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journal or publication title	Journal of International Philosophy
number	3
page range	291-307
year	2014-03-31
URL	http://id.nii.ac.jp/1060/00008194/

Metaphysics in the Meiji Period

Kosaka Kunitsugu

1

Many enlightenment thinkers from the early Meiji 明治 period (1868-1912), including Nishi Amane 西周 (1829-1897), Tsuda Mamichi 津田真道 (1829-1901), and Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉 (1834-1903), were critical of Confucianism, particularly Neo-Confucianism. For them, enlightenment first meant rejecting the old and traditional Confucianism and adopting the modern science of the West. In this sense, one could say that for them, “enlightenment” meant Westernization. Their thought was very pragmatic, logical, and practical; they sought, in the words of Fukuzawa, a “practical learning close to the normal and everyday needs of humans,”¹ or, in the words of Nishi, a “practical science” that could meet the “everyday needs of human society.”² From this perspective, they rejected Neo-Confucianism as an “empty theory.” Thus, their thought naturally was empirical and positivistic, and skeptical – or even rejecting – of metaphysics. This can be seen by looking at, for example, Nishi’s “Kaidaimon” 開題門 (An introduction to various problems), a text he is thought to have drafted while studying abroad in the Netherlands. There, while he offers unreserved praise of Comte’s positivism – something that “has not yet been seen in our Asia” – for being “solid in its proofs and clear in its claims,” he offers what could be described as a half-hearted or even negative evaluation of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, stating that while their “theories have some differences” from Neo-Confucianism, they are “very similar to it.”³

In this way, early Meiji period enlightenment thinkers generally adopted a stance that was empiricist, utilitarian, and positivist, and their thought was opposed to Neo-Confucianism and metaphysics. We could say that this was partially in response to the demands of the time. In the history of Meiji philosophy, metaphysics (*called junsei tetsugaku* 純正哲学, or pure philosophy, in Japanese at the time) did not finally appear until the Meiji 20s. Representative metaphysical thinkers from then were Inoue Enryō 井上円了 (1858-1919), Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1855-1944), Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之 (1863-1903), and Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870-1945).

Incidentally, their systems of thought shared several characteristics in common. First, they were deeply connected to the doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism. Both Inoue Enryō and Kiyozawa Manshi were Buddhists from the Ōtani school (*Ōtaniha* 大谷派) of the True Pure Land sect (*Jōdo shinshū* 浄土真宗). Inoue Tetsujirō writes in his autobiography that he came to have a deep relationship with Buddhism after listening to Hara Tanzan’s 原坦山 lectures on Mahayana scriptures while he was enrolled at Tokyo University.⁴ It is also well known that Nishida’s first work, *Zen no kenkyū* 善の研究 [An inquiry into the good], was based on his Zen experiences in *shikan-taza* 只管打坐 (themeless meditation) over the course of many years. In fact, the reality that these figures speak of is very close to the concept of “suchness” (*shinnyo* 真如) found in the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* (*daijō kishin ron* 大乘起信論).

In this way, metaphysics in Meiji – in fact, in modern – Japan was deeply connected to Mahayana Buddhist thought. When Western philosophy was adopted during the time between the end of the Edo 江戸 period (1603-1867) and the beginning of the Meiji period, scholars of Western learning (*yōgakusha* 洋学者) translated it entirely using Confucian concepts and terminology. Japanese philosophical terms in use today are almost all

Confucian words that have undergone semantic change or reinterpretation. However, when they grew out of simply adopting Western philosophy and finally tried to construct their own philosophy, their eyes turned towards the doctrines of Buddhism. This is probably related to the fact that while Confucianism is pragmatic and practical, it lacks theoretical and logical depth. In contrast, in Buddhism there are profound reflections regarding the self and the world. While Confucian thought's strength lies in the moral and political idea of "self discipline [as the key to] the governance of humankind" (*shūko chijin* 修己治人), Buddhism's excellence lies in its meditative and metaphysical contemplations. This is something that cannot be overlooked when considering the characteristics of modern Japanese philosophy.

The second characteristic of Meiji period metaphysics lies in its adaptation of the "identical realism" (*genshō soku jitsuzai ron* 現象即實在論, lit. phenomena as reality) spoken of by Inoue Testujirō. Below I will explain this theory in detail, however at present suffice it to say that, as its name suggests, its essential feature can be found in its denial of the existence of any kind of "substance" (*jittai* 実体) or "noumenon" (*hontai* 本体) that is separate from or transcends phenomena. It rejects a dualistic world and the two worlds doctrine, positing that everyday reality is as it is reality, or that the noumenon is in the recesses of everyday reality. It sees reality not as something that goes beyond phenomena, but rather as something inherent in them. One could say that it sees phenomena and reality as being two sides of one coin, or as the inside and outside of the same thing. Therefore, it inevitably becomes immanentist and this-world-ism, and comes to have a strong pantheistic hue. This is probably the reason the above four thinkers' philosophical endeavors all resembled that of Spinoza. Inoue Tetsujirō's "identical realism," Inoue Enryō's "mutual implication theory" (*shōnyo sōgan ron* 象如相含論), Kiyozawa Manshi's "theory of the finite and the infinite" (*yūgen mugen ron* 有限無限論), Nishida Kitarō's "theory of pure experience" (*junsui keiken setsu* 純粹經驗說), and so on all were characterized by this type of thought. They all share a foundational way of thinking that sees the subjective and the objective as two sides of one reality and phenomena as the development or manifestations of this reality. It is the "inside as outside, outside as inside" (*uchi soku soto, soto soku uchi* 内即外·外即内) and the "one as many, many as one" (*ichi soku ta, ta soku ichi* 一即多·多即一) spoken of in Nishida's late-period philosophy. Also, this characteristic is also related to Buddhism's view of reality and its "logic of essence-function [*taiyū* 体用]".

The third characteristic of Meiji period metaphysics is that it is based on the "logic of identity [*soku* 即]". This logic can be found in ideas such as *genshō soku jitsuzai*, *shin soku motsu* 心即物 (mind as matter), and *ri soku busshin* 理即物心 (the principle as matter and mind). The "*soku*" here is not simply identity, but identity that has been mediated by negation. In other words, this "*soku*" is at the same time "*hi*" 非 (not). Therefore, the logic of identity is at the same time the logic of identity and difference (*sokuhi* 即非). At the basis of this way of thinking a logic of negation and a dialectical mode of thought is implied, however Meiji philosophers stopped short of delving deeply into this point. This can be said with regard to Nishida's theory of pure experience found in *Zen no kenkyū*. It is at what could be called thought's direct or presentative stage that has not reached a clear reflective and logical self-consciousness. This can also be seen by, for example, the fact that Nishida calls an ideal or ultimate pure experience "intellectual intuition" (*chiteki chokkan* 知的直観). While his theory contains elements or beginnings of a dialectical mode of thought, it fails to develop them in a self-conscious direction.

After going through the Taishō 大正 period (1912–1926), modern Japanese philosophy finally flowered upon entering the Shōwa 昭和 period (1926–1989) in the form of Nishida's logic of "place" (*basho* 場所) and "dialectic of place" (of absolute nothingness), Tanabe Hajime's 田辺元 (1885–1962) logic of "species" (*shu* 種) and "dialectic of absolute mediation [*zettai baikai* 絶対媒介]," Watsuji Tetsurō's 和辻哲郎 (1889–1960) "dialectic of emptiness [*kū* 空]" found in his ontology of humans, Takahashi Satomi's 高橋里美 (1886–1964) "enveloping dialectics" and Miki Kiyoshi's 三木清 (1897–1945) "logic of imagination." Thus, what we will be considering in this

paper are the various forms of what can be called “prototypical” Japanese-style idealism that emerged before Japanese philosophy reached this kind of self-awakening logic.

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In the Meiji period, metaphysics was generally called *junsei tetsugaku*, or pure philosophy. What was this metaphysics, and what came to people’s mind when they heard this phrase? Regarding this point, I would like to look at the ideas of Inoue Enryō, who was the first person to construct a metaphysics in Japan. It is probably safe to say that Enryō’s definitions of philosophy and metaphysics were generally accepted ideas that could be found in the writings of all the philosophers during this time.

According to Enryō, broadly speaking, there are two types of things that exist in the universe: those that have shape and substance, and those that do not. The sun, the moon, stars, mountains, rivers, grass, and trees have shape and substance, while ideas, thought, gods, and buddhas do not. The field of study that does experiments regarding the former is “natural science” (*rigaku* 理学). On the other hand, the field of study that researches the latter is “philosophy.” Thus, Enryō says we could call natural science a “field of experiments” and philosophy a “field of thought.” Here, the words “experiments” and “thought” respectively mean “to actually verify” and “ideas and concepts.” In short, natural science relates to the principle (*ri* 理) of material things that have form, and philosophy relates to the characteristics of the formless nature of the mind (*shinsei* 心性). Incidentally, while philosophy includes psychology, logic, ethics, and so on, it is centered around metaphysics, the “field of pure reason within philosophy that investigates the basic principles [*gensoku* 原則] of truth and the basis of the sciences,”⁵ and includes the study of the noumenon of mind, the noumenon of matter, the source and interrelationship of mind and matter, and so on.

Even today, we could say that this understanding of metaphysics is correct. Generally speaking, metaphysics is the original and unique territory of philosophy that does not simply stop at the world of phenomena, but looks to the noumenon or reality that is the basis on which the phenomenal world comes to be, and investigates it and the relationship between this noumenon (reality) and phenomena. It is philosophy’s most important and distinctive domain, the field called “First Philosophy” (πρώτη φιλοσοφία) by Aristotle in ancient times, and traditionally called metaphysics or ontology.⁶

The content of the metaphysics Enryō constructed was in essence a theory that phenomena and suchness imply the characteristics of each other. Here, “suchness” (*nyo* 如) refers to reality or the noumenon. His theory argues that phenomena and suchness are identical and inseparable, and that they mutually contain or imply each other. Phenomena, the result (*ka* 果), include within them suchness, the cause (*in* 因). Suchness, the noumenon, appears within phenomena. In the same way, suchness (the cause) contains within it phenomena (the result), and phenomena are latent in the noumenon suchness

Let us look into his thought a little more concretely.

Tetsugaku issekiwa 哲学一夕話 (Talks from a philosophical night), published between Meiji 19 and 20 (1886–1887), is the representative work of Enryō’s early period. Comprised of three talks, each discusses one of philosophy’s three fundamental issues: the world (phenomena), their noumenon (reality), and truth (knowledge, or *ninshiki* 認識).

In the first talk, Enryō discusses whether or not matter and mind are separate, asserting that the discriminative world of matter and mind (the world of phenomena) and the world in which there is no discrimination between matter and mind (the world of reality) do not oppose each other, but rather are identical and inseparable. He argues that since in discrimination there is non-discrimination, and in non-discrimination there is discrimination, both worlds are inseparable and indivisible, and the world of truth is formed only after they are

united. In other words, phenomena are reality, and reality is phenomena. Enryō sees this identity-based relationship between the world of discrimination and the world of non-discrimination like that of the two sides of one coin. For example, he says, “The mind of non-discrimination is known by the mind of discrimination, and the mind of discrimination is established based on the mind of non-discrimination.”⁷ In the paragraph that precedes this sentence, this is argued from an epistemological viewpoint, and in the proceeding one, from an ontological standpoint. In other words, the mind of non-discrimination is only perceived by relying upon the discriminative mind. However, this discriminative mind only arises based on the non-discriminative mind. The discriminative mind and the non-discriminative mind have this kind of identity-based or implicative relationship on a deep level.

In the second talk, the core of the work, Enryō discusses the validity or lack thereof of materialism, idealism, theism, and agnosticism in relation to issue of the nature of the noumenon of the phenomenal world. In conclusion, he argues that we should adopt the “Enryō Middle Way”⁸ that is not partial to any one position. According to him, a view that sees the discriminative world (the world of phenomena) and the non-discriminative world (the world of reality) as being in an identity-based relationship or as two sides of one coin can be found in all four theories. Their differences lie simply in whether they see the non-discriminative world as being only matter, only mind, or God.

In this work, Enryō’s eclectic way of thinking is particularly striking. It is only natural that Ōnishi Hajime’s 大西祝critique arose, which saw it as simply a compounding of the four above-described conflicting stances that was akin to mixing water and oil.⁹ Generally, those who encounter Enryō’s thought sense its richness and other positive qualities, however this text’s writing is a little dull, and lacks a drive to investigate the true characteristics of profound things and discuss them in a logical and systematic fashion. Compared to the richness of his thought, its writing form is too monotonous and is lacking in depth and sharpness. Thought that originally had considerable and valuable dialectical depth is made shallow by a logic of sameness, and cheapened by a very shallow eclecticism. There are only conclusions, and no proof. This is a shortcoming that can be found in all of his works.¹⁰

In the third talk of *Tetsugaku issekiwa*, Enryō discusses the location of truth, arguing that it is neither in the world of matter nor in the world of the mind, and also neither outside nor inside matter or mind. Since non-discrimination arises from discrimination, and discrimination is established based on non-discrimination, truth is also discrimination as non-discrimination (*sabetsu soku musabetsu* 差別即無差別), and non-discrimination as discrimination (*musabetsu soku sabetsu* 無差別即差別). Here, he again casually ties together two compounds with the character *soku*, asserting that phenomena and reality are in an identity-based relationship, or two sides of one coin. Aspects like negation and self-consciousness are generally rare in Enryō’s thought. In other words, it lacks a dialectical perspective. One receives the impression that conflicting and opposing things are being directly fused together and equated without any mediation. This is probably one of the main reasons that Enryō’s philosophy is criticized as being dogmatic.

Enryō was a prolific writer who left us a very large number of works throughout his life. Even if we just list those related to metaphysics, there is a considerable amount; besides *Tetsugaku issekiwa*, *Tetsugaku yōron* 哲学要論 (Essentials of philosophy, Vol. 1 – Meiji 19/1886, Vol. 2 – Meiji 20/1887), *Bukkyō katsuron joron* 仏教活論序論 (The revitalization of Buddhism: an introduction, Meiji 20/1886), *Junsei tetsugaku kōgi* 純正哲学講義 (Lectures on metaphysics, Meiji 25/1892) *Hayuibutsu ron* 破唯物論 (Destroying materialism, Meiji 31/1898), *Tetsugaku shin’an* 哲学新案 (A new philosophical theory), Meiji 42/1908), and so on come to mind. In *Bukkyō katsuron joron*, Enryō asserts that the doctrines of Buddhism match those of philosophy, and therefore also are in agreement with the spirit of his slogan “defend the nation and love the truth” (*gokoku airi* 護国愛理). *Junsei tetsugaku kōgi* is a record of lectures given at the Hall of Philosophy (*tetsugakkan* 哲学館). In *Hayuibutsu ron*, the first

half “Destroying Worldly Teachings” (*hazokumon* 破俗門) presents a criticism of materialism, and the second half develops on his own ideas regarding metaphysics. Lastly, *Tetsugaku shin’an*, his major work, systematically describes his metaphysics. Enryō was originally a systematic thinker, and this personality of his is the most apparent here. Therefore, I would like to consider the content of this work in a little more detail.

In *Testugaku shin’an*, Enryō defines philosophy as the “comprehensive overall view” (*sōgō no daikan* 総合の大観). This position had been advocated by many of Enryō’s predecessors since Nishi Amane,¹¹ however Enryō’s thought is unique in that it does not simply stop at this formal definition, but actually attempts to describe in a systematic fashion how this is the case. Arguing in detail, Enryō first divides this comprehensive overall view that is philosophy into a “front view” (*hyōkan* 表観) and “back view” (*rikan* 裏観). Then, he divides the “front view” into an “outer view” (*gaikan* 外観) and “inner view” (*naikan* 内観), the “outer view” into a “vertical view” (*jūkan* 縦観) and “horizontal view” (*ōkan* 横観), and the “inner view” into a “past view” (*kakan* 過観) and “present view” (*genkan* 現観). According to Enryō, the “front view” observes the absolute or infinite world from the side of the relative or finite, and the “back view” observes the relative or finite world of phenomena from ultimate, infinite oneness. If the front view is the perspective of reason (*risei* 理性), then the back view is the perspective of belief (*shinsei* 信性). If the former is the perspective of “philosophy,” then the latter is the perspective of “religion.” Therefore, in *Tetsugaku shin’an*, Enryō mainly considers the “front view.”

As described above, the “front view” is divided into the “outer view” and the “inner view.” The “outer view” observes the universe objectively through things, and in contrast the “inner view” observes the universe subjectively through the mind. Therefore, it can be said that the latter considers the material world (*bukkai* 物界), while the former considers the mental world (*shinkai* 心界). The “outer view” is divided into the “vertical view” and the “horizontal view.” The “vertical view” considers the historical formation of the material world, and the “horizontal view” considers the internal structure of the material world. If the former is a theory regarding the formation of the universe (the theory of evolution, or *shinkaron* 進化論¹²), then the latter should be called a structural theory (essence theory). Lastly, while the “past view” considers the mental world’s process of formation, the “present view” considers its structure and the relationship between mind and matter. Therefore, the relationship of the “past view” and “present view” in the “inner view” corresponds to that of the “horizontal view” and the “vertical view” in the “outer view.”

Even just by looking at the above framework, it can be seen that Enryō’s thought has a magnificent systematic and unificatory nature. This is the greatest characteristic of his thought. The concept of “mutual implication” (*sōgan* 相含) consistently runs throughout the various parts or elements of this system. Enryō first says in his discussion of the “horizontal view” that matter and force mutually imply each other (*mutsuriki sōgan* 物力相含), and that matter’s noumenon (*mitsugen* 物元) and matter’s phenomena (*bussō* 物象) as well as force’s noumenon (*rikigen* 力元) and force’s phenomena (*rikishō* 力象) are each in a relationship of mutual implication. He also calls this “the implication of noumenon and phenomena” (*taishō sōgan* 体象相含) and the “implication of phenomena and suchness” (*shōnyo sōgan* 象如相含). In the same way, he states that in the “present view,” the mind’s phenomena (*shinshō* 心象) and the mind’s noumenon/suchness (*shinnyo* 心如) are in a relationship of mutual implication, as is the noumenon of material phenomena, or the suchness of matter (*motsunyo* 物如), and the noumenon of mental phenomena, or the mind’s suchness. He describes this last relationship as “the mutual implication of the two suchnesses” (*nyonyo sōgan* 如如相含). In this way, Enryō argues that the true nature of the universe is manifold and inexhaustible mutual implication, describing the mutual implication of matter’s phenomena and noumenon, the mind’s phenomena and noumenon, material phenomena and mind phenomena, and matter’s noumenon and the mind’s noumenon. This way of thinking resembles two of the four realms described in the *Flower Ornament Sutra* (*kegongyō* 華嚴經): “the realm of non-obstruction between principle and phenomena” (*riji muge hokkai* 理事無礙法界) and “the realm of non-obstruction between phenomena” (*jiji*

muge hokkai 事事無礙法界). Furthermore, it shares many points in common with the idea of the microcosmos in Leibniz's monad theory, as well as Spinoza's pantheism. This perspective is also a characteristic shared between Enryō's thought and Japanese identical realism.

As can be seen above, this theory of mutual implication is the basic thought of Enryō's metaphysics. The formation theory, or theory of circular change (*rinkasetsu* 輪化説), found in the outer view and the theory of the formation of the world of the mind, or mind-cause theory (*inshinsetsu* 因心説), found in the inner view are, in the end, nothing more than one aspect of this theory of mutual implication. According to him, this theory is neither monism, dualism, nor pluralism, neither materialism nor idealism, neither empiricism nor rationalism, neither skepticism nor dogmatism, but rather a "theory of mutual implication that synthesizes these various theories."¹³ Enryō's conception of philosophy as a "comprehensive overall view" is straightforwardly expressed here. This tendency to not be partial to pre-existing perspectives and reject them as one-sided while at the same time attempting to synthesize and unify them from a viewpoint called "Enryō's Middle Way" or "Enryō's Great Way" is consistently found in his thought from *Tetsugaku issekiwa* onwards. In the "theory of mutual implication" found in *Tetsugaku shin'an*, this tendency finally took a systematic logical form.

However, what is "mutual implication" in the first place? Looking at the Chinese characters that make up the compound *sōgan*, we could understand it to mean the mutual inclusion of something else. For example, the suchness of matter (in other words, the noumenon of material phenomena) latently includes within itself its material phenomena, and this material phenomena includes within itself the suchness of matter, its noumenon. In this sense, the suchness of matter and the phenomena of matter mutually include each other. Thus, we could re-articulate this relationship of implication as one of cause and effect. Matter's suchness (the cause) latently naturally contains its effect, and, conversely, phenomena (the effect) naturally must contain its cause. This is the completely the same with regard to the relationship between phenomena of the mind and the suchness of the mind.

However, if this is the case, it cannot be said that here the meaning of suchness including phenomena and the meaning of phenomena including suchness are completely the same. This is just like we cannot say that the meaning of saying the effect is included in the cause is the same as the meaning of saying that the cause is included in the effect. When Enryō says "the mutual implication of phenomena and suchness," he primarily has in mind the inclusion of suchness in phenomena. "Mutual implication" in this sense is close to the meaning of "expression" or "representation," and thus it corresponds with Spinoza's concept of "modus" and especially Leibniz's concept of "perception." The phenomena of matter (or mind) express the suchness of matter (or mind) in various forms; within one all is reflected. This is the same as how a monad expresses the whole universe while being one part of it. Enryō's probably had Leibniz's concept of the *microcosme* in mind when he stated that mutual implication is similar to how the entire universe is reflected in one's eyes while one's eyes are at the same time only one part of the universe. In fact, Enryō states that humans are a *microcosme*, a miniature copy of the world, and a model of the universe.¹⁴

However, the situation is slightly different with regard to the idea that the matter's suchness and the mind's suchness implicate each other (*nyonyo sōgan* 如々相含) and matter's phenomena and the mind's phenomena implicate each other (*shōshō sōgan* 象々相含).¹⁵ This is because they are cases of neither a cause and effect relationship nor a relationship between the whole and its parts. Rather, these ideas express two sides or stages of the same single thing. The meaning of "mutual implication" in this case can be best explained by the parallel relationship spoken of by Spinoza. The suchness of matter and the suchness of the mind are two sides of the one suchness. We might be able to say that since this is expressing the essential infinite nature of this one suchness from a different perspective, the suchness of matter and the suchness of mind both mutually include each other. This is the same as how it can be said that since the *cogitatio* and *extensio* are two attributes of one single *sub-*

stantia, they mutually include each other. “Material phenomena” and “mind phenomena” are ways of finitely expressing the one suchness; the relationship between them and the latter is the same as that between the mental *modus* (mind) that is a characteristic of the *cogitatio* and the material *modus* (body) that is a characteristic of the *extensio*. Enryō’s use of the metaphor of two mirrors reflecting each other to explain how matter’s suchness and the mind’s suchness implicate each other¹⁶ is undoubtedly an attempt by him to show that they as well as the phenomena of matter and the phenomena of the mind both are in parallel relationships.

In this way, Enryō’s “suchness” and “phenomena” correspond to Spinoza’s *substantia* and *modus*, and the relationship between Enryō’s one suchness, mind/material suchness, and mind/material phenomena correspond to the relationship between Spinoza’s *substantia* (God), the characteristics *cogitatio* and *extensio*, and the *modi* of mind and body. However, the one suchness that Enryō speaks of is not a static substance like Spinoza’s God, but rather is an endlessly dynamic activity or energy. However, in Spinoza’s philosophy as well, God is *natura naturans* (naturing nature), with all things being thought to naturally arise from the eternal and infinite original nature of this God. Therefore, it is not impossible to see God as the source of all activity. On the other hand, the one suchness that is dynamic activity which Enryō speaks of is just like the axis of a top that stops in one place while continually spinning around: it must be have within it staticness.

Incidentally, the concepts of matter and force’s noumenon as well as rationality and belief that are found in Enryō’s complete model of the universe¹⁷ are close to the idea of *modus infinitus* in Spinoza’s philosophy. In other words, they are the intermediaries or mediators between the noumenon and phenomena, or *substantia* and *modus*. We could certainly say Enryō’s idea that belief and rationality are the relative infinite which function to bridge the two worlds of suchness and phenomena¹⁸ is in agreement with Spinoza’s understanding of intuitional knowledge and rational knowledge. The former (belief/intuitional knowledge) is cognition that transmits from the absolute to the relative, and the latter (rationality/rational knowledge) is cognition that seeks the absolute from the relative. The former is the perspective of religion, and the latter is the perspective of philosophy. Therefore, religion and philosophy also both mutually include each other. In this way, we can conclude that Enryō’s theory of mutual implication, while having in it some different elements, is essentially a form of Spinozism. This Spinozism is an element shared by the group of thinkers that belong to the genealogy of identical realism. Put simply, it is the logic of a religious self-awakening based on an immanentist perspective.

3

Inoue Tetsujirō’s identical realism can be understood by looking at his various works such as “Waga sekaikan no ichijin” 我世界観の一塵 (A bit of my worldview, Meiji 27/1894), “Genshō soku jitsuzai ron no yōryō” 現象即实在論の要領 (The gist of identical realism, Meiji 30/1897), “Ninshiki to jitsuzai to no kankei” 認識と实在との関係 (The relationship of knowledge and reality, Meiji 34/1901), “Yuibutsuron to yuishinron to ni taisuru jitsuzai-ron no tetsugakuteki kachi” 唯物論と唯心論とに対する实在論の哲学的価値 (The philosophical value of realism in relation to materialism and idealism, Meiji 44/1911), and *Meiji tetsugakkai no kaiko* 明治哲学界の回顧 (Looking back on the world of Meiji philosophy, Shōwa 昭和 7/1932). Out of these, the longest is “Ninshiki to jitsuzai to no kankei,” and the most succinct and to the point is “Genshō soku jitsuzai ron no yōryō.”

Inoue saw the duty of philosophy as being the investigation of reality, and thought that philosophy differs from the natural sciences, which investigate phenomena, on this point. However, according to him, reality does not exist apart from phenomena, phenomena do not exist independently from reality (both are identical and inseparable), and therefore an idea of reality can also be obtained by investigating phenomena. While in this sense, for Inoue, phenomena are the object of both the natural sciences and philosophy, the latter researches the particular variations of phenomena, and the former goes further to investigate the eternal unchanging reality.

Thus, the task assigned to philosophy is to make clear (1) how an idea of reality can be obtained, (2) the nature of the concept of reality, and (3) the relationship between reality and phenomena. This view of philosophy is almost completely in accordance with Enryō's aforementioned definition of metaphysics.

Inoue defines reality as "infinite universality" (*mugen no tsūsei* 無限の通性, *unendliche Allgemeinheit*). This is close to Hegel's notion of "concrete universality" (*konkrete Allgemeinheit*). In the case of Hegel, this concrete universality is "the Absolute" (*das Absolute*), while Inoue also describes "infinite generality" using the Buddhist term "one suchness" (*ichinyo* 一如, Skt. *tathatā*). According to Inoue, while phenomena are the discriminative characteristics of the world, reality is the world's non-discriminative and equal characteristic. Reality and phenomena are nothing other than two mutually identical and inseparable different sides or aspects of the same world. He states, "While I on an abstract level divide reality and phenomena, originally both are inseparable parts of the same essence and fundamentally do not differ. Separate from phenomena there is no reality, and separate from reality there is no phenomena – they are unified and make up the world."¹⁹ Additionally, while in reality there is no discrimination between the subjective and objective, on the other hand, phenomena is the world of discrimination between the two. Inoue sees the subjective and objective as being two different ways to arrive at an idea of the reality.

On this point, Inoue's "Ninshiki to jitsuzai no kankei" is completely the same – it explains in detail how phenomena and reality are identical and inseparable. However, it goes further to touch upon the relationship between the subjective and objective in the world of phenomena, arguing that since they are simply "the result of logical abstraction" and a distinction that does not originally exist, the subjective, objective, and reality are in what could be called a Trinitarian relationship.

Reality is not separate from the subjective; it does not occupy a third (*tertium quid*) position. In other words, it does away with discrimination between subjective and objective. This is reality (*Wesen*). If one were to discriminate this single entity and see it as something opposing, it becomes the subjective and objective. If one were to combine the subjective and objective and reduce them to their original state, they become reality. Truly, this should be called the one that is three and the three that is one.²⁰

Not only is the mind represented as simply mental discriminative phenomena, but it is also represented as the non-discriminative mental reality. Only by having these two sides does the mind become the mind. At the basis of mental phenomena that continually change must be an eternal and undying mental reality. Furthermore, without the distinction between "I" and "him" or one individual and another individual, there is no mental reality. Inoue saw this "infinite universality" as a type of activity (*Thätigkeit*), and thought that mental phenomena were the result or manifestations of this activity. In other words, while the mental reality is the innate aspect of the mind, mental phenomena are its acquired aspect.²¹

Inoue thought that a similar thing could be said with regard to phenomena of the mind and the reality of matter. For example, while color as phenomena possesses infinite discrimination and transformations, there is no discrimination in color as reality. If one goes back to the origin of color, which contains an infinite number of distinctions, one arrives at the one white light that it branches off from. From one perspective, a ray of light is a white light containing no distinctions, however at the same time from a different perspective it is color with its infinite number of distinctions. The same thing can be said with regard to sounds, scents, flavor, and so on.

While this is the relationship between phenomena and reality, what is the relationship between the subjective and the objective?

As described above, Inoue saw the difference between subjective and the objective or mind and matter as being one of how reality is approached. While we say, "subjective reality" and "objective reality," this is only a

distinction that exists in the context of one approaching the idea of reality; there is no distinction within reality itself between the subjective and the objective. Reality is the unification of the subjective and objective; in it there is no discrimination between the subjective and objective. As mentioned above, Inoue calls this reality “one suchness.” This is the one suchness of the subjective and the objective and of mind and matter. However, it is unclear exactly why and how Inoue thinks that this discriminatory world arises from the non-discriminative one suchness that is the sole reality.

Inoue’s identical realism brings to mind the “identity philosophy” (*Identitätsphilosophie*) of Schelling. The “one suchness” (*tathatā*) that is reality which he speaks of corresponds to Schelling’s “the absolute” (*das Absolute*) that is “indifference” (*Indifferenz*), and Inoue’s subjective and objective correspond to Schelling’s self and nature. The subjective and the objective are two different ways of seeing the same thing; they are different in that they are two ways of arriving at the suchness that is the absolute. Just as Schelling’s absolute was criticized by Hegel as just being like a dark night where all cows turn black,²² in Inoue’s thought the issue of how the discriminative world of the subjective and the objective or mind and nature arise from the non-discriminative one suchness is really not resolved. Inoue’s identical realism is something that just tries to logically explain the relationship between phenomena and reality; it does not try to make clear how phenomena arise from reality, or how the distinction between the subjective and the objective arises. In other words, it is a philosophy based on a “reflective” perspective, not a “generative” one. Inoue only asserts that phenomena and reality are two sides of one coin, and that the subjective and the objective are in a parallel relationship – in other words, he is just arguing that there is the logical relationship of identity between phenomena and reality and the subjective and the objective. He neglects to consider their generative relationship. In this respect, just as Schelling’s philosophy was Spinozism, Inoue’s identical realism can also be seen as one of its varieties.

As was the case in the above-discussed mutual implication theory of Inoue Enryō, in Inoue Testujirō’s thought as well, it is argued that the subjective and the objective, matter and mind, and phenomena and reality are in a mutually identical non-dualistic relationship and are the incessant activity of an unknowable reality. Furthermore, besides his distinguishing from an entirely epistemological viewpoint between the subjective and the objective as two different ways to arrive at reality, many of his claims agree with Enryō’s mutual implication theory. This prototype of idealism in Japan was called “identical realism” (*Identitätsrealismus*) and “the theory of the complete interpenetration of reality” (*en’yū jitsuzairon* 円融実在論, *einheitlicher Realismus*) by Inoue.

4

Let us now consider Kiyozawa Manshi’s metaphysics. His “theory of the finite and infinite” developed in *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu* 宗教哲学骸骨 (The skeleton of a philosophy of religion, Meiji 25/1892) and *Tariki tetsugaku gaikotsu shikō* 他力哲学骸骨試稿 (An attempt at an overview of other-power philosophy, Meiji 28/1895) is also one variation of identical realism. In this case, the finite refers to the relative, and the infinite refers to the absolute. Since Kiyozawa primarily thought about the relationship between the finite and the infinite in connection with religion (Buddhism), this relationship is also one between Buddha and sentient beings.

According to Kiyozawa, generally, since finite things are only finite in that they are in relation to other finite things, the finite is “relative.” Also, since finite things are limited by other finite things, the finite is “dependent” (*iritsu* 依立). Furthermore, since finite things only exist by depending on other finite things, the finite is naturally “multiple” and “incomplete.” In contrast, the infinite is “one” because it is the whole of all finite things, “absolute” because there is nothing that exists in opposition to it outside of it, and “independent” because it is not limited by anything else. Therefore, the infinite is at the same time “complete.”

In this way, while the finite and the infinite are normally thought to be mutually opposing or conflicting concepts, Kiyozawa did not think that the infinite existed outside of the finite in opposition to it, but rather that the infinite was in the finite and envelopes the finite from within it. In this sense, this infinite is close to Hegel's ideas of the "true infinite" (*wahrhafte Unendlichkeit*) and the "concrete universal" (*konkrete Allgemeinheit*). Kiyozawa thought that the finite and the infinite were not different essences but the same essence, and saw both of them as being in a relationship in which they mutually included the other. He thought about this identity-based relationship of the finite and the infinite using the model of an organic body.

He argued as follows. In an organic body, each element is separate while at the same time closely connected to other elements. There is no part that is independent; all parts are in a mutually dependent and interdependent relationship in which they cannot be separated from each other. For example, a hand can only carry out its unique functions when it is connected to other systems and organs in the body. If this connection is lost, a hand will not be able to adequately perform its functions. Conversely, if a hand is cut off and loses its functions as a hand, other systems and organs in the body are always seriously affected. In this way, a hand is closely connected to other systems and organs in the body, and they all come together to form the whole body.

Therefore, Kiyozawa asserts, a hand is a hand because within it all other body systems and organs are contained within it. Therefore, it is one part of the body while at the same time the whole body. In other words, in the part of the body that is a hand, the whole body is included. In this sense, the hand is part of the body and at the same time expresses the whole body. This can be said with regard the feet, eyes, mouth, and all the other organs in the body.

Kiyozawa explains this identity-based complementary relationship between a part and the whole as the "mutuality of prince and subject" (*shuhan gogu* 主伴互具). This refers to all finite things acting as the machine (engine) for each finite element when each is carrying out its function. For a hand to function as a hand, the other organs must work as its engine. Without the other organs working, the hand cannot carry out its function as a hand. If this were shown as a general expression, it would be as follows: in order for A to be A, B, C, and D must work as its engine, and in order for B to be B, A, C, and D must work as its engine. When one finite thing becomes the "prince" (*shukō* 主公, the master), all other things become "subjects" (*hanzoku* 伴属, retainers), and they mutually contain each other, with them combining to serve the infinite whole.²³ In this way there comes to be the mutually overlapping world of the infinite.

This thought brings to mind the thought found in the *Flower Ornament Sutra* which is encapsulated by the phrase "again and again, without limit" (*jūjū mujin* 重々無尽), and also has aspects in common with Leibniz's monad theory. While each finite thing is part of the whole and a constitutive element, since within one finite thing all things are included, it is one small universe; within each finite thing the world as a whole is reflected.

Kiyozawa tried to see the cause and effect relationship between the finite and the infinite as a completely religious one. According to him, the core of religion is the coming together of the finite and the infinite. In this case, on the one hand there is a path in which a finite thing develops the infinite within itself and becomes the infinite on its own, and on the other hand there is a path in which the infinite that is on the outside of finite things leads the finite and makes it reach the infinite. The former is found in the teaching of self-power (*jiriki mon* 自力門), and the latter is found in the teachings of other-power (*tariki mon* 他力門). Put in terms of sentient beings and buddhas, the gate of self-power is the path on which sentient beings themselves develop their internal buddha nature with their own power and become buddhas, while the gate of other-power is the path in which a buddha (Amida 阿弥陀 Buddha) leads sentient beings to reach buddhahood. Kiyozawa calls the former the "infinite as cause" (*insei mugen* 因性無限) and the latter the "infinite as effect" (*katai mugen* 果体無限).²⁴

In this way, Kiyozawa thought that his theories regarding the finite and infinite fit those found in the teachings of self-power and other-power in Buddhism. However, according to Kiyozawa, within this "infinite," there

is the internal infinite and the external infinite, which respectively correspond to the teachings of self-power and other-power. He saw the outer infinite as the “bad” or false infinite; the “infinite” for him was the internal infinite. The outer infinite is not the true infinite, but rather the relative infinite or the finite-dimensional infinite. To think otherwise, he argues, is to adopt a view based on a transcendental way of thinking in which the internal infinite is objectified and turned into noema. The noumenon of the infinite (Amida Buddha) that is often seen as being outside is actually the infinite that is internal to oneself. The basis of the infinite as effect is the infinite as cause; the former is a view based on the externalization (in Kiyozawa’s terminology, the “self-alienation,” or *itaika* 異体化) of the infinite as cause, which originally is the same entity as the finite. However, we must ask, if this is the case, is not the path in which a finite thing develops the infinite internal to itself and itself becomes the infinite – in other words, the teachings of the self-power path of holiness (*shōdōmon* 聖道) – original Buddhism, and the path in which the infinite that is outside of finite things (Amida Buddha) leads finite things (sentient beings) to the infinite – in other words, the other-power Pure Land teachings (*jōdomon* 浄土門) – a corruption that has deviated from original Buddhism?

In this way, the relationship of the finite and the infinite in a logical sense does not exactly match their relationship in a cause-and-effect or religious sense. Particularly in Buddhism, there is not one infinite, but many infinities (buddhas), or perhaps we could say Buddhism has a different type of infinite. The so-called three bodies (*sanjin* 三身) – the dharma body (*hosshin* 法身), response body (*ōjin* 応身), and reward body (*hōjin* 報身) – are all the infinite. Within this infinite, there is the internal infinite as well as the external infinite, and both the infinite as the self and the infinite as another. When thinking of buddhas as the infinite, it is not an infinite in the original logical sense of the word, but an infinite that has come to have a religious meaning. It is assumed that several different infinities exist, and it is rather forced to try to explain the religious relationship between sentient beings and buddhas as the logical relationship between the finite and the infinite. Even if this analogical thinking works in the case of the teachings of the self-power path of holiness, it does not for the other-power Pure Land teachings.

However, due to limited space, I cannot consider this issue in more detail,²⁵ and lastly would like to consider Kiyozawa’s theory of becoming.

Kiyozawa used the compound *tenka* 転化 (becoming) to refer to the change or movement of things. He saw the change of things as including progression (*shinka* 進化) and regression (*taika* 退化), and thus chose *tenka* to refer to both of these aspects. Kiyozawa’s theory of becoming is characterized by its understanding of progression as the change of going from the finite to the infinite, and regression as the change of going from the infinite to the finite. According to him, progression can only be spoken of in the case of finite things, not between the finite and the infinite. He says that a relationship between the finite and the infinite only exists in a religious relationship. However, in this case, the finite does not progress to the infinite, but rather the finite develops by itself the infinite that was originally latent within it. The finite does not change into an infinite that is something other than itself; originally the finite and the infinite are of the same essence. The finite awakens to the infinite within it. On this point Kiyozawa’s identical realism differs from both Inoues’ understandings of it. The finite and the infinite are “of the same essence and in the same position” (*dōtai heii* 同体並位), not “different essences, one of which comes before, and one of which comes after” (*itai zengo* 異体前後).²⁶ Where there is the finite, there is also the infinite; where there is the infinite, there is also the finite. The finite does not progress and become the infinite, and the infinite does not change into the finite. While it is said that the relationship of the finite and the infinite is developed, the finite itself does not change into the infinite. Only when, following the law of causes, conditions, and effects, infinite suchness and finite ignorance come together is the result – all dharmas – born.²⁷ The finite does not become the infinite, which exists in opposition to it. The finite becomes the infinite as it is. Kiyozawa says it is the same as how a beautiful gem is always a beautiful gem, but it comes to gorgeously shine

by being cut and polished. In this way, in Kiyozawa's identical realism, phenomena or finite things are seen as reaching reality or the infinite through awakening and practice. This is very different than the thought of both Inoues. In Kiyozawa's thought, the idea that identity is at the same time identity and difference is pronounced. We should recognize this as a step forward.

Relatedly, Kiyozawa also argues that the dharmas of the universe are connected to each other; each dharma possesses the truth of the entire universe. In this "principle of the interrelationship of all dharmas" (*manbō sōkan no ri* 万法相関の理)²⁸ commonalities with the "again and again, without limit" teaching of the *Flower Ornament Sutra* as well as Leibniz's monad theory can be seen. As previously stated, this is a characteristic shared by identical realism as well.

5

Lastly, let us consider the theory of pure experience found in Nishida Kitarō's *Zen no kenkyū* (Meiji 44/1911). Pure experience is a phenomenon in which there is no distinction between subject and object in a unified consciousness. It is epitomized in the *samādhi* (perfect absorption) of religionists and the states of inspiration of artists. It is a state like, for example, the *dhyāna* (meditative concentration) of monastics engaged in Buddhist training, or the "afflatus" of painters. In this phenomenon of consciousness, consciousness is in an intense state of unification, and the subjective and the objective are not yet divided. Or, rather, the distinction or opposition between subject and object is already transcended. In other words, it is not so much the world before distinctions, but rather a world in which all distinctions have been overcome. It is the equal and non-discriminative world spoken of in Buddhism. This ideal or ultimate pure experience is also called "intellectual intuition." It is the world in which "the marks of subject and object sink away, the marks of things and the self are forgotten" (*shukyaku sōbotsu, motsuga sōbō* 主客相没、物我相忘), and all discrimination has disappeared.

However, on the other hand, Nishida also calls the pre-conscious state of a newborn baby in which there are no distinctions between self/other and lightness/darkness as well as the stage of direct experiences like sensation and perception "pure experience." In fact, he even calls reflective thought such as signification and judgment pure experience. Yet, in the first place, since the act of reflection is based on distinction and discrimination, it might be thought that calling it pure experience is slightly illogical. Actually, in his next work *Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei* 自覚に於ける直観と反省 (Intuition and reflection in self-awakening, Taishō 6/1917), Nishida himself recognizes that reflection is a stage external and in opposition to intuition (pure experience). He asserts that intuition and reflection only come to be internally unified with the idea of self-awakening. In other words, in self-awakening, reflecting on the self is adding something to it; it is intuiting a new self. Intuiting this new self gives birth to even more self-reflection. In this way, Nishida came to think that in self-awakening, the self is incessantly developed by intuition giving birth to reflection and this reflection giving birth to new intuition.

However, in *Zen no kenkyū*, Nishida used individual pure experiences as his starting point, trying to explain everything using the concept. Therefore, it was necessary for him to see the various stages of reflective thinking that are based upon distinction as being pure experience in a broad sense. In other words, it was necessary for him to assert that reflective thinking is not a stage external to pure experience, but rather an internal one that could not be omitted in the development of pure experience. Therefore, Nishida argued that reflective thought is also one type of pure experience based on the following reasons. The unification or lack of unification of consciousness is an issue of relative comparison; consciousness that at first glance is thought to be divided can be said to be a unified consciousness from the perspective of a lower divided consciousness, and, on the other hand, consciousness that appears to be unified is a divided consciousness when compared to a higher unified

consciousness. Furthermore, in the systematic development of consciousness, the internal division of consciousness is an indispensable element and necessary stage for reaching a greater unification of consciousness. While it must be said that this is a somewhat apologetic explanation, at any rate, in this way, he argues, “The truth of pure experience is the alpha and omega of our thought.”²⁹

Furthermore, Nishida assumed that behind or at the basis of these types of pure experience existed a “certain unifying something” (*tōitsuteki arumono* 統一的或者) or a “the fundamental unifying power” (*kongenteki tōitsuryoku* 根源的統一力), and thought that the former was the differentiated or developed characteristics of the latter. In the third section of *Zen no kenkyū* “The Good” (*zen* 善), this root unifying power is seen as the phenomenon of universal consciousness that exists in contrast to individual pure experiences that are separate consciousness phenomena, and called “The One Great Personality” (*ichidai jinkaku* 一大人格) “The Spirit” (*seishin* 精神). In the fourth section “Religion” (*shūkyō* 宗教) it is called “God” (*kami* 神). Nishida came to call this universal operation of consciousness “self-awakening” (*jikaku* 自覚) in *Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei* and also described it mystically as the “absolute free will” that is “self-awakening of self-awakening.” In the “Latter Section” of *Hataraku mono kara miru mono he* 働くものから観るものへ (From the Actor to the Seer, Shōwa 2/1927), at this limit it completely changed, and turned into the logical concept of the “place of absolute nothingness” (*zettai mu no basho* 絶対無の場所). It can be said that this was a development or turn from pure experience to the self-awakening of pure experience itself as well as from the self-awakening of pure experience to the place in which the self-awakening of pure experience is established. Nishida’s philosophy can probably be described in one phrase as a philosophy of self-awakening. Put more precisely, it is the self-awakening of pure experience itself as well as the place self-awakening – in Japanese *bashoteki jikaku* 場所的自覚 – of pure experience. According to Nishida’s definition, self-awakening is “the self seeing the self” (*jiko ga jiko wo miru* 自己が自己を見る). This self is nothing other than pure experience, and therefore it is pure experience seeing pure experience itself. More precisely, since self-awakening is “the self seeing the self in itself” (*jiko ga jiko ni oite jiko wo miru* 自己が自己に於て自己を見る), self-awakening is pure experience seeing the self itself in the basis of the self (the place of absolute nothingness). Also, at the same time this is the place of absolute nothingness reflecting all things as the shadow of the self inside the self. In this way, in Nishida philosophy the subjective and the objective are always not divided, and the individual and the universal are identical. The self (the subjective) sees the self (the objective) in the self itself (the universal). At the same time, this is the self (the universal) reflecting the shadow of the self (the objective) within the self. In later period Nishida philosophy terms, this is “inside as outside, outside as inside” or “the one as many, many as one.”

However, discussing the development of Nishida philosophy is not the aim of this paper, and therefore I would like to again return to the pure experience thought found in *Zen no kenkyū*.

As previously described, in Nishida’s pure experience thought there is the element of the oneness of the subjective and objective, as well as the element of the identity of the individual and the universal. It therefore meets the two requirements for being identical realism. This can also be seen in places other than the first and second sections of *Zen no kenkyū*, which specifically discuss pure experience and reality. In the third section entitled “The Good” of the same monograph, Nishida states, “Originally, there is no distinction between things and the self. Just like it can be said that the objective world is a reflection of the self, the self is a reflection of the objective world.”³⁰ He also asserts, “Heaven and earth have the same source, and all things are of one essence,”³¹ and says, “Our true self is the noumenon of the universe.”³² Furthermore, in the fourth section “Religion,” not only does he argue that God and humans share the same nature, but also that the relationship of God and the universe is that of “noumenon and phenomena,” not that of “an artist and his work,” and that the universe is not the “creation” of God, but an “expression” of God. All things are an expression of the one and only God. He states, “Our individuality is the differentiation of God’s nature,” as well as, “The relationship between

God and our individual consciousnesses is the relationship of consciousness as a whole and its parts.”³³ Therefore, God is the basis of humans and the universe, and our returning to God is nothing other than returning to this basis.

In this way, Nishida’s theory of pure experience belongs to the genealogy of identical realism. His difference between the two Inoues is that, just like Kiyozawa, he emphasizes the negation of the self and the stage of self-awakening. This point is expressed in many of his statements. For example, he writes, “The method of knowing the true self and becoming one with God is only to be found in the obtaining of the power of the unification of subject and object by oneself. The obtaining of this power is our coming back to life after we have completely killed this false self and died once from the world of desire.”³⁴ He also states, “the activity of the true personality [*jinkaku* 人格] can be seen for the first time at the place in which one has exhausted all the power of the self, almost all self-consciousness has disappeared, and the self has no consciousness of the self,”³⁵ as well as, “At the point which the subjective illusions of the self have been completely worn out and completely unified with things, the true needs of the self are fulfilled, and one can see the true self.”³⁶

Lastly, I would like to mention one way in which Nishida’s theory of pure experience differs from other theories of identical realism: it has strong idealist personality. Of course, since his theory of pure experience speaks of a phenomenon of consciousness in which there is not yet any divide between the subjective and the objective, it itself is neither materialism nor idealism. It is a perspective that transcends this binary opposition. However, Nishida seeks this transcendental or unifying stance using an idealist approach. He thinks that God is the basis of the universe and its foundational unifying power, and defines this so-called Spirit as the unifying aspect of the differentiating development of this unifying power, or, conversely, nature as that which is unified. It is clear how as a result his thought that gave precedence to Spirit’s nature arose. This kind of idealist thought can be found in Nishida’s statements such as, “Genuine subjectivity is reality’s noumenon,”³⁷ “Reality is the reality that for the first time becomes complete in the Spirit,”³⁸ and, “It must be said that trying to explain the Spirit through the essence of things is upside down thinking.”³⁹ Nishida came to be influenced by the subjective idealists Berkeley and Fichte probably for this reason. Furthermore, here we can also point out the influence of Yangming 陽明 school of Confucianism, which teaches that “the heart-mind is the principle” (*shinsokuri* 心即理), or at least similarity between the two.⁴⁰

Another way in which Nishida’s theory of pure experience differs from other theories of identical realism is its pronounced dialectical personality. While Nishida philosophy is generally known as the logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity, Nishida himself defined it as a dialectic of place, drawing a clear line between it and the process dialectics of Hegel and Marx. While I am unable to discuss in detail the differences between the two,⁴¹ in short, while in the latter the contradictions and oppositions of the everyday world are thought to be synthesized and unified at a higher stage, in the former contradictory or opposing things possess are self-identical as they are. The beginnings of this thought of contradictory self-identity can be already seen in *Zen no kenkyū*. Nishida states the following in the second section of this work when discussing “the basic system of reality” :

In the establishment of reality ... unification and mutual opposition, or rather contradiction, are necessary at the basis. Just as Heraclitus said that conflict is the father of all things, reality is established based on contradiction; red things are established in opposition to non-red things, and working things are established in opposition to that which is the object of that working. When contradiction disappears reality also vanishes. Originally, this contradiction and unification are just the same thing seen from two sides. There is contradiction because there is unification, and there is unification because there is contradiction. It is like, for example, white and black – two things that in all ways are the same yet different in one way are the

most opposed to each other. In contrast, two things like virtue and a triangle that do not have any clear opposition also do not have any clear unification. The most powerful reality is that which has most skillfully harmonized and unified various contradictions.⁴²

Here, contradiction and unification are two indispensable sides of all things. Nishida is saying that contradiction is only contradiction when there is unification, and conversely unification is only unification when there is contradiction. As an example, he presents the relationship of black and white. Black and white mutually contradict and oppose each other, however at the same time both are the same and in accordance in the sense that they are both colors. In contrast, things such as virtue and a triangle that do not match in any way also neither contradict nor oppose each other. The most fundamental reality is that which has most skillfully harmonized and unified the various contradictions and oppositions within it.

In this way, in *Zen no kenkyū* as well, the contradictions and oppositions of everyday reality are not synthesized and unified at a higher level, but rather they are two sides that are indispensable in unification. Therefore, the internal contradictions and oppositions of things, as they are, are self-identical. Here, he is not describing a dialectical development or progression of things, but rather things' internal dialectical structure.

Furthermore, in the same chapter, Nishida states, "The basic system of reality is one and many, many and one. Within equality there is discrimination, and within discrimination there is equality. Since these two sides cannot be separated, they can be seen as the self-development of one thing. The independent self-completing reality always has this system."⁴³ Here, Nishida's later "one as many, many as one" thought can be clearly seen.

Of course, it cannot be denied that in Nishida's theory of pure experience there is a process-based dialectical way of thing that posits the division of the sole reality and its development through unification, however it must be pointed out that at the same time there is a dialectic of place in which contradictions and oppositions are, as they are, unified; they form a complete whole. Even with regard to the differentiation and development of pure experience, the development spoken of there is at the same time thought of as a return to the source. It is forward progression that is going back to the source and development that is internal unfolding. Phenomena are the development of reality, and the development of phenomena is a return to their source. This way of thinking can be found in the identical realism of the three above-described figures, and therefore it could be said that this is a special characteristic of Japanese-style idealism.

(Endnotes)

- 1 Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉, *Gakumon no susume* 学問のすゝめ [An encouragement of learning], 1st ed., in *Fukuzawa Yukichi shū* 福沢諭吉集 [Collected works of Fukuzawa Yukichi], ed. Ishikawa Takeshi 石川雄, Kindai Nihon shisō taikai 2 近代日本思想大系2 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1975), p. 4.
- 2 See Nishi Amane 西周, "Ronri shinsetsu" 論理新説 [New theory of logic] and "Bimyō gakusetsu" 美妙学説 [Theory of aesthetics] in *Nishi Amane zenshū* 西周全集 [The complete works of Nishi Amane], ed. Ōkubo Toshiaki 大久保利謙, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Munetaka Shobō, 1960).
- 3 Nishi, *Nishi Amane zenshū*, vol. 1, p. 19.
- 4 Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎, *Kaikyū roku* 懐旧録 [Reminiscences], in *Inoue Tetsujirō shū* 井上哲次郎集 [Collected works of Inoue Tetsujirō], ed. Shimazono Susumu 島蘭進 and Isomae Jun'ichi 磯前順一, vol. 8 (Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan, 2003).
- 5 Inoue Enryō 井上円了, *Junsei tetsugaku kōgi* 純正哲学講義 [Lectures on pure philosophy] in *Inoue Enryō zenshū* 井上円了全集 [The complete works of Inoue Enryō], ed. Tōyō Daigaku Sōritsu Hyaku Shūnen Kinen Ronbunshū Hensan Iinkai 東洋大学創立一〇〇周年記念論文集編纂委員会, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tōyō Daigaku, 1987), p. 34.
- 6 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1026a24.
- 7 Inoue Enryō, *Tetsugaku issekiwa* 哲学一夕話 [Talks from a philosophical night], vol. 1, in *Inoue Enryō zenshū*, vol. 1, p.

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- 8 Inoue, *Tetsugaku issekiwa*, vol. 2, in *Inoue Enryō zenshū*, vol. 1, p. 66.
- 9 Ōnishi Hajime 大西祝, "Testugaku issekiwa dai ni hen wo yomu" 哲学一夕話第二篇を読む [Reading talks from a philosophical night, volume 2], *Rikugō zasshi* 六合雑誌 [Cosmos magazine] no. 79, July 1887 (Meiji 20).
- 10 This can be said regarding Inoue Tetsujirō as well.
- 11 Nishi Amane defines philosophy as the "generalization principle" (*sōkatsu no ri* 総括の理) in his *Hyaku gaku renkan* 百学連環 (Encyclopedia), and as the "unification view" in his *Shōhaku sakki* 尚白劄記 (Shōhaku writings).
- 12 Enryō also calls the theory of evolution the "great theory of change" (*daikasetsu* 大化説) and the "theory of circular change" (*rinkasetsu* 輪化説). These names are used to refer to progression and retrogression as well as their periodic recurrence.
- 13 Inoue Enryō, *Tetsugaku shin'an* 哲学新案 [A new philosophical theory], *Inoue Enryō zenshū*, vol. 1, p. 401.
- 14 Ibid., p. 374.
- 15 Nitta Yoshihiro 新田義弘, "Inoue Enryō no genshō soku jitsuzai ron" 井上円了の現象即実在論 [Inoue Enryō's identical realism], in *Inoue Enryō to seiyō shisō* 井上円了と西洋思想 [Inoue Enryō and western thought], ed. Satō Shigeo 佐藤繁雄 (Tokyo: Tōyō Daigaku Inoue Enryō Kenkyūkai, 1988)
- 16 Inoue, *Tetsugaku shin'an*, p. 355.
- 17 Enryō's complete model of the universe is as follows:



- 18 For example, in his discussion of the "back view," Enryō states, "Since rationality and belief both contain the nature of the infinite, one can not only realize the absolute of the mind's suchness, but also come into contact with the marvelous essence of the one suchness" (Inoue, *Tetsugaku shin'an* 375-376).
- 19 Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎, "Genshō soku jitsuzai ron no yōryō" 現象即実在論の要領 [The gist of identical realism], *Tetsugaku zasshi* 哲学雑誌 [Philosophy magazine] 13 no. 123, p. 381.
- 20 Inoue Tesujirō, "Ninshiki to jitsuzai to no kankei" 認識と実在との関係 [The relationship between knowledge and reality], *Tetsugaku zasshi* 13 no. 123, p. 147.
- 21 Inoue, "Ninshiki to jitsuzai to no kankei," p. 197.
- 22 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Vorrede, Hegel Werke in Zwanzig Bänden, Suhrkamp Verlag, Bd.3, S.22.
- 23 In the English translation of *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu*, *The Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion*, *shukō* and *hanzoku* are respectively translated as "prince" and "subject." See Kiyozawa Manshi 清沢満之, *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu* 宗教哲学骸骨 [The skeleton of a philosophy of religion] in *Kiyozawa Manshi zenshū* 清沢満之全集 [The complete works of Kiyozawa Manshi], vol. 2, ed. Ōtani Daigaku 大谷大学 (Kyoto: Ōtani Daigaku, 2003), p. 59.
- 24 Ibid., p. 11.
- 25 See Kosaka Kunitsugu 小坂国継, "Kiyozawa manshi no yūgen mugen ron" 清沢満之の有限無限論 [Kiyozawa Manshi's theory of the finite and the infinite], *Basho* 場所 [Place] No. 12.
- 26 Kiyozawa, *Shūkyō tetsugaku gaikotsu*, p. 27.
- 27 Ibid., p. 27-28.
- 28 Kiyozawa Manshi, "Banbō sōkan no ri" 万法相関の理 [The principle of the interrelationship of all dharmas] in *Kiyozawa Manshi zenshū*, vol. 2, p. 749.
- 29 Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎, *Zen no kenkyū* 善の研究 [An inquiry into the good], ed. Kosaka Kunitsugu (Tokyo: Kōdansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 2006).
- 30 Nishida, *Zen no kenkyū*, p. 352.

- 31 Ibid., p. 352.
- 32 Ibid., p. 374.
- 33 Ibid., p. 440-441.
- 34 Ibid., p. 374-375.
- 35 Ibid., p. 349.
- 36 Ibid., p. 350.
- 37 Ibid. p. 197.
- 38 Ibid., p. 218.
- 39 Ibid., p. 404.
- 40 Regarding the relationship between *Zen no kenkyū* and the Yangming school of Confucianism, see Kosaka Kunitsugu, “*Zen no kenkyū* to yōmeigaku” 『善の研究』と陽明学 [*Zen no kenkyū* and the Yangming school of Confucianism], *Basho*, ed. Nishida Tetsugaku Kenkyūkai 西田哲学研究会 no. 4.
- 41 See Kosaka Kunitsugu, 小坂国継, “Hutatsu no benshōhō - Hegel to Nishida Kitarō” 二つの弁証法—ヘーゲルと西田幾多郎 [Two Types of Dialectic - Hegel and Nishida Kitarō], *Hihakushisō Kenkyū*, ed. Hikakushisō Gakkai 比較思想学会 no. 16.
- 42 Nishida, *Zen no kenkyū*, p. 173-174.
- 43 Nishida, *Zen no kenkyū*, p. 175.

Keywords: “identical realism” “mutual implication theory” “theory of the finite and infinite” “true experience theory”
“Spinozism”