

Why We Think We Can't Dance: Theory of Mind and Children's Desire to Perform

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RUNNING HEAD: THEORY OF MIND AND PERFORMANCE

Why We Think We Can't Dance:

Theory of Mind and Children's Desire to Perform

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Abstract

Theory of Mind (ToM) allows children to achieve success in the social world by understanding others' minds. A study with 3-12 year-olds, however, demonstrates that gains in ToM are linked to decreases in children's desire to engage in performative behaviors associated with health and well-being – such as singing and dancing. One hundred and fifty nine middle class children from diverse backgrounds in a Northeastern USA metropolitan area completed the study in 2011. The development of ToM is associated with decreases in self-esteem which in turn predicts decreases in children's willingness to perform. This shift away from performance begins at age 4 (when ToM begins to develop), years before children enter puberty.

Keywords: Theory of Mind, Performance, Self-Esteem, Social Norms

Why We Think We Can't Dance:

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Chaperoning a middle school dance – with girls and boys slouched against bleachers, refusing to dance despite booming music – inevitably leads adults to comment: "Why aren't they dancing?" This refusal is particularly notable because these same children, just a few years earlier, were prone to dance, sing, and more generally *perform* constantly – in school, at home, in the backseat of the car, and while watching television – with both relish and confidence in their abilities. Why do people lose this willingness to perform with age? We suggest that one crucial reason is the development of children's awareness that their peers may be critically evaluating their abilities – an offshoot of the ability to understand others' minds – that may decrease their self-esteem and desire to perform. We explored the link between children's ability to understand the minds of observers and their willingness to perform by giving them the choice to sing, dance, or avoid both activities.

Theory of mind (ToM) is generally viewed as a positive development, typically beginning around age 4, with sharp increases between ages 5-6 and further development throughout school-age years (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The overwhelming consensus is that ToM allows children to achieve success in the social world by interpreting human behavior and understanding cultural meanings and social norms (Bruner & Feldman, 1993; Gauvain, 1998), such that individuals with deficits in ToM have difficulty in social interaction and in determining the intentions of others (Baker, 2003; Frith, Happé, & Siddons, 1994).

ToM is a fundamental, upstream cognitive construct that influences a number of downstream variables - including perspective-taking, empathy, and mentalizing more generally - that in turn influence conversation skills, social competence, and communication effectiveness (Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland, & Keysar, 2010; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). While ToM is often conflated with the psychological concepts of empathy and perspective-taking, researchers have posited that ToM may be a precursor to these abilities (Howlin, Baron-Cohen & Hadwin, 1999; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010); indeed, Malle (2005) suggests that ToM is fundamental to all aspects of social cognition. Why would increases in TOM – in understanding the minds of others – be linked to a decrease in the desire to perform? Children's concern with garnering desirable social evaluations – and experience of related emotions such as embarrassment – develop as early as 4 years old, with further development particularly between ages 6 to 11 (Banerjee, Bennett, & Luke, 2012; Banerjee & Lintern, 2000; Watling & Banerjee, 2012). Importantly for our account, ToM is linked to increasing sensitivity to criticism (Cutting & Dunn, 2002; Dunn, 1995); Lecce, Caputi, and Hughes (2011), for example, show that sensitivity to criticism mediates the relation between ToM and academic achievement.

As a result, we hypothesized that improved ToM would predict older children's decreased willingness to perform due to the heightened sensitivity to criticism – and resulting blow to self-esteem – that ToM engenders.

Method

One hundred fifty-nine middle-class children (81 female; 40 African-Americans; 29 Asian-Americans; 60 Non-Hispanic Whites; 15 Hispanic or Latino-Americans; and 15 'Other') aged 3-12 from 8 summer camps in a large Northeastern metropolitan area participated individually in the experiment in 2011. Age groups ranged in size from 12-18 children. Note that the gender composition of our sample did not vary by age ($\chi^2(9) = 1.34$, p = .99, Cohen's d = m.18) and gender was not correlated with ToM, self-esteem, or performance choices (rs < .08, ps > .32).

Children were interviewed one by one in an unused classroom and were told by the experimenter, "I'm here today to learn more about you and other kids your age." Each child completed a preference task and a ToM task (order counterbalanced). In the preference task, the experimenter presented each child with four options in random order: sing a song of their choosing (performance task), perform a dance of their choosing (performance task) (both performance tasks were without music), circle red shapes on a page (nonperformance task), or color in a square (nonperformance task). Children selected two of the options to complete in front of the experimenter. We chose singing and dancing as prototypical performance behaviors that are also subject to scrutiny by peers.

We assessed ToM with three measures intended to capture different aspects and levels of ToM: the Sally and Anne false belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), the Cookie Box misleading container test (Gopnik & Astington, 1988), and the Duck and Lion social test (Nguyen & Frye, 1999), the latter designed to test a more mature ToM (see Appendix A). Given our interest in the development of ToM across a wide age range (ages 3-12) we chose these measures because they are appropriate for use with very young children but also resonate with older children; similar false belief measures have been used with children ages 6-11 (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011; Pellicano, 2010). For each task, participants were required to pass control questions and the test question to score one point. The results of each task were summed for a composite measure [range: 0-3, α = .84].

Finally, children completed a 7-item self-esteem scale [α = .95] using a 5-option "smiley face" scale (see Appendix B). We adapted items from Harter's (1982) Perceived Competence Scale for Children, Harter and Pike's (1984) Perceived Competence and Social Acceptance Scale, and Harter's (1985) Self Perception Profile. Children rated themselves on several domains crucial to childhood self-esteem including cognitive/scholastic competence, social acceptance, physical/athletic competence, physical appearance, and behavioral conduct (e.g., Harter 1985; Harter & Pike, 1984). Because these measures were initially developed for older children, we checked to ensure that the reliability of the self-esteem scale for our youngest participants (ages 3-5) was acceptable [α = .89].

Results

As predicted, age was negatively related to choosing to sing ($\beta = -.38$, p < .001, 95% confidence interval [CI] = -.40, -.35) and choosing to dance ($\beta = -.30$, p < .001, 95% CI = -.32, -.27; Figure 1). The percentage of children choosing singing ranged from 75% and 63% (ages 3 and 4) to 20% and 6% (ages 11 and 12); similarly, the percent choosing dancing ranged from 50% (ages 3 and 4) to 13% and 12% (ages 11 and 12). Conversely, age was positively related to choosing circling ($\beta = .30$, p < .001, 95% CI = .27, .33) and coloring ($\beta = .38$, p < .001, 95% CI = .36, .40). The percentage of children choosing circling ranged from 38% (ages 3 and 4) to 80% and 82% (ages 11 and 12); the percent choosing coloring ranged from 38% and 50% (ages 3 and 4) to 87% and 100% (ages 11 and 12).

Put another way, while 31.2% of 3-year olds and 18.8% of 4-year olds chose to *both* sing and dance, not a single child aged 11 or 12 did so. In contrast, only 6.2% of both 3- and 4-year olds chose to avoid both singing and dancing, compared to 66.7% of 11-year olds and 82.4% of

12-year olds. Nor is it the case that older children generally prefer circling and coloring. We offered six circling and coloring tasks to a separate sample (N = 34, aged 3-4 or 11-12) as they waited for another experiment. Younger children spontaneously completed more tasks than older children (Ms = 2.21 versus 1.00, t(32) = 3.80, p < .01, Cohen's d = 1.34) suggesting that older children's desire to complete such tasks in our main experiment is not due to their intrinsically greater liking than younger children. Order of options did not influence our results.

Age was positively related to ToM ($\beta = .69$, p < .001, 95% CI = .64, .74) with low scores at ages 3 and 4 (Ms = .25 and .56) and high scores at ages 11 and 12 (Ms = 2.80 and 2.76), with a particular inflection point between ages 5 and 6 (Figure 1). Finally, age was negatively related to self-esteem ($\beta = -.40$, p < .001, 95% CI = -.44, -.36) and self-esteem was negatively related to ToM ($\beta = -.44$, p < .001, 95% CI = -.69, -.19).

We used bootstrapping procedures to confirm the (independent) mediating roles of ToM and self-esteem on the relationship between age and performance (choosing to sing and dance). These procedures, preferable for smaller samples, generate a 95% confidence interval around the indirect effect where mediation is said to occur if zero falls outside that confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008). ToM had a significant mediating effect on the relationship between age and performance ($\beta = -.10$, 95% *CI* = -.13; -.07), also confirmed by a Sobel test (z =- 6.71, p < .01). Bootstrapping results also showed that self-esteem had a significant mediating effect on the relationship between age and performance ($\beta = -.05$, 95% *CI* = -.07; -.03), also confirmed by a Sobel test (z = -4.66, p < .01). We note that these results are consistent when we restrict our analyses only to older children (ages 9-12), for whom ToM scores were near ceiling: ToM remains a significant mediator between age and performance (95% *CI* = -.2103; -.1205; z =- 6.15, p < .01). Next, we tested our more nuanced conceptual account – that increases in ToM lead to decreases in self-esteem that affect children's desire to perform – using structural equation modeling. We used AMOS 4 software (Byrne, 2001) to test multiple-step, multiple mediator path models (Hayes, 2009; Iacobucci, Saldanha, & Deng, 2007). The tests of mediation included comparisons of full mediation, non-mediation, and partial mediation models of the relationships between ToM, self-esteem and performance – a total of 4 models. The full mediation model (#1; no relation between ToM and performance) resulted in a poor fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 71.72$, df = 3, p = .00, CFI = .767, NFI = .765, IFI = .772, RMSEA = .38 and 90% CI= .31-.46). The non-mediation model (#2; only direct relationships between ToM and self-esteem on performance) demonstrated a better fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 37.85$, df = 3, p = .00, CFI = .882, NFI = .876, IFI = .884, RMSEA = .27 and 90% CI= .20, -.35).

In support of our account, however, the partial mediation model (#3; with a direct effect of ToM on performance) resulted in the best fit ($\chi^2 = 3.17$, df = 2, p = .00, CFI = .996, NFI = .990, IFI = .996, RMSEA = .06 and 90% CI = .00, -.18; $\beta_{Age \rightarrow ToM \rightarrow SE \rightarrow Perf} = -.48$). The model fit was superior to both the full mediation model ($\Delta \chi^2 = 68.55$, $\Delta df = 1$, p < .001) and to the nonmediation model ($\Delta \chi^2 = 34.68$, $\Delta df = 1$, p < .001). Of note, with small samples (such as in our case), the Chi-Square statistic lacks power and may not discriminate between good fitting models and poor fitting models (Kenny & McCoach, 2003). Due to the restrictiveness of the Model Chi-Square, researchers have sought alternative indices to assess model fit. One statistic that minimizes the impact of sample size is Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, and Summers' (1977) relative/normed chi-square ($\chi 2/df$). Although there is no consensus regarding an acceptable ratio for this statistic, some have recommended that the ratio not exceed 5.0 (Wheaton et al., 1977) while others have recommended that the ratio not exceed 2.0 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Our χ^2/df ratio is 1.59, suggesting that our model provides an acceptable fit.

In this partial mediation model (#3), age was positively related to ToM (β = .69, p < .001, 95% CI = .64, .74) and ToM in turn was significantly and negatively related to self-esteem (β = - .44, p < .001, 95% CI = -.69, -.19) and performance (β = -.49, p < .001, CI=-.60, -.36; Figure 2). Self-esteem partially mediated the relation between ToM and performance, with a significant relationship between self-esteem and performance (β = .46, p < .001, CI=.33, .57). This model explained 65% of the variance in performance.

Finally, we tested an alternative partial mediation model (#4; with ToM as a mediator between self-esteem and performance). This model resulted in a poor fit to the data ($\chi^2 = 77.80$, df = 3, p = .00, CFI = .743, NFI = .745, IFI = .749, RMSEA = .49 and 95% CI = .40, -.58). In support of our hypothesis, a chi-square difference test (Kline, 1998) established the superiority of model #3 (age \rightarrow theory of mind \rightarrow self-esteem \rightarrow performance) over model #4 (age \rightarrow selfesteem \rightarrow theory of mind \rightarrow performance) ($\Delta \chi^2 = 34.68, \Delta df = 1, p < .001$).

Discussion

Why do children avoid performing as they grow older? Our results support our account that ToM appears to equip children with the ability to predict that others may not view their performance as favorably as they do, which is associated with decreased self-esteem – and avoiding the spotlight. Note that our data address a salient alternative explanation for our pattern of performance avoidance, one familiar to anyone interacting with socially awkward adolescents or preteens: as children enter puberty they experience a host of changes that decrease their desire to perform. However, our results show that the shift away from performance begins as early as age 4 – years before children enter puberty – suggesting that these changes in later childhood are unlikely to account for our results.

The present research has several limitations that warrant further research. First, although our analyses address several alternative explanations, further experiments are needed to establish a causal impact of ToM on performance. Second, we used ToM measures that were appropriate for use with very young children but also resonated with older children; future research is needed to develop measures better-suited for wider age ranges. Third, what specific aspects of selfesteem – a multi-faceted construct – ultimately link to lower desires to perform? We show that children's explicit self-esteem is linked to avoiding performance, but a fuller understanding of this process could be gained by assessing both implicit and explicit self-esteem (Dunham, Barron, & Banaji, 2007; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Fourth, other mediating factors likely play a role in decreasing performance, such as mistaken – and likely erroneously negative – perceptions of peers' opinions of one's abilities, as well as antecedent states such as mood. Finally, future research should examine the generalizability of our results to other kinds of performance behaviors and other kinds of performance situations (e.g. alone versus in public). Our conceptualization suggests that regardless of the performance behavior - from singing and dancing to playing musical instruments and acting – a more developed ToM is linked to avoidance of performance. At the same time, some evidence suggests that the effect of a peer audience on behavior in younger vs. older children is domain specific (Banerjee & Lintern, 2000; Banerjee & Yuill, 1999), suggesting an interesting area for further examination.

Previous research has examined links between development of ToM and increases in negative behaviors such as antisocial deception (Repacholi, Slaughter, Pritchard, & Gibbs, 2003). Our results suggest that ToM may also be linked to decreases in enjoyable behaviors – like singing and dancing – that are associated with activities shown to have benefits for health and happiness (e.g., Bonilha, Onofre, Vieira, Prado, & Martinez, 2008; Brown et al., 2005; Clift & Hancox, 2010). This unwillingness to perform likely perpetuates beyond school dances, affecting the willingness of people older than 12 – adults – to engage in such playful behaviors as well.

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Age	Theory of	Self-Esteem				
(Years)	Mind (SD)	(SD)	% Sing	% Dance	% Circle	% Color
3	.25 (.78)	4.77 (.45)	75	50	38	38
4	.56 (.81)	4.82 (.24)	63	50	38	50
5	.89 (1.13)	4.61 (.50)	56	56	39	50
6	2.08 (1.24)	4.44 (.58)	42	42	58	58
7	2.24 (1.03)	4.16 (.72)	24	24	71	82
8	2.47 (.87)	4.24 (.80)	41	29	59	71
9	2.69 (.79)	4.27 (.65)	31	25	69	75
10	2.60 (.63)	4.38 (.65)	33	27	60	80
11	2.80 (.41)	4.13 (.92)	20	13	80	87
12	2.76 (.56)	3.76 (.67)	6	12	82	100

Table 1. Theory of mind, self-esteem, and percentage of children selecting different tasks as a function of age.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations.

	Mean (S.D.)	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Gender											
2. Age	7.50 (2.90)	.00	1.00								
3. Theory of M	ind 1.92 (1.26)	.03	.69**	1.00							
4. Self-Esteem	4.35 (.70)	08	40**	44**	1.00						
5. Picked Sing	.39 (.49)	09	38**	46**	.56**	1.00					
6. Picked Danc	e .33 (.47)	.01	30**	46**	.34**	12	1.00				
7. Picked Sing and Dance	.72 (.64)	.01	51**	69**	.68**	.68**	.65**	1.00			
8. Picked Circle	e .59 (.49)	02	.30**	.50**	40**	31**	- .62**	-69**	1.00		
9. Picked Color	.69 (.46)	.11	.38**	.42**	51**	61**	- .23**	64**	11	1.00	
10. Picked Circle Color	e and 1.28 (.64)	.06	.51**	.69**	68**	68**	- .64**	-1.00**	.69**	.64**	1.00

Notes. * p < .05; ** p < .01. Numbers represent zero-order correlation coefficients.

Figure 1. Percentage choosing each task (left axis) and theory of mind (right axis) as a function of age. ToM develops with age (black line); younger children prefer performance tasks (singing and dancing – red lines); older children prefer non-performance tasks (circling and coloring – blue lines).





Figure 2. Structural equation model demonstrating that as children age, increases in ToM lead to decreases in self-esteem that affect the desire to perform (** p < .001).



Note: Performance is coded as the total choices of singing and dancing out of the four options (range: 0-2).

Task	Description	Test and Control Questions	Scoring		
Sally-Anne	In the narrated story (with pictures), a doll	Test:	Pass-Basket		
(Baron-Cohen et al.	(Sally) places a toy car in her basket and	"Where will Sally look first for her	Fail-Box		
1985)	leaves the scene. Another doll (Anne) moves the toy car to a box while Sally is	toy car?"			
	away. When Sally returns she goes to look	Control:			
	for the toy car.	1. "Where is the toy car really?"			
		2. "Where did Sally put the toy car in			
		the beginning?"			
Misleading Container	We filled a familiar cookie box with	Control:			
(Gopnik and Astington 1988)	pencils. All children were first asked to name the expected content (cookies). The	"What is really in the box?"			
	researcher then revealed the true content of	Test:			
	the box (i.e., pencils), before closing it and	"Someone else is coming in next.	Pass-Cookies		
	asking a control question. A control	The person hasn't looked inside this	Fail-Pencils		
	question was asked immediately after	box before. When I show it to			
	showing true contents of box but before test	him/her all closed up like this, what			
	question.	will s/he say is in it?"			
Duck and Lion	Children were shown a story about Duck	Test: "What does Duck (David) think	Pass-Reading		
(Nguyen and Frye 1999)	and Lion, and the scenes were narrated by the researcher.	Lion (Liam) is doing in the room?"	Fail-Sleeping		
	Narrated Story: "*Duck and Lion are	Control:			
	reading. Duck leaves the room to get	"What was Lion doing at the			
	another book to read with Lion. Lion	beginning?"			
	decides to stop reading and go to sleep."				
	*Duck and Lion were replaced with David				
	and Liam for ages 6 and older				

APPENDIX A Theory of Mind Tasks

APPENDIX B Self-Esteem Scale

1. When I think about how many friends I have, I feel:



2. When I think about how good I am at things, I feel:




3. When I think about how well I behave, I feel:



4. When I think about how good I am in school, I feel:



5. When I think about how much other kids like me, I feel:



6. When I see a picture of myself, I feel:



7. When I think about the things I can do, I feel:

