

Chapter 3 Social Grants to Fight Poverty: Policy Development , Achievements and Limitations

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Chapter 3

Social Grants to Fight Poverty: Policy Development, Achievements and Limitations

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has seen economic growth and established itself as one of the “emerging economies” in the world. Thanks to affirmative action and other policy initiatives to empower the historically disadvantaged population, there has emerged a significant black middle class, who are often dubbed “black diamonds.” On another front, however, poverty is still prevalent, and the fight against it is a great challenge for South Africa. Although South Africa is far richer than other countries on the continent, more than half the population is estimated to be living below the poverty line of R577 per person per month (Statistics South Africa 2012b)¹.

Although there is a wide range of policies that can affect income distribution, the centre of the ANC government’s fight against poverty has been income support through social grants. Therefore this chapter focuses on social grant provision as one of the key policy areas for transformation in post-apartheid South Africa. The social grant programme in South Africa is one of the largest cash transfer schemes in developing countries, and it has attracted wide international attention as a successful model of poverty alleviation. While many studies have been made regarding the impact of social grants on the poverty situation (e.g. Ardington and Lund 1995; Case and Deaton 1998; Duflo 2000; Woolard and Leibbrandt 2010; DSD, SASSA and UNICEF 2012), a political

¹ R577 per person per month is the upper poverty line, which refers to the food poverty line (R305) plus the average amount derived from non-food items of households whose total food expenditure is equal to the food poverty line (Statistics South Africa 2012b: 5).

analysis of welfare policy making has been relatively less developed, with some notable exceptions (Johnson 2000; Sagner 2000; Seekings 2005; 2008). To study the issue from the latter perspective is important, however, as the size of the current programme is a result of layers of past political decisions, both in the apartheid and post-apartheid eras, which were often made not on economically rational considerations, but for political or ideological reasons. This chapter tries to fill the gap by examining the process of development in social grant policy.

The chapter is structured as follows. I will first present a rough sketch of poverty and inequality in South Africa since the end of apartheid, followed by a current and historical overview of social grants in the country. Then I will examine public policy discourse and policy development regarding social grants since democratisation, and explore how social grants have become such a large programme and have moved to centre stage in the fight against poverty. The final section examines the remaining challenges and prospects for the future.

1. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN THE POST-APARTHEID ERA

According to the latest census results, the average annual household income more than doubled in the period between 2001 and 2011. There are significant differences between the races; the average annual income for White-headed households was six times that of African-headed households in 2011. While the rate of increase for the ten years was bigger for African-headed households than White, Coloured or Indian/Asian households, one could not deny that the racial inequality which was characteristic of the apartheid state remains after democratisation (Table 1).

Table 1 Average Annual Household Income by Type of Household Head (Rand)

	2001	2011	Change (%)
African	22,522	60,613	169.1
Coloured	51,440	112,172	118.1
Indian/ Asian	102,606	251,541	145.2
White	193,820	365,134	88.4
Total	48,385	103,204	113.3

Source: Statistics South Africa (2012a: 36-37).

Note: The figures shown in the table are in nominal terms. The Consumer Price Index increased by 77.5% in the period (Statistics South Africa 2012a: 37).

In addition to the stark inter-racial inequality, there is an increasing level of intra-racial inequality, especially within the African population. According to Borat and others, while the Gini coefficient for the total population increased from 0.64 in 1995 to 0.72 in 2005, intra-racial inequality for all four population groups also widened. The Gini coefficient was highest for the African population, 0.61 in 2005 (an increase from 0.56 in 1995),

while the same year's figures for the White, Asian, and Coloured counterparts were 0.51 (0.44), 0.56 (0.46) and 0.59 (0.49) respectively (Bhorat, Van der Westhuizen and Jacobs 2009: Table 2).

While the inequality, both between the races and within the races, has worsened since the end of apartheid, there has been some improvement in the poverty situation, although it has been slow. In the early 2000s, many researchers argued that both inequality and poverty worsened after the end of apartheid (e.g. Meth and Dias 2004; Hoogeveen and Ozler 2006). However, recent research using newer data shows the poverty headcount (incidence of poverty) and the poverty gap (depth of poverty) decreased between 1995 and 2005 (Bhorat and van der Westhuizen n.d. [2008?]). This reduction in poverty seems to have much to do with the expansion of social grants in the 2000s. According to Woolard and Leibbrandt (2010), if there had not been social grants, poverty would have worsened during the period from 1993 to 2008.

Interestingly, while social grants serve to reduce poverty, Bhorat and others observed no impact on the Gini coefficient. They argue this is probably because not only the poorest households but also households in middle-income deciles are receiving social grants (Bhorat, Van der Westhuizen and Jacobs 2009: 18-19). In other words, social grants in South Africa are not a relief for the few, narrowly targeted poor who are in exceptional circumstances, but they have a relatively wide coverage.

2. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL GRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

2.1 The Current Social Grant System

Currently, there are several kinds of social grants for elderly persons, persons with disabilities and children up to the age of 18 in South Africa. As of September 2012, there are 16 million beneficiaries of one kind of social grant or other, of which 11.3 million are receiving the Child Support Grant (CSG), followed by the Old Age Grant (or social pension as it is widely known) and the Disability Grant (Table 2, Figure 1). Social grants are non-contributory, means-tested cash transfers, in contrast to social insurance benefits, which are based on contribution records. Although they are means-tested, the criteria are not so selective. It is estimated that the coverage for social pensions is about 80% of the population of eligible age, and 70% for children of eligible age are beneficiaries of the CSG (Garcia and Moore 2012: 52-53).


Table 2 Social Grants in South Africa

Grant Type	Beneficiaries	Maximum Monthly Amount Payable as of April 2012	Number of Beneficiaries as of 30 September 2012
Old Age Grant (social pension)	People who are 60 years or older	R1200 (R1220 if 75 years or older)	2,811,380
War Veteran's Grant	Former soldiers who fought in the First World War (1904-1918), the Second World War (1939-1945), the Zulu uprising (1906) or the Korean War	R1220	641
Disability Grant	People with a physical or mental disability which makes one unfit to work for a period of longer than six months	R1200	1,187,457
Grant-in-Aid	Additional grant for recipients of a Disability Grant, a War Veteran's Grant or an Old Age Grant who are not able to look after themselves owing to their physical or mental disabilities, and therefore need full-time care from someone else	R280	69,965
Care Dependency Grant	Parent, primary caregiver, or foster parent who takes care of a child who is younger than 18 years old and has a severe disability and is in need of full-time and special care	R1200 per child	118,769
Foster Child Grant	Foster parents of foster children who have been placed in their custody by a court as a result of being orphaned, abandoned, at risk, abused or neglected	R770 per child	585,699
Child Support Grant	Primary caregivers of children up to the age of 18 years	R280 per child	11,306,024
Total			16,009,970

Source: South Africa Government Services (<http://www.services.gov.za/>, accessed 11 January 2013); SASSA (2012b).

Note: The total does not include Grant-in-Aid.

Figure 1 Number of Beneficiaries of Social Grants, FY1996/97 - FY2011/12 ('000)



Source: SASSA (2009; 2012a).

Note: Other grants include the War Veteran's Grant, the Care Dependency Grant and the Foster Child Grant.

In the rest of the chapter, my argument will concentrate on the two largest programmes, i.e. the CSG and the Old Age Grant. This is not to deny the importance of the other social grants, especially the Disability Grant and Foster Child Grant in the context of the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, but it is because the CSG and the Old Age Grant represent the unique character of social grants in South Africa.

2.2 Historical Development of Social Grants

Although the CSG is currently the largest social grant programme in terms of the number of beneficiaries, the social pension has historically been the most important programme in public income support for African households.

The history of the Old Age Grant started in the 1920s when the social pension was introduced for Whites and Coloureds as part of the solution for the "poor white" problem after the South African War (Sagner 2000). It was later extended to Africans in 1944. As for the background to this extension, Seekings points out that liberal thinking was influential during the Second World War, particularly as a result of the Beveridge Report in the United Kingdom. The collapse of subsistence agriculture in the African reserves due to overpopulation and overgrazing were also of concern to the government (Seekings 2005). The crisis in the African reserves meant an increase in labour costs for the mining sector, which was dependent on the "cheap labour" provided by the reserves which bore the reproduction cost of labour. In this context, social pensions for Africans

not only helped Africans to survive, but they also served as indirect support for the mining sector (Sagner 2000).

Although the amount of the pension for Africans was much lower than that for Whites, it still became an important source of income for African households under the apartheid regime (Wilson and Ramphela 1989). After the character of the labour market shifted from a labour shortage to a labour surplus in the late 1970s, and chronic mass unemployment among Africans began (Seekings and Natrass 2005), its importance for the livelihood of African households arguably increased. In the racialised labour market, the burden of unemployment was concentrated on the Africans, and it was particularly severe in the rural areas. In such circumstances, the social pension was often the sole form of income for entire households (Human Awareness Programme 1984: 8)

There was a huge racial difference in the amount of the pension in the 1960s, but the gap started to decrease in the 1970s and it was equalized between the races by 1993. This was achieved mainly by drastically decreasing the grant amount to Whites in real terms, while at the same time gradually increasing the grant amount for other populations. The slash in the pension amount for Whites was politically possible because most Whites no longer relied on the social pension as their main source of income after retirement. Due to racial privilege in areas such as the labour market and education, many White workers came to obtain stable jobs with social security arrangements such as membership of retirement funds, while this was not the case for most Africans. As a result, by the end of the apartheid era, most of the recipients of the social pension, which was for elderly persons who could not rely on other sources of income, were Africans (Van der Berg 1997; 1998).

Regarding social grants for children, African children in single parent households were mostly excluded from receiving the State Maintenance Grant (SMG) (Lund Committee 1996). It was after the new CSG was introduced in 1998 to replace the SMG following the recommendation by the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support that many African households became able to have access to social grants for children. More details of the process will be provided in the next section.

3. POLICY DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL GRANTS AFTER DEMOCRATISATION

3.1 The Social Pension Re-Positioned in the Developmental Context

In 1994, the ANC declared in its election manifesto, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), that it would tackle poverty as its first priority. “[A]n election victory is only a first step. No political democracy can survive and flourish if the mass of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life. Attacking poverty and deprivation must therefore be the first priority of a democratic government” (ANC 1994: 1.2.9). Since the ANC assumed power, it has been social grants that have repeatedly been cited as evidence that the ANC was taking the problem of poverty seriously. For instance, in 1998, Trevor Manuel, the Minister of

Finance at the time, stated in his annual Budget Speech as follows:

One of the most redistributive spending programmes is social security and welfare. Social grants are paid to over 3 million beneficiaries, and are a crucial source of income to poor households, particularly in rural areas. Welfare and social security spending represents Government's primary investment in poverty alleviation (Manuel 1998).

It should be noted, however, that the CSG had not yet been introduced at the time of this speech, and the social grants that were being delivered at that time were the same as those under the apartheid regime. In other words, the social security system that the ANC government inherited from the previous regime was already somewhat redistributive. As noted in the previous section, although African families could not have access to social grants for children before the CSG was introduced, most of the recipients of social pensions were already Africans by the end of the apartheid regime, and racial discrimination in the amount payable was also abolished by 1993.

The importance of the social pension for the survival of impoverished African households had already been pointed out in the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty in the 1980s (Wilson and Ramphela 1989). In addition, in the 1990s, more studies demonstrated the positive effects of social pensions for poverty alleviation. What was particularly important, among other results, was the finding that the social pension had positive impacts on the health and educational status of young African children living with pensioners. Legally speaking, the social pension is meant for elderly persons as individuals; in practice, however, studies showed that the social pension was being shared with family members and therefore contributed to the poverty alleviation of entire households, rather than just supporting the lives of individual elderly persons (e.g. Ardington and Lund 1995; Case and Deaton 1998). Such research findings greatly helped to introduce into public policy discourse the idea that social grants are "developmental", rather than just a "hand out".

The Smith Committee on Strategy and Policy Review of Retirement Provision exemplifies this point. In 1995, the government commissioned the Smith Committee to conduct research and make recommendations about the retirement provision system, including the social pension (which is non-contributory) and the retirement fund schemes (which are contributory). In the Committee, Pieter le Roux, who was professor at University of Western Cape and a committee member, presented a strong argument that the social pension was well targeted at poorer households and is used by many extended families for developmental purposes (le Roux 1995). Although there were concerns expressed in the committee about the fiscal sustainability of the social pension as well as its possible negative impact on incentives for workers to provide from their earnings, the Smith Committee eventually acknowledged that "the old age assistance system [i.e. social pension] has a uniquely successful form of poverty relief and redistribution" and recommended that it be retained as "the centrepiece which other forms of provision must support" (Smith Committee 1995: 29, 31). The government accepted the

recommendation, and the social pension was retained.

3.2 Introduction and Subsequent Expansion of the CSG

Unlike the social pension, one can observe a clear break from the apartheid era as well as a significant policy change since democratisation in the area of social grants for children.

While it was decided to maintain the social pension soon after democratisation, it should be noted that fiscal constraints did affect social policy development in the late 1990s. Although the RDP in 1994 reiterated the need to address poverty and promised redistribution, it was after just two years that a neo-liberal macroeconomic strategy, Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), was introduced in 1996. With the GEAR firmly placed at the centre of all policies, the government in the late 1990s strongly emphasized fiscal discipline for the sake of macroeconomic stability, and social grants were no exception.

Fiscal constraints were the major reason why the amount of the CSG was initially set as low as R100 per month per child, which meant that existing SMG recipients (mainly Coloured and Indian/Asian single mothers) had to face a drastic reduction in the amounts they received (Johnson 2000). Looking back at the process of reform for the social grants for children, Francie Lund, who was a professor at the University of Natal and chaired the Lund Committee, which was instrumental in designing the new CSG, recalls that she was advised by Alec Erwin, then deputy minister of finance, that she should “take the existence of the fiscal constraint seriously and [...] ‘redistribute within the existing envelope’,” otherwise her recommendation for policy reform would not be taken seriously (Lund 2008: 90). As an author of Ardington and Lund (1995), Lund believed that social grants could play a positive developmental role, and she had the strong will to make social grants available for African children. The initial low amount of the CSG was the result of a tight balancing act between the inescapable fiscal pressures and the need to achieve equity.

Not only was the grant amount of CSG low, but it also started very slowly, with only 150,000 children newly registered for the grant by FY1999/2000 (see Figure 2 above). However, retrospectively, the fact that the Lund Committee managed to succeed in pushing through the reform and get it put into practice made room for a huge increase both in the number of beneficiaries and the total expenditure for social grants in the 2000s and afterwards. While the CSG was initially only for children up to six years old, the age limit was gradually raised in the 2000s and now it covers children up to 18 years old. The grant amount has also been raised over the years. As we have seen already, now the number of beneficiaries of the CSG has reached more than 11 million. While the conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin American countries absorb much less than 1% of GDP, the cost of social grants in South Africa is now approximately 3% of GDP (Barrientos and Hulme 2009).

Several elements can be pointed out as background for this expansion. Firstly, the government’s decision to raise the age limit of the CSG was a direct response to the report of the Taylor Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social

Security for South Africa, which was published in 2002. Although the mandate of the Taylor Committee was rather wide (including contributory retirement provision as well as a health insurance system), its main recommendation concerned expanding social grants. What was particularly notable was that the Committee supported the phasing-in of a basic income grant (BIG), or a social grant that is to be paid unconditionally to all individuals regardless of age, gender, or labour market status, as a key to eradicating extreme poverty. Extending the CSG to children up to 18 years old and making it universal (i.e. abolishing the means test) was recommended as the first steps for the introduction of a BIG in the future (Taylor Committee 2002a).

While the government, citing fiscal and other reasons², rejected the call for a BIG by the Taylor Committee and civil society organisations, who supported the idea, it nonetheless decided to extend the CSG. It also started to make serious efforts to enrol more and more children in the programme (DSD, SASSA and UNICEF 2012: 30). Considering the fact that one of the key arguments for a BIG that was made by its proponents in civil society was that the existing social grants were failing to reach many people who could qualify because of the problems of the means-test (Basic Income Grant Coalition 2003), the government's response, stated above, was probably driven at least partly by a perceived necessity to justify its decision not to introduce a BIG, and to demonstrate that the expansion of and improvement in implementation in existing programmes were good enough for the purpose of poverty alleviation.

Secondly, the new constitution matters. In the Bill of Rights of the new post-apartheid constitution, which became law in 1996, the right to social security was established as a constitutional right. Section 27 of the new constitution reads: "everyone has the right to have access to ... social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance," and "the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights"³. Simply put, this clause obliges the government to continuously expand the coverage of social security until "everyone" can enjoy the right. Children's rights are also established in Section 28 of the constitution. Since the new constitution came into effect, these clauses have been used for a number of public litigation cases as well as policy advocacy outside courts over the government's obligation to realise these rights⁴. With the Constitutional Court making several judgements in favour of plaintiffs, constitutional socio-economic rights have been gradually substantiated. As the Grootboom case, which was a landmark judgment by the Constitutional Court about socio-economic rights, was mentioned in the Taylor

² While the National Treasury strongly opposed a BIG for fiscal reasons, the government leaders at that time often cited normative concerns that able-bodied people should work instead of depending on social grants. See Matisonn and Seekings (2003) and Makino (2004) for more detailed discussion about the public debate over a BIG in the early 2000s.

³ "Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996," on the South African Government Information website (<http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/index.htm>, accessed 27 January 2013).

⁴ The issue of life-saving AIDS drugs, for which a civil society group Treatment Action Campaign organised a number of mass actions and fought court cases against the government, best illustrates the point (Friedman and Mottiar 2005; Heywood 2005).

Committee Report (Taylor Committee 2002b), the government must have been aware of the risk of being taken to court over the limited coverage of social grants when it considered their extension.

Thirdly, there is political merit for the government to expand social grants. In the manifesto for the 2009 elections, the first thing the ANC had to say about its achievement to “push back the frontiers of poverty” was how it had successfully expanded the social grant. The manifesto reads:

In 1996, only 3 million people had access to social grants. Today 12.5 million receive social grants. In 1996, only 34,000 children had access to social grants. Today nearly 8 million children younger than 14 years receive social grants (ANC 2009).

Direct cash transfers in the form of social grants are very tangible, thus it arguably has strong political appeal and is useful for consolidating popular support for the government and the ruling party. The fact that the social grant programme in South Africa is internationally highly acclaimed in the context of increased interest in cash transfer programmes for social protection might also be contributing to strengthening the political appeal⁵.

3.3 Limitation of Existing Social Grants: The Issue of Unemployment

As we have seen, there has been a rapid increase in the coverage of social grants in the 2000s, and this has contributed to the reduction of poverty both in terms of the poverty head count and the poverty gap. There is a serious limitation, however, in fighting against poverty solely with the existing social grants. This is because there is limited income security for the unemployed, despite a high unemployment rate that exceeds 25%.

Unemployment is a significant contributor to poverty and inequality in South Africa. The official unemployment rate was 25.5% in the third quarter in 2012, and the rate is much higher if discouraged job-seekers are included. Unemployment among the youth is particularly alarming: about one third of the youth (15-24 years) are so-called NEET, i.e. not in employment, education or training, and the unemployment rate for this age group is more than 50% (Statistics South Africa 2012c).

The issue of mass unemployment has been a primary concern for the ANC government. Its key macroeconomic strategy documents, such as GEAR, Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), and the more recent National Development Plan, have been organised around the ultimate goal of economic growth accompanying job creation. In the recent 53rd ANC National Conference in December 2012, unemployment, along with poverty and inequality, was again presented as one of the elements in the “triple challenge” that the ANC was facing (ANC 2012). Besides indirect and medium- to long-term strategies to restructure the economy to increase

⁵ See Garcia and Moore (2012) for the latest review of cash transfer programmes in Africa.

employment, the ANC had already introduced some direct policy measures, of which the most notable is the Public Works Programmes (PWPs), to provide short-term work for the unemployed. However, PWPs have not covered all the unemployed who wish to participate (cf. Haddad and Adato 2001), nor have they provided income for participants beyond the programme period of several months to a maximum of two years⁶.

Regarding social security measures for the unemployed, there is the unemployment insurance fund, which is mandatory for all employees to join. It does not, however, provide income security for people in long-term unemployment nor for those with no work experience since leaving school. In addition, it should be noted that in South Africa, subsistence agriculture is so weak, due to the historical confiscation of productive land by White colonisers, that it cannot function as an effective informal social security system, as is often the case in other developing countries. People generally depend on cash income for a livelihood even in rural areas, and in the context of job scarcity, the social grants for the elderly, children and disabled people have often constituted the sole stable source of cash income for poor households. As a result, these social grants are often the only social security available for those who are able-bodied but without work.

The practice of sharing social grants among household members has contributed to alleviating general poverty. However, we might also point out that there is some danger in simply assuming that social grants are shared. Let me illustrate this point using the case of the social pension. The social pension has often been described as “generous” (e.g. Duflo 2000), based on the fact that the amount of the grant is higher than either the per capita poverty line or the mean per capita income of the African population. However, in reality, it often cannot meet the very basic needs of elderly persons because it is shared among family members, particularly when there is no other source of income in the household. Møller and Sotshongaye (1996) found pensioners felt they were impoverished because they had to share their pensions with other family members. Sagner and Mtati (1999) also demonstrated the pressure for pension sharing by pointing out that pensioners felt they would not get necessary care when they got frail, if they did not share their pensions with family members. The reasons why social grants are shared may be partly cultural, but they are mainly because of the chronic mass unemployment. In this context, policy discourse, which conflates existing social grants designed for economically inactive people with a general poverty alleviation scheme, could conceal the unsolved problem of a lack of income security for the unemployed.

CONCLUSION

The social grant programme in South Africa is one of the largest cash transfer programmes among developing countries. It has been at the centre of the ANC government’s fight against poverty, and many studies show that South Africa has indeed

⁶ According to the ministerial determination which sets the working conditions for the PWPs, workers on the programmes are employed on a temporary basis, and a worker may not be employed for longer than 24 months in any five-year cycle (http://www.epwp.gov.za/Downloads/legal_ministerialdetermination.doc, accessed 3 February 2013).

been successful in alleviating poverty through the provision of social grants.

This chapter has examined the process of the historical development of the social grant programme in South Africa, and demonstrated how it has become so big since democratisation. We have seen that there was the establishment of a shared recognition among experts and policy makers that social grants are an effective poverty alleviation tool and that they can play a “developmental” role. This contributed to the maintenance of the social pension that the government inherited from the apartheid regime, and to the introduction, and afterwards the extension, of the Child Support Grant, even during a time of fiscal pressures. Although the neo-liberal macroeconomic framework did affect policy development in the 1990s, the social grant programme has expanded both in terms of the number of beneficiaries and in terms of the total budget from the 2000s and onwards. We also discussed how there were political considerations behind the expansion of the social grants, i.e. the government responded to the pressure it received from civil society as well as from its own research committee to introduce a basic income grant, or to act in accordance with its constitutional obligation to take concrete measures to realise the right to social security.

There is a serious limitation in the existing social grants, however, as is discussed above. Despite the fact that the social grant programme is reaching many people, it is not yet comprehensive, because there is no social grant provision for adults who are fit to work but who are unable to find a job in a society where employment opportunities are scarce. What are the prospects for the future regarding the strengthening of income security for the unemployed? A youth wage subsidy scheme for companies who recruit new employees has been on the agenda for a while, but it has been reported that the powerful trade unions are opposed to the idea, fearing it might lead to the replacement of existing workers with low-cost young workers⁷. Recently, another idea of a job-seekers grant, which is a social grant for the unemployed and is intended to assist them in their job-seeking activities, appeared in the run-up to the ANC National Conference in 2012, and the conference’s resolution included the statement that it would accelerate “the development and implementation of financial support for job-seekers, that is tied to compulsory learning and skills development as part of the Comprehensive Social Security System” (ANC 2012: 2.4.2.1). Whether these policy ideas will be realised, and in what form, however, depends largely on further consideration within the ANC Alliance and in the government, and this still remains to be seen.

⁷ “Youth Wage Subsidy Tops Agenda at ANC Lekgotla,” *City Press*, 31 January 2013 (<http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/youth-wage-subsidy-tops-agenda-at-anc-lekgotla/>, accessed 5 February 2013).

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