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The Issue and Possibilities of the Study of International Philosophy: International Philosophy as a Philosophy with Origins in Multiple Lifeworlds

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In these times we live in, when we question the issue and possibilities of the study of international philosophy, as long as international philosophy is philosophy, it clearly has to be a philosophy capable of directly or indirectly inquiring the Fukushima nuclear accident that occurred on March 11, 2011.

At a time when the foundations for human survival as a social being are on the point of crisis—that is to say, at a point when the roots of culture that housing, food, and clothing comprising it have been overturned—philosophical studies naturally must be self-awareness of the fact that their own foundations are likewise on the verge of collapse. A nuclear accident is a manmade disaster, as too is global warming. All forms of pollution, and all wars, are the result of actions taken by humans. Philosophy has a decidedly important role to play for humans confronting this survival crisis as a field of scholarship that can take up human existence and all human activities—including scholarly research—as subjects of inquiry.

One of the central issues here is what the proper place and significance that natural science research—which underpins contemporary technological civilization—has in human existence as a social existence. It is impossible for Humans living to answer questions about what it means to apply technology based on natural science research and within what sort of framework it should be used without clarifying the scope of natural science research methodology. In answering these questions, we must also be able to clarify the methodology of research in the mental sciences, and be able to present a methodology for a philosophy that can unify all types of scholarship.

I hope that by doing this I can clarify the issues and possibilities of international philosophy in the future. In the work that follows, I will introduce the orientation of phenomenology, which represents the main current in contemporary philosophy that allows for comprehensive investigations of nature and the mind, and highlight some aspects of contemporary civilization, thoroughly imbued as it is with natural science research. I will also present some findings from various scientific studies of the mind and look at the study of philosophy in Japan, a field that through its reception of Western philosophy may indeed represent international philosophy.

1. A Philosophy investigating the essence of Science and Technology, and Establishing the Scope of Natural Science Methodology

Philosophy has functioned as a means for self-awareness among humans in every era. As a subject of inquiry, we must also take up the question of what the essence is of the technological civilization humans have achieved. That is to say, it must be able investigate the questions of how natural science research is undertaken and in what its results are applied. Of course, while philosophers may make inquiries regarding all aspects of human behavior, this is not to say that they will actually carry out natural science research. However, at this moment when nuclear power plant safety is a problem and specialists come forth with words like *sōteigai* (想定外, “the unexpected”) when talking about the scale of the earthquake and tsunami, I believe the role thrust upon philosophers is first to firmly point out that to “expect” (想定, *sōtei*) something is itself a “human act”

performed in this case by humans who are natural scientists—and hence it is natural scientists who did the expecting—and then to press for answers about the very methods that are used for “expecting” something.

Philosophers must be able to understand the basic framework and scope of natural science research methodologies, including such matters as what a natural scientist has in mind regarding “how to handle past data,” “how to process statistics,” and “how to establish causal relationships.” That is not all. The philosopher must also press for answers about how the so-called non-subjective “objective time and space itself” that provides the framework in which all data is collected, as well as that objectivity itself, are maintained when shedding light on nature through causal relationships, that is to say, when conducting repeated experiments and observations. Furthermore, questions must also be raised about whether or not it is possible for all of nature to be turned into data through objective space-time.

The first thing that must be said when we do this is that the “objective time and space” that natural scientists use in their experiments and observations are a “time and space that functions as a convention mutually agreed upon with other people. The “objective time and space” comes to be known in the form of knowledge through learning. In that regard, the time and space we experience directly gives meaning to a space centered on our bodies, such as “long when we are waiting for someone” or “good but brief,” “good but brief,” or “your left is opposite to my right,” namely, time expands and contracts, while the significance of space is taken from the locations of those respective bodies. We begin our inquiry into the scope of the methodology of the natural sciences by contraposing so-called objective time and space with the time and space we experience subjectively.

(1) I first present an example that shows most vividly the differences between how we understand the time and space we actually experience in our lives and the objective time and space as used in the natural sciences.

A noticeable change has occurred in recent years in the field of developmental psychology in terms of stance and research methods, with a shift from taking individual persons as the starting point for their research to relations between people (e.g., between parent and child). Daniel N. Stern, an American developmental psychologist who also works as a infant psychoanalyst, stands as the preeminent example of this. Stern puts stress on the importance to an infant’s development of shared emotional experiences communicated between the parent and child. In his view, emotional communications provide a foundation for healthy development, and the verbal communication is premised on them. Stern terms this communicating of emotions “affect attunement (something that is exactly like tuning a piano).” Stern, who also works as a infant psychoanalyst, emphasizes that it is even dangerous when someone is raised incapable of actually sensing other humans—i.e., “there are (other) people around” or “people are together with people”—in those cases in which there has been no affect attunement whatsoever between parent and child.

However, what is surprising is that Stern boldly rejects the idea of “interactional synchrony” between mother and baby when trying to demonstrate scientifically and causally the shared time required for vivid emotional exchanges between mother and child, because of an impossibility to verify through experiments for corroboration. Stern puts emphasis on the importance of affect attunement and shared emotional experiences in the mother-child relationship on the one hand, but on the other thinks that, viewed objectively, affect attunement does not occur simultaneously in precise. The point I want to raise here concerns the differences in the meaning of “simultaneity as a time rendered in numerical values” expressed using an apparatus such as “scientifically is not simultaneous” and the meaning of “simultaneity in actual experience” such as when emotions are in accord. Objective time as used in the natural sciences is expressed as a series of points in time on a time axis, with $+t$ for points to the right of zero (the origin of the coordinates) and $-t$ for points to its left. The future lies to the right of the zero point and the past to the left. If we were to measure the activity in the brain regions of the mother and baby on this time axis, and if for example the activity in their brains in response to a specific stimulus was off by 0.25 seconds, this would be regarded as “not truly simultaneous.” They could be called simultaneous when the present time for the zero points overlaps precisely. However, when affect attunement occurs—for example, when an infant is puzzled by a toy robot facing him that he is seeing for the first time and then tries to discern from his mother’s expression how he should respond—the emotions in the mother’s expression

are conveyed directly (i.e., affect attunement is produced between the pair). Just what can “simultaneity in numerical values” indicate about the simultaneity of when their emotions are in accord? Because they are able to share emotions at that time, the baby connects that to the appropriate behavior in response to them. The simultaneity of affect attunement with the mother is unimportant for the infant with whom it is produced. Meanwhile, would natural science even want to say that one or the other event was in the past since the zero points do not overlap? So, when is it that the past becomes the past in numerical terms? 0.1 seconds later . . . no, 0.05 seconds, no, 0.025, 0.0125 . . . there is no end of partitioning. Certainly, as long as none can arrive at the zero point, a point in time cannot express the question of when the past begins.

Thus, when the past is indeterminate, the future is likewise, and even the present is not something determinable as a point in time, so from just where does a point in time on the time axis derive the meaning of anterior-posterior relationships in time—things like being “simultaneous,” or “the past,” or “the future”—and to what specific points of time are we applying those points? In the world of physical quantities measured in terms of so-called objective time and space, not only does the passage of time in terms of “now, the past, or the future” lack meaning, but space in terms of “up-down, right-left, backwards-forwards” lacks meaning as well. It is always the human subject that assigns meaning. That said, the human subject does not arbitrarily decide the anterior-posterior relationships among events and assign them meaning in terms of “past,” “present,” and “future.” Like “water gone under the bridge,” things that are gone into the past become past and cannot be assigned the meaning of “future.”

On the other hand, quantities of radiation expressed in numerical figures in terms of millisieverts or microsieverts that cannot be sensed are a threat to the lives of these humans who assign such meaning. However, just like time and space, the meaning that these numerical figures have comes precisely because they have a direct effect on the life and death of those life-forms that give meaning to the world. However, this is the same thing as the world of physical quantities itself lacking any meaning whatsoever. The distinction between the world of physical quantities expressed in numerical figures and the world of living beings that assign meaning to that world of physical quantities is fundamentally important.

(2) There are other examples for revealing the scope of the methodology of the natural sciences that use objective time and space and carry out repeated experiments and observations. Ironically, those limits are revealed in the most important research finding from the increasingly talked-about field of neuroscience research. That finding is Benjamin Libet’s discovery of the “half second delay in consciousness.”

The gist of Libet’s theory is as follows: [1] consciousness is produced after a 0.5-second delay of brain activity that does not reach the consciousness, [2] our experience of simultaneity with reality is produced by referring back to the primary evoked potential (EP) response of the cerebral cortex (i.e., the electrical response that occurs 0.03 seconds after the stimulus arrives at the cortex) that is recognized with the start of the external sensory stimulus 0.5 seconds later by the human subject, and [3] human free consciousness is assured by the ability to consciously ‘veto’ that action 0.1 to 0.2 seconds before a conscious behavior is shifted into practice (that is to say, 0.3 to 0.4 seconds after unconscious activity in the brain begins).

The objectivity of this “half-second delay in consciousness” in [1] has been verified in corroborating experiments carried out by numerous neuroscientists. Consciousness really does take 0.5 seconds to be produced. Many criticisms have been raised regarding the assertions in [2] about the retroactivity of subjective time described as going back to the primary EP response and in [3] that the vetoing conscious guarantees free consciousness. The issue I want to focus on here is the fact these two points do not allow for self-awareness of the various premises and their limits included in the theoretical reason and practical reason in modern Western philosophy. Those premises and limits are the dualistic oppositional schema in epistemology of “the subject and the object” from theoretical philosophy, and the dualistic oppositional schema connected to practical reason of “free consciousness and causality in nature” from practical philosophy.

(a) “The subject and the object” here refer to the subject and the object that we see in no other than Libet when he tells us that the subject refers backward to the primary EP response from about 0.5 seconds before, or objectively about 0.5 seconds after. Consciousness is produced when the subject refers back to the primary EP response, while the content of the

consciousness that it is thus aware of is none other than the product (an objective fact) of the brain activity generated unconsciously for 0.5 seconds. This makes the case for an epistemological structure in which the conscious subject is the form and the object is the content in the form of cerebral activity. The subject produces consciousness in the form of duration and sheds light on the object—which is unconscious cerebral activity—as the content of that consciousness. This sort of cognitive scheme, in which actions (operations) are connected to the subject as form and content to the object is linked—by way of Aristotle’s form (*morphe*) and matter (*hyle*), the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, and that structure in Kant known as “the thing in itself” (*Ding an sich*) touched off by the formal *a priori* of the subject—to Libet’s argument in [3] regarding the “free consciousness to veto.”

b) Given the conscious veto is also a form of consciousness, a 0.5-second time lag might be thought of as required for that type of consciousness to operate as well, but Libet argues that the conscious veto alone does not unusually require 0.5 seconds. Setting aside this fundamental inconsistency, why is that free consciousness must be positioned at a point in time along the so-called objective time axis? It is so because, lapsing into so-called determinism, it is believed that causal relationships are defined through the anterior-posterior relationships of points in time along the time axis, and the nonconscious brain activity that occurs during that 0.5-second time lag winds up being established by the causal relationships in question as a natural activity. Thus, since unconscious cerebral activities are determined causally, some kind of intervention must take place during the causal process along the time axis; that intervention is held to be a conscious veto that itself does not require a time duration. However, as we will see below, free consciousness is not something that is assured only by contraposing with a determinism based on natural causation. The essence of consciousness cannot be understood in terms of alternatives like “natural causality versus free consciousness” or “the subject of consciousness versus the object of facts”.

2. Study of International Philosophy Formed Out of Multiple “Lifeworlds”

(1) New Ways of Understanding Consciousness and Unconsciousness: Conquest of the Dualistic Thought Scheme through Intentionality

[1] Consciousness, as neuroscientist Libet conceives of it, can be said to be conscious as a formal principle that is produced by the subject referring back to the primary EP response. This conscious subject can be conscious of the content of its consciousness as an object by shedding light on unconscious cerebral activity. In contrast, the essence of “consciousness” as presented in Husserlian phenomenology consists in overcoming from the start such dualistic oppositions as those of “subject and object” or “form and content.” Consciousness is always produced as a matter of being aware of something, always through being conscious of some sort of content. That is the essence of consciousness. To put it another way, the subject and the object are always regarded as having already been completed, as having already been bridged. This consciousness, as being related toward something and assigning meaning, has “intentionality” as its essence. And because intentionality always entails turning toward the world and going beyond it, it is also spoken of as “transcending”; the analysis of the way in which it goes beyond is called “transcendental analysis.” What’s more, someone is just aware of the various ways in which it is going beyond, that is to say, how the consciousness works as way of being related, precisely in the middle of it doing that work. We call this consciousness that is able to be conscious of how it itself works—a consciousness that we could also say is self-awareness—a “primal-consciousness” that cannot refer back any farther than that, a mirroring primal-consciousness.

[2] For a concrete example of this, look at how we regularly distinguish between voluntary and involuntary movement in our daily lives. We distinguish between intentional acts and those that occur before there is intention. Intentionally conscious movements are clearly distinguished from those instances when “a movement happens,” like when a body is moved in some way as during an earthquake. In the case of voluntary movement, we are self-aware and primal-conscious of the fact that we are moving our bodies on our own. In contrast, with involuntary movement, when a movement is going to happen, consciousness follows the movement and when the movement has already happened, there is still no consciousness of that

movement. However, even with the lack of consciousness, if this “a movement happens” is not something that still lies ahead, it is not possible to notice the difference with a movement that has already happened. This means that there must be some action that, without being conscious of it, leaves “a movement happens” as “a movement happens.” This action is called “retention” (an action in which past things are left behind) from prior to consciousness, or of the nonconscious state in a broad sense. What’s more, because this leaves this “action as action” without being conscious of it—because it assigns “the meaning of movement” to it—it is regarded as having intentionality. Further, we say it is “passive intentionality” in the sense that the action occurs before it rises to the consciousness and can later be accepted. In contrast, we describe intentionality that operates with being conscious of it and of consciously making things work, as in the case of voluntary movement as “active intentionality.” The feature of active intentionality is that one is self-aware and primal-conscious of the fact that it is working exactly while it is working.

[3] Setting aside retention in the case of voluntary movement when we are primal-conscious of our own movements, the fact that retention is revealed to be passive intentionality that operates unconsciously is of great importance. This is because the cerebral activity of which Libet speaks that operates unconsciously for 0.5 seconds would certainly not be determined as a natural causal relationship in Husserlian phenomenology. Rather, kinesthesia is regarded as a (so-called pre-constructed) process created through retention as passive intentionality prior to consciousness. The fact that it is not deterministically defined by causality comes from and is demonstrated by the apodictic evidence (Ger. apodiktische Evidenz) of the primal-conscious. Consequently, at this stage, the conflict between natural causation and free consciousness does not yet arise. Since passive intentionality is still intentionality despite being nonconscious, it cannot be determined as a causal relationship and operates as something that assigns “motivation and meaning.” Also, since it does not rise to the conscious level, it is not in the same dimension as the activities of a free consciousness that makes comparisons and judgments. What this reveals and establishes is the domain in which passive intentionality functions to assign motives for living in a domain that comes before the either-or, two-dimensional conflicts of “natural cause and free consciousness”.

[4] Moreover, kinesthesia is not simply the only thing that remains in unconscious retention as passive intentionality. When, for example, when a room has suddenly become quiet, we notice that an air conditioner is on. In this case, without paying any special attention to it or even noticing it, we continue to hear the sound of the air conditioner, which is retained and remains. This is because if that were not the case, no contrast would arise with the sound of an air conditioner that could no longer be heard and a change in sound would not be noticed. Another example is when lost in a book we happen to notice that our surroundings have gotten dark and our feet cold. Since the brightness and warmth have been retained without being consciously aware of it, We notice the change in the sight to the effect that it has grown dark through the contrast with the brightness we have retained, and notice the change feeling in the body of having grown cold through the contrast with the warmth that has been unconsciously retained. That’s not all. As we live, without our being aware of it, our anticipations of the future already take place in the dimension of sensations. For example, sometimes when we walk while thinking about something, we nearly trip and fall from not noticing bumps in the road. What happens is that when we first start to fall over, we stumble over a bump that went unnoticed precisely because we put our feet forward supposing that there would be no bumps ahead, that is to say, making the supposition without directing the attention of our consciousness to the road’s flatness. This unconscious supposition as a matter of anticipating the future is called “protention” in Husserlian phenomenology. Thus, the retention and protention that always work unconsciously in all sensations work in the background. What this means is that we have to say that the domain of feelings, such as sensations and sentiment, is produced through passive intentionality, and is produced prior to dualistic oppositional schema, such as “material (natural) causality and freedom of the mind (conscious)”.

(2) Lifeworld Produced from the Twofold Structure of Feeling’s Passiveness and Intellect’s Activeness

[1] Persistence and change in sensation is produced through retention and protention—which function unconsciously—by

operating as passive intentionality. This unconscious retention and protention of sensation is regarded as arising in the domain of feeling as “passive synthesis,” by a regularity of “association (Assoziation)”, as spoken of above, that is the “contrast” when there is change and “similarity” when there is persistence. While I may throw around words like “association” and “passive synthesis,” what I am talking about is not a particularly difficult thing. The ways in which “affect attunement” and “inter-affectivity”—which as Stern notes in his development psychology work occur unconsciously between mother and child—are generated can be called “association” and “passive synthesis.” Why we have to use such vocabulary is that regardless of whether we are dealing with relations between a mother-child or those between adults, philosophical study needs to go through the “methodical doubt” followed in Descartes that allows us to critically examine all methodologies of scholarship. Compared with the strictness of philosophical inquiries over the evidence of consciousness (including nonconsciousness) in others (known as the theory of reciprocal subjectivity or of intersubjectivity), methodologies in which the discovery of mirror neurons—which are believed to capture the behavior of others, and the discovery of which is regarded as representing the most cutting-edge finding in the neurosciences—or Stern’s arguments regarding affective movement in the mother-child relationship, is so simple that those methodology cannot withstand critical examination. We cannot hand over the foundational theories of affective and linguistic communications—which can be said to set the stage for all behavior in human social life—to these research orientations with their lack of self awareness in the methodologies of natural science.

[2] Husserl, in his 1936 work, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, saw a crisis in all European scholarship residing in the mathematization of our daily lives (what is called the lifeworld, or *Lebenswelt*, in phenomenology) first introduced by Galileo. Mathematization refers to measuring all natural phenomena in numerical terms, deriving natural laws from that, and then applying them not only to natural phenomena but also to the whole of human life. Mirror neuron theory, which has been described by neuroscientist Vilayanur S. Ramachandran as one of the most important discoveries in neuroscience of the past decade, suggests that at the same time that we understand the intentions of another person’s behavior, the difference between the other person’s behavior and our own is to be found in the difference in the firing rates of the mirror neurons in each person. Our mirror neurons fire at a higher rate when we pick an apple and eat it than when we see that another person pick an apple and eat it and we understand what that person is doing. There is a numerical difference. It is the second coming of the lie detector, which no one talks about anymore. On the other hand, in the domain of the evidence for consciousness that is disinterested and not related to quantitative differences of this sort, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary movement given without a doubt to each person is given by the primal-conscious. “Consciousness about the difference between your body and another person’s” is also clear primal-conscious of itself in the presence or absence of kinesthesia. We must not forget that the neuroscience research itself proposes that the qualia of all sensations including kinesthesia cannot be derived from the regularity of quantities.

[3] Husserl responded to the mathematization of the lifeworld by advocating a reinstatement of humans, who live in the totality of feeling and intellect. He clearly laid out a philosophical orientation in the form of transcendental phenomenology as one capable of integrating researches in the natural sciences. The distinctive element here is to be found in seeing in basic attitudinal differences how humans live in their lifeworlds. Husserl calls the attitude of simply living without giving any particular reflection to the mechanisms and makeup of daily life the “natural attitude”. Living based on the worldview of the natural sciences is called the “naturalistic attitude.” The “personalistic attitude” describes living in recognition that the other people who are members of society are personalities. Finally, to make investigations as philosophy regarding the basic essence of those attitudes and their genesis is called the “transcendental attitude.” We can say that in the transcendental attitude, what kind of methodologies that the naturalistic attitude takes as its premise in natural science research can be clarified and the conditions in various social systems that the personalistic attitude needs to be able to function in society can be elucidated. For humans confronting the crisis of technological civilization caused by technological civilization, we can say that securing a “lifeworld” that makes living itself possible based on these various attitudes is of vital importance. As a result, finding the

proper place for natural science research in the social systems in which the personalistic attitude is made possible must be established in the transcendental attitude, which is capable of methodologically integrating all fields of scholarship.

(3) The Issue of International Philosophy in Japan and Its Possibilities

[1] In its essence, the personalistic attitude belongs to the self-awareness that humans do their living only in relationships as a totality having both feeling and intellect. Human relationships are based on direct “affective communications” and on linguistic communications that operate through the medium of words; their origins and foundations lie in each social system. When trying to position natural research in the social system, a necessity for investigating regarding personalistic attitude when trying to position natural research in the social system is shown clearly through the manmade disaster of the nuclear accident that occurred in March of this year [2011]. I was filled with unbearable anger toward myself for having been consuming electric power with no clear awareness of where that electricity was being generated, no interest in the sorts of expectations natural scientists had as expressed in safety standards, and being indifferent toward the government’s overall energy policies. I was fine as long as I could use my computer and the power did not go out. Meanwhile, economic rationality and efficiency have been the top criteria for making judgments when it came to radioactive contamination problems or the various pollution lawsuits. Money is the key. Finance. GDP growth. During the years after the war when Japan’s economy was growing, people started calling Japanese “economic animals.” While I as someone studying philosophy could not think about myself that way at all, I was aware of the fact that it applied to me when I came back from Germany and began to work at a Japanese university. When I was student, I met Mori Arimasa’s notion that “It will take a century for Japanese to understand something like personality” as well as the comment of a French woman who was visiting Japan during those days and, having been exposed to how Tokyo people lived, said that “Japan really is probably where the third atomic bomb will be dropped.” Now I keenly sensed every day the real meaning of such things.

[2] Kuwako Toshio, a philosopher who has moderated or chaired various committees and talks among the persons involved on the occasion of resolving pollution problems concerned with public works, and Maruyama Tokuji, a philosopher involved for many years in the Minamata pollution lawsuits, have both made a number of points in common. First, they say that the separation of powers, which is a basic principle of democracy (i.e., the mutual independence of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary), does not function in Japanese society. Also, they note the fact that research on causality—the problem of natural science research—is used expediently by government lapdog scholars in the stock phrase, “A causal relationship could not be established.” There is a big difference here with Germany. There, if actual damage has been caused, the government is legally bound to take preventive measures even before the causal relationships have been elucidated (this is *Vorsorgeprinzip* as the precautionary principle introduced in the 1970s as the basic principle of environmental legislation and policy). In fact, the so-called “consensus formation” through “discussion” called for when the interests of the parties conflicted is consensus among supporters after the people who are opposed stop attending the “discussions.” The reason they do not show up for these talks is, in short, due to mental oppression. The techniques of oppression are elaborate. For example, “causal relationships have not been confirmed,” which draw on the specialist knowledge of the government-lapdog scholars and “the refusal to investigate causal relationships (setting them as unexpected, as something not to be brought into the realm of so-called expectation),” and legislation to suit the administration, administrative rationality in which judicial rationality is premised. Backing is given to supporters, fictitious conflicts and antagonisms are stirred up (that is to say, staged), using the public interest as a pretext, they cut the roots of “affective communication” among the people rooted in a given community. In other words, the pain in the hearts of individual people that are hard to put into words are contained and suppressed as being “the ego of those persons.” Among my acquaintances is a midlevel bureaucrat who works at a city hall and that person tells me that most of the people involved in administration are familiar with this machinery of oppression and suffer the pangs of conscience in their day-to-day work. However, because reform cannot come from the inside—people do have to live with their families—he asked me to criticize it from the outside. This clearly shows just how difficult it is for someone in Japan to adopt the personalistic attitude,

living in the totality of feeling and intellect.

[3] So, looking back, we see that philosophical study in Japan has always been international philosophy since the Meiji period. Philosophical studies based mainly on Western philosophy seem frequently to go through a process in which the work begins as the study of philosophy of foreign countries and, while the scholar pursues those studies, those features that distinguish how Japanese feel and think about things become clear. On this occasion, what's important and what they continue to do is to acquire proficiency in the language of that country and accumulate experiences living with not just that country's linguistic communications but also the affective communications that function as the foundation for them.

We can offer up Nishida *Kitarō's* philosophy of "pure experience" with its treatment of "beyond the dichotomy of subject and object" as providing the archetypal example in which Western philosophy wound up reaffirming Japanese traditional culture as it was being received. In my view, Nishida's idea of pure experience is precisely the same as the "I-Thou relationship" proposed by scholar of discourse philosophy Martin Buber; Nishida's concept of "space" can be paired with the concept of "*das Zwischen* (Between)". This correspondence relationship is not just an intuition. It can be demonstrated in a more rigorous epistemological and ethical analysis performed through a philosophical inquiry into Husserl's notion of "intersubjectivity", which entails questioning the origins of the fundamental sameness and differences of the self and other subjects. That is to say, it can be demonstrated through the elucidation of the "personalistic attitude" in "intersubjectivity". Such analyses show that that reality in Nishida's pure experience shares its essence with the "I-Thou relationship" in which "as forgetting the self I immerse in things. However, as Mori Arimasa points out, we must mention a distinctive feature of the concept of pure experience in that it does not entail passing through the "I-It relationship" that is the premise for Buber's "I-Thou relationship". The "I-It relationship" is pushed to the background and treated lightly. The "I-It relationship" is an attitude that thoroughly imbues objective observations and the world of the absolute third person. It is the third person when we are talking about a third-party organization in the case of fact-finding surveys. The parent-child relationship is the basis for first- and second-person relationships, and as such we could say it's natural for affect to enter into them unadjusted. The opinions like Nakane Chie's concept of the "vertical society (based on "boss-henchman relationships")," Doi Takeo's "*amae* (indulgence)", and Mori Arimasa's "dyadic relations (I am none other than the You to you)" can be said to bear the vestiges of the "self-awareness of Japanese culture" that became apparent through contact with the culture of foreign countries. Social systems can be properly constructed only by making the "I-It relationship" their cornerstone.

On the other hand, we can also hear people from the industrial world saying that the essence of Japan's *monozukuri bunka* (culture of making things) is most clearly and precisely expressed in Nishida's notion of the "beyond the dichotomy of subject and object" in pure experience (see Maekawa Masao, *Maekawa wa naze "tobu" no ka, kyōdōtai, basho, sumiwake, monozukkuri tetsugaku*). However, establishing a social system where it is possible to form a society in which the space for pure experience is guaranteed—we cannot sit *zazen* at a temple in the polluted hotspot of Fukushima—and where we can concentrate on *monozukuri* itself has become clear in the accomplishment of the international philosophy opened to the philosophies of other countries. This is the most important issue for international philosophy in Japan in the future. We can indeed say that the possibilities of an international philosophy that can learn from the origins of other lifeworlds will be tested.

Conclusion

There are two points I emphasize with respect to the issue and the possibilities of international philosophy for the future that we have been considering up to this point.

- (1) Philosophy is something that can discern the scope of the methodology of the natural sciences. When differences and conflicts arise in the interpretation of data in a given domain of natural science research, it can interject itself into that debate and even suggest proper research directions for that specialized domain. For example, on an ethics committee dealing with biodiversity, philosopher Peter Janich regarded that philosophy played a part in constructing the foundations for debate to take place by analyzing concepts precisely to interject himself into a conflict that had grown so intense that debate was impossible over the traditional concept of "living things" among morphobiologists and genetic biologists. Philosophy can and must be the cornerstones for all learning.

(2) The reality of the affective communications that are based on sensibility must be verbalized through the understanding, must be clearly stated, and must be the standards for building and reforming the social system. The role that philosophers must seek to play is that of “verbalizing experience” (Merleau-Ponty). They must be able to produce the reality of first- and second-person relationships (the I-Thou relationship) into third-person observations using language, and by so doing establish the conditions for social systems in which I-Thou relationships (pure experience) can take shape. They must consistently have the attitude that they will respect the pain in the heart clamoring for something in the bodies of the persons involved to be expressed, wait for the moment when it is “put into words,” and as they are helping with it they bear witness to it. Of course, this is directly connected to the effort of putting their own sensibility into words. This is the attitude of philosophical observation (Husserl’s transcendental attitude) that arises from humans who live in a lifeworld as the totality of sensibility and understanding.