2001), this is readily explainable as distance is just one of a number of factors potentially influencing accessibility.

Overall, distance does appear to be one of the main factors influencing accessibility. Consequently, it plays a prominent role in the systems of accessibility measurement developed by Toole (1996) and Ariel (1999), and in the analysis of topic marking in many studies (see Givón, 1983c). In some studies (e.g. Ariel, 1988a; Givón, 1984), distance has performed adequately as the only measure taken. A key question, however, is the unit for measuring distance. The lexical unit is perhaps too small to be practical for the present study (Ariel, 1999, uses this measure but only for a study of resumptive pronouns). This is discussed further in the following subsection, where it is established that clauses are an important unit in measuring accessibility.

2.5.2 Syntax and clauses

Binding Theory (e.g. Chomsky, 1982) proposes three structural principles that account for some distributional phenomena in the use of pronouns, lexical REs, reflexives (e.g. *herself*) and reciprocals (e.g. *each other*) (the term anaphor applies only to reflexives and reciprocals in the Chomskyan tradition). These are (Chomsky, p. 20):

- “A. An anaphor is bound in its governing category.
- B. A pronominal is free in its governing category.
- C. An R- expression is free”

These principles account for linguistic rules such as the following (adapted from Haegeman, 1994), where * indicates a grammatically unacceptable form:

1. Poirot₁ admires *him₁/himself₁.
2. Poirot₁ admires him₂/*himself₂.
3. Bertie₁ said that he_{1/2} felt rather ill.

Although reflexives are not a focus of the present study, of particular importance here is the suggestion that there are clause level constraints on how pronouns and lexical REs are interpreted. To put it simply, in a simple sentence, the use of an object pronoun indicates that the object is not co-referential with the subject (Examples 1 and 2), while in embedded clauses, pronouns can be either co-referential or non-co-referential with the main clause subject (Example 3). Such features support Arnold’s contention that “[w]ithin a clause, the relative accessibility of entities is more strongly determined by syntactic and thematic prominence” than by distance (2010, p. 190).

Such syntactic accounts are not the only way to account for the phenomena underlying these examples, Bach argues against syntactic accounts and proposes that “being mentioned elsewhere in a sentence is just one way of being salient” (1987). Ariel (1990, pp. 97-98) adopts the slightly weaker position that AT “constrains possible grammaticalization processes involving pronominal forms” (p. 98). Huang (2007) argues that apparent syntactic constraints are actually grammaticalized features of language use arising from neo-Gricean principles.

In a further approach, Gernsbacher (1990) draws attention to clausal boundaries (and other types of boundary) and the effect on memory. For example, she cites research demonstrating sharply decreasing language recall after a single

intervening clause, and greater difficulty resolving pronouns when there is an intervening clause between an anaphor and its antecedent.

For the present study, the most relevant aspect of these phenomena is that the clause appears to be an important structural boundary. That is, referents appear to have highest accessibility for the duration of the clause in which they are most immediately represented. Clauses, therefore, are an appropriate unit for the measurement of distance. However, for the purposes of analyzing spoken discourse, some researchers (Tomlin, 1987; Toole, 1996) have found it useful to treat clauses as the linguistic realization of a proposition. An advantage of this is that partial clauses with elided elements may be frequent in speech, and can be distinguished from abandoned clauses and thus counted as a factor in determining distance. The present study, therefore, follows Toole (1996) in adopting Tomlin's definition (1987, p. 461) (discussed in Chapter 4).

Finally, it must be acknowledged that there are syntactic constraints on the distribution of zero in spoken English, which effectively restrict zeros to the position of syntactic subject (Williams, 1988). The use of zeros in other syntactic positions is interpreted as an error irrespective of accessibility:

4. John bought an ice cream but \emptyset dropped it.
5. *John bought an ice cream but he dropped \emptyset .

2.5.3 Competition

A further factor established in the literature as influencing accessibility is *competition*. This occurs when multiple referents can potentially compete for the resolution of a RE. For example, Clancy (1980) found that in both English and Japanese oral narratives, most high-accessibility markers (pronouns and/or zeros), were used when there were no intervening referents between an anaphor and its antecedent. This is particularly the case for zero in English. In both languages, the presence of just one intervening referent substantially increased the likelihood that a lexical RE would be used, and the effect increased with further intervening

referents. Clancy concluded that competition played a stronger role in prompting lexical REs than did distance or structural boundaries measured in terms of clauses and sentences (p. 143).

In a more recent study, Schiffrin (2006) found that “next-mention pronouns are less frequent when the referent is potentially ambiguous” (p. 172). Similarly, Brown (1983) found that the average potential for ambiguity (i.e. the competition factor) was least for those referents encoded with high accessibility markers (zero and unstressed pronouns). However, counter to the predictions of AT, in Brown’s findings, *the* + N and names were typically found in cases of less competition than demonstrative forms. In interpreting this finding, it is important to stress that AT does not reduce accessibility to any one factor and so there could be accessibility-based explanations for this finding.

A number of psycholinguistic studies also support the notion that competition plays a role in accessibility. For example, the *Information Load Hypothesis* (Almor, 1999) proposes a model in which the capacity for memory “is determined by not only the number of stored items but also by their activation (e.g., Just & Carpenter 1992) such that higher activation can result in more competition and therefore in higher cost” (Almor & Nair, 2007, p. 91). Similarly, competition plays a key role in Gernsbacher’s (1990) *Structure Building Framework*, in the form of the processes of *enhancement* and *suppression*, which relate, respectively, to how reference to an entity increases its accessibility and decreases the accessibility of other entities.

More generally, the competition hypothesis is supported in linguistic approaches such as that articulated by Givón (1983a), and is reflected in the referential coding systems used by some researchers (Schiffrin, 2006; Toole, 1996). In many approaches, competition is presumed only to occur when the competing referents are “*semantically compatible* (most commonly in terms of animacy, humanity, agentivity or semantic plausibility as object or subject)” (Givón, 1983a, p. 14). This is motivated by the recognition that many REs preclude certain interpretations due to semantic features (such as *he* being marked for male). More recently, however, Arnold and Griffen (2007) have presented psycholinguistic

evidence suggesting that competition also arises from referents that are not semantically compatible with the RE. They suggest that the cognitive strain involved in maintaining a discourse model with multiple referents produces a competition effect.

A general problem appears to arise in establishing exactly what qualifies as competition for nonhuman entities, as nearly all can be referred to with the pronoun *it*. In particular, a problem arises in that utterances made regarding the weather and other situational factors also frequently involve *it*. For example, in uttering *it's hot* in relation to a bowl of soup, it is unclear whether the day's temperature should be considered competition. In short, it is often unclear how to determine exactly which referential and non-referential entities (and non-entities) are in competition for resolution of expressions relating to non-human entities.

For the purposes of the present study, a distinction is drawn between competition arising from semantically compatible (hereafter *matching*) referents and a more general competition effect from multiple (non-matching) entities. As with previous studies, only matching referents are to be counted as competition, as these appear to have the greatest direct effect on accessibility marking, and it is unclear how to incorporate the more general concept of competition into the analysis. The analysis will, however, include an identification of the number of referents in each narrative and consideration will be given to the prediction that narrative retellings with more referents in a particular scene will tend to result in a greater number of low-accessibility markers due to processing load.

2.5.4 Salience and topicality

There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the *salience* of a referent influences the choice of RE used to refer to it. The more salient a referent is, the higher its accessibility is likely to be. Entities may, for example, be salient as a result of being prominent within the physical context or through discourse topicality (Ariel, 1990). As with much discourse, the narrative elicitation task used in the present study does not involve referents that are physically present,

and so topicality is the major factor in salience in the task used in the present study.

Ariel (1990) draws a distinction between *discourse topics* (global) and *local topics*, and cites studies indicating that discourse topics are more frequently pronominalized than local topics. It is not entirely clear how Ariel defines discourse and local topic, but the former may be related to the concept of *quaestio*, insofar as texts are designed to answer a fundamental, implicit question (the *quaestio*) (Klein & Perdue, 1992; von Stutterheim & Klein, 1989). In this view, retellings of the present narrative task (see Chapter 4) are structured around answering the implicit *quaestio* ‘what happened to Charlie?’ In recognizing this, addressees are expected to maintain a relatively prominent role for Charlie in their mental model irrespective of whether there is a substantial distance between the current and previous mentions of Charlie. This is supported by evidence from psycholinguistic research (e.g. Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988; Morrow, 1985; Sanford & Garrod, 1981). Studies also indicate that references to main characters tend to be pronominalized more frequently than references to minor characters (Clancy, 1980; Morrow, 1985; Redeker, 1987), and that only main characters can be introduced (Clancy, 1980; Smith, Noda, Andrews, & Jucker, 2005) and re-introduced (Klein & Perdue, 1992) with pronouns. It is important to note that, overall, AT sees the pronominalization of main characters as the result of main characters having high accessibility, rather than as a result of their *discourse profile* as main characters (Ariel, 2004). This position is supported by the finding that references to minor characters decrease the accessibility of main characters (Gernsbacher, Robertson, Palladino, & Werner, 2004).

Similarly, it is somewhat unclear how Ariel defines local topic, although topicality can be distinguished at the clause level (for which, in English, subject is sometimes considered to be a grammaticalization of topic), and various larger units including sequences of clauses, and (in written text) paragraphs, sections, chapters and entire works (Givón, 1983a, p. 7). Above the clause level, local topicality can be established in at least two main ways. Firstly, repeated mentions of an entity increase its topicality and therefore accessibility. Gernsbacher and her colleagues present experimental evidence for this in a series of studies

(Gernsbacher, 1990; Gernsbacher et al., 2004), and account for the findings through the proposed processes of suppression and enhancement. Once an entity has been established as part of a topical chain of references, it is likely to reappear in the immediately following clause.

Secondly, local topicality is established partially through the syntactic position of REs. That is, topicality is usually associated with the syntactic subject in English, or through other focusing structures (e.g. *there is . . .*; left-dislocation). Topics are typically thought of as being, in some sense, given/old information, and are therefore associated with higher accessibility. One illustration of this is that the maintenance of local topics in coordinate structures is frequently able to be achieved with a zero in the second topic position. Indeed, this is one of the very few felicitous uses of zero in written English:

2. He went to the library and Ø returned a book.

Williams (1988, 1989) argues that the use of zero in other contexts is not (as often presumed) indicative of error, and demonstrates that zero is also found in spoken English in parallel clauses with overt coordination (Example 3), and when “the exophoric referent is clear from context” (Example 4):

3. He just walked into the crossfire. Ø Never knew what hit him.
4. (*at a lecture*) Ø Sure knows his stuff. (1989, p. 154)

What is clear from examples 2 and 3 is that an important element in creating a permissible context for zero in English is topic maintenance. This is further supported by syntactic rules barring the use of zero in other syntactic positions (e.g. zeros are not permitted in object position in English). Example 4 demonstrates that topicality is not the sole factor in permitting zero (the felicity of this example appears to be partially due to the lack of any competition, and also what is predicated on the referent).

Finally, experimental research by Gompel and Majid (2004) indicates that pronouns relating to entities that have been referred to multiple times are easier to

process than those relating to less frequently occurring antecedents. As Gompel and Majid note, this supports saliency accounts of pronoun resolution.

In short, a suitable measurement of salience or topicality involves an assessment of global topicality and local topicality. For the purposes of this study, global topicality is equated with references to either of two main characters, and local topicality is to be measured in terms of the frequency of references to a particular entity in the immediately preceding utterances. The referent that is the topic of a clause is predicted to have high accessibility in the topic position of the following clause.

2.5.5 Episodes and boundaries

A further factor affecting accessibility is discourse boundaries. Chafe's early speculation was that discourse boundaries, such as a change of scene, would involve the introduction of a new set of entities into "the consciousness of the addressee, presumably pushing out old ones" (1976, p. 33). A great deal of linguistic and psycholinguistic evidence has subsequently confirmed this effect, and the types of relevant boundaries include those involving related sequences of events (scenes), shifts in time and place, and larger episodes. In spoken language, boundaries can be established through prosody and other discourse markers, while in written language, sentences, paragraphs, sections and chapters all signal boundaries. Linguistically, pronouns tend to be used within episodes, while lexical REs are typically used when the referent traverses episode boundaries.

Among the early psycholinguistic evidence, Sanford and Garrod (1981) demonstrated that, in narratives, the accessibility of *principal actors* (including main characters and other central entities) remains high after temporal and spatial boundaries (hereafter defined as *episodes*), but *auxiliary entities* (minor characters and other entities) are often *scenario-dependent*, in that they are strongly associated with particular scenarios (e.g. waiters in a restaurant scenario), and have low cognitive accessibility at the cessation of that scenario.

More generally, the influence of episodes on cognitive accessibility has been related to the structure and limited capacity of memory (Tomlin, 1987, p. 456), and to processes involved in building a discourse model (Gernsbacher, 1990). Similarly, in a study of narrative comprehension, Black and Bower concluded that “episodes act as separate chunks in memory” (1979, p. 317).

However, the use of full REs cannot entirely be explained in terms of referents being less accessible after boundaries, and Vonk, Hustinx and Simons demonstrate that speakers also *use* low-accessibility markers to actually indicate the presence of such a boundary (1992). Conversely, high-accessibility markers signal a continuation of theme.

Linguistic evidence supporting the episode hypothesis is found particularly in the studies by Fox (1987b) and Tomlin (1987) (also Clancy, 1980; Schiffrin, 2006). Similarly to Vonk et al. (1992), Fox argued that pronominal references in spoken discourse signal the continuation of a thematic sequence, and that use of a full NP signals that the sequence has *closed*. Analyzing spoken discourse from within a conversation analysis perspective, Fox gave a number of examples of how such sequences remain *open*, including being positioned in the middle of an *adjacency pair*, when a *turn expansion* is made, and when an adjacency pair is *tied* to a preceding pair (e.g. through *post-elaboration*). Fox argued that the ability of an adjacency pair to tie to pairs other than the immediately preceding one accounts for the phenomena of long-distance anaphora (see Subsection 2.5.1).

To summarize, a strong episode-hypothesis predicts that “[i]ndividuals will use full nouns on first mention after an episode boundary; individuals will use pronouns to sustain reference during an episode” (Tomlin, 1987, p. 475).

However, it does not appear that the episodic hypothesis can fully account for RE selection. In particular, competition appears to be a substantial factor, and Tomlin specifically controls this variable in his data collection (1987). Perhaps a revised episodic/competition hypothesis could be revisited in future studies as a possible account of RE marking and a potential alternative to Accessibility Theory.

However, a number of potential problems remain with such a theory, particularly around determining the various types of boundary in different modes of

communication, genres, and text types (relevant here is Toole's, 1996, critique of Fox, 1987). At present, the universal applicability of AT (where boundaries are seen as just one factor contributing to accessibility) appears more convincing. To conclude, following Toole, episode boundaries are to be included in the coding system for accessibility in the present study. Syntactic boundaries formed at the clause level were discussed in Subsection 2.5.2.

2.5.6 Parallelism

A number of researchers have identified *parallelism* as a factor that strongly influences the interpretation of anaphoric pronouns (e.g. Chambers & Smyth, 1998; Gernsbacher, 1990; Grober, Beardsley, & Caramazza, 1978). In short, the parallelism hypothesis may be summarized as:

In successive parallel structures, there is a preference to interpret parallel grammatical NP constituents as relating to the same referent.

In parallel structures, the use of a zero or unstressed pronoun in the second structure indicates co-reference, while the use of a stressed pronoun or lexical NP indicates reference switch.

The principle of parallelism is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the following example from (adapted from Kehler, p. 157):

6. Sarah Palin admires Hillary Clinton, and George W. Bush
absolutely worships her.

In this example, there is a strong preference to interpret *her* as being co-referential with Hillary Clinton (to signal otherwise requires the use of contrastive stress). As Kehler points out, this interpretation is strongly preferred in spite of the seeming implausibility (given our world knowledge) of Bush (a Republican) worshipping Clinton (a Democrat), and the much more plausible possibility that he admires a Republican (such as Palin).

It should be noted that Ariel (2004, pp. 109-110) specifically rejects the parallelism principle and maintains that accessibility can account for such data. However, the findings from previous studies appear reasonably convincing; therefore, the present study follows the previous studies mentioned in including parallelism in the analysis of accessibility.

2.5.7 Genre and mode

Accessibility Theory (Ariel, 1990, 2001) proposes that a single principle accounts for RE selection. The features are not, therefore, variable among *cognitive genres* (e.g. narratives, descriptions) or *social genres* (e.g. recipes, love letters) (to use Bruce's, 2005, 2008, distinction), nor between the spoken and written modes or different registers. This contrasts with what Ariel (2004) calls a *discourse profiles* approach, in which processing cues and strategies for reference resolution arise from knowledge of prototypical discourse patterns.

Within the discourse profiles approach, Fox (1987a, 1987b) presented comparative analyses of pronoun and lexical REs used for referent tracking in conversational speech, written expository texts, and written narrative texts. Among Fox's findings were indications that pronominal reference is more frequent in conversational English than in written expository texts, and that for these text types, the average distance between an anaphor and its antecedent is far greater in the spoken data (2.52 clauses) than in the written data (1.21 clauses). The contrast was much less marked between the written narratives and the conversational data. Fox concluded that "there is no single rule for anaphora that can be specified for all of English" (Fox, 1987b, p. 152), and further, "that it is entirely clear that a *structural approach* to texts is critical for our understanding of anaphora" (1987b, p. 142, emphasis added).

Underlying Fox's research approach was the perspective that "any treatment of anaphora must seek its understanding in the hierarchical structure of the text-type being used as a source of data" (1987b, p. 1), and the view that written and spoken

“modes are fundamentally different in the units that serve to organize them” (Fox, 1987b, p. 3). To this end, Fox (1987a, 1987b) analyzed conversational interactions through a *conversation analysis* approach (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), the written expository texts through *rhetorical structure analysis* (Mann, Matthiessen, & Thompson, 1982), and the written narratives through a modified *story grammar* (Rumelhart, 1975).

However, in a critique of Fox’s approach, Toole (1996) argued that by using three substantially different systems of analysis for the three types of text, there was no basis on which to make a valid comparison between these types of text, and, therefore, Fox’s results may have been due to differences in the methods of analysis. In short, having assumed that the three types of data were sufficiently different to warrant separate systems of analysis, it was perhaps unsurprising that Fox found that the results of the analysis diverged in crucial ways.

Toole’s own analysis supports Ariel’s (1990, 1999, 2004) findings in suggesting that the single principle of accessibility can account for RE selection in all of the data examined, concluding that “[t]he factors which affect referential choice are universal and apply regardless of genre” (Toole, p. 286). Implicit in this (rather dated) definition of genre is that there are no differences in accessibility marking between the spoken and written modes. Although consistent with the predictions of AT, this last point may be somewhat surprising as Fox (1987b) identifies some seemingly relevant differences between the two modes. These include the opportunity for clarification requests and prosodic confirmation in spoken discourse, and the fleeting textual trace of spoken language. Similarly, in a summary of previous research, Chini observed that “[r]eferential devices are normally more explicit in written formal texts” (2005, p. 68) although it is unclear which studies support this interpretation. In short, there currently appears to be no convincing evidence of such differences.

It must be noted that most studies reporting on genre-specific aspects of reference are not based on current definitions of genre. For example, Toole selected 1000-word excerpts from “science-fiction novels, academic book reviews, informal conversations, and current affairs interviews”. Of these, it is unclear how informal

conversations can be considered to constitute a genre, and no details are provided of these conversations. Under Bruce's (2005, 2008) definition of genre, the three remaining types of data constitute different social genres, each of which may be presumed to contain multiple rhetorical moves and, therefore, contain multiple cognitive genres (e.g. a science-fiction novel might alternate between recounting events, explain a process, describe a location, etc.). In short, it is unclear whether previous studies investigating the relationship between accessibility, REs, and genre have focused on data that is meaningfully comparable in terms of genre. The major exception to this is Schiffrin's (2006) comparison of oral narratives and lists.

Schiffrin (2006) examined four factors influencing the use of a pronoun in subsequent mentions: recency, potential ambiguity, topicality, and boundaries. Of particular interest is that Schiffrin concluded that boundaries had a more substantial effect on the accessibility of referents in lists than in narratives. Several possible explanations are offered for this, such as boundaries being more sharply delineated in lists (Schiffrin, 2006, pp. 176-178). Schiffrin also identifies other aspects of genre that may affect accessibility. For example, although the effect of potential ambiguity (competition) appears to be the same in both genres, Schiffrin found that potential ambiguity occurred more frequently in narratives than in lists. She suggests that this may be because "narratives disambiguate referents by actions (their predicates) but lists are often filled with stative predicates . . . with little semantic content" (p. 172). These findings suggest that the individual factors that influence accessibility may be more or less influential within different cognitive genres.

In short, while current evidence appears to suggest that the more abstract and general approach of Accessibility Theory better accounts for RE selection than Fox's (1987a, 1987b) genre specific approaches, Schiffrin's (2006) findings suggest that some factors affecting accessibility (such as the strength of boundary delineation) may vary in their realization between different genres. It is suggested that the relation between genre and accessibility marking be revisited in future studies working within a current framework for genre, such as that of Bruce (2005, 2008). With this in mind, the present study will examine data elicited from

a single, well-researched communicative task (narrative retellings), although it should be noted that there may be variations in the rhetorical moves (and therefore cognitive genres) that individual speakers select. The analysis will also be restricted to spoken data.

2.5.8 Speaker internal factors

Arnold (2010) notes that most accounts of reference assume that RE selection is entirely motivated by concern for *recipient design*. However, there is mounting evidence that *cognitive load* also influences a speaker's RE selection. For example, Arnold and Griffin (2007) argue that the cognitive demands involved in maintaining multiple characters in a mental model of discourse lead to greater use of lexical REs (as discussed in Section 2.5.3 of this appendix). Arnold and Griffen present evidence suggesting that this is motivated by the speaker's own processing needs rather than those of the addressee.

2.5.9 Animacy

Fraurud (1996) reported an animacy effect on pronoun use, such that 100% of pronouns relating to non-human referents in a sample of Swedish narrative data had an antecedent in the present or immediately preceding sentence, compared to 87% of pronouns with human referents. Animacy theorists (Dahl & Fraurud, 1996; Fraurud, 1996; Yamamoto, 1999) have typically sought to account for this as a distinction in *individuation* (i.e. the extent to which an entity is treated as an identifiable individual) attributable to the anthropocentric perspective in human cognition. Similarly, Ariel (2004, p. 95) argues that “nonhuman entities are not as salient to us as humans are”.

In the present study, the results of piloting the analytical methods for establishing accessibility suggested that inanimate objects provide little or no competition to human referents. For instance, human referents were able to be reintroduced with pronouns after multiple intervening clauses, but only if all the entities in the intervening clauses were inanimate objects. This finding contrasts markedly with

those found here and elsewhere for the competition effect of even one human referent (irrespective of gender; cf. Subsection 2.5.3). Accordingly, a simple binary distinction is made in the present study between the competition provided by animate and inanimate entities. Future studies may wish to explore in greater detail the competition effects of entities with varying degrees of animacy.

2.5.10 Implications for the present study: Determining accessibility

The studies reviewed in this section demonstrate that a wide variety of factors appear to influence referent accessibility. Future studies are likely to reveal more such factors. Such findings have been incorporated into AT, with Ariel (1990, 1999, 2001) stressing that accessibility is a result of multiple factors. This is supported by evidence (Ariel, 1999) showing that the sum total of several accessibility-related factors more accurately reflects the distribution of RE types than do any single factor.

This complexity poses a substantial problem for efforts to determine referent accessibility in discourse. As cognitive accessibility cannot be directly quantified, Toole (1996) and Ariel (1999) aim for a best estimate of accessibility based on a number of grammatical and discoursal factors known to impact on accessibility. These include the factors identified in subsections 2.5.1 to 2.5.5 above. The system of accessibility analysis developed for the present study (see Chapter 4), is a development of Toole's (1996) system. In light of the discussion in Subsections 2.5.6 to 2.5.9 above, Toole's system is to be supplemented with the factors of global topicality (operationalized as *main character*), parallelism, and animacy. Possible genre effects are noted and, to some extent, controlled through the use of data from a single retelling task. Effects of non-matching competition (i.e. cognitive load) will be analysed indirectly through assessing the number of referents in each retelling.

Finally, it is emphasized here that cognitive accessibility cannot be directly assessed. However, it can be approximated through an analysis of those factors most closely associated with accessibility effects. This is done with an

understanding that “the weightings assigned to the various contributing factors are not claimed to have cognitive reality” (Toole, 1996, p. 275).

3 Appendix to Chapter 3: Review of literature

3.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews a selection of some of the more important SLL studies relating to use of the main RE types. These are presented in order from highest accessibility markers through to the lowest, beginning with zeros in Section 3.1, pronouns in Section 3.2, demonstrative forms in Section 3.3, names in Section 3.4, and articles in Section 3.5.

3.1 Zero

A number of studies report that learners at the lowest levels of proficiency rely heavily on zero, with the referential system basically involving a choice between zero and lexical NP (Kim, 2000; Klein & Perdue, 1992). This appears to be true irrespective of the learners' source and target languages. However, at low-intermediate levels, use of zero tends to decrease, and zeros are only gradually reintegrated into the referential systems of higher proficiency learners, reaching target-like frequency only at the highest levels of competency. As a number of researchers have commented, this appears surprising because, firstly, for the participants in a number of studies, the source language permits extensive use of zero. Furthermore, the acquisition of an empty form appears substantially less demanding than acquisition of, for example, pronouns. However, Muñoz (1995) essentially argues that English zeros may lack saliency for learners whose source languages use zeros much more widely, and who have come to recognize pronouns as the unmarked high-accessibility marker in English. Furthermore, learners (particularly in foreign language learning contexts) may lack sufficient exposure to English zeros "to allow the internalization of the syntactic restrictions under which zero anaphora is used" (p. 525). However, studies also show less frequent SLL use of zero in target languages that use zero extensively, for example English and Dutch learners of Japanese (Nakahama, 2003; Yoshioka, 2008). Furthermore, Hendriks reported frequent use of zeros for referent

maintenance contexts in both L1 Chinese (31%) and L1 German (26%), yet her Chinese learners of German underused this form (9%). However, non-target-like use of zeros is not restricted to underuse/avoidance. In particular, Williams (1988, 1989) reported advanced English SLL speakers and speakers of Singaporean English using zeros in syntactic constructions not found in her L1 data, and in contexts where there was a substantially greater distance between the zero and its antecedent than found in target-like English. Also of note is the suggestion that only high-proficiency SLLs have the language competence with which to maintain entities in the topic position over longer stretches of discourse (e.g. through passive voice), thereby creating the contexts in which zero is most appropriate (Nakahama, 2009).

3.2 Pronouns

English pronouns present a substantial problem for many learners as they are marked for a number of distinctions (gender, number, subject/object/possessive), and may vary in syntactic distribution between the source and target language (cf. Spanish and English object pronouns), and may vary in frequency between languages (cf. English and Japanese). Furthermore, they frequently occur in natural speech in an unstressed form and may therefore go unnoticed by some hearers. In addition, English requires the use of a pronoun for high accessibility referents in syntactic contexts where they are typically omitted in other languages, as illustrated in this example (Gundel & Tarone, 1983, p. 284):

The boy made a sandwich and put *it*/* \emptyset in the bag

Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, researchers have noted the absence of pronouns at low levels of language competency (e.g. Kim, 2000; Klein & Perdue, 1992). Even at higher levels, pronouns may be omitted (i.e. use of zero), or avoided in favour of lexical NPs (e.g. Fakhri, 1989; Kang, 2004). Klein and Perdue made the following generalizations for learners of various source and target languages:

Definitely referring lexical NPs are used before overt pronouns;

Singular anaphoric pronoun reference appears before plural;
Human appears before inanimate;
Nominative appears before oblique. (p. 318)

Felix and Hahn (1985) also reported a developmental sequence in which first-person pronouns and *you* or *he* were initially used for all persons, followed by recognition of number, development of third person pronouns, and finally gender. Interestingly, it has been reported that certain types of pronoun error do not occur in learner data, and this has been attributed to constraints that exist in all languages (Gundel, Stenson, & Tarone, 1984; Gundel & Tarone, 1983).

No studies were identified relating to SLL acquisition of stressed pronouns.

3.3 Demonstrative forms

Swierzbina (2010) notes that “very little research has specifically targeted L2 learners’ use of demonstratives” (p. 995). Swierzbina’s review of the literature identifies reports of both under-use and over-use in relation to target-like frequency, but notes that few of these studies “are situated in a comprehensive theoretical framework for reference (p. 996).

Using Strauss’s framework (see Strauss, 2002), Niimura and Hayashi (1994, 1996) found that Japanese learners of English and English-speaking learners of Japanese had substantial difficulties, even at advanced levels, in mastering the demonstrative system of the target language. This occurred despite the two systems being similar in many respects. Niimura and Hayashi suggested that some of the problems were triggered by fundamentally misleading pedagogical grammars that focus on spatio-temporal deixis and proximity.

Discussing her earlier (2004) findings, Swierzbina (2010) reported that the low-proficiency Japanese learners in her study “used significantly fewer demonstratives compared to the higher proficiency learners. The latter used demonstratives somewhat more frequently than did the English NS, but the

difference was not significant” (p. 996). The range of demonstrative forms used was also related to level, with the lower-proficiency speakers relying on just one or two demonstrative forms, while the highest proficiency group typically used “three or all four demonstrative forms” (p. 996). Of particular interest to the present study is Swierzbina’s finding that, in terms of the Givenness Hierarchy framework, the learners in all proficiency groups usually used the demonstrative forms to encode the “highest cognitive status Activated” (p. 997). That is, they usually appropriately used the forms *this*, *that*, and *this* + N but not the form *that* + N, which was often used to signal a higher status than was warranted.

3.4 Names

None of the studies reviewed focused on the use of names as forms of reference (as opposed to address terms) by SLL learners. This lack of interest is perhaps due to the (apparently) relatively simple morpho-syntactic issues around names, in which the genitive case (and its alternatives) appears to be the major challenge. However, this presupposes a number of issues that have not been examined in the literature reviewed. Firstly, it presupposes that learners recognize that common nouns and proper nouns are distinct word classes and, therefore, that features such as articles do not apply to (most) proper nouns. Master (1987, p. 24) reported abandoning research into SLL use of articles with proper nouns as “there seemed to be no clear pattern of acquisition short of a generalized tendency to improved accuracy” and that there was substantial variation among learners that “tended to depend on his or her experience in the world.” Secondly, in many cases learner exposure to personal names would seem to be relatively limited in terms of range and frequency. It seems likely that learners learn some names very well, while others that are encountered less frequently, and which pose phonological difficulties, may be avoided.

A further issue relates specifically to the use of names as accessibility markers. As noted in Chapter 2, in AT, first names are proposed to encode a higher degree of accessibility than surnames, and these in turn encode a higher degree than full names. Although Ariel (1990, 2001) proposes this as a linguistic universal, there

appear to be important variations “based in general socio-cultural preferences or, within a given culture, . . . based in individual or situational factors” (Stivers, 2007, p. 73). Therefore, learning appropriate accessibility marking through name selection in a second language appears to involve significant sociolinguistic and pragmatic knowledge.

Finally, it seems that some names present a substantial phonological challenge for learners, and it may be presumed that such names may be avoided on this basis. Studies of phonological avoidance, in general, appear to be rare, with Jenkins (2000, pp. 111-112) identifying only Celce-Murcia’s (1977) case study of one child; no studies were identified that specifically investigated name avoidance on the basis of phonological factors. Nevertheless, it seems likely that names may present difficulties because, firstly, the range of names in the English-speaking world reflect very diverse linguistic origins, and may involve, for example, phonological features not found in the L1, including phonemes, stress patterns, and consonant clusters. Secondly, it seems likely that many names have very low frequency in discourse and may be encountered late, if at all, in a learner’s exposure to the target language.

3.5 Articles

Evidence from a large number of studies confirms that English articles remain a substantial problem for learners from source languages without a comparable article system. Lang (2010) describes the system as “complex, obscure, and non-salient” (p. xxix) and “one of the most difficult challenges and one of the most frustrating experiences for L2 learners” (p. xxx). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, articles are the most extensively studied English RE form.

The broadest study reviewed is Master’s (1987) study of article acquisition in learners from five L1 backgrounds at four proficiency levels. Those participants from languages with articles (Spanish and German) were found to have functionally acquired (i.e. 90% accuracy) the English article system by the third proficiency level, while those from article-less languages (Chinese, Japanese, and

Russian) acquired the system only at the fourth (i.e. the highest) level of overall language proficiency. The participants from these article-less languages were found to follow a similar development pattern in which bare nouns initially dominate, followed by a stage of ‘*the*-flooding’ (substantial over-use), with the indefinite article integrated only later. This is supported by Huebner’s (1983, 1985) longitudinal study of one Hmong speaker, who also progressed through stages of *the*-flooding and the late acquisition of the indefinite article.

Studies investigating aspects of article acquisition have reported on a number of source language groups, including Japanese (Butler, 2002; Parrish, 1987), Swedish and Finnish (Jarvis, 2002), Vietnamese (Thu, 2005), Russian and Korean (Ionin, Ko, & Wexler, 2004) and Chinese (Lang, 2010). Many relate to conceptual distinctions such as hearer knowledge, specific reference, and countability (Butler, 2002), definiteness/specificity (Ionin et al., 2004), or new/continuous/reintroduced and topic/comment (Jarvis, 2002). Overall, the findings emphasize the difficulty for some learner-groups posed by articles, leading some researchers to suggest that articles may be avoided in favour of bare nouns, pronouns, and demonstratives (Lang, 2010; Snape & Kupisch, 2010).

4 Appendix to Chapter 4: Methodology

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents some further details of the methods used in the study. A brief outline of the *Modern Times* narrative is presented in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 relates to Chapter 4.5 in the main thesis, and discusses some lessons that were learned during piloting. Much of the remainder of the chapter discusses issues that arose during analysis. The participant consent form is presented in Chapter 4.8.

4.1 The *Modern Times* narrative

Part one (watched by both interactants)

- Intertitle: '*The gamin – a child of the waterfront, who refuses to go hungry.*' A young lady is stealing bananas from a crate at the wharf and throwing them to other hungry children. A worker arrives and tries to catch her, but she escapes.
- An office door with the title 'President: Electro Steel Corp'. Inside, a man is monitoring the factory floor through closed circuit television. He sends orders to a bare-chested man on the factory floor to increase the speed of the production line.
- In another location within the factory, Charlie Chaplin is working on a conveyor belt with two others. His job is to tighten the bolts of the small metal objects on the conveyor belt. Friction occurs between Chaplin and his colleague, as Chaplin struggles to keep up with the speed of the conveyor belt. Chaplin's supervisor intervenes.
- The bare-chested worker receives another instruction from the President to increase the speed of the production line.
- Chaplin is replaced on the production line by a 'relief man' (his supervisor) while he goes to the bathroom. Chaplin has muscle spasms as he walks, as a result of the repetitive nature of his job. Chaplin returns to his position at the conveyor belt, and takes his place back on the production line.

- Returning to the president's office, a secretary announces to the president the arrival of some visitors: a man in a suit, two assistants, and a machine on wheels, with a shiny dome on top. Part one finishes just as they are about to introduce themselves.

Part two (initially watched by only one participant: 'the speaker')

- Intertitle: '*Lunchtime*'. Chaplin and his colleagues are working on the production line, which slows down and stops. Chaplin cannot stop 'working', and instinctively uses his tools to tighten the buttons on the back of the secretary's skirt.
- Chaplin's colleague (with whom Chaplin had previously had problems with) pours a bowl of soup and places it on a bench and sits down next to it. Chaplin, who still has muscle spasms, nearly sits in the soup. His colleague stops Chaplin just in time and orders him to pass the soup to him, however Chaplin again has muscle spasms and he spills the soup over the man and over the floor. After a brief altercation, the man sits in his own soup.
- The president and his visitors arrive on the factory floor with the machine. The boss selects Chaplin to be the 'guinea pig' in a trial of this machine, which turns out to be an automatic feeding machine. The dome is lifted to reveal four plates of food which are fed to Chaplin: a bowl of soup, a plate with cubes of (perhaps) bread, a corn cob that rotates as Chaplin eats it, and a cream pie desert. After each course, a sponge-like object wipes his mouth.
- At first the machine functions well. But it soon malfunctions, and force-feeds Chaplin too quickly. After some time, the inventor of the machine manages to stop it. They try again, and again it malfunctions, throwing the pie into Chaplin's face, and then repeatedly hitting him with the sponge. The inventor pleads with the president, but the president replies "It's no good – it isn't practical" (shown on an intertitle). The president and his management team leave. Fade to black.
- Intertitle: '*Alone and hungry*'. A bread truck is on the street, and a baker is delivering bread to a patisserie. The girl (the gamin from part one) stares longingly at the window of the patisserie, and then, while the baker is in

the shop, she steals loaf of bread from the truck and runs. A woman who was passing by witnesses the theft. As the girl runs, Chaplin is coming round the corner, and the two collide and fall to the ground. By this stage, the baker has come out of the shop and the witness tells him that the girl has stolen the bread. Chaplin stands and picks up the bread.

- The baker runs over to Chaplin and the girl, and remonstrates with the girl. Chaplin hides the bread behind his back. At this moment, a policeman appears, and the baker tells him “She stole a loaf of bread” (intertitle). Chaplin responds “no, she didn't – I did” (intertitle), and produces the loaf from behind his back. Thus Chaplin takes responsibility for the theft and is arrested and taken away.
- However, after the policeman and Chaplin have left the scene, the witness reappears and tells the baker “It was the girl – not the man” (intertitle). The baker and the witness then run after the policeman. The girl is arrested by another policeman and she is taken away.
- Outside a tobacconist, Chaplin is placed in a ‘paddy wagon’, with six other men and a woman. The back of the vehicle has no door and is guarded by a policeman. Chaplin accidentally sits on the lap of a female prisoner. The vehicle stops, and the girl gets on board. Chaplin stands and offers her his seat, and says ‘Remember me – and the bread?’ (intertitle). Looking around, the girl begins to cry and Chaplin offers her his handkerchief. Distracted, he then sits down on the other woman’s lap again, and she pushes him off. He falls on her lap again when the vehicle goes around a tight corner.
- The girl suddenly looks angry and determined. She stands up and tries to push her way past the police officer, and Chaplin follows her. At this moment, the vehicle is speeding around a tight corner and nearly collides with another vehicle. Chaplin, the girl, and the policeman lose their balance and fall out the open door.
- The three characters are lying on the road, with Chaplin the only one who is conscious. He rouses the girl and says “Now is your chance to escape!” (intertitle). At that moment, the police officer regains consciousness, and is still holding his bat in his hand, but looks dazed. Chaplin gently rubs the

policeman's head, but then grips his wrist and pulls his arm in such a way that the policeman hits himself in the head with the baton.

- Chaplin again tells the girl to run away, and she agrees, and runs off towards the corner. Chaplin stays by the policeman. When the girl gets to the corner, she turns around and motions for Chaplin to come with her. Chaplin is unsure at first, but with the policeman waking up, he decides to run. Chaplin and the girl ran off down the street. Fade to black.

4.2 Lessons learned during piloting

To begin, a brief anecdote is presented here to illustrate the issue raised in Chapter 4.4. During piloting of the data collection methods and analysis, I also spent some time redecorating and painting rooms in my house. Prior to painting, I used a product to fill the gaps between where walls met each other or met the ceiling. After two or three days engaged in gap-filling, I found I could not walk into any room anywhere without scanning for gaps and marvelling at how frequently they appeared. In the case of gaps, the evidence can be rather objectively evaluated, but I soon asked myself whether I was 'noticing' features in my data that had other, perhaps more plausible, interpretations. This issue appeared particularly relevant to the (uncritical) identification of accessibility marking as a trigger for miscommunication, as this was the metaphorical equivalent of my 'wall/ceiling gaps'. In addition, because miscommunications are relatively infrequent, in a study such as this, there is a tendency to look ever harder for evidence of their occurrence.

A similar lesson was later learned (during the main study) in relation to the miscommunication in Extract 4.1. Although this lesson was learned during the main study rather than the piloting, it relates to the lesson learned about the researcher's theoretical orientation, as discussed in Chapter 4.4 of the thesis:

Extract 4.1: *Steffi and Otis*

<p>T = 20.13 9</p>	<p>S – and <u>the thi old lady</u> saw that and Ø tell the . chef [mmhm] and when <u>the young lady</u> run out the – ran out of them, <u>she</u> ah came across with Charlie, and er: um: and then she um: . <UNSURE TONE> bump him down</p>	<p>O – I was very confused. The first thing that I thought was that the OLD lady had bumped into Charlie.</p>
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Initially, it seemed unclear why the problem had occurred, particularly as the coding system indicated that the relevant RE (a pronoun) was appropriate. However, after repeated listening to the recording, it seemed that the miscommunication was triggered by an under-explicit RE (i.e. a speaker factor). Intuitively, this assumption seemed progressively more plausible upon each listening of the recording, and eventually seemed ‘obvious’. However, because this finding conflicted with the predictions of the coding system (a fact initially attributed to a limitation of the system), it was decided to confirm the finding with the panel of L1 judges (discussed in Chapter 4). Unexpectedly, all five judges (independently) interpreted the reference exactly as the speaker had intended, and with no apparent strain or difficulty. This suggested that hearer-based factors (perhaps momentary distraction) were the most likely trigger. Reflecting on this, it seems possible that the apparent mis-analysis of the problem may have been based on an implicit belief I had that speakers, not hearers, triggered most miscommunications. Aside from reinforcing the point made in Chapter 4.4 about the influence of the researcher’s theoretical orientation, this also highlighted the value of having independent judges with whom to confirm some interpretations.

4.3 Identifying zeros

Considerable thought was given to establishing what would be recorded as a zero in these data. Following trials on pilot data, a coding protocol was developed based on work by Williams (1988, 1989). The central principle was that zeros were identified as occurring where the context would have allowed a pronoun to have been used felicitously. The analysis was restricted to third-person subjects and direct objects of finite verbs. Following Williams, interrogatives were

excluded, as were pleonastic uses of *it*. In this subsection, all examples are from the interaction between Jake and Sonny.

Zeros were not identified for successive verbs linked by a coordinator, with no other intervening sentence constituent. For example:

the plate rotates and [] pushes the next bit

However, zeros were recorded where there were one or more intervening words, including particles (of phrasal verbs).

she like gets up and Ø looks real mad?,

It is, however, acknowledged that phrasal verbs do form a single semantic unit and so there are, perhaps, issues of validity in maintaining this distinction based on intervening words. Nevertheless, the ‘intervening words’ principle does allow greater reliability in coding than other principles that were considered.

The practices in coding can be illustrated in the following extract:

then this metal bar comes in and Ø¹ pushes it in his mouth and then the plate rotates and []² pushes the next bit and Ø³ pushes the next bit, and then [*it pushes*] []⁴ the the third

1. coded zero because there is an adverb separating the two verbs
2. not coded zero because there is no other intervening constituent
3. coded zero because an object intervenes between the verbs
4. not coded zero as the verb is also elided.

Similar to the fourth example above is the following, where ‘starts’ is also elided:

so it starts hitting him and [] hitting him and [] hitting him and [] hitting him

However, it appears to be relatively common for auxiliary *be* verbs (and auxiliaries such as *would*) to be omitted following a zero, and these were recorded as zeros in these data. An example is recorded in the following (where the *it* relates to an event rather than a true referent):

Extract 4.2: *Jake and Sonny*

T = 6.37 8e	J – and er . um . . Ø just kinda like bumpy ride, and then the girl comes, police
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A problem with this was that it sometimes became unclear whether the relevant clause was to be analysed as *zero + be + finite verb* or as *[] + non-finite verb*, and also whether, indeed, a *be* verb or some other type of verb had been elided. In such cases, inference was required and it is acknowledged that the alternative interpretation may also be plausible.

An example of these complexities is illustrated in Extract 4.3:

Extract 4.3: *Jake and Sonny*

T = 2.50 5c	the administrator guys and the the the technicians are trying to like fix it and Ø ¹ like undo like the um, Ø ² pull down the thing
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In this example, “and like undo” was interpreted as meaning “they like undo”, and therefore a zero was coded, rather than the similarly plausible “like trying to undo” which would have received no zero (due to elided verb).

A further coding principle is illustrated in the example below. Here, Jake abandoned his initial construction (*offers*), and the new construction (with *gets up*) was recorded as having its own subject:

so he offers, you know, Ø¹ gets up and Ø² offers her a seat

4.4 Analysing accessibility

Coding protocol for people with co-textual antecedents

Adapted from Toole (1996)

The basic unit of analysis here is the referential act. Repaired references and REs that are repeated within a single act of reference are only counted once (e.g. for measures of distance, competition, and recurrence).

Distance and unity

For entity A at point X in the discourse (A_x), if the last mention:

- a. Is in the same proposition, accessibility = **4**
- b. Is in the proposition immediately previous, = **3**
- c. Is in this episode but not in this or the last proposition, = **2**
- d. Is in the previous episode, then = **1**
- e. Otherwise, = **0**

Notes:

- The term *proposition* is defined here as “a semantic unit composed of a predicate plus its arguments (Tomlin, 1987, p. 461)” (cited in Toole, p. 272). This includes structures involving reporting verbs followed by reported speech.
- The term *episode* is defined as “a semantic unit in discourse organisation consisting of a set of related propositions governed by a macroproposition or paragraph level fame. (Tomlin, 1987, p. 460)” (cited in Toole, p. 272)
- “Following Tomlin, embedded complement clauses are not counted as separate propositions but as arguments of the matrix clause.” (Toole, 1996, p. 272)

Competition

For a given entity A at point X in the discourse (A_x)

- a. If there are **no competing human entities for** A_x in the last four or more propositions (and no previous mention of A in that time), then the accessibility of A_x is **increased by two**. (zero competition)
- b. If there are **no competing human entities between** A_x in the last one, two or three propositions (and no previous mention of A in that time), then the accessibility of A_x is **increased by one**. (zero competition)
- c. If higher conditions (a & b) are not met and there are **no matching entities between** A_x and last mention of A, there is **no change** to accessibility rating of A_x .
- d. If **one** matching entity has been mentioned **between** A_x and last mention of A, then the accessibility of A_x is **reduced by one**.
- e. If **more than one** matching entity has been mentioned **between** A_x and last mention of A, then the accessibility of A_x is **reduced by two**

Notes

- A *competing entity* in this case means any other singular *human* referent (any gender).
- “A ‘matching entity’ is defined as an entity which has the same value as entity A for the features of person, number, and gender.” (Toole, p. 274)
- An embedded RE does not count as competition
- REs in abandoned propositions are counted as competition

Recurrence

For entity A at point X in the discourse (A_x)

- a. If A has **not been mentioned in the last four propositions**, there is **no change** to accessibility
- b. If A has been mentioned **once or twice** in the last four propositions, the accessibility level of A_x is **increased by one**.
- c. If A has been mentioned **more than twice** in the last four propositions, the accessibility level of A_x is **increased by two**.

Notes

- Two mentions within the same *previous* proposition only counts as one

Local topicality and parallelism

- a. If A is encoded as the singular syntactic topic or the syntactic focus (e.g. *there was that man*) of the immediately *previous* clause, then the accessibility level of A_x is **increased by one**.
- b. If A is encoded in the same grammatical position of object or indirect object in the present and the immediately previous clause, and the syntactic subject remains the same, then the accessibility level of A_x is **increased by one**.
e.g. He₁ gave him₂ an ice cream. He₁ handed him₂ a napkin.

Global topicality

- a. If A relates to one of the two central characters (Charlie and the girl), then the accessibility level of A_x is **increased by one**.
- b. If A relates to any minor character, there is no change to the accessibility level of A_x

Notes relating to plural reference:

- References that are included in a plural RE are counted in distance and saliency but not in competition.
- A plural RE in subject position does not give topicality to a singular expression in the following clause.

4.5 Validity of the referent tracking coding system for accessibility

In this section, some further examples are presented of the coding system in operation, as well as discussion of some of the limitations of the system.

The principle that speakers can structure discourse by using more explicit REs was demonstrated in the following sequence (Vonk et al., 1992, p. 303), in which the use of a pronoun in (5) appears awkward:

- (1) Sally Jones got up early this morning.
- (2) She wanted to clean the house.
- (3) Her parents were coming to visit her.
- (4) She was looking forward to seeing them.
- (5) She weighs 80 kilograms.
- (6) She had to lose weight on her doctor's advice.
- (7) So she planned to cook a nice but sober meal.

In (5), there is no difficulty in resolving the referent of the pronoun, but as Vonk et al. point out, *she* seems unnatural because of the shift in theme. Vonk et al. argued that “when a device is used that is more specific than is necessary for the recovery of the intended entity, it also has a discourse structuring function. It marks the beginning of a new theme concerning the same discourse referent” (p. 304).

As Vonk's example is illustrative rather than an extract of genuine speech, there may be a suspicion that it represents a discourse analyst's version of the type of linguistic data (pseudo-sentences) that Chafe (1994, p. 47) argued “were neither things people would say nor things people would write”. Nevertheless, depending on how sentence (5) is interpreted, the infelicity of the pronoun appears to be accounted for in the present coding system. Specifically, if (5) is interpreted as a type of episode boundary, then the referent is analysed as having accessibility D4 (*Distance +1; Competition -1; Recurrence +2; Parallelism +1; Global topicality +1*). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, although this is within the range of what appears felicitous for the L1 speakers, it is also a context in which intermediate

and low-accessibility markers account for 42.7% of L1 references in such accessibility contexts.

An example from the literature that the current system does account for well is one that has been discussed in relation to Centering Theory (Walker, Joshi, & Prince, 1998, pp. 1-2, 6-7). Walker et al. argue that Centering Theory explains how the processing of the final pronoun in 10 below is apparently more difficult than that in 9.

9. (a) Jeff₁ helped Dick₂ wash the car.
(b) He₁ washed the windows as Dick₂ waxed the car.
(c) He₁ soaped a pane.
10. (a) Jeff₁ helped Dick₂ wash the car.
(b) He₁ washed the windows as Dick₂ waxed the car.
(c) He₂ buffed the hood.

(1998, pp. 6-7)

According to Walker et al., in (9c) Jeff is the ‘centre’, or the focus of attention, but in (10c) there is a shift in attentional focus, and Dick becomes the attentional centre. The choice of the pronoun is a poor way to signal this shift, and the discourse becomes strained. The present coding system, however, predicts that both Jeff and Dick have accessibility D5 in sentence (c) (*Jeff: Distance +3, Competition -1, Recurrence +1, Parallelism +1, Global topicality +1; Dick: Distance +3, Competition +0, Recurrence +1, Parallelism +1, Global topicality +0*). This appears to represent a limitation of the coding system. It could be that, the competition provided by Dick as the grammatical object of the second sentence should receive a lower weighting than that for Jeff as the syntactic subject of that sentence.

It should also be noted that although AT is a theory of the use of definite NPs and entails certain predictions relating to RE resolution, it is not to be confused with a full theory of RE (or anaphor) interpretation. Thus, the coding system is unable to predict when information predicated on an RE influences interpretation of that RE.

4.6 Identifying reported speech

An ambiguity exists in the reference of certain NPs in English, depending on whether the speaker is directly quoting somebody, or merely reporting the gist of what was said:

- (1a) John₁ said “it was me₁”.
- (1b) John₁ said it was me₂.
- (2a) The lady₁ said “she₂ went to the bank.”
- (2b) The lady₁ said she₁ went to the bank.
- (2c) The lady₁ said she₂ went to the bank.

As examples (1a) and (1b) illustrate, ambiguity of first (and second) person pronouns is generally avoided in written language through the use of speech marks (Bhat, 2004). Comparison of examples (2a) and (2b) demonstrate that the presence of speech marks enclosing third person pronouns generally indicates other-reference rather than self-reference. However, a comparison of (2b) and (2c) demonstrates that the absence of speech marks does not rule out either interpretation.

For the present study, the addition of speech marks provides a convenient means of signalling to the reader direct and indirect reported speech, and these were added during the transcription process. However, an issue arises in regard to whether an utterance may be inferred as direct or (indirect) reported speech. Many speakers indicated reported speech through a change in voice quality, as if adopting the voice of the character. However, in some cases there appeared to be little, if any, perceptible phonological indication of this distinction. In such cases, the main grounds for these inferences were the researcher’s knowledge of the film, which provide grounds for reasonable assumptions of the speaker’s intended meaning.

4.7 Data management with NVivo

Initially, the NVivo 8 software package was used to manage most aspects of the coding of the data. NVivo is a qualitative research tool, facilitating the management of multiple transcripts, along with audio and video sources. Transcripts may be coded in multiple ways and then be ‘queried’ for correspondences between different levels of analysis. The appeal of NVivo is mostly in regard to its value as a tool for coding qualitative data, although it also allows for basic manual quantitative coding and analysis, and is effective in identifying correlations between certain types of data.

NVivo was found to be particularly useful for coding potential miscommunication but two limitations for analyzing language became apparent. Firstly, NVivo cannot be used to code two overlapping stretches of text separately within the same node (category). This becomes problematic for linguistics-based research as it means that referring expressions containing an embedded reference can only be represented as a single item within one coding ‘node’ in NVivo. So, for example, whereas Example 1 contains two NPs with the potential to refer, they cannot both be coded separately within a *definite description* node (or whichever name is given to the node): only 1 (the coding that encompasses the embedded code) is recorded by NVivo.

1. . . . and then *the girl who stole the bananas* arrived . . .
2. . . . and then the girl who stole *the bananas* arrived . . .

In the present study, this presented limitations not only for coding the type of referring expression, but also for coding the level of reference: Examples 1 and 2 should both be coded Level 1. The partial solution for this, although not ideal, was to code these as follows:

- [1c] . . . and then *the girl who stole* the bananas arrived . . .
[1d] . . . and then the girl who stole *the bananas* arrived . . .

However, on a few occasions, this compromise was unsatisfactory as the embedded referring expression occurred in the middle of an extended act of reference. The choice, therefore, became one of either misrepresenting the length of the referential episode, or omitting the smaller embedded episode at one or more of the nodes. Neither option was entirely satisfactory.

An additional problem with NVivo is that no changes may be made to an imported document after it has been coded, as this ‘shifts’ any previous coding to a different part of the text. This became relevant on a small number of occasions when, for example, a zero pronoun was missed during the document preparation, and only identified during the fine-grained analysis that occurred during coding. In these cases, they were coded as a ‘free node’, and added to the totals at the end.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the use of NVivo was ultimately abandoned due, mainly, to the laborious process of using this software to code large numbers of linguistic items.

4.8 Participant consent form

Request for Participation in L2 Spoken English Research Project

My name is Jonathon Ryan and I am currently carrying out a project for my PhD through the Department of General and Applied Linguistics here at the University of Waikato. My research project is related to the use of language in interactional situations. I very much hope that you would be willing to help me by participating in a film re-telling task. Following this activity, I will ask each of the participants some questions regarding the conversation. Each of these activities will be recorded. I will analyse the data after it has been collected.

If you agree to participate in the project, I will be very happy to clarify any points that you wish to discuss, and make arrangements with you to complete the following tasks:

Task 1: Film re-tell task. First, you will be assigned a ‘hearer’ or ‘speaker’ role. I will then ask you and another participant to watch a 4-minute long film clip. I will then ask the hearer to leave the room while the speaker watches another 7-minute clip of the same film. The speaker will then report to the hearer what happened in the second part of the clip. This talk will be recorded on video and audio tape.

Task 2: Immediately after the completion of the recording, I will ask the hearer some questions regarding his/her interpretation of what the speaker said. This will take approximately 10-15 minutes. If any clarification is required, I may then briefly ask the speaker some questions regarding what s/he meant. These conversations will also be recorded on audio tape and/or video.

Please note that this research will not involve any evaluation or assessment of either participant.

Your confidentiality will be guaranteed. I would like to assure you that the names of participants will not be divulged beyond those directly involved in the project – that is, myself and my supervisors Dr. Roger Barnard and Dr. Ian Bruce. The

confidentiality of participating teachers and students is preserved through the use of pseudonyms in all reporting of the research. Please note that the PhD thesis will be lodged in the university library and will be freely accessible on the internet to anyone. Potentially, the research findings could also in the future be reported in academic journal articles, education magazines, or conference papers. Should an article be published, I will send you a copy if you wish.

Any report of the information from the research will not identify you. However, because the results of the research may be used in future publications, a copy of your recordings and transcripts will be stored for five years after the completion of the project, under secure conditions. After this period, the original recordings and transcripts will be destroyed.

Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. You may decline to answer any question. Please note that you may fully withdraw from the project at any stage up to two weeks after your final involvement, with no need to give any reason for so doing.

The intended outcome of this research will be a thesis submitted towards the fulfilment of a PhD qualification. Ultimately, the research is intended to improve my understanding of the teaching of English as a second language.

If you are willing to participate in this project, please fill in and sign the consent form that is attached, and return it to me. Please retain a copy of both this letter and the consent form.

This research project has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Any questions about the ethical conduct of this research may be sent to the Secretary of the Committee, email fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz, postal address, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Te Kura Kete Aronui, University of Waikato, Te Whare Wananga o Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240

You may contact me at the following email address jgr3@waikato.ac.nz or on extension 6777.

If you have read and understood the above information, and you agree to participate, please sign the declaration statement below. Please keep a copy of this form for your own reference. If you would like to check further details, please contact me at the email address or phone number above.

I, agree to participate in the research project being conducted by Jonathon Ryan, doctoral student at the University of Waikato.

I understand that my rights to privacy and confidentiality will be assured throughout and after my involvement in the above research project, and that I may withdraw from participating at any time, with no need to provide any reason for doing so.

Signed: (Participant)

Date:

Contact phone number:

Email:

I wish to see a copy of any publication of the research YES NO (Please circle your choice)

Signed: (Jonathon Ryan, Researcher)

Date:

Thank you

Jonathon Ryan

J3.14

5 Appendix to Chapter 5: Referents, referring expressions, and acts of reference

5.1 Word count

Basic raw data relating to the number of references and the length of each transcript is presented for the L1 and SLL speakers Table 5.1. The figures for the total number of words in each transcript were derived using the ‘word count’ query option in Microsoft Word, which not only counts the hearer’s contributions (which form no further part in the analysis), but also count non-linguistic items as words, including such things as the symbols for laughter (@) and the timestamp.

The third column provides the number the number of REs used by the main speaker in the act of making Level I, Level II, and Level III references. The fourth column indicates the total number of individual acts of reference made by the speaker. This is always less than (or, in one case, the same as) the number of referring expressions, because all speakers occasionally created acts of reference involving two or more referring phrases. An example of this is illustrated below, where a speaker uses two distinct phrases to achieve a single referential act.

Extract 5.1: *Vicky and Francesca*

T = 0.07 1	V – okay, well you know how they left it, where <u>the urchin girl</u> , <u>like yoh street homeless girl</u> , and then Charlie was at work and there’s these guys up in the metal office and there’s that big like spaceship-looking, convexed, thing – it’s actually like a big dinner plate [huh], okay,
---------------	--

The fourth column indicates the speakers’ total number of references and mentions of film-based entities in the interactions. The figures here include those mentions of hearer-new entities that are not considered to be referential in the present study (as discussed in Chapter 2), and thus the figures are greater than for the number of referential acts. One type of entity not included in this count is Level III attributive references, of the type *It was her* in which the pronoun *it* (in this case) refers to the attribute of being *the thief*. There were an additional 69 of these types of reference by the 26 speakers.

This particular chart, unlike the others, presents the information hierarchically from the most to least number of words in the interaction. Subsequent tables are organised alphabetically according to the pseudonym of the speaker.

Table 5.1: Words and acts of reference in the retellings

L1 retellings

	word count	REs	Referential acts	Acts at Levels I to IV
Shelley	2286	277	273	302
Jake	1923	282	267	292
Kate	1614	239	231	264
Adele	1494	224	211	244
Fiona	1258	180	158	175
Kath	758	156	137	156
Jeff	660	102	96	109
Vicky	554	90	78	85
Lillian	523	87	75	88
Shaun	372	66	57	62
Total	11442	1703	1583	1777
Average	1144.2	170.3	158.3	177.7

SLL retellings

	word count	REs	Referential acts	Acts at Levels I to IV
Kevin	1606	162	136	147
Leonie	1407	163	148	176
Judy	1153	210	195	209
Rozenatina	1118	168	147	153
Najwa	1089	112	103	114
Stella	1068	131	118	132
Tim	1023	118	107	119
Bobby	1006	131	123	140
Joanna	931	104	103	111
Martina	924	114	104	120
Joel	806	105	93	111
Sanaa	736	112	102	113
Aida	703	82	81	92
Alisha	695	88	85	97
Max	691	138	127	143
Annie	627	72	66	78
Shoko	578	66	66	76
Kubra	546	86	75	82
Barbara	499	40	38	42
Alex	477	60	54	59
Total	17683	2262	2071	2314
Average	884.15	113.1	103.55	115.7

5.2 Range of referents in each narrative

This section presents additional findings supporting the discussion in Chapter. Some of the relevant discussion is based on Table 5.1, on page 73.

5.2.1 Number of acts of reference by each speaker

As discussed in Chapter 2, an act of reference is one of the basic units of analysis in the present study, and is defined here as a pragmatic act in which the speaker intends to make it clear to the hearer which referent is being indicated. The onset of an act of reference is typically the first element (e.g. a determiner) in the first referring expression, although it may also be a pre-introduction element such as the underlined portion in the following (see Smith et al., 2005):

you remember that guy in the singlet

The completion of an act of reference is the final element which ostensibly satisfies the speaker that the reference is resolvable. In many cases this is the completion of a RE, but may be some subsequent element such as self-repair, acknowledgment, or negotiation (Smith et al., 2005). A single act of reference may involve more than one referring expression, and may also involve other embedded references. For example, the following act of reference involving two referring expressions (*that guy Russell* and *the guy with the caravan*), with a further embedded act of reference (to a caravan, which in this case is realised by a single referring expression).

I saw that guy Russell. You know, the guy with the caravan.

Overall, the analysis of the data transcripts shows that the L1 speakers in this study made approximately 50% more Level I, Level II, and Level III acts of reference per interaction than the SLL speakers, using an average of 158 referential acts each compared to 104 by the SLL speakers. A substantial proportion of the additional L1 references relate to just two referents: Charlie, and the feeding machine.

In relation to the two main characters, the L1 speakers made considerably more references to Charlie (an average of 44 per retelling) than did the SLL speakers (23 per retelling), but there was quite a similar frequency in relation to the girl (an average of 27 and 23 references respectively). For most of the minor characters

(e.g. the boss, the witness, the baker) the number of references were similar in the L1 and SLL retellings, typically averaging between two and four references each. However, the two minor characters most frequently referred to by the L1 speakers (the colleague and the second policeman, averaging six references each) occurred substantially less frequently in the SLL retellings (an average of two references each) than in the L1 data. In addition, plural references were much more frequent in the L1 data (average of 12) than in the SLL data (average of six). The relevant data for the L1 speakers is presented in Table 5.3 (p. 79) and for the SLLs in Table 5.4 (p. 80).

There were also some significant differences in the frequency of references to non-human referents in the data, particularly relating to specific parts of the feeding machine. Whereas the frequency of references to the feeding machine as a whole were relatively similar (16 for L1 speakers and 12 for SLL speakers), the L1 speakers tended to refer much more frequently to specific parts of the machine, such as its dishes or mechanical components (24 for L1 speakers and 7 for SLL speakers). In addition, the L1 speakers referred to significantly more of the minor objects coded collectively as ‘other’ (e.g. a handkerchief) which were peripheral to the main events of the narrative (13 compared to 5).

The greater number of referential acts in the L1 data partly reflects the greater range of entities referred to in these retellings, but is particularly associated with the greater number of references to Charlie overall, and the number of references to specific parts of the feeding machine. This reflects the greater details that the L1 speakers tended to provide in relation to the scene in which the feeding machine operates on Charlie. Although this scene is prominent in the film, one SLL speaker avoided mentioning it at all, while a further three (compared to just one L1 speaker) referred to the whole machine but did not distinguish any of its specific parts. Furthermore, while four L1 speakers each made between 44 and 48 references to machine parts, the highest number of such references among any SLL speakers was 21. That the SLL speakers gave fewer details (or even avoided retelling this scene) may have been a strategic decision motivated by the difficulty of explaining this part of the narrative.

To summarize, overall, the analysis shows that the L1 speakers tended to make substantially more references, and to a greater range of referents, than the SLL speakers. The greater number of referential acts in the L1 data means that there are more 'places' in these narratives where problematic reference could potentially occur. Furthermore, in the L1 narratives, the greater frequency of references to some minor characters and objects (e.g. to the second policeman, the colleague, the female prisoner, the conveyor belt) suggests that such referents may have greater saliency than in the SLL retellings. This could suggest greater overall competition in the resolution of REs in a typical L1 narrative. Thus while it would appear that the L1 retellings tend to provide an opportunity to develop a richer mental picture of the narrative, their referential complexity would also generally seem to provide more opportunity for referential miscommunication.

5.2.2 Range of referents in the retellings

In general, the L1 narratives tended to include a substantially wider range of referents than the SLL narratives (as presented in Table 5.2). For example, while 80% of the L1 speakers referred to Chaplin's colleague on the production line, only 30% of the SLL speakers did so. Similarly, 40% of the L1 speakers mentioned the female prisoner, compared to only 5% of the SLL speakers. Neither of these two characters are involved in any of the three major narrative events (the operation of the feeding machine; the theft; the escape), and thus a possible explanation could be that the narrower range of referents in the SLL subjects resulted from narrative strategies involving more selectivity over events. However, even in re-telling the major narrative events, there appeared to be a tendency for the SLL subjects to use fewer referents. For example, despite all narratives including the theft and escape from the police van, five of the SLL-L1 narratives did not contain the second policeman, and four did not contain the baker, compared to one narrative each in the L1-L1 interactions. Similarly, although individual parts of the feeding machine (e.g. the bowl, the neck brace) were not separately coded separately, it appears that speakers in the L1-L1 narratives tended to identify a substantially greater range of specific parts of the machine, than the SLL speakers did.

Table 5.2: Level I referents identified by participants

L1	Charlie	Girl	Machine	Colleague	Boss	Factory machinery	Other
Adele	■		■	■		■	
Fiona	■			■		■	
Jake	■		■	■		■	
Jeff	■			■		■	
Kate	■			■		■	
Kath	■			■		■	
Lillian	■			■			
Shaun	■			■		■	
Shelley	■			■		■	
Vicky	■			■			
L2							
Anna	■			■	■		
Albert	■			■			■
Alice	■			■			
Anne	■	■		■			
Becky	■						■
Bruce	■		■	■	■		
Joel	■		■		■		
Josie	■			■	■		
Julia	■			■			■
Kane	■		■		■		■
Kyrah	■			■	■		
Leonie	■		■	■	■	■	
Martha	■			■	■	■	
Michael	■			■	■		■
Nadia	■	■		■	■		■
Rachel	■			■	■		3
Sabrina	■			■	■		2
Shona	■		■		■		
Steffi	■			■	■		
Toby	■	■		■		■	

Legend

■	Hearer-known character introduced as hearer-known
■	Hearer-known character introduced as hearer-new
□	Hearer-known character not mentioned by the speaker

Characters referred to only through plural expressions are excluded

Thus, at least in terms of referents, the retellings by the L1 speakers tended to be substantially more complex than those by the SLL speakers. Specifically, the L1 speakers introduce and maintain references to more characters and other entities, therefore increasing the ‘competition’ effect.

Apparent exceptions to the general tendency for broader and more frequent references by L1 speakers are data for mentions of the boss and scientist. For example, only half of L1 speakers appear to refer to the boss, compared to 16 out of 19 SLL speakers. However this is misleading, since all of the L1 speakers did refer to the boss, but for half of the speakers this was achieved always as part of a plural set, as the following extract illustrates:

Extract 5.2 *Adele and Laine*

T = 1.46 5-6	A – [@all @over @the @seat] and the guy’s all like (<i>melodramatic sigh x2</i>) and then all the working men are just sitting on like a big row of benches, like eating?, and in front of them is the conveyor belt. And <u>all the flash: boss people come along?</u> , [yep] @and they have like a @feeding @machine
-----------------	---

Thus the plural set used by the L1 speakers to refer to the boss also includes the scientist, a prominent technician, and several other members apparently of the management team. The use of plurals explains the absence of singular referring expressions for not only the boss, but also the scientist. What is not clear, however, is why the L1 speakers typically did not distinguish between the more prominent members of this group.

Therefore, the non-coding of plural references (discussed in Chapter 4) is somewhat problematic for assessing the range and frequency of referents in the retellings. The only plural referring expressions that were individually coded for referents were those indicating ‘Charlie and the girl’ (sometimes with the second policeman). Nevertheless, un-coded plural references were much more frequent in the L1 data (averaging fifteen references per speaker) than in the L2 data (average of 6.1 per speaker).

Table 5.3: L1 references and mentions of human characters

	Chaplin	Banana Girl	Chaplin & Girl	Boss	Colleague	Scientist	Baker	Witness	Female prisoner	Policemen 1 & 1b	Policeman 2	Other people	Plurals	Total refs to characters
Adele	58	34	2		6		6	5	4	5	8		13	141
Fiona	44	32	4	1	7	3	5	4		4	3		7	114
Jake	64	32	6	3	11		9	4	6	4	16	7	24	186
Jeff	23	19	4		6		1	4		2	1		9	69
Kate	48	27	5	3	17		5	6	2	4	6	7	19	149
Kath	37	19	2		2		5	3		1	5		8	82
Lillian	17	11	4				1	2		3	4		5	47
Shaun	15	11	3	3	2		1	2					4	41
Shelley	71	39	7	2	7		4	5	1	7	13		17	173
Vicky	25	24	3					1			3		9	65
Total	402	248	40	12	58	3	37	36	13	30	59	14	115	1067
Average	40.2	24.8	4	1.2	5.8	0.3	3.7	3.6	1.3	3	5.9	1.4	11.5	106.7

Table 5.4: SLL references and mentions of human characters

	Chaplin	Banana Girl	Chaplin & Girl	Boss	Colleague	Scientist	Baker	Witness	Female prisoner	Policemen 1 & 1b	Policeman 2	Other people	Plurals	Total refs to characters
Aanna	13	22	6	1			4	3		4	3		6	62
Albert	5	9	4	2		1	2	3		5		1	2	34
Alice	15	18	8	3			2	4		3			5	58
Anne	16	14	5	3		1	4	2		5			3	53
Becky	8	11						3		4				26
Bruce	22	29	3	3	3		5	5		4	3		6	83
Joel	26	21	7	1		1	3	2		5	3		4	73
Josie	18	21	16	4						4			8	71
Julia	59	42	2		16	3	6	5		4	3	1	8	149
Kane	23	29	3	3			13	8		7	8	3	8	105
Kyrah	17	21	5	2				4		3	3		6	61
Leonie	41	26	6	4	6		3	4		6	1		13	110
Martha	23	18	4	2			5	3		4	3		10	72
Michael	39	24	6	2	2	2	6	3		3	4		6	97
Nadia	17	18	8	3		5	3	3		3	7			67
Rachel	24	35	11	6		1	2	7		10	2	1	8	107
Sabrina	18	24	6	3			2	5		5	3	1	12	79
Shona	13	20	2	1				3		3	2		5	49
Steffi	32	27	6	2	2		4	3	2	4	3		6	91
Toby	28	26	4		5		5	5		3	2		5	83
Total	457	455	112	45	34	14	69	75	2	89	50	7	121	1530
Average	22.85	22.75	5.6	2.25	1.7	0.7	3.45	3.75	0.1	4.45	2.5	0.35	6.05	76.5

Table 5.5: Referents of nonhuman entities in L1 retellings

	Feeding machine	Food & machine parts	Factory machine	Loaf of bread	Paddy wagon	Other objects	Film	Total to nonhuman entities
Adele	18	47	2	5	6	18	7	103
Fiona	13	15	3	7	2	16	8	64
Jake	24	44	1	8	5	20	11	113
Jeff	8	4	3	2	7	9	7	40
Kate	19	45	2	6	5	27	11	115
Kath	17	8	1	9	5	11	7	58
Lillian	15	8		6	4	2	6	41
Shaun	6			2	2	3	4	17
Shelley	23	48		5	23	19	11	129
Vicky	10	1		2	3		4	20
Total	153	220	12	52	62	125	76	700
Average	15.3	22	1.2	5.2	6.2	12.5	7.6	70

Table 5.6: Referents of nonhuman entities in L1 retellings

	Feeding machine	Food & machine parts	Factory machine	Loaf of bread	Paddy wagon	Other objects	Film	Total to nonhuman entities
Aanna	13	4		3	2	3	2	27
Albert	13			5	2	1	4	25
Alice	18	7		5	3	2	4	39
Anne	6	2		4	3	4	6	25
Becky				7	1	2	6	16
Bruce	11	20	1	5	5	6	9	57
Joel	18	6		3	4		7	38
Josie	12	5		5	5	5	8	40
Julia	21	17		5	6	7	4	60
Kane	19			7	8	2	5	41
Kyrah	6	1		4	4	1	5	21
Leonie	17	21	1	3	6	14	4	66
Martha	9	13	2	4	4	7	9	48
Michael	12	9		6	2	9	8	46
Nadia	13	12		4	10	2	6	47
Rachel	15		1	13	3	3	9	44
Sabrina	17	3		5	2	2	5	34
Shona	7	3		4	4	9		27
Steffi	9	5		2	6	10	9	41
Toby	10	2	2	4	8	2	8	36
Total	246	130	7	98	88	91	118	778
Average	12.3	6.5	0.35	4.9	4.4	4.55	5.9	38.9

The following table presents again the figures for the number of references made to the two main characters, Charlie and the girl, individually and collectively. The figure for the percentage of overall references that these represent is also given.

Table 5.7: References to the central characters

		Chaplin	Banana Girl	Chaplin & Girl	Total references to MCs	All references e	Refs to MCs as % of total
LIs	Adele	58	34	2	94	244	38.5%
	Fiona	44	32	4	80	178	44.9%
	Jake	64	32	6	102	299	34.1%
	Jeff	23	19	4	46	109	42.2%
	Kate	48	27	5	80	264	30.3%
	Kath	37	19	2	58	140	41.4%
	Lillian	17	11	4	32	88	36.4%
	Shaun	15	11	3	29	58	50.0%
	Shelley	71	39	7	117	302	38.7%
	Vicky	25	24	3	52	84	61.9%
	Total	402	248	40	690	1766	
	Average	40.2	24.8	4	69	176.6	39.1%
SLLs	Aanna	13	22	6	41	89	46.1%
	Albert	5	9	4	18	59	30.5%
	Alice	15	18	8	41	97	42.3%
	Anne	16	14	5	35	78	44.9%
	Becky	8	11	0	19	42	45.2%
	Bruce	22	29	3	54	139	38.8%
	Joel	26	21	7	54	111	48.6%
	Josie	18	21	16	55	111	49.5%
	Julia	59	42	2	103	209	49.3%
	Kane	23	29	3	55	147	37.4%
	Kyrah	17	21	5	43	82	52.4%
	Leonie	41	26	6	73	176	41.5%
	Martha	23	18	4	45	120	37.5%
	Michael	39	24	6	69	143	48.3%
	Nadia	17	18	8	43	114	37.7%
	Rachel	24	35	11	70	153	45.8%
	Sabrina	18	24	6	48	113	42.5%
	Shona	13	20	2	35	76	46.1%
	Steffi	32	27	6	65	132	49.2%
	Toby	28	26	4	58	119	48.7%
	Total	457	455	112	1024	2310	
	Average	22.85	22.75	5.6	51.2	115.5	44.3%

5.3 Frequency of referring expression types in the data

This section presents findings for the frequency with which RE types were used by each speaker. Table 5.8 presents these data for the L1 speakers and Table 5.9 presents these findings for the SLL speakers.

Table 5.8: L1 speakers' use of referring expression types

	Conventional Referring Expressions									Non-conventional Referring Expressions		Total
	∅	3 rd person pronoun (stressed)	This (That)	This + NP (That + NP)	This + modifier (That + modifier)	First name (last name)	Short definite description	Demonstrative + long description (The + long descr.)	Full name (Name + modifier)	The + name (Indefinite NPs)	Bare nouns (Bare noun + modifier)	
Adele	19	117 (1)		1 (3)	(3)	12	63	2 (2)	1			224
Fiona	13	89 (1)		6	(2)		39	1 (1)	10	(1)		163
Jake	28	125 (1)	1 (1)	14 (1)	5	19 (2)	71	2 (10)			2	282
Jeff	11	50 (2)		1 (1)	1		21	(4)	9		2	102
Kate	10	134	2 (3)	1 (2)	1 (1)	14	64	(7)			1	240
Kath	9	76	(1)	(1)			20	1 (5)	4 (3)		1	121
Lillian	3	36 (2)	(2)			5	30	2 (2)	4 (1)			87
Shaun	2	35	(2)	(3)			10	2	4			58
Shelley	14	162 (2)	(1)	1 (3)	(1)	1	77	1 (1)	11 (2)	(1)	2	280
Vicky	6	65		1		2	11	2 (1)	1		1	90
Total	115	889 (9)	3 (10)	25 (14)	7 (7)	53 (2)	406	13 (33)	44 (6)	0 (2)	9 (0)	1647
% of all forms	7.0%	54.0% (0.5%)	0.2% (0.6%)	1.5% (0.9%)	0.4% (0.4%)	3.2% (0.1%)	24.7%	0.8% (2%)	2.7% (0.4%)	0% (0.1%)	0.5% (0%)	

Table 5.9: SLL speaker's use of referring expression types

	Conventional Referring Expressions										Non-conventional RE		Total
	∅	3 rd pers pron. (stress)	This (That)	This + NP (That + NP)	This + mod (That + mod)	First name (last name)	Short def descrip	Dem + long des (The + long)	Full name (Name + modifier)	The + name (Indef NPs)	Bare N (Bare N + modifier)		
Aanna	6	33	(1)	(1)		(2)	35	(1)		(2)	1	82	
Albert	5	21	(1)	(2)		2	23	(5)	2	(1)	2	60	
Alice	8	33	(3)	(6)	(2)	(6)	22	1	(1)	1	4 (1)	88	
Anne	7	25					39				1	72	
Becky	1	5					30	(2)			2	40	
Bruce	19	55				8	39	(2)		1 (2)	5	131	
Joel	10	33 (2)					34		9	8 (1)	8	105	
Josie	3	35		2			39	1 (2)	11	5 (1)	5	104	
Julia	9	97 (3)		6 (2)			70	(3)	15 (2)		3	210	
Kane	18	50	1	2 (1)	1	(10)	56	(3)	(1)	4 (1)	14	162	
Kyrah	5	47 (2)		4		5	20	1		(1)	1	86	
Leonie	8	53	(1)	2 (2)		18	68	(2)		(2)	7	163	
Martha	10	39		(6)	(1)	(9)	41	3 (2)		1 (2)		114	
Michael	21	65 (1)	1	(2)		(9)	34	(3)			2	138	
Nadia	6	40	(3)	1 (9)	(2)	(9)	39	1			2	112	
Rachel	10	70		(3)		9	62	(7)	1	1 (1)	4	168	
Sabrina	4	51	3 (1)	11 (2)		7	28	(1)			4	112	
Shona		27				(9)	23	(1)		1	5	66	
Steffi	9	38	(5)	(2)		14 (1)	51	(3)		4 (1)	3	131	
Toby	7	32		1		(14)	55	(3)		2 (1)	3	118	
Total	166	849 (8)	5 (15)	29 (38)	1 (5)	63 (69)	808	7 (40)	38 (4)	28 (16)	76 (1)	2262	
% all forms	7.3%	37.5% (0.4%)	0.2% (0.7%)	1.3% (1.7%)	<0.1% (0.2%)	2.8% (3.1%)	35.7%	0.3% (1.6%)	1.7% (0.2%)	1.2% (0.7%)	3.4% (<0.1%)		

Table 5.10: Percentage of pronouns and short definite descriptions used

L1			SLL		
	Pronouns	Short descriptions		Pronouns	Short descriptions
Adele	52.2%	28.1%	Aanna	40.2%	42.7%
Fiona	54.6%	23.9%	Albert	32.8%	35.9%
Jake	44.3%	25.2%	Alice	37.5%	25.0%
Jeff	49.0%	20.6%	Anne	34.7%	54.2%
Kate	55.8%	26.7%	Becky	12.5%	75.0%
Kath	62.8%	16.5%	Bruce	42.0%	29.8%
Lillian	41.4%	34.5%	Joel	31.4%	32.4%
Shaun	60.3%	17.2%	Josie	33.7%	37.5%
Shelley	57.9%	27.5%	Julia	46.2%	33.3%
Vicky	72.2%	12.2%	Kane	30.9%	34.6%
Average	54.0%	24.7%	Kyrah	54.7%	23.3%
			Leonie	32.5%	41.7%
			Martha	34.2%	36.0%
			Michael	47.1%	24.6%
			Nadia	35.7%	34.8%
			Rachel	41.7%	36.9%
			Sabrina	45.5%	25.0%
			Shona	40.9%	34.8%
			Steffi	29.0%	38.9%
			Toby	27.1%	46.6%
			Average	37.50%	35.70%

5.4 The distribution of demonstrative REs

In these data, the L1 and SLL participants infrequently used demonstrative NPs to refer, particularly the forms *bare demonstrative* and *demonstrative + modifier*. However, it is not the case that these *linguistic forms* were not used, rather, that the majority of uses of these forms were non-referential. The following tables present the findings for the level of reference (or non-reference) that these noun phrases encoded. The figures indicate that, in many respects, the L1 speakers and SLL speakers used (and avoided) these expressions in approximately the same contexts.

Table 5.11: Bare demonstratives

L1 speakers (SLL Speakers)

	Level 1-3	Level 4 Reference intro.	Event, Time, Place	Prop	Nil	Uncoded
This	4 (5)	0 (0)	0 (6)	3 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)
That	14 (16)	0 (3)	33 (42)	14 (26)	2 (1)	0 (0)

Table 5.12: Demonstrative + gesture

L1 speakers (SLL Speakers)

	Level 1-3	Level 4 Reference intro.	Event, Time, Place	Prop	Nil	Uncoded
This + gesture	0 (0)	0 (0)	8 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
That + gesture	0 (0)	0 (0)	9 (6)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)

Table 5.13: Demonstrative + NP

L1 speakers (SLL Speakers)

	Level 1-3	Level 4 Reference intro.	Event, Time, Place	Prop	Nil	Uncoded
This + NP	30 (31)	14 (2)	4 (14)	0 (1)	4 (0)	1 (0)
That + NP	20 (38)	0 (0)	8 (7)	0 (0)	3 (0)	0 (0)

Table 5.14: Demonstrative + modifier

L1 speakers (SLL Speakers)

	Level 1-3	Level 4 Reference intro.	Event, Time, Place	Prop	Nil	Uncoded
This + modifier	8 (1)	6 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
That + modifier	7 (5)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)

Some obvious differences are also found. For example, the SLLs used the form *that* + NP substantially more frequently than the L1 speakers. The L1 speakers introduced new characters with *this* + NP substantially more frequently than the SLL speakers, while SLL speakers use this form to refer to events, places, and time.

However, the most interesting finding appears to be that pronominal-*that* (bare *that*) was used far more frequently to mention events, time and place than to refer to people and objects. An implication for the present study is that bare demonstratives constitute a very minor type of RE (at least in retelling this type of narrative).

5.5 Use of stress

As discussed in Chapter 5, participants were found to use stress to mark a distinction in accessibility between two *matching* referents (i.e. referents encoded as having similar semantic features, e.g. two policemen). Stress appears to be placed on the referring expression when it relates to the less accessible of two (and presumably more) matching referents. For example, in the following extract, the speaker appears to distinguish between two of Charlie's colleagues with a similar expression (*the/that + other guy*), using stress on the word *other* to clarify the distinction:

Extract 5.3 *Kate and Nina*

T = 0.53 2	<p>K – you know, aw, what was the last scene?, you know how they, [well that machine, yeah they bring]</p> <p>N – [well there was that silver thing on a #trolley, wasn't it]</p> <p>K – that machine into the office?, and in the next part it shows Charlie and <u>that other guy</u>₁ . still doing . . whatever's [#@] happening on the conveyor belt, that . #I #don-, that twisting thing ['eah] and then . it comes up that it's lunch time?, and so the conveyor belt slows down. And then, so they're kinda having a rest, and then Charlie's ticking?, you know how he was ticking 'cause he's going [like this] ((twitching gesture))</p> <p>N – [aw yeah]</p> <p>K – he's like ((twitching gesture)) . . anyway, and then <u>the OTHer guy</u>₂ <u>that he's working with</u>, he go- – oh no, Charlie goes away, [mm] and then the other guy pulls out his flask,</p>
-------------------	--

5.6 Pronoun errors

Two pronoun errors occurred in the L1 data, and these are presented below:

Extract 5.4 *Kate and Nina*

T = 4.02 7-8	<p>K – [the homeless girl?, yeah] well, she's walking down the street, she turns a corner and there's a bakery, I'm sure it's a bakery, anyway, there's a truck, kinda backed up, um delivering some food and stuff, I think it might've been bread, and so the guy goes inside with this tray of whatever food is on the tray, and then she: goes, and she's like 'oh look the truck's open', [mm] and so she steals a loaf of bread, she runs away with it, and then, this old lady had just come round the corner and Ø noticed her doing it?, and so when the guy from the truck comes out of the bakery, . the old lady tells <u>her</u>, and she's running away, . and then .</p>
---------------------	---

Extract 5.5 *Shelley and Jenny*

T = 7.17 21	S – and they both went on the ground, and then the baker comes back and he's – and the lady's like 'that lady – girl stole your bread', or something like that, [yeh] and then they chase after <u>him</u> , and then J – him or her? S – . . HER, and him, [yep] – well no, they chase after her,
----------------	--

An alternative analysis of Extract 5.4 is that the speaker intended to say “tell *on* her”, but omitted the preposition.

5.7 Direct speech

Data was collected for the number of times that direct speech was used in each interaction, with the figure given for the total number of instances of direct speech, and also the figure for the total number of instances in the theft scene. The figures here relate to dialogue involving recognised lexical items, such as the underlined portions in the following extract, but not to other non-lexical items such as the italicised portions presented in Extract 5.6 (which were a feature of some L1 speakers' dialogue):

Extract 5.6 *Adele and Laine*

T = 5.32 17-20	A – he's like ' <u>oh, take my seat</u> ' because she had to stand up and like hold one of those [yep] circle things?, and he's all like ' <u>remember me? I'm with the bread, it was me</u> ' L – [@@@] A – [and stuff] and he was like ' <i>ohhhh</i> ' like you know, sort of like . [yep@] . and the girl was like ' <i>oh</i> ', so she takes a seat.
-------------------	--

In a small number of cases, it was unclear whether the speaker was using direct or indirect speech. There were four such cases in the SLL retellings, including three in the theft scene. The findings are reported in Table 5.15.

Table 5.15: Use of direct reported speech

L1 Speakers

	Total use of direct reported speech	Direct reported speech in theft scene
Adele	12	3
Fiona	5	3
Jake	9	4
Jeff	2	2
Kate	8	4
Kath	2	0
Lillian	2	3
Shaun	1	1
Shelley	8	3
Vicky	6	3
Total	55	26

SLL Speakers

	Total use of direct reported speech	Direct reported speech in theft scene
Aanna	1	1
Albert		
Alice	3	3
Anne	3	3
Becky	1	1
Bruce	4	4
Joel	2	2
Josie	2	2
Julia		
Kane	3	2
Kyrah		
Leonie	2	2
Martha	1	1
Michael	6	4
Nadia	8	4
Rachel	12	7
Sabrina	7	3
Shona	4	3
Steffi	3	2
Toby	1	1
Total	63	45

5.8 Generics

The following table presents figures for the number of users of generic *you* by each of the speakers. Generic *you* is distinguished from genuine second person reference in which the speaker refers to the addressee (e.g. ‘Do you remember’), and is also distinguished from the use of *you* as part of the filler ‘you know’, and the fixed expression ‘how do you say/pronounce’. The figures below do not include repeats and recasts.

Table 5.16: Use of generic *you* and *your*

L1 Speakers

	You	Your
Adele	2	
Fiona		2
Jake	2	2
Jeff	1	
Kate	2	
Kath		
Lillian	2	
Shaun		
Shelley	6	
Vicky		
Total	15	4

SLL Speakers

	You	Your
Aanna		
Albert		
Alice		
Anne		
Becky		
Bruce		
Joel		
Josie		
Julia	1	
Kane	2	2
Kyrah		
Leonie		
Martha		
Michael	1	
Nadia	5	3
Rachel	6	2
Sabrina		
Shona		
Steffi		
Toby	1	
Total	16	7

Table 5.17: Generic references describing the feeding machine

		You (your)	The + noun [singular]	The + noun [plural]	They (them)	Bare plural (e.g. people)	Complex definite	a + noun	Nobody	Zero	His + N
L1	Adele										
	Fiona	4									
	Jake	2									
	Jeff										
	Kate	2									
	Kath										
	Lillian	2									
	Shaun										
	Shelley										
	Vicky				2						
	Total	10			2						
SLL	Aanna										
	Albert		2		1						
	Alice										
	Anne										
	Becky										
	Bruce										
	Joel										
	Josie			2				1			
	Julia		1			1	1				
	Kane	3				2		2		2	
	Kyrah			1	1						
	Leonie					1					
	Martha										
	Michael	1									
	Nadia	4				1					
	Rachel	7					1				
	Sabrina			1	2	2					
	Shona										
	Steffi					1					
	Toby		2						1		1
	Total	15	5	4	4	8	2	3	1	2	1

6 Appendix to Chapter 6: Accessibility marking

The findings reported in this chapter support the summaries provided in the main body of the thesis.

6.1 Accessibility marking in referent tracking

Table 6.1 reports the percentage of all references at each accessibility degree in both the L1 and SLL retellings.

Table 6.1: References at each accessibility degree

	L1	SLL
D8	0.4%	0.6%
D7	13.9%	19.1%
D6	26.5%	20.0%
D5	24.8%	21.5%
D4	12.8%	14.9%
D3	8.3%	9.2%
D2	6.1%	5.8%
D1	6.0%	6.7%
D0	1.1%	2.2%

Figure 6.1 reports details of the distribution of RE types according to accessibility degree in the L1 data;

Figure 6.2 presents the findings for the SLL retellings.

Figure 6.1: L1 accessibility marking

	D0	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8
∅	0	0	0	0	0	19	34	23	0
Pronoun	0	2	3	21	57	151	161	88	3
Stressed pronoun	0	0	1	0	2	3	2	0	0
This/That	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This/That + NP	0	0	3	2	3	4	2	0	0
First name	2	6	8	13	11	9	2	1	0
Last name	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Short definite description	5	29	21	18	24	7	7	0	0
Long description	0	6	3	0	0	0	1	0	0
Full name	2	5	9	12	4	6	4	0	0
The + name	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Bare noun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indefinite	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	9	48	49	67	103	199	213	112	3

Figure 6.2: SLL accessibility marking

	D0	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8
∅	0	0	0	1	6	28	17	37	0
Pronoun	0	3	6	14	46	104	130	144	6
Stressed pronoun	0	0	0	1	2	5	2	4	0
This/That	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This/That + NP	0	0	2	8	4	3	4	0	0
First name	2	4	6	9	14	14	7	1	0
Last name	2	5	12	10	20	10	7	1	0
Short definite description	17	44	27	43	54	42	38	11	0
Long description	2	10	0	1	1	3	0	0	0
Full name	1	2	4	5	7	11	2	1	0
The + name	0	0	2	2	4	6	5	5	0
Bare noun	0	3	3	3	2	5	3	2	0
Indefinite	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	0
Total	24	72	62	99	161	232	216	206	6

Table 6.2: Distribution of RE types by accessibility degree

	% of D8		% of D7		% of D6		% of D5		% of D4		% of D3		% of D2		% of D1		% of D0		
	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	
∅			20.0%	18.0%	16.0%	7.9%	9.5%	12.1%		3.7%		1.0%							
Pronoun	100.0%	100.0%	78.6%	69.9%	75.6%	60.2%	75.9%	44.8%	55.3%	28.6%	31.3%	14.1%	6.1%	9.7%	4.2%	4.2%			
Stressed pronoun				1.9%	0.9%	0.9%	1.5%	2.2%	1.9%	1.2%		1.0%	2.0%						
This/That																			
This/That + NP					0.9%	1.9%	2.0%	1.3%	2.9%	2.5%	3.0%	8.1%	6.1%	3.2%					
First name			0.9%		0.9%	3.2%	4.5%	6.0%	10.7%	8.7%	19.4%	9.1%	16.3%	9.7%	12.5%	5.6%	22.2%	8.3%	
Last name						3.2%		4.3%	1.0%	12.4%		10.1%	2.0%	19.4%		6.9%		8.3%	
Short def. description				5.3%	3.3%	17.6%	3.5%	18.1%	23.3%	33.5%	26.9%	43.4%	42.9%	43.5%	60.4%	61.1%	55.6%	70.8%	
Long description					0.5%			1.3%		0.6%		1.0%	6.1%		12.5%	13.9%		8.3%	
Full name					1.9%	0.9%	3.0%	4.7%	3.9%	4.3%	17.9%	5.1%	18.4%	6.5%	10.4%	2.8%	22.2%	4.2%	
The + name				2.4%		2.3%		2.6%	1.0%	2.5%	1.5%	2.0%		3.2%					
Bare noun				1.0%		1.4%		2.2%		1.2%		3.0%		4.8%		4.2%			
Indefinite										0.6%		2.0%				1.4%			

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Table 6.3: Number of REs used at each accessibility degree

	D8		D7		D6		D5		D4		D3		D2		D1		D0		Total	
	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL	L1	SLL
∅	0	0	23	37	34	17	19	28	0	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	76	89
Pronoun	3	6	88	144	161	130	151	104	57	46	21	14	3	6	2	3	0	0	486	453
Stressed pronoun	0	0	0	4	2	2	3	5	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	14
This/That	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This/That + NP	0	0	0	0	2	4	4	3	3	4	2	8	3	2	0	0	0	0	14	21
First name	0	0	1	1	2	7	9	14	11	14	13	9	8	6	6	4	2	2	52	57
Last name	0	0	0	1	0	7	0	10	1	20	0	10	1	12	0	5	0	2	2	67
Short definite description	0	0	0	11	7	38	7	42	24	54	18	43	21	27	29	44	5	17	111	276
Long description	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	3	0	6	10	0	2	10	17
Full name	0	0	0	1	4	2	6	11	4	7	12	5	9	4	5	2	2	1	42	33
The + name	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	6	1	4	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	24
Bare noun	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	5	0	2	0	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	21
Indefinite	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	6
Total	0	6	115	206	213	216	199	232	103	161	67	99	49	62	48	72	9	24	803	1078

6.2 Under-explicit zeros

An example is presented in the following extract of a zero with Accessibility Degree 4. As argued in Chapter 6, although this example appears to be under-explicit by L1-speaker standards, it appears unlikely to result in miscommunication:

Extract 6.1: *Julia and Abby*

T = 1.26 3-4	Charlie Chaplin came and he was, ah with with with his movement?, his gestures and all, and he . ah, HIS colleague want him not to sit on thi: . bowl of soup, and he took up the – and h- he even asked Charlie Chaplin to pass the bowl of soup to him, so Charlie Chaplin ah took up the bowl and he was – his hands were shaking, and he passed thi: . . bowl of soup to his colleague but in in the process he spilt some of the soup because of his movement, and of course his colleague was so mad at him and he, ahh, he – I think, if I'm not mistaken, he nearly hit him, Ø bash him up for spilling his soup@ all over him,
---------------------	---

6.3 Introducing the major characters

6.3.1 Introducing Charlie

Table 6.4 presents how Chaplin was introduced by the speakers. Only the initial form selected by the speaker is presented here, so for instance, Extract 6.1 is recorded as ‘short name’ only, as the speaker initially appears to consider the expression *Charlie* sufficient, and only modifies this in response to an unsolicited contribution from the hearer:

Extract 6.2: *Albert and Marg*

T = 0.30 2	A – an- . the owner pick . d Charlie: . yea M – Charlie Chaplin A – Yeah Charlie Chapman?,
---------------	--

In Table 6.4, a shaded box indicates the form used, with a * indicating that the speaker sought confirmation from the hearer through the use of a rising terminal or other means. The symbol # indicates that the speaker directly and overtly appealed to shared knowledge through an expression such as *you know?*.

Table 6.4: Introducing Charlie

L1	Pronoun	This/that + noun	First name	Surname	Full name	The + noun	Long definite	Name + modifier	Staged reference
Adele									
Fiona									
Jake									
Jeff									
Kate									
Kath									
Lillian									
Shaun									
Shelley									
Vicky									
SLL									
Aanna		*∫							
Alex									
Alice									
Anne									
Becky									*#
Bruce									
Joel									
Josie									
Julia					*				
Kane				*					
Kyrah									
Leonie			*						
Martha									
Michael									
Nadia									
Rachel							*		
Sabrina			*						
Shona									
Steffi									*#
Toby									

Legend

*	High-rising terminal tone
#	Overt direct appeal to common ground
∫	note that an alternative analysis may see this as an example of ‘reminder <i>that</i> ’, and therefore indicating low-accessibility

The chart is structured as a scale in which semantically light expressions are on the left, and heavy expressions are on the right. The chart is based on Ariel’s (2001) hierarchy of referring expressions, with the additional category of *episodic reference*. Episodic reference is used here to describe the introduction of the referent through a series of moves in which the act of reference may (using the

terminology of Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) involve instalment noun phrases, and may be refashioned through repair, expansion, or replacement, and may be further negotiated by the hearer (see Chapter 2).

For the purposes of the discussion in this section, article errors are ignored. So, for instance, in Extract 6.3 it appears that the speaker has infelicitously used *a* instead of *the*, yet it has been counted as a definite article in the table.

Extract 6.3: *Kane and Racquel*

T = 5.23 7-9	K – it's not . right about the machine, [okay] uh, and when the Chaplin um mm, worker worker work on [[TARGET: WALK ON]] walk on way?,and . er <u>a a beautiful lady</u> , [yep] just just appeared on the part one, [yep yep] beautiful lady gives the bananas [yeh yeh] ah,
---------------------	---

A further factor in apparent over-explicitness may be relative familiarity with Charlie Chaplin. Clearly, Chaplin would not be equally well-known among the participants. With this in mind, part of the data collection procedure involved the researcher establishing that the participants could identify Charlie Chaplin by asking them to describe his appearance. If necessary, the researcher then showed an image of Chaplin from *Modern Times*. The purpose of this was to try to ensure that the participants could refer to Chaplin's character by name. Nevertheless, despite being able to identify Chaplin, it became clear that speakers varied in their confidence in using his name. One L1 speaker addressed the researcher during the interaction in order to confirm Chaplin's name:

Extract 6.4: *Lillian and Astrid*

4	L – THAT comes into the SCENE, and then the little Charlie Chapman – [[ADDRESSES RESEARCHER]] that's the guy eh? Charlie Chapman Res – yeah L – he: um, HE . is having his lunch break, and then the machine comes in, and they tell HIM to come to the machine, so he's standing there behind this little working thing, and it was like a machine that, I guess you don't have to stop for a lunch break, it feeds you?
---	---

Curiously, as in the example above, four of the seven L1 speakers referred to Chaplin as *Chapman*. None of the SLLs made this error, although two (Sabrina and Steffi) appeared hesitant in pronouncing his name, and two (Steffi and Shona) had distinctly non-target like pronunciation.

Extract 6.5: *Steffi and Otis*

T = 0.22	S – and after you leave, I watch two segments, and the first one is . um: . lunchtime, and it describe the – what happened, um in the factory when the workers having their lunch, and ah, ah you know the char- the hero, what’s the name?, [um] Chaplin? O – Charlie Chaplin S – er how do you pronounce that? O – Charlie S – Charl . Lee O – Charlie Chaplin S – ok, [yeah] then O – with the face like this S – yeah, he’s ah: keep the hand shaking
1-2a	

Extract 6.6: *Sabrina and April*

T = 1.36	S – and then this machine like . give the food, and j- just they can move j- – maybe it’s from ##, I don’t know what they use it here, . . and then the mach- they choose ah . Ch- Charlie? A –mmhmm S – and then . . they . start – um, there’s a manager and some peoples they look for this machine it’s good or not?
3-6	

Extract 6.7: *Shona and Dallas*

T = 0.20	S – Um at first um /fɪplɪn/ [[target: Chaplin]] w- a:nd . the workers had a lunch, ah because the job finished, [right] then @ what happened was
1	

Similarly, the use of definite descriptions (noun phrases other than names and pronouns) may be connected to the speaker’s familiarity with Chaplin. Three SLL speakers (but no L1 speakers) used a description to introduce Charlie. Besides the possibility that this was a deliberate choice (e.g. to indicate low-accessibility), there are various other possible explanations for this. It could be that they were uncertain of Chaplin’s name, or wanted to avoid pronouncing it. Alternatively it is possible that some speakers make a distinction between *Chaplin the actor* and *Chaplin’s character*, preferring not to equate the actor’s name with the character name.

Extract 6.8: *Rachel and Renee*

T = 1.24	and:, the boss . mm . come, and the boss came: eh: to the . place where those people have rest for the lunch, and the boss was pointed to the . the funny guy@, # # with the beard? R – oh Charlie Chaplin T – Charlie yeah, and then he’s become the volunteer ones to be seated,
3	

Extract 6.9: *Anne and Tom*

T = 1.45	A – you remember they are working?, [yeh] and after that, they had a lunchtime, and er er the boss, I think the boss hired some like scientist, to invite [[target: invent?]] a machine, like er automatically, [yeh] um so they um, they ask the <u>the small guy</u> , ahh to sit here, and
1-3	

Pronominal introductions of Charlie

Extract 6.10 is one of five pronominal introductions of Charlie in these data.

Extract 6.10: *Shelley and Jacky*

T = 1.22	J – so was there a continuation? S – I think so
1	J – okay S – what happened when you left? J – they were in the factory area S – oh yeah, yep [yeah, that carried on for a while] J – [and then um] they stopped, that he w- that <u>he</u> went back doing [[gesture]] the thing that . like, when [yep] I left S – umm, . . yeah, that – it continued like that, and then they s- broke for lunch, J – okay [and then like] S – [and there] was like a play of like his workmate like having hot soup and stuff,

In this example, the interlocutors collaborate to establish common ground, establishing that the previous scene continues, which presumably activates recall of the associated characters. The relevant set of characters is then referred to by *they*, and, as Smith et al note in relation to their data (p. 1874), Chaplin is the most salient member of this group.

6.3.2 Introductions of the girl

As the following excerpts from the stimulated recall illustrate, there was substantial individual variation in the extent to which the girl was accessible for different L1 hearers. For Jim, the girl was easily recoverable in memory, while for Molly the girl was much less recoverable. This finding confirms that there are important hearer-factors in the successful resolution of reference.

Extract 6.11: *Jim SR*

T = 4.54	R – this girl from the very beginning of the film J – I definitely knew who she was talking about [yep] . when she says this girl . she's- . . . [yeah] R – [you're] thinking with the . . . J – yeah, the one who was throwing the bananas to the [uh-huh] to the gamins, fr- from the ship R – right J – unforgettable
4	R – unforgettable because? J – she was stunning [@right] . even in black and white

Extract 6.6.12: *Leonie and Molly*

T = 30.21 13	L – err, then it, er, then on the street, a woman . who um show . showed at the first . at first, on the waterfront, who’s thro[wing banana] M – [oh yeah yeah yeah] L – who’s thrown banana to childrens, [mhm] she . M – I forgot about that <MISC> very quietly </MISC> @@	R – okay, um, did you have a clear idea . at first that she was RE-introducing a character that we had seen before? M – YEAH, I’d just totally forgotten that clip [yeah] of the @# @# @# I’d totally forgotten the bit [right] with the gamin and the bananas M – but then, yeah, I understood who she meant, [yeah] as soon as um, as soon as I remembered that that had been there?
---------------------	--	--

Introductions and non-introductions of the girl

In three cases, SLL speakers did not (or did not appear to) introduce the girl as a hearer-known character. In the first case (Nadia and Chloe) this is very clear, as Chloe asked whether Nadia was referring to the banana girl, and Nadia replied that it was a different girl. This was classified in the present study as non-reference (*mentioning* rather than referring; see Chapter 2). In the other two cases, it also appears that the speaker had either misunderstood there to be two girls, or perhaps recognised that it was the same girl but chosen not to make this clear to the hearer. A third possibility is that the speaker attempted to refer, but chose the wrong form to refer (*indefinite article + noun*). These two examples were classified as non-reference.

Extract 6.13: *Nadia and Chloe*

T = 1.32 5-6	N – it’s not working. And then the second part, is um, is about Chaplin?, [mhm], um, no it’s about <u>this /ði:s/ GIRL who stole a BREAD, . . .</u> C – <u>oh, the girl from the very beginning?</u> N – <u>ah, I think it’s different girl?</u> C – okay N – ah yah, I think it’s the different girl. C – okay
---------------------	--

Extract 6.14: *Toby and Whitney*

T = 3.40 9-10	and then, . after this . there was another story, yeah # # story is Chaplin, and Chaplin found a <u>girl, in the street,</u> W – <u>yeah</u> T – and str- the girl was . was hungry, and then he stole steal stolen
----------------------	---

Extract 6.15: *Anne and Tom*

T = 3.05 6-8	so that's the first part, and the the second part is um, . about um a- also the small guy and er, and er a <u>girl</u> , um first, er the girl is . alo- alone, and she felt [[target: felt]] very hungry,
-----------------	--

REs used to introduce the girl

The following example illustrates an episodic, interactional introduction of the girl:

Extract 6.16: *Martha and Paul*

T = 2.18	M – and after that the: s- the first story started back?,
4	P – mhm M – with the girl?, er and the bananas?, P – yes M – and the ship P – the gamin, yeah M – yep the first part,

Table 6.5 presents data for how the girl was introduced by the L1 and SLL participants.

Table 6.5: Introducing the girl

L1	Pronoun	This/that + noun	This/that + noun	The + (modifier) + noun	The + noun + modifier	RE + event	Staged reference
Adele			*				
Fiona							#
Jake						*#	
Jeff					*#		
Kate					*		
Kat						*#	
Lillian						*#	
Shaun		*					
Shelley				*#			
Vicky				#			
L2							
Anna						*#	
Albert				*#			
Alice					*#		
Anne							
Becky						*#	
Bruce							*#
Joel	*+bare noun						
Josie						*#	
Julia							*#
Kane							*#
Kyrah			*#				
Leonie							*#
Martha							*#
Michael						*#	
Nadia							
Rachel							
Sabrina						*#	
Shona							*#
Steffi					#		
Toby							

Legend

*	High-rising terminal tone
#	Overt direct appeal to common ground

Figure 6.3 presents data comparing how speakers introduced Charlie (C) and the girl (W). All of the L1 participants and 16 of the 20 SLL participants use higher accessibility markers to introduce Charlie than to introduce the girl.

Figure 6.3: Introducing the major characters comparative chart

	Pronoun	First name	Surname	Full name	The/this/that + noun	This/that + noun + modifier	The + (modifier) + noun	The + noun + modifier	Name + modifier	RE + event	Staged reference
Adele	C					W					
Fiona	C										W
Jake		C								W	
Jeff				C				W			
Kate		C		W				W			
Kat									C	W	
Lillian									C	W	
Shaun	C				W						
Shelley	C						W				
Vicky		C					W				
L2											
Aanna					C					W	
Albert		C					W				
Alice								W	C		
Anne					C						
Becky										W	C
Bruce		C									W
Joel	W			C							
Josie				C						W	
Julia				C							W
Kane			C								W
Kyrah	C					W					
Leonie		C									W
Martha			C								W
Michael			C							W	
Nadia			C								
Rachel								C		W	
Sabrina		C								W	
Shona		C									W
Steffi								W	C		
Toby			C								

6.3.3 Introducing hearer-new characters

Two major ways to introduce hearer-new referents are identified in the literature. The most common of these is the use of an indefinite expression, prototypically defined as a noun phrase with an indefinite article functioning as the determiner (e.g. *a baker*), with other options including indefinite uses of *this* (e.g. *this guy*) and *some* (e.g. *some guy*), as well as other determiners (e.g. *another*; *one*). The second major way to introduce a referent is through a definite description licensed by a *bridging inference* (e.g. Clark, 1975). These typically occur in contexts where the referent fulfils a particular role that is expected in the context, either licensed through a cognitive script (e.g. a first mention of *the waiter* in a restaurant), or through a more general frame (e.g. *the door* in a room). In such examples the referent is unknown to the hearer, but fulfils a role that is to some extent expected.

In addition, there are also ways in which speakers prepare listeners for the introduction of a new character (Smith et al., 2005). Such an analysis is not presented here, but is considered in analysing which introductions were problematic (Chapter 7).

7 Appendix to Chapter 7: Miscommunication

7.1 Referentiality and resolution

In the stimulated recall presented in Extract 7.1, Maddy revealed that she was relatively unconcerned with identifying the referent of *they*:

Extract 7.1: *Aanna and Maddy*

<p>T = 10.05 3</p>	<p>A – ah lunchtime begins, ah the workers have their lunch, [mhm] . and . ah they have a rest, and then <u>they</u> . come to pick ah one of worker to try this mach- ah try the machine. [mhm] Ah at first it works very well .</p>	<p>R – now, I think she said something about they brought this machine down to . [mm] and who did you think was with the machine at this point? M – I have no idea who ‘they’ was, but it didn't matter, because I thought the ‘they’ is insignificant, who is GETting the machine is more important,</p>
------------------------	---	--

The following extract is a further example of a hearer reporting being comfortable with non-resolution of a reference. In Extract 7.2 the speaker (Tina) specifically sought confirmation that Arlene had correctly identified the intended machine:

Extract 7.2: *Tina and Arlene*

<p>T = 1.10 2-3</p>	<p>T – . . . and then, um, . the boss guy, you know that big machine, that was in the boss's office? A – oh yeah, yeah T – yeh, that like the salesman, he came down with THAT, and then Charlie Chaplin got chosen to try it, it was like a food thing?. A – oh yeah T – and then there was like – so he had to stand there</p>
-------------------------	--

However, during the stimulated recall interview, Arlene reported having “no idea” which machine was meant and explained further in Extract 7.3:

Extract 7.3: *Arlene SR*

<p>Recording 3 T=0.03</p>	<p>R – yeah, and can you remember wh- why you let it go? A – um, ‘cause I understood kind of the rest of the gist of the story, so I didn't think it was . that much of a vital part?, of the understanding of the story [yeh] so I thought it would just be less complicated to let her explain, and she was obviously going to explain what it was, . ‘cause she brought it back up again, [oh yeah] so I kind of thought well if I just don't say anything I'll probably find out what it is anyway</p>
-----------------------------------	--

	R – oh yeah A – and if I'm still not sure, then – if I think it's important, then um, then I'll ask afterwards
--	---

7.2 Miscommunicated introductions of the colleague

In Extract 7.4, Fiona (a L1 speaker) highlighted the colleague's large size, and his location alongside Charlie. Although similar introductions were sometimes successful, Geoff reported an initial sense of ambiguity, before opting for the wrong interpretation:

Extract 7.4: *Fiona and Geoff*

T = 10.22 2	there was that really big guy standing next to him?, in the, in the thing,
----------------	--

A notable feature here is that Fiona appeared to emphasize the importance of this reference through the use of a particularly informative referential act, and through the use of a try-marker (inviting Geoff to accept or reject the reference). Although Geoff initially accepted the RE, he later sought clarification before settling on an incorrect interpretation. The problem, it appears, is that both competing referents match this description.

In Extract 7.5, Steffi (a SLL) uses descriptive content that is far less informative, leaving Otis unable to identify the referent:

Extract 7.5: *Steffi and Otis*

T = 11.20 2	S – and ah <u>the other man</u> . um . bring the soup?,
----------------	---

In this case, Steffi appears less aware of the ambiguity of the RE and of the low-accessibility of the referent. An alternative interpretation may be that Steffi did not prioritize identification of the character (see Chapter 7.3).

Extract 7.6, also from an L1 retelling, illustrates the role of hearer factors in miscommunication. Here, the introduction of the colleague is misinterpreted by Sonny:

Extract 7.6: *Jake and Sonny*

T = 0.43 2-3	J – and then um so there’s the big industrial worker, the guy who was working next to him?, [yeh] so they sit down to have their lunch
-----------------	--

This introduction appeared to have some potential for ambiguity, as despite being very informative, the relief man was not excluded by a semantic interpretation of the reference. Interestingly, during the stimulated recall interview, Sonny suggested that, in holding mental representations of the colleague and the relief man, “maybe I just merged them together” into one character. Sonny further explained “I presume they’re more or less the same character”, suggesting that, as far as the narrative is concerned, he considered the distinction between the two characters to be unimportant.

7.3 Examples of misidentification in referent introductions

This section presents in greater detail some of the miscommunications discussed in 7.5.3.

Extract 7.7: *Steffi and Otis*

T = 12.22 3	and then before you leave, there is a big machine?, did you notice that?	<p>R – when she said that, which machine were you thinking of?</p> <p>O – ahh, the wrong one, I think, because the one that – when she said big machine, I was thinking of when there was a video screen with a man, and a whole lot of leaders and pulleys, and the guy was –</p> <p>R – yeah,</p> <p>O – that’s the machine that’s I thought about because . that was the biggest machine that I saw</p> <p>R – right, okay, but did that idea change: as the</p> <p>O – yes, when she mentioned later on that the machine was feeding someone, then I thought to the . um . er contraption which was about the height of a man, that they wheeled into a room</p> <p>R – ahh</p> <p>O – that they were looking at</p>
----------------	--	--

7.4 Failed introductions

Extract 7.8: *Anne and Tom*

<p>T = 15.33 10</p>	<p>A – and ah ah and Ø give the bread to the to the guy, but ah and then, ah er the owner of the store, and < . . . > <QUIET ASIDE> how </QUIET ASIDE > . . . er because <u>one woman</u> told him, ah ‘someone, s- s- ah someone steal your bread’, so er he . he and the police ran to catch – want to catch the – wanted to catch the girl,</p>	<p>R – what was your understanding there? T – um, . . . that she’d given the bread to Charlie Chaplin, then sort of run into the shop and said ‘look! HE stole the bread’ R – oh, okay, so the girl, the banana girl T – yep . . . who’d stolen the bread gave it to Charlie Chaplin . um and the shop owner knew he had some bread stolen, possibly, um and she was pointing ‘nah it was that guy’ R – okay, so she was blaming Chaplin T – yeah R – for something she did</p>
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Extract 7.9: *Kane and Racquel*

<p>T = 26.52 12</p>	<p>the beautiful lady . um want to . um /stəl/ some bread [yeh] and he just get a bread, and Ø r- run away, [@] . and a – and a <u>old lady</u> /si:d/ – ah, h- has saw- saw saw # so he just – ah she just stolen the bread,</p>	<p>Res – he mentioned ‘old lady’ there, [mm] I got the idea later on, that you hadn’t picked up initially that R – no, no, [no] so it was just a witness Res – had seen the girl still the bread</p>
<p>T = 28.50 14</p>	<p>*K – and er at this time, ah the worker has come here – come to here – oh, h- h- has come – come here, R – yep [oh] yep K – and . . . and th- the old lady told him- ah t- tol- told the worker ah < . . . > it’s the girl /stəlm/ ah their bread, . . – their bread, . R – um, the K – uh, old lady told Ø R – whose the old lady? K – ah just ah R – oh, just AN old lady K – ah yeah R – okay</p>	<p>Res – w- at that point, had you just – [mm] you thought he was, yeah . . # R – no, <u>I just hadn’t heard the first bit, [oh yeah] I probably zoned out@ [@] it’s nothing to do with his English @</u></p>

*Intervening utterances have been omitted

Bold pronouns indicate a pronoun error

Extract 7.10: *Leonie and Molly*

T = 7.32	L – err, then it, er, then on the street, a woman . who um show . showed at the first . at first, on the waterfront, who’s thro[wing banana]
12-17	<p>M – [oh yeah yeah yeah]</p> <p>L – who’s thrown banana to childrens, [mhm] she .</p> <p>M – I forgot about that <MISC> very quietly </MISC> @@</p> <p>L – she walk . . um when she walk on the street, she saw . a a car- mm . .</p> <p>M – a truck? Or .</p> <p>L – ah, it it should be a a truck, well, there – ah, . . a truck of bread?</p> <p>M – okay</p> <p>L – she’s ah – anyway, she steal ah she stole ah . loaf of bread, . a <u>woman</u> saw her, and er . Ø tell tell the ah the owner of the .</p> <p>M – the truck <MISC> quietly </MISC></p> <p>L – the the yeah, the truck,</p>

Extract 7.11: *Michael and Reuben*

T = 13.57	<p>M – looks into the baker's shop, Ø sees um a baker carrying bread into #his shop, as the baker's inside, she runs over to the truck, Ø takes one of the breads, Ø runs off, but bumps into Chaplin at the corner?, <u>lady points at her</u> and says 'look! she stole your bread' to the baker</p>	<p>Res – what was happening here? You thought at the time</p> <p>R – okay, she had . stolen some bread, . as she bumped into Charlie Chaplin, . um . . . the bak- . no no, just a second, . I think the baker had seen that someone had stolen it, and was pointing to a policeman that . she'd stolen the bread, [okay] now what happens is Charlie Chaplin says 'nah nah nah, I did it', trying to protect her,</p>
8		

Extract 7.12: *Rachel and Renee*

T = 3.56	<p>ah Charlie hold the breads, [uh-huh] and then she . ah – Charlie wants to protect her and Ø 'she's not takes – is not stolen the bread, but <i>I</i> was the one . stolen the bread' and then</p>
11	<p>R – yep</p> <p>T – suddenly <u>the police</u> CAME, and they take away Charlie and then, . ah but then the girl who saw – ah it's not a girl, I think it is the old, ## middle womans, . the one that's #sure that she wa- . stole the bread, said 'not the man but she's the one stole the bread',</p>

7.5 Miscommunication extracts relating to Chapter 7.5

The extracts in this section accompany the discussion in Chapter 7.

Extract 7.13: *Kyrah and Jim*

T = 2.29 2	<p>K – so you know where the film stop?, when um, . . . the head of the company was in his office</p> <p>J – yep, [that’s right]</p> <p>K – [and the] people came in and [introduce]</p> <p>J – [they were] going to show him . something</p> <p>K – yes, . a machine:?, so: actually to <u>him</u>, and he had to try it</p>	<p>J – when she said ‘HE had to try it’, and I was . . . who was he?, you know, obviously I knew the film was centered around . Charlie, but I thought that she was meaning that it was . th- the company director who was having to try the machine</p> <p>R – ahh-huh. Oh, so < . . > was it that you weren’t clear which one it was?, or at</p> <p>J – when she said that I thought that she was talking about the company director</p>
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Extract 7.14: *Alice and Donna*

T = 1.50 1	<p>A – ah, after you leave, the lunchtime was started, so . the Chaplin, th- the worker, . he he didn’t bring his lunchbox, and other co-workers had a lunch, [yes] and <u>the principal of that company</u>, came to – came down to the co-workers?,</p>	<p>R – when she said the principal of that company, did you have . an idea of who she meant there?</p> <p>D – mmm, could it have been that guy that we saw at the very beginning in that office?</p> <p>R – right, okay</p> <p>D – like, someone important?</p>
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Extract 7.15: *Fiona and Geoff*

T = 13.15 4	<p>and then you know the: director guy?, and he had the contraption?, that he was about to show him</p> <p><i>(Later, the hearer asks the speaker to clarify)</i></p>	<p>G – going back to the director, just quickly, um, there was another guy, that big guy in the first piece with the dark hair and the dark mo’?, I thought he could have also been a director because he was sort of telling Charlie to hurry up and get into line, so he could have been also in line for a director, and I think that’s – but . . I swayed towards that other guy in the suit,</p>
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Extract 7.16: *Kane and Racquel*

<p>T = 17.57</p> <p>1</p>	<p>K – er the title of the part two is: er lunchtime, [okay] ah and at the beginning of the: . part two ah . ah < . . . > when the factory < > when the worker < > go into th- . ah were going – going, ah going for their lunch?, [mhm] and um:, < > <u>the the manager of the worker, o-or factory</u> [yeh] and er he he ah brought a a new machine, [right] to to . er to Chaplin to the Chap- [okay] Chaplin [yep yep]</p>	<p>Res – so when he mentioned the manager, did you have a clear idea of who he meant?</p> <p>R – the: I thought it was the person who was annoying him, before, but it [okay] could it it could either mean that, or it could mean the – . . oh no, I didn't even think to ask</p> <p>Res – no, okay, yep</p> <p>R – yeah 'cause it could mean – it could mean anyone, actually</p> <p>Res – okay</p> <p>R – like that one – th- the guy who said – who kept giving directives to the man who was pulling on the</p> <p>Res – oh yeah</p> <p>R – it could be him</p> <p>Res – yep</p> <p>R – or it could be the one who was annoying him at the start</p>
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Extract 7.17: *Julia and Andrina*

<p>T = 14.45</p> <p>5</p>	<p>and um < > okay, let me recall what happened then, ah okay after that, um . they were fighting – in the midst of fighting – and in the end the colleague sat his – this colleague sat on thi: bowl of soup. Yeah, and <u>the manager</u>, after that</p>	<p>R: when she said the manager, did you have a clear idea who that was?</p> <p>A: no, no, I couldn't picture who it was</p>
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7.5.1 Vague introductions and anaphoric reference

This sub-section presents findings in which *vague introductions* became problematic under certain conditions in anaphoric reference. Vague introductions are defined here as those in which a term such as *they* or an indefinite pronoun (e.g. *somebody*) were used, and include the type of antecedent-less pronoun identified by Yule (1982) and others (discussed in Chapter 3). In the present data, vague introductions of hearer-new entities appeared to become problematic for later referent tracking. Although only two such miscommunications were identified in the present study, these appear to represent all such examples in these data.

In Extract 7.18, Vicky initially used *they* to introduce a vague plural set of characters, and then made a subsequent vague reference to this set by using the term *everybody*. Later, however, Vicky specifically referred to one member of the group – the witness – with the term *the lady*. This final reference was misinterpreted by Francesca as being coreferential with the girl.

Extract 7.18: *Vicky and Francesca*

T = 7.30 6	<p>she had an opportunity to grab a piece of bread, and she did, so <u>they</u> saw her,*</p> <p>and then . . . <u>everybody</u> was kinda come back around them, and they were like ## ‘she stole bread’ but then he goes ‘no, I did it’*</p> <p>and then <u>the lady</u>’s like ‘no no no it’s her it’s her’, so they took her away, as well.</p>	<p>F – so he got arrested because he admitted that it was him, [mhm] umm but then she would’ve felt bad, and she said ‘no, it was me’, so they just chucked her in as well,</p>
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* Intervening utterances omitted

A similar trigger of problematic reference in SLL speech appeared to occur in Extract 7.19:

Extract 7.19: *Rachel and Renee*

T = 20.51 10	<p>and then finally <u>someone</u> watch her, and <u>she</u> said ‘oh she st- stolen the . . . um the bread’*</p> <p>and then < . . . > <u>the people who – the girl who watch that she’s trying to stolen #</u>, and #says ‘she’s stoling the bread’, and then suddenly the bread was changed because of the falling down?,</p>	<p>R – well, it’s something about somebody stealing bread, and then there’s a collision, they’re struggling, I suppose and they collide, there’s a struggle, <UNCERTAIN TONE> the bread gets dropped </UNCERTAIN TONE> – somebody snatches the dropped bread – something like that*</p> <p>Res – but you don’t really know who was involved in this?</p> <p>R – well, prob- probably the girl with the bana- with the – from the banana scene, plus another woman, . . . plus . . . Charlie Chaplin and MAYBE another guy</p>
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*Intervening utterances omitted

The stimulated recall in Extract 7.19 suggests that Renee did form a mental file for a second female character, but overall there was a high degree of referential ambiguity and non-resolution, and it is not clear at what stage the introduction was successfully completed. Although an indefinite pronoun was used to introduce the witness, the introduction may have been successfully completed in

the following clause with the co-referential pronoun *she*. This appears to have clarified the reference although it may have created some uncertainty and strain. In the next reference to the witness, Rachel appeared to recognize that the witness had low accessibility, perhaps due to the vague introduction, and used a particularly descriptive and syntactically complex RE.

In summary, it appears that vague introductions of hearer-new entities become problematic if the referent is referred to subsequently.

7.5.2 Problematic introductions of trivial characters

In Extract 7.20, the SLL speaker (Steffi) introduced a minor character (the female prisoner), but this causes a minor communicative breakdown, and, in the SR interview, Otis reported some trouble in accommodating this new character.

Extract 7.20: *Steffi and Otis*

T = 25.38 14	S – and er Charlie um . was . um keep sitting down – ah sitting on the lap of the – of a fat lady, @and @ O – fat lady? S – yeah, because there are – there was a fat lady sat on [okay] the
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One possible interpretation is that Otis initially interpreted the introduction as an anaphoric reference to a character that he was unable to identify. However, given Otis’s comments, it appears more likely that he had attached more referential significance to this *trivial character* (see Chafe, 1994, pp. 88-91) than Steffi had intended to convey, and thus become confused by this character’s role in the narrative. Thus it may be that Steffi had trouble signalling triviality in the introduction of this new character. It is notable that Steffi was the only SLL speaker to introduce this character, compared to 4 of the 10 L1 speakers. It is not immediately clear how the L1 speakers clarify this triviality, but it may be related to the use of indefinite *this* (two speakers). An important factor may also be related to the clause structure used by the SLL speaker, in which *the lap of the* precedes *a fat lady*. This perhaps gives undue prominence to *lap*, suggesting that the lady is identifiable in the context.

7.6 Referent tracking

This section presents extracts and further discussion relating to miscommunicated acts of referent tracking.

7.6.1 Under-explicit reference

The following two miscommunications appear to have been triggered by under-explicitness. In Extract 7.21, it is unclear whether the miscommunication occurred at point (1) or point (2), but both involve under-explicitness:

Extract 7.21: *Fiona and Geoff*

T = 11.32	there was that really big guy standing next to him?, in the, in the thing, and he put his soup out in a bowl, and then Charlie Chaplin was like sitting next to the bowl, and <u>he</u> asked <u>him</u> to pass it to <u>him</u> , but because <u>he</u> was . . . like, you know how <u>he</u> was shaking?, [yeah] after@ yeah, so <u>he</u> picked up the bowl and Ø started shaking and the soup went everywhere,
3	

The first pronoun underlined (1) was under-explicit (D2 for the speaker-intended referent, which is the colleague, compared to D6 for Charlie). If, however, the breakdown did not occur at that point, then it appears to have occurred at position (2), where the speaker-intended referent (Charlie) had accessibility Degree 4 compared to the colleague's accessibility of D6.

In Extract 7.22, the first underlined pronoun was intended to refer to Charlie, but Charlie (D4) had lower accessibility than the policeman (D5). The resulting miscommunication is revealed in Extract 7.23.

Extract 7.22: *Lillian and Astrid*

T = 8.20	L – Charlie . . . Charlie wakes her up because she's unconscious, and then the police officer that's lying next to them wakes up, and then <u>he hits him in the head with his banger</u> , and then the police guy knocks out again	A – Um, < . . . > they're unconscious or something and the policeman wakes up, and wants to wake them up, so he hits them over the head with his little pole or . R – okay, policeman hits them? A – yeah
14		

Extract 7.23: *Astrid SR*

T = 21.36	A – ahh, okay, [[SURPRISED TONE]] I thought she said HE got his little pole thingy and knocked THEM out [mm] or something,
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7.6.2 Over-explicit reference

The miscommunication presented in Extract 7.24 is discussed in Chapter 7.

Extract 7.25 provides evidence from the stimulated recall that a miscommunication had occurred.

Extract 7.24: *Kate and Nina*

T = 0.18 1	<p>K – that machine into the office?, and in the next part it shows Charlie and <u>that other guy</u> . still doing . . whatever’s [@] happening on the conveyor belt, that . #I #don-, that twisting thing [‘eah] and then . it comes up that it’s lunch time?, and so the conveyor belt slows down. And then, so they’re kinda having a rest, and then Charlie’s ticking?, you know how he was ticking ‘cause he’s going [like this] ((TWITCHING GESTURE))</p> <p>N – [aw yeah]</p> <p>K – he’s like ((TWITCHING GESTURE))</p> <p>N – [aw yeah]</p> <p>K – he’s like ((TWITCHING GESTURE)) . . anyway, and then <u>the OTHER guy that he’s working with</u>, he go- – oh no, Charlie goes away, [mm] and then <u>the other guy</u> pulls out his flask, . and Ø pours his soup into a bowl that he leaves . on one side of the bench?, [yep] and then Charlie comes back and he’s almost going to sit on it, and then the guy . kind of warns him, ‘that’s my lunch, don’t sit on it’, so Charlie picks it up and he’s ticking away, and he like shaking it, and it . he tips it on <u>the guy – the other guy</u>, [yeah] and then the guy gets kinda angry, Ø puts it down, . on the seat beside him, and then the o- the guy sits on it, Ø sits on his own lunch.</p>
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Extract 7.25: *SR with Nina*

SR 28.25	<p>N – Oh it’s <i>his</i> soup, ok, I got that part mixed up,</p> <p>R – Aw, you thought it was .</p> <p>N – I thought it was the other guy</p> <p>R – Aw, okay</p> <p>N – the one he was sharing his shift with</p>
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One further, possible, example of an over-explicit RE resulting in miscommunication is presented in Extract 7.26, with evidence of the

communicative outcome presented in Extract 7.27. This miscommunication is discussed in Chapter 7.

Extract 7.26: *Michael and Reuben*

T = 0.48 1-2	M – Chaplin came in, Ø started . um winding his nuts again?, and as the machine left off, he obviously got up and had #the twitchy motions going on and Ø couldn't control himself properly, um <u>his workmate</u> . poured a plate of soup, um @@ <u>Ch- Chaplin nearly</u> sits in it, <u>he</u> gets up again, um Ø gets the plate again obviously Ø still going with the twitchy motion, Ø #hands #him #over the plate of soup, Ø spills it everywhere.
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Extract 7.27: *SR Reuben*

T = 20.07	<p>((<i>Charlie spills his colleague's soup</i>))</p> <p>R – oh, <SURPRISED> . . . okay . . .</p> <p>Res – comment?</p> <p>R – that's interesting, 'cause he said he spilt a bowl of soup on HIM, so I thought the workmate had got angry and spilt it on .</p> <p>Res – on?</p> <p>R – on Charlie</p>
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Extract 7.28 is also discussed in Chapter 7 and as presented here in greater contextual detail and with the relevant comments from the stimulated recall interview.

Extract 7.28: *Anne and Tom*

T = 15.33 10	<p>A – first, er the girl is . alo- alone, and she felt [[target: felt]] very hungry, and er, she saw a . a <quiet aside> how to make </quiet aside> er, a store, . some some bread, so they- so she stole a bread, and then Ø run away, but er she hate [[target: hit]] the . the small guy, and ah ah and Ø give the bread to the to the guy, but ah and then, ah er the owner of the store, and < . . . > <QUIET ASIDE> how </QUIET ASIDE> . . . er because <u>one woman</u> told him, ah 'someone, s- s- ah someone steal your bread', so er he . he and the police ran to catch – want to catch the – wanted to catch the girl,</p>	<p>R – what was your understanding there?</p> <p>T – um, . . . that she'd given the bread to Charlie Chaplin, then sort of run into the shop and said 'look! HE stole the bread'</p> <p>R – oh, okay, so the girl, the banana girl</p> <p>T – yep . . . who'd stolen the bread gave it to Charlie Chaplin . um and the shop owner knew he had some bread stolen, possibly, um and she was pointing 'nah it was that guy'</p> <p>R – okay, so she was blaming Chaplin</p> <p>T – yeah</p> <p>R – for something she did</p>
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7.6.3 Pronoun errors

The following extract contains an error and successful outcome that is very similar to the first example presented in the corresponding subsection in Chapter 7. The relevant lexical relation in this extract is between *stolen* and *steal*.

Extract 7.29: *Bruce and Seth*

T = 3.03 8-10	<p>B – and then, you know, you remember the lady, in the first part in movie?</p> <p>S – . Yep</p> <p>B – She: . stolen the:</p> <p>S – the banana one</p> <p>B – banana [yeah]</p> <p>S – [yeah]</p> <p>B – and she come a- come again- c- come out again, an- in a . br- bread shop something</p> <p>S – Mmhm</p> <p>B – and <u>he</u> stole a loaf of ah bread and Ø run away, an- . and Ø f- fall over with er Charlie?</p>	<p>R – Okay, tell me what you understood at the time</p> <p>S – Okay, umm . the banana lady has come back, she’s gone into a bakery stolen a loaf, and Charlie was following her</p>
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Extract 7.30 is discussed in Chapter 7 and reproduced here with a longer excerpt from the stimulated recall interview.

Extract 7.30: *Kyrah and Jim*

T = 15.31 9	<p>K – Charlie tells her to escape and he will stay there with the policeman?, but she convinces Charlie to come with her – him, . and yeah, Ø both escape,</p>	<p>J – what I did note, as something interesting, was . that she had . . . in saying that . um . . . she convinced Charlie to go . with her, and then she mistakenly corrects herself to say ‘she convinces Charlie . to go with ‘her I mean him’</p> <p>R – uh-huh</p> <p>J – which is something that I . thought was interesting</p> <p>R – but so, she said it RIGHT,</p> <p>J – and then . . .</p> <p>R – she-</p> <p>J – mistakenly corrected herself</p> <p>R – yeah, it never entered your head that it . that it might be some other him?</p> <p>J – no</p>
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Extract 7.31: *Rachel and Renee*

<p>T = 20.51 10</p>	<p>T – and then she’s kind of, . I think she’s a BEGGAR, or a homeless, something like that?, and she’s looking outside of the bread – where people the – bak- the bakery?, and um . she’s looking at the bread, and she want</p> <p>R – looking at the?</p> <p>T – the the window?, out- outside the windows, and then [okay] suddenly a man carry a lot of . ah a lot of ah bread, and then <u>he</u> stolen the bread, and then finally someone watch her, and she said ‘oh <u>she</u> st- stolen the . um the bread’, but then when she wants to run away with the bread and then accidentally see . . /kræs/ [[TARGET: #CRASH]] or ### Charlie:?</p> <p>R – Charlie Chaplin?</p> <p>T – Charlie Chaplin@, and then they fall down and then, the the man the owner of the bread say that, and then < . . > the people who – the girl who watch that she’s trying to stolen #, and #says ‘she’s stoling the bread’, and then suddenly the bread was changed because of the falling down?,</p>	<p>R – I’m thinking it now, and I think I was thinking it earlier as well like, <u>the pronouns she’s getting – the hes and the shes – getting a bit confused here, so that’s why I wasn’t sure how many people were involved in this . [oh, okay] incident she was describing,</u> [okay] and wh- what the man – who the man was and how he came into it</p> <p>Res – right</p> <p>R – because really, the only one that . that has been mentioned BEFORE, was the girl from the banana scene</p> <p>Res – right</p> <p>R – so that’s the only one I can actually visualize?</p> <p>Res – okay, do you remember – did you have an idea of what they were doing? Or was it</p> <p>R – <u>well, it’s something about somebody stealing bread, and then there’s a collision, they’re struggling, I suppose and they collide, there’s a struggle, <UNCERTAIN TONE> the bread gets dropped </UNCERTAIN TONE> – somebody snatches the dropped bread – something like that</u></p> <p>Res – okay, okay, so s-</p> <p>R – Charlie Chaplin’s there, he <QUIET ASIDE> what does he? </QUIET ASIDE> snatches the bread or, I can’t remember</p> <p>Res – okay</p> <p>R – but there’s obviously a struggle</p> <p>Res – but you don’t really know who was involved in this?</p> <p>R – well, prob- probably the girl with the bana- with the – from the banana scene, plus another woman, . . plus . . Charlie Chaplin and MAYBE another guy</p> <p>Res – right, but who does what [is not really clear?]</p> <p>R – [isn’t clear, its] not clear, yeah</p>
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7.6.4 Direct and indirect speech

The examples of miscommunication discussed in Chapter 7 are presented here in greater contextual detail and with evidence from the stimulated recall interview.

Extract 7.32: *Vicky and Francesca*

<p>T = 7.30 6</p>	<p>V – but then he goes ‘no, I did it’ and – ‘cause he had the bread, cause he liked her I guess, [@] and he got chucked in the old, um paddy wagon . . and then <u>the lady’s like ‘no no no it’s her it’s her’</u>, so they took her away, as well. All the time like he just looked so funny, ya know, funny stuff’s</p>	<p>F – [so he] got – so he got arrested because he admitted that it was him, [mhm] umm but then she would’ve felt bad, and she said ‘no, it was me’, so they just chucked her in as well, not not one of them, they just grabbed both of them</p>
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Extract 7.33: *Lillian and Astrid*

<p>T = 6.34 10</p>	<p>L – Charlie grabs the loaf of bread, the police come, and the guy that owns the bread came running up, and <u>this lady said like ‘the chick stole it’</u> but Charlie Chapman said he stole it, so the police took Charlie,</p>	<p>A – um, so the woman had it, and then Charlie took it, and then – R – that’s the woman throwing the bananas? A – yeah, [yep] and then um Charlie told the police that he stole it, so took blame, and then she said, apparently, it wasn’t him, it was her. R – right. A – I think that’s what she was saying.</p>
<p>T = 7.02 11</p>	<p>L – <u>and then the chick said to the police ‘no: it was the chick’</u>, so Charlie gets put into the police car, and then</p>	<p>R – so ‘the chick said it was the chick’, so A – yeah, I was like ‘oh, ok’ @ R – so, so, so did you interpret it to be that she was owning up to it – I did it – or that someone else said ‘no, she did it’? A – I was guessing that it was her owning up to it, taking blame</p>

The third instance of miscommunication resulting from apparent confusion over direct or indirect speech, involves an SLL-L1 pair. This case is interesting because the speaker did appear to use lexical means (*woman* and *girl*) to clearly distinguish the two characters:

Extract 7.34: *Michael and Reuben*

<p>T = 2.40 10</p>	<p>M – Chaplin says ‘no no it was me who stole the bread’, ‘cause as < . . > as they collided he got the bread off her basically, Ø pulls out the bread, ‘no it was me’, um HE gets taken away, <u>the woman says to the baker ‘no no it was definitely the girl’</u></p>
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However, as reported in Subsection 7.54, the hearer (Reuben) formed no mental image of a witness (Extract 7.35), and this appears to be due to Michael using a bare noun (*lady*) to initially introduce this witness. Therefore, with no other pre-existing female character in his mental model of the discourse, Reuben appears to

have assumed that the RE was co-referential with the girl. This occurs despite the relatively overt signals of direct speech.

Extract 7.35: *SR Reuben*

T = 26.27	<p>R – mmhm, and somehow she'll be running back to the police and saying 'no no it was me'</p> <p>Res – ahh</p> <p>R – because she realises he was so kind and she can't let him</p> <p>Res – ahhh that's what you thought happened?, she owned up</p> <p>R – mmm</p> <p>Res – to – ah, okay</p> <p>R – that's MY take on what happened, [right] I guess we'll find out in a minute</p>
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7.6.5 Lexical differentiation

A crucial aspect of referential success is the selection of appropriate semantic content in a referring expression. However, in the present data, lexical errors were seldom implicated as a factor in triggering miscommunication, with perhaps the use of *principal* to refer to the boss being the only exception (Example 7.6, Subsection 7.5.2).

However, lexis does appear to play an important role in helping to maintain a distinction between matching referents across stretches of discourse. This is perhaps best illustrated through analysis of the lexical means by which speakers distinguished the girl and the witness. Management of the switches between these characters appeared important for successful communication, yet was problematic on a number of occasions.

In all of the recounts, the girl was introduced first, and in nearly all cases, she was established as a hearer-known (Level I) character. The speaker had then to introduce the witness as a new character, and in subsequent utterances distinguish between her and the girl. Importantly, both characters could only be referred to by description rather than a name. However, the head words in most descriptions (*girl, woman, lady*) were used for both characters in these data, and it was, therefore, of interest to observe how individual speakers used these terms.

The most obvious descriptively-relevant difference between the girl and the witness is their respective ages. Several viewers estimated the girl's age to be between 17 and 20, while the witness is perhaps between 45 and 50. Thus the term *girl*, which in most contexts is semantically marked for youth, was most frequently used to refer to the former. Conversely, the terms *woman* and *lady* are semantically marked for adult, and, indeed, speakers tended to use these terms for the witness. More subjectively, several participants commented on the beauty of the girl, and some speakers used this feature to distinguish her from the witness. Indicators of socio-economic status also distinguish the characters, with the girl being barefoot and apparently homeless, while the witness is well-dressed. This could be a factor in the use of *lady* to describe the witness, reflecting an archaic yet well-known use of this term. In short, there appear to be a number of reasonable grounds on which to make a semantic distinction in the REs used for the girl and for the witness.

Analysis reveals that in most cases, the main female characters were referred to using one of four lexical items: *girl*, *woman*, *lady* or *witness*, with terms such as *chick* and *passerby* confined to one or two narratives each. Most speakers maintained a distinction between the girl and the witness by tending to reserve the head noun *girl* to refer to the girl, and *woman* or *lady* to refer to the witness. However, this pattern was slightly clearer in the SLL data than in the L1 data, with four L1 speakers rigidly maintaining a distinction between the REs used for the two characters, compared to 11 of the SLL speakers. Whether or not the strict maintenance of a distinction between the head nouns was a (conscious) strategy, it did seem to assist the hearer's role in distinguishing the characters.

When analysing examples of miscommunication involving these characters, a lack of lexical differentiation often becomes apparent. For instance, an important factor in the L1-L1 miscommunication presented in the main text as Example 7.2.3, appears to be the lack of lexical differentiation in the passage "*the chick₁ said to the police 'no: it was the chick₂'*". The speaker originally introduced both the girl and the witness with the head noun *lady*, but all subsequent full references to the girl were with the expression *the chick*, which was used five times. Perhaps

confusingly, the speaker then also referred to the witness as *the chick*. It seems very probable that this lack of differentiation in head nouns triggered the miscommunication. Lack of lexical differentiation between these two characters also became problematic in one case where both characters were referred to as *the woman* (Extract 7.36).

Extract 7.36: *Sabrina and April*

T = 21.01 16	S – she’s in trouble, he said ‘I’m, I’m did that, she doesn’t di- di- didn’t anything’? And the police take – took Charlie, and <u>the OTHER woman she₂</u> still insist, and <u>she₂</u> say ‘no, <u>that woman she₁</u> steal it, not that person’?, an’ the police take him in the, in the car, to the police to get to the police station? And they got also <u>the woman₁</u> , um both now, he he’s start to /nek/ [[TARGET: #MAKE]] <u>her₁</u> remember? He said ‘I’m the man the bread, Charlie’, he said that for <u>the woman₁</u> ,	J – that bit there? That was A – that was I’m guessing Charlie talking to the witness saying it was ME maybe, or maybe the cop J – oh, okay A – I would say – I mean it’s Charlie talking again, um [yeah] I would say he was saying ‘no, no it was me it, wasn’t her’ J – ahhh, telling this to the cop, yeah . you weren’t completely sure who [##] A – whether – well watching it just then I’m not sure whether or not she’s talking about the woman or to the cop – I’m assuming she’s talking to the cop, as . the woman has already said ‘no no’ J – at the time A – then at the time they’ve got him – um . at the time I thought he was talking to the cop? J – yep A – listening to it now, I’m thinking maybe, I dunno, I’m not sure J – yep, okay A – but they’re already in the car at this stage, is – I’m guessing they’re already in the car at this stage [yeah] – or he’s already in the car [uh-huh] so my assumption would be he’s talking to the cop
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To summarise, it appears that lexical differentiation between referents is both an effective strategy for minimizing miscommunication and occasionally a genuine trigger of miscommunication. In these data, there was also a suggestion that such differentiation may be more frequently maintained by the SLL participants, such that it may be a successful feature of SLL reference. It is unclear whether this was a deliberate strategy, or whether it arose inadvertently as a consequence of attention to lexical correctness, where an effort was made not to over-extend the

semantic range of lexical item. In other contexts, however, a lack of lexical resources may preclude this strategy.

Interestingly, however, it appears that the L1 interlocutors were not always sensitive to lexical differentiation. For instance, in the narrative preceding the miscommunication presented in the main text as Example 7.2.2, the speaker always referred to the girl using expressions such as *the homeless girl* or *the urchin girl*, yet when she used the term *the lady* (to refer to the witness), the hearer misinterpreted this as co-referential with the girl. In short, then, lexical differentiation appears to be an effective strategy, yet far from failsafe.

7.7 Other factors implicated in triggering miscommunication

The extracts in this section relate to issues discussed in Chapter 7.7 and are sub-categorized according to the feature to be highlighted.

Pronunciation

Extract 7.37: *Josie and Rochelle*

T = 13.55 5	<p>J – yeah, so, and part one you . ah you, the end is like ah, Charlie Chaplin just make something in the factory, right?</p> <p>R – mhm</p> <p>J – do you know what happens? @@</p> <p>R – ahh, . no</p> <p>J – yes, so Charlie Chaplin and to finish the- his work in the factory?,</p> <p>R – mhm</p> <p>J – and er in part one, and did you – d- do you know, er, did you see the ah #acompling?, ah . . er Ø push a kind of machine? [yeah] in the office?</p>	<p>Res – so she introduced a, um . she mentioned this</p> <p>R – machine, I didn't even hear what she said, I kept hearing 'masher' for the first few times, I thought 'oh machine'</p> <p>Res – oh@ okay@, yeah, yeah</p> <p>R – so that when I said yeah, I was thinking #about masher, um yeah</p> <p>Res – oh okay, but you knew what she meant?</p> <p>R – I knew what she meant sort of, I I had had a vague idea, but because I didn't know if she was saying mash – I kept thinking she was saying masher? [okay] < . . > but I saw a machine in my mind,</p> <p>Res – okay</p> <p>R – but I figured that was maybe at the purpose, where she said – when I heard 'mash' I thought that must be the machine's purpose, but I didn't actually hear her say machine</p>
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		<p>Res – ahhh oh you thought it was like a MASHer [yeah] kind of</p> <p>R – and then when she started explaining how the- how it started feeding food, I was like ‘OH yeah she said machine, right’</p>
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Extract 7.38 presents initial evidence of miscommunication through comments made by the hearer prior to the stimulated recall interview. Extract 7.39 then presents the relevant excerpt from the retelling and the accompanying comment from the stimulated recall interview:

Extract 7.38: *SR Molly*

	<p>M – there was only one bit where I got a bit confused</p> <p>R – oh, okay, what was:</p> <p>M – when she: was talking about the first woman and the second woman, I didn’t really get where the second woman came from</p> <p>R – oh, okay</p> <p>M – for a minute I thought that it was the woman the owner of the TRUCK, but then that didn’t seem very likely for that time, so I figured she was just like a bystander who was a witness to it</p> <p>R – uh-huh, okay</p>
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Extract 7.39: *Leonie and Molly*

T = 33.23 16	<p>L – she steal ah she stole ah . loaf of bread, . <u>a woman saw her</u>, and er . Ø tell tell the ah the owner of the .</p>	<p>M – I thought no I thought that there was only one woman</p> <p>R – yeah</p> <p>M – yeah, I THINK probably when she said ‘a woman saw her’ I thought maybe she was repeating ‘a woman STOLE’ or something</p> <p>R – ah, okay</p> <p>M – I didn’t cotton on at first that were two women and it wasn’t until she said something about . the second woman and I thought ‘eh?, who</p>
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Extract 7.40 presents further evidence of miscommunication triggered by a pronunciation error.

Extract 7.40: *Steffi and Otis*

<p>T = 13.35 4</p>	<p>for um . . ah feeding people . . meal, and er um Charlie was the man, ah selected from his colleagues to . um um to test the machine, whether it [uh-huh] the machines ah works well or not, and the:, the machine starts very well, um feed <u>the Charl</u> with um: . cakes?, [mm] and there is a little ah digit help Charlie to mop the mouth,</p>	<p>R – what was your understanding of the the function of this machine? O – yeah, I was quite confused when she said the word ‘feed’, ‘cause I couldn’t . exactly guess how it was feeding <u>the child</u>, because . I thought maybe it was R – was it a child you said? O – yep she said – I thought she said child [okay] so then I thought she was talking about it feeding the child* <u>R – uh-huh, okay, okay, interesting. And that child, was – so that was a NEW kind of character maybe, that’d</u> <u>O – yeah, she jumped from Charlie to the child, so</u> <u>R – yeah, okay, okay</u></p>
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*Intervening comments have been omitted

Disfluency

Extract 7.41: *Alice and Donna*

<p>T = 12.16 8</p>	<p>A – covered her, like Ø ‘that, that’s not . – she’s not stoled, I did’, like that, and the . Chaplin was caught by police, and . . . that situation that <u>the ladies – the ladies and the < . . > the ladies</u> just told police, that ‘it’s not HIM, it’s the LADY – the poor girl – stole that bread’, and both of them caught by police, and finally they just moved, er they . ah moved to the police station by the . police car something?,</p>	<p>D – okay, um . police got Chaplin, [okay] and <u>the lady – I’m not sure if it’s the lady that saw or the lady that owned the bakery, one of those ladies said</u> ‘hey, it wasn’t Chaplin, it was the lady’</p>
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Extract 7.42: *Albert and Marg*

<p>T = 14.12 11</p>	<p>A – she stole thee: bread from: the shop?, and like . . a- another woman . saw that . she w- she stole it?, M – Mmhmm A – and Ø tell the policeman?, . ana- . yeah, . an a policeman they: owner of the shop? And she: . whe:n thee girl who stole the bread?, ran ah- ran away, she: like . . . crash with Charlie Chapman, M – ah</p>	<p>M – now I wasn’t sure quite what he said then, so I was sorta thinking okay: lets hear the next bit and maybe I’ll figure it out R – right, okay. He mentioned an owner of the shop, that was the: M – I don’t think it was the woman. That called the police. R – no. Right. M – I didn’t think, but I wasn’t quite sure at that stage because I didn’t quite catch what he said.</p>
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Event sequencing

Extract 7.43: Bruce and Steven

<p>T = 24.07 13</p>	<p>B – So, . maybe they go to tell the police again, [mhm] so the lady didn't . get escaped, so she was actually arrest again, by p-ah police. So, mm, Charlie was . arrested and so they, I think they got a van an- on the way to: . probably jail or something, [mhm] and halfway they . they pick up <u>the the lady</u>, from halfway. And they meet again, .</p>	<p>R – So at that point S – . . . yeah, I think initially at that point I wasn't really sure what was going on. Um, obviously they've been arrested, but I couldn't quite work out what was going on. R – Right. Now when he said that they picked up the lady halfway, [yeh] . you were thinking that was the banana lady? S – Well yeah, I thought it might've been the banana lady, because he said that – or MAYbe that was because he'd said that . um . she's tried to escape but got caught,</p>
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Morphological error

In Extract 7.44, the speaker failed to successfully introduce the feeding machine despite using the strategies identified in Chapter 7.5 as generally being successful. One factor in this may be the morphological error in the key verb bring/brought. There is evidence that this has been misunderstood by the hearer, as the entities that she identified are large, fixed, stationary machines that are incapable of being brought anywhere.

Extract 7.44: Sabrina and April

<p>T = 10.23 1</p>	<p>S – okay, I will start talk about part two, of the movie? A – mmhmm S – so, you know at the last part, we see together, #when they #<u>bringed</u> the machine?</p>	<p>J – when she said the machine, did you have a clear idea A – when she said the machine, I thought of two machines obviously, the first one with the big buttons and the levers, . J – yep A – and the second one was the one where they were doing the whole [[gesture]] J – yeah [okay]</p>
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7.8 Generic reference

In this example, a specific reference to the feeding machine was interpreted as generic reference. The initial trigger appears to be the use of a bare noun.

Extract 7.45: *Rachel and Renee*

T = 0.57 1-3	T – umm we stop at the first part, #where [[TARGET: #WITH]] we have a man, there . #think were three or four men, they came to meet the boss?, [yeh] and they tried to promote like, <u>new machine</u> , to the boss – like people that have to EAT, like didn't have to eat your – #where [[TARGET: #WITH]] your #spoon, like did you th- all the machine feeds you and things like that.
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7.9 Repair and clarification as a discourse troublespot

Extract 7.46 is discussed in Chapter 7, reproduced here in greater contextual detail and with the relevant comments from the stimulated recall interview.

Extract 7.46: *Kane and Racquel*

T = 26.10 10	<p>K – Ø [w- w- walking] on the street, ah when when the beautiful lady . mm, . oh, he – she is very . ah hangry, .</p> <p>R – hungry?</p> <p>K – uh uh HUNGry, [oh] hungry, he wa- he was very hungry, and er .</p> <p>R – SHE, or HE?</p> <p>K – she sh- sh- she, er . mm . he he he just walking . . < . . > a bread shop, bread shop [yeh], h- he see a – he saw a bread shop, um, and the the worker, just . . mm put the bread er, . out of the car,</p>	<p>Res – was this still Chaplin?, whose in the bread shop?</p> <p>R – no, Charlie Chapman's working – walking towards the bread shop, and the worker's unloading bread in the shop</p>
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*Pronoun errors are in bold

The following extract reveals a lengthy passage of clarification and negotiation over the identity of a referent. The stimulated recall interview that follows in Extract 7.48 reveals that miscommunication occurred.

Extract 7.47: *Fiona and Geoff*

T = 16.01 5-6-7	<p>F – and then of course it wouldn't work, 'cause trying to – a contraption putting a um a plate up to your mouth, and pouring it into your mouth, is never @really @gonna @work@,</p> <p>G – so it – so um, just to re-cap this little bit, [yep] . so um, . . they're having lunch, and the big guy that that in the last scene that I saw because [yeah] there were two big guys ay?, [yeh] that first . um . the first I think he had a dark hair,</p>
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	<p>and a and a dark moustache, not that guy in the lunch,</p> <p>F – no</p> <p>G – it was the second guy, the last guy</p> <p>F – yeah, no the big</p> <p>G – before I left, he was sort of balding, little bit, sort of [yeh] fairer [yeh] so he – so he – they were having and then Charlie lost soup all over him,</p> <p>F – yep, lost the guy’s soup</p> <p>G – oh, lost HIS soup [yeah] and so they were getting a bit agitated with each other, then the big boss man with the lunch like – [yep] contraption had a device [yep] that could feed you while you're working at the same time? [yeah] okay, cool.</p> <p>F – but it kind of all failed. [Okay] and it kind of went everywhere and . it was sort of a comedy sketch,</p>
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Extract 7.48: *SR Geoff*

T = 30.59	<p>G – so this is a different big guy that I'm – this is – this is the start of the – from when I left, was it?</p> <p>Res – yeah</p> <p>G – see that – this is a different big guy,</p> <p>Res – right, yeah, you were thinking of the baldy guy [was it?]</p> <p>G – [yeah], because when I left, there was a different guy, this is the first original big guy,</p>
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8 Appendix to Chapter 8: Discussion of the nature of reference

8.1 Reference and noun phrase types: Definiteness and indefiniteness

Also supporting the pragmatic distinction between referential/non-referential is the well-known correlation between these concepts and the linguistic distinction of definiteness/indefiniteness. In particular, analysis of the present data supports the widely held view that indefinite NPs are almost invariably used non-referentially. The archetypal marker of indefiniteness is the indefinite article, and in the present L1 data there were 149 uses of *a/an*, with only 2 of these appearing to be possibly referential. In both of these cases the speaker was making a subsequent reference to an entity already within the current discourse, and so these were coded as referential. However, it could be that they were performance errors, or that (for an unknown reason) the speaker chose to reintroduce the entity as being hearer-new. The present data therefore support the view (e.g. Ariel, 1990; Bach, 2008; Carlson, 2004; Lycan, 2000) that the canonical uses of indefinite NPs (*a/an* and indefinite article-like uses of *some* and *this*) are non-referential. They are non-referential in the sense that they do not prompt the hearer to attempt identification of the referent, and, as claimed elsewhere (e.g. Bach, 2008), exceptions are very rare.

Conversely, definite NP's are closely associated with the pragmatic notion of reference. In particular, it is widely accepted that the canonical use of names is referential, with non-referential uses being relatively infrequent, and largely confined to talk about names (e.g. *Jack was the most popular boy's name last year*). In the present data, the only use of a name that was identified as being arguably non-referential is the one presented in Extract 8.1, where the speaker appears to be speaking of a type of action or sequence of events associated with Chaplin movies, rather than about Charlie. However, even in this case it may be argued that the larger NP constituent is best understood as having an embedded reference to Charlie.

Extract 8.1: *Shelley and Jenny*

T = 7.57 22-23-24	and so Charlie Chaplin's on the police thing in the back of the police truck, and he's just doing something funny – I don't know, sitting . . . <QUIET ASIDE> or something < QUIET ASIDE > oh that's right, he's like falling onto this big lady, . . . you know, just <u>this same Charlie Chaplin thing</u> , . . . and then the girl gets put on to the police truck as well,
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However, although names and indefinite NPs appear to correlate strongly with referential and non-referential respectively, as expected, evidence in the present data demonstrates a somewhat weaker correlation between the concept of reference and uses of the definite article. Of the 552 uses of *the* in the L1 data, 446 (80.8%) were referential. Non-referential uses in the data included expressions of time (e.g. *the same time*; *the lunch break*), location (e.g. *the ground*; *at the back*), events (e.g. *the incident*; *the accident*), attributes and roles (e.g. *being the gentleman*; *to be the guinea pig*), generic entities (e.g. *they try to take her to the cops*), numerical order (e.g. *the first*; *the next one*), equative constructions (e.g. *she's the one*), and other non-referential uses (e.g. *the purpose*; *the expression on his face*).

To summarize, although the linguistic concept of definiteness/indefiniteness is not to be considered a grammaticalization of the pragmatic notion of referential/non-referential, there are strong correlations between some NP types and the referential/non-referential distinction. In the present data, there is seen to be a particularly strong correlation between indefinite NPs (*a*, *this* and *some*) and non-reference, and also between names and reference.

8.2 Referentiality and *they*

One type of RE that is frequently used in these data with apparently low referentiality is the vague or antecedentless use of *they* identified by Yule (1982) and others (see Chapter 3), as presented in Extract 8.2:

Extract 8.2: *Kath and Nikita*

T = 00.00 1-4	the Charlie Chapman character went away, and Ø got < . > his lunch, Ø almost sat in the soup?, and then um there was that big machine?, towards the end of [yep] the first part?, <u>they</u> bought that in with a whole heap of kind of older men, and <u>they</u> chose the Charlie Chapman guy
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Here, the first *they* has no antecedent. Without prior knowledge of this scene, it would be uncertain who the pronoun refers to, although a logical (and correct) assumption based on the hearer's knowledge of *Part One* would be that it is the inventor and the boss. The antecedent of the second *they* would probably be interpreted as co-referential with the first *they*. Unlike many of the examples discussed in other works (e.g. Jucker, Smith, & Lüdge, 2003; Yule, 1982), examples such as this involve hearer-known referents in a context where there seems to be a strong preference for a particular interpretation.

It also became apparent very early in the coding process that *it* was frequently ambiguous, particularly in the episodes relating to the feeding machine. For example, Extract 8.3 includes two uses of *it* which (although they have antecedents) appear to be ambiguous without knowledge of the film (e.g. did the corn break during the malfunction or did the machine break?). However, there is no indication that this was communicatively problematic (see also examples in Jucker et al., 2003, p. 1744).

Extract 8.3: *Lillian and Astrid*

5-6	L – it had little gadgets that would make him eat, Ø made him . yep, drink. And then there was a corn cob, and the corn cob was spinning around and then <u>it</u> broke, like the machine went out of control and Charlie Chapman couldn't keep up with the machine, and then the machine like blew up, and then <u>it</u> went to dessert
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The point is that even if pronouns have referents, some do not require resolution in order to understand the speaker's main purpose of clarifying what is predicated on the RE (see Yule, 1982).

A further example of a fuller RE (cited in Chapter 8) with low referentiality is Extract 8.4:

Extract 8.4: *Shelley and Jenny*

T = 1.22 1	S – [and there] was like a play of like <u>his workmate</u> like having hot soup and stuff, and it ah [was just – you know] J – [in like canteen, or] what?
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8.3 Clarification requests as interruptions

These examples illustrate a point made in Chapter 8, in which it was argued that frequent clarification requests can be a source of annoyance for the speaker. In the interaction between Shelley and Jenny, such requests were frequent and a distinct sense of annoyance was detected in the extract presented in Extract 8.5, particularly through Shelley’s tone over her last two turns:

Extract 8.5: *Shelley and Jenny*

T = 3.56 9b	S – it would rotate to the next plate J – [oh cool] S – [to the next] course J – so the tables rotating? and S – wait, okay, it [starts off with] J – [###] S – right let me finish@, J – @alright
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A further example occurred in Extract 8.6, where Shelley’s apparent annoyance is prefaced with “I told you”:

Extract 8.6: *Shelley and Jenny*

T = 9.57 26-27	S – Charlie Chaplin, the banana girl and the poh-poh at the back?, fell out of the truck J – the Charlie Chaplin @, the banana girl, and the poh-poh? S – yeah, Ø FELL out of the back of the truck J – when did the poh-poh come into it S – I told you, the policeman was standing at the back of the truck, J – oh yeah S – yeh sorry, policeman.
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8.4 Referentiality and vagueness

In this subsection, the concept of referentiality is distinguished from the concept of (referential) vagueness that was discussed in Chapter 2. The major work relating to vague language is by Channell (1994), but little of this work (outside of *placeholder* words such as *thingy* and *whatchamacallit*) relates to reference (although issues relating to denotation are discussed). Of more interest to the present study is Jucker et al. (2003), where some vague uses of pronouns are discussed. Jucker et al. argue that speakers strategically use vague expressions to focus the hearer's attention on what is predicated of a referent rather than the precise identity of the referent. This conclusion is similar to the one reached by Yule (1982) in relation to similar uses of pronouns, and the present study draws on these perspectives in explaining limited and partial referentiality.

However, the concept of limited referentiality is not to be confused with vagueness. Vagueness appears to relate to the degree of specification, or richness of description, presented by the speaker in relation to context and context. Thus, Jucker et al. (pp. 1743-1744) discuss passages in which *it* is used in relation to a shifting range of entities, and which are vague in the sense of being semantically and syntactically under-determined, even though "it can safely be assumed that the addressee had no difficulties" in interpreting the expression. Similarly, Jucker et al. discuss antecedent-less uses of *they* relating to hearer-new entities. What is not discussed, then, are acts of Level I or Level II reference in which reference resolution is de-emphasized.

A further important difference between what is proposed in this study and what is proposed by Jucker et al., is the role of the hearer. In the present study, I have argued that the referentiality of a speech act is determined as a joint action involving both the speaker and the hearer. As argued in Chapter 8, interactants do not always focus on prioritizing the resolution of references, and this is directly relevant to the definition of reference as a communicative act. Furthermore, the overall degree of referentiality in a speech act is initially established by the speaker, but the perspective of the hearer can function either to maintain this degree of referentiality or lower it (but not raise it). In contrast, the term

vagueness appears to have been used solely for what is communicated by the speaker, relative to context and co-text. That is, in relation to reference, the speaker can either choose a clear and precise term or a term with some degree of semantic ambiguity.

To summarize, the concept of vagueness is both broader than referentiality (applying to many areas of language use) and also narrower in the sense that it applies to only what the speaker does, rather than to how speakers and hearers align in the joint action of communication. In general, the focus is largely on the extent to which discourse entities are invested with attributes in the mental representation and does not relate to the extent genuine acts of reference require resolution.

9 Appendix to Chapter 9: Discussion of learner reference and miscommunication

9.1 The range of REs in advanced learner varieties

In Chapter 3, evidence was reviewed of typical developmental patterns in the acquisition of English RE types, with relevant studies including those of Klein and Perdue (1992) and Kim (2000). As few findings have been reported in relation to advanced learner varieties, the following research question was posed:

Q1.1 Do advanced SLLs use a target-like range of RE types?

Key findings

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the SLLs used a much more restricted range of RE types than the L1 participants, averaging just seven conventional RE types, with only one reaching the L1 average of ten. Analysis of the L1 retellings suggested a core set of RE types that appear to be required in target-like retellings. Five SLLs did not use the full range of these forms, with four failing to use two or more forms. Of most interest is that all five of these speakers failed to use any demonstrative RE type. This suggests that intermediate-accessibility markers may be the last of the main RE types to be functionally acquired by advanced SLLs.

Relation to previous findings

Few other studies have reported on SLL use of English demonstrative REs, with the most prominent being Niimura and Hayashi's (1994, 1996) work using a research design (cloze tests) that specifically prompts a choice between *this*, *that* and *it* (discussed in Appendix 3). Of the studies reviewed, only Swierzbinska (2004) examined demonstratives as part of a wider system of SLL reference.

Swierzbina's findings contrast with those presented here, with all 15 of Swierzbina's Japanese participants using at least one demonstrative form. This contrast occurs despite a nearly identical film retelling task (also involving *Modern Times*), and a comparable number REs per retelling. Source language background provides only a partial explanation, as the only Japanese participant in the present study was also one of those who avoided all demonstratives. Rather, the most relevant factor appears to be differing definitions of reference, with Swierzbina's framework including NPs relating to events, location, and time. Re-analysis of the present data reveals three of these five speakers using demonstrative forms in such ways.

A further, partial, explanation may be differences in the participants' proficiency levels. Although the participants in the present study may have higher overall proficiency than those in Swierzbina's study, language development does not always occur in a linear fashion, and it may be that some of Swierzbina's participants overused these forms. Indeed, a calculation of Swierzbina's figures (p. 77 and p. 100) reveals the SLLs using substantially more demonstrative forms (10.3% of all definite NPs) than the L1s (7.5%) in her study. This is supported by the findings of Niimura and Hayashi (1994, 1996), who found frequent semantic errors by intermediate and advanced Japanese learners, with over-use in some contexts, and under-use in others. In the present data, three participants appeared to substantially overuse these forms (13%-16% of all REs, compared to the L1 mean of 4%).

These findings suggest a developmental stage in which intermediate or advanced learners move from a stage of avoidance of demonstrative forms to a stage of overuse, before developing target-like use. Certainly, the two speakers who appeared most competent (Michael and Julia) were among those who did use these forms with target-like frequency. Similar developmental patterns have been suggested for other language forms, such as the acquisition of articles (Huebner, 1983; Master, 1987).

Summary and implications

Although some elementary level learners may use demonstrative forms for some purposes (Klein & Perdue, 1992), evidence from both the present study and previous research (Niimura & Hayashi, 1994, 1996) suggests that even some advanced learners struggle to identify pragmatically appropriate contexts for the referential use of these forms in narratives. This appears to occur despite advanced SLLs accurately using such forms for non-referential communicative purposes (e.g. in relation to time and location), and presumably also in contexts of deictic reference. It therefore appears that demonstrative forms may be the last of the core RE types to be functionally acquired by advanced learners of English, at least in narrative communication.

This finding contributes a further detail to the literature relating to the development of referential systems in learner English. As discussed in Chapter 2 of the main thesis, previous studies have mapped a general progression from elementary to advanced levels (Kim, 2000; Klein & Perdue, 1992). The finding presented in this subsection relates to a specific detail within the (relatively under-researched) areas of advanced varieties of English and acquisition of referential English demonstratives.

9.2 Miscommunication

9.2.1 Under-explicitness and miscommunication

The following example is discussed in Chapter 9.3.3.

Extract 9.1: *Lillian and Astrid*

14-15	L – Charlie ₁ wakes her up because she's unconscious, and then the police officer ₂ that's lying next to them wakes up, and then <u>he</u> ₁ hits <u>him</u> ₂ in the head with his ₂ banger
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As with the other relevant L1-L1 miscommunications, the hearer's interpretation of these references is supported by the predictions of the accessibility coding

system: the first underlined pronoun will be interpreted as referring to the most accessible male referent (the policeman), and the second pronoun (because of binding constraints which disallow co-reference with the previous pronoun) will be interpreted as referring to Charlie.

9.3 Clarification strategies resulting in miscommunication

The nature of clarification moves as a *troublespot* is illustrated in Extract 9.2 where the hearer (Geoff) initiated an extended sequence to clarify the referent, which resulted in miscommunication.

Extract 9.2: *Fiona and Geoff*

T = 1.23 5b-6-7a	<p>G – so it – so um, just to re-cap this little bit, [yep] . so um, . . they’re having lunch, and the big guy that that in the last scene that I saw because [yeah] there were two big guys ay?, [yeh] that first . um . the first I think he had a dark hair, and a and a dark moustache, not that guy in the lunch,</p> <p>F – no</p> <p>G – it was the second guy, the last guy</p> <p>F – yeah, no the big</p> <p>G – before I left, he was sort of balding, little bit, sort of [yeh] fairer [yeh] so he – so he – they were having – or were just about to have lunch, [yep] and, and then Charlie lost soup all over him,</p> <p>F – yep, Ø lost the guy’s soup</p>
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An interesting feature here is that Geoff initially identified the intended referent (*the big guy that that in the last scene that I saw*), and initiated the clarification in order to confirm this interpretation. However, the negotiation was somehow flawed, and lead Geoff to abandon this (correct) interpretation in favour of an incorrect one.

It may be that the phrase *a dark moustache* was taken by Fiona to refer to Charlie, and so she attempted to clarify by saying *no*, then agrees with Geoff’s second attempt, and introduced the description *big*. Geoff appeared to detect some ambiguity, and made further attempts to clarify the reference, which Fiona infelicitously agreed with. As a result, Geoff confidently assumed that he had identified the intended referent, but, in fact, miscommunication had occurred.

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