



THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

Edinburgh Research Explorer

'The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics'

Citation for published version:

Hepburn, E 2008, "The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics" German Politics, vol 17(2), pp. 184-202.

Link:

[Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer](#)

Document Version:

Author final version (often known as postprint)

Published In:

German Politics

Publisher Rights Statement:

© Hepburn, E. (2008). 'The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics'. German Politics, 17(2), 184-202

General rights

Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy

The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.



The Neglected Nation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavage in Bavarian Party Politics

Eve Hepburn, School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh¹

ABSTRACT

This article examines the continuing salience of the territorial cleavage in Bavarian party politics. It does so through an exploration of the Christian Social Union's (CSU) mobilisation of Bavarian identity as part of its political project, which has forced other parties in Bavaria to strengthen their territorial goals and identities. Parties have articulated different constructions of 'Bavaria' to rival the CSU's dominant nation-building project. However, they have been unable to portray themselves as 'standing up for Bavarian interests' due to the constraints of the statewide parties to which they belong. As an exclusively Bavarian party, the CSU has no such constraints. Indeed, the CSU's core aim of strengthening Bavaria's position vis-à-vis the German federation may be viewed as akin to that of the CiU in Catalonia, Spirit in Flanders or Plaid Cymru in Wales. Like these parties, the case of the CSU in Bavaria demonstrates that substate territorial mobilisation has as much to do with negotiating autonomy *within* the state as seceding *from* it. To that end, the CSU provides a valuable case of how a regionalist party operating within a multi-level political system has sought to influence the regional, state and European levels to obtain a comparative territorial advantage.

Bavaria is one of the oldest states in Europe... We are very different from the rest of Germany, we like to be independent. We fight for more competences and powers for the regions; we are leading the fight – other regions that are hyphenated have no tradition... Bavaria is very similar to Scotland. We see ourselves as a nation.

Eberhard Sinner, Bavarian Minister of European and Federal Affairs²

The term *Nation* is rarely used in the German political context. As Weigelt has argued, nation belongs to a group of 'sullied concepts' that were used and abused by the National Socialist Party during the 1930s and 1940s.³ In the post-war period, German scholars and politicians have refrained from expressing pride or love of their country through the ambit of *Nationalismus* due to the seemingly irrevocable connotations with the aggression and expansionism of the Third Reich.⁴ For

this reason, Eberhard Sinner's declaration that 'we see ourselves as a nation' – with 'we' being understood as the Christian Social Union, the Land government or perhaps the imagined community of Bavaria – is quite unusual. Perhaps the more so, since the CSU's preferred discourse for expressing a sense of pride and belonging to the Free State of Bavaria has at its nodal point the term *Heimat* – which roughly equates to 'homeland' in English.⁵

One explanation for Sinner's use of the term nation, albeit in an English-speaking context, is the desire of CSU politicians to place Bavaria in the category of European 'stateless nations'. Once considered a peripheral throwback to the past, territorial mobilisation in Europe has been understood by scholars as a modern and progressive force, and an understandable reaction to globalisation and supranational integration.⁶ Stateless nations have become a vogue and exclusive club that more and more regions wish to join. There are not only symbolic (recognition) motivations for this; trans-national networks also offer functional benefits to members. For example, Regions with Legislative Powers (Regleg) acts as a lobbying group on the European Commission, and members engage in trade and cultural exchanges. Bavaria, of note, has been active in developing links with other stateless nations in Regleg and other transregional networks. This in part explains why Sinner sought to convey that Bavarians considered themselves a people as much as the Scots. As evident in official party literature and speeches, the CSU wishes Bavaria to be considered as a distinct political and cultural entity on a par with the stateless nations of the developed world.

Within the social sciences, however, this association has been under-explored. As Bavaria is predominantly classified as a state, region or *Heimat* in the German political context, it has been neglected in studies of comparative nationalism. Moreover, the CSU's self-classification as a Christian Conservative party has resulted in its exclusion from most studies of regionalist parties. Yet this article contends that Bavaria, and the Christian Social Union, should be included in comparative studies of substate territorial mobilisation, and offers a number of arguments to substantiate this claim. The discussion begins by introducing the central concepts – nation and *Heimat*. It then explores how the CSU constructs, and associates itself with, the Bavarian nation. Following this, the article considers how opposition parties in Bavaria have advanced competing claims of the nation, and how territory continues to constitute a major factor in structuring party competition. The article finally considers the effects of Europe on the autonomy goals of Bavarian parties, and places the CSU's demands for a 'Europe of the Regions' within a wider comparative discussion of the role of regionalist parties in systems of multilevel governance.

NATION AND HEIMAT

'Nation' belongs to a category of essentially contested concepts.⁷ A variety of meanings – often contradictory – have been ascribed to the term nation. This concept has, for example, been made synonymous with an ethno-linguistic group, a human population sharing an historic territory, a cultural artefact, a daily plebiscite, a mass public culture, a psychological construction, and sometimes – imprecisely – a state.⁸ Arguably, only Benedict Anderson's concept of the nation as an 'imagined community' has gained widespread acceptance amongst scholars, though the operationalisation of this term remains highly contested. Anderson himself maintained that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community bounded by a common language imagine themselves, through a horizontal fraternity, to form a nation, or to behave as if they formed one. The nation can therefore be interpreted as a set of ideas, or an aspiration, to be made and remade. Anderson's argument underlined an important point shared by modernist theorists of nationalism, which is that nations are not 'born', but rather they are continuously re-constituted and reinterpreted by social and political actors as an important unit of shared identity. Yet what aspects of 'nation' receive the most attention in the social constructions of these actors? Or, put another way, is it possible to identify some common denominators of nations?

Nations are often said to consist of an ethnic, cultural or linguistic community with a common descent and shared history, a definition which is usefully employed to distinguish a nation from the political machinery of a state.⁹ This description is limited in its application, however, by the occurrence of nations that are multiethnic or multicultural in their self-definition (such as Canada, Switzerland or Catalonia). According to Giovanni Sartori, it is improper to equate one concept with another – i.e. a nation with an ethnic group or a culture (which may instead be a property of a nation).¹⁰ Language, equally, is problematic in that a nation may have several languages (for instance, English, Gaelic and Scots are spoken in Scotland) or it may share the same language with a number of different countries (i.e. Spanish in Latin America), rendering the criteria of 'linguistic community' ineffective as a marker of distinction. What, then, of the common decent aspect of nations? The United States of America prides itself on the diverse origins of its national population, as do other 'new' countries such as Australia. This leaves us, finally, with shared history as a key attribute of nations. However, the development of consensus on a nation's history is often hampered by competing historiographies within a nation, as the case of Quebec and Canada has shown, a problem that is further compounded by the selective rendering of history to highlight some aspects whilst concealing others, namely creating a 'reusable past'.

A number of theorists of nations and nationalisms have arrived at the conclusion that any 'scientific' or 'objective' definition of nation is doomed to fail.¹¹ A proposed alternative is to accept a subjective definition of nation, namely, that a nation exists when a body of people feel they are a

nation.¹² Yet this definition also poses problems. As Hobsbawm warned, 'defining a nation by its members' consciousness of belonging to it is tautological and provides only an *a posteriori* guide to what a nation is. Moreover, it can lead the incautious into extremes of voluntarism which suggests that all that is needed to be or to create a nation is the will to be one.'¹³ This caveat reminds us that as 'old' places are socially, politically and economically transformed, 'new' places are also created.¹⁴ As such, any understanding of nation as a united of shared identity must acknowledge the role of actors in seeking to create, alter or prioritise a sense of belonging to a territory, and to account for their motivations in doing so. In particular, scholars have argued that political parties play a vital role in constructing nations.¹⁵

In describing a sense of belonging to a specific territory and group of people with a shared identity, many political parties employ the term 'nation' (such as the Scottish National Party), some prefer 'people' (the Sardinian Party of Action), whilst the Christian Social Union uses the word *Heimat*. Although this concept has a very imprecise meaning, Eberhard Sinner maintains that: '*Heimat* means to have an identity, to have roots, a language and history, and to be aware of this'. This is not unlike some of the objective and subjective definitions of nation as discussed above. Indeed, Sutherland has convincingly argued in this journal that the CSU's prioritisation and politicisation of the term *Heimat* is similar to the strategy employed by nationalist parties to prioritise the identity and interests of the nation.¹⁶ She maintains that the CSU has reinvented the concepts of *Heimat* and *Vaterland* following the Second World War to accord to its nation-building project in Bavaria. For the CSU, *Heimat* evokes a sense of love and belonging to a place, people, culture and traditions, whilst *Vaterland* contrarily suggests responsibility and citizenship. The CSU has sought to capture feelings of identity, and to depict the Bavaria as an 'imagined community' with strong emotional and symbolic content based on a thousand-year old Bavarian history of statehood. The party has furthermore politicised this identity and linked its construction of the *Freistaat Bayern* to its political, cultural and socioeconomic aims of combining the social market with high-tech innovation in Bavaria, epitomised by their slogan *Laptop and Lederhose*. *Heimat* may thus be understood as a variant of 'nation' as a social construction based on a territorial community. As Sutherland argues, 'only the substitution of the term *Heimat* for *Nation* distinguishes the strategy of the CSU from archetypal nation-building policies'.¹⁷

An objection to this association is that the CSU describes neither itself as a nationalist party, nor (in German-language official party literature) Bavaria a nation. Putting aside the subjective association of Bavaria with the stateless nations by CSU politicians, we may, however, identify some external attributes of nation that we can identify in the case of Bavaria: numerous scholars have held that a strong territorial identity exists among the Bavarian people, which has affected

political and cultural life in the Land, most obviously through the continuous re-election of a party that proclaims to be defender of Bavarian interests¹⁸; all of Bavaria's political parties hold that Bavaria has a unique culture and traditions within the Federal Republic, including a separate dialect, cuisine, dress, and folklore; a 'reusable past' is provided for Bavarian nation-builders in the form of a long history of legislative and administrative autonomy; and a strong popular demand for self-determination and even independence exists amongst the Bavarian electorate. In a survey conducted by the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, Bavarians were asked whether they wanted Bavaria to have more autonomy in Germany. Whilst 57% supported more autonomy for Bavaria, 17% supported outright independence.¹⁹ For this reason alone it could be argued that Bavaria has the same right to be analysed in the context of substate nations as Quebec, Galicia or Wales, where in the latter case only 13.9% of people support independence (in 2003).

Yet it is worthwhile reiterating at this point that nations are not necessarily precursors for states, and that many nations may coexist peacefully within a given 'plurinational state', which is reflected in the self-determination demands of regionalist parties. For this reason, Bavaria's popular preference for more autonomy in Germany rather than independence per se corresponds with the demands of other stateless nations in Europe. It is important to bear in mind that not all regionalist parties seek sovereign state independence. In fact, the vast majority of these parties interpret self-determination to mean varying degrees of autonomy such as devolution and federalism – for example *Plaid Cymru*, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* and *Union Valdotaïne*.²⁰ The CSU's goals to decentralise the German federation, and its self-definition as a Bavarian party striving to achieve maximum autonomy for Bavaria in Germany and Europe, thus placing it firmly in the same category as those regionalist parties just mentioned. This argument is returned to below. But first it is necessary to provide some background on the development of the *Freistaat*.

THE FREE STATE OF BAVARIA

When the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was created, Bavaria constituted the only large political entity among the ten German Länder whose historical boundaries had survived the territorial restructuring following the Second World War. Bavaria's unique historical claim led Franz-Joseph Strauss, former Minister-President and CSU Chairman, to scornfully refer to other Länder as 'hyphenated' (and therefore artificial) states. Bavaria – according to the official state website – was in contrast 'one of the oldest European states...it dates back to 500AD'.²¹ To provide a brief historical snapshot, Bavaria made the journey from dukedom in 554 AD, to being granted independence by Emperor Barbarossa in 1180, to Prince Electorate at the beginning of the Thirty Years War in 1623. The territory flourished and expanded under the Germanic Federation created

following the Napoleonic wars, being declared a Kingdom (*Königreich*) in 1806. When Germany unified in 1871, Bavaria became part of an Empire that was dominated by Bismarck and Prussia. Yet it still retained its special status, and Bavaria kept its own king and monarchic institutions, a military unit in the army with its own costume and regulations, postal service and diplomatic representation abroad. Moreover, Bavarian voters elected patriotic parties whose main aim was to protect the interests of Bavaria from state centralisation and other encroachments: the Bavarian Patriotic Party (BPP) and later the Bavarian Centre Party (*Zentrum*). As Milosch argues, 'this insistence on membership yet distinction within Germany, this loyal independence, pride in being German and determination to live in a Bavarian state' is central to the Bavarian character.²² The territory's special status in the German Empire came to an end, however in November 1918, when socialist insurrections spread across the country. It was only within Bavaria, however, that the Independent Socialist Party was able to take control and establish the first Bavarian *Freistaat* – albeit a Soviet one.²³ The ensuing mayhem, which saw German troops being called in to end the 'red terror', cemented a distrust of socialism by the Bavarian electorate. In the following years they moved to the opposite extreme: to support for Hitler's Nazi Party.²⁴ After the capitulation of the German army in 1945, Bavaria came under the control of an American military government, which proclaimed the existence of a Bavarian state in September 1945. The following year, the main political parties drew up a new constitution for Bavaria, and in December 1946, Bavaria became a Land in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In order to protect its special identity and interests in the FRG, successive Bavarian governments have continuously provided an independent, and sometimes dissident, voice in German affairs.²⁵ The strong territorial identity of Bavarian parties was apparent in their unanimous rejection of the German federal constitution (*Grundgesetz* or Basic Law) in 1949, because it was not perceived to be federalist enough. The previous year, the Bavarian Assembly had voted upon a Bavarian constitution, the first line of which read 'Bavaria is a Free State', and which was littered with references to Bavaria's traditions of statehood and sense of identity. Bavarian parties thus decided to keep the term *Freistaat* to symbolise Bavaria's independent spirit, but carefully divorced it from its socialist republican roots. Since then, Bavarian governments have vehemently defended the powers of the Länder vis-à-vis the federal government and any hint of centralisation through imprecise clauses in the Basic Law are met with strident condemnation. Politically, scholars have argued that 'the Free State of Bavaria has operated almost as a system within a system'.²⁶ Bavaria's political system, which is dominated by the CSU, was able to maintain its pre-war political culture and traditions. The most significant of these, according to Padgett and Burkett, were 'Catholicism and separatism ('nationalism' might not be too strong a description)'.²⁷ Yet the CSU has not sought

independence. Instead, it has accommodated a strong federalist drive within its territorial strategy: the CSU seeks maximum *autonomy* for Bavaria within the German state and the European Union.

Bavaria's claims to autonomy and special treatment have been bolstered by its 'economic miracle', which gives it a clout in federal negotiations that derives from its economic importance to Germany. For centuries until the 1950s, Bavaria's economy was predominantly agricultural and it was one of the poorest regions of Germany. But within less than twenty years, it underwent a complete volte-face, with new technological centres sweeping across the Land. Indeed, Bavaria became the only Land in Germany to ever move from being a recipient of equalisation funds to one of the main contributors. Its economic success has been linked to its focus on preserving Bavaria's cultural heritage by supporting the traditionally important Bavarian farmers, craftsmen and small businessmen, whilst fusing this strategy with investment in new high-tech industries to generate economic growth and investment.²⁸ The CSU-led Bavarian government now promotes a mixed economy of *Laptop und Lederhose* that combines market liberalism with an active policy of state economic intervention and social protection. This is presented by the CSU as 'the Bavarian Way'.²⁹

REGIONALISM, FEDERALISM AND THE CSU

The Christian Social Union (CSU) was founded on 10 October 1945. The first proposed name for the party was the Bavarian Christian Social Union, but the prefix was dropped due to the US Military Government's unease about sanctioning political regionalism in the new Germany. Yet this did not prevent it from developing a role as 'the party representing Bavaria's special interests in the Federal Republic'³⁰. Like its predecessors – the Bavarian Patriotic Party (BPP), the Bavarian Centre Party, and the Bavarian People's Party (BVP) of the Weimar period – the CSU was able to accommodate two competing strands: that of an explicitly Bavarian regionalism based on the concept of *Heimat*, and a more German-oriented federalism. The CSU did not restrict its activities and demands to the Bavarian political arena. Instead, it negotiated a partnership with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), whereby both parties agreed not to contest elections outside of their territories (Bavaria for the CSU and the rest of Germany for the CDU). As a result of this agreement, the CSU developed what Alf Mintzel has described as an institutional and political *Doppelrolle* (dual role) 'as an autonomous *Land* party with special federal characteristics'.³¹ This means that it can contest federal elections and be involved in federal politics even if its agreement with the CDU means that it can only field candidates in Bavaria. This furnishes the CSU with a political significance in Bonn that extends far beyond Bavaria. Indeed, the CSU has been the third political force in federal politics for a number of years. At the same time, throughout the post-war period, the CSU positioned itself as the only party capable of effectively representing Bavarian

interests in Germany, and has been enormously successful in convincing voters of this ability. With the exception of a short break in 1954–7, the CSU has continuously governed Bavaria since the first Landtag election in 1946, without coalition partners since 1966, and with a two-thirds majority in the Landtag since 2003. As one scholar marvels, 'in Bavaria the CSU established a political dominance unequalled by any other party in any other country of postwar Western Europe'.³²

The CSU's success in dominating Bavarian politics can be attributed to a number of factors. First, it sought to advance a vision of a single Bavarian culture, to which it tied its party identity. The Bavarian party system in the immediate post-war period was fragmented and heterogeneous, reflecting the distinct political cultures of Swabia, Franconia and Old Bavaria. On coming to power, the CSU sought to overcome the divergent regional traditions and religious cleavages that have long divided the Land. This was achieved through the promotion of an over-arching Bavarian identity that bridged the divide between the Catholic South and Protestant North, and integrated the diverse regional traditions. The CSU was, moreover, successful in tying its party identity to this homogenous Bavarian political culture. During the 1986 elections the CSU's slogan was 'Three names, a single force: Bavaria, the CSU and Strauss', while more recently the CSU adopted the straight-to-the-point command 'Vote for Bavaria'. The CSU also employed the national symbols of Bavaria – the lion and the blue diamond – as party symbols, located on the backdrop of the national flag of Bavaria. As Mintzel notes, 'it is not even necessary to add the CSU's name. In fact nearly everyone knows which party is meant'.³³

Another essential ingredient in the success of the CSU was its ability to adapt to maintain and adapt the traditional Bavarian identity to a modern industrial setting. The CSU, as party of government, was the main agent of post-war industrialisation in Bavaria, and it was able to skilfully steer the enormous socioeconomic changes brought on by rapid industrialisation in Bavaria without major disruptions to Bavarian society.³⁴ The CSU sought to satisfy the demands of farmers and property-owners, whilst at the same time remaining attractive to the new classes of blue-collar and white-collar workers. These diverse groups accounted for a large percentage of CSU membership, and would also provide the electoral basis of the CSU's success.

During the course of Bavaria's modernisation, the CSU underwent its own transformation, from being a party representative of Catholic-Conservative agrarian communities to being a modern, inter-confessional, broadly-based mass party. This transformation was inspired by the CSU's being ousted from office in 1954-7 by the *Vierer-Koalition* (Coalition of Four) of the SPD, FDP, Bavarian Party and All-German Block/Party of Refugees and Expellees (BHE). The CSU reorganised completely, undergoing a 'transformation process into a mass and machine party'.³⁵ The party created a broad organisational sub-structure by setting up local offices in every almost

municipality, a centralisation and bureaucratisation of the party machine with qualified staff, the establishment of a weekly party newspaper, the *Bayernkurier*, and the foundation of a party research institute, the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Munich. The CSU's internal reorganisation and modernisation allowed it to throw off its reputation as a primarily Old Bavarian party representing agrarian interests, and transformed itself into a catch-all party, climbing back up to its 50% mark in Bavarian Landtag elections. In this way, the CSU extended itself into the Liberal and Social Democratic political strongholds and made itself attractive to all classes. This required the accommodation of different ideological strands, ranging from right-wing populist to more liberal policies. For instance, although the party has strongly conservative social and cultural values, its support of the 'social market' – that is, market liberalism tempered by a belief in the responsibility of the state to care for its citizens – as well as an emphasis on subsidiarity, enabled the party to appeal to the middle ground. The party's advocacy of inter-confessional Christianity also allowed it to appeal to the Protestant communities of northern Bavaria and the Catholic communities of the South. Yet the party's transformation did not entail a desertion of its strong regional identity. Instead, the CSU was able to use its vast new government and political resources to shape a strong, conservative and patriotic Bavarian political culture,³⁶ by integrating the various regional traditions through the use of the media, control of the state bureaucracy, and its numerous and powerful local organisations. As Sutherland argues, the CSU was able to dominate the social and 'institutional discourse' of Bavaria, and set the political agenda, by virtue of its powerful position in Bavaria.

Finally, a key determinant of the CSU's success was the decision not to restrict its activities and demands to the Bavarian political arena. In 1947–9 the CSU negotiated an agreement with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), enabling it to participate in federal politics as part of the Christian Democratic parliamentary group and fill Cabinet posts in CDU-CSU governments. This did not threaten the CSU's independence – which was manifested through separate party programmes and congresses, organisational and membership structures, and the existence of a CSU *Landesgruppe* in the Bundestag. Had the CSU not made this pact, which cemented its commitment to both federalism in Germany *and* regionalism in Bavaria, it is likely that it would have become another local party pursuing a 'radical separatist patriotism'.³⁷ This is precisely what happened to its main rival in the 1950s, the *Bayernpartei*. The BP stood for the Catholic, conservative and agrarian traditions of the rural communities of Old Bavaria and its main slogan, 'Bavaria for Bavarians' (*Bayern den Bayern*) captured the party's patriotism. It won more than 17.9% of the vote in the 1950 Landtag election, causing great concern within the CSU. At the same time, the BP's brief electoral success catalysed the CSU's transformation into a modern, inter-confessional catch-all party and from the early 1960s the BP 'never recovered from the resounding defeat the

CSU inflicted on it" (James 1995: 3). The BP moved to a more radical position on the right of the CSU, further reducing its support base. Moreover, whilst the CSU sought to secure Bavaria's autonomy by achieving a more strongly federalised German Republic, the BP moved from support for radical federalism to outright separatism in order to avoid being dominated by the 'Prussians'. The BP's refusal to modernise and appeal to a voter base beyond the Catholic, rural population of Old Bavaria meant that since the 1960s the BP has constituted a 'micro-party' unable to capture more than 5% of the vote.

Meanwhile, the CSU has explicitly stated that its aims are to achieve more influence and autonomy for Bavaria – both formally through the decentralisation of powers to the Länder within Germany, and informally through Bavaria's para-diplomatic relations with other regions and states in Europe. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the CSU should be understood as a nationalist party that seeks maximum sovereignty for Bavaria: 'The CSU rhetorically expresses love for the Bavarian *Heimat* and the need to preserve and defend it in much the same way as nationalists prioritise the nation... the ideology of the CSU is nothing other than a nationalist one'.³⁸ This argument is corroborated by politicians and civil servants in the state chancellery, who argue that 'we are a nation in the German context, and also in a European context.'³⁹ The CSU has realised that it can wield more power and influence within federal German and European structures if it supports federalism rather than independence. This means that, as much as being a regionalist party, the CSU also plays the German federal game. The party is a staunch supporter of a strong type of federalism, which is based on decentralisation of the maximum degree of authority to the Länder, greater policy autonomy, and a more powerful Bundesrat. According to one of the CSU's Landtag election manifestos, 'Who votes for the CSU votes for a strong representation of Bavaria in the Bundestag. The CSU is the only party that can effectively represent Bavaria'.⁴⁰ Rather than pursuing a path of separation from Germany, the CSU prefers to trade-off independence with being a strong player in Germany and Europe, a strategy to which other Bavarian parties have had to respond.

THE TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGE IN BAVARIAN PARTY POLITICS

The regionalist profile of Bavaria's 'party of state' has had a significant impact on party competition. In its quest to defend the Bavarian identity and increase Bavaria's influence in Germany and Europe, the CSU has forced regional branches of statewide parties in Bavaria to enter the territorial debate. Bavarian branches of the Social Democratic Party, the Free Democrats and Greens have all acknowledged the need to take a more pro-Bavarian stance in order to succeed electorally, and have adopted distinctly territorial identities and policies.⁴¹ Yet such is the strength

of the CSU's hegemonic status in the Bavarian party system that the opposition parties in Bavaria have been unable to seriously combat the CSU's hold over Bavarian politics since the 1950s.

The Bavarian Social Democratic Party, which is the oldest party in Bavaria (est. 1892), forms the main opposition to the CSU in the Bavarian Landtag. Scholars have argued that the Bavarian SPD has exhibited a separate identity from its counterparts in Germany, which derives from its operation within a peculiarly CSU-dominated Bavarian political context, as well as its own long-standing sympathy with the need to preserve Bavaria's identity.⁴² For instance, during the debates on the German constitution in the 1940s, the Bavarian SPD pushed for a 'strong' type of federalism that gave equal weight to the Bundestag and Bundesrat and decentralised the community and economic structures of the state. This became known as '*der bajuwarische Impetus*' (the Bavarian impetus) and differentiated the Bavarian SPD from the federal party. There were other sources of difference. In response to the strongly anti-Left political landscape of Bavaria, the Bavarian SPD became 'more *Volkspartei* than a class party' long before the German SPD adopted the Godesberg Programme of 1956, in which the party dropped its Marxist roots in its bid to become a 'catch-all' party.⁴³

In the post-war years, the *BayernSPD* made various attempts to steal the CSU's thunder as the true *Bavarian* party, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Some authors have explained this by arguing that the political climate of Bavaria is not amenable to social democratic thinking due to the historical predominance of the Christian-Conservative ideology linked to Bavarian patriotism.⁴⁴ Others, like Mintzel, have argued that the Bavarian SPD's weak position is due to its inability to create a Bavarian social democratic counter-culture.⁴⁵ Attempts to reform the party in 1990 by achieving Land party status and calling themselves *BayernSPD* instead of *die bayerische SPD* were too little too late. In the elections the following year, it failed to overturn its electoral decline or surpass its best election result, 35.8% of the vote in 1966 Landtag elections. Since then, it has been unable to cross the magic '30% threshold', and its support fell to an all-time low in 2003 when it received only 19% in the Landtag election. Efforts to 'Bavarianise' the party, acknowledged to be necessary by party officials to combat the CSU, also broke with the internationalist principles of the federal SPD. The SPD's state-centrism even led to demands for the Bavarian party to pursue a relationship similar to that of the CSU and CDU.⁴⁶ But even if the branch became independent, it is questionable whether it would be able to convince voters of its pro-Bavarian credentials.

Similar problems existed for the development of Liberalism in Bavaria. The FDP has been hampered by its perception as a Bavarian 'affiliate' of the federal party, and its staunch opposition to regional patriotism and the development of a strong 'Bavarian' profile for the party. For them, regional pride is associated with particularism and exclusivity. To that end, the FDP has always

maintained a firmly pro-federal stance in which power is decentralised and as 'close' as possible to the citizens. Yet at the same time, the FDP are no strangers to playing the Bavarian card. The party insists that 'we in Bavaria love our freedom, our independence and our traditions'⁴⁷ and during the debates on the reform of German federalism the party wanted 'a strong Bavaria' with autonomous decision-making capacities.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the current party leader has acknowledged the fact that the party has to become more Bavarian to win more votes.⁴⁹ So far, this strategy has been unsuccessful. The FDP has been unable to cross the 5% hurdle of parliamentary eligibility since being ousted from parliament in 1994, and has since disappeared off the political radar.

There is some indication, however, that a new political tradition is emerging in Bavaria that does not simply say 'Please – we're also from Bavaria!' like the SPD and FDP.⁵⁰ Although Green party support is lower in Bavaria than any other Land, the party has managed to politicise the issue of environmentalism and frame it within a Bavarian context. *Die Grünen* won their first seats in the Bavarian Landtag in 1986, with 7.5% of the vote, some years after the German Green Party was created out of citizen-initiative groups to contest the 1979 European elections. In Bavaria, some scholars argue that the Greens should be considered less an ecological movement and more of a protest movement against the 'unholy trinity' of the Bavarian state, the CSU and the Catholic Church.⁵¹ Yet the party has been slow in committing itself to a specifically Bavarian agenda, due to a large anti-nationalist wing. Nationalism was associated with their main political rival – the CSU – and viewed as something that had to be weakened in order to bring about an open multicultural society. Another section of the party, however, believed that a non- or anti-Bavarian party attitude contributed to its 'impotence' (*Ohnmacht*) in the Land.⁵² It was only when the party saw that the regionalisation of Green parties elsewhere was working so well that they also decided to become more Land-focused.⁵³ This involved the creation of policies that would appeal to the strongly patriotic and conservative Bavarian electorate. In the countryside the Greens sought to woo environmentally-concerned pro-Bavarian conservatives from the CSU, which is something that the SPD was unable to achieve due to its image as a party of the industrial heartlands. Furthermore, in the main towns and cities the Greens appealed to the left-wing anti-CSU vote, thereby eating into SPD electoral support. The Greens' adoption of this dual urban-rural strategy has allowed the party to succeed where the SPD had so far failed. The Greens increased their share of the vote from 5.7% in the 1998 Landtag election to 7.7% in 2003 – their best ever result. But the Greens' adoption of a more Bavarian image, and their articulation of a multicultural Bavarian *Heimat*, has yet to effectively challenge the CSU's dominant discourse on nationhood.

PARTY CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE BAVARIAN *HEIMAT*

The CSU has continuously asserted the existence of Bavaria as an 'imagined community' and has sought to mobilise the population around its construction of the Bavarian *Heimat*. Its interpretation of the Bavarian nation is derived from an historical myth of statehood, territorial continuity and importantly, shared culture and traditions. For instance, in elaborating the shared characteristics of the nations of Scotland and Bavaria, Eberhard Sinner referred to the national dress, flags, cuisine and traditions.⁵⁴ The party is also adept at mobilising certain elements in Bavaria's history that glorify the Land and its independent spirit, whilst ignoring other less palatable incidents, such as the establishment of a Socialist Republic in 1919. The CSU creates a 'reusable past', and a crucial aspect of Bavarian nationhood is its long history of political autonomy. Former Minister President Max Streibl once said that: 'Bavarian sovereignty is the political protector of the Bavarian way of life. Bavaria, the oldest German state and one of the oldest states in Europe, should never be allowed to sink to the level of a mere administrative province.'⁵⁵ At the same time, the CSU's construction of Bavaria is based upon the post-war modernisation of the Land, with the CSU at the helm. This vision of 'modern' Bavaria brimming with high-tech industries is complemented by safeguarding craftsmen and farmers, who are associated with Bavaria's culture and social values.

To underline Bavaria's territorial integrity, the CSU has sought to develop a singular political culture in which the regional traditions of Swabia, Franconia and Old Bavaria are integrated into an overarching vision of the Bavarian nation. It has developed cultural policies that assert Bavaria's unique identity, such as annual traditional festivals and cultural events, and teaching Bavarian history and literature in schools. It has also unofficially sought to ensure that Bavarian society would not be threatened by foreign influences, so that Bavaria could continue to enjoy a more or less homogenous culture. The CSU advocates the full assimilation of a limited number of immigrants and asylum seekers, and staunchly opposes multiculturalism, which 'tears up the very roots of our national and cultural identity, developed over centuries'.⁵⁶ One of the CSU's posters in the 1998 federal elections even urged people not to vote for them if they accepted more foreigners in Bavaria. This language is close to that of the *Republikaner*, a right-wing populist party that won 14.6% of Bavarian seats in the European elections in 1989. Parties of the extreme right pose the greatest electoral threat to the CSU, as both the *Bayernpartei* and *Republikaner* have demonstrated. Both parties had been bolstered by the leadership of ex-CSU party officials that had become disillusioned with the governing party's 'moderate' state on both territorial and social issues. The CSU, in response to the anti-immigrant electoral threat of the *Republikaner*, further emphasised that membership of the nation was based on blood and descent. Due to these cultural and immigration strategies, the CSU is seen as the main protector of the Bavarian culture and people.

The Bavarian SPD has been unable to create a social-democratic 'counter-culture' in opposition to the political hegemony of the CSU state. Despite pledges by the Bavarian SPD that 'we will allow nobody, and especially not the CSU, to outstrip our love for this land',⁵⁷ this patriotism has not been evident in party programmes or propaganda. One electoral placard in 1978 declared: 'The powerful CSU needs to be checked by a strong Bavarian SPD. Therefore please give us your vote'.⁵⁸ According to Sutherland, the SPD has made no attempt challenge the CSU's construction of *Heimat*, and indeed its image of Bavaria is derived from the CSU's 'world view'.⁵⁹ Yet a closer analysis of the SPD's construction of the nation shows that it does differ from the CSU's version. The SPD understand the Bavarian nation as 'our cosmopolitan Bavarian *Heimat*' and declared that 'we are a multicultural society'.⁶⁰ The party has countered the CSU's version of a homogenous political culture by emphasising Bavaria's diverse regional traditions. This may be considered an electoral strategy as much as an ideological discourse on the Bavarian *Heimat*. The SPD performs better in communal elections, especially in the cities of Munich and Nuremberg and the industrial north-east. Support for a heterogeneous Bavaria is a way of countering the centralism of the CSU at the Land level and its continued emphasis on celebrating 'Old Bavarian' culture.

The FDP believes in an open, pluralistic society, where the rights of the individual are protected regardless of race, religion, gender or country of origin. It thus perceives the CSU's efforts to 'protect' Bavaria from outsiders as going against the grain of democratic liberal thinking. One member stated that: 'I will not declare the Liberal party uniform to be *Lederhose* and *Gamsbart*⁶¹ – we should first of all get rid of all superficial and hackneyed clichéd ideas about our Bavarian *Heimat* that we have internalised'.⁶² Instead the Liberals interpret the *Heimat* as a hybrid of diverse and juxtaposing cultures, towns and villages. This fits in with the Bavarian Liberals' vision of a pluralistic society in Bavaria, and challenges the CSU's aversion to cultural diversity.

The Greens have also sought to displace the CSU-constructed image of a homogenous Christian-conservative nation based on the cultural iconography of '*Altbayern*' (Old Bavaria) – the oldest and most traditional part of Bavaria, which is what CSU politicians really refer to when they speak of 1000 years of historical continuity. The image of this society, steeped in tradition and home to the Bavarian national costume, anthem, coat of arms and other iconography associated with the Land, is perceived as backward and inimical to their dreams of creating an open, multi-cultural, pluralistic and tolerant society. Instead, the Greens have advanced a vision of an open, modern and progressive Bavaria that simultaneously respects its history, regional diversity, traditions and environmental values. This has necessitated re-appropriating some of the main symbols of Bavarian nationhood, whilst giving them a Green twist. To illustrate, in Green party elections posters for the 2003 Landtag election, the party co-chair, Sepp Daxenburger, was wearing *lederhose* and drinking a

maß (a tankard of beer) in a traditional beer garden. Other posters showed a group of Bavarian youths – of different ages, colours and backgrounds – enjoying a drink in a beer garden. And by the late 1990s, the Green Party was holding its party meetings in beer gardens – a strategy that had been monopolised by the CSU. The Greens were clearly moving onto CSU territory – using traditional Bavarian images to appeal to voters. The success of the Green vision of the Bavarian *Heimat*, has led some authors to argue that the party is the only political force identifiable with a 'counter-culture to the political hegemony of the CSU'.⁶³ But even though the Green Party has begun to challenge the CSU's construction of Bavaria, it is reluctant to mobilise the nation for political ends, or to argue in defence of special Bavarian interests within the FRG.

If Bavaria's opposition parties continue to refrain from fully adopting an explicitly Bavarian identity, it is unlikely that they will ever be able to seriously challenge the hegemony of the CSU. One of the main reasons for the CSU's success is its articulation of, and identification with, the nation. The Bavarian electorate has demonstrated time and again their support for the CSU and its defence of the *Heimat* at the voting booths. If Bavarian branches of all-German statewide parties fail to articulate a strong identification with the Land, they will only further distance themselves from Bavarian voters, who *have* demonstrated such an identification. In 1995, the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach conducted a survey that examined the existence of multiple identities in Germany.⁶⁴ The findings revealed that within Germany, only Bavarians claimed a strong identification with their Land: 41% identified themselves as 'more Bavarian' whilst 50% considered themselves to be 'more German'. Although the German identity came out strongest, if these results are compared to other Länder it is demonstrated that a minority 41% is in fact very substantial. In the state of Saxony/Thuringia, which came second in terms of regional identification, only 21% identified with their Land, whilst the median rate of identification as 'more German' for the non-Bavarian Länder was much higher, at 70%. More recent research has revealed the existence of an even stronger Bavarian identity amongst young people.⁶⁵ Bachmann conducted a survey of young voters (aged 18 to 29) to determine their levels of identification with Bavaria, Germany and Europe. Over 62% of respondents expressed a strong or very strong identification with Bavaria, compared to 48.2% with Germany and 44% with Europe. Her analysis indicated that the strong Bavarian identity amongst young voters helped the CSU, and its image as *the* Bavarian party, gain electoral support. Her surveys also revealed that for many, supporting Bavaria and voting CSU was the same thing.

Evidence that this sense of national identification was linked to the CSU was provided in a survey on voter contentment with Länder governments, conducted in 2004.⁶⁶ Bavarians demonstrated a greater sense of confidence in their (CSU-led) government compared to other Länder (almost 50%). The second most positive evaluation was only 40% in Baden-Württemberg

and Hesse. Bavarians appears to show an impressive loyalty towards 'their' party and opposition parties face a number of challenges in combating such overwhelming support for the CSU if they do not seek to accommodate, and also mobilise, Bavarian identity. This challenge is made all the harder by the fact that future generations of Bavarian voters – the youth – have currently demonstrated a clear preference for the CSU. According to Bachmann's findings, young people support the CSU because it is seen to reflect their strong sense of Bavarian identity, and also because it is seen to stand up for Bavaria against the (then) incumbent SPD-Green federal government. This is a status that the SPD, FDP and Greens, hamstrung by their all-German profiles, have failed to achieve.

A EUROPE OF THE REGIONS

Debates about Bavaria's autonomy within Germany have been strongly affected by developments in Europe. The CSU has throughout its history been a firm and enthusiastic advocate of the principle of European integration.⁶⁷ Franz Joseph Strauss, for instance, saw European integration as a way for uniting the 'two Germanies' and a bulwark to the socialist-communist Europe to the east. Moreover, economic integration was seen as providing new markets for the robust business community in Bavaria. However, in the late 1980s the CSU began to fear that Land competences were being transferred to the EU level whilst the Basic Law remained '*europablind*'.⁶⁸ Bavaria's hard-won autonomy appeared to be under threat by Europe intruding on its laws, powers and society. In response, the CSU-led Bavarian government sought to halt, and even push back, some of the perceived European encroachments on Länder competences. It was instrumental in pressing for laws that strengthened Länder rights of participation vis-à-vis the Bundesrat in European matters, such as the amendment to Article 23 of the German Basic Law.⁶⁹ The Länder were also guaranteed a delegate to represent Germany in Europe where Länder responsibilities were concerned. But perhaps most importantly, the CSU organised a series of conferences, entitled 'Europe of the Regions' in the late 1980s. The aim was to develop a common Länder position on European integration, and its outcomes arguably led to the entrenchment of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, and the creation of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994.

Bavaria was at the forefront of demands to entrench Länder rights to prevent further European encroachments on their autonomy.⁷⁰ The CSU argued that the EU should be subject to the same scrutiny and criticism as the German federal government, and became openly critical of policies it considered to compromise or threaten Bavarian interests. In order to make its demands and criticisms known, the CSU developed several direct and indirect institutional routes to Europe. As party of regional government, the CSU lobbied the European Commission through its regional

office (which is larger than that of some member states) in Brussels, through its active leadership role in Regions with Legislative Powers, through the Committee of the Regions, and perhaps most importantly, via-a-vis the constitutionalised coordination structures for European policy-making in Germany and its right to represent Germany in those Council of Ministers meetings that concern Bavarian competences. In addition to these multiple channels, the CSU was well-represented in the European Parliament⁷¹ and the European People's Party. The EPP opens up an especially productive route to influencing European institutions, as CSU representatives are able to meet regularly with the several Prime Ministers of EU member states that sit on the EPP board. Although it is difficult to measure and quantify the impact of these informal methods of influence on European decision-making, the CSU is certainly a highly visible actor in European circles.

Within Bavaria, the CSU and other Bavarian parties have advanced competing constitutional preferences in Europe to further protect Bavaria's autonomy. The CSU is a staunch advocate of securing greater regional autonomy in Europe through a process of decentralising federalism. This would allow individual regions and states to set their own agendas and have exclusive control over a range of policy issues, rather than trying to impose a centralist solution from Brussels – a demand encapsulated in the idea of 'Europe of the Regions'. For the CSU, this means that decisions would be taken as close to the citizens as possible, regions would constitute a third level (*dritte Ebene*) alongside member states and the EU, and Brussels should only take decisions in the event that the issue cannot be dealt with at a lower level. This structure amounts to a European *Staatenverbund* (confederation) rather than a *Bundesstaat* (federal state), so that the EU is structured on intergovernmental lines, rather than decisions being issued from Brussels. The way in which the CSU is able to reconcile its support for an (state-based) intergovernmental Europe with a regionalised one is through a careful elaboration of the concept of subsidiarity. This means that 'decisions are to be taken where one can judge them best' and is designed to empower the lowest level of decision-making, which for the CSU means the region (Bavaria).⁷² This interpretation of subsidiarity allows the CSU to support the integrity and sovereignty of the member states of the EU, whilst also believing that European states must give up some of their sovereignty.

Initially, the idea of strengthening the position of the Länder in a regionalised Europe was warmly welcomed by parties across the Bavarian political spectrum. However, the way in which the opposition parties interpret the concept of a 'Europe of the Regions' differs considerably from the CSU's version, which has evolved to mean a 'Europe of the Citizens' for the Liberals, and a 'Europe of the Communes' for the Greens and SPD. Bavaria's opposition parties have criticised the centralisation of power at the Bavarian level by arguing for greater decentralisation to levels beneath the region in a 'Europe of the Regions within the Regions'. So far, as we have seen, these

strategies have been largely unsuccessful. But since the mid-1990s, the CSU also downplayed its goal of creating a Europe of the Regions, though for other reasons. Since the failure of the CoR to become anything other than a weak advisory body, and the impasse regarding regional developments in European institutions, the CSU has tried another track in Europe. It sought to lobby for the protection of its competences within the German federal state, rather than focusing exclusively on increasing regional rights of participation in Europe. In particular, its disappointment with the draft European Constitution, which failed to include significant rights for the regions, was one of the main reasons why the CSU sought to push for constitutional reform of the German state (another motivation was to extract greater fiscal autonomy for the Laender, which is also linked to European integration and the need for greater regional competitiveness to succeed in the single market). As Jeffery has argued, the CSU's central guiding philosophy has been: if you protect the 'hard shell' of the state, you also protect the Länder.⁷³

The experience of the CSU in Europe shows how parties operating at the regional level have been forced to respond to the new challenges, as well as opportunities, of multi-level governance. The creation of multiple loci of decision-making, and multiple arenas of political conflict and party competition, has necessitated the development of multiple strategies by parties. Thus, within Bavaria the CSU positions itself as the defender of Bavaria interests and identity. In Germany, the CSU has sought to strengthen its voice in German federal policy-making channels to influence European policy, for instance through constitutionalised coordination structures for policy-making, and access to the Council of Ministers through representation of the German state delegation. Meanwhile, at the EU level itself, the CSU has developed various means to directly influence European policy through the European Parliament, Committee of the Regions and through inter-regional networks such as Regleg – in a sense, bypassing the state. Furthermore, different slogans, rhetoric and concepts are used at different levels of decision-making. In the European sphere the CSU compares Bavaria to the stateless nations of Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec, in Germany Bavaria is referred to as a *Freistaat* – a Land with distinct territorial interests, and in Bavaria itself, the CSU refers to the territory as *Heimat*, evoking strong cultural associations. The CSU has thus chosen to engage in the politics of multilevel governance, and to 'build' the Bavarian nation within the larger contexts of Germany and Europe, from which it has tried to extract as many concessions and benefits as possible to secure Bavarian territorial interests.

CONCLUSION

This article has explored the territorial strategy of the CSU in relation to the emerging system of multi-level governance in Europe. It has also examined, at the substate level, the impact of the

CSU's strong emphasis on identity on party competition in Bavaria. It was argued that 'nation' is an analytically contested social construct that may be called by a variety of names – and in the case of Bavaria, the CSU mobilises around the concept of *Heimat* as a unit of shared identity. The CSU has been instrumental in forging a strong sense of Bavarian identity by overcoming historic and socio-cultural divisions within the Land. It has also succeeded in linking its party identity to the Bavarian *Heimat* to the extent that the CSU, and the Land it has governed for over sixty years, seem inextricable. The CSU has thus been able to monopolise the Bavarian national identity vis-à-vis its competitors in the regional party system. These have included parties representing more extreme Bavarian nationalist and German nationalist sensibilities – such as the *Bayernpartei* and *Republikaner* – in addition to regional branches of statewide parties. In the last few years, the Bavarian SPD, Greens and FDP have each acknowledged the need to engage in identity politics in Bavaria, and to position themselves as standing up for Bavarian interests in Germany and Europe.

However, branches of statewide parties still lack the same degree of organisational and programmatic autonomy as the CSU does from the CDU, which would allow them to portray themselves as fighting for Bavarian interests either at the Land or federal level. They continue to be perceived in Bavaria as *German* parties beholden to Berlin. This has left the CSU virtually unchallenged on the territorial dimension of party competition. The only party that has posed some threat to the CSU in this area is the Bavarian Green Party. In contrast to the other statewide parties, the Greens have sought to construct a counter-culture to the CSU and to develop an alternative understanding of Bavarian *Heimat* as open, pluralistic and multicultural that still appeals to 'Old Bavarian' traditions. Moreover, the Greens have been able to pursue a dual strategy that appeals to both conservative sentiment in rural areas, and to progressive sentiment in urban areas. In this way, the Greens have become more of a 'catch-all' party in conservative Bavaria than even the SPD, which has been weakened by divisions with the statewide party about how to approach the regional question, as well as the party's limited appeal in rural areas. However, the continuing strength and attractiveness of the CSU to Bavarian voters as *the* party of Bavaria is evident in the impressive election results of the CSU, where today the party continues to obtain over 60% of regional vote – a result that the Green Party has thus far been hardly able to dent (with less than 10% of the vote).

In a broader context, the case of Bavaria exemplifies how the reconfiguration of the state in response to European integration has forced regionalist parties to alter their territorial strategies to account for increasing interdependence across borders, and the new distributions of competences across different territorial levels. The CSU's efforts to grasp the opportunities of European integration for substate territories, whilst maintaining the benefits of being part of the German federation, is akin to the demands of the vast majority of regionalist parties in Europe that seek to

negotiate their autonomy within state and European structures.⁷⁴ The new constellations of power created by multilevel governance in Europe have also required statewide parties to refocus their strategies for the regional setting, as well as developing alternative visions of European integration and the place of Bavaria within these processes. Thus, the Bavarian SPD, Greens and FDP advocate a 'Europe of the Communes' to contrast with the CSU's 'Europe of the Regions', which is seen to unduly centralise powers at the Bavarian state level. Clearly, the CSU is no longer – or ever has been – the only party with a distinct Bavarian or European territorial strategy, and its construction of the Bavarian *Heimat* has been challenged by alternative conceptions of a multicultural Bavaria. But whilst opposition parties have welcomed the greater Europeanisation of Bavaria, as understood as increasing cultural diversity, the CSU – under pressure from the right-wing *Republikaner* – has rejected any notion of multiculturalism and diversity associated with EU norms and supranational integration. This aspect of Europe is viewed as an encroachment on Bavarian autonomy, and a threat to Bavaria's culture, identity and sense of nationhood.

¹ I would like to thank Charlie Jeffery, Claire Sutherland and Michael Münter for their advice and comments on this research project. I also gratefully acknowledge the support provided for this research by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number PTA-026-27-1484).

² Interview with the author, Bavarian State Chancellery, 14/1/2005.

³ K. Weigelt (ed), *Patriotismus in Europa* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1988).

⁴ See F. Roth, *Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995); and H. Schissler and Y. Soysal, *The Nation, Europe and the World* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005).

⁵ See D. Morley and K. Robins, 'No place like *Heimat*: Images of Home(land) in European Culture' in G. Eley and R. Suny (eds), *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

⁶ See, for instance, M. Keating, *Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland* (London: Macmillan, 1996).

⁷ M. Freedon, 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology', *Political Studies* 46/4 (1998).

⁸ For definitions of the nation, see A. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); C. Geertz (ed), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963); M. Hechter & M. Levi, 'The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 2-3 (1979); and D. Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991).

⁹ See A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); J. Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987); and A. Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

¹⁰ G. Sartori, 'Guidelines for Concept Analysis' in G. Sartori (ed), *Social Science Concepts. Systematic Analysis* (London: Sage, 1984).

¹¹ H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London: Methuen, 1977); E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

¹² H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1944); R. Emerson, *From empire to nation: The rise to self-assertion of Asian and African peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

¹³ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*.

¹⁴ A. Paasi, 'Place and region: regional worlds and words', *Progress in Human Geography* 26/6 (2002).

¹⁵ J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*; M. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

¹⁶ C. Sutherland, ' "Nation, Heimat, Vaterland" The Reinvention of Concepts by the Bavarian CSU Party', *German Politics* 10/3 (2001).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ For example, C. Jeffery and S. Collins, 'The German Lander and EU Enlargement: Between apple pie and issue linkage', *German Politics* 7/2 (1998); P. James, *The Politics of Bavaria* (Aldershot; Avebury, 1995); A. Mintzel, *Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern: Strategie und Erfolg; Gewinner und Verlierer* (Passau : Wiss.-Verl. Rothe, 1999); Sutherland, 'Nation, Heimat, Vaterland'; M. Bauer, 'The German Länder and the European Constitutional Treaty - Heading for a Differentiated Theory of Regional Elite Support for European Integration', *Regional & Federal Studies* 16/1 (2006).

¹⁹ Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, *Generationenstudie 2003. Heimat und Heimatgefühl in Bayern* (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, 2003), p.49.

²⁰ For instance, see P. Lynch, *Minority Nationalism and European Integration* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996); and De Winter, L. and H. Tursan, *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe* (London and NY: Routledge, 1998).

²¹ www.bayern.de/English/ [date accessed: 5/2/2005]

²² M. Milosch, *Modernizing Bavaria. The Politics of Franz Joseph Strauss and the CSU 1949-1969* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), p.4.

²³ Whilst *Freistaat* translates into English as 'Free State', the term signifies republic in the German language.

²⁴ The National Socialists increased their vote from 6.3% in the 1928 Landtag election, to 32.5% in the 1932 election.

²⁵ D.R. Dorondo, *Bavaria and German Federalism. Reich to Republic, 1918-33, 1945-49* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992).

²⁶ James, *The Politics of Bavaria*.

²⁷ S. Padgett and T. Burkett, *Political parties and elections in West Germany: the search for a new stability* (London : C. Hurst, 1986), p114.

²⁸ Mintzel, *Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern*.

²⁹ E. Stoiber, Speech by the Bavarian State Minister Dr. Edmund Stoiber to the Society of International Relations in Montreal, 29 October 1999. See www.bavierequebec.org/en/corim_en.htm [date accessed: 11/5/2006].

³⁰ G. Roberts, *German Politics Today* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p81.

³¹ Mintzel, *Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern*, p.92.

³² Milosch, *Modernizing Bavaria*, p.ix.

³³ A. Mintzel, 'Political and Socio-economic Developments in the Postwar Era: The Case of Bavaria 1945-1989' in K. Rohe (ed) *Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. Social Foundations of German Parties and German Party Systems 1867- 1987* (New York and Oxford; Berg, 1990), p.176.

³⁴ Mintzel, 'Political and Socio-economic Developments in the Postwar Era'; Milosch, *Modernizing Bavaria*.

³⁵ A. Mintzel, 'The Christian Social Union in Bavaria. Analytical Notes on its Development, Role and Political Success', in M. Kaase and K. von Beyme (eds) *Elections and Parties* (London: Sage, 1978), p.204

³⁶ Sutherland, 'Nation, Heimat, Vaterland'; K. Mueller, *Schwierige Machtverhältnisse, die CSU nach Strauß*, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004).

³⁷ Mintzel, 'The Christian Social Union in Bavaria', p.222.

³⁸ Sutherland, 'Nation, Heimat, Vaterland'.

³⁹ Interview with Eberhard Sinner, Bavarian State Minister for European and Federal Affairs, State Chancellery, 14/1/2005.

⁴⁰ CSU, *Heimat Bayern. Zukunft Deutschland. Mit uns. CSU* (Munich: CSU, 1990), p.20.

⁴¹ Interviews with Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberg, Leader of the *FDP Bayern* on 13/1/2005; Sepp Daxenburger, Co-Leader of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in Bayern on 26/1/2005; and Harald Schneider, Press spokesperson for the *Bayern SPD* on 2/2/2005.

⁴² I. Unger, *Die Bayernpartei. Geschichte und Struktur 1945-1957*, (Stuttgart: Herausgegeben vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1979); R. Ostermann, *Freiheit für den Freistaat : kleine Geschichte der bayerischen SPD* (Essen : Klartext-Verlag, 1994); James, *The Politics of Bavaria*.

⁴³ Unger, *Die Bayernpartei*, p.59.

⁴⁴ H. Oberreuter, 'Abgeordnete zwischen Partei- und Persönlichkeitsorientierung: Zur Leidensspirale' der bayerischen SPD', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 18/1 (1987); Mintzel, *Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern*; James, *The Politics of Bavaria*.

⁴⁵ A. Mintzel, 'Specificities of Bavarian Political Culture' in D. Berg-Schlosser and R. Rytlewski (eds) *Political Culture in Germany*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p.110.

⁴⁶ Interview with Harald Schneider, Press Spokesperson, BayernSPD, 2/2/2005.

⁴⁷ FDP Bayern, *Landtag Wahlprogramm* (Munich: FDP Landesverband-Bayern, 2003).

⁴⁸ FDP Bayern, *Wahlprogramm 1998 für Bayern* (Munich: FDP Landesverband-Bayern, 1998), p.46.

⁴⁹ Interview with Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenburger on 13/1/2005.

⁵⁰ Mintzel, *Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern*, p.120.

⁵¹ Mintzel, 'Political and Socio-economic Developments in the Postwar Era', p.172; James, *The Politics of Bavaria*.

⁵² S. Immerfall, 'Die Grünen in Bayern: Zum politischen und parlamentarischen Selbstverständnis grüner Abgeordneter im bayerischen Landtag' in S. Immerfall, A. Kuntz, A. Mintzel and P. Thurner (eds) *Parteien in Bayern. Vier Studien*, (Passau: Passauer Papiere zur Sozialwissenschaft, PaPaS, Vol. 15, 1996), p.35.

⁵³ Interview with a Bavarian Green Party official, 15/01/2005.

⁵⁴ Interview with the author, Bavarian State Chancellery, 14/1/2005.

⁵⁵ Speech in Munich on 6 July 1990. See Sutherland, 'Nation, Heimat, Vaterland', p.25.

⁵⁶ Stoiber's statement was printed in *Die Welt* on 25 February 1989 and cited in Sutherland, 'Nation, Heimat, Vaterland', p.208.

⁵⁷ Cited in H. Rothmund, *Akzente in der Politik* (Munich: SPD-Landesverband. Red., 1986).

⁵⁸ Ostermann, *Freiheit für den Freistaat*, p.160.

⁵⁹ Sutherland, 'Nation, Heimat, Vaterland'.

⁶⁰ BayernSPD, *Es ist Zeit fuer den Wechsel. Regierungsprogramm der Bayern SPD* (Munich: BayernSPD, 1994), p.35.

⁶¹ Julian Gyger, former Chair of the Bavarian FDP.

⁶² FDP Bayern, *Ruckblick, Dank, Perspektiven* (Munich: FDP Landesverband-Bayern, 1983), p.34.

⁶³ James, *The Politics of Bavaria*, p.103.

⁶⁴ Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, IfD-Umfrage 6019, p.5.

⁶⁵ S. Bachmann, 'The Faithful Children of the CSU' (2004). Unpublished paper given to the author by the Bavarian Green Party Spokesperson, Alex Burger.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ The CSU's enthusiastic support for European integration is captured in its slogan 'Bavaria is my *Heimat*, Germany is my *Vaterland* and Europe is my future'.

⁶⁸ C. Jeffery, 'The German Länder: From Milieu-Shaping to Territorial Politics', *Proceedings of the British Academy* Vol. 119 (2003).

⁶⁹ This lays out the constitutional basis for German membership of the EU, in which the Federal Republic was forbidden to cede Länder competences to the EU without the approval of the Bundesrat.

⁷⁰ See Jeffery 'The German Länder'; and Bauer, 'The German Länder and the European Constitutional Treaty'.

⁷¹ Out of the 11 seats allocated for Bavaria in the European Parliament, the CSU elected 8 of its members in 1994; 10 in 1999; and 9 in 2004. The CSU also forms a group with the CDU in the EP, known as the CDU-CSU Europagruppe.

⁷² CSU, *Wir machen das Beste aus Europa. Für Bayern* (Munich: CSU, 1994).

⁷³ C. Jeffery, 'Regions and the Constitution for Europe: British and German Impacts', *German Politics* 13/4 (2004).

⁷⁴ A. Elias (ed), *Whatever Happened to the Europe of the Regions? Revisiting the Regional Dimension of European Politics*, Special Issue of *Regional & Federal Studies* (2008—forthcoming).