

1. Bullets, Ballots and Bread: the Democratic Transition in Mozambique

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シリーズタイトル(英)	Africa Research Series
シリーズ番号	7
journal or publication title	Southern Africa after Democratization
page range	1-31
year	1996
章番号	1
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00016668

**BULLETS, BALLOTS AND BREAD:
THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN MOZAMBIQUE**

BY

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“Our war was organized by foreigners and now our peace is being organized by foreigners.” Carlos Cardoso, October 1994¹⁾

On 29 October 1994, the Republic of Mozambique held its first ever democratic elections. The two main contending parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, had only recently foresworn conflict in exchange for a contest at the ballot box. Having fought a bitter internecine war for over a decade and a half, the prospects for a peaceful transition to democracy were considered to be dim by most observers, especially given the disastrous experience in Angola. However, confounding all expectations, Mozambicans went enmass to the polls and, despite a last-ditch attempt to scuttle the elections, voted in a new government.

The transition to democracy in Mozambique has been hailed as a success, especially so by proponents of the United Nations in wake of disastrous experiences in Somalia and Bosnia. However, a deeper analysis of the situation in Mozambique highlights the contradictions and complexities surrounding this apparent achievement. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the Angolan case, elections in and of themselves do not guarantee adherence democracy. In analyzing both the movement from open conflict to the elections of October 1994 and the long term prospects for building democracy in Mozambique, it is necessary view the democratic transition as an extended process, one which commenced with the advent of negotiations to end the war and has carried through to the post-election period.

This paper examines the process of democratization in Mozambique, focusing on the transition from a closed political system to that of an open or democratic political system. Specifically, the paper looks at the staged development towards democratization as presupposed by the international community's approach to post-conflict states, embodied most explicitly in the role of the United Nations and the international donor community in

Mozambique, and its impact on that process. In examining the phenomenon of transition to democracy in Mozambique, three basic themes are broached. They are the establishment of the pre-requisites for democracy; the role of the international community in fostering democracy; and sustaining democracy in Mozambique.

1. Creating the Pre-requisites for Democracy: Negotiating the General Peace Agreement

Bringing the decades of civil war to an end was the central precondition to establishing an open political system in Mozambique. The onset of negotiations, culminating with the signing of the formal peace treaty in Rome in 1992, coincided with the opening of the internal political process. Underlying these developments was the impact of change at the international and regional levels which gave momentum to the search for peace.

The movement away from open warfare towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Mozambique was not easily taken. Like the conflict itself, negotiations between the Government and Renamo were protracted and characterized by the kind of mistrust incumbent with long standing opponents. Crucial to the instigation of this process were changes in the international political climate and the domestic environment, both of which brought pressures to bear on the otherwise recalcitrant Mozambican parties. With the establishment of a genuine commitment to negotiate a peace settlement, characterized by the onset of direct talks and the setting of a definitive agenda for negotiations, the peace process was able to reach closure with the signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome.

A. The Elements of Negotiation

In examining the movement from conflict to negotiation, it is important to identify the principal factors which prove to be critical to the process. In this regard, the parties to the conflict and the mediators make up one important set of agents to the process. The context within which the negotiations take place, setting the parameters of action for both the parties to the conflict and the mediators, is another area of crucial importance. It is the combination of all of these elements, interacting at the matrix of the negotiations, which determines the timing and content of a formal peace settlement.

The Parties to the Conflict

As noted above, the conflict in Mozambique involved two principal parties - - the Government of Mozambique and Renamo - - as well as a host of supporting actors. In examining these parties, it is important to identify the institutional setting of the organization, specifically the political ideology or programme and the structure of the organization.

The Government was constitutionally ruled by the country's sole political party, Frelimo (Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique). Frelimo officially espoused the ideology of Marxist-Leninism, albeit reserving the right to incorporate Mozambican elements into the creed, and this perspective had informed its world view as well as determined much of the content of its policies. But, following its failure to gain access to Comecon as well as the crushing financial burden of combatting the Renamo insurgency, the party had adopted a liberalized economic programme by the Fourth Party Congress of April 1983. This initial change in economic sector was expanded considerably in 1987, with the onset of a World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programme. The stage was set for further liberalizations, this time in the political sphere. At the Fifth Congress in July 1989, radical reforms to the legal structures and institutions of state were proposed. By 1990, with the publication of a liberal-democratic constitution and the commencement of preliminary discussions with Renamo, the transformation of Frelimo away from the fundamental precepts of its Marxist-Leninist roots was all but complete.

The organization of the Government was similar to other communist states, though many observers felt there to be a degree of open debate unheard of in orthodox communist states. The primacy of the party made all significant appointments contingent upon political affiliation. At the same time, the changes in first economic and then political policy were accompanied by growing divisions within the party as to the policy direction it should take. These ideological fissures were complicated by internal ethnic divisions, which increasingly pitted the white, mestizo and Indian members of the party against the black Africans on issues like conscription into the army and the relative absence of black Mozambicans in positions of authority in the party. The failed coup attempt on June 1991 pointed to stresses placed on the party as it shifted towards a negotiated resolution to the conflict.

Renamo, initially formed and directed by the Rhodesian Secret Service and later taken on by South African Military Intelligence, was for many years unable to articulate a political programme with any elements of

consistency or depth beyond a crude anti - Frelimo formulation²⁾. Reflective of the aims of those who supported its establishment, the organization's history of assassinations and defections speaks as much to the struggle for clarity on political aims as to that of individuals struggling for political power. The conscious attempt, encouraged by American sources in the aftermath of the Nkomati Accord, to wrest Renamo from its foreign origins and place black Africans in senior positions in the organization was crucial in firming up its ideological perspective. After 1988, the year that the guerrilla movement held its first substantive congress, Renamo began to develop a political programme which was predicated on an amalgamation of Western values such as promotion of a market economy and more traditionalist Mozambican concerns such as the re - instatement of tribal headman system. As the prospect of a negotiated settlement began to take concrete form, especially in light of the far - reaching changes to the Mozambican polity engineered by the Government after 1990, Renamo attempted to sharpen its political programme to meet the exigencies of the peace process.

As an organization, Renamo was ill - equipped to enter into negotiations. In spite of changes wrought at the National Conference in 1988, its structure was still decidedly military in composition and orientation. Propaganda offices that did exist were supported by Western conservative movements and staffed by a seemingly endless rotation of figures. These problems were to prove to be the source of difficulties throughout the negotiations and well into the implementation of the peace agreement. The problems of communication, both technical and personal, between the constituent parts of Renamo made negotiations difficult. The field commanders operated with a degree of autonomy though within the context of the maintenance of military discipline. Coupled with these issues was the paucity of skilled negotiators on the Renamo side. As a result, suspicions that the Government would be able to, by dint of its superior knowledge and negotiating experience in such forum as the debt talks, secure a settlement at the expense of Renamo's interests marked much of the negotiation process.

Regional actors, especially the Governments of Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya and South Africa, played important if changing roles in the negotiation process. Robert Mugabe, the leader of Zimbabwe, had taken a direct interest in the maintenance of the transport network in Mozambique. With the support of the Front Line States and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), Zimbabwean troops had been dispatched to protect the vital Beira corridor linking Zimbabwe with the

Indian Ocean port of Beira. This presence brought a declaration of war from Renamo in 1986 and not only were Zimbabwean soldiers on the corridor targets but the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe itself began to experience incursions and nascent de-stabilization. Malawi's Kamuzu Banda, the renegade of the region, had taken an equivocal stance towards the de-stabilization of its neighbour. In the first instance, based on its traditional friendship with Portugal and territorial ambitions for northern Mozambique, Malawi had served as a transit point and safe haven for Renamo guerrillas. The settling of one million Mozambican refugees in southern Malawi became, in some instances, a source of support and recruitment for Renamo which operated with the collusion of local Malawian officials. However, from the mid-eighties onward, Renamo's attacks on the Nacala corridor had caused Banda to send a Malawian military force in to guard this vital transport network for his country. The Government of Daniel Arap Moi, leader of Kenya, was the newcomer to the politics of Southern Africa. Having allowed Renamo to establish an office in Nairobi, the Kenyan Government sought to position itself as a power broker in the Mozambican civil war.

South Africa's interests in its neighbour has been outlined above. It is suffice to note that South Africa's pre-occupation with its own transformative political process, coupled with de Klerk's curbing of the South African Defence Force and the dismantling of the National Security Management System which fostered de-stabilization policies towards Mozambique, increased dramatically following the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990. Mandela's choice of Maputo as his first foreign destination, both an homage to Mozambique's role in support of the African National Congress and an effort to underscore its importance to the emerging peace process in South Africa, signalled the end of further coercive South African involvement in that country. Thereafter, the South African Government quietly and effectively abdicated its political interests in Mozambique to the Western governments.

Of the members of the international community involved in the negotiations, the American, Portuguese, British, French and South African governments joined the process, ultimately underwriting it through their participation in the negotiations in Rome and their financial support for the General Peace Agreement. All of these countries had constituencies supportive of either side in the conflict, though, following the transformation of Frelimo away from the command economy and its signature of the Nkomati Accord, Western governments were more readily supportive of

Maputo. Finally, the United Nations, the international financial community and the NGOs were partners to the entire process as they were ultimately called upon to witness, facilitate and provide technical assistance in fulfilling the terms of the peace agreement.

It bears mentioning that the Soviet Union (and its constituent elements after its break up) and the Eastern Europe countries which had proved to be a bulwark of support for the Mozambican government throughout the seventies and up to the mid - eighties, played a role of diminishing significance during the build up to negotiations. This reflected the changing international environment, a factor which was to have a discernable impact on a number of regional conflicts which were drawn to a close by the ending of the Cold War.

The Context of Negotiations

A crucial question for analysts of conflict resolution is to understand what brings antagonists to the negotiating table and keeps them there until an agreement is reached. In the case of Mozambique, the elements which brought the Government and Renamo to Rome are principally rooted in changes in the international and regional environment, coupled with a genuine weariness and concrete lack of capacity on the part of the Mozambican population and society to participate in the unending war. Both parties were dependent upon foreign sources for the continuation of the conflict, especially so as the already limited resources of Mozambique had been squandered or rendered inaccessible under the pressure of repeated drought, destruction and famine. Thus, against this background, it was the withdrawal or threatened withdrawal of sources of support - - both military and financial - - which served as a catalyst for the onset of negotiations.

Key factors influencing the Government's decision to pursue a negotiated settlement of the conflict have their origin in significant changes in the international and regional environment. The changing international climate, specifically the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev's political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union, exerted a profound influence on the conduct of the war in Mozambique. Coupled with these was Gorbachev's commitment to wind down regional conflicts in the Third World, symbolized by its withdrawal from Afganistan in February 1988. In Mozambique's case, the role of Soviet and East German military assistance, both in the form of advisors and material (especially oil) - - while never attaining the levels found in Angola - - had proven to be crucial to maintaining the Government's capacity to wage war. Coupled with this dwindling interest of

the international donor community in continuing to respond to the decade-long emergency as well as finance the bankrupt Mozambican economy. Pledges by donor governments to Mozambique's 1990 aid appeal fell far short of needs, so much so that a decision was taken not to bother mounting an appeal in 1991. Underlying this change in attitude was, again, the dramatic transformation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which saw the West's interests shift to that region of the world. For a country which had become the Third World's mendicant, the implications of a drop in foreign aid were serious if not potentially disastrous.

At the regional level, Zimbabwe's commitment of troops to the defense of the Beira corridor was increasingly being questioned both by opposition politicians and the public in general. The financial drain on the Zimbabwean treasury, estimated to be one million Zimbabwean dollars a day, was exacerbated by the spectacle of growing Zimbabwean casualties. Regular Renamo incursions into the border areas, in search of basic necessities, also raised the costs of Zimbabwe's involvement in the war. The irony of Mugabe, who had himself been brought to the negotiating table by an increasingly beleaguered Mozambican state in 1979, quietly urging the Mozambican government to come to an agreement with Renamo was surely not lost on the ZANU leader.

In the case of Renamo, the implications of the transformations in the international and regional environment were critical in bringing about a change in its attitude towards negotiations. The international environment, which had once held great promise for Renamo, had failed to deliver the needed support. Partly a reflection of the diminishing interest in the regional battlegrounds of the Cold War, the tapering off of foreign interest was also linked to the failure to win crucial American backing for the organization. Publicity surrounding the Homione massacre in 1987 and, coming in the wake of efforts to secure Republican Party support for the organization, the publication of the U.S. State Department's Gersony Report in 1988³⁾ cast Renamo into the netherworld of guerrilla movements outside of mainstream Cold War support.

Concurrently, at the regional level the withdrawal of South African (both official and unofficial) support for the rebel movement, a process which began in earnest after the 1988 meeting at Songo between P.W. Botha and Joaquim Chissano, hurried Renamo's move to a negotiated resolution to the conflict. With the ascension of F.W. de Klerk to the State Presidency in September 1990, the South African state re-oriented its policies away from the de-stabilization strategies of the recent past. The prospect of an ANC

government in the near future all but assured Renamo that it would lose even a tacit base of support in South Africa.

Finally, against this backdrop of substantial change in the international and regional environment, the deteriorating domestic conditions left the Mozambican parties little choice but to pursue a non-military resolution to the conflict. The failure to achieve a military outcome to the conflict - - and, with the withdrawal of foreign support - - the unlikely prospect that one would be forthcoming in the near future tempered ideological hawks on both sides. The Government's military successes at the close of the eighties, while not able to defeat the guerrilla movement outright, were successful in dis-lodging it from long held territory. This was particularly the case in the province of Zambezia, the country's most populous and agriculturally richest where Renamo had controlled vast swathes of land including some minor district capitols. However, despite the achievements of the Government's military campaign, in classic guerrilla style, Renamo simply withdrew in the face of strong opposition. It took to sweeping the countryside in small bands, living off any small population centres it came across and sporadically attacking convoys in their search for food and weaponry. After nearly fifteen years, neither side had been able to gain an assured advantage in the protracted military struggle.

Linked to this was the imminent collapse of the Mozambican economy and, with it the polity, rendering the continuation of the war by the Government and Renamo all but impossible. The catastrophic economic situation faced by the Government, a product both of the war and its own ill-conceived development policies, meant that the economy was undergoing a serious process of disintegration. The advent of structural adjustment policies had acted to alleviate some of the difficulties, especially for producers of agricultural commodities, but had also exacerbated the divide between the elite and the mass of urban and rural poor. At the same time, the drought sweeping across Southern Africa had, with devastating effect, placed the majority of Mozambicans in danger of starvation. For Renamo, dependent upon the rural population for its sustenance, the shrinking of its traditional sources of support spelled the end for its ability to remain outside of the international humanitarian assistance umbrella.

B. Negotiating an End to the Conflict⁴⁾

Taking the decision to open direct talks was but the first step in a lengthy process of negotiating a peace settlement. In examining this period, three

distinctive phases governing the negotiations in Mozambique can be discerned. The first phase was marked by the instigation of a partial cease fire which collapsed almost immediately in a hail of recriminations. This was followed by a period of obfuscation, characterized by technical difficulties in communications and punctuated by recourse to the military option, all of which was only concluded with the settlement of these issues. The last phase, which opened with the establishment of an agenda for discussions, saw the rapid acceptance of a range of negotiating points and culminated in the signing of the General Peace Agreement formally ending Mozambique's civil war.

The first round of talks, held in July 1990 in Rome under the auspices of the Sant'Edigo community, held a great deal of promise, with both sides issuing a joint statement committing themselves to the search for common ground which would bring about an end to the war. The impetus of this first encounter carried the parties through to a second round in August and a third in November 1990. The November meetings produced a partial cease-fire covering the Beira and Limpopo corridors, the latter linking Zimbabwe to Maputo. In exchange for the cessation of Renamo attacks on these, Zimbabwean troops withdrew to within 1.6 kms of either side of the corridors. The Joint Verification Committee, an internationally staffed commission of experts with representatives from Zimbabwe, Congo, Zambia, Kenya, Portugal, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, Italy, France, the Mozambican government and Renamo, was established to monitor the agreement.

In spite of the partial cease fire agreement, it was made clear at this stage that neither side was prepared to forgo the military option, if only as a bargaining chip in the negotiations. The third round was almost called off unilaterally by Renamo because of a Government offensive against its headquarters at Gorongosa. The Government clearly believed that Renamo could be forced to make concessions at the negotiation table through pressures in the field. Renamo likewise insisted on proving its wrecking capacity throughout the first three rounds of talks, in particular its ability to attack emergency relief convoys, to cause recurrent blackouts in Maputo by severing the power-lines from South Africa, and to hit trains carrying returning Mozambican miners on the Ressano Garcia - Maputo route. And while agreement was reached as the inviolability of the Beira and Limpopo corridors, as a prelude to the fourth round held on 27 January 1991, Renamo took to attacking the Nacala corridor which linked that Mozambican port to Malawi.

Problems also plagued the JVC. The JVC was soon flooded by allegations of violations made by both Renamo and Frelimo. By the middle of 1991, the utility of the JVC was being seriously questioned, as were Renamo's intentions. While Renamo accused Zimbabwean troops of straying beyond the 1.6 km strip on either side of the corridor, the consensus amongst observers was that in the majority of cases the blame for violations lay with Renamo. In addition, throughout January 1991 Renamo stepped up its attacks on the Tete corridor, another vital transport link for both Zimbabwe and Malawi. While not covered by the cease-fire such military actions, Renamo actions were seen to run against the spirit the partial cease fire as well as damaging attempts to extend it across the whole country. Two further round of talks, held in late December 1990 and late January 1991 were also plagued by discord.

The sixth round of talks, scheduled to have started on 8 April 1991, were delayed because Renamo claimed its communications network was not functional. Renamo then demanded a change in the previously agreed agenda, calling for the abolition of SNASP (the secret police), the dissolution of private armies and the repatriation of refugees. Frelimo consented to the first point and SNASP was abolished by ministerial decree while Renamo was eventually persuaded to abandon its two other demands. However, the most important outcome of this round of discussions was the agreement of a forty-five point agenda. While over-ambitious in terms of its scope, nonetheless, the agenda served an important function as it divided the topics for negotiation into political and military issues (formation of a single national army, reintegration of demobilized military personnel, the establishment of political parties, electoral rules and release of political prisoners), and guarantees (formation of a new supervisory cease-fire commission, schedule for the electoral procedure). This lay the foundation for talks to take place around specific bundles of issues rather than along the disparate lines seen to date and was to ultimately take the form of the Protocols of the General Peace Agreement.⁵⁾

The next round of negotiations focused on the newly ratified constitution. Beginning in May, the talks never got past the first item on the agenda, namely the legislation passed by the National Assembly in December 1990 governing the establishment of political parties. According to this legislation, regionalist, secessionist, racially exclusive and religious parties were outlawed, and in order to qualify as a party, organisers were required to present a list of 1,100 supporters, with at least 100 signatures drawn from each of the country's ten provinces. In the same way that it had earlier

rejected the new constitution so it refused to recognise the new laws governing the formation of parties, on the grounds that it had not been consulted⁶⁾. At the next round of talks at the end of May Renamo presented an alternative constitution for discussion, while it also contested the requirements drawn up by Frelimo governing the registration of political parties, which Maputo claimed were aimed at ensuring they would be nationally representative. The eighth round was held in August 1991 where it raised yet another demand - - that a number of key ministries should be taken over by the UN in the period between a cease - fire and elections. This was rejected outright by Frelimo and the talks again ended in an impasse.

Concurrent with the negotiations was the onset of a devastating drought across the country, raising the spectre of wide spread starvation amongst the population. Emerging out of this dire situation was a Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Humanitarian Assistance on 16 July 1991. This was a crucial step for both parties and the international community, as it sanctified the principle of freedom of movement and access to all Mozambican territory by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations in the name of humanitarianism.

With the discussions about the constitution either resolved or set aside, the negotiators could re-commence with the process. It focused on the specific areas identified in the agenda and a breakthrough was not long in forthcoming. At the ninth round of talks, held in October 1991, the first of a series of protocols was signed. With the formal acceptance of Protocol One, Renamo agreed to conduct its struggle by political means in accordance with existing Mozambican legislation once a cease - fire was signed, and in return Frelimo committed itself not to introduce any new laws. At the next round of talks, Protocol Two was signed, detailing the requirements for the establishment and recognition of political parties. Following in rapid succession were the promulgation of Protocol Three outlining the laws governing the election, Protocol Four on military questions, Protocol Five on civilian administration of territory, Protocol Six on the cease - fire and Protocol Seven on the provisions for financing the peace. The entire package of agreements was ratified on 4 October 1992 by Chissano and Dhalkama at a ceremony held in Rome.

The General Peace Agreement was a landmark document in the history of this war - ravaged country. It committed the two contending parties, both of whom had a history of militarism and authoritarianism, to an unprecedented programme of de-militarization and democracy. The involvement of the international community, symbolized by the insertion of

the United Nations into the fulfillment of the terms of the Rome Agreement, marked the culmination of a process of direct international engagement in Mozambican affairs. Henceforth, the burden of maintaining the momentum of the peace process would shift irrevocably into the hands of the international community, especially the United Nations.

2. The Role of the International Community in Fostering Democracy: Implementing the General Peace Agreement

The role of the international community widened from facilitator of the transitional process to, ultimately, assuming responsibility for its successful implementation. With multi-party elections serving as the stated culmination of this transition process, the pressure to ensure that all matters conformed to this end point was to exact a high price on the thorough implementation of some of the key provisions of the General Peace Agreement. At the same time, the problems of conducting elections in an immediate post-conflict situation were themselves compounded by a host of issues, including asymmetry in access to the nascent political system and the difficulties in achieving complete demilitarization of combatants. These placed further constraints upon the UN's ability to fulfil its objectives, in some cases, jeopardizing the outcome of the UN mission itself as well as having implications for the long term sustainability of democracy in Mozambique.

A. The United Nations Mission to Mozambique

The General Peace Agreement called specifically upon the UN to participate in the monitoring of the cease fire, providing humanitarian assistance and monitoring of the elections. It established a time table for the implementation of the major components of the peace agreement full demobilization of both armies by April 1993 and the elections in October 1993.⁷¹

The Government and Renamo to formally establish the Supervising and Monitoring Commission (CSC) as the central authority overseeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement. Chaired by the Special Representative, the CSC was composed of representatives from the Government, Renamo, Italy, Portugal, France, Great Britain and the United States. The CSC's mandate included the settling of disputes between the parties, any question of interpretation of the General Peace Agreement and a

coordinating role for the subsidiary commissions to be established. The CSC created three subordinate commissions to deal directly with the immediate issues surrounding the de-militarization of the conflict, the Cease Fire Commission, the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilizing Military Personnel and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. With the Security Council's passage of Resolution 797 (1992) in December 1992, the United Nations Operation for Mozambique or ONUMOZ was officially launched.

Only a short time after taking up its responsibilities in Maputo, ONUMOZ was beset by the politics of the peace process. The terms of the General Peace Agreement called for the introduction of a UN presence into the country almost immediately.⁸⁾ This proved to be unrealistic, as it took nearly six months for the UN mission to establish itself in the country. Underlying the delay was a combination of intransigence on the part of the parties in Mozambique, the difficulties in obtaining a Status of Forces agreement with the Government and the generally slow pace which seemed to accompany the formation of UN operations of this type.⁹⁾ With ONUMOZ only fully operational in June 1993, the overall time table established in the Rome Agreement (which had called for de-mobilization to be completed in mid-April and the elections to take place in October) was clearly unworkable.

As the election deadline approached, Boutros-Ghali convened an extraordinary summit with the two Mozambican leaders. Held on 17-20 October 1993, the Secretary General used this opportunity to hammer out a series of compromises with the recalcitrant parties. A new time table was drawn up which gave the mission sixteen more months to complete its task. It called for the concentration of troops in the Assembly Areas to begin in September 1993 with full de-mobilization completed in May 1994; the transportation home of de-mobilized soldiers to begin in October 1993 and be completed by April 1994; the new army to be established in May 1994 and fully operational by September 1994; voter registration to commence in April 1994 and be completed in June 1994; the election to take place in October 1994. The continuing concern within both the Security Council and the international donor community as to the slow progress in implementing the General Peace Agreement the Security Council to pass SC Resolution 898 (1994) in February 1994, linking the introduction of over one thousand UN police with a time table for the withdrawal of ONUMOZ on 15 November 1994.¹⁰⁾

The politics of the peace support operation were also a significant factor in the pace of implementation. Both the Government and Renamo found

cause to obfuscate in the CSC on the details or implementation of previously agreed upon programmes, most notably in the areas of de-militarization, de-mining and the election. It was apparent from the outset that Renamo was ill-prepared to engage in the responsibilities incumbent upon it as partner in the peace agreement, from politicking on committee structures to complexities of conducting an election campaign.¹¹⁾ Recognition of this fact led Dhlakama, who insisted upon the receipt of \$15 mn promised in Rome to facilitate the transformation of Renamo from a military organization to a political one, to throw several obstacles in the way of the process. These included a reluctance to take up residence in Maputo, the call for the withdrawal of 65% of foreign soldiers before beginning the concentration of Renamo troops into Assembly Areas and an unwillingness to identify Assembly Areas for the de-mobilization, inspite of the phased introduction of the programme agreed upon at a CSC meeting in January 1993.¹²⁾ Its three month boycott of the CSC and other committees, only ended in June 1993, significantly stalled the peace process.

Another element of the politics of the peace support operation in Mozambique was that of inter-agency relations within ONUMOZ and, indeed, within the institutions of the wider UN system. The bureaucratic wrangling, involving everything from in-fighting over "turf" issues to paralysis over procedures, played a significant part in the character of the mission. Problems stemmed from a range of institutional issues, including the overlap in terms of mandate fueled inter-agency conflict over everything from the securing of lucrative contracts to implementing their provisions; the narrowness of mandates which prevented agencies from fulfilling aspects of the peace process which would seem to logically fall within their purview; institutional prohibitions on working with non-state bodies which was an obstruction to UN action in Renamo areas; and the incompatible bureaucratic procedures in key areas such as accounting, trust fund management and the allocation of resources.

Finally, the relationship between the international donor community and ONUMOZ was one which continued to have an impact on the character of the mission. The Special Representative met regularly with the representatives of key donor countries to discuss aspects of the UN mission. At the same time, the Committee structures created by the General Peace Agreement gave the international donor community an unprecedented and direct role in the conduct, management and policy-making of the country. Their voice increasingly influenced aspects of the peace process, as they - - the financiers of various projects undertaken by ONUMOZ - - scrutinized the

budgetary implications of committee decisions. The conscious linkage between policy-making and budgetary constraints influenced Security Council decisions where the Perm 5 resisted efforts to change the election date a second time, and ultimately obliged Boutros - Ghali to take steps such as linking the introduction of a UN police component with the withdrawal of the UN presence from Mozambique.

ONUMOZ and De - militarization¹⁴⁾

The demilitarization of conflict had been identified as a pre - requisite to both the elections and, more broadly, the long term viability of democracy in Mozambique. ONUMOZ was charged with the structuring and implementation of the de - militarization scheme for the estimated 63,000 Government troops and 20,000 Renamo troops.¹⁴⁾ Through the mechanism of the Cease Fire Commission and the introduction of a large UN peace keeping presence into the country, ONUMOZ was to act as guarantor of the cease fire, the inviolability of the transportation network and assist in aspects of the de - mobilization effort. These measures were to be followed by the implementation of steps to bring about the complete de - militarization of the situation. These included demobilization of all military forces before the elections, the devotion of substantial resources to the process of reintegrating soldiers into society and the creation of a new national army. Oversight of these latter procedures was put in the hands of the ONUMOZ Technical Unit for Demobilization.¹⁵⁾

The first component of the de - militarization programme was to bring in the 7,500 UN peace keeping forces to monitor the withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops. Situated along the transport corridors which cut across the country, ONUMOZ would have to organize a phased pullout of foreign soldiers concurrent with the introduction of UN peace keeping forces. As noted earlier, Renamo's insisted that 65% of the foreign troops be withdrawn before the concentration of troops for de - mobilization could commence. Complicating the situation was the slowness in identifying and consolidating plans for the introduction of UN peace keeping forces. By February 1993, with the deadline for the introduction of UN troops already passed, sixteen countries had agreed to supply the UN with soldiers though no definitive schedule of deployment had been set.¹⁶⁾ The difficulties in securing a Status of Forces Agreement with the Government, which allows UN troops freedom of movement and immunity from local taxation and import duties, was another barrier to the introduction of UN forces.¹⁷⁾ After

much wrangling over this issue, 6,000 peace keepers were finally put into place in August 1993.¹⁸⁾

Linked to the installation of UN peace keeping forces in the country was the monitoring of the cease fire between the Government and Renamo by the CCF. As it transpired, the overwhelming majority of cease fire violations were centred around movement of troops rather than accusations of shooting incidents or attacks. This constant shifting of forces from one location to another, represented each side's anticipation of or a response developments in the peace process, especially with regard to de-mobilization and the forthcoming elections. The separation of forces, a step provided for in the General Peace Agreement, had been in effect abandoned as its implementation would have further stalled the peace process.¹⁹⁾

De-mobilization of Government and Renamo troops occupied the second phase of de-militarization.²⁰⁾ Several factors conspired to make this process very problematic. In the first instance, the actual location of the Assembly Areas, or concentration points, was a source of contention. Both parties sought to retain effective control of territory, thus the selection of Assembly Areas was made on a strategic basis which ignored simple logistical criteria such as proximity to roads and water for re-supply of the camps.²¹⁾ The end result of these delays was that it was not until 30 November 1993 that twenty of the forty-nine Assembly Areas were actually officially opened to receive troops; the other twenty-nine had become operational by February 1994. An additional difficulty was the issue of the Government's para-military forces, something not adequately addressed in the General Peace Agreement. Estimated to number 155,000²²⁾, Government militias were scattered across the rural areas, often only nominally under the authority of district or provincial officials. It was only in January 1994 did they actually begin to disarm with two-thirds of their number de-mobilized by July.²³⁾ Further complications focused around the formation of the new national army. The substantial delay in selecting those soldiers who were to join the new military from those to be de-mobilized, partially a function of Government intransigence and a patent unwillingness on the part of many soldiers continue military service, while the clandestine removal of Renamo's child soldiers, abducted in their hundreds and forcibly incorporated into the guerrilla army, caused more setbacks to the process.²⁴⁾

In spite of achieving only a partial gathering of military forces in the Assembly Areas, it was decided that the first de-mobilizations should take place on 10 March 1994. Up to January 1994, it was the Government provided the bulk of the troops, bringing 8,000 to their Assembly Areas as compared

with Renamo's 4,000.²⁵⁾ However, by mid-March 1994 the balance had shifted with 50% (31,000) of the Government troops and 65% (12,413) of Renamo troops in cantonment, though this still represented only half of the total number of Mozambican troops; by 5 July 84% (41,974) of the Government troops in the Assembly Areas and 90% (17,402) of Renamo troops.²⁶⁾ By August, with the deadline for de-mobilization weeks away, suddenly the prevarication on the part of the Government changed to cooperation: its 8,000 remaining troops were rushed to the Assembly Areas for de-mobilization. With the assembly phase completed on 15 August, the final total of registered soldiers was 64,130 (Government) and 22,637 (Renamo).²⁷⁾ Nonetheless, both sides retained forces outside of the de-mobilization process, approximately 5,000 Government troops and 2,000 Renamo troops, as a hedge against post-electoral crises.

The final stage of de-mobilization, introducing measures for the long term maintenance of the de-mobilized troops, was taken up by UNOHAC. This involved the establishment of the Information and Referral Service (IRS) and the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS). The IRS was conceived as a mechanism for providing de-mobilized soldiers with access to information on the job market as well as basic information on aspects of the reintegration programme. The RSS was to provide de-mobilized soldiers with eighteen months of subsidies in the form of cash disbursements given at local branches of the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento.²⁸⁾ Using a Trust Fund administered by the UNDP, the RSS would provide the ex-soldiers with reasonable assurance of financial support for an extended period of time; during this period, it was hoped that they would find employment in their districts and, concurrently, integrate into the local community. The end result would be to cement the transition from the life of a soldier to that of a civilian. To assist in this process, vocational kits consisting of agricultural tools, seeds, and food rations for up to three months were given to de-mobilized soldiers upon departure from the Assembly Areas.

The establishment of a new national army, the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM), was another area of de-militarization which proved to be contentious. After a delay of several months, 550 soldiers - half from the Government side and the other half from Renamo - were sent to a camp in Nyanga, Zimbabwe, where British officers provided instruction on aspects of military training which the Mozambicans were expected to pass on to their own troops back home. However, continuing acrimony between the two parties, coupled with the slowness in identifying the potential new recruits threatened to paralyze the process. In light of these

developments, the Security Council authorized the Special Representative to take up the chairmanship of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force.

Joint command of the new army was finally agreed upon in January 1994, while eighty top officers were appointed in June to command the newly created infantry battalions. Delays in the supply of new equipment and the renovation of inadequate training facilities, coupled with the prolonged process of identifying new soldiers forced the compression of training into six weeks. By the time the elections had started, less than 10,000 soldiers had completed their training and there was talk of reducing the total numbers in the FADM to 15,000.

ONUMOZ and Elections

The role of the UN in the election process in Mozambique was to resemble its position in other post - conflict electoral situations, that is to say, the UN would monitor both the registration of voters, the conduct of the campaign itself, and the counting of the votes. In this way, it would act as a guarantor of the validity of the elections. As in the Angolan case (and others before it), ONUMOZ would - - along with a host of other institutions such as the Commonwealth and European Union - - provide observers to the election process whose role it was to verify the different aspects of the election process.

The election was to be direct for the office of President for a five year term on the basis of a simple majority (or second ballot if necessary) and indirect for representation to the 250 member National Assembly for a five year term, selected on the basis of proportional representation. The Mozambicans themselves, through the National Election Commission (CNE), would administer all of the logistical components of the election including that of voter education and registration, the establishment of polling stations, and the counting of votes. Establishing a legal framework conducive to electioneering and assuring that all of the officially registered parties had equal access to the media were also among the tasks of the CNE. At the same time, through its position as one of the members of the CNE, ONUMOZ officials were in a position to advise and influence the conduct of this critical final stage to the peace process in the country.

The election in October 1994, the stated culmination of the peace process, was subject to a number of near fatal postponements. In the first instance, the Multi - Party Conference, held in April 1993, was to have been the forum for the discussion and approval of the election law. It collapsed in a hail of

accusations, with Renamo and twelve other parties claiming that the Government had not given them adequate time to study the document.²⁹⁾ Difficulties involving the composition of the various district, provincial and national electoral commissions, as well as the status of overseas voters, stalled further talks. It took the personal intervention of the Secretary General in October 1993 and a subsequent intercession by the Special Representative in December to finally re-start discussions. The Electoral Law was passed by the Mozambican National Assembly in December and took effect in January 1994. The newly established CNE thereafter took up its duties and, with the assistance of foreign experts, began organizing the coming election.

The two party political landscape which dominated the proceedings in Mozambique had, with the advent of the new democratic constitution in 1990 and the General Peace Agreement two years later, devolved into a panoply of seventeen parties purporting to represent a range of interests.³⁰⁾ Old political stalwarts and dissidents such as Domingo Arouca mingled with genuine democrats and outright opportunists to vie for votes and foreign financial assistance. The brevity of the actual election campaign, coupled with the difficulties in accessing the media and financial support, limited the viability of these parties. Concurrently, fixated upon the disaster in Angola and concerned that Renamo would not honour the results of the election, Western governments began to exert pressure upon the Government to accept a government of national unity, much like the successful example of neighbouring South Africa. The American Under Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moose, declared:

Where there's no tradition of a 'loyal opposition', it's crucial to ensure the losers have a continuing stake in the democratic process, or else they will lose faith and start a new form of tyranny.³¹⁾

The Government's resistance to this arrangement, even in the face of the persuasive powers of Nelson Mandela³²⁾, closed off this option.

In spite of its narrowly defined role in the elections, ONUMOZ found itself increasingly involved in the mechanics of fostering democracy. Renamo (though the other emergent parties lay claim to financial resources as well) presented a continuing source of difficulty in its pursuit of adequate finances for the conduct of political activity. Given the UN's commitment to supporting the terms of the Rome Agreement, and in this instance the realization of an election, this meant that it had an interest in seeing Renamo gain access to financial support. This fact was underscored on several occasions when Dhlakama made Renamo's actions in fulfillment of the terms

of the General Peace Agreement conditional upon obtaining funds for his organization. It took Ajello's personal intervention with the international donor community to stave off the series of crises engendered by this issue.

Though voter registration did not commence until 1 June, afflicted by the delays hampering the whole electoral process, the response on the part of the Mozambican people was overwhelming with over 5.2 million persons registering to vote.³³⁾ The election campaign, which officially started on 22 September, was conducted in an atmosphere of growing tension, deliberately nurtured by Renamo's declaration that it would view anything less than victory in key central provinces as a sure sign of electoral tampering; at the same time, contradicting himself, Dhlakama indicated on several occasions that he would respect the results of the election.³⁴⁾ In mid-October 1,200 UN election observers were brought into the country and, under the guidance of the Technical Unit (which had been seconded to organize the logistics of election monitoring), were placed across the country. Despite a scare on the eve of the elections, when Dhlakama temporarily pulled his party out of the process claiming fraud, the elections themselves ran smoothly. With approximately 85% of the electorate participating, Chissano was elected President with 53% of the vote against Dhlakama's 33% while Frelimo won 129 of the 250 seats in the National Assembly and Renamo gained 112.³⁵⁾ None of the smaller parties broke the requisite 5% ceiling set by the constitution to obtain a place in the National Assembly. Despite continuing objections from Renamo leadership, blunted by the international community's acceptance of the results and Renamo's inability to return to all-out warfare, the end of the long journey to peace seemed at last to have been realized.

3. Sustaining Democracy in Mozambique

While elections signalled the formal termination of the transition to democracy, the long term viability of democracy in Mozambique is dependent upon the successful application of the concept of nation-building. Central to this process is the construction of the key elements of a democratic polity, including the establishment of a multi-party system, a vibrant civil society, an independent judiciary, complete demilitarization of the country, and, underlying all of this, economic prosperity. The record of the Mozambican polity in the year following the historic 1994 election in these areas is mixed, with successes in certain sectors and failures in others.

A. Multi - party Democracy

As in any country emerging from a traumatic period of conflict, the economic climate is hostage to the political situation. In this regard Mozambique is no exception and, for this reason, Chissano's unwillingness to give Renamo governorships or significant positions in any of the five provinces in which it won a majority of votes is a continuing source of controversy. Both the United States and the European Union have criticized the President for his stance, suggesting that some of the political crises facing the new state would have been averted had Dhlakama had a greater public role. At the same time, the state has yet to allocate the resources necessary to assure the independence of the legislature and the judiciary. The establishment of what has been characterized as a "crisis cabinet" - - composed of old Frelimo stalwarts and ex - military officials (such as the former Minister of Defence Alberto Chipande) - - which seems to wield effective power in the new government is for some an indication that Frelimo will try to continue to rule the country on its own.³⁶⁾

Uncertainty still surrounds the position of Renamo under the new dispensation. Dhlakama has to date resisted government's offers of a substantial (by Mozambican standards) salary and official perks, while continuing to call upon Chissano to recognize his status as official Leader of the Opposition, a position which would give him the right to address the parliament.³⁷⁾ At Renamo's first post - election conference in February 1995, the paucity of trained officials was made apparent as senior figures moved into parliament only to be replaced by lesser qualified personnel. Renamo itself is in some measure of disarray, partially a function of the Frelimo government's strategy of denying it access to sources of authority while concurrently attempting to divide the leadership from its support base. Renamo's blatant pleas for funding, calling alternatively for foreign support or a share of government revenues, overshadowed any attempt to define a post - election programme which would signal its relevance to contemporary Mozambican politics.

B. Civil Society

The roots of civil society in Mozambique had never been given an opportunity to take hold. From the Portuguese era to the Frelimo period, those non - state actors which give both depth and vibrancy to a society's political culture were consistently discouraged through stringent application

of legal and political measures. The opening of Mozambican political life, responding to both the pressures within the society and emulating the changes sweeping much of the socialist world, marked a turning point for elements of civil society. At the same time, the establishment of a suitable climate for the development of a genuine civil society to develop is itself jeopardized by the economic difficulties plaguing the country.

Of the indigenous elements of civil society in Mozambique, the most developed are the religious institutions, specifically the Catholic Church and the Muslim community. The role of these institutions was most strongly felt in the period of highest repression, that is between 1975 and 1990. It was the Catholic Church, through its international links, which was able to use its contacts with both the Government and Renamo to encourage and support the negotiated settlement. In the post-election period, these institutions are increasingly looked to for social support in the form of charity as well as centres for training and education. The prestige which accrued to individuals such as the Archbishop of Beira, a figure instrumental to the negotiations, allows the Church to play a role in the politics of Mozambique which can serve as a legitimated alternative to the established political parties.

The creation of an independent media is another element crucial to the development of a healthy civil society. In the Mozambican case, after an extensive discussion on the role of the Government in broadcasting during the public debate on the constitution in 1990, reluctantly gave up its control over the printed press. This allowed, for the first time in Mozambican history, the sustained development of alternative news sources, such as the weeklies MediaFax, Imparcial and Savana. However, its control of the electronic media remains firm and there are no significant efforts being made to change the situation.

Finally, with respect to the development of civil society, the role of foreign Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) has been crucial as a source of finance, training and overall support. From the onset of Scandinavian assistance to solidary networks in a range of Western countries, the presence and influence of the NGO community has shaped both the experiences of local NGOs and the wider Mozambican community. NGOs represent an alternative foreign policy to that of their government's, more often than not one which is ideologically motivated and centred on people to people assistance rather than direct financial transfers. In this context, NGO personnel have developed an acute knowledge of local conditions in the country. Given the country's low level of development, the impact of these institutions has been strong, at times out of proportion to the government's

own programmes and institutions in the fulfilment of its developmental agenda. This trend was exacerbated by the triple legacies of the civil war, the imposition of socialist economic policies and a series of natural disasters.

C. Independent Judiciary

The establishment of an independent judiciary is one of the most neglected elements in the transition to democracy. While enshrined in the 1990 constitution, the selection of the judiciary remains the prerogative of the Government of the day and there have been few positive signs that this pillar of democratic government is being given the requisite support for it to function on a fully independent basis. Exacerbating the situation is the absence of a coherent, codified legal system which takes into account the current conditions presiding in the country. Rather, the judiciary must contend with a hodge-podge of laws dating from the colonial era, the socialist era and the transitional period. The attendant confusion is yet another impediment to the development of the rule of law in Mozambique.

D. Demilitarization

Demilitarization of Mozambique is one of the keys to completing the transition away from conflict. The longer term components of the demilitarization programme are experiencing problems, though these still remain within the parameters of manageability. The government's bid for direct control over the foreign-funded subsidiary package for ex-soldiers, allegedly as a means of courting the veterans' vote in the forthcoming local elections, was blocked by the international donor community.³⁸⁾ At the same time, the fund itself is short US \$4.29mn, owing to the unexpected numbers of soldiers choosing to demobilize rather than stay in the army.³⁹⁾ The formation of an association for demobilized soldiers actively petitioning for issues concerning ex-combatants presents an interesting case of emergent civil society which could, paradoxically, work against the very reintegration goals of the UN's demobilization programme. Adding to the government's woes is the problem of dissent within the military. Three major mutinies have occurred in 1995, one in the heart of Maputo itself at the Escolar Militar, provoking responses ranging from government payouts to police shootouts. Complaining of their low salaries and poor living conditions, soldiers have taken hostages and fired on passersby. Threatened by a march on parliament in April this year, the government was forced to deploy its special forces to

thwart further attacks. Complicating the situation, former Renamo officers in the new army have voiced concern over their isolation from army decisions and threatened to withdrawal altogether from the FADM. Finally, with the FADM still short of its new target of 15,000 personnel, the government has launched a recruitment drive to make up the short fall.

Outside of dissension in the military and amongst demobilized soldiers, violence and criminality have risen in post-election Mozambique. Over a hundred undeclared arms caches have been discovered containing 22,000 functioning weapons; if the proliferation in illegal arms transactions in neighbouring South Africa is any indication, there remain vast quantities of weapons still available in Mozambique.⁴⁰⁾ Symptomatic of this break down in the recently achieved law and order, even the new Chief of the General Staff, Lagios Lidimo, was shot by car thieves while driving in Maputo.⁴¹⁾ A police assault on Renamo officials in Tete underscored both the lack of reconciliation between Frelimo era figures and concurrent problems with the ill-disciplined police force. Responding to a growing chorus of criticism, the Minister of the Interior recently fired 98 policemen and announced the establishment of a three year training programme for the police funded by the French government aimed at instilling professionalism in the force.⁴²⁾ Nevertheless, the proliferation of small arms both within Mozambique and across the region continue to contribute to rising crime, posing a constant danger to peace and stability.

E. Economic Prosperity

The signing of the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa, coupled with the subsequent changes in official government policy called for by the Fourth Party Congress, were watershed events in the country's relationship with international financial community. With the blessing of leading Western powers, especially the United States, Britain and France, Mozambique was able to open negotiations with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund for provisions of assistance in ameliorating its economic crisis. The result was the establishment in 1987 of the Economic Rehabilitation Programme (or PRE) which provided the institutional and policy environment for the transition away from a socialist economy to that of a market economy. Underpinning this programme was a series of semi-annual donor's conferences in which Mozambique's progress was scrutinized by the international financial community.

Addressing a conference this year, President Joaquim Chissano

declared: "We cannot have sustainable government if there is no economic base."⁴³⁾ The economic situation in the country remains crucial to the overall stability of the political and social environment. While overall figures on the government's Programme for Economic and Social Recovery give the impression of a robust economy (GDP grew 19.2 per cent in 1993), the rising rate of inflation, pegged at over 70 per cent annually in 1994, and the estimated 65 per cent unemployment figure belies such an optimistic perspective.⁴⁴⁾ The level of abject physical destruction in the country, from roads and buildings to farmland and industry, and the virtual absence of an educated or trained population, provides a further caution. At the same time, some developments augur well for Mozambique's long term revival. The utilization of the transport corridors and ports, especially Beira, by land-locked countries has increased measurably since the signing of the GPA. In 1994, over 50 per cent of Zimbabwe's containered exports went through the relatively inexpensive port at Beira (as opposed to South African ports), though it was clear to foreign trade officials and businessmen that both the capacity of the port facilities needed further upgrading and the problem of "on route" tolls needed to be addressed.⁴⁵⁾ The revival of Beira would firmly re-establish a commercial and industrial hub that could serve as base for development in the central provinces.

The fostering of these conditions depends, at least in the short and medium term, on the level and direction of foreign assistance to Mozambique. At the same time, as the world's most aid dependent state, Mozambique must exercise tremendous caution in designing, and approving development plans.⁴⁶⁾ One of the key sources of future revenue for the government is the sale of power from the crippled Cahora Bassa hydro-electric project in Tete province. To this end, the European Investment Bank and European Development Fund have pledged ECU40mn and ECU20mn respectively to rehabilitate Cahora Bassa.⁴⁷⁾ The development of the natural gas fields at Pande in Inhambane province is another area capturing foreign attention. At the World Bank Consultative Group meeting in March 1995, US\$780mn was pledged (excluding debt relief) to assist Mozambican development. The Mozambican Finance Minister, in keeping with the prevalent international financial practice, outlined an austerity programme which took further aim at government spending and called for further privatization of parastatal concerns such as the Moatize coal fields. Included in the new budget was a 37 per cent reduction in military spending, bringing it to 1.6 per cent of total GDP (though overall spending on security is one quarter of the total budget), while education and health were increased by

twenty-two and forty-four per cent respectively.⁴⁸⁾ Mozambique's battered transport network will receive a boost in the form of US \$100mn to repair 10,000 kilometres of road.⁴⁹⁾

Another important component of economic rehabilitation is the encouragement of foreign direct investment in the country. Mozambique has experienced significant gains in this area, with foreign direct investment rocketing to US \$16.5mn in 1994, three times the total in the previous year. Significantly, Portuguese interests have eclipsed South African and British foreign direct investment in 1994, buying up the majority of newly privatized government concerns. The recent establishment of the Maputo Corridor, a multi-million dollar investment project to rehabilitate and expand the transportation linkages between South Africa and Mozambique, promises to bring the most substantial investment to date.⁵⁰⁾ Related to this phenomenon is the growing attention given to agriculture. The Natal and Transvaal Agricultural Unions, as well as an Italian-South African association, have conducted talks with the Mozambican government over farming opportunities in Mozambique. Spurred on by fears of land reform in South Africa (as well as a dislike for the ANC), the white farmers and their leader General Constant Viljoen have signed an agreement with Maputo to open up farm land to white interests in the Save region. This has been coupled to a US\$16mn South African initiative, backed by the SANDF and the private company Mechen, to begin demining the potential farmland for which 2,000 South African farmers have applied.⁵¹⁾

At the heart of the land issue lies the contentious matter of tenure. For the vast majority of Mozambicans, some form of subsistence agriculture remains the single most prevalent occupation. Dispossessed under colonialism, forced to collectivize under socialism, driven from the land by famine and war, the Mozambican peasant appears on the brink of becoming marginalized yet again. Despite the promulgation of laws guaranteeing entitlement to small holders, the last few years have been witness to a massive sell-off of natural resources which took no account of legality. According to an authoritative study, by May 1994 40mn hectares of land - - representing more than half of Mozambique's total land area - - had been granted on a concessional basis or had been outright sold to foreign interests.⁵²⁾ Aggravating the problem is confusion over entitlement to the land stemming from counter-claims originating in the colonial era, independence and during the war itself. Financial and administrative mismanagement at the provincial and district level, as well as rampant corruption amongst government officials, have contributed to this firesale of

Mozambican resources.⁵³⁾ The creation of a landless peasantry is a potentially explosive development for the new democratic state.

4. Conclusion

In the end, for democracy to survive in Mozambique, *peace building*, the transition point between peace keeping and development, must move from its preliminary stages concerned with demilitarization and elections to the long term dimensions of economic rehabilitation, the cultivation of a vibrant civil society and other nation-building activities.⁵⁴⁾ The willingness of the international community to support this transition, through selective financial assistance, foreign investment, institutional support and capacity building both inside the government and the wider society, will have a determining influence on the success of the new dispensation. Balanced against role this is the corrosive impact on Mozambican sovereignty caused by its dependency on international assistance and, increasingly, the state's indiscriminant pandering to the interests of foreign capital at the expense of its citizens.

As for the reconciliation between Frelimo and Renamo, whether through a genuine commitment to peace or through sheer exhaustion, it may prove to be easier to achieve than building the economic and social base of the nation. Armed banditry, borne of hunger, unemployment and habit, threaten the new democratic dispensation in the same way that civil war once brought the old government to its knees. The inability of the nascent legal system to enforce existing statutory legislation on land tenure, coupled with the phenomenon of a dispossessed peasantry, is in itself alarming. Coupled with the monumental social problems of the reintegration of ex-soldiers, the unregulated circulation of weaponry and the return of over a million refugees, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the criminal violence of today - - mediated through growing social disaffection - - could well end up as the political violence of tomorrow. For the time being, the government can rightly claim the legitimacy bestowed upon it by the 1994 elections. Whether it retains the loyalty of its newly enfranchised citizenry remains to be seen.

ENDNOTES

- 1) *Weekly Mail/ Guardian*, 21 - 27 October 1994.
- 2) See Alex Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique* (London: James Currey 1991).
- 3) The Gersony Report systematically detailed, on the basis of interviews with refugees, numerous cases of Renamo's brutal treatment of the civilian population.
- 4) This section draws substantially on the work of American diplomat Cameron Hume, whose account of the negotiations is the most thorough - going one available. Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace 1994).
- 5) See the *General Peace Agreement 1992* (Amsterdam: AWEPA/African - European Institute 1992).
- 6) This was in spite of the fact that Chissano had made it clear that all Renamo had to do was register as a political party, elect representatives to the assembly and propose any changes it saw fit.
- 7) For an outline of the timetable see Protocol Four, Protocol Five, Protocol Six, *General Peace Agreement 1992* (Amsterdam: African - European Institute 1992), pp.34 - 36, 42 - 44, 48 - 50, 56 - 64.
- 8) See the *General Peace Agreement 1992* (Amsterdam: AWEPA/African - European Institute 1992).
- 9) Thus, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the transport corridors, a pre - condition in the entire de - militarization process, did not take effect until 15 April 1993.
- 10) This withdrawal date was echoed in SC Resolution 916 (1994) passed on 5 May 1994.
- 11) Renamo sent forty - five of its officials to a month - long seminar at its headquarters in Maringue in March 1993. AWEPA, *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, May 1993, No.3, p.1.
- 12) "Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effort," *Africa Recovery*, December 1992 - February 1993, p.26.
- 13) For a more thorough account see Chris Alden, "Swords into Ploughshares? The United Nations and Demilitarization in Mozambique," *International Peacekeeping* vol.2: 2, Summer 1995, pp175 - 193.
- 14) UNOHAC, "Repatriation of Demobilized Soldiers," *Mozambique*

- Report*, June 1993, p.1.
- 15) Underlying the decisions surrounding the structure of the demilitarization programme was the recent UN experience in Angola. See Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," *Journal of Modern African Studies* vol 33: 1, pp 103-128.
 - 16) "Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effort," *Africa Recovery*, December 1992 - February 1993, p.26.
 - 17) It was alleged that the Government was reluctant to lose the estimated \$1 mn a day it collected from the UN as well as an unwillingness to have ONUMOZ monitor its troop movements. *Africa Confidential*, 14 May 1993, vol 34: 10, p.8.
 - 18) *Keeping the Peace or Disturbing It: UN Humanitarian Military Intervention in Mozambique*, case study prepared September 1993, p.4.
 - 19) Interview with Ton Pardoel, Chief Technical Unit Officer, 26 May 1994.
 - 20) The Technical Unit received approval to assist in the demobilization of 13,765 Government soldiers already scheduled under the previous plan; this proved to be a valuable dress-rehearsal for ONUMOZ.
 - 21) UNOHAC, "Demobilization Update," *Mozambique Report*, August 1993, p.6. For example, the site of the Nhamagua Assembly Area was not near any potable water.
 - 22) Interview with Colonel Pier Segala, Cease Fire Commission, 14 September 1994. Segala estimated that the Renamo militia consisted of 2 or 3 thousand soldiers.
 - 23) Renamo officials were particularly concerned about the Government's expanding Rapid Intervention Force which, like its Angolan counterpart, included numerous ex-soldiers.
 - 24) *Sunday Times* (UK), 6 November 1994. Only 3,632 child soldiers were in fact discovered at the Renamo bases, though it was clear to UN military observers that numerous Renamo soldiers were only just above the internationally sanctioned age of fifteen.
 - 25) *Africa Confidential*, 7 January 1994, vol 35: 1, p.5.
 - 26) *Africa Confidential*, 18 March 1994, vol 35: 6, pp.6-7; AWEPA, *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, July 1994, No.10, p.2.
 - 27) *Africa Confidential*, 23 September 1994, vol 35: 19, pp.3-4.
 - 28) Each Government and Renamo soldier is to receive six months of their regular salary plus bonuses (with a minimum of 75,000 meticaís) from the Government, with half of that given to them at the point of official demobilization and half given to them in the district of resettlement. Upon completion of the Government subsidy programme, the UNDP will

provide a further twelve months of support.

- 29) The twelve parties, outsiders to the negotiations and its elaborate structures, demanded financial support for themselves. "Dicing with Democracy," *Africa: South and East*, June 1993, p.11.
- 30) Interestingly, in preparation for the election Chissano made changes to the ethnic composition of the Government, which Renamo had always criticized as dominated by Shangaan, to broaden its appeal with the Mozambican people. *Africa Confidential*, 18 March 1994, vol 35: 6, p.7.
- 31) AWEPEAA, *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, August 1993, No.5, p.4.
- 32) Mandela visited Maputo in August 1994 and, at the request of Boutros-Ghali, tried (and failed) to convince Chissano to accept the Government of National Unity formulation.
- 33) *Africa Confidential*, 23 September 1994, vol 35: 19, p.3.
- 34) *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 21 - 27 October 1994.
- 35) *Washington Post*, 11 November 1994.
- 36) *Indian Ocean Newsletter* no.654, 14 January 1995.
- 37) Having run for the executive position, Dhlakama is not eligible to sit as a Renamo MP.
- 38) *Indian Ocean Newsletter* no.665, 1 April 1995. It is alleged that the government wanted control of these funds as a means of wielding patronage over the ex - soldiers in advance of the local elections.
- 39) US \$31.9mn is required for the Trust Fund, of which US \$8.9mn has been received and US \$27.6mn has been pledged by the donor community. AWEPEAA, *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, February 1995.
- 40) *Africa Recovery*, December 1994, p.14.
- 41) *Africa Confidential* 36: 8, 14 April 1995.
- 42) Radio Maputo 12 May 1995.
- 43) *Facts and Reports* 25: J, 26 May 1995.
- 44) Hans Abrahamsson and Anders Nilsson, *Mozambique: The Troubled Transition* (London: Zed 1995), pp.116 - 117; Minister of Labour, Mozambican Television, 13 January 1995.
- 45) *Indian Ocean Newsletter* no.654, 14 January 1995.
- 46) Abrahamsson and Nilsson, op.cit., pp. 131 - 146.
- 47) *Indian Ocean Newsletter* no.674, 3 June 1995.
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