

国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要
第 21 号 (平成 29 年)

Journal of the International College
for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies
Vol. XXI, 2017

Reshaping Timelessness: Paradigm Shifts in the Interpretation of Buddhist Meditation

Florin Deleanu

Reshaping Timelessness: Paradigm Shifts in the Interpretation of Buddhist Meditation

Florin Deleanu

Meditation is a timeless practice and experience. This is what gurus, pundits, and enthusiasts have been telling us for decades.¹ And our Zeitgeist — so heavily in-formed by New Age presuppositions — has fallen in love with the appraisal. We have granted meditation a privileged locus in our mental landscape viewing it as a ‘singularity’ where (trans-) psychological forces work in different, even mysterious, ways. Deep contemplative experiences and the philosophical conclusions which they yield are beyond history. Or are they?...

This paper irreverently argues for a different view. Meditation is, I believe, as historical and as prone to interpretative fiddling as any other human act and product. How do I know it? I’m not a meditation enthusiast, let alone a guru or a pundit, but I have a better source of knowledge: the Buddhist sources themselves, though admittedly not in a straightforward manner. In spite of the much-favoured strategy of preaching *ad hominem*, epitomised by the ideal of skilful means (*upāya*), as well as of the inclusivistic approach seen in numerous Buddhist sources, it cannot be denied that there are countless statements about the Teaching, practice included, made *sub specie aeternitatis*.²

¹ See, for instance, ‘[...] the yogic experience of a timeless, utterly detached, transic peace was an important ingredient and determinant of the Buddhist conception of Nibbāna; that is, it is an experience-produced doctrine’ (King 1992, VII). Also cf. the title of Sayadaw U Pandita’s book: *Timeless Wisdom: Teachings on the Satipatthana Vipassana Meditation Practice*.

So if it's not the primary sources per se which deny the changeless, timeless nature of meditation, how do I know it? To be more precise, my conclusions are the result of an analysis based upon a philologico-historical methodology and historicist premises. Does such an analysis ensure a more 'objective' understanding of the subject? Since I adopt it, I obviously believe so. Whoops! This already smells of circular judgement.... The problem of proof is beyond the scope of this paper, but I shall frankly admit that to a (hopefully tolerable) degree, circularity is present in this as in many (most?) other judgements. I also admit that the philologico-historical methodology cannot ensure the same objectivity as mathematical truths, not even guarantee the uniformity of conclusions. My findings will therefore be unavoidably contaminated by a dose a subjectivity. Hopefully, it is not such as large as the dose of subjectivity in judgements relying on personal experience, feelings, unchecked hearsay, and (worst!) wishful thinking.

This said, what does my philologico-historical approach reveal? Similarly named or described contemplative techniques and states are not necessarily construed and evaluated identically. Different texts confront us with different definitions, interpretations, even technical advice for what superficially appear to be similar practices.³ From a historicist perspective, this hardly comes as a surprise. Texts, sacred or profane, are authored and redacted by flesh-and-blood human beings. No matter how skilled in meditation, how versed in contemplative psychology they may have been, these people lived and expressed their conclusions under the constraints of their age (as actually everyone else, including scientists, empirical

² For more details, see Addendum I.

³ To some, if not many, readers, this may seem a matter a fact, but it is quite difficult to prove it independently of empiric 'common-sense' criteria. This is not, however, the place to engage in a philosophical discussion on the validity of methodological presuppositions.

philosophers, and historians).

When the divergences in the theory and praxis of meditation are wide enough, we can speak of paradigm shifts. In this paper, I identify and focus on four such paradigm shifts in the history of Yogācāra Buddhism.⁴ I shall call them (1) ‘subsumption’, (2) ‘inversion’, (3) ‘augmentation’, and (4) ‘substitution’.

I. Subsumption

Imagine for a moment you are a meditation devotee somewhere in Northern India around the middle of the 3rd century C.E. As luck (or rather karma) would have it, you will encounter a Buddhist contemplative thoroughly versed in spiritual cultivation (*yoginā yogajñena*). After being enquired about your motivation and judged to be well beyond the regular monastic dabbler, you will be encouraged to focus on the benefits of the meditative training. ‘Very well, good Sir! (*sadhu, sādhu, bhadrāmukha*)’, the master will say, ‘whilst [ordinary people] are shackled to passion, aversion, and bewilderment, thou wishest to break these [very] shackles’.

Our kind-hearted expert will thereupon instruct you on five points (*pañcasu sthāneṣu*), to wit, guarding and accumulating the requisites necessary for meditation (*samādhisambhārarakṣopacaya*), solitude (*prā-vivekya*), mental focusing (*cittaiḥgratā*), purification from hindrances (*āvaraṇaviśuddhi*), and cultivation of contemplation (*manaskārabhāvanā*). The last point includes five basic techniques, i.e. meditating upon the impure (*aśubhā*), friendliness (*maitrī*), dependent origination (*idaṃpraty-ayatāpratītyasamutpāda*), analysis of elements (*dhātuprabhedā*), and

⁴ Such patterns of re-interpretation are not limited to Yogācāra in particular or Buddhism in general. They can be found in many, if not most, spiritual traditions. Again, this is not the place to attempt a comparative survey.

mindfulness of breathing (*ānāpānasmṛti*). The master will assign you one of these methods depending on the defilement dominating your psychological profile. To boost your training, he may also initiate you into practice of the four absorptions (*dhyāna*) and four immaterial attainments (*ārūpyasamāpatti*).

Many familiar with early Yogācāra sources will have recognised that this fictional scenario is based upon the 3rd century treatise *Śrāvakabhūmi*.⁵ And in one form or another, most of the techniques above are traceable to canonical sources and later became adopted as basic meditative recipes in many Buddhist traditions.⁶ Details aside, we can assume that this must have been how a neophyte was trained in the early ascetic communities.

Kindly indulge me a little longer with our imaginary Dharma trip and try to picture yourself putting every drop of energy into the meditative methods you learned under the *Śrāvakabhūmi* master. And do it year after year in the wilderness, far away from the madness of civilisation

⁵ For the first paragraph of this section, I have relied on ŚrBh-TG #22, 10–12. Much of my presentation cum partial translation comes from the following passage: *evam ca punar āyācitena yoginā yogajñena sa ādikarmikas tatprathamakarmiko yogamanasikāre prayuktukāmaḥ ślakṣṇaślakṣṇair vacanāpathaiḥ samuttejayitavyaḥ saṃpraharṣayitavyaḥ prahāṇe cānuśaṃso varṇayitavyaḥ. “sādhu, sādhu, bhadrāmukha, [...] rāgadveṣamohanigaḍabandhanāyām⁽¹⁾ bandhanāni chettukāmaḥ.”* (ŚrBh-TG #22, 12.3–10)

⁽¹⁾ ŚrBh-TG #22 reads °*bandhitāyām*. I prefer the ŚrBh-MS reading. Skt. °*bandhita*° has a causative meaning (see MW s.v.) which does not make sense here. (I am grateful for this suggestion to Professor Emeritus Dr. Lambert Schmithausen.)

The phrase ‘[the master] instructs [the novice] on five points’ (*pañcasu sthāneṣu vinayate*) occurs at id. 28.4.

The exposition of these points forms the content of the rest of *Yogasthāna* III.

The practice of the absorptions and attainments is detailed in the *Laukikamārga* Chapter of *Yogasthāna* IV (for edition, translation, and study, see Deleanu 2006).

⁶ For more details, see Addendum II.

(monasteries, included...). One day you will decide to check out the results of your arduous training and return to the benevolent *Śrāvakabhūmi* master. But alack, much to your chagrin, impermanence took its toll and he has passed away. The only meditation studio (as well as the latest rage) in the ascetic community follows a new 'curriculum': the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.⁷ Since it looks pretty close to what you have been practising, you decide to give it a go.

But your first meditation session will be a bombshell! You'll be stunned to learn that you got it wrong! The only consolation may be that you're not the first one. Generation after generation of contemplatives who have followed the traditional paradigm have committed the same error. But don't worry! The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* master will teach you how to fix the mistake:

The path of (preliminary) practice⁸ shall be correctly followed in order to eliminate this [i.e. ideation (*saṃjñā*)]. Through thine understanding (*buddhi*) which carefully (*su*^o) investigates (*vicārita*^o) all objects of knowledge and by [keeping in mind] the ideation that all

⁷ Both *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* are now included in the encyclopaedic *Yogācārabhūmi*. For details concerning formation and dating, see Deleanu 2006, 147–247.

⁸ Or simply: 'path of practice'. In many contexts, *prayoga* seems to be virtually identical with *yoga* or 'practice'. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* itself (BoBh-W 81.18–21; BoBh-D 58.19–21) defines *prayoga* in general terms, i.e. continuous and arduous practice in various types of training (*śikṣāpadeṣu*). But we also know that in a more technical sense, typical of Abhidharma scholastics, *prayogamārga* is construed as 'path of preliminary practice' (e.g. AKBh 320.14). Such a use must have also been known to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* authors. Actually, here we have the compound *prayogamārga* rather than *prayoga*. All things considered, it is hard to decide whether our passage employs *prayogamārga* as a generic term for 'method of meditative training' or in its specialised sense of 'preliminary phase of practice'.

[other] ideations of phenomena (*dharmā*) are adventitious,⁹ thou shalt thus repeatedly remove all ideations [conducive to] the proliferation (*prapañca*) of any phenomena whatsoever¹⁰ and shalt consistently dwell on the thing [in-itself] by means of a non-conceptualising (*nirvikalpa*^o) mental state which functions by grasping only the object without characteristics (*nirnimitta*^o). Thou shalt thus attain [a state of] mental focus [which stems] from the lineage of the pure contemplation of the Tathāgata Supreme Cognition. Thou shalt not relinquish (*mā riñciṣyasi*) this mental orientation (*manasikāra*^o) [even] when practising meditation upon the impure. [Likewise,] thou shalt not relinquish this very mental orientation [even] when practising meditation upon friendliness, dependent origination, analysis of elements, mindfulness of breathing, the first absorption [and so on] up to the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation [as well as] the bodhisattva's countless meditations, supernatural faculties, contemplations, and attainments.¹¹

(*tasyā vibhavāya prayogamārgaḥ samyak pariṣṛhito bhaviṣyati. sa tvam evaṃ sarvajñeyasuvicāritayā buddhyā*¹² *sarvadharmasamjñāsv āgamtukasamjñayā sarvadharmeṣu sarvaprapañcasamjñām apanīyāpanīya nirvikalpena*¹³ *cetasā nirnimittenārthamātragrahaṇāpravṛttenāsmiṃ*¹⁴ *vastuni bahulaṃ vihara. evaṃ*

⁹ Literally, 'by the ideation of adventitious[ness] directed at the ideations of all phenomena'.

¹⁰ Literally, '[directed] at all phenomena'.

¹¹ Cf. D Wi 203b2-5; T 30.572a3-14. Parts of the same passage are translated into Japanese in Hotori 1984, 91-92.

¹² BoBh-D adds *evaṃ te* after *buddhyā*.

¹³ BoBh-D reads *nirvikāreṇa*. See, however, Tibetan rendering *rnam par mi rtogs pa'i sems* (D Wi 203b2) and Chinese translation 無分別 [...] 之心 (T 30.572a6).

¹⁴ Wogihara reads *tasmim*. Tibetan reads *de* (D Wi 203b3) while Chinese renders 此 (T 30.572a7). Both Wogihara and Dutt readings are possible, but I prefer the latter.

*te tathāgatajñānaviśuddhisamādhigotrāc*¹⁵ *cittasyaikāgratā*¹⁶ *pratilabdā bhaviṣyati. sa tvaṃ saced āsubhāṃ manasikaroṣi, etam*¹⁷ *manasikāraṃ mā riñciṣyasi. sacen maitrīm idampratyayatāpratityasamutpādaṃ dhātuprabhedam ānāpānasmr̥tiṃ prathamam dhyānam vistareṇa yāvan naivasamjñānā- samjñāyatanam*¹⁸ *apramāṇabodhisattvadhyanābhijñāsamādhisamāpattir manasikaroṣi, etam eva manasikāraṃ mā riñciṣyasi.)*¹⁹

And if you think this is a brand-new development, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* master will stun you again. This — he will stress — is a timeless recipe set

¹⁵ BoBh-W: °jñānā°.

¹⁶ Ch. 無倒心一境性 suggests **aviṣarītā cittasyaikāgratā*. Tib. reads together with the Skt., i.e. without **aviṣarītā*.

¹⁷ Both Nanjio and Dutt read: *enam*. I suggest the emendation above with some hesitations. True, if we adopt strict Pāṇinian rules, *etam* is the correct reading. Neither Vedic Skt. nor Pāṇinian Skt. admit of *ena* at the beginning of a sentence (see Wackernagel and Debrunner [1954] 1987, Vol. III, 523–526; PW I 1097–8, s.v.; MW 232, s.v.; Speijer [1886] 1988, 205; Gotō 2013, 71), but in the less strict varieties of the language, such as Epic Skt. (*‘un language à pureté amoindrie, ouvert aux facilités qui entraîne l’exercice d’un idiom populaire’*, Renou 1956, 104), the restriction can be ignored, albeit often for metrical reasons (as Hopkins said, ‘metre surpasses grammar’) – see Oberlies 2003, 109. And in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (at least, some texts: e.g. Aṣṭa-pp), the rule no longer holds good (Edgerton [1953] 1985, Vol. I, 117, §§ 21.48–49). If the BoBh occurrence discussed is a Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit vestige (or lowbrow/non-Śiṣṭa Sanskrit), then the emendation is not necessary. The issue is, however, further complicated by the fact that at the end of the passage above, we see *etam eva manasikāraṃ*, which in spite of its different syntactic structure, pleads for the emendation to *etam*. A definitive conclusion will be possible only after a thorough investigation into the use of the pronoun in the manuscript witnesses of the BoBh in particular and Buddhist literature (especially full- and quasi-Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit) in general.

¹⁸ BoBh-D: °*samjñāyanam*.

¹⁹ BoBh-W 396.12–25; BoBh-D 273.15–24. For the Tibetan translation of the passage, see D Wi 203b2–5. Xuanzang’s 玄奘 Chinese rendering is found at T 30.572a3–12.

forth by the past, present, and future Tathāgatas for the benefit of the novice bodhisattva (*bodhisattvam ādikarmikam*).²⁰ As for your Śrāvākayāna past, don't fret about it! 'Even the followers of the Disciples' Vehicle who practise by means of this mental orientation will quickly become more proficient in supernatural faculties and reach the realisation of [the essence of] phenomena' (*śrāvako 'pi cānena manaskāreṇa prayujyamaṇaḥ kṣip-rābhijñataraḥ syād dharmābhisamayāya [...]*).²¹

From a historicist perspective — pace the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* author(s) — we have here a paradigm shift in the interpretation as well as practice of meditation. Traditional techniques become subsumed under a new model of praxis tailored to suit a new philosophical agenda. Meditating on the impure, etc. is not altered in its main framework, let alone discarded. But all perceptive data yielded by these traditional exercises are now governed by a higher perceptive filter categorising them as 'adventitious' and prodding cognition into a 'non-conceptual mental state' which gives access to the thing-in-itself (*vastumātra*), the epistemic and soteriologic ideal of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.²²

2. Inversion²³

Another interpretative strategy is the reversed evaluation of what appear

²⁰ See BoBh-W 397.2–5; BoBh-D 273.24–274.2.

²¹ BoBh-W 397.5–7; BoBh-D 274.2–3.

²² For more details on the epistemological ideas and spiritual praxis of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, see Deleanu 2013.

²³ This section was inspired by Schmithausen 2007, whose insights brought to my attention the discrepancies between the *Śrāvākabhūmi* and the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* passages discussed below (see Schmithausen 2007, mainly pp. 223–224; 233–234). More on the meditative practices in these texts is found in Schmithausen's outstanding study (2007). Deleanu 2012 also gives a detailed presentation of the path of spiritual cultivation in the *Śrāvākabhūmi*.

to be similar meditative experiences. One example is provided by a *Śrāvabhūmi* passage detailing the so-called supramundane path (*loketataramārga*). This arduous spiritual process includes a step where the yogi must focus on the mind itself as the object of meditation. In the peculiar terminology used the text, this is part of the contemplation leading to [/characterised by] conviction (*ādhimokṣiko manaskārah*).²⁴

In order to eliminate the existential conceit or notion of a Self (*asmimāna*), which prevents the mind from staying firmly riveted to the ultimate goal of Nirvāṇa, the contemplative turns his/her concentration towards mind itself. He/she²⁵ gradually gains direct insight into the fact that the mind, too, is impermanent, conducive to suffering, empty, and no (n)-Self.²⁶ Eventually, as the Self-notion is discarded (*asmimānaṃ prahāya*), the yogi reaches a trance-like state in which the mind appears to have no object (*anālabana*), to have ceased (*vigata*) altogether into complete calmness (*praśānta*).²⁷

²⁴ ŚrBh-Sh 495.15–502.14. The mastery of this contemplation is explained as corresponding to the attainment of the supreme mundane factors (*laukikā agradharmāḥ*): *tasya yāval laukikebhyo 'gradharmebhya ādhimokṣiko manaskārah*. (ŚrBh-Sh 502.12–13).

²⁵ Many, if not most, of the traditional Indian sources, Buddhism included, usually employ only masculine forms ('he', 'his', etc.) when speaking of contemplatives. Seen from the paradigm of our age, such a usage is sexist. One should, however, add that there are also traditional sources clearly referring to female meditators, too (see, for instance, the examples analysed in Silk 2000). The monastic Order of nuns likewise attests to the fact that women were not barred from spiritual praxis. I shall try to reflect the gender duality in my descriptions of the accounts, but as far as the translations from the originals are concerned, I shall use only masculine forms. This should be understood as an attempt to stay close to the conventions of the traditional wording rather than making sexist assumptions.

²⁶ ŚrBh-Sh 497.3–499.12.

²⁷ *tasya tac cittam tasmin samaye niruddham iva khyāti, na ca tan niruddham bhavati. anālabanam*⁽¹⁾ *iva khyāti, na ca tad <an> ālabanam bhavati.*⁽²⁾ *tasya tac*

But this is only a temporary experience. Neither the vanishing of the object nor the complete calmness are ever-lasting. There are, however, some people — the *Śrāvakabhūmi* adds — who are slow-witted (*manda°*), deluded (*momūha°*), and conceited (*abhimāna*) enough to take this state to be the very realisation (*abhisamaya*) of the Four Noble Truths.²⁸ Wrong! — the text warns us. The first actual insight into the Noble Truths — the *Śrāvakabhūmi* continues — occurs *after* the emergence from this trance. This is a moment of non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) cognition based on direct perception (*pratyakṣajñāna*) which brings into full effect the certain knowledge (*niścayajñāna*) associated with the highest spiritual realisation (*abhisamaya*).²⁹

The *Śrāvakabhūmi* doesn't tell us who the slow-witted are, but a similarly 'deluded' interpretation of an apparently kindred state is advocated by ... no other than the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. The latter, needless to say (at least for specialists), is part of the same encyclopaedic treatise *Yogācārabhūmi* which includes the *Śrāvakabhūmi* itself. In tune with the *mūla*-text upon which it glosses and elaborates,³⁰ the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* holds that the bodhisattva's practice must aim at the

cittam praśāntam vigatam iva khyāti, na ca tad vigatam bhavati. ŚrBh-Sh 499.20–500.1.

(1) ŚrBh-Sh reads: [...] *samaye khyāti niruddham iva, na ca tan niruddham bhavaty anālambanam* [...], which seems to be a misplacement cum mis-punctuation. (I am indebted to Prof. Schmithausen for bringing this detail to my attention.)

(2) ŚrBh-Sh and ŚrBh-MS read: *na ca tadālambanam*. The emendation is based on Ch. and Tib. See also Schmithausen 2007, 223, n. 38. The general purport of the passage also makes the emendation necessary.

²⁸ ŚrBh-Sh 500.4–6.

²⁹ ŚrBh-Sh 500.6–17.

³⁰ The passage in question comes from the *Bodhisattvabūmiviniścaya*, the exegetical section on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. For more detailed references, see below.

eradication of the conceptual knowledge (*vikalpa*) and its replacement with correct knowledge (*samyajñāna*) giving access to the Supreme Reality (*tathatā*).³¹ As imperfectly as words can approximate this trans-linguistic Reality, here is the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* definition of it:

What is the pure Essence of Phenomena (*dharmadhātu*)?³² It is the Supreme Reality (*tathatā*) [attained] through the cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the correct knowledge (*samyajñāna*) which has eliminated all images of appearances (*nimitta*).

(*chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa gang zhe na | yang dag pa'i shes pa bsgom pa la brten nas mtshan ma thams cad bsa*³³ *bas de bzhin nyid gang yin pa ste*)³⁴

In the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, *nimitta* refers to the world of appearances, i.e. the diversity of phenomena conceptually constructed (*vikalpita*) by ordinary sentient beings.³⁵ The experience of Supreme Reality seems to

³¹ The Supreme Reality is equated by the text with the ineffable thing-in-itself (*vastu*). See VinSam-K 69, § 2.4.; VinSam-Ta 121, § 1.2.4; VinSam-Ch: T30.696a4-5.

Let us also note that in this passage the Sanskrit terms in brackets are reconstructions. The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* has mostly survived only in Tibetan and Chinese translations. Since the *mūla*-text is, however, extant in Sanskrit, too, we can be fairly sure that many of these reconstructions reflect the original.

³² Ch.: 法界清淨 ‘purification [/purity] of the *dharmadhātu*’.

³³ C, D: *bsa*; G, N, P: *gsa*. I read here with the C, D stemma (as Kramer 93 and Schmithausen 2007, 234, n. 81, also do).

³⁴ *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, Kramer ed. 93, § 3.5.2.4.1. Cf. VinSam-Ch: 云何名為 法界清淨？謂：修正智故，永除諸相 證得真如。(T 30.701c4-5).

³⁵ In our text, *nimitta* is defined as the thing (*vastu*) which serves as the basis of the verbal expression (see VinSam-K 69, § 2.1.; VinSam-Ta 121, § 1.2.1). The latter is a misleading epistemic tool when it comes to expressing the Supreme Reality. The original Sanskrit presupposed by Tib. *mtshan ma* in the passage cited here is most likely *nimitta* as also suggested by Ch. 相. But this raises a problem since *nimitta* in its technical sense is rendered into Tib. as *rgyu mtshan*. (The Chinese translation

imply the complete lack of mental images or, in other words, the absence of discrete cognitive objects (*anālabhāna*), which sounds similar to the state described in the *Śrāvākabhūmi* passage cited above. This comes as no surprise for a Mahāyāna text. The *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* had long ago declared the *samādhi* leading to the realisation of the sameness of all phenomena (*sarvadharmasamatā*) to be the ‘king of contemplations’ (*samādhirāja*).³⁶

It is, however, striking that (what later became) two sections of the same text give different evaluations to a more or less similar contemplative experience. For the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, the undifferentiated, objectless experience is identified with the realisation of the Supreme Reality while the *Śrāvākabhūmi* considers it a preliminary (albeit important) step preparing the yogi for the actual insight into the Noble Truths. The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* also speaks of the discernment of the Four Truths, but this is a phase subsequent to the objectless experience of the Supreme Reality. Answering an opponent who points out that the realisation of the Four Truths preached by the Buddha implies conceptual discernment (Skt. **parivitarakayati*;³⁷ Tib. *yongs su rtog par byed*; Ch. 分別), i.e. reflective

remains, however, 相.) Tib. *mtshan ma* used in our passage suggests rather the commoner meaning of *nimitta* as ‘characteristic’ or ‘mental image’ (in meditation, etc.). It is hard to know why the Tibetan translators decided to differentiate here (an interpretative rendering meant to underline the precise nuance of the word in this context?). But even if we read the term in the sense of ‘characteristic’ or ‘mental image’, the purport of the passage does not change substantially.

³⁶ AṣṭaPp-W 987.9–10. AṣṭaPp-V 259.18. See also various other *samādhis* directed at the uniformity (*samatā*) at AṣṭaPp-W 985–987; AṣṭaPp-V 259. Cf. ‘due to the uniformity of all phenomena, the perfection of wisdom [shares the same] uniformity’ (*sarvadharmasamatayā prajñāpāramitāsamatā*) (AṣṭaPp-W 985.25–26; AṣṭaPp-V 259.4). See also DaBh-K 96; DaBh-D 47, § A (describing the sixth stage on the bodhisattva’s path). Let also note here that the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* exerted a noticeable influence on the formation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which also cites from the text (for more details, see Deleanu 2013).

mode of cognition accompanied by objects/characteristics (**sanimitta*; *mtshan ma dang bcas par 'gyur*; 有相), the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* argues:

The pure cognition, both mundane and supramundane, regarding the [Four Noble] Truths is achieved through the power of cognition without mental images (**animittajñāna*; *mtshan ma med pa'i shes pa*; 無相智). Thanks to this [power], the afflictions (*kleśa*) are [also] eliminated. Therefore, the cognition without mental images — which is the cause of the cognition regarding the [Truth of] Suffering, etc. as well as of the elimination of the afflictions —³⁸ is figuratively designated (**uṣacāra*; *nye bar gdags pa*; 假說) as the cognition regarding the [Truth of] Suffering, etc. [like] in cases of naming the result for [/instead of] the cause.³⁹ Hence, there is no error [as assumed by the opponent].

(*bden pa rnam la 'jig rten pa dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'i shes pa rnam par dag pa ni mtshan ma med pa'i shes pa'i dbang gis byung ba yin pa'i phyir | de nyid kyis nyon mongs rnam par spangs pas na mtshan ma med pa'i shes pa sdug bsngal la sogs pa'i shes pa'i rgyur gyur pa nyon mongs pa spong bar byed pa gang yin pa de nyid la rgyu la 'bras bu gdags pa byas nas sdug bsngal la sogs pa shes par*⁴⁰ *nye bar gdags pas nyes pa med do* ||)⁴¹

³⁷ Or **parikalpate*.

³⁸ Literally, 'and brings about the elimination of afflictions'.

³⁹ This is an instance of the logical method of superimposing the name of the result upon the cause (*hetau phaloṣacārah*). (I am grateful to Prof. Schmithausen for this detail.)

⁴⁰ G, N, P: *par*; C, D: *pas*.

⁴¹ *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, Kramer ed. 92–93, § 3.3.4. The Chinese translation passage, including the opponent's argument, reads: 問：苦等諸智 世尊說為得清淨因。若苦等智 於苦等諦 分別苦等，應成有相。若不分別苦等諸智，便非是有。彼無有故，云何能得畢竟清淨？答：由無相智增上力故，於諸諦中極善清淨 通世、出世分別智生，即名已斷所斷煩惱。其無相智 是苦等智因，正能斷滅所斷煩惱。於此因中 假立

In the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, the objectless cognition is the actual experience of Awakening while the reflective cognition of the Four Truths, often presupposed by the traditional approach, is derived from it. Roughly speaking, this is an inversion of the place and importance given to more or less similar meditative experiences.⁴²

3. Augmentation

The passage I have chosen to illustrate the augmentative strategy represents a milestone in the history of Buddhist philosophy. It is probably the earliest attested statement of the representation-only (*viññaptimātratā*) doctrine, which marks the birth of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda as a distinct philosophical school. The so-called *viññaptimātra(tā)* passage⁴³ occurs in the Maitreya Chapter (**Maitreyapariivarta*) of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, a text most probably compiled in first half of the 4th century.⁴⁴ The entire chapter is dedicated to the path of spiritual cultivation, basically framed upon the practice of tranquillity (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*).

But let us first take a look at an earlier passage which may have paved the way for the birth of the *viññaptimātratā* Weltanschauung. It is found in the *Śrāvakahūmi* where it is introduced as a citation from a canonical text.

果名，即假說此爲苦等智。是故無過。(T 30.701b9-16).

⁴² I say ‘roughly’ because the *Śrāvakahūmi* paradigm also contains a non-conceptual moment of direct perception. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact mental process involved here, but it seems to suggest an intuitive internalisation of the Truths rather than an entirely objectless experience.

⁴³ The passage is known in Japanese Buddhist studies as the *yuishiki-dan* 唯識段 or *yuishiki no kyōmon* 唯識の經文.

⁴⁴ This is the title according to the Tibetan translation: *Byams pa'i le'u*. In Xuanzang's rendering of the text, it is entitled ‘The Chapter on the Examination of Spiritual Practice’ (分別瑜伽品 **Yogaṅgarikṣāparivarta*).

For the date of the text, see Deleanu 2006, 172-176.

The *Śrāvaka bhūmi* calls it the *Muktakasūtra*, but in modern Buddhist studies, it is often referred to as the *Revatasūtra* (after the Buddha's interlocutor's name).⁴⁵ Speaking of the objects visualised in meditation, the *Muktakasūtra/Revatasūtra* describes them as follows:

He [i.e. the contemplative] does not see the [visualised] object itself in a non-mediated, direct manner⁴⁶ but generates a replica or image [which is] nothing but cognition, nothing but visualisation, nothing but recollection.⁴⁷

(*sa na tad eva jñeyam vastu samavahitam*⁴⁸ *sammukhibhūtam paśyati, api tu tatpratirūpakam asyotpadyate tatpratibhāsam vā, jñānamātram vā, darśanamātram vā, pratismṛtamātram*⁴⁹ *vā*).⁵⁰

The *vijñaptimātratā* thesis in the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* is likewise pronounced in a context discussing the nature of the visualised objects in the *vipaśyanā* practice. *Vipaśyanā* is defined as a reflective process which,

⁴⁵ The passage has been discussed in numerous modern contributions. Here I limit myself to mentioning Schmithausen 2007, 237, and Schmithausen 2014, 498–9.

⁴⁶ Skt. *samavahitam sammukhibhūtam* literally mean '[in such a manner as if] touching [directly], [as if] being face to face'.

⁴⁷ A more literal rendering of the last part of the sentence would be 'which is knowing-only, seeing-only, recollection-only'. Schmithausen 2014, 499, suggests that *pratismṛta* could also be construed as 'mindful observation'.

⁴⁸ ŚrBh-MS as well as ŚrBh-Sh read: *samāhitam*. The hypothetical emendation above is based on Tib. *nye bar gyur* and Ch. 和合.

⁴⁹ Or should this be emended to *pratismṛtimātram* (as, for instance, AbhSamBh 116.2)? Anyway, *pratismṛtamātram* should most likely be taken here as an action noun. See Schmithausen 2014, 499, n. 2110.

⁵⁰ ŚrBh II 52.18–20; ŚrBh-MS 71a6–7; See also ŚrBh-Sh 119.15–18; Sakuma 1990 II 12.6–9 (cf. p. 109, too). Ch.: 彼雖於其本所知事，不能和合，現前觀察，然與本事相似而生。於彼所緣有彼相似，唯智，唯見，唯正憶念。(T 30.428b5–7). For Tib., see D 77b; P. 93b.

benefiting from the calmness brought by *śamatha* meditation, can be directed at images perceived in inner concentration (*adhyātmasamādhigocarapratiḥimba*; *nang du ting nge 'dzin gyi spod yul gzugs brnyan*; 內三摩地所行影像).⁵¹ These images as well as the cognitive objects (*jñeyārtha*; *shes bya'i don*; 所知義)⁵² which they represent become the focus of the yogi's examination (*vicaya*; *rnam par 'byed pa*; 思擇), intense examination (*pravicaya*; *rab tu rnam par 'byed pa*; 最極思擇), thorough inspection (*parivitarika*; *yong su rtog pa*; 周遍尋思).⁵³

It is at this juncture that the nature of the images meditated upon in *vipaśyanā* becomes an issue. Asked by Bodhisattva Maitreya whether these images are different from the contemplating mind, the Buddha declares them to be 'non-different' (*abhinna*; *tha dad pa ma yin*; 無異). These images are, he says, representation-only (*viññaptimātra*; *rnam par rig pa tsam*; 唯 [...] 識).⁵⁴ But what makes the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* special is the fact that the scope of definition is expended to all cognitive acts:

I declare that the consciousness (*viññāna*)⁵⁵ is constituted (*prabhāvita*)

⁵¹ Most of the reconstructions of Sanskrit terms in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* passages quoted here are based on Lamotte 1935. (For simplicity's sake, I omit the asterisk in this section.)

⁵² Literally, *jñeya* translates as 'cognisable'.

⁵³ See ch. VIII, § 4. (The paragraph numeration follows Lamotte ed.).

⁵⁴ In the Tibetan rendering, the sentence reads: *gzugs brnyan de rnam par rig pa tsam du zad pa'i phyir te* | (P Ngu 29b1; D Ca 27a4; sTog Na 38b2; Lamotte ed. 91.4-5, § 7; Dunhuang MS: Hakamaya 2008, 122.27-28). Ch.: 由彼影像 唯是識故。(T 16.698b2).

(NB: In the citations from and references to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the siglum 'Ch.' should be understood as referring Xuanzang's translation into Chinese (Taishō Canon Vol. 16, # 676). A more thorough investigation would require collating all extant Chinese translations.)

⁵⁵ Schmithausen (2014, 503) suggests a more precise, if explanatory, translation of

by mere representation [/appearance](*vijñaptimātra*) of [/as] the cognitive object [/support](*ālabhana*).⁵⁶

(Skt. **tadālabhanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṃ vijñānam (iti)(aḥaṃ) vadāmi*.⁵⁷ Tib. *rnam par shes pa ni*⁵⁸ *dmigs pa dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phyee ba yin no*⁵⁹ *zhes ngas bshad do* || P Ngu 29b1; D Ca 27a4; sTog Na 38b2; Lamotte ed. 91.4–5, § 7; Dunhuang MS; Hakamaya 2008, 122.28–29. Ch. 我說：識所緣唯⁶⁰識所現故。 T 16.698b2)⁶¹

The Buddha goes on explaining that ‘the inherent (*prakṛtistha*)⁶² mental

vijñāna as ‘sensory and cognitive awareness’. See Schmithausen 2014, 503; cf. note below.

⁵⁶ My translation here owes much to Schmithausen 2014, 503 (see also 400–1; et passim). For other renderings, see Lamotte 1935, 211; Powers 1995, 155

⁵⁷ The words in brackets are optional. ‘I declare (d)’ could be also reconstructed as *mayoktam* or *mayā deśitam*.

The Sanskrit reconstruction follows — or rather sums up — Schmithausen 2014, 395, 397–8, et passim. The philological and historical problems connected to the so-called *vijñaptimātra* (*tā*) passage are brilliantly addressed in Schmithausen 1984 (for conclusions regarding the Skt. reconstruction, see p. 437: **ālabhanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṃ vijñānam* ‘consciousness is characterised by [the fact that its] object is nothing but representation’) and Schmithausen 2014, 387–505 (see also 507f. for the meaning of *prabhāvita*). The latter monograph offers an extensive and superbly argued discussion of other reconstructions and latest interpretations.

⁵⁸ Lamotte ed.: *pa'i*. Lamotte ed. contains no note accounting for this reading. It might be an emendation on the basis of Xuanzang’s rendering (and/or other sources?), but nothing is said to this effect either.

⁵⁹ D adds: || (i.e. double *shad*).

⁶⁰ Song ed. [宋, in Taishō sigla], Old Song ed. [宮, in Taishō sigla]: 惟.

⁶¹ In Xuanzang’s rendering, the sentence is rather differently worded: ‘I declare that [this is] because 故 the object [/support] of consciousness is only a manifestation 所現 of the consciousness.’

⁶² Tib. *rang bzhin du gnas pa* literally translates ‘abiding as/in self-nature’. (Cf. Ch. 自性而住) And so would Lamotte’s Sanskrit reconstruction **svabhāvasthita*. The Sanskrit compound is linguistically possible, but as far as I know, it does not seem to

images (*cittabimba*) of the appearances (*abhāsa*) of visible forms (*rūpa*), etc. [perceived by] sentient beings (*sattva*)⁶³ are not different (*abhinna*; *tha dad pa ma yin*; 無異) from the mind. The fools (*bāla*; *byis pa*; 愚夫) however, unaware of the fact that these mental images are nothing but representation (*viññaptimātra*; *nam par rig pa tsam*; 唯[...]識), fall into trap of distorted cognition (*viparyastacittatā*; *phyin ci log tu sems*; 作顛倒解).

The contemplative must, of course, fully comprehend and eventually transcend the epistemic mechanism of the *viññaptimātratā*. By ‘yoking together’ (*yuganaddha*; *zung du ’jug pa*; 和合俱轉) the insight and tranquillity into a single act of mental one-pointedness (*cittaikāgratā*; *sems rtsé gcig pa nyid*; 心一境性), the yogi reaches a state in which:

he realises that these images (*pratibimba*) which pertain to the

occur in Buddhist literature. *Rang bzhin du gnas pa* (or *rang bzhin gyis gnas pa*) rendering *prakṛtistha* is, on the other hand, well-attested in Buddhist, especially Yogācāra, sources: e.g. BoBh-W 3.2; 331.12; 401.7; MSA 11.12; etc. Chandra 1994, s.v., also registers *rang bzhin du gnas pa* as equivalent to *prakṛtistha* on the basis of the *Pravrajyāvastu*. (The testimony of Chandra [1959] 1971, s.v., can be dismissed as hypothetical since it records the compound on the basis of the same *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* passage under discussion here). *Prakṛtistha* (literally, ‘naturally/spontaneously abiding’) means ‘inherent’, ‘original’, ‘innate’ (as well as ‘abiding in the original state’, ‘genuine’, etc., though the latter semantic ramifications are not relevant here).

The idea conveyed by the text, whether the Sanskrit original was **prakṛtistha* or **svabhāvasthita*, seems to be that the mental images of phenomena are inherent to the mind, occurring spontaneously, rather than being caused or depending on external objects.

⁶³ Tib. *sems can rnam kyī gzugs la sogs par snang ba sems kyī gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa* (Lamotte ed. 91, § 9); Ch. 若諸有情 自性而住 綠色等心 所行影像。(T 16.698b9-10).

My understanding of the Tibetan is closer, though not identical, to Lamotte 1935, 212, rather than to Powers 1995, 155. Ch. is rather free but the purport is the same.

domain of concentration (*samādhigocara*) are nothing but representation (*vijñaptimātra*), and having realised this, he contemplates [focuses upon] (*manaskaroti*) the Supreme Reality (*tathatā*).

(Tib.: *ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan de la 'di ni rnam par rig pa tsam yin no zhes bya bar rtogs te | de rtogs nas de bzhin nyid du yid la byed pa gang pa yin pa'o* || Lamotte ed. 92.11–13, § 9. Ch.: 謂通達三摩地所行⁶⁴影像 唯是其識, 或通達此已 復思惟如性。T 16.698b23–24)

Whether this amounts to a variety of idealism which denies categorically the existence of objects exterior to the mind remains an issue of (often bitterly fought) controversy. I cannot enter into details here, but no matter what interpretation we adopt, its importance for our discussion does not change. The *Śrāvakabhūmi* describes the nature of the visualised objects as a mere cognitive act (*jñānamātra*) within the limited experience of meditation. The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, on the other hand, enlarges the scope to all objects of knowledge. Whatever we perceive is representation-only (*vijñaptimātra*), all 'objects' we see or hear are ultimately of the essence and reducible to the mind.

4. Substitution

The fourth interpretative strategy refers to a process of semantic transplant widely seen throughout Buddhist history, meditation being only one of its areas of application. It involves investing established technical terms with new meanings,⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Taishō reads: 所云. This must be a scribal (or typographical?) error for 所行 = *gocara*. Cf. Ch. and Tib. translations in note 63 above.

⁶⁵ This interpretative strategy has been quite prolific throughout the whole Buddhist history. And Buddhist authors, mainly Mahāyānist and Tantric, made extensive use of it declaring new meanings to be revelations made, more often than

Here we shall examine how the Sarvāstivādin five-step model of the spiritual path was adopted in Yogācāra Buddhism with a complete revamping of its semantic content. Let's first have a brief look at the description of the Sarvāstivādin path to Arhatship in the *Abhidharmakośa*.

(1) After fulfilling the fundamental requirements of developing the resolution (*pranidhāna*) to attain Nirvāṇa⁶⁶ and leading a holy life in accordance with the ethical code of the monastic Order,⁶⁷

(2) the practioner embarks upon the preparatory path (*prayogamārga*),⁶⁸ This step consists in three distinct phases: (a) basic meditative training, i.e. cultivation of the impure⁶⁹ and/or mindfulness of breathing;⁷⁰ (b) the four applications of mindfulness, practised in a manner similar to the descriptions in canonical sources;⁷¹ and (c) the wholesome roots (*kuśalamūla*) conducive to insight (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) into the Noble Truths, which continue the four applications of mindfulness,⁷² laying the

not, by the Buddha Himself. The very title of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, i.e. *The Scripture on the Unravelling the Hidden Meaning*, hints to its semantic mission. Just before its famous announcement of the third turning of the Wheel of Teaching (*dharma-cakra*), the text elaborates on the implicit meaning which requires proper explanation (*neyārtha*) vs the explicit or definitive meaning (*nitārtha*) (see Lamotte 1935, 83–85, §§ 28–29; T 16.696c-697a).

With the advent of Tantric Buddhism, we witness even more radical examples of semantic remodelling such as, for instance, the famous identification of the five aggregates (*pañca skandhāḥ*) with the Five Fundamental Buddhas (e.g. *Guhyasamājatantra* ch. XVII ver. 50, Matsunaga ed. 1978, 104, also cited in the (Tāntrika) Āryadeva's *Caryāmēlāpakapradīpa*, Wedemeyer 2007, 350)

⁶⁶ AKBh ch. VI ver. 24c. See also AKBh ch. III ver. 44c; ch. IV ver. 124; ch. VII ver. 30; ch. VII ver. 34.

⁶⁷ AKBh p. 334.

⁶⁸ See AKBh ch. VI ver. 17–25 & commentary.

⁶⁹ AKBh ch. VI ver. 9–11.

⁷⁰ AKBh ch. VI ver. 12–13.

⁷¹ AKBh ch. VI ver. 14–16.

⁷² AKBh ch. VI ver. 17–25.

emphasis on the contemplation of the Four Noble Truths in sixteen aspects.⁷³

(3) The third step, called the ‘path of vision’ (*darśanamārga*),⁷⁴ is described as the ‘realisation (*abhisamaya*) [leading to the] insight into the Truths [effected] by non-contaminated wisdom.’⁷⁵ This realisation will, however, stamp out only the proclivities (*anuśaya*) related to such intellectual defilements (*kleśa*) as wrong views (*drṣṭi*) concerning the existence of a self, etc.

(4) The subtler defilements stemming from emotional attachments like lust (*rāga*) and hatred (*pratigha*) or from our fundamental ignorance (*avidyā*) can only be abandoned at the next level named the ‘path of cultivation’ (*bhāvanāmārga*).⁷⁶ This is a long, arduous process of meditation on the Noble Truths which gradually eradicates all traces, no matter how subtle, of latent proclivities.

(5) The culmination of this process is known as the ‘path requiring no more training’ (*āśaikṣamārga*), which is the moment and state of Arhatship, of Awakening to the Truth and Liberation from the cycle of rebirth.⁷⁷

The five-step paradigm of spiritual progression was also adopted in Yogācāra Buddhism but not without semantic substitutions. The *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* is probably the earliest Yogācāra text which makes use of it. Verses (*śloka*) 6–10 and their prose commentary (*bhāṣya*)⁷⁸ in the Chapter on Reality (*Tattvādhikāra*) sketch out what will

⁷³ *tac catuḥ satyagocaram, ṣoḍaśākāram.* (AKBh ch. VI ver. 17 b-c)

⁷⁴ AKBh ch. VI ver. 25–32.

⁷⁵ *darśanābhisamayo ’nāsravayā prajñayā satyānām* (AKBh 351.12)

⁷⁶ AKBh ch. VI ver. 33–44.

⁷⁷ *Tatṣayāptyā kṣayajñānam, āśaikṣo ’rhann asau tadā.* (AKBh ch. VI ver. 45ab)

⁷⁸ Traditionally, the authorship of the verses is attributed to Maitreya while the commentary is, more often than not, considered to be the work of Vasubandhu. The latter attribution is rather controversial. The issue is far from settled, but the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkārabhāṣya* is not included in the corpus believed to have been

become the basic model of the Yogācāra spiritual ladder. In spite of a terminology which is identical to Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika texts, the content of each step is construed in a different manner. Let us have a look at one example:⁷⁹

The second stanza [sets forth] the abiding (*avasthāna*) in [the realisation that] the manifestation of the [cognitive objects] is mind-only (*cittamātra*), [realisation achieved after] having comprehended that the objects are nothing but mental verbalisation. This is the bodhisattva's station of [cultivating the wholesome factors] leading to the penetration [of the Truth] (*nirvedhabhāgīyāvasthā*). From this point on, as [the yogi] reaches direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) into the Essence of Phenomena (*dharmadhātu*), [he] becomes dissociated from the characteristic of the [cognitive] subject-object (*grāhya-grāhaka*) duality.⁸⁰ This is the station of the path of vision

authored by Vaubandhu the Kośakāra (see Deleanu 2006, 186). The fact remains, however, that the verses were compiled by person(s) different from the author the *bhāṣya*, which reflects a more developed stage in the history of the Yogācāra doctrine.

⁷⁹ The citation comes from the commentary (*bhāṣya*) ad verse (*śloka*) 7.

⁸⁰ Professor Schmithausen kindly suggested the possibility of a different reading. If we emend *pratyakṣato gamane dvaya°* to *pratyakṣatāgamanam | dvaya°*, the meaning would become: 'Thereupon the *dharmadhātu* is directly perceived.'⁽¹⁾ [That the *dharmadhātu* is] dissociated from the characteristic of duality (verse 6.7d) [refers to the dissociation] from the characteristic of [the epistemic split into] subject and object.' The passage is actually cited as such in Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* (Thakur ed. 507.12f.): *tataḥ pareṇa dharmadhātōḥ pratyakṣatāgamanam, yo dvaya°*, where the gloss on *dvayalakṣaṇena viyukto* is syntactically connected with the preceding sentence by introducing the relative pronoun *yo* (referring to *dharmadhātu*). The suggestion is certainly worth considering, especially if we suppose Jñānaśrīmitra cited the sentence from a textual version closer to the original rather than rephrased it for exegetical purposes. Tentatively, I

(*darśanamārgāvasthā*).

(*dvītiyena manojalpamātrān arthān viditvā tadābhāse cittamātre 'vasthānam. iyaṃ bodhisattvasya nirvedhabhāgīyāvasthā. tataḥ pareṇa dharmadhātoḥ pratyakṣato gamane dvayalakṣaṇena viyukto grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇena. iyaṃ darśana- mārgāvasthā*).⁸¹

The direct perception into the Essence of Phenomena is then explained as abiding in the realisation that even mind-only does not exist since without a cognised object there can be no cognising subject (*cittamātrasya nāstitvāvagamanaṃ grāhyābhāve grāhakābhāvāt*).⁸² And the station of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārgāvasthā*), which also is equated to the transformation of the basis of existence (*āśrayaḥparivartana*), consists in the attainment of the undifferentiated state (*samatā*) of Reality by means of non-conceptual cognition (*avikalpajñāna*).⁸³

Similar structural categories are thus revamped to accommodate new philosophical ideals and praxis paradigms. The largely reflective meditation directed at the internalisation of the Four Truths in the traditional approach is replaced with contemplative practices aiming at the non-conceptual cognition of the undifferentiated Supreme Reality and resting

stick, however, to Lévi's edition since the emendation would not alter the basic meaning of the sentence.

⁽¹⁾ Literally, 'becomes *pratyakṣa* = is directly manifest', *pratyakṣa* being used here as a qualification of the object (cf., for instance, AbhSam 105.8f. = AbhSamBh 152.27).

⁸¹ *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, Lévi ed. 24.9–12. Cf. Ch.: 釋曰：此偈顯第二通達分位。由解一切諸義唯是意言為性。則了一切諸義悉是心光。菩薩爾時名善住唯識。從彼後現見法界。了達所有二相。即解脫能執所執。(T 31. 599a15–18).

⁸² MSA reads *grāhyābhāve*. I emend together with Limaye 1992, 73. See also Ch. 所取物無故 as well as Ui's translation into Japanese (1961b, 110). For entire commentary ad *śloka* 8, see MSA 24.12–16.

⁸³ For the *bhāṣya* ad *śloka* 9, see MSA 24.16–20.

upon the idealist presupposition that the objects of ordinary perception are nothing by mind.⁸⁴

Epilogue

History: In or Beyond?

The fact that Buddhism has found various ways to interpret and redesign its meditative repertoire is not a weakness. It attests to flexibility and openness to diversity, an attitude which is often seen in its inclusivistic approach. In the case of Yogācāra Buddhism, for instance, we see the spirit of inclusivism in the encyclopaedic *Yogācārabhūmi* treatise which embraces various meditative traditions. A similar attitude is also displayed by Kumārajīva (ca 339–409)⁸⁵ in his anthology dedicated to contemplative practice known as the *Zuochan sanmei jing* 坐禪三昧經 or *The Scripture on the Concentration of Sitting Meditation* (**Dhyānasamādhisūtra?*).⁸⁶ It is true that the inclusivistic approach is rarely, if ever, impartial. Quite often it reflects hierarchic patterns. Kumārajīva's *Zuochan sanmei jing* symptomatically states that 'those whose wisdom regarding [the essence of] phenomena [/essential factors of reality] (*dharma*) is shallow are called Arhats, those [whose wisdom] is intermediate are called Solitary Buddhas (*pratyekabuddha*), and those [whose wisdom] is profound are called Buddhas' (於諸法中, 智慧淺入名阿羅漢。中入名辟支佛。深入名佛。T 15. 281a7–8). And a similar view is professed by countless Mahāyāna sources.

⁸⁴ For the use of 'idealism' in relation to Yogācāra Buddhism, see Addendum III.

⁸⁵ Kumārajīva's dates are not known with precision. 344–413, 350–409, etc. have also been put forward. See Kamata 1983, 213–226.

⁸⁶ The *Zuochan sanmei jing* is largely based on original Indic sources translated by Kumārajīva at the request of his Chinese disciples. Although it probably reflects syncretic approaches current in Northwestern India and/or Serindia, the work as such is the product of Kumārajīva's editorial efforts, with possible exegetical/authorial contributions. (The text is also accessible in English translation thanks to Yamabe and Sueki 2009).

In spite of its hierarchical partiality, this inclusivistic paradigm strikes a chord with our modern *Zeitgeist*.

This degree of openness and flexibility should not, however, be confused with an understanding of history similar to modern secular views. Whatever particular form they may take, the latter are usually based upon historicist presuppositions. Historicism⁸⁷ itself has been formulated in different ways, but the mainstream understanding is best described by the following definition given by Thornhill (1998):

Historicism defined as ‘the affirmation that life and reality are history alone’ by Benedetto Croce ([*History as the Story of Liberty*] 1938:65), [...] is an insistence on the historicity of all knowledge and cognition [...]. It is intended as a critique of the normative, allegedly anti-historical, epistemologies of Enlightenment thought, expressly Kant. [...] [One of its main assumptions is] that the truth-content of cognition is dependent not on categorical logic, but upon its situatedness in, and constant attentiveness to, history.

This is not the way traditional Buddhism understands the relation between history and Truth, including the teachings and practices leading to it.

Does then Buddhism totally lack a historical perspective on the way teachings and practices are transmitted? There seem to be only two traditional models attempting a more or less ‘historical’ approach to doctrinal change.⁸⁸ The first one is the periodisation of the Buddha’s

⁸⁷ The concept is also referred to as ‘historism’ and, less frequently, as ‘historicity’.

⁸⁸ I do not take into consideration here the Buddhist historiographical (or rather historico-hagiographical) literature represented by such genres as the *Vamsas* in Pali, *Chos 'byung*s in Tibetan, *zhuans* 傳 in Chinese, etc. Although they display (albeit not constantly and consistently) criteria similar to modern historiography, such texts are not canonical and therefore not representative of the core

missionary activity. This was one of the most convenient and prolific hermeneutical tools accounting for the plurality (often of a contradictory nature) of the Buddhist teachings and scriptures. The paradigmatic scriptural model is provided by the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.⁸⁹ The text proclaims that the Buddha turned the Dharma-Wheel (*chos kyi 'khor lo* [...] *rab tu bskor*), i.e. expounded the basic tenets, three times, each revealing a deeper layer of Truth.⁹⁰ The first time, he taught the Four Noble Truths for the benefit of the Śrāvakayāna followers. The second time, he set forth the doctrines of emptiness of no intrinsic essence, no arising, no passing away, etc. for the sake of Mahāyāna followers. The revelation, however, was made in statements whose ultimate meaning requires to be determined (**neyārtha; drang ba'i don*). It was at the third turning of the Dharma-Wheel that he taught the definitive meaning (**nītārtha; nges pa'i don*) of emptiness, sense which is (of course!) conveyed by the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.⁹¹

The second 'historical' approach is the idea that the teaching (*śāsana*) of each Buddha is doomed to a cycle of deterioration. Typically, it starts with a period when the True Dharma (*saddharma; dam pa'i chos*; 正法) thrives during the lifetime of a Buddha. After the Buddha passes into the *parinirvāṇa*, the teaching loses its former vigour entering the period of the 'semblance Dharma' (*saddharmapratirūpaka; dam pa'i chos kyi gzugs brnyan*; 像法). Finally, the True Teaching enters its latter days

philosophical outlook of the Buddhist tradition.

⁸⁹ The model was also famous in Tibetan Buddhism (see, for instance, Bu-ston's *Chos 'byung*; cf. Obermiller [1932] 1996, 53-54).

⁹⁰ Tib.: Lamotte ed. ch. VII, § 30 (pp. 85-6); cf. Ch.: T 16.697a-b.

⁹¹ This periodisation formula will enjoy huge popularity in East Asian Buddhism, contributing to the formation of such elaborate doctrinal classifications 教判 as 'the teachings of the five periods' 五時教 or 'the five periods and eight teachings' 五時八教 in the Tiantai/Tendai tradition 天台宗 and 'the five teachings and ten principles' 五教十宗 in the Huayan/Kegon school 華嚴宗.

experiencing increasing decay and finally annihilation (*saddharmavipralo-
pa; dam pa'i chos rab tu rnam pa 'jig pa; 末法*).⁹²

Both approaches are, however, a far cry from the way secular historians look at the doctrinal and textual change. They could at best be described as 'quasi-historical' attempts which do not rest upon historicist presuppositions. This does not mean that they do not function within the traditional Buddhist paradigm. And my discussion here is not meant to deny the right of existence of this paradigm in the modern world. I only wish to highlight its peculiar nature. To my (historicist) mind, the only problematic issue is the attempt to combine the traditional and modern paradigms in an unsystematic, inconsistent way, to talk about the timelessness of a subject while professing to examine its 'history' or presenting it as satisfying empirical criteria.

I hope this paper does not muddle paradigms and criteria. It is, once again, based upon historicist premises and attempts to tackle meditation as described in primary sources from a philologico-historical viewpoint. The conclusion yielded by this attempt is that meditation is as firmly anchored in historicity as any other mental state. Far from being an ahistorical black-box, it is a permeable process subject to a wide range of factors from personal psychological profiles to large cultural paradigms. This in itself is not a flaw or weakness but it does not guarantee claims that contemplative states are 'pure' or 'beyond history'.

Addendum I

We shall look here only at just a handful of sources stating the timelessness

⁹² The idea exists in various hues and shapes in both Mainstream and Mahāyāna Buddhism. Even a sketchy sketch would not, however, do justice to its complexity. For an excellent monograph, focusing on the Buddhist prophecy of decline known as the 'Kausambi Story', see Nattier 1991.

and universality of the Buddhist Teaching, praxis included. They come from different ages and traditions attesting to the centrality of the motif throughout Buddhist history.

The idea is already found in the early Canon. According to a famous stanza in the *Samyuttanikāya*, the Buddhas of the past, present, and future dwelled, dwell, and will dwell in as well as revere the True Dharma (*saddhamma*). And the scripture concludes, ‘this is the Universal Norm of [all] the Buddhas’ (*esā buddhānaṃ dhammatā*).⁹³

Similarly, the fact that all conditioned phenomena (*saṅkhārā*) are impermanent (*aniccā*), begetting suffering (*dukkhā*), and no (n)-Self (*anattā*),⁹⁴ remains a [universal] principle (*dhātu*), the lasting nature (*ñhitatā*) of the truth (*dhamma*), the fixed course (*niyāmatā*) of the truth (*dhamma*) whether Tathāgatas arise or not.⁹⁵

In the *Saddharmapuṇḍarikasūtra*, the Truth (*dharma*) [of the Single Vehicle (*ekayāna*)] revealed by the Buddhas is likewise described as having a lasting nature (*dharmasthitim*), fixed course (*dharmaniyāmatām*), and unshakable, eternal stability in the world (*nityasthitām loki imām akampyām*).⁹⁶

⁹³ *Ye ca atitā sambuddhā, ye ca buddhā anāgatā |
Yo c-etarahi sambuddho, bahūnaṃ sokanāsano ||
Sabbe saddhammagaruno, vihariṃsu viharanti ca |
Atha pi viharissanti, esā buddhānaṃ dhammatā ||* (SN I 140.10-14)

⁹⁴ In the Pali tradition, these are called the ‘three distinctive marks’ (*tilakkhaṇa*) of the Buddhist teaching. In East Asian Buddhism, they are usually known as the ‘three Dharma-seals’ 三法印.

⁹⁵ *Uppādā vā, bhikkhave, tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ, ñhitāva sā dhātu dhammaññhitatā dhammaniyaṃmatā. Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā. [...] Sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā. [...] Sabbe dhammā anattā. [...]* (AN I 286). The precise sense of the key terms *dhātu dhammaññhitatā dhammaniyaṃmatā* is not exactly clear, and neither are the glosses in the traditional Pali commentaries. Cf. also Woodward [1932] 1979, Vol. I, 264-5; Bodhi 2012, 363.

⁹⁶ *dharmasthitim dharmaniyaṃmatām ca nityasthitām loki imām akampyām |*

Key practices leading to the supreme Truth can also appear qualified as universal or uniquely superior. In such cases, the implication is that they function beyond historical limitations or personal peculiarities.

In the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*, the Buddha ends his exposition of the tranquillity-insight (*śamathaviṣāyanā* 止觀) practice by declaring it to be the perfect and pure path of spiritual cultivation (**yogamārga*; *ṛnal 'byor kyi lam*; 瑜伽道) which was taught by the Buddhas of the past and will be taught by the Buddhas of the future.⁹⁷

In the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the yogi who succeeds in abandoning all mental images [/constructs] (*nimitta*) and reaches an imageless state (*nirābhāsam* [...] *bhavet*)⁹⁸ is blessed by the Buddhas coming from all lands.⁹⁹ The sutra also refers to its doctrines and practices as representing the teachings of the Buddhas of the past, present, and future.¹⁰⁰

In the *Compendium of the Essence* (Skt. **Hṛdayanikṣepa*;¹⁰¹ Tib. *Snying*

buddhās ca bodhiṃ pṛthivīya maṇḍe prakāśayiṣyanti upāyakausalam ||

(Kern and Nanjio ed. 53.9–10; Wogihara and Tsuchida ed. 51.19–21; ch. II, ver. 103)

Ch. 是法住法位 世間相常住
於道場知已 導師方便說 (T 9.9b10–11)
(Cf. preceding stanza, too.)

⁹⁷ Tib.: Lamotte ed. ch. VIII, § 39, p. 120. Ch.: T 16.703a11.

⁹⁸ Śikṣānanda Chinese translation: 'dwells in [a state] without object [/support]' 住於無所緣 (T 16.602b1).

⁹⁹ *vidhūya sarvāṇyetaṇi nirābhāsam yadā bhavet |*
tadā buddhakarādityāḥ sarvakṣetrāḥ samāgatāḥ |
śiro hi tasya mārjanti nimittam tathatānugam || (Nanjio ed. 1923 [1956], 98).

捨離此一切 住於無所緣
是則能隨入 如如真實相
十方諸國土 所有無量佛
悉引光明手 而摩是人頂 (T 16.602b1–4; Śikṣānanda's Chinese translation)

¹⁰⁰ E.g. Nanjio ed. 1923 [1956], 1; 98 (passage subsequent to the verse cited above); 260; etc.

¹⁰¹ Skt. title according to a rather unclear transliteration (P Gi 10a; D 293b). Another possible, albeit unattested, reconstructions would be **Hṛdayasamkṣepa*.

po nges par bsdu ba), the Mādhyamika-cum-Tāntrika master Atīśa (982–1054) gives a succinct description of the bodhisattva path which he declares to be ‘the essence preached by the Buddhas of the three periods [i.e. the past, present, and future]’ (*dus gsum sangs rgyas kyis gsung pa’i | snying po [...]*).¹⁰²

To change the cultural landscape, similar ideas are also seen in Dōgen’s 道元 (1200–1253) works. In his (symptomatically entitled) *Universal Recommendation of the Method of Sitting Meditation* 普勸坐禪儀, the Japanese Zen master tells that all accomplished practitioners, whether of our cosmic realm or others, whether from India or China, equally have the Buddha-seal and have devoted themselves only to the *zazen* practice 唯務打坐.¹⁰³ The latter is identical with the *shikan taza* 只管打坐 or ‘single-minded meditation’, the paramount means and goal in Dōgen’s teachings. And in the (substantially different) redaction of the same work,¹⁰⁴ Dōgen declares that basically there are no differences in the Buddha’s teachings, whether it is in this or other cosmic realms (凡其自界他方 佛法本無異法。T 82.2a21–22).

Addendum II

The five basic techniques of meditation discussed in Section 1 was a popular combinatory formula found in many Northern schools of Indian Buddhism, first and foremost, in Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra.¹⁰⁵ They will become even more popular in East Asian Buddhism, where they are mainly known as ‘the five contemplations for stilling the

¹⁰² For Tib. text, see Sherburne 2003, 374. A similar verse is found in the *sNying po bsdu ba* (id. 368).

¹⁰³ 凡夫自界他方 西天東地 等持佛印, 一檀宗風, 唯務打坐。(T 82.1b13–14)

¹⁰⁴ Preserved at the Komazawa University Library (see T 82 1, n. 2).

¹⁰⁵ For a detailed study of these five meditative techniques, see Ōminami 1977.

mind' 五停心觀.¹⁰⁶

Let us look again at the set in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, which is one of the earliest sources attesting the combinatory formula, adding the recommended categories of practitioners for each meditation. This suggests that the neophytes were not supposed to master the entire set. It rather appears that they were taught only one particular technique in accordance to the dominant proclivity affecting each individual's psyche.¹⁰⁷

- (1) Meditation on impurity (*aśubhā*) 不淨觀, recommended for meditators dominated by sensual passion [/lust](*rāgacarita*) 貪欲.
- (2) Meditation on friendliness (*maitri*) 慈悲觀, for meditators dominated by hatred (*dveṣacarita*) 瞋恚.
- (3) Meditation on dependent origination (*idaṃpratyayatāpratīyasamutpāda*) 因緣觀, for meditators dominated by bewilderment (*mohacarita*) 愚癡.
- (4) Analysis of the elements [of existence](*dhātuprabheda*) 界分別觀,¹⁰⁸ for meditators dominated by arrogance (*mānacarita*) 我慢 (我見).
- (5) Mindfulness of breathing (*ānāpānasmṛti*) 數息觀,¹⁰⁹ for meditators dominated by restless thoughts (*vitarkacarita*) 散亂心.

This is not, however, the only combinatory and terminological formula. There are other patterns, too, one of them being 'the five types of meditation' 五門禪.¹¹⁰ The latter consists of the same members as the set

¹⁰⁶ See Huiyuan's 淨影寺慧遠 (523–592) *Meanings and Writs of the Great Vehicle* 大乘義章 (T 44.697c); Zhiyi's 智顓 (538–597) *Arcane of Meaning of the Lotus Sutra* 法華玄義 (T 33.707c, 786a), *Great Tranquillity and Insight* 摩訶止觀 (T 46.35c, 51b, 117b), etc.

¹⁰⁷ See ŚrBh-TG II 50.14–52.10; ŚrBh-Sh 198.12–199.9; also ŚrBh-TG II 58.7ff.; ŚrBh-Sh 202.3ff. For a more detailed discussion, see Deleanu 2012.

¹⁰⁸ Also rendered as 六界觀, 界方便觀, etc.

¹⁰⁹ Also rendered as 持息念、安那般那念、安般念, etc.

¹¹⁰ This is a set apparently originating with the so-called 'meditation scriptures' 禪經, a corpus of texts surviving mainly in Chinese translation and/or compiled in

above with one exception. It replaces the analysis of the elements (*dhātuprabheda*) with the Buddha recollection (*buddhānusmṛti*) 念佛觀,¹¹¹ which is recommended to meditators equally 等分 afflicted by lust, hatred, bewilderment, and restless thoughts.¹¹²

Addendum III

Qualifying Yogācāra Buddhism as ‘idealistic’ will surely make (quite?) a few learned eyebrows rise. The academic community is far from having achieved consensus on the proper terminology describing the philosophy of the school. A growing number of scholars in the West (e.g. Lusthaus 2002) as well as the East (e.g. Shiba 2003) argue that Yogācāra is far closer to phenomenology.

My understanding of the classical Yogācāra philosophy¹¹³ (intrinsically

China (more or often than not on the basis of Indian sources). Their scholastic affiliation is difficult to pinpoint, but roughly speaking, they tend to mix a large dose of Śrāvakayāna (often Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika) doctrines and practices with Mahāyāna elements.

The rendering ‘five types of meditation’ hinges on construing 門 as ‘category’ or ‘method’, rather than ‘gate’. I adopt the former but if the latter meaning was intended, the translation should be ‘the five meditations [serving as] gateway [to the path toward the Awakening]’. Cf. the term *avatāramukha* ‘gateways for the entrance [to the path]’ in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh-W 110.21–22 and 25). The latter compound is translated into Chinese by Xuanzang as 趣入門 (T 31.504b). Note, however, that the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* does not use the numeral ‘five’ although this is the number of techniques referred to here.

¹¹¹ The *Zuochan sanmei jing* 坐禪三昧經 calls it the ‘bodhisattva concentration on the Buddha recollection’ 菩薩念佛三昧 (T 15.281b25).

¹¹² This is the antidote prescribed in the *Zuochan sanmei jing* (若多婬欲人, 不淨法門治。若多瞋恚人, 慈心法門治。若多愚癡人, 思惟觀因緣法門治。若多思覺人, 念息法門治。若多等分人, 念佛法門治。T 15.281c2–5). Other meditation scriptures prescribe it, however, for other types of affliction.

¹¹³ I understand ‘classical Yogācāra’ as referring to the subtly different but

linked to my labelling it ‘idealism’) is along the same lines advocated by the excellent study of Birgit Kellner and John Taber (2014) (also containing a survey of the scholarly discussions on the subject). As for the term ‘idealism’, I follow the definition given by the British philosopher Timothy L.S. Sprigge (1998):

Idealism is now usually understood in philosophy as the view that mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an appearance to or expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner essence. However, a philosophy which makes the physical world dependent upon mind is usually also called idealist even if it postulates some further hidden, more basic reality behind the mental and physical scenes (for example, Kant’s things-in-themselves).

The classical Yogācāra philosophy seems to match the definition, albeit in a unique way. The problem underlying a lexeme like ‘idealism’ is that it denotes a wide genus whose semantic sphere includes numerous species and subspecies. The ‘Yogācāra species’ of idealism is not completely identical with the Platonic idealism or Berkeley’s idealist philosophy. Actually, depending on the semantic scale at which you set your judgements, you may also say that they represent different philosophies. But when looking from a more encompassing perspective, they can be seen

kindred strains of philosophy which start with the texts (mostly verses) ascribed to Maitreya (mid-4th century), is systematised by the Asaṅga (ca 330-405) and Vasubandhu (ca 350-430, and continue with such exegetes as Sthiramati and Dharmapāla in the 6th century. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, when expressing their ontological views (the former more than the latter), can also be regarded as roughly belonging to the classical period. This phase comes to an end with the rise and dominance of the Hybrid Yogācāra-Madhyamaka current(s) represented by Jñānagarbha (ca 700-760), Śāntarakṣita (ca 725-788), Kamalaśīla (ca 740-795), etc. in the 8th century.

as sharing enough similarities to come under the definition above.

There is, hence, no harm in comparing and finding similarities between Yogācāra and phenomenology. And I believe that some points of similitude exist such as, for instance, those between the non-conceptual forms of Yogācāra meditation and the phenomenological ideal of epoché. But there are also other areas in which their approach is quite different. Overemphasising the similarities in an attempt to accommodate Yogācāra under a phenomenological umbrella is a Procrustean approach. But even if the phenomenological reading of Yogācāra were correct, it would not change my label of 'idealist'. To my mind, the unwarranted (almost mystical) belief in intuitive knowledge seen in phenomenology (especially in its Husserlian and Heideggerian varieties) is a type of idealism.

What further complicates our understanding and labelling the Yogācāra philosophy is that its tenets are often stated in relation to spiritual and soteriological ideals (like most other Buddhist schools, for that matter). Actually, the very term 'representation-only' (*viññaptimātratā* or *viññaptimātratva*) is used with a double, if closely connected, meaning. At one level, it is a convenient, if not perfect, description of the reality as seen by ordinary people (*prthagjana*): the objects which they perceive as external to the mind are merely products of their wrong representation. In this sense, *viññaptimātratā* is an epistemological/ontological descriptor. But on a higher, spiritual level, this descriptor is itself incorrect and non-functioning = non-existent. At this higher semantic dimension, the *viññaptimātratā* becomes the platform for its own denial. Verses 25 to 30 in Vasubandhu's *Viññaptimātratāsiddhi* make this abundantly clear.¹¹⁴ Equally revealing is the discussion of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* in Section 4 above.

I would therefore suggest that the term 'self-deconstructing subjective

¹¹⁴ For critical Sanskrit and Tibetan editions of the *mūla*-text and Sthiramati's *bhāṣya*, see Buescher 2007, 132–143.

idealism' might work as a species descriptor for the classical Yogācāra philosophy.

ABBREVIATIONS

Citations of and references to Pali sources are done according to the following model: SN III 174.3 stands for *Samyuttanikāya*, volume III, page 174, line 3. (For Pali sources, whose titles have been abbreviated according to the widely accepted conventions detailed in the *Epilegomena to Vol. I of A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, I refer to the PTS editions.)

Citations of and references to Sanskrit sources are done according to the following model: AKBh 351.12 stands for the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, page 351, line 12. Alternatively, I refer to the verse rather than to the page. Thus, AKBh ch. VI ver. 17 b-c stands for the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, chapter VI, verse (*kārikā*) 17, second and third quarter.

Citations of and references to Tibetan translations are done according to the following model: D Wi 111a1 stands for the *sDe-dge Canon*, volume Wi (i.e. traditional Tibetan numeration), folio 111, recto, line 1.

Citations of and references to Chinese translations are done according to the following model: T 30.527b16 stands for the *Taishō Canon*, volume 30, page 527, segment b (middle segment), column 16.

AbhSam = *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (see Pradhan 1950)

AbhSamBh = *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (see Tatia 1976)

AKBh: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (see Pradhan 1975)

AṣṭaPp-V: *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* (see Vaidya 1960)

AṣṭaPp-W: *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* (see Wogihara 1932–1935)

BHS: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit

BoBh-D: *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (see Dutt 1978)

BoBh-W *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Wogihara [1936] 1971)

- C: Co-ne edition of the *bsTan 'gyur*
 Ch.: Chinese translation
 D: sDe-dge edition of the Tibetan Canon (see Takasaki et al. 1980)
 DaBh-K: *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (see Kondō 1936)
 DaBh-R: *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (see Rahder 1926)
 G: Golden edition of the *bsTan 'gyur*
 MBh: *Mahābhārata*
 MSA: *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (see Lévi 1907)
 MW: Monier-Williams [1899] 1986.
 N: sNar-thang edition of the *bsTan 'gyur*
 P: Peking edition of the Tibetan Canon (see Suzuki 1955–1961)
 PW: Böhtlingk and Roth [1855–1875] 1990.
 Skt.: Sanskrit original
 ŚrBh-MS: *Śrāvakahūmi* Manuscript (see Taishō University and China
 Library of Nationalities facsimile edition 1994)
 ŚrBh-Sh: *Śrāvakahūmi* (see Shukla 1973)
 ŚrBh-TG II (see Shōmon ji Kenkyū-kai 2007)
 ŚrBh-TG # 22: *Śrāvakahūmi* (see Shōmon ji Kenkyū-kai [= Taishō Group
 of Research on the *Śrāvakahūmi*] 2008)
 sTog: sTog pa Palace edition of the Tibetan Canon
 T: Taishō Canon (see Takakusu and Watanabe [1922–1933] 1991)
 Tib.: Tibetan translation
 VinSam-Ch: Chinese translation of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* in T = Taishō
 Canon
 VinSam-K: *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (see Kramer 2005)
 VinSam-Ta: *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (see Takahashi 2005)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bodhi, Bhikkhu tr. 2012. *The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha*. Boston:

- Wisdom Publications.
- Böhtlingk, Otto and Rudolf Roth. [1855–1875] 1990. *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*. 7 vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers.
- Buescher, Hartmut. 2007. *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñāptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Chandra, Lokesh. [1959] 1971. *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary*. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co.
- Chandra, Lokesh. 1994. *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary: Supplementary Volume 7*. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture and Aditya Prakashan.
- Deleanu, Florin. 2006. *The Chapter on the Mundane Path (Laukikamārga) in the Śrāvakabhūmi: A Trilingual Edition (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese), Annotated Translation, and Introductory Study*. 2 vols. Tokyo: The International Institute of Buddhist Studies.¹¹⁵
- Deleanu, Florin. 2012. 'Far From the Madding Strife for Hollow Pleasures: Meditation and Liberation in the Śrāvakabhūmi'. *Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies* 国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要 16 (2012): 1-38.
- Deleanu, Florin. 2013. 'Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself', in Ulrich Timme Kragh ed. *The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press: 884-919.
- Dutt, Nalinaksha ed. 1978. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal

¹¹⁵ Electronic edition (uploaded 2015) also available online: https://icabs.repo.nii.ac.jp/index.php?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_snippet&index_id=83&pn=1&count=20&order=17&lang=japanese&page_id=13&block_id=17

- Research Institute.
- Edgerton, Franklin [1953] 1985. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. Volume I: Grammar; Volume II: Dictionary. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers.
- Gotō, Toshifumi, in co-operation with Jared S. Klein and Velizar Sadovski. 2013. *Old Indo-Aryan Morphology and Its Indo-Iranian Background*. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭. 2008. *Yuishiki bunken kenkyū* 唯識文献研究. Tokyo: Daizō shuppan kabushiki gaisha.
- Hotori Rishō 阿理生. 1984. 'Sanmai no ichi sokumen: Joken ni tsuite' 三昧の一側面—除遣について—. *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究 32 (2): 90–94.
- Kamata Shigeo 鎌田茂雄. 1983. *Chūgoku bukkyō-shi*. Vol. II: *Juyō-ki no bukkyō* 中国仏教史第二卷 受容期の仏教. Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai.
- Kellner, Birgit and John Taber. 2014. 'Studies in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda idealism I: The interpretation of Vasubandhu's *Vimśikā*'. *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 68/3: 709–756.
- Kern, H. and Nanjio Bunyiu ed. [1908–1912] 1970. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag.
- King, Winston L. 1992. *Therāvada Meditation: The Buddhist Transformation of Yoga*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas Publishers.
- Kondō, Ryūkō ed. 1936. *Daśabhūmiśvaro nāma mahāyānasūtram* 梵文大方廣佛華嚴經十地品. Tokyo: Daijyō Bukkyō Kenyō-kai.
- Kramer, Jowita. 2005. *Kategorien der Wirklichkeit im frühen Yogācāra: Der Fünf-vastu- Abschnitt in der Viniścayasamgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmi*. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag.
- Lamotte, É. ed. and tr. 1935. *Samdhinirmocanasūtra: L'explication des mystères*. Louvain: Université de Louvain.
- Lévi, Sylvain ed. 1907. *Asaṅga Mahāyāna-Sūtrālamkāra: Exposé de la*

- doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra*. Tome I: Texte. Paris: Libraire Honoré Champion.
- Limaye, Surekha Vijay ed. and tr. 1992. *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra by Asaṅga*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
- Lusthaus, Dan. 2002. *Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih lun*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Matsunaga, Yukei ed. 1978. *The Guhyasamāja Tantra*. Osaka: Toho shuppan.
- Monier-Williams, Monier [1899] 1986. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Etymologically and Philologically Arranged with Special Reference to Cognate Indo-European Languages*. New edition, greatly enlarged and improved with the collaboration of Professor E. Leumann and Professor C. Cappeler. Tokyo: Meicho Fukyūkai.
- Nanjio, Bunyiu ed. 1923 [1956]. *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. Kyoto: Otani University Press.
- Nattier, Jan. 1991. *Once upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline*. Berkeley, California: Asian Humanities Press.
- Oberlies, Thomas. 2003. *A Grammar of Epic Sanskrit*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Obermiller, E. [1932] 1996. *The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet by Bu-Ston. Companion Volume to The Jewellery of Scripture*. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
- Ōminami Ryūshō 大南龍昇. 1977. 'Go jōshinkan to go monzen' 五停心觀と五門禪. In Sekiguchi Shindai 関口真大 ed. *Bukkyō jissen genri 仏教実践原理*, Tokyo: Sankibō shoten, pp. 71-90.
- Powers, John tr. 1995. *Wisdom of Buddha: The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*. Berkeley: Dharma Publishing.
- Pradhan, Pralhad ed. 1950. *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga*. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati.

- Pradhan, P. ed. 1975. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
- Rahder, J. ed. 1926. *Daśabhūmikasūtra et Bodhisattvabhūmi Chapitres Vihāra et Bhūmi*. Paris: Paul Geuthner.
- Renou, Louis. 1956. *Histoire de la langue sanskrite*. Lyons: IAC.
- Sakuma, Hidenori S. 1990. *Die Āśrayaparivṛitti-Theorie in der Yogācāra-bhūmi*. 2 vols. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Schmithausen, Lambert. 1984. 'On the Vijñaptimātra Passage in Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra VIII.7'. *Acta Indologica* 8: 433-455.
- Schmithausen, Lambert. 2007. 'Aspects of Spiritual Practice in Early Yogācāra'. *Kokusai bukkyōgaku daigakuin daigaku kenkyū kiyō* 国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要 11: 213-244.
- Schmithausen, Lambert. 2014. *The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses and Reflections*. Tokyo: The International Institute of Buddhist Studies.
- Shōmon ji Kenkyū-kai 声聞地研究会 ed. and tr. 2007. *Yuga ron Shomon ji Dai'ni yugasho: Sansukurittogo to wayaku* 瑜伽論 声聞地 第二瑜伽処一サンスクリット語テキストと和訳一(*Śrāvabhūmi: Revised Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation, The Second Chapter*). Tokyo: Sanki-bō bussho-rin.
- Shōmon ji Kenkyū-kai 声聞地研究会 ed. and tr. 2008. 'Bonbun Shōmon ji (22): Daisan yugasho (1) wayaku, kamon' 梵文声聞地(二十二)一第三瑜伽処(1)和訳・科文一. *Taishō daigaku sōgō bukkyō kenkyō-jo nenpō* 大正大学総合佛教研究所年報 30: 1-79.
- Sherburne, Richard. *The Complete Works of Atīśa Śrī Dīpaṃkarajñāna Jo-bo-rje*. New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2003
- Shiba Haruhide 司馬春英. 2003. *Yuishiki shisō to genshōhaku: Shisō kōzō no hikaku kenkyū ni mukete* 唯識思想と現象学—思想構造の比較研究に向けて—. Tokyo: Taishō daigaku shuppan-kai.
- Shukla, Karunesha ed. 1973. *Śrāvabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga*. Patna: K.P.

- Jayaswal.
- Silk, Jonathan. 2000. 'The *Yogācāra Bhikṣu*'. In Johnathan Silk ed. *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Speijer, J.S. [1886] 1988. *Sanskrit Syntax*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Sprigge, T.L.S. 1998. 'Idealism'. In Edward Craig, general editor, and Luciano Floridi, consultant editor. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 10 vols. London and New York: Routledge.
- Suzuki, D.T. ed. 1955–1961. *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Reprinted under the Supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto*. Tokyo: Chibetto Daizōkyō kenkyūkai.
- Taishō University (Tokyo) and China Library of Nationalities (Beijing). 1994. *Facsimile Edition of the "Śrāvakabhūmi" Sanskrit Palm-leaf Manuscript* 瑜伽師地論聲聞地梵文原文影印本. Beijing: Minzu chubanshe.
- Takahashi Kōichi 高橋晃一. 2005. Bosatsu ji 'Shinjitsu gi hon' kara 'Shō ketchaku bun chū Bosatsu ji' he no shisō tenkai: vastu gainen wo chūshin toshite 『菩薩地』 「真実品」 から 「撰決択分中菩薩地」 への思想展開 — vastu 概念を中心として —. Tokyo: The Sankibo Press.
- Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 and Watanabe Kaigyoku 渡邊海旭, chief editors. [1922–1933] 1991. *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新修大藏經.. 85 vols. Tokyo: Taishō shinshū daizōkyō kankōkai.
- Takasaki, Jikidō 高崎直道, Zuihō Yamaguchi 山口瑞鳳, and Noriaki Hakamaya 袴谷憲昭, ed. 1980. *sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka bsTan hgyur* — preserved at the Faculty of Letters University of Tokyo デルゲ版チベット大藏經 論疎部. Tokyo: Sekai seiten kankō kyōkai.
- Tatia, Namthal ed. 1976. *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣyam*. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
- Thakur, A. ed. 1959. *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.

- Thornhill, Christopher. 1998. 'Historicism'. In Edward Craig, general editor; Luciano Floridi, consultant editor. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 10 vols. London and New York: Routledge, s.v. 'Historicism'.
- U Pandita, Sayadaw. 2011. *Timeless Wisdom: Teachings on the Satipatthana Vipassana Meditation Practice*. Available online: <http://www.vipassana.com/meditation/upandita/>
- Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽. 1961. *Daijō shōgon kyō ron kenkyū* 大乘莊嚴經論研究. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
- Vaidya, P.L. ed. 1960. *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, with Haribhadra's Commentary Called Āloka*. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning.
- Wackernagel, Jacob and Albert Debrunner. [1954] 1987. *Altindische Grammatik*. 3 vols. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Wedemeyer, Christian K. ed. and tr. 2007. *Āryadeva's Lamp that Integrates the Practices (Caryāmelāpakapradīpa): The Gradual Path of Vajrayāna Buddhism According to the Esoteric Community Noble Tradition*. New York: The American Institute of Buddhist Studies.
- Wogihara, U. ed. 1932-1935. *Abhisamayālamkāra'ālokā Prajñāpāramitāvya-ākhyā (Commentary on Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā), The Work of Haribhadra, Together with the Text Commented on*. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko.
- Wogihara, Unrai ed. [1936] 1971. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store.
- Wogihara, U. and C. Tsuchida ed. 1958. *Saddharmaṣaṣṭaśāstra-sūtram*. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store.
- Woodward, F.L. tr. [1932] 1979. *The Book of Gradual Sayings*. 5 vols. London: Pali Text Society.
- Yamabe, Nobuyoshi and Sueki Fumihiko, tr. 2009. *The Sutra on the Concentration of Sitting Meditation*. Berkeley, California: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research.

*Professor,
International College
for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies*