Cancelling *Phantasmata*: the Fate and Function of the Inner Image

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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a reassessment of the 'inner image' as a dimension of subjectivity and cultural production. Recent artistic practice – object- and time-based as much as relational – does not position subjects that have anything like the *phantasmata* that were central to pre-modern thought or the mental imagery of modern psychology and philosophy of mind. Dominant discourse of 'the image', meanwhile, is not of something 'in' individual consciousness, but constitutive of a material, monist flux. Against such *doxa* this thesis argues that the inner image - as an unverifiable and incommunicable perception-like experience - has a *critical-utopian function:* critical in its evasion of communicative rationality and naturalized externality, utopian in its non-realization and incongruity with the immediate.

My procedure is to conduct close readings of episodes in theory and practice where the notion of an inner image is at stake. I begin by discerning the inner image in G E Lessing's *Laokoon* essay, and the utopian valence it holds; the plays of Villiers de L'Isle-Adam are then taken to dramatize a confrontation of 'metaphysical' inner images with Naturalist theatre; Roland Barthes's punctum is referred to cinematic montage – Eisenstein's, Brakhage's, and the single-shot films of de Rijke and de Rooij; I explore two modes of language in Conceptual Art - Marcel Broodthaers non-semantic materiality and Robert Barry's semantic immateriality. Lastly I turn to nueroscientific practice, and suggest the inner image's fate in recent attempts via brain-imaging to communicate with humans in a vegetative state.

The concerns of the written thesis are also those of my art practice of video, sound and writing; what is implicit in the latter is articulated explicitly in the former. The arguments developed here are intended, in turn, to contribute to the wider discussion of how to continue to think critical difference and the constitution of subjectivity.

DECLARATION

I affirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own.

Signed:

Date:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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The Status of the Inner Image

The following introduces the notion of an 'inner image' or *phantasma* in negative: by examining recent practices and critical discourses from which it is absent. The inner image's absence from a disparate range of forms – 'relational' and 'installation' art as much as the appearance of language *per se* in art's visual field – is both conceptual and empirical. That is, these forms are both predicated on their subjects *not being* subjects with 'inner' images, and, as apparatuses, do not *permit* 'inner' images. The section concludes with the discussion of an artwork that illuminates these assumptions by refuting them.

Imagination seems like a prosthesis affixed to the real so as to produce more intercourse between interlocutors[1]

Art premised on inter-human, or inter-subjective engagement – called variously 'relational', 'socially engaged' or 'dialogic' - does not position subjects who have inner images, as will be demonstrated in reference to the work of Rirkrit Tiravanija and Nicholas Bourriaud's critical account of it, and the work of artist group WockenKlausur, as explicated by Grant Kester.

The mainstay of Rirkrit Tiravanija's practice, from *Untitled 1992 (Free)* to its recreation as *Untitled (Free/Still)* (2007), is the cooking and serving of meals for gallery visitors. The practice is exemplary of the "convivial" relations that Nicolas Bourriaud identifies in art of the nineteen-nineties, defined most famously as

> an art that takes as its theoretical horizon the realm of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an independent and *private* symbolic space [1998, p14]

Art like Tiravanija's rejects modernism's other tenets, not least the attempt to form the "imaginary and utopian"; the meals instead *are* "ways of living and models of

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[1] Bourriaud, 1998, p80

[2] Pertinent here is Boris Groys's recently translated (though written in 2000) *Under Suspicion: A Phenomenology of Media.* With critique of the media – where suspicion that the media disguise and conceal truth is fundamental - as the point of departure, Groys posits "ontological suspicion", where to regard is to suspect: "[e]ssence, substance, God, force, matter, or Being are just a few of the many names for this hidden Other that

action within the existing real" [1998, p13], or "everyday micro-utopias" [1998, p31]. As they dine and converse, the humans taking part in - or constituting - work like Tiravanija's are not privately imagining 'something else': in their public presence and interlocution, they *are* that something else.

Relational art, moreover, foregrounds the inter-subjective dimension of 'art' in general: the art exhibition, uniquely among cultural forms, "produces a specific sociability" in that it allows "immediate discussion": "I see and perceive, I comment, and I evolve in a unique space and time" [1998, p16]. Relational art turns this capacity of the art gallery – for its objects to be talked over, rather than contemplated in "private symbolic space" - into an operational mode. Liam Gillick considers his own work "a backdrop to activity. … If some people just stand with their backs to the work and talk to each other then that's good." [Gillick, 2000, p16]

While the fault of television and literature is to "refer each individual … to his or her space of private consumption" [Bourriaud, 1998, p15], what is essential to Bourriaud's conception of relational art is not the co-existence or co-presence of its subjects (theatre and cinema "bring small groups together", albeit "before specific, unmistakable images" [1998, p16]) but that these subjects *speak*. "Thought," as Bourriaud quotes Tristan Tzara, "is made in the mouth" [1998, p40]; "[r]eality is what I talk about with a third party." [1998, p80]. Thought is inseparable from speech, experience from its articulation. It is not only a disinclination for attendees to Tiravanija's exhibitions to appreciate the taste of soup in silence; it is that relational art's subjects *do not have unsaid thought*: their interior is subsumed by and assimilated to the exterior. Thus behavior or activity is only that which is external and publically observable. The non-speaking contemplative subject appears to relational art as the novel-reading owner appears to the dog:

> [H]ow insensible, each of us, to all that makes life significant for the other! … As you sit there reading the most moving romance you ever fell upon, what sort of a judge is your fox-terrier of your behavior? With all his good will toward you, the nature of your conduct is absolutely excluded from his comprehension. … What queer disease is that that comes over you every day, of holding things and staring at them like that for hours together, paralyzed of motion and vacant of all conscious life? [James, 2010, p146]

Such a "queer disease", then, is what the inner image looks like from the outside, and what practices like Tiravanija's, conceptualized by Bourriaud, are intent on curing.[2]

Discursivity without Remainder

Another variant of art that takes human interaction rather than perception as its operative mode is exemplified by the practice of Austrian artist group WochenKlausur. Where the work described by Bourriaud takes place in art galleries, WochenKlausur's projects (though sponsored and initiated by art institutions) take place 'in public', working directly with local populations. And while Bourriaud's relational practices therapeutically purge their subjects of interiority[3], it is sociopolitical ills that WochenKlausur's projects set out to cure.

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> Evidently, the hypothesis of thinking is nothing but the effect of the observer's suspicion that the speaker does not "think" what he says – or, in other words, that things are different inside the speaker from the way they appear on the medial surface of his speech. Thinking as such cannot be defined other than by means of this possible discrepancy between exterior and interior, that is, as the hidden Other of language. [2012, p51]

Thought, then, is only the suspicion "spontaneously aroused in the observer when he watches the other speak" [2012, p51]. What Groys expresses ironically is something of the "behaviouristic" attitude exhibited as much by this relational art as the by the neuroscientific assessment of consciousness discussed in chapter 5.

[3]Except Douglas Gordon, whose practice emphasizes self-division both thematically and performatively, and Bourriaud calls "the "wild" dimension of … interactivity" – "acting parasitically and paradoxically in the social space" [1998, p32].

Typical of the latter took place in 1994. Invited by the Shedhalle in Zurich to conduct a project involving drug issues, the group set up a shelter for homeless, drug-addicted sex workers. To obtain support for the intervention, experts in the field of drug issues – as well as the mayor and chief of police - were sent out on Lake Zurich in a boat, where they were able to exchange views without any public exposure. A modest consensus was achieved, and the plan for the women's shelter was realized. More recently (and ultimately less successfully), was an *Intervention to Overcome Social Barriers* (2006) in Leeds, to where WochenKlausur were invited "to implement a proposal to improve the communication between diverse quarters of the city" [WochenKlausur, 2006]. Advantaged and deprived districts were joined in the undertaking of "small projects" [ibid.], facilitated by the artist group, that involved local associations, NGOs, businesses and politicians from both wealthier and poorer areas.

Grant Kester [2004] understands these small projects, and specifically the Zurich boat trips, as what Jürgen Habermas, in his attempt to construct a model of subjectivity based on communicative interaction, calls "ideal speech situations". In these, "every subject with the competence to speak is allowed to take part in discourse," "everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever," "everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever," and "everyone is allowed to express his or her attitudes, desires and needs."[Habermas, 1991, p89] Habermas's concept of an ideal speech situation captures that aspect of the Zurich boat trip whereby those on the boat were unmonitored and free to speak outside their official capacities and *a priori* 'positions'. What is assumed by the ideal speech situation so applied, then, is that the participants *have* 'real', ideologically uninflected "attitudes, desires and needs", and that these *can* be expressed and understood. Such "universal communicability" is, however, according to Theodor Adorno, a "liberal fiction" [1974, p80] and moreover, a form of oppression: that which is not already known, inasmuch as it is not heard, is censored. The ideal of full, transparent communicability is yet defended by Michael Dummett, for whom it is the essence of "thought" - as opposed to other "private" objects of mind such as mental images - that it be *transferable*:

I can convey to you exactly what I am thinking. … I do more than tell you what my thought is like – I communicate to you the very thought. Hence any attempt to investigate thought which culminates in a study of what is in essence private, that is, of inner mental experience, must have missed their mark." [1978, pp116-7]

Dummett's suggestion is that thought can be fully communicated and understood by anyone – is essentially public - because it excludes the non-discursive. But as Jay Bernstein (following Adorno) points out,

> If my thought about an object is somehow dependent on a mental image, if my experience of an object enters essentially into my thought about it, then any proposition about the object will include something not transparently communicable or fully expressible. [2001, p220]

In these terms thought cannot be so easily handed over "like a trinket" [ibid.]: the non-discursive is unexpressed and private, a "remainder". On WochenKlausur's boat, then, are subjects engaged in total communication, "exchanging views" and freely expressing "his or her attitudes, desires and needs" - and subjects without mental images.

The most important part of the experience is that you do not know what is inside and outside your head

There are other modes of artistic production that aim at reversing psychological and egological assumptions about aesthetic experience. The *immersive installation* is one of these where, put crudely, rather than there being an object that causes something to happen 'in' the subject, the subject is 'in' something happening. The immersive installation is concerned not with participation in a social field, however, but with immersion in a sensory field, from which language is prohibited, rather than obligated. The following will briefly suggest the status of inner images in such situations.

The immersive installation hyperbolically articulated is the *mist room*: a brightly lit enclosed space filled with a constantly-replenished fine spray of water, amongst which 'viewers' move about. Ann Veronica Janssens's *Blue, Red and Yellow* (2001) is one example, Anthony Gormley's *Blind Light* (2007) is another. Entering one of Janssen's rooms, Mieke Bal finds that "the dense, impenetrable mist packed into the space", whose limits she "could not even guess", is so bright and luridly coloured that "it seemed made out of kitsch fantasies of heaven." As her eyes and proprioceptive sense adjust the "absolute opacity of the white that surrounded" her recedes and she becomes "aware of [her] own dissolution" [Bal, 1999, p20]. Gormley's installation is couched in terms of contained environmental

experience - "[y]ou enter this interior space that is the equivalent of being on top of a mountain or at the bottom of the sea … inside it you find the outside" - but the intended result is the same: "you become the immersed figure in an endless ground, literally the subject of the work." [Gormley, 2007]

Dissolution of the self – literally forming a *solution* with the work – is the priority, and is putatively achieved by not *representing* space, light and so on, but by presenting these elements directly. Sensory *immediacy* is the result: coloured light without, or at least deferring, subjectivity's determinations. If, as Adorno suggests, "[d]istance is a phenomenon of works of art that transcends mere existence: their absolute proximity would mean their absolute integration" [1973, p460], the attempt here is explicitly to integrate with that mere existence. The 'aesthetic distance' refused in the symbiosis of observer and work is not only the refusal of a Kantian disinterestedness, nor of the possibility of conceptual 'grasp' or 'overall view', but of the distance in which the subject searches for any 'inner' images - hypotheses, recollections, and associations.[4]

An exhibition by James Turrell in 2010 includes a work in the mist room vein, *Dhatu* (2010), where what from the outside appears to be a luminous pink screen is in fact the open side of a recessed, brightly lit room, which the subject enters, then being putatively 'in' the colour. One of the artist's *Ganzfeld,* or 'total field' series, *Dhatu* is, according to one commentator, "much better when you can see the block colour without other people standing in the way" [Gompertz, 2010]. If with *Dhatu*, the presence of other subjects impedes the loss of self to pure sensation, then *Bindu Shards,* presented in the same exhibition*,* achieves it by being constructed to be individually experienced. The work is what Turrell calls a 'perceptual cell': an enclosed globe – evoking both medical technology and trade fair gimmick - in which the participant lies and for several minutes and is bombarded with strobing lights that trigger hallucinations of space and depth,[5] or

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[4] Michael Fried's notion of 'absorption' should not go with mention here. Absorption, for Fried, is an effect of the artwork 'ignoring' the beholder, producing a "perfect trance of involvement" or enthrallment and prolonged concentration [Fried, 1988, p103]. Self-consciousness compromises absorption, resulting in 'theatricality', of which postmodernism in general is guilty.

[5] A phenomenon well accounted-for, not least by William Burroughs, who in the 1960s produced his own stroboscopes or *"Dream Machines"*. "I looked into it," writes Alan Ginsberg, "it sets up optical fields as religious and mandalic as the hallucinogenic drugs – it's like being able to have jewelled biblical designs and landscapes without taking chemicals' [quoted in ter Meulen et al., 2009, p319]. Worth noting is the contrasting

as one critic experienced, of "an ever-changing pattern of flowers, crystals, galaxies, quasars and nebulae … defined by colours that change convulsively". The same writer, Jonathan Jones, continues:

> [T]he most important part of the experience is that you do not know what is inside and outside your head. I saw a space, or rather an ever-changing succession of spaces, but these were independent of any actual material reality – they existed only in my head. … The whole of space seems compressed into your skull. [Jones 2010][6]

The grammatical choice is suggestive: rationalized retrospectively as being "only in my head", in the present tense of the experience "*you do* not know *what is* inside and outside your head". As quasi-perceptual (like perception but occurring without the stimuli that would cause the perception, or "independent of any actual material reality"), the representations and colours *are* 'inner'. But the localizing happens after the fact: the *experienced* totalization of the inner image – intensive and extensive amalgamated - cancels 'inner' as predicate. As such, the images are not introspected. Enacting the logic of the spectacle that, as Jonathan Crary observes, "prescribes the production of separate, isolated, but not introspective individuals' [2001, p79], *Bindu Shards* turns 'inwardness' *inside out*.

Depthlessness

Several of film-maker Emily Wardill's works are understood to foreground the materiality of language over semantic transparency, or as Wardill puts it, to pursue the "idea of there being a materiality to communication which is impossible to ignore and which can be used for political ends" [Wardill 2009]. Formal stuttering draws attention away from informational content and toward the "grain"[7]

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directions: Ginsberg looks "into it"; with *Bindu Shards,* "space seems compressed into your skull" – it looks into the percipient.

[6] Ironically – or maybe appropriately – for something absolutizing the '1st-person', the experience of *Bindu Shards* was largely known to the public second-hand, ekphrastically, through accounts like Jones's - booked-out as it was weeks in advance by the artworld elite [see Jones 2010].

[7] Barthes's famous "grain of the voice" is specifically associated with sound's expression of the *body* "the tongue, the glottis, the teeth, the mucous membrane, the nose" - rather than the soul.

of the voice itself: the actors in *Sick Serena and Dregs and Wreck and Wreck* (2007) are asked "to deliver their lines as though they were allergic to what they were saying" [Wardill 2010]; a non-native-English speaker provides a stilted, robotic-sounding voiceover for *The Diamond (Descartes's Daughter)* (2008). Foregrounding the voice-over's sound or form inhibits its denominative function, its 'framing' of the diegesis, the *identifying* of "the elements of the scene and the scene itself" [Barthes, 1977, p32]. Rather than functioning to frame the represented objects, the voice becomes an object in its own right and one of "the elements of the scene". This is really the "political ends" Wardill speaks of: the voice is demoted from a position of invisible, omniscient mastery, determining the perceptual field, to a position in the perceptual field itself.

In this manner Wardill continues the modernist avant-garde practice of emphasizing the spatial and acoustic qualities of linguistic signifiers over the signifieds they refer to: from the typographical and topographical constellations of Mallarmé's *Un Coup de Dés Jamais N'Abolira Le Hasard (1897),* Russian *Zaum* glossographia and Hugo Ball's glossolalaic Dada performances, through concrete poetry and sound poetry, Marcel Broodthaers's 'rebus' films and plaques, and onwards. Focusing on Anglo-American conceptualism – centrally Robert Smithson's *A Heap of Language* (1966) - Liz Kotz suggests the subversion of emphasizing materiality is, in that it is

> a way to wreck language and wreck art, and perhaps to disassemble and disable the larger systems of publicity and propaganda that used words and images to create fantasies of consumption and falsify reality. [Kotz, 2010, p2]

Frederic Jameson understands the foregrounding of spatial and acoustic materiality as a trait of the postmodern, following on the discreditation of the hermeneutic or 'depth model' of meaning, where what "in its inert, objectival form, is taken as a clue or a symptom for some vaster reality which replaces it as its ultimate truth" [Jameson, 1984, p195].[8] Effacement of depth means that the isolated signifier becomes ever more material or *"literal"*:

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[8] Cognition – or rather, *recognition* – as offence against material objecthood is well articulated in Alphonso Lingis's descriptions of the Andean Quechua people:

> You can wander the high Andes and, by night, hear the murmurs of the people around the fire, hear their Quechua tongue without understanding it, hear the light, subtle, supple tripping of their sounds, hear their intonations and their murmurs,

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> [I]n normal speech, we try to see through the materiality of words (their strange sounds and printed appearance, my voice timbre and peculiar accent, and so forth) towards their meaning. As meaning is lost, the materiality of words becomes obsessive … [A] signifier that has lost its signified has thereby been transformed into an image. [Jameson, 1982, p550]

It is these terms that Wardill's films are at least in part received. Dieter Roelstraete appeals to an "antiquarian shard of postmodern theory" when he offers that "writing composed of concrete images is a fairly accurate way of describing what Wardill does, even if … we are only half the time able to decipher, let alone understand." [2011, p77] Such writing is "not necessarily meant for comprehension … the question as to what lies behind it all is rendered profoundly problematic, if not meaningless entirely" [ibid.] This is all to say that, as Roelstraete's critical performance suggests (and to the detriment of the work's analysis), the postmodern refusal of the depth model is now *assumed*: it is not seen as a contingent critical move but as naturalized, as a given.

In what is arguably the primordial version of the depth model - Aristotle's formulation of the human voice as *semantikos psophos*, 'significant sound' [1987, 420b] – speech is differentiated from animal noises by being accompanied by *phantasmata*.[9] Without *phantasmatic* accompaniment, the sound is not voice but

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> hear it as the very resonance of their substance, their gentle, unassertive, vibrant, sensitive way of vocalizing together. […] But if you were to drink some magic potion, some cocktail of coca tea and whisky, and suddenly understood their language, and abruptly understood that they are speaking about "transporting cocaine into the hands of the Colombian agents," then abruptly you have subjected yourself to the codings of imperial society; you have suddenly related their sounds not to their own throats and substance but to the international code established by the reigning barbarian empire in Washington and Bonn and Tokyo, where cocaine means the same thing—crime. [Lingis, 1994, p112]

In Lingis's account, to understand is to have "subjected yourself to the codings of imperial society": comprehension equals domination. This entails a manifest primitivism: the Quechua have "intonations and … murmurs", rather than the language which is being used to describe them, as "the very resonance of their substance"; like Aristotle's non-human animals, their sounds "belong" to their own throats.

[9] The hyperbolic articulation of the belief in language's *phantasmata* is Joseph Addison's: "The reader finds a scene drawn in stronger colors and painted more to the life in his

the bare "impact of inbreathed air against the windpipe" [ibid.]. "Wrecked" language, then, is *psophos* minus *semantikos,* which does not evoke *phantasmata* in the listener, let alone convey the speaker's inner images. The images of such writing, *a*s signifiers without signifieds, are all 'outer', 'concrete', or empirical.

Roelstraete's characterization of Wardill's project, however, (in an urgency to fall back on "postmodern" meaninglessness) downplays language's other roles, as exemplified by *Sea Oak* (2008). Developed from interviews with members of the Californian think-tank the Rockridge Institute, *Sea Oak* consists of a 51-minute soundtrack on imageless black leader, playing on a spot-lit film projector. The interviewees discuss their research into contemporary political rhetoric, and its tendency to "create within peoples' minds frames which relate to their own sense of identity" [Wardill 2009]. Wardill agrees in interview that it was necessary that *Sea Oak* have no visual image-track because the Rockridge project is "about language on its own conjuring up images in the minds of individual listeners" [ibid.]. In his 'postmodern' drive, Roelstraete dismisses *Sea Oak* as merely confirming – like the decommissioned obsolescence of its projector – that the "left-wing enterprise of the analysis of language as a primary site of power has gone out of business" [2011, p73]. But removal of the visual track, surely, urges the viewer to attend to the acoustic track, and to what is being said: it is to *confirm* the importance of the analysis of language and its power of "conjuring up images in the minds of individual listeners". Attending to verbal analyses of verbal imagery, moreover, forces a kind of introspection on the listener, as they are made aware of how what they are listening to informs their own thought.

While the influence of Peter Gidal's *Close Up* (1983) - an almost entirely imageless film with a soundtrack of interviews with Nicaraguan revolutionaries – is manifest, *Sea Oak* displays the importance of structuralist film's exploration and exposure of how 'images' are arrived at. Disjunction of sound and visual image – the voice-over describing not the current picture in a series but the next – in Hollis Frampton's *Nostalgia* (1971), or in the same artist's *Poetic Justice* (1972), where written directions for shooting a film are placed one at a time before the camera, foregrounds the differences between putative verbal images and visual images

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imagination by the help of words than by an actual survey of the scene which they describe" [Addison, 'The Pleasures of the Imagination, VI', *Spectator,* no. 416, 1712, quoted in Mitchell, 1984, p515]. This pictorialism would come to be seminally refuted in Lessing's essay on the Laokoon.

projected on a screen.

When compared to the stuttering verbal deliveries of *Sick Serena ...* and *The Diamond, Sea Oak*'s interviews suggest, moreover, a consequence of 'wrecking' language in punishment for its part in the 'falsification' of reality and creation of "fantasies of consumption" [10]. The process that withdraws from systems of communication is the same process that removes language's *phantasmatic* accompaniment: *reification of the sign results.* As Benjamin Buchloh points out,

> This insistence on the autonomous physicality and pure semiotic presence of functionalized speech acts and commodified objects transformed the very opponent of reification – poetic language – into plasticity and objecthood.'
> [Buchloh, 1988, p74]

That is, reification of the sign both inhibits language's capacity to "create fantasies of consumption and falsify reality" *and* limits its capacity to transcend or negate reality.

Conclusion

The preceding sketch of the inner image's status in recent artistic practice has shown how one variant of 'relational' art assumes that its subjects only speak, or interact: they *do not have unsaid thought*. With their interior subsumed by and assimilated to the exterior, there is no*where* for inner images. Another variant of relational art assumes the full communicability of its subjects' thoughts because 'thought' is discursive and therefore wholly public. No non-discursive, inexpressible, private remainder is countenanced. The 'immersive' installation, meanwhile, emphasizes sensory *immediacy* at the expense of the cognitive *distance* that allows for hypotheses, recollections, and associations. In the name of 'self transcendence' these works demand an absorption that renders intensive and extensive undifferentiated, and introspection invalid.

It is critically assumed that language, as it appears in art's spatial field,

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[10] As the historical avant-garde does. For Hugo Ball, as the instrumental reason articulated by mass, industrialised warfare extended to - and is conveyed upon - language, it is by verbal means that Ball can respond: poetic glossolalia like "*gadji beri bimba ...*" is "a chance to get rid of all the filth that clings to this accursed language [of] this humiliated age" [1996, p8].

enjoys a characteristically postmodern *depthlessness*: that the materiality of the verbal signifier effaces any kind of signification. The reified sign, now an object among others, is inhibited from evoking images by the same politically-motivated disabling of its conceptual, denominative function.

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Defining and Accounting for *phantasmata*

Given the preceding examination of recent artistic practices, how might the putative 'inner image' in question be defined? Provisionally, as that which

a) *has sensory content, making it 'quasi-perceptual': like a perception but occurring in the absence of the stimuli that would cause the perception,*

and

b) *is 'private', in the sense of being incommunicable and in the sense of being empirically ('outwardly') imperceptible and unverifiable.*

This thesis will call this sensory-private image a *phantasma*, after that described by Aristotle. This is in the knowledge that Aristotle's hylomorphic epistemology makes *phantasmata* not 'inner' in the way that Descartes's or Locke's *ideas* are inner representations[11]. Rather, Aristotle's *phantasma* is taken in its capacity as a response to the problems created by the Empedoclean doctrine that things are known "by reference to something in soul which is like them" [1987, 410a12], or that *like knows like.* If there must already be an elemental correlation of soul and thing in order for the soul to know or perceive that thing, then where there is no correlation there is no thought or perception - all appearances must be true. 'Like knows like' means that perceiving and thinking *can only be about their cause.* Perceiving *p* will only be brought about by that object, *p*; believing *b* will be brought about by that state of affairs, *b*.[12] Aristotle thus introduces *phantasmata* – stored and reproduced by the *phantasia* - to account for – and allow - thought and perception to be other than correlative with the immediate environment's stimuli, *to deviate from the way things are:* (a) in the above definition.

The phantasma's afterlife in psychoanalysis (*Phantasie* as opposed to the philosophers' *Einbildungskraft*) is only partly relevant here. What is taken on is the 'therapeutic' effect of the phantasma's excision or cancellation, as in Breuer's claim to regularly relieve Anna O., "of the whole stock of imaginative products which she had accumulated since my last visit" [1895, p30]. Extraction of the

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[11] see Rorty, 1979, p45-6.

[12] This argument from the phantasma's intentionality is Victor Caston's, made, amongst other places, in Caston, 1996.

phantasma in this sense could be said to return thought and perception to *the way things are,* while resistance to this would emphasize (b), the phantasma's non-discursive incommunicability.

The inevitable association of *phantasmagoria* - the early nineteenth-century magic lantern displays, that concealed from the audience the means used to create the illusions - is also noted. The association of course connects up with the mystified fabrications and total sensory envelopment of James Turrell's special effects, and with the technological visual spectacle more generally. [13] *Phantasmagoria* would then entail, as it does for Turrell, a *cancellation* of any inner images, via their emulation and assimilation, rather their positing.

Proximate Accounts

How, then, to account for the *phantasma* and its status, as suggested in the first part of this introduction? The place of 'imagination' in visual aesthetics and literary theory is too well described; rather, it seems prudent to appeal to accounts that pertain to the characteristics of the 'inner image' in question.

Frank Kermode's *Romantic Image* (1957) is helpful in this regard. Kermode considers the formation of such an image – which is at heart Yeats's symbol – to be impelled by the twin beliefs in "a radiant truth out of space and time, and in the necessary isolation or estrangement of men who can perceive it" [2002, p4]. Its origins lie in criticism of societal materialism; its truth has "nothing to do with the intellect of scientists", but exists "in a condition of perfect unity and vitality' [2002, p124]. For the artist, to be "cut off from life and action … is necessary as preparation for the 'vision'" [2002, p9], which is what the poetry relays as image:

> utterly original and not in the old sense 'imitated'; 'concrete', yet fluid and suggestive; a means to truth, a truth unrelated to, and more exalted than, that of positivist science, or any observation depending upon the discursive reason; out of the flux of life, and therefore, under one aspect, dead; yet uniquely alive because of its participation in a higher order of existence, and because it is analogous not to a machine but to an organism; coextensive in matter and form; resistant to explication; largely independent of intention, and of any form of ethical utility … [2002, p53]

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[13] The phantasmagoria "figures Benjamin's Marxist-Freudian theory of base-superstructure relations in a society ruled by the commodity form" [Cohen, 1989, p87]

Kermode's sketch is useful in several ways. It suggests the assumptions of recent artistic practices that would excise exactly such an image: its *critiques* of originality and transcendent truth, its demand to include images *in* – if not make them constituent *of* – the "flux" of life, its concomitant intention to *end* subjective isolation. Meanwhile, it prepares us for the work of Villiers de L'Isle-Adam, which we will encounter in chapter 2, and the art-for-art's-sake aestheticism feeds into high modernist 'autonomy', which will inform our understanding of the inner image throughout.

Also important to my conception of the 'inner image' is Giorgio Agamben's reconstruction of medieval 'phantasmology' in *Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture (1993)*. Agamben presents Aristotle's "organic psychological theory" [1993, p75] as the first to explicitly posit the autonomous production and location of 'phantasms', and emphasizes the centrality of the phantasm to a wide variety of phenomena - indeed, the soul does not think without it – to imagining, remembering, dreaming, speaking and divination. It is Aristotle's phantasm that, "dramatized and enriched by borrowings from Stoicism and Neoplatonism" goes on to occupy "a central position in spiritual firmament of Middle ages" [1993, p77]. The contrast to the putatively rationalized present is noted:

> We moderns, perhaps because of our habit of stressing the rational and abstract aspect of the cognitive processes, have long ceased to be amazed by the mysterious power of the internal imagination ... that animates our dreams and dominates our waking moments more than we are perhaps willing to admit. [1993, p77]

Two art-historical narratives are suggestive of this loss of amazement. One is Rosalind Krauss's identification of a change in mid-twentieth-century art's mode of address from 'private' to 'public'. Rhetoric of 1950s abstract expressionists made the work's 'meaning' to be the transcription of the artist's inner emotions. Predicated on an analogy "between the psychological interior of the artist and the illusionistic interior of the picture", the surface of the work acts as a map of the artist's "inner, inviolable self" [Krauss, 1977, p256] - Rothko's "*tableau vivant* of human incommunicability" [Rothko, 2002, p571-3].[14] Minimalist sculptors, claims

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[14] A more charitable (and here more pertinent) version of abstract expressionism's individualistic, almost ascetic aspect, is socio-historical: "internal exile was a way of

Krauss, reverse this: "in both their choice of materials and their method of assembling them, were intent to deny the interiority of the sculpted form" [Krauss, 1977, p254], and, hence to "refute the uniqueness, privacy, and inaccessibility of experience" [1977, p259] itself.

In positing a minimalist refutation of individualized interiority - which is arguably reiterated in the more recent move from hermeneutic reception to impersonal *affect* (see Alberro, 2009) - Krauss's concern is with an artistic 'inner self' and the artwork's expression of it, rather than the work's *reception,* or the subject 'positioned' by the work. However 'public' and dismissive of private interiority, these sculptures are still *viewed* by individuals: perceptions that leave meaning lodged in the subject.

Another pertinent account is intimated by John Roberts in *The Intangibilities of Form* (2007), who finds in certain art practices of the 20th-century a progressive movement away from 'first person' expression, aesthetics, and "the whole panoply of possessive individualism inherent in the Cartesian Theatre" [2007, p125]. Modernism's "aggressive Cartesianism and asocial aestheticism" [2007, p128] is radically undermined first by Duchamp and again by Warhol's 'Factory', to be fully rejected by Conceptualism, with its repertoire of techniques borrowed from manifold non-artistic fields of production. This demonstrates to Roberts that "the artist's voice becomes subordinate to the forces of reproducibility and general social technique" [ibid.].

Again, Robert's thesis is specifically concerned with the figure of the artist and artistic labour, rather than any receptive or specular labour: the trajectory charted is toward collective practices that have no place for a viewer as such. Both accounts, however, are indicative of a generalized refutation of the 'inner' or, better, Hegelian *Innerlichkeit*: that which is both a thing's essence and a person's subjective, self-conscious withdrawal associated with Socrates, Protestantism, Descartes and Romanticism.[15]

Accordingly, I want to 'step back' and suggest a historical account of the *phantasma*'s cancellation which also provides the theoretical frame for the following investigation. I propose two, opposing, logics: *totalization of the concept* and *totalization of the image*. The crux of the latter is Henri Bergson's declaration of material reality to be an "aggregate" of images; the crux of the former, which

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avoiding subservience to, and maintaining some independence from, the dominant culture" [Harrison and Wood, 2002, p558].

[15] See Inwood, 1992, p142.

will be described now, is the recognition of a social-historical truth in Kant's transcendental subject.[16]

Totalization of the Concept

A totalization of the concept is integral to Adorno and Horkeheimer's account of societal rationalization in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. There, the dynamic of conceptual thought's progressive domination is articulated through a re-functioning of Kantian 'transcendental subjectivity'. That is, Kant's epistemology is seen to summarize and model the historical rationalization of reason, in the following manner.

The 'Copernican revolution' of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787) is to take the categories that allow experience - substance, causality, space, time, and so on – out of the world and make them features of cognition, of reason itself. This 'transcendental subjectivity' is then the framework of concepts within which experienced pains, pleasure, perceptions, etc., are not only understood but experienced *at all*:

> experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. (1998, Bxvi-xviii)

Thus reason as conceptual framework takes priority over nature and *gives law to nature*. Objects are only recognized through categories that have their source in the subject; thus it is that Kant's philosophical judgment "aims at the new yet

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[16] It is noted that this thesis moves in the 'opposite direction' to the popular philosophical movement away from subjectivity and "correlationism" - "the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other" [Meillassoux, 2008, p5] - to the postulation of objects independent of human perception (Harman). If these projects refute the anthropocentrism of Kant's Copernican revolution, whereby objects conform to the mind of the subject – this project recognizes, with Adorno and Horkheimer, the socio-historical significance of Kant's move, and the continuing need to interrogate what the mind of the subject does to its objects; the notion of an 'inner image', I suggest, is a means to do so.

recognizes nothing new, since it always repeats what reason has placed into objects beforehand" [2002, p20].

Adorno and Horkheimer take 'transcendental subjectivity' as a socio-historical model of reason's *rationalization:* what was to be the instrument of freedom, on becoming total, drives out all other forms of reasoning (there is also 'mimetic' reason) and reverts to domination. The prioritized abstract concepts of transcendental subjectivity stand for the socially mandated precedence of abstract categories (i.e., of exchange) over their objects:

> Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities. For the Enlightenment, anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion; modern positivism consigns it to poetry [2002, p5]

Since the part of reason that systematizes and quantifies has a subjective source, it can only find what it itself has placed into objects beforehand, and when thought is only mathematical, the world is only measurable.

Adorno and Horkheimer remind readers, however, that some conceptual abstraction *is necessary to thought*. The concept is the medium of reasoning and cognition generally - "mental representation is only an instrument":

> In thought, human beings distance themselves from nature in order to arrange it in such a way that it can be mastered. Like the material tool, which, as a thing, is held fast as that thing in different situations and thereby separates the world, as something chaotic, multiple and disparate, from that which is known, single and identical, so the concept is the idea-tool which fits into things at the very point from which one can take hold of them. Thought thus becomes illusory wherever it seeks to deny its fruition of separating, distancing, and objectifying. [2002, p31]

While "[a]ll mystical union remains a deception, the impotently, inward trace of the forfeited revolution" [ibid], the damage the concept does to the object, as well as the distance it stands the subject from it, must be admitted. Moreover, when the results of conceptual abstraction are *systematically* detached from what is abstracted, and reified as independent, the resulting reasoning masters the object,

which is then only what reason determines it to be: a token or example of what is already known.[17]

Positivism

'Positivism' as *Dialectic of Enlightenment* uses the term, is really the *ideology* of Enlightenment, its "belief" system, and the "judicial office of enlightened reason" [2002, p19]. As the ideology of that which was developed as a means of self-preservation, out of fear, its "ultimate product" is "pure immanence", which is

> nothing other than a form of universal taboo. Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the "outside" is the real source of fear." [2002, p11]

It is positivism that dictates that "[a]ll gods and qualities" – i.e. that which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one - "must be destroyed" [2002, p5].

There is a strong critique of positivism in much of the Frankfurt School's work. Horkheimer uses the term frequently, for example in the 1937 essay *The Latest Attack on Metaphysics*. There it is argued that insofar as logical empiricism "holds only to what is, to the guarantee of facts" [1972, p133], science is robbed of its emancipatory possibilities, because brute facts can only grasp the present, and the possibility for changing the status quo in the future is lost. Adorno's introduction to the "*Positivismusstreit*" papers of the 1960s re-iterates the point: positivism's refusal to recognize subjectivity's power in creating the world makes it complicit with a politics which accepts the world as finished reality.

In the same text it is argued that the actual goal of positivist prohibitions is "*fantasy*" [1976, p51]. Comte's sociology, which reveals an "apologetic, static orientation" is "the first enemy of both metaphysics and fantasy simultaneously" [ibid.]. As that which is not sensuously realized, without "hastily realized facticity", fantasy retains a halo of indeterminacy. Positivism thus attempts to reify

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[17] Thus Adorno's epistemology aims to re-instate the object, to demonstrate how the object of cognition is more than, different from and non-identical with how it appears in the context of rationalised reason. His aesthetics, meanwhile, will posit modernist art as critical of abstract rationality by being beyond exchange, repositories of *mimetic* rationality and sensuous particulars. [see de Duve, 2010]

it and set in abstract opposition – rather than dialectical relation - to reality. This however (at least potentially) is positivism's undoing:

> The defamation of fantasy, and the inability to conceive of what does not yet exist, become sand in the mechanism of the apparatus itself, as soon as it finds itself confronted with phenomena not provided for in its schema. [1976, p50]

The Words We Use Will Remain Concepts

Language is directly implicated in conceptual domination. It is language that partakes, not in the "manifold affinities between existing things", but in "the single relationship between the subject who confers meaning and the meaningless object, between rational significance and its accidental bearer" [2002, p7]. Like abstraction itself, language's relationship to its objects is one of "liquidation" [2002, p9]. As *Negative Dialectics* asserts:

> [N]o matter how hard we try for linguistic expression of ... a history congealed in things, the words we use will remain concepts. Their precision substitutes for the thing itself, without quite bringing its selfhood to mind; there is a gap between words and the things they conjure. Hence the residue of arbitrariness and relativity in the choice of words as well as in the presentation of the whole. [1973, 52f]

The 'nominalist tendency' [2002, p17] of Enlightenment is to identify and categorize - hence the complicity of language in conceptual dominance. The belief in a link between the name and the essence of the thing named - that naming in some way captures, masters, encompasses the thing named – is demonstrated by the Judaic prohibition of naming God: "The pledge of salvation lies in the rejection of any faith which claims to depict it, knowledge in the denunciation of illusion" [ibid.]. Language, however, has a double character – it is both nominalist or classifying and *mimetic*, both 'sign' and 'image':

> As sign, language must resign itself to being calculation and, to know nature, must renounce the claim to resemble it. As image it must resign itself to being a likeness and, to be entirely nature, must renounce the claim to know it. ... The separation of sign and image is inescapable. [2002, p 13]

Language as sign works on the side of science, at a distance; language as 'image' "is" nature. Their relationship must be dialectical; if it is "hypostatized over again,

then each of the isolated principles tends towards the destruction of truth." [ibid.] 'Image' alone can impart no conceptual knowledge, while language purged of its gestural, poetic dimensions – the positivist dream of "[t]hought … completely extirpated [of] its mimetic impulse" would "end up in madness" [1994, p40].

Publicness of Mind

The social-historical truth that Adorno saw in Kant's epistemology is recognised again by more recent sociological philosophy. The theorists of the Italian Autonomia movement note the dominance of abstract concepts, and like Adorno, attempt to dis-identify subjectivity with them.[18] It seems that Paulo Virno's discussion of 'publicness of mind' and the "general intellect' extends - and should be understood in terms of – Adorno's account of the totalization of the concept.

Virno contends that a "publicness of mind" is symptomatic of a political economy in which previously separate aspects of life have blended. What was interior - "intellect" - has merged, along with "labour", into the exterior of public, political "action". This is the field of the "multitude": Virno's attempt to account for the post-Fordist work force for whom – as opposed to Fordism's repetitive and segmented assembly-line labour - production or labour is immaterial, and rests on the cognitive ability and intellectual engagement to produce socially.

Both reflecting on what "resources" the multitude might "count on for protection from the dangerousness of the world" [2004, p34] (recalling Enlightenment's development as a means of self-preservation, out of fear) and accounting for their predicament, Virno appeals to the Aristotelian concept of *topoi koinoi*. For Aristotle, says Virno, the *topoi koinoi* or 'common places', or are "the most generally valid logical and linguistic forms of all of our discourse", common because "no one can do without them" [2004, p35]. These places, however, are inconspicuous. The connection between more and less, the opposition of opposites,

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[18] The differences must also be admitted, and are instructive. Firstly, Adorno is not concerned re-theorizing the proletariat, as the Autonomists are. Secondly, regarding the place of art - for Adorno it is modernist art's autonomy that makes it critical of abstract rationality; for the autonomists art can only operate in addition to an already existing logic, already embedded in the abstractions of exchange. And this marks the real influence on the thinkers of Autonomia: it is Deleuze and Guattari that leads to Antonio Negri's desire to exploit the communicative capacity – rather than interrupt it - in the formation of a connective, multitudinous new proletariat.

the category of reciprocity and so on, *structure* discourse, but do not appear. The forms that *can* be seen are "special places", or *"topoi idioi"*. These are visible expressions - 'metaphors, witticisms, allocutions, etc.' - that are appropriate only to particular areas of social life, to certain audiences. Historically, they are the province of *substantial* communities who attempt to secure an interior as a refuge from exterior threat. The multitude, however, are "exposed omnilaterally to the world" with no specific discourses of refuge with which to orient themselves. They witness the "special places" of discourse receding, submerging, and the generic "common places" moving to the foreground, to the surface. Everywhere, regardless of context, we speak and think in the same way; we have only general logical-linguistic constructs, rather than "sectorial ethical-communicative codes" at our disposal [2004, p37]. Orientation, 'rhetorical topography' is lost - and the formerly private, hidden structures of thought and speech, the "common places" which make up the "life of the mind", are made exterior and *public*.

Likewise the 'general intellect': Virno, again using Aristotle, aligns the life of the thinker with the stranger: the thinker cannot be "at home" amidst the *agora*. If today, says Virno, reversing the analogy, being a stranger, having no sense of "home", is the normative condition, it demands that the stranger become a thinker,

> because they turn to the most essential categories of the abstract intellect in order
> to protect themselves from the blows of random chance, in order to take refuge
> from contingency and from the unforeseen. [2004, p38]

Those without a home put their trust in the "common places"': the abstract or "general intellect".[19]

This general or public intellect which the multitude draws upon is the point of departure for opposing developments. While it can give way to a "*non-governmental* public sphere, far from the myths and rituals of sovereignty", the situation of thought, language, self-reflection, the capacity for learning coming to the forefront can equally take on an "oppressive appearance" [2004, p40]: "If the publicness of the intellect does not yield to the realm of a public sphere, of a political space in which the many can tend to common affairs, then it produces terrifying effects." [ibid.] That is, the unifying "common places" of the mind, the

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[19] Which, for the post-Fordist worker, "comprises formal and informal knowledge, imagination, ethical inclinations, mentalities and language games" [Virno 2007, p5].

linguistic-cognitive faculties, which came to the forefront as a form of protection, when unchecked, leads to an "omnipotence of thought" [2004, p41].

This omnipotence is the teleological end point of one dynamic that, I suggest, cancels the 'inner image'; the other movement that does so is in the opposite direction, towards a totalization of the image, which I will describe now.

Totalization of the Image - Dualism and interiority

In "affirm[ing] the reality of spirit and the reality of matter", Henri Bergson's *Matter and Memory* is self-confessedly "frankly dualistic". Bergson's hope is rather "to lessen, if not to overcome" dualism's "theoretical difficulties" [1911, xi]. One method of doing so, whilst maintaining a duality, is to *shift the dimension* of the Cartesian dichotomy from the spatial to the temporal. Rather than spirit or mind being 'in here' and body being 'out there', as it is for Descartes, the realm of Bergson's spirit is the past, as unrecollected, virtual or 'pure' memory, while the body is 'actual' and in the present. There is then no interior that transcends and excludes an exterior.[20]

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[20] The other move towards image-totalization, initiated contemporaneously with Bergson and in the same anti-dualist spirit, is Edmund Husserl's appropriation of Franz Brentano's concept of 'intentionality' - the necessity for consciousness to exist as consciousness *of* something other than itself - on to his own phenomenology. For Jean-Paul Sartre, writing in 1939, Husserl's move is revolutionary: consciousness and the world are now "given at one stroke": thus,

> We are delivered from Proust. We are likewise delivered from the "internal life": in vain would we seek the caresses and fondlings of our intimate selves, … for everything is finally outside: everything, even ourselves. Outside, in the world, among others. It is not in some hiding-place that we will discover ourselves; it is on the road, in the town, in the midst of the crowd, a thing among things, a human among humans." [2002, p384]

The intentionality thesis entails, then, the erasure of an 'inner image': everything is outside, "even ourselves". When it comes to *L'Imaginaire* (1940) the primary characteristic of the image Sartre describes is that it is not a thing *in* consciousness – this is the 'illusion of immanence' – but that it *is* a consciousness. However, when the intentional object at which the image aims is the subject's own *knowledge* of an external (absent or non-existing) thing, we have a mental image which is complete at its inception and 'teaches nothing' [2004, p7]. This is because 'the existence of a psychic phenomenon and the meaning that it

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Another strategy in Bergson's project, and the one that concerns us here, is to redefine or reposition the 'image'. The image of *Matter and Memory* is

> a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a *representation,* but less than that which the realist calls a *thing* — an existence placed halfway between the 'thing' and the 'representation'. [1911 xi-xii]

An image, then, is not something mental, formed 'in' the consciousness of the perceiving subject; but neither is it 'out there'. It is instead "self-existing" [1911, xii], the neutral word for that makes no ontological distinction between mind and body. An "aggregate" of these images [1911, xi] is what constitutes material reality, or matter. Positing such an aggregate of images *annuls psychological interiority*: "every image is within certain images and without others; but of the aggregate of images we cannot say that it is within or without us, since interiority and exteriority are only relations among images" [1911, p13].

No Images 'In' Consciousness

Matter should not be reduced, says Bergson, "to the perception we have of it", and neither should it be thought of as something "able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they" [1911, xi]. Matter, that is, is *already* perception – "pure perception, which is the lowest degree of mind – mind without memory – is really matter" [1911, p296] – and if matter is an aggregate of images, then perception is *of* images, not of matter that then becomes an image 'in' consciousness.[21]

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has for consciousness are one' [2004, p19]. The image's self-containment, where its existence and its meaning are identical, is also the source of *freedom*. It is not determined by anything outside itself; it is free from the constraints of the objective world.

[21] Another consequence of images pre-existing perception is that the world corresponds exactly to our idea of it. We cannot be mistaken about an image. Bergson defends his redefinition of images by appealing to Berkley's definition of things as ideas:

> The word 'idea' ordinarily indicates an existence of this kind, I mean to say a completely realized existence, whose being is indistinguishable from its seeming, while the word 'thing' makes us think of a reality which would be at the same time a reservoir … that is why Berkeley prefers to call bodies ideas rather than things. [2007, p137]

Perception and memory are counterparts: "Our perceptions are undoubtedly interlaced with memories and inversely, a memory … only becomes actual by borrowing the body of some perception into which it slips" [1911, p72]. Recollecting or imagining is when 'pure', virtual memory is actualized in perceptual qualities. As the perception is always already *of* the image aggregate, recollection's or imagining's images are *amongst* that aggregate.

The Body

The body, being matter, is part of the aggregate, and hence an image amongst other images. From the outside it is not distinct from the rest of matter – but the body is the one image "that contrasts with all the others in that I know it from the outside by perceptions, but also from the inside by affections" [1911, p16]. To be known from the inside by affections is not to say that those affections are created 'in' the body / brain. As an image itself, the brain cannot create images. The "physiologists and psychologists" claim that, just as "the centrifugal movements of the nervous system can call forth a movement of the body or of parts of the body, so the centripetal movements, or at least some of them, give birth to the representation of the external world" [1911, p2]. But for Bergson, "[t]he afferent nerves are images, the brain is an image, the disturbance travelling through the sensory nerves and propagated in the brain is an image too" [1911, p3]. All images being on a single plane, one cannot create another. The problem, when considering the aggregate, is that the body is naturally isolated as constant and centred, which leads to 'inner / outer' distinctions.

> But if, on the contrary, all images are posited at the outset, my body will necessarily end by standing out in the midst of a distinct thing, since they change unceasingly, and it does not vary. The distinction between inside and outside will then be only the distinction between the part and the whole. There is, first of all, the aggregate of images; and then, in this aggregate, there are 'centres of action',

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A world consisting of Berkley's ideas or Bergson's images is fully knowable. As Leonard Lawler puts it, "matter is precisely what it appears to be" [2003, p5] – which is also the effect of the Empedoclean doctrine of 'like knows like', and why Aristotle introduces the *phantasma*: for thought to diverge from the way things are.

from which the interesting images appear to be reflected: thus perceptions are born and actions made ready. [1911, p44]

The body is not something that gives "gives birth" to representations - it is instead a "centre of action".

The Utopian Uniformity of the Aggregate

The ultimate goal of *Matter and Memory* is "to seek experience at its source", before it is utilized and "becomes properly human experience." [1911, p240] The aggregate's 'centres of action', which are gaps and arrests in the continuum, form according to the needs of human utility. It is "[b]y unmaking that which these needs have made" that "we may restore to intuition its original purity and so recover contact with the real." [1911, p241] When the discontinuity of needs is dissolved into the uniformity of the aggregate, the human is restored to

> the material universe itself, defined as the totality of images ... a kind of consciousness ... in which everything compensates and neutralizes everything else, a consciousness of which all the potential parts, balancing each other by a reaction which is always equal to the action, reciprocally hinder each other from standing out. [1911, p312]

The "totality of images" is then what counts as *utopia* in Bergson's project.

The Hatred of Interiority and Generalized Exteriority

When Gilles Deleuze comes to revivify Bergson's project in the later twentieth-century it is as an expression of a "hatred of interiority" [1995, p6] – of essences as much as psychological subjectivity – and as a strategy in the anti-humanistic effort to "get rid of our selves, and demolish ourselves" [1986, p69]. With Bergson, Deleuze insists on the hypothesis of a pre-personal 'pure perception', a plane of images that do not represent, a totality of appearances without essence:

> There are images, things are themselves images, because images aren't in our brain. The brain's just one image among others. Images are constantly acting and reacting on each other, producing and consuming. There's no difference at all between *images, things,* and motion [1995, p. 42].

As for Bergson, the brain is what interrupts the flow of images, splitting it into the 'virtual' and the 'actual'. For example, when reading a verbal description, or when a sound or smell prompts a Proustian association, the 'image' experienced is virtual. Just as memory images are not in the brain, verbal images are not 'in' the sounds of language. They exist – they are *real* – but exist virtually, alongside the actual.

The Cartesian *ego cogito* that represents an outside world to itself is not the only hated interiority. Deleuze argues for a *generalized exteriority,* for "[e]very thing, that is to say every image, [to be] indistinguishable from its actions and reactions" [1986, p58]: things understood in terms of the relations between them, not in terms of any intrinsic or essential meaning or value.

Interiority and Utopian Thought

Bergson-Deleuze's assimilation of 'inner' images to a pre-personal plane and totality of appearances without essence correlates structurally with the claims of Jean Baudrillard's hyperbolic critique of commodity culture. Baudrillard's *Simulacra and Simulations* (1981) declares the invalidity of distinctions between object and representation, thing and idea. A world of self-referential signs or 'hyperreality' undermines any contrast to the real by absorbing the real within itself - the TV newscast is the example. This is developed in *Les Strategies Fatales* (1983) into the claim that the culture of enlightened modernity in its contemporary stage has in effect made reality itself utopian, a no-place.

While totalizing, and excessively extrapolating from cyber-space, Baudrillard's reversal of the real and utopian makes Andreas Huyssen ask:

> When reality can no longer be represented, understood, or conceptualized in terms of a stable episteme, when the modernist problematic of language and representation is no longer limited to the aesthetic realm, but, because of the spread of the media, has become all-pervasive, what are the consequences for utopian thought? [1995, p91]

Utopian thought, after all, has to ground itself in perceptions and constructions of what *is* in order to project what *might be*. *Dialectic* between given reality and the desire for imagined other worlds – not assimilation to the infinite recycling of simulacra – is, claims Huyssen, constitutive of utopian thought.

The totalization of the image - Bergson-Deleuze's assimilation of interiority to a pre-personal totality of appearances without essence - forsakes the *contrast* of interior to the surrounding external world, and with it, any utopian valence interiority may have had. Utopia is then realized, and annulled, as the "material universe itself".

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Chapter Outline

With the dynamics of the image's and concept's totalization as theoretical frame in place, my first turn in the pursuit of an inner image and its critical-utopian function is to the work of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81).

'Utopia' in Lessing is usually taken to be what Karl Mannheim calls the "liberal-humanitarian Idea", the end point of *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts / The Education of Humankind's (1780)* unilinear historical progress and evolution. Utopia as the apotheosis of conceptual thought is illustrated by the conclusion of *Nathan der Weise,* where ethnic and religious difference is effaced in the formation and *depiction*, moreover, of a perfected state: Christian, Jew and Muslim 'united' as members of the same family, aligning with the "ideal commonwealth" tradition of Plato's *Republic*, More's *Utopia*, and Bacon's *New Atlantis.* As such, Lessing would seem to contribute to, if not define, the cultural logic of totalized conceptual thought and the concomitant rationalization of the inner image.

This chapter argues instead for the utopian character of the *Laokoon* essay's *Einbildung*: the immaterial counterpart of the material *Bild.* Lessing sets out the *Einbildung* in reaction to the excesses of *ut picture poesis* and descriptive poetry – hence the *Einbildung* does not describe; rather, it is an image that leaves its object, like Homer's gods, *unseen.* As variously Theodor Adorno and Ernst Bloch, as well as Karl Mannheim and Paul Ricoeur suggest, it is the *phantasiae*'s non-spatiality, its "nowhereness", its refusal to describe a place, that grants this 'inner image' its utopian function.

After being integral to modernist theorization of medium-specificity and aesthetic autonomy, and after being deconstructed in turn, not least by W J T Mitchell [1986], the *Laokoon* essays's binary prescriptions – of which the *Einbildung* is a consequence - are now held in low regard by a resolutely 'post-medium' field of art. What this reassessment of Lessing and the *Laokoon* essay urges, however, is not a return to modernist delineations or even to Jacques Ranciere's 'representational regime', but a renewed attention to the tensions and non-consensus, rather than happy connectivity, between language and images.

Chapter 2 begins by describing how Naturalist theatre of the mid-nineteenth century, predicated on positivist anti-metaphysical repressions, determinedly refuses its audience 'inner' images. I read Villiers de L'Isle-Adam's *La Révolte* [1870] as an attempt – both explicitly, in theatrical form, and implicitly,

in textual content – to challenge this, and explore what the challenge entails for the putative 'inner' image's utopian function.

Set in "*le salon d'un banquier*", *La Révolte* is a one-act melodrama in which the protagonist, Elizabeth, announces to her husband, Felix, that she is leaving him. Her announcement, the reasons for it, and Felix's remonstrations make up the majority of the play. The eventual departure is followed by a short "dumb scene" representing the passing of a few hours, where upon she returns, in apparent capitulation, and the play ends. I suggest that the protagonist's declared intention to leave is taken up as an image – of "where" she will go - by the audience. The image of this "elsewhere" then exists in tension with the material presence of the stage, and is consequently 'utopian' in both form and content. I then show how in the writings of Remy de Gourmont and Maurice Maeterlink this inner image becomes totalized 'intertextually', and the utopian function – dependent on a *differential* relation with the non-utopian - is lost.

Meanwhile, the *limits* of the utopian valence of the inner image asserted in *La Révolte* are discerned via the protagonist's references to Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy, and the modernist recognition of the utopian valence of his aesthetics. Schopenhauer's conception of music as abstract leads Bloch to consider it the "inwardly utopian art, completely beyond the scope of anything empirically verifiable", and Adorno to declare it outside the rationale of exchange or commerce. Although ascetic and will-less, Elizabeth's utopia is yet depictive and hence tied to the pecuniary. The blame is on her husband and the positivist, materialist ethics he stands for: "His accounts have crippled my mind".

Chapter 3 reconsiders the question Roland Barthes asks himself - and answers in the negative – in *Camera Lucida* [1980], to consider the possibility of an inner image of cinematic spectatorship. The chapter proceeds by establishing two conceptions of the viewer's engagement: that in which there is an 'extra' image, existing in the realm of the spectator, which is not the cinematographic material itself, and that in which there is 'only one' image, which is a unification of the spectator's thought and cinematographic material. Barthes, I suggest, asks his question in fear of the latter, in which cognitive autonomy is lost to the medium, and in answering negatively passes over the 'added' or 'extra' images of *soviet montage* because their addition is not the voluntary prerogative of the viewer. Soviet montage's extra image or *Obraz* is, moreover, made by *instrumentalizing* the viewer's 'innate' logical, meaning-making faculties. Eisenstein attempts to put this 'Kuleshov effect' to pedagogic ends, as in *Strike* (1925); later cinema and its theorization, as Gilles Deleuze [1985] articulates, attempt to refute the effect as

both manipulative and logocentric, and in doing so, eliminate the 'extra' image from the realm of the spectator and make cinematic experience monist.

I use a critical dispute over Stan Brakhage's *The Animals of Eden and After* (1970) to demonstrate the difficulties of such a strategy, and to emphasize the apparently irresistible, *involuntary* character of these extra images, before suggesting two further tactics of their prevention: by speeding up the cuts to a flicker or slowing them down to complete continuity. I take Brakhage's own *Persian Series* [1999] as exemplary of the former, and Jeroen de Rijke and Willem de Rooij *Of Three Men* [1998] as exemplary of the latter. Even with these works, however, some mode of 'adding' to the images yet persists; *Of Three Men,* in particular, presents itself as an occasion - that Barthes saw provided by photography - to *close one's eyes,* recollect, and let the "detail … rise of its own accord into affective consciousness".

Chapter 4 pursues the relationships between language, image and interiority back into visual art and specifically Conceptual Art's late-sixties-early-seventies zenith, in a comparative discussion of the work of Marcel Broodthaers and Robert Barry, via the criticism of Rosalind Krauss. Those relationships – and specifically the role of an inner image – are framed by these artists' invocation of different aspects of the work of Stéphane Mallarmé.

Broodthaers takes on Mallarmé's *spatialization* of the material elements of language, via surrealist *écriture*, to form a *rebus* which is language's material form exaggerated to inhibit semantic 'content'. Barry's sentences, meanwhile, are conventionally 'meaningful', but exhibit Mallarmé's auto-destructive, "negative logic" whereby what is evoked is immediately 'erased' or collapses in "resonant disappearance": 'pictures' are promised but what is offered is unpicturable. While Broodthaers's engagement with Mallarmé is of course explicit – as in 1969's *Exposition Literaire autour de Mallarmé* – Barry's is, rather, an application of Mallarméan logic to the interrogation of the art object's ontology.

What both practices contribute to – through paradigmatically opposing deployments of language - is a critique of the dominance of conceptual thought over experience. Barry's texts challenge *universal communicability:* the notion that every thought can be expressed, and that thought is therefore primarily – necessarily – conceptual. Broodthaers's rebuses, in their resistance to being read, offer experience that refuses to be conceptualized.

The chapter begins with an instructive misreading by Krauss of Broodthaers's 1974 Studio International cover, that allows the development of two notions of the 'rebus': one that Broodthaers professes, which is a combination of

the visual and verbal to the semantic annulment of both, and one that Krauss applies to Broodthaers, which, counter to her post-structuralist avowals, entails the verbal-conceptual determination of the visual. It is at the latter effacement of the non-conceptual, in fact, that both artists' practices take aim. The conclusion then moved to is that if Krauss's critical work entails a totalization of the concept, and Broodthaers's rebus represents a reification of the sign that cancels language's *phantasmata* along with its conceptual determinations, Barry's negative logic of *evoked blanks* presents an alternative and *utopian* dynamic.

The final chapter is presented both as an epilogue and as a perspectival shift on the question of the inner image - from the field of art history, theory and practice to that of neuroscience. I suggest, however, that the same issues – of verbal *phantasmata,* of refuted interiority, of the inner image's instrumentalization – are at stake, not least because the neuroscientific test-subject takes up the position of the reading and viewing subject of the previous chapters.

Since the late 1990s, developments in brain scanning technology have enabled clinicians to detect neural activity and infer cognitive processes among brain-damaged people whose impairments prevent outward signs of cognition. The protagonist of this movement is the British neuroscientist Adrian Owen, who has pioneered and publicised the use of neuro-imaging as a diagnostic and even communicative tool for patients in a 'vegetative state', that is, 'awake' but not (apparently) 'aware'. This chapter examines the processes and conclusions of *Detecting awareness in the vegetative state,* the 2006 paper in which Owen and his research team first claim - against medical and clinical consensus on the automaticity of vegetative brain activity - to have demonstrated the presence of consciousness in a patient previously diagnosed as vegetative. The reported experiment was conducted on woman who, when asked to imagine performing certain activities, produced fMRI scans indistinguishable from those of 'healthy' subjects imagining the same activities. The experimenters conclude that this correlation, plus the patient's apparent understanding of, and compliance with, the verbal request, means that the patient is 'conscious'.

What is at stake in the experiment, and reflects back on the previous chapters' art-historical case studies, is not only a relationship between language and 'imaging' (ascription of subjecthood hinges on whether the instruction to imagine by itself causes the image) - it is the nature and ethics of 'imaging' itself. As the 'Momus glass' of the chapter's epigraph suggests, if the fMRI scan's representation of increased cerebral blood flow coincides with the subject imagining something, it is then an image of imagining, and as the unobservable

rendered observable, and the private, public, a step closer to realizing the positivist dream of full communicability (parodied for example by Barry's attempts at telepathy in the previous chapter). To make neural activity into observable behaviour is, moreover, to take something involuntary as a voluntary: to take a 'fingerprint' as a 'confession'; the experimental apparatus, meanwhile, gives the test-subject no means to actively *refuse*.

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CHAPTER 1

Einbildung: Lessing's other utopia

Introduction

'Utopia' in the work of G E Lessing is usually taken to be represented by the conclusion of *Nathan der Weise*: an Enlightenment, liberal-humanist representation. The following suggests an alternative. The *Einbildung*, immaterial counterpart of the *Bild* and consequence of the *Laokoon* essay's dichotomies, can be understood in terms of a modernist 'utopian function'.

1.1. Lessing's Utopia / *Laokoon*'s Utopian Function

The conclusion of Lessing's *Nathan de Weise* shows man – and here Arnold Hauser may not be too broad – to be 'inwardly free, … free to choose his means [and] accountable for his actions to none but himself' [1999, p87-8]. It is the climax of that play, where the protagonists renounce difference for Enlightenment universality, ethnic and religious identities forgotten as if disrobed, that is most often taken to stand for 'utopia' in Lessing[22]. This utopia is liberal-humanist, in both in form and content, and as the *portrayal* of a good society - Christian, Jew and Muslim 'united' as members of the same family - aligns with the "ideal commonwealth"[23] tradition of Plato's *Republic*, More's *Utopia*, and Bacon's *New Atlantis*: the Ideal *realized* and *pictured*. There can be identified in the *Laokoon* essays's *Einbildung*, however, a form of utopian thought which is not a perfected state didactically described as in liberal-humanist literature. The *Einbildung* maintains the utopian as (aesthetic) experience, as utopian *function.* As that which is not described, the utopian function of the *Einbildung* is owed to Lessing's denigration of description in poetry, of which the following provides an account.

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[22] See, for example, Hill (2008)

[23] As Ruth Levitas (1990) suggests: the 'liberal-humanist tradition ... a literary genre, even ... visions of ideal societies' [p68]

1.2. Descriptive Poetry

From the passages describing mythical nature and landscape in Spenser's *Fairie Queene* (1590)[24] a trend develops through 17th century English poetry that reaches its apogee in James Thomson's *Seasons*, published in 1726. Thomson's blank verse poem consists of four extended evocations – mythifications in turn - of seasonal effects; a typically eulogistic scene from the 'Winter' section being:

> Thro' the hush'd Air, the whitening Shower descends,
> At first, thin-wavering; till, at last, the Flakes
> Fall broad, and wide, and fast, dimming the Day,
> With a continual Flow. See! sudden, hoar'd,
> The Woods beneath the stainless Burden bow,
> Blackning, along the mazy Stream it melts;
> Earth's universal Face, deep-hid, and chill,
> Is all one, dazzling, Waste. [...]

Seasons was soon translated into German, where it was popular and influential; its influence can clearly be seen in Albrecht von Haller's *Die Alpen*, from 1732:

> Der Blumen helles Gold, in Strahlen umgebogen,

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[24] Of, for example, Mammon's cave:

> In all that rowme was nothing to be seene
> But huge great yron chests, and coffers strong,
> All bard with double bends, that none could weene
> Them to efforce by violence or wrong;
> On every side they placèd were along.
> But all the grownd with sculs was scattered
> And dead mens bones, which round about were flong;
> Whose lives, it seemed, whilome there was shed,
> And their vile carcases now left unburièd.
> [2006, p99]

Kaske and Stoll note in their introduction the extent to which the descriptions of hell in Milton's *Paradise Lost* owe many of their details, and even some phrasings, to Spenser, while James Thompson's *The Castle of Indolence* (1748) amalgamates several of Spenser's spaces and revives the Spenserian stanza, adopting both the form and manner of *The Faerie Queene* (xxvi).

Thuermt sich am Stengel auf, und kroent sein grau Gewand,

Der Blaetter glattes Weiss, mit tiefem Gruen durchzogen,

Strahlt von dem bunten Blitz von feuchtem Diamant.

[The bright gold of the flowers, refracted into rays,

Towers up the stalk and crowns his grey mantle,

The smooth whiteness of the leaves, streaked with a deep green,

Glistens with the bright lightening of a moist diamond.[25]

1.3. Against Description, Against Matter

In his essay on the Laocoön Lessing takes up against this "mania for description" in poetry - *Die Alpen* is his contemporary example - along with a "mania for allegory" [1962, p5] in painting. They are, he contends, the results of a pernicious belief in *ut pictoria poesis*. The principal of the inherent similarity among art forms has mutually deformed the verbal and visual arts,

> by attempting to make the former a speaking picture, without actually knowing what it could and ought to paint, and the latter a silent poem, without having considered to what degree it is able to express general ideas without denying its true function and degenerating into a purely arbitrary means of expression. [1962, p5]

While Lessing's own earlier works were not without fashionable attempts to "paint poetically"[26], the demotion of description is central to the argument of his essay on the Laokoon sculpture. Verbal description is devalued for aspiring to the material, empirical *Bild* or picture; the 'properly' poetic evokes the immediately experienced, internal, subjective, *Einbildung*. The latter, says Lessing

> is not necessarily something that can be converted into a material painting; but every detail, every combination of details by which the poet makes his subject so palpable to us that we become more conscious of the subject than of his words, is picturesque, is a picture. [1962, p74-5]

A poetic picture, as opposed implicitly to a description's picture, cannot necessarily be painted. It is to this end that "the ancients" maintained the illusory status or

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25 Trans. David E Wellbery in Wellbery, 1984, p219

[26] see McCormick, p258

'*enargia*' of such poetic '*phantasiae*'; if modern treatise on poetry had kept this terminology, 'poetical *phantasiae* would not have been so readily confined to the limits of a material painting' [1962, p208]. Then a poetic picture is the state in which the reader is 'more conscious of the subject than of [the] words', or when the words disappear before that which they evoke. Once that which is written or spoken is dematerialized, poetry fundamentally consists of 'incorporeal … forms' which may 'exist simultaneously without concealing or damaging each other,' in direct opposition to 'objects themselves or their natural symbols in the narrow confines of space or time.' [1962, p40] What is evinced is a poetic picture that cannot be translated into - is the obverse of, is repelled by - *matter.*[27]

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[27] For Lessing, to approximate matter via description, "to give the reader an idea of the whole, the poet enumerates one by one several parts or things" [1962, p91]. But these remain only parts: the resultant image has nothing of the 'liveliness and likeness that poet and painter are capable of offering us in their images' [1962, p103]. *Die Alpen's* lines, says Lessing, "might be very lovely to recite if one has the flower itself in hand; by themselves, however, they say little or nothing" [1962, p104]. That numerating the parts, accumulating predicates, risks losing the described object al together, causes the modernist turn to metaphor: Cecil Day-Lewis, in his book on the *The Poetic Image,* will look in commiseration upon passages in Gerard Manley Hopkins's journals where "he describes an object with such minute and scrupulous accuracy of detail that the object itself completely disappears" [2011, p24]; it is metaphor that meets the need for "expressing the relationship between things and the relationship between things and feelings" [ibid, p25]. What is considered description's failing – making Hopkins's object "completely disappear" and the lines of *Die Alpen* say "nothing" – is what blurs Lessing's prescriptive dichotomy and grants *description a utopian function.*

The descriptive writing of Raymond Roussell – an "aberrant modern", as Frederic Jameson [1991, p135] calls him, considering various modernist aesthetics' ideologies of perception - is a case in point. Roussell describes "at lengths interestingly intolerable for most readers" [ibid.]: the descriptions of machines in *Impressions d'Afrique* (1910) and *Locus Solus* (1914) exhaust the reader and the object equally. The interminably complex, exposited and explained does not permit the formation of "whole" ideations of, for example, the "balloon-powered paving apparatus" that fashions a mosaic out of extracted teeth in *Locus Solus* or *Impressions d'Afrique's* "apparatus, made of metal, [that] looked at first glance distinctly like a loom." In the middle of it, "parallel to the current, was stretched a horizontal warp, consisting of an infinite number of blue threads, placed side by side in a single row, which took up no more than six feet by reason of their extraordinary fineness. … In front of them a batten, a sort of huge metal comb ..." [2010, p15] Another "contraption", meanwhile (in an excerpt admittedly too short to serve), "consisted of a sort

1.4. Rendering the Gods

If the descriptive nature poetry to which Lessing is reacting attempts to engage with matter (albeit in eulogy), it is literally 'of the earth'. Lessing advances his argument for a poetic picture by appositely taking the heavens and their occupants, rather than profane landscape, as 'subject'. When Homer writes of the gods fighting "the entire battle is represented in the poem as being invisible" [1962, p66]. In painting, however, "everything is visible in but one way" [ibid.]: invisibility is conveyed by "a thin cloud veiling the side of the object that is turned toward the other persons in the pictures" [1962, p68]. When in Homer, Athene picks up a stone to throw, it is "black and rugged and huge, one which men of a former time had set there as a boundary mark of the cornfield" [XXI 403-5]; when Mars is thrown to the ground, "[h]e cover[s] seven acres" [XXI. 407]. If the painter gives the god this extraordinary size, argues Lessing, "it is no longer Mars … who is lying on the ground, but a common warrior." Poetry 'exalts the gods' by *not* describing them, by leaving their 'size, strength, [and] speed' 'unseen':

> The invisibility leaves the imagination free rein to enlarge the scene and envisage the persons and actions of the gods on a grander scale than the measure of ordinary man. [1962, p66]

Moreover, because the poet works with the imagination's incorporeal forms, "[i]nvisibility is the natural condition of his gods … an enlightenment, an increased power of mortal vision is required, if they are intended to be seen." [1962, pp69-70] When painting - and by implication, painterly writing – represents the gods,

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of large grindstone, which was worked by a pedal and which set in motion a whole system of wheels, rods, levers and springs, forming an extricable tangle of metal; from one side extended an articulated arm, which ended in a hand armed with a foil" [2010, p35].

Such descriptions parody the positivist aspirations of nineteenth-century literary projects such as Emile Zola's, where the "hypertrophy of real detail", as Zola calls it [Hanon, 1981, p11] is a prime strategy of anti-idealist, polemical realism. The process that should bring the object to observation renders invisible.

everything which in the poem raises the gods above godlike human creatures vanishes altogether. Size, strength, swiftness qualities which Homer always has in store for his gods in a higher and more extraordinary degree than that bestowed on his finest heroes – must in the painting sink to the common level of humanity. [1962, pp67-68]

Thus poetic pictures are distinguished from descriptive pictures, by making the gods' invisibility and ineffability equivalent: what cannot be said, cannot be seen.

1.5. The *Einbildung* as both Psychological and Transcendent

This is not, or not only, a duplicitous play of words; the words are of secondary importance to the *Einbildung* that they *evoke*. As such the *Laokoon* entails an application to language of the Neoplatonic notion that artworks connect directly with the transcendent Ideal. For Plotinus, rather than making copies of copies as Plato would have it, the artist by-passes the sensible world and imitates the transcendent Ideas themselves. The claim makes images radically truthful whilst retaining the structure of the Platonic cosmos in which they had been fundamentally deceptive. Furthermore, it made the work of art superior in its reflection of the Ideal than imperfect Nature itself:

> Still the arts are not to be slighted on the ground that they create by imitation of natural objects; for … we must recognize that they give no bare reproduction of the thing seen but go back to the Ideas from which Nature itself derives … Thus Pheidias wrought the Zeus upon no model among things of sense but by apprehending what form Zeus must take if he chose to become manifest to sight. [cited in Abrams, 1953, p42]

Lessing's *Einbildung* entails this by-passing of the sensible in the elucidation of originary 'Ideas'. But whereas for Plotinus, Zeus could feasibly be rendered in stone, Lessing would find Pheidias fundamentally ill-qualified, in fact going further than Plotinus in his claim that only the poet, who works in ideas, the medium of the gods, can render them. Plotinus's argument served to elevate art over all human pursuits, to make it a bridge to the Ideas and to God himself (the result being that the artist turns from craftsman to creator, from 'mirror', in the terms of M H Abram's classic study, to 'lamp'), the explicit implication being that Ideas resided both in the region of transcendental subsistence *and* within the mind itself: the arts "go back to the Ideas from which Nature itself derives," and in a

statue "this form is not in the material; it is in the designer before it enters the stone …" [cited in Abrams, 1953, p43]. For Lessing however, stone – any matter - stultifies the imagination and interrupts the ethereal connection between artist, spectator and the transcendental subsistence.

1.6. Autonomy and Instrumentalization of the *Einbildung*

It should be made clear that the *Einbildung* set out in the *Laokoon* essays is a poetic picture not only elevated above prevalent 18th century conceptions – that it can only be a peripheral, secondary structure, decoration or ornament - but also above Lessing's own previous conception, as set out in the commentaries on his *Fabeln* (1759). Here what poetry evokes is of central importance, but its importance is pedagogic, rather than metaphysical: evocation is *instrumentalized* as a tool for understanding. The commentaries claim that the fables require no explanation or explication of their moral because metaphoric and metonymic images convey the moral *intuitively*. Intuitive cognition results from the transformation of universal principles into localized instances, instances which, "when imaginatively attended to by the reader, immediately manifests the moral truth in question" [Wellbery, 1984, p193]. These localized instances are figurative, vivid and sensual, but, vitally – and in this aspect the treaties agree - not obscured by description. Foxes are not described as cunning, dogs not described as faithful: the symbolism of characteristics is implicit and imaginatively supplied by the reader in the process of intuition. The fable *Der Besitzer des Bogens* actually tells this story: a man has his prize bow carved with images to improve its appearance, but which only weaken it, causing it to break, putting end to the beauty of its *efficacy*[28]. The beauty of the bow's efficacy as a bow is also the beauty of the fable's utilitarian function prioritized over its 'entertainment' value. It is this functionalized, pedagogic role which ensures that the fabulist's poetic images remain earth-bound; the poetic image of the *Laokoon* essay, by contrast, must be fully *autonomous*, neither a vehicle for theoretical knowledge nor allude to anything in the world.

The difference between the images of the *Fabeln* and those proposed in the *Laokoon* essay is most marked by a change in the conception of the reader's imaginative engagement. Whereas the fabulist demands a linear input from the reader in intuiting a moral message, the onus in the *Laokoon* essay is on the

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[28] see Beate Allert (2005)

imagination's "free play" [Lessing, 1962, p16] In the latter, the imagination must be restricted neither by material things in the world *nor* representations of them[29]. It works through - almost *despite* - the body's material: when we find a work of art beautiful it 'is beautiful not to our eyes but to our imagination through our eyes" [1962, p41]. The eye is guilty by association with the world's visibility, another object that the imagination must negotiate or mitigate to allow fruition, on its passage to the transcendent.[30]

1.7. The *Einbildung* Negates

The *Laokoon* essay's primary claim, that verbal arts proceed in time and plastic arts exist in space, must be recalled to appreciate an important element of the *Einbildung*: that it *negates*. The sounds and written signs of poetry are material which is perceived, but, as verbal, exist in time and 'disappear' successively from view or audition. An imaginative experience arises of their content; the *Einbildung*, extended in time, *occludes* space's simultaneously present things (Lessing's space is Euclidean and atemporal, "what is seen in nature at once" [1962, p103]). David E Wellbery articulates this dynamic most clearly:

> The temporal movement of thought negates space, takes apart the confused simultaneity of things, and, by virtue of this negation, attains to mastery over the manifold impingements imposed by the world in its brute presence. … For Lessing, the negation of worldliness accomplished by the successivity and discreteness of linguistic signs allows the imagination to return to itself from its

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29 The argument is not, as Jacques Ranciere suggests, "grounded in the distance between real presentation and artistic representation" [2007, p126]; there is no distance between them as long as both partake of *matter*. What is important is rather the mode: the representative power of the immediately experienced *Einbildung,* or poetic, internal, subjective image, is far superior to that of the material, empirical *Bild*.

[30]As David Wellbery (1984) points out, the ideal history of mind progressively detaching from worldliness, in which poetry occupies both a 'later' and 'higher' stage than the plastic arts, is projected onto human events in the *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (*On the Education of Mankind*, 1780) which describes man's progress towards God and the truth of revelation as a progress from 'Bild' (image) to 'Begriff' (concept). At the end of this infinite path of the history of language, where man finally absolved from sin and has therefore achieved likeness with God, there is an imageless and wordless language of pure knowledge.

exile in space and exteriority …. [endowing poetry with] a syntax that conforms to the movement of the imagination.' [1984, p132-3]

In other words, just as the poetic *Einbildung* renders present what is absent, it renders absent what is present.

1.8. The Utopian Function of the *Einbildung*

The notion of a utopian function - as opposed to a (described, nominated) utopia - is articulated in 20th-century western Marxism, most prominently by Ernst Bloch. Central to Bloch's notion, as it is for the Frankfurt School's more generally[31], is the Judaic taboo on idolatrous images, reworked in resistance to prematurely positive utopian thought. The efficacy of a utopian *function* within experience depends on utopia *not* being pictured or described. As Bloch, in discussion with Theodor Adorno, remarks,

> If I portray utopia, or an installment of utopia, in a book, 'it has at least become real already and, as you said, 'cast into a picture.' One is thus deceived. It is diffused, and there is a reification of ephemeral or non-ephemeral tendencies, as if it were already more than a being-in-tendency, as if the day were already there. Thus, the iconoclastic rebellion against reification is now in this context completely correct. [2009, p11]

Just as the utopian function must reject determinate content, it is also stipulated to be ultimately *oppositional*: '[t]he essential function of utopia", writes Bloch, "is a critique of what is present' [1988, p12]. Thus the not-pictured is critically opposed to the pictured, the undescribed to the described.

While bearing Bloch's formulations in mind, most pertinent here seems the notion of a utopian function suggested by Karl Mannheim, whose *Ideology and Utopia* (1929) was in fact the object of extensive critique by various members of the Frankfurt School, for re-assimilating the concepts to the idealist metaphysics from which Marx had rescued them[32]. In *Ideology and Utopia,* Mannheim reverses

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[31] In *The Aesthetic Dimension,* for example, Herbert Marcuse thinks the utopian impulse through Freudian psychoanalysis as counterweight to the combined pressures of the so-called "performance principle" and the institutional pleasures of "repressive desublimation".

[32] see Martin Jay, 1974.

the standard Marxist understanding, which is that utopia prevents social change by imposing an ideal on reality:

> A state of mind is utopian when (a) it is incongruous with the immediate situation and (b) when passed onto actions, tend to shatter the order of things. [1936, p341]

For Mannheim, utopia *promotes* social change; it is ideology that sustains the existing state of affairs. Both ideology and utopia are ideas that transcend their contextual reality, both being oriented towards the non-existent: utopia, to the future, and ideology to the past.

1.9. Utopias of Sense and Idea, Spatial and Temporal

Mannheim goes on to offer a typology of utopias. The first form of utopian "mentality", the orgiastic chiliasm of the Anabaptists (Mannheim's account owes much to Ernst Bloch's early work on Thomas Muenzer), is essentially experiential: action is not inspired by "ideas", but by forces with roots "in much deeper-lying vital and elemental levels of the psyche" [1936, p192], by the possibility of a leap over into ecstasy.

> Orgiastic energies and ecstatic outbursts began to operate in a worldly setting, and tensions, previously transcending day to day life became explosive agents within it ... [This form of utopia] corresponded to the spiritual fermentation and physical excitement of the peasants, of a stratum living closest to the earth [ibid.].

The primary identifying characteristic of Chiliastic experience is "absolute presentness" [1936, p193]. For the Chiliast, "the present becomes the breach through which what was previously inward bursts out suddenly, takes hold of the outer world and transforms it" [ibid.]. Whereas the mystic describes his ecstasy as a situation that cannot be conceived of in spatial or temporal terms, the Chiliast has sensual experience present in all its robustness, which is inseparable from his spirituality and the immediate present.

Mannheim contrasts the Chiliastic utopia with the "liberal-humanitarian Idea". The latter is "a formal goal projected into the infinite future whose function it is to act as a mere regulative device in mundane affairs" [1936, p197]. As bourgeois liberalism loses sense for material things, ideals empty of content and their utopia correspondingly lacks depth or colour. This overemphasis on form

corresponds to "the manner of experiencing historical time as unilinear progress and evolution" [1936, p197] - one source of which, says Mannheim, is Lessing's *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts / The Education of Humankind (1780)*, where religious history is traced as a progress from polytheism to monotheism, to the ethic of Christianity, to a world in which good is done for its own sake. Thus, "the religious idea of development may be understood as an ebbing away of the Chiliastic impulse - as a process in which abiding faith [*Harren*] becomes, in the German milieu a 'waiting and anticipation'" [1936, p201], and the revolutionary Chiliastic time-sense merges imperceptibly into the evolutionary.

1.10. The Glance from Nowhere

In his *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (1985) Paul Ricoeur sets aside the difficulty of applying Mannheim's dichotomy (the utopian and ideological only appear retrospectively, where the former is *found to have* transformed the given social situation[33]), and develops the contrast into a subtler plurality of aspects. While the function of ideology is always legitimation, it may serve to integrate as much as distort or dissimulate; and while utopia's function is always to challenge, its pathology is of escape. In Ricoeur's account, the imagination is the force behind both these processes:

> On the one hand, imagination may function to preserve an order. In this case the function of the imagination is to stage a process of identification that mirrors the order. Imagination has the appearance here of a picture. On the other hand, though, imagination may have a disruptive function; it may work as a breakthrough. Its image in this case is productive, an imagining of something else, the elsewhere … Ideology represents the first kind of imagination; it has a function of preservation. Utopia, in contrast, represents the second kind of imagination; it is always the glance from nowhere. [1985, p286]

A clear dichotomy forms when the foregoing concepts are returned to the *Laokoon*: the ideological and utopian map directly onto, respectively, the descriptive *Bild* and the (properly) poetic *Einbildung*. The "increased power of mortal vision" holds a utopian function only insofar as it remains a vision, empirically *unrealized*, or rather, remains a power, rather than a vision *of* anything. Remembering Lessing's insistence that "poetical phantasiae" should not be "confined to the limits of a

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[33] see Levitas, 1990, p69

material painting", it is the phantasiae's non-spatiality, its "nowhereness", its refusal to describe a place, that grants the utopian function. Meanwhile it is description's process of identification, giving rise to confirmation and recognition, that makes it the ideological legitimation of the status quo. Nature poetry like von Haller's, in a historical moment of incipient industrialisation, is that 'picture of ...', what Ricoeur would call a "symbolic confirmation of the past"; the properly poetic *Einbildung* is "a symbolic opening towards the future".

Conclusion

The climax of *Nathan de Weise unites* a Christian knight, the adopted daughter of a Jew, and a Muslim ruler as members of the same family: difference *subsumed* under Enlightenment universality. This climax meets with that of Mankind's, as described in the *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*: progress towards God and the truth of revelation as a progress towards the *Begriff* or *concept*, what Mannheim calls the "liberal-humanitarian Idea". The *Einbildung* is not this concept: it is an image, but an image that leaves its object, like Homer's gods, *unseen*. Therein lies its utopian function.[34]

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[34] For a recent counter-argument to such a claim, one may well look to the work of Jacques Ranciere. Rancière's is, like W J T Mitchell's (1986), a critical reaction to the Laokoon's high modernist invocation[34] as much to the implication of Lessing's assertions. Ranciere recognizes Lessing's essay as a decisively divisive moment: the "absence of common measurement", the "registration of the disjunction between registers of expression and therefore between the arts" that Lessing's *Laokoon* formulates, leads to a rationalization into spheres of autonomy within the arts and ultimately to a "loss of their power of thinking in common" [2007, p39]. According to Rancière, to claim that the means of artform *x* are inadequate to represent subject *y*'s singularity, is to lay claim to what is properly 'sayable' and properly made 'visible': Lessing's essay embodies the attempt to subject the image to hierarchical divisions and prescriptions. The argument that "the suffering of Virgil's Laokoon … is unrepresentable in sculpture, because its visual realism divests art of its ideality insofar as it divests the character of his dignity", means that "[e]xtreme suffering belonged to a reality that was, in principle, excluded from the art of the visible.' [2009, p124-5] Moreover, the idea of the unrepresentable *per se* conflates, says Ranciere, two distinct notions: "impossibility and interdiction", i.e. 'can not' and 'must not'. Lessing's argument is the same as that behind Burke's declaration that *Paradise Lost's* Satan was unrepresentable in painting: "its sublime aspect depended upon the duplicitous play of words that do not really let us see what they pretend to show us" [2009, p123]. A "duplicitous play of words", then, would be all that the foregoing claims - for the utopian function of an image that leaves its object unseen - would amount to.

CHAPTER 2

The Revolt of the Inner Image

2.1. Naturalism incipient

Two years after Lessing's *Laokoon* essay, the Parisien theatre critic Louis Charpentier publishes the *Causes de la décadence du goût sur le théâtre*. This is one of several French tracts in the late 1760s and early 1770s that, like Lessing's essay, set themselves against the distasteful refinements of neo-classicism. For Charpentier, these are extolled by the courtly and 'decadent' plays of the *Comédie Française*, that, in formal terms, prioritize speech - the dramatic space of the text – over material, theatrical space. At the other end of the spectrum were the 'illiterate' commercial fairground theaters that foregrounded the stage and the player's bodies. Theatre's decline, it was perceived, was found in the increasingly wide division between the two; and Charpentier's answer – the opposite of Lessing's - is to aesthetically *unify*. French theatre could be renewed by the introduction of a dramaturgy based on classical comedy, updated to the contemporary moral situation. This entailed finding a mid-point between 'high' verbal representations and 'low' visual representations – in other words, the realization on the stage of the visual world of the text; and it is with this move that the *naturalism* of the bourgeois domestic drama is incipient.

2.1.1. Naturalist theatre and Positivism

In the realization of the text's visual world, naturalist theatre necessarily entailed a cancellation of the kind of "phantasaie" that Lessing had proffered. The motivation for the cancellation is there in the mid-century milieu of Darwinian determinism, Marxian materialism, but particularly Compte's *positivism*. By 1860 a Naturalist theatre – rising to dominance over melodramas, spectacle plays, comic operas, and vaudevilles – was fully formed on the precept of the truth of the phenomenal object-world. Emile Zola would concretize it as

> the study of the human predicament within the framework of reality, the rejection
> of all myths: people living in their true environment, a drama free from old wives'

tales and tattered histories, from grand meaningless words and conventional foolishness and bragging. [Zola, 1996, p72]

The dramatic space or world of the text, then, was not something to be left to imaginative inference: it was to be brought 'within the framework of reality', realized in empirical space, made public, and *observed.* Emphatic empirical images – detailed costumes, three-dimensional, illusionistic sets - were the result. Speech, similarly, could not refer to the unobservable: *it could not depart from the fully-represented profane world of the stage.* To do so would intimate an 'elsewhere' beyond positivist study. Thus exposition is always motivated, there are no soliloquies, no asides, and language includes no 'grand meaningless words'.

2.1.2. La Révolte

On the 6th of May, 1870, the curtain rises at the Theatre du Vaudeville on the first performance of a one-act play named *La Révolte,* written by Villiers de L'Isle-Adam. The curtain rises - according to Villiers's script, published the same year - on "*le salon d'un banquier*" [Villiers, 1870, p19]: a large, opulent sitting-room, richly decorated with carpets and chandeliers in red, black and gold. On the left of the stage is an office-table, covered with account-books and papers. A man and a woman sit opposite each other, examining documents, tallying bank notes. The ensuing plot of this short melodrama is simple. The woman, Elizabeth, will announce to her husband, Felix, that she is leaving him[35]. Her announcement, the reasons for it, and Felix's remonstrations make up the majority of the play. The eventual departure is followed by a short "dumb scene" representing the passing of a few hours, where upon Elizabeth returns in apparent capitulation, and the play ends.

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[35] This revolt must be marked off from others of the period. It is not the revolt of September that year, which led to the institution of the Paris Commune. Neither is it Peter Kropotkin's anarcho-communist journal, started in Geneva at the end of that decade. It comes several months before the sending of Mikhail Bakunin's *Letters*, with their demand for '*propagande par le fait*': the revolt of Villier's protagonist's, if it is 'by the deed', is one not of violent action but of *exit*. This revolt is too soon, out of step: it runs for 6 nights before it closes. It is re-staged, novelized, assimilated, in the 1890s.

Introduction

In the following I want to explore in what way the eponymous revolt might also be one against the anti-metaphysical repressions of Naturalist theatre, and what this means for a putative 'inner image' and its utopian function. This exploration takes two routes:

1. The protagonist's declared intention to leave is taken up as an image – of "where" she will go - by the audience. The image of this "elsewhere" then exists in tension with the material presence of the stage. It is consequently 'utopian' in both form and content. When this image, as inner, becomes totalized 'intertextually' the utopian function is lost.

2. Via the protagonist's references to Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy, and the modernist appropriation of Schopenhauer's aesthetics to utopian ends, the limits of *La Revolte's* – or at least of the inner image it asserts - utopian valence is suggested.

2.2. Elizabeth's Dream as (Utopian) Inner Image

In the last moments before Elizabeth leaves, she points to a crystal paper weight on the table and tells Felix it is a "souvenir" - it is "polished, transparent, truthful - and icy cold. If you should ever think of me - look at it" [Villiers, 1901, p29]. But Felix and the audience also have another, quite different *souvenir* of Elizabeth. By the time she leaves, they know where she intends to go, in both abstract and concrete terms. The abstract terms of this extra-, or post-diegetic life are of a 'dream', both in contradistinction to the rational, waking present and in terms of a hope or wish. To dream is

> to forget the tyranny of inferior minds, which are a thousand times more abject than stupidity itself. To dream is to escape hearing the moans of incurable misery. It is to forget those humiliations we have to bear and to inflict on others, called social life. It is to forget so-called duties, which are nothing but greed of profit, and in whose name we shut our eyes to the lot of the weak and suffering. It is to contemplate in the depths of our thought a hidden world only faintly reflected by outside realities. It is to strengthen the ever conscious hope in death - death which is at hand. It is to feel the mystery of the everlasting, to feel solitary but immortal.

It is to love the Ideal, to love it as naturally as the river flows to the sea. And as for the rest — the amusements and duties of the wretched age in which my lot is cast —they are not worth a day's existence. To dream is to die — to die in silence with a glimpse of heaven in one's eyes. [Villiers, 1901, pp20-21]

Practically, concretely, she will re-open her "old books" and live in "silence" [1901, p26]. She will be able to achieve this because she has invested her share of their fortune so that she will be able "to count on a little bread and cheese for the rest of [her] life, without going through any further trials" [1901, p13]; and she has invested in property:

Far from here is Iceland, Sicily or Norway—it doesn't matter which—in a country of my own choice stands a lonely house which I have earned, bought with my money. Instead of being caged in this office, I shall retire to this delightful far-off spot, where I shall get a glimpse of the horizon - *that's* something useful ... [1901, p25]

In the time before Elizabeth's departure these signifiers of an eschatological 'elsewhere' are set out, for the audience to gather up, as an image. The elsewhere is posited as both spatially 'beyond' the Naturalist mis-en-scene - it is *not here, not this* - and temporally after it - she *will go* there.

2.3. The Dumb Scene, Return and Soliloquy

When Elizabeth does finally leave, Felix, alone on stage, delivers a panicked, breathless rant, before collapsing in a faint. A "*dumb scene*" follows:

The clock over the door strikes one. Slow music. Then from time to time after a sufficiently long pause, two o'clock, then half-past two, then three, then half-past three, and at length four o'clock strikes. Felix remains unconscious. The dawn appears at the windows. The candles go out. The rim of a candlestick cracks. The fire burns down. The door in the background is roughly opened. Elisabeth enters trembling, deadly pale, holding her pocket handkerchief to her mouth. Without seeing her husband, she goes slowly to the big arm-chair, next the mantelpiece, throws off her hat, then covering her face with her hands, sits down and begins to think aloud. She is cold and shivers, her teeth chatter. [1901, p31]

"*To herself*" Elizabeth explains her return: in the carriage, despite her longing for freedom, a "cold feeling of exile" came over her.

> I knew that the sacred breath of life was around me - that I was conscious of it, and yet I was indifferent. I enjoyed it no more. ... I had forgotten how to soar above the world, how to shut my ears against the mocking laughter of mankind. .... These four years of drudgery have broken my spirits. ... His accounts have crippled my mind. [1901, p33]

She concludes that her place is there, with Felix, and resolves to educate her daughter; "that is all - and tomorrow I shall recommence my old life." She takes off her cloak and arranges her dress to "*appear as she was at first*", goes to the table and opens the account books, then "sits down and takes up her pen in the same attitude as when [the] curtain rose." Felix wakes up. Realizing only four hours have passed, he is gratified, and takes her hand. For a moment, Elizabeth, "*smiling, seems quite happy*" before becoming "*gloomy again*" and "*lost in thought*". She concludes the play by "*look[ing] at him with pity and sadness*" and calling him, "*in a slow and serious voice*", a "[p]oor man" [1901, p34-5].

In Villiers's work the revolt against naturalism is internal. *La Revolte's* staging is a convincing illusion of bourgeois domesticity: a single room, richly detailed and coloured. The protagonists' behaviour and language are, similarly, true to their environment - but only initially. The "grand meaningless words" of her dream speech, the poetic "flight" precedes her own flight from the stage, the naturalism of which collapses behind her, in the form of the "dumb scene" / "*scene muette*" [Villiers, 1870, p52].

In her absence, and with Felix lying unconscious on the sofa, time *speeds up:* its passing is indicated by the half-hourly striking of the clock, occurring "from time to time, after a sufficiently long pause"; and by the windows lightening, the candles going out, the fire burning down. The implied effect is similar to that experienced by the protagonist of H G Well's *Time Machine* (1895)*,* for whom, at a greater speed, "[t]he night came like the turning out of a lamp, and in another moment came tomorrow. The laboratory grew faint and hazy, then fainter and ever fainter. Tomorrow night came black, then day again, night again, day again, faster and faster still" [2008, p22]. We now know this effect as the cinematic 'time-lapse' sequence - as indeed seen in Gene Warren's special effects for George Pal's 1960 *Time Machine*.

The cinematic comparison is instructive. The cinema audience always

"shares time" with the screen: they accelerate and decelerate with it, submitting their own 'lived' temporality to that represented[36]. In the naturalist theatre, too, time is shared evenly between the auditorium and the stage. The actors move in the same time - and space - as the audience. *La Revolte*'s dumb scene breaks with the *mis-en-scene*'s naturalism, then, by staging a different time, or tempo, to that of the auditorium. For a few moments, while "slow", extra-diegetic music plays, the stage-time is not coextensive with the audience's. In these moments there are no subjectivities on stage: Felix, unconscious and motionless, is part of the *mis-en-scene*. Then the bifurcated tempos re-join with a jolt when the "door in the background is roughly opened [and] Elisabeth enters".

Inasmuch as stage and auditorium are temporally united, Elizabeth's return means a return to naturalism. But there is an anti-naturalistic persistence: she "sits down and begins to think aloud". Thinking aloud means a *soliloquy* - not an aside or monologue - which, as an index of unobservable interiority, naturalism prohibits. Naturalism would have her sit in silence, continuing the dumb scene. Giving a diegetic description of what happened in the carriage, how the longed-for freedom turned to "exile", she explains her return *to herself*, but also, of course, to the audience. The soliloquy is thought made public: for its duration the audience are no longer naturalism's observers, but attendant, assimilated in thought. An anti-naturalistic act, but, as thought made speech, externalized and realized, *in positivistic spirit*. When Felix comes to he speaks *to* her, while she is "*lost in thought*" [Villiers, 1901, p36] - thought retracted into the unobservable interior, and the terminus of her trajectory.

2.4. Materiality of *La Revolte*'s Stage Prevents Full Idealization

As a dramatic production, *La Revolte's* material presence thwarts the aspirations of Elizabeth and her utterances. The bourgeois *mis-en-scene* – her husband's ideology, the living-room stage set, Euclidean space, space itself – prevents a full 'idealization'. We find, however, that this is achieved inter-textually, when a *fictional La Revolte* is staged in Remy de Gourmont's novel *Sixtine*, published in 1890. Gourmont's *Revolte* (it is not named directly, but the references are clear) suppresses the domestic, bourgeois staging of Villier's play; indeed it is

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[36] "When you read a text," says Chantal Akerman, "you're in your own time. That is not the case in film. In fact, in film, you're dominated by my time' [cited in Campany (ed.), 2007, p195]

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mainly represented in the novel by paraphrasings of Elizabeth's 'dream' speech. And it this speech – pure text, cut off from the drama's mis-en-scene as much as it is, being in a novel, freed from the theatre's spatial occlusions - which gives the audience an 'esthetic thrill':

> They listened without letting a syllable of the magic prose escape their ears, and they dreamed while listening; they forgot the omnipotence of inferior minds; they deified each other, they ascended, supple and light, the mystic steps, summoned now by the illusion of a very pure and very expanding air at the summit of a narrow mountain above the clouds. [de Gourmont, 1922, p234]

As Frantisek Deak [1993, p23] points out, the fictional production of *La Revolte* achieves a symbolism – or rather, a symbolist reception-as-deification - that the impoverished reality of the stage production could never do. Inasmuch as in reading a novel, imaginative experience entirely overrides the contingencies of embodiment; to the extent that George Poulet can assert (from a phenomenological standpoint) that objects are closed but the book demands our presence: 'You are inside it; it is inside you; there is no longer either inside or outside' (1969, p54). The consciousness is one with its object, thinks another's thoughts, speaks, feels, suffers as another: 'The work is a sort of human being … constituting itself in me as the subject of its own objects' (1969, p59). Moreover, its 'idealized' appearance in de Gourmont's novel, written twenty years after the play, contributed to the making of Villiers de L'Isle-Adam into a cult figure for writers in the late 1880s, including Maurice Maeterlinck.

2.5. Maeterlinck Against Materiality: No Inner Image Because All is Inner Image

Maeterlinck, amongst others, recognizes a violent contrast with which a theatre built on Symbolist premises must deal – but then attempts to reconcile the symbol's inner image to what is 'outer'. We see this in his *Menus Propos* ['Small Talk'], published in September 1890 after the production of his play *L'Intruse.*

Maeterlinck is clearly concerned to continue Villiers' project. For the former, 'the theatre is a situation in which "[w]e must pay attention only to what we cannot properly assess" [1994, p144]. Moreover, what Maeterlinck perceives as theatre's "two traits", which seem to each "cancel out the other", should be understood in terms of an duality which is not only Villiers's but recognisable from

Lessing. For Maeterlinck poetry is that art which is "evasive and never speaks face-to-face … the temporary mask of the faceless unknown" [ibid.] but the theatre – material representation – "puts things back exactly where they were before the poet arrived" [1994, p145]. Theatre – and here Maeterlinck seems to have Diderot's realistic pictorial tableaux in mind – "produces just about what would happen if you were to give substance to the subject matter of a painting and in doing so turn it into everyday life": an "inexplicable light would suddenly be extinguished" [ibid.].

Moreover, because "the stage itself … is contingent … suddenly there is, by comparison with the passive subject of the poem, an extraordinary phenomenon of polarization". Maeterlinck thus wants to eradicate both the objectivity of the stage *and* the subjectivity of the actor – both are impediments to the full attainment of the Symbol's 'ideality' – that inexplicable light - in the consciousness of the audience. While, 'in ordinary life I must see the man who is talking to me, because most of his words have no meaning whatsoever independent of his presence', a poem that Maeterlinck "*see*[s] being recited is always a lie" [ibid]. The actor interrupts the 'rays' that 'spread out towards infinity' from the 'shining centre' of the Symbol - because 'whenever man penetrates a poem, the immense poem of his own presence snuffs out everything around him' [ibid]. Maeterlinck's answer is to 'eliminate the living being from the stage' [ibid], to depersonalize the actors, to make beings 'like us but visibly endowed with a dead soul' which 'cannot die', which inspire fear through 'their absolute lack of mystery … the absence of eternity about them' [1994, p146]: humans minus interiority, blended into the scenery. The result is that 'the atmosphere of terror in which [the androids] move is the very atmosphere of the poem' [ibid]; stage and poem, 'outer' image and 'inner' image, coalesce.

2.6. From Naturalism to Panorama

If inner images – i.e., images that are not of what is immediately present – are eliminated from the naturalist theatre's audience, it is because the play's textual world has been fully realized on the stage, rather than being left to imaginative inference. Speech, which could potentially refer to or evoke images of something outside the mis-en-scene, would best be eliminated. Following this logic, naturalist theatre's visual, material aspect could dominate to the extent that the spectacle would separate off into textless panorama and diorama. That is to say, the full

extent of naturalist theatre's logic is the panorama. As the dramaturg Hermann Bahr put it contemporaneously,

> Suddenly in the nineteenth century the imagination of the audience was no longer to be trusted. This would be another whole chapter, on the psychological history of the middle classes: how they had hardly achieved power, when they began on all sides to lose faith in their strength and sought aids to sustain it. So when previously a stage-set had only said to the audience, 'Imagine a castle or forest', it Is now filled with doubt about its ability to achieve this and instead tries to reproduce such settings. The sign is replaced by a panorama. [1996, p162]

Realistic scenery and costumes had been used to provide spectacular or picturesque backdrops at least since Robert Barker had patented his panoramic painting process in 1787, when the invention of a 360-degree viewing experience was claimed "to perfect an entire view of any country of situation as it appears to an observer". The panorama, however, as a speechless, subject-less naturalist stage set - extended laterally, in effect, to surround the audience - is the full articulation of the desire to cancel the inner image.

2.7. Glory Machine

Indignant about the failure *La révolte* – which played only five times at the Theatre de Vaudeville in 1870 - Villiers writes one of his *Contes cruels*, 'La machine à gloire', in 1874. It concerns the *claque*, or paid troop of applauders, an institution in nineteenth-century Parisian theater. Humans, however, are too unpredictable, their responses contingent for such a role that, like the age, demands uniform efficiency. Hence inventor Bathybius Bottom's 'Glory Machine', which automates the claque, producing a range of audience effects:

> *Screams of frightened women, choked Sobs, truly communicative Tears, little brusque Laughs...Howls, Chokings, Encore!, Recalls, silent Tears, Threats, Recalls with additional Howls, Pounding of approbation, uttered Opinions, Wreaths, Principles, Convictions, moral Tendencies, epileptic Attacks, Childbirth, Insults, Suicides, Noises of discussions (Art-for-art's-sake, Form and Idea), etc.*
> **[**Villiers, 1983, p. 108; trans Weiss, 2001, p8-9]

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With the 'Glory Machine' in place, the success of the play need not be risked on incompetent humans, who might miss their cues. When the Glory Machine replaces the audience entirely, Dr. Bottom's invention transforms the whole theatre into a machine for producing glory.

Conceived in revenge against the audience and critics who rejected his play, and the conventions of the theatre that staged it, what the Glory Machine entails, of course, is the removal an audience of human subjects who might have the inner image proposed in *La Revolte*. The result, as Allan S Weiss suggests, is a "countersublime, where … consciousness, subsumed by pure presence, eschews all transcendence; where the imagination exists in direct proportion to somatization" [Weiss, 2001, p9]: an audience without interiority, known only from the outside, by their behavioural – and largely non-verbal – responses: tears, laughter, howls as well as the 'noise' of discussion.

2.8. Schopenhauer, Aesthetics and Asceticism

To Elizabeth's 'dream' speech Felix retorts, "You must have been reading some mischievous novel which has unhinged your mind" [Villiers, 1901, p21]. The speech will indeed *enter* a novel, as has been demonstrated, but the text marking it is philosophical, rather than literary: Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* (1818). A brief explication of this intertextual dynamic is necessary.

In Schopenhauer's idealism, informed by Plato, Kant and the Upanishads, the physical world is phenomenal and exists only for the subject of knowledge. The sharp division between appearance and thing-in-itself - "what we know is not a sun and an earth, but an eye that sees the sun, and a hand, that feels the earth" [1950, I, p3] - means that "all that exists for knowledge is only an object in relation to a subject, the perception of a perceiver, in a word, Idea" [ibid]. As well as perceptually experiencing phenomena, the subject is aware of themselves from within, as 'Will'. The Will is the inner being of both the human subject and all Nature. Everything in Nature is the appearance of what *in itself* is Will. Indeed the universe is a single, cosmic Will to Exist which sustains the phenomenal, spatio-temporal world. And it is the Will which causes the world's wretchedness: its constant striving drives each part of the phenomenal world to survive at the expense of each other part.

There are, says Schopenhauer, two means of respite from this misery, of attaining

the painless state ... of the gods; for we are for the moment set free from the miserable striving of the will; ... It is in the beauty of both nature and art that we can achieve this temporary release from the will." [1950, III, p38]

The "beauty of ... art", or aesthetic experience, is when knowledge and perception, normally instrumental to the Will's satisfaction, gain autonomy from it, in pure will-less contemplation. This affords a loss of individuality - the subject becomes an impersonal and universal pure subject of knowledge, perceiving not things in space but the (basically Platonic) Ideas by which the Will manifests itself. The other, longer lasting solution is to distance the self from worldly preoccupations. To become aware of the wretchedness and futility of manifesting the cosmic Will to Live and its push for existence and gratification leads to sanctity, becoming an ascetic in whom the Will denies itself. The ascetic has no concern for living and prospering; in them the Will merely, only just, sustains the phenomenal spatio-temporal world. Both routes entail release from the binding constraints of a body rooted in and condemned to a world governed by space, time, and causal determination.[37]

La Revolte's Elizabeth, then, espouses exactly Schopenhauer's subjectivistic epistemology when she declares that "[t]he world has only the meaning the strength of words and the power of eyes give it" [Villiers, 1901, p20]. Her dream is the path of an ascetic saint, with its "escape" from the world's "incurable misery" through contemplating a "hidden world" and its "hope in death" in "the depths of our thought".[38]

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[37] Jonathan Crary has suggested that Schopenhauer's positing of an autonomous aesthetic experience is inspired by a growing awareness of the *physiological* in scientific discourse of the time. Schopenhauer's aesthetic subject is freed from the demands of the Will and a body increasingly understood as a complex of involuntary responses to stimuli: "If at the core of all Schopenhauer's work is his aversion to the instinctual life of the body, to the ceaseless and monotonous repetition of its pulses and desires, his utopia of aesthetic perception was also a retreat from the anguish of a modernized world that was making the body into an apparatus of predictable reflex activity" [1992, pp77-8].

[38] Felix makes a placating offer of twice-weekly trips to "the country" – they "brighten one up" and are "good for business". It is Felix's offer that prompts Elizabeth's Schopenhaurian dream of escape, with which it works in opposition: Felix's trips are incorporated into bourgeois 'life', and an extension of the present; the latter is an explicit breach with both.

2.9. Schopenhauer's music

An aesthetic experience occurs, claims Schopenhauer [1950, I], when a person perceives an object, bypasses its spatio-temporal objectification and sees through to the universal *Idea* of the object. Since Schopenhauer's epistemology is basically *correlative*, ie. the quality of the subject of experience must correspond to the quality of the object of experience - this means that the subject takes on a universal quality. The individual loses themselves - literally, de-individualises - in absorbed contemplation of the Idea.[39]

What Felix has 'in mind', may be well illustrated by Renoir's *La promenade* - produced, like *La revolte*, in 1870.

    La promenade depicts urban, bourgeois Parisians in felicitous intimacy with 'nature' as much with each other: their hands entwined, just as the leaves and shadows of leaves play across their clothes and link them to the greenery. Exterior Nature is domesticated. This is surely a trip to 'the' country - carefully secured and rationalized - as Felix imagines it. However, in his monograph on the painting, John House [1997, p5] makes the point that la promenade was not submitted to the Salon but was made to appeal to private collectors, who, in the late 1860s, were refusing the idealizations of academic history painting in favour of genre pieces that featured and affirmed their own lifestyles as fashionable, contemporary city dwellers (we can well imagine Felix as one of these). These scenes, moreover, often had erotic connotations beyond their apparently benign subject matter - Manet's *Dejeuner sur l'herbe* being the prime example - and House goes on to contend that the Parisian audience of 1870 would recognise la Promenade as set in a locale upstream on the Seine that was infamous for anonymous sexual encounters.

    Thus a double valence opens up: it is both an image of non-'Utopian' continuity with urban life, Nature's otherness assimilated, and of desublimated sexuality, operating outside rationalized structures. Meanwhile, just as the painting's execution is indebted to Monet and Courbet, in the feathery brushwork and palette respectively, what speaks through the depiction is Jean-Antoine Watteau's early 18th-century *fête galantes*: scenes of ideal courtship in (cultivated) pastoral settings from which all the cares of daily life seem excluded [see Cowart, 2001, p 470]. To the extent that we can speak of the idyll or pastoral as having a utopian valence, as Frederic Jameson recently has, it is as "rest": "relief from the frenzied anxieties of the actual social world, a glimpse of stillness and of transfigured human nature" [2005, p415]. Such rest significantly constitutes Elizabeth's dream; but Felix's trips to the country merely "brighten one up", rather than transfigure.

[39] It is prudent to mention Samuel Beckett's early Schopenhaurian reading of *Proust* (1931) here. In it, Beckett contrasts *involuntary* memory, which yields a "revelation of reality", to

The arts are then ranked according to the extent to which this transcendence can take place, from architecture, through sculpture, painting, to the highest, 'tragedy' or dramatic poetry. All plastic and verbal arts, however, are limited by being concerned with human forms and emotions, that is, they are compelled by mimesis, they "copy the Ideas". Only music lies outside this scheme: the aesthetic superlative, it "copies the Will itself". Music presents no Ideas for contemplation; in the metaphysical schema, music instead is on a level with the Ideas themselves: it directly manifests - is an "immediate image [*Abbild*]" of - the Will. The Will, as the thing-in-itself, surpasses all representation, and puts music in the paradoxical position of being an image of what has no image.[40] As an imageless image, then, it achieves autarky, not signifying a world but becoming a world in its own right. The problem is that we instinctively want to give images to it:

> Music does not express this or that particular and definite joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or delight, or merriment, or peace of mind … Yet we completely understand them in this extracted quintescence. Hence it arises that our imagination is so easily excited by music, and now seeks to give form to that invisible yet actively moved spirit world which speaks to us directly, and to clothe it with flesh and blood … This is the origin of the song with words, and finally of the opera …[41] [1950, I, p52]

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voluntary memory – *trying* to remember – which is equivalent to imagining and which impedes revelation. Where the "abandonment" of involuntary recollection brings the object "as particular and unique and not merely the member of a family, … independent of any general notion and detached from the sanity of a cause, isolated and inexplicable in the light of ignorance" [1999, p11], the effort of imagining obscures its object: voluntary memory "provides an image as far removed from the real as the myth of imagination". Voluntary imagination is the "dream of a madman" [1999, p55] and the "ineluctable gangrene of romanticism". Beckett's project is then shaped by the bind of attempting to excise this gangrene - to bring imagination to an end – by necessarily using further acts of imagination. Hence the logics of *Imagination Dead Imagine* (1965)*,* and *Worstward Ho* (1983), where objects are negated only to be reconstituted by the act of negating them.

40 This point is made by Ludger Luetkehaus [2006, p96].

41 The cinematizing effect of 20th-century personal audio devices is predicted: "This deep relation which music has to the true nature of all things also explains the fact that suitable music played to any scene, action, event, or surrounding seems to disclose to us its secret meaning, and appears as the most accurate and distinct commentary upon it. [...] Music makes every picture, and indeed every scene of real life and of the world, at once appear

Not only opera but "*tonmalerei*" or sound-painting, like Haydn's *Seasons,* is a "reproductive" and thus "reprehensible" form. Just as Lessing was reacting to the word-painting of nature poetry - epitomized, indeed, by Thompson's *Seasons* - so does Schopenhauer take on his genre-distinctions.

2.10. High Modernist Utopia and Schopenhauer's Music

Schopenhauer's articulation of an autonomous artistic perception makes, as Jonathan Crary suggests, a "crucial anticipatory statement of modernist aesthetics" [1992, p75]. Indeed Schopenhauer's essentially ascetic view of the purpose of art predicts the aesthetic autonomy and opposition of kitsch and avant-garde propounded by high modernist critics, while it is his conception of music as qualitively different aesthetic experience that appeals to 20th-century formalists. Clement Greenberg acknowledges that

> [b]ecause of its 'absolute' nature, its remoteness from imitation, its almost complete absorption in the very physical quality of its medium, as well as because of its resources of suggestion, music had come to replace poetry as the paragon of art. [1986, p31]

Theodor Adorno, meanwhile, recognizes the critical-utopian implications, that "the conceptless, abstract moment [which] Schopenhauer recommended to irrationalist philosophy, makes [music] unreceptive to the *ratio* of the ability to be sold" [cited in Luetkehaus, 2006]. That is, word-less music is liberated from every cause but its own, from instrumental reason. It is Ernst Bloch that goes furthest in recognizing the utopian valence of Schopenhauer's conception of music, as well as where it is compromised. Bloch considers Schopenhauer's idea, that music "is a language that reason does not understand", a "crucial turning point" [1986, I, p153-4]. The problem is that in Schopenhauer's hands it leads us merely into the "bottomless void" of subjectivity. For Bloch, the pure immanence of Schopenhauerian musical experience is no conduit to the "not-yet": an object is needed for transcendence, for the self to be moved "to the new self". What Bloch does take from Schopenhauer is that music can reveal the thing-in-itself. What is revealed, however, is not the immanently desiring Will; Bloch's thing-in-itself is that "which is not yet; …

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with higher significance, certainly all the more in proportion as its melody is analagous to the inner spirit of the given phenomenon." [1950, I, p52]

utopia calling out to itself through goodness, music, metaphysics, but unrealizable in mundane terms" [1986, I, p158]. Thus for Bloch, music is the

> inwardly utopian art, completely beyond the scope of anything empirically verifiable [1985, p195]

Free from the burden of representation, music can connect us sensuously with what is "otherwise unsayable" and again grant us the "sensory and even intellectual contact with transcendence" that now resides behind the curtain drawn by the "free, virile, operative, Luciferean, rationalistic" spirit of the Renaissance, Reformation, and modernity [1986, I, p159]. Bloch imagines a refunctioning of Romantic, bourgois *Innerlichkeit* that transforms subjective space into one that opens onto "an ethics and metaphysics of inwardness, of fraternal inwardness" [ibid].

Conclusion

The above excursion through Schopenhauerian aesthetics and their modernist recuperation serves to adumbrate the specifically utopian function of the inner image evoked by Elizabeth's dream. Its function is limited in two respects: by being depictive in a way that the "inwardly utopian art" of music is not, but also by remaining what Frederic Jameson, borrowing from Coleridge, calls utopian 'fancy', as opposed to utopian 'imagination'. Where fancy works with what is available, the imagination is radical. Elizabeth's dream is predicated on *money* - she has invested her share of their fortune - and *property* - the "lonely house" which she has "bought with [her] money"; while it is pecuniary thought that renders her unable to realize those ambitions: "His accounts have crippled my mind". As Jameson remarks,

> The lived misery of money, the desperation of poorer societies, the pitiful media spectacles of the rich ones, is palpable to everyone. It is the decision to abandon money, to place this demand at the forefront of a political programme, that marks the rupture and opens up a space into which utopia may enter … [2005, pp166-8]

Elizabeth's fatal binding to the *ratio* of exchange is then at one with the failure to attain the conceptless, imageless moment promised by her Schopenhauerian *ratio*.

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CHAPTER 3

Do I add to the images in movies?[42]

Introduction

In pursuit of an inner image of cinematic spectatorship the following reconsiders the above question Roland Barthes asks himself - and answers in the negative – in *Camera Lucida* (1980). I proceed by establishing two conceptions of the viewer's engagement: that in which there is an 'extra' image, existing in the realm of the spectator, which is not the cinematographic material itself, and that in which there is 'only one' image, which is a unification of the spectator's thought and cinematographic material. Barthes, I suggest, asks his question out of fear of the unification of thought and material, in which cognitive autonomy is lost to the medium. His negative answer passes over the 'added' or 'extra' images of *soviet montage,* which I detail here, because their addition is not the voluntary prerogative of the viewer. Soviet montage's extra image or *Obraz* is, moreover, made by *instrumentalizing* the viewer's 'innate' logical, meaning-making faculties. Eisenstein attempts to put this 'Kulehov effect' to pedagogic ends, as in *Strike* (1925); later cinema and its theorization, as Gilles Deleuze [1985] suggests, attempt to refute the effect as both manipulative and logocentric, and in doing so, eliminate the 'extra' image from the realm of the spectator and make cinematic experience monist.

A critical dispute over Stan Brakhage's *The Animals of Eden and After* (1970) demonstrates the difficulties of such a strategy, and emphasizes the apparently irresistible, *involuntary* character of these extra images. I explore two further tactics in the prevention of extra (and, being only in the real of the spectator, *inner*) images: by speeding up the cuts to a flicker or slowing them down to complete continuity. I take Brakhage's own *Persian Series* (1999) as exemplary of the former, and Jeroen de Rijke and Willem de Rooij *Of Three Men* (1998) as exemplary of the latter. Even with these works, however, some mode of 'adding' to the images yet persists; *Of Three Men,* in particular, presents itself as an occasion - that Barthes saw provided by photography - to *close one's eyes,* recollect, and let the "detail … rise of its own accord into affective consciousness".

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[42] Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans Richard Howard, p55

3.1. Adding with Eyes Closed

In his 1970 essay *The Third Meaning: Research Notes on Several Eisenstein Stills* the titular third meaning is that which is neither directly communicated by the image nor symbolized by any communally understood signs within the image. As this *obtuse* (as opposed to obvious) meaning is conveyed by features which are not part of any recognizable symbolic system, it is unique to the response of the individual viewer. The third meaning is the prototype of the '*punctum*' described a decade later in *Camera Lucida.* There, discussing how it is that affective meaning apparently not conveyed by the manifest depiction arises, Barthes comes to the conclusion that the *punctum* might best be revealed when "the photograph is no longer in front of me and I think back on it …

> … as if direct vision oriented its language wrongly, engaging it in an effort of description which will always miss its point of effect, the *punctum. …* Ultimately – or at the limit – in order to see a photograph well, it is best to look away or close your eyes. […] The photograph touches me if I withdraw it from its usual blah-blah … to say nothing, to shut my eyes, to allow the detail to rise of its own accord into affective consciousness. [1982, p53-5]

The punctum is best perceived by turning away from the photograph itself because the punctum is contributed by the viewer. The photograph "triggers" it, but the punctum is a subjective "addition".[43] The continued presence of the photograph prevents this addition. This is because, as Peter Wollen points out, the photograph for Barthes exists in space and the viewing subject exists in time – the viewer has time to "veer away on a train of thought, circle back, traverse and criss-cross the image [in a] free rewriting time rather than an imposed reading time" [1984, p108] Thus Barthes writes about film stills rather films, whose constant change *imposes* time on the viewer.

> Do I add to the images in movies? I don't think so; I don't have time: in front of the screen, I am not free to shut my eyes; otherwise, opening them again I would

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[43] The punctum is private. It is that which is resists theorization, classification, or representation. To successfully describe or name it, then, turns it into the *studium*. This, as Derek Attridge [1997] points out, is the fundamental problem of the theory's application: if the punctum is ever communicated to anyone else, if Barthes is successful in his descriptions of the *punctum,* then he will have made them socially communicable and what is of the order of the socially communicable belongs to the *studium.*

not discover the same image; I am constrained to a continuous voracity; a host of other qualities, but not *pensiveness* … [1982, p55]

The viewer cannot be 'thoughtful' in front of the screen because thought is temporal and the changing image occupies that time, confirming the complaint of Georges Duhamel, as quoted by Walter Benjamin, that "I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts have been replaced by moving images" [Benjamin 1977]. *Camera Lucida's* ruminations express a humanist fear of loss of autonomy, the corrective to which is for the spectator's thought to be *separate* to the moving, changing image. To ask if one "add[s] to the images in movies" is in this sense to ask if one *can be* cognitively separate from the images in the movies *in order to* add to them. In considering discreet film stills, Barthes passes over a way in which the images in the movies *are* 'added to', that is, in the experience of *montage*. Barthes passes over it, I suggest, because it is not *freely* added. The montage addition is not a "free rewriting" but is *determined* by the cinematographic material.[44] It is, yet, an 'extra', existing in the realm of the spectator and not 'in' the images. The following details the way in which this 'extra' is central to theories of Soviet montage of the 1920s.

3.2. Kuleshov's Montage

Lev Kuleshov demonstrates that the relationship of shot to shot produces a semantic effect that overrides the actor's performance, as in the experiment conducted in 1918, with the matinee idol Ivan Mozzhukhin. A long take in close-up of Mozzhukin's expressionlessly neutral face is intercut with various shots –

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[44] Raymond Bellour extends Barthes suggestion of "pensiveness" to describe the effect of stills in motion pictures. Barthes doesn't "have time" to "add to the images in movies"; but, suggests Bellour, when the spectator of a film is confronted with a photograph (as in Ophul's *Letter from an Unknown Woman* (1948), Hitchcock's *Shadow of a Doubt* (1943); Antonioni's *Blow-up* (1966), or Lang's *Beyond a Reasonable Doubt* (1956)) they are granted a respite from the film's unfolding, distanced, and given time to "add". The disruption of the filmic illusion allows one to "add", paradoxically, "by subtraction. The photo subtracts me from the fiction of the cinema … creating a distance, another time, the photographs permits me to reflect on cinema … that is, to reflect that I am at the cinema. In short, the presence of the photo permits me to invest more freely in what I am seeing. It helps me close my eyes, yet keep them wide open" [1984, p120].

bowl of soup, woman in a coffin, a child playing with a toy bear – and the audience (of students – it was shown to Kuleshov's classes in the VGIK) marvels at the sensitivity of the actor, who appears respectively hungry, sad or lustful. Writes Kuleshov,

> With correct montage, even if one takes the performance of an actor directed at something quite different, it will still reach the viewer in the way intended by the editor, because the viewer himself will complete the sequence and see that which is suggested to him by the montage. [1974, p54]

The radicality of this 'constructive' editing becomes apparent when contrasted with 'analytic': whereas the latter, following an establishing shot, consists in close ups that merely convey the scene, the former conveys *ideas* – 'hunger', 'sadness', 'lust' - through the juxtaposition of shots, cut from entirely different films.

3.3. *Izobrazhenie / Obraz*

Eisenstein combines Kuleshov's findings with his own conviction that the "basic materials of the theatre arise from the spectator himself – and from our guiding of the spectator into a desired direction" which is the making "perceptible" of the "final ideological conclusion" [1943, p166]. The experiments of Kuleshov demonstrated how, through editing, the "anti-Naturalist, anti-psychologist trend in the theatre could also be introduced into cinema, using scientific, laboratory-tested and specifically cinematic methods" [Wollen, 1972, p24]. Over the twenties and thirties behaviourist notions of response, as suggested in early texts such as *Montage of Attractions* and *A Materialist Approach to Film Form*, give way to working terms such as "pathos", and a new psychologism, the taking of spectator's subjectivity into consideration, as it is in *Montage 1938*. There it is described how, before the film is made, there "hovers" in the mind's eye of the director an image which "emotionally embod[ies] his theme." The director's task is

> to transform this image into a few basic partial representations which, in their combination and juxtaposition, shall evoke in the consciousness and feelings of the spectator, reader, or auditor, the same initial image which originally hovered before the creative artist. [1991, p34]

The partial representations or *izobrazhenie* are strongly demarcated from the global, theme-image or *obraz* that the spectator mentally unifies them into. The global logic in fact follows the local logic, which is that of the effect identified by Kuleshov:

> [T]he juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot – as it does a *creation*. It resembles a creation – rather than a sum of its parts – from the circumstance that in every such juxtaposition the result is qualitively distinguishable from each component element viewed separately. [1991, p18]

Eisenstein is emphatic that juxtaposition produces *qualitively distinguishable* effects, effects that are 'extra' to the cinematographic components.[45] In the example of "a grave, juxtaposed with a woman in mourning weeping beside it", from which "scarcely anybody will fail to jump to the conclusion: *a widow*" [1991, p16], the woman and the grave are "*objectively representable*", but "'*a widow*', arising from a juxtaposition of the two representations, is objectively unrepresentable – a new idea, a new conception, a new image." [1991, p19] This extra image is 'in' the viewer; the clear connotation is of *impregnation*: "[w]ithin me, as a spectator, this image is born and grown. Not only the author has created, but I also – the creating spectator – have participated" [1991, p36].

3.4. Involuntary Rationalizing

The fault of this 'extra' notion of cinematic experience is articulated by Gilles Deleuze in second of his cinema books. For Deleuze [1985], the "shocks" that Eisenstein's montage produces are "intellectual": they are premised on belief in the powers of rational and logical thought. The viewer is forced to synthesize, to overcome the manifest conflict between two shots – of for example *Strike's* (1925) workers and cattle - and to "think the Whole". To extend Deleuze's point, we can name the source of the problem as the Kuleshov effect, which is really an

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[45] This is not the only understanding of montage's operation. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for one, considers it a temporal phenomenon where "the meaning of a shot … depends on what precedes it in the movie" [1964, p54]. Memory of the previous shot informs the perception of the current shot, rather than shots combining to produce a separate entity.

involuntary rationalizing; saying that it forces the viewer to synthesize is the same as saying that it *activates their proclivity* to synthesize.

The proclivity had been noted by Eisenstein. What "the 'leftists' of montage" (i.e. those without pedagogic intent) discovered, "[w]hile playing with pieces of film," was "the fact that two pieces of film of any kind, placed together, inevitably combine into a new concept, a new quality, arising out of that juxtaposition" [1991, p16]. Eisenstein admits that he too was "charmed primarily with that newly revealed feature of the film strips," that, "no matter how unrelated they might be, and frequently despite themselves, they engendered a 'third something' and became correlated when juxtaposed according to the will of an editor." [1991, p19] The automaticity of the correlations, moreover, appeals to a humanist *essentialism:* for Béla Balázs, "[s]eeking a meaning is a fundamental function of human consciousness and nothing is more difficult than to accept with complete passivity meaningless, purely accidental phenomena" [1952, p120]. The *involuntary rationalization* effected by montage later persuades Christian Metz of cinema's *logomorphism*:

> An isolated photograph can of course tell nothing! Yet why must it be that, by some strange correlation, two juxtaposed photographs must tell something? Going from one image to two images, is to go from image to language. [1974, p46]

Potemkin's lion statues sequence is "a magnificent *syntagma",* an "unequivocal symbol of the workers' revolt", and "a fact of language (*fait de langue*)" [ibid.]. Shots in sequence activate the synthesizing, rationalizing, *linguistic* subject; that it happens inevitably, despite themselves, confirms its *essential* nature, that the human is *at heart* rational:

> It is as if a kind of induction current were linking images among themselves, *whatever one did,* as if the human mind (the spectator's as well as the film-maker's) were incapable of not making a connection between two successive images. [ibid.]

It is of course exactly this kind of essentialism that Deleuze wants to overturn. But before examining his strategy for doing so, something of temporal juxtaposition's irresistible force, as well as the desire to erase the 'extra' image and subtract cinematic experience to the cinematographic material, can be illustrated by turning to a critical dispute over the films of Stan Brakhage.

3.5. Eisenstein / Brakhage

'Camera Lucida / Camera Obscura', Annette Michelson's lead article in a 1973 special issue of *Art Forum,*[46] presents the work of Sergei Eisenstein and Stan Brakhage in parallel, both positioning the latter in the realm of, and showing his paradigmatic break from, the former. Intent on cementing Brakhage's critical legitimacy, Michelson calls the two film-makers the "alpha and omega" of film art – Eisenstein the 'lucida', Brakhage the 'obscura'. The former's gaze of "analysis" is contrasted with the latter's gaze of "fascination ... eluding analytic grasp" [1973, p2].

Brakhage's films, then, are introduced as a paradigmatically different mode of practice: that which cannot be "grasped". According to critic Victor Grauer, this is also true at the level of montage. For Grauer, the "true achievement of Brakhage's montage, the heart of his cinematic revolution" is the ability to "create juxtapositions which resist our need" – and Grauer quotes Rosalind Krauss - "for conceptual order … transcending the materials of experience". The images are organized "in such a way as to defeat any possible coding process before it can begin" [Grauer 1998].

3.6. The Animals of Eden and After

Grauer, however, is writing to correct the interpretation of Brakhage's film *The Animals of Eden and After* (1970) by P Adams Sitney, the film-maker's main critical exegete, who indeed claims a cognitive "grasp". According to Sitney, the film "portrays the process of convalescence as a normalization or accommodation to socially dictated patterns of perception and thought." The "turning point of the film" is the birth of a goat, after which,

> Brakhage cuts from the colour image of the animal's labour to a black and white image of a crying baby. The shift in film stock emphasizes the decisiveness of this moment. In the narrative of the film, this is the point at which the child, witnessing the birth of the animal, imagines his own birth. [2002, p391]

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[46] The issue includes 'The Third Meaning: Notes on Some of Eisenstein's Stills' by Roland Barthes, 'For God and Country' by Noel Carroll, 'Montage "October": Dialectic of the Shot' by Rosalind Krauss, and 'Stan and Jane Brakhage, Talking' by Hollis Frampton.

At another point a caged bird is intercut with the crying child. According to Sitney, "the trapped bird now stands for the feeling of the weeping child." [ibid.] *The Animals of Eden and After,* then, has been *read*, the shots rationalized into the determination of a *third something*: 'birth of goat + crying child = child imagining own birth' just as 'woman + grave = widow' for Eisenstein. Grauer rejects Sitney's account:

> We see images of a young boy in bed. Nothing in the film informs us that he is the protagonist of a narrative. We see a goat giving birth, but there is nothing in the way this event presents itself that can lead us to understand it as a "turning point." If a shot of the boy directly follows a shot of the goat, it is Brakhage's special achievement, all but unique among filmmakers, that we will not fall victim to the Kuleshov effect and automatically assume that the child is "witnessing the birth" of a baby goat. Similarly, a juxtaposition of a shot of "the crying child" and the caged bird cannot, in the context created by Brakhage, cause the bird to "stand for the feeling of the weeping child." [Grauer, 1998]

What Grauer claims is that the viewing subject *adds nothing* to *The Animals of Eden and After*. "We see images of a young boy in bed … [w]e see a goat giving birth …": all Grauer's viewing subject perceives are the images presented to them (as if this itself involved no addition, as if seeing the image of a young boy in bed did not involve a "conceptual order … transcending the materials of experience"). The only images involved in *The Animals of Eden and After* are those on the screen.

How to reconcile the two accounts? If Sitney's displays a submission to the proclivity to rationalize, Grauer's seems a wilful refusal or *repression* of something that the perceived material makes *involuntary*. His claim could then be understood as a *polemical* refutation of the logocentric humanism implied by Sitney's reading – (although Grauer's appeal to notions of genius, uniqueness and mastery would suggest otherwise).

3.7. Preventing Rationalization

If*, contrary to Victor Grauer's claims, *The Animals of Eden and After cannot* prevent the viewer "fall[ing] victim to the Kuleshov effect" it is due to the film being a sequence of perceivable representations: where the viewing subject

"*see[s]* images of a young boy in bed" and "*see[s]* a goat giving birth" conceptual ordering has already begun.

On this logic, to *in fact* prevent the Kuleshov effect – and eliminate 'extra' images from cinematic experience – it is necessary to change the material so that it is prevented from stimulating involuntary rationalization.

This is indeed what Deleuze recommends in antidote to Eisenstein's intellectual shocks: a cinema of continuously flowing images that – exactly Barthes's fear - do not leave time for critical distance or contemplation, that acts i*mmediately* on a pre-reflexive, pre-verbal level. Artaud illustrates for Deleuze the kind of shock which is a radical *dissociation*, conflating multiple voices and viewpoints that cannot be synthesized into a unified whole. Instead of forcing logical thought, this cinema *makes it impossible to think*: one image replaces another at a rate that prohibits interpretation. This cinema reveals the subject's own powerlessness, its own 'impower' ('impuissance'), which must be confronted to "produce a new image of thought" [1989, p168].

3.8. Persian Series

Brakhage's hand-painted films, such as those of the *Persian Series* (1999), can be taken as an example of the attempt to *prevent* logical thought by presenting an 'unrecognizable' continuous flow of images: each frame is differently marked, producing when projected rapidly and constantly changing coloured forms, interspersed with the darkness of unmarked leader.

With the Kuleshov effect disabled, and no time for synthesis, there should be no 'extra' images, there should be only one image, which is a unification of the spectator's thought and cinematographic material. The coloured frames of the *Persian Series*, indeed, seem to hyperbolize that unification by *emulating* thought – or at least by suggesting what Brakhage calls "so-called hallucinations … day-dreams or night dreams", but particularly "the abstractions which move so dynamically when closed eyelids are pressed" [1978, pp. 120-128]. The *Persian Series's* flickering colour fields do suggest "closed-eye vision": "those explosions you can see by rubbing; there's a whole world of moving pattern [1982, p115]. As such, there be no 'extra' image in the realm of the spectator, which is not the cinematographic material – because the cinematographic material here effectively *pre-empts* any such images.

3.9. Analagon of the Hypnagogic

The threat of recognition and conceptual determination, however, persists. If the frames of the *Persian Series* are emulating the "dots and moving patterns of closed-eye vision" then they are mimicking phosphenes or entoptic lights, within the eyeball itself. It is these that Jean-Paul Sartre in *L'Imaginaire* claims provide the 'analagon' for hypnagogic imagery. All imaginative acts, says Sartre, require some matter, or *analagon* to work on, whether it be external or an 'internal' to the subject: it is a question of "animating a certain matter to make a *representation* of an absent or nonexistent object." [2004, p50] In the case of the 'hypnagogic' imagery, that occurs on the verge of sleep, the analagon is within the eye. Sartre evokes the transition:

> My eyes are closed. A field of relatively stable luminous spots of varying colours and brightnesses appear. Movements begin, vague swirls, which create luminous forms without definite contours. … [W]e try to follow them with our eyes. … The result of these movements is indefinite and indefinable phosphorescent paths. Then, all at once, forms with clear contours appear. … One does not posit these forms as really existent outside oneself, nor even as existing in the entoptic field: one only posits that one sees them at the moment. In a word: I do not *see* the teeth of the saw (I see nothing but the phosphenes), but I *know* that what I see *is* a figure of teeth of a saw. … Nothing new has appeared, no image has been projected on the entoptic lights, but, in apprehending them, one apprehends them *as* teeth of a saw or *as* stars. [2004, pp45-6]

Sartre's account of experiencing the lights themselves, before "forms with clear contours appear", would appositely describe watching the *Persian Series;* that "forms with clear contours appear" to Sartre suggests that they may also appear to the viewer of Brakhage's film, an expression of the involuntary urge to conceptual order. Sartre is emphatic, however, that images like the "teeth of a saw" are not 'extra' to the analagon's material: *nothing new has appeared, no image has been projected*. According to the *intentionality* of Sartre's phenomenological view, the apprehension (*as* "teeth of a saw") *is* the image: a unity of thought and material. The *Persian Series*, meanwhile, in both flickering form and abstract content, has strived to annul any 'extra' images the viewer might have. Whether the discernment of figurations counts as a subjective 'addition' or the thought and material remain indivisible depends on whether or not the situation is phenomenologically framed.

3.10. Continuity

The *Persian Series* exemplifies one strategy for undermining the Kuleshov effect and reducing cinematic experience to a single image, by effectively *speeding up* the rate of the cuts to the level of the frame rate. Making each frame a shot – each frame of abstract forms different to the next - renders the shots *unrecognizable* and interrupts the "induction current" that Metz referred to. There is no time for - and no object of - recognition and conceptual determination. The dynamically opposite strategy in preventing involuntary rationalization is to *slow down* the rate of cuts from shot to shot – *to zero* - and have only slight, permutational changes between frame content.

In the late 1990s Dutch artists Jeroen de Rijke and Willem de Rooij produce three films each consisting of ten-minute-long, static takes. One of these, *Of Three Men* (1998) begins with a fade-in from black, effected by a figure moving away from in front of the lens (perhaps in reference to the 'concealed' cuts of Hollywood films like Hitchcock's 1948 *Rope*). The interior of a church is revealed, the centralized perspectival lines extending into the space of the room in which *Of Three Men* is projected. The eponymous figures can be dimly made out sitting down in the back ground, just off centre. Registering the bare floor and chandeliers, and that the figures are kneeling in prayer, the viewer slowly realizes that the church is in fact a mosque (see Loers, 2000). For the 10-minute duration of the film, only the barest movement is perceptible - the chandelier gently turns, rhomboids of sunlight form and dissolve on the floor.

Of Three Men, then*,* exemplifies second strategy suggested above, and in doing so consciously recourses to film-theoretical arguments of the 1960s, and the refutation of montage in favour of *continuity* by André Bazin. Eisenstein, says Bazin, puts "faith in the image" [2004, 24], his montage creating "a sense or meaning not objectively contained in the images themselves but derived exclusively from their juxtaposition" [2004, p25]. Bazin offers instead "faith in reality" [2004, p24]: 'shooting in continuity', with long takes and deep focus, "adds nothing to the reality, it does not deform it, it forces it to reveal its structural depth, to bring out the preexisting relations" [2004, p27]. Continuity and montage divide, moreover, in terms of spectator participation: montage is rejected as being inherently manipulative and coercive, the viewing is passive, if hypnotic; continuity requires attention and an active deciphering. For Bazin, where 'montage' cinema amounts to a kind of repressive, psychological conditioning, with the

continuous shot, like 'reality', the viewing subject is 'free' to perceive or choose their own level of reading.

Meanwhile, particularly in the context of its two companion films - *Chun Tian* (1994) and *Bantar Gebang* (2000) – *Of Three Men* suggests an atavistic return to the Lumiere brothers' aiming of a stationary camera at a factory gate; or even of the early fiction 'tableaux' films, like Louis Feuillade's *Fantômas* (1913), where the camera is set back from the drama, which is played out in prolonged shots and complex choreography (see Bordwell, 1997). *Of Three Men*, however, sublates both this kind of synchronic montage (simultaneously presented elements in a single shot) and diachronic montage (separate shots in serial form). Rather than spatial or temporal juxtaposition, the operative mode is diegetic *superimposition:* as the church reveals itself beneath the mosque (or, as suggested above, the mosque 'appears' from the church architecture), Bazin's "structural depth" of "pre-existing relations" applies literally.[47]

Once this is understood, unlike the *Persian Series' simulation* of closed-eye vision, *Of Three Men* would seem to encourage the viewer to *actually* close their eyes.[48] We recall that Barthes cannot shut his eyes and imagine at the cinema because, on opening them again, he would not "discover the same image": *Of Three Men's* 'image' does not change for the full ten minutes of its duration. The pervasive calm is the viewer's reassurance that the image will not change (playing off both the religious claim to eternity and the manifest, contradictory, architectural change) – it will still be there on opening. And with the image's centrally receding perspective conjoining and extending the projection space, the viewer is implicated as next to – even one of - the three men under the chandelier: prayer, closed-eye contemplation, would seem to be the appropriate behavior.

Conclusion

It has been the aim of the above discussion to view cinematic experience

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[47] Not forgetting, as Sven Lütticken has pointed out, the submerged art-historical scene of the seventeenth-century paintings that depicted the whitewashed interiors of Protestant churches that were once Catholic [2007, p115].

[48] The many correlations between *Camera Lucida* and Sartre's *L'Imaginaire,* to which Barthes book is dedicated, have been marked extensively elsewhere; for my purposes it is worth reiterating that the *punctum* best reveals itself with closed eyes, as a mental image, the "detail … ris[ing] of its own accord into affective consciousness".

'from the position' of an image that is 'extra' to the cinematographic material, and as such 'only' the viewer's addition, and *inner*. It has then been possible to consider in what way, and why, this image has been both asserted and annulled, or cancelled. A number of aspects revealed themselves:

Eisenstein's extra image or *Obraz* is a putting of Kuleshov's findings - that the image will "reach the viewer in the way intended by the editor, because the viewer himself will complete the sequence and see that which is suggested to him by the montage" - to pedagogic ends. It is made by *instrumentalizing* the viewer's 'innate' logical, meaning-making faculties. This extra image is refuted because it is perceived to be both manipulative and logocentric. Eisenstein's metaphor is of impregnating the viewer, *by recruiting or soliciting their imagination or creativity*: "[w]ithin me, as a spectator, this image is born and grown. Not only the author has created, but I also – the creating spectator – have participated." Christian Metz, meanwhile, confirms the extra image's formation as a kind of involuntary rationalization, an *"induction current … linking images among themselves, whatever one did"*, the mind "incapable of not making a connection between two successive images. [ibid] Reactions to Stan Brakhage's film *The Animals of Eden and After* confirmed the "induction current" of temporal juxtaposition's irresistible force, as well as the desire to erase the 'extra' image and subtract cinematic experience to the cinematographic material.

Two forms of editing or montage presented themselves that might overcome the induction current of involuntary rationalization: one, recommended by Deleuze, consisted of speeding up the cuts to a continuous flicker that does not leave time for critical distance or contemplation, acting i*mmediately* on a pre-reflexive level; the other, recommended by Bazin, for whom 'montage' amounts to a kind of psychological conditioning, is the continuous shot, without any cuts.

However, on examination of films taken to be exemplary of these two modes - Brakhage's *Persian Series* [1999] and Jeroen de Rijke and Willem de Rooij *Of Three Men* [1998] respectively – it was found that some form of 'addition' to the images yet persisted. Where the *Persian Series* appears to purposefully simulate 'closed-eye vision', *Of Three Men,* presents itself as an occasion - that Barthes saw provided by photography – to literally *close one's eyes* and recollect, and in doing so, liberate one's spectatorship of the changing image from "continuous voracity".

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CHAPTER 4

Two Kinds of Blankness

Introduction

In the pursuit of the relationships between language, image and interiority – here specifically in Conceptual Art's late-sixties-early-seventies zenith - the following compares the work of Marcel Broodthaers and Robert Barry, via the criticism of Rosalind Krauss. The invocation of different aspects of the work of Stéphane Mallarmé by these artists provides a frame through which to perceive those relationships.

Broodthaers takes on Mallarmé's *spatialization* of the lexical and typographic elements of language via the surrealist *écriture*'s *rebus*: language's material form exaggerated to inhibit semantic 'content'. Barry's sentences, meanwhile, are conventionally 'meaningful', but exhibit Mallarmé's auto-destructive, "negative logic" whereby what is evoked is immediately 'erased' or collapses in "resonant disappearance": 'pictures' are promised but what is offered is unpicturable. Broodthaers's engagement with Mallarmé is of course explicit – as in 1969's *Exposition Literaire autour de Mallarmé* – while Barry's is, rather, an application of Mallarméan logic to the interrogation of the art object's ontology.

What both practices contribute to – through paradigmatically opposing deployments of language - is a critique of the dominance of conceptual thought over experience. Barry's texts challenge *universal communicability:* the notion that every thought can be expressed, and that thought is therefore primarily – necessarily – public. Broodthaers's rebuses, in their resistance to being read, offer experience that refuses to be conceptualized.

I begin with an instructive misreading by Krauss of Broodthaers's 1974 Studio International cover, that allows the development of two notions of the 'rebus': one that Broodthaers professes, which is a combination of the visual and verbal to the semantic annulment of both, and one that Krauss applies to Broodthaers, which, counter to her post-structuralist avowals, entails the verbal-conceptual determination of the visual. It is at the latter effacement of the non-conceptual, in fact, that both artists' practices take aim.

4.1. Krauss Reads Broodthaers's Studio International Cover

In black capital letters on white disks, in turn on a black ground, is the phrase "FINE ARTS". In place of the "E", however, is an image of an eagle, and the image of an ass replaces the 'A'. This is Marcel Broodthaers' 1974 Studio International cover. According to Rosalind Krauss, the combination of letters and images that Broodthaers had reproduced from a 19th-century alphabet game, is a 'rebus', and two readings can be made of it.

In the first instance, Krauss takes the eagle to "symbolise" nobility and the ass to "present the lowliness of a beast of burden", extrapolating that the larger "idea of Art" is contrasted with the "stupefying practice of actually making". In the second instance, by ignoring the images, the phrase can be made to read "FIN ARTS", or the end of the 'arts', of the "individual arts as medium specific" [2000, p.12]. Then, in a combination of the two readings, "the eagle itself will be folded into the hybrid or intermedia condition of the rebus, in which not only language and image but high and low and any other oppositional pairing one can think of will freely mix" [ibid.]. From there, the "eagle principle", the "idea of Art" as the post-medium rebus, now functions anew, as the ubiquitous mixed-media installation.

4.2. The Question of the Rebus

But when we come to ask in what way Broodthaers's magazine cover is presented, and understood, as a rebus, the answer can only be ambivalent. It must first be admitted that there is no rebus 'principle' at work, inasmuch as existing symbols - letters or words - are not being used purely for their sounds, regardless of their meaning, to represent new words. Neither "Fine-Eagle", "Ass-Arts', "F.I.N.-eagle", nor "Ass-R.T.S." have homophones. Compare *L.H.O.O.Q.*, where the reader says the letters and listens to the sounds they make, to arrive at *Elle a chaud au cul.*

Because symbols are not being used for their sounds Broodthaer's "rebus" is not language-specific, that is, it could be in any language where those letters appear. Compare a French example, suggested by Authur Danto, showing a man holding in his hand a large green letter "I" - *un grand I vert* - which gives its homophone *un grand hiver*, "a long winter" [2001, p136]. In English "a big green I" has no phonetic tie.

A rebus such as Danto's example is *mono-logical*. It is a puzzle with an answer, that means nothing unless it means *un grand hiver*. And the answer is usually syntactically coherent - *Elle a chaud au cul* or *Ieusous Christos Theou Hyios, Soter* - if not an actual sentence. Compare this to Krauss's analysis of Broodthaer's rebus, which not only provides *two* readings, but is ultimately elaborated to stand in synecdoche for her whole discussion on the "post-medium" condition. Where the rebus, as puzzle, has a determinate meaning, and things in no way 'freely mix', Krauss / Broodthaers's is *indeterminate*.

4.3. The Communicating Rebus

What *is* rebus-like about Krauss's reading is that *the images are not considered in their particularity,* but treated instead as *concepts*. The particularity of the eagle image is the way it is rendered, wings spread, on a rock, in colour, etc. These sensual details are subsumed in a reading *as reading,* that treats the image as a linguistic concept, to stand for the abstract "eagle" (and from there another abstraction is attached: the eagle 'symbolizes' nobility), the problem being that reading *entails* identification.

Meanwhile Krauss is disingenuous in saying that the ass "present[s]" the 'lowliness of a beast of burden' - although Krauss wants to insinuate a contrast of 'ideal' theory with material practice, the ass is as much a *re*-presentation as the eagle is. Further, they are graphic representations made iconic, given the traits of linguistic signifiers and made to *communicate*. The rebus-principle, then, is a principle of homogenization, a levelling, where, counter to the source phrase *non verbis, sed rebus,* the sensuous particularity of the objects and images is subsumed by linguistic concepts. '[L]anguage and image' *do not* 'freely mix': language, determinate meaning, takes over. Thus the contradiction of Krauss's analysis: in its indeterminacy, the magazine cover is no rebus, but, in the effacement of its images by linguistic conceptualisation, it is read *into* one.

4.4. The Incommunicative Rebus

Krauss was most likely inspired to call Broodthaers's magazine work a rebus because it is what Broodthaers himself calls many of his works. However, what is rebus-like about Krauss's reading - the triumph of determinate, linguistic meaning over sensuous particularity, making images communicate - is exactly

refused by Broodthaers. Of his 1967 film *Le Corbeau et Le Renard* Broodthaers says:

> I had my text printed and placed before it various everyday objects (boots, a telephone, a bottle of milk) which were meant to form a direct relationship with the printed letters. It was an attempt to deny, as far as possible, meaning to the word as well as to the image. … [But] There was still too much distance between object and text. In order to integrate text and object, I would have to print on the screen the same typographic characters I had used in the film. My film is a rebus, something you have to want to figure out. It's a reading exercise. [1988, p36]

A rebus, as we have seen above, is indeed something to be 'figured out': like an equation, there is a single answer. But for Broodthaers, his film is a rebus inasmuch as "*you have to want to*" figure it out*, even while, as an attempt to "deny ... meaning to the word as well as to the image", there is no single answer possible. It only *looks* like a rebus: interpretative closure is an insinuated promise, "reading exercise" being a joke at the expense of the reader's patience. Broodthaers's vacuum-formed plaques are also "rebuses,

> [a]nd the subject, a speculation about a difficulty of reading that results when you use this substance. … Reading is impeded by the image-like quality of the text and vice versa. … They are intended to be read on a double level – each one involved in a negative attitude which seems to me specific to the stance of the artist: not to place the message completely on one side alone, neither image nor text. That is, the refusal to deliver a clear message – as if this role were not incumbent upon the artist, and by extension upon all producers with an economic interest. [1988, p41-2]

Broodthaers self-understanding of his rebuses, then, is contradictory - but contradictory in accord with his stated intention not to provide determinate meanings (Krauss cites Buchloh in calling these contradictory explanations 'blague', willful double negations "in which a petrified language acts to mimic the present-day reification of speech itself at the hands of the consciousness industry" [2001, p34]. Just as the plaques' text and images have a "negative attitude" to each other in a mutual, visio-verbal denial of meaning, so do his artworks and his statements about them.

4.5. Strong and Weak Rebuses

The important point here is that Broodthaers's (weak) rebuses, in their mutual, visio-verbal *refusal* of meaning are in the lineage of the historical avant-garde's resistance to what Benjamin Buchloh calls "the positivist and instrumentalist subjection of language to meaning and communication" [1988, p.76]. In practice, from Mallarmé though Duchamp to Broodthaers, this means foregrounding the space and material of language, its visual opacity. As Buchloh goes on to point out, however, insisting on the "autonomous physicality and pure semiotic presence of ... speech acts and ... objects transform[s] the very opponent of reification – poetic language – into ... plasticity and objecthood" [1988, p.74]. That is, both communicative language and poetic language rely on transparency: resistance to one risks loss of the other. I want to return to this, but for the moment, the fundamental contrast is between Broodthaer's 'meaningless', weak rebus and Krauss's strong rebus, strong because it pursues the principle of effacing the image's contingent particularity with linguistic concepts, rendering *transparent* what was visually opaque, rendering meaning-*full*. The two rebuses can be characterized as 'weak' – *indeterminacy, heterogeneity, language enfeebled, systems of communication withdrawn from* – and 'strong' - *determinate meanings, homogeneity, language omnipotent, and subsumption* by *systems of communication*. The weak rebus was the visio-verbal form of avant-garde production which, in an effort to resist communication, "freely mixed" not only language and image "but high and low and any other oppositional pairing one can think of". The strong rebus is the form of a landscape dominated by communication, coherently occupied by intellect's concepts.

4.6. Language is not transparent[49]

A more recent critical work on Broodthaers considers his 1969 *Exposition Literaire autour de Mallarmé: Marcel Broodthaers a la Deblioudebliou / S* at Antwerp's Wide White Space gallery to amount to a critique of conceptual art's consolidation of language as transparent, permutable, accessible, immaterial:

> Broodthaers's works in the *Exposition litteraire* counter the notion of capitalist culture dissolving into spectral spectacle. They insist instead on the physicality of

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[49] Mel Bochner, various iterations, e.g. 1969

the word-image and the embodiment of our relation to it. They provide a counter-example to uses of language that dissolve text into something that opposes the objecthood of art, aiming to "dematerialize" it. [Haidu, 2010, p85]

I want now to turn to the work of Robert Barry, one of those to which Haidu claims Broodthaers's is paradigmatically counterposed. I will suggest, however, that at least one of the 'dematerializations' that Barry's works enact produces the same effects as Broodthaers's 'materializations', which is a critique of communicative transparency.

4.7. Telepathy

In the first section of the catalogue for the *19 May - 19 June 1969* exhibition at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Robert Barry's contribution reads,

> ROBERT BARRY / Telepathic Piece, 1969 / (During the Exhibition I will try to communicate telepathically a work of art, the nature of which is a series of thoughts that are not applicable to language or image.) [Seigelaub, 1969]

This is followed by an entry in the "II. Presentation" section: "At the conclusion of the exhibition (June 19, 1969), the information about the work of art was made known in this catalogue." [ibid.]

One understanding of Barry's work of this period is that, as he says himself in the recently released interview, it "raises a lot of fundamental problems as far as the existence of a work of art is concerned: just how much is needed, and how much has to be known about a work of art, before it does exist" [2001, p86]. Here however I want to emphasize and pursue another aspect: as a parody of communication. The texts' effect of a cognitive blankness make the point.

Telepathic Piece mocks expressivist aesthetics: that the artwork is an expression of thought, or interiority, which is then "received" by the auditor. *Telepathic Piece*, after all, is composed of thoughts "*not applicable to language or image*". There *is* no message – only confirmation of the Beckettian maxim that "there is nothing to express" and "nothing from which to express" [Beckett, 1999, p103]. If there is no message what does the receiver receive, and how do they know they have received it? Pressed by the interviewer Patricia Norvell, Barry suggests if someone has an ineffable experience – something which is "impossible to adequately describe" [Alberro et al., 2001, p96] - during the exhibition, they

may ascribe it to Barry (the ascription would have to be retrospective – the catalogue announcing the work was released *after* the exhibition). Considered with others of Barry's works from the period - where things are "not noted by the conscious mind", or "not yet known to me", things "I am not at the moment thinking" - what is asserted is the *impossibility* of expression – not least because the 'interior' thing to be expressed is not available to the artist themselves. *Telepathic Piece* forces recognition of the fact that

> you can never totally know what's going on in my mind anyway; that any object which I present to you and you perceive … brings with it all the fantasies and everything else which you associate with those things and which I have no control over" [Alberro et al., 2001, p87]

Barry is emphatic that one's "personal experience" is incommunicable; "it's like Sartre says: "Only you can experience your own death, your own making love, your own" … anything" [ibid.]. Language – that which otherwise might bring an end to the isolation - is for Barry "symbols devised by other people which I'm forced to use" [ibid.].

Barry illustrates a commitment to this kind of autarky with his contribution to *Prospect 69* at the Kunsthalle in Deusseldorf was an interview in the exhibition catalogue. The interview is not the artwork, though. In the interview Barry declares that "[t]he piece will consist of the ideas that people will have from reading this interview" [Fischer et al., 1969, p121] The artwork is made of thought: when a person reads the interview in the catalogue, they will be experiencing the artwork. Because the artwork is not the transcribed and printed interview, the text on the page, the artwork will have as many different forms as there are readers of the interview - or as Barry puts it, "The piece in its entirety is unknowable because it exists in the minds of so many people" [ibid.]. So it is a single artwork – *the, it* – formed from the thoughts of each reader, but "[e]ach person can really know that part which is in his own mind" [ibid.]. They know *that* there is something in common that putatively spans all their minds, but can't know what *it* is.

4.8. Private / Public

Rosalind Krauss identifies and condemns this radical privacy. In *Sense and Sensibility: Reflection on Post '60s Sculpture*, Krauss claims that Minimalism's rejection of traditional illusionism and anthropomorphism implies the rejection of

idealist models of consciousness and the concomitant psychological model of a "private self". According to this latter model, just as illusionistic painting's background exists before and supports the figures, the notion of the (artist's) private self is a given, "exist[ing] replete with meanings prior to contact with its world" [1973, p47]. Illusionistic space equals an idealist "space" of consciousness.

Minimalist art works to "deny the singular, intimate and impenetrable aspect of the experience" [1973, p50]: it does not suggest a private self beyond or behind the artwork, access to which grants the work its meaning. By using impersonal, non-mimetic, inexpressive forms, minimalist works refute origination from a hidden, private self; their insistence on literal readings is an effort to avoid idealist consciousness. They are instead fully "public", their meaning available to anyone who can perceive them: the perception of them *is* their meaning.[50]

Art of the late 1960s and early 1970s, says Krauss, should be understood not only in terms of its form but also by the extent to which it rejects or accepts this traditional model of the "a priori" private self. Mel Bochner and Richard Serra, like the minimalists before them, reject it: Bochner in particular, uses language in a way that banishes the fantasy of an expressed privacy in favour of "a linguistic space that is fully non-psychological" [1973, p51]. Others like Heubler, On Kawara and Barry embrace it, basing their work on an idea of individual experience as unique, mysterious and unverifiable.

4.9. Communicative Transparency

What Krauss misses, however, is that if a private self is expressed, by, for example, *Telepathic Piece*, it is in terms "*not applicable to language or image*": the private self evoked 'in the mind' of the receiving private self is a *blank*. Barry's

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[50] Hal Foster questions Krauss's position by pointing to the difficulty of reading minimalism phenomenologically – which Kraus does, particularly via Merleau-Ponty - or reading minimalism "as a phenomenology" [2001, p42], i.e. perception without history, language, sexuality, or power. Foster points out that phenomenology is attacked (not least by structural linguistics, Krauss's other interpretative mode) because humanism and idealist consciousness were thought to be residual in it: "For instance, just as phenomenology undercuts the idealism of the Cartesian "I think", so minimalism undercuts the existentialism of the abstract-expressionist "I express, " but both substitute an "I perceive" that leaves meaning lodged in the subject." [2001, p43]. In other words, minimalism's refutation of the myth of transparent expression generates another myth: that of the pure, subjectless presence of the object.

is a *critique* of communicative transparency and expressivist aesthetics, underlining disjunctions between thought, expression and interpretation that are irreducible.

In the catalogue for *July, August, September 1969. Juillet, Août, Septembre 1969. Juli, August, September 1969*, which served as the guide to the location and description of works, each made in a different part of the world in the title's time period, Barry's entry appears as:

> ROBERT BARRY / Psychic Series, 1969 / Everything in the unconscious perceived by the senses but not noted by the conscious mind during trips to Baltimore, during the summer of 1967. [Seigelaub, 1969b, p3]

The text – which is repeated in French and German - shares its structure with several others of Barry's, notably "All the things I know but I am not at the moment thinking – 1:36 PM, 15 June 1969, New York" (another catalogue entry, this time for the group show *557, 087* at Seth Siegelaub Gallery), and "Something which is very near in place and time, but is not yet known to me" (a work produced 30 times between 1969 and 1972, the date of each exhibition's opening added at the end of the sentence). In all, independent clause is followed by subordinate. An affirmative nomination –*something, everything, all the things* – precedes a conjunction and subordinate clause that mitigates – *but is not, but I am not, but not noted by*. In each, nomination invites 'picturing' before mitigation revokes the invitation.[51] "Everything in the unconscious perceived by the senses" is notionally picturable, in pertaining to the sensory - but what are sensory impressions if not "noted by the conscious mind"? Grasp is eluded. Again, "something which is very near in place and time" provokes an ideation of proximity – there is a *thing* which is *close* – which is then 'struck through' as not 'in' the narrator's awareness.[52] It is

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[51] Art and Language's 1967 *Air Show* - a proposal for the exhibition of an unspecified 'column' of air - would be another example of description, or at least nomination, giving onto no 'graspable' object. [see Harrison and Wood, 2003, p868]

[52] In the latter sentence a utopian dynamic is inferred – explicitly, if we read the "not yet" as Ernst Bloch's. The dynamic is heightened in 1970, for a solo exhibition in Turin, with *Marcuse Piece*: "Some places to which we can come, and for a while 'be free to think about what we are going to do'." Taken from Herbert Marcuse's *An Essay on Liberation,* the quotation was composed for the occasion with adhesive letters on one of the gallery walls. Its utopian function is undermined, however – at least from a Blochean perspective - by naming something *present*: the (commercial) gallery is utopia, utopia is here, rather than elsewhere. See Buchloh, 1990, p142.

this rescinded promise to picture that mocks expressive and communicative efficacy: the reading subject is like a faulty television set that does not 'get a picture' from the broadcast signal.[53]

4.10. Negative Logic

The logic is the "negative logic" that Sartre discerns in Mallarmé. Sartre emphasizes the poetry's self-negating nihilism (presenting it as a kind of deferred, textualized suicide) whereby objects are evoked only to collapse back in "resonant disappearance" [1988, p140]:

> how, by means of his pen, a lace bedspread abolishes itself, revealing only the absence of a bed; … or how a grave is burdened only with "the very absence of weighty wreaths." [1988, p143]

Barry's texts follow the spirit – the eschewal of communication – if not the structure of phrases such as *"Ma faim qui d'aucun fruits ici ne se regale / Trouve en leur docte manqué un saveur egale"* [My hunger which feasts here on no fruit / Finds in their learned absence an equal flavour]. Meanwhile Mallarmé's emphasis on the pleasures of "step-by-step discovery" and the evoking of an object "little by little, so as to bring to light a state of the soul or, inversely, to choose an object and bring out of it a state of the soul through a series of unravellings" [trans Dorra, p141] would seem well articulated (if literally) by Barry's 1971 slide projection of eight sentences in rotation: "IT IS PURPOSEFUL. / IT IS VARIED. / IT IS DIRECT. / IT IS AMORPHOUS. / IT IS INFLUENCED. / IT IS REMOTE. / IT IS DEFINED. / IT IS INCONSISTENT."[54]

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[53] Contrast Yoko Ono's 1964 "Build three thousand chimneys and line them up / So it will look like one from a certain point /And three thousand from another point" [Quoted in Sperlinger, 2005]. Here mental picturing is not only not negated but would seem to be a functional requirement of the work.

[54] It is worth remembering that the projections are not the art object. They follow the logic of the inert gas and radiation works, which were not visually perceptible, so required identifying wall plaques. If the catalogue entries identify the artwork in the exhibition and give information on it – that which these phrases identify and give information on is the "something", the "everything" they refer to. On this rationale, the 'IT' of the projections refers to the (absent) art object, which may be "the ideas that people will have from reading" the sentence.

Conclusion

In the preceding the practices of Broodthaers and Barry were taken (from an obviously wide field of possible alternatives) to be indicative of two attitudes to language, the image and interiority in Conceptual art of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Examination of the notion of the 'rebus', as professed by Broodthaers and imposed by Krauss, produced 'weak' and 'strong' variants. Broodthaers's 'weak' rebus is a combination of the visual and verbal to the semantic annulment of both, Krauss's 'strong' rebus pursues the principle of effacing the visual image's contingent particularity with linguistic concepts, rendering *transparent* what was materially opaque, *making the image communicate*. Broodthaers's rebus thus stood for the historical avant-garde's 'wrecking' of language in resistance to its positivist and instrumentalist subjection to meaning and communication' – in resistance, in fact, to precisely the kind of rationalization that Krauss imposes on Broodthaers's rebus.

Taking as a frame the invocation of different aspects of the work of Stéphane Mallarmé, meanwhile, allowed the discernment of the artists' different versions of what could be called 'blankness'. Broodthaers's blank is before – in place of - semiosis, taking on Mallarmé's exaggeration of materiality that inhibits semantic 'content' or the structuring of a meaning 'in' the subject of consciousness. Barry's sentences, on the other hand, are conventionally 'meaningful' but exhibit Mallarmé's auto-destructive, "negative logic" whereby what is evoked is immediately 'cancelled': the blank is *after* semiosis.

Given that a certain 'blankness' - *not* being pictured or described - is fundamental to the efficacy of a utopian *function* within experience, utopian functions can in this respect be drawn from the two approaches: the total and the differential. Broodthaers's is a total withdrawal from systems of communication; Barry's uses their means, *remaining amongst* perceptions and constructions of what *is* just as it opens onto *what is not* [see Huyssen 1995].

With Barry's *Telepathic Piece*, moreover, the liberal utopia of full communicability, without subjective mediation, without subjectivity's inconvenient distortions, is successfully parodied – and leads us to the implications of the 'mind reading' neuro-imaging technology of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

The Momus Glass

Introduction

Momus, the Greek god of satire, mocked Hephaestus for not having made humans with windows into their hearts, so that their secret thoughts and feelings could be discerned. "If the fixture of *Momus'*s glass, in the human breast … had taken place," reasons the narrator of Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* (1759),

> nothing more would have been wanting, in order to have taken a man's character, but to have taken a chair and gone softly, as you would to a dioptrical beehive, and look'd in - view'd the soul stark naked; - observ'd all her motions, - her machinations; - traced all her maggots from their first engendering to their crawling forth; -watched her loose in her frisks, her gambols, her capricios; and after some notice of her more solemn deportment, consequent upon such frisks, &c. - then taken your pen and ink and set down nothing but what you had seen, and could have sworn to: - But this is an advantage not to be had by the biographer in this planet […] - our minds shine not through the body, but are wrapt up here in a dark covering of uncrystalized flesh and blood; so that if would come to the specifick characters of them, we must go some other way to work. [1996, pp30-31]

The following views the status and discourse of the inner image not from the position of art history, theory and practice but from that of neuroscience and neuro-ethics, and considers the fMRI scanner used to determine levels of consciousness in the vegetative as just such a 'Momus Glass'. As such, the implications for subjectivity's construal of bypassing the typically hermeneutic "other way[s] to work" are adumbrated.

The following examines the processes and conclusions of *Detecting awareness in the vegetative state,* the 2006 paper in which - against medical and clinical consensus on the automaticity of vegetative brain activity – the claim to have demonstrated the presence of consciousness in a patient previously diagnosed as vegetative is first made. The reported experiment was conducted on a woman who, when asked to imagine performing certain activities, produced fMRI scans indistinguishable from those of 'healthy' subjects imagining the same activities. The experimenters conclude that this correlation, plus the patient's apparent

understanding of, and compliance with, the verbal request, means that the patient is 'conscious'.

5.1. The Behaviouristic Approach

Owen et al.'s [2006] experiment takes a *behaviouristic* approach to the ascription of consciousness[55]. That is, the assessment criteria excludes 'intrinsic' aspects: the phenomenal, 1st-person 'interior', the 'what it is like' to think or be conscious. It is excluded because it is inherently inaccessible to observation:

> [O]ur ability to know unequivocally that another being is consciously aware is ultimately determined not by whether or not he or she is aware but instead by his or her ability to communicate that fact through a recognized behavioral response. [2007a, p1099]

According to the behaviouristic approach, not only is consciousness *ascribed* on the basis of 'extrinsic', observable, behavioural responses, but consciousness *is* the ability to produce behavioural responses adequate to certain stimuli. As a 2012 biographical article in *Nature,* entitled 'The Mind Reader', claims, Owen "takes a "know it if you see it" approach" -

> Responding to commands and questions - communication - is an undeniably conscious activity, in his view. "In the end if [critics] say they have no reason to believe the patient is conscious, I say 'fine, but I have no reason to believe you are either,' he says. [Cyranoski, 2012, p180]

As I will show, the behaviouristic or "know-it-if-you-see-it" approach is manifested in the experimental paradigm. We will find that, in the turning of

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[55] And as such has Alan Turing's theoretical test for machine intelligence as its methodological forebearer. *Computing Machinery and Intelligence* (1950) is a proposal for an experimental method of answering the question "Can machines think?", which to avoid defining 'thought', is quickly substituted for the question of whether a computer can imitate a human in conversation convincingly enough for an interlocutor to surmise that they are conversing with a human. If so, claims Turing, the computer can indeed be said to be thinking or 'intelligent'. For Turing, what is 'behind' the responses is immaterial; what matters is that the machine "play the imitation game satisfactorily" [1950, p446].

mental activity into observable behaviour, the subject's licence *not* to respond to commands and questions, to refuse to communicate, is revoked.

5.2. Overcoming Hermeneutics

"The vegetative state", as Owen et al begin their report, is "one of the least understood and most ethically troubling conditions in modern medicine" [Owen et al., 2006, 1402]. The term was first coined in the early 1970s for an increasing number of people who, following damage to the brainstem or midbrain, and facilitated by improving life-support methods, had moved out of coma but were not fully conscious. The term is descriptive[56]: someone in a vegetative state has - unlike in a comatose state - sleep-wake cycles and breathes without support, but their responses and movements are reflex, they show no signs of "purposeful behaviour in response to stimulation" [Owen et al 2006, 1402]. They are consequently taken to lack awareness of themselves or environment and therefore consciousness. Most troubling for the patient's family, inexperienced doctors and even ethical policy makers is that people in the vegetative state *appear* 'awake'. They breath unaided, their eyes may be open, they may move their head and limbs, they may even smile or cry; but the gestures do not signify the patient's spiritual 'presence'. What to the understandably credulist family member or friend is a smile at recognizing a loved one by their bedside, is in fact the involuntary contraction of facial muscles coinciding with the gaze coming to arbitrary rest: not an expression of emotion and not an effect of an intrinsic cause.

Reliably ascertaining the level of residual consciousness depends, then, on bypassing 'intuitive' readings of patients' behaviour. Fulfilling the objective criteria of standardized measurements such as the Glasgow Coma Scale,[57] however, still depends on the judgment of a clinician. A patient is determined as conscious by giving a predicted response to an external prompt or command, and it is the clinician who surveys the patient's movements, and decides if they are most parsimoniously explained *as* responses, *as* predicted, as being under voluntary control. Such assessment "remains highly subjective" and "dependent on the

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[56] See Jennet and Plum (1972)

[57] Proposed in 1974 by professors of neurosurgery at the University of Glasgow [Teasdale G, Jennett B.,1974], assessment with the scale involves measuring the patient's responses against certain criteria concerning eye, verbal and motor response to stimuli, and giving a score between 3 (deep coma) and 15 (fully awake).

patients exhibited behaviour" [Coleman et al., 2009, p2542]. It is with the intention of overcoming this necessary hermeneutics that several studies since 2000 have used neuro-imaging techniques to look directly at patterns of brain activation in response to different stimuli; Owen et al [2006] is the first to claim the technique's detection of *conscious awareness*.

5.3. The Experiment: the Test-Subject

The subject of Owen et al's experiment was a 23-year old woman who had been in a road accident 5 months previously, in July 2005, where she had sustained severe traumatic brain injury. After an initial comatose state, she had opened her eyes and demonstrated sleep-wake cycles. However, even during waking periods, she remained unresponsive and manifested no spontaneous, intentional behaviours.[58]

5.3.1. The Stimuli

In-ear headphones, intended to limit background noise from the scanner, are placed on the subject. The subject is moved into the scanner. Stimuli are then presented via the headphones as two types of pre-recorded spoken sentences.

Firstly, the patient is subjected to 237 'trials': 10 second phases in which either a sentence, a "noise-equivalent", or silence is played to the patient; the fMRI scan is made in the last 1.6 seconds of each phase. The sentences are such as

There was milk and sugar in his coffee.

The "acoustically matched noise sequences" [Owen et al, 2006, p1402] that these sentences alternate with "had the same duration, spectral profile and amplitude as the original speech, but were entirely unintelligible" [Owen et al, 2006a, p1].[59] The

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[58] The Italian Eluana Englaro, who died in 2009, was a similar age to Owen et al's subject - 22 - when she entered a vegetative state, which, also like Owen et al's subject, followed injuries sustained in a car accident. And like Owen et al's patient, Englaro became a test subject - this time, an explicitly rather than implicitly political one - as Parliament, Supreme Court, Church and even Prime Minister contested her subjecthood.

[59] We might imagine how a poetry teacher emphasizes a line's meter - *'da da DUM ,da DUM da, da da DUM da',* in the case of the above sentence; or the 'speech melodies', created by mimicking the intonations of recordings of speech on orchestral instruments, in Steve Reich's 1988 *Different Trains*.

sentences and their noise-equivalents are given in order to detect "speech-specific" brain activity: whether bare "speech perception and semantic processing" [Owen et al, 2006, p1402] are taking place. Some sentences contain ambiguous homophone words, for example "creak" and "creek", that when processed, are known to activate areas of the brain that subserve the selection of semantic knowledge among competing alternatives. Speech-specific brain activity, Owen et al (2006) admit, is not itself indicative of consciousness - its perception and processing can take place automatically, while asleep or under anesthetic. It is for this reason that the experimenters include a second input stage of mental imagery tasks, which require volition to be performed.

In this stage pre-recorded spoken instructions were given were at the beginning of 30-second periods. The instructions to imagine alternated with instructions to rest, in order to have a relative, relational difference to the activity of the mental imaging task. Task and rest were repeated ten times: "Imagine playing tennis [*30 second pause*] Now just relax. [*30 second pause*] Imagine playing tennis [*30 second pause*] Now just relax. …" The second instruction, a spatial navigation task, was to "[i]magine visiting the rooms in your house, starting from the front door." This was also repeated ten times, in alternation with the instruction to rest.

5.3.2. The Responses

Owen et al found that speech-specific regions of the patient's brain were clearly activated by the sentences of the first input stage, where the acoustically matched noise sequences did not. The activation was equivalent to that observed in healthy volunteers listening to the same stimuli. The sentences containing ambiguous homophone words did indeed activate the expected additional brain regions. Patterns of brain activation observed during the second fMRI investigation were highly suggestive of a relevant, active mental performance. As Owen et al report, "Her neural responses were indistinguishable from those observed in healthy volunteers performing the same imagery tasks in the scanner" [Owen et al, 2006, p1402].

5.4. Interpretation and Ascription

Owen et al interpret the neural activations in response to the sentences, noise-equivalents, and silences of the first experiment to be evidence that the

woman could perceive and process speech. Admitting that speech processing of the first experiment was involuntary, they go on to interpret the neural activations of the imagery tasks to show that,

> despite fulfilling the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of vegetative state, this patient retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to respond to them through her brain activity, rather than through speech or movement. Moreover, her decision to cooperate with the authors by imagining particular tasks when asked to do so represents a clear act of intention, which confirmed beyond any doubt that she was consciously aware of herself and her surroundings. [Owen et al., 2006, p1402]

The interpretation is radical on several counts: most notably that she decided to cooperate with the experimenters (and that the display of volition equalled consciousness), and that she communicated her cooperation *through her brain activity*.

5.5. Objections

"Although it is theoretically possible that the mere instruction to imagine such actions triggers specific and automatic changes in brain activity," offered Owen et al in pre-emptive defence,

> the complexity of the commands used here and the richness of the imagery that is likely to be required to produce a response that is indistinguishable from that of healthy individuals, make this possibility extremely unlikely. [Owen et al., 2006a, p2]

The explanation of their results met immediate objections, however, on exactly these grounds. The UCLA psychologist Daniel Greenberg disputed Owen et al's conclusion that the patient made a "decision to cooperate" that "represents a clear act of intention". The observed brain activity may have been involuntarily triggered by the word 'tennis', rather than be the voluntary following of instructions, willfully imagine themselves playing tennis. What would happen, wonders Greenberg, if the experimenters presented sentences in a different, non-instructive form, e.g. "Sharleen was playing tennis"? Or a more complex sentence, such as "Imagine visiting the rooms in your home after playing tennis" (Greenberg

2007) - where brain activation associated with tennis would suggest that the instruction had not been followed?

Parashkev Nachev and Masud Husain of Imperial College London also reminded Owen et al of the extensive literature demonstrating "involuntary and elaborate activation of task-specific brain areas in response to passive exposure to stimuli associated with a specific action, with or without conscious awareness" [2007, p. 1221]. On this basis, instead of comparing responses to the instructions to imagine playing tennis with those to "relax," Nachev and Husain suggest Owen et al could have compared "imagine playing tennis" with "do not imagine playing tennis." All the activation reported "could therefore have been wholly automatic and unconscious" [ibid.].

5.6. Response to the Objections

Owen et al reply that, although words such as "tennis" and "house" can elicit wholly automatic neural responses in the absence of consciousness, these responses tend to last for only a few seconds, and occur in areas of the brain associated with language processing. Their patient's nueral activity, by contrast, lasted for the full 30 seconds of each imagery task, and was observed in regions appropriate to the tasks, e.g., in response to the "tennis" instruction, a region known to be involved in purposefully imagining coordinated movements. "Such responses", write Owen et al, "are impossible to explain in terms of automatic brain processes." [Owen et al, 2007, p1221]

To Greenberg's suggestion - that non-instructive sentences ("Sharleen was playing tennis") could have produced the observed pattern of activation - Owen et al respond by staging a supplementary control condition. In it, a healthy volunteer showed no activation in the relevant brain areas when presented with isolated words, such as 'tennis' and 'house'. Owen et al. thus remained convinced that "[t]he most parsimonious explanation" of the results was that the patient "was consciously aware and purposefully following the instructions given to her, despite her diagnosis of vegetative state." [Owen et al, 2007, p1221]

5.7. Fingerprint and Confession

As the medical ethicist John Stins points out, to claim that the woman communicated her conscious self to the researchers "by modulating her brain

activity" [Stins, 2008, p5][60] entails a far-reaching change in the *ontological* status of brain activity. The neuroscientific consensus is, put crudely, that neural activity - the brain - is the cause of behaviour; Owen et al (2006) however, treat the woman's brain activity *itself* as behavioural expression, as both cause and effect. A 'semiotic' view of this shift reveals its ramifications.

"One fingerprint taken at the scene of the crime,' declares the 1931 *Manuel de police technique,* "is worth even more than the criminal's confession'. Citing the *Manuel* in support, Paul Virilio claims that the introduction of fingerprints as legal proof "marks the decline of the story, of the eye-witness account and the descriptive model, once the basis of every investigation" [1994, p42]. It is the accidentally-deposited fingerprint, not the voluntary confession or statement, that comes to be viewed as "immutable reality" [Virilio, 1994, p42].

The fingerprint, of course, is one of C S Pierce's 'indexical' signs: "a real thing or fact which is a sign of its object by virtue of being connected with it as a matter of fact" [Pierce, 1903, v.4, p447] (another being the bullet hole, which is an indexical sign that a gun was fired). Unlike the subjectively-mediated confession, an index is a sign *not determined by interpretation*; it is historically determined, says Pierce, by the event that produced it. In criminal trials, the prosecution will introduce indexical signs - which might equally be footprints or DNA - of *the actual presence of the person in question* at the scene of the crime.

5.8. The Subject Must Confess to Being Conscious

It seems that something of this relationship between fingerprint and confession - both in its historical and synchronic aspects - is to be seen in the neuroscientific claim to detect awareness in the vegetative state. Firstly, the claim is made at a late stage in the decline of the (subjective) confession and the rise of the (neuroscientific) fingerprint. Advances in critical care allow increasing numbers of patients to survive out of coma and into the vegetative state, of which they can give no report, while concurrent growth in the availability and reliability of brain scanning techniques promotes the persuasive force of the neuro-image as replacement.[61]

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[60] It was on this basis that Owen et al conducted a follow-up experiment, reported in the *The New England Journal of Medicine* in 2010, in which an individual who been diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative state answered 'yes' and 'no' to questions solely by changing his patterns of fMRI activity.

[61] As brain imaging evolves, says Alan Gross, and the precision in the localization of brain

Secondly, the clinical consensus is that brain activation or "imaging findings" is not enough to determine someone as conscious: a "reliable communication from the patient'' [Kobylarz & Schill, 2004, p. 1358] is needed. As the neurologist Lionel Naccache claims, "[c]onsciousness is univocally probed in humans through the subject's report of his or her own mental states", and that "[t]he ability to report one's own mental state is the fundamental property of consciousness." [2006, p1396] From this "naturalistic" view, then, the giving of a 'first-person', veridical report of consciousness's intrinsic aspects is itself the primary evidential act of a conscious subject; the subject must *confess* to being conscious in order to be so.

5.9. Iconicity and Indexicality

Meanwhile, fMRI visuals are arguably *indexical* signs. Following Pierce in distinguishing mimetic, depictive *iconicity* (e.g. a drawing of a brain) from *indexicality,* Alan Gross (2008) suggests that there is a causal relationship between the brain and its fMRI rendering. fMRI visuals are not 'pictures of' the body's interior, after all - they are detections of hemodynamic or blood flow changes around the brain; these changes are then taken as indicative of neural activity (see Dumit 2004). Hence 'functional' imaging: it visualises physiological functions, not anatomical structures. The graphic records of fMRI are indexical "insofar as the visible tracks of [brain] events point back to their cause." [Gross, 2008, p382]

The *etiology* of the fMRI visual, however, is what most crucially distinguishes its indexicality, and at the same time *implicates its iconicity*. As Thomas Szasz writes (following Reichenbach rather than Pierce),

> How do we distinguish indexical signs from iconic signs? By ascertaining whether the sign is "given" by a person or "given off" by him. Iconic signs resemble conventional signs: both are manufactured, more or less deliberately, by an agent, that is a person, whereas indexical signs are given off passively by an organism or thing." [Szasz, 2007, pp77-78]

Hence the confession - a sign of which the iconicity is now affirmed - is "given" (more or less) voluntarily, the fingerprint is "given off" (more or less) involuntarily, accidentally. We can now see how the claim to detect awareness in

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functions increases, they draw attention away from a persistent constraint: "the brain functions so precisely located are just those that are not constitutive of our humanity." [Gross, 2008, p380]

the vegetative state appeals at once to both the indexicality and iconicity of the fMRI report:

1) Owen et al had resorted to the analysis of brain activity, after all, to *avoid* the need for interpretation of the patient's "ambiguous" exhibited behaviour. Thinking *involuntarily* gives off its neural image; like the crime scene fingerprint, it is taken as a sign of *the actual presence of the person.*

2) In saying that the woman "retained the ability to understand spoken commands and to respond to them through her brain activity, rather than through speech or movement", Owen et al claim brain activity to be *instead of* speech; it *takes the place of* the "report" that Naccache wants. As a *voluntarily given* response to commands, the fMRI visual was a confession of her consciousness.

5.10 "The Soul Stark Naked"

This semiotic confusion demonstrates a more general confusion over to what extent Owen et al's subject is, in Szasz's terms, an 'agent' or 'person' who gives iconic signs, or an 'organism' or 'thing' which only gives off indexical signs. Specifically, it demonstrates that the confession of consciousness, which must necessarily be given voluntarily, is in fact *taken* from the subject, by the experimental apparatus. The imaging technology rolls back the boundary between physiology and behaviour, bringing the neurological to the observable surface. The subject is helpless to display the neural sign, which is seized as confession.

Although Owen et al seem to successfully refute the claim that the wording of the imagery tasks involuntarily triggered task-specific activity, their reply ignores another of Nachev and Husain's objections. This was to the assertion that the task-specific brain activity indicated the patient's "decision to cooperate": "[O]ne cannot speak of a decision," Nachev and Husain write, "when there is no evidence of choice" [2007, p1221]. The registering of *no response* from the woman in Owen et al's experiment would have signified in their paradigm that she was incapable of comprehension, rather than that she had decided not to cooperate. There was no means for her to actively *refuse*.

Conclusion

Despite asking after the inner image from an entirely different perspective – the theory and practice of neuroscience, rather than art – it seems that the same issues have arisen. The "acoustically matched noise sequences" that test for bare "speech perception and semantic processing", the question of whether a mental

image of playing tennis is involuntarily triggered by the instruction to "[i]magine playing tennis", or if the image is a result of voluntary effort, recourses to the Aristotalian specificity of human speech as being 'meaningful sound', as sound accompanied by *phantasmata.*

Meanwhile, as the 'Momus glass' of the chapter's epigraph suggests, private, unobservable interiority is paradigmatically refuted. This 'behaviouristic' approach recourses to the positivist 'bringing to observation' of chapter 2's naturalist theatre, as well as Adorno and Horkheimer's suggestion of positivism's "pure immanence" being "nothing other than a form of universal taboo [where] [n]othing is allowed to remain outside" - that is, to remain *unverifiable*. This attitude to the inner image is different from, for example, J B Watson's (1913) *behaviourism,* where mental images, because externally unobservable, are non-existent. And it is different from the cognitive psychology that recognises the privacy of mental images, but, as *inferred* from the subject's account, assimilates them again to the field of observation (see Holt, 1964). Rather, for Owen et al, if the physiognomic behaviour of the brain scan correlates with the brain scan of a healthy subject during a certain task, then the interior, the 'what-it-is-like' to be that person, the inner image itself, *is of no consequence*.

What I want to focus on, however, is the way in which the specificity of the inner image is effaced by being made to communicate, and how this coincides with the apparatus's constituting of the subject. The subject's inner images are *instrumentalized;* there is an 'autonomy' – in the sense of both purposeless and dereistic - to imagining playing tennis, to imagining walking around one's house, that is lost in their being made to communicate the subject's sentience. Rather than being an activity that separates one from the world by negating it (as Lessing's *Einbildung* does), imagining is made into something that returns the subject to the communicative fold. It seems, moreover, that the apparatus *forces* this return. Refusing to participate – by *not* following the instructions to imagine - would register the test-subject as being *unable* to participate, unable to understand the instructions, and insentient: the test-subject suffers the *obligation to express*.

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CONCLUSION

Recapitulation of Argument

The aim of this thesis has been to trace the fate, valences and role of incommunicable, perception-like thought - what I call an "inner image" - in art's reception. The central argument is that recent production and reception is beholden to a critique of interiority that programmatically outlaws such images. I argue that in the context of these prohibitions an inner image – as both experienced in engagement and as procedurally facilitated in practice - has a critical-utopian function. Reference to a historically and formally wide range of examples both supports the argument and explores the ramifications of the claim.

Review of Methodology and Findings

The introduction set out a number of concepts and theories that served as frames through which to view the objects and texts in chapters 1 to 5, resulting in findings that are summarised below. There first follows a review of the interpretative concepts applied. These regarded both the manner in which practices refuse the subject engaging with them 'inner images', and the epistemological and social dynamics that effect the cancellation of the 'inner image'.

Coextension of speech and thought: It was shown that one variant of 'relational' art, associated with Nicolas Bourriaud, assumes that its subjects only speak, or interact, and that they *do not have unsaid thought*. Full and general exteriorization allows no-*where* for inner images.

Communicative plenitude: Another variant of relational art – Grant Kester's 'dialogic' - grants its subjects no 'privacy' because it assumes its subjects to be purely rational and discursive, their thoughts then fully communicable and therefore wholly public. No non-discursive, inexpressible, private remainder is countenanced.

Perceptual absorption: The 'immersive' installation effaces the cognitive *distance* that allows for hypotheses, recollections, and associations. In the name of a quasi- or frankly religious 'self transcendence' - "you go inside - behind the eye - to greet the light" [Steward, 2010] remarks James Turrell - these works in fact entail a pure immanence and absorption that renders intensive and extensive undifferentiated, and '*inner*' images nullified.

Reification of signs: It was also suggested that language in art's spatial field – after concrete poetry, after the text works of Smithson and Andre, but also after Mallarmé and Broodthaers - is typically understood to efface signification with the materiality of its signifiers. This kind of postmodern "*depthlessness*", as Frederic Jameson identified it, is naturalized, and no longer a radical critique of language's conceptual, denominative function. It is then a given that language as 'reified' sign does not deal in – does not evoke or express - 'inner images'.

Critique of individual spectatorship: The above state of affairs was attributed to a general rejection of models of subjectivity imputed by the Enlightenment – Descartes's dualist, Kant's transcendental subject – and their associated promotion of individualized spectatorship, and of *spectatorship* itself.

Matter as images: Henri Bergson's attempt to annul Cartesian, psychological interiority by naming matter is an "aggregate of images" makes perception *of* images, not of matter that then becomes an image 'in' consciousness, as it does on Descartes's model.

Nondistinction of appearance and essence: Bergson-Deleuze assimilate interiority to a pre-personal totality of appearances without essence.

Harmonizing of the utopian: This forsakes the *contrast* of interior to the surrounding external world. Utopia is then realized, and annulled, in the uniformity of the aggregate, as the "material universe itself".

Realization of the utopian: The move also abolishes any utopian valence held by interiority as that without the exterior's "realized facticity" [Adorno, 1976, p51]. The works that Nicolas Bourriaud describes, meanwhile, *are* "ways of living and models of action within the existing real", or "everyday micro-utopias".

Precedence of abstract categories over objects: Adorno and Horkeheimer's account of societal rationalization provided a means of thinking of the inner image as non-discursive, unexpressed and private "remainder" after conceptual thought has been expressed. The social theory of Paulo Virno seemed to extend this logic, with the contention that the increased demand on the post-Fordist worker's intellectual capacities leads to the formerly private, hidden structures of thought and speech, the "common places" which make up the "life of the mind", being made exterior and *public*.

Positivism: According to Adorno, the ideology of Enlightenment, "the first enemy of both metaphysics and fantasy simultaneously" [1976, p51], that consigns the outwardly unverifiable to "poetry".

The above concepts then framed and guided my analysis of various artworks and texts - literary criticism, theatre, cinema, Conceptual art, neuroscientific research - to reveal the following.

Chapter 1 used 18th-century literary criticism to show the difference between "utopia" and "utopian function", and the relationship between language and inner image.[62] 'Utopia' for G E Lessing was found to be such perfected states as the liberal-humanist conclusion of *Nathan der Weise* and the end point of the progress described in the *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*. By contrast, it was found that the *Einbildung* of the *Laokoon* essay - the immaterial counterpart of the *Bild* and the 'pictures' that poetry engages in as opposed to painting's pictures - operates as a form of utopian thought which is *not* a perfected state. Rather, the *Einbildung* owes its utopian function to Lessing's denigration of description in poetry: it is that which is *not* described, an image that leaves its object, like Homer's gods, *unseen*.

Reading nineteenth century theatre through Adorno and Horkheimer's notion of 'positivism' showed, in chapter 2, how the *naturalism* of the mid-nineteenth century bourgeois domestic drama necessarily entailed a cancellation of the kind of *Einbildung* that Lessing had proffered. Naturalist theatre's speech *could not in reference depart from the fully represented – and present - world of the stage.* Exposition is thus always motivated, there are no soliloquies and no asides. In this way naturalist theatre carries out the positivist refusal, noted by Adorno and Horkheimer, to allow anything "to remain outside, since the mere idea of the "outside" is the real source of fear" [2002, p11].

This chapter also showed the threat to the utopian function of the inner image from harmonization, realization, and depiction. It was shown that Elizabeth, the protagonist of Villiers de L'Isle-Adam *La Révolte* (1870), by repeatedly declaring her intention to leave, provides the conditions for an image of *where* she will go: a 'lonely house', in 'Iceland, Sicily or Norway', where there is contemplation, reading, silence, and ultimately, death (in the Schopenhauerian sense, of death of the Will). This image – which, without perceptual stimulus, is

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[62] A critical review of the methodology implemented in the foregoing thesis must admit the historical and formal disparity of the case studies. Some defence of the choice of Lessing's literary theory, for example, is required. Lessing stands for *modernity's* signal characteristic: an embracing of scientific and philosophical rationalism, liberalism, and egalitarianism. Realization of this characterizes the utopian conclusion to of *Nathan der Weise* (and the ideal speech situations of WochenKlausur). Engaging with this aspect of Lessing allows us suggest modernism's – rather than modernity's – utopia: a form of thought.

'inner' - then exists in tension with the material presence of the stage, "*le salon d'un banquier*". The image was claimed to be utopian in form - in Mannheim's sense of "incongruous with the immediate situation" – and content – a teleologically remote 'elsewhere' of perfected living.

Remy de Gourmont's 1890 novel *Sixtine* appropriates Elizabeth's 'dream' speech. Excised from the domestic drama's mis-en-scene as much as it is, being in a novel, freed from the theatre's spatial occlusions, the image no longer has a utopian value because it is no longer *in tension* with the realized presence of the stage. Meanwhile, via Elizabeth's references to Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy, and the modernist appropriation of Schopenhauer's aesthetics to utopian ends, the limits of the utopian function of the inner image implicated by *La Revolte* were discerned. We found that Elizabeth's dream was doubly limited in this capacity, by being depictive in a way that the "inwardly utopian art" of Schopenhauer's music is not, but also by what is depicted being ultimately bound to the "immediate situation" – that is, "*le salon d'un banquier*" – *money*, not abandoned, limits the radial imagination: "His accounts", says Elizabeth, "have crippled my mind".

Reading cinematic experience through the concepts of *perceptual absorption* and *matter as images* allowed us to discern the role of an 'inner image' in that medium. For Gilles Deleuze, "[t]he brain is the screen" and "[c]inema, precisely because it puts the image in motion, or rather endows the image with self-motion, never stops tracing the circuits of the brain" [2000, p366]. The medium itself serves as an argument for the unification of thought and material, for matter as image and image as matter. Roland Barthes represents the opposite view: the fear of autonomous thought being subsumed to the moving image, of *perceptual absorption preventing the formation of inner images*.

It followed that one way that one *does* "add to the images in the movies", as Barthes puts it, is as a viewer of *constructive editing*, but that Barthes passes over this addition because the viewer does not do it "freely". Eisenstein's *Obraz,* I suggested, is such an addition: the "global image" gained from the spectator's mental unification of the fragmentary, partial cinematic representations or *izobrazhenie.* Kuleshov's experiments, intercutting shots of an expressionless actor with shots of objects, had demonstrated that the image will "reach the viewer in the way intended by the editor, because the viewer himself will complete the sequence and see that which is suggested to him by the montage". Eisenstein turns this to pedagogic ends, effectively attempting to *instrumentalize* the viewer's 'innate' logical, meaning-making faculties and sculpt or shape the *Obraz* 'within' the viewer.

I went on to show how Eisenstein's endeavor is rejected as both ethically suspect and logocentric. Christian Metz considered the Kuleshov effect, which underpins Eisenstein's montage, to confirm the logomorphism of cinema: "why must it be that, by some strange correlation, two juxtaposed photographs must tell something? Going from one image to two images, is to go from image to language" [1974, p46]. Later cinema would attempt to refute this logomorphism and in the process reduce cinematic experience to the cinematographic material itself. I described two logics of disabling the cinematagraphic material and preventing it from inducing these inner images: one, recommended by Deleuze, consisted of speeding up the cuts to a continuous flicker that acts *im*-mediately on the subject, on a pre-reflexive level; the other, recommended by Bazin, is effectively to reduce the cut rate to zero, to the continuous shot. However, on examination of films taken to be exemplary of these two logics - Brakhage's *Persian Series* (1999) and Jeroen de Rijke and Willem de Rooij *Of Three Men* (1998) respectively – it was found that some form of 'addition' to the images yet persisted. If Barthes's fear of *perceptual absorption preventing the formation of inner images* is ungrounded, and the viewing subject can resist the determinations of the cinematographic material, a reconsideration of the cinema's spectating subject, or at least a practice of cinematic reception, would seem to be demanded. I will develop this below.

Chapter 4 showed that a notion of an 'inner image' could serve to critique 'communicative plenitude'. The chapter concerned a phase of artistic production in which totalization of the concept (as in Joseph Kosuth's logical-positivism-inspired project) and the polemical critique of the visually perceived object in fact meets with its opposing logic (as in Broodthaers). As such, this would seem to be a phase in which an inner image is very much at stake, both asserted and refuted. Robert Barry and Marcel Broodthaers were taken to be indicative of the former and latter, respectively.

Two aspects of the work of Stéphane Mallarmé suggested these practices' two attitudes to the inner image. In taking on Mallarmé's *spatialization* of the lexical and typographic elements of language via the surrealist *écriture*'s *rebus*, the material form of language in Broodthaers's films and vacuum-formed plaques is exaggerated to inhibit semantic 'content' and thus the formation of 'inner' images. Barry's sentences, meanwhile, were shown to be conventionally 'semantic' or evocative, but exhibit Mallarmé's auto-destructive, "negative logic" whereby what is evoked is immediately effaced: 'pictures' are promised but what is offered is unpicturable. What both practices contribute to – through paradigmatically opposing deployments of language - is a critique of the dominance of conceptual

thought over experience. The blankness evoked by Barry's texts – I suggested that Barry's reading subject is like a faulty television set that does not 'get a picture' from the broadcast signal - challenge *universal communicability:* the notion that every thought can be expressed, and that thought is therefore primarily – necessarily – conceptual. Broodthaers's rebuses, in their resistance to being read, offer experience that refuses to be conceptualized.

Meanwhile the dual logics of the *reification of signs* and the *precedence of abstract categories over objects* played out in the difference between Krauss's and Broodthaer's notion of the rebus. Broodthaers's 'weak' rebus is a combination of the visual and verbal to the semantic annulment of both, in line with the historical avant-garde's 'wrecking' of language in resistance to its positivist and instrumentalist subjection to meaning and communication; Krauss's 'strong' rebus pursues the principle of effacing the visual image's contingent particularity with linguistic concepts, rendering *transparent* what was materially opaque, *making the image communicate* – which was exactly the fate of the inner image in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 showed "positivism's" effect on the inner image. The test for awareness in the comatose via neuroscientific means paradigmatically refutes private, unobservable interiority - as did the inter-subjective, relational art encountered in the introduction (positivism and post-structuralism-theorized art meeting in their anti-metaphysical struggles; see Rose, 1984). This 'behaviouristic' approach sublates the attitude to the inner image entailed by J B Watson's *behaviourism* - where mental images, because externally unobservable, are non-existent – and the attitude of cognitive psychology that *infers* them from subject's account. Rather, for Owen et al, if the observed neural 'behaviour' *matches* the brain scan of a healthy subject during a certain task (Enlightenment's making of "dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities"), then the interior, the 'what-it-is-like' to be that person, the inner image itself, *is of no consequence*.

What this section of the thesis shows most clearly is the way in which the specificity of the inner image – *as* inner - is effaced by being made to communicate, and how this coincides with the apparatus's constituting of the subject. There is an 'autonomy' – in the sense of both purposelessness and dereistic separation - to imagining playing tennis, to imagining walking around one's house, that is lost in those imaginings being made to communicate the subject's sentience. The subject's inner images are *instrumentalized;* rather than being an activity that separates one from the world by negating it (as Lessing's *Einbildung* does),

imagining is made into something that returns the subject to the communicative fold. It seems, moreover, that the apparatus *forces* this return. Refusing to participate – by *not* following the instructions to imagine - would register the test-subject as being *unable* to participate, unable to understand the instructions, and insentient.

Reflection on the thesis and future developments

As the above summary of findings suggests, the investigation has covered a wide historical scope and a disparate array of media, that, at times, has proved difficult to marshal. While I have tried to suggest that the moments in which an inner image is at stake take part in common historical logics – the 'fate' of the title – and that those moments contribute different qualities to the notion in question, a contraction in the examined field will benefit future research. I intend this to be a development of issues arising in the last chapter: the nexus of artistic and scientific practices and the constitution of the political subject.

On the relation of written thesis and practice

Before setting out the conclusion and implications of these findings, I want now to discuss the relationship of the written thesis to my art practice, and describe how the practice works as research and forms part of the overall project. I will then move to include findings from practice within a general conclusion.

I maintain an artistic practice in parallel with my theoretical research. By 'parallel' I mean that the investigations that result in video installations and radio broadcasts share *concerns* with the investigations that result in the written thesis. I do not seek to reflect – and certainly not illustrate – the "inner image" in my studio practice. Rather, the studio practice draws upon ideas elucidated in written investigation and the direction of the written investigation is steered by findings of practical experiment in the studio. The two elements are thus mutually, dialogically impelling, moving between implicit and explicit articulation of shared ongoing concerns. I hope to make this relationship, and the nature of those concerns, apparent below.

Practice as research

This leads to a note on how I understand practice as research, or rather, how the practical element contributes to the overall research project. Christopher Frayling's early (in terms of the developing field of art research in academic context) and much-cited distinctions are useful here. His 1994 article identifies:

1) Research *for* practice – the conducting of (often technical) research to deliver tools and material knowledge to be applied in practice. This is where "the thinking is, so to speak, embodied in the artefact, where the goal is not primarily communicable knowledge in the sense of verbal communication, but in the sense of visual or iconic or imagistic communication" [Frayling p5].

2) Research *into* practice – interpretative observation at a theoretical distance from the object of study, such as observing the working processes of others, but also the kind of historical research represented in this thesis by chapters 1 to 5.

3) Research *through* practice – where practice or creative enquiry is the methodological vehicle, a field of practical experiment with communicable results.

My work involves, firstly, research *for* practice: I 'find out' about a subject in an explorative, non-hypothesized process, collating materials and texts, from which the work is built, through an editorial process of addition and removal. Then – and this is how the practical element contributes to the overall research project - I *reflect* upon the process and the results of the process. This reflection articulates the thinking "embodied" in the end product or artefact. To an extent, this becomes research *into* practice, as I submit the work to a descriptive analysis from a 'distance', as well as from a position of first-person familiarity.

It is in fact this combined process of research *for* practice and research *into* practice that comprises research *through* practice, or 'artistic research'. The process of exploration, intuitive decision, thinking through, collation, and editing in the production of a work – the "for" – is detached from the result of that process. Reflection on the work – the "into" - brings forth the thought embedded in the

object *and* critically develops that which contingently arises from it. Reflection on the pre- or non-reflective, then, constitutes research *through* practice.

As such, research through practice, or "practice as research", as I conceive it, is open to the accusation of exactly the deleterious rationalization, the 'totalization of the concept', that this thesis claims recent art and thought indulges in. Indeed there is a notion of 'artistic research', proposed recently by Henk Borgdorff, as that which "seeks not so much to make explicit the knowledge that art is said to produce, but rather to provide a specific articulation of the pre-reflective, non-conceptual content of art." [2011, p44] This artistic research somehow "convey[s] and communicate[s] content that is enclosed in aesthetic experiences, enacted in creative practices and embodied in artistic products" [ibid, p45]. What this notion misses, and what this thesis has shown, is that "pre-reflective" and "non-conceptual" content *cannot be articulated* because articulation necessarily involves reflection and conceptualization. As Frayling points out, what distinguishes research from "the gathering of reference materials" [p5] is *the communication of results* – of practical experiment, or of theoretical investigation. Hence 'artistic research', to be research, appears as an inherently positivistic enterprise that cannot countenance the incommunicable experiential. It can only, as Andrew Bowie, rephrasing Adorno, has recently written, attempt to explicate "the fact that what art conveys is not reducible to what can be said about what it conveys" [2013, p141]; it can only, as this project attempts to, describe the *conditions* of the experience.

Reflections on Practice: *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*

I include documentation of only two examples of my artistic practice as an appendix to this thesis. These works have been selected - from the research period's extensive practical output, which includes performative texts and short films, besides the installation and radio work presented here - as most pertinent to the concerns of the thesis, and as most fruitfully submitted to analysis.

The Incoherence of the Incoherence (2010)[63] consists of a fictional text and a 12 minute video projection. This written component of the work has been both

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[63] The title is taken from the Arab philosopher Averroes's book (called in Arabic *Tahafut al-Tahafut*) and written around 1180. It is a refutation of Ghazali's *Tahafut al-Falasifa* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), and a defense of the philosophical – rather than theologial - study of religion.

performed live as a lecture and presented as a printed hand out, with a footnote that it is a transcription of "a lecture presented on the 22nd of February 1969". The significance of these differing modes of presentation I will arrive at shortly.

The text presents itself as one of a series on the archaeology of biblical miracle sites – this one discussing the site of the raising of Lazarus - suggesting that previous lectures examined "what remain of Bethesda, where the paralysed man was healed, and the pools of Siloam, where the blind man was given sight". The narrative proceeds in a measured, rational tone going on to refer to slides of photographs – "This is El Aizarya, seen from a hill to the north" – and diagrams – "You can see that the passage meets the mosque at a … 90-degree angle" - of the archaeological sites. The lecturer / narrator describes a progressive movement into the tomb of Lazarus's purported resurrection, before concluding that such "close inspection … cannot take us very far" - presumably that is, cannot confirm the authenticity of the site - or the miracle.

The narrator then introduces 'aerial photography' as a methodological corrective, on the basis that "what is undetectable at ground level" becomes apparent when seen from a distance. The effect is compared to standing back from a half-tone illustration: the indeterminate dots become a recognisable image. A history of 'aerial archaeology' and its employment in the Middle East follows, before the narrator introduces their own aerial images of the biblical site: "This is 'fifteen furlongs from Jerusalem', as John's gospel tells us, at an altitude of 500ft with oblique dawn light." The rationally expository tone gives way: "the universal comes forth … as you can see in this photograph … the limestone array no less than revivifies Lazarus." From "5000 feet", claims the narrator, one can see something "restored to life", become "flesh and blood". The text ends with the narrator introducing the next lectures in the series.

Besides the text or performance is a 12 minute video. This begins with a sequence 'point-of-view' camera shots, moving in stages through a museum, approaching a painting – Joseph Wright's *A Philosopher Lecturing on the Orrery* (1766) – and the actual orrery positioned in front of it. The sequence is accompanied by low orchestral music. It dissolves to a schematic representation of an orrery, before an abrupt cut, and cessation of music, to a static image of a middle-eastern settlement and the whirring sound of a slide projector. The image change is accompanied by the 'click' of the projector. Images of archeological sites follow, the point-of-view ever approaching the rock until it apparently 'zooms into' the print of the photograph itself, revealing the dispersed dots from which it is constituted. There is a cut to black before the following sequence progressively

'zooms out', the point of view higher and higher from the ground, before it fades to a close up of the museum orrery and the orchestral music recommences. The video concludes as the point-of-view reverses the opening sequence, withdraws from the museum, and fades to black.

How these two components that make up the work are presented is important. One mode of presentation is for the text to be performed (2nd December 2010 at Waterside Project Space). The performer reads the text from a lectern to one side of the projection screen; the video is played, without introduction, the moment the performer finishes. In this version the connection of text and video is clear. The viewing subject recognises scenes recently described. It is possible that attention to the character and appearance of the performer diverts focus from imagining the scenes he describes. To this end the performer is instructed to 'minimize' their performance.

Another mode of presentation is to play an audio recording of the lecture before playing the video (30th November 2010 at Made in Goldsmiths Gallery). This of course foregrounds the content of the speech (notwithstanding the 'grain' of the voice), but risks visual attention wandering to things outside the work – the room, the audience, and so on.

A third mode is to have the text printed as a 'hand out', and the video playing on a loop. The text is either offered as one copy on a lectern proximate to the screen, to be read by visitors on site, individually, or as a 'multiple', left on a table near to the projection screen, to be taken away by gallery visitors (*Lecture Hall / Free School*, Five Years Gallery, 2010).

If the text is read after seeing the video, as is possible in this third mode, the text becomes a stimulus to the recollection of the images from the video. The phenomenal experience of reading is then in some sense predetermined. In practical terms, this third mode means that the text is certainly not read before the video is watched, and probably not read at all. If the text is not read at all, one must accept that 'the work' is not encountered, and realize that 'the work' is not the video and not the text. These are, rather, the material conditions for 'the work', which is the interaction of the two elements: the play of imaginal anticipation, realization and annulment.

Reflections on *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* in light of the thesis

The following considers these material conditions as they are in the first, optimum mode, described above.

By spatio-temporally separating the text from the image that it would conventionally annotate or describe, acts of anticipation and recollection are encouraged. The text generates images - "El Aizarya, seen from a hill to the north", "the passage meets the mosque at a … 90-degree angle", and so on. Mental visualisation is encouraged because the references are to something that *should be* present - "This is … ", "You can see that …" – something that was or will be there. As they then watch the video, the viewing subject *recognises* the scenes referred to in the text. With the logic established, the viewing subject expects to recognise the miracle, to *see* the "the limestone array no less than revivify[ying] Lazarus." The epiphany, the resurrection, the revelation, however, *isn't there.* The viewer is then tasked with accounting for this disappointing desublimation. Is the narrator irrational or unreliable? Is the sublime aspect of the revivification only, as Jacques Ranciere says of *Paradise Lost's* Satan, a "duplicitous play of words that do not really let us see what they pretend to show us" [2009, p123]? Or maybe there is no visual analogue for what the text intimates, which must remain unrealised, wherein lies its potency, as hope.

Reflections on Practice: *The Sorrows of Usefulness*

The radio work *The Sorrows of Usefulness* (2010) begins with the sound of chairs scraping and the beginning of some kind of presentation to an audience. A female voice talks deliberately through the planning process, methodology and equipment for an "experiment". A slide projector whirs and clicks in the background. It soon cuts to a male voice, and background noise ceases. The voice makes terse observations: "Subject rests head in hands", etc, giving time references with each comment. There are pauses between each comment – "dead air" - sometimes long. Then a third person speaks, hesitantly describing a scene: "There are lots of people … and some kind of stage …". Where the Monitor describes everything 'external' - the Subject's behaviour, seating position, noises and possible 'artefacts' in and around the room - the Subject describes the 'internal', apparently attempting to describe what appears to his 'mind's eye'[64]. The first, female voice is heard again, telling us that the target "was not attained". Then the voice of the 'monitor' is heard again, introducing the next experiment, and the sequence is repeated. This time the Subject and Monitor speak in unison. It

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[64] To emphasize the impression that these images are 'occuring to' the Subject, that he is striving to 'receive' them, the actor playing the Subject read the texts once, then attempted to remember and draw the spatial characteristics, verbalising as he did so.

becomes apparent the locale they are describing is the room in which they are conducting the experiment[65]. After the monitor's reference to 'wind outside', the sound of a storm increases until it almost obscures the voices, and the play concludes.

This work for radio has been broadcast in 27 minute and 16 minute edits. It has also been disseminated in several modes:

Firstly, as part of an on-line web 'magazine' (radiauteur.com, 2011), in the context of other 'radio art', on which it can be heard at any time. Secondly, it has been broadcast 'live' (i.e. once, not looped or downloadable) as part of a web stream (*Are You Experienced (?),* [Space], 2010). This manifestation also had a performance element, in that it was heard from speakers on a stage within the gallery from which it was broadcast, as part of a number of other performances for radio. On stage was set up a rudimentary 'set': a table and two chairs, with two plastic cups and some pieces of blank paper – the mis-en-scene of the experiments in the radio play. Thus two separate presentations resulted: one for the absent audience and one for the present audience. For the present one, it appeared as a theatrical piece, with loud speakers taking the place of the protagonists; for the absent one it was more conventionally radiophonic. Since the work is intended to refer metaphorically to radiophonic experience, stage installation is, on reflection, not successful: attention is diverted to the aesthetic choice of recorded lines read through loud speakers over live protagonists.

A third mode I think is most successful: broadcast 'live' (not looped or downloadable), as part of self-curated series of internet broadcasts (*Cast and Figment*, Soundfjord, 2011). Thus it has no mandated, controlled, visual manifestation, appealing to precisely to qualities of conventional, pre-digital, (and non-repeatable) 'radio'; it is also contextualized by radio works which are also concerned to foreground their own medium.

It is instructive to compare *The Sorrows of Usefulness* as a work for radio with *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* as a visio-verbal work for gallery installation. The possibility arises that the radio work, being without visual form, allows the generation of the 'inner images' referred to in the thesis, without the consequent annulment or dissipation in recognition caused by *The Incoherence of*

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[65] The Subject's 'visions' are of the architecture of Dante's hell and the scene of the first trial in Kafka's novel. These were chosen as archetypical, mythic scenes of retribution, placing the setting of *The Sorrows of Usefulness* - the anonymous conference room with its neon strip light and fire-retardant ceiling panels – in the same lineage, and presenting such attempts at instrumentalization as forms of governance.

the Incoherence's sequence of visual images. Unrestrained imaginal production would seem to be the result. However, what in fact happens is that the inter-subjective 'restraint' of imaginal acts becomes embodied thematically *within the narrative*. The radio work foregrounds the way in which the verbal stimulation of the imagination is also the *control* of the imagination, a sculpting over which the listener has no voluntary control: verbal description causes the listener to involuntarily 'see'.

This is indeed why I selected the redacted findings of a Ministry of Defence study of 'remote viewing', released in response to a Freedom of Information request[66], as the source material for a radio play. 'Remote viewing' seemed to be a dynamic metaphor for radiophonic experience – thought caused by something distant. Moreover, the metaphor is *performed*: as the Subject receives the vision and describes it, so do the audience.

Reflections on *The Sorrows of Usefulness* in light of the thesis

The narrative makes clear (as the source material does) that the 'targets' are not 'accessed' – that the claim to telepathically see something outside perceptual range is not substantiated. If telepathy is not taking place then the Subject is simply imagining, engaged in 'mere' reverie. The experiment can then be understood to be an attempt to put daydream-like, dereistic states (illogical, idiosyncratic, disconnected from reality) to *use*: an attempt to *instrumentalize reverie*.

This can profitably be compared to the operations of the neuroscientific attempt to detect awareness in the vegetative state that I set out in chapter 5. In both cases the *autonomy* of imagining - imagination as expression of the subject's autonomy, as it is for Sartre - is denigrated. In the case of Owen et al's experiment, imagining is put to use as communication; the remote viewing of *The Sorrows of Usefulness* attempts to put imagining to use as perception.

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[66] Available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FreedomOfInformation/DisclosureLog/SearchDisclosureLog/RemoteViewing.htm (last accessed December 2013)

Conclusion and Implications of Findings

What is at stake in the question of the 'inner image' is the conception and status of the subject that encounters the work. The denial of interiority to the subject denies it certain capacities *as* a subject, at the same time as denying the encounter certain critical-utopian valences; it is the role of an 'inner image' to give form to these capacities and valences.

The critique of interiority, when naturalized, leads to a positivistic state. As the foregoing thesis has shown, in this state the theatre's *mis-en-scene* is a framework of reality that allows nothing beyond itself; in this state, artworks are everyday micro-utopias, ways of living within the existing real; in this state, the neuroscientist regards consciousness as the ability to respond suitably to stimuli.

This is because for positivism, as Horkheimer (1972) points out, the distinction between what an entity is and what it appears to be is meaningless: the world of appearances constitutes the structure of reality and one can only know that which is given in experience. For positivism, concrete realities are corporeal things in the pure state, *abstracted from subjectivity and from human praxis*. Positivism's attempt to abstract subjectivity, its refusal to recognize subjectivity's role in human praxis, *in creating the world*, makes it complicit with a politics which accepts the world as finished reality. There results a fatal resignation to circumstance. In an universal taboo of pure immanence, positivism prohibits "*fantasy*" [Adorno et al, 1976, p51]: that which is not sensuously realized, which retains a halo of indeterminacy, which does not yet exist.

It is in this way that the excision of interiority from the encounter removes with it critical-utopian thought: the unrealized, the indeterminate, the not yet existent. And it is in this sense that the denial of interiority to the encounter denies the subject the capacity *as* a subject *to resist circumstance*, if only by turning away.

But what does it mean to say that perception-like thought - an 'inner image' - is an articulation of the capacity to refuse what is given to perception? It means that what is encountered must work paradoxically and *provide the conditions for its own negation*. We have seen this in the protagonist that describes an extra-diegetic elsewhere, we have seen this in the film without movement and no expectation of it: situations in which the subject is provided with the textual means to think against what is materially presented to them.

Is, then, the inner image as set out here merely a psychic site of refuge? Should it not be disparaged in the terms that Adorno disparages bourgeois 'inwardness'? At first a protest against a social order heteronomously imposed on

its subjects, inwardness becomes "the mirage of an inner kingdom where the silent majority are indemnified for what is denied them socially … [it] becomes increasingly shadowy and empty, indeed contentless in itself." [2004, p116]. What has been described in this thesis, rather, is an inner image whose contentlessness is of *itself* a resistance to heteronomously imposed *content*. Its utopian function consists not in complete escape, but in tensional relationships: unrealized against the realized, indeterminate against the determinate, the not yet existent against the present.

To reiterate, this time in terms of Aristotle's *phantasma*: practices that operate on a naturalized refutation of interiority would seek to be environments with which thought can only correlate. What is at stake in the question of the inner image is the capacity for thought to be other than correlative with the environment, that is, *to deviate from the way things are.*

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APPENDIX

My practical investigations mainly result in visio-verbal works for gallery installation and sound works for radio. The former consist of combinations of extended text and visual images. The text may be performed live, read in a printed supplement, or included in the video as voiceover or subtitle. Visual sequences are temporally and / or spatially dislocated from the verbal elements, provoking acts of memory, imaging and anticipation – the 'inner image' I explore in the thesis - that are doubled in the narratives. In a similar manner, the radio works reflexively pursue the characteristics of radiophonic experience through metaphor. The visio-verbal and aural works then can be understood as experiments in relations between language, image and subjectivity: how they may produce - and critically disrupt - each other.

The following examples of my practice relevant to the thesis will also be exhibited at the viva examination:

The Incoherence of the Incoherence (2010): a lecture on the archeology of biblical miracle sites, accompanied by slides, *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* consists of a 12 minute video and text (to be performed, or read independently of viewing the video).

The Sorrows of Usefulness (2010): based on released, redacted Ministry of Defense documentation, *The Sorrows of Usefulness* is a dramatization for radio of experiments in 'remote viewing' [cast: Olivia Armstrong as the Supervisor, Simon King as the Monitor and Adam Loxley as the Subject.]

The enclosed disc contains the video component of *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* and a recording of *The Sorrows of Usefulness.* The text component of *The Incoherence of the Incoherence* follows.

*

The Third Demonstration*

We have been discussing the five demonstrations, where the miracle worker becomes the giver of signs or *semeia*, and what archaeological traces there may be found of them. As was mentioned in the earlier lectures, we are not so much looking for evidence or manifestations of those *semeia* as for the locations that *bear witness* to them, and to submit those to empirical analysis.

So far we have looked at what remains of Bethesda, where the paralysed man was healed, and the pools of Siloam, where the blind man was given sight. Today we will be examining the ancient town of Bethany, where Lazarus was raised from the dead.

*This essay is the text of a lecture presented on 22nd February 1969 at the l'École biblique et archéologique française de Jérusalem (EBAF). It was transcribed and translated by Antoine Manuensis.

Bethany itself seems to have been abandoned, apart from the religious buildings, in about the fourteenth century. Little of it has ever been excavated, but a great deal of pottery from the New Testament period has been found scattered in the area marked in our map here by a circle. Triangulating this with the account of the route taken by Jesus from Jerusalem allows us to know fairly well where the Bethany was. El Aizariya - which means 'the place of Lazarus' - is the village which now approximately occupies the site.

This is El Aizarya, seen from a hill to the north. In the foreground you can see the religious buildings that remain from Bethany: the Franciscan church on the left, a mosque at the centre and a Greek Orthodox church on the right. The arrow indicates the present entrance to the 'Tomb of Lazarus'.

As you can see in this diagram, the entrance was not always where it is today. Originally one entered from the east, on the left in the diagram. This is now

blocked by the mosque, which was built on the ruins of a fourth century Byzantine church. You can see that the passage meets the mosque at a 60-, rather than 90- degree angle. This suggests that the tomb chambers and passage pre-existed the Byzantine church, and thus that the church was built at an already venerated site. Remember last week's rule of thumb, that a holy place first apparent after 400AD is more likely to be an *imaginary* addition to the topography.

One now enters the site from the north, through a staircase cut from the rock by the Franciscans in the seventeenth century. This leads to the antechamber. The tomb itself is approached by a manhole in the floor of the antechamber and a low passage through which the visitor must crawl.

This is the view looking vertically down the manhole into the passage from the antechamber to the tomb. If we return to this slide we can see that there is a window above the passage. We've simplified the diagram by showing both the window and passage as longer than they really are. Now, it has been suggested

that the manhole is original, since it would fit the words in John XI:38-9 that a stone lay 'upon' it. However, both the Latin and English translations render a Greek word which could equally mean 'against', and the wording of the gospel does not tell us whether the stone was lying vertically or horizontally.

We proceed along the passage and into the tomb itself. The modern visitor finds that the visible surfaces are all masonry or plaster, except for a hole in the west wall through which the decaying limestone can be seen. The position of the hole is marked by a cross on our diagram. This is a photograph of it. You can see where the living rock is revealed, behind the metre stick. There are some signs of what may have been a tomb shelf cut into the rock. The masonry elsewhere prevents us from examining further.

So all that can be affirmed from a pedestrian, 'coal face' view of the site is that it most likely *was* a tomb, and that it *is* in the area of the village of Bethany. But with the decay and alterations, and without firmer textual support, close inspection of the kind just

described cannot take us very far.

We learnt in our previous talks that weather conditions dictate what materials are available to archaeological analysis. The humidity and particularly the rainy winters in the Holy Land have rotted organic remains, cloth, parchment and so forth. At the same time, the scarcity of wood means that buildings have had to be made of stone, making ruins here more resilient than those in climes further north. Interiors are altered and domestic paraphernalia long gone, but the architectural outlines are extant. The archaeologist thus faces the paradox that *distance from the ruins may reveal more than proximity to them.*

It is then that we turn to - 'ascend to', I suppose one should say - the techniques of *aerial photography.* The camera fixed to an aircraft can take a photograph that records those 'outlines' as comprehensive designs. What is undetectable at ground level, for example slight disturbances in the surface or how pieces of masonry are distributed, when seen from high above form into virtual blueprints of long-vanished constructions. Even totally buried sites, given favourable circumstances, leave marks on the landscape that may clearly be seen from the air.

These techniques have been employed all over the world, including the Holy Land. The foundational work here is that of the French Jesuit priest and pioneering aerial archaeologist, Antoine Poidebard. His *La Trace de Rome dans le Moyen-Orient* was published in 1934 and remains to this day the definitive account of Near Eastern aerial observation; his biography more or less parallels that of the discipline. Born in 1888, he served as an interpreter in WWI before being made an observer in the air force. Following the war and the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Geographical Society of France entrusted him with an investigation into the economic potential of northern Syria. The enterprise involved studying forms of extinct but formerly-flourishing agriculture. The traces of these forms could best be made out from the air, 'from the elevation', as Poidebard tells it, 'of the bombardier' - and of course the meticulous method, topographic know-how and

interpretative skill he gained from his wartime experiences undeniably profited his research. On the very first survey, however, he was startled: not by the irrigation systems he had come for but by the profusion and alignment of conic hills or 'tells' which betrayed ancient, abandoned settlements. The potential archaeological application of the methods dawned on Poidebard, and his project was born. Eight years of intensive surveying later, he published *La Trace*.

Although his research was dedicated to the eastern extent of the Roman Empire, he also found evidence of the more elusive points of contact between Rome and the Hellenized Semitic populace. He surveyed places such as Tell Dothan, dune-encroached Caesarea with its ancient hippodromes and the Samaritan sanctuary on Mount Gerizim, but stopped short of the epigraphically rich environs of Jerusalem. With the area offering so little to the excavator, we enrolled some local pilots and aircraft and embarked on our own aerial studies of Bethany.

It must be said that the enterprise was not without its hazards, for us as it was for Poidebard. There is the local condition known in Hebrew as the *sharav* and in Arabic as the *khamsin*, when high temperatures are accompanied by a sharp drop in humidity, and by what Jeremiah calls 'a scorching wind from the high bare places in the wilderness'. The dust storm, one of the Deuteronomic curses, makes high altitude observation and photography almost impossible. Then there are the mirages, light refractions produced by our compulsion to superimpose analogies with what we know, which during much of the day forbid the gauging of exact distances and dimensions.

These photographs were taken during more favourable conditions. This is 'fifteen furlongs' from Jerusalem, as John's gospel tells us, at an altitude of 500ft and with oblique dawn light. You can see that there are practically no trees, but plenty of scrub and thorns. The scrub growth in the bottom left there has been hindered by the dissolving of lime in old buried walls, which causes that tell-tale lighter tone of vegetation. Climbing further one realises how thickly

rock-strewn the steppe is, as this photograph shows. It is these rocks, by the way, that we have to thank for the prevalence of tombs in the area, including the one under investigation, for they make grave-digging nearly impossible.

Now, imagine holding a magnifying glass to a half-tone illustration. One sees indeterminate black spots. The dotted screen only reassembles into a picture from a more distant position. Ascending over Bethany has just this effect. At 1500ft, the particulars that trap terrestrial work dissolve and the universal comes forth. There is revealed, as you can see in this photograph, what the mock reality of earth-bound experience never will, that is, a picture of a world. The limestone array no less than *revivifies Lazarus*.

It not only raises him but more, because it abstracts the useful and opportune. It does so by a certain accident of perspective, of position, call it what you will. Consider Eusebius's words on the discovery of that other tomb. 'As layer after layer of the subsoil beneath Hadrian's temple was revealed', he writes, 'the venerable and most holy memorial of the Saviour's resurrection, beyond all our hopes, came into view. The Holy of Holies, the Cave, was like our Saviour 'restored to life' ... by its very existence bearing clearer testimony to the resurrection than any words.' End quote.

The aerial method has the same result, but the motion is reversed. By moving away from the immediately apparent, what was circumstantial when dispersed reforms into the *self-evident*. This photograph, taken at approximately 5000ft and from the north of the site, shows the steppe, under bright, late-morning light. You can see the ancient roadways between Jerusalem and Jericho appearing neatly marked. And there, 'restored to life', is that which the ground has produced by accident, *in a moment of aberration*, let's say. The steppe provides the formula. At the next stage, the idea becomes flesh and blood. That's all.

I hope today's talk has suggested to you how one might submit holy places to empirical analysis in such a way that they *bear witness*, again, to the events that made them holy. I hope I have shown aerial

photography, though perhaps a counter-intuitive choice, to be one such method. It is one we will return to as we continue our discussion of the five *semeia*. Next week we will be focusing on the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, and what might be found of it at that point, in the words of Mark XI:I, near 'to Bethphage and Bethany, at the Mount of Olives'. Thank you.

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