

Stop making sense(s):

Some late medieval and very late medieval views on faculty psychology

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During the last few decades, following a period of relative neglect, the topic of the internal senses has received substantial contributions. Important studies from the 1960s and 1970s, namely Wolfson and Harvey,¹ as well as the critical edition of Avicenna's *De anima* contributed to a safe establishment of the status-quo view on the internal processing faculties, especially in the context of the Aristotelian tradition and its commentators. Of course, in a sense there is only the Aristotelian tradition in what concerns the internal senses, because this is largely an Aristotelian affair: the issue arises mostly in what concerns the model of cognition initiated by Aristotle and interpreted in a variety of ways during the medieval period, especially after Avicenna. I will return to this later on. For now, I want to clear away a related issue in the literature that is often associated with the question of the internal senses. To my mind, moreover, this issue should be taken separately, if one is to aim at some sort of conceptual clarity on the issue. Here I am referring to the conflation between the number of the internal senses and the question of the unicity versus plurality of substantial forms in a living composite.

The conflation of these two questions contributes to clouding the water more than helping to understand it. The reason is that if a given author subscribes to the existence of a plurality of forms (*potentiae*), then the conclusion that there are several powers or faculties (*vires*) in the soul is inevitable. This is the result, I think, of approaching the issue of the internal senses from the standpoint of a general theory of faculties which, in turn, has its starting point in the debates over the *Scientia de anima*. Traditionally, the human soul is constituted by the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual *potentiae* or clusters of faculties that explain the range of functions humans are capable

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¹ H. A. Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," *Harvard Theological Review* 28:2 (1935), 69–133; E. R. Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: The Warburg Institute-University of London, 1935).

of; faculties, on the other hand, are cognitive operational units, such as common sense and phantasy, that have a mode of operation and a proper object that defines them, and in some cases even a bodily location. Important as this debate is, it seems to me that the best way to proceed in the investigation on the role that the internal senses play in any account of cognition is to focus on a particular cluster of functions, for example those of the sensitive soul.² The point is then to focus exclusively on the faculties that receive, retain, and process the sensory information acquired from the sense modalities in isolation from how a given author conceives of the soul as a whole, and the relation between the different cognitive parts.³

Once we have narrowed the focus to one such cluster of functions, we can proceed to examine what the philosophical tradition says about the unity or plurality of the powers within that cluster. The dominant view, post-reception of Aristotelian works on natural philosophy, in particular the *De anima*, is that there is an array of sensory faculties or internal senses, with the Avicennian schema of five a starting point for multiplicity of variations. Overviews of the question in the medieval period, such as the above-mentioned Harvey and Wolfson, emphasize this pluralist account of the internal senses. More recent work includes Perler's (2015) volume *The Faculties* for the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series, and Perler and Korcilius' (2014) edited volume *Partitioning the Soul*,⁴ reinforce this focus on pluralist models. As a result, it seems that all medieval thinkers were on the pluralist side of the debate.

Having a built-in resistance to dominant views, I would like to investigate whether there are alternative accounts that do not posit a multiplicity of internal senses. The main task I set out for this chapter is to show that there some authors who argue for the reduction of the number of internal processing faculties, in some cases to one all-encompassing power. Derivative tasks include understanding what the philosophical justification for such a model is, if there is one, and whether we can find shared, common assumptions underlying this proposed reduction. The justification for such an attempt is twofold. On the one hand, it fits well with recent interpretations of Aristotle that tend to read his theory of perceptual functions as the working of one unified perceptual faculty,

² It is interesting to observe that the same thing happened in the historiography of the reduced number of internal senses as it did in what concerns the plurality of forms: these two models were largely dominant in the medieval period, but overviews tend to emphasize the opposite view as the "normal one."

³ Another way to avoid any confusion is to analyze the alternatives according to the following scheme:

- (i) Soul > flowing faculties (e.g. Thomas Aquinas)
- (ii) Soul = faculties (e.g. William Auvergne)
- (iii) Soul > parts = faculties (e.g., William Ockham)

To my knowledge no one would subscribe to the model:

- (iv) Soul > parts > flowing faculties

⁴ D. Perler, *The Faculties: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); K. Corcilius and D. Perler, eds., *Partitioning the Soul: Debates from Plato to Leibniz* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014).

rather than the ontologically distinct powers that the post-Avicennian tradition retrospectively attributes to him. On the other hand, the purpose is to investigate a branch in the tradition of philosophical psychology of unification of psychological functions that has remained largely neglected.

In the first part of this paper (sections I-III), I focus on a brief historical/developmental account of theories of reduction in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In the second part (sections IV-V), I will focus on two late sixteenth-/early seventeenth-century models of internal senses, those of Francisco Suárez and Manuel de Góis (also known as the *Coimbra Commentary on the De anima*). In the conclusion, I will hopefully tie up the loose ends and suggest a general interpretation of the philosophical implications and consequences of such views.

I. *Setting the stage*

The third song of the Talking Heads album from which I paraphrased the title of my talk called “Slippery People,” has the lyrics “Try to recognize what is in your mind.” This could easily serve as the motto of any attempt by our medieval thinkers to make sense of the senses that allow us to have access to the things in the world and their properties. To know things in the world, we need to have this information made available to us in ways that are conducive of our cognitive awareness. I shall say very little if anything about this part of the process, but rather focus on the stages when the information has been made available and needs to be processed and retained for further downstream processing. In order to account for this variety of requirements, medieval thinkers took the soul to be constituted by faculties corresponding to different functions or operations. Some thinkers, most notably Avicenna, thought that this required establishing both a principle of identity—what makes a faculty the kind of thing it is—and a principle of distinction—what makes this faculty different from another one. As is well known, Avicenna proposes that the faculties of the sensitive soul, that is, common sense, retentive imagination, compositional imagination, estimative power, and memory be organized on the basis of three principles:

- (1) Distinction between those powers that deal with sensible forms (common sense and imagination) and those that deal with intentions (estimative and memory)
- (2) Distinction between those powers that receive information (common sense and estimative) and those that store information (imagination and memory)

(3) Powers that process information (compositional imagination)⁵

This scheme allows for classifying the powers and distinguishing them from each other. But the principle of identity is found elsewhere, according to the basic notion that powers are defined by their objects; that is, to each kind of object must correspond a type of power. Different objects require different operations and the type of operation defines the faculty, as the scheme just presented shows. The simplicity of this scheme allowed for (and even stimulated) variation and interpretation throughout the medieval period. Once one reflects on it, however, it starts to make sense to ask: What is this all about? Such an enquiry can find two more “scientific” expressions in the form of two questions: what is the ontological status of these faculties and what is the subject of the operation of a given faculty? These two questions find their answer in the debates over the localization of the faculties and the relation between the powers and the essence of the soul. But under the general historical characterization there is space for considerations that resist the identification of distinctive faculties on the basis of distinctive places in the brain and mechanisms of operative nature, bringing the focus rather to the subject of the cognitive acts and the nature of the act itself.

The core issue to be addressed, when talking about faculties in general and the inner senses in particular, boils down to the issue about the nature of the functions they perform and whether these are taken in such a robust sense as to require the positing of distinct ontological entities in addition to the soul itself. The localization issue raises problems of its own,⁶ but it can be interpreted in ways that lean one way (unification/simplification) or another (plurification/complexification), because the physical evidence is shown to be mostly inconclusive, as we shall see. This last aspect is of course not surprising once we consider the unlikely (medieval) proposition of postulating that different functions of the soul need to take place in certain bodily locations. This proposition is less problematic at face value in what concerns the external sense modalities, because there is the compelling case that bodily organs require certain dispositions that are proportional to the physical properties of the proper object of that sense. However, this same

⁵ Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus*, edited by S. van Riet (Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill, 1972), I.5, 79–89. See, e.g., Carla di Martino, *Ratio Particularis. Doctrine des sens internes d’Avicenne à Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 25–6. Thomas Aquinas, among others, will argue against the need to distinguish between compositional and retentive imagination.

⁶ The internal senses do not have organs, like the proper senses, but are located, i.e. have seats where they conduct or perform their operations. A lesion on one of these seats, in most cases brain cavities or ventricles, leads to the loss of the function. The questions of whether this is always the case and whether the lesion has consequences for the remaining psychological functions cannot be addressed here but are interesting in their own right.

principle of necessary material conditions for the exercise of psychological faculties cannot be simply transferred to the internal senses.

II. Olivi: Unification as a mode of activity

Peter John Olivi is certainly one of the most interesting thinkers of the thirteenth century and he proves this also with respect to his account of the internal senses. In a series of questions in the second book of his *Commentary to the Sentences* of Peter Lombard, namely questions 62 to 66 he defines the role of the common sense followed by questions concerning the relation between the common sense and the other traditionally mentioned internal senses.

Olivi starts by considering the distinction between the functions performed by the common sense and the proper senses and equating the possibility of there being no common sense. This possibility is quickly dismissed because, whereas the proper senses are directed to the external things and cannot as such have as object its own acts, the common sense is that power at the root of the sense modalities that takes the act of the senses as its own objects. In other words, while we perceive things outside the soul by means of the proper senses, we perceive that we are undergoing a perceptual experience – be that seeing or hearing – by means of the common sense. There is a sense, however, in which we apprehend by the common sense the objects of the proper senses, because one of the key functions of the common sense is to adjudicate between proper sensibles. Olivi claims that this can be done only if the judging capacity has direct access to those sensibles.

It soon becomes clear that Olivi builds his argumentation on the basis of two central ideas: the first, as Toivanen (2013) well points out, is the centralizing and unifying role of sensation that the common sense, as a unique power, brings or allows. The idea is that there must be one power that receives, judges, and controls what goes on in the sense modalities and that it judges as it were from a neutral point of view. This leads to the second aspect, which is to consider the common sense as occupying the top of a hierarchy of powers, or better said, of functions and that what gives it its status is the capacity to endow the being of which it is part of the sensation of having a sensation.⁷

It is on the basis of this self-awareness that derives clearly from the active nature of the soul, sensitive, that the common sense is the power among powers: it presides, rules, and connects all sense modalities. Significantly, the common sense is at the root of this activity of the soul by

⁷“... vita quae sentit se sentire corporalia sentiat etiam se ipsam,” Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum*, edited by B. Jansen. Florence: Quaracchi, 1924), q. 62, 589.

controlling and regulating the unified intentional flow of the soul. Whenever this unified intentionality is disturbed by competing stimuli, the common sense, as the root of sensation, must intervene and concentrate the *aspectus* or directed intentionality to one such stimulus (QiniiS 59, 555). And this is due to the requirements that flow from what perception is all about, that is to keep the animal life going: to persevere in being. The same reasoning is then applied to the competition between different internal senses, which is the result of the close connection between powers of the soul *colligantia potentiarum* (QiniiS 50, 54; Toivanen 2013, 170). As such, the common-sense senses all acts of the proper senses (QiniiS 73, 98; see Toivanen 2013). This unity of the perceptual operations is explained also in terms of a common organic root, which is found in the heart and in the brain (see QiniiS 73, 97).

Before continuing I would like to make three further points. The first is the explicit location of the source of attention to the sensitive soul, in two forms: the attention of the proper senses directed to their sense organs; and the attention of the common sense that includes the general disposition for taking care of the well-being of the animal. The second point is that if one takes Olivi seriously on this common-sense based attention, we need to re-consider the nature of his direct perceptual realism. Take the following passage:

Therefore, know first that the common sense can apprehend immediately no real or present object except the act of the particular senses by [means of] which it apprehends their objects⁸

He seems to be clearly noting that what the common sense is primarily aware, i.e. primary attends to, are the acts of the proper senses and via them the things those acts are about. Or, if one wishes to be more charitable, one could say that it apprehends the objects of the acts by apprehending the acts that have those objects as objects—this is what he suggests in the continuation of the text. It is clear that this act of the common sense is voluntary.

The final point concerns what Olivi says about the process of habituation or education (in a weak sense) by which one comes to develop a disposition to behave and judge incoming sensory information in a given way. In the same way, human beings can develop their skills in judging the quality and beneficial nature of a wine, or children become increasingly more proficient in reading, which they are able to do faster and with more understanding (605). The motivation for Olivi to

⁸ “Sciendum ergo primo quod sensus communis nullum obiectum reale et praesentiale potest immediate apprehendere nisi tantum actus particularium sensuum per quorum actus apprehendit obiecta eorum,” Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones...*, 594.

address this issue is not to develop a robust account of learning, but rather to collapse the traditional functions belonging to different internal sensory powers, such as estimation and phantasy and memory unto that of the common sense. In other words, the best way for him to merge an account of intentions in estimation and species in memory with the unified account of the common sense is to give this very robust, all-encompassing role to the common sense. As Olivi grants no role to species, he needs not explain how these are found and retained in the internal senses and is therefore quite free to refute the argument from localization: that is to say, the argument that concludes from the existence of different requirements for the nature of the ventricles in the brain appropriated to the functions of the different powers. As there are no species, there are no different material requirements for the operations of receiving and retaining the species and, therefore, no clear distinction between internal senses based on localization.

III. Buridan: Simplification to one

Something very similar can be found in John Buridan, namely in questions 10, 22 and 23 of book II of the *De anima*.⁹ Buridan makes a clear case in question 10 for the view that perception requires the existence of species received in the sense organs but that this reception is not enough for the perceptual act, that is, the act of awareness of a sensible property via its species.

There could be no sensation if there were no reception of the species in the organ of sense, because the species is the representation of the thing and thus that which allows us to perceive the external thing. If the reception of the species is not sufficient for perception, it is also the case that the soul as the formative principle of sensation is not sufficient for sensation without the species. Existing in a state of first actuality, the soul is disposed for perception, but the act itself (thus, the second actuality) requires the determination of the species, one is led to conclude. The basic idea is clear and presupposes a division of labor: species dispose the sense organs in a way that makes them receptive to the act of sensation caused by the soul.

But this is a general way of describing the process, which needs to be fleshed out in psychological terms of powers and operations. In question 22 about whether it is necessary to posit a common sense in addition to the particular senses, Buridan gives four reasons for an affirmative answer. The first is that the external senses do not perceive their own acts (literally, “an external sense is not perceptive of its own act”); it is therefore necessary to posit an internal sense that, not

⁹ For a different account of Buridan and the internal senses, see Sander de Boer, “John Buridan on the Internal Senses,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, 25 (2014), 403–21.

being changed by the change of the external thing causes in the organs of the proper senses, is that by means of which one judges that one sees or hears. The second reason is that the external senses cognize nothing in the absence of receiving sensible species. We experience privation, for instance, when we perceive darkness in a dark room with our eyes open. The third reason is that we have experiences of things in their absence, as in the case of dreaming, which could not be the case if we had not kept the species of those things once present. Fourthly, we are able to combine and separate the images of perceived things, and judge in addition the difference and agreement between the objects of the different sense modalities: we judge that this thing, which is white, is also sweet, just in the way a dog we call also judges that the one it sees is the same one calling him. Neither of these operations can be done by the external senses because this requires a power that knows the objects of the different senses about which it adjudicates, whereas the external senses in their own operations are limited to their own proper object, such as color to sight. Only the internal sense, which is the common sense, can do so. Once proved that there is an internal sense, Buridan reflects in the following question on the traditional division of the cognitive operations of the sensory soul into distinct faculties. This is an important issue: it is one thing to recognize the existence of different operations and another to assert the need for the different operations *to be performed by distinct powers*. It is to this second issue that Buridan turns next.

His starting point is the question of whether there is, in addition to the common sense, other internal senses. He presents a series of arguments that are worth serious consideration.¹⁰ Throughout the question, Buridan lists the full range of psychological faculties found in the tradition, that is, the common sense, phantasy, imagination, memory, estimative and cogitative power. He evaluates their role and describes their functions, but concludes for all of them that each of these functions can be performed equally well by a single faculty, the common sense. To be clear, he is not reducing the functions, but rather the faculties that would be distinguished on the basis of those different functions. In his words,

Different names are imposed on the same power according to the different operations.¹¹

Different operations do not entail the existence of different performing faculties; rather, we have one and the same power that is responsible for all processing functions post-sense modalities and

¹⁰ "Utrum oportet, preter sensum communem, ponere alios sensus interiores," John Buridan, *Quaestiones on Aristotle's De anima*, in P. Sobol, *John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation: an Edition of Book II of His Commentary on Aristotle's Book on the Soul*, PhD Dissertation 1984, 23.

¹¹ "Eidem enim virtuti secundum eius diversas operationes imponuntur talis diversa nomina," John Buridan, *Quaestiones...*, 385.

that we give different names to those cognitive functions. For example, we refer to the common sense's function of considering the species in the absence of the object phantasy, but this is a functional or operative distinction rather than an ontological one. The only exception Buridan makes is to the existence of what he calls a non-cognitive power (*virtus non cognoscitiva*) to retain the species and intentions: memory is necessary to make available the acquired sensory information for further processing. Particularly interesting is how downbeat he sounds when describing this conclusion, as if he was forced to accept it on the basis of experiential evidence, rather than because it is philosophically imposing. In fact, Buridan points out that this retaining non-cognitive faculty is not another—in addition to the common sense—from the point of view of the soul, but from the point of view of the organ and act.¹² If I understand what is going on here, it seems that Buridan is saying that retaining species and intentions require the existence of an appropriated organ but that this retention and the power responsible for it are not properly part of the cognitive process.

One of the most striking arguments is that if there were other sensory faculties, they would be superior to the common sense because this is at the root of the proper senses; but he claims, the common sense is that superior power to the proper senses. That is why, he argues, Aristotle himself never talked about any other internal sense than the common sense.¹³ Therefore, also on the basis of authority,

there is no other cognitive sensitive internal power beyond the common sense.¹⁴

Making it clear that a perceiver need not have different powers to receive and process the species or intentions representative of things present in sensation, Buridan develops a conception of two levels of sensation, one incomplete taking place in the proper senses and another completing taking place in the common sense. Let me explain this, because I think the details are relevant. To completely follow this lead, I will also examine question 25 of the same second book of Buridan's *De anima*.¹⁵

¹² “De prima dubitatione ponenda est hec prima conclusio, quod, preter sensum communem et singulas virtutes cognoscitivas, ponenda est aliqua virtus non cognoscitiva reservativa specierum sensibilium et intentionum. Et non dico quod sit alia ex parte anime, sicut alias dictum est, sed ex parte organi et operis,” John Buridan, *Quaestiones...*, 380.

¹³ “Igitur non erat intention Aristotelis quod supra sensum commune esset aliqua alia sensitive virtus,” John Buridan, *Quaestiones...*, 379.

¹⁴ “... preter sensum commune, nulla est virtus sensitive cognoscitiva interior,” John Buridan, *Quaestiones...*, 382.

¹⁵ A completely different picture emerges from reading Steneck's PhD, because he grounds his interpretation on question 27 of the second book that is not edited in Sobol. Steneck's reading is based on the first versions of the commentary, whereas Sobol's edition is from the third *lectura*. On the difference between these two versions, see Deborah Black, “Imagination, Particular Reason, and Memory: The Role of the Internal Senses in Human Cognition,” in *A Companion to Medieval Theories of Cognition*, ed. R. L. Friedman and M. Pickavé (forthcoming).

In this latter question, Buridan establishes an important distinction between sensation as taking place in the (organs of the) proper senses and sensation as taking place in the (organ of the) common sense. The question takes off from the apparent impasse we are left with in question 10: on the one hand, the species which are received in the sense organs are necessary, but not sufficient to explain perception; on the other hand, a number of cases such as the lack of perception during sleep and the phenomenon of double image makes it clear that there is more to perception than having the species in the sense organs. The question then is whether what we call perception includes, already at its basic level, processing faculties. Buridan's answer is, yes and no.

Aristotle had called the common sense and its organ "the first sensitive" (*primum sensitivum*), which would seem to indicate that whatever is perceived is perceived by the common sense. Moreover, perception seems to include judgment about what is received in the proper senses and the capacity to represent things in different places. But against this evidence, Buridan argues that the reception of intentions in the eye requires the action of the soul in the sense organ,¹⁶ thus vision takes place primarily in the eye rather than in the common sense. However, he is quick to add that from these acts of perception is excluded the awareness of having a perceptual experience because

we do not perceive ourselves as sensing except by an act formed in the common sense.¹⁷

The basic thought is then that the visual experience is sort of "phenomenologically empty," to use modern terminology, without being integrated into the operation of the common sense and its act of basic awareness of ourselves as experiencing the visual sensation. If we do not attend to the experience, for instance in the case of being distracted or sleeping, we are unable to know that we have felt (Sobol, ed., 419), despite the fact that something has been received in the external senses. This leads Buridan to conclude that in these cases, there is an incomplete sensation and that such a sensation is complete only when the species that are representative of the sensible things are received at and are processed by the common sense, and we come to be aware of what they represent.

Buridan seems to be operating on a different level from the explicit statements found in Olivi, which clearly associated the unity of the internal sense to the unity of the perceptual experience. But there is an unequivocal shared tendency to associate the description of how we

¹⁶ "... ad quas intentiones faciendas requiritur actio anime sensitive prima, ymo actualis visio cuiusmodi iste intentiones sunt representative," John Buridan, *Quaestiones...*, 418.

¹⁷ "Sed non percipimus nos sentire nisi per actum in sensu communi formatum," John Buridan, *Quaestiones...*, 418.

perceive, and its somewhat active nature, and the unity of the sense that roots this perceptual experience.

IV. Suárez: *One is enough*

Francisco Suárez presents a detailed discussion of the internal senses in his *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*, Eighth Disputation, which is divided into two questions.¹⁸ There is much to say about the context of this disputation, especially in relation to the issue of his account of perception in general, but this is not the place for such context. Instead my focus is on the principle of distinction between the inner senses.

Suárez starts by stating that an internal sense is needed in addition to the external senses (or sense modalities) in order to explain two aspects of the perceptual experience: one, the discerning of the differences between the objects per se of the sense modalities (like color to sight) and two, the perception of the operations or acts of the external senses.¹⁹ Once the necessity of such power is asserted, one needs to consider whether one power is enough or several powers must be posited. Traditionally, Suárez goes on to say, up to seven functions of this internal sense are named, namely common sense, phantasy, imagination, estimation, cogitation, memory, and reminiscence.²⁰ The question is whether there is a nominal distinction between them that corresponds only to the different operations, or whether these are really distinct faculties, the ontological status of which needs to be investigated.²¹

In the continuation of the text, Suárez considers the latter option, listing all these powers together with their specific functions and how they relate to one another. The first in the list is the common sense, which is thought to stand at the root of the different sense modalities. To be at the root is essential for it to perform the function of judging the objects of the proper senses and it is precisely having all the sensibles as objects that define the common sense.²² In order to be able to judge these objects, a power like that needs to know these objects, which is made possible by both

¹⁸ I use the following edition: Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De Anima*, ed. S. Castellote. T. 1: Madrid, Sociedad de estudios y publicaciones, 1978; t. II: Madrid, Labor, 1981; t. III: Madrid, Fundación Xavier Zubiri, 1991.

¹⁹ “Praeter sensus externos, necesse est ponere alium sensum interiorem, qui discernat inter sensibilia propria sensuum externorum, et eorum operationes cognoscat,” Disputatio VIII, 3.

²⁰ “In hac quaestione suppono dari sensum interiorem, ad cuius suppositionem notandum est quod haec septem nomina: sensus communis, phantasia, imaginativa, aestimativa, cogitativa, memoria, et reminiscentia,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 3.

²¹ “sive significant potentias diversas, sive eandem, prout est principium diversorum actuum,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 3.

²² “Et dicitur communis communitate obiecti, non quia sensibilia communia percipiat, sed quia cognoscat omnia sensibilia externa,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 4. See Perler, “Suárez on Consciousness,” *Vivarium* 52 (2014) [261–86], 271.

the power and the organ receiving the species from the object.²³ Thus, this received information is easily accessible to the faculty at the root of the proper senses, i.e. the common sense.

On the other hand, Suárez notes, the power that is capable of knowing all sensible things, even when these are absent, is phantasy.²⁴ Because it is able to know them as absent, phantasy must not only be able to know, but also to keep them, which is the task often associated with the power of memory. In that sense, we need not distinguish the powers of the common sense and phantasy; rather, we need only say that they are one and the same power (I shall return to this point later on).²⁵ Suárez soon points out that this identification applies also to imagination,²⁶ and then goes on applying this principle of reduction to all the remaining powers. Phantasy is the only power necessary for all these operations because it receives and conserves the species of sensible things (sensed and non-sensed intentions), compounds and knows them in their absence.

According to Suárez, some have objected to this reduction and claimed instead that we should posit *two* internal senses rather than just one. Which powers these two are, however, remains a matter of dispute: according to some, it is the common sense and phantasy (the latter including the powers of memory, estimative, etc.); according to others, it is one power that is the combination of the functions of common sense and phantasy and another which is the combination of the functions of estimative and memory. Still others object entirely to this simplification and continue to argue for the existence of three, four, five, or even six such internal sensory powers. Among these possibilities, none of which are his own, Suárez elects the view he attributes to Aquinas, which claims that there are four powers—these being the common sense, phantasy, estimative or cogitative, and memory.²⁷ This is, he adds, the most probable because it is based on solid grounds,²⁸ that is, on (i) the distinction between powers that deal with sensed species and those that deal with

²³ “supponit species recipi in organo, et non in potentia, quod supra improbatum est,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 4; see also Disputatio VIII, q.1, 10: “Item, species ipsae non tantum recipiuntur in organo, sed in ipsa potentia, ex cuius natura provenit quod in ipsamet species conserventur melius vel deterius, quamvis nonnihil iuvet organi dispositio.”

²⁴ “Illa ergo potentia, quae species rerum sensatarum in absentia illarum conservat, et per illas abstractivè cognoscit, phantasia dicitur,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 4.

²⁵ “Sed forte id non est necessarium, quia istae duo non sunt duae potentiae distinctae. Clarius ergo definitur phantasia, ut sit potentia quae species sensibilium externorum recipit et conservat, et per illas operatur in absentia obiectorum,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 5.

²⁶ “Imaginatio est idem cum phantasia, solum addit virtutem componendi sensibilia et fingendi impossibilia,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 6.

²⁷ The list is very close to Averroes, *Comm. De anima*, III.6, 415–16. On Suárez on Aquinas, see J. B. South, “Suárez on Imagination,” *Vivarium* 39:1 (2001), 119–51.

²⁸ “Quarta ergo opinio, quae inter citatas est probabilior, duplex habet fundamentum: Primum est cognitionem sensitivam, aliam fieri per species sensatas, aliam per insensatas, et potentias cognoscentes per illas esse diversas, nam potentiae cognoscentes per species sensibiles diversarum rationum diversae sunt. (...) Secundum fundamentum est quod in potentiis sensitivis potentia cognoscens in praesentia obiecti et in absentia sunt distinctae,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 7.

non-sensed ones (intentions) and on (ii) the distinction between powers that operate in the presence of the object and those that operate in their absence. Particularly interesting is what he says at some point, that is:

it must be noted that the [number of] internal senses are not to be multiplied because one is more powerful than the other, but that one cannot perform the act of the other; on the contrary, if we posit two internal senses of which one can [do] everything the other can and more, it is superfluous to posit the one which can do less.²⁹

The internal senses do not need to follow the same principle of plurality as the external senses because, whereas the latter need to be changed by their proper objects, and are specifically disposed for this change, the former do not.³⁰ The basic idea here seems to be that because the internal senses are not subjected to the same sort of material constraints as the proper senses are, they need not be diversified according to the principle of material dispositions. The internal sense has a higher degree of universality in comparison to the different sense modalities and therefore can execute multiple functions directed to different kinds of objects.³¹

Having reached the preliminary conclusion that there are not many internal senses, there could be the case that there are two, Suárez considers, these being the common sense and phantasy. This cannot however be right, as the following argument purports to demonstrate:³²

²⁹ “Pro decisione veritatis est notandum quod sensus interni non sunt multiplicandi per hoc quod unus possit plura quam alius, sed per hoc quod unus non potest afficere actum alterius, nec e contrario, nam si ponuntur duo sensus interni, quorum unus potest quidquid alius et plura, superflue ponitur ille quae pauciora potest,” *Disputatio VIII*, q.1, 8.

³⁰ “quamvis ergo sensus interior cognoscat quidquid exterior, non tamen per immutationem obiecti; et ideo ad hoc fuerunt necessarii externi sensus, quia nisi illi immutarentur, non posset interior potentia aliquid percipere,” *Disputatio VIII*, q.1, 8.

³¹ The same point could be made *mutatis mutandi* about the connection between lower sensory powers and higher intellectual powers, subsumed under the concept of sympathy among powers. This is the way both Dominik Perler and Anna Tropia have argued. I think this is probably right. But, as I said at the beginning of this paper, my focus is on the unity of powers or faculties within the same psychological cluster, in this case the sensory one. See Perler, “Suárez on Consciousness”; and Anna Tropia, “Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy: The Necessity of the ‘*Connexio Potentiarum*’ in the Present State,” in Lukás Novák, ed., *Suárez’s Metaphysics in its Historical and Systematic Context* (De Gruyter: 2014), 275–92. On the unity of the internal senses, see J. B. South, “Suárez on Imagination”; M. Rozemond, “Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez’s Soul,” in B. Hill and H. Lagerlund, eds., *The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), [154–72] 159; and S. Knuuttila, “Suárez’s Psychology,” in V. M. Salas and R. L. Fastiggi, eds., *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*. Leiden: Brill, 2014, [192–220] 209–11.

³² “Probat, nam potentia cognoscens in absentia obiecti, debet recipere species illius; ergo vel recipit illas in praesentia obiecti, vel in illius absentia; in absentia est impossibile, nam sensibilia tantum immutant sensus, dum sunt illis praesentia; et in sensibus externis non durant species neque actus, nisi in praesentia sensibilibus; ergo cum phantasia et memoria non possint immutari, nisi media immutatione sensus exterioris, debent immutari in praesentia obiecti; ergo etiam possunt cognoscere in praesentia obiecti. Patet ultima consequentia, nam potentia, quae potest immutari ab obiecto praesenti, potest attente immutari, et consequenter potest simul in actum exire, immo necessario exhibet, quia in illo instanti in quo recipit species est potentia naturaliter agens, et non impedita; ergo potentia

For a faculty to know objects in their absence it must receive their species;
If this faculty receives these species, it either does so in their presence or in their absence;
It cannot be in their absence, otherwise it would not receive them;
It must be in their presence;
Therefore, the same faculty knows objects in their presence and in their absence.

The distinction between these two acts—knowing in the presence and knowing in the absence—is not enough to distinguish two faculties; on the contrary, it shows how they (common sense and phantasy) can be—and in fact are—one and the same.³³ A similar sort of argument can be made to prove that phantasy and the estimative are, in animals, one and the same power: although there is a distinction between non-sensed intentions, like enmity, and sensed ones, like shape, the fact is that the sheep only perceives the wolf as an enemy once it perceives its shape and other accidental features, such as color, smell, etc.³⁴ Therefore, it must be by one and the same faculty that the sheep perceives these accidental features and that it judges the wolf to be an enemy—“this is an enemy”—and these two acts cannot be separable. If the acts are not separable, the same must also be said of the case with their performing faculty.³⁵ Therefore, most likely there is only one internal sense,³⁶ which is *phantasia*, with only conceptual distinctions between its operations.³⁷

V. De Góis: Reduction but not to one

cognoscens in absentia obiecti potest cognoscere in praesentia; non ergo propter hos actus sunt multiplicandae potentiae,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 8.

³³ This is striking in the face of Suárez’ commitment to the view of the real distinction between the soul and its parts—how to make sense of the apparent contradiction between this real distinction and the clear nominalist inclinations of this reduction of the internal senses to one? He clearly denies this possibility for the rational powers of intellect and will, rejecting as absurd that the will would understand and the intellect would will. Part of the explanation can be the particular nature of the sense powers; in fact, Marleen Rozemond (2014, 235, n. 69) notes: “This difference between intellect and will on one hand, and faculties that require a subject that is at least partly corporeal explains an interesting feature of Suárez’s discussion. When he argues that the faculties of the soul are really distinct from it, he focuses entirely on will and intellect. For him the issues would have been obvious and less in need of discussion for the other faculties.”

³⁴ “potentia cognoscens lupum ut inimicum, non alia ratione id cognoscit nisi cognoscendo figuram et alia accidentia illius exteriora,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 10.

³⁵ “Forte dicitur satis esse quod una potentia cognoscat lupum ut sic, ut alia iudicet esse inimicum. Sed hoc non intelligitur, nam hoc iudicium: ‘Hic est inimicus’ includit intrinsece cognitionem huius qui est inimicus; ergo non sunt actus separabiles ad diversas potentias pertinentes,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 10.

³⁶ “Probabilissimum videtur sensum interiorem tantum esse realiter unum,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 10–1.

³⁷ “Sensus interior est una potentia realiter et formaliter, solum quod distinguitur ratione, secundum quod ad diversos actus comparator,” Disputatio VIII, q.1, 12. Such basic unity has its precursor in Qusta ibn Luca (see Harvey 1975, 41).

Interestingly, the argument we just saw in the previous section aimed at showing that common sense and phantasy cannot be two distinct powers—an argument that was not able to convince Suárez, but was convincing for the author I will be considering next, the Portuguese Manuel de Góis. I will concentrate on his *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu in tres libros de anima Aristotelis* (Coimbra Commentator (CC) or de Góis, hereafter), which was published for the first time in 1598.

In Book three, chapter three, questions one to four, CC considers at great length the number of the so-called internal senses. According to the tradition, there are many internal senses but authors disagree on their number. For some, like Avicenna, Algazel, or Albert the Great, there are five internal senses, to know: the common sense, imagination (retentive power), the estimative power, phantasy (compositional power), and memory. Others, such as Thomas Aquinas, dismiss the distinction between imagination and phantasy, and propose instead four internal senses. According to still others, such as Galen, Nemesius of Emesa, and Gregory of Nissa, the number is limited to three. But instead of focusing on their number, de Góis proceeds to examine the criteria on the basis of which the division of labor between the internal senses is done. The starting point are the traditional two arguments,

(1) *the argument from localization*: to the number of brain ventricles must correspond the number of internal senses.³⁸

(2) *the argument from function*: the difference between the internal senses resides in the nature of the functions they perform and the operations they execute. To the diversity of cognitive functions must correspond a variety of cognitive faculties.

De Góis notes the difficulty to agree on the localization principle, because there is a basic objection about spiritual faculties requiring a bodily home to operate;³⁹ but even if that were true, there is still disagreement concerning the number of brain ventricles where these faculties would be located. For instance, scholars seem to disagree on the evidence for the existence of one or two ventricles in the

³⁸ “Tribus potissimum rationibus ad internorum sensuum multitudinem sonituendam Philosophi adducti sunt. Quidam ex cerebri uentriculis, ubi sentiendi officinas collocatas esse inquirunt, quos uentriculos plures esse anatomicis obseruationibus constat, nempe tres, quatuorque,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu In tres libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae*, Coimbra 1598, [transcription by Mário Santiago Carvalho, available online at: http://www.uc.pt/fluc/lif/publicacoes/textos_disponiveis_online/pdf/de_anima], III.3, 1.1, 254.

³⁹ “...quia cum sensus sint qualitates, quae non occupant locum, atque adeo nec domicilia,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis*... III.3, 1.1, 254.

frontal part of the brain that would host the common sense.⁴⁰ The disagreement extends to the existence of neural pathways (sensory nerves) leading from this ventricle to the different parts of the body,⁴¹ which would be required as the common sense is the power that connects the information coming from the external senses.

The problem with the argument for the diversity of powers is that the evidence concerning the existence of these physiological pathways underlying the psychological functions needs to be unequivocal. De Góis tells us that there is much evidence from Galen that a lesion in a part of the brain, where a given faculty is located, impairs its functioning. Particularly vivid is the telling of the madman in Rome, whose reason was fully operating, but his faculty of judgment severely impaired, leading him to throw from a window, first an innocuous object, but when further incited by the observing mob, to throw a glass jar and finally a child.⁴² This example seems to show that although there is some basis for postulating the ventricular localization of psychological faculties, it gives no evidence to the *number* of faculties. The argument from localization is therefore found to be at best inconclusive.

CC turns then to considering the merits of the argument from function, that is to say, whether it is possible to establish a distinction between operations which would ground a distinction of powers performing them.⁴³ The basic issue at stake is which operations define each faculty, so that its operations could not be carried by any other faculty (an argument similar to the one found in Suárez). From traditionally accepted requirements, the details of which need not concern us here, CC claims that one could easily accept the existence of three internal senses, to know common sense, phantasy (*phantasia*), and memory (III.3, 1.2, 258).

However, his own view can be further reduced and he proposes collapsing the distinction between phantasy and memory, and concludes, with Pedro da Fonseca—together with “other [unnamed] illustrious philosophers of our time” that *there are only two internal senses, phantasy and common sense*.⁴⁴ Among the reasons for this conclusion is that there is no need to posit two faculties to account for short term and long term conservation of species, the roles traditionally associated

⁴⁰ *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.1, 254.

⁴¹ This conception is found in Galen and transmitted, for instance, by Qusta ibn Luca.

⁴² “In hoc ergo uis apprehendens integra mansit, quia et uasa, et puerum, et aclamantes rites apprehendebat. Aegrotabat tamen iudicatrix facultas, quia et uasa, et puerum deiiciendum insane aestimabat, nec comminuenda uasa et interituum puerum inferebat,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.1, 255.

⁴³ “Alii igitur internorum sensuum differentias astruunt ex diuersitate munerum, et operationum, quae ab iis administrantur, quod uidelicet ea munia, et functiones tam uariae sint, ac dissimiles, ut necessario plures facultates exigant,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.1, 256.

⁴⁴ “...asserens duas tantum esse potentias sensitivas internas; sensum communem, et phantasiam,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.3, 258. Some decades earlier, Philip Melanchthon defended in his *Commentarius De anima* the existence of only two ventricles in the brain that correspond to the faculties of common sense (*sensus communis*) and memory (*memoria*) (ed., Wittenberg 1540, 132–33).

with (retentive) imagination and (sensory) memory;⁴⁵ instead, phantasy is enough to perform both types of retention. The same principle of “one power, multiple functions” is then applied to all the other faculties, so that the conclusion is that one should not infer the diversity of powers from the diversity of operations.⁴⁶ The same power is able to perform a diversity of functions; what is relevant is the type and the requirements for each function. The authority of Aristotle appears as the final argument for this reduction because, as CC points out, he only discusses phantasy and common sense in his work.⁴⁷ This statement of course requires a tour de force to explain away memory and the acknowledged fact that Aristotle did write a treatise with that name, as de Góis himself notes. His reply is that one should not conclude from the existence of such a work that there is in fact a *faculty* of memory distinct from the faculty of imagination, but rather that the faculty of imagination performs the *function* of remembering.

Aristotle on the other hand supplies the definite argument against further reduction of the internal senses to one power, a position that would place the Coimbra Commentary closer to the position found in Suárez. De Góis objects to this reading by insisting that Aristotle himself proposed the existence of both common sense and phantasy because he felt the need to explain that the difference in operation between a power that has the object present and one that has it in its absence.⁴⁸ This distinction cannot be performed by one and the same power. So, the conclusion is that one should not conclude from the diversity of operations the diversity of powers, except in the case of operating with or without the object present. Each of the two admitted internal senses, common sense and phantasy, are to be thought of as multiply faceted powers, each responsible for performing a variety of operations.⁴⁹ Interestingly, de Góis concludes by returning to the issue of localization to conclude that the common sense is located in the frontal part of the brain, whereas phantasy occupies the rest of the brain.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ “Praetera quod non sit duplex thesaurus alter specierum sensatarum, alter insensatarum, ut plerique aiunt, ea ratione probat, quia eadem facultas, ut iidem concedunt, ex speciebus sensatis elicit non sensatas, easque inter se uariae iungit, et componit,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.3, 258.

⁴⁶ “...secundo concedere re uera non esse plures potentias, etsi ob diuersitatem modi operandi plures dicantur,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.3, 259.

⁴⁷ “...quia Aristoteles capite secundo, et tertio huius libri, ubi potentias sensitivas internas accurate inuestigauit, non plures inuenit, constitutivae quam duas, uidelicet sensum communem, et phantasiam,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.3, 259.

⁴⁸ This is a difference to Suárez, who claims that (according to South, at least) that “a power that can know in the absence of an object can know in the presence of the object as well.”

⁴⁹ “Manet ergo ex superiori disputatione duas tantummodo esse internas sentiendi facultates, sensum communem, et phantasiam, quae ex officiorum diuersitate, non solum uaria sortitur nomina, ut supra monuimus, sed etiam quasi multiplex potentia, non natura, et specie, sed operationum faecunditate dici potest,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.3, 259.

⁵⁰ *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 1.3[–4], 260–61.

The last aspect I want to consider in this paper, now that the functions and the faculties that perform them have been identified, is whether the same functions can be found in different kinds of beings. To be more precise, the question is whether both internal senses can be found in all animals. De Góis's reply is that the common sense, as the center for sensation, is found in all animals. The common sense is like the center of the circle, which here stands for the proper senses. As we have seen, de Góis attributes to the common sense the functions of receiving and perceiving the differences between the objects of the proper senses, that is, to judge and distinguish the sweet from the white, meaning that it must be one power that does it. It is also the function of the common sense to perceive the acts of the proper senses, that is to say, sight does not see itself seeing but I see myself seeing by the activity of the common sense. As the result of this all-encompassing power, we do not need to have a specific power in addition to all others that is responsible for keeping attention: rather, de Góis says, to pay attention is nothing other than to tend to the object (III.1, 2, 433).

As noted before, De Góis argues that the common sense is found in all animals, but this is not the case for the other internal sense. Phantasy is found to be of a different kind in different beings, with the higher kind being found only in rational beings. Next, I focus on the why of this restriction by examining the distinctive functions of phantasy. These are:

- (A) to retain the species (sensed and non-sensed, i.e. intentions) of perceived things;
- (B) to know things in their absence;
- (C) to apprehend non-sensed species;
- (D) to compose and divide sensed and non-sensed species;
- (F) to reason (*discurrere*) about particular things.⁵¹

Taken in a weaker sense (A, B, and C), as a retentive and processing (/active) faculty, phantasy can be found in most species of animals. However, in a narrower and more proper sense (D, F), phantasy is found only in human beings.

It is not credible to think that a power of the sensory soul is able to perform any of the operation indicated in (F) with universal contents,⁵² but it is possible to consider it from the point of

⁵¹ (A) to retain the species (sensed and non-sensed) of perceived things is traditionally the function of retentive imagination and memory; (B) to know things in their absence is the function of phantasy; (C) to apprehend non-sensed species is the function of estimative/cogitative; D # to compose and divide sensed and non-sensed species, and (F) to reason (*discurrere*) about particular things is the function of the cogitative.

⁵² "Planum est enim, et alibi a nobis demonstratum, cognitionem uniuersalium rerum non cadere in potentias organo corporeo affixas, sed solam uim intellectricem" *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.1, 262.

view of forming propositions and discursively reasoning about particular things.⁵³ What this means exactly is what de Góis explores next. He starts by presenting a series of arguments against this possibility, namely that:

F1 the senses cannot perceive the copula establishing the relation between subject and predicate;⁵⁴

F2 the senses cannot operate on their own act (i.e. no operation of the senses can have its own act as the object), which would be the case if the senses were to assent to a judgment arising from itself;

F3 to be discursive requires the knowledge of the principles/rules of discourse, which clearly is not the case with the senses.⁵⁵

The first thing to make absolutely clear is that these functions cannot be performed by the common sense.⁵⁶ Not that the capacity to judge the information from the proper senses is absent from the common sense, but that in this case no proposition exists: judging here means a direct mode of taking in the data received, that is, of taking the object as appropriated or convenient.⁵⁷

Now, the commentary makes it clear that the only way for this capacity to be realized is for it to depend less on being an internal sense and thus a sensory power, and more on account of a certain flux originating in the neighboring faculty of reason.⁵⁸ That leads our author to assert that the internal sense or faculty of phantasy can have such operations because it is, in the structure of the human soul, in direct contact with the rational power.

Phantasy—which, one must be reminded, our author does not distinguish from the cogitative power—has the capacity to operate as a sort of particular reason, as the result of a certain flux from reason (*ex defluxu rationis*).⁵⁹ There is something impressively close to Neoplatonist ideas

⁵³ “Phantasia potest ex utroque termino singulari propositiones conficere, et circa singularia ad illius obiectum pertinentia discurrere,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.2, 263.

⁵⁴ “In qualibet propositione datur copula praedicati cum subiecto, quae est relatio rationis; sed in sensu neque relatio rationis dari potest, neque ab eo percipi, cum ad rationem duntaxat, et ad intellectum pertineat,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.1, 262.

⁵⁵ “Nulla facultas potest dicurrere, nisi cui notae sunt communes illae regulae, et principia, quibus omnis discursus innititur, nempe dici de omni, et dici de nullo. (...) Nulla igitur facultas sensitiva potest discurrere,” III.3, 2.1, 262.

⁵⁶ “Sensus communis non componit, nec diuidit, aut discurret,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.2, 263.

⁵⁷ “Primum pro quavis simplici potentiae cognitione attingente obiectum sibi conueniens, esto ipsam conuenientiam non discernat; Secundo accipitur iudicium pro cognitione item simplici, qua tamen et obiecti conuenientia, et cognitio, atque discrimen inter res aliquas dignoscitur,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.1, 263.

⁵⁸ “Nam hae operationes si sensibus insint, non eis per se competunt, sed ex defluxu, et uicina rationis, a qua bruta absunt,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.1, 262.

⁵⁹ “non quasi, ut paulo ante diximus, id merito sensitivae partis obtineat, sed ex defluxu rationis, quia haec potentia ex eadem anima rationis particeps, tanquam ex eodem fonte dimanat, eique proxime coniungitur quoad fas est sensitivae parti,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.2, 263.

of emanation (*ex eodem fonte dimanat*), but these apply more often than not to content, whereas what seems to be at play here is the notion of a sensitive power to be given an extra boost in its cognitive reach by sharing *in operative terms* a processing power with reason.⁶⁰ Phantasy has no access to the principles of reasoning or even the possibility to conceive of the notion of relation, for example; but all it needs is to be the power in the vicinity (and influence) of the intellect, which knows the universal terms of syllogisms, their rules, and the first principles.⁶¹

The suggestion that de Góis leaves for our consideration is that in beings endowed with reason there is a hierarchy of cognitive powers largely modular in their functional enclosures. However, that there is also a level of cooperation between powers of different orders, possibly to make the whole system more efficient in global terms (the text reads, “for the benefit of another”). One way to read this is to take it as a re-run of the argument we find in thirteenth century authors of the *colligantia potentiarum* extended to the sensitive-intellective interaction and integration. But whereas that conjunction was essential to the operations of the sensory soul, in this case de Góis is obliged to admit that these acts, belonging as they do properly to the intellect, can be said to be of phantasy (thus of the sensory part of the soul) accidentally, due not to what this power is in itself, but to its proximity (in being) and influence (in operation) to the intellect.⁶²

VI.

To conclude: I presented an overview of the development of a unified model of the internal senses and essayed to provide a philosophical justification for the reduction of their number. My suggestion is that this reduction is associated with perceptual activity and the level of awareness implicated in this activity. This holds true, I believe, even if there are levels of reduction and levels of activity in the different authors. Less relevant seems to be a given thinker’s commitment to the unity or the plurality of the substantial forms in the human soul, as we find representatives of either view (Olivi for the plurality, Suárez for the unity) subscribing the one internal sense model. How strong these hypotheses are in a long historiographical perspective cannot be asserted here but it deserves further examination. The results that seem clear enough, however, from the historical sources examined above is that there is an alternative model of the internal senses, according to

⁶⁰ “...ita consentaneum est, ut cogitativa ex intellectivis potentiae consortio aliquid rationis adipiscatur,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.2., 263. In a sense, this is close to Aquinas’ statement that “illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis; sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quandam fluentiam,” *apud* Di Martino 2008, 93.

⁶¹ *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.3, 264.

⁶² “Quod non obstat quominus idem in gradu aliquo inferiori competat etiam phantasiae non per se, sed ob coniunctionem cum intellectu,” *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis...* III.3, 2.3, 265.

(forthcoming in Jakob Fink (ed.), *The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition*: Springer)

which unity and simplification trumps plurality—a model which has been neglected in the existing overview of the topic.