# Educational Assortative Mating Increasingly Related to Income Inequality 

## Questions

Does educational assortative mating contribute to household income inequality?

Do these contributions differ across countries and change over time?
So far, studies concluded that there is little association between changes in educational homogamy and income inequality (on DK, US, UK), hypotheses

- Changes in educational homogamy not big enough Education not strongly related to household income


## Data

Luxembourg Income Studies for 21 countries

Two time periods spaced at least one decade apart

Equivalized Disposable Household Income Inequality
Households comprised of singles or couples living with or without children; heads of households aged 30-64

Education: ISCED 1-2 / ISCED 3-4 / ISCED 5-6
Sample sizes in range [4251, 8852]

## Method

## ‘Counterfactual' simulations

Given country-period educational distribution what would estimated income inequality be in case of:
a) minimal homogamy
b) maximal homogamy

We divide households into groups $j$ according to the combined levels of education of oppositesex couples (singles form separate groups according to sex and education). If $p_{j}$ is a group's share in the population, $x_{j}$ its average income, and $T_{j}$ inequality in income within that group, the Theil-index can be estimated as: $T=\sum_{j} p_{j} \frac{\bar{x}_{j}}{\Sigma_{i} \bar{x}_{j} p_{j}} \ln \left(\frac{x_{j}}{\Sigma_{i} \bar{x}_{j} p_{j}}\right)+\sum_{j} p_{j} \frac{x_{j}}{\sum_{j} \bar{x}_{j} p_{j}} T_{j}$

We estimate 'counterfactual' values of $p_{i}$ : Minimal homogamy: partners' levels of education independent (multiplying for each cell of $4 \times 4$ population share of table row total with population share of column total). Maximum homogamy: We first maximize shares on the diagonal of the of possible shares of groups remains. The resulting pi are combined with observed values of $x_{1}$ and $T_{j}$ to calculate 'counterfactual' household income inequality.

## Example

Stylized Example Spain 2013


## Results

Over last few decades, educational homogamy mostly declined

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline County \& First Year \& Last Year \& \% Change \& First rear \& Last Year \& \% Change \& First year \& Lastyear <br>
\hline \& Theil \& Theil \& in Theil \& Taub \& Taub \& Taub \& OR College \& OR College <br>
\hline Austria (87704) \& ${ }_{0}^{0.0094}$ \& 0.127
0.105 \& 51.2
15.4 \& ${ }_{0}^{0.504}$ \& ${ }_{0}^{0.400}$ \& $\stackrel{-24.7}{-9.1}$ \& ${ }_{17.5}^{36.7}$ \& ${ }_{11.7}^{7.3}$ <br>
\hline Czecech Rep. (92\%/13) \& 0.081 \& 0.144 \& ${ }_{77.8}$ \& 0.403 \& 0.426 \& 5.7 \& 15.9 \& 9.8 <br>
\hline Denmark (87710) \& 0.107 \& 0.144 \& 34.6 \& 0.386 \& 0.375 \& -28 \& 8.3 \& 5 <br>
\hline Estotia ( Poorlo) \& 0.266 \& 0.214 \& -19,6 \& 0.420 \& 0.414 \& -1.4 \& 7.0 \& 7.2 <br>
\hline Finland (955/13) \& 0.094 \& 0.124 \& 31.9 \& 0.363 \& 0.335 \& -7.7 \& 5.7 \& 4.4 <br>
\hline France (778/10) \& 0.209 \& 0.177 \& -15.3 \& 0.364 \& 0.454 \& 24.7 \& 18.4 \& 10.0 <br>
\hline Gemmany (994/13) \& 0.145 \& 0.195 \& 34.5 \& 0.364 \& 0.362 \& -0.5 \& 5.5 \& 53 <br>
\hline Greece (95510) \& 0.235 \& 0.224 \& 4.7 \& 0.626 \& 0.589 \& -5.9 \& 24.5 \& 14.9 <br>
\hline Hungan (991/12) \& 0.148 \& 0.175 \& 18.2 \& 0.491 \& 0.569 \& 15.9 \& 14.1 \& 16.7 <br>
\hline Ireand (924/10) \& ${ }_{0}^{0.254}$ \& 0.169 \& ${ }^{-31.5}$ \& 0.508 \& 0.5351 \& 4.5 \& ${ }^{10.1}$ \& 10.0
103 <br>
\hline Haty (891/10) \& 0.166 \& 0.202 \& 21.7 \& ${ }_{0}^{0.622}$ \& 0.554 \& -10.9 \& ${ }^{260}$ \& 19.3 <br>
\hline Luxembours 9191713 ) \& 0.106 \& ${ }_{0}^{0.153}$ \& 44.3 \& ${ }^{0.397}$ \& ${ }^{0.5937}$ \& 50.4 \& 18.6

34 \& ${ }_{18,4}^{18.4}$ <br>

\hline Netherelands $9893 / 13)$ \& 0.113 \& ${ }^{0.132}$ \& | 16.8 |
| :--- |
| 54.8 | \& ${ }^{0.477}$ \& 0.380 \& -20.3 \& 34.9 \& 5.3 <br>

\hline Nomay (186713) \& ${ }^{0.0084}$ \& ${ }_{0}^{0.133}$ \& ${ }_{94.8}^{59.8}$ \& 0.420 \& 0.378 \& -10.0 \& ${ }_{9} 9.5$ \& ${ }_{20}^{60}$ <br>
\hline Poland (88613) \& 0.118 \& 0.234
0.34
0.1 \& ${ }_{81.1}^{98.3}$ \& 0.565 \& ${ }_{0}^{0.543}$ \& - -1.5 \& ${ }_{108}^{36.5}$ \& ${ }_{231}^{21.0}$ <br>
\hline Stiovenaia (997/12) \& ${ }_{0}^{0.0097}$ \& ${ }_{0}^{0.163}$ \& ${ }_{68.0}^{88.1}$ \& ${ }_{0}^{0.542}$ \& 0.450 \& ${ }_{-12.1}$ \& 10.9
11.9 \& ${ }_{8.4}^{23.1}$ <br>
\hline Spain (900/13) \& 0.187 \& 0.222 \& 18.7 \& 0.551 \& 0.441 \& -20.0 \& 21.4 \& 6.7 <br>
\hline  \& ${ }^{0.083}$ \& 0.117 \& 41.0 \& ${ }^{0.332}$ \& 0.381 \& ${ }_{-0.3}$ \& ${ }_{1} 7.4$ \& ${ }_{7}^{6.0}$ <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}


But, its association with income inequality increased on average


Changing levels of homogamy relatively unimportant, but its consequences play a (modest) role (i.e. increased returns from household levels of education)

