AN ANALYSIS OF THE *GUTSARUZHINJI* POLITY IN ZIMBABWE

BY

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## SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR BERNARD MATOLINO

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DECLARATION

Unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text, this whole thesis is my own original work.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all the suffering masses of Zimbabwe and Africa in general. May all the Bhasikiti and Murove Chieftainship Family be encouraged to serve their community and nation well.

ABSTRACT

The absence of a sound and robust African political ideology grounded in Africa's traditional and cultural philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu* has led to Africa's continued subjugation and domination by both Western and Eastern bloc nations. Africa has been compelled to choose between capitalism or socialism which are both foreign ideologies. The author strongly contests the above view and provides an alternative ideology which is in all respects African and grounded in Africa's richest philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu*. *Gutsaruzhinji,* both as a philosophy and political ideology is entrenched in traditional African cultural ideals rooted in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. It is the author's contention that *gutsaruzhinji* is an aunthentic African philosophy, tested in Zimbabwean politics, deserves to be assigned both regional and international status. The author believes, it is time for ubiquitous philosophy that can be employed to extricate Africa and its people from perpetual poverty and inequalities perpetrated by colonialism. *Gutsaruzhinji* focuses on effectively meeting the social and economic needs of all citizens who had been marginalised by colonial apartheid development trajectory. This will immediately see the abandonment of both capitalism and socialism as guiding ideologies in African social, economic and political development. *Gutsaruzhinji* was nurtured throughout the pre-colonial period and is evident in such traditional practices as *nhimbe* or *majangano* or *letseka,* where free labour and service was given to enable every member of the community to get food and be self-sufficient. The merit of this thesis is that it brings a new African political thought and consciousness needed to continue embracing *hunhu/ubuntu* values which are key to the survival of African Philosophy and good governance. The two important vehicles of African identity and survival, *hunhu/ubuntu* and *gutsaruzhinji* are set to continue defending the African intellectual territory and political landscape to eternity. This thesis is intended to also assist in extricating and blending African philosophies like *Ujamaa,* Consciencism, Negritude and Humanism from the label "African Socialism" and bond them with *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, making them an integral part of *gutsaruzhinji* polity. Africa will for the first time adopt and use its own political ideology to better the livelihood of its citizens.

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General Introduction

The thesis seeks to argue that the absence of a solid guiding political ideology in Africa has led to the continued domination and subjugation of African states by the West. This lack of a home-grown political ideology has caused untold suffering to the masses of Africa through neo-colonial capitalist tendencies which tended to use multi-national companies to expropriate Africa's natural resources and profits made on African soil for their Western or Eastern mother countries. To counter this continued haemorrhage of wealth, a new robust ideological framework has to be adopted. This ideology should take care of the interests of African people first and foremost. Amilcar Cabral has argued that "the ideological deficiency not to say the total lack of ideology within the national liberation movements, constitutes one of the greatest weakness of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all.... nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory" (Cabral 1969:22). The model of development envisaged by Cabral was based on, "self-reliance, meeting the people's basic needs and decentralised people-centred and bottom-up type of decision making" (Cabral 1969:168).

In this study, the author seeks to argue that the "*gutsaruzhinji*" (satisfy the multitude/majority) political ideology, which is born out of *Hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, can deliver the expected results in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular. This theory was first tested in Zimbabwe in 1980 by the post-colonial government of Robert Mugabe. It yielded a number of remarkably positive results. These are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. However, the same government later strayed from *hunhu/ubuntu* and almost lost its relevance to the people due to a host of reasons as demonstrated in Chapter Four of this thesis. Julius Nyerere contends that "The vital point is that the basis of socialist organisation is the meeting of people's needs, not making of profit" (Nyerere, 1968:303). This was in answer to the dilemma which most African nationalist leaders found themselves in. In prosecuting an armed struggle against the settler colonialists, they appealed to Karl Marx's dialectical materialism as a guiding ideology. Soon after attaining political independence most of them continued to pronounce themselves socialist which presented them with innumerable challenges as socialism could not be transplanted wholesale from Europe to Africa. The author also argues that socialism, as pronounced by Karl Marx, was only relevant to Africa as a pre-independence nationalist strategy used in the fight against colonialism,

which had created two distinct and antagonistic classes, the capitalist minority white ruling class and the impoverished African majority who were their servants.

Once political independence was attained, there was need to radically abandon socialism as espoused by Karl Marx and find a home-grown socio-economic and political strategy which would address the day to day needs of the African people. This view is shared by D.A. Masolo, who notes two fundamental dilemmas faced by post-colonial states as, "first, that all formerly colonised persons ought to have a view of the impact of colonialism behind which they ought to unite to overthrow it; second, that the overthrow of colonialism be replaced with another, liberated and assumedly authentic identity" (Eze, 1997:285). This search for post-colonial identity led Africa's father figures like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Kambarami Nyerere, Leopold Senghor and others to adopt what is now known as African Socialism as a guiding philosophy in post–independent African polities. This study argues that Marxist socialism does not address the African development trajectory, and any appeal to or use of the word socialism in the African polity attracts direct criticism and failure in the same way that it did in Europe in particular, and the West in general.

Daniel Tetteh Osabu-Kle argues that Africans should not be forced to choose between two Western ideologies, that is, between liberal democracy and socialism. He argues that Africans "will only be able to solve their problems the African way. What Africa needs is a democratic practice that is compatible with indigenous culture and not the blind emulation of any foreign political culture. A modernized form of Africa's own indigenous consensual and democratic culture would provide a necessary and compatible political condition for successful economic growth" (Osabu-Kle 2000:25). Osabu Kle goes on to suggest a totally new name for what he qualifies as democracy in Africa. He calls it "Jaku-democracy". Osabu-Kle argues that

> Jaku-democracy requires some modification of Africa's indigenous democratic practices to satisfy the present day needs of Africans- Jaku democracy would therefore be the type of culturally compatible democracy suitable for Africans. Calling the system Jaku democracy will send the signal to African minds that the continent's people have their own type of democracy, one they can be proud of, and this will contribute to an emancipation from mental slavery (Osabu-Kle, 2000:278).

Gutsaruzhinji should similarly be understood in its original African and Zimbabwean construct, and from the angle that shows that governments in Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, should try and address the socio-economic ills created by a past

colonial capitalist construction with an authentic indigenous ideology that was totally different from a Marxist–Leninist doctrine. What is true of Jaku-Democracy is also true of *gutsaruzhinji*, as argued by Osabu-Kle who contends that, "Afrocentrism shall replace Eurocentrism in Africa and jaku-democracy shall be established not only to achieve the political prerequisites for successful development in African countries but also to realise the African dream of a United States of Africa" (ibid). This notion is shared by Claude Ake who blames African leaders for adopting the modernization theory as prescribed by their erstwhile colonial masters from the West. Ake contends that, "these leaders (African leaders) allowed the international development community to provide the development paradigm and agenda for Africa, translated into development paradigm which is essentially useless as a tool of social transformation and economic development precisely because it largely ignores the historical and cultural memory of the African countries" (Ake, 2000:15-16).

Gutsaruzhinji, therefore, seeks to extricate African political thought and practice from any foreign ingredient. While *gutsaruzhinji* will as an indigenous term appeal to its own African political and socio-economic systems, it will definitely minimise the frontal attacks launched against any socialist project by its numerous enemies.

Another reputable economist, George B.N. Ayittey, also argues that African socialism was just imposed on the African state. Ayittey contends that "African governments alone imposed the alien ideology of socialism on their countries, consolidating an enormous economic and political power in the hands of the state... Traditional Africa was never socialist. It had private ownership of the means of production (Land, Labour and Capital) free enterprise, free village markets, free trade and entrepreneurial spirit" (Ayittey, 1991:163-4).

Ayittey goes on to clarify the misconception about communal ownership of land, arguing that there "…is a great deal of confusion about communal land ownership in traditional Africa, But historically, land in Africa was never communally-owned as the myth goes. It was privately-owned by the family or clan, not a tribal government... Africans also believed in a sacred bond between the living and the dead. Thus the land wherever their ancestors are buried cannot be sold" (ibid). This researcher agrees with Ayittey on this notion, and especially on the fact that traditional Africa had her own free markets and free enterprise. *Gutsaruzhinji* is about the free economic and political activities of marginalised people. Chapter One and Two of this study highlights the striking similarities and differences

between the ideological paradigms of Marxist socialism and African socialism and the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology as informed by *hunhu/ubuntu*.

This study argues that socialism as espoused by Karl Marx was only relevant in Zimbabwe and Africa in so far as it assisted the liberation struggle in fighting settler colonialism in Africa. Post-independent Zimbabwe and Africa had no business with Marxist Leninist socialism. The creation of different brands of African socialism, namely materialist socialism, traditional socialism and mixed socialism, all tried to distil the previous notion of Marxist socialism into an African variant. While this effort by African leaders is commendable, it did not fully birth the "African Child" whom the author calls *gutsaruzhinji*. Therefore, what is of value in the brands of African socialism is successfully synthesised in *gutsaruzhinji*, with its original indigenous flair and appeal. It is the researcher's contention that if properly adopted, *gutsaruzhinji* has the potential to light Africa up again and compel its leaders to be people-oriented rather than tossed all over by the winds of ideological confusion and borrowings from the Eurocentric view. This is covered in Chapters One and Two**.**

Chapter Three and Four of this study details the practice or implementation of the *gutsaruzhinji* policies in Zimbabwe, highlighting both its achievements and how it was stalled, owing to a variety of reasons; and how, like a mustard seed, it dies in the ground to germinate and create the ideal tree with fruits and grows to be a big tree where all the birds of Africa feed and lay their eggs for posterity. Chapter Five of this study addresses this by highlighting the attempts to resuscitate *gutsaruzhinji* and give its future prospects in Zimbabwe in particular, and Africa in general.

Chapter Six examines those ideas, from different philosophers, that corroborate *gutsaruzhinji* including Thaddeus Metz, Fainos Mangena, Jonathan Chimakonam, Koanane and Olatunji. The discussion consolidates *gutsaruzhinji* as a philosophy, and further, it does not only address Zimbabwe's polity, but also talks to Africa and the world at large. Chapter Seven gives a comprehensive summary of all the dominant views contained in the thesis, chapter by chapter.

CHAPTER ONE: NATIONALIST IDEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHIES AND THE *GUTSARIZHINJI* POLITY

1.0   Introduction

The author seeks to highlight the fertile ground on which the philosophy of *gutsaruzhinji* is anchored, that is, on the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. *Hunhu/ubuntu* should be known to be the seed, womb or deep well from which arise genuine and original ideas or ontology in African thought. Ramose (2002) argues that *Ubuntu* is at the root of African philosophy and being. He contends that "*Ubuntu* is a wellspring that flows within African existence and epistemology" (Ramose, 2002: 114 -115).

The author also argues that Africa's father figures in the persons of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Kenneth Kaunda and others tried to connect with the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy but were swayed by their revolutionary slogans of socialism which they tried to graft into African thought. A distinction between the two ideas of *gutsaruzhinji* as informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, and socialism, will be briefly provided. Detailed definition of *gutsaruzhinji* will be conducted in Chapter Two.

1.1   *Hunhu/ubuntu* Philosophy as the Root of *Gutsaruzhinji*

The word *Ubuntu* is derived from a Nguni (isiZulu) aphorism *umuntu umuntu ngabantu*, which can be translated as "A person is a person because of or through others" (Moloketi 2009: 243; Tutu, 2004:26). The Shona equivalent of *ubuntu* is *hunhu* which states, *"Munhu munhu muvanhu"* (A person is person through other people) (Mangena 2012b:15). *Hunhu/ubuntu* can be described as the capacity in an African culture to express compassion, reciprocity, dignity, humanity and the mutuality of building and maintaining communities with justice and mutual caring (Khoza, 2008:6; Luhabe, 2002:103; Mandela, 2006: xxv; Tutu, 1999:34-35). The application of *hunhu/ubuntu* is pervasive in almost all parts of the African continent, hence the *hunhu* philosophy is integrated into all aspects of day-to-day life throughout Africa and is a concept shared by all tribes in Southern, Central, West and East Africa among people of Bantu origin. The *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy believes in group solidarity which is central to the survival of African communities. Respect and love amongst community members play an important role in an African framework. The African view of

personhood rejects the notion that a person can be identified in terms of physical and psychological features only. It expresses the interconnectedness, common humanity and the responsibility for each other (Ramose 1999:193-194, Samkange and Samkange 1980:89; Mangena 2012a:1520). Former President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton, acknowledged the importance of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy when on 26 September 2006 he told the labour conference in the United Kingdom to embrace *Ubuntu*:

> All you need is *Ubuntu*. Society is important because of *Ubuntu*. If we were the most beautiful, the most intelligent, the most wealthy, the most powerful person–and then found all of a sudden that we were alone on the planet, it wouldn't amount to a hill of beans (Khomba, 2011:161-162).

In this regard, Samkange and Samkange (1980:89) describe *hunhu/ubuntu* as the "attention one human being gives to another: the kindness, courtesy, consideration and friendly lines in the relationship between people, a code of behaviour, an attitude to others and to life ..." Thus a person with *hunhu/ubuntu* is one who upholds African cultural standards, expectations, values and norms and keeps his African identity. According to Keesing (1976), African culture is a picture of the ideational world of an African people, regardless of their geographical location and pivots around *hunhu/ubuntu. Hunhuism/Ubuntuism* is, therefore, centred on belief in the goodness and perfectibility of man, where emotion, reason and behaviour are regarded as the surest guides of man to a happier life (July, 2004:135). Discipline, morality altruism, self and social consciousness, responsibility and duty are all definitive of *hunhu/ubuntu*. Kamalu (1999) suggests that the ten virtues for eternal happiness pursued by Africans in ancient Egypt and summarised into the four cardinal virtues of justice, fortitude, prudence and temperance by Plato, are all embodied in the African vision of *hunhu/ubuntu.* The metaphysics of *hunhu/ubuntu* deals with the nature of being as understood by people from Southern, Eastern, Western and Northern Africa. Thus a human being is always in communion with other human beings as well as the spiritual world. Sekou Toure has called this "the communion of persons" whereby "being" is a function of the "us" or "we" as opposed to the "I" as found in "the autonomy of the individuals" that is celebrated in the West in Rene Descartes' "*Cogito ergo sum*" (I think therefore I am). Pobee (1979) defines the African being in terms of what he calls "*cognatus ego sum*" which means, "I am related by blood, therefore I exist.' Essentially this means that in Africa the idea of "being" is relational. Just as Socrates' and Plato's matter partakes in immutable forms, being, in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy depends solely on its relationships with the spiritual world

populated by ancestral, avenging and alien spirits, with the greater spiritual being called, *Musikavanhu/Nyadenga/Unkulunkulu* (the God of Creation). The greatest Being works with his lieutenants, the ancestors and other spirits, to protect the interests of the lesser beings *vanhu/abantu* (people). In return, *vanhu/abantu* enact rituals of appeasement so that this does not become a one-way kind of interaction.

Western Socratic/Platonic metaphysics is dualistic in character, while *hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics is onto–triadic or tripartite in character. It involves the Supreme Being (God), other lesser spirits, ancestral (alien and avenging) and human beings. This, therefore, enforces the continuous relation between individuals and the family, clan, greater community and nation at large. *Gutsaruzhinji* benefits from this metaphysical understanding by trying to instil a good sense of belonging to the other. Samkange and Samkange (1989) reinforces this idea by pointing out that when leaders fail to govern properly by not respecting *hunhu/ubuntu* values and cultural norms, the ancestral spirits and *Musikavanhu* are believed to punish them by causing drought and suffering.

Nabudere (2002:3) adds another important aspect to the *huntu/ubuntu* metaphysics by stating that in addition to the "living dead" – (ancestoral spirits) and God (the Supreme Being) there are also the "unborn" who are envisaged to exist in the future. None in the chain of being are to be offended as there are dire consequences to this. They all live together in symbiosis. The transformation of the "living dead" occupies a continuous space which Ramose (2004) calls "the ontology of the invisible beings" or African metaphysics.

According to Ramose, *Ubuntu* philosophy and religion have no separate and specific theologies. Through these invisible forces, according to Ramose, Africans seek explanations for certain happenings which cannot otherwise be explained by "normal" or "rational" means. Conflicts can also be easily settled using *hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics as witnessed in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and The Unity Accord signed in 1987 in Zimbabwe between PF-ZAPU and ZANU (PF). Christianity also played an equally important role in both instances cited above. Christianity preaches forgiveness in the context of forgiving those who do evil or wrong things against you without asking them to pay you back for the wrongs committed as advised in the Lord's prayer, "forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgives everyone who sins against us" (Luke 11:4). The whole exercise is done to satisfy the interests of the majority, both the "living dead", and

the "unborn" for posterity. This is what *gutsaruzhinji* seeks to achieve. The Criticism against *hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics is that African leadership ends up being corrupt and promoting nepotism, regionalism, cronyism and kleptocratic rule.

1.2   *Hunhu/Ubuntu* Ethics and Politics as a guide to *Gutsaruzhinji*

Hunhu/Ubuntu ethics refers to the idea of *Hunhu/ubuntu* in moral terms and phrases such as "*tsika dzakanaka*" (good behaviour), *kuzvibata kana kuti kusazvibata* (self-control or reckless behaviour), *kukudza vakuru* (respecting elders) and *kuteerera vabereki* (being obedient or disobedient to one's immediate parents and the other elders) (Mangena 2012a).

In Shona society people say, "*Mwana anorerwa nemusha kana kuti nedunhu"* (it takes a clan, village or community to raise a child) (Mangena, 2012a). Nafukho (2006) presents *hunhu/ubuntu* as being upward-looking/transcendental and lateral. This mean that *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics are not only confined to the interaction between humans, but they also involve spiritual beings such as *Mwari/Musikavanhu/* Unkulunkulu (Creator God), *vadzimu* (ancestors) and *Mashavi* (alien spirits). Thus, *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics are spiritual, dialogical and consensual (Nafukho, 2006). Nabudere (2002) explains that *umuntu/munhu* (person) is the maker of politics, religion and law. "Umuntu – the subject makes the law and at the same time commands its obedience by all persons including him/herself. There is no one above the law. This explains why in *ubuntu* political philosophy royal power is expected to spring from the people as expressed in *Setswana* the words "*kgosi ke kgosi kabatho*", or in modern parlance, "power belongs to the people" Therefore, all laws pronounced by the king or chief must express the will of the people who must respect and obey it in their own name since they make them together with the king in council (Nabudere, 2002:6).

Commenting on African Ethics and Laws, J.H. Driberg, a Western jurist said, "African Law is positive not negative. It does not say 'Thou shalt not'; but 'Thou shalt'"; Law does not create offence, it does not create criminals; it directs how individuals and communities should behave towards each other. Its whole object is to maintain an equilibrium, and the practices of African Law are directed not against specific infractions but to the restoration of this equilibrium" (Nabudere, 2002:6). Therefore, African Law which is anchored on *ubuntu* is a living law based on the recognition of the continuous oneness and wholeness of the living, the living-dead and the unborn. Mangena (2012:11) states that *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics proceeds

through what is called the Common Moral Position (CMP). The CMP is not a position established by one person as is the case with Plato's justice theory, Aristotle's eudemonistic ethics, Kant's deontology or Bentham's hedonism (Mangena, 2012:11). In the CMP, the community is the source, author and custodian of moral standards whose objective is to have a person who is communo-centric rather than one who is individualistic. In *Shona/Ndebele* society, respect for elders is one of the ways in which personhood can be expressed with the goal being to uphold communal values. Respect for one's elders is non-negotiable since elders are the custodians of these values and fountains of moral wisdom.

The CMP is dialogical and spiritual in the sense that elders set moral standards in consultation with the spirit world which, as intimated earlier, is made up of *Musikavanhu* (Creator, God) and *vadzimu* (ancestors). A point of departure is the fact that where CMP is concerned, moral standards are upheld by society (ibid). Mangena asserts that where CMP is concerned, society is not coerced into accepting the moral standards constituting it. The elders (who represent society), *vadzimu*-ancestors (who convey the message to *Mwari*), and *Mwari* – Creator God (who gives nod of approval) ensure that the standards protect the interests of the community at large.

Communities are at liberty to exercise their choice or free will but remain responsible for the choices they make as well as their actions. For instance, if a community chooses to ignore the warnings of the spirit world regarding an impending danger, such as a calamity say, flooding or famine resulting from failure by that community to observe certain rituals, the community has to face the consequences. Thus, *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics and politics can be transformed into guiding principles underlining *gutsaruzhinji* in its plea to have governments always being guided by societal needs. It is important that this is seen to happen since society represents the oneness with God the Creator, the living-dead (ancestors) and the unborn who represent the future. This is the important grounding positions of *gutsaruzhinji* as a political philosophy entrenched in *ubuntu* philosophy and its ethics.

On the basis of *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics, Nabudere argues that:

> Today the majority of African post-colonial leadership is guilty of despotic and authoritarian rule in their countries. This leadership is unaccountable and tends to promote nepotism, cronyism and kleptocratic rule. This is what has created a wide gap between the African people and their rulers resulting in the intensification of violent conflicts among the African people. It follows that

for peace to prevail on the continent…, the demand for the cessation of repressive rule, exploitation and social exclusion of the post-colonial state and its imperialist linkages. It must put in place a politics of inclusiveness and human security for all (Nabudere, 2002:7).

In this respect, the author asserts that the political leaderships are culpable for abandoning the people as well as the *gutsaruzhinji* polity in Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2000. This is what is examined in Chapter Four of this thesis. Contrary to what Mugabe says, *gutsaruzhinji* cannot be construed to be a Marxist socialist doctrine. (Mangena, 2014)

Gutsaruzhinji as a political philosophy does not exist outside the dictates of *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics. It draws from the mother-body to give correct guidelines to what constitutes being with the people and serving their interests and needs. Mangena (2012b:10;14;15) stresses this point when he observes that "the CMP is brought to bear when individuals within a group or community realize that their individuality only carries meaning when they exist to serve the interest and needs of their group or community." Likewise, government leaders under *gutsaruzhinji* have no other business besides being servant leaders and assisting the socio-economic development of their people. The tools of trade for *gutsaruzhinji* are kept in the *hunhu/ubuntu* ethical tool box. This tool box (of *hunhu/ubuntu*) according to Nhlanhla Mkhize (2008) calls for a "particular mode of being in the world, which mode of being requires each person to maintain social justice, to be empathetic to others, to be respectful and to have a conscience." The author agrees with Mangena and Chitando entirely, when they contend:

> Indeed, *ubuntu* is a special product which helps in the realization of a nation's goals, aspirations and most importantly a nation's place in the world … *Hunhu/ubuntu* serves to remind Zimbabwe's political leaders and technocrats that policies are only meaningful when they enhance the well-being of the majority. Servant leaders are individuals who know that they are there to serve, and not to be served. They invest their mental and physical energies in promoting growth. They go all out to ensure that their compatriots overcome poverty and enjoy prosperity. *Hunhu/ubuntu* acts as a reminder that despite people's political differences, they should remain united by the fact that they occupy the same geographic space and are beneficiaries of this land which was passed down to them by their ancestors (Mangena et al 2011:235:241).

If *gutsaruzhinji* is an African philosophy drawing its essence from *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics, it necessarily follows that its Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) is in the *hunhu/ubuntu*

philosophy which is both indigenous and people-centred philosophy capable of solving Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political challenges.

1.3 *Hunhu/Ubuntu* Epistemology couched in *Gutsaruzhinji*

In the Western sense of the word, epistemology deals with the meaning, source and nature of knowledge. Scholars differ on the source of knowledge, with some arguing that reason is the source, others saying experience or the use of the senses as the source of knowledge. According to Battle (2009:135), "African epistemology begins with community and moves to individuality". The idea of knowledge in Africa resides in the community and not in the individual that makes up the community. Battle argues that there is an ontological need in the individual to know self and community (Battle, 2009:135) and understand that the discourses on *hunhu/ubuntu* traditional epistemology stem from this wisdom. Ramose (1999) echoes this view when he says that "the African tree of knowledge stems from *ubuntu* philosophy. Thus, *hunhu/ubuntu* is a wellspring that flows within African notions of existence and epistemology in which the two constitute a wholeness and oneness". Just like *hunhu/ubuntu* ontology, *hunhu/ubuntu* epistemology is experiential. Storytelling and proverbs are used to express this epistemology. For instance, the proverb *Rega zvipore akabva mukutsva* (Experience is the best teacher) provided by Mangena (2012) is a case in point. In this regard, those who contract sexually transmitted infections (STIs) know and tell others that promiscuity is bad and should never be practised. In Shona, the elders say: *takabva nako kumhunga hakuna ipwa* (We passed through the millet field and we know that there are no sweet reeds there). One gets to know that there are no sweet reeds in the millet field because he/she has passed through the millet field. This proverb is an illustration that one has to use the senses to discern knowledge (Mangena, 2012b:14).

According to Mangena (2012:14,15), the elders are the custodians of the cultural conscience of every African society because of their wealth of experience. They use their experience to formulate and transmit moral wisdom to the youth through folklores, proverbs and other knowledge tools. Knowledge is, therefore, gained by the individual as he/she interacts with others in the community.

The important point to note in *hunhu/ubuntu* epistemology is that in prosecuting the *gutsaruzhinji* polity there is a constant need to hear what the people say about each

programme before it is implemented. The people have to have full knowledge of the consequences of doing certain things as opposed to having government or political leadership prescribing what the people have to do in their communities. *Gutsaruzhinji* is, therefore, grounded in a rich *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and can hardly fail to yield the expected results if there is adequate consultation and consensus is sought throughout the process and in all the necessary stages. It must be noted that this understanding or epistemological consideration helps to remove the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy from Western socialism since it is a subdivision of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy with an African epistemological setting. Having given this important theoretical framework of *huntu/ubuntu*, it is important to consider some important similarities between what the fathers of African socialism had vis-a-vis *hunhu/uhuntu Philosophy and gutsaruzhinji.*

1.4   A Critique of *Hunhu /Ubuntu*

The author wants to highlight some of the known critics of *hunhu/ubuntu* who have tried to discredit this noble African philosophy. In the process, however, they attracted a lot of backlash and criticism in return. Acccordingly, the author adds his voice in further discrediting their unwarranted attack of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

1.4.1   Wim Van Binsbergen's Critique of Ubuntu

Wim Van Binsbergen (2002) opened a discussion in which he looked at *hunhu/ubuntu* as an archaic philosophy relevant only to pre-historic African societies, and which, however, is no longer relevant to modern society. Thus, it is prudent to quote him in detail where he argues that:

> *Ubuntu* philosophy, I will argue constitutes not a straightforward emic rendering of a pre-existing African philosophy available since time immemorial in the various languages belonging to the Bantu language family. Instead it is argued that *ubuntu* philosophy amounts to a remote ethic reconstruction, in an alien globalised format, of a set of implied ideas that do inform aspects of village and kin relations in at least many contexts in contemporary Southern Africa; the historical depth of these ideas is difficult to gauge, and their format differs greatly from the academic codification of *ubuntu*, …my argument concludes with an examination of the potential dangers of *ubuntu* as a mystifying real conflict perpetuating resentment (as in the case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and obscuring the excessive, pursuit of individual gain (Binsbergen, 2002:53-9).

Before the author can criticise Binbergen on the above assertions, it is worthwhile exposing his limited view of *ubuntu* further. He goes on to assert that;

> the level of late twentieth century villages in Southern African concept of *ubuntu* is more than perlocutionary or illocutionary constituting not so much the enunciation of an actual practice, but at best a local ideology to which appeal is made whenever actual practice is initiated (e.g at initiation rites and weddings or whenever actual practice is argued in conflict settlement, (divination) to stay too far from this idea (Binsbergen, 2002).

It is easily discernible that the Dutch scholar and researcher is doing his best to understand foreign practices and *ubuntu* ideology which he only wants to analyse in comparison to world views and Western philosophic articulations. The authoremphathises with Binsbergen on this outsider view without upholding it. Binsbergen further suggests that it is academics and management consultants who benefit from the inspiration of *ubuntu* as an African village way of life and thought by instilling internalized cultural norms in resolving conflicts and strengthening peaceful co-existence. This noble duty of *ubuntu* is criticized by Binsbergen who sees it as a "lubricant or a pacifier (in the child care sense) in situations where conflict is real and should not be obscured by smothering it under a blanket of the mutually recognized humanity of the parties involved as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (T.R.C) in South Africa and the continuing class conflict after the attainment of majority rule in Zimbabwe under Mugabe in 1980 and South Africa in 1994 under Nelson Mandela. The example of the T.R.C. led by Desmond Tutu, is given by Binsbergen as he claims that perpetrators of crime against humanity in the pre-independent apartheid era in South Africa were re-admitted or accepted into the new South African society at no greater personal cost than admitting guilt and offering of apologies. It is, however, ironic that *ubuntu* is painted as representing reconciliation in a non-African way. If the practice of *ubuntu* in the T.R.C was effected, the culprits or perpetrators of human rights abuse would have paid large heads of cattle or money to appease the spirits of the dead. It is evident that Christian values are now being mixed with the values of *ubuntu* to deliberately distort *ubuntu* and serve a narrow political purpose. Win Van Binsbergen's criticism of *ubuntu* on this score is incapable of withstanding the real *ubuntu* test. Binsbergen goes on to acknowledge the proper value of *ubuntu* philosophy but quickly ridicules it for not doing everything he thinks *ubuntu* is capable of when he contends:

> The handling of *ubuntu* in the context of continuing and exacerbating class conflict in Southern Africa today … the fundamental relations of inequality

were not radically confronted: those between town and country, between owners and the landless, between middle classes and the urban poor, between men and women, between the educated and the non- educated and between the middle-aged and the young. Here *ubuntu* can, in the hands of those who wish to build the country, serve as a liberating transformative concept. However, it can also be wielded as a mystifying concept in the hands of those who, after the post apartheid reshuffle, were able to personally cross over to the privileged side of the huge class divide without being over-sensitive about the wider social cost of their individual economic status and advancement. Those using the concept of *ubuntu* selectively for their own private gain, seem to be saying to their fellow participants:How could you possibly question the way in which this specific situation is being handled by us whereas it is clear that we appeal to our most cherished common African ancestral heritage, to our *ubuntu*: - It would be difficult to protest, as a born African, against the manipulative use of *ubuntu* defined as an eminently ancestral African concept summing up the eternal value of African cultures finally finding recognition. Let it therefore be me who protests, as an honorary African … with a crime rate that is by far the highest in the world, post apartheid South Africa needs in addition to the sociability of *ubuntu* more factual, elocutionary and urban based tools of self redress (Binsbergen, 2002:70-89).

It will be instructive to evaluate and critically assess the validility or lack of it of Binsbergen's criticism of *ubuntu* before engaging yet another critic of *ubuntu*.

1.4.2   Response to Wim Van Binsbergen

Wim Van Binsbergen (2002) above, calls himself an "honorary African", implying that as a Dutch scholar his study of traditional African Practice in Zambia (2002:53-89), South Africa and to some extent Zimbabwe as well, gave him a form of African status that qualifies him to critique and challenge African issues of culture and tradition not studied in an analytical way as has been done by himself. The author dispute this self imposed honorary status. Conversely, this author argues that this is where the corruption of pure African culture and ideology is easily incorporated into Christian or Western traditions since researchers from outside tend always to use a comparative approach.

In his response to an article titled "The End of *Ubuntu*" by Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013), Thaddeus Metz (2014:65) argues that this is the "Beginning of *ubuntu*" and invites scholars to begin the work of further developing and broadening this rich and valuable African Philosophy of *ubuntu*. Looked at from this perspective, Binsbergen's conspiracy attempt to discredit a rich African ideology on superficial grounds, and by simply labeling it archaic, reflects his inability to appreciate the depth of African thinking or ideology and the scope that

it has to guide events in Africa. Accordingly, this study presents *gutsaruzhinji* as an African ideology tapping from *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, and as one that is capable of addressing the current socio-economic and political ills perpetrated by post–independent African leaders. To affirm this, Matolino and Kwindingwi state that "*Ubuntu* rests on some core values such as humanness, caring, sharing, respect and compassion; (2013:199) and these values have to be cherished and further developed to guide modern society in achieving both social and economic justice. These values are not limited Africa's prehistoric era.

The accusation by Binsbergen (2002) of post-independent leaders in both Zimbabwe and South Africa in terms of their being perceived to perpetuate inequalities is ironically the opposite of what *hunhu/ubuntu* stands for. In this regard, the blame for shortfalls in this respect should be apportioned to those leaders who do not espouse the servant leadership advocated by *hunhu/ubuntu* as argued by Mangena (2014). Binsbergen, therefore, demonstrates his conspiracy theory of trying to discredit African thinking on African leaders who embrace or perpetuate crude western capitalist modes of development where they could embrace the *gutsaruzhinji* model as informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

Binsbergen (2002) displays yet another critically limited view of *ubuntu* when he accuses *ubuntu* of being an "eminently ancestral, African concept.." to imply that foreigners like him see nothing worth emulating in *hunhu/ubuntu*. The fact is Africans believe in the strong bond between the living dead (ancestors), the current living and future generations. This understanding, therefore, compels the living to seriously consider the moral worthiness of their actions since what they do affects future generations and the living dead are believed to punish those who transgress from fundamental values (Mangena, 2012a; Ramose,1999). By appealing to the ancestral element, *ubuntu* is not being exclusive as Binsbergen argues. In fact, it instills a sense of preservation of a heritage for the benefit of both the living and the future generations. Ironically, an inheritance is never sold out to the next person, but is instead, preserved. Therefore, we must conclude that those who, like Binsbergen, want to consign *ubuntu* to the dustbin of history are only demonstrating their alienness which renders them inimical to the heritage of *ubuntu*. In this regard it has to be said that they are, in fact, angtagonistic to Africans, the heirs apparent of *hunhu/ubuntu*.

Lastly, Binsbergen criticizes *ubuntu* for what he considers its inclination towards "mystifying real conflict (as in the case of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission) and

obscuring the excessive pursuit of individual gain" (Binsbergen, 2002:53-9). The author has already demonstrated Binsbergen's limited view of *ubuntu* and how he wants to infuse Christian doctrine into it. Firstly, reconciliation under *ubuntu* is meant to end conflict by making the accused or wrong-doers pay in material form for their misdeeds in order to appease both the living aggrieved and their living dead (ancestors) and thereby bring harmony to the land (Mangena 2012). On the same note, Christian tradition advocates confession and forgiveness without paying ransom. This is a doctrinal Christain assertion based on the contention that whatever ransom may be necessary for transgression was paid by Jesus' 'death on the cross'. The T.R.C in South Africa and the Policy of reconciliation in Zimbabwe only used the Christian method in administering reconciliation with the result that in the end they only alluded to the same values under *ubuntu* without exacting compensation from the perpetrators or inflicting upon them any form of punishment. It is for this reason that this study submits that there is no end to the conflict, violence and inequalities, precisely because no ransom to appease both the living and living dead was legislated for.

To blame *ubuntu* for the shortcomings of the two incidents with regard to South Africa and Zimbabwe is to trivialise issues. *Hunhu/Ubuntu* is currently crying for competent black academics and intellectuals to bail out *ubuntu* from the siege by Western philosophers like Binsbergen masquerading as "honorary Africans". Binsbergen's allegation that *ubuntu* is "obscuring the excessive pursuit of individual gain" can only be conceived as an attack on the call for humaneness, love and compassion in *hunhu/ubuntu* which shuns excessive individual acquisitiveness as witnessed in western capitalist production ideology that glorifies the individual at the expense of the majority or community. This is antithetical to African communalism as informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The irony of it is glaring when Binsbergen on the same note accuses post–independent South Africa and Zimbabwe for perpetuating inequalities under the mistaken guise of *ubuntu*. *Gutsaruzhinji* as a philosophy is presented herein to unmask some of these conspiracy theorists who have attained "honorary African" status.

1.4.3 "The End of *Ubuntu*" by Bernard Matolino and Wenceslus Kwindingwi

In part Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) replicate the attempt by Wim van Binsbergen to render *ubuntu* obsolete through their article entitled "The End of *Ubuntu*" and published in the *South African journal of Philosophy* on 6 September 2013.

Matolino and Kwindingwi's main criticism of *Ubuntu* can be aptly captured in their own articulation,

> We have argued that *ubuntu* as narrative of return is not well suited for complex, multicultural societies that do not prize communality and associations drawn along those lines[…] *Ubuntu* , as an ethical theory that is taken to be natural to the people of Sub –Saharan Africa , we argue , can only be fully realized in a naturalistic and traditionalistic context of those people. However, such a natural habit that would favour the chances of *ubuntu* has largely disappeared because of the irresistible effects of factors such as industrialisation and modernity. The disappearance of such natural and favourable conditions renders *ubuntu* obsolete. It is obsolete by virtue of the fact that the context in which its values could be recognized is now extinct. We are of the view that in order for these values to be realized they have to be embedded in structures of communalism. Without communalism there is no possibility of *ubuntu* and its attendant values retaining their relevance and suitability for use by the indigenes of sub Saharan Africa (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013:203)

There is no doubt that Matolino and Kwindingwi accept that *ubuntu* is a moral theory that according to them rests "on some core values such as humanness, caring, sharing, respect and compassion" (2013: 199). It does seem to be given that any society whether modern and highly industrialised or communal, cherishes and lives by these values. The values enumerated cannot possibly be obsolete or extinct as claimed by Matolino and Kwindigwi. In response to the claim of Matolino and Kwindigwi, Metz (2014) argues that a theory's truth or applicability is not restricted to the conditions of its origination; neither is its universally truthfulness. Metz argues that the "theory that the essence of water H^2O originated solely in the Western world, but it is universally true. Someone from a society that did not come up with and confirm the claim that water is H^20 would be mistaken if she thought otherwise" (2014:68). The author agrees with Metz's conclusion after looking at both John Mills utilitarianism and Emmanuel Kant's Formula of humanity that holds that 'For most philosophers whether they are justified, moral theories have nothing to do with where they originated or whether the masses already accept them. These principles could be true for, or

only apply to those living in all societies, even those that are not modern and in which the principles are disbelieved" (ibid). It is therefore grievous and extremely inadequate to claim that *ubuntu* is obsolete or extinct because communal society is absent in urban or metropolitan cities when its values and principles of *ubuntu* transcend physical geographical borders.

Matolino and Kwindingwi further claim that *ubuntu* is one of the failed theories of return equivalent to Nyerere's *Ujamaa*, Nkrumah's Cosciencism, Senghor's Negritude, Kaunda's Humanism and other African leaders' ideas. In this regard, the next section attempts to explain how although some of these important theories suffered from western conspiracy theories and internal dislocation, they nevertheless, remain true models of African *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which can be successfully deployed under the *gutsaruzhinji* theory to achieve the same intended objectives. The claim that *ubuntu* is a failed theory of return is patently wrong and creates the belief that the demise of socialism had a corporate effect on *ubuntu,* a supposition strongly objected to by this theory on *gutsaruzhinji*. There are shortfalls in the exposition of Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) as evidenced in their contention that:

> The success of *ubuntu* largely depends on undifferentiated, small and tight-knit communities that are relatively undeveloped. Through mutual recognition and interdependence members of these communities foster the necessary feelings of solidarity that enable the spirit of *ubuntu* to flourish … Without the existence of such communities the notion of *ubuntu* becomes only but an appendage to the political desires, wills and manipulations of the elite … (Matolino and Kwindingwi, 2013:202).

It is clear that the argument and claim of manipulation by the political elite to entrench inequalities is similar to Binsbergen's argument which the author has adequately answered in 1.5.1b. The author is further inclined to agree with Metz's response to Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) above argument, when he argues;

> One major part of *ubuntu* is sharing a way of life, but another is caring for others' quality of life. Since the state must be concerned for its people and do what it takes to meet their needs, it must reduce some *ubuntu* when it comes to identifying closely with clients in order to produce much more *ubuntu* when it comes to improving the quality of their lives.(cf. Metz, 2010b: 386-387). I strongly suspect that a similar argument applies to a market oriented economy (though probably not a fully blown capitalist one)… I think another interpretation is no less plausible namely, that *ubuntu* as a plausible ethical theory prescribes honouring relationships of sharing caring and, as a corollary

doing what it takes in a given circumstance to strike a decent balance between the two" (Metz, 2014:69).

The response by Metz, is the same response that this thesis wants to address and highlight when demonstrating the need for government, through the people-centred ideology of *gutsaruzhinji,* informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, can be used to improve the quality of people's livelihoods and reduce the inequalities rather than entrench them. Entrenching poverty and inequality as argued by Binsbergen and Matolino and Kwindingwi is ironically the opposite of what *ubuntu* stands for. Wiredu (2000) has famously put forward a proposal for a "non-party polity" in which legislators elected by a majority of the populace, would not be affiliated with a particular constituency for the sake of which they would jockey for a majority of votes; instead, they would propose policies that they think are good for the public as a whole, and would adopt only those that are the object of unanimous agreement among themselves. Similar models have been suggested by many theorists including Kwame Gyekye (1992) Benewzet Bujo (2009) and Lesiba Teffo (2004).

The criticisms levelled against *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy by the trio, Binsbergen, Matolino and Kwindingwi fail to dislodge the fundamental principles embedded in *hunhu/ubuntu* that is now run universal. Jonathan Chimakonam (2016) argues:

> (It) is the proper function of philosophers to employ the tool of logic in re-articulating pertinent world view ideas at a higher level of understanding. With regard to *ubuntu* in African philosophy, I concur with Metz, that this project has just begun (2014:71) … If Metz's theory of *ubuntu* is Metzian, so what? What else would it be? Kant's idealism is Kantian; Fichte's idealism is Fichtean; Hegels idealism is Hegelian. But all are versions of idealisms notwithstanding (Chimakonam, 2016:229).

Chimakonam urges all African scholars and intellectuals to employ their tools in further developing the *ubuntu* ideology. The *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy coincides with what Metz (2014) and Chimakonam (2016) are calling for. This thesis affirms the view expressed by Metz when he (Metz) declares, "I submit that it is up to those living in contemporary Southern Africa to refashion the interpretation of *ubuntu* so that its characteristic elements are construed in light of our best current understanding of what is morally right" (2011:536). Those who, like Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013), criticise *ubuntu* are ironically advancing the cause and argument of *ubuntu* as aptly noted by Chimakonam when observing that "in fact the beauty of the philosophical enterprise is that anything philosophical can be philosophically criticized to open new vistas and sustain the conversion" (Chimakonam

2015b; 11-12). The fact that *ubuntu* is authentically and indigenously African is hardly ever seriously questioned, as testified by Murithi (2009; 226), but scholars have had reason to doubt if the concept has any Western equivalents (Tutu, 2009:34-35. Koenane, 2016) echoes the above view when they contend that

> *ubuntu* has attained greater prominence than other rival theories… the truth is that history illustrates that no theory, system or ideology is ever perfect from inception. All wrong theories and systems of today have evolved through debates suggestions, criticisms and contributions not by ceasing to discuss and challenge them… there is nothing to show that *ubuntu* has been adopted merely because of its past, pre-colonial existence (Primitivism) without measuring its postcolonial suitability.

Significantly, Matolino and Kwindingwi do not qualify their concept of "narrative of return". These authors seem to completely miss the important point that *ubuntu* means different things to different people. Praeg (2014:11) puts *ubuntu* at par with the Aristotelian virtue ethic and African socialism. Stubbs (2011:1) draws similarities between *ubuntu* and Christianity. We argue that since Christianity advocates and promotes the same values as those of *ubuntu*, it would be interesting to know whether to be logically consistent the two authors are equally dismissive of the Christian ethos as they are of *ubuntu*, (2016; 265-6).

In this thesis, the author supports the views expressed above and opts to further clarify the relevance of *ubuntu* to every sector of life, whether rural or urban. In this regard, governments can deploy *hunhu/ubuntu* values to improve people's livelihoods through good, people-centred governance. In short, through *gutsaruzhinji*. The author further agrees with Koenane and Olantunji's (2016:267) contention that although *ubuntu* as a concept originates from Southern Africa, its Pan –African and African nationalist advocates such as Nabudere, Ramose, Teffoy, Letseka, Khoza, Tutu, Mangena, Samkange and others do not see its application as being limited to Southern Africa, let alone to South Africa alone. *Hunhu/ubuntu* has nothing to do with pigmentation, which is only incidental. On the one hand, one can become a person because his/her actions are accepted by the community as being good, while on the other hand, we refer to other people as "non persons" because they exhibit conduct that does not fit in with what is regarded as *ubuntu*. This is better expressed in the Sesotho and Shona expressions which state: *Se mang –mang ha ana botho* and *Munhu uyu haana hunhu*, respectively, literally meaning that "so and so lacks the moral traits which qualify one as a person". Put differently any person who is badly–behaved is not acting in a

manner befitting humanness. The author cannot agree more with Koenane and Olantunji, when they categorically state:

> ...*ubuntu* as a moral theory is much more than what people do, it is also about the failure to act appropriately when obligated to do so. The idea of *ubuntu* as a normative moral theory thus takes morality seriously as a vehicle through which we can promote the well–being of our fellow human being irrespective of their skin colour or place of origin, as such *ubuntu* transcends whatever artificial differences may exist among people (Koanane and Olatunji, 2016:268).

These views are also echoed by Swanson (2007:53 and 55) when he postulates that *ubuntu* contributes positively to human rights and also brings hope. He contends that *ubuntu* is renowned as a philosophy in which every person is recognized as brother or sister, and explains that *ubuntu* is generally considered as a "spiritual way of being in the broader socio-political context of southern Africa". *Ubuntu* is first and foremost a way of life as espoused by Mangena (2012:12) who contends that *hunhu/ubuntu* is not only a dialogical African moral theory; it is a way of life. Praeg (2014:19-20) says it differently when he characterizes *ubuntu* as the "actualized communitarian praxis of humanizing", and acknowledges the role of *ubuntu* in a global context that he calls the "global phenomenon" (2014:37). The *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy should be a lively discussion among African philosophers. The accusation leveled against the Matolino and Kwindingwi project of trying to end the discussion on *ubuntu* was largely drawn from non-African scholars like Broodryk, Marx and Van Binbergen, but fail to consult well-known African scholars like Mokgoro (1998), Teffo (1998), Ramose (2002), Khoza (2012) Letseka (2000; 2013A; 2014) Samkange (1980), Mangena (2012) and others. This renders their criticism of *ubuntu* irrelevant in African academic circles and reduces it to a conspiracy theory aimed at bringing down African thinking as a way of promoting Western ideologies exclusively. However, it has to be acknowledged that the contribution of Matolino and Kwindingwi contribute to strengthen the theory of *ubuntu* as noted by Chimakonam. Chimakonam, Koenane and Olatunji (2016) are less kind to the critics of *ubuntu* when they do not take kindly to the Matolino and Kwindingwi project, stating that "calling for the demise of *ubuntu* is a disguised form of suggesting the death of the African way of life and a philosophy of life, which is an old Western project" (2016:274).

The *gutsaruzhinji* polity which is largely informed by the *hunhu/ubuntu* moral theory encourages the ethics of responsibility and obligation towards others through deliberate

practical attempts to create a better life for all citizens by making structural changes which eradicate poverty and create an enabling environment for citizens to prosper. Leonhard Praeg's (2016) assessment of *ubuntu* is informative. Praeg contends

> Two of the standard though very different ways of framing *ubuntu* are either as African Humanism or as African Communitarianism. When *ubuntu* is framed as humanism, the question of violence is heterogeneous to it, posited exterior to the very logic of *Ubuntu* which as a result becomes synecdoche for a whole rambour of good news- "harmony", "friendliness", "love", shared humanity", forgiveness,' reconciliation,' the fact that freedom is indivisible' and so on. On the other hand, when *Ubuntu* is framed as "African Communitarianism" violence assumes a constitutive role. Political liberals never tire of criticising communitarian for the fact that the common good can only be prioritized over individual rights through the violence of coercion (Praeg, 2016:295).

Unity is a central tenet of African tradition and political discourse. When individual politicians acting on behalf of the people who elect them to office use it as a moral compass for their actions in the public domain, a moral dictum that states that "an act is morally good when it fosters party unity, morally bad when it doesn't", and when this implicit and sometimes explicit moral dictum is elevated above the laws of the land, a communitarian ethic is effectively posited as a guarantor of the constitutional order in a manner that only Nyerere could only have dreamed of when , in " Importance of a national ethic' (in Freedom and Unity 1967:174-175), he argued that only a national ethic, and not the constitution, can act as a safeguard for people's freedom and what they value.

The *gutsaruzhinji* polity seeks to show the need for achieving both the "shared humanity" and the "shared resources". In this regard, *ubuntu* does not separate political and material rights from the socio- economic base needed for the meaningful actualisation of these rights as echoed by Shivji (2014). Praeg thus asserts:

> *Ubuntu* is a useful place holder for, or reminder of a conception of personhood and justice that can usefully be invoked to interrogate the assumptions and limits of liberal democracy. In short then: Is *ubuntu* dead: Yes, if by *Ubuntu* we understand the nationalist sentimentally sweet synerdoche for everything nice. Is there a future in the *Ubuntu* debate? Yes if we dare to theorise it in all its complexity as the uncomfortable communitarian substratum of our juridico- political order (Praeg, 2016:299).

In response to the complexity of *Ubuntu* theory, the author introduces the *gutsaruzhinji-ubuntu*-driven theory to address and answer to the juridico-political and socio-economic challenges besetting post –colonial Africa.

1.5   A Critique of *Gutsaruzhinji* and African Socialism

It is the author's contention that what informs and makes *gutsaruzhinji* also informs *Ujamaa*; Consciencism, Negritude, Kaunda-humanism and even Kenyan "African Socialism". The author agrees with Ramose (2002) when he argues that, "The African tree of knowledge stems from the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Thus, *hunhu/ubuntu* is a wellspring that flows within African notions of existence and epistemology in which the two constitute a wholeness and oneness" (Ramose, 2002:114-115).

In grappling with Africa's multiplicity of problems, African leaders and thinkers erroneously aligned their thinking to socialism and became so entangled in that frame of mind that they ended up branding their noble ideas as Marxist Socialism. There was an attempt to domesticate or baptise marxist socialism under the name of African socialism. Many scholars agree that their ideas about what they called African Socialism are informed by African traditional life. It is this reference to 'traditional African life' that makes the author agree with Ramose. In this regard our views coincide in asserting that *hunhu/ubuntu* is the tree of knowledge guiding African Philosophy. This is also echoed by George Ayittey (1990) when he observes that, "The Spirit of African Socialism is always wrong. It is as alien to Africa as it is to the rest of the world."

Matolino (2008:162) weighs in by asking a very important question:

> If socialism in Africa had always been there and was most perfect here on this continent, then there ought to be at least one proper African term that precisely calls socialism by its name not by proxies such as Nyerere's familyhood, Nkrumah's consiencism and Senghor's Negritude. It is not entirely farfetched to suggest that Africans who lived in that traditional Africa had no knowledge or the slightest tendency to think of themselves as socialists of any shade.

Insisting on the term 'socialism' in traditional Africa is tantamount to grafting an orange tree on a mango plant. It does not bring any expected fruits. Neither oranges nor mangoes are harvested in such a scenario. Kofi Busia (1967: 75) was equally baffled by this appeal to African socialism, when he remarked:

> African socialism is a compound of several ingredients. It is a compound of reactions to colonialism, capitalism, Marxist- Leninist doctrine, combined with the search for economic development, national sovereignty, democratic freedom and internationalism, and culture.

George Ayittey poured scorn on the founding fathers in Africa, saying:

> History shows that most of the nationalists who took over the controls of their countries' economies failed in their effects to generate development, disgraced themselves and ruined millions of African lives in the process. Tarnishing their own record or courageous struggle for independence, most of these nationalists fell, with monotonous regularity from grace to grass to the grave (Ayittey, 1991:163).

As earlier on intimated, *gutsaruzhinji* is categoric in that, it is rooted in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. This answers the first question of finding a traditional word for socialism as asked by Matolino. Secondly, *gutsaruzhinji* as a sub-division of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is clear of its mandate. Here the author likens this to grafting different mango species to a traditional mango plant. The result is that you reap the big stringless mangoes so grafted. In this analogy, *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy as the tree of African philosophy should, according to Ramose (2002), be a tree whose branches guide African political theory and practice. Having said this, it is now worth looking at each of the theories put forward by African leaders, mainly Julius Nyerere-*Ujamaa*; Kwame Nkrumah's consiencism; Leopold Senghor's Negritude; Kenneth Kaunda's Humanism and Jomo Kenyatta's African socialism with a view to assessing where they animate with *hunhu/ubuntu* Philosophy. The idea is to determine whether or not it is possible to extricate these theories from the blind following of African socialism and align them to *gutsaruzhinji*. If that is achieved, future generations will have a sound basis on which to extricate the struggling African people from misery, poverty and underdevelopment and usher them to a "land flowing with milk and honey". Since all African leaders appealed to African tradition and culture, which are the embodiment of the philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu*, the phylosophy is essentially the benchmark the author uses to analyse each doctrine above.

1.5.1 Julius Nyerere's *Ujamaa*

Ujamaa is the Kiswahili word for the traditional kinship communalism existing in many rural communities in Africa. When President Nyerere of Tanzania first enunciated his ideology and equated Tanzanian socialism to the *ujamaa* concept, it still had strong traditionalist connotations (Boesen et al, 1977:12). *Ujamaa ujijimi* means rural development through a gradual but eventually complete transformation of rural Tanzania into socialist communities, where all political and economic activities, especially production, are collectively organized.

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Ujamaa is the official ideology of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and its government. Its essential elements were personally conceived and formulated by Nyerere who put it in numerous speeches, articles and policy papers. Nyerere perceived an ideal society built up as a network of *Ujamaa* communities, where all exploitation of man by man would be abolished and everybody recognizes everybody else's right to a fair share of the material and social benefits of the community as well as the corresponding duty to cooperate and contribute with their work to the creation of these benefits. Through mutual cooperation *ujamaa* communities are linked together in still large units, up to the level of the nation which again cooperates with other nations, ideally on the basis of equality, freedom and unity among all mankind (Boesen et al, 1977:15).

Writing in one of his essays, "*Ujamaa* – the basis of African Socialism", Nyerere stated that, "Socialism, like democracy is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society, it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that people care for each other's welfare" (Nyerere, 1996:162). Nyerere firmly believed that socialism had nothing to do with Karl Marx, but was an attitude of mind not limited to written rules. The most important human value was to care for one another and never to exploit fellow Africans as done by colonial capitalists who then entrenched inequalities among man. Nyerere's ideology and policy framework can be aptly captured in his concluding remarks on *ujamaa* policy discussions where he contends that:

> What is here being proposed is that we in Tanzania should move from being a nation of individual peasant producers who are gradually adopting the incentives and ethics of the capitalist system. Instead we should gradually become a nation of *Ujamaa* villages where the people cooperate directly in small groups and where these groups cooperate together for joint enterprises; This can be done. We already have groups of people who try to operate this system in many parts of the country. We must encourage them and encourage others to adopt this way of life too. It is not a question of forcing our people to change their habits. And it is a question of all of us together making a reality of the principles of equality and freedom which are enshrined in our policy of Tanzania Socialism (Nyerere, 1968:365).

Put more precisely, the idea of *ujamaa* as conceived by Nyerere was an attempt to fight and address the socio–economic inequalities perpetrated by capitalism. Nyerere was not being anti-white necessarily, rather he was advocating a return to the African traditional way of relating to one another as equals. Sharing and co-operating as embedded in the '*nhimbe*' or '*majangano*' concept in *gutsaruzhinji* makes it evident that these *hunhu/ubuntu* values in

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ujamaa ideology were not derived from Karl Marx's socialism. Nyerere captures this vividly when he says, "Our first step, therefore, must be to re-educate ourselves, to regain our former attitude of mind. In our traditional African society we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community and the community took care of us. We neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellow man" (Nyerere, 1968:6).

The appeal to "our traditional African society" was in a way invoking the *hunhu/ubuntu* values of love, sharing, compassion, unity and cooperation to be the guiding moral code for conducting government business. It will therefore, be this service to the people from all *ujamaa* villages, to the nation state, which animates *gutsaruzhinji* and *ujamaa*. It is not the author's intention to give every detail of how the *ujamaa* policies were implemented in Tanzania nor how they succeeded or faced implementation challenges. The most important fact is that the ideology tried to find its origins in traditional African cultural practices. This definitely demonstrates that the ideas were separate and discrete, and that regardless of how Nyerere tried to equate them to socialism, they were surely not Marxist socialism. Rather it was the pursuit of redress for past colonial socio-economic inequalities and the empowering of every citizen to live a better life which only, is related to the empowerment of workers under Marxist socialism. It is one thing to talk about a good idea or philosophy, and quite another to implement that idea in a way that brings its intended out come. The grounding of *Ujamaa* in traditional culture or *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, needed to be implemented by people who had a full knowledge of how such an idea can work well in a changing environment with all the necessary state support and resources to make it work well.

Jannik Boesen, Birgit Storgord Madsen and Tony Moody (1978) in their study and evaluation of the various *ujamaa* projects carried out in Tanzania with the sole aim of transforming people's lives, contend that:

> It may to some degree be unfair to the ideology and its creator to give major emphasis to the implementation in so far as the President (Nyerere) himself through his numerous speeches and writings has given major emphasis to the explanation of the basic concepts and principles on which to form an alternative society and much less emphasis to the implementation. On the other hand it is only through the implementation that the ideology will prove its strength (Boesen et al, 1978:144).

They go on to acknowledge that Tanzania is one of the few countries on the African continent which has moved ahead to start implementation of a socialist policy on a broad front which,

besides a transformation of the rural economy, includes measures such as the nationalization of industries, commercial enterprises and financial institutions and the formation of a one-party system. The transformation of a rural economy is most important for successful socialist development in so far as agricultural production is declared the basis of development and in so far as 90% of the population is involved in agricultural production. Transformation was to take place by mobilization and education was to aim at creating a socialist attitude of mind to comprehend the institutions to be established.

The formation of villages was regarded as a precondition for the envisaged transformation, and within these villages a new mode of production was started, based on communal ownership of the means of production, co-operative efforts, democratic decision-making, and a derived network of social relations, (Boesen et al, 1978:145). Nyerere sought to develop a political and economic theory that would give full effect to the communitarian view where the individual's interests are not more pronounced but those of the larger community. This demonstrated Nyerere's dislike of the previous capitalist mode of production as it was ushered in by white colonizers and because it caused people to abandon their traditional way of life. Nyerere attributed the social class systems so created to capitalism which he condemned for its pursuit of wealth to satisfy only individual ambition at the expense of the larger community. In both traditional and modern societies, the production of wealth according to Nyerere rested on three key variables. Land for both Agriculture and mineral production came first, while second was the tools used to produce wealth on the land/mines/manufacturing industries. According to Nyerere these were to belong to the people or the workers (black citizens) as the third element of labour.

The traditional approach to labour did not leave out others as exploiters but everyone was a worker. This is evident in Nyerere's contention according to which he says:

> In traditional African Society everybody was a worker. There was no other way of earning a living for the community. Even the Elder, who appeared to be enjoying himself without doing any work and for whom everybody else appeared to be working, had, in fact, worked hard all his younger days. The, wealth he now appeared to possess was not his, personally; it was only 'his' as the Elder of the group which had produced it. He was its guardian. The wealth itself gave him neither power nor prestige. The respect paid to him by the young was his because he was older than they, and served his community longer; and the 'poor' Elder enjoyed as much respect in our society as the 'rich' Elder (Nyerere; 1968:4).

The clarity in Nyerere's above statement points to the fact that *Ujamaa* ideology does not seek to enrich others at the expense of the worker and that everyone should work for the benefit of the community not individual as in the capitalist state. Wealth was not a status symbol but was held on behalf of the people in the community. Work was done voluntarily as a way of life with no one being employed to work for someone. This principle is critical in assessing different ideologies, socialism and capitalism included. Both systems differ from *gutsaruzhinji,* the traditional approach which is the subject of this thesis. In *gutsaruzhinji*, work is meant to benefit all not create social classes. The security of individuals were guaranteed in the community which shares food with those who lack it in times of need. It was however, key that every person cherished work and worked hard to produce. No person was to be spared from the dignity of labour and production labour tools. This is where Nyerere stressed the point that even visitors who come to your homestead could only be treated to visitors' status for two days. On the third day they were supposed to join the family in working in the fields. Nyerere illustrated his contention with the Kiswahili saying: "*Mgeni siku mbili; Siku ya tatu mpe jembe,*" translated to mean, "Treat your guest for two days as a visitor; on the third day give him/ her a hoe to go and work" (1968:5). It was, therefore, imperative according to *ujamaa*, for government to create conditions which enabled every person to work. Ensuring that everyone is a worker for self-sustenance, meant that various efforts in agriculture including *ujamaa* dairy units, *ujamaa* tea cultivations, *ujamaa bambara* nut cultivation, women's *ujamaa* groups and *ujamaa* sweet potato cultivation were all meant to concretise the doctrine of every person contributing to national development (Boesen et al, 1978:130-141).

Nyerere abhorred the notion of a paid worker who worked for capitalist benefit instead of the general good of the community at large. To this he retorted that the worker as an employee "reflects a capitalist attitude of mind which was introduced into Africa with the coming of colonialism and is totally foreign to our way of thinking (Nyerere, 1968:6).

Wealth creation according to Nyerere is not wrong as long as the wealthy share with the poor or needy. While everyone has a duty to work and produce, it is however, common cause that some can negatively be affected by weather patterns or may lack the labour tools to produce, hence the need for government through *ujamaa* to provide both the land and the labour tools to the citizens. Wealth was not to be used as a weapon of power domination of the less privileged but was to be shared. This is again in keeping with Mbiti's dictum, "I am because

we are, and since we are therefore I am." It is this *ujamaa* doctrine as it used to be, in the small family, then the extended family, the community and nation at large which Nyerere sought to infuse into the new nation of independent Tanzania. This clarity on *ujamaa* became even clearer when he said, "Wealth belonged to the family as a whole; and every member of a family had the right to the use of family property. No one used wealth for the purpose of dominating others. This is how we want to life as a nation. We want the whole nation to live as one family" (Nyerere, 1966:137).

Those with authority or had the status of respected elders did not need to oppress others. Wealth and authority according to Nyerere were not symbols of class distinctions but instead a receipt for guidance, unity and cooperation among members. With his usual simplicity and directness, Nyerere argued, "Just as a father does not use his status to dominate and exploit his wife, children and other relatives, so in a nation the leaders or the fortunate people must not use their positions or their wealth to exploit others. In a small family the father was respected. He was not feared. Similarly, in a nation it is better to respect leaders than to fear them", (1966:142). The *ujamaa* doctrine or philosophy was, therefore, grounded in the *hunhu/ ubuntu* philosophy in which were embedded a number of cardinal principles including love, unity, compassion, co-operation, and sharing. These then were the values that each member of the community had to embrace and practise. Of interest is the fact that while these values were characteristic of the past, they were not its preserve. Accordingly, present generations across the board, whether from a communal set-up or from the entire modern world all subscribe to these same values for the betterment of humanity.

While Nyerere advocated for African Socialism, he nevertheless only did choose between the two ideologies, that is, he chose between socialism and capitalism. His idea was to choose an ideology that could co-exist alongside his *ujamaa* doctrine. For this reason, socialism was preferred to the individualism and oppression camouflaged in capitalism. For the avoidance of doubt on this matter, Nyerere put it clearly that

> Traditional African society was not called 'socialist', it was just life. Yet it was socialist in the principles upon which it was based. It involved human equality, and it involved mutual responsibility with every member of the community being concerned about the work and the welfare of every other member. Its poverty was the result of ignorance of modern technology, and of the small size of the group which worked together. The society we live in now is more complicated than that of our forefathers, and therefore

gives us an opportunity to defeat the poverty from which they suffered (Nyerere, 1966:312).

From all the foregoing, it is evident that Nyerere is clear that African society was never socialist. There is, however, a certain similarity between socialism and traditional African practices as evidenced by how both systems embrace the tenets of human equality, freedom and cooperation. These values are entrenched in traditional African practice and belief as observed by Ramose (2005). There is also the thinking that the doctrine of *hunhu/ubuntu* can be exported from Africa to the rest of the world.

1.5.2   A Critique of Nyerere's *Ujamaa* philosophy

Ujamaa was a philosophy put forward by Julius Nyerere in his Arusha Declaration of 1967 with the primary purpose of achieving development through self –reliance with government playing a controlling role in economic development (Nyerere, 1968:60). Thus Nyerere said, "The doctrine of self-reliance does not mean isolationism. For us self–reliance is a positive affirmation that for our own development, we shall depend upon our own resources" (Nyerere, 1968:319). Nyerere goes on to explain the difference between his philosophy and capitalism on the one hand, and between his doctrine and socilasm on the other hand.

Ujamaa, as Nyerere (1968) asserted, is opposed to capitalism, because;

> Capitalism seeks to build its happy society on the exploitation of man by man. It is also opposed to doctrinaire socialism, which seeks to build its happy society on the basis of the "inevitable conflict between man and man". *Ujamaa* in contrast to these two (capitalism and socialism) was to represent a third way – a synthesis of what is best in traditional African peasant society and the best the country had acquired from its colonial experience (Nyerere, 1967:7).

It is clear from the above that Nyerere's philosophy was not informed by either capitalism or socialism. He was guided by African thinking and by an African way of life which valued the unity of a family. *Ujamaa,* was seen as being central to the attainment of a self-reliant socialist nation. National self-reliance had gained currency in the lexicon of development discourse in the immediate post –independence era when it began to be argued that the structure of dependency and underdevelopment tended to externalise the focus of national development in various ways, and that these ways tended to undermine the gainful and effective participation of African states in the international economy. It was suggested that to

redress this, African states needed to aim at localizing the factors of economic development through autonomous policy formulation and implementation. There was a need to mobilize the efforts of the community and maximise the utilisation of available resources towards the satisfaction of the basic needs of the population (Palmer, 1975:5-6).

The word *ujamaa* is Swahili name for 'familyhood'. *Ujamaa* as espoused buy Nyerere was essentially rooted in traditional African values and its main thrust was familyhood and communalism in traditional African societies. *Ujamaa* had three of the fundamental qualities of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, namely freedom, equality and unity (Ibhawoi and Dibua, 2003: 3). Nyerere (1976:17) emphasised the importance of the three values by stating that there must be equality because only on that basis will men work cooperatively. There must be freedom, because the individual is not served by society unless it is his: and that there must be unity, because only when society is unified can its members live and work in peace, security and well-being. These three, Nyerere contended, are not new to Africa; they have always been part of the traditional social order.

Osabu –Kle (2000:171) notes that *ujamaa* "was supposed to embrace the communal concepts of African culture such as mutual respect, common property and common labour". All these are undoubtedly entrenched in *hunhu/ubuntu*. Ibawoh and Dibua (2003:6) note that:

> What was unique to Nyerere's concept of *Ujamaa* however, was the complete rejection of class struggle as the basis of his, "African socialism". For him, the foundation of African socialism is not the class struggle, but the traditional African institution of the extended family system. It was as a result of his or her socialization in the family –not antagonistic class relations-that the African acquired that attitude of mind, which ensured a predisposition towards socialism.

These values however, were destroyed by the colonial occupation of Africa. Monidin, (1976:167) echoes this view when he argues that colonialism shifted the centre of political, social and economic gravity from the African's own environment to the colonial metropole. Nyerere thus saw the central challenge in terms of preserving within the wider society the same socialist attitude which in pre-colonial days supposedly gave every individual, the security that comes from belonging to the extended family (Nyerere, 1967:165). From a philosophical stand view, *ujamaa* derives sustenance from the values of *hunhu/ubuntu* in traditional African culture to try and present Africa's political dimension from this

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communitarian set-up making it possible to confront African problems with an African solution.

It seems to be the case that *ujamaa* was contaminated with the socialist discourse previously adopted by Nyerere through calling the traditional brand "African socialism". Those opposed to socialism used it as an excuse to scuttle Nyerere's development initiatives. Ibhawoh and Dibua (2003) note this point when they observe that *ujamaa* "was influenced by a mix of Fabian socialism and catholic social teachings" (2003:4). Stoger –Eising (2000:134-50) argues that there are close parallels between Nyerere's political ideas and those of Rousseau. She notes that Nyerere's ideas represented an attempt at fusing European concepts deriving from Kantian liberalism with the ethos derived from his more communitarian native African Society.

Nyerere did not hide his mixture of socialist views with *Ujamaa*. Thus, he said, "Traditional African Society was in practice organised on a basis which was in accordance with socialist principles... in traditional African society everybody was a worker", (Nyerere, 1968:4-5). The stark reality is that in traditional society everyone worked in his/her own field. While people were not employed, they were, nevertheless, self-reliant. This clouding with the Marxist – Leninist worker cost *ujamaa* many friends who had to fight it with the same zeal they used against any socialist project. The nationalisation of all banks and large industrial enterprises including large scale agricultural processing industries soon after the Arusha Declaration as reported by Arkaide (1973:370) made all the 'commanding heights' of the economy to come under the direct control of the state. Western governments, particularly the Scandinavian countries, were impressed by the commitment to self – reliance and were willing to support Nyerere (Coulson, 1985:2) while others like Britain whose banks, namely, Barclays, Standard and National and Grindleys were nationalised reacted negatively causing a massive withdrawal of personnel and discrediting the public sector banking industry thereby crippling the Tanzanian economy (Dibua, 2003:4). The justification of communitarism as being equal to socialism was equally misleading since the two had different ontological grounding and environment. The metaphysical and epistemological differences are traceable in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy given earlier on in this chapter. Implementation of the *Ujamaa* projects has attracted mixed feelings, with some scholars arguing that the good policy framework was implemented quickly without due consideration of current realities in Tanzania. James Scott (1999:239) was of this view when he commented;

> ... the modern planned village in Tanzania was essentially a point by point negation of existing rural practice, which include shifting cultivation and pastoralism; polycropping; small scattered settlements with houses built higgledly –piggledly and production that was dispersed and opaque to the state.

Scott's sentiments were echoed in Abraham Babu's statement which admitted some failure in the *ujamaa* project when he stated thus:

> That we failed to achieve those lofty objectives cannot be blamed on the Arusha Declaration or *Ujamaa* itself but rather on the mistaken order of priorities. What we should have tackled last was given top priority and what should have come first was consequently never attempted (Babu, 1991:31-34).

It is this mismatch between practice and reality that cost good African projects their viability and appeal. In this regard, *gutsaruzhinji* is a case in point.

Ibhawoh and Dibua argue against the throwing of the dirty bath water together with the child and instead ask for a deconstruction of the *ujamaa* philosophy as an authentic African philosophy. They assert that *ujamaa* needs to be extricated from the foreign contamination it received. They state clearly:

> …there is need for a deconstruction of *Ujamaa*, which goes beyond binary frameworks. Such deconstruction must seek to interrogate *Ujamaa* not only as political ideology but also within the context of the varied objectives and aspirations which informed it. *Ujamaa* was also conceived as a development strategy. Unfortunately the emphasis on the politics – ideological and economic dimension of *Ujamaa* has obscured these aspects of the experiment" (Dibua, 2003:22).

It is the author's contention that this noble African project, emanating, as it does, from Africa's most priced ideology informed by *hunhu /ubuntu*, should find its resurrection in *gutsaruzhinji* which aims at achieving the initial objectives of *Ujamaa* in an African context without the contamination of socialist doctrine.

1.6   Consciencism by Kwame Nkrumah

Kwame Nkrumah, the founding president of independent Ghana, in 1957, like Julius Nyerere firmly believed that an ideology to guide and spearhead development in the post–colonial era, in post-colonial Ghana, had to be mooted. He, however, believed that the nation had to be crafted from the people's past history. Nkrumah contend;

> I have said an ideology seeks to bring a specific order into the total life of its society. To achieve this it needs to employ a number of instruments. The ideology of a society displays itself in political theory, social theory and moral theory, and uses these as instruments. It establishes a particular range of political social and moral behavior such that unless behavior of this sort fell within the established range, it would be incompatible with ideology (Nkrumah, 1964:59).

His major argument was that only one ideology compatible with that society was possible. No one could implement two different ideologies to guide a society especially when the other ideology is foreign to the people. Nkrumah considered capitalism which was introduced in Africa and Ghana in particular by colonialists as foreign and never to be adopted in independent Ghana. To this extent he argued "African Society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment which represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa using colonialism and neo-colonialism as its primary vehicles" (Nkrumah, 1964:68). Nkrumah, like Nyerere, preferred socialism to capitalism. He associated socialism as being compatible with African traditional values. This is confirmed by his argument in the statement below:

> This idea of the original value of man imposes duties of a socialist kind upon us. Herein lies the basic of African Communalism. This theoretical basis expressed itself on the social level in terms of institutions such as the clan, underlining the initial equality of all and the responsibility of many for one…
> In the traditional African society, no sectional interest could be regarded as supreme; nor did legislative and executive power aid the interest of any particular group. The welfare of the people was supreme… neither economic nor political subjugation could be considered as being in tune with the traditional African egalitarian view of man" (Nkrumah, 1964:69-70).

A number of issues are clear from Nkrumah's above assertion. Firstly, that traditional African philosophy should be the basis of post-colonial African philosophy. Secondly, he affirms Nyerere's ideology of the importance of a family or clan as embedded in African

Communalism. Thirdly, and most important, is that there should be no exploitation of man by man and an egalitarian society is to be established. It could be added that the fourth mission was to redress the socio-economic inequalities created by capitalism by ushering in an ideology informed by traditional African thought, which thought the author has already appealed to for *hunhu/ubuntu* values. It is, therefore, on the basis of the above considerations that Nkrumah introduced what he termed philosophical conciencism to address the above mentioned concerns. The author is compelled to quote Nkrumah in greater detail so that his philosophy of consiencism is properly laid down. Nkrumah contend that;

> Our philosophy must find its weapons in the environment and living conditions of the African people. It is from those conditions that the intellectual content of our philosophy must be created. The emancipation of the African continent is the emancipation of man. This requires two aims; first, the restitution of the egalitarianism of human society, and second, the logistic mobilization of all our resources towards attainment of that restitution. The philosophy that must stand behind this social revolution is that which I have once referred to as philosophical consciencism: consciencism is the map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable African society to digest the Western and the Islamic and, the Euro-Christian elements in Africa and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality. The African personality is itself defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society (Nkrumah, 1964:78-79).

There is no doubt that Nkrumah's ideology is strongly informed by *hunhu/ubuntu*, which is the basis of traditional African society, as echoed by Ramose ((2005), Tutu (1999), Mangena (2012.a) and others. The task laid by Nkrumah's ideology of consciencism was further specified as, "taking its start from the present content of the African conscience, indicates the way in which progress is forged out of the conflict in that conscience" (ibid). The main preoccupation was now to eradicate capitalism, for according to Nkrumah's earlier assertions, it cannot live side by side with socialism which he branded the traditional African society mode. The creation of an egalitarian society could be generally accepted as the main objective of consciencism as a guiding philosophy. Nkrumah also believed, strongly, that after laying such an important ideology, it would be naïve if that ideology is not put to practical operations to solve Africa's and the people's problems. Nkumah asserted, "Thought without practice is empty, and philosophical consciencism constantly exhibits areas of practical significance –philosophical consiencism connects knowledge with action,.. Egalitarianism is not only political but also ethical; for it implies a certain range of human conduct which is alone acceptable to it" (Nkrumah, 1964:92-3).

Nkrumah believed that rules could be changed to meet long-standing ethical considerations in accordance with time. While modernity did not essentially mean foregoing long-established egalitarian ethics inherent in the traditional African way of life, the application of rules could be altered to achieve the original purpose. He argued that, "According to philosophical consciencism, ethical rules are not permanent but depend on the stage reached in the historical evolution of a society, so however that cardinal principles of egalitarianism are conserved, a society does not change its ethics by merely changing its rules" (bid). By implication, and through the link between consiencism and the principles espoused by socialism, the establishment of consiencism in Ghana would naturally end the previous established order of colonial capitalism and its attendant socio-economic inequalities, and replace it with a new egalitarian society. This, according to Nkrumah, was the revolutionary change which consciencism as a philosophy had to achieve in Ghana.

The Cardinal ethical principles of philosophical consciencism were, "treat each man as an end in himself and not merely as a means," (Nkrumah, 1964:95). The foundation of egalitarisnism in traditional African thought, was the established view, which according to Nkrumah, was the fact that, "man is one, for all men have the same basis and arise from the same evolution according to materialism" (bid). This takes us to another important dimension in Nkrumah's consiencism, where he envisaged a society rid of social classes. Nkrumah assserted that in traditional African society there were no social classes as now created by colonial capitalism. Capitalism thrived on the exploitation of man's labour to enrich one man, the colonizer, hence, accordingly, "Exploitation and class-subjection are alike contrary to consciencism" (ibid). The drive for individual social and economic development became the evident task of consiencism. This, according to Nkrumah was to be sought using political action "in a fierce and constant struggle for emancipation as an indispensable first step towards securing economic independence and integrity" (Nkrumah, 1964:99). Nkrumah's vehicle on which consciencism was to spread throughout Ghana was a mass party. He declares, that, "We can therefore say this positive action must be backed by a mass party and quantitatively to improve this mass so that by education and an increase unit degree of consciousness, its aptitude for positive action becomes heightened. This was why the Convention People's Party of Ghana developed its education wing, workers wing, farmers wing, youth wing, women's wing etc" (Nkrumah, 1994:100).

Nkrumah just like Nyerere believed in the organization of people under a one-party state system, which he argued was better able to express and satisfy the common aspiration of a nation as a whole, than a multiple parliamentary system, which is in fact only, "a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, the inherent struggle between the 'haves' and the 'have not'", (ibid). Nkrumah was so radical that he did not believe in taking any socio-economic and political advice from his erstwhile colonizers as this was tantamount to, "hand (ing) back our independence to the oppressor on a silver platter," (ibid). The liberation of a people institutes principles which enjoin the recognition and destruction of imperialistic domination whether it is political, economization, whether it is political, economic, social and cultural action must always have reference to the needs and nature of the liberated territory and it is from these needs and nature that the action must derive authenticity. It can, therefore, be said that Nkrumah was a strong advocate of participatory democracy according to which "the people are the backbone of positive action" (1964:103). This grounding of consciencism definitely equates it to *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy where priority is given to satisfying the people's social, economic and political needs. Consiencism therefore, according to Nkrumah, is grounded in past African tradition equated herein to the values and principles of *hunhu/ubuntu*. However, Nkrumah further seeks a regenerative concept in the modern world with life forgeing for it a strong continuing link with our past and also offering to it an assured bond with our future.

To this end Nkrumah contends, "Independence is of the people; it is won by the people for the people. That it is won for the people follows from their ownership of sovereignty. The people have not mastered their independence until it has been given a national and social content and purpose that will generate their well-being and uplift" (ibid.) The hallmark of consciencism is clearly the transformation of people's lives in keeping with their traditional African thought and practice. The dilemna Nkrumah and Nyerere faced was what to do with socialism and capitalism in order to allow indigenous, authentic African ideas to take centre stage without linking their ideologies to socialism. In this regard, the stance taken herein is that while socialism has many things egalitarian in nature, like the Christian view it remains foreign and should not be confused with traditional African thinking or more precisely *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

Consciencism as a social policy connects well with the kind of egalitarianism and humanism that preceded colonialism and although its values and principles are also present in Islamic traditions, Christian teachings and western idealism, by contrast, in establishing its

fundamental tenets, consciencism is informed by things that are traditionally African. There is, therefore, a strong case for consiencism as a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* and less as a model of African socialism. It can also be argued that African thought linked to socialism was fought with the same vigour used by the Western capitalist to eliminate it (Socialism) from the face of this planet.

1.6.1 A Critique of Nkrumaism/Consciencism

Agboza (2011) states that Nkrumaist ideology has always been "consciencism". The philosophy of Nkrumaism has always been philosophical consciencism. Moreover, socialism in Nkrumaism is a social- political theory and practice derived from materialism in the same way that capitalism is also a social–political theory and practice derived from idealism. (Agboza, 2011:113).

When laying his political ideology Kwame Nkrumah maintains that "The cardinal principle of philosophical consciencism is to treat each man as an end in himself and not merely as a means. This is fundamental to all socialist or humanist conception of man" (Nkrumah, 1964:95). He goes on to argue that traditional African ethical rules are founded on the principles of an egalitarianism entrenched in the traditional communalistic society. He, however, points out that Islamic and Euro-Christian religious traditions have transformed ancient African traditional culture tremendously to the extent that there is now a need to strike a balance and find harmony within contemporary life. Nkrumah's conception on this matter outlined in 1967 at a seminar in Cairo is given below:

> I warned in my book Consciencism that "our society is not the old society but a new society enlarged by Islamic and Euro-Christian influences. This is a fact that any socio-economic policies must recognise and take into account. Yet the literature of African socialism" comes close to suggesting that today's African Societies are communalistic. The two societies are not coterminous; and such an equation cannot be supported by any attentive observation. (Nkrumah, 1967:3).

The most important values espoused by the three (Islamic, Euro-Christian and traditional African culture) are humanistic values of egalitarianism (ibid). It is again these values which caused Nkrumah to adopt socialism and champion it as "African socialism" to try and differentiate it from Marxist Socialism. To emphasise his point Nkrumah stated:

> …the basic organisation of many African societies in different periods of history manifested a certain communalism and … the philosophy and

humanist purposes behind that organisation are worthy of recapture. A community in which each saw his well-being in the welfare of the group certainly was praiseworthy, even if the manner in which the well-being of the group was pursued makes no contribution to our purposes. Thus, what socialist thought in Africa must capture is not the structure of the traditional African society' but its spirit, for the spirit of communalism is crystallised in its humanism and in its reconciliation of individual advancement with group welfare (ibid).

What is clear from the above is that the values of *hunhu/ubuntu* in traditional communal living characterized by caring for each other and selflessness informs consciencism. In short consciencism is a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The only problem Nkrumah brings to his otherwise authentic African philosophy is equating it to socialism. This contamination with socialism based purely on egalitarian values which are entrenched in communalism does not call for socialism in consiencism. This view is shared by George Ayittey who criticises the founding fathers of post-independent African states like Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor and others for failing to make this important distinction. Ayittey (1990:12) argued:

> So why impose on black Africans an economic system which is alien to their culture? True, African peasants are communalistic and socialistic in the sense that they pool their resources together to build and care about their neighbours and family members. But that hardly makes them 'Socialists'. Communalism does not necessarily imply communism or socialism. Failure to make this important distinction led many African leaders and experts astray.

The author agrees with Ayittey entirely on this point. There is nothing to warrant the placing of *Ujamaa*, Consciecism, Negritude, Zambian Humanism and Kenya's African Socialism to the branding of these important philosophies branching from *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy under the socialist tag. This only served to weaken and misdirect African Philosophy when attempting to solve Western problems instead of insisting on using these ideologies as a departure from Western influences. *Gutsaruzhinji* as presented earlier seeks to extricate African ideology and transform it into a formidable tool with which scholars and political leaders can champion a new socio-economic and political order in Africa. It was erroneous for Nkrumah and Nyerere to use socialism to defend and expand the communalistic values entrenched in the teachings on egalitariansm of traditional *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The problem as noted by Agbodza (2011) is that African leaders contended that they had been contaminated by Western education to the extent that they preferred choosing socialism as a tool with which to fight colonialism and neo-colonialism to the detriment of African thought. Where socialism collapsed, their ideologies being linked to it did the same. This collateral

damage can now be avoided if the West and East come to know of a distinct African Philosophy with no bearing on neither socialism nor capitalism, but only giving solutions to African problems of underdevelopment and poverty. To this end *gutsaruzhinji* is presented as one solution. The metaphysics, ethics and epistemological grounds of consciencism render it undeniably a tenet of *hunhu/ubuntu*. What binds the communalistic view is belief in the three (metaphysical, ethics and epistemology) value system of the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The coincidence of certain similarities with other foreign traditions should of necessity not override the African philosophical discourse.

1.7   Negritude by Leopold Senghor

Negritude is defined by Leopold Sedar Senghor as "the sum of cultural values of the black world as they are expressed in the life, the institutions, and the works of black men" (Senghor 1993:83).This statement by Senghor clearly speaks to the notion that negritude as a philosophy is informed by the values espoused in traditional African cultural thinking rather than by foreign Western thought. Senghor was simply appealing to *hunhu/ubuntu* as argued in Nyerere's *ujamaa*, Nkrumah's consciencism, Kenya's African Socialism, Kaunda's humanism and others.

Regarding negritude, Mabana (2009) argues that negritude embodies a black literacy movement and a socio-political ideology towards the emancipation of black people. The word "negritude" is originally attributed to the Martiniquan writer Aime Cesaire who published his surrealistic masterpiece in 1939, "*Cahier d'um retour au pays natal*" (Notebook of a return to the Native Land) considered as the ethnic anthem of blacks all over the world.

The leading figures of Negritude were Aime Cesaire (1913) Leon Damas from French Guyana (1912-1978) and its major theoretician Leopold Sedar Senghor (1906-2001). Black poets claimed to be re-writing the black history falsified by the West, exploring black culture and past and redefining the sensitive values of the cosmos. By proudly affirming their African cultural and racial heritage by celebrating the beauty of Africa and the enchanting charm of black woman, by singing of the fights and by capturing the cruel tragedies of all blacks, the poets of negritude had a prophetic mission and a mystical vision of the New World. Their voices echoed complaints, hopes and deep feelings of the black people

denouncing the imperialistic Western ethnocentrism. Mabana (2009:2) states, "Negritude remains to me the most important literacy and philosophical movement of the Black Francophone world". Mudimbe (1988:95) acknowledges the contributions of Senghor in shaping African thought in the Francophone countries when he says;

> Senghors's influence on contemporary African thought, particularly in Francophone countries, is considerable. There is an African literature that flatters condescending Western eras, in which Africans prove, by means of the negritude of black personality rhetoric, that they are "intelligent human beings" who once had respectable civilizations that colonialism destroyed (Mudimbe, 1988:36).

Negritude is the reawakening of African thinkers to embrace *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy in the 21st century, to confront modern world socio-economic challenges. The same call is being made through the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy espoused herein. Initially, negritude wanted to extricate Africans and Black people from seeing, "themselves through the lenses of Western patterns (Mbana, 2009:8)

The word 'negro' refers to people of a designated colour - black. The identity of the African has been a source of ridicule from the west: at one point everything dark was inferior and devilish, (Antony, 2014:524). Senghor (1993) developed the colour-based identity philosophy of negritude as a concept to reverse the colonialist portrayal of things African as evil, subhuman, and inferior in all things European. He maintains that, "negritude is the whole complex of civilized values, cultural, economic, social and political which characterize the black peoples, or more precisely, the Negro-Africa World" (Senghor, 1993:83). Teiphard (1959) holds the same views on negritude as a philosophy of rediscovery and cultural reawakening, a philosophy of cultural emancipation aimed at giving the African people a sense of pride and dignity in their identity as Africans by making them appreciate the value of their culture as something distinct from the other culture and identity.

Nwoko (1988) states that Senghor highlights four dimensions of negritude. The first dimension is cultural negritude which highlights the role of emotion as dominating the entire Negro-African cultural system. In addition, Senghor emphasises the role played by religion, and states that "it is their emotive attitude towards the world which explains the cultural values of the African,their religion and social structure, their art and literature, above all, the genius of their languages" (Senghor, 1975:35). Senghor holds that the reinforcement of man is at once the reinforcement of other created things and of God who created all things. The

ancestors are the oldest expression of God (Janet 2008). Furthermore, Senghor uses the cultural component to differentiate how Africans think compared to the Western world or Europeans whom he describes this way, "European reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilization, Negro–African reasoning is intuitive by participation" (1964;74). This is an area where Negritude cannot be misunderstood to be Western socialism but to be rooted in the *hunhu/ubuntu* cultural settings of black people. Senghor amplifies this point further by contending that, "The African, introversive, seems also to abandon himself to the object by the very fact of his emotion…Africans, or specifically Arabs and Negroes, think with their soul. I would even say with their heart" (Senghor, 1972:44). The culture of participation and being with one another informs negro-thinking. It is therefore this traditional way of gaining knowledge which must be maintained against such discursive analysis by the West and Marxian dialectics. The second aspect of Senghor's negritude is social negritude according to which the family is the centre of social structure in negritude. Man as a person realizes his being in the family structure. The family according to Senghor (1959:2) embraces "the sum of all persons living and dead, who acknowledge a common ancestor …"This family unit notion is seen as a strong basis from which to inculcate traditional values and caring for each other. Senghor enhances this point when he states, "Thus the Negro-African symphathises, abandons his personality to become identified with the other, dies to be reborn in the other. He does not assimilate, he is assimilated. He lives in a symbiosis" (1964:73).

Social negritude enticed many scholars to quickly associate it with socialism rather than capitalism. This contention is too simplistic to be acceptable. The *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is a distinct stand-alone not linked to any variant. The third aspect of negritude is economic negritude which holds that in the African traditional society there is no personal property. Senghor exemplifies this with the question of land which cannot be owned as wealth or property, since it is considered a force or spirit. The ancestors watch and guard over its good use and punish members for misuse of land. Nwoke, (2006) states that in Senghorian negritude, labour is collective and free, and does not diminish a person. Economic negritude further differentiates the socialist thrust in the Marxist view of the worker and capitalist pursuit of work for profiteering. Senghor states his views on economic negritude as follows:

> West African realities are those of under developed countries–peasant countries here, cattle countries there – once Feudalistic, but traditionally classless and with no wage earning sector. They are community countries

where money is not king. Though, dialectical materialism can help in analysing our societies it cannot fully interpret them (Senghor, 1964:77).

It is clear from the above that an African economic set-up does not seek to create classes but to enhance cooperation and shared resource utilization. The notion of *gutsaruzhinji* which magnifies the validity of *hunhu/ubuntu* values in guiding socio-economic policies (Mangena 2014) Ramose (2005) is evident in economic negritude.

The fourth aspect of Senghor's negritude is political negritude, which is developed in an active humanism under his federal democracy. He believes that this is the only kind of democracy that would help Africa. Senghor (1964) believes that democracy is the traditional form of Negro –African societies and this he derives from the absence of classes in traditional African societies before colonialism. The federal democracy, which he advocates for is a unitary decentralized state. Individual states of the federation with their assemblies and governments will direct their local welfare according to the will of people (Antony, 2014:525). Senghor conceives a federal government organized as follows;

> The majority party will have the political conception and direction. The federal government and the federal assembly will direct foreign affairs. Whence the necessity for a strongly centralized party. The assemblies and governments of the federated states will control local affairs. The one is hardly less essential than the other, for reasons of principle and practice. Democracy requires us to start from the foundation, the masses; the popular will must first be expressed by the base, and the responsibilities, both economic and political, must be exercised there (Senghor, 1964:86).

Senghor values the will and needs of the majority of the people. This is how *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology puts communalism above individualism. This same notion is argued by the author as *gutsaruzhinji* polity. Minorities have to subject their interests to those of the majority. Leadership should serve the masses and avoid creating elitism. It is clear that this system takes from the African tradition where the chief or king gives power to his headmen/sub-chiefs and kraal heads to manage the people's local needs and attend to disputes before they can be forwarded to the king or senior Chief. It is, therefore, clear that African tradition had its own well-thought-out governance system, yet the colonialists rubbished everything which was done by the Negro or African. The author in the same vein proposes the *gutsaruzhinji* polity as an effective substitute to the talk about African socialism or Western Capitalism since *gutsaruzhinji* is informed by traditional African thought and practice as enshrined in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The cultural, social, economic and political negritude as argued by

Senghor are compatible with *gutsaruzhinji* and never with any other foreign ideologies. Similarities in some areas can be definitely be noted in all systems (Socialism and capitalism) but *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is irreversible. Senghor says this in a very clear comparative argument, "For us socialism is a method to be tested in contact with African realities. It is basically a question, after choosing lucidly, of assimilating our choices. To assimilate is to transform foods that are foreign to us, to make them our flesh and blood in word, to Negrofy and Berberize them. This brings us to Negro-Berber humanism; we must integrate the Negro Berber in his material determination by transcending them in the name of certain spiritual values" (Senghor, 1964:84).

Negro-Berber humanism is communitarian in nature; therefore the attributes in it which are similar to socialism can be assimilated without any problems since they are confirmed by African tradition. The assimilation process does not contaminate African thought with foreign doctrine. Senghor's narrative on the fundamental values embedded in Negritude as informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* communalism are intereting. He writes, "Negro-African society puts stress on the group than on the individual, more on solidarity than on the activity and needs of the individual, more on the communion of persons than on their autonomy. Ours is a community society. This does not mean that it ignores the individual or that collectivist society ignores solidarity, but the latter bases this solidarity on the activities of the individuals whereas the community society bases it on the general activity of the group" (Senghor, 1964:93-94).

Nothing can explain *gutsaruzhinji* better than what Senghor says above. Individuals are not crucified but are fulfilled in the majority co-existence and elimination of socio-economic inequalities transcends individual selfish gratifications. The *hunhu/ubuntu* values of love, unity, cooperation, freedom, dignity and solidarity are inherent in both negritude and *gutsaruzhinji,* hence the need to distil foreign values in our African political ideologies. Senghor makes the necessary confession of how political ideologies such as socialism were coined in African states. He explains hat socialism was only used as a weapon in a bid to gain political freedom by the African states. It was, therefore, never aimed at being the authentic African guiding ideology. Senghor contends, "If at the close of World war II, we chose socialism as a political doctrine, it was because, to make our anti-colonialist struggle effective , we needed a practical method that would be the application of a certain theory. For socialism is at the same time theory and practice" (Senghor, 1964:107).

The author agrees with Senghor's above-stated views entirely and accepts that what has come to be known as African Socialism was merely a tool used to fight colonialism and never to be an ideology or philosophy guiding post –independence African states. In its place, the author has presented the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology which is essentially informed by traditional African thought as enshrined in the *hunhu/ubuntu* doctrine.

The biblical Paul corrected the people of Athens who worshipped an "Unknown God" (Acts 17: 23). Paul explained that this God they called "Unknown" was the creator of all things and the God of the Universe. Similarly, the author advises all who proclaim *gutsaruzhinji* as African Socialism are mistaken, as the *gutsaruzhinji* polity is embedded in our *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

1.7.1   A Critique of Senghor's Negritude

Mabana (2009) defines Negritude as a black literary movement and socio- political ideology towards the emancipation of black people. Leopold Sedar Senghor coined the term "Negritude", in response to the racism still in France where Africans were portrayed as evil and sub-human or at least inferior to all things European. The word 'Negro' refers to a people of a designated colour: black (Antony, 2014:524).

According to Senghor (1993:83) 'negritude is the whole complex of civilized values, cultural, economic, social and political which characterise black peoples, or more precisely, the Negro-Africa world". Teilhard (1959) argued that Senghor believed that every African shares certain distinctive and innate characteristics, values and aesthetics. Negritude, for Senghor (1993) became the active rooting of black identity in this inescapable and natural African essence. According to Oyekan (2008), even in colour symbolism, negritude asserts that black is more beautiful than white and soft, dark, night is preferable to harsh daylight. Senghor (1967:96) in his poem 'Black woman romanticizes the beauty of the black race:

> Naked woman, black woman
> Clothed with your colour which is life, with your form which is beauty!
> In your shadow l have grown up; the gentleness of your hands was laid over
> my eyes. And now, high in the sun –baked pass, at the hearts of summer, at the
> heart of noon, l come upon you, my promised land, and your beauty strikes me
> to the heart like the flash of an angel.

In his poem above 'black", becomes life and beauty. Below is a quote from Senghor detailing how he felt about "black" in Negritude:

> These distinctive black values are not just meant for the African and his world, it is the contribution of the African to the civilization of the world. Thus, negritude is Africa's contribution to world civilization. It is not ideologism, radicalism or false myth. It is the whole man-body and spirit in its search for universal explanation and realization (Senghor, 1967:83)

Senghor goes on to explain how the African attained his knowledge in a way far different from that of his European counterparts. In this regard Senghor says, "All these values are essentially informed by intuitive reason....In other words, the sense of communion, the gift of rhythm, such are the elements of negritude, which we find indelibly stamped on all the works and activities of the black man" (ibid). It is clear from the above that negritude is arguably rooted in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Everything related to it is not borrowed from outside Africa and African culture.

1.8   Kaunda's Humanism

Kenneth Kaunda's government and his United National Independent Party (UNIP) adopted and declared humanism as the country's national Philosophy on April 27, 1967. Humanism was presented by Kaunda as a "set of philosophical guidelines rooted in the Zambian cultural heritage intended to unite the country in the common task of economic, social and political development" (Chibwe et al, 1990:292). The Philosophy of humanism repudiated both capitalism and communism. This ideology was crafted as an "effective means of eradicating the previous evils of colonialism and capitalism", as presented by Mwaipaya (1981). Mwaipaya contends that:

> Humanism was conceived as a means of reconstructing a new moral social order in Africa compatible with the African traditional way of life centered on communal and extended family system. In a nutshell, Zambian humanists sought to establish a classless society, conceived of as the natural state of Africa before the arrival of colonialism (Mwaipaya, 1981:13).

What comes out clearly from the fundamental objects of humanism was the need to restore African dignity which had been tramped upon by colonialism which had established the white minority as a superior race of people and left Africans as sub-human beings. The

inspiration of previous traditional life of a classless society became the embodiment of Zambian humanism.

The summary of Kaunda's main objectives and vision about his philosophy and targets of humanism was given in his speech in 1976 at the ninth National council meeting of UNIP. Ihonvbere (1996:26) gives twelve targets laid by Kaunda to provide greater social security to Zambians; Abolish exploitation and victimization; increase Zambian participation in the control of the economy ; provide free education and free medical service to all Zambians; transform the armed forces into an instrument for the service of fellow Zambians; expand infrastructure construction and rural development; stem out abuse of power, corruption and injustices; and guarantee peace and freedom, with the state controlling the economy on behalf of all the Zambian people, (Ihonvbere, 1996:26).

Like all the first independent states and African leaders, Kaunda saw the establishment of a one-party state as the only viable means of establishing Zambian Humanism. Again this was informed by the traditional set-up of a King and his subordinates.

1.8.1 Principles of Zambian Humanism

The principles of Zambian humanism were anchored in both, norms of social behavior of traditional African society and Kaunda's religious (Christian) conception of human nature (Mwaipaya, 1981:10). By adhering to traditional African social values and adopting Christian values, humanists believed that human evil inclinations or desires would be eliminated and "replaced with genuine Christian love, leading to the destruction of the animal in man, which is the source of all evil inclinations, greed, envy and similar self –centred tendencies" (ibid).

The major tenets of Zambian humanism embraced egalitarianism, man–centeredness , respect for human dignity, hospitality or generosity, kindness, hard work and self-reliance, communalism, cooperation, political leadership as trusteeship and respect for age and authority, (Meebeko, 1977:11). Zambian humanists regarded egalitarianism as the most important principle because it promoted equality in political, social, economic and other relations, thereby addressing the inequalities created by the previous colonial capitalist system.

Inclusiveness was yet another important principle of Zambian humanism as it was seen to be consistent with the extended family system widely prevalent in traditional African society. The inclusiveness principle characterized the importance of kinships in African society, which employ a social security scheme to assist family members in need of assistance instead of relying on external institutional support. This brings to mind Julius Nyerere's *ujamaa* philosophy which was constructed to address similar concerns though in a slightly different way. Communities in traditional African society accepted and looked after the sick, the physically handicapped and the aged, and provided mutual aid by encouraging community mindedness and cooperation and discouraging individualism (Mwaipaya, 1981:12).

Kaunda Cherished the man-centred approach to development in all areas. He argued that, "African traditional society has always been man-centred and by emulating it, Zambian society could not fail to actualize its ideas" (Mwaipaya, 1981:7). The man-centredness is also embedded in the *gutsaruzhinji* "*nhimbe*" or collective free labour practice which is a fundamental tenet of *hunhu/ubuntu* values denoting both selflessness and love, unity and co-operation. These values and principles, while they are evident in Christian practice, are so entrenched in traditional African practice as contained in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

Communalism and cooperation as earlier on given were other important pillars of Zambian Humanism. Unlike capitalism which advocated for the private ownership of land and labour, traditional society discouraged materialism and selfishness, while encouraging communal use of land. Mwaipaya states that a man owned a piece of land only for as long as he tilled it or used it in some other way. As soon as the land was abandoned, he lost claim to it and it reverted to the common pool" (1981:5). It should be made clear, however, that the individual had full authority to use land for his sustenance and that of his family members. The purpose of land was for production for the general good, without excluding anyone from enjoying the fruits of his/her labour, but laziness was a deprivation of both self and society, hence one could lose the land use rights. This takes us to the most cherished principle of hard work and self–reliance in Zambian Humanism.

It should, however, be noted that this principle is prevalent in all African philosophies discussed, *ujamaa*, consciencism; African socialism; negritude and *gutsaruzhinji*. Zambian humanists argued that, the willingness of individuals to work hard was of prime importance to achieve national socio-economic development. Self- reliance in humanist thought differed

substantially with individualism and selfishness, characterised in capitalism. When one was considered self-reliant, he/she was also known to have that extended family to which he/she was part. The extended family connected with the clan and society at large. Therefore, self reliance was in a way a major contributing factor to national development than individualism. Zambian humanism was, therefore, largely informed by traditional values which were in sync with the creation of an egalitarian society, bridging the gap between the 'haves' and 'have nots' created by settler colonialism and its capitalist economic ideology. Socialism became the only suitable alternative and was to be animated it with *hunhu/ubuntu* values in traditional African culture. It is, however, this crossbreeding that the author argues was not necessary since a comprehensive implementation of humanism as an authentic African Philosophy anchored on *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy was possible. The crossbreeding ended up seeing only one sector–agriculture in Zambia- implementing the humanistic ideology leaving other sectors like mining industry and international trade subjected to neo –colonial tendencies which most scholars attribute to the limited success of the policy.

1.8.2   A Critique of Kaunda's Humanism

According to Mwaipaya (1981:130), Kaunda's humanism relied heavily for its foundation on the norms of social behaviour in traditional African societies as well as on Kenneth Kaunda's religious conception of human nature. Mwaipaya argues that by adhering to traditional African social values and adopting Christian values, humanists believed that human evil in inclinations or desires would be eliminated and "replaced with genuine Christian love; the elimination of human evil inclination would lead to the destruction of the animal in man, which is the source of all evil inclinations, greed, envy and similar self–centered tendencies" (ibid).

Zambian humanism as informed by Kaunda's Christian conception of human nature became the basis for political organisation of human relations, political activities, economic structure, agricultural activities and national development in general (1981:12). Outlined below are Kaunda's views on the philosophy of humanism:

> Zambian Humanism came from our own appreciation and understanding of
> our society. Zambian Humanism believes in God the Supreme Being. It

> believes that loving God with all our soul; all our heart, and with all our mind
> and strength, will make us appreciate the human being created in God's image.
> If we love our neighbour as we love ourselves, we will not exploit them but
> work together with them for the common good (Kaunda, 2007:iv)

The emphasis on God, the Supreme Being, and love for the neighbour is also fundamental to *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The "common good" in *hunhu/ubuntu* is considered highly valuable above individual interest. Its strong emphasis and inclination to the Christian God as the creator and Christian ethical values led Schreiter (1985) to refer to Zambian humanism as a local theology. Alex Sekwat (2000:525) gave the basic tenets of Zambian humanism embraced by the government of Zambia as egalitarianism, inclusiveness, acceptance, mutual aid, man–centredness, respect for human dignity, hospitality, generosity, kindness, hard work and self-reliance, communalism, cooperativism, political leadership as trusteeship, and respect for age and authority. These values are enshrined in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy as cited by Tutu (2004:25-26) as well as in Euro–Christian ethics.

The conceptual framework of Zambian humanism should be clearly understood to be a philosophy put forward to counter the effects of colonialism and its apartheid developmental system in post–independence Zambia. The predicament which quickly befell it was the tendency to associate humanism with socialism on the grounds that they had wrestled with the capitalist colonial system. This is evident in Kaunda's sentiments expressed below:

> We work to eliminate from the face of Zambia, the exploitation of one man by
> another. We fight to eliminate all forms of evil. These mailed in the
> philosophy of capitalism and its off-shoots of imperialism, colonialism, neo-
> colonialism, fascism and racism in all their manifestations. It has always been
> pointed out that one cannot be a humanist without being a socialist. Humanists
> believe that mankind is one and indivisible (Kaunda, 1974:13).

It is possible to be humanist as guided by *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy not socialism as alluded to by Kaunda above. It is also correct that mankind is indivisible as contained in *hunhu/ubuntu's* communitarian view. Kaunda summarised humanism in his popularised motto, "One Zambia, One Nation". The appeal to socialism derailed the otherwise Zambian ideology and dragged it to such practices as nationalisation of state resources to a level where economic collapse and hyperinflation led to the removal of Kaunda and his party UNIP in a general election in 1991.

It is therefore the author's contention that all the theories put forward by the founding fathers of post–independent African states should just have maintained their original state which was mainly informed by both *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and the prevailing religious belief systems and avoided being entangled in the socialist milieu. *Gutsaruzhinji* comes in to extricate both African philosophy and African political thought into addressing the socio-economic challenges bedevilling almost all African states and uplift the generality of the people from poverty through effective relations with both the West and East. There is absolutely no need for rigid adoption of either socialism or capitalism. Instead, policies which address poverty and underdevelopment must be adopted for the benefit of the generality of the people as advocated by the ideological values in *hunhu/ubuntu*.

1.9   Kenyan African Socialism

There are two African traditions which form an essential basis of Kenyan African Socialism. The two traditions are political democracy and mutual social responsibility.These two important components made Kenya to structure its socio-economic and political ideology guided by principles and values believed to have been prevalent in African traditional society.

In 1965, the Government of Kenya published a white paper referred to as Sessional Paper No.10 or simply the Paper which enunciated the doctrine of African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya. Jomo Kenyatta who was then President tasked Tom Mboya to lead its crafting and subsequent presentation to both Government and the Kenyan National Assembly as he was the Minister of Planning and Economic Development. Tom Mboya summarized the whole Philosophy in the Paper by saying, "The Paper assembled in one document a philosophy by which we can live in pride, social justice, human dignity and political equality and a set of practical policies and measures designed to promote economic development, social progress and cultural growth" (Molinddin, 1981:67).

Mboya explained that the use of the word "African" was intended to convey the African roots of a system that is itself African in its characteristics; not a foreign import of socialism. It was largely drawing from "the best of African traditions, and adaptable to new and rapidly changing circumstances" (ibid).

The political democracy in African tradition implies that each member of society is equal in terms of political rights and that no individual or group will be permitted to exert undue

influence on the policies of the state. The state represented everyone impartially without prejudice. No minority interests were given special preferences as was the case in the colonial era where the minority white apartheid system granted them. In African society a man was born politically free and equal and his voice and counsel were heard and respected regardless of the economic wealth he possessed. Section 9 of the paper, went on to explain that even where traditional leaders appeared to have greater wealth and hold disproportionate political influence over their tribal or clan community, there were traditional checks and balances including sanctions against abuse of such power. Traditional leaders were regarded as trustees whose influence was circumscribed in customary law and in religion.

Section 10 of the Paper went on to state that African socialism differs politically from communism because it ensures every mature citizen equal political rights and from capitalism because it prevents the exercise of disproportionate political influence by economic power groups. Another fundamental force in African traditional life was religion which provided a strict moral code for the community.

Section 11 appealed to the family unit in a similar fashion to *ujamaa*, by stating that, "Mutual social responsibility is an extension of the African family spirit to the nation as whole, with the hope that ultimately the same spirit can be extended to ever larger areas… if society prospers its members will share in that prosperity and society cannot prosper without the full cooperation of its members. The state has an obligation to ensure equal opportunities to all its citizens and to eliminate care and social security.

Section 12, of the Paper contains striking similarities to Nyerere's advocacy for hard work by every member of the community in its *ujamaa* doctrine, when it made an appeal that "To ensure success in the endeavours of the government, all citizens must contribute to the degree they are able, to the rapid development of the economy and society. Every member of African traditional society had a duty to work. This duty was acknowledged and willingly accepted by members because the mechanism for sharing society benefits, the reciprocal response of society to the individuals' contribution was definite, automatic and universally recognized (Molinddin, 1981:67).

Section 13, of the sessional paper spelt out what was considered anti-social behaviour or practices which were against traditional African life. These included "sending needed capital abroad, allowing land to lie idle and undeveloped, misusing the nation's limited resources

and conspicuous consumption when the nation's limited resources and needs require savings, are examples of anti-social behaviour that African socialism will not countenance. Another important component of Kenyan African socialism, was its adaptability mechanisms according to which traditional African practice was structured to change and meet modern society while still keeping and preserving the fundamental tenets of traditional life.

Section 15 of the paper directed that African Socialism must be flexible because the problems it will confront and the incomes and desires of the people will change over time, often quickly and substantially. A rigid doctrinaire system will have little chance for survival. However, section 16, was quick to preserve the fundamental tenets where it categorically stated,

> No matter how pressing immediate problems may be, progress toward ultimate objectives will be the major consideration in particular political equality, social justice and human dignity will not be sacrificed to achieve more material ends more quickly. Nor will these objectives be compromised today in the faint hope that by so doing they can be reinstated more fully in some unknown and far distant future (ibid).

Mboya contended that African socialism must be prepared to cope with a vast range of problems, some of which cannot even be visualized in the present. A rigid system however appropriate to present circumstances, will quickly become obsolete. All practical economic systems, regardless of their origin (Marxist Socialism and Western Capitalism) have demonstrated adaptability. The problems of today are not the problems of a century ago. African socialism is designed to be a working system in a modern setting, fully prepared to adapt itself to changing circumstances and new problems (ibid). It is, therefore, clear that traditional African values will remain valid to every upcoming modern society but application models to achieve the same values of freedom; equality, human dignity and cooperation will be changing. This reinforces Metz's (2014) argument that *ubuntu* as the Campus of traditional African values has just started and everyone has a role to see its proper articulation and implementation in modern society than preaching the "end of *ubuntu*," as argued by Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013).

One area where Kenyan African Socialism demonstrated a complete shift in pursuit of adaptability was the area of trade with other countries. Section 23, was very clear on this matter in stating that, "modern methods of production, distribution, transportation and communication mean no country can progress rapidly in isolation. The means for promoting

trade, ensuring fair and stable prices for primary products and reducing market barriers must be sought and supported. Kenya places no ideological barriers on trade and expects that trade relations should be conducted in general on the basis of economic considerations" (ibid). This simply meant that on trade, Kenya could trade with the Western, or Eastern block, regardless of their policies of whether they are capitalist, communists or socialist. What was key to them was the benefit accruing to the Kenyan economy and ultimately the Kenyan people in addressing their socio-economic needs. Similarly, regarding land title and communal ownership of land as previously practised in traditional African settings, the paper categorically stated, These African traditions cannot be carried over indiscriminately to a modern, monetary economy. The need to develop and invest requires credit and a credit economy rests heavily on a system of land titles and their registration. The ownership of land must, therefore, be made definite and explicit if land consolidation and development are to be fully successful. It does not follow, however, that society will also give up its stake in how resources are used. Indeed, it is a fundamental characteristic of African socialism that society has a duty to plan, guide and control the uses of all productive resources under African socialism, the power to control resource use resides with the state. Ownership can be abused, whether private or public and ways must be found to control resource use (paper 96 Section 30 and 31).

The whole point of shifting ownership from the communal holding of trust under a traditional leader or chief, to the state does not result in the shifting of benefits. The people remain the main beneficiaries but now under the watchful eyes of a responsible government. There are different application mechanisms, all of which serve primary goals as envisaged and contained in traditional African settings. Thus, we have more evidence affirming that the values of *hunhu/ubuntu* are prevalent in African societies and their application of the same values.

The main features of African Socialism in Kenya can be summarized as political democracy; mutual social responsibility; various forms of ownership; a range of controls to ensure that property is used in accordance with the mutual interests of society and its members; diffusion of ownership to avoid the concentration of economic power in one place and the promulgation of progressive taxes to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and income. Like all other political formations studied earlier, the TANU of Julius Nyerere, CCP of Kwame Nkrumah and KANU the ruling party in Kenya shared the ideology espoused in the

KANU Manifesto which states, "We aim to build a country where men and women are motivated by a sense of service and not driven by a greedy desire for personal gain" (Page 1). "The traditional respect and care for the aged among our people must continue… (Page3) "The first aim of (seven years free education) will be to produce good citizens inspired with a desire to serve their fellowmen"(page4). "We are confident that the dynamic spirit of hard work and self-reliance which will motivate the Government will inspire the people throughout the land to great and still greater effort for the betterment of their communities" (page 13). Moreover, "every individual has a duty to play his part in building national unity. Your duties are not limited to the political sphere. You must endeavour to support social advance" (Sessional Paper, 1965:16-17).

There is no doubt that the clarity of both government policy and KANU's political ideology are informed by traditional African thinking. This traditional thought is all but summarised in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy advocated by Ramose (2005), Mangena (2012a), Samkange and Samkange (1980), Tutu (1999) and others.

1.9.1   A Critique of Kenyatta's African Socialism

The socio-economic development path Kenya embarked on after its national Independence under Jomo Kenyatta was spelt out in a government sponsored document which came to be popularly known as the "Sessional paper No.10." Section 7 of this paper is an attempt to demystify the concept of "African Socialism" and delink it with mainstream socialism, by stating:

> In the phrase "African Socialism," the word "African" is not introduced to describe a continent to which a foreign ideology is to be transplanted. It is meant to convey the African roots of a system that is itself African in its characteristics. African political and economic system that is positively African not being imported from any country or being a blue print of any foreign ideology but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques from whatever source. The principle conditions are: (i) It must draw on the best of African Traditions
> (ii) It must be adaptable to new and rapidly changing circumstances and
> (iii) It must not rest its success on a satellite relationship with any other country or group of countries (Kenya Government Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965).

The reference to African Tradition was further explained in terms of the qualities of political democracy under which in the olden days there were no differences in political rights based on economic differentiation and mutual social responsibility under which there was full cooperation among members of a community (Chipembere 1970:103) Clearly, this was an appeal to the *hunhu/ubuntu* values contained in the communalistic set-up of traditional African polities. The centrality of the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which lies in its guiding of African political and philosophical thought is evident. This essentially denies direct link between the projects of African socialists and Western Marxist socialist variants. Chipembere reinforces this view when he contends that:

> the paper (sessional paper No.10) severely criticises Marxism as well as Laissez –faire capitalism and declares that both have been abandoned in part even by those who claim to follow them because they were written for their time and made no allowance for changing times and conditions" (ibid).

In practice Kenyans demonstrated their distinct approach by giving title deeds to individual land holders unlike in socialist traditions where the state owns land on behalf of its citizens (ibid). While the state could only control the use of resources, it rejected state ownership of such resources.

Cooperation was believed to be rooted in African tradition and therefore encouraged but with increased discipline and training. These communalistic values as enshrined in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy became the embodiment of Kenya socialism, but there was nothing socialistic to warrant the name "Kenyan socialism". This adoption of "socialism" a foreign label can be seen to be serving no purpose at all, save to derail African thinking into effectively solving African socio-economic challenges in a way which does not attract negative feelings from those who have come across socialism. The main objective of African socialism in Kenya as noted by Chipembere (1970:105) was the provision of increased welfare services of various types by the government, but it did not necessarily need to bankrupt the nation and mortage economic growth for generations.In short the correct word for Kenya should not have been "Kenyan socialism but a "Welfare state". Essentially this meant addressing the needs of the majority in Kenya. To this end the name *gutsaruzhinji* can be an unparalleled alternative. As contained in paragraph 4 to 8 of the paper only the "socialist' concepts of common ownership", mutual social responsibility and democracy are not importations from abroad, but are rooted in the African past.

Oginga Odinga has sarcastically mocked the whole hypocrisy in the pronouncement of Kenyan socialism when he avers:

> Throughout the confused talk about African socialism for Kenya, there is basically false assumption that there can be a harmony of interests between private capital, including private foreign capital, and the Government as the representative of public interest in Kenya...These politicians want to build a capitalist system in the image of Western capitalism but are too embarrassed or dishonest to call it that" (Odinga, 1968:302 & 311).

Many critics of Sessional paper No.10 have labelled it capitalism masquerading as socialism (Chipembere, 1970:109). However, according to Tom Mboya who authored the sessional paper No. 10, African socialism must or rather aims to, "look on the development process" not as an end, but as a means towards increased prosperity for all. It is not bothered by the puritan code of ethics which makes savings, at the expense of other people's consumption, a virtue, nor by the Hegelian mystique that the future is in some way more important than the present (and must be guided) by the very different economic situation in which modern Africa finds itself (Clark, 1970:13).

The whole discourse of African socialism or socialism in general can, therefore, be seen to be a gimmick, and shrewd pacification of old pre-colonial rhetoric which sought to appeal to the previous founders of African nationalist movements but now had nothing to do with socialism per-se but, preferring instead to reconnect Africa to its own indigenous systems as, embraced in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy to solve current social, economic and political problems.

1.10   Ethiopian Socialism

Ethiopian socialism presents fertile ground for assessing how African states were colonized by foreign ideas even without the white capitalist settlers playing a physical role as in previous colonized states. Ethiopia was never colonized and adopted socialism voluntarily by mistakenly choosing between capitalism and socialism both of which were Western ideologies. The most obvious reason in choosing socialism was equating socialism to traditional African cultural values. The author strongly contests this notion and will throughout endeavor to give clear explanations. The economy of Ethiopia the world's firth poorest country (Ottaway, 1981:132) revolved almost exclusively around the land. It was

land that provided the livelihood of over 90 percent of the population and the wealth and power of the elite. Emperor Haile Selassie who ruled Ethiopia with royal absolutism from feudalism, was overthrown by the military in 1974 who got the backing of civilians (Ottaway, 1981:129). The coordinating committee of the military known as the Derg or the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) which seized power in June 1974, was not guided by a precise ideology. It however proclaimed that it was adopting socialism as an ideology to steer development in Ethiopia in December 1974 (ibid). The military later formed a political party named the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). The leaders who had studied Marxism from universities abroad tried to work out this ideology in the development of Ethiopia.

Socialism in Ethiopia was simply the chosen alternative to capitalism because under the Emperor Haile Selaisse, the peasants did not own land as it was under the feudal lords and the Emperor. The system operated just like Western capitalism. Land was nationalized and given to ordinary peasants. Ottaway (1981) states that the Derg, "simply nationalized all land and gave use rights to those who were presently cultivating it … organized the rural population into 'peasant associations, in 1979, sought to accelerate collectivization by formalizing a process through which 'producers' cooperatives or peasant collectives, should be formed," (1981:138). Without appealing to *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology openly, it can however, be noted that the Derg, were now creating a communal system where every peasant would work to produce for domestic consumption removing dependency on the state and on the feudal lords for subsistence. The previous state of deprivation under Emperor Selassie was to the peasant's equivalent to colonization, hence the peasants joined the military in overthrowing him in June 1974. The most important point is that socialism in Ethiopia was not used as a tool for liberating the peasants but was merely adopted by those who had learnt Marxist–Leminist Socialism in Europe. This is where Osabu–Kle (2000) argues that:

> compatible cultural democracy is not based on any foreign ideology be it socialism, Marxism, capitalism, or liberalism–but is grounded in Africanism, the ideological, economic and political practice of Africans on African soil in accordance with African culture, and colonial mentality and cleansed of foreign excrescence. In other words Africans should not be forced to choose between two Western ideologies; liberal democracy or socialism; they will only be able to solve their problems the African way not the blind emulation of any foreign political culture (Osabu-Kle, 2000:11,17,25).

Ethiopian Socialism is the most vivid and open demonstration of mental slavery and blind emulation of foreign doctrines. The author agrees with Osabu–Kle when he further contends that:

> most Africans have come to suffer from a deeply embedded form of mental slavery, a colonisation of the mind in which everything African is considered inferior to everything foreign… ideological re-education of African society to create the new African or, more accurately, to convert the present day African into a new African–who can contribute effectively to the realization of nationalist objectives and who places the unity and common destiny of the nation as whole above his or her narrow self - interest (Osabu– Kle, 2000:107, 114).

The challenge being put forward by Osabu–Kle is of revisiting the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and making it compatible with modern day socio –economic development. The pioneering of such ideologies as *ujamaa*, consciencism, negritude, Zambian humanism and others, should be accompanied by heavy investment into developing these African thoughts without any reference to western philosophy, or ideologies which would lead to a dilution of the African brand. The *gutsaruzhinji* doctrine seeks to extricate and distil African thought in accordance with *hunhu/ubuntu* epistemological and metaphysical grounding. This is the whole reason Metz (2014) advises that articulation of African thought and practice as enshrined in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy has just begun.

1.11   Conclusion

The author discussed that the philosophy of *gutsaruzhinji* is rooted in the *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology. The Ontological, metaphysical and epistemological dimensions of *hunhu/ubuntu* were given to try and foster the basis of African philosophical thinking. Communitarianism being the greatest pride of traditional African cultural life, has a big ideological branch stemming out of it which the author calls *gutsaruzhunji*. The *gutsaruzhinji* ideology should be cultivated and popularised in African circles to enable it to become a standalone ideology different from socialism and capitalism. Allowing an authentic African political ideology to guide the building of the African state will make it easy drawing references from the philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu* since it is the basis of African thinking. This was further clarified by critiquing the different philosophies propounded by Africa's father figures Julius Nyerere; Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta, Kenneth Kaunda and others. It was made clear that their ideologies were largely informed by African thinking in its

hunhu/ubuntu philosophy. The only danger was grafting these philosophies to socialism instead of continuing to anchor them in a *hunhu/ubuntu* foundation. The next chapter executes a proper definition of *gutsaruzhinji* and demonstrates how it is a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

CHAPTER TWO: *GUTSARUZHINJI* IN ZIMBABWE

2.0   Introduction

This chapter characterizes the idea of *gutsaruzhinji* as a social concept and a philosophy. The author argues that *gutsaruzhinji* is a sub-branch of the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which guides and tries to solve the socio-economic and political challenges besetting post-colonial governments in Zimbabwe in particular, and Africa in general. The historical narrative of the idea of *gutsaruzhinji* will be explored briefly to give it its proper perspective. The traditional Shona meaning of *gutsaruzhinji* vis-à-vis the English adoption of socialism as its equivalent is explained. The author discusses how *gutsaruzhinji* came to be known as another branch of socialism (Mangena, 2014:100; Chinyowa, 2007:186).

It should be categorically stated that not many scholars in Zimbabwe apart from the above have written about *gutsaruzhinji* in its authentic and organic state; instead many scholars preferred to see it and write about it as socialism. Even the two scholars (Mangena and Chinyowa) chose to do it passing without giving the details the author explores. Consequently, the literature relating to *gutsaruzhinji* is mostly from magazines and newspapers. This is like a new minefield or a jungle which needs to be cleared to give room to effective farming.

2.1   The Conceptual Framework of *Gutsaruzhinji*

The absence of an authentic African political philosophy to guide African governments to solve real problems of poverty and inequality has driven the author to critically look at the idea of *gutsaruzhinji* as a possible solution to this vacuum. Borrowed ideologies have proved to be unsustainable in dealing with Africa's socio-economic and political challenges. Osabu-Kle (2000:25) argues that Africans should not be forced to choose between two Western ideologies: liberal democracy or socialism. Osabu-Kle argues against the imposition of the word "democracy" in Africa. He believes that Africans never practise the democracy preached by the Western view; instead he provides a new name to replace Western Democracy to which he has given the name Jaku-democracy, maintaining that, "What Africa needs is a democratic practice that is compatible with indigenous culture and not the blind

emulation of any foreign political culture" (Osabu-Kle, 2000:25). Osabu-Kle refutes the idea of affixing democracy as advocated by foreign ideologies to African thinking. Osabu-Kle thus has renamed democracy Jaku to align it with African practice and culture. African practice and culture are discussed under the big umbrella term *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Similarly *gutsaruzhinji* has its deep roots in African practice and culture and is, therefore, a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology as this chapter attempts to show.

The second conceptual consideration deals with the history of colonization in Zimbabwe, which saw the minority white settlers dispossessing Africans of their natural resources and land and thereafter settle them on poor soils where they were congested (Moyo, 2003:13). The effective remedy to this inequity needed to be grounded in the adoption of a nationalist political process which led to the remedy of the injustices of colonialism. The First Chimurenga war led by Mbuya Nehanda in the 1890s failed to achieve this. It was not until 1980 that Zimbabwe attained its political independence (Ushewokunze, 1984:8-10).

The attainment of political independence brings us to the third consideration of Unity and Reconciliation between the two previously warring racial groups- the indigenous blacks and the former white colonizers became official policy. Any sustainable development calls for peaceful co-existence. *Gutsaruzhinji* was then seen as the ideology of choice to navigate the turbulence of first conflict to peaceful co-existence in accordance with past historical and traditional African practice and culture. The philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu* had to permeate into the new political establishment through its branch of communalistic practice called *gutsaruzhinji*. This new term *gutsaruzhinji*, has been left undomesticated and unexplored academically. It can be added that *gutsaruzhinji* adds value to the Zimbabwean polity and to African political discourse in general. Genuine reconciliation calls for redistribution of national wealth in a non-racial and non-partisan manner. In this regard, *gutsaruzhinji,* a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is poised to achieve this.

2.2   Definition of *Gutsaruzhinji*

Chimhundu (2001:348) defines *gutsaruzhinji* as "*Marongerwo eupfumi munyika anoitwa nehurumende, ane chinangwa chokuti munhu wese akwanise kuwana zvinomukwanira*". (Equitable distribution of wealth to satisfy every citizen). Clearly, *gutsaruzhinji* as a nationalist ideological political philosophy was chosen by Robert Mugabe and his party –

ZANU PF to be their guiding ideology in the war of liberation in order to be able to appeal to the generality of people to support their war efforts in order to redistribute the wealth equitably since the minority white colonial settlers were virtually in charge of every sector of wealth creation including the most priced land and its natural resources, leaving the majority Zimbabweans marginalized. The word *gutsaruzhinji* apart from being an indigenous Shona word, has a deep philosophical and political meaning. It advocated and still advocates for freedom, equity and self sustainability. Hannah (1961:205) defines *gutsa* as to "satiate or satisfy" while "*ruzhinji*" means "a majority." Thus, *gutsaruzhinji* means "satisfy the majority". The whole meaning of the word essentially locates it in the communitarian view where the needs and interests of the majority of the people in the community takes priority over individual needs (Mbiti, 1970:141; Temples, 1959:67; Gyekye, 1997:59). Commenting on the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy, Mangena remarks thus;

> In Zimbabwe, this trend of philosophy was popularized by Robert Gabriel Mugabe's socialism that was blended by a local ideology called *gutsaruzhinji* (promoting the interest of the majority).… During those early years of Zimbabwe's independence, Mugabe believed that only a well-fed, healthy and educated nation would lead to socio-political and economic development and that self seeking attitudes would be retrogressive to this development. So, *gutsaruzhinji* a philosophy premised on the idea of communal belonging was going to be the panacea to the problems affecting this new Zimbabwe which was smarting from a protracted war of liberation (Mangena, 2014:100).

Mangena's clarification of *gutsaruzhinji* as an ideology is important given that *gutsaruzhinji* is "premised on the idea of communal belonging". This, therefore, locates *gutsaruzhinji* as an authentic indigenous Zimbabwean tradition or African tradition which has nothing to do with the socialism preached by Marx and Lenin. Chinyowa also echoes Mangena's sentiments though he seems to confuse Marxism with *gutsaruzhinji*, something that this author has major objections to. The stance taken herein casts *gutsaruzhinji* and socialism as two distinctly different entities. However, it is important to quote Chinyowa, in detail, and then elaborate the difference in the two notions:

> At independence, the new Zimbabwe government sought to create a new social and political order by adopting the Marxist-Leninist ideology of scientific socialism to replace the existing colonial capitalist system. Socialist ideology was believed to be better able to effect the necessary revolutionary changes expected by a people who were not only tired of colonial injustice but were emerging from a protracted armed struggle. The new ideology was believed to be properly geared towards creating an equitable distribution of the means of production and consumption. It was expected to eliminate the social

and economic inequalities that were associated with colonial capitalism …. It is thus not surprising that the immediate post-independent period was characterized by slogans castigating colonialism and imperialism and hailing the new ideology of socialism, which became popularly known as the *gutsaruzhinji* (satisfaction for all) doctrine (Chinyowa 2007:188).

The author's task is to extricate *gutsaruzhinji* from socialism and present *gutsaruzhinji* in its original Shona meaning without confusing it with Marxist socialism. The study also argues that *gutsaruzhinji* is indeed a philosophy branching from the ideology of *hunhu/uhunhu*. The view that socialism preached at the dawn of independence, known as *gutsaruzhinji* was the same as Marxist socialism is not only incorrect but it distorts the ontological and metaphysical grounding of this new rich African philosophy. The use of this indigenous term- *gutsaruzhinji* was meant to remove misconceptions associated with socialism per se. *Gutsaruzhinji* is, therefore, a nationalist ideology aimed at redressing the socio-economic and political imbalances caused by colonialism's apartheid ideology to development. The author maintains that the failure to isolate *gutsaruzhinji* and socialism has led many scholars to blindly blanket *gutsaruzhinji* with socialism, then fail to extensively dig deeper into the *gutsaruzhinji* political ideology. As an African stand-alone doctrine grounded in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, not Marxist socialism. Striking similarities with Marxist socialism including the advocacy for equitable redistribution of wealth, however, that does not in any way connect it to Marxism and Leninism. African nationalist leaders chose to deliberately allow this faulty and incorrect interchangeable use of the Shona word *gutsaruzhinji* and socialism to gain political mileage from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics –USSR, where they obtained military hardware to prosecute the armed struggle. Realising the danger of post-independent Zimbabwe to continue to be perceived as using Marxist doctrine, Mugabe had to bring clarity on this matter, and spoke thus;

> Socialism has many varieties and forms; each must be related to people's history, culture and tradition. In our culture we have traits of socialist practice – for example, "*nhimbe*" or "*majangano*" communal use of land and so on. ZANU-PF wants to see a fair distribution of wealth and natural resources in Zimbabwe; a fair wage based on good production; control of the major means of production by government and the Party, and equal opportunity and access to all social services such as education, health and others (Zimbabwe News Vol. 16, May/June 1985:20).

The reference to *gutsaruzhinji* as being entrenched in the African tradition of "*nhimbe*" or "*majangano*" is targeted at highlighting the fact that *gutsaruzhinji* is not an invention or a

newly-created concept but a long-standing communitarian practice enshrined in the philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu*. This practice considers generosity and the sharing of wealth as a common virtue. "*Nhimbe*" or "*majangano*" were done in rotation until every member of the community benefited from free labour provided by fellow community members. This ensured every member had food for the family and surplus to sell on the open market. Speaking in The Zimbabwe News, Mugabe was more explicit when he propounded his party ideology in Shona, saying:

> *Bato reveruzhinji reZANU (PF) richazadzisa hutongi hwegwara regutsaruzhinji ... Kana zvaro gwara iri riine zvikamu zvakasiyana. Zvese zvinofanira kuzadziswa zvichifambirana netsika pamwe nemagariro evanhu. MuZimbabwe takagara tichingotevedza gwara iri mumishandira pamwe yataiita yakaita seye "nhimbe" ne "majangano" mumabasa edu ese ekurima nemamwewo. Bato revanhu reZANU (PF) ririkuda kuona kugoverwa kwakaenzanirana kwehupfumi hwenyika yedu pamwe nezviwanikwa zvayo..."*
> (ZANU (PF)'s commitment to socialism is based on the principles of Marxism Leninism. Socialism has many varieties and forms; each must be related to people's history, culture and tradition in the context in which it is practiced. In our culture, we have had traits of socialist practices- for example, "*nhimbe*" "*majangano*" communal use of land and so on. ZANU (PF) wants to see a fair distribution of wealth and natural resources in Zimbabwe; a fair wage based on good production), (Zimbabwean News Vol. 16. No. 5. May/June, 1985).

From the above, it is clear that the word *gutsaruzhinji* is used interchangeably with socialism. Secondly, even Mugabe, while admitting that *gutsaruzhinji* was different from Marxism Socialism because *gutsaruzhinji* had its roots or ontological underpinnings in Zimbabwean traditional culture and cultural practices, he does not categorically want to isolate *gutsaruzhinji* from the Marxist view where striking similarities are confused to mean one is borrowing from the other. This view is rejected by the author, *gutsaruzhinji* has both its name and ontological attributes in *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology in African traditional setting

Mugabe also realized that the negative consequences of using the word "socialism" interchangeably with *gutsaruzhinji* had to be further clarified. He then went on to say:

> Our socialist aspiration faces a number of challenges from persons and institutions opposed to this ideology outside Zimbabwe. Foremost, of the external institutions are the IMF and World Bank which gives money on stringent conditions meant to defeat socialism. Within Zimbabwe we have many people who want to walk in the shoes of colonialists and grab all wealth for themselves as individuals… faced with this situation it is imperative that we should think seriously of new political arrangements which would make it

difficult for external enemies to drive wedges between us and retard our socialist objective (ibid).

The danger facing *gutsaruzhinji,* was the misconception of equating it to Western Socialism which it was not. It is however, unfortunate that the leadership did not go on to advocate the use of only one name – *gutsaruzhinji* and never to allow the continued use of the word "socialism" since it distorted the distinctive and ontological grounding of *gutsaruzhinji* as a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Its nationalist advocacy for equitable redistribution of wealth was a simple call to return to African communalist ethics whose tenets are entrenched in the ethos of *hunhu/ubuntu*. Land and resource redistribution was the first stepping stone in building a *gutsaruzhinji* polity. Land was the productive assert every family was entitled to in traditional communal life, thereby dispossessing people of their land was tantamount to taking away their very existence.

This is why *gutsaruzhinji* a humanistic ideology, is defined in *hunhu/ubuntu* as a caring, love and sustainable co-existence with members in a community where "*nhimbe*" is the order of good living. Jonathan Moyo (2004) had it right when he said, "Our land reform is our socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*)". It is, therefore, important to discuss the theoretical framework of *gutsaruzhinji* in some detail.

2.3   The Theoretical Framework of *Gutsaruzhinji*

The theoretical framework of *gutsaruzhinji* has its ontological and/or metaphysical underpinnings in the communitarian view of how indigenous Africans – mostly Sub-Saharan Africans lived. A number of scholars define their existence and co-existence as understood in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy (Samkange and Samkange, 1984; Michael Onyebuchi Eze, 2008; Ramose, 2002). *Gutsaruzhinji* is, therefore, a humanistic ideology redefining and guiding African political thought to solve the post-colonial problems of inequality and underdevelopment in a way that is compatible with the *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology. It is, therefore, a philosophy insofar as it seeks to give solutions to problems affecting post colonial governments in charting their way to socio-economic prosperity and political stability. Scholars who have argued on the importance of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy in African thinking have therefore, laid a strong foundation to the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology since it is arguably a branch of this philosophy. It is imperative to highlight the aspects of *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology which qualifies *gutsaruzhinji* as its sub-branch.

Ramose (2002) argues that *ubuntu* is at the root of African philosophy and being. He states that the African tree of knowledge stems from *ubuntu* philosophy. According to him, *Ubuntu* is a wellspring that flows within African existence and epistemology in which the two aspects *ubu* and *ntu* constitute a wholeness and oneness. Thus, *ubuntu* expresses the generality and oneness of being human. *Ubuntu* cannot be fragmented because it is continuous and always in motion (ibid). Ramose's argument is convincing in that African thinking is grounded in the way the people lived and perceived life in general. Their belief systems and cultural values inform their ideology. *Hunhu/ubuntu* is the broad generalisation and conceptualisation of the metaphysical and ethical values reposed in traditional African culture. This belief sees the oneness and continuous flow of life from the Creator- *Musikavanhu* God Almighty (Samkange 1980), to the first human being and the unborn in the future. While technological advancement can bring new systems, value systems remain largely influenced by this ontological and metaphysical understanding of a united person as argued by Ramose. Most scholars who have tried to define what it means to be a person or what constitutes a person in African thinking agree that the person is created, educated and transformed by the community. Individualism does not exist in the African way of life, which is enshrined in the *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology which can be adopted to serve the African people and persuade them to identify with this important thinking contained in *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology. Menkiti, (1984:171) also emphasises this important point when he argues that "the African view of man denies that person can be defined by focusing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the love individual. Rather man is defined by the environing community. The reality of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories, whatever these maybe", (1984:171-172). The overall position is that the community, or majority people, take precedence over individuals in *gutsaruzhinji* as defined by Chimhundu (2001:348). Clearly, *gutsaruzhinji* becomes a brand or a baby whose DNA is in the parenthood of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

Nabudere (2002) raises an important argument about *ubuntu* which the author believes locates *gutsaruzhinji* as a good example of a philosophy branching from *ubuntu*, when he observes:

> *Umuntu* is a maker of his/her world, which constantly emerges and constantly changes. In his/her existence, *umuntu* is the creator of politics, religion and law. An African philosophy of life that guides the thinking and actions of Africans must therefore be found in their lived historical experiences and not

from philosophical abstractions that have very little meaning in actual life. This is where African philosophy differs remarkably from Western analytical and continental philosophy. *Umuntu* strives to create conditions for his/her existence with other beings for, as the Zulu proverb says, "U*muntu umuntu ngabantu*", which literary means "a person is a person through other persons". This belief therefore prescribes *ubuntu* as "being with others" (Nabudere, 2002:3).

From the above, two important points are laid down: One that African philosophy can only come from a lived African way of life, adapting to changing times. Secondly, that Africans have established themselves as beings not capable of living without others; but living with and for other people in line with the aphorism, "*Umuntu umuntu ngabantu*". Essentially, *gutsaruzhinji* advocates for a life lived to satisfy the needs and interests of other people. This is not an abstraction of *gutsaruzhinji* as a socialist philosophy but *gutsaruzhinji* as a humanistic African philosophy with its roots in *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology. This view is also shared by Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa who argues:

> Africans have this thing called *ubuntu…* the essence of being human. It is part of gift that Africans will give the world. It embraces hospitality, caring about others, willing to go the extra mile for the sake of others. We believe a person is a person through other persons, that my humanity is caught up, bound up and inextricably in yours. When I dehumanize you I inexorably dehumanise myself. The solitary individual is a contradiction in terms and, therefore you seek to work for the common good because your humanity comes into its own community, in belonging (Tutu, 2004:25-26).

Another very important philosophical point about *gutsaruzhinji* and its *hunhu/ubuntu* parents is made apparent in the preceding selection of text above. Humanity is from one common being or community of persons sharing the same interests and goals. All philosophizing is communitarian in nature, making it difficult to distinguish metaphysics, social theory and morality in African thinking. Any political theory which separates the person from the community is not representative of African thinking. If *gutsaruzhinji* passes the test of locating the people above   a person, then is definitely informed by the African thinking as enshrined in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. A person's relevance only comes through direct contribution to the welfare of the majority. Teffo and Roux (1998) echoes this view that metaphysics in its theoretical formulation is essentially expressed in social terms and practical ways of living as espoused by the communitarian ethic and politics, "African metaphysical thinking is social in nature ... it is difficult to distinguish metaphysics, social theory and morality in African thinking because all philosophizing is communitarian in

nature," (Teffo and Roux, 1998:139). *Gutsaruzhinji* is anchored in communitarian thinking couched in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The people, not the individual, takes precedence. Kaphagawani (2000:73) affirms this when he says, "African communalism presented a desirable alternative to the Western framework of individualism, which was the underlying premise of exploitative and conflictual Western capitalism. Communalism was not only a metaphysical principle of social existence but also a sort of critique of the social order," (2000:73). This is the whole reason behind Mbiti's famous statement, "Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say, "I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am" (Mbiti, 1970:141). This becomes the focal point of understanding both *gutsaruzhinji* and its glorious body couched in *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology.

The living for others concept in *ubuntu* is the same call for government to ensure that the majority people are assisted to be economically self-sufficient in a *gutsaruzhinji* polity. Since this self-sacrifice, compassion, love for others; mutual inter-dependency and living for the common good is part and parcel of African values esteemed by the society; application of *gutsaruzhinji* policies becomes natural if there is no deliberate deviation from the norm. Talukhaba and Ngowi contend;

> *Ubuntu* application is pervasive in almost all parts of the African continent. Hence, the *Ubuntu* philosophy is integrated into all aspects of day to day life throughout Africa and it's a concept shared by all tribes in Southern, Central, West and East Africa, amongst people of Bantu origin (Ngowi, 1999:338).

The prevalence of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy essentially means *gutsaruzhinji* as a sub-division of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, if properly packaged, can be implemented throughout Africa restoring the misery, poverty and inequalities prevalent in most African communities.

Ramose uses humanness to define *hunhu/ubuntu*, while Samkange and Samkange use humanism to define and characterize the same attributes. The difference between the two should, however, be noted. Dolamo (2013:2) refers to humanness as the essence of being human, including the character traits that define it, while Flexner (1988:645) refers to humanism as an ideology; an outlook or a thought system in which human interests and needs are given more value than the interests and needs of other beings. Taken together, humanness and humanism become definitive aspects of *hunhu/ubuntu* only if the prefix "African" is

added to them to have African humanness and African humanism respectively. African humanness would then entail that the qualities of selflessness and commitment to one's group or community, are more important than the selfish celebration of individual achievement and dispositions.

African humanism, on the other hand, would then refer to an ideology, outlook or thought system that values peaceful co-existence and the valorization of the community. In other words, it is a philosophy that sees human needs, interests and dignity as being of fundamental importance and concern (Gyekye, 1997:158). Gykye maintains that African humanism "is quite different from the Western classical notion of humanism which places a premium on acquired individual skills and favours a social and political system that encourages individual freedom and civil rights" (ibid). Thus, among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, the expression "*munhu munhu muvanhu*" which in Ndebele and Zulu languages translates to "*Umuntu umuntu ngabantu*" (a person is a person through other persons) best explains the idea of African humanism (Mangena, 2012a; Mangena, 2012b; Shutte, 2008; Tutu, 1999). Eze (2008) in defining and characterising African humanism, observes that as a public discourse, *ubuntu/botho* has gained recognition as a peculiar form of African humanism, encapsulated in the following *bantu* aphorism, like "*Motho ke motho ka batho babang; Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* (a person is a person through other people). In other words, a human being achieves humanity through his/her relations with other human beings. Therefore, the two terms humanness and humanism are aspects of the philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu* which places communal interest ahead of individual interest. This is what *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy is all about; and hence the reason the author argues that it is a sub-division of the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Yamamoto (1999:52) puts it differently when he gives the altruistic character of *ubuntu* as, "the idea that no one can be healthy when the community is sick. *Ubuntu* says I am human only because you are human. If I undermine your humanity, I dehumanize myself."

The above idea is also echoed by Mbiti's who contends thus;

> In traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except corporately. He owes this existence to other people […]. He is simply part of the whole. The community must therefore make, create, or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the corporate group […] This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man. (Mbiti, 1969:108-109).

Eze considers *ubuntu* as a restorative philosophy. It is important to quote him in detail since his call for a new direction or ideology to guide the African renaissance is what the author is doing in articulating the *gutsaruzhinji* polity. Onyebuchi Eze contends;

> To be a person through another person is an invitation to inter-culturality. *Ubuntu* configures a theory of socio-cultural imagination through a reformation of the African cultural system. *Ubuntu* is a narrative of renaissance; it is a philosophy of restoration. It is an attempt to restore a person's subjectivity and recognize him as a human being, irrespective of his status in life. The authority of our discourse lies in its potential ability to generate a new direction of menaing to deal with the contemporary of humanity in Africa" (Onyebuchi Eze, 2008:258-9)'.

The above argument by Onyebuchi Eze is quite valid in the Zimbabwean context where *gutsaruzhinji* was used for the redistribution of Land in 2000 under the Fast Track Land Reform (FTLR) (Moyo, 2004) and the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33] (IEEA). This was made possible due to that fact that traditional African cultural morality calls for the deliberate doing of things to better the majority. This is enshrined in what Mangena (2012a:10) calls the Common Moral Position – (CMP). African culture does not celebrate the prosperity of individuals, ignoring the poor or those in lack (Mangena, 2012b:15). This is the strongest component of *huntu/ubuntu* which is embedded in *gutsaruzhinji* to try and give a new direction to African politics. Gutsaruzhinji and CMP animate on the call to desist from individualistic self serving attitudes as practiced in capitalist societies, but to embrace the sharing of wealth and caring for the needy. If Africa fails to restore wealth to the ordinary citizens and allows individualistic tendencies of accumulation in the same colonial fashion then Africa will be doomed. Our culture openly fights against that as articulated by Onyebuchi Eze above. When people are called to share wealth as advocated by the IEEA, the morality behind it is the fact that foreign companies have continued to appropriate wealth from Zimbabwe to the mother countries, (Mangena 2012a). This, however, is discussed in greater detail in Chapter five. *Gutsaruzhinji* as a humanistic philosophy tries to address the contemporary problems faced by the people of Zimbabwe at the dawn of 21st century. Ramose makes the same call after studying the Sesotho aphorism. "*Feta Kgomo othsware motho*" which he explains as follows:

> This means that if and when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and preservation of the life of another human being, then one should choose to preserve the life of another human being. The central meaning here

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is that mutual care for another as human beings precedes concern for the accumulation and safeguarding of wealth as though such a concern were an end in itself. While we see that "motho" is once again the primary reality in traditional African culture, here we have also the principle of sharing as the regulative element of social organization. This is the principle animating the much talked about African communalism" (Ramose, 2002a:114 -115).

He goes on to advocate for an alternative to the present international economic relations between the poor and the rich nations. His burden remains: "African philosophy, in its commitment to thought and practice must continue to keep all of us on our toes by calling us to the moral responsibility to the "other" (Ibid). Many scholars have studied the communitarian view to African life and its *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy but have not been able to prosecute a political philosophy to arrest African governance problems. Bernard Matolino (2008) in his concluding remarks after presenting his thesis in analysis of personhood, has this important remark which ignited the *gutsaruzhinji* thought in the author's mind; he asserts:

> A second worthwhile endeavor, to my mind, would be an attempt at investing a political theory within the African context that goes beyond the claims and aims of African socialism. I think it is important that there be developed an African political philosophy that is responsive to both the genuine needs of Africans on the continent and takes into account the various African realities both negative and positive. Such a political philosophy would be one that is not only interested in retrieving and furthering African traditional beliefs. There is no gain saying that the African continent is in many parts afflicted by political failure ranging from civil wars, power grabs, and absence of democracy, in the modern and traditional sense, corruption, poor governance that results in the spread of otherwise preventable hunger, disease and death – just to name a few. All these problems and a plethora of others can be directly owed to political incompetence. I think it would be beneficial to develop a political theory that has to address all these issues and empower African people without crudely resorting to traditional (Matolino, 2008:194).

The author agrees with the above and offers *gutsaruzhinji* as the ideology of choice to African political thought and Zimbabwe in particular. The unfortunate scenario in African thought is trying to benchmark African thinking to the Western view. This has led many African thinkers to misdirect their philosophies as African socialism. The author therefore further concurs with Matolino and gives the reason why *gutsaruzhinji* is not part of what can be referred to as African socialism. Gykye (1989) also argues against the advocates of the ideology of African socialism from West and East Africa such as Nkrumah, Senghor and Nyerere. The author discusses this contradiction in Chapter One as well.

2.4 **The Historical origins and reasons for *Gutsaruzhinji* in Zimbabwe Pre-Colonial period**

Gutsaruzhinji as an ideology is historically anchored on two traditional African practices, common among the Shona-speaking people of Zimbabwe. The two practices are the *Zunde raMambo* and "*nhimbe*" or "*majangano*. These practices date back to the time before the colonial occupation of Zimbabwe. To be more precise the Mapungubwe Dynasty in 900AD to 1100AD and the Great Zimbabwe Empire 1200AD to 1500AD, both contain a historical narrative pregnant with such practices. In turn these practices validate the *gutsaruzhinji* polity in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

2.4.1(a) **The *Zunde raMambo* as *gutsaruzhinji* basis**

Zunde raMambo is a traditional social security arrangement designed to address the contingency of drought or famine. This form of social security existed before the colonization of Zimbabwe. *Zunde raMambo* is a local phrase in Shona language which loosely translated means 'the King's granary" (Dhemba et al, 2002). Kaseke (2006) states that the chief as a traditional leader has to promote the welfare of his/her people, and *Zunde raMambo* is one medium through which this was realized. Traditional custom requires the chief in any given locality to designate land for growing food crops as protection against food insecurity in the community. This common land is referred to as the *Zunde*. Members of the community provide their labour on a voluntary basis even though they do not all necessarily benefit directly from the harvest. Members of the community take turns to participate in the entire production process from ploughing and sowing, to weeding and harvesting the entire crop. The harvest is stored in granaries at the chief's homestead as food reserves, which are distributed to the chief's subjects only in the event of food shortages to the needy (Kaseke, 2002:1).

In the distribution matrix, priority was given to older persons, widows, orphans and persons with disabilities (ibid). Traditionally, the food reserves from *Zunde raMambo* were also used to feed the chief's soldiers given their role in protecting the entire community. The community did not need urging to participate in the *Zunde raMambo* project and there was a buy-in from everyone. The self-motivation in the community made the provision of labour for the project easy. The people appreciated the importance of *Zunde raMambo* and enjoyed

the benefits of their labour directly and indirectly. *Zunde raMambo* provided security for the needy and also took care of the needs of the army. It became a collective responsibility.

Kaseke (2002) maintains that this voluntary participation helps to sharpen the community's sense of belonging and identity. Furthermore, it reinforces solidaristic relationships in the community. Apart from providing food security, the *Zunde raMambo* also has a social and political function. The chief as the head of the community had to ensure sufficient food distribution among his members, thereby taking full responsibility for any shortages or inequalities in food sustenance in his community. This practice was stopped by the colonial regime which set up new power structures curtailing the powers and responsibilities of all chiefs. The state assumed the role played by *Zunde raMambo*, although in reality the state abdicated its responsibilities on racial grounds (ibid).

It can be argued that the *Zunde raMambo* practice was in keeping with the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, which espoused, love, unity, cooperation, empathy and human dignity as important values and principles to be observed by all. The distribution of food by the chief, as head of community, can still be executed by the state this regard, *gutsaruzhinji* is a viable indigenous concept that can be used. It is a home-grown construct as opposed to concepts borrowed from the West. Furthermore, it is steeped in traditional African cultural practice and can, accordingly, attain high levels of approval among a country's population. Its revival both as a guiding philosophy and in reality after the restoration of the powers of the chiefs after independence cannot be disputed. There was absolutely no connection from the Christian view or any other foreign ideology in the execution of *Zunde raMambo*. This is why the author maintains that *gutsaruzhinji* is an authentic African ideology that can be traced back to *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and had nothing to do with socialism or capitalism.

The Second and very important practice by the Shona speaking people in Zimbabwe was the *nhimbe* or *majangano* practice. Chifamba (2017) gives a brilliant narrative of how *nhimbe* used to work in traditional Shona practice. Below is what Chifamba says;

> I yearn for a return to that spirit of communalism demonstrated in the "*nhimbe/ilima*" (communal collaboration) concept, which used to prevail in our communities, especially the rural when it involved doing tasks that would naturally have proven insurmountable to individuals. I remember as I grew up villagers would invite those they were friends with to come and help do tasks such as tilling the land, ferrying manure to the fields, weeding, harvests or many other tasks without extending a monetary payment. They would just

brew some traditional beer and "*maheu*" (for non-alcoholics), buy a few loaves of bread or even bake their own from wheat flour and slaughter one or two road runners (chicken) and in some cases slaughter a goat depending on the attendance. This would be enough to see many people from the village or even beyond coming together to do the work in one day. A task that would have taken weeks for an individual to accomplish would be completed in a day. *Nhimbe*s would provide a platform for people to iron out differences that would have otherwise seen them taking up arms against each other or even resorting to witchcraft. The traditional concept of *nhimbe* runs deep in Zimbabwean culture, not just among the dominant Shona but the entire nation and was responsible to a very large extent for the food self-sufficiency that used to prevail throughout the country. No one would miss important seasonal deadlines owing to lack traction power, as is happening today. Even those that did not have cattle or donkeys would have their fields ploughed in time and people would use Open Pollinated varieties of seed if they could not afford treated seed from shops. *Nhimbe* managed to erase the differences between the haves and have-nots and the concept was generally a social unifier as it took care of both nutritional and social issues of the populace. Implements would be used communally and everything for the day of the function was for everybody and all people would have a sense of oneness that also promoted a very high sense of responsibility in most things people did (Chifamba, 2017).

The above citation of Chifamba illustrates what "*nhimbe*" was originally established to achieve and serve in traditional practice. The Shona Dictionary defines "*nhimbe*" as communal work done as part of a group (Shona Dictionary-VaShona Project).

The *nhimbe* practice as highlighted by Chifamba was the epitome of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, summarized by Mbiti (1969) when he says, "I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am". The people learnt to support one another in all aspects of life. There was joy and benefit in seeing every member of the community living in self-sufficiency arising from collective selfless effort to uplift one another. This era was again crushed by colonialism which set up a capitalist agenda where individualism was preached as a mark of success. The return to the basics or the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology is directed at restoring this important philosophical understanding that life is fully lived and achieved if the needs of every citizen are met. Government is, therefore, challenged to ensure the restoration of these important values in all its socio-economic policies.

Another important historical narrative which incubated the *gutsaruzhinji* polity is the Mapungubwe Dynasty, 960 to 1170AD and the Great Zimbabwe Empire 1200 to 1500AD. Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe are of international interest because they represent the development of indigenous states in Southern Africa (Huffman, 2009). In general, and with

regard to Mapungubwe, evidence shows that surplus trade contributed much wealth to the state. In addition the growing population of about 9 000 people helped transform a ranked kin-based society with male hereditary leadership at K2 to a class-based bureaucracy with sacred leadership at Mapungubwe (Huff, 1982; Mitchell, 2002; Pikirayi, 2000; Pwiti, 2005).

2.4.1(b)   Mapungubwe Dynasty and *Gutsaruzhinji*

The Mapungubwe landscape incorporates an extensive valley system around the Shashe-Limpopo confluence, as well as the surrounding plateaus in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Geographically, Mapungubwe lies within a sandstone topography interrupted by mafic intrusions (McCarthy and Rubidge, 2008:108-111). The first Bantu-speaking farmers moved into Mapungubwe between 350 and 450AD. It is probable that there were sufficient rains at the time of their settling in and beyond. Later, in about 900 AD, Zhizo people moved into the area from South-West Zimbabwe. The Mapungubwe king became the rainmaker, praying to God through his ancestors. According to Horton (1967, 1975), religious systems in Africa that emphasise the ancestors and spirits are associated with small scale social structures with limited trade and limited multicultural interaction. In the case of Mapungubwe, international trade gradually widened the range of interaction and introduced new social issues. At about 1300AD Mapungubwe and associated settlements in the region were abandoned and Great Zimbabwe became the new power. This was largely caused by the serious droughts that had a devastating effect on agricultural activities around Mapungubwe.

Murimbika (2006:163) alludes to the principle of sacredness as the cause of the demise of Mapungubwe. Although sacred leaders were supposed to be chosen by God, the ancestors could express their displeasure while natural disasters signified supernatural displeasure in a King's rule. Ultimately, the King bore the brunt for failed agricultural seasons. When this happened, his right to lead was challenged. This principle of sacred leadership in Southern Africa still operates today.

The Mapungubwe cultural landscape was the centre of the first kingdom in Southern Africa, established by the cultural ancestors of the present day Shona and Venda. It includes over 400 archeaological sites and three successive capitals of Schroda, K2 and Mapungubwe, occupied between AD900 and 1300 (Kuper, 1982). The dynamic interaction between society and landscape during this period laid the foundation for a new type of social organization in

Southern Africa. The kingdom grew as a result of two major factors: firstly, the wealth accumulated from trade in gold, glass beads, cotton cloth, Chinese and local ceramics, ivory, copper and hides within the Indian Ocean network, and secondly, an ideal landscape and climatic conditions for agriculture that provided for a population of over 9000 people. The East coast trade established at Schroda by AD900 was of great significance at Mapungubwe, together with the wealth and power at The K2 occupation. By the 13th Century AD, a social hierarchy had developed. The King occupied Mapungubwe Hill which was then modified to separate the elite from the commoners below (Huffman, 2001, 2004, 2007a). This onset of the Little Ice Age caused drought and crop failures leading to the demise of the whole kingdom.

The author is drawn to the philosophical applications of an African Kingdom with a king ruling over 9000 people. The mere fact that at Mapungubwe, international trade with Indians, Chinese, Portuguese and other nationalities, makes it clear that governance issues were not introduced to Zimbabwe by the colonialists. The basic political philosophy guiding the kings then was the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which acknowledged the existence and importance of the living dead/ancestors as capable of guiding kings and leaders who prayed to God Almighty through them (Murimbika, 2006:163). The need for kings to intercede or pray for the rains to enable their subjects to get good harvests and to avert hunger in the kingdom is a good practice by leadership to ensure that all the social and economic needs of the citizens are addressed. It is clear that trade deals entered into during Mapungubwe Dynasty were the source of the clothing and ornaments used at family level. The modern state could take a cue from the Mapungubwe dynasty to improve their governance style. It is, however, ironic that the international trade created a new culture which further isolated the king from his people. The drought and change of weather patterns at Mapungubwe that led to its collapse, is attributed to punishment by the ancestral spirits who are thought to have have been angry about certain violations of traditional practice. That the *gutsaruzhinji* polity provides for important cultural attachment to servant leadership is evidence that fundamental ethical values are enshrined in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

2.4.1(c) The Great Zimbabwe era as the basis for *gutsaruzhinji*

The Great Zimbabwe kingdom was yet another outstanding example of African leadership. The location of Great Zimbabwe is in South Central Africa, in present-day Zimbabwe

between the Zambezi (North) and Limpopo (South) rivers. The Great Zimbabwe site is situated on a high plateau, mostly over 1000m (3,250ft) (Ampin, 2004). The civilization of Great Zimbabwe reached its zenith from 1100-1450AD although local Shona speaking farmers had settled in present day Zimbabwe nearly a thousand years earlier. The Great Zimbabwe site, featuring the Great Enclosure wall, is one of the most astounding regions with monuments in Africa, second only to the Nile Valley pyramid region (ibid).

The ancient plan of Great Zimbabwe is in two parts; the hill complex and the valley complex. The hill complex is where the King kept many of his treasures, although he lived in the *Imba Huru* (Great Enclosure) in the valley, he spent considerable ritual time on the hill (ibid). The building of this complex took skill, determination and industry and thus the Imba Huru demonstrated a high level of administrative and social achievement by bringing together stone masons (15 000 tons of granite blocks) and other workers on a grand scale (ibid). Great Zimbabwe operated just like a big city and was the site of central government for the country and entire region. An extensive trading network made Great Zimbabwe one of the most significant trading regions during the medieval period. The main trading items were gold, iron, copper, tin, cattle and cowrie shells. Imported items included glassware from Syria, a minted coin from Kilwa, Tanzania as well as Persian and Chinese ceramics from the 13-14th centuries (ibid). Manu Ampin (2004) goes on to confirm that Great Zimbabwe was an important commercial and political centre under a central ruler for about 350 years (1100-1450AD), with a population of about 18 000 inhabitants. This made Great Zimbabwe one of the largest cities of its day. Today Great Zimbabwe is a symbol of African cultural development. It is so important not simply because of its masterful masonry but because it is a cultural clue that survived and that has been reclaimed. Now it needs to be fully interpreted and placed within the larger context of sub-Saharan history, a context that still lies hidden (Ndoro, 1997).

The study of Great Zimbabwe makes it clear to the author that *gutsaruzhinji* was long incubated in the administration of such Great Kingdoms since a population of more than 18 000 people was kept intact and had regular and dependable supplies of food and other necessities. At this time, no foreign ideologies had come to pollute the indigenous African mind or teach doctrines of socialism and capitalism. The people were guided by their culture and values as they were fully aware that the living-dead/ancestors could guide and punish the current leadership if they strayed from standard norms. The leadership was expected to leave

an inheritance future generations of the unborn. Wealth was, therefore, a collective issue rather than an individual possession. *Hunhu/Ubuntu* was the guiding philosophy of any leader and African person. The rituals presided over by kings ensured that the kings were also under supernatural authority and could not just do as he pleased or oppress his subjects. In such an eventuality, the consequences were dire.

The author finds it interesting and paradoxical that the first whiteman, namely the German explorer Karl Mauch, in 1871 refused to accept that Great Zimbabwe was the handwork of Africans preferring to say it was built by Phoenicians or Israelite settlers (Ndoro, 1997:5). The list of western scholars who unashamedly refused to accept the work of Africans in building Great Zimbabwe is endless, including Willi Posselt, James Theodore Bent, (1891); Richard N. Hall, (1902) and others. Honest people like Randall-Maclver (1905); Getrude Caton-Thompson (1929); and Peter S. Garlake who maintained that the Great Zimbabwe was indeed authentic original work by black Africans (Ndoro, 1997). If such visible sites as Great Zimbabwe, Mapungubwe, Khami, Naletale, Domboshawa (in Nothern Botswana), Manikweni (In Mozambique) and Thulamela (in Northern South Africa), all works by Africans in ancient days, are dismissed on the grounds that Western supremacy does not want to acknowledge African originality, what then can be said about ideologies the like the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, the *gutsaruzhinji* polity and *ujamaa*? All these need to wage a new war in intellectual circles and on the open political frontier. The open evidence that some in the West do not take kindly to African development, as exhibited by the Great Zimbabwe denial, should strengthen African academics to write more about the validity of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy as permeating all facets of African life.

2.4.2 The Colonial Period as a Catalyst for *gutsaruzhinji*

It is the colonial period which strengthened Zimbabweans' and black nationalists' resolve to see *gutsaruzhinji* replace what they considered the brutality and inhuman treatment of all Africans since the colonial apartheid development system coupled with capitalism marginalized the people from their God-given resources. Inequalities became so acute that people were reminded of traditional cultural ways were the only way to restore their human and African dignity.

A narrative of colonialism is executed for the purpose of giving insight on to how *gutsaruzhinji,* apart from being entrenched in *hunhu/ubuntu* practice, had a clear motivation to run as the very opposite of colonial capitalism. The colonization of Zimbabwe was orchestrated from South Africa by one of the champions of British Imperialism, Cecil John Rhodes in 1890 (Zvobgo, 1994:8). Evidently, the rationale behind colonialism was capitalism as evidenced by Rhodes' securing of a Royal Charter for his British South African Company (B.S.A.C) in 1889. The charter granted him control over Zimbabwe. Subsequently in 1890, armed with his occupation forces, the British South African Police (B.S.A.P), he overran the African native settlers and raised the Union Jack at Fort Salisbury (Harare) (Gwarinda, 1985:96). Economic development rapidly intensified with the opening up of mines in many places within a space of twenty years. Gold was mined in Que Que (Kwekwe), coal in Wanke (Hwange), Copper in Mangula (Mhangura), asbestos in Shaban (Zvishavane) (ibid).

Land alienation against the blacks, forced labour, brutality and insensitivity exhibited by Rhodes and his people in dealing with native Africans led to the 1896-97 First Chimurenga rebellion during which the Shona and Ndebele people engaged in. Essentially, the war was a war of resistance against colonial rule (Zvobgo, 1994:9). The defeat of the native Africans led to the establishment of a segregatory policy on land tenure. Capitalist modes of agricultural production and organisations were introduced. The best land was reserved for European occupation while Africans were crowded into comparatively much poorer areas. With the advent of the Land Apportionment Act of 1913, 50.8 percent of the total land was declared "European" whilst 30 percent of the remaining land was reserved for the African population (Herbet, 1990:17). In 1922, 33 620 whites made their voice heard in a referendum and arbitrarily decided to make Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) a self-governing territory of Britain (Zvobgo, 1994:10). In 1923, the colony under Cecil John Rhodes was granted responsible government, thereby crowning Rhodes as the First Prime Minister of Rhodesia (ibid).

Subsequent change in the colonial leadership takes us to the rise of the Rhodesia Front (RF) Party led by Winston Joseph Field who became prime minister and was deputized by Ian Douglas Smith who replaced Field and declared Unilateral Independence from Britain on 11 November 1965. In South Africa, the proportion of black to white was 5 to 1, while in Rhodesia it was 24 to 1 (Wall, 1990:32). The reluctance and defiant stance by Ian Smith to grant the Africans who were the majority their right to vote led to the the the Second Chimurenga

War from 1966 to 1980. Smith eventually succumbed to the external and internal pressures emanating from the economic sanctions imposed on his government by the United Nations Security Council. The ferocious war of liberation waged by the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) led by Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) led by Joshua Nkomo took its toll on the minority white establishment. The Lancaster House political settlement in 1979 ended with a general election in 1980 where majority rule became the new order of the day.

Since the war of liberation was a fight against selfish white minority minority rule, it became common cause that a new system of governance which catered for the needs and wishes of the majority people should be put in place. *Gutsaruzhinji* became the natural policy and philosophy to restore African dignity and address the socio-economic inequalities created by the previous capitalist system. It was also during the war of liberation that the nationalists (Mugabe and Nkomo) promised the people that *gutsaruzhinji* would replace capitalism.

People were promised the chance to revert back to their land, which was in the hands of the minority white settlers. They were also promised that they would share mineral and other natural wealth equitably to remove poverty and suffering from the people. The advent of political independence in April 1980, marked a new era where the *gutsaruzhinji* polity had to be instituted in all systems of governance. Coincidentally, the socialist countries which also had supported the Zimbabwean war of liberation to crush capitalism saw an opportunity to forge an alliance against Western capitalism. The author treats this, as a mere coincidence and rejects the notion of equating *gutsaruzhinji* with socialism, though some nationalists had this mistaken view.

2.4.3   The War of Liberation as *Gutsaruzhinji*

The two wars of liberation in Zimbabwe were fought with the underlining objective of establishing a *gutsaruzhinji* polity in Zimbabwe. The first and most important resource the people wanted to have and own without interference was land. When people were driven from their ancestral land in 1896 by the colonisers under Cecil Rhodes colonisers, the first Chimurenga war had to be fought to regain ancestral land and their human dignity (Bhebhe, 1999; Manungo, 1991; Simbanegavi, 2000). When native Zimbabweans were removed by force from their traditional lands and settled on infertile soils, this was not only social

dispossession but also economic disempowerment. Given that native Zimbabweans valued being able to remain domiciled on ancestral land where they could carry out their rituals and keep in touch with the living dead, their forced removal from these lands was also effectively a spiritual dislocation. Thus, the link between the land and the living dead is yet another important pillar of *hunhu/ubuntu* practice which Africans hold dear. With the forced relocation, the entrenchment of the *gutsaruzhinji* in this philosophy (*hunhu/ubuntu*) was threatened and the fight for land reclamation became a fight for the *gutsaruzhinji* polity.

The Second Chimurenga led by nationalists like Joshua Nkomo and his Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was on a higher level of sophistication but fundamentally still aimed at the restoration of land rights and human dignity. The removal of people from their original homes through the Native Land Husbandry Act 1951 and their subsequent systematic alienation through discriminatory policies entrenched the people's resolve to restore their right to own ancestral land and enjoy their cultural rights.

Chung (2006:44) gives a much clearer picture than most on the main grievances triggered the rise aginst foreign domination up in the Second Chimurenga. Chung states:

> Black peasants were crowded into granite-dominated lands, beautiful to look at, but barren. Many black families remembered the days when they once inhabited the more fertile farms, which had been forcibly taken from them and given to white farmers. This bitter memory was engraved in the communal psyche. Those fortunate enough to harvest a good crop were not allowed to sell it to the government-controlled marketing board. Instead, they had to find a friendly white farmer who would agree to market it on their behalf and charged a heavy commission for their services. Schools and clinics for blacks, where they existed were provided by missionaries as part of their religious work. Education for blacks was severely restricted.

The above narration by Chung explains why black Africans had to rise up and take arms to restore the *gutsaruzhinji* polity back to their livelihood. The notion that blacks could retain the dignity of owning their ancestral land and heritage which had been stolen by settler colonialism kept the people's resolve to fight to the bitter end. This is the same spirit we saw in the building of the Mapungubwe dynasty and the building of Great Zimbabwe in AD 900-1100 and 1200-1500 respectively. The unity of the people in defining themselves as Africans, guided by the same principles and cultural values which epitomize the collective benefits and collective utilization of natural resources as a joint inheritance from the living dead

(ancestors) to the present and unborn future generations. The causes of the Second Chimurenga war were strongly rooted in the First Chimurenga war. Lan (1985) summarises the major causes of the Second Chimurenga as land, racial inequalities and agricultural policies, and points out the following:

> …when resistance came, it had 3 main sources. Firstly, the loss of the lands. Secondly, the enforced restructuring of the black population, once independent agricultural producers and traders, now a labour force divided into two sectors; very low paid male migrants flowing backwards and forwards between town and countryside and unpaid female subsistence producers in the reserves. Thirdly, the enforced disruption of long established agricultural techniques in order to perpertuate a much hated political and economic order (Lan, 1985:123)

The three causes laid out by Lan remain the reason why *gutsaruzhinji* polity has to be seen to be implemented in all aspects of people's social and economic life. It is, therefore, not an imported, foreign ideology, but a deeply sensed traditional philosophy pre-existing the first colonial period. The *gutsaruzhinji* ideology has to be further explored along with its sources – *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Failure to implement *gutsaruzhinji* fully has the potential to set African countries into a vicious circle where continued uprisings and conflicts are the order of the day. Africans have a DNA that renders them partial to living and caring for each other. Western capitalism and socialism are unlikely to take Africa out of its socio-economic challenges. *Gutsaruzhinji* is, therefore, herein prescribed as the solution for both African political thought and socio-economic ideology to guarantee equal opportunities.

2.5   Comparative Analysis of *Gutsaruzhinji* and five African philosophies

It is pertinent to be reminded by Nziramasanga (1991) that a person with *hunhu/ubuntu* is one who upholds the African cultural standards, expectations, values and norms and keeps his/her African identity. African culture, according to Keesing (1976), is a picture of the ideational world of African people, regardless of their geographical location and pivots around *hunhu/ubuntu*. *Hunhu*ism/*Ubuntu*ism is, therefore, centred around belief in the goodness and perfectibility of man, where emotion, reason and behaviour are regarded as sure guides of man to a happier life (July, 2004:135). This is the hallmark of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy from which African leaders and thinkers have drawn their ideologies to guide development in their post-colonial states.

The appeal to African tradition by *ujamaa*, negritude, consciencism, humanism; *gutsaruzhinji* and African socialism in Kenya all point to the clear fact that these are philosophies drawn from the one African tree of *Hunhu*ism/*Ubuntu*ism not from any foreign ideological construction. All six ideologies listed above belong in the realm of philosophy because they individually seek to provide solutions to the socio-economic and political challenges besetting post–independence state in Africa. It is the author's contention that the centre of all the six ideologies above is the consideration of man's needs as warranting a collective approach to solving them and looking at African people not merely as individuals but as a unified community. This communitarian view transcends the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological realisation that Africans are not only a united force with their Creator God, *musikavanhu*, but are one with their living dead who continue to maintain this relationship for their well-being. Religion plays a key role in moulding both behaviour and thought processes in all the six ideologies. The appeal to traditional religion, Euro–Christian and Islamic traditions confirms the belief in the Supreme God in all of them. From the foregoing, the author can safely conclude that socialism and capitalism have no place in the grounding of African philosophies laid down by Nyerere, Nkrumah, Senghor, Kaunda, Kenyatta and Mugabe. Any of the ideologies put forward by these leaders can be reconstructed without reference to socialism and still guide African people in socio-economic development. Nonetheless, *gutsaruzhinji* appears to be inclusive of all six philosophies. Its main focus is the socio-economic redistribution of wealth for the uplifting of the general standards of life for all people in the country, (Mangena, 2014). The call for egalitarianism in the six ideologies seems to be surpassed by true meaning of the Shona word *gutsaruzhinji* as given by Chimhundu (2001:348).

The main challenge which the author tries to solve, is the separation of these good African ideologies, which were contaminated by both pre-independence nationalist revolutionary rhetoric castigating settler colonialism with its attendant capitalism and imperialism, and the glorification of Marxist socialism which began to be grafted onto the continent's post-independence states. These socio-economic and cultural prescriptions turned out to be a not-so-suitable recipe for Africa's development agenda. If socialism was popularised by Karl Marx and Lenin, *gutsaruzhinji* should now take root to stand in for *ujamaa*, negritude, humanism and African socialism in Kenya, and be the new rallying point for an African

philosophy incorporating all there is in the other five ideologies as informed by the source *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

2.6   Difference between *Gutsaruzhinji* and *Ujamaa*

The first notable difference between *gutsaruzhinji* and *ujamaa* is that *gutsaruzhinji* focuses on the totality of society or nation as a whole, and is not limited to small family groupings like *ujamaa*. The problem of focusing development on a family or clan level as espoused in the *ujamaa* ideology is the danger of dividing the nation into nepotistic, tribal groups which inhibit national cohesion. In *gutsaruzhinji,* when a policy is made, its implementation and multiplier benefits should cascade to every citizen regardless of colour, creed and religious affiliation. *Ujamaa* looks at how families are organized to be self-reliant while *gutsaruzhinji* advocates equitable distribution of national resources to meet every person's social economic and political needs. The second aspect is that *gutsaruzhinji* does not only appeal to rural communities or ancient traditional communities but to all including modern metropolitan communities for the simple reason the needs of every member of any society has to be properly articulated and addressed by those in governance in such a way as to bridge the inequality gap in society at large. *Ujamaa* largely concentrated on communal rural farming initiatives, leaving the inequality gap to increase in urban areas and metropolitan cities. *Gutsaruzhinji* does not look at people according to their specific area or natural geographical set up, but adopts a national outlook which applies to all people regardless of where they reside, prioritize their social, and economic upliftment and a shared national cake. For *ujamaa*, one of the greatest weaknesses lay in the different application in different communities resulting in skewed development, for example, when free education was made mandatory at primary school level and everyone in the country could access it at the same time including adults who had remained illiterate during the colonial apartheid era. *Gutsaruzhinji* cuts across geographical divides. The third notable difference is that *gutsaruzhinji* places the responsibility for human socio-economic development on the incumbent government put in place by the will of the people. It acknowledges that the role of central government is distributive, and that the government has to craft laws and put in place systems which enable every citizen to benefit and have their social and economic needs catered for. *Ujamaa* places that responsibility in the family, an arrangement that has attendant weaknesses including the likelihood of being manipulated and even incapable of helping its

own members. A poor father has little chance to advance the social and economic needs of his family. The government is the father figure in *gutsaruzhinji* and is tasked with catering for the nation in various ways and is, therefore culpable in respect of the social and economic backwardness of its citizens.

Lastly, *gutsaruzhinji* as an ideology, does not apply to blacks only. It is colour blind or racialy blind. Humanity does not need segregation. Blacks, Asians, whites, coloureds, and any other racial configuration are duty-bound as citizens of the country to contribute to its wellbeing while conversely government has a responsibility to treat all its citizens equally. *Ujamaa* seems to incline itself to poor black communities, leaving other races unattended.

2.7   Differences between *Gutsaruzhinji* and Consciencism

Nkrumah's consciencism is a blend of three traditions, namely Islam, Western Christianity and African tradition. This mixed brew dilutes the authenticity of African philosophy as contained in the *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology. *Gutsaruzhinji* is clear on its mother body or DNA, only as *hunhu/ubuntu*. This clarity in *gutsaruzhinji* enables other scholars to value their *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which is on the verge of dilution with other traditions as seen in consciencism. African philosophy should develop in its own right and be marketed internationally without any appeal to other doctrines. This is what *gutsaruzhinji* as an ideology stands for. It is a stand-alone African ideology, a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy on which the author agrees with Tutu (2004) and Ramose (2005) has to be exported to the international community as an authentic ideology from Africa.

Another important difference in the two ideologies, is the fact that *gutsaruzhinji* looks at the totality of the human being and his vulnerability to central government which has taken over the role of the king in the traditional set-ups to fairly adjudicate the distribution of wealth. Consciencism is not so concerned with on this critical role of government.

The third notable difference is that, consciencism was crafted in way which inclined it towards socialism and thereby detesting capitalism, while *gutsaruzhinji* looks at how government should benefit its citizens in accordance with the values embedded in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. This outright categorization of socialism and capitalism does not exist in *gutsaruzhinji,* since its main thrust is already set up as enshrined in the *hunhu/ubuntu* doctrine. The danger of associating with one (socialism) against the other *(*capitalism) is

attracting international resistance from either bloc resulting in sabotage activities as witnessed in the coup plotting Nkrumah's removal as he was seen to be aligning himself with the socialist block. An African ideology should never be a straight jacket of any of the Western ideologies, as that would entail its loss of relevance and authenticity. Similarities can be drawn between ideologies in a comparative approach, never to aid or strengthen its doctrinal content. The content, principles and values of *gutsaruzhinji* are only spelt out in the traditional African *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy period.

Lastly *gutsaruzhinji,* unlike consiencism is not a blend of Western and African traditional teachings. *Gutsaruzhinji*'s ideals are derived only from traditional African teachings and doctrines as already argued in *hunhu/ubuntu*. Western teachings can only by coincidence be seen to be similar to some of the doctrines in *gutsaruzhinji*. Authenticity is one of the African philosophy whereby most scholars want to gain approval of their indigenous knowledge systems or philosophies by blending them with well- known western ideas like liberal democracy, utilitarianism and others whose authors are well known. *Gutsaruzhinji* stands to challenge and this writer is cognisant of what Osabu - Kle (2004) advocates when he suggests that African ideologies be marketed in their native language and taste.

2.8   Differences between *Gutsaruzhinji* and Negritude

Negritude as a philosophy was ushered with the main purpose of demonstrating that Africans are great thinkers capable of advancing their own ideas as opposed to the perception that Africans were inferior intellectually. Senghor's main preoccupation was the mounting of a defence of Africans in such a way that negritude attained the state of a competing racial construct directed at the West. Senghor's stance had the unintended effect of sounding racist. *Gutsaruzhinji* is meant to inform and be adopted by all, regardless of geographical location and/or racial stock, who seek to better their citizens through good governance systems. The doctrinal teachings of *gutsaruzhinji* appeal to inclusive governance which tries to address the socio-economic needs of the governed. *Gutsaruzhinji* is, therefore, neither racially-based nor in competition with Western ideas or philosophies since it merely states its authentic attributes as contained in traditional African philosophy and its metaphysics, epistemological grounding and ethical teachings are stated in line with what is inherent to *hunhu/ubuntu.* Interested parties in the international arena are expected to make choices more or less as they

would in a food market where they indicate what they wish to eat: a traditional chicken (road runner) or a broiler, served with rapoko mealie–meal *sadza* or rice.

Gutsaruzhinji stands for the *sadza* meal cooked with road-runner chicken and *rapoko sadza*–meal. Ironically this dish is becoming very popular with all races and is recommended for its high nutritional value. Unlike Negritude, *gutsaruzhinji* can be used to serve every human being on earth, and not Africans alone.

In accordance with a position already enunciated herein, *gutsaruzhinji* should not be construed as African socialism in the manner that negritude was. In a *gutsaruzhinji* polity neither the West nor the East is an enemy and the only consideration is the identification of that which benefits the majority of citizens regardless of its origin. However, *gutsaruzhinji* seeks to preserve the important cultural practices which make leaders more accountable to their subjects by instilling servant leadership values. It does not merely take pride in being African in the manner of negritude, but is exalted by offering service to all people.

2.9   Differences between *Gutsaruzhinji* and Zambian Humanism

Zambian Humanism has many attributes in common with *gutsaruzhinji,* the author can still argue that Kaunda's humanism was in a way more inclined to the restoration of the African person as a human being, just like his white former colonial ruler. Egalitarianism seeks to portray all people as equal and deserving same dignity as human beings. While this is an undeniable requisite remedy to colonial imbalances, it does not necessarily and categorically lay emphasis on the distribution of resources in the way that *gutsaruzhinji* does. *Gutsaruzhinji*'s key objective is the equitable distribution of all material resources. The distribution of wealth is what naturally indicates whether or not egalitarianism or humanity's dignity is being realized, and not the other way round.

Zambian humanism seeks to spell out what it is to be human and hence to enforce social systems which treat all human beings as equals on largely theoretical grounds. *Gutsaruzhinji* is the exact practical equipment of all citizens materially without discrimination in the full knowledge that wealth belongs to the citizens. The *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy in *gutsaruzhinji* regards shared wealth as the fundamental driver in the quest to realize the humanity and dignity in all man. It would be mere lip-service to talk about egalitarianism and human dignity without addressing economic fundamentals first. *Gutsaruzhinji* is much clearer on this

ideological path than Zambian humanism. Put differently, *gutsaruzhinji* says wealth belongs to us all as an inheritance from our fore-fathers. It also exhorts us to share the wealth equitably. Kaunda's humanism only says that we are created equal by God almighty as human beings and that, therefore, we must treat each other as equals.

The difference between *gutsaruzhinji* and humanism is evident when people share what belongs to them by inheritance. In terms of *gutsaruzhinji* all of them are entitled to receive a share or dividend.The state is duty-bound through *gutsaruzhinji* to ensure equitable resource distribution.

2.10   Differences between Kenyan African Socialism & *Gutsaruzhinji*

There should be an acknowledgement that the policies adopted by the Kenyan government were largely centred on the main socio-economic fundamentals which *gutsaruzhinji* seeks to address. However, in choosing African socialism as their ideology, the Kenyans exhibited some obsession with foreign ideologies. It should be possible to call an indigenous tree by its own traditional name. For instance a '*mutobwe*' tree just retains its name and foreigners should be educated to call it by that name. However, some for want of pleasing foreign English speaking people call it an "African chewing gum", tree because its fruits can be chewed like a chewing gum.This is where we lose the whole plot in regard to African philosophy and African ideology. Our African ideologies should bear a brand name which is originally African. That way we retain ownership of the ideology and principle values espoused. *Gutsaruzhinji* as an indigenous African Shona name, explaining our own *hunhu/ubuntu* anchored philosophy will from the onset indicate to every reader or academic that one is not dealing with a dilution or blend of western ideas. African socialism in Kenya is a clear testimony of how Africans are afraid to stand on their own two feet and be committed to be good originators of their own undiluted and unpolluted ideas. It stands to reason, that *gutsaruzhinji* is an African philosophy for solving African problems, but which, however, can also be used internationally as it carries the invaluable *hunhu/ubuntu* doctrine. *Gutsaruzhinji* is thus a moral theoretical framework that can be used to remould our new society for servant leadership. African socialism is a mixed blend of both African ideas as contained in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and other similar adaptable doctrines in both socialist and capitalist economies.

It remains the burden of African philosophy to define itself clearly. In this context Osabu–Kle (2002) asserts that intellectuals should express their ideologies in their own indigenous languages. It follows, therefore, that *gutsaruzhinji* should be a welcome addition to African and international philosophic abstraction given that it is more representative of African ideas than African socialism as crafted by the Kenyan government.

2.11   Differences between *Gutsaruzhinji* and Ethiopian socialism

The failure by the Ethiopian government to craft a homegrown African philosophy to guide Ethiopia before and after the fall of Emperor Selassie is yet another lamentable experience. The worst unimaginable offence was to recast socialism simply as a preferred ideology for Ethiopians against perceived capitalist traits in the deposed 'Emperor's dictatorship'. The invitation of people from Germany and Russia to train Ethiopians on the socialist development path was another lamentable incident. For the land redistribution exercise it was necessary to regard land as a national resource as well as an inheritance from the forefathers. To do so was to assert the right of every Ethiopian to own land. This had totally nothing to do with socialism. The inevitable followed, when just like all other socialist projects, dictatorship and poverty could not be eradicated from Ethiopia. A foreign ideology like socialism will never solve African problems for there are unique needs that require well-thought-out ideas. The philosophy *of hunhu/ubuntu* can be adopted to benefit the process of coming to terms with an African philosophy. *Gutsaruzhinji* is therefore a clear distinction from the foreign Marxist-Leninist driven socialism adopted and practised for a while in Ethiopia. The overthrow and deposition of the Ethiopian Derg leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, was a clear testimony of failure (Adejumobi, 2007). Marxist-socialism and *gutsaruzhinji* are two different ideologies. One is indigenously African, rooted in African philosophy, while Ethiopian Marxist-Socialism is a Western ideology focusing on the restoration of workers' rights and work entitlement. *Gutsaruzhinji* stands for all people in a country whose national wealth has to benefit every citizen.

2.12   Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the definition of *gutsaruzhinji* and argued that *gutsaruzhinji* is a philosophy branching off from the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Consequently *hunhu/ubuntu*

philosophy has been further highlighted to clarify the point that *gutsaruzhinji* is not in any way Western socialism. *Gutsaruzhinji* is, however, a new philosophy which has not been interrogated extensively by many scholars save for Mangena and Chinyowa, who only picked it from the mere pronouncement by Robert Mugabe in post–independence Zimbabwe. The author wishes to make it an ideology of choice, to redefine African Philosophy without reference to socialism and capitalism as doing that has weakened the forerunners to African thinking as witnessed in *Ujamaa*; Negritude consiencism; Zambian Humanism and Kenyan African Socialism. *Hunhu/ubuntu* therefore forms the basis of the literature which informs *gutsaruzhinji* ideology. However, the lack of literature from scholar contribution to this important ideology does not stop it from being developed by the author further since there are concrete examples of what the philosophy of *gutsaruzhinji* achieved in its implementation stages. The author believes that *gutsaruzhinji* should be preached and popularised more than was done to other ideologies like the socialism of Karl Marx and capitalism. It is this firm commitment that will see Africa, being lit up by the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology to the extent that scholars will join hands in redefining our political ideology in unison with *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and according to the *gutsaruzhiinji* ideology.

CHAPTER THREE: *THE GUTSARUZHINJI* AND ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES, 1980-1990

3.0   Introduction

The author seeks to show that the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy guided the newly-independent Zimbabwe into designing policies which generally addressed pre-colonial inequalities. Arguments articulating *gutsaruzhinji* as the central and fundamental ideology used to transform the socio-economic and political environment from 1980 to 1990 are marshalled herein. The author provides supporting detail for the above argument and gives relevant examples of how the education system, health, agriculture and other important infrastructural developments were tackled, using the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy. In this chapter, the author also seeks to show that *gutsaruzhinji* is a philosophy which stems or branches from *hunhu/ubuntu* as argued in Chapter Two. This is done to demonstrate that *gutsaruzhinji* is not an untested theory but a philosophy with fruits to show.

3.1   The *Gutsaruzhinji* polity in Post-Independence Zimbabwe from 1980 to 1990

3.1.1   The National Policy of Reconciliation

Nabudere (2004:7) argues that reconciliation is conceived and practised in African societies under the philosophy of *Ubuntu*. This is so because of the compelling values of love and peaceful co-existence in the traditional African communitarian set-up. When Robert Mugabe was pronounced Prime Minister of the Independent Zimbabwe in 1980, his first task was to build a united nation which had been polarized by the long armed struggle in the war of liberation. He found it difficult to prosecute his *gutsaruzhinji* policies (Mangena, 2014:101) without first uniting the nation. Mugabe's passionate call for reconciliation is clearly articulated in his speech when he said:

> Henceforth you and I must strive to adapt ourselves, intellectually and spiritually to the reality of our political change and relate to each other as brothers bound one to another by a bond of comradeship. If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you become a friend and ally with the same national interests, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should seek to revive the

wounds and grievances of the past? The wrong of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten…. Surely this is now time to beat our swords into ploughshares, so that we can attend to the problems of developing our economy and our society (Mugabe, 1980).

In the above quote, Mugabe appeals to the spirit of brotherhood and the "bond of comradeship" which should be cemented by "love that binds you to me and me to you" to forgive each other and live peacefully. This position was arguably arrived at because the *gutsaruzhinji* polity he was now launching had within it the traditional African spirit of living as a united family and the Christian values of love and forgiveness, these both enshrined in *hunhu/ubuntu* made the road to reconciliation smoother than it could have been without these values. On this score, *ujamaa*, negritude, consciencism, humanism and *gutsaruzhinji* resonate. Unity, love, tolerance and co-existence are important attributes of African philosophy born from their traditional life informed by the cardinal principle that says, "I am because you are, and you are because I am" in Mbiti's dictum.

The overriding spirit of humanism contained in the *hunhu/ubuntu* doctrine continued to be reflected in Mugabe's leadership as he went on to say:

> It could never be a correct justification that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains an evil whether practised by white against black or by black against white. Our majority rule would easily turn into inhuman rule if we oppressed, persecuted or harassed those who do not look or think like the majority of us (Mugabe, 1980).

It is also discernible from the above, that the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy was inclusive of of the interests of minority groups, had non-racial considerations and the cherished the freedom of all people in the nation.

Commenting further on the reconciliation in Zimbabwe, Raftopoulos (2004:10) observed that, "the reconciliation policy of Zimbabwe's ruling party, constructed within a purported discourse of socialism, placed less emphasis on legitimized private accumulation than on the extended reach and intervention of the state." It should be noted that Raftopoulos' reference to socialism makes the same mistake of many scholars in refering to Mugabe's *gutsaruzhinji* policy as "socialism" as the two were mistaken to mean the same thing (Mangena 2014; Chinyowa 2007: 186). However, it is reasonable to argue that Raftopoulos was right in pointing out that reconciliation also meant government was not going to take the white

minority's private property unconstitutionally. Mugabe stressed this point in his maiden independence speech, when he pointed out that:

> It is not the intention of our government, when it comes into being, to deprive the civil servants of their pension rights and accrued benefits; nor do we want to drive anybody out of this country; nor do we intend to interfere unconstitutionally with the property rights of individual (Mugabe 1980).

This clarity on property rights places *gutsaruzhinji* beyond the reach of socialism which advocates the nationalization of previous owners' property. This was true reconciliation as defined by Clark (2007:340) who conceptualizes reconciliation as a process that involves the rebuilding of fractured individual and communal relationships after a conflict with a view towards encouraging meaningful interaction and cooperation between former antagonists.

Mandaza (1986:42) observed that the reconciliation route was not an easy one for Mugabe during early 1980s, as he remarked,

> Mugabe would have to begin the delicate task of nation-building in an atmosphere of intense suspicion and even hostility on the part of those he had defeated at home; against the covert threats of military, political and economic destabilization from South Africa; and with the pervasive threat of economic and political blackmail by the imperialist powers that had been the undertakers of the Lancaster House Agreement but were now seeking to keep the new state in line.

The most important point from the above was that Mugabe had to ensure that the socio-political environment was conducive to meeting the needs of the previously marginalized black people by burying all seeds of future conflict. This is evident in his concluding remarks in his address to the nation on 4 March 1980, when he ended by stressing, "Let us deepen our sense of belonging and engender a common interest that knows no race, colour or creed. Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single loyalty" (ibid).

Mark (2007) asserts that reconciliation is much more than just co-existence as it also involves the importance of meeting basic human needs such as food, shelter and health care following conflict. The *gutsaruzhinji* polity could only thrive and succeed in a peaceful environment and this was made possible by the compelling values embedded in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy from where it derived its epistemological, ontological and metaphysical essence.

3.1.1(a)   An Analysis of the reconciliation policy

Reconciliation derives its validity from an African ethos that is entirely African and has deep roots in the African way of life and philosophy, (Nabudere, 2015:17). In accordance with *hunhu/ubuntu* practice reconciliation has at least five considerations which are taken into effect in order to genuinely and permanently resolve conflicts.

Firstly, reconciliation requires the creation of a consensus about the existence of the conflict. In the Zimbabwean situation, the major conflict was that the minority white settlers who had dispossessed the majority blacks of their ancestral land. Other areas of conflict were that settler governments had created a discriminatory system by which they downgraded black Africans to be second class citizens of Zimbabwe. On this first score it can safely be said that both sides (black and white) acknowledged the existence of this problem, then there was the Lancaster House settlement which stipulated that land inequalities would be re-visited after ten years of independence. This clause alone can be seen to have scuttled the spirit of genuine reconciliation since it allowed people to live with this conflict for more than ten years after the pronunciation of the policy of reconciliation in 1980 (Bhebhe, 1999). Genuine reconciliation should have allowed an immediate and permanent resolution to this matter.

On other matters or cases of racial discrimination caused by the apartheid system especially in wealth distribution and socio-economic opportunities, laws outlawing racial discrimination were put in place, but white racial schools remained operational. This, therefore, essentially meant the reconciliation announced by Mugabe was a mere political gimmick which did not effectively deal with real conflicts as expected under the *hunhu/ubuntu* conflict resolution mechanism.

The second principle in reconciliation is that all the parties involved need to accept responsibility for the wrongs committed, since guilt is not the main point of the process, (Nabudere, 2001:17). What is important is the recognition of the problem, acceptance of responsibility for what happened and willingness to be part of the search for a solution (ibid). In Christian theology reconciliation demands open confession as the basis for integrity and authenticity of the faith; while *hunhu/ubuntu* relies on the production of material goods (animals, cattle; goats; chicken; money) to appease the aggrieved. The failure of the white minority to pay for land reparations and offer a large amount of money needed towards

addressing past conflicts in Zimbabwe was a clear indication that no reconciliation took place in accordance with *hunhu/ubuntu* practice. The mere acknowledgement of this conflict at Lancaster House conference in 1979 (Bhebhe, 1999) became irrelevant without the production of goods as reparations. This is why this conflict had to later emerge and cause the third Chimurenga in 2000, when citizens and war veterans went to forcibly occupy and repossess their ancestral land from the white settlers (Moyo, 2005).

Thirdly, reconciliation according to Nabudere (2015) requires the performance of ritual and the explicit public verbalization of the termination of the conflict by all parties. This may take the form of a public oath followed by ritual such as the sharing of a meal or drink. The ritual is aimed at invoking the supernatural beings and the living–dead to intercede and assist the process of reconciliation. In Zimbabwe, no public ceremony of reconciliation between the whites and blacks was conducted. The independence celebrations were performed by the black majority celebrating their attainment of political independence or their victory over white supremacy and oppression. It stands to reason that while Mugabe pronounced his unwillingness to punish the whites for their previous ills, genuine reconciliation never took place in accordance with traditional African practice. Even in the context of Christian theology no public confessions were made since there was no commission set up to spearhead the reconciliation process.

In South Africa, following the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's first black president on 10 May 1994, and in order to promote national unity and reconciliation, Mandela's government enacted the National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995. Thereafter the government of South Africa set up the Truth and Reconciliatin Committee (TRC) and and President Mandela appointed Bishop Desmond Tutu as head of the commission November 29 in 1995 (Tutu, 1999). It is again on this score that the author contend that after the Gukurahundi massacres or war in Matabeleland in Zimbabwe in 1983-5, an organ should have been set up to facilitate a process of meaningful reconciliation in accordance with the practice of *hunhu/ubuntu.* There was, of course, a political agreement reached between Joshua Nkomo's PF-ZAPU party and Mugabe's ZANU in 1987 with the result that the Unity Accord, 1987 was signed. The fourth principle in reconciliation is made operational as soon as steps are taken to bring about the transformation of the conflict into a non-conflictual situation for the good of the larger humanity (Nabudere 2015). In this regard, reconciliation is not an alternative to conflict but a transformation of the conflict. Both parties

must define the stakes involved and relativise these stakes for the sake of the wider community as well as the future of the unborn (ibid). Looking closely at the Zimbabwean scenario this was perhaps the most important part of the reconciliation process. Mugabe knew it would be difficult to get international financial support to help the reconstruction and rebuilding of a new nation if he continued to antagonize the white minority. Significant numbers of minority whites remained in the country and committed themselves to peaceful co-existence following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 and the pronouncement of the policy of reconciliation. This pacified the black majority who ordinarily would have wanted to see justice and restoration effected immediately. However, the transformation of the conflict into a non-coflictual situation has a tendency of making people live in false hope or under pretence. Years down the line, the same conflict erupts and often does so at the most inopportune times. The 2000 land wars in Zimbabwe and subsequent indigenization conflicts bear testimony to this.

Finally, reconciliation goes beyond established normative rules, institutions and procedures, which may be adequate to deal with the conflict. Reconciliation is, therefore, a creative and flexible human activity that is undertaken for the sake of humanity as a shared community, (Nabudere, 2015). In most cases mediators are needed to arbitrate and see a peaceful settlement to the conflict. In Zimbabwe, the mere pronouncement of or appeal for reconciliation by Mugabe as the Prime Minister, without any major subsequent laws, set the tone for the whole nation to begin to coexist alongside their former enemies (the whites) and vice versa. Peace in the nation that had been in a protracted war was needed to foster a new development trajectory. The need to establish a *gutsaruzhinji* polity, therefore, compelled the immediate suspension of all conflict without following any laid-down ground rules or procedures. In this regard, this author argues, however, that Mugabe only succeeded in putting up temporary measures that only achieved a partial reconciliation which was never in keeping neither with traditional African practice as informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* culture, nor with the Christian theological view since both would ideally have seen the creation of a reconciliation body and the setting up of proper structures to deal with past perpetrators of atrocities if they came forward to confess and physically paid for the wrongs or crimes committed. This would have had the potential to allow a quick closure to conflict. Nevertheless, the political pronouncement served the day's purpose, as peace was achieved to steer the development efforts of the new state.

3.1.2   *Gutsaruzhinji* and the shaping of government policies in Post-Independence Zimbabwe.

Mangena (2014:100) defines *gutsaruzhinji* as "a philosophy premised on the idea of communal belonging". This is also shared by Chinyowa (2007:186) who argues that the Post-Independence period in Zimbabwe was "characterized by slogans castigating colonialism and imperialism and hailing the official ideology of socialism which became popularly known as *gutsaruzhinji* (satisfaction for all) doctrine". This idea of communal belonging in *gutsaruzhinji* was also emphasized by Mugabe who equated *gutsaruzhinji* with the traditional practice of *nhimbe* or *majangano* (Zimbabwe News, 1985:20). This, therefore, effectively means that *gutsaruzhinji* is a branch of the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which is an embodiment of communitarian living. The guiding tenets of *hunhu/ubuntu* are love, cooperation, equity, freedom, good behavior, honesty, justice, trustworthiness, hardwork, integrity, hospitality and devotion to the family as well as to community welfare (Nziramasanga, 1999; Samkange and Samkange, 1980; July, 2004:135; Dzobo, 1992; Kamuhu, 1990; and Stentel and Spieker 1999).

Chimhundu (2001:348) describes *gutsaruzhinji* as '*Marongerwo eupfumi munyika anoitwa nehurumende, ane chinangwa chokuti munhu wese akwanise kuwana zvinomukwanira*' (Wealth distribution in the country with the sole aim of ensuring that every person has enough to sustain his/her life). It was this philosophy which government used to guide its policy formulation and implementation from 1980 to 1990. In the section that follows, an exposé of *gutsaruzhinji* as it was implemented in critical areas of governance including infrastructure development, health delivery, agriculture, education, local government and political party organization.

3.1.2(a)   *Gutsaruzhinji* and the Education system in Zimbabwe.

The problems of inequality in educational opportunities and the segregatory nature of educational provision in the period preceding independence needed a philosophy that would be inclusive, rehabilitative and able to curtail the effects of pre-independence injustices. Armed with the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology, Mugabe declared primary education free and compulsory for every child in 1980. This came to be known as "mass education". Gwarinda (1985:55) defines this mass education as a "socialist education system which includes the

whole population rather than a section of it. It cuts across age, sex, race and class. Education thus became a true national exercise. Socialist (education thus needs to be mass education to encompass everyone" (Gwarinda 1985:55).

Gwarinda goes on to link *gutsaruzhinji* mass education with its communalistic and *hunhu/ubuntu* values, when he argues:

> …where elitist education focuses on individualism, mass education, being socialist education stresses collectivism and communal ethics. The common good is the guiding principle under socialism… Socialism indeed recognizes individuality and seeks to ensure individual fulfillment but within the framework of common good … Under socialism the satisfaction of the group is the satisfaction of the individual… Therefore, mass education ensures that there cannot arise a special group of parasites who will use education to maintain a position of superiority (Gwarinda, 1985:55).

It is important to note the fundamental tenets of *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy from the above. While Gwarinda did not differentiate between socialism and *gutsaruzhinji*, the author replaces socialism cited above with *gutsaruzhinji* since it was the guiding philosophy not socialism as many people wrongly construed it. Common good and the "satisfaction of the group is the satisfaction of the individual" is in keeping with Mbiti's dictum, "I am therefore we are; we are therefore I am." The *gutsaruzhinji* mode of education enabled citizens to avail themselves of the opportunity to gain literacy and numeracy previously denied them by colonial education. Another important component of *gutsaruzhinji* is the reinforcement of *hunhu/ubuntu* values. This was quickly captured in the Zimbabwe education system when government introduced the teaching of traditional culture in the education curriculum. It restructured the Ministry of Education to be known as the "Ministry of Education and Culture". Gwarinda (1985:61) could not hide his pleasure to this development, as he remarked:

> In socialist revolution, education and culture are turned into an instrument of the workers and peasants to free society from the chains of bourgeoisie social order … this is not the same as returning to the past in the sense of cultural retrogression, rather it is a case of borrowing from the past for modern adaptation.

It is clear that the cultural component in the education system was aimed at restoring the important traditional African values of *hunhu/ubuntu* which would mould the African child

towards co-operation and co-existence with others in the community against the individualistic values in the colonial curriculum.

Another very important component of *hunhu/ubuntu*, which *gutsaruzhinji* education had to infuse into the children's education was the virtue of hard work and working to earn a living. This saw government introducing a policy which came to be known as "Education with Production" (Chung, 1985). Chung who was also Minister of education during the period of this new policy lents her support to education with production by stating that "Education is about developing people through interaction between thought and work" (Chung, 1985:108). From the above statement, it can successfully be argued that *gutsaruzhinji* as a philosophy was able to provide a solution for educational and social inequalities created by the post-colonial apartheid policy. Since a philosophy should provide solutions to human problems, *gutsaruzhinji* provided a real solution on the education frontier.

Critics of the *gutsaruzhinji* education system were quick to say that the mass education created many unemployed graduates and the unemployment rate increased as the job market could not absorb all the educated graduates churned out of the many colleges and institutions of higher learning created after independence. Rungano Zvobgo (1994:100) rose in defense of mass education when he argued:

> It must be stressed however, that a reformed curriculum, though an essential aspect of educational and social reform would not have the magic solution to the problem of youth unemployment. It is possible to produce thousands of artisans, craftsmen and other key specialists for all sectors of industry and commerce and still be confronted with the problem of unemployment. The solution lies in a resilient economy that is able to generate employment and wealth for the nation (Zvobgo, 1994:100).

Effective implementation of a good government policy would always call for continuous improvements to meet existing challenges, and this must be considered in the implementation of future *gutsaruzhinji* education policies. In 1999 government set up the Nziramasanga Commission to look into how best to address the 21st century challenges of the education system. The Commission later reported in its findings that:

> the nation is further challenged by the inability of the system to produce graduates whose skills are relevant to the field of work. There are more complex skills emerging in information technology which call for reforms in

curriculum to enable the education system to produce highly skilled cadres
who can survive in the twenty-first century (Nziramasanga, 1999:14).

The most important point in the above comment is that there is a need for continuous improvement in the education system in order to enable it to assist individual as well as overall economic development. What needs to change is not the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy but the implementation strategies. Most viable African ideologies like *ujamaa*, consciencism and humanism were distorted by the manner of implementation preferred by governments which did not give due consideration to continuous improvement of the implementation modalities. Mass education in Zimbabwe which was a key product of *gutsaruzhinji* addressed colonial imbalances in educational attainment, but going forward the need to use education as a tool for economic development became imperative. However, the successes achieved by *gutsaruzhinji* education policies cannot be successfully challenged as admitted by Dashwood (2000) "Until 1991 primary education was free for everyone and the government was successful in ensuring that even the very poorest had access to education services" (Dashwood, 2000:41).

This is supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) latest statistical digest, with Zimbabwe pegged at 92% literacy rate (Edward Shizha and Michael Kariwo 2011:ix) If *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy sponsored this success, it necessarily follows that it is not only a philosophy but also something of practical worth.

3.1.2(b)   A Critique of *gutsaruzhinji* education

The main challenge to African education remains the curriculum itself. Who decides what African children have to learn? How do they learn? What is the benefit to the learner. The national economy and society at large? These are the hard questions which need to be answered in a philosophic way. The danger in not addressing these questions is that we might willy-nilly be perpetuating colonial education whose targets were simply to address the capitalist market and establish Eurocentric values and other foreign value systems at the expense of traditional African persona and *hunhu/ubuntu* value systems.

Educational content was not the primary challenge of *gutsaruzhinji* education as given in 3.1.2.1. Zimbabwe's mass education was largely aimed at ensuring the acquisition of numeracy and literacy skills by previously disadvantaged black children. This became the

first trap to blindly getting baptized in European education and promoting its value systems. This is affirmed by Chisaka et al (2015) when they contend that "In the early 1980s, the Government of Zimbabwe had the noble intention of creating an egalitarian curriculum which we believe was influenced by the philosophy of *ubuntu/hunhu*. However, these intentions appear to have largely remained on paper and were not put into real practice" (Chisaka et al, 2015).

The obvious reason for the immediate failure to implement the *hunhu/ubuntu* curriculum was that government did not have enough intellectual manpower to create material to execute its plan. Instead it followed through the colonial curriculum that was meant for the whites and aligned along the three knowledge/skills domains. "For the African curriculum, the approach was to design the technical vocational curriculum in such a way as to demean this curriculum and make it inferior to academic curriculum. This appeared to have the effect of making the black citizen shun the tech/voc curriculum and make them focus on the academic curriculum with the disastrous effects of promoting the interests of a minority of learners who are less than 25 percent of the learners in the case of our 'O' level finalists nationwide yearly" (ibid). Chisaka et al (2015) argue that "in our view, our school curriculum should be guided and inspired by our national ethos, our national indigenous philosophy of *hunhu/ubuntu* which cherishes success for all according to ability, hence should provide windows of opportunities for all knowledge/ skills domains in an equitable manner, as proposed in the five knowledge and skills characters that is, the sciences, the humanities, the languages, the arts, and the technical/vocational, then there will be no waste in investing all learning resources in one area like academic pursuits, where the majority of learners (more than 75 percent) are judged as failures or rejects at the end of the day year in year out as the case is with our 'O' level" (Chisaka, 2000; 2002; 2007) (ibid). The above assertions were corroborated by Caiphus Nziramasanga (1997) who later headed the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Education and Training, when he argued for the abolition of the use of examinations at Grade 7 and 'O' level on the grounds that they were outdated. Nziramasanga saw these examinations as a continued colonial capitalist hegemony focusing on unnecessary competition in academic excellence than on the development of the full human being, useful to society at large. Nziramasanga wrote:

> This is a system introduced by the colonial regime to prevent blacks from reaching tertiary education so why are we still holding on to it when it has become irrelevant to the 21st century education? That the exams should go is

what the commission found, not Nziramasanga as a person … I want us as a country to engage in a constructive debate on this topic because that is the only way we can come up with a common position, but you should know that what we found out as a commission is that the exams are out of date, (Nziramasanga, 2015).

Post-independence *gutsaruzhinji* education mainly focused on the huge numbers of people going through the previous colonial education system. The stiff competition for jobs and opportunities which left the majority unemployed in the capitalist market exacerbated capitalism. Adoption of the *gutsaruzhinji hunhu/ubuntu* values is likely to have avoided this predicament. To this end, Nziramasanga did not relent in his message for commitment to *hunhu/hunhu* education which can ultimately deliver on the promises of a genuine *gutsaruzhinji* polity. He concludes his argument by a passionate appeal, "We should now, in our new curriculum, introduce an *ubuntu* based curriculum which, I think is Zimbabwe's educational philosophy.

The Zimbabwean education is currently grounded in a philosophy of education that is alien. It is therefore, essential to search for a philosophy that will bring relevance to the education system- an education system that emanates from the existential historical circumstances of the people. We argue that for the education system at any level to be relevant, it must have its foundations in the philosophy of *hunhu*. It is not being argued that the philosophy is one of philosophical foundations but that it be the foundation of Zimbabwe education" (Nziramasanga, 2015). In the *gutsaruzhinji* education policy as first proposed, it can be seen that the only philosophical objective achieved was equal treatment and equal access to learning facilities which was absent in colonial education. However, the irony of the situation is that the new opportunity for education has far-reaching effects that are equally damaging to the African child than the previous lack of education. In other words, the author is saying, the inherited colonial education caused many problems both social and economic, which needed more time to redress.

The deduction to be made in this case is that if a proper *gutsaruzhinji* curriculum fostering *hunhu/ubuntu* values had been introduced at the outset in post- colonial Zimbabwe, the development trajectory might have been different. Bonda and Kaputa (2016:37) argue that *hunhu/ubuntu* mainstreaming in the education curricula from early childhood development (ECD) to tertiary institutions should be mandatory to inculcate the invaluable values in Africans and guarantee peace, harmony, the spirit of brotherhood, togetherness, respect,

solidarity, teamwork, unity, reconciliation, cooperation and hard work among other important values. Broodryk (2006) remarks that the biggest lesson Africa can export to the world is how to appreciate these *hunhu/ubuntu* values. Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru and Makuva (2014) concur with Broockryk (2000) when they maintain that '*hunhu/ubuntu*' is not an imported but an indigenous philosophy rooted in the experiences of indigenous Africans and that it should therefore permeate the epistemological axiological and ontological underpinning of Zimbabwean education systems. Furthermore, Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru and Makuva (2014) contend that an appropriate epistemology in education should incorporate the teaching of skills in a way that translates theory into practice and creates a bridge between school and community. This would make education relevant to life, dignify manual labour and encourage a spirit of self –reliance (Kaputa, 2011).

The Education with Production policy in the early days of the *gutsaruzhinji* education which as reported by Chung (1984) was quickly abandoned owing to a predominantly colonial capitalist focus according to which students were being schooled to work in capitalist industries than to be creators of industries, jobs and builders of their own society. The author agrees with Bonda (2013) that, "education curricula should be designed in such a way that *Ubuntu*/unhu values are inculcated in learners in terms of knowledge, skills, attitudes, social and work ethics. In some technical subjects like engineering, information communication and technology as well as chemistry *ubuntu*/unhu values and ethos such as diligence, integrity a spirit of oneness and cooperation could be instilled in learners through *ubuntu*/unhu oriented metholody" (ibid).

The whole education system addressed peripheral issues of *gutsaruzhinji* leaving out major content issues of *gutsaruzhinji*'s *hunhu/ubuntu* curriculum unattended. This development increased Western-type of educational skills, knowledge, value and attitudes at the expense of the advancement of *hunhu/ubuntu* values. The author is also cognizant of the fact that while a barrage of criticism can be marshaled against *gutsaruzhinji* education, Zimbabwe was a new state in 1980 which had seen too much neglect to the African Education system that to effectively address all major curriculum concerns, and the related philosophical challenges in education needed more than two decades. The intellectual capacity to create the new curriculum and teach the bulk of learners from primary school level to university was just absent. The initial stages were commendable, although invariably, there were more fundamental problems with regard to proper orientation towards real *hunhu/ubuntu* education

curriculum formation and implementation. Efforts to address the problems were definitely seen in the establishment of the Nziramasanga Commission in 1997, again a very late inquiry.

3.1.3 *Gutsaruzhinji* and the health delivery system in independent Zimbabwe.

The overriding principle in guiding the health delivery system in post-independence Zimbabwe was not only the provision of medical facilities to the previously marginalized, rather it was also imperative from the *hunhu/ubuntu* values in *gutsaruzhinji* that human life was sacrosanct and every effort had to be made to save and preserve it. In mid-1980, government introduced a free health care service for those earning less than $150 per month (GOZ, 1990:36). These were the majority of people since 85% of the population was comprised of peasants living on subsistence farming. *Gutsaruzhinji* is about meeting the needs or satisfying the majority's basic requirements.

More evidence of the deployment of *gutsaruzhinji* ideology was the government's passage of the Traditional Medical Practitioners Act (1981) and the establishment of the Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association (ZINATHA) in the same year. This not only gave the necessary recognition and legal framework within which traditional treatment could be regulated, supervised, upgraded and scientifically investigated, but also addressed the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy whereby the realm of spiri took care of the living in practical terms. The *hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics, ethics and epistemology can be seen to take effect in guiding the *gutsaruzhinji* health policies in post-independent Zimbabwe. To further ensure that the health needs of every village in each communal community were adequately attended to, in the absence of proper infrastructure, in particular the absence of clinics, Government in 1983 introduced a primary health care policy where it trained and deployed village health workers in every village and gave them medicine to treat basic ailments (GOZ, 1980:36). In addition to these village health workers, a Maternal and Child Health Programme for mothers and children was also launched in June 1983, where the training of traditional midwives in elementary hygiene, basic midwifery and identification of "artist" pregnancies were undertaken nationwide. The report by the Ministry of Information, summarized the *gutsaruzhinji* health delivery system as follows:

> Zimbabwe's health system is a success story in Africa. The system has effective primary health care, good referral system and free health services for low income groups. The key to this success has been the inter-sectoral

approach which resulted in cooperation between various agencies of government, health sector itself, social security, private sector and various organizations (Ministry of Information Handbook Update, 1990:36).

Cooperation is cited as the cornerstone of the success cited by the Ministry of Information and is one of the important attributes in the *nhimbe* practice of *gutsaruzhinji* and its attendant *hunhu/ubuntu* values as argued in Chapter two. The above report was corroborated by Dashwood (2000:44) who stated that, "From 1980 to 1985, there was a 58 percent increase in the provision of rural health centres. The number of centres rose from an average of 9.5 per 100 000 people in 1980 to 15 per 100 000 people in 1985 (Dashwood, 2000:14). For most of the peasantry then, the provision of health facilities was a visible and tangible benefit of independence. The *gutsaruzhinji* health care programmes of post-independence Zimbabwe communicate a communitarian bias as Government and the community were in a sustained symbiotic relationship as well as exhibit a *hunhu/ubuntu* thrust. The need for government commitment, respect for human life and care for disadvantaged peasants cannot be over-emphasized. The author's contention remains that all these developments were not informed by the socialist thinking of Karl Marx or Lenin, but by a philosophy which had its deep roots in the people's *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy wherein caring for each other is not taught but is lived as naturally commanded by the communitarian view. *Gutsaruzhinji* is therefore no imitation of Western socialism as other scholars would want many people to believe. If it can shape the present and future life of a generation and a nation such as Zimbabwe, it certainly becomes a philosophy to be reckoned with in Zimbabwe in particular and Africa in general.

3.1.3(a)   A Critique of *Gutsaruzhinji* Health policies

The health delivery policies of immediate post–independence Zimbabwe were more focused on equitable distribution of access to facilities like clinics and general hygiene. However, a *hunhu/ubuntu* health society was desirable. Indigenous medical care systems and medicine development were the key to the *gutsaruzhinji* health policy. It was commendable to see the establishment of the ZINATHA in 1981 as explained in 3.1.2.2 but its proper equipment and country-wide distribution of services remained elusive. The author wishes to argue that black African traditional medicine is still looked down upon as inferior, unsuitable and poorly packaged in comparison to Western medicine.

What is current is that doctors and nurses in training currently train on the basis of advancing Western or foreign medical prescriptions than developing indigenous knowledge systems in the health delivery area. Traditionally, those called "*n'anga*' or "witchdoctor" in English parlance "knew how to treat most of the ailments using traditional herbs or shrubs. If there had been proper investment in the development of African medicine, some of the current western driven medical prescriptions and drugs would have been replaced by effective traditional medicine. During the Mapungubwe Dynasty and Great Zimbabwe Kingdom from 900AD 1500AD no recorded clinics or hospitals existed but people lived a healthy life in these semi-modern traditional metropolitans. Murove (2009), Busia and Kasilo (2010), and WHO (2013a,b) maintain that there is an increasing call for the integration of African Traditional Medicine (ATM) and practitioners into the health care system of each African country. Integration will offer patients a wider choices and may contribute to the treatment of acute diseases (WHO, 2013:A37).

Prinsloo (2001) argues that the '*Ubuntu* way of caring for the sick is underpinned by the regulative concept of sharing and 'caring'. He goes on to argue that in African medicine, the sick person is treated or cared for in a particular way in terms of African traditional thinking which is different from Western thinking. Sickness is regarded as the result of disturbed relationships with his or her fellow men, implying that *ubuntu* thinkers have a particular idea of the causes for diseases and the cure also differs. For example, through an intricate process of interviews, the causes of insomnia may be traced to the contravention of certain cultural ritualistic taboos or superstitions or to offences against certain divinities, ancestors and supernatural powers (Ademuwagum, 1978:91). This leads to the problem .of distinguishing between physical and psychological ailments or conditions and how this distinction affects the holistic framework of understanding a person in terms of sharing and caring.

According to Ademuwagun (1978) headaches, malaria, fever, and dysentery are classified as physical sickness, and illnesses caused by unemployment, lack of money, strained human relations and inability to get along with others are regarded as socio-psychological illnesses. It is, therefore, necessary that *ubuntu* traditional African medical care and healing facilities be instituted in all areas where the black community resides to ensure effective, total care of the entire African citizenry. Sogolo et al (1995:9) claim that a people's general conception of health and disease is linked to its cultures as represented by their overall world–view. This constitutes for the African, a holistic conception of disease or illness.

A traditional healer does not associate diseases with specific parts of the body by starting to diagnose an illness by a physical examination of the patients' body, as what happens in Western society. Instead, the traditional healer is primarily concerned with the patient's background in socio-cultural within divine supernatural relations (Prinsloo, 2016:62). The *ubuntu* medical health care philosophy should influence African governments' health delivery policies rather than pursue the colonial or western view which does not only commercialises health care, but also fails to understand the African person. This area had glaring inadequacies in the *gutsaruzhinji* health care system of Zimbabwe.

The training of many nurses and doctors in accordance with western medicine is another area where *hunhu/ubuntu* health care policies remained inadequate. Sogolo argues that "an African healer may attribute a disease to a scientific natural cause not too dissimilar to the germ theory of modern medicine. Yet he may also believe that the same disease is caused by supernatural forces. He would then proceed to cure the disease in these two seemingly incompatible directions" (Sogolo et al, 1995:11). Sogolo et al therefore, advises that the syllabi for physicians and nurses should include psychological training in order to deal with wider issues which are not too complicated. Prinsloo (2016) maintains that the unique position of *ubuntu*–thinking as caring for the sick, is therefore, not in terms of being unparalleled, but in terms of a difference in explicitly demanding or prescribing a moral duty which cannot be said to be that explicit in Western medicine. The crux of the difference is that "caring" for the sick in *hunhu/ubuntu* thinking has a wider application (another form of reference) than what is commonly accepted as medical care in Western medicine.

The author, therefore, advocates a complete overhaul of health policies to embrace important *hunhu/ubuntu* medical care to cover all the people in Zimbabwe in particular and Africa in general. This is in keeping with *gutsaruzhinji* ideology, in socio-economic development. South Africa's Department of Health in its Draft Policy on African Traditional medicine declared, 'Most importantly in recognition of the reality that the majority of South African people still use and continue to rely on African Traditional medicine for their primary healthcare needs, there is a need for a policy to institutionalize and regulate African traditional medicine" (Draft Policy, para3.1). The reason many people prefer traditional medicine to Western medicine is the simple fact that it is affordable and addresses both the spiritual and physical social needs of people. The Department of Health also identify traditional medicine as one based on a "traditional philosophy" which is defined by the Act as

"indigenous African techniques, principles, theories, ideologies, beliefs, opinions, customs and uses of traditional medicine communicated from ancestor to descendants or from generations, with or without written documents, whether supported by science or not, and which are generally used in traditional health practice" (2007:1).

It is important to note that the reference to "traditional medicine communicated from ancestors to descendants is related to *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy in health care whereby the supernatural is believed to cause illness to the living as a form of punishment thereby highlighting the inseparability between the living and living-dead in health delivery. This understanding of the human beings is absent in the Western view hence the need to ensure traditional African philosophy of what constitute causes of disease and remedies or treatment should not be influenced by the Western view. It is an important development that in July 2001, the Organization of African unity (now the African Union –AU) declared the period 2001-2010, the "Decade for African traditional medicine" and requested all stake- holders to prepare a plan of action for implementation with the main objective of guiding member states to recognize accept develop and integrate traditional medicine into their public health systems, (AU: 2009). Rautenbach (2007:180) states that approximately 70-80% of the African population makes use of the services of traditional practitioners, dispensing traditional medicines. The same trend can be traced and found in most of African states where *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is prevalent and widely accepted. This is the new frontier the author believes needs aggressive interventions and a form of medical care which is not only affordable to the majority of people, but also addresses peculiar African ailments and causes of diseases rather than merely relying only on the Western germ theory to diagnose and treat diseases.

3.1.4   *Gutsaruzhinji* in Land and Agricultural development in independent Zimbabwe, 1980- 1990.

From a communitarian point of view, land in Zimbabwe was not only the means of production but also an inheritance from the living-dead (ancestors) (Moyo, 2004; Samkange, 1980; Nabudere, 2004; Ramose, 1999:2014 and Onyebuchi Eze, 2008). In Zimbabwe, even the policy of reconciliation had not been able to address this burning issue since it was the main cause of the war of Liberation. Gwarinda (1985) attest to this fact when he explains that; "By 1979 the Europeans had reserved for themselves 50% of Zimbabwe or 90% of the

best land, while indigenous Zimbabweans or 95% of the total population were to occupy the remaining poor land in the reserves later called Tribal Trust Lands" (1985:97). This status quo was against all that *gutsaruzhinji* stood for and had to be addressed effectively. It should, however, be noted that this is also an area where the 1979 brokered Lancaster House Settlement protected white minority interests in land by putting a clause which only allowed governments to take land on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis until the expiry of the first ten years after independence (Moyo, 1990:186).

Gutsaruzhinji compelled government to redistribute land to the landless people as a socio-economic tool. According to Moyo (1990) the absentee farmers' farms were taken and and used to re-settle people who then began to practise communal subsistence farming. However, government can be credited for training more agriculture extension service workers and deploying them in the rural areas to give farming knowledge with a view to boosting production on the small fields peasants had. It also provided loan money to allow peasants to borrow and buy farming inputs to increase their yields (Moyo 1990). These initiatives resonate well with *gutsaruzhinji* in the sense that increased yields meant the bulk of peasant farmers could get enough food to feed themselves and send a surplus to the market for sale. In pursuit of its *gutsaruzhinji* policy, government increased the price of maize, sorghum, *mhunga* and *rapoko*, all grown by the majority peasants as an economic support measure to allow peasants to get both money for self-sustenance and also boost the national economic production. Jeffery Hebert (1990:89-98) confirmed that:

> The government offered generous price incentives to peasant farmers. In 1981 season, the government increased the price of maize from $85 per tonne to $120 per tonne. In 1987, the government positively discriminated in favour of peasant farmers offering them $150 per tonne, compared to only $100 per tonne to commercial farmers. The price for mhunga went up to $250 per tonne and rapoko $300 per ton.

From the above, it is clear that government deliberately chose to increase the prices for peasant farmer produce to boost their economic status since these were the majority people, *gutsaruzhinji* policy was evidently in operation. When the majority peasant farmers were satisfied by these price incentives their production records for these crops shoot up, thereby promoting the gross national product (Dashwood, 2000:54).

If *gutsaruzhinji* can compel government to address the plight of its ordinary citizens, then *gutsaruzhinji* is not only a philosophy which speaks to old traditions of communalism, but it

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is also a tool to deal with contemporary challenges. Beef production by ordinary farmers in the 1980s also saw a boost because of both price incentives and loan schemes given to farmers. Ian Scoones echoes this success by highlighting that, "Beef exports became an important foreign exchange for the country in 1980 to 1990s" (2014:21).

When a government considers the plight of the poor and takes measures to address them, it definitely will have solved the social, economic and political challenges of its people. The guiding philosophy (*gutsaruzhinji*) can be credited in that regard. However, the land issue was not effectively dealt with in the first and second decade after independence. This led to "Third Chimurenga" which shall be discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis.

3.1.4(a)   A Critique of the *gutsaruzhinji* land and Agricultural policies

The author characterized the whole essence of *gutsaruzhinji* as coming from the *nhimbe* or *majangano*, where people helped one another in tilling the land or harvesting to ensure each member of the family has food on the table. Put differently, Jonathan Moyo said, "Our socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) is land-driven, we should get the land reform first and use it as the base for a new recovery" (Bond et al, 2002:203). Clearly the redistribution of land to the landless was supposed to be an uncompromised stand by government to ensure that the inequalities and the needs of the ordinary people were met. Leaving the minority white colonial farmers to continue to hold on to vast land, when people remained in object poverty, was one of the most retrogressive moves by the new government of Robert Mugabe. This was tantamount to pronouncing *gutsaruzhinji* while implementing a capitalist polity on the economic frontier. The two ideologies (*gutsaruzhinji* and capitalism) are extreme opposites of each other and can, therefore, not coexist. Essentially, cosmetic land reforms carried out as discussed in 3.1.2.3 did very little to ensure the establishment of a *gutsaruzhinji* polity in Zimbabwe.

The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 provided that there would be no compulsory acquisition of land from the colonizers in the first ten years of independence. This provision was retrogressive, given that freedom, independence and racial inequality was land-based and, therefore, land should have been the first take-off point in the implementation of gutsaruzhinmji in Zimbabwe. Ironically, even after, the expiry of the given ten years in 1990, land reform was only effected in the year 2000 through the agency of land hungry peasants

and war veterans. Up until this happened, the political leadership had been in a slumber with regard to the land question.

The second fundamental philosophical consideration in *gutsaruzhinji* and land reform was the fact that people had to reconnect with their ancestoral lands and be allowed to stay where their ancestral graves were. Such a dispensation enabled people to connect spiritually with the living-dead whose spiritual guidance had led the prosecution of the first and second Chimurenga wars. Since Chapter One and Chapter Two of this thesis affirm that the cornestone of *hunhu/ubuntu* is the concept of *gutsaruzhinji*, the fundamentals remain essentially unattended for as long as there is nothing done to deal effectively and decisively matters relating to *gutsaruzhinji* and the land issue. Essentially the policy remained in incubation until the year 2000. It can be argued that the serious droughts that took place in Zimbabwe in year 1982-3 and 1991-1992, attest to the fact that the living-dead were sending a message that the ruling elite had abandoned the *gutsaruzhinji* thereby duplicating what happened during the Mapungubwe Dynasty and Great Zimbabwe Empire where leadership was side- tracked by foreign traders to abandon their culture (Bhebhe (1999). Drought and scarcity led to the abandonment of the two empires and the scattering of their subjects in different directions in search of good pastures.

3.1.5 *Gutsaruzhinji* and Industrial Development in Post-independence Zimbabwe.

The *gutsaruzhinji* policy's influence in Zimbabwe's industrial and manufacturing development can be understood from how Maurice Nyagumbo − a minister and senior member of the ruling ZANU PF put it:

> It is the government's view that nationalization is not the right thing for any socialist (*gutsaruzhinji*) government to do. Instead, the government believes that it should side with the private sector, get expertise in industrialization then put its own industries which will compete with the private sector. We still do not have the expertise to run our own industries. When we have trained our own manpower, then we can establish our own industries as we will be assured at that stage of proper management. (Moto − November 1983:5).

From the above statement, it can be argued that the traditional *hunhu/ubuntu* values in *gutsaruzhinji* where individual effort in wealth creation was a virtue to be attained by all, were evident. However, individual success could be shared in the community. This is where capitalist production values animate with *gutsaruzhinji* to allow economic growth to bring

benefit to the majority of people. Mugabe had alluded to this when he gave his inaugural speech on 4 March 1980, by stating, "Nor do we want to drive anybody out of this country; nor do we intend to interfere unconstitutionally with the property rights of individuals" (Mugabe 1980). *Gutsaruzhinji* does not thrive on taking individual properties and causing them to be forcibly given to those without because that would be tantamount to robbery or what the English say is "to rob Peter to pay Paul". It is unethical by the *hunhu/ubuntu* standards as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. Bernard Chidzero, then Minister of Economic Planning and Development in the government of Zimbabwe reinforced this notion when he argued:

> True investment in traditionally successful sectors, generates spillover effects that may eventually raise the standard of living in the backward sector… It is therefore, imperative that we redirect investment in order to achieve growth with equity because it makes long term economic sense to do so; both government and private enterprise… The people and government of this country accept the fact that the task of development and success is primarily their own responsibility, (*Parade*, October 1980:45).

This statement is in keeping with the dictum, "I am because we are". The success spill-over of individual private enterprises would be harnessed and support the development of the underdeveloped. *Gutsaruzhinji* in this context is clearly not socialist and pro-Western. *Gutsaruzhinji* philosophy is therefore key in integrating different communities to work for the good of mankind. When Mugabe was addressing students and intellectuals at Pittsburg University, USA on 3 October 1984, he laid bare this important fact of co-existence being done in his country when he stated, "What I wish to stress is the fact that our young nation is determined, if given the chance, to forge ahead and meet the aspirations of our once down-trodden people by creating a dynamic society in which people will be proud to work together as equals" (Mugabe, 1984). *Gutsaruzhinji* is colour-blind. All it seeks is the satisfaction of all (Chinyowa, 2007:186; Mangena, 2014: 100; Chimhundu, 2001:348). No one said it better than Enos Nkala – Minister of Finance 1980, who contended:

> We look upon our brand of socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) as Zimbabwe oriented and not as an alien prescription. We have a mixed economy with state enterprises and private enterprises co-existing in harmony. It is not government intention to change this co-existence. I wish to stress that we regard external investment as most desirable and essential if we are to succeed in our basic philosophy of raising the living standards of all our people. The application of Zimbabwe socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) will be both pragmatic and mild. The needs of the nation being meaningful economic advancement, rising standards of living and

more equal distribution of wealth, require us to bond together as one nation and to act as one nation. (Parade, October 1980:3).

When Nkala pointed out that *gutsaruzhinji* application in Zimbabwe "will be both pragmatic and mild" he clearly meant it would adopt and adapt to anything which could assist in the uplifting of the people's standards of living. Capitalist traditions or socialist practices would all have to adopted into the *gutsaruzhinji hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy where the individual corporately existed and enjoyed wellbeing. This is the position echoed by Ayittey (1990:12) who says that both capitalist and socialist traits are found in traditional African economic systems.

3.1.5(a)   A Critique of *gutsaruzhinji* Industrial & Economic Development policies

In an ideal *gutsaruzhinji* economy, the majority of people should contribute to the gross domestic product, and not just a few of them.. The majority of People should be empowered to produce and the ownership of critical national resources should be the people with the help of government. Both production and processing should ensure local benefit to the majority of people and discourage the externalization of both resources and benefit. The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act. (IEEA) 14(2007) came twenty-seven years after independence. It is in this policy as discussed in 5.13 of this thesis that proper and effective *gutsaruzhinji* policies were enacted just as there were real *gutsaruzhinji* land policies in the 2000 era. On the ground, however, *gutsaruzhinji* remained under incubation to about 2007 with the result that once more the country reverted to a capitalist mode of production. Rawls (1971: 60) states that social and economic inequalities can be justified only if it works to the advantage of the least-advantaged members of society. Such an occurrence would be in keeping with *gutsaruzhinji*, and when that happens, the implication is that when the economy and industries in particular are under the control of a few multinationals and some white elites as in 1980 to 2000, capitalist production methods and values prevail, while *gutsaruzhinji* remains a pipe dream.

The observation of property rights by the Mugabe government in not nationalizing industry is commendable, but the administration should have quickly moved in to capacitate local production and facilitate wider beneficiation of national resources. The growth with equity as advocated by Chidzero and highlighted in 3.1.2.4 (Parade, October 1980:45) remained elusive. Understandably, local talent had to be developed over time for effective

participation, but local beneficiation of mineral resources through localized final production and through employment of more blacks to enable them to gain experience did not become deliberate policy until 2007.

The author argues further that the proper implementation of *gutsaruzhinji* policies under the guise of socialism in the first phase of post–independence Zimbabwe not only delayed the full implementation of the ideology but compromised the authenticity of *gutsaruzhinji* economic policies.

3.1.6 *Gutsaruzhinji* in Local Governance in Zimbabwe 1980 – 1990

Governance in traditional set-ups had a chief or king guided by a council of elders who lived with the people and knew what the people's needs and requirements were (Samkage and Samkage, 1980; Makuvaza, 1996). *Gutsaruzhinji* being a people-centred philosophy with deep roots in African traditional practice had to be reflected in how Zimbabwe was governed.

Government moved in quickly to decentralise its functions by creating Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) as well as Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and District Councils in every administrative district (GOZ, 1980). Traditional leaders like the village head under the area chief were to oversee both the decision-making and the welfare of their communities including settling disputes (Makumbe, 1998:57). Central government was only established to provide resources which could then be equitably distributed by local District Councils through the VIDCOs and WADCOs. This type of governance resonates with the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy, since decision-making was done from the grassroots and people were responsible for managing and directing their own affairs.

Makumbe (1998:57) acknowledges that government decentralization through the VIDCO and WADCO provided four positive contributions which are in line with *gutsaruzhinji* policy and these are:

1. People at grass roots level now had the right to democratically elect their own representatives without undue interference from the state.

2. Central government now took into consideration the peoples' views on local issues when making decisions.

3. At grassroots level people were free to express their views on the way local development activities should be conducted and they could question public officials when they observed that their local affairs were not being handled in the manner they recommended.

4. The people were now participating effectively in the development of their own areas, during the colonial period (Makumbe, 1998:57).

One major attribute of the *gutsaruzhinji* polity is freedom, which has always been the right of every person in communal living to exercise corporately. The freedom of the individual was in the group or community (Ramose, 2014). Makumbe's fourth point emphasises the fact that each individual's socio- economic well-being was decided by the individuals who happened to be in the VIDCO and WADCO, so the betterment of their lives became their responsibility but supported by central government in critical areas. Clearly, the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology addressed the problem of dictatorship and imposition of foreign ideas, which makes the ideology wholly-owned by the indigenous people of Zimbabwe. For that reason, nothing foreign or Western can be ascribed to *gutsaruzhinji* polity. Smith echoes the positive impact of the *gutsaruzhinji* decentralization in Zimbabwean polity when he concedes:

> Decentralisation has been seen as particularly relevant to meeting the needs of the poor. It is argued that if development is to mean eradication of poverty, inequality and material deprivation, it must engage the involvement and mobilization of the poor (Smith, 1985:186)

This decentralisation is also summarised in the fact that traditional leadership was restored and most of the chiefs whose status had been lowered during colonial rule were returned to the previous traditional roles. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013; Section 280: 281; 282; 283; 284 and 285 stipulates the roles and functions of a Chief. In this regard Section 280: subsection (2) states that "A traditional leader is responsible for performing the cultural, customary and traditional functions of a chief, head person or village head, as the case may be, for his community." The decentralisation of the governance system coupled with the restoration of traditional leadership is one solid example of *gutsaruzhinji* polity in Zimbabwe. It is intellectual naivety to deny that *gutsaruzhinji* is both a philosophy and a sub-branch of traditional *hunhu/ubuntu* African philosophy. The philosophy is premised on the fact that the people or community takes precedence over all things.

The sprouting of 11 growth points, 550 rural service centres and 55 district councils all point to the fact that *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy solved governance issues in post –independence Zimbabwe (GOZ, 1990:29).

3.1.6(a)   A Critique of Gutsaruzhinmji Governance

Colonial rule established itself by weakening and in most cases removing the power of traditional chiefs. Those who were left to rule were given new orders and only exercised their powers under the colonial administration's District Commissioner (Nyati, 2000:89; Keulder, 1998:201; Musekiwa, 2012).

Prior to the colonization of Zimbabwe the institution of traditional leadership being the sole governance structure with legitimacy to govern, derived its power from tradition and culture (Chigwata, 2015: 250). Traditional leaders had fused "governmental powers and authority that is judicial, administrative and political. Keulder (1998) contends that soon after colonisation in 1890, the colonial government dismantled and in some cases replaced traditional governance structures with "modern" state institutions as it sought to advance its interests and exercise firm control over the black population. Some of the powers of the traditional leaders, such as the power to allocate land, were taken away or became limited. Ndlovu and Dube (2012:7) state that the Chiefs became salaried government officials accountable to the colonial government and some of them began to be appointed outside the relevant ruling clan or tribe.

The motivational for the change of governance from the traditional chiefs to the colonial state was to completely get rid of *gutsaruzhinji* governance and establish capitalist monopolistic governance aimed at furthering the interest of the minority. The post–independence government of Mugabe was therefore challenged to restore the institution of traditional chiefs which was the symbol of *hunhu/ubuntu* values. Ndlovu and Dube (2012) argue that this never happened:

> One would believe that at independence in 1980 the new government would restore the dignity of the traditional leaders. This was not to be; the manipulation of traditional leadership continues in modern Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF government knew that the reinstatement of Chiefs to their original power would be a recipe for disaster. Empowering the chiefs with the status they had had prior to colonization meant empowering communities with their traditional lifestyles. This would have rendered amaNdebele ungovernable,

especially with a Shona–dominated government. Therefore, the abuse and manipulation of traditional leadership continued under the new government. Although colonialism greatly transformed the institution of traditional leadership, the incutubent government has done much to affect the situation of traditional leadership in contempory Zimbabwe (Ndlovu and Dube, 2012:58).

It is clear from the above statement that, *gutsaruzhinji* governance did not get full commitment from the post –independence government. The new government may have adopted colonial governance structures to entrench and later retain its hold on political power. Alternatively, there may have been no firm commitment to remove capitalist tendencies in governance since the land management did not devolve back to the traditional chiefs to exercise *gutsaruzhinji* governance. Ndlovu and Dube (2012) further argue against the continued colonial tendencies, where currently Chapter 29:17 of the Traditional Leadership Act provides that the Minister of Local Government appoints and installs chiefs. Having any Minister of Local Government installing Ndebele Chiefs is a deviation from and strongly neglects the amaNdebele cultural and religious norms. In the Ndebele state, the king installed chiefs because it was he who possessed the royal Ndebele state's ancestral spirits. As things now obtain, ministers may not even be of royalty in their societyThis begs the question of how then they can install a chief–particularly a Ndebele chief?" (ibid).

The foregoing facts expose the new government's inadequacy in embracing the *gutsaruzhinji* polity in full. *Gutsaruzhinji* speaks of a return to the guidance of good governance through the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy where people and their cultural beliefs and heritage mattered most. The deliberate avoidance of following cultural practices and traditions in governance, ironically means the removal of white men from political office and replacing them with black men to do almost the same. Strange cultural practices like the installation of women as chiefs in a patriarchal society like Zimbabwe were introduced by the post-independence government. A clear breath of *hunhu/ubuntu* practice is the basis of *gutsaruzhinji* polity. While Nkomo (in Chiwome and Gambahaya 1998:118) claims that the appointment of female chiefs represents the democratisation of majority rule, it is clear that Ndebele and Shona culture regards women as perpetual minors (Guy, 1996:34) who are incapable of teaching anything to men. The politicization of the installation of chiefs follows a colonial rule route. The late Chief Khayisa Ndiweni (quoted in (CJP, 1997:25) noted that the appointment of the first female chief Sinqobile Mabhena in 1997, was political. He states that "there is a house of chiefs in this country… if there is something that goes against tradition

we discuss it. Why did they bypass the house of chiefs?" The politicians ignored the concerns of other Ndebele chiefs when they installed a woman–as noted. The phenomenon of female chieftainship goes against Ndebele custom and the issue should have been settled in the Chief's Council before the politicians weighed in with those installed chiefs who then became tools of partisan politics thereby abrogating their sacred duties and responsibilities. The author refers to the issue of traditional leaders to gauge the seriousness of government in following through a *gutsaruzhinji* governance process.

Failure to observe some of these important benchmarks of good *gutsaruzhinji* governance system can be traced back in all structures to evaluate the government's attitude towards a full *gutsaruzhinji* polity. The Gukurahundi atrocities (1982-1987) that took place in Matabeland and the Midlands, not only stripped the Ndebele of confidence, but also went on to put a dent in the government's commitment to *gutsaruzhinji* since thousands of people were killed by the government's fifth brigade soldiers (Ndlovu–Gatsheni, 2009:189). The massacres remain to be properly and traditionally resolved to this day since the aggrieved families have not yet been compensated. Governing ordinary citizens by instilling fear in them as what happened in this incident militates against the *gutsaruzhinji* polity.

The author, however, acknowledges the fact that the traditional model of governance where the king ruled through his chiefs, headmen and kraal heads was replaced by a unitary government. Currently, the President, provincial councils and district councils work in tandem with the Minister of Local Government, while provincial ministers work with provincial administrators. In a situation that is reminiscent of the pre-independence situation, district administrators tend to mirror the old set-up. However, more legislative frameworks giving full decentralized powers and resources at these levels are still to be instituted in accordance with the requirement of the new constitution of 2013. As discussed previously, these democratic institutions could deliver *gutsaruzhinji* governance if political manipulation by the ruling party is removed.

3.1.7   The *Gutsaruzhinji* ideology in the ruling ZANU PF party.

It is important to critically analyse Mugabe's statement with regard to his Party's commitment to the *gutsaruzhinji* polity. When addressing his party's congress in 1985 Mugabe spelt out his philosophical point of view thus:

> ZANU PF is committed to socialism [*gutsaruzhinji*]. Socialism has many varieties and forms; each must be related to people's history, culture and tradition in the context in which it is practised. In our culture we have had traits of socialist practices, for example '*nhimbe*", "*majangano*" communal use of land and so on. Zanu PF wants to see a fair distribution of wealth and natural resources in Zimbabwe: a fair wage based on good production; control of the major means of production by government and party; and equal opportunity and access to all social services such as education, health and others, (Zimbabwe News, May/June, 1985:20)

In above statement makes it clear that the most important point is the ontological setting of *gutsaruzhinji* which is the history, culture and tradition of the black Zimbabwean people. In asserting that "culture and tradition" influence the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy, Mugabe was therefore admitting the fact that *gutsaruzhinji* was rooted in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and was, therefore, is its branch. Secondly, the metaphysical belief in the existence of a human being as spirit and mediator of "*Mwari Musikavanhu*" God Almighty (Samkange 1980) is part of the history and cultural traditions of the Shona and Ndebele people in Zimbabwe (Nziramasanga, 1999; Makuvaza, 1996). Since this ontological and metaphysical underpinning in *gutsaruzhinji* ideology is traceable in the history, culture and tradition of the Zimbabwean people, it therefore stands distinct from any foreign or Western influence such as that through socialism. This, therefore, makes *gutsaruzhinji* a Zimbabwean philosophy which has possibilities of being shared among African people and their states where *hunhu/ubuntu* values are shared. Thirdly, by referring to "*nhimbe*" and "*majangano*" as well as the communal use of land, Mugabe was stressing the socio-economic productive methods to be employed in pursuit of the *gutsaruzhinji* polity. *Nhimbe* is defined as free social labour which was not profit-oriented but was intrinsically motivated to boost the productive capacity of every member in the community to produce enough food for the family plus a surplus to sell on the open market or feed strangers. This was made possible because the community believed it was one indivisible unit bound by *hunhu/ubuntu* values.

The role of *gutsaruzhinji* in the redistribution of wealth is clearly spelt out when Mugabe says, "Zanu PF wants to see a fair distribution of wealth and natural resources in Zimbabwe". In Zimbabwe by then, the white minority consisting only 5% of the population owned 90% of the good land while 95% of the population only used 10% of the land, (Gwarinda, 1985:97). The industries and mines were owned by foreign conglomerates. An environment that would be conducive to wealth creation by previously marginalised Zimbabweans had to be provided. This essentially called for the removal of all laws which had anything to do with

preferential treatment. However, each individual had to work to earn a good living. The capitalist methods of working to produce and sell on the open market could now resonate with *gutsaruzhinji*'s productive matrix. This fourth point is important in that it stops *gut ruzhinji* from alignment with communism where wealth is believed to belong to everyone. This usually misunderstood aspect of communism is what led to the formation of co-operatives such as those under Tanzania's *ujamaa* which later on collapsed. The reference to "pragmatic methods" by Nkala as previously cited explains this important point.

The fifth point stressed by Mugabe has to do with "equal opportunity and access to all social services such as education; health and others". This statement confirms two important points, firstly that every citizen has a right to knowledge and life, and that these are guaranteed by the state. The second of the two points cited is the fact that communalistic and *Hunhu/ubuntu* values in traditional Zimbabwe and Africa in general do not allow anyone to celebrate when others are suffering or are in need. The "symbiotic relationship" espoused by Leopold Senghor is organically part and parcel of *gutsaruzhinji* development. The Mbiti dictum is again reinforced in this statement, but differently to read: "A sound mind in a healthy body – I am because we are".

The structural formation of ZANU PF also explains in detail how entrenched the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy initially was in guiding all its activities. Its party organs as spelt out in Article 4 of its constitution start from the cell or village level going on and spread to branch, district, province and central committee. Decision-making starts from below and goes up on recommendation until final decisions are passed by the higher organ as stipulated in (Article 30 Sub-sections (1) and (2)) which says:

> Any organ of the party may propose amendments to the constitution and shall
> in the case of the constitution and shall in the case of subordinate organs of the
> party be required to submit such proposed amendments to the next superior
> organ for onward transmission.... (Article 30:21).

This is an indication of democratic values embedded in the party in its pursuit of *gutsaruzhinji* policies. Every person has to be involved in the political decisions as well as in economic development. It can be seen from this party set-up that the same structures obtain in government where the VIDCOs; WADCOs; District and Provincial councils inform Central government. This symbiotic relationship between the party and government is in sync with *gutsaruzhinji* communitarian and *hunhu/ubuntu* values.

In order to implement the *gutsaruzhinji* policies fully, ZANU PF had to bind its leadership with a strict Leadership Code, which came to be generally referred to as the Leadership Code 1984. It had a litany of prohibitions or "don'ts" which leaders had to observe to ensure that people are served effectively without putting selfish interest first. It is worth while to cite Section (b) 7 and 8 of the leadership code to appreciate the magnitude of the party's commitment to *gutsaruzhinji*. Section b, states that the party firmly upholds the principle of equality of man. Therefore publicly or privately a leader may not advocate of any of the following (i) Tribalism (ii) regionalism (iii) Sectionalism (iv) Nepotism (v) racism (vi) Sex discrimination". Section 7 goes on to emphasise,

> ZANU regards corruption as an evil disease destructive of society. Therefore it is decreed that a leader shall not (a) accept or obtain from any person a gift or consideration as inducement or reward for doing or failing to do or for having done or (b) give or offer a gift to any person as an inducement to that other person.

Section 8 forbids leaders from acquiring extra properties or engaging in profit-making businesses other than living from his/her salary, while section 9 guards against leaders using their close relatives to do business on their behalf.

The Leadership Code (1984) became another strong regulating authority instituted towards the attainment of the polity of *gutsaruzhinji*. *Hunhu/ubuntu* ethics as spelt out in Chapter Two of this thesis is essentially captured and reinforced as a measure for achieving the goals of *gutsaruzhinji*. Deviations from the leadership code by either party leadership or government leadership would ordinarily lead to the abandonment of *gutsaruzhinji* as shown in Chapter Four. It should also be noted that a good political philosophy (*gutsaruzhinji*) has to ride on good and honest leadership which lives in ways that are compatible with *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics as spelt out in Chapter Two.

3.2   Further ideological support for *gutsaruzhinji*

It should be noted that for any political and national programme to succeed, it needs the backing, endorsement and support of the religious community. In Zimbabwe, Christianity and African traditional religion have the highest number of followers. The *gutsaruzhinji* doctrine and the political appeal to socialism needed to be endorsed from the church which remained sceptical about Marxism as it was considered atheistic. Equally, the African traditional religious community had a strong stake in the *gutsaruzhinji* polity and in restoring its cultural

values. Speaking on the role of religion in embracing *gutsaruzhinji* in Zimbabwe, Reverend Canaaan Banana explained to the church as follows:

> Thus all of us were quite aware that our brand of socialism had to accept African religiosity and see how this could be used to overthrow the immorality of yesterday ...we have all called for positive involvement of the church in socialism and socialist programmes, (Banana, 1997:5).

Two points are clear from above selection of text. First is the observation that *gutsaruzhinji* is not a foreign ideology since it speaks to "African religiosity." Secondly, *gutsaruzhinji* is an ideology which can restore good moral values when used as a tool "to overthrow the immorality of yesterday" (Samkange, 1980). This is possible because of its strong ethical values derived from the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The *gutsaruzhinji* fundamental tenets of freedom, equality, love, unity and peaceful co-existence are part of the main teachings in the Christian faith. Banana captures these values when he argues:

> Socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) says wealth is essentially social and not private and therefore must be socially distributed...we must learn to live for each other. There is wealth in sharing and there is poverty in greed and selfishness. (ibid)

When Banana says "we must learn to live for each other", he appeals not only to the "*nhimbe*" practice in *gutsaruzhinji* but also appeals to the metaphysical aspect of human beings were life is not considered a personal property but a gift to humanity. Humanism is believed to be divinely ordained as the duty of man. In that respect, *gutsaruzhinji* is the fulfillment of the Godly doctrine. Thus we see again the priced maxim in action: "I am because you are".

Wemter, a staunch supporter of the *gutsaruzhinji* polity in Zimbabwe who argued;

> Both the church and socialist (*gutsaruzhinji)* society hold that man will reach fulfillment, not merely by pursuing his personal self–interest, but by serving his fellow man" (Moto, July 1982:34).

Wermter's characterisation of *gutsaruzhinji* is key in confirming *gutsaruzhinji*'s epistemological view, that full knowledge, or "fulfillment" is gained by knowing and serving your community. This is indeed in keeping with *hunhu/ubuntu* epistemology. *Hunhu/ubuntu*, according to Mwikamba (2005:17), has a deep religious ontology which forms an integral continuum, whereby the living world is incorporated and brought under the spirit world. A human being's sense of the finite, vulnerability and mortality leads many Africans to believe

in the power of magic and super human beings. In African thinking, all human beings and nature are animated by the basic principle of a "vital force" (Tempels 2006:21-25). Placide Tempels is credited for authoring Bantu philosophy when he studied the African way of life using the Congolese as an example in 1952.

World view of the West is aptly summarised by Rene Descartes (1637) with the dictum "Cogito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I exist). In Africa the opposite is true and is also aptly portrayed with the words "I exist because I belong to a family". Mbae (2005:19) stressesthis important point by saying, "In African traditional life human beings and nature are believed to be bound together, that is, there is a symbiosis between them."

In Zimbabwe, Taringa (2006) echoes this traditional practice when he argues:

> For the Shona like most people in Africa, land has primarily a value linked to a tribe, its chief and the spirits of their ancestors...The Chief is the senior descendant of the ancestral spirits who founded the chiefdom. His authority is linked to the land and the spirits that own it. Land is therefore a communal property belonging to both, the living and the dead... Human existence remains under the tutelage of the sacred. It is observed, regulated and promoted by the sacred (Taringa, 2006:195-212).

From the above statements, the issue of land as the basis of the *gutsaruzhinji* polity becomes evident. Black indigenous Zimbabweans hold that their land is part of their heritage and does not, therefore, belong present or erstwhile white settlers. Accordingly, all available land has to be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans in fulfillment of the bon d between them, the ancestors and the land. Thus, land ownership in Zimbabwe must of necessity and in accordance long-standing custom, take cognisance of the spiritual dimension regarding land ownership.

Under *gutsaruzhinji* Government has the responsibility to ensure equitable redistribution of the people's ancestral inheritance. The land issue in Zimbabwe became volatile in 2000, after people had lost patience with the government's lack of commitment to land redistribution. In consequence, people unilaterally seized and occupied what they claimed as their own. This issue is discussed in Chapter 5. However, something else that becomes apparent is the fact that *gutsaruzhinji* as a philosophy was largely influenced by *hunhu/ubuntu*'s metaphysical and epistemological belief system. In turn the belief system tended to be regulated by *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics whose laws are mostly governed by belief systems that ascribe punishment for bad behaviours to the 'living-dead'.

3.3   Conclusion

The philosophy of *gutsaruzhinji* and the *gutsaruzhinji* polity in post-independence Zimbabwe in the first decade was highlighted in this chapter with a view to demonstrating that *gutsaruzhinji* is a distinct Zimbabwean African political philosophy and a sub-branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy as well. The strength of *gutsaruzhinji* in guiding and fashioning government policies in key areas such as national reconciliation, education, new health policies, and agriculture and industrial development were all made possible by the fact of *gutsaruzhinji* drawing from *hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics; *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics and *hunhu/ubuntu* epistemology. The Christian and African Traditional religion communities in Zimbabwe were both useful in echoing the notion that *gutsaruzhinji* is a philosophy that presents a golden platform for equitable socio-economic development in independent Zimbabwe. It is however, unfortunate that *gutsaruzhinji* harmstrung by the 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Amendments which did not allow the repossession of land- the country's most priced asset. Another major observation to make is that land was critical to the implementation of *gutsaruzhinji*.Therefore, the straitjacketing of the land question until after the expiry of the first ten years of independence had a limiting impact on *gutsaruzhinji*. Chapter Four explores the question of the difficulties emanating from the choice made by Government in abandoning *gutsaruzhinji* in favour of ESAP which does not embrace *gutsaruzhinji* teachings.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE BETRAYAL OF *GUTSARUZHINJI.*

4.0   Introduction

This Chapter shows how the philosophy of *gutsaruzhinji*, while apt and relevant, was betrayed when the ruling elite later chose to serve narrow, parochial capitalist interests. As argued in Chapter Two and Three of this thesis, the attributes of both capitalism and socialism are also inherent in *gutsaruzhinji*. However, any attempt to reduce *gutsaruzhinji*, exclusively to either of the two can derail the whole process and lead to failure. This has been the trend in Africa where good political ideologies championed by leaders like Nyerere, Nkrumah and others were misconstrued and consequently adjudged to have failed their nations. To the contrary, whatever failure was observed was in large measure due to the negative effects of foreign development paradigms. Accordingly, this chapter attempts to show how the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in Zimbabwe (ESAP) worked against *gutsaruzhinji*. In addition, the author highlights the fact that many African political programmes are derailed when the leaders were tempted to adopt ESAP. Saunders (1996:8) attests to this reality when he remarks:

> In a short time, ESAP's World Bank inspired reforms has ripped into the existing economic and social infrastructure shifting the focus of many mass-oriented development social programs away from redistribution toward management of defined and limited, public resources.

The above statement is an open admission by Saunders that the progress made by *gutsaruzhinji* in the first decade was destroyed by the capitalist's "defined and limited" development agenda.

4.1   Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) versus *gutsaruzhinji*

Saunders (1996:8) argues that Zimbabwe's economic adjustment program (ESAP) contained a collection of World Bank –inspired reforms, trade and currency deregulation, devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, movement towards high real interest rates, the lifting of price controls, the chopping of "social spending" and the removal of consumer subsidies. Government claimed this was the only alternative to continued production bottle necks,

stagnant local demand and a worsening unemployment problem that threatened to become politically troublesome.

ESAP is a straightjacket policy instrument by Bretton Woods financial institutions deployed to direct economic development in a manner that suits their financial interests. Once financial interest takes priority over the people's welfare needs, there can be no doubt that *gutsaruzhinji* is effectively suspended or sacrificed on the altar of Western interests. Commenting on the negative aspects of ESAP for *gutsaruzhinji* policies, Saunders (1996:8) had this to say:

> But in a country where local production was highly integrated and often efficient, and where the state provided a range of quality social services, the reforms represented more peril than promise for most. ESAP, one study concluded, was quickly bringing the Zimbabwean working class to the brink of widespread destitution. In the rural areas, the majority population was often forced to depend on government food aid...making it clear that the ESAP reforms themselves were the leading factor in undermining ordinary people's standard of living. Of particular note was the rapid deterioration in the country's acclaimed health and education sectors.

A number of issues are made clear by the above statement. Firstly, the introduction of a foreign ideology to substitute the traditional indigenous values had disastrous consequences on the livelihood of the Zimbabwe people. Secondly, what *gutsaruzhinji* had achieved for the health and education sectors was now being reversed by the introduction of a Western-sponsored philosophy to development. Thirdly, socio-economic development is not only defined by the country's Gross Domstic Product (GDP) figures but the general welfare of ordinary people especially in accessing their health and educational needs. Policies which cater for the narrow economic interests of the minority group (capitalist investors) are not likely to succeed in Zimbabwe and Africa in general where the majority people struggle to acquire basic survival utilities. This brings us to *hunhu /ubuntu* ethics, the fourth pillar of *gutsaruzhinji*. It may be pertinent to comment that the discussion on *hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics and ethics has made it clear that the oneness of the living human's with the spiritual or living-dead (ancestors) who punish wrong behaviour whenever it occurs and are thought to do so through natural disasters such ass droughts and floods. For example, people were quick to attribute the 1992-93 drought in Zimbabwe to the abandonment of the traditional philosophy of *gutsaruzhinji* in favour of ESAP. While some can argue that the drought was a natural occurrence and that its link with ESAP can only have been coincidental

given that weather patterns can be scientifically explained. That then rendered the thinking that the drought was a direct result of conflict between the country and the living-dead something that belonged to the realm of mere superstition. However, the fact remains that many people began to suffer the socio-economic hardships brought to bear on them by a Western-sponsored economic ideologies. Saunders (1996:8) lamented:

> The cruelest irony of ESAP is perhaps that a policy which aimed to halve the government deficit and finance a higher short-term debt through expanded industrialisation, in reality ended by doubling the national debt, putting additional pressure on the government deficit and stunting an anticipated process of locally–driven re-industrialisation. As early as 1993, the country experienced its first "IMF" riots when the lifting of subsidies and decontrol of market prices sent prices of bread soaring 30%.

Gutsaruzhinji had set the pace for both redistribution of wealth to cascade to the peasants and workers and also allowed a proper reindustrialisation. Nathan Shamuyarira, a former cabinet Minister in the Mugabe government, made a stunning confession:

> When the cabinet accepted the ESAP programme, I predicted it would fail and retard our economy. Today I am glad that it has failed because it was a capitalist project. I was totally against it (Bond et al, 2001:2004).

It is therefore clear, that Shamuyarira was not only against a foreign sponsored economic policy (ESAP), but was also convinced that their traditional Philosophy of *gutsaruzhinji* should not have been abandoned since capitalist economic production models do not work in country with 95% of the population living in abject poverty. *Gutsaruzhinji* strives to ensure that the basic standards of living for ordinary people are uplifted. Morgan Tsvangirai- the then Secretary General of The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) mocked the whole ESAP programme when he sarcastically said, "We accept that it (ESAP) will succeed in making a few people richer and majority of people poor. Any country that is serious about structural reform, but doesn't deal with the historical imbalance of land reform, hasn't done anything" (Love, 2000:33-34).

Tsvangirai's statement above indicates to firstly, that a philosophy which is devoid of the historical and traditional way of a people's livelihood is not only imposed but will not succeed since its DNA is in a foreign motherbody (Western capitalism) in Washington. Secondly, *gutsaruzhinji* is viewed as an ideal philosophy for Zimbabwe since it seeks to see the equitable redistribution of land to the majority. The land was supposed to be the basis of

economic production by ordinary citizens with a multiplier effect of cascading the surplus of agricultural produce for economic development. Agriculture was the backbone of industrial development and the major booster of the manufacturing sector, hence empowering the majority of the people through land reform, would have not only reduced rural poverty but also increased the base of economic growth, something that ESAP could not achieve.

Jonathan Moyo (2001) weighs in by corroborating the above view of land as the basis of economic development and the fact that the *gutsaruzhinji* polity is largely land-driven. He writes:

> ESAP was born dead and it has taken a lot of good to make a bad thing better. Maybe it could have worked if those who wanted it were honest people who had used it to benefit business. But it turned out that it was a weapon against the people... those who sold us ESAP have run away from their responsibilities. We wanted oranges and they left us with lemons. ESAP has been an injection to a slow death and each dose weakens the strength of government. ESAP has proved that it weakens the capacity of government to provide services for its people. The Zimbabwe currency has been devalued 300 times but exports have not increased. There is no economic growth... we should get land reform first and use it as a base for a new recovery. Land has been regarded as a secondary issue but it is a pivotal issue and the core of the problems. Every other issue is consequential, like politics and economics. Our socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) is land driven, (Bond et al, 2002:201-2).

Moyo clarifies a number of pertinent issues. He makes it clear that ESAP was "an injection to a slow death"; probably implying that ESAP was only meant to destroy the gains made by *gutsaruzhinji* in the first decade of post independent Zimbabwe. Secondly, ESAP was a foreign development agenda which was ignorantly adopted as he equates it to wanting oranges and being left with lemons. Put simply, the country wanted money to strengthen the gains of *gutsaruzhinji,* but was instead offered an opposing ideology wrapped in a box full of money. Thirdly, ESAP was only a diversionary strategy to enable the political leaders to divert attention from fulfilling the land redistribution mandate which was now supposed to be carried out without the constraints of the Lancashire House constitutional arrangements since the restrictive clauses of that agreement had by now expired. *Gutsaruzhinji* could have been effected in its true sense in accordance with its guidelines as informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics, *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics and *hunhu/ubuntu* epistemology, where the land of the ancestors could be now be repossesed to the rightful beneficiaries. Once this land restoration was achieved, agricultural production could commence and thereby empower and effect

restorative justice by appealing to both the living-dead and existing landless peasants. This is the background to the maxim, "Our socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) is land-driven."

The fourth and most important point was that there was a deliberate withdrawal from the land redistribution exercise by the political leadership whose commitment to *gutsaruzhinji* seemed to have been taken over by love of personal riches. The leaders used the opportunity to get money as easy loans from the IMF to start enriching themselves against the dictates of their own Leadership Code, and against *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics and *hunhu/ubuntu* epistemology. The long and short of it is that Zimbabwe could not move forward nor survive without implementing *gutsaruzhinji* ideology in its development agenda.

Dashwood (2000) also observes that even the slight amendments in the land Acquisition Act made in 1992, were discriminatory as they did not allow the poor and landless to benefit or get land. Instead, the rich and those with capacity to borrow money were considered. This was again against *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy which believes in empowering the weak to grow the economy. Dashwood contend;

> In the area of land redistribution serious doubts can be cast as to what extent the controversial land Acquisition Act, as revised in 1992, will benefit the peasantry. It is not self –evident that the beneficiaries of land reform will be among the poorest in the communal areas. The criteria for selection of families are no longer based on social need, but on whether potential beneficiaries can demonstrate proven farming experience and competency. This is in sharp contrast to the objectives as outlined in 1984 which include that the plight of people at the lower end of the scale; with no land and no employment be provided with opportunities. Within the communal areas themselves, there remained thousands of families who were landless, and many more whose land was not large enough, or ecologically suitable, to produce enough to survive. (Dashwood, 2000:181)

This was a serious mistake by Government and a clear deviation from *gutsaruzhinji* policies which were meant to address and uplift the economic status of the majority of the people through agrarian land reforms. Government's concentration on the manufacturing industry which was largely owned by minority colonial white settlers and a few members of the emerging black elite through its ESAP project was counterproductive. This brings us to a very important emerging reality that national development should not only be measured by the GDP growth rate as directed by ESAP, but by the removal of poverty from the majority of citizens. This is the main thrust of *gutsaruzhinji*. Any attempt to use Western measures of economic performance guided by the Bretton Woods scale are futile.

Masipula Sithole (1998:14-15) corroborates the above argument when he observes that the suffering of the ordinary people brought about by ESAP and deviation from the *gutsaruzhinji* polity when he asserts:

> My contention is that if it was shared poverty, it would not generate so much tension. But poverty in Zimbabwe is characterised by two tendencies, we are witnessing the politics of poverty amid plenty, apparently plenty for the political class. Most people in this country are having it rough; they are hurting; they feel cheated over the independence dividend. The hope is that we correct something that has gone fundamentally wrong with the revolution and our society before we are overtaken by events.

The "independence dividend", was largely land and this led to the "Third Chimurenga" in 2000 (Sauls, 2005) which would have been avoided had leadership had gone on to institute a proper full scale land reform after 1990, instead of adopting ESAP. The painful truth is that *gutsaruzhinji* did not fail but that the leadership was enticed into buying what appeared to be "oranges" while they were given "lemons" according to Moyo (2002). Arguably the reason for seeking "oranges" was to gain more energy to achieve quick economic gains. This is contradictory to *gutsaruzhinji* where an economic boost should be commensurate with social upliftment. Where poverty thrives "amid plenty" as alluded to by Sithole, *gutsaruzhinji* should be brought in to correct that anomaly as was attempted after 2000. This contention is argued in detail in Chapter Five. It should, however, be noted that ESAP was a long worked out theory for control of post–independence African countries. In other words ESAP was a neo-colonial construct. Mbembe (2000:83) attests to this fact;

> One of the major political events of the end of this century is the crumbling of African states independence and sovereignty, and their (surreptitious) subjection to the supervision of international lenders. The government by proxy exercised by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and lenders (whether public or private) is no longer limited to requiring respect for great principles and macro-economic balances. In practice, supervision by international lenders has been considerably strengthened and is hence forth manifested by a range of direct interventions in internal economic management, including credit control, the execution of privatisations, the definitions of consumer needs, import policies, agricultural programs, and the reduction of costs and direct control of the treasury.

Nothing can be closer to the truth than the above analysis by Mbembe. Whereas Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, and tried to use its independence to craft its independent policies of *gutsaruzhinji* as earlier on presented in Chapter Three of this thesis, the same independence was eroded and almost taken away by the adoption of ESAP, the tragic

casualty was a suspension of *gutsaruzhinji* with disastrous consequences. *Gutsaruzhinji,* as argued in Chapter Two had its guardians in the traditional African set-up where chiefs and kings presided over the land on behalf of the living-dead or ancestors to allow equitable distribution of wealth (*hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics and ethics). Now the supposed kings or chiefs (the government was now run by foreigners –IMF and World Bank) who were not responsive to *hunhu/ubuntu* in which *gutsaruzhinji* is subsumed. In as much as political leaders became prisoners to foreign lenders, *gutsaruzhinji* became a corporate prisoner; which only fought to be free after the year 2000 when the ihird Chimurenga commenced.Oberdabernig (2005), however, argues that structural adjustment programs can be completed successfully in many different ways. Oberdabernig implies that different consequences of poverty and income distribution are possible under such blueprints as ESAP. Some schools of thought maintain that political power plays an important role in determining the way of achieving a program (Vreeland 2002; Garuda, 2002 and Pastor, 1987). It is, therefore, most likely that IMF programmes are implemented in ways that hurt politically powerful groups least.

4.2   A Critique of ESAP in Zimbabwe

The author is duty-bound to insist that politicians were duty-bound to embrace ESAP as a socio-economic development model. The unbalanced nature of relations between a small country like Zimbabwe and international bodies such as the IMF and World Bank is very difficult to ignore. The global politics of the time embraced ESAP as a recipe for economic revitalisation for developing third world countries. ESAP was based on a Policy Framework Paper (PFP) jointly prepared by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the government of Zimbabwe (GOZ). It was favourably received at the Paris Consultative Group meeting in 1991. The programme which was to be implemented over a five-year period (1991-95) consisted of a set of macroeconomic policy measures ostensibly to attain the goal of economic growth, stability and improved standards of living (Ojo and Ajayi, 1997:12).

ESAP sought to transform Zimbabwe's tightly-controlled economic system into a more open, market-driven economy. Firstly, the restructuring sought to promote higher growth and to reduce poverty and unemployment by reducing fiscal and parastatal deficits and instituting prudent monetary policy. Secondly, it sought to liberalize trade policies and the foreign

exchange systems. Thirdly, it aimed at carrying out domestic deregulation and fourthly, it aimed at establishing a social safety net and training programmes for vulnerable groups. The focus was on the formal sector as the engine of growth (ZSAP, 1995:6).

Saunders (1996) states:

> When ESAP was first introduced, the government claimed it was the only alternative to continued production bottlenecks, stagnant local demand and a worsening unemployment problem that threatened to become politically troublesome. Zimbabwean industry was an easy convert, but the country's political leadership was less easily swayed. In the 1980s, Zimbabwe had been a star performer in Africa in the provision of social services and in the reconstruction and development of its public infrastructure. Average life expectancy was on the rise; childhood mortality was down; and other measuring sticks such as the literacy rate and technical skills capacity were encouraging. Moreover, most of this social growth was financed by government without jeopardizing relative macroeconomic stability. (Saunders, 1996:8)

It is clear from what Saunders says that government intentions were noble. The fact that the first decade had tried to address the more pressing issues of social inequality in education and health meant the second decade was now supposed to address macro and micro-economic factors to grow a viable economy to absorb the growing numbers of unemployed educated graduates. A viable economy with many players was envisaged. The IMF and World Bank's ubiquitous one-size-fits-all policy on financial lending can be seen to be inappropriate for a social and economic system like Zimbabwe, whose economy was for a century serving only the minority white community. It is very difficult for one needing financial aid to resist the stringent conditionality put by lenders when it seems that there are no other options available to extricate oneself from the balance of payments and dried-up foreign reserves and a great need of foreign currency. The financiers manipulate the borrowing government and took charge of economic policy issues against the reality of domestic social challenges. The structural economic adjustment programme contained the usual collection of Bank-inspired reforms, trade and currency deregulation, devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar, movement towards high real interest rates, the lifting of price controls, the chopping of "social spending" and removal of consumer subsidies. All were standard ingredients of "liberalization" as were the Banks and IMF's increasing emphasis on a reduction of the government deficit, civil service reforms and the shedding of public enterprises (ibid).

Saunders (1996) indicate that the fact that Government and its bankers (the World Bank and IMF) said the new investment would be focused on modernizing the manufacturing sector which would enable the country to compete in international markets and earn the hard currency needed to pay back ESAP's underpinning foreign loans. An optimistic target of 5% annual growth in GDP was set by the Bank and government, but alas, "ESAP fell far short of its main macroeconomic targets. In reality, growth slowed down and became more erratic, averaging only 1,2% (not the 5% envisaged) over the years 1991-94, a disappointing performance only partly due to the droughts of 1992 and 1993. In fact, a range of indicators reflect the entrenchment of deeper and more systemic problems in the "reformed" economy including high inflation (which has stubbornly remained above 20%, averaging 28.8% in 1991-94, instead of falling to the projected 10%) and continued substantial government deficit" (ibid)

The popular public perception according to Saunders (1996) was that Government's main economic policy was being driven by 'foreign experts" (implying the IMF and World Bank) essentially meaning the two financial bodies had become the elephant in the room through whose actions central government was a casualty in as much as it was perceived to be a partner. This is corroborated by Jonathan Moyo (2012) when he claims that "Maybe it (ESAP) could have worked if those who wanted it were honest people who had used it to benefit business. But it turned out that it was a weapon against the people … those who sold us ESAP have run away from their responsibilities. We wanted oranges and they left us with lemons" (Bond et al, 2002:201-3).

One thing is made clear, and that thing is that the government's intentions in adopting ESAP were noble given that the government sought to build a competitive economy and export-led industrialization (Saunders, 1996:8). It is unfair criticism to accuse a person who is robbed of his millions of dollars by a defrauder who pretends to offer genuine service, yet his real intention is to steal money and run away. On this score, the author is made to symphathise with the noble objectives of government. Beggars, the world over are vulnerable to those who give them help. Their choices of better options are limited. The IMF and World Bank are organisations that are powerful and inflexible to direct financial resources to the empowerment of ordinary citizens whose livelihood had to be uplifted first in order to reap long-term future economic gains. The quick fix economic prescription was not in keeping

with a nation which had suffered a century of marginalization. The author therefore, agrees, with Saunders (1996:19) that,

> ESAP's World Bank – inspired reforms have ripped into the existing economic and social infrastructure, shifting the focus of many mass-oriented development social programs away from redistribution towards management of defined and limited, even declining public resources.

The shift from the state's emphasis in social programmes away from a concern with issues of equity and access towards a system of management driven primarily by the problem of how to administer the supply of services given defined and limited resources, caused the drift from the *gutsaruzhinji* polity. The Zimbabwe Country Assistance Evaluation Report No. 29058 (2004) (ZCAE) lays the blame equally on the IMF and World Bank where it states that the bank's inability to finance land acquisition was a constraint to effective dialogue and experimentation on approaches. The bank could have undertaken analytical and advisory activities (AAA) on alternative approaches, disseminated findings from elsewhere that only in exceptional cases are large farms more efficient than small farms and also argued for the relaxation of rules on the subdivision of land.

Definitely, the World Bank and IMF had participated in many developing countries and seen that the macro-economic policies of management, never boosted hosting countries' economies but that in fact, put nations into debt and servitude. The Bank (IMF and World Bank) was unable to launch a lending program for agriculture, and gave insufficient attention to social safety nets. This is construed to be deliberate and mischievous as the bank did not want to offend their allies (minority colonial white farmers still holding onto large farms) since they wanted the colonial status quo to remain dominant in the new Zimbabwe. A clear sign, that *gutsaruzhinji* as a polity initiated in the post-independence era was a victim of the conspiracy by the acception of Washington Consensus who were the major beneficiaries of colonial capitalism.

Ingram (2004) attests to these facts when he contends, "The Zimbabwean experience provides four lessons. First, given the necessity of macro-economic stability, especially achieving fiscal sustainability, the Bank should have undertaken a PER (Public Expenditure Review) prior to 1995, and should have been more forceful in ensuring that credible steps to achieve fiscal sustainability were incorporated in adjustment lending, and should have formed a judgement not only about the macroeconomic fiscal targets, but also about the likelihood of

their implementation. Second, the Bank should have given greater attention to reducing the glaring inequalities and poverty by undertaking in-depth analytical work on poverty and more proactively addressing land reform before 1998. Third, the bank should not have relied on commitments with technocrats in the absence of political consensus for reforms. Fourth, in the absence of ownership by the political leadership, the bank should have insisted that the agreed conditions be fulfilled first and not proceeded to lend on the basis of promises. The bank's willingness to lend sent the wrong message to clients and partners (Ingram, 2004:8).

ESAP has to take the blame rather than the rightful owners of the project who are the World Bank and IMF. A capitalist agenda in a *gutsaruzhinji* economy and polity was not only retrogressive but was also deliberate sabotage to Zimbabwe's new socio-economic development under the good guidance of a *hunhu/ubuntu* driven philosophy. It was deliberate that the IMF and World Bank did not want to fund broad-based social-economic development which was land-based because they wanted to protect white minority hegemony in Zimbabwe. This white minority was the right-hand man of Western capitalism. Zimbabwe being a small nation which had suffered economic sanctions soon after Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 (Zvobgo, 1996) up to 1980, needed a heavy capital injection and hence could do very little without the assistance of these big international financing organisations. Rukuni (1992) contends that structural adjustment programmes in Africa have failed largely because they are imposed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) without taking cognizance of the social and economic realities in the affected countries' economies. The experts say the International Financial Institutions have tended to heap the entire blame for poor economic performance in African economies on internal causes in these countries, yet the terms of trade which have worked against these economies have been least considered. Rukuni (1992) further argues that the presentation of the weaknesses discovered in African economies was poorly handled by the IFIs, as the IFIs often seemed to be saying "these people do not know anything and distort the market". ESAPs have also failed because of the IFIs attack on social services such as free health and free education which African leaders see as a stepping stone to empowering the majority of the people. No African government can afford to ignore the long entrenched socio-economic inequalities created by colonialism in African states and enunciated through education and health and expect to be serving its people much longer. This is why the *gutsaruzhinji* polity in Africa and Zimbabwe in particular was a necessity.

The experts, according to Rukuni (1992), heap blame for the failure of ESAPs on IFIs because these tend to give orders to borrowing nations to observe political pluralism to get their financial aid. While the idea of political pluralism is not bad since at times development takes place if there is true democracy and intelligent hard work in a competitive environment, the presentation of the issue was unacceptable as it sounded like "getting orders from abroad", a sort of neo-colonialism, which was now being introduced. China has developed its economy well, based on a one-party political system. This is where Osabu-Kle's argument on the Western imposition of democracy in Africa needs to be challenged. He describes African democracy as jaku-democracy which is different from Western democracy. While the IFIs demand democracy, they never advise the creation of sound tripartite institutions to guarantee industrial democracy. On the contrary, their recommendations have insinuate that labour protection and minimum wage legislation work against labour market flexibility (Rukuni, 1992).

Rukuni (1992) further argues that the IFIs have adopted the aval of profit maximization at all times without considering things like employment creation, balanced economic growth and the improvement of the living standards of the workers. Instead their policies have led to reduced employment levels and high inflation rates. Thus, African development has to be anchored on the *gutsaruzhinji* polity to allow the majority of the people to gain literacy and numeracy so that there is wider participation in economic development. The one-size-fits-all approach advocated by IFI prescriptions was probably the cause of ESAP failure in Zimbabwe and Africa.

Zvobgo (2003) argues that "Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Government agreed to strengthen the economy along free market lines. It was this decision which brought about the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. International finance organisations, supported by Western countries, which fund them, notably Britain and the United States of America, wanted a complete reform of the Government of Zimbabwe's economic policies. Although the government claimed that the Structural Adjustment of the economy was a home-brewed programme, the form it took, portrayed the hallmarks of IMF and World Bank prescriptions. These prescriptions had disastrously failed elsewhere in the developing world notably in Jamaica, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia" (Zvobgo, 2003:84-85).

This study argues that grafting a mango tree to a lemon tree neither produces mangoes nor lemons. The new tree will just waste the irrigation water and finally dies. This is the case where IFIs imposed the foreign economic policies of capitalism although *gutsaruzhinji* has proved to be the ideal policy and philosophy to steer African states out of captivity by the minority colonisers. It is pertinent to look at some of the conditions imposed on the Zimbabwean government in order to access the IFIs funds, as presented by Zvobgo (2003:85). In presenting these conditions, the author also interrogates each one of them to highlight the negative impacts they carry to a new state previously subjected to a separatist development policies for close to a century.

The conditions ran as follows:

1. Economic liberalization in order to allow increased participation of the private sector and other players:

   This condition favoured the white minority businesses and other elites since the black majority had not established themselves as very competitive on the market. These needed protection from big business monopolies and foreign multinationals who would use their economic superiority to suppress the emergence of new and upcoming businesses. These definitely needed protection by the state. Government only realized had reality in 2007 when it crafted the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act.

2. Reduction of government's role in economic management:

   The above statement sounds good in principle when you look at it from the viewpoint of developed capitalist economies where fair and equal treatment and non-interference is the norm. In Zimbabwe, this was not to be, because it was like beginning to run a ten- kilometre race when others have already covered eight kilometers before the whistle is blown to start the race. Such a race is obviously won by those at the 8km peg because of their undue advantage. In the case of Zimbabwe, the government should have taken time to protect black business entrepreneurs to grow and liberalise and reduce interfering possibly after twenty or thirty years of control. The result was the same as in number 1, where the increase of black entrepreneurs was suffocated by the established multinationals and prevailing capitalist set-up. This arrangement merely benefitted Western business at the expense of black business.

3. Market forces to be the determinants on prices.

Big companies capitalized on their strength to benefit from economies of scale in mass production and the small business whose operational expenses were high could not compete and therefore closed shop. Where the competition was less, monopoly business increased prices and ripped off the people, which lead to price hikes and general civil unrest and street protests in 1996.

4. Deregulation of the labour market to enable employers to hire and fire workers with limited restraint from government:
This increased the unemployment rate and weakened worker's bargaining power. The workers were laid off in nembers, thereby adding to the poverty levels and social insecurity. This had no consideration to the black worker who formed the bulk of the work force.

5. Introduction of cost-recovery measures in education and the health sector:
This caused major school dropouts and reduced the number of children who could access education through payment of fees since the bulk of the black population were poor and could not afford to pay their children's school fees or pay for their treatment in hospitals and clinics thereby increasing mortality rate. The black community had been marginalized for a long time and needed support to build a strong socio-economic base. "As a result of rising education costs and increased poverty, enrolment at secondary school level fell by 10% between 1991 and 1993" (Zvobgo, 2003:93). This is evidence of how IFIs prescribed the wrong medicine for a dying patient. They were only profit-oriented and deliberately ignored the reality of majority poverty.

6. Making the private sector the engines for economic growth:
Again, on the a face of it, this appears good, but it fails to address the Zimbabwean reality that the private sector was run by the white minority, hence this clause or demand, entrenched neo-colonial hegemony with the whites left to freely exercise their economic power over the majority blacks. The government and politicians had no choice since they had no money to establish viable businesses. The loans advanced only focused on those areas where white monopolies had a superior advantage and competition was stiff.

7. Reduction of government control on parastatals to allow for their privatization and commercialization:

Rukuni (1996) argues that the popular thinking in Africa is that it is only unprofitable parastatals that should be privatized so that the private sector can prove its financial muscles and entrepreneurial capabilities. The IFIs, however, say unprofitable parastatals should be closed, the workers retrenched and profitable parastatals be privatized. The workers retrenched not only add to the number of unemployed but also add to the number of people suffering under poverty and failure to provide for the education of their children as well as failure to raise money to access good medical health since user-fees were restored in these two sectors.

8. Reduction of the civil service in order to reduce government expenditure:

The need for alternative employment for the retrenched civil servants was not carefully considered as this piled pressure on the labour market where unemployment graph continued to rise unabated. Some essential services in critical areas like education, health and social work, were left with skeletal staff only, reducing efficiency and good service provision for the struggling masses. Yet this was justified under the GDP growth rate as a good policy initiative.

9. Reduction of inflation through tight monetary policies:

The ultimate reality was that inflation increased owing to skewed production models which allowed monopolising companies to increase prices at will since price controls were removed. Interest rates were hiked and inflation became the order of the day and ultimately triggering street protests in 1996.

10. Reduced spending and domestic and international borrowing:

This condition saw Government failing to provide essential services for marginalized people as infrastructure development like road maintenance, dam construction and more clinics and hospitals for the general populace which had to travel more than twenty kilometres to access schools, clinics and clean water was halted.

The conditions set out by the IFIs were self-serving and had no regard to the suffering masses of Zimbabwe. It is, therefore, these conditions that the IFIs use in Africa to maintain their stronghold on post-independence states while continuing their neo-colonial tendencies. There was very little the politician and government could do since they only held political power while economic power remained with the Western-sponsored colonial masters. Zvobgo (2003:87) laments that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's conditions ignored the fundamental realities faced by Zimbabwe's peasantry and working class people.

Both groups face serious financial difficulties resulting from erratic rains, severe droughts and low crop production. In urban areas, increasing joblessness and the growing closure of foreign as well as domestic companies reduced earnings available to the worker, essentially meaning the ability of the people to participate in cost sharing was severely eroded.

There is a great need for African governments to develop and implement local solutions for local problems to get rid of the neo-colonial tendencies and dishonesty shown in the hypocrisy of IMF and World Bank lending policies. The author agrees with Zvobgo's assertions entirely where he contends that "ESAP should never have been implemented in its original form given the fact that its theoretical framework assumptions and prescriptions were foreign and had already failed dismally elsewhere. ESAP was the one drug that nearly killed the patient. The country needs now, more than ever before, to generate massive domestic investment. This can be achieved without compromising national sovereignty and independence. Countries like Malaysia have been able to do so" (Zvobgo, 2003:99).

The Land Reform in 2000 and the subsequent Indigenous Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:30] were forcefully put in place as a corrective measure to the blunders made by adopting ESAP prescriptions to entrench Western capitalism at the expense of *gutsaruzhinji*. As observed by Zvobgo (2003), there was a need for urgent measures to restore the viability of the social services, in particular education and health, the agro-industries and the informal sectors of the economy. These are the bedrock of society's survival. There is a limit to how far white resistance to economic reform can continue to be held responsible for the country's economic fortunes. Failure to restore public confidence in public systems and services can seriously endanger political stability. In future, a serious surgical analysis of externally-brewed solutions to Zimbabwe's problems need to be undertaken before the solutions are adopted or tried, to avoid the ESAP experience.

The other exogenous factor which contributed to the failure of ESAP was drought. Zimbabwe was hit by two droughts. The first one in 1982 was characterized as the worst of the century, while the subsequent one in 1992/93 was more localized. The impact of the droughts was compounded by unfavourable global commodity price trends. The prices of flue-cured tobacco, sugar and beef fell in real terms between 1991 and 1996 (Ingram et al, 2004:30). It is, however, pertinent to consider how in traditional Zimbabwe from the Mapungubwe Dynasty 900 to 1100AD and during the era of Great Zimbabwe in 1200 to 1500AD drought

was believed to be punishment meted upon the rulers when they were drawn to stray from the practice of *hunhu/ubuntu* leadership which was largely influenced by failure by the leadership to cooperate with the living-dead (ancestors), preferring instead to please foreign traders. Once aspects of tradition and culture were transgressed drought was a sure punishment until an appeasing cultural rite was performed.

By stating this fact, the author is not being superstitious but is only being cognizant of the coincidence of events and issues. ESAP being a stray from the *gutsaruzhinji* polity could also have attracted the drought punishment. While this can be counter-argued by asserting that while the effects of the droughts were prevalent in Southern Africa, neo-colonial tendencies were also prevalent in the same region. Climate change is now turning to into a reality the world over. However, the main culprits in all this are the developed countries whose emission of greenhouse gases and high industrial pollution are profuse. The net effect of all this was that the *gutsaruzhinji* polity introduced soon after independence in Zimbabwe was being resisted by the white minority who believed in capitalist production models against the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology. Mbembe observes that "One of the major political events of the end of this century is the crumbling of African states independence and sovereignty and their (superstitious) subjection to the supervision of international lenders. The government by proxy exercised by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund is no longer limited to requiring respect for principles and macro-economic balances" (Mbembe, 2000:83).

Any African state desirous of real growth and serving its people, needs to ignore these financial bodies, and as advised by Zvobgo (2003) and to follow the Asian Tigers and the Malaysian experience. Zimbabwe is already taking this route, considering the Land Reform Programme and the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 46:30] which shall be discussed in Chapter Five.

4.3   *Gutsaruzhinji* **and the Fate of Socialism**

In 4.1, the author highlighted the reasons why and how capitalist-sponsored ideas could not survive in an environment where *gutsaruzhinji* had spread its roots. It is important to critically assess whether or not Western socialism had any effects on *gutsaruzhinji* which could have caused the suspension of *gutsaruzhinji* policies.

The author does not labour much in showing the difference between Western Socialism and *gutsaruzhinji* as this has been extensively dealt with in Chapter Two and Three of this thesis. Two fundamental points, however, need reemphasis. Firstly, that Marxist –Leninist Socialism wanted to promote the dictatorship of the proletariat where the means of production are nationalized by the state, thus abolishing private ownership of property (Muslow, 1986:66; Grand et al, 1989:145; Hann, 1993:xiv). Secondly, Marxist socialism wanted to ensure the abolition of social classes by creating an egalitarian society (ibid). Looking at *gutsaruzhinji* in Zimbabwe, the first point is discounted because Zimbabwe never believed nor practised the nationalisation of private property for the period 1990 to 2000. Neither did it have a dictatorship of the workers nor the proletariat since it was largely a peasant-dominated community. We are reminded of Nyagumbo's remarks that "It is the government view that nationalization is not the right thing to do. Instead, the government believes to side with the private sector, get expertise in industrialization then put its own industries which will compete with the private sector" (Moto, November 1983:5).

Living up to its word as clearly-stated above, government never nationalised any private property from 1980 to the year 2000; therefore, this did not affect *gutsaruzhinji* from a socialist point of view. Accompanying this factor is the largely peasant community set-up where the few workers in the civil service and private companies found themselves being retrenched instead of creating the dictatorship of the proletariat as in Marxist–Leninist socialist discourse. Consequently, unemployment became a major feature in the collapse of Zimbabwe's economy and the suspension of the *gutsaruzhinji*. The egalitarian society became an illusion as social classes began to emerge after the introduction of ESAP: the classes of the bourgeoisie and the political elite; and the suffering of the peasants and workers became more pronounced. It is however, reasonable to say that social classes militate against the good practice of both *gutsaruzhinji* and socialism. This is the reason why in the Zimbabwean situation, the leaders had to be bound by the strict Leadership Code (1984). However, deviation from both *gutsaruzhinji* and the leadership code, by the political elite was against the principles of *gutsaruzhinji* and those of socialism. Thus, corruption and eliticism began to surface. One of the most important attributes of socialist governments according to Owusu (2003) was that governments played a dominant role in all aspects of economic development. However, it was clear that from 1990 to 2000, the private sector and World Bank were in charge of the economic development or lack of it through ESAP. It is,

therefore, evident that neither socialist doctrine nor the philosophy of *gutsaruzhinji* had any associated contribution to the deviation into ESAP programme. The view of the Bretton Woods institutions according to which the economic growth of a country has a direct influence on poverty as the gains achieved via growth would trickle down and benefit the poor leading to a reduction in poverty was far-fetched. However, Cohen, Gunter and Lofgren (2005) agree that neither macro-economic stability nor economic growth is enough for alleviating poverty. Stiglitz (2002) argues that trickle-down strategies are not the best methods for fighting poverty, rather it is important, nevertheless, to take distributional effects into account, hence the socio –economic and political factors as advocated in *gutsaruzhinji* have to be considered.

Heidhues and Obare (2011:54) agree that ESAP paid insufficient attention to the social dimension of development and to the institutional weaknesses of developing countries. Most scholars believe agriculture provides a wider base for poverty reduction and providing sound economic development. This was stressed by Daniel Acemoglu (2001) who noted the danger in African countries of ascribing to agriculture a secondary role of supplying raw materials and providing tax revenues to finance development in other sectors. On this score, *gutsaruzhinji* cannot have been affected by socialism since most people could not get the means of production in the form of land. On the issue of land, it should be noted that when Zimbabweans forcibly acquired land after 2000, this did not immediately give the expected results since the process was not planned but haphazardly done. Had exceleratedland redistribution covering the majority of landless citizens started immediately after 1990, even alongside the other structural reforms, the economy and people's livelihood would have been improved significantly. This is where *gutsaruzhinji* and some capitalist practices could have paid dividends. *Gutsaruzhinji* is replaceable by either socialism or capitalism although the two can work together in areas where it can effectively address the socio-economic needs of the people.

4.4   The Impact of Foreign Aid on *Gutsaruzhinji*

The author finds it compelling to interrogate the two philosophies and see how they could co-exist or not in the Zimbabwean polity. Capitalism and *gutsaruzhinji* can best be viewed between 1980 and 2000 in Zimbabwe. As argued in Chapter Two, some capitalist production models can be fused with *gutsaruzhinji* to boost production capacity in the nation. However,

a rider to this is that this eclectic combination can only succeed if ordinary people's needs are established first before interventions from the capitalist angle is brought in in the form of capacitation measures. As the process unfolds care should bew taken to ensure there is no diversion from original objectives.

Mhone (2000:45-50) and Nillela and Robinson (1993) state that the severe drought in 1991-1992 forced Government to borrow money from the IMF and World Bank to boost the importation of food to feed the majority of starving peasants. Any money borrowed from these organizations is tied to their development agenda, which might not necessarily be in keeping with *gutsaruzhinji*.

Stiglitz (2011) argues that IMF and World Bank policies are controlled by Ministers and bank governors who have created policies that favour the financial community. Furthermore, the World Bank's support for the "Washington Consensus" – a set of policies that promote stabilization, liberalization and privatization of the economy, is damaging because of its emphasis on deregulation. Instead policies should help countries develop "the right regulatory structure".

The recipient country automatically loses its autonomy as economic control is shifted from it to Washington. This arrangement is in contradiction to *gutsaruzhinji* which gives legitimacy to local governance as an equivalent of the traditional chief or king in the context of *hunhu/ubuntu*. Essentially, the World Bank and IMF delegitimized the African state. In the case of Zimbabwe, World Bank and IMF intervention rendered *gutsaruzhinji* unenforceable. This is echoed by the FAQ (2005) Report that said, "IMF conditionalities may additionally result in the loss of a state's authority to govern its own economy as national economic policies are predetermined under IMF packages". (2005:1).The second area of conflict is that the IMF and World Bank as stated by Stiglitz (2011) serve the financial interests of bankers in Wall Street. This is yet another philosophical contradiction with *gutsaruzhinji* whose philosophy is to serve humanity not individuals. The *hunhu/ubuntu* values human beings above financial considerations. Being as rigid as they are, the IMF and World Bank are not compatible with *gutsaruzhinji,* and hence their involvement in financial assistance to mitigate the effects of drought led to the suspension of key aspects of the *gutsaruzhinji* polity such as the *Zunde raMambo* contingency instrument.

Weisbrot (2006), an economist and co-director of the centre for Economic Research at the World Bank, argues that the Bank's emphasis on austerity and privatization has increased poverty in developing countries. This is evident in Zimbabwe where after borrowing money to augment the drought relief programmes of 1991-92, Government failed to institute land redistribution on the premise that Land was the private property of the white minority colonial settlers and also began to implement the austerity measures involving the laying off of public servants and private sector and also lowered wages in the private sector. These actions aggravated the poverty margins and continued suffering of the people in contradiction to *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy. One element which makes the IMF non-compatible with *gutsaruzhinji* is their flawed development model. A report by Global Exchange (1994) contends that IMF forces countries from the Global South to prioritise export production over the development of diversified domestic economies. It further states that nearly 80 percent of all malnourished children in the developing world live in countries where farmers have been forced to shift from food production for local consumption to the production of export crops destined for wealthy countries. Conversely, *gutsaruzhinji* encourages each family to grow or produce enough food for the family's self-sustenance as illustrated by the *nhimbe* practices in traditional Africa. The World Bank and IMF also require countries to eliminate assistance to domestic industries (subsidies) while providing benefits for multinational corporations – For example, forcibly lowering labour costs. The cycle of poverty under IMF and World Bank interventions is perpetuated, not eliminated, as governments' debt to the IMF grows. It can be safely said that the IMF and World Bank have a re-colonisation strategy and that they entrench inequalities which *gutsaruzhinji* fights to eliminate.

The most important contradiction between the IMF and *gutsaruzhinji* became apparent in that the former from 1990 to 2000 reversed the gains made in 1980-1990 by the latter. The cost of both access to education and health went up with the IMF – imposed "user fees" in these public services. Most children, especially the girls, were withdrawn from schools and the mortality rate increased again (Global Exchange, 1994:2). The truth is that the IMF and World Bank do not serve the people but instead defer to the financial requirements of Wall Street funders. Little can be done since Government was supposed to be implementing *gutsaruzhinji*, but suddenly found that its hands were now tied by the conditions of IMF and World Bank.

Pettinger (2013) argues that the IMF loan facility conditions are unfriendly to user countries. This user unfriendly IMF protocol is manifest in the reduction of government borrowings, higher taxes and lower spending, higher interest rates to stabilize currency, the allowing of failing firms to go bankrupt, structural adjustment, privatization, deregulation and bureaucracy.

4.5   The Impact of Corruption and Elitism on *Gutsaruzhinji*

Mangena and Chitando (2011) argue that *hunhu/ubuntu* is a transformative African philosophy which should be used in the Zimbabwean governance systems in order to promote servant leadership. They argue that only servant leadership can lead to the achievement of national goals including the country's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This study agrees with them, especially when they state,

> *Hunhu/ubuntu* as the ethical benchmark of African societies provides a guide to African man and woman in whatever setting they are. *Hunhu* or *ubuntu* is the bone and marrow of sub-Saharan Africa, especially Southern Africa. *Hunhu* or *ubuntu* plays a major role in reminding leaders that they are there primarily to serve their fellow human beings and not to enrich themselves. Leaders who embrace *hunhu/ubuntu* know that they may not flaunt wealth when the majority of the citizens are struggling to have only a meal a day. At any rate, *hunhu* or *ubuntu* itself implies that the leader cannot exist on his/her own, but only among fellow citizens. *Hunhu/ubuntu* serves to remind Zimbabwe's political leaders and technocrats that policies are only meaningful when they enhance the well-being of the majority. *Hunhu/ubuntu* therefore acts as a political ideology that guides leaders to serve their citizens rather than to enjoy being hero-worshipped, (Mangena et al, 2011:241).

The author argues in Chapter Two that *gutsaruzhinji* is only a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* metaphysics, *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics and *hunhu/ubuntu* epistemology. Further, this writer contends that it is clear that Mangena and Chitando are saying that the *gutsaruzhinji* polity succeeds when it is backed by a leadership that embraces *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics. Zimbabwe has also been exposed to the fallout from the failure by ZANU-PF to adhere to the provisions of the party's 1984 Leadership Code which had a list of prohibitions in keeping with *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics. Section b of the Leadership Code states that:

> The party firmly upholds the principle of the equality of man. Therefore publicly or privately a leader may not advocate any of the following; (i) Tribalism (ii) regionalism (iii) sectionalism (iv) nepotism (v) racism (vi) sex discrimination. Section 7 states that Zanu regards corruption as an evil disease

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destructive of society. Therefore, it is decreed that a leader shall not (a) accept or obtain from any person a gift or consideration as inducement or reward for doing or failing to do or having done or (b) give or offer a gift to any person as an inducement to that other person (Leadership Code, 1984)

Section 8 forbids leaders from acquiring extra properties or engaging in profit-making business other than living on their legitimate salaries or wages, while Section 9 guards against leaders using their close relatives to do business on their behalf. The leadership code later became a living testimony that ZANU- PF was committed to the establishment and fulfillment of *gutsaruzhinji* policy in Zimbabwe. However, when the leadership deviated from the leadership code and started amassing personal wealth the abandonment of *gutsaruzhinji* policies became evident. It necessarily follows that any deviation from both the Leadership Code and the *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics, results in a compromised execution of the *gutsaruzhinji* polity.

Events between 1990 and 2000 indicate that the Zimbabwean leadership did not only stray in adopting ESAP policies, but that they also got carried away with materialist policies to levels where they abandoned the leadership code. Dashwood argues that despite the deterrence by the Leadership Code, many leaders were later found disregarding the code for personal wealth. He accurately observed that:

> Although the 1984 Code explicitly stated that in no circumstances shall relatives be used as fronts for business ventures, many leaders owned businesses under names of friends or relatives. One minister who has not made an effort to hide his wealth is Edson Zvobgo who owns a commercial farm and runs a business in Masvingo … Tapfumanei Solomon Mujuru (former Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army) who stepped down in 1992, built up a business empire worth millions of dollars in the name of his brother Misheck Mujuru (Dashwood, 2000: 98).

If the leadership Code in keeping with *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics was meant to focus on servant leadership aimed at *gutsaruzhinji* or working to meet the needs of the majority, the efforts at self-enrichment in defiance of the leadership code signalled a new era of corruption and elitism which was not only counter-productive, but negated the values of *gutsaruzhinji* and the true spirit of servant leadership. In these circumstances the needs of the people had no advocates, hence the adoption of such anti-people policies as ESAP discussed in 4.1.

In October 1994, the president of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), Peter McSporran reported that more than half of Mugabe's cabinet were now CFU members (Dashwood,

2000:99). The irony of this was that the ruling elite were now replacing the colonial white farmers but leaving the majority of people landless. This practice was a violation of what *gutsaruzhinji* stands for. There was every reason for the political leadership to implement *gutsaruzhinji* in the redistribution of land after the expiry of the Lancaster House prohibitions in 1990. When leadership chooses to empower or enrich themselves, even against their own code, there is nothing a good philosophy can do. When this is the case, only the electorate can decide the matter by choosing other leaders and hope that way to realize their dreams.

Morgan Tsvangirai (then the ZCTU Secretary General but later the MDC Party Leader) corroborated McSporran's report when he said; "In this country we are saying that we can't institute any Land Reform. But what we have managed to do is that the ruling class have acquired farms for themselves but have failed to distribute any land to the people" (Love, 2000:34). Corruption and elitism had not only crept into the ruling party and government but the embourgeoisiement of the leaders was now an offshoot of ESAP's narrow capitalist thrust against *gutsaruzhinji*. On this score, it should be noted that *gutsaruzhinji* does not forbid an individual to acquire wealth and at the same time be servants of the people and ensure that the means of production – land, is afforded to all families and not just to a minority privileged by their political positions. There are numerous incidents that demonstrate the corruption and elitism highlighted by scholars and public media organizations, for example, the ZS1.2b tender scandal; The Willowgate Scandal; the War Victims Compensation Fund Scam of 1997 and the Lorac- Zimbank Scandal (Dashwood, 2000:99-105; Financial Gazette, 1997; Sithole, 1998:14-15).

The philosophical argument for *gutsaruzhinji* is that it is not possible for African governments to stray from addressing the post-colonial challenges of redistribution of wealth and the bringing about of transformation, under the guidance of *gutsaruzhinji*, in the lives of the generality of the people. In these circumstnaces, capitalist policies can only work if they originate from the local people and get blended with *gutsaruzhinji*'s *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics. When government leaders spend more money on such acts of self-gratification as the prurchase of luxury cars when the people require financial resources for their upkeep, the problem is not with the ideology of *gutsaruzhinji,* but with the individuals who are corrupted and subsequently stray from the *gutsaruzhinji* path to self serving grasping. This is where Masipula Sithole laments that;

…poverty in Zimbabwe is characterized by two tendencies, we are witnessing the politics of poverty amid plenty, apparently plenty for the political class. *Vamwe Havana chokudya; Vamwe vanotengerwa dzimota mbiri mbiri, yemuHarare neyeruzevha. Dzigoti ngadzidhure motokari dzacho;* (Some don't have anything to eat; others have two cars bought for them, one for use in Harare and the other for rural areas, all expensive cars). Such differentials are bad enough even if the cars were bought with personal money; but they are bought with public funds from an overtaxed citizenry. I maintain that the outcome of the political war now being waged against the forgetful political class will be decided by which side does not forget the mujibas and chimbwindos (war collaborators) and indeed which side does not forget the people (Sithole, 1998:14-15).

Two points are important from Sithole's observation. The first one is that there was evidence of the leadership straying from both the leadership code and *gutsaruzhinji*'s *hunhu/ubuntu* teachings. Secondly, expenditure on luxuries by Government when the majority of the people are suffering de-legitimized the relevance of Mugabe's government. Sithole also makes it clear that straying from *gutsaruzhinji* can only be remedied through the voting public who can discard a leadership which strayed from *gutsaruzhinji*'s *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics at the country's a general elections. This was achieved in 2000 when the people voted against the government-sponsored constitutional referendum in which they voted NO against the government's YES position, forcing government to quickly revert to the *gutsaruzhinji* polity of land redistribution as discussed in Chapter Five.

An important point is that national resources should be shared equally among all the citizens of the country. Luxury-spending by government is against our traditional values which disapprove of such extravagance even if one uses his/her own resources. Where public funds are used in this way the lack of restraint and probity becomes outstanding. Mangena and Chitando (2011:242) provide sound advice on the matter:

Leaders with *hunhu* or *ubuntu* are aware of their obligations towards the poor. They do not buy the latest models of expensive cars when their fellow citizens are wallowing in abject poverty. They ensure the proceeds from national resources are channeled towards meeting the needs of socially disadvanted members of the community. Leaders with *hunhu/ubuntu* are willing to forgo the trappings of power and focus on the things that really matter; serving the poorest of the poor.

We are all reminded therefore, that *gutsaruzhinji* and its attendant *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics have no substitute. *Gutsaruzhinji* is not only a humanist philosophy but is also one that addresses

African problems using traditional *hunhu/ubuntu* values. Lues (2009:241) echoes this important view when he argues:

> The concept of *ubuntu* emphasizes supportiveness, cooperation and communalism … In the context of the *ubuntu-* oriented team leader, the concept promotes inclusive administration and development, racial unity and trust, cooperation, democracy and the application of the Rule of Law. The main standards are honesty, responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, competence, adherence to democratic procedure and social equity.

These are the *gutsaruzhinji* attributes and the tools of the trade, which all emanate from the tree of *hunhu*/umuntu philosophy. A leadership which becomes corrupted by power and stays too long in power until in the end it is corrupt to the extent of deviating from *gutsaruzhinji* polity can only take a cue from the holy scriptures which say, "If salt loses its saltness, it is worthless but fit to be thrown away and to be trodden under the foot of men" (Mathew 5:13, Mark 9:50, Luke 14:34).

4.6   Conclusion

This chapter looked at the diversion of Zimbabwe's socio-economic development trajectory from *gutsaruzhinji*-driven policies to a narrow capitalist model supervised by the "Washington Consensus" which restored the economic interests of the minority under ESAP. Unlike *gutsaruzhinji* where policy-makers consult the people to learn their socio-economic needs, ESAP had laid down procedures which could not be achieved since they made the majority of people poorer without creating the much-needed employment opportunities and adding instead to unemployment levels through the laying off of workers through the stipulated austerity measurers. The most important point learned in all this painful process is that Western-sponsored development philosophies (especially capitalism) cannot work in an environment mired in deep poverty and sharp inequalities caused by a long period of colonialism. *Gutsaruzhinji* policies which are driven by the traditional ideology of *hunhu/ubuntu* stand out as a better remedy to the disproportionate development of the past.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, tend not to help with African development challenges. Instead, they act as instruments of re-colonisation and increasing inequalities and focus on those who can afford the loans and can repay the borrowed moneys,

yet post-colonial inequalities call for a welfare approach to build capacity in the generality of the previously marginalized.

Issues of corruption and elitism are the opportunistic diseases associated with a capitalist development model and these destroy the socio-economic foundations laid down by *gutsaruzhinji* and its *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics which are responsible for the creation of servant leadership. From the year 2000 onwards, Government chose to meet its socio-economic challenges under the guidance of *gutsaruzhinji* though too late to manage the processes through a peaceful and proper developmental model, as sshall be indicated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: EFFORTS TO RESUSCITATE THE *GUTSARUZHINJI* POLITY IN ZIMBABWE

5.0   Introduction

In Chapter Four, the author discussed how ESAP, the policy blueprint adopted by Zimbabwe's government, from 1990 to 2000 eventually caused the social and economic collapse in the country and brought to an abrupt halt the *gutsaruzhinji* policies adopted in 1980. *Gutsaruzhinji* had now been substituted with ESAP for ten years and was at the verge of extinction.

This chapter considers the efforts made to resuscitate *gutsaruzhinji* policies through the implementation of two very important programmes, one of them the "Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)" or the Third Chimurenga/Land Revolution (Saul, 2005:142; Masungure, 2012:287; Moyo, 2004). The second programme was the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA, Chapter 14:33) which was enacted to try and foster the lost spirit of emancipating the majority of Zimbabweans from poverty and economic inequalities caused by colonialism and its apartheid development system. The FTLRP saw the taking of large commercial farms from the minority of white commercial farmers and redistributing it to the landless indigenous majority Zimbabweans. The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (IEEA), Chapter 14:33 nationalized mineral wealth and other natural resources, and involved acquiring and sharing business operations owned by multi-nationals and foreign conglomerates. The period examined covers the year 2000 to 2016. The successes and failures of this process is ongoing and hence it is difficult to categorically quantify the result. However, there are events which the author believes are positive attributes of *gutsaruzhinji* which can be refined to build this important philosophy (*gutsaruzhinji*) not only in Zimbabwe but in Africa and beyond as argued in this chapter.

5.1   The Fast Track Land Reform and *Gutsaruzhinji*

5.1.1   The Conceptual Framework of FTLR

The rejection of the ZANU PF sponsored Constitutional Referendum in February 2000 by the people of Zimbabwe by voting NO to it, created a crisis of legitimacy in ZANU-PF

governance as it was now facing the Parliamentary Elections in June 2000 and Presidential Elections in 2002 (Saul, 2005:142). The only political alternative was to reconnect with the people and address their socio-economic concerns which it had ignored since its adoption of anti-people policies like ESAP in 1990 as reflected in Chapter Four. To restore legitimacy, Mugabe's government and party, invoked the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy. This was observed by Eldred Masunungure and Jabusile Shumba who contend,

> Ruling elites want legitimacy and recognition from those they govern. When the legitimacy of these elites is threatened by crisis be it economic or ecological – such that they can no longer provide basic resources to their agitated followers … they become more desperate and adopt pragmatic strategies to survive, using political offices or positions to unlock resources such as arable land to share among the citizenry. In the case of Zimbabwe ZANU PF created a new legislation and policy to wrestle land from white settler farmers and give it to black households (Masunungure et al, 2005:284).

This desperate desire for legitimacy became the source of mismanagement of this critical resource (land) as the ruling elites' fear of upsetting their followers allowed them to carry out what became known as *jambanja* (chaotic land take over) (Moyo, 2004, Masunungure et al, 2005) as they chose to be bystanders. Masunungure and Shumba echoe this when they observe that the ruling elites cannot control how their followers use the resources they acquire in this way. Indeed, for fear of upsetting them, the elite are forced to be more and more chaotic and populistic, suspending all rules relating to the wise use of resources in question (ibid).

5.1.2   The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLR) as *gutsaruzhinji*

From a philosophical point of view the FTLR can be best understood as involving *gutsaruzhinji,* from two important perspectives. Firstly, from that of the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and secondly the perspective of from John Rawls' Theory of Justice.

According to *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, as argued by Ramose (1999:2014), Samkange and Samkange (1990); Desmond Tutu (1999); Mangena (2012a, 2015) and others, the fundamental issue is the promotion of group or communal interests over individual interests. All agree in affirming Mbiti's dictum, "I am because we are; since we are therefore I am" (Mbiti 1969:215). This brings to the fore the idea that minority white commercial farmers could not have continued serving their individual interests by holding on to vast tracts of

prime land while the masses of peasants remained landless and poor. It would also have been deemed to be against the principles of *hunhu/ubuntu* for the minority group to be in charge of national resources at the expense of the majority. Ironically, and as a direct consequence of colonization, the whites had forcibly taken and alienated land that belonged to indigenous Zimbabweans.

Ramose proposes a new awakening period for Africans, which he calls Makoko/Hungwe and the beginning of a new life. He argues that:

> It is the hour to assert and reaffirm the dignity of the African precisely by seizing the initiative to remedy historical injustice with historical justice. It is the season of the return of the land to its original owners; the period of reversion to unmodified and unencumbered sovereignty. It is the age of restitution and reparation to Africa. It is the age of African memory functioning as the critique of history (Ramose, 2002b:608).

The return of the land to its rightful owners as argued above, did not only mean the correction of historical injustices and the restitution of what rightly belonged to the Zimbabwean peasantry, but also the restoration of the *hunhu/ubuntu* as argued by George Sofa Dei whereby "the African conception of the triadic constitution of community as including the living, the dead (ancestors) and the yet to be born" was reconfigured (Dei 1994:12). It is important to further clarify this claim of the ontological, metaphysical and ethical unity in *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy in relation to the land. Nyasani clarifies this point by arguing that "we" of the living members of the community are part of a flow of life that is to the future (Nyasani 1989:13-25). Land is considered traditionally to be an inheritance which is passed to generations by the ancestors and chief is the custodian of land.

This view is shared by Taringa (2016:204-5) who asserts,

> Primarily it is the chiefdom that stands in special relations to the land. It is the land bequeathed to chiefs by the ancestors. Land belongs to the living, the unborn and the dead. The chief acts as the trustee. He allocates land to people. Land rights are vested in cooperative groups that have overriding rights over those of individuals … So the fundamental attitude to land is a religious one and is based on fear of mystical sanction by the ancestors. Land is sacred because it bears the remains of the ancestors particularly in the form of graves of the chiefs. Shona religion is based on the grave.

This is the hallmark of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy where future generations inherit the land of their forefathers and live off it and observe family rituals on the graves of their ancestors who

they believe are the custodians of their lives and future children (Taringa, 2016:204). The FTLR, therefore, was a restoration of lost heritage in which the values of *hunhu/ubuntu* were revitalized. Landless Zimbabweans and others reconnected with their ancestors as they went back to stay on land on which ancestral graves were sited. The ontological relevance and connection was such a strong force that it instilled ethical *hunhu/ubuntu* values that in part meant that the taboos of African culture were to be observed again.

The *gutsaruzhinji* in the land reform programme viewed from the above perspective was a historical imperative in the fulfillment of the *hunhu/ubuntu* values which had taken a long time to correct. Once done, however, the overall import was that the country had repossessed their inheritance and heritage forcibly taken from their forefathers by the whites minority through colonization as from 1890 and following. Etieyibo (2014:73) emphasizes the importance of the humanistic values in *ubuntu* where the interests, needs and wellbeing of the group are seen to be more important than anything else, while strong emphasis is made on sharing, caring and compassion for others, a phenomenom summarized thus, "Your pain is my pain, my wealth is your wealth and your salvation is my salvation" (2014:73).

The collective effort exerted in retaking land from the white minority who had, in the first place, appropriated it illegally from peasant Zimbabweans at colonization, became an act of natural justice since current white owners had benefitted from colonization. In this regard, Eze by contrast observes:

> In Zimbabwe for example, land redistribution was a genuine political problem, and one which had demanded a just settlement, since the days of colonialism … Zimbabwe is also a signatory to international conventions and lays claim to democratic principles. Accordingly, the violence associated with the invasion of white "owned" farms cannot be justified. Zimbabwean academics have often justified these violent actions on the *Ubuntu*/botho principle of sharing. But, *Ubuntu*/botho shuns violence and upholds the ultimate sanctity of life (Eze, 2013:255).

The acknowledgement of the use of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy to justify the action taken in the FTLR, while contradicting one of its basic principles of non-violence, can be explained by reference to Mangena's Common Moral Position (CMP) theory (2012b:10). As a *hunhu/ubuntu* moral imperative, the CMP holds that issues of what is right and what is wrong are issues of the group or community and not the individual (Mangena 2012b:10). The group or community here is represented by elders who have the power to link the young generation

to the spirit world and the spirit world to the young generation (Mangena 2016:75). This is the same belief which led young and old to wage the war of liberation on the understanding that the spirit world (ancestors) required them to fight to regain their lost heritage. The FTLR became viewed likewise as the culmination of the processes of repossession of the country's ancestral heritage in refutation of the unjustified occupation by white minority colonisers. The CMP, therefore, justifies the action of the majority against the individualistic interests of the minority. *Gutsaruzhinji* philosophy as expressed through the FTLR is, therefore, in keeping with the *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology that informs it. Mangena concludes by arguing:

> So the CMP is brought to bear when individuals within a group or community realize that their individuality only carries meaning when they exist to serve the interests and needs of their group or community. The CMP is a product of the collective wisdom not of one individual within a given society …. *Hunhu/ubuntu* ethics were relational, dialogical, consensual and spiritual. Horizontal and vertical as opposed to Western ethics which are individualistic, elitist and horizontal (Mangena, 2016:77).

Justification of the FTLR thus arises from the fact that it addressed the long-standing need of the landless community and the spiritual need of the living-dead both of which are traditionally part of the triadic continuum of ownership. No international agreements by the government could supersede the natural justice enshrined in the *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics as argued. This is why Government had to quickly craft laws which justified the FTLR and made land legally possessed by those who had taken it over during the reclamation exercise. The de facto occupation became de jure once certificates of occupation, and offer letters including 99 year leases were granted (Moyo, 2004). This was a part fulfillment of *gutsaruzhinj's* quest to redistribute Zimbabwe's wealth and resources among its citizenry. Jonathan Moyo observes, "Our socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) is land driven, we should get the land reform first and use it as the base for a new recovery" (Bond et al, 2002:203).

The justification of FTLR as *gutsaruzhinji* can also be argued using the John Rawls theory of justice. Rawls agrees with John Locke who sees legitimate political authority as deriving from the free and voluntary consent of the governed from a contract or agreement between governor and governed person. According to Rawls, justice is what free and equal persons would agree to as the basic terms of social cooperation in conditions that are fair for this purpose, (Arneson, 2008:1). Rawls is more explicit when he further argues:

> For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the divisions of advantages from social cooperation, by major institution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, collective markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family are examples of major social institutions (Rawls, 1971:6).

Even Menkiti, the foremost African communitarian recognizes Rawls to be sympathetic to this view. Menkiti argues:

> …as far as Africans are concerned the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories ... just as the naval points men to umbilical linkage with generations preceding then so also does language and its associated social rules point to a mental commonwealth with others whose life histories encompass the past, present and future... justice owed a moral personality a potentiality that is ordinarily realized in due course" (Menkiti, 1984:171-9).

The basic structure of society according to Rawls and equitable distribution of social and economic utilities, supported by Menkiti's communalistic commonwealth view are in consonance with *gutsaruzhinji* FTLR. Asserting justice as the basic structure of society as argued by Rawls makes it possible to draw parallels with Mangena's (2012a: 10) Common Moral Position–CMP where community view on morality show what is right and wrong for all. Most importantly, Rawls stresses the fact that people's rights in owning the means of production cannot be compromised. The repossession of land which originally was occupied by peasants before colonization, and from which the peasants obtained their socio-economic survival and which land was their inherited means of production was a just enterprise consequent upon historical injustices that had to be righted. The FTLR was, accordingly, a tool by which justice was exacted as well as one through which empowerment as well as protection, as argued by Rawls, was guaranteed.

Rawls further proposes two fundamental principles of justice. The first one is the principle of Equal Liberty which he outlines as "Each person is to have equal rights to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all," (Rawls 1971:220). His second principle of social inequality is explained thus: "…social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so the they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to position and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (1971:72). Critically looking at these principles in

the Zimbabwean context, we can safely argue that the first principle was commensurate with the attaining of civil liberties from at the point of national independence in 1980 onwards.

The second principle on of social and economic inequalities was addressed by the FTLR and the Indigenisation Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33] after 200. The justification of the FTLR is that it sought to give benefit to the least advantaged, who were the majority peasants. The element of "conditions of fair equality of opportunity" can similarly be argued as having been addressed in the FTLR, as all those got land never paid for it, the government admitted responsibility to compensate outgoing minority white farmers for improvements done on the farm but not to buy the land as it was originally taken for free from their ancestors. This ushered in some realisation of the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy which is at the centre of traditional African socio-economic development. *Gutsaruzhinji'*s main thrust is benefiting the "least advantaged" who happen to be in the majority. They were in the majority because the most powerful (colonial settlers) deprived them of their private property, which was land. This is why Jonathan Moyo (2002) alluded to the fact that land was *gutsaruzhinji* itself.

There is little doubt that *gutsaruzhinji* guided both the Fast Track Land Reform Programme and the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Programmes has proved to be a philosophy which provided solutions to Zimbabwe's socio-economic inequalities. However, critics of the FTLR have a different view. Sadomba (2011:171) contends,

> Several authors (Hammer etal2003: Feltoe 2004; Selby 2006; Alexander 2006; Raftopolous and Mlambo 2005 have concluded that these occupations (FTLR) were instigated by ZANU PF as a political move in order, among other reasons, to weaken or break the coalition behind the 'No" vote in the referendum which represented a real political threat to an otherwise firmly entrenched regime ... This more nuanced view questions the picture of the fast track land reform as a homogeneous process and of ZANU PF as an actor with a single political aim.

While Sadomba may have a valid criticism, it does not however, take away the reality that the FTLR was addressing an injustice which had been perpetrated for a long time. The irony also remains that Mugabe had protected the interests of white farmers against the principles and objectives of the first and Second Chimurenga or war of liberation. This had stalled socio-economic development to a level where he had lost perceived legitimacy to govern. Eldred Masungure and Jabusile Shumaba got it right, when reflecting on the pre and post-2000

FTLR, they alluded to the legitimacy issue highlighted earlier on. However, the same arguments strengthen the point that *gutsaruzhinji* is a philosophy difficult to replace since its previous suspension in favour of ESAP had created insurmountable problems which eventually led to a more speed implementation in both the FTLR and the IEEP.

5.1.3 *Gutsaruzhinji* in the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act. (IEEA)

The author is compelled to bring in the controversial IEEA as a *gutsaruzhinji* issue. The complexity of this matter can be discussed with reference to *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology and the Utilitarian and Liberal philosophic arguments.

The IEEA was crafted in 2008 to give indigenous people a 51% shareholding to foreign businesses with a net value of $500 000.00 leaving the 49% of the shares to the investor (IEEA 14/2007:1-3). The rationale behind it was that foreign companies should ensure that the majority of Zimbabweans benefit from the exploitation of their natural resources and that the accumulation of wealth in Zimbabwe should not benefit only the few company owners but the generality of Zimbabwean people.

The philosophical argument is that the policy was intended to solve the entrenched inequalities ignored for a long time in both the pre and post-independence phases. The majority of Zimbabwean people had inherited these planned perpetual inequalities through the colonial development programmes. *Gustaruzhinji* seeks to see policies which benefit the majority of the people in the country. The whole IEEA can best be viewed not on the legalistic view of property rights but from a moral aspect where *hunhu/ubuntu* values take precedence. In the CMP argued by Mangena (2012a:10) the taking of 51% share from foreign companies and leaving them with 49% was in keeping with *hunhu/ubuntu* values where wealth was considered not to belong to an individual but to the family and entire clan or community (Ramose, 1999). John Rawls's principle of justice again comes into play justifying IEEA on his second principle which holds that social and economic inequalities can be justified only if they work to the advantage of the least advantaged members of society (Sandel, 2009:11).

Jeremy Bentham's principle of utility (Sandel, 2009:3) states:

> We should always do whatever will produce the greatest amount of happiness. The IEEA was viewed as giving the majority people a new lease of life and the 51% shares were bringing happiness to the greatest number of previously marginalised citizens whose right to ownership of their ancestral property had been usurped by the colonizers. John Stuart Mill another utilitarian, says that people have certain inalienable rights which can never be taken away.

The right to ownership of mineral wealth and other natural resources was an inalienable right of black Zimbabweans as inheritance from their forefathers, hence that restoration of these rights through IEEA's 51% share have justification in John Locke's view. These inalienable rights include freedom, equality, property right and government by consent as they were given by law of nature before government were put in place (ibid).

In the Zimbabwean context at colonization, people lost rights to freedom, property and equality due to colonialism. The minority white colonizers, took land by force but went on to protect their loot by the same principle of rights, as they now claimed to be the owners of both land and government. Critics of the IEEA take a libertarian view which argues that we must never violate anyone's right-even if doing so would increase overall happiness, (Sandel, 2009;4). Libetarians criticise governments which they say have no business passing moralistic legislation. I think however, that legislation on property distribution or rights can be seen as moralistic as argued in *hunhu/ubuntu's* CMP discussion. Similarly the IEEA was viewed as taking someone's hard earned wealth and giving it to the poor without their consent. The irony however, is that certain companies had exploited the poor to get that wealth. The historical truth of colonization leaves this hypocrisy.

Even Immanuel Kant who is viewed as a proud racist had something in his argument that can be used to support the IEEA, although the author has strong views against Kant in many other areas. While he criticises the utilitarians in their pursuit of happiness, instead of freedom as the goal of morality, he is also against the libertarians by stating that freedom does not mean doing what one wants; but what is right (Sandel, 2009:7). Accordingly, morality to him is, "doing the right thing just because you know it is the right thing". If this argument is valid, then the IEEA and its 51% was a good *gutsaruzhinji* policy because it was the right thing to do to address colonially perpetuated inequalities in Zimbabwe. Ramose echoes this view when he argues that "If and when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the

preservation of the life of another human being, then one should choose to preserve the life of another human being" (Ramose, 2002:173). It was therefore the right thing to do to take 51% shares and redistribute it to the poor and long suffering people of Zimbabwe who had endured colonial injustice for a long time. Although Kant prevaricates on the difference between Locke's inalienable rights as given naturally, to reasoned rights coming out of the human mind, it is almost the same thing given that *huntu/ubuntu* values are passed to next generations by elders through their experience which makes this tantamount to saying that experience comes through facts of life. One speak of natural law or the CMP like Mangena (2012a:10) or Kant's reasoned moral values. The *gutsaruzhinji* ideology can, therefore, successfully obtain the endorsement in IEEA as argued. On the other hand many modern liberals argue that there are only two types of moral obligations. First, there are universal duties that we owe to every human being, such as the duty to avoid harming people unnecessarily. Secondly there are voluntary obligations that we acquire by consent such as when we agree to help someone or promise to be faithful to our partners and friends (Sandel, 2009:14-15).

However, some still believe that we can be morally obligated to a particular community even though we have not assumed the obligation voluntarily. Obligations of membership and loyalty can arise simply because of who we are, like being someone's friend, being a member of a particular community or a citizen of a particular country (ibid). This argument justifies the moral obligations to recognise the rights the citizens of Zimbabwe have to the land of their forefathers or ancestors through inheritance essentially warranting the enjoyment of national resources. By the same token, the grandchildren of the colonial settlers had an obligation to restore possessions of their own that their forefathers or kinsmen looted from black Zimbabweans. The author, therefore, contends that the *gutsaruzhinji* policies behind IEEA are admissible and enforceable in accordance with this modern liberal philosophy.

5.2   An Evaluation of *gutsaruzhinji*

Gutsaruzhinji should be understood and evaluated on the basis of what it really is, that is, as a branch of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. A branch of any tree should only contribute to the identification of that same tree's species. Many branches of an orange tree reveal themselves as parts of the orange tree. If an orange tree has a grafted lemon branch on it, the difference between the similar branches will be seen by a mixture of fruits coming from one tree, that is,

through lemons and oranges. This will definitely mean that there are two different trees. *Gutsaruzhinji* should reflect the *hunhu/ubuntu* values from whose roots it draws its water, food and existence. It was not grafted to *hunhu/ubuntu* hence its fruits should be the same as those of other *hunhu/ubuntu* norms, values, attitudes and practices. It is, therefore, important to identify the evaluative beacons of *gutsaruzhinji* as provided by Ramose and Tutu. Ramose (1999) puts it clearly that "the African tree of knowledge stems from *ubuntu* philosophy. Thus, *ubuntu* is a wellspring that flows within African notions of existence and epistemology in which the two (ubu- and –ntu) constitute a wholeness and oneness".

Tutu (2008:2) argues:

> Africans have this thing called *UBUNTU* … the essence of being human. It is part of the gift that Africans will give the world. It embraces hospitality, caring about others, willing to go the extra mile for the sake of others. We believe a person is a person through another person, that my humanity is caught up, bound up and inextricable in yours. When I dehumanize you I inexorably dehumanize myself. The solitary individual is a contradiction in terms and, therefore, you seek to work for the common good because your humanity comes if own community is belonging.

Mbiti (1969:108-109) sums it up by saying, "I am, because we are; and since we are therefore I am". The above can assist as evaluative tools for *gutsaruzhinji* notwithstanding other important contributions by other scholars on *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The Common Moral Position by Mangena 2012a, (CMP) as argued earlier is another yardstick.

Gutsaruzhinji as presented by both Mangena (2014) and Chinyowa (2008) was geared to addressing the burning needs of the Zimbabwean populace. The strength of *gutsaruzhinji* was seen in the overall output of its educational, health, infrastructure and other policy gains in the period 1980 to 1990 as presented in Chapter Three. The FTLRP and IEEA after 2000 add to the *gutsaruzhinji* policy initiatives in the Zimbabwean polity. What is distinct in *gutsaruzhinji* as a philosophy is that it tries to address and bring solutions to the challenges faced by the majority. The main consideration is whatever has to be done by Government has to benefit the majority of the people. It removes completely individualistic tendencies where one can exploit the majority to earn a living. *Gutsaruzhinji,* therefore, qualifies to be part and parcel of communitarian living. Essentially, the majority or community shapes the individual. Invariably, minority interests have to co-exist with the majority. This is in keeping with both

dictums, 'A person is a person through others" and "I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am".

Gutsaruzhinji is concerned with the equipping and empowering of individual families to achieve socio-economic development. This is the same *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy seen in Julius Nyerere's *ujamaa* ideological concept (Nyerere, 1968:60).

The word *ujamaa* is Swahili for familyhood. Nyerere's philosophy was essentially rooted in the traditional African values of *hunhu/ubuntu*. *Ujamaa*'s core thrust was the emphasis on the development of the family or familyhood and communalism. In laying the *ujamaa* doctrine Nyerere said, "The doctrine of self-reliance does not mean isolation. For us self – reliance is a positive affirmation that for our own development, we shall depend upon our own resources" (Nyerere, 1968:319). Nyerere went on to clarify *ujamaa*, whereupon he said, "Wealth belonged to the family as a whole, and every member of the family had the right to the use of family property. No one used wealth for the purpose of dominating others. This is how we want to live as nation. We want the whole nation to live as one family" (Nyerere, 1968:137). Every member of the community had to be educated given good health care and provided with land to carry out productive farming. Both individual rights and community interest were realised.

Gutsaruzhinji, therefore, addresses both individual and community problems of poverty and inequality. Its commitment to solving problems of poverty and inequality and its commitment to sharing national wealth possessed by those who have an excess thereof through the IEEA, as earlier on argued, becomes the true fulfillment of *hunhu/ubuntu* doctrine in *gutsaruzhinji* whereas as observed by Ramose (2002a) in the Sesotho aphorism, "Feta Kgomo otsvare motho", which he explains as:

> Mutual care for one another as human beings precedes concern for accumulation and safeguarding of wealth as though such a concern were an end in itself. While we see that motho is once again the primary reality in traditional African Culture, here we have also the principle of sharing as the regulative element of social organization. This is the principle animating the much talked about African Communalism (Ramose, 2002a:114-115).

Gutsaruzhinji is therefore, a philosophy which presents itself as an alternative to changing people's socio-economic conditions for the better by calling everyone to have moral responsibility towards the "other" in thought and practice.

The author is convinced by the appeal to *hunhu/ubuntu* moral philosophy bin *gutsaruzhinji* as articulated by Mangena's CMP (2012a) where he emphasizes that "the community is the source, author and custodian of moral standards, and personhood is defined in terms of conformity to these established moral standards whose objective is to have a person who is commune-centric rather than one who is individualistic" (2012:11). This places *gutsaruzhinji* at the centre where it becomes a philosophy of choice not only to Zimbabweans but to all Africans in general. Kwame Gyekye echoes this notion when he argues for "a life lived in harmony and cooperation with others, a life of mutual consideration and aid and of interdependence, but at the same time a life that provides a viable framework for the fulfillment of the individual's nature and potentials" (Gyekye 1997:35-76). *Gutsaruzhinji* does not limit individual potential neither does it forbid individual accumulation of wealth. It only ensures that those with exceptional skills in wealth accumulation, realize that within their communities the less gifted and poor need their voluntary support in keeping with such traditional practice as exemplified by *nhimbe* or *majangano* where the community gathers to give free labour and service to their fellow member to produce more food for self-sustenance.This principle is echoed by Nyerere in his speech where he says, "Leaders must not be masters", and where he also explains clearly that "Just as a father does not use his status to dominate and exploit his children and other relatives, so in a nation the leaders or the fortunate people must not use their positions or their wealth to exploit others. In a small family, the father was respected. He was not feared" (Nyerere 1968:142). This servant leadership is entrenched in the *hunhu/ ubuntu* practice as put forward by Mangena who contends:

> *Hunhu or ubuntu* serves to remind Zimbabwe's political leaders and technocrats that policies are only meaningful when they enhance the well being of the majority. Servant leaders are individuals who know that they are there to serve, and not to be served. They invest their mental and physical energies in promoting economic growth. The go all out to ensure that their compatriots overcome poverty and enjoy prosperity. Servant leaders promote unity. Thus; within the context of *ubuntu*, people are family, (Mangena et al, 2011:241).

Gutsaruzhinji stemming from *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, is all about humanism and co-existence. It fulfills this call by ensuring that economic wealth and other developmental programmes benefit the generality of people. This was captured in all its developmental projects highlighted in this thesis. It remains a reality that the *gutsaruzhinji* policies can only

succeed if the implementers and decision-makers embrace the servant leadership skills advocated by *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy in its call for freedom from corruption and honesty in executing duties.

We can also be sure that *gutsaruzhinji* will be in extreme danger if leadership is not guided by *hunhu/ubuntu* values or traditional African practice and culture. When foreign ideologies and cultures are adopted at the expense of *gutsaruzhinji* policies, the good policies of *gutsaruzhinji* die as it is allergic to foreign doctrine. *Gutsaruzhinji* could not co-exist with ESAP from 1990 to 2000. This was also demonstrated in Nkrumah's consciencism wherein he advocates a single ideology to direct society. This is what Nkrumah says in detail on this important matter:

> Our philosophy, must find its weapons in the environment and living conditions of the African people. It is from those conditions that the intellectual content of our philosophy must be created. This requires two aims; first the restitution of the egalitarianism of human society, and second, the logistic mobilization of all our resources towards the attainment of restitution.... is that which I have once referred to as philosophical consciencism; consiencism is the map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable African society to digest the Western and Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that fit into African personality..... taking its start from the present content of the African conscience, indicates the way in which progress is forged out of the conflict in that conscience (Nkrumah, 1964:78-9).

Nothing can respond to the appeal to the philosophy of *huntu/ubuntu* and the African environment as argued by Nkrumah above, better than the *gutsaruzhinji* ideology. The people have to be at the centre of both decision- making and implementation without being crowded out by foreign ideologies. In Chapter Four of this thesis it is shown how *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophical teachings could not co-exist with the foreign capitalist ideology called ESAP. The temptation of viewing African tradition and its cultural values as inferior to Western traditions now needs to learn from *gutsaruzhinji's, huntu/ubuntu* driven ideology which is also in keeping with Nyerere's *ujamaa* and Nkrumah's consiencism as the philosophy to drive Africa out of poverty.

5.3   The future of *Gutsaruzhinji*

The future of *gutsaruzhinji* remains unshakable as long as African leaders commit themselves to the total emancipation of their people from the poverty entrenched by past apartheid colonial rule. It is an undeniable reality that economic prosperity comes from turning ordinary citizens into middle class producers of goods and services which contribute to economic growth rather than having the peasants live on Government handouts and foreign donations.

Deliberate empowerment policies aimed at creating wealth using the majority of ordinary people rather than concentrating on individualist policies bent on promoting eliticism have to be the only way forward. *Gutsaruzhinji*'s *hunhu/ubuntu* manifestation entrenches it inside deep African traditions difficult to discard. The new calls for the twenty-first century to retain to the basics of our values and practices informed by the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is an area where both the intellectuals and the ordinary citizens realize that Africans will always be a single community, thus affirming the imperative that holds that community values in both *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy and *hunhu/ubuntu* values are identical. Any government which constantly consults its people, hears their concerns, needs and aspirations and then crafts policies guided by the people, will not only retain power, but will also see the growth and socio-economic upliftment of its people.

On the philosophical stage, John Rawl's theory of justice affirms that *gutsaruzhinji*'s economic redistributive policies will reduce the continued suffering by the majority of people. Ramose (2002b) proposes a new concept for Africa which he calls Mokoko/Hungwe and argues that:

> It is the period of the birds. It is the hour to assert and reaffirm the dignity of the African precisely by seizing the initiative to remedy historical injustice with historical justice. It is the season of the return of the land to its original rightful owners; the period of reversion to unmodified and unencumbered sovereignty. It is the age of restitution and reparation to Africa. It is the age of African memory functioning as the critique of history. (Ramose, 2002b:608).

It is in this area that *gutsaruzhinji* has managed to awaken and attract international critics to the undeniable facts both that past injustices are no longer sustainable and that *hunhu/ubuntu* values call for the African leader to embrace what Mangena and Chitando (2011) called servant leadership enshrined in *hunhu/ubuntu* as also informed by a Common Moral Position

CMP (Mangena, 2012a:11). The author is convinced that *gutsaruzhinji*, which is a humanistic philosophy can have no substitute in carrying out the important challenges and duties African governments have in uplifting the socio-economic status of their people. The new message of this important philosophy (*gutsaruzhinji*) has to be advocated throughout the African continent to allow African leaders to embrace this important philosophy. This is what other scholars like Bernard Matolino (2008:194) have been yearning for, when he said:

> I think it would be beneficial to develop a political philosophy that is responsive to both the genuine needs of Africans on the continent and takes into account the various African realities both negative and positive, a political theory that does address all these issues and empower African people without crudely resorting to the traditional.

Gutsaruzhinji as a political theory and humanistic philosophy, emanating from the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy, does not crudely resort to vain tradition but embraces the transformation of our value systems to embrace the current needs of the majority.

The cause of *gutsaruzhinji* was also accurately captured by Arthur Mutambara (2017), (writing in his book, "In Search of the Elusive Zimbabwean Dream") where he argues:

> Consequently, on the African Continent we have a problem of lack of economic empowerment where Africans are the have-nots. Africans are landless. When they obtained independence, they were given the crown and the whites kept the jewels. Political independence is meaningless without economic power. The crucial land question has not been resolved in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Kenya. In fact, in most of the African countries, land dispossession was a key part of colonization and constituted the main grievance behind the liberation struggle on the continent. Land is the source and foundation of all economic activities, be it agriculture, mining, commerce or industry. [….] There are limitations to how you can use free markets and capitalism as a weapon of struggle, otherwise it will simply exacerbate the difference between the haves and the have-nots. We need to emphasise non-market values like community, collective economics, peace, love, self-respect and decency (Mutambara, 2017:149-159).

Mutambara makes two things very clear from his argument above. Firstly, land reform and economic empowerment are mandatory for the restoration of the African dignity and emancipation of the indigenous from an evil system of apartheid and its attendant capitalism. Secondly, a philosophy which embraces community values has to be deployed to end the capitalist system. This philosophy, is no doubt the one presented by the author as *gutsaruzhinji*. It embraces the cultural values needed in our *hunhu/ubuntu*. Mutambara echoes

these *hunhu/ubuntu* values as "collective economics, peace, love, self-respect and decency". Put simply, this is *gutsaruzhinji* and what it stands for in Zimbabwe and Africa at large.

5.4   Conclusion

The Land Reform and the Indigenous Economic Empowerment Programmes in Zimbabwe marked the second and most critical phase of implementing *gutsaruzhinji*- driven policies. There is a real justification for aims of both programmes in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Land and its natural resources belonged to the indigenous people as an inheritance from their ancestors. It was therefore, imperative to have the land restored to its rightful owners in order to guarantee empowerment in posterity. Despite the violent and more aggressive way of their implementation (FTLR and IEEA) according to John Rawl's theory of Justice, the actions were justified as they served the majority of disadvantaged people. *Gutsaruzhinji* is, therefore, strategically placed as a new political philosophy to redress social and economic inequalities long- perpetrated on the African continent.

This new theory (*gutsaruzhinji*) should be seen as the answer to Matolino's call for "a political philosophy that is responsive to the needs of Africans on the continent". *Gutsaruzhinji* is also in a greater sense, a work in support of progressive modern philosophers like Thaddeus Metz (2014) who argue that, it is time to begin the business of deploying *hunhu/ubuntu* values and philosophy for answering contemporary problems. The author dedicates Chapter Six to a discussion of this matter.

CHAPTER SIX: THADDEUS METZ AND *GUTSARUZHINJI*

6.0   Introduction

In this chapter the author briefly highlights the argument from Thaddeus Metz (2014) in which he respond to Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi's (2013) claim (in the *South African Journal of Philosophy*) in an article entitled, "The end of *ubuntu*". This study also exposes other scholarly arguments in support and criticism of Metz's views. The *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy is then presented as a good example of what Metz is advocating for. It is, therefore, this symbiotic relationship 'between *hunhu/ubuntu* as articulated by Metz and *gutsaruzhinji* which should broaden and deepen the new discourse in both African philosophy and give an African solutions to deep-seated poverty, inequality, as well as good governance.

6.1   Conceptual Framework

Thaddeus Metz (2014) has challenged Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi's (2013) claim of "The end of *ubuntu*," in a way which provokes both the intellectual and political community to consider the values and teachings of *ubuntu* in a totally new perspective. Metz's response resonates with the *gutsaruzhinji* theory, particularly when he contends that, "We should view scholarly enquiry into, and the political application of *ubuntu* as projects that are only now properly getting started" (Metz, 2014:65). *Gutsaruzhinji* is one such product of *ubuntu* which needs to be understood and spread to all African states as an *ubuntu*/*hunhu*-driven philosophy which needs to be adopted to solve Africa's socio-economic and political problems. *Gutsaruzhinji* does not only stands as an answer to Metz's call but also as a partner in the understanding of the values embedded in traditional African Philosophy, capable of solving African problems in an African way, without copying the Western ideologies which are largely responsible for the problems besetting Africa today.

6.2   Thaddeus Metz's "Just the beginning of *Ubuntu*" argument.

Thaddeus Metz's (2014) argument that the discussions and serious articulation of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is now beginning to take off the intellectual and political ground, should be understood in the light of the provocation which was done by Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) who argued that talk or discussion about *ubuntu* is no longer relevant to

modern society since *ubuntu* was only practised in pre-modern communitarian communities. It is worthwhile quoting what Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) said exactly which provoked a response from Metz (2014) response. Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013:203) contend,

> We have argued that *ubuntu* as a narrative of return is not well suited for complex, multicultural societies that do not prize communality and associations drawn along those lines. What our argument does is simply to point out lived circumstances that are necessary for the ethic of *ubuntu* to be a success. *Ubuntu*, as an ethical theory that is taken to be natural to the people of sub-saharan Africa, we argue, can only be fully realized in a naturalistic and traditionalistic context of those people. However, such a natural habitat that would favour the chances of *ubuntu* has largely disappeared because of the irreversible effects of factors such as industrialisation and modernity. The disappearance of such natural and favourable conditions renders *ubuntu* obsolete. It is obsolete by virtue of the fact that the context in which its values could be recognized is now extinct. We are of the view that in order for these values to be realised they have to be embedded in the structures of communalism. Without communalism there is no possibility of *ubuntu* and its attendant values retaining their relevance and suitability for use by the indigenes of sub-Saharan Africa. This idea rises from our view that the mutability of African societies (away from their traditional antecedents) has rendered *ubuntu* dissonant with the naturalness of the opportunities for its realization.

Metz (2014) responds by giving an example of a theory developed long time ago which remains true to this modern day. The theory that the essence of water is H_2O originated solely in the Western world, but is universally true. Metz (2014) contends that someone from a society that did not come up with and confirm the claim that water is H_2O would be mistaken if she thought otherwise. On the same grounds it would be naïve to discredit *ubuntu* as an ethical theory only because it was crafted during the pre-modern communitarian set-up. Metz goes further to refer to John Stewart Mill's utilitarianism and Immanuel Kant's formula of humanity. He argues that "for most philosophers, whether they are justified moral theories has nothing to do with where they originated or whether the masses already accept them. These principles could be 'true for' or apply to, those living in all societies even those that are not modern and in which the principles are disbelieved" (Metz, 2014:68).

Metz goes on to cite what Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) believe to be the core values of *ubuntu*, to see whether those values are no longer applicable to modern society as they claim. Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) argue that, "*Ubuntu* rests on some core values such as humanness, caring, sharing, respect, empathy and compassion among others "(2013:200). Metz (2014) therefore argues that surely, those in large scale, technologically developed

societies can be humane, respectful and compassionate and can share what they have with others. Given these values as clearly articulated by Matilino and Kwindingwi (2013) their same claim of trying to discredit or discount *ubuntu* as only confined to primitive communal society does not stand.

Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013:202) further argue that:

> The success of *ubuntu* largely depends on undifferentiated, small and tight–knit communities that are relatively undeveloped. Through mutual recognition and interdependence members of these communities foster the necessary feelings of solidarity that enable the spirit of *ubuntu* to flourish … Without the existence of such communities the notion of *ubuntu* becomes only but an appendage to the political desires, wills and manipulations of the elite.…

To the above, Metz (2014) responds by reminding Matolino and Kwindingwi that *ubuntu* was not a function of intimate relationships, but is, instead, a matter of being hospitable, to strangers. This was widespread in pre-colonial Africa where one welcomes visitors and strangers to a village to the point of sharing one's own best food with them, at least for a time (e.g Mandela 2006a; Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009). Viewing everyone regardless of whether or not they are related to oneself as part of a human family and someone with whom to commune is also a core aspect of *ubuntu* (Shutte, 2001:25-3; Mandela, 2006b; Gyekye, 2010). These facets of *ubuntu* are clearly not applicable only to members of small and tight–knit communities that are relatively underdeveloped (Metz, 2014:69).

Metz's second argument in defence of *ubuntu* is that *ubuntu* provides all-things considered a remedy for certain relationships in contemporary Africa that admittedly lack *ubuntu* to some degree. He gives the example of a state bureaucracy in which clients are treated as mere numbers and must conform to a pre-defined system of rules in order to obtain benefits. He contends that such a state is without substantial portions of *ubuntu* in terms of how it relates to its citizens. For the state as a distinct agent tasked with fostering a shared way of life between it and its residents, or to treat their capacity for such sharing as equally valuable, the state needs its administrators generally to maintain distance from clients and to follow martial rules in how they are treated. Since the state must be concerned for its people and do what it takes to meet their needs, it must reduce some *ubuntu* when it comes to identifying closely with clients in order to produce much more *ubuntu* when it comes to improving the quality of

their lives since one major part of *ubuntu* concerns sharing a way of life, but another is caring for others quality of life,.. (Metz, 2014:69).

Metz (2014) goes on to give practical examples of how a modern society and the community can display the same spirit of caring practised in the olden days where *nhimbe* or *letsema* used to be the order of the day. He gives an example of how a community can collectively improve education through a coordinated effort. For instance, the state might ask that construction companies put up rooms that would serve as a school library (or a chemistry centre, or chess club, etc); wealthier individuals with extra books might donate some to libraries , taking the time to collect from houses in their neighbourhoods; and retired persons from the local community volunteer their time to run the library. And a list of who have contributed and how could widely be publicised on the internet, and on radio and television, indicating to society how far it has come towards its goal of X number of new libraries and how far it has yet to go (ibid). Such projects display the practice of *ubuntu* in a modern society. The claim by Matolino and Kwindingwi that *ubuntu* only works in premodern undeveloped communities fall away.

It is, therefore, this critical application of *ubuntu* values which has to be embraced by African governments in order to be able to serve their people effectively. The *gutsaruzhinji* ideology captures those ethical values in *hunhu/ubuntu* to encourage government to address the needs of the majority of its marginalised citizens. The *ubuntu* philosophy and *gutsaruzhinji* polity resonate in serving the needs of the people in a way which displays love, empathy, sharing, unity and compassion. These values, if properly embraced by a leadership, means that servant-leadership and pro-people activities will always be guiding lines for service delivery. Metz (2014) goes on to propose another very important element, *nhimbe* or *lekgotla* for building political consensus and forming an inclusive government capable of delivering good service to the generality of people. He goes on to cite the proposal by Kwasi Wiredus (2000) for a non-party polity in which legislators elected by the majority of the populace, would not be affiliated with particular constituencies for the sake of which they jockey for a majority of votes; instead, they would propose policies that they think are good for the public as a whole, and would adopt only those that are the object of unanimous agreement among themselves. Similar models are suggested by many other theorists, including the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1992), the Congolese theologian Benezet Bujo (2009) and South Africa's Mogobe Ramose (1999:135-152) and Teffo (2004).

Metz argues that in South Africa the majority party, the African National Congress (ANC), may consider *ubuntu* values and come up with a de facto, if not de-jure government of national unity. Above all, it should make appointments based much more on qualifications including integrity, and much less on party membership and patronage, so as to do what is more likely to improve the quality of citizens' lives. It could appoint more persons to cabinet, who were not necessarily ANC members, as well as consult, and more generally meaningfully engage with those likely to be affected by the proposals as well as with experts who were not part of the government. Working together, South Africans could do more: or so *ubuntu* plausibly entails (Metz, 2014:70).

What Metz lays clearly on the table is that the values of *hunhu/ubuntu*, love, unity, compassion and cooperation are not restricted to pre-modern communities but permeate the socio-economic and political fabric of the modern day. It, however, remains the prerogative of current leaders to embrace and apply these values in a way which benefits their people. In Zimbabwe, after a disputed Presidential election in 2008, The African Union advised Zimbabwe to form a Unity Government including the competing parties of ZANUPF under Mugabe and MDC-T under Morgan Tsvangirai and the smaller MDC led by Arthur Mutambara (Dziva et al, 2013:3 & 82).

Mukoma (2008) equated the Government of National Unity (GNU) with a coalition government, designed specifically to accommodate all participating political players in government structures. Among others it includes the presidium, legislatures, cabinet, security sectors and the civil service. Chigora and Guzura (2011) assessed the Zimbabwean GNU in the context of promoting and hindering liberal democracy and as a peace-building strategy after protracted violence and human rights abuses. In the preamble to this GNU agreement, the parties declared their intention to permanently resolve the multiple threats to the wellbeing of Zimbabwe (GPA 2008:1). The GNU is credited with ensuring a peaceful and free constitutional referendum and with finally coming up with a totally new Zimbabwe Constitution which they did on 22 May 2013 (Dziva et al, 2013:90). This is a living example of what *ubuntu* values can do in the 21st Century and in modern day politics. It is also a clear example discrediting those who claim that *ubuntu* was dead thereby reinforcing Metz's assertion that *ubuntu* practice and theorizing is just beginning.

One of the greatest challenges our African intellectuals have is in the crafting of better and more modern day philosophical thoughts while tapping the tree of knowledge (Ramose: 2005) which is *ubuntu*. Metz is quite clear about all the criticisms leveled against *ubuntu* especially by those who only take the world view version like Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). To the world view critics Metz gladly mentions the criticism of *ubuntu* before going forward to prescribe a philosophical system for it. It might be useful to view Metz's acknowledgement in full as shown below:

> [C]ommon criticism of *ubuntu* is its apparent collectivist orientation, with many suspecting that it requires some king of group –think, uncompromising majoritarianism or extreme sacrifice for society, which is compatible with the value of individual freedom that is among the most promising ideals in the liberal tradition… [Another] ground of scepticism about the relevance of *ubuntu* for public morality is that it is inappropriate for the new South Africa because of its traditional origin. Ideas associated with *ubuntu* grew out of small –scale, pastoral societies in the pre-colonial era whose worldviews were based on thickly spiritual notions such as relationships with ancestors ("the living dead"). If certain values, had their source there, then it is reasonable to doubt that they are fit for a large –scale, industrialized, modern society with a plurality of cultures, many of which are secular (Metz, 2011:533-534).

Later, Metz after having taken note of the shortcomings of *ubuntu* as observed by those who subscribe to worldview criticism presented a modern version of *ubuntu* as a philosophical system. This is where he successfully gives examples of how the core values of *ubuntu* can be applied to modern day industrialized and metropolitan communities. This theoretical understanding of *ubuntu* by Metz resonates with the *gutsaruzhinji* polity. As against the descriptive and hypothetical nature of the worldview narrative, a systematic or systematized account of *hunhu/ ubuntu* is prescriptive and categorical, and fits in with the rational principles that make it adequate and universally applicable. In this way Metz positions *hunhu/ubuntu* as a worldview containing philosophically attractive gems which philosophers can tap into to construct a modern rigorous system such as an ethic of relations (Metz, 2013:80-81; 2014:67). Fainos Mangena (2012a) has constructed a moral theory of Common Moral Position (CMP), in which he argues that *hunhu/ubuntu* constructed from traditional cultural practice and long-standing experience as taught by the adult members of the community has to form a common basis for guiding modern day ethics. Mangena (2012a) is corroborated by Metz's articulation, where he contends "I am to articulate a normative theoretical account of *ubuntu* that is not vulnerable to these three objections. I construct an ethical principle that not only grows out of indigenous understandings of *ubuntu* but is fairly

precise, clearly accounts for the importance of individual liberty and is readily applicable to addressing present-day South Africa as well as other societies. To flesh out these claims, I explain how the *Ubuntu*-based moral theory I spell out serves as a promising foundation for human rights. In short, I am to make good on the assertion made by the South African Constitutional Court that *ubuntu* is the "underlying motif of the Bill of Rights" and on similar claims made by some of the Court's members" (Metz 2011:534).

It is this deep understanding of *hunhu/ubuntu* by Metz which enables him to challenge Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) by arguing that *ubuntu* theorization and further philosophical articulation deriving from the original traditional version is just beginning to take shape as scholars begin to embrace *hunhu/ubuntu* as an ethic and as a public discourse in a philosophical system taking only its background inspiration from the worldview narrative version. The author agrees with Metz entirely, especially in consideration of *gutsaruzhinji* as a new philosophy which is borne out of the *hunhu/ubuntu* traditional philosophy to guide modern day good governance in Zimbabwe, in particular, but should cover all African states. It is very difficult to disagree with Metz, especially when he lays bare the challenge of African philosophers, "I submit that it is up to those living in contemporary southern Africa to refashion the interpretation of *ubuntu* so that its characteristic elements are constructed in light of our best current understandings of what is morally right. Such refashioning is a project that can be assisted by appealing to some of the techniques of analytic philosophy, which include the construction and evaluation of a moral theory. A moral theory is roughly a principle purporting to indicate by appeal to as few properties as possible, what all right actions have in common as distinct from wrong ones. What (if anything) do characteristically immoral acts such as lying, abusing insulting, raping, kidnapping and breaking promises have in common by virtue of which they are wrong. Standard answers to this question in Western philosophy include the moral theories that such actions are wrong insofar as they tend to reduce a people's quality of life (utilitarianism) and solely to the extent that they degrade people's capacity for autonomy (Kantianism). How should someone answer this question if she finds the Southern African values associated with talk of *ubuntu* attractive" (Metz, 2011:536).

This declaration by Metz supports all scholarly work towards a deeper understanding of *hunhu/ubuntu*. *Gutsaruzhinji* is such one such scholarly work with an inclination towards good governance, taking inspiration from our traditional "*nhimbe*" or "*Majangano*" or

"*Lekgotla*", to address the current rampant socio-economic inequalities caused by capitalist colonial development machinations. Heidegger (1990), worked out his own interpretation of phenomenology and existentialism. His critique of traditional metaphysics and his opposition to positivism and technological world domination have been embraced by leading theorists of post modernity (Derrida, Foucault, and lyotard. His thinking has influenced in people such diverse fields as phenomenology (Merlean-poultry existentialism (Sartre, Ortega Gasset) hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur), political theory (Arendt, Marcuse, Habermas), Physchology (Boss, Binswanger, Rollo May) and theology (Bultmann, Rahner, Tillich). Therefore, in the same way some of these Western theorists came to be popularly associated with their thinking like Emmanuel Kant's idealism became Kantianism, Fitchte, Schelling and Hegel ideas became Fichteani, Schellian and Hegelian ideas respectively. The author agrees with Jonathan Chimakonam (2016:229) who proposes the naming of Metz's moral ideas derived from *hunhu/ubuntu* as Metzian. Chimakonam further concurs with Metz that the business of re-articulating *hunhu/ubuntu* ideas is just beginning in Africa when he contend that:

> It is the proper function of philosophers to employ the tool of logic in re-articulating pertinent world view ideas at a higher level of understanding. With regard to *ubuntu* in African Philosophy, I concur with Metz, that this project has only just begun. In African philosophy parlance, those who toe the line that Metz toes are eulogized as philosophers and kept apart from those who describe worldviews, are called ethno philosophers. The Great Debate in African philosophy was aimed at liquidating the menace of ethno philosophers and ecouraging individualistic discourses and system building. The project of systematizing *ubuntu* carried out in the ethical dimension by Metz represents a new version of *ubuntu* with theoretical sophistication (Chimakonam, 2016:229).

Metz's re-articulation of the ideas of worldview *ubuntu* into a proper philosophical system while being Metzian does not fall short of being "*ubuntu*". The edifice of philosophy is never completed and exhausted in any number of theories (ibid). In like manner Chitando and Mangena (2011) prescribe *hunhu/ubuntu* as a prerequisite for the achievement of the millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed to at the United Nations summit in September 2000, by heads of state from all over the world. The eight MDGs were set out as follows:

Goal 1   To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

Goal 2:   To achieve universal primary education

Goal 3:   To promote gender equality and empower women.

Goal 4:   To reduce child mortality

Goal 5:   To improve maternal health

Goal 6:   To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Goal 7:   To ensure environmental sustainability

Goal 8:   To develop a global partnership for development.

Chitando and Mangena (2011) argue that Zimbabwe in particular, "is still very far away from achieving these goals. The reason for this is that those who govern, especially the politicians, have, since the beginning of the new millennium, been driven by selfish motives to acquire as much wealth as is possible, against the spirit of *hunhu/ubuntu* which calls for a fair distribution of social and economic advantages or life chances" (Chitando and Mangena , 2011:236). The above claim is corroborated by Rukuni (2007:72) who argues that *hunhu/ubuntu–Botho,* comprises several pathways as a way of life while at the same time developing strong families and communities and therefore strong modern African nations. These age-old pathways have been developed to empower the individual so that every single African man and woman has the ability to carry the responsibility for his or her life, family and community and the power to help chart the way of the continent of Africa into the future.

Chitando and Mangena (2011) declare that *hunhu /ubuntu*, being an indigenous philosophy that promotes communal harmony and well-being is strategic for the attainment of the MDGs in Zimbabwe (2011:240). This assertion is simply advocating the political' ideology of *gutsaruzhinji* which is informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* to chart the new way forward in proper governance and addressing the inequalities as spelt out by the MDGs in 2000. This is what they say:

> Leaders who embrace *hunhu* or *ubuntu* know that they may not flaunt wealth when the majority of the citizens are struggling to have only a meal a day. Leaders who have imbided the tenets of *hunhu/ubuntu* cannot sleep well when the majority of their citizens are living below the poverty datum line. *Hunhu/ubuntu* therefore act as a political ideology that guides leaders to serve

their citizens rather than to enjoy being hero–worshipped. At any rate, *hunhu* or *ubuntu* itself implies that the leader cannot exist on his/her own, but only among fellow citizens (ibid).

This further clarifies Metz's appeal to the ubiquitous African maxim, "A person is a person through other persons". When Nguni speakers state "*Umuntu umuntu abantu*" while Sotho – Tswana speakers say "*Motho kje motho ka batho babang*" and Shona speakers say, *"Munhu munhu nevanhu"* this implies that the normative account of what we ought to value in life involves our causally dependent survival. Personhood, selfhood and humanness in characteristic Southern African language and thought are value –laden concepts. That is one can be more or less of a person, self or human being, where the more of a person is the better. Austine Shutte (2001:31) sums up the basics of the ethics "our deepest moral obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more deeply into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfillment, selfishness is excluded".

The construction of the *hunhu/ubuntu* political ideology of *gutsaruzhinji* should stand to guide a modern political, social and economic discourse that can see not only the achievement of the MDGs as argued by Chitando and Mangena (2011) but the total emancipation of African citizens from poverty caused by greedy capitalist tendencies towards a society with more human face, driven by *hunhu/ubuntu* values.

6.3   Metz's Moral theory and *Gutsaruzhinji*

Metz worked out a moral theory that this study finds compatible with *gutsaruzhinji* teachings or tenets. His moral theory was formulated from a deeper understanding of the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy just as *gutsaruzhinji* is informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Metz (2007) contends that "The favoured interpretation of *ubuntu* is the principle that an action is right in so far as it respects harmonious relationships, one in which people identify with, and exhibit solidarity towards, one another. I maintain that this is the most defensible moral theory with an African pedigree and that it should be developed further with an eye to rivaling dominant Western theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism" (Metz, 2007:321).

Metz articulation is anchored on two words: "identity" and "solidarity" which he argues form the basis of harmonious relationships. To identify with each other, according to Metz, is largely for people to think of themselves as members of the same group, that is to conceive of

themselves as a "we" for them to take pride or feel shame in the group's activities, as well as for them to engage in joint projects, co-ordinating their behavior to realize shared ends" (Metz, 2011:538).

The second aspect of solidarity he explains as follows, "to exhibit solidarity is for people to engage in mutual aid, to act in ways that are reasonably expected to benefit each other. Solidarity is also a matter of people's attitudes such as emotions and motives being positively oriented toward others, say, by sympathizing with them and helping them for their sake" (ibid).

The author associates Metz's above articulation of moral principle benchmarks as in keeping with the *gutsaruzhinji* polity which seeks to see the socio-economic needs of the majority of the people being addressed by a governing body. In other words, the government has to identify itself as being part of the people it serves and goes further to work hand in hand with the people, daily consulting them in order to address their concerns and needs. In this way the government can be seen to be in solidarity with the people. Actions by government governed by these two key words, "identity" and a "solidarity" speak deeper in the *nhimbe* or *majangano* which the author explained in Chapter One and Two as the key pillars of *gutsaruzhinji* polity. The author agrees entirely with Metz, when he says , "for people to fail to identify with each other could go beyond mere alienation and involve outright division between them, that is people not thinking of themselves as an imposition on 'you', but also aiming to undermine one another's ends," (ibid). This scenario is synonymous with capitalism which considers the 'self' or individual interests as coming before the rest of the group. This is why capitalism was never part and parcel of African traditional culture, or practice. The *hunhu/ubuntu* in traditional African culture always speaks to the 'we' hence Mbiti's dictum, "I am because we are; and because we are, therefore I am". In this way people will always be in solidarity with one another. For failure to display solidarity according to Metz, 'would be for them to be uninterested in each other's flourishing or, worse, to exhibit ill–will in the form of hostility and cruelty" (ibid).

There cannot be a better proof of the authenticity of this principle than the colonial capitalism which marginalized the majority black people, in pursuit of self enrichment and the exploitation of wealth by the few. The *gutsaruzhinji* polity comes in to address these social and economic inequalities created by a foreign doctrine by capturing and tapping into the

hunhu/ubuntu driven philosophy in addressing modern day social economic and political challenges. On this score Metz is again entirely correct when he argues that the development of this rich ideology of *ubuntu* has just started. Many scholars should come on board to expound in different directions while emphasing the importance of how *hunhu/ubuntu* can be the cornerstone of our African survival of Western Capitalism, which is arguably responsible for the impoverishment of many African States. Again leadership has to embrace the *gutsaruzhinji* polity which stands out as distinctly different from both socialism and capitalism.

Nkondo (2007:91) corroborates the above notion when he argues *"[U] buntu* advocates … express commitment to the good of the community in which their identities were formed, and a need to experience their lives as bound up in that of their community". This point is further stressed and deepened by Munyaka and Motlhabi (2009:71-72) who contend that "Individuals consider themselves integral parts of the whole community. A person is socialised to think of himself or herself, as inextricably bound to others. *Ubuntu* ethics can be termed anti-egoistic as it discourages people from seeking their own good without regard for the detriment of others and the community. *Ubuntu* promotes the spirit that one should live for others'. Any person or government governed by this *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy can easily implement the *gutsaruzhinji* polity to benefit its citizens.

Metz's moral theory is also boosted by Desmond Tutu (1999) who echoes the pillars of *ubuntu* principle when he remarks that "harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Anything that subverts or undermines this after good is to be avoided like the plague" (Tutu, 1999:35). Tutu, therefore, stresses the point that one must, above all, avoid unfriendliness or acting in ways that would threaten communal ties. Metz, in his moral theory points out that for someone to act rightly or to exhibit *ubuntu*, one ought to prize or honour such friendly or communal relationships. Honouring communal relationships involves being as friendly as one can and doing what one can to foster friendliness in others, without one using a very unfriendly means. To sum up, the maxim "A person is a person through other persons", A human being lives a genuinely human way of life to the extent that she prizes identity and solidarity with other human beings or "an individual realizes her true self by respecting the value of friendship' (Metz, 2011:540).

Metz distinguishes between the *ubuntu* moral theory and Utilirianism and Kantianism, by stating that the *Ubuntu* moral theory is, "grounded in a salient Southern African valuation of community, whereby actions are wrong not merely insofar as they harm people (Utilitarianism) or degrade an individual's autonomy (Kantianism) but rather just to the extent that they are unfriendly or more carefully, fail to respect friendship or the capacity for it (ibid). Action such as deception, coercion and exploitation, he argues, fail to honour communal relationships in that the actor is distancing himself from the person acted upon, instead of enjoying a sense of togetherness; the actor is subordinating behaviour with her; the actor is failing to act for the good of the other, but rather for his own or someone else's interest or the actor lacks positive attitudes towards the others good, and is instead unconcerned or malevolent.

The theory of *ubuntu*, as articulated by Metz, is the one responsible for guiding African politicians as they attempt to implement a *gutsaruzhinji* polity since deviation from *gutsaruzhinji* and its *ubuntu* theoretical principles leads to the implementation of self-centred ideologies (capitalism) or trying to dilute *ubuntu* principles by leaning on socialism which does not precisely bring out the hunmhu/*ubuntu* driven *gutsaruzhinji*. It will be imperative to consider Metz's moral principle in evaluating how the land reform issues should be tacked as a human right.

6.3.1   Metz's Land Reform and *Gutsaruzhinji* rights

The issue of land in Zimbabwe has been addressed as the only tangible basis of a *gutsaruzhinji* polity (Moyo 2002). However, as already explained in Chapter Five, the land reform had to take a more radical route whereby it entered on a sudden revolutionary change in a warlike or highly militarized fashion.

Metz, using his moral principle, argues that "respect for people's capacity for friendliness can permit unfriendliness in response to unfriendliness, but most clearly when and only when responding in that way will prevent or make up for harm done to victims of the initial unfriendliness" (Metz, 2011:553).

Metz (2011:553) goes on to explain that in the present South African context, an unfriendly action by the state towards the whites such as the expropriation of the land they currently hold is justified only if it is likely to help those harmed by the land being held by the whites,

that is, dispossessed blacks. He goes further to suggest that, " in order to run farms and keep the economy stable, blacks given agricultural land need substantial financing and training" (ibid). The argument by Metz maintains that taking land from the whites who had stolen it from the blacks is a justifiable act of redress and restoring friendliness between the two protagonists whites and blacks. He categorically states, 'whites do owe blacks land, and so they, and the state that wrongfully gave land to whites in the past, must transfer it in a way that is likely to benefit blacks. The state could take a radical approach but implement it gradually, while white farmers could take a moderate approach but do so immediately … white farmers, could begin by formally apologizing for retaining substantial control over land that was wrongfully taken from the black people of the land. And they could collectively decide to impart skills, to blacks and to transfer a certain percentage of fertile land to those with the demonstrable ability to make use of it" (2011:554).

From Metz's argument above, it is quite clear that the *gutsaruzhinji* land reform is morally enforceable and just. It is a way in which friendship and solidarity can be restored between two warring groups of dispossessed blacks and the appropriators, the minority whites. The author, finds Metz's moral principle quite appealing in the sense that it embraces the *gutsaruzhinji* polity. This, therefore, means that *gutsaruzhinji* should not be restricted to Zimbabwe, but be spread to all African states who suffered marginalization and unfairness in the socio-economic distribution of wealth. The suggestion by Metz, for both government/state and white farmers to assist black farmers financially and technologically implies that *hunhu/ubuntu* is not a violent theory. Instead it embraces good co-existence and cooperation values in nation-building. In this way, *hunhu/ubuntu* as an African traditional philosophy is not restricted to work only in primitive old communities, but the moral theories drawn from it can continue to guide people in the contemporary world including exporting it to other continents as argued by Tutu (1999). *Gutsaruzhinji* is, therefore, one of the traditional African political theories which need to be preached to the entire African continent and the world over to challenge both socialism and capitalism.

6.4   Mangena's Common Moral Position (CMP) theory as *gutsaruzhinji* driven

Having considered Metz's Moral theory which largely supports the *gutsaruzhinji* polity, it is also critical that the author highlights Mangena's (2012b.10) Common Moral Position (CMP) which again promotes the central teachings in *hunhu/ubuntu* theory which in turn support the *gutsaruzhinji* theory.

Mangena (2012b:10) contends that "the CMP holds that issue of the group or community and not the individual. The group or community here is represented by elders who have the power to link the young generation to the spirit world and the spirit world to the young generation" (2016: 75). What is key in this CMP is that the majority of people (elders in the community are responsible for prescribing what is wrong and right, not a single person. A second aspect is that ownership of the CMP belongs to the community not one person. Mangena's argument as to why the CMP is referred to as common is set out below:

> It is common because it is a position that has been passed by elders from generation to generation as tsika the knowing or possessing and being able to use rules, customs and traditions of society) , and is packed in the rules, customs and traditions of the Shona society. It is also common because it is a characteristic feature of all Bantu–speaking people and it does not need to be established and authenticated by one person as is the case with Aristotelian eudemonism Kantian deontology, Platonic Justice and Metzian basic norm. It is common because it has a group or communal authorship. The CMP is not some kind of principle or norm that is comparable to deontological teleological or even virtue-based principles as they obtain in the West. It is more that mere principle, norm or even moral quality; it is a way of life (Mangena, 2012b:10).

What is made clear above by Mangena is that the CMP is not a position established by one person as is the case with Plato's justice theory. In CMP, the community is the source, author and custodian of moral standards and personhood is defined in terms of conformity to these established moral standards whose objective is to have a person who is commune-centric rather than one who is individualistic. In Shona/Ndebele society, for instance, respect for elders is one of the ways in which personhood can be expressed with the goal being to uphold communal values. Respect for elders is a non–negotiable matter since these are the custodians of these values and a fountain of moral wisdom.

Drawing a parallel here with *gutsaruzhinji* is the fact that the policies decided upon should not focus on enhancing just individuals but the generality of people in the community.

Everything done by the state should be targeted at addressing the needs of the majority people. Governments and states, owe their existence to the proper functioning and daily meeting of citizen's needs. This is clearly different from the colonial capitalist thrust where individual benefit or minority interests were the driving element in socio- economic development. There has to be full participation of the people. Mangena goes on to explain how the process of attaining CMP is reached. He argues that the CMP is dialogical and spiritual in the sense that elders set the moral standards in consultation with the spirit world which is made up of *Mwari Musikavanhu/ Unkulunkulu* (creator God) and *Midzimu* (ancestors), and these moral standards are upheld by society (2012:12) 'to protect the interest of the community at large" Everything is, therefore, done to preserve and protect the interests of the majority people in the community than cater for the interests of a few elders only. Both the elders and the Creator God, *Musikavanhu/Unkulunkulu*, together with *Midzimu* –the ancestors serve the interests of the community at large. It is this aspect of *hunhu/ubuntu* teachings captured by Mangena (2012) which further animates the *gutsaruzhinji* polity as the inescapable political .philosophy to extricate marginalized communities and emancipate them into a dignified social and economic status their Creator God almighty had always desired for them, before greedy colonial capitalists destroyed the social fabric of their culture and coexistence.

The CMP as a moral imperative of *hunhu*/*ubuntu* ethics, says that since the individual is important insofar as he or she contributes to the betterment of the group or community, and since the group or the community is at the centre of all moral deliberations (Mangena, 20912b:10), individual actions cannot be judged in isolation from the group or community. Mangena gives a living example of how in Shona Society a young man or woman caught behaving in an unusual manner by the elders will generate the question "Mwana wokwani uyu (Whose child is he or she)? The question suggests that the problem is not with the child but with the group or community where the child was raised or belongs to. Drawing a parallel again from the above, the *gutsaruzhinji* polity will not measure successful government, simply on the basis of the GDP growth rate, but on the general welfare of the ordinary citizens. The reduction of the poverty levels of the majority and not that of the few rich elites becomes the benchmark of a good governance. Mangena (2012) goes on to argue that, "the CMP is brought to bear when individuals within a group or community realize that their individuality only carries meaning when they exist to serve the interests and needs of their

group or community. Because the elders of the community understand the language of the spirit world as well as the language of this world, they are better positioned to establish and operationalise the CMP as a moral imperative of *hunhu/ubuntu* ethics (2016:77).

There is no doubt that the CMP serves a *gutsaruzhinji* polity rather than a capitalist society. The richness of this culture is displayed or passed on to the next generation through story – telling, proverbs, riddles and idioms. Mangena (2012b:15) gives two examples of proverbs which strengthen community integrity like; "*Mazano marairanwa*" (Wisdom is a shared experience) teaches the youth that individual wisdom amounts to nothing if it is not guided by the wisdom of the group or community. Another proverb he gives is, "*Rume rimwe harikombi churu*" (One man by himself cannot surround an anthill) attests to the fact that an individual needs others to survive in an African set-up. The author can also provide another similar proverb in teaching, "*Chara chimwe hachitsvanyi inda*", (One finger cannot kill a lice) meaning that complicated tasks are only achievable when people work as a group than through individualism. All these *gutsaruzhinji hunhu/ubuntu* teachings point to the fact that *hunhu/ubuntu* cannot be said to be extinct or to be only relevant to primitive societies and that it remains relevant today in the modern or contemporary world to guide leadership into proper service of the people.

Under the good guidance of the *hunhu/ubuntu* CMP, Mangena (2012b) argues, servant leadership by rulers can be realized to steer Zimbabwe to the achievement of the agreed Millennium Development Goals.

6.5   Other philosophers in support of *Gutsaruzhinji* Philosophy

The author now wants to consider contributions by different scholars which are in support of what *gutsaruzhinji* as an *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology stands for. This serves to demonstrate not that *hunhu/ubuntu* is compatible with modernity or the contemporary world, but that new theories should be marshaled by academics to boost the popularity of the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy and further project it as an indigenous philosophy capable of solving the problems besetting Africa and the world at large.

Jonathan Chimakonam (2016) argues in support of Metz's articulation of *hunhu/ubuntu* as a discourse which has just begun to take shape in Africa and should be encouraged to project African philosophy in a sophisticated way to solve African problems using indigenous

knowledge systems. He contends that "It is the proper function of philosophers to employ the tool of logic in re-articulating pertinent worldview ideas at a higher level of understanding. With regard to *ubuntu* in African philosophy, this writer concurs with Metz that this project has only just begun (2014:71). Philosophers are those who speak for themselves. The project of systematizing *ubuntu* carried out in the ethical dimension by Metz represents a new version of *ubuntu* with theoretical sophistication" (Chimakonam; 2016:29) From the above statement, theories like *gutsaruzhinji* embracing *hunhu/ubuntu* as new political philosophies to steer modern day politics receive the same accolades from Chimakonam.

Koenane and Olatunji (2016) lend their support to contemporary views articulating *hunhu/ubuntu* theories to address current situations. They clearly spell out their position by stating, "We argue that *ubuntu*, insofar as it is a moral theory, is competitive and will ultimately prove to be a desirable ethic which could contribute positively towards developing moral (character in the contemporary sociopolitical environment in parts of Africa. Our understanding of *ubuntu* is that it is an all–inclusive worldview that stands for universalised humanness (*ubuntu*/botho) values, which are shared across cultures, and which include care, respect, tolerance, honesty, hospitality, compassion and emphaty" (Koenane and Olatunji, 2016:263).

The *hunhu / ubuntu* values espoused above are the same values which drive the *gutsaruzhinji* polity. The fact that *hunhu/ubuntu* is authentically and indigenously African is hardly ever contested/or seriously questioned as testified by Murithi (2009:226) but scholars have doubted if the concept has any Western equivalents (Tutu, 1999:34-35). This issue of trying to find an equivalent to *hunhu/ubuntu* driven philosophies like *gutsaruzhinji* has confused most of the African father figures' brilliant thoughts like "*ujamaa*", "consciencism" and "negritude" into what came to be known as a corruption of African thought to Western Socialism has not only diluted African philosophical discourse but has also derailed it in a way that discredits socialism in Western Europe and its possible demise affected the development of these important *hunhu/ubuntu* theories in Africa. It is doubtful whether Americans would deny that pragmatism is authentically American simply because it fosters individualism or the commodification/commercialization of human value, as has been pointed out by scholars such as Hanzaeen and Khansari (2011:34-45), Ehala (2009:107-118) and Shoemaker (1999:183-199).

Koanane and Olatunji (2016) argue that "history illustrates that no theory, system or ideology is ever perfect from inception. All strong theories and systems of today have evolved through debates, suggestions, criticism and contributions, not by ceasing to discuss and challenge them" (2016:265). By this analogy, Koenane and Olantunji are suggesting that even *ujamaa*, consciencism and negritude should continue to be perfected as African theories derived from *hunhu/ubuntu* values to guide the future. The debate the author has put forward in articulating the *gutsaruzhinji* polity is just the beginning of a long journey of finding and popularizing African *hunhu/ubuntu*-driven political thought to guide African states to find lasting solutions to good governance when addressing the rampant inequalities and poverty prevalence in the African communities. Admittedly, Koenane and Olantunji state the same when they say, "Accordingly, our understanding of *ubuntu* as a way of life, more so among people in sub-Saharan Africa, is exactly to achieve this determination, the shaping and directing of the thought of insiders" (Ibid). They go further to argue that, although *ubuntu* as a concept originates from Southern Africa, its Pan-African nationalist advocates such as Nabudere, Ramose, Teffor, Letseka, Khoza, Tutu and others do not see its application as limited to Southern Africa only, let alone to South Africa or Zimbabwe. The idea of *hunhu/ubuntu* as a normative moral theory thus takes morality seriously as a vehicle through which we can promote the well-being of our fellow human beings' irrespective of their skin colour or place of origin. Thus, *ubuntu* transcends whatever artificial differences may exist among people. The proper model of this vehicle in the socio-political arena is what the author has argued for as the *gutsaruzhinji* polity.

In recognizing the role of *hunhu/ubuntu* alongside other discourses that are meant to bring about social order (like *gutsaruzhinji*) Preag (2014:37) asserts that, "[t]o call *ubuntu* a global phenomenon means recognizing that global discourses (Christianity, human rights and so on) give a particular expression to the meaning of local traditions such as *ubuntu* but in a way that allows *ubuntu* to feed back into the global discourses as a locally based critique and expansion of those very discourses".

Praeg above seems to be suggesting that, the proper packaging of *ubuntu* for local and international export has to be modelled differently to address different communities. *Gutsaruzhinji* is a model presented by the author to transport *hunhu/ubuntu* values into the political playing field to level the ground so that sanity can prevail through the good values

espoused by *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. Ramose (2005:72) was able to transport *hunhu/ubuntu* in the legal or justive system where he argued:

> [e]ven apart from liquistic analysis, a persuasive philosophical argument can be made that there is a "family atmosphere", that is, a kind of philosophical affinity and kinship among and between the different indigenous people of Africa. No doubt there will be variations within this broad philosophical "family atmosphere". But the blood circulating through the "family" members is the same in its basics. In this sense, *ubuntu* is the basis of African law.

Ubuntu can be brought to bear in any field of human participation or involvement socially, economically and politically. It is a "family" philosophy and is, therefore, all-embracing. What is now needed is to package and promote it in various branches and departments of human existence. The values cannot be extinct as argued by Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013). Koenane and Olatunji (2016) even argue that the ideas of *ujamaa* by Nyerere, Nkrumah's consciencism, negritude by Senghor and Kaunda's humanism did not, per se, fail, but, "These systems were made to fail by world powers" (2016:271). They defend the African *hunhu/ubuntu* "family" position as argued by Ramose, when he contends further that "*Ubuntu* like most other African worldviews, expresses itself in all aspects of life, and it is therefore not strange at all that the concept is used in many different spheres of people's lives. It is a way of life (Mangena, 2012:12). Our conception of *ubuntu* justice and fairness is not a punitive measure, but more a corrective one: …. *Ubuntu* is a principle through which good governance should be promoted, and *ubuntu* discourse in matters of governance stimulates public participation, which encourages accountability in politicians", (ibid) *Gutsaruzhinji* in this context takes care of the *ubuntu* discourse in matters of governance, stimulating public participation, which encourages accountability in politicians as aptly argued by Koenane and Olatunji. *Hunhu/ubuntu* as they correctly spell out, "constitutes a still-viable way of life in which an individual learns to be human and live responsibly and harmoniously with others". Swanson (2007:180) taps into the *ubuntu* discourse by looking at it as a project and ongoing struggle,

> The struggle for [u]buntu, on a local and national scale, served as a philosophy of struggle for people trying to heal the brutality and desperateness of a deeply raptured society. In heart-felt terms, the struggle for [u]buntu becomes the struggle for the dignity and soul of South Africa.

Gutsaruzhinji should be seen as a project of the above struggle to heal the brutality and desperateness of a deeply ruptured society, as alluded to by Swanson. It is, therefore, the

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critical elements of *hunhu/ubuntu* embodied by *gutsaruzhinji* which turns to heal the brutality and desperateness of our socio-economic status 'ruptured' by colonial capitalism. From this understanding, *gutsaruzhinji* as *Ubuntu* an project cannot fail to redirect and heal the political and economic field previously ravaged for the benefit of minority capitalists who knew nothing and cared less about Africans and their way of life. Scholars such as Ramose (2002); Letseka (200; 2013a; 2013b), Metz (2011), Khoza (2002), Mangena (2012a, b) and others, believe that the *hunhu/ubuntu* moral theory could contribute positively and meaningfully to the global community.

Those who argue against the discourse of *hunhu/ubuntu* and *gutsaruzhinji* according to Koenane and Olatunji (2016:274) are only working in a "disguised form of suggesting the death of the African way of life and philosophy of life, which is an old Western project. It has been made before, but has come in the form of rejecting and negating African worldviews in general. We are all aware of the academic project in an attempt to ensure the dominance of Western discourse as the only kind that is rational and effective."

The *hunhu/ubuntu* discourse should, therefore, of necessity be accompanied by practical attempts to create a better life for ordinary citizens of Africa. There should be structural changes which eradicate poverty and create an enabling environment for ordinary people or citizens in any state to prosper. This is a key purpose of *hunhu/ubuntu* driven *gutsaruzhinji* polity. To this end, the author agrees with Koenane and Olantunji's assertion that "*ubuntu* as a moral theory encourages the ethic of responsibility and obligation towards others and this can only be a good thing in our troubled country. For us, *ubuntu* represents what has become known by the iconic phrase, "the struggle continues" (2016:275). Steve Biko lends credence to this view in his categoric pronouncement, "The great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift has to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face" (Biko, 1978:46). The author is tempted to say almost the same that the West has propagated capitalism and socialism, but he now gives the world a more humane way of governance, the *gutsaruzhinji* polity.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the massive contribution made by the scholarly work of Thaddius Metz in defending what *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy stands for in Africa and indicate that more contributions are needed to advance this philosophy in the contemporary world. His summary views that, "We should view scholarly enquiry into, and the political application of *ubuntu* as projects that are only now properly getting started" (Metz 2014:65) In response to Metz's assertion above, the author advocates the embracing of the ideology of *gutsaruzhinji* as informed by *hunhu/ubuntu* to carry the modern generation forward. Metz's Moral Theory supported or complimented by Mangena's Common Moral Position (CMP) makes it clear that *hunhu/ubuntu* theories such as *gutsaruzhinji* cannot just be dismissed at face value since they are rooted firmly in a philosophy (*hunhu/ubuntu*) which has stood the test of times, precolonial, colonial and post-colonial and its relevance is there to demonstrate today. Apparently most theorists care to discuss the philosophy and demonstrate the relevance of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy like Ramose, Tutu, Letseka, Shutte, Broadryk, Eze, Hountondji, Wiredu, Mandela, Gyekye, Bujo, Teffo, Mangena, Samkange and Samkange and many others in fact, affirm the importance of this (*hunhu/ubuntu*) philosophy, as a project accurately described by Koenane and Olantunji this way: "For us *ubuntu* represents what has become known by the iconic phrase, "the struggle continues" This indicates affirming that more scholarly work advancing *hunhu/ubuntu* related theories has to be marshalled in all aspects of human life.

Gutsaruzhinji as a political theory now needs not only to redeem the false accusation of similar African ideas like *ujamaa*, negritude, consciescism, humanism and others which have mistakenly been placed under the heading of socialism to discredit their African originality, but it also needs to be preached to the rest of Africa and all over the world. *Gutsaruzhinji* should mark the strong foundation for African political philosophy capable of guiding contemporary politics to address the social, political and economic challenges and inequalities responsible for the downgrading of African states, ranked among the poorest of States yet richest in resources.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY CONCLUSION

7.0   Introduction

This conclusion begins by revisiting the conceptual base of the hypotheses, themes and argumentation that in combination constitute the thesis. In the process, the links between the concepts are systematized and clarified. Having itemized the contributions made by the *gutsaruzhinji* polity in Zimbabwe, the author then outlines the concluding arguments of the thesis.

7.1   Conclusion

The study is based on the notion that African governance systems have continuously failed to address the challenges emanating from the prevailing inequalities and created by colonial and exclusionary capitalist development paradigm. The main contributing factor is construed as being the lack of a coherent indigenous political ideology to guide the political arena in African states without having to resort to foreign doctrines like socialism or capitalism. Cabral subscribes to this hypothesis and argues that "the ideological deficiency not to say the total lack of ideology within the national liberation movements constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of all … nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory" (Cabral, 1969:22). The absence of a profound theory in Africa is identified as being the catalyst responsible for diluting African traditional thought into what came to be popularly known as African socialism. This discourse according to the author is not correct. Those who fought socialism to promote capitalism tend to muster considerably more quantities of additional energy after which they set in motion actions that are capable of destabilizing and scuttling ideas that are the intellectual products from Africa's father figures such as Julius Nyerere's *ujamaa*; Nkrumah's consciencism; Senghor's negritude, Kaunda's humanism and others.

Osabu-Kle (2000) argues that Africans should not be forced to choose between two Western ideologies: liberal democracy or socialism. The author agrees with Osabu-Kle's contention when he says, "What Africa needs is a democratic practice that is compatible with indigenous culture and not the blind emulation of any foreign political culture. A modernized form of

Africa's own indigenous consensual and democratic culture would provide a necessary and compatible political condition for successful economic growth". (Osabu-Kle, 2000:25). Even in the field of democracy, Osabu-Kle is not convinced that the word "democracy" describes African governance systems properly. Instead he prefers to give it a label that is African and indigenous. Accordingly, Osabu-Kle uses the term "*Jaku-democracy*" to introduce the term into mainstream traditional African settings and discourse and also use it to illustrate that democracy in Africa is different from what the word stands for in the Western thinking. In his own words, Osabu-Kle clearly states,

> *Jaku-democracy* requires some modification of Africa's indigenus democratic practices to satisfy the present day needs of Africans. Jaku-democracy would therefore be the type of culturally compatible democracy suitable for Africa. Calling the system to African mind that the continent's people have their own type of democracy, one they can be proud of, and this contribute to an emancipation from mental slavery (Osabu-Kle, 2000:278).

The arguments, presented by Cabral (1969) and Osabu-Kle (2000) both indicate the need for indigenous African political thought. The author has identified *gutsaruzhinji* as the solution to this political vacuum. *Jaku-democracy* is a brilliant initiative by Osabu-Kle. However, the author feels that any further reference to a foreign word would quickly distort the purpose of 'Jaku' since he termed it *Jaku-democracy*. This, in the author's view, is equivalent to calling *ujamaa*, socialism. The use of the indigenous Shona *term 'gutsaruzhinji'* encourages audience to embrace the traditional teachings of *hunhu/ubuntu.* When one speaks of the *gutsaruzhinji* polity one is, essentially, referring to *hunhu/ubuntu* guided philosophy rather than to either socialism or capitalism. The author also had to extricate *gutsaruzhinji* from politicians who were muddling it with socialist, liberation war struggle slogans. African nationalists benefitted immensely from socialist countries like Russia, China, Cuba and others when they went in search of military arsenals to prosecute the wars of liberation wherever it was necessary to do so. However, the author wishes to avoid the confusion that might arise from the relationship between former liberation war fighters and the countries from which they obtained military hardware. This has the effect of obviating all possible sources of potential confusion in post-independence political discourse which has had to revert back to indigenous governance systems like *gutsaruzhinji* personified through the *nhimbe*, *majangano* or *letseka* traditional African concepts of labour and cooperation.

The discussion about *gutsaruzhinji* cannot proceed without a clear understanding of what *gutsaruzhinji* stands for. Without giving a Shona dictionary meaning of the word as done by Chimhundu (2001), the word is an embodiment of *hunhu/ubuntu* teachings. The parents' blood samples or DNA of *gutsaruzhinji* are the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. It carries these qualities and attributes into the political arena to redress socio-economic inequalities. A deep understanding of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is paramount to knowing how *gutsaruzhinji* interacts with this philosophy in guiding the new political discourse in African governance systems. This is a new mining field which Thaddeus Metz (2014) correctly says is "just the beginning for *ubuntu* to address problems of inequality".

The debate about the importance or lack of *hunhu/ubuntu* in addressing modern day socio-economic and political challenges is attracting criticism and counter criticisms from two angles or fronts. Some Western views try to trivialize the importance and relevance of *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology in the contemporary world. An African view is adamant in its defence of *hunhu/ubuntu* and dismisses such views as the usual conspiracy theories aimed at discrediting African thinkers and categorizing them as inferior to Western philosophers. This is something that is long-established and whose theoretical base resides in the work of such scholars as Emmanuel Kant who did not believe that an African was an intelligent human being. Strides made in the articulation of *hunhu/ubuntu* by scholars like Ramose, Tutu, Shutte, Broodryk, Bujo, Teffo, Mangena, Metz, Samkange and Samkange, Gyekye and others, give reasons why *hunhu/ubuntu*, can be deployed in all facets of human existence in the contemporary world to give proper guidance and lasting solutions to African problems. It is therefore, from this standpoint that *gutsaruzhinji* should not be underestimated and relegated to being just an archaic philosophy.

Sceptics must be persuaded to see the light at the end of the tunnel in the form of continuous intellectual engagement with the practical solutions that abound in *hunhu/ubuntu* driven ideologies.Practical examples of how *gutsaruzhinji* tried to address colonial imbalances and inequalities in the social and economic sphere in Zimbabwe is given as proof that the political theory of *gutsaruzhinji* is a more viable route than either capitalism or socialism. The first ten years after Zimbabwe's independence, the subsequent land reform and the indigenous Economic Empowerment policies are all *gutsaruzhinji*-driven. These constructs acquire their moral justification from the country's *hunhu/ubuntu*, the beacon standing out to validate *gutsaruzhinji* ideology. All in all *gutsaruzhinji* is an answer to Cabral's call for a viable

African political theory to end the socio-economic and political crises besetting African governance. On the contrary, capitalism has again been discredited as an option in Zimbabwe's post- independence polity, given the fact that ESAP proved to be a disastrous policy which could not effect the much needed change to a large social base beset with poverty, incapacitation and marginalization. It, therefore, stands to reason that, African problems need undiluted indigenous African solutions which are richly anchored in Africa's *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. This philosophy has to begin its deployment in all facets of governance in African states.

The first chapter gave a comprehensive view and deep understanding of what hunh/*ubuntu* philosophy is all about. To understand *hunhu/ubuntu* better, one has first of all to know or get a good comprehension of what it entails to be a person in African thought. This is aptly given by Tutu (2004:25) where he points out that "A person is a person through other persons. None of us comes into the world fully-formed. We would not know how to think, or walk, or speak, or behave as human beings. We need other human beings in order to be human". The word *Ubuntu* is derived from the Nguni (IsiZulu) aphorism: *Umuntu umuntu ngabantu*, which is translated as, "A person is a person because of or through others". (Moloketi, 2009:243, Tutu 2004:25-26). In Shona *hunhu* comes from the same aphorism: *munhu unoitwa munhu nevamwe vanhu* (Mangena, 2012a; Samkange and Samkange, 1980:38). (An African is not a rugged individual, but a person living within a community). In a hostile environment, it is only through such community solidarity that hunger, isolation deprivation, poverty and other emerging challenges can be survived because of the community's brotherly and sisterly concern, co-operation, care and sharing. *Hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy believes in group solidarity which is central to the survival of African communities (Dia, 1992; Mbigi and Maree, 2005:75). The philosophy represents an African conception of human beings and their relationship with the community that embodies the ethics defining Africans and their social behaviours (ibid). Ramose (2002:325) argues that the prefix *ubu* must be understood as "being-becoming" and thus as embracing the idea of motion, while the *ntu* may be construed as the "temporarily having become". Understood from this perspective, *ubuntu* is about becoming; it is what people must strive to become, not necessarily what they are.

Hunhu/Ubuntu application is pervasive in almost all parts of the African continent. *Hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is integrated into all aspects of day to day life throughout Africa and is a concept shared by all tribes in Southern, Central, West and East Africa amongst

people of Bantu origin (Rwelamila, Talukhaba and Ngovi, 1999:38). The values contained in *hunhu/ubuntu* ideology are the same values which *gutsaruzhinji* set itself to try and achieve in modern day Zimbabwe. *Hunhu/ubuntu* has further to be described as the capacity in an African culture to express compassion, reciprocity, unity, dignity, cooperation, humanity and mutuality in the interests of building and maintaining communities with justice and mutual caring (Khoza, 2006:6; Luhabe, 2002:103; Mandela, 2006:xxv; Tutu, 1999:34-35). Central to the idea of *hunhu/ubuntu* is living life day to day in a way that promotes the well-being of every citizen.

With regard to *ubuntu*, Koenane and Olatunji (2016) say, "The idea of *ubuntu* as a normative moral theory takes morality seriously as a vehicle through which we can promote the well being of our fellow human beings irrespective of their skin colour or place of origin" (2016:268). The whole essence of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy is being able to live well or relate well for the benefit of others. One is taught to prioritise group interest above individual self-seeking desires or interests. Capitalist tendencies have completely no room in *hunhu/ubuntu* practice. Metz (2014) weighs in on this notion when he contends that, "*ubuntu* when interpreted as an ethical theory is well understood to prescribe honouring relationships of sharing a way of life and caring for others' quality of life. Sharing a way of life is roughly a matter of enjoying a sense of togetherness and engaging in joint projects, while caring for others' quality of life consists of doing what is likely to make others better off for their sake and typically consequent to sympathy with them" (2014:71). The *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy therefore, sees people in the plural sense not as individuals.

The plural sense of *hunhu/ubuntu* is aptly summarized by Mbiti's (1969/2005) dictum, "I am because we are and, since we are, therefore I am". Sekou Toure (1961) called this "the communion of persons", whereby "being" is a function of the "us" or "we" as opposed to the "I" as found in "the autonomy of individuals", that is celebrated in the West, as seen in the Rene Descartes aphorism, "*Cogito ergo sum*" (I think therefore I am). Pobee (1979) defines the African being in terms of what he calls "*cognitus ego sum*" which means "I am related by blood, therefore I exist".

Another important aspect of *hunhu/ubuntu* is linking the living to the living-dead (ancestors), and the unborn children as given by Nabudere (2002:3). This is echoed by Ramose (2004) who calls it "the ontology of the invisible beings" or calls it adiological aspect of

hunhu/ubuntu" where the three "beings" the living-dead-ancestors; report to God Almighty and Creator of all things in order to serve the current living physically on earth. The last group has also to take care of the unborn children and must therefore, plan well for their future wellbeing. This symbiotic relationship is important in keeping the unity of the family and the continuous dialogue of what he calls the "triadic". The foundation or basic tenets of *hunhu*/ubutnu are therefore, harmonious values which include care, respect, tolerance, honesty, hospitality, compassion, empathy, unity, love, fortgiveness and cooperation. These values, therefore, need cultivation in the contemporary world.

The Second Chapter gave a detailed exposition of *gutsaruzhinji*. The Shona meaning of the word "*gutsaruzhinji*" was given by Chimhundu (2001:348) as "*Marongerwo eupfumi munyika anoitwa nehurumende, ane chinangwa chokuti munhu wese akwanise kuwana zvinomukwanira*", meaning (Equitable distribution of wealth to satisfy every citizen). Hannah (1961:205) defined *gutsaruzhinji* as "satisfying the majority". The emphasis of "majority interest and the satisfaction of their needs" is compatible with the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. The individual only exist in the plural sense and in addressing the needs of the majority. The word *gutsaruzhinji* was first used by Mugabe who equated it to the pre-colonial traditional cultural practice of *nhimbe* or *majangan*o where people spend time to work in their fellow neighbour's field to assist with labour to boost food production.

The free labour provided by a group of neighbours is reciprocated in turns to ensure every member of the community has enough food to feed on for a whole year. The "*nhimbe*" practice became a personification of *gutsaruzhinji*. It should be borne in mind that the same '*nhimbe*" was a cultural practice displaying the real practice and implementation of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy. It therefore, necessarily follows that *gutsaruzhinji* being the personification of *nhimbe* or *majangano* or *lekgotla* or *ketsema*: all depicting the harmonious working together and helping one another has become a political vehicle carrying *hunhu/ubuntu* to governance systems. Mangena (2014) was able to summarise the *gutsaruzhinji* philosophy as it was known to Mugabe, when he said:

> In Zimbabwe, this trend of philosophy was popularized by Robert Gabriel Mugabe's socialism that was blended by a local ideology called *gutsaruzhinji* (promoting the interest of the majority) ….. Mugabe believed that only a well-fed, healthy and educated nation would lead to socio-political and economic development and that self-seeking attitudes would be retrogressive to this development. So, *gutsaruzhinji*, a philosophy which was premised on the idea

of communal belonging was going to be the panacea to the problems affecting this new Zimbabwe (Mangena, 2014:100).

What is important from Mangena's citation above is the fact that *gutsaruzhinji* was chosen as a philosophy to address colonial imbalances. Secondly, *gutsaruzhinji* was chosen because it was part of the traditional idea of communal belonging which clearly projects it as a product of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy since the ideology was prevalent in so-called "primitive" communal settings. Thirdly, *gutsaruzhinji* was to be the replacement of socialism in Zimbabwe. The fourth and most important point was that *gutsaruzhinji* was to end colonial capitalism by embracing "majority interest" instead of "self-seeking attitudes" which is the basis of Western capitalism.

Gutsaruzhinji having ben newly propagated by Mugabe, very few scholars have taken an interest in it, enough to want to study it and articulate its theoretical construct. Mangena (2014) only mentions what Mugabe said about his new philosophy and what he intended to achieve through it. Similarly, Chinyowa (2007) is also credited for taking note of the fact that Zimbabwe's political theory was being driven by *gutsaruzhinji* though he did not see the difference between *gutsaruzhinji* and socialism. This was the mistake made by most of the people who did not separate the two distinct ideologies (socialism and *gutsaruzhinji*). Consequently, the author took on the challenge to bring clarity to this new ideology and develop it alongside its source, *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy.

Other scholars, including Chinyowa confused the two, as follows:

> The new ideology was believed to be properly geared towards creating an equitable distribution of the means of production and consumption. It was expected to eliminate the social and economic inequalities that were associated with colonial capitalism. It is thus not surprising that the immediate post-independence period was characterized by slogans castigating colonialism and imperialism and hailing the ideology of socialism which became popularly known as the *gutsaruzhinji* (satisfaction for all) doctrine (Chinyowa, 2007:188)

We may note a number of issues from Chiyowa's statement. Firstly, he agrees with Mangena that *gutsaruzhinji* was meant to address colonial imbalances and inequality caused by apartheid capitalist policies. Secondly, he also saw *gutsaruzhinji* as a declaration of the end of capitalist mode of social and economic development. Thirdly, *gutsaruzhinji* was to ensure that the multinationals expropriating wealth outside the country while impoverishing the

majority of Zimbabwean people was to end as was "characterized by slogans castigating colonialism and imperialism" The fourth point, was that while Zimbabwe supported socialist countries which assisted it with material and moral support during the war of liberation, the new philosophy was not called socialism but *gutsaruzhinji*. This is where most people lost it. They could not see that the deliberate choice of the word *gutsaruzhinji* also meant a different ideology from socialism. Some politicians were swayed to remain with the socialist mindset yet it was a new era of *hunhu/ubuntu* driven *gutsaruzhinji*.

However, Mugabe remained clear about which philosophy was guiding him, as he explained the difference between *gutsaruzhinji* and socialism, by choosing to say:

> In our culture, we have traits of socialist practice – for example, "*nhimbe*" or "*majangano*" communal use of land and so on. ZANU-PF wants to see a fair distribution of wealth and natural resources in Zimbabwe … equal opportunity and access to all social services such as education, health and others (Zimbabwe News, (Vol.16, May/June) 1985:20).

Mugabe clarifies a few issues from his statement above. Firstly, he is very clear, his *gutsaruzhinji* draws from or is animated by *hunhu/ubuntu* cultural practice of "*nhimbe*" or "*majangano*". Secondly, this practice (*nhimbe*) was used to end shortages and lack among the people or community since people were assisted to get enough food. By adopting *gutsaruzhinji*, clearly it meant ending poverty and inequalities in the country. Thirdly, *gutsaruzhinji* entails getting "equal opportunity and access to all social services", in a way which enables every person to work hard and contribute meaningfully towards his/her own welfare through collective effort. This distinction of *gutsaruzhinji* as "*nhimbe*" isolates it from Western Socialism. The only danger which remained was Mugabe was not bold enough to categorically state that the era of socialism as it assisted the liberation struggle was over. Similarly, in the same manner, the defeated capitalists could not be allowed to extend their hegemonic hold on the economy.

Since most academics saw no difference between the new ideology of *gutsaruzhinji* and socialism, the author has responded to the call by Metz to amplify the discussion on *hunhu/ubuntu'*. Accordingly, the discourse is just beginning, hence *gutsaruzhinji* as the proper vehicle carrying it (*hunhu/ubuntu*) is breaking the ice. It is also pertinent to note that African political ideas which tried to identify with traditional African culture like Nyerere's *Ujamaa*, were quickly branded African socialism without engaging in deeper consideration of

the values and potential in emancipating the marginalized citizens. The author has taken the challenge to validate *gutsaruzhinji* not only as a philosophy but also as a practice used in Zimbabwe to change the social and economic status of citizens in the first decade post-independence.

Chapter Three of this thesis highlights how *gutsaruzhinji*-driven policies changed the education system and the health delivery system throughout the country as well as the infrastructure and became the new hope for socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe.

Another important teaching in the *gutsaruzhinji*'s *hunhu/ubuntu* driven values which saw immediate implementation was reconciliation. Mugabe who was driven by the culturally rich philosophy (*gutsaruzhinji*) went on to preach reconciliation with his former political enemies (the white colonisers) emphasizing love, unity and togetherness in order to steer the nation forward peacefully. In his independence speech marking the beginning of his Executive duties under *gutsaruzhinji* guidance, he declared that, "Henceforth you and I must strive to adapt ourselves intellectually and spiritually to the reality of our political change and relate to each other as brothers bound one to another by a bond of comradeship … If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that bids you to me and me to you… Surely this is now time to beat our swords into plough shares, so that we can attend to the problems of developing our economy and our society" (Mugabe, 1980).

It is clear from Mugabe's speech that elements of *hunhu/ubuntu* values like love, unity, cooperation and forgiveness were evidently driving him to adopt this important policy of reconciliation. His emphasis that people should 'relate to each other as brothers bound to one another by a bond of comradeship" is in keeping with Mbiti's dictum, 'I am because you are and since we are, therefore I am". This is the overriding ethical value of *hunhu/ubuntu*'s *gutsaruzhinji* theory. As argued by Metz (2014), *hunhu/ubuntu* does not consider skin pigmentation. Mugabe tapped into this notion when he argued, "Our majority rule would easily turn into inhuman rule if we oppressed, persecuted or harassed those who do not look or think like the majority of us" (ibid). Through this statement, Mugabe presented his *gutsaruzhinji* as an inclusive, non-racial and epitomized freedom, unity and love. It was largely this policy which made most of the minority white former colonisers to stay in Zimbabwe and stop fleeing to Europe and also begin to participate in the broader picture of new nation building.

Government went on to declare primary education free and compulsory to every child from 1980 onwards (Gwarinda, 1985:55). Takawira Gwarinda goes on to link the *gutsaruzhinji* mass education to its communalistic and *hunhu/ubuntu* values, when he contend;

> Where elitist education focuses on individualism, mass education, being socialist (*gutsaruzhinji*) education stresses collectivism and communal ethics … Under socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) the satisfaction of the group is the satisfaction of the individual …. Therefore, mass education ensures that there cannot arise a special group of parasites who will use education to maintain a position of superiority (Gwarinda, 1985:55).

The education system became the new *gutsaruzhinji* vehicle of social transformation allowing the marginalized black children the opportunity to gain literacy and numeracy in proportional numbers which quickly earned Zimbabwe as the most literate nation with 92% literacy rate (Shizha and Kariwo, 2011:ix). This was echoed by Dashwood (2000) confirming that "Until 1991 primary education was free for everyone, and government was successful in ensuring that even the very poorest had access to education" (Dashwood, 2000:41). This became the beacon of one of the notable successes of *gutsaruzhinji* polity.

The *gutsaruzhinji* policy was also deployed in the health delivery system, where government introduced free health care services for those earning less than $150.00 per month (GoZ, 1990:36). Government went further to ensure that every citizen in the communal villages had access to good health care. It trained and deployed village health workers in every village and gave them free medicine to treat basic ailments, like malaria, headache and other minor diseases (GoZ, 1980:36).

Many health schemes were introduced broadening the health access by the poor. The practice and use of traditional medicine by the Traditional Medical Practitioners was authored through an Act of Parliament in 1981, known as the Traditional Medical Practitioners Act (1981). This enabled the Zimbabwe Traditional Healers Association to practice with government support and approval. The health needs of the generality of the people were taken care of, hence another milestone in the implementation of *gutsaruzhinji* driven policies.

In the agricultural sector, government embarked on a partial redistribution of land to the landless people by buying land from the white farmers under "willing sellers of commercial farm land and willing buyer" as was provided for in the 1979 Lancaster House land agreement (Moyo, 1990:186). Government also made deliberate grain price increases to

encourage and support peasant farmers to continue growing enough food to get surpluses to sell on the open market to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) depots established throughout the administrative districts. This is confirmed by Hebert (1990) who says:

> The government offered price incentives to peasant farmers. In 1981 season, the government increased the price of maize from $85 per tone to $120 per tonne. In 1987, the government positively discriminated in favour of peasant farmers offering them $150 per tonne compared to only $100 per tonne to commercial farmers (Hebert, 1990:89-98).

Government was inclined to see the ordinary peasant farmers improving their socio-economic status through effective agricultural production. Scoones highlights some of the *gutsaruzhinji* agricultural successes post-independence when he states that "Beef exports became an important foreign exchange earner for the country in 1980 to the 1990s" (Scoones, 2014:21).

In the manufacturing industries the *gutsaruzhinji* model was again deployed with government clearly spelling its position that it was not taking the Western socialist route of nationalizing industries. This was made clear by Maurice Nyagumbo who stated that; "It is the government's view that nationalization is not the right thing for any socialist (*gutsaruzhinji*) government to do. Instead, the government believes that it should side with the private sector, get expertise in industrialisation then put its own industries which will compete with the private sector" (Moto, 1983:5).

Government allowed the growth and strengthening of industries to equip black entrance into the sector as well as boost the job market, instead of chasing the previous owners. The development of trust taken by government was also seen by how it decentralized power and responsibilities from central government to the village ward levels. This marked a new era of good democratic decision-making systems empowering ordinary citizens to take on effective roles in shaping their future and that of their next generation. B.C. Smith (1985) observed this new development trajectory and conceded that, "Decentralisation is seen as being particularly relevant to meeting the needs of the poor. It is argued that if development is to mean eradication of poverty, inequality and material deprivation, it must engage the involvement and mobilization of the poor" (Smith, 1985:186).

The decentralization of governance systems coupled with the restoration of the traditional leadership roles of chiefs and headman, became a solid example of *gutsaruzhinji* polity in Zimbabwe. It could be seen that the ruling party was able to implement the *gutsaruzhinji*

policies because it had bound itself with a strict leadership Code which compelled leaders to serve the people not their selfish interests. Section 7 and 8 of the ZANU-PF Leadership Code are very clear:

> The party firmly upholds the principle of equality of man. Therefore, publicly or privately, a leader may not advocate of any of the following (i) Tribalism (ii) Regionalism (iii) Sectionalism (iv) Nepotism (v) Racism (iv) Sexual discrimination. Therefore, it is decreed that a leader shall not (a) accept or obtain from any person a gift or consideration as inducement or reward for doing or failing to do or for having done or (b) give or offer a gift to any person as inducement to the other person. Section 8 forbids leaders from acquiring extra properties or engaging in profit making business other than living from his/her salary.

This became the source of a servant leadership which is guided by *hunhu/ubuntu* values as argued by Mangena (2015). *Gutsaruzhinji* values therefore shaped the governing party's ethical conduct in keeping with *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy as can be noted from their Leadership Code (1985).

Chapter Four of this thesis describes a new contradiction to the practice of *gutsaruzhinji* when government was coerced to adopt a new economic policy called ESAP and drifted away from *gutsaruzhinji* polity, thus revolving back to capitalism. ESAP which was a Washington Consensus project for African developing countries had disastrous consequences to the Zimbabwean economy and polity. Unlike *gutsaruzhinji* where people are consulted to say what development projects they want to carryout, ESAP as argued by Saunders (1996) contained the usual collection of World Bank-inspired reforms, trade and currency deregulation, devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, movement towards high interest rates, the lifting of price controls, chopping of "social spending" and removal of consumer subsidies. The whole programme was mooted in Washington in United States of America by what is known as the "Washington Consensus".

Saunders lamented the catastrophic results the whole project had in Zimbabwe.. He argued, "In a short time, ESAP's World Bank-inspired reforms has ripped into the existing economic and social infrastructure shifting the focus of many mass-oriented development social programs away from redistribution toward management defined and limited, public resources" (Saunders, 1996:8).

ESAP was a straitjacket policy instrument of the IMF and World Bank, focusing on their financial interests as money lenders. Once financial considerations or interests, take priority over people's welfare needs, no doubt capitalism would be on the driver's seat, while *gutsaruzhinji* was taken hostage and prisoner without trial for ten years. Nathan Shamuyarira (a minister in the Mugabe government then) made a stunning confession, "When the cabinet accepted the ESAP programme, I predicted it would fail and retard our economy. Today I am glad that it has failed, because it was a capitalist project. I was totally against it"(Bond etal 2001:204). This confession is a vindication that only *gutsaruzhinji* polity is needed to address the marginalized people's socio–economic plight. Morgan Tsvangirai (the then secretary General of Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union ZCTU) mocked the whole ESAP programme when he sarcastically said, "We accept that it (ESAP) will succeed in making a few people richer and majority of people poor. Any country that is serious about structural reform, but doesn't deal with the historical imbalance of land reform, hasn't done anything" (Love, 2000:33-34).

No sooner had the government of Zimbabwe started the programme of ESAP, than they realised that *gutsaruzhinji* is the panacea to development in Zimbabwe. By year 2000, no one could stop the people from redeeming themselves from the evil which had come against their progress in the name of ESAP. Jonathan Moyo (2001) supported the people's Third Chimurenga stating that; "ESAP was born dead, and it has taken a lot of good to make a bad thing better. There is no economic growth … we should get land reform first and use it as a pivotal issue and the core of the problem. Every other issue is consequential" (Bond et al 2002:201-3). The land reform become the new *gutsaruzhinji* focus in year 2000 onwards. Guided by Moyo's concluding remarks, where he categorically stated that, "our socialism (*gutsaruzhinji*) is Land driven" (ibid.)

Chapter Five of this thesis amplifies the fact that *gutsaruzhinji* was largely land-driven as argued by Moyo (2001) The author argues that the Fast Track Land reform programme can be justified by an appeal to *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which is essentially a *gutsaruzhinji* construct. For the purpose of a clearer understanding, it is instructive to examine the content of John Rawls Theory of Justice (1971).

Ramose (1999) argues in support of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which he believes promotes group or communal interests against individual interest. Ramose holds that historical

injustices done by the colonial whites needed to be addressed without compromise. He contends that, "it is the hour to assert and reaffirm the dignity of the African precisely by seizing the initiative to remedy historical injustice with historical justice. It is the reason of the return of the land to its original owners. It is the age of restitution and reparation to Africa" (Ramose, 2002b:608).

The taking back of the land from minority white farmers who had force- fully taken it from them during colonization, Zimbabweans applying a "remedy to historical injustice with historical justice" and getting "restitution" especially where some improvements on the farm were made. Land is part of the *ubuntu/ ubuntu*'s triadic relationship' and where people had to connect with their ancestral land, through a communion of the living and living-dead. People were happy to revert to the graves of their forefathers where they were displaced. Dei (1994) rekindles this flame when he asserts that, "the African conception of the triadic constitution of community as including the living, the dead (ancestors) and the yet to be born" (Dei 1994:12). This marked the ontological and metaphysical relevance of human beings and their environment or land as given to them by their creator. Land therefore in the *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy was and remains an asset by inheritance from the living-dead (ancestors) which cannot be sold or transferred to foreigners since it is passed to generations by the ancestors. In clarifying the argument, Taringa states that,

> Land belongs to the living, the unborn and the dead. The Chief acts as the trustee. He allocates land to people. Land rights are vested in cooperative groups that have overriding rights over those of individuals … So the fundamental attitude to land is a religious one and is based on fear of mystical sanction by the ancestors. Land is sacred because it bears the remains of the ancestors particularly in the form of graves of the chiefs (Taringa, 2016i:204-5).

The FTLR was, therefore, restoration of lost heritage. In it and through it *hunhu/ubuntu* values were revitalized. In short *gutsaruzhinji* was achieved.

The justification of FTLR as *gutsaruzhinji* from John Rawls' justice theory is clear, where Rawls argues that justice is what free and equal persons would agree to as the basic terms of social cooperation in the conditions that are fair for this purpose (Arneson, 2008:1). The black peasants were dispossessed of their land without their consent. This breach of justice by the colonisers had no justification. Taking it through the FTLR was instituting justice. Rawls is so clear on this and says, "For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure

of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the divisions of advantages from social cooperation, by major institutions and the principal economic and social arrangements" (Rawls, 1971:6). Rawls societal benefit has justification according to Rawls' articulation of Justice. Menkiti corroborates Rawls' argument when he contends that, "As a far as Africans are concerned, the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life," (Menkiti, 1984:171). Similarly, the redistribution of land to the majority of landless black people, taking it from the few or minority white colonisers who in this case had no moral support since they had forcibly taken it from their rightful owners (the black ancestoral forefather).

The *gutsaruzhinji* policies in both land reform and IEEA find justification in Metz's moral theory are supported and backed up by Mangena's CMP (2012A:10). *Gutsaruzhunji* also draws support and justification from Rawls' second principle of Justice and Berthan's principle of utility theory (2009).

Metz argues that "In the present context, that means that an unfriendly action by the state towards whites, such as expropriation of land they currently hold is justified only if it is likely to help those harmed by the land being held by whites that is, dispossessed blacks" (Metz, 2011:553). The FTLR gave land to the landless because land was the only source of income and livelihood; hence according to Metz, it was justified since it benefited the former dispossessed owner, (the blacks) in a way which improved their lives. He, however, advises government to give financial support to the black farmers to maximize their benefit. This view is supported by Rawls' second principle of justice which holds that, social and economic inequalities can be justified only if it works to the advantage of the least advantaged members of society" (Sandel, 2009:11). The peasants were the least advantaged members of society in Zimbabwe. Berthan's principle of utility also states that, "We should do whatever will produce the greatest of happiness" (Sandel, 2009:3). The IEEA is viewed as having given the people a new lease of life by awarding them 51% shares to 49% remaining to the owner of the company. The above theories are in support of *gutsaruzhinji* polity.

The author concludes Chapter Six, by agreeing with Metz, that the articulation of *hunhu/ubuntu*-based theories to change the people's livelihood in Africa has just begun. *Gutsaruzhinji* is one such project which is breaking the ground to give a message on African

governance that says this *hunhu /ubuntu*-loaded political philosophy (*gutsaruzhinji*) has to be considered as a breakthrough to African political thought. African states should embrace it to better serve the interests of their people as well as emancipate them from poverty and marginalization caused by a century of colonization and its ugly crude capitalism.

7.2   Limitation of the study

Gutsaruzhinji is a new philosophy which not many scholars have dared to engage it and made substantive researches on it. The two scholars Mangena (2014) and Chinyowa (2008) only make mention of how the word was used alongside socialism without giving their own views about why they consider *gutsaruzhinji* to be a separate entity. The author, however, is grateful for their work as it gives proof that it was part of post–colonial Zimbabwe's agenda. Chinhundu (2001) gave a dictionary meaning of the word as he understood it. Life examples of how *gutsaruzhinji* was applied to post–independence Zimbabwe remained the onerous task of the author. There was a great need to have other views critiquing the subject, for the better scrutiny by the reader. The author, however, set himself the task of convincing the reader that *gutsaruzhinji* is not only an indispensable philosophy born out of traditional African *hunhu/ubuntu* values, but that it is also capable of restoring and guiding the effective redistribution of wealth not only to Zimbabwe but to most African states ravaged by separatist colonial capitalist systems.

The second challenge is that *gutsaruzhinji*'s appeal to *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy which largely informs it or 'the tree of life' to it according to Ramose (1999) is still an expanse of virgin territory where different scholars are still contesting *hunhu/ubuntu* of its relevance in the contemporary world as seen in the argument by Metolino and Kwindingwi (2013) declaring "the end of *ubuntu*". The evaluation of both *gutsaruzhinji* and *hunhu/ubuntu*, now tends to be subjected to individual perceptions, especially in view of how different people or scholars view *hunhu/ubuntu* doctrines.

The third and last hurdle, is the fact that Zimbabwe's social and economic status has been buttered by two competing periods of ESAP and FTLR alongside IEEA, whose effects are not yet over but are still ongoing. This coupled with the long stay of Robert Mugabe at the helm of governance makes it difficult to separate poor governance, the now rampant corruption and the *gutsaruzhinji* theory per se. Any scholars or ordinary observers can

mistake one of the three for the causes of the socio-economic meltdown currently besetting Zimbabwe. However, those with good binoculars like the author can see through the mist.

7.3   Recommendations for further study

The author acknowledges and is very much alive to the fact that *gutsaruzhinji* is anchored on two important pillars, firstly *gutsaruzhinji* is informed by the communitarian view greatly linked to or embedded in *hunhu / ubuntu* philosophy. Secondly, *gutsaruzhinji* derives support and livelihood from moral and justice theories. To address the first cause of *hunhu/ ubuntu* influence, scholars should start doing what Thaddeus Metz is advocating. There is a need to write and research more on how the philosophy of *hunhu / ubuntu* can be effectively used to better people's lives in the contemporary world. Scholars like Mangena and Chitando (2015) who have linked the possible achievement of Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) to the proper deployment of *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy are considered to have embarked on this long journey alluded to by Metz (2014). More ammunition intellectually, needs to be marshaled to articulate the relevance and importance of this indigenous philosophy to fulfill Steve Biko's dream stipulated when he said, "The great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift has to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face" (Biko, 1978:46). This is only possible through massive intellectual engagement in exposing the new saviour born out of African *hunhu/ubuntu* philosophy just as Bishop Desmond Tutu prophesied "Africans have this thing called *ubuntu*...the essence of being human. It is part of the gift Africans will give the world" (Tutu 2008:2). We can only give this gift by marketing it until it becomes acceptable to all, locally and internationally.

More theories articulating issues of morality and justice guided by a deeper appreciation of *hunhu/ Ubuntu,* again need to be formulated and marshaled for the intellectual community so that morality and justice can continue to embrace *hunhu/ ubuntu* values. It would be better still, if academics arrived at what all agree is the new "*hunhu/ubuntu* universal moral and justice theory".

More literature capturing the teething problems in the implementation of the tenets of *gutsaruzhinji* interrogated to bring clarity to whether the challenges faced were policy-related or simply part of Africa political leadership which seems to be drifting away from *hunhu/*

ubuntu practice, by distancing themselves from the people in pursuit of selfish interest, as stated by Barack Obama who ,speaking in Addis Abba in Ethiopia in 2015, accused African heads of states to be richer that their economies. The author desires to advise the intellectual community to take this thesis as a wake-up call to start to interrogate the *gutsaruzhinji* polity afresh and not to confuse socialism or what became known as African socialism with *gutsaruzhinji*. After all, even now, revisionists are beginning to appreciate the value of Nyerere's *ujamaa* philosophy than previous critics who had thrown it in the dustbin.

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