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Managing the Humanitarian Supply Chain
- a Collaborative Approach?

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ABSTRACT

Humanitarian disasters are expected to increase 5-fold over the next 50 years. In 2010 a total of 385 separate disasters killed over 297,000 people worldwide, affected more than 217 million others and caused US$ 123.9 billion of economic damages. It is suggested that the scale of resource dedicated to logistics provision in response to disasters accounts for upwards of 80% of the total budget, hence humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a research topic is very much in the spotlight. Consequently, this research addresses what is argued to be the under-representation of humanitarian logistics in the literature and the associated lack of empirical research focussed on the management of the supply chain.

Collaborative working has been promoted as a *Silver Bullet* in many areas of Supply Chain Management and is contended to be a mechanism to prevent organisations optimising solely their own results rather than integrating their goals and activities with others to benefit overall end user value. Collaborative techniques inherent within commercial supply chains have not been observed in the humanitarian relief chain. This study investigates why this is the case, as this lack of collaboration is reported to lead to inefficiency; which at worst results in increased humanitarian suffering and additional loss of life. Hence, the findings reveal ways to advance collaborative working within the humanitarian relief supply chain.

Criticism is levelled at the predominance of quantitative methodologies in current research within humanitarian logistics. This study addresses this gap as well as the calls for more cross-organisational case studies within the field, by adopting a multi-case, qualitative approach based on the triangulation of data gathered during a series of in-depth interviews and focus groups across 4 separate humanitarian relief organisations. Data interpretation is through content analysis to identify specific patterns and themes. The research concerns itself with the response immediately following the onset of a disaster. This limited scope helps to address issues surrounding the generalisability of a purely qualitative approach whilst also maintaining control over data volume; however, there are still ample opportunities for significant theoretical and practical contribution.

The findings identify specific barriers to collaborative working within the sector; in particular, themes and patterns within management and control, understanding and training, relationships, and military involvement have surfaced. Outcomes also have implications for commercial supply chain managers who are increasingly faced with challenges that no longer obey the traditional rules of forecast driven certainty and predictability, and are therefore, expected to adopt the more event driven, agile and flexible approaches that are already a reality for their humanitarian sector counterparts.

The study concludes with the development of a conceptual generic model of the humanitarian supply chain that includes a number of significant issues which, if addressed will improve collaboration and thereby benefit overall efficiency and effectiveness to the general betterment of future relief provision.

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GLOSSARY

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CILT	Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport
CLM	Council for Logistics Management
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
CSCMP	Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DFID	Department for International Development
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRO	Disaster Relief Operations
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HADRO	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HELP	Humanitarian and Emergency Logistics
HERR	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
HFN	Hastily Formed Network
HRR	Humanitarian Response Review
IAPG	Inter-Agency Procurement Group
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDLO	International Development Law Organisation
IFRC	International Federation Of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JDP	Joint Defence Publication
JHLSCM	The Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management
JFC	Joint Forces Command
JFLogC	Joint Forces Logistic Component
MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODSG	OCHA Donor Support Group
Oxfam	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
RAF	Royal Air Force
RedR	Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief
RM	Relationship Marketing
RN	Royal Navy
SC	Supply Chain
SCC	Supply Chain Collaboration
SCM	Supply Chain Management
SDSR	Strategic Defence and Security Review
SNM	Supply Network Management
Tearfund	The Evangelical Alliance Relief Fund
UK MOD	United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
UN	United Nations
UN CMCS	United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Section
UN HABITAT	UN Human Settlements Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR	United Nations Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	UN Mine Action Service
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN OHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UN USG/ERC	United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

"As in previous years, there has been an increase in demand for humanitarian assistance while the operating environment for delivering such assistance becomes more complex. Humanitarian responders are more numerous and diverse…..It will be essential over the coming years for the international system to find ways to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by this new environment and to respond more effectively to its challenges and demands".

(UN, 2013, p.2)

1.1   Introduction

During the final writing of this thesis Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines. The devastation caused as a result of this natural disaster (see Fig 1.1) illustrates that disasters, either artificial or natural, may occur at any time around the world with enormous consequences (Decker *et al*, 2013; Haavisto and Kovács, 2013; Day *et al,* 2012; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada *et al*, 2006).

Fig 1.1   Aerial Images of Before and After Typhoon Haiyan (BBC News, 2013a)

In 1883, Krakatoa in Indonesia erupted causing over 100,000 deaths and the eruption was heard over 3000 miles away. However, it took weeks for people in the Western World to learn the true extent of the disaster (Day *et al*, 2012, p.21) and even longer for any kind of response to be generated. Contrast that with the devastation caused by the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011 which was watched in real time across the world. Modern day humanitarian relief operations are likely to be conducted in the spotlight of the media

and will be afforded heightened public and political attention (Heaslip, 2011). In 2010, a total of 385 separate natural disasters killed over 297 000 people worldwide, affected more than 217 million others and caused US$123.9 billion of economic damages (Guhu-Sapir *et al*, 2011). The earthquake in Haiti affected at least 3 million people with between 217,000 to 230,000 deaths and flooding in Thailand affected over 12.8 million people with the World Bank estimating economic damages exceeding US$45 billion (Tang, 2011). Moreover, disaster relief is and will continue to be a growth area with both natural and man-made disasters expected to increase another five-fold over the next 50 years (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). Consequently, disasters will continue to generate an impact and a public awareness that demands immediate action aimed at reducing humanitarian suffering as well as speeding up overall response and recovery times.

The provision of timely and appropriate humanitarian aid has developed into a global and multinational industry (Carroll and Neu, 2009) and more and more focus is being placed on the optimisation of the logistics and supply chains that are charged with transforming public and private donations into tangible aid[1]. Whilst commentary (Blansjaar, 2011; van Wassenhove, 2006) debates the actual scale of resource that is dedicated to logistics provision in response to disasters, (somewhere between 50 and 80% of the total budget) what is clear is that humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a research topic is now very much in the spotlight. Emergency logistics and Supply Chain Management (SCM) have emerged as worldwide-noticeable themes, as there now exists a fierce need to coordinate the logistics resources of the public and private sectors to avoid arbitrary resource allocation during disasters (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada *et al*, 2006). Collaborative working has been promoted as a 'Silver Bullet' in many areas of SCM and is contended to be a mechanism to prevent organisations within the supply chain optimising solely their own results rather than integrating their goals and activities with others to benefit overall end user value (Porter, 1998; Cooper *et al*, 1997). However, collaborative techniques inherent within commercial supply chains have not been observed in the humanitarian relief chain and ineffective coordination of efforts between relief suppliers, logistics servers and demanders is still a major concern (Day *et al*, 2012; Heaslip, 2012a, 2011 and 2010; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). Whilst acknowledging the attention that the field of humanitarian logistics and SCM has gained as a research area, and the fact that researchers have begun to lay the foundations for a core body of knowledge, numerous academic commentators (Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Day *et al,* 2012; Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Overstreet et al, 2011; Kovács and

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[1] As will be discussed within section 2.3.2 a unionist perspective (Larson and Halldórsson, 2004) will be adopted within this thesis, whereby logistics is regarded as a fundamental part of SCM as an overall discipline.

Spens, 2011, 2008 and 2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Mangan et al, 2012; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2004; Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005; Murray, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; Rickard, 2003) suggest that the field is relatively new and is still in its infancy. Moreover, criticism is also levelled at the predominance of quantitative methodologies in current research within humanitarian logistics and there are calls for the collection of more qualitative empirical data within the field (see section 2.11 and Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011). Hence, this qualitative study addresses this gap as well as the calls for more cross-organisational case studies within the field, focusing on the participant narratives and responses of logistics practicioners engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid immediately following the onset of a disaster.

Having set the scene for the reader, this first chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis, detailing the rationale and context of the research and setting out the final research objective, question and aim for the investigation. A short introduction to the final methodology adopted is included as well as a summary of the research findings and overall contribution to knowledge. The final conclusion to the chapter is preceded by a short explanation of the overall structure of the thesis.

1.2   Origins of Interest, Research Rationale and Context

It is suggested that any narrative depends on the perspective of its author (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013, p.viii). Hence, it is appropriate to begin with a short description of the author's background which will serve to establish the personal perspective, whilst giving the reader the context and rationale behind the overall research, thereby forming the basis of the on-going discussion within this thesis. Prior to taking up a role within academia, the researcher served for almost 26 years in the Royal Air Force (RAF), during which time he was involved in numerous overseas military operations, on behalf of the UK Government, NATO and the United Nations. In particular, time spent on a variety of overseas operations gave first hand exposure to the challenges and frustrations of working alongside organisations engaged in the practical provision of humanitarian relief and support to affected populations in need of life saving aid. The researcher recalls being struck at the time by the common drive amongst all participants within the humanitarian supply chain to improve the provision of aid and to alleviate suffering, but also by the reticence of some organisations and individuals to avoid and, in some cases to actively reject the attempts made by military personnel and their chains' of command to step away from a solely security based role and to involve themselves in the practical provision of the relief effort itself. On leaving the RAF, the author took up a position as a senior lecturer in logistics and operations management within higher education and as such was given responsibility by his institution

for the leadership of under and post graduate programmes in logistics management. As such, along with the student body, he attended a wide variety of guest lectures and presentations given by logistics practioners. One such lecture, delivered by a senior logistics manager with in excess of 25 years practical association with humanitarian relief provision, highlighted what was perceived to be the vital importance, yet frustrating lack of a collaborative approach within the sector. These practical observations chimed with the military experiences of the author, and served to ignite personal academic interest within the field. Further research and consideration of what was a somewhat limited array of academic articles at the time (early 2009), left the author convinced that he had identified an area of study that was at the time, lacking in academic rigour and, hence presented an attractive area to dedicate a period of doctrinally focussed research to. Of particular interest was the opportunity to engage in an area of academic knowledge that was at a relatively early stage in its development but also in one that, given the life and death realities of associated outcomes also demanded not only significant academic contribution but perhaps, of equal importance a practical development of existing managerial strategy.

The initial UN response to Typhoon Haiyan was to launch an appeal for $301 million (£190 million) to help the relief effort (BBC News, 2013b). Moreover, the quotation at the start of this Chapter is taken from the annual United Nations (UN) report on the strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance issued in July 2013 (UN, 2013); it serves to illustrate the increasing demand for humanitarian aid, and to support the view that the operating environment for delivering such assistance is becoming ever more complex due to the involvement of an increasingly numerous and diverse group of responders and organisations. In reporting on progress in the coordination of humanitarian assistance the document goes on to discuss the need to:

> *"Improve humanitarian leadership, coordination and accountability both in headquarters and in the field" (*UN, 2013, p6)

In short, this research is both timely and pertinent as it investigates themes and issues that have significant financial implications but that are also associated with what the UN currently regard as key areas for future development and progress within the humanitarian relief supply chain.

As discussed earlier numerous academic commentators agree that the research field of humanitarian logistics is relatively new and still in its infancy; indeed Kovács and Spens (2007) suggest that "Literature on humanitarian logistics is scant" (p100) and Day *et al* (2012) determine that relief activity coordination in a changing environment is amongst the most pressingly significant challenge areas in which researchers can contribute to the field

of humanitarian relief disaster SCM (p32). Moreover, Fawcett and Waller (2013) contend that SCM is the newest business discipline and that as such, it is going through what they describe as "growing pains" (p.183) as it seeks to chart its future course and define a meaningful destiny for itself. Although the number of beneficiaries of humanitarian aid has grown year-on-year (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011; Tatham 2011), until the inception of *The Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management* (JHLSCM) in June 2011 no dedicated journal existed within the field nor was there any journal or other outlet focusing on this topic alone. Academic interest has been growing in this area, yet publications still remain fragmented and generalised; however, acknowledgment is now made of the increasing number of special issues of scientific journals that have been dedicated to the humanitarian logistics field since 2005 (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011). Hence, whilst lessons have been learned from past aid operations, operational failures still occur at the point of contact for humanitarian missions. Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) comment on the growing body of practice-based literature on humanitarian SCM and Logistics, but note that this work seldom refers to well-established concepts within academic supply chain literature; they go on to postulate that if attempts were made to apply such concepts from the business model to the humanitarian aid supply chain, we may identify many important parallels, but also many equally important differences (p.115). Similarly, Beamon (2004) observes that the majority of existing supply chain research focuses on managing and/or optimizing the commercial supply of goods and services and that whilst the humanitarian relief process is an important domain for SCM it has received little academic attention.

Chandes and Paché (2009) discuss the absence of collaboration between humanitarian actors (Kovács and Spens, 2008) and highlight that this results in lost time, wasted resources and ultimately a deeply disorganised supply chain (p337); they go on to suggest that the opening of a research agenda on the critical need for a more collaborative strategy is of the highest priority. Dash *et al* (2013) suggest that "Disaster response supply chain management is an emerging field and there is great potential for research in emergency logistics and disaster response initiatives" (p60) and Kumar and Havey (2013) highlight the need for more research on disaster relief supply chain management in light of frustrations with the delays in receiving aid following the Haiti earthquake in 2010. Finally, by way of a summary of current thinking in the field, Fawcett and Waller (2013) suggest that:

> *"Recent research indicates that the top barrier to more effective humanitarian aid and disaster relief is inadequate logistics, followed by weak governance and insufficient collaboration"* (p187)

1.3   Appropriate Research Boundaries

As will be developed in more detail in Chapter 3, a qualitative, inductive, approach was adopted (Garfinkel, 1967 and Sacks *et al*, 1974 both cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007). A variety of carefully selected methods were utilised to produce the rich data needed to establish similarities and, perhaps more importantly differences between key organisations (Gill and Johnson, 2010, Saunders *et al*, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007). Noting that generalisability and justification of a purely qualitative approach would be key concerns, distinct barriers (Gieryn, 1983) were put around the research at an early stage. Whilst acknowledging the importance of all phases of humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) (see Fig 2.9 and Section 2.6.1), the expected outcomes of a piece of doctrinally focussed research, volume of information and the need for focussed research effort, resulted in the decision to concentrate on the *Immediate Response* phase of humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Moreover, for the same reasons, whilst the importance of all types of disasters is noted, the overall emphasis of the study took as its focus the sudden onset - natural type of disasters (Van Wassenhove, 2006) (see Fig 2.5 and Section 2.4.1).

1.4   Final Research Objective, Question and Aim

Within this context, the overall objective of this research was to fill the identified gap in knowledge surrounding the effective planning and coordination of the provision of humanitarian logistics during the immediate response phase (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007), and to evaluate how effective collaboration might be achieved within the humanitarian relief supply chain. The research question was therefore:

When considering the Immediate Response to Natural Disasters what are the key drivers within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain that will help to improve future collaborative working?

The aim of the thesis was to make a theoretical contribution to contingency theoretic perspectives and a functional contribution to existing humanitarian and commercial supply chain practice, by revealing what factors restrict effective collaboration between actors (Kovács and Spens, 2008) within humanitarian relief environments and suggesting how these issues might be addressed in the future.

1.5   Research Methodology

Whilst the range of issues that bear, both directly and more peripherally, on the research approach adopted are developed and discussed within Chapter 3 of this thesis, by way of introduction the final research approach was split into 3 distinct stages (see Fig 3.4). The aim of the first stage was to establish contact with prospective participants whilst also confirming the relevance of the *etic* issues developed during the literary review process. Stages 2 and 3 were designed to gather the rich data that would be needed to address the overall aims and research question of the study; furthermore the *emic* issues which were used to formulate the final contribution to knowledge were also identified. All 3 stages lent themselves to a qualitative approach and to the use of multiple methods of data collection. Once analysis was complete the related findings and interpretations were confirmed with participants through a checking and feedback process.

The use of case studies and in particular the merits afforded by a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2013; Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995) were exploited and given the perspectives sought here, the use of a multi-site cross comparison served to increase confidence in the overall findings, whilst addressing the concerns levelled at the qualitative researcher's door regarding reliability of data and generalisability of findings.   Hence, four different humanitarian relief organisations, all of whom are involved in the provision of *immediate response* to disasters (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007) participated in the final research (see Table 3.2). In keeping with the classic case study process (Yin, 2013; Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995) each organisation was considered in isolation (Chapters 4 through 7) with final conclusions and contributions being established through a cross-case analysis (Chapter 8). Whilst fulfilling the final research objectives, this overall approach also addressed the thoughts offered by Kovács and Spens (2011), as developed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.11.2) who highlight the need for good and applicable research within the field with empirical data being gathered through the use of appropriate qualitative method.

1.6   Summary of Research Findings and Overall Contribution to Knowledge

It is a recognised and frequently criticised characteristic of qualitative research that simple descriptions of the emergent findings are difficult to articulate (Bryman and Bell, 2012; Saunders *et al*, 2012; Silverman, 2011a). For example, in the body of this thesis the findings and overall contribution to knowledge emerge over many pages of data extracts, analysis and explanatory text that span five chapters. Hence, in addressing the research question, the associated cross-case analysis of the data gathered provided an overall contribution to

knowledge that will be presented in Chapter 8. The contribution was applicable to both the humanitarian and commercial supply chains and implications for methodology were also identified. By way of introduction a short summary of the key areas of the contribution are discussed here.

1.6.1 The Humanitarian Relief Sector

The findings identify specific barriers to collaborative working within the humanitarian relief sector; in particular, key *emic* issues and themes are identified and subsequent contributions made in four key areas, namely:

1. Management and Control.
2. Understanding and Training.
3. Relationships.
4. Military Involvement.

Moreover, the study concludes with the development of a development of a conceptual generic model of the humanitarian supply chain that includes a number of significant issues which, if addressed will improve collaboration and thereby benefit overall efficiency and effectiveness to the general betterment of future relief provision.

1.6.2 The Commercial Sector

Commercial supply chain managers are increasingly faced with challenges that no longer obey the traditional rules of forecast driven certainty and are therefore, forced to adopt the more event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian sector counterparts (Kovács, 2012; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011). Large scale disruptions with very short lead times are emerging as one of the most pressing issues for commercial supply chains, consequently business sector supply chain managers can learn from their humanitarian sector counterparts who are expected to respond to disasters with very short lead times (Decker *et al*, 2013, p238). Hence whilst the main focus of this research was the development of findings and an overall contribution within the specialised context associated with the humanitarian relief sector, a constant consideration throughout was the potential for generalisation of the findings to the wider body of knowledge and in particular to that associated within the management of commercial sector supply chains. Consequently, the implications of some of the findings of this research and elements of the final contribution are also considered in the following areas of the commercial business supply chain:

1. Barriers to Collaborative Working.
2. Combating Supply Chain Complexity.
3. Joint Training Initiatives.
4. Suppression of Market Forces.
5. Defining Value in the Value Chain.
6. Network Structures and Power.

1.6.3 Limitations of the Study and Implications for Methodology

In common with all research this study suffered from a number of limitations. Whilst these limitations did not detract from the overall significance of the findings, it was right to comment on them at some stage in the final reporting process (Section 8.9). Moreover, whilst the final Research Strategy (Fig 3.4) proved on the whole to be successful, it was not without its difficulties and challenges; hence, comment is also made by way of lessons learned and some implications for methodology are identified in 3 key areas, namely:

1. Research Boundaries.
2. Multiple 'Domains'.
3. Interviews, Focus Groups and Observation.

1.7   Structure of the Thesis

To introduce and develop the arguments summarised here in detail, the thesis comprises eight chapters, including this introduction, that cover the literature in the field, methodological considerations, individual domain analysis with theoretical comments, and final conclusions and contribution to knowledge. These chapters are constituted as follows.

> **Chapter 1. Introduction**. The first chapter serves to set the scene for the reader and details the rationale and context of the research itself. The final research objective, question and aim of the investigation are explained and a summary of the final research findings and overall contribution to knowledge offered.

> **Chapter 2. Perspectives on Humanitarian Supply Chain Management and Collaboration**. The literary review begins by setting the scene with a discussion on the scale of the challenge that the humanitarian relief community faces. The disciplines associated with, and the definitions of supply chain and logistics

management are considered, and a comparison of the key issues associated with the business and humanitarian supply chains leads into a contextual discussion on the humanitarian supply chain itself. The actors within the humanitarian supply chain are established before consideration of the arguments for a network approach to the supply chain, and also of the academic discourse on the formation of hastily formed networks in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster is made. The pressures on the humanitarian supply chain and on those employed within it, are analysed as themes and issues are identified which will help to inform the first stage of the final research design. Thoughts then turn to the distinct phases of disaster relief operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and to the identification of an appropriate phase of focus for this research. The case is made for the review and overall research to take as its focus the immediate response phase to disaster relief and an appropriate supply chain for the immediate response phase is discussed. Arguments are then considered for optimisation and collaboration within the humanitarian supply chain before a discussion on achieving collaboration through clusters leads into an analysis of the aims and structure of the United Nations Cluster Approach. This discussion suggests that the United Nations has a significant role to play in the management of relationships amongst collaborating actors within the humanitarian supply chain, hence the review moves on to consider the associated academic discourse on relationship management and power within this context. The penultimate section of the review highlights a clear research opportunity; moreover, a significant number of research gaps are identified which form the basis of, and underpin the final research question and aim of the thesis.

Chapter 3. Research Methodology. The range of issues that bear, both directly and more peripherally, on the research approach adopted are discussed within this chapter. In explaining how the final methodology was arrived at both the external and internal influences on the methodological decisions made are acknowledged, and sources revealed surrounding the connections between the purpose of the research, the philosophical and theoretical perspectives taken and the research question previously arrived at in Chapter 2. In order to clearly explain and justify the thought processes involved in arriving at the final methodology the *research onion* (Saunders *et al*, 2009) is systematically *peeled*, with discussion of each exposed *layer* being offered to explain the thinking behind the final chosen approach. The resulting research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data and the choice of design reflects decisions made about the priority given to a range of dimensions within the research process (Bryman and Bell, 2007); hence,

set against this background the research design methods employed to collect and analyse data are also discussed.

Chapter 4. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Individual Domain Analysis. The data gathered from The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the participants within the UN Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. A short background and history of the OCHA, its formation and role is included together with a discussion on the organisation's growing influence and focus on the coordination of the overall humanitarian relief effort. The tasking and structure of the CMCS is explained before the use of the organisation as a research domain for the study is justified. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the key *etic* and *emic* issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.

Chapter 5. The UK Ministry of Defence Joint Forces Command – Individual Domain Analysis. The data gathered from the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) Joint Forces Command (JFC) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. A short background and history of the UK military contribution to humanitarian disaster relief is included. A discussion on the strategy behind the Joint Forces Logistic Component then follows, together with narrative on the organisation's role within the planning and coordination of the UK military contribution to humanitarian disaster relief. The UK MOD's definitions of disaster relief operations are then explained and clarified before the future strategy for the JFC (post 2012) is considered together with a consideration of the on-going and escalating MOD involvement within disaster relief. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the key *etic* and *emic* issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.

Chapter 6. Oxfam International – Individual Domain Analysis. The data gathered from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. A short background and history

of Oxfam International is included together with a discussion on the organisation's current (as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the key *etic* and *emic* issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.

Chapter 7. Tearfund – Individual Domain Analysis. The data gathered from participants within The Evangelical Alliance Relief (TEAR) Fund is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. A short background and history of Tearfund is included together with a look at its current (as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the key *etic* and *emic* issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.

Chapter 8. Thesis Conclusions and Overall Contribution to Knowledge. In keeping with the classic case study process (Yin, 2013 Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995) the discussion within Chapters 4 through 7 considers each of the research domains in isolation. Hence, in seeking to establish the final conclusions and academic contribution the debate within this Chapter considers the results of a cross-domain analysis and uses as its basis the 4 significant *emic* themes and issues that emerged during the individual domain analyses; namely, management and control, understanding and training, relationships and military involvement. Each *emic* theme is discussed separately, with the latter part of the Chapter drawing out the significance of the overall cross-domain analysis and with it the final contribution to knowledge. The implications of this research and the associated findings are then considered within the context of the business supply chain. In common with all research this study suffered from a number of limitations; hence, whilst these limitations did not detract from the overall significance of the findings, they are discussed within this Chapter. Similarly, whilst the final Research Strategy (Fig 3.4) proved, on the whole to be successful, it was not without its difficulties and challenges; therefore, by way of lessons learned comment is also included on the implications for methodology. Finally, the findings of this research reveal a number of opportunities for further research that would both enhance the contributions identified within this thesis and also generate new contributions to the body of

knowledge. Thus, in closing the Chapter, a number of suggestions for further research are highlighted.

1.8   Conclusion

This chapter has laid the foundations for the thesis. The extent of the research problem and its background were introduced. The rationale and context of the study were set out and the final research objective, question and aim established. A short introduction to the final methodology adopted was included together with a summary of the research findings and overall contribution to knowledge. Finally, a short explanation of the overall structure of the thesis was set out. What emerges is a timely and pertinent investigation into what is a burgeoning field of academic interest, and one in which more qualitative empirical research is called for (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011). Public awareness when a disaster strikes demands immediate action that is aimed at reducing humanitarian suffering as well as speeding up overall response and recovery times. It is clear that humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a research topic is now very much in the spotlight and that this research has a valid contribution to make to the developing body of knowledge in the field.

CHAPTER 2

PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION

"The line between order and disorder lies in logistics"

(Sun-Tzu, translated by Ames, 1993)

2.1   Integrating Existing Literature within the Research Process

A competent review of the literature is at least in part a means of affirming your credibility as someone who is knowledgeable in your chosen area (Bryman and Bell, 2007). However, this is not simply a matter of reproducing the theoretical opinions that previous scholars have variously expressed, but must also include a demonstration of the ability to interpret what has been written whilst possibly using the ideas of others to support a particular view-point or argument. Two main reasons exist for reviewing the literature (Sharp *et al,* 2002 cited in Saunders *et al,* 2009); the first, the *preliminary review* helps to generate and refine ideas in order to arrive at a final research idea that meets the requirements of both the examining and sponsoring organisations. The second often referred to as the *critical review* or *critical literature review* (Saunders *et al,* 2009), is a part of the research project proper. Here the student will demonstrate an awareness of the current state of knowledge within the chosen subject field, note its limitations and identify in the wider context the anticipated area of contribution to be achieved through further enquiry. Jankowicz (2005) best summarises the fundamental intentions of the literature review:

> *"There is little point in reinventing the wheel…..the work that you do is not done in a vacuum, but builds on the ideas of other people who have studied the field before you. This requires you describe what has been published, and to marshal the information in a relevant and critical way"* (p.161)

The review of previous related research should also help to identify key concepts and variables relevant to the chosen research area which may well have been defined by researchers in different ways and thus inconsistently reported (Gill and Johnson, 2010). Indeed these inconsistencies may need appropriate recognition and resolution within the review itself. A key part of this close review of the topic should be an attempt to narrow the focus of discussion in order to position the research substantively and methodologically in relation to existing literature. In doing so there should also be ample opportunity to highlight

those issues within the research which will provide additional or alternative insights; thereby justifying the project through elaboration of the predicted contribution.

The precise approach to the literature will depend upon the methodological approach (deductive or inductive) that the researcher is intending to use (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders *et al,* 2009). With a *deductive* approach the role of the literature review is to critically review existing knowledge and to enable an exploration between differing variables or constructs of interest. The primary aim is to identify theories and ideas which will be used to test hypotheses which have been developed through the review process; these hypotheses are then testable through the collection of appropriate data. However, with *inductive* research the purposes of the literature review are altogether different (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders *et al,* 2009). Whilst the issues of contextualization and justification in relation to the existing body of knowledge are equally important within the literature review, and the research will still have a clearly defined purpose with associated research question(s) and objectives, there are no predetermined theories or conceptual frameworks at the outset. Inductive approaches are concerned with developing a pre-understanding of the substantive area of interest that provides a starting point for the research in terms of what Blumer (1954, cited by Gill and Johnson (2010) and Saunders *et al,* 2009) described as *sensitizing concepts*. Blumer argued that the literature review should not be used as a vehicle to impose previously conceptualized ideas through the process of operationalisation used by deductive researchers; moreover the view is that there should be no "preconceived theory that dictates, prior to research, relevancies in concepts and hypotheses" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.215).

As already noted in Chapter 1 and developed in more detail in Chapter 3, a qualitative, inductive, approach was adopted for this thesis (Garfinkel, 1967 and Sacks *et al,* 1974 both cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007). Carefully selected data gathering techniques were utilised to produce the rich data needed to establish similarities and, perhaps more importantly differences between key actors and/or organisations (Gill and Johnson, 2010, Saunders *et al,* 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007). Noting that generalisability and justification of a purely qualitative approach would be key concerns, distinct barriers (Gieryn, 1983) were put around the research at an early stage (see Section 2.6). Whilst acknowledging the importance of all phases of humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) (see Fig 2.9 and Section 2.6.1), the expected outcomes of a piece of doctrinally focussed research, volume of information and the need for focussed research effort, resulted in the decision to concentrate on the *Immediate Response* phase of humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007).

2.1.1 Structure of the Literary Review

This literary review has been written to give the reader a logical flow to, and justification of the final research question and aim. By way of a road map, the structure of the review is depicted in Fig 2.1.

Setting the Scene and a Discussion on the Scale of the Overall Challenge

Generic Definitions of Supply Chain Management & Logistics and a discussion within the context of Humanitarian Relief

Pressures on the Humanitarian Supply Chain, its actors and donors

The Phases of Disaster Relief and a Focus on the Immediate Response Phase

The Case for Optimisation and Collaboration and a discussion on differing strategies and approaches

The United Nations Cluster Approach

The Case for Further Study and Identified Research Gaps

Research Question & Aim

Fig 2.1   Structure of the Literary Review

The literary review will begin by setting the scene with a discussion on the scale of the challenge that the humanitarian relief community is faced with. The disciplines associated with, and the definitions of supply chain and logistics management will then be considered, commencing with a generic view before a comparison of the key issues associated with the business and humanitarian supply chains will lead into a contextual discussion on the humanitarian supply chain itself. The actors within the humanitarian supply chain will be established before consideration of the arguments for a network approach to the supply chain, and also of the academic discourse on the formation of hastily formed networks in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster is made. The pressures on the humanitarian supply chain and on those employed within it, will be analysed as themes and issues are identified which will help to inform the first stage of the final research design (as discussed and developed in Chapter 3). Thoughts will turn to the distinct phases of disaster relief operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and to the identification of an appropriate phase of focus for this research. The importance of all phases of humanitarian relief provision is acknowledged and the case is made for the review and overall research to take as its focus the immediate response phase to disaster relief. An appropriate supply chain for the immediate response phase will be discussed before the arguments for and concept of optimisation and collaboration within the humanitarian supply chain are considered. A discussion on achieving collaboration through clusters will lead into an analysis of the aims and structure of the United Nations Cluster Approach, and a discussion on the overall effectiveness of this approach as an aid to collaboration. This discussion suggests that the United Nations has a significant role to play in the management of relationships amongst collaborating actors within the humanitarian supply chain, hence the review will move on to consider the associated academic discourse on relationship management and power within this context. The penultimate section of this review will draw on previous discussion within this Chapter to highlight a clear research opportunity within what is a burgeoning field of academic knowledge. Moreover, a significant number of research gaps will be identified which will form the basis of this research and the final doctoral study. Finally, the research question and aim of the thesis will be stated.

What emerges within this review is a growing body of knowledge in a field that has come a long way since the original outcries about the poor management of the 2004 Asian tsunami relief effort (Kovács, 2011, p250). Whilst commentary (Blansjaar, 2011; van Wassenhove, 2006) debates the actual scale of resource that is dedicated to logistics provision in response to disasters, (somewhere between 50 and 80% of the total budget) what is clear is that humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a research topic is now very much in

the spotlight; so much so that opinion is now being offered that no longer is there simply a case for humanitarian logisticians to look at their commercial counterparts for best practice but that there is also a growing case for adoption of the reciprocal view (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011).

The scene will now be set with a discussion on the scale of the challenge that the humanitarian supply chain community face.

2.2   Setting the Scene - the Scale of the Challenge

"As in previous years, there has been an increase in demand for humanitarian assistance while the operating environment for delivering such assistance becomes more complex. Humanitarian responders are more numerous and diverse…..It will be essential over the coming years for the international system to find ways to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by this new environment and to respond more effectively to its challenges and demands".
(Un, 2013, p.2)

"Effective [Humanitarian] logistics is the essence of famine relief because the greatest task in providing aid is getting food to the people who are starving" (Long and Wood, 1995, p213).

"The speed of humanitarian aid after a disaster depends on the ability of logisticians to procure, transport and receive supplies at the site of a humanitarian relief effort" (Thomas, 2003, p4)

The unprecedented world-wide response to the 2004 Asian Tsunami resulted in approximately $5 billion being raised by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Thomas and Fritz, 2006); but many global companies wanted to do more – to give goods in kind and to lend logistics staff or managers. Despite cautions against sending out unsolicited items, aid agencies were confronted with a stream of gifts sent out by well-meaning donors. Within two weeks of the Tsunami, Colombo airport (Sri Lanka) reported that 288 freighter flights had arrived without airway bills to deliver humanitarian cargo (Thomas and Fritz, 2006); whilst some carried much-needed supplies that had been cleared by recognised humanitarian organisations a significant number brought unsolicited and inappropriate items (such as cuddly toys for children). What results is described as a "Crowded Stage" (Heaslip, 2011, p.150) with the sheer number of disparate actors involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance complicating efforts to improve coordination.

Disaster and disaster relief are not particularly new concepts. Fritz (1961) described disaster as "Uncontrollable events that are coordinated in time or space, in which a society

undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfilment of all of the essential functions is prevented" (p.655); Sjoberg (cited by Baker and Chapman,1962) saw disaster as "a severe, relatively sudden and frequently unexpected disruption of a social system resulting from some precipitating event that is not subject to social control" (p.357); a view clearly supported by Guhu-Sapir, *et al* (2011) whose reference to "a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering"(p7) is that preferred by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). Perhaps a more telling and forthright assessment is that offered by Smith (cited by Rodriguez *et al*, 2006) who simply see disasters as:

> *"Events that produce death and destruction and cause considerable social, political and economic disruption"* (p.301).

Van Wassenhove (2006) provides a simple grid to help differentiate between sudden disasters and those which develop more slowly over a more protracted period, see Fig 2.2.

	Natural	Man-Made
Sudden-onset	Earthquake Hurricane Tornadoes	Terrorist Attack Coup d'état Chemical Leak
Slow on-set	Famine Drought Poverty	Political Crisis Refugee Crisis

Fig 2.2   Explaining Disasters. (Van Wassenhove, 2006, p476)

As will be discussed later and developed in greater depth within Chapter 3, appropriate boundary setting based on associated research boundary work (Gieryn 1983) was a key issue at the outset of this study. This meant that, whilst acknowledging the importance of all types of disasters, this review and the overall emphasis of the study took as their focus the *sudden onset - natural* (Van Wassenhove, 2006) type of disasters.

According to figures offered by CRED, in 2010 alone a total of 385 separate natural disasters killed over 297 000 people worldwide, affecting more than 217.0 million others and causing US$ 123.9 billion of economic damages (Guhu-Sapir *et al*, 2011). It is

unsurprising therefore that an extensive humanitarian community has built up progressively during the last 50 years (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006). Moreover, disaster relief is and will continue to be a growth market with both natural and man-made disasters expected to increase another five-fold over the next 50 years (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). Consideration of the natural disasters reported between 1900 and 2010, Fig 2.3 (International Disaster Data Base, EM-DAT, 2012) would seem to support these somewhat pessimistic forecasts.

Year	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Number of Disasters	5	5	8	10	15	30	45	65	120	250	450	400

Fig 2.3 Natural Disasters Reported 1900-2010 (International Disaster Database, EM–DAT, 2011).

Trunick (2005) notes that supply chain management and logistics have always been an important factor in humanitarian aid operations, to the extent that logistics efforts account for 80 percent of disaster relief. Agreeing with this, van Wassenhove (2006) argues that the majority of NGOs are in practice logistics organisations as he also estimates that some 80 percent of NGO expenditure is related in some way to logistics. One of the notable

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aspects of the relief effort following the 2004 Asian Tsunami was the public acknowledgement of the role of logistics in effective relief. In the immediate aftermath of the Tsunami, relief goods flooded airports and warehouses in the affected regions leaving aid agencies struggling to sort through, store and distribute the piles of supplies. In Sri Lanka cargo-laden humanitarian flights overwhelmed the goods capacity of the airport and downstream relief agencies struggled to locate warehouses to store excess inventory. Indian transportation pipelines were bottlenecked and in Indonesia damaged infrastructure created what Thomas and Kopczak (2005) described as a "logistical nightmare" (p1). A spokesman for Doctors Without Borders at the time acknowledged the importance of coordinated logistics and supply chain management:

> *"What is needed are supply managers: people who sort goods, identify priorities, track deliveries and direct the traffic of a relief effort in full gear"* (Economist, 2005).

However, the logistical obstacles to delivering humanitarian aid make managing a commercial supply chain look easy by comparison and many organisations continue to underestimate the importance of logistics in disaster relief operations and still focus on fundraising activities only (Murray, 2005). Whilst the perspective of the logistician is seen as a strategic and central component to the planning of effective relief effort (Thomas, 2003), research (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) has shown that only a handful of aid agencies have prioritized the creation of high-performance logistics and supply chain operations and that consequently, relief operations are not as efficient and effective as they could be; as a result relief to beneficiaries is delayed or reduced.

Having set the scene discussion must now turn to the background to and definitions of, SCM and logistics both in the generic sense and to those more pertinent to the humanitarian sector.

2.3   Supply Chain Management and Logistics

Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Logistics are not new ideas (Christopher, 2011). From the building of the pyramids to the relief of hunger in Africa, the principles underpinning the effective flow of materials and information to meet the requirements of customers have altered little. Academic opinion (Mangan *et al*, 2012; Slack *et al*, 2010; Greasley 2009; Bozarth and Handfield, 2008; Harrison and van Hoek, 2008 to name but a few) support the traditional Transformational Process view of an organisation, placing the emphasis on the activities that the particular organisation must perform when managing its own operations. However, opinion is also quick to acknowledge that it is not enough for an organisation to simply focus on operations within its own boundaries anymore, and that managers must

also appreciate how the organisation is linked within the operations of its suppliers, distributors and most importantly, customers; in essence it is vital for organisations to appreciate their position in what is termed the Supply Chain and the role that logistics has to play within it (Sweeney, 2005). SCM's economic and social construction are not just noteworthy but remarkable (Fawcett and Waller, 2013, p.183) as it provides the opportunity to optimise logistical performance at the inter-organisational level (Mangan *et al*, 2012; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Monczka *et al*, 2010; Lysons and Farrington, 2006). It seeks to achieve linkage and co-ordination between the processes of other entities (suppliers and customers) in the pipeline and the organisation itself. For SCM to be successful it involves a significant change from the traditional arm's-length, even adversarial, customer/supplier relationships of the past with a focus on co-operation and trust and the recognition that, if properly managed "the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts" (Christopher, 2011, p.3). It appears that SCM is "Logistics taken across inter-organisational boundaries" (Cooper *et al*, 1997, p.1) but what is also clear is that for SCM to succeed managers must appreciate how their organisational processes are linked in with those of their suppliers, distributors and customers (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and Handfield, 2008). The discussion will now consider the generic background to, and definitions of SCM and logistics.

2.3.1   Generic Background and Definitions

There has been significant debate surrounding what distinguishes logistics and SCM. It appears that SCM is "Logistics taken across inter-organisational boundaries" (Cooper *et al*, 1997, p.1) but what is also clear is that for SCM to succeed managers must appreciate how their organisational processes are linked in with those of their suppliers, distributors and customers (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and Handfield, 2008). Larson and Halldórsson (2004) offer 4 conceptual perspectives (see fig 2.4)

Fig 2.4   Perspectives on Logistics versus Supply Chain Management (Larson and Halldórsson, 2004, p19)

The traditionalist view places SCM within logistics, and suggests that SCM is just one small part of the logistics function. The re-labeling perspective contends that SCM is simply a renaming of what was once understood to be logistics and is now known as SCM. The unionist perspective regards logistics as a fundamental part of SCM in that SCM completely subsumes the logistics function.   Finally, the intersectionist perspective is described by Larson and Halldórsson (2004) as:

> *"The intersection concept suggests SCM is not the union of logistics, marketing, operations management, purchasing and other functional areas. Rather, it includes strategic, integrative elements from all of these disciplines. For instance, in the purchasing area, negotiating a long-term arrangement is a strategic element and transmitting a purchase order is tactical. The supply chain manager would be involved in the negotiations, but not the purchase order transmission. Similarly, in the logistics area, hiring a third-party logistics (3PL) provider is a strategic decision, while picking and packing in the warehouse are tactical. At the intersection, SCM co-ordinates cross functional efforts across multiple firms. SCM is strategic, not tactical.* (p.21)

The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP, 2014) acknowledge that supply chain management (SCM) as a profession has continued to change and evolve to fit the needs of the growing global supply chain. They also note that the fact that the supply chain is expected to cover a broad range of disciplines, means that it can be difficult to clearly define what a supply chain actually is. Indeed the CSCMP argue that at times SCM can be confused with the term logistics management; accordingly, they propose the following definitions:

> *"Supply chain management encompasses the planning and management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third party service providers, and customers. In essence, supply chain management integrates supply and demand management within and across companies"* (CSCMP, 2014).

> *"Logistics management is that part of supply chain management that plans, implements, and controls the efficient, effective forward and reverses flow and storage of goods, services and related information between the point of origin and the point of consumption in order to meet customers' requirements"* (CSCMP, 2014).

If we are to be in a position to move the discussion on to consider the specific context of the humanitarian supply chain, given that these generic definitions are set against the business sector it is appropriate at this point to consider a comparison of the humanitarian supply chain with that for the business sector.

2.3.2 Humanitarian and Business Supply Chains – a Comparison

Table 2.1 offers a comparison of the key issues associated with Business and Humanitarian Supply Chains.

	Supply Chain	
Issue	Business	Humanitarian
Logistical Demands	Predetermined Predictable - Efficient Stable - Uncomplicated	Unique Unpredictable – Reactive - Inefficient Unstable - Complex
Logistical Drivers/ Motivators	Profit Costs Quality Efficiency Effectiveness	Preservation and Improvement of Life Speed of Response – acute timeframe Flexibility Agility Effectiveness
Improvement and Learning	Encouraged Achievable	Waking up Little time to review, rapid response leads to a fire fighting approach
Actor/Stakeholder Involvement	Manageable Numbers Similar Interests	Numerous Differing Interests – political, ideological
Risk of Mismatch	Increasing - globalisation = longer paths and shorter response times Decreasing margins for error	High Very small margins for error
Approaches to Collaboration	Common reasons to collaborate – *win-win* long-term non-adversarial relationships encouraged Business Culture and successes reinforce cooperation. High levels of buyer dominance over suppliers. Ability to reconfigure supplier relationships selectively and dissolve partnerships that have outlived usefulness. Supplier Associations – forums to enable suppliers to understand customer plans Businesses can see humanitarians as idealistic and inefficient.	Little Reason to Collaborate - large numbers of disparate donors, governments and military actors with differing interests Little evidence of agreement on relationships Overall lack of coordination – some evidence of improving cooperation with organisations becoming more adept at working with corporate partners Logistics Cluster - cross functional team to coordinate NGOs and allocated process Increasing power of donors who can detrimentally affect balance of supply and demand Humanitarians sceptical of the business world.

Table 2.1   Comparison of Business and Humanitarian Supply Chains

Emergencies generated by natural disasters are unique (Chandes and Paché, 2010, p322); lives are at stake and in contrast to the business sector the issue is not to bring quality logistical service to consumers at the lowest cost. Unlike in business, where traditionally logistical demands have usually been predetermined, the humanitarian supply chain is faced with a series of unknowns (Cassidy, 2003). In business profit maximisation and cost

minimisation are ordinarily key drivers/motivators as is the desire to sustain long-term market demand and the limitation of uncertainty within the supply chain; however, the provision of humanitarian aid has a differing set of characteristics which inevitably complicate the associated management task (Decker *et al*, 2013; Kumar and Havey, 2013; Dash *et al,* 2013; Mays *et al*, 2012; Heaslip, 2011; McLachlin and Larson, 2011; Kovács and Spens, 2007). Humanitarians aim to prioritise a shared moral code which overrides economic outcomes; moreover they operate in environments which will feature high uncertainty and constantly changing contexts (Mays *et al,* 2012). Humanitarian organisations may also be expected to leave one disaster zone and deploy straight into another offering little time to invest in the process of improvement and learning. Commentators argue that humanitarian organisations are somewhere between 15 and 20 years behind their private sector counterparts in respect of the application of supply chain management tools, and in the realisation of the levels of efficiency and effectiveness associated with the recognition of logistics as a managerial discipline (Spring, 2006; Van Wassenhove, 2006).

Humanitarian disasters often involve and test the abilities of numerous organisations, actors and contending stakeholders including governments, non-governmental (NGOs) or private voluntary organisations, multi-governmental organisations, and local and national military organisations (Kovács and Spens, 2008; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009a). Within two weeks of the 2004 Asian Tsunami, Colombo airport (Sri Lanka) 288 freighter flights had arrived without airway bills to deliver humanitarian cargo (Thomas and Fritz, 2006); moreover approximately 400 NGOs were working on the ground in Indonesia alone (Völz, 2005). As is the case in the private sector, the risk of mismatch and the disruption afforded by globalisation, together with the associated smaller margins for error (Kleindorfer and Van Wassenhove, 2004) will inevitably put even more strain on humanitarian supply chains. Indeed, it is argued (Perry, 2007, Van Wassenhove, 2006; Kleindorfer and Van Wassenhove, 2004) that the private sector could have lessons to learn from the challenges faced by humanitarian supply chains, which show the extremes of a trend towards the greater levels of risk and uncertainty that are becoming more and more apparent in modern global private sector supply chains (Christopher, 2011).

This comparison and discussion leaves us in a position to consider appropriate definitions within the specific context of the humanitarian supply chain, and the associated logistics demands and requirements.

2.3.3   Humanitarian Supply Chain Management and Logistics

Humanitarian SCM and logistics have emerged as a worldwide-noticeable theme as disasters, either man-made or natural, may occur at any time around the world with enormous consequences (Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006). Consequently, the provision of timely and appropriate humanitarian aid has developed into a global and multinational industry (Carroll and Neu, 2009) and more and more focus is being placed on the optimization of the logistics and supply chains that are charged with transforming public and private donations into tangible aid. There now exists a fierce need to coordinate the logistics resources of the public and private sectors to avoid arbitrary resource allocation during disasters; however, ineffective coordination of efforts between relief suppliers, logistics servers and demanders is still a major concern (Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). It has been recognised that the humanitarian relief effort concerns itself with:

> *"A process of planning, managing and controlling the efficient flows of relief, information, and services from the points of origin to the points of destination to meet the urgent needs of the affected people"* (Ernst, 2003),

and that in humanitarian relief operations:

> *"Logistics planning and coordination need to be seen as essential rather than merely desirable"* (Rickard, 2003).

Whilst business logistics has already been clearly defined by numerous authors (see for example Mangan *et* al, 2012; Christopher, 2011; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Slack et al, 2010; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Monczka *et al*, 2010), definitions of humanitarian logistics are less prevalent. The principles of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport's Humanitarian and Emergency Logistics (HELP) forum offer one definition:

> *"Right people, equipment and material, in the right place, in the right sequence as soon as possible, to deliver maximum relief at the least cost – saved lives, reduced suffering and the best use of donated funds"* (CILT, 2011).

However, the statement offered by Thomas and Kopczak (2005) seems to be the one that is currently adopted by the majority of authors within the field:

> *"the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials, as well as related information, from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people. The function encompasses a range of activities, including preparedness, planning, procurement, transport, warehousing, tracking and tracing, and customs clearance"* (p.2)

The similarity between this definition and that offered by the CSCMP (2014) and discussed earlier, in respect of the business sector is striking. Hence, for the purposes of this research Thomas and Kopczak's (2005) definition for the humanitarian SC is adopted. Moreover, thinking back to the perspectives offered by Larson and Halldórsson (2004), some argue that within the humanitarian logistics community a re-labeling is taking place in that what was once logistics is now SCM (Heaslip, 2012b, p.38). However, given the focus on collaboration within this thesis a unionist stance will be adopted whereby logistics is regarded as a fundamental part of SCM. In keeping with the thoughts of Mangan et al (2012):

> "The SC is a much wider, intercompany, boundary-spanning concept, than is the case with logistics". (p.13)

Thomas and Kopczak (2005, p2) offer four supporting reasons why humanitarian logistics is central to disaster relief and crucial to the performance of both current and future operations:

1. Logistics is crucial to the effectiveness and speed of response for major humanitarian programs.

2. With procurement and transportation included in the function logistics can be one of the most expensive parts of a relief effort.

3. The logistics department is often the repository of data that can be analysed to provide post-event learning, as it will handle the tracking of goods through the supply chain.

4. Logistics data reflects all aspects of execution from the effectiveness of suppliers and transportation providers, to the cost and timeliness of response, to the appropriateness of donated goods and the management of information.

Having defined the humanitarian supply chain within the context of this research and acknowledged the significance of the chain itself and of the associated logistics processes, thoughts must now turn to defining the actors involved in the overall relief effort.

2.3.4   The Actors within the Humanitarian Supply Chain

The supply chains associated with business enterprise ordinarily concern themselves with the effective and efficient management of the flow of goods, information and finances to final customers (demand satisfaction); however in the case of humanitarian logistics, circumstance calls for the process to go beyond mere profitability (Ernst, 2003).   In humanitarian logistics demand is not actually created as the end customer has no true choice (Kovács and Spens, 2007); hence, the numerous actors involved in the Humanitarian Aid Supply Network are not linked or motivated by pure financial gain or by the simple need to satisfy demand. Each actor within what will be a complex supply network will have their own motivation and distinct reasons for their participation (the idea of motivation and influences will be discussed in greater depth later, see Section 2.4). Kovács and Spens first offered a model of actors within the supply network of humanitarian aid in 2007, which included donors, aid agencies, governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGO), military, logistics service providers and suppliers. The original model was presented in numerous arenas both academic and practical and following the associated feedback was modified to the revised version below (Fig 2.5)

Fig 2.5 Actors in the Supply Chain Network of Humanitarian Aid – a Revised Model (Kovács and Spens, 2008)

The revised model depicts the actors within the supply network as donors, aid agencies, NGOs, governments, military and logistics providers. Donors are considered as the important actors who, in recent years have provided the bulk of funding in support of the relief effort; typically these will include foundations, individual donors and the private sector, as well as country specific funding such as that from the United Kingdom. Other actors include the military, the governments from host and neighbouring nations, and other NGOs and logistics providers. The military is acknowledged as a significant actor on many occasions (Ozdammer *et al*, 2004) and their role will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this review. Many independent companies or individuals may elect to supply materials and services in disaster relief; however, these suppliers (Kovács and Spens, 2008) may have vastly different reasons for participating in disaster relief (the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility will be discussed later).

This model is still not without its critics and the failure to include beneficiaries as customers in respect of the aid effort has been noted (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006); however Kovács and Spens (2008) contend that they should not be included as they are not in a position to shape demand, the contention being that NGOs and aid agencies will effectively represent

the interests of beneficiaries by completing needs assessments in the aftermath of a disaster (Long and Wood, 1995). Another criticism surrounds the inclusion of the media (Heaslip *et al,* 2007), and the assertion that they can influence the donor response to disasters. Whilst acknowledging the role of the media Kovács and Spens (2008) are content that they should not feature as the final model stems from the use of an industrial network approach and, as such only includes active participants within the delivery of humanitarian aid. It should also be noted at this stage that whilst the core responsibility of humanitarian organisations is towards beneficiaries of aid, actors also face pressure from other stakeholder groups, most prominently the donors that they are ultimately accountable to (Beamon and Balcik 2008). (The associated pressures will be discussed in greater detail later in thesis). Hence, the customers of this SC network are both the donors and beneficiaries and the suppliers can also be donors and/or paid suppliers (Charles *et al,* 2010, Oloruntoba and Gray 2009). As discussed earlier, the model offered here serves to illustrate the number of disparate actors and the resulting complexity of the humanitarian SC and hence the challenge associated with achieving overall coordination of effort when at times "everyone and no one may seem to be in charge" (Heaslip, 2011, p.151).

2.3.4.1 The Military Contribution

The involvement of military forces in the provision of humanitarian aid in cases of conflict or natural disasters is not a new concept (Heaslip and Barber, 2014). Examples of associated intervention exist during World Wars I and II and up to the present day, including the Berlin Airlift, the Congo, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Mozambique (Heaslip *et al*, 2012, p.377; Doel, 1995, p.26). Weeks (2007) notes the significant United States military involvement in the responses to recent natural disasters, such as the Asian Tsunami and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Moreover, Weeks also highlights the wish of the then President (George W Bush) to see an even larger role for the military in the response to natural disasters. Similarly, with the end of the Cold War, the UK government has become more involved in the provision of humanitarian aid, not only through the funding of UN Agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) but also with the tasking of its armed forces. Such an outlook and focus is highlighted by the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011) which, under the chairmanship of Lord Ashdown considered the way that the UK government responds to humanitarian emergencies. The review identified that:

"It is because the impulse to relieve suffering is rooted in morality that our interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must always be driven by need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full part (and often a leading part) as a member of the international community in order to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more compassionate world, but a safer one too – and that benefits all of us". (HERR, 2011, p3)

There is a clear distinction between the military response to a complex emergency (such as that in Iraq or Afghanistan) and that associated with a natural disaster, and the contention amongst academic commentators is that the contributions of military actors are more readily accepted following a natural disaster (Cross, 2012; Balcik *et* al, 2010, Kovács and Taham, 2009). Moreover, in some cases the contributions of militaries who are regarded as middle powers such as those from Canada, Holland, Ireland or the Scandinavian countries is seen as more acceptable than that offered by those from larger powers, for example the United States or United Kingdom (Rutherford *et al,* 2003). Military humanitarian actors have traditionally favoured short-term lifesaving interventions with a clearly defined exit strategy (Rigby, 2001, p.957), hence in keeping with the focus of this thesis the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008) to a natural disaster is considered to be the element where there is likely to be a mix of military and non-military organisations working alongside one another (Pettit and Beresford, 2005). This is due in no small part to the capacity boosting availability of military resources, and on the military's ability to cope with the unpredictability of demand and associated flexibility of response required (Rietjens *et al*, 2007); moreover, the rapid response offered by the military together with its structured command and control systems is not found in the majority of NGOs or other actors within the humanitarian supply chain (Kovács and Tatham, 2010).

As will be discussed later within this thesis (Section 4.4.1) the Oslo Guidelines (UN, 2006) were developed to ensure that foreign military and civil defence assets deployed in response to a natural disaster could support and complement relief operations whilst working together in collaboration. The Guidelines clearly state that military resources must not be used "in a manner that would compromise the civilian nature and character of humanitarian assistance" (p.4). However, noting that military assets are still frequently used in support of the relief effort, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA) and its humanitarian partners are frequently called upon to work with its member states to incorporate into contingency planning the possibility of military asset usage, and to engage military actors at an early stage in the response in order to guide military efforts and to protect the humanitarian space (Seigel, 2011; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is the organisation within OCHA tasked with facilitating dialogue and

interaction between civilian and military actors within a given disaster zone (OCHA, 2012d). As a result of its role, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 the UN CMCS was chosen as an appropriate domain of study for this research. Furthermore, following a humanitarian natural disaster the UK government may be requested to mount or lend support to the relief effort in the country or region affected (see discussion on the role of a humanitarian military, Fischer, 2011). The UK contribution will usually be led by the Department for International Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if civilian resources are insufficient or if this approach provides a comparative advantage. The Joint Forces Logistic Component (JFLogC) is the organisation within the UK Ministry of Defence which is tasked with the planning and coordination of all military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HADRO) (MOD, 2008). Hence, as will be discussed within Chapters 3 and 5 the JFLogC was selected as an appropriate domain of study for this research.

2.3.5 Supply Network Management and Hastily Formed Networks

In an attempt to reflect the growing recognition that the logistics of a disaster response are a key cost driver (Christopher, 2011; Aitken *et* al, 2005), some argue that the term Supply Network Management (SNM) is actually a more accurate representation of the reality found in many commercial and humanitarian scenarios (Tatham and Pettit, 2010, p.610). This argument is typified by Lambert *et al* (1998) who suggest that:

> *"Strictly speaking, however, the supply chain is not just a chain of businesses with one-to-one business-to-business relationships, but a network of multiple business and relationships"* (p.1)

Given this, discussion will now turn to a network approach to the supply chain. The terms *supply chain* and *supply network* are both offered by way of descriptors of the linkages that enable organisations to serve the end customer (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011). Whilst the term *chain* describes a relatively simple, sequential set of links, *network* refers to a more complex structure which relies upon two-way exchanges between member organisations. In essence the *network* can be described as a series of interdependent processes which, when working in harmony go together to serve the end customer (Sadler, 2007). In offering arguments in support of collaboration in what he describes as a "synchronous supply chain" Christopher (2011, p141) discusses the problems associated with the inherent disconnection between stages within conventional supply chains. Moreover, Christopher goes on to contend that if the supply chain is regarded as a "confederation of partners linked together as a network" (p104) and not as a series of "separate islands" (p141), then true agility can be achieved.

Gadde *et al* (2010) bring strategic choice into the debate as they discuss three basic approaches to network strategy:

1. **Conservative Network Strategy**: Rely on low-involvement and minimal 'thin' relationships, looking instead to actively exploit perceived benefits within the market.

2. **Liberal Network Strategy**: Characterised by a variation between high- and low-involvement relationships depending on circumstances. Extensive collaboration will be used if benefit is perceived whilst other relationships may be governed by market mechanisms.

3. **Radical Network Strategy**: Relationships should be the norm as it is believed that collaboration will always provide opportunities for performance improvement.

In discussing barriers and facilitators to the development of sustainable networks, Hingley and Lindgreen (2013) argue for a clearer understanding of the potential benefits of a network structure within a business context, whilst highlighting the possible impact of power relationships and the role of lead organisations within distribution networks. Although the discussion focusses on the role of local and regional food businesses within networks the similarities with the field of humanitarian relief provision are striking. Hence the concept of relationships and power will be discussed later in this review as the potential position of the United Nations within the humanitarian SC is considered. The use of market mapping as an approach to describe the value chain, support services and business environment (Albu and Griffith, 2006) offers a participative vehicle to identify the *blockers* or *gatekeepers* (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley *et al*, 2010) who ultimately prevent cooperation and cohesion within a given network. The mapping process also promotes a better understanding of the competencies and relationships necessary for specific market systems to work by identifying 3 distinct components:

1. **Business Environment (the influencers)**: Infrastructure and policies, institutions and processes that shape the market system.

2. **Market Chain Actors and their Linkages (the players)**: The chain of actors who own a product as it moves form primary producers to consumers.

3. **Service Providers (the supporters)**: The business and extension services that support the operation.

Taking this discussion into the field of this research, Yaziji and Doh (2009) recognise the importance of NGO networks, advising that given their limited resources, NGOs in particular can benefit from network involvement. If an NGO is positioned correctly it can gain influence by identifying and filling structural holes within the network, and can find itself in the role of a *power broker* as it is called upon to mediate or moderate relationships between others within the overall synchronised configuration (Doh and Teegan, 2003). Kumar and Havey (2013) support this view, arguing the case for a network authority to make best use of the diverse expertise inherent within a humanitarian supply chain; the associated structure being designed to make best use of the community relationships and trust that exists between NGOs throughout the world, resulting in a more effective overall response. However, the challenge in applying this theoretical approach to rapid onset disasters is that the networks are what Kumar and Havey (2013) describe as *hastily formed* (HFN), hence there is not the opportunity to build the trust that can be associated with longer term relationships. The characteristics of HFN's are listed as (Tatham and Kovács, 2010):

1. Rapidly Established Network.

2. Participants from Different Communities, Organisations and Cultures.

3. Participants Forced to work in a shared, confined space.

In a development of Hung *et al*'s, (2004) discussion on a peripheral route to trust Tatham and Kovács (2010, p38) suggest a model of *swift trust* that they feel is pertinent within humanitarian supply chains, see Figure 2.6.

Fig 2.6   The Route to Swift Trust (Tatham and Kovács, 2010, p38).

Given the critical nature of humanitarian relief and the necessarily short delivery times required, the HFNs that are formed are normally between relatively small numbers of suppliers which may already have mature trusting relationships (Tatham and Kovács, 2010). However, the nature of the HFN becomes important when the other individuals and organisations that are also active in the same disaster response are considered as these relationships are not mature and the Route to Swift Trust may well be evident. Furthermore, the complexity of the final network is multiplied still further due to the numerous additional internal and external pressures that act on the humanitarian supply chain, hence, the discussion will now turn to consider these as we endeavour to clarify the overall scale of the associated managerial challenge.

2.4   Pressures on the Humanitarian Supply Chain

The discussion thus far has identified the complexity that results when a humanitarian supply chain is developed and also highlighted the number and variety of different associated actors. As will be discussed and developed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, a 3 stage research design was developed with the initial stage being based on the development of

the *etic* themes and issues that have an influence on the humanitarian SC and collaboration within it. Hence, if these themes and issues are to be identified then consideration must be given at this stage to the inherent pressures both internal and external on the SC itself.

2.4.1 Humanitarian Principles and the Humanitarian Space

> *"The Humanitarian Space is an environment where humanitarians can work without hindrance and follow humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity"* (Spearin, 2001, p22).

The principle of humanity means that humankind shall be treated humanely in all circumstances by saving lives and alleviating suffering, while ensuring respect for the individual. This is a fundamental principle of humanitarian response (Picet, 1979). The Code of conflict for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, introduces the concept of the humanitarian imperative which expands the principle of humanity to include the right to receive and to give humanitarian assistance. It states the obligation of the international community "to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed" (Slim, 2000).

Humanity, neutrality and impartiality must be present to constitute a humanitarian operation (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Add to this the concept of independence and the 4 humanitarian principles are defined (DFID, 2008):

1. **Humanity**: to bring assistance to people in distress without discrimination

2. **Impartiality**: Action is based solely on need

3. **Neutrality**: Humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict.

4. **Independence**: Humanitarian action must be kept separate from political, economic, military or other objectives.

These principles were first developed by Henry Dunant after the battle of Solferino (1859), initially to protect the rights of soldiers. They became part of the Geneva Convention in 1864 and then formed the seeds of the Red Cross Movement in 1875 (British Red Cross, 2010). *Dunanists* have their beliefs firmly rooted in the principles advocated by Henry Dunant and work tirelessly to uphold the principles of impartiality and neutrality, advocating a non-interventionist strategy in conflict (Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011).

The Humanitarian Space (the framework within which organisations can properly conduct humanitarian work) is driven by the three principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.25). The Humanitarian Space exists in both a physical and virtual sense, and it is the goal of all humanitarian agencies to live and operate within it. In the physical sense, security is the key as it represents the zone where all aid agencies are protected from violent intervention and can move and operate freely. In the virtual sense, it represents the interaction between the different humanitarian actors and systems and how they can create a working environment where their mandates can be maintained and executed. Given that all three principles included are of equal importance, Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009) contend that the visual representation of this idea (Fig 2.7) should be one of an equilateral triangle whose internal area equates to the humanitarian pace. Maintaining its balance is what all agencies should strive for and any compromise on any one principle would affect the size and shape of the triangle and ultimately individual agencies' ability to operate effectively. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the forth principle of Independence must also have an overriding influence on the overall strategy and shape of any relief operation (DFID, 2008).

Fig 2.7   Humanitarian Space and Principles (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.27)

Weiss and Collins (2000) note that a dilemma may emerge when armed conflict rages and non-combatants are clearly being targeted by a warring party. How should the humanitarian organisation maintain impartiality neutrality and independence, when this may involve

breaking these key principles by making public the violations and atrocities that they are witnessing? Moreover, as well as courting question from voluntary financial contributors, this approach may also involve humanitarian actors taking the chance that the belligerents may withdraw their consent for a humanitarian presence. Recent commentary (Charity and Security, 2010a) on the approaches of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) towards the provision of health services in Afghanistan illustrates this point and highlights the lengths that humanitarian actors must go to, and the criticism which they may face whilst endeavouring to uphold Dunanist principles. The ICRC's Mission Statement is to be:

> *"An impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance"* (ICRC, 2010).

In keeping with this statement the ICRC has been providing first aid kits, training and other humanitarian aid to anyone in the conflict areas, including Afghan security forces and the Taliban. This has triggered an angry response from some but others see it as "neutrality at its best" (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 2010). Indeed, a US military spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan offered his support to the ICRC approach recognising "the need for the their [Red Cross'] work to be executed impartially" (Washington Times, 2010). Moreover, arguments are growing (Charity and Security, 2010b) that impartiality is a fundamental principle of NGOs who provide humanitarian assistance and that it is time for the US to change laws that restrict aid groups in these efforts.

Post the 9/11 atrocities in New York (2001), arguments began to emerge regarding the humanitarian communities' ability to maintain its neutral position (Stoddard, 2003; Lobe, 2003; USAID, 2003) in the face of messages from the White House (USAID, 2003) that neutral humanitarianism had no place within the framework of the Global War on Terror. More recently, Bear (2009) offered the view that it was time to accept that NGOs were no longer neutral and that they should stop 'clinging to the myth' that they are. He cites statistical analysis (Humanitarian Policy Group, 2009) that demonstrates the increasing numbers of humanitarian aid workers killed, kidnapped or seriously injured in 2008 when compared to figures for the previous year (260 in 2008 against 206 in 2007). Bear (2009) contends that although NGOs still believe that they are maintaining a neutral stance the harsh reality is that NGOs are no longer seen as neutral, at least not in places such as Afghanistan and Darfur. Indeed the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) report (2009) explains that:

> *"The most recent evidence continues to show that even those agencies that make considerable efforts to dissociate themselves from political actors and project an image of neutrality have not been immune from attack….aid organisations are being attacked not just because they are perceived to be cooperating with Western political actors, but because they are perceived as wholly a part of the Western agenda"* (p.6)

The HPG (2009) go on to highlight the relative surge in attack rates seen, especially against NGO international (expatriate) staff and conclude that attacks on aid workers were increasingly politically motivated. In the face of these pressures, historically NGOs have still refused to accept military assistance (Beauregard, 1998, p.3), believing that it undermines their independence or compromises the key principles of impartiality and neutrality. Many NGOs oppose military assistance in the belief that being seen with any military organisation, including peace keepers, can increase the chances that the NGO will be attacked and/or denied permission to travel freely. Some organisations refuse military assistance in almost any circumstance, one such being the ICRC:

> *"Only on direct order from the ICRC headquarters will delegates even converse with any military force, let alone work with them operationally"* (Natsios, 1995, p.73).

Clearly given this discussion the role for the armed forces within humanitarian supply chains should be clarified. A view echoed by Seipel (2011) who highlights the potential that combined working between humanitarian aid logisticians and military supply chain specialists could bring (p.228) and also by Boin *et al* (2010) who call for more research to help establish under what conditions and during which phases of the disaster the military can play a role, as they note that flawed disaster supply chains often evoke calls for the military to *"take over"* as they will bring *"unified command"* and *"decisive leadership"* (p.4).

2.4.2   Political Influence and Motivation

Doh and Teegan (2003) suggest that NGOs have been defined as "Those non-profit associations focused on social change via political influence" (p.xi) and as "Organisations of individuals and donors committed to the promotion of a particular set of issues through advocacy work" (p206). In recent years numerous NGOs have been formed with the goal of influencing policy decisions and shaping global political perspectives on issues ranging from protecting humanitarian law to protecting the environment (Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003). By way of example, Amnesty International whose stated purpose is to:

> *"Stand up for humanity and human rights…………..to protect individuals wherever justice, fairness, freedom and truth are denied"* (Amnesty International, 2010)

has, through relentless campaigning, succeeded in gaining immense power in placing human rights issues high on governmental agendas (Steinberg, 2003). Similarly, Oxfam International believe that they can "End poverty and injustice, as part of a global movement for change" (Oxfam International, 2010) whist Médecins Sans Frontiéres "Are committed to providing medical aid where it is most needed, regardless of race, religion, politics or gender" (Médecins Sans Frontiéres, 2010). Using a wide range of tactics with different audiences, NGOs increasingly push their agendas through campaigns targeting specific corporations, governments or audiences (Yaziji and Doh, 2009). In some instances NGOs target specific corporations pushing them to meet existing social expectations and legal requirements but also seeking to change broader expectations about corporate responsibility and governmental regulations (Doh and Teegan, 2003).

Steinberg (2003) notes that one of the harshest fronts of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the information war, in which powerful NGOs with major influence on the international media consistently display a biased approach. He highlights what he describes as the "hijacking" of the Durban anti-racism conference in 2001 by anti-Israel NGOs as an illustration of the dangers of politically motivated humanitarian groups that derive credibility simply on the basis of mission statements promoting what he describes as universal human right". Moreover, Steinberg (2003) believes that NGOs' non-political nature and adherence to these human rights principles has given them a halo effect against criticism and scrutiny, and that direct political influence has been felt through the misquotation of international law and the overuse of terms such as war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing. This unchecked authority has allowed several groups to blur the distinction between advancing human rights and promoting narrow ideological and political causes, and this coupled with perceived impartiality has granted NGOs immense moral authority. Steinberg's comments ultimately resulted in the establishment of NGO Monitor (2010) which was founded to "promote [NGO] accountability and to advance vigorous discussion on the reports and activities of NGOs claiming to promote moral agendas, such as human aid and human rights".

2.4.3 The World Economy and International Response

Humanitarian workers and organisations face the challenge of finding neutral ways to operationalise their mandate without compromising their principles or producing a negative impact (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000). NGOs will typically try and assert economic pressure on countries and organisations to further their own stated goals or missions. One year on from the Gleneagles G8 summit, Oxfam (2006) issued a briefing note reminding member states of their agreed commitment to debt cancellation, aid provision, peacekeeping and arms control, world trade deals and climate change. This note, issued one week in advance of a follow up meeting of G8 finance ministers, explored the progress (or the lack thereof) since the G8 summit. It contrasted the positive results of decisions such as the cancellation of Zambia's $5 billion debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the removal of education fees in Burundi, with the fact that 500,000 women died in either pregnancy or childbirth and 11 million children died from poverty, conflict, and disease during the same period. A similar note (Oxfam, 2009) highlighted the perceived negativity of a model of economic growth utilised by nations rich in minerals and hydrocarbons involved in extractive activities. Arguments were offered that the model frequently had negative social, environmental, financial, and institutional impacts. Furthermore, Oxfam (2009) suggested that these issues were all consequences of exploitation contracts agreed between producing states and multinational corporations which were harmful to the common good. The view was that in many cases, such a model had contributed to bad public policies and low levels or bad quality of public spending in producing countries.

2.4.4 Fund Raising Strategies, Competition and Corporate Social Responsibility

In terms of total resources in the mid-1990s, NGOs surpassed the resources of the United Nations (excluding the IMF and World Bank) in the disbursement of total official development (Weiss and Collins, 2000). The largest NGOs had budgets of several million US dollars and were dependent upon funds from governments and international organisations as well as donations from private individuals and foundations. The Lancet (2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) acknowledge the competition amongst NGOs for donor funding and the associated desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency, sometimes at the expense of quantifiable end results. Indeed, in a review of the immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake the Lancet offer the view that NGOS were:

"Jostling for position, each claiming that they are doing the most for earthquake survivors" (p253)

In the past funding for international disaster response came primarily from a small number of western governments (Katoch, 2006). This allowed donor governments to insist that those agencies to which they gave their money participated in established coordination processes. However, responses to the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) and to Hurricane Katrina (2005) changed this situation as the public emerged as a major donor in its own right. The United Nations (2005, p4) noted that the tsunami resulted in:

"An unprecedented influx, at all levels of relief effort, of goods and services from the corporate business community".

An increasing number of companies were seeking visible means of demonstrating to their stakeholders, including employees, customers, vendors, and local communities, that they were actively subscribing to the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Katoch, 2006).

In 2002 Porter and Kramer noted that many corporations appreciated that they could enhance their competitiveness by engaging in partnerships where social and economic values overlapped. Consequently, private logistics companies (TNT, DHL, UPS, FedEx and the like) were increasingly seeking to participate in partnerships with NGO humanitarian organisations, not only with charitable and societal intent but also as an opportunity for learning and business development. Accordingly, in an era of rapid globalisation of business, disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) have prompted companies to re-examine their roles and to consider humanitarian activities in terms of their overall CSR strategy (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). The Tsunami triggered immense interest in disaster response amongst major corporations and added to the proliferation of corporate sector networks seeking their own distinct role in the relief effort. However, motivation for this interest appears to be mixed; whilst the ethics of CSR undoubtedly plays a major part, so too does a desire for the associated positive publicity and perhaps increased market access that contributions may bring (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Katoch, 2006). In short, by seeming to become better corporate citizens the view is that these organisations believe that they can benefit both their own business and society in general.

Although some NGOs, in a bid to uphold their Dunanist principles vehemently refuse any governmental contributions or limit them to a small percentage of their overall budget

(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009), Weiss and Collins (2000) argue that the majority are not so discriminating about contributions to their organisational well-being and that this dependency on corporate and governmental donations can produce another negative effect. In a bid to maintain contribution levels, NGOs may feel that they must demonstrate to donors that their presence and inputs into a humanitarian mission are valuable. Hence, the NGO may be pressured into ignoring local inputs and ideas as well as the comparative advantages of collaborating with other agencies in the field, and look instead to create and capture the humanitarian space (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.27) that best suits their donors perceived needs. Indeed, The Lancet (2010) observed during the relief effort following the Haiti earthquake, that many aid agencies sometimes acted according to their own best interests rather than in the interests of disaster victims and believed that aid organisations must be judged not just financially but also on how they physically operated within the field:

> *"Large aid agencies and humanitarian organisations are often highly competitive with each other. Polluted by the internal power politics and the unsavoury characteristics seen in many big corporations, large aid agencies can be obsessed with raising money through their own appeal efforts".* (p253)

2.4.5 Societal Wealth, Interference and Influence

High income societies can afford better measures to limit the effects of natural disasters (Strömberg, 2007). Buildings can be constructed of stronger and more durable materials; housing can be built on raised platforms to withstand flooding and agricultural areas irrigated to reduce loss during droughts. Warning systems can be introduced for certain natural disasters (Sheets and Williams, 2001 cited by Strömberg, 2007) and when disaster does strike, such as the recent floods in Australia or the earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand (BBC News, 2011, 2011a, 2011b) negative effects can be limited, as medical care and food can be quickly provided and mass evacuations facilitated when needed. Moreover, as the government typically handles many of these measures, disasters may be less severe in societies which have efficient and accountable governments, and within countries that are more democratic with civil liberties and a free press (Isham *et al*, 1997; Sen, 1990). Indeed, in a comparison across states within India, Besley and Burgess (2002) found that emergency relief was more responsive in states where people read newspapers.

In the aftermath of natural disasters there can be significant interference with society and therefore institutional change arising from both the initial impact effects and corresponding responses (Albala-Bertrand, 2000). Moreover, such effects and responses may be intense, long-term and, in the main deliberate. The associated preventative activities may have

societal implications as they aim to modify people's behaviour and institutions, so that if the impact cannot be avoided at least its effects can be both reduced and effectively counteracted when and if they do occur. Preventative activities may include, for example the establishment of land-use regulations and building codes, with the associated enforcement structures. They may also deal with people's involvement in the implementation of effective prediction or warning measures and self-help systems, and also in government's rapid and effective reaction to potential and actual impact effects (Strömberg, 2007, Albala-Bertrand, 2000). Furthermore, preventative measures may include insurance, mortgage and taxation systems that encourage safer types of behaviour and a better distribution of risk so that disaster effects can be reduced (Albala-Bertrand, 2000). Finally, in a bid to gauge response effectiveness and to minimize antisocial and speculative behaviour, markets, migrations and human reactions may be monitored.

Having considered the pressures that are inherent within the humanitarian supply chain thoughts must now turn to the distinct phases of the relief effort (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and to the identification of an appropriate phase of focus for this research.

2.5   The Phases of Disaster Relief

Disaster Relief is often described as a multi-stage process (Tomansi and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007; Petit and Beresford, 2005; Nisha de Silva, 2001; Long,1997). Lee and Zbinden (2003) discuss three phases of disaster relief operations, *preparedness*, *during operations* and *post operations*. This idea is taken a stage further (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) with different operations or phases within disaster relief being identified as preparation, immediate response and reconstruction, see Fig 2.8.

Fig 2.8   Phases of Disaster Relief Operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007)

Preparation: Although natural disasters are difficult to predict, some regions are prone to prepare for particular risks. Tokyo, San Francisco and Reykjavik are

offered as examples of cities that need to make careful preparations for the possibility of major earthquakes (Kovács and Spens, 2007, p.102) and other cities and regions are too close to active volcanoes or lie in hurricane prone regions to simply ignore appropriate preparation and planning (Nisha de Silva, 2001). However, Murray (2005) notes that as donors often insist that money is seen to go directly to help beneficiaries by way of direct aid, the financing of preparatory measures are often neglected; hence regional actors such as regional governments, businesses and NGOs should finance and lead preparatory initiatives. From a research perspective, Kovács and Spens (2008) discuss the focus within the literature on the preparation phase to the detriment of the immediate response and reconstruction phases. They note the abundance of simulation and modelling articles on the preparation phase (p.220) and the reliance on the ability to offer predictions of requirements, such as inventory (see for example Chang *et al*, 2007; Beamon and Kotelba, 2006) in support of natural disasters. In short, the contention is that few papers deal with the physical dynamics of an emergency and with tem the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008).

Immediate Response: Once a natural disaster strikes, the emergency plans of regional actors are instigated (Kovács and Spens, 2007). However, although actors may be prepared for the disaster, they will still be forced to operate in an environment with a significantly destabilised structure (Murray, 2005; Cassidy, 2003). Moreover, the challenge can be compounded if the disaster strikes in a less developed region, which from the outset may have inadequate infrastructures (Long and Wood, 1995). As a result, actors are forced to make assumptions regarding the requirements of the aid effort on limited information. The main problem areas within the immediate response phase lie in coordinating supply requirements against unpredictable demand (Long and Wood, 1995) and with what is termed the last mile problem (Gaboury, 2005; Ozdamar *et al*, 2004; Beamon, 2004; Long 1997; Long and Wood, 1995) of transporting the correct items to beneficiaries. Consequently, unsolicited supplies are seen to create blockages within the humanitarian SC at airports and within warehouses (Murray, 2005; Cassidy, 2003). The few articles that have focussed on the immediate response phase consider the problems of coordinating supply and also consider the challenges of unpredictability and of meeting the last mile challenge (Kovács and Spens, 2008, p.221). However, many of these articles are located within quantitative method and suggest new modelling and simulation developments (see for example Tzeng *et al*, 2007; Yi and Kumar, 2007; Tovia, 2006). In short, the call is for more qualitative research which has as its focus the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008).

Reconstruction: Gustavsson (2003) notes that for many disaster struck regions funding is often focussed on short-term relief and that the long-term reconstruction phase is neglected. However, the reconstruction phase is argued to be of equal importance as disasters can have long term effects on a region (Kovács and Spens, 2007). Hence, regional actors should also have as their focus the reconstruction phase, which will require some form of continuity planning; moreover, a key element of this process should include consideration and appropriate revision of preparatory plans to encompass lessons learned from the outcomes of the response to the current disaster (Thomas, 2003), thereby completing the loop back to the preparation phase. Kovács and Spens (2008) contend that the reconstruction phase has largely been neglected both in the literature and in humanitarian aid as a whole (p.222). Gustavsson (2003) believes that this is indicative of the lack of long-term funding and the associated concentration on the immediate response phase. Perhaps understandably, articles that do focus on reconstruction are focussed on regional perspectives rather than on the overall relief effort (see for example Salam, 2007, which focusses on the outcomes of the Asian Tsunami).

Whilst acknowledging the importance of all phases of humanitarian relief provision, the calls for more qualitative research within the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008) and the expected outcomes of a piece of doctrinally focussed research, volume of information and the need for focussed research effort, meant that the decision was taken to concentrate on the Immediate Response phase of humanitarian relief provision.; hence, this review will now take as its focus the immediate response phase and the discussion will turn to an appropriate supply chain to address the associated demands.

2.5.1 Immediate Response Phase – The Right Supply Chain

"The onset of a disaster will demand an immediate response with the emphasis on getting the right goods, at the right time, to the right place, and distributed to the right people" (Tomansi and van Wassenhove, 2009, p.48)

During the early stages of the disaster relief effort supply chains need to be designed and deployed at once even though the knowledge of the situation may be very limited (Beamon, 2004; Tomansi and van Wassenhove, 2004; Long and Wood, 1995). Whilst it is essential to design and instigate a supply chain that addresses the immediate needs of the affected population (food, water, shelter, medicines), information may be very limited on the specific impact of the particular disaster.

"The smooth coordination and avoidance of duplication of effort relies on information sharing and knowing who will be involved in the disaster response and in what capacity" (Tomansi and van Wassenhove, 2009, p.49).

The urgency and pressures involved may mean that humanitarian agencies are happy to accept a premium to get the right goods to the right place at the right time; for example, goods may be flown in from abroad as quickly as possible as at this stage expense is secondary. Research into sources of supply chain delay within warehousing or customs processes (Handfield and Nichols, 1999) suggests that as much as 95% of associated time and resources are wasted on waiting for goods and services to arrive in the required place. Clearly any saving in this area within a humanitarian supply chain could be turned into preserved lives on the ground. Whilst speed and urgency are key, not every type of good is needed in every disaster zone and unsolicited donations may actually become a burden on the supply chain; hence, it is imperative that appropriate monitoring and communication are evident to promote efficiency; what Christopher (2011) describes as supply chain responsiveness. Moreover, supply chain collaboration is argued to be important as sub-optimisation occurs when each organisation within a supply chain attempts to optimise its own results rather than integrating its goals and activities with other organisations for the benefit of the whole chain (Christopher, 2011; Senge, 2010; Cooper et al, 1997), hence it is appropriate that we consider these concepts next.

2.6 Humanitarian Supply Chains - The Case for Optimisation and Collaboration

"Problems of inter-agency coordination are often most evident in the initial frantic stages of response to a humanitarian emergency when aid agencies often fail to make the effort, or simply find it too difficult to collaborate" (Fenton, 2003, p23)

"The myriad of humanitarian organisations must co-ordinate their efforts in every disaster if they are to provide real relief at the point of need"
(Kovács and Spens, 2009, p506)

"Logistic co-ordination is required both within humanitarian supply chains and between humanitarian organisations to achieve efficient relief"
(Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, p115)

Supply Chain Collaboration (SCC) is not a new concept. Writing in 1990 Bowersox concluded that what he termed logistics alliances "were making US industry more efficient and thus more competitive" (p.45). In citing one executive who said "for us, the reason for this venture [logistics alliance] is market impact…. cost reduction is important but secondary" (p.45), Bowersox further noted that, in keeping with Porter's (1990) value chain analogy, the main rationale for orchestrating an alliance was to increase competitive

advantage. SCC is focused on relationships and may be of significant benefit to all supply chain partners (Monczka et al, 2010; Lysons and Farrington, 2006). SCC simply refers to a chain where two or more independent organisations work jointly (collaborate) to plan and execute supply chain operations with greater success than when acting in isolation (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). Successfully formulating the appropriate strategy in a particular customer/supplier situation implies that all entities within the supply chain must work together (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006). Collaboration has been promoted as a silver bullet in many areas of SCM and it is argued that overall supply chain value is increased when organisations within the chain seek to integrate their goals and activities together with other organisations for the benefit of the whole chain (Christopher, 2011; Cooper et al, 1997; Porter, 1990) rather than focussing on their own individual results. A global survey of supply chain progress conducted in 2004 (Supply Chain Management Review and Computer Sciences Corporation) observed that collaboration was cited as the single most pressing issue. The survey showed that 44 percent of the sample organisations had initiatives specifically associated with collaboration; however, only 35 percent of these initiatives turned out to be even moderately successful. Kampstra and Ashayeri (2006) contend that this offers a typical example of a situation where not all participants in every supply chain had embedded collaborative values and that you cannot ultimately collaborate with a party that lacks a genuine desire to collaborate.

Dash *et al* (2013) discuss the positive impact that collaboration and coordination can have on overall supply chain performance. With emerging competition for funding amongst major relief organisations, Thomas and Kopczak (2005) note that although many humanitarian heads of logistics faced the same challenges, there is still a tendency for each to fight their own battles with little collaboration; indeed the lack of logistical integration means that humanitarian organisations run the risk of entering into direct competition with other organisations (Chandes and Paché, 2010); competition that limits the ability to achieve some level of common intent (Olson and Gregorian, 2007). Fenton (2003) comments on the sad reality of this behaviour, noting that all too often emergencies trigger a huge scramble amongst aid organisations for donor money to support their own relief incentives, which is often to the detriment of valuable coordination (p24). Following their review of core logistics challenges post the 2004 Asian Tsunami, Thomas and Kopczak (2005) found that several humanitarian relief organisations were, in a bid to speed up future response times, independently seeking to procure regional warehousing and that three such organisations were actually talking to the same warehouse providers in the same city. Similarly two organisations had commissioned costly analyses to select a fleet management system and three were, again, independently wrestling with the idea of a training program for field logisticians. None of these managers knew that their counterparts had the same objectives

hence, there was little collaboration or resource sharing. Moving this idea on to the immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, *The Lancet* (2010, p253) comment on the "jostling for position" amongst NGOs and on the fact that some agencies claimed to be "spearheading" the relief effort, whilst in reality the situation in Haiti was "chaotic, devastating and anything but coordinated".

A theoretical discussion (Carroll and Neu, 2009) seeking a developmental framework for a comprehensive set of universal techniques and a commonality in humanitarian logistics and supply chain management, discusses the importance of taking a tri-axial view based around the complementing characteristics and common values associated with the business, military and humanitarian logistics sectors. Through better collaboration the humanitarian relief sector could take best practice from business and military logistics and supply chain management systems, as they seek to improve the overall performance of humanitarian logistics missions. A similar review in the aftermath of the Asian tsunami (Oloruntoba, 2005) suggests that whilst the extent of effective collaboration between national authorities, local actors and international actors appeared to be *adequate*, longer term coordination and partnership between actors would be required for a successful relief effort and that there should be clarification of organisational roles in disaster management. In Haiti, the United Nations, commenting on the relief efforts following the 2010 earthquake noted the lack of:

> *"Capacity [on the ground] required to coordinate efficiently the large number of partners (in excess of 900 official NGOs were operating in Haiti according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) involved in the operation"* (Lynch, 2010).

In addition, Heaslip (2010) observes that:

> *"In fragile settings such as Haiti, the mandates, timeframes, guiding principles and methodologies for working of civilian aid agencies and military forces are radically different and often clash, despite good intentions and a sincere common desire to "help the people" held by international military and civilian aid personnel involved in disaster relief operations".*

Moreover, extensive academic commentary (Russell, 2005 and Davidson, 2006 both cited by Carroll and Neu, 2009; DEFRA 2007; Townsend, 2006) on a wide variety of humanitarian relief operations, ranging from the Asian Tsunami in 2004, the South Asian earthquake and US Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the UK floods in Hull in 2007, all point to catastrophic logistics and supply chain management failures. All of these examples display similar identifiable failures stemming from the neglect of close proactive collaboration within the whole network of disaster and emergency relief actor agencies. Whilst each organisation had its own operating methods and goals, it is only through the coordination of plans and

the sharing of resources that "effective humanitarian logistics" would be truly achieved (Long and Wood, 1995, p216). Additional work written in the days immediately following the Asian Tsunami (Oloruntoba, 2005) also acknowledged the plethora of domestic and international agencies and organisations working to address the regions' humanitarian relief requirements, whilst it also offered additional support for the establishment of a standardised, coordinated logistics management system within the region. Earlier work (Gustavsson, 2003) focussing on lessons learned following humanitarian relief efforts within Kosovo and Iraq (post military intervention), acknowledged that no one agency could meet the logistical challenges presented within the associated supply chains on its own, and that what was required was a much higher degree of collaboration across all agencies. It was important that the whole humanitarian relief sector drew on the proven expertise and successes borne out of cooperation and collaboration across the commercial sector. In a similar vein, Kovács and Tatham (2009) in a paper investigating ways of improving SC responsiveness pointed to the necessity of greater interoperability between the numerous actors, whilst Akhtar *et al* (2012) noted that successful coordination in Humanitarian Supply Chains could contribute towards:

> *"acceptance of proposals, amount of donations received, delivering supplies and completing projects on time, quality, reduction of costs, a quick response time, flexibility, fair distribution of supplies, donors and beneficiary satisfaction"* (p.22)

A selective review of literature within the field (Carroll and Neu, 2009) noted that proposed solutions to alleviate operational failures along humanitarian logistics and supply chains centred upon adaptations of traditional conceptual approaches to SCM. The underlying theme was for a common approach requiring collaboration throughout and between supply chain tiers and actors at all levels and positions of responsibility.

> "*Where end to end supply chain collaboration was not developed sufficiently to offer a robust and responsive logistics system, product or service delivery failure was inevitable"* (Carroll and Neu, 2009, p1029)

Supply Chain Optimisation concentrates on controlling the various elements of the supply chain and removing the non-value-added steps that are evident within it. In keeping with many academic commentators, (Mangan *et al*, 2012; Seipel, 2011; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Christopher, 2010; Skjoett-Larsen *et al*, 2003), Lysons and Farrington (2006) argue that optimisation of the supply chain is most likely to be achieved by collaboration between cross-functional teams within the organisation and customers and suppliers external to it, but can this be achieved within the pressurised environments inherent after a disaster within environments which are typically characterised by the need for acute urgency and a high level of intensity (number of tasks vs time and available

resources). Moreover, actions within these environments will be carried out by a series of different actors with different levels of commitment to the task and each other, and with differing motives and agendas (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada *et al*, 2006; Lyles, 2005). In essence, the profit-making incentive associated with Lysons and Farrington's (2006) arguments for supply chain collaboration is effectively replaced by the need for a speedy and lifesaving response. Furthermore, Davis (1993) suggested that reduction of uncertainty within such a supply chain would lead to optimisation and pointed out that failure to fulfil promises was a distinct source of such uncertainty.

2.6.1   Collaboration through Clusters

In offering his economic cluster theory, Porter (1998) suggested that clusters are:

> *"Geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field…. they often extend downstream to channels and customers and laterally to manufacturers of complementary products and to companies in industries related by skills, technologies, or common inputs"* (p.78).

Moreover, being part of a cluster allows companies to "Operate more productively whilst coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement" (p.81). Patti (2006) develops this concept into the Supply Chain context, contending that clusters should "include upstream suppliers and downstream customers and may often extend horizontally to include the makers of similar and complementary products that require the same basic skills, raw materials, and specialized equipment" (p.266). Cluster members benefit from both competition and cooperation. Productivity increases for members as they are afforded better access to employees and suppliers and to specialised information and public institutions, increased availability of complementary products and services, and better motivation and incentivisation. Competition amongst members forces them to improve their efficiencies, to control costs, and to actively seek ways to enhance their capabilities and overall contribution; without this competition and motivation amongst members a cluster will fail. Much of the cooperation will occur vertically within the supply chain. However, horizontal cooperation will occur whenever there is no direct competition and whenever there is an outside threat to the overall existence of the cluster (Patti, p.267).

Whilst recognising what they describe as the "veritable flood of interest" (p.1) of the cluster concept in regional analysis and policy, by way of contrast, and in critique of Porter's (1998) original work Asheim *et al* (2009) contend that clusters have been "oversold" (p.23) and suggest that there has long been a need for an objective assessment of their feasibility and

overall success. Simmie (2009) also criticises Porter's (1998) contribution to the debate on clusters as he comments that many industrial regions and areas of the business sector cannot be fully analysed and driven using a clustered approach. Similarly, Martin and Sunley (2003, p.5) question the success of a clustered approach and argue that "the mere popularity of a construct is by no means a guarantee of its profundity"; indeed, they go on to debate the influential nature of the clustered approach and the fact that "its overall seductiveness has resulted in a rush to apply the concept in some business arenas, in advance of theoretical and empirical assessments of the strategy" (p.35). Turning to the practical application of the concept and in particular the application of the clustered approach to the humanitarian sector, as will be discussed later in this Chapter (section 2.10) Jensen (2012) argues that whilst clusters are fine in principle, in practice they are ineffective and cumbersome as they slow things down in the field; in essence little had actually changed since clusters were first introduced into the humanitarian supply chain.

2.6.2 Horizontal and Vertical Collaboration

When considering the variety of forms of potential supply chain collaboration, Barratt (2004) argues the case for two main categories, vertical and horizontal collaboration, see Fig 2.9. Horizontal collaboration improves coordination between organisations that are "experts in the same functional area" (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p.666) and occurs when 2 or more competing or unrelated organisations cooperate to share private information or resources such as a warehouse space or manufacturing capacity (Prakash and Desmukh, 2010; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). It is defined as "concerted practices between companies operating at the same level(s) in the market" (Cruijssen *et al,* 2007) and may involve collaboration with both competitors and non-competitors (Barratt, 2004; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). Vertical collaboration aims to "synchronise different levels of a supply chain for overall efficiency…..making all participants focus on the final customers' needs" (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p.667). It takes place across different tiers within the supply chain and occurs when "two or more organisations such as the manufacturer, the distributor, the carrier, and the retailer share their responsibilities, resources, and performance information to serve relatively similar end customers" (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p.19).

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                          Vertical
                        Collaboration

                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │                 │
                    │    External     │
                    │  Collaboration  │
                    │   (Suppliers)   │
        ┌───────────┼─────────────────┼───────────────┐
        │           │                 │               │
External│           │                 │    External   │      Horizontal
Collaboration (Other│     Internal    │  Collaboration │    Collaboration
   Organisations)   │   Collaboration │  (Competitors) │
        │           │                 │               │
        └───────────┼─────────────────┼───────────────┘
                    │                 │
                    │    External     │
                    │  Collaboration  │
                    │   (Customers)   │
                    │                 │
                    └─────────────────┘
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
Fig 2.9   The Scope of Collaboration: Generally (Barratt, 2004)

In summarising selected theoretical ideas on collaboration and categorisation, Jahre and Jensen (2010, p.666) offer the following views on what to coordinate and why:

Dimension/ Type of Coordination	Horizontal	Vertical
What to Coordinate	Actors, activities, resources at strategic, tactical and operational levels in information, money and material flows for companies at the *same* stage in the supply chain. Focus on the companies and their specific tasks.	Actors, activities, resources at strategic, tactical and operational levels in information, money and material flows for companies at *different* stages in the supply chain. Focus on the customer and synchronisation.
Why Coordinate	To achieve economies of scale and to reduce costs for the individual company. To have access to more physical resources, information and competence.	To reduce overall supply chain costs for some actors. To improve customer service through smoother flows.

Table 2.2   Coordination Aspects in Selected Literature (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p666)

Collaboration through the adoption of clusters has been suggested as a possible solution to address the lack of optimisation and coordination inherent within the humanitarian supply chain, and the United Nations Cluster Approach has been identified as a step in the right direction in this respect (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 2006), hence the review will now turn to a consideration of the UN Cluster Approach.

2.7   The United Nations Cluster Approach – A Step in the Right Direction?

Fig 2.10   How the Cluster System Works (UN OCHA, 2011)

The United Nations (UN) Cluster Approach was developed following the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) of the global humanitarian relief system commissioned by the then United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, which was tasked with carrying out "an independent assessment of the humanitarian system in which the experts identify reasons why the aid community sometimes falls short of its goals" (p.1). The HRR (OCHA, 2005) concluded that:

> *"A common element in the problems encountered is reliance of many NGOs on individual initiatives as opposed to group action….however, there is a sense that the time has arrived for the humanitarian community to work collectively towards an inclusive system-wide coordination mechanism to which all stakeholders can feel a sense of belonging."* (p.47)

2.7.1   Aims and Structure

The UN Cluster Approach organises humanitarian relief into a number of specialist clusters with a predefined leadership. The aim of the approach is to strengthen overall response capacity as well as to improve the overall effectiveness of the response in five key ways (United Nations OCHA, 2005):

1. Ensure sufficient global capacity is built up and maintained in all the main sectors/areas of response, with a view to ensuring timely and effective responses in new crises.

2. Provide predictable leadership in all the main sectors/areas of response.

3. Develop/ design approaches around the concept of partnerships (i.e. clusters) between UN agencies, international organisations and NGOs.

4. Strengthen accountability by making cluster leads answerable at the global level for building up a more predictable and effective response capacity and at the field level, for fulfilling agreed roles and responsibilities.

5. Improve strategic field-level coordination and prioritization in specific sectors/areas of response by placing responsibility for leadership and coordination of these issues with the competent operational agency.

The cluster concept is designed to apply to all humanitarian UN bodies, as well as national and international NGOs involved in the provision of disaster relief. In essence any humanitarian organisation which has the capacity can lead a cluster and organisations working in the field may find themselves contributing to a number of clusters. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) which is designated as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance (IASC, 2011) has defined global clusters in eleven functional areas of humanitarian activity, with associated lead organisations, see Table 2.3. However, whilst the responsibilities for cluster leads have been clearly defined, commentators (Jensen, 2012) argue that the ways in which those responsibilities should be handled are *"less obvious"* (p.148). In essence how is the cluster leader expected to fulfil its lead responsibilities in an environment where many independent organisations *"often object to being directed"* (p.148).

Global Cluster	Cluster Lead Organisation(s)
Camp Coordination and Camp Management	UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
Early Recovery	UN Development Programme (UNDP)
Education	UN Children's' Fund (UNICEF) Save the children (SC)
Emergency Shelter	UNHCR International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
Emergency Telecommunications	World Food Programme (WFP)
Food Security	Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) WFP
Health	World Health Organisation (WHO)
Logistics	WFP
Nutrition	UNICEF
Protection	UNHCR International Rescue Committee (IRC) UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) UNDP Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	UNICEF Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief (RedR)

Table 2.3   Global Clusters and Cluster Leads (Humanitarian Reform, 2011)

Having introduced the cluster concept and described it in general terms, given the framing of this research and overall research question it is appropriate that this research takes as its focus the logistics cluster.

2.7.2   The Logistics Cluster

The Logistics Cluster is responsible for preparedness and emergency response in respect of the overall logistics response and is expected to (Altay and Labonte, 2011, p.92; Jahre and Jensen, 2010):

1.   Fill logistics gaps and alleviate bottlenecks

2.   Prioritize logistics interventions and investments

3.   Collect/ share information and assets

4.   Coordinate port and corridor movements to reduce congestion

5.   Provide details of transporters and rough indication of market rates

6.   Provide guidance on customs issues

7.   Provide information on equipment and/or relief supply items

In the first year of implementation of the UN Cluster Approach (2006) the Logistics Cluster accounted for by far the largest portion of the allocated resource (almost one quarter of the US $40 million total budget, (OCHA, 2006, p.3). Altay and Labonte (2011, p.93) suggest was that this substantial contribution could serve as an indicator of the importance of logistics in humanitarian operations or alternatively could demonstrate the amount of neglect afforded logistics as a discipline within the field up to that point in time. Encouragingly, or perhaps worryingly as at 2011, the only one of the eleven functional clusters to meet the IASC Working Group baseline capacity and preparedness standard (to be able to respond to 3 major disasters per annum, affecting up to 500,000 with two disasters occurring simultaneously) was the Logistics Cluster (Altay and Labonte, 2011, p.93).

2.7.3   An Aid to Collaboration?

Research into and evaluations of the cluster approach and of interventions since its first field use in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006 (Jahre and Jensen, 2010; ActionAid, 2007; Stoddard *et al* 2007; Cosgrave *et al*, 2007; Street, 2007) note initial high levels of confusion regarding individual agency roles; there was a general lack of understanding amongst field workers in respect of the role of each cluster and the associated cluster leads (Stoddard *et al,* 2007*;* Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006). However, there were many positive aspects to the Concept including increased opportunities for collaboration and dialogue, improved coordination and greater predictability (Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006); the approach continues to develop and in 2011 it was viewed as a means of facilitating more effective and efficient levels of humanitarian response in the medium to long-term (Altay and Labonte, 2011). However, there are still concerns relating to inter-cluster coordination. It has been noted that:

> *"The general feeling amongst NGOs was that clusters were overly compartmentalised and that there were too many"* (ActionAid, 2007, p.5).

There was also a

> *"Fundamental barrier to addressing cross-cutting issues stemming from weak inter-cluster coordination, including inadequate information management and analysis"* (Stoddard *et al*, 2007, p.40).

When reflecting on the humanitarian efforts in respect of the 2007 Mozambique floods, concerns were raised that whilst the clustered approach might encourage a closer focus on the designated functional areas (see Table 2.3), this could be to the detriment of cross-

cluster themes (Cosgrave *et al*, 2007, p.3). Furthermore, research on the application of the approach in Pakistan post the 2005 earthquake, observed that some participants:

> *"Found the increased demands due to the need for inter-cluster coordination to be a burden rather than a help in ensuring adequate and timely responses, in managing information and avoiding both gaps and duplication"* (Street, 2007, p.3).

2.7.4   Horizontal or Vertical Collaboration?

Considering the relative merits offered by the application of both horizontal and vertical collaboration it has been argued (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010) that the focus of the cluster system thus far has been on Horizontal Collaboration, that is "improving coordination between organisations that are considered to be experts in the same functional area of disaster response" (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p.666). Cluster collaboration takes place, on the whole between providers of services at the same stage of the supply chain, for example between providers of water and sanitation solutions. However, Kovács (2011) does question the role of cluster leaders, describing the current system as a "stove-pipe approach" whilst noting that:

> *"Everybody wants coordination [collaboration] but nobody wants to be to be coordinated"* (p251)

One clear advantage of horizontal collaboration is the achievement of economies of scale for actors and this is perhaps a key driver for the adoption of this approach in what are globally frugal times. However, this approach can also be the source of a significant overall disadvantage as became evident when considering the response to the Pakistan earthquake (Street, 2007), where individual clusters were seen to function with internal efficiency, whilst failing to operate in harmony with one another. An issue summarised by Jahre and Jensen (2010):

> *"Coordination [collaboration] within clusters may impede coordination [collaboration] across clusters, leading to excessive functional focus and reduced focus on total beneficiary needs"* (p.667)

Whilst accepting that the application of horizontal collaboration is still far from perfect, academic opinion (Kovács, 2011; Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Street, 2007) suggests that the real challenge for the cluster approach lies in the adoption of vertical, cross-cluster collaboration, which occurs when "2 or more organisations such as the manufacturer, the distributor, the carrier, and the retailer share their responsibilities,

resources, and performance information to serve relatively similar end customers" (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p.19). Research (Jahre and Jensen, 2010) suggests that it is inherently difficult to make humanitarian supply chains customer driven, and that a more strategic approach considering the upstream level could serve to enhance on going and future humanitarian operations (p677). Significant problems are generated as responsibility for global resource allocation is defined by the permanent cluster lead whilst facilitation of the appropriate response in the field rests with the designated local cluster leader. Evidence suggests that cross-cluster collaboration, and a means to bridge the supply chain from the global to the local level has still to be addressed (Stoddard *et al*, 2007). Summarising (Jahre and Jensen, 2010):

> *"Effective vertical collaboration depends on successfully merging the pipelines of many of the organisations in an operation, and on creating a strategic level for carrying out coordination between disasters; that is preparing for a coordinated approach in operations"* (p668)

Building on these ideas it has been suggested that the next dimension for collaboration within humanitarian disaster relief should be to seek a more strategic view as the field looks to move on from a Humanitarian Logistics Management (Horizontal) approach to adopt Humanitarian Supply Chain Management (Vertical) concepts (Kovács, 2011, p253). A view echoed by the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), an independent review chaired by Lord (Paddy) Ashdown tasked to look at how Great Britain responds to humanitarian disasters, who amongst their findings concluded that clusters needed to be more strategic, and be grouped around need and the ability to work on several levels (HERR, 2011, p31).

This discussion on the United Nations Cluster Approach would suggest that the United Nations has a significant role to play in the management of relationships amongst collaborating actors within the humanitarian supply chain, hence it is appropriate that the discussion moves on to consider the associated academic discourse within this context.

2.7.5 Relationship Management, Power and Supply Chain Collaboration

Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that the three critical components to a supply chain strategy are information flow, product flow and relationship management. Moreover, they describe relationship management as the most fragile and tenuous of the three. Traditionally business exchange has been based on transactional relations focusing on a single product transaction with little if any information sharing (Jagdev and Thoben, 2001). Transactions in the 1970s and 80s were characterized by tough price negotiations with seller and buyer looking at their customers and suppliers as adversaries that provided the best way to increase the individual company's profit margin (Skjoett-Larsen *et al,* 2003). These arm's length relations were often characterised by distrust and competition. At the end of the 1980s a significant change in trading relations took place with previous arm's length relations being replaced by durable arm's length relationships and strategic partnerships (Kalafatis, 2000; Dyer *et al*, 1998), characterised by a high degree of information exchange. It has been suggested (Christopher, 2011) that the practice of partnership sourcing is now widespread and that the benefits of such an approach can include improved quality, innovation sharing, reduced costs and integrated scheduling of production and delivery. At the route of this argument are the concepts of Relationship Marketing (RM) and Partnering. RM emphasises the importance of establishing and maintaining relationships between customers and buyers (Iglesias *et al*, 2011, p631). Initial definitions of RM (for example Berry, 1983 cited by Iglesias *et al*, 2011) centred their focus on relationships with external customers; however, other, more recent commentators developed the concept of RM to include other actors and relationships, out with those established between a company and its end customers (Christopher *et al*, 1991). This idea of the expanded view leads to the concept of Partnering which Upadhye and Battacharya (cited by Sadler, 2007) define as:

> *"Business relationship based on mutual trust, openness, shared risk and shared rewards that yield a competitive advantage, resulting in greater business performance than companies could achieve individually"* (p169)

The idea proffered is that customer/supplier relationships should be based on partnership and that successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and trust where there is a constant search for win-win solutions (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006).

Power as a construct in business to business relationships has received irregular and contrasting treatment from analysts (Hingley, 2005a, p.848). Contrasting views surround

the idea that on the one hand power can have a negative effect on the workings of a successful supply chain, in that it negates co-operation and is not helpful in building relationships (Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997); however, there are some commentators (Kalafatis, 2000; Earp *et al,* 1999; Blois, 1998; Campbell, 1997) who support the view that power can have a positive influence and that diversity within relationships is a good thing. Campbell (1997) notes that there is no clear correlation between a customer's trust in a supplier or vice versa and that the basis of relationships is founded on other factors such as business opportunism or a salesman's charisma. Similarly, Palmer (2002, 2000) contends that individuals and organisations are not motivated by the need or desire to cooperate but by self-interest and in the longer term self-preservation; a view supported by Cox (2004, 2001) who argues that business relationships are entered into for reasons of self or organisational gain, usually associated with monetary gain. The acceptance of power imbalance is a first step towards successful relationship building and although collaborative chain activity is commended suppliers must still be prepared to operate within conditions of imbalanced power and reward (Hingley, 2005a, p.63). Whilst modern day literature more often than not trumpets SCM and SCC as strategies that benefit all collaborators and ultimately the end customer, we should not lose sight of the fact that it is possible for some contributors to try and take advantage of the situation by forming opportunistic trade deals at the expense of other members (Simtupang and Sridharan, 2002). These actions may generate inertia and supply chain conflict, resulting in unnecessary cost and a degraded customer service. Consequently, a key factor in the construction of a successful collaborative supply chain must be the elimination of managerial inertia in favour of a chain that develops joint initiatives to ensure that each member has a stake in success by delivering value to the end customer. A collaborative supply chain should develop appropriate and common performance measures, integrated policies, information sharing, and incentive alignment. Despite the clear and slightly historic message on the benefits that SCC can bring, Senge (2010) seems to suggest that little has changed. Whilst initially agreeing that in order to effect change across a supply chain you must first "Focus on the nature of relationships" (p.71); sadly, Senge goes on to add:

"*In most supply chains, 90 percent of them [relationships] are transactional …..there is very little trust and very little ability to innovate together*" (p.71).

Having discussed power as a construct in business to business relationships and the contrasting views on the influence that power can have on the workings of a successful supply chain (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 2005a; Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Kalafatis, 2000; Earp *et al,* 1999; Blois,1998; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Campbell, 1997) the debate must now turn to the question of who is the true power broker along the

humanitarian supply chain? In introducing the Structural Holes Theory Burt (2005) contends that an individual or organisation within a network, can strengthen its position by acting as a broker. In this context the broker would seek to identify structural holes within the humanitarian supply chain and to creating bridges across these holes, hence relocating the organisation in a stronger and more powerful position. The United Nations Cluster Approach suggests that the UN is the accepted power broker in a system that is realising opportunities for dialogue and improved coordination and that is now facilitating more effective and efficient levels of humanitarian response in the medium to long-term (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006). However, is this really the case with actors and organisations readily accepting that power imbalance is a first step towards successful relationship building and in certain circumstance being content to operate within conditions of imbalanced power and reward (Hingley, 2005a, p.63).

2.8   An Empirical Opportunity - The Case for Further Study and the Identified Research Gaps

The foregoing discussion and analysis have served to highlight a clear empirical opportunity within what is a developing body of academic knowledge. Moreover, a significant number of research gaps have been identified which will form the basis of this research and the final doctoral study. These gaps will now be analysed and considered by way of justification of the final research question and aim.

2.8.1   A Burgeoning Field

Whilst acknowledging the attention that the field of humanitarian SCM has gained as a research area, and the fact that researchers have begun to lay the foundations for a core body of knowledge, numerous academic commentators (Leiras *et al*, 2014; Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Mangan *et al*, 2012; Overstreet *et al,* 2011; Kovács and Spens, 2011, 2008 and 2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2004; Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005; Murray, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; Rickard, 2003) suggest that the research field of humanitarian SCM is relatively new and is still in its infancy.

"Literature on humanitarian logistics is scant" (Kovács and Spens, 2007, p100)

Fawcett and Waller (2013) contend that SCM is the newest business discipline and that, as such it is going through what they describe as "growing pains" (p.183) as it seeks to chart its future course and define a meaningful destiny for itself. Indeed, whilst the use of SCM techniques is becoming more prevalent in the humanitarian sector (Leiras *et al*,

2014; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009), with the intent to encompass cross-functional and inter-agency approaches becoming more popular, it is acknowledged that there is no single form of humanitarian supply chain and, therefore no single definition of *Humanitarian Supply Chain Management* (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, p.115).

Modern Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) supply chains enable a faster and more effective response than ever before (Day *et al*, 2012). Although the number of beneficiaries of humanitarian aid has grown year-on-year (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011; Tatham 2011), until the inception of *The Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management* (JHLSCM) in June 2011 no dedicated journal existed within the field nor was there any journal or other outlet focusing on this topic alone. Academic interest has been growing in this area, yet publications still remain fragmented and generalised; however, acknowledgment is now made of the increasing number of special issues of scientific journals that have been dedicated to the humanitarian logistics field since 2005 (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011). Hence, whilst lessons have been learned from past aid operations, operational failures still occur at the point of contact for humanitarian missions. Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) comment on the growing body of practice-based literature on Humanitarian SCM and Logistics, but note that this work seldom refers to well-established concepts within academic supply chain literature; they go on to postulate that if attempts were made to apply such concepts from the business model to the humanitarian aid supply chain, we may identify many important parallels, but also many equally important differences (p.115). Similarly, Beamon (2004) observes that the majority of existing supply chain research is focused on managing and/or optimizing the commercial supply of goods and services, and that whilst the humanitarian relief process is an important domain for SCM it has received little attention.

In their study of the 2007 Pisco Earthquake in Peru, Chandes and Paché (2010) discuss the absence of collaboration between humanitarian actors and highlight that this resulted in lost time, wasted resources and ultimately a deeply disorganised supply chain (p337). Observation of the logistical response to the Pisco earthquake demonstrated that business logistics, mixing a service and a manufacturing perspective, could furnish valuable information to the field of humanitarian logistics not only on the conditions of success within collaborative logistics, but also on the obstacles that must be overcome (opposition of individual and collective interests, conflict over the division of tasks to be performed….). In concluding, Chandes and Paché (2010) demand a greater depth of exploratory reflection within humanitarian logistics and a more rigorous maintenance of the debate surrounding SCM, opening a research agenda of the highest priority on the critical need for a more collaborative strategy (p337). Moving this debate forward Dash *et al* (2013) suggest that

"disaster response supply chain management is an emerging field and there is great potential for research in emergency logistics and disaster response initiatives" (p.60) and Kumar and Havey (2013) highlight the need for more research on disaster relief supply chain management in light of frustrations with the delays in receiving aid following the Haiti earthquake (2010). Finally, by way of a summary of current thinking in the field, Fawcett and Waller (2013) suggest that:

> *"Recent research indicates that the top barrier to more effective HADR is inadequate logistics, followed by weak governance and insufficient collaboration"* (p.187)

2.8.2 Standardisation and Collaboration

In the aftermath of the Asian Tsunami, there was a noticeable increase in interest from academia as well as from logistics practitioners in the development of theory and practice within the field of Humanitarian SCM; indeed some 40 separate articles and conference papers were published in the area between late 2005 and 2007 (Grant and Auton, 2008; Kovács and Spens, 2008). Humanitarian logistics had established itself as a field of high research interest however, whilst many papers within the field used the concept of supply chain management as a starting point, very few of them had a supply chain focus in the empirical research, for the field to develop such an approach was called for (Kovács and Spens, 2008). There is an urgent requirement for standardisation of logistics for humanitarian emergencies, a shortage of humanitarian logistics experts, inadequate assessment and planning and limited collaboration and coordination across the humanitarian supply chain as a whole, which creates duplication of effort and wastage (Kovács and Spens, 2007, p103). This lack of collaboration could, at worst mean that relief efforts in the field are restricted; hence, networks within affected countries which are best placed to implement immediate aid might be severely limited, leading to an increased loss of life and suffering (The Lancet, 2010). Although the discipline of humanitarian logistics is "maturing" (Kovács, 2011, p260), for the field to truly evolve, further research is needed in support of the planning and execution of the important operations of disaster relief. Sophisticated collaboration mechanisms, such as those seen in commercial supply chains that are not currently observed in the disaster relief chain, require further inquiry to develop new and innovative ways to define relationships and contracts in ways that support the provision of humanitarian relief (Akhtar *et al*, 2012; Balcik *et al*, 2010, p33; Vincent and Bagshaw, 2005). However, as already discussed the extent of the challenge implicit in achieving a coordinated response between NGOs must also reflect, at least in part, the desire of many such organisations to maintain a degree of independence from their colleagues (Tatham, 2011).

Thomas and Fritz (2006) note that academic comparability between humanitarian and business operations processes has been limited and Carroll and Neu (2009), whilst supporting the concept of end-to-end supply chain collaboration within humanitarian logistics, offer what they describe as a pioneering attempt to promote best practice analysis from military, business and humanitarian sectors (p1029).

> *"Perhaps the supply chain academic community has a role to play in disseminating the concepts of its discipline in a way that convinces humanitarian donors of the importance and value of providing resources for appropriate information systems and supply chain processes [Supply Chain Collaboration] as much as for tangible relief supplies".* (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, p118)

Discussing aspects of humanitarian supply chain management that are in need of further research, Larson (2011) highlighted the importance of further investigation into the role of intra- and inter-organisational relationships offering the hypothesis that:

> *"Greater coordination – within NGOs, among NGOs and between NGOs and other actors can reduce disaster risk and improve humanitarian effectiveness"* (p29)

whilst Boin *et al* (2010) offer the compelling view that:

> *"Coordination is the Holy Grail of disaster response"* (p4)

In a similar vein, outlining potential areas of research within the field Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that the combination of inter-agency collaboration with supply chain collaboration should be a key research area (Table 1, p8); humanitarian logistics requires good and applicable research with empirical data being gathered through the use of case studies or other qualitative methodologies. Indeed, a poll of Editorial Advisory and Review Board members carried out to establish the scope of the first publication of the JHLSCM (Kovács and Spens, 2011) led to specific criticism of the seeming reliance on the use of quantitative methodologies, which led to research outcomes that "often propose elegant solutions to problems, with little or no attention paid to how solutions might be implemented" (p10). Kunz and Reiner (2012) offer the view that "empirical methodologies such as cross-organisational case studies should be used more in order to increase knowledge in the field" (p.133) as they note that most research methodologies utilised within humanitarian logistics research use simulation and modelling. Supporting these views, Balcik *et al* (2010) point out that :

> *"The literature lacks studies that broadly and systematically address relief chain coordination"* (p22)

This drive and need for more research in this area is perhaps best summarised by Tatham (2011):

"Given its pivotal role in the preparation for, and response to, a disaster, logistics and the members of the logistic profession across all of the responding agencies and organisations have a highly influential role to play. Improved cooperation would not only pay significant dividends through the development and sharing of best practice and the appropriate integration of people, processes and technology, it would also help to break down the wider barriers of mutual suspicion that, unquestionably, exist" (p14)

2.8.3   A More Strategic View - Learning From and Informing Business

What of the discipline and practice of supply chain management as a whole? Larson (2011) offers the view that humanitarian logisticians have much to learn from their business counterparts; there has been limited knowledge transfer between business and humanitarian logistics practitioners and as a result aid agencies are many years behind business organisations in the adoption of modern supply chain practices (p15); indeed it has been suggested that humanitarian aid agencies may be 15 or even 20 years behind adopting today's fundamental tools of logistics and supply chain management (van Wassenhove, 2006; Spring, 2006). However, it should also be noted, that there is increasing opinion that the traditional view of a predictable and stable commercial supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm. Dash *et al* (2013) proffer the idea that some aspects of commercial logistics and SCM in support of normal every day activity are similar to those within disaster response supply chains; hence, managers of both disciplines could learn from each other and supplement best practice within both fields (p.58). Commercial supply chain managers are increasingly faced with challenges that no longer obey the traditional rules of forecast driven certainty and are therefore, forced to adopt the more event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian counterparts (Decker *et al*, 2013; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011). Indeed, the prospective outreach of humanitarian logistics research through managerial relevance and access to research results, and the overall usefulness of such work to logistics practitioners in all fields is now being noted (Dash *et al,* 2013; Decker *et al*, 2013; Kovács, 2012). In short, perhaps the commercial sector has something to learn from its humanitarian counterparts and vice versa?

2.8.4 Identified Gaps in the Research

By way of a final summary of this discussion and in support of the final research question, aim and adopted methodology and method, Table 2.4 is now included which sets out and describes the background to the identified research gaps.

Identified Research Gap	Description	Academic Underpinning Sources
Research in the field of humanitarian SCM is relatively new and is still in its infancy.	Humanitarian SCM is starting to receive attention as a field of research and scholars have begun to lay the foundations for a core body of knowledge; however the field still needs significantly more academic research and associated publications.	Leiras *et al*, (2014) Fawcett and Waller (2013) Kunz and Reiner (2012) Mangan *et al* (2012) Overstreet *et al* (2011) Kovács and Spens (2011, 2008, 2007) Carroll and Neu (2009) Tomasini and van Wassenhove (2009) Grant and Auton, 2008 Thomas and Fritz (2006) Yamada *et al* (2006) Lyles (2005) Murray (2005) Thomas and Kopczak (2005)
The humanitarian field must encompass more cross-functional and inter-agency approaches	SCM is the newest business discipline and is still seeking to chart its future course and define a meaningful destiny for itself.	Leiras *et al*, (2014) Fawcett and Waller (2013) Tatahm and Paettit (2010) Ballou (2007) Tomansini and van Wassenhove (2009) Oloruntoba and Gray (2006)
Research within humanitarian SCM seldom refers to the application of well-established concepts within academic supply chain literature such as those associated with SC collaboration.	If attempts were made to apply well-established academic concepts from the business sector to the humanitarian SC, then important parallels, and equally important differences may be identified to the benefit of the overall relief effort.	Akhtar *et al* (2012) Kunz and Reiner (2012) Balcik *et al* (2010) Carroll and Neu (2009) Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) Vincent and Bagshaw (2005) Beamon (2004)
A research agenda is required on the critical need for stronger governance and a more collaborative strategy within the humanitarian SC.	There is an absence of collaboration within the humanitarian SC, hence a greater depth of exploratory reflection is required, and a more rigorous debate surrounding humanitarian SC collaboration is needed.	Leiras *et al*, (2014) Fawcett and Waller (2013) Kumar and Havey (2013) Kovács (2011) Tatham (2011) Balcik *et al* (2010) Chandes and Paché (2010) *The Lancet*, 2010

Identified Research Gap	Description	Academic Underpinning Sources
Lessons can be learned from the humanitarian sector by business sector SC managers to the benefit of the discipline of SCM as a whole.	There is limited knowledge transfer between business and humanitarian logistics practitioners and as a result aid agencies are many years behind business organisations in the adoption of modern supply chain practices. The traditional view of a predictable and stable commercial supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm within the business sector and SC managers face similar challenges to their humanitarian counterparts.	Dash *et al* (2013) Decker *et al* (2013) Kovács (2012) Christopher and Tatham (2011) Boin *et al* (2010) Carroll and Neu (2009) Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) Thomas and Fritz (2006)
Further research is needed into the role of intra- and inter-organisational relationships within the humanitarian SC.	The contention is that greater coordination within NGOs, among NGOs and between NGOs and other actors within the humanitarian SC can reduce disaster risk and improve humanitarian effectiveness. The belief being that coordination is the Holy Grail of disaster response.	Leiras *et al*, (2014) Kovács and Spens (2011) Larson (2011) Boin *et al* (2010)
More research is required within the field with empirical data being gathered through case studies or other qualitative methodologies.	Current research within the field is predominantly focussed on quantitative methodologies which utilise simulation and modelling.	Kunz and Reiner (2012) Kovács and Spens (2011) Tatham (2011)
More research is required into the success of UN Cluster Concept	Analysis of the United Nation Cluster Approach suggests that the concept has, in part answered the call for a collaboration within the humanitarian SC. Is this true in reality?	Altay and Labonte (2011) HERR (2011) Kovács (2011) Barratt, 2004

Table 2.4   Identified Gaps in the Research

2.9   The Final Research Question and Aim of the Thesis

Given the foregoing discussion, this study will seek to fill the identified gaps in the research (Table 2.4) surrounding the effective planning and coordination of the provision of emergency logistics and to evaluate how effective collaboration might be achieved along the humanitarian supply chain as a result. The foregoing narrative and analysis therefore gives rise to the single research question:

> **When considering the Immediate Response to Natural Disasters what are the key drivers within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain that will help to improve future collaborative working?**

The aim of the thesis is to make a theoretical contribution to contingency theoretic perspectives and a functional contribution to existing business and humanitarian supply chain practice, by revealing what factors restrict effective collaboration between actors within humanitarian relief environments and suggesting how these issues might be addressed in the future.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

"People undertake research in order to find things out in a systematic way, thereby increasing their knowledge"

(Jankowicz, 2005)

3.1   Introduction

Once a topic has been identified and a research question refined, thoughts must then turn to the sort of data required to answer the question and to how this data might be gathered (Cameron and Price, 2009). A research methodology is simply a technique for collecting data (Creswell, 2013; Bryman and Bell, 2007) and choosing an appropriate methodology depends on a clear understanding of what each method has to offer, what it can do and, perhaps more importantly what it cannot do and what type of research findings will be produced. The research philosophy adopted contains important assumptions about the way in which the researcher views the world and these assumptions will underpin the overall research strategy and chosen methods (Saunders *et al*, 2010). Accordingly, the range of issues that bear, both directly and more peripherally, on the research approach adopted will be addressed. In explaining how the final methodology was arrived at both the external and internal influences on the methodological decisions made will be acknowledged, and sources revealed surrounding the connections between the purpose of the research, the philosophical and theoretical perspectives taken and the research question previously arrived at in Chapter 2. A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data and the choice of design reflects decisions made about the priority given to a range of dimensions within the research process (Bryman and Bell, 2007); hence, set against this background the research design methods employed to collect and analyse data will also be discussed.

3.2   Methodological Choice, Research Philosophy and the Personal Perspective

Methodology should represent the theory of how actual research is undertaken (Blaikie, 2007). In achieving this, methodology seeks to guide the development of rigorous, comprehensive and integrated approaches based on critical assessment of a range of influences and options. Blaikie (2007) goes on to suggest that these should include, amongst other things, the topic of research, underlying philosophical inclinations about how theory should be generated and/or tested, what criteria should be satisfied and what resources are available. In essence the research methodology adopted must contain

important assumptions about the researcher's ontological and epistemological views on the world (Saunders *et al,* 2009). Business and management researchers must have an awareness of the philosophical commitments that they make through their choice of research strategy as this has a significant impact not only on what they do but on their understanding of what it is that they are actually investigating. In part the philosophy adopted will be influenced by practical considerations, however the main influence is likely to be the particular researcher's view of the relationship between knowledge and how it is developed. The important issue is not whether the researcher is philosophically informed but how well is the researcher able to reflect upon the philosophical choices made and defend them in relation to the alternatives available (Johnson and Clark, 2006 cited by Saunders et al, 2009, p108).

Individual assumptions about human knowledge and about the nature of reality will have an inevitable impact on how we shape and understand research questions, the methods that we use and how findings are interpreted (Crotty, 1998). The contention being that the main influence on the philosophy that an individual adopts is likely to be their particular view of what is acceptable knowledge and the process by which this is developed (Saunders *et al,* 2012, p.128). As discussed earlier within this thesis (section 1.2), prior to taking up a role within academia, the researcher served for almost 26 years in the RAF, in what is arguably a classic objectivist reality. The structures and social entities certainly exist in a reality that is external to, and independent of the social actors within it (Bryman and Bell, 2012; Blakie, 2007). In essence military personnel change roles on a regular basis, but duties are described by terms of reference and operating procedures which must be adhered to. A strict hierarchy is necessarily maintained and there is little, if any room for the subjectivist view. Furthermore, when considering the epistemological position and what is accepted as knowledge (Bryman and Bell, 2012; Saunders *et al,* 2012; Cameron and Price, 2009; Blaikie, 2007) the law like generalisations associated with the military environment would seem to reflect the positivist philosophy and the position associated with that of the natural scientist (Saunders *et al*, 2012, p.134). Add to this the fact that this researcher served as an aviation engineer and the suggested links to an objectivist, positivist stance would seem obvious. However, whilst still serving, this researcher began to consider management as an academic discipline and was stuck by the fact that despite this objectivist structure, individual approaches to management and the interactions between the associated social actors within the military arena, still had a significant part to play in the overall nature of reality. In effect, for this researcher the opinion was formed in favour of the subjectivist aspect of ontology. Moreover, the view was also developed that the social world of management was simply too complex to support this 'law-like' scientific generalisation and that for meaningful commentary, an understanding of the differences between social actors

must be considered. Hence, against this argument and realisation the subjectivist, interpretivist views are favoured by this researcher and, as will be described in this Chapter will form the basis for the remainder of this thesis.

3.3   Formulating the Research Question – Identifying Relevant Literature

Exploring and engaging with the literature relevant to the particular focus of the research must be a thread that runs through the entire research process (Creswell, 2013; Cameron and Price, 2009; Blaikie, 2007). Moreover, in order to establish what work has been previously published within the subject field, it is important that the literature search is carefully planned to ensure that the relevant and up-to-date literature is located (Saunders *et al,* 2009). In order to avoid what they describe as *information overload* Saunders *et al* (2009, p.75) suggest that key words and search items should be established at an early stage; accordingly, the table included at Appendix A sets out the key words used throughout this research process. These key words were revisited on a 4 monthly cycle to ensure that an up-to-date literary review was maintained; in addition reference lists associated with articles found during the initial keyword search were also investigated. Consequently, the stock of literature gradually expanded to well in excess of 250 items. Hence, it was useful to keep a data base of articles with a short précis of each article being maintained to aid with the management of the literature. In addition to journal searches through established library search engines, such as Emerald and Ebsco, the research was also informed through registration with Google Scholar, which proved to be a very useful and much used facility throughout the project.

3.4   Arriving at a Methodology

Arriving at a methodology is a complex process. The range of methodological literature that explains the different approaches to research that have developed, in both the natural and social sciences, bears witness to how diverse the options are, how problematic the choices may be and how these are intimately connected to different philosophical and theoretical perspectives (see for example: Creswell, 2013; Gill and Johnson, 2010; Cameron and Price, 2009; Saunders *et al*, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Blaikie, 2007). Numerous academic models are offered which seek to assist researchers in navigating these diverse options and the inherent complexities and perhaps conflicts involved in selecting an appropriate methodology (see for example: Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders *et al*, 2009; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). As with any model it would be unwise to consider any one in particular as necessarily *right*, but by the same token it would also be folly to consider any model as *wrong,* at least because they all offer an attempt to distil ideas and options down to a

workable and tangible level. In short, as a guide for how an issue might be resolved, they are essential and extremely helpful. Indeed, Partington (2000) suggests that the level of consideration should lie somewhere between simply applying an established, normative approach with little further comment and reconstructing the entire philosophy of science to arrive at a unique methodological strategy. His advice, however, is to find and explain an approach that is appropriate to the requirements of the research and its context rather than to favour either extreme. This advice echoes that of Emmett (1972), to adopt a style that is essentially a matter of convenience, employing an approach that is relevant and helpful to the subject matter and the method of enquiry, rather than given as an absolute. Accordingly, the thinking that was used to arrive at the chosen approach will now be explained.

3.4.1 The Research Process - An Appropriate Methodological Model

As discussed previously there are numerous models which attempt to represent the field. The models aim to integrate contributions from a range of academic texts in an attempt to encapsulate the options available for the researcher. More or less prescriptive as to the approaches to research, they usefully indicate how philosophical, theoretical and methodological perspectives might be aligned. One such model, that offered by Saunders *et al* (2009), (Fig 3.1) depicts what they refer to as the *research onion*. This nested hierarchy seeks to avoid the strict polarity apparent within some models (see for example: Hussey and Hussey, 1997), while retaining the conceptual identity of the different layers and still indicating potential associations between those layers.

Fig 3.1   The Research Onion (Saunders *et al*, 2009, p.108)

In keeping with other such representations, Saunders *et al* (2009) offer a model that allows the researcher to identify the key issues that require attention if the final research methodology adopted is to be both justifiable and credible. Fundamental to its use is a process that leads from initial considerations of underlying philosophical perspectives through a series of *layers* before finally arriving at appropriate methods of data collection and analysis. The researcher also considered this model to be similar to the depiction of a hill on an Ordnance Survey map. If one considers the *onion* in a 3 dimensional way, then the overall data collection method becomes the top of the hill with all of the supporting elements that go towards the overall philosophy and approach underpinning the *peak*. With this in mind, in order to clearly explain and justify the thought processes involved in arriving at the final methodology the *onion* will now be systematically *peeled*, (or indeed the hill climbed), with discussion of each exposed *layer* being offered to explain the thinking behind the final chosen approach.

3.5 Philosophical Positioning

As discussed earlier, the research philosophy adopted must contain important assumptions about the researcher's ontological and epistemological views of the world (Saunders *et al*, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007). In part the philosophy adopted will be influenced by practical considerations (access to data and/or participants, time constraints etc..) but it is these assumptions about initial researcher positioning that will underpin the overall research strategy and the associated research methods. Considering the outer layer of the research onion at Fig. 3.1 Saunders *et al* (2009) offer a comparative view of the 4 alternative research philosophies.

	Positivism	Realism	Interpretivism	Pragmatism
Ontology – the nature of *reality*	External, objective, independent of social actors	Objective. Exists independent of human thoughts and beliefs or knowledge	Socially constructed, subjective, may change	External multiple, view chosen to best enable answering of research question
Epistemology –what constitutes *knowledge*	Only observable phenomena can provide credible data	Observable phenomena provide credible facts. Insufficient data means inaccuracies	Subjective meanings and social phenomena. Focus upon the details of a situation and reality behind the details	Depends on the research question. Either or both observable phenomena and subjective meanings can provide acceptable knowledge

Table 3.1   Comparison of 4 Research Philosophies in Management Research (Saunders *et al*, 2009, p.19)

3.5.1 Ontology and Epistemology

The idea that ontological and epistemological standing can be effectively polarised onto a position on a sliding scale is somewhat simplistic although it is fair to acknowledge that this representation does help to portray the options that are available to the researcher. As this research was primarily concerned with the relationships that exist amongst actors within Humanitarian Relief Supply Chains, and the influence of those relationships on the

collaborative process, the focus had to be from the perspective of the actors involved. Furthermore, given the objectives it was of limited interest to simply describe particular behaviours in particular circumstances. Von Wright (1971, cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007) depicts the epistemological clash between positivism and interpretivism when considering the social sciences and discusses the issues surrounding appropriate approaches when trying to interpret human action. In essence the clash reflects a division between gaining an *explanation* of human behaviour that is inherent within the positivist approach and the *understanding* of human behaviour that is the goal of interpretivism. The aim within this research project was, through appropriate analysis and some warranted speculation to identify the processes and mechanism that produced inherent behaviours, the influences on those behaviours and to speculate on how they might be modified and ultimately improved for the greater benefit of all involved in the provision of humanitarian relief (see discussion on Porter's Value Chain (1990) within Section 2.2). The goal was not to simply *explain* inherent behaviour, but to develop an approach that would reveal participants' *understandings* of behaviours that held reality for them; hence the epistemological locations would have to reveal humanitarian actor's interpretations and understandings of their reality coupled with an ontology that would link participant experiences with dissimilar levels of reality.

Hence in keeping with the thoughts of Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, cited by Saunders *et al*, 2009, p.109) whilst the pragmatic approach was intuitively appealing, the idea of a constantly moving ontology did not seem appropriate. The subjective, socially constructed ontological view coupled with the epistemological focus on the details of a situation and the reality behind those details meant that the overall standpoint within this thesis was an interpretivist one.

Final Philosophical Positioning

Interpretivism

3.6   The Appropriate Research Approach – Deductive or Inductive?

3.6.1   Distinctions

The distinction between deductive and inductive approaches is at first glance a simple one (Creswell, 2013; Saunders *et al,* 2010; Cameron and Price, 2009). Deductive research has its origins in research in the natural sciences. It starts with theory and proceeds by testing

hypotheses derived from that theory. On the other hand, inductive research does quite the opposite in that it starts with observations and derives theory from those observations. Bryman and Bell (2007) offer the opinion that the deductive approach represents the commonest view of the nature of the relationship between theory and research as the researcher develops hypotheses based on what is known about the domain under scrutiny and of the associated theoretical ideas; however, they also argue that the last step when utilising deduction actually involves some induction, as the researcher infers the implications of his or her findings for the theory that prompted the whole exercise. Whilst noting that deductive research is what most people understand as *scientific research* Cameron and Price (2009) believe that logically speaking inductive research must come first and that induction is the "chicken that lays the theory egg" (p.75). But just as the processes associated with a deductive approach will entail an element of induction so the inductive approach is likely to include some deduction. Once the phase of theoretical reflection on a set of data has taken place, the researcher may wish to collect additional data in order to identify the conditions in which a suggested theory will or will not hold true, in short the application of a deductive approach utilising the newly induced theoretical ideas (Saunders *et al,* 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).

3.6.2   A Collective Wariness – the Case for the Inductive Approach

The emergence of the social sciences in the 20th century led to a wariness of deduction amongst associated researchers. Social sciences researchers were critical of the idea that a cause-effect link could be made between particular variables without allowance being made for an understanding of the way in which humans interpret and interact with their social world. Followers of induction also criticise the ridgid methodologies associated with deduction that make no allowance for alternative explanations of what is actually happening (Saunders *et al*, 2009). The call for more inductive, theory-building studies which are useful, relevant and up-to-date has been growing for some time (see for example Daft and Lewin, 1990 who question the usefulness and relevance of much organizational theory). Underlying these practical concerns are the more fundamental methodological issues surrounding the dominance of the quantitative, deductive, theory-testing research paradigms in management research which is challenged on scientific grounds (Partington, 2000, p.92). Numerous commentators now offer the view that the evolving status of research into organisations has made it appropriate for researchers to adopt methodologies that aim to build new theories from empirical data (see for example Eisenhardt, 1989). As discussed earlier this research sought to identify and understand relationships within the field of humanitarian supply chains and the influences that social interaction could have, hence the interpretive view working with what Saunders *et al* (2009, p.116) describe as the

social actors within the field was adopted. Moreover, as highlighted within Chapter 2 (see section 2.11), although the discipline of humanitarian logistics is "maturing" (Kovács, 2011, p260); for the field to truly evolve, further research is needed in support of the planning and execution of the important operations of disaster relief. Sophisticated collaboration mechanisms, such as those seen in commercial supply chains that are not currently observed in the relief chain, require further inquiry to develop new and innovative ways to define relationships and contracts in ways that support the provision of relief (Balcik *et al*, 2010, p.33). Hence, the case for an inductive approach lies in this desire to induce hypotheses from the field research. Given that the purpose of the research was to develop an understanding and explanation of the nature of relationship forming, analysing data as defined by the subject matter rather than on pre-constructed hypotheses which had been developed in advance of the fieldwork, the inductive approach was considered to be the most appropriate.

> Final Research Approach
> **Inductive**

3.7   The Final Research Strategy

3.7.1   Grounded Theory

"*The purpose of grounded theory is theory construction rather than description or application of existing theories*" (Charmaz and Bryant, 2011, p.292)

Grounded theory is thought to be the best example of the inductive approach as it is firmly rooted in the assumption that research should not begin with a prior hypothesis but that hypotheses should be developed from close data analysis (Silverman 2011a, Saunders *et al,* 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007). Based on the seminal work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) it is a strategy which should be adopted where a more behaviouristic review is required (Sunday, 1979 cited by Gill and Johnson, 2010). But grounded theory was and still remains more than simply a process of theory development that is grounded in data collection. It is implicit in the joint and several works of Glaser, Strauss, Corbin and others that the term *grounded theory* refers to a process. However, although much cited in the organisational literature, Bryman and Bell (2007) note that the associated methods and techniques remain

contentious, not least between its original authors who developed the approach along different paths following the publication of the initial text (Glaser and Strauss, 1967); moreover, there is considerable controversy about what grounded theory actually is and entails (Charmaz, 2000 cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.585). Whereas Glaser (1992) has sought continuously to promote a highly flexible approach dependent as much on the creativity and ingenuity of the research as on any procedure guidance, Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) have developed an ever more systematised approach where data collection, analysis and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another. Reassuringly, one part of the process of development is the clear shift that Glaser and Strauss have both made from their initial 1967 view that grounded theory was uniquely the domain of professionally trained sociologists to one accepting that the approach was adaptable to a variety of fields and disciplines (Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1990), although perhaps more especially in the social sciences.

Miles and Huberman (1994) offer the view that the grounded approach can be used to enable the researcher to "identify and explain patterns and processes, commonalities and differences" (p.9). However, Suddaby, (2006, cited by Saunders *et al,* 2009) lists six common misconceptions about a grounded approach:

1. It should not be an excuse to ignore the literature.
2. It is not a presentation of raw data.
3. It is not theory testing.
4. It is an interpretative, highly creative process and not a logico-deductive one.
5. It is not perfect and can by its very nature be 'messy'; hence the researcher must develop a tacit feel for their data.
6. It is not easy and is the product of experience, hard work and creativity.

Partington (2000) offers a similar view, in that researchers attracted by the guiding principles associated with grounded theory cannot escape the undiminished need for "sensitivity, creativity, patience, perseverance, courage and luck" (p.91). Against these warnings is the view that where the researcher wishes to facilitate reflection upon events and/or identify organisational structure then inductive grounding may make this process easier (Locke, 2001); moreover, this approach can also offer a "strong handle on what real life is like" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.10) and is conducted by "people who apply a broad set of skills and experiences in a variety of settings rather than exclusively by functionally constrained academics " (Partington, 2000, p.91).

In this research, therefore, the decision was taken to use the highly flexible approach espoused by Glaser (1992). The attraction of the Glaserian approach was that it does not simply support the 'classic' grounded approach, but allows the researcher the licence to

build upon existing theory and the freedom to speculate on developing elements of that theory rather than simply producing a range of procedurally linked concepts as espoused by Strauss and Corbin (1990). Glaser (1992) explicitly allows for considerable freedom in speculating beyond the raw data to draw generalisations, rather than to depend on strict adherence to procedural rules and the constraints of conditional process. However, in spite of his somewhat free-form approach Glaser's ultimate and explicit interest remains in the development of strong sociological constructs (Glaser, 1992). Although the researcher is not a trained sociologist, this work was based on an interest in the processes of organisational life and on the wish to generate a theoretical explanation for poorly researched phenomena in a discrete context. The view was taken that, even for a relatively novice researcher, this kind of investigation held the potential to produce interesting contributions to both theory and practice, and perhaps have relevance beyond the limited context of the research. Hence, the overall strategy was best placed within the grounded theory-building approach.

3.7.2   Case Studies

"*A strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence*" (Robson, 2002, p.178)

Yin (2009) describes a case study as "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context" (p.14). Simons (2009) argues that in-depth case study research is more effective in addressing *what is currently happening* within an industry and *why it is happening* when compared to more traditional analysis, which often describes *what has happened in the past*. Case studies should be of particular interest if the overall aim of the research is to gain a rich understanding of the process being studied (Creswell, 2013; Morris and Wood, 1991 cited by Saunders *et al,* 2009). Saunders *et al* go on to suggest that case study research is more often than not used in explanatory and exploratory research which is aimed at addressing the question *why*? Yin (2013) distinguishes between case studies and histories, but the only difference that he identifies between the two is that a case study uses direct observation and systematic interviewing. Yin also offers the view that a case study is an empirical inquiry that enables:

1. In depth investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.

2. The study of a situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points.

3. The utilisation of multiple sources of evidence.

Traditionally theory has been developed by combining observations from previous literature, common sense and experience, but the tie to actual data may often be a somewhat tenuous one (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, back in 1967, Glaser and Strauss were arguing that it is the intimate connection with the empirical reality that permits the development of a testable, relevant and valid theory. Qualitative research studies social phenomena from the perspective of the informants (Creswell, 2013; Banister *et al,* 1994). Within this general tradition, case studies have an important function in theory building, especially when investigating emergent organisational behaviour that is informal or unusual, when current theory is weak or under-developed and there are potentially many variables whose connections are not immediately obvious (Hartley, 1994). Hartley goes on to suggest more specifically that case studies allow us to explore social processes as they unfold, in their natural organisational and environmental context, often revealing uniqueness rather than typicality. Similarly, by engaging closely with the informant's domain the researcher can capture the concepts and categories used by subjects to organise their world and therefore aid the emergence of new insights (Jones, cited by Mangham, 1987). Yin (2013) notes that case studies are also useful when the boundaries between context and phenomena are not clearly evidenced and context is deliberately part of the design.

When researching in a field for which little or no formal theory exists or, as here, when new insights are sought, the value of the qualitative theory building approach to case study becomes evident (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Yin (2009) points out that bias on the part of the researcher and a lack of rigour has undermined the legitimacy of case studies in some fields and that conclusions drawn from single case studies are open to accusations that they produce insufficient data for effective conclusions to be drawn. However, what is clear is that the case study continues to be an important part of research in the fields of management and social science. Indeed numerous supply chain management text books are populated with case studies, both long and short, for instructional purposes (see for example Mangan *et al,* 2012; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Lysons and Farrington, 2006, Mentzer, 2004; and Lysons and Gillingham 2003). Moreover, it is argued that the in-depth case study approach allows for greater insight into the field of study within a real life context and that the method is especially useful for analysing various stages of a supply chain

(Soosay *et al,* 2008).   The exploratory aspects of a multiple case study approach proves especially useful for investigating supply chains and developing an in-depth insight into individual key stages within the chain itself. Case studies can be used to offer a multi-dimensional and flexible assessment of supply chains through deeper exploration and identification of relatively complex key areas and events within the chain. This allows for the collation of a wide spectrum of information for the enhancement of academic research and the development of theories which may benefit various key personnel at various stages of the supply chain (Soosay *et al*, 2008). In a similar vein, outlining potential areas of research within the humanitarian field Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that the combination of inter-agency collaboration with supply chain collaboration should be a key research area:

> *"Humanitarian logistics requires good and applicable research with empirical data being gathered through the use of case studies or other qualitative methodologies"* (Table 1, p8).

As discussed earlier (section 3.6), a strong argument in favour of the inductive approach is that it offers the potential to answer not only the research question but also questions not originally asked (Partington 2000); the contention being that when research is conducted from the perspective of the informant, and the researcher remains open to surprise rather than seeking to confirm expectations, ever more interesting insights can emerge from field work. Qualitative case studies allow for the adoption of an integrated method approach, not only to improve rigour, but also to explore and understand a specific topic while allowing the researcher to develop the best possible methodology for their given area of research (Cameron and Price, 2009; Saunders *et al*, 2009; Yin, 2009).

The kind of focus, depth and detail proposed by these scholars represents an almost self-evident description of, and argument for the use of case study within the context of this research. While the criteria evinced above have discrete characteristics it is clear by inspection that they also emerge from a common underlying theme. To paraphrase, this can be stated as follows. When new insights are sought and when it is deemed important to reveal and to understand the unique perspectives of informants within the natural organisational contexts and environments then the argument for adopting a qualitative, inductive case based approach is strong.   In light of the study objectives, a qualitative multiple case study approach using an integrated research methodology was acknowledged as an appropriate and valuable means of developing this research. Within the context of this study, the case study approach allowed the researcher to investigate and examine the studied phenomena within a real life context and explore *why* and *what* was

happening in a current situation (Yin, 2009). Case studies also provide the opportunity for a holistic view of what is happening within a business, enabling the researcher to see the *whole picture*. Finally, this method was chosen as it is considered to be one of the most effective means of obtaining a broad range of rich data (Saunders *et al*, 2009).

3.7.3   Single vs Multiple-Case Design

Each of the notions advanced in the previous paragraphs resonate with the needs and intentions of this investigation and so the use of a case based, qualitative and inductive approach held clear attractions for the overall research strategy.   However, should the approach be that of a single case or would a multiple-case design be the better option? Yin (2009) argues that the use of multiple-cases provides more compelling evidence and is therefore regarded as being more robust. In addition, a qualitative multiple-case study not only allows for comparison between individual companies or cases, but the collection of increased, in-depth, exploratory data favours the identification of a greater number of unknown conditions and events (Soosay *et al,* 2008). Yin (2009) also suggests that the use of multiple-case designs has increased in frequency over recent years and offers the view that in some fields multiple-case studies have been regarded as a different methodology from the single-case approach. Multiple-case designs arguably have distinct advantages when compared to the single-case approach (Herriott and Firestone, 1983 cited by Yin, 2009) in that the evidence produced is often considered to be more compelling, hence overall findings are viewed as more robust. Furthermore, they are used more often than not where the intention of the research is to compare and contrast findings and to look for similarities and differences across a number of organisations (Cameron and Price, 2009; Simons, 2009). As this thesis was concerned with identifying reasons why participant actors within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain were struggling to collaborate, it was felt that the associated field work was well suited to the use of multiple-case studies based on different actors within the Supply Chain itself.   Yin (2009) also suggests that whilst supplementing the findings associated with a single-case, the data gathered from additional cases might also fill a gap left by the first case (p.62), thereby making the findings all the more compelling. Moreover, the selection of a multiple-case approach also benefits the justification of the final findings and serves to address the arguments surrounding triangulation of the final qualitative data and associated findings (see section 3.11.7).

3.7.4 Cross-Case Research and Analysis

An illustration of the cross study method is included in Fig 3.2.

Fig 3.2   Case Study Research (Yin, 2009, p.57)

Following the development of theory the figure illustrates the importance of the case selection and data collection process. It also shows that each case should be treated as an individual study before cross-case analysis is used to identify trends, commonality and differences (Yin, 2009) which will lead to the final findings and the overall contribution. The adoption of this approach is amplified within Fig 3.4 and the associated discussion (see section 3.10).

A True *Case* Study?

Having considered the overall methodology to be adopted within this research thoughts turned to the actual definition of the word *case* and the merits of its use given the overall context of this study. Definitions of classic *cases* (Simons, 2009, Yin, 2009, Stake, 1995) suggest that the selected organisations should be considered from all angles and all aspects and clearly this was not to be the approach here, where a much more focussed view of the participant organisation's particular approaches to disaster relief and the *immediate response* phase (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007) in particular would be the key. Accordingly, in order to locate the *cases* within the general context the decision was taken to use the term *domain* instead of *case*, whereby a *domain* is understood to be more descriptively rich than a *case* expressed as an area of human practice valued by

society and mastered through a recognised period of study and learning (Gardner,1997). Hence, hereafter, throughout the thesis the classification of *domain* is used in preference to the term *case*.

The Final Research *Domains* – A Justifiable Choice

As will be discussed later, within the general context, the aim was to identify a sufficient number of domains to achieve data triangulation and with it generalisability of the final findings and contribution (See section 3.11.7). Following Stage I of the research design (See Fig 4) responses were received from 11 of the 18 organisations that were contacted (see Appendix B). However, a decision had to be taken on the number of domains that would feature in the final research, offset against the necessary limitations associated with the required word count for the final thesis together with the requirement for rich qualitative data, identified as key to the successful fulfilment of the study itself. Hence, against these restrictions and stipulations four actor organisations, all of whom are involved in the provision of *immediate response* (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007) to disasters were identified as *domains* for the study. In-depth introductions to these organisations are included within the separate domain analysis chapters (4 through 7); but by way of summary and justification, the following organisations were selected:

> **The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance**: Following initial contact during Stage I of the research process (see Fig 3.4 and section 3.11.1), and a discussion on the overall research topic, the researcher was advised by the United Nations to contact their Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA) as it is deemed to be responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent and coordinated response to emergencies and disaster relief. A key pillar of the OCHA mandate is to "coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors" (OCHA, 2012a). OCHA's overall role is to ensure effective coordination, including strengthening the cluster approach (see section 2.10), data and information management, and reporting. The organisation believe that by ensuring that the right structures, partnerships and leaders are supported, they and their humanitarian partners can better coordinate humanitarian situations. Moreover, OCHA also aims to promote efficient interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian operations. Given that the overall emphasis of this research was based around an investigation of the use of collaborative techniques within the humanitarian relief supply chain, inclusion of OCHA was considered to be essential.

The UK Ministry of Defence Joint Forces Command: Weiss and Campbell (1991) note that it seems that when disasters occur, governments often turn to the military for help as the military have certain resources immediately to hand as well as the transport and human assets with which to distribute them. Following a humanitarian disaster the UK government may be requested to mount or lend support to the relief effort in the country or region affected (see discussion on the role of a humanitarian military, Fischer, 2011). The UK contribution will usually be led by the Department for International Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if civilian resources are insufficient, or if this approach provides a comparative advantage. The Joint Forces Logistic Component (JFLogC) within the Ministry of Defence's Joint Forces Command is the organisation tasked with the planning and coordination of all military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (MOD, 2008). The researcher's personal origins of interest, and previous military background have already been highlighted (section 1.2); moreover, access to participants within JFLogC could be facilitated through previous military colleagues and contacts. Hence having identified, the key role that the military has to play within the humanitarian relief supply chain and the responsibilities placed on the JFLogC in particular, the organisation was identified as a key contributor towards achievement of the overall research aims.

Oxfam International: is a confederation of 17 organisations networked together in more than 90 countries (Oxfam International, 2011). One of the 14 members of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) Oxfam International is registered as a Foundation in The Hague and as a foreign company limited by guarantee in the UK (Oxfam International, 2011). The 2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 2012) records total expenditure as €911 million (£730 million as at November 2012), with €660 million (£530 million) being spent on regional programmes. Figures such as these show the organisation listed in the top 10 humanitarian NGO's and agencies (see Table 1 in Tatham and Petit, 2010, p.611) together with some of the other positive respondents contacted during Stage I of the research (see Fig 3.4 and section 3.11.1), and listed at Appendix B, namely the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), CARE International and UNICEF. Moreover, a close comparison of the mission statements, overall aims and structure of similar sized NGOs operating within the field, confirms that Oxfam International can be considered to be one that represents a typical large organisation. Hence, Oxfam International was selected as a domain that could represent the views of the NGOs listed in the top ten of those operating within the humanitarian relief supply

chain, and as a domain that could offer a significant contribution to the overall outcomes and final contribution.

Tearfund: Tearfund is a Christian international aid agency working globally to end poverty and injustice (DEC, 2012). One of the 14 members of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) the organisation is a signatory to the Red Cross Code of Conduct (IFRC, 2012) and a member of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP, 2012). Tearfund follows a biblical path in believing that helping communities in need is central to the purpose of local churches, wherever they may be (Tearfund, 2011). The 2011/12 Director's Report and Accounts (Tearfund 2012) records total Tearfund income as £70 million and expenditure on charitable activities as £59 million. In keeping with similar size religious NGOs, Tearfund is committed to ensuring that as much as possible of the money donated is turned into aid on the ground. Hence, for the purposes of this research it was considered to be representative of those smaller organisations who responded positively during Stage I of the research process (see Fig 3.4 and section 3.11.1), namely Comic Relief and Concern Worldwide. Moreover, whilst it does not have a lead role in the collaborative effort within the humanitarian SC, Tearfund is considered to be a representative of those smaller organisations who are a key element of the overall SC and are therefore, in a position to offer key contributions and comment in support of the overall research approach. Moreover, a close comparison of the mission statements, overall aims and structure of similar sized NGOs operating within the field, confirms that Tearfund can be considered to be one that is typical of those smaller organisations. Hence, Tearfund was selected as an organisation that could represent the views of the smaller sized NGOs operating within the humanitarian relief supply chain, and as a domain that could add to the overall findings and associated final contribution.

By way of final summary the organisations to be considered as *cases* within this study are also shown in Table 3.2.

Organisation	Mission Statement	Justification
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)	*"Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies"* (OCHA, 2012)	OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.
UK MOD – Joint Force Logistics Command	*"A Disaster Relief operation is a primary Military Task and contribution to a disaster relief response. It provides specific assistance to an afflicted overseas population"* (JDP 3-52, 2008)	Following a humanitarian disaster overseas, the UK may be requested to mount or lend support to a relief effort in the country or region affected. The UK military contribution will be coordinated by the Joint Force Logistics Command within the UK MOD.
Oxfam International	*"We believe we can end poverty and injustice, as part of a global movement for change"* (Oxfam, 2011)	Considered to be representative of the 10 largest NGOs within the sector. An international confederation of 17 organizations networked together in 92 countries, as part of a global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty.
Tearfund	*"Our vision is to see 50 million people released from spiritual and material poverty through a worldwide network of 100,000 local churches"* (Tearfund, 2011)	Considered to be representative of a relatively small NGO within the sector formed and based around core Christian values. Tearfund takes a comprehensive and integrated approach to disasters and disaster vulnerability, undertaking disaster risk reduction, disaster response and advocacy work.

Table 3.2   Organisations Selected as Cases within this Study

Whilst discussing her approach to case study research, and the linkage of it to the grounded theory approach, Simons (2009) draws on the work of Charmaz (2006) and explains that whilst engaged in case study she:

"Always works from an intention to reflect and accurately represent participants' meanings in the policy and practice contexts in which they work, that is for these to be grounded in participants' perspectives" (p.125)

Simons goes on to clarify that throughout the research process she is concerned with theorising and using a range of different processes before arriving at an interpretative theory associated with her selected case or cases. Given the similarity of the approach and research design explained and adopted here, and the support for the linkage between grounded theory and case study the final research strategy will be a multiple-domain grounded one.

> Final Research Strategy
>
> **Multiple-*Domain* and Grounded**

3.8   Qualitative or Quantitative Method?

Most texts seem to find it useful to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative research although it is argued that the distinction can be an ambiguous one as it is regarded by some as a fundamental contrast but by others as no longer useful or even "false" (Layder, 1993 cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.28). Use of the distinction does however still seem to be a useful one, as it represents a means of classifying the different methods that are available to the researcher and provides a helpful vehicle when considering the options open for data collection and analysis. Although, on the face of it the clear distinction between quantitative and qualitative research would seem to be the presence or lack of measurable, quantifiable data, some writers suggest that the differences run far deeper (Barbour, 2009; Cameron and Price, 2009; Flick, 2009; Saunders *et al,* 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007). In short, choice of approach will differ in relation to the researcher's philosophical preference in respect of the epistemological and ontological foundations associated with the overall research strategy adopted (see Table 3.3).

	Quantitative	Qualitative
Principal orientation to the role of theory in relation to research	Deductive	Inductive
Epistemological orientation	Positivism	Interpretivism
Ontological orientation	Objectivism	Constructionism

Table 3.3   Fundamental Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative Research Strategies (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.28)

Moreover, once chosen the associated mechanisms and processes to be utilised by the researcher will differ markedly (see Table 3.4). These will be discussed in greater depth later, particularly in respect of the criticisms that are proffered as a result.

Quantitative	Qualitative
Numbers	Words
Point of view of researcher	Points of view of participants
Researcher distant	Researcher close
Theory Testing	Theory emergent
Static	Process
Structured	Unstructured
Generalization	Contextual understanding
Hard, reliable data	Rich, deep data
Macro	Micro
Behaviour	Meaning
Artificial settings	Natural Settings

Table 3.4   Some Common Contrasts between Quantitative and Qualitative Research (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.426)

3.8.1. Quantitative Research

Quantitative research can be constructed as a strategy that emphasises quantification through the collection of data that entails a deductive approach with the accent on testing theories. Data gathering will incorporate the practices associated with the natural scientific model and of positivism in particular, embodying a view of social reality as an external, objective reality (Cameron and Price, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Data collection and analysis are much less labour intensive than that for qualitative work and conclusions can be drawn across a much wider sample set.   This is important to a positivist as

generalisability will normally be of concern and justification that findings can be taken beyond the confines of the particular context in which the research was originally conducted; hence findings may also encompass statistical analysis and estimations of probability across a representative sample. Moreover, results seem to be more *scientific* feel and are, therefore more appealing to most managers (Cameron and Price, 2007, p.213).

Several criticisms have been offered against the quantitative approach and the associated epistemological and ontological foundations on which it is based. As one would expect, these have been voiced most loudly from exponents and supporters of the qualitative method. Social scientists employing a deductive, positivist, quantitative approach are effectively turning a blind eye to the inherent differences between the social and natural worlds and to the key factors which distinguish people and social institutions from the world of nature.

> *"The thought objects constructed by the social scientist ……. have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily life within the social world*" (Schultz, 1962, cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.19).

Other commentators (Silverman, 2011b; Brabour, 2009) offer the view that the measurement processes utilised by quantitative researchers present an artificial and spurious sense of precision and accuracy. For example are respondents to questionnaires all interpreting questions similarly and can true validity of responses be justified as a result? Finally, the reliance on instruments and procedure to gather and analyse data leaves the researcher and associated outcomes isolated from reality. Overall outcomes are left detached from reality with findings representing a 'snap shot in time' rather than the on-going and developing reality of the social world (Mordue, 2011).

3.8.2   Qualitative Research

Against a background of historical academic scepticism qualitative research has over the past 15 years or so established itself as an acceptable approach within a broad range of disciplines (Silverman, 2011b; Barbour, 2009; Flick, 2009). It is usually constructed as a research strategy that emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. This approach will most likely appeal to a pragmatist or a constructionist, interested in how meaning is constructed. Data will be richer and less shaped by the researcher's own preconceptions than that associated with the quantitative approach. It can generate deeper insights and understanding and form the basis for theoretical development where none exists. Data gathered will predominantly support an inductive

approach surrounding the rejection of the natural scientific model in favour of the generation of theory and a review of the way in which individuals interpret their social world; social reality will be viewed as a constantly shifting emergent property of the individual's creation (Cameron and Price, 2009; Flick, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).

However, data collection can be time-consuming and data analysis may require sophisticated and even more time-consuming analysis if conclusions are to be robust rather than simply reflections on the researcher's own thinking (Silverman, 2011a, 2010; Miles and Huberman, 1994). The associated time demands will normally mean that the data set will be gathered from a relatively small sample (when compared to that for a quantitative approach) meaning that generalisability of findings will always be an issue. Indeed it is interesting to note that the majority of academic publications based around the outcomes of qualitative research strategy seem to dedicate significantly more narrative in support of the research strategy than that afforded to research strategy within papers dedicated to their quantitative counterparts, perhaps reflecting the scepticism and concerns discussed here (Mordue, 2011).

In keeping with the critical views afforded by the qualitative community on their quantitative counterparts, the quantitative community have some equally strong views on the pitfalls of a qualitative research strategy. The approach is considered to be too subjective, relying too much on the researcher's unsystematic views on what is significant and important and also on the close relationships that the researcher invariably builds up with his subject audience. The basic premise of the strategy means that replication of studies is another area of concern, in that the unstructured nature of the research leaves it all but impossible to reproduce the original conditions and circumstances of the findings. Moreover, as outcomes are bound to be dependent upon the individual characteristics of the researcher (personality, background, age, gender….) replication is unachievable. Similarly, generalisation is of concern with the scope of the findings being severely restricted. In essence, how can just one or two cases be presented as truly representative of all cases? (Cresswell, 2013; Saunders *et al*, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).

3.8.3 An Appropriate Method?

The focus of this research was to gain an in-depth insight into the humanitarian relief supply chain and with it a thorough understanding of existing practices as perceived by the study participants. This type of research lends itself to exploratory qualitative techniques, including case studies and in-depth interviews, which have been shown to be an effective means of gathering a large amount of data rich information about a particular subject area

while being closely involved with the subject participants (Silverman, 2011a; 2011b; 2010; Brabour, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Outlining potential areas of research within the field Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that humanitarian logistics requires good and applicable research with empirical data being gathered through the use of case studies or other qualitative methods. A poll of Editorial Advisory and Review Board members carried out to establish the scope of the first publication of the *Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management* (Kovács and Spens, 2011) resulted in specific criticism of the seeming reliance on the use of quantitative research methods within the field. Sandwell (2011) performed a study into the operational issues encountered in humanitarian logistics which considered the wider issues affecting humanitarian organisations, whilst McLauchlin and Larson (2011) sought to advance thought and practice on supply chain relationship building by considering lessons to be learned from leading humanitarian logistics practitioners. Such studies are examples of those within the field of humanitarian logistics that have implemented the use of qualitative methodological techniques including exploratory in-depth interviews, case studies and focus groups to fulfil their objectives. However, Kunz and Reiner (2012) discuss the paucity of such research, offering the view that "empirical methodologies such as cross-organisational case studies should be used more in order to increase knowledge in the field" (p.133) as they note that most research methodologies currently utilised within humanitarian logistics rely solely on the use of quantitative simulation and modelling.

Whilst there is clearly a balance to be struck between the use of qualitative and quantitative method, given the foregoing discussion a qualitative method (Saunders *et al,* 2009) was determined to be the most appropriate within this study, with the inflexible nature of the positivist quantitative methods regarded as unsuitable for addressing the research problem in this instance. As will be discussed later (see section 3.11) the strategy associated within this research was effectively broken down onto 3 distinct stages based on the application of differing qualitative methods.

Final Research Method

Qualitative

3.9   Time Horizons – a Cross-sectional Study

The researcher must decide whether the final findings are to offer a *snapshot* taken at a particular point in time or results that are more in keeping with a diary over a given period. Saunders *et al* (2009, p.155) contrast *Cross-sectional studies* with *Longitudinal studies*; the former being typical of research projects undertaken for academic courses which are necessarily time constrained and describe an incidence or phenomenon at a given point in time, the latter offering the capacity to study change and development. As discussed earlier this study utilised a retrospective review (a *snapshot*) of the humanitarian relief supply chain at a given point in time; moreover, whilst recommendations would be made for future improvements there was no realistic opportunity to change process or actual events during the study; hence, this study clearly fulfilled the criteria associated with a Cross-sectional study.

Time Horizon

Cross-Sectional

3.10   The Final Methodology

Table 3.5 is now included, by way of a summary of the discussion thus far and as a means to clarify and justify the final methodological approach:

	Final Approach	Reasoning
Philosophical Positioning	Interpretivism	An approach that would reveal participants' understandings of behaviours that held reality for them. To reveal humanitarian actor's interpretations and understanding of their reality coupled with an ontology that would link participant experiences with dissimilar levels of reality.
Approach	Inductive	To develop an understanding and explanation of the nature of relationship forming, analysing data as defined by the subject matter.
Methodological Choice	Grounded ('Theory Building')	Not *classic* but the Glaserian (1992) approach which explicitly allows for considerable freedom in speculating beyond the raw data to draw generalisations, rather than to depend on strict adherence to procedural rules and the constraints of conditional process. The potential to produce interesting contributions to both theory and practice and perhaps have relevance beyond the limited context of the research.
	Multiple-*Domain* Study	As this thesis is concerned with identifying reasons why participant actors within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain are struggling to collaborate, the associated field work was well suited to the use of multiple-case studies based on different actors within the Chain itself. The focus and context of the study meant that the term *domain* was substituted for the term *case*.
Strategy	Qualitative	This study considers the opinions and approaches utilised by a number of different organisational actors within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain. A qualitative approach would address the need for good and applicable research within the field with data being gathered on the *emic* issues through the use of appropriate qualitative methodologies (Kovács and Spens 2011).
Time Horizon	Cross-sectional	A retrospective review (*snapshot* in time) of the humanitarian supply chain fulfilling the cross-sectional criteria.

Table 3.5   A Summary of the Final Methodological Approach

In keeping with the strategy discussed in section 3.3.1, it is only right that the *research onion* model (Saunders et al, 2009) is also returned to at this stage.

Fig 3.3   The Research Onion 'Peeled' (adapted Saunders *et al*, 2009, p.108)

Note: Dotted line around grounded theory to indicate a 'theory building' rather than a *classic* grounded approach.

3.11   *Etic* and *Emic* Knowledge and Data

The terms *etic* and *emic* were first suggested by linguist Kenneth Pike in 1990 (Headland *et al,* 1990). Referring to the insider versus outsider, subjective versus objective view of the world, they offer a method of signposting for anthropologists and other researchers working within social and behavioural sciences to refer to 2 kinds of data concerning human behaviour (Kottack, 2012). According to Pike (1967 cited by Xia, 2011), the use of these terms "proves convenient…to describe behaviour from two different standpoints, which lead to results which shade into one another (p.77). The proposition offered by Headland *et al* (1990) is that researchers use the term *etic* to refer to objective or outsider accounts and *emic* to refer to subjective or insider accounts. They offer the following by way of definition:

Etic **Knowledge**: refers to generalisations about human behaviour and describes observations of behaviour from the perspective of the outsider. The *etic* approach acknowledges that members of a culture may be too involved in day to day activity to offer an impartial view. Hence, when using the *etic* approach the researcher develops what he or she considers to be important (Kottack, 2012) and issues and themes are identified by the researcher in advance of field work through consideration of secondary sources. *Etic* data represent the researcher's interpretation as an outsider (Xia, 2011, p.80).

Emic **Knowledge:** and interpretations are those existing within a culture that are determined by local custom, meaning and belief and are described by a native of the culture associated with the research. The *emic* approach investigates how people think and how they perceive and categorise their world (Kottack, 2012), hence, *emic* issues and themes will be identified and developed by the researcher engaged in field work. In their simplest form, *emic* data come primarily from interviews among subjects. It is the subject who describes to the researcher his/her own behaviours and thoughts of the phenomena under investigation (Xia, 2011, p.80).

The *etic* and *emic* approaches are at times regarded as in conflict with one another, and the suggestion is that one should be preferred to the exclusion of the other. However, Xia (2013) argues in favour of the complimentary nature of the two approaches, particularly for researchers involved in identifying the form and function of human social systems. Given this discussion and the context of the research question, the associated research design and the data gathering methods adopted, the terms *etic* and *emic* were considered as appropriate signposts (Headland et al, 1990) to describe and label the key issues and themes as they were developed.

3.12   The Overall Research Design - Data Collection and Analysis

Having established an overall methodology for the study the next stage must be to address the issue of data collection and analysis and ultimately the final research design. A number of methods exist which will facilitate the collection of the rich data required in order to fulfil the requirements of this study and they will be discussed in greater detail now. By way of illustration the final research design for this study is outlined in Figure 3.4.

```
                 Research Idea  ◄──────────────────┐
                                                    │
                                     ┌──────────────────────────────┐
                                     │ Informed by prior interest    │
                                     │ and personal experiences      │
                                     └──────────────────────────────┘
                                                    │
          Research Aims and Objectives  ◄───┐       │
                                            │       ▼
                                     ┌──────────────────────────────┐
                                     │ Literature Review leads        │
                                     │ to initial etic                │
                                     │ Issues/Themes (see             │
          Three Stage Research Design│ Appendix E)                    │
                                     └──────────────────────────────┘
```

Stage I (section 3.11.1)
Initial contact with NGOs through questionnaire to identify willing participants and key *etic* issues

- Develop an introductory questionnaire based on *etic* issues
- Pilot with one NGO
- Send out to other NGOs
- Coding and analysis of responses (identify key *etic* issues/themes)

Stage II (section 3.11.2)
Confirm *etic* issues and develop *emic* issues through semi-structured interviews with willing participants

- Develop semi-structured interview guide based on key *etic* issues
- Pilot with one NGO
- Approach other selected NGOs and MOD/ UN OCHA
- Coding and analysis of responses (qualitative data – confirm key *etic* issues/themes and emergent *emic* issues/themes)
- Check findings/understanding with participants

Respondent Validation - Feedback

Stage III (section 3.11.3)
Confirm *emic* issues and investigate through focus groups with willing participants

- Develop focus group topic guide based on key *emic* issues
- Pilot with one NGO
- Approach other selected NGOs and MOD/ UN OCHA
- Coding and analysis of responses (qualitative data – confirm key *emic* issues/themes)
- Check findings/understanding with participants

Respondent Validation - Feedback

Cross-Domain Analysis

Final Contribution to Knowledge

Fig 3.4   The Final Research Design

By way of summary, the final design was split into 3 distinct stages; the aim of the first stage was to establish contact with prospective participants whilst also confirming the relevance of the *etic* issues developed during the literary review process. A covering letter/e mail (Appendix C) and self-completion questionnaire (Appendix D) was sent out to prospective NGO participants. The aim of this was 2 fold; firstly the questionnaire and accompanying letter would serve as a means of introduction to prospective participants and secondly, the completed questionnaires would provide some initial primary data on the respondent NGOs and allow the researcher to select appropriate participants for Stages II and III of the study. Stages II and III were designed to gather the rich data that would be needed to address the overall aims and research question of the study, hence, all 3 stages lent themselves to a qualitative approach using multiple methods of data collection. Once analysis was complete the related findings and interpretations were confirmed with participants through a checking and feedback process (as illustrated in Fig 3.4).

This overall research process also addressed the thoughts offered by Kovács and Spens (2011), discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.11) who highlight the need for good and applicable research within the humanitarian logistics field with data being gathered through the use of appropriate qualitative method. Indeed Kovács and Spens (2011) go on to discuss the specific criticism levelled at research within this particular field whereby there is a seeming reliance on the use of quantitative methodology. The use of case studies and in particular the merits afforded by a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2009) has been discussed earlier (see section 3.7.3) but given the perspectives sought here, a multi-site cross comparison also served to increase confidence in the overall findings whilst addressing the concerns levelled at the qualitative researcher's door regarding reliability of data and generalisability of findings. For completeness, each stage of the final research design will now be discussed in greater detail.

3.12.1 Stage I – Identification of Participants and Confirmation of Key *Etic* Issues

Stage I of the research process was designed to identify prospective participants and also to confirm the relevance and currency within the humanitarian relief community of those *etic* issues identified during the literary review (see Appendix E). Analysis of the data gathered would also aid with the production of the interview schedule to be used during the semi-structured interviews within Stage II of the process (see Appendix F). A survey strategy is a common and popular approach within business and management research and is best used for exploratory and descriptive research (Saunders *et al*, 2009). Moreover, data can be collected which can be used to suggest possible reasons for particular relationships between participants. Brown (1998) believes that the information gathered through

questionnaires can be used to make meaningful comparisons between departments within an organisation or between organisations themselves. Keohane (1971) supports this view as she argues that the data offered by questionnaires emerges more clearly than that for interviews and that the resulting recommendations can be made with greater confidence. There are a number of advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of questionnaires as a means of gathering data are encapsulated by Oppenheim (1996), see Table 3.6

Advantages	Disadvantages
Low cost data collection	Low response rates
Low cost processing	Cannot correct misunderstandings/ probe or explain.
No Interviewer – respondents more willing to answer awkward/ embarrassing questions	No control
Quickly reach widely dispersed respondents	No observation of respondents

Table 3.6   An Adaptation of Oppenheim's (1996) Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaires

3.12.1.1   An Initial Questionnaire

Given this discussion an initial questionnaire was produced (see Appendix D). This was sent out to a total of 16 NGOs which were selected as being typical (Stake, 1995) of those operating within the Humanitarian SC as well as to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the MOD Joint Forces Command (JFLogC) (see Appendix B); also included was a letter/e mail of introduction (see Appendix C). Prior to this the questionnaire was piloted with one NGO in order to establish clarity of the questions asked and also the time taken to complete the questionnaire. The questions used were based around the *etic* issues that had been highlighted during the literary review (see Appendix E). To increase response speed, questions were made deliberately straight forward with closed or multiple choice answers being sought. Moreover, noting the warnings offered against the use of *sensitive* questions (Collins and Hussey, 2003), in that they may result in questionnaires being discarded or ignored these were also avoided. The final responses assisted with the selection process of appropriate organisations for Stages II and III of the study and also with the development of the interview schedule to be used within Stage II (see Appendix F). Responses were received from OCHA, the JFLogC and 9 NGOs (see Appendix B); moreover 7 of the NGO respondents also offered to participate

in the study, representing 43% of the non-governmental organisations contacted. Of these respondents the OCHA, JFLogC and 2 NGOs were finally selected as participants in the research and justification of these final selection is included in Section 3.7.6 and Table 3.2.

3.12.2   Stage II – Discussion of *Etic* Issues and Development of *Emic* Issues

Having established links to, and selected the participant organisations which would be considered as the *domains* throughout the study, Stage II was designed to gather rich qualitative data on the associated *etic* issues; furthermore, the *emic* issues which would be used to formulate the final contribution to knowledge would also be identified.

Interview data is often considered to be the major source of information obtainable for qualitative research and the use of in-depth interviews is often the foremost form of data collection within a case-based study (Yin 2009). Barbour (2009) describes interviews as "the gold standard of qualitative research which involve a somewhat rarified, in-depth exchange between researcher and researched" (p.133). Simons (2009) describes this technique as a means of getting inside someone's head and discovering their perspective and finding out feelings, memories and interpretations that would otherwise be left undiscovered using any other means; in essence Simons believes that interviews allow insight into a participant's memories and as such provide explanations of how things have come to be. In the business research interview the aim is for the interviewer to elicit all manner of information such as interviewee behaviour, attitudes, norms, beliefs and values (Saunders *et al,* 2009; *Bryman* and Bell, 2007); moreover an interview can help the researcher to gather valid and reliable data that is relevant to the established question and aims. Indeed, where research questions and aims have yet to be established an interview or interviews may help the researcher to establish these. Interviews can give you a degree of flexibility and adaptability that it is difficult to replicate using other methods (Cameron and Price, 2009). An experienced interviewer can re-word questions, drawing out discussions to make the whole process more akin to having a conversation. This conversational ambience makes the subject more willing to disclose things that they may be reluctant to put in writing on a questionnaire. Meaning can also be explored as the researcher can ask the respondent to elaborate, expand upon or clarify a point.

Interviews may be highly formalised and structured, using standardised questions for each interviewee or may be informal and unstructured conversations, or indeed they may fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Various typologies are used to illustrate this level of formality (see for example Healey, 1991 and Robson, 2002 both cited by Saunders

et al 2009). Fig 3.5 offers a summary of the wide variety of interview formats that are available.

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                         Interviews
        ┌────────────────────┴────────────────────┐
  Standardised                              Non-Standardised
                              ┌──────────────────────┴──────────────────────┐
                         One to One                                     One to Many
              ┌──────────────┼──────────────┐                  ┌─────────────┴─────────────┐
        Face to Face     Telephone      Electronic           Group                     Electronic
                                                               │                           │
                                                          Focus Groups              Focus Groups
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
Fig 3.5   Summary of Interview Forms (Saunders *et al,* 2009, p.321)

Standardised interviews (often referred to as interviewer-administered questionnaires) are based on a predetermined set of questions which are read out with the response being recorded and coded against a standard schedule. They are invariably used to collect quantifiable data as part of a survey and whilst there is some social interaction between researcher and participant they do not offer the flexibility and adaptability afforded by their non-standardised counterparts. Non-standardised interviews, on the other hand are used to facilitate the gathering of data which will afford itself to qualitative analysis , thereby helping the researcher to reveal and understand not only *what* and *how* but also to explore the *why* (Saunders *et al*, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007).

One particular advantage of selecting interviews as a means of data collection is that they provide an opportunity for the researcher to receive feedback when face-to-face with the respondent, which would otherwise be unobtainable (Cameron and Price, 2009). This was particularly relevant within the context of this research, as the researcher felt it was important to be able to gauge the interviewee's body language and expressive non-verbal responses (see section 3.11.5 on Observation). The scope of in-depth interviews can vary greatly from being highly structured to completely unstructured, depending on the design and requirements of a particular study (Saunders *et al,* 2009). Unstructured interviews do not normally require a pre-determined interview schedule and allow for completely open

dialogue and discussion between the researcher and the participant. However, if a completely unstructured approach is adopted then concerns can be raised as to whether all of the relevant information pertinent to the research question will be

gathered. By contrast, a highly structured approach is one that will follow a strict interview schedule solely relying on a set of pre-prepared interview questions. In this study both of these extremes were deemed to be unsuitable as it was felt that adopting a highly structured approach would not allow any opportunity for discussion to take place, or for the development of any answers or obvious discussion points; however, some structure was still required if the interviews were to lead to relevant rich data. In essence, the exploratory nature of this research required a method that facilitated open discussion, whilst ensuring that relevant and in-depth data was collected; hence, a semi-structured interview approach which effectively fell somewhere between the two extremes discussed here, was adopted.

Within the framework of a semi-structured interview, whilst questions will not be asked in an inflexible manner or even in a pre-determined order the researcher will set out to ask the interviewee about a set of predetermined topics or subject areas. In order to achieve this, and to ensure that all of the themes and separate issues under investigation are addressed in sufficient depth, the researcher will often use an *interview guide* or *schedule* (Bryman and Bell 2007). Whilst the exploratory nature of the technique is intended to gain a greater depth and broader range of knowledge, allowing for adaptations and deviations to be made, the interview schedule will serve to keep the researcher within the parameters of the overall research question. Within the realms of the in-depth interview, the researcher has an opportunity to use their initiative and follow up on an interviewee's response to develop areas of interest that may not have been previously anticipated (Cameron and Price, 2009). This provides an opportunity for other, relevant topics to be discussed that may arise during the course of the interview and which appear to be promising for providing rich data or additional insights (Saunders *et al*, 2009); in effect the process allows for the identification of the *emic* issues which may formulate the final contribution to knowledge. Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005), argue that one of the main advantages of in-depth interviews is that the researcher gains a more accurate and clear picture of a participant's position and attitude and behaviour. This is possible because of the open ended question structure often in place that allows the interviewee to answer freely according to their own thinking and their answers are not constrained by only a few alternatives.

3.12.2.1   Semi-Structured Interviews

One of the greatest disadvantages of in-depth interviewing is that it requires a certain level of skill by the researcher (Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). However, in this case the researcher was an experienced and trained interviewer who had carried out upwards of 1000 semi-structured interviews with applicants for places as Royal Air Force officers and aircrew. Given this, the original research question, associated aims, and the call for a more qualitative approach to data gathering within the field (Kovács and Spens, 2011) the non-standardised approach was seen as the ideal vehicle to gather the rich, in-depth data that would be needed to address the final aims and research question. Accordingly a semi-structured interview schedule was produced for this stage (Appendix F). This strategy also ensured the consistent, yet isolated approach necessary within each individual participant and organisational *domain* given the adoption of a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2009 and Fig 3.2).

3.12.3   Stage III – Clarification of *Emic* Issues and the Final Contribution

Having established the *emic* issues associated with the research question through analysis of the data gathered during Stage II of the process, the overall aim of Stage III was to clarify these issues with a view to formulating the final contribution to knowledge. Given the approach in Stage II, due consideration had to be given to the thoughts of Silverman (2011b) on how one-to-one interview data is being used in research, and on the increasing tendency for qualitative research to rely exclusively on interview data alone. This is a view supported by Atkinson and Silverman (1997) who suggest that one-to-one interviews are more often than not being held up as a means of reflecting the character of the wider society, laying bare people's feelings in order to elicit the *inside story*. In short any assumption that interviews are the default method to establish qualitative data must be challenged. Hence, the decision was taken that another research method was required to address these comments and to increase overall credibility of findings and contribution. Moreover, the researcher was also attracted by the clear opportunity to practice and hone an additional method. The use of focus groups proved to be an attractive means of addressing some of these comments and to also assist still further in expanding the ideas raised within the one-to-one process utilised during Stage II, thereby justifying and underpinning the final contribution to knowledge.

Focus groups have become a popular method for researchers examining the ways in which people interact with one another, allowing for collective exploration of themes and issues (Liamputtong, 2011; Cameron and Price, 2009; Krueger and Casey, 2008; Bryman and Bell,

2007). The approach assists the researcher to develop an understanding of why people react in the way that they do. The researcher acts as a facilitator, prompting the group to discuss and explore the area of research interest in a bid to discover what is important to the group whilst exposing differences in opinion and perspective, areas of tension and conflict as well as areas of agreement and consensus. Focus groups also give the researcher an opportunity to observe participant behaviour and dynamics allowing the researcher to perceive the political and social interactions that take place (Laimputtong, 2011; Krueger and Casey, 2008). As discussed earlier this research utilised multiple domain studies to ascertain differing humanitarian actors' views on collaboration within associated relief supply chains. Hence, the use of focus groups was considered to be a key, final factor in gathering appropriate qualitative data.

3.12.3.1 Participant Focus Groups and Additional Stimuli

Given this discussion, the decision was taken to utilise a series of focus groups during the third stage of the research, with participants being those respondents who had already been interviewed during Stage II of the process. One focus group was carried out within each of the four participant organisations, with the researcher facilitating the process and recording key themes on a white board as participants discussed the key *emic* themes. In order to ensure consistency across all focus groups cross-domain analysis of the *emic* issues identified during Stage II led to the production of a single topic guide (Barbour, 2009) (see Appendix G). Whilst focus groups were identified and utilised in gathering appropriate qualitative data, consideration also had to be given to ensure that group focus was maintained on what was effectively a retrospective review of participant experiences. Hence, drawing upon the work of Ericsson and Simon (see Hayes, 1986) within the field of psychological protocol analysis and verbal reporting (the idea that subjects should be encouraged to think aloud using triggers to stimulate recall and discussion), and further discussion by Barbour (2009) on the use of stimulus materials to enrich the qualitative data gathered within focus groups, participants were also encouraged to recount experiences utilising their own materials such as maps, photographs and video clips. Thus, with the researcher acting as the facilitator, the basis of the focus groups was initially set around the topic guide; however the individual stimuli quickly served to expand discussion and to help group members to develop the issues at hand and to put them into context. Moreover, the stimuli used also provided another strand of invaluable data for desk top study and analysis, and an additional lens to add depth and density (richness) to the overall data set gathered as suggested by Denzin and Lincoln (2005).

3.12.4   Observation

Whilst the main purpose of the interview is to gather in-depth information relating to the subject area, it is recommended (Flick, 2009; Yin, 2009, Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Miles and Huberman, 1994), that the researcher seeks to utilise additional techniques in conjunction with this strategy to establish further data rich information in order to address issues surrounding corroboration and generalisability (see section 3.11.7 on triangulation). One such method is observation (Barbour, 2009).   Observation essentially involves "the systematic observation, recording, description, analysis and interpretation of people's behaviour" (Saunders *et al*, 2009 p.288). Barbour (2009) describes observational fieldwork as "a method that was initially very popular with anthropologists engaged in the study of other cultures" (p.17); she also acknowledges that it is now a popular method within sociology which has allowed researchers to study how work or social practices are enacted on a daily basis. Observation affords the researcher the opportunity to effectively act as a *fly on the wall*, the minimal involvement on the part of the researcher being used to uncover inconsistencies between how people perceive and present their involvement, to how they actually act in practice. Saunders *et al*, (2009) differentiate between participant observation and structured observation offering the view that whilst the former enables the researcher to gather data on the meanings that people attach to their actions, the latter is a technique that is more concerned with the frequency of those actions. Participant observation will enable the researcher to discover the delicate nuances of meaning and as Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994, p.39) put it:

> *"In the social sciences we cannot hope to adequately explain the behaviour of social actors unless we at least try to understand their meaning"* (p.39).

Given the research question and aims under investigation here, observation was identified as a useful method to gain appropriate data on the interaction between actors along the humanitarian relief supply chain. However, amongst others Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994) note that *classic* participant observation involves the researcher "immersing himself in the research setting, with the objective of sharing peoples' lives while attempting to learn their symbolic world" (p.37) (see for example the study by Boje (1991) on story performance in an office supply firm). Given the subject matter within this thesis, a *classic* participant approach was deemed impractical as, clearly the researcher would not be able to follow humanitarian relief specialists into an active disaster area or relief zone. However, conscious of a desire to avoid the temptation to just focus on narrative and in particular what was said, the decision was taken to utilise observation in order to highlight many other issues surrounding the research. Hence, turning to the thoughts of Cameron and Price

(2009) who suggest that non-participant observation is an approach where "the researcher is concentrating simply on the act of observing" (p.255) a mix of the two approaches was identified as a suitable compromise which would allow observation to form a constituent part of the data gathering strategy. As a former military officer the researcher had previous experience of employment within such areas and effectively understood the associated working practices and language, arguably associated with a participant observer. Moreover, in his previous role as an RAF interviewing and selection officer (see section 3.11.2), the researcher had extensive experience and training within the field of interviewee observation and in identifying the messages associated with participant behaviour during interview, arguably acting as a non-participant observer.

3.12.4.1   Observation within Interviews and Focus Groups

Consequently, whilst the verbal content of interviews and focus groups gathered during Stages II and III was digitally recorded and transcribed into narrative representation, field notes were also maintained which produced a description of what was seen; this included issues such as how things were said, focus group interaction, what issues were avoided and which areas drew the more emotional responses and reactions. Whilst some field notes were made during the interviews and focus groups it proved invaluable to also take time out immediately after the sessions to revisit and embellish the field notes whilst observations were still relatively *fresh* in the mind.

3.12.5   Respondent Validation – Feedback

Silverman (2011a) discusses the merits of taking research findings back to those who have been studied in a bid to validate research findings. This argument builds on the ideas proffered by Reason and Rowan (1981) and Bloor (1978 cited by Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) who offer the idea that good researchers will go back to participants with tentative results in order to refine them in the light of subjects' reactions. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) also suggest that a crucial test for any final results is whether the actors whose beliefs and behaviour have been analysed and described, actually recognise the final findings. Moreover, they highlight that further detail and evidence may be forthcoming from participants as they are invited to review initial findings and that this new data may alter the plausibility and interpretation of existing data and with it the final overall contribution to knowledge. Consequently, the findings of the research were presented to the participants at each stage of the research process for comment and feedback on the final analysis, understanding and findings. (see Fig 3.4).

3.12.6   Triangulation of Qualitative Data and Generalisability

The integration of a number of different methodological techniques has been shown to strengthen qualitative research.   This is known as *triangulation* or *methodological triangulation* whereby the combination of research techniques can strengthen and add weight to the validity of the research findings (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Cameron and Price, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).   The term *triangulation* has its roots in the engineering profession where it was used to ensure increased accuracy of results produced. By taking three measurements rather than two, engineers were more able to produce findings that would be considered to be both accurate and valid (Hassard and Cox, 1995 cited by Cameron and Price, 2009). Whilst this motive of accuracy may seem somewhat at odds with the ontology and epistemology that underpin the general approaches and methodology associated with qualitative research, thinking back to the discussion earlier on the criticism and scepticism surrounding the generalisability of associated findings (see section 3.8.2), it would seem that a means of triangulating findings is key to the success and ultimate credibility of a thesis of this type. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) offer the view that in the context of qualitative research, triangulation should be looked upon as an "alternative to validation" (p.4) in that it should allow the researcher, through the use of a number of different lenses to "add depth and density to the data". Saunders *et al* (2009) echo this sentiment referring to triangulation as "the use of different data collection techniques within one study to ensure that the data are telling you what you think they are telling you" (p.146). Similarly, Cameron and Price, (2009) discuss the value of gathering data from a range of different sources as they describe and discuss the merits of what they term "Data Triangulation" (p.257).

This study used multiple sources of "data source triangulation" (Yin, 2009, p.116) which are aimed at "corroborating the same facts or phenomenon". *Convergence of Evidence* was achieved as data was gathered through the form of interviews and focus groups with diverse organisations (actors within the humanitarian relief supply chain) and with different types of interviewees (at all strategic and operational levels).   Moreover, additional data was gathered through observation and analysis of protocol data (Hayes, 1986); hence, it can be argued that the use of multiple settings and multiple method to gather data enhanced the overall generalisability of the research. Finally, checks were also made as to whether the findings were plausible and agreeable through the use of participant feedback (Miles and Huberman 1994).

3.13   Data Analysis

Once the process of data collection commences, the real challenge for any researcher is the collation and control of that data. The process of data collection during the 3 stages described earlier and an appreciation of the sheer volume of information generated, illustrates what is an acknowledged problem within qualitative research, in that the research is done chiefly with words and not numbers (as in quantitative research) and that words, unlike numbers can have multiple meanings and by their very nature are harder to manipulate (Silverman, 2011a; 2011b; 2010; Barbour, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994) Hence, the need for a structured strategy to collate and analyse the data gathered to cope with what has been described as *data pile up* or *data overload* (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.56).

3.13.1   Data Management and Research Ethics

In keeping with the final research design the following chain of evidence was created:

Stage I **(section 3.11.1)** Initial contact with NGOs through questionnaire to identify willing participants and key *etic* issues	→	**Stage II** **(section 3.11.2)** Confirm *etic* issues and develop *emic* issues through semi-structured interviews with willing participants	→	**Stage III** **(section 3.11.3)** Confirm *emic* issues and investigate through focus groups with willing participants

Fig 3.6   The Chain of Evidence

As a result of this process a substantial amount of qualitative data was gathered, necessitating the need for the digital storage and achieving of research data. Whilst digital folders were created for each case study and the associated individual interviews and focus groups, all data gathered was destroyed following final approval and submission of the thesis. Moreover, as the data collection, analysis and field work associated with this study involved gaining access to a variety of organisations and their employees, research ethics and the appropriateness of the researcher's behaviour in relation to the rights of those who become the subject of their work or are affected by it (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p183) had to be a key consideration; hence, all Ethical Principles for Research with Humans within the University of Lincoln Ethics Procedures (UofL, 2009) were adhered to during the design and subsequent implementation of the final research strategy, in that the dignity and autonomy of individuals was considered at all times. All participants gave informed consent and anonymity was assured at all times.

3.13.2   Codification and Codes

Miles and Huberman (1994) differentiate between coding and codes. Coding is a process of analysis where field notes are transcribed or synthesized to give them meaning.   This part of analysis involves how the researcher differentiates and combines the data gathered and the reflections that are made about the information.   "Coding is an attempt to fix meaning, constructing a particular vision of the world that excludes other viewpoints" (Seale, 1999, p.154).   Codes are the tags or labels that are used to assign meaning to the description and inferential information complied during the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994).   They are more often than not a word or a short phrase that "symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data" (Saldana, 2013, p.3).   They will usually be attached to chunks of data, words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs connected to a specific setting, a grouping which Dey (1993) describes as distinguishable or definable *themes* which can be used as a basis for comparison.   They can take the form of a straightforward category label or a more complex one such as a metaphor (Miles and Huberman, 1994).   In interpretive research these codes are often already known as they are based on the general topics that have been previously set out within the thesis.   These predetermined themes or *etic* issues (those brought to the research from the *outside*) were guided by the literature and concepts of the research problem, its aims and objectives and are prevalent within the interview guide developed for Stage II (see Appendix F).   Hence for the initial analysis stages of this study, a manual coding system was developed in order to organise the data in line with those whose *etic* topics previously discussed and developed within Chapter 2 (as included in Appendix E).

By way of illustration of the process used, included below is a short data extract from one of the Stage II interviews with coding for *etic* topics. This extract comes from the second *domain* of study (UK MOD – Joint Force Logistic Command) and an interview with the Commandant:

> *You have small and medium NGOs some of which are better at delivering than others with scale bringing its own complexity of organisation but also strengths* [**PWRPOS**]. *The airport was tiny, with a very small area of aircraft and equipment. Very early on the NGOs had flooded in and there was limited military involvement and it took some time to get my team onto the ground. There was only one real hard standing and the NGOs had occupied this with flags flying* [**SUSFR**], *however I struggled to see why a number of these were there apart from having their flag flying* [**SUSSTRAT**]. *It was pretty chaotic as NGOs do not like to be told what to do and do not like to be coordinated* [**RMOPP**, **PWRNEG**]. *The scale thing does matter*

as it is clear that there are some small organisations that rely on the larger ones for logistic support [**PWRPOS**, **RMT**, **COLALL**, **COLHOR**, **COLVER**] *but there are also others who will jealously guard their independence* [**HUMSIND**] *and do not like to be seen as working with any other organisations* [**PWRNEG**]. *As a general rule the NGOs are far happier to operate alone than to be seen as being part of an alliance* [**COLALL**]. *These organisations almost trade on their independence* [**HUMSIND**] *and impartiality* [**HUMSIMP**] *and their main aim seems to be to wave a flag and to get publicity and be noticed* [**SUSFR**, **SUSSTRAT**]. *They effectively claimed the ground because they got there first* [**PWRNEG**, **SUSSTRAT**]. *Most of the aid that was delivered was not actually needed and effectively clogged up the airhead some form of coordination was clearly needed* [**COLCLU**].

This example which is from an early interview illustrates the density of coding that was typical at the beginning of the process when what was important in respect of the study was not entirely clear and so consequently, many comments were coded. Also many of the same codes are repeatedly used throughout, this is both natural and deliberate as there are mostly repetitive patterns of action and consistencies within human affairs and the ultimate aim of the coding process is to identify repetitive patterns and themes (Saldana, 2013; Miles and Huberman, 1994). As the process unfolded, this density reduced markedly as the significant categories were identified and subsumed earlier categories. Indeed in keeping with the thoughts of Dey (1993) who regards the creation and identification of codes as an on-going aspect of any research project, where coding categories can be extended, modified or even discarded, the researcher was conscious of the need to identify emerging codes as and when they appeared. Miles and Hubmeran (1994) commend the revision of codes throughout any research project in order to address the *emic* issues (those that emerge throughout the study which may be nested within the original *etic* issues) and to also take account of the researcher's growing field experience, as they put it:

> *"There is more going on out there than our initial frames have dreamed of, and few field researchers are foolish enough to avoid looking for these things"* (p.61)

Furthermore, some codes will simply not work, others may decay away and some may flourish to an extent that they may have to be broken down into more manageable sub-codes.

3.13.3   Thoughts on Computer-assisted Qualitative Data Analysis – Nvivo 10

Drawing on the thoughts of Bryman and Bell (2012) who believe that one of the most significant developments in qualitative research since the middle of the 1980s is the emergence of computer software that can assist in the use of qualitative data analysis (p593), time was taken during the analysis phase to experiment with the use of NVivo (QSR International, 2012) as an a computer based aid to data analysis.   Unfortunately, the software was found to be cumbersome and far from intuitive leaving the researcher to take the decision quite early on in the process to stick with manual coding and the use of coloured highlighter pens to facilitate analysis.

3.14   Writing Up the Research and Final Contribution

3.14.1   The Write Up – Presenting Qualitative Research

As this thesis was based predominantly on a qualitative approach and the gathering of rich and in-depth data, questions were raised on how to present this data within the final manuscript. Pratt (2009) and Silverman (2011b) discuss the challenges associated with writing up qualitative research and agree that unlike quantitative findings, which will invariably have a *significance level* or a *magic number* associated with them, qualitative findings present quite different issues for the researcher if an appropriate message is to be conveyed to the reader. Pratt (2009) talks of 2 *perilous paths* which should be avoided when qualitative research is discussed:

1. A lack of balance between theory and data.
2. Turning a qualitative narrative into a quantitative one.

Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007 cited by Pratt, 2009) talk of "telling and not showing" (p.857), where the author offers no clear evidence of the transition from their data to their interpretation of that data. The advice offered is to place some data within the body of the thesis and to avoid the inclusion of elaborate tables of data which rely on the reader constantly transiting to and from the table whilst also hoping that the reader has the understanding of the data that the author had originally intended. Consequently the *domain* analysis Chapters (4 through 7) and the final Concluding Chapter (8) include quotations extracted from the data gathered which offer a summary of overall opinion or typify responses within a particular area of discussion or focus. This approach will also hopefully make the document more interesting and logical for the reader.

Qualitative researchers will often try and make their research more palatable to the quantitative community by using *deductive shorthand* which effectively mimics quantitative techniques (Pratt, 2009, p.857; also discussed in Mordue, 2011). Given the inductive nature of this study, clearly this was to be avoided. In a similar vein, the triangulation of the data analysed is key for credibility and generalisability, hence the use of 4 research *domains* and an associated array of data gathering techniques (see section 3.11.7). Finally, in keeping with the advice on presenting such work (Yin, 2013) the final report consists of separate chapters (4 through 7) for each *domain* of study together with a final chapter (8) covering the cross-*domain* analysis, results and overall contribution.

3.14.2 The Theoretical Contribution?

The ultimate aim of any study such as this is to spell out the final significant contribution to knowledge (Phillips and Pugh, 2005; Rugg and Petre, 2004). Most organisational scholars do not generate theory from scratch but generally work on the improvement of what already exists (Whetten, 1989, p492) and this is certainly the case here. As discussed earlier whilst the principles of grounded theory were utilised a *theory building* rather than a *classic* grounded approach was adopted (see section 3.7.1) with a view to presenting findings that would improve upon processes that already exist. However, this does create a problem in that it is difficult to then judge what constitutes a sufficient contribution to warrant the final award.

A theory must contain the following elements (Dubin, 1978 cited by Whetten, 1989, p.490):

What factors logically should be considered as part of the explanation of the social phenomena of interest? When authors begin to map out the conceptual landscape of a topic, they should remember that it is easier to delete unnecessary or invalid elements and recognise that their ideas will be refined over time; hence they should err on the side of including too many factors as they look to justify their arguments.

How are the factors that are included related? Visual representation may help to clarify the author's thinking whilst also increasing reader comprehension, not forgetting that the researcher must also justify why the findings and related factors should be given credence in the context of the particular representation or phenomena under discussion?

Why should colleagues give credence to this particular representation of the phenomena? The answer lies in the logic of the underlying model. The soundness

of fundamental views of human nature, organisational requisites or societal processes provide the reasonableness of the proposed conceptualization.

Whilst it is possible to make a theoretical contribution by simply adding or subtracting factors to the existing processes (the *whats*) a better way to demonstrate the value is to identify how these changes affect current relationships between variables (the *hows*). These relationships, Whetten (1989) argues are where the true theory lies as he cites Poincare (1983):

> *"Science is facts, just as houses are made of stone….But a pile of stones is not a house and a collection of facts is not necessarily science"* (p.493)

But what are the factors that conceptual arguments are judged upon as these must inform what is a 'significant contribution' and with it the final award. Tables 3.7 summarises these key factors by way of 7 questions:

Question	Notes:
Whats new?	Reviewers are not necessarily looking for new theories but modifications or extensions to current theories should alter scholarly opinion in some way.
So what?	Will the theory change existing practice and process?
Why so?	Is there compelling evidence to support the proposed theory?
Well done?	Is there evidence of reasoned thinking and a broad understanding of the associated subject area?
Done well?	Is the argument well written and presented and is it an enjoyable read?
Why now?	Is the topic of contemporary interest?
Who cares?	What is the likely scale of academic interest in the subject area and overall contribution?

Table 3.7   Factors Considered in Judging the Theoretical Contribution (adapted from Whetten, 1989, p.494)

3.15 Conclusion

In this chapter a detailed account of the philosophy, strategy, methodology and analytical processes of the research study has been presented. As explained and justified, in order to address the research question and achieve the associated aims the study adopted qualitative methods utilising a multiple-case study approach (Yin, 2009). A 3 stage process involving self-completion questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and focus groups is described and illustrated (Fig 3.4), with observation and protocol data being incorporated in the final approach in order to address criticisms levelled at the validity and generalisability of purely qualitative data gathering strategies. Similarly, the use of case studies and in particular the merits afforded by a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2013; Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995), are exploited and arguments offered that given the perspectives sought here, the use of a multi-site cross comparison serves to increase confidence in the overall findings; in essence adding credibility to the overall contribution to knowledge. Definitions of *classic* cases (Yin, 2009, Simons, 2009, Stake, 1995) suggest that the selected organisations should be considered from all angles and all aspects; however this is not the approach here, where a much more focussed view of the participant organisation's particular approaches was deemed to be a key to success. Hence, in order to locate the *cases* within the general context of the research, arguments are offered to justify the use of the term *domain* instead of *case* throughout the analysis; whereby a *domain* is understood to be more descriptively rich than a *case* (Gardner,1997).

By systematically *peeling* the *research onion* (Saunders *et al*, 2009) the discussion of each exposed *layer* affords the opportunity to understand and appreciate the thinking behind the final chosen approach. The resulting research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data, and the choice of design reflects decisions made about the priority given to a range of dimensions within the research process. Hence, set against this background the research design, methodology and associated methods employed to collect and analyse data are also described and clarified. Whilst enabling the fulfilment of the final research aims, the approach described also addresses the calls offered by Kovács and Spens (2011), who highlight the need for good and applicable research within the humanitarian logistics field, with empirical data being gathered through the use of appropriate qualitative method; and also those of Kunz and Reiner (2012) who believe that "empirical methodologies such as cross-organisational case studies should be used more in order to increase knowledge in the [humanitarian logistics] field" (p.133).

CHAPTER 4

THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS

"OCHA is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. The aim is to assist people when they most need relief or protection. A key pillar of the OCHA mandate is to coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors."

(OCHA, 2012a)

4.1   Introduction

This is the first of four chapters that present an analysis of the data gathered from the individual domains considered during this research. This approach is in keeping with *classic* multiple-case design (Simons, 2009; Yin, 2009; Hartley, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989) where the researcher is advised to consider each case in isolation prior to final cross-case analysis. Consequently, it should be noted at this stage that in order to ensure this isolated yet consistent consideration of the research domains, the approach described within this chapter will be mirrored within chapters 5,6 and 7.

The data gathered from The United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the participants within the UN Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. A continuation of the adopted research methods established within Chapter 3 will be utilised as data gathered at each of the 3 stages of the final research strategy will be discussed and analysed. Following guidance on the application of the case study method (Yin, 2009) the narrative and analysis presented here will be completed in isolation from the other cases (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7) with a cross-comparison of the data gathered from all four

domains being included in Chapter 8 where a review of trends, commonality and differences will result in the final contribution to knowledge.

By way of introduction a short background and history of the OCHA, its formation and role is included together with a discussion on the organisation's growing influence and focus on the coordination of the overall humanitarian relief effort. The tasking and structure of the CMCS is explained before the use of the organisation as a research domain for the study is justified. Following the inclusion of a listing of respondents and their backgrounds the discussion turns to an analysis of the key *etic* and *emic* issues and themes identified. The chapter is structured in 3 parts at this point which follow Stages I to III of the final research approach as developed and discussed within Chapter 3 of this thesis. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse. Thus, the approach will enable an exploration of the trends that describe the barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and the identification of measures that might help to address these barriers, thereby potentially improving collaboration along humanitarian relief supply chains in the future.

4.2 Background – Coordinating the Overall Humanitarian Effort

The Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC) is responsible for the oversight of all emergencies requiring United Nations humanitarian assistance. The ERC also acts as the central focal point for governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental relief activities. This responsibility is managed through OCHA which is the organisation within the UN Secretariat tasked with the overall coordination of humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies (OCHA, 2012a). OCHA also ensures that there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort. The ERC leads the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. In a country affected by a disaster or conflict, the ERC may appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) who will be tasked with ensuring that response efforts are organised. The HC works through an established OCHA office with government, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and affected communities. OCHA's stated overall mission is to (OCHA, 2012a):

1. Mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies.

2. Advocate the rights of people in need.

3. Promote preparedness and prevention.

4. Facilitate sustainable solutions.

OCHA's Strategic Framework is built on three pillars (OCHA, 2012a):

1. **Partnerships:** Partnership has always been integral to OCHA's efforts. Sustained relations, built on trust and mutual respect, are considered to be vital when preparing for and responding to humanitarian emergencies. OCHA is positioned within the international humanitarian system to convene and influence agendas. They try and achieve this strategically, with the aim of creating a more enabling environment for humanitarian action.

2. **Service Provision:** OCHA try to ensure that their services and support to partners evolve and meet clients' needs. They achieve this by focusing on helping partners through humanitarian coordination, leadership, strengthening coordination mechanisms, and improving the evidence base for humanitarian decision-making, planning and resource allocation.

3. **Reliability and Professionalism:** In 2010, OCHA introduced rapid reaction solutions to ensure that the right people are on the ground immediately after a new disaster. This effort is coordinated by longer-term staff to ensure continuity of the overall OCHA presence.

OCHA has over 30 offices around the world, split across 4 continents with upwards of 1,900 staff. OCHA's coordination work is funded from the UN's regular budget, member states' voluntary contributions and private donations. Since 2002, OCHA's budgetary requirements have almost quadrupled as it has expanded its overall role and influence; however, its regular budget allocation from the UN has remained almost static (OCHA, 2012a). This trend means that OCHA now places great reliance on extra-budgetary resources and that its current income is predominantly by way of voluntary contributions from individual member states and the European Commission (see OCHA, 2012b for a

breakdown of donors as at February 2011). By way of example, for 2010-11 only 0.6 per cent of the United Nations Regular Budget was allocated to OCHA which amounted to some US $14 million (£9 million) however its reported programme and administrative budget was close US $242 million (£151 million) (OCHA, 2012c).

Donors to OCHA are grouped in an informal OCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG) with members committing to annual funding of a minimum threshold (currently US $0.5 million, £0.3 million). They provide financial, political and technical support towards fulfilling OCHA's mandated coordination activities. The ODSG's goal is to support OCHA in fulfilling its mandate by acting as a sounding board and a source of advice on policy, management, budgetary and financial questions. The Group also acts as a mechanism for feedback, donor consultation and the exchange of views on OCHA's strategic priorities, new project initiatives, evaluations and reviews. The Group also discusses measures that members may take individually or collectively to assist OCHA in better fulfilling its mission and goals on the basis of the humanitarian principles (DFID, 2008).

It should also be noted at this stage that the UN and OCHA have no influence on governments that have bi-lateral arrangements with countries requesting military assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster (Cottey and Forster, 2005; Macrae, 2002). By way of example, during the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013) Australia and Canada were embedded with OCHA in delivering the humanitarian response, whilst other countries who lacked bilateral agreements with the Philippine government, such as the United States and the United Kingdom found themselves on the periphery of the humanitarian effort.

4.3   A Brief History – United Nations' Commitment since 1991

In December 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 46/182 (UN, 2012), which was designed to strengthen the UN response to complex emergencies and natural disasters, whilst improving the overall effectiveness of humanitarian operations in the field. The resolution also created the position of ERC; a role which combined into a single UN focal point the functions carried out by the Secretary-General's representatives for major and complex emergencies, as well as the UN's natural disaster functions carried out by the UN Disaster Relief Organisation. Soon after the resolution was adopted, the Secretary-General established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). He also assigned the ERC the status of Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, with offices in New York and Geneva to provide institutional support. Resolution 46/182 (UN, 2012) also

created the IASC, the Consolidated Appeals Process and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund as key coordination mechanisms and tools of the ERC. In 1998, as part of the Secretary-General's programme of reform, DHA was reorganised into the OCHA that exists today, with an expanded mandate to include the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. This means that OCHA carries out its coordination function primarily through the IASC, which is chaired by the ERC. Participants include all humanitarian partners, from UN agencies, funds and programmes, to the Red Cross movement and NGOs. The IASC is expected to ensure inter-agency decision-making in response to complex emergencies and these responses include needs assessments, consolidated appeals, field coordination arrangements and the development of humanitarian policies.

4.4   A Growing Influence - Current Focus and Coordination Activity

OCHA lists as its main areas of focus, policy, advocacy, information management, humanitarian financing and coordination (OCHA, 2012a); however, given the topic of research within this thesis the discussion will now deal solely with the final OCHA area of focus, that of coordination.

OCHA is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent and coordinated response to emergencies and disaster relief. The aim is to assist people when they most need relief or protection. A key pillar of the OCHA mandate is to "coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors" (OCHA, 2012a). OCHA is committed to leading the international community's efforts to develop a better architecture for the humanitarian system, a strategy which includes; the introduction of HCs within disaster areas; the development of representative and inclusive Humanitarian Country Teams; the management of an effective and well-coordinated framework within which all humanitarian organisations can contribute systematically; and predictable funding tools. OCHA currently plays a key role in operational coordination in crisis situations, including assessing situations and needs; agreeing common priorities; developing common strategies to address issues such as negotiating access, mobilizing funding and other resources; clarifying consistent public messaging; and monitoring progress. OCHA's overall role is to support the leadership of the HCs and to ensure effective coordination, including strengthening the cluster approach, data and information management, and reporting. They believe that by ensuring that the right structures, partnerships and leaders are supported, they and their humanitarian partners can better prepare for and more effectively coordinate humanitarian situations. OCHA serves as the

secretariat for inter-agency coordination mechanisms such as the IASC and for rapid-response tools, such as the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination system, and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group. OCHA also aims to promote efficient interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian operations, to bridge gaps in environmental emergency management, and to map global emergency relief stockpiles on behalf of the whole humanitarian community.

4.4.1 United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Section

The Oslo Guidelines (UN, 2006) which sought to ensure that foreign military and civil defence assets deployed in response to a natural disaster could support and complement relief operations were developed through an inter-governmental, inter-agency process. The Guidelines clearly state that military assets must not be used "*in a manner that would compromise the civilian nature and character of humanitarian assistance*" (p.4). However, military assets are frequently used in support of relief efforts, hence OCHA and its humanitarian partners are frequently called upon to work with its member states to incorporate into contingency planning the possibility of military asset usage, and to engage military actors at an early stage in the response in order to guide military efforts and to protect the humanitarian space (Seigel, 2011; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.27). The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is the organisation within OCHA tasked with facilitating dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors within a given disaster zone (OCHA, 2012d).

4.5   Data Collection, Respondents and Results

The UN CMCS was first contacted in July 2012 through a series of introductory letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research methodology. Key respondents are shown in Table 4.1:

Respondent	Time with OCHA (years)	Relevant Practical Experience	Role	Code
Officer In Charge	15	Pakistan Floods, Haiti, Africa, Balkans, Asian Tsunami, Sudan; Somalia	Leadership and overall command of the UN-CMCoord.	OIC
Officer In Charge Policy and Plans	10	Pakistan Floods, Haiti, Africa, Afghanistan,	Coordination and development of strategic policy and planning.	PP
Officer In Charge Operational and Field Support Unit	12	Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan Floods, Haiti, Asian Tsunami,	To manage resources engaged in the delivery of individual relief projects	OFS
Officer In Charge Training and Partnership Unit	11	Pakistan Floods, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq,	To develop, coordinate and deliver training within the UN- CMCoord	TPU
Humanitarian Coordinator	10	Pakistan Floods, Haiti, Africa, Afghanistan,	To ensure that the response effort during a given relief operation is organised and coordinated on the ground.	HC1
	8	Haiti, Asian Tsunami (Banda Aceh),		HC2

Table 4.1   UN CMCS – Key Respondents

4.6   Data Analysis – Stage I – Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered through the introductory questionnaires will now be discussed. In achieving this due consideration will be given to the practical relevance of the initial *etic* issues and themes identified within the Literature Review as set out and codified at Appendix E. Note that *etic* data analysis codes included within Appendix E and respondent codes within Table 4.1 will be used at this stage.

4.6.1   Humanitarian Space

The senior respondent (OIC) made it clear that an essential responsibility of the UN CMCS was to protect and promote all four of the humanitarian principles. He was keen to stress that whilst military action supports political purposes (POLINF), humanitarian assistance should be based on recipient need and should be provided neutrally (HUMSNEU). The remaining respondents had a variety of opinions as to the relative importance of the humanitarian principles however, it was clear that they all agreed on the significance of the Oslo Guidelines (UN, 2006a) when working with the military to ensure that the key areas of impartiality (HUMIMP), operational independence (HUMIND) and neutrality (HUMNEU) are not compromised and that the overall civilian character of the humanitarian assistance offered is not affected (SUSCSR).

> Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Humanitarian Principles/ Military Role/ Maintenance of Oslo Guidelines/ Corporate Social Responsibility

4.6.2   Organisational Sustainment, Power and Relationships

The UN CMCS is regarded by the respondents as the key arbiter in the avoidance of competition (SUSSTRAT) between NGOs and local governments. Moreover, the respondents with operational, on the ground experience (OIC, OFS, HC1,2) highlighted that the organisation is tasked with minimising any inconsistency in approach (RMT) and also regards itself as a driver in helping to facilitate and establish common goals amongst contributors (PWRPOS, RMT).

4.6.3 Collaborative Working and the Military

The operational involvement in the relief effort was highlighted by the junior respondents (PP, OFS, TPU, HC1,2) who emphasised the importance of the UN CMCS in its role as the enabler of collaborative working between donors operating in the same humanitarian relief space (COLCLU, COLALL). This is particularly true when local and international humanitarian organisations are involved and are expected to work alongside the military (HUMSIND). The belief is that effective and consistent humanitarian civil-military coordination (COLCLU, COLLALL, COLRES) is a shared responsibility that is crucial to safeguarding humanitarian principles and the humanitarian space (PWRPOS, RMT). All respondents expressed the opinion that the OCHA is expected to manage the level of coordination and the associated differing relationships that develop (RMT, RMOPP, COLCU). The senior and operationally experienced respondents (OIC, OPS, HC1,2) were keen to comment on the military contribution to the disaster relief effort and believed that, given their ability to rapidly mobilise and deploy unique assets and expertise, the military could offer a valuable contribution to any humanitarian operation (COLHOR, COLVER, COLLALL). The senior respondent (OIC) also noted that the acceptance of military assistance is vital in some circumstances and that the UN cluster concept could ensure differing levels of collaboration between humanitarian organisations and the military; collaboration which could effectively range from what he termed *cooperation* through to *coexistence* (PWRPOS, RMT, COLCLU).

Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:

UN Cluster Concept/ Lead Status/ Power
and Relationships/ Military Assistance

4.6.4   Summary – UN-CMCS Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

In completing Stage I of the research strategy with the UN CMCS the following key *etic* themes and issues were identified to inform Stage II of the research strategy.

Theme	Issue	Description	Notes
Humanitarian Space	Humanitarian Principles	Neutrality and Impartiality	How maintained/ managed
	Military Role	Should not compromise humanitarian principles	How to ensure civilian character is established and maintained
	Maintenance of Oslo Guidelines	Success of guidelines	How enforced
	Corporate Social Responsibility	Humanitarian principles are not compromised and the overall civilian character of the humanitarian assistance offered is not affected.	How achieved? Clarify meaning/ understanding
Organisational Sustainment, Power and Relationships	Management of Competition	Key arbiter in avoidance of competition	How?
	Power	Facilitate and establish common goals amongst contributors	How? How is this approach received by participants? Examples?
	Relationship Management	Power broker role?	How are relationships managed? Problems? Examples?
Collaborative Working and the Military	UN Cluster Concept	Success of the approach	Successes? Examples? How established/ managed/ maintained
	Lead Status	Manager of collaboration and alliances	How received/ managed/ maintained Examples?
	Power	Broker between military, governments and NGOs	How received? Successes? Examples?
	Relationship Management		
	Military Assistance		

Table 4.2   UN CMCS – Stage I Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

4.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing *Emic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with members of the UN CMCS listed in Table 4.1 will now be discussed. In keeping with Stage II of the final research strategy interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which was developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key *etic* themes and issues that had been identified as a result (see Appendix E). Note that respondent codes listed within Table 4.1 will still be used throughout this discussion.

4.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration

> *"The increasing number of actors within humanitarian relief areas means that whilst coordination of effort is essential it is [at the same time] extremely challenging"* (OFS)

> *"We regard OCHA as a critical contributor….we have seen examples in the past where the genuine drive to help has led to aid agencies working on their own without proper coordination…this leads to duplication of effort and ineffectiveness".* (OIC)

The thoughts cited above illustrate agreement with the views offered in the literature (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) on the growing number of actors within humanitarian relief zones and reflect the common perception amongst those interviewed within the UN CMCS on the need for coordination within humanitarian relief provision, and the overall requirement for their office and the UN OCHA. Effective collaboration will be a contributing factor in any supply chain activity (Seigel, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009) and it is reassuring to note that OCHA's role as a facilitator of closer working was regarded as "crucial" (OIC, PP) amongst participants and effectively made life "easier within relief zones, as providers and recipients of aid know who to approach to get quick answers and quick responses" (OFS). Hinting at the importance of supply chain resilience (Christopher, 2011) and the ability of that chain to withstand turbulence, OFS offered the view that the presence of OCHA and its representatives made victims of disasters feel "safer and reassured", a view shared by OIC and PP who asserted a strong belief that "OCHA make a clear difference to those who are suffering on the ground". TPU was keen to discuss the impact of previous disasters and highlighted the fact that a new strategic framework had been adopted by the OCHA following a review of the lessons learned post the responses to the Haiti Earthquake and Pakistan Floods of 2010. This is also echoed in the OCHA Plan and Budget statement (UN OCHA, 2013) where a new strategic plan is explained based on the UN Under-Secretary General's emphasis on "strengthening OCHA's field effectiveness" (p.5).

OIC emphasised that this strategic framework is at the heart of all OCHA activity and that he saw his organisation's role as one that should look to:

> *"Broaden partnerships and become more accountable for the way that resources are managed whilst also trying to improve coordination of humanitarian provision and making the provision of humanitarian relief more effective and efficient"*

Agreeing with academic support for the use of clusters as a vehicle to achieve collaboration within supply chains (Patti, 2006, Porter, 1998) the respondents were supportive of the UN Cluster Concept and believed that it has a clear role to play in the overall effectiveness of humanitarian relief provision.

> *"The Cluster Concept is a leap forward from its predecessor where basically every organisation did its own thing…it was an obvious requirement and has been, on the whole a success since its introduction"* (PP).

OIC believed that the cluster approach strengthened the relationship between the UN and international NGOs, but felt that there is a need to develop mechanisms for assessing the performance of clusters. OIC was unaware of any such mechanisms but agreed that they would be useful at all levels and stages of the relief effort. Agreeing with OIC, PP felt that accountability was a real weak point of the cluster approach and that there were very low levels of accountability of cluster leads to the HC in the field. He offered the view that this is as a direct result of what he termed the "very loose" link between the cluster approach and the overall OCHA coordination system. Referring to his experiences in Haiti, OFS felt that the cluster approach had been driven from the top down and that there had been little inclusion of the local providers and population, hence he felt that this had effectively undermined local ownership and with it local responsibility for relief action. This experience would seem to echo the academic view that in order to be effective, clusters should include both "upstream suppliers and downstream customers" (Patti, p.266).

OFS also felt that there is no clear criteria for the implementation of clusters in the context of situations where reoccurring natural disasters exist, which serves to undermine participation and promote what he termed "emergency thinking outside emergencies". In a similar vein, OIC commented that the cluster approach is too exclusive and does not include important providers such as national NGOs, governments and local donors. Agreeing with Porter's initial economic cluster theory (1998), OIC felt that this lack of involvement could:

> *"Weaken local ownership and create tension with local government which could lead to unsustainable solutions and clear issues in the overall success of the long term recovery strategy".*

Demonstrating agreement with the academic view that cluster leads could learn valuable lessons from consideration of 4PL strategies (Jensen, 2012) the data gathered offers empirical evidence that there is a requirement to improve and promote inter-agency contingency planning and that joint exercises at a country level might help to achieve this. Moreover, there is also a requirement for clear guidance on inter-cluster coordination and an explanation of the role of OCHA in making this happen within humanitarian emergency areas. The view is that clusters need to be rationalised to avoid duplication and to ensure the most efficient use of time and resources (PP). There is a common view that there is a lack of guidance on how to effectively invoke an 'exit strategy' (OFS) to help countries to move on from the cluster approach, and that there is a requirement to establish appropriate links between humanitarian aid organisations and local developmental actors within affected countries. Further comment on this issue related back to the model on the Phases of Disaster Relief Operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and on the clear need to establish closer linkages between the different stages of the disaster relief operation (OFS,HC1,HC2). TPU noted that there is a requirement to provide training for country representatives on the cluster approach, its roles and responsibilities and that this should include all countries involved and all agencies be they governmental or non-governmental.

Maintaining the training theme and suggesting agreement with the thoughts offered by Moore and Taylor (2011) and Thomas and Mizushima (2005) on the importance of humanitarian logistics professionalisation, TPU discussed the idea of long term investment in cluster coordination as a professional career path within provider organisations, and that whenever possible trained cluster coordinators and teams should be in the field for longer periods, putting them in a position to effectively train national and local personnel prior to final withdrawal.

The data gathered illustrates that OCHA regards itself as effectively a 4PL provider (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010) which acts as a facilitator of resource sharing:

> *"We do not have our own resources as such but regard our role as one that brings together providers and encourages the effective and efficient sharing of facilities and resources"* (OIC).

All respondents agree with the view that effective information sharing is a key element in a successful supply chain (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and Handfield, 2008); however, the consensus is that there is a significant amount of misunderstanding amongst humanitarian organisations and providers on OCHA's role and capacity in relation to

information sharing and management at both the global and country level. That said, all respondents agree that the cluster approach has improved information sharing, however information management is weak with significant amounts of information being lost or not shared when it was most needed (HC1, commenting on his experiences of the Pakistan floods, 2010).

Returning to a discussion on supply chain resilience (Christopher, 2011) OIC believed that the UN CMCS contribution is essential in complex emergencies, particularly where there is associated risk to individual contributors, and that the military has a vital role to play in facilitating humanitarian access, protecting civilians, and providing security for humanitarian aid workers. All respondents acknowledged the import role that the military has to play in the overall relief effort agreeing with commentary on the inevitability of such a contribution (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011). PP felt that there was an inevitability in that:

> *"National governments see the deployment of their military resources as a quick and visible sign of involvement at an early stage of the disaster response".*

OFS echoed this thought:

> *"When an emergency or disaster occurs which leads to a humanitarian need, lots of countries will deploy their military's or paramilitary organizations in direct response"*

However, OFS also seemed to reflect the ideas discussed by Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009) in respect of the role that the Humanitarian Principles have to play in what they argue constitutes a *humanitarian operation,* as he noted the problems that military intervention can create when local and international humanitarian organisations are involved. In short, OFS clearly believes that it is vital that all organisations operating in the same area do not affect the overall neutrality and impartiality of the response.

> ### Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Field Effectiveness/ Strategic Framework/ Cluster Concept/ Cluster Training/ Professionalisation/ Local Organisational Training/ Joint Training

4.7.2 Power and Relationships

The data confirm the view that the relationship that exists between humanitarian actors will change depending on the type of emergency and the roles and responsibilities that are agreed and established with, and for the associated military contributors (OFS, HU1, HU2). There was acknowledgement that UN CMCS is seen by some humanitarian relief organisations as the *power broker* (Burt, 2005) in the supply chain and that the organisation is regarded by some humanitarian organisations as the focal point in the UN system for humanitarian civil-military coordination. However the respondents do not regard themselves as necessarily a lead organisation, but more as one that plays the role of a facilitator.

OFS agreed that the CMCS is happy to offer advice on matters relating to the involvement of foreign military resources to disaster relief and humanitarian relief operations, but was quick to stress that this is always complimented by the publication of operational guidance. The data gathered shows that the UN CMCS regards its role as one of providing support for humanitarian and military actors through the provision of training and advice on the guidelines that govern the use of foreign military and civil defence assets and humanitarian civil-military interaction. TPU explained that the training programmes that UN CMCS offer are designed to develop the skills and knowledge necessary amongst humanitarian and military actors to facilitate communication and, where required successful coordination and interaction (for details of courses see discussion in OCHA 2013b). OIC related his experiences at Banda Aceh in support of the Asian Tsunami (2004) in the following vignette, where he discusses power and relationships in respect of the need, as he saw it for OCHA to take the lead in the overall coordination of the humanitarian relief community:

> *"We developed a Humanitarian Information Centre and encouraged all NGOs to register with us and also to give an indication of what contribution they were intending to make. This helped us to produce maps of sectors showing who was working where and doing what and also to produce a list of contact information for all contributors. I suppose it was accepted that in this sense we held the power in the region at that time. We also chaired bi-weekly meetings and circulated minutes of decisions and outcomes……. We were conscious that attendance [at the meetings] was voluntary and that there were other meetings being held amongst some of those who elected not to attend ours".*

OIC went on to discuss the role that the local government had to play in this process and was quick to emphasise that meetings were also brokered with local representatives, with an emphasis on giving them the lead role at an early stage in the relief effort. OIC was quick to stress that he did not feel that there is any competition for the lead role in the recovery effort and that the role of OCHA and of the UN CMCS is to facilitate rather than dominate; moreover the overall aim is to return control to local government and agencies at the earliest opportunity. Arguing against the academic view that market competition does not really influence organisations within the humanitarian relief supply chain (Dash *et al,* 2013; Mays *et al*, 2102) OIC agreed with the assertions offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) in that there is clear competition between donor organisations when it comes to what OIC termed as the "more high profile" elements of the disaster relief process; an opinion shared by other UN CMCS respondents (OFS, HC1, HC2) who felt that there is a drive to be noticed amongst NGOs and that this could be "unhealthy at times" (OFS).

> Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Power Broker and Facilitator/ Local Governmental Involvement/ Inter-Agency Competition

4.7.3   The Humanitarian Space

In keeping with arguments offered regarding what constitutes a humanitarian operation (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008) all participants were happy to acknowledge the importance of the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. There is a common view that it is essential to protect and promote the humanitarian principles. PP explained that the administration of the principles within UN CMCS and OCHA lies with the IASC, which is designated as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance (IASC, 2011). OIC referred to his experiences in South Sudan:

> *"Successful coordination in humanitarian relief operations is based on logical and consistent UN engagement and on the establishment of stable peace arrangements, particularly in those countries that are recovering from a conflict. Maintaining the humanitarian principles means that in classic political peacekeeping missions there should be close coordination between all organisations that are on the ground, be they local, military, governmental or NGO".*

OFS felt that the humanitarian principles can be used to help facilitate collaboration between military and non-military organisations operating within disaster relief areas as they are

understood by everyone, and the common need to maintain them can be used to break down all types of barriers, be they political and/or religious or those that result from armed conflict.

Weiss and Collins (2000) noted the dilemma that may emerge when humanitarian organisations are asked to provide aid in regions where armed conflict means that non-combatants are being targeted by a warring party, and the data gathered (OFS, HC1, HC2) also confirms the need for military assistance in such disaster relief areas. Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia were all offered as a typical examples of insecure countries where security of aid workers is a real issue. However, there also seemed to be agreement with the Humanitarian Policy Group Report (2009) on the view that violence against aid workers in other humanitarian areas has reduced in recent times and that this is probably due to what OFS described as:

> *"The overall improvements to organisations' management and assessment of security risk over the past 5 years".*

As a result, there is a common view that humanitarian relief organisations, and in particular those sponsored by the UN, struggle to maintain a meaningful presence and safe access to affected people in areas where there is inherent conflict, which "ironically is normally where those most in need of aid find themselves" (HC2). Despite these issues it was clear that the UN CMCS strategy is to avoid a military response as such, with a clear reluctance to resort to armed escorts be they from the military or private security organisations. Moreover, there is no support to the idea of centralisation or to a regime of restricted movement. Reflecting the views highlighted by Heaslip (2011) and Beauregard (1998) on the acceptance of military assistance, HC1 pointed to his experiences in Haiti following the earthquake (2010), contending that the fact that the security rules which were in place called for armed escorts as standard actually restricted the aid effort as some NGOs simply refused to accept military assistance.

OFS did point out however, that in keeping with the humanitarian principles organisations within the sector will always find ways to carry on delivering aid to affected populations. He also believed that he had seen a shift in approach which was due to a change in the overall UN security management strategy. Many humanitarian organisations now appreciate the importance of remaining in the secure environment that is established with the local community over time, and this acceptance helps to facilitate wider reaching and more effective access to those in greatest need.

Reflecting the academic discussion on political perception (Reindrop and Wiles, 2001) OFS commented on the view that some NGOs still exhibit in respect of the UN and OCHA:

> *"Whilst the UN are meant to be neutral, politics and perception often prevent us from carrying out and coordinating humanitarian relief effort. We are still regarded by some [NGOs] as an organisation that represents Western governments and this creates problems for us in some disaster relief operations"*

The data gathered support a common belief that the UN CMCS was created to facilitate discussions and working relationships between all contributors. This is particularly true when it comes to the issue of military assistance and cooperation, where the view is that the organisation's role is to promote communication and interaction between all actors within the disaster relief zone be they civilian or military. Those relationships and agreements that developed as a result, are between the donors and should be based solely on their requirements and overall beliefs. The UN CMCS provide a framework that is designed to promote a broader understanding of humanitarian relief provision, which does include guidelines for political and military actors on how best to work together in humanitarian relief areas (UN OCHA, 2012d). PP explained that the framework had been designed to:

> *"Help all of those involved [in the relief effort] to develop specific policy within internationally agreed guidelines based on the working environments that they find themselves in …..it [the framework] should help organisations to come to agreements based on appropriate civil-military coordination structures"*

There is also a view that OCHA is trying to establish a predictable approach to the involvement of military resources by encouraging their use in not just the disaster relief stage but also in the build-up and recovery; clearly linking to Kovács and Spens (2008, 2007) discussions on the different phases of disaster relief operations and in particular to their call for an increase in the military contribution to the *preparation* and *reconstruction* phases.

> ### Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Maintain Secure Environment/ Maintain Humanitarian Principles/ Political Perception of OCHA/ Longer Term Military Involvement

4.7.4 Organisational Sustainment

> *"We now understand our role a lot better and are more effective and efficient as a result…….I think that more importantly the donor community are starting to understand our role too"* (PP)

The above statement echoes the views within the data gathered, which suggests agreement that UN OCHA and the UN CMCS in particular have a growing role to play in the disaster relief effort. OIC and PP pointed to the fact that the organisation and its role has grown significantly since its inception in 1991, a view shared by the USG/ERC in her opening statement in OCHA's latest Annual Plan and Budget (UN OCHA, 2013):

> *"Power is shifting and evolving; from traditional Government structures to a multiplicity of civic and private actors living increasingly interconnected lives. This has profound implications for the way that we do our work"* (p1)

TPU offered the view that a broadening of role and emphasis for OCHA has yet to be transmitted to the humanitarian community and agreed that this should be included in all new training strategies both within and out with his organisation. Participants pointed to the challenges associated with achieving sustainment against the growing demand for instant information (HC1), and to the fact that there is far greater expectation from donors and customers (OIC). Much like in the business sector the risk of mismatch and the disruption caused by globalisation and the associated smaller margins for error, will inevitably put more strain on humanitarian relief supply chains (Perry 2007, Kleindorf and van Wassenhove, 2004); however, HC1 was quick to stress that advances in technology and the ability to quickly gather more accurate and timely information were realising significant improvements in the ability to deliver better and more effective aid. PP agreed that new technology could play an active role in the facilitation of information sharing, but was also keen to stress that the gathering of such information rested with the organisations involved in the disaster response itself and not necessarily with members of OCHA and the UN CMCS. Reflecting the overall strategic plan for OCHA (2013, p5) respondents discussed the need to demonstrate overall economic value for money to donors and agreed that they were being driven to achieve greater effectiveness within relief zones (HC1) and a more visible presence and lasting contribution (TPU).

> **Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:**
>
> Strategic Framework/ Overall Role of OCHA/ Economically Accountable/ Information Facilitator/ Flexibility

4.7.5 Summary – UN-CMCS Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

Theme	Issue	Description	Notes
Management and Control	Field Effectiveness	Visibility of Presence and Overall Contribution	Increasing pressure to demonstrate economic value
	Economically Accountable		
	Information Facilitator	Utilise modern technology	Emphasis on facilitation of data access and not on data gathering
	Flexibility	How to achieve against economic pressures	Increasing pressure to demonstrate value for money
	Strategic Framework	Increase efficiency and effectiveness	
	Cluster Concept	Performance Measurement	How to make Cluster Leads Accountable
		Exclusivity	Local Government must be Involved at all times
		Overall linkage to OCHA	Very *loose* = confusion.
		Implementation Guidelines	Need to be produced to prevent confusion
Relationships	Local Governmental Involvement	Promote local ownership and responsibility at an early stage.	Prevent undermining of local authorities
	Power Broker and Facilitator	Not leader.	Promote understanding
	Inter-Agency Competition	Evident in the field.	How to manage
	Political Perception of OCHA	Guidelines	Local confusion
Understanding and Training	Overall Role of OCHA	Promote Wider Understanding	Facilitator not actor.
	Joint Training	Interagency exercises in planning and coordination	Who does what when
	Professionalisation	Career path for Cluster and HUMLOG Leaders/Managers	Improve efficiency/ effectiveness
	Local Organisational Training	Part of exit strategy for HUMLOG organisations	Pass responsibility for recovery to locals
	Cluster Training	Promote understanding and management	Roles and responsibilities.
Military Involvement	Maintain Secure Environment	Provide security for HUMLOG workers	Last resort
	Longer term	Not just immediate response but preparation and reconstruction	Maintain presence after immediate response
	Maintain Humanitarian Principles	Help to Facilitate collaboration and break down political barriers	Use in insecure countries

Table 4.3   UN CMCS Stage II Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

4.8   Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirming *Emic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with members of the UN CMCS will now be discussed. Three of the participants listed in Table 4.1 (OFS, HC1, HC2) were unable to take part in the Focus Group, hence membership was restricted to the remaining three UN CMCS participants listed in Table 4.1. In keeping with Stage III of the final research strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based around the Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G) which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings and the key *emic* themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes listed within Table 4.1 will still be used throughout this discussion.

4.8.1   Management and Control

> *"We believe that OCHA and the CMCS play vital roles in the disaster relief effort, particularly in those areas where there are security issues as we [CMCS] are tasked with providing security for the civilian population and for the humanitarian aid workers"* (OIC)

From the outset of the UN-CMCS Focus Group there was clear agreement on the importance of effective coordination and a common belief that an ad hoc approach was not effective within humanitarian relief areas. There was clear consensus on the role and responsibility of OCHA and the CMCS, however, it is acknowledged that achieving effective coordination is not an easy task and that the UN organisations do not always get it right.

> *"We provide guidelines to help participating organisations and governments to provide humanitarian aid but we do to a certain extent rely on those organisations involved to adhere to the guidance offered"* (OIC)

The Group felt that their coordination challenge is being exacerbated as those involved in humanitarian relief have two new issues to face. Firstly, the increasing scale and number of crises which often occur simultaneously, and secondly new types of emergencies which are more often than not caused and made worse by long-term problems such as extreme poverty, population growth and climate change; the view is that both of these issues call for much closer links between humanitarian actors themselves, as well as between those involved in third world developmental projects. Local involvement is also recognised as a key to success:

"The pressure to effectively coordinate is all the more prevalent as is a clear recognition of the importance of establishing national ownership at an early stage. The UN must look to lead effective and principled humanitarian action, which is also aimed at long term recovery and addressing the root causes of disasters". (TPU)

Turning to the Cluster Concept. The Group are in agreement with the overall aims of the Concept itself and also agree that it should seek to make global cluster leads accountable to the ERC for ensuring more effective inter-agency working, and with it a more effective response to humanitarian disasters. All participants also agreed that whilst the Cluster Leads are issued with objectives, there is little evidence of an effective monitoring system to report cluster performance against. The consensus was that clusters should look to involve local communities and authorities wherever possible as omission of local governments in the decision making process can lead to unnecessary tensions and confusion. PP reiterated the view expressed during Stage II of the research (see 4.8.1) in that the linkage between the clusters and OCHA is unclear to some and that this does effect the overall efficiency of the humanitarian relief system. This is a view shared by TPU who felt that:

"Clearer guidelines on the cluster approach, similar to those that we [CMCS] issue on Civil-Military Coordination in relief areas would help everyone not involved with the UN. I have witnessed local and national confusion as well as a duplication of effort on occasion which could have been addressed though clearer direction at the start"

4.8.2 Understanding and Training

"The demands and expectations on OCHA and its Humanitarian Coordinators is growing as is the pressure that is placed upon them. The situation calls for experienced and professional leadership and this is not always easy to find". (TPU)

In agreement with the assertions offered in the literature (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Bolshe *et al*, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005), the Group acknowledged the importance of training and professionalisation within humanitarian logistics. As Goffnet *et al* (2013) and Heaslip (2011) discuss, the participants also appreciated the merits of joint training exercises; however they did recognise that such initiatives may be difficult to arrange in practice. Some group members had taken part in such events in the past, but they commented that although valuable, attendance had been sporadic; moreover, given the current financial climate and increasing number of humanitarian relief operations, the view was that it may be difficult to justify such a strategy in the future.

The Group discussed the UN CMCoord Officer Deployment Plan, which offers a number of options and is used to provide predictable and sustainable humanitarian civil-military coordination in the event of humanitarian emergencies (OCHA, 2013a). The Plan utilises the phased deployment of CMCS staff members and additional OCHA personnel, together with outsourced consultants to effect a staged approach to the build-up following a humanitarian disaster. TPU was quick to emphasise that all of these staff will be appropriately experienced and trained through the CMCS Training Partnership Programme which offers a range of courses at a wide variety of venues across the globe. The following courses were on offer in 2013 (OCHA, 2013b):

1. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Course.

2. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Field Course.

3. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Training of Trainers (ToT) Course .

4. Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Familiarisation Course.

Answering Heaslip's (2011) call for more cross-fertilisation between the military, UN agencies and NGOs within training (p.164) the UN-CMCoord Courses are aimed at military and civilian organisations with experience in emergency response. The strategy is that UN representatives as well as those from governments, NGOs and the military are able to share ideas and discuss operational strategies in a learning environment (OCHA, 2013b). TPU did concede that attendance at these courses was difficult for some and that participation from smaller organisations was very low. He also agreed that whilst the cluster concept was discussed on these courses it may be a prudent idea to establish a course aimed at cluster leaders which could clarify roles, structures and responsibilities.

4.8.3 Relationships

There was clear support for the belief that coordination has come a long way since the OCHA was created and that the organisation was striving to form stronger relationships between donors, NGOs, and UN agencies; but also acknowledgement that this is not always an easy task. During a discussion on the merits of local engagement and building relationships with local authorities PP spoke of his experiences during the initial response to the Haiti earthquake (2010):

> *"The majority of Haitians lived in poverty prior to the earthquake, and depended on a dysfunctional urban economy which effectively collapsed within seconds. There was no identifiable authority or government to speak of, hence establishing relationships with the locals was extremely difficult. Prior to the disaster there wasn't a functioning economic system but there was political instability and weak national institutions. This made it very difficult to obtain local decisions on critical issues, such as land ownership for the relocation of the hundreds of thousands of displaced Haitians or on simple things such as waste disposal".*

This vignette serves to demonstrate the overall Group opinion on the challenges associated with building relationships with local organisations, and also illustrates that those challenges are much the same as those reported within the business sector (Iglesias *et al*, 2011; Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007). Whilst there is a clear consensus that relationship building with local authorities was a good strategy, as it helped communities to take ownership of the recovery and also relief agencies to develop exit strategies at an early stage, in reality identification of the local authorities was not always an easy task. TPU returned to the discussion on the Training and Partnership Unit (see 4.9.2) and reminded the Group that this is aimed at establishing partnerships with a wide variety of global humanitarian relief organisations, and that the strategy not only trains OCHA staff but also aims to promote inter-organisational relationships by offering training to members of other relief organisations.

The Group agreed with the view that the private sector is an increasingly influential contributor to all stages of humanitarian relief (Christopher and Tatham, 2011, p.1) and also noted the contribution that smaller contributors have to make.

> *"We shouldn't forget the private sector's role in this as well as other emerging smaller contributors, such as religious organisations……there is a need for OCHA and the international humanitarian community to establish standards and certification systems, and this should include ensuring that existing coordination and partnership strategies are inclusive and effective at bringing all of these different groups together"* (OIC)

As discussed in the literature (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011) there is also recognition that humanitarian relief workers have some significant lessons to learn from the private sector in a number of areas including risk management and logistics, and that there is a need to create relationships with the private sector which may help the humanitarian community to increase capacity and fill any gaps that exist within the humanitarian response. Whilst the increasing number of partnerships within the sector were acknowledged, it was argued that this is not being reflected by a "growing spirit of community" (PP). The overall feeling is that inter-organisational relationships are running on a project timeline and that this is leading to a culture of "working in siloes with duplication

of effort" (PP). Ultimately, the Group conceded that the sector is predominantly governed by transactional relationships, based on authority and bureaucratic structure rather than transformational partnerships, with an emphasis on a joint vision and a feeling of loyalty and trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385).

4.8.4 Military Involvement

"Whilst the Oslo Guidelines call for the use of military involvement in humanitarian relief as a last resort there are clear areas where the military can offer expertise and resources" (PP)

The Group discussed the availability of military transport and logistics and other resources as well as the expertise in the provision of flexible and responsive supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011). These assets, termed Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) are provided on a non-profit basis and are made available under the control and coordination of OCHA and the CMCS (OCHA, 2012d). Resources will be requested by CMCS through a 24-hour contact point system which is established with UN Member States, but only as a last resort when all other resources have proved to be insufficient, exhausted, or unavailable. Despite these controls there was clear concern within the Group regarding the idea of "militarising" (PP) the overall relief effort, and the adverse effect that the presence of foreign military forces can have on the local population and also on the ability of civilian humanitarian organisations to operate freely within certain countries.

"When a humanitarian disaster happens many international governments will use their military forces as a means of providing a quick and visible response. This can create a problem when local and international humanitarian organisations are also involved but obviously it is essential that everyone can operate in the same areas without effecting the overall civilian perception of the humanitarian relief process" (OIC).

The Group acknowledged the efforts of some countries and governments to increase the overall military contribution to the humanitarian relief effort as discussed by Heaslip (2011), Seipel (2011) and Tatham (2011) as well as the increasing number of disasters that see international and local military forces working alongside civilian relief organisations. The view is that the CMCS task of ensuring and administering collaboration and cooperation between civilian and military actors is more and more important; however, there was also acknowledgement that the organisation and its staff have to be aware of and promote the humanitarian principles, and aim to help all organisations to pursue common goals to the benefit of those in need.

There is also a consensus that the CMCS has to be aware of the political influence that is often placed on the military participants. OIC spoke of the Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines that are produced by OCHA and offered by way of example the document produced for operations in Haiti (OCHA, 2011). Hinting at the discussion offered by Heaslip (2011, p.163) on the need to establish "clear blue water" between military and civilian actors, OIC explained that the document was written to address any potential "blurring of lines between military actors on one side, and humanitarian actors on the other" and thereby "ensure adequate arrangements for civil military-engagement and to safeguard humanitarian principles and action" (OCHA, 2011, p.3).

4.9 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues

As the first of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research findings, this chapter has drawn upon data gathered from the UN OCHA and in particular the respondents within the Organisation's CMCS. Having firstly established the key *etic* issues and themes through analysis of questionnaire responses, *emic* issues were developed and then investigated through a series of semi-structured interviews with OCHA participants. Finally, additional analysis and application of relevant literature within the field informed the areas of discussion within a participant focus group. Hence, in keeping with the final research strategy through triangulation of data gathered and findings from questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and also looked to identify how these barriers might be addressed to improve collaboration in the future. Following the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the findings and trends discussed within this section will be used during a final cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions and academic contribution. The section will now be broken down into the key *emic* themes and issues identified within the UN OCHA arrived at through application of Stages I and II of the final research strategy and confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.

4.9.1 Management and Control

Initial discussion and analysis surrounding the secondary data available on the UN OCHA, confirms the organisation's growing influence within the coordination of effective humanitarian relief. OCHA's overall approach to its role to "bring together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies" (OCHA, 2012a) is established, as is the contribution that the UN CMCS has to make in the facilitation of the interaction between civilian and military actors within disaster relief zones (OCHA, 2012d). Whilst there is

agreement with the academic view that effective coordination has a significant role to play in any supply chain activity (Carroll and Neu, 2009), the data gathered concurs with arguments on the challenges that OCHA faces in achieving effective coordination against the growing number of actors within humanitarian relief zones (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Moreover, the increasing scale and number of crises and the worry that such events now occur simultaneously adds to the issues that OCHA faces, as does the fact that emergencies are now made worse by long term problems such as extreme poverty, population growth and climate change.

The positive impact of OCHA's strategic framework is highlighted and there is general agreement with the view (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) that the use of clusters in general, and the UN Cluster Concept in particular has a clear role to play in future successes. There is a suggestion within the literature (Patti, 2006) that clusters have to include both upstream and downstream customers in order to be effective and in confirming this opinion, participants added that clusters should not be formed or driven from the top down. Concerns are raised surrounding effective cluster implementation, and agreement demonstrated with Porter's economic cluster theory (1998), in that whenever possible clusters should strive to include local authorities at an early stage. In keeping with the thoughts of Jensen (2012), OCHA's function is likened to that of a 4PL, and consequently, cluster leads can learn valuable lessons by considering the adoption of 4PL strategies (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011). Information sharing (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and Handfield, 2008) is a key to success in disaster relief operations, but the role of OCHA in the provision of information is misunderstood in that the organisation is established to facilitate information sharing and not, as some believe to carry out information gathering.

4.9.2   Understanding and Training

Thomas and Mizushima (2005) argue the case for logistics training being a necessity and not a luxury within the humanitarian sector, and their views, and those of more recent commentators (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Bolshe *et al*, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011) are echoed as training and professionalisation were a key theme of discussion amongst OCHA participants. There is a clear requirement for experienced and professional humanitarian logisticians, but such skills are not easy to find. Educational and training strategies should include local representation and all of those agencies involved in the relief effort, as this will help to develop and facilitate successful exit strategies post the disaster and the reconstruction phase. As discussed in the literature (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011), there is recognition that humanitarian relief workers have some significant lessons to learn from the private sector in a number of areas, including risk management

and logistics; moreover, there is a need to create relationships with the private sector which may help the humanitarian community to increase capacity and to fill any gaps that exist within the current humanitarian response. Consequently, the availability of OCHA training courses, which are aimed at establishing partnerships with a wide variety of global humanitarian relief organisations should be highlighted (OCHA, 2013b); however, attendance at these courses is difficult for some organisations and very limited from other, smaller organisations. Furthermore, whilst the cluster concept is discussed on these courses it might be prudent to establish a course specifically for cluster leaders.

4.9.3 Relationships

Coordination within humanitarian relief zones has improved markedly since the formation of OCHA, but there is still an ongoing requirement for more improvement, and a need for the establishment of stronger relationships between all actors within the sector. The relationship that exists between humanitarian actors will change depending on the type of emergency, and on the initial roles and responsibilities that are agreed for the associated military contributors. The UN CMCS is seen by some humanitarian relief organisations as the *power broker* (Burt, 2005) within the supply chain, although the organisation's role is as a centre for advice and support, rather than one that necessarily provides leadership. The challenges associated with building relationships with local organisations within the humanitarian sector, reflect the views on the similar issues faced by those within the business sector (Iglesias *et al*, 2011; Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007). There is clear correlation with literary opinion on the importance of early local engagement (Vincent and Bagshaw, 2005) and on effective coordination with local authorities. OCHA's role is to facilitate such initiatives whilst at the same time aiming to return control to local government at the earliest opportunity. Such strategies help communities to take ownership of the recovery and also assist aid relief agencies in the development of exit strategies at an early stage; however, in reality identification of appropriate local authorities is not always an easy task.

There is an increasing contribution from the business sector, and an associated growth in the number of partnerships between business and humanitarian organisations; however, this is not reflected by a corresponding growth in a spirit of community. These views concur with the thoughts on the challenges surrounding Hastily Formed Networks (Kumar and Havey, 2013) and with those of Senge (2010) on the lack of trust and propensity for transactional relationships within modern day Supply Chains. Inter-organisational relationships are organised and agreed against project timelines, and this results in a culture of working within siloes which lead to unnecessary duplication of effort. Ultimately, the

humanitarian sector is predominantly governed by transactional relationships, based on authority and bureaucratic structure rather than transformational partnerships, with an emphasis on a joint vision and a feeling of loyalty and trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385). Disagreeing with the view that market competition does not really influence organisations within the humanitarian relief supply chain (Dash *et al*, 2013; Mays *et al*, 2102) the opinion amongst OCHA participants echoes academic commentary (Olson and Gregorian, 2007) in that there is evidence of competition between donor organisations, which has a negative effect on the overall relief effort. In essence, there is a propensity amongst donor organisations to try and be noticed through involvement in the higher profile elements of the disaster relief process, such as those that may appear on the worldwide media.

4.9.4   Military Involvement

OCHA is trying to establish a more predictable approach to the involvement of military resources within humanitarian relief zones by encouraging their use in not just the disaster relief stage, but also in the build-up and recovery phases, clearly linking to Kovács and Spens (2008, 2007) discussions on the different phases of disaster relief operations and, in particular to their call for an increase in the military contribution within the preparation and reconstruction phases. The inevitability of military involvement within disaster relief operations is accepted and regarded as a means of maintaining supply chain resilience (Christopher, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011), particularly where there is a perceived risk to the well-being of humanitarian actors. However, a question still remains as although military intervention is seen by some international governments as a means of demonstrating a timely response, the conflict between a military presence and the maintenance of humanitarian principles (Tomansi and Van Wassenhove, 2009) presents a clear challenge for future disaster response operations. Weiss and Collins (2000) note the dilemma that may emerge when humanitarian organisations are asked to provide aid in regions where armed conflict means that non-combatants are being targeted by a warring party, and the data gathered acknowledges the need for military assistance in such disaster relief areas. However, there is also agreement with the Humanitarian Policy Group Report (2009) in that violence against aid workers in other humanitarian areas has reduced over the last 5 years, and that this is probably due to overall improvements within the management and assessment of security risk.

Humanitarian relief organisations, and in particular those sponsored by the UN, do struggle to maintain a meaningful presence and safe access to affected victims who are located in areas of inherent conflict. Despite these issues, reflecting the academic discourse on the reluctance of some aid organisations to accept military assistance (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel,

2011; Beauregard, 1998), it is also evident that the UN CMCS strategy is to avoid a military response whenever possible, and to refrain from the use of armed escorts and centralisation or restricted movement. Despite these challenges, reassuringly, the data also offers empirical support to the assertion that relief organisations will always find a way to deliver aid to affected populations (Heaslip, 2011). Moreover, in light of changes in the overall UN security management strategy, there has been a shift in approach amongst some organisations, who now appreciate the importance of remaining in the secure environment that military contributors provide.

As discussed in the literature (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011), some countries and governments are seeking to increase the overall military contribution to the humanitarian relief effort and there is a corresponding increase in the number of disasters that see international and local military forces working alongside civilian relief organisations; however, the UN CMCS is also conscious that it has to be aware of the political influence that is often placed on those military participants. Consequently, the Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines that are produced by OCHA for disaster relief operations, are written to effectively address any potential blurring of lines between military actors on the one side and humanitarian actors on the other (Heaslip, 2011); thereby, safeguarding the humanitarian principles (Tomansi and Van Wassenhove, 2009).

CHAPTER 5

THE UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE JOINT FORCES COMMAND – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS

"Some enabling military capabilities are best delivered jointly. To provide a more effective vehicle for organising, commanding and championing some of these capabilities, we propose setting up a Joint Forces Command (JFC)."

(MOD, 2011)

5.1   Introduction

The data gathered from the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) Joint Forces Command (JFC) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. By way of introduction a short background and history of the UK military contribution to humanitarian disaster relief is included. A discussion on the strategy behind the Joint Forces Logistic Component (JFLogC) then follows, together with narrative on the organisation's role within the planning and coordination of the UK military contribution to humanitarian disaster relief. The UK MOD's definitions of disaster relief operations are then explained and clarified before the future strategy for the JFC (post 2012) is considered, together with a consideration of the on-going and escalating MOD involvement within disaster relief. A listing of respondents and their backgrounds (Table 5.1) is included before the discussion turns to an analysis of the key *etic* and *emic* issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.

5.2   Background – UK Military Contribution to Humanitarian Disaster Relief

Following a humanitarian disaster the UK government may be requested to mount or lend support to the relief effort in the country or region affected (see discussion on the role of a *humanitarian military*, Fischer, 2011).   The UK contribution will usually be led by the Department for International Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if civilian resources are insufficient or if this approach provides a comparative advantage. A Service Level Agreement exists between DFID and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) should this military contribution be required. Weiss and Campbell (1991) note that it seems that when disasters, either natural or man-made occur, governments often turn to the military for help as the military have certain resources immediately to hand, such as food, medicine and fuel as well as transport and human assets with which to distribute them. However, it should be noted at this stage that under United Nations agreements, the use of military foreign humanitarian aid must always be as a "last resort" (UN, 2006, p4).

Logistics is regarded as fundamental to every military activity in all environments (MOD, 2003).   Forces involved on operations, wherever they may be, require the right level of support at the right time, in the right place. The challenge lies in the identification of *right* and its most effective, economical and efficient delivery. Historically, each UK military service has been responsible for delivering its own support and whilst this arrangement provided commanders with sound guarantees it came at a price; heavy resource costs, duplication of effort and an unwieldy and complex logistics tail (MOD, 2003, p1-1). In a bid to make best use of limited resources, whilst also being cognisant of the critical need for rapid and flexible response, the JFLogC was formed by the UK MOD in 2003. The JFLogC was formed in the light of the need to be prepared to operate logistically within multiservice, multinational environments, in which it may be necessary to provide both support to, and draw from other nations and organisations. For the purposes of the JFLogC logistics is defined as "the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces" (MOD, 2003, p1-2) whilst joint logistics is "the co-ordinated mutual logistic support of two or more [military] Services" (MOD, 2003, p1-3).

The JFLogC is tasked with the planning and coordination of all military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HADRO) (MOD, 2008). JFLogC policy and doctrine (MOD, 2003) identifies the possible requirement for the MOD to initiate humanitarian and related operations and acknowledges that these will involve personnel and formations adapting quickly to a 'non-war fighting stance' (p9-2). As a consequence, the type of commodity or functional service required will alter subtly from *warlike* stores to those for humanitarian needs. This change will require rapid adjustment to the logistic

demands within the supply chain; for example where once ammunition handling was required there may be a need for the bulk movement of food, water, tents and the like. Military doctrine (MOD, 2003) dictates that where operations are associated with the provision of humanitarian relief then those personnel involved will be expected to take account of the remaining national infrastructure, establish environmental conditions, provide liaison with the local civilian authorities and, most importantly the reporting media. Indeed, note is taken of the negative effect that a lack of attention or application to the media response to the military logistics contribution can ultimately have at a political level (p9-3). Military doctrine does stress that the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be perceived to be impartial, and that any aid or support that is provided should enhance the perceived legitimacy of the deployed forces amongst the recipient population and other humanitarian actors within the affected region (MOD, 2008, p4-3).

5.3   MOD Definitions

The MOD (2008) utilise 2 distinct definitions of disaster assistance to help them to define and plan the associated level of response. A *Disaster Relief Operation* (DRO) is defined as a "primary military task and contribution to a disaster relief response" (p1-2). Such a task should be designed to provide specific assistance to an afflicted overseas population. *Humanitarian Assistance* is designated as a secondary military task, which is defined as "the provision of relief aid by military forces conducting operations other than DROs" (p1-2). By way of example, consideration of the UK MOD contribution to the response to 2 earthquakes in Central Asia, illustrates the distinction between a *DRO* and *Humanitarian Assistance*:

> **Earthquake in Northern Pakistan, October 2005:**   UK Chinook helicopters were involved in the relief effort as part of an Operation *specifically mounted* in response to a request from the Pakistani government for assistance in respect of this disaster, hence this example represents a *DRO*.

> **Earthquake in Northern Afghanistan, March 2002**: UK Chinook helicopters were once again involved in the relief effort but were *already deployed* within Afghanistan in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). They undertook relief flights as a *secondary task* within the wider ISAF mission, hence this represents *Humanitarian Assistance*.

5.4   Future Strategy – The Joint Forces Command

Established to ensure that a range of vital military capabilities, functions and organisations, such as logistics, medical services, training education and intelligence were organised and managed effectively and efficiently to support success on military operations, the JFC achieved Initial Operating Capability in April 2012. The launch of the JFC was regarded as a major milestone in the MOD's Transforming Defence programme (MOD, 2012) as it brought together a number of joint Defence organisations including the JFLogC. The JFC was to ensure that investment in joint capabilities is appropriate and coherent, and to seek to strengthen the link between experience in operational theatres and top-level decision-making. The creation of the JFC was recommended by the Defence Reform review (MOD, 2011), led by Lord Levene, as part of what has been regarded as the most significant programme of change across the MOD in a generation (see discussion within the Strategic Defence and Security Review, direct.gov, 2010). The total number of military and civilian personnel in the JFC will be in the region of 30,000, a figure which includes those forces deployed on operations. These personnel are at sites across the UK, overseas in the Permanent Joint Operating Bases, and on operations in military theatres around the world, most notably Afghanistan (MOD, 2012).

5.5   On-going and Escalating MOD Contribution to Disaster Relief

With the end of the Cold War, the UK government has become more involved in the provision of humanitarian aid, not only through the funding of UN Agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) but also with the tasking of its armed forces. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (MOD, 1998) signalled greater emphasis on, and acknowledgement of the provision of 'Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations' (p22) and such a focus focus has continued in more recent governmental publications resulting in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011) which, under the chairmanship of Lord Ashdown considered the way that the UK government responds to humanitarian emergencies. The review identified that:

> *"It is because the impulse to relieve suffering is rooted in morality that our interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must always be driven by need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full part (and often a leading part) as a member of the international community in order to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more compassionate world, but a safer one too – and that benefits all of us".* (HERR, 2011, p3)

As a consequence of this continued and developing governmental focus, the UK MOD are involved in a wide variety of on-going relief efforts across the globe. For example, each year Royal Navy (RN) personnel who are employed on the Atlantic Patrol Task (North) pre-position a warship and supporting royal fleet auxiliary ships in the Caribbean for the hurricane season. In 2007 such RN resources followed some 150 miles behind Hurricane Dean and after its destructive landfall in Belize, joined British Army personnel who were training in the region at the time to assist in relief efforts. Later in the same season a RN Lynx Helicopter was tasked to deliver aid following Tropical Storm Noel's devastating landfall in the Dominican Republic. More recently the deployment of RN (The Telegraph, 2013) and Royal Air Force (RAF) resources (BBC News, 2013c) in support of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines serves to further illustrate the escalating MOD contribution to the aid effort.

5.6   Data Collection, Respondents and Results

JFLogC were first contacted in February 2012 through a series of introductory letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research methodology. Key respondents are shown in Table 5.1:

Respondent	Military Rank	Time with MOD (years)	Relevant Practical Experience	Role	Code
Commandant JFLogC	Air Commodore	25	Afghanistan, Pakistan Earthquake, Haiti, Asian Tsunami (Banda Aceh), Africa, Balkans	Leadership and overall command of the JFLogC.	CDT
Component Commander JFLogC	Colonel	20	Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Pakistan, Asian Tsunami (Banda Aceh)	Control and management of force-level logistic support and resources engaged in a response operation.	COM
SO1 HADRO	Lieutenant Colonel	22	Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti	Development of overall response strategy given a particular operation and management of that strategy from within the UK Headquarters.	SO1
SO2 HADRO	Major	15	Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia	Support to the overall strategy development. Reconnaissance of disaster areas and assessment of on-site needs.	SO21
SO2 HADRO	Lieutenant Commander RN	18	Caribbean Hurricane Relief (x3)		SO22
SO3 HADRO	Flight Lieutenant	10	Afghanistan	Direct liaison between JFLogC and site facilities.	SO3

Table 5.1   JFLogC – Key Respondents

5.6.1   Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies

Prior to a discussion on, and analysis of the data gathered from the JFLogC participants it should be noted that whilst the focus of this research was on the immediate response to natural disasters, it quickly became apparent that respondents did not make the same distinction between natural disasters and complex emergencies that can be seen in the academic discourse, which does acknowledge the inherent differences between the required responses (Cross, 2012; Balcik *et al*, 2010, Kovács and Taham, 2009). Consequently, JFLogC respondents regard their experiences to be of equal importance irrespective of the type of disaster (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Hence, at times the data and associated analysis of JFLogC data will refer to participant experiences within complex emergencies, as these are viewed to be of equal importance in helping to address the final research question and aim of this thesis.

5.7   Data Analysis – Stage I – Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered from JFLogC via the introductory questionnaires (Appendix D), will now be discussed. In achieving this due consideration will be given to the practical relevance of the initial *etic* issues and themes identified within the Literature Review as set out and codified at Appendix E. Note that respondent codes within Table 5.1 will be used at this stage.

5.7.1   Humanitarian Principles and Space

The four humanitarian principles were acknowledged by all participants and given equal priority by the senior respondents (CDT, COM, SO1); however, whilst all of the junior respondents (SO21,22, SO3) ranked humanity (HUMSHUM) and impartiality (HUMSIMP) as the most important principles they did not offer a view on the significance of neutrality (HUMNEU) and independence (HUMSIND). Perhaps this is understandable given the clear conflict between these principles and their chosen military careers (POLINF, POLMOT). The senior respondent (CDT) also commented on the importance of the Oslo Guidelines (UN, 2006a) in the maintenance of the humanitarian principles when his staff were called upon to work alongside civilian organisations and local governments on disaster relief operations (SUSCSR).

> ### Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Humanitarian Principles/ Military Role/
> Politics/ Maintenance of Oslo Guidelines

5.7.2   Collaboration, Organisation and Power

All respondents believed that they were in a position to establish and facilitate an effective supply chain (COLRES) that was specifically designed for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Moreover, whilst all respondents acknowledged and recognised that they operate within the UN Cluster concept, the junior respondents saw this as a bottleneck to success and questioned its ability to offer practical coordination in an operational context (COLCLU). The senior respondents (CDT, COM, SO1) were happy to take the lead in future operations (PWRPOS, RMT) and all respondents recorded that they were content to work with other organisations and to share facilities and resources (COLRES, COLALL, COLHOR,

COLVER). Validity of contribution was important to the senior respondent (CDT) and all respondents ranked the demonstration of Corporate Social Responsibility (SUSCSR) above the demonstration of competitive behaviour towards other contributors (SUSSTRAT).

> Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:
>
> UN Cluster Concept/ Power and Relationship Management/ Collaboration/ Corporate Social Responsibility

5.7.3   Summary – JFLogC Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

Theme	Issue	Description	Notes
Humanitarian Principles and Space	Humanitarian Principles	Neutrality and Impartiality	Conflict with military values
	Military Role	Conflict with humanitarian principles	How addressed
	Politics	Political influence on decisions	Affect?
	Maintenance of Oslo Guidelines	Importance of Guidelines	How achieved/ maintained/ enforced Clarify meaning/ understanding
Collaboration, Organisation and Power	UN Cluster Concept	Success of the approach	Successes? Examples? How established/ managed/ maintained
	Power	Between military, local and national governments and NGOs	How received? Successes? Examples?
	Relationship Management		
	Collaboration		
	Corporate Social Responsibility	Demonstration of CSR	How? Examples?

Table 5.2   JFLOGC – Stage I Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

5.8 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing *Emic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with members of JFLogC listed in Table 5.1 will now be discussed. In keeping with Stage II of the final research strategy interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which had been developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key *etic* themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes listed within Table 5.1 will still be used throughout this discussion.

5.8.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration

"By the time we got there, there were already a lot of organisations on the ground. All of the NGOs had flooded in and pitched their tents with their flags flying. What was evident to me was that there were a number of organisations on the ground that had to demonstrate that they were there, but how effective they were being and what their reason for being there other than that was not really clear to me. It was pretty chaotic because NGOs don't like to be told what to do, they don't like to be coordinated and commanded or controlled". (CDT)

The thoughts above illustrate how the data reveals a common perception amongst the respondents within the JFLogC in respect of NGO presence within disaster relief zones. In keeping with the thoughts of Heaslip (2011 and 2010) on the military's suspicion of aid workers and the inherent lack of understanding between military contributors and NGOs, questioning of the actual contribution of some non-military participants is a common theme as is a clear need amongst JFLogC participants to understand the reasons behind why some NGOs are in the disaster region at all. There is obvious frustration at the fact that these organisations are taking up valuable space on the ground (SO1) whilst, in the eyes of JFLogC participants, they make no visible contribution to the overall aid effort. Comments regarding chaos and a lack of coordination are perhaps understandable, as military ethos and training are traditionally and necessarily based around identifiable structure, command and control and reporting procedures (see for example Joint Defence Publication 3-52, MOD, 2008). The data gathered supports the view (Heaslip, 2010) that whilst military personnel are happy to be led and controlled in a top-down manner, members of the NGO community, in the eyes of the military appear to be somewhat disorganised, but at the same time significantly more operationally flexible. Observations that are supported by Thompson (2010) who notes that "even though military forces have a huge potential to make a difference in the [disaster relief] logistics arena sensitivities remain" (p.2) and Heaslip (2010) who believes that these "radically different" methodologies and guiding principles can result in clashes. COM was keen to describe his frustration and annoyance at what he described as "the ridiculous reticence of some NGOs to remain deliberately uncoordinated for no good reason".

The following demonstrates a commonly held view amongst JFLogC contributors in respect of the UN Cluster Concept:

> *"The UN Cluster Concept works in the final area of delivery. The UN believes that it works upstream but it doesn't work like that. In my experience it at least provides a way of having a nightly meeting to try and facilitate some order of coordination amongst those who are there. To be fair it sort of works a bit but the name 'Cluster' is a really apt name for it!"* (COM)

In clear disagreement with the academic support for a clustered approach (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) it is evident amongst the more junior respondents in particular (SO21, SO22 and SO3), that the concept is held in some contempt and that, in keeping with Jensen's (2012) thoughts, in practice is regarded as a hindrance to successful provision of disaster relief. Participants clearly disagree with the assertion that clusters allow participants to operate more productively (Patti, 2006), and feel that the UN Cluster Concept actually "stove pipes" the relief effort, meaning that contributors just focus on their own perceived area of expertise; moreover clusters are regarded as something that NGOs can hide behind whilst working in isolation (SO3). The data confirms that there is a common understanding of the concept of Supply Chain Collaboration and it is reassuring to note that the definitions offered by JFLogC respondents are in agreement with the academic views already discussed within this thesis. However, this common understanding seems to exacerbate the situation for JFLogC as it serves to highlight what CDT regarded as "visible flaws in the UN Cluster Concept idea". In essence, respondents can see the need for the Cluster Concept, but are frustrated by its inability to achieve its aims in reality. Agreeing with Jensen's (2012) thoughts on the challenges for cluster leaders to take responsibility in an environment where many independent organisations "often object to being directed" (p.148), the comment that serves to sum up the JFLogC feelings on the UN Cluster Concept comes from SO1:

> *"What they really need is a good Sergeant Major to coordinate the effort on the ground!"*

The data gathered within JFLogC does not make happy reading for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which COM regarded as the "biggest misnomer around as OCHA doesn't do coordination". The consensus of opinion amongst respondents is that OCHA may work in what CDT described as "peace time", meaning during periods of quiet, but that it is "unable to produce the goods on the ground when it really has to", referring to times following events where immediate disaster response is called for. A clear theme within the data is that OCHA do not really coordinate disaster relief events and hence do little to address the issue of "stove piping" discussed earlier in

this section. This belief would seem to misalign itself with the stated overall aims of OCHA itself (OCHA, 2012a) and of the UN Cluster Approach (UN, OCHA, 2005) in particular. Rickard (2003) is clear in the view that within humanitarian relief zones "Logistics planning and coordination need to be seen as essential rather than merely desirable"; however, the senior respondents (CDT, COM) agree that they have seen little evidence of any improvement in this area since OHCA's introduction. CDT refers to the "Crowded Stage" (Heaslip, 2011, p150) as he cites an example where aid was being received in a disaster relief zone that was "clogging up the area", and was clearly frustrated as he believed that "most of the aid that arrived was not needed" or had "arrived at the wrong time":

"If the UN OCHA cannot resolve these sort of issues then who should…". (CDT)

Furthermore, CDT believed that this lack of coordination meant that there was:

"no real organisation of NGOs as they arrive in the disaster relief zone……it [the relief effort] grows organically as NGOs pitch tents wherever they can as they arrive and stake a claim to their ground……".

These observations seem to echo academic discourse on the importance of coordination and information flow (Ernst, 2003; Rickard, 2003) and the overall assertion on the requirement for a comprehensive needs analysis prior to the commencement of any disaster relief effort:

"What is clear is that contributors [NGOs] are flying in due to the urgency to be seen to be doing something on the ground. I believe that this should not happen straight away and that there is a requirement to stand back, assess what is the real need in the context of the particular operation and then to act, something else that OCHA claim to do but from my experiences do not achieve in reality" (COM)

Sadly, the data also demonstrates that things have not really moved on since the observations made by Reindorp and Wiles in 2001, who whilst observing humanitarian coordination within the field, conclude that humanitarian responses are often based on insufficient analysis of the context of the disaster and that contributing agencies often struggle to make a telling impact due to a lack of local knowledge (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001).

> **Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:**
>
> Supply Chain Control/ OCHA Role/ UN Cluster Concept/ Coordination/ Local Control

5.8.2 Power and Relationships

> *"There is a power base in that scale does matter. Some smaller organisations who might be delivering in the same field do rely on some of the bigger ones for logistical support. Others jealously guard their independence as they do not want to be seen to be tarnished by others. As a general rule they [NGOs] are happier operating on their own rather than in alliance with others".* (CDT)

Clearly contesting the concept of a value chain (Porter, 1990), a common view amongst the JFLogC respondents concurs with that offered by CDT. Whilst Porter argued for efficiency and effectiveness through the formation of supply chain networks the inherent theme within the data reflects the views of Chandes and Paché (2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) in that in order to be successful NGOs rely on competition for resources, ground and other assets. Consequently, the view is that there is a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act alone rather than in partnership with others. In essence the military view is that:

> *"NGOs are not happy to be led and are much happier when working alone"* (COM).

Burt (2005) contends that an organisation can become a *power broker* by creating bridges to cross what he terms the *structural holes* within a supply chain; hence, in light of this discussion, and the foregoing on the military requirement for an identifiable management structure, it is unsurprising that JFLogC respondents are quick to offer the view that they would happily assume the role of the *power broker* (Kumar and Havey, 2013; Don and Teegan, 2003) and adopt lead status within a humanitarian relief zone if the opportunity arose. However, CDT made some interesting and candid points about what he described as the *arrogant attitude* that is sometimes evident amongst him and his colleagues:

> *"The trouble with the military is that we think that we always know best, however in this context [disaster and humanitarian relief] that is clearly not the case"*

Echoing the views of Heaslip (2011, 2010) on the level of understanding between military humanitarian contributors and their civilian counterparts, CDT went on to explain that the military do not understand what he describes as "the humanitarian landscape" nor do they have an appreciation of "NGOs and what they can do". CDT acknowledges that NGOs are the "experts in their field" and that the military could clearly learn a lot from them. However, reflecting Seipel's (2011) assertions regarding the "over-inflated view of their own capabilities" (p.227) that is inherent amongst some military contributors, CDT is also quick to argue that the reciprocal of this is also true in that "NGOs could learn a lot from the military in respect of command and control and other niche skills that military logisticians possess". SO1 also has strong views on what he described as "niche areas" and these will be discussed within the following section.

Data on the issue of trust supported the view proffered by Heaslip (2011) as it revealed a common perception that respondents feel that they are not trusted by NGOs and other donor organisations, and that this is in part due to a "clear misunderstanding of the military role within humanitarian relief" (SO22):

> "NGOs should be made aware of what the military can do for them and also why we are there…education is the key….." (SO22)

This idea is expanded upon in the next section where measures to "educate NGOs" will be discussed.

Tatham and Kovács (2010) develop Hung *et al's* (2004) discussion on a peripheral route to trust and suggested a model for the establishment of swift trust within the *Hastily Formed Networks* (Kumar and Havey, 2013) which are inherent within humanitarian relief zones. The data gathered suggests broad agreement that relationships and relationship management is "what the military are trained to facilitate" (SO1). More than one respondent was quick to highlight the extensive experience that they had of rapidly establishing teams and nurturing the relationships that are associated with success.

> "I have witnessed good and bad relationships but talking to people is what we are about" (SO21).

Referring again to the issue of trust (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010), and on the need for mutual trust and openness within successful partnerships (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007), SO1 acknowledged that the public perception of the UK military has been tarnished by recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that this might have an adverse effect on relationships with other organisations; he also suggested that working relationships could be built by putting forward the idea that JFLogC should be regarded as the "acceptable face of military":

> "JFLogC is about the provision of logistics support and that is what is needed in disaster relief zones. High readiness and rapid response is what disaster relief calls for and we can provide that. We should remind other donor organisations that the JFLogC are not a war fighting command and that we are there to help"

> Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Relationships/ Humanitarian Landscape/ Expertise/ Acceptable face of the military

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5.8.3 The Humanitarian Space

"Some organisations do trade on their Independence and are obsessive in trying to demonstrate independence and impartiality. They are renowned for it, believing that they do what they do and do it very well". (SO1)

Despite the academic view that the humanitarian principles must be present to constitute a humanitarian operation (Seipel, 2011; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) SO1's statement typifies the data gathered within the JFLogC on the subject of the Humanitarian Space and Principles (DFID, 2008). There is obvious frustration at the influence that the humanitarian principles have on the overall disaster relief effort but also an evident scepticism amongst respondents in the fact that these principles could prove to be "malleable when required" (CDT). By way of support to this assertion, CDT offered the following vignette in respect of his experiences during the disaster relief effort to the Pakistani Earthquake (2005):

"We were asked to provide helicopter support to an NGO who had a very strong reputation for its impartiality and independence and was well known for its refusal to accept military assistance or to work alongside the military in any capacity. I discussed the requirements with the NGO representative on the ground and he presented me with an ultimatum on behalf of his head office. We were to put red crosses on the sides of the aircraft involved, our aircrew were not to fly in their military flying clothing and no weapons were to be carried. For sound military reasons I refused on all 3 counts whereupon the representative agreed that he was happy to work with us anyway. He later told me that had he passed my response back to his head office the chances were that they would have refused him permission to use our aircraft. An example of a pragmatic decision on the ground that led to the successful delivery of life saving aid".

The clear message that comes out of this vignette and the one that is supported by similar responses from other JFLogC respondents is that NGO representatives employed in disaster relief areas are relatively happy to work with the military under the right circumstances, but that further up the NGO managerial chain there is a different attitude in respect of the maintenance of the humanitarian principles; thereby underpinning the view that during humanitarian relief operations, "strongly motivated people from the military and NGO organisations usually find ways to surmount barriers that they encounter" (Heaslip, 2011, p.163).

Analysing the associated JFLogC data highlights the fact that in keeping with the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011) discussed earlier, the military are very keen to do significantly more in respect of the disaster relief effort; however, the respondents see the humanitarian principles and associated NGO attitudes to them as a real barrier to effective progress in this area:

"We want to up the profile of the military within humanitarian relief and my organisation has been established to do just that, but the humanitarian principles seem to be a real hindrance in achieving this aim" (COM).

To that end, and in keeping with the discourse on integrating learning (Goffnet *et al,* 2013; Heaslip 2011) and learning mechanisms for humanitarian logistics (Lu *et al*, 2013) members of the HADRO team are keen to establish links within NGOs and to deliver presentations on what the military can offer by way of contribution. SO1 believes that NGOs are "naïve to think that the military can just provide security and heavy lift helicopters and they should tap in to a lot more relevant capability". Citing the UK military publications on Logistics for Joint Operations (MOD, 2003) and on Doctrine for Disaster Relief Operations (MOD, 2008), SO1 went on to discuss the following "niche areas" where he believed that his organisation can make a meaningful contribution:

1. Initial reconnaissance and identification of need.
2. Provision of effective data links and information gathering.
3. Logistics planning and coordination both immediate and longer term.
4. Establishment of central operations centres and the associated command and control.
5. Engineering and building projects to re-establish infrastructure and logistics links.

Ultimately SO1 felt that military personnel can offer the same "can do" attitude that he had witnessed amongst members of NGOs engaged in the provision of disaster relief "on the ground"; however, when pressed he did agree that his niche areas do look remarkably similar to the overall aims of the UN Cluster Concept and the associated OCHA responsibilities (OCHA, 2005); moreover they would also seem to reflect the economic cluster theory proffered by Porter (1998) and developed by Patti (2006).

Turning to the political dimension CDT supported the academic view on the linkage between governments and their military (Yaziji, 2009; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003; Weiss and Collins, 2000). CDT believes that in a lot of disaster affected areas "the local military are the government" and that:

"NGOs should realise that by working with the local military they are effectively working with the local government".

CDT went on to develop the idea that in lots of countries where disaster happens, boundaries between the military and government are unclear and asserts that NGOs should be ready to adapt to this:

"Whilst NGOs don't like dealing with military, they need to understand that the local military is the government and therefore they should be happy to work alongside them in appropriate circumstances".

On a similar theme COM felt that in his experience host nations are all too happy to "hand over their sovereignty to the NGOs", and that local governments should look to "be strong and maintain overall control of the disaster relief effort". He offers the following vignette regarding his experiences of the events following the Asian Tsunami (2004):

"One of the great strengths in Banda Ache was the Indonesian military ground forces as they were effectively the government's representatives on the ground. When we arrived they had a clear plan that mapped out where the relief effort would be within 3 weeks and when contributors including ourselves would be expected to leave the area. It was evident that despite being fully aware of the need for outside assistance, they were not happy to hand over control of the situation to any other organisation and as a result they maintained control over the NGOs and other contributors in the area. This framework gave the Indonesian military and government clear control."

COM believes that other nations should consider this approach and that forward planning would enable them to control the "flood of contributors" into their country as well as the "influx of foreign aid and NGOs". He feels that governments have certain levers to use to facilitate this control, for example visa allocation, but did acknowledge that what are invariably desperate nations have to remain "forceful enough to make such strategies happen".

> **Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:**
>
> Political Pressure/ Local Governments/Perception

5.8.4 Organisational Sustainment

"In Haiti there must have been over 300 NGOs and other organisations on the ground when we arrived. They were all there taking up precious hard standing in an area where, ironically ground space was at a premium, but I did struggle to see what they were all doing there………..the vast array of different coloured tents, banners and logos on show did serve to brighten up the place" (SO1)

"When we arrived all of the NGOs were in tents on the hard standing with flags flying, it quickly became apparent that their main aim seemed to be get the publicity as its good for fund raising". (COM)

"I have seen the UN Cluster Concept used to allocate areas to each organisation and this seemed important for each NGO to have their own area where they can demonstrate that they are doing stuff to their donors". (CDT)

The thoughts offered above reflect those of all of the JFLogC respondents as there is a clear perception that the demonstration of "presence on ground" (COM) is a key issue for NGOs within humanitarian relief zones. Moreover, some respondents regard this as the main reason why so many organisations quickly arrive in a disaster relief zone and then seem to "add little if anything to the actual relief effort" (SO22).

"What was evident to me was that there were a number of organisations on the ground that had to demonstrate that they were there, but how effective they were being and what their reason for being there other than that was not really clear to me". (CDT)

CDT's frustration triggered the discussion which has already been related in the last section regarding strong local control over NGOs and the levers that nations have to control the "flood of contributors" (COM). CDT believes that a "fear of a loss of funding" may actually drive NGOs to "utilise their resources in an inefficient yet publically acceptable way"; an opinion that would seem to echo those of Olson and Gregorian (2007) who highlight the negative impact that funding relationships and competition can have on the coordination process and those of Kent (1987) who discusses the adverse influence on NGO's of a "fear of donor withdrawal".

> ## Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Understanding of NGOs role/ Control of NGOs

5.8.5 Summary – JFLogC Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

Theme	Issue	Description	Notes
Management and Control	Supply Chain	Who has overall control?	Issues brought by complexity
	UN Cluster Concept	Ineffective; Stove pipes effort	Frustration at lack of overall impact
	Coordination	NGOs	Who coordinates
		Ineffective?	Doesn't work
	Local control	Who maintains this?	Strength of local governments
Understanding and Training	OCHA	Misnomer	What is its Role?
	NGOs	Roles	Overall Contribution
		Why so many?	Why are some there?
	Humanitarian landscape	Lack of knowledge	How to educate
Relationships	Community	Military vs Civilian	How to develop
		Avoided by some NGOs	Why?
	Acceptable face of the military	What is it?	How to demonstrate to other participants?
	NGOs	Reticence to work alone	How to change perception and opinion
		Don't trust the military	
	Expertise	Trained to nurture a sense of community	How to exploit
Military Involvement	Pressure to do more	Demonstrate more humanitarian involvement	Exploit niche areas
	Local Governments	Work with local authorities and do not take over sovereignty	How to ensure
		Help to maintain overall control	Strength of local governments
	Perception	JFLOGC is not a War fighting Command	How to change perceptions

Table 5.3　　JFLogC – Stage II Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

5.9   Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirming *Emic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with members of JFLogC will now be discussed. Two of the participants (COM and SO22) listed in Table 5.1 were unable to take part in the Focus Group, hence membership was restricted to the remaining four JFLogC participants listed in Table 5.1. In keeping with Stage III of the final research strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based around the Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G) which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings and the key *emic* themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes listed within Table 5.1 will still be used throughout this discussion.

5.9.1   Management and Control

Initial discussions within the JFLogC Focus Group reflects the literary views on the positive impact that collaboration and coordination can have on supply chain performance (Dash *et al,* 2013; Carroll and Neu, 2009). All participants agree that the facilitation role should rest with OCHA, "after all the C is meant to stand for coordination" (CDT), however there is also clear frustration amongst the Group with OCHA's inability to achieve this aim and with what SO1 termed the "ineffectiveness" of the organisation. By way of illustration, CDT offered the following experience:

> *"In Pakistan OCHA watched on as NGOs pitched their tents on the hard standing whilst we were left to operate helicopters from a muddy field. They [OCHA] did not seem to appreciate the ridiculous situation that they were supposedly coordinating….."*

The Group do not agree with the idea that an ad hoc approach to humanitarian relief has any merit although they do echo the view (Akhtar *et al,* 2012; Kovács and Tatham, 2009; Oloruntoba, 2005; Gustavsson, 2003) that this is what regularly happens in reality.

> *"In my experience, planning and coordination will always make an operation more effective and a lack of it must result in inefficiency and overall wasted effort"* (SO1)

This response is perhaps predictable given the military training and culture of the Group and CDT did become somewhat emotional as he discussed the contribution that the military had to make in respect of coordination as, once again he related his experiences in Pakistan:

"In Pakistan the young men had to stay high in the hills to keep control of their land. It was clear that there were no plans for the winter and so we agreed to take the planning task on. We used our expeditionary logistics experience to model where depots could be placed to give helicopter and vehicle access and I believe made a significant contribution to the relief effort as a result. To deny the overall effort this opportunity just because we are military would have been crass to be frank"

The Group then mooted the idea of establishing a coordinating authority amongst UK based NGOs. Referring back to Porter's Value Chain SO3 suggests that this authority should be based on niche capabilities, and that it should not be forgotten that the military has some key skill sets and capability to contribute, particularly in the areas of rapid reaction and expeditionary logistics provision. The idea of the military skill set in expeditionary logistics was a key theme of the focus group and there was strong agreement that the military has a lot more to offer, if permitted and accepted.

There are equally strong opinions on the role and success of the UN Cluster Concept UN OCHA, 2011). Questioning the overall effectiveness and aims of the Concept (OCHA, 2005), SO3 offered further support to Jensen's (2012) discussion on the cumbersome nature of clusters in practice. SO3 believes that the Concept serves to "stove pipe" the relief effort, giving those involved an excuse to work in isolation from other donors. The Group agreed that some form of performance measurement might help the situation, and that it would also help to hold the cluster leaders accountable for their actions. Discussion surrounding the *traffic lights* performance management system of key performance indicators led to a suggestion that this approach might offer a possible solution, although there is agreement that such a strategy will call for very careful and political management. (Note: The *traffic lights system* is a military adaptation of the Balanced Scorecard System (Kaplan and Norton, 1996), for an example of its application within the military see Australian Government, (DofD), 2005).

Concurring with the academic views that in order to be effective clusters should include both "upstream suppliers and downstream customers" (Patti, p266), the Group agreed that local governments should be involved in all aspects of the relief effort and that this should include cluster management itself. However, there is acknowledgement that this could be difficult in light of what the literature identifies as *blocker*s (Burt, 2005) and *gatekeepers* (Hingley *et al,* 2010). CDT recalled an experience in Haiti and also pointed to the Balkans where he found it "difficult to know who was actually in charge from day to day". Turning to the discussions in support of the use of partnerships within successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006) there is also consensus that the linkage between OHCA and the clusters is confusing and unclear and at times "non-

existent" (CDT), and that clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and overall usage will serve to help all those involved.

5.9.2   Understanding and Training

The theme and importance of training and overall professionalisation within humanitarian logistics is argued for by Thomas and Mizushima in 2005 and is also highlighted in more recent work (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011). Agreeing with the importance of such a strategy, the Group view was that integrated training exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of partnered working and collaboration within humanitarian relief zones (Goffnet *et* al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011). This is unsurprising given that this type of approach is a key feature of military training and development. Echoing the economic cluster theory (Porter, 1998) CDT supported the involvement of local governments and organisations in such strategies and by way of example related his experiences of forward planning exercises in Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone:

> *"Working through contacts in Ghana we were able to speak to local governments and discuss how we could work with them on disaster relief projects. Using the fictitious scenario of a broken dam and the associated floods we briefed government representatives on our military capability and were able to convince them to build military cooperation into their long term plans. They realised how by working together and using our different skill sets and expertise we could help to address the relief effort in an efficient and effective manner."*

The introduction of the idea of the *humanitarian landscape* (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Seipel, 2011; Spearin, 2001), first discussed during Stage II of the research confirmed CDT's view that there is a lack of appreciation of the skill sets possessed by NGOs and other donor organisations amongst JFLogC participants. Whilst agreeing that successful relationships should be built on mutual trust and openness (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007) all Focus Group members conceded that they do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster relief, but also argued that the reciprocal is also true in that other humanitarian organisations fail to understand the military role, hence the consensus is that joint training would help; a discussion that offers clear empirical support to the assertions offered by Heaslip (2011).

The Group agreed that the current military chain of command would never sanction humanitarian logistics as an individual profession per se, but could see clear benefit if such an approach is adopted by the civilian sector. Echoing the ideas purported on integrated

service learning within the sector (Goffnet *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011) SO1 believes that it would be beneficial if the military 'experts' are involved in advising on the content of any associated courses or training programmes, but was also happy to accept the opinions of other members of the Focus Group in that this will probably not happen in reality. Indeed, the overall view is that realistically military involvement in any such training initiatives will not be politically acceptable. SO1 went on to discuss the ongoing development work of an appropriate training course for members of the JFLogC who are tasked with the planning and coordination of all military HADRO. Referring back to the earlier discussion on the Cluster Concept (5.10.1) there is strong agreement that any training initiatives should include appropriate elements on the Concept and the associated structures, roles and responsibilities, and that a course aimed specifically at cluster leads will also add great value.

5.9.3   Relationships

Participants feel that the inclusion of local governments and organisations, be they military or not is key to the overall effectiveness of the disaster relief effort. The discussion did turn to the associated issues surrounding identification of the local authorities but SO1 best surmised the JFLogC Group opinion:

> *"There is clear value in establishing working links with the local authorities. After all the disaster is on their patch therefore they should best know the area and their peoples' needs. I see us [the military] as a resource provider and we should be guided by those who have the knowledge to make us most effective".*

Handfield and Nichols (1999) contest that relationship management is the most fragile and tenuous component in any successful supply chain and the Group felt that given their experience of working with different nations under the NATO Chain of Command, they have a role to play in this area. Agreeing with the literary discourse on partnership sourcing (Christopher, 2011, Iglesias *et al,* 2011, Lysons and Farrington, 2006) the Group believe that JFLogC staff already have relevant experience of establishing international relationships; however, there is acknowledgement that the circumstances and demands when comparing a NATO operation to that in respect of a response to a humanitarian disaster, are somewhat different. That said, there is still a strong view that what is required is a NATO style organisation for disaster relief and that although OCHA claim to be that organisation, the command structures that they implement do not have the same effect.

The Group echoed the lessons learned following the Hull floods in 2007 (DEFRA, 2007) in that relationships at the UK level should be addressed in the first instance and that the

working relationship between JFLogC and DFID can be improved. The feeling is that there should be a lot more liaison between JFLogC and DFID and that the associated teams should get to know one another, and to try and understand their roles and contributions to the overall disaster relief effort. The Group acknowledge that DFID has responsibility for leading and coordinating the UK Government's humanitarian response (DFID, 2008; MOD, 2008 and 2003) and suggest that, because of this they can have some influence on the UN if that is needed or deemed appropriate. However there is a consensus that DFID are a difficult organisation to work with:

> *"DFID want to command the military mission….What we [the military] want is to be given mission command and not to be micro managed".* (SO21)

(*Mission Command* is a military doctrinal philosophy which represents a shift away from a leadership methodology based on iron discipline and control to one which is based on the commander being given the freedom of thought to achieve a given task. Also see Watters, 2002)

Information flow is acknowledged as a critical component in the supply chain (Handfield and Nichols, 1999) and communication between organisations in the field was discussed by the Group as a real issue of concern. CDT was quick to point out that Command and Communication was a real problem for him in Pakistan. However, he suggested that these problems illustrate that the type of person who is drawn to work in the voluntary sector perhaps already has a prejudiced view of the military and that this does not help with relationship building:

> *"Perhaps we could flag ship previous military successes within humanitarian relief and work together with OCHA to try and address these prejudiced views of the military contribution amongst those in the voluntary sector"*

Power is not viewed as an issue by the Group as all participants were happy to act in a subordinate role and to effectively accept the inherent power imbalances (Hingley, 2005a) within the overall supply chain structure. Referring to the Joint Doctrine Publication on Disaster Relief Operations (MOD, 2008) all participants appreciate the coordinating responsibilities that the UN and its associated offices have to play in disaster relief areas and seem to concur with the idea that the UN are to act as the *power broker* (Burt, 2005) within humanitarian relief zones. There is however, obvious frustration at the lack of control and coordination witnessed and clear disagreement with the idea that this is being improved within the field (Altay and Labonte, 2011) indeed, this became a key feature of the whole session. In essence, consensus within the JFLogC Group is that the organisation is happy to carry out all tasks given, but that it should be effectively coordinated and controlled by those who are placed in a position of power in the relief zone, the *gatekeepers* in academic

terms (Hingley *et al,* 2010). However, participants find it difficult to identify who has the lead role on the ground, or who has specific responsibility for elements of the relief effort:

"….if we can't identify who is in charge, then how can anyone else". (CDT)

5.9.4 Military Involvement

The Group began this section by discussing the idea that in keeping with the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011) the UK Government are keen that the military look to demonstrate more high profile involvement in humanitarian relief. The Group agreed that this could prove difficult as, in keeping with Dunanist principles (Seigel, 2011; Tatham, 2011) their experience is that most NGOs are not happy to work alongside a military man in uniform. The view is that a military uniform would always be viewed by some as a symbol of an organisation that operates in contravention to humanitarian principles, and that attempts to reduce the impact of a uniform such as the UN blue beret are, on the whole ineffective; there are still clear challenges ahead:

> *"We [the military] are still tarnished with Iraq backlash. A serious repair job is needed at a national and international level."* (CDT)

> *"In my experience, changing from an Army to a UN blue beret has little effect at the end of the day"* (COM)[2]

There is broad acceptance that any association with the military can be seen by some donor organisations as being against the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) and in particular impartiality (DFID, 2008), but also a view that NGOs appear to be happy for military intervention when their staff feel under threat. The consensus is that JFLogC and the military in general should do more to publicise military measures in respect of impartiality and to challenge the perceptions of NGOs. The suggestion is that examples such as the prioritising of medical aid for injured Taliban forces in Afghanistan or the support for the International Red Cross stance to provide first aid kits, training and other humanitarian aid to anyone in the conflict area, including Afghan security forces and the Taliban (Washington Times, 2010) can help in this respect.

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[2] The researcher can also add operational support to this view given his personal experiences as discussed in section 1.2.

CDT offered the following regarding the local military:

> *"In lots of places where disaster happens, the boundaries between military and government are unclear. For example Pakistan has a civilian president but we all know that the military runs the country. The same could be said for Haiti and some North African countries. In Indonesia this was true to a certain extent hence whilst NGOs do not like working with the military they must appreciate that in these cases the local military is the government and therefore they should be prepared to work alongside them".* (CDT)

There was a debate on the role of the military in future disaster relief operations and a suggestion that whilst no one can stop NGOs arriving in the disaster area, the JFLogC could be utilised to control the arrival and distribution of military resources. CDT suggested that JFLogC should look to simple niche markets as they seek to identify a greater role. As an example, he offered his successes in Banda Aceh where his team had placed a large map of the area on an outside wall and populated it with relevant information, thereby becoming an information centre for all contributors.

5.10 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues

This is the second of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research findings and the discussion has drawn upon the data gathered from participants within the UK MOD's JFLogC. Having firstly established the key *etic* issues and themes through analysis of questionnaire responses, *emic* issues were developed and then investigated through a series of semi-structured interviews with JFLogC participants. Finally, additional analysis and application of relevant literature within the field informed the areas of discussion within a participant focus group. Hence, in keeping with the final research strategy through triangulation of data gathered and findings from questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and also identified how these barriers might be addressed to improve collaboration in the future. Following the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the findings and trends discussed within this section will be used during a final cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions and academic contribution. The section will now be broken down into the key *emic* themes and issues identified within the JFLogC arrived at through application of Stages I and II of the final research strategy, and confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.

5.10.1　Management and Control

The JFLogC participants agree with academic opinion on the positive nature of, and clear requirement for collaboration and coordination along the humanitarian relief supply chain (Dash *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Rickard, 2003).　Participant experiences confirm that planning and coordination will always make the relief effort more effective and efficient, and will help to reduce overall waste (Slack *et al,* 2010).　Whilst the coordination role should rest with the UN OCHA the organisation struggles to meet its coordination task and is at times ineffective.　OCHA works well during periods of quiet, but is less effective in the face of events where an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) is required.　An ad hoc approach to the management of the humanitarian relief supply chain is not appropriate, but participants do concur with literary observations which suggest that this is the case in some relief zones (Akhtar *et al,* 2012; Kovács and Tatham, 2009; Oloruntoba, 2005; Gustavsson, 2003).　The idea of establishing a coordinating authority amongst UK based NGOs is suggested, and in agreement with Porter's concept of a Value Chain (1990) the arguments presented are based around niche capabilities and the provision of supply chain agility (Christopher, 2011) through exploitation of the military's key skill sets within the field of expeditionary and rapid reaction logistics.

In disagreement with academic support for a clustered approach (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), the overall effectiveness and aims of the UN Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) are questioned as in keeping with Jensen (2012) the concept can prove to be cumbersome and serve to stove pipe the relief effort, acting as a hindrance in some practical cases; moreover, clusters give those involved an excuse to work in isolation from other participants.　To improve success the Cluster Concept requires some form of performance measurement system, which serves to hold cluster leaders accountable for their actions.　Hence, there is support for the adoption of a traffic light system similar to that used by the MOD (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, Australian Government, (DofD), 2005).　Academic discourse on the need to include both "upstream suppliers and downstream customers" (Patti, p.266) is reflected in the view that local governments should be involved in all aspects of the relief effort and that this should include cluster management. However, this could be difficult due to *blocker*s (Burt, 2005) and *gatekeepers* (Hingley *et al,* 2010) within the supply chain, and due to inherent problems with the identification of appropriate local authorities within some humanitarian relief zones.　There is broad support for the use of partnerships within successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006), but also consensus that the linkage between OHCA and the clusters is confusing and unclear and at times non-existent, hence, clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and overall usage are required.

5.10.2   Understanding and Training

JFLogC opinion reflects the academic view on the importance of training and overall professionalisation within humanitarian logistics (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005). However, the overall consensus is that whilst the current military chain of command would never sanction humanitarian logistics as an individual profession within the military, participants can see clear benefit if such an approach was adopted by civilian humanitarian organisations. Echoing the ideas purported by Goffnet *et al* (2013) and Heaslip (2011), and in keeping with military approaches to training, integrated training exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of partnered working within humanitarian relief zones. Whilst agreeing that successful relationships should be built on mutual trust and openness (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007), JFLogC participants concede that they do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster relief; however in keeping with Heaslip (2011) the belief is that the reciprocal is also true, in that other organisations do not understand the military role within humanitarian operations. Joint training strategies will help to address this lack of understanding and appreciation. Concurring with the economic cluster theory (Porter, 1998), the involvement of local governments and organisations in such educational strategies is regarded as an essential element in their overall success. Supporting the ideas offered on integrated service learning within the sector (Goffnet *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011) it will be beneficial if military 'experts' can be involved in advising on the content of any associated courses or training programmes; however, there is also a pragmatic acceptance that this will probably not happen in reality due to political pressures (Thompson, 2010) and the overall impact on some donor organisations to preserve the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008).

JFLogC is also engaged in the development of an internal training course for members of the organisation who are tasked with the planning and coordination of all military HADRO. To address issues surrounding the implementation, management and overall structure of the UN Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) such training initiatives will include appropriate elements on the concept itself. Furthermore a training programme specifically aimed at cluster leaders will also be of great benefit.

5.10.3　Relationships

Handfield and Nichols (1999) offer the view that relationship management is the most fragile and tenuous component in any successful supply chain. Agreeing with the literary discourse on partnership sourcing (Christopher, 2011, Iglesias *et al,* 2011, Lysons and Farrington, 2006) the consensus is that JFLogC staff already have relevant experience of establishing international relationships. Working with different nations under the NATO Chain of Command means that JFLogC staff are skilled in relationship management, and in generating *swift trust* (Tatham and Kovács, 2010) within the inherent *Hastily Formed Networks* (Kumar and Havey, 2013).

Whilst Porter (1990) argued for efficiency and effectiveness through the formation of supply chain networks, the inherent view echoes that of Chandes and Paché (2010), in that in order to be successful NGOs rely on competition for resources, ground and other assets. Consequently, there is a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act alone and to demonstrate overall presence on the ground, views which concur with the observations offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) on NGO's actions due to financial pressures and the fear of donor withdrawal. The inclusion of local governments and organisations is considered to be a key to the overall effectiveness of the disaster relief effort, and the JFLogC regards itself as a resource provider which is happy to be guided by those who have the local knowledge to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall relief effort. A NATO style organisation for humanitarian relief is required to help address the associated issues and although OCHA claim to be that organisation (OCHA, 2012a), the command structures that it implements within the field do not have the desired effect. The lessons learned following the Hull floods in 2007 (DEFRA, 2007) suggest that the UK based working relationship between the JFLogC and DFID should be addressed in the first instance. Consequently, there should be significantly more liaison between the JFLogC and DFID, and the associated teams should take measures to gain a clearer understanding of their organisation's roles and overall contribution to the relief effort. In essence, JFLogC participants want to be given the freedom to make decisions using the military doctrinal philosophy of *Mission Command* (Watters, 2002).

Information flow is a critical component in the supply chain (Handfield and Nichols, 1999; Ernst, 2003; Rickard, 2003) and JFLogC participants agree that communication between organisations within the field is a real area of concern. Reflecting the discussion on mistrust (Heaslip, 2011), the challenge of relationship building is further exacerbated for the JFLogC due to some organisational and/or individual prejudiced views of the military amongst other humanitarian organisations. The aim for the military should be to build upon past successes

within the humanitarian relief sector, and to try and use these to redress the preconceived views of their contribution.

The JFLogC is happy to act in a subordinate role and to accept the inherent power imbalances (Hingley, 2005a) within the overall supply chain structure. Military policy documents (MOD, 2008 and 2003) reflect the coordinating responsibilities that the UN and its associated offices have to play in humanitarian relief areas and concur with the idea that the UN are to act as the *power broker* (Burt, 2005) within such areas. The JFLogC is content to carry out all tasks given to it, but its contribution should be effectively coordinated and controlled by the *gatekeepers* (Hingley *et al,* 2010) in the field, namely the OCHA. However, a lack of clear control and coordination has been witnessed, clearly in disagreement with the view that this has improved in recent humanitarian responses (Altay and Labonte, 2011). In sum, it is difficult at times to identify who has responsibility for elements of the relief effort on the ground. Whilst military personnel are happy to be led and controlled, the view is that members of the NGO community are not; an opinion supported by Thompson (2010) who notes that whilst military forces have the potential to make a difference with disaster relief arenas, what he describes as "sensitivities" still remain (p.2) and by Heaslip (2010) who believes that these *radically different* methodologies and guiding principles can result in what he terms *clashes* between the military and civilian humanitarian organisations.

5.10.4 Military Involvement

In keeping with the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011) the UK Government is keen that the military look to demonstrate more high profile involvement in humanitarian relief. However, this could prove difficult as, in keeping with Dunanist principles (Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011) most NGOs are not happy to work alongside the military. A military uniform will always be viewed by some as a symbol of an organisation that operates in contravention to humanitarian principles, and attempts to reduce the impact of a uniform, such as the UN blue beret are on the whole ineffective. Referring to the issue of trust (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010) and to the need for mutual trust and openness within successful partnerships (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007), JFLogC participants acknowledge that the public perception of the UK military had been tarnished by recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this may have an adverse effect on relationships with other organisations. Hence, the JFLogC should strive to be regarded as the acceptable face of military. In a similar vein, there is also broad acceptance that any association with the military can be seen by some donor organisations as being against the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) and in particular against impartiality (DFID, 2008), but also a belief that NGOs appear to be happy for military

intervention under the right circumstances, and particularly in situations where humanitarian actors feel under threat. Consequently, the JFLogC and the military in general, should do more to publicise current and past military measures and successes in respect of impartiality. Moreover, NGOs who refuse to work alongside the military should be reminded that in some cases the local military is the government and that if the drive is to include local authorities in the overall relief effort, then they will be forced to work alongside them. To that end, and in keeping with the discourse on integrating learning (Goffnet *et al*, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) and that on learning mechanisms for humanitarian logistics (Lu *et al*, 2013), members of the HADRO team are keen to establish links within NGOs and to deliver presentations on what the military can offer by way of a lasting contribution. As the UK military and the JFLogC in particular look to expand its role in future humanitarian relief operations by exploiting niche areas of expertise, the suggestion is that they could assist with the control of the arrival and distribution of international military resources within the relief zone.

OXFAM INTERNATIONAL – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS

"Working with thousands of local partner organizations, we work with people living in poverty striving to exercise their human rights, assert their dignity as full citizens and take control of their lives."

(Oxfam International, 2011)

6.1   Introduction

The data gathered from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. By way of introduction a short background and history of Oxfam International is included together with a discussion on the organisation's current (as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures. A justification on the use of Oxfam as a research domain for this study is then offered.   Following the inclusion of a listing of respondents and their backgrounds (Table 6.1) the discussion turns to an analysis of the key *etic* and *emic* issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.

6.2   Background – Core Beliefs, Drivers and Scale

Formed in 1995 by a group of independent non-governmental organizations whose aim was to work together for greater impact on the international stage, Oxfam International is an international confederation of 17 organisations networked together in more than 90 countries, as part of a global movement for change to build a future free from the injustice of poverty (Oxfam International, 2011). One of the 14 members of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) they work directly with communities and seek to influence the powerful to ensure that poor people can improve their lives and livelihoods and have a say in decisions that affect them.

Oxfam International believe that respect for human rights will help lift people out of poverty and injustice, allow them to assert their dignity and guarantee sustainable development. They argue that everyone should have the right to a livelihood and they work at many levels with partners and communities in support of their right to a decent living. They strive for better working conditions and better protection of the natural resources on which poor communities depend. They work with partners and communities to implement programs that lead to self-sustaining livelihoods, with a strong focus on women and campaign for fairer trade rules at the global level, and for better policies at the national level. They maintain that being healthy and educated is an essential step along the route out of poverty, and point out that millions of people have no access to health services, schooling or safe water. Moreover, Oxfam International remind the world that many communities are constantly at risk from illnesses that are easily prevented or treated, or are unable to read and write, which means exclusion from their society (Oxfam International, 2011). They campaign for more and better aid, with a focus on basic services.

Oxfam International is registered as a Foundation in The Hague and as a foreign company limited by guarantee in the UK (Oxfam International, 2011). Each affiliate is a member of the Foundation and subscribes to the Foundation's constitution through an affiliation agreement. The constitution consists of three documents: the Constitution, the Code of Conduct, and the Rules of Procedure (Oxfam International, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). Affiliates must also sign a trade-mark licence, which enables them to use the Oxfam International brand. The Foundation is governed by the Oxfam International Board which meets annually. The 2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 2012) records total expenditure as €911 million (£730 million as at November 2012), with €660 million (£530 million) being spent on regional programmes. 47% of this expenditure was split across the top 20 countries; the biggest beneficiary during the reporting year being Haiti to the tune of almost €60 million (£48 million).

6.3   A Brief History – Committed to Human Rights since 1942

The name "Oxfam" comes from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, founded in Britain in 1942. The group campaigned for food supplies to be sent through an allied naval blockade to starving women and children in enemy-occupied Greece during the Second World War (Oxfam International 2011). As well as becoming a world leader in the delivery of emergency relief, Oxfam International implements long-term development programs in vulnerable communities. They are also part of a wider global movement, campaigning with others, for example, to end unfair trade rules, demand better health and education services for all, and to combat climate change. Today, there are 17 member organizations of the

Oxfam International confederation. They are based in: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Ireland, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Quebec, Spain and the United States. The Oxfam International Secretariat is based in Oxford, UK. The Secretariat runs advocacy offices in Brussels, Geneva, New York, Washington DC and Brasilia.

At the program level, Oxfam International provides health training and clean water supplies, as well as funding schools and teacher training. They contend that in disasters, people are at greater risk of violence, disease and abuse and seek to contribute to saving lives in emergencies by providing shelter, clean water and sanitation, and by working with local partners, help communities to rebuild and to better prepare themselves for future disasters (Oxfam International, 2012). Oxfam International supports partners and communities to understand their rights and to speak out about their needs and concerns and, with others, to get people in power to listen and act.   They also support the view that people who are marginalised, because they are women, disabled or members of a religious or ethnic minority are more likely to be poor and work to combat such discrimination, to ensure that such groups have the means to enjoy equal access to jobs, essential services and influence.

6.4   Current Humanitarian Programmes and Structures

The 2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 2012) states that Oxfam International was engaged in operations in 92 countries worldwide (see in green on Fig 6.1). This work included long term development programs, responding to humanitarian crises, campaigning and advocacy and raising public awareness of the causes of poverty and injustice. As at November 2012 they were involved in emergency relief efforts in the Sahel region of Tunisia, Eastern Africa, Pakistan (support to the floods), Sudan, DR Congo, Afghanistan, and Haiti.

Fig 6.1   Oxfam International – World Wide Commitments (Oxfam International, 2012)

6.5   Data Collection, Respondents and Results

Oxfam International was first contacted in March 2012 through a series of introductory letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research methodology. Key respondents are shown in Table 6.1:

Respondent	Time with Oxfam (years)	Practical Experience	Role	Code
Head of International Logistics and Supply	6 (19 years with MSF)	Involved in logistics support to every major humanitarian crisis since 1987	To lead and manage the International Logistics and Supply team.	HOL
Deputy Head of International Logistics and Supply	12	Most major crises since joining the organisation	A member of the Logistics Management Team for a given relief programme.	DHOL
International Logistics Manager	10	Haiti, Pakistan, South Sudan, Liberia,	To manage resources engaged in the delivery of specific relief projects	ILM
International Area Manager	8	Haiti, Pakistan	Responsible for the management of specific logistics and supply chain functions involved in one particular relief project. Regular communication with other agencies and partner organisations.	IAM

Table 6.1   Oxfam International – Key Respondents

6.6   Data Analysis – Stage I – Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered from Oxfam International via the introductory questionnaires (Appendix D), will now be discussed. In achieving this due consideration will be given to the practical relevance of the initial *etic* issues and themes identified within the Literature Review as set out and codified at Appendix E. Note that respondent codes within Table 6.1 will be used at this stage.

6.6.1 General Processes and Coordination

The senior respondents (HOL, DHOL) agreed that Oxfam International operate a supply chain that is specifically designed for its role (COLRES). They confirmed that the organisation is affiliated to the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and that they are familiar with the United Nations Cluster Concept (COLCLU). All respondents agreed that the Cluster concept was used to help alleviate bottlenecks and to fill logistics gaps (COLALL, COLRES) and the senior respondent (HOL) confirmed that the concept also helped to prioritise logistics interventions and investments (COLHOR) and to collect and share information assets (COLVER), however this was not a view shared with the operational managers (ILM, IAM). Similarly there was a difference of opinion on the use of the cluster concept when it came to coordinating port and corridor movements and to reduce congestion (COLALL, COLRES). Whilst the senior respondents (HOL, DHOL) agreed that the concept helped with coordination of the logistics effort the juniors (ILM, ALM) with more recent operational experiences, believed that this was not the case. Indeed all agreed that coordination of the logistics effort with UN agencies, other NGOs and the military (COLALL) within disaster relief operations was not achieved through the United Nations Cluster Concept. Moreover, the provision of information on equipment and on specific relief supply items was not gained through the concept (HOL, DHOL).

> Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Use of and Success or otherwise of the UN Cluster Concept

6.6.2 Organisational Sustainment, Power and the Military

The senior respondent (HOL) confirmed that Oxfam International took the lead in product specification and procurement (PWRPOS) and that they work with suppliers and program staff to create material kits that are used to support standard interventions within water and sanitation (COLHOR, COLVER, COLALL, COLRES). He also confirmed that Oxfam purchase and preposition water and sanitation kits as part of the overall Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster approach which, under the overall leadership of UNICEF aims to address gaps in response and enhance the overall quality of humanitarian assistance

(PWRPOS, RMT, COLALL, COLHOR). Moreover, Oxfam International are happy to take the lead in future operations (PWRPOS, RMT) and do share facilities with other NGOs (COLALL). Those with recent operational experience (ILM, ALM) confirmed that facilities are shared with numerous NGOs (COLHOR, COLVER). Oxfam is prepared to accept military assistance from organisations that are working under a UN mandate, but acceptance of this did depend on the associated circumstances (RMT). The senior respondents (HOL, DHOL) were in agreement that the demonstration to donors of an organisational presence and of the value of their contributions, was the priority within a relief zone (SUSFR) and that they did not regard competitive behaviour towards other contributors as important (SUSSTRAT). It was notable that the demonstration of the concepts of CSR was a priority for the IAM and ILM (SUSCSR).

> Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Positive Aspects of Power/ WASH cluster approach/ Trust/ Relationship Management/ Military Assistance/ Organisational Presence/ Corporate Social Responsibility

6.6.3   Summary - Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

In completing Stage I of the research strategy with Oxfam the following key *etic* themes and issues were identified to inform Stage II of the research strategy.

Theme	Issue	Description	Notes
General Processes and Coordination	UN Cluster Concept	Alleviate bottlenecks and fill logistics gaps	How? Which gaps? Examples? Successful?
		Prioritise logistics interventions and investments	
		Collect and share information assets	
		Coordination of the logistics effort with UN agencies, other NGOs and the military is not achieved	Why not? Examples? How to improve
Organisational Sustainment, Power and the Military	Power	Oxfam take the lead in product specification and procurement	Examples? Successful strategy?
	WASH cluster approach	Oxfam purchase and preposition water and sanitation kits as part of the overall approach	Successful strategy? Issues?
	Trust	Oxfam are happy to take the lead in future operations and do share facilities with other NGOs	How is trust established/maintained? Relationship issues? Examples?
	Relationship Management		
	Military Assistance	Oxfam are prepared to accept military assistance but this depends on the associated circumstances.	What circumstances? What type of/ how much assistance? Examples?
	Organisational Presence	The demonstration to donors of an organisational presence and of the value of their contributions was a priority.	How demonstrated? Examples?
	Corporate Social Responsibility	Demonstration of CSR is a priority.	How achieved?

Table 6.2   Oxfam – Stage I Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

6.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing *Emic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with members of Oxfam International listed in Table 6.1 will now be discussed. In keeping with Stage II of the final research strategy interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which had been developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key *etic* themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes listed within Table 6.1 will still be used throughout this discussion.

6.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration

In discussing resilience and the requirement for agility and flexibility Christopher (2011) highlights the issues surrounding the complexity that is inherent within modern supply chains, arguing that such supply chains will quickly descend into chaos unless they are connected through effective coordination and collaboration, shared information and knowledge. The data gathered from Oxfam concurs with these ideas as participants agree that whilst the humanitarian relief supply chain is designed for its needs, it does struggle to work in reality and efforts to facilitate effective collaboration in the field are hampered by overall complexity. In essence, the view is that in most cases, when faced with the need for an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) there is little evidence of coordination on the ground as donor organisations according to IAM:

"Jump in as there is nothing to prevent the influx of NGOs and other agencies"

Participant opinion on collaboration and coordination is typified by HOL:

"In my experience 5 or 6 big agencies deploy into a disaster zone and they take on national and local partners…..less well equipped organisations then arrive who have people but no access to materials or supply chains…"

The thoughts above also serve to illustrate the agreement that is evident amongst Oxfam participants with academic discourse on the challenges presented within humanitarian relief zones by the growing number of donor agencies and the resulting supply chain complexity that they bring (Heaslip, 2012a and 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada *et al*, 2006)

HOL agrees that some coordination is a good thing and cited the example of a unified coding system for humanitarian relief equipment that is now in place as one that is helping larger agencies and cluster leads to gain access to, and share common equipment and resources. He echoed the opinions of Altay and Labonte (2011) believing that coordination of technology is a step forward and that new IT systems and the associated information

sharing opportunities have significantly improved standardisation and interoperability across the sector. However, HOL also offered a counter view on collaboration and suggested that what he described as an "ad hoc approach" might actually benefit the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian relief effort. Arguing for the benefits of an element of chaos and uncertainty and agreeing with Mullins' (2013) assertion that "without uncertainty there would be no decisions to make" (p.639), HOL's belief was that there is far too much time spent in trying to apply formal structure to the supply chain. Contesting academic opinion on the benefits of applying business sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006), HOL argued that striving for structure and coordination within humanitarian relief zones is actually a "red herring" and felt that the inherent bureaucratic barriers actually served to slow the relief effort down. HOL's assertion was that what the sector really needs is a model built on an organisation's ability to perform.

In keeping with the arguments offered by Dash *et al* (2013) the data suggests that the use of classic market mechanisms will not guarantee a quality response in the provision of humanitarian relief and that what is really needed in the sector is a more rigid system that can judge agencies on their performance; moreover, such a system should have the legitimacy to exclude those that have a history of letting the overall effort down. DHOL cited the example of large Christian organisations that have access to considerable funds through church donations, but that have in his experience turned this funding into bibles at a time when food, shelter and medical aid were a clear priority. DHOL also highlighted the efforts of the Inter-Agency Procurement Group (IPAG) which is a "network of logistics professionals who work collectively on humanitarian supply chain activities" (IPAG, 2013) who are trying to establish an overall organisational certification standard across the sector as a first step in such a strategy. He also acknowledged the Sphere Project (2011) as the common reference for the minimum standards of delivery within the field, but agreed with the view that whilst it does advocate integration of humanitarian organisations, it does not state specific performance evaluation measures (Heaslip, 2011, p.165).

The data gathered highlights UN reforms where donors are encouraged to donate more money through UN agencies, but the inherent view is that such measures can be restrictive and that the policy is actually designed to reduce the number of agencies on the ground, or at the very least to bring more structure between the lead and other agencies. ILM offered the view that in his experience:

> *"UN agencies were reluctant to take on the level of control that is needed…..were not equipped to cope……and did not have the required skills to implement coordination on the ground".*

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Porter (1998) suggests that "clusters allow companies to operate more productively whilst coordinating with related companies" (p.78), however IAM feels that clusters and cluster leaders are notoriously bad at communicating with local actors and local governmental organisations, clearly in disagreement with the advice offered by Patti (2006) on cluster membership within the supply chain context. HOL cited the overall Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster approach (UNICEF, 2013) within which Oxfam International purchase and preposition water and sanitation kits (see Section 6.7.2) as an example of the frustrations that he has experienced with the clustered approach. Oxfam has worked in close collaboration with developmental and engineering organisations to help develop a common standard for the contents of these sanitation kits and on setting the overall quality requirements of the associated contents. The WASH Cluster working group now aim to manage these prepositioned stocks and to allocate kits to agencies who have capacity but no supply lines. However, this strategy calls for a standard specification of kit contents and overall quality, a specification that has been almost impossible to arrive at and sustain. The data also contends with academic views on the advantages of pre-positioned equipment (Mangan *et al,* 2012; Gadde *et al,* 2010; Gourdin, 2006) as it demonstrates an overall belief that having pre-positioned equipment presents its own particular problems. DHOL spoke of his experiences in the response to the Pakistan floods (2010)

> *"All stocks were drawn upon at the outset….stock from stores were arriving on mass without any coordination….it reminded me of when we used to receive unsolicited truckloads of unwanted teddy bears in the past…"*

DHOL went on to confirm that the critical bottleneck is not the availability of supplies but of money and people. He confirmed that Oxfam International is content to share the organisation's equipment and materials with other NGOs and agencies and argued that the Oxfam International catalogue of humanitarian logistics equipment is regarded as the one that sets the standard within the sector for the provision of water and sanitation equipment.

HOL suggests that a real concern that he has perceived across the sector is in respect of the ability of the humanitarian relief community to respond to multiple disasters and the likelihood of having to cope with more than one disaster at the same time. He believes that it is not a case of if but when this will be a requirement and contested that whilst the response system was growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that required to cope with the complexity of the impending demand for multiple responses.

There is broad agreement amongst Oxfam participants, with the view that the military does have a role to play within disaster relief zones (Heaslip, 2011; Thompson, 2010, Beauregard, 1998) but also some reservation in that the contribution has to be under the

right circumstances and on what ILM termed "An ad hoc basis where there may be a need for military resources such as trucks and planes or for military manpower to boost capacity". HOL discussed the role that the local military can play in coordinating the efforts and contribution of external military organisations and cited his experiences of the Pakistani military in this respect. However, he also referred to Haiti and to the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, where in keeping with the observations offered by Lynch (2010), HOL felt that the country was disorganised and did not have a strong enough political or military structure to help with the coordination of the US military contribution.

> Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Coordination/ Quality/ OCHA/ Ad hoc military contribution/ Equipment sharing/ Equipment development

6.7.2   Power and Relationships

The data demonstrates overall agreement with the academic discourse on the advantages of a partnered approach (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006) and that Oxfam International is happy to take the lead or be led within humanitarian relief operations. Acknowledging the challenges associated with the formation of what Kumar and Havey (2013) term Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the onset of an immediate response operation (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007), HOL offered Oxfam International's contribution to the WASH Cluster (UNICEF, 2013) as an example of a possible route to swift trust (Tatham and Kovács, 2010) within the sector, and of the organisational relationships that can work within the provision of humanitarian relief. Albeit a longer term relationship, the initiative is led by UNICEF under the IASC approach and acts as the global lead agency for water, sanitation and hygiene. HOL explained that Oxfam International has successfully coordinated developmental programmes for water and sanitation equipment in partnership with various engineering companies and that such relationships can be used as building blocks to address the challenges associated with future HFNs:

> *"The famous multi-functional Oxfam Bucket has not only ensured that fresh water can be transported quickly and safely but it has also enabled us to demonstrate our expertise in providing sanitation and water as a part of the overall disaster relief effort"*

(For more on the Oxfam Bucket see Oxfam, 2013).

The Lancet (2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) acknowledge the inherent competition amongst NGOs for donor funding, and the associated desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency sometimes at the expense of quantifiable end results. In a review of the immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake the Lancet observed that NGOS were *"Jostling for position, each claiming that they are doing the most for earthquake survivors"* (p253).   The data concurs with this view and DHOL highlights that the humanitarian sector is like any other and that it should not be forgotten that:

> *"Oxfam International is still a business….. it would not exist without donations…….because of this normal market forces and competition will inevitably be a factor within the sector".*

Clearly in disagreement with academic opinion on the positive impact that collaboration and coordination can have on supply chain performance (Dash *et al*, 2013, Christopher, 2011, Patti, 2006; Porter 1998 and 1990), and on the concerns that humanitarian organisations run the risk of entering into competition with other organisations (Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007), the data demonstrates that whilst the perception may be that the humanitarian sector is driven by a willingness to help, business opportunism still exists as do financial and political motives. In keeping with this observation all respondents comment that the key limiting factors on the ability to provide aid will always be the availability of money and people, and that there is always more work than capacity. ILM suggests that this lack of resources has, in his experience led to some issues in the past with other organisations who have accused Oxfam International of "not showing up" at certain disasters, and that this did present relationship management issues on occasion particularly with respect to the vital areas of "mutual trust and openness" (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007, p.169).

> Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Equipment sharing/ Equipment development/ Market forces/ Competition/ Finance

6.7.3   The Humanitarian Space

The data gathered concurs with the academic views on the importance of the preservation of the humanitarian principles within the "humanitarian space" (Spearin, 2001, p.22). All participants confirm that Impartiality and Neutrality (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009;

DFID, 2008) are key factors in the overall disaster relief effort and in the associated response. DHOL believes that the UN has a key role to play in leading discussions on the "rules of engagement with the military contributors". He introduced the idea of what he termed *2 hats* for the military and discussed the difficulties that this will inevitably bring:

> *"At times [following natural disasters] the military want to wear 2 hats, one driven by the pressure to achieve political aims [in the aftermath of the disaster] and the other to support the humanitarian relief effort [at a later stage]……they cannot wear both…."*.

DHOL contests that trying to incorporate humanitarian relief within the larger political context is an impossible task as military and political objectives will always collide with humanitarian principles. Whilst offering agreement with Heaslip's (2011) assertion that "military and humanitarian organisations need to establish clear blue water between one another" (p.163), in DHOL's terms the military has to clarify which *hat* they are wearing at the outset of the relief effort, and should consistently adopt that one role (or *hat*) throughout the relief operation. HOL also agrees with the thoughts offered by Williamson (2011), in that the military idea of using humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds is a flawed one that does not constitute or assist humanitarian relief work.

All participants agree that politics does not have a role to play in Oxfam International's overall strategic approach. However, in keeping with the academic view (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003), HOL is happy to accept that political influence is an inevitable factor within the humanitarian sector as a whole. He discussed his experience of the role that the local interests of some donor countries has to play:

> *"The European Community prepositioned [humanitarian relief] stocks in Dubai…..the local government were happy to accept this as the storage and subsequent transportation costs boosted their economy"*

> *"The Norwegian Government were keen to support Norwegian Church Aid's contribution to the WASH cluster as local production costs of water and sanitation kits would bring money back into the Norwegian economy"*

> ### Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
> ### Rules of engagement/Conflict with warfare/ Political influence

6.7.4 Organisational Sustainment

In keeping with the view that an increasing number of organisations are seeking visible means to demonstrate their involvement in, and contribution to the humanitarian relief effort (Heaslip, 2011; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Katoch, 2006; Porter and Kramer, 2002) the data demonstrates that organisational sustainment is a significant consideration within Oxfam International. Weiss and Collins (2000) acknowledge the inevitability of this and argue the negative impact that such pressures can have on charitable organisations such as Oxfam International, whose reliance on financial donations from the donor community may result in them looking to capture the humanitarian space that best suites perceived donor need. Echoing this assertion, and in agreement with the arguments offered by Oloson and Gregorian (2007), DHOL believes that his organisation is not on its own in this respect, and that NGOs and aid agencies in general operate on a business model in competition with each other. He also pointed to the fact that Oxfam International would not exist without donations and to the statement in its annual report:

> *"Oxfam would not exist without the support of the millions of people across the world who donate, support the Oxfam shops, participate and organize events and buy gifts from Oxfam Unwrapped".* (Oxfam International, 2012)

All respondents agree with this view and the belief amongst them is that relief organisations compete for resources in order to function, and that those organisation's donors often want to see their donation being used to assist certain types of victims in particular ways. This would seem to agree with the observations offered in the Lancet (2010) in that relief workers tend to adopt certain types of behaviour even when they know that their resources would be better used in other ways; moreover they also echo the thoughts of Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) who commented on the adverse influence that financial pressure and a corresponding fear of donor withdrawal can have on NGO behaviour within humanitarian relief zones. By way of an illustrative summary, ILM offered the following:

> *"If you are seen to be giving an appropriate response then you will be put on the list for the response to the next disaster………..it is important to be invited to the party to encourage donations and to maintain the organisation [Oxfam International] going forward"*

HOL also discussed the effectiveness of the UK Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) offering it as an example of an organisation that was able to provide a mechanism to unify fund raising and of one that encourages working together, joint advertising and collective working. He did however, offer a cautionary note in that he felt that the UK DEC can undermine individual agency accountability and with it the incentivisation to achieve higher performance levels that market mechanisms will bring; moreover, HOL felt that the

Committee also lower the threshold for participation by agencies that are essentially unqualified to contribute to the overall relief effort.

Confirming the argument that competition does exist within the sector (Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000), DHOL confirmed that Oxfam International is now recognised by the European Commission as a Human Care Procurement Centre, meaning that they are able to sell water and sanitation equipment to other disaster relief agencies who will not have to go through the standard 3 quote procurement cycle. This removal of levels of administration helps with quicker purchasing and therefore provision of rapid aid. However, DHOL was also quick to highlight that this new status is helping Oxfam International to recover equipment developmental, production and operational costs, whilst also confirming what he argued is the organisation's lead status within the sector and their overall competitive positioning in respect of other donor agencies.

> Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Competition/ Market Forces/ Donor influence

6.7.5 Summary – Oxfam International Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

Theme	Issue	Description	Notes
Management and Control	Coordination	Lacking on the ground	Why?
		Information sharing is a good thing	Promote
		Strict coordination slows down relief effort	Ad hoc approach?
			Accept sector for what it is
	Clusters	Bad at communicating locally	Why?
	Quality	Judge contributors an ability to perform	IPAG – certification standard across sector Sphere – no power
	OCHA	Unwilling to take on control function	Incorrect skill sets
		Unable to cope	
Relationships	Equipment sharing and development	WASH Cluster	Positive examples
		Engineering successes	
	Market Forces	Drive the sector like any other	Accept within and out with the sector
	Competition	NGOs compete for resources	
	Finance	NGOs must be ran as businesses	
	Political Influence	Governmental pressures to promote economy	
Military Involvement	Rules of engagement	UN to lead discussions	Clear guidelines for all contributors
	Conflict with warfare	Military cannot wear "2 Hats"	Clarify which role
		Hearts and minds initiatives	Not humanitarian relief
	Ad hoc basis	When needed	

Table 6.3   Oxfam International – Stage II Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

6.8   Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirm *Emic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with members of Oxfam International will now be discussed. All participants listed in Table 6.1 were able to take part in the Focus Group. In keeping with Stage III of the final research strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based around the Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G) which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings and the key *emic* themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes listed within Table 6.1 will still be used throughout this discussion.

6.8.1   Management and Control

> *"OCHA are always on the ground and visible but I feel that some of their staff lack the experience to grasp the initiative and to really coordinate the overall response"* (IAM)

The consensus amongst the Oxfam International Focus Group was that the efforts of UN agencies do help to save lives and that the UN, and in particular OCHA should take the lead in ensuring that timely and adequate relief is provided. However, there was also agreement with the precautionary views offered by Senge (2010) on the lack of success within supply chain collaboration and also with those offered by Kampstra and Ashayeri, (2006) in that "You cannot collaborate with a party that lacks a genuine desire to collaborate" (p.312). The participant view is that OCHA has to try and achieve overall coordination against what ILM describes as "a tide of uncoordinated but willing donor organisations". The Group agree that OCHA has already made a significant contribution to the relief effort by supporting international and local governments in planning and co-ordinating humanitarian responses, but that more could and has to be done.

Discussing his experiences of the Pakistan Floods (2010) ILM offered the view that the "painfully slow" overall UN response had resulted in an aid effort that was equally slow and often uncoordinated and that, as a consequence one that had struggled to deliver sufficient assistance to all of those who needed it. HOL commented on the perception amongst some that the sector is dominated by the UN and a relatively small number of western based international donor organisations, and discussed moves to create collaborative organisations away from UN and Western influence. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 2013), an inter-state collaboration of 10 regional agencies was offered as an example of such an initiative with an "amalgamation of the willing" (ASEAN, 2013) being established which does not rely on UN or western money but instead centres itself on Japan as its main donor. Whilst there was agreement that strategies such as this offer a means

of increasing overall global capacity for disaster response, the Group were also quick to agree that ASEAN has modelled itself on the UN structure and approaches, which could possibly lead to similar bureaucratic frustrations to those experienced as a result of UN involvement.

Discussion on the Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) centred on Oxfam's involvement in the Logistics Cluster and in keeping with academic discourse (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010) on the organisation's aim to develop strategies from the bottom up. The clear drive is to develop an approach which helps the victims of humanitarian disasters to help themselves; the suggestion was that this is being achieved by working closely with local communities and involving appropriate local authorities and organisations in the cluster at an early stage, thereby adhering to the suggested academic guidelines for successful cluster implementation and management (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998). The Group agreed with the view that strong inter-cluster coordination is required (Stoddard et al, 2007; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006) together with mechanisms to provide comprehensive recommendations and directions on how to better assess and analyse humanitarian disasters of the future. The consensus is that such strategies will help to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of relief operations as a whole through the gathering of detailed information and illustrations showing overall need at an earlier stage. DHOL explained that better knowledge of who is doing what and where will help to target those in greatest need in a timelier manner. Opinion was that the cluster system is currently struggling due to a lack of experience amongst cluster coordinators of the skill sets necessary to cope with the initial phase of the response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). The training implications of this will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, but this together with the fact that too many key UN staff are based centrally rather than in the field of operations, leads to what ILM contends are "gaps in provision, duplication of effort and frustrating delays in delivery of aid". This discussion on the negativity of centralisation clearly echoes the views offered by Handy (1993, cited by Mullins, 2013) on the concept, together with the thoughts of and arguments for, decentralisation and less hierarchical supervision within organisations (Bollinger and Hofstede, 1987, cited by Chanlat *et al,* 2013).

The administrative procedures used to distribute funds to the relief organisations by some cluster leads was also called into question, as the belief is that these are slowing things down and unsuited to meet the demand for a highly flexible supply chain which is capable of quickly adapting to deliver urgently needed aid as disasters rapidly develop and change (Christopher, 2011; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010). This lack of supply chain responsiveness and resilience (Christopher, 2011) clearly frustrated HOL who believes that if the associated issues can be addressed then the immediate response phase

can be shortened in a significant number of cases, allowing organisations to concentrate on the recovery and sustainment phases (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). It is his hope that with the right level of coordination and management, it will be possible to offer a combined approach across all phases of the relief effort as argued for by Thomas and Kopczak (2005).

6.8.2 Understanding and Training

In agreement with the academic arguments and calls for an increase in logistics training and professionalisation (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Bolshe *et al*, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005) all participants agree that there is a need for additional training, and that such an approach can only benefit the overall efficiency and effectiveness of their organisation in particular, and the overall disaster response in general. Echoing the academic view (Tatham and Altay, 2013, Goffnet *et al*, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) the Group acknowledged that there is a lack of understanding and appreciation amongst some staff, particularly in respect of the roles and contribution of other organisations and participants within the sector as well as in areas such as the Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011). However, there is also consensus that whilst the relatively high turnover of staff within Oxfam International itself might be problematic in respect of educational development, opportunities to professionalise within the sector could act as a retention tool; thereby concurring with the viewpoint offered by Lu *et al,* (2013). HOL believes that the increasing number of disasters worldwide (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) together with the high overall cost of logistics provision, (Guhu-Sapir, *et al,* 2011) can be used as a "lever" to justify greater investment in training, however, he does concede that given the current financial climate, this may be difficult to achieve. ILM suggested that within Oxfam there is a tendency to recruit staff with previous knowledge of the sector, or those with a specific skill set gained within the business sector (for example supply chain managers), a strategy which would seem to align itself with a policy of "individual grafting" as suggested by Song *et al* (2003). HOL agreed with this assertion and cited his own experience where he joined Oxfam after gaining 19 years of experience of the sector working with Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF).

The Group discussed the need for the inclusion of local organisations and governments in training strategies and offered as an example the approach that had been adopted by Oxfam in Laos, a country which is prone to flooding and landslides during the regional monsoon season.

"We [Oxfam] help to train the vulnerable local communities so that they are better able to deal with their needs in times of disaster. The locals are now able to adopt mitigation measures and be ready before the disaster strikes. In the longer term, this training means that the local community is able to improve its own food security together with its own people's livelihoods". (ILM)

This example of successful training delivery seems to echo the academic advice on integrated learning (Goffnet *et al,* 2013), as the strategy is facilitated in partnership with the local National Disaster Management Office in Laos where local residents are trained on how to take effective action should flooding occur. Some 8000 community volunteers have already been trained in rescue and emergency response measures and are supplied and trained in the use of the required emergency equipment such as boats, life jackets and first aid kits.

6.8.3 Relationships

The Group echoed the academic discourse on the partnered approach and on who should be included in the management of successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011, Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Patti, 2006); moreover, the discussion reflected the importance of local involvement and also the strategy that Oxfam adopts of striving to build what HOL describes as "grass roots relationships". However, the Group confirmed that whilst fine in principle relationship management with local authorities is not without its challenges in practice. In order to illustrate this, 2 vignettes are included within this section which were discussed during the Focus Group and are based on Oxfam International projects within Somalia. They serve to illustrate the value of, and the frustrations associated with achieving local cooperation whilst trying to preserve Oxfam International's strict policy against making any payments to local armed groups.

"Somalia is a classic example as insecurity and difficulty in identifying who is the government on the ground mean that it is very difficult to monitor movements of funds. Another problem is that we [Oxfam International] find it very difficult to maintain humanitarian quality standards as well as transparency and accountability to our donors. Because of this we try and use the long standing relationships that we have established with local partners to help ensure that our aid is actually getting through to the most vulnerable". (HOL)

The Group agreed that whilst the above approach helps to illustrate Oxfam International's efforts to maintain the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) and, in particular impartiality, the strategy also meant that it was virtually impossible to offer predictable and timely delivery of aid to those who were in greatest need. HOL went on to relate his experiences of an initiative in 2011 in Somalia under the WASH Cluster working

group (UNICEF, 2013) where Oxfam looked to expand an existing programme in an area of the country which was under the control of an armed opposition group:

> *"Our plan included giving money to our local partners to directly help support their livelihoods. On hearing of this the local authorities demanded 20% of the project budget, which our partner refused to pay. The money was only available for a 3-month period and as negotiations continued it looked like we would have to use the funding on another project. On hearing this the local authorities finally gave their provisional and unconditional support. It still took another 4 or 5 days before approval was finally given because the local commander was travelling to another part of the country. This negotiation meant that the overall project and associated aid were delayed for around 2 months".*

The Group consensus was that inter-organisational cooperation is a good idea in theory, however in practice such a strategy leads to "bureaucratic systems that slow down the overall response" (ILM). The consensus was that this is in no small part due to governmental influence on some organisations as discussed by Yaziji and Doh, (2009) and Doh and Teegan, (2003) and to the fact that some countries look upon humanitarian relief as a means of supporting their own economies, also concurring with the academic opinion on political influence (Steinberg, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002).

Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Weiss and Collins (2000) contest that competition exists within the humanitarian sector in the same way as the business environment, and in agreement with these assertions DHOL returned to his discussion during Stage II of the research and to his assertion that humanitarian relief organisations are still businesses that will be driven by the market. There was agreement within the Group to this idea and a clear consensus that:

> *"Money talks, just like in any other industry"* (DHOL).

6.8.4 Military Involvement

There was clear agreement within the Group with the proposition that there was a role for the military in the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Thompson; 2010); however, the consensus was that wherever possible aid is most effectively delivered by civilian humanitarian organisations under the leadership of the UN. Regional stability and with it security are enhanced and not undermined by the provision of impartial, needs-based humanitarian aid and there is a potential for military involvement to lead to potentially dangerous consequences which may affect and limit civilian aid agencies' ability to work.

The participants acknowledged the view that the overall military contribution to the humanitarian relief effort is growing (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011) and that the increasing number of disasters worldwide is resulting in a correspondingly larger number of humanitarian relief operations where international and local military forces are working alongside civilian relief organisations. There was also agreement that under the right circumstances, and Iraq and Afghanistan were offered as examples of such circumstances, military forces should be used to provide aid, particularly if the region is deemed to be too insecure for civilian agencies to operate safely. All participants would welcome military support when it was not safe for them to work; however, referring back to the debate on the preservation of the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008) there was also concern raised regarding the perception that such actions might have with the local community.

> *"Neutrality and impartiality do not go cap in hand with a military uniform I am afraid."* (IAM)

The overall feeling within the Group was that in order to ensure an appropriate response under the humanitarian principles all organisations involved, including those from the military should ensure that any aid delivered has as its primary aim the reduction of either poverty or suffering.

The issue of longer term involvement for the military led to a discussion on the UK governments' approach in Afghanistan, and to the implementation of the *stabilisation doctrine* (MOD, 2009), which effectively sees the change from a focus on rapid short term, high profile response to aid provision aimed at winning hearts and minds, in favour of a policy of involvement in highly-visible militarised aid units created to assist in building projects such as schools and hospitals. These projects are funded by donor aid but owned and led by the local communities themselves and give the military an opportunity to facilitate and support developmental and structural improvements, whilst using their obvious expertise in ensuring security for the local community. Whilst acknowledging that such measures may prove to be a step in the right direction, there were concerns voiced in that military involvement is used by some governments as a means of inflicting influence as they seek to use aid provision as a means to achieve longer term political objectives (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009). Consequently the Group felt that any military forces involved in the relief effort should adhere to the UN agreed civil-military guidelines that are issued for each humanitarian relief operation and that the associated military rules of engagement should prohibit the use of humanitarian assistance for military or governmental objectives. The consensus was that whilst there is a clear responsibility on governments to take action in such cases, there is also a role to play for NGOs and that Oxfam International and other

aid organisations have to ensure that their activities and donations do not directly or indirectly provide resources to be used to assist military conflict. Consequently, participants felt that NGOs should refuse any donations which are conditional on them cooperating with military forces, or which require the recipient organisation to distribute aid based on the political or military cooperation of those receiving it. Perhaps ILM best summed up the overall opinion within the Group:

> *"All of those involved must ensure that the aid that we provide does not contribute in any way to any contravention of international human rights and the overall humanitarian principles"*

6.9   Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues

As the third of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research findings, this chapter has drawn upon data gathered from participants within Oxfam International. Having firstly established the key *etic* issues and themes through analysis of questionnaire responses, *emic* issues were developed and then investigated through a series of semi-structured interviews with Oxfam International participants. Finally, additional analysis and application of relevant literature within the field informed the areas of discussion within a participant focus group. Hence, in keeping with the final research strategy through triangulation of data gathered and findings from questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and also looked to identify how these barriers might be addressed to improve collaboration in the future. Following the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the findings and trends discussed within this section will be used during a final cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions and academic contribution. The section will now be broken down into the key *emic* themes and issues identified within Oxfam International arrived at through application of Stages I and II of the final research strategy and confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.

6.9.1   Management and Control

The data gathered from Oxfam International concurs with the calls for agility and flexibility within humanitarian relief supply chains (Christopher, 2011). However, the supply chain struggles to work in reality and efforts to facilitate effective collaboration are hampered by overall complexity. In cases where an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) is called for, there is little evidence of coordination and agreement with academic concern on the challenges presented by the growing number of donor agencies involved

within humanitarian relief zones (Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada *et al*, 2006). The efforts of UN agencies does help to save lives and OCHA should take the lead in coordinating the overall relief effort. However, there is also agreement with the academic discourse on the inherent lack of success with supply chain collaboration strategies (Senge, 2010) and also an acknowledgement that collaboration cannot be achieved with organisations who do not wish to do so (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006). OCHA had already made a significant contribution to the relief effort by supporting international and local governments in planning and co-ordinating humanitarian responses but, in keeping with the arguments for the inclusion of downstream customers in successful supply chains (Patti, 2006) more can and has to be done in this vital area. The overall UN response is very slow at times, and this results in an aid effort that is equally slow. There is a perception amongst some that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor organisations, hence, there are ongoing strategies to create collaborative organisations away from UN and western influence. Such strategies might offer a means of increasing overall global capacity for disaster response, but new models are based on the current UN structure so may well encounter similar bureaucratic frustrations as a consequence.

Academic opinion on the benefits of new IT systems are echoed (Altay and Labonte, 2011) and the associated information sharing opportunities have significantly improved standardisation and interoperability across the sector. An alternate view on the effects of collaboration was offered, and the suggestion made striving for collaboration within the sector was a *red herring*; an ad hoc approach might actually benefit the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian relief effort. Arguing the case for an element of chaos and uncertainty and agreeing with the idea that uncertainty leads to decision making (Mullins, 2013) the view was that there was far too much time spent in trying to apply formal structure to the supply chain. Contesting academic opinion on the benefits of applying business sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006), efforts to establish structure and coordination within humanitarian relief zones are actually detrimental on occasion. In keeping with the argument that classic market mechanisms will not guarantee a quality response within the sector (Dash *et al,* 2013; Olson and Gregorian, 2007) what is really needed is a more rigid system that can judge agencies on their performance, and that has the legitimacy to exclude those that have a history of letting the overall effort down.

Porter (1998) suggested that "clusters allow companies to operate more productively whilst coordinating with related companies" (p.78), however the Oxfam participant view is that clusters and cluster leaders are notoriously bad at communicating with local actors and local

governmental organisations, clearly in disagreement with the advice on cluster membership within the supply chain context (Patti, 2006). In keeping with academic discourse (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010) on the organisation's aim to develop strategies from the bottom up, and following academic guidance on successful cluster implementation (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) Oxfam's strategy is to develop approaches which help victims of humanitarian disasters to help themselves and this is being achieved by working closely with local communities and involving appropriate local authorities and organisations at an early stage. The consensus echoes the academic discussion on the requirement for inter-cluster coordination (Stoddard et al, 2007; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006) and mechanisms to provide comprehensive recommendations and directions on how to better assess and analyse future humanitarian disasters should be introduced. The UN Cluster system is struggling due to a lack of experience amongst cluster coordinators in dealing with the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Moreover, in keeping with the academic debate on the negative effect that centralisation of staff and decision makers can bring (Handy, 1993, cited by Mullins, 2013; Bollinger and Hofstede, 1987, cited by Chanlat *et al,* 2013) too many key UN staff are based centrally rather than in the field of operations.

The critical bottleneck in the supply chain is not the availability of supplies but that of money and people. Administrative procedures used to distribute funds to the relief organisations by some cluster leads are questioned as these are seen to slow things down and are regarded as unsuited to the demand for a highly flexible and adaptable supply chain (Christopher, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011). If this lack of supply chain responsiveness and resilience (Christopher, 2011) can be addressed then the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) could be significantly shortened. Furthermore, with the right level of coordination and management, it will be possible to introduce a combined approach across all phases of the relief effort, as called for by Thomas and Kopczak (2005). A real concern is in respect of the ability of the humanitarian relief community to respond to multiple disasters and the likelihood of having to cope with more than one disaster at the same time. The belief is that whilst the response system is growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that required to cope with the complexity of the impending demand for multiple responses.

6.9.2   Understanding and Training

Oxfam International participants agree with the academic call for an increase in logistics training and professionalisation (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Bolshe *et al*, 2013; Allen *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005). Echoing the

academic discourse (Tatham and Altay, 2103, Goffnet *et al*, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) there is a lack of understanding and appreciation amongst some relief workers particularly in respect of the roles and contribution of other organisations and contributors within the sector. However, whilst there is concern that the relatively high turnover of staff within Oxfam International itself might be problematic in respect of educational development, there is agreement that opportunities to professionalise within the sector could act as a retention tool (Lu *et al*, 2013). The increasing number of disasters worldwide (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) together with the high overall cost of logistics provision (Guhu-Sapir, *et al*, 2011) could be used as a means to justify greater investment in training, but there is pragmatic resignation that the current financial climate will make financial investment in training difficult to justify. Moreover, Oxfam International tend to adopt an "individual grafting" (Song *et al*, 2003) approach to staff recruitment by employing those with previous knowledge of the sector, or those who possess specific skill sets gained within the business sector (for example supply chain managers).

Echoing the academic advice on the benefits of integrated learning (Goffnet *et al*, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) participants acknowledge the need for the inclusion of local organisations and governments in training strategies and believe that such initiatives help to facilitate partnerships with the local communities; thereby, supporting Oxfam International's bottom up approach to humanitarian relief provision.

6.9.3 Relationships

The data gathered echoes the academic discussion on the partnered approach and on who should be included in the management of successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011, Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Patti, 2006). Oxfam International are happy to take the lead or be led within humanitarian relief operations, and place great importance on local involvement in building what were described as "grass roots relationships". However, whilst fine in principle, relationship management with local authorities can be problematic in practice, particularly in countries where there is conflict, instability and insecurity. There is often difficulty in identifying who the local government is, hence it becomes difficult to monitor and control the movements of donor funding and to maintain humanitarian quality standards. Hence, Oxfam International staff attempt to establish and utilise long standing relationships with local partners to help ensure that aid is delivered to the most vulnerable. Whilst this strategy helps to maintain the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009, DFID, 2008) it also means that it is virtually impossible to offer predictable and timely delivery of aid. The bureaucratic processes associated with the approach mean that in some cases local militia demand percentage payments from project

funds. Oxfam International's refusal to not make such payments and the consequent negotiation process has delayed projects in the past and the associated delivery of aid (see vignettes in section 6.9.3).

There are challenges associated with the formation of what Kumar and Havey (2013) term Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the onset of an immediate response operation (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Oxfam International's contribution to the WASH Cluster (UNICEF, 2013) was included as an example of a possible route to swift trust (Tatham and Kovács, 2010) within the sector. The data gathered reflects agreement with the benefits of the value chain (Porter, 1990), and inter-organisational cooperation is seen as a good idea in theory; however, in practice such a strategy leads to bureaucratic systems that slow down the overall response. In accord with the academic discourse (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Doh and Teegan, 2003; Steinberg, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002) the participant view was that there is governmental influence on some organisations within the sector, and some countries regard humanitarian relief as a means of supporting their own economies and political agendas.

In disagreement with academic opinion on the positive impact that collaboration and coordination can have on supply chain performance (Dash *et* al, 2013, Christopher, 2011, Patti, 2006; Porter 1998 and 1990) and on the concerns that that humanitarian organisations run the risk of entering into competition with other organisations (Chandes and Paché, 2010), the data offers empirical evidence that business opportunism does exist within the sector. The overall analysis supports the contention that humanitarian relief organisations are still businesses that will be driven by the market and associated market forces, and that the desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency to donors will sometimes occur to the detriment of quantifiable end results (The Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000).

6.9.4 Military Involvement

There is a role for the military in the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Thompson; 2010, Beauregard, 1998); but there are also some reservations in that the military contribution has to be under the right circumstances and where there may be a need for military resources such as trucks and planes or for military manpower to boost capacity. However, wherever possible aid is most effectively delivered by civilian humanitarian organisations under the leadership of the UN. Regional stability and with it security, are enhanced and not undermined by the provision of impartial, needs-based humanitarian aid and there is a potential for military involvement to lead to dangerous

consequences which may affect and limit the ability of civilian aid agencies' to work (Williamson, 2011).

The overall military contribution to the humanitarian relief effort is growing (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011, Lynch, 2010) and the increasing number of disasters worldwide are resulting in a correspondingly larger number of humanitarian relief operations where military forces are working alongside civilian relief organisations. Under the right circumstances military forces should be used to provide aid, this is particularly true within regions which are deemed as unsafe for civilian agencies to operate in. Referring back to the debate on the preservation of the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008), concerns are raised regarding the perception that military involvement has within local communities; the data supports the academic view (Williamson, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011) that the concepts of neutrality and impartiality do not sit well with military intervention within the humanitarian relief supply chain. In order to ensure an appropriate response under the humanitarian principles all organisations involved, including those from the military should ensure that any aid delivered has as its primary aim the reduction of poverty or suffering.

Trying to incorporate humanitarian relief within the larger political context is an impossible task as military and political objectives will always collide with humanitarian principles. Warfare will always conflict with humanitarian principles and consequently, there are occasions when the military want to wear 2 *hats*, one driven by the pressure to achieve political aims and the other to support the humanitarian relief effort. Whilst offering agreement with Heaslip's (2011) assertion that "military and humanitarian organisations need to establish clear blue water between one another" (p.163), Oxfam participants believe that the challenge for the military is to clarify which *hat* they are wearing at the outset of the relief effort and to consistently adopt that one role throughout the ensuing relief operation. In agreement with the observations made by Williamson (2011) the military idea of using humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds is a flawed one and does not constitute or assist humanitarian relief work.

The implementation of the *stabilisation doctrine* (MOD, 2009) and the corresponding change of military focus away from purely rapid short term humanitarian support, in favour of a policy of involvement in longer term militarised aid and building projects is welcome; however, there are concerns voiced in agreement with the observation that some governments regarded military involvement as a means of achieving long term political influence (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009). Consequently, any military forces involved in the relief effort should adhere to the UN agreed civil-military guidelines;

moreover, the associated military rules of engagement should prohibit the use of humanitarian assistance for the fulfilment of military or governmental objectives. Whilst there is a clear responsibility on governments to take action in such cases there is also a role to play for NGOs and aid organisations who have to ensure that their activities and donations do not directly or indirectly provide resources to be used to assist military conflict. Consequently, NGOs should refuse any donations which are conditional on them cooperating with military forces and all agencies involved in the relief effort have to ensure that the aid that is provided does not contribute in any way to any contravention of international human rights and the overall humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008).

CHAPTER 7

TEARFUND – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS

"Tearfund has a big vision which we've been bringing into being since 1968. We know there's God-given-potential in poor communities. We work with local churches to unlock this potential."

(Tearfund, 2011)

7.1 Introduction

The data gathered from participants within The Evangelical Alliance Relief (TEAR) Fund is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. By way of introduction a short background and history of Tearfund is included together with a look at its current (as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the key *etic* and *emic* issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.

7.2 Background – Core Beliefs, Drivers and Scale

Tearfund is a Christian international aid agency working globally to end poverty and injustice (DEC, 2012). They are passionate about living out God's kingdom values of love, hope and transformation (Tearfund, 2011). One of the 14 members of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) they are recognised for their professional expertise in development, disaster response, disaster risk reduction and advocacy. Tearfund believe that this level of professionalism and expertise, matched with the enduring, sustainable effectiveness of the local church, is a powerful force in the face of poverty. They are committed to standards of conduct and good practice that ensure that they are always accountable for the work that they do. Tearfund are signatories to the Red Cross Code of Conduct (IFRC, 2012) and members of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP, 2012).

Core to Tearfund's Christian values is the belief that aid must be given regardless of race, religion, nationality or gender, and that it will never be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. This is of vital importance to Tearfund staff as this is seen as the kind of 'development work' that is described in the Bible. They follow a biblical path in believing that helping communities in need is central to the purpose of local churches, wherever they may be (Tearfund, 2011).

The 2011/12 Director's Report and Accounts (Tearfund 2012) records total Tearfund income as £70 million and expenditure on charitable activities as £59 million. All expenditure is overseen by the UK Charity Commission, and the Fund is committed to ensuring that as much as possible of the money donated to them is spent in ways that benefit the people who need it most. Approximately 91% of all donations go towards emergency, development and humanitarian work, as well as other elements of Tearfund charitable work such as campaigning and advocacy. Of the remaining funds, 8% is spent on fund raising activity (which compares well with similar size organisations) and around 1% is spent on the costs of governance. (Tearfund, 2011).

7.3   A Brief History - Fighting Poverty since 1968

Donations to the Evangelical Church during World Refugee Year in 1960, and subsequent donations in support of famine relief efforts in Biafra prompted the public launch of Tearfund in 1968. Increasing publicity and public awareness prompted Cliff Richard to give his first fundraising concert for the cause in the Royal Albert Hall in 1969. In the 1970s Tearfund expanded with facilities being created to enable supporters to sponsor children in Bangladesh; their donations being used to provide food, healthcare and education through Christian projects. In 1980 Tearfund sent its own medical team to work in refugee camps in Somalia and in 1985 driven by the events surrounding Band Aid, the Fund established a regular donation programme to provide long-term support for aid development programmes. The 1990s were marked by civil unrest in the Balkans and Tearfund were at the forefront of the associated humanitarian relief efforts. In 1994 Tearfund launched a significant appeal and relief response effort following the Rwandan genocide, and in response to the devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch on Central America (1998) joined the Disasters Emergency Committee of relief agencies to appeal for funds (DEC, 2012). Tearfund ended the 1990's by becoming a founder-member of the Jubilee 2000 movement, an international coalition movement in over 40 countries that called for cancellation of third world debt by the year 2000 (Dent and Peters, 1999).

Since 2000 Tearfund has been involved in all major disaster relief efforts across the globe, from severe floods in Africa and South Asia to helping to cope with the humanitarian impact of conflicts in Afghanistan and Darfur. The Fund responded to the devastation following the Asian Tsunami (2004) and in 2005, acted as a leading member of the Make Poverty History (2005) coalition; a coalition of charities, religious groups, trade unions and campaigning groups aimed at holding governments to account to end world poverty (Nicholls, 2005).

7.4   A Growing Portfolio - Current Humanitarian Programmes and Structures

Tearfund's meteoric rise within the humanitarian relief sector continues today as it has a policy of responding operationally to humanitarian disasters in situations of overwhelming need (Tearfund, 2011). As at October 2012 operational programmes were on-going in Darfur, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan and Haiti (Tearfund, 2012). During financial year 2011/12 more than 7,300 new local churches were established to address the needs of poor, vulnerable and marginalised people in their communities. Integral mission initiatives were increased to 109, across 59 countries including partnerships with support organisations in Nepal, Zimbabwe and Pakistan (p6). A comprehensive and integrated approach to disasters and disaster vulnerability, undertaking disaster risk reduction and disaster response exists through the activities of Tearfund partners, their direct operational programmes, Tearfund UK teams, local churches and global networks. Each programme is led by a programme director and a senior management team and each project location is under the responsibility of an Area Coordinator. The Operational Team in the UK Head Office includes finance staff and technical services staff to ensure that programmes are effectively supported, along with a humanitarian support team which provides wider support to Tearfund staff and partners (Tearfund, 2012).

7.5 Data Collection, Respondents and Results

Tearfund were first contacted in May 2012 through a series of introductory letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research methodology. Key respondents are shown in Table 7.1:

Respondent	Time with Tearfund (years)	Practical Experience	Role	Code
Head of International Finance and Logistics	24	Involved in logistics support to every major humanitarian crisis since 1989	To lead and manage the International Finance and Logistics team.	HOL
Deputy Programme Director	19	Most major crises since joining the organisation	Part of the Senior Management Team for a given relief programme with significant external representation of Tearfund.	DPD
International Logistics Manager	7	Darfur, Pakistan, South Sudan, Liberia, Haiti, DRC	To manage resources engaged in the delivery of specific operational projects	ILM
Area Coordinator	7	Afghan National Solidarity Programme, Haiti	Responsible for the management of specific financial, logistics and human resource functions engaged on one particular operation. Regular communication with other agencies and partner organisations.	AC
Base Manager (x3)	5	DRC, Haiti	Responsible for managing a project area office and delivering operational support to project sites in Logistics, Finance, HR and general administration.	BM1
	3	Haiti		BM2
	2	Haiti		BM3

Table 7.1   Tearfund – Key Respondents

7.6 **Data Analysis – Stage I – Key *Etic* Themes and Issues**

Analysis of the data gathered via the introductory questionnaires (Appendix D), will now be discussed. In achieving this due consideration will be given to the practical relevance of the initial *etic* issues and themes identified within the Literature Review as set out and codified at Appendix E. Note that respondent codes within Table 7.1 will be used at this stage.

7.6.1 General Processes, Power, Relationships and Collaboration

All respondents agreed that the organisation operated a supply chain that was designed specifically for its particular role (COLRES). However, senior respondents (HOL, DPD, ILM) stated that Tearfund do not operate under the UN Cluster Concept (COLCLU) whilst only one junior respondent (BM1) was aware of the strategy. All respondents offered the view that Tearfund do not take the lead in any logistical activity along the humanitarian relief supply chain and the senior view was that they would not be willing to accept such responsibility in any future operations (HOL, DPD) (PWRPOS, PWRNEG, RMT, RMOPP). Facilities are shared with other NGOs (AC, BM1,2,3) but this is at a localised level (COLHOR) and there is no visibility of this in the higher operational sense (COLVER) (HOL, DPD, ILM). When it comes to acceptance of military assistance there was a resounding answer of 'Depends on the circumstances' from all respondents (HUMSIND).

> Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:
>
> UN Cluster Concept/ Lead Status/ Power/ Relationships/Sharing of Facilities/ Military Assistance

7.6.2 The Humanitarian Space

When considering the Humanitarian Space and the 4 humanitarian principles, all principles were recognised and acknowledged by the respondents but whilst they were scored as being of equal importance by the senior respondents (HOL, DPD), it was interesting to note that the more junior respondents (ILM, AC, BM) were all happy to offer an opinion and to grade most and least important as in Fig 7.1

Fig 7.1 – Humanitarian Principles - Tearfund Junior Responses

Humanity (HUMSHUM) and Impartiality (HUMSIMP) are clearly the most important with Neutrality (HUMSNEU) and Independence (HUMSIND) being the least important in the eyes of the Tearfund's humanitarian relief practioners. However, perhaps this could have been expected as if one considers the definitions of the 4 principles set out in the questionnaire (Appendix D), there are some close similarities between those offered for Humanity and Impartiality and Neutrality and Independence which should have perhaps, with hindsight been avoided.

> Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:
>
> Humanitarian Principles

7.6.3   Organisational Sustainment

In prioritising the statements surrounding organisational sustainment the senior respondent (HOL) pointed to Tearfund's membership of the interagency Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and noted that one of the Fund's most important aims was to adhere to the associated quality, accountability and performance improvement initiatives (HAP,

2012). The senior respondent also noted that whilst there was a drive to demonstrate to donors that their presence and inputs into a humanitarian mission were valuable (SUSFR), this was only in the context of value for money. Moreover, demonstrating competitive behaviour towards other humanitarian actors and organisations (SUSSTRAT) and seeking visible means of demonstrating active subscription to CSR, (SUSCSR) were not applicable in his eyes. Other respondents (DPD, ILM, AC, BM) noted that it was important to demonstrate a presence (SUSFR) and this was particularly true of the junior respondents (LM), who regarded this to be a priority when working in a practical relief area. Demonstration of subscription to CSR (SUSCSR) was also an area of importance, but demonstration of competitive behaviour (SUSSTRAT) was considered to be not-applicable by all respondents.

Key *Etic* Themes and Issues:

Membership of HAP

Demonstration of Value for money/ Presence

7.6.4 Summary - Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

In completing Stage I of the research strategy with Tearfund the following key *etic* themes and issues were identified to inform Stage II of the research strategy.

Theme	Issue	Description	Notes
General Processes, Power, Relationships and Collaboration	UN Cluster Concept	Senior vs junior knowledge Why Tearfund do not adopt the strategy	LM not aware of concept
	Lead status	Do not take the lead in any operational activity	Who does? Happy to follow? Power/relationships?
	Sharing of facilities	Facilities shared but at local level	Why not at a higher level? What is shared? Who with?
	Military Assistance	Acceptance will 'Depend on the Circumstances'	What circumstances? What type of/ how much assistance?
The Humanitarian Space	Humanity vs Impartiality	Misunderstanding of definitions	Clarify understanding and relevance of principles
	Neutrality vs Independence		
Organisational Sustainment	Membership of HAP	Adherence to the associated quality, accountability and performance improvement initiatives.	Check general awareness of HAP membership and principles
	Demonstration of Value for money	Must demonstrate value for money to donors	How? Awareness at junior respondent level?
	Demonstration of Presence	Must demonstrate presence to donors	How? Senior vs Junior opinions.

Table 7.2   Tearfund – Stage I Key *Etic* Themes and Issues

7.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing *Emic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with members of Tearfund listed in Table 7.1 will now be discussed. In keeping with Stage II of the final research strategy interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which had been developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key *etic* themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes listed within Table 7.1 will still be used throughout this discussion.

7.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration

> *"The UN Cluster Approach is fine to a point but I have seen it work as both a bottleneck and an enabler……for it to be truly effective the controlling authorities must concentrate on the effective coordination of international agencies much more than they do at present…..they must take a more active role on the ground and not sit back and let things develop…"* (HOL)

The quote above echoes the feelings of all Tearfund respondents in respect of the effectiveness of the UN Cluster Approach (UN OCHA, 2011). The data gathered demonstrates overall support for the theoretical concept of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), but that the practical application of the concept in real time disaster relief operations is somewhat different. The view is that there are too many priorities competing with each other and that the current approach clouds the issue and does not allow donors to have a clear understanding of what the immediate needs are (DPD). Referring to his experiences during the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, when the Cluster Approach was first used ILM did feel that the overall relief effort was better coordinated than it would have been without it; however, there were clear areas for improvement and, in keeping with the thoughts of Jensen (2012) clusters contributed to unaccountability and inefficiencies in the response as many cluster leads had no delegated authority to make decisions. Moreover, ILM was obviously frustrated as he discussed his experiences of the response to the Haitian earthquake (2010), where he agreed with the view offered by Lynch (2010) in that little had changed in the intervening 5 years.

The data show a common perception amongst the Tearfund respondents that there are cultural barriers to effective collaboration:

> *"The greatest limitation of the UN Cluster Approach is the failure by cluster lead agencies at a global level to adequately prioritise and resource cluster leadership and coordination responsibilities…..this is not just down to funding issues but also to inter-agency culture and rivalry"* (HOL)

This view would seem to echo that offered by Reindorp and Wiles (2001) in a report commissioned by the UN OCHA, which ultimately informed the introduction of the UN Cluster Approach, where they note that "there is an institutional culture within humanitarian agencies in which cooperation is neither required nor rewarded" (p.50). Views that would also seem to concur with comments on the reticence of some organisations to act alone (Heaslip, 2011; Senge, 2010) and on the simple fact that "You cannot collaborate with a party that lacks a genuine desire to collaborate" (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006, p.312). Moreover, and somewhat disappointingly, the practical observations of ILM would also seem to be confirmed in that little has in fact changed since the introduction of the Cluster Approach in 2005 (Lynch, 2010). AC sums up the overall Tearfund view on the Cluster Approach as he agreed with Patti (2006) in that the best way forward was to retain clusters, but to make them more concise by outlining clear priorities and including as many stakeholders as possible in the process.

Christopher (2011) supported the need for a flexible and agile supply chain and BM1 supports this idea as he calls for agencies to increase their capacity to respond speedily with skilled coordinators. Furthermore, BM1 contends that this can be best achieved through the development of a classic partnered approach (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006), adopting closer working relationships together with the sharing of assets, facilities and knowledge. Referring to his experiences in Haiti (2010), BM1 felt that a more accurate analysis of the situation on the ground would have helped, and that the lack of reliable information sharing and communication mechanisms was the main contributor to an overall lack of knowledge and awareness. BM3 supported this view and the observations made by Lynch (2010), as he discussed the limitations on offloading capability and storage capacity that he had experienced in Haiti; issues that he felt were as a direct result of the sheer scale of devastation to the airport, sea port and roads, combined with a lack of information sharing that had led to a very slow dispersal of aid. BM3 also felt that partnerships and the sharing of assets is a key factor in the provision of effective humanitarian aid:

> *"We [Tearfund] aim to be accountable to our donors and to those partners who we participate in projects with……Tearfund is about participation….because of this we are happy to share information and facilities"*

AC offered some very strong views on the acceptance of military assistance and reflected the observations offered by Williamson (2011) in believing that the military should never act as the lead organisation within natural disaster relief zones. Heaslip (2011) suggests that there are 2 aspects of military support in humanitarian, the provision of security and the provision of resources; however, AC's clear view was that the military should focus solely

on the first of these, as he believed that the military are in a humanitarian relief zone to protect him and his colleagues, and that military contributors should leave humanitarian organisations to carry out the actual relief effort:

> *"They [the military] have a clear role to play in providing security for relief workers but should not try and interfere with NGOs and donors in the relief zone"*

His views are probably influenced by his personal experiences in Haiti, where he felt that in the immediate response to the natural disaster the US military had initially taken control but that they had done this without any clear authority, when perhaps it would have been better under the auspices of the UN. DPD was a little more reserved on this issue and pointed to the fact that sensitivity over sovereignty will almost always rule out an international military role unless it is as part of the UN; thereby supporting the view that in response to natural disasters civil-military coordination should be strictly between governments and their military's (UN OCHA, 2013a). Echoing the academic discourse on the benefits of applying business sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006) DPD believed that NGOs and aid agencies in general should operate on a business model in isolation from the military and in direct competition with each other. His overall view was that although international military forces are useful in providing support to the supply, delivery and distribution of aid, a well-coordinated humanitarian response must look beyond the issue of distribution of relief and to the re-establishment of systems and livelihoods, thereby helping a population to recover as quickly as possible. In sum, his overall view was that:

> *"The military is not equipped nor really interested in dealing with this".*

The data gathered suggests that these opinions are shared by the other Tearfund respondents, but that there is also general agreement with the view that military intervention does have a vital role to play in the overall relief effort (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011; Thompson, 2010). However, the consensus would seem to support the argument proffered by Katoch (2006) in that foreign military assistance should only be provided at the request of the affected government and that any subsequent response must be coordinated through that government. Moreover the data goes on to acknowledge the view that the UN is best placed to coordinate the relief effort given its position in relation to affected governments and the worldwide donor community (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001).

Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

Clusters/ Coordination/ Information Sharing and Knowledge/ Asset Sharing/ Military Assistance/ Links to local Government

7.7.2 Power and Relationships

The data gathered concurred with academic views in support of a partnered approach (Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006) and on who should be included in the management of successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Patti, 2006); furthermore it confirms that a key tenant of Tearfund's overall strategy is to work in partnership with other organisations within the humanitarian relief sector. DPD discussed the organisation's membership of numerous committees and groups within the sector and cited the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) and the Inter-Agency Procurement Group (IPAG, 2013) as examples of Tearfund's willingness to work with partner organisations, NGOs and governments who specialise in areas where they believed that they could have the greatest impact:

> *"When we work with partners we do not try and impose on them…..we try and work with partners who share our values……we are always trying to improve the quality of our partnerships".* (DPD)

Disappointingly for the sector as a whole, HOL offered support to the academic discourse on the negative effect that power can have on the workings of a successful supply chain, in that it negates co-operation and is not helpful in building relationships (Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997) as he added that, to his knowledge certain other smaller NGOs were not happy to join such organisations as there was a perception that they would not be treated on an equal basis.

Tearfund participants were content with the idea that power imbalance is a first step towards successful relationship building, and were clearly content to operate within conditions of imbalanced power and reward (Hingley, 2005a, p.63), as they accepted that the size of their organisation meant that, realistically they will not be offered lead status in a relief zone. The consensus was that trust and relationship management within what Kumar and Havey (2013) describe as *Hastily Formed Networks* (HFN) were of vital importance to them, and to the Tearfund's overall strategy. Chandes and Paché (2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) contend that business opportunism exists within the sector, but the data gathered demonstrates that competition was not an issue in the case of the Tearfund; however, this view can probably be explained by consideration of the core Christian values that drive overall organisational policy (Tearfund, 2011). HOL was quick to refer to the Organisation's overall belief that they should be open and accountable to their financial supporters and that "for every pound donated around 91 pence goes to our humanitarian field work" (according to the Tearfund website, approximately eight pence is spent raising funds and less than one penny in every pound is spent on the costs of governance (Tearfund, 2011)). HOL and DPD discussed Tearfund's membership of the Humanitarian Accountability

Partnership (HAP, 2012) and the fact that the organisation is a signatory to the Red Cross Code of Conduct (IFRC, 2012):

> *"Our Christian values mean that we are committed to living out God's core values through our dedication to those who need us and relationships with other donor organisations"* (HOL)

Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:

Partnerships

Accountability to Donors

7.7.3 The Humanitarian Space

The data gathered demonstrates that the maintenance of all humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008) and Christian beliefs are a significant factor in the Tearfund's overall strategy. All respondents are clearly aware of the Tearfund's Quality Standards (Tearfund, 2013) and Statement of Faith (Tearfund, 2013a):

> *"God's love for everyone is important to us and our Christian beliefs mean that we will always remain neutral…..we will try and reach all who need our help"* (AC)

> *"The Bible describes development work and that is what we do……we help local churches to help themselves wherever they are"* (BM3)

In disagreement with the academic view (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003), the data confirms that politics do not influence Tearfund policy or direction in respect of the humanitarian effort in the field and that respondents "would not let political barriers prevent us from carrying out God's teaching" (BM3).   Typical of the responses in this area is that offered by ILM who felt that help must be provided on the basis of need, and that he and his colleagues must clearly identify those who are in greatest need regardless of political pressures. However, in contrast DPD did acknowledge the view (Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003) that in recent years some NGOs had attempted to influence policy decisions to help shape global political perspectives on a wide range of humanitarian issues as he cited Tearfund's involvement in the Enough Food for Everyone IF (2013) as an example of the organisation's attempts to bring influence to bear on what he described as "key decision-makers".

Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:

Influence Key Decision Makers

7.7.4 Organisational Sustainment

Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) comment on the adverse influence that financial pressure and a fear of donor withdrawal can have on NGO behaviour within humanitarian relief zones, and the data gathered demonstrates acknowledgement of a commitment and accountability to the donor community. HOL explained that Tearfund is dedicated to ensuring that the work that they do will have a lasting and positive impact and that the relief effort has been built on local need and local skills and resources. He explained that Tearfund achieve this through a network of local churches and partner organisations and that the money donated is used to help to inspire Christian believers to challenge poverty and injustice and to help the most vulnerable as a result. ILM referred to the Tearfund Supporter's Charter (Tearfund, 2013b):

> *"Where we set out our commitment to our supporters, make clear promises to them and ask for their feedback on how we spend their donations"*

The data does not suggest that Tearfund actively seek publicity; they rely on their donors to keep abreast of their activities through a dedicated website and the publication of annual report and accounts. The Organisation is aware of the impact on the environment and is committed to the key tenants of Corporate Social Responsibility:

> *"We want to reduce our impact on the environment……when we work with the local churches we always ensure that we do not do anything that may harm the natural environment"* (AC)

Key *Emic* Themes and Issues:

Accountability to donors

Impact on the Environment

7.7.5 Summary – Tearfund Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

Theme	Issue	Description	Notes
Management and Control	Coordination	Practical reality	Competing priorities
	Clusters	Areas for improvement	No change since inception
		Inter-agency culture and rivalry	Negative effect on clusters
		Make role more concise	Outline priorities and include stakeholders
Relationships	Information and Knowledge Sharing	Lack of reliable information	Poor overall awareness
			Slow distribution of aid
	Asset sharing	Increase capacity	Speed up distribution
	Partnerships	Unequal treatment	Concern of smaller NGOs
		Quality of delivery	Seek to improve
		Success achieved through Christian beliefs	
	Influence key decision makers	Aim to help poor and vulnerable	Partnership with action groups
	Accountable to donors	Feedback to donors	Awareness
	Impact on the environment	Corporate Social Responsibility	
Military Involvement	Assistance	Clarity of role	
	Links to local government	Maintenance of Sovereignty	Establish control over external military participants
		Role of local military	
	Interest beyond initial response	Not just distribution but overall recovery	Accelerate overall recovery

Table 7.3   Tearfund – Stage II Key *Emic* Themes and Issues

7.8 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirm *Emic* Themes and Issues

Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with members of Tearfund will now be discussed. Two of the participants list in Table 7.1 (BM2 and BM3) were unable to attend the Focus Group, hence membership was restricted to the five remaining members of Tearfund listed in Table 7.1. In keeping with Stage III of the final research strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based around the Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G) which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings and the key *emic* themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes listed within Table 7.1 will still be used throughout this discussion.

7.8.1 Management and Control

There is a clear support amongst the Tearfund Focus Group for the view that all participant organisations have a part to play in the relief effort and that better coordination will benefit the overall provision and efficient delivery of aid. However, the consensus was that OCHA has an impossible task (ILM); moreover, the Group also acknowledged the increasing demands being placed on OCHA in light of the growing number of donor agencies involved within the overall humanitarian relief effort (Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006). Coordination of the relief effort is required but the belief was that the task is too big for one organisation:

> *"The competing agendas and open rivalry at times between international organisations means that little coordinated activity can actually take place...... We prefer to do our own thing if possible and to work by establishing close links with the local community at an early stage".* (ILM).

Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that a critical component to a successful supply chain strategy is relationship management and to counter the ILM's assertions the remaining participants acknowledged that the Tearfund has to work with other agencies in order to gain access to vital resources and expertise. The overall view was that the Tearfund is not a large enough organisation to act in isolation and that consequently, it has to rely on other agencies for resources such as transport and storage space. However, the bureaucracy involved in such a strategy can lead to significant delays in getting aid to those who need it most. Tearfund also relies on other organisations for strategic information on the disaster area itself, but in keeping with the observations made by Heaslip (2011) and Lynch (2010) there was agreement and noticeable frustration at the slow and at times inaccurate information flow:

"In Haiti we really struggled for information at the beginning as there was no central point…..we were also regarded by some as a small organisation so we had to search out information when it would have been better to have been given it" (BM1)

This statement highlights another area of concern for the Group in the way that NGOs, in their experience are ranked within disaster relief areas (HOL). The Group felt that those larger organisations in the field lacked an understanding of what others had to contribute, and that an increase in knowledge would help the overall effort.

Turning to the UN Cluster Concept, participant opinion echoed with that of Jensen (2112), in that whilst clusters were fine in principle, in practice they were ineffective and slowed things down in the field. Whilst there was clear acknowledgement of, and support for the academic concept of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) the overall opinion agreed with Jensen (2101) in that they can prove to be cumbersome and difficult to manage, leading to significant delays in relief provision. This is due in no small part to the fact that clusters and their leaders are not held accountable and in most cases are not empowered to make decisions and to sanction actions. The view was that the link between the clusters and OCHA is not clear and that some cluster leaders keep referring back to the UN to make decisions, whilst others carry out their own ideas without any consultation. The idea of performance management (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) and cluster accountability was well received and there was agreement that some clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and management will help to address the inherent confusion amongst participant organisations. There was also a strong consensus that in keeping with the academic view, in order to be effective clusters should include both "upstream suppliers and downstream customers" (Patti, p.266); consequently the inclusion of local governments and organisations is paramount to any successful strategy. Moreover, the involvement of local communities and authorities in the cluster concept would serve to enhance its overall success and to prevent a sense of distrust amongst recipient communities.

"Local communities are at the heart of all Tearfund activity and this works for us……why should the cluster approach be any different…..leaving them out makes them suspicious and unsure…include local authorities and communities and they can begin to take responsibility for their own well-being and recovery at an early stage in the relief effort" (AC)

7.8.2   Understanding and Training

There was clear agreement with the view that training and professionalisation is a vital aspect of humanitarian provision (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005); however, the Group and HOL in particular were pragmatic in respect of the financial restrictions that are associated with the provision of specific training within the Tearfund. The overall consensus was that given its size and budget, the Tearfund is restricted in respect of training funding. The organisation's aim is to turn as much of its donations into aid as possible, hence, the organisation could not really justify committing funding to professional training for its staff. As a consequence, the overall approach to training within Tearfund is one that takes advantage of employing staff from other organisations with appropriate knowledge, a process referred to as "Individual Grafting" by Song *et al* (2003) or one that encompasses a strategy of experiential learning within the organisation itself (Huber, 1991).

> *"Tearfund recruit predominantly volunteers who are driven to them by Christian belief, if these volunteers can offer additional and relevant skills then so much the better but we are happy for them to learn through experience and from others within the organisation"* (HOL)

The size of the Tearfund was also raised as an issue in respect of joint training and exercises as whilst it was acknowledged that this is a good idea in theory (Goffnet *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011), there was a fear that such a strategy might detract from ongoing relief provision and effort. Indeed, the question was raised as to how organisations, and in particular those smaller ones such as the Tearfund can spare staff to take part in joint training exercises as the vast majority of their volunteers are constantly engaged in aid provision across the world.

The Group were keen to discuss Tearfund's approach to local training and the successes that they have had. The following vignettes serve to illustrate the Tearfund strategy in respect of local engagement and training:

> *"After the initial response to the Haiti earthquake, Tearfund started to help the local communities to deal with the flooding and landslides that affect them every year after the huge storms which pass over the country. We identified that the residents of the very difficult to access communities had to be equipped with the training and understanding to reduce the risks and hard ship using their own resources.'* (ILM)

Also based in Haiti, AC spoke of a school building project:

> *"Through our local partner in Haiti, the Union of Baptist Churches, we opened a school to train builders of the future. Part of the training was also to prepare local communities for future earthquakes or disasters".*

7.8.3 Relationships

In keeping with the view that customer/supplier relationships should be based on partnership and that successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and trust where there is a constant search for win-win solutions (Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Sadler, 2007; Christopher, 2011), Tearfund's fund raising and aid delivery strategies rely on successful relationships and effective use of partnered working. The Group discussed Tearfund's membership of organisations such as the DEC and HAP (see earlier discussion in this Chapter), together with its affiliation to the Micah Network, "a global Christian community of organisations and individuals, often operating in isolation, drawn together to significantly enhance their capacity and impact as well as develop their ability to act collectively in key areas of concern" (Micah Network, 2013). The Focus Group agreed that memberships such as these were vital in helping Tearfund and other similar sized or smaller humanitarian relief organisations to have a more significant say in proceedings and disaster relief operations in general; thereby, suggesting that there is an inherent power imbalance (Hingley, 2005a) within humanitarian relief zones, but also acknowledging the Tearfund's position within it. By way of illustration, DPD felt that:

> *"We know that will never be in a position of power, but we don't want to be……our aim is to improve the quality of our partnerships to the benefit of those in need".* (DPD)

Referring to the work on Hastily Formed Networks (Kumar and Havey, 2013; Tatham and Kovács, 2010) the consensus was that a significant challenge is to establish working relationships at an early stage of any relief project; in keeping with Tatham and Kovács development of Chung's work on swift trust (2010) the aim is to try and build relationships through trust and common Christian belief. Tearfund's Open Door strategy of tailored relationships (Tearfund, 2011) was discussed as an example of the organisation's creation of such relationships:

> *"We [Tearfund] encourage local churches to join with us to establish a project within an area of community. These projects stretch far and wide with a number of UK churches establishing links across nations"* (DPD)

This approach has seen significant funds raised by UK based churches and dioceses in support of long term projects in South America, Africa and Asia (Tearfund, 2011) and the belief amongst participants is that they offer a great illustration of what can be achieved by working together in close partnership. Although the projects discussed by the Focus Group are longer term the consensus was that they serve to illustrate what likeminded Christian people and organisations can achieve by working together. The Group also believed that their strategy of working with local organisations within disaster relief areas was another key to the organisation's overall success.

> *"We [Tearfund] give financial grants to partner churches to fund specific projects and also encourage our partners to develop their own capacity within individual communities".* (AC)

There were also further discussions around the organisation's training initiatives with local partners on the development of disaster management and risk reduction schemes.

7.8.4 Military Involvement

There was clear acknowledgement that the military has a role to play in the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Thompson; 2010) and also agreement that the overall military contribution to the relief effort was growing; however, whilst the Group did agree that the military might possess the will and the expertise to make a larger contribution, some participants clearly found it difficult to align military involvement in disaster relief with the maintenance of the humanitarian (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008), and Christian principles. AC was quick to reaffirm the views that he had offered during Stage II of the research:

> *"The military have a clear role, to maintain security and to protect the aid workers when required…….they [the military] should not try to involve themselves in aid provision itself as this type of involvement confuses the local communities who may well live in fear of a military uniform"*

There was acknowledgement that the UN blue beret might help to address some of these fears, but also agreement with the worry that a military uniform will always be a sign of conflict and suffering to some. In keeping with the views offered by Heslip (2011) and

Williamson (2011) the belief was that the military would always struggle to address differing roles within a humanitarian relief zone, or indeed to change roles part way through a disaster relief operation. In essence, the Group support clear guidelines and UN control of military resources and felt that there would never be a situation where the military should be given a controlling influence over the disaster relief effort. In sum, the UN and OCHA are given a controlling role and they should maintain it in close liaison with local governments and authorities.

The data gathered demonstrates agreement with the thoughts of Doh and Teegan (2003) in that the Tearfund regards itself as a political lobbyist which tries to influence governments and organisations to help the needy and vulnerable around the world:

> *"We don't just respond to disasters but look to actively influence authorities and governments in support of those who do not have a voice……we do this through our membership of organisations and groups which have similar hopes and desires"* (HOL)

There was agreement with the view that politics does have a role to play in the relief effort itself and that some organisations are influenced by political agendas (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and Gregorian, 2007). The overall consensus was that political influence was inevitable as a lot of donors are large multi-national organisations who want to be seen to be making a contribution by their shareholders. However, the Group did feel that this is why Tearfund and similar organisations do prove attractive to some donors, as they believe that their strategy based around common belief was appealing to what they termed as "the average Christian man in the street".

7.9   Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues

As the last of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research findings, this chapter has drawn upon data gathered from participants within the Tearfund. Having firstly established the key *etic* issues and themes through analysis of questionnaire responses, *emic* issues were developed and then investigated through a series of semi-structured interviews with Tearfund participants. Finally, additional analysis and application of relevant literature within the field informed the areas of discussion within a participant focus group. Hence, in keeping with the final research strategy through triangulation of data gathered and findings from questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and also looked to identify how these barriers might be addressed to improve collaboration in the future. Following the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the findings

and trends discussed within this section will be used during a final cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions and academic contribution. The section will now be broken down into the key *emic* themes and issues identified within the Tearfund arrived at through application of Stages I and II of the final research strategy and confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.

7.9.1 Management and Control

All participant organisations have a part to play in the relief effort and a more coordinated approach will benefit the overall delivery of aid. However, OCHA has an impossible task as the growing number of donor agencies involved within the overall humanitarian relief effort (Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006) means that the coordination role is too big for one organisation. Competing agendas and open rivalry at times between international relief organisations, means that little coordinated activity actually takes place; as a result on occasion, the Tearfund preferred to work alone and to concentrate on establishing close links with the local community. When the Tearfund does work with other agencies it is as a result of a need to gain access to vital resources such as transport and storage space, this strategy relies on sound relationship management along the supply chain (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). However, the bureaucracy involved in such a strategy can lead to significant delays in getting aid to those who needed it most. The Tearfund also looks to other humanitarian organisations for strategic information on the disaster area itself, but in keeping with the observations made by Heaslip (2011) and Lynch (2010) there was agreement and noticeable frustration at the slow and at times inaccurate flow of such information.

NGOs are effectively ranked within disaster relief areas, and larger organisations in the sector lack an understanding of what others have to contribute; an increase in knowledge in this area will significantly help the overall effort. Concurring with Jensen (2012), clusters are fine in principle, but in practice are ineffective and slow things down in the field. The concept of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) has support but did prove to be cumbersome in practice as cluster leaders are not held accountable and are not empowered to make decisions or to sanction actions. Competing priorities within relief zones mean that the cluster approach clouds the issues at hand and does little to allow donors to have a clear understanding of what the immediate needs are. The link between clusters and OCHA is not clear and many cluster leaders appear to have no delegated authority; consequently, some leaders refer back to the UN to make decisions whilst others carry out their own ideas without any consultation. Some form of performance management (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) strategy which makes cluster leaders accountable is required, as are clearer

guidelines on cluster implementation and management. The Tearfund participants agreed that little has changed since the introduction of clusters and that in order to be effective, clusters should include both "upstream suppliers and downstream customers" (Patti, p.266); hence, the inclusion of local governments and organisations at an early stage is considered as paramount to any successful strategy. The involvement of local communities and authorities is at the heart of the Tearfund's activity and a similar approach within clusters will serve to enhance overall success and help to prevent a sense of distrust amongst recipient communities. There is a common perception that there are cultural barriers to effective collaboration and the greatest limitation of the UN Cluster Approach is the failure by cluster lead agencies at a global level to adequately prioritise and resource cluster leadership and coordination responsibilities. These failings are due to inherent rivalries within an inter-agency culture; as reflected in the associated academic discourse (Heaslip, 2011; Lynch, 2010; Senge, 2010; Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006; Reindorp and Wiles, 2001).

7.9.2   Understanding and Training

Training is a vital aspect of humanitarian provision (Tatham and Altay, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima in 2005); however the size of the Tearfund's budget means that the justification of funding for training programmes is difficult. The organisation's stated aim is to turn as much of its donations into aid as possible, hence it struggles to commit funding to professionalise its staff. Consequently, the overall approach to training is one of *Individual Grafting* (Song *et al*, 2003) with staff being employed who already have appropriate training and knowledge or one that encompasses experiential learning within the organisation itself (Huber, 1991).

The size of the Tearfund is also a factor in respect of participation in joint training and exercises and whilst the concept is acknowledged as a good one in theory (Goffnet *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011), there is a fear that such a strategy may detract from ongoing relief provision. Smaller organisations cannot spare staff to take part in training exercises as the vast majority of their volunteers are constantly engaged in aid provision across the world. The Tearfund's approach to local training and the resulting successes with residents being equipped with the training and understanding to reduce the risks and hardship of future disasters, was highlighted as an example of the merits of local engagement in any training initiatives.

7.9.3   Relationships

Christopher (2011) supports the need for a flexible and agile humanitarian relief supply chain and there was support for this idea and a call for disaster relief agencies to increase their capacity to respond speedily with skilled coordinators. There is agreement with the argument that customer/supplier relationships should be based on partnerships and that successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and trust (Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Sadler, 2007; Christopher, 2011). Fund raising and aid delivery strategies within the Tearfund rely on successful relationship management (Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007; Christopher *et al*, 1991) and on the effective use of partnered working. The Tearfund's membership of organisations such as the DEC and HAP (see earlier discussion in this Chapter), together with its affiliation to the Micah Network (2013), are vital in helping it and other similar sized or smaller humanitarian relief organisations to have a more significant say in disaster relief operations.

There is support for academic arguments (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003) on the impact of political influence within the sector, in that the Tearfund regards itself as a political lobbyist that tries to influence governments and organisations. The Tearfund does not just respond to disasters, but seeks to influence authorities and governments through its membership of organisations and groups which have similar hopes and desires and who aim to act as a single voice for the needy and vulnerable around the world. From Tearfund's perspective, politics and political agendas do not have a role to play in the relief effort in the field; however, some participants agreed that some organisations' contribution to the relief effort is influenced by political agendas (Williamson, 2011; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Yaziji and Doh, 2009). The view was that this is inevitable as a significant number of donations come from large multi-national organisations who want to be seen to be making a telling contribution by their shareholders. However, the hope is that the Tearfund and similar organisations will prove attractive to some donors, as their funding strategies are based around common beliefs which will hopefully appeal to what Tearfund participants regard as the "average Christian man in the street". In sum, aid must be provided on the basis of need and the Tearfund's role is to make best use of donations by identifying those who are in greatest need, irrespective of political pressures.

The inherent power imbalance (Hingley, 2005a) within humanitarian relief zones is accepted, and the Tearfund is content with its position within it. It is acknowledged that the organisation has neither the expertise nor the desire to be placed in a position of power, relying instead on its ability to improve the quality of its partnerships to the benefit of those

in need. A significant challenge is to establish working relationships at the early stages of any relief project (Kumar and Havey, 2013; Tatham and Kovács, 2010) and these relationships should be developed through trust and common Christian belief. Tearfund's Open Door strategy of tailored relationships (Tearfund, 2011), which encourages UK churches and churches within disaster relief zones to establish joint projects within local communities, was offered as an example of the success that the creation of such relationships with likeminded Christian groups can bring. The Tearfund is also a member of numerous committees and groups within the sector such as the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) and the Inter-Agency Procurement Group, (IPAG, 2013) but certain other smaller NGOs elect to not join such organisations as there is a perception that they will not be treated on an equal basis.

Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that information flow is a critical component to a successful supply chain strategy and Tearfund participants agreed that a more accurate analysis of the situation on the ground is required. In keeping with Heaslip (2011), a general lack of reliable information sharing and communication mechanisms is a main contributor to an overall lack of knowledge and awareness, and is a key contributor to the resultant slow dispersal of aid.

7.9.4   Military Involvement

The military has a role to play in the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Thompson; 2010) and the overall military contribution to the relief effort is growing (Tatham, 2011); however, whilst the military might possess the will and the expertise to make a larger contribution, some Tearfund participants found it difficult to align military involvement in disaster relief with the maintenance of the humanitarian (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008), and Christian principles; principles which are clearly a significant factor in Tearfund's overall strategy, Quality Standards and overall Statement of Faith (Tearfund, 2013, 2013a).

The Tearfund view is that the military should maintain security and protect aid workers when required, and should not be involve itself in aid provision, as this may confuse local communities who might already be living in fear of military uniforms. The belief is that whilst the UN blue berry might help to address some of these fears, a military uniform will always be a sign of conflict and suffering to some. Following the views of Heaslip (2011) and Williamson (2011) the consensus is that the military will always struggle to maintain 2 roles, or indeed to change roles part way through a disaster relief operation; consequently, clear guidelines should always be issued clarifying the military contribution and foreign military

assistance should only be provided at the request of the affected government, with the UN maintaining control of international military resources at all times. Sensitivity over sovereignty will almost always rule out an international military role unless it is as part of the UN, and civil-military coordination should be strictly between governments and their military's (UN OCHA, 2013a). There should never be a scenario where the military are given a controlling influence over the disaster relief effort. The UN are given a controlling role and they should maintain it in close liaison with local governments and authorities.

Echoing the academic discourse on the benefits of applying business sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006) NGOs and aid agencies in general should operate on a business model in isolation from the military and in direct competition with each other. International military forces are useful in providing support to the supply, delivery and distribution of aid; however, a well-coordinated humanitarian response must look beyond the issue of distribution of relief and to the re-establishment of systems and livelihoods; thereby helping the affected population to recover as quickly as possible. The overall belief was that the military are not equipped nor really interested in dealing with this type of longer term approach.

CHAPTER 8

THESIS CONCLUSIONS AND OVERALL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

"Most scholars are not going to generate a new theory from scratch. Instead, they work on improving that which already exists"

(Whetten, 1989, p.492)

8.1   Introduction

The ultimate aim of any study such as this is to spell out the final significant contribution to knowledge (Phillips and Pugh, 2005; Rugg and Petre, 2004). Consequently, the overall aim of this thesis was to make a theoretical contribution to academic perspectives and a functional contribution to existing practical business and humanitarian supply chain practice. The study was designed to fill the identified gap (established within Chapter 2) in the knowledge surrounding the effective planning and coordination of the provision of emergency logistics and in doing so answer the following research question:

When considering the Immediate Response to Natural Disasters what are the key drivers within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain that will help to improve future collaborative working?

Thus far the thesis has, in keeping with the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) considered each of the research domains in isolation (Chapters 4 through 7). Hence, if the final findings and overall academic contribution are to be established this Chapter must discuss the results of a cross-domain analysis and use as its basis the 4 significant *emic* themes and issues that emerged during the individual domain analyses. These were:

1. Management and Control
2. Understanding and Training
3. Relationships
4. Military Involvement

Each *emic* theme will be discussed separately, with the latter part of the Chapter drawing out the significance of the overall cross-domain analysis and with it the final findings and overall contribution to knowledge.

There is increasing support for the view that the traditional concept of a predictable and stable commercial supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm and that, as a consequence supply chain managers employed within the business sector are increasingly forced to adopt the more event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian relief counterparts (Kovács, 2012; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011). Hence, the implications of this research and the associated findings will be considered within the context of the business supply chain. Furthermore, in common with all research this study suffers from a number of limitations. Whilst these limitations do not detract from the overall significance of the findings, it would be remiss to not comment on them at some stage in the final reporting process. Similarly, whilst the final Research Strategy proved, on the whole to be successful, it was not without its difficulties and challenges; hence, by way of lessons learned some comment is included on the implications for methodology. Finally, the findings of this research reveal a number of opportunities for further research that would both enhance the contributions identified here and generate new contributions to the body of knowledge. Hence, in closing the Chapter a number of suggestions for further research are offered.

8.2   Cross - Domain Analysis and Final Research Findings

8.2.1   Management and Control

8.2.1.1   Collaboration and the Humanitarian Supply Chain

Many academic commentators (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Kalafatis, 2000; Dyer *et al*, 1998 to name but a few), advocate a partnered approach to the management of the supply chain. Cross-domain analysis of the data gathered during this research provides empirical evidence that this approach is not just the preserve of the business sector and that the merits of the value chain concept are also fully appreciated and supported by logistics practitioners engaged in the provision of humanitarian relief. Indeed, as will be discussed and developed later in this Chapter, the data demonstrate that the humanitarian sector is analogous to the business sector, in that humanitarian relief organisations are in effect businesses that are driven by the need to demonstrate and establish competitive advantage within a humanitarian *market* that is driven by market forces within the sector. The data also offer support to the view that SCM techniques are becoming more prevalent within the humanitarian sector and that theoretical views offered on the drive to encompass cross-functional and inter-agency approaches (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006) should be extended to include the humanitarian sector. Moreover, participant experiences also contributed to the traditional

theoretical position that planning and coordination would always make the supply chain more effective and efficient by helping to reduce overall waste (Slack *et al,* 2010).

A recurring theme within the empirical investigation is a call for agility and flexibility within humanitarian supply chains, corroborating that within the literature (Christopher, 2011); however, the data gathered during this research from both participant NGOs is not consistent with theory as it demonstrates that the supply chain is ineffective in reality and in particular when faced with a demand for an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). The critical bottleneck in the humanitarian supply chain is not the availability of supplies but that of money and people. There is agreement with the broader concept of a highly flexible and adaptable supply chain (Christopher, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011) but administrative procedures used to distribute funds to relief organisations are slowing the relief effort down and are, therefore regarded as unsuited to the sector's requirements. The data gathered add empirical support to the view that resolution of the inherent issues surrounding supply chain responsiveness and resilience (Christopher, 2011) would significantly reduce the length of the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Furthermore, there is also support for the assertion that the right level of coordination and management within the humanitarian supply chain will make it possible to introduce a combined approach across all phases of the relief effort (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005).

In essence, efforts to facilitate effective collaboration within the supply chain are hampered by overall complexity. The view amongst Tearfund participants adds empirical support to the view identified within the literature review on the inherent competition within the sector (The Lancet, 2010; Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Fenton 2003), as participants believe that competing agendas and open rivalry at times between international relief organisations, means that little coordinated activity actually takes place; indeed when smaller agencies turn to larger organisations for strategic assistance the response is frustratingly slow. Further analysis of Tearfund data reflects the view that NGOs are effectively ranked within disaster relief areas, meaning that they are classified by order of size; moreover, the view expressed by all Tearfund participants is that larger organisations working in the sector lack an understanding of what other, smaller organisations have to contribute. Finally, the research moves the academic discussion forward as analysis of the data gathered suggests that a perception exists amongst some that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor organisations. No significant study within the field seems to refer to these issues surrounding organisational perception and positioning hence a theoretical finding of this study is:

> **Finding 1: Smaller NGOs who are operating within the humanitarian relief supply chain believe that they are ranked according to size and that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor organisations.**

The data gathered reveal that participants from all four research domains agree with the academic stance on the positive nature of, and clear requirement for, collaboration and coordination within the humanitarian supply chain (Dash *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011 and 2010; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Rickard, 2003); moreover, the data reflect that the efforts of the UN agencies involved in the provision of humanitarian aid do help to save lives and that OCHA should take the lead in coordinating the overall relief effort. However, the data also add to the literary discussion on the inherent lack of success within the business sector in respect of supply chain collaboration (Senge, 2010; Kampstra *et al*, 2006). Furthermore, the data gathered serve to extend existing theory into a field where it is yet to be applied, as it confirms that the same issues are prevalent within the humanitarian sector, in that collaboration cannot be achieved amongst organisations who do not wish to do so. This study offers empirical evidence that to achieve the panacea of collaboration, the greatest challenge for the humanitarian supply chain is to facilitate and manage the effective coordination of the overall collaborative effort. The concerns raised by participants link back to discussions within the literature review regarding the challenges that OCHA face in light of the growing number of actors within humanitarian relief zones (Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007; Yamada *et al*, 2006), and also to the ever increasing number of humanitarian disasters that are occurring worldwide. Participant opinion is that whilst the response system is growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that required to cope with the complexity of the impending demand for multiple responses. Specifically, this research moves the academic trajectory forward from its current position, as data gathered demonstrate that participants are not only concerned with the increasing scale and number of crises, but also with the fact that such events are likely to occur simultaneously. Furthermore, the fact that current emergencies are made worse by long term problems such as extreme poverty, population growth and climate change will also have to be a consideration in the on-going debate. Hence a practical finding of this study is:

> **Finding 2: The demands placed on the humanitarian supply chain during the immediate response phase, the threat of simultaneously occurring disasters and the effect of longer term environmental problems mean that effective collaborative working is not achieved.**

8.2.1.2 The UN Cluster Concept

In presenting his economic cluster theory, Porter (1998) suggests that being part of a cluster will allow organisations to "operate more productively whilst coordinating with related companies" (p.81). Patti (2006) extends the concept into the supply chain context, as he contends that clusters should "include upstream suppliers and downstream customers and may often extend horizontally to include the makers of similar and complementary products" (p.266). Martin and Sunley (2003, p.5) question the success of a clustered approach and debate the influential nature of such an approach and the fact that "its overall seductiveness has resulted in a rush to apply the concept in some business arenas, in advance of theoretical and empirical assessments of the strategy" (p.35). This thesis contributes to the theoretical discussion on clusters by moving its trajectory on from the traditional business arena into that of the humanitarian sector. Specifically, the study concerns itself with the UN Cluster Concept and with gathering empirical data in respect of the logistics cluster in particular.

The data add to the discussion within the literature review in confirming that the use of clusters in general, and the UN Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) in particular, was considered by all participants to be a good idea in theory and that, as such the Concept should have a role to play in the future provision of humanitarian relief. However, a recurring finding that emerged during this research, was a clear concern amongst participants surrounding the practical implementation and the leadership and management of clusters. Indeed, the data extends Asheim *et al's* (2009) theoretical criticism of Porter's (1998) original work from the business into the humanitarian sector whilst adding empirical evidence in support of their contention that the cluster concept has been "oversold" (p.23). The data also reflects an inherent mismatch between the theoretical concept of clusters and practical reality; thereby, serving to demonstrate that Simmie's (2009) observation that many industrial regions and areas of the business sector cannot be fully analysed and driven using a clustered approach, is a theoretical position that is equally applicable to the humanitarian sector. Moreover, this research concurs with Jensen's (2012) argument that whilst the use of clusters in the humanitarian sector is fine in principle, in practice they are ineffective and cumbersome as they slow things down in the field. Adding to Jensen's stance, and extending his theoretical debate, questions were raised during this study regarding the overall effectiveness and aims of the UN Cluster Concept, as participants felt

that the concept served to 'stove pipe' the relief effort and effectively acted as a hindrance in some cases. The perception amongst study participants was that there were cultural barriers to effective collaboration and that the greatest limitation of the Cluster Approach was the failure by cluster lead agencies at a global level to adequately prioritise and resource cluster leadership and coordination responsibilities.

The data gathered here offer empirical support to the discussion on the negative impact that inherent organisational rivalries can have within an inter-agency culture (Heaslip, 2011; Lynch, 2010; Senge, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006; Reindorp and Wiles, 2001). In addition, the data also demonstrate support for academic debate on the requirement for inter-cluster coordination (Stoddard *et al*, 2007; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006) and there was a call amongst study participants for the introduction of mechanisms to provide comprehensive recommendations and directions on how to better assess and analyse future humanitarian disasters. The view amongst JFLogC participants is that the UN Cluster Concept gives those involved an excuse to work in isolation from other humanitarian organisations; furthermore analysis of the data gathered from the participant NGOs suggests a conflict with the theoretical views on the importance of cluster involvement and engagement (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), as participants believe that clusters and cluster leaders are notoriously bad at communicating with local actors and local governmental organisations. In practice, cluster leaders are not held accountable for their actions and are not empowered to make decisions or to sanction actions. Consequently, the data reflect the view that what is really needed is a more rigid system that can judge agencies on their performance (Heaslip, 2011) and add to the theoretical debate by suggesting that such a system should have the authority and legitimacy to exclude those that have a history of letting the overall effort down. Competing priorities within relief zones mean that the cluster approach clouds the issues at hand and does not allow donors to have a clear understanding of what the immediate needs are. The link between clusters and OCHA is not clear and many cluster leaders appear to have no delegated authority; consequently, some leaders refer back to the UN to make decisions whilst others carry out their own ideas without any consultation. Thus in light of these concerns, a theoretical finding of this study is to move the academic trajectory on to consider the introduction of some form of performance management strategy and to extend the use of Kaplan and Norton's (1996) theory on the Balanced Score Card Performance to encompass the humanitarian sector, thereby making cluster leaders accountable for their actions and decisions. Additionally, the findings also give empirical support to the need for a practical discussion on the development of clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and management.

> **Finding 3: Ineffective cluster leadership and unclear cluster implementation guidelines within the humanitarian supply chain have a negative effect on collaborative working.**

8.2.2   Understanding and Training

8.2.2.1   Understanding

The data offer empirical support to the concepts of relationship management and understanding within supply chain partnerships (Christopher, 2011; Monczka *et al*, 2010; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006).   The issues surrounding relationship management will be considered in the next section of this thesis, but the data gathered demonstrates the clear similarities between the humanitarian and business sectors. The data gathered effectively extend the theoretical debate on mutual understanding away from the traditional business context, and into that of the humanitarian relief sector; where understanding amongst partners is considered to be of equal importance if successful collaborations are to be achieved.   Specific examples that arise serve to supplement ongoing discussion on the lack of understanding and appreciation amongst some relief workers, particularly in respect of the roles and contribution of other organisations within the sector (Tatham and Altay, 2013, Goffnet *et al*, 2013; Heaslip, 2011).   JFLogC participants concede that they do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster relief, nor do they have an understanding of the specific logistics skill sets possessed by NGOs and other donor organisations; however, in keeping with Heaslip (2011) they also suggest that the reverse is true in that other humanitarian organisations do not seem to understand what the military can offer to the overall relief effort. The data gathered from the participant NGOs reflects a similar perception with an evident lack of understanding of military logistical capabilities and skills. Moreover, the Tearfund participant view is that the military role is to maintain security and protect aid workers when required, and should not involve aid provision itself as this may cause confusion within local communities.   Hence, this research suggests that there is a requirement for an extension of the current theoretical debate on how practical understanding, particularly between the military and humanitarian relief NGOs can be improved.

> **Finding 4: The lack of understanding amongst humanitarian relief practitioners and military contributors of the logistical capabilities of other organisations operating within the supply chain has a negative impact on collaborative working.**

8.2.2.2   Humanitarian Logistics Training and Professionalisation

A recurring theme that emerges within this research is that of training and the requirement for a professionalisation strategy within the humanitarian logistics field.   The empirical evidence gathered reflects the debate that is already evident within the literature and the associated regular calls for appropriate training and skills development programmes within the sector (Allen *et al*, 2013; Bolsche *et al*, 2013; Tatham and Altay, 2013; Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005).   The data gathered here offers agreement that there is a clear requirement for experienced and professional humanitarian logisticians, and an acknowledgement that such skills are not easy to find.   However, the data also suggest a new trajectory to the theoretical debate as they demonstrate concerns amongst the NGO participants that their relatively high turnover of staff may be problematic in respect of educational development, and that despite the increasing number of disasters worldwide and the corresponding rise in overall logistics costs (Guhu-Sapir, *et al,* 2011), the current financial climate and budgetary constraints make financial investment in training difficult for humanitarian organisations to justify.   In contrast to these concerns, the data also serve to corroborate the argument that opportunities to professionalise within the sector could act as a retention tool (Lu *et al,* 2013).   This study does offer empirical support to the concepts and discussions on the approaches to training and recruitment that are currently being adopted within the humanitarian sector.   Specifically, the data gathered from the participant NGOs confirms that both Oxfam International and Tearfund favour an individual grafting (Song *et al,* 2003) approach to staff recruitment, as they seek to employ those with previous knowledge of the sector, or those who possess specific skill sets gained within the business sector (for example supply chain managers).

The data also support the view that humanitarian relief workers have some significant lessons to learn from their private sector counterparts in a number of areas including risk management and logistics and that consequently, there is a need to create relationships with logisticians in the private sector which are aimed at bridging the educational and capability gaps that exist within the overall response (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011).   The data also show that OCHA is attempting to answer calls for more educational cross-fertilisation between military, UN and NGO humanitarian contributors (Heaslip, 2011, p.164) by providing a variety of training courses which are designed to establish partnerships with a wide variety of global humanitarian relief organisations (OCHA, 2013b), thereby also promoting collaborative working.   Moreover, referring back to the last section of this thesis and to finding 4 of this study, the data confirm that the content of these courses aims to develop the knowledge necessary between humanitarian and

military actors within the field, and to facilitate communication and successful coordination and interaction. However, the data also demonstrate that attendance on these courses is difficult for some NGOs and very low from the smaller humanitarian organisations in particular. Indeed, Tearfund participants suggest that the courses are not attractive or readily accessible to their staff in particular, and to smaller humanitarian organisations in general; in effect, smaller organisations within the sector cannot spare staff to take part in training and educational programmes as their policy's and donors dictate that the vast majority of their volunteers are constantly engaged in aid provision activities across the world. Hence, given that there is no significant study in this area, a finding of this research is to suggest that the theoretical trajectory should be extended to consider the whole issue of OCHA training courses and in particular to consider ways to make such courses more readily accessible and attractive to a larger number of humanitarian organisations.

> **Finding 5: Current OCHA humanitarian relief training programmes are designed to promote collaborative working, however the courses are not readily accessible or attractive to a large proportion of organisations within the sector.**

8.2.2.3   Local Engagement and Joint Training

Linking back to the discussions within Chapter 2 on the importance of local engagement within the supply chain (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) and on the advantages of an integrated approach to learning within the sector (Goffnet *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011), the data gathered corroborates the theoretical call for the inclusion of local organisations and governments within training strategies, and confirms the assertion that such initiatives help to facilitate the development of working partnerships with local communities. Moreover, the data illustrate that the inclusion of local representation and all agencies involved will help to develop and facilitate successful exit strategies following the final reconstruction phase. Reflecting the academic discussion on the practical relevance and advantages of an integrated approach to learning within the humanitarian sector (Goffnet *et al,* 2013; Heaslip, 2011), JFLogC participants believe that a joint approach to training, similar to that adopted by the military would be of great benefit to the future success of the overall relief effort. Furthermore, JFLogC participants are keen to be given the opportunity to utilise their military expertise in quick reaction, expeditionary logistics to assist with the development of such courses or training programmes, although there is a pragmatic acceptance amongst military participants that this may not be politically acceptable in reality. Hence, a finding of this study is to offer empirical evidence to support the extension of the current theoretical and practical discussions to consider the implementation of a concept of training within the

sector where integrated exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of collaborative working.

Finding 6: Joint training initiatives which include all participant organisations would improve collaborative working within the humanitarian relief supply chain.

8.2.3 Relationships

8.2.3.1 Competition within the Humanitarian Supply Chain and Defining Value

It has been suggested that the practice of partnership sourcing is now widespread and that the benefits of such an approach can include improved quality, innovation sharing, reduced costs and integrated scheduling of production and delivery (Christopher, 2011). At the route of this argument are the concepts of Relationship Marketing (RM) and Partnering; however, Handfield and Nichols (1999) offer the view that relationship management is the most fragile and tenuous component in any successful supply chain. Whilst offering support to this assertion, the data gathered during this research reveal that the relationships that exist between actors within the humanitarian supply chain will change depending on the type of emergency, and on the initial roles and responsibilities that are agreed and established with and for contributors to the overall relief effort. Despite the added complexity associated with the humanitarian supply chain, this research adds empirical support to the findings of the literature review and confirms the need for mutual trust and openness within successful partnerships in general, and within the humanitarian supply chain in particular (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010; Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Patti, 2006).

Furthermore, the data demonstrate agreement amongst participants that coordination within humanitarian relief zones has improved significantly since the formation of OCHA and that inter-organisational cooperation is a good idea in theory; however, in practice such a strategy leads to bureaucratic systems that slow down the overall response. Hence, there is an ongoing requirement for improvement in this area and for the establishment of stronger relationships between all actors within the humanitarian supply chain. In direct contrast with these aspirations, the data also offer empirical support to the view that humanitarian organisations run the risk of entering into competition with other organisations within the sector, as in order to be successful NGOs often find themselves competing for resources, ground and other assets (Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007). In short,

triangulation of the data gathered from participant NGOs demonstrates the existence of business opportunism within the humanitarian sector. Whilst revealing this mismatch with the view that market competition does not really influence organisations within the humanitarian supply chain (Dash *et al*, 2013; Mays *et al*, 2102) the data also provide empirical evidence that this competition between donor organisations has a negative effect on the overall relief effort. Furthermore, the data show a propensity amongst donor organisations to try and be noticed through involvement in the higher profile elements of the disaster relief process such as those that may appear on the worldwide media. There is also a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act alone and to demonstrate overall presence on the ground, findings which concur with the observations offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) on NGO's actions in light of funding pressures and a fear of donor withdrawal. Hence, the data corroborate the contention that humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by the market and the associated market forces, and that the desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency to donors is inherent within the supply chain to the detriment of quantifiable end results (The Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000).

Adding to the earlier discussion on the broader concept of a value chain approach to supply chain management (Porter, 1990), and to the assertions offered on the negative impact that the use of different language and terminology can have on overall perception and trust (Heaslip, 2011), a recurring theme that emerged during this research was the lack of a common understanding and definition of the term *value* amongst participants within the humanitarian sector and the detrimental impact that this has on the final efficient and effective delivery of aid. Lindgreen *et al* (2012) argue that academics and practitioners alike agree that they have only just begun to understand what value means within a business context (p.207); hence, this research suggests that this theoretical debate should be taken into a new sector as it demonstrates that this same lack of understanding exists within the humanitarian sector. Indeed, the data gathered demonstrates a conflict within the sector in respect of what *humanitarian value* actually is. In support of Porter's (1990) concept of value, Lindgreen *et al* (2012) suggest that in order to action what they term *value delivery*, managers need to leverage their resources by executing decisions that mobilise, coordinate, and deploy them in efficient and effective ways (p.212); the contention being that this form of leveraging is essential to provide an offering that satisfies end customer need. Value should be specified from the end-customer perspective (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011), however, this research demonstrates that what constitutes value to the end customer within the humanitarian supply chain contrasts with that of contributing organisations. Whilst the end customer (the victim of the disaster) regards the provision of the means to survive post the onset of a disaster as the *value* of the supply chain,

contributing NGOs must factor in their own sustainability and seek to address inherent market forces and donor pressure as they seek to agree their definition of *value*, whilst military contributors seek to demonstrate *value* in terms of political and governmental expectation.

Given the foregoing discussion, a finding of this study is to move the theoretical debate on to a new academic trajectory highlighting the negative impact that competition is having on efforts to establish collaborative working within humanitarian supply chains. Furthermore, given the lack of a significant study in this area, the debate must also be linked to the need for agreement on a common definition and understanding of what constitutes *value* by all organisations operating within the humanitarian sector.

> **Finding 7:   Market competition between donor organisations within the humanitarian sector and the lack of common agreement of what constitutes *value* has a negative impact on collaborative working and on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian supply chain.**

8.2.3.2   Hastily Formed Networks and Local Engagement

Whilst corroborating the argument that customer/supplier relationships should be based on partnerships, this research also concurs that successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and trust (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006). A recurring theme within the data gathered here links back to the earlier discussion within the literature review and acknowledges the challenges associated with the formation of what Kumar and Havey (2013) term Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the onset of an immediate response operation (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Furthermore, the data gathered reveal the increasing contribution from the business sector to the humanitarian relief supply chain and an associated growth in the number of partnerships between the business and humanitarian sectors as a whole. However, the data also demonstrate that this is not reflected by a corresponding growth in a spirit of community within the sector, thereby giving empirical support not only to the issues surrounding the theoretical concept of a HFN (Kumar and Havey, 2013) but also agreeing with the academic views on the lack of trust and propensity for transactional relationships within modern day supply chains in general (Senge, 2010), and within humanitarian relief supply chains in particular (Heaslip, 2011). This research gives empirical evidence to support the view that inter-organisational relationships within the humanitarian sector are organised and agreed against project timelines and that this results in a culture of working within siloes, leading to unnecessary

duplication of effort and to a lack of collaborative working and trust within the supply chain itself. In essence, support is offered for the view that the humanitarian sector is predominantly governed by transactional relationships, based on authority and bureaucratic structure rather than by transformational partnerships, with an emphasis on a joint vision and a feeling of loyalty and trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385; Heaslip, 2011).

This research offers evidence to support the contention that one of the main characteristics of the final HFNs that are formed within humanitarian relief operations is that they will inevitably involve participants from different communities, organisations and cultures (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010). However, despite adding to the overall complexity of the resultant HFNs, early engagement with local authorities is considered to be a key to the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian relief supply chain; thereby extending Vincent and Bagshaw's (2005) existing theoretical position on the importance of early local engagement within business sector supply chains and associated HFNs into the humanitarian sector itself. Moreover, the data gathered on the challenges faced by humanitarian organisations as they attempt to build relationships with local authorities, also offer empirical evidence to support assertions that similar challenges are faced by supply chain managers working within business sector organisations (Iglesias *et al*, 2011; Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007). However, this research also demonstrates that whilst this concept and approach is considered to be fine in principle, relationship management with local authorities within the humanitarian sector can be problematic in practice, particularly in countries where there is conflict, instability and insecurity. Participants in this research believe that it is OCHA's role to facilitate such initiatives and that OCHA should also aim to return control to local government at the earliest opportunity. The clear view is that such strategies help communities to take ownership of the recovery and also assist aid relief agencies in the development of exit strategies at an earlier stage; but the data also acknowledge that in reality identification of appropriate local authorities is not always an easy task. Moreover, a lack of a clearly identified local authority means that it becomes difficult to monitor and control the movements of donor funding and to maintain humanitarian quality standards. The data gathered from Oxfam International in particular demonstrate that as a result of these problems the organisation favour a strategy which relies on the establishment and utilisation of long standing relationships with local partners, which helps to ensure that aid is delivered to the most vulnerable; a strategy that is acknowledged to perhaps better suit the preparation and reconstruction phases rather than the immediate response phase of the relief effort. Hence, a finding of this study is to move the theoretical debate forward from its current position on the formation of HFNs within the humanitarian relief supply chain, to one that discusses what measures can be taken to

identify appropriate local authorities at an early stage in the disaster relief response and considers how these authorities can then be included as the HFNs develop.

> **Finding 8: The Hastily Formed Networks which develop during the immediate response phase to a disaster must include identified local authorities.**

8.2.3.3   Power Imbalance and the Gatekeepers

As discussed in Chapter 2, power as a construct in business to business relationships has received irregular and contrasting treatment from analysts (Hingley, 2005a, p.848). Contrasting views surround the idea that on the one hand power can have a negative effect on the workings of a successful supply chain, in that it negates co-operation and is not helpful in building relationships (Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997); however, there are some commentators (Kalafatis, 2000; Earp *et al,* 1999; Blois, 1998; Campbell, 1997) who support the view that power can have a positive influence and that diversity within relationships is a good thing. The data gathered here demonstrate that all participants are happy to act in a subordinate role and readily accept the inherent power imbalances (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 2005b) within the overall humanitarian supply chain structure. Data from the JFLogC reveal that military policy documents (MOD, 2008 and 2003) are written to reflect the coordinating responsibilities that the UN and its associated offices have to play in humanitarian relief areas, and concur with the concept that the UN is to act as the *power broker* (Burt, 2005) within such areas. Although not previously applied, extending existing theory into the humanitarian sector helps to explain the inherent power structure as JFLogC is aware of what Thompson (2010) describes as the "sensitivities" (p.2) surrounding their presence within humanitarian relief zones and of the "clashes" that these can generate (Heaslip, 2010); consequently, JFLogC is content to carry out all tasks given to it under the coordination of the UN which they regard as the *gatekeeper* within the humanitarian supply chain (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley *et al*, 2010).   However, a recurring theme within the data gathered is that despite the acknowledged role that the UN and OCHA has, there is still an inherent lack of clear control and coordination within the humanitarian supply chain; findings that offer empirical evidence that is clearly inconsistent with the theoretical view that control and coordination have improved in recent humanitarian relief operations (Altay and Labonte, 2011). Indeed, the data gathered from the participant NGOs and the JFLogC during this research reveal that it is difficult at times to identify who has overall responsibility for elements of the relief effort on the ground. Moreover, this research suggests that although OCHA claim to be, and are

recognised as the coordinating organisation (OCHA, 2012a), the command structures that the organisation implement do not have the desired practical effect. Hence, a finding of this research is that through the application of existing theory the power structure within the humanitarian supply chain can be explained, with OCHA being afforded *power broker* (Burt, 2005) and *gatekeeper* status (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley *et al*, 2010); however, challenging theoretical and practical debates should now take place to address why this structure is not resulting in a coordinated humanitarian response.

Finding 9: UN OCHA are not effectively coordinating the humanitarian supply chain in the field.

8.2.4   Military Involvement

8.2.4.1   The Escalating MOD Contribution to Humanitarian Relief

The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (MOD, 1998) signalled a greater emphasis on, and an acknowledgement of the provision of 'Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations' (p22), whilst the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011) highlighted the fact that the UK Government is keen that the military look to demonstrate more high profile involvement in humanitarian relief. The data gathered during this research, and in particular analysis of the findings from participants within the JFLogC, adds empirical evidence to support these governmental aspirations and also serve to expand the earlier discussions within this thesis on the escalating MOD Contribution to the overall disaster relief effort.

The data support the view that the increasing number of disasters worldwide are resulting in a correspondingly larger number of humanitarian relief operations where military forces are working alongside civilian relief organisations (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011). The inevitability of military involvement within disaster relief provision is accepted and research participants agree with the theoretical assertion that such involvement offers a means of maintaining supply chain resilience, particularly in disasters where there is a clear risk to the well-being of humanitarian actors (Christopher, 2011). However, the data also contribute to the discussion by demonstrating that there should never be a scenario where the military is given a controlling influence over the disaster relief effort. The UN has a controlling role and should maintain it through close liaison with local governments and authorities.

Analysis of the data gathered from the NGO participants offers empirical support to theoretical discussion on the benefits of applying business sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006), and to the overall view that whenever possible NGOs and aid agencies in general should aim to operate on a business model which is in isolation from the military, but on one that is also in direct competition with each other. International military forces are useful in providing support to the supply, delivery and distribution of aid; however, triangulation of the data gathered demonstrates that a well-coordinated humanitarian response must look beyond the issue of distribution of relief and to the re-establishment of systems and livelihoods, thereby helping the affected population to recover as quickly as possible. In essence, the overall assertion amongst NGO participants is that the military is not equipped, nor really interested in dealing with this type of longer term approach. In a similar vein this research also confirms that OCHA is trying to establish a more predictable approach to the involvement of military resources within humanitarian relief zones, by taking measures to encourage the use of such resources not just in the immediate response phase of the disaster, but also in the build-up and recovery phases. Such results extend the findings of the literature review and clearly link to Kovács and Spens' (2008, 2007) calls for an increase in the military finding within the preparation and reconstruction phases. Hence, the foregoing discussion leads to a practical finding of this study:

> **Finding 10: Military organisations must seek to expand their contribution within the humanitarian supply chain from the immediate response phase to encompass the longer term phases of disaster relief.**

A recurring theme within this research echoes existing theoretical discussion on military involvement in the humanitarian supply chain, in that any escalation in military involvement could prove to be difficult, given that most NGOs are reluctant to work alongside the military (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011; Beauregard, 1998). Whilst the data gathered from the NGO participants are consistent with the view that there is a role for the military in the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Thompson; 2010, Beauregard, 1998); this research also demonstrates a belief amongst NGO participants that the military contribution has to be under the right circumstances; specific examples offered are situations where there may be a need to boost capacity through the utilisation of military resources such as trucks, aircraft and manpower. The empirical investigation adds support to the discussion within the literature review on the inherent difficulty amongst some participants within the humanitarian supply chain to align military involvement in disaster relief with the maintenance of the humanitarian principles (Heaslip, 2011; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008). The data also highlight concern regarding the perception

that military involvement has within local communities; furthermore, analysis of data gathered from Tearfund participants supports the view that the role for the military should be to maintain security and to protect aid workers when required. In short, donor governments should not involve their military forces' in aid provision itself, as this may lead to confusion amongst local communities who might already be living in fear of military uniforms. Moreover, the findings are also consistent with OCHA policy, as triangulation of the data gathered from non-military participants demonstrates agreement that sensitivity over sovereignty will almost always rule out an international military role, unless it is as part of the UN and civil-military coordination between governments and their military's (UN OCHA, 2013a). Effectively the findings demonstrate linkage to the theoretical concepts already discussed within Chapter 2, in that neutrality and impartiality do not sit well with military intervention within the humanitarian supply chain. Indeed, in order to ensure an appropriate response under the humanitarian principles all organisations involved, including those from the military should ensure that any aid delivered has as its primary aim the reduction of poverty or suffering. Moreover, NGOs and aid organisations have to ensure that their activities and donations do not directly or indirectly provide resources to be used to assist military conflict and consequently, should refuse any donations which are conditional on cooperation with military forces. Finally, all agencies involved in the relief effort have to ensure that the aid that is provided does not contribute in any way to any contravention of international human rights and the overall humanitarian principles.

The data gathered from the NGO participants corroborated the theoretical views offered by Williamson (2011), in that the military idea of using humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds is a flawed one, and one that does not constitute or assist humanitarian relief work; in essence, aid is most effectively delivered by civilian humanitarian organisations under the leadership of the UN. Analysis of the JFLogC data adds additional support to this discussion as the organisation's strategy is to avoid a military response whenever possible, and to refrain from the use of visible and restrictive contributions such as armed escorts or centralised safe working areas. The data support the concept of the overall UN security management strategy, which aims to establish a secure working environment for humanitarian relief organisations through successful collaborative initiatives with foreign military contributors (UN OCHA, 2013a). Moreover, this study provides empirical evidence that regional stability and with it security, are enhanced and not undermined by the provision of impartial needs-based humanitarian aid. However, whilst there is a potential for military involvement within the humanitarian supply chain, there is also a danger that such involvement can destabilise situations which may lead to potentially dangerous consequences that may ultimately affect and limit the ability of civilian aid agencies to efficiently and effectively deliver aid. As a result, donor organisations tend to resist adopting

collaborative working strategies with military contributors within the humanitarian supply chain. Given this discussion, this study demonstrates consistency with the existing theoretical position on the influence on the humanitarian principles (Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009; Spearin, 2001; Slim, 2000). However, as highlighted earlier in this Chapter the UK Government is still keen that its' military look to demonstrate more high profile involvement in humanitarian relief, hence from a practical viewpoint the following finding is highlighted:

Finding 11: Preservation of the humanitarian principles has a negative impact on the adoption of collaborative working strategies between humanitarian relief organisations and military contributors within the humanitarian supply chain.

8.2.4.3 Two Hats - The Political Dimension

This research moves the trajectory of the theoretical debate into the political arena, as the data gathered offers empirical support to the view that military intervention is regarded by some international governments as a means of demonstrating a rapid and visible response immediately following the onset of a natural humanitarian disaster. Moreover, this empirical research also corroborates the discussion within the literature review in that some governments regard military involvement as a means of achieving longer term political influence (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000). A recurring theme of the research is that any military forces involved in the relief effort should adhere to the UN agreed civil-military guidelines, and that the associated military rules of engagement should prohibit the use of humanitarian assistance for the fulfilment of military or governmental objectives. However, the data gathered here demonstrate that incorporating humanitarian relief within the larger political context is an impossible task in reality as military and political objectives contradict and collide. In addition, this conflict of interests is leading to confusion, not only between humanitarian donor organisations working within the supply chain, but also amongst the final recipients of the aid itself. Analysis of the data supports the view that a military uniform will always be viewed by some as a symbol of an organisation that operates in contravention of the humanitarian principles, and that attempts to reduce the impact of a uniform, such as the adoption of the UN blue beret are on the whole ineffective; ultimately, a military uniform will always be a symbol of conflict and suffering to some. In short, as discussed in the previous section of this thesis, warfare will always conflict with the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008).

As a result of these circumstances, there are occasions when the military attempt to wear 2 *hats*, one driven by the pressure to achieve political aims and the other to support the humanitarian relief effort itself. The data gathered demonstrates that the challenge for the military is to clarify which *hat* they are wearing at the outset of the relief effort and, as importantly to avoid confusion by consistently adopting the single role associated with the chosen *hat* throughout the relief operation. The recurring theme in this research is that whilst military organisations involved in the humanitarian supply chain will always struggle to wear 2 *hats*, there is also a propensity to try and change *hats* part way through a disaster relief operation as military contributors attempt to move from a political to a humanitarian stance. Ironically, this process may actually involve a physical change of hat from the standard military one to the UN blue beret but, as discussed earlier this proves to have little impact on this issue in reality. Moreover, analysis of data gathered within the JFLogC reveals that the current UK military chain of command will never sanction humanitarian supply chain management as an individual profession per se, thereby dismissing the idea of creating separate organisations within the military to deal with the humanitarian and political elements of the overall contribution. However, the impact of this repositioning by military contributors will not only destabilise the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian supply chain, but also deter any efforts to work collaboratively on the part of the humanitarian NGOs.

Consequently, in light of this analysis and given that no significant study has considered these issues, a finding of this study is to offer empirical evidence that a theoretical debate should be initiated that takes the current discussions forward to consider how clear guidelines can be issued clarifying the military contribution at the outset of a disaster relief operation. In effect theory should be established which offers advice on methods to make it clear to all involved which *hat* the military organisation is to wear within that particular relief operation. Moreover, the academic trajectory should also consider the role that national governments have to play in ensuring that their military force's contributions are consistent throughout a humanitarian operation, and that the underpinning direction of the military contribution does not change part way through the relief effort.

> **Finding 12: Changing the underpinning stance of the military contribution from a political to a humanitarian one has a destabilising effect on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian supply chain.**

8.3 Summary of Development of the Final Research Findings

By way of summary, Table 8.1 illustrates the development of the final findings from the initial *etic* themes through identified *emic* themes and discussion of the cross-domain analysis within this research. The table also serves to highlight the separate findings which will help to formulate the overall contribution to the body of knowledge, together with overall influences on the practical management of the humanitarian supply chain.

	etic issue	*emic* issue	Discussion	Final Finding	Theory	Practice
1	Collaboration and Coordination	Management and Control	Smaller NGOs operating within the humanitarian supply chain believe that they are effectively ranked by order of size; moreover, the larger organisations working in the sector lack an understanding of what other, smaller organisations have to contribute. A perception also exists amongst some that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor organisations. No significant study within the field seems to refer to these issues surrounding organisational perception and positioning.	Smaller NGOs who are operating within the humanitarian supply chain believe that they are ranked according to size and that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor organisations.	√	
2			The humanitarian supply chain faces increasing challenges in light of the growing number of actors within it and also the ever increasing number of humanitarian disasters that are occurring worldwide and at the same time. Whilst the response system is growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that required to cope with the complexity of the impending demand for multiple responses. Consequently, participants within the supply chain are not only concerned with the increasing scale and number of crises but also with the fact that such events are occurring simultaneously.	The demands placed on the humanitarian supply chain during the immediate response phase, the threat of simultaneously occurring disasters and the effect of longer term environmental problems mean that effective collaborative working is not achieved.		√
3	Organisation and Power		Competing priorities within relief zones mean that the cluster approach clouds the issues at hand and does not allow donors to have a clear understanding of what the immediate needs are. The link between clusters and OCHA is not clear and many cluster leaders appear to have no delegated authority; some leaders refer back to the UN to make decisions whilst others carry out their own ideas without any consultation. Some form of performance management strategy which makes cluster leaders accountable for their actions and decisions should be implemented. There is also a requirement for clearer guidelines on cluster management.	Ineffective cluster leadership and unclear cluster implementation guidelines within the humanitarian supply chain have a negative effect on collaborative working.	√	√

	etic issue	*emic* issue	Discussion	Final Finding	Theory	Practice
4			JFLogC participants concede that they do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster relief, nor do they have an understanding of the specific logistics skill sets possessed by NGOs and other donor organisations. They also suggest that other humanitarian organisations do not understand what the military can offer to the overall relief effort. Hence, there is a requirement for a debate on how practical understanding, particularly between the military and humanitarian relief NGOs can be improved.	The lack of understanding amongst humanitarian relief practitioners and military contributors of the logistical capabilities of other organisations operating within the supply chain has a negative impact on collaborative working.	√	√
5	Training and Professionalisation (2.9)	Understanding and Training	OCHA provide a variety of training courses which are designed to establish partnerships between global humanitarian relief organisations and to promote collaborative working. Courses also aim to develop the knowledge necessary between humanitarian and military actors to facilitate successful coordination. However, attendance on courses is difficult for some NGOs and very low from the smaller humanitarian organisations. The academic trajectory should move forward to consider ways to make current training courses more readily accessible and attractive to a larger number of humanitarian organisations.	Current OCHA humanitarian relief training programmes are designed to promote collaborative working, however the courses are not readily accessible or attractive to a large proportion of organisations within the sector.	√	
6			A joint approach to training would be of great benefit to the future success of the overall relief effort. The academic debate should move forward to consider a concept of training within the sector where integrated exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of collaborative working.	Joint training initiatives which include all participant organisations would improve collaborative working within the humanitarian supply chain.	√	√

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	etic issue	*emic* issue	Discussion	Final Finding	Theory	Practice
7	Organisational Sustainment, Power and Relationships	Relationships	Humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by the market and the associated forces. The desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness to donors is inherent within the humanitarian supply chain to the detriment of quantifiable results. There is conflict within the sector in respect of what *humanitarian value* actually is. What constitutes value to the end customer within the humanitarian supply chain contrasts with that of contributing organisations. The end customer (the victim of the disaster) views the provision of the means to survive post the onset of a disaster as the value; but contributing NGOs must factor in their own sustainability and seek to address inherent market forces and donor pressure as they define value, whilst military contributors demonstrate value in terms of political and governmental expectation. The academic trajectory should move forward to discuss ways to highlight the negative impact that competition is having on collaborative working. The debate must also be linked to the need for a common definition and understanding of what constitutes value within the humanitarian sector.	Market competition between donor organisations within the humanitarian sector and the lack of common agreement of what constitutes *value* has a negative impact on collaborative working and on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian supply chain.	√	
8			Strategies which help local communities to take ownership of the recovery assist aid agencies in the development of early exit strategies. Identification of appropriate local authorities is not easy. A lack of a clearly identified local authority means that it becomes difficult to monitor and control the movement of donor funding and to maintain standards. The academic debate should move forward to discuss measures to identify appropriate authorities at an early stage in the response and how these authorities can be included in HFNs.	The Hastily Formed Networks which develop during the immediate response phase to a disaster must include identified local authorities.	√	
9			OCHA has *power broker* (Burt, 2005) and *gatekeeper* status (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley *et al*, 2010) within the humanitarian supply chain, but the command and control structures which it implements are ineffective. The academic debate should move on to address why OCHA is failing to effectively coordinate the humanitarian supply chain.	UN OCHA are not effectively coordinating the humanitarian supply chain in the field.	√	√

	etic issue	*emic* issue	Discussion	Final Finding	Theory	Practice
10			NGOs believe that the military are not interested in dealing with the longer term relief effort. OCHA are trying to establish more predictable approaches to the involvement of military resources within humanitarian supply chains by encouraging the use of military resources during all response phases.	Military organisations must seek to expand their contribution within the humanitarian supply chain from the immediate response phase to encompass the longer term phases of disaster relief.		√
11	Humanitarian Space and Political Influence	Military Involvement	Regional stability and security are enhanced by the provision of impartial, needs-based humanitarian aid. There is a potential for military involvement within the humanitarian supply chain, but such involvement can destabilise situations leading to potentially dangerous consequences, affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the relief effort. Consequently, donor organisations tend to resist collaborative working strategies with military contributors within the humanitarian supply chain.	Preservation of the humanitarian principles has a negative impact on the adoption of collaborative working strategies between humanitarian relief organisations and military contributors within the humanitarian supply chain.		√
12			Military contributors attempt to move from a political to a humanitarian stance as the humanitarian response develops. This not only destabilises the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian supply chain, but also deters collaborative working. The academic debate should move forward to discuss how guidelines can be issued clarifying the military contribution at the outset of a disaster response. The discussion should also consider the role that national governments have to play in ensuring that military contributions are consistent throughout the operation and that the underpinning direction of the military contribution does not change part way through the relief effort.	Changing the underpinning stance of the military contribution from a political to a humanitarian one has a destabilising effect on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian supply chain.	√	

Table 8.1   Summary of the Development of the Final Research Findings

8.4   The Final Contribution to the Body of Knowledge

As discussed earlier in this thesis the field of humanitarian SCM has developed as a research area, and consequently researchers are now beginning to lay the foundations for a core body of knowledge. However, numerous academic commentators (Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Mangan *et al*, 2012; Overstreet *et al*, 2011; Kovács and Spens, 2011, 2008 and 2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2006; Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005; Murray, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; Rickard, 2003) suggest that the research field of humanitarian SCM is relatively new and is still in its infancy.   Moreover, Larson (2011) highlights the importance of further research into the role that intra- and inter-organisational relationships have to play in the "greater coordination" (p29) of the supply chain itself. Similarly, Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that humanitarian supply chain collaboration should be a key research area (p8), and go on to contend that humanitarian SCM requires more research with empirical data being gathered through the use of case studies or other qualitative methodologies. Indeed, a poll of Editorial Advisory and Review Board members carried out to establish the scope of the first publication of the JHLSCM (Kovács and Spens, 2011) led to specific criticism of the reliance on the use of quantitative methodologies and Kunz and Reiner (2012) offer the view that "empirical methodologies such as cross-organisational case studies should be used more in order to increase knowledge in the field" (p.133). This research serves to address these calls for more qualitative, case study based research within the field as appropriate and topical rich empirical data has been gathered that, as discussed in this chapter and illustrated in Table 8.1 contributes to the body of knowledge in a variety of ways. Consequently, this section of the thesis will draw together the previous discussion within this chapter and set out the associated contribution to knowledge that develops from consideration of the final findings. By way of summary, a final generic conceptual model is offered (Fig 8.1), which illustrates the key drivers that emerged as a result of this research, which will help to improve future collaborative working within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain (the grey box). The power broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley *et al*, 2010) has a central role in the achievement of the panacea of overall collaboration and hence, is depicted at the centre of the model. External influences on the humanitarian supply chain are shown in green, whilst the internal drivers are those which appear in blue.

The Humanitarian Supply Chain

Long Term Environmental Issues

Humanitarian Principles

Simultaneous Disasters

Participant Perception

Effective Cluster Management

Management and Control

Joint Training Initiatives

Defining *Value*

Appreciating Capability

Understanding and Training

Power Broker

Collaboration

Relationships

Market Competition

Involvement in Training Courses

Gate Keeper

Hastily Formed Networks

Military Role

Expanding Contribution

Political vs Humanitarian

Fig 8.1 The External and Internal Influences on collaboration within the Humanitarian Supply Chain

As discussed in Chapter 2, power as a construct in business to business relationships and the inherent power imbalances that exist have received irregular and contrasting treatment from analysts (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 2005b, Hingley, 2005a, p.848). On the one hand power is regarded as having a negative effect on the workings of a successful supply chain (Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997); however, some commentators favour the opposite view and argue that power can have a positive influence and that diversity within relationships is a good thing (Kalafatis, 2000; Earp et al, 1999; Blois, 1998; Campbell, 1997). The theory discussed here restricts itself to the business sector; however, the findings of this research demonstrate that by applying the same theoretical concepts to the humanitarian sector, analysis of the associated results evince that UN and OCHA are afforded power broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010) status within the humanitarian supply chain. However, a recurring theme within the data gathered is that despite this acknowledgment, there is a lack of clear supply chain control and coordination. Moreover, the data gathered from the participant NGOs and the JFLogC during this research reveal that it is difficult to identify at times who has overall responsibility for elements of the humanitarian effort on the ground. In short, the findings of this study suggest that although UN OCHA claim to be, and are recognised as the coordinating organisation (OCHA, 2012a), the command structures that the organisation implement do not have the desired practical effect. Hence, an element of the final contribution of this thesis is that through the application of existing theory the power structure within the humanitarian supply chain can be explained, however, a theoretical debate should now take place to address why this structure is not resulting in a coordinated overall humanitarian response. Most importantly the discussion should address who should be given the role of power broker and gatekeeper for the humanitarian supply chain.

In order to develop an overall view of the final findings of this thesis and the subsequent overall contribution, four internal pillars have been identified during this research which have an equally significant bearing on overall collaboration within the humanitarian supply chain, namely, Management and Control; Understanding and Training; Relationships and Military Involvement. Fig 8.1 offers a conceptual illustration of these pillars, together with a depiction of the underlying drivers which influence them. By way of explanation each of these pillars will now be considered in turn.

8.5 Management and Control

8.5.1 Participant Perception

This study identifies a new debate on the perceived influence that the larger agencies within the sector have on those smaller contributing organisations. Moreover, the data gathered also gives empirical support to an additional notion amongst smaller NGOs within the field, that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor organisations. Hence, as no significant study within the field refers to these issues surrounding organisational perception and positioning, a significant element of the final contribution is the identification of participant perception as an underpinning factor in the overall management and control of the humanitarian supply chain.

8.5.2 Effective Cluster Management

As highlighted within Chapter 2, substantial research already exists on the UN Cluster Concept (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; ActionAid, 2007; Stoddard et al 2007; Cosgrave et al, 2007; Street, 2007; Barratt, 2004), with more recent analysis suggesting that the Concept offers a step in the right direction towards a collaborative approach within the humanitarian supply chain (Altay and Labonte, 2011, Kovács, 2011). However, the data gathered during this study demonstrate clear inconsistency with this view, and show that the cluster concept should not be regarded as the silver bullet that it is argued to be in previous research. Earlier research into UN clusters (Jahre and Jensen, 2010; ActionAid, 2007; Stoddard et al 2007; Cosgrave et al, 2007; Street, 2007) notes confusion amongst humanitarian field workers, in respect of the role of each cluster and the associated cluster leads and the findings of this study identify that this is still the case as cluster management is identified as ineffective. Current criticisms of the cluster concept (Asheim *et al*, 2009; Simmie, 2009) are based on analysis of the business sector; hence, part of the final contribution of this research is to extend such commentary into the humanitarian sector, with the empirical evidence gathered here demonstrating that the concept has been equally "oversold" (Simmie, 2009, p.23). Furthermore, the findings of this research also show that cluster leaders are not held accountable for their actions and are not empowered to make decisions or to sanction actions. Consequently, this study serves to support the view that what is really needed within the humanitarian supply chain is a more rigid system that can judge agencies on their performance (Heaslip, 2011), but also adds to the current debate by suggesting that such a system should have the authority and

legitimacy to exclude those that have a history of letting the overall humanitarian effort down. Hence, an additional element of the overall contribution is the call for the introduction of a performance management strategy and to suggest that an extension of Kaplan and Norton's (1996) Balanced Score Card Performance approach will serve to make cluster leaders accountable for their actions and decisions within the humanitarian supply chain.

8.6   Understanding and Training

8.6.1   Joint Training Initiatives

Analysis of data gathered evince support to calls for a joint approach to training within the humanitarian sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011). Moreover, analysis of the data also reflect discussion within Chapter 2 on the significance of local engagement within the supply chain (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), and triangulation of the findings corroborate theoretical calls for the inclusion of local organisations and governments within training strategies. Hence, part of the final contribution is to add to the current academic trajectory, by providing empirical evidence to support the extension of current thinking considering the implementation of integrated training strategies within the sector, which encompass all members of the humanitarian supply chain.

8.6.2   Appreciating Capability

This research offers specific examples that supplement ongoing discussion on the lack of understanding and appreciation amongst humanitarian workers in respect of the roles and contribution of all organisations within the sector (Tatham and Altay, 2013, Goffnet *et al*, 2013; Heaslip, 2011). Hence, the final contribution also calls for an extension of the current theoretical debate on how practical understanding, and in particular that between military and humanitarian organisations operating within the humanitarian supply chain can be improved.

8.6.3   Involvement in Training Courses

The data gathered during this research evince that a variety of training courses are available which are designed to provide opportunities to establish partnerships and collaborative working amongst all humanitarian relief organisations (OCHA, 2013b). However, the data also demonstrate that attendance on these courses is difficult for some NGOs and very low

from the smaller humanitarian organisations in particular. Hence, given the absence of a significant study in this area, an addition to the final contribution of this research is to highlight the requirement for the development of a theoretical trajectory which considers attendance on, and involvement in training courses, and has as its focus consideration of strategies which will make such courses more readily accessible and attractive to a larger number of the smaller humanitarian organisations.

8.7   Relationships

8.7.1   Defining *Value*

Adding to the discussion on the negative impact that the use of different language and terminology can have on overall perception and trust (Heaslip, 2011), a recurring theme that emerged during this research was the lack of a common understanding and definition of the term *value* amongst participants within the humanitarian sector. Lindgreen *et al* (2012) argue that academics and practitioners have only just begun to understand what *value* means within a business context (p.207); hence, as research in this area is currently restricted to the business sector, an element of the final contribution is to highlight the need to take this theoretical debate into the humanitarian sector. However, the data gathered here demonstrates that any such research will not be without its challenges as in this context, the end customer (the victim of the disaster) regards the provision of humanitarian aid and with it the means to survive, as the *value* of the chain; whilst contributing NGOs must factor in their own sustainability and address inherent market forces and donor pressure as they seek their definition of *value*, whilst military contributors are expected to demonstrate *value* in terms of political and governmental expectation.

8.7.2   Market Competition

The data gathered offers empirical support to the view that humanitarian organisations run the risk of entering into direct competition with other organisations within the sector, as in order to be successful NGOs often find themselves competing for resources, ground and other assets (Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007). In essence, the data demonstrate the existence of business opportunism within the humanitarian sector. Whilst revealing this mismatch with the view that market competition does not really influence organisations within the humanitarian supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2102) the data also provide empirical evidence that this competition between donor organisations has

a negative effect on the overall relief effort. There is also a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act alone and to demonstrate overall presence on the ground, findings which concur with the observations offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) on NGO's actions in light of funding pressures and a fear of donor withdrawal. Hence, the data corroborate the contention that humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by the market and the associated market forces, and that the desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency to donors is inherent within the supply chain to the detriment of quantifiable end results (The Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000). Given these findings, a significant element of the final contribution is acknowledgement of the impact of market competition within the humanitarian supply chain.

8.7.3   Hastily Formed Networks

Theoretical discussion and research on the importance of early local engagement has thus far restricted itself to consideration of business sector supply chains (Vincent and Bagshaw, 2005), hence the final contribution of this study serves to provide empirical evidence that early engagement with local authorities is also regarded as key to the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian supply chain. Local authorities should be included as the HFNs that are an inevitable consequence of the immediate response phase are formed. However, the findings of this research also show that the management of relationships with such authority within the humanitarian sector can be somewhat problematic, particularly in countries where there is conflict, instability and insecurity. The data gathered supports the proposition that whilst such strategies can help local communities to take ownership of the recovery, and will also assist humanitarian agencies in the development of early exit strategies, the identification of appropriate local authorities is not always an easy task. Moreover, the lack of clearly identified authorities mean that it becomes difficult to monitor and control the movement of donor funding and to maintain humanitarian quality standards.   This discussion leads to the assertion that the theoretical debate and research agenda should move towards a trajectory that seeks to identify what measures can be taken to identify appropriate local authorities at an early stage in the humanitarian response, and also consider how these authorities can be included as HFNs develop.

8.8 Military Role

8.8.1 Political vs Humanitarian

The empirical data gathered during this research corroborates the discussion within Chapter 2 as it confirms that some governments regard military involvement in the humanitarian supply chain as a means of achieving longer term political influence (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000). However, the findings of this study also demonstrate that incorporating humanitarian relief within the larger political context is an impossible task in reality as military and political objectives contradict and collide. Hence, a contribution of this thesis is the proposition that there are occasions when the military attempt to wear 2 hats within the humanitarian supply chain, one driven by the pressure to achieve political aims and the other to support the humanitarian effort itself, this causes confusion for the local recipients of the aid, as well as for other organisations engaged in the overall humanitarian effort. Hence, the findings of this research show that military contributors should clarify which hat they are wearing at the outset of the relief effort and consistently adopt the single role associated with their chosen hat throughout the humanitarian operation. Consequently, given that no significant study has considered these conceptual issues in the past, a part of the final contribution is to call for a theoretical debate and associated research to be initiated that considers how guidelines can be issued which clarify the military contribution at the outset of a humanitarian operation, and also ensure that the associated role is consistently maintained throughout.

8.8.2 Expanding Contribution

The data gathered during this research, and in particular analysis of the findings from participants within the JFLogC, adds empirical evidence to support the reported desiore of the UK Government to escalate the existing MOD Contribution to the overall disaster relief effort, as set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (MOD, 1998) and more recently in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011). In a similar vein this research also confirms that OCHA is trying to establish a more predictable approach to the involvement of military resources within humanitarian relief zones by taking measures to encourage the use of such resources not just in the immediate response phase of the disaster, but also in the build-up and recovery phases. Hence a final element of the contribution is join Kovács and Spens' (2008, 2007) calls for an increase in the military contribution by calling for an

academic debate on the measures needed to expand the current military contribution to include both the preparation and reconstruction phases of the humanitarian effort.

8.9 Implications for Business Sector Supply Chain Management and General Theory

Whilst the previous sections of this Chapter have discussed the implications of the findings within the specialised context and domains investigated relating to the humanitarian supply chain, a constant consideration throughout this research has been the potential for generalisation of the findings to the wider body of knowledge and in particular to that associated within the management of business sector supply chains. Large scale disruptions with very short lead times are emerging as one of the most pressing issues for commercial supply chains, consequently business sector supply chain managers can learn from their humanitarian sector counterparts who are expected to respond to disasters with very short lead times (Decker *et al*, 2013, p238). Larson (2011) offers the view that humanitarian logisticians have much to learn from their business counterparts arguing that there has been limited knowledge transfer between business and humanitarian logistics practitioners and that, as a result aid agencies are many years behind business organisations in the adoption of modern supply chain practices (p15). However, there is also increasing support for the reciprocal view in that the traditional concept of a predictable and stable commercial supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm, and the findings of this research serve to offer empirical evidence that some aspects of commercial logistics and supply chain practice utilised in support of everyday business activity are markedly similar to those that are evident within the humanitarian supply chain (Kovács, 2012; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011). Commercial supply chain managers are increasingly faced with challenges that no longer obey the traditional rules of forecast driven certainty and are therefore, forced to adopt the more event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian relief counterparts. Consequently, the implications of some of the findings of this research and elements of the final contribution should be considered in the context of the business supply chain.

8.9.1 Barriers to Collaborative Working

The findings reveal that in keeping with their business sector counterparts, supply chain managers employed within the humanitarian sector appreciate the concept of the *value chain* (Porter, 1990) and understand that in applying this principle they should look beyond

what are the traditional boundaries associated with competition and to identify what in business terms will give them a competitive advantage. However, this research demonstrates that despite this acknowledgement, there are still barriers that exist to achieving the panacea of collaborative working. The findings add support to the opinions offered by Senge (2010) in relation to the business sector, in that a key factor in the construction of a successful collaborative supply chain must be the elimination of managerial inertia in favour of a managerial approach that seeks to develop joint initiatives, to ensure that each contributor has a stake in overall success by delivering value to the end customer. In effect whilst the supply chain managers can see the benefit of collaborative working, they are still averse to applying the concept in reality. Hence, the academic theoretical trajectory should take the empirical evidence gathered during this research and move the debate forward to address the reasons why this is the case, not just within the humanitarian sector but also within corresponding business supply chains.

8.9.2 Combating Supply Chain Complexity

Resilience, flexibly and agility are all called for if a modern day business sector supply chain is to be successful, and a common feature of the resulting chains is the growing complexity resulting from the corresponding rise in the number of contributors (Christopher, 2011; Slack *et al*, 2010; Greasley, 2009). The findings of this research confirm that all of these factors are a feature of the humanitarian supply chain and can therefore, inform business practice as the data gathered here serves to illustrate empirically the challenges associated with the management and control of such supply chains. Analysis of the data gathered confirms that if raising the number of contributors and the corresponding increasing supply chain complexity are to be successful, then a controlling authority that is empowered to coordinate overall activity and end customer delivery is essential. However, in order for this to happen in reality, a collaborative supply chain should seek to develop appropriate and common performance measures, integrated policies, information sharing, and incentive alignment. Discourse in respect of the business sector suggests clusters as a means of addressing these challenges as they provide a means to "…operate more productively whilst coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement" (Porter 1998, p.81). However, whilst the findings of this research support the demand for appropriate performance measurement, they suggest that the business sector should also be aware that for clusters to be effective there is a reliance on appropriately empowered and accountable cluster leaders and a demand for clear cluster implementation guidelines.

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8.9.3   Joint Training Initiatives

Analysis of the findings offers empirical support to the view that joint training initiatives and training programmes will promote understanding and appreciation amongst members of the humanitarian supply chain (Heaslip, 2011), thereby establishing a vehicle to promote collaborative working.   Given the earlier discussion on the growing similarities between business and humanitarian supply chains, the assertion in light of this research is that this proposal will apply equally to the business sector, and that supply chain managers in general should consider the adoption of joint training initiatives as they seek to work collaboratively with partners to benefit overall value.

8.9.4   Suppression of Market Forces

This research confirms that as in the business sector, market competition does have a role to play in the effectiveness and overall dynamics of the humanitarian supply chain. Analysis of the data demonstrates that external forces acting on the supply chain such as political motives and donor pressure, effectively create competition within the humanitarian *market* which has a negative impact on the willingness of participants to adopt collaborative working strategies. This empirical evidence should have a bearing on the business sector in helping to develop an academic trajectory that debates how market forces might be suppressed by supply chain managers, to benefit overall supply chain success and end customer value.

8.9.5   Defining Value in the Value Chain

Heaslip (2011) suggests that the use of different language and terminology within the humanitarian supply chain obscures understanding and leads to misperception and mistrust.   Moreover, Lindgreen *et al* (2012) argue that academics and practioners alike agree that they have only just begun to understand what *value* means within a business context (p.207) and Harrison and van Hoek (2011) contend that *value* should be specified from the end-customer perspective. However, a recurring theme that emerged during this research was the lack of a common understanding and definition of the term *value* amongst participants within the humanitarian supply chain.   Triangulation of the data gathered demonstrates that what constitutes *value* to the end-customer within the humanitarian supply chain contrasts with that of contributing organisations.   Porter's (1990) original conceptual argument was that a common understanding of *value* will result in an efficient and effective value chain; by way of confirmation of this view the findings of this research

reveal that a conflicting understanding of what constitutes *value* amongst contributors and end-customers has a negative overall impact on delivery to the end-customer and also on the success of the value chain itself. Hence, given the similarities between humanitarian and business sector value chains, the proposal is that the empirical evidence gathered during this research should be used to move the general academic trajectory forward to discuss the impact that a lack of a common language, and in particular clear agreement on what constitutes *value* can have on overall value chain effectiveness and efficiency.

8.9.6   Supply Chain Structures and Power

The data gathered adds to the findings of the literature review and to the discussion on the barriers and facilitators to the development of sustainable supply chains, and to the associated arguments for a clearer understanding of the potential benefits of a structured approach within the business context (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley *et al*, 2010). The empirical evidence gathered during this research highlights that participants within the humanitarian supply chain accept the power relationships that exist within the sector and are also content to acknowledge the role of lead organisations within the chain itself. Hence, these findings support the view that not all organisations are averse to playing a subordinate role within the supply chain structure. Moreover, given the similarities with the chains formed within the business sector, the proposition is that business sector supply chain managers, and indeed more general managers operating in a variety of contexts and domains and not simply those that are analogous with the context and domains of this study, should be content with the assertion that power is not necessarily a negative concept.

8.10   Limitations of the Study and Implications for Methodology

In common with all research, but perhaps even more so at this level of professional and academic development, this study suffers from a number of limitations. Whilst these limitations do not detract from the overall significance of the findings, it would be remiss to not comment on them at some stage in the final reporting process. Moreover, whilst the final Research Strategy proved, on the whole to be successful, it was not without its difficulties and challenges; hence, it would be wrong not to offer, by way of lessons learned some comment on the implications for methodology.

8.10.1 Research Boundaries

The focus of this research was to gain an in-depth and thorough understanding of existing practices within the humanitarian supply chain as perceived by the study participants. Academic discourse suggests that this type of research lends itself to exploratory qualitative techniques, including case studies and in-depth interviews, which have been shown to be an effective means of gathering a large amount of data rich information about a particular subject area while being closely involved with the subject participants (Silverman, 2010; 2011a; 2011b; Brabour, 2009). Moreover, the approach also served to answer the calls for an increase in the use of such empirical methodology within the field of humanitarian relief, and also those for good and applicable research within the field where data is gathered through the use of appropriate qualitative method (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011). Given this approach, appropriate boundary setting based on associated research boundary work (Gieryn 1983) was a key feature at the outset of this research as the decision was taken to limit the overall scope. This measure was taken as a means of addressing issues surrounding the generalisability of a purely qualitative approach and also to help maintain control over the volume of data gathered. Hence, the research took as its focus the response immediately following the onset of a humanitarian disaster. Whilst this may be viewed by some as a limitation, the analysis of the data gathered and the resultant contributions to knowledge demonstrate that this approach should be regarded as a strength of the study as it presented ample opportunities for significant theoretical and practical contribution. Moreover, the approach assisted with data control, thereby lending itself to the rich analysis required to fulfil the requirements of the final research question and should, therefore be considered as an appropriate methodology for similar research in the future.

8.10.2 Multiple *Domains*

As this thesis was concerned with identifying reasons why participant actors within the humanitarian supply chain were struggling to collaborate, it was felt that the associated field work was well suited to the use of multiple-case studies based on different actors within the supply chain itself. However, consideration of the definition of a classic *case* (Yin, 2009, Simons, 2009, Stake, 1995) and its suggestion that the selected organisations should be considered from all angles and all aspects, led to the conclusion that this research was not really concerned with *cases* per se; hence in order to locate the *cases* within the general context the decision was taken to use the term *domain* in preference to *case*. This may be

seen as a limitation by some, but the depth of the analysis and associated findings produced as a result of this approach supports the argument that it should be regarded as an overall strength of this thesis and one that could be adopted in future research which seeks rich analysis of organisations or areas which do not necessarily fit the classic definition of a *case*.

Similarly, consideration of the number of organisations involved within the humanitarian supply chain may call into question the selection of only 4 research domains. However, in keeping with any research project this one suffered from resourcing challenges particularly in relation to time and researcher availability, as well as those associated with the limited word count allowance for the final thesis. In short, a pragmatic decision had to be taken if the required field work and data analysis were to be completed and the word count restrictions adhered to. In defence of this limitation the 4 organisations all had a key role to play in the humanitarian supply chain and as a result were considered to represent the supply chain as a whole. Moreover, this study used multiple sources of "data source triangulation" (Yin, 2009, p.116) which were aimed at corroborating the same facts or phenomenon. Convergence of Evidence was achieved as data was gathered through the form of interviews and focus groups with deliberately diverse organisations within the humanitarian supply chain and with different types of participants at all strategic and operational levels. Furthermore, the use of multiple settings to gather data enhanced the generalisability of the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994) and checks were also made as to whether the findings were plausible to the subjects of the research through respondent validation feedback following each stage of the research. Whilst the use of a high number of domains would have been desirable, the rich data gathered, final findings and contribution all support the assertion that this approach was a justifiable and credible one.

8.10.3 Interviews, Focus Groups and Observation

While the main purpose of the interview is to gather in-depth information relating to the subject area, it is recommended (Flick, 2009; Yin, 2009, Denzin and Lincoln, 2008; Miles and Huberman, 1994) that the researcher seeks to utilise additional techniques in conjunction with this strategy to establish further data rich information in order to address issues surrounding corroboration and generalisability. Consequently, the decision was taken to utilise focus groups as an additional method which would allow for collective exploration of themes and issues (Liamputtong, 2011; Cameron and Price, 2009; Krueger and Casey, 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Moreover, following the advice offered by

Barbour (2009) observation was identified as a method that would not only serve to enhance the data gathered during the interview stage, but one that would also add to the overall richness and extent of the data recorded during the focus groups. However, an acknowledged limitation of this approach surrounds the use of Skype for some interviews and focus groups. As discussed in Chapter three, the choice of the UN OCHA as a domain was considered to be critical to the outcomes of this research, but the practical reality of interviewing participants during stage II and facilitating a focus group during stage III of the final research strategy presented specific problems given that the participants were all based in Geneva, Switzerland. A visit to Switzerland was out of the question, hence Skype was used to carry out interviews and focus groups. Whilst the system was adequate for the interview process, the use of observation as an additional data gathering method was severely limited. Moreover, facilitation of a focus group via Skype was virtually impossible under these circumstances, with the resulting session being akin to a conference call rather than a facilitated focus group. Hence, whilst analysis of the data gathered from UN OCHA participants made a telling contribution to the final findings of this research, future researchers would be advised to consider how to address issues surrounding face-to-face access to participants as they seek to develop similar methodologies and take decisions on final methods.

Finally, in acknowledging these limitations and explaining the background to them the contention is that they in no way detract from the significance of the final findings and contribution as discussed earlier within this chapter. Indeed the proposition is that when properly identified and developed in addition to informing future methodologies, the limitations serve two main purposes in respect of this particular thesis. Firstly, they highlight the overall breadth of theoretical development realistically achievable by the researcher and consequently, that expected by the reader; and secondly, they act as a provocation for further research which may take as its starting point resolution of the identified limitations.

8.11   Opportunities for Further Research

The findings of this study offer a number of opportunities for further research that would both embellish the contributions identified here and generate new contributions to the body of knowledge. However, one of the most seductive characteristics of research is that the options are virtually unbounded, hence discussion within this section will be restricted to those topics which are closely linked to the final findings, contribution and limitations that have already been discussed.

8.11.1 Further Generalisation and Triangulation

The limited number of domains under consideration during this research has already been discussed and acknowledged as a limitation. Hence, a repeat of this methodology across a wider section of the humanitarian relief community which encompasses more participant organisations, would serve as a test of the contended generalisability and triangulation of the final contribution and Research Proposition. Given the final issues surrounding the lack of face-to-face access to UN OCHA participants during this research, and the significant role that the organisation has to play in the coordination of the humanitarian supply chain, any such studies should try and encompass a visit to the UN OCHA offices in Geneva, Switzerland.

8.11.2 Organisational Perception and Positioning

Analysis of Tearfund data reflects the view that NGOs are effectively ranked within disaster relief areas, and are effectively classified by order of size. Moreover, the view expressed by all Tearfund participants is that larger organisations working in the sector lack an understanding of what other, smaller organisations have to contribute. Finally, the findings serve to move the academic discussion forward, as analysis of the data suggests that a perception exists amongst some that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international donor organisations. Hence, as no significant study within the field currently exists, additional research is required to gather more rich empirical data on the issues surrounding organisational perception and positioning within the humanitarian supply chain.

8.11.3 Cluster Performance Management and Leadership

The findings of this research offer empirical evidence that the link between the UN Clusters (UN OCHA, 2011) and OCHA is not clear and that many cluster leaders appear to have no delegated authority. Moreover, analysis of the data gathered suggests that some form of performance management strategy which makes cluster leaders accountable for their actions and decisions is required. Hence, additional research which is focussed on the effectiveness of the UN Cluster Concept as a whole is required which takes as its focus the effective management of the concept, and considers measures to make cluster leaders accountable for their actions.

8.11.4 Practical Understanding within the Humanitarian Supply Chain

The findings of this research offer empirical evidence in support of the discussion on the overall lack of understanding amongst humanitarian relief practitioners and military contributors, in respect of the logistical capabilities of other organisations operating within the humanitarian relief supply chain (Heaslip, 2011). JFLogC participants concede that they do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster relief; moreover analysis of the data gathered from NGOs confirms that humanitarian organisations do not understand what the military can offer to the overall relief effort. Hence, there is a clear requirement for additional research which seeks to analyse the reasons behind this lack of understanding and which aims to offer ways to address how practical understanding, particularly between the military and humanitarian relief NGOs can be improved.

8.11.5 UN OCHA Courses and Joint Training Initiatives

This research has identified that the UN OCHA provide a variety of training courses which are designed to establish partnerships between global humanitarian relief organisations and to promote collaborative working. However, the findings reveal that attendance on courses is difficult for some NGOs and that participation is very low amongst the smaller humanitarian organisations. Hence, research is required to consider ways to make current training courses more readily accessible and attractive to a larger number of humanitarian organisations. Linked to this are the ongoing discussions on the merits of a joint approach to training (Heaslip, 2011) and the assertion, particularly by JFLogC participants that such a strategy would be of great benefit to the future success of the overall relief effort. Hence any future research in this area should also consider a concept of training within the sector where integrated exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of collaborative working.

8.11.6 Command, Control and Competition in the Humanitarian *Market*

The findings of this research demonstrate that the UN OCHA has acknowledged *power broker* (Burt, 2005) and *gatekeeper* status (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley *et al,* 2010) within the humanitarian supply chain, but also reveal that the command and control structures which are implemented by the UN OCHA within humanitarian relief zones are not effective. In addition, this research offers empirical support to the assertion that

humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by the associated market forces within the sector (The Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000). Analysis of the data reveals that these market forces, and the inherent desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness to donors by some humanitarian organisations, is having a negative impact on the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian relief supply chain. In effect, humanitarian organisations are forced to act independently and as a result, outside of the UN OCHA command and control structures. Hence, further research is required to consider the influence of market forces within the humanitarian sector and the negative impact that they are having on OCHA's efforts to coordinate the humanitarian supply chain.

8.11.7 The Humanitarian Space and the Military Contribution

The findings of this research confirm that the UK MOD are keen to expand their role within the humanitarian supply chain (HERR, 2011). However, analysis of the data gathered amongst NGO participants also reveals a direct conflict between this military aspiration and the humanitarian organisations' desire to preserve the humanitarian principles. Moreover, the findings offer empirical evidence of a concern amongst NGOs that any military involvement in the humanitarian supply chain serves to destabilise it and to have a negative impact on the overall effectiveness of the relief effort. To add to this, the findings also demonstrate that military contributors are often forced by governmental pressure to move from a political to a humanitarian stance as the response develops. This not only serves to destabilise situations still further, but also to deter any desire to adopt collaborative working. Hence, further research is required into how this conflict between the military aspiration to increase involvement in the humanitarian supply chain and the NGO desire to maintain the humanitarian principles can be addressed. Any such research should also consider the role that national governments have to play in ensuring that military contributions are consistent throughout the relief effort and do not change direction part way through the relief effort.

But what of the future for this particular researcher? As has been discussed earlier in this thesis humanitarian disasters are here to stay and are sadly, on the increase. Hence, the aim will be to continue to conduct research along a similar academic trajectory and in particular within the theme of relationship management. The concept of how to develop managerial strategies which will help to facilitate collaborative working amongst organisations and individuals which, whilst sharing a common desire to help those in need

are clearly poles apart is a real challenge and one that appeals. Hence, the intention will be to continue to develop the insights that the research has revealed thus far into a more comprehensive theoretical position.

8.12   A Final Thought

Above all else this research has served to demonstrate the significance of the overall contribution that the supply chain and associated managerial discipline have to make to the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian relief effort in response to immediate disasters. The findings confirm that in keeping with the corresponding organisations in the business sector, those who operate in the humanitarian sector are acutely aware of the importance that the effective management of their resources has to offer. However, the data gathered here serves to demonstrate that the humanitarian sector still has some significant challenges ahead if this appreciation is to turn into practical results. The lack of awareness and trust amongst participants within the humanitarian supply chain identified within this thesis, and the confirmation of a corresponding unwillingness to adopt collaborative working is having a negative effect on what is the *bottom line* for the humanitarian sector; which, in the final analysis is improved efficiency and effectiveness within the humanitarian supply chain leading to reduced response times, the delivery of more aid and ultimately an increase in the number of lives saved. In short, organisations and individuals working within the humanitarian relief sector would be well advised to put aside their differences and to consider the thoughts of Sun-Tzu (translated by Ames, 1993):

"The line between order and disorder lies in logistics"

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APPENDICES

Key Words used Throughout the Research Process

Key Words	Notes
"Humanitarian (Aid) Logistics"	General overview of topic area accounting for common link between 'logistics' & 'Supply Chains'.
"Humanitarian (Aid) Supply Chains"	More specific focus on management of chains and in particular collaboration and/or coordination.
"Humanitarian (Aid)" and "Supply Chain"/ "Logistics Management"	Some authors write about 'Disaster Relief' as opposed to 'humanitarian relief'
"Humanitarian Supply Chain Collaboration"/ "Coordination"	'Disaster' seems to be interchangeable with the terms 'Humanitarian' and 'Emergency'
"Supply Chain Coordination"/ "Coordination"	Specifics of current approaches to collaboration/ coordination.
"Disaster Relief" and "Logistics"/ "Emergency Relief" and "Logistics"/ "Supply Chain Management"	
"Humanitarian Logistics"/ "Supply Chain Operations"	Investigate the role that power plays within collaborative relationships
"Humanitarian", "Disaster" and "Emergency" Supply Chain"/ "Logistics" and "Efficiency"/ "Effectiveness"	
"NGO" and "Coordination"/ "Collaboration" and "Military"	
"UN" and "Cluster Approach"	
"Power" and "Relationship Management"/ "Relationship Marketing"	
"Qualitative Research"	Increase working knowledge of research tools/ techniques available in order to arrive at informed justification of final methodology
"Case Study" and "Research"	
"Qualitative Data" and "Analysis"	
"Observation" and "Research"	
"Focus Groups" and "Research"	
"Grounded Theory" and "Ethnography"	

Humanitarian and Non-Governmental Organisations Contacted and Responses

Ser	Organisation	Address	E mail	Participate?	Response
1	Action Aid	Chataway House, Leach Road, Chard, Somerset, TA20 1FR	mail@actionaid.org	N	"I am very sorry but due to the high volume of requests of this nature that we receive we find ourselves unable to answer them individually but we are happy to point you in the direction of publically available materials". Please feel free to visit www.actionaid.org.uk (our UK website) www.actionaid.org (our International website) and our financial report: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/101399/trustees_report_and_accounts.html
2	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) though: British Red Cross	44 Moorfields, London EC2Y 9AL	information@redcross.org.uk	Y	Willing to Participate
3	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD)	Romero House, 55 Westminster Bridge Road, London, SE1 7JB	cafod@cafod.org.uk	N	NONE
4	CARE International UK	9th Floor, 89 Albert Embankment, London, SE1 7TP	info@careinternational.org.uk	Y	Willing to Participate
5	Christian Aid	PO Box 100, London, SE1 7RT	info@christian-aid.org	N	NONE
6	Comic Relief UK	89 Albert Embankment London	info@comicrelief.com	Y	Willing to Participate

Ser	Organisation	Address	E mail	Participate?	Response
		SE1 7TP			
7	Concern Worldwide	13/14 Calico House , Clove Hitch Quay , London, SW11 3TN	info@concern.net	Y	Willing to Participate
8	Islamic Relief UK	Head Office, 16 Lower Marsh, London, SE1 7RJ	info@islamic-relief.org.uk	N	NONE
9	MOD Joint Force Logistic Component HQ	Joint Forces Command, Northwood HQ, Sandy Lane, Middlesex, HA6 3HP		Y	Willing to Participate
10	Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF)	67-74 Saffron Hill London EC1N 8QX	office-ldn@london.msf.org	N	"We are a small team in London and are unable to assist students with research, but we would urge you to consult the MSF websites where there is a wealth of information that should help you".
11	Merlin	Head office, 12th Floor, 207 Old Street, London EC1V 9NR	hq@merlin.org.uk	N	NONE
12	Oxfam	Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford. OX4 2JY	enquiries@oxfam.org.uk	Y	"We welcome the opportunity to discuss our responses further"
13	Plan UK	Finsgate, 5-7 Cranwood Street, London, EC1V 9LH		N	NONE

Ser	Organisation	Address	E mail	Participate?	Response
14	Save the Children UK	Head Office, 1 St John's Lane, London EC1M 4AR	supporter.care@savethechildren.org.uk	N	NONE
15	Tearfund	100 Church Road, Teddington, TW11 8QE	enquiry@tearfund.org	Y	"We are a relatively small NGO and I am very happy to discuss further if this is of interest to you"
16	UNICEF UK	UNICEF Supply Division UNICEF Plads, Freeport 2100 Copenhagen Ø Denmark Telephone +(45) 35 27 35 27 Facsimile + (45) 35 26 94 21	supply@unicef.org	Y	Willing to Participate
17	UN OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland	ocha@un.org	Y	Willing to Participate
18	World Vision UK	Opal Drive, Fox Milne, Milton Keynes, MK15 0ZR	info@worldvision.org.uk	N	None

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Director Logistics Operations
[

                                        ]

Dear Sir/Madam

RESEARCH PROJECT – HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS COLLABORATION

I am a senior lecturer at the University of Lincoln and am currently engaged in a Doctoral Research Project which will consider the management of the supply chains and logistics activities associated with provision of humanitarian relief; in particular my research will consider how Non-Governmental Organisations collaborate within humanitarian relief areas and, in light of past practitioner experiences how collaboration might be managed within such areas in the future.

Whilst I fully appreciate how busy you must be, I enclose a short questionnaire of what are, hopefully straightforward questions which I trust that you will be able to find the time to answer. This questionnaire has been sent to a number of NGO logistics practitioners and my aim at present is to establish some preliminary data; once I have analysed this data my intention will be to conduct more in-depth research into the trends and issues raised.

Ultimately, my aim is to make a lasting contribution to knowledge within what is a vital area for the humanitarian relief supply chain and, to that end, I will be happy for you to review my findings as and when they become available.

With many thanks in anticipation

Yours faithfully,

Gary Ramsden
Senior Lecturer Logistics and Operations Management

Enc:

1 x Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management Questionnaire
1 x Stamped Addressed Envelope

Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management Questionnaire

Background Details:

Name	
Job Title	
Organisation	
Time employed with this organisation	
Name of any other humanitarian relief organisations that you have worked for	
Total time employed within humanitarian relief provision	
Operational Experience: Please list all relief operations that you have had some involvement in	

Please turn over for some short questions associated with Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management

Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management:

Do you believe that your organisation operates a supply chain designed specifically for its particular role/needs?	Yes	No
UK NGOs only: Is your organisation affiliated to the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC)?	Yes	No
Does your organisation operate within the United Nations Cluster concept?	Yes	No
If yes, please tick the areas for which your organisation has (or would) use the UN Cluster concept	Fill logistics gaps and alleviate bottlenecks	
	Prioritize logistics interventions and investments	
	Collect/ share information and assets	
	Coordinate port and corridor movements to reduce congestion	
	Provide details of transporters and rough indication of market rates	
	Provide guidance on customs issues	
	Provide information on equipment and/or relief supply items	
	Co-ordination with other UN Agencies	
	Co-ordination with other NGOs	
	Co-ordination with the military	
Which of these principles do you believe that your organisation would consider to be of the greatest importance in respect of the provision of humanitarian relief (please rank as 1 (most important) to 4 (least important))	**Humanity** (Humankind shall be treated humanely in all circumstances by saving lives and alleviating suffering, while ensuring respect for the individual)	
	Neutrality (Advocation of a non-interventionist strategy in conflict)	
	Impartiality (Decisions should be based on objective criteria, rather than on the basis of bias, prejudice, or preferring the benefit to one person over another)	
	Independence (Actions must be kept separate from political, economic, military or other objectives)	
	All are of equal importance	
Does your organisation take the lead in any logistical activity along the humanitarian relief supply chain?	Yes	No
If Yes please state which activities and in which operations	Activity:	Operation:

If **No** would your organisation be happy to take the lead in any future operations?	Yes	No
Does your organisation share facilities with other NGOs?	Yes	No
If **Yes** please list which facilities and who they are shared with	Facility:	Organisation Shared with:
Is your organisation prepared to accept military assistance from armed forces working under a UN mandate?	Yes	No
	Depends on the circumstances	
Within a relief zone which of these aims are the most important to your organisation (please rank as 1 (most important) to 3 (least important))	Demonstrating to donors that their presence and inputs into a humanitarian mission are valuable	
	Demonstrating competitive behaviour towards other humanitarian actors and organisations	
	Seeking visible means of demonstrating active subscription to the concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility.	
	All are of equal importance	
Would you be happy to discuss your responses in greater depth at a future date?	Yes	No

Many thanks for taking the time to complete this questionnaire

Please return it to:

G P Ramsden
University of Lincoln
Lincoln Business School
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Lincoln
LN6 7TS
UK
in the Stamped Addressed Envelope provided or e mail back to:

gramsden@lincoln.ac.uk

Initial Etic Data Analysis Codes (adapted from Miles and Huberman, 1994)

Theme (Section in Literature Review)		Description	Code
Humanitarian Space (2.5.1)	Humanity	Humankind shall be treated humanely in all circumstances by saving lives and alleviating suffering, while ensuring respect for the individual	HUMSHUM
	Neutrality	Advocation of a non-interventionist strategy in conflict	HUMSNEU
	Impartiality	Decisions should be based on objective criteria, rather than on the basis of bias, prejudice, or preferring the benefit to one person over another	HUMSIMP
	Independence	Humanitarian action must be kept separate from political, economic, military or other objectives.	HUMSIND
Politics (2.5.2)	Influence	Looking to influence policy decisions and to shape global political perspectives	POLINF
	Motivation	A perceived moral authority to promote ideological and political causes	POLMOT
World Economy (2.5.3)	Influence	Finding neutral ways to operationalize mandates without compromising underlying principles or producing a negative impact	WEINF
	International Pressure	Asserting economic pressure on countries and organisations to further individually stated goals or missions	WEIP
Organisational Sustainment (2.5.4)	Fund Raising	Demonstrating to donors that their presence and inputs into a humanitarian mission are valuable	SUSFR
	Strategy	Demonstrating competitive behaviour towards other humanitarian actors and organisations	SUSSTRAT
	Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)	Seeking visible means of demonstrating active subscription to the concepts of CSR	SUSCSR
Societal Wealth (2.5.5)	Interference	Applying advance measures to limit the overall effect of disasters	SWINT
	Influence	Attempts to influence long-term change arising from both the initial impact effects and corresponding responses to disasters	SWINF
Power (2.10.3)	Positive	Positive aspects of power on collaboration and co-operation	PWRPOS
	Negative	Negative effects of power	PWRNEG
Relationship Management (2.8)	Trust	Mutual working, partnerships, win-win opportunities exploited	RMT
	Opportunism	Self-interest and associated gain are prevalent	RMOPP

Theme (Section in Literature Review)		Description	Code
Collaboration (Optimisation) (2.8/ 2.9)	Clusters	Concept adopted and appreciated, upstream and downstream customers are included in supply chain planning and operations	COLCLU
	Horizontal	Experts in the same functional area working together	COLHOR
	Vertical	Synchronise different functional levels of supply chain for overall efficiency	COLVER
	Alliances	Seen to benefit all involved – encouraged	COLALL
	Resilience	Supply chain is designed to cope with disturbance	COLRES

Stage II - Interview Schedule

Introductions

This interview is being recorded – it will only be heard by myself – all materials will be kept confidential as per the consent agreement.

For the purposes of the digital recording…………………………..

Date

Time

Organisation

Name

Job Title

This interview should take between 1 and 1.5 hours.

The interview is semi-structured and informal – basically I want it to be a conversation and to offer you the opportunity to tell me what you want me to know about your views on collaboration along humanitarian relief supply chains. However, I do have some key issues that I hope we will cover, so I will check my prompts occasionally to make sure we are more-or-less on track.

This interview has four parts;

    A. General Processes, Coordination & Collaboration.
    B. Power and Relationships
    C. The Humanitarian Space
    D. Organisational Sustainment

SECTION A: General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration

A1.   Definitions

To confirm understanding at the outset of the interview, how do you define collaboration?

What is coordination and how does it differ from collaboration?

What do the terms mean to you?

A2.   UN Cluster Concept

What is your understanding of the concept?

- Is it a good thing – or are there problems with it?

    o   What examples would you offer both good and bad, of the concept's practical implementation?

- In your experience does the concept help to facilitate the following:

    o   Information and Asset Sharing

    o   Prioritising of events and interventions

- In your experience does the concept work in reality?

A3.   Sharing of Facilities

Does your organisation share facilities with other NGO's?

- How is this instigated?

- Are agreements in place or established?

- Can you offer any examples of successes and/or failures of such agreements?

A4.   Military Assistance

Does your organisation accept military assistance?

- Under what circumstances?

- When is military assistance acceptable to your organisation?

- Can you offer specific examples of the use of military assistance

Section B: Power and Relationships

B1. Lead Status

Is your organisation willing to accept lead status in a humanitarian relief effort?

- Can you offer me some practical examples of where this has happened?

B2. Trust

Is your organisation happy to be led by another?

- Can you offer me some practical examples of where this has happened?

B3. Relationship Management

How does your organisation manage its relationships with other NGOs and contributing organisations?

- Do you regard other organisations as competition?

- Are there conflicts of interest?

- How are these managed?

    - Can you offer practical examples?

Section C: The Humanitarian Space

C1. Humanitarian Principles

What do you understand to be the Humanitarian Principles?

- How are these principles maintained by your organisation?

- Do they have a bearing on approaches and attitudes?

- Can you offer practical examples?

C2. The Oslo Guidelines

What do you understand to be the Oslo Guidelines?

- How are these principles maintained by your organisation?

- Do they have a bearing on approaches and attitudes?

- Can you offer practical examples?

C3. Politics

Does politics play a role in the overall decision making process for your organisation?

- Can you offer any practical examples?

C4. The Military Role

How does the role of the military in humanitarian relief conflict with the humanitarian principles?

Is there a role for the military in humanitarian relief?

- Should there be dividing lines and where are they?

- When is military assistance acceptable/ not acceptable?

Section D: Organisational Sustainment

D1. Demonstration to the Donor Community

How important is the demonstration of the following to your organisation and its donor community:

- Organisational presence
- Corporate Social Responsibility
- Value for money

How does your organisation achieve the above?

- Can you offer practical examples?

Finally

- Many thanks for your help and time.
- If you think of anything else, or have any queries, please contact me.
- I plan to hold a series of focus groups to discuss my findings in about a year's time as this will give me the time to analyse the data that I have collected through the interview process. Obviously you would be more than welcome at one of these and I will contact you with an invitation.
- I aim to have the final research report finished in 2015 and this will be accessible to you via the internet.

Stage III - Focus Group Topic Guide

Introductions

This focus group is being recorded – it will only be heard by myself – all materials will be kept confidential as per the consent agreement.

For the purposes of the digital recording…………………………..

Date

Time

Organisation

Individual Names and Job Titles

This session should take about 1 hour.

You should notice that the areas covered during this session will be very similar to those which were raised during our one-to-one interviews. We have already exchanged feedback on your individual interviews but now the idea is to expand on some of the key issues that were raised in this open forum. I will introduce the discussion topics and key issues that I hope we will cover and then it's over to you to discuss with my occasional prompting. In essence I will act as chairman, so I will check my prompts occasionally to make sure that we are more-or-less on track.

The generic areas that I would like us to cover will cover are:

   A. Management and Control
   B. Understanding and Training
   C. Relationships
   D. Military Involvement

Section A: Management & Control

A1. Coordination

Discuss the practical realities:

- Competing agendas
- UN Strategic Framework
  - Role of OCHA
- Does coordination restrict the overall relief effort?
  - Does an Ad Hoc approach work?
  - Lack of coordination has benefits?
- Experiences
  - Problems?
  - Successes?

A2. Cluster Concept

Discuss experiences of and opinions on the Concept:

- Is Performance Measurement required?
  - Make Cluster Leads Accountable
- Should Local Governments be involved?
  - Exclusivity leads to distrust
- Links to OCHA
  - Loose?
- Are Implementation Guidelines required
  - Prevent confusion?
- Experiences
  - Problems?
  - Successes?

Section B: Understanding & Training

B1.   Joint Training

Opinions on the idea of joint training and exercises

- Promote wider understanding of roles
    - o OCHA
    - o NGOs
    - o Military
    - o Local Governmental Organisations
- Promote appreciation of the Humanitarian Landscape
    - o Environment
    - o Demands
    - o Problems
    - o Experiences
- Include Local Organisations and Governments?
    - o Promote local ownership and responsibility
    - o Long term exit strategy?

B2.   Professionalisation

The adoption of Humanitarian Logistics as a 'profession'

- Career Paths
- Improve efficiency/effectiveness?
- Academic requirements
    - o European Qualifications Framework (EQF)
- Experiences?
    - o Existing Programmes

B3.   Cluster Training

Is training required in this area?

- Promote understanding
    - o Structures
    - o Roles
    - o Responsibilities

Section C: Relationships

C1.   Local

Discuss relationships with local organisations

- Experiences?
- How to establish
- Value?
- How to promote a sense of community?

C2.   Inter-Organisational

Discuss the idea of collaboration and working together

- Positive or negative?
- Should NGOs be regarded like any other business?
    - Market forces
    - Competition
- How should this be managed
    - By who?
- Communication
- Resource sharing
    - Examples
    - Successes?
    - Problems?

C3.   Power and Trust

Where does/should the power lie?

- Power Broker(s)
    - OCHA
    - Cluster Leads
    - Local Government
    - Military

Section D: Military Involvement

D1.   Perceptions

Discuss organisational and individual perceptions of the military role

- Pressure on military to demonstrate more humanitarian involvement
    - o How to expand the current agenda
    - o Longer term involvement beyond initial response
- Security vs Conflict
    - o Clash of interests
    - o Achievable
    - o Experiences?
- Maintenance of Humanitarian Principles
    - o Humanity; Neutrality; Impartiality; Independence
    - o Is this a military responsibility/role
- What is the overall military role?
    - o Can the military wear 2 hats?

D2.   Political Influence

Political pressures and influence of international and local military

- Hearts and minds initiatives
    - o Humanitarian relief?
- Rules of Engagement
    - o OSLO Guidelines
    - o OCHA Guidelines
- Links to Local Governments
    - o How to establish and maintain sovereignty
    - o Who has/should have overall control?