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# Part II. Case Studies in the Middle East and Central Asia: who move, who retreat? : 9. The 1991 Intifadah in Iraq: Seen through Analyses of the Discourses of Iraqi Intellectuals



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# 9. THE 1991 *INTIFĀḌAH* IN IRAQ

## SEEN THROUGH ANALYSES OF THE DISCOURSES OF IRAQI INTELLECTUALS

Keiko SAKAI

Until the outbreak of the Gulf War, social conflicts in Iraq were principally classified into the type led by certain ideological political organisations; popular uprisings in the 1950s were mainly led by Iraqi Communist Party, which enjoyed wide popularity at the time and had various social support bases, regardless of the ethnic, religious, and sectarian complexity of Iraqi society. In Kurdistan, Kurdish nationalism or ethnic consciousness has been driving force behind socio-political conflicts with the central government. Later, Islamism appeared among several insurrections, taking the form of religious processions, which erupted as reflections of social grievances among Shiite *'ulamā'* and poor peasants in the holy cities.

The 1991 Uprising (*intifāḍah*) that broke out after the Gulf War was different in nature from the earlier social conflicts on the following points; (1) the territorial width and geographical spread of the movement; (2) the lack of any unified leadership or leading political ideologies, especially in the south; and (3) the variety of the social strata of the participants. The number of casualties was also unprecedented; it is reported that more than 100,000 people were killed in this *intifāḍah*, i.e., double that in the Gulf War.[1]

In this chapter I would like to elucidate the political and social significance of the 1991 *intifāḍah* from the following points of view. Firstly, should it be understood as the result of a mass mobilisation led by existing political forces, or as an unexpected aggregation behaviour far removed from these socio-political organisations (i.e., continuity or discontinuity with social movements)? Secondly, what was the main purpose of the

*intifāḍah*? Did the participants share common aims and targets in imagining a future society in Iraq (i.e., the presence or absence of the ideation of a collective identity to sustain the movement)? Thirdly, did ideological organisations play a role in overcoming social cleavages, or in intensifying them (i.e., distance between the ideas of the movements and their actual fields of actions)? Lastly, to what do the actors in the movements ascribe the failure of the *intifāḍah*? In other words, what do they consider to have been the obstacle to the development of a shared consciousness in the national integrity in Iraq?

In order to answer these questions, I will analyse the discourses of various Iraqi opposition forces, either organisations or individuals, and through them will clarify the differences in the interpretations of the *intifāḍah* according to the political stance of the opposition force. It is not my aim to discover who draws the most correct picture of the *intifāḍah*, but rather to highlight the variety of these forces, which originates from the diversity of their understandings of Iraqi society, and of the impact of Ba'thi rule upon it. That is why I focus especially on the movements in the southern part of Iraq, where it is often said that a majority of the population is Shiite. Interpreting the movements in the north is rather simple: there is no doubt that they were led by the Kurdish "nationalist" groups. Movements in the south were dissimilar to them, and more complex in their motivations and methods of mobilisation.

## What Happened in March 1991 in Southern Iraq?

First of all, I will present a general outline of what happened in March 1991. It was on the 1st of March that the first war cry was heard in the southern part of Iraq. A correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in Safwan reported that an Iraqi tank, which had withdrawn from Kuwait after the cease-fire, fired shells through a huge portrait of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn in Basra. The uprising spread easily and swiftly through that governorate, then spread to neighbouring areas, such as Dhī Qār (Nāṣirīyah), Maysān ('Amārah), and Muthannah (Samāwah) on the next day. On the third or fourth day, the uprising reached two of the holy cities, al-Najaf and Karbalā'. Within a week, eight governorates, all south of Baghdad, fell under the control of the rebels. On the fourth day, the Kurds also started to rise up against the regime, but here I will concentrate on what happened in the southern region only. Some sources confirm that demonstrations and clashes against the authorities also occurred in some parts of Baghdad (al-Thawrah, Shu'alah, and Kāẓimīyah).

The central government launched oppressive military actions against the revolts a week after the uprising began, but only after ten days or more did it intensify the attack against the rebels with tanks and heavy air raids. Some opposition groups announced that government forces had used napalm bombs. Cockburn points out that a request for assistance by Āyāt Allāh al-Khū'i and his son was refused by the United States on the 11th of March, and that this gave the regime a green light for extensive military operations against the rebels.[2] On March 15th, the government officially admitted that there had been "riots" in al-Najaf, Karbalā', Bābil and other places, and on the following day Ṣaddām Ḥusayn declared that he had crushed the "mobs." All the Iraqi newspapers started to publish pictures of the destruction, and interviews with local people.

During the military operation, the regime tried to manipulate Islamic *'ulamā'* into issuing *fatwā* ordering the people not to join in the uprising, and it captured Āyāt Allāh al-Khū'i,[3] and took him to Baghdad with his son on the 20th. On the second day of the rebellion, Sayyid Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr had also been arrested and was forced to withdraw his comments supporting the *intifāḍah*.[4] This treatment also greatly dampened the uprising, and the movements diminished day by day, though there were continued reports of minor uprisings until the first half of April. Negotiations between Kurdish nationalist forces (i.e., Bārzānī's KDP and Ṭālabānī's PUK) and the regime, which started publicly on the 22nd of April, came as a fatal blow to those who participated in the uprising, and it was almost completely crushed.

## How Do the Political Actors Perceive *Intifāḍah*?

To assess the role of the political parties in the *intifāḍah*, I would like here to analyse the discourses of the major opposition organisations that are believed to have been involved in it in some way. I will shed light especially on the Islamic political parties such as SCIRI (Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq), al-Da'wah Party, and Islamic Action Organisation ('Amal), as well as the Iraqi Communist Party, which are said to be only opposition actors that maintain cells inside Iraq to certain extent. Through this analysis, we may evaluate how these opposition forces recognised the continuity and discontinuity between their previous movements and the *intifāḍah*. In other words, I will present the opposition forces' attempts to categorise the *intifāḍah* in the framework of their own political ideologies and strategies through *ex post facto* interpretations and definitions.

*Common Recognition*

Most of the opposition forces admit that there were anarchical and irrational elements to the *intifāḍah*. Islamists and Communists agree that the *intifāḍah* burst out accidentally and coincidentally. The government underlined this anarchical aspect of the phenomenon and described the *intifāḍah* as riots (*fitnah*) by mobs (*ghawghā'*), which were mobilised by "agents of the foreign powers." "Foreign powers" here obviously means Iran, and possibly the United States.

In contrast to the government's effort to minimise the political impact of the *intifāḍah*, the opposition forces emphasise the existence of clear motivations and aims among the participants. These opposition groups claim that the aim of the *intifāḍah* was to overthrow the regime, and ascribe the reasons for its eruption to the accumulated grievances of the people against the regime's long and harsh oppression, and to the desperate atmosphere caused by the complete defeat in the Gulf War. They noted that it had spread to most of the territory of Iraq, with the exception of several governorates in the central area. They observed that all members of all types of social groups took part in the *intifāḍah*, regardless of ethnic, religious, sectarian, and social differences. Among them, discontented youth were the driving force of the movements. The opposition forces also agreed on the use of the term *intifāḍah*, which implies a kind of civil resistance movement, especially suggesting a parallel to the Palestinian *intifāḍah* in the late 1980s.[5]

They agreed that the main targets of the attacks had been branch buildings of the Ba'th party, security and police offices, as well as prisons (in order to set political criminals free). It was also agreed that the *intifāḍah* failed because of the lack of unified leadership, organisational co-ordination, and effective methods of communications between cities, as well as because of the huge gap in military capacity between the regime and the rebels. They also blamed the absence of international support, though they denied foreign influence, both from the Unites States and from Iran.

Essentially, both the Communists and Islamists shared the opinion that the change in the political opportunities for Iraqi social movements—the isolation of the regime from international society, the defeat in the Gulf War, and the relative decline of the military and security forces' ability to oppress opposition—was the primary reason behind the emergence of the *intifāḍah*. With regard to the mobilisation structures and framing process, which McAdams sees as the main factors for social movements as well as political opportunities,[6] the different opposition forces disagree on various

points. In the next section, I will clarify the aspects upon which they disagree.

*Differences of Perceptions*
First, I will examine the discourses of the Islamists, who emphasise the presence of the mobilisation organisations and the significance of religion in the framing process of the *intifāḍah*. Both members of the current organisations as individuals emphasise the role of the regional leadership groups founded in the "liberated" areas. Al-'Ajulī, for example, points out that revolutionary executive committees have been established for various purposes such as military affairs, economy, public relations, finance and security in al-Najaf "in order to raise popular consciousness on politics and Jihad".[7] As it is a less political organisation, many of the observers noted the presence of administrative institutions founded in accordance with the *fatwā* issued by Āyāt Allāh al-Khū'i in al-Najaf. Some Islamists also emphasised the preparation and co-ordination of collective actions for the uprising in the Marsh area, where small bands of Islamists opposition forces and army deserters had been continuously trained since the beginning of the Iraq-Iran War. They claimed that it was they who actually started the *intifāḍah*.[8] This emphasis on the importance of these preparatory activities in the Marshes flavours the Islamists' discourse, so that they give a slightly different version of the story of the beginning of the *intifāḍah*. According to them, the uprising in the Marshes preceded an unplanned shot against Ṣaddām's portrait, which is widely believed to have been the trigger of the uprising.[9]

Secondly, Islamists take it for granted that Islamic slogans are recognised as a common moral force. They emphasised the significance of hoisting the green flag in the liberated areas,[10] and of the slogan "Allāh Akbar". Other Islamic terms used for the revolutionary establishments were also positively valued, including some which obviously showed Shiite traits, such as "the revolution of Imam Ḥusayn" and "there is no *wālī* other than (Imām) 'Alī".[11] The slogans often went as far as to indicate a certain political ideology, such as "for Shahīd Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr"[12] and "not East nor West, but Islamic revolution".[13] The names of Āyāt Allāh Khomeini and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm, the chairmen of the SCIRI, were also referred to. Clandestine broadcasting started under the name of "the Voice of the Islamic Revolution."

In a word, the Islamists understand that the movements in the *intifāḍah*, though lacking specific leading organisations at the beginning, produced institutions for administration in the "liberated" areas, under a

shared understanding of Islamic meanings and definitions and of collective Islamic identity among the participants.

In contrast, the Communists denounced the Islamists for their establishment of Iranian-style revolutionary committees in the "liberated" areas, which they believed clearly hinted at an intention to establish an Islamic state. The Communists insisted that local leadership organisations should have been jointly led by coalitions of the opposition.[14] Islamic slogans were also targets of the condemnation of Communists, who claimed that they had limited the sphere of the *intifāḍah* not only to Shiite society but even to certain ideological groups.[15] The Islamists' propaganda, they said, instilled fear in people both inside and outside of Iraq, and it was Ṣaddām himself who made the most use of it. The Communists claimed that their shared identity was of being an Iraqi nation (*waṭanī*), not an Arab nation (*qawmī*) or an Islamic one. Fāliḥ 'Abd al-Jabbār, a leftist intellectual, argues that since the Gulf War, *waṭanīyah* has developed among the people's *ummah* (community) outside of the official nationalism of *qawmīyah*, and the *intifāḍah* was the first occasion where the *ummah* was able to clearly distinguish the two.[16]

As for the controversy on the framing process, however, even among the Islamists there was criticism that the slogans had been used as an excuse for the regime to escalate its sectarian policy, and not as a moral force for the participants. According to Nawwār, Maḥmūd al-Hāshimī, ex-chairman of the SCIRI, expressed self criticism on the excessive involvement of Iran, and on the fact that the slogans had gone too far.[17] Sa'd Jabr, who is not an Islamist but a pro-West liberal and the son of a respected Shiite politician under the Monarchy, claims that it was the regime that raised the poster of Bāqir al-Ḥakīm and Khomeini in order to damage the popularity of the movements.[18]

### *Sectarian Cleavages?*

With regard to the significance of slogans in creating collective identity among movement participants, Oberschall, in analysing the social movements in socialist Eastern Europe in 1989, argues that "without the grassroots organisation and access to the news media, the opposition groups could do this only by appealing to a shared culture of national symbols that the Communists (i.e., the regimes) had tried to suppress in the last forty years".[19] He pointed out that demonstrations in Eastern Europe raised slogans claiming "we are the people" in the end of the 1980s, and the comprehensiveness of this slogan attracted various social classes, until inducing cracks among the ruling class.

In the case of the *intifāḍah* in Iraq, slogans could not play the major role that they did in Eastern Europe. Rather they acted as an impediment, as the Communists argue, to unifying the movements. On this point, some Western scholars underline the social cleavages within the sectarian differences in explaining the reason for the failure of the *intifāḍah*.[20] It is true that the movements did not penetrate the two Sunni governorates of Anbār and Ṣalāh al-Dīn, which gives the appearance of a gap among the political interests of the sectarian groups.

These two governorates, however, must be understood as the birthplaces of several high officials of the regime (al-Tikrītīs and al-Dūrīs) as well as of the Republican Guards (al-Jubūrīs, al-Dulaymīs, et. al.), rather than as merely Sunni-populated area. There are reports that the Sunni population stood up against the regime in Ramādī, Ba'qūbah and other areas.[21] Most of the Iraqi opposition forces reject the sectarian explanation, insisting that the *intifāḍah* failed to reach Baghdad and other central area because of the concentration of the armed forces represented by the Republican Guard, and of the high security in these areas. They stress that it was the ideological meanings carried by the religious that hindered the expansion of the movements. In other words, the legitimacy prepared by the Islamists, which included the establishment of an Islamic state and Islamic revolution, was not shared by the whole nation because of its ideological characteristics.

## Confusion Over the Collective Action Frames

### *Destruction of the Symbols*

What was, then, the common national consciousness shared by the participants in the *intifāḍah*? There was no other obvious crystallisation of an alternative collective identity in the movements. Instead, what some scholars emphasise as a common motivation in the *intifāḍah* was an attempt to abolish all the existing symbols of the present regime. It is symbolic that the *intifāḍah* began with a shot fired by an unknown tank commander against a portrait of Ṣaddām in Basra. The "shooting of Ṣaddām's portrait" became a kind of legend of the beginning of the *intifāḍah;* similar versions are reported in Zubayr[22] and other places.[23] This legend suggests that the psychological power under the present regime had broken down, that the "barrier of fear had collapsed." Most of the opposition forces consider this to be a positive result of the *intifāḍah,* together with the demolition of symbols of the domination of the regime. It was reported that even traffic lights were destroyed, as they were seen as symbols of tyranny.

In this "destruction of symbols," attempts were made to distinguish "us" and "them" along the cleavage line between "the regime" and "the opposition," and not along sectarian or ethnic lines. The destruction, however, was not directed against the center of the regime, located in Baghdad, but rather was mainly targeted at the enemy within their communities. Cockburn points out that the "deserters (from the Army) preferred to concentrate on lynching local Baath officials," even when "the way to Baghdad is open."[24] Their concern was to get rid of anyone/anything which represented the regime in the realm of their lives.

In this phase of the conflict, "the enemy" could not be described using existing social traits, or even by political affiliation. Ṣaddām's regime has established its power on the basis of networks of loyalty, mobilising various social patron-client relations. The system did not necessarily depend on a party system or on sectarian/tribal inclinations. Rather, it established a monopoly of authority and legitimacy, annihilating all social authorities (such as tribes, religious communities, and local notables) which were capable of mediating between the society and the state. State control, including that using psychological methods, was directed directly at individuals, without going through social mediation.

The ambiguity of the definition of "the enemy" among those who rose against the regime is precisely a reflection of this flexibility of Ṣaddām's power base. The deeper the state penetrates into every corner of society, the more invisible the tools of control become. Thus the border between "us" and "the enemy" can be very subjective and changeable, and the notion of the "enemy" can expand infinitely. This may be one of the reasons for the large numbers of casualties in the *intifāḍah*.

It is ironic that the regime began to take a clear and apparent policy of discrimination toward the Shiite population after the *intifāḍah*, labelling them as an "inferior sect". It did so because it had to preserve its power basis at least among the Sunni population, fearing that the notion of "the enemy" might coalesce into an alliance of the ruling elites; it intended to make the barrier between the two sects visible. For the first time, it allowed the publication of editorials which expressed hatred toward the Shiite population in Iraq as being "backward," in *al-Thawrah* newspaper, the party's organ, in April.[25] This apparent discriminatory policy toward the Shiites can be also seen in the fact that a tank came into combat in the "liberated" area with the slogan "no more Shiites after tomorrow" painted on its side.[26]

After the elimination of the symbols of the enemy from the daily life of the local community, however, what people witnessed during the *intifāḍah* was a vacuum of ideas about justice and injustice. Even in the

holy cities, religious morals were deeply undermined; the fact that it was al-Khū'i who issued the first *fatwa* urging the people to bury the dead bodies may support this image of the negligence of basic Islamic or human morals in the *intifāḍah*. Ra'ūf bitterly remembers that al-Khū'i was very late in deciding to issue the *fatwā* and to establish a committee to restore security in the "liberated" area.[27] Alternative symbols were required as the movements expand, and Islamists tried to fill the vacuum with an immature Islamic identity, but in vain. It is worth mentioning Ra'ūf's analysis of the reason for mobilising the image of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm or Khomeini. He indicates that there were indeed actual leaders of the movements, especially in the Marsh area, but the participants were unable to create from them the image of a national hero, because their activities were totally secret and hidden from the eyes of the people.[28]

*Searching for "Something Communal"*

The above arguments on the importance of the "destruction of symbol," the "anonymity" of the actors in the movement, and the "invisibility of the enemy" can mainly be seen in the discourses of Western scholars (such as Cockburn) or Western-educated Arab or Iraqi scholars (such as Makiya). Their interpretation of the *intifāḍah* is based on a "strong state vs. weak society" model, and they recognise Iraqi society as being deeply penetrated by the state under Ba'thi control. The individual became atomised after the regime uprooted all the existing social ties, such as religious, tribal, and ethnic networks, and took over most of the voluntary associations. He had to stand against the state by himself, without any social mediation. We may find in this discussion a connotation of irrational crowd behaviour in an anarchical mass society, lacking civil society.

It is worth mentioning, however, that some raise objections to the above interpretation of the *intifāḍah*. Fā'iq Shaykh 'Alī, an individual Islamist who was once in charge of a committee in al-Najaf,[29] argues that the "protest culture" of Islam did play a significant role in the *intifāḍah*.[30] He emphasises the significance of religious rituals and locations in the movements, rather than religious ideology or political institutions. He suggests that the society in its stateless situation revealed an autonomous moral system that was able to sustain the local community in its crisis, utilising traditional networks and value-systems. In arguing about how the *intifāḍah* began, 'Alī calls attention to earlier incidents that inspired the outbreak of the *intifāḍah*, together with the guerrilla activities in the Marsh; one was the anti-Ṣaddām demonstration in al-Najaf, on the occasion of the funeral of Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm at al-Hindī Mosque on the 23rd of

February. The other was an anti-regime demonstration in Karbalā' on the eve of the outbreak of the *intifāḍah*. It also took place during a religious march to welcome Āyāt Allāh al-Khū'i, who coincidently was visiting the shrine of Imām Ḥusayn there.[31] The essential point of his interpretation is that the opposition organisations, including SCIRI and al-Da'wah, were far from being involved in the *intifāḍah*.[32] He insists that people without any political affiliations carried out the *intifāḍah*, and that the organisations in the "liberated" area emerged voluntarily from their daily social networks, without guidance from the existing ideological political forces.

'Alī is not the only author who emphasizes the role of Islamic rituals and places; al-Ḥillī points out the coincidence of the beginning of the *intifāḍah* with the anniversary of Imām Mahdī's birth (March 1st). He also mentions that it was relatively easy to mobilise the people who gathered for that occasion into anti-government demonstrations, particularly in the holy cities. Al-'Ajulī remarks that the "Voice of Islamic Revolution" was broadcast from the shrine of Imām 'Alī in al-Najaf. In the holy cities of al-Najaf and Karbalā', the courtyards of the shrines turned to be the bases as well as starting points for demonstrations and other collective action against the regime. In a word, what is emphasised is the importance of the role of the communal, rather than national, pattern of protest culture. This is reminiscent of Oberschall's argument on the role of the Catholic tradition, from which the legitimacy of anti-regime movements was often derived; in Eastern Europe, churches were habitually used as gathering places for demonstrations and other protest activities, and this was especially true in the case of Poland.[33]

This communal protest culture seen in religious rituals was, however, too weak to support entire movements. It would be more accurate to say that only holy cities could promote such large-scale religious activities. In other places, such as in Kāẓimīyah near from the capital, there were strict restrictions on apolitical religious gatherings.

As a lesson learned from the gravity of the lack of social mediation and the consequence of the opportunities for communal mobilisation, some scholars highlight post-War attempts to fulfil the social vacuum by re-establishing communal ties. We may understand the regime's policy of revitalising the tribal networks in local communities in the same context. Realising its inability to mobilise the entire state apparatus to control atomised individuals, the regime preferred to depend on tribal groups, not branches or sub-institutions of the ruling parties. In other words, it needed the help of society.[34]

On the other hand, one Islamist pointed out that there was an attempt

to reform the *ḥawzah* and the religious hierarchy among the Shiite *'ulamā'*, led by the late Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr. Ra'ūf classifies the development of the Iraqi Islamic movements into three periods. The first generation, represented by the Islamic political parties such as al-Da'wah, constitutes those who were active inside Iraq until the assassination of Bāqir al-Ṣadr in 1980. The second generation grew up under the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s, and became more inclined to religion, being exhausted by the war and social unrest. This generation, Ra'ūf describes, were the main actors in the *intifāḍah*, and these two generations left Iraq after the ruthless oppression by the regime. The third generation is those who stayed inside Iraq after the Gulf War, and gathered around Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr.[35] According to Ra'ūf, Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr chose to co-exist with the regime, and confined his activities to the religious field, staying away from politics. He gave importance to restoring the religious foundation of the daily life of the people, through reviving the Friday Prayer.[36] In particular, Ra'ūf says, his aim was to regain a positive relationship with tribal society. This can be seen as a counter measure against the regime's re-tribalisation policy, and a reconsideration of the role of the *'ulamā'* as a mediator between them and the regime. [37]

Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr was, however, assassinated in 1999, possibly by the regime. The assassination may be tied to the fact that after the incident, the regime started to reconsider the excesses of its re-tribalisation policy, and began to rely again on the party structure to control local communities.

## Conclusion

Various discourses on the *intifāḍah* among Iraqi scholars reflect the ways in which they recognised the social and political structure in Iraq at the time of the Gulf War. Through their analyses of the reasons why the *intifāḍah* failed, they clarify their perceptions on what they see as the crucial problems in the formation of national integrity in Iraq.

Anti-government political parties, and particularly Islamic groups, essentially tried to interpret the *intifāḍah* as a positive result of their struggle against the regime since the 1970s, based on Islamic political ideology. They describe the institutions and collective action frames established during the *intifāḍah* as being along the lines of Islamic ideology. This notion is not shared by the other ideological groups, however, who criticised it as exposing the absence of a common national identity in Iraq. This argument reveals the fragility of the coalition among the Iraqi opposition forces, which finally was taken over by the Iraqi National Congress, established in London with the support of the United States.

Other scholars cast light on the state's penetration of society as a result of the Ba'th party's policy, which caused the atomisation of the individual. This affected the development of the notion of "us" and "the enemy" in the *intifāḍah*. The border between the two became erratic, rather than defined by existing social distinctions or political affiliations. Not only did political forces fail to offer suitable alternatives for shared idea of legitimacy and collective action frames, but the society also proved to be too weak to revitalise its communal ties and morals in the situation of statelessness. In conjunction with this perception, some Islamists shed light on the efforts of *'ulamā'* to fill this social vacuum between the individuals and the state, and re-establish communal networks.

Can we understand this is an attempt to build up a public sphere of civil society? Of course the Islamists never consider their social activities in the framework of "civil society" or "democratisation." We may sense, however, the influence of these notions upon recent Islamist ideas, especially in their adoption of the word "*intifāḍah,*" whose connotation was "civilian resistance," instead of "Islamic revolution" in the early stage of the uprising.

Notes:

[1] Kanan Makiya, *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 203. Fakhrī Karīm, a leading intellectual of the Iraqi Communist Party, figures it was more than 200,000. Fakhrī Karīm, "Shu'ūn al-Waṭan wa-al-Mu'āraḍah fī Nadwah bi-Lundun," *Al-Thaqāfah al-Jadīdah*, No. 234, June 1991, pp. 8–14.

[2] Andrew Cockburn & Patrick Cockburn, *Out of Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999), pp. 24–25.

[3] Abū al-Qāsim al-Khū'i, originally from the Khū'i area in Iran, became *marja' al-taqlīd* in al-Najaf after the death of Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm. He maintained a stance detached from politics throughout his life, to the contrast with his students such as Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Muḥammad Faḍl Allāh. Died in 1992.

[4] Baghdad Radio broadcasted Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr's regret over the statement which he made at the time in support of the uprising, to the interviewer's question. He continued to say that "[the rioters] are mobs who are absolutely unknown within the society. Baghdad Domestic Service, March 18, 1991, carried by FBIS, *Daily Report*, March 21, 1991.

[5] Among the references cited here, al-'Abbāsī's work is only the exception. He calls this uprising "popular revolution (*thawrah sha'bīyah*)" accomplished by "Islamists and the Kurds". Muḥammad al-'Abbāsī, *Min Zākhū ilā Karbalā': Qiṣṣat al-Mu'āmarah 'alā al-Thawrah al-Sha'bīyah fī al-'Irāq* (Cairo: Al-Zahrah lil-I'lām al-'Arabī, 1992).

6 Doug McAdam John D. McCarthy & Mayer A. Zald, "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes: Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective in Social Movements," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer A. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

7 Shumrān al-ʻAjulī, *Al-Khāriṭah al-Siyāsīyah lil-Muʻāraḍah al-ʻIrāqīyah* (London: Dār al-Ḥikmah, 2000), pp. 332–335.

8 ʻĀdil Ra'ūf, *Al-ʻAmal al-Islāmiyah fī al-ʻIrāq bayna al-Marjāʻīyah wa-al-Ḥizbīyah: Qirā' Naqdīyah li-Masīrat Nisf Qarn 1950–2000* (Damascus: Al-Markaz al-ʻIrāqī lil-Iʻlām wa-al-Dirāsāt, 2000), pp. 436–439.

9 Walīd al-Ḥillī, *Al-ʻIrāq: Al-Wāqiʻ wa-Āfāq al-Mustaqbal* (Beirut: Dār al-Furāt, 1992), pp. 157–158. Walīd al-Ḥillī is one of the representatives of a branch of al- Daʻwah party in London.

10 al-Ḥillī, *Al-ʻIrāq,* p. 164.

11 Mājid al-Mājid, *Intifāḍat al-Shaʻb al-ʻIrāqī 1991m/1412h* (Beirut: Dār al-Wifāq, 1991), p. 43.

12 Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, born in Kāẓimīyah in 1935, is a founder of al- Daʻwah party. His Islamic thought became a foundation of the entire modern Islamic movements among Shiites in Iraq. He became *marjaʻ al-taqlīd* after the death of Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm in 1970. The regime, in fear of his popular influence and the rise of Islamic movements, assassinated him in 1980, along with his sister.

13 al-Mājid, *Intifāḍat al-Shaʻb al-ʻIrāqī 1991m/1412h.* p. 27.

14 The Communist Party generally accentuated the importance of Joint Action Committee (*lajnat al-ʻamal al-mushtarak*) which was established in the end of 1990 in Damascus, against present "dictatorship" and to build up a "transient government to replace the current regime in a way to represent all classes if the people of Iraq." It was the first attempt to coordinate the cooperative relationship among the various opposition forces, including Islamic groups. During the *intifāḍah* the conference was held in Beirut to support the *intifāḍah* and more than 300 individuals or from organisations attended. Lajnat al-ʻAmal al-Mushtarak li-Quwā al-Muʻāraḍah al-ʻIrāqīyah, *Wathā'iq al-Mu'tamar al-ʻĀmm li-Quwā al-Muʻāraḍah al-ʻIrāqīyah* (Beirut, March 11–13, 1991).

15 ʻAbd al-Ḥusayn Shaʻbān, *Al-ʻĀṣifah ʻalā "Bilād al-Shams": Dirāsāt fī Qaḍāyā al-Ḥarb wa-al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-ʻIrāqī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kunūz al-Adabīyah, 1994), p. 96; Karīm, "Shu'ūn al-Waṭan wa-al-Muʻāraḍah fī Nadwah bi-Lundun," pp. 8–14; Raḥīm ʻAjīnah, "Hal min Tajdīd fī al-Mawqif min al-Jaysh?," *Al-Thaqāfah al-Jadīdah,* No. 236, August 1991, pp. 10–13.

16 Fāliḥ ʻAbd al-Jabbār, "Al-Intifāḍah al-ʻIrāqīyah baʻd Tisʻ Sanawāt: Bayna al-Nisyān wa-al-Dhākirah," *Al-Thaqāfah al-Jadīdah*, No. 295, July–August 2000; Fāliḥ ʻAbd al-Jabbār, "Al-*Intifāḍah* 1991 . . . Hādhā al-Najāḥ al-Muwājil!," *Al-Thaqāfah al-Jadīdah*, No. 258, 1994.

17 Ibrāhīm Nawwār, *Al-Muʻāraḍah al-ʻIrāqīyah wa-al-Ṣirāʻ li-Isqāṭ Ṣaddām, 1990–1993* (London: N Publication, 1993), pp. 75–76.

18 Cockburn & Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, p. 22.

19 Anthony Oberschall, "Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern European Revolts of 1989," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer A. Zald, eds.,

*Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 107.

[20] Ofra Bengio, "Nation Building in Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Iraq," in *Minorities and the State in the Arab World* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishere, 1999), pp. 159–160.

[21] Al-Ḥillī notes that the officer who shot Saddam's portrait was a Sunni. See al-Ḥillī, *Al-'Irāq*, p. 156.

[22] Cockburn & Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, p. 15; Faleh Abdul Jabbar, "Why the Intifada Failed," in Fran Hazelton, ed., *Iraq Since the Gulf War* (London/New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994), p. 107.

[23] Makiya, *Cruelty and Silence*, pp. 59–61.

[24] Cockburn & Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, p. 20.

[25] Bank al-Ma'rūmāt al-'Irāqī, *Al-Atharāt al-Ṭā'ifīyah fī al-'Irāq* (n.p: Bank al-Ma'rūmāt al-'Irāqī, 1999).

[26] al-Ḥillī, *Al-'Irāq*, p. 165.

[27] Ra'ūf, *Al-'Amal al-Islāmīyah fī al-'Irāq bayna al-Marjā'īyah wa-al-Ḥizbīyah*, pp. 452–456.

[28] Ra'ūf, *Al-'Amal al-Islāmīyah fī al-'Irāq bayna al-Marjā'īyah wa-al-Ḥizbīyah*, pp. 446–448.

[29] Based on the interview by the author, London, 1996.

[30] Fā'iq Shaykh 'Alī, "Al-Intifāḍah al-'Irāqīyah fī Dhikrā-hā al-Khāmisah, 1/5: Qiṣṣat al-Sharārah al-Ūlā," *Al-Ḥayāh* (London), March 22, 1996.

[31] 'Alī, "Al-Intifāḍah al-'Irāqīyah fī Dhikrā-hā al-Khāmisah, 1/5."

[32] Fā'iq Shaykh 'Alī, "Al-Intifāḍah al-'Irāqīyah fī Dhikrā-hā al-Khāmisah, 4/5: Man Kān warā' al-Intifāḍah?," *Al-Ḥayāh*, March 25, 1996.

[33] Oberschall, "Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern European Revolts of 1989," p. 105.

[34] Amatzia Baram, "Neo-tribalism in Iraq 1991–1996," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, February 1997; Keiko Sakai, "State Penetration of Society: Tribal Value as a Tool of State Control in Iraq," in Walid Kazziha, Enid Hill & Keiko Sakai, eds., *Civil Society and the Middle East* (M.E.S. Series No. 43, Tokyo: IDE, 1997).

[35] 'Ādil Ra'ūf, *Muḥammad Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr, Marjā'īyat al-Maydān: Mashrū'u-hu al-Taghyīrī wa-Waqā'i' al-Ightlyāl* (Damascus: Al-Markaz al-'Irāqī lil-I'lām wa-al-Dirāsāt, 1999), pp. 88–91. Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr, a cousin of the late Bāqir al-Ṣadr, became *marja' al-taqlīd* after the death of al-Khū'i. It is often reported that the regime preferred him to be *marja'*.

[36] In Iraq Shiite *'ulamā'* had refrained from holding the Friday prayer, in consideration of the fact that the Ba'th regime was not an Islamic government.

[37] Ra'ūf, *Muḥammad Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ṣadr, Marjā'īyat al-Maydān*, pp. 101–182.

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