# EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Department of Political and Social Sciences

Organising for Victory... and Defeat?
The Organisational Strategy of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (1975-1996)

by

Mónica Méndez-Lago

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining
the Degree of Doctor of the European University Institute

Examining Jury:
Prof. Stefano Bartolini (EUI-Supervisor)
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MCD

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INTRODUCTION

From the transition to democracy in 1975 the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) geared its organisational strategy towards the goal of victory, which occurred at the 1982 elections. In that short span of time it built a party organisation from scratch that contributed to its dominance in Spanish politics for nearly fifteen years, until it was defeated in the 1996 elections. Although its defeat can be attributed to many other factors, its organisational form and strategy failed to improve its declining electoral prospects before defeat occurred and can be considered an important contributing factor.

This thesis is about political parties, although it is only focused on one political party, the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party. Moreover, it studies only certain aspects of political parties, namely the way they develop their organisation in the pursuit of their electoral goals. Yet, it is intended to be framed into questions that regard more general issues regarding the functioning and study of political parties and their organisation, and ultimately, democratic governance. The central role of political parties in democratic system has for long attracted political scientists to studying their organisation, functioning and interaction. Parties seem to be a good point of departure to speculate on the direction of current democratic political systems given that, as Katz and Mair (1995: 21) have noted, "each model of party organisation has an associated model of democracy".

The study of party organisation from a systemic perspective has focused on the tasks or functions parties fulfil in the political system. To an extent, the way parties are organised is influenced by the need to perform these functions, but at the same time the way they are organise influences the extent to which parties will continue to be the optimal means to perform them (Strøm and Svåsand 1996: 6). The functions traditionally performed by political parties are the provision of candidates for public office, the articulation and aggregation of social interests, the identification of goals and the structuration of the vote. These functions can be carried out in very different ways along time and across parties, but they can also lose their relevance and therefore, stop being performed or start being performed by other organisations. Most authors agree that, although parties have gradually stopped being the only actor in charge of the functions they used to carry out, they still have the important function of selecting and recruiting political personnel and candidates for public office. Unlike with the rest

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of the functions ascribed to parties, they have maintained their monopoly in the presentation of candidates at elections (Sartori 1976: 64, Maor 1997: 6).

Political parties can also be treated as units of analysis, to be studied not just for their consequences on the political system, but also from the perspective of the individual party organisations. Some analyses have explored the missing link between the macro processes at the systemic level, the meso level of organisations and the micro world of individual behaviour and attitudes, i.e., how parties have tried to modify their environments and have been transformed by this very same environment. Parties may use organisational tools and resources to modify their environments in their favour. Regarding the meso-micro link, organisational structuring is a way to set limits to competition, by creating, maintaining and expand a stable electorate that develop an identification with the ideology, values, and programs of a party.

Thus, in order to obtain and keep electoral support, political parties (and politicians) can use several means: they may advocate policies that they will implement when and if they get into power, or laws they will defend in parliament. They may also use and develop their organisations, either to be more responsive and anticipate societal needs and preferences, to "encapsulate" it so as to develop a fairly stable basis of support, or at the very least to convey their messages and policies to the electorate. The mobilisation of support can take place in different manners, all of which involve to different extents diverse organisational structures, rules, practices and activities. *The design and use of organisational resources for the mobilisation of support are the core aspects of party strategy studied in this thesis.*

The establishment of a connection between parties and the electorate, however loose this might be, involves action from individuals inside political parties and involves choice among different possible organisational structures (see Koelble 1992). Therefore the relationship (or the lack of it) between parties and citizens is not achieved automatically, but comes to a large extent as a result of a particular course of action followed by party actors, which develop a particular type of organisation, that must be established and sustained. Even if the decision is not to develop a strong organisation in order to mobilise support, these tasks will have to be performed either by other organisations or by professionals hired by politicians.

Parties are not unitary actors, but complex organisations comprised of many individuals each with her or his own agenda. The interaction of these individuals is "the driving force of party life" (Katz and Mair 1990: 13). Hence, political parties have also been studied from the

perspective of politicians, individually or collectively considered.[1] From this perspective. political parties solve several collective action problems of individual politicians (see Aldrich 1995[2]), of which the most interesting for this thesis is the one that concerns the mobilisation of support. They also solve collective action problems of voters, but this will not be addressed here.

The analysis of the PSOE's organisational strategy will mainly focus on party leaders and organisers. Politicians are interesting to study because they are subject to various influences. To get access to, or to remain in office individual politicians seek to keep the support both of their party and of the electorate. Therefore, decisions concerning organisational issues directed at the mobilisation of support are likely to be taken with caution, given that they may also affect the situation of the very same persons taking the decisions. Throughout the thesis it is stated that intentions are different from outcomes, and therefore, although much attention is given to the ideas and intentions expressed by party leaders, officials and organisers or by the whole party in different documents, it is acknowledged that the outcome of their decisions, plans and strategies are influenced by different factors that may make the outcome depart from the initial plan. The only such factors that will be examined are those which belong to the party organisation itself.

This thesis operates at two levels. At the theoretical/analytical level it aims to apply the notion of organisational strategy to the development of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party using a perspective that combines the analysis of processes at the micro level of individual politicians, who are affected by the immediate environment in which they operate (the party) and the external one (the political system), with the examination of the resulting choices concerning the way a political party is structured and functions. Thus, the analytical framework will insist on the double nature of constraints to which party leaders and organisers are subject: external constraints that characterise the political and social environment in which parties operate, and the internal constraint that characterises the organisation/institution in which these leaders make their decisions. The thesis also attempts to depict the organisational strategies followed by the PSOE in the period studied, in relation to three items: membership policy,

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[1] See Koelble 1996: 255 for a similar definition of parties. "..the model characterises political parties as a means of obtaining a set of common goals - policies, votes and office- for a wide group of individuals."

[2] "Why... do politicians create and recreate the party, exploit its features, or ignore its dictates? It has been in their interests to do so" (Aldrich 1995: 21). "Election requires persuading members of the public to support that candidacy and mobilizing as many of those supporters as possible. This is a problem of collective action. How do candidates get supporters to vote for them... as well as get them to provide the cadre of workers and contribute the resources needed to win election? The political party has long been the solution (Aldrich 1995: 23).

relations with unions and other secondary organisations, and the relationship with the electorate at large.

At the empirical level, this thesis aims to avoid the problem pointed out by Katz and Mair (1994: 1) regarding the scarcity of empirical work on party organisations by relying on various types of empirical data. As a result, the thesis presents a novel and detailed study of the development of the PSOE from 1975 to 1996, specifically focused on its organisational aspects.[3] Both at the theoretical and at the empirical level the thesis attempts to solve the problem of the underdevelopment of good indicators of different aspects of party organisations, which is linked to the scarcity of empirical analyses. This thesis argues in favour of a "sophistication" of the indicators used in the study of party organisations. For instance, it is not enough to say that members are less needed/wanted in parties because the costs in getting and retaining them outweigh the benefits they provide, since these costs and benefits may also be altered by modifying members' role within the party organisation. Thus, the search for indicators has to go further in order to capture the ways in which party leaders and organisers not only take present costs and benefits into account, but also plan deliberate action to modify them.

The Spanish Workers' Socialist Party

The thesis analyses the organisational development of the Spanish Socialist Party from the transition to democracy in Spain until the last general elections in 1996. The Spanish Socialist Party was founded at the end of the 19th century (1888), and became an important party during the Second Republic (1931-36). It nearly disappeared from the scene during Franco's regime and was then reconstructed at the end of the 1960s and during the first half of the 1970s.

The PSOE's history is studied only insofar as it can provide explanations of the current development of its organisation. This serves to study the influence of the historical legacy, i.e., whether and how past strategies may constrain present choices over organisational structure and strategy. The fact that the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party is a party with a history behind it, *but* was reconstructed at the end of Franco's regime, makes it an exceptional case to check the relative weight of historical and environmental variables. If the analysis were based on a

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[3] Several works have been devoted to the PSOE, but none have been specifically devoted to organisational aspects (see Gillespie 1989, Share 1989, Juliá). Pilar Gangas includes a chapter devoted to the PSOE in her analysis of the organisation of Spanish political parties, but due to the scope of her work her analysis is necessarily less detailed than the one presented here.

completely new party, then obviously there would be no point in looking at the influence of the historical legacy, because there would not be one. The other extreme would be to analyse a party with complete continuity in its development.

Therefore, in principle the choice of organisational structure and strategy in the PSOE is expected to be more flexible in its adaptation to the constraints and opportunities imposed by the environment than other Western European parties, which are supposed to be more affected by the burden of historical legacies and past strategies. Studying the PSOE, thus, also allows one to check upon the validity of theories that try to understand the transformation of party organisation by looking at the characteristics of the environments in which they operate. In this respect, it seems that the social and economic environment in which PSOE was reconstructed offered a range of resources at the hands of party leaders that made it difficult, and even unwise to make too heavy organisational investments, but this is something to be empirically tested in the thesis.

Choosing to focus on the transformation of one political party in a longitudinal perspective has been considered an optimal research strategy for several reasons. First, examining a single party intensively was thought to be an adequate way to generate insights and plausible propositions concerning the challenges faced by political parties. Secondly, the span of time chosen composed of changing political and institutional contexts permitted me to track the responses of party actors in their choice of organisational strategies. Third, the time and energy consuming task of collecting detailed information about intra-party processes suggested the greater adequacy of concentrating on a single case, that will hopefully contribute to further comparative analyses on party organisations. The fact that the work of this thesis is grounded on comparative concepts and discussions is expected to make it a valid contribution to the joint endeavour of the comparative study of the development of party organisations.

Structure of the thesis

In order to carry out this research I proceed in three steps. First, here is the theoretical and analytical framework that focuses on the concept of party strategy and spells out a model that proposes the external and internal influences on the design and implementation of parties' organisational strategies. The second step is contained in Part II of the thesis, that comprises chapters 2, 3 and 4, which presents readers with the political and institutional context in which party leaders made their decisions about organisational strategy. The third step, Part III of the present work, which comprises chapters 5, 6 and 7, actually studies the nature of the different aspects of the PSOE's organisational strategies and examines their implementation.

Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework of the thesis, focused on the concept of party organisational strategy, and the factors that influence whether and how parties work out such a strategy, its characteristics and to what extent it is implemented. These questions are studied in the light of the effect of external and internal constraints that shape the nature of a strategy, but also influence its likelihood of being implemented. The chapter also proposes several *"trade-offs"* involved in decisions concerning organisational strategies, which correspond to the idea that certain organisational properties cannot be maximised simultaneously. The idea that organisational forms and properties have *"shifting advantages"* depending on the characteristics of the environment in which a party operate is also discussed. Chapter 1 ends with a revision of the most important variables to take into account when undertaking the analysis of the nature and evolution of parties' organisational strategies.

Chapter 2 covers the most relevant passages of the history of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party and its role in Spanish Politics since its foundation to the present. It attempts to inform readers about the context in which the party has operated in the period analysed in the thesis, as well as to provide clues on other features of the party to which I do not return in the rest of the thesis, but which are important in order to understand the context in which organisational choices were being made. It places a special emphasis on the transformation of the structure of competition of the party system and of its degree of competitiveness. It also present a quick overview of the different terms of the Socialist governments. Although the rest of the thesis focuses on the PSOE *qua* party organisation it is important to take into account the events that were occurring in the governmental arena.

Chapter 3 is also a "context" chapter, but in this case it is the characteristics of the institutional setting that are supposed to have an impact on the type of organisational structure and strategy which are spelled out and defined for the Spanish case. First, the structure of the State is examined, with the idea that *the process of political decentralisation* that Spain has undergone since the transition to democracy *has presented parties with an incentive to decentralise some aspects of their functioning*. The characteristics of the Spanish electoral law and its expected effects on party organisation are also examined. In particular, *the choice of electoral district (the province) and the low degree of proportionality displayed by the electoral system are considered the most influential elements on organisational strategy*.

While chapter 3 revises the main features of the Spanish political system and the institutions that have been hypothesised to have a greater influence over organisational strategy, chapter 4 undertakes a similar task, this time examining the intra-party variables that are expected to have an influence over the goals, preferences and strategies of party actors. In

short, *in this chapter party organisation is seen as one of the causes or structuring agents of party politics rather than as one of its consequences*, considering organisational strategies as an internal party policy (see Katz and Mair 1990: 13). The chapter centres on the study of the party statutes and rules (similar to constitutions in political systems) that define the party's structure and the powers, roles and tasks assigned to the party bodies at different hierarchical levels. It also looks at the transformations of these issues over time. Finally, the territorial centralisation and the degree of factionalism (the other intra-party features that were hypothesised in chapter 1 to have an incidence on the organisational strategy of the party) will be studied.

From the previous examination of the characteristics of the external environment in the case of the PSOE from 1975, *the expectation is to find an organisational strategy that departs from the one typical for mass parties, given the means at the disposal of party leaders and organisers when making organisational choices.* The detailed analysis of the three items mentioned (membership, links with other organisations and campaign development) provides not only a study of the relative weight of each time, but of the specific characteristics of each item considered separately. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 each develop one of the three components of a party's organisational strategy spelled out in the analytical framework, namely the membership policy, the relationship with secondary organisations and the development of organisational capacities to communicate with the electorates at large, paying special attention to the organisational aspects of campaigning.

Chapter 5 looks at the *membership policy* of the PSOE from 1975 to 1996. It starts by presenting a brief overview of the arguments in favour and against parties' pursuing a large membership base by focusing on the costs and benefits of members for party organisations. It outlines the membership policy of the PSOE, investigating the degree to which party leaders were interested in recruiting members, for what purposes, and the various instruments used to increase membership: recruitment drives, absorbing parties and providing incentives by changing what the definition of party member. *The chapter argues that internal considerations, which are often overlooked, are extremely important to understand the PSOE's strategy in relation to members, particularly once a certain membership level was surpassed.* This does not deny the need for members for external purposes, the chapter also argues that there are external motivations that pressed the PSOE to increase its membership, although these had to do more with being present in all electoral arenas, than with the vote-getting capacities of members. Special attention is given to check upon the effect of being in office on the interest expressed by party leaders and organisers in increasing membership. The

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chapter finishes with a section in which the membership levels and their trends are discussed. keeping in mind the fact that membership levels depend on more factors than the action of party leaders and of the party organisation.

Chapter 6 concentrates on assessing the extent to which the PSOE used indirect ways of seeking support, via establishing close ties with unions or other secondary organisations. The chapter focuses mainly on the analysis of the nature of the ties between the PSOE and the General Workers' Union (UGT) and their transformation over the period studied, and the extent to which these ties were valued by the party organisation as a way to obtain and maintain electoral support. Emphasis is placed on considering external and internal conditions of both the PSOE and the other organisations, that are hypothesised to be important in shaping their nature. The incumbency factor is also closely examined here, to check whether it has an important role in explaining the transformation of party-unions ties. The second part of the chapter focuses on the relationship between the PSOE and the social movements in general.

Finally chapter 7 looks at the development of organisational capacities to communicate with the electorate at large, and in particular, at the organisation of electoral campaigns. The expectation is to find that much emphasis was put on the development of efficient electoral campaigns and a great effort in communicating policies and messages to the electorate. Again in this chapter, it will be argued that entering office is a major factor that explains the nature and extent of parties communication capacities. It also looks at how organisational resources are created for and used in election campaigns. It studies the nature of PSOE campaigns from an organisational perspective according to four dimensions: degree of centralisation, labour/capital intensiveness, degree of professionalisation and degree of homogeneity. It tries to assess the internal and external influences on the PSOE election campaigns in relation to the dimensions just mentioned.

The thesis finishes with some concluding remarks first about the main empirical findings related to the case studied, connecting the three components of organisational strategy studied in the thesis, and some reflections on the implications for the study of party behaviour in general.

Sources

One of the problems of studying party organisational strategies is the limited empirical data that are ready and available for researchers. The amount of potential information is huge, but accessibility is a big problem. Thus, the analysis performed here has relied on two main primary sources: documents and interviews.

Secondary literature has been extremely useful for some chapters of the thesis, in particular the book by Gillespie (1989) and, the book by Juliá (1997), which was published when the writing of the thesis was well advanced. However, these two books have first the problem that they only study the PSOE until 1986 (1982 in the case of Juliá), and second, that they are not directly concerned with organisational issues. The scarcity of studies specifically devoted to the organisational analysis of the PSOE, particularly of those that depart from the analysis of party structures and rules, is the reason why chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 rely mainly on primary sources.

The most important primary sources used were party documents and the information provided by party leaders and organisers in personal interviews. The documentary sources[4] used included published material both at the central party organisations and from regional federations (resolutions of party congress, management report of different executive bodies at different territorial levels, and so on), unpublished material such as the transcription of debates in conferences, internal reports and documents. Contact with several party leaders established through the interviews proved to be an important source of information on internal party documents of whose existence I would otherwise have been ignorant.

This is one of the main problems one faces when studying the internal politics of parties with regard to their own organisation. Few events are recorded, and even if they are, more often than not researchers are not allowed to use that material, at least not given access to the internal circulars or communications that correspond to recent times. The lack of information may even make the researcher doubt whether some documents exist or not. For example, sometimes the existence of a document or a follow-up of a particular organisational scheme is enough to change the evaluation on the extent to which an organisational objective has been pursued or a scheme implemented. If there is no open access to all party documents it is even difficult to ascertain whether the document in question exists, let alone to know its content.

Another difficulty faced in studying the organisational strategy of the PSOE, in relation to the organisation of electoral campaigns, is that most of these documents are not published. The only published material were the regulations on the functioning of Election Committees, and of Guide Books in which the campaign strategy was explained (meant to be used only by party branches, not by external users). The information provided by these sources was complemented with the examination of the daily reports sent from each provincial election committee to the central one during four out of the seven general election campaigns there

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[4] Listed in a section at the end of the bibliography.

have been in the period of time studied. This documentation include the written records of communications from the different provincial committees, which are kept at the PSOE's electoral headquarters, where I had the opportunity to go through them.

Although party documents, statutes and rules have been the main source of information, there is no denying that power relations exist outside these procedures. However, even if one cannot trust the "the official story", nor can one disregard the rules and structures since they "are a meaningful indication of the party's own conception of its organisational style" (Katz and Mair 1990: 17). As Katz and Mair hold, the party statutes and what is in them are an important resource in intra-organisational struggles and parties must be careful about what they incorporate within them. In addition, party statutes show how the party should function in theory, which is a good way to begin to assess how they work in practice (Katz and Mair 1990). In short, the official story of the party organisation matters and often is the only "hard" data on which analysts of political parties can rely.

One important advantage of studying the PSOE with respect to other Spanish political parties, all affected to different extents by a reluctance to disclose internal information, is the existence of different publications, periodicals of a semi-academic nature such as *Sistema* and *Leviatán*. Various party leaders often publish articles in these journals that contain their views on several organisational topics, some of which have also been used to write this thesis, and have represented a valuable source of information.

In-depth interviews have been the other important primary source of information to write this thesis. They have provided information both about events that were not always recorded in party publications and about the beliefs and views of relevant party leaders and officials with respect to different aspects of the PSOE's organisational structure and strategy. Most interviews I carried out were with leaders of the central party organisation, although I also interviewed some party officials and leaders at the regional and local levels.[5] Part of each questionnaire was based on common questions for all interviewees, that concerned general topics such as the personal experience of the interviewee inside the party organisation and general questions about the development of the party organisation. The other part of each interview was usually focused on the issue in which the interviewee was mostly involved in the party management. Whenever it was possible, attempts were made to cross-check the information obtained from different interviewees, or to relate them to accounts obtained from other sources.

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[5] The interviews are listed in the appendix.

The interviews I did myself were complemented with those carried out by Gunther and his team at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, which were kindly donated to the Juan March Institute (Madrid). They constitute a valuable source of direct information about the PSOE's organisation at the time of the transition, and present the advantage of not being subject to ex-post evaluations. The book by Burns (1996), which collects interviews carried out in 1996 with several important Socialist leaders presents just this disadvantage, since the party leaders interviewed provided their interpretation of past events. However, this was also an interesting perspective provided that it can be complemented with other sources released at the time action was occurring. The interviews I carried out had the same problem, so from this angle, Burns' book has also been a very valuable source for interpretations and evaluations from different intra-party actors whom I could not interview directly. Finally, to a lesser extent some of the interviews donated by Gillespie to the Fundación Pablo Iglesias have also been used. He mainly concentrated on interviewing party leaders in exile or inside Spain, as well as the main actors of the PSOE reconstruction during the end of Franco's regime.

PART I. THE THEORY

CHAPTER 1. THE ANALYTICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Politicians seek to keep the support both of their party and of the electorate to get access to or remain in office.[1] Recent studies that have applied the principal-agent model to the study of political parties have emphasised the double nature of the agency of party leaders, who have two principals, the electorate and its rank and file members. These models emphasise the fact that politicians' chances of re-election depend on their control of both the internal and the external party arena. From this starting point, this chapter lays the conceptual and analytical framework that will be the basis of the study of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party in the rest of the thesis. It puts forward a way of looking at party organisational strategies that focuses on the factors that influence the creation and deployment of an organisational resources to win and retain votes, their quantity and nature, and emphasises both internal and external constraints on party organisers and strategists.

The first section of this chapter gives a definition of organisational strategy and of its components. It tries to relate organisational strategy to the other goals of parties, but also to the process by which organisational decisions are taken within parties, i.e., within intra-party politics. The second section deals with previous attempts to study party organisation and focuses on finding indicators of organisational strategy, as well as discussing the specific question to which the rest of the thesis will try to provide an answer. Finally the third section concentrates on those variables that influence the shape and functioning of party organisations.

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[1] The primary goal of politicians is re-election (or election). The assumption that leaders are vote oriented is taken without entering into the discussion of whether politicians want votes just to keep their positions, or to carry out policies (see Aldrich 1995 for a discussion of this issue). This idea is well expressed in the following passage by Maravall (1996: 13) "To keep the control of the party in difficult circumstances is crucial for them: incumbents will try to get protection for their unpopular policies or breaches of promises under the party's mantle, that is, quelling internal opposition and manipulating party loyalties rooted in past political experiences. If they are successful, their credibility vis-à-vis citizens will increase [...]. And if things turn out badly externally, the politicians who control the party will at least be able to survive internally and have a chance in the future to stand again for office. If they fail to control it, they will face political death." For a similar approach see also Koelble (1996).

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1. Organisational strategy: definition and components

Before defining an organisational strategy, the next section explores the location of organisational strategies in the overall functioning of parties, relating them to the general discussion of the goals of parties.

1.1. Party actors, goals and resources

The goals of a party, like those of any type of organisation, provide orientation by depicting a future state of affairs which the organisation strives to realise and setting the guidelines for organisational activity.[2] The literature on parties has produced a lengthy list of definitions of what political parties and their goals are.[3]

Party goals, and generally speaking the goals of any organisation, can be classified according to different criteria (policy goals, ideological goals, organisational goals and so on). Each of these goals can then be decomposed in more specific ones and classified in different levels of generality. For instance, in each moment in the history of a party organisation, the main ideological goal of a party,[4] which is usually quite abstract, has to be complemented by specific policy stands and proposals, by the choice of a social group or a constellation of them that give support to the project, and by the choice of the type of organisational characteristics that are most suitable for the attainment of its goal. Even the most abstract goals are periodically re-defined as illustrated, for example, by the continuous debate on the meaning of socialism and of the defining characteristics of the left.

Michels (1911) showed in his seminal work on the organisation of the German Social Democratic Party that parties suffer a process of "displacement of goals" by which they reverse the priority between goals (for example the emancipation of the working class), and their means (the party organisation), in a way that makes the means become a goal and the goal a means. In the process of forming, granting resources, recruiting personnel for the party

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[2] In fact the concept of organisational goals is among the most controversial concepts in the theory of organisations, and I will not discuss this in detail here. See Etzioni 1964 and Perrow, 1968 for examples of the different approaches on organisational goals.

[3] These definitions are an example of this long list: "A political party is first of all an organized attempt to get power. Power is defined as control of the government" (Schattschneider 1942: 35); "A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power" (Schumpeter 1962:283); "A party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing, through elections, candidates for public office" (Sartori 1976: 64); "Any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office holders under a given label" (Epstein 1980: 9); "Social organizations with political objectives" (Harmel and Janda 1982: 42).

[4] It receives different names in different parties. In the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party it is called *"programa máximo"*.

organisation, which was created in principle as an instrument for the attainment of certain goals, actors and groups become more concerned with preserving and building up the organisation than with the achievement of its initial purposes (Etzioni 1964: 10).[5] This process may be facilitated by the generality of the initial goals that need to be adjusted to particular conditions in each historical moment. However, as Linz (1966) points out:

> "the hypothesis asserting the inevitable displacement of goals by an organisation, - the becoming an end in itself of the organisation - requires further specification. If we accept the premise that the goals would not be attainable without organisation, the maintenance of that organisation is both a means to the end and - since it is necessary - an end for those wanting to achieve the goals. In that case we do not necessarily have displacement of goals but an addition of goals and often, but not inevitably, a modification of goals. It seems unlikely that the people would support a voluntary organisation that does not serve some interests of the members, that was only an end in itself and not also a means for some end (perhaps not the original end)."

Linz's point stresses the flexible and recursive nature of goals and means in the study of complex organisations, so that certain goals are at the same time goals and means to achieve either more general or other types of goals.

Thus, in order to be achieved abstract goals must be turned into more tangible ones.[6] In the literature on political parties the issue of the operationalisation of party goals has been solved by looking at the means that allow parties to achieve their goals. In this light, scholars have debated whether parties are primarily vote, policy or office seekers.[7] According to Downs (1957), parties are primarily vote-seekers, and, accordingly, they elaborate policies and programmes in order to win elections, and not the other way round.[8] However, a closer consideration of the constellation of parties and party behaviour shows that all parties share

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[5] As Garvía notes (1993: 13) the displacement of goals is normatively neutral and does not necessarily imply the law of oligarchy developed by Michels. The displacement in itself does not provide information about the reasons why leaders of the party have abandoned the initial goals of the organisation. They might have done so with the primary objective of remaining in their position, but also if their driving motivation is the survival of the party, but circumstances are so that the best decision is to leave aside temporarily the original goals of the organisations.

[6] This is something that both the party and the analyst need to do: "The actor must operationalise them in order to be able to act, to decide which actions to choose and to what extent they have the intended effect. The analyst needs to operationalise so that he can describe and explain the actions of the actor" (Sjöblom 1968: 74).

[7] The literature on parties tends to use the term goals, means and resources indiscriminately. This is so because they are considered "empty" categories, qualified by the organisation or individual that it refers to and by its level of generality. Goals can be means to achieve higher order goals. In order to attain goals individual or collective actors need resources that are used as means towards the realization of those goals. These are therefore terms that need to be qualified and contextualized in order to be used properly.

[8] For a critical overview of the views of Downs on party goals see Schlesinger 1975.

these three goals but to different extents,[9] that is, whether one of these goals is considered instrumental and therefore secondary to the realisation of another varies from party to party, and in different situations. It could also be just a matter of perspective. Thus, as Strøm (1990) has noted, a suggestive and useful way to think of these goals is in circumstances in which it is impossible to maximise the three of them; in order to accomplish one of them it is necessary to make adjustments in the others.

Since parties do not operate in just one arena, we have to look for a diversity of arenas in which they obtain, create and deploy their resources. The *governmental arena* represents the sphere of government and public office and puts many resources at the disposal of party organisation. If it is a coalition government, the strength of a party depends on the number of positions or offices it holds. Both in single party governments and as part of a coalition parties can, to different extents, realise some of their goals and influence their environment through the use of public policy.[10] The *parliamentary arena* refers to the legislative activities of parties in parliament. The position of parties in this arena, and their capacity to exert influence depends to a large extent on the number of seats it holds.[11] Finally, in the *electoral arena* the position of a party is determined by the amount of votes it gets, which in turn influences the position of the party in the other arenas.[12] Party leadership is likely to belong to the three arenas at the same time (considering in this case the parliamentary and governmental arenas at the national level, this scheme is reproduced at different territorial levels). However, some party elites may belong to one arena but not to the others, for example, independent members of cabinet, or independent parliamentarians who have been elected because they were included as such in the party list. In addition to these three *external arenas* there is the party organisation as an *internal arena*.

When discussing these issues, it is essential to take into consideration the interplay between the internal and external nature of party organisations. It is useful to portray parties in this double way since it makes us aware of the fact that party rules, structures and activities

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[9] The same can be said about intra-party actors, who can be assumed to have these three goals but order them in a different way depending on where they are placed within the party organisation, as will be seen in the next sub-section of the chapter.

[10] See Dunleavy and Husbands (1981) for an analysis of the use of public policy as an instrument for the creation of a favourable environment for a party.

[11] To be sure, both in the case of the governmental and the parliamentary arena one has to be cautious not to precipitate the general conclusion that the more seats, the more influence. An exception to these are pivotal parties with blackmail potential (Sartori 1976), based on the fact that their deputies (and there might be very few of them) are fundamental for another party to form a government.

[12] As well as other important issues such as the level of public finance the party is going to obtain, in most countries.

have both internal and external consequences. If one tries to explain the choices of a party only looking at their external consequences, then an important input to the calculation of the costs and benefits of a particular course of action, is overlooked namely the potential consequences for the internal party life and position of the leaders taking the decisions. Conversely, overlooking the external constraints and incentives also tends to overemphasise the influence of factors internal to the party organisation. The *internal party arena* comprises on the one hand the party actors and groups, and on the other, the structures, bodies and rules of decision-making created to govern and run the party organisation. All parties, even the smallest ones, need to establish a minimal set of rules and structures in order to organise their members and activities and make decisions on policies and electoral strategies (Koelble 1991). In short, internal party organisation refers to the structures and rules that regulate the interaction between different actors and sub-units within the party (Hix 1995: 96).

Parties are not unitary actors but "conflict systems with sub-coalitions of activists advocating a variety of different strategies and goals" (Kitschelt 1989a: 47).[13] These sub-coalitions may be formed on ideological or policy grounds, or they might be based on the interest of territorially defined sub-units of the party (Hine 1982). It is quite likely that these groups share certain goals since they all belong to the same party, but they may also disagree on others and may have different opinions about how to attain them. These sub-coalitions or groups may be shifting or relatively stable, and even regulated in the statutes of the party. Moreover, regarding the fragmentary character of parties, it is important to keep in mind that they are territorial organisations. Interaction inside parties takes place at different levels of aggregation which may have different interests and different degrees of access to autonomous resources. It is precisely these calculations that are key to understanding the process of organisational functioning, rule creation and strategies of growth.[14]

The expression '*external party organisation*' does not necessarily refer to actors, structures or rules other than the internal aspect already mentioned, but to a different prism with which to observe these actors, structures and rules. Thus, the external party organisation

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[13] See also Eldersveld 1964, Katz and Mair 1992.

[14] In this respect, it must be emphasised again that, although this thesis concentrates on those party activities directed at the mobilisation of support, it does so from the acknowledgement that parties are neither purely rational vote maximising machines, nor unitary groups. As Kitschelt (1989: 47) states: "Discourse on policy and strategy is not governed simply by electoral vote maximisation, because in most Western democracies parties have other tasks and powers than electoral maximisation. The are focal organisations in complex networks of communication between state and civil society and have many ties to political actors and organisations other than those provided by electoral competition. Parties are vehicles of interest articulation *as* well as interest aggregation. The electoralist view ignores the fact that in many democracies parties are more than electoral machines".

refers to the link between the party organisation and the external arena; it concerns the role and activities that some party actors and bodies perform in the arenas where the party operates.

The former distinction between an internal and an external aspect of party organisation also serves to highlight the co-existence of an instrumental character of party organisation, dedicated to the attainment of the party goals, and the fact that parties themselves are sites of activity (Schonfeld 1983). One of the main contentions of this thesis is that one cannot understand the organisational evolution and functioning of parties unless these two aspects are considered. The result of linking the internal and external arenas is the realisation that parties are both voluntary organisations of individuals presumably existing to carry out members' wishes and bound by their decisions, and organisations whose survival largely depends on their success in getting support from the electorate. Sjöblom (1968: 52) summarises this dual character of party organisation in the following way:

> "the party can be regarded as an arena [...], but it can also be regarded as an instrument for the aspirations of the party in external arenas [...]. The party organisation is then considered an instrument for exerting influence on the behaviour of voters."

A simple way to grasp the connection between the internal and the external facets of party organisation is by focusing on the party leaders, party organisers and/or party strategists[15] as the linking element between two arenas. The emphasis on leaders' actions also makes sense since most of the organisational strategies studied here come as initiatives or blueprints from the Executive Commission from either national or regional and local levels.

Resources can be defined very generally as "means or facilities that a collective action organisation finds useful in functioning" (Knoke 1990: 51). Parties extract resources from their participation at these various arenas and convert them into means to influence society, thereby creating resources of their own which can then be deployed to influence their position within the party system (see Panebianco 1988: 207). For Panebianco (1988) the relationship between the party and the arenas in which it operates can be characterised by various degrees of uncertainty. It is precisely this uncertainty that the leaders of the party try to reduce as much as

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[15] As defined by Scarrow (1996: 38) "The terms party leaders, party organisers, and party strategists are used [...] to refer to individuals who gain formal or de facto control over the financial and personnel resources of a party's extra-parliamentary organisation. The leadership group often includes the party chair, the party manager, the head of the party's parliamentary delegation and some or all members of the party's national executive. Party organizers are party employees who have the job of directing the year-round work of the extra-parliamentary party. [...] The term party strategists refer to all those who articulate organizational plans for the party and who possess some influence with the current party leadership. [...]. These are the individuals who usually must give at least tacit assent to official organizational strategies."

possible through exerting some control over their environments, or at least, by attaining some degree of organisational expediency and autonomy that provides the party with some protection from unexpected risks such as challenges from other parties or serious electoral defeats. In short, party organisations receive resources from the participation in these various arenas, and the organisation itself might be considered a resource itself for the attainment of other goals.

Therefore, one can see the action of parties as an exchange of resources with the various arenas in which it participates. In order to survive as organisations parties need votes. To get these, parties need to offer policies, governmental programs to the electorate. This would be a Downsian way to see the process. We can reverse the motivational and instrumental order, and consider that parties' (or politicians') main motivation is re-election (for the sake of it or to implement policies or for any other reason), in order to get votes they need votes, and in order to do that they need party organisation. In any case ideas, policies and electoral offers must all be conveyed to the electorate in one way or another.

To do this, politicians and parties need to have resources that can be converted into means to influence the electorate. At the very least they need money, which cannot be used in its raw form. Money is a transferable resource that can be used for different purposes. It can be used to develop organisational resources, for example, to increase party membership[16] and offer their members better facilities, more activities and education in order to increase the intensity of their link to the party. Alternatively, it can also be used to improve the capacity to organise efficient election campaigns, to buy time slots in the media or to hire professionals for the party. It is thus a raw resource that can be used in many different ways. Similarly, time and effort can also be considered raw resources that the party can use in different directions. The interest lies precisely in finding out what party leaders and strategists consider an asset or a liability, and therefore what sort of calculations guide their decisions over the conversion of raw resources into organisational resources.[17] Two types of processes are involved. First the creation of organisational means or resources, usually as a result of a transformation of resources obtained in external arenas. Secondly, how existing organisational resources are deployed in the attainment of a goal. In other words, the question is to find out what is

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[16] An increase of members would also provide the party with more "raw resources". Alternatively one can also conceive membership drives as a way to look for finance.

[17] Scarrow (1996: 35) also makes this difference between types of resources, albeit with a different emphasis on the subjective character of organisational ones: "Unlike money, the value of members as an organizational resource is a subjective one, and it is precisely this subjective view that can shed light on parties' organizational manifestation."

considered a "resource", understood as an asset and what organisational activities or features are considered as liabilities.

The central idea of the preceding discussion is that parties are both *resource-attracting*, *resource-generating* and *resource-allocating* systems with interdependent external and internal spheres. Internally, party leaders and organisers allocate resources obtained externally both between different activities, and in the different territorial sub-units. This allocation is supposed to be driven by a number of goals and interests, which may sometimes be a matter of conflict among the different groups or territorial units within the party. This dissertation intends to explore the factors that influence the nature of this allocation among three main resources/activities related to the process of mobilisation of support and therefore it aims to study the process of creation and use of organisational resources.

1.2. The definition of organisational strategy

At this point it is important to come back to the task of defining the term "strategy" and how it is applied in this thesis. The general definition of the term strategy proposed by Sjöblom (1968: 30) serves as a good point of departure:

> "An actor's extensive and comprehensive planning of the use of available means with the object of attaining certain goals attempted in competition with others. The actor is presumed to have the option of choice."

Strategy is a construction, done both by the party leaders and organisers and by the analyst.[18] It is, as Scarrow notes (1996: 51), more difficult to identify than other features of parties:

> "It is relatively straightforward to ascribe policy preferences to parties [...], because party elites regularly endorse written programmes and election platforms, but they only rarely lend their support to documents which summarize organisational strategies."

This is hardly surprising, given the fact that certain aspects of the organisational functioning of parties are frequently considered as unintended consequences of other actions, or as instrumental actions toward the achievement of other goals. Therefore, parties may present their goals and the means to attain them as a more or less detailed blueprint that guides the development of organisational resources and the activities of the party, but more often than not it is the analyst who has to trace different aspects of the rules, practices and activities of

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[18] As Sjöblom (1968: 30) states "Every actor must construct a model for the relation between available means and goals" .

parties and label them as a strategy. In fact, the whole question of organisational strategy can be problematised and converted into a research question itself. Such an enterprise might well conclude that there are no grounds either to reconstruct or to present the party's organisational policy and activities under the name strategy. Or, even if it can be presented as such, a conclusion could be that the implementation of this strategy does not occur or only partially. In other words, the term strategy may suggest a higher coherence and rigidity than is the case in the actual functioning of parties. Whether this imposition is to an extent acceptable and helps to understand party functioning or not, is an empirical question that this thesis aims to elucidate.

Admittedly, strategy might be a potential problematic term for other reasons. First, it is an ambiguous and abstract term, attributes that can be an advantage, but also a disadvantage. They can be considered an advantage if the researcher manages to define the particular nature of the objectives, resources and activities to which the term is applied. Certainly, in order to become operative, a limitation of the term must be done. In order to do this there must be a clear identification of the means and the goals of the party that are the focus of the study. In the present analysis the focus has already been set on the creation, development and use of organisational resources mainly directed at the mobilisation of electoral support, and the interaction of this process with other goals and resource-creation of the party in its different spheres. Scarrow (1996: 49) defines organisational strategy in a similar way as:

> "a plan for optimizing the use of available and potential organisational resources in order to promote the realization of the electoral strategy."

The second potentially problematic aspect of the term strategy relates to the assumption of rationality of actors. Often the term strategy is associated with a rationalistic theoretical framework since actors are assumed to have a range of options and choose the one that is most likely to achieve their goals with the minimum investment. That is, they behave in a rational way with respect to their goals and possibilities. To avoid going into any depth in such a lengthy debate on the concept of rationality, here the assumption will be that actors, both within parties and considering the party as a collective actor, are purposive (Garvía 1993:4). They take courses of action with the purpose of attaining certain objectives, which implies neither that there is only one objective, nor that there is no interaction with other needs and objectives. Secondly, actions may yield unintended or unwanted consequences that impinge upon future decisions of the actors.

Considering that organisational choices are strategic simply means that actors calculate costs, benefits and different courses of actions, and that organisational choices are not taken in a vacuum. On the contrary, it is expected that the past choices of the party, the interaction with the realisation of other goals of the party and other internal and external constraints will play a relevant role in their shaping. This introduces another positive aspect of employing the term strategy, namely the emphasis on the actor's objectives, evaluation of available and potential means in order to accomplish them according to existing resources, or the need to create more. All this enables the researcher to inquire into the independent role of elites, and parties in general, how they may pursue or eschew the organisational connection, and develop organisational capacities that can help them dominate the environment to their advantage, instead of leaving them at the mercy of the social and economic trends.[19] It is precisely due to this non-deterministic relationship between the parties and their environments that the perceptions, evaluations and decisions of party leaders and strategists regarding the development of organisational resources become interesting to study.

It is important to emphasise that the concept of organisational strategy is not the same as the concept of the linkage function of parties studied by other authors, primarily Lawson (1980). First, the concept of linkage refers to a function of parties at the system level, that is, to the process by which a two-way communication is created between parties and society and its consequences for the channelling of demands and the legitimisation of political elites. In the present thesis, however, the perspective is from one individual party and the analysis is performed in terms of the assets and liabilities of such an organisational connection for an individual party organisation (and to the extent that it is possible, for sub-groups of activists of the party), not on its consequences at the systemic level. Secondly, the concept of linkage also incorporates the outcome of a particular strategy, that is, it also refers to the individuals behaviour in response to a party strategy. Apart from the reasons mentioned above, the term organisational strategy has been preferred since it conveys the idea that the strategy embodies how the party perceives and intends to respond to its environment by developing its own organisation. It reflects, to a large extent, decisions that are largely under the control of the party, even if the effects of these decisions are not completely under its control.[20]

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[19] In the trend pointed out by the distinction made by Sartori (1969) between "the sociology of politics" by which parties are seen as dependent variables which are studied in terms of their passive receivers of the changes in their environments or "the political sociology", which takes parties also as independent variables which can mould and change their environments to their advantage.

[20] An example of this can be the launching of a membership drive. This decision is under the control of the party. The party executive, for example, decides to mobilise its members to find new members, put

An illustrative way to see what the object of study of the thesis is, might be to think of a political party as a mini political system[21] composed by internal actors that compete to gain control of its governing bodies and influence the party's programme (Eldersveld 1964,[22] Katz and Mair 1992, Maor 1997: 147). The aspect studied here constitutes a policy, which regulates the functioning of the party apparatus, as well as the areas of expansion, allocation of resources in different organisational activities, and only exceptionally refers to changes in the structure and rules which regulate the conditions in which this "internal politics" takes place.[23] It affects therefore those who occupy these structures and it also affects the outputs of the party.

Two phases of the organisational strategy of parties are distinguished. First the process of its elaboration and design, which, in the most fortunate cases, is made explicit in documents produced for and after party congresses, in party conferences and meetings of its governing bodies. During this stage, different party actors may hold divergent opinions regarding the suitable organisational policy and, depending on the period in which it is analysed, there may be more or less debate on the matter. Eventually a firmer decision is achieved and (sometimes) made public as the party policy.

The second stage is the implementation of these resolutions in concrete reforms of the party statutes and rules, or in the form of concrete blueprints or plans. Studying this is obviously easier in the case of changes in the regulation of the statutory rights and duties of members than, for example, assessing how and to what extent a membership drive has been implemented. Nonetheless, it is worth studying the implementation phase of different types of organisational activities since it is probably when many of the conflicting interests between external and internal aspects of party organisation will emerge and where the sub-ordination of some goals may be more evident. Furthermore, in the study of the implementation, it is relevant to bring in the idea of the party as a territorial organisation, i.e., as a multi-level

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advertisements on the media, lower membership dues. However, the result of such a strategy may not be successful and the factors that influence this success are more varied and therefore party leaders do not control this process to such an extent.

[21] Which is not the same as saying that they are democratic political systems.

[22] "The party is also a polity, a miniature political system [...]. The party has distinctive patterns of power distribution. It has a representative process, an electoral system, sub-processes for recruiting leaders, defining goals and resolving internal system conflicts. Above all the party is a decision making system" (Eldersveld 1964:1).

[23] In the terms applied to political systems, organisational strategy includes both the organisational policy designed and carried out by the executive body of the party and the reforms in which the legislative body of the party modifies the structures and rules upon which these activities are based.

organisation in which each sub-unit has a function to comply with in the context of the implementation of a general strategy.

2. Party organisation and the mobilisation of support. The components and indicators of an organisational strategy

At the most general level, mobilisation has been defined as the development of processes of interaction between at least three types of actors: unorganised individuals, organised intermediary actors (among which, political parties) and the government (Nedelman 1987: 183). As Sartori has pointed out (1991), there has been a confusion in the use of the term *mobilisation* between those who understood and used it as self-mobilisation (from the part of those mobilised) or hetero-mobilisation, i.e., the activities of those actors whose aim is to mobilise others (individuals, parties or other organisations, etc.). In the present thesis, the focus is on these latter types of mobilisatory efforts that Sartori refers to as hetero-mobilisation, no matter how stable, how short-term, how intense, or how much of the party organisation is effectively involved in them.

One of the reasons why there is a relatively low number of analyses that look at party organisational strategy from this approach nowadays is the preconception of its lack of effectiveness. This scepticism is probably reinforced by the fact that we remain ignorant with respect to the reasons that move parties (or party leaders and strategists) to maintain and develop organisational resources, whether they attach any mobilisatory value to them or whether they develop and maintain them for different reasons. Huckfeld and Sprague summarise this idea (1992: 70):

> "There is in this field a great discrepancy between the political scientists, who have generated a general scepticism regarding the mobilisation potential of party organisations and the fact that parties and party activists continue to invest heavily in the effort."

Exploring the organisational activities of parties aimed at mobilisation of support (or at the lack of such activities) thus constitutes a way to find out if parties as organisations are still capable, and interested, in performing their traditional task as mobilising agents and the way they do so. As Cameron (1974: 148) stated in the 1970s, and as is still true today:

> "it becomes necessary to analyze how the mobilizing agent [in this case a political party[24]] induces individuals to adopt new patterns of behaviour. How it adapts its organisation to be more effective and to see what organisational elements it uses in the task of mobilization

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[24] Note of the author.

effort. Little attention is paid to the strategies and tactics of mobilization and still less to the changes in these strategies over time."

Even if we remain sceptical about the actual outcomes or success of these activities performed by parties, the fact is that they still invest in them, so it is important to look at the logic and argumentation of the party leaders and strategists, their perception of the environments in which the party operates, the development of organisational resources and how these are deployed.

A contention of this thesis is that party organisation may still be considered a powerful tool in the mobilisation of electoral support, but more particularly, that it is worth studying whether party leaders, organisers and strategists still consider, to a certain extent, organisational resources in such a manner, whether this is in a traditional sense (i.e. using the traditional organisational means) or in innovative ones. The next section quickly reviews the different contributions made by the literature on party organisations that will be useful in deciding the precise organisational aspects that are to be the focus of analysis of this thesis.

2.1. Dimensions/indicators of party organisation

The recent literature on party decline has undermined the relevance of organisation for the mobilisation of support in the electoral arena. While it is widely accepted that at the turn of the century and during a good part of the twentieth century the establishment and activities of party organisation helped the structuring of electorates, nowadays the socio-political, institutional and economic transformations that our societies have undergone are presumed to have diminished the utility of organisational resources in the activities of vote-getting.

The organisational intervention of parties was considered a constituent part of the process of freezing of cleavages and political alternatives (Mair 1987: 134). Consequently, the increasing electoral volatility of the recent years was interpreted, first as a sign that party organisations no longer structure voting preferences to the same extent they once did and, secondly, as evidence that even if parties did invest in such an organisational link, it would not have the same "freezing" results.[25] This last assertion also holds for parties and electorates in countries which have experienced democratisation at the end of this century. Electorates in these systems tend to be more volatile, not due to an unfreezing process, but simply to the fact

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[25] Electorates have become more socially and culturally heterogeneous and less "controllable" by parties (Panebianco 1988:265). Following Mair (1990) or Bartolini (1983) it could be said that it is the success of mass parties in implementing most of their policies - economic redistribution, social policies, education - , that has also contributed to create the conditions that are (partly) influencing their decline as an organisational type.

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that stable ties between voters and parties have not had time to be formed. In principle it seems that there are neither the incentives for parties to develop the organisational strategies to forge strong links with the electorate, nor are these modern electorates easy to "encapsulate" (see Barnes, López Pina and McDonough 1986).[26]

Technological, institutional and social transformations of the environment in which parties operate are said to have diminished the utility of large party organisations. On the one hand technological developments (such as TV) have provided parties with means to communicate with the electorate at large, thereby reducing the need for direct organisational intervention, and on the other they have increased the means at the disposal of parties to find out the preferences of the electorates, such as marketing techniques and opinion polls (Katz 1990, Mair 1990 and 1992). The institutional changes refer mainly to the introduction of state finance for political parties, which has diminished the financial value of members, and even of collateral organisations, where they were important sources of finance.[27] These two arguments emphasise the reasons why party elites may change their willingness to invest in *certain* organisational resources such as members and prefer to invest *in others* such as professional campaigns and developing organisational capacities to carry them out, but they do not demonstrate that party organisations are never considered for these purposes.

Social transformations have also been used to point at a change in the optimal party organisational strategies. This is an argument which mostly refers to the readiness with which citizens may respond to opportunities to join or support a party. Social change has meant an increase in the average level of education, the generalisation of welfare benefits has reduced the value of party benefits and the expansion of leisure possibilities that have made the parties a less attractive offer than it used to be (Scarrow 1996: 8). Therefore, not only have the incentives for developing membership changed, so have the social conditions needed for this strategy to be successful.

The former logic of argumentation, characterised by Sferza (1994:1) as *'environmental approach'*, considers major changes in the socio-political and institutional environments as the underlying motor of party organisational development. There is a clear emphasis on the notion

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[26] For a further development of this argument see Von Beyme 1996 in which he contends that mass parties of the era of classical modernity could not have been developed in the two last waves of democratisation, namely the Southern and East European ones.

[27] Parties are by no means passive recipients of these reforms. On the contrary, measures like public finance, or other legal regulation on parties have been approved by parties in Parliament (Katz and Mair 1995). Parties may try to use their capacity to manipulate the institutional environment, since that is easier than to manipulate the socio-economic one, in an attempt to compensate for other type of changes that are more difficult to control, intervene in, or adapt to.

of adaptation, by which parties accommodate their organisational style to the demands imposed by different institutional and social environments. Each constellation of environmental factors is associated with a conception of organisational expediency by which certain forms and strategies carry competitive advantages over others (Katz and Mair 1995). This type of reasoning is behind the development of party types. The most prominent types in this sequential historical typology are the *cadre party* and *the mass party* (Duverger 1959), the *catch-all* party (Kirchheimer 1966) and the *cartel party* (Katz and Mair 1995). This approach and the dimensions and indicators of party organisation on which this exercise has relied are not very useful for the present research for several reasons.

The first problematic aspect derives from the nature of this typology, since the dimensions and indicators used to build it change from one author to another. In other words, the most well-known types of parties mentioned above, i.e., the cadre party, mass party, catch all party, and the recent cartel party, have been developed by different authors and form a sort of 'typology along time'. Each of these authors introduces new dimensions and indicators, which would not be a problem if at the same time the older ones, and their respective indicators were not quickly disregarded, without exploring a possible continuation with a transformation of their role within party functioning. Otherwise, there is a sense of ad-hoc addition of dimensions to this typology over time.

Secondly, and most important for this thesis, the concern behind the typology goes beyond the characterisation and understanding of party organisational strategies. It regards the interaction between parties, society and, more recently, the State.[28] In other words, the question driving these analyses on party types seems to be systemic rather than organisational. The unit of analysis in these inquiries is not really the individual party but 'the party type', that is often not the result of an induction process or generalisations of individual party characteristics, but ideal types developed in a deductive way.[29] Each party type is associated with a model of democracy (Katz and Mair 1995), with a type of electoral competition, and, with a form of representation. This obviously imposes a great level of generality on the

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[28] Katz and Mair (1995) have pointed at the need to consider the relationship between parties and the state in order to understand their development as institutions.

[29] For example, Katz and Mair's project on the evolution of party organisation is partly determined not to be trapped in the logic of ideal types reasoning, and they therefore choose a large number of indicators in order to leave as much room as possible to test different hypotheses. Still, they seem to be trapped with this idea of the cartel party. In the final evaluation though, there is a recognition of mixed evidence on the trends predicted just by looking at the environments in which parties act, for two main reasons that connect with the point that is of interest here: first, that each national (and even sub-national) concrete environment is considered in the empirical analysis; and secondly that both quantitative and qualitative considerations should be combined in order to assess the direction of these trends.

dimensions on which these taxonomies of parties are based, which leads to a high level of indeterminacy when one is actually interested in the heuristic value of these types to understand the development of concrete parties, rather than on the development of parties as institutions or on the evolution of democratic systems. Thus, the attempt to test the utility of these party types on individual parties leads to the realisation that the indicators and elements used in these classifications are not discriminatory enough to have a deep knowledge of the functioning and characterisation of party organisations if they are the dependent variable of an analysis.

Other authors (Katz 1990, Sferza 1994, Scarrow 1994 and 1996) have been more restrictive in their scope and have concentrated on one organisational aspect to examine how it changes along the different stages of parties as institutions or in political parties individually considered. Scarrow (1996), for example, focuses on members which she considers a key organisational resource whose utility is nowadays under question. She studies how party organisers and strategists have changed their evaluation of this organisational resource over the last four decades, how they have put into practice measures to develop membership organisations, and the incentives, activities and rules that have been used. Nevertheless, even if this is a more fruitful approach, it would also probably gain from including other organisational resources with which members are "competing", such as indirect and loose relationship with other organisations (and their members), or the development of highly efficient campaign organisations, and an increasing use of the mass media.[30] The fact that "traditional" organisational activities are less relevant than they used to be does not necessarily mean that party organisations *tout court* are any less important. The elements of party organisation that used to be important might have diminished in importance today, but not completely, and new organisational elements may have acquired more relevance (Selle and Svåsand 1991).[31]

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[30] Considering other aspects of party organisation sometimes leads Scarrow to questionable conclusions about the intentions and interpretations. For example, when discussing the value attributed to members by the party organisers in the CDU she mentions its decision to change the statutes so that the delegates to conferences were allocated to local parties according to the number of members for which they forwarded a membership tax, i.e., an amount of money per member. She interprets it in the following way: "these changes reflected a new recognition of the potential importance of members as a source of national income" (Scarrow 1996: 118). While this indeed might be possible there are alternative explanations to this change of rules that pertain to the internal aspect of party organisation, namely that adopting this new rule would give local parties less incentive to declare more members than they actually had in order to obtain more delegates to party conferences, or at least make sure that this had a cost for local parties.

[31] Sainsbury (1983: 249) reacts also to the idea of the declining functionality of party organisations in the following way: "a broader definition of the electoral function that the one provided by Epstein, one which includes structuring political options and mobilising voters would restore the organisational variable to its proper place".

It is likely that party organisation has several effects on the mobilisation of electorates in the mind of leaders and strategists. First, an effect of organisational structure is indirectly exerted via the policies and electoral strategies the party adopts. As Kitschelt notes (1994), certain types of party organisations tend to impose more rigidity on the capacities of parties to select policies and electoral strategies that match the preferences of the electorate. Kitschelt proposes eight mechanisms related to the organisational features of parties that bring about strategic inflexibility within political parties in adapting to changing demands by the electorate (1994: 10).[32] The second effect of party organisation, the one mostly examined in this thesis, is directly concerned with the *means* chosen to mobilise the electorate. It refers to the development and use of organisational resources to convey the policies and programmes pursued by a party.

With that idea in mind we can think of the ways with which parties have and may still use their organisation in order to reach the electorate. They have two main ways to do so: a *direct way* through the expansion of the organisation by creating a membership that attaches individuals to the party and/or an *indirect* one, either through organisational co-operation with unions or with other types of secondary associations, by "contracting-out" the organisation/mobilisatory tasks to these organisations.[33] Finally, they can generate the organisational capacities needed to access the electorate at large, mainly during electoral campaigns, but also in other types of campaign. All these three ways of mobilising electorates involve the party organisation in different manners. In the last case, arguably the most debatable one, it is also clear that, in order to develop electoral campaigns aimed at the electorate at large, or at specific sections of it, parties need to develop organisational capacities that allow them to do so in an effective way (acquiring expertise, infrastructure, more or less sophisticated means of knowing and interpreting their environments).

Both internal and external considerations will shape organisational strategies. Again it is useful to refer to the double nature of party organisations, as instruments and as sites of activity and power, since the expansion of a certain organisational resource useful for the attainment of a goal for the whole party might collide with the particular interests of certain

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[32] These are, at the rank-and-file level (a) a high member/voter ratio, (b) importance of patronage incentives for members, (c) a large bureaucratic party machine and (d) limited ideological diversity. At the leadership level (a) long term internal recruitment procedure controlled in a decentralised way, (b) representative party conferences, (c) a separation of party executives from party legislators, and (d) tight linkages between party organisation and union leadership.

[33] This idea of "contracting out" is developed in Kalyvas 1996 (see page 55 onwards) for the case of Conservative elites and the Church at the end of last century and the beginning of this one and it is borrowed from the theory of vertical integration in industrial economics.

intra-party actors, or have an effect on the internal distribution of power within a party organisation.

There is a further point that is relevant to discuss here, namely the consideration that both quantitative and qualitative indicators are essential in the study of party organisations. In many occasions change is qualitative; rather than doing more or less of the same activity, there is a change of activity. As Kirchheimer (1966) stressed for the case of members, if the utility of members decreases, we should expect less effort from party organisations to create and sustain a large membership (quantitative change), but also a less relevant role of the member inside the party (qualitative change). In fact, as Mair suggests (1994), it could be the case that there is a quantitative increase or stability in members, matched by a qualitative transformation of their characteristics and of their role within the party (they become less active).

Most of what party leaders can do in order to shape the characteristics of their organisation is to provide incentives that foster or hinder certain behaviours. These incentives are, in most cases, of a qualitative nature. Taking again the example of membership, party leaders and strategists cannot directly determine the number of members, but they can lower the barrier of entry, or in other words, facilitate the procedure and increase or decrease their rights and duties, expand their participatory rights, clarify their tasks within the party. In short, they can make the party more attractive for members to join it.

2.2. Components of party organisational strategy

The next three sections spell out the elements that will be studied in order to characterise the organisational strategy of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party in the second part of the thesis: membership policy, links with other organisations (particularly with unions) and the communication with the electorate at large. They correspond respectively to what Maor (1997: 100) calls intra-organisation, inter-organisation and organisation-to-voter activities. The review of the main hypotheses related to each of these issues offered by the theory and literature on party organisation applied for the Spanish Socialists will not be developed here, but in the chapters devoted to each of these three aspects.

2.2.1. Membership policy

Various authors have suggested the diminishing returns of membership for vote-getting purposes (see, for example, Epstein 1980 and Katz 1990). According to this assertion, we should expect a lower investment in the creation and maintenance of this organisational resource. If we did not observe any evidence of declining organisational investment in

membership, we would have to check whether this was due to the fact that members are valued for different reasons than their vote-getting capacities, or otherwise conclude that the previous proposition of diminishing utility does not hold in the case(s) analysed.

The first type of evidence to look for to find out the interest of party leaders and organisers in recruiting members, regards the declarations of party documents about this issue, in particular the resolutions of party congresses, of the Federal Committee of the party, and the programmes of the department in charge with organisational maintenance within the Executive Commission. The second type of evidence concerns the phase of implementation of the intentions and declarations expressed in congress resolutions, internal party programmes, and comprises what is generally referred to as "the structure of incentives" offered to members. In particular these are the facilities towards affiliation, the rights and duties members have within the organisation, and the type of tasks members are supposed to carry out. The study of what the party offers to members will also serve to illustrate the type of members it wants. The intention to recruit members may materialise in concrete plans for membership drives. In that case, evidence would come in the form of how these have been organised and whether there is any consistent pattern, so as to know if and why the party invests more in some areas or sectors of the electorate than others.

As it was mentioned above,[34] concentrating solely on membership figures is risky, since they also measure the outcome of the development of measures to increase it. Nonetheless, keeping in mind that they are also dependent upon other variables, membership figures will also be examined, in order to check what influence specific or regional membership drives have had. At this stage the unit of analysis will temporarily be the party federations or even the party at the provincial/electoral district level. When available, evaluations from the Executive Commission (national and/or regional) or some other body within the party on the relative success or failure of a membership policy will also be used.

All this evidence will provide valuable information to answer the main questions regarding the membership policy of parties. To what extent do leaders want members? What type of members do they want? Do the answers to the former questions vary according to changes in the environment of parties (an increase in competitiveness for instance), or according to internal reasons (proximity of a party congress)? What are members used for? Are they considered a valuable organisational resource? If so, why? If not, why not?

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[34] Scarrow (1996: 20) notes the following regarding the value of quantitative measures: "This definition suggests that indicators of strategy, not of size, will be needed in order to answer the question of whether membership parties are disappearing."

2.2.2. Links with secondary organisations

Parties may seek support by "contracting out"[35] to secondary organisations the task of mobilising the electorate, just establishing loose links with these organisations in order to endorse their support during elections, or establish no relationship with them at all. Opting for one of these strategies is likely to depend on existing resources, i.e., on the availability and strength of secondary organisations, as well as on their readiness to establish links with political parties.

Attention will be drawn first to the description and analysis of the relationships with unions, which are particularly relevant in the case of a social democratic party. The changing nature of the relationship between these parties and the unions has been a matter of debate in the last two decades. It has been argued that the need of socialist and social-democratic parties to appeal to a broader electorate implied a de-politicisation of the relationship between unions and social-democratic parties (Taylor 1993). In short, the suggestion is that the political environment of the late 1970s and of the 1980s pointed to a looser, more flexible party-union relationship than was the case in previous decades (see Kitschelt 1994). Unions themselves, particularly when there is a high degree of union diversity, may no longer be in favour of having a formal link with a particular political party and therefore, may not support this type of arrangement, particularly if the party in question is in government, given that this formal linkage could constrain their freedom of action (not to mention the government's).

The indicators of the relationship between the party and the unions also include formal and informal structures and rules such as the provision of obligatory double membership, the degree of enforcement of this provision (the degree of overlap between membership at different hierarchical and territorial levels of the party), the existence of formal or informal co-operation for specific purposes of the two organisations, for example, at times of union ballot or election, and the influence each organisation has on the other (presence at the executive and federal committee, statutory rights, etc.).

The second type of organisations whose relationship with parties is relevant to analyse are other interest groups which traditionally have had a more distant, or even conflictual relationship with social democratic parties. These include professional associations that have specific interests that the party may want to address and, in order to do that, they might create a stable organisational procedure of co-operation for the channelling of demands or not. Here

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[35] For instance, part of Kalyvas' (1996) study of the formation of Christian Democracy analyses the attempts of conservative politicians to avoid creating mass parties, by "contracting out" mass organisation to the Church.

the most important indicator is the effort devoted to this issue by the party and particularly the degree to which formal procedures of co-operation have been established or whether they have been ad-hoc.

The third type of organisation analysed will be social movements and non governmental organisations. Again, the indicators are rather loose, and they regard the awareness of the party of these movements, its position towards them and, particularly, the efforts of the organisers of the party to establish stable relationships between the two. Evidence of this can be found through party declarations and resolutions from congresses, as well as from other party documents and interviews with key actors in the party organisation.

These pieces of information will serve to give a tentative answer to questions such as: how does the party evaluate possible co-operation with associations and organisations that link it indirectly with sectors of the electorate, but which do not imply the same organisational effort as a large membership? How does the party attempt to establish these links, through formal or informal arrangements? At the leadership or rank-and-file level? What kind of participatory rights are offered to these associations? Do efforts in connecting with different sectors in society correspond to increases in the competitivity of environments? Do the type of organisations the party contact depend on the structure of competition? Is this an element that is homogeneous across the regional party federations?

2.2.3. Relationship with the electorate as a whole: communication and campaign capacities.

According to the theories of the evolution and adaptation of political parties to existing conditions, they tend to take advantage of the technical developments at their disposal and communicate with electorates at large. Moreover, they not only use these technical developments to communicate, but also to get a sense of the preferences of electorates, via surveys and other marketing techniques. Therefore, one should expect to see an increasing part of the raw resources of a party organisation, particularly in vote-maximising ones, used in the development of the areas of the organisation devoted to these issues, to the hiring of agencies for electoral campaigns, to buying presence in the media and so on.

It is often argued that party and government leaders are increasingly establishing communication links between electors and themselves without resort to party organisation. While it is impossible to deny the growing importance of mass media, this does not rule out the role of party organisation in mounting electoral campaigns, or other types of campaigns about a particular issue. The degree to which these latter tasks are organised by the party itself or are

contracted out to other agents, and the extent to which the campaign relies on the use of organisational resources (members for example) are empirical questions that need to be answered. The answers probably change along time, depending on the development of the organisation itself, on the degree of control it wants to have over the product, i.e., over the campaign or communication policy.

One set of indicators will concern the changes in the organisational infrastructure dealing with election campaigns and communication activities in general. The second part of the empirical analysis will concern the way the party actually uses these organisational infrastructures and other organisational resources (members, leaders) during election campaigns. Two main features will be the focus of analysis: firstly the allocation of organisational resources to the different districts, and secondly, the degree of centralisation and de-centralisation of campaign organisation. The indicators will be explained in more detail in the chapter devoted to this organisational aspect.

2.3. The "reconstruction" of organisational strategy

The chapters devoted to the description and analysis of the organisational strategy of the Spanish Socialist Party will attempt to find evidence, in the first place of the relative weight of the following three types of party activity and resource-development: membership organisation, the relationship established with secondary organisations, and the development and use of organisational capacities in electoral campaigns (see figure 1.1 for a summary of the components and research questions). The relationship between the effort invested in the three is conditioned by the fact that parties have limited resources to invest in vote-getting and, therefore, have to agree on a set of priorities on how to do it. These priorities and how they are materialised can be observed in the design and formal description of the organisational policy of the party as well as in its implementation. The second characterisation of party strategy focuses not on the relative weight of each of these three activities, but on the traits and specificities of each of them considered separately.

To the extent that it is possible, for each of these organisational elements there are two phases to be studied. The design one corresponds to the intentions and plans mentioned in the resolution of party congresses, reports of the Federal Committee, or of different departments of the Executive Commission. The implementation phase regards the actual putting into practice of these intentions. This can evaluated by looking at the occurrence of statutory reforms, or by the degree of accomplishment or enforcement of those reforms: the designing of concrete measures or plans, the allocation of raw resources to carry it out. Evidence on the

degree of implementation will concentrate on reports of the Executive Commission of the party and on other indicators of the actual behaviour of the party leaders and officers. For both phases the information provided by party documents will be completed by and contrasted with interviews with relevant party leaders and officials at different territorial levels.[36] Thus, as far as it is possible there will be an attempt to combine "the official story" (rules, statutes and officials reports) of the party with the "informal story". Both are revealing of the way a party functions. As Katz and Mair (1992: 7) point out, the rules constitute an important resource in the struggle for power within the party.[37] They also reflect past struggles, which means that some of the current struggles will only be considered successful if they are included as formalised rules.

It is important to distinguish organisational strategy as a product of the party leaders and debates, from their implementation *within* the party, and from the outcomes of the implementation of such a strategy *outside* the party (response from the electorate, electoral success). A party may improve its organisational capacity and still not obtain the results that motivated the strategy, or might attempt to increase its members, but fail to achieve it. These are three distinct processes. It is indeed a complex issue; organisational outcomes may also be unintended consequences of other strategies, and organisational strategies may lead to unintended or at least non-optimal outcomes due to their interaction with other strategies or processes.[38] This study focuses mostly on the perceptions, calculations and decisions on what organisational aspects to develop (i.e., on the intra-party actors' preferences concerning organisational strategies) and on the implementation of these within the party. Notwithstanding the previous statement, being a longitudinal study, it seems likely that the perceptions of the actors within the party of the effects of past organisational strategies do affect subsequent actions. In fact, the pieces of evidence upon which this thesis will construct its arguments are neither pure strategies nor outcomes, but lay somewhere in between strategies and outcomes. While formal policies in resolutions and documents are closer to strategies, the implementation of these are closer to outcomes.

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[36] Two surveys about the characteristics of the socialist membership carried out by the party itself will also be used as well as a survey designed by the author, together with Prof. Julián Santamaría, which was given to the delegates to the 34th Party Congress of the PSOE, held in June 1997.

[37] For an alternative view see Panebianco 1988: 35.

[38] I owe this point to a discussion with Francesc Trillas (European University Institute).

Figure 1.1. Summary of components and indicators of organisational strategy

	Organisational strategy: Allocation of effort/resources among these three items:		
	Membership policy	Relationship with secondary organisations	Relationship with the electorate as a whole
Formal Indicators	- rights of members - duties of members - formal procedure for joining the party	- formal statutory obligations of contact (double membership, presence of these organisations at the committees of the party) - at which level, individual or organisational?	- structure and rules of functioning during election campaigns - special structures devoted to the organisation of campaigns - department of communication?
Behavioural indicators	- activities organised for the members - activities to increase membership - spread of efforts to increase members throughout the territory - spread of efforts to increase members along time - use of members (during election and non-election periods)	- activities organised by the two organisations - degree of actual co-operation in organisational activities	- use of surveys and other techniques - allocation of organisational resources in the districts: degree of responsiveness towards the environment
Questions asked	Do the party leaders at the national and sub-national level want members? What type of members? What are members used for? Does the effort on membership vary across different environments?	What type of organisations does the party relate with? Which type of relationship? Top down or down-top process? What degree of participation is offered to secondary organisations within the party. To what extent is this considered a substitution of members' input?	How much of the organisation of the party is effectively involved in campaigns? Who designs, and sets the goals of a campaign? On what basis (surveys, past electoral results)? Does the allocation of organisational resources vary according to the different competitive environments in the electorate? What is the degree of co-ordination between central party-federations and provincial levels of the party?

3. The 'trade-offs' and 'shifting advantages' of organisational resources

This section develops two main ideas. The first is that the building of organisations involve different *trade-offs*, i.e., it involves choices that in most cases entail a compromise between two extremes that are impossible to maximise simultaneously. These different *trade-offs* refer to the obvious impossibility to enhance all organisational aspects: spending more time/energy in developing a membership base might entail paying less attention to other aspects. They also refer to the consequences of organisational choices, i.e., to the difficulty in maximising both central control and internal participation, leaders' autonomy and members' rights in decision making procedures and so on. Secondly, the *'shifting advantages'*[39] allude to the fact that whether or not an organisational activity or asset is a resource or a liability depends on different external scenarios *and* on intra-party considerations.

As was mentioned above, parties are resource-attracting, resource-allocation, and resource-creating systems. As Knoke (1990: 58) states:

> "the essential task of the internal polity of an organisation is to make binding decisions that allocate collective resources to the organisation's goals. Choices among goals are reflected in many specific actions taken by the organisation: proportion of the annual budget allocated to various categories, new programs undertaken and old ones dropped or expanded [...]."

Parties allocate resources both horizontally between different activities, giving priority to certain aspects, and vertically in the different territorial sub-units, which may enjoy different extents of autonomy. Seen from a *diachronic perspective* the changes in this allocation may be the result of changes both in intra-party factors or/and the external environment, which produce a shift in the evaluation of what constitutes an asset that is worth investing in, or to use in particular contexts. Seen from a *synchronic perspective*, the party leaders and strategists find themselves with a particular amount of raw resources, which they have to convert into organisational resources. The fact that resources are limited forces them to rank those items, structures and activities whose reinforcement will be to the detriment of others. In terms of allocation of material resources, there is a zero-sum logic, where a reduced effort in a particular aspect of party organisation is traded off by an increased effort in other aspects, for example, campaign organisation. Mair (1994: 13) expresses this trade-off in the following way:

> "New professionalism appears to indicate a shift from a situation in which many of the activities of central office were directed towards the organisation and maintenance of the party

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[39] Expression borrowed from Sferza (1994).

on the ground (a key concern in the mass party), towards one in which they are now increasingly directed towards the mobilization of support in the electorate at large."

The previous sections of this chapter have been devoted to the specification of the object of analysis of this thesis, but so far, explanations have only been dealt with in a tangential way. Now it is time to do a tentative search for explanatory variables that give an account of the relative emphasis on certain resources, of the particular characteristics of organisational strategy relating to each of the three aspects mentioned before, and finally, possible explanations (if it occurs) why the implementation of the strategy might depart from the original plan.

Among the analyses that look at the evolution of party organisations I will concentrate on two broad types: an approach that looks at party-related explanations of organisational development; and an approach that looks primarily at the environments in which parties operate in order to find explanatory factors of how they are organised and how they change (Sferza 1994). In the former case, *the path dependence approach*, it is the history of the party and its internal characteristics that are highlighted in order to explain its transformation, whereas for the *evolutionary approach* the different environments which parties face are considered to be the catalysts of changes in their organisational structures, practices and activities.

A fundamental difference between the two approaches is that the *evolutionary* approach has tended to be used in comparative analyses and has concentrated more on outcome variables and on the environmental factors that have helped to produce them, rather than in the logic and processes of transformation, or on the actors that took decisions on organisational matters. In other words, evolutionary approaches have tended to concentrate on ultimate rather than immediate sources of party change. As Kitschelt (1989a: 44) notes, evolutionary models tend to lack micro-foundations; "[E]volutionary theory tells us nothing about how activists reason about political strategy. It cannot reconstruct the internal process of organisational and strategic change in parties". Conversely, approaches that have concentrated more on party characteristics have tended to develop an actor based account of the development of specific parties and have concentrated on the immediate causes of party functioning, but have often disregarded the opportunities and constraints that characterise external environments in which a party operates.

Both approaches have advantages and limitations, some of which cannot be avoided, but it is important to be aware of them. They are useful, in any case, because they help us to

select those variables outside and inside parties that are supposed to affect their organisational strategies.

3.1. Context variables

In order to figure out which organisational resources to use and invest in, what kind of actions to get involved in or what sorts of groups to appeal to, party leaders and organisers evaluate a range of actions and their likely consequences, and the features of the environment obviously have a role in these calculations.[40] As Aldrich (1979: 122) points out, environments may be viewed from an information flow perspective: "a source of information used directly by decision makers as one basis for maintaining or modifying structures and activities".

The scope of what is meant by the environment of parties matches the generality of the indicators of organisational development of parties used by the evolutionary approach. Given that party types are studied in a historic perspective, the changes in the socio-economic, technological, political and institutional features of the party environment have to be of a certain magnitude before they render certain organisational forms and strategies less beneficial than they used to be. From the perspective of an individual party organisation as the unit of analysis, environments become "smaller", less coherent and less uniform. They can be defined historically but also territorially, as Sferza (1994: 6) points out:

> "the environment in which parties operate is far from uniform, as national contexts often encompass sub-national variations which justify the co-existence within individual parties of diverse and partly contradictory regional models normally associated with different type of parties."

The potential list of elements of the environment which could have an influence on the organisational structure and strategy of parties is very long. It is easier to figure out the items in this list by imagining the concerns in the mind of party leaders and strategists: the effects of the electoral law, the characteristics of the population, the heterogeneity of these characteristics in the different regions, the availability of technological developments, the strategies chosen by other parties. In order to impose a certain order in this long list, two criteria are used. The first criterion is the nature of the feature, whether it is refers to

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[40] At the same time it also seems logical to think that parties, through their action, have an influence on the environment in which they operate, in other words, there is a feedback between the environment and parties. Parties adapt their organisation and strategies to the environment they operate in and by implementing their strategies and carrying out different activities and policies, contribute to the change of the environment.

characteristics of the electorate and of electoral competition, or to the institutional structure of the political system in which the party operates.

The second criterion refers to the constant or variable character of the environmental feature along the period of time analysed. The categorisation presented here is specific to the Spanish case. In other words, the environmental elements here treated as constant are not intrinsically so. While constant factors are essential to understand the initial constraints and incentives on the party organisation, their explanatory value is likely to fade when it comes to explaining variation of organisational strategy over time. This simplistic account becomes more complex when we take into consideration the interaction between variable factors and constant ones, i.e., the effects of the (constant) electoral system are different according to the distribution of votes among parties.

Figure 1.2. Context variables

	Context variables	
	Constant/Quasi-constant	Variable
Institutional	Electoral system	Degree of political decentralisation
Political		Structure of competition Degree of competitiveness

Political institutions provide actors working under their influence with different structures of opportunities that make certain choices more likely than others. This is a widely accepted assertion about the influence of institutional context on the behaviour of actors. In the case of political parties, certain institutions provide them with incentives that make certain organisational styles and strategies more beneficial for the attainment of their goals. Institutions here are considered to be structures and rules whose functioning can be regarded as a compound of rewards and punishments that influence outcomes and decisions by setting limits and creating opportunities. Two institutional variables are considered relevant:

• The electoral law, the regulation of electoral campaigns, party finance and other legal regulation of the functioning of parties (cell 1 in figure 1.2). Given that an important activity of parties is directed at the electoral arena, the ways electoral campaigns, the financing of parties, and how votes are translated into seats are all likely to influence the calculations over the most suitable organisational strategies to obtain the electoral goals of the party.

The institutional arrangements mentioned are supposed to have both a direct effect on the organisational strategy, influencing the allocation of funds within a party, and an indirect effect, via the party's organisational structure, which is also likely to be affected by the characteristics of the electoral system. These effects will be further explored both from a theoretical point of view and from an empirical one in chapter 3 of the thesis.

- the degree of political decentralisation of the State (cell 2 in figure 1.2). A proposition to be studied in the empirical part of the thesis is that the de-centralisation of political power of the State has an indirect effect on organisational strategy via its influence over the structure of the party. The intervening variable in this relationship is the degree of decentralisation of the functioning of the party. This feature is likely to affect both the design and implementation phases of organisational strategies, depending on whether one or both are the responsibility of central or regional party authorities. Even if organisational decisions are not decentralised, the fact that there are several political arenas within the party is likely to provide sub-party units with autonomous access to resources. This fact, in turn, might increase the chances that during implementation the centrally designed strategies depart from their original objectives. A more specific and complete analysis of the predicted effect of these variables, applied to the Spanish case, is provided in chapter 3 of the thesis.

The other type of feature related to the context in which parties operate refers to the characteristics of political/electoral competition. There are two main variables that are expected to have an influence on the way parties develop and use their organisational resources:

- The degree of competitiveness of the electoral arena is likely to influence the organisational strategy in at least two ways. First, as the party as a whole is concerned, the higher the degree of competitiveness, the more incentives to develop and use the organisation as a resource. Secondly, electoral scenarios are not homogenous and often encompass very different degrees of competitiveness according to areas of the country. This is supposed to affect the internal distribution, both of raw resources to be converted into organisational resources, and of the use of organisational resources during electoral campaigns.

- The structure of competition, which refers to both the number and ideological location of parties that contend elections and the position of the party in question in this structure. The most important influence of the structure of competition for the research presented here concerns the heterogeneity of structures of competition across the territory in order to

figure out the incentives for the party to develop a coherent electoral, as well as organisational strategy.

There is another fundamental variable that refers to the position of the political party in the competitive game, namely its *governmental status*. For when parties are in government, particularly single-party government, they are likely to have less incentive to rely on organisational efforts. First, they have other means to influence the electorate at their disposal, namely public policy. As Panebianco (1988: 113) states, "[t]he public resources which state control places at the disposal of governing parties often seriously inhibit organisational development". This is so, he follows, because:

> "The more public resources available, the less the leaders' need to highly institutionalize the organisation... leaders are not interested in creating a party bureaucracy, and selective incentives pass through other channels (e.g. governmental ones)."

Secondly, parties in government are also less likely to invest in their organisation as an instrument of mobilisation because most individuals within the party are busy with their governmental tasks so that the party becomes a second priority. Finally, it is important to check on the effect of the time in its history when a party becomes a governmental party in its organisational development (Panebianco 1988) for it seems likely that early access to government, "early" meaning in the first stages of a party's history can delay its organisational development. The case of the Spanish Socialist Party represents a good opportunity to shed light on this question.

A short part of the period of time analysed coincides with the transition to democracy in Spain. Thus, before concluding the discussion on the effect of contextual variables it is important to mention briefly some particularities of the processes of transitions to democracy and how important it is to take them into account when studying the strategies of one of the actors that participate in such process, i.e., of one political party. Political parties are central actors of processes of transition (Morlino 1995: 315, Pridham 1995), but they are also subject to the characteristics of such process which tend to be dominated by a high degree of uncertainty and fluidity. All the decisions made by party leaders are made in a context of varying degrees of uncertainty both about the ultimate outcome of the transition process, and about the utility of certain decisions for each of the actors. It is also important to bear in mind the fluidity that characterises the period in which the institutional arrangements, the political parties and the party system are being simultaneously constructed.

As mentioned before, concentrating too much on external variables might lead us to overlook the influence of other internal party concerns and the fact that environments can be interpreted in very different ways. In a nutshell, environmental approaches tend to forget that party organisations are not only instruments to achieve other goals of the party but that they are also composed of individuals and groups whose jobs, status, situations, ideals might be jeopardised were a change of organisational structures or activities to be carried out. These type of variables are considered in the next section.

3.2. Intra-party characteristics

As stated earlier, the other main approach to the study of the change in party organisations, what Sferza (1994) calls *path-dependence models*, focuses on variables internal to the party to explain their transitions (see Panebianco 1988). This approach emphasises the idea of organisational inertia, vested interests and the fact that, once an institutional order is created it is difficult to change because it affects, at least in the short term, the interests of the same people who are supposed to initiate, design and implement the reforms. It is not necessarily the case that the transformations have to affect negatively those who have to implement them but, the higher the degree of uncertainty over the outcome of the changes and the higher the vulnerability of these leaders, the more likely it is that organisational inertia prevails. The legacy of the organisation is also difficult to modify because it is part of the party identity/culture. Historical legacies and organisational inertia are therefore assumed to have a high explanatory power regarding the current features of a party.[41]

However, even acknowledging that organisational inertia and legacies are important, and that they help to explain subsequent actions of the party, we still remain without an explanation of the particular features that characterise these legacies or organisational cultures. Using an analogy taken from statistical analysis might help explain this assertion: the lagged value of any variable tends to score a very high forecasting power of the value of the dependent variable, but that does not amount to an explanation since there is no specification of the effect of variables exogenous to the phenomenon that we want to explain. This is the reason why we must also take into account the characteristics of the environment of the party, even if we remain within a party or intra-party centred approach. It is also important to understand why on certain occasions the organisational legacy of the party is considered an

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[41] See for example the importance given to the genetic model of parties in the work of Panebianco (1988). Certain features of the origins of the party are supposed to affect all its further development.

asset, and the occasions in which it is considered a liability and, secondly, regarding the latter case, when this consideration is translated into organisational innovation. The term *inertia* refers to the fact that, through various mechanisms, the practices, rules and structures of an organisation get perpetuated either because they suit the interests of certain actors or simply because it is difficult to enforce changes, even if these are considered beneficial for the party as a whole in terms of external performance.

Organisational strategies are never completely free from historical influences, but at the moment of democratic transition or in young democratic regimes, political inheritances are likely to be less of a burden than in other more stable political systems where parties have been functioning over a long period of time. In these cases it is clearer that one has to regard organisational legacies *both* as constraints and as assets.

In the analyses of party development which focus on intra-party and party level variables, there is the implicit rejection of an *"optimal"* type of party organisation according to the technological and socio-economic factors that characterise the environment in which parties operate. Each party has a history of its own, and variations among parties across and within countries leads one to conceive the process of party transition as path-dependent and not necessarily convergent. The most important advantage of this approach is the emphasis on the need to look at parties as individual organisations, and therefore as groups of people fighting for funds, positions, or power, whose only worry is not the external consequences of what they do. However, as Sferza (1994:1) notices, although there is the advantage of a richer understanding of the path followed by a party, but there are disadvantages such as imposing too much coherence upon that trajectory:

> "The path dependency perspective... lends itself to a much richer and more interactive understanding of environmental constraints and party adaptation. The determinism which is avoided when comparing parties among themselves, however, is re-introduced when this approach is applied to a party across time. In this case, the emphasis on continuity within each path makes this approach inattentive to how variations in the environment and party strategies may combine in causing substantial discontinuities in party trajectories."

There are several internal party features that will be taken into consideration, since they are supposed to influence the design and implementation of organisational strategies. The first one is the organisational structure and rules of a party, which are likely to affect its organisational activities. Rules and structures tend to reflect the existing balance of power within the party; they affect the chances of different party groups to influence the characteristics of organisational strategy and the way certain procedures or activities take

place. In short, intra-party institutional structures and rules also influence the way decisions are made (these rules can be ignored or modified in the course of a decision, but that is a different matter).

Other intra-party features are likely to have an impact on the characteristics of organisational strategy: its *cohesion* and its *territorial integration*. *Party cohesion* refers to the unity of goals and action among party members, which may or may not be the function of disciplinary repression (Ozbudun 1970: 305). *Horizontal cohesion* refers to the unity of action among the members of any single hierarchical status within the party, whether this status is the rank-and-file or the national party leaders. *Vertical cohesion* refers to the unity of action among members of different hierarchical levels within the organisation, for example, to the cohesion among leaders and regional leaders, or leader and members, that is, to relationships top-down or bottom-up on the hierarchical scale. It tends to correlate with the level of horizontal cohesion, in other words, when leaders are divided, usually this division penetrates the rest of the organisation. However, it is worth making the distinction to allow for a time delay between the occurrence of horizontal division and the occurrence of a vertical one and the consequences of each on organisational strategy design and implementation.

The more disunited a party is, the more likely it is to disagree on organisational aspects, some of which may only be regarded for its internal value, but that might have external consequences. The degree of horizontal and vertical cohesion is not only likely to affect the actual design of the strategy, which is generally designed by the leadership of the party, which at most can reach agreements with other intra-party groups in order to avoid conflict. Horizontal and vertical cohesion are more likely to affect the implementation of organisational strategies and policies, either because each side of the conflict (which might have arisen for an exogenous reason) has different views over how the party should organise, or, because the organisational policy, if implemented, may alter the map of organisational power, which would in turn affect the positions and power of each faction or group.

Territorial integration refers to the pattern of interaction between party units at varying territorial levels, for example between the regional federations and the national party organisations (Cotter, Bibby and Huckshorn 1989: 62). This could also be looked at from the opposite perspective, checking on the degree of autonomy that local and regional party federations have from the centre. This is reflected in the party structures and rules, but also in some important practices such as the allocation of funds and candidate selection. The distinction centralisation/decentralisation is not used because it is usually restricted to the decision-making process, whereas here territorial integration/disintegration has a less restricted

meaning. As seen in the previous rubric devoted to the effect of exogenous variables, political decentralisation of the State is likely to exert its influence over organisational strategy via the transformation of the structure of the party, which in turn influences its day to day functioning: how it is internally financed, autonomous access of sub-national units of the party to external resources, decision-making inside the party and so on. The less a party is territorially integrated, the less likely it is that there is a homogenous organisational strategy across the whole territory, either because each territorial unit develops its own, or because they have no incentives nor suffer coercion to comply with the strategies designed at the central party organisation. This is a proposition that will be explored in the empirical chapters of the thesis.

Conclusions

The general analytical framework with which the organisational strategies of the Spanish Socialist Party will be analysed which has been spelled out in the last pages emphasises that *organisational strategies* are shaped by factors that are *external but also internal to a party organisation*. Therefore, the two aspects must be looked at when trying to explain its characteristics and its degree of implementation. This can be seen in the logic that underlies "nested" games which suggests that the outcomes of intra-party struggles and decisions are explicable only through an analysis of the actions of intra-party players whose choices are not only structured by the institutional structure of the party, but also by their different interests and by competing external political arenas (Koelble 1992). Among these external arenas, the thesis focuses on the party organisation in relation to the electoral arena.

Thus, the explanatory model proposed here takes the organisational development of parties and the activities they perform as a function of both internal and external variables. Some of these external variables are more important for their effect on other features that in turn affect the nature of organisational strategies than for their direct effect (such is the case of the political decentralisation of the State). The expected effects will be further developed in chapter 3 and 4 of the thesis. Before doing that, though, chapter 2 will focus on providing the reader with a quick summary of the history of the Spanish Workers Socialist Party since its foundation in the last century to the present, so that the aspects dealt with in the rest of the thesis can be placed within the broader context of Spanish politics.

PART II. THE CONTEXT: HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

CHAPTER 2. THE PSOE AND SPANISH POLITICS

Introduction

This chapter presents the history of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party in the context of Spanish politics since its origins to the present, insisting on those points that are most relevant to understand the current organisational strategy of the party. It contains a first part devoted to the description of the PSOE from its inception to the end of the Civil War. The aim of this section is to provide the reader with a historical background of the party. It will highlight those features of its history that have most influenced the current development, namely the history of factional struggle in the Second Republic. It will also examine the PSOE during Franco's regime until the start of the transition process. Emphasis is placed on understanding the process by which the PSOE was re-constructed from the mid 1960s onwards, since this is important to make sense of organisational choices or just to give them a context that is difficult to provide in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

The second part concentrates on the transition to democracy starting in 1975 and on the role of the PSOE in this process. In a parallel way it also reviews the evolution of the party life and that of Spanish politics, including the first general elections of 1977 and 1979. It is important to be aware of the choices concerning the general strategy and goals of the PSOE of this period in order to understand the organisational choices, which are studied later on in the third part of the thesis. There is a special emphasis on placing the PSOE in each political context and in relation to other political forces.

Finally, the last part of the chapter deals with the period in which the PSOE was in government. It is impossible here to furnish readers with a full account of the course of Spanish politics during all these years, so the intention is just to mention the most important events from this period. This last section is divided according to the different PSOE terms of office. Some points that will be discussed here will be taken up again later in more detail or with a different focus in other chapters of the thesis, but they are mentioned here with the aim of mapping the different stages of development of the PSOE in conjunction with Spanish politics.

1. Origins and evolution of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party 1879-1970

1.1. From 1879 to the Second Republic

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) was founded in 1879 in Madrid by a group of print-workers among whom was Pablo Iglesias, regarded as the founding father of the party. At that time Spain had a recently restored monarchic regime in which a Conservative and Liberal party regularly alternated in power. These were notable parties whose permanence in power was based on the manipulation of elections by the Ministry of the Interior and the local political bosses, the *caciques* (Carr 1993: 1).

The first Party Congress did not take place until August 1888. The Socialist Party declared among its main goals the abolition of the class struggle, the emancipation of the proletariat and the transformation of private property. As means to realise these goals the party demanded the establishment of public freedoms, the right to go on strike, the reduction of working hours, the ban of work for minors, laws that protected life, heath, and State nationalisation of transport, mines and forests (Juliá 1997: 22). From its foundation the PSOE was closely connected to the General Workers' Union (UGT), that was founded in 1888 as a formally autonomous union federation which acted as the PSOE's ally in the labour movement (Gillespie 1989: 9).

Since its formation the PSOE differentiated between the maximal program (*programa máximo*) and minimal program (*programa mínimo*), which, as Juliá (1997: 40) states, was a way to distinguish between long term and short term party goals. The *programa máximo* contained the aspirations and goals to which socialists devoted their struggle, independently of whether they could see that accomplished in their lifetime, whereas the *programa mínimo*, were the day-to-day actions that were necessary to obtain improvements in the way defined by the maximal program. This differentiation also reveals the dualism between pragmatism and utopianism, reformism and radicalism that has characterised the PSOE ever since. While the *programa máximo* contained more utopianism, the *programa mínimo* tended to be more pragmatic and proposed small steps towards the transformation of society.

During its early years electoral breakthrough proved to be particularly difficult due to the absence of universal suffrage and to the advantages found by local notables in the plurality electoral system controlling the electoral process. This delay in being represented in political institutions was not only due to the power of *caciques*, but also to the fact that Spain was a predominantly agrarian society, that anarchism was strong among some of its potential

audience, and that the choices of the PSOE in refusing to fight elections in coalition with other political forces. As graph 2.1 shows, during these years the PSOE's electoral performance was very poor. For example, in 1901 there were only twenty-seven socialist local councillors, but still not a single socialist had managed to be elected for parliament (Gillespie 1989).

Graph 2.1. Share of votes for the PSOE 1891-1936

Source: Own elaboration with data obtained from Contreras 1983.

From its foundation until the turn of the century the debate inside the party was focused on the question of political alliances, namely whether the PSOE should collaborate with the Republicans or whether it should go it alone, at the expense of being electorally and organisationally weaker (Juliá 1997: 23). Although the main parties of the oligarchic system were the Liberals and the Conservatives, the Republicans attracted most of the attention and criticism of the socialists, since the PSOE feared that it was with them that they were fighting for the support of the working class, not with the parties of the establishment. Serious internal struggles developed between those who sought to end with the political isolation of the PSOE and those, like Pablo Iglesias, who were suspicious of Republicans and refused to collaborate with them.

The opinion of this latter group prevailed and the socialists chose to fight elections on their own until the end of the century, even if they were aware that joining forces with other parties was the only way in which the PSOE could increase its chances to obtain representation in the Chamber of Deputies. At the turn of the century the PSOE changed strategy and overcame its refusal to co-operate with other non-establishment parties such as the Republicans. In 1910 the PSOE obtained its first deputy, Pablo Iglesias, in alliance with the Republicans (Linz 1979).

In the early 1920s, as with other European socialist parties, the PSOE was affected by the events of the Russian Revolution and its effects on the left movement. As a response to the revolution the PSOE broke its policy of collaboration with the Republicans and the Radicals (Share 1989: 16) and membership in the third international was rejected in 1921. A section of the party left it to from the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de España).

The PSOE was ambiguous in its attitude towards the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera which lasted from 1923 to 1930. Although the PSOE officially rejected it, the party was not very active in fighting it either. According to Share (1989: 18), the PSOE and the UGT had the official view that both the Restoration monarchy and the dictatorship were undemocratic bourgeois regimes and that, under those conditions, the representation of the working class within any of the two systems could help to achieve the goal of socialism. As a result of this reasoning, both the PSOE and the UGT agreed to participate in the corporatist labour relations system created by Primo de Rivera. In turn the Dictatorship repressed the anarchist union CNT,[1] but was lenient towards the PSOE and UGT, that made the most of this opportunity to gain on comparative advantages *vis-à-vis* their competitors.[2] In the framework of this collaboration in 1924 Largo Caballero, at the time the UGT's General Secretary, accepted an appointment as a councillor of the State. Primo de Rivera had created this position to be occupied by a representative of organised labour. The acceptance of Largo Caballero provoked criticism both inside and outside the PSOE, particularly from Indalecio Prieto, an important leader of the party (Preston 1994: 20). The PSOE eventually came to reject participation in the attempts carried out by Primo to institutionalise his dictatorship and instead gave its support to the establishment of a Republican regime in Spain.[3]

1.2. The Second Republic (1931-36) and the Civil War (1936-39)

The PSOE became one of the most important parties of the Second Republic (1931 to 1936). During this period it increased its membership and became the Spanish political party that most resembled the mass party model characteristic of other contemporary European socialist parties (Contreras 1983: 106). During the first years of the Republic, it had around 17,000 members but by the end of it membership had grown to about 90,000. Not only had

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[1] CNT stands for Confederación Nacional del Trabajo.

[2] As Preston (1994: 16) states "the integration of the national leadership into the new regime was considerable and the UGT had representation on several state committees. The Socialist 'Casas del Pueblo' remained open and most UGT sections were allowed to continue functioning, while anarchists and Communists suffered a total clamp down of their activities."

[3] Preston (1994: 20) explains how the opposition to the dictatorship grew within the PSOE.

membership grown quantitatively, but the spread of the party also extended across the whole of the Spanish territory. As Linz (1979: 88) points out, "it was the only party that was able to have candidates in every Spanish region, except for Catalonia".

This was also the first occasion in which the PSOE participated in government, from 1931 to 1933. The most important problem the PSOE had to face was its lack of internal cohesion. The main tendencies, marked by a high degree of personalism, were characterised by their disagreement over the strategy and goals the party should adopt in relation to its participation in government.[4] The faction organised around Julián Besteiro opposed any participation in Republican governments, in the belief that following that path would undermine the chances of achieving the socialists' goals, but was loyal to the Republican regime. The other two factions, one led by Largo Caballero and the other led by Indalecio Prieto were both in favour of governmental participation. While Prieto was the clearest advocate of the participation strategy of all three leaders, Largo Caballero had a more instrumental view and was only in favour of the collaboration if it was in the interests of the working class and the realisation of socialism.[5] By 1933 Largo Caballero changed his mind about the benefits of such collaboration, he turned against Republicans and against the Republican regime and radicalised his discourse (see Preston 1994: 52, Share 1989: 20).

The coinciding strategy of alliances with the Republicans (at least between two tendencies of the PSOE) had broken down by 1933. The PSOE became increasingly polarised around the differences between Largo Caballero, who advocated revolutionary actions, and Prieto, who still supported the formation of a broad coalition to defend the Republic (Share 1989: 21). Each of them had different power bases; while Prieto was stronger within the PSOE Executive Commission, Largo Caballero had a stronghold in the Young Socialists organisation and in the General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores). The PSOE ended up deciding to run the 1933 parliamentary elections alone, and this had bad consequences on the results. After these elections a right-wing coalition entered in office.

In the coming years the PSOE gradually became more radicalised. In 1934 it participated in the organisation of the revolutionary events that took place in Asturias. In 1936 it took part in the Popular Front, a coalition of the centre left, Socialists and of Communists,

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[4] The leaders were Largo Caballero and Prieto respectively.
[5] It is very common to find descriptions of Largo Caballero as a leader that did not base his decisions on any strong ideological or theoretical foundations, but on a sharp opportunism based on what he felt to be in the immediate material interests of the socialist movement, particularly of the UGT. According to Preston (1994: 25) "this pragmatism made Largo's position more subject to sudden and inconsistent shifts than were either of the other two tendencies."

that fought and won the 1936 elections. In spite of the resistance of some sectors of the PSOE, the presence of the Communists in the coalition was actively supported by Largo Caballero, who had radicalised his positions as a result of his disappointment with the slowness of reforms and by the obstructionist attitude of the right (Preston 1994). The victory of the Popular Front in the elections served to calm neither the political climate nor the internal struggles within PSOE. On the contrary, the relations between Largo Caballero and Prieto turned even bitterer (Share 1989: 24).

The PSOE was therefore split in fratricidal internal struggles when the breakdown of the Second Republic occurred. The division continued during the War and even at the beginning of the period of exile that the PSOE suffered after the War.

1.3. Under Franco's regime. The dark years from the Civil War to the 1960s

After the Civil War political parties and unions were outlawed and their properties confiscated. The PSOE's organisation virtually collapsed due to the strong repression of the early years of Franco's regime. During the 1940s and the 1950s most of its Executive Commissions were arrested and suffered severe repression, "from 1939 to 1953 six consecutive PSOE Executive Commissions inside Spain were arrested by the francoist police" (Share 1989: 25). This was the main reason put forward to justify the decision to move the Executive Commission to the exile, in Toulouse, so the PSOE was divided in the party in exile[6] and the party inside Spain.

The persistence of internal divisions inherited from the second Republic was an important factor that weakened the capacity of the PSOE to reorganise its forces and develop an efficient opposition to the regime. The faction led by Prieto managed to impose itself on the others and shortly later he was substituted by Rodolfo Llopis in the leadership of the party. The main defining trait of the PSOE at this stage was its strong anti-communism as a reaction to the experiences of the Second Republic and the Civil War (Share 1989: 25).

The party organisation inside Spain was practically non existent for about two decades. Maravall (1982: 140-145) examines the process of reconstruction of the party that had several stages which included a very slow take off in the 1960s, then a schism and a renovation of the leadership in the first part of the 1970s. Most of its organisational efforts coincided with the first strikes under Francoism and developed from the prisons, given that most leaders from the party had been captured during the Civil War or in the early stages of Franco's dictatorship.

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[6] After the Civil War Largo Caballero fled to France while Prieto went to Mexico.

1.4. The crisis of Francoism and the renovation of the PSOE

During the 1960s Spain enjoyed unprecedented economic growth, which led to rapid social and cultural transformations. Social conflict and political protest grew, particularly among the new generations of students, urban professionals and industrial workers. A new political opposition was slowly being created, at the time clearly dominated by the obviously illegal Communist Party[7] (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) and in the labour sphere by the also illegal union Workers' Commissions, Comisiones Obreras (CCOO). There were other small groups, among which the socialists of the PSOE and other socialist parties.[8]

The PSOE gradually started to resume its activities inside Spain from the mid 1960s. The renovation attempts were launched both from within, by those federations of the party which were still active, particularly those in the north of Spain (Asturias, Vizcaya), and, from the exile, by those groups that did not support Llopis. Another important attempt to relaunch the party was initiated in Andalucía and was led by a group of university teachers and labour lawyers who directed their efforts both at re-establishing contacts with old militants and with other socialist groups scattered in the rest of Spain (Maravall 1982: 144). At this point the PSOE inside Spain was a very weak organisation with very few members.

The lack of co-ordination among these different socialist groups in Spain was enhanced by the decision of the Executive Commission of the party that banned the horizontal contacts among the regional party federations in the interior (Juliá 1997: 359). Two other factors that increased the difficulties faced by the socialists within Spain in presenting a united front to the socialism in the exile were the internal fights and the lack of effective organisation that beset the socialists in Madrid. For some authors like Gillespie (1989) and Juliá (1997) this failure of the PSOE in Madrid to get organised in order to represent socialism within Spain and build a

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[7] This becomes apparent in a passage taken from an interview from Maravall's book on the opposition to Franco's regime (1978: 141) "It was the Communist Party that made the switch, starting an avalanche, giving admission into the party to every chap who simply didn't like Carrero Blanco's face...". Part of this book is devoted to study the strategies of recruitment developed by secret political organisations during Franco's regime, trying to provide an interpretation in terms of organisational policies, from a perspective that is similar to the one pursued in this thesis.

[8] Other important socialist organisations that were active in the 1960s were the socialist fronts, Frente de Liberación Popular (FLP) in Madrid, Front Obrer de Catalunya, (FOC) in Barcelona. A member of one of the FLP explains his impression of the spectrum of political groups in this period "For those from Madrid the PSOE basically did not exist at the late 1960s and early 1970s. We had never seen a Socialist. [...]. For us there was nothing except the PCE [Communist Party], that seemed to us opaque and conspiratorial, and the radicals in the Frente de Liberación Popular, *Felipe* (FLP), which we preferred..., because it was the only alternative in the radical non communist left" (in Burns 1996: 95). Several members of the FLP, such as Joaquín Leguina and Carlos Romero, and the FOC, such as Narcis Serra and Pascual Maragall were to become important PSOE leaders after the transition.

solid executive in the 1960s was crucial to understand the subsequent development of the party and the role of the group from Seville in the reconstruction of the party.

The leaders of the PSOE in the interior became increasingly critical with the positions of the party in exile because they believed that the leaders in the exile were losing touch with the reality in Spain, which had changed greatly since they had left the country. In addition, as Juliá (1997: 336) points out, there was a generation gap. Most of the leaders inside Spain belonged to a younger generation, who had no direct experience of either the Civil War, which made it difficult for them to understand the fierce anti-communism advocated by the party executive, or the subsequent repression that had justified the strict rules of functioning adopted by the party leadership in order to avoid repression. According to Juliá (1997), the failure in attracting and assimilating the demands of these new generations diminished the PSOE's chances of incorporating the opposition to the regime that was emerging in universities. This opposition was channelled through other groups that had nothing to do with the PSOE or with the Young Socialists.[9]

The division between the PSOE in and outside Spain, and the increasing distance between the two groups left unanswered the question of who would lead socialism in Spain when Franco's regime fell. The attempts of Tierno Galván first to enter the Socialist Party in Madrid and take command of it and later to create a socialist party of his own, the Socialist Party in the Interior (Partido Socialista del Interior), claiming to fill the gap left by the PSOE when it left for the exile, must be understood under this uncertainty over the leadership of the socialists.

Just before the 24th party Congress (the 11th Congress in exile), held in 1970, the different PSOE nuclei that were active in Spain, increased their co-operation in order to obtain more influence on party decisions. Until that moment these groups among which the most important were the Basque Country, Asturias and Madrid had enjoyed representation but no right to vote in party congresses. The reason given for this was that, due to the clandestine character of the PSOE inside Spain, it was virtually impossible to establish the size of its membership, and consequently, also to estimate the number of delegates that corresponded to each federation. The federations inside Spain were requesting both an equal share in the international representation of the party as the party in the exile and, to be granted autonomous decision making powers for matters pertaining to the party in Spain itself[10] (Gillespie 1989:

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[9] Such as the FLP or FOC mentioned before.
[10] In the UGT the non-exiled part had gained control of the organisation in the Congress held in 1971 (Gillespie 1989: 274).

269). The group of socialists from Seville were particularly active in defending the need of part of the PSOE not in exile to have more representatives on the Executive Commission. The decision finally reached was that there would be nine representatives of the party from within Spain and seven of the party in the exile, thus redressing the balance between the interior and the exterior in favour of the former. Llopis had been challenged severely in his preferences for the PSOE's executive, but was still re-elected as first secretary (Juliá 1997: 402).

In the course of the two following years the tensions between the domestic party and the party in the exile increased, particularly over the issue of the relationship with the Communists. By now it was clear that the PSOE in exile had not been able to accommodate the new generations that had not lived the Civil War. These new generations thought that the PSOE needed to have a more modern image, to participate more systematically in mass struggle and did not agree with the fierce anti-communism advocated by the leadership. As Gillespie (1989: 268) notes "among the active minority in Spain there was a growing conviction that the PSOE could only be energised if both its leadership and propaganda base returned to the interior". Juliá (1997: 395) expresses in a similar way the widespread discontent about the state of the PSOE within Spain:

> "The dominant feeling in 1970 in all party federations was that things were working badly, that the PSOE was incapable of attracting students, that it had lost its traditional strength among workers, and that the party branches were isolated from one another and that the Permanent Committee did not have enough resources to effectively run the organisation in the interior."

In 1972 the Executive Commission was planning to convene an extraordinary party congress, which was quite convenient for Llopis since it would focus on discussing the issue of the relationship with the Communists, but being an extraordinary congress, it would not entail an election of the Executive Commission of the Party and thus no risks for his position as the leader of the PSOE. However, a coalition of some of the PSOE in exile and at home insisted that the Congress should be held earlier, and not be restricted to discussing the relationship with Communists. When this group realised that Llopis was not going to call the Congress, they decided to hold it regardless in the month of August, while the rest of the Executive Commission, loyal to Llopis, held another in December of the same year. This led to the split of the party between the PSOE *Histórico*, that remained loyal to Llopis, and the PSOE *Renovado*, composed mainly by socialists from inside Spain and by a few groups in exile, particularly by the new generations of socialists in exile. Both the PSOE *Histórico* and the PSOE *Renovado* claimed to be the legitimate Spanish Workers' Socialist Party and presented

their cases at the Socialist International. This latter played a major role in the fortunes of the two parties by recognising the PSOE *Renovado* as the legitimate socialist party.[11]

Although the internal part of the PSOE gained weight in the Executive Commission elected at the 1972 Congress of the PSOE *Renovado,* the Executive chosen still had representatives from the PSOE in exile (Juliá 1997: 412). The new Executive Commission was composed by five members in exile, and nine not (Gillespie 1989: 281). The position of first secretary was left vacant. Instead, a collegiate form of leadership was adopted with specific responsibilities for each member. The strategy of the party changed: anti-communism was no longer the guiding principle of alliance formation, and the will to combine efforts with other political forces in order to overthrow the authoritarian regime became the PSOE's main concern (Juliá 1997: 406).[12]

The final stage of renovation took place at the 1974 Party Congress in Suresnes, where Felipe González was elected as first secretary of the party. Two important decisions were taken. First the Executive of the PSOE was to be composed only by representatives residing in Spain.[13] Secondly, the position of first secretary was brought back into existence during this Congress with the justification that since the PSOE was still illegal, its name could not be easily used in public and that therefore it was better to choose a person that could speak for the party and be identified with it (Gillespie 1989: 289). Hence, Felipe González was chosen to occupy this position. The person who at the beginning of the Congress seemed to have the best chance of being elected First Secretary was Nicolás Redondo, already Secretary general of the UGT, but he refused to stand as a candidate, and so Felipe González was chosen, receiving the support of the Andalusian and the Basque representatives (Juliá 1997: 421).

The resolutions adopted in that congress insisted on the idea of a struggle against the dictatorship with the aim of achieving a democratic breakthrough by mobilising mass pressure and organising demonstrations (Maravall 1982: 146; Juliá 1997: 418 and 426). During these last years of the dictatorship the PSOE enhanced its efforts to spread the organisation to the whole territory and to get in touch with the myriad of socialists groups that were active in the different Spanish provinces.

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[11] A detailed account of how this decision was taken and the factors that influenced this outcome is given in Gillespie (1989: 285).

[12] This had also been the result of the 1971 UGT Congress.

[13] Juliá (1997:417) points out that this decision had already been taken at a preparatory informal meeting that gathered two representatives from the PSOE in the Basque Country, three from Andalucía and one from Madrid. The only member that lived in the exile was Juan Iglesias, who took charge of the Secretary of Emigration (Juliá 1997: 423). .

2. The transition to democracy

2.1. Pressures from below and the 27th Congress of the PSOE.

The Spanish transition to democracy took place in two distinct periods. The first one which lasted roughly until the first legislative elections in June 1977, was dominated by "pressure and demands from below" (Maravall 1982: 12). These were a reflection of the strategy of mass mobilisation adopted by the still illegal left wing parties and unions that took the form of strikes and demonstrations.[14] These mobilisations had started at the end of the 1960s and increased in the period following Franco's death. Although politically they were very significant, it should be borne in mind that they only affected a small proportion of the population (Maravall 1982: 14); most of the population supported a more moderate and peaceful transition to a democratic regime.

When Franco died the main political actors could be classified in three groups according to their preferences about whether and how a transformation of Franco's regime should come about: *continuismo, reforma* and *ruptura.* Those in favour of maintaining the previous regime with no or very few, minor, modifications were the *continuists,* mainly composed by a part of Franco's political elite. The second option was the *reformist* one, which involved a gradual concession of liberties and representative rights through the channels institutionalised in Franco's regime, i.e., securing institutional continuity and maintaining public order (Hopkin 1995: 49). Advocates of *reforma* included members of the Francoist political elite and of the moderate opposition towards the regime. They varied in the degree to which they wanted to transform the system, but all of them agreed that the regime had to change substantially and open up to other political actors. Finally, the opposition forces of the left (which included the PSOE and the PCE) were in favour of a clear break with the past, i.e., *ruptura.* They rejected any type of negotiated reform and called for the immediate constitution of a provisional government that would dismantle the Francoist state, call elections and establish a democratic regime.

After the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos confirmed Carlos Arias as Prime Minister. This was interpreted as a sign that there was little intention of reforming the political system in a democratic way, given that Arias was a continuist. In spite of that, he included important reformist ministers in the cabinet in an attempt to negotiate a very moderate reform of the

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[14] Maravall (1982: 13) reports that 156 million working hours were lost in 1976, whereas this figure went down to 110 million in 1977 and was reduced to 68 million in 1978.

regime, but this ultimately failed. In the meanwhile, workers' mobilisation continued to increase and there was clear pressure for regime change. At this point there was a great deal of uncertainty among political actors, particularly in the opposition, as to whether there would be transition at all, and on the type of transition that would take place.

Once Arias was ousted, the King succeeded in appointing Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister. He was very well known neither to the Francoist elite, nor to the opposition, nor to the Spanish public. Although there was little in Suárez's biography that indicated any commitment to democracy,[15] he immediately made moves that showed he was a reformist who was attempting to change the basis of the Francoist regime without resorting to a sudden break (*ruptura*). Between July 1976, when he was appointed, and June 1977, he managed to solve the conflict first between continuists and reformists, and secondly between *reforma* and *ruptura*, and somewhat reconcile their interests, while at the same time paving the way for the democratisation of the political regime. The procedure followed to do so combined elements of both reform and rupture; the main steps for the establishment of a democratic regime were the core of the Law for Political Reform, which had the juridical status of a Fundamental Law of the existing regime and was approved by the Francoist Cortes. It was a reformist way to break with the Francoist regime.

The Law for Political Reform was voted on in a Referendum on the 15 December 1976 and widely approved by the Spanish electorate, even if the left opposition called for abstention since they considered it to provide insufficient guarantees for a transition to a democratic regime. Neither the PCE nor the PSOE were legal parties at the time, thus it was difficult for them to actively endorse Suárez's reformist line (Preston 1986). Their opposition, however, was mild. Although the left parties did not agree with the means adopted to pursue the reformist strategy, they did share its main goal, i.e. the establishment of a parliamentary democracy (Share 1986: 180). The reason for this was that the less successful the reformist strategy of Suárez was, the less likely it was that a democratic regime would be established, and this failure would enhance the chances not of a *ruptura* but of a continuation of a non-democratic regime. In other words, if Suárez failed in his strategy then the risk was that there was a return to authoritarianism.

While all of this was happening, the PSOE was also devoted to reconstructing its organisation in the different provinces. It held its 27th Congress in December 1976, still in a

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[15] The opposition reacted to Suárez's appointment by calling for massive demonstrations in favour of political liberties and a general political amnesty (Preston 1986: 93).

semi-clandestine since the PSOE was still illegal though its activities were tolerated. It was the first PSOE Congress to be held in Spanish territory since the Civil War. This was a good occasion for the party to publicise itself and to distinguish itself from other socialist competitors such as the Federation of Socialist Parties, the Partido Socialista Popular and the PSOE-H, the section of the PSOE that had remained loyal to Llopis in 1972. In order to meet these objectives, important West European socialist leaders such as Willy Brandt, François Mitterand, Michael Foot and Mario Soares were invited to attend the Congress. This helped to show that the PSOE was the only one among this large group of socialist parties, which had the support and recognition of the Socialist International.

The resolutions of the 27th Congress still called for a radical break with the dictatorship and rejected any reformist path to democracy (Res 27C 1976: 4). However, as has been shown above, the political circumstances were so that the choice was in fact between a negotiated *ruptura*, that is a reformist process, or the risk of not having democracy at all. While the official party documents still insisted on *ruptura*, Felipe González and other party leaders publicly recognised its impossibility and gave unequivocal signs of approval of a *ruptura-pactada*, that is of a negotiated break with the dictatorship. This also points at a recurrent element of the party behaviour during this phase: the combination of both a radical discourse with a more moderate line when it was needed, mainly attributable to the dialectic abilities of Felipe González.

The PSOE was under pressure to moderate its discourse from Western European socialist parties such as the SPD, which was helping the PSOE in different ways, but on the other, there were other factors that pushed it to keep a radical stance (Juliá 1997: 454). First there was the legacy of the period as a clandestine party and of the intra-party fights of the new generation of leaders against the more moderate Llopis. Secondly, in order to win votes from the Communists, the PSOE could not moderate its discourse too much.

Apart from the establishment of democracy, the second goal of the PSOE was to maximise its electoral support. In the resolutions of the 27th party Congress it is stated that the PSOE "should get as many votes as possible in order to advance in the parliamentary way to socialism, which should be combined with a strategy of mass mobilisation" (Res27C 1976). Although the PSOE was always in favour of combining the parliamentary way with a strategy of mass mobilisation, the attainment of the parliamentary majority as a goal was formulated in a more explicit way as the likelihood of actually attaining it increased, as we will see in the next section of the chapter.

The approval of the Law for Political Reform and the acceptance by Suárez of several of the demands of the opposition such as the dissolution of important Francoist institutions, of the vertical unions, the granting of political amnesty and the compromise to call for free elections marked the end of this phase of the transition characterised by "pressures from below". In return, the political parties of the opposition adopted a moderated line that implied the slowing down of the efforts of mass mobilisation that had characterised the first stage of the transition (Maravall 1982: 12).

2.2. Consensus politics. The 1978 Constitution

The second period of the transition was characterised by the predominance of *"reform from above"*, that is, from the political elite which moved in the direction of the demands for a negotiated break put forward by democratic groups (Maravall 1982: 2). After the legalisation of the Communist Party in April 1977, the first democratic elections took place on the 15th of June 1977.

Before the elections a plethora of parties were created, a phenomenon that was enhanced both by the uncertainty regarding the behaviour of the Spanish electorate and the effects of the electoral law. The election results cleared away some of the uncertainties that had dominated the political scene in the previous months, namely which parties would occupy a more prominent space in the new party system and in each of the ideological blocks. The Unión de Centro Democrático, a coalition created shortly before the elections whose leader was the incumbent Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, obtained the relative majority of the votes. The PSOE came second with nearly 30 % of the vote, quite far from the Communist Party, which only obtained 9.3%. This gave the Socialist Party an important role in the process of Constitution making and in the design of the new democratic system.

The results (shown in table 2.1) were much more favourable to the Socialists than they had expected. The great distance in electoral support between these parties (29.3 for the PSOE and 9.33 for the PCE) were taken as a relative surprise given that the PCE had a much stronger organisation and had been a more visible party in the opposition to the Francoist regime.[16] The fourth relevant state-wide party was the conservative Alianza Popular, placed to the right of the UCD (see figure 2.1 below for changes in the placement of Spanish parties in the left-right continuum). The AP included in its higher positions former ministers and public

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[16] Regarding the results of the Communist Party in the 1977 elections Alfonso Guerra, in an interview published in 1996, says the following "We made a mistake with respect to (the share of the vote of) the PCE. [...] We thought it would get more votes" (Juliá, Pradera y Prieto 1996: 158).

officials of the Francoist regime. Its acceptance of certain aspects of the dictatorship and its full-front opposition to the legalisation of the communist party made the AP appear to the public opinion as a continuist party whose unconditional and complete acceptance of democracy was uncertain at this stage (Gangas 1994: 147).

Table 2.1 Electoral results for the Chamber of Deputies 1977-1996

	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
UCD	34.4	35.0	6.8	—	—	—	—
PSOE	29.3	30.5	48.4	44.4	39.9	39.1	37.5
PCE/IU	9.3	10.8	4.1	3.9	9.1	9.6	10.6
AP/PP	8.2	6.0	26.5	26.2	26.0	35.0	38.9
CDS	0.0	0.0	2.9	9.3	8.0	1.8	—
CiU	2.8	2.7	3.7	5.1	5.1	5.0	4.6
PNV	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.3
EE	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	—	—
EA	—	—	—	—	0.6	0.6	0.5
ERC	0.8	0.8	0.7	—	—	0.8	0.7
HB	—	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.7
PAR	—	0.2	—	0.4	0.4	0.5	—
UV	—	—	—	0.4	0.7	0.5	0.4
BNG	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.9
CC	—	—	—	—	—	0.9	0.9
Others	13.2	11.1	3.5	7.2	7.5	4.1	3.2

* Own elaboration with data obtained from the Ministry of Interior. Percentages are calculated after subtracting null and blank votes from the valid votes. See list of parties in the appendix.

The period immediately after the elections was characterised by co-operation among the different political forces, particularly while the Constitution was being drafted. The conciliatory attitude of the Suárez's government and the co-operative response by the parties in the opposition became known as the *politics of consensus*, with moderation of all party leaders whose priority was to secure agreements over matters that were crucial to the legitimacy and endurance of the democratic regime. A wider acceptance of the constitutional text entailed a higher legitimacy of the democratic regime and greater chances for its consolidation.

Thus, an important particularity of this period for the different political parties was that their first goal was to secure democracy, which was a precondition to the realisation of any other 'ordinary' goal such as vote maximisation or government participation.[17] This was also

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[17] Gunther (1987: 54) defines *the politics of consensus* as "the explicit abandonment of majoritarian or winner take all principles of partisan interactions. Accordingly, the key participants in these successful negotiations defined their goals not as the maximisation of the interests of their respective clienteles, but rather as the creation of a legitimate and stable regime within which their respective supporters interests would merely be satisfied."

the case for the PSOE.[18] Party leaders played a key role in the negotiations that culminated in founding the new regime, while at the same time being engaged in decisions concerning the image, ideological stances and the organisation of their respective parties.

Figure 2.1. Ideological position of the main Spanish state-wide parties (1978-1996)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1978		PCE (2.5)		PSOE (3.8)		UCD (6.0)		AP (8.5)		
1979		PCE (2.4)		PSOE (3.9)		UCD (6.5)		AP (7.9)		
1982		PCE (2.1)		PSOE (3.5)		CDS (5.8) (6.2) UCD		AP (8.6)		
1984		PCE (2.1)		PSOE (4.2)	CDS (5.6)		AP (7.6)			
1985		PCE (2.0)		PSOE (3.8)	CDS (5.5)		AP (8.0)			
1989		IU (2.2)		PSOE (4.2)		CDS (6.0)		PP (8.15)		
1993		IU (2.5)		PSOE (4.5)			PP (7.9)			
1996		IU (2.5)		PSOE (4.5)			PP (7.95)			

Own elaboration after data obtained from Linz and Montero 1986 for the data up to 1985, for the data of 1989, Montero and Torcal 1990. The 1993 and 1996 data come from CIS Studies 2061 and 2210. The figures are the mean position in the ideological scale from 1(left) to 10 (right) assigned by survey respondents.

The main results of this conciliatory mood were the Moncloa Pacts and the new Constitution. The Moncloa Pacts, signed in October 1977 by all main Spanish political parties, was a compromise that included an austerity program to fight the effects of economic crisis, a program of reforms of political institutions, particularly of the social security system and of the regressive taxation system inherited from Franco's regime (Preston 1986: 137). For the left-wing parties and the unions other relevant points of this pact were the establishment of trade union representation within companies, and the devolution of union property expropriated after the Civil War. In exchange, the parties of the left promised to adopt a strategy of moderation and urged the trade unions to do the same.

However, the most important product of this consensual phase was the new Constitution, which was drafted between August 1977 and October 1978. The main characteristics of the process of elaboration of the Constitution were the combination of public and private negotiations among the different party representatives. It was in the latter that most agreements were achieved, given that transactions were more easily achieved in this type of negotiation. The main areas of conflict were over such issues as divorce, abortion, the death penalty, the electoral law, labour relations, regional autonomy and the role of the Catholic Church in the educational system.[19] The result was a constitutional text that was in many

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[18] See for example the resolutions of the 1976 PSOE Congress (page 3) for evidence of this subordination of party goals.

[19] See Gunther (1985) and Bonime-Blanc (1985) for a detailed account of the drafting of the Constitution.

respects ambiguous or too vague, but was at least accepted by most political groups, with the important exception of the Basque Nationalists who abstained at the vote in the Cortes.

The phase of the *politics of consensus* lasted until the ratification of the Constitution by popular referendum in December 1978.[20] During this period the economic crisis and the increase of terrorist action by ETA functioned as further incentives for political leaders to maintain a conciliatory strategy, given their potential disruptive nature for the consolidation of democracy.

2.3. The PSOE as an "alternativa de poder"

After becoming the main party in the opposition and the dominant party of the left in the 1977 elections, the PSOE explicitly decided to present itself as the alternative to the UCD in government (*alternativa de poder*).[21] This was important because it influenced other aspects of the party functioning, such as the selection of which social groups in the electorate to mobilise, its image and discourse. If the goal of obtaining an electoral majority was the priority, the PSOE necessarily needed to address to a larger share of the electorate, and, as shall be shown later, this also had consequences over the type of organisational strategy needed to achieve such goals.

At this stage, however, it was unclear whether there was agreement inside the party over the price that should be paid in order to be the *alternativa de poder*. In other words, it was not clear that all party sectors shared this goal. Even if they did, it was not clear that they agreed on the strategies to achieve them, particularly over the issue of the autonomy of the socialist project (*autonomía del proyecto socialista*). This autonomy implied rejecting the formation of broad alliances with other political forces in order to become the governmental alternative to the UCD. While the *critical sector* was more eager to reach pacts with other political forces to the left of the PSOE, in order to become the governmental alternative to the UCD, the most numerous sector which included its leaders clearly rejected this possibility and wanted the PSOE to attract enough electoral support to carry out its own electoral program independently (Maravall 1991: 10-11).

PSOE discourse and electoral strategy became more moderate. While in 1976 the PSOE defined itself as "a class party and therefore of the masses, Marxist and democratic"

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[20] Gunther (1987: 61) points out that the interviews with party elites he carried out were full of references of the need to moderate one's behaviour in the interest of creating a stable and legitimate democracy.

[21] "From the elections of the 15th of June [1977] the party defined a strategy to become the governmental alternative. The place we occupied in the political scene and the results of the elections pointed us in this direction" (Felipe González, opening speech of the 28th Party Congress, May 1979).

(MG27C 1976: 4) and the general tone of the resolutions pointed at a strict definition of working class, over time the definition of what working class constituted gradually changed to suit the electoral aspirations of the party. Only three years later, in 1979, the definition was looser and avoided making reference to the *working class* in an attempt to reach *all* workers. For instance, the guide of the 1979 general election campaign instructs campaigners to "insist on explaining what it is that the PSOE understands by workers, i.e., anyone who earns a salary" (GC 1979: 55).

This last sentence illustrates the above mentioned coexistence of a more radical strategy (class party, radical program, Marxist definition of the party) with a moderate one that appealed to the middle class and those sectors of the electorate that had voted UCD in 1977. However, the capacity to combine both discourses depending on the situation and the type of public had certain limitations that became clear in the 1979 elections. In the meantime other events increased the PSOE's hopes to become the party with the most votes, such as the absorption of small socialists parties that had fought the 1977 elections on their own, which included some regional socialist parties which had belonged to the Federation of Socialist Parties, or the Partido Socialista Popular.

The results of the 1979 elections were considered a failure by the PSOE[22] (see table 2.1), since there was virtually no improvement from the 1977 elections. The UCD won the elections with 35% of the vote, while the PSOE obtained 30.5%, only managing to improve slightly on the 29.3% it had obtained in 1977. If we consider the votes as a proportion of the electorate the results are worse, since the PSOE lost more than two points with respect to 1977.[23] In short, there was a widespread frustration inside the party due to the failure in to improve the results. This was exacerbated by the impression that a decisive part of the electorate was influenced by UCD's leader televised message on the last day of the campaign in which he managed to spoil the strategy of moderation followed by the PSOE. In his speech Suárez insisted on the perils of voting for a party that defined itself as Marxist and had such a radical program (García Morillo 1979, Tezanos 1979b: 72, Juliá 1997: 524). By so doing, the UCD was able to take advantage of the contradiction between a radical party platform and a moderate image and style during the election campaign.[24]

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[22] "It is true that these elections (1979) did not confirm the expectations our party had" (Felipe González, opening speech of the 28th Party Congress, May 1979).

[23] It obtained 22.7% in 1977 for 20.5% in 1979.

[24] Gunther (1987: 19) cites some interviews with leaders of the UCD in which they chose this incoherence as one of the main campaign lines of the UCD against the PSOE.

Table 2.2. Electoral share of the vote as a percentage of the electorate

	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
PSOE	22.7	20.4	37.7	30.6	27.4	29.5	29.1
AP	6.5	4.0	20.4	18.0	17.9	26.4	30.2
PCE-IU	7.3	7.2	3.1	3.2	6.3	7.3	8.2
UCD	26.9	23.5	5.6	—	—	—	—

Own elaboration. Data from the Ministry of Interior.

The stagnation of the PSOE's vote at the 1979 elections provoked different interpretations of the strategy the party should follow. The leadership of the party considered this stagnation as evidence that the co-existence of the two styles, radical and moderate, made it virtually impossible for the party to obtain enough electoral support to win the elections.[25] Therefore, the majoritarian sector of the PSOE viewed these results as an indication that the party had to moderate its image if it wanted to win an election. An example of this latter point of view is provided by Tezanos (1979: 75) in his analysis of a survey commissioned by the PSOE. He argues that an incorrect definition of the PSOE as a class party that did not take into account the importance of new social sectors could lead to a serious decrease in votes, not merely a failure to obtain an electoral majority. His article, whose stated aim was to figure out why the Socialist party in those two years had failed to make significant advances and to analyse the possible sources of votes for the PSOE, concluded (Tezanos 1979: 70):

> "the PSOE has chances to improve its vote both to its left and to its right, but quantitatively speaking the latter yields by far a greater probability of growth"

On the contrary, according to the PSOE's left (the *criticos),* the PSOE had been punished by abstention in traditional Socialist strongholds as a result of the conciliatory attitude followed by the party during the "consensus" period.

At the local elections that took place a few months later (April 1979) the PSOE obtained better results, but only after reaching a pact with the Communist Party. As a result of the pact, the PSOE and the PCE gained control of twenty-seven provincial capitals and governed in 44 out of the 53 biggest cities (Preston 1986: 157). The idea of having to reach pacts with other political forces, and with the Communist Party in particular, was far from the first choice of PSOE leaders. Felipe González was very careful in emphasising that the PSOE had to avoid feeling triumphant after these local elections, since the victory was only partial, given that it had happened in conjunction with the Communists. To prevent the left of the party

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[25] "In one and a half years of political struggle we have not been able to integrate other sectors of society in our political project" (Felipe González, opening speech of the 28th Party Congress, May 1979).

from trying to enlarge the co-operation with the Communists beyond the local level, he insisted again that the PSOE should be *autonomous* from other political parties.[26]

The Marxist definition of the party and the strict definition of the working class was perceived as the main impediment to further electoral growth. In fact, Felipe González had already announced his intention to ask the party to remove the term "Marxist" from the PSOE program in May 1978. This provoked a serious upheaval within the party which remained unresolved until the 28th Party Congress,[27] held in May 1979, dominated precisely by the conflict over the Marxist definition of the party. The conflict emerged between the group of *oficialistas*, sometimes referred to as *felipistas*, and their critics (*críticos*). The *oficialistas* were more numerous in the Executive Commission of the PSOE, but some of the *críticos* were also members of this governing body. The *críticos* were opposed to what they thought was an electoralist line that the party was taking, which implied changing the party's identity as a workers' party. They preferred a strategy of unity of the left to the attainment of the electoral majority of a catch-all socialist party. They were against diluting the working class character of the party and renouncing the term *Marxism* to define the party's program. They also denounced the erosion of internal democracy and the increasing concentration of power in the hands of Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra,[28] and the right to form internal organised tendencies.[29]

The *críticos* advocated a strategy of mass mobilisation similar to the one which the party had formally adopted in 1976, but had not been put into practice. In the Political Resolutions of the 28th Congress, the position of the *críticos* was clear. They considered that the abandonment of a strategy of mass mobilisation so as to follow the *politics of consensus* had entailed great costs for the goals of the party and that now it was about time to put an end to that moderation in order to devote more effort to the active mobilisation of the working class.[30]

The delegates to the 28th Party Congress, directly chosen by the local branches, backed the *críticos*, but at the same time expressed their wish to keep Felipe González as the PSOE's

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[26] "this strategy has to remain socialist, and therefore, autonomous..." (Felipe González, opening speech of the 28th Party Congress, May 1979).

[27] For a detailed account of the development of this Party Congress see Preston (1986: 153-157) and Gillespie (1989: 356-348).

[28] The *críticos* denounced with particular emphasis the lack of consultation before the signing of the Moncloa Pact and the intervention of the party leadership to influence the composition of party electoral lists (Gillespie 1989: 342).

[29] Among the critics there were important personalities with a long tradition in the party such as Luis Gómez Llorente, Fernando Morán, Pablo Castellano and Francisco Bustelo (De Esteban and López Guerra, 1982: 121).

[30] Resolutions of the 28th Congress, page 4.

General Secretary.[31] Felipe González refused to stand for re-election since this meant defending the contents of the Political Resolution with which he did not agree, as he mentioned in the closing speech. The *críticos* had not prepared an alternative candidate because they probably never thought that González would decline to stand, so a Steering Committee was appointed to run the party until an Extraordinary Congress was convened.

The main results of the Extraordinary Congress that took place three months later were the election of Felipe González as the Secretary General of the party and of Alfonso Guerra as the vice-Secretary General, and a compromise solution by which the PSOE disregarded Marxism as one of its defining traits, but admitted its utility as an instrument of analysis. Apart from the consequences that this victory had in the internal party arena, which will be explored in subsequent chapters, this result was important because it meant a unification of the goals of the party around a cohesive leadership and two ideas: becoming the party in government and doing so without resorting to coalitions with other left-wing parties, even if it meant reaching a wider space in the ideological spectrum (*alternativa* and *autonomía*).

As Shares (1989: 58) points out "[s]omewhat ironically, after the PSOE leadership defeated the party's left and consolidated a more moderate party program, the Socialist Party stepped up its attack on the UCD government". The disappointment with the 1979 results led the PSOE to put more pressure on the government and to promote itself as the only alternative to a weak UCD government that would gradually disintegrate mainly due to intra-party struggles. Several authors also point at the resentment caused by the anti-Marxist last speech of Suárez in the 1979 general elections campaign as one of the reasons that moved the PSOE to show a more hostile attitude towards the UCD (see Preston 1986, Share 1989). Felipe González increased his hostility towards the government, both attacking its policies in public and privately attempting to negotiate with the social democratic wing of UCD (Preston 1986: 169). These moves were helped by the fact that UCD was already suffering from very little internal cohesion, and was losing power in the regional elections that took place such as the ones in the Basque Country and Galicia, obtaining a very damaging defeat at the referendum for autonomy of Andalucía.

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[31] This critical attitude was clearly anticipated by Felipe González in his opening address to the Congress when he said that, to his knowledge, the PSOE was the only political party where the delegates that disapproved of the record of the Executive Commission were the only ones allowed time to express their views. He also criticised the fact that delegates were strictly bound by prior Local Branches decisions, arguing that "if the vote is exclusively determined by the debate in the Local Branch assembly, then there is no need to debate here [...]. If, on the contrary, this debate makes sense in order to clarify positions and deepen the knowledge of the management (of the Executive Commission), then the predetermination of the vote is democratically incorrect" (Felipe González, opening speech of the 28th Party Congress, May 1979).

In May 1980 the PSOE put forward a censure motion against Adolfo Suárez.[32] It had very little or no chance of winning the absolute majority of votes in the Chamber of Deputies, but it was a good occasion to attract the attention of the mass media and to present Felipe González as a serious alternative for Suárez. Thus, even if the motion was formally rejected,[33] the PSOE obtained a political victory, given that Suárez refused even to reply to the motion in the Chamber of Deputies. Felipe González took advantage of this opportunity to present his program in a televised debate, to show that both himself and his party were credible and serious alternatives to the UCD and that they were ready to govern the country (Preston 1986: 174).

After the 1979 general elections the party system started a process of decomposition at the elite level, particularly of the UCD, which culminated in a partisan realignment of massive proportions. The ideological and programmatic heterogeneity inside the UCD, as well as the continuous conflict among its political families proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for the institutionalisation of the party (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 127). Various scholars have studied the collapse of the UCD, reaching the conclusion that its explanation lies mainly in the domain of the choices and behaviour of its elites, rather than in a massive realignment of its electorate, which took place only *after* there were clear signs of decomposition of the coalition.[34]

There was a widespread feeling of crisis provoked by the incapacity of Suárez, politically weak for the above mentioned reasons, to face a difficult situation aggravated by the rise of terrorist attacks and he resigned in January 1981. Shortly after, during the investiture of his successor in Parliament, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, there was an attempted coup led by sectors of the military, which failed in its purpose. Given the existence of important threats to democracy, the PSOE offered to take part in a coalition government, which was rejected by Calvo Sotelo.[35] Thus, the PSOE abandoned the hostility it had displayed in the previous year and took a more co-operative attitude towards the government, which was led by a much less

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[32] As Hopkin notes (1995: 221) "The object of the motion was unmistakably that of attacking Suárez on his weakest ground - Parliament - at a moment when he was facing strong criticism from within the party as a result of the Andalusian referendum". The UCD suffered attacks by the right-wing party Alianza Popular and by the PSOE, which in principle were beneficial to both parties since their electoral growth partly depended on the fortunes of UCD.

[33] The actual result was 166 in favour of Adolfo Suárez for 152 supporting the censure motion (Cebrián 1996: 296).

[34] For a more detailed analysis of this question see Huneeus (1985), Gunther (1986), Caciagli (1989) and Hopkins (1995).

[35] According to various sources there had been similar offers since the Autumn of 1980, when the factors that led to the attempted coup of February 1981 were most evident. See Preston, 1986, Hopkin 1995, Maravall 1991.

charismatic (and less threatening) leader than Suárez. By that time it was clear that the Socialists were in a very good position to win the following general elections, but the margin of the victory was still uncertain.

In the meantime, the PSOE held its 29th Congress in October 1981. It was much more peaceful and calm than the 28th Congress, as a result of the operation of the organisational reforms that had modified the basis of representation in Congresses and of the decision of the *críticos* not to participate in it.[36] As Share (1989: 60) notes, the 29th Congress was another opportunity to show the public that the PSOE was a united and mature party. The resolutions approved in the 29th Party Congress reiterated the PSOE's moderation, thus correcting the previous ambiguity between radical documents and a moderate public discourse, in favour of a more moderate and coherent discourse. In those Congress Resolutions the caution with which the PSOE avoided antagonising different sectors of the population and attempted to integrate their interests into a unique program is clearly noticeable.

These are the most prominent features that characterised Spanish politics until the general elections were held in October 1982, which brought the Socialists to power.

3. The PSOE in government 1982-1996

3.1. The first term in office: 1982-1986

In the 1982 general elections the PSOE obtained 48.4 % of the votes and the absolute majority of seats[37] (see table 2.1 for the results). The circumstances in which these elections were held (the 1981 failed coup d'Etat and the fatal crisis of the party in government) as well as other factors, such as the youthful aspect of most Socialist leaders representing a new generation in politics born after the Civil War, gave this victory a special meaning.

The share of the vote of UCD fell from 34.8 to 6.7 percent, and its representation in the Congress of Deputies was reduced from 168 to 11 seats. In fact, the UCD that contended these elections was the residue of the old UCD after the breakaways by Suárez who formed his own party, the Centro Democrático y Social, the Liberals who joined the conservative Alianza Popular and Fernández Ordoñez, who formed the PAD which later joined the PSOE. Alianza Popular, now leading the electoral coalition Coalición Popular, became the second major party

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[36] This was to show their rejection of these new rules which denied representations to groups with minoritarian support.

[37] The PSOE obtained 202 deputies out of 350 (i.e. 57.7% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies).

in these elections.[38] It gained 19% of the vote and increased its representation at the Congress from 9 seats in 1979 to 107. The PCE also posted worse electoral results than in 1979 due, among other reasons, to the lack of internal cohesion provoked both by generational conflicts within the party and by fights over the adoption of Eurocommunism. The disappearance of the UCD and the decline of the PCE brought about a simplification of the Spanish party system which became more polarised, given that the voters of the two major parties (PSOE and AP) were further apart than the voters from the two major parties until 1982 (UCD and PSOE) (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 418).

In these elections the PSOE managed to mobilise first-time voters, voters that had abstained in the previous elections, and ex-UCD voters as well as ex-PCE voters. Its success derived from its ability to form a large coalition of middle and working classes. In 1982, 70% of its electorate declared itself to belong to the working class, 25% to the low-middle and middle class, and only 5% to the middle-upper or upper class (Pühle 1982: 302). The PSOE's support grew among the "blue collar" workers with respect to 1979, while at the same time it managed to increase the votes of "white collar" workers (see Pühle 1986).

Graph 2.2. Share of the votes of main parties in local elections 1979-95.

These elections marked the beginning of a new phase of dominance by the PSOE at all governmental levels: national, regional and local. As graph 2.2 shows, in 1983 the PSOE won

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[38] The other parties in Coalición Popular apart from AP were the PDP (Partido Demócrata Popular), the PAR (Partido Aragonés Regionalista), the UV (Unión Valenciana) and UPN (Unión del Pueblo Navarro) (Montero 1986: 348).

the local elections with 42.7% of the vote, while Alianza Popular got 25.9%. The PSOE also obtained the absolute majority of seats in the regional parliaments of seven out of the thirteen Autonomous Communities that held elections that year,[39] and in four more it obtained a relative majority of seats (see table 2.3 below). The PSOE formed government in all these eleven Autonomous Communities. This must be added to the fact that the PSOE was already in government in Spain's most populated region, Andalucía, and had a fairly strong electoral support in most of the "historical" regions, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country, both resistant to the penetration of Spanish conservatism.

Table 2.3. Composition of regional governments 1983-1995.

	1983	1987	1991	1995
Castilla La Mancha	PSOE-AM	PSOE-AM	PSOE-AM	PSOE-M
Andalucía	PSOE-AM	PSOE-AM	PSOE-AM	PSOE-m
Extremadura	PSOE-AM	PSOE-AM	PSOE-AM	PSOE-m
Murcia	PSOE-AM	PSOE-AM	PSOE-AM	PP-AM
C. Valenciana	PSOE-AM	PSOE-m	PSOE-AM	PP-m
Asturias	PSOE-AM	PSOE-m	PSOE-m	PP-m
Madrid	PSOE-AM	PSOE-m	PSOE-m	PP-AM
La Rioja	PSOE-AM	AP-m	PSOE-m	PP-AM
Navarra	PSOE-m	PSOE-m	UPN-m	UPN-m
Aragón	PSOE-m	PAR-m	PAR+PP/PSOE-m	PP-PAR
Castilla y León	PSOE-m	AP-m	PP-AM	PP-m
Canarias	PSOE-m	CDS+AIC+(AP)	AIC+PSOE/CC	CC
Baleares	AP-m	AP-UM	PP/UM-MA	PP-AM
Cantabria	AP-AM/m	AP-AM	PP	PP-m
Galicia	AP-m	AP-m	PP-AM	PP-AM
Cataluña	CiU-AM	CiU-AM	CiU-AM	CiU-m
País Vasco	PNV-m	PNV-PSE*	PNV+EA+EE	PNV+PSE*+EA

Source: Own elaboration from data from Revenga 1989 and Anuario EL PAIS. AM: Absolute majority; m: simple majority in the regional Chamber of Deputies* PSE stands for PSE-PSOE: Partido Socialista Euskadi-PSOE.[40]

In 1982 the PSOE had a reformist electoral program with no reference to a 'qualitative break' with capitalism. The main compromises contained in the 1982 PSOE's electoral programme were the modernisation of Spain and the consolidation of democracy. According to Maravall (1991: 20-22) the government's priorities were to conclude the process of political decentralisation of the state, to introduce reforms protecting civil rights and to consolidate Spanish foreign relations after a long period of isolation, particularly focused on the integration in the European Community.

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[39] The four "historic" Autonomous Communities (Cataluña, País Vasco, Galicia and Andalucía) hold elections separately.

[40] I thank Mireia Grau (European University Institute) for all her help in providing me with data on regional governments. Any errors are of course my sole responsibility.

In relation to the first objective, the Socialist government passed legislation on abortion, conscientious objection, habeas corpus and legal assistance, and undertook a reform of the educational system. It also passed a reform of the judiciary system, although according to Maravall this remained a focus of dissatisfaction of the Spanish population who judged the Socialist's management of this area to be inadequate. The reforms of the structure of the State were based on a political and administrative decentralisation that transformed Spain into a quasi-federal system. Under the Socialist government the Statutes of thirteen Autonomous Communities were passed, as well as the transfer of competences, economic and administrative resources. Another issue related to the consolidation of democracy that were tackled by the Socialist governments was the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control.

The central concern of the government, however, was to confront the difficulties the Spanish economy was facing: the economy was growing at only 1.2%, inflation was around 14%, the unemployment rate was 17%, the public deficit 5.5%, and a there was a high external deficit. As soon as it came in office, the Socialist government left aside the "expansionist-oriented" electoral program which sought to use state investment to stimulate economic growth, create employment and to restructure industry, and adopted instead an economic adjustment plan advocated by the social democratic sectors of the party (see Share 1989 and Boix 1996: 148-50). According to several sources the previous experience of the French socialists had much to do with the easiness, or in other occasions, the resignation, with which this was accepted.[41] The socialist government introduced a strict program of economic adjustment and structural reforms which lasted from 1982 to 1985 and included a devaluation of the currency, a reduction of the money supply, an industrial restructuring and a flexibilization of labour market (Maravall 1991: 24). Its objectives were to reduce inflation by limiting wages and cutting state spending. It included an industrial restructuring program to eliminate inefficient industries and re-direct resources towards other industries. The government also engaged in a process of renovation of the fiscal system, to help with this readjustment period, involving a tax increase, particularly increases in tax revenues[42] and the creation of a more progressive system, as well as the design of measures to fight fiscal fraud.

By 1985 inflation was down to 8%, and the external deficit had turned into a surplus

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[41] See for example the references to this question in the interviews of the Ministers of the Economy, Miguel Boyer (1982-1985) and Carlos Solchaga (1985-1993) in Burns (1996).

[42] The level of fiscal pressure as a percentage of the GDP increased from 18.4 in 1975 to 28.8 in 1985 and 34.4. in 1990 (Maravall 1997: 179).

, but the costs were a higher unemployment rate, which had gone up to nearly three million people. This was potentially very damaging for the Socialists, who had centred their 1982 program on the need to fight unemployment and on promises to create many more jobs. Expansionist measures were adopted; there were incentives for consumption carried out by means of reducing the tax revenue and incentives for investments were also implemented. This turn in policy coincided with the world wide economic recovery, so Spain started a period of strong economic growth. The benefits of entrepreneurs augmented and foreign investment in Spain increased dramatically, particularly after Spain's entry in the European Community, on January 1st 1986. However, the promise of creating 800,000 jobs contained in the 1982 program was not fulfilled and unemployment remained a great concern of the government and a serious political and economic problem.

Another important problem the Government had to confront during these years was the referendum over the permanence of Spain in the NATO. The PSOE had been a fierce advocate of non-entry at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, when the Calvo Sotelo government agreed to join NATO. When this effectively took place, in the autumn of 1981, the PSOE organised an anti-NATO campaign and the resolutions of the 29th PSOE Party Congress also held in 1981 called for NATO withdrawal.[43] The terms of the debate were substantially changed when the time came to maintain their promise. The question was no longer whether to enter NATO or not, but instead whether to leave NATO or remain,[44] but even accepting the status quo (remaining in NATO) involved a shift of the PSOE's official position. In the 1982 general elections the PSOE included in its manifesto the commitment to hold a referendum on the issue and the promise to freeze the entry into the integrated military command of NATO until citizens had expressed their opinion.

Although this proved to be a very divisive question inside the PSOE, Maravall (1996: 15) points out that "the party was not very difficult to convince", particularly compared to the difficulty in convincing Spanish society at large. The definition of the new position on the NATO issue ended in an intermediary solution which accepted remaining part of NATO without integrating in its military command, which banned nuclear weapons on Spanish territory, and which as a condition for membership asked for a reduction of US troops based in Spain (Share 1989: 82). The change of position officially took place at the 30th Party Congress

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[43] The theme of the campaign was "OTAN, de entrada no". The campaign was also viewed as an opportunity to mobilise the party and the electorate for the next general elections (see Share 1989: 80 and chapter 7 of the thesis).

[44] For a detailed account of the development of the position of the PSOE vis-à-vis NATO see Maravall (1996) and Del Val (1996).

(1984). There was hardly any debate at the Congress about the change of policy stand,[45] but both the change in position in the Party Congress and the campaign of the Referendum were, as will be examined in chapter 4, dramatic experiences for the party and for a part of the electorate. As Maravall (1996:15) points out, public opinion was harder to change than the party. The positions of other parties as well as the political atmosphere turned the referendum into a sort of popular vote of confidence in González. The referendum was held in March 1986 and the results were a narrow victory for the option of remaining in NATO.

The PSOE won again the general elections that were held shortly after the NATO referendum, in June 1986, and also obtained an absolute majority of seats. The electoral results were thus characterised by continuity and by the lack of competitiveness.[46] That said, the PSOE lost four percentage points with respect to the second most voted party, the conservative Alianza Popular and 1.2 million votes with respect to the general elections of 1982. It obtained 30.6% of the vote as opposed to 37.7% in 1982. Alianza Popular, still part of the Coalición Popular, did not succeed in increasing its representation and therefore could not be considered a potential alternative to the dominance of the PSOE. It remained nearly twenty points distant from the Socialists (see table 2.1).

The Communist Party contended these elections as part of a new coalition, the United Left, which was formed by the Communist party and other small groups that had joined their efforts to support the "no" vote at the NATO referendum (Del Castillo and Sani 1986: 626). Its aim was to improve the results obtained by the PCE in 1982 by attracting disenchanted voters from the PSOE, but at these elections failed to do so. Finally, the emergence of a new state-wide party led by the Catalan politician, Miquel Roca, that attempted to co-ordinate the regionalist and nationalist centre-right parties in one front did not change the electoral scene since it failed to obtain a single deputy. The fact that the CDS, led by Suárez, did not participate in this initiative certainly contributed to its failure. Instead, the CDS fought the election alone, obtaining an important increase of votes and nineteen deputies, but its relevance as a potential coalition party was undermined by the fact that the Socialist party had an absolute majority and therefore needed no coalition partners. Thus, although it lost some of its support the position of the PSOE in the electoral arena remained uncontested after the 1986 elections.

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[45] José María Maravall (personal interview 28/12/95) credits the UGT as one of the causes limiting the debate. The UGT asked the party not to deepen the debate on the issue in exchange for not positioning itself publicly against remaining in NATO.

[46] See for example Del Castillo and Sani (1986), Montero (1992) and Anduiza & Méndez (1997).

3.2. The second term: 1986-1989

The most important features of this term were the continuity in political objectives related to the social, economic and political modernisation of Spain, and the increase of political tension, particularly within the labour movement. The term coincided with a period of economic growth, as part of the world-wide economic improvement. There was an important increase in foreign capital investment in Spain. GDP grew at a rate of over 5% and significant numbers of new jobs were created. However, the labour movement complained that the benefits of such growth did not reach workers, while an atmosphere of quick enrichment dominated Spain.

In 1987 Solchaga, the Minister of Finance, recommended entrepreneurs to negotiate wage increases around 5%. This proposal was rejected by the unions who after the years of economic restructuring refused to internalise the cost of moderation in a context of economic growth and increasing profits to capital. Labour protest intensified and the following year the Government failed to convince the union confederations of the need to negotiate. The result of the increasing confrontation was the unions' call for a general strike that took place in December 1988, whose causes and consequences on the PSOE-unions links are analysed in detail in chapter 6 of this thesis. The strike was relevant not only for its meaning as a protest against the economic policy of the government, but because it channelled protest to the socialists' style of conducting politics which was regarded as distant and to a certain extent authoritarian.[47]

This was one of the central issues that dominated the development of the 31st PSOE Party Congress (January 1988). Even if it took place before the general strike of 1987, it was still clear that the relations between the PSOE and the UGT were experiencing a serious deterioration and the coming confrontation was evident (see chapter 6 for more details). The other important issue of the 31st Congress was the debate over the adoption of a 25% quota for the internal representation of women, directed to increasing their representation both in party governing bodies and in electoral lists (so indirectly, at least, in Parliament). The 31st Congress can be regarded as continuing the features of party congresses since the beginning of the 1980s, i.e., large majorities in the vote on the management of the Executive Commission and in the election of new governing party bodies, very little debate and control of the party apparatus of the main resources of the party.

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[47] According to the data of López Pintor a third of the population thought that the reason that had most influenced people to go on strike was that they were in favour of the demands of the unions, while around 38% either were frightened of pickets, and nearly 20% just to show opposition to the way the Socialists were governing the country (López Pintor 1994: 591).

The general strike also had important direct and indirect consequences on the relationship between the government and the party organisation, and in the definition of preferences of intra-party actors. Tension within the party increased among the different sectors which had divergent ideas both regarding socio-economic policy and internal party matters. These internal struggles intensified after rumours emerged that González intended to resign, which started around the date of the general strike, since this implied that a successor had to be elected.

However, in spite of the increasingly difficult context for the PSOE, it still dominated the electoral arena. The PSOE won the 1987 local elections, although its share of the vote fell from the 42% it had obtained in 1983 to 36%. Its percentage of mayors and local councillors remained the same. This marked the start of a trend of the Socialist vote to rise in rural areas and to decline in urban ones. At the regional elections it also managed to maintain its condition as the most voted party in most Autonomous Communities, losing only the government of Castilla y León, which went to the Popular Party and Aragón, which went to the coalition between the PAR and PP, although the PSOE was the biggest party.

In the 1989 elections the fear rose that the PSOE would lose its absolute majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The results of the elections confirmed these suspicions, given that the PSOE was one seat short of the absolute majority. The electoral performance with respect to the total electorate worsened by three points (27.4% of the electorate in 1989 as opposed to 30.6% in 1986, see table 2.2.). However, its closest competitor, the old Alianza Popular, now called Popular Party, with a new leader Jose María Aznar, failed to increase its share of the vote and was still far from being a government alternative. The United Left nearly doubled its share of the votes and became the third state-wide party, with 17 deputies in the Chamber. The CDS's share of the vote declined slightly, becoming the fourth state-wide party.

3.3. The third term: 1989-1993

The best way to define the rest of the Socialists' time in office is to say that public attention went from policies to politics.[48] Political scandals, their influence in the electoral performance of the PSOE, together with the strengthening of the leadership of José María Aznar of the conservative Partido Popular and the decreasing distance between the two parties were the most prominent issues of this Socialist term in office.

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[48] An expression used by Maravall in several passages of his 1997 book.

There was an important turn in the economic and social policy of the Government, partly as a result of the opposition to the government's policy of the labour movement and wide sectors of the population that had led to the general strike in December 1988. Changes in the socio-economic policy included the increase in social expenditure from 17% to 20% of GDP, an increase in the number of people covered by unemployment benefit which augmented from 34% to 67% coverage in the period from 1993 to 1994, and the establishment of non-contributive pensions.[49] All of this occurred in a context of economic expansion which lasted until 1992, when a serious crisis hit the Spanish economy.[50]

Secondly, this period was characterised by the erosion of the PSOE/Government public image due to the emergence of several corruption cases, denounced mainly by the press and followed by judicial investigations. There was also a dramatic deterioration of the relationship between the socialists and the media (Maravall 1991: 19). Most scandals came to light as a result of judicial investigations backed, or even in certain occasions prompted by the mass media, especially by the newspaper 'El Mundo'. For example, the resignation from government of Alfonso Guerra was preceded by a year-long campaign, which as Heywood (1995b: 117) states, was presented as investigative journalism but in many cases "was little more than vindictive personalism".

The series of corruption cases included the use of an office at the headquarters of the Andalusian regional government for private business purposes by Juan Guerra, the brother of the vice-president of the Government (this was made public at the beginning of 1990) and a series of scandals related to the illegal party financing known as "the Filesa affair". This consisted of high ranking party members, among whom a deputy and a senator, who had run a group of front companies that paid bills for the party with money that had been obtained by charging business and banks for fictitious consultancy work between 1989 and 1991 (Heywood 1994: 118). Other scandals emerged concerning the alleged payment of commissions in return for contracts related to the 1992 World Expo in Sevilla. The consequences of this deterioration on the Socialists' electoral fortunes is difficult to assess, but it seems clear that they did have an influence on spreading an atmosphere of political cynicism and distrust of politicians, more especially towards the Socialists.

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[49] Most of the economic indicators were taken from an extensive report on the 1982-1992 period published by El País on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 1982 elections.

[50] 1992 was a year marked by the Olympic Games that were held in Barcelona and the World Exhibition "Expo" in Seville.

The third distinctive feature of this term was the emergence of important internal party struggles within the PSOE, which set up an opposition between the party apparatus organised around Alfonso Guerra, and the heterogeneous group referred to as *renovadores*, who advocated a transformation of the party discourse and the way the party organisation functioned. In this context it was hardly surprising that the 32nd Party Congress, which was preceded by an overt expression of discontent by a section of the party over the control exerted by Alfonso Guerra of the party apparatus and the excessive concentration of power within the PSOE, focused mainly on internal questions, not so much related to organisational issues, but to intra-party disputes over power and control. The result of this Congress was succinctly put by one of the best known *renovadores*, the then Minister of the Economy, Carlos Solchaga, "we [the renovadores] have lost the Congress".[51] However, this provisional defeat did not quench the internal struggle which escalated until the 1993 elections were held, and continued afterwards.

Although the PSOE actually increased its percentage of the vote in the 1991 local elections (with respect to the 1987 local elections), the fact that it lost the mayor of important cities like Madrid, Sevilla or Valencia portrayed an image of electoral decline. In the regional elections it managed to keep the absolute majority of seats, and hence the regional government in Extremadura, Castilla La Mancha and Murcia. It kept the governments of Comunidad Valenciana, Asturias, Madrid and Navarra, and regained those of La Rioja and Aragón, all with a simple majority of seats (see table 2.3).

The PSOE started to suffer from a general government wear and tear. Since the initial hopes raised by the coming of the socialist government were very high, so were some of the disillusions ten years later. By 1992, when the Socialists celebrated a decade in power, the feeling of a crisis both political and economic was clear among Spaniards.[52] Intra-party disputes, the fatigue of González and his doubts on whether to stand as candidate in the following general elections, the economic crisis, the opposition of the labour movement and the aggressiveness of part of the press were the main defining characteristics of the atmosphere in which this anniversary was celebrated.

Things did not improve in the first half of 1993. The combination of the corruption scandals and the mild reaction of the PSOE apparatus, together with the intensification of the

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[51] El País 11/11/90.

[52] López Pintor (1994) signals the spring of 1992 as the moment in which there is a break of the generally good evaluation of the political and economic situation. Nearly one out of every two citizens considered that both political and economic conditions were bad.

internal divisions pushed González to call legislative elections in June 1993. For the first time since the Socialists accession to power there was a widespread feeling that the Partido Popular *could* win the elections. This did not occur. After an aggressive campaign mostly centred on Felipe González that mobilised leftist sectors of the electorate that had abstained in previous elections, the PSOE lost the absolute majority of seats and a slight percentage of the valid votes (see table 2.1), but managed to increase its share of votes as a percentage of the electorate, i.e., it managed to mobilise a larger number of voters.

Although it did not win the elections, the Popular Party substantially increased its support. Since 1989 the PP elections had undergone a process of internal renovation of elites and ideological moderation in an effort to capture the electorate of the centre. The move towards the centre of the PP was facilitated by the fact that the CDS was in crisis, due to certain political decisions made by the party elites, as well as to the resignation of its leader, Suárez, which greatly debilitated the party and decreased its chances at the 1993 elections. These good results of the PP legitimated the renovation of the party that had been led by José María Aznar and its claims to be a viable alternative to the PSOE. The failure of the CDS to obtain parliamentary representation transformed the structure of competition of the party system, given that from this moment the PP and the PSOE competed directly with each other to attract the electorate of the centre.

These elections helped to clarify some trends in electoral behaviour that had been developing in the previous elections. Although the PSOE had managed to increase its share of the vote as a percentage of the electorate, and maintain roughly the same amount of votes as in 1982, the characteristics of its voters had changed dramatically. While in 1982 the PSOE voters were mostly urban, educated and middle class, ten years later, they came mostly from rural areas, were working-class or dependants (pensioners, unemployed and housewives) and with a low educational level.[53] As table 2.4 shows, the young, urban and most educated voters had abandoned the PSOE in the time passed from 1982, thus increasing the relative weight of old, rural and less educated voters.

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[53] See for example González 1995 and 1996, Boix 1996 and Torcal & Chibber 1996 who argue that the change in the structure of support of the socialists underwent a process of "proletarianization" due to the withdrawal of support of the middle classes and of the blue collars so that the weight of dependants or unskilled workers was higher. These authors agree in explaining these as a partial result of the policies carried out by the socialist government, particularly from 1989 onwards which gave priorities to pensions, health and unemployment coverage.

Table 2.4. Socio-demographic composition of the PSOE electorate

	1982	1993
Sex		
Men	54	47
Women	46	53
Age		
18-24	19	12
25-34	23	18
35-44	20	17
45-54	17	14
55-65	12	15
Over 65	9	24
Habitat		
Less than 10,000 inhabitants	26	28
10,000-50,000 inhab.	23	25
50,000-100,000 inhab.	10	9
100,000-500,000 inhab.	21	23
Over 500,000	20	16
Education		
Less than primary school	25	42
Completed primary school	19	22
Vocational training/secondary school	37	28
University (three years degree)	5	3
University (five years degree or more)	14	4

Source. Wert, Toharia and López Pintor 1993: 34.
Each number represents the percentage of each category over a 100 voters who declare their intention to vote for the PSOE

3.4. The fourth term: 1993-1996

The results of the 1993 elections were interpreted both by the press and by the voters as a personal victory for Felipe González,[54] who in his speech of thanks insisted that he had "understood the message" implied in those results regarding the need to "change the change".[55] The PSOE lost its absolute majority of the seats so it sought to reach an agreement with other political forces in order to govern in a more comfortable condition. Although there were sections of the PSOE that were in favour of reaching agreements with the left coalition, United

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[54] As shown by the responses obtained in a post-election survey carried out in 1993 to the following question (López Pintor 1994: 607): "In your opinion, what did people vote in the 6th of June elections, for Felipe González or for the PSOE?":

	Total (%)	PSOE (%)	PP (%)
Felipe González	73	73	75
PSOE	16	18	14
Both	6	5	6

[55] The sentence "For a change of the change" ("El *cambio del cambio*") refers to the PSOE slogan in 1982 "por el cambio".

Left, there were several aspects of the program sustained by this coalition that were unacceptable for Felipe González such as their rejection of the economic policy carried out by the Socialists or the questioning of the Maastricht treaty. After negotiations the PSOE reached an agreement to govern with the support of the Catalan Nationalists (CiU). This did not satisfy a sector of the party that saw this as a further confirmation of the shift of the PSOE to the right.

The most relevant feature of the term was the harsh atmosphere that characterised Spanish politics. A good part of the media had an even bitter attitude against the Socialist government than in the previous term. This atmosphere was worsened by the scandals that continued to emerge, adding to the cases that were still unsolved in various courts of justice. Thus, while the Juan Guerra or the Filesa affair connected to the illicit financing of the PSOE were still opened, other corruption scandals came to the public light. Political corruption and scandals concentrated most of the media and public concern, so little attention was paid to the actual policies carried out by the Socialists. However, the government engaged in more reforms than it had done in previous years, introducing labour reforms that had been postponed, reforming housing legislation and adopting greater budget discipline (Maravall 1997: 193).

Within the PSOE the internal struggles went on, particularly until the 33rd Party Congress held in March 1994, in which the *renovadores* were slightly more represented in delegates than the *guerristas* (supporters of Alfonso Guerra). Slowly it became clear that González had decided to abandon his neutral position and to side with the *renovadores*. At this Congress the *guerristas* lost important positions of power within the party, but still managed to come to an agreement with the *renovadores* to keep Alfonso Guerra as the Deputy General Secretary and some *guerristas* in an Executive Commission composed mostly by *renovadores*. In spite of this agreement, the wounds were not completely healed and consequently the PSOE remained uncohesive.

The translation of all of these problems in the electoral arena became clear in June 1994, when the Popular Party obtained its first victory over the Socialists at the European Elections. In the following year the PP also won the local and regional elections and made substantial progress in regions where it had previously had enormous difficulties, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country. The general elections held in March 1996 were won by the Popular Party, although by a smaller margin over the Socialist Party than was expected from the different surveys that had been published all through the 1993-96 term. The Socialists, who again focused their campaign around Felipe González, managed to mobilise a substantial part

of hesitant voters, the majority of whom voted for the PSOE in order to avoid a big advantage of the Popular Party (Barreiro and Sánchez Cuenca 1997: 3).

Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to give an account of the main events of Spanish politics and the Socialist Party since its creation, focusing more on the period after the transition to democracy, which is the period analysed in the rest of the thesis. The contents of this chapter hopefully will be useful in situating some of the events that will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

The following citations by Maravall and Boix point to two important conclusions of the preceding sections, and more importantly, point at the interaction between the developments explained in this chapter and the party organisation, that is the focus of analysis of the thesis.

> "*Politics rather than policies* did most political damage to the social democratic government.[...] I am referring to their growing isolation from key social groups, the hostility of important media, the *dwindling appeal of their party organisation,*[56] corruption scandals and bitter internal disputes" Maravall 1997: 191-2)".

In the same vein, Boix, who concentrates his efforts in analysing the economic and social policy of the Socialist government arrives at the following conclusion.

> "*only a well organised party capable of fully mobilizing its constituencies* (and helped by a divided opposition) can sustain a decided public investment strategy (at the expense of present public consumption) over time, that is, without losing electoral support. *This condition is not met by the Spanish Socialist party today.* It is probably *the lack of a strong party organisation* that jeopardized the PSOE's commitment towards a balanced budget and strong capital formation policies in the late 1980s" (Boix 1995: 54).

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[56] My emphasis, both in Maravall's and in Boix's quotations.

CHAPTER 3. THE EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to characterise the main features of the institutional context in which the PSOE has developed its organisation since 1976. As was advanced in chapter 1 the institutional settings of the political system in which a party operates are supposed to enter the calculation of the costs and benefits of an organisational structure or activity. Through their actions, parties (or party leaders) can also modify some features of the environment in which they operate, but here attention will be focused on only one side of the phenomenon, namely the way in which institutions and societal characteristics influence the decisions over organisational strategy.

The features of the environment that are hypothesised to be more influential are the territorial structure of the State, that regulates how power is distributed in the territory, and the characteristics of the electoral law, which regulates how elections take place and how votes are translated into power (seats). It will be argued that the process of political decentralisation of power from the State to the regions has provoked a decentralisation of the functioning of political parties, in this case the PSOE, of its organisational structure and activities. As far as the electoral system is concerned it will be argued that the most direct and evident effect is that the choice of the province as the electoral district has forced the PSOE to have an effective organisation at this territorial level. At the same time, in response to the process of regional decentralisation, it has created regional federations where they did not exist. It will also be argued that the low level of proportionality of the electoral system and the fact that the degree of proportionality is very uneven across electoral districts also provides political parties with strong incentives to distribute their resources unevenly in election campaigns.

1. The structure of the State.

The linkage between the structure of the State and party organisations is to be found in the incentives that an institutional arrangement creates for parties in their quest for political power.[1] Contrary to other more stable institutional features, the Spanish state structure has changed continuously over the last twenty years and therefore its influence is not expected to be the same for every period, but must be understood as a challenge that the Spanish parties have confronted and had to respond to.

The 1978 Spanish Constitution declares that the Spanish state is organised territorially at three sub-national levels: municipal, provincial and regional.[2] There are around 8,000 municipalities in Spain, each of them administered by a council which is directly elected every four years. Councillors elect the mayor among themselves. Municipal governments enjoy much less autonomy than regions (Heywood 1995a: 157). Although municipal governments have relied heavily on central government for finance, and their autonomy in this respect is limited, it is important to take into account at least one aspect of this governmental level: the number of offices to be filled. There are over 8,000 municipalities, which means that there are many elective positions to be filled as municipal councillors.

At the provincial level the representative assembly is the *Diputación* (Provincial Council), composed of deputies who are elected[3] among local councillors of the municipalities in the province, and are distributed among parties according to the previous municipal electoral results. The province also enjoys much less autonomy than the Autonomous Communities, but they are important because they retain their traditional role as outposts of central government, a role that is carried out by the *gobierno civil*, designated by the central government (Newton and Donaghy 1997: 154). In the context of this thesis the point to emphasise is the existence of a provincial governmental level that, although very often neglected, according to all accounts is extremely relevant in party life at the local level since it is an important source of patronage. Moreover, central government (thus from 1982 to 1996 the PSOE) has the chance to send representatives to the provinces who may at times try to counterbalance the increasing power of regions.

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[1] The emphasis here is on the direction of causality that goes from the institutional structures to the parties, but obviously in this case, the other arrow is extremely relevant, given the protagonism of parties both in the design and in the implementation of the process of political de-centralization.

[2] Regions are called Autonomous Communities, referred to as ACs.

[3] Except in the Basque provinces.

Still, the most important development of the last twenty years has been the process of political decentralisation through the establishment of the Autonomous Communities. There are very few studies which deal with the impact of federal or highly de-centralised political structures on party organisations.[4] The following lines represent a tentative attempt to do so.

1.1. The Spanish process of decentralisation: heterogeneity and fluidity

Centre-periphery conflict has been a recurrent trait of Spanish politics, and by and large an unsolved issue which came up during the transition to democracy. This conflict is based on a variety of regional identities built on cultural, ethnic and linguistic peculiarities, as well as on an uneven economic and social development. The strive for political decentralisation involved the regions in which the regionalist/nationalist feelings were most developed, i.e., Cataluña and the País Vasco, and to a lesser extent, Galicia.[5] During the Second Republic there were attempts to grant political autonomy to these regions, but they were interrupted in 1936 by the Civil War. Far from removing this conflict, the centralist vision of the State displayed by Franco exacerbated the demands of autonomy from these regions that reacted to the repression exerted by the dictatorship on any manifestation of their cultural or linguistic identities.

This is not the place to reproduce with detail the complexities of the process of decentralisation of the Spanish State.[6] However, it is important to recall some of its most relevant traits. First, it is essential to keep in mind the *heterogeneity* of the *paths* taken by the different Autonomous Communities (ACs from now on) and of the *powers* enjoyed by each of them. Roughly speaking, there are two types of ACs according to the procedure by which they gained autonomy. First there are the 'historic' regions, Cataluña, País Vasco and Galicia, which obtained their autonomous status automatically, without the need to make any formal application to the central authorities on the grounds that they had already approved the Autonomy Statutes during the Second Republic. Andalucía followed a procedure that assimilated it to the 'historic' Communities. In contrast, the normal route required a process of consultation of municipal governments before making the formal application for autonomy. The resulting Autonomous Communities initially had a low degree of autonomy, having to wait

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[4] A relevant exception can be found in the work of Chandler and Chandler 1987.

[5] In general here I will use the Spanish names of the regions and Autonomous Communities. In the appendix there is a map with all Spanish Autonomous Communities and provinces.

[6] For a more detailed account of this process see Aja 1985, López Guerra 1991 and Heywood 1995a.

at least a period of five years before they could enjoy a similar level of autonomy to that granted to the 'historic' ACs.[7]

The 1978 Constitution is intentionally ambiguous in that it does not contain a detailed plan of what the de-centralised state should be like, but only an outline of the guidelines that should govern the process of devolution, which therefore became open-ended and subject to further negotiations (López Guerra 1991). As a result of this *indeterminacy*, one of the most distinctive traits of the process of devolution has been the coexistence *of different types of regions according to their level of autonomy*, which not only depended on the route by which they had reached autonomy, but also on negotiations with the central government to obtain transfer of powers.[8] Basically there are two groups of ACs, the first one with a higher level of responsibilities which include the 'historic' communities (País Vasco, Cataluña and Galicia) and also Navarra, Andalucía, Comunidad Valenciana and the Comunidad Canaria, and the second group, also referred to as 'slow track' that contains the rest of the ACs (Asturias, Castilla-León and Castilla La Mancha, Balearic Islands, Rioja, Extremadura, Murcia, Cantabria and Madrid), with a lower level of political autonomy (López Guerra 1991: 333). Pacts among the main political parties have been geared at imposing some order and homogeneity in this highly heterogeneous process of devolution.[9] In spite of the pacts to impose some homogeneity to the process of political decentralisation, it can still be characterised as a highly heterogeneous and fluid process.

The second important trait that needs to be emphasised is the *homogeneity of internal organisation of the ACs*.[10] All of them have a parliamentary system based on a unicameral

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[7] These are Baleares, Comunidad Comunidad Valenciana, Comunidad Canaria, Murcia, Aragón, Asturias, Castilla y León, Castilla La Mancha, Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, Extremadura, and Navarra. Andalucía followed the 'exceptional' route by which a region could apply to obtain the same level of autonomy as the 'historic' regions provided that a number of conditions were satisfied. A referendum had to be held both for the approval of the application for autonomy and a second one for the approval of the autonomy statute (art. 151 Spanish Constitution 1978).

[8] The 'historic' communities and those regions which had not reached autonomy through the slow route were granted from the very beginning of the process a high number of powers. The ACs that had followed the 'normal' or 'slow'route in principle were entitled to enjoy the powers included in art.148.1 of the Constitution. However, several of these Autonomous Communities have managed to claim further powers as a result of negotiations with the central government, a possibility which is outlined in the article 150.2 of the Constitution. This emphasises the indeterminacy of the model of distribution of powers which very much depends on negotiations between ACs and the central government (and the subsequent approval of Parliament).

[9] For example, the Autonomic Pacts of 1992 have attempted to homogenise the differences in terms of competences among ACs by regulating the transfer of some powers to the 'slow track' ACs, so that all of them would become closer in their degree of autonomy.

[10] Autonomous Communities are granted with the power to decide upon their institutional system by article 148.1 of the Constitution. The definition of their institutions and the powers they assume are outlined in each Statute of Autonomy which also had to be approved by the central Parliament.

parliament, a government headed by the president of the AC, who is elected by the members of this chamber, and their own administrative organisation. Regarding the regional electoral cycle it is also important to mention that most ACs share the same fixed electoral cycle which means that regional elections take place in thirteen out of the seventeen ACs on the same day every four years.[11] Only the presidents of four ACs (Andalucía, País Vasco, Cataluña and Galicia) have the power to call elections and therefore have a different electoral cycle from the rest of ACs.[12]

1.2. The expected effects of political decentralisation on party organisation

Federalism or political decentralisation provides multiple arenas of semiautonomous decision-making in which leaders are given special opportunities to respond to different electorates that are not available in unitary states (Chandler and Chandler 1987). Different types of elections may also bring about a differentiation of the party manifestos and strategies in order to be able to cater for different electorates. This, in turn may increase instances in which party policy at the central level conflicts with party strategy at the regional level. A high degree of political decentralisation may stimulate contradictory pressures on party leaders of the regional organisations who must both respond to and defend the interest of their regions, and act according to the policies decided upon by the national executive of the party, or, by the government. If the regional units are very different from each other, which in principle will increase the heterogeneity of interests. Federalism might even remove the need for a unified party strategy in the whole country.[13] In short, the combination of regionally autonomous units with their own electoral process and political institutions, provides a set of incentives conducive to decentralisation within parties, both in their structures and their strategies.

Chandler and Chandler (1987) argue that looking at political decentralisation as a uniform phenomenon does not allow one to develop testable hypotheses about the kind of incentives it poses to party organisations. They propose a distinction between *jurisdictional* and *functional* federalism. *Jurisdictional federalism* is characterised by a division of competences among levels of authority, each of which has its well defined policy sectors to

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[11] So far four regional elections for the non-historic ACs have taken place, in 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995.

[12] There is a recent example of the relevance of this difference, in the doubts faced by the president of Cataluña when he had to decide whether to call regional elections in Cataluña in November 1995, or wait until the parliamentary elections were over.

[13] This is also the opinion of Katz and Kolodny (1994) who have studied the organisation of parties in the US where they point at the division of political rewards between hierarchical levels as a major hindrance to coherent party strategies. One could also add that the peculiarities of that system makes it so that parties do not need to develop coherent party strategies anyway.

take care of. On the contrary, the guiding principle of *functional federalism* is the division of labour in the same policy field, that is, different levels of governments are responsible for different stages in the policy process. These authors suggest that while *jurisdictional federalism* expands the incentives for political elites to exploit regional conflicts and encourages the creation of parallel party organisation at each governmental level, *functional federalism* favours organisational integration among the territorial branches of a single party organisation. In systems close to the functional-federal model the need for co-ordination and co-operation in the policy process provides a strong incentive for co-ordinated party positions and cohesive behaviour at different territorial levels of the party. As a result, regional party elites are expected to be highly integrated in the federal party organisation and to have an active voice in it.

The Spanish system so far, is a *mixture of jurisdictional and functional models*, depending on the particular AC and policy field we are considering. Some policy fields belong exclusively to the ACs or to the State, while others are shared between the two governmental levels (each having to carry out different tasks or functions). The disparity of incentives provided by such a system still in flux illustrates the difficulty in evaluating the effects of the process of decentralisation in political parties. However, it also seems obvious that, no matter how difficult this task might be, the issue should not be overlooked.

The decentralisation of political power to regions is supposed to act as an incentive for the decentralisation of power within party organisations. This incentive co-exists with others that presumably push in the direction of centralisation, such as, for example the requisites of campaigning based on national mass media. However, the mere existence of representative chambers and important elections at the regional level suggests a strengthening of this organisational level so as to be able to fight those elections.

Thus, the first expected effect of Spanish decentralisation is on the organisation of the party, which needs to develop its structures at the regional level. In many cases the Autonomous Communities[14] created after 1975 coincided with old federations of the party

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[14] In this respect it is important to note that the Constitution does not list a number of Autonomous Communities and simply states the right of provinces which have common borders and share cultural, economic and historical peculiarities. This was obvious for a number of cases, but not for others. For example, Aragón was accorded autonomous regional status while Leon which had once been an independent kingdom was not, and was included in the region of Castilla-León (Heywood 1995a: 142). A counter example is that of Madrid, which had no specific historical, cultural or economic tradition and was still granted the autonomous status. This was so because of the possibility to grant the status of Autonomous Community to provinces which did not gather the requisites stated in the article 143.1, which is outlined in article 144. In other words, at the beginning of the devolution process the actual territorial map was to a certain extent a matter of definition, and therefore could not coincide with the regional organisation of parties if they had any.

which come from the Second Republic, but in others this was not the case. As the next chapter will show in more detail, this accommodation did exist and had clear effects on the party organisational structure and dynamics. Although the PSOE formally defined itself as a federal party it underwent a period of regionalisation (i.e., creation and strengthening of regional federations) which has been parallel to the process of federalisation of the State.

Secondly, *political decentralisation is supposed to have diminished the conditions neccesary for a coherent organisational strategy to be designed and implemented in the whole country, given the greater incentives to depart from the guidelines provided by the central party authorities and the diminishing resources at the disposal of the central authorities to make federations comply with the strategies designed at the central party level.* This possibility will be explored taking three aspects of the PSOE's organisational policy in chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Third, it is expected to produce a redistribution of intra-party power. In the course of time, certain regional leaders "control" votes and policies and therefore, to some extent, have a privileged exchange of resources with the environment vis-à-vis other intra-party actors. Thus, at the very least, political decentralisation is likely to have given regional leaders control over resources that can be used as a bargaining asset inside the Socialist Party. When evaluating this possibility the high number of regional governments in the hands of the Socialists since 1983 must be borne in mind. The problem with assessing decentralisation within political parties is that it can take as many forms and be as complicated to evaluate as the decentralisation of the State itself, but in principle it seems that attention should be paid to the distribution of resources inside the party, the decentralisation of decision-making processes and the distribution of competences in the different territorial levels.

2. The incentive structure of the Spanish electoral system.

The literature on electoral systems has focused on their effects on party system format, while virtually no attention has been paid to the effects on party organisation. What follows is an attempt to figure out the structure of incentives in which the leaders and strategists of the Socialist party took their decisions over organisational strategies, that includes the electoral system and other features of the regulation of the functioning of parties in Spain.

The work of Katz (1980) and Gunther (1989) are useful studies to take as a point of departure in this inquiry. First, and by far the most thorough analysis of this matter, is Katz's *Theory of parties and electoral systems* (1980) in which he elaborates a deductive theory that

allows party leaders' behaviour to be predicted from a description of the electoral environment. The main thread of his analysis can be summed up thus: "since different electoral systems will reward the same distribution of votes differently, they may be expected to have an immediate impact on the calculations of politicians" (Katz 1980: 13). Although he mainly concentrates on the electoral strategies as the dependent variable of his study, he acknowledges that the party is generally organised in the same manner as he predicts for electoral strategies.[15] Unlike other authors, Katz incorporates in his theory variables that not only pertain to the electoral systems, for instance the way votes are translated into seats, but others that affect how elections are conducted, such as the legal regulation of electoral campaigns.

Gunther's article on elites, electoral laws and party systems is also helpful in the development of deductive propositions about the responses of party elites to the incentive structures created by the Spanish electoral system (Gunther 1989). The specific puzzle he aims to solve refers to the fact that the leaders of the centre and centre-right parties preferred to contend the 1982 Spanish general election separately, knowing that this was a quasi-suicidal action, since this move greatly decreased their chances of obtaining a good share of the seats. Moreover, this article is a study of the interaction of the goal of maximising electoral representation with other goals that might make party leaders and strategists depart from the behaviour "dictated" by the features of the electoral system.

The main idea that both of these authors share is that electoral rules have an impact on party organisation, whose primary, but not only goal is to win votes and elections. Parties are expected to organise, at least to a certain extent, around the incentives provided by the electoral system. Their analyses and the above mentioned literature on the effects of electoral systems point at several variables and help to identify their expected effects that will be examined in the following sections of this chapter.

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[15] "The thrust of the theory presented here is that parliamentary party organization will appear as an extension of campaign organization, and hence will reveal the same structural characteristics as a rationally organized campaigns. Predictions of campaign organization based on the arguments presented here should also apply to the parliamentary parties. The basic theory therefore goes that rational behaviour by politicians causes a coincidence of campaign and legislative organization" (Katz 1980: 32).

2.1. Main features of the Spanish electoral system.

The most prominent feature of the Spanish electoral system for the lower chamber[16] is the *great deviation from perfect proportionality* it yields as a result of considerable differences in district size and of the electoral formula applied.

The Spanish electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies uses the d'Hont formula to perform the conversion of votes into seats. The d'Hont formula tends to favour large parties to the detriment of small ones (Rae 1971, Gallagher 1991). It seems that one of the intentions of the Spanish élites was to reduce the fragmentation of the party system, which was perceived to have greatly contributed to the breakdown of democratic regime in the Second Republic (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 45; Gunther 1989: 835).

Although the effect of the electoral formula on (dis)proportionality is important, *the decisive element in determining the degree of proportionality of the Spanish electoral system is the size of the constituencies.*[17] The electoral districts are the units within which voting returns are translated into a distribution of parliamentary seats. The district magnitude is defined as the number of seats assigned by the electoral law to a district. As Rae (1971) showed, the district magnitude hinges upon the proportionality of the electoral system which is inversely related to district magnitude. As the magnitude of a district increases, the correspondence between the share of the votes and the share of seats obtained by a political party tends to increase as well, although at a decreasing rate. Other authors have repeated and confirmed Rae's findings (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 112, Lijphart 1994: 10). In a study specially devoted to studying the effects of the Spanish electoral system, Rae (1993) concluded that the district magnitude was the most important variable in explaining the low degree of proportionality of the Spanish system.

The average district magnitude is calculated by dividing the total seats of the chamber in question by the number of electoral districts. Both factors conduce to a low average district magnitude in the Spanish case. The lower chamber of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados) is composed of 350 members and there are 50 electoral districts, which correspond to the provinces, the traditional administrative territorial unit. These 50 provinces, together with the Spanish territories in Africa, Ceuta and Melilla, which choose one

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[16] The discussion concentrates on the electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies (*Congreso de los diputados*), whose functions are much more important than those of the Senate both in matters related to the formation and control of government and in the legislative process.

[17] This was suggested by Hogan (1945) and then studied systematically much later by Rae (1971).

deputy each, add up to a total of 52 electoral districts, yielding an average district magnitude of 6.7.[18]

The effects of the choice of electoral district contained in the electoral law for political parties are varied. On the one hand it is expected to provide parties with a strong and direct incentive to adapt their organisational structures to the requirements of campaigning and to have organisational presence at the provincial level. Even if a political party had not traditionally organised around this territorial level, it is very likely that the introduction of the province as the electoral district would have an effect in this direction. On the other hand, the fact that the province is the electoral district, together with the small size of the Chamber of Deputies, is also expected to have indirect effects on parties' organisational strategies, as a result of the *high degree of disproportionality and an unequal distribution of these disproportional effects derived from the small average size of districts*, as shall be shown in the next two sections.

2.2. The low degree of proportionality

The Spanish electoral system, due to the combination of the electoral formula and the low average district magnitude[19] just mentioned is the system that displays the lowest degree of proportionality among all proportional electoral systems.[20] The distortion between share of the votes and share of the seats it produces is more similar to plurality systems (Gallagher 1991: 46, Montero and Vallès 1992: 7). Table 3.1 shows a consistent trend by which the two largest parties at the state level are substantially over-represented (around 10% for the first party and 5% for the second), whereas the third (and fourth when there was one) national parties are

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[18] These features are very hard to modify given that they are included in the 1978 Constitution, which states that each province is entitled to a minimum of two representatives complemented by a variable number added on the basis the population of each province. These two elements respond to the intention to obtain an equilibrium of representation among provinces, which led to an over-representation of rural underpopulated districts (see Fernández Segado 1993). An example frequently cited is the different ratio inhabitants/seats in Soria (26,402 inhabitants per seat) and Madrid (112,254 inhabitants per seat) (Montero and Vallés 1992: 4). See table 2 for more details on the representational bias contained in the allocation of seats. Small districts (those which elect from three to six deputies) are over represented, i.e., they elect around 10% more deputies that would be the case if the attribution of seats was strictly dependent upon population and the large districts under-represented roughly by the same percentage.

[19] There is also a legal threshold of 3% of the votes at a provincial level in order to take part in the allocation of seats, but this has no effect except for Madrid and Barcelona. As we can see in the tables in the appendix, it is only in districts of size 32, 33 or 34 where a party that gets less than 3% of the vote could theoretically obtain representation. In other large districts (16 or higher) this is only the case if the number of parties increase.

[20] Strøm (1990) contends that votes are not valued intrinsically but in relation the conversion into parliamentary seats or legislative weights. The electoral law is the intervening mechanisms by which this process is carried out and distortions produced by the electoral system can affect party behaviour.

under-represented. Parties that have a strong electoral support in only a few districts, such as nationalist and regionalist parties, are hardly affected in any way, as we can see in table 3.1 for the cases of the Catalan (CiU) or the centre-right Basque nationalists (PNV).

This high deviation from perfect proportionality increases the barrier of entry for small parties, discourages splinters and therefore favours the stability of electoral results and of the party system. As a result of this latter effect one can expect intra-party divisions to be solved by negotiations in order to achieve a different distribution of power inside the same party, given the penalties imposed by the electoral system on splits to form new parties (Gangas 1994).

Table 3.1. Difference between percentage of seats and percentage of votes 1977-1996.

	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
UCD	+12.9	+12.9	-3.1	—	—	—	—
PSOE	+4.4	+4.1	+10.4	+8.5	+10.4	+6.6	+2.8
PP	-3.8	-3.5	+4.7	+3.9	+4.8	+5.4	+5.7
IU	-0.6	-4.2	-2.4	-2.7	-4.3	-4.4	-4.6
CDS	—	—	-2.2	-3.8	-3.9	-3.5[21]	—
CiU	-0.6	-0.5	-0.2	+0.1	+0.1	+0.2	0
PNV	+0.6	+0.4	+0.5	+0.2	+0.2	+0.1	+0.1

Source: Montero and Vallés, 1992 completed for 1993 and 1996 with data from the Ministry of Interior

These disproportional effects are not uniformly distributed over all electoral districts. Indeed, an important feature of the Spanish system is the variety of effects in terms of proportionality among electoral districts that it contains, which will be examined in the next section of the chapter.

2.3. Unequal distribution of incentives.

If we consider organisational strategy as a territorial phenomenon and the cost of each seat to vary according to the magnitude of the district, then the average district magnitude measure, as proposed by Rae, does not contain enough information to deduce the incentive structure provided by an electoral system. The standard deviation or some other measure that permits us to check on the distribution of district sizes becomes an essential piece of information. As table 3.2 shows, most Spanish electoral districts are small, and within this group the majority of districts elect five or less deputies.

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[21] In 1993 with 3.51% the centre party, CDS, failed to get representation in the Chamber of Deputies.

Table 3.2. Distribution of district sizes in 1996 elections

District magnitude	Frequency	Seats (frequency * size)	Cumulative Sum (seats)
1	2	2	
3	9	27	29
4	8	32	61
5	11	55	116
6	4	24	140
7	6	42	182
8	1	8	190
9	5	45	235
10	1	10	245
11	1	11	256
13	1	13	269
16	1	16	285
31	1	31	316
34	1	34	350 seats

Taken from a presentation at the European University Institute by Eva Anduiza and Mónica Méndez (1996).
The different shading correspond to the three type of districts according to their degree of proportionality.

According to the findings of Rae (1971) regarding the relationship between district size and proportionality, there is a first type that applies a plurality system, composed by Ceuta and Melilla, each of which elects one deputy. As tables 3.2 shows, districts of type II (that elect from three to six deputies) where the most disproportional effects occur, are the most numerous. Type III includes those districts that elect seven or eight deputies where the distortion effect is medium. Finally, in districts of type IV the distribution of seats is similar to that of the votes, but as table 3.2 shows, there are very few of these large districts.

Generally speaking it can also be assumed that districts in each group share certain traits that are also relevant for the organisational strategies of parties. Small sized districts tend to be rural areas that less populated, whereas district with high magnitude are predominantly urban. Those two population's characteristics are different enough in attitudes, interests and habits to predict the need of parties to develop diverse organisational strategies in each.

It can also be expected that more parties contest the elections in those districts where the threshold of representation is lower, i.e., in large districts, and therefore that the structure of competition will be different along the different district sizes.[22] Table 3.3 shows a division of the electoral districts according to the number of parties that obtained parliamentary

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[22] The structure of competition, defined as the number and relative strength of parties in a district does not only depend on the characteristics of the electoral systems. The existence of social, economic or ethnic divisions are also conducive to the increase in number of parties.

representation. In all the general elections that have taken place so far only two parties have obtained representation in at least fifty percent of all electoral districts. There is also a substantial number of districts in which three parties manage to obtain representation, and much fewer in which four or more parties obtain representatives. These latter districts tend to be either the biggest ones or those in which nationalist parties are important such as the districts in the País Vasco or Cataluña.

Table 3.3. Percentage of electoral districts according to number of parties that obtain representation

Number of parties	% of districts 1977	% of districts 1979	% of districts 1982	% of districts 1986	% of districts 1989	% of districts 1993	% of districts 1996
Six	2	2	0	0	2	0	0
Five	2	0	4	4	6	4	6
Four	12	12	4	10	14	6	2
Three	30	34	32	34	18	26	36
Two	50	50	60	52	60	64	56
One	4	2	0	0	0	0	0
Total *	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* The two uninominal districts, Ceuta and Melilla, have not been included in the table. Own elaboration after data from the Ministry of Interior.

The suspicion that the bipartisan representation by and large concerns the small districts is confirmed by the data shown in table 3.4. In virtually all elections that have been held so far in Spain, small districts (3-6 seats) have represented around 80% of all the districts with bipartisan representation. This tendency has increased in a very substantial way in the last decade in which small districts have represented around 90% of all the districts with bipartisan competition. By contrast, the proportion of large or medium sized districts in which only two parties obtain representation is much lower, and there are virtually no large districts in which no third party obtains representation.

Table 3.4. Percentage of districts in which only two parties obtain representation

District size	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
Type II (3-6)	80.0	87.5	66.6	88.4	96.5	87.0	93.1
Type III (7-8)	20.0	12.5	26.6	7.7	3.4	9.7	6.9
Type IV (9 or more)	0	0	6.6	3.8	0	3.2	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
District size	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
Type II (3-6)	64.5	67.7	64.5	69.6	87.5	84.3	81.2
Type III (7-8)	45.4	27.3	72.7	28.6	14.3	42.8	28.6
Type IV (9 or more)	0	0	25.0	10.0	0	9.0	0

The second part of table shows the percentage of districts out of the total districts in each type of district size (row percentage), that had bipartisan representation in each election. The data shown in the table confirm that over time districts in which only two parties get representatives have increased as a proportion of all small districts. Until the 1982 elections in around 65% of small districts only two parties obtained representation, but since those elections the figure has increased to include 81% of this type of district (in 1996). Although this does not mean that it is always the largest parties at the national level that obtain representation, it is so in most of the cases. Medium sized districts (7-8) also show a tendency, albeit a softer and more unstable one, to have bipartisan representation.

Table 3.5 shows the districts in which three parties obtain representation split by district size. As was shown in table 3.3, roughly in a third of the total number of districts, three parties obtain the total number of seats. Small districts are in most elections the most numerous group with three-party representation, although they represent a lower percentage of the overall figure than was the case for bipartisan representation (see table 3.4). The table reveals a decreasing trend with respect to the frequency with which third parties get a seat in small districts, whereas the opposite trend affects the large districts, especially in the 1993 and 1996 elections. This is probably affected by the crisis of the CDS, the centrist party which had more chances to do well in small districts than the other state wide party, the leftist IU. The second part of the table shows the percentage of districts in which three parties obtain representation with respect to the total number of districts in each size category. The most striking result is the increase since 1993 of the percentage of medium and large districts in which only three parties obtain the seats at stake. In short, in large districts the number of parties that obtain representation has tended to diminish, from four or five to three parties.

Table 3.5. Percentage of districts in which three parties obtain representation

District size	1977	1979	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996
Type II (3-6)	53.3	50.0	68.7	56.2	40.0	28.6	27.8
Type III (7-8)	26.7	31.2	12.5	18.7	30.0	14.3	27.8
Type IV (9 or more)	20.0	18.7	18.7	25.0	30.0	57.1	44.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Type II (3-6)	25.8	25.8	35.4	27.3	12.5	12.5	15.6
Type III (7-8)	36.3	45.4	18.2	42.8	42.8	28.6	83.3
Type IV (9 or more)	37.5	37.5	37.5	40.0	27.2	72.7	72.7
Total	30.0	32.0	32.0	32.0	20.0	28.0	36.0

The conclusion is that in most electoral districts only two parties have a high chance of obtaining representation, and in a smaller, but still substantial proportion of all districts, third

parties still have a moderate chance to obtain representation. It is only in relatively large districts where it is the norm that at least three parties obtain representation in the Chamber of Deputies.

Seen from the perspective of parties, district size influences the difference in votes between parties that is relevant in order to consider that there is a seat worth fighting for. In addition to the effect of size on strategic calculations, *whether the number of deputies that an electoral district chooses is odd or even is also an important consideration*, particularly in small or medium sized districts where usually only two parties obtain representation. In small districts that elect an *odd* number of deputies the slightest difference in percentage of the vote can make the winning party (in votes) obtain the last deputy at stake, regardless of the size of the victory over the second most voted party in the district. In the cases where there are usually two parties that obtain representations this last seat takes the role of the seat that is distributed in a uninominal district, provided that there are no third parties that get enough votes to get a seat,[23] which, as the table above have shown, is a fairly rare case.

Conversely, in small districts that elect an *even* number of deputies a fairly large percentage difference of the two parties can yield an equal distribution of seats between these two parties. Obviously there is a threshold in the difference of votes between the two parties, over which this difference is big enough so that the distribution of seats becomes unequal, 3:1, or 4:2 and so on. Take, for instance, the case of Burgos, a province that elects four deputies. Differences between the first and second most voted parties in the district[24] of 5.4 (1982), 2.3 (1986), 11.3 (1989) and 15.6 (1993), always in favour of AP/PP have yielded the same distribution of seats, two for the AP/PP and two for the PSOE. It was only in the 1996 elections when the PP had an advantage over the PSOE of 23.7 percentual points that the distribution of seats in Burgos changed: the PP obtained three deputies as opposed to one for the PSOE. This example shows the disparity of difference in votes that can yield the same distribution of seats and the influence of the Spanish electoral system on the lack of "profitability" in terms of seats of a large percentage of votes. It also illustrates the consequences of the fact that the number of deputies assigned to a district is odd or even.

The decision of where to invest in order to maximise the number of seats won, while at the same time avoiding to waste many votes, depends on the incentive structure provided by the system and on the attitudes and preferences of the electorate. What has been shown in this

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[23] In other words if the third party does not get a quantity of votes higher than the votes of the winning party divided by the magnitude of the district.

[24] The Popular Party and the PSOE respectively.

chapter is that, independently of the characteristics of the electorate, the incentives provided by the electoral system are strong enough by themselves to presume they exert an influence on organisational strategies. This issue will be taken up again in chapter 7 which deals more precisely with the allocation of resources during electoral campaigns.

It has also been shown that the existence of competitors is more dangerous for the PSOE (or for any major party) in some districts than in others. That said, the incentives are conducive to mergers with small parties in *any* type of district,[25] since these mergers are beneficial both for the small parties, that otherwise have no chance of obtaining representation, and for the large one which increases the chances of maximising votes or representation.

In conclusion, the great dispersion of sizes of electoral districts in Spain creates a variety of incentive structures for parties: in some districts parties operate within a very proportional electoral system while in others this is not the case (Rae 1993: 10). In other words, incentives to invest organisational resources to gain votes and seats are not uniformly distributed; the type of competition varies across districts. These characteristics are expected to provide party organisers and strategies with incentives to produce differentiation rather than uniformity in the allocation of organisational resources across electoral districts. In short, the heterogeneity of incentive structures makes it necessary to consider the geographical distribution of electoral support (Johnston 1982: 305). In certain electoral systems such as the Spanish one, certain voters in particular places are of much greater potential value to the parties seeking their support than are other voters in different places.

2.4. Other features of the electoral system and the legal regulation of party functioning

There are other features of the electoral law and of the legal regulation of party functioning that are expected to have an influence on the party organisational strategy. Examples of these are features of the electoral law such as the type of ballot or the regulation of election campaigns and party finance. In Spain, unlike in countries such as Germany, there is no law regulating different aspects of party functioning such as the selection of candidates or the rights of party members. As a result, the discussion on the legal regulation of party functioning will be confined to the issue of party finance.[26]

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[25] As will be shown later on, this is a particularly important point. Given the initial uncertainty of the transitional period there were many socialist parties, usually regionally located whose electoral support was small, but enough to harm sometimes the aspirations of the PSOE.

[26] See Poguntke (1994) for a revision of the influence of legal provisions on German party organisations and Satrústegui 1993 for a debate about the aspects of party functioning that a new Spanish law should regulate.

- *Ballot structure*

Ballot structure influences the role of the voter in elections and shapes their choices. Rae (1971) makes a distinction between ordinal and categorical ballot. In the former, the voter has the option of stating one or more preferences, either among candidates of the same party or among parties of different candidates. None of these is possible in the Spanish case. Voters must choose from closed lists of candidates and have no possibility to express a preference for a candidate.

This is also likely to affect party organisation in several ways. First, since voters do not have the chance to choose among candidates, it is completely up to the party to decide who has more chances of election by placing the candidates in a particular order. This gives party governing bodies a great amount of power; deciding who is going to be a party candidate, where and in which order becomes one of the most important selective incentives to distribute among would-be candidates.

Secondly, this feature is expected to affect the organisational and campaign styles, particularly in relation to their cohesion and coherence. Closed party lists provide candidates , with incentives to have a common strategy (Katz 1980: 32). In electoral systems in which the voter can state preferences, candidates are to a certain extent in competition with other candidates from the same party and therefore might need to organise their campaigns, at least partially, independently from the party organisation. In the Spanish case candidates can conduct their entire campaign effectively through the party's organisation and there are no incentives for candidates to defend positions other than his/her party, or to criticise other candidates of the same party in order to get more votes.

Thirdly, there is the effect of this type of ballot in intra-party conflict at candidate selection. Closed lists tend to increase internal conflict in the process of candidate selection given that the position of a candidate in the list determines his or her chances of being elected more than any other factor. This might explain why it is a resource that is centralised within the PSOE, as will be shown in subsequent chapters of the thesis.

- *Campaign and party finance*

Many authors have signalled ways in which public finance affects the functioning of parties (Alexander 1989, Strøm 1990, Mendilow 1992, Katz and Mair 1992). The specific features of each public finance scheme are also expected to affect parties within the same system in a different way, depending on the criteria upon which the allocation of financial help is based.

In Spain the regulations concerning campaign and party funding reinforce the disproportional effects of the electoral law. The main regulations of this issue are contained in the electoral law LOREG[27] and in a special law of public finance for political parties (LOFPP 1987).[28] According to the regulations regarding the public subsidies for campaign expenditures included in the LOREG, parties are granted a certain amount of money for each vote obtained in the electoral districts in which the party has obtained at least one seat. This amount is complemented by a lump sum for each seat. Given the large amount of small and medium sized districts where parties with 10% or 15% of the vote can fail to get a seat, this means that there are many votes which are not rewarded financially. Both small and extra-parliamentary parties, these latter to a higher degree, are obviously penalised by this system.

The Law of Public Finance for parties (1987) has somewhat alleviated this inegalitarian situation by applying a new way of allocating the subsidies for the ordinary activities of parties.[29] The current practice is to divide the total amount of subsidies in three parts, one of which is distributed according to the number of representatives in the Chamber of Deputies obtained by each party in the previous general election. The remaining two thirds are allocated on the basis of the amount of votes obtained by the parties in the former general election, excluding the votes of those constituencies where a party failed to reach the 3% of the valid votes, which is the legal threshold at a provincial level (art. 163.1 LOREG). Small and extra-parliamentary parties are better-off after the implementation of this law, but overall, the system applied for the finance of campaign and ordinary expenses greatly favours large parties.

Indirect public finance such as free access to public mass media, or exemption of costs for mailing ballot papers during campaigns are also assumed by the state.[30] Free access to public media is available for every party contending an election. The time allocated to each party depends on the electoral percentage obtained at the previous general election, although new parties or those which failed to obtain representation at the previous election also have a

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[27] LOREG stands for Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General, 5/1985 and LOFPP which stands for Ley Orgánica de Financiación de los Partidos Políticos 3/1987. Before 1985 the financing of electoral campaigns and expenditures was included in the 1977 electoral laws whose criteria were very similar to the 1985 ones except that in 1985 the amount of money corresponding to votes and seats increased, and the law established that these amounts were to be periodically adjusted for inflation (LOREG 1985, art.176.4)

[28] LFPP, Ley Orgánica de Financiación de los Partidos Políticos.

[29] Before the specific law on the finance of parties was passed in 1987 the distribution of public subsidies for regular party activities was regulated by the Law of Political Parties of 1978 which had the same criteria for the distribution of public subsidies at electoral times, i.e., the parliamentary parties received an annual concession of a fixed amount for each seat obtained in each of the two chambers and a fixed sum for each vote obtained in the electoral districts where the party won representation (Del Castillo 1990: 185).

[30] These costs have been assumed by the State since the reform introduced in March 1991 in the LOREG, art.175.3).

right to a minimum amount of time. Exemption of costs for mailing ballot papers and publicity is only available to those parties who have managed to get enough representatives to form a parliamentary group, that is, for those parties which have obtained 5 deputies (LOREG, art. 17). Clearly, it favours the major parties and does not help to mitigate the inequalities introduced by the system of direct finance.

Public party finance as it works in Spain is also likely to make parties very dependent on their electoral results since both election and non-election subsidies are based to a great extent on obtaining good electoral results. Parties are subject to a paradoxical set of incentives. In order to become less dependent in the long term on electoral results, they should try to secure their income through other means rather than the finance that derives from electoral results. One alternative would be to raise money from their members. However, and this is where the paradoxical aspect comes in, it is precisely the existence of generous public subsidies which is often presented as one of the reasons that make parties disregard members' contributions, together with the fact that the increasing costs of electioneering and organisational maintenance have made these contributions largely insufficient.

Public financing is expected to have two complementary effects on organisational strategy. The first effect concerns the distribution of power within the party: public financing can have very different effects depending on which level of the party organisation receives the money. In the Spanish Socialist Party revenues are collected and distributed by the centre for parliamentary and local elections, while revenues related to regional elections are collected at the regional federation level.[31] This is supposed to enhance centralisation within the party and it is an obvious indicator of concentration of resources in the hands of the central organisation. Secondly, state subsidies tend to reduce the relative importance of membership dues, to reduce the incentives to attract and maintain members, to reduce the efforts to mobilise membership and to lead to a decline of activities at the grass roots level.

However, a good part of party finance also derives from the occupation of public offices, from parliamentary seats to positions in the administration and in government at its different territorial levels. and from illegal practices.

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[31] This is one of the most difficult points to ascertain. In the different interviews to party officials at different territorial levels the answer to this question varied; in some cases interviewees said that regional federations both received and decided how the subsidies were going to be spent and in other cases it was not clear whether the formal recipient was the regional federation or the central party organisation.

Conclusions

This chapter started with the assertion that the institutional setting in which political parties, that is, features such as the organisation of regional and local government, election laws and the regulation of party finance, shape the organisational forms and activities of political parties. As was also acknowledged, political parties are not the subject of transformations of their institutional environments, but in many cases they are agents of those transformations. However, the aim of the chapter was to deal with one direction of the arrow and provide information on the main aspects of the Spanish institutional setting that are likely to have an effect on the organisational strategy of political parties, in this case of the PSOE. This effect can be direct, for example public financing can affect membership policy by rendering members' financial contribution superfluous, or indirect, for instance, institutional settings may influence the existence of a pool of resources to exchange in intra-party processes. An example of this latter effect would be that of the electoral system for the lower house based on closed blocked electoral lists. This makes the elaboration of these lists of candidates an important intra-party resource which leaders will want to control.

These effects on organisational strategies are complex and most of the time they are mediated through intervening variables, so this chapter has not focused so much on actually "measuring" these exogenous variables, as would be done if we were to apply a statistical modelling technique, but just to point at these institutional settings in order to be aware of the context in which party actors take their decisions. This context comprises in part the incentive structures provided by the institutional settings which can modify both the amount of resources available for internal distribution within the party organisation, and the characteristics of the organisational strategy designed to influence part of this context: the electorate.

What follows is a summary of the most important features of the institutional setting in which the PSOE developed its strategies:

• Spain has undergone a process of political decentralisation to the regions that started at the end of the 1970s and has not yet finished. It is asymmetrical, i.e., not all regions have the same powers, at least initially, and highly fluid due to the constant renegotiation of the powers of the regions. The development of the regional institutions is expected to influence a similar development in the party structures which, in turn, is expected to influence the way decisions are taken within the party, as well as its day to day functioning.

- Apart from the regional level, it is also important to take into account the very high number of municipalities that exist in Spain, which pose an important challenge to parties that have to find candidates to contest local elections.

- The province is the electoral district. Even considering the process of regionalisation, and the accommodation of the party structures to that process, the fact that provinces are electoral districts also points at the permanence of the provincial party structures, at least for electoral purposes.

- The electoral system has effects that depart largely from perfect proportionality due to the joint effect of applying the d'Hont formula and the existence of a majority of small districts. Furthermore, these effects are unevenly distributed, i.e., the "profitability" of votes varies greatly across districts, and this is expected to affect the distribution of resources during election campaigns (and perhaps in inter-election periods).

- Finally, the financing of political parties, mostly based on public subsidies is supposed to influence organisational strategy greatly, since it diminishes the relevance of members as a source of finance. It has also been suggested that it influences the internal distribution of power, although this is more difficult to ascertain.

CHAPTER 4. THE INTERNAL SETTING: THE PSOE'S ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

Introduction

This chapter will look at the organisational structure of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. The first section reviews the main traits its organisational structure from the foundation of the PSOE to the beginning of Spain's transition to democracy. It is important to have an idea of how the PSOE has been organised since its foundation, given that the PSOE represents a case of high inertia of historical structures that must be accounted for. It could mean that these structures have proved highly efficient and that this explains their resilience to change in spite of the transformation of the political system and the party elites. Alternatively other factors may account for their persistence over time, in spite of the inefficiency shown by structures that were designed a century ago.

However, the bulk of the chapter will examine the organisational structure of the party *after* the transition to democracy, with two underlying ideas. Firstly that structures and rules constrain the scope of action or provide opportunities for intra-party actors. As was argued in chapter one, with due caution a political party can be studied as a mini political system. Thus, while chapter 3 has looked at the main features of the Spanish political system and the institutions that have been hypothesised to have a greater influence over the nature of the organisational strategy of the Socialist party, in this chapter a similar task is undertaken with respect to the party structures and rules. The chapter focuses on the party statutes (similar to constitutions in political systems), the party structure and the powers, roles and tasks assigned to party bodies at different hierarchical levels.

Looking at the organisational structures and rules also provides information about the struggles within the party organisation during and after the transition to democracy, given that "rules and structures of today reflect struggles of the past" (Katz and Mair 1992). Finally, I will also examine the territorial centralisation and the degree of factionalism, the other intra-party features that were hypothesised in chapter 1 to have an effect on the organisational strategy of the party.

1. The historical legacy: organisational structure of the party I (1879-1975)

Since the history of the PSOE has been revised in chapter 2, this section will concentrate strictly on the organisational structure and rules of the party during the period between its foundation and the transition to democracy.

The PSOE was an *externally* created party.[1] As shown in chapter 2, due to the alliance policy it followed, it needed a long time before it had parliamentary representation, finally succeeding nearly twenty years after its creation. Until the first part of the twentieth century the party organisation was hardly formalised. At the beginning of the century it started formalising its structures. The most important party body was the National Committee (Comité Nacional), which was in charge of the finance, co-ordination, propaganda, and international relations of the party. It was composed by nine members, of which only the president was elected at the Party Congress. The rest of the members of the National Committee were elected by the members of the party where the Committee was placed (Contreras 1983). Congresses took place every two or three years and their main tasks were evaluating the management of the Comité Nacional, as well as deciding on party strategy. Another characteristic of the PSOE was its high degree of *personalism*, concentrated on the figure of its founding father, Pablo Iglesias. The president was also director of the party newspaper, El Socialista. As years went by the relevance of the General Secretary increased, he was elected by the Congress of the party, and it also started to be a paid position.

The PSOE grew following a process of *diffusion* that led to the creation of federations in different regions. The creation of provincial and regional structures was included in the program of the party approved at the 1915 Congress. Six regional federations were created: Asturias, Cataluña, Galicia, Baleares, País Vasco and Valencia), although according to Gangas (1994) these were not the places with the highest socialist affiliation (which were Andalucía y Castilla la Nueva), but those with the highest level of syndical activity. The PSOE had a nominal federal structure that was made compatible with a high centralisation of power inside the party organisation. In the XI Party Congress (1918) the National Committee was transformed to include representatives from the regions. At the beginning this only included those regions in which the regionalist/nationalist feelings were more developed or where the socialists were strong (Cataluña, Valencia, Galicia, País Vasco and Asturias), but from 1928

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[1] This refers to Duverger's (1959) distinction between *"internal"* and *"external"* parties. "Internal" parties emerge from the collaboration of members of parliament whereas "external" are formed from outside parliament. External parties tend to rely on mass organisations to mobilise the electorates, while internal parties benefit from their participation in Parliament to extract resources to gain support from the electorate.

onwards all regional federations were represented in this body (Contreras 1983: 105). At the same congress a new party body was created, the Executive Commission, which was also part of the National Committee. The Executive Commission took the powers and tasks of the old National Committee (Contreras 1984: 296).

From its foundation the leaders of the PSOE showed special interest in the development of the organisation. The education and the organisation of the working class became one of the most important concerns of the PSOE (Juliá 1997: 36). This was done primarily through the General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT) and through its own party organisation, whose means to participate in the socialisation of the workers into the socialist culture were the *Casas del Pueblo*. These were buildings established throughout Spain, which were used as centres for the education of workers and training of militants and also served as social clubs and meeting places (Gillespie 1989: 28). The PSOE diffused its ideas through the party paper, El Socialista, which was launched in 1886.

The PSOE was mainly a party of *direct* membership.[2] Although it was composed of territorial local branches, workplace, female and, later on, youth sections, Contreras (1981: 73) holds that membership was in fact direct because most of these collectivities were not autonomous from the party organisation. All PSOE members were obliged to take part in the UGT section corresponding to their job, but this obligation was not reciprocal (Contreras 1981: 75). The reason why this is anyway considered *direct membership* is that these obligations applied once one was a PSOE member, but was not the result of agreements between two organisations to share their membership. The UGT, which held its first Congress in 1888, was formally created as an autonomous union, although it acted as the PSOE ally in the labour movement. This was more obvious after 1918 when the socialist nature of the union was formalised (Juliá 1997: 90). In practice, although the two organisations were for a long time autonomous, the roles and in some places the organisational structures of both organisations were not clearly differentiated (Gillespie 1989: 44; Gangas 1994: 93).

After the Civil War, one sector of the PSOE went to exile, while the rest remained in Spain. Most attempts at re-organisation were aborted and the first three Executive Commissions were arrested by the police and subsequently dismantled. The difficulty in operating in this context of repression was why Rodolfo Llopis, who had become General Secretary of the party, argued in favour of moving the Executive to the exile. With the move of

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[2] According to Duverger's distinction between parties of *direct* and *indirect* membership.

the Executive into the exile the PSOE gradually lost its presence in the Spanish territory, except for a few scattered groups.

The formal structure of the PSOE also changed after the Civil War. The statutes of 1944 redefined the organisational structure removing the syndicalist and women sections. Thus from then on the PSOE was organised only according to a territorial criterion. Llopis tended to avoid the style in which the PSOE had functioned during the Second Republic, so centralisation and co-ordination, both hierarchically and between organisations at home and in exile were heightened. A second influence of the Republic was the fear of factionalism which led Llopis to forbid organised tendencies in the party and to develop detailed rules in which the different offences were listed and corresponding sanctions.

The most important organisational change underwent by the party during the renovation of the leadership at the beginning of the 1970s was that the leadership returned to the country. For a short time there was no General Secretary, but this situation lasted for only a few years until in 1974 the position was created again and occupied by Felipe González.[3] These were years in which the reconstruction of the organisation was taking place, through a process of establishing party branches in the different provinces as was explained in chapter 2. The functioning of the PSOE organisation was highly fluid, dominated by personal contacts and informal practices (Gangas 1994). There seemed to be no questioning of the party statutes at this stage, whether it should be re-organised on a territorial basis or go back to the combination of territorial and sectional criteria that was in place during the Second Republic. However, the fact that certain party structures, such as the existence of a personal or collective leadership was flexible conveys the impression that at this stage the PSOE was not highly constrained by the historical legacy, but rather that this legacy was adapted to the circumstances and to the aim of achieving a rapid (and to the extent that was possible, controlled) reconstruction of the party organisation over the whole Spanish territory.

2. The organisational structure of the party II (1976-1996)

According to the 1976 statutes, approved at the 27th Party Congress (held in December 1976), the PSOE has a federal structure composed of four territorial layers, the *agrupación local*

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[3] The official name of his position when it was recreated was *Primer Secretario* (First Secretary). It changed denomination again at the 28th (1979) Party Congress.

(local branch), the provincial,[4] regional and national level.[5] The main governing bodies are the Federal Congress, the highest decision making body of the party which elects the Federal Executive Commission, the most important day to day decision-making party body, and since 1984, part of the Federal Committee,[6] whose tasks are to control the Federal Executive Commission and deliberate on the main political decisions of the party.[7]

There are other party bodies at the federal level such as the *Comisión de Conflictos* (Conflicts Committee), which deals with disciplinary matters (since 1994 it has been called *Comisión de Garantías*), and the *Comisión Revisora de Cuentas* (Auditing Commission), which controls the use of the budget allocation at each secretary and territorial level of the party. As a reaction to the proliferation of financial scandals which had come to the public light since the beginning of the 1990s, at the 33rd Party Congress a new party body was created at the federal level which is in charge of keeping a record of the goods and properties owned by the party's public office holders.[8]

The following pages will be devoted to describing in detail the role and characteristics of the main federal bodies: the Federal Congress, the Federal Committee and the Federal Executive Commission. Among all the rules and practices the following description will focus on those that are most important to understand the internal politics of the PSOE since 1975. The other aim of this description of the composition and tasks of the party's federal bodies is to provide a framework that specifies the internal structure of incentives for the different creation and uses of organisational resources.

2.1. Federal level

2.1.1. The Federal Congress

The Federal Congress is the highest authority within the party at the national level. All arrangements and procedures concerning the way party Congresses take place are described in the Party Statutes and in the Congress Rules (*Reglamento de Congresos*), that can be modified

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[4] Except in a few regional federations where the *comarca*, a sub-regional division different from the province, is taken as the basis of organisation. This is the case of the Federación Valenciana, the Catalan PSC and of Galicia.

[5] See the organigram of the party structure in the appendix.

[6] The other part is elected by the regional federations.

[7] The names in Spanish: *Congreso Federal, Comisión Ejecutiva Federal* and *Comité Federal*.

[8] This is the *Comisión de Registro de Bienes y Actividades de los Cargos Públicos del Partido* (PSOE Statutes 1994, arts.48-49).

in the course of a Congress.[9] Party Congress has changed the frequency with which it meets: in 1976 the PSOE statutes stated that it should meet every two years, but this was changed in the 1981 Federal Congress to three years, and in 1990 the interval between Congresses was set to be from three to four years.

Composition

The Federal Congress is composed of delegates of lower territorial levels of the party. Two important elements concerning the election of delegates to the Federal Congress were modified in the 28th (1979) and 30th Congress (1984): the territorial unit of the party represented in congresses and the system used to elect delegates.

Until May 1979 the Federal Congress was composed of delegates chosen by the local branches[10] in a quantity that corresponded to the amount of members that paid their dues in each branch. In the conflictual 28th Congress (May 1979) a reform of this system was approved according to which party members, instead of directly electing the delegates to the Congress in the local branches, would elect delegates to the Provincial Congress, which in turn would elect delegates to the Federal Congress, i.e., after the reform the local branches only elected delegates to the Federal Congress in an *indirect* way. The Provincial Congress then had to decide whether or not its delegates would form a joint delegation at the Federal Congress with the delegates of the rest of the provinces from the same regional federation. Another option for provincial delegations was to vote with the rest of the provincial delegations from the same region for only certain issues and not for others. In this latter case, the list of these issues had to made public before the Federal Congress started.

A relevant implication of this change of the basis of representation in 1979 was *the centralisation of power in the federal authorities of the party*. The new territorial basis of representation increased the ability of the party apparatus at the centre to influence both the composition of the delegations and the behaviour of the head of the delegation[11] because there were now fewer delegations at the Congress.

The second important reform of the system to elect delegates was passed at the 30th Congress (1984). Previously, the election was done with a plurality system with closed lists, i.e., all the party members that composed the list that obtained the plurality of the votes formed

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[9] "The Congress is sovereign with respect to its rules and functioning" (PSOE Statutes 1978, art.27). This provision has remained in all the statutes until now.

[10] Art.26, PSOE Statutes, 1978.

[11] Usually provincial, although in most cases this implies regional federations, since it is fairly rare to find provincial delegations that chose not to vote together with the rest of the provinces in their region.

the provincial delegation in the Federal Congress. In 1984 the plurality system was slightly modified to allow for the representation of groups that did not get the plurality of the votes in each province.[12] This was done when the existence of the so called "current of opinion" within the party was explicitly acknowledged. The use of the *winner-takes-all* system had made the presence of minority sectors in delegations to the Congress virtually impossible, unless they negotiated to be part of a single list with the other internal groups. According to the modification adopted in 1984, the most voted list of candidates in each province obtained all the positions *only if* no other list obtained more than 20% of the votes at the Provincial Congress convened to choose representatives at the Federal Congress. If another list obtained at least 20% of the votes, then it would also get a right to have 25% of the delegates assigned to that province. If there were two lists, in addition to the most voted one, with a support above the 20% of the valid votes, each of them would obtain 20% of the delegates of that province (PSOE Statutes 1984, art.3.19).

This rule was modified again at the 33rd Federal Congress (March 1994). The new regulation means less representation for minority lists if there is only one of them (20% of posts for at least 20% of the votes instead of the previous 25%), but more if there are two or more lists above the 20% threshold. In this latter situation, the list with the highest number of votes gets 50%+1 delegates, and the rest of the delegates are distributed between the other lists in proportion to their votes. Although they still under-represented the minority group(s), the new rules yield a better representation of the real strength of each intra-party group than the former ones (see table 4.1).

Apart from the provincial delegates, other participants in the Party Congress include the components of the Federal party bodies, as well as a representation of the groups collectively affiliated to the PSOE, which have voice but no vote unless otherwise stated in the affiliation agreements.

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[12] Groups with minoritarian support, particularly the *críticos* had already pushed to find a formula which introduced a higher degree of proportionality in the 29th Congress (1981). An allocation of 20% of the delegation places to minorities representing at least 25% of the party membership was agreed by Guerra and González, but was defeated in the Federal Committee of the party, after it encountered the opposition of the three main regional leaders of the party, the General Secretary of Andalucía, País Valenciano and Madrid federations. As a result the agreement ended up being just a recommendation to integrate minoritarian groups, leaving the different party federations to decide upon the most adequate measure to do so. The group Izquierda Socialista reacted to this by boycotting the Congress, in face of the lack of guarantee that they would be well represented (Report of the meeting of the Federal Committee held on the 11th and 12th July 1981, Caciagli 1982, Gillespie 1989: 362).

Table 4.1. Summary of the system used to elect the delegates to the Federal Congress 1976-1994

	1976-1984	1984-1994	1994 onwards (if there is only one list with at least 20% of votes)	1994 onwards (if there are more than two lists with at least 20% of votes)
List with the highest number of votes gets	All delegates	75% of delegates	80% of delegates	50%+1
Second most voted list (if above 20% of votes) gets	———	25% of delegates	20% of delegates	Rest of delegates in proportion to
Third most voted list (if above 20% of votes) gets	———	———	———	the votes of each of the two lists

Tasks

The Federal Congress examines the management of the federal party bodies (Federal Executive Commission, Federal Committee, Federal Auditing Committee and Federal Discipline Committee). It also debates and approves the party statutes and its policy direction, sets the guidelines for political action and defines the general party strategy.

There are two basic documents in each party congress, the Management Report of the federal bodies of the party (of which the most important report is the one of the Federal Executive Commission), and the *Ponencia-Marco*, in which the policies of the party are developed, which forms the basis of the debates that take place in every Congress. The *Ponencia-Marco* has different thematic chapters. During the Congress, delegate sit in different Committees, each of which discusses one of these chapters. These reports are the basis for the resolutions of the Congress. The Plenarium of the Congress votes for or against the reports and decisions agreed upon by each committee.

The way the *Ponencia-Marco* is drafted has changed from being to a large extent a bottom-up process to become a top-down one (Gangas 1994). This has increased the power of the central party authorities to monitor and set the agenda of the Congress. Until 1984 it was either the local branches (up to the 28th Congress, May 1979) or the Provincial Congresses, that elaborated the proposals that served as the basis for debate in the Federal Congress. These were put together, edited and published by the Federal Executive Commission, which then sent a *Memoria de Ponencias* as well as the Management Report of the federal bodies to all local branches at least one month before the Congress (PSOE Statutes 1981, art.26). This was to a large extent a bottom-up, de-centralised process in which the lower levels of the party were the first to set the issues, positions and agenda of the Congress.

From 1984 the process changed and the elaboration of the *Ponencia Marco* became a responsibility of the Federal Committee. This text was prepared by a small number of people appointed by the Federal Executive Commission and by the Federal Committee, and was sent

to all the local branches along with the Management Report of the federal bodies of the party. Local branches could then propose amendments to be discussed at the Provincial Congresses. Amendments only got though Provincial and Regional Congresses provided that they were backed by at least 20% of the delegates. The official reason offered for this change was that the new rules simplified the procedure, while with the previous ones the members had too many amendments to go through and in the end there was less debate.[13] Without entering into considerations of the validity of these justifications, *the new procedure made it more difficult to incorporate new demands from below, i.e., from local branches.*

The Federal Congress also controls the activities carried out by the Federal Executive Commission, the Federal Committee, the Federal Auditing Committee and the Federal Conflicts Committee (from 1994, Member's Guarantees Committee). This takes place on the first day of the Congress, after the Executive Commission addresses the Plenarium to defend the results of the mandate which is about to finish, usually with a speech of the Secretary General of the party.

The third important task of the Federal Congress is electing the members of the Federal Executive Commission, the Federal Auditing Committee, the Federal Conflicts Committee and part of the members of the Federal Committee (this only from the 30th Party Congress held in 1984).

Voting procedures at the Federal Congress.

The way of taking decisions in Party Congresses and the procedure to elect the members of the different intra-party bodies have been the subject of a lively debate within the party. The issues discussed were: the *formula of representation* (plurality vs. proportional), whether votes should be cast by *individual delegates or collectively by each delegation* as a whole (provincial or regional) and whether the vote of delegates (or of the heads of the delegation) should be *public or secret*. These issues are expected to have an influence: (1) over the degree to which delegates/heads of delegations feel constrained to vote in one particular direction; (2) on the extent to which their actions could be monitored, both by the central party leadership and by the rank and file; and, (3) on the representation of minority or dissenting groups in the governing bodies of the party.

Let us start with the debate between plurality and proportional systems. The Federal Executive Commission, the Federal Auditing Committee and the members of the Conflicts

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[13] This was argumented in the Conference of Organisation where this reform was discussed (PSOE Conference of Organisation 1983: 264).

Committee are elected by a pure plurality system.[14] One of the key traits of the party Congresses held since 1979 is that *there has usually been only one list of candidates for any of these bodies*. Delegates either vote for that list or show their discontent/rejection by abstaining or leaving their ballot papers blank.[15] In other words, elections to the Executive Commission have not been competitive, neither among different individual candidates nor among different lists of candidates. As Juliá (1997: 576) notes:

> "the debate that had characterised the first years of the re-foundation turned into the most absolute unanimity regarding policy and the possibility to vote for positions in the Executive among different candidatures, which was customary in the pre-Civil War socialism, was now considered as an archaic practice."

As a result, *the negotiations to establish the list of candidates for the Executive Commission concentrate most of the energies of delegates and the media coverage in every Congress,*[16] particularly at times when party cohesion is low and consensus on a single list is more difficult to achieve. Other effects of the use of this system are the homogeneity of the resulting Executive, since the presence of any group that dissents from the majority line is nearly impossible unless it is the result of negotiations during the choosing of candidatures. At the same time, the process of election of the main governing bodies of the party lacks transparency and raises serious doubts over the extent to which delegates, not to mention the rank and file, have a real say on their composition, given that negotiations are carried out away from the formal Congress, by the leadership of the party or by the elites of each of the intra-party groups defined either by personal allegiances or by territorial criteria. It could be said that the system by which these bodies are effectively formed is co-optation.

As was mentioned above, since the 30th Congress (1984) the Federal Congress also elects part of the members of the Federal Committee with a system that facilitates the representation of minorities. The rules are the same as those applied to the election of

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[14] It is important to note how difficult it is to find out how this works, since the Statutes are quite vague with respect to how elections take place, they refer to the plurality system but do not specify how candidatures are presented and so on.

[15] An exception to this was the Extraordinary Congress (September 1979) where two different lists competed to be in the Executive. The list led by González obtained 85.9% of the votes and the other one led by Gómez Llorente (a '*crítico*') gathered 6.9% of the votes (El País, 30/9/79). Another exception took place in the 29th Congress (1981) when the number of candidates exceeded by one the number of positions in the Executive Commission of the party; Rafael Escuredo put forward his candidature and obtained 23.7%, while the lowest percentage obtained by one of the elected members was 65.7% (El País 25/10/81).

[16] This is explicitly recognised even in the party paper, El Socialista. For example, in the information of the 34th Party Congress (March 1994) it published: "Felipe González proposed a list to the negotiators and these started incorporating or changing names until they managed to give a final composition of the new executive of the party".

delegates for the Federal Congress, i.e., the list which gathers the plurality of the delegates' votes gets all the positions in the Federal Committee chosen by the Federal Congress unless there is another list which manages to get more than 20% of the votes, in which case the most voted list obtains 75% of the positions, and the other one the remaining 25%. In the 33rd Congress (March 1994), this was changed in the same manner described for the election of delegates to the Federal Congress (see table 4.1). Although it is a corrected plurality system, 20% of the votes is clearly a high threshold that minorities find difficult to surpass, especially since their own representation is small because they have been subject to the filtering of the system used to elect the delegates to the Congress.

However, despite the more lenient rules, even in the election for the Federal Committee there has hardly ever been two lists of candidates.[17] Occasionally there are the so-called *"listas de integración"*, which are the result of an unequal negotiation between the group with largest support and minority ones. Even in periods of intra-party conflict, there have been negotiations to agree on a list of candidates between the different groups on the basis of the votes that each group had obtained in election of delegates at the Provincial Congresses that are held before the Federal Congress. The only recognised *current of opinion*, Izquierda Socialista, which has always pushed for the adoption of proportionality in the election of the different party bodies, has on several occasions also reached agreements with the majority sector of the party to decide upon a single list of candidates for the Federal Committee.[18]

The second and third important related issues of debate refer to whether the vote cast by delegates for electing bodies, voting on resolutions and so on, should be collective or individual, and whether it should be secret or public. From 1976 to 1994 the statutes of the PSOE stated that delegates only voted individually on the Congress resolutions and to elect the members of the Federal Committee,[19] while the head of each delegation voted for all the party members represented by that delegation in the vote on the management of the incumbent Federal Executive Commission, and with secret vote in the election of the Federal Executive Commission, Federal Auditing Committee and Federal Discipline Committee (PSOE Statutes 1978, art.30).

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[17] An exception to this is the list of Izquierda Socialista at the 31st Congress, that obtained 22% of the votes. In the 32nd Congress it failed to obtain representation at the Federal Committee since it only got 10.8% of the vote.

[18] In most occasions when it has had its own list of candidates it has failed to obtain representation at the Federal Congress. In the 30th Congress (1984) it accepted a few positions in the only candidature, while in the 32nd Congress it presented its own list, failing to obtain the threshold of 20% of the vote.

[19] The 30th Congress (1984) was the first time that a part of the members of the Federal Committees were elected at the Federal Congress.

The election of the members of the Federal Committee did not raise the same kind of debate. Since it was decided that part of the Federal Committee would be elected at the Federal Congress it was also settled that the vote would be secret and granted to individual delegates (PSOE Statutes 1984, art.24). This was regarded as the institutional mechanism that could grant some representation to minorities. As a matter of fact, the combination of individual and secret vote contributed to some "unexpected results". For example, in the 31st Congress (1988) 7% of the delegates to the Congress belonged to Izquierda Socialista,[20] but the list presented by them to the election of the Federal Committee obtained 22.5% of the delegates' vote.[21]

It is interesting to see how the arguments in favour of or against the individual vote of delegates changed over the years until an extension of individual voting took place in the 33rd Party Congress (1994). Izquierda Socialista had pushed for individual vote since its formation as a *corriente*, not succeeding until there were other forces that fought for the same purpose In the Conference of Organisation held in 1983 the debate on the individual/collective and secret/public character of the vote was linked to the question of whether delegates should be tied to their constituencies by an imperative or a representative mandate, but also to the issue of internal democracy/accountability. On the one hand, those in favour of collective vote claimed that the individual delegate represents a provincial or a regional federation in the Federal Congress, and therefore he/she should voice the majority decision of the members of that province/region. On the other hand, those who advocated individual voting maintained that there are many issues that come up in a Party Congress that cannot be anticipated before it takes place, and that individual secret ballot is the only way to ensure a reasonable extent of democratic decision-making in the party, since collective voting makes it easier for the party apparatus to control decisions.[22]

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[20] Due mainly to the corrected plurality system mentioned above.

[21] The results are reported in El País 25/1/1988.

[22] The statement of Joaquín Leguina, at this Conference of Organisation (Transcription of debates, PSOE 1983: 323) serves as an example of the justification given to extend individual voting:

> "I would like to listen to someone defending the current situation... The current situation was born as a result of a historical need, at a given time the local branches for economic reasons, or because they were illegal, could not send their delegates to the Congress, and instead they sent one representative of all who "carried" the votes of that Branch. Nowadays this has changed completely, and that historical necessity has been turned into a virtue that defies common sense."

For an opposite argumentation see Chaves in the same conference (Transcription of debates, PSOE 1983: 335):

> "When a delegate goes to the (Party) Congress he is not representing himself, but has a mandate from his fellow party members and has to represent them. With individual voting there is total

Leaving aside the motivations behind advocating one or the other system, what seems unquestionable is that the combination of indirect representation, a winner-takes-all list system for internal elections of delegates and block-voting by delegations regardless of differences within them limited the representation and influence of minority groups (see also Gillespie 1989: 357). In addition, the concentration of most voting power in the head of the delegation reduced the real impact that of the recognition of the "currents of opinion"; even if minority groups managed to be represented in a delegation, most matters were voted by the head of the delegation, and therefore these minority groups were easily defeated in the vote that took place within each delegation to find a common standpoint. Another clear implication of the block vote by delegations is that the minority groups were not able to use their votes to develop strategies or build alliances across regional federations.

In 1987 the issue of collective vs. individual voting in congresses was discussed at a meeting of the Federal Committee, which rejected the extension of the use of the individual vote of delegates to other decisions different than the ones already mentioned. The party paper, El Socialista gave the following justification of this decision:

> "The Federal Committee considered that the current procedure of vote by delegations and mandates at the Congress, representing the number of party members with a mandate from each delegation, *is more democratic and closer to the historical tradition of the party.*"[23] (El Socialista 31/1/1987).

At the 32nd Congress, when the internal struggles between *guerristas* and *renovadores*[24] were already quite visible, a few federations in which *renovadores* were stronger supported the change of voting procedure for the election of the Executive Commission, so as to allow delegates to cast their votes individually and "escape" from the control exerted by the *guerristas.*[25] This proposal was defeated. At the following Congress, the 33rd (1994), when the internal struggle between *guerristas* and *renovadores* was at its peak, Felipe González publicly supported the shift to individual vote on the vote of the Management

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> freedom of vote. If one delegation is composed by fifteen delegates we can find that there can be fifteen different proposals, out of which maybe one or two are representative of what the province says... The delegates at the Congress have to be subject to the mandate they have received and therefore there cannot be the freedom of vote that the individual vote entails".

[23] My emphasis.

[24] The characteristics of these two intra-party groups, which increasingly confronted each other by the 1990s, will be dealt with later on in the chapter.

[25] For example Madrid's federation (Federación Socialista Madrileña, FSM) and the federation from Cádiz (Andalucía) were in favour of granting vote rights to individual delegates.

Report of the federal governing bodies and for the election of the new Executive Commission.[26]

In all these debates over whether votes should be individual or collective, secret or public, there was hardly ever any reference to the implication of each type of vote on the qualities that should make the party more attractive to would-be members. However, as will be discussed in chapter 5, it seems clear that some of these arrangements give more control to the rank and file than others, some provide more opportunities for the development of a strong party central organisation with enough power to control those people that go to congresses and how they vote. Still these reasons were hardly ever advanced by any of the parties in arguing for one or the other type, except in very vague references to the more or less democratic character of each type of system.

2.1.2. The Federal Committee

The Federal Committee is the permanent representation of the Party Congress. It is defined by the party statues as the most important body of the party in the inter-congress periods.

Composition

From 1976 to 1979 the Federal Committee was composed by the members of the Federal Executive Commission and by a representation of the regional federations, whose size depended upon their membership. At the 28th Party Congress (1979) the Regional Secretaries as well as one representative from Young Socialists, became permanent members of the Federal Committee. At this same Congress, the bases for calculating the number of representatives of regional federations at the Federal Committee were changed, introducing a territorial criterion. According to the new rules the number of representatives of each regional federation was equal to the number of provinces that composed that region plus a number of representatives that depended on the regional federation's membership (see table 4.2). As will be discussed in chapter 5, the change in rules diminished the role of membership in the internal power allocated to regional or provincial federations.

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[26] El País 10/3/94.

Table 4.2. Criteria of representation of party federations in the Federal Committee 1976-1994

1976	1979	1981	1984	1988	1990	1994
1-300 members: 1 representative 301-1000: 1 more representative. 1001-5000 1 more 5002- 1 more for each 2000 members or fraction of that.	Same	4 repr for each party federation with three or more provinces, plus 1 additional repr. for each 3000 members. 2 repr for each party federation with less than three provinces, plus 1 for each 3000 1 repr for each province that is not part of any regional federation, plus 1 for each 3000 members 1 for each federation outside of Spain Each party federation will not have a number of representatives less than the number of provinces	Same system, but now the additional one is for 4000 members or fraction over 2000	Same	Same	Same

In the 30th Congress (October 1984) some important modifications of the composition of the Federal Committee were adopted: the President of the Socialist Parliamentary Group became a permanent member of the Federal Committee.[27] It was also decided that some of the members of the Federal Committee would be elected by the Federal Congress.[28] The amount of members of the Federal Committee elected by the Federal Congress was 36 until 1990 (32nd Congress), when it was raised to 39.[29] The existence of this part of the Federal Committee elected at the Congress introduced a higher control by the central party apparatus over the composition and balance of power in the Federal Committee, which otherwise would only be elected by the different regional federations.

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[27] Following the decisions taken at the Conference of Organisation held in March 1983.

[28] This issue was debated in the Conference of Organisation held in 1983. A participant in this conference justified as follows the election of the Federal Committee *both* by the Federal Congress and by the regional federations (Transcription of debates, PSOE 1983: 349)

> "If the idea is to federalise the party, this means that the members of the Federal Committee are so in a double way, as representatives of the whole and of part of the party."

Another participant at the Conference expressed an opposite view of the idea that part of the members of the Federal Committee should be elected by the Federal Congress (Transcription of debates, PSOE 1983: 275):

> "...if the Federal Committee is the representative body of the different federations and nationalities then the fact that some members of the Federal Committee are chosen by the Federal Congress distorts the representation of each (regional) federation."

[29] The system used to elect these members of the Federal Committee has already been discussed in the previous section.

Tasks

The Federal Committee defines the party's political line and the strategy of alliances with other political forces, supervises the Statutes of the regional federations and controls the activities and decisions of the Federal Executive Commission, the Federal Conflicts Committee and the Federal Auditing Committee. In 1979 the ratification of the electoral lists to different public offices became another important task of this Committee, which has veto power over the candidates selected at the provincial level (PSOE Statutes 1979, art.29). The Federal Committee was also in charge of filling the vacancies at the Federal Executive Commission, the Federal Auditing Committee and the Federal Conflicts Committee.

In 30th Congress (1984), after the arrival of the PSOE into office, certain control functions of government were attributed to the Federal Committee; it was in charge of monitoring governmental action and the legislative activity of the party. Other tasks included approving the budget of the party, the control of the activities of the regional federations, the ratification of the manifestos for regional elections (to the representative chambers of the Autonomous Communities) and the approval of the strategy of political alliances followed in each of them. According to the party statutes, the Federal Committee was to play the role of referee in the disputes between federations of the party and the Federal Executive Commission.

The next addition of tasks to the Federal Committee took place in the 34th Party Congress (March 1994) when it had to elect three people to form the newly created *Comisión de Registro de Bienes y Actividades*. It also had to set the contribution that public office holders had to give to the party, and the proportion of the membership due that should be administered by the Federal Executive Commission.[30] Finally, the Federal Committee was given the tasks to designate the candidate for Prime Minister, a procedure that had not been formalised in the party rules before (PSOE Statutes 1994, art.31).

The marginal role of the Federal Committee

As was mentioned at the beginning of the section the Federal Committee is in theory the most important party body after the Congress, but in practice its role has been reduced to discussing and ratifying the positions and decisions of the Federal Executive Commission (or of the government). Several reasons have been advanced at different periods of time to justify this statement.

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[30] Neither of these two tasks were new, but they had not been formally ascribed to the Federal Committee before.

In the first years after the party reconstruction the functioning of this Committee was rather chaotic because of the high turnover in its composition, particularly among the members sent by the federations, either as a result of changes provoked by the outcomes of regional congresses, or as a result of the fact that at that time the members of the Federal Committees elected by the federations could be removed by the same body that had nominated them. This produced a lack of continuity in the work of the committee that was denounced in the 28th Federal Executive Commission Management Report (1979).[31] The ability to remove members at the Federal Committee either disappeared afterwards, or was not used by the regional federations, since there is no other mention of this problem in the subsequent Federal Executive Commission Management Reports.

The Federal Committee is a more numerous and less cohesive body than the Executive Commission and it meets less frequently than would be necessary if its real task were to define and control party policy. From 1976 to 1984 the statutes of the party stipulated that the Federal Committee had to meet at least once every four months, which changed to every six months in 1984, while in 1990 the rule went back to how it was before, that is a minimum of three meetings per year. In the last meeting of the year the Executive Federal Committee has to present the reports of its activities to be approved by the Federal Committee (PSOE Statutes 1990, art.32). It can also hold extraordinary meetings when requested to at least a third of its members or by the Federal Executive Commission. Table 4.3. shows the frequency with which the Federal Committee has met since the transition to democracy. The figures in parentheses represent the average months between meetings also considering extraordinary ones, which always yield an average lower than the frequency of meetings stated in the party statutes. If we only consider ordinary meetings then the frequency lowers considerably (the period between the 31st and the 32nd Congress is when the Federal Committee met less often). However, those party leaders that complain about the loss of protagonism of the Federal Committee probably refer more to its lack of power as agenda-setter, to its low visibility and to the fact that decisions taken by the Federal Committee were in effect not binding.

This was particularly evident after the PSOE came into office. There was no clear definition of the role of the party as an organisation in relation to the government and this also affected the role of the Federal Committee. Although in principle such a role was to set the

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[31] "The Federal Committee agrees that the Executive Commission gives notice to the Regional Federations or of Nationality and to Provincial Branches that the right to revoke [members of the Federal Committee] can only be exercised for disciplinary reasons or for strong political reasons. The decision will have to be reasoned in a written communication sent to the Executive Commission, and announced in the following Federal Committee" (MG 28C 1979: 160).

guidelines of action of the government, in fact most political discussions took place *after* important decisions had been made by the government. As an example, the Federal Committee of the party did not meet before the general strike, nor before the vote of confidence of González in 1989.[32]

Table 4.3. Frequency of meetings of the Federal Committee

	Ord.	Ext.	Total	Average interval of months between meetings	Statutory space between meetings
27th-28th Congress	6	8	14	4.7 (2.0)	4 months
28th-29th Congress	6		6	4.0 (4.0)	4 months
29th-30th Congress	8	6	14	4.6 (2.6)	4 months
30th-31st Congress	11	5	16	3.5 (2.4)	6 months
31st-32nd Congress	5	3	8	6.6 (4.1)	6 months
32nd-33rd Congress	7	4	11	5.5 (3.5)	4 months
33rd-34th Congress	9	3	12	4.3 (3.2)	4 months

My own elaboration with data obtained from the reports of the Federal Committee (1979, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1994 and 1997).

2.1.3. The Federal Executive Commission

The Federal Executive Commission is the executive power inside the party. It is the body which meets most often (every month or month and a half), makes the most important decisions, and controls the day-to-day functioning of the party. In practice it is the most important body of the party in which the crucial political decisions are either taken or approved.

Composition

It is composed of a variable number of members elected at the Federal Congresses among which the most important positions are the General Secretary, occupied for the whole period studied by Felipe González, and the Deputy General Secretary, held by Alfonso Guerra from 1979 to 1997. The president of the party, Ramón Rubial, has honorary powers. The rest of the Executive Secretaries can be divided in two groups: those who are in charge of an area of activities within the party management and those without a specific task ascribed to them (*vocales* or *. ·retarios ejecutivos sin área*).

Some of these areas of activities have not changed their denomination over the years such as the Secretary of Organisation, Secretary of Finance/Administration or the Secretary of

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[32] This is denounced in an article published in El País, 3-11-90, by Antonio García Santesmases, Vicent Garcés and Manuel de la Rocha, all three members of Izquierda Socialista.

Education (*Formación*), International Relations and Institutional politics. Other areas of activities such as the one that deals with the press and propaganda have been restructured several times. Other secretaries have been created more recently such as the Secretary for Citizen Participation (later Secretary of Relations with Society) or the Secretary of Women participation, and others, like the Secretary of Syndical Affairs have disappeared, but on the whole the areas covered by the Federal Executive Commission have not changed much.[33]

At the 29th Congress (1981) a reduced Executive sub-committee was created, the Permanent Commission (*Comisión Permanente*) composed by the General Secretary, the Vice-Secretary and the secretaries in charge of a particular area of activities. It was more operative in its functioning and met more often than the Executive Commission.

The Federal Executive Commission has tended to grow when it was necessary to integrate different sectors of the party (see table 4.4). Two important jumps in the size of the Executive took place when there was internal conflict: in the 28th party congress (1979) and also in the 32nd one (1990). When internal tensions arose within the party in the beginning of the 1990s the fight for the composition of the Executive Commission became more intense. At the 32nd Congress (1990), one of the two main contending parts in the intra-party struggle, the *renovadores*, was in favour of enlarging the Executive Commission in order to dilute the control Alfonso Guerra had over its members and in this way gain influence over decisions taken in the party. A similar thing happened at the following Congress (1994), when the need to integrate both *renovadores* and *guerristas* raised the size of the Executive Commission to thirty-five, the largest in the post transition period. These internal tensions coincided with the increasing protagonism of the regional leaders of the party who pushed to have more presence in the Executive Commission.[34]

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[33] See the appendix for a table with the areas and members of the Executive Commission of the PSOE since 1974.

[34] This is recognised in a somewhat cynical way by Alfonso Guerra in an interview published in El País 23/7/1984 "The executive bodies of political parties tend to increase in size to solve sectional and territorial conflicts and this is a bad policy".

Thus, there is some evidence that points at the relevance of internal political affairs in explaining the size of the Executive Commission. This assertion is reinforced by the fact that the number of executive secretaries, that is, those members in charge of an area within the party functioning, have remained more or less stable over time (see table 4.4).

Table 4.4. Internal structure and composition of the Executive Commission

	Secretaries with area	Other secretaries	Total	% increase
1976	12	7 (44.4%)	19	—
1979	16	8 (57.1%)	24	26.3
1981	9	16 (31.0%)	25	4.2
1984	11	6 (36.7%)	17	-32.0
1988	12	11 (38.7%)	23	35.3
1990	12	19 (37.5%)	31	34.8
1994	11	25 (33.3%)	36	16.1

Source: My own elaboration with data from 1976, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1990 and 1994 PSOE Statutes.

At the 30th Party Congress (1984) an important issue regarding composition was raised, when a motion was passed that defined some incompatibilities between holding executive public offices or being appointed in the administration and being a secretary in Executive Commission in charge of one of the areas of activity (PSOE Statutes 1984, art.38).[35] The initial intention was to include a complete incompatibility between being in the Executive and holding an executive public office, but it was softened during the course of the debates in the 30th Party Congress.[36] In the end the incompatibilities only affected those members of the Executive Commission who were in charge of specific areas of activities (eight at the time this measure was introduced). The President, the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General were also exempted from this rule.[37] On the one hand the exceptions to the incompatibilities ensured that certain emblematic figures of the party would not be put aside from the top positions of the party and on the other facilitated a better co-ordination between the Government and the party.

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[35] This proves Wert wrong (1994: 632, ft 101) when he states the following: "..the incompatibility between being minister and being member of the Federal Executive has never been formalised in the Party Statutes..."

[36] The Federation of Valencia, for example, backed an amendment to the article that made compatible holding a Secretary without area and holding executive public office (El País 9-12-84).

[37] The text of the article included in the party statutes was the following: "The members of the Federal Executive Commission, except the President, General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary and the six Executive Secretaries must have a preferential dedication to their positions. Thus, they cannot hold public offices of an executive or discretionary character" (PSOE Statutes 1984, art.38).

This provision was created at a time (30th Congress, 1984) when the areas of influence of the party-organisation and the party-in-government were being redefined. Therefore, one of the reasons given to justify it was that the party activities could not be left aside only because the PSOE was in government. However, it also had "internal" interpretations. Although the introduction of this provision had been defended by Alfonso Guerra for some time before it was approved,[38] it was not interpreted as an "innocent move" by many party leaders, particularly by those who were most directly affected by it. It was interpreted as a way to take command of the party, and to prevent members of the cabinet at that time from gaining control over the party organisation.

The question of incompatibilities again became an issue at the end of the 1980s when the distance between the socialist government and the party executive grew, particularly after Alfonso Guerra left the government. One of the most discussed issues before and during the 32nd Congress (1990) was whether ministers should be in the former Executive or not. This did not seem to have so much to do with a question of principle, but with the fact that part of the Government as both ideologically and personally confronted with the incumbent Executive Commission and demanded more pluralism in the Executive that was to emerge from the Congress. In this case there was no reference to the need to have people exclusively devoted to party activities and seemed more a struggle of different party actors to keep their influence in the party organisation.

As a matter of fact, as the first column of table 4.5 shows, there were very few cases of members of government that were also members of the Federal Executive Commission (without considering Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra). The highest number corresponds to the period between 1981 and 1984, and this is because the Executive Commission was chosen in 1981 before the PSOE won the 1982 elections, so these three people were first part of the Executive Commission and then were chosen to form part of the first Socialist cabinet. After 1982 there was only one person in each of the terms who was part of both the government and the Executive Commission until 1994 when there were three. By this time Alfonso Guerra was already out of Government and had lost the control of the Executive Commission at the 33rd Party Congress.

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[38] Alfonso Guerra declared to El País 8/10/1981 "...The members of Executive must not be part of the government. In other words, those who are willing to be part of the Executive Commission must know that they are not going to be in Government if we win the elections" [...] "We are not going to tolerate the dismantling of the PSOE."

Table 4.5. Federal Executive Commission

Composition	Government	Women	Regional PSOE General Secretaries	Regional PSOE Presidents	Heads of regional government
1976	0	5.3	0	0	0
1979	0	8.3	0	0	0
1981	0 (3)	12.0	2	0	0
1984	0 (1)	23.5	0	0	0
1988	1	21.7	1	2	1
1990	0(1)*	21.2	3	1	2
1994	3	30.6	7(8)	1	4

Source: Own elaboration[39]

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[39] I thank Mireia Grau for pointing out some missing data in previous versions of this table. The data correspond to the moment in which each Federal Executive Commission was formed, and, with some explicit exceptions, do not record changes occurred in between Congresses.

In the Federal Executive Commission (FEC) elected at the 29th Congress (1981) the two Regional Secretaries (column 3) are José María Benegas (General Secretary of the Basque Country Federation) and Joan Lerma (General Secretary of the Federation of the Comunidad Valenciana). When the party won the elections in 1982 three members of the FEC were appointed ministers: Joaquín Almunia, José María Maravall and Javier Solana.

In the FEC elected at the 30th Congress (1984) Sáez de Cosculluela was the speaker of the Socialist Parliamentary Group and thus member of the FEC was afterwards appointed minister (column 1).

In the FEC that resulted from the 31st Congress (1988) the Regional PSOE presidents (column 4) were José Acosta, (president of the Socialist Federation of Madrid); Antonio García Miralles, (president of the Socialist Party in the Comunidad Valenciana) and there was only one PSOE Regional Secretary (column 3), Miguel Angel Martínez, General Secretary of the Federation of Castilla La Mancha. José María Maravall (Minister of Education at the time) was also elected as member of the FEC, without an area of party activities assigned to him (column 1).

In the FEC elected at the 32nd Congress (1990) the PSOE Regional Secretaries (column 3) were Raimon Obiols (General Secretary of the Catalan Socialist Party), Jerónimo Saavedra (General Secretary of the Federation of the Canary Islands and later on appointed minister of Public Administration, therefore counted in columns 1 and 3) and José Bono (General Secretary of the Federation of Castilla La Mancha, although at the following regional congress he did not stand again and became President of that regional federation). José Acosta (President of the PSOE federation of Madrid) is the other president of a regional federation present in the Federal Executive Commission (column 4). José Bono was also the head of the government of Castilla La Mancha and therefore is counted twice (in column 3 and 5) and column 5 also includes Manuel Chaves, president of the Andalucía.

In the FEC that came out of the 33rd Party Congress (1994) there were three ministers of the government of the time: Juan Manuel Eguiagaray, Jerónimo Saavedra and Javier Solana (column 1). There were also four presidents of the governments of Autonomous Communities (column 5): José Bono (Castilla La Mancha), Juan Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra (Extremadura), Joan Lerma (Comunidad Valenciana until May 1995) and Manuel Chaves (Andalucía). José Bono was then President of the Regional Federation of Castilla La Mancha and is therefore counted in columns 4 and 5. There were seven General Secretaries of regional party federations: Raimon Obiols (General Secretary of the Catalan Socialist Party), Jesús Quijano (General Secretary of the PSOE Federation in Castilla-León, Luis Martínez Noval (Federation of Asturias), Ramón Jaúregui (Federation of the Basque Country), Joan Lerma (Federation of Com. Valenciana, also counted in column 5), Jerónimo Saavedra (Federation of Islas Canarias, also counted in column 1) and J. Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra (Federation of Extremadura, also counted in column 5). Manuel Chaves, President of the Autonomous Government of Andalucía became the regional secretary of this strong federation shortly after the 33rd Congress and this would be the eighth regional secretary in column 3.

Table 4.6 represents the degree of renewal of the composition of the Federal Executive Commission. Focusing first on the quantitative change, columns 4 and 5 represent two different ways to measure the extent of renewal; while *"%perm"* represents the percentage of members of the *old* Executive Commission that are re-elected, *"perm2%"* is the percentage of the newly elected Executive Commission that already belonged to the previous one. The former way to measure renewal is usually the only index reported (see for example Maravall 1997). However, given the variation of the size of the Executive, using only this indicator is misleading since it hides cases of no renewal at all (see for example the 1984 Executive Commission in table 4.6). In addition, it seems useful to use both to pinpoint cases in which new people have been incorporated to the Executive without diminishing the presence of the previously dominant group. Strictly speaking renewal will be higher if both "% perm" and *"%perm2"* are low and similar in size, which would mean that a low number of previous members of the Executive remain, with the rest of the new Executive composed by new members.

Table 4.6. Degree of renewal in the Federal Executive Commission

Congress	Size	Old mem.	% perm*	% perm2**
27th (Dec. 1976)	19			
Extraordinary C. (Sept. 1979)	24	9	47.4	37.5
29th (Oct.1981)	25	17	70.8	68.0
30th (Dec. 1984)	17	17	68.0	100.0
31st (Jan. 1988)	23	13	76.5	56.5
32nd (Nov. 1990)	31	20	87.0	64.5
33rd (March. 1994)	36	17	54.8	47.2

* "%perm": percentage of old Executive Commission members that are re-elected.
** "%perm2" percentage of new Executive Commission that already belonged to the previous one.

The Extraordinary Congress that took place after the conflictive 28th Congress chose an Executive Commission characterised by renewal, given that only 37.5% of its members were part of the previous Executive Commission. As has been mentioned before, in this Congress two lists competed to be the Executive Commission, which combined with the majority system used explains the high degree of renewal. After this a phase of increasing rigidity in the leadership of the party set in, with a high percentage of members of the Executive Commissions being re-elected in each Congress. The best example is 1984, when the previously described regime of incompatibilities was first applied: 68% of the former Executive was re-elected, but these re-elected members constituted 100% of the new Executive Commission; in other words, there was not a single new member in the Executive. The situation did not change much in 1988 nor in 1990, but in these two cases the high percentage

of re-election was compensated by an inclusion of new members in the Executive. In 1990 this combination was a result of the pressure exerted by the *renovadores* to dilute the power of Alfonso Guerra inside the party. In 1994 there was a distinctively lower percentage of re-elections which coincide with the decline of the strength of Guerra within the party.

In conclusion, the examination of the characteristics of the composition of the leadership of the PSOE from 1975 to the present points to a low degree of leadership renovation, particularly during the 1980s. This examination has also underlined an increasing distance between the Executive of the PSOE and the socialist government after the inclusion of the incompatibilities that prevented most members of Government from holding an important position within the party's Executive.

Tasks

Until 1984 the formal tasks of the Federal Executive Commission were the following: conducting the international relations of the party, administering party property and carrying out the activities needed in order to accomplish the party goals (PSOE Statutes 1978, art.37). This vague definition was replaced in 1984 by a more specific list of issues: the organisation of the internal life of the party, international relations, relations with other political forces, the supervision and control of the government and the legislative activities of the party, as well as giving support for these two tasks by collaborating in the explanation of government policy to society (PSOE Statutes 1984, art.33). In the 33rd Congress (1994) some activities were added such as the approval of the party budget, the power to put forward a candidate for Prime Minister for approval by the Federal Committee, the power to put forward the candidates for leadership of the Socialist Parliamentary Group and finally, the power to convene sectional conferences of the party (PSOE Statutes 1994, art.34).

There are very few instances of control on the functioning of the Federal Executive Commission. In 1984 it was made possible for a group of at least 20% of the members of the Federal Committee to put forward a question of confidence to the Federal Executive Commission. In order to succeed it needs to be approved by the absolute majority of the Federal Committee. The possibility has never been used so far.

2.2. Other territorial structures: the regional and local levels

The territorial structure of the PSOE is composed of four levels: the federal (national), the regional, provincial and the local. Each of them more or less reproduces the structure already explained for the federal level with the differences that we will now go into.

The lowest territorial level is the Local Branch (*Agrupación Local*), which, unlike the rest of the party levels, does not necessarily correspond to an administrative division of the State, in other words, there may be more than one local branch in any one municipality. In urban municipalities it is very common to find more than one PSOE branch. The Local Branch is defined in the party statutes as the basic party unit, where members carry out their activities. There are two main party bodies at the local branch level: the Assembly (*Asamblea*) and the Local Committee (*Comité Local*). The Assembly is the highest authority of the local branch, composed of all the party members that correspond to that branch. The Local Committee is the executive body of the local branch, chosen by the Assembly. The procedures and functioning of the local branches is monitored by the Federal authorities of the party by means of the regulation that is approved by the Federal Committee.[40]

At the provincial level the structure is similar to the federal one. The Provincial Congress, which meets before the Federal Congress takes place both to elect the delegates to the Federal Congress and to discuss the *Ponencia-Marco*. It also meets after the Federal and Regional Congress to elect the Provincial Executive Commission and the Provincial Committee, similar in tasks to the Federal Executive Commission and the Federal Committee and to decide on the strategy of the party in each province. Some of the regional federations of the party are not composed by Provincial branches, since the administrative tradition of some Spanish regions is that they are not organised on the basis of provinces but of *comarcas*, which are sub-divisions of provinces. This is the case in Galicia, Comunidad Valenciana and Catalonia.

At the regional level the main party authority is the Regional Congress, which has similar powers to the Federal Congress but applied at the regional level. The Regional Committee corresponds, at its territorial level, to the tasks already explained for the Federal Committee while the Regional Executive Commission corresponds to the Federal Executive. Here I can only roughly point out some general features of the territorial structure of the party because each federation may have specificities that can only be studied by means of a thorough

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[40] The name of these rules is "Normas Reguladoras del Funcionamiento de las Agrupaciones Locales."

analysis of the Statutes of each federation, but most of them do appear, in fact, to have a similar structure (Gangas 1994).

Regional Congresses take place after the Federal congress,[41] in which delegates from the provinces or the *comarcas* get together to decide the political strategy of each federation in the coming years. Only in the 1976 Statutes of the party was there a thorough description of the characteristics of the regional bodies of the party, but since then they have changed to and are now regulated by the Statutes of each federation. However, one can presume there are not many differences across federations, at least in procedural terms, given that all the party statutes have to be congruent with the rules designed at the federal level. This control is exercised by the fact that the different statutes have to be approved by the Federal Committee of the party, although its thoroughness is neither clear[42] nor easy to ascertain.

3. Other organisational features

3.1. Territorial integration

The aspects of relations between party bodies at different territorial levels that will be emphasised here are those related on the one hand to the unity and cohesion and, on the other, to the extent of decentralisation of party decision-making and functioning. The decentralisation of different aspects of party activities may depend both on the party structures and on the behaviour of intra-party actors, and in turn, may influence the organisational strategies (in particular a differentiated creation and use of organisational resources, or the implementation of centrally designed strategies). Therefore, it is important to find out the degree of centralisation-decentralisation contained in the party statutes and rules, as well as in its behaviour, so as to elucidate how these can influence the organisational policies of the party, their design and implementation.

What were the implications of having a federal party structure in the functioning of the PSOE? In 1976 the debate was already focused on the difference between being a federation of parties and a federal party, clearly insisting that it was the latter that the PSOE wanted to become. The leaders of the PSOE insisted that the party was federal in its structure and

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[41] Statutes approved at the 30th Congress (Disposición final segunda).
[42] It is difficult to ascertain the degree of control exercised by the central authorities of the party. For example, in the field work period of the thesis I asked for a copy of the Statutes of the regional federation of Extremadura at the central headquarters documentation centre and they said they did not have a copy.

functioning, but not a federation or confederation of parties. The justification of this was the following:

> "If we choose a federal structure for our (socialist) organisation the margin of autonomy needed for the decentralised functioning of the party will be respected. The federations of the regions and *'nationalities'* must have autonomy to apply the global strategy decided on the basis of the specific needs of each region or *nationality* [...] The representative and executive bodies of these nationalities must also respond to these problems with full autonomy, assuming the claims of each *nationality* in defence of their culture and particularities..." (MG 27C 1976: 19).[43]

All along the period since the transition the Socialists have expressed their fear that federalisation would mean the disintegration of a unified message across the territory.

> "we cannot permit that our political project gets fragmented in the same way that the interests of the right are fragmented.... [...]. If we do, we will lose maybe our best advantage in the medium term, i.e., the fact that we are the only political party that is capable of giving backbone to the whole state, that is, the only party who is able to govern this country." (Boletín PSOE, May 1980)

The current relations between the federal authorities of the party and the regional federations cannot be understood without taking into account the characteristics of the process of formation of the regional structures of the PSOE. The PSOE is a centrally created party (or centrally reconstructed party) at least in its post-Franco form. In most cases, the regional federations were created as a second step in the reconstruction of the party, after the provincial branches had been set up. This process was very closely controlled by the central authorities of the party, in particular by Alfonso Guerra, the then Secretary of Organisation. The traits of this process varied across provinces, but the resulting provincial branches were a varying mixture of remnants of the PSOE from the Republic (where they had remained active), plus new members that had joined during the dictatorship, together with other socialists who initially came from other parties such as the Federation of Socialist Parties.[44]

The command of the process of reconstruction at the different provinces by the federal authorities of the party facilitated the subsequent centralisation of resources and of decision-making capacity. This is highlighted by Juliá (1996 and 1997), who claims that it is extremely important to take into account that the reconstruction of the party and the command of the dominant coalition took place *before* regional or local elites had time to develop. The party's

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[43] The term *'nacionalidades'* translated here as 'nationalities' was included in the 1978 Constitution to refer to regions with strong national identities.
[44] In chapter 5 there is a more detailed account of the process of mergers with other socialist parties.

federal (central) authorities were in control of this process and managed to commandeer resources that would otherwise have made regional/provincial leaders more powerful.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s the federalisation of the party is mentioned in the party documents as one of the first priorities to be undertaken by the Secretary of Organisation. The term *federalisation* in this context referred to the creation of regional federations while still keeping the provincial ones. It started around 1979, as an attempt to adjust the party structures to the organisation of the State approved in the 1978 Constitution.[45] According to some PSOE documents the process of federalisation finished in 1982, although in other documents it is implicitly acknowledged[46] that federalisation was not achieved completely until the mid 1980s:

> "We still think that the federal articulation of the party... is one of the most important problems that the party currently faces.. .Our worry has grown with the difficulties found by this Federal Executive Commission to connect and co-ordinate the application of the Executive's resolutions at the different organisational levels." (Report of the Secretary of Organisation presented at the Federal Committee meeting of 24th/25th July 1982)

At least initially, the creation of regional federations did not mean a challenge to the control of most important political decisions by the PSOE federal bodies, given the control exerted by these authorities over the different regional leaders. Provisions were made so that the Federal Executive Commission of the party had the power to decide on political alliances, and to veto candidates in the lists for public office. For example, the decision of the Federal Executive Commission to change a decision taken by a Regional Committee had to be ratified by the Federal Committee (PSOE Statutes 1976, art.24).[47]

Looking at how the party distributes its finances is another way to see the extent to which main resources are controlled by the federal (national) party authorities. Party dues are paid at the Local Branches, that keep part of them for their own expenses, and forward the rest to the provincial federation, that also keeps a percentage and sends the rest to the regional federation which does the same, sending the remaining money to the federal bodies of the party. However, it must be kept in mind that only a minor part of party finances comes from membership dues while the most important part comes from public subsidies. The part that corresponds to the electoral expenses in regional elections is forwarded to the different regional federations, whereas the federal bodies distribute the subsidies obtained in general and

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[45] Joaquín Almunia, personal interview, 14/6/96.

[46] The provinces of Badajoz and Cáceres are not reported to form the Federation of Extremadura until the mid 1980s.

[47] This provision remained in the Party Statutes for the whole period studied.

local elections. The annual public subsidy for the day-to-day activities of parties is also distributed by the Federal Executive Commission, that forwards 45 percent to the federations on the basis of its membership (Res 29C 1981). In addition to these sources, regional, provincial and local party organisations have their own sources of finance through the participation in government at these levels, patronage, etc. Although the federal party authorities have attempted to gain control over the finances of each federation, particularly after the outbreak of several scandals, it seems a highly decentralised system from this perspective.

Two other areas where it is interesting to study the degree of intervention of the federal party authorities are candidate-selection and the administration of disciplinary measures. As far as candidate selection is concerned the procedure followed, which will be explained in detail in chapter 5, federal party authorities can veto proposals submitted by regional federations, particularly for the candidates for the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. The extent to which this veto power has been exercised has varied over the years, but the possibility of intervention has always existed. As far as the disciplinary measures are concerned, until 1984 there were Committees of Conflicts both at the Federal and the Regional level, and in principle cases were judged at the regional level and only went to the federal one for appeal. Since 1984 there has been only one Committee of Conflicts at the federal level.

These indicators, however, fail to convey the idea, shared both by party members and observers, of a very centralised party, at least until the mid 1980s. The reason for this might be that central control was based more on informal than formal practices, that is, on the control of the regional federations derived from how the PSOE was reconstructed and on the informal pressure exerted by the federal party authorities on the basis of personal loyalty.

Although there were no formal changes, several interviewees confirmed that the level of effective autonomy of regional federations has increased since the beginning of the 1990s. The increasing autonomy of regional federations ran parallel to the expansion of regional leaders. In turn, the increase of power of regional leaders coincided with the growth of powers of Autonomous Communities, and was facilitated by the weakening of the party federal authorities as a result of the participation in government. From this perspective, *the federalisation of the party was not so much a way to encompass decisions in the different organisational levels, nor an attempt to accommodate the structure of the party to the State structure as previously. Instead, it turned into a search for new organisational structures through which to exercise internal power.*

The term *baron* was coined to refer to regional leaders, especially those heading regional party federation and regional government simultaneously. Alfonso Guerra, the Deputy General Secretary, was for a long time against the increase of power of regional barons. Since Guerra controlled the functioning of most of the organisation, he could also make things difficult for any regional leader who challenged him. In spite of his opposition, regional leaders of federations like Madrid, Andalucía and Castilla La Mancha, who had been helped into office by the *guerristas*, subsequently affirmed their autonomy. Generally speaking, around the mid 1980s *barons* began exploiting their own command of votes and patronage, and sometimes of large congress delegations, in order to assert some autonomy from the centre (Gillespie 1992).

Another revealing example of the increasing importance of *barons* is that during the 1980s their regular meetings with Felipe González became more important than the meetings of the Executive Commission.[48] The Conference of Organisation (1983) had considered institutionalising these meetings through the creation of a Federal Political Co-ordination Committee[49] with consultative/advisory prerogatives. This new body would have been composed by the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, the General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary, the Executive Secretary of Regional Policy, the presidents of each region and the general secretary of each federation,[50] but the proposal did not get through. However, the lack of formal recognition did not stop these meetings from becoming a regular practice during the 1980s.[51]

The increasing power of regional leaders was also noticeable in their participation in the federal governing bodies of the party. As columns 4, 5 and 6 in table 4.6 show, during the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s the presence of regional leaders in the Federal Executive Commission increased, particularly in the 33rd Party Congress (1994). The regular meetings with the regional secretaries and Felipe González continued, and seemed to have played an important role in persuading key figures to abandon *guerrismo* at the 34th Congress in 1994 (Gillespie 1992). The opposition to the federal party apparatus became widespread among the regional leaders, who fought for a more federal party in which they would be more

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[48] "During all these years, besides the meetings of the Government, where the most important decisions concerning general political guidelines were made, the meetings of Felipe González with the [PSOE] regional General Secretaries were much more interesting from this point of view, than the meetings of the Federal Executive Commission" (Interview with Joaquín Almunia in Burns 1996: 334).

[49] In Spanish, *Consejo Federal de Coordinación Política*.

[50] Transcription of the debates at the Conference of Organisation, 1983.

[51] As early as 1983, during the sessions of the Conference of Organisation of the PSOE, José Rodríguez de la Borbolla commented the need to institutionalise the regular meetings between the General Secretary of the party and the General Secretaries of the different federations of the party, since they were not contemplated in the party statutes (Transcription of the debates, Conference of Organisation 1983: 259).

influential, especially after the position of Alfonso Guerra was weakened by the scandal of the illicit enrichment of his brother.

The issue of territorial integration is highly complex and may well change in the coming years. The fluidity of the process of political decentralisation of the Spanish state means the party organisation needs to redefine its unitary message as well as the differentiating traits of each federation, and forces it to find a balance between territorial cohesion and particularism.[52] What is now clear is that the internal politics of the PSOE depend on reaching pacts with different regional leaders, who have gained command of resources that they use in the intra-party games (members, votes, and so on).

3.2. Degree of cohesion/factionalism

This analysis is undertaken with the idea that to the extent that there is factionalism the confronted groups may also hold different views over the organisational strategies that should be pursued, and how resources should be deployed in the creation and use of different organisational tools. The second idea advanced in the theoretical framework related to the influence of intra-party struggles over organisational strategies is that if a political party is affected by a large degree of internal strife, it will not undertake normal, day-to-day activities or plan organisational developments, firstly because time and energies will be devoted to the internal struggle and secondly because of the uncertainty that such divisions create over who is in control of the party.

One of the most important organisational concerns of the PSOE's leadership since its reconstruction was party unity and discipline. Maravall (1992: 11) advances several reasons to account for this: firstly, the memories of past fratricidal struggles, particularly from the Second Republic when the bitter internal conflict among different party factions had contributed to the breakdown not only of the PSOE but of democracy.[53] The second reason is related to the attribution of the electoral defeat of March 1979 to the internal divisions in the party over strategy and policies. Finally, the PSOE had in the UCD, the governing coalition from 1977 to 1982, an example of how damaging internal factions could be for a party's chances. This

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[52] At the time when this thesis was being revised the issue of territorial integration of the party federations was again back on the agenda after the President of Andalucía, the Socialist Manuel Chaves accepted a deal on public health finance from the central government (led by the Popular Party) which had been formally rejected by the PSOE, and by other of its most relevant regional figures (see El País 20/12/97).

[53] Craig (1995a:1) also shares the same point of view, "minimising dissent within the party was crucial for the PSOE's rise to power in the context of a post transition policy which associated fractious parties with democratic breakdown."

concem is illustrated by the insistence of various party documents on the need to portray an image of a united party, that marked a contrast with the image of internal crisis portrayed by the communists (PCE) and the governmental coalition, UCD:

> "The strength of the PSOE lies in its political cohesion. This cohesion must be based in its internal democracy as well as on Socialist discipline. In addition to the internal debate, that constitutes one of the essential characteristics of the PSOE, the Federal Committee finds it necessary to recall that decisions reached through a democratic procedure and the acts of the executive and public-office holders must be taken up and respected. Internal democracy and discipline are, together with the Socialist ideology and ethics, essential components of the PSOE." (Political resolution, Federal Committee, 22-23 June 1980)[54]

The first important episode of clear internal conflict took place in the 28th Congress (1979) over the issue of whether to abandon Marxism as a defining characteristic of the party. The conflict confronted those in favour of the party leadership with the *críticos* over the strategy the PSOE should follow. As has been examined in chapter 2, the 28th Congress finished with the resignation of Felipe González, unwilling to lead a party which had the resolutions stemming from that Congress, but the heterogeneous critical group was unable to put forward an alternative candidature for the leadership of the party, that finally remained in the hands of Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra after the Extraordinary Congress of September 1979. Gillespie (1989) reports disciplinary actions initiated by the federal party apparatus in between the 28th Congress and the Extraordinary Congress against dissenters (between May and September 1979). After the Extraordinary Congress the level of intra-party conflict greatly diminished.

During the second half of the 1970s there were informal groups or cliques inside the party connected to a large extent to the origin of its members. For example, groups of nationalists or regionalists were mainly the result of the incorporation of peripheral socialist groups into the PSOE, and the ex-members of the PSP also maintained special links once integrated in the PSOE (Gillespie 1989: 400, López Guerra and De Esteban 1982: 118). The rapid reconstruction of the PSOE meant that for a long while party life was very much based on personal contacts, even friendships, and the importance of enduring personal loyalties developed during this period cannot be underestimated even in the current functioning of the party organisation.

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[54] In the part of the resolutions of the 29th Party Congress (1981) that analyses the political situation in Spain, the dramatic loss of electoral support of the UCD is interpreted partly as a punishment of the electorate for its internal crisis. The same reasoning is then applied to the Communist Party (Res 29C 1981: 8).

None of the previous internal groups had a formal organisation, unlike Izquierda Socialista, which was recognised as an internal 'current of opinion' *(corriente de opinión)* in 1983, a few years after its formation. It was founded in November 1980 by the heirs of the critical sector from the 28th Party Congress (Gillespie 1989: 400). The members of Izquierda Socialista shared an interest in internal party democracy and were more to the left than the official party position. They defended the statutory obligation for all PSOE militants to be active in the UGT and the traditional conception of a party of militants against the emerging of a much looser conception of membership. It was born in Madrid, but quickly found support in Cáceres, Catalonia, Valencia, Galicia, Asturias, Murcia and Granada (Gillespie 1989). However, the PSOE was against the recognition of the existence of what was called "currents of opinion", and even more reluctant to accept the existence of "organised tendencies".

From the 29th Congress (1981) the party statutes tolerated the existence of currents of opinion, but the regulation on how they should operate were not developed until 1983 at the Conference of Organisation. The conclusion of this debate was the decision to reform the internal electoral system so as to introduce some degree of proportionality that facilitated the presence of a minority groups in the delegation to congresses, and in the deliberative committees of the party.[55] Nevertheless, the members of Izquierda Socialista continued to fight for the adoption of a proportional system for the election of internal party bodies. The formalisation of the currents of opinion was also reflected in the party statutes at the 30th Federal Congress (1984) particularly in the following articles:

> "Total freedom of internal debate is guaranteed to individual members and to 'currents of opinion' formed by groups of members who share the same views and criteria [...]. Organized tendencies will not be allowed" (PSOE Statutes 1984, art.3.2)

> "... the main function of 'currents' [...] is to stimulate internal debate, to contribute with criticism, analysis, alternatives and priorities to the development of the Socialist program" (PSOE Statutes 1984, art. 3.10)

The 'currents of opinion' do not receive special financial help from the party, although they could, in theory, use the party offices, receive the documents they needed, use the party's infrastructure and so on. Izquierda Socialista is the only recognised "current of opinion". It has

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[55] There were people in this conference, for example José Rodríguez de la Borbolla, who claimed that the system that was being approved rigidified the functioning of the party by clearly dividing it into a majoritarian and a minoritarian part. "I have the feeling that the debate we are having here leads to the legitimisation of one only one minority that does not correspond with the intention to provide a device that facilitates the representation of all possible minorities... The system that has been proposed tends *to calcify* the majority and the minority(ies)" (Transcription of debates, PSOE Conference of Organisation 1983: 183).

defended policies to the left of those carried out by the Government and of those backed by the majority of the party. As mentioned before, the 20% threshold needed to obtain representation in delegations or in different Committees, together with other provisions such as the vote by the head of delegation in many decisions, have hindered the presence of this group in the different party debates. In short, Izquierda Socialista has never really threatened the cohesion of the PSOE.

The dominant group within the PSOE was characterised by a high level of unity until the end of the 1980s. The control of most of the resources of the party was centralised by the federal authorities in the figure of Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra, particularly in the latter one, more devoted to the tasks related to the party organisation. From the moment the PSOE entered government (1982) there was a tacit division of labour according to which Felipe González dedicated all his time and energies to the tasks of Prime Minister while Alfonso Guerra took care of the party organisation, together with José María Benegas, who from 1984 was the Federal Secretary of Organisation.

From the mid 1980s onwards there appeared various challenges to party cohesion. The referendum over NATO membership was an important one (see chapter 2 for details). The change of position that concluded in the acceptance of the permanence of Spain in the NATO officially took place at the 30th Congress of the party in 1984. For most party members this represented a dramatic policy shift that was difficult to swallow, particularly when the moment of campaigning in favour of the "yes" vote arrived.[56] Although there was opposition to the official PSOE position on behalf of Izquierda Socialista, the party leadership showed a high degree of cohesion in favour of remaining in NATO. Another important challenging situation which jeopardised internal cohesion was the conflict with the UGT that resulted in the General Strike of 1988 and the subsequent dissolution of formal party union links, which will be examined in detail in chapter 6.

The conflict with the UGT at the end of the 1980s added to other factors that worsened cohesion within the party leadership. First, there was increasing discontent among part of the leadership with the way the party was run, with the high centralisation of decision-making, but more particularly with the control exerted by Alfonso Guerra over party affairs. This increasing discontent with the practices and style of running the party was a gradual process that broke into an open crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. At that moment Alfonso Guerra was put under examination by a sector of the party (*renovadores*) as a result of the

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[56] Cited in many personal interviews.

political scandal caused by the his brother's illegal money-making, and even more clearly when the PSOE Executive Commission reacted in a defensive way to the publicisation of the illegal financing of the PSOE and even to the judicial investigation of this affair.

However, the origins of the crisis date from well before the moment this conflict became public. Ever since the beginning of the Socialists' period in government, there had been disagreements between Felipe González and Guerra but for a long time they had been solved by differentiating the primary sphere of action of each of them; for González it was the government while Guerra was mostly in charge of the party and the co-ordination of the party-government links. Guerra had always presented himself as a *"party man"*, and he was reported - or reported himself - to be reluctant to accept to participate in the government in which he would end up becoming the Deputy Prime Minister.[57] The friction between the two leaders were not always clearly defined, but seemed to arise after several ministerial appointments made by González. Guerra was concerned that the people chosen by González as ministers in many cases were not party members. There seemed to be disagreements over policy orientation although they are difficult to document. Finally, although it might have had an ideological aspect, it seems that the confrontation still had much to do with fights over power and spheres of influence within the party organisation. All of this confrontation did not involve questioning the leadership of Felipe González, which was never contested by Guerra, but his degree of influence in party decisions.

For example, in the first socialist cabinet there were frequent confrontations between Alfonso Guerra and Miguel Boyer, the Minister of Economy who was actively supported by González.[58] The resignation of Miguel Boyer was apparently related to a veto by Alfonso Guerra on his promotion to the position of vice-president. Miguel Boyer argued that it was necessary for him to be promoted to the position of vice-president in order to avoid the continuous bilateral confrontation he had with the different ministries. Guerra vetoed this idea and Boyer subsequently resigned from his position as Minister of the Economy.[59] Boyer was

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[57] Guerra in a interview published in Burns (1996: 141) declares the following "I had the intention to quit politics in 1982, and for a month I refused to be a member of the Cabinet." In his book Burns (1996: 308) recalls that Guerra insisted on keeping an image of distance from the government when he was Deputy Prime Minister by saying that he had "observer" status in Government.

[58] The events that led to the resignation of Miguel Boyer as a minister of the Economy are quite illustrative of this clash between the two. According to Boyer, he had pushed González to promote him to the position of Vice-president, so that he could confront other ministers from a position of superiority. González did not deny this possibility, but did not accept it either. Guerra then started mobilising against this idea, making public declarations that it was impossible to have two vice-presidencies. Boyer perceived all this as a veto from Guerra and resigned (see interview with Boyer published in Burns 1996).

[59] See interview with Miguel Boyer included in Burns 1996.

replaced by Carlos Solchaga, who was not backed by the party apparatus either and had a roughly similar approach to economic policy as his predecessor. There was also a conflictual relationship between Alfonso Guerra and Carlos Solchaga, particularly at the end of the 1980s on the occasion of the general strike called by the main union confederations (included the UGT). Carlos Solchaga was quite open about his rejection of some of the policies and attitudes advocated by the PSOE's Executive, and was in favour of a change in the party discourse, its leading figures and its organisation so as to bring it closer to the positions held by the majority of the cabinet. At this stage internal divisions over economic policy were emerging between market-oriented liberals and those who advocated more populist leftist policies. However, it would be wrong to interpret intra-party struggles as driven exclusively by ideological motives, since to a great extent they also seem to be linked with loyalties, power, careers and spoils and the definition of internal power balance.

There were other signs that indicated how since the mid 1980s the party and the government were going down separate paths. For example, in the mid 1980s the party organisation engaged in debates known as the Jávea sessions organised by Alfonso Guerra and in the Programa 2000, which, as we will see in chapter 5, served to mobilise the organisation with the aim to produce a debate over the strategy of the party, but left out of the debate important members of the party and the government. In addition, the conclusions of such a lengthy debate were afterwards "put in a drawer", giving a sense of uselessness to the whole exercise. The distance between the party (which in this case included also the control of the Socialist parliamentary group) and the government grew at the end of the 1980s.[60]

The 32nd Congress (1990) was the first one characterised by overt conflict within the previous cohesive leadership. The confrontation between those who wanted to renew the PSOE and the party apparatus had started a few months before the Congress took place and had attracted much attention from the media,[61] but Alfonso Guerra managed to win the control of the newly elected Executive Commission. However, in the final speech at this congress (1990), Felipe González explicitly asked the party to respect his autonomy in managing

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[60] Examples of this were the rejection of the Parliamentary Group of some legislation initiated by the Minister of Public Administration or the confrontation between the Government and the Parliamentary Group over the legislation that regulated strikes in 1990.

[61] During the summer of 1990 an interview with Jorge Semprún, at the time Minister of Culture, was published in El País (29/7/90) in which he clearly criticised the concentration of power within the PSOE, and characterised *guerrismo* as 'opportunistic' and 'demagogic'. He also criticised the party apparatus and the lack of reaction it had shown after Guerra's brother scandal had come to the public light. This was followed by increasing conflicts between *renovadores* and *guerristas*, most of whom used the mass media, particularly the written press to publicise their views on the party organisation and the coming Party Congress.

governmental affairs. The following sentence of Wert (1994: 631) summarises well the implication of this Congress for the relationship between the party and the government: "....the (apparent) losers of Party Congresses, the most paradigmatic of which was the 32nd one. have been the real winners as far as the PSOE strategic alternatives were concerned".

In the following years, the tension between those in favour of a change in the party discourse and style, named *renovadores*, and the *guerristas* was evident, although the defining characteristics of each of the groups are not easy to pinpoint. The *renovadores* were a very heterogeneous group more in favour of adjusting the socialist discourse to the new conditions, they were generally less afraid of market, deregulatory policies than were the *guerristas*, but in both groups there were examples of people with the opposite political ideas to those defended by most of its components. The reason for this is that allegiance to each of the groups was also very much a matter of personal loyalties, political careers and maybe even social class. In short, the difficulty in describing the groups is that if one picks up randomly one socialist leader, knowing his or her ideological preferences would help little in placing them among the *guerristas* or the *renovadores*. Whether one was in one camp or the other was more a result of a particular personal path, career, history within the party, although there were also many cases of switches from one "camp" to the other, particularly from *guerristas* to the more heterogeneous *renovadores*, particularly after it became more evident that Felipe González was leaning more to the side of *renovadores*. It is virtually impossible to figure out which is true for each case and hence the difficulty in analysing the internal struggles in the Socialist party in this period. As Gillespie (1992: 5) notes:

> "Conflict within the PSOE is far more concerned with power, careers, spoils and rewards than with strategy, policy and ideology and what appears to be ideological confrontation is often little more than a facade for battles designed to redefine the internal distribution of power."

This is confirmed by the fact that in the most conflictual congresses of this time, the 32nd and 33rd, resolutions on policy and strategy were approved with high percentages of the delegates' votes, without many problems while it was in the negotiations for the composition of the Executive Commission that the confrontation between the two main groups was obvious.[62] According to some observers, the perceptions and use of the party organisation of the two groups was slightly different. This is well exemplified in Maravall's (1996: 15) passage "while Guerra used to say that 'when we convince the party, then we shall be able to convince society', González argued 'society will help us to convince the party'." Joaquín Almunia also

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[62] Personal interview with Joaquín Almunia (14/6/96).

recognises a subtle difference between *guerristas* and *renovadores* in relation to the way they perceived the party by saying that *guerristas* tend to see the party more in a patrimonial way whereas *renovadores* in a more instrumental one.[63]

A further element that increased the factional moves and tension within the party was the repeated threat of González to resign. This happened first in 1989[64] when, during the course of the general election campaign, he declared that it would be his last time as a candidate. This made all possible successors start making moves to be well placed in the event of a resignation by González, so the internal struggle within the party increased. It became apparent that Alfonso Guerra was not ready to be submissive in the designation of a successor.[65] The second time that it was made public that González was considering leaving office was in 1992, when there were rumours of his plans to resign after the Olympic Games and the Expo in Seville had finished. He also communicated this to the general secretaries of several regional federations, to launch a "controlled" succession process.

By this time Guerra had already been replaced in Government after he had resigned as a result of the scandal involving his brother. The most immediate result of Guerra's departure was a deterioration of the party-government relations. Narcis Serra was his successor as the vice-president of the Government. He was not in any ways close to Guerra, nor did he share his political opinions on policy or on the role of the PSOE. Guerra regarded the government reshuffle that occurred after his resignation as treason on the part of González, who felt had not kept his word and had chosen certain ministers that Guerra did not approve of. When González put forward the idea that he was going to resign and that therefore the president would be Narcis Serra, the *guerristas* started working against this idea from within the party organisation. They opposed both the contents and the way things were being done, and accused González of authoritarianism.

From 1990 to 1993 the use of the press by the different camps of the internal struggle to exchange accusations was constant. This took place in a political environment of hostility by many sectors of the media and in the context of electoral decline, and increasing loss of support evident at the 1991 local and regional elections and in the different surveys that were published in the press. In 1993, when the Filesa affair (illegal financing of the PSOE) was at its

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[63] Personal interview (14/6/96).

[64] It could be said that it had also happened in the 28th Party Congress, though strictly speaking in that occasion Felipe González refused to stand again for the position of General Secretary.

[65] This coincided with increasing divergence over economic and social policy after the success of the general strike of December 1988 and with the electoral decline which was evident after the Socialists lost the absolute majority of seats in the 1989 elections.

peak González was in favour of showing clear signs that the party would respond to the accusations with resignations of important members of the Executive Commission, while Guerra defended the theory of a conspiracy and waited to take more measures until the courts decided on the penal responsibilities surrounding the case. The division of the party was huge and penetrated all territorial levels, whereas the political and economic context were also unfavourable. In these conditions, González decided to call elections and take control of the party.[66]

This was evident after the elections when Felipe González proposed Carlos Solchaga, one of the few people who was certain to get Guerra's disapproval, as the spokesman of the Socialist Parliamentary Group. This was taken as a 'declaration of war' by Guerra, who advanced his own candidate for the same position. For the first time in many years there was a vote in the Federal Executive Commission between the two candidates. The results of the vote were very close: 15 votes for Carlos Solchaga, the candidate backed by González for 13 votes for Eduardo Martín Toval.[67] The vote was repeated at the Parliamentary Group and again there was a victory for González. This obviously increased the feeling of an overt fracture inside the party which would last until the 33rd Congress held in March 1994.[68] Since that Congress, where the *guerristas* lost positions in the Executive Commission, internal conflict gradually diminished.

Conclusions

The first aim of the chapter was to characterise the organisational structure of the PSOE from its origins to the present. As has been shown, most of its characteristics in the Second Republic were maintained after the reconstruction of the party organisation during the 1970s. However, not all of the features of the organisational structure remained: some were kept while others, such as the existence of thematic branches as well as territorial ones, were either not considered or rejected. This already points at something that will be taken up again in the subsequent chapters of the thesis, namely the combination of a direct impact of the historical legacy with the conscious use of such a legacy by the main party leaders at the time of the reconstruction of the PSOE. According to this interpretation, the party leaders had a

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[66] According to the account of El País (23/1/93) of the meeting of the Federal Committee of 22 January 1993, Felipe González announced his intention to stop with the division of competences government/party and take active part in both.

[67] El País, 26/6/93.

[68] At the Parliamentary Group, Solchaga obtained 87 votes against 66 for Martín Toval, and there were five blank votes and one invalid one (El País 29/6/93).

considerable amount of room to depart from the practices and structures embodied in the historical legacy they confronted at the time the PSOE was reconstructed. Certain practices were "rescued" or maintained, while others were disregarded mainly because they did not suit the objectives of the party leaders at the time of the party reconstruction. Examples of this are the choice to organise exclusively on a territorial basis, which made the process of party growth easier than it would have been if there had been a combination of territorial and sectional principles.

The second aim of the chapter was to find out the structure of incentives embodied in the party organisational structures since the transition to democracy. As has been shown the rules and structures have ensured the increasing control of the party organisation by the party leadership, through mechanisms such as the block vote of regional federations at Party Congress and the reduction to a minimum of the presence of minorities in party bodies, particularly in the executive bodies. The increasing rigidity of the party structures has been a result not only of the incentives in this direction contained in the party rules, but also a result of the lack of real intra-party competition that has led to a low degree of renovation of its leadership.

Since the end of the 1970s there has been a process of concentration of decision making power in the Federal Executive Commission of the party, where the co-ordination first with the parliamentary group and then with the government were assured given that the leaders of the party organisation, Felipe González (General Secretary) and Alfonso Guerra (Deputy General Secretary) were first the main figures of the Socialist Parliamentary Group and when the PSOE entered government became Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. This overlap lasted until the resignation of Alfonso Guerra from Government, and marked the start of a period of high internal disruption that, with ups and downs in intensity, continued until after the Socialists lost the 1996 general elections. In the next part of the thesis there will be an opportunity to check upon the effect of this internal struggle on the management of the party organisation, and in the design and implementation of organisational strategies.

PART III. THE PSOE'S ORGANISATIONAL
STRATEGY 1975-1996

CHAPTER 5. THE MEMBERSHIP POLICY

Introduction

This chapter aims to explore several questions regarding the value attached to members at different stages in the recent history of the PSOE since the transition to democracy. It starts with a short review of the propositions of the literature on party organisations on the value of members, which are summarised in a series of potential costs and benefits of members for political parties, in particular for party leaders.

The chapter then moves on to analyse the goals of the PSOE regarding party membership during the different phases studied and the instruments used to achieve them. It will be argued that the party strategy in relation to members is governed more by internal than by external considerations, particularly once a certain membership level has been surpassed. The chapter finishes with a section in which the membership levels and their trends are discussed, keeping mind the fact that membership levels depend on many more factors than simply the action of the party organisation.

1. Theoretical work regarding the membership strategies of parties

The PSOE, as well as the rest of the current Spanish political parties, was re-constructed or created anew in a period in which the membership of West European parties was said to be shrinking, among other reasons, due to an alleged decreasing utility of members for party leaders and organisers (Katz 1990: 145). The decrease of membership is quantitative, shown in a decline of the percentage of members as a proportion of the electorate (see Katz et al 1992), and qualitative, shown in a reduced role of members within party organisations (Kirchheimer 1966). Both arguments point at a diminished role of party membership as opposed to other features of party organisations.

Bartolini (1983:200) approaches the study of membership trends from two perspectives: the organisational one, which focuses on the factors that modify the calculations of leaders on the value of members as an organisational resource, and the individual perspective which focuses on citizens and their calculations on whether to join a party or not,

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and the factors that influence this decision. Similarly, Scarrow (1996:2) has identified *demand-side* arguments which illustrate why political parties do not need members as much as they used to, and *supply-side* arguments, which aim to explain why citizens are nowadays less likely to join parties than they once were.

From the organisational perspective, the development of mass media that allowed parties to reach wider sectors of the electorate, as well as the provision of state funding for political parties and cultural and social transformations are supposed to have made membership a less attractive organisational resource. For a long while there was widespread agreement among scholars on the accuracy of the following diagnosis: while membership organisations had proved to be an effective response to the challenge of mobilising support at the time of the enfranchisement of large numbers of voters, particularly for socialist and communist parties, this was no longer the case in wholly enfranchised, educated societies. In other words, *the changing environment had shifted the advantage of this organisational resource and suggested the need for party organisations to develop other type of resources*: expertise in communication, promoting effective organisational structures for electioneering and so on.

The arguments given to show the decreasing interest of party leaders and organisers in recruiting members are complemented with other *supply-side arguments* that emphasise the growing importance of factors that make citizens less interested in joining parties. Some of these arguments relate to the expansion of welfare provisions, which have reduced the party-linked welfare benefits and to the expansion of the leisure industry and public education, which have diminished the value of the educational and leisure opportunities provided by parties (Mair 1990: 182, Scarrow 1996: 8). Finally, the development of the mass media has also reduced the need for a communication function of party organisations. Political parties used to be an important means to distribute information from leaders to followers (Svåsand and Selle 1983: 215), whereas now members and followers can obtain information from television, radio or other means much quicker than from their own organisations. These transformations lead one to conclude that even if party leaders and organisers were equally keen in recruiting members as they (presumably) once were, they would have a difficult job in doing so, given the alleged lesser interest of citizens.

In addition to this line of reasoning depicting the context in which current parties operate, it is important to highlight some features particular to the present case. After the Franco dictatorship Spanish society presented clear signs of de-mobilisation, de-politicisation, apathy and anti-party feeling. There was very little associative life and political parties had been banned for forty years (Montero 1981). Political affiliation or allegiance was considered a

dangerous behaviour by most citizens, or at least, seen with reluctance, and clearly required more efforts on the part of citizens (and thus of parties) than is usually included in the equations that try to predict the likelihood of someone joining a political party.

Even if most of the arguments presented above explaining the decreased utility of members are compelling, they do not always specify in a satisfactory way the process by which this drop in membership figures/value takes place, and in many cases they are used without the necessary step of contrasting these hypotheses empirically. Recently some authors (see Mair 1995, Scarrow 1996) have urged a more refined approach that stops considering members only as organisational assets *or* as organisational liabilities. As Scarrow (1996:2) puts it:

> "Current debates about the possible demise of parties as membership organisations must be enriched by a more nuanced view of the many ways in which parties have sought to profit from their members. Establishing reasons for which party organisers have valued membership will make it easier to understand the strategic dilemma faced by organisers who have weighed the costs and benefits of enrolling members."

There are three main sources of dissatisfaction with the way membership has been studied:

- the excessive level of generality at which many studies and statements regarding membership remain, together with the failure to translate arguments into empirically testable hypotheses with the consequent lack of validation of the arguments advanced.

- the tendency not to consider what party leaders and organisers actually do or say, and instead directly deduce a course of action from the characteristics of a socio-economic, political and cultural environment. Hardly any credit is given to party documents or data as a legitimate source of information on what party leaders and organisers think about members as an organisational resource.

- the inclination to overestimate the external aspect of party organisations, disregarding the potential need and use of members for internal party life. In certain cases *the consideration of a unitary goal of all party actors leads to the dismissal of certain reasons that could be behind an organisational transformation, which might be too quickly interpreted in outward terms, when part of the explanation may lie in internal party factors.*[1] As Bartolini

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[1] An example of the potentially misleading results of this excessive weight of certain aspects of members is provided by the interpretation of Scarrow (1996) of some transformations in the CDU, already mentioned in chapter 1. In her book she detects an organisational change in the CDU by which the delegates to conferences were allocated to local parties according to the number of members for which they forwarded the yearly membership tax. She interprets these as a new recognition of the potential importance of members as a source of national income and fails to explore the possibility that this change may respond to internal party reasons such as the need to increase control by the centre of the functioning of party conferences, or to avoid factions or

(1983: 207) suggests, members can be a resource used by factions in internal party struggles.

The following section will quickly outline the different propositions on the costs and benefits of members for the party leaders and organisers both considering the internal and external context in which they operate, i.e., from a demand-side perspective. This double consideration anticipates the possibility that in certain phases of a party's organisational life the internal aspect becomes more predominant while in other phases the external performance is the focus of attention. It also permits us to take into account situations in which an external cost may be compensated for by an internal benefit or vice versa. Moreover, the recognition of an external and an internal value of party members is a good way to integrate the double logic of party functioning mentioned at the beginning of thesis: the party as an instrument in order to attain certain goals and the party as an arena in its own right.

Throughout the following discussion 'members' refer in principle to the rank-and-file, who include a wide range of people, from those who want to dedicate some part of their leisure time to the party to those who want to make a career out of it, but have not yet started doing so.

1.1. Costs and benefits of members for political parties

1.1.1. The potential costs of members

- *Cost 1. Uncertainty for party leaders* who may not manage to control an excessively numerous or unstable membership. The less strict the filters for membership the larger the membership. This is also related to internal control; the more rights members have, the easier it is for leaders/organisers at different territorial levels to lose control, and therefore, the lower their certainty about their position within the party.

- *Cost 2.* Rank and file *tend to support vote losing policies* (Scarrow 1994: 45). There is a widespread belief that a party's rank and file tend to be ideologically more radical than voters and leaders, either because they are not subject to the same structure of incentives and motivations that induce party leaders to be more moderate, or because they are intrinsically more radical (see May 1973, Kitschelt 1989b, Dunleavy 1990, Norris 1995).

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territorial groups within the party from artificially increasing membership for their own purposes. The measures introduced did not avoid these moves, but without doubt made them more costly since membership could be artificially inflated, but had to be paid for.

This trait may also make them a nuisance, since they may hinder the adoption of moderate programmes and policy stands that are needed to cater for the demands of a large and diverse electorate. This idea was also present in Kirchheimer's (1966) catch-all party, i.e., parties have to marginalise members in order to reach a greater share of the electorate.

- *Cost 3*. Members may *endanger organisational cohesion*. This is both an internal and an external cost and is particularly important in electoral scenarios in which unity and cohesion are highly valued.

- *Cost 4. If a party is in government*, members might be an *internal opposition* which is difficult to react to without giving the image of internal division or lack of support for the government from within its own party.

- *Cost 5. Members "waste" organisational resources* (Scarrow 1994: 46) that could be spent on other things. These costs are evident both for enrolment and maintaining members.

1.1.2. The potential benefits of party members

- *Benefit 1. Members may be used by factions in internal party struggles* (Bartolini 1983: 207). They can be used to increase the internal power of certain regional federations or of intra-party groups defined by other criteria. In most parties the number of delegates sent to the conferences depends on the membership level, either of territorial federations, in the case of territorially organised parties, or of the different factions in the case of factionalized parties, or both. In periods of internal division, of uncertainty over the control of the party apparatus or the definition of certain policies the different parts can try to increase the members in their favour in order to secure an advantage over the other factions.

- *Benefit 2*. Members can be used *as volunteer workers inside the party*. They provide free labour during and in between electoral campaigns. Those who contend that large party membership is an obsolete phenomenon think that this function is less and less relevant, given the increasing centralisation of electoral campaigns and the prevailing use of professional experts and mass media. However, parties *still* need members to carry out certain activities, particularly in campaigning and during the election day. That said, this motivation alone should not be enough to arouse much interest in enrolling members.

- *Benefit 3*. Members are *potential candidates for representative positions or officials in the public administration* (Scarrow 1994: 48). This is likely to be more important in a decentralised state like Spain, where there are three governmental levels with positions to be filled.

- *Benefit 4.* Members as *"ambassadors to the community"* (Scarrow 1994:48). Members can be seen as a means of communication with the broad electorate. Again, with the development of mass media this function has been disregarded, although it is not clear whether parties themselves consider it such a marginal one. The main point is to see whether party leaders and organisers think of this as a type of investment which can entail very little cost so that it may be worth investing in anyway, even if the benefits are uncertain, variable and difficult to measure.

- *Benefit 5. Members' legitimising function* (see Mair 1995). Party leaders and organisers may perceive large memberships as *indicators of the strength* of the party organisation.

- *Benefit 6.* Members' *signalling role.*[2] The diversity of a party's membership may be viewed as an indicator of support from diverse segments of the population and as a sign of acceptance by these sectors. The endorsement of explicit support from members of differentiated 'communities' (intellectuals, ethnic minorities and so on) can act as a signal to get support in each of these communities. This is an important qualitative aspect of membership.

- *Benefit 7. Members provide financial resources to the party.* This benefit relates to cost 5, in the sense that one has to evaluate whether the party leaders/organisers perceive the income from members as exceeding the investment made by the party organisation or not. One also should value alternative sources of income such as public finance or the existence of individual private or corporate donors (Scarrow 1996).

The interesting question is whether party leaders consider the benefits of memberships to outweigh the costs mentioned in the previous section, and what they do to maximise the former and minimise the latter. In order to provide an answer to this question one must not only infer whether members are assets or liabilities from the characteristics of the institutional and social environment in which parties operate, but also follow the reasons provided by party leaders and organisers.

1.2. Dimensions of extra-parliamentary party organisation

The first important feature to look at is the effort spent in increasing and retaining membership in general, and whether the party seeks particular types of members. Members do not only have to be recruited but also retained, although the efforts invested in either of these practices

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[2] I owe this point to a discussion with Francesc Trillas (European University Institute).

may vary according to parties or over time within the same party. In order to increase its membership, a party has to maximising the number of members recruited while at the same time minimise the drop outs. Other alternatives that might yield the same net number of members could be to increase the effort in recruiting, not bothering about maintenance, so that recruitment would nevertheless largely outweigh drop outs. Thinking about members in this manner leads us to pose the question about what is it that party leaders and organisers can do so that the party attracts new members, while at the same time not losing the ones it has already.

Party leaders might deliberately change structures and practices, or push for these changes in order to make membership more appealing to individuals with distinct interests. Party organisations can be characterised by their different attitudes towards members by focusing on the following dimensions, which refer to measures that are, to a large extent, under the control of the party leaders and organisers (or strictly speaking of the party itself as a collective body that decides upon its own governing rules).[3]

The first dimension is that of *inclusiveness* (Scarrow 1996: 30) and refers to the *"height of barriers separating members from other supporters"* (see figure 1 for a summary of the dimensions and their indicators). It measures 'the easiness or difficulty of enrolment', which is in turn based on the actual *procedure to become a member* (whether there is a form to fill in, how long it takes to effectively acquire members' rights, etc.) and on the *visibility* of the party. The more visible and accessible party organisations are, the less of an effort those who want to join it will have to make. Finally, it also depends on the definition of what a member is, of the *definition of the rights and duties of members*. The effect of the definition of members' rights and duties is not clear-cut, but it is safe to say that the more flexible the definition is, the higher the quantity and variety of members.

The second dimension, *involvement,* refers to the requirements and opportunities given to members to get involved in the party's work and activities. This is mainly determined by the clarity of definition of their tasks, to the level of party activity in between elections and to the existence of people within the party organisation (usually Local Branches) who organise activities with or for members in inter-election periods. Again, it is not easy to anticipate the effects of this on the sheer number of members. If parties demand a high level of involvement from *all* members, it is likely to be the case that it does not attract those individuals who are

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[3] The initial inspiration to develop these dimensions comes from Scarrow 1996, but the final proposal is quite different from hers.

willing to be affiliated to the organisation and formally adhere to it, but have no wish to get too involved in the party work. However, organising such activities is also supposed to make the party more attractive for those who want to make their membership useful.

The third dimension refers to the channels of *participation in decision-making* offered to members. It mainly refers to three areas which seem particularly important for any party: *candidate selection, election of party governing bodies,* and the *drafting of manifestos/programs*. As will be discussed later, the assumption is not that all members want to participate very actively, but that the fact that the possibility of participating exists at least provides for the opportunity for those who seek it and will attract a certain type of members or prevent others from dropping out. The participatory rights of members are both *formal* and *informal*, i.e., the statutes and rules of the party define the extent to which members can participate, but real practices also help us to assess whether these participatory opportunities are effectively offered to members. This dimension also includes a component regarding the discipline enforced by the party governing bodies, which is also likely to influence the chances for members to participate *in intra-party decision making.*

How much each dimension is developed and the covariation of the three of them will depend on the perception of leaders of the internal and external cost and benefits of recruiting and retaining members, which is then combined with their perception of the evaluations different citizens make about their own benefits and costs derived from joining a political party. Seen in a (theoretical) logical sequence, once party leaders and organisers decide upon the balance between the costs and benefits of recruiting members, and what type of members, they will implement these decisions by different means that will be studied in section 4, in particular by generating incentives towards recruitment and remaining within the organisation.

Figure.5.1. Dimensions of party organisation regarding members.

Dimension	Components	Indicators	Sub-indicators
Inclusiveness Height of barrier of entry/exit	Process of affiliation	Degree of formalization of the process of affiliation Formal requirements	- application form? - speed of the process, probation period? - minimum age? - signatures? - dues? amount?
	Definition of the boundaries member-non member	Other requirements: member's rights-duties Definition of sympathisers/ degree of formalization	- joint membership allowed? - obligation to be affiliated to a particular union?
	Visibility/accessibility	Information about affiliation procedure Can would-be members easily locate and contact the party? Does it recruit regularly: membership drives	- leaflets, or information on other means about how to join the party - homogeneous and visible logos in party offices? - information about location of party offices/branches? - regularity of membership drives? who designs them?
Involvement in the party work	Definition of what the party expects from members	Formal definitions: statutes and other rules Practices: use of members within the party	- clarity of definition of members' tasks - people in charge of running activities - degree of flexibility to accommodate to members' availability/wish to get involved in party activities - non-electoral party activities: regularity, type of activities - participation at electoral campaigns - likelihood of making an internal career within the party - likelihood of standing for public office - information about party policies, decisions, etc., to members.
Participation in decision-making processes (voice)	Influence on the decisions taken by the party	- candidate selection - internal elections - programs	- does the party have primaries? - degree of veto and intervention by the central party organisation nor intermediary levels? - internal electoral system within the party? - how is the electoral program/general policy lines developed? - what are the internal ways of informing members?
	Discipline	Level of conformity enforced	- are tendencies allowed? - can members express their views if they oppose a decision taken by the party? disciplinary consequences?

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The idea to study incentives provided by political parties comes from the application of organisational theories to the analysis of intra-party life (Wilson 1973, Schlesinger 1984, Panebianco 1988). From this perspective, parties as voluntary organisations, depend on the distribution of incentives to obtain the participation of leaders, members and even of voters. If we focus the attention on the object to which the incentives are directed, the theory distinguishes two types of incentive depending on the collective or individual recipient. First come *collective incentives*, that is benefits or promises of benefits that the organisation must distribute equally among the participants. Collective incentives mainly refer to incentives of identity (one participates because one identifies with the organisation), incentives of solidarity (one participates because one shares the political or social goals of the other participants), and ideological incentives (one participates because one identifies with the cause of the organisation). The organisational ideology is for Panebianco (1988:11) the primary source of collective incentives.

Secondly, there are *selective incentives* that are only distributed to some participants. Selective incentives usually refer to power, status and material incentives. They are often employed to explain the behaviour of party elites who compete for organisational control, but in addition party members can seek career benefits (those who Panebianco calls careerists), as well as other things such as a social life, friends, connections, a feeling of belonging to a community and so on. Recent analyses consider as selective incentives also non-political incentives, or material incentives that do not derive from an active political involvement that would help to explain the participation of those members of parties that are less involved with the party and less interested in politics (Scarrow 1994:52). It could be that it is the active, participatory members who act as constraints to the leaders those who are increasingly problematic, but not membership as a whole.

Another schema that can be applied to the study of membership in connection with the incentives offered by parties, is the famous triad developed by Hirschman: *exit, voice* and *loyalty*.[4] The three elements of the triad are interlinked. According to Hirschman *exit* and *voice* are mechanisms by which managers perceive the failings in the performance of their organisations. In principle, the more opportunities for *voice* there are in an organisation, the less likely it is that individuals will resort to *exit* (abandoning the organisation). In addition, as

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[4] See Hirschman 1970, especially pages 34-36 and 77 where he explicitly applies exit and voice to political parties. See also Koelble 1991.

was said before, the more opportunities for *voice*, the more attractive the organisation will be for would-be members. Thus, from the perspective of the party leadership and organisers, enlarging the institutional opportunities to express voice is supposed to increase the entry and to diminish the likelihood of *exit*. A high degree of loyalty of members can also neutralise *exit* and favour the resort to *voice* (or, alternative, to permanent silence). Without exploring in more detail Hirschman's ideas, it is clear that for this thesis *it is the institutional design of a party organisation and its influence in likelihood of exit, voice and loyalty that makes Hirschman's scheme particularly interesting,* since it highlights the potential costs and benefits of introducing incentives for making party decision-making more participatory.

The concepts, dimensions and indicators developed until now will be useful to analyse the membership policy developed by the PSOE since its reconstruction during the transition to democracy. The next section will look at the way party documents have defined the organisational goals of the PSOE since the mid 1970s.

2. The membership strategy 1975-1996: goals

The three following sections will refer to the goals of the party as described in the party documents, without pre-judging whether or not they really were so in practice.

2.1. Growth: the search for members

The PSOE established both its ideological and, to an even greater extent, its organisational identity through appeal to its historical legacy, i.e., of having been by Spanish standards a mass party in the Second Republic (see Linz 1979, Contreras 1983). From the start of its reconstruction during the transition to democracy the PSOE was nominally committed to the development of a mass party (Craig 1995a:1). The first item internal bulletin of the party published after its legalisation, called *'Boletín Socialismo es Libertad'*, had as its front page in one of the first issues the headline *"Por un partido de masas"*. The definition of mass party had not only a quantitative aspect, as becomes clear in the management report of the Federal Executive Commission (1976-1979) presented at the 28th Congress (1979):

> "we think that a mass party is not only such due to the size of its membership or to its having millions of votes. A mass party follows a mass strategy, emerges from the people and is the engine of popular movements. The day to day praxis of our action is to be the vanguard of the labour struggle, to be present in the neighbourhoods, in the feminist and youth movements."
> (MG 28 1979: 88)

The strategy of mass mobilisation advocated at the beginning of the transition, combining electoral and extra-parliamentary activities, made the party place great emphasis on using extra-parliamentary means to press for radical social and political change (Gunther 1986b:12). The calls for mass mobilisation were gradually abandoned both as a result of the type of negotiations that characterised the transition to democracy (referred to in chapter 2 as *the politics of consensus*), and on the other, as a result of the increasing moderation of the PSOE after the 1977 elections, which was hardly compatible with a strategy of mass mobilisation.

This contrast is evident when comparing the political resolutions of the 28th Congress (May 1979) and those of the Extraordinary Congress (September 1979). The resolutions issued after the conclusion of the 28th Congress, influenced by the sector of the party that was critical of the increasing moderation of the PSOE, contained an apologetic justification of the reasons that moved the PSOE to such moderation and a diagnosis of the consequences of such an attitude on the party organisation:

> "the PSOE considers that, even if the consensual attitudes that have facilitated the fundamental steps to obtain democratic freedoms, this has also involved a high political cost: the demobilisation of workers, which makes the relationship with the masses difficult, stopping the party growth and provoking a deterioration of the militant activity." (Res 28, May 1979: 5)

This text is not reproduced in the resolutions of the Extraordinary congress held three months later, in which the *críticos* were defeated, even if the rest of that part of the resolutions very much resembled those of the 28th Congress. The new resolutions excluded all mention of popular mobilisation as a strategy of the party although they retained definition of the PSOE as a mass party. Further evidence of the increasing moderation of the organisational strategy is provided by the contents of a lecture given by González at the 1980 PSOE Summer School in which he contended that the term 'mass party' was old fashioned, and, in addition, unsuitable for the Spanish context in which the term "masses" had a pejorative connotation (Boletín PSOE 1980).

The goal of growth was accompanied by the explicit wish to have a disciplined, united party, whose behaviour was governed by coherence and a sense of direction that the whole organisation should share:

> "We must be strict in maintaining discipline and in increasing our membership." (MG 28 1979: 103)

The question of internal struggles and lack of cohesion worried the leadership of the party, also for historical reasons. The internal fights that had dominated party life at the end of the Second Republic had remained in the collective memory as one of the factors that had contributed to the disintegration of socialism and eventually to the breakdown of democracy (Maravall 1991: 11). Nevertheless, in spite of this concern, the party's quick success in having a fairly large organisational base without being able to cope with this growth created serious problems of internal instability, manifested at the 28th Party Congress. Over 70% of the delegates had been members of the PSOE for less than four years (Tezanos 1980). At that Party Congress it became clear that a widespread consensus over basic decision-making procedures, on the roles of militants and officials was lacking. The organisational reforms introduced at this Congress, explained in detail in chapter 4, limited the influence of the rank and file in decision making and at Party Congresses helped to combine the goal of numerical growth with that of maintaining a disciplined and united party.

Therefore, in addition to the declarations regarding the wish to increase membership and to become a mass party, the party governing bodies had another concern, namely the need to inject some order in what had been until then a disorganised growth of members in a very quick passage from clandestinity to legality. A couple of years later, in 1981, the Secretary of Organisation still insisted on this need to combine quantitative growth with control by the central organisation of who was joining the party as a priority that had guided the activities of the Secretary of Organisation:

> "...our aim was to know the organisation...The party organisation had the urgent need to find out exactly how many of us there were, how and where" (MG 29 1981: 56)

In spite of the abandonment of the strategy of mass mobilisation and of the transformation of the organisational style, the party's organisation still attracted much of the attention of party strategists and organisers. Many passages of different PSOE documents emphasise the idea that the way in which the party was organised would affect its likelihood of obtaining enough electoral support to govern without the need of other political forces, thereby accomplishing the two objectives: to be an alternative to the governing party (*alternativa de poder*) and autonomous so as to form a single-party government.[5] There was still a explicit wish to grow as a party, and a recognition that growth was needed if the party wanted to become a credible governmental alternative, *but the stress on the direction in which*

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[5] See the section about the strategy of the PSOE during the transition to democracy in chapter 2 for an explanation of *autonomía* and *alternativa de poder*.

the party should grow went from its mobilisatory capacities an insistence on the development of management capabilities, so as to ensure that growth of the organisation served the general aims of the party.

The mentions of insufficient presence of the party in society were very common in the different party reports and resolutions during the first half of the 1980s. During the first years of government one of the goals of the PSOE was to convert at least some of the huge amount of electoral support into membership for the party. However, from the moment in which the PSOE entered office the reference to the need to grow as a party organisation was more connected with the task of becoming an intermediary between civil society and the government:

> " We need to strengthen the party as a mediator between government and civil society. The party is insufficiently developed as a civil organisation in relation to the institutional power attained... In order to achieve social hegemony we need to have more presence in society" (Documento de estrategia PSOE 1983).

By the end of the 1980s the party resolutions and reports became more satisfied with the growth attained. They still referred to the need for the party to open itself to society, to become more outwardly than inwardly oriented, but references to the need to increase membership diminished considerably.

At the end of the 1980s it is common to find appeals to increase membership among concrete groups of the population, particularly *women and young people.* In fact, the PSOE had for a long time included among its goals the need to increase the number of female members.[6] Regularly in the internal bulletin "Boletín PSOE" or in the party paper "El Socialista" there were reports of the extent to which women were represented, together with an explicit declaration of intention to make it grow. However, at the end of the 1980s, the objective of increasing activism among women became more explicit and was followed by specific measures such as the development of a 25% quota for women in the internal posts of representation and in electoral lists, and specific membership drives for women that will be discussed later. There was also increasing concern about the problems the PSOE faced in engaging the new generations both as party members and as voters.

To sum up, the declared aim of increasing membership has always been present in the resolutions of the party, albeit with varying intensity. The goal of growth was an overriding

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[6] For example, some of the services provided by the party at the beginning of its reconstruction in the seventies was a centre for family planning, which only worked for a short while.

priority at the post-transitional period, and its importance decreased from the mid 1980s, to nearly disappear as an explicit party goal in the party documents produced at the beginning of the 1990s.

2.2. Territorial growth

The goal of growth referred not only to increasing the number of members, but also to the *geographical spread* of the party organisation, therefore, to the expansion of the number of *agrupaciones* or local branches of the party across the territory. Organisational presence in all parts of the country seemed a necessary, though obviously not sufficient condition for attaining the absolute majority of the votes. Furthermore, since one of the limitations of virtually all parties in Spain, particularly the right wing ones, was their failure to get good electoral results in all districts, the PSOE always regarded its good geographical spread as a useful comparative advantage.

Local elections had a greater role than parliamentary ones in the definition of the objective of territorial growth. Spain has more than 8,000 municipalities, and therefore having a branch and presenting candidates at local elections in all of them is a difficult task, but it has always been considered a target towards which the party had to aim. As early as 1978 one of the most important party officials at the federal level[7] stated the following:

> "We want to greatly expand the structure of the PSOE. Now we have 1500 Agrupaciones out of the 3000 municipalities in Spain. We want to cover all the territory of Spain. We are interested in the municipalities as a basis of support. Our strategy is to form three pillars: parliamentary base, a municipal base and a syndical one."

From 1979, when the first municipal elections took place, it became essential to have as many local branches as possible, so that the PSOE would be able to provide candidates for all municipalities. The following excerpt belongs to an internal publication of the party in 1978, which reports a meeting called by the Secretary of Organisation:

> "It was observed that there was a Local Branch in all cities over 20,000 inhabitants, a deadline (May the 30th) was fixed to constitute Local Branches in municipalities in between 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants. The priority is to extend this plan to all the municipalities of Spain. The concrete goals are to present publicly the PSOE in the municipalities without a Local Branch, to get new members and sympathisers where currently there are none, to obtain more direct information about potential candidates to be local councillors and mayors, to evaluate if they meet the requirements needed to be included in the PSOE lists, and to support

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[7] Interview #75 carried out by Richard Gunther in 1978. Gunther's archive (Juan March Institute).

the weakest Local Branches so that they increase their membership." (Boletín Socialismo es Libertad, June 1978)

The report of the Federal Executive Commission presented at the following Congress (1979) showed that it was a quite common pattern for individuals that were close to the PSOE to participate first in the local elections either as independent candidates or campaigners and only afterwards establish a new PSOE local branch. As can be seen in table 5.1, at this stage (1979) the PSOE presented candidatures for major or local councillors in 3,268 municipalities, covering nearly all municipalities with a number of inhabitants higher than 10,000. However, as the 1979 report proceeds to explain, this was not considered sufficient, and the objective of territorial spread to smaller municipalities continued to be a priority of the federal governing bodies of the party. This is likely to be linked to the financial needs of the PSOE, given that having candidatures allowed the party to have access to the public funds for campaigns and elections, but mostly because holding positions in local government provided access to resources that facilitated the maintenance of the party organisation to a much greater extent than the financial contributions of party members.

Table 5.1. Number of candidatures of the PSOE by size of the municipality

Inhabitants	Num munic.	Local Branches	Number of candidatures
Over 20,000	242	241	241
10,000-20,000	279	250	260
5,000-10,000	544	406	405
2,000-5,000	1,188	574	821
1,000-2,000	1,122	376	573
Under 1,000	4,693	559	968
Total	8,068	2,406	3,268

Source: MG 28C 1979: 162-63.

The resolutions of the 29th Party Congress (1981) again stated as one of the main objectives of the party organisation an increase of its presence at the local level, giving priority to those municipalities where there were already members of Local Councils representing the PSOE, but no party local branch (Res 29 1981: 46):

"... the extension of the organisation, specially in places where the party is scarce on the ground, and as a priority in those places were the PSOE have local councillors but no party structure."

The aim to increase territorial spread, together with the need to have candidates in local elections, lasted for the whole decade of the 1980s. In 1983, the internal bulletin of the party

insisted on the problems the PSOE in its attempt to put forward candidates in all those municipalities where there was no local branch of the party:

> "Since the party only has 3,000 Local Branches in Spain, we need a great organisational effort to be able to have lists in the remaining 4,000 municipalities where we do not have Local Branches..." (Boletín Socialista, February 1983)

In 1988 references can still be found in party documents of the need to increase the party's geographical spread. In spite of the fact that at the end of the 1980s the PSOE was the party with the highest number of lists in local elections, reaching 80% of all municipalities (see table 5.2), in the Executive Commission Report presented at the 31st Party Congress (1988) local elections were again mentioned as the main motivation for being present at the local level, particularly in small municipalities:

> "Knowing that at local elections there are places where the elections are won or lost before they even take place, simply due to having a PSOE list, and aware of the fact that lists for local elections cannot be ready overnight, the Secretary of Organisation in co-operation with the Secretary of Institutional Politics, designed an 'extension drive'... for areas where the party is not present or is insufficiently present" (MG 31 1988: 7)

The PSOE was immediately followed in extent of geographical spread by the Popular Party, which had also managed to increase substantially its spread after José María Aznar took over the leadership of the party in 1989. However, an 80 per cent coverage was still considered insufficient by the PSOE leaders for whom territorial extension was still an important aim to be achieved by reaching new members interested in local politics or attracting independent candidates. Thus, even in the second half of the 1980s when, as this chapter will proceed to show, the real interest in affiliating and retaining members was very doubtful, the interest in territorial expansion remained, mainly due to the importance of being present at the local elections.

Table 5.2 Total number of candidatures and percentage out of the total number of municipalities

	1979	1983	1987	1991
PSOE	3,368 (41.4)	5,588 (68.6)	5,969 (73.3)	6,522 (80.1)
AP-PP	991 (12.3)	5,618 (69.0)	5,200 (63.8)	6,343 (77.9)
UCD-CDS	6,150 (75.5)	1,003 (12.3)	3,150 (38.7)	2,253 (27.7)
PCE-IU	1,525 (18.7)	1,666 (20.5)	1,466 (18.0)	1,561 (19.2)
CiU	385 (4.7)	683 (8.4)	841 (10.3)	863 (10.6)
PNV	186 (2.3)	229 (2.8)	209 (2.6)	217 (2.7)
Others	6,935	5,147	5,277	5,115
Total	19,540	19,934	22,112	22,874

Source: López Nieto 1994. The figures in parentheses show the percentage out of the whole number of municipalities (around 8,000 for the whole period) and have been added to the original table in López Nieto.[8]

2.3. Mobilisation of the organisation

During the second half of the 1970s the goal of growth was accompanied by that of mobilisation. The resolutions of the first party congresses insisted on the need to create mechanisms in order to change the legacy of clandestinity, the need to "open" the party and increase its presence in society. The party bulletin "Socialismo es Libertad" (February 1977) explained the effect of having been a clandestine party in the following way:

> "Clandestinity has made us change the true dimension of the PSOE. It is a mistake to consider that the party finishes in the geographic frontier of our Branches."

The references in the party documents of the need to extend the party's actions beyond local branches were numerous. The worry with the excessive inward character of the party organisation became explicit at the 29th Congress resolutions:

> "The party branches should devote more effort to modifying the party activities in a new concept of activism, that, keeping the unbreakable link of every militant with their local branch, at the same times allows them to analyse their surroundings, to be present in the social movements and progressive organisations, and to spread their socialist message."

From 1982 onwards, when the PSOE came to power at different territorial levels, the documents produced by the party insisted on mobilisation, though now directed to the need to support governmental action. The *"Documento de Estrategia"* (PSOE 1983) issued just after it came into the national government, acknowledged the insufficient development of the PSOE as

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[8] It is also important to take into account the distribution of population according to types of municipalities. 86.2% of municipalities have 5000 inhabitants or less, and represent only the 16.8% of the total Spanish population. Conversely, only 0.8% of municipalities gather around 42% of the population, in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants (Delgado Sotillos 1997: 165). For example Castilla León chooses half of all local representatives, since it contains nearly 28% of all Spanish municipalities, but only 7% of the population.

an organisation, particularly when compared to the development of the party as a governmental organisation. The document identified this inward orientation of the party organisation and functioning as one of its main weaknesses.

Again the reports and resolutions produced at the 30th Congress (1984), the first one held after the socialists' arrival in government, insisted on this fact, now even more intensely felt by those few who had remained devoted only to party tasks. The accusations of *"institutionalisation"*[9] of the party did not take long to emerge. One of the problems the Secretary of Organisation pointed out in the Report of the Executive Commission for the 30th congress was:

> "[the] insufficient level of social activism of party members and the excessive bureaucratisation of our work methods, that are slow and inefficient. The militant's activities were too inwards, without thinking enough about modifying gradually his or her surroundings."

The same type of comments continued during the 31st and 32nd Congresses (1988 and 1990), parallel to the spread of the feeling that the party was becoming more and more closed to societal demands. The amount of self-critique in the search for causes of the diagnosed closeness and distance from societal needs was, however, very limited, virtually non existent. In 1994, in a context of internal division, partly due to the discontent of a sector of the party with the concentration of power and the closure of the PSOE to society, the 34th Congress resolutions were slightly more self-critical and more ready to take steps, albeit timid ones, towards opening up the party.

3. The membership strategy 1975-1996: instruments

The next sections examine how the party tried to accomplish these three goals regarding membership levels and activities, and the strategies and instruments used in order to achieve them. Three main types of actions will be considered, all of which are connected with the three theoretical dimensions that characterise extra-parliamentary organisations developed in section 2 of the chapter:

- mergers/absorption of other parties/organisations
- active membership drives
- the generation of incentives directed at increasing membership.

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[9] This is the literal translation of the term used by most party leaders and officials interviewed when describing the PSOE in this period.

3.1. Mergers/absorption of other parties and organisations.

Membership can be increased by merging with other organisations, whose members are in principle free not to agree with the merger or the absorption, and decide not to follow. Generally a significant amount of members of the old party are expected to remain within the new one.

This type of strategy was mainly followed during the period of transition (until 1978), that is, at the time when the party system was more in a state of flux and therefore there were more parties that could be object of such mergers. Santesmases (1985) identifies four groups of parties that were present in the Spanish political system at the beginning of the transition to democracy: first the (*renovated*) PSOE; secondly the Historic Socialist Party (PSOE-H), that is the remainder of the PSOE in the exile after the schism of 1972, that had failed to obtain the support of the Socialist International as the legitimate heir of the PSOE from the Second Republic; thirdly another socialist party which had been founded in the 1960s, called the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP);[10] and finally, a myriad of small regionally based socialist parties that formed the Federation of Socialist Parties (Federación de Partidos Socialistas). At the 1977 elections the FSP formed an electoral coalition with the PSP.

The need for a united socialist movement was strongly advocated as early as the 27th Congress (1976) and became a priority of the PSOE in the years between the first and the second general elections (1977-79). Attempts to unit the socialist movement were mainly concerned with presenting common lists of candidates, as was the case with the Convergencia Socialista Madrileña[11] or with other socialists parties in Catalonia.[12] Contacts with other socialist organisations had started before 1997. In 1974 there had been contacts between the PSOE and other socialist groups that had emerged in Catalonia, the region of Valencia and Galicia,[13] that according to some PSOE documents were unsuccessful, due to the different

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[10] See chapter 2 for more details of these parties.

[11] The integration with the CSM took place in May 1977, just before the first general elections which took place in June of that year (MG 28C, 1979).

[12] In 1977 elections, the Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Congres and the PSOE federation in Catalunya presented common lists, and it was in 1978 when they reached a formal agreement that also included the Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Reagrupament that led to the creation of the PSC. It was created as an independent political party, formally differentiated from the PSOE although linked to it through a protocol of Unity that defined it as a federated party (Marcet 1995:170). However, it participates in some aspects of the PSOE's internal life as any other federations and since 1982 its members of Parliament have been part of a unique Parliamentary Group. However, juridically and financially the PSC is in all aspects independent of the PSOE and in certain activities, for example, election campaigns it enjoys more independence than other federations.

[13] "From October 1974 it has been a priority of this Executive to increase the contact with other groups and organisations that called themselves socialist" (MG 27C 1976).

conception of how the articulation of socialism should take place. This was followed by a phase of confrontation between the Socialist Party and the recently founded Federación de Partidos Socialistas (which was the coalition formed by these socialist groups with a regional base). The Socialist Party expressed its position in the following way (MG 27 1976: 18):

> "From the beginning we have defended as one of the basic principles for the achievement of a unitary socialist movement [...] that there must be only one socialist organisation for the whole State, that for evident reasons must rely on our party."

Therefore, the condition set by the PSOE was that the process of unification of the socialist camp had to be led by the PSOE, in other words, the other parties had to merge or negotiate to be part of the PSOE.[14] It was clear that the PSOE negotiated with more leverage than the other organisations for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was the oldest party of all (with the exception of the controversy with the PSOE-H[15]), and could claim to have a history behind it which backed its intention to be the only expression of socialism in Spain. Secondly, although poorly organised, it was stronger than the rest of the parties, was present in more provinces and had more financial resources than its socialist competitors.

This was more evident after the 1977 elections that left the Socialist Party in a much more advantageous position to negotiate. The balance of forces among the different socialist parties was clear: the Socialist Party (PSOE) was the strongest of all, the PSP together with the FPS managed to obtain six deputies,[16] while the PSOE-H did not managed to obtain parliamentary representation. These results not only meant that these parties would have little or no influence in the policies or laws passed, but also that they would not get access to public finance, given that this depended not only on the number of votes, but on the number of seats obtained by each party (see chapter 3). After the 1977 elections some of these parties suffered

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[14] This marked a change with respect to the attitude of the PSOE in 1973, when the party's National Committee had agreed to reunify the socialist opposition groups through the foundation of an Iberian Socialist Confederation (Gillespie 1989: 310, Juliá 1997: 439).

[15] This controversy was caused by the schism of 1972 when, after disagreements between the PSOE in the exile led by Llopis and the PSOE inside Spain, the latter convened a Congress to be held in August 1972 which was not recognised as such by Llopis, who called another Congress in December of the same year. The Socialist International was called to decide which of the two sides (the PSOE-Renovado or the PSOE-Histórico led by Llopis) were the legitimate representatives of socialism in Spain. Two years later it announced that the Socialist International recognised the PSOE-Renovado as the legitimate Socialist Party in Spain (Gillespie 1989, Peydró Caro 1980).

[16] See chapter 2 for an account of the electoral results and Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1986: 77) for a more detailed analysis of the PSP electoral results.

from serious financial debts due to worse electoral results than expected,[17] a reason which played an important role in the decision to merge with the PSOE.

This was the case for the PSP, which came out of the 1977 elections with serious financial debts. The round of negotiations on the conditions of the merge started in January 1978 and finished in April 1978 in a PSP Congress held in Torremolinos (Gillespie 1989: 330). The procedure followed was to create a Committee with representatives of both parties, to discuss the conditions under which the merger would take place.

The agreement reached, which was published in the internal bulletin of the party and in El Socialista, based the decision to merge on the programmatic proximity of the two parties. An important point of the negotiations concerned the statutory obligation for members of the PSOE to be affiliated to the socialist union, UGT which was problematic since PSP members were usually members of the communist oriented union, Workers Commission (Comisiones Obreras, CCOO) or of another trade union confederation, the Worker Syndical Union (Unión Sindical Obrera, USO).[18]

The process of unification received quite a lot of attention from the media since the leader of the PSP, Enrique Tierno Galván, was a very well-known personality, due, among other reasons to his activities against the Francoist regime. The results of the negotiation were that Enrique Tierno was made honorary president of the PSOE, two members of the PSP leadership joined the PSOE Federal Executive Commission, and several of its members were included in the 1979 lists of candidates for the different elections.[19] This can hardly be considered a high cost paid by the PSOE, given the need it had for experts and cadres that which were more abundant in the PSP given its greater strength among professionals and in academic circles. The PSP had 8,000 members, of which about 50% accepted the merger with the PSOE and joined it. The conditions varied at the different territorial levels of the party. The provinces in which the number of PSP members who joined the PSOE were Madrid, Murcia, Valencia, Ciudad Real and Cádiz which all together sum up to 66.2 % of the total number of PSP members who affiliated to the PSOE (MG 28 1979: 165). This is confirmed by the figures reported by several regional party officials interviewed by Gunther et al. in 1978.

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[17] For example, in an interview with Gillespie (which he kindly donated to the Fundación Pablo Iglesias), the PSP leader mentions this debt of 80 million pesetas as one of the reasons that moved his party to merge with the Socialists.

[18] See chapter 5 (section 2.1) for more details on how this problem was an obstacle for the integration of some PSP members in the PSOE.

[19] The different regional officials of the PSOE interviewed by Gunther also report that after the agreement, their respective executives were enlarged to accommodate one or two members from the PSP (Archive donated to the Juan March Institute).

The case of the negotiations with the Federación de Partidos Socialista is more complex, in the first place because instead of one single party there were many regionally based parties to negotiate with, and secondly because it entailed dealing with the issue of federalism and the centre-periphery relations both within the party organisation and in the Spanish state. The socialist parties that formed the FPS shared their rejection of centralism as one of their distinguishing features from the PSOE. The position of the PSOE is clear in an article published in the journal Sistema, where Felipe González (1976) contended that there were two alternatives in the formation of unitary socialist movement: there were those who wanted to articulate it through a federal socialist party, and those who wanted to build a confederation of small regionally-based socialist parties. The preference of the PSOE was clearly for the former, that is, it was in favour of building a centralised movement which would at most grant some autonomy to the different constituent parts.[20] As Gillespie (1989: 318) summarises: "The offer was to reinforce federalism within the PSOE, not to enter into a new federation of socialist parties". Otherwise, Felipe González continued, the danger was that the socialist movement would be soon torn apart by centrifugal forces and insolidarity due to the conflicting interests of the different regions.

The need to incorporate these small regionally based socialist parties that formed the FPS had the effect of making the PSOE more aware of the need to give a real meaning to the formal federal character of the party structures. The PSOE pursued these mergers by providing federations with a certain degree of autonomy (see chapter 4) while at the same time maintaining a high degree of cohesion and co-ordination. It combined a federal structure with a concentration of resources at the centre of the party. Most of these mergers, done through negotiations among party elites, were successful and by the end of 1978 the only socialist party that was a real threat to the electoral progress of the PSOE was the Partido Socialista de Andalucía.[21]

As was the case with the PSP, one of the motivations of the PSOE was the search for cadres, given that in some of the constituent parties of the Federation of Socialist Parties was mainly composed by well-prepared individuals who could stand for candidates for the PSOE (Gillespie 1989: 328). As Juliá (1997: 475) notes, the PSOE was inflexible in that it would not

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[20] The discussion on the best way to articulate the different socialist groups took place in the context of more general discussions about the decentralisation of the State (see chapter 2 for an account of the political decentralisation in Spain and chapter 4 for the same purposes applied to the centre-periphery relations within the PSOE).

[21] Which, indeed, proved to be harmful for the electoral performance of the party, particularly in certain provinces such as Cádiz or Málaga (see table 5.3).

modify its basic programmatic line or the name of the party, but was ready to offer good positions to the leaders of these parties both in the party hierarchy and in the electoral lists, probably moved by the wish to give an image of competence to show that it was a credible alternative to the UCD. The concern of the PSOE with this issue was particularly clear when the lists of candidates for the legislative elections of 1979 were set up, since the guideline given by the central party leaders was to favour the presence of lawyers and economists even if this implied a veto from the central party authorities of the lists drawn up by provincial federations (García Morillo 1979: 193).

With the PSOE-H the situation was slightly more tense first due to the confrontation that had produced the split in 1972, but also to the fact that the PSOE-H was registered as a legal party before the PSOE *Renovado* (which was the one officially recognised by the Socialist International). This helped to antagonise the members of the two socialist organisations and was interpreted by the PSOE *Renovado* as a provocation from the UCD. In the 1979 Executive Report (28th Party Congress) there are several mentions of the attempts to establish contacts with the PSOE-H. As in the case of the PSP, the tone used is rather condescending: the PSOE was willing to reach agreements but was nor ready to make many concessions. The reunification negotiations were blocked due to the lack of agreement between the two parties on the preconditions for reunification set by the PSOE-H: no relations with the Communist Party and both the renovated PSOE and the PSOE-H to have equal representation in the unified PSOE. These conditions were unacceptable for the PSOE-R, but also for some PSOE-H leaders who left the party to join the renovated PSOE (Gillespie 1989: 327, ft. 10). Thus, in the end no formal agreement was signed. In some provinces the members of the PSOE-H were more eager to join the PSOE, whereas in others the confrontation between the two organisations was high and the absorption did not occur.[22]

The absorption of all these parties was certainly not done just in search for cadres, but also to avoid competition and the dispersion of the socialist vote. As has been shown in chapter 3, the main effect of Spanish electoral law is to over-represent the two most voted parties in each electoral district, and this gives small parties an important incentive to join larger ones. The next table shows the electoral results for the Socialist Party in the 1977 and 1979 general elections in all the electoral districts (provinces) and how in certain provinces the total votes for all these socialist parties in 1977 was quite substantial, and obviously detrimental to the

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[22] In Madrid for example, an important group of PSOE-H members joined the PSOE-R after the 1977 elections. One of them, José Prat, became the president of the Federación Socialista Madrileña.

chances of the PSOE, while the effects of the electoral system made it very difficult for these small parties to obtain representation.

While it is obviously true that the absorption of these parties diminished the number of socialist competitors of the PSOE, this table shows that this did not have an immediate effect in improving the 1977 results. In 1979 the PSOE improved the joint votes of the parties merged in a few provinces, which happened to be the smaller districts, such as Avila, Almería, Badajoz, Baleares, Cuenca, Teruel, Cáceres, Castellón, but in the most important districts the PSOE was far from improving the sum of the 1977 results of the PSOE and the PSP. This was the case in districts where the PSP was particularly strong such as Cádiz, Sevilla, Madrid and Valencia where the 1979 results were substantially worse than the joint vote of PSOE and PSP in 1977, nearly ten points in all the four cases.

Therefore the merger was not perceived to have immediate effects on electoral results in the 1979 elections, which is something that probably contributed to make the party leadership aware of the fact that a substantial electoral improvement would only come as a result of a clear moderation of the PSOE line as happened in the 28th Congress.

After the unity of the socialist movement was achieved, mergers with other parties ceased to be a priority of the PSOE, which was by then the biggest party of the left with no opposition on the socialist front. Nevertheless, there were other instances of mergers with other parties. At the end of 1982, before the general elections took place, the party absorbed the Party of Democratic Action (Partido de Acción Democrática, PAD) which was formerly part of the governing coalition, Unión de Centro Democrático. This merger presented fewer problems than the former ones, probably because it was negotiated at a time when the prospects of victory smoothened the transactions involved in the negotiations such as finding places for members of the PAD in the PSOE electoral lists. This was facilitated by the fact that the PAD was a very small party. As a result, one of the conclusions of the negotiating Committee was the automatic integration of all members of the PAD into the PSOE[23] and some of the most relevant leaders of the PAD were included in the PSOE 1982 electoral lists.[24]

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[23] Reported at the meeting of the PSOE Federal Committee of 5-6/2/83.

[24] Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, the PAD leader who had been Minister of Justice with UCD, was third in the 1982 PSOE list for Madrid, while another PAD leader was put in the ninth position. In addition, a PAD member was included in the lists of Cádiz, Murcia, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Alicante and Zaragoza (El Socialista 276, 1982).

Table 5.3. Evolution of the PSOE's electoral performance 1977-1979

Province	PSOE 1977	PSOE 1979	Dif % 79-77	Other socialist parties 1977	dif% sim*	Other socialist parties 1979
Álava	27.50	21.44	-6.06	PSP (1.36) PSE (2.23)	-9.66	PSOE-H (0.59)
Albacete	33.33	38.79	5.47		5.47	PSOE-H (1.31)
Alicante	38.87	39.46	0.59	PSP (3.98)	-3.39	PSOE-H (0.94)
Almería	27.51	37.13	9.62	PSP (2.84)	6.78	PSA (2.78)
Asturias	31.70	37.37	5.67	PSP (7.22)	-1.55	PSOE-H (0.58)
Ávila	14.27	20.08	5.81	PSP (1.69)	4.12	
Badajoz	33.82	37.37	3.54	PSP (1.74)	1.80	PSOE-H (0.97)
Baleares	22.96	29.49	6.53	PSP (5.14)	1.39	
Barcelona	30.74	30.41	-0.33	PSP (1.58)	-1.91	PSOE-H (1.31)
Burgos	23.96	23.10	-0.86	PSP (3.17)	-4.03	PSOE-H (1.26)
Cáceres	26.23	38.00	11.76	PSP (2.02)	9.74	
Cádiz	36.67	30.19	-6.48	PSP (9.79)	-16.27	PSA (19.76) PSOE-H (0.42)
Cantabria	26.41	30.42	4.00	PSP (2.66) PSOE-H (6.56)	-2.22	PSOE-H (1.45)
Castellón	29.35	35.79	6.44	PSP (2.73)	3.71	PSOE-H (1.22)
Ciudad Real	31.96	39.60	7.64	PSP (5.57)	2.07	
Córdoba	33.88	30.12	-3.76	PSP (3.65)	-7.41	PSA (9.97) PSOE-H (0.86)
La Coruña	17.48	17.92	0.44	PSP (5.33) PSG (3.73)	-8.62	PSOE-H (2.88)
Cuenca	22.52	31.65	9.13	PSP (1.55)	7.58	
Gerona	24.61	28.12	3.51	PSP (0.70)	2.80	
Granada	32.14	35.79	3.65	PSP (3.64)	0.01	PSA (6.19) PSOE-H (0.59)
Guadalajara	21.43	23.45	2.02	PSP (2.70)	-0.69	PSOE-H (1.0)
Guipúzcoa	28.10	18.25	-9.85	PSP (1.50) PSE (5.49)	-16.84	
Huelva	33.44	35.48	2.04	PSP (2.67)	-0.63	PSA (9.63) PSOE-H (1.09)
Huesca	27.56	34.84	7.28	PSP (11.28)	-4.00	PSOE-H (0.87)
Jaén	39.40	41.94	2.54	PSP (2.07) PSOE-H (0.66)	-0.19	PSA (3.45) PSOE-H (0.33)
León	24.08	27.91	3.83	PSP (3.41)	0.42	
Lérida	14.98	25.02	10.04		10.04	
Lugo	12.45	17.55	5.09	PSP (5.62) PSG (1.26)	-1.79	
Madrid	31.88	33.46	1.58	PSP (9.16)	-7.58	PSOE-H (0.58)
Málaga	39.78	36.02	-3.77	PSP (5.33)	-9.10	PSA (12.02) PSOE-H (1.12)
Murcia	35.08	39.33	4.26	PSP (5.01)	-0.76	PSOE-H (1.71)
Navarra	21.16	21.97	0.81	PSP (2.59)	-1.78	
Orense	13.10	16.23	3.13	PSP (1.48) PSG (1.54)	0.11	
Palencia	25.38	26.21	0.82	PSP (3.03)	-2.21	
Las Palmas	13.43	14.51	1.08	PSP (2.61)	-1.53	
Pontevedra	15.68	16.99	1.31	PSP (4.96) PSG (1.73)	-5.38	
La Rioja	26.34	29.27	2.93	PSP (2.31)	0.62	
Salamanca	22.86	26.64	3.78	PSP (5.92)	-2.14	PSOE-H (1.36)
Sta Cruz Tfe	19.80	21.81	2.02	PSP (5.67)	-3.65	
Segovia	21.45	23.18	1.74	PSP (6.32)	-4.58	
Sevilla	36.49	29.44	-7.05	PSP (4.88)	-11.93	PSA (14.7) PSOE-H (0.54)
Soria	18.57	25.83	7.27	PSP (5.02)	2.24	
Tarragona	23.75	28.88	5.13		5.13	
Teruel	17.81	27.22	9.41	PSP (3.66)	5.75	
Toledo	31.62	32.16	0.54	PSP (1.60)	-1.06	PSOE-H (0.66)
Valencia	35.88	36.72	0.84	PSP (5.33)	-4.49	PSOE-H (1.10)
Valladolid	31.20	30.50	-0.70	PSP (2.63)	-3.33	PSOE-H (1.20)
Vizcaya	24.79	19.10	-5.70	PSP (2.19) PSE (2.74)	-10.63	PSOE-H (0.75)
Zamora	20.23	22.66	2.42	PSP (2.07)	0.35	
Zaragoza	25.47	26.85	1.38	PSP (10.86)	-9.48	PSOE-H (0.95)
Ceuta	32.56	35.50	2.94	PSP (11.41)	-8.46	
Melilla	27.37	21.48	-5.89		-5.89	

* %dif sim is the difference between the 1979 PSOE results and the sum of the votes of the PSOE, PSP, the Galician Socialist Party (PSG) and the Basque Socialist Party (PSE) in 1977.

Finally, in 1992, other less important parties and organisations were absorbed: the Spanish Workers' Party (PTE, Partido Trabajadores de España), the European Foundation (Fundación Europa) and a small Basque party (Euskadiko Ezquerra). Both the PTE and Fundación Europa, which was not a proper political party, were very small and their relevance laid in the communist past of their leaders. The PTE was led by Santiago Carrillo, the famous ex-leader of the Communist Party and while the second was a foundation also led by an ex-communist. Both absorptions can be interpreted in the light of the competition between the PSOE and the United Left (and, within it, the Communist Party), where the PSOE was interested in showing a greater capacity than the United Left to unite all the left forces. The last party mentioned, Euskadiko Ezquerra, was part of the leftist Nationalism in the Basque country and included ex-members of ETA among its leaders who had left the terrorist organisation with the establishment of a democratic regime in Spain (Montabes 1995:141).

Summing up, the mergers and absorption of new parties was in all cases done from a position of strength of the PSOE, unwilling to renounce to its name or command of the process of merging. In none of the cases, even those that occurred before the 1977 elections were these negotiations conducted between 'equals'. Secondly, it must be emphasised that this strategy was mainly used during the transition to democracy in a period where the party system was still being formed. The search for members seems to be only a marginal motivation for these mergers, while the search for prepared candidates for office, particularly at the local level, seems a more compelling motivation (Benefit 3). The result of different surveys of the rank and file carried out in 1980, 1983, 1986 and 1989 showed that the percentage of PSOE members who had formerly been members of other parties which had then merged with the PSOE was below 5%.[25] The mergers practically stopped after 1982, with the exception of a very few mergers that took place ten years later. Unlike in the previous cases, the inclusion of some of the new members stood as candidates in the PSOE lists seems the price that the PSOE had to pay in order to accomplish the mergers rather than the main motivation behind them.

3.2. Actively seeking members: membership drives

The expression 'active search for members' refers to those activities or party actions whose primary and declared objective is to enlarge party membership. Membership drives are the

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[25] The specific percentages were: 3.8% of total members in 1980, 2.3% in 1983, 4.1% in 1986 and 2.6 in 1989 (Report *"Los Afiliados Socialistas en 1989"*, survey carried out by IDES in 1989, pp.46). The proportion coming either from the Communist Party or from other left-wing parties that had not merged with the PSOE was much higher (15.6% in 1980, 19.8% in 1983, 15.3% in 1986 and 10.8% in 1989).

most common example of such activities: they are orchestrated campaigns with the explicit objective of attracting new members, a general objective which is usually made up of sub-objectives, both according to territorial areas and time-periods. Membership drives are often accompanied by different measures that belong to the next part of the chapter, namely to the creation of incentives such as special membership due, or other types of selective incentives. These campaigns can have very different contents depending on their design, periodicity, timing and specific purpose. They rely on the use of the party organisation itself, i.e., using party members to get more members, and sometimes also on the mass media. However, whatever the specific form and contents membership drives might have, they tend to have in common the fact that they make the party organisation more visible to the electorate, thereby reducing the costs for individuals to become members (dimension 1, see figure 5.1). The party as an organisation becomes more visible and they make it more explicit why it is important to recruit members. In short, membership drives tend to diminish the effort that any citizen must do if he/she wants to join a political party.

In the PSOE the development of formal membership drives did not take place until the 1980s; before that date the idea of growth was so important that it was not confined to specific campaigns. From 1981 the objectives of the Secretary of Organisation regarding the growth of the party were put within the frame of a membership drive. For the purpose of this membership drive a series of sociological studies[26] were carried out in order to find out the specific needs of the party organisation in different geographical areas. The sociological study included questions designed to find out which were the areas in which the likelihood of increasing members was highest so as to "to draw conclusions on the motivations needed for the sympathiser-voter to make a greater formal commitment with the PSOE" (MG 29 1981: 58).[27]

The numerical objective of this membership drive was to increase membership by 20 to 25%. It was acknowledged that a membership drive by itself was not enough to increase the membership and that it had to go together with other measures such as a simplification of the process of affiliation, as well as a greater clarity of presentation of the tasks that the new member would perform in the organisation. The general objective of 20 to 25% membership increase was corrected upwards or downwards according to the particularities of each province, which is the lowest territorial level in which concrete goals of the membership drive

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[26] Study called *"Estudio Sociológico de Extensión"*. The regions identified as those which most needed a membership drive were Galicia, both Castillas and Euskadi.
[27] See the results of the survey *"Los Afiliados Socialistas"* analysed by Tezanos and Gómez Yáñez (1981) This survey was repeated, more or less with the same format in 1983, 1986 and 1989. Only the report of the 1981 survey was published and available for the rank and file or to be purchased by interested individuals.

were defined. The way in which this membership drive was carried out is explained in different party documents, although the fact that this information is scattered in various documents obliges one to do more reconstruction than would be advisable.

According to these accounts, the preparatory phase consisted on the realisation of the mentioned sociological study and the visit by the Federal Executive Commission to each federation in order to hold a preparatory meeting with the regional or provincial party officials. There were also joint sessions in which all the Regional Secretaries of Organisation met together. In these meetings the Federal Secretary of Organisation gave directions to the Regional Secretaries of Organisation about the specific goals regarding the organisation of the party (not only related to membership drives but to other general objectives) as well as the strategies designed to attain them.[28] The Federal Secretary of Political Education also participated in the training of the local party officials who were in charge of carrying out this program.

In 1983 the implementation phase started and the membership drive was launched with the slogan *"Acércate, participa, afíliate".*[29] The regional federations had a large margin of freedom in the way they implemented the drive: they could change the slogan and there was no uniformity in the design of publicity for the campaign. Most federations used this opportunity to add their specific names to that of the PSOE, or even design different slogans or publicity pamphlets. In one of the last issues of the Boletín Socialista of 1983[30] there was an interesting interview of all regional party officials in charge of implementing the membership drive. Most of the Executive Secretaries interviewed referred to the membership drive more as a means to increase territorial spread than just to increase membership quantitatively, mentioning the number of municipalities in the region and the percentage of them in which there was a Local Branch. In some regions, such as Castilla León, the local member responsible of the drive mentioned as its first objective to attract those members of Local Councils that had been elected in the previous local elections of May 1983 as independent candidates. This illustrates the predominance of the objective of territorial growth, connected with the need to be present at the local governmental level, as was advanced in the second section of the chapter.

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[28] The Report of the Executive Commission approved by the Federal Committee mentions meetings with the General Secretaries of the regional federations and of the Federal Committee's working group on organisational matters of the Federal Committee (17-20 January), with the provincial Secretaries of Organisation (26-26 feb) and on 20 and 21st of may 1983 with the regional Secretaries of Organisation.

[29] The translation would be *"Come closer, participate, and join the party"*, *Documento de Estrategia*, PSOE 1983.

[30] Boletín Socialista, October-November 1983.

I will focus on one of the regional federations, the one of Madrid (FSM, Federación Socialista Madrileña) in order to study in detail the phases of implementation of the membership drive. In the FSM this campaign took place from the summer of 1983 and lasted for approximately one year. The guidelines[31] given to the Local Branches and the planning of the membership drive were quite meticulous; the documentation included a detailed schedule of dates in which the different stages of the drive should be completed, as well as detailed information on the way to undertake the campaign. It was run by the Local Secretary of Organisation along with voluntary party members. The phases were the following:

- The first step was the calculation of the level of presence of the party (by multiplying the ratio of members/electors by 100), in order to find out the initial index of organisational presence of PSOE. At that time the FSM had an extremely low organisational presence of 0.92 which means that less than 1% of the electorate was member of the PSOE, and the objective set was to reach 2.5%. At the level of the Local Branch the objective was set to multiply the index obtained by applying the formula mentioned by 3.

- Publicise the campaign, first by a public rally where the membership drive was formally launched, and by advertisements in the radio and in the press.

- The drive was based on meetings with would-be members that were chosen by a careful selection process that included a study of the electoral census in the territory of each Local Branch.[32] The indications show that the targets chosen were either previous voters or young people that had been included in the electoral census shortly before the membership drive took place.[33] Once this quantitative selection was done, a qualitative one had to be done according to other information of the area to cover that could be indicative of the likelihood of success of the membership drive. The individuals selected were then issued an invitation

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[31] *Campaña de afiliación* 1984. Federación Socialista Madrileña.

[32] The document makes reference to the Circular 100 sent by the Federal Executive Commission (Secretary of Organisation) which communicated all Local Branches about the importance of the electoral census for the implementation of the affiliation and extension campaign of the party (FSM, Campaña de Afiliación 1984). This refers to the electoral registers used by PSOE observers at the previous general election, which could contain an indication of who had voted and who had not.

[33] The specific guidelines on how to proceed with the electoral registers were to first divide them by polling stations, separating those in which the results had been favourable to the PSOE in the previous general elections from those who had not. The second step was to separate those ballot stations in which the results obtained for the PSOE were higher than the average amount of votes obtained by the PSOE in the whole municipality or election district. If the electoral register also indicated those people who had not voted in the last elections, then those people should also be dismissed as targets. Other type of voters that were dismissed were those under 18, and those for whom there was confirmation that they had voted for other parties in previous elections, such as members of Local Councils representing other parties, those who had acted as party observers at the polling stations on behalf of other political parties. The next step consisted in classifying according to their age the remaining individuals after the procedure of elimination just described.

to come to a meeting of the party at the Local Branch.[34] The invitation sent to the individuals selected included a pamphlet specially designed for this campaign which explained the offer to contribute to the *"change"*[35] by joining the party, an explanation of the internal functioning of the PSOE and a letter by Felipe González. It also included a letter addressed to the person contacted signed by the General Secretary of the Local Branch. At the regional level several meetings were scheduled as part of the membership drive, around the issue of the first year of Socialist Government and the new law on education that was being discussed during that period (Ley Orgánica de Derecho a la Educación).

In some of the regions the planned membership drives, as one of the reports of the Secretary of Organisation acknowledges, were not implemented due to lack of funds. In these cases the Federal Executive Commission of the Party launched a special financial help that was offered in order to start the implementation process.

The quantitative results of the membership drive do not seem very positive (see graphs in the last section of the chapter). If we look at the overall membership figures of the party the results clearly do not meet the goal of 20 to 25% growth set by the campaign, although the results varied across different regions. The two following paragraphs are examples of how the party documents referred to the results of the drive, mostly in terms of how the way it was designed influenced the internal functioning of the organisation rather than commenting on the actual degree to which numerical objectives had been accomplished (Secretary of Organisation Management Report discussed at the Federal Committee, 14-15th January 1984):

> "One of the results has been that the regional organisations have worked out a growth plan, with concrete measures geared at quantitative and qualitative extension, anticipating in each place the best suited methods for the different sectors of society."

And:

> "The results of the drive differ by area, but all of them share a common denominator, the Regional Committees that have designed the drives, involving the Local Branches in the planning, have managed to mobilise the party organisation."

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[34] The turnout was expected to be around 15-20% percent of those contacted and therefore the Regional Secretary of Organisation advised to plan just one of these meetings per week and to invite a number of people five or six times higher than the physical capacity of the Local Branch to make sure that it was not a failure.
[35] This refers to the electoral slogan used by the PSOE in the 1982 elections *"Por el cambio"* ("For change").

In spite of these evaluations and of the internal criticism of the results that were expressed at the 30th Congress of the party,[36] this constitutes the most important campaign of affiliation undertaken by the PSOE.

The Management Report presented by the Secretary of Organisation to the 31st Congress (1988) refers to a new membership drive called *"Cada uno, uno"* whose aim, as the slogan conveys, was to increase the membership by making that each member of the party responsible to find another person who wanted to join it. This recruitment drive was also based on the different studies both of the characteristics and activities of members and of drop outs that were regularly carried out by the Secretary of Organisation. The procedure seems similar to the previously described one: meetings to co-ordinate with regional and provincial executives and, in some cases, financial or technical assistance for the design and/or implementation of the campaign (MG 31, 1988). The first evaluation of this campaign was included in the 1988 Executive Commission Report:

> "the result was not the one initially expected, due to the remains of old habits that close the party to the new member who tries to come closer to our organisation, but, in spite of that it has been a valid instrument to exceed the goal of 200,000 members that we had decided for this term."

The fairly negative evaluation of the party of this membership drive is confirmed by a passage of the next Executive Commission report (32nd Congress, 1990) in which the Secretary of Organisation informs that the campaign *"Cada uno, uno"*, whose results had been much less successful than expected, had been re-launched with some variations after the 31st Congress (1988). The question that arises when one wants to evaluate the actual implementation of this follow-up recruitment drive is whether there is less internal party information covering the development of the drive or whether in effect there were less activities directed towards its implementation. It seems that both are partly true. Certainly, the fact that El Socialista (the internal bulletin had ceased publication) does not deal with this topic with half of the intensity that it did during the previous campaign can be considered a piece of evidence, given that this is the most important means of communication among the different levels within the party.

Other party officials at different levels within the organisation have confirmed the lack of visibility of this drive inside and outside the party organisation. The reasons provided by

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[36] Different articles published in newspapers such as "El País" and "La Vanguardia" reported a critical reaction of delegates to the 30th Congress of the effectiveness of the membership drive.

these sources are that the PSOE was at this stage heavily engaged in governmental activities at different territorial levels, and as such party activity was left aside. For example, in the Report of the Regional Executive Commission of the FSM there is not one mention of this latter drive in any of its sections, neither the report of the Regional Secretary of Organisation, nor those of other departments refer in any way to this campaign. Instead of a membership drive, it seemed more a declaration of intent, with less specific preparations, and without evidence of implementation nor monitoring of results. Unlike in the case of the 1983/1984 membership drive, there is virtually no reference either to how it was financed nor to the publicity or pamphlets designed for the occasion.

Membership drives can be general in their definition of the type of members the party wants to attract or can be targeted at a specific section of the population. The only specific membership drive the PSOE has carried out in all this time, to my knowledge, was carried out parallel to the campaign "*Cada uno, uno*" by the recently created Secretary of Women Participation, and was called "*Cada una, una*". It included conferences, discussion groups, specific propaganda on the policy of the PSOE towards women. It was oriented primarily towards women's organisations, and developed in unison with the execution of the quota approved at the 31st Congress which stated that at least 25% of the components of party bodies and electoral lists had to be women (PSOE Statutes 1988, art.9.k).

In the report of the Federal Executive Commission sent to the 33rd Federal Congress (1994) there is no reference whatsoever of any initiative to develop membership drives. It seems that the party organisers were increasingly disappointed with the results of this type of initiative, together with the fact that the period between the 32nd and 33rd Congresses (1990-94) coincided with an escalation in intra-party conflict (see chapter 4) that virtually paralysed the party organisation. The abandonment of these type of recruitment drives was confirmed in a personal interview with the current Federal Secretary of Organisation who expressed his opinion that he did not conceive of such drives as publicity campaigns, but that the strategy of the party with regard to increasing its membership should concentrate on making the internal reforms and generating the discourse necessary to make the party more attractive to people, in other words to provide the incentives people need in order to participate actively in the party organisation:

> " I do not think of a membership drive as a advertising campaign with the usual elements designed to get across a fact, a product,.... I rather think of it as a presence that must be attractive, to make offers that are suggestive enough, and with which a progressive sector of this society can identify so that they understand the need to participate in that commitment, this is a gradual process."

The creation of incentives directed at facilitating recruitment or participating in the party organisation are dealt with in the next section of the chapter.

3.3. Generating incentives for affiliation

This section will be structured following the list of indicators developed in figure 5.1, section 2.2 of the chapter. Creating incentives for would-be members may be directed at lowering the height of the barrier of entry to the party and also at increasing the barrier of exit for existing members, by modifying their opportunities to get involved in the party activities or to voice their concerns.

3.3.1. Inclusiveness: barriers to entry

Two important aspects regarding the height of the entry barrier are the degree of formality of membership procedures and the party's accessibility to would-be members (this has been partly dealt with in the previous section). In turn the level of the barriers which separate party members from those outside is determined by the privileges and duties attached to party members (Scarrow 1996). Lowering barriers can therefore be achieved either by making the membership procedure easier or by modifying the requirements for becoming a party member.

At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s there was the feeling among the party elite and organisers that the party had grown too quickly without being able to have an idea of the type of people that were joining it. The initial growth of the party took place in a fairly chaotic way: the party leadership lacked control, both because there were different groups competing inside it for the definition of the goals and strategies of the party, and the increase in membership was happening at the same time that the structures of the party were being created. This was recognised in the 1981 Management Report, where the Secretary of Organisation acknowledged the following

> " The numerical growth was not accompanied by the necessary solidity and sometimes we had the feeling we had 'buildings without foundations' with the corresponding danger of collapse [...], the inexperience later on led to difficult situations..." (MG 29 1981: 58)

The expression "difficult situations" probably refers to the events of the 28th Congress (1979). After that Congress, the PSOE underwent important reforms in its internal system of representation at Party Congresses that enhanced uniformity within the party (see chapter 4 for a detailed explanation on the specific reforms implemented) as well as making control from the

centre easier. The other side of the coin was that these reforms diminished the influence of the rank and file in party decisions.

By 1983, when the Conference of Organisation took place, this feeling of lack of control was over, and some voices within the party started worrying precisely about the opposite reasons: the party was becoming too monolithic and closed to interaction with society. One of the *Ponencias* presented at this conference hinted at the possibility of lowering the formal and informal barriers of entry to the party, by removing the need to be introduced by two people who were already members of the party (this was called the *avales*).[37] The way the requirements and procedure of enrolment changed are discussed in the rest of this section and summarised in the table 5.4.

Some of the participants at the Conference of Organisation (1983) argued that the requirement of having the formal support of two members of the party (the *"avales"*) was outdated and intended for political circumstances that were no longer present. Two arguments were debated. Firstly, the maintenance of this requirement was said to be detrimental to the growth of the party particularly in urban areas where these personal contacts are more difficult to find. Secondly, according to some of the participants, the *"avales"* were not properly used and therefore not even useful for their initial purposes: "We all know that for joining the one who "sponsors" is the one who is at that moment in the local branch (*Casa del Pueblo*)".[38] That said, other participants expressed their concern that the removal of this requirement would entail a loss of control by the party over the suitability of new members.[39] The final decision was to remove the need of two signatures in the 1984 Party Statutes. However, this reform did not last for long: in 1988 the need to have two signatures to support applications for membership was reintroduced in the party statutes (PSOE Statutes 1988, art.6).

The 1983 Conference of Organisation also eased the enrolment procedure in another respect. Instead of having to wait to be approved in the local assembly, applications to become a member were automatically approved *unless* someone opposed in the following local assembly. If this occurred the two people introducing the would-be member into the organisation would have the right to appeal to other levels of the party.

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[37] Some of the data put forward to back this argument stemmed from a survey that was undertaken by the party in order to find out the reasons why people joined. One of the findings was that one of the most common reasons to drop out was the tedious procedure of formalities. These people initially tried to join the PSOE and then abandoned it before having completed the affiliation process.

[38] Transcription of the *"Conferencia de Organización"* held in March 1983, page 22.

[39] Pablo Castellanos and Luis Gómez Llorente, who were both members of the "critics" with the party leadership, shared this objection (Transcription of the *Conferencia de Organización* 1983: 65 and 87 respectively).

Table 5.4. The process of enrolment in the PSOE (1976-1994)

	Age	Signatures	Formal process	Time (approx.)	Appeals if denied	UGT	Direct affiliation
1976	16	Yes	Application form to the Local Branch Approval by the Local Committee, ratification in the first Local Assembly if unanimity exists	Indefinite (depending on the date of the Assembly)	It is possible to appeal to the Assembly and then to the Provincial Conflicts Committee	Yes	Direct affiliation via the Executive Commission if no opposition from the Local Branch
1979	18	Yes [40] (a year)	The same as before Introduction of the need to make public the applications in the board at least 15 days before the Assembly	Same [41]	Same as before	Yes	Same as before, but now these members do not have voting rights and cannot hold representative office inside the party
1981	18	Yes (a year)	Same as before	Same	Same	Yes	Same
1984	18	No (introd. course)	Important change: automatic affiliation as long as nobody objects, orally or in a written form. In that case it is voted by the Assembly	Quicker real incorporation	Appeal to the nearest Committee up in the party hierarchy [42]	Yes	Same
1988	18	Yes (course)	Same procedure	Same	Same	Yes	Same
1990	18	Yes (course)	Same procedure	Same	Same	No	Same
1994	18	Yes (course)	Same procedure	Same [43]	Appeal to the nearest Executive Commission in the party hierarchy	No	Same

Own elaboration after data from Federal Statutes of the PSOE 1978, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1990 and 1994.

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[40] Those who signed. or presented the would be member needed to have been PSOE members for at least one year.

[41] According to José Félix Tezanos speech at the Conference of Organisation (1983) this procedure could even take a few months.

[42] In the Statutes approved at the 30th Congress (1984) the Provincial and Regional Disciplinary Committees were abolished.

[43] An interview with the current Federal Secretary of Organisation suggests that this period is in practice longer, given that he said that the minimum period before the affiliation was regularised was one month and the maximum three months. The explanation to this divergence might be that for the census of members a month might be needed in order to check that there are no appeals by other members of the Local Branch.

A compulsory introductory course for new members, whose contents were approved by the Federal Executive Commission was established in the same year. A report of the Federal Executive Commission presented for approval to the Federal Committee in July 1983 referred to the political education of members as one of the priorities of the party to respond to the quick growth that was still taking place (Management Report FEC, 23-24th July 1983). Apart from the introductory course on the history and functioning of the PSOE, since the end of the 1970s new members receive a folder called *"Carpeta del Afiliado"* (Dossier for party members, later called *"Así somos"*[44]), whose contents have not changed much over the years.[45] It includes the party statutes, a summary of the resolutions of the previous party Federal Congress or an analysis of the existing political situation. A short history of the PSOE as well as an explanation of how it is organised is also included as well as the rules that regulate the functioning of local branches. The leaflets mentioned explain quite clearly the functioning of the party, but do not present clear indications of how members can really participate within the party and remain quite vague about the actual tasks of members. More recently the party organisation has used videos, especially in explaining the history of the party to new members, although it is uncertain whether there are many local branches that actually make use of them.

Apart from these changes, the enrolment procedure has remained basically unvaried. The only important modification has regarded the removal of the obligation of PSOE members to be affiliated to the General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT). In principle this might have made membership in the PSOE easier for individuals who do not want to join any union confederation and for the members of other trade unions, in particular for the other main trade union confederation, the Workers' Commissions (CCOO, Comisiones Obreras). It must be said, however, that the level of enforcement of the double-membership rule was quite weak before it was removed and, therefore, the need to be a member of the UGT could hardly had been considered a deterrent to participation when it was still valid. Different surveys of the characteristics of the PSOE members provide evidence of the low level of double membership, that never reached half of the party members.[46] Unfortunately no data are available for the period after which membership in the UGT stopped being compulsory.[47]

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[44] In English it would be "This is us".

[45] It was introduced at the period when José María Maravall became Secretary of Education (*Secretario de Formación*) in the party, in 1979 (Personal interview, 28/12/96).

[46] See chapter 6 for more details on this point.

[47] This obligation was not symmetrical. Members of the UGT were not obliged to be members of the PSOE. This will be looked at in more detail in the chapter 6.

Party dues can also act as a barrier to membership, particularly if they are very high or if the payment procedure is not convenient for members. Membership dues in the PSOE do not seem to have increased substantially, although this is difficult to ascertain given that the official PSOE documents only provide information about the minimum amount of money that the central party offices requests from the regional federations. The Regional Executive Commission in turn sets a minimum amount of money that has to be forwarded to it by the Provincial Branches and the Provincial Executive Commission does the same with the Local Branches in its area of influence. Dues have traditionally been lower for retired people, the unemployed[48] and people with very low salaries.[49] In principle those members who stop paying for six months lose their membership rights, particularly the right to vote in Local Assemblies.[50] The material of a course on management designed for local party cadres advises them to pay via automatic bank drafts in order to make it easier for the member, who this way has to make a bigger effort to drop out, and also in order not to accumulate unpaid dues. However, this does not yet seem to be a generalised practice.[51]

It is worth mentioning that the introduction of new technologies such as Internet has not been used to facilitate enrolment, nor even to provide information on how to join the party and what being a member entails. Although in 1996, when the Web site was created there used to be information how the PSOE is organised, this information did not include information of the activities carried out at the party local branches, and there was no indication of how people could participate in a concrete way within the organisation. Now even this information on how the party is organised has disappeared from the Web page. Unlike other parties[52] whose Web sites explain how to join the party, or who even include in their Web pages the affiliation form in order to facilitate the affiliation process, this is not the case in the PSOE's site, which does not even include precise indications of how to proceed if one wants to become a member.

The PSOE regional and local party organisations have also made some limited use of new technologies. To my knowledge only a couple of them have used the Web page to

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[48] Both are exempted from the obligation to pay dues (art. 13 Normas Reguladoras sobre el Funcionamiento de las Agrupaciones Locales).

[49] The publication "Boletín Socialista" (February 1981) refers to the need to be flexible with those members who earned less than 75% of the minimal wage.

[50] The party rules state that Local Branches should send members in this situation a registered letter informing them of their situation and of the fact that they will lose their membership rights if the debt with the party is not satisfied in a period of a month after the reception of the letter.

[51] PSOE 1993, *Curso Dirección Integral Dirección y Gestión de las Agrupaciones Locales.*

[52] In the first page of its Web site, the PSC (Catalan Socialist Party) explains how to become a member of the party and includes a membership application form that has to be printed and sent to the party headquarters. This is also the case with many West European parties.

explicitly attract members.[53] It can be argued that this only affects a minor proportion of the population who have access to Internet,[54] but it is also indicative of the interest in attracting members.

Blurring the line between members and non-members is another way to increase the organisational presence of the PSOE, by extending the ways in which citizens can be associated with a party. At the 1983 Conference of Organisation there was a proposal to deepen the relationships with sympathisers of the PSOE. The resolutions of this conference included the creation of a "*yearly coupon*" by which people who felt close to the PSOE, but for some reason did not want to become full members, could pay an annual amount of money to support the party and in exchange they would receive party information and publications. Through this *bono* the PSOE was hoping that the lower territorial levels could start working out a census of sympathisers in order to have more information about them and eventually use their volunteer labour in party activities. The degree to which this was implemented seems very limited and, again, it seems one of these initiatives that were only implemented for a very short period of time (if they were implemented at all), not enough to establish a routine in the party functioning.

Through my interviews with local representatives of the party it became clear that the relationship with sympathisers is rather informal. Local cadres have a list of people who are usually ready to collaborate with the party when they are needed, but the chances of expanding this list are limited to the circle around existing party members. The difference between sympathisers and members is that the former do not have voting rights, cannot attend the party assemblies, do not have to pay the dues (except for the time in which the formerly mentioned "bono" was in place) and, at the time when it was compulsory, sympathisers were not obliged to be affiliated to the UGT. The main practical difference is that sympathisers do not have the right to vote in internal decisions (election of delegates, votes on motions, etc.). Although the possibility to involve sympathisers in internal decisions has emerged in the recent debates on organisational reform, there seems to be a great deal of resistance towards any reform in this direction both among cadres and members.[55] Recently, the way the party deals with

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[53] The campaign is called "Sumar 2000 más" ("2000 more!"). It can be found at http://www.tst.hnet.es/tfe_ceipsoe/aflilia.htm. Two possibilities are offered, either print the form and take it to the Local Branch, or send it via Internet, and the party then contacts the person to explain the procedure to follow.
[54] According to the report by Association for Media Research (Asociación para la investigación de los medios de comunicación, AIMC) 3.3% of Spanish population used Internet at the end of 1997. Even if small this quantity is progressing very rapidly every year (AIMC 1997: 5-6).
[55] The preliminary results of survey designed by Julián Santamaría and Mónica Méndez, that was administered to the delegates of the 34th PSOE Congress (June 1997) show that while more than 90% of the delegates (who

sympathisers has changed, rather than placing them within the party organisation but in a kind of "weak" membership status, the relationship with them now takes place mostly through the single-issue groups of the party, which will be dealt with in the next section of the chapter.

3.3.2. Involvement in the party organisation

According to the scheme developed in figure 5.1, *involvement* measures the type of activities parties expect members to carry out and the extent to which the party organisation facilitates the involvement in party life for members who want to do so.

This dimension includes the definition of the tasks of members, not only in the statutes of the party, but also in its every-day practice, and the existence of local level cadres who are in charge of organising the work of members. It should be kept in mind, however, that this does not assume that the higher the requirements of involvement, the higher the incentives to join the party for *every* individual. Different individuals may react to different type of incentives when considering joining or leaving party. However, it seems logical to think that the more flexible a party is regarding the level of involvement that is required from members, the better it can cater for different demands of potential members.

The tasks of members, and for that matter, of Local Branches, are not specifically defined in the party rules and documents, which mainly deal with their formal rights and duties. In the course of years the rules that govern the PSOE's functioning have increased, particularly the technical matters such as the process of enrolment, the documentation that they should send to the provincial, regional or federal level, and so on, but this has not come together with a clarification of the actual role of members in the party organisation.[56] In these documents Local Branches are defined as the basic unit of the party, and are held responsible for checking that members comply with their rights and duties as well as for creating the conditions for their participation in the activities of the party.

How this general statement translates to day to day practice has been the subject of discussion since the re-construction of the party during the transition to democracy. Already during the transition it seemed evident that the social and political attributes of Spanish society were very different from those characterised it in the Second Republic where the Casas del Pueblo (a party building open to the public, usually a bar), used to carry out important

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were mostly middle level cadres) agreed with the participation of sympathisers in single issue groups, party activities, and helping out in election campaigns, 75% agreed that they participated in the debates on party policy, 43% in the selection of candidates for public office and only 14% in elections of internal party bodies.

[56] Their activity is basically regulated by the Normas de Funcionamiento de las Agrupaciones Locales, and by the Reglamento Federal de Asambleas, as well as by the Party Statutes and the rest of party rules.

educational, social and cultural functions (Gillespie 1989.28). Party leaders and organisers were influenced by the practices of other Western European socialist parties, who had a tradition of mass membership, such as the German SPD or the Austrian SPÖ,[57] but at the same time were aware that the PSOE at the end of the 1970s had neither a similar historical legacy or organisational culture nor the socio-political conditions to carry out the same type of activities as its Western European counterparts, as comes clear in the following statement:

> " A simple approach to the meaning of party membership in a society like the current Spanish one leads to escaping the temptation to convert the party into a compensating mechanism to the deficiencies of the State in education or culture." (Res 29, 1981: 14)

There was more agreement on the role that Local Branches and Casas del Pueblo could not play, than consensus on what they actually could. There was a fair amount of confusion regarding the role local branches and grassroots members should have in the party organisation, together with a concern over the excessive inward-oriented character of the activities of members.

During the first years after the transition to democracy it was fairly common to engage members to do voluntary work. Both in the party journal and in other party documents during these years it was customary to insert petitions for experts on particular topics to do volunteer work for the party and to find lists of names of members, as a way the PSOE organisation had to thank them for their collaboration on various matters. In time a good part of those voluntary workers ended up specialising in, and some of them making a profession out of the tasks they carried out in the party organisation. This is particularly true in the activities connected with the organisation of electoral campaigns, which will be dealt with in chapter 7.

As early as 1982, which is retrospectively when most interviewees see the most active period of the party in terms of its mobilisation, there were worries expressed with regard to the lack of activities organised by Local Branches. This was considered both a cause and consequence of the apathy shown by party members and of the lack of external projection of the PSOE. This diagnosis was confirmed by the data of a survey carried out by the Secretary of Organisation, based on a questionnaire that was sent to all Local Branches. The next table shows the results of this survey, that can be regarded as an indicator of the degree to which the

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[57] This stems both from the interviews I carried out and from several references in the party documents of conferences organised to study the way other European socialist parties were organised as the one mentioned in the 1981 Federal Executive Commission Report (MG 29C 1981: 66).

party organisation, in this case at the level of the Local Branches, organised activities in which members could participate.

Table 5.5. Percentage of Local Branches that carried out the following activities:

	May 82	June-82
Internal activities:		
Meetings of the Local Committee	89.6	86.3
Ordinary Assemblies	59.8	58.0
Extra-ordinary Assemblies	36.0	32.0
Other non organic internal activities		
Meetings of "Grupos Socialistas"	34.9	29.2
Do single-issue groups exist?	20.2	14.9
Information activities		
Information meetings about general political matters	23.2	19.7
Information meetings about parliamentary politics	12.3	8.5
Information meetings about labour-union matters	17.9	11.8
Other information meetings	19.6	13.3
The Local Branch has informed about internal circulars in the last month	83.4	78.0
New members and "education" activities		
New members in the last two months?	56.2	49.0
Introductory talks for new members	36.2	29.6
Fund-raising activities	16.0	15.6
Internal fraternisation activities	35.1	23.6
Visits or meetings with other Local Branches	52.8	53.6
Propaganda activities		
Putting up posters	45.3	25.1
Distribution of pamphlets	40.6	32.8
Caravanas de propaganda	13.8	9.1
Rallies	12.3	9.2
Are attendants to public meetings given some information about the party?	24.3	21.3
Meetings to express solidarity	30.0	23.5
Outdoors information board?	15.5	12.0
In-doors information board?	30.0	27.7
Sindical activities		
Meetings and joint events with the UGT	46.8	41.2
Meetings and visits to work places	14.3	13.6
Cultural activities		
Activities for young people	13.8	11.7
Organisation of "fiestas populares"	22.6	19.9
Short trips	10.2	8.0
Co-ordination with local public office holders		
Meetings of member of local councils with members	70.6	61.6

Source: Encuesta a las Agrupaciones Locales, PSOE 1982.

One should be very careful in interpreting the previous table, and in generalising these figures for the whole party, given the low response rate of the survey.[58] The figures represent the percentage of Local Branches who had performed any of the activities written in the first

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[58] It is likely that the most active ones were also the most eager to send their questionnaire. That would mean that the whole questionnaire overestimates the rate of activity in the party.

column during the two months in between the two waves of the survey. The highest percentages correspond to internal political activities. Most of the Local Branches that answered the survey had carried out internal party activities such as meetings of its Local Committee, and, a lower but still reasonable percentage had held Assemblies.[59] Around 20% of Local Branches had organised some sort of information meeting, which is certainly not a high percentage, considering the big number of non-responses. This is indeed one of the main areas of complaint of party members,[60] who tend to express their discontent with having to resort to television instead of their Local Branch to find out the position of their own party on various topics. While for the most part this phenomenon appears inevitable, it seems that the PSOE has never managed to give its members the feeling that they were being informed, either more quickly, or in a qualitatively better way by the party organisation than through mass media. As far as the dispersion of internal party information is concerned, the survey shows there was a surprisingly low percentage of branches that had information boards either outside or inside the building to inform members, sympathisers, would-be members or just the general public, which supports the idea that there was a problem for members to get to know what was going on, also inside the party organisation.

The survey also asked Local Branches about the attempt to involve public office holders in the party organisation, in regular visits to the Local Branches to meet the party members to explain the party policies and decisions. This could be considered a way to attract and retain members, giving them an advantage over the average citizen. In the survey the questions only referred to the local level office holders, and the percentage of Local Branches in which there had been meetings of this sort is quite high. All subsequent party documents give the impression that this practice was more frequent when the party only held power at the municipal level, and was not extended for regional, and even less for national level public office holders.[61]

Nearly half of the Local Branches had received new applicants in the two waves of the survey, but only around 30% of them had provided them with introductory courses, which in fact had not yet been formally included in the party rules. Very few Local Branches had

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[59] It must be kept in mind that the Party Statutes state that ordinary Assemblies take place every four months.

[60] Local and regional party officials interviewed pointed out that this had been a major complaint, particularly since the Socialists had come to government. When asked about this matter, other national level party leaders conceded that this was a problem, but regarded it as a fairly unsolvable one, given that there was no way to compete with TV and other means of communication.

[61] José Antonio Gómez Yáñez (1993) also points at the failure to achieve direct, even if infrequent, communication between public office holders and party members.

developed fund-raising activities, which seems rather surprising given the fact that Local Branches are supposed to depend basically on the money they raise themselves. This money was usually made from selling food or gimmicks at neighbourhood or village *fêtes* where there is stall of the party. It is also interesting to note the general decreasing attempts to organise, and therefore to involve members, in maintenance activities, particularly in some of them such as fund raising. A partial explanation of this might be that as the PSOE occupied more public offices, it also gained both direct access to public finance and indirect access through the contribution that members of the party who held public office had to pay.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the around half of the branches had developed some kind of propaganda activity, particularly putting up posters and distributing pamphlets, even if the survey was not carried out during an election campaign. Only a very low percentage declared to have organised other non-political activities such as dances, sports activities, films, and other leisure activities. It seems therefore that local branches mainly engaged members in activities connected with election campaigns and had much less activity in between elections. The low level of activity implies a lower number of opportunities for party members to contribute with their work, should they have wished to do so.

The general impression is that members feel the party only works properly when there are election campaigns, and that the party only wants the rank and file for these occasions. This was also the source of many complaints of the rank and file, some of them published in the party press El Socialista, particularly during the first part of the 1980s. From this moment the critical reflection on this disappeared from the pages of the PSOE party journal, but presumably not from the minds of the rank and file. Virtually all party officials at different hierarchical levels whom I interviewed (around fifteen years after the 1982 survey) agreed that it is during election campaigns when the party actions are better organised and co-ordinated. The reason provided is that in election campaigns there are clear goals, and explicit indications on what the rank and file should do. Members put up posters, attend meetings, rallies, and to a very limited extent even canvass.

At the federal level the PSOE has carried out very timid attempts to establish vote-getting activities for members in between elections. In 1983 the PSOE launched a leaflet in which it gave instructions to the *"electoral agents"*, i.e., members of the party acting as ambassadors of the party to the community, on how to communicate the party's policies, and how to put forward the views of the Socialist Party in an effective way. There has been no other specific mention of this activity until very recently; the work programme of the Secretary of Organisation (corresponding to 1995-1996) mentions the need to resume the experience of

having *"electoral agents"*, though it is not clear whether it is in the same sense[62] as in the document produced in 1983.

Did this fairly low and decreasing level of activity directed at involving party members worry the party leaders and organisers? Were there serious attempts to stop this tendency? At the beginning of the 1980s the party did make an effort not only to grow, but also to mobilise its organisation. Much importance seemed to be given to the spreading of information within the organisation via de Boletín PSOE (which only existed between 1980 and 1984, preceded by the Boletín Socialismo es Libertad). Both of them devoted many pages to informing readers about organisational activities, different local branches in the territory, and constituted a forum in which the work of active members was echoed and given some recognition. This function of the party press clearly declined in the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s.

During the first half of the 1980s, when the debates about the PSOE's organisational life were most vivid, the size of the Local Branches was believed to bear some relationship on the capacity to organise activities and to engage members into doing volunteer work for the party. In one of the issues of the Boletín Socialista a report was published which explored the level of participation and involvement of members in small and big branches (Boletín Socialista, Sept-Oct. 1981). The conclusion was that the size of Local Branches did make a difference in the degree to which they could carry out activities and at the same time be in contact with members, with the optimal number of members set at around 150-200. Later on, at the Conference of Organisation (1983) this issue was debated again, and in the final resolutions there was a recommendation for Branches not to exceed 150-200 members.[63]

During the rest of the 1980s this problem was not further debated and only a few regional federations underwent serious re-organisation schemes to optimise the size of local branches. Most of these were rural areas, so the reason behind undergoing a process of reorganisation was probably not connected with the previous findings, particularly since the urban areas did not experienced such transformations. Seen from the intra-party perspective, it was a complicated measure to implement, since it implied finding the agreement of a local

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[62] *"Programa de Trabajo de la Secretaría de Organización"* kindly made available to me by the current Secretary of Organisation.

[63] Also discussed at the Federal Committee, 2-3 June 1984. According to personal observation and to the information obtained from the interviews most Local Branches, particularly those in cities, tend to be under-resourced, do not have rooms large enough to host even the members that belong to that Branch. Gómez Yáñez in a 1996 article in which he develops ideas to improve the party organisation to make the PSOE more competitive after its electoral defeats signals as the most important points the need to develop the concept of a local (and sectional) branch and the need to establish common criteria regarding the public image of branches, implicitly admitting that none exists.

branch to split and therefore have even less financial resources, while at the same time it was an expensive move, since the new branch needed to pay for its offices as well. It was also risky for the Local Committee, since dividing could affect the power balance.

The second response from the PSOE's federal structure in order to increase the activity of its members was the organisation of the party on *functional lines* in addition to the territorial criterion. This was not a new idea. According to Maravall (1991), this possibility to organise around sectional groups had been envisaged since the beginning of the PSOE reconstruction, but it was excluded because of the dangers of corporativism it entailed. At the 28th and 29th Congresses (1979 and 1981) the so called "Socialist Groups" were formally launched, each of which dealt with one topic, "health policy", "education", etc. Although some documents had already made reference to this question,[64] the main step towards the definition of the tasks and organisation of these groups was taken at the 29th Congress. In its resolutions the party defined the Grupos Socialistas as the:

> " Working groups for the political development of the socialist alternatives in social and quality of life issues" (Res 29 1981: 66).

The underlying idea is that this type of activity mobilised existing members and attracted new ones because, unlike other activities organised by the Local Branches, the functional groups were more likely to attract members who had something in common which was more central and practical in their lives:

> " Party members will work in the Socialist Groups depending on their specific motivations, whether they are technical experts in the subjects that each Group deals with, without abandoning their work at the territorial branches" (Res 29 1981: 66).

Some of these groups had been working before on an experimental basis, such as the Socialist Group on Health and the Socialist Group on Ecology and Environment. Already in this experimental phase, these groups had complained in the party bulletin about the fact that the PSOE was trying to develop single issue groups, and at the same time defending different policies in national and regional institutions.[65] This points at one of the problems that the attempt to organise on functional lines found from the start: the degree to which these groups should influence the party policy concerning in their particular field of competence. If this

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[64] See for example José M. Maravall and Ciriaco de Vicente *"Los frentes de lucha y la política socialista"*, cited by José M. Maravall in personal interview (28/12/96) whose objective was to compete with the Communist party and the need to attract members.

[65] Boletín Socialista.

influence was negligible then the whole enterprise would certainly not be an incentive to involve existing or new grassroots members in the party activities, but on the other hand, they could not have such a big influence that members not belonging to these working groups felt left aside. There was still a widespread fear of corporativism and excessive fragmentation of interests connected with the development of these groups.

Another unsolved issue has to do with how to combine the existence of these groups with the power structure defined in the Party Statutes. From the moment they were formed, the *Socialist Groups* had no formal power within the organisation and were completely subordinated to the territorial hierarchical structure. This is also the reason why it becomes difficult to know the periods in which they were active, because there is no trace of their presence in the composition of any party committee. According to the information I obtained in interviews with party officials, it seems that they were only active for a limited period of time, which lasted until just after the arrival of the Socialists in power.

As happened with other areas of activity, the arrival in office provoked a reconsideration of the role of the Socialist Groups. They were no longer sources of ideas and programmatic lines, since ministers had their own cabinets and advisors as well as demands from other organised groups to pay attention to. They went through a period of uncertainty about their role and how to exert influence on the party and on the Government.[66]

Most of these debates about how the party should be organised so as to increase the level of involvement from members died off, particularly after the 30th Congress (1984). In the words of one of the party officials interviewed, who also had important governmental responsibilities at the time "the party became invisible". This did not happen immediately after the arrival of the PSOE to government, which casts some doubt over the fact that the main reason for the decrease of party activities was just governmental participation, and suggests that the decline in party activity was facilitated by the priorities of the components of the Federal Executive Commission elected at the 30th Congress (1984) and of lower level regional or local leaders which are the levels where visibility can be directly encouraged. We will come back to this point later on in the chapter.

In the 1990s the issue of party activities and lack of involvement both of members and would-be members came back onto the agenda. One of the most important concerns of party leaders and organisers was the clear loss of electoral support in urban areas, particularly among the middle classes. In the first place, the debate that had been present at the beginning of the

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[66] Personal interview with Alejandro Cercas, Federal Secretary of Relationship with Society from 1988 to 1997.

1980s about the failure of Local Branches as mechanisms for recruiting and holding party members was revived. A serious deterioration of the party organisation, in terms of votes, membership, activities of Local Branches, and cohesion was evident and was considered the point of departure of this debate.

This worried party leaders and organisers who came up with various solutions, none of them new in the party organisational debates. There was a Committee created in 1992 following a mandate of the Federal Committee, whose aim was to analyse the way the structure and message of the PSOE could adapt itself to the complexities of the urban population. The least novel aspect of all was its diagnosis of a confusion among party leaders and organisers regarding the role Local Branches and grassroots should perform. One of the PSOE's most important and veteran regional leaders acknowledged this during a course that took place in the Fundación Jaime Vera in the summer of 1993 in the following expressive way:

> " it is unclear why one is active in a Local Branch, and it is also unclear what the party can offer to a person when they make a request to join the party."

It became clear that while the territorial principle of organisation still worked efficiently in the rural areas, in urban ones this was not the case. The initial reaction to this was to propose the creation of lower level branches that coincided with the neighbourhood, to come physically closer to citizens in urban contexts (PSOE 1992, Report of the Committee on Large Cities):

> "The Neighbourhood Branches must be considered the most important instruments of participation and social presence in cities [...] A good network of Local Branches in the cities would allow a better mobilisation potential, not only due to the number of members, but also due to the number of people they are in touch with, they could increase the participation of the socialists in a greater number of activities in the neighbourhood."

As a matter of fact, there was not too much consensus within the party regarding the diagnosis and solutions to this problem. In the same 1993 Summer School meeting mentioned above, Joaquín Almunia, Secretary of Studies and Programs expressed the following views:

> "the party opted for the wrong solution when it supported the existence of smaller Local Branches when what is needed seems to be exactly the opposite. The smaller the size of a Local Branch, the more limited their financial and human resources and the more difficult it will be to get in touch with urban populations... Only big Local Branches that are able to host sectional organisations, will allow members to develop their activities"

Ciprià Ciscar, the current Federal Secretary of Organisation also had a less optimistic view of the adequacy of the solution proposed by the Committee on Large Cities:

> "the Neighbourhood Branches are a solution but not a panacea. A city with a highly urban culture needs points of reference with an urban discourse. Therefore the dispersion might not be the right formula... I think what is needed is to be very close not only to territorial concerns but to sectional ones, and to have reference points that allow a dialogue to be generated."[67]

Another solution advanced to the lack of involvement of party members consisted on trying to avoid apathy by developing different specific programs. The first one was called *"Programa del Responsable"*, which consisted on the following: in Local Branches with more than 50 members a person would be appointed (the *"Responsable"*) with the task of "generating more dynamism in the activities of members" (PSOE Statutes 1990, art.3.6).[68] The program, according to the Federal Secretary of Organisation and other regional and local level party officials interviewed was a failure. The reasons given for that were the resistance towards this kind of schemes on the part of the lowest territorial levels of the party organisation and the "PSOE's organisational culture".[69] According to one member of a Local Committee interviewed "these were 'laboratory' programs designed at the central party organisation...", with little knowledge of the resources and potentials of the Local Branches.[70]

A similar spirit was behind the idea of creating an *Animador Sociopolítico* in every Local Branch. This person, according to the *"Guía del Animador Sociopolítico"* published by the PSOE, was supposed to be in charge of organising non-political activities such as social gatherings to welcome new members, trips, and other type of social activities. The idea did not even become a proper party organisational scheme. None of the regional or local party officials interviewed even knew about the existence of this initiative of the Federal Executive Commission, which shows how little it was developed in practice, far from what one would conclude by looking at the publication on the issue printed by the Federal Secretary of Education.

Finally, the idea to organise single-issue groups was revived. For the first time, the idea of giving single-issue groups some influence over decision making was taken into consideration. In the 33rd Party Congress (1994) a modification of the statutes of the party

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[67] Personal interview with Ciprià Ciscar, current Federal Secretary of Organisation, 12/6/96.

[68] This program, according to the Federal Secretary of Organisation, José M. Benegas, was inspired by the organisational strategies of the Austrian Socialist Party (Personal Interview, 20/9/96).

[69] Personal interview with the current Federal Secretary of Organisation, 20/9/96).

[70] Personal interview with the Secretary of Organisation of a Local Branch of a municipality in Madrid's metropolitan area, (25/6/96).

was passed which allowed some of these sectional groups to become branches with the same rights as territorial ones, albeit only on an experimental basis. The idea was to leave it up to members to decide whether they wanted to participate in the territorial party organisation or in the sectional one, instead of the previous situation in which members had to combine the activities in the functional groups with the traditional territorial activism, since participatory rights of members in internal matters could only be exercised at the territorial Local Branch.

Within the PSOE, particularly at the lower territorial levels, this idea was not overwhelmingly accepted. There seems to be resistance towards its implementation because of the loss of power of Local Branches it would entail. They also contended that these single issue groups (Grupos Sectoriales) did not carry out the work that Local Branches are supposed to do both in election campaigns, and in the maintenance of the party organisation in between elections.[71] The other source of criticism was the fear of corporate interests influencing the party decisions on policy and recruitment. For some people inside the PSOE, the development of sectional/functional groups goes against the very idea of a party that represents the working class, given that the first groups to have organised are "liberal" professions such as doctors, nurses and so on. The direction this debate will take in the near future is not clear. So far these groups have not been relevant in intra-party decisions, so future Party Congresses will have to evaluate the experimental experiences and set new objectives regarding the development of the sectional organisation of the party.

3.3.3. Participation in decision making

This dimension measures the possibilities given by the structure and rules of the party governing members' participation and their influence on decision-making within the party. There seem to be three areas where decision-making is more fundamental: first, in the selection of candidates for public office, who in the end have to implement the party policy; secondly, the right to participate in developing the party's policies which is stated in Party Congress resolutions and in its electoral programs and manifestos. Finally, the other area where decision-making seems important is the internal party arena, in other words the capacity of the grass roots to elect those who run the party organisation and to influence their decisions.

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[71] Personal interview with a party official from the Federación Socialista Madrileña, September 1996, who was referring to the ASU (Asociación Socialista Universitaria), the only sectional organisation which has been functioning all these years). This party official was particularly keen on making the point that the establishment of these single-issue groups were easier to control than local branches and thus were also an interested move of the Federal party bodies.

Starting with the first element mentioned, the formal procedure of candidate selection for the different levels of government have common characteristics. In all of them the process starts at the Local Branches, which propose a list of candidates to the next hierarchical level. In the case of general elections the proposals gathered from all Local Branches in the election district[72] are the sent to the Provincial Committee that draws up a tentative list, which then has to be approved by the Regional Committee and sent for approval to the Federal Committee. The Federal Committee of the party designates a Federal List Committee in charge of supervising the preparation of lists. For the years studied this Committee has enjoyed both formal and informal veto powers over the proposals of lower hierarchical levels.

The party leadership can influence the electoral lists both in a formal way, through this Lists Committee and the Federal Committee, who has to give the final approval to the lists and, secondly, and in an informal way by providing guidelines of the criteria candidates should meet and expressing their preference for specific persons. From the perspective of the grassroots member, each proposal that stems out of a Local Branch has to go through many stages, and the final result can be completely different from the initial proposal, without any room to express agreement or manifest formal discontent with it.

The extent of actual intervention of the central party bodies in the drawing of the lists has varied over the years. At the first few general elections, particularly in 1979 there were several hard reactions from provincial Committees to changes made by the Federal Lists Committees.[73] This latter justified them by alluding to the need to include technicians and experts showing that the PSOE was ready to govern, as well as the need to promote candidates for the coming Local elections. This central intervention was also interpreted as a manoeuvre of the party leaders to purge the left wing (De Esteban and López Guerra 1979:71). According to a high level party official[74] who has regularly participated in the preparation of lists of candidates, these interventions decreased with time, and when they occurred they were mostly directed at enforcing the application of the quota for women that was introduced at the 31st Congress by which 25% of the candidates in every list had to be women. However, even if it is true that central intervention has decreased, this might be a result of the fact that central leaders *already* controlled regional ones, and therefore this did not imply an increase of participation of the rank and file.

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[72] For legislative elections and the elections in most Autonomous Communities this is the province (see second part of chapter 3).
[73] From the 33rd Congress (1994) this Federal Lists Committee is not re-elected in every electoral process, but stays the same for the whole inter-congress period (art.31.j Estatutos PSOE 1994).
[74] Personal interview, September 1996.

The preparation of electoral lists in the last general elections (1996) showed that there was still important intervention from the Federal authorities of the party.[75] The expectation of loss of seats and the general situation of division within the party probably increased the visibility of this phenomenon. This issue will be taken up again from a different perspective in chapter 7. For now, *the most important point for this section of the thesis is to underline the limited influence of members in candidate selection for legislative elections.*

At the local level, there has been a tendency recently to increase the influence of the rank and file in the selection of candidates, at least at the local level. For example, the influence of the rank and file in the selection of the candidate for the post of mayor in medium and large municipalities is now much greater: the possibility for them to be elected directly by secret individual vote of members at the local branches was included in the last party rules on candidate selection at the local level. The trend seems to be towards enlarging participatory rights in this area, while still keeping control of the process, i.e., a managed de-centralisation. In the case of the primaries for local election the Local Executive Commission has the prerogative to propose their candidate to be the PSOE's candidate for mayor, but a percentage of the rank and file can support alternative candidates (PSOE 1995).[76]

The power of rank and file members regarding the selection of the candidate for Prime Minister has not been any greater until 1997. A recent example of this is the case of the 1996 General Elections. When Felipe González announced his intention not to stand as a candidate, the decision on who would replace him and the final debate occurred among a very small number of people outside of any party body.[77]

The second issue where participatory rights are important concerns the development of the direction of party policy. The direct participation of the rank and file in this task is virtually non existent, but the indirect one also seems to have diminished over the years. As chapter 4 has pointed out, Party Congresses have tended to be more and more widely spaced in time, and in practice they only set the very general political guidelines of the party. Before the PSOE was ever in power, policy proposals came from the party organisation, even if these came from working groups of technicians/experts who worked for the party leadership. From the moment

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[75] During the last elections the central party organisation had trouble finding constituencies which would accept ministers of the last government as candidates, most of whom had not been members of the party before being ministers (El País, also in El Socialista).

[76] PSOE 1995. *Normas de selección de candidatos a las elecciones locales. PSOE*

[77] Joaquín Almunia, Secretary of Studies and Programs from 1994 to 1997. Personal interview (14/6/1996).

the PSOE entered office there was a certain amount of confusion over the role of the party.[78] and of the Party Congresses in particular, should play in the setting of the principal political orientations. There was an increasing tension between the PSOE/party organisation wanting to exert some control of the party in government and at the same time giving support to the projects designed in Ministries (see chapter 4). The tension between the two spheres increased considerably after the resignation of the Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy General Secretary, Alfonso Guerra, who had until then ensured some degree of co-ordination between the two.

An example of the disfunctionalities caused by this situation is shown by the debate on policy renewal called Programa 2000. It consisted on a series of debates both of members and non-members, intellectuals, associations, and other fora in which the different elements of renewal were discussed until a final manifesto was approved at the 32nd Party Congress. Although the initiative was led by the sector of the PSOE that was closest to Alfonso Guerra and the party apparatus, most party officials interviewed agree that this was a mobilisatory and highly participatory process, particularly at the lower territorial levels. It was eventually approved by 99% of the delegates at the 32nd Congress, but then had very little influence over the policies implemented by the Government. This probably had a negative effect on the perception of the real chances to participate and exert some influence in the definition of the party's policy.[79]

As far as the electoral programmes are concerned there is virtually no specification of the procedure that should be followed in order to prepare it. The party rules just state that it has to be worked out and approved by the Federal Committee. There is also a department of the Federal Executive Commission devoted to the development of party policy (Secretary of Studies and Programmes). According to the Secretary of Studies and Programmes from 1994 to 1997,[80] the electoral programme in its first version is a compilation of material coming from different sources: studies specifically commissioned for this purpose, proposals that stem from the work of the few working groups that still function within the party (part of the new sectional organisation which is being re-launched at the moment), and ideas taken from other Socialist parties. However, the most important source when the PSOE was in government

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[78] See, for example, the statutory reforms undertaken in the first Federal Congress after the arrival in Government, held in 1984 (chapter 2).

[79] As recognised by José Félix Tezanos (personal interview) and in an interview with him published in Burns (1996) where he points out the paradox that the Programa 2000 was approved by the 32nd Party Congress (1990) in which the position of Guerra was reinforced, but never put into practice by the Government. In an interview published in Burns (1996) Alfonso Guerra alludes to a tactical pact from the media to silence the Programa 2000. See also Gillespie 1993.

[80] Personal interview, June 1996.

were the ministries and cabinets. With all of this material a draft electoral programme is elaborated and presented at the Federal Committee. Each member of this Committee has about a week to present amendments before it is approved. The important issue is that members of the Federal Committee are not obliged to inform Local Branches or involve them in the process. According to the Secretary of Studies and Programmes it is not a very participatory debate, for the simple reason that there is no time for it to be participatory, in the form the process has taken thus far.

Given the virtual lack of means of direct participation in decision making, the rank and file have to rely on indirect participation through representatives at higher territorial and hierarchical levels. This increases the importance of the internal system of representation that determines how these representatives are elected. As has been shown in chapter 4, the combination of a corrected plurality system to elect delegates to Congresses with a double tier system of representation makes the influence of the rank and file in party decisions very small. In a sense their votes seem to basically serve to give an idea of the bargaining power that each of the intra-party groups (defined ideologically or territorially) have in the negotiations to fill in the party governing bodies. Maravall (1996:14) concludes the following "these mechanisms led to an uncritical delegation of decisions to the leadership, the languishing of internal debates, the inhibition of information". while for Satrústegui (1993: 35) it is clear that "the PSOE has a structure absolutely unsuitable for increasing rank and file participation". The lack of internal pluralism and the increasing concentration of power that characterised the PSOE through the 1980s until the beginning of the 1990s, also worked to discourage active participation within the party.

To sum up, the opportunities for participation for the rank and file offered by the PSOE's internal structure have been very limited for the whole period studied, particularly since the institutional reforms implemented in 1979.

4. The membership strategy 1975-96: results

The membership levels will be analysed according to different criteria, first quantitatively, without considering territorial spread, taking into account both levels of membership and the speed of growth, both of individual members and of local branches. Secondly, the geographical spread of the party growth will be briefly examined, having a look at the trends in the different regional federations.

4.1. Quantitative and territorial growth

Graph 5.1 shows the official membership figures since 1976, divided into male and female members (from 1977, the first date for which separate data by gender are available). Considering that at the point of departure in 1976 the party had virtually no members at all the first years logically show a rapid increase in membership, which is more visible in the black line of graph 5.2 that represents the percentage of membership increase per year.

Another important thing to notice is the very low percentage of female members compared to male ones, particularly until the 1980s. Graph 5.2 shows that the yearly percentage increase of female members is greater than that of men for the whole period studied, which does not seem surprising considering the low starting point. Both male and female membership follow a similar pattern of growth. It is interesting to note that the incentives towards the representation of women in the party bodies and in the election lists introduced in 1988 do not seem to have resulted in a greater level of increase of female members.

Graph.5.1. Number of members (male and female) 1977-96.

Own elaboration with data of the PSOE Federal Secretary of Organisation

It is more interesting to focus on graphs 5.2 and 5.3, and try to check on the times when there have been higher or lower rates of growth. Firstly, it is clear that the rate of growth has not been steady over the whole period studied. The black line in 5.3 starts with a distinct decline, which is normal since the previous increase from having nearly no members in 1976 to the membership of 1978 had been dramatic. What seems more important is that the PSOE rates of growth from 1979 and 1981 are very low, particularly considering the previous rates. Although we do not have detailed data on the membership movements that have led to these figures (new members and drop outs), it seems plausible to believe that there are internal

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reasons that account first for this decline and then stagnation of the rate of growth. These are the years immediately after the conflictual 28th Congress, and these data suggest that quite a large number of members either voluntarily abandoned the organisation or were obliged to do so as a result of disciplinary actions. They also coincides with the explicit wish already mentioned in different sections of this chapter to impose some order on the growth of the party organisation.

Graph.5.2. Yearly % increase in female and male members

Own elaboration with data of the PSOE Federal Secretary of Organisation

In 1982 there is a clear peak, probably influenced by the overwhelming victory of the Socialists in the general elections that took place that year, which is followed by a clear decline of the rate of growth, which coincide with the membership drive launched in 1983, that indeed yielded very poor results. The rate of growth decreases steadily to levels near to 5%, until the next general elections in 1986 when there is another peak, sustained until the following local and regional elections that took place in 1987, to then decline again.

The 1989 general elections did not have the same effect as the previous ones on the rate of growth; on the contrary, in 1989 the rate of change diminished slightly with respect to the previous year. There was, however an increase both in 1990 and in 1991, when the regional and local elections took place. From that moment there was a clear decline of the growth rate, which coincided with the intensification of intra-party struggles and the external hostile political environment towards the PSOE. Except for a subtle increase that coincided with the 1993 elections there has been a declining trend, stopping in 1995, when there were regional and local elections. In 1996 there was a very slight improvement, which coincided with the 1996 elections that were highly mobilisatory, although the PSOE ended up losing

them and remained at a short distance from the Popular Party.[81]These membership trends over the last twenty years point at regional and local elections, rather than at general ones as a catalyst of party membership growth.

As was mentioned before, members may be used for internal purposes, either to increase the power of each regional federation, whose voting power is based on the size of its membership, or the power of internal factions. This suggests that membership should be related to the cycle of Party Congresses so attention should be directed to see whether the peaks coincide with years in which Party Congresses take place. This does not seem to be the case if we look at graph 2, where 1979, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1990 and 1994 do not coincide with greater rates of growth than the average, but rather with decline. This could suggest a hypothesis in the opposite direction of the one advanced by other authors (see for example Bartolini 1983), namely that the rate of members growth *decreases* before a Congress takes place *precisely because of intra-factional reasons*.[82] If each faction or intra-party group wants to keep control of its "members", and establishing the basis of control requires time, then we should see a decrease in the rate of growth just before Congresses. To be sure, more data is required to examine empirically such a hypothesis. This would also confirm the idea advanced in chapter 4 which argued that the intra-party rules enacted in 1979 (internal system of representation) certainly do not operate as an incentive for affiliation.

Graph.5.3. Yearly growth in members and local branches

Own elaboration with data of the PSOE Federal Secretary of Organisation

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[81] The Secretary of Organisation mentioned in a personal interview (12/6/96) that during the 1996 election campaign and just after the election there had been a noticeable increase in membership.
[82] There is a technical reason for this, namely that the process of affiliation stops a few months before a Congress takes place, but this hypothesis is intended to consider the months before the internal census is closed.

It is also interesting to look at the geographical/territorial spread of the PSOE from 1976-96 (see graph.5.3), particularly if we consider the insistence on the goal of territorial growth explained in the first sections of the chapter. In this case we see a much clearer trend with two peaks in 1981 and 1983 (when local elections were held) and a constant trend from 1983, with a steady growth in local branches since then at around 5% per annum increase until 1994, when the territorial expansion of the party stopped. The growth rate of each specific regional federation can be observed in graph 5.4.

Graph.5.4. Yearly growth by regional federation[83]

In the interpretation of all these figures it must be taken into consideration that the ratio of membership/electorate is extremely low in Spain; only around 2% of the electorate belonged to a political party in 1990, which means that a lower percentage belonged to the PSOE.[84] This is a very low figure compared to other Western European countries. The following table shows the level of party membership (to any party) as a percentage of the electorate in other countries and it is easy to check that even countries which have experienced relatively recent authoritarian regimes show much higher membership rates than Spain.

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[83] 1979e means that the figures for 1979 do not correspond to the internal membership census used at the 28th Party Congress (held in May), but to the Extraordinary one (held in September).

[84] The data shown in this table come from surveys, whereas the PSOE membership figures come from the official figures provided by the Federal Executive Commission. Both sources, for different reasons, must be taken with caution.

Table 5.6. Party membership as a percentage of the electorate

Country	Around 1990*
Austria	21.8%
Belgium	9.2
Finland	12.9
Italy	9.7
Greece	7.0
Portugal	4.5
West Germany	4.2
Great Britain	3.3
Spain	2.0

Sources: Morlino 1995 for Greece, Portugal and
Spain (approximate data taken from a graph).
For the rest of the countries: Katz et al. 1992.
* Taking the closest election to 1990

Graph 5.5 shows the organisational strength of the different PSOE regional federations using the ratio membership/total electorate as indicated by Bartolini (1983: 189) and by Katz et al. (1992: 320) that permits one to compare them meaningfully. As the graph shows, the PSOE has shown an uneven strength across the Spanish regions, although it is probably more evenly distributed across the territory than any other Spanish party.[85] At the beginning of the period studied the differences among regional federations were smaller, and since then the pace of growth has been irregular depending on the federations: the PSOE has tended to increase its presence in rural regions such as Extremadura, Murcia, Castilla La Mancha and Andalucía, where it has also proved to be more electorally resilient (see also graph 5.4 for levels of growth by regional federation). Certainly the direction of causality between electoral and organisational resilience is not clear, although in these regions it does seem the case that organisational growth came *after* electoral success, given the landslide victory of the PSOE in 1982 in most electoral districts.

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[85] One of the main problems faced by the UCD first, and then by the AP-PP was their difficulty in reaching a minimal basis of support in all Spanish regions. However the lack of data of their membership in each region does not provide evidence for this statement.

Graph.5.5 Regional implantation 1977-1997.

However, the PSOE's organisational presence is lower, and has not improved much over the years in regions that are predominantly urban such as Madrid. The rural/urban divide is by no means the only factor that differentiates the regions in which there is a stronger presence of the socialists; among those regions with low members/electorate ratio there are also regions like Galicia.

It is interesting to note the divergence between taking an "inwards" or an "outwards" perspective on the "strength" of federations. Graph 5.6 shows the internal strength of regional federations, i.e., the share of the total party membership that corresponds to each regional federation, which is the criterion used inside the party when talking about strong or weak federations. Given that the party rules also use this criterion to allocate delegates, the number of representatives at the Federal Committee, etc., it makes sense to pay attention to the internal distribution of members. Each area in the graph corresponds to the percentage of total party members in one regional federation, with the order of the areas the same as the legend on the right-hand side of the graph. The most important federation is Andalucía, with over a quarter of total membership for the whole period studied, followed by the Federación Valenciana, whose internal strength in terms of members has decreased since the beginning of the 1990s, keeping however the second position.

From this graph it becomes clear that the stronger federations have lost some of their relative strength as the federations that were very small in 1979 have grown over the years.

Thus, while in 1979 the regional federations of Andalucía, Comunidad Valenciana, Castilla La Mancha and Madrid concentrated 60% of total membership, in 1997 the same federations accounted for a little over 50%. Basically the balance of forces has remained similar to that of 1979, but the small federations have slightly increased their weight within the organisation, particularly Extremadura and Murcia.

Graph.5.6. Regional federations' share of total PSOE membership

4.2. What type of members?

As has been argued before, there are many aspects that determine the characteristics of party members apart from the actual membership policy followed by the party organisation, particularly in cases, such as the PSOE, where the membership policy has not been particularly 'aggressive'. In any case, it will be useful to have a brief overview of the characteristics of the PSOE members. Data about this topic are difficult to find, and unfortunately in this case they do not cover the 1990s, since the last survey of the rank and file commissioned by the Federal Executive Commission was in 1989.

In 1989 there was a predominance of manual workers among party members: 43.5% as opposed to 34% of middle class, while the rest of respondents were not in the active labour force. The proportion of the party members who were middle class had increased since 1980 when around 25% of the membership were middle class and 50% were manual workers. Graph 5.6 shows changes in the membership divided by age groups. The largest age group is that of members between 31 and 40 years old. An important percentage of party members, over 20% for the whole decade of the 1980s, were older than 60. This indicates a considerable presence of members whose links to the PSOE probably dated back to the II Republic either directly or through family background. Although there was a substantial percentage of members under 30, they were clearly underrepresented with respect to the eldest group.

The PSOE is a party with few members, many of whom have some relative in the party organisation. As Graph 5.7 shows there is a consistent trend whereby around 40% of party members declare having one or more relatives who are also PSOE members. The combination of these data with the information obtained in interviews with party officials confirm the difficulties experienced by the PSOE in "opening" the party and reaching "new" sectors in the population that are not already near to the socialists.

Graph 5.7 Membership by age groups

Graph 5.8 Members' "family ties"

Attention will now be focused on the degree of involvement/participation of party members. It is important to take into account that the following table showing the results of three surveys on party members does not only measure the efforts or activities of party organisation, but also the response by members. It has the advantage, though, of having four observations during the course of the 1980s.

Table 5.7. Percentage of party members who declared having participated in any of the following party activities in the three months before the survey was carried out

	1980	1983	1986	1989
Paid dues	83	66.9	70.2	67.5
Have been at the Local Branch	71	69.1	68.2	62.3
Have attended an Assembly or internal meeting	80	70.1	67.2	61.2
Have participated in courses or conferences organised by the PSOE	38	35.1	35.5	30.7
Have participated in any activity related to the program 2000	--	--	--	25.0
Have attended cultural activities	--	28.0	22.6	23.2
Have participated in specific working groups (*Grupos Socialistas*)	27	24.3	20.1	18.1
Have distributed press or leaflets	50	18.9	16.7	12.6
Have participated in distributing party propaganda	46	15.0	13.9	9.5
Have raised funds for the PSOE	35	19.8	17.8	8.8
Have participated in "*caravanas de propaganda*"	38	10.3	8.8	6.3
Have been on party stalls selling things	20	5.5	5.4	3.7
Have participated in specific campaigns organised by the party	--	13.1	17.5	--

Source: Instituto IDES. Los Afiliados Socialistas en 1989.

As can be observed in the previous table, the highest level of involvement of party members is in "internal" matters such as paying the party dues, attending assemblies at the local branch, or just going there, without attending a meeting. Even these intra-party activities show a significant decline at the end of the 1980s. Two types of behaviour might contribute to this decline, on the one hand those members who became public office holders or who accepted positions in the administration, that had less time to dedicate to the party and, on the other hand, disillusioned rank and file members who subsequently reduce their involvement in the party.

Another example of the decay of activity within the PSOE is the amount of people which had satisfied one of the minimal requirements of membership: paying the membership dues. By the end of the decade only 67% of its members paid membership dues. What seems more dubious is the high level of members interviewed who had attended an Assembly at their Local Branch, which does not coincide with the reported 25-30% reported by personal interviews and other sources (Maravall 1991).

Other types of internal activities are only attended by 30-35% of the members, but this proportion seems more stable over time. Nor is it clear whether the introductory course which new members take is included in this question. The same applies to cultural activities, which show a low, albeit stable, level of participation of party members. A doubt arises when reading and interpreting this data, namely the lack of data on the regularity of the activities that respondents are asked to consider. That is to say, from looking at these data we do not know whether the members' involvement with the party has decreased, whether the offer of these type of activities has decreased, or both.

Thirdly, there are activities such as distributing party leaflets, propaganda, etc. The figures yield a distinctive downwards pattern in the number of members that have participated in this sort of activity, which may well partly be a reflection of the decrease in the expectations of the Local Branches, and might be illustrative of the decay in their activities, since some of these activities cannot be done if they are not organised by the party.

Conclusions

This chapter has analysed the organisational policy of the PSOE regarding membership by examining the definition of the specific goals by party leaders and organisers and in party documents, as well as the instruments used to achieve them. Two different phases can be identified according to the goals regarding membership, before and after the PSOE became a governmental party not only at the State level but also at the regional and municipal levels.

When Franco died the most imperative goal of the PSOE was to grow as an organisation both in number of members and in territorial spread. As has been shown, the main motivation behind this search for members was to find suitable candidates for public office at the different governmental levels, particularly at the local level, given the fact that Spain has a very high number of municipalities. One of the main instruments of searching for candidates, while at the same time diminishing the competition for votes from the other small socialist parties, was to absorb these parties, some of which had well-prepared cadres that were highly needed in the PSOE.

Although finding candidates was an urgent motivation for the PSOE, it was not the only one; during the post-transitional phase other potential benefits of members were still noticeable. Members were indeed welcome as voluntary labour in election campaigns and also in inter-election periods, and considered both a valuable asset as "ambassadors to the community", or just to portray an image of a strong party organisation (for Spanish standards), particularly in relation to the main competitor of the PSOE in the left camp, the Communist Party. Given the fact that public financing for political parties was available since the very beginning of the transition to democracy, party members were never considered an important asset from the financial point of view, at least from the perspective of the central party organisation.

All these benefits were subordinated to the potential cost of members, that became evident at the end of the 1970s, especially around the 28th Party Congress: growth was a priority, but only as long as it was an ordered process. Thus, from the beginning the goal of

growth was accompanied by the need to maintain party cohesion and discipline, that were facilitated by the organisational reforms that changed the representation basis at Party Congresses (dealt with extensively in chapter 4). These reforms were carried out regardless of whether they had a bad effect on membership growth. Thus, the organisational rules and practices were not shaped primarily to attract members: as section 4.3 of this chapter has shown, very few incentives for affiliation were created to attract members, even during the pre-governmental period.

All that said, the pre-governmental phase can be considered as much more geared towards attracting and retaining members than the period in which the PSOE was in government. There was a combination of a decreasing interest and a lesser need for members plus a lack of organisational capacities to search for them. The landslide victory of the PSOE at the 1982 elections and the lack of competition from other political parties decreased the need to show strength by achieving organisational growth. At the same time, the passage of many party officials to governmental positions left the PSOE with few people in charge of the internal party management. This lack of organisational capacity, which could have been the temporary effect of a sudden passage to government at the different territorial levels, turned into a permanent deficiency during the whole governmental period. There was no clear idea of what the party organisation was supposed to do while the party was in government.

This does not mean that the general goal of growth was completely abandoned, but certainly became less of a priority. After a short phase that followed the 1982 elections in which several documents refer to the possibility to turn part of that electoral support into organisational growth, the references to the need to increase members or grow in other ways diminish and are practically reduced to the search for candidates for local elections. The most important membership drive was carried out precisely in these first years of government participation, and its results were not evaluated very positively.

Although as the years went by the Socialists became increasingly aware of the inadequacy of their party structure and rules for attracting membership, this did not translate into an effective change of structures to make them more appealing for the potential members. In the 1990s party documents reflect a clear worry with the PSOE's decline among the urban middle classes, but this has not entailed a process of rethinking about the party's organisational structures that would lead to reforms in order to make it more attractive to would-be members. Engaged in an intra-party struggle that seemed to absorb all its energies, there were very few signs of a debate on these matters within the PSOE. Thus, while the instruments used to grow in the previous phase were abandoned - there were few socialist parties to absorb, and

membership drives were no longer considered useful - the creation of incentives towards affiliation such as making the party organisation more visible, more attractive or more participatory were not undertaken. The only reforms envisaged were the creation of party branches organised by functional basis, without renouncing to the primacy of the territorial criterion. Vested interests in the current party organisation, structured according to a territorial criterion, seem to play a role in the reluctance of intra-party actors to this organisational reform.

CHAPTER 6. LINKS WITH THE UNIONS AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS

Introduction[1]

As was advanced in the first chapters, one of the various options for mobilising support that party strategists and organisers have is to rely primarily on a network of functional organisations. The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of PSOE's use of secondary organisations as a means to reach support, to explore the extent to which the party relied on other organisations, and for which purposes. Among secondary organisations, special attention will be paid to trade unions, traditionally related to left parties.

This will serve to answer such questions: how did the PSOE evaluate the idea of engaging in co-operation with associations and organisations linking it indirectly with sectors of the electorate, but which do not imply the same organisational effort as a large membership? How did the PSOE attempt to establish these links? Through formal or informal arrangements? At the leadership or rank-and-file level? What kind of participatory rights in party decision-making are offered to these associations? Do efforts in connecting with different sectors in society correspond to increases in electoral competitiveness? More importantly, as was suggested in the previous chapter, the fact of being the party in government seems to have a relevant influence over the evaluation of organisational resources. If this is the case with the issue studied in this chapter, how did the evaluation of the links with secondary organisations change when the PSOE entered government?

Although the evaluation of party leaders and organisers is surely not the only element that shapes the relationship between secondary organisations and parties, it will be the main focus of the chapter, at the acknowledged risk of not considering the position of the leaders of secondary organisations, except for a very few occasions.

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[1] I would like to express my gratitude to Javier Astudillo for providing me with relevant literature in order to develop this chapter.

1. The relationship between parties and other organisations

Before going into the analysis of the relationship of the PSOE with secondary organisations I will examine the main propositions of the literature dealing with the relationship between parties and trade unions. This exercise does not aim to be an exhaustive revision of the literature, but just to find concepts, indicators and trends explored that are useful to analyse the relationship between the PSOE and the union movement. A briefer second part of the section will examine the ideas advanced by the scholars who have investigated the relationship between parties and old/new social movements.

1.1. Party-union ties

For a long time the studies of the relations between parties and trade unions was based on the understanding that such relationship was beneficial for both organisations. This was manifested in the use of expressions like 'Siamese twins' (Ebbinghaus 1995), in the conception of the unions as 'transmission belts', and in the very use of the term 'labour movement' which was "...frequently used to refer to the complex of unions and associated parties of the working class, in distinction to the union movement" (Fishman 1990: 163).

According to this perspective, the relationship between communist, socialist or social-democratic parties and unions consisted of a co-ordinated strategy which was based on the division of labour between the political and economic spheres (Daley and Howell 1992/3: 3). Daley and Howell distinguish two components of the concept of 'political exchange' initially developed by Pizzorno (1978) to characterise the relationship between parties and unions: the economic and the political bargain. The former refers to the negotiations between political parties and unions that concern employment and wage restraint, whereas the political bargain basically refers to an exchange by which the union 'delivers' the core electoral constituency of the party, while the party provides a political environment and a legal framework favourable to union organisation and collective bargaining (Daley and Howell 1992/3: 6). Summing up, trade unions can provide important resources for political parties such as votes, money and infrastructure while parties, particularly if they are in government, can push for legislation favourable to the unions, can enhance economic and social gains that benefit workers and can help the unions act in the industrial sphere (Daley and Howell 1992/3: 5, Valenzuela 1992: 60).

Party-union linkages vary in intensity and operate at various levels of the two organisations (Ebbinghaus 1993: 52). Bartolini (1996: 8) distinguishes different types of cross-

linkage between the corporate and the electoral arena according to the intensity of such relationship:

- this link may be absent or very weak;
- if it exists it may be what he calls of a *demand-group* type, which means that both parties and unions maintain "full freedom of support bargaining". Each of them is a client of the other in its domain of action exchanging electoral and policy support;
- a *contingent* type relationship, which is a link manifested in alliances based on the proximity of the goals of both organisations, without "organisational, ideological and personnel interpenetration";
- the relationship may be *interlocking,* characterised by a high interpenetration of corporate and electoral organisations "reinforcing each other on the basis of leadership and membership overlap and interchange, support-base coincidence and wide arena of common collective activities", and finally,
- the relationship may be one of *dependency* in which one of the organisations "tends to direct the second politically and organisationally".

In order to characterise the extent and type of linkage between a political party and a trade union organisation according to the preceding typology a set of precise indicators has to be used. These are summarised in figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1. Indicators of type and intensity of party-union ties

- joint decision-making?
- dual membership (percentages)
- interlocking directorates?
- co-operation in the formal procedure of policy-making (drafting of manifestos)
- co-operation in each other's activities, i.e. party co-operation in union elections and vice versa, public endorsements of each organisation in favour of the other, etc.
- sharing buildings and facilities
- goals of both organisations

There is a great diversity of intensity and types of relationship between social democratic/socialist parties and trade unions across Western Europe (see Ebbinghaus 1993).

This diversity has been explained with reference to different factors that will be briefly reviewed below.

The variables that influence the relationship between parties and unions pertain to different levels of generality. At the structural level there is widespread agreement that, since the Second World War countries in the West have undergone an economic and political transformation that has altered the calculus of interest for both parties and unions regarding the evaluation of their ties. This has happened as a result of the crumbling of the material bases of both the economic and political bargain mentioned before. The closeness between parties and unions was the product of a particular historical period, with a distinct form of economic growth, whereas nowadays both of them are more difficult to achieve, or even not desirable either for parties or for unions:

> "The economic bargain is far more difficult to put together because both sides of the bargain become problematic. On the one hand, states are less able to deliver full employment and increased social expenditure... On the other hand, the fragmentation and decentralization of bargaining make wage restraint even more difficult for national union confederations to orchestrate." (Daley and Howell 1992/3: 7)

The political bargain is also less easy to achieve nowadays because the transformation of the social structure has made it unwise for a party to be identified exclusively with a trade union, at least in electoral terms. Following this line of reasoning, the decline of social democracy has been blamed partly on parties' close links with unions, either directly by linking them to the interests of the working class, or indirectly, as Kitchelt argues, if strong links with the unions are an important organisational constraint that prevent socialist parties from adopting efficient electoral strategies.[2] The idea is well summarised in the following (Kitschelt 1994: 6):

> "while in the past strong working class organisation in centralised labour unions, allied with social democratic parties, was a political asset that boosted the parties' electoral fortunes and policy effectiveness, this asset now has turned into a liability as the very success of past social democratic policies has created new socio-economic constituencies that are no longer attracted by the traditional message."

Therefore the conclusion drawn is that nowadays both parties and unions are less capable than before of delivering their side of the political exchange. Unions are less able to mobilise workers, and in some cases are organisationally weak, thus of very little organisational and financial help as support organisations for political parties, whereas workers

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[2] For a development of this thesis see Koelble 1991 and 1992.

have diminished their numerical importance and their internal cohesion as a group. Parties, on the other hand, have less policy instruments at their disposal to be able to favour unions when they are in government. To sum up, the suggestion is that *a close formal link with unions was once an electoral asset and has now turned into an electoral liability for both parties and unions.*

Other variables that help to explain the relationship between parties and unions apply to particular political systems, individual parties or organisations. The first of these variables is the structure of competition both in the party system and in the union movement, or more precisely, their level of fragmentation. This is what Bartolini (1996: 9) calls *mode of representation* that concerns the "extent to which a one-to-one monopolistic relation of representation in both channels is present". This refers to the structure of competition (number and size of organisations) in the corporate and electoral domain. From the perspective of trade union leaders, the calculus regarding the maintenance of close ties with a political party refers to the best way of attaining their goals within the configuration of union competition, whether through collaboration with a party, or through co-operation with rival trade unions. The position of the party is also important: whether the party in question is in government or not can greatly modify the components of such calculus. As Valenzuela (1992: 61) states, unions can rarely obtain party support for all their demands when "their" party is in government. This often leads them to put some distance between themselves and the party. From the perspective of the political party the perspective is slightly different. It has to evaluate the potential electoral/political costs and benefits of establishing links with a union organisation, the extent to which it can deliver the policies demanded by the union without jeopardising other groups of support, how harmful the effective opposition of unions in a case of conflict can be for the party's electoral prospects, etc. Again, the calculus changes if the party is in government: when the party is in opposition, it can express itself with greater freedom in favour of union demands (Valenzuela 1992: 61).

Taking a historical perspective may be of assistance in understanding the current state of party-union ties. General or particular external conditions at a given time may not lead us to hypothesise the existence of a close link between parties and unions and yet we may find a close party-union tie which comes more as an inheritance from historical links than as a response to current socio-economic and political conditions. As several studies stress, the way both parties and unions were created and the mobilisatory strategies they chose influence to a great extent further developments of their mutual relationship (Panebianco 1988, Ebbinghaus 1993, Bartolini 1996). According to this line of research the variations in party-union ties are,

to a great extent, the result of the historical origins of the parties and the unions, the organisational form they took and the sequence of formation (party-union or the other way round). The emphasis is therefore on the variables that facilitated or hindered co-operation at the time when the two types of organisations emerged, and on the relations that were forged at this stage, which subsequently condition other choices of both organisations and the extent and speed with which they can adapt to changes in their respective environments. Thus, historical legacies not only affect the current relationship between political parties and unions, but also condition the speed with which they can change. The more formal the ties and the longer they have been established, the more difficult they are to erase.

The main problem associated with this line of research is that it refers to the Western democracies in which the formation of working class organisations took place at a similar period of time, which coincided with important processes such as enfranchisement, and therefore their conclusions might be difficult to translate to cases, such as the Spanish one, where the political discontinuity has altered this sequence of events. This fact makes it more difficult to evaluate the extent to which legacies have a true weight on limiting or facilitating certain decisions or whether legacies are mostly used strategically by political actors when they find it convenient in order to legitimise their current actions.

Although the processes of interaction between parties and unions can be sketched without referring to the internal politics of each of them, in order to fully grasp the way these ties have evolved, intra-organisational variables must be taken into consideration. This links with the framework defined in the first chapter of the thesis which emphasised the need to pay attention to both internal and external variables in order to understand organisational strategies. Presumably leaders of both unions and parties base their evaluations of the benefits and costs of establishing and maintaining party-union ties both on external and intra-organisational conditions. External conditions (economic and political change), historical legacies and conjunctural variables (whether the party is in government or not, structure of competition, etc.) are relevant since they partially shape the behaviour of leaders and their decisions, but the balance of power among different intra-organisational groups and other internal variables should also be considered. Thus, changes in the relationship between parties and unions can be a reaction to transformations in the economic and social structure in which both organisations used to work that make the collaboration less beneficial for one or both of them, but they are mediated by internal union and/or party politics.

1.2. Other organisations: old and new movements[3]

Unions or professional organisations are not the only organisations with which a party can try to establish links in order to have more support among certain social groups. Parties may also contact other type of organisations such as cultural, sports, youth, consumer, and other organisations.

The relationship between these secondary organisations and political parties can be analysed through the same prism as the party-union ties. The idea is that social and economic transformations have altered the basis of the calculus of the returns of maintaining close links with political parties. Those political systems where political parties were part of a network of organisations in which individuals' life took place 'from the cradle to the grave' have shown a certain inertia, whereas in systems where this organisational alignment was not so strong the incentives to create one from scratch have virtually disappeared.

Another topical theme has been the impact of new social movements and their success in mobilising the mass public as a challenge to established parties in their traditional role as mediators between citizens and the political system.[4] According to the literature that studies this topic, new social movements embody three important challenges for established parties: a programmatic, an electoral and an organisational one (Rohrschneider 1993). These studies focus on the competition between parties and other organisations for the same resources: citizens' participation. However, there is also a potential for complementary relations. A political party may attempt to establish regular links with social movements in order to increase its chances of getting support from certain social groups, or from groups that share a particular type of interests. At the same time it might be to the benefit of social groups to establish steady contacts with a party that is close to its interests. The question is not so much whether there is co-operation between parties and other type of organisations, but whether it can be stable in time, or, alternatively, whether organisations need some autonomy in order to accomplish their aims so that they can bargain with different parties and governments to push for policies in their favour.

As was argued in the preceding sections attention should be paid not only to the electoral arena but to the "associative" one, that is, to the degree of "competition" among

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[3] For a discussion of the distinctiveness of new social movements, see for example the work of Kitschelt 1993, who suggests that new social movements, unlike old ones, engage in a politics of space, as well as in a politics of social identity. They are predominantly concerned with the procurement of pure public goods, rather than economic-distributive goods.

[4] See, for example, Dalton, Kuechler and Bürklin (1990), Kitschelt (1990) and (1993), Kriesi (1993) and Rohrschneider 1993.

associations, or to the interests in co-operating for associations that may depend on their location in their respective arena of action. Different models of relationship may be established between the two type of organisations with three alternative scenarios in mind:

- political parties try to take the place of social movements, competing with them by adopting a similar organisation along single issue sub-organisations;
- parties establish a dialogue with the leadership of different social movements and organisations in order to incorporate their demands;
- they do not develop any links at all.

The indicators to be used in order to characterise the relationship between the party and social movements are the same that were mentioned in the case of trade unions.

2. The PSOE-UGT relationship between 1975 and 1996

2.1. Happily married: UGT-PSOE relations from 1975 to 1982

The period from the transition to democracy to the arrival of the socialists to government was characterised by close co-operation between the PSOE and the General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores, UGT). It was, as a matter of fact, a continuation of the co-operation that had characterised the relationship between the two organisations since their founding congress in 1888.[5]

Thus the historical legacy was one of close co-operation between the two organisations, which in practice were almost indistinguishable from one another at certain periods.[6] The experience of exile during the time of Franco enhanced that co-operation, since the two organisations underwent similar paths: their executive bodies went into exile, both organisations nearly disappeared from the country as a result of severe repression and then faced the challenge of reconstructing their organisations. The UGT and the PSOE followed

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[5] The General Workers' Union was founded in 1888 as a formally autonomous union federation which was to serve as the PSOE's ally in the labour movement (Gillespie 1989: 9). See chapter 2 and the first section of chapter 4 for more details on the historical development of the PSOE and the UGT.

[6] According to Gillespie the pattern that prevailed until 1930 was of a greater influence of UGT over the party's development than the other way round "The party tended to grow when the economic climate was favourable to labour and when Socialist-led workers won strikes; it lost members or stood still in periods of high unemployment and labour defeats" (Gillespie 1989: 25).

roughly the same process starting the move of the Executive bodies back to Spain, except that in the UGT this took place a couple of years before the PSOE.

At that time there was a high degree of overlap in the composition of the top leadership positions of the UGT and the PSOE, as well as many joint activities. According to Nicolás Redondo, leader of the UGT from 1974 to 1994, the main reason for that overlap is that the UGT did not have any syndical tasks to carry out since it had decided not to not participate in the Francoist structures of labour representation, and therefore, together with the PSOE, devoted all its energies to launching the transition to democracy:

> "[I]t was the same organisation... since we did not have any syndical function when we were illegal, we had the same criteria, the same behaviour and the same praxis as the party (PSOE)."(Interview with Nicolás Redondo published in Burns 1996: 202)[7]

Before exploring further the relationship between the PSOE and the UGT it is important to have an understanding of the situation of the labour movement during and after the transition to democracy.

2.1 1. The labour movement at the transition to democracy

The most important union confederation was the Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obreras, CCOO). The strength of the CCOO can be partially attributed to their having used a mixture of legal and illegal tactics in the Francoist period that combined infiltration in the vertical unionist structure created by the regime[8] and the mobilisation of workers in illegal forms of protests (Fishman 1991: 97).[9] The former strategy had given it more presence and visibility at the work places[10] without losing its confrontational character vis-à-vis the regime. The members of the Spanish Communist Party, PCE, were the dominant group inside the CCOO, although its leadership insisted on its independence from any political party.[11] Conversely, the UGT had always remained outside the vertical unions and therefore was in a weaker position when the

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[7] In Guindal and Serrano (1986) there is another interview in which Nicolás Redondo expresses a similar view on this period.

[8] The Francoist regime not only repressed pre-existing unions but also created an official "vertical union" with obligatory membership for all workers and employers called Organización Sindical Obrera (Fishman 1991: 89).

[9] For an account of the situation of the labour movement during the transition to democracy see also Linz 1981 and Pérez Díaz 1979 and 1993.

[10] According to Maravall (1982) this strategy allowed them to train cadres, to carry out an extensive campaign of recruitment, to win experience and influence everyday bargaining within firms.

[11] The initial founding groups of the CCOO included left-falangists, Catholic worker activists, independent socialists and communists.

transition started. It therefore suffered more severely from the effects of forty years of dictatorship, during most of which the executive of the union was in the exile.

When Franco died the presence of the UGT was very weak, except for a few places such as Asturias or the Basque Country (Maravall 1978: 68-73, Gillespie 1989: 263), so its first goal was to regain presence in territories where its organisation had virtually disappeared. As a matter of fact, the reorganisation of the UGT had already started in the 1960s, but the difficulties derived from having the leadership in exile slowed down the process. Before the UGT could effectively face the challenge of organisational reconstruction in Spain the bitter conflicts that had come out between the leadership in and outside Spain had to be solved. Once the executive moved to the country the process of reconstruction experienced a clear boost (see Maravall 1978: 78).

There were also other smaller labour organisations such as the Syndical Worker Union (Unión Sindical Obrera, USO) founded by ex-UGT militants and left-wing Catholic workers in the early 1960s. Its goals were less radical than those of the UGT, a fact that Maravall (1978: 85) relates to the USO's origins in left-wing Catholicism and socialism. One of the features that differentiated the USO from the other important labour organisations was its refusal to establish close links with political parties. This trait was at the very origins of its existence as a separate organisation from the CCOO, which occurred as a reaction to the increasing strength of the PCE inside the CCOO (Maravall 1978: 85, Sagardoy & Blanco 1982: 77). During Franco's dictatorship, the USO, like the CCOO, also combined the use of legal means, it participated in the official Francoist system of labour representation, and illegal means in order to fight for the creation of non-official workers' councils and assemblies within factories. In the first democratic elections for workers' councils the USO competed with the UGT in roughly the same ideological space.

Party-union relations need to be looked at in the context of the structure of competition in the electoral and in the corporate arena. Not only was there uncertainty and competition among political parties to have a good position in the party system that would come out of the 1977 founding elections, the different union organisations were also engaged in a similar process. As was mentioned in chapter 2, the uncertainty concerning the party system to a great extent vanished after the 1977 general elections, which resulted in a victory of the centre party, UCD, followed by the PSOE which was the main party of the left. In the corporate arena part of this uncertainty disappeared after the first worker council elections took place between January and March 1978, whose results are presented in table 6.1. These elections "cleared up

what had been a rather confusion world of multiple labour organisations, all claiming large working-class influence" (Maravall 1982: 165).

As table 6.1 shows, the trade union map was dominated by the communist-oriented CCOO, that managed to obtain 34.4% of the delegates,[12] followed at some distance by the socialist-oriented UGT. The competition between the UGT and the USO at the 1978 elections was clearly favourable to the former, a fact which would later condition the subsequent attempts of mergers between the two organisations.[13] This division of the trade union movement, and the inverse correlation of forces with respect to the party system (where there was also competition on the left with the Socialists having much larger support than the communists, see chapter 2) are particularly important in order to understand the pattern of party-union relations until 1982. The CCOO and the UGT were usually supported by the PCE and PSOE respectively, although such relationships could not be taken for granted in all parts of the country or at all times (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 203).

Table 6.1. Results of worker council elections 1978-1995 (percentage of delegates)

	UGT	CCOO	USO	Others[14]	Non-union delegates[15]
1978	21.7	34.4	3.9	21.8	18.1
1980	29.3	30.9	8.7	15.3	15.8
1982	36.7	33.4	4.6	13.2	12.1
1986	40.2	34.3	3.8	14.1	7.6
1990	44.0	36.5	2.8	12.9	3.8
1995	34.7	37.8	⟶	[27.5]	⟵

Source: Adapted from Jordana 1992 and Astudillo 1996. For 1995 USO and non-union delegates are included in 'others'.

It is also important to check upon the membership levels of unions to calculate their interest from the perspective of attracting electoral support. Membership was low (and is still so), around 15% percent of the workforce (Milner and Nombela 1995). However, as Milner and Nombela point out, membership levels are not a good measure of the power of unions in

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[12] Workers' representative elections, also called "union elections" have a dual role: selecting representatives at the workplace level to sit on work councils and determining the relative presence of different unions in each sector level bargaining arena (and in each region). The proportion of representatives under the auspices of each union determines that union's status nationally, regionally and within individual industries. This creates certain significant rights for each particular union. In order to get the status of "most representative union" a union has to obtain a minimum of 10% delegates in the country or 15% at the regional level (Milner and Nombela 1995: 13).

[13] The UGT and a splinter group of USO merged in 1978.

[14] None of the unions under "others" managed to obtain the 10% of delegates at the national level required to become a "representative union".

[15] Union representation in Spain is based on workplace delegates voted by workers, who do not necessarily have to belong to any of the unions.

Spain and they advise using measures like the degree of participation at workers' representative elections, the proportion of representatives under the auspices of each union or the "union coverage", i.e., the proportion of workers covered by union negotiated collective agreements. If one only looks at membership the conclusion reached is that "unions exercise power to an extent wholly disproportionate to their membership levels" (Milner and Nombela 1995: 12).

2.1.2. PSOE-UGT ties

During the transition to democracy the main goals of the PSOE and the UGT were complementary. Both wanted to secure the process of democratisation and, at the same time, dominate their respective arenas in order to implement the policies contained in their programs. This is illustrated by the many passages in documents of both organisations which insist on the fact that the PSOE and the UGT worked for the realisation of the same ultimate goals, each within their own domain of action.

In its 27th Congress (December 1976) the PSOE stated that one of its main aims was to support the UGT, and encouraged all its members to help the UGT in consolidating their organisation (Res 27 1976). The PSOE considered the development of a strong socialist union as a vital condition for the success of the PSOE's goals of transforming society. An excerpt of the 1979 Federal Executive management report shows the explicitness of the reciprocal support between the PSOE and UGT:

> "It is obvious that the UGT without the PSOE will not be able to defend the interests of the working class on the path to socialism; by the same token, the PSOE without the UGT is doomed to be an electoralist party without working-class support." (MG 28, 1979: 214)

The policy of the PSOE in relation to the UGT explicitly recognised its side of the political bargain by mentioning its commitment to monitor the socio-economic policy of the UCD government and the development of a legal framework of labour relations fighting for the interests of the UGT (Boletín Socialista PSOE Nov./Dec. 1980).

How did the two organisations co-operate in order to achieve these goals? From a formal perspective both the UGT and the PSOE were autonomous organisations and were not tied by any formal links. However, in practice different indicators point at a close relationship between the two organisations, which was took place in several ways that are examined in the following sub-sections.

• *Double membership*

In spite of these common goals, the only formal provision linking the two organisations was the obligation of PSOE's members to join the UGT and work actively within it (PSOE Statutes 1978, art.8.g[16]). However, the extent to which this obligation was enforced remains unclear. Table 6.2 shows the results of a study of the characteristics of party members commissioned by the PSOE's Executive Commission which was carried out in 1980 revealed that 41 per cent of all party members did not belong to the UGT. Among the members who were active in the labour market 35 per cent were not affiliated to the UGT.[17] This is one of the reasons why the party documents insisted on the need to enforce the provision of compulsory double membership and to increase the level of activity of PSOE members in the UGT. According to Maravall (1982:167) another reason for this insistence was the fact that the support for the UGT among PSOE voters and members was weaker than that for CCOO among the PCE voters and members. This is shown in table 6.3: while 94 per cent of PCE members were also members of CCOO, 85 per cent of PSOE members were members of UGT. In the case of voters, 85 per cent of PCE voters were members of CCOO for 54 per cent of PSOE voters who were UGT members.

Table 6.2. % of UGT members among PSOE's members

1980..................................	41%
1983..................................	48.5%
1986..................................	46.4%
1989..................................	38.6%

Source: Instituto IDES. Los Afiliados Socialistas en 1989.[18]

An influential party strategist stated in his interview that the provision of compulsory double membership and, generally speaking, the link between the PSOE and the UGT was more important for symbolic reasons than for the actual enforcement of dual membership. In other words, the benefit of such relationship for the PSOE did not derive only from a direct increase of votes or members as a result of its co-operation with the UGT, but from conveying an *"image of a strong socialist movement"*.[19] Given that the communist movement had a

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[16] The same provision is included in art.9 of the PSOE Statutes voted in the 28th (1979), 29th (1981) and 30th (1984) Congresses, and in art.10 of the Statutes voted at the 31st Congress (1988).

[17] See Tezanos and Gómez Yáñez "Los Afiliados Socialistas" (1981: 66).

[18] The table includes the results of subsequent similar surveys carried out in 1983, 1986 and 1989.

[19] Personal interview with Roberto Dorado, member of the Instituto de Técnicas Electorales and of the Election Committees of each general election from 1977 to 1989 (both included). He was also the Director of the Department of Analysis of the Cabinet Ministry from 1982 to 1994.

powerful organisation it was important that the socialist movement was able to transmit an image of party and union strength, beneficial to the PSOE in its competition with the Communist party and for the UGT with the CCOO.

Table 6.3. Relationship between trade union membership and party support

	Trade union affiliation		Trade union sympathy		Trade Union vote	
	UGT	CCOO	UGT	CCOO	UGT	CCOO
PSOE						
Voters	54	32	22	26	72	45
Militants	82	13	—	—	—	—
PCE						
Voters	7	85	7	62	2	39
Militants	3	94	—	—	—	—

Source: Maravall 1982: 169. For the first two columns percentages have to be calculated horizontally, i.e. with respect to the parties, whereas in the third column percentages are vertical, i.e. 100%= trade union.

- *Syndical/Union groups (Grupos Sindicales)*

The PSOE carried out several activities in order to improve its level of affiliation and activism among UGT members. An important instrument designed for this were the so called Syndical Groups (*Grupos Sindicales*) (PSOE 1976: 5). They were included in the party statutes in the 28th Congress (1979) in an article of the Party Statutes that stated the following:

> "the party members that belong to the UGT, as stated in art.10, will take part in the Socialist Syndical Groups, operating in the workplaces, inside the different unions of the UGT structure" (PSOE Statutes 1979, art.44).

Their goal was defined in the following way:

> "the goal of socialist members is to develop the party's union policy inside the UGT, as well as to carry the socialist policy and propaganda to the factories and workshops." (Boletín Socialista 1978)

There are various references in the PSOE bulletin from 1980 to 1982 to these groups as a means to increase the activities of the PSOE members inside the UGT (Boletín Socialista 1980-82). In addition to carrying out party policy inside the UGT the members of these groups had the "obligation", to the extent that it was possible, to occupy the elective offices inside UGT (Boletín Socialista 1978) and vice versa, the party advised those PSOE members who already held some responsibilities inside UGT to take part in the activities of the Syndical Groups (MG28 1979: 215). The situation varied across the regional party federations; while in

some provinces the PSOE worked at the work place through the UGT structures, in others such as Sevilla the PSOE placed their own representatives at the work places aside from the UGT.[20]

In any case it seems clear that the Syndical Groups were designed, with some exceptions, to have more presence at the workplace *through* the UGT. The PSOE Secretary of Syndical Affairs acknowledged the limited presence of the socialists inside the workplaces so that specific target areas had to be selected to start with the Syndical Groups. The Management Report presented at the 28th Party Congress (1979: 215) indicates the criterion used in order to select these areas: it recommended the organisation of Syndical Groups first where the CCOO had won the previous workers' council elections,[21] and in the territorial federations where CCOO was stronger (Cataluña, Galicia and Andalucía). This illustrates the extent to which the Syndical Groups were considered as a means to increase the support for both the UGT and the PSOE in their respective arenas. According to Joaquín Almunia[22] the policy to create Syndical Groups did not work well except for a few large enterprises and for a very limited period of time.

According to several party officials interviewed, the initiative to form the Syndical Groups was also connected with the internal politics of the UGT. Some UGT leaders who at that time were close to the PSOE's Executive, asked for its support to help them keep the control of the UGT against another group that was in favour of UGT being autonomous from the PSOE, formed mostly by members coming from USO.[23] The Management Report presented at the PSOE 28th Federal Congress (May 1979) refers to that type of events in the following manner:

> "All throughout the history of the UGT there have been systematic attempts of non-socialist organisations to break into the UGT in order to control it. These attempts were not successful due to the coherence of the socialists inside the UGT. These infiltrations will happen again - as a matter of fact, they are happening as we speak - so we must be ready to preserve the socialist, revolutionary and democratic character of the UGT." (MG 28C: 214)

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[20] Information obtained from interviews by Gunther to PSOE party officials.

[21] The specific sectors were the UGT Industry Federations (metal, construction, health and banking sectors).

[22] Personal interview, 14/6/96.

[23] It is interesting to note that the same UGT leaders (among whom its General Secretary at the time, Nicolás Redondo) who insisted on the creation of the Syndical Groups, that they considered a legitimate tool of the party to increase support in the UGT, would later on fiercely criticise them at the time of rupture between the PSOE and the UGT. (Information provided in a personal interview with a highly ranked party official).

• *Interlocking directorates*

There are other examples of the close relationship that tied the two organisations. For instance, in many provinces the PSOE and the UGT shared buildings and facilities (Gangas 1994: 118).[24] Other indicator frequently used to explore the degree of integration of parties and unions is the extent to which the main governing bodies of the two organisations overlap in their composition.

In the 30th UGT Congress (1976) there were moves to strengthen its autonomy by making its officers ineligible for party or political office, but they were defeated (Gillespie 1989: 315). At this stage there was a considerable degree of overlap that tended to affect more the deliberative than the executive party bodies; a good part of the Federal Committee had some tasks of responsibility in the UGT, 57% in 1979 and 55% in 1982 (Tezanos 1983: 169). There were also members of the UGT Executive Committee who were elected members of parliament in the PSOE's lists, such as the Secretary General of the UGT, Nicolás Redondo. The composition of the regional and provincial committees of the two organisations often included common members, but, it should be stated that this was not a statutory provision, and that this situation varied across the different provincial branches (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 202)

A further example of co-ordination at different levels is that according to the provincial party officials interviewed by Gunther et al. in most provinces there were frequent joint meetings of the UGT and PSOE provincial Executive Commissions (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 209). Other examples are common activities organised by both organisations, or activities of one of them in which important leaders from the other one participated.

• *The mobilisation of the vote: the electoral and corporate arenas*

The most fundamental aspect of the co-operation between the two organisations was, however, their mutual support in electoral processes. The PSOE supported the UGT at every election for Workers' Councils, particularly in the 1978 and 1980 ones, which is when the UGT suffered from its greatest shortage of material and technical resources. The report of the PSOE's Executive Commission presented at the 28th Congress (May 1979) and the one presented at the 29th Congress (December 1981) provide some information about the organisational effort made by the party in order to support the UGT, which included the

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[24] In one province, it was necessary to pass through the office of the UGT in order to reach the PSOE office (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 203).

training of members of the union in electoral techniques, the work of party members, leadership and public office holders in the UGT's campaign.[25]

In 1980 the PSOE was in a better position to provide the UGT with effective support. The reason for this is that the 1980 trade unions elections took place after the first local elections had been held, which means that by that time the PSOE had an extensive network of members in local governments. This facilitated the organisation of campaigning in small firms where the organisational weakness of both the UGT and the PSOE had proven to be a drawback at the previous trade unions elections. In 1982 the campaign in favour of the UGT at the small firms was mainly carried out by the party office-holders at the local level.[26] This, together with other factors, contributed to the improvement of the UGT's results in the 1980 elections with respect to 1978, particularly within large firms, thereby balancing the situation between the partisan and the corporate arenas (see table 6.1).[27]

Several passages of the PSOE's documents suggest that this support was more effective at the level of party elites and material resources than at the grassroots level. A passage of the 29th Party Congress resolutions (1981) states that although the results of the UGT in the 1980 workers' council elections were substantially better than the 1978 ones, they could have been even better if there had been a greater effort by PSOE members. It specifically mentions a certain apathy of party members with respect to these elections (Res 29, 1981: 187).

The UGT also gave its support to the PSOE in general election campaigns. In every electoral process the UGT publicly endorsed the policies proposed by the PSOE and called on their members to vote for the PSOE, as acknowledged by Nicolás Redondo "in the UGT we had the tradition to clearly ask people to vote for the party".[28] This co-operation did not only refer to campaigning, but to earlier stages of the electoral process such as the drafting of the electoral manifesto, that was also developed in consultation with the UGT. For example, in 1982 the UGT exerted pressure to have some of their demands included in the PSOE's

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[25] This point was also mentioned by José María Maravall and Joaquín Almunia at the time Secretary of Education and Secretary of Union Affairs (personal interviews, 28/12/95 and 14/6/96 respectively).

[26] José María Maravall, personal interview 28/5/95.

[27] Another factor that is believed to have favoured the UGT in these four years was its strategy of pressure and negotiation that received more support among the workers than the strategy of direct confrontation followed by the CCOO (Maravall 1982: 170).

[28] Interview with Nicolás Redondo published in Burns 1996: 209.

electoral program.[29] Another example of collaboration was the participation of leading figures of the UGT in public rallies of the PSOE.[30]

It seems therefore that the leaders of the socialist party regarded co-operation with unions as a positive political investment. As was mentioned above, this was related to the competition among the parties in the left, particularly between the Communists and the PSOE. According to the conclusions drawn by Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1986: 202) in their study of the Spanish party system, party elites believed unions played the most decisive role in channelling the working class vote toward one party of the left, as opposed to any of its left-wing rivals. An interview carried out at that time by Gunther with one of the highest ranked PSOE officials reveals how the leaders of the party considered the development of the UGT as a means of increasing their own support:

> "In order to receive a parliamentary majority and in order to form a government, we need to increase popular support. This can only come from attracting support in a large number of municipalities and from developing a working class trade union."

Co-operation at election times is an important aspect of what was referred to in section 1 as the political bargain. In return for the explicit support of the UGT, the PSOE was in a position to deliver the products of such a bargain since some important issues regarding labour relations were being discussed in the period between 1977 and 1982 among which the position of the unions in the political system (1978 Constitution, *Estatuto de los Trabajadores*[31]) and the return of union property confiscated after the Civil War. The UGT was also explicit about the basis of the political bargain with the PSOE: "the UGT has publicly endorsed the PSOE's program [for the 1982 elections] not only through its members efforts but also through providing some of its officials. It has done this in the belief that the party's program reflects part of our project as an organisation to find a solution to the problems of the working class" (UGT 1983: 40).[32]

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[29] Joaquín Almunia, personal interview, 14/6/1996. See also Nicolás Redondo in Burns (1996: 209).

[30] See, for example, 'El País' 8/2/79 that reports the participation of Nicolás Redondo in rallies organised by the PSOE for the 1979 General Election campaign, or El País '11/2/79', "UGT approves a motion explicitly supporting the PSOE in the general elections".

[31] For example, see in the PSOE internal bulletin the rejection of the initial draft of the *Estatuto de los Trabajadores*: "The draft was unacceptable for us, since it was against our syndical policy, which is the one defended by the UGT" (Boletín Socialista 1980).

[32] (UGT 1993). Resolutions of the 33rd Congress, cited in Astudillo 1996.

However, even if the PSOE recognised the support from the UGT as a valuable asset, it did not always explicitly acknowledge this link, particularly in general election campaigns, out of fear that it might jeopardise the votes of those workers affiliated to the Workers Commissions (CCOO). A good example of this can be found in the campaign guide for the 1979 elections in which advice is given to campaigners and PSOE rank and file that they should not ask for the vote of the UGT members but for the vote of *all workers*, so as not to antagonise the voters of CCOO (GC 1979: 35).[33] Looking at table 6.3 it is clear that this caution makes sense, since the PSOE managed to obtain a substantial support among members of CCOO (45 per cent voted for the PSOE), while keeping the support of the major part of UGT members (72 per cent).

In section 1 reference was made to the possible cost for social democratic parties of having close links with unions, since this link may limit its chances to get the support of both the working and the middle classes. The possibility of an *electoral dilemma*[34] did not materialise in this period and this was well known to the party strategists.[35] First, the data show the compatibility between establishing close links with the UGT and at the same time keeping the support of a substantial proportion of CCOO members and sympathisers. The second possible dilemma referred to the possibility that middle class voters might withdraw their support from a party with overt links with a trade union. However, this does not seem to be the case judging from both to post-electoral analysis[36] and the perception of the party strategists and officials, who seemed to be more concerned about the impact of the Marxist self-definition of the party in getting votes from the new middle classes, than about explicit links with UGT.

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[33] According to an article written by José María Zufiaur, ex-leading member of the USO and member of the UGT's Confederal Executive Committee, the PSOE had also asked the UGT not to be to explicit about their support to the PSOE in 1982, so as to attract the vote of members and sympathisers of CCOO (EL GLOBO, 15/1/1988).

[34] The dilemma refers to the fact that in order to obtain electoral majorities, social democratic parties must resort not only to their 'natural base', that is the working class, but also attempt to gain the support of the middle classes. However, there is some kind of trade-off for parties expressed in a loss of working class voters if they reach the middle class. Leaders of class-based parties must therefore choose between a party that is homogeneous in its class appeal but condemned to perpetual electoral defeats, or a party that struggles for electoral success at the cost of diluting its class orientation (Przeworski 1985:102, Przeworski and Sprague 1986:55).

[35] They had data from surveys commissioned by the Party's Executive Commission. See, for example, Tezanos 1979.

[36] As the analysis of Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1986) show, the PSOE managed to get support both of the working and the middle class in 1979, although it was weaker than the UCD among the middle class.

- *Organisational logic as an obstacle to co-operation*

The relationship between the PSOE and UGT was not only influenced by the calculations c the electoral/political costs and benefits of such a relationship, but also by other worries of th PSOE and UGT with respect to their respective domain of action (partisan and corporate) an the internal politics of their organisations.

In the partisan arena, the mergers of the PSOE with other small socialist partie complicated its relationship with the UGT, while the merger of the UGT and part of the US(also disturbed the relationship between UGT and the PSOE. As has been mentioned, accordin to the PSOE statutes new members were also required to join the UGT. The problem was th; many members of the small socialist parties that were merging with the PSOE already belonge to other trade unions, particularly to the CCOO and to the USO. The extent to which thi constituted a problem varied across the territory (according to party federations).[37] A Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1986: 211) state "these persons were forced to make a difficu choice between switching to a new party and maintaining loyalty to their trade union", wit many choosing the latter. This was obviously detrimental for the PSOE, that was eager to ge more members, especially those qualified members that these small parties could provide, wh could stand as candidates at the municipal elections.

In the corporate arena too the merger of a section of the USO with the UGT whicl took place at the end of 1977[38] made the relationship between the UGT and the PSOE mor complicated, given that USO members were fierce advocates of union autonomy from politica parties. According to a high ranking party official interviewed by Gunther,[39] in the process o negotiation between the UGT and USO the three UGT members who were part of the PSOI Executive Commission resigned in order to facilitate the merging process.[40] This point is no too clear, since various members of that Executive Commission that I interviewed declarec that Nicolás Redondo continued attending the meetings of the PSOE Executive Commission.

To sum up, the phase from the start of the transition to democracy until the victory o the PSOE at the 1982 elections was characterised by the continuation of the close historic link;

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[37] For example in Cataluña the UGT was viewed by the Socialists of the PSC as the union for immigrants, anc therefore were reluctant to join it (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 211).

[38] The negotiations between the two organisations led to a split in October 1977; one part of the USO led b) José María Zufiaur merged with the UGT, while the other part, led by Manuel Zaguirre, kept the USO ir existence as a separate union (Gillespie 1989: 332).

[39] Interviews by Gunther (Juan March Institute).

[40] According to the Executive Commission Report presented at the 28th Congress (1979) the Federal Committee of the party in its meeting on 4/5th of March 1978 chose a new member of the Executive Commission to replace Nicolás Redondo (MG 28C 1979: 160).

between the PSOE and the UGT as a result of sharing complementary goals and of existing facilitating conditions. The structure and degree of competition in the electoral arena between the PSOE and the PCE and in the corporate one between the CCOO and UGT favoured the co-operation between the UGT and the PSOE so as to become each the dominant organisation in their respective arenas. Another condition that facilitated co-operation between the two was the opportunity to exchange goods; while the PSOE defended the interests of the UGT in the negotiations during the drafting of the Constitution and other important labour legislation, the UGT co-operated with the PSOE in election campaigns and mobilised workers to support the PSOE. As will be shown in the next sections, the conditions that facilitated the political exchange between the two organisations changed when the PSOE entered office.

2.2. 1982- 1987: tensions begin

In 1982 the PSOE won the general elections with an absolute majority of seats and the UGT became the trade union with the most delegates in the worker councils (see table 6.1). The goal to become the dominant organisation of the left in their own sphere had been accomplished.

The phase from 1982 until 1988 was characterised by a rapid increase of friction between the socialist government and the labour movement, and with the UGT in particular, which had a clear repercussion on PSOE-UGT ties. The tension grew throughout the period until it reached a peak when the union confederations (UGT and CCOO) called a general strike which took place the 14th of December 1988.

2.2.1. The terms of the disagreement

During the first years after the arrival of the PSOE to office, the PSOE and the UGT still considered that they shared ultimate goals and had to support each other in trying to achieve them. However, tensions between the two organisations also began as soon as the PSOE arrived in power.

Just after the 1982 general election the UGT refused to participate in the Socialist Government. Whether the refusal referred to any position in the cabinet or to a particular Ministry is difficult to ascertain since the answer varies according to the sources consulted. El Socialista, reported that the Executive of the UGT had decided before the elections not to participate in a Socialist government, with the justification given by Nicolás Redondo in an interview published in the same issue that "they could support the government from the

outside, but we should not create the confusion that it is the UGT which is in Government".[41] However, according to other statement made by Nicolás Redondo, the decision was not to take part in certain positions of the cabinet "at the UGT Executive we had agreed that if the party required anyone from our Executive to be minister we would accept any ministry except the Ministry of Labour".[42] This was precisely the offer of Felipe González, who tried to have José Luis Corcuera, at the time member of the UGT Executive, as Minister of Labour.[43] The result was that there was no formal UGT participation in the first socialist cabinet, although many ex-UGT cadres did take positions in the Socialist government.

The confrontation between the UGT and the socialist government resulted from a disagreement of the former with the economic policy followed.[44] During the first term in office, characterised by a serious economic crisis, the Socialists implemented a program of economic adjustment and industrial restructuring. The two first conflicts between the Government/party and the UGT resulted from a delay in the implementation of the legislation that established the 40-hour working week, and from disagreements over the plans for industrial restructuring. The Government partially gave in to demands of the UGT in the plan of industrial restructuring, but maintained the spirit of the economic reforms. As Bermeo and García-Durán (1994: 113) note "the PSOE's response to labour pressure was not to reverse policy but to construct elaborate compensation schemes instead".[45] In the end the UGT gave its support to the Governmental policies at a time when the CCOO had a clear confrontational position. There were other problems such as the inclusion of the compromise of the socialists to create 800,000 jobs in the 1982 program,[46] while by the end of the legislature unemployment not only had not diminished, but had actually risen considerably.

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[41] El Socialista, 283, 10-16 Nov. 1982, pp.24-7.

[42] Nicolás Redondo interviewed by Burns (1996: 209).

[43] In the same interview carried out in 1996 (Burns 1996: 210) Nicolás Redondo points out that Felipe González referred to the historical experience of the PSOE's government during the Second Republic in which Francisco Largo Caballero, leader of the UGT, was Minister of Labour from 1931 to 1933. This is another example of the ambiguous use of the historical legacy by the leaders of the party after the transition to democracy.

[44] "The clash over macroeconomic policies was compounded by growing disagreements on social policies and on the role of the state in the economy, concerning unemployment benefits, pensions and the control of investment" (Boix 1995: 26).

[45] Workers who lost their jobs as a result of reconversion schemes were, under certain conditions given three years of unemployment subsidy, some had early retirement with benefits, the most affected regions were given tax deductions, investment subsidies, etc. (Bermeo and García Durán 1994: 113).

[46] According to Almunia, Solchaga and Boyer, the problem was that the compromise to create 800,000 new jobs was included in the election manifesto not as a result of a serious study by those people who were in charge of the economy area of the PSOE, but as a last minute concession to the UGT with nearly no chances of being fulfilled (interviews published in Burns 1996).

The labour movement, UGT included, reacted against the laws passed by the Socialists easing the hiring of workers on a temporary or part-time basis and fought the attempts to lower the barriers to dismiss workers. In 1985 the conflict between the UGT and the government became more obvious to public opinion when they disagreed the reform of pensions law proposed by the socialists. The UGT mounted demonstrations against the reform, together with the CCOO, and some UGT leaders voted against the reform at the Congress of Deputies.[47] The opposition to the reforms of the pension system had a greater impact than other policy conflicts because, unlike the industrial restructuring plans, it was not localised in certain regions of the country (Bermeo and García-Durán 1994: 115). In spite of this conflict, as Maravall (1993: 118) states, pacts between the government and UGT were reached more easily at these early stages of the Socialist government than they would be afterwards.

Boix (1996) argues that in 1982 the socialist government had two alternatives in order to fight inflation: to attract unions into a social pact to ensure moderate wage increases, or if social concertation was not possible, to control inflation through a restrictive monetary policy and a reduction of public expenditure. The first one, according to Boix, was preferred since it corresponded to the traditional social-democratic practice of including the union movement in the policy-making process.

The improvement of economic conditions started in 1985 and had important repercussions in the Government/PSOE/UGT relations. The cost of supporting a restrictive economic policy based on wage restraint increased for the UGT at a time of economic expansion. Although the government insisted on the need to continue with a similar economic policy, for the UGT there was no further justification for more sacrifices from workers, even if these sacrifices were made for the sake of creating employment.

Incomes policy worked during 1985 and 1986 in reducing inflation, but the UGT abandoned the subsequent round of negotiations, possibly out of fear that its co-operative attitude would entail a loss of support in the coming Worker Councils elections. As a result in 1987 there was no agreement on wage restraint. This coincided with an unexpected increase in inflation that worsened the on-going fight between the unions and the government over the impact labour costs had on inflation levels, and consequently, over the need of workers to continue "sacrificing" their wage increases (or parts of it) in order to develop an economic

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[47] The main point of disagreement was that the point of reference for the calculus of the amount of the pension benefit was changed from being the last two years of work to the last ten years.

policy whose first priority was economic growth, and only after that proceed to redistribute it, rather than the other way round.

The UGT became increasingly dissatisfied with the Socialists' economic policies and feared losing support if it remained associated with government policy.[48] The tension further increased when the UGT leader (Nicolás Redondo) and its Confederal Secretary of Organisation (Antón Saracíbar), refused to approve the 1988 budget and resigned as deputies of the Socialist Parliamentary Group in the Congress of Deputies.[49] This friction was further complicated by the difficult personal relationship between the leaders of both organisations and by mutual accusations of attempts to influence the internal politics of each of the two organisations.[50] This certainly does not mean that it was because Felipe González and Nicolás Redondo had developed hostility towards each other that the two organisations broke their traditional ties, but in the context of political tension it surely did not help to make things easier.

Maravall argues that the strategy of the UGT reflected the idea that "the new economic conditions of capitalism left no room for the expression of alternative ideologies from governments" (1997). In other words, the conditions that facilitated the economic exchange between the union and the government had diminished. The immediate consequence of this was that "the unions should act in accordance with a principle of 'political indifference', according to which the political sign of the party in government was less important than what they would actually negotiate with that government (Maravall 1997). This is not the right place to dwell on the details that explain the reasons for the disagreements about economic policy, but what seems clear is that these were evident, and that the UGT found fewer and fewer reasons to have a close relationship either with the Socialist government or with the PSOE. Nicolás Redondo looks back at the period from 1982 to 1987 as the one in which the UGT changed its evaluation of the costs and benefits of having close links with the PSOE and taking part in its parliamentary group, reaching the conclusion that the costs exceeded the benefits of such participation. The distrust expressed in these words is surely affected by subsequent events since the following excerpts correspond to an interview carried out in 1996, but is

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[48] Nicolás Redondo declares the following "Until 1985/86 the [Government's] policy was still acceptable" (Burns 1996: 213). Solchaga in his interview published in the same book mentions that Nicolás Redondo withdrew from negotiations over a 5% increase of wages for 1987 because he was afraid that the UGT would lose support at the workers' councils elections.

[49] El País, 21/10/1987.

[50] "...there were many destabilising attempts, by which the party wanted to oust the UGT leadership", Nicolás Redondo in Burns (1996: 214). The PSOE also accused the leadership of the UGT to put pressure on those members who were less critical with the party and the government.

nevertheless a valid piece of evidence of how the evaluation of the ties with the PSOE by the UGT leader were changing:

> "We started to notice that it does not matter how many people there are in the party executive or in the cabinet, this does not make the union stronger, it can even work the other way round. It can work so that the union man in government ends up being the governmental party man in the union." (Nicolás Redondo in Burns 1996: 210)

And,

> "We realised that having our people in the party did not entail having more influence, and the same applied to the parliamentary group, from which I had to resign." (Nicolás Redondo in Burns 1996: 210)

The government, or at least a good part of the government, was also heavily influenced by the example of economic and electoral failure provided by the British Labour Party in 1979, interpreted as an illustration of the consequences of being dominated by the union movement.[51] Carlos Solchaga, the minister of the economy believed that "concertation was expensive and inefficient as well as less needed in a phase of economic expansion" (Maravall 1993: 118). This surely had a consequence on the difficult communication between the UGT and the government,[52] which made it hard for the UGT to internalise the cost of supporting certain governmental decisions, since very often the UGT was both annoyed by the lack of consultation and left with little time to react to governmental decisions.

It is important to realise that so far the attention has been put on the relationship between the UGT and the Socialist Government (party-in-government), not specifically with the PSOE's Executive Commission. However, the predominance of the party-in-government over the other faces of the party was clear. Even if there were sectors in the PSOE's governing bodies that did not agree with the economic policy and supported the claims of the UGT, they did not have the resources to impose that decision within the party.

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[51] "Miguel Boyer and I were very aware of the difficulties of the British Labour Party as a result of being under the control of the TUC. We thought that should not happen here. We certainly had to have a good relation with unions, particularly with the UGT that is part of the socialist family, but the Government and the economic policy could not be conditioned by the unions." (Interview to Carlos Solchaga, Minister of industry from 1982-85 and of the Economy 1985-93 in Burns 1996: 152).

[52] "I am certain that Nicolás Redondo has found out about some decisions of the socialist government that concerned thousands of workers though the press. Neither the press nor the Government had asked him his opinion or advice, as the UGT General Secretary." (Intreview with Manuel Simón, ex-member of the UGT Executive Commission in Burns 1996: 90).

2.2.2. PSOE-UGT ties under stress

Formally speaking the links between the PSOE and the UGT remained the same as they had been since the transition. They still shared many buildings and facilities,[53] the compulsory double-membership in the PSOE Statutes,[54] together with the obligation of members to produce some evidence of being UGT members after a month of having been a member of the PSOE (art.5.3 in the 1984 PSOE Statutes, art.6.3 in the 1988 Party Statutes). The percentage of party members who were also members of the UGT went up considerably from 1980 to 1983, as table 6.2 shows, to decrease slightly in 1986. However, there is hardly any mention at all of the Syndical Groups, except for a few in documents from 1982, which leads to the tentative conclusion that either they were abandoned as a strategy or were inactive for a number of years.

Other informal indicators of ties between the two organisations could still be found in this period, although there was a gradual decrease in the mechanisms of co-operation. Informal meetings between delegations from the PSOE and the UGT were held frequently, at least until 1984 according to the PSOE documents, and were regarded as useful in overcoming some difficulties in the relationship between the two.

> "The meetings between the Executive Committees of the two organisations have been frequent, both with the whole committees or of parts of them. Some of them were particularly important in solving issues that confronted the UGT and the Socialist government." (MG30 1984: 59)

Later on the meeting points between the two organisations gradually disappeared. It is likely that the superiority of the government with respect to the party executive in setting the policy directions had an influence on this, since it made meetings between the PSOE's Executive Commission and the UGT fairly useless in terms of achieving real influence over the direction of the government's economic and social policy. As was discussed in chapter 4, there was very little or no overlap between the party Executive Commission and the Government, except for Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra.

There was still mutual support between the two organisations in electoral processes both at the partisan and the corporate arena, but judging from the party documents and internal press the co-operation was less intense than previously (from the transition until 1982). At the 1982 Workers' Councils elections, the PSOE gave its political and logistic support to the UGT,

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[53] This was even more the case after 1986, when the UGT recovered many of the buildings or property that had been confiscated after the Civil War.
[54] Art. 9 of the PSOE Statutes 1984 and 1988 PSOE Statutes, art.10.

but there were less explicit references of the party effort at these elections than there was in 1980. This might be due to the fact that the PSOE was at the same time engaged in organising its own election campaign. Moreover, the kind of material and technical support that the party had provided in previous occasions was less necessary in these elections that were already the third union elections held since the transition to democracy. However, although the support at this stage seemed more symbolic than either material or technical it was still overt and public. For example, a political resolution of the Federal Committee of the PSOE released at the end of October 1986 stated the following:

> "in the context of the electoral process at the workplaces that is taking place during these months, the PSOE wants to express its support and solidarity for the UGT and manifests its satisfaction for the first results that point at the consolidation of UGT as the most voted union." (Political Resolution of the Federal Committee held on 31/10/86, included in MG 31, 1988:155)

The UGT also expressed its support for the PSOE at the 1982 and 1986 election campaigns.[55] As in the previous phase, important UGT leaders participated in the party's electoral campaign activities. In addition, the UGT General Secretary, Nicolás Redondo and its Secretary of Organisation, Antón Saracíbar, as well as other less known national and regional union leaders were candidates of the party both at the 1982 and the 1986 general elections.

In 1986 the support of the UGT was more difficult to achieve, since the first tensions between the government and the union had already emerged. In spite of those episodes of confrontation in the weeks before the 1986 general election 'El País'[56] published an article signed by Nicolás Redondo in which he explicitly expressed the support of the UGT for the PSOE. However, it is interesting to notice the caution in justifying such support by saying that it was based on a careful examination of the policies contained in the party's electoral program, rather than on strong ties or community of goals between the two organisations. Redondo was careful to rule out the possibility that supporting the party undermined the autonomy of UGT.[57] However, something was clearly changing in the type of relationship that tied the union and the party.

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[55] 'El Socialista' (15/4/1986) mentions the invitation to the UGT to participate in the debate of the electoral program.

[56] El País, 19/6/1986.

[57] According to the PSOE's documents the 1989 electoral program also included some of the UGT's demands, for example, the need to regulate the right to strike (see MG 32C 1990: 139).

"There is no doubt that the project of transformation that we defend is a shared task between the UGT and the PSOE, but we must also insist that our autonomy as a union has made us take this decision strictly as a result of considerations regarding labour demands and the programmatic offers"

"The inclusion of our demands and the verification of our syndical program with the project proposed for the coming years is the reason behind our support for a program and for a party like the PSOE, that is able to put it in practice."

There are other clear examples that the relationship was eroding. The gains resulting from the political bargain were not enough for the UGT to carry on co-operating at a time when the Constitution had already been approved and the framework of labour relations was already designed, while the economic-and political conditions and the Government's attitude made the economic exchange increasingly difficult. In addition, the UGT had the impression that the PSOE had more resources to compensate for the lack of popularity of certain economic measures with other policies, whereas the UGT had not that opportunity.

Again, it is important to bear in mind the characteristics of competition at the partisan and the corporate arena, as well as the internal politics of the PSOE and the UGT. As table 6.1 sows, in the 1986 union elections the UGT increased its percentage of delegates at workers' councils, but these results were not taken as a victory since they covered an increase of support at small and medium sized firms at the expense of an important loss at big firms. The CCOO won the elections in large firms (Paramio 1990: 77). According to Paramio (1990) and Maravall (1997: 176ft) these results led some union leaders to interpret them as a political failure, and to see their close link with the PSOE (party and government) as one of the causes for that loss of support.[58] This would help to explain the changing evaluation of the costs and benefits of supporting the Government, which made the UGT accelerate its separation from the PSOE and the government in 1987, when it refused to resume the negotiations for wage restraint and two important UGT leaders resigned as PSOE deputies in Parliament.

In the partisan arena the PSOE had virtually no opposition since both the Communist and the Popular Party were undergoing severe internal crises and encountered serious difficulties in finding leaders that could compete with Felipe González. As a result of the lack of competitiveness there were few reasons to give in to more union demands out of fear of

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[58] Solchaga suggests in an interview with Burns (1996: 158) a way in which the fear of losing the 1986 union elections might have influenced the readiness of the UGT to reach agreements on wage restraint with the Government: "Still in 1986, when inflation had reduced considerably, and the forecast was good, I proposed to Nicolás Redondo to reach a social pact for the following year with a 5% wage increase, he first accepts and then breaks the negotiations because he was afraid of losing the [1986 union] elections."

losing votes. Another consequence was that the weight of the opposition to the governmental policies was carried more by union movement than by the political parties.[59]

There were still a few activities in which both organisations participated, but they tended to decrease over the years.[60] For example, in 1983 Felipe González participated in the celebration of Labour Day, that was organised by the UGT, while in 1986[61] and 1987[62] his place was filled by the PSOE Secretary of Organisation. At this time the two most important trade unions organised Labour Day demonstrations separately, something that would change as soon as the rupture with the PSOE became a fact.

Parallel to the increase of confrontation between the UGT and the government, the strength of those in favour of maintaining a close link with the party decreased inside the UGT. A coalition was gradually being forged between those UGT leaders who had always supported complete union autonomy[63] and those who were in favour of maintaining close ties with the PSOE, but thought that working inside the PSOE to change the government policies was simply not effective and therefore preferred to break these ties rather than acquiesce with the government's economic policy. There was only a small group inside the union who insisted on the need to come to an agreement with the government and keep ties with the PSOE (see Zambrana 1990).

The PSOE, on the contrary, still showed interest in having overt close links with the UGT. For instance, in the opening address to the 31st Congress (January 1988), when the relationship between the Government and the UGT was in an extremely delicate phase, Felipe González publicly offered a position in the PSOE Federal Executive Commission to the UGT. However, it was also clear that the social and economic policy of the government was not going to change much, since it was not ready to actually give anything in return for a UGT move that would have brought it closer to the PSOE. That offer can also be interpreted as a way the PSOE had to put all the burden of the bad relationship between the PSOE and the UGT onto the UGT's. In the PSOE 31st Congress resolutions there is still a passage about the need to consolidate the UGT as the first trade union which:

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[59] "There was virtually no opposition... Spain was persuaded to have a Socialist government for a long time, because there was no opposition. The unions inherited from the mass media the opposition role" (Carlos Solchaga in Burns 1996: 159).

[60] Here the discussion refers mainly to activities carried out by the central authorities of each organisation, not to the regional, provincial and local levels.

[61] El País 25/4/1986 "Txiki Benegas [PSOE Secretary of Organisation] will represent the PSOE in the UGT's First of May celebration."

[62] El Socialista 428 (30/4/87).

[63] Many of these leaders were part of the USO group that had joined the UGT in October 1977.

"...must be the main strategic ally for the socialist project.... As a result, the party must work for the consolidation of the UGT as the main union organisation and to keep a relationship of close co-operation based on common interest and shared ideas. That's why we are worried about the scarce syndical activity of party members and the lack of thinking about labour problems inside the party, which are mistakenly presented as a demonstration of respect for the UGT, but in practice hide and nourish the lack of interest of many socialists in union issues." (Res31C 1988: 81)

There was an increasing preoccupation among the party leaders with the effects of a rupture with the UGT. Although union membership was low, the UGT's manifest loss of confidence in the government had serious potential political consequences in weakening the credibility of the socialist policies and limiting the room for further reforms (Maravall 1997: 175). At the time it was thought that it was also likely to have electoral costs, although their size was uncertain.

At the beginning of 1988 the signs of rupture were evident. Nicolás Redondo and José Antonio Saracíbar, along with other less known UGT leaders, had given up their seat in Congress, the instruments of co-ordination between the two organisations had disappeared and the public declarations of the leaders of both organisations in the media were harsh.

2.3. The 1988 General Strike and its consequences on the UGT-PSOE links

The growing tensions between the socialist government and the labour movement, and more concretely the UGT, culminated in a general strike held on the 14th December 1988, called by the CCOO and the UGT. It was directed against the Youth Employment Scheme (Plan de Empleo Juvenil), a scheme that subsidised employers if they took on school leavers with short term contracts paying them the minimum wage. The unions were fiercely opposed to this plan. The UGT demanded the immediate withdrawal of the scheme, the extension of unemployment coverage, increases in pensions and increases in public sector wages to compensate for the unexpected inflation increase.[64]

The tension between the two organisations escalated, with mutual accusations of interference in internal affairs. The PSOE accused the UGT of purging those people who were against the strike, whereas the UGT accused the PSOE and the government of trying to interfere in the UGT's internal affairs by organising meetings with cadres in an attempt to convince them to vote against the general strike. The leaders of both organisations exchanged insults in the media, and the atmosphere was one of clear confrontation.

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[64] See the interviews and articles collected by Juliá (1989) for information on the positions of the most important participants and observers of the general strike.

As soon as the strike was called a campaign started inside the PSOE to counter the arguments put forward by the unions, and particularly by the UGT, so as to limit the success of the strike. In spite of the attempt to mobilise support for the government's policy, the strike was a success. González quickly recognised this fact and offered to negotiate with trade unions, agreeing to withdraw the youth unemployment scheme and to adjust pensions and public sector wages to inflation but he refused to expand the unemployment coverage levels (Boix 1995: 28). From then on the government repeatedly tried to establish new social pacts with the unions, but these offers were rejected by the UGT which by this time had started to come close to the CCOO. They launched a joint platform in which they demanded more social expenditure, greater government planning of the economy, an extensive housing policy and a fairer tax system (Boix 1995: 28).

There were no other instances of social concertation for the rest of the Socialists' time in office. According to Boix (1995) one of the reasons that explains the few incentives for the union movement to engage in a process of social concertation is that their clientele was composed of skilled manual workers present in medium and large companies, and therefore it was unlikely that unions were eager to exchange wage restraint for more employment among temporary and unskilled workers. Once the objectives of democratic consolidation, the discussion of the status of union organisations and the establishment of a framework of union relations had been completed, the unions were left with objectives strictly related to labour relations and started to be more responsive to their clienteles.

The rupture and open conflict between the PSOE and the UGT was an intense experience for PSOE members. All leaders and cadres interviewed agree in stressing the emotional components of the crisis of the relations between the two organisations. For example, Joaquín Almunia, who at the time of the general strike was Ministry of Public Administration, referred to this in a personal interview as follows:

> "This was a very difficult moment in the party, as a drama. In both places the feeling was that we were a split family, the atmosphere of divorce, of children that see how their parents get divorced. It was not a divorce where everything is agreed upon and settled but a divorce with tensions and fights, and this meant a break with a tradition that was a hundred years old."

A high ranking official of the PSOE even referred to the conflict as a "hidden split", alluding to the fact that cadres and leaders, and to a lesser extent the rank and file, were forced to decide where to stand. If one looks at the yearly figures for party members (see graphs and tables in chapter 5) these events are not seen to have a great effect. The index of growth is smaller than in other phases, but does not in principle look like a "hidden split" (unless there

was one which had been accompanied by a big influx of new members). It is also possible that due to the problems with the internal census this "hidden split" is not reflected in membership figures and refers to the fact that members, even if they did not renounce their membership in the two organisations, in practice had to decide whether to remain fully involved in party activities or in union activities, due to the confrontation between the two.

There was also, to a great extent, "a bad conscience" among the PSOE leadership and the government about the way things had gone, but at the same time both insisted that the PSOE and the government had tried to establish negotiations to stop the general strike until the very last minute, that the party had offered the leader of the UGT a position at the Executive Commission, which he had refused, but in the final analysis the PSOE blamed the UGT for what had happened, as becomes clear in some of the things that were said in the first meeting of the Federal Committee of the PSOE *after* the General Strike:

> "The common meeting places have gradually disappeared, the instruments to solve problems, the attendance of the UGT General Secretary at the Executive meeting, the attendance of important union leaders at the meetings of the Federal Committee and the breaking of the joint committee PSOE-UGT" [...] "This was not done following the wishes of the party that still thinks the traditional model is the right one, but because the UGT has abandoned that model, in a clear agreement with the communist union."[65]

The PSOE was not of one mind on this matter. The internal "current of opinion" Izquierda Socialista was open in its support of some of the claims put forward by the union movement. Although other leaders manifested their sympathy with the union's demands, most PSOE leaders started publicly questioning the relationship with the UGT, in particular the compulsory double membership in UGT for members of the PSOE. The PSOE Executive wanted an explanation of the fact that most of those members of UGT who had defended the party's positions had been sanctioned.

> "Given that membership at the UGT is compulsory for PSOE members, and since many of them have been punished for defending the party positions, the Federal Committee finds it necessary that the UGT says something about the convenience of maintaining the traditional presence of socialist union members inside its organisation." (El Socialista 458, 15th January 1989)

The PSOE reacted to the general strike and the internal moves inside the union against those who supported the government by launching a new policy regarding its presence in the

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[65] These two paragraphs come from a report of the meeting of the Federal Committee that took place on 13-14 January 1989 in which the relationship between the PSOE and UGT after the General Strike was debated. (El Socialista 468 (15/1/89).

workplace. The justification given for this was that up until that moment the PSOE's workplace presence had been basically ensured by the UGT, and therefore it did not need to have a direct presence there. The *"responsables en las fábricas"* were created to represent the interests of the PSOE in the workplace. This scheme was supposed to rely on workers who were PSOE members, who would be contacted by a co-ordinator of the party at the provincial level, who would be in charge of directing and co-ordinating the activities of these "delegates". According to what was published, these delegates would support the UGT at the union elections, and the main motivation for the creation of this new figure was that the PSOE would now have to do the work that up until the rupture had been carried out by the UGT.

According to the PSOE documents it seems either a "bluff" or just a failure, since there is no mention of those stages nor of the phases of implementation of that project. In the information published in 'El Socialista' about the new policy there were no definite deadlines to carry out this scheme, nor definite objectives, and there is hardly any further reference to this. The information regarding this issue published by the press does report a more definite plan with concrete stages and deadlines, but the internal documents and the party magazine do not reflect these details.[66]

An important example of the change in the relationship between the two was the withdrawal of the support of the UGT at the European Elections of June 1989. These were the first elections that were held after the General strike and the UGT did not call on its members to vote for the PSOE. What is more important, the UGT did not support the PSOE at the following general elections, which were held in October that year. Nicolás Redondo stated that the UGT did not explicitly support any political party, but given the historical trajectory of support to the socialists it was clear that stopping a tradition of explicitly backing the PSOE at the elections had a special meaning, and therefore it was difficult to take at face value the political neutrality of the UGT in these elections.

From the electoral point of view the PSOE was not ready to make big concessions in order to have the support of the UGT, which was considered neither a big asset nor a big liability. In other words, if there was a very low price to pay then the PSOE was ready to accept it, given the low costs associated with having close links with a union. However, if the costs were in policy concessions it was not ready to make them because the benefit of explicit union support was not that great.

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[66] (El País 6/2/89).

The compulsory membership at the UGT, which was only effectively followed by less than 50% of the party membership (see table 6.2),[67] was finally abolished at the 32nd Party Congress (November 1990). The article that regulated double membership in the party statutes was substituted with the obligation to be active in *any* social movement. The only concession to the UGT was that art. 10 explicitly stated that if members did choose to participate in the labour movement, the party recommended to do so in the UGT.

From the rupture onwards the relationship between the PSOE and the UGT was formally similar to what it has with the other main confederation, the CCOO, although at the regional, provincial and local levels there is still a closer relationship between the PSOE and the UGT.[68] An example of this is that there were members of the CCOO in the Federal Committee and also members of the PSOE at the CCOO executive body. The relationship with the UGT, although different to what it had historically been, also improved with time. The change in the leadership of both the UGT and the CCOO may have contributed to the appeasing of the previously conflictual relations, as well as the transformation in the political and social conditions, particularly after the PSOE into opposition.

3. The PSOE and other social movements (1975-1996)

The wish to establish a close relationship with social movements has been present in the PSOE documents and statements during the whole period studied, but it is doubtful that this has translated into concrete actions. The way this relationship has been understood, the degree to which the general objective of having close links with the social movements and secondary organisations has been specified into manageable goals and the extent to which concrete measures have been taken have varied over the years. The following section gives an overview of the policy of the party vis-à-vis secondary organisations in the post-transition period. It is divided into two phases, one between the transition and the arrival of the Socialists to government, and the second covering the Socialists' time in office (1983-1996).

Given the large amount of organisations one should look at to study this issue, the analysis will remain at a general level and will mainly rely on party documents and interviews with the PSOE leaders, therefore giving "one side of the picture", the party side. The scarcity of previous studies of this topic represents a further impediment to a deeper analysis.

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[67] According to the results of the 1989 survey of the PSOE rank and file, 56.5% of the party members were in favour of abolishing the provision of compulsory membership in the UGT, while 30.5% were in favour of maintaining it, 11.3% were hesitant and 1.6% did not know or did not answer.

[68] Joaquín Almunia, personal interview (14/6/96).

3.1. Before government: 1977-1982

One of the characteristics of Franco's regime was its demobilising effects. The first period of Francoism was characterised by intense political repression and "a totalitarian attempt at ideological reorientation on a fascist model" (Alvárez-Junco 1994: 309). In the 1960s social movements emerged enhanced by the economic and social change that included workers, students, nationalists, citizen/neighbourhood associations and feminist organisations (Alvárez Junco 1994: 311). An important characteristic of these movements, particularly of the citizen movement, was "their formal rejection of any form of support that implied some kind of dependency upon a party organisation" (Castells 1983: 273). Another example of this is the self-definition of feminist movements as "autonomous" and "independent from political parties". In compensation for this independence these movements permitted simultaneous membership of a political party, which in the case of feminist organisations was usually the Communist Party (Folguera 1988: 120).

At the end of Franco's regime and during the start of the transition to democracy the left-wing parties regarded these movements in different ways. For the radical left, grassroots protest was part of a potential revolutionary process, while for the PCE it was an additional factor in a massive popular peaceful protest within their general strategy of *ruptura* that would put an end to Franco's regime. For the PSOE these movements were also additional means to put forward their demands to end the dictatorship. The PCE was the strongest party among these movements; most of its activists considered the PCE as a reference point when discussing their strategies and accepted the need to subordinate their strategy to that of the PCE. The PCE, as has been mentioned in other sections of the thesis, was the party with the strongest organisation both in the opposition to Franco's regime and during the transition to democracy. For Alvárez Junco (1994: 323) it was this politicisation of social movements that would eventually lead to their undoing.

Although social movements, including the labour organisations, had an important role in the transition to democracy especially by exerting pressure and organising demonstrations during the first years of the transition, political parties were the main agents of reform. An important consequence of the *politics of consensus*[69] carried out by party elites was the demobilisation of previously active sectors of the population, so that these elites could reach global agreements without having to win the support of their respective clienteles after every

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[69] See chapter 2 for an explanation of the main characteristics of the Spanish transition to democracy and of the meaning of the "politics of consensus".

single decision. The politics of consensus would eventually contribute to what was called *desencanto*[70] (disenchantment), which in turn provoked more demobilisation.

Social movements were, and still are, very weak in Spain. Table 6.4 shows the low percentage of the population that belonged to an association or voluntary organisation in 1981 (only 31% of the population), and the even smaller proportion of the population who declared to work actively in secondary organisations (23%). The same table shows that the proportion of citizens that participated in any kind of organisation was even smaller in 1990. The associative weakness that has traditionally characterised Spanish society was exacerbated by the difficulties the social movements faced in abandoning the practices of illegality and adapting to the changed environment of the democratic regime. Another factor which contributed to increase the weakness of social movements in the transition period was that they lost a good part of their cadres who went into politics, at the national, regional, and mostly at the local level (Alberich 1993: 102). This marked the beginning of a process of "institutionalisation" of the social movements, understood as an increasing presence in and reliance on political institutions.

Table 6.4. The organisational weakness of Spanish society 1981-1990

	1981	1990
% that belong to associations/voluntary organisations.................	31	22
% active in those organisations..	23	12

Source: Orizo 1991: 133.

All that said, the PSOE repeatedly stated in its documents that one of its priorities was to be present in the different social movements in several manners: first through the active work of party members in the different associations and secondly through contacts between the leadership of both organisations at the different territorial levels. There was a Secretary of Sectional Action at the Federal Executive Commission whose responsibility was to establish contacts with different types of secondary associations. The party leaders considered the contacts with secondary organisations as a useful instrument to transmit the party policies and programmatic offers, but the direct competition with the PCE for the support of these movements probably constituted the most important stimulus for the PSOE.

The tone of the recommendations of several PSOE documents to its members to participate in social movements reveals the tendency of the party and their members to attempt

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[70] The term *desencanto* was coined to describe the feelings of impotence as well as the destruction of millenarian revolutionary expectations (Alvárez Junco 1994: 321).

to control the different movements in which they participated: "The PSOE must be there [inside the social movements] without a wish to control them" (Boletín Socialista, Dec. 1980).[71] Again, the 29th Congress Resolutions (1981) insisted on the need to participate in social movements, while at the same time respecting their autonomy. The resolutions referred to the need of the PSOE to reach social movements such as ecologist groups, consumer organisations in the context of the defence of the "bloc of classes" strategy that was put forward by the party elite once the narrow definition of class party had been left behind after 1979. The establishment of links with secondary organisations was considered, albeit in a very vague and abstract way, as a means to get closer to new groups of support. There was also explicit recognition of some kind of a political exchange with social movements, although less explicit than with the UGT, by which the party committed itself to push for legislation in favour of social movements, particularly in favour of their participation at the local level (Res 29C 1981, Boletín Socialista Nov.-Dec. 1981).

The socialists designed specific measures to promote the activities of the rank and file in social movements. First, the PSOE created the working groups called "Socialist Groups". Each Socialist Group was associated to a policy issue such as education, health, ecology and the environment, social services, consumer rights and women's issues. As was mentioned in chapter 5, these groups were created firstly with the aim of increasing the level of activity of members, since their passivity had been attributed, at least partially, to the territorial structure of the party, and secondly, to improve the presence of party members in social movements in order to attract members and/or votes. Another sign of the intention of "openness" with which these groups were created was the fact that sympathisers of the party were encouraged to participate in their activities:

> "the socialist groups should [...] try to bridge the gap between social movements and left parties, between social and political activism." (Ciriaco de Vicente. Boletín Socialista, 7, 1980)

> "The work of the Socialist Groups will take place in the Casas del Pueblo" [...]. "They are not autonomous, they are just a manifestation of the deepening of territorial activism." (Res 29C: 66).

The activities carried out by these groups were very few and, according to the party magazine, most of them took place in 1981. These activities included two/three days meetings

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[71] Without evaluating the sincerity of such recommendation (' without controlling them') I understand it as a reaction to they way PSOE members were participating in the social movements.

devoted to debating one single topic such as the *"Jornadas Socialistas en Defensa de los Consumidores"* (Boletín Socialista, January 1981), or the *"Jornadas Socialistas sobre Minusválidos"* (Boletín Socialista, April 1981).[72] These working sessions probably had a difficult time reaching the media, which suggests the limited extent to which this strategy served the purpose of "opening up" the party. It is difficult to ascertain the impact they had in the different specific communities directly concerned with each of the issues discussed.

To sum up, the phase between Franco's death and the 1982 elections was dominated by the recognition of the PSOE of the value of participating in social movements as a means to get support. The PSOE documents showed some reflection on the idea of importing the principle of organisation along functional or thematic lines into its own party organisation, but it is clear that the territorial principle predominated and other criteria were accepted only as long as they did not alter the hierarchical territorial structure. Both political parties and social movements were trying to adapt their structures and organisational capacities to the requirements of a democratic political system. The extent to which real collaboration between the two occurred was very limited, and in any case, very difficult to document. One gets the impression that the collaboration in this phase was moved by a "negative" reason, i.e., to avoid the presence of the Communist Party among the social movements. In any case it is difficult to find evidence of attempts to establish an enduring collaboration between the PSOE and the social movements.

3.2. The PSOE in government 1982-1996

The loss of personnel and of visibility of the party organisation that took place when the PSOE entered office hindered the establishment and maintenance of close links between the party organisation and social movements. There was a drastic slow down of all party activity, that included the adoption of a functional criterion to the organisation of the party and the development of relations with social movements. This is recognised in the Report of the activities of the Federal Executive Commission between 1984 and 19988 presented at the 31st Federal Congress (1988):

> "Immediately after the 30th Congress (1984) we started the task of reconstructing the [Socialist] groups and committees that had clearly declined their activities since the arrival of the Socialists in government." (MG 31 1988: 50)

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[72] The English translation would be "Socialist workshop about consumer rights" and "Socialist workshop about disabilities".

The relationship between the PSOE and the social movements was discussed at the 1983 Conference of Organisation. The possibility of "collective membership" was included in the statement issued after this Conference, as a recommendation to be approved at the 30th Congress (1984). The collective affiliation was available for cultural, professional and other types of associations of different social movements (ecology, citizen, etc.) whose goals were compatible with those of the PSOE and whose members had agreed to adhere to the PSOE (PSOE Statutes 1984, art.6). The application had to be addressed to the Executive Commission at the territorial level where the organisation operated, and had to be approved by the Federal, Regional or Provincial Committee, which would also decide on the representation of the association in the Party Congresses and Committees (excluding the Executive Commissions). The provision of collective affiliation seems to have been a failure, since it was only used on two occasions,[73] and this only if we apply a broad meaning of the term secondary organisation.[74] Different party officials report the lack of interest on both sides, the PSOE and the would-be member organisations. It seems undeniable that the instrument of collective affiliation did not serve the purpose to bring the PSOE closer to secondary organisations operating in the different social movements.

From 1984 the work related to secondary organisations and social movements was concentrated in an area under the command of an Executive Secretary of the Federal Executive Commission. This could be considered an indication of a greater concern of the PSOE with this issue, although even the name chosen for that Executive Secretary is a sign of the increasing distance between the party and society: "Secretary of Citizen Participation", later on changed to "Secretary of Social Movement and Citizen Participation" and finally, from 1994, "Secretary of Relations with Society".

Although in general the social movements had a lower membership than in the previous phase (see table 6.4), during the Socialists' term in office they mobilised against some governmental measures. An example of these are the anti-NATO campaign in favour of the "no vote" in the NATO referendum, the mobilisation of students against the education reform and the already mentioned general strike of December 1988. Yet, as Alvárez Junco (1994) points out, none of these protests meant a reconstruction of social movements. According to this

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[73] Alejandro Cercas, personal interview, January 1996. He referred to two foundations mainly composed by ex-communists, the Fundación Europa and another Foundation led by the ex-communist leader, Santiago Carrillo. The two cases obviously do not match very well the spirit of the instrument of collective affiliation as defined in the PSOE Statutes.

[74] José Antonio Gómez Yáñez, personal interview, 17/2/95. He also defends this point in an unpublished paper entitled "El partido de los ciudadanos: el impulso democrático."

author (1994: 321) these demonstrations were vehicles for the expression of general frustration and discontent of different groups with their situation but also with the arrogant style of governing of the Socialists. This helps to explain the difficulties in consolidating these protest movements in stable single-issue movements.

The Executive Commission Report (presented at the 31st Party Congress, 1988) explains the lines of action followed in relation to secondary organisation and social movements. The main objective was to increase the socialists' presence in the different social movements, an aim that was pursued in two ways. The first initiative consisted on increasing the contacts between the different levels of the party organisation and the leaders of different organisations. This was considered an effective manner to reach the secondary organisations, although it was acknowledged that it was a problem to restrain the contact to the elite level:

> "We have given priority to the work with leaders because we have the capacity to access a hundred people... In order to reach millions of people we contact the movement leaders, although we are aware they are also part of a bureaucracy." (Alejandro Cercas, personal interview, January 1996)

The second initiative to increase the presence of the PSOE in the social movements was the (re)launch of the Sectional Groups (single-issue groups). As has been mentioned before, these were considered a means to organise activism around different topics, although the organic power and decision-making power remained a competence of the territorial structure. The most important single issue groups dealt with ecology, social services, citizenship movement, health and consumer rights.

From 1988 (31st Congress) the Federal Secretary of Citizens' Participation also encouraged the creation of Secretaries of Citizen Participation at each territorial level and the nomination of co-ordinators of the party for each type of social movement at the regional and provincial levels. The tasks of these co-ordinators consisted in directing the work of party members in these different organisations. The idea was to have a network of co-ordinators, and it was to a large extent achieved, although the results are very difficult to evaluate.

The third path of action, as stated by the Secretary of Citizen Participation at the 31st Congress, was to support the existing social movements that had goals similar to those of the PSOE, was well as to give incentives for the creation of organisations 'close to the Socialists'. This represents a qualitative difference with the other strategies, it was no longer developing means to relate to existing organisations, now the idea was to actually promote the creation of *separate organisations*. Unfortunately, again in this case it is extremely difficult to have an idea

of the extent to which this idea was applied, not to mention the problems in ascertaining its success.

The Secretary of Women's' Participation was in charge of establishing contact with the women movement. It listed as one of its priorities the goal encouraging the associative life of socialist women, both in affiliation to women associations or creating them where they did not exist. The creation of the Federation of Progressive Women in October 1988 was part of this attempt of the PSOE to get in contact with women associations in order to lead the women's movement (MG 31C 1988: 110). Even if, as the rest of secondary associations, women associations were few and very weak these were relatively successful moves geared at showing the concern of the PSOE with women's issues, with the aim to become a party that was identified with the defence of such issues. However, this attempt co-existed with difficulties in implementing internal measures such as the 25% quota for female representation, both in the internal bodies and in the electoral lists.[75]

Finally, from the 32nd Congress (1990) it is worthwhile noticing an increasing interest of the party in relation to associations of liberal professionals. Different steps were taken in order to improve these links: the first one consisted in identifying the profession/occupation of party members, which was considered a preliminary task, necessary to organise some kind of activity around professional interests (MG 32C: 98). The idea was to organise two/three day meetings around one topic, which brought together party members in that particular field, professionals and sympathisers. The 1990 Executive Report mentions the celebration of a Conference of Socialist Doctors and Practitioners.

A significant change in the formal relationship with the party and social movements took place at the 32nd Congress (1990). The obligation of party members to be affiliated to the UGT was removed from the party statutes and exchanged for an obligation to participate in *any* social movement. If this was a labour organisation the recommended choice was the UGT (PSOE Statutes 1990, art.10). With the inclusion of this clause, the nominal commitment of the party with the social movements increased though it is not clear that this made any practical difference. According to the 1994 Executive Commission Report, around 30% of party members took part in other organisations; the highest percentage corresponded to Parents' associations, neighbourhood, cultural, sports, pensioners and professional organisations,

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[75] The report of the Federal Committee meeting of 10/5/86 mentions the complaints of Alfonso Guerra about the lack of compliance of regional federations of the recommendations to include women in the electoral lists (MG 31C: 140). The difficulties in including women in the lists, particularly in positions where they had good chances of being elected persisted in subsequent elections, according to several party officials interviewed.

followed at a great distance by ecologists, pacifists, consumer groups and student organisations. The level of participation was lower than the one obtained just before the 32nd Congress (1990) which was around 39% (MG32 1990: 87). It is interesting to note the emphasis with which the management reports presented to the 32nd and 33rd Party Congress mentioned that a good proportion of those party members that participated in other organisations had been "democratically elected to be part of the governing bodies of these organisations" (MG 32, 1990: 88, MG 33, 1994: 134).

However, as the Secretary of Citizen Participation acknowledged in a personal interview "a very small proportion of that 30% has been directly promoted by the party". Here it is important to distinguish between the incentives for party members and cadres to participate in other organisations and the incentives offered to these organisations to establish contact with the PSOE. As far as the former are concerned, in practice there were even negative incentives for party members to be active in other organisations, since the activity in these movements is, not in general valued by the middle-level and local level cadres.[76] This is also pointed out by a member of the 1994-97 Federal Executive Commission:

> "Given that internal power emerges from the capacity to get votes at the different party territorial levels, the efficacy of a member's activism is greater if he/she devotes his/her time to acquiring internal control instead of defending the positions of the party in the street" (Joaquín Almunia, personal interview, 14/6/96).

It is difficult to find indicators of the degree of activity of single-issue groups. The Executive Commission Report to the 31st Congress (1988) shows information about the regularity of their internal publications: the groups that dealt with Social Services had published an internal bulletin roughly twice a year since June 1985, and the same applies for the group dealing with the citizen movement, which had started in 1986. However both the groups dealing with Ecology and Environment and with Health issues had only published two issues in four years, whereas the one that dealt with Consumers Rights just one (MG 31, 1988: 52). To be sure, it is not a perfect indicator of the degree of activity, but it does point at a low and irregular level of activity. Another possible indicator, given the difficulty to find them, could be the number of meetings of each of these groups per year. The data shown in table 6.5 confirm the generally low level of activity in most of these groups, except for the group dealing with health issues. In the rest of the groups the activity is very irregular and only increases slightly over the years.

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[76] Alejandro Cercas, personal interview, January 1996.

At the 33rd Party Congress the way the sectional structure of the party was conceived changed slightly. For the first time it was envisaged to give the single-issue groups, now called *'Organizaciones Sectoriales'* some internal power.[77] This change responded to a widespread feeling among those in favour of a functional approach to the structure of the party that it would not be successful unless it had some internal power. The intention, also stated in the party statutes, was to initiate a change towards a situation in which members could choose whether they wanted to belong to a normal territorial branch or a functional-thematic one, and exercise their right as party members only in one of them. In order to advance in this direction the 1994 Party Statutes granted Sectional Organisations the right to organise as party branches on an experimental basis (art. 25.8). However, this does not seem to be an easy route, since this initiative still provokes many negative reactions inside the party organisation.

Table 6.5. Number of meetings of single-issue groups per year

Issue	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Health.............................	24	50	14	14	30	45
Neighbourhood................	0	2	2	7	13	15
Consumers	1	0	0	—	—	—
Environment....................	3	5	12	4	6	10
Peace and co-operation....	0	—	—	2	6	9
Sports.............................	—	—	—	2	4	8
Professionals...................	6	12	11	—	—	—
Disabilities.....................	3	13	3	7	14	7
Drugs	0	0	1	4	10	12
Childhood and family......	0	1	2	2	4	4
Social integration............	—	—	—	—	—	6
"Gitanos"	0	5	2	3	4	4
Elderly people.................	0	4	0	7	15	6
Total..............................	37	92	47	52	106	126

Source. PSOE Executive Commission Management Report 1990, 1994 and 1997.

Thus, to conclude, the relationship between the PSOE and the secondary organisations was not very successful during the time when the Socialists were in office. The PSOE documents acknowledge a certain paralysis due to the lack of a clear idea of what the relations between the party and social movements should be. The governmental status of the party also

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[77] See for example a citation that shows how the creation of single-issue groups was perceived before: "We have avoided the confrontation of a sectional/functional organisation and the territorial organisation, since we have took it that our challenge was to sectionalise the work of members, rather than the organisation" (MG 31C 1988: 50-1).

changed the perception of the different secondary organisations about the need to negotiate policy or establish contacts with the PSOE (as party organisation), or whether it was more effective to negotiate directly with the government and the administration, which was the preferred option in most cases. This coincided with an increasing dependence of secondary organisations on the State, given their reliance on public funding in order to survive.

Another factor which helps to explain the preference of organisations to deal directly with the government is the type of party-government relations that were established. In both the first phase when Alfonso Guerra was in charge of co-ordination and in the second, from the 1990s onwards, when the confrontation between the two was more evident, it was clear that for secondary organisations direct contact with the government was more effective, since it was the one that delineated the main policies. This does not mean that secondary organisations never resorted to contacts with the PSOE Executive Commission, but that they were subject to the effectiveness of direct contacts between the secondary organisations and the government/administration.

The attempts to develop single-issue branches and to organise, at least partially, according to a functional criterion can also be interpreted as a way to overcome the difficulties in establishing links with secondary organisations. However, the introduction of single-issue branches has proved to be very difficult due to the resistance of important sectors of the party organisation.

Conclusions

This chapter has investigated the nature of the links between the PSOE and secondary organisations, especially union organisations and more concretely, its links with the socialist oriented union, the UGT. The historical legacy in the case of the PSOE-UGT relationship were conducive to strong ties, given that they had been closely related for nearly a century and that their roles had hardly been differentiated during Franco's regime.

In the period from the transition to democracy to the victory of the PSOE at the 1982 general elections, the two organisations became increasingly differentiated but relied upon one another to carry out their goals in the corporate and electoral arenas. It has been argued that the structure and degree of competition in the corporate and electoral arenas is an important element that explains the disposition of the PSOE to nurture its support for the UGT both by defending its interests in the establishment of a legal and institutional framework of labour

relations, and in providing various types of practical support when worker councils' elections were held. In turn the UGT served as a channel of electoral mobilisation of workers' support to the PSOE in its goal first to become the dominant party of the left and then to win office.

The situation changed when the PSOE was in office. The relationship between the two organisations gradually deteriorated as a result of disagreements over economic and social policy, particularly after the mid 1980s. This discrepancy greatly affected the relationship between the two organisations, and the meeting points and joint activities diminished over the decade. The confrontation culminated in a general strike called by the CCOO and the UGT in 1988, after which the UGT stopped endorsing the PSOE's proposals at election campaigns. The PSOE was more reluctant to formally end the collaboration, since it provided more benefits than costs, but ended up erasing from its statutes the only formal provision that tided the two organisations, namely the obligation of PSOE members to be affiliated to the UGT.

The structure of competition was different from the previous phase; while the PSOE faced virtually no competition in the electoral arena, the UGT encountered a higher competitive situation with its rival union, the CCOO, in the corporate arena. In addition, the potential benefits the UGT could extract from its collaboration with the PSOE were few in a moment when most of the institutional and legal instruments that regulated labour relations were already in place and given the type of economic policy being followed. The internal politics of both organisations also played a role in the relationship between the two.

The ties between the PSOE and other new and old social movements have been weak for the whole period analysed. This can be attributed both to the organisational weakness of Spanish social movements, and to the lack of PSOE initiative in carrying out measures to develop strong links with them. It is only in the phase immediately after the transition to democracy when there were significant efforts, partially explained by its competition with the PCE for the support from these groups.

The relationship between the PSOE and the secondary organisations of the different social movements was not very successful during the socialists term in office. As has been argued, the governmental situation of the party also changed the perception of the different secondary organisations about the need to negotiate policy or establish organisational contacts with the party organisation, or whether it was more effective to negotiate directly with the government and the administration, which was the preferred options in most cases.

In short, although in written documents and statements the PSOE has always expressed its wish to be present in social movements, concrete ideas and actions about how to collaborate with them have not yet become clear. The introduction of the sectional-functional

criterion in the PSOE organisation, in addition to the territorial one, may be one way to make the party organisation and its members closer to the social movements, but the steps toward the establishment of such sectional organisations so far have been rather timid.

CHAPTER 7. COMMUNICATION AND THE ORGANISATION OF ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS

Introduction

The electoral success of a party depends, at least partly, on the way it responds to the demands of the population, its success in proposing policies that find the support of large groups of the electorate, its command of resources and ability to spread these policy proposals, and its capacity to use in the most advantageous way the incentives contained in the electoral law. Some elements of this list refer to the actual content of party policies, but others emphasise the means by which these policies are conveyed to the electorate. This relates to the discussion of whether it is what parties do that matters most, or what they say and how they say it. Parties, as other organisations, devote resources to managing their image both at election and non-election times. To be sure, the image of a party to a large extent is built on the messages it puts across and the policies it supports, but it is also undeniable that the way in which these "contents" are conveyed is also extremely important. Communicating, creating images, developing strategies can become as important as policies or facts themselves are.

This chapter focuses on these attempts to communicate policies and messages to the electorate at large as a means of winning their support, mainly at election but also at non-election times. As was mentioned in the introductory pages one of the major questions that this thesis attempts to answer is the extent to which this party activity - communication strategies and capacities to carry out election campaigns - is developed in relation to other party activities. The chapter will centre around three main questions. The first relates to the way the PSOE has confronted the need to communicate with the electorate at large. This involves looking at the structures, personnel and resources that the PSOE has devoted to communication efforts, and more particularly to the organisation of election campaigns. The analysis of the organisation of general election campaigns will constitute the main focus of the chapter.

The second important question concerns the role played by the party organisation in the organisation and implementations of campaigns, how election campaigns have conditioned the development of the party organisation, and conversely, how party organisation has conditioned

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the way campaigns have been conducted. Finally, a further relevant question refers to the interaction between external factors and challenges with internal actors. One can think of campaigns as one of those clear instances in which external goals prevail over intra-party considerations and the following analysis will examine the extent to which the campaigns of the PSOE confirm this reasoning.

1. Theoretical work regarding political communication: election campaign and communication strategies

Interest in studying political communication and campaigning has increased over the years both among practitioners and academics.[1] Notwithstanding this renewed interest, Bowler and Farrell (1992: 7) point out that "unlike voting or media studies which have well-developed research questions and methodological techniques, campaign studies are still in their relative infancy". This section of the chapter will try to overcome this shortcoming in an attempt to systematise and adapt the models that define the elements, processes and structure of campaigns. This revision does not attempt to be an exhaustive elaboration of the existing literature on the topic, but a selection of those concepts that are most useful for this thesis.

Campaigns can be generally defined as a planned set of communication activities that takes place in a specified time period, designed to achieve certain changes in the behaviour of the campaign targets, or at least to convey some information to these targets. All political campaigns have in common the search to create support or rejection for a particular policy, issue, candidate or party. In the context of party competition, election campaigns are considered the most intense period in terms of party image creation and communication with the electorate. Election campaigns are also important because they constitute the period in which parties, as citizen organisations as opposed to parliamentary groups or the government, attract the attention from the media. However, as Butler and Ranney (1992: 2) note, "electioneering" is not only confined to election campaigns; campaigns can be conceived as the culmination of a process of communication that starts after a general election takes place and lasts until the next election is held.

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[1] One of the reasons that accounts for this increasing interest has to do with the abandonment of the idea that campaigns do not make a difference in the electoral returns of a party. On the one hand the increase in the amount of available electorate which can be won by either party during the time just before an election takes place contributed to highlight the importance of election campaigns (see Farrell 1996). On the other hand, the increase of interest has to do with the transformation of the means available for campaigning (as a result of the emergence and spread of television, and more recently of other telecommunication techniques: cable TV, satellite TV, Internet).

Most studies on election campaigns have concentrated on the analysis of electoral strategies, the use of media and how party messages are conveyed, the development of party and leader images, while the organisational aspect of election campaigns has been somewhat neglected.[2] Yet, it seems an essential point to look at. The process of campaigning is an organisational effort and, of course, an organisationally mediated process.[3] The development of capacities to carry out the necessary activities to conduct effective electoral campaigns is not only confined in time to the actual campaign, but also belongs to the general organisational strategy of a party. Taking a historical perspective increases the interest in looking at the organisational aspects of campaigns. As several authors point out, it is quite likely that the complexity of organisational structure has changed in response to the need to mount more complex campaigns (Webb 1992, Bowler and Farrell 1992: 15).

What are the relevant concepts and dimensions to look at in order to study systematically the characteristics of campaigns as organisational efforts? In what follows I will set out a series of concepts/elements that are useful in analysing and characterising election campaigns from an organisational perspective, which will enable us both to characterise the development of campaign organisation in the Spanish Socialist Party since 1975.

1.1. Organisational capacities to develop campaigns

The first point to examine is the organisational infrastructure needed in order to design and carry out activities related to the tasks of campaigning and communicating with the electorate at large. The organisational requirements can be very different if a party opts to *'contract out'* communication tasks to a different agent, for example to a public relations company, if it only contracts out a part or none of this process. This is particularly pertinent to the first stages of party formation (or reconstruction after a long time of illegality) since campaign requirements are likely to trigger off an organisational development that would otherwise be slower. Alternatively, a recently formed or reconstructed party organisation might be so weak that it cannot cope with the task of organising an election campaign, and is constrained to contract out most of the activities related to campaigning to other agents.

Thus, this dimension of a party refers to the structures, personnel and resources that a political party devotes to campaign preparation, organisation and implementation. More

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[2] See Bowler and Farrell 1992, Christensen & Svåsand 1993, and Farrell 1996 for good exceptions to this statement.
[3] This idea of campaigns as organisational mediated processes is developed by Webb (1992: 286 note 1) Christensen and Svåsand (1993).

concretely, it relates to questions such as whether there is a permanent body of the party in charge of communication policy, or campaigning, or whether it is created on a temporary basis, at which level(s) of the party organisation, etc. It is also important to know who takes part in this body, how it is formed and whether other party bodies can control its activities and decisions.

1.2. Campaign phases

The analysis of campaign organisation becomes clearer if we divide it into different phases: campaign planning, implementation and evaluation. These phases can be sub-divided into different stages, but for the sake of simplicity I will not go into further details here.[4]

The *planning* of the campaign comprises the analysis of the competitive environment and the definition of objectives at different levels of generality. It involves deciding the electoral goals of the party in quantitative terms, i.e., the different goals in terms of seats won and the ranking of the different possible scenarios according to their feasibility, but also the selection of "target groups", that is, the design of an electoral strategy in order to attain those goals, involving deciding which social groups the party is going to try to appeal primarily and how it is going to do so.

The *implementation phase* corresponds to the actual election or communication campaign and the putting into practice of the strategies decided in the planning stage. Although the planning stage is usually carried out by a small number of people, it must be implemented by mobilising the whole party organisation. The period of implementation does not necessarily coincide with the period devoted to campaigning stated in the electoral law, which in the Spanish case is two weeks, although the pre-campaign period is particularly important (see Semetko 1996).

The *evaluation phase* corresponds to the appraisal of the extent to which the objectives set at the planning phase have been attained, as well as the assessment of the degree to which the means have been useful to attain them. It refers to whether a political party carries out an evaluation over the way every campaign has been conducted and draws lessons from previous experiences with prospective intentions to modify certain features or reinforce others on future occasions.

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[4] The two phases mentioned here are inspired by the work of Farrell and Bowler (1992).

1.3. Campaign dimensions: trying to characterise campaigning styles

According to the literature on election campaigning there are four main dimensions that characterise campaigning styles from an organisational perspective (and the different campaign phases mentioned before). The discussion of these dimensions will be based on the following diagram.

Figure 7.1. Summary of campaign phases, dimensions and indicators

Phases	Dimensions	Questions/indicators
Planning	• Centralisation/Decentralisation • Homogeneity/heterogeneity	Who is in charge? Selection of goals/targets
Implementation	• Labour/capital intensive • Professionalization/Amateurism	Evaluation and allocation of resources Means chosen (use of TV, party members, etc.)

1.3.1. Dimension 1: centralisation/decentralisation

Parties need to communicate reactions to events that take place during the campaign, and this is expected to lead to *centralisation* in order to co-ordinate messages and responses. Historically there is a shift from campaigns designed and organised by dispersed local party organisations to central co-ordination of the campaign by the national leadership. This is also expected to vary according to several institutional factors such as the media structure of a country and its electoral system.

It is important to examine which stages and aspects of electoral campaigns are centralised and to what extent. Centralisation may have different effects on the planning and the implementation of an election campaign. In this respect it is important to notice that the increasing use of new technologies is not only likely to affect the conduct of campaigns, but also their preparation and co-ordination: the Internet, faxes, cellular phones can all increase campaign co-ordination by the central party authorities.[5] The degree to which party central authorities control and allocate resources to different constituencies and the extent to which

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[5] As Butler and Ranney note (1992: 280) "they are particularly helpful in securing quick agreement on damage limitation when an untoward event or an oratorical gaffe embarrasses a campaign".

they can control what is said and how the campaign should be conducted in each region are indicators of campaign centralisation. In order to study all this it is essential to know how the internal communications within the party take place during election campaigns and how coherence is ensured.

1.3.2. Dimension 2: homogeneity/heterogeneity

Homogeneity/heterogeneity of the campaign design, activities and contents is another relevant dimension that characterises election campaigns and their organisation. It relates to the extent of standardisation of campaign activities and messages across the territory, i.e., across electoral districts. It is related to centralisation in one respect: in principle centrally designed campaigns are more likely to be homogeneous in contents, than non-centrally designed campaigns.

This is one of the dimensions which is supposed to have been most influenced by the spread of mass media and new technologies, although the direction of the effects are somewhat contradictory given the opportunities that these means of communications provide both to reach the whole electorate, but also to differentiate messages for specific audiences. On the one hand television typically has a national coverage and produces undifferentiated messages, both from the social and the territorial point of view. As a result, campaigns are said to have become more homogeneous in the recent years. As Farrell (1996: 171) states: "Campaigns have become more standardised, marked in particular by greater uniformity in the campaign message and in its presentation by the organisation countrywide". On the other hand, as Farrell has also pointed out, the increasing use of computers and other new technologies may have the opposite effect: permitting market segmentation and targeting as opposed to standardisation. Thus, the use of new technologies hinges upon the *homogeneity* of election campaigns, although not in any simplistic way.

The degree of *homogeneity* of campaign efforts and messages can also be influenced by other features of the environment. For example, one might expect campaigns in rural and urban areas to be different: since the life-styles of individuals living in these areas are different the efforts of parties so as to capture their attention are also likely to be different in nature. Whether or not these differences exist, and whether it remains so in the era of TV needs to be established.

As was pointed out in chapter 3, other features of the institutional setting can have an effect on the homogeneity of campaign organisation and contents. For instance, the degree of political decentralisation of a State. Where regional authorities are important it may be

worthwhile for candidates to depart from the centrally designed messages in order to increase their prestige as regional leaders. The electoral system is also expected to have some influence on the degree of homogeneity/differentiation of campaign messages and organisation across the territory. As was shown in chapter 3, the Spanish electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies displays very different rates of proportionality depending on the size of the electoral district, which gives votes in different districts a very different "value" in terms of seats. This, combined with the degree and structure of election competition at a particular place and time, leads one to anticipate heterogeneous campaign efforts across the territory.

Another factor that might influence the homogeneity of campaign planning/implementation is the internal party cohesion. One would expect homogeneity of campaign organisation and contents to be higher as internal cohesion increases, and tensions among intra-party groups to hinder homogeneity/standardisation of messages. Again, whether this is the case, and whether there are mechanisms linking party cohesion to campaign organisation in this fashion, remain to be examined empirically.

1.3.3. Dimension 3: labour intensive/capital intensive

This dimension relates mainly to the means chosen in order to put across the party viewpoints and policies. As Ware states (1996: 296), there are two main "generalised" resources that can be used in an election campaign: money and labour, and they are only interchangeable to a limited extent. Money and labour make possible rather different kinds of campaigns: money can be used to buy time on TV, produce and locate posters, pay mailing and so on, while labour can be used in canvassing and leafleting. Although money can be used to contract "labour" there are certain activities that party members carry out, such as canvassing, that are difficult to "buy" from a company with similar results. Ware (1996: 397) distinguishes four methods that parties may employ to communicate with voters, obviously linked to the types of activities they perform. Each requires a different mixture of capital and labour:

- intensive personal contact: using friends, neighbours, etc.,
- non-intensive forms of personal contact: canvassing, meetings, speeches,
- impersonal contact through printed arguments, slogans or images. Leaflets, posters, and campaign literature mailed to voters,
- impersonal contact through electronic communication.

Capital intensive campaigns are those based primarily on the use of TV and on the use of experts to design the publicity, slogans, and so on, while *labour intensive campaigns* are epitomised by the traditional campaign in which most effort was based on the work of party volunteers in their constituencies. The increasing use of TV, and the introduction of public finance has led authors to state that we are now witnessing more *capital-intensive* rather than *labour intensive* campaigns (Strøm 1990: 574). There has been an increase in the relative importance of money in comparison with labour as a campaign resource. Yet, even if there is little doubt that campaigns have become more *capital intensive*, it is still important to determine the extent to which *labour* is relevant, and in which types of activities it is deployed.

The television revolution meant that parties had a channel that they could use to reach directly the electorate at large, rather than concentrating their energies on organising activities such as rallies or canvassing that could only reach a part of the electorate. In addition to that, TV images were a much more powerful tool for vote-getting than written documents or the press. Therefore, the argument goes, the traditional campaign activities (i.e., circulating written documents, door to door canvassing by party volunteers, rallies and parades, posters and newspaper advertisements) were left aside.

Although there is widespread agreement in admitting an increase in the use of TV and new technologies in campaigning, this agreement is not universal with respect to the evaluation of the extent of this use, and more importantly, on its implications on party organisation. Epstein (1980), for example, suggested that the development of television would cause a decline in party membership, not just because it could displace functions of mass membership organisations, but also because the need for professional staff to manage mass media campaigns was at odds with the talents available from party members. Party members, with all these new techniques, might cease to be an electioneering need.

However, not all observers agree on this interpretation. Scarrow (1996) has pointed out that the relevant question for researchers is not whether parties and candidates have adopted new communications technologies, but whether employing these techniques has always transformed electioneering in similar ways. She advances three plausible scenarios after the arrival of TV and other mass media:

> "Three plausible scenarios describe how party organizers might view members' efforts after national electioneering becomes primarily focused on national media, they could expect members' effort to dwindle as they are replaced by new technologies, they could expect members to continue old electioneering customs, if only for the sake of party traditions, or they could hope that members would perform new tasks which would complement and perhaps enhance the new technologies." (Scarrow 1996: 89)

Thus, some authors have recently pointed to the need to be more cautions in drawing conclusions on the impact new technologies have had on party organisations, noting that their effect might have been assumed too quickly. In this vein, Frantzich (1989) shows how the adaptation of American parties to new technologies has revitalised party organisation, after an initial face of decline in front of the rise of consultants. Parties, according to this author, have discovered a new role in providing campaign services, and this has led to more profound organisational changes such as the increasing nationalisation and centralisation. A more nuanced view of the effect of new technologies is certainly needed.

Norris (1997) indicates that the modernisation of campaigning does not mean that local activity has ceased, but just that the *main* focus of the campaign battlefield has shifted to the party leadership in the television studios. As she states, several British analyses prove that constituency campaigning remains important to the results in marginal seats. What is most important for this thesis is to find out whether campaign strategists and organisers share a belief that local campaigning can make a difference. However, it is plausible to anticipate that local activity is conditioned by the general campaign strategy and only carried out to the extent that it does not collide with other campaign characteristics. Farrell (1996: 173) notes this point when he writes the following:

> "Local issues and the activities of individual politicians are acceptable only insofar as they are not in conflict with the national campaign; nothing must allow the impression to be created of splits or differences in the campaign; nothing must detract from the image of campaign homogeneity"

The increasing use of television is also connected to the increasing personalisation of campaigns. The centrality of leaders in election campaigns has run parallel to the increase in the use of television and the shift in campaign activities. Since mass media, and particular television became more important, the campaigns are focused on the figure of the leader of the party, or the candidate for Prime Minister. Whether leaders are electoral assets or liabilities is now magnified by the increasing attention drawn to them in public campaigning. By the same token, they have become powerful resources that party strategists and organisers can use in the campaign.

1.3.4. Dimension 4: professionalization/amateurism

This dimension refers to whether campaign activities are carried out by professionals or by party members. The literature on election campaigns has identified an increasing use of professionals of campaign organisation in all the activities involved in campaigning (surveys,

publicity, design of slogans, etc.) recruited from outside the party, as opposed to relying mainly on party volunteers. An indicator of the *degree of professionalization* of campaigns is the extent to which party leaders remain in control of the design and implementation of the campaign.

There is no doubt that there has been an increasing professionalization of election campaigns, which varies across political systems and also across political parties. However, it is important to give a proper definition of what is meant by professionalization.[6] Professionalization tends to be equated with the increasing reliance on experts who come from outside the party. In other words, an increasing professionalization is understood to diminish the amount of voluntary work involved in campaigning, and this is not always the case. One could be a professional in advertising, be a member of a party *and* help to organise its campaigns. This is the reason why the dichotomy proposed here opposes professionalization and amateurism, rather than focusing on whether the relationship between the party and the professionals is a contractual one or not.

The most widely used indicator to assess the extent of professionalization of election campaigns is whether a party makes use of consultants, public relations, and communication experts. In order to have a detailed picture of their role this information must be complemented with an examination of the actual role of these external consultants and the extent to which they participate in the different stages of campaigning.

With the use of these conceptual tools the next sections examine the characteristics of communication policy in the Spanish Socialist Party since the transition to democracy until the mid 1990s, placing an emphasis on the characteristics of election campaigns. The analysis will not be organised according to the dimensions described above, but these will help us to characterise the changing nature of PSOE campaigns.

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[6] It is important to differentiate the use of the term 'professionalization' in the context of campaign organisation from the classical usage of professionalization in politics, which refers to the fact that politicians are increasingly devoted only to this activity during their whole lives. Katz and Mair (1990: 20) get round the difference between professionalization in politics and in campaign organisation by using the term *"vocationalisation"* to refer to the number of people living from politics and professionalization to the shift from amateurism to hiring expertise, or to professional in-house expertise. See Von Beyme (1996) for a discussion on the changing meaning of professionalization.

2. Organisational capacities and communication policy

The rapid turn of events after the transition to democracy, and more concretely, the short period of time between the ratification of the Law of Political Reform (December 1976), the legalisation of political parties and the first general elections (held in June 1977) indicates how important it was to have a well organised team in charge of making the PSOE visible to Spanish society.

The first objective of the PSOE at the transition to democracy was to familiarise the Spanish population with the Socialist Party. This was a context in which an extremely big number of parties were competing to get a position in the new party system. The Socialist Party, however, had a major advantage compared to other parties: its history and the support of the Socialist International. However, it also had some challengers such as the Historical Socialist Party (PSOE-H) or other socialist parties whose strength was still uncertain. Unlike other leaders such as Santiago Carrillo, leader of the Communist Party, or Manuel Fraga, leader of Alianza Popular, who had been to some extent leading figures either in the Second Republic or in the opposition movement to Franco's regime, Felipe González was a new face to most of the Spanish electorate.[7]

Although a minor part of the population was already mobilised as an opposition to Franco, most of it had to be mobilised by the different parties in this very short period of time. It was an electorate that had not voted for forty years and faced a great amount of parties from which to choose. Therefore, parties had to put all their efforts in trying to get their message across in the best possible way, since, as has been said in chapter 2, these elections were particularly important given that they would set the initial shape of the party system, and those parties that did not manage to get parliamentary representation would have serious difficulties in surviving[8].

The need to have a team specialised in political communication had been a concern of the leadership of the PSOE well before the dictatorship started showing clear signs of decline. Around 1972 Alfonso Guerra gathered several people, some of whom developed their

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[7] The results of a survey carried out at the beginning of 1977 show that while only 47% of interviewees had ever heard of Felipe González 88% knew Adolfo Suárez (cited by Gunther 1986a: 459). According to many authors this would prove to be an advantage for González and the PSOE, as the electorate personalised in him their demands for change, but here it is mentioned as an example of the different task that the PSOE had ahead at that time, compared to other political parties.

[8] It should be recalled that the first local elections were not held until May 1979 while the regional ones took place after this date. .

professional careers in fields related to public relations,[9] communication and advertising, and formed a team called Instituto de Técnicas Electorales[10] (Institute of Electoral Techniques, ITE from now on). As he often points out, at that time this move was considered "*outrageous*" and "*extravagant*"[11] by the rest of the parties, which concentrated their efforts on making the regime fall. This team could count on the support of fellow European socialist parties, in particular of the Swedish, French and German ones. In the context of this co-operation, the components of the ITE travelled around Europe to learn from them techniques to organise and run election campaigns, before any other party in Spain.[12] The ITE organised not only the election campaigns but also the first PSOE Congress held in Spain after the dictatorship and the campaign for the Law of Political Reform (both in December 1976). These occasions were used as an opportunity to publicise the party's views, its leader and also its new logo.

In spite of the existence of the ITE, during the transition to democracy the PSOE recognised its limitations when dealing with the organisation of campaigns and propaganda activities due to the small size of its organisation, and to its lack of material resources, but seemed concerned with improving them. A good illustration of this concern is the inclusion in the resolutions of the 27th Party Congress (1976) of a motion related to the need to develop a strategy of communication of the party (Res27C 1976: 6). The means chosen to improve the communication of the party with the electorate corresponded more to the practice of clandestine parties than with the reality of Spanish society at that moment; there is a proposal to create a propaganda network owned exclusively by the party (Res 27C 1976: 6-7). Several passages of these resolutions showed that, after forty years of dictatorship, the PSOE had a great distrust of the existing media owned by the "bourgeoisie" to diffuse the messages and standpoints of the PSOE (in particular of TV channels). These passages correspond more to an organisation that was used to operate as a clandestine party in a hostile environment of repression than to one used to working in a democratic environment.

In the same Party Congress (27th, December 1976), a motion was approved that led to the creation of a technical department to be in charge with the design of propaganda and the

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[9] See for example the case of Julio Feo who says in his interview with Tom Burns (1996: 369): "At that stage I was working in advertising and marketing, so somehow I connected my professional interests with politics".

[10] According to Feo (1993) this team was formed by Alfonso Guerra, Roberto Dorado, Javier Tezanos, José Félix Tezanos and himself, and could count on the participation of other party members or sympathisers whose professional interests were related to public opinion studies, marketing, etc.

[11] See the interview with Guerra in Burns 1996: 130.

[12] Julio Feo, participant in the ITE, mentions the following conversation with Alfonso Guerra "We talked about the possibility that elections could be held after Franco died, and of the need to create an image for the PSOE..." (Interview published in Burns 1996: 369).

organisation of activities related to election campaigns. It is explicitly stated in these resolutions that this technical department would be composed by *"experts"* in the field of advertising. This seems to be the formalisation in the party structure defined at the 27th Congress of the already mentioned Instituto de Técnicas Electorales.[13] Alfonso Guerra[14] became the key person in the planning and implementation of electoral campaigns. The activities of this team included commissioning and analysing surveys and the recording and analysis of electoral results at different levels of aggregation (for local and regional elections), and the study of the effects of the election laws, and the design and implementation of election campaigns.[15] It was initially ascribed to the Secretary of Press and Propaganda, although in practice it worked in co-ordination with other areas of activity of the party organisation, such as the Secretary of Organisation.

During the first years after the transition to democracy the PSOE's attempt to communicate with the electorate not only entailed an adaptation to a changing environment in terms of the possibilities that the mass media offered, but mostly involved abandoning the practices associated with clandestinity. Different passages of the 1979 Federal Executive Commission Report (MG28 1979: 191) illustrate this difficulty and show that there was internal concern with the question of how to modify the party propaganda in order to transform it from a situation of clandestinity to one of free party competition.[16] Emphasis was put on the need to base the design of the party's communication strategy on careful social analysis rather than on mere impressions of the characteristics of Spanish society.

However, this concern was neither shared by the whole Executive, nor was the use of surveys or of new techniques of communication widely accepted. Among the group of *críticos* who confronted the suggestion of Felipe González to abandon Marxism at the 28th Party Congress (1979),[17] there were some who rejected the logic of electoral competition. They disapproved the means used, such as surveys or modern techniques of communication, as well as the moderation of discourse and the concentration of power in the leadership of the party.

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[13] The party received important support from other Socialist parties, specially from the SPD that provided both substantial financial help as well as advice and training which were both important to carry out effective electoral campaigns (Gangas 1994: 117).

[14] He was the Secretary of Organisation from 1976 to 1979 and from then until 1997 Deputy General Secretary.

[15] Mentioned in the Executive Commission management report presented at the 28th Party Congress held in May 1979 (MG 28C: 139).

[16] The inertia of this culture of "clandestinity" has been mentioned in several of the interviews I conducted to illustrate the reasons that explain the difficulties of the party in being an open organisation and in communicating with the electorate.

[17] See chapter 2 and 4 for details on the internal struggle at the 28th Party Congress.

This is reflected in the Executive Commission Report presented at the 28th Congress (MG 28 1979: 95):

> "Some 'party fellows' do not feel at ease when we use surveys as the starting point of our political analyses. This is understandable though not admissible. In a democratic system, governing involves being trusted by the electorate, and this would only be "electoralism" if our organisation just sought votes and then forgot the electorate in everyday politics. [Electoral surveys] are valuable because they make us find out, analyse, not only what we want to do, but also what citizens that vote for us want us to do."

In the 28th Congress (1979), the Secretaries of Press and Propaganda merged positions. The period between 1979 and 1981 is the only inter-congress interval in the period from 1976 to 1996 in which no election was held. This meant that there was more time to devote to the re-structuring of campaigns and communication activities. The main task of this new Secretary was to present to the public the positions and activities of the party, to project to the electorate what the party did, and to organise election campaigns the party's "electoral apparatus" (MG 29C: 167). The report of this Secretary of Press and Propaganda mentions the following tasks of this office in non-election time: to keep a minimum electoral infrastructure devoted to the evaluation of previous campaigns and to the preparation of forthcoming ones, to support the party federations in by-elections or sub-national ones, and to analyse surveys.

In the 1981 Executive Commission Report there are still references to the need to gain control of part of the mass media, instead of relying on media that "belonged to the right". This report also states the need to uniformize several aspects of the external communication of the party, insisting that all gimmicks and gifts produced by the party had to contain the same symbol, the closed hand holding a rose, so as to avoid possible confusion derived from the use of several of them (MG29C 1981: 173). The collaboration with fellow European socialist parties continued in this stage, particularly in the form of trips by members of the PSOE campaign team to other countries to study the campaign techniques of other parties, although the PSOE now also hosted visitors from other countries.

After the 29th Congress (1981) the Federal Executive Commission decided to concentrate on having everything ready for a hypothetical general election that, according to political situation reflected in the party's documents "could be called any minute". As will be seen in the next section, most of the energies of the party organisation at this stage were already devoted to the preparation of the general election campaign.

The phase between the transition to democracy and victory in the 1982 elections was extremely active from the perspective of the activities related to political communication.

There were many single-issues campaigns organised at very short notice. Just to give some examples of non-election campaigns that were carried out in this period: the publicity campaign for the 27th Congress (Dec. 1976), the one to publicise the new party logo, for the Law for Political Reform, the one after the formal legalisation of the PSOE, the campaign organised to explain the position of the PSOE in the Moncloa Pacts and later on the same year the campaign in favour of the approval of the 1978 Constitution. Later on, after the 1979 elections, the mobilisation of the party organisation took place around the campaigns to publicise the PSOE's views against Spain's entry in NATO (1981) and in defence of democracy after the failed attempted coup of 1981. Although the internal party documents reflect the difficulties in mobilising the party organisation in these campaigns (MG 29C 1981: 62), it does seem that it was more active and mobilised than has been the case in the subsequent phases. Furthermore, these campaigns were explicitly recognised as means to *show* the party's capacity to reach and mobilise the electorate, not just to convey the party's position and ideas on a particular topic.[18]

This changed when the PSOE came into power. Most of the personnel who had been in charge of the design and organisation of campaigns went to work in the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister's offices. As occurred with other party activities, there was a certain amount of confusion over the role the party organisation should play in relation to the communication policy; it was not clear whether its main role was to explain the government's positions, and if so how to do it. Single issue campaigns did not stop completely, but they gradually became fewer and had less repercussion in the media because the attention of the media had moved from the PSOE as an organisation to the PSOE as the Government. The retrospective evaluation of Julio Feo, who took part in the preparation of several election campaigns and was general secretary of the President's office, is quite revealing:

> "The biggest mistake since 1982 was communication... We forgot to communicate.. What was the problem? To a large extent the problem was related to the type of relationship we had with the print media, due to the lack of understanding of how one has to communicate from the Government." (Feo in Burns 1996: 377)

Perhaps it was in the communication policy that the presence of the PSOE in government had most noticeable effects. The party organisation lost most of its visibility in the mass media, and part of its human resources. Some efforts were made within the party structures to redress this situation, which worsened over time as a result of the increasing

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[18] "We hope the campaign... that we are planning to explain our position regarding NATO will be another opportunity to demonstrate our mobilisatory capacities to get in touch with the electorate" (MG 29C 1981: 62).

confrontation between the government and the press (see Pradera 1991). A new Secretary of Communication was created at the 1984 Party Congress, whose task was similar to that ascribed to the Secretaries of Press and Propaganda before. Its report of activities insisted that it was created to improve both the relationship with the mass media and the internal communication of the different party levels (MG31C 1988: 62), but this does not seem more than a declaration of intent, which had little or no translation into practice.

Throughout this period there was scant effort to create a stable body within the party organisation that would be in charge of the tasks related to communication and it was mostly those people that had been involved in these tasks from the early stages of the party reconstruction who continued to do so, even if they were formally ascribed to other activities within the party structure or were engaged in governmental tasks. When the relationship with the press worsened the PSOE leaders tended to react in a defensive way to what they thought was an atmosphere of prosecution. This can be seen in the 1990 report of the Executive Commission to the 32nd Congress of the party in the hey day of bureaucratisation of the party organisation:

> "in a context characterised by the lack of means of communication favourable to the Socialists, our analyses, policies and messages have been conveyed to society thanks only to the mobilisation of the party organisation and its leaders, that have made possible the circulation of ideas and policy offers." (MG 32C 1990: 38)

The internal struggle that dominated the party life during the first part of the 1990s did not contribute to the improvement of the communication policy of the PSOE. On the one hand there was little interest in portraying an image of a divided party, aware as Socialist politicians were that the Spanish electorate tends to punish divided parties. However, on the other hand, the need of each faction to publicise their views prevailed over this general party goal and made them "use" the media to advance their position in the intra-party struggle.

After the 34th Congress (1994) the internal party conflict diminished; the *renovadores* had a greater presence in the Federal Executive Commission and the *guerristas* lost control over that part of the activities related to the organisation of campaigns and communication tasks. The renovation of personnel that this shift entailed, together with the increasing concern in the party organisation regarding the decline in electoral support, contributed to the decision to create the Electoral and Communication Department (Departamento Electoral y de

Comunicación, DECO) at the end of 1994.[19] This department is part of the Secretary of Organisation and is run by a person appointed by the Federal Executive Commission. It has three main tasks: the analysis of the political situation, the formulation of communication and political strategies, and the training of a national network capable of mobilising the party at any moment. So far, however, it has only been concerned to analysing the political situation and the organisation of election campaigns.[20] The aim to create a permanent electoral structure to co-ordinate election units at lower territorial levels has not yet been developed, although it remains the most ambitious project of this new department. It is interesting to note that most PSOE's leaders and organisers seem to be aware of the competitive advantage of the Popular Party in everything that concerns the development of communication skills, the preparation of its leaders, the existence of a permanent team in charge of this area, but this does not seem to translate into effective action that could change the situation in the PSOE.[21]

The way the PSOE Web page was created in 1996 is a revealing example of the lack of an orchestrated strategy of communication. The 1997 Executive Commission Report mentions the creation of the Web page as one of the achievements of the Secretary of Studies and Programmes and not as one belonging to the Secretary of Organisation (in charge of communication and election campaigns). It also explains that the PSOE regards the site as a way to communicate with the electorate, and even have some feed-back through the electronic mail. However, in practice, the interactive possibilities offered by the Internet have clearly not been exploited by the PSOE. For example, even if the e-mail address of the party does appear in the page, there is no explicit invitation for visitors to the Web to make use of this facility.[22] In addition to that, there is virtually no information about party activities, how to get in touch with the party organisation, or how to collaborate with the Socialists. There is another section with the party programme, which in the 1996 elections contained the electoral manifesto.

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[19] As Ignacio Varela states in a personal interview (11/1/96) "The PSOE has never had a permanent electoral structure, in the Executive there have always been one or two members that have devoted their time mainly to those issues, not so much because of the positions they occupied in the Executive but because of who they were."

[20] Rules of functioning of the Election and Communications Department (*Reglamento del Departamento Electoral y de Comnicación*) PSOE (Secretary of Organisation, 7/11/94).

[21] This comparative advantage was noted by Julián Santamaría (Director of the DECO, personal interview 12/12/95) in the following way "Three or four years ago the PP understood that it needed to modernise its structures, leadership, personnel... It has made an enormous effort in communication skills, it has greatly modernised. It keeps a permanent organisation devoted to these tasks and has done so before the PSOE."

[22] Again in this case it is interesting to notice the difference with the Catalan Socialist Party, which in their page invites visitors to write to their Secretary General. In the last Congress of the PSC there was also a section to write amendments, proposals, etc., something that did not happen in the case of the PSOE in their 34th Congress (1997).

Finally there are two other sections of the Web page that are updated every week that contain information about the activities of the PSOE in parliament, the agenda for the week, the position of the parliamentary group in the different laws discussed and so on, and a summary of the position of the party on key issues of Spanish politics.

It is important to emphasise that the sections of the PSOE Web page that deal only with internal/organisational affairs are the only ones that are not updated regularly. Nevertheless there may have been some progress in this respect, since the documents used at the 34th Congress were made available on the PSOE's Web page. Finally it is worth pointing out that so far the Internet has not been considered as a means of internal party communication, as has been the case in other political parties.[23]

The PSOE regional and local party organisations have increasingly made use of new technologies as well. In 1997 there were about fourteen Web sites of the Socialist party (including four for the Catalan Socialist Party). The design and type of services offered in these sites varied greatly. Some of them made extensive use of the interactive possibilities offered by the Internet, and enable users to write to party officials and elected representatives. Others offer the possibility to join the party by filling in an affiliation form (and one of them even carried out a membership drive though its Web page[24]). Most of them offer party documents, resolutions, press releases of the Executive Commission at the different territorial levels. However, these efforts do not seem to respond to a state-wide action co-ordinated by the central party authorities, but to the autonomous initiative of the regional and local parties, who also decide what to put in these pages and what use to make of them.

3. Political communication & election campaigns

3.1. The "organisational structure" of election campaigns

There are scarce references in the party documents and rules about how campaigns are organised, except that it is a task of the Executive Commission. This marks a sharp contrast with the great extent to which other internal activities of the party are regulated. Thus, unlike

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[23] For example the Italian PDS uses Internet to spread documents to the regional and local branches. See http://www.pds.it

[24] The campaign is called "Sumar 2000 más" ("2000 more!"), and it can be found at "http://www.tst.hnet.es /tfe_ceipsoe/aflilia.htm." Two possibilities are offered, either to print the form and take it to the Local Branch, or to send it via Internet, after which the party contacts the person to explain the procedure he or she should follow.

other party activities, the organisation of campaigns has been more a matter of practice than of formal regulation.[25]

In spite of the lack of formal regulation, the general procedure has been roughly similar in all election campaigns since 1977. After an election is called the Federal Executive Commission appoints a campaign co-ordinator who is in charge of the planning and co-ordination of the different tasks involved in an election campaign. In all the general election campaigns studied[26] this co-ordinator was a member of the Executive Commission,[27] but there is no statutory obligation for this. For all general elections held since 1977, except for 1996, the general co-ordinator of campaigns was Alfonso Guerra, the Deputy Secretary General from 1979 until 1997. The responsibilities of the campaign co-ordinator comprise the organisation of all activities related to campaigning: orientation, organisation, strategic and operational management.[28] He or she designates the other members of the Federal Electoral Committee, a committee which is at the top of the hierarchical structure in charge of the organisation of election campaigns. It is not necessarily composed just by politicians or members of the party Executive, but also by party functionaries.

It is important to notice that two important aspects of general elections, namely candidate selection and the elaboration of the party manifesto are not carried out by the Federal Election Committee, but by the Federal Committee and the Federal Executive Commission of the party respectively. The process of candidate selection has already been described in chapter 5, and will not be repeated here, but it is important to emphasise the dissociation of the two: the search for "good" candidates is not done by experts in party strategy or communications, but rather these have to adapt to the choice made by other party bodies. As far as the party manifesto is concerned, the Election Committee only intervenes after it has been approved by the Federal Committee, thus at a very late stage of its preparation, with the intention to highlight those aspects in which the campaign is going to be based.[29] Except for those two aspects, the rest of the activities related to the election campaign have been and remain a responsibility of the Federal Election Committee.[30]

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[25] Ignacio Varela, personal interview, 11/1/96.

[26] That is in the 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993 and 1996 general election campaigns.

[27] Personal interviews with Ignacio Varela and Roberto Dorado, both members of most Federal Electoral Committees since 1976, (11/1/96 and 13/9/96 respectively). The former was absent from the Federal Election Committee in 1993, while the latter was part of it until 1993, but not in 1996.

[28] Personal interview with Ignacio Varela, 11/1/96.

[29] Personal interview with Joaquín Almunia (14/6/96), Luis Pérez (18/6/96) and Ignacio Varela (11/1/96)

[30] Personal interview with Ignacio Varela, 11/1/96.

The following passage included in the report of the 1979 Executive Commission Report (MG28C 1979: 194) is one of those rare cases in which party documents contain an (ex-post) rationalisation of its decision to concentrate the tasks of the organisation of campaigns in the Federal Election Committee.

> "The creation of a special body to run the election campaigns permits us to confront in a rational way the different tasks involved in such an enterprise: operational, financial, etc."

The work of the Election Committee is based on a *horizontal* and *vertical division of labour*. The horizontal division of labour is achieved though the internal division of tasks among members of this Committee. The vertical division of labour consists in the creation of Election Committees at different territorial levels among which the most important ones are the provinces (which are also the electoral districts).

The horizontal division of labour consists in the distribution of tasks of the Federal Election Committee among several sub-areas each of which is the responsibility of one person selected by the general co-ordinator. These areas include: planning and programmes, a person in charge of the links with lower level electoral committees, propaganda, finance, press and media, legal advisor and an area in charge of the study and analysis of survey data and other material useful to develop party strategies.

The structure of the Election Committee has remained roughly the same over the period of time studied, with very small variations. The party officials at the different levels who were interviewed all agreed that this system of division of labour associated with the Election committees was satisfactory.[31] There was much less consensus about the adequacy of the contents of campaigns,[32] with the style and type of messages chosen to address the electorate, which were considered innovatory in 1982, but have not improved since then. All of the party officials interviewed noticed the great continuity of the composition of the main nucleus of the Federal Election Committee, that in fact turned into a kind of informal permanent election committee.[33] This continuity stopped in the 1993 election, which, as will be examined later, was a very peculiar campaign.

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[31] Personal interview with Joaquín Almunia (14/6/96): "We have reflected next to nothing on the day-to-day party functioning. However, the electoral structures (...) have been organised in roughly the same way since the first campaign, and have worked quite well. The substitution of the Executive by the Federal Election Committee has also worked quite well".

[32] Several interviewees showed concern with the lack of innovation in the campaigns of the party since 1982, these people were not connected with the team that had been in charge of organising these campaigns.

[33] Ignacio Varela, Luis Pérez and Roberto Dorado, personal interviews.

As mentioned above, the vertical division of labour is based on the creation of Election Committees at different territorial levels, particularly in the provinces. Each province[34] has its own Provincial Campaign Co-ordinator, appointed by the Federal Campaign Co-ordinator, in theory on the basis of the recommendations put forward by the Provincial and Regional Executive Commissions.[35] This Provincial Co-ordinator, in turn, forms a Provincial Election Committee, with roughly the same internal structure as the Federal one.[36] However, given the high degree of centralisation pursued by the Federal Election Committee, in the Provinces the areas related to strategic response and survey analysis are much less developed and less important than at the Federal level.[37] The communication between Federal Election Committees and Provincial ones take place either through guidelines transmitted from the general co-ordinator to the provincial co-ordinators, or directly by the different members of the Election Committees in each territorial level in charge of a particular area of activities.[38]

In each campaign a booklet is produced which contains the guidelines for Provincial Election Committees (*Normas de funcionamiento de los Comités Electorales Provinciales*). No such rules exist for the Federal Election Committee, whose functioning must be induced from the tasks assigned to the members of the provincial committees or from information obtained at the interviews with members of this Committee. There should also be Local Election Committees at every local branch[39] although this is not always the case.[40]

The Federal Election Committee produces a second booklet called Campaign Guide (*Guía de Campaña*), which is distributed to all Election Committees at the different territorial levels. It is considered an instrument to ensure a certain campaign homogeneity in the whole party organisation. Its main functions and contents have changed over the years. In the 1977 and 1979 general elections the Campaign Guide included the specification of the quantitative goals of the PSOE in the elections, the social groups that were to be the main targets of the campaign plus the main policy stances to highlight in order to get their support, and practical

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[34] The provinces are the election districts.

[35] Ignacio Varela and Luis Pérez, personal interview, 11/1/96 and 18/6/96 respectively.

[36] In the lower level Election Committees, like provincial and local ones, the internal departments dealing with the operative running of the campaign, whereas the analysis, planning and decision-making ones are much less important than the Federal one (Ignacio Varela, personal interview, 11/1/96).

[37] Personal interview with Ignacio Varela, 11/1/96.

[38] The conversations of Alfonso Guerra with ten or twenty of this co-ordinators at a time are also mentioned several times by members of the Election Committee (see Feo 1993, also mentioned in the interviews I held with Ignacio Varela and Roberto Dorado).

[39] As stated in the contents of the course edited by the PSOE Secretary of Education on how to run a Local Branch (PSOE 1993, Curso *"Dirección y Gestión Integral de la Agrupación Local*).

[40] As pointed out by several party officials and people involved in the organisation of campaigns, the reality is different from this: many Local Branches do not have enough resources to organise an Election Committee.

guidelines concerning the organisation of rallies/meetings or the role of the rank and file during the campaign. These latter types of instructions tended to disappear in the Campaign Guides during the second part of the 1980s probably as a result of the fact that the provincial branches were more used to organising elections, and began to concentrate more on explaining the targets and the messages that the party organisation should put forward in each campaign. Even these became less common, since this Campaign Guide was often leaked to the media and therefore the most important strategic lines were hardly ever included.[41] Therefore, over the years these Campaign Guides have become less important (and less informative for the external analyst).

In the 1996 general election a daily internal bulletin was published by the Federal Election Committee with the aim of increasing both the intensity and efficiency of the communication between the Provincial and the Federal Election Committees. They were based on all the information collected from the provincial committees and from an analysis of the contents of the mass media and distributed by fax every day to all provincial branches. They contained the main events of the campaign, the most important issues, as well as the standpoint of the PSOE in each of these topics. According to a provincial co-ordinator interviewed, this was a useful tool to find potential responses to messages of other political parties or of the media. Presumably this instrument also served to inform all the Provincial Committees of how the campaign was proceeding in other parts of the territory and also served to homogenise the messages across the country.[42]

The Federal Election Committee is assisted by a Political Committee formed by members of the Federal Executive Commission. It seems that this Political Committee has never had much influence on the design and implementation of the campaign, but that it was created in order to eliminate suspicions that the Election Committee was not under the control of the Executive Commission. An example of the lack of formal regulation of campaign organisation is that the existence of this Political Committee is not written in any party rules, but only appears in the internal information about campaigns.[43] This Political Committee was only visible at times when the internal cohesion was low, and there was a high degree of confrontation between the *guerristas*, traditionally in charge of the organisation of campaigns,

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[41] Personal interview with Ignacio Varela, 11/1/96.

[42] This had already been put into practice in the 1993 campaign in the PSC "Generals 93" and served as a means of communication between the PSC Central Campaign Committee and the ones based in *comarcas* and municipalities. See SF1993, 20/5/93.

[43] Personal interview with Roberto Dorado, 13/9/96.

and the *renovadores*,[44] who after the conflict became overt were not willing to leave this area of activities to the *guerristas*. For instance, the 1993 general elections ware dominated by a confrontation of this type and on this occasion the Political Committee had a more important role than at any other election.

Therefore, in practice during election campaigns the whole structure of party activities is under the control of the Federal Election Committee. Most Secretaries of the party, as well as most of its functionaries are under the direct authority of the Campaign co-ordinator[45] and only very few remain at the central headquarters to take care of regular party management. Although in principle the team that organises electoral campaigns is bound by the decisions concerning the political and strategic line taken by the Federal Congress, the Federal Committee and the Federal Executive Commission, in practice, the Election Committee has had substantial room for manoeuvre in deciding the style and concrete messages of the campaign, and, generally speaking, to run the party organisation during the period of an election campaign.[46]

This leads to the perception of the campaign period as an 'state of emergency' in the normal functioning of the party organisation, not even regulated by formal rules and procedures, but by the practice of former campaigns. This has enhanced the possibility to put forward strategies that have not been explicitly accepted by the PSOE's governing bodies, such as the use of a clearly more moderate message in the 1977 and 1979 election campaigns than the political lines set by Party Congresses (Coverdale 1979: 62). This possibility is not so important when the party is united and agrees on the same strategy, but can become so at times when party cohesion is low. This was for example the case of the 1993 campaign, widely recognised among interviewees as the worst organised since the transition to democracy. There was a disagreement between members of the Political Committee (called also Strategic Committee) and the members of the Federal Election Committee over the groups that the PSOE should primarily address. While the former wanted to attract the electors of the centre, the latter insisted on trying to attract those located at the left of the ideological continuum.[47]

This 'state of emergency' was more evident in the period from 1977 to 1993 since the Election Committee included very few members of the Executive Commission and thus the contrast with the normal power structure was also greater. On average two or three members

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[44] See chapter 2 for an explanation of this intra-party conflict.

[45] There is even a "physical" move since the electoral headquarters or the party are in a different location than the main headquarters of the party.

[46] Personal interview, Ignacio Varela 11/1/96.

[47] Personal interview, José María Maravall 28/12/95 and Roberto Dorado (13/9/96)

of the Federal Election Committee were also part of the Federal Executive Commission: Alfonso Guerra, deputy General Secretary, who was the campaign co-ordinator until 1993 Guillermo Galeote who was also a member of the Executive Commission from 1976 until 1993 was also member of the Election Committees until 1989. In 1996 the Election Committee included more members of the Executive Commission than was the case on previous occasions, but it is too soon to judge whether this constitutes a new organisational style or not.

3.2. Campaign phases and dimensions

The following two sections analyse the general election campaign focusing on their organisational features dividing them into the two analytical stages mentioned in the first section of the chapter.

3.2.1 Planning

3.2.1.1. Anticipation of planning

As was advanced in the first section of the chapter the degree of anticipation with which election campaigns are planned can influence both how effective they are and can also be considered an indicator of the value attached to campaigns by a party organisation.

During the period studied (1977-96) the planning of all general election campaigns started well before the elections were called. This was easy when the PSOE was in government, given that calling an election is a competency of the Prime Minister, as set out in the 1978 Spanish Constitution. For the three terms in which the PSOE had an absolute majority and governed alone, it was up to Felipe González to evaluate the political situation so as to decide when to call a general election, within the temporal limit of four years imposed by the Constitution. This situation changed after 1993 when, having lost the absolute majority of seats in the lower chamber, the PSOE had to rely on the support of the Catalan centre-right nationalists of CiU,[48] given that in this situation elections would be held when they decided to withdraw their support. This happened in the autumn of 1995 when the withdrawal of the support of CiU made Felipe González call general elections, held in March 1996.

Nevertheless, being in office and therefore in control of the timing of general elections is not the only explanation for the anticipation with which campaign preparations were made. Leaving aside the *foundational* elections which took place in 1977 with little time available for

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[48] Which stands for Convergència i Unió.

preparations, in 1979 and 1982 the PSOE started preparing the campaign well before the elections were called. According to all party strategists and officials interviewed and to different party documents, the 1982 campaign had the longest and best preparation of all.[49]

This anticipation has tended to reduce slightly over the years although this is difficult to measure due to the great continuity of the members of the Election Committee, which makes it difficult to find out when the (formal) Election Committee as such actually started to work. This reduction could respond to the decrease of competitiveness in the elections during the 1980s and also to the fact mentioned already that the PSOE could not be taken by surprise given that it was up to the Prime Minister to call elections.

The start of campaign or pre-campaign activities is related to the anticipation with which campaigns are planned. The pre-campaign period has been increasingly important in Spanish elections, particularly in the 1990s due to the increase in competitiveness and to the shortening of the legal campaign period. The pre-campaign period is used not only to spread the party program without actually asking people for their vote, which is illegal, but to start the mobilisation of the party organisation, so that when the official campaign starts the party is ready to organise different activities. This becomes evident in the communications between the Federal Election Committee and the Provincial Election Committees.[50]

The aspects involved in the planning of the campaign that were mentioned at the beginning of the chapter will be examined in the following sections: the definition of the electoral strategy, i.e., which social groups it is going to target, the policies and messages it is going to try to put across, the definition of the objectives in terms of votes and seats, and the distribution of this objective in the different districts, the design and planning of how these messages are to be conveyed and the allocation of resources.

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[49] "The campaign that was prepared with most anticipation was that of 1982, that started its preparations one and a half years before the election" (Ignacio Varela, personal interview, 11/1/96). See also the Executive Commission report (MG 30C 1984: 10): "As early as 1981 the Federal Electoral Committee was formed and shortly later so were the Provincial ones."

[50] This is called "Seguimiento de Federaciones" (SF from now on), and consist of faxes interchanged between each provincial Election Committee and the Federal Election Committee. I had the opportunity to review this documentation for four of the six general elections studied and in all of the cases the communication between provincial and federal election committees started to take place long before the official campaigned started. During the period of time between the start of these communications and the beginning of the official campaign the contents of the messages tend to relate to the degree of mobilisation of the party organisation as well as to negotiations over the presence of important party leaders in each of the districts.

3.2.1.2. Setting goals for general elections

In the planning stage of campaigns the goals of the PSOE for the election are decided. First, there is a general evaluation of the state of electoral competition, of the chances of the party according to electoral surveys from which a general goal in terms of share of the vote and seats is decided. Different scenarios are hypothesised and ordered according to the degree to which they are desirable and/or likely to occur. For instance, in 1993, when the PSOE faced a particularly difficult situation with a clear danger of losing the absolute majority of seats and a substantial share of the vote, the objective of the PSOE was to reach around 160 seats in the lower chamber, which in quantitative terms meant obtaining more or less 37% of the vote. In order to do that, reasoned the document on electoral strategy,[51] the PSOE had to recover a million voters. According to the results on transfers of votes among parties provided by the survey data available to the party strategists, these votes were more likely to come from ex-PSOE voters who had decided to abstain rather than from the Popular Party or United Left. The specific target of the PSOE in these election were thus the ex-PSOE voters who were mainly urban, young, educated, middle class and located in the centre-left of the ideological continuum. This is an illustration of how the general goals are de-composed into more concrete ones.

The general goal is also divided into quantitative goals for each district that are set in co-operation with the provincial co-ordinator on the basis of analysis of previous elections, surveys and the political situation in each province.[52] The primary objective of any provincial party branch is to increase its votes, even if that does not lead to an increase of the seats, i.e., votes are not only valued by party leaders/strategists in terms of seats, but as an achievement in themselves that show the strength of the party organisation. However, for the central design of the campaign it is more important to find out the amount and location of seats "at stake", that is, to find out in which districts it is crucial to win more votes either to keep the seats the party has already or to win new ones.[53] As has been shown in chapter 3, the Spanish electoral system provides very different incentives according to the size of the district, which causes some votes to be "wasted". In small districts increasing the number of votes does not imply increasing the number of seats, whereas the bigger (but also fewer) districts with a higher degree of

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[51] Documento de Estrategia Electoral, Internal Party Document, April 1993.
[52] Ignacio Varela, personal interview, 11/1/96.
[53] As was pointed out in chapter 3 it is not appropriate to talk about marginal districts in the Spanish case, but of *marginal seats.*

proportionality translate better the change in share of the vote into a change of seats. This is a feature that the strategists of the party are clearly aware of as the following passage shows:

"Although the electoral decline of the PSOE is quite homogeneous across the national territory, the cost in terms of seats is unequal depending on the areas." (Documento de Estrategia Electoral 1993:6)

During the planning stage the main political issues of the campaign are also decided, in connection with the party goals for the election, and with the characteristics of the groups which constitute the main target of the campaign.

3.2.1.3. Planning of the allocation of resources

There are two questions related to the planning on how resources will be allocated in the election campaign. The first relates to how resources are distributed across the territory, i.e., across electoral districts and whether this allocation is influenced mainly by external factors, namely the degree of competitiveness of that district, or other factors. The second refers to the distribution of resources in different campaign "means", or the channels chosen to reach the electorate at election campaigns.

The question of the distribution of resources across election districts will be addressed first. It is likely that the views of the general co-ordinator and the provincial one over the situation of a province differ slightly, since the former considers the province in particular as part of a bigger scenario, whereas the latter is primarily concerned about the province where he/she is the co-ordinator. Following this logic, it should be the Federal Committee who, evaluating the "profitability" of votes in different districts, decides to give priority to certain areas.

The main issue to examine is whether or not external considerations[54] play a role in the distribution of campaign resources across the different provincial branches. The PSOE campaign documents acknowledge that other political parties allocate resources in a differentiated way depending on the characteristics of the district. In the rules of functioning of the Election Committees of 1996 there is a passage that warns Provincial Committees to be aware of the fact that "it is not by chance that the leaders of a party concentrate their efforts in some provinces and not in others, that the electoral publicity of a party is not homogeneously distributed..." (NF 1996: 37).[55] Presumably this means that nor is it by chance that the PSOE

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[54] Examples would be the effects of the electoral system and the state of electoral competition.
[55] With this the Federal Committee was also trying to convince Provincial Committees of the advantages of producing good reports of the developments of the campaign in each province so that the Federal Election

distributes its efforts among the different districts unevenly, although internal considerations play a bigger role than expected.

The financial resources of the party are split between a large sum controlled by the Federal Election Committee (about 75%),[56] used to pay for advertisements in the radio and press, rallies, leaflets, posters, campaign material that are centrally designed and printed with the same format. The rest of the money is distributed to the Provincial Committees which have some autonomy to decide how to use it. When asked about the distribution of financial resources among the different districts the party strategists responded that the procedure followed is one of "distributive justice" (sic).[57] Each province is allocated a minimum amount of money regardless of the size of its electorate and of the degree of competitiveness in that particular election. The rest of the money is allocated on the basis of the size of the electorate of each district. Therefore, the competitiveness of the district in each election does not seem to influence the distribution of money done by the Federal Election Committee. However, not all campaign organisers agreed on this; another member of Federal Election Committee in several campaigns commented that the intensity of competition did make a difference in the allocation of financial resources, although only a marginal one.[58] Thus, according to the evidence gathered, external conditions like competitiveness play a role, but it is not the most important criterion when distributing financial resources.

Leadership is another resource which can be used to find out how the territorial allocation of resources is done. One of the reasons for this, as will be examined in more detail later on, is that one of the major features of election campaigns is the leader's centrally co-ordinated country wide tour.[59] During the planning of the campaign, and sometimes even during the campaign itself, every Provincial Election Committee and the Federal Election Committee engage in negotiations to attract the presence of the most important party leaders.[60]

Committee could get information about what the competing political parties were doing in order to design an appropriate response.

[56] According to Luis Pérez (member of the Federal Election Committee in 1996) 400 million pesetas were spent at the provincial level, and 1200 by the central authorities (18/6/96).

[57] Luis Pérez, personal interview 18/6/96.

[58] Roberto Dorado, personal interview 13/9/96.

[59] As we will see later, it is useful not only as an indicator of the perception of the party of the marginal districts, and of the resources at its disposal to improve their position in these districts, but also to differentiate one general election from the other in terms of competitiveness.

[60] Examples of these negotiations can be found in the correspondence between Provincial and Federal Election Committees. For example, the comments of one of the reports includes the following "We get petitions from Salamanca to have more support and the presence of party leaders" (SF 22-5-93), "Teruel insists that Alfonso [Guerra] goes there and asks the Federal Election Committee to do its best" (SF 21-5-93. Another passage of the daily report on the comments gathered from the provincial committees include the following: "They [Provincial Election Committees] think that ministers should not only visit their own constituencies, and they

During this period all Provincial Election Committees try to have the candidate for Prime Minister or another important party leader visit their province, and it is the Federal Election Committee that decides on the places that the main leaders of the party will visit. According to the campaign organisers interviewed the itineraries are set according to two criteria: the party "tradition", such as the place where the leader opens the campaign and the place where he closes it, and secondly the degree of competitiveness of the different districts. Among party organisers and strategists there is the belief that its presence in a rally, which will then be echoed by the local and national media, effectively improve the electoral results in that district.[61] Again in this case, external circumstances play an important role in the distribution of "leadership", but there are also internal considerations like the party "tradition" or whether a province has not been visited by important leaders for a long time, in which case it claims its right to have some important leader in their province, regardless of other factors.

The second question introduced at the beginning of this sub-section was how resources, in this case mainly financial resource, are allocated to different means to reach the electorate. Spanish election campaigns, particularly after the creation of privately owned channels, are fought primarily on TV. All election campaigns were mainly based on the use of TV as a means of communicating messages to the electorate, but the way and extent to which they did so has increased over the years. At the first elections the PSOE did not trust public TV, allegedly favourable to the centre party led by Adolfo Suárez, the then Prime Minister. The main use of TV was through the free slots allocated to every party, and news programmes, but it was not an elaborate use of TV such as news management, agenda setting, etc. This reinforced the need for public meetings and direct contact with the electorate in these campaigns.

The importance of television has been greater with the increasing competitiveness and the establishment of private TV channels. Private channels cannot broadcast party advertisements, but are allowed to organise programmes in which leaders of the different parties discuss some political issue. In this context, developing expertise to make the most of the different possibilities to appear on TV has become more important. In the 1993 general

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ask to have the presence of popular party leaders" (SF 13-2-96). To conclude these illustrative examples here are the comments of a member of a Provincial Committee asking the Federal Election Committee to have the presence of an important party leader "we are fighting for a seat with the PP and the difference is around 2,000 votes... therefore we would appreciate it if a leader of a certain importance came to a meeting in the most populated, and progressive, area [of the province]" (SF 1996).

[61] "The visits of the General Secretary had a positive impact on the vote forecasts" (as declared by Luis Pérez, member of the Federal Election Committee in El Socialista 288, YEAR).

election the televised debate between Felipe González and the PP leader (José María Aznar) was the main feature of the campaign. An illustration of this renewed concern appears in the 1996 Campaign Guide:

> "We have to make a constant effort to keep a presence in the mass media, which is the main channel to convey our message to citizens. We have to avoid giving the impression of an 'empty chair' that should be occupied by the PSOE." (GC 1996)

This concern is also present in the 1996 campaign whose documents refer to the need to organise more campaign activities in the morning hours so that they are included in the TV news programs during the day, to the need to increase participation of candidates in talk radio programmes and to call-in when issues of interest were being discussed (NF 1996: 30). An interesting point also related to the centralisation of the campaign, is that these documents state that the Federal Electoral Committee had to give permission for anyone to participate in debates in the media. In spite of this increased interest, several party officials acknowledge the party's reluctance to modernise its techniques and to learn communication skills.

As was pointed out in the first section of the chapter, new technologies can lead to centralisation and standardisation, but also to the opposite characteristics; it must be said that the latest trends in the use of TV and mass media in Spain point to a change of strategy in this respect, as a result of a differentiated use of local radio and TV stations, but it is still too early to draw any conclusions.[62]

There is continuity in all the campaigns studied in relation to the dual use of mass media and direct contact with the electorate in the form of public rallies. Both large and small rallies continued to be scheduled in every general election. During the first general elections there was, particularly among the parties of the left, the idea that the amount of people they managed to concentrate in party rallies was a way to demonstrate which organisation was stronger, and that this would have a relevant impact on the results, not so much due to the effect of the direct contact with voters in the rallies or meetings, but due to the image of a strong party conveyed to the electorate. This is pointed out by Roberto Dorado in a personal interview:

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[62] "The repercussion of campaign activities is determined by the influence of local TV stations. A meeting in a small village of Valencia was broadcast by the two local TV stations and by the radio. This should be an example for future planning" (SF 1996: 21, 28-2-96). There are similar reports from the Canary Islands concerning the 1996 elections.

"Although some people think they are irrelevant [public rallies]. I think they are still an important element of mobilisation... undoubtedly in those years[63] people wanted to listen and the strength of each party was evaluated partly on the basis of these public rallies."

Obviously the value attached to public meetings and rallies has changed since the beginning of the transition, but as the previous citation illustrates there still seems to be the widespread belief among campaign organisers that being able to hold rallies in most villages is a way to show the strength of the party organisation, presumably more so in rural areas.[64] As one member of the Federal Election Committee mentioned in an interview carried out in 1996 "our aim in every campaign is to organise a rally in every municipality".[65] Party organisers judge the success of these rallies more in terms of the publicity they generated through the coverage by the media than in terms of the amount of people that attended them, as shown in the rules for Provincial Election Committees "the added profitability of the public rally/public activity comes from the repercussion in the media" (NF 1996:24).

Nevertheless, the fact that rallies are organised in very small municipalities show there is some reliance on their sheer impact, regardless of their indirect repercussion. The Federal Election Committee also encourages local branches to continue with these public meetings, even if there are only a few people there, although obviously this is not considered desirable. It also encourages Provincial Election Committees to publicise them in advance and to rightly choose the place where the meeting is to be held carefully so as to make it a success.[66]

Even if there are occasional questionings of their effectiveness in vote-getting, the campaign strategies and organisers have not changed the practice of organising many meetings at election campaigns.[67] It is interesting to note that most of the party officials interviewed referred to the tradition of the party to explain the maintenance of this practice, even if this tradition is only twenty years old. Intra-party considerations also help to explain why public rallies have continued to be a central feature of PSOE campaigns. According to the provincial co-ordinators interviewed these meetings are a way for local branches to get activated, to

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[63] He was being asked about the general elections during the transition to democracy and the different role of party rallies nowadays.

[64] This was also stated by other people interviewed that had some experience in campaigning either as candidates like Pedro Bofill or as campaign co-ordinators like Pedro Torres (personal interviews).

[65] Luis Pérez, personal interview 18/6/96.

[66] This emerges from the correspondence between the Provincial and the Federal Election Committee.

[67] According to some regular members of the Federal Election Committee, the PSOE frequently considers stopping encouraging the organisation of so many public activities, but so far no steps have been taken in that direction. Sometimes it is the members of the Provincial Committees who question the value of organising so many meetings: "the issue is not going to many places, but making sure that the party is present in fora with a greater influence, for example in the mass media, at the University... in different organisations". (SF 1993).

mobilise with a concrete task in mind, particularly in a party such as the PSOE with little or no mobilisation in inter-election periods.

3.2.1.4. Other dimensions of election campaigns planning stage

An important issue to look at is whether the planning of the election campaign is a centralised activity, i.e., done by the party headquarters or by the regional or provincial federations. This is likely to have an influence on campaign homogeneity across the territory. In the PSOE *planning is a centralised activity done by the Federal Election Committee.* It only resorts to *professionals* outside the party to a limited extent. The PSOE hires the services of different companies, particularly for the design of advertisements and slogans, and for the organisation of rallies, but the members of the Federal Election Committee emphasise the fact that these people hired follow the instructions of the party, and only participate translating the ideas of the components of the Federal Election Committee into "marketing language".

The PSOE publicity department also takes on the responsibility for the production of local campaign material so that the unity of the campaign concept is preserved. Campaign literature and advertisement is to a large extent printed, or at least designed by the central party headquarters. Those leaflets in which the leader of the party appears are published by the party headquarters and sent to the different delegations. The same applies to the ballot papers which are distributed among the population, which are also sent by the party headquarters. For the rest of the material, the party headquarters at the beginning of the campaign produce a set of guidelines which contains the general indications of the criteria that written publicity of the party must follow to ensure homogeneity, should the federations want to put a photograph of the local candidate, or change slightly the contents of a billboard or leaflet.

Thus, *homogeneity of party image* across the territory has been pursued by fixing common standards for party publications. According to several campaign organisers, the lack of homogenous party image along the territory had been a problem during the 1977 campaign, and the development of those common standards can be partially understood as a reaction to this fact.[68] Homogeneity is also ensured by meetings of the co-ordinators before, and during the campaign through constant communication between the Federal and Provincial Election Committees.

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[68] Julio Feo (1993), active participant in this campaign, comments on this in his memories of the years in which he worked with Felipe González, first in the party organisation and then in government.

3.2.2. Implementation

Campaigns guides emphasise the need to maintain a high degree of co-ordination during the actual election campaign. For example, the 1979 Campaign Guide stressed the need to enhance co-ordination and coherence during the campaign, linking its success to a high degree of co-ordination. In order to ensure that co-ordination, the guide stated the need to keep every action of the party within the guidelines marked by the central party organisation and warned local organisations of the dangers involved in thinking that they could interpret their local environment better than the Federal Electoral Committee. Electoral Committees at different levels had to follow the orders and guidelines dictated by the Federal Electoral Committee.

This insistence has been a constant in all general elections that have taken place since then. Campaign planners argue that an effective party must speak with a single voice. Members of the Federal Election Committee interviewed stressed that departures from the general line of campaigning and in general unintentional, since everyone more or less agrees that it benefits neither the party nor individual candidates to do that. When there is internal division, such as in 1993, homogeneity is more difficult to ensure, but in any case easier than it is during regular party functioning.

The main way to ensure *homogeneity in the implementation* of the campaign is the *"Seguimiento de federaciones"* (follow-up of the campaign activities of each federation). Every day each Provincial Election Committee must fill in and send a form (designed by the central party organisation) with a report of the events of the campaign, rallies organised, attendance, and also a brief analysis of the campaign events of the opposition parties. This is then processed by the Federal Election Committee to produce new guidelines that are spread again to the different federations. Central campaign organisers have used old and new technologies to improve not only their direct communication with potential party voters, but also their communication with lower territorial levels, to ensure that local campaigners can echo centrally determined responses to each campaign day's media headlines.

In the 1996 general elections the style of the *"seguimiento"* has become somewhat more relaxed. Whereas in 1993 the system seemed to be quite rigid, with hours being fixed for each Provincial Election Committee to send their information to the central party organisation, in the 1996 elections this seemed more relaxed. This might have been in reaction to criticisms

by the Provincial Election Committees that complained about its lack of flexibility in previous campaigns.[69]

3.3. Characteristics of election campaign: uses of organisational resources

3.3.1. The role of the rank and file and Local Branches

As has been said in section 1 of the chapter, changes in the way campaigns are organised imply transformations in the role of members and local party organisations. However, as this section shows, rank and file members are still needed as free labour, especially during election campaigns, even if their role has been clearly secondary in comparison to that of the mass media.

In party documents produced at the end of the 1970s, when the PSOE was still a small organisation in terms of members and financial resources, it is easy to find passages thanking party members for their contribution in developing activities for the party both at the central and local level.[70] At this stage the PSOE relied mainly on members or sympathisers whose professional activity was related to advertising, public relations and so on, and it was proud of it mentioning this fact as something that differentiated the PSOE from other Spanish political parties, particularly from centre and right wing ones. In other words, *professionalization* was considered as desirable, but it was equated with expediency rather than with relying on external professionals to carry out these activities.

> "The working out of the creative line and design, as well as the implementation of the campaign has been carried out thanks to the voluntary collaboration of 'fellow Socialists', who were specialised in related fields. This makes us different from the right-wing parties, and even from other left-wing parties, who contract out these tasks to big advertising companies, while we carry them out based exclusively on the participation and activism of our members" (MG 28C: 192).

As has been mentioned above, the PSOE has based its campaigns on a combination of an extensive use of TV but also on the organisation of public meetings in as many municipalities as was possible. The need to mount so many meetings requires participation of the rank and file not only to help at the local and provincial levels, but to attend those directly organised by Federal Election Committee:

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[69] Information obtained from the examination of the documents of "Seguimiento de Federaciones" for the 1982, 1986, 1993 and 1996 elections.

[70] See, for example, the 1979 Executive Commission Report "expert members that have voluntarily and freely contributed with their knowledge and time" (MG 28 1979: 191).

> "The Regional and Provincial Committees will make special mobilisatory plans of the party organisation for these activities. All Local Branches will be contacted well before and the means will be provided so that all rank and file can attend the public events, accompanied by the largest possible number of friends and relatives." (NF 1996: 25)

Other traditional activities that the party expects members to carry out are putting up posters and distributing leaflets. The insistence on this type of activity was much greater at the beginning of the period studied, at the end of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s. For example, the *Libro del Militante*[71] published in 1983 devoted several sections to the explanation of the role of rank and file in publicising the PSOE's views.

A recent novel use of traditional means of electioneering which require the work of members and local parties is *canvassing*. There is no tradition of canvassing in Spain. Although it had been practised before in the PSOE, especially by rural branches, it only appeared as an institutionalised and planned activity in the 1993 elections. On this occasion canvassing was directed to the areas with large numbers of undecided voters, non-voters and former PSOE voters.[72] The campaign documents sent to the Provincial Committees also explain how to plan the canvassing activities, and how to proceed in each visit. The goals of canvassing were described as follows:

> "... to involve the greatest number of rank and file in the task of canvassing, defined as a basic element of this campaign. With it we can reach a large number of voters, and the rank and file member is the main protagonist of this action." (NF 1993)

As was the case with rallies, there was probably an expectation to have an indirect effect, that is, media attention on *canvassing* would amplify its results. However, the fact that canvassing continued *despite* a negative reaction from the press and the rest of political parties reveals a belief in its direct effects in vote-getting. Some of the emphasis on having direct contact with the electorate through canvassing can be explained by the tense relationship between the Socialists and a good part of the media, particularly during the 1993 elections. At the beginning of the period this was due to distrust of public TV, controlled by the government

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[71] The *Libro del Militante* was published in 1983 with a summary of the history of the PSOE, an explanation of its organisational structure and the tasks of its main governing bodies as well as an explanation of the tasks and duties of the rank and file.

[72] Already carried out in Sevilla in the 1989 elections (El Socialista 31-10-89). This strategy was also advocated in the report of the *Conferencia de Ciudades*, carried out in order to put forward ways by which the Socialists could regain support in urban areas. The reaction of the mass media was not very positive, particularly to the usage of canvassing for the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Socialist in Government. This method was not fully accepted as a legitimate way of gaining votes, but rather as an intrusion into people's privacy. The use of personal information in order to plan which houses to visit was reported as illegitimate by some newspapers.

as there were no rules of democratic control yet. Therefore there were different stimuli on the party organisers; on the one hand the common wisdom was changing in all Western European parties and pointed to an increasing reliance on mass media to spread campaign messages, while on the other, the deteriorating relationship between the party and the media suggested an increasing need to use the party organisation itself as a means to relate to the electorate at large.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which this activity was effectively carried out. The reports of the implementation of the campaign written by the provincial Election Committees mention it only briefly. In some provinces it is explicitly stated that it worked well, while in others it is not mentioned at all. It is clear that it was not regarded as one of the most important campaign activities, not even at the local level. An indirect evaluation of its results can be derived from the fact that canvassing was abandoned in the following elections. It was still carried out by some federations, but it was not an activity centrally co-ordinated by the Election Committee.[73]

Finally, members are needed at election periods to act as party observers at the polling stations. This is one of the criteria used by campaign planners to evaluate the success of the campaign from the organisational perspective: whether or not the PSOE has managed to cover all the polling stations with its members and sympathisers.[74]

Thus, confirming what was indicated in chapter 5, members are considered to be of value since they can be used as free labour during and between election campaigns. It is also widely recognised in the party that it is only in election campaigns when there is a considerable amount of activity on the part of the rank and file. This can be partially explained by the fact that it is the time when members have a better defined role to fulfil. However, this must not lead us to conclude that there is a great deal of activity since the previous statement, shared by most of the party officials interviewed, is combined with the assertion that local parties are "dead" in between election time.

The years from 1977 to 1982 are considered the most active phase: all interviewees show a certain nostalgia for this period when politics was still associated with the fight for democracy and its consolidation. Nevertheless, even the information is somewhat contradictory regarding this period of higher mobilisation. Party officials say there are certain party activities

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[73] See, for example, the case of Castilla La Mancha whose candidates also canvassed, as well as visited markets (SF 1996 21/2/96).

[74] Luis Pérez, personal interview, 18/6/96.

that were carried out exclusively by members but admit that there were organisational failures such as the one contained in the following passage of an Executive Commission Report:

> "the disparity in spending on tasks such as putting up posters leads us to think that there are some cases of very low membership activity, although we don't know what explains this." (MG28 1979: 287).[75]

The following general elections (1986 and 1989) were characterised by low levels of competitiveness, and the reports between the Provincial and the Federal Election Committees discuss the relative difficulty in mobilising the party organisation due to the perception that their activity was not necessary to win the elections. At the 1989 elections competitiveness increased, but it was in 1993 when there was for the first time the fear that the PSOE could lose the elections. In 1993 there was a combination of circumstances that could have affected the level of membership activity during the campaign in opposite ways. The growth of competitiveness could have increased the level of activity of the rank and file perceiving a greater need for their participation. Alternatively, the internal division of the PSOE between *'renovadores'* and *'guerristas'* could have worked in the opposite direction, and hindered rank and file electioneering activities, making internal questions prevail over the external goal of winning the elections. According to party campaigners interviewed, the rank and file were highly mobilised in the 1993 and 1996 elections, when there was a risk of losing office. However, other evidence points at a different conclusion: "the likely victory of the Popular Party makes our members refrain from participating in the election campaign..." (SF 1996, 19-2-96: 10).

3.3.2. Leadership as an electoral resource.

Both scholars and PSOE members at its different hierarchical levels agree that Felipe González was the main electoral asset of the party following the transition to democracy. This was not so obvious at the first general election, when Felipe González, unlike the leaders of other Spanish political parties, was not very well known.[76] According to Alfonso Guerra at this point there was some debate at the Federal Election Committee over the extent to which the 1977 campaign should be focused primarily on the party leader, Felipe González, or on the PSOE as a whole. The former option was preferred by Alfonso Guerra for the reasons he points out in an interview published in 1996:

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[75] The passage in this case comes from the Management Report of the Federal Auditing Committee.

[76] "Our problem was to launch a leader such as Felipe, who was at the time unknown", Roberto Dorado, personal interview, 13/9/96. See also footnote 7 of this chapter.

> "In 1977 we had an intense debate, very strong and tense, in the party leadership. The issue was whether we should focus the 1977 election campaign on one person or a group. There was a lively debate in which I defended the idea that we should focus on a person. I thought we needed to have a face to represent a party that had been under cover for forty years" (Alfonso Guerra in Burns 1996: 139)

According to another participant at Federal Election Committee at that moment the idea was not so much to create a "super-leader", but to make the most of resources available to the PSOE.[77] Given that Felipe González was a young leader, the identification of the PSOE with him was useful because it helped to disassociate the party from the Civil War, which according to surveys was as rejected by the Spanish population as the subsequent dictatorship.[78] This does not mean that the PSOE as an organisation was left aside completely: on the contrary the fact that the PSOE was the oldest party organisation among the political parties that competed in the 1977 elections was also highlighted. Thus, the 1977 campaign was based on a combination of new and old elements that minimised the presence of problematic historical passages such as the divisions in the II Republic, while taking advantages of being a party 'with a history behind it'.[79] Very soon the PSOE strategists realised of the advantages of reinforcing the identification of the PSOE with its leader, even if this entailed a lesser degree of visibility of the party organisation: "the leadership of Felipe was enhanced though different campaigns and very quickly we saw that the leader was more important than the party" (Julio Feo in Burns 1996: 376).

Not all Spanish political parties focused their first general election campaigns on their leaders, but most of them did. This was one of the main consequences of the primacy of TV in campaigning ever since the elections after democracy. The leader of the centre UCD coalition Adolfo Suárez, who was a popular charismatic leader with a ad-hoc party created very shortly before the elections took place, contributed to the personalisation of campaigns and politics in general from the time of the first election campaign. There are other features of the Spanish political system that enhance the personalisation of politics and campaigning, such as the fact that it is parliamentary but with strong powers of the Prime Minister, who concentrates much of the attention from the media.

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[77] See Julio Feo in Burns (1996:370): "...we never tried to create a 'super-leader'. We were just trying to play our cards to maximise our chances, and at that moment, our best 'card' was Felipe González."

[78] Julio Feo points out the following (Burns 1996: 370-1) "Felipe González was the element that disassociated the PSOE with the Civil War. [...]. We clearly used the historic memories... trying to insist on the new PSOE."

[79] "The [1977] campaign capitalised heavily on the personal charisma of the handsome 34-year-old González. Party orators frequently invoked the PSOE's glorious history and its ties with the great Spanish Socialist leaders of the early twentieth century" (Coverdale 1979: 64).

The extent to which leadership is used can be considered (ex-post, obviously) a response to the competitiveness of each general election.[80] Felipe González had an intensive participation in the campaigns from 1977 to 1982. Conversely, after he became Prime Minister he diminished his participation in election campaigns. He had a minor participation in the 1986 and 1989 general election campaigns, when there was no doubt that the PSOE would win. A member of the Federal Election Committee characterised González campaigns as "week-end campaigns", particularly in 1986. This pattern changed in 1993 when the position of the PSOE was jeopardised by the growth of the Popular Party. This external challenge is not the only reason why Felipe González was more prominent in this campaign and must be complemented with internal considerations such as the clear intra-party division that made him react and lead the campaign to stop the *guerristas* from controlling every aspect of it. In the 1993 election there was a division of labour, Felipe González relied on his own team to carry out his campaign, while the Federal Election Committee, where *guerristas* predominated, was in charge of the other aspects of the party campaign.

The difficult situation of the Socialist Party, that faced accusations of illegal finance and corruption practices made it more advantageous to place a greater emphasis on Felipe González, who had managed to maintain his popularity, rather than on the PSOE as a whole. References to the PSOE as a party or the use of the word 'socialist' were scarce in that campaign in which both Felipe González and the main candidates tended to use expressions such as "project of progress". Another example that illustrates this feature is that there as an endorsement of intellectuals in favour of Felipe González, rather than in favour of the Socialist Party.[81] The inclusion of independent candidates in the PSOE lists was also portrayed as an initiative of Felipe González, even in opposition to a part of the PSOE, with the aim of overcoming the effects of corruption cases on the urban middle classes and attracting their

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[80] That this is perceived as such both by campaign organisers at the Federal and the Provincial Committees becomes clear when reading some of the reports sent by the Provincial Committees to the Federal one. For example, in Burgos the distribution of seats from 1982 to 1993 was 2/2 between the PSOE and the PP. In the 1996 elections the AP/PP had acquired such an advantage over the PSOE that the second seat for the PSOE was at risk. In one of their reports they write the following "Many PP high-ranking officials have come to this province. People comment that the PSOE has given up there, since it is not doing much to secure its second seat. They are asking us to send some important leader, and they feel that the party does not take enough interest in this province, because it is not making the effort to send anyone important there. This is discouraging people and even party members" (SF 21-2-96).

[81] The endorsement entitled, *"Manifesto de ciudadanos participantes en ámbitos e instituciones sociales, culturales, científicas, profesionales y recreativas"* published in El País (4/6/93), which had the heading "Señor Felipe González" and did not mention the Socialist Party in any part of the text.

vote.[82] The victory of the PSOE in these elections reinforced the status of Felipe González as an electoral asset[83] and his power within the party.

In December 1995 Felipe González announced that he did not intend to stand in the elections that were due in March 1996. There was difficulty in finding an alternative candidate since Javier Solana, one of the party leaders with the best chance of becoming Gonzalez's successor, was nominated Secretary General of NATO. In the end "the party" asked Felipe González to stand again. Even if parts of the party were not very enthusiastic about his candidature, all sectors acknowledged that he was more of an electoral asset than a liability. Once again in 1996 general election the PSOE campaign was primarily focused on Felipe González, although in this case it was not enough to win the elections. However the loss of support was much smaller than had been predicted; the PSOE finished only 1.4 points behind the winner, the Popular Party in percentage of the vote.

This part of the thesis have put forward the idea that the image of the PSOE was very much directed to enhancing its leader, Felipe González. This does not automatically hinder the development of the party organisation. During the first electoral campaigns the PSOE also emphasised its own organisation. However, as time went by, and particularly when the party was going through difficult moments as a result both of accusations of corruption and of internal conflict, personalisation increased, peaking in the last two electoral campaigns of 1994 and 1996.

Conclusions

The chapter started by insisting that communication activities in general and specific campaigns in particular were organisationally mediated processes and, in turn, helped to shape the organisational features of a political party. This means that the party organisation has to develop certain capacities, or at least contract them out, in order to convey messages to the electorate at large.

Two distinct types of communication activities have been differentiated: those that take place in between elections and those that correspond to election campaigns. While the PSOE has shown special interest in the organisation of election campaigns since the restoration of

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[82] The reaction of the *guerristas* was not very positive.

[83] The percentages of socialist voters who declared that González had been their main reason for supporting the government were 22% in 1986, 14% in 1989 and 23% in 1993 (Maravall 1996: 32). In addition, around 75% of Spanish voters, believed that people that voted socialist had voted more for Felipe González than for the PSOE (see footnote 54, chapter 2).

democracy, the same cannot be said about regular communication activities in non election periods. The PSOE was keen on building up party structures that allowed it to develop efficient communication with the electorate, usually via single-issue campaigns, or just to be able to convey its positions during the phase between the beginning of the transition to democracy and the accession to government, but this interest did not remain at the same level when it was in government. This is partly explained by the fact that being a governmental party it had other ways to communicate its policies to society, but this points to a second issue, namely that there was no clear idea of the role of the party in this respect during the period in government. In short, there was no permanent department inside the PSOE specialised in the design of communication campaigns and the organisational policy in this respect was rather erratic. In addition, probably as a partial consequence of the previous statement, but also due to other circumstances, the relationship between the PSOE and the media deteriorated during the 1980s. It has only been in recent years that the concern with these issues has translated into the creation of a department of elections and communications, but it is too soon to evaluate the extent to which it will solve the deficiencies of the PSOE in this field.

The second focus of this chapter has been the organisation of election campaigns, which have been given total pre-eminence over other organisational activities. The organisation of current election campaigns does not differ much from the way the first campaigns were carried out after the transition to democracy. The way the PSOE organises campaigns has been considered efficient, although there is increasing discontent with the slowness with which the party organisation is adopting new skills to improve its communication with the electorate, either by developing organisation capacities or by achieving a better preparation of cadres and candidates.

It is now time to summarise the main finding of the preceding sections, focusing on the four dimensions presented in the first section of the chapter. The first dimension was that of centralisation. *Centralisation* is very high in the planning stages of election campaigns, in which the goals and targets, the slogans and the main policy offers are decided upon. Financial resources are centrally controlled and only a proportion of them are distributed to the party organisation at the electoral districts (the provinces). The other resource whose distribution across electoral districts has been studied is leadership, or the physical presence of the main leaders of the party in particular districts as a way to attract voter and media attention. The distribution of resources along electoral districts is subject to both internal and external considerations. Although the competitive situation of each district play an important role in candidate selection and in the distribution of "leadership resources" during the campaign, the

allocation of financial resources does not seem to follow this logic. The distribution of centrally controlled financial resources among the electoral districts depends on the size of the electorate in each district, thus does not seem to respond to the competitive situation in each district. This leads us to the tentative conclusion that there is a lower threshold of campaigning in each district, no matter whether there are seats at stake or not, that might respond to the fact that in a political party like the PSOE, with very little inter-election mobilisation, the survival of the party qua extra-parliamentary organisation depends to a large extent on the peaks of mobilisation that achieved during election campaigns.

As far as the *homogeneity* is concerned, the institutional setting offered contradictory expectations. On the one hand, as chapter 3 showed, the proportional list system used in the elections to the lower chamber offers very little incentive to depart from a unified message for individual candidates, but, on the other, the increasing importance of regional government might work in the opposite direction. Finally, the overwhelming importance of TV also points towards contradictory expectations. Television can enhance unity of message over the whole territory and social groups, but the existence of regional TV and radio stations might work in the opposite direction.

So far *homogeneity* has been an important characteristic both of the contents and the general organisational style of the PSOE's campaigns, and it remains to be seen whether any of the factors mentioned that are likely to lead to increasing heterogeneity of campaign styles or messages will play an important role in the future. During the first general election campaigns homogeneity was more difficult to achieve, but it seems likely that this was a result of lack of practice and difficulties in co-ordination than from pre-planned strategies. *Homogeneity* has not suffered much either from the existence of severe intra-party struggles since the beginning of the 1990s. Even in the 1993 campaign which represents the peak of intra-party divisions in the period studied, campaigning seems the organisational activity which was least affected by the division. To be sure, the effects where highly noted in the campaign preparation, negotiations, which became more time- and energy-consuming and more inefficient, and even in differences regarding who should be the main targets of the campaign, but this did not translate into severe contradictions in the campaign contents.

The election campaigns of the PSOE (and generally speaking the campaigns of the main Spanish political parties) have tended to be more *capital* than *labour oriented* since the restoration of democracy. The pre-eminence of TV and advertisements in other media such as the press and the radio account for the previous statement. That said, even capital-intensive campaigns need the voluntary work of party members to carry out activities, at the very least at

the local level. As a matter of fact, although it is clear that in capital-intensive campaigns the role of labour is secondary, it would be more accurate to say that the human component of the whole activity of campaigning is more concentrated in particular phases of the campaign, or simply used in a different manner. The insistence of the PSOE to rely on the organisation of rallies in as many municipalities as possible explains this need of voluntary labour during election campaigns. Thus, the voluntary work required from members during election campaigns was in organising and attending rallies, and their presence at polling stations as observers during election day. Voluntary labour from members is not only valued in terms of the electoral returns that it may produce, but in terms of the activation of the party organisation.

The most difficult dimension to assess is the degree of *professionalization-amateurism* and its changes over time. Many members became more professionalized, but only because those who started doing these tasks continued doing them at the end of the period studied, and not because much use was made of professional experts in communication or marketing.

Finally it is worth noting that the organisation of campaigns has acted as a catalyst for the development of the party organisation. Several authors have questioned the direction of causality in the relationship between electoral success and party growth. While the traditional mass class model of parties views membership as a pre-requisite for being electorally successful, other authors argue that in certain conditions this causality may be reversed. This has already been suggested for the Spanish case in Craig (1994) who contends that party growth is a function of electoral success. This is reflected in the party documents, for example the Federal Executive Commission states that "electoral processes have been extremely useful to consolidate the party organisation" (MG 28C 1979: 165). It has also shaped the development of some features of the party organisation, particularly in the first stages of reconstruction after the restoration of democracy.[84]

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[84] "The main organisational mistake has been the elimination of the Provincial Branches in some regional federations. This mistake has been evident when we have contended elections that were played out mainly in the provinces" (MG 28C: 163). The province is the electoral district for the general elections and also for the regional elections in most Autonomous Communities (see chapter 3).

CONCLUSIONS

As stated at the outset, the main aim of this thesis was to study the organisational development of the Spanish Workers' Socialist Party in its efforts to mobilise support by looking at three aspects: the development of a membership organisation; mobilisation via secondary organisations, mainly unions; and the development of capacities and expertise to communicate directly with the electorate, particularly in election campaigns. It has been acknowledged that the organisational aspect of mobilisation is not the only concern of a political party since it interacts with many other activities assigned to party organisations such as the provision and selection of candidates for public office, or its activities in arenas other than the electoral one.

This concluding chapter begins in section 1 with a review of the main empirical findings of the thesis regarding the transformation of the organisational development of the PSOE since the transition to democracy in 1975. This section also tackles the question of whether the PSOE had an organisational strategy and the extent to which it was implemented. The chapter moves on to evaluate in section 2 the degree to which the analytical category "organisational strategy" is a useful term in the analysis of political parties, whether parties *can* have organisational strategies, or whether their internal politics or the transformations in their political and social environments have made it increasingly difficult to design and implement their strategies. This section also evaluates the extent to which the aspects that were highlighted in the analytical framework of the thesis have proved to be useful in this study of party behaviour. In particular, this section assesses the utility of seeing party organisations, as both instruments and as arenas of action (the internal and external aspect of parties), and how this double consideration facilitates an understanding of their functioning. The conclusions are then broadened in a final section, which elaborates on some implications of this analysis for the general study of political parties and their organisations.

1. The PSOE 1975-1996: organising for victory... and defeat?

During the period of time studied the PSOE conditioned its organisational strategy to the maintenance of a high degree of internal cohesion and control. This proved to be an advantage at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, in a context of uncertainty regarding the

stability of democracy and of high competition from other political parties, and continued to be so for the rest of the 1980s when democracy was consolidated and there was hardly any competition from other parties. But it produced diminishing returns as the political context changed at the end of the 1980s, becoming clearly unsuitable to deal with the challenge of an increasingly competitive political environment in the 1990s. These three periods and the organisational strategy of the PSOE will be examined in the next paragraphs.

The first phase covers the period of re-construction of the party organisation which began in the 1960s, but in this thesis is studied mainly from the beginning of the process of transition to democracy in Spain. This period was governed by uncertainty regarding both the fate of the political system that was being built, and the position of the main political actors in this new system. The main uncertainties concerning the latter point vanished when the PSOE became the second most voted party at the first democratic elections (1977). After confirming its electoral potential, the PSOE directed all its actions, including its organisational strategy, to becoming the alternative to the governing coalition, the Unión de Centro Democrático.

The PSOE made important investments in its organisation during this first phase. The short time-span between the party reconstruction and the first elections (1977 the general elections and the 1979 local ones) helps to explain why the investment in organisational resources was intense but did not last, particularly the fact that the PSOE was soon successful and came to office, first in 1979 at various local governments and then in 1982 at the national level.

During the first stage that goes from the beginning of transition roughly to the 1982 elections the organisational strategy was governed by the need to grow, numerically and territorially at least to be able to find enough candidatures for public offices. Since the departure point was an organisation with virtually no members, the goal of organisational growth was a fairly obvious one that all intra-party actors shared. Party strategists and organisers also believed it was important *to convey* an image of a strong organisation, given that the other party in the left, the Communists, had a strong membership base at that time. Thus, *membership growth was an important concern, at least to reach a certain minimal threshold so as to be able to provide candidates for office and have the minimal capacity to organise election campaigns.*

However, from the end of the 1970s *the maintenance of internal control and discipline prevailed over any other organisational concern.* The extent and nature of the investment in three items of organisational policy: - electioneering, increasing membership and

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the links with the General Workers' Union[1]- was conditional on the maintenance of a cohesive and united organisation. Party structures that enhanced the central control of the growth process were maintained or created anew, and the territorial-hierarchical principle was preferred over other potential forms of organisation (for instance along functional lines), that could make central control more difficult. The 28th Party Congress (1979), as chapter 2 has shown, was a clear example of the effects of losing control of an organisation that was growing too quickly, but this was rapidly remedied through a series of statutory reforms that enhanced the powers of central party authorities to influence the composition of regional and provincial delegations to Party Congresses and the way they voted in Congresses (explained in detail in chapter 4).

It was not only a matter of organisational norms and rules; the practices followed in the day-to-day party functioning and at Party Congresses also revealed an increasing concern with limiting the possibility of disorder inside the party. Internal struggles were perceived to have high electoral costs, a perception that was reinforced by the bad results obtained by other main political parties, such as the communist PCE and the centre-right governmental coalition, UCD, which were both undergoing severe internal crises. As in other political systems, in Spain there is a premium on party unity, and the PSOE leaders were well aware of it.

The external political and institutional setting, combined with the overriding goal of achieving office on its own, facilitated the predominance of these organisational priorities. First, the electoral system played an important role. On the one hand, the Spanish electoral system based on closed lists with no preference-voting made the preparation of these lists an important resource to be controlled in intra-party exchanges. In the PSOE it was controlled by the central party authorities who had both formal and informal veto powers over the proposals put forward by the provincial and regional party federations. On the other hand, the low degree of proportionality of the electoral system encouraged party cohesion by discouraging splinter parties, which had very little chance of obtaining parliamentary representation. To a certain extent the internal[2] and external institutional environments neutralised each other: while the internal institutional environment incentives was not participatory, thus discouraging discouraged *'voice'* and encouraging *'exit'*, the external incentives discouraged *'exit'*, at least if the politicians that chose the *'exit'* option wanted to pursue a political career.[3]

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[1] The discussion on the specificity of these three items is not retaken here, they are developed in chapter 5, 6 and 7.

[2] That is, party rules and structures (see chapter 4).

[3] Incidentally this is related to the predominance of co-optation, mergers and so on over the formation of new parties, with very low chances of obtaining representation.

Other institutional settings reinforced the organisational priorities of the PSOE. For instance, the existence of public party finance provided the party organisation with resources that depended on its electoral success, and made members rather superfluous from the financial perspective, at least for the party organisation at the central level. The spread of mass media and television from the transition period further diminished the need for a large membership base, in terms of vote-getting.

Most party resources were spent directly or indirectly on electoral campaigns by creating the organisational capacities to conduct effective campaigns, and only secondarily on other organisational items or activities. Nevertheless, the three aspects of organisational policy mentioned were developed to a greater extent than in the subsequent phase. For instance, the co-operation with the General Workers' Union was particularly strong during this phase, facilitated by the structure of competition in the corporate and the electoral arena. While the UGT benefited from the PSOE's support in its fight with the communist-oriented union, Workers' Commissions, the PSOE benefited from the support of the UGT in its competition with the Communist Party.

Strictly speaking this first period (1975-1982) is the only one in which the PSOE had a clear organisational strategy, understood not only as a reconstruction on the part of the analyst, but as an orchestrated set of actions which concerned the creation of deployment of organisational resources. The organisational strategy was not isolated but was co-ordinated with the general party strategy of becoming the party of government. This was facilitated by the fact that the PSOE was in that moment a very centralised party and its federal governing bodies had enough power to enforce the implementation of a strategy devised at the centre. There were problems of implementation but these were due to lack of co-ordination, immaturity or lack of resources rather than to the active resistance of regional and local branches.

The landslide victory obtained by the PSOE in the 1982 general elections marked a new phase in its organisational development. This success was followed by the victory in most local and regional governments at the 1983 elections. *Being in government at the different territorial levels had a clear impact on the organisational strategy of the PSOE.* First, it had the immediate effect of "emptying" the party organisation of cadres who took on governmental responsibilities and left aside, at least temporarily, their tasks in the party organisation. This void was intensified by the lack of a clear idea of the role the PSOE (*qua* organisation) should have when the party was in government, whether it just had to "sustain" the government and explain its policies, or whether it had other roles similar to those performed in the pre-

governmental phase. Secondly, the participation in government placed at the PSOE's disposal a large amount of resources with which to influence society. Apart from developing policies in a very comfortable situation, given that it held an absolute majority of seats, the access to government meant having to fill in many positions and having access to patronage. In short, it opened a pool of resources that went far beyond the party's existing *and* potential organisational resources, and diminished the need and the "profitability" of investing in its own party organisation.

The PSOE needed members to occupy all these positions in the different governmental levels and in the administration, but they were less needed for vote-getting purposes, particularly if enlarging the membership base meant losing control of how the party organisation behaved in relation to the government. As chapter 5 has shown, except for the initial attempts at its early years in office directed at finding candidates for local elections or the membership drives designed with the aim of converting the great amount of electoral support into organisational resources, *there was a decreasing emphasis in recruiting and maintaining members*. This does not mean that the PSOE did not have a steady rate of membership growth during these years, but that there was less effort in this direction from the party organisation.

The economic policies pursued by the Government created a considerable degree of tension with the labour movement, particularly with the traditional ally of the PSOE, the General Workers' Union. The conditions that had facilitated the maintenance of close but informal links between the two organisations gradually vanished during the PSOE's period in government, culminating in UGT-supported general strike against the government's economic policy in December 1988. The confrontation between the UGT and the Socialist government greatly affected the party-union ties. The lack of independence of the party organisation from the party-in-government blocked any attempts of the former to maintain stronger links with the UGT.

Although it did not have the same implications as the breaking of ties with the UGT, the already weak relationship of the PSOE with other social movements and secondary organisation also suffered when the PSOE came to government. This was partly because these groups preferred to negotiate directly with the administration instead of the party organisation and partly because there was no clear strategy to incorporate the demands of these groups in the party programmes or activities. In addition, the attempts of the PSOE to have a presence in the social movements or to create new organisations dominated by party members did not always respect their autonomy.

The PSOE rules underwent minor changes that facilitated the representation of minorities in internal governing bodies, but nothing was done to transform either the party structures or its practices in order to increase rank and file participation in decision-making. The composition of the party governing bodies was also very stable during these years. As chapter 4 has shown, the ruling party body, the Federal Executive Commission, during these years had very low rates of renewal in its composition. According to the information I obtained in interviews with several party officials this also seemed to be the pattern at lower territorial levels.

During this second phase electioneering and campaigning continued to draw the largest amount of internal resources. However, from the beginning of the 1980s less effort was made in this field of activities, shown by the clear lack of innovation of communication skills and campaign capacities. Part of explanation for this lies in the decreasing interest of the PSOE in its own organisation as a resource, once it had access to other resources through its governmental participation. But internal considerations also play a role in explaining this lack of adaptation of the PSOE style of campaigning and communicating with the electorate at large. Innovation would have been facilitated by a change in the people in control of designing and organising electoral campaigns, but this would have implied a loss of internal power for these intra-party actors. As chapter 7 has shown, from 1977 to 1993 there was a significant continuity in the group in charge of the design and organisation of electoral campaigns, headed by the deputy General Secretary, Alfonso Guerra. This does not mean that the 1993 change, which responded to internal shifts in power rather than to the desire to innovate in campaigning, automatically meant adopting a new style, but it certainly facilitated transformations in the way campaigns were conducted.

The lack of dynamism in the way the party organisation functioned cannot be attributed solely to the party's being in office, but to the long-term incapacity of the PSOE to adapt its party organisation to these circumstances. When it came into office in 1982 the PSOE had not anticipated what being in government would entail for the functioning of the party organisation, but once in government it did not accelerate its thinking. As a result, the interest in the PSOE *qua organisation* gradually declined during these years.

Moreover, the electoral success the PSOE enjoyed at the different governmental levels during this decade further discouraged taking risks by changing the organisational structure, rules or practices. In effect, the lack of competitiveness in the party system for most of the 1980s contributed to a stabilisation of these characteristics: there were few external challenges to act as catalyst for change and there were also few intra-party incentives to initiate reforms.

This situation changed by the end of the decade when the Socialists came under pressure, caused by the several political scandals that came to light, and to the increasing competitiveness of the electoral arena, coupled with important intra-party divisions that hampered the reaction against the now clear external challenges.

The main organisational novelty during the 1980s was the expansion of the regional federations and the increasing power of their leaders, the regional *barons*. From the mid 1980s onwards regional barons, helped by the process of political decentralisation that led to development of Autonomous Communities, began exploiting their own command of votes and patronage, and sometimes of large Party Congress delegations, in order to assert some autonomy from the federal party authorities. Regional leaders gained influence in central decision-making in spite of the attempts of the federal party authorities to keep them under control, in an transformation from purely hierarchical relations to a tacit "non-intervention" agreement on certain issues, combined with situations of balanced bargaining between the federal party authorities and the regional ones on other issues.

There is mixed evidence concerning attempts by the central party organisation to keep control of important decisions, combined with increasing decentralisation of other issues, particularly of day-to-day organisational management. The general impression is that regional federations developed a considerable degree of autonomy in their decisions concerning organisational matters, except in issues that directly related to the internal balance of power. Those aspects of organisational strategy that are more closely related to the balance of internal power are still controlled by the central authorities.

The internal party division that opposed *renovadores* and *guerristas* was the most distinctive trait of the third phase in the organisational development of the PSOE (which roughly covers the period from 1990 to the 1996 elections). *The internal struggle absorbed the time and energies of intra-party actors, engaged in an on-going fight for control over the party organisation.* It also enhanced the character of the party organisation as the arena in which the struggle for power occurred to the detriment of its instrumental value. In other words, existing organisational resources were being used to favour the positions of one internal group over another, rather than for attaining external goals.

Until intra-party problems started the co-ordination of the different arenas in which the PSOE participated was ensured by the presence of Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra in all of these arenas (Felipe González was simultaneously Prime Minister and the PSOE General Secretary and Alfonso Guerra, deputy Prime Minister and deputy General Secretary). The increasing internal division and the resignation of Alfonso Guerra altered this situation. The

division of roles between the two by which Felipe González concentrated his energy on the government and Alfonso Guerra on the party organisation implied serious problems of co-ordination between the party-in-government and the party-organisation once Guerra was out of the government.

The results of the 33rd Party Congress (March 1994) where the *guerristas* became a minority in the Federal Executive Committee, redressed this imbalance by providing those in government with greater control over the party organisation. Until then the position of *guerristas* in the party had been enhanced by the fact that a large proportion of their group devoted a great deal of their energy to internal party matters. As full-time participants, they had command both of information and communications resources that other party leaders and regular party members lacked. During this phase regional leaders continued to increase in importance. The mutual "non-intervention" relations or, in some important issues, the submission of regional federations to the federal Executive was substituted by the active participation of in the federal party bodies, particularly in the Federal Executive Commission (see tables in chapter 4).

In addition to this conflictual internal situation, after 1990 the PSOE faced a more competitive environment in the electoral arena. The threat of losing power that was already present in the 1993 general elections came true when the PSOE lost the 1996 general elections, although it remained very close to the winning party, the Popular Party. The defeat had been preceded by the victory of the Popular Party in the 1994 European elections as well as by the loss of most regional governments and the local government of most of the highest populated municipalities at the 1995 elections. This meant also losing access to some of the resources that the PSOE had enjoyed in the previous fourteen years such as posts in the public administration and government, policy-making and patronage.

If one applies a strict definition of organisational strategy, it can be said that the PSOE only had, one in the period from 1975 to 1982. After arriving in Government the PSOE gradually stopped implementing the strategy it had had from 1975 to 1982 and did not develop a new one. Although during its first years in office there were signs that it was still concerned to build organisational capacities (for example, the membership drive that was enacted in 1983-84), these efforts gradually disappeared. The gradual loss of interest in building and using organisational capacities had to do with the easy access to other means of attracting support as well as to the lack of competition that characterised the electoral arena during much of the time the PSOE was in office. When this circumstance started changing and competitiveness increased due to the growth of the Popular Party, the PSOE did not react by

strengthening its organisation. On the contrary, it underwent a serious internal crisis that undermined its chances to respond adequately to the external challenges.

The field work done for this thesis stopped just before the 34th Party Congress (June 1997), in which there was an important qualitative renovation of the PSOE's Executive Commission: both Felipe González, its General Secretary and Alfonso Guerra, Deputy General Secretary, left the Executive in this Congress. Joaquín Almunia became the new General Secretary, while no deputy General Secretary was chosen to replace Alfonso Guerra. Although the remnants of the internal crisis are still there, the "leading actors" moved out of the spotlight. Attempts to introduce organisational reforms of a large scope such as the introduction of primaries or the effective development of the long planned functional organisation, as well as the re-organisation of the party organisation in urban areas were discussed at the 34th Congress and are on the current agenda of the PSOE. This shows that there is an apparent acknowledgement that it is difficult to increase membership by attracting citizens to join the party, to establish links with the social movements and to renew the party image with the current organisational structure, but it is not clear either whether the vested interests it embodies will prevent change, or whether the external challenges will be of such size that they will offset the internal organisational inertia.

2. Organisational strategy, trade-offs, shifting advantages and the double nature of party organisations. Assessing the utility of the analytical framework

There are two questions that need to be evaluated. First, whether the term 'organisational strategy' is a useful analytic concept, or whether it carries so much construction on the part of the analyst that it is not useful to depict parties' organisational functioning. Secondly, on a different level, this thesis also brings up the issue of whether the current scenario of party and electoral competition in Western democracies have made it increasingly difficult, and even unwise, for parties to have organisational strategies, whether parties are in a position to develop organisational strategies in order to influence in their environments, or whether external and internal environments have become too unpredictable for strategies to work.

As far as the first question is concerned, it is clear that using the term organisational strategy in a loose way is always possible, no matter how little a party organisation is actually organised. However, the more the concept has to be "stretched", the more we become uncertain so as to whether it is the party that presents the creation and deployment of organisational resources as an orchestrated set of decisions or whether it is a reconstruction on the part of the analyst. Even reaching the conclusion that there is no organisational strategy,

for example for the case of the PSOE since it entered office, means neither that it lacked any strategy at all aimed at influencing in its environment, nor that its organisational structure disappeared. It simply emphasises the fact that the PSOE did not give much value to its organisation and did not develop a strategy that involved the creation and/or the deployment of organisational resources.

The second question refers to whether the nature of the scenarios in which political parties compete in Western democracies has changed in such a way that it is hardly ever possible to accomplish any organisational strategy, given the amount of time usually needed to do so, which conflicts with the need to accommodate to changing scenarios. However, this discussion refers more to parties' capacity to have any kind of long term strategy to skew the environments in which they compete in their favour, rather than on the profitability of investing in organisational resources. Various authors have pointed out the increasing difficulties faced by parties in confronting changing scenarios, but this does not mean that using their organisations in different ways cannot be a way to act upon these scenarios. Thus, the real challenge for researchers is to discover the new ways parties are finding in order to exert some influence over their environments, the organisational tools they use, even if the total amount of resources devoted to their organisation has diminished. *The fact that traditional organisational activities are less relevant than they used to be does not necessarily mean that party organisations tout court are any less important.* The elements of party organisation that used to be important may have diminished in importance today, but not completely, and new organisational elements may have acquired more relevance.

The work in this thesis has concentrated on the characteristics of the scenarios found by a party that was reconstructed in a context with very different characteristics from the ones where mass parties emerged. Parties have probably less chance to influence the electorates in such a context, particularly via their organisational structures and activities, but certainly this does not mean that parties are passive actors in such contexts because they have shaped the institutional system under which they were to function. Even as regards the way they use their organisation as a tool to increase their power in other arenas, there have been times recently when the PSOE has made heavy organisational investments, although obviously the objectives and reasons behind them were rather different from the ones typical of mass parties born at the beginning of this century.

At the beginning of the thesis the claim was made that it was useful to focus on the idea of *trade-offs* involved in organisational decisions and on the variables that influence the existence and magnitude of these *trade-offs*. In fact, a *trade-off* is just the elegant version of

the commonplace in everyday life "you can't have it all". Political parties are no different and cannot have it all, but it is important to find out which are the organisational properties or items whose simultaneous maximisation is impossible, or undesirable, at least in the eyes of party organisers and strategists. These *trade-offs* are affected by internal and external[4] factors that make some courses of action more appealing than others for particular actors within a political party.

In the organisational formation and development of the PSOE there were clear *trade-offs*, of a more or less obvious nature. As stated in the previous section, party central *control and cohesion* were the priorities over the whole period studied; however, the extent to which this goal was made compatible with others changed over this period. During the phase of party reconstruction, after some episodes of internal disorder, control was a perceived prerequisite in order to have an organisation that could share a unified goal (attaining government) and work cohesively towards it. This was compatible with increasing membership and with the establishment of links with other organisations, or in the case of the socialist union UGT, maintaining them. However, *once the goal of gaining office was achieved the extent to which the search of control and cohesion prevailed over other organisational concerns did not diminish*. This reduced the capacity of the party organisation to adapt to changes in the environment, particularly at the end of the decade when it had to face a more competitive environment.

The second type of trade-off, of a more obvious nature refers to the fact that "raw" resources are limited and this forces party organisers and strategists to rank those organisational items and activities that should be reinforced to the detriment of others. If we consider it in terms of allocation of material resources, then it is a zero-sum logic that leads to a situation in which a decline of the effort in a particular aspect of party organisation is traded off by the increase of effort in other aspects, for example, campaign organisation. From this perspective campaigning related activities clearly attracted most material and non-material resources from the party organisation. Although this is not explicit, the PSOE has turned more and more into an organisation that is only clearly visible as an organisation in electoral campaigns.

The combination of the two ways to consider the *trade-offs* involved in the selection of organisational priorities, as well as the consideration of the internal and external environment of parties helps to explain the pre-eminence in the PSOE of developing organisational

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[4] Meaning external and internal to the party organisation.

capacities to carry out effective election campaigns over any other means of vote getting such as the development of a mass membership organisation, or the establishment of strong links with secondary organisations. Apart from being the optimal strategy for mobilising support given the availability and spread of mass media, as well as the weakness of secondary organisations, investing in issues related to campaign organisation and electioneering had less costs in terms of internal control. In fact the type of campaigns developed, and in general modern campaigning was perfectly compatible with (and even enhanced) a tight control of the main decisions from the central party apparatus.

For most of the time the priorities of maintaining cohesion and centralised control of the party organisation were more important than the restrictions imposed by financial resources. In other words, over the years studied there are decisions concerning the party organisation that cannot be explained on the grounds of financial or material constraints: searching for members or granting them more rights was not that expensive in financial terms, but entailed a potential loss of control and cohesion since it meant delegating influence and control over important decisions.

The idea of *"shifting advantages"* advanced in the first chapter of the thesis has also proved to be a useful heuristic tool in the analysis of the PSOE's organisational development. It is also based on a common-sense idea: organisational structures, forms and practices are not adequate *per se*, but are more or less suited for certain internal and external environments.[5] In the case of the PSOE during the period of time studied the organisational structure and practices that were useful in a context of uncertainty about the fate of the political system, surrounded by political rivals affected by severe internal crises, became less useful once these characteristics had changed. *The interaction of low inter-party competition, low intra-party competition in the 1980s with virtually no monitoring of the party leaders, partly as a result of organisational decisions made at a time when both inter-party competition and intra-party competition were high (end of the 1970s), diminished the competitive capacities of the party organisation to face the new challenges in the early 1990s.*

In short, this shows that an organisational property or characteristic can be an *asset* under certain circumstances, but not under a different set of conditions. Short/long term costs and benefits enter this calculation. From this perspective, mass parties were perhaps possible because at the time they developed it was an optimal choice both in the short-medium *and* in

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[5] The internal environment is the one that characterises the party organisation, while the external one is the socio-political and institutional environment in which a party operates.

the long term, whereas in the current conditions there are very few incentives towards enlarging membership or giving them participatory rights in the short term, but these tend to increase when we consider the long term. However, party leaders and organisers tend to be more influenced in their decisions by short rather than long term considerations.

Another important issue that this thesis has highlighted is that the relative advantage or disadvantage attached to an organisational form and strategy does not depend only on variables that pertain to the external environment in which the party operates (competitiveness at the electoral arena, the electoral system and so on), but also on party attributes and intra-party conditions. This work suggests that the different internal and external environments exert *nested influences.*[6] This means that a party's organisational structure is influenced by characteristics external to the party organisation to which they have to adapt, and also by the interests and preferences of intra-party actors. But it also serves as the context in which these intra-party actors take decisions, which might end up transforming that very same internal context (incidentally, also the external one). Thus, organisational strategy understood as an "internal policy" of parties regarding their allocation of existing resources and creation of new ones is influenced by the external institutional setting and context, but also by the internal institutional system and actors since both help to shape the preferences and strategies of the most important actors in the internal decision making process.

Often, when scholars give advice about the need to take into consideration the intra-party arena to explain party behaviour they refer to the need to consider parties as non-unitary actors, but as groups or coalitions of individuals who do not necessarily have the same organisational goals and preferences. However, in addition to this important consideration, there are other aspects of the internal party arena that condition party behaviour such as the institutional setting in which intra-party actors work. These latter aspects are often neglected when giving the general advice to take into account the contents of the intra-party "black box", and yet they are essential in order to understand party behaviour. In the case studied, internal considerations influenced decisions on whether to engage members or not, particularly when there were intra-party conflicts, as well as influencing resource allocation in election campaigns, even affecting the establishment of relationship with other organisations. In short, they are very important variables to take into consideration. Finally, the case of the PSOE shows how important it is to be aware of centre-periphery relations inside political parties, and how these reacted to a transformation of the external institutional environment in a direction

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[6] See Koelble (1992).

that reinforced the resources of regional party leaders that hindered the implementation of the few organisational measures taken at the centre.

The analysis presented here also sheds light on the effect of becoming a governmental party on organisational strategies and opens future lines of research to test systematically some of the tentative conclusions regarding incumbency and party organisation. The PSOE represents an extreme case, given the short period of time after its reconstruction in which it had time to develop its organisation before it won office. The PSOE confirms Panebianco's claim (see chapter 1) that parties slow down their organisational development once they attain governmental office. To be more precise, *once in government the party organisation continued developing, but at a decreasing speed and intensity*. The various chapters have unravelled the processes that underlie such a claim.

Although attaining government was a catalyst for membership growth, it also hindered the internal dynamism of the party organisation and shaped its growth in a way that had diminishing returns over time. Relying on the resources that being in government put in the hands of the PSOE constrained the party organisation's capacity to react to new conditions, particularly once it has lost most of those resources (at the 1996 general elections and the 1995 regional and local ones). Out of power, the PSOE must now either modify its strategy and rely in its own organisational resources in the hope of winning office, or risk leaving itself at the mercy of the mistakes of the current incumbent, the Popular Party.[7]

Finally, a word on the weight of historical legacies and path-dependency in the explanation of organisational strategies of the PSOE. Many party leaders and officials interviewed allude to the weight of organisational inertia and historical legacies to explain the choices of the PSOE during and after the transition to democracy. The abuse of explanations based on historical legacies to explain the trajectory of the PSOE just after the transition to democracy is incorrect for several reasons. Firstly, it alters the original sense of historical legacies as the accumulation of party strategies and their constraining effect on future choices, given that around 1975 in many respects the party organisation was created anew. The PSOE's organisation was basically reconstructed after the transition to democracy, and *historical legacy influenced actors as much as it was used by these same actors*. Secondly, over-using this interpretation leaves us with unexplained actors' preferences and strategies. While not denying their weight, one should be extremely cautions about using these officials and leaders

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[7] This goes against Koelble's (1996:261) idea that the PSOE's organisational design has "facilitated electoral success during the 1980s and 1990s and might help the party to adjust quickly should it lose power in an up-coming election."

disclaimer and turn it into an explanation without analysing the alternative options that were at the disposal of these leaders.

As shown in chapter 2 and 4, it is undeniable that the historical legacy was intelligently managed: the PSOE leaders at the transition succeeded in maintaining a symbolic link with the past of a centenary organisation, while at the same time offering new ideas, and more importantly, new leaders that were not connected with the Civil War or with the dictatorship, providing a combination characterised by "symbolic continuity and political discontinuity".[8] On the organisational front there were only a few changes with respect to the inherited structure. However, this should not be interpreted so much as a burden whose weight was impossible to control: no evidence has been found of such a constraint to change of structures when the transition took place. Different alternatives were considered, such as combining the territorial principle of organisation with sectional or functional ones, but they were disregarded. Other organisational mechanisms were changed: important organisational reforms that altered the traditional mechanisms of internal representation in congresses *were* introduced and were not hindered by this alleged heavy weight of historical practice.

This does not deny that the legacy of the practices as a clandestine party plays a role in the party culture or in the introvert nature of party organisation, but one should be cautious not to hurry to give historical legacies too much explanatory power without undertaking a careful analysis of the *current* conditions, contexts, preferences and choices.[9] Precisely for this reason, the stability of the post-transitional context as compared to the one lived in the transition to democracy seems to suggest that *it is plausible that the organisational structure and practices carried out during the period of time covered by this thesis will act as a heavier constraint on future organisational choices of the PSOE than the legacy found by party actors at the transition to democracy.*

The reasons for this are double. First, it is difficult to think of contexts like the one provided by the transition to democracy, in which the party organisation was very small (thus few people were actually affected by the legacies or vested interests) and the political/institutional context was highly fluid. Even if the Spanish transition was characterised by reform rather than sudden break with the past, this had to do more with the form in which transition took place than with the actual contents of the transformation. Secondly the organisational form and practices developed in the period analysed are likely to act as a burden

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[8] Expression used by Pradera (1992: 33).

[9] "Current" meaning contemporary to the time analysed in a study.

because of their restrictive nature. It seems logical to think that it is more difficult to open up an organisation once it has been working for twenty years under the same set of (restrictive) rules, than it is to "close" it or concentrate its control in a few hands at a time when the amount of actors deprived of "voice" by this move is small and the chances to substitute them by more loyal ones was higher (as was the case at the end of the 1970s). In the former case, granting voice or opening the organisation might lead to short term difficulties for the leaders implementing the reform, even with the prospect of increasing advantages for individual party actors or for the whole party organisation in the medium term.

3. Broadening the lessons...

The study of the organisational strategies of the PSOE provide insights that might add to the reflection about the current thinking of party organisations. It suggests that it is interesting to proceed by investigating the existence of *generation, period* and *age* effects in the study of the development of party organisations.[10] While generation effects are those traits that are supposed to be due to having been born in the same cohort, i.e., are shared by the individuals who belong to the same generation (in this case by the parties), the transformations associated with periods of time affect individuals of different ages and generation. Finally age effects tries to measure the effect that derives from the passage of time for each individual party organisation. Applied to the analysis of party organisations, *period effects* offer an explanation of the traits of party organisations based on their adaptation to the demands imposed by the social and institutional environments, while *generation effects* encourage the permanence of certain organisational traits and consolidate an organisational form across different periods of time, thus retarding the adaptation to the new circumstances offered by these new *'periods'*, characterised by particular social, economic, political and technological conditions. The introduction of *'age'* effects complements the picture by highlighting the importance of the development of each individual party organisation under the influence of *generation* and *period* effects, but also of a particular constellation of factors that affect its organisational nature. This points to the advantages of keeping in mind the need to combine the study of party types, which is concerned with their role as organisations as much as it is with their role as institutions in the political systems, with the study of parties as individual organisations.

Whereas much of the thinking of the evolution of party types (as constellation of

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[10] The concept of generation and period effects is introduced, but not fully developed, by Katz and Mair (1990) and later on by Maor (1997: 112/3).

certain organisational traits) has been framed in the fairly homogenous development of most established Western European democracies, the study of political parties from countries with different cultural or societal traditions or with a different timing of their processes of democratisation enrich the debate on the driving forces of party organisational development and diminish the chance of organisational convergence towards a universal party type. In short, the study of party organisations that develop in contexts slightly different than those of democratic systems with a continuity of democracy helps to unravel the *period, generation* and *age* effects mentioned above. Although the present work did not have this as its main objective, at its completion this appears as one of the avenues it opens for future comparative research.

Although in the first chapter some reservations were expressed towards the utility of party models for the study of a single party organisational strategy, the conclusions must reconsider this issue at least in one respect. As Katz and Mair (1995: 19) point out, party models are interesting because they summarise information about the effects mentioned above and "can be used as heuristic polar types to which individual parties may approximate more or less closely at a given time". The case of the PSOE suggests that it is not only researchers who think in terms of these ideal types, but also party leaders and organisers who often justify their decisions with reference to these party types, more concretely in the case studied here, alluding to the mass party model.

Mair (1994: 2) argues that the thinking of how parties work, even in normative terms, has remained within the terms of reference set by the mass party model. In the case studied it is interesting to see how the terms of the discussion on how the party organisation should work, at least at the level of discourse, also remained to a large extent within the mass party model, perhaps because Socialist leaders were influenced by other fellow European parties who were or had had typical mass party organisations. In spite of the distinct departure of the PSOE's organisational style from the mass party strategy, it is clear that many party documents try to project an image of the PSOE as a mass party, or as party that aspired to be one, particularly in its pre-governmental period.

This leads to the tentative hypothesis that should be tested in further research that the mass party model seems to enjoy more prestige and a higher legitimacy than other party types. If drawing resources from the State, i.e., indirectly from citizens, had been equally legitimate, then there should have been no problem in admitting it, or at least no need to recreate the discourse of mass parties. This study suggests that when the PSOE strategy clearly departed from that of mass membership parties, its leaders seemed to have a "bad conscience" and gave

signs that suggest they thought they ought to be doing something different, and at least *maintain the appearance* of developing something similar to the mass party model.[11]

It is also essential to be aware of the second part of Katz and Mair's remark cited above, namely the need to combine the study of party types and the consequences for the political system as a whole with the study of parties as individual organisations that are not only non-unitary actors, but composed of individuals, who sometimes co-ordinate their actions in groups (factions). The study of how *specific* leaders want to remain in their positions, and *specific* rank and file want to become leaders or exert more control over leaders, helps to understand the complexities of internal party functioning. It also helps to understand the difficulties involved in making choices concerning the party organisation that bring about costs that exceed benefits in the short run, even if the relationship may be reversed for the middle and long run. The current leaders effecting the reforms are the ones who are going to suffer the costs and uncertainties. Even if these are mild reforms that do not much endanger the position of leaders in general, they might endanger the position of specific leaders.

Finally, the focus on organisational strategies as subject to internal and external pressures, partly affected by similar challenges to other political parties, and partly affected by the particular features of that individual organisation, helps one to go beyond the formal description of organisational processes and forces researchers to make explicit the choices that party actors confront. This is not an easy task given that intra-party actors hardly ever formalise their preferences and it is difficult to do an ex-post reconstruction that disentangles preferences from strategies, preferences from outcomes, and strategies from outcomes. However, no matter how frustrating this exercise might sometimes be, it is worth the effort. If one reads off strategies from outcomes the whole exercise loses its relevance. This thesis has hopefully contributed to do some of this combined analysis of party behaviour.

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[11] See Katz 1997 for some reflections on this point.

Map of Spain

PSOE' s organizational structure

Federal level: PSOE	**Federal Congress**	**Federal Executive Commission** (Permanent Com. from 1981)	**Federal Committee**	**Federal Conflicts Committee**

Comisión de Registro de Biene: (f1993)

Federal Auditing Committee

Regional level: Party federations PSOE-XX	**Regional Congress**	**Regional Executive Commission**	**Regional Committee**	**Regional Auditing Committee**

Regional Conflict: Committee (u 1984

Provincial level: provincial branches	**Provincial Congress**	**Provincial Executive Commission**	**Provincial Committee**

Local level: local branches	**Local Assembly**	**Local Committee**	**Local Assembly**

Notes: (f) indicates that a party body exists <u>from</u> the date mentioned afterwards.
(u) indicates that a party body exists <u>until</u> the date mentioned afterwards.
⟶ means "elects (the whole body or part of it)

PSOE Federal Executive Commissions (1974-1997)

XXVI Congress (1974)	XXVI Congress (Dec. 1976)	Extraordinary Congress (Sept. 1979)	XXIX Congress 1981 (Oct. 1981)
	President: Ramón Rubial	President: Ramón Rubial	President: Ramón Rubial
First Secretary: Felipe González	First Secretary: Felipe González	General Secretary: Felipe González	General Secretary: Felipe González
		Deputy General Secretary: Alfonso Guerra	Deputy General Secretary: Alfonso Guerra
Secr. of Organization: Nicolás Redondo	Secr. of Organization: Alfonso Guerra	Secr. of Organization: Carmen García Bloise	Secr. of Organization: Carmen García Bloise
Secr. of Administration: Eduardo López Albizu	Secr. of Administration: Carmen García Bloise	Secr. of Administration: Emilio Alonso.	Secr. of Administration: Emilio Alonso.
Secr. of Training and Documentation: Francisco Bustelo	Secr. of Training and Documentation: Luis Gómez Llorente	Secr. of Training: José María Maravall	
		Secr of Studies and Programs: Javier Solana	Secr of Studies and Programs: Joaquín Almunia
		Secr. of Section policies: Ciriaco de Vicente	Secr. of Social Affaires: Ciriaco de Vicente
Secr. of Press and Information: Alfonso Guerra	Secr. of Press and Information: Javier Solana	Secr. Press and Propaganda: Guillermo Galeote	
		Secr. of Local policy: Luis Fajardo	
	Secr. of Political Relations: Enrique Múgica	Secr. of Political Relations: Enrique Múgica	
Secr. of Relations with the Young Soc.: José Mª Benegas	Secr. of Relations with the Young Soc.: José Mª Benegas	Secr. of Relations with the Young Soc. Juan Antonio Barragán	
		Secr. of Regional Policy María Izquierdo	
Secr. of Syndical Policy: Agustín González	Secr. of Syndical and Social Affaires: Eduardo López Albizu	Secr. of Syndical Policy Joaquín Almunia	
Secr. of Emigration: Juan Iglesias	Secr. of Emigration: José Luis Albiñana (Francisco Vázquez)	Secr. of Emigration: Francisco López Real	
		Secr. of Culture: Ignacio Sotelo	Secr. of Culture: José María Maravall
Secr. of International Relations: Pablo Castellano	Secr. of International Relations: Luis Yáñez		
Secr. of Propaganda: Guillermo Galeote	Secr. of Propaganda: Guillermo Galeote		Secr. of Image: Guillermo Galeote
Secr. of Coordination: Enrique Múgica			
		S. Política Económica: María Izquierdo	
	Vocales: Nicolás Redondo, Carlos Cigarrán, José María Triginer, Luis Fajardo, Miguel Boyer (he resigned and was substituted), Rafael Ballesteros y Antonio García Miralles	Vocales: Raimon Obiols, José María Benegas, Pedro Bofill, Carlos Cigarrán, José Angel Fernández Villa, José Federico de Carvajal, Gregorio Peces-Barba, Donato Fuejo.	Executive Secretaries: María Izquierdo, Carmen Mestre, Javier Sáenz Cosculluela, José María Benegas, Manuel Chaves, Pedro Bofill, Salvador Clotas, Franciso López Real, Salvador Fernández Moreda, José Angel Fernández Villa, Joan Lerma, Javier Solana, Luis Fajardo, Enrique Múgica, Raimon Obiols, Joan Prats

XXX Congress (1984)	XXXI Congress (Jan 1988)	XXXII Congress (Nov.1990)	XXXIII Congress (March 1994)	XXXIV Congress (June 1997)
Pres.: Ramón Rubial.	Pres.: Ramón Rubial	Pres.: Ramón Rubial	Pres.: Ramón Rubial	Pres.: Ramón Rubial
G. Secretary:F. González	G. Secretary:F. González	G. Secretary:F. González	G. Secretary:F. González	G. Secretary:J. Almunia
Deputy Gen. Secretary: Alfonso Guerra	Dep. Gen. Secretary: Alfonso Guerra	Deputy Gen. Secretary: Alfonso Guerra	Dep. Gen. Secretary: Alfonso Guerra	
Secr. of Organization: Carmen García Bloise	Secr. of Organization: José María Benegas	Secr. of Organization: José María Benegas	Secr. of Organization: Ciprià Ciscar	Secr. of Organization: Ciprià Ciscar
Secr. of Adm.: Emilio Alonso	Secr Adm./ Finances: Guillermo Galeote	Secr Adm. and Finances: Guillermo Galeote	Secr Adm. and Finances: Francisco Marugán	
Secr. of Int. Relations: Elena Flores	Secr. of Int. Relations: Elena Flores	Secr. of International Relations: Elena Flores	Secr. of Int. Relations: Raimon Obiols	Secr. of Int. Relations: Raimon Obiols
	Secr. Eco. Affaires: F. Fernández Marugán	Secr. Eco. Affaires: F. Fernández Marugán		Secr. of Economy: J.M. Eguiagaray
SecrCulture/Education Salvador Clotas	Secr of Cult.ure: Salvador Clotas	Secr of Culture: Salvador Clotas		Secr. of Culture: Joaquin Leguina
Secr. of Institutional Policy: Enrique Múgica	Secr. of Institutional Policy: J. L.Corcuera (Abel Caballero)	Secr. of Institutional Policy: Abel Caballero	Secr. of Political and Institutional Relations: J. M. Benegas	Secr. of Municipal Politics: Alfonso Perales
	Secr. of Training: José Félix Tezanos	Secr. of Training: José Félix Tezanos	Secr. of Training: Ludolfo Paramio	Secr. Regional Politics: R. Jaúregui
Secr. of Citizen Particip: A. Cercas	Secr. of Citizen Particip.: A. Cercas	Secr. Citizen Particip./ Social Mov/s: A. Cercas	Secr. of Relations with Society: A. Cercas	Secr. of Relations with Society: C.Cerdeira
		Secr. of Women's Pption Josefa Pardo	Secr. of Women's Pption: C. Hermosín (C. Deaz)	Secr. of Women's Pption: Micaela Navarro
Secr. of Communication: Guillermo Galeote	Secr. of Communication: Guillermo Galeote			Secr.Relations with Media A. Pérez Rubalcaba
Secr of Ec., Soc./ Syndical Affaires: Manuel Chaves			Secr of Studies and Programs: J.Almunia	Secr. of Employment: Joan Lerma
		Secr. of Emigration: Carmen García Bloise		Secr. of Social Welfare: C. Díez Baldeón
Executive Secretaries: Matilde Fernández Salvador Fernández Moreda, José Angel Fernández Villa, Javier Sáenz Coscullela and Francisco Fernández Marugán	Executive Secretaries: Dolores Renau, Carmen García Bloise, Matilde Fernández, José Acosta, Carmen Hermosín, Miguel Angel Martínez, Josep Maria Sala, Antonio García Miralles, Enrique Múgica, José María Maravall and José Angel Fernández Villa.	Executive Secretaries: Ludolfo Paramio, José María Maravall, Matilde Fernández, Enrique Múgica, Carmen Hermosín, José Acosta, Antonio García Miralles, José Angel Fernández Villa, Josep Maria Sala, Ramón Aguiló, José Bono, Florencio Campos, Manuel Chaves, Juan Manuel Eguiagaray, Josefa Frau, Raimon Obiols, Ludolfo Paramio, María Soledad Pérez and Jerónimo Saavedra	Executive Secretaries: J. A. Amate Rodríguez, J. Barrero López, J. Bono Martínez, A.Caballero, M. J. Calderón Caballero, M. Chaves, C.Díez de Valdeón, J.M. Eguiagaray, Matilde Fernández, J. Frau, L. García Arias, C. García Bloise, Joan Lerma, B. García Manzanares, R. Jaúregui, M. de la Madre, L. Martínez Noval, J. Pardo Ortíz, J. Quijano, J. Carlos Rodríguez Ibarra, A.M. Ruiz Tagle, J.Saavedra, N. Serra F. Sauquillo, and J. Solana.	Executive Secretaries: J. Bono, J. Borrell, A. Brito, A. Caballero, M. Chaves, L. Eguren, J. Frau, C. Hermosín, A. Leiva, M.A. Martínez, C. Martínez Ten, Ana Noguera, A. Pérez Cueto, M. Reyes, T. Riera, J.L. Rodríguez Zapatero, C.Rumi, P.Sauquillo, N. Serra and F. Vázquez

List of Interviews

Isabel Alfaya: September 1996

Joaquín Almunia: 14th June 1996

Alfonso Arroyo: Junio/September 1996

José María Benegas: 20th September de 1996

Juan Cazorla: September 1996

Alejando Cercas: January 1996 and June 1996

Ciprià Ciscar: 12th June de 1996

María Soledad Domínguez: July 1996

José Antonio Gómez Yáñez: 19th December 1995/10th January 1996

Ricardo Izquierdo: June 1996

Jaime Lissavetzky: 13th June 1996

Antonio Magariños: 15th January 1996

José María Maravall: 28th December 1995

Ludolfo Paramio: 16th December 1995 and June 1996

Luis Pérez: June 1996

Ramón Ropero: July 1996

José Félix Tezanos: 19th September 1996

Ricard Torrell: June 1996

Pedro Torres: July 1996

Francesc Trillas: April 1996

Ignacio Varela: 11th January 1996

List of Parties/Electoral coalitions

UCD, Unión de Centro Democrático, Union of the Democratic Centre

PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party

PCE, Partido Comunista de España, Communist Party of Spain

PP, Partido Popular, Popular Party

IU, Izquierda Unida, United Left

CDS, Centro Democrático y Social, Democratic and Social Centre

CiU, Convergència i Unió, Convergence and Union

ERC, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Republican Left of Catalonia

PNV, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Basque Nationalist Party

EA, Eusko Alkartasuna, Basque Solidarity

EE, Euskadiko Ezquerra, Basque Socialist Party

HB, Herri Batasuna, United People

CC, Coalición Canaria, Canarian Coalition

PAR, Partido Aragonés Regionalista, Aragonese Party

UV, Unión Valenciana, Valencian Union

BNG, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Galician Nationalist Bloc

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PARTY DOCUMENTS

Throughout the text some of the party documents are not cited entirelly but with the following abbreviations:

- (MG30 1984: 110): Memoria de Gestión de los Organos Federales (Management Report of the Federal Bodies, usually refers specifically to the report of the Executive Committee). The number "30" refers to the Party Congress, and is followed by the year in which that Congress was held, and where possible, by the page of the report in which the citation can be found.

- (Res30 1984: 110): Resoluciones del Congreso Federal. (Party Congress Resolutions). As in the previous case, the number "30" refers to the Party Congress, and is followed by the year in which that Congress was held, and where possible, by the page of the Resolutions in which the citation can be found.

- (NF 1996: 110): Normas de Funcionamiento de los Comités Electorales Provinciales, Insulares y Comarcales (Working rules of the Provincial Election Committees), the year refers to the elections in which the Rules were produced, and is followed by the page in which the citation included in the text was found

- (GC 1996: 110): Guía de Campaña (Campaign Guide). The year refers to the elections to which the Campaign Guide corresponds, followed by the page in which the citation included in the text was found.

- (NF 1996: 110): Normas de Funcionamiento de los Comités Electorales Provinciales, (Guidelines for the Provincial Election Committees). The year refers to the elections to which the Guidelines correspond, followed by the page in which the citation included in the text was found.

- (SF 11/1/96): Seguimiento de Federaciones durante las campañas electorales (Monitoring of the Provincial Federations at election campaigns). The year refers to the elections to which the Monitoring corresponds, followed by the date in which the report to which the passage cited was found.

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