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ASEAN and the Non-Traditional Regional Security Agenda

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Without a doubt, the whole area of non-traditional security – whether it be threats, issues or challenges (the three are more or less used interchangeably in ASEAN statements and documents on the subject) – has come to occupy a prominent place on the regional security agenda in recent years.¹ This is very much in keeping with the ‘widening’, or ‘broadening’, of the security agenda which has occurred internationally in both the academic literature and, crucially, in the policy sphere.

As Peter Hough has argued, whilst “there is a case to be made that military threats in the twenty-first century are as apparent as ever and maybe even greater than during the Cold War, the simple fact remains that they are not the only threats that face states, people and the world as a whole.”² That threats can emanate from other sectors, and thus the security agenda should be widened accordingly, is something which has gained increasing recognition amongst political leaders and policy-makers.³ Indeed, what has occurred, Hough contends, is that there has been an acceptance “that non-military issues can become ‘securitized’ and hence be privileged with ‘national security’ status.”⁴ This securitization has taken two forms. First, in the identification of selected non-military areas (Hough cites drug trafficking and civil emergencies as examples) which the capabilities of armed forces can be used to respond to. Secondly, in the securitizing of a range of “non-military problems ... [which] have domestic military repercussions. Issues such as AIDS or environmental degradation ... may destabilize regional balances of power and trigger military conflict that the onlooking government may be drawn into or be affected by in some capacity.”⁵ Both these forms of the securitization of non-traditional issues have been observable in the region.⁶

In securitizing a range of non-traditional issues, and thus attaching the label of ‘national security’ to them, it has been rightly recognised by the ASEAN states, however, that there are problems which are beyond the capacity of any individual state to respond to and thus they require collective action by ASEAN members and co-operation with extra-regional dialogue partners.

¹ At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, one plenary session was entitled ‘New Dimensions of Security’ although the areas listed under this rubric by the first speaker (the spread of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism; energy security and stability; climate change; maritime security; outer space; and cyber security) would readily fit under the non-traditional security label. Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser, India. *The 9th IISS Asia Security Summit. The Shangri-La Dialogue. Second Plenary Session New Dimensions of Security. Saturday 05 June 2010.*

² Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security* (Abingdon : Routledge, 2004), p. 7.

³ Hough cites the example of the Clinton administration’s 1994 National Security Strategy which stated that: “Not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security implications for both present and long term American policy”. The White House, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 1. Cited *ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ ASEAN, of course, has ‘traditionally’ securitized a range of non-military issues anyway with its comprehensive definition of security.

This paper seeks to briefly address a number of questions. Which issues have come to be placed on the non-traditional security agenda then? Have some of them been accorded a priority and has this emphasis changed over time? What ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms have been developed accordingly in response, or, has the response lain outside the ASEAN-inspired co-operative regional security framework?

In the Joint Declaration issued at the 6th ASEAN-China summit held in Phnom Penh in November 2002, “the increasingly serious nature” of non-traditional security issues and the effect they can have on regional and international stability was noted and a number of priority areas for co-operation were identified. These included: “combating trafficking in illegal drugs, people smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime.”⁷ A more extensive list was drawn up at a 2005 ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) seminar on non-traditional security issues. Here, the areas for concern as far as threats to the Asia-Pacific went were: “Terrorism and other non-traditional security issues such as illicit drugs, infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS, people smuggling and human trafficking, corruption, money laundering, cyber crime, piracy, environmental degradation, corruption and illegal logging”.⁸ A number of causes were put forward for the increase in the prevalence of these non-traditional threats, with it being stressed that they were “products of interwoven political, economic, ethnic, religious and other factors and have emerged against diverse historical and cultural backgrounds.” These threats tended to be “more diversified and had both intrastate and interstate implications and propagated more rapidly than traditional ones and their effects were increasingly complex.”⁹

Interestingly, in light of subsequent developments, there is no mention in these attempts to identify the main non-traditional security issues of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). It is significant, though, that in both instances the issues of drugs is mentioned first.

Indeed, as the Association itself has acknowledged, the problem of drug abuse and drug trafficking were at the heart of ASEAN’s first efforts to combat transnational crime with the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord calling for intensified cooperation to deal with the problem.¹⁰ It was only some 21 years later, Ralph Emmers argues, with the impending inclusion of Laos and Myanmar that the problem of narcotics was actually securitized however.¹¹ Since then, and as a consequence of “globalisation, technological advancement and greater mobility of people and resources across national borders, transnational crime has become increasingly pervasive, diversified and organized ... [and has taken on] many new forms”.¹²

⁷ *Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues*, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/zgcydyhz/dlczgdm/tt26290> (accessed 30 July 2010).

⁸ *Chair’s Summary Report. ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues*, 7-8 March 2005, Sanya, China.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *ASEAN Plan of Action To Combat Transnational Crime*, <http://www.aseansec.org/16133.htm> (accessed 31 August 2010).

¹¹ Ralph Emmers, “ASEAN and the securitization of transnational crime in Southeast Asia”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2003, p. 425. Emmers ultimately concludes that the securitization of transnational crime has not led to effective policy responses and it would have been better if it had remained a criminal issue.

¹² *ASEAN Plan of Action*.

The basic framework for co-operation in this area was established under the 1997 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime with the principal element being the two-yearly ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) which is responsible for coordinating the activities of the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters and the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL).¹³ An ASEANAPOL Secretariat was eventually established in January 2010.

An ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime was adopted in June 1999 with the stated objective of encouraging the members “to expand their efforts in combating transnational crime at the national and bilateral levels to the regional level.”¹⁴ The areas in which it was intended members should act in included information exchange; the criminalization of specific crimes (e.g., illicit drug trafficking) and the harmonization of police to deal with them; the appointment of police attachés or liaison officers in each other’s capitals; the conduct of regional training programmes; the promotion of international capacity-building through the establishment of an ASEAN Centre for Combating Transnational Crime; and the pursuit of extra-regional cooperation (through, for example, requesting technical assistance from Dialogue Partners and exchanging information with them).¹⁵ In order to implement this Plan, a Work Programme was subsequently adopted in May 2002.¹⁶ This programme includes eight areas in which co-operation is to occur (illegal drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, sea-piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, terrorism, international economic crime, and cyber crime), with each area containing the same specific aspects (exchange of information, legal matters, law enforcement matters, training, institutional capacity-building, and extra-regional co-operation).¹⁷

Prior to the attack on the United States in September 2001 and the bombing in Bali in October the following year, transnational crime and terrorism were ostensibly seen as separate non-traditional security issues. Since then, however, they have largely been conjoined.¹⁸ There is, for example, an ARF Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) and an Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on CTTC.¹⁹

If drugs, transnational crime and terrorism have tended to dominate the ASEAN and ASEAN-led regional security agenda as far as non-traditional security is concerned, then two other issue areas have begun to gain greater prominence in recent years: maritime security and, especially, HADR.

Many of the non-traditional security issues listed previously have had a maritime dimension (piracy most obviously, but also the smuggling of people and weapons), and the ASEAN states have long had concerns about the problems of illegal fishing and very traditional

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime*, Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2002, <http://www.aseansec.org/5616.htm> (accessed 10 September 2010).

¹⁷ *Ibid.* The Lao PDR was, understandably, exempted from co-operation in the area of sea-piracy.

¹⁸ This point is made by Emmers who goes as far as to contend that “ASEAN’s more recent response to transnational crime has been dominated by the threat of terrorism.” Emmers, *op.cit.*, p. 428.

¹⁹ At the most recent ISM on CTTC held in Bandar Seri Begawan in April this year, the three priority areas for practical co-operation were “illicit drugs, bioterrorism and biosecurity, and cybersecurity and cybercrime.” *Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Meeting of the Eight [sic] ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime*, Bandar Seri Begawan, 28-30 April 2010.

security concerns over territorial disputes (especially in the South China Sea). However, 'maritime security' as such has never really been given an 'ASEAN' dimension. Hitherto, co-operative efforts have centred around sub-regional efforts such as the co-ordinated naval patrols which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore began in the Malacca Strait in July 2004 and which were formalised under the Malacca Strait Co-ordinated Patrol network agreement of April 2006. Multilateral military exercises to enable its members to be better able to deal with a range of maritime security concerns, including piracy and Exclusive Economic Zone protection, have been a feature of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) since 2003/04.²⁰

In November 2007, however, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) 3-year Work Programme outlined the need to promote co-operation in non-traditional security areas and specifically listed maritime security in this context.²¹ The 15th ARF Meeting held in Singapore in 2008 established the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) which met for the first time in Indonesia in March 2009.²² The second ISM on MS was hosted by New Zealand in March this year. At this meeting, New Zealand tabled a draft outline of a Work Plan on Maritime Security for discussion.²³ Subsequently, at the 17th ARF Meeting in July the Ministers provided a mandate for the drawing up of an ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security to be considered over the next inter-sessional year.²⁴

Although natural disasters have always been listed when non-traditional security issues were being identified, and the need to be able to respond to them had long been a feature of the defence planning of several ASEAN states (notably Indonesia), it was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami which made HADR a priority area and created an imperative for regional co-operation in this area. The tsunami caused the deaths of over 225,000 people in eleven

²⁰ Much as ASEAN had been driven to pursue counter-terrorism co-operation in the changed environment post-September 11, Thayer argues that these attacks "heightened fears of catastrophic terrorist action in the Malacca Strait" and saw the FPDA move to enhance its members' ability to respond to a range of asymmetric threats. Indeed, there was to be a deliberate effort to incorporate a number of non-conventional issues into the FPDA's training activities. Carlyle A. Thayer, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever", *Security Challenges*, Vol. 3, No. 1, February 2007, p. 88.

²¹ *ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) Three (3)-Year Work Programme*, <http://www.aseansec.org/21214.pdf> (accessed 30 July 2010).

²² *ASEAN Regional Forum Draft Outline of a Work Plan on Maritime Security. A Template for Discussion*, 2nd ARF ISM on Maritime Security, Auckland 29-31 March 2010.

²³ This draft outline noted that: "Maritime security related issues represent some of the most pressing and potentially useful areas for cooperation in this ARF region." Priority areas put forward included maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery at sea as well as transnational organized crimes at sea such as the smuggling of drugs, weapons and people along with (unspecified) environmental crimes. Proposed project types, tailored to priority areas, included training to improve law enforcement capacity; workshops aimed at capacity-building through the sharing of information; and various multilateral field and/or table top exercises. *Ibid.*

²⁴ 43rd AMM/PMC/17th AFR Vietnam 2010 Chairman's Statement 17th ASEAN Regional Forum, Ha Noi, 23 July 2010, <http://www.aseansec.org/24929.htm> (accessed 20 August 2010).

countries²⁵ and, until the recent flooding in Pakistan, was the largest humanitarian crisis in recent memory.²⁶

In the wake of the 2004 tsunami the ASEAN members signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) in July 2005 and this has now entered into force. Under Article 9 of the AADMER, ASEAN Standby Agreements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response have been established which aim “to identify and mobilise available assets and capacities for disaster management, which Member Countries shall, on a voluntary basis, earmark to help each other in times of disaster emergency.”²⁷ The online inventory allows the respective member of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (consisting of the heads of the national disaster management agencies of the ASEAN members) to provide, and access, information in the following categories: emergency response/search and rescue; emergency stockpiles of disaster relief items; military and civilian assets; and disaster management expertise and available technologies.²⁸ Additionally, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management has now been operationalised and it is hoped that the centre will cooperate with the “United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot in Subang, Malaysia, and regional training centres such as the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) in Bangkok”.²⁹

The response to the 2004 tsunami in the region also saw the initiation of the Asia-Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO) process. The first of these conferences was held in Singapore in 2006 and at the fourth one in Honolulu last year the “Asia-Pacific Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in National Disaster Response Operations” were finalised. These guidelines will be finally approved and endorsed at the last conference in 2010.³⁰

At their meeting in 2006 the FPDA Ministers too responded to the 2004 tsunami stating the need to develop capacity and interoperability for HADR.³¹ Subsequently, and resulting from a 2006 paper on ‘Building Capacity in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief’, the FPDA developed their ‘Roadmap of Activities to Build FPDA HADR Capacity’ a year later.³²

²⁵ These statistics were cited by Dr. Mike Kelly, Australian Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support, in his opening remarks on behalf of Australia to the 3rd Asia Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Third Asia-Pacific Conference On Military Assistance To Disaster Relief Operations, APC-MADRO Report*, Canberra, Australia, 5-6 November 2008, p. 19.

²⁶ The United Nations notes that the flooding in Pakistan has killed over 1,600 people and affected the lives of some 14 million people. The number of people affected thus exceeds the combined total of the 2004 tsunami along with the earthquakes in Kashmir and Haiti which have occurred recently. *The Telegraph*, No. 995, August 18-24 2010, p. 11.

²⁷ *ASEAN Standby Agreement for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response*, <http://standby.aseansec.org/> (accessed on 10 August 2010).

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ 43rd AMM/PMC/17th ARF Vietnam 2010 Chairman’s Statement.

³⁰ “Conference moves toward finalizing Guidelines using foreign military assistance in disaster response operations”, News Release, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-SMHA), 1 October 2009.

³¹ See Thayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91. Thayer notes that Exercise SUMAN PROTECTOR scheduled for 2007 was to be HADR orientated. *Ibid.* The FPDA’s embrace of HADR is also discussed in Ralph Emmers, “The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture”, *RSIS Working Paper*, No. 195, 20 April 2010, pp. 20-21.

³² Information kindly provided by International Defence Relations Branch, Defence Policy and Planning Unit, Ministry of Defence, New Zealand.

HADR has become an important element of the work of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Informal Meeting (ACDIFM). For example, at the 3rd ADMM held at Pattaya, Thailand on 26 February 2009, the Ministers adopted the concept paper on the *Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief* which sets out to accelerate the ASEAN militaries' operational effectiveness in the said issues³³. The fourth ADMM, held in Ha Noi on 11 May 2010, followed up on this concept paper and welcomed Indonesia's "follow-up efforts to develop the Roadmap for the use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, including the establishment of Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) for HADR Cooperation"³⁴. The 7th ACDIFM held on 23 March 2010 in Ha Noi – which had as its theme "Enhancing effectiveness of ASEAN Military Cooperation in dealing with non-traditional security challenges in the region" – drew up a Two Year Activity Work Plan (2010-2011). Under this Work Plan an ASEAN Table Top Exercise in HADR will be co-hosted by Indonesia and Singapore early in 2011.³⁵

It has also featured strongly on the ARF's agenda. There is now an ISM on Disaster Relief as well as a Vision Statement pertaining to disaster relief; a Disaster Relief Work Plan; and ARF Strategic Guidance for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.³⁶ More usefully, perhaps, the ARF is developing practical co-operation in this area. In May 2009 the first ARF Voluntary Demonstration of Response on Disaster Relief exercise was held in Central Luzon in the Philippines. The scenario for this exercise saw the ARF participating members respond to a Philippine request for international humanitarian relief following a devastating super-typhoon.³⁷ A more extensive ARF Disaster Relief Exercise is scheduled to be held in Manado, in Indonesia, in March 2011.³⁸

Whilst the urgency of the need to improve HADR co-operation has obviously dissipated somewhat, overall momentum in this area has been sustained by subsequent natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes in Pakistan in 2005 and in China in 2007, and Cyclone Nargis which devastated parts of Burma the same year). Indeed, it has readily been acknowledged that the "Asia-Pacific region is prone to a variety of natural hazards including typhoons, floods, drought, landslides, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, bushfires, tsunami and disease outbreaks. Statistically, [therefore] it suffers more natural disasters than any other region in the world."³⁹ It is not surprising then that in his speech to the Fourth Plenary Session –

³³ *Joint Declaration of ASEAN Defence Ministers on Strengthening ASEAN Defence Establishments To Meet the Challenges of Non-Traditional Security Threats* .

³⁴ *Joint declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on strengthening ASEAN Defence cooperation for stability and development of the region*, <http://admm.org.un/sites/eng/Pages/PrintNews.aspx?NewsId=14614> (accessed 30 July 2010).

³⁵ *7th ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Force Informal Meeting (ACDIFM), Friday, 26 March 2010*.

³⁶ *43rd AMM/PMC/17th ARF Vietnam 2010 Chairman's Statement*.

³⁷ Office of Civil Defense, *Concept Notes of ARF-VDR Table Top Exercise*, 27 April 2009, http://210.185.184.52/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=1 (accessed 31 August 2010) and AUSAID, *Disaster Response Exercise Demonstrates Regional Capabilities*, 22 May 2009, http://www.usaid.gov.au/hottopics/topic.cfm?ID=3417_7954_1409_2826_9623 (accessed 31 August 2010).

³⁸ *43rd AMM/PMC/17th ARF Vietnam 2010 Chairman's Statement*.

³⁹ Dr. Mike Kelly, opening remarks on behalf of Australia to the 3rd Asia Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Third Asia-Pacific Conference On Military Assistance To Disaster Relief Operations, APC-MADRO Report*, Canberra, Australia, 5-6 November 2008, p. 21.

which focussed on humanitarian and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific – at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, our Defence Minister, Dr. Wayne Mapp rightly contended that: “Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are critically important to the countries and peoples of our region.”⁴⁰ In so doing, he effectively linked HADR to the concept of human security which is largely absent from the ASEAN security agenda. Dr. Mapp consequently called for humanitarian relief to be “a priority area” for the soon to be established ADMM Plus group.⁴¹ Dr. Mapp’s Malaysian counterpart, speaking at the same plenary session proposed that HADR capacity-building could be on the agenda for the first ADMM Plus Meeting.⁴² In keeping with such calls, and the original intention behind the ADMM Plus that there should be cooperation between ASEAN and regional states in the Asia-Pacific to meet a number of complex transnational security issues, it has since been decided that the ADMM Plus is likely to focus on HADR, along with maritime security, military medicine, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping.⁴³

Although it is possible to single out some of the more prominent non-traditional security issues for discussion, as has been the case here, in reality many non-traditional security issues are inter-related and this increases the difficulty of seeking to address them. A wide-range of co-operative efforts by ASEAN, ASEAN-led and other regional organisations have been promoted and in some cases, especially maritime security and HADR, these are increasing. No attempt has been made here to assess the effectiveness of these efforts, although the voluntary and non-binding nature of many of the agreements and the lack of funding for some programmes clearly limits their utility. Indeed, there has been criticism within the region for the lack of action. Indonesia, for example, has suggested a regional HADR standby force but this has yet to be pursued further.

It has also been apparent that the traditional ASEAN issue of non-interference, and associated sovereignty concerns, have been predominant at times. This is not surprising perhaps given the sensitivity surrounding the potential deployment of military assets to assist in disaster relief in an affected country (particularly if the military is to be the first rather than the last responder).

There has also been criticism that a focus on non-traditional security issues, particularly HADR, is a demonstration of a failure to co-operate over, or deal with, more problematic traditional ones.⁴⁴ Conversely, it might be argued that co-operation in non-traditional areas has acted as another confidence-building measure and may actually provide a good basis for co-operation in other, more sensitive, ones. It has also been suggested that an inability to deal with traditional threats reduces the prospects for successful co-operation in the non-

⁴⁰ Dr. Wayne Mapp, Minister of Defence, New Zealand, *The 9th IISS Security Summit. The Shangri-La Dialogue. Fourth Plenary Session Humanitarian and Disaster Relief In The Asia-Pacific. Sunday 06 June 2010.* The thrust of Dr. Mapp’s speech was that a ‘core’ function of forces should be humanitarian assistance.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Dato’ Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Minister of Defence, Malaysia, *The 9th IISS Security Summit. The Shangri-La Dialogue. Fourth Plenary Session Humanitarian and Disaster Relief In The Asia-Pacific. Sunday 06 June 2010.*

⁴³ Information kindly provided by International Defence Relations Branch, Defence Policy and Planning Unit, Ministry of Defence, New Zealand.

⁴⁴ Ian Storey contends, in relation to the most recent ARF, that it “is moving toward more cooperation on less sensitive issues like humanitarian cooperation and disaster relief ... because the other issues are just too difficult to deal with.” “Asian security forum to boost regional disaster relief”, *Channelnews.asia.com*, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/print/1070616/1/.html (accessed 23 July 2010).

traditional arena.⁴⁵ Certainly, it has been readily apparent that exigent traditional security concerns can divert attention away from non-traditional ones.⁴⁶

Whatever the merits of these arguments, it has been acknowledged that whilst non-traditional security threats are “pressing issues”, “both traditional and non-traditional security threats need to be balanced in terms of setting priorities and policy planning.”⁴⁷ It should also be acknowledged that non-traditional security has only comparatively recently begun to feature prominently on the regional security agenda and, accordingly, that practical co-operation (especially in the area of HADR) is still in its early stages. Further progress will depend on a mix of political will and prevailing circumstances.

⁴⁵ See Kanti Bajpai, “The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), and Security in the Asia Pacific”. A paper presented at the conference on an Asia-Pacific community held in Sydney, Australia, December 3-5, 2009, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁶ See Mark G. Rolls, *The 8th Shangri-La Dialogue: A Traditional Approach*,

<http://www.asianz.org.nz/our-work/track-2/track-2-dialogues/shangri-la-dialogue-09-rolls>

⁴⁷ *Report of The 6th ARF Security Policy Conference, 19 May 2009, Phuket, Thailand.*