THE AGRARIAN LEGACY: A STUDY OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE
AND IDEOLOGY IN MODERN CHINA

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Zuo Xiang

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Edward B Reeves

Director of Thesis

Master's Committee: _Edward B Reeves_ , Chairman

Jacek Ganowic

David R. Rudy

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Date

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Abstract of Thesis

Zuo Xiang, M. A.

Morehead State University, 1992

Director of Thesis _____

Edward B Reeves

Through historical and comparative analysis this study demonstrates how and why an agrarian system has been reproduced in modern China and how that legacy strongly influences post-revolutionary political structure and ideology. The agrarian legacy also helps explain China's difficulty in establishing a capitalist market structure, an industrialized economy, and a more democratic political system. The analysis draws heavily upon recent work by Lenski, Lenski, and Nolan (1991) on ecological evolutionary theory.

A primary source of evidence in this research is my own personal experience as a native of China. Other sources include: comparative data for agrarian societies from Murdock and White's (1969) Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), Tuden and Marshall's (1972) political organizational codes for the societies in the SCCS, and a number of literary and historical documents.

This research begins with an examination of the political structure and ideology of imperial China. The analysis shows that throughout its long history China has clearly demonstrated political and ideological features consistent with other agrarian societies. Second, this research illustrates that Maoism as a dominant ideology in modern China served a similar function as Confucianism in imperial China. These ideologies (Maoism and Confucianism) validated the political power of China's emperors and ruling class. Ideological currents and the agrarian legacy have significantly slowed the development of rational-legal

authority. So while China has demonstrated economic growth and industriali-
zation, it has not developed a commensurate political and economic structure as
predicted, for example, by the theories of Max Weber (1947). Third, this study
explores "the second revolution" (Harding 1986) of post-Maoist China to reform
its political and economic structure toward a more rational-legal form.

This study finds that the Chinese polity has been slow to achieve rational-
legal forms that characterize the polities of the advanced industrial societies
because China's technological base remains largely agrarian. It also finds that
current political economic reforms in post-Maoist China continue to press for
economic growth and development but remain conservative in promoting political
change so as to maintain a tight social order. Ultimately, I believe that
industrialization, changes in the demographics of the labor force, and economic
growth will eventually produce broader changes in the political system. Political
liberalization and more democratic political institutions will come to China, but
gradually as a result of increasing industrialization.

Accepted by:

Edward B Reeve , Chairman

Jacek Jarmono

David R. Rudy

Introduction

The Problem

This study will show that Imperial China was a classic agrarian society. It will argue that the agrarian political structure and ideology have been reproduced in post-revolutionary China. Also I consider the ways in which traditional and charismatic authority of the agrarian polity has begun to change toward one based on more rational-legal principles in recent China.

One key to understanding contemporary Chinese political structure and ideology is to view them in terms of the legacies of imperial China's polity founded in B.C. 221. More than two thousand years of traditional bureaucracy is firmly rooted in Chinese political structure. Even though the Chinese Communist Party has held power since 1949, it has still, in most respects, continued the imperial tradition; and traditional Chinese political ideology has been reproduced in an altered symbolic form. Whether it was the imperial emperor or the Communist paramount leaders, all considered that the dominant ideology played an indispensable function to keep social harmony and stability. One insisted on Confucianism, the other upholds Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought. Both deeply feared that change would bring about social chaos. To some extent, there was no Chinese revolution, but only another traditional bureaucratic restoration with new elements.

Therefore, it is important to know the characteristics of imperial Chinese political structure which are based on the typical features of agrarian society. Also, we should realize how important it has become for Chinese Communist government to adopt pragmatic policies and new structures in order to modernize its national economy. Under this situation, an interesting question is how post-

Maoist China gradually reforms its traditional and charismatic authority structures toward a more rational-legal authority.

In this study, I will adhere to the following questions and themes:

1. Traditional agrarian China may reveal more about social order and political stability than any other society. The Chinese imperial system was the most enduring major political system in world history. What are the fundamental factors which allowed this "permanent dynastic system" to survive?

2. As an advanced, highly developed agrarian society, why is it that imperial China could create a great integrated political bureaucracy in its early history? Why did it stagnate at that level?

3. Although a dramatic revolution occurred in China to smash the imperial political structure, why does post-revolutionary China still reflect traditional legacies? Why do the agrarian "remnants" still exert a strong influence on contemporary China?

4. What factors explain an under-developed and inefficient bureaucratic system in China? How can post-Maoist China face the rapidly changing world and reform its political and economic system toward a more rational-legal form?

5. Ideology has always played an indispensable function in Chinese political life, both in the imperial era's Confucianism and in post-revolutionary China's Maoism and "four principles". How do these dominant ideologies work in the political structure?

"Agrarian Society" As a Theoretical Construct

This study depends upon the method of political sociology--the sociological study of political processes and political systems (Eisenstadt 1971). It seeks to describe and explicate the characteristics of agrarian societies, and to analyze the development and change of the Chinese polity from the imperial era to

contemporary times. To accomplish this it relies on Lenski's model of "agrarian society" and "industrializing agrarian society" to explain why post-revolutionary China has inherited the agrarian polity of the imperial era. Therefore it discusses how the agrarian legacy still strongly influences Chinese political structure and the ideology of post-revolutionary China.

1.   Typology of societies based upon subsistence technology

Most human societies have changed little during their course of existence. But it is clear that some societies have grown substantially, some have shifted from a nomadic way of life to permanent settlements in villages, and some have shifted from a predominantly rural mode of life to a predominantly urban one. Such changes have usually been accompanied by important changes in social organization, such as substantial increases in organizational complexity, the division of labor, and social inequality. In short, some societies have experienced a process of substantial growth and development while others have not (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 60).

According to Lenski, production technology plays the most critical part in societal growth and development, because "an advance in subsistence technology is a necessary precondition for a significant increase in the size and complexity of a society", and "technology defines the limits of what is possible for a society" (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 60). On the basis of subsistence technology, the patterns of social organization change.   The different types of political structure and ideology of societies are also influenced by production technology.   Arguing in this way leads Lenski to classify human societies based upon their subsistence technologies.   In accordance with their primary mode of subsistence, human societies are divided into ten basic categories (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 70):

Hunting and gathering societies

Simple horticultural societies

Advanced horticultural societies

Simple agrarian societies

Advanced agrarian societies

Fishing societies

Maritime societies

Simple herding societies

Advanced herding societies

Industrial societies

"A society is classified as a hunting and gathering society only if the hunting of wild animals and foraging for uncultivated plant foods are its primary means of subsistence. Horticultural societies are societies which practice farming, but do not have *plows*. Agrarian societies engage in farming, but they use *plows*. Advanced agrarian societies use iron tools and weapons, while simple agrarian societies have only copper and bronze, which are softer metals and less plentiful" (Lenski et al. 1991, pp. 70-1).

Fishing, herding, and maritime societies are different from the other types of societies in that they are environmentally specialized types, although the development of these societies still depended on their subsistence technologies.

Industrial societies are the newest type of society and technologically the most advanced. The distinguishing feature of these societies is their heavy dependence on machine technology and inanimate sources of energy. Because of their highly advanced technology, industrial societies are the most powerful and productive societies the world has seen to date. This situation determines the difference between pre-industrial societies and industrial societies.

It is important to point out that not all societies fit neatly into the ten types of societies mentioned above. Some are hybrids that combine in roughly equal proportions the characteristics of two or more of the basic types. Lenski

considers, often--though not always--that hybrid societies are in a state of transition form one mode of production to another and from one level of development to another. Therefore, many lesser-developed societies today are beginning to industrialize. But they still depend heavily on preindustrial technology, which also determines their social, political, and economic structures. Some of these can be characterized as industrializing agrarian societies.

2. General political and ideological features of agrarian society

In nearly all advanced agrarian societies, government was the basic integrating force. Coercion was necessary to hold things together and maintain the benefit of a tiny elite. It was important to agrarian societies to have a strong military force. Most advanced agrarian societies had a monarchy headed by a king or emperor whose position was usually hereditary. "Agrarian rulers and governing classes saw nothing immoral in the use of what we (not they) would call 'public office' for private gain. To them, it was simply the legitimate use of their 'patrimony'" (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 78).

The king or emperor naturally wanted the greatest possible control over his subordinates, so he held supreme authority. Another faction in advanced agrarian societies was an authoritarian bureaucracy shot through with kinship ties, nepotism, and favoritism. Thus, bureaucracy was another indispensable faction in the agrarian polity and it deeply influenced the political process in nearly every agrarian society. An excellent case study is Antonio's *"Authoritarian Bureaucracy in Ancient Rome* " (1986). It clearly illustrates the characteristics of an advanced agrarian society. Rome, through its bureaucracy, organized the society into a structure of extraction and coercion, but this also generated responses from below. An elaborate network of patron-client relationships provided means to avert extraction and arbitrary impositions of power. A dynamic of state control

and clientelistic adjustment resulted.

From ancient Rome's example, we find that the state apparatus was small and highly personal. Unlike modern governmental bureaucracy, appointment, advancement, and day-to-day functioning depended largely on personal loyalty derived from familial, friendship, and dependency relations. Offices were created in an ad hoc manner, lacked legal jurisdiction, and did not usually require special training. Political structural differentiation was part of a broader process of centralization that concentrated complete power in the hands of the emperor (Antonio 1986). This kind of bureaucracy built upon and perpetuated a complex, vertical class and status hierarchy. A similar situation can be found in imperial China.

Furthermore, the Roman emperor relied on the high aristocracy for political support, advisors, and official appointees. Beneath the high aristocracy was the curial order (decurious) who occupied positions on prestigious city councils (municipal senates) and held the important magistracies. In imperial China, royal family members, eunuchs, and certain levels of literati composed a similar hierarchical structure.

The patron-client relationship (patronage or clientelism) became the key link of the authoritarian bureaucracy of ancient Rome. It was based on submission and loyalty, extraction and mutual assistance. Clients served their patron and received protection and assistance in return. Patrons represented their clients in court, provided them subsistence, or exerted influence to promote their careers. Patronage promoted stable domination by establishing bonds and reciprocities that cut across the vertical class and status hierarchies. Patronage was the basis of official appointment because everything was done 'from above' and people had to depend upon their allies (Antonio 1986). The emperor appointed his 'friends' and clients, who in turn appointed their 'friends' and

clients. The network of patron-client alliances suffused the bureaucracy and the wider society. Finally, since promotion reflected patronage networks, this skewed the appointment process strongly toward loyalty and personalism, and away from uniform emphasis on professional training, merit, seniority, specialization, and legal jurisdiction (Saller 1980; Cotton 1981; see Antonio 1986, p. 30).

These features match Udy's characterization of "informal organization"--a type of traditional organizational hierarchy that departs significantly from Weber's ideal-typical bureaucracy (Udy 1959). The features of authoritarian bureaucracy of ancient Rome exhibited many informal arrangements, such as lack legal jurisdiction, personalism, patrimonialism, nepotism, clientelism, etc. The informal characteristics of the authoritarian bureaucracy reflected characteristics of the wider agrarian society: the dispersed economic resource base with relatively inefficient transportation and communications, the huge peasant population, and the lack of resources to finance a more formalized bureaucracy (Antonio 1986). This situation is still found within industrializing agrarian societies.

The ideology of agrarian societies was founded upon the universal faiths, which played an indispensable function in maintaining societal unity, such as Buddhism in South East Asia, Confucianism in China, and Christianity in Europe. Religion offered ruling dynasties a strong basis to legitimate their supreme power. For example, the doctrine of the 'Divine Right of Kings' prevailed in European countries prior to the industrial era, and the Roman emperor was worshiped as god. Eisenstdat calls this kind of ideology a "totalistic ideology" (1966, p. 105).

> "In advanced agrarian society, the single most important consequence of an increase in economic surplus was further growth of the state and in the power of the governing class that controlled it. This contributed, directly or indirectly, to most of the other important social and cultural changes of the agrarian era. It lay behind the shift from militia to professional armies; the increase in inequality, and the development of ideologies justifying inequality

and the power of elites; the rise of the merchant class and the increase in trade and commerce; the growth of urban populations; the increase in the division of labor; and the slowing of the rate of innovation" (Lenski et al. 1991, p. 200).

In a word, the agrarian subsistence technology determined social evolution and development. It also determined the characteristics of agrarian polity and ideology (see chart 1).

Chart 1. The Relationship Between Subsistence Technology and Agrarian Polity

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+-------------------------+   determined    +-----------------------------------+
| Agrarian Subsistence    |                 | Agrarian Polity:                  |
| Technology:             |---------------->| sovereign emperor or king         |
| plow agriculture        |                 | traditional,charismatic authority |
| large rural population  |<--------------  | centralized executive force       |
| low productive force    |   based on      | strong police,military function   |
+-------------------------+                 | patrimonialism,clientelism        |
                                            | totalistic ideology               |
                                            +-----------------------------------+
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
3. The transition to industrializing agrarian societies

Despite the rapid spread of industrialization during the last two centuries, less than a quarter of the world's population lives in societies that can be considered highly industrialized. The great majority, however, do live in societies that have been substantially altered as a consequence of the diffusion of modern industrial technology. These hybrid societies are best described as *industrializing societies*--the ones commonly referred to as the developing nations of the Third World (Lenski et al. 1991). Many of these nations are in a transitional phase, moving from an agrarian way of life to a modern industrial one. The industrializing agrarian societies (including China, India, countries in the Middle East, Latin American, and Eastern Europe) combine elements of both the agrarian past and the industrial present.

In industrializing agrarian societies, one of the greatest hindrances to development has been the kind of governing class they inherited from the past.

This class enjoyed a privileged status for centuries, and its members have seldom shown any desire to change things in the twentieth century. From their perspective, change is something to be resisted, or, when possible, exploited for their personal benefit (Lenski et al. 1991). But there are many differences among these industrializing societies. The political systems they have developed during this century are widely varying, some have adopted the model of Western industrial democracy, others have followed the model of socialism or communism.

In my presentation, I will use Lenski's model sketched above to analyze how the Chinese case falls into his model of "agrarian society" and "industrializing agrarian society".

Sources of Evidence

A primary source of evidence is my own personal experience as a native Chinese from Sichuan province. I will also use a number of secondary sources, books, articles, etc which describe imperial and contemporary China. Some comparative data for agrarian societies come from Murdock and White's (1969) Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) and Tuden and Marshall's (1972) political organizational codes for the societies in the SCCS.

Plan of the Study

This study is divided into three parts. In the first part, the **Ideology and Political Structure in Imperial China**, I will describe imperial political characteristics and show how these relate to the typical features of an agrarian polity. In the second part, **Post-Revolutionary China**, I will discuss how the political structure of modern China resembles that of the Imperial era. I will also emphasize the dominant ideology of Maoism and the political rituals that helped to sustain it. Concluding this part I discuss the inefficiency of the Chinese

political structure and process. In part 3, **China After Mao**, I will illustrate how post-Maoist China under Deng gradually reformed the political and economic structures, but the "second revolution" of post-Maoist China still clings to an ideological conservatism, despite Deng's pragmatism in areas of economic reform.

Part I Ideology and Political Structure in Imperial China

Chapter 1 Imperial Chinese Ideology

China became an advanced agrarian society during the Qin dynasty, at which time the Imperial system, along with its patrimonial bureaucracy, was established. This form of government had lasted more than two thousand years. The basic pattern of the Chinese polity over the centuries had been that of a hereditary emperor who ruled with the help of literati, royal family members, and eunuchs. Emperors and dynasties could be and were overthrown, to be replaced by other emperors and other dynasties. Continuity was preserved, however, because from generation to generation--until the beginning of this century--the literati who controlled and administrated the country shared the same values as their predecessors and were chosen in the same way (Schwartz 1965). Confucianism provided the ideological foundation of the imperial political system; the literati played an indispensable function to enhance and propagate Confucianism.

1. Confucianism as a dominant ideology

"Confucianism was remarkable because it was secular and was considered valid and appropriate for the problems of everyone--emperor, bureaucrat, landlord, and ordinary subject" (Pye 1978, p. 32). It spoke with authority about the common concerns of all who, like fathers, must look after their children. It was used as a moral code for hierarchical social relations, and served to maintain the patrimonial order.

Confucius was primarily interested in how men might live together so there could be peace and harmony in their society as well as their personal lives. Confucius' teachings stressed *Ren*--filial piety, *Li*--loyalty to one's superior, and

De--virtuous conduct. The emphasis was on good manners and ethical conduct for rulers, officials, and the masses. The basic assumption was that the empire was essentially a huge extended family; the emperor could be regarded as the father, and his subjects as his children. Confucius stressed the importance of a virtuous ruler who set a good example by saying to one monarch: "If your desire is for good, the people will be good. The moral character of the ruler is the wind; the moral character of those beneath him is the grass. When the grass has the wind upon it, it assuredly bends" (cited in Schwartz 1965, p. 25).

The philosophy of Confucianism, which bade the ruler deal with the mass of the people as children, was essentially a code for the guidance of an absolute but hopefully benevolent dictatorship. That is why the Chinese people have always wished for a kind and benevolent emperor or paternalistic officials until today. Of course, this circumstance had strong parallels with the traditional Chinese patriarchal family system.

Confucianism was not only a systematic philosophy of state rule, but also an attitude toward the universe and a quasi-religious system (Schwartz 1965). For example, the emperor was considered the 'Son of Heaven'. He was believed to be granted the right to communicate directly to the 'Spirit of Heaven' and to make sacrificial rites. Furthermore, it was the emperor's right to grant recognition to powerful deities as objects of worship, bestowing title and rank upon them or demoting them as the occasion demanded. The masses, on the other hand, led by the household patriarchs, worshiped their own ancestral spirits.

Confucianism emphasized court etiquette, state ceremonies, and proper conduct toward one's ancestors in the famous five degrees of relationships. These relationships were: father\son, emperor\subject, husband\wife, older brother\younger brother, and friends\friends. It aimed at social harmony and stability which was the cement that held society together and was supposed to be

a moral consensus. The building blocks that were held together by this cement were human bonds and mutual obligations arranged in a huge hierarchy--from emperor and ministers down through local officials and local gentry, and finally to the immediate family--the bonds between emperor and official, father and son, husband and wife, brothers, and friends (Whyte 1986).

2. The analogy between family and state bureaucracy

Patriarchy, patrimonialism, and filial piety were indispensable for the Chinese bureaucracy. While patriarchy reflected the family system per se, patrimonialism extended the respect for authority toward the political center and toward the emperor (Son of Heaven) who was to govern the empire as a father governs his family. Filial piety exemplified this multilevel relationship, because "it was a doctrine of sincere submission, a doctrine that prescribes the superiority of the father's role, as well as the manner of obedience given to the person in that role" (Hamilton 1990, p. 77).

It was 'Ren', 'Li' and 'De' of Confucianism that merged the patriarchal family system and the patrimonial bureaucracy into an organic whole to form the characteristics of the Chinese ideology. On the basis of man's desire and emotion, Confucianism proposed the highest moral principle 'Ren'. It described the ethical code and established the spiritual order of interpersonal relationships. 'Ren' stands for (1) the obliteration of the individual; (2) the spirit of sacrifice; (3) self-restraint; (4) lack of privacy and (5) ideological control (Gong Wen-xiang 1989, p. 365). The main content of 'Ren' is filial piety expressed toward parents, elders, and superiors. In the situation of the patriarchal family, the first important thing is filial piety. "Filial piety is the root of all virtue of Confucianism. Because our bodies, in every hair and bit of skin, are received by us from our parents, we must not venture to injure or scar them. This is the

beginning of filial piety." (Scharfstein 1974, p. 6, cited from *The Classic of Filial Piety*). When the moral order of patriarchy was applied to socio-political life, it was defined as *'Li'*, described as 'the way to administer a state' or 'the norms of appropriate behavior according to status'. *'Li'* places the stress on the subordinate's duty to obey, assigns role obligations that signify his or her submission to duty, and restricts legitimate acts of power and obedience to behaviors in a role set (eg. father\son, emperor\subjects, etc.). This depersonalized form of patriarchy is in turn justified by the belief that it is the duty of all individuals to conform to their roles in order to maintain the harmony of the whole. In the bureaucracy, loyalty to the emperor and complete obedience became cardinal principles.

By emphasizing relations between 'father\son', 'emperor\subjects', etc., Confucianism offered strong ideological support to the emperor as well as to the bureaucracy with its numerous officials. As a famous philosopher Zhu Xi (AD 1130-1200) said, "Take for instance the human heart: father-son, prince-minister, brothers, husband-wife, friends, these relationships are just naturally embedded in it. To deny these relationships was to deny one's own nature" (cited in Hamilton 1990, p. 95). Another philosopher Cheng Hao (AD 1032-1085) also pointed out that such relationships actually belong to the eternal principle of the cosmos from which there was no escape between heaven and earth (See Hamilton 1990, p. 95).

Patriarchy was extended to become a basic principle of political as well as social structure. The society was seen as one vast 'extended family' ruled over by a paternalistic emperor, the 'Son of Heaven' and other paternalistic officials. Weber made note of this when he wrote "Just as patrimonialism has its genesis in the piety of children of the house toward the patriarch's authority, so Confucianism bases the subordination of the officials to the ruler, of the lower

to the higher-ranking officials, and particularly of the subjects to the officials and the ruler, on the cardinal virtue of filial piety" (cited in Hamilton 1990, p. 60). This is why Weber further noted that state authority as well as family authority in China approached the pure form, and the concept of piety, the virtue common to all examples of patriarchy and patrimonialism, reached its highest level (cited in Hamilton 1990, p. 61).

Therefore the legitimating ideology of the patrimonial bureaucracy was based on the ideology of the extended patriarchical family system. So there were strong roots of patrimonialism bred into the whole society. Patriarchy and patrimonialism merged to become typical characteristics of Chinese political ideology under Confucianism (See chart 2).

Chart 2. The Analogy Between Family and State Bureaucracy

(Dotted lines represent relationships based on analogy)

Chapter 2 The Agrarian Polity of Imperial China

1.   Comparison of China with other agrarian societies

To demonstrate that the political structure of imperial and pre-revolutionary China represents a typical agrarian polity, I have selected thirty agrarian societies from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of preindustrial societies to identify their common political characteristics. Through this comparison it will be shown that China's political characteristics fall in the modal categories in almost every instance.

Murdock and White (1969, the data for China was collected in 1936, See Murdock and White) selected 186 societies for their standard sample, and it includes many types of societies including hunting and gathering, horticultural, agrarian, and fishing and herding. Agrarian societies were distinguished from the other types according to the following criteria: if the reliance on *plow* agriculture accounted for more than 56 percent of the food consumed, or if the reliance on *plow* agriculture was in the range of 46-55 percent and no other mode of food production--such as fishing or herding--was equally important. This coding definition resulted in the sample of 30 agrarian societies.

Tuden and Marshall's paper "Political Organization: Cross-Cultural Codes 4" (1972) provided a detailed definition and presentation of coded variables in order to interpret the political structure of the thirty agrarian societies. I determined the frequency distributions for each of the political characteristics to find out whether or not China fell in the mode for the sample of agrarian societies (See Appendix 1 for complete definitions of Tuden and Marshall's codes).

Results of the comparative analysis

In agrarian society, the police function played an important role to hold the peasant mass in check. Because most agrarian societies were united by military force, the government had to use some coercion to keep people together in certain geographical areas. Effective control of the migration of people became an important question to agrarian society, since labor was the cardinal productive force. In the sample of 30 agrarian societies, twenty-two (73.3 percent) had police functions that were specialized and institutionalized. Preindustrial China is in the modal category on this variable (Table 1).

Table 1. Police

```
 Value Label                          Frequency   Percent
not specialized                               6      20.0
military organization                         1       3.3
*specialized                                 22      73.3
                                         -------   -------
                           Total             29     100.0
Valid Cases       29       Missing Cases      1
(*China is in this category)
```

As a matter of fact, the data reflected the Chinese Baojia system. This was a neighborhood administrative system organized on the basis of households by which the government enforced its rule at the primary level at that time. The government controlled all types of information about people through the Baojia system. The police function of the system formed a primary basis for local governmental rule.

The coded variable *Levels of Sovereignty* indicates the highest level of indigenous political integration at which functionaries have the power to enforce important decisions bearing on subordinate levels in the political structure (Tuden

and Marshall 1972). Twenty of the 30 agrarian societies (66.7 percent) were coded thus: 'effective sovereignty is found at the third or higher level of political integration above the local community, as in the case of a large state divided into administrative provinces which are further subdivide into lesser administrative districts' (Table 2).

Table 2. Levels of Sovereignty Transcending the Local Community

Value Label	Frequency	Percent
absence	3	10.0
one level	3	10.0
two levels	4	13.3
*three levels or more	20	**66.7**
	-------	-------
TOTAL	30	100.0

Valid Cases   30   Missing Cases   0
(*China is in this category)

The political system of China had numerous layers. At the top was the emperor followed by the royal family, eunuchs, and important literati who composed the highest rank in the ruling pyramid. The second level was composed of many kinds of ministries. The third level consisted of the hierarchy outside of the capital of the central government, at the provincial and local levels. So multiple levels of sovereignty existed in the Chinese polity. Once again the lowest level of political organization was found in the Baojia system.

After considering the police function and levels of sovereignty, naturally we will ask who is vested with decision-making power at highest level of effective sovereignty in agrarian societies. The coded variables of *Executive* and *Deliberative and Consultative Bodies* show us that most agrarian societies were monarchies headed by a king or emperor. There were no deliberative and

consultative bodies as a rule. Succession of the executive was usually hereditary within a ruling family or determined by a ruling clique.

Concerning the *Executive* function, in more than half of the societies (53.3 percent) the supreme decision-making authority was concentrated in a single authoritative leader, eg., a paramount chief, king, or emperor (Table 3). The *Deliberative and Consultative Bodies* variable reflects that in 66.7 percent of societies there was an 'absence of a deliberative body' (Table 4).

Table 3. Executive

Value Label	Frequency	Percent
no effective executive	3	10.0
council	1	3.3
shared executive	9	30.0
plural executive	1	3.3
*single executive	16	**53.3**
TOTAL	30	100.0

Valid Cases   30   Missing Cases   0
(*China is in this category)

Table 4. Deliberative and Consultative Bodies

Value Label	Frequency	Percent
*absence deliberative body	20	**66.7**
aristocratic deliver body	1	3.3
deliberative council	3	10.0
plural deliberative body	2	6.7
independent deliberative body	4	13.3
TOTAL	30	100.0

Valid Cases   30   Missing Cases   0
(*China is in this category)

In the political structure of China, the emperor and his court were at the apex of a hierarchical establishment composed of a civil bureaucracy of the Chinese literati. The emperor had absolute decision-making power in the whole country, and the viceroys and governors were comparably powerful at the regional and provincial levels. In the local districts the dominant official was the magistrate. This structure based its claims of legitimacy on the hegemonical ideology of Confucianism, which had been the universal faith in China since 206 B.C. The doctrines of 'Ren', 'Li' and 'De' played an indispensable function to maintain the imperial dynasty's survival as already noted.

We need to mention here that the emperor was usually succeeded by his son or another family member, except when hereditary succession was disrupted by rebellion or revolution. But as soon as the rebel leader became the new emperor, the hereditary system started to work again. This was because the combination of patrimonial family structure and Confucian ideology reproduced the same political structure. In view of this, it is not difficult to see why the Chinese political system lasted more than two thousand years.

The Chinese traditionally were never able to think of themselves as being without an emperor. The Chinese people overwhelmed the last emperor in 1911 to establish a Republic, but they still maintained the political structure of the imperial institution. The paramount leader Chiang Kai-shei had supreme dictatorial power, and no one could challenge him. He was like a former emperor. The SCCS data reflect this, based on the situation in 1936.

The other political variables still to be considered reflect the autocratic power of the central *Executive*. First, subordinate officials were typically appointed by the supreme executive (51.7 percent) (Table 5). Second, the principle subordinate functionaries were heads of territorial divisions of the state who were closely supervised by the supreme executive and formed part of a

centralized administrative system (50 percent) (Table 6). Third, in a plurality of agrarian societies (46.7 percent) the supreme executive appointed judicial authority which was then relatively independent of the executive (Table 7). On all of these dimensions, China was found to be in the modal categories. The long tradition of centralization with supreme executive power exercised by the emperor determined the Chinese political system and was also typical of other agrarian societies.

Table 5. Selection of Subordinate Officials

Value Label	Frequency	Percent
absence effective sovereignty	3	10.3
patrilineal succession	2	6.9
hereditary succession	1	3.4
personal influence	1.	3.4
election by constituencies	4	13.8
*supreme appointment	15	**51.7**
hereditary with appointment	3	10.3
TOTAL	29	100.0

Valid Cases   29   Missing Cases   1
(*China is in this category)

Table 6. Administrative Hierarchy

Value Label	Frequency	Percent
absence effective sovereignty	3	10.0
councils of plural statuses	2	6.7
kin group	4	13.3
decentralized administration	3	10.0
*centralized administration	15	**50.0**
share authority with deliberate	3	10.0
TOTAL	30	100.0

Valid Cases   30   Missing Cases   0
(*China is in this category)

Table 7. Judiciary

Value Label	Frequency	Percent
lack judicial authority	3	10.0
very limit judicial authority	3	10.0
executive as judicial power	10	33.3
*relatively independent	14	**46.7**
-------	-------
TOTAL	30	100.0

Valid Cases   30   Missing Cases   0
(*China is in this category)

Only on the political organizational characteristic of *Advisory Bodies* was China found to be non-modal (See table 8). In fact, this variable reflects the situation in which the supreme executive surrounded himself with advisors who were family members.

Table 8. Advisory Bodies

Value Label	Frequency	Percent
absence effective sovereignty	3	10.3
absence separate consultative	5	17.2
kin group	4	13.8
personal favorite of executive	1	3.4
advisory body	2	6.9
*consultative with hereditary	1	3.4
administrative advisory	13	44.8
-------	-------
TOTAl	30	100.0

Valid Cases   29   Missing Cases   1
(*China is in this category)

By describing, explaining, and comparing the data of the thirty agrarian societies, we have verified that the political structure of pre-revolutionary China fits the agrarian pattern very well.

2. Additional characteristics of political structure and process in Imperial China

Weber distinguished three types of authority (1947):

1) Rational legal authority--resting on a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the rights of those elevated to authority;

2) Traditional authority--resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority;

3) Charismatic authority--resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.

In the case of rational-legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of their office. In the case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the person or the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is (within its sphere) bound by tradition. But here the obligation of obedience is not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations. In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma (Weber 1947).

Traditional authority was perhaps the most prevalent type in agrarian societies in general and in China in particular. The patriarchal family and its extension as a model of state organization exemplified this. Patriarchalism is a system where authority is usually organized on both an economic and a kinship

basis, as a household. Authority is exercised by a particular individual who is designated by a definite rule of inheritance.

While primarily reflecting traditional authority, China's polity showed characteristics of charismatic authority. Weber describes charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional qualities" (1947, p. 329). It is essential that the charismatic individual be recognized or regarded as such. This recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion arising out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope" (Eisenstadt 1968, p. xviii). The idea of the 'Son of Heaven' exemplified this. As a matter of fact, the political structure and process in China had always depended on the leadership of the 'Son of Heaven', who embraced both traditional and charismatic authority. Rational-legal authority was non-existent.

The institution of a supreme emperor began with unification in 211 BC., when the state of Qin conquered its neighbors and set the stage for the Han dynasty during which Confucianism became a state doctrine or dominant ideology. The emperor's absolute authority placed him in a unique position. To the Chinese people, the worship of *Tian* (heaven) as the supreme power was restricted to the sovereign alone. His position was confirmed as the authorized or legitimated leader of mankind, and he acted as their representative or intermediary in negotiating with the supreme being. *Tian-Zi* meaning 'Son of Heaven' exercised a profound effect on the Chinese concept of sovereignty.

Confucianism, as a secular religion enhanced the position of emperor and sanctified his sovereignty. In China, the throne of emperor was surrounded with rituals which brought the mystical *Tian* near to the secular earth. The emperor usually wrote in red and his officials wrote in black. In an audience, he alone faced south, while they faced north. Only the emperor could use the special term

Zhen , meaning *I*. The characters of his personal name were taboo throughout the whole country, and any reference to the emperor or the imperial will was always separated from, and elevated above, the rest of the lines of any document in which it appeared. Imperial edicts were received with incense and ritual prostration, and temples were built for the worship of His Majesty. All subjects performed the traditional *Kowtow (Ke Tou)* and cheered 'Long live, long long live the emperor' (*WanSui WanWanSui*) in the emperor's presence (This situation is repeated in the Cultural Revolution in contemporary China).

Ideally, the sovereign emperor was pictured as a holy or saintly ruler, who had been provided by heaven (*Tian*) so as to appear at the appropriate moment on earth. The connection between earthly government and the ordinances of Heaven was taken further with the assumption that the 'Son of Heaven' was responsible to Heaven for the welfare of his earthly charges. As 'Son of Heaven', he maintained the universal harmony of man and nature by doing the right things at right time according to the Mandate of Heaven (*Ren*, *Li* and *De* of Confucianism). No one could challenge his power or question the morality of his action.

How did the emperor rule his realm? As 'Son of Heaven', the emperor was placed at the highest position of a power pyramid. Beneath him there was a huge hierarchy with a pyramidal structure to rule the government and the people (See chart 3). From the chart, we can see that the imperial emperor stood at the apex of the pyramidal power structure. The literati, royal family, in-law family of the emperor (WaiQi), and the eunuchs comprised the state bureaucracy.

The political structure of the Han dynasty (B.C. 206--A.D. 202) illustrated the supreme power of the emperor and the function of literati, WaiQi, and the eunuchs. Its political patterns showed was similar to Rome's 'Authoritarian

Chart 3. The Pyramidal Power Structure in
Imperial China

Emperor

Patri-
archal
& in-law
family

Central
&
Provin-
cial

literati

Eunuchs

Local literati

bureaucracy' described previously.

First, the political authority in the state was completely centralized in the sovereignty of the emperor. Second, the emperor's authority in the conduct of the administration was exercised in his behalf by his chief ministers. They stood at the top of a graded bureaucracy and were responsible to him for the success or failure of the administration. Third, this bureaucracy was centralized in the vast palace at the capital (e.g.,the Forbidden City in Beijing) where the emperor exercised the power of appointment to office. His chief task became the selection of civil servants (who came from the literati or the royal family), with an eye to the maintenance of his power and his dynasty.

Among the three political factions (literati, patriarchal and in-law families of the emperor, and eunuchs), the literati were the most important part of the political structure. The Emperor actually realized his rule depending on the literati who shared knowledge and a common ethics--Confucianism--which gave the members of this faction a strong sense of solidarity (Pye 1978).

The Chinese literati were a status group who had proven themselves in a series of competitive examinations which tested their scholarship and the depth of their knowledge of the Confucian tradition. They played an indispensable social function in the bureaucracy. Although numerically infinitesimal, the literati were extremely powerful by reason of their unity and closeness to the emperor. They owned the largest amount of land. This class possessed every privilege, the highest being the privilege of reproducing itself, which was the monopoly of Confucian education (Balazs 1964). The literati elite drew its strength from the indispensable function it performed--the coordination and supervisors of the productive labor of others. This made the whole social organism work. All mediating and administrative functions were carried out by the literati.

Most of the Chinese people accepted the literati as their 'father-mother'

officials (Fumu Guan). This was because the people were deeply influenced by traditional Confucianism. A passage from Mencius (the most influential Confucian after Confucius himself) who gave popular form to Confucian thought, will give a much better idea about the literati:

> "Great men have their business, and little men have their business....Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them" (See Balazs, p. 62, cited from Mencius III A, 4; trans. James Legge, *Chinese Classics* 2, 249-50).

Continuity of government was a necessity if the cohesion of a vast agrarian empire was to be maintained. This explains why the ruling class was able to cling so tenaciously to their prerogatives and last for such an astonishing length of time. Without strict fulfillment of the coordinating function by the literati and its united political philosophy--Confucianism, China would quickly have disintegrated (Balazs 1964).

It is important to point out that China adopted the Confucianism doctrine as the dominant ideology, which was enhanced and promulgated by the literati. It helped China to create a patriarchal, paternalistic world in which gradations of rank, from the sovereign downward, were marked by the reciprocal relations of favor and obligation. Individual rights, initiative, and liberty were entirely lacking. Under the guidance of the state hegemony of Confucianism, all literati in the central and local government performed their duty based on 'loyalty to the emperor and taking care of the people according to *Ren, Li, De*'. The literati as an elite group were contingent on the persistence of the ideal of a unified Empire. Of course, this situation helped the emperor to maintain the united bureaucracy and his sovereign authority.

There are two other important political groups, besides the literati in the imperial era. One consisted of the members of the patriarchal and in-law families of the emperor. As mentioned before, the 'Son of Heaven' ruled the whole country, which was just like a extended patriarchal family. So we can imagine the function of the patriarchal family and in-law family in court politics. Since the throne of the emperor usually devolved to the oldest son, the emperor usually favored his in-laws for appointment as high officials of court politics so as to avoid power struggles for the succession within his patriarchal family. This was because the in-law family (WaiQi) or maternal relatives were the one group of persons completely dependent upon the emperor's favor as well as tied to him by marriage bonds (Fairbank 1986).

Meanwhile, the emperor kept a number of eunuchs who were devoted exclusively to serve the person of the emperor. It was their day-to-day relationship with the emperor that helped them become another political interest group. Within the palace there were many eunuchs (e.g. by the end of the Ming dynasty, there were seventy thousand eunuchs in the Forbidden City; during Qing dynasty the number exceeded one hundred thousand) who served for the emperor's lifetime. In theory, the eunuchs had no role in the management of government or the making any of public policy, however the emperor came to rely on them more and more.

The emperor usually depended on eunuchs and relatives to supervise and counter the power of the literati. The emperor always used these two groups to supervise and control a large number of literati in the central and local bureaucracy. In the short term the supervisory function of in-law family and eunuchs was an effective way to promote the whole organism to work well. However, in the long term, it weakened and undermined the regular bureaucracy, since the strong contradiction between well-educated literati, who depended on

their own ability and knowledge of Confucianism, and in-law family members and eunuchs, who were only personal favorites of the emperor, could not be avoided. It often happened that in-law family members and eunuchs meddled in court politics. This always had chaotic consequences, a situation that is repeatedly verified by Chinese history. That is why the first emperor of each dynasty usually strictly controlled the number of eunuchs and forbade the appointment of in-law family members as high officials in the inner court. But it was impossible for subsequent emperors to avoid using many in-law family members and large numbers of eunuchs. A new dynasty reproduced or copied the same political structure of the former dynasty. History was repeated with surprising similarity.

Summary

My aim in discussing the political structure and process in imperial China and comparing it with other agrarian societies is to establish a basis for understanding the persistence of patrimonial politics and the cult of the supreme leader in modern China. It is obvious that no one can conjure away the sheer length of time the Chinese Empire lasted, or deny the permanence of the imperial institutions, which endured in spite of successive metamorphosis. The Chinese people overthrew the last emperor in 1911 and Mao Zedong brought dramatic revolution to China after 1949, but post-revolutionary China is still reacting to the legacies of imperial polity. Following the theory of Lenski et al. (1991) a reason for this can be suggested in the fact that although modern China has entered the industrial era, its polity still operates on an agrarian model. As in other industrializing agrarian societies, China's leaders today are restricted to forms of government and ideological discourse that were established in the agrarian era.

Part II Post-Revolutionary China

Chapter 3   Maoism as an Ideology

The twentieth century has witnessed the passing away of traditional Chinese imperial political structure. Revolutionary elites appeared with a new totalistic ideology--Marxist-Leninism and Maoism and established the People's Republic of China. The country entered the industrial era. But as an industrializing agrarian society, according to Lenski et al., China is a mixture of the old and the new. Preindustrial technology is still widespread in agriculture. In 1949, for example, there were only 401 tractors in the whole country and all of these were imported. In 1958 the figure was 45,330 and in 1966 it stood at over 200,000 with more than 2,200 state tractor stations. However, in spite of this spectacular rise, in 1962 less than 10 percent of China's ploughland was being worked by mechanical methods (Tregear 1980). Other evidence of industrializing influences occurring in agricultural production can be seen in the growth in powered irrigation and the use of artificial fertilizer (Table 9).

In 1949, the country still had a basically agrarian population distribution with nearly 90 percent of the people living in rural areas, and preindustrial agriculture predominated. The growth of mechanized agriculture in the decades since the Chinese Revolution has steadily reduced the proportion of the rural population compared to the urban (Table 10). But not until 1989 did a majority of the Chinese people live in urban centers, and still China has a long way to go to reach the advanced industrial pattern where only a tiny minority live in the rural areas and are employed in agriculture.

Table 9. Post-Revolutionary China: The Subsistence Technology and Rural   Economic Indicators, 1952-1980

	1952	1957	1965	1976	1980	Increase 1952-1980(%)
Tractors (excluding small tractors) (1,000)	1	1	7	40	75	7,400
Powered irrigation (mill.hp)	0.1	0.6	9	54	75	75,000
Artificial fertilizer used per mu (jin)	0.1	0.4	3	8	17	7,000
Artificial fertilizer (mill.tons)	--	0.2	2	5	12	12,000*

Note: jin = roughly 0.5 kg.
      * 1957-1980

Source: Adapted from Christopher J. Smith, 1991, P 75

Table 10. China's Urban and Rural Population, 1949-1989

	Urban		Rural	
	Pop. (mill.)	% of Total	Pop. (mill.)	% of Total
1949	57.45	10.6	48.40	89.4
1958	107.21	16.3	552.73	83.7
1966	133.13	17.9	612.29	82.1
1976	163.41	17.4	773.76	82.6
1978	172.45	17.9	790.14	82.1
1981	201.71	20.2	799.01	79.2
1983	241.50	23.5	786.14	76.5
1985	384.46	36.6	665.98	63.4
1987	503.62	46.6	577.11	53.4
1989	579.72	51.7	540.77	48.3

Source from Jonathan D. Spence's "The Search For Modern China", Christopher J. Smith's "China: people and places in the land of one billion" and Encyclopedic Britannica 1991.

According to Lenski's ecological-evolutionary theory (1991), we should not expect the Chinese polity to achieve the rational-legal forms that characterize the polities of the advanced industrial societies while the technological base remains largely agrarian. In following discussions, I will argue how the political structures and ideology of China still follow the old agrarian pattern.

1. Maoism as a hegemonic ideology

According to Huntington, when traditional political institutions are smashed by revolution, the post-revolutionary order depends on the emergence of one strong political party (1968). The Chinese Communist Party under Mao was just that kind of party. Instead of a drive toward pluralism and a system of legitimacy anchored in the realities of political processes, there was a frantic search for a new totalistic ideology to replace the outdated and eroding Confucian order. Marxist-Leninism in its Maoist form became that new moral order which reenergized the elite's claims to moral superiority and invincibility. The party as a new form of political organization assumed the role which the literati and other traditional elites played in the agrarian polity. Social stability depended directly on the strength of the Party and the Party's strength like that of the literati of old depended on its unifying ideology. To keep the society in harmony and order, the Party used Maoism as its dominant ideology, just as Confucianism had played a similar function in pre-revolutionary China.

Hegemony is an important concept that comes from *Gramsci's (1971) prison notebooks*. Gramsci always emphasized that it was very critical for the process of socialist transition to create a strong ideology. Although the Chinese Communist Party has not adopted Gramsci's theory as its guiding thought (they considered Gramsci's thought to be anti-Marxist), Chinese ideology is nevertheless similar to Gramsci's hegemony.

The ruling class use their control of education, culture, communications media, etc. to propagate hegemony in social life according to their interests. Hegemony has created "a certain way of life and thought that is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused through society in all its institutional and private manifestations'" (Sallach 1974, p. 41). Ideological hegemony becomes the main vehicle to realize social control by the ruling class. This is clearly exemplified by Maoism.

Mao applied the principles of Marxist-Leninism to the Chinese situation, especially the 'successful experience' of the October Revolution of the former Soviet Union. Then he generalized a set of theories and thought adapted for the Chinese situation to guide the Chinese revolution. Through a combination of the 'universal principle of Marxist-Leninism' with Chinese practice, Maoism was created. The Chinese Communist Party under the direction of Mao Zedong formed one of the largest ideological institutions of the modern world.

Mao Zedong once told American journalist Edward Snow if there were no God in China, one would have to be created. Mao understood the Chinese traditional culture very well, especially the political consciousness of people who needed a god-like emperor. Mao like other agrarian leaders did not want to promote the development of democratic politics or to reform the imperial political consciousness of the old society. On the contrary, he took advantage of people's old political consciousness: Mao became the new emperor.

(1)   The centrality of 'class struggle' in Mao's ideology

The central concept of Maoism is the notion of 'class struggle'. This doctrine was deployed in Chinese society to control all economic and political fields and social life until 1978. It reached its peak in the 'disaster' of the 'Cultural Revolution'. Mao insisted 'never forget class struggle'. He believed if

the Party forced confrontations with sources of social resentment and discontent even peasants could become 'conscious' and mobilized to the revolutionary course. His idea was to keep society in a continual state of revolution.

The Chinese Party under Mao not only used all its ideological institutions to propagate hegemony, but it also launched a number of mass movements to continue the revolution. Under the directive of 'class struggle is not over yet', they purged many people who disagreed with Mao, including higher leaders and lower cadres. Mao let loose cruel struggles within the Party to consolidate his hegemony. "In the post-revolutionary period, the continuing series of political and economic campaigns express most fully Mao's commitment to 'class struggle'" (Solomon 1971, p. 256).

Here, I give an example how the Party used educational institutions to influence the Chinese people. When I was a primary school student, our first lesson was that Mao was the greatest liberator. He helped the Chinese people to become emancipated from the feudalism, imperialism, and semi-colonialism of old China. There was no room for any other ideologies but Maoism. The second lesson was "Never forget class struggle" and "We would rather be a socialist grass than a capitalist tree", "We would rather have socialist low ratio of economic growth than capitalist high rate of growth", "We would rather stop production for two years than stop 'class struggle' for one moment". When we entered middle school, we had to study more of Mao's works. It was basic education to the student in the period of the Cultural Revolution. From the beginning, we were completely influenced by Mao's thought. I think both Mao and the Party clearly understood Gramsci's words "they (the ruling class) can simply create a terrain more favorable to dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of national life" (Gramsci 1971, p. 184).

(2)   'Small group' and political education

Mao depended on many kinds of 'small groups' (*xiao zu*) and political education to realize 'class struggle'. 'Small groups' organize people to study Maoism, the documents of the Chinese Communist Party, and the principles of Marxist-Leninism.

From Martin Whyte (1974), we learn the most important of such efforts was the formation of the *Bao-Jia* system. Thus, the 'small group' was actually a legacy of imperial China. According to official Qing dynasty (1644-1911) documents, throughout the empire inhabitants were organized into groups of ten households (termed a *bai*), ten of these groups were organized into a grouping called a *jia*, and ten of these would in turn form a *bao*. Each grouping would have a head chosen from its families, under the supervision of the *Cun* (small town) magistrate and his assistants (Whyte 1974). The primary purpose of the *Bao-Jia* system was to keep track of the population, control disorder, integrate societal unity and consolidate the rule of government. The *Bao-Jia* system paralleled the 'small group' of post-revolutionary China, both in augmenting formal organizational structures with semi-official groupings of ordinary citizens and in assigning collective responsibility for reporting deviance to higher authorities.

The many kinds of 'small groups' and neighborhood committees found in every urban and rural residential register births and deaths, organize political study meetings for imbuing the Communist Party's ideology, and mediate family disputes. To some extent, therefore, the 'small group' was patterned after the imperial *Bao-Jia* system. But the post-revolutionary bureaucracy under Mao extended much further down into society and was able to maintain closer supervision over basic level groups. 'Small groups' were organized primarily on the basis of units of work or study, although there were also residential groups.

The systematic ideological study and mutual group criticism of political education made up the central topic of the 'small groups'. Chinese Communist 'small group' ritual harkens back to more general practices, inclinations, and philosophical themes of traditional China (Whyte 1974).

The 'small group' aimed at political indoctrination. The formal hierarchy of political indoctrination included: the Party Central Committee and propaganda department at the top, study committees at territorial and organizational levels down to the individual unit, and 'small groups' divided into different grades under the local study committee. Everyone in the country was involved in these 'small groups' to accept political education. The content of the indoctrination consisted in Mao's books and speeches, Party Central Committee's documents, and Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Political study was divided into distinct stages: individual study, mutual-help 'small group' meetings, 'small group' discussions, mutual criticism, large meetings, and summations (Whyte 1974). This situation, by and large, still exits in contemporary China.

Maoism could be seen as the dominant ideology which played the same function as Confucianism in imperial China. In traditional China the unity of society was preserved by subjecting the potential governing elite to a long course of study of orthodox philosophical texts--Confucianism. Unified in outlook by this rigid indoctrination, the elite could then give unity to the state bureaucracy and the entire society. A similar practice exits in post-revolutionary China, although the nature of both the texts and the elite has changed (Whyte 1974).

In conclusion, 'small group' ritual is highly routinized, performing a maintenance function throughout the whole society. It contributes to preventing deviance and maintaining social control. So, we would say, the Chinese Communist Party seems to be more successful in getting people to 'drop' old habits and to undertake new tasks through the ritual of political education than

they are in maintaining change (Whyte 1974). Finally, 'small group' ritual plays an important function of effective communications, of getting official ideas, especially Mao's ideas, down to ordinary citizens.

2. Political ritual during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)

As a charismatic leader of the Chinese Party and people, Mao had sovereign authority. In effect, he created himself to become a new emperor. According to Durkheim (1965), the experience of religion and the idea of the divine are the products of collective activity. Religious belief and social ritual enhance the solidarity of the collective or group on which people depend. In other words, there exists a reciprocal relationship between religion and society. Religious belief symbolically expresses social reality (Durkheim 1965). Social ritual makes use of common emotions and interests to bind people together in the collective activity and to strengthen the moral order. Thus, social ritual is a primary mechanism for promoting integration and unity in society.

Why does social ritual produce a mystical energy to bind individuals together and make people forget their private interests for the sake of the collectivity? Where does the mystical energy come from? When individuals come together in social rituals, they focus their attention and behavior on common symbols. As a result of their interaction and inter-stimulation, a powerful emotional energy is produced. Each individual feels about him others who share the common experience. This causes the emotional energy to be reinforced. The conduct of each person promotes a common experience that transcends the individual participants. This effect is very important to social life and society, because the emotions of the collective group cause their members to unite and it strengthens their social bonds. The spatial and temporal concentration of the participants during social ritual acts as an exceptionally

powerful stimulus. Thus, Durkheim said: "When they (individuals) are once come together, a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every sentiment expressed finds a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside impressions; each echoes the others, and is re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance" (Durkheim 1965, p. 247). In this collective ambience, each person experiences a supernatural strength which makes all feel inseparable.

When we use Durkheim's ideas about religious belief and ritual to understand modern society, we can see that what goes on in social ritual can play an important role to bind individuals together for political purposes. Using Durkheim we can understand why Mao used 'political ritual' to promote political ideology and the legitimacy of his regime. The political deification of Mao Zedong succeeded in binding the Chinese people together and created an intense collective awareness during the Cultural Revolution.

When the Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of China in 1949, Confucianism and other kinds of religious belief such as Buddhism and Taoism were abolished and replaced by Marxist doctrine which declared 'religion is the opiate of the people'. All traditional religious ritual was discontinued. The only dominant ideology of post-revolutionary China was Maoism, which combined Marxism-Leninism with concrete conditions in China. But according to Durkheim, rituals are a system of rites that every society uses as an adhesive to hold itself together. Rituals must exist even in secular societies. Although the Chinese Party eliminated Confucianism and other religious belief, they initiated and encouraged a new form of social ritual activity centered around Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Party, so as to realize the common goal of 'utopian socialism' during the Cultural Revolution.

In the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao was seen as the 'Great Leader', 'Great Helmsman', and 'Great Liberator' and was widely worshipped by the people. Each person took part in 'small group' rituals to accept political education and to understand Maoist doctrines. Maoism became the new orthodoxy. The political rituals which deified Mao penetrated the whole society. At that time, there were many slogans such as 'Long live Chairman Mao' and 'Be ready to die in defense of Chairman Mao' displayed everywhere. There were many songs which children sang reminiscent of Western hymns in praise of Jesus. The content proclaimed: 'My love for my parents is great but greater still is my love for Chairman Mao', or 'We think of you every minute, respected Chairman Mao'. The cult of personality, which the 'small group' pushed to the extreme, derived implicit support from the previous long history of emperor worship. Loyalty toward the leader rested on the traditional concept of loyalty to one's superiors in all political and social ranks. The injunction, 'every directive issued by Chairman Mao must be obeyed whether you understand it or not, agree with it or not', drew on the traditional Confucian virtue of obedience.

Meanwhile, Mao was glorified as 'The Red Sun', 'The Great Teacher', 'The Great Commander', 'The Great Steersman' and 'The Messiah of Working People'. Mao became a symbol of the divine, the source of supernatural energy. Catching a glimpse of him in public left observers with unforgettable memories, and many were reduced to tears by the experience. A kind of supernatural energy was produced by collective ritual activities. The individuals and masses would spend the night in the street if they knew Mao's route the next day would take him past them. When Mao finally appeared, the people would jump, shout, cry out and shake the 'Little Red Book' of Mao in paroxysms of joy. Because individuals, who had obeyed Mao as their god and who for this reason believed that Mao was with them, approached the world with confidence and with a

feeling of increased energy. A collective will to worship Mao penetrated each person and became an integral part of the Chinese people.

Mao's appearances verify what Durkheim said about the particular attitude of a man speaking to a crowd. If he has succeeded in entering into communion with the crowd, his language has a grandiloquence that would be ridiculous in ordinary circumstances; his gestures show a certain domination; his very thought is impatient of all rules, and easily falls into all sorts of excesses (Durkheim 1965, p. 241). Mao's enormous presence was something very real; it came to him from the masses which he always addressed. The sentiments provoked by his words (Mao's Little Red Book) came back to him, but enlarged and amplified, and to this degree the masses of society strengthened his own sentiment. Under this circumstance, Mao became a leader of confidence, courage and boldness of action, just like the believer who thinks that he feels the regard of his god turned graciously toward him (Durkheim 1965, p. 242). Like the emperors of old, Mao became an omnipotent, god-like figure whom no one could challenge.

Political ritual activities of deification were set up in association with the fanatic devotion to the idol Mao. For instance, it was very common that, in the morning before breakfast, family members stood before Mao's picture asking for instructions for the day. In the evening, standing before Mao's picture again, they made a quiet confession of the 'sins' they had committed during the day. People worshiped Mao as a routine activity--often before working, before class, before a meeting, or before dinner. They would all stand up, facing Mao's picture, and say 'we wish longevity to our Great Leader, the Reddest Sun in our heart, Chairman Mao'. When a formal meeting or a conference was held, two songs in praise of Mao were added at the beginning and the end of the meeting 'The East is Red' and 'Sailing in the Sea Relies on the Helmsman'. Here I quote a few lines from these songs.

'Red is the east, rises the sun.

China has brought forth a Mao Ze-dong.

For the people's happiness he works

He is the people's liberator'.

*   *   *   *   *

'Sailing the seas depends on the Helmsman

Life and growth depend on the sun.

Rain and dewdrops nourish the crops,

Making revolution depends on Mao Ze-dong's thought,

Mao's thought is the sun that forever shines'.

These two songs were considered as sacred as the Chinese national anthem. The masses were also expected to learn and practice a special dance of loyalty to Mao. While performing the loyalty dance people used to hold the 'Little Red Book' on their chest. Meanwhile they sang a song such as 'The East is Red' as they danced. Thus Mao was worshiped continually through verbal expression, singing and dancing. These ritual activities expressed the idea that Mao had saved the Chinese people from the miserable 'old society'. He was the great liberator of the people and he would lead them on the right path. Thus the collective values were dramatized and reinforced (Wuthnow 1987), and social cohesion was promoted.

In the midst of this effervescent social environment and out of this effervescence itself Maoism as religious belief penetrated the whole society. The social rituals to "which society is strongly enough attached to impose them upon its members, are, by that very fact, marked with a distinctive sign provocative of respect" (Durkheim 1965, p. 238). Mao's works were 'holy writ': one sentence spoken by him was as potent as ten thousand ordinary sentences, and his writing

was printed in the 'Precious Red Book'. In order to make them more accessible and convenient for a person to carry, some of his quotations were collected in the 'Little Red Book' and handed out to each individual (Jiping Zuo 1991), just like the Bible comes in many forms and sizes to facilitate its wide use in a Christian country. People could memorize each sentence of the 'Red Book' by heart and use Mao's words to solve daily problems. People often met together to study Mao's works as Christians read the Bible.

Moreover, during that period, whenever a new 'highest instruction' from Mao was announced, people would go into the streets and celebrate at the very moment the new instruction was released, even if it was midnight, holding the 'Red Book' high in their hands. The supernatural, mystical strength of Mao made individuals forget their own interests, they made themselves his devotees.

When Durkheim used the concept of 'symbol' to explain the elementary belief of the Australian societies, he said: "In fact, it is a well-known law that the sentiments aroused in us by something spontaneously attach themselves to the symbol which represents them" (Durkheim 1965, p. 251). In the Cultural Revolution, red, for the Chinese people, was a sign of loyalty to Mao. It also suggested love. This transference of sentiments comes simply from the fact that the idea of Mao and the symbols of Mao were closely united in individuals' minds. The result was that the emotions provoked by the one extended contagiously to the other. During that period, the relationship between Mao and the masses was seen as that of the sun and sunflowers. Like sunflowers turning toward the sun, the hearts of people turned toward Mao. The Chinese people were unable to think of themselves being without Chairman Mao during the Cultural Revolution, just as the agrarian Chinese state was unthinkable without the Emperor to guide it.

All of the places where Mao had ever stayed, such as SaoSan in which he

was born, Tiananmen Gate, etc., were seen as 'holy places' and they often evoked strong emotions of love. People went to there to demonstrate their respect for Mao.

Summary

Mao and the Party's leaders successfully employed rituals to achieve political cohesion. Chinese society showed cohesion and unity at least until Mao died in 1976, even though Mao's aura covered up a lot of instability and inner tensions.

If we compare Maoist political ritual activities to the imperial Chinese polity, we observe that Maoism was like a new Confucianism. The orthodox position on Mao's thought served as a justification for the status quo in the Chinese Communist system. Since Mao's doctrines were treated religiously, they legitimated his regime and prevented any changes either on the theoretical level or in practice (Zuo Jiping 1991).

Chapter 4 Political Structure in Modern China

Chinese agrarian society based on subsistence level production and the ideology of Confucianism formulated a hierarchical structuring of society with traditional and charismatic authority; a collectivist organization at the village and neighborhood level with individuals made subservient to the large group; and a tightly knit social network, with a strong emphasis on the extended family. In this chapter, I exhibit the particularistic ties of patronage, nepotism, and favoritism that have persisted in contemporary China.

Huntington (1968) considers that the party, as a new form of political organization after the revolution, takes over traditional elites and social stability depends directly on the strength of the party. He proposes a one dominant party model. In a dominant party system only one party has capacity to govern the whole society. The processes determining governmental policy and political leadership function almost exclusively through the framework of a single party. The party becomes the source of legitimacy and since the party is the institutional embodiment of national sovereignty, it becomes the popular will. The dominant party decides the paramount position of political leaders and their fortunes as representatives of the people's interest. Under these circumstances, one might infer that the party bureaucracy should be highly efficient in implementing its policies.

The political structure of post-revolutionary China was based on just such a dominant party system--the Chinese Communist Party. But its political system and bureaucracy are nevertheless very inefficient. So the Chinese case does not fall into Huntington's model of a dominant party system. Lenski's ecological-

evolutionary theory better explains China's difficulty converting traditional and charismatic authority to rational-legal authority.

Lenski et al. argue that in industrializing agrarian societies, one of the greatest hindrances to development has been the kind of governing class they inherited form the past (1991). The legacies of imperial political structure and process still have a strong influence on the Chinese Communist government. When we look at China, it seems like Confucianism is reborn in Mao's dominant ideology along with features of the agrarian polity such as patrimonialism, nepotism and favoritism. These legacies caused China's single party system to have inefficiencies not explained by Huntington's model.

1.   Historical factors in the development of patronage, nepotism, and favoritism

The most egregious mistake made by many was the belief that legalism, which had played an important role during the first dynasty, was compatible with Confucianism. Confucianism, with its emphasis on personal relationships, kinship and fealty to elders, masters, and emperor, unconditionally became the hegemonic ideology of the ruling class, and the concept of the role of law was very far from the consciousness of the Chinese leaders, officials, and masses. Although China advocates the establishment of a rationalized legal system today, Stavis states that: "It would be the most radical break in China's three thousands years of political tradition to have the top leadership legitimize its power in laws and popularly elected institutions" (Stavis 1983, pp. 189-91).

Since the Han Dynasty, Confucianism with its emphasis on personal relationships and blood-ties overshadowed the rule of law. In fact, it was impossible to avoid informal patron-client relations, nepotism and favoritism. This is because in China all individuals belonged to a network of particularistic

relationships, some in which an individual was dominant, and some in which he was subservient.

2. Patronage (patron-client relations) in post-revolutionary China

China was in chaos after the May Fourth Movement overthrew the last emperor of Chinese history. Who could rule the huge country and its people? After more than thirty years of war, including anti-Japanese struggles coupled with a long and terrible domestic war against Chiang Kai-si and the Kuangmingdang, the Chinese Communist Party established the Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.) in 1949. The Party offered many kinds of privileges in politics, economy and social life. Thus, another form of patrimonialism (patronage), nepotism and favoritism appeared in China; and although the emperor no longer existed, the features of the old order were still at work.

According to Weber, in an organization based on rational-legal authority, political leaders should act in obedience to the regulations of law and order. But in China, because there is no institutionalization of rational-legal bureaucracy, the Chinese political leaders have to set up many alliance or special personal relationships with each other so as to maintain their power or to fight others for personal security. Each high official of the central government has his own patron-client network. The practical situation of the Party and the government bureaucracy reflects Eisenstadt's statement: "The most important tensions inherent in these relations (patron-clients) are those between the emphasis on purely solidary or spiritual relations and concrete--power and instrumental--obligations" (1984, p. 14).

In China, the Communist Party Chairman such as Mao Ze-dong or Deng Xiao-ping as paramount leaders were much like an emperor with the supreme decision-making concentrated in their hands. The only difference was that they

couldn't appoint their own sons as their direct successors, but they could determine or choose the successor of the Party who came from the ruling clique.

The basis of power networks in politics is a pattern of personal bonds known as *GuanXi* . *GuanXi* describes the intense, personal bonds of acquaintanceship and mutual belonging that give vivid context to the networks of personal associations (Pye 1981). Only through *GuanXi* , could political leaders set up networks for confirming power or enlarging influence so that they could hold predominant power. According to Eisenstadt and Roniger, "this is evidence of clientelistic networks within state socialist regimes" (1981, p. 234).

In China political decisions are firmly controlled by the politburo and the secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party and by the Standing Committee of the State Council, the top Commanders of the military, and the leaders of the wealthiest and largest cities and provinces (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1986). In Harding's analysis of radical and moderate reform (1986), we can see how patron-client relationships work among the Chinese political elites.

Deng Xiaoping is the patron of General Secretary Hu Yao-bang, Zhao Zhi-yang, vice premier Wan Li, Tian Ji-yun and Zhu Rong-ji. They were reformers who emphasized as their basic program developing a commodity economy and decreasing the socialist planned economy while moving toward a market economy gradually. Veteran leaders Chun Yun, Peng Zheng, Premier Li Peng and Vice premier Yao Yi-lin are represented as moderate reformers who place their emphasis on using a 'state economic plan' as guidance for developing a national economy. They fought their way to the top through a combination of factors: the influence of patrons, Deng Xiaoping and Chun Yun; the persuasiveness of their policy recommendations; political skill and knowledge; and the networks of personal connections built up over many years (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1986).

Because Hu Yaobang had formed a patron-client relationship with Deng Xiaoping since the early 1940's, when Deng took over from former Chairman Hua Guofeng, he appointed Hu Yaobang to be the General Secretary. Zhao Zhiyang was the governor of Sichuan province (Deng's hometown) before he was appointed premier in 1981. It was due to the special personal relationship with Deng and his loyalty to Deng that he got the chance to enter the highest political position. Deng as their patron gave them the opportunity to become the elite leaders; meanwhile Deng got his clients' support to confirm his supreme position over the whole Party and the government.

It is through *GuanXi* that political elites establish reciprocal dependent relationships with political allies to protect themselves in political struggles. Actually in Chinese politics, names of elites never stand alone, for they are always linked, for better or worse, with others. Whenever a new name is added to the politburo or the standing committee, everyone speculates about the newcomer's personal affiliations, and hence about whose power has brought about this new appointment and whether the sponsor was in fact shrewd in sponsoring such an individual (Pye 1981).

Why do Chinese political elites need to set up *GuanXi* ? Traditional Chinese culture (Confucianism) emphasized the importance of handling many kinds of *GuanXi* in a huge social web. The main reason, the main motivation, is to search for career security and protection of power. "The extraordinary force that holds together the networks of officials is the intense attraction of mutual dependency in the Chinese culture between superiors and subordinates, each of whom needs the other for his own protection and each of whom is vulnerable to the other..." (Pye 1981, p. 7). Under this circumstance, personal relationship strengthens allies and integrates and creates linkage networks that extend upward in support of particular leaders as 'patrons' who, in turn, look for 'clients' to

ensure their power. Weber's ideal-type of impersonal management does not exist. Personal loyalty and informal *GuanXi* have a dominating presence on the Chinese political stage.

The endless unpredictable political struggles for power within the Communist Party became another reason for political elites and officials to search for patronage as protection against repeated purges of rivals by the predominant leader. More than 30 years of political power struggles has taught people to search for patron-clients relationships so as to protect themselves. In the 1950's, the Great Leap Forward and "Hundred Flowers Bloom, A Hundred Schools Contend" campaign caused a number of higher leaders, including Marshal Peng Dehai, to lose office and to be put into jail. In the 1960's, National leaders Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were purged by Mao Zedong in the Cultural Revolution. Thousands of officials were forced into study groups of Maoist thought or sent to the countryside to accept re-education. In the 1970's the Lin Biao rebellion caused another purging campaign. Mao allowed Deng to reappear, but Deng was purged again in early 1976. In similar fashion, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and other political elites launched many campaigns after Mao's death: a period of criticism of 'bourgeois liberalism' in 1980-1981; a campaign against 'spiritual pollution' in the ideological and cultural sphere in 1983-1984; and a crackdown against corruption in 1985-1986 (see chapter 7).

From these unpredictable political movements, we can see that the rule of law has meant little in modern China. In the face of many political upheavals, higher leaders, officials and masses became victims of political struggles and many people, including officials at all levels, were left to wonder what the highest leader, such as Mao, Deng and the Party apparatus wanted. The non-institutionalized Chinese bureaucracy did not ensure a stable power position and personal security in these political struggles. Those who wanted to pursue

protection of their power or keep their higher social status and win promotion or maintain personal security, had to seek as their patrons those most powerful leaders, who in turn wove webs of personal dependence with their clients.

According to Lieberthal and Oksenberg, bonds of *GuanXi* arise from family connections, common geographical origin, shared experience (school or military service ties), or shared loyalty toward the same patron or commander (such as Zhou Enlai or Deng Xiaoping) (1988). When Hu Yao-bang was General Secretary from 1981 to 1987, people who associated with the Communist Youth League in the 1950's which Hu headed were able to rise to good positions rapidly; and people who were trained in Moscow in 1950's, where Li Peng was active, were winning positions at many levels when Li became Premier. From this, we can clearly see how important patron-clients relations are.

3.   *Taizidang* in China

Under Confucianism kinship relations were extremely important in the agrarian polity and they have retained this importance in modern China. The term *Taizidang* is used in referring to nepotism in the Chinese bureaucracy. *Taizidang* actually is a general designation for the children of the Chinese high-levels cadres. But it has a special meaning in politics. It is a group of people who, as children of political elites of China (most of them were founders of P.R.China), have been promoted to high-level government and Party positions. These 'princes' hold the same important political positions as their parents.

Table 11 shows characteristics of *Taizidang* members. It is the privileged families that can offer their children overseas study (formerly the Communist leaders always sent their children to Moscow, but now children of *Taizidang* are sent to the U.S.A.). If we look at 'family background', we find that most of the

Taizidang'sparents held important positions, including former National Chairman, former Premier, Vice-Premier, Vice-Chairman of Military Committee, Ministers, Marshals, etc. That is to say, most *Taizidang* members are the descendants of old revolutionaries who made great contributions to the Chinese revolution and whose sufferings in the Cultural Revolution are highly appreciated in Chinese society.

Table 11. Profiles of Select Members of *Taizidang*

Name	AGE	POSITION	EDUCATION	FAMILY BACKGROUND
Li Peng	62	PB\CC\Premier	University(O)	Zhou Enlai, Deng Yinzhao(AS),former premier
Zhou Jiahua	63	PB\CC\vice-Premier	University(O\D)	Ye Jianying(SL),former vice Chairman of the Party, former Chairman of military committee
Ye Xuanping	65	CC\Vice-Chairman	University(O\D)	Ye Jianying(S), see above (former marshal)
Peng Shilu	65	Vice-Minister	University(O\D)	Peng Pai(S), former minister
Ding Henggao	59	CC\Minister	University	Nie Rongzhen(SL), former marshal of PLA
Chen Changyi	56	CC\Provincial secretary	University	Xi Zongxun(SL), former standing committee member
Li Changan	56	Minister	University	Li Fuchun(S), former vice premier
Li Tieying	54	PB\CC\State Councilor	University	Li Weihan(S), one of oldest revolutionary
Song Ruixiang	51	Governor	University	Song Renqiong(S), former standing committee member
Liao Hui	49	CC\vice-Minister	University	Liao Chenzhi(S), former minister
Zhang Boxing	?	CC\Provincial secretary	Unknown	Peng Zheng(SL), former chairman of national committee
Bu He	?	CC\Governor	Unknown	Ulanfu(S), former vice chairman of national committee
Wu Shaozu	?	CC\Minister	Unknown	Wu Yunfu(S), former minister
Chen Haosu	48	Vice-Minister	University	Chen Yi(S), former vice premier and marshal
He Pengfei	46	Major General	Unknown	He Long(S), former vice premier and marshal
Chen Yuan	54	Minister	University	Chen Yun(S), former vice chairman of the Party
Qiao Zonghuai	?	CC\Vice Minister	Unknown	Qiao Guanhua(S), former minister
Liu Yuan	48	CC\Governor	University	Liu Shaoqi(S), former chairman of Chinese government
Xie Jingping	?	Governor	Unknown	Xi Zhongxun(S), former standing committee member
Yu Zhengsheng	45	Major	Unknown	Zhang Aiping(SL), former general of PLA

Note: All position are as of November, 1989. (Zhou Jiahua became vice-premier in 1991). Biographical information is from Zhonggong Renming Lu (Taibei: Guoli Zhengzhi daxue, 1983), Wolfgang Barike, who's who in the People's Republic of China, 2nd ed. (NY, K.G. Saur 1987. and China Directory 1990 (Tokyo: Radio Press, Nov. 1989). PB, CC and PLS stand for Politburo and Central Committee members and People's Liberal Army; Oand D for attendance at universities overseas or domestically; and AS, S and SL for adopted son, son and son in law (All information came from "Studies in Comparative Communism", Vol 24, No. 1, March 1991, p. 58-76).

This situation in the P.R.C. is not unique, but has a counterpart. When we look into the political high-ranking elites of Taiwan (Republic of China), a country which shares the same agrarian legacies of imperial China with the People's Republic of China, we find a strong similarity between *Taizidang* in Taiwan and *Taizidang* in Communist China (See table 12).

Table 12: The 13th KMT Central Committee Members with High-ranking Cadre Family Background

Name	Position	Family Background
Chen Li-an	Standing committee member minister of economic affair	Father: Ch'en Ch'en former premier
Soong Ch'u-yu	Standing committee member deputy general of the KMT	Father: Soong Ta, general of the army
Lian Chan	Standing committee member minister of foreign affairs	Father: Lian Chen-tung president's adviser
Kuo Wan-lung	Standing committee member minister of finance	Husband: Ni Wen-ya, standing committee member
Chien Fu	Standing committee member Chairman of committee of Economic Construction	Father: Chien She-liang,former president of Academy of Science
Chien Chun	Member of Central Committee, secretary general of Executive Yuan	Father: Chien She-liang, (see above)
Ma Ying-jeou	Member of Central Committee, deputy general of Central Committee	Father: Ma Heh-ling, deputy director, Control Yuan
Chiang Hsiao-yen	Member of Central Committee, vice-minister of foreign affair	Father: Chiang Ching-kuo, former president, son of Chiang Kai-shek
Chiang Hsiao-tsu	Member of Central Committee	Father: Chiang Ching-Kuo, see above
Chiang Hsiao-yung	Member of Central Committee	Father: Chaing Ching-Kuo, see above
Ting Mao-shih	Member of Central Committee	Father-in-law: Huang Chieh, former general of army
Wang Hsiao-lan	Member of Central Committee	Father: Wang Tih-wu, former standing committee member
Yu Fan-ying	Member of Central Committee	Father: Ku Cheng-kang, former standing committee member

Source: These data are from various issues of *Hsin-hsin-wen (New News Weekly)* (TaiPei) (See "Transformation and Change in Mainland China and Taiwan, p. 24)

Eisenstadat and Roniger argue that the family is the initial 'coalition' on which unconditional trust is based (1984). If the father was 'dragon' or 'phoenix', the son should be 'dragon' or 'phoenix'. The situation replicated that of the feudal China in which the traditional family structure was also linked to the 'politics of the emperor's relatives on his wife's side of his family' (waiqi), which took advantage of their special privilege to promote their offspring to higher positions of power. As well, the *Taizidang* also reflects the strong influence of Confucianism. Of course, *Taizidang* not only depend on their own family background, but also rely on *GuanXi* or patron-client relations. Under the unwritten code of 'caring for the children of old comrades-in-arms, old work-mates, old superiors, and old subordinates' (*huxiang zhaogu laozhanyou laotongshi laoshangji laobuxia de zinu*), a number of princes of old political elites have been promoted to important positions of the state and the Party, ranging from premier to provincial governors.

4. The everyday reality of *GuanXi*

GuanXi and nepotism penetrate all ranks of Chinese society today, not only the political elite. The only difference is that for the common people it emphasizes material interests, rather than seeking political power. This network of *GuanXi* in every day life is a system in which an individual develops a series of acquaintances for whom favors are done in the expectation of returned favors at some time in the future. Having good *GuanXi* proves to be an extremely useful way of getting things done in a resource-scarce environment (finding a good job, getting a good house and good pay, etc.). It takes many forms, varying

all the way from perfectly legal 'string pulling' with small gifts and favors, to out-
right corruptions, involving bribery and criminal actions. Nevertheless, *GuanXi*
works for those able to use it.

For example, one of my friends went to work at the International
Investment and Trust Corporation, which is one of the best companies in my
hometown. It is difficult to become an employee if you don't have good *GuanXi*
with company officials (*lingdao*), even though you may have high qualifications.
There are only forty employees in the company. Of these, 35 have many kinds of
GuanXi with the *lingdao*. Some of them are children of 'old comrades-in-arms',
or 'work-mates', or 'old superiors' and 'old subordinates'. Their parents had
established good *GuanXi* a long time before. (My friend's father was supervisor
of the current president many years ago, so it was easy for my friend to become
an employee of that company). Employees became 'clients' of the *lingdao*. So
people always say: "even though you have thousands of good things and thousands
of good qualities, you are nothing as long as you do not have a 'good father'".

GuanXi causes serious corruption in the Chinese bureaucracy. The policy
of "reform and open to the rest world" created numerous opportunities for
GuanXi . From the beginning of 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his followers set out
to re-establish some private incentives in China's economy, which had reached the
brink of collapse after the Cultural Revolution. Their intentions were to assert
individuals' rights to transact with each other and therefore ease problems
encountered in the central coordination of agricultural and industrial production.
Their aim was to gradually change the economic system from a central planning
economy to a quasi-market economy. To do this, they established some private
property rights and allowed decentralized markets a large role in allocating scarce
goods. Within these markets they allowed prices to fluctuate (Sands 1990). Since
there is no strict scientific management and institutionalized bureaucracy, abuse

of governmental authority and the use of *GuanXi* became serious problems. Because both prices and supplies of consumer goods were fixed too low, one only obtained many goods either by standing in lines or using *GuanXi*. Those who had bureaucratic connections clearly gained under this system. If one had access to a scarce good, one could parley this access into increased command over other goods through direct exchange. (This phenomenon was called *houmen*, or backdoor.) Many officials found themselves in an excellent position to 'get rich' and to 'glorify' themselves, because they had some control over distribution.

GuanXi has caused other problems for the Chinese bureaucracy. First, it has caused millions of Yuan in states funds to flow into the hands of small collectives and individuals through numerous loopholes, thus seriously undermining the Chinese economic reform. Second, corruptions caused by using public office for private gain and pursuing personal comfort have seriously undermined the credibility of the reform process. Third, the legitimacy of the national government is undermined, as the events in the Tianmen Square clearly show.

Why can't the Chinese Communist Party rid itself of *GuanXi*, and nepotism? There are three main reasons: (1) The P.R.C. was established and developed on an agrarian societal base that is only beginning to industrialize. These patterns cannot be done away with quickly or easily. (2) The overcentralized power of the Chinese Communist Party favors patron-client exchange, *GuanXi* and nepotism. There is no institutionalized bureaucracy to constrain the absolute power of the Party which promotes 'personality politics' (*renzhi*); (3) The privileges of the Party foster the development of *GuanXi* and nepotism. To acquire scarce resources, individuals have to establish good *GuanXi* and form their own network if they want to live better and feel more secure.

Summary

Patronage, nepotism and favoritism are deeply rooted in the agrarian pattern of Chinese society. Although the Chinese leaders are motivated by a desire to get rid of these imperial legacies, the monopoly power of the Communist Party and the overcentralization of the bureaucracy exacerbates these informal relations in Chinese society. It is difficult for the Chinese government to change the structure of 'personality politics' and Party sovereignty, so that these informal relationships continue to undermine the development of a rational political process. Moreover, the low level of industrial development does not permit a rapid restructuring of the polity in a more rational-legal direction (Lenski et al. 1990).

Chapter 5 The Chinese Bureaucracy in an Era of Gradual Industrialization

Agrarian societies with their low standard of living for the majority of the population, low efficiency technologies, and low investment in human capital could not sustain large-scale institutions along the lines of Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy. This situation persisted in industrializing agrarian societies like China in recent decades. In this chapter I will discuss additional features of China's political bureaucracy not anticipated from Weber's framework.

1.   Personalized rule and acute political struggle

According to Weber, in an organization based on rational-legal authority with an emphasis on formal rules and procedures, political leaders should act in obedience to the requirements of the law and not in accordance with personal whim. But in China the political process operates in a different way. The one party system cannot avoid serious political struggles like those which occurred in the imperial era. During the Cultural Revolution, the personalized rule of Mao Zedong reached an apex, as we saw in chapter 3. After Mao consolidated his power, he purged Liu Shaoqi, the former Chairman of the country. This was a continuation of the political struggles that were so familiar in the agrarian polity.

One problem concerns strongly centralized decision making. Political decisions are firmly controlled by the Party Politburo, the Secretariat, the Military Affairs Commission, and the Government State Council. A few high level officials decide the fate of the Chinese people. But Chinese leaders have seldom obeyed formal rules and bureaucratic procedures when they made decisions. The reform policy regarding Chinese agriculture was a good example of this. A group

of young intellectuals visited the countryside to investigate how to increase the living standards of peasants. In 1978, after two years of investigation, they proposed "responsibility farming" which designated the household as an unit responsible for productivity after the household head singed a contract for a piece of land with the village government. When Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Zhiyang read this proposal, they implemented it without further discussion.

Because the moderate reformers could not tolerate some points of radical reform, they launched several campaigns: "anti-bourgeois liberalism" in 1981, "anti-spiritual pollution" and "socialist civilization" in 1985. All of this exemplified an acute power struggle between the moderates and the radicals (Harding 1987). Because political leaders of the two major factions, moderate Chun Yun and the more radical Deng Xiaoping, had difficulty agreeing, they frequently contradicted each other. They set the ideological tone, helped shape the agenda, and provided initiative and discipline for their clients. Both Hu Yaobang's resignation in 1987 and Zhao Zhiyang's removal in 1989 were the results of power struggles. Those within the Party who wanted to reform the political structure were rendered ineffective. This situation caused the reforms to always be in a state of instability and change.

There is another example which helps explain why Chinese leaders do not obey the formal rules and procedures of bureaucracy. Deng reportedly called Zhao Zhiyang in for a meeting on price reform in May 1988, and complained that "our pace has not been fast enough"; "we must adopt bolder measures; do not be afraid to take risk"; "do not care about opposition of the moderate reformers". So, Zhao Zhiyang gave out the order to lift price controls so prices could float according to supply and demand. But price reform caused serious inflation which had never occurred before in socialist China. In the first quarter of 1988, price for nonstaple foods went up by 24.2 percent, with a rise of 48.7 percent in the

prices of fresh vegetables (Asian Survey 1989). This brought serious criticism from the moderate reformers, especially Chun Yun, Yao Yinling, and Li Peng. Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping was also pressured by the moderate reformers. This caused Deng to complain, "I would not vouch for anyone. If the situation continues to deteriorate, I will have to have Zhao dismissed". The dysfunctional consequences of price reform became a prelude to Zhao's removal. After that time, the Chinese reform movement almost reversed itself. The moderate reformers started to make conservative policy. So, Chun Yun wrote:

> "No one alone will be able to secure power. Only by forming factions can people secure their power and positions. As a result, there naturally are parties outside the Party, and factions within the Party. No faction dares to be careless in dealing with other factions, and they would rather suspect others than believe in them. This is the way they treat other factions, and do not they do the same to comrades of their own faction? Everyone feels insecure and is on guard all the time." (Chun Yun 1980, p. 83).

The seriousness of these power struggles made the achievement of rational-legal authority very difficult. The Chinese leaders did not care about existing rules or regulations, they only depended on their personal judgment and behavior. These factors were a major obstacle to the realization of an efficient bureaucracy.

2. Ambiguous functions and overlapping ministries

Ambiguous functions and overlapping ministries reflect a situation in which governmental goals and procedures are not spelled out and the level of productivity stays low. Administration remains relatively unspecialized. Although Chinese bureaucracy has expanded much more in the past decade than in any other period of Chinese history, there is no stable specialized division of function, and the top leaders often bypass the processes of bureaucracy in order to make

policy decisions peremptorily.

We can examine the low degree of specialization from three aspects as follows:

First, there is no clearly specialized division between the Party, the government, and the military. Their structures overlap each other and form many interlocking organizations. At the beginning of the 1950's, the Party gradually took over daily administration which should have been performed by the government. The Party usurps the functions of the various levels of government even now, (although the Chinese leaders advocated a separation between them after 1978). The Party dominates everything, not only at the upper level leadership but also at low levels. Second, overlapping governmental organization lacks an institutionalized division of labor and cooperation. Sometimes, officials of many central commissions or ministries and local organizations pose the question: where is the power (the means to make some decision and perform it)? Actually, they all hold some power, but each lacks the ability to make the policy decisions. I think this situation reflects a low level of coordination. The lack of coordination shows in three ways: (1) The different commissions and ministries constantly wrangle with each other and always make contradictory policies. (2) No commission or ministry can make any important policies independently, they must negotiate with others repeatingly before making any decisions; (3) since all reform policies must consider the benefit of all commissions or ministries, it is very difficult to make a comprehensive reform policy.

Third, the top leaders frequently circumvent rules and regulations to make personal decisions about policy. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were instinctively opposed to bureaucracy (although Deng advocated some rational reform close to the ideal-type). They feared bureaucracy because it could constrain their individual supreme power. Thus, they made decisions through

their assistants or clients. The reform policy of "Opening 14 Special Economic Zones" was decided suddenly after Deng Xiaoping visited the ShengZheng (Guangdong province) in 1985. It was not deliberated on by various government departments that would be affected. Instead it was put into effect directly through the office of Deng.

The lack of specialization and cooperation in both the Chinese Party and the government leads to irresponsibility. The overlapping functions has promoted organizational expansion that appears uncontrollable. The Chinese Party and the government have tried again and again to cut back on the proliferation of government offices. They proposed a "revolutionary, youthful, knowledgeable, and specialized" approach to government to replace "timidity, inertia and obstructionism". But they always fell into a vicious cycle of "simplifying--expanding--resimplifying--reexpanding". The first retrenchment was in 1958, when they decreased the commissions and ministries from 82 to 60. By 1965, the number had grown to more than 80 again. In 1970, the second retrenchment occurred, cutting back to 33 organizations, but in 1981 the number had expanded to 98. In 1982, the third retrenchment resulted in a reduction to 56, but in 1988, it reexpanded to 98 again.

3. A fragmented, segmented and stratified system

China shows another feature of an industrializing agrarian polity: a lack of coordination between the central authority and local administration. Below the apex, the Chinese system consists of a bewildering number of national agencies, as well as provincial and local units (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1986). So the process of realizing government policy is very scattered, and local governments have considerable *de facto* autonomy. Since they are assigned abundant resources and specific permission, they have such strong self-reliance

that they can become careless and distort the policy coming from the central government in Beijing. Along with political economic reform, local governments have received even more authority, such as control of their budgets, taxes, materials, etc. Although every province and city should carry out the policy of the central government, the relationship between them is not institutionalized. Many important policies are put into effect largely through an informal system of consultation and compromise, quite independently of organizational procedures.

In this situation, the relationship between the central government and local government is in confusion. Whether or not to completely follow the central policy becomes a recurrent question. The central government sometimes attempts to recentralize the power which had been given to the localities. But as soon as the central government does this, officials of almost every province complain that when the policy was tightened, it was difficult to complete the kinds of plans which the central government asked of them; then the central government has to decentralize its authority again. The abnormal relationship between levels of government created another vicious cycle: centralism leads to rigidity, rigidity leads to complaints, complaints lead to decentralization, decentralizations leads to disorder, and disorder leads back to centralization (Jiang Yiwei. See Gorden White 1983). Deng Xiaoping spoke to this problem when he said: "since we can delegate power, we can also retrieve it any time we like". The Chinese leaders are wary of too much centralization fearing it would dampen the enthusiasm of the localities; but if they decentralize authority, it would cause localism and confusion. It is difficult to resolve such contradictions.

The confused relationship between the central and local governments has two aspects. The first is that the "contradiction between central policy directives and specific local requirements as well as the 'leaky' quality of power in a

complex hierarchy have led to informal decentralization within the Party and government, notably the phenomenon of 'independent kingdoms' under the local party" (Harding 1987, p. 37). As a matter of fact, local Party and government officials always alter central policy in accordance with their own interests. Sometimes they twisted their execution of the central policy for their own benefit. Guangdong province is a good example of this. It not only applied the "reform and open to the rest of the world" concept to all fields of political economy completely and flexibly, but also refused some central policies which were not suited to the situation of Guangdong province.

The second is the ubiquitous "bargaining" phenomenon in the Chinese government. These bargains are generally negotiated among commissions or ministries to serve both administrative and personal objectives. According to my experience (I was at the Foreign Exchange Administration of the People's Bank of the Central Government with my president to bargain the business scope of our corporation), I found that no one strictly obeys the regulations. Actually the higher the position of the official, the less likely he is to obey. In the bargaining process, *GuanXi* is most important. That is, if you offer me (a higher level person) special assistance, I will offer you special favors in return. We had good GuanXi with the head of the Foreign Exchange Bureau, so we got a broad range of business. Especially, we got permission to borrow foreign currency from the international money market. This is the result of bargaining for privileges. Because if we did not have good GuanXi with them, we could not have gotten the right to borrow foreign currency from abroad directly. Of course, in the process of bargaining, bribes and corruption easily arise.

Between the localities (provinces, directed cities, special economic zones) and the central government, there is always bargaining for privilege regarding policies that include all kinds of annual plans, budgets, and revenues. The

success of bargaining for each province depends on its local government's economic wealth, geographic factors, and the special relationship with the top leaders. Guangdong, Fujian and the special economic zones have gotten many privileges through the bargaining procedure. This is why you hear people in China say: "If the central government gave us these privileges, we could be successful just like Guangdong province." Whether or not bargaining is successful becomes a critical factor for local and regional economic development.

The central government actually loses the power to implement sound policy, thereby causing an unstable and changeable policy. To give an example, the central government in Beijing had a policy of strictly controlling investment in basic construction. But there existed the bargaining for privileges, because local governments did not like such strict control. This caused many duplicated investments and brought about huge financial waste to the country. The central government also wanted to control the foreign currency available to each province and control the importing of advanced technology and machinery. But each province wanted to import products according to their own desire. They ignored the "whole" situation of China, and they only paid attention to their own interests. That has caused a serious situation today. From the beginning of reform in 1978 to 1991, there were more than one hundred assembly plants producing color televisions of various brands in China (every province has three or five factories, all imported to the U. S. A., Japan or West Germany). Each assembly plant requires foreign currency to import materials and spare parts. But foreign currency is very scarce in China. So it is impossible to satisfy the needs of all the plants. Many of them have become idle while a lot of foreign currency was wasted.

4.   Results of top-down development

A fourth problem is top-down development. It is obvious that when the Communist Party established the People Republic of China, Mao Zedong came to place the struggle for people's hearts and minds ahead of the struggle to transform the economy (Lenski et al. 1991). The Party and government have always emphasized that they represent, to the utmost, the interests of the Chinese people. That is to say, the will of the Party is also the people's will. They usually indoctrinated the Chinese people to accept the Party's programs through many kinds of propaganda. But this communication had only one direction: from the top-down. Elites made development plans or policies according to their own political view, not in accordance with the people's interests. They did not care about what the people thought. They completely ignored the varied interests of the people. This situation was like Perrow's (1986) criticism of the Classical Management Theory where supervisors or managers only considered employees as tools or parts of machinery, and they were never to be given consideration (even though they finally did get *some* care, because employers needed them to keep production going). In China, the Chinese people became a tool or victim of the power struggles. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution clearly showed this.

Under these circumstances, illustrated above, on one hand, people do not understand what the Party wants to do, and on the other hand, people only care about themselves. Sometimes, the policy of the Party and government was misunderstood and "twisted". People did not want to become victims of mass movements, like the Great Leap Forward and the Culture Revolution. This caused many policies to be given up halfway. People did not believe in the Party and the government. Also, some people always adopted an opportunistic attitude toward the policies of the Party. Meanwhile most of people took advantage of

patronage to protect themselves. The patronage relationship always makes it easy to bring about factionism that prevents realization of policy. Therefore, it is hardly possible to fully perform the policy.

Summary

The Chinese Communist Party attempted to rid the people of feudal consciousness after they took national power, but ironically in many ways they only intensified it: (1) The power of the Party surpasses any rule of law and the constitution. No one can constrain its absolute power. This is just like imperial polity in Chinese history. (2) The privilege of the Party fosters the development of patrimonial relations--patronage, 'GuanXi' and 'bargaining'. 'Going the back door' became universal. The privilege of the Party causes corruption to become a serious problem in itself. (3) Abuse of power to further personal interests divorces the leaders from the masses. Inefficiency and irresponsibility become part of the privilege of the Party elite. All of these critically prevent the Chinese government from approaching Weber's ideal type of rational-legal authority which is based on functional efficiency, impersonal performance of duties, and a coordinated and flexible hierarchical structure.

Thus, there are many obstacles to the Chinese Party and the government realizing Weber's ideal-type rational-legal authority. In this chapter I have discussed (1) personalized rule and acute political struggles, (2) ambiguous functions and overlapping ministries, (3) a fragmented, segmented, and stratified system, and (4) the abnormal result of top-down development. However, the deeper underlying cause, as Lenski et al. suggest, is the persistence of an agrarian technological base well into the post-Revolutionary period.

Part III China After Mao

Chapter 6 Deng's Political Economic Reforms

When Mao died in 1976, Chinese political and economic structure was almost on the brink of collapse. Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader after Mao, proposed a policy of "reform and openness to the outside world" and emphasized the gradual establishment of more open and flexible national economy with modern technology and advanced management. Other higher leaders of post-Maoist China also recognized the present political economic structure that hindered Chinese modernization. Former Premier Zhao Zhiyang noted that: "China's existing political structure was born out of the war years, basically established in the period of social transformation and developed in the course of large-scale mass movements and incessantly intensifying mandatory planning...it fails to suit economic, political and cultural modernization under peacetime conditions or the development of a socialist commodity economy" (Zhao Zhiyang 1986).

China has made great strides in the economic field since Deng's dramatic reform policies were inaugurated in 1978. Hary Harding calls this 'the Chinese second revolution' (1987). Deng Xiaoping once remarked that "the purpose of socialism is to make the country rich and strong" (New York Times, Dec. 30, 1980). The regime of Deng Xiaoping has not only accommodated China to the world capitalist market but accommodated itself to China's existing social structure, even while attempting to rationalize and 'modernize' it (Meisner 1989). Thus, Deng has said "what is good enough for capitalism, evidently, is good enough for socialism" (emphasizing the economic field) (Beijing Review, Sep. 13, 1987). A cornerstone of Deng's policy has been greater emphasis on market

mechanisms and less emphasis on centralized economic planning.

1. China's progress under Deng

During the 1980's, China's relative growth in economic output has outperformed the industrial countries and the world as a whole (Table 13). The rural population of China for the first time decreased to 48.3 percent in 1989 (See P 32 table 10). This reflects a shift toward greater industrial employment. The labor force employed in industry and the service sector increased 119 percent between 1981 and 1989 (*Business China 1990*). This is important evidence of the trend toward industrial society. Industrial output increased throughout the 1980s (Table 14). Meanwhile, the Chinese people's living standard has also improved (Table 15).

**Table 13: Growth of World Output (Industry and Agriculture) 1981-1988:
China Compared with Other Groups of Countries
(Percentage Change, per Year)**

	Average per Year					
	1981-1986	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
China	**8.8**	**12.0**	**12.3**	**7.0**	**7.0**	**7.0**
Worldwide	2.7	4.5	3.4	3.0	3.2	2.7
Developing countries	1.5	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.7	3.8
Developed market economies	2.2	4.7	2.9	2.4	2.6	3.0
In N.America	2.4	6.4	2.8	2.6	2.7	3.4
In W.Europe	1.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4
Japan	3.6	5.1	4.5	2.5	2.6	3.0
Centrally planned economies (Europe)	3.3	3.8	3.6	4.3	4.1	4.5

Source: Adapted from United Nations, **1987 World Economic Survey 1987**: Current Trends and Policies in the World Economyy (New York: United Nations), P 13, Table II.1. (See Smith, Christopher J. 1990).

Table 14. Output of Selected Major Industrial (Consumer) Products, China, 1979, 1983, 1987

	1979	1983	1987	1987 as a % of 1979
Chemical fibers (10,000 tons)	32.6	54.1	117.5	+360
Machine-made paper (10,000 tons)	493	661	1,141	+229
Synthetic detergents (10,000 tons)	32.4	67.7	119.2	+370
Bicycles (10,000)	1,009	2,758	4,117	+408
Wristwatches (10,000)	1,750	3,478	6,159	+349
Canned food (10,000 tons)	50.1	84.5	161.5	+322
Beer (10,000 tons)	52	163	540	+1,038
Cigarettes (10,000 case)	1,303	1,938	2,881	+216

Source: adapted from Christopher J. Smith, 1991, P 112. (*China: Statistical Yearbook 1988*)

Table 15. Ownership of Selected Consumer Durable Goods
(1978, 1982, and 1987)

	No. Owned per 100 persons (Whole of China)		
	1978	1982	1987
Sewing machines	3.5	6.6	11.0
Wristwatches	8.5	18.8	42.8
Bicycles	7.7	13.1	27.1
Radios	7.8	18.2	24.1
Television sets	0.3	2.7	10.7

Source: Adapted from Christopher J. Smith, 1991, P 169 and *China Statistical Yearbook 1988.*

Deng's reform policy moved forward on two major directions: (1) The first of these was the *decentralization* of administrative power and economic decision-making. In a series of stages, greater autonomy was granted to regional authorities as well as to individual enterprises. (2) *Market principles* were introduced into the socialist command economy. Privately owned industrial enterprises were encouraged to develop in the economy (Table 16). These issues will be observed in the following section.

Table 16. The Increase of Privately Owned Industrial Enterprises and Percentage of Total Gross Output Value, 1985-1987

	1985		1986		1987	
	% of Total No.	% of Total Output Value	% of Total No.	% of Total Output Value	% of Total No.	% of Total Output Value
State enterprises	1.81	64.9	1.44	62.3	1.31	59.7
Collective enterprises	33.60	32.1	27.2	33.5	24.30	34.6
Private enterprises	64.60	1.8	71.30	2.8	74.30	3.6
In cities and town	6.40	---	5.50	---	6.60	
In rural areas	58.20	---	65.80	---	67.70	

Source: Adapted from Christopher J. Smith, 1991 (*China Statistical Yearbook 1988*)

2.   Political economic reform in China

After 1949, the Chinese Communist Party set up a central, hierarchial administrative structure. All power and authority of the state was in the hands of the central government with the National People's Congress serving as the highest organ of the state authority, and the State Council serving as its executive organ. Under the Council, there were appropriately · one hundred ministries, commissions, general bureaus, and many special agencies. The second level of the administration includes thirty-one provinces, five autonomous districts, three centrally administrated cities, and 14 special economic zones (Before 1978, there were no Special Economic Zones.) All policies were made by the central committee and the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. Economic development was centrally planed. Power was overcentralized and relations between the Party and the government were ambiguous. The Party's intrusion into political, economic and social life became a serious obstacle to developing the national economy.

The Chinese Communist Party leaders, Deng Xiaoping and other veteran officials considered it critical to change the economic structure. Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 1978, a complex political economic reform has been underway. The regime established new policies designed to foster rapid economic development. These policies well known by now: reprivatization of the economy; increased material incentives to encourage labor productivity; attacking of egalitarian practices that interfered with economic efficiency; political relaxation to mobilize support for the regime; and professional, economic, and intellectual exchange with the advanced capitalist countries. These changes resulted in a shift to a more individualized conception of economic organization and activity (Dirlik 1989).

Under Deng, the Party attempted to inaugurate a new era of relationship

with the governmental administration. Functional specialization and organizational separation were stressed, and the previous tendency of the Party to exercise direct supervision over government activities has been criticized. Decentralized decision making was extended to localities, basic level production units, and enterprises (White 1984).

The policy can be summarized in several propositions: enterprise should be given initiative and authority over production planning; prices should be adjusted to accurately reflect a balance between supply and demand; regions should be encouraged to specialize in those products for which they possess a comparative advantage; and economic levers should gradually replace administrative orders as the mechanisms for state regulation of the economy (Hu Qiamu 1978). As evidence of the success of this policy, China's economy has posted an annual average increase of 9 percent since 1978. More evidence of the success of Deng's pragmatism can be seen by looking at the economic achievement of Guangdong province.

3. The relationship between decentralization and economic achievement in Guangdong Province

Guangdong province has a unique advantage because of its coastline of 2,400 kilometers and its proximity to the seaport of Hong Kong. Guangdong is not like Liangning and Sichuan provinces which have massive industrial bases, abundant resources and a huge investment from the central government during 1960's and 1970's. As a consequence, Guangdong has been permitted greater independence and autonomy than many of the other provinces, especially the internal provinces. Thus, Guangdong leaped ahead of the internal provinces. It was able to make many reforms on its own, such as a low corporation tax (15 percent), tax holidays, inexpensive land and services, greater freedom in labor

management, and increased access to a market economy. The governors of Guangdong (Ren Zhongyi, Ye Xuanping) directed the reform adopting the following guidelines: "If something is not explicitly prohibited, then move ahead" and "if something is allowed, then use it to the hilt" (See Vegol 1989, p. 81). Fortunately, Guangdong was not much affected by the attack on "bourgeois liberalization" in 1980, the campaign against "spiritual pollution" in the ideological and cultural spheres in 1980, and the crackdown on corruption in 1985. Even though in 1987, the central government tried to slow economic growth nationwide, it appears that the theme was "business as usual" in Guangdong. Officials in the province and lower level officials seemed set on continuing the province's high level of growth. With Guangdong province's supply of local capital and economic and political savvy, the central government in Beijing had difficulty enforcing its "slow down" policy.

In a little more than 10 years, Guangdong has created an "economic miracle" that even surpasses Taiwan and Korea. The economy of sixty-million people (compared to Taiwan's twenty-million and South Korea's seventy-two million) has grown at an average annual rate of 16.5 percent over the ten years, a growth rate that exceeds Taiwan and Korea (Shirk 1989, p. 919). The GNP of Guangdong province has already grown to 150 billion RMB in 1989, nearly one-tenth of the entire GNP of China (Zhen 1990, pp. 38-9). How did Guangdong accomplished this "economic miracle" in such a short time? What were the foundations of such rapid economic development?

During the Cultural Revolution, the Party and the government were fused to a very large extent at the provincial level and below. During the reform movement, a effort was made to separate them. The Party no longer directly intervenes in detailed administrative matters. There is now greater professionalism in public administration, and administration by technocrats over

government bureaus, economic enterprises, and grassroots organizations (Harding 1987). Former premier Zhao Ziyang explained the general concept behind structural reform in his report on the Seventh Five-Year plan, given at the National People's Congress in April 1986. Zhao said that the Party should no longer be responsible for "assigning quotas, approving construction projects, and allotting funds and mandatory planning", and the government bureaucracy should conduct " overall planning, implement policies, organize coordination, provide services, use economic means of regulation, and exercise effective inspection and supervision." (Zhao 1986, See Harding 1987, p. 226). In short, as the economy was transformed from a centrally planned system into a regulated market, the function of the government departments had to change as well. Although the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is still at the core of bringing modernization to China, the Party no longer crudely interferes with economic development and social life as it did before. The government is increasingly relying on indirect methods to control economic development. This new system is helping to replace, to some extent, centralized bureaucratic measures "by the use of market force and price mechanisms to create a structure in which basic-level units and individuals are given a much larger measure of autonomy than before to respond to economic incentives" (Xue Muqiao 1980, p. 7).

In recent years, the government of Guangdong province has significantly moved toward decentralization. The provincial government began to use macro-economic levers--prices, taxation, and fiscal policy as indirect methods to influence development. Guangdong has not only attracted large financial investment from abroad and from the internal provinces, but has also reduced the contradictions between the government and the enterprises which existed in the internal provinces. These things created an excellent environment for economic growth.

Decentralization is a major reason for Guangdong's success. It gives the local government greater power to enact its own regulations, adopt its own legislation and adjust the central policy to meet local conditions. Some of the responsibility for economic planning may also be transferred to the municipal levels (Harding 1987). The decentralization of economic management was implemented by establishing 14 relatively self-reliant economic regions. There are also five special economic zones in Guangdong Province.

The government of Guangdong not only has greater relative autonomy and a decentralized allocation of authority from the central government in Beijing, but also gave its power to the lower counties and productive enterprises. The governor recognized that enterprise vitality required greater autonomy and a change in the direction of the government's role from providing microeconomic supervision to giving macroeconomic guidelines and increasing the role of the market. Many enterprises had enough freedom from higher level planning that even if they were subject to supervision by the local Party and government officials, they were able to begin responding to new economic opportunities much as enterprises in the industrial capitalist societies. Managers were made responsible for the direction of sales, capital, labor, and materials. Given autonomy, the managers of enterprises in Guangdong Province are showing great initiative. Their administrative style has been forged by competition in the market. While pursuing profits, they enhance the wealth of Guangdong Province. This demonstrates what Adam Smith wrote: " The harmony between individual self-interest and the goal of the commonwealth were achieved through competition" (Heilbroner 1986, p. 161).

In my opinion, decentralization and the idea that 'what is good enough for capitalism, evidently, is good enough for socialism' are the foundations of the economic miracle in Guangdong province. After separation between the Party

and the government, the leaders of Guangdong have successfully divorced the Party from interference in economic affairs as well. Meanwhile, they have adopted a comprehensive framework of macro-economic levers to promote economic development. They have professionalized government administration and democratized local government. The slogan "To the outside, more open; to the inside, looser; to those below, more leeway" sums up the policy adopted by Guangdong Province.

It is interesting to note that this experiment with economic laissez-faire has a precedent in Chinese history. The ancient Chinese philosopher, Lao Shi said:" So long as I 'do nothing', the people will of themselves be transformed; so long as I love quietude, the people will of themselves go straight; so long as I act only by inactivity, the people will of themselves become prosperous; so long as I have no wants the people will of themselves return to the 'state of the uncarved block' (Lao Zhi 1968, p. 211, See Waley). He also said: "Does nothing, yet achieves everything" (Lao Zhi 1968, p. 200, See Waley). That is not to say that the government does not care about the development of the society at all, but the government refrains from interfering with the freedom of people and economic development. The central government gives localities and people enough autonomy to promote economic development and social progress.

Summary

In a little more than ten years, the structure of Guangdong's political economy has experienced great change. The people, the enterprises, the government and the Party, all agree that the first step is to develop the economy, thereby raising the living standard. The situation is a result of Deng's pragmatism. But Guangdong's economic achievement like the rest of China's economic reform has been counter-balanced by Deng's ideological conservatism.

Chapter 7 Persistence of a Dominant Ideology

Lenski et al. state, "Today, in all but the most backward parts of the industrializing agrarian world, there is an intellectual ferment and a clash of ideas between the advocates of traditional belief systems and the proponents of newer ones. The situation is often extremely complicated, because both traditionalists and modernizers differ among themselves on many points, while others favor various blends of the old and the new" (1991, p. 381). This situation is found in present-day China. Deng's goal has not been to create a revolutionary society (like Mao's launching of the Cultural Revolution), but to achieve a "pragmatic adjustment of revolution to the demands of present reality" (Dirlik and Meisuer 1989, p. 7). Deng's pragmatic economic reform is different from Mao's utopian social revolution. Deng represented the Chinese pragmatic leaders in the post-Mao era and did not believe in Mao's 'class struggle' and his personality cult. On the contrary, Deng proposed to repair the damage of thirty years of 'class struggle'. Deng wanted to get on with the task of national development but this required an ideology that would preserve political stability.

1.   Conservative ideology in post-Maoist China

For Gramsci (and many other Marxists), a major source of domination rests in the process of ideological hegemony in addition to ownership of the means of production. The keys to success are ideological as well as economic. To achieve ideological hegemony, the leaders of a historical bloc must develop a universal view that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society, and they must be able to claim with plausibility that their particular interests are

those of society at large. In fact, hegemony on "a massive scale, is bound to be uneven in the degree of legitimacy it commands and to leave some room for antagonistic cultural expressions to develop" (Adamson 1973, p. 5).

When the Party under Deng performed political economic reform, it never forgot to employ the dominant ideology of the 'four principles'. Deng said that reform must not challenge the 'four principles'. The core of the principles was the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly of power. Deng claimed that without the exclusive and unquestioned leadership of his own Party, a country as large, fractious, and backward as China would crumble into chaos (See Nathan 1990, p. 2).

Since 1976, the Chinese Communist Party has on a number of occasions attempted to put the record straight on Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. Cynics have referred to such actions (with some justification) as attempts to falsify or reinterpret history to better fit with the outlook of Post-Maoist China. Because Mao's ideology of 'class struggle' failed to develop the national economy and raise living standards, it created widespread disillusionment after the Cultural Revolution. Thus, the Party communique stated that "the large-scale turbulent class struggles of a mass character have in the main come to an end" and decreed that the Party and people should shift their attention to socialist modernization. From The Third Plenum in December 1978, there came the endorsement of national discussions on criterion of truth in order to demystify and demythologize Mao. In the speech of vice-chairman Ye Jianying on September 17, 1979, he said, "We must oppose the view that advocates class struggle, to say nothing of creating so-called class struggle out of the void. The basic goal of revolution is to liberate and develop the social productive force, to improve living standards of the Chinese people" (Beijing Review 1979). The 'four principles' became the dominant political ideology to go along with pragmatic economic reforms. The

Party leaders have used these cardinal principles to combat unorthodox ideas.

From 1978 to 1979, there were a series of ideological arguments against Marxism and Mao Zedong's thought. The main idea was to use Western concepts of democracy, freedom and human rights to evaluate the thirty years of Chinese socialism and to repudiate Maoism completely. Thus Wei Jingsheng argued, "The leaders of our nation must be informed that we want to take our destiny into our own hands. We want no more gods and emperors; no more saviors of any kind. We want to be masters of our own country....Democracy, freedom and happiness are the only gods of modernization. Without this fifth modernization, the four others are nothing more than a new-fangled lie" (Quoted in G. Barme and J. Minford ed. 1986, p. 227).

According to this opinion, socialism had failed in China. The Party and its leaders had reimposed a feudalist totalitarianism, just like the imperial emperor in Chinese history. If the Chinese people wished to modernize, they must first establish democracy and modernize China's social system. Without democracy society would sink into stagnation, and economic growth would encounter insurmountable obstacles. The people should share the power with the Party and end the monopoly of communist control. In a word, everything was bad in socialist China. Only democracy, freedom and human rights could save China. The whole society was undergoing a 'crisis of faith'. Some people began to doubt the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninism, and Mao Zedong's thought was bitterly attacked.

With the Party's hegemony in peril, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the 'four principles' to guide the country in March 1979. The 'four principles' refer to (1) upholding the socialist road, (2) the dictatorship of the people's democracy, (3) the leadership of the communist Party, and (4) the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thought. The aim of advocating the 'four principles' was to

ask people to obey them, thereby preventing them from being affected by any oppositional ideas. Meanwhile the Party used the principle of the 'dictatorship of the people's democracy' to arrest Wei Jinsheng and others who were accused of violating the Chinese Constitution by propagating anti-socialist thoughts. Democracy and freedom, according to the Party, could only come from the 'four principles'.

2.   The dominant ideology of the 'four principles'

The 'four principles' summarize the dominant political ideology in post-Maoist China. It will be instructive if we analyze these principles. The Chinese concept of socialism has two concrete meanings: first, ownership of the means of production by the state or by collective units; and second, the principle of distribution according to work and the planned economy. The experiment of granting autonomy to enterprises and the expansion of the use of the market mechanism as a supplement to planning point to a loosening of the system of planned economy. The principle of the dictatorship of the peoples's democracy is a necessary reaffirmation of the Party's link to Marxism-Leninism. Its main function is to legitimize the leadership of the Party. The principle of upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's thoughts reasserts that these ideas are the backbone of Chinese socialism. Alternatively, these principles can all be reinterpreted under the formula of integrating "the universal principles of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought with the concrete practice of socialist modernization and develop it under the new historical conditions" (Beijing Review, Dec. 29, 1978).

Undoubtedly, the leadership of the Party is the "most basic of the 'four principles", as Deng Xiaoping emphasized on January 1, 1980. (Renmin Ribao, January 1, 1980, p. 1). The theme of the Fifth Plenum held in February 1980 was

to strengthen and improve the leadership of the Party, thereby strengthening the 'monistic center of power' in the society. What this meant was that all power and authority of the state should be firmly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Deng Xiaoping said: "Without the Communist Party's leadership there would definitely be great disorder under heaven and the nation would be torn apart by disunity. This has been verified by the Chinese history....Without the Party's leadership there will be no socialist system" (Deng Xiaoping 1985, p. 369).

Ironically, this agrees with Marx's dominant ideology thesis: the idea that the dominant class needs to sustain legitimacy through claiming to represent the interests of the society as a whole becomes a central feature of political discourse (Giddens 1979). So we can see how important it is to the Party to hold fast to the 'four principles', which are written into the Chinese Constitution.

Meanwhile, the Party used its control of education, culture, communications media, and the like to propagandize the 'four principles'. In fact, Western-style democracy and freedom do not fit the Chinese national conditions (Quoqing), because there is no concept of democracy in traditional Chinese culture. In several thousand years of Chinese history, there was no democratic system like that of ancient Greece. China, a huge society that is only beginning to threw off its agrarian legacy, has more than 1 billion people, eighty percent of whom are peasant. Most of them have no conception of democracy whatsoever. That is why Deng has often argued and pointed out that China's national condition--a code word for backwardness--does not allow the country to have as much democracy as Western states. "In our situation today," he said in 1979, explaining why China must adhere to the 'four principles', "we must do things in accordance with Chinese conditions and find a Chinese-style path to modernization. Departure from the 'four principles' and talk about democracy in the abstract will inevitably lead to the unchecked spread of ultra-democracy and

anarchism" (Deng Xiaoping 1989, p. 22). In 1989, when American President George Bush visited Beijing, Deng told Bush, "If we were to run elections among China's one billion people now, chaos...would certainly ensue....Democracy is our goal, but the state must maintain stability" (Beijing Review, January 12-22, 1989, p. 16).

The traditional Chinese notion of the human being emphasized responsibilities rather than rights. The Chinese have always defined themselves in terms of their obligations to society, not in terms of what society and government owe them. They have never been imbued with the political ideals of freedom and human rights so characteristic of the bourgeois industrial democracies. There were only endless peasant revolutions and rebellions that went right on throughout Chinese history.

This not to say that the Chinese do not want to be free or endowed with human rights, but that with the exception of a small stratum of educated intellectuals, most Chinese believe that to take advantage of individual rights is to do something selfish. It is in the Chinese cultural heritage to feel that the mere act of taking these rights somehow taints them with a suggestion of self-indulgence, of putting one's own desires ahead of the interests of the group or society as a whole. This is both very traditional, in the sense that Confucians always emphasized controlling selfish feelings with proper forms of selfless behavior and it is also very Marxist. Deng too has always viewed things from the standpoint of the good of society as a whole rather than that of the individual. China is not a society which emphasizes individualism. And so, while some young intellectuals have talked about democracy and human rights, these are not things that have come to the Chinese as fundamental aspects of their culture, as they have in the West.

Another thing I want to explain is that Chinese intellectuals are a very

small part of China, and it is only in the last few years that most of the younger generation have begun to have some contact with outside world. Those things which the more extreme advocates of democracy have been asking for may sound very familiar to Westerners, but they are quite new to Chinese who may not grasp the full implications of Western individualist democracy. The West has the historical tradition of democracy and human rights that began with Greek civilization more than two thousand years ago. At that time, the first emperor of China had established a central authoritarian system. There was no background of democracy in Chinese cultural history. Most Chinese are used to authoritarian rule after several thousand years of imperial dynasties.

So, we could say that the young intellectuals who advocate Western democracy do not understand Chinese history very well. They do not know about the constraints which an agrarian history lays upon political development. Actually, the most important thing for China is to develop an strong industrial economy and raise people's living standards in a stable social environment. Under these situations, it is possible to develop toward more democracy. Thus we may better understand Deng's use of the 'four principles'. Otherwise, chaos and instability will return to China.

3.   Upholding the 'four principles' against 'bourgeois liberalization' and 'spiritual pollution'

In the process of promulgating its dominant ideology, the Party launched a series of campaigns to criticize 'bourgeois liberalization' in 1980-1981, and 'spiritual pollution' in 1985-1986, and to crackdown on corruption and 'erroneous trend of thoughts' in 1987. The aim of these campaigns was to indoctrinate the 'four principles' throughout the society and perhaps more importantly among intellectual and political elites, because "the dominant ideology is best seen as

securing the coherence of the dominant class" (Abercrombie and Turner 1978). In this section I want to analyze what 'spiritual pollution' and 'bourgeois liberalization' were about.

In 1983-1985, there was a 'trend of thought' which wanted to use 'humanism and alienation' to reinterpret Chinese Marxism. Some intellectuals who advocated these ideas thought that alienation not only exists in capitalism, but also in socialist China. The source of the problem in China was an 'alienation of power'. This was because the existence of organs of state power implies alienation in the political field. In the socialist state the organs of power had to be placed above society and to issue orders to their citizens; the 'servants of the people' must become the 'masters of the people'. Nepotism, favoritism, and patrimonialism were seen as reflections of this alienation of power. These thinkers believed that the only way to abolish alienation would be to outlaw the leadership of the Party and give up socialism. It was ideas of this sort that Deng referred to as 'spiritual pollution'. There were two categories of 'spiritual pollution': one was departure from Marxist-Leninism and Maoist thought including so-called 'socialist aberrations'; the other was to promulgate bourgeois values in order to repudiate the Chinese socialist path.

Meanwhile the Party defined 'bourgeois liberalization' as denying Marxism completely, denying the Chinese socialist system, propagating 'wholesale Westernization', following a capitalist path and abolishing the leadership of the Party. Scientist Fang Lizhi, ideological theorist Wang Rongwang and Liu Binyan were the main proponents. They argued that the 'four principles' were 'outdated, rigid, dogmatic concepts and worn-out phrases' that had led China to calamity on several occasions. They thought that the only way for China to go was to develop a capitalist 'private enterprise system' and 'wholesale Westernization'. To these ideas the response of the Party was unambiguous! "No Chinese with pride,

confidence, and respect for history and fact will ever endorse this idea of 'wholesale Westernization'" (People's Daily, March, 1987, p. 1).

For the Party the only choice was to preclude any other ideologies from forming an 'effective opposition' which could cause ideological confusion in the society. So the opposition leaders were expelled from the Chinese Communist Party. Then the Party used the newspapers, TV. and other media to criticize them and pointed out, "Fang Lizhi, Wang Rongwang and Liu Binyan have made a series of extremely erroneous speeches advocating bourgeois liberalization. They have seriously violated the 'four principles'" (Beijing Review, May 14-23, 1987, p. 12). The aim of the opposition was to instill the idea of bourgeois liberalism into Chinese society, to sow discord between the Party and the people, and to incite dissatisfaction with socialism and the Party. Deng Xiaoping said, "We must have a peaceful, stable social environment to implement the 'reform and openness to the outside world' policy so as to realize modernization. We must not allow any people to propagate 'bourgeois liberalization'. If the trend of liberalization thought was promulgated pervasively in society, our goal could not be achieved. In a word, stability and unity of society in China is the first important thing" (Deng Xiaoping, May, 1985).

In fact, Deng Xiaoping recognized these problems when he advocated the 'reform and openness to the outside world' policy. In January 1980, he gave a speech in which he said: "I should point out that some infiltration of bourgeois ideology is inevitable because of the non-socialist ideas that already exist in our Party and country, the ten-year rampage of 'cultural revolution' and the fact that we need to develop diplomatic and trade relations with capitalist countries....that is why it is necessary to stress repeatedly that we must adhere to the 'four principles'....When we study the technology and management experience of capitalist society, we must never allow ourselves to worship capitalist countries,

to succumb to corrosive capitalist influences, or to lose the national pride and self-confidence of socialist China. We must eradicate resolutely the trend toward bourgeois liberalization that is emerging within the Party and society" (Deng Xiaoping, 1980, A Speech in the Fifth Plenum of the Conference of the Party). From his speech, we see clearly that Deng knew how to wield the dominant ideology so as to maintain social stability and unity.

During ten years of stability from 1978 to 1988, the Party was pragmatic in promoting economic modernization and conservative in politics to keep social order. As a matter of fact, Deng and the Party achieved enormous economic results. First, in agriculture, Deng disbanded the communes and leased the land back to the peasant households for private management. This increased the value of agriculture output as well as gained the support of eighty hundred million peasants. Second, in commerce and industry, Deng allowed the growth of small individual and collective factories, stores, and service trades. This private and semi-private sector has grown rapidly, employs a large portion of the labor force and produces at least a fifth of China's industrial product (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1988, p. 287). People's living standards were raised enormously. Third, Deng opened up the Chinese economy to foreign trade and investment. So far, over seventy-nine billion US dollars of foreign investment has flowed into China, and foreign trade now constitutes twenty-eight percent of the GNP (Beijing Review 32:10, March 6-12, 1989). All of this has resulted from developing the national economy in a stable social and political environment.

4.   Retrospect: the situation of the Chinese dominant ideology after
      June 4th 1989

Although the May-June demonstrations were peaceful and did not seek to overthrow communism or the ruling Party, Deng labeled them a 'counter-

revolutionary rebellion' because of their demand for independent political organizations and free press. These demands threatened the single party system (Nathan 1990). So, when some intellectuals wanted to share power with the Party through propagating the oppositional ideology of 'bourgeois liberalization' and 'wholesale westernization', the Party pointed out that they did not represent eighty hundred million peasants. If spurred to rebellion, these 'garbage' would cause chaos. What most Chinese actually want is for the 'reform and openness to the outside world' policies to continue. They want the society to remain stable so that they can increase their living standards.

Deng said again: "If we allow demonstrations in China with more than one billion people, how can we maintain stability? In an unstable country, nothing could be achieved" (Deng Xiaoping, April 25, 1989 Speech in Beijing, See World Affair, Vol.152, No.3, 1989-90). The new General Secretary Jiang Zeming reiterated 'The June 4th Turmoil' had set out to "....subvert the socialist system and...turn China into a bourgeois republic and an appendage of the big Western imperialist powers". This would be the result of 'bourgeois liberalization'. So, the Party called for strengthening and insisting on the 'four principles', especially building the leadership of the Party at all levels in order to safeguard the socialist path. Jiang emphasized that it would have been impossible to make the great advances after 1978 without insisting on the 'four principles'. 'The June 4th Turmoil' happened in China because the two former General Secretaries did not give unswerving support to the hegemony of the Party and instead supported 'bourgeois liberalization'. Jiang said that China must uphold the basic principles of the Party; it should never have permitted the use of the policy of 'reforming to develop socialist commodity economy' as a *cover* to propagate capitalist ideology such as 'democracy, freedom and human-rights'.

As soon as the Tiananmen Massacre was over, the Party began a campaign

of ideological education in all levels of Chinese society. People were required to study the speeches of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zeming as well as relevant articles in *People's Daily*. They were required to write self-assessment reports during the Spring of 1989 --with particular emphasis on their behavior (the important criterion being whether or not they had taken part in the June 4th Turmoil). Further appraisals took place at unit or group meetings. Finally, individual cases were examined by higher-level Party authorities. (When I was in China, I experienced that campaign.) The Chinese Party not only used mass media to indoctrinate the 'four principles', but also used coercive methods to purge people's minds and bodies to achieve its aim of hegemony. And they stepped up the censorship of all heterodox views (especially bourgeois liberalization).

The Chinese Party has continued to follow the 'four principles'. Jiang Zeming made a speech at the meeting of the Central Committee on Oct. 22, 1991. He emphasized the need to continue ideological work in the Party in order to prevent some of its members (including some high leaders such as Zhao Zhiyang, Hu Yaobang and others) from straying from the 'four principles'.

Summary

In the process of industrialization in China, the most important objective may be to maintain a stable social and political environment and to continue the policy of 'reform and openness to the outside world', although this means continuing conservatism in politics. If the argument of Lenski et al. (1991) is correct, industrialization will eventually force political liberalization in China. Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, all had one party systems before they achieved great success in their national economies. After the economic foundations were established, they began to adjust and reform their single party dictatorships and gradually moved toward more democratic societies. These countries took a long time to shift away from a despotic political structure to democracy, and they are still struggling for it. So, it is important and necessary for China to approach political reform gradually. The comment of the ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Zhi is appropriate: "Ruling a large kingdom is indeed like cooking small fish" (Lao Zhi 1963, p. 287, See Aurthur Waley). Change can only be accomplished with great care, and in small steps.

Conclusions.

Technological innovation exerts a strong influence on human societies, because an advance in the technological base is a necessary precondition for any substantial growth or development in terms of size, complexity, power, and wealth. Technology impacts social, political and economic structures; and these structures, in turn, react on technology and influence its further development (Lenski et al. 1991). In two thousand years of Chinese history, the technological base scarcely changed while the imperial polity and Confucianism were equally persistent. During the twentieth century, China entered the industrial era, but still technological change came slowly. Thus, even after the 1949 Revolution, the new polity seemed more like the imperial system it replaced than the government of an industrialized country. Mao Zedong became like a new emperor and Marxist-Leninism tempered with Mao's thought was a new dominant ideology. In recent decades, however, China has undergone a steady trend toward industrialization, and this has challenged the traditional agrarian pattern of the polity. I have sketched this trend in the preceding chapters (see Table 17 for a summary).

After 10 years of reform--"the second revolution" (Harding 1987)--the market already plays a huge role in China's economy, with nearly half its industrial output coming from non-state companies. The challenge Deng has set is to introduce market principles of competition and efficiency to state enterprises and thereby to decentralize economic decision making. The results are owing to the strong pragmatism of the current leaders. Deng Xiaoping expressed it best, with characteristic conciseness: When some complained that his program of economic reform was a reintroduction of capitalism, he responded that it does not matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.

The political elite appears determined to stick with pragmatic policies.

The present Communist Party Congress of China opened a crucial meeting on Oct. 12, 1992 by vowing to pursue supreme leader Deng Xiaoping's pragmatist reform for 100 years. The Party leader said: "We can truly say that we have begun a new revolution, the objective of which is to fundamentally change the economic structure that has hampered the development of the productive forces and to establish a new and vigorous socialist economic structure" (Jiang Zeming, Oct. 12, 1992).

Due to the world-wide influence of industrialization the most important political trend in the twentieth century has been the spread of democracy. Lenski et al. (1991) suggest that as industrializing agrarian societies continue to modernize their technological base and economy there may be an increasing movement toward developing more democratic political institutions. This trend is visible today in Post-Maoist China, although the movement is slow. Political leaders continue to believe that economic reform can be accomplished without political liberalization and western-style democracy. The banner of the recent Party Congress reads "Insist on the Socialist Road under the Guidance of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism with Chinese Characteristics". China's leaders are committed to rapid economic modernization while they are extremely cautious about democratization. But elsewhere in Asia authoritarian regimes have found that economic growth almost invariably brings about demand for democratization from emerging middle classes. The calls for political reform and greater democracy will also increase in China as industrialization continues.

Table 17. Evolution of the Chinese Political Structure

Attribute of the system	Imperial China	Maoist China	Post-Maoist China
How leader(s) view process of change	Feared change would bring chaos	Continuous revolution to prevent backsliding	Reform; gradual economic change under conservative ideology
Preferred method of policy implementation	Imperial decrees	Class struggle, mobilization of populace	More pragmatism; autonomy to provincial and local units
Intrusiveness of the state	Completely, totally	Totally through 'small group' rituals	Pursuit of some private interests and withdrawal tolerated
Main tasks of governmental bureaucracy	Maintain legitimacy and continuation of the dynasty	Continual revolution, elimination of lingering bourgeois influences	Changing economic structure toward socialist market economy, emphasizing efficiency
Dominant ideology	Confucianism	Maoism	Deng's 'four principles'
Mechanisms for integrating the polity	Patrominalism and military coercion	Networks of personal relations, coercion	Networks of personal relations, partially regularized personnel system, partial market competition, coercion
Techniques for controlling political power	Sovereign emperor and endless political purges	Endless campaigns, purges	Partial campaigns but to some extent obey the regularity of a more rational-legal bureaucracy
Extent of political 'institutionalization'	Very low, rule of men totally	Low, rule of men rather than institutions	Still low, but approaching a more modern bureaucracy
Nature of politics at top level	Struggles between emperor's in-laws, high literati and eunuchs	Unbridled factionalism below top leader	Struggles still remain but emphasizing unity to develop the national economy
Rule at top	One-man rule	One-man rule	Collective leadership, patron-clients
Dominant organizational hierarchies	Literati, emperor's in-law families and eunuchs; military force	Chinese Communist Party People's Liberation Army public security	Party committee chain of command, Propaganda Dept., State planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, army, public security forces; provincial and local government departments

Source: Partially adapted from Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush "China's Political Evolution: 1972-1982".

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Appendix 1. Definition of Codes (From Tuden and Marshall, 1972)

Police

The following symbols indicate the degree of specialization and institutionalization of police functions.

o   Police functions are not specialized or institutionalized at any level of political integration, the maintenance of law and order being left exclusively to informal mechanisms of social control, to private retaliation, or to sorcery.

i   There is only incipient specialization, as when groups with other functions are assigned police functions in emergencies, eg., military societies at a Plains Indian annual sun dance and buffalo hunt.

r   Police functions are assumed by the retainers of chiefs.

m   Police functions are assumed by the military organization.

s   Police functions are specialized and institutionalized on at least some level or levels of political integration.

Levels of Sovereignty

The symbols below indicate the level of effective sovereignty, defined as the highest level of indigenous political integration at which functionaries have and commonly exercise the power to enforce important decisions at subordinate levels in the political structure--notable to compel participation in warfare, to collect taxes or tribute, and /or to exact sanctions for major delict. Unless at least one of these powers is found at a particular level, a lack of effective sovereignty is assumed for that level.

A   Absence of effective sovereignty at any level transcending that of the local

community, ie., a stateless society.

B   Effective sovereignty occurs at the first (but no higher) level of political integration above the local community, as in the case of a petty paramount chief ruling a district composed of a number of local communities.

C   Effective sovereignty occurs at the second (but no higher) level of political integration above the local community, as in the case of a small state comprising a number of administrative districts under subordinate functionaries.

D   Effective sovereignty is found at the third (or higher) level of political integration above the local community, as in the case of a large state divided into administrative provinces which are further subdivided into lesser administrative districts.

Deliberative and Consultative Bodies

The following symbols indicate the composition of a deliberative body which exercises or shares supreme decision-making authority at the level of effective sovereignty, as indicated by C or S of *Executive*. A bicameral legislature with different modes of selection is indicated by two letters.

O   Absence of a supreme deliberative body.

A   An aristocratic deliberative body whose membership is hereditary or otherwise confined to ascribed statuses and is representative primarily of a ruling class or classes, eg., a council of nobles.

C   A deliberative council whose members are appointed by, but are relatively independent of, the chief executive, a ruling clique or party, or particularly designated electors at the same level of political integration, eg., a supreme soviet.

R   A deliberative body representative of several or all of the state's major

class or ethnic components.

E   An elective legislature or parliament chosen independently by the franchise of a substantial proportion of the free citizenry.

Executive

O   Absence of effective sovereignty, and consequently of executive functionaries, at any level above that of the local community.

C   Supreme decision-making authority is vested in a council, assembly, or other deliberative body with no single executive other than at best a presiding officer.

S   Supreme decision-making authority is shared more or less equally by a single (or plural) executive and a deliver body, eg., a king, president or prime minister and a supreme council or parliament.

P   Supreme decision-making authority is vested in a single authoritative leader, eg., a paramount chief, king, or dictator, however much he may in fact be influenced by advisors.

Administrative Hierarchy

The following symbols indicate the type of subordinate functionaries who occupy the most influential statuses at the level of political integration immediately below that characterized by effective sovereignty, and the relationship of these functionaries to the supreme executive.

A   Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above that of the local community.

P   The principal subordinate functionaries are popular assemblies, councils of notables, or other plural (rather than individual) statuses which represent their constituencies and enjoy a substantial measure of

independence *vis-a-vis* the supreme executive.

K   The principal subordinate functionaries are heads of component kin groups rather than of territorial divisions of the state, and owe their positions primarily to kinship principles.

D   The principal subordinate functionaries are heads of territorial divisions of the state who enjoy a substantial degree of decentralized independence *vis-a-vis* the supreme executive.

S   The principal subordinate functionaries are head of territorial divisions of the state who are closely supervised by the supreme executive and form part of a centralized administrative system.

+   A plus following a letter indicates the presence of a deliberative body which shares authority at this level.

Selection of Subordinate Officials

The following symbols indicate the prevailing mode of succession to the statuses of the principal subordinate administrative functionaries.

o   Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above that of the local community.

p   Patrilineal succession.

m   Matrilineal succession.

h   Hereditary succession within a ruling lineage or other privileged group, the particular individual choice being determined by some special elective or appointive procedure.

s   Succession is based primarily on seniority or age/

i   Informal recognition on the basis of personal influence, prestige, or wealth.

e   Formal election by their constituencies.

a   Appointment by the supreme executive.

Judiciary

The following symbols indicate the locus of supreme judicial jurisdiction (normally appellate) at the level of effective sovereignty.

O   Supreme judicial authority is lacking at any level above that of the local community.

L   Supreme judicial authority exists at a level above that of the local community but below that of effective sovereignty.

E   Supreme judicial authority is exercised by the supreme executive, eg., the king is also the supreme judge, the council is also the supreme curt.

I   Supreme juridical authority is vested in a functionary or functionaries who are appointed by the supreme executive and /or the supreme deliberative body but are at least relatively independent of the appointing authority.

P   Supreme judicial authority is independent of the political system and is vested in a priesthood or other primarily religious functionaries.

H   Supreme judicial authority is exercised by independent hereditary functionaries.

Advisory Bodies

The following symbols indicate the composition of political bodies or groups at the same level which have important advisory or consultative functions but do not have independent or co-ordinate decision-making powers.

o   Absence of effective sovereignty at any level above that of the local community.

n   Absence of a separate consultative body.

r   The principal advisors of the supreme executive are his (or their) close relatives, eg., members of the royal family or lineage.

f   The principal advisors are a coterie of personal favorites of the supreme

executive (or of influential council members), among whom neither close relatives nor sodality mates predominate, eg., royal courtiers, a 'kitchen cabinet'.

s The principal advisors are members of a secret society, cult group, age-grade, or other sodality.

y The advisory body is composed of representatives of subordinate groups.

z The consultative body is otherwise constituted, eg., composed of individuals with hereditary status.

a The principal advisors are administrative functionaries, eg., the heads of administrative departments, a president's or prime minister's cabinet.

Selection of Executive

The following symbols indicate the mode of selection of supreme executive functionaries other than members of an authoritative council or deliberative body.

o Absence of effective sovereignty, and consequently of executive functionaries at any level above that of the local community.

p Succession is hereditary and patrilineal, normally from father to son.

q The same except that a brother takes precedence over a son.

m Succession is hereditary and matrilineal, normally from Mobr to SiSo.

n The same except that a brother takes precedence over a nephew.

f Succession is hereditary within a ruling family (or group of families), the choice among potential heirs being made by the family, the predecessor, a council, or special functionaries with electoral powers.

l Succession is nonhereditary and is determined by a body of limited size, eg., a ruling clique, a particular political party, or a small body of designated elector. This symbol is to be used instead of e when elections are merely a stereotyped confirmation of the decision of a limited power

group.

c   The single (or plural) executive is elected or otherwise chosen by a council or other deliberative body. In the absence of such an executive, the same symbol can be employed for the presiding officer of the supreme council.

i   Succession is through informal recognition on the basis of personal qualifications.

e   Succession is nonhereditary but a formal electoral procedure which is participated in by a substantial proportion of the free citizenry.

a   The single (or plural) executive is an appointee of a dominant alien society, eg., a colonial power.

s   The succession is determined primarily by supernatural means, eg., divination.

Appendix 2. Coded data on Political Organization of Agrarian Societies

ID	LEVSOV	HPO1	EXEC	SELEXEC1	DCBOD1	ABOD1	JUD	POLICE	ADHIER	SELSUBO
33	3	3	4	5	0	7	2	.	5	3
37	3	4	4	1	0	2	3	4	5	7
42	2	1	3	.	0	1	2	0	1	5
43	3	4	2	1	4	7	1	4	5	7
44	1	2	4	1	0	.	2	4	1	.
45	3	2	4	1	0	1	2	3	5	7
47	3	2	2	7	4	7	3	4	6	7
48	2	2	1	1	3	1	2	0	3	1
49	3	2	4	5	0	2	2	4	5	7
50	2	2	4	.	0	7	3	4	5	7
51	2	4	2	7	2	7	3	4	6	6
54	3	4	4	7	0	7	1	4	6	6
56	3	2	4	5	0	3	2	4	5	7
59	3	4	2	.	4	7	3	4	4	8
62	3	4	2	10	2	7	3	4	4	8
63	3	4	2	10	2	7	3	4	4	8
64	1	0	4	1	0	2	2	0	5	7
67	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
68	1	0	4	1	0	1	2	4	3	1
71	3	4	2	7	3	7	3	4	3	6
73	3	0	2	1	1	1	1	4	5	7
75	3	2	4	5	0	2	2	4	5	7
76	3	4	4	.	0	7	3	4	5	7
83	3	4	4	7	0	5	3	4	5	7
84	3	4	4	7	0	5	3	4	5	7
113	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
114	**3**	**4**	**4**	**7**	**0**	**6**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**7**
115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
116	3	4	4	7	0	7	3	4	5	7
117	3	0	2	7	4	7	3	4	3	6

Number of cases read =   30   Number of cases listed =   30
(ID 114 is China)

Appendix 3: Code Book

CROSS-CULTURAL   CODES (SCCS)

POLICE   POLICE

                        o=0   i=1   r=2   m=3 s=4

LEVSOV   LEVELS OF SOVEREIGNTY

                        A=0 B=1   C=2   D=3

DCBOD1   DELIBERATIVE   AND CONSULATIVE BODIES

                        O=0   A=1   C=2   R=3   E=4

EXEC   EXECUTIVE

                        O=0   C=1   S=2   P=3   L=4

ADHIER   ADMINISTRATIVE   HIERARCHY

                        A=0   P=1   K=2   D=3   D+=4

                        S=5   S+=6

SELSUBO   SELECTION OF SUBORDINATE   OFFICIALS

                        o=0   p=1   m=2   h=3   s=4   i=5

                        e=6   a=7   ah=8

JUD1   JUDICIARY

                        O=0   L=1   E=2   I=3   P=4   H=5

HPO1   HIGHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

                        o=0   p=1   a=2   c=3   i=4

ABOD1   ADVISORY BODIES

                        o=0   n=1   r=2   f=3   s=4   y=5

                        z=6   a=7

SELEXEC1   SELECTION OF EXECUTIVE

                        o=0   p=1   q=2   m=3   m=4   f=5

                        l=6   c=7   i=8   e=9   a=10 s=11