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An analysis of elite sport policy change in three sports in Canada and the United Kingdom

by

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A Doctoral Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
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Abbreviations

AAA	Amateur Athletics Association
AAFC	Amateur Athletic Federation of Canada
AAP	Athlete Assistance Programme (Canada)
AAUC	Amateur Athletic Union of Canada
AC	Athletics Canada
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
AIS	Australian Institute of Sport
APA	Athlete Personal Award (UK)
ASA	Amateur Swimming Association
ASC	Australian Sports Commission
ASFGB	Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain
BAAB	British Amateur Athletic Board
BAF	British Athletic Federation
BOA	British Olympic Association
CAAU	Canadian Amateur Athletic Union
CAC	Coaching Association of Canada
CASM	Canadian Academy of Sport Medicine
CBET	Competency-Based Education and Training
CIS	Canadian Interuniversity Sport
COA	Canadian Olympic Association
COC	Canadian Olympic Committee
CSC	Canadian Sport Centre
CTFA	Canadian Track and Field Association
CYA	Canadian Yachting Association
DCMS	Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DISR	Department of Industry, Science and Resources
DNH	Department of National Heritage
FINA	Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur
GDR	German Democratic Republic
IAAF	International Association of Athletics Federations
IOC	International Olympic Committee
ISAF	International Sailing Federation
NCAA	National Collegiate Athletic Association
NCCP	National Coaching Certification Programme
NCF	National Coaching Foundation
NGB	National Governing Body of Sport
NSO	National Sporting Organisation
OSG	Olympic Steering Group (RYA)
P/TSO	Provincial/Territorial Sporting Organisation
QPP	Quadrennial Planning Process
RYA	Royal Yachting Association
SFAF	Sport Funding and Accountability Framework
SNC	Swimming/Natation Canada
SSC	Specialist Sports College
UKA	UK Athletics
UKSI	United Kingdom Sports Institute
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YRA	Yacht Racing Association

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Abstract

This thesis explores the process of elite sport policy change in three sports (swimming, athletics and sailing/yachting) in Canada and the United Kingdom (UK). The nature of policy change is a complex and multi-faceted process and a primary aim of the study is to identify and analyse key sources of policy change in four elements of elite sport programming: i) the development of elite level facilities; ii) the emergence of 'full-time' swimmers, athletes and sailors; iii) the adoption of a more professional and scientific approach to coaching, sports science and sports medicine; and iv) competition opportunities and structures at the elite level. The study focuses on the meso-level of analysis, which centres on the structures and patterns of relationships in respect of three Canadian national sporting organisations (NSOs) and three UK national governing bodies of sport (NGBs) - representing the three sports cited above. The macro-level of analysis is also considered, where the primary concern is to analyse relations of power between government and quasi-governmental sporting agencies and the respective NSOs/NGBs.

A case study approach is adopted, focusing on the six NSOs/NGBs, wherein a qualitative methodology is utilised in order to elicit data in respect of policy change in the four key elements of elite sport programming set out above. Within the case study approach, the advocacy coalition framework has proved useful in drawing attention to the notion of changing values and belief systems as a key source of policy change, as well as highlighting the need to take into account factors external to the policy subsystem under investigation. In Canada, it is evident that the preoccupation with high performance sport over the past 30 years, at federal government level, has perceptibly altered over the past two to three years. In contrast, in the UK, from the mid-1990s onwards, there has been a noticeable shift towards supporting elite sport objectives from both Conservative and Labour administrations. The study concludes that it is only by exploring specific sports through a comparative-analytic framework that a better understanding of policy change, within the complex and multi-layered sport policy process, might be achieved.

Key words: elite sport, policy change, United Kingdom, Canada, swimming, athletics, sailing/yachting

Chapter 1
Introduction

Research aims, objectives and context

The aim of this thesis is to explore the policy processes underlying shifts in policy direction and emphasis in three sports at the elite level in Canada and the United Kingdom (UK). In short, the thesis centres on an analysis of the nature of policy change at the level of three national sporting organisations (NSOs) in Canada and three national governing bodies of sport (NGBs) in the UK in the sports of swimming, athletics and sailing/yachting – the terms sailing/yachting are used interchangeably throughout. For the purpose of this study, the adopted operational definition of 'elite sport', or 'high performance sport' to use the Canadian terminology (these terms are also used interchangeably throughout), is 'a competition sport at the highest international level with a priority placed on sports in the Olympic Games[1] programme and on those sports with regular world championships' (Semotiuk 1989, quoted in Semotiuk 1996: 7). It can also be noted that it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the growing interest in, and development of, policy initiatives and programmes for Paralympic athletes. One final point of clarification in relation to the substantive content of the thesis is that information has been gathered up to and including March 2003; therefore, developments after this date are not included in the analysis.

While the thesis is primarily concerned with investigating the salience of theories of the policy process (cf. Sabatier 1999) at the meso-level of policy analysis/theorising, it is important to locate the latter within a macro-level approach that enables an exploration of the (power) relationships between the state and civil society. More specifically, a macro-level exploration is important as it sensitises us to questions such as 'Why are certain actors in a privileged position in the policy-making process?' and 'In whose interest do they rule and how does their rule result in that interest being served?' (Marsh 1995: 5-6; Marsh & Stoker 1995a: 293). Following such an exploration at the macro-level, questions such as 'Who rules/makes policy?' and 'How do they rule/make policy?' (Marsh 1995: 5-6 Marsh & Stoker 1995a: 293) may be investigated at the meso-level and, together with a salient conceptualisation of power relations, a more complete picture of policy change can be revealed. In order to achieve the research aims outlined above a number of more concrete objectives can be delineated:

- To provide an account of the emergence of sport policy, in general, and explain the development of elite sport policy, in particular, in Canada and the UK;
- To evaluate the utility of different meso-level theories of the policy process in order to understand better the nature of elite sport policy change;
- To analyse the process of policy change within the sport development policy subsystem in relation to both exogenous and endogenous factors;
- Following on from the last objective: to examine the usefulness of the concept of 'policy-oriented learning' and the cluster of related ideas within the broader concept of 'policy transfer'.

Rationale for investigating elite sport policy processes

Over the past 30 years many Western countries have embarked upon - albeit to varying degrees - strategies for the systematic and scientific pursuit of victory, accomplished, in large part, by the spread of state-sponsored sport systems, once the preserve of former Eastern bloc states (cf. Green & Oakley 2001a; Whitson 1998). On this issue, Whitson has argued that 'Today, countries like Canada, Australia, and most western European nations invest substantial sums in trying to win medals in international sport, especially in the Olympic Games' (1998: 2). In Canada, beginning in the 1970s, the federal government was responsible for the construction of a policy framework that underpinned the establishment of a cadre of elite athletes capable of achieving medal-winning success at major international sporting events, most notably, at the Olympic Games (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990). The unintended consequences of this drive for sporting excellence in Canada were brought into sharp relief with the Ben Johnson drugs affair at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. What followed, was a series of inquiries into the values and belief systems underpinning Canadian sport, in general, and Canadian high performance sport, in particular (cf. Blackhurst et al. 1991; Canada 1992; Dubin 1990). In Canada, an interesting point of departure, then, for this study, is how past policy deliberations, for example, the noted debates over the type of values/belief systems underpinning the country's 'sport delivery system' (cf. Thibault & Harvey 1997) have resulted in the changing emphases evident in the new Canadian Sport Policy (Canadian Heritage 2002a) and subsequent legislation, *An Act to Promote Physical Activity and Sport* - Bill C-12[2] (House of Commons of Canada 2002). In short, in Canada there is evidence of a significant shift in policy direction and emphasis at the federal level. Thus, Kidd's (1988b: 13; 1995: 9) contention that, for the best part of 30 years, Canadian sport has been characterised by a 'philosophy' or 'ideology' of excellence,

appears, at least in the rhetoric of the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy and Bill C-12, to be subject to a process of abjuration.

With regard to the UK, policy priorities towards developing a framework of support systems for elite level athletes have, traditionally, been rather more ambiguous. Yet, two factors in particular are characteristic of the changing direction and emphasis of sport policy in the UK since the mid-1990s. Firstly, in 1995 the Conservative Government, largely through the influence of Prime Minister, John Major, published *Sport: Raising the Game* (Department of National Heritage [DNH] 1995), the first government policy statement on sport in 20 years. Secondly, in 1994, the country's first National Lottery since the 19th century was introduced - sport was one of five 'good causes' to benefit from monies raised by the Lottery. The significance of Lottery monies for the emergence of a more systematic approach to developing the country's elite athletes cannot be underestimated. In 2001-2002, for example, '£22,550,608 was allocated from the World Class Performance[3] programme to 33 UK/GB[4] sports, representing a total of 762 athletes' (UK Sport 2002e: 7). The significance of Lottery monies is clear if we consider that, in the same year, UK Sport distributed (just) £5,817,768 of Exchequer funding to UK/GB national governing bodies and other partner organisations (UK Sport 2002e: 7-8). While some doubts remain (cf. McDonald 1995, 2000) regarding the Government's continuing commitment to policies aligned to 'sporting opportunities for all' – see below - the following statement from UK Sport's Lottery Strategy for 2002-2005 is indicative of the changing emphases in the UK sport policy sector in recent years:

> While the promotion of sporting opportunities for all remains a central pillar of Government sports policy, the development of the World Class programmes and priorities reflects a growing public awareness, that for a variety of reasons – social, political, economic and, of course, sporting – winning medals is just as important as getting people to take part in sport (UK Sport 2002e: 8).

The two key strands of *Sport: Raising the Game* – youth sport and excellence – were sustained in the Labour Party's sport policy document, *A Sporting Future for All* (Department for Culture, Media & Sport [DCMS] 2000). A further instructive aspect of this document is the emphasis put on the modernisation of national governing bodies of sport, to be achieved, in large part, by meeting objectives set at DCMS/UK Sport/Home Country Sport Council levels. Therefore, an important aspect of the ensuing investigation centres on how these emerging hierarchical (resource) relationships

between government/quasi-governmental organisations and national governing bodies of sport might be implicated in policy change at the elite levels of swimming, athletics and sailing/yachting in the UK.

Policy change

As discussed, the thesis has a central concern with analysing the processes underlying 'policy change', therefore, some brief comments are warranted on our understanding of what we mean by the term, as well as some insights into the importance of studying this aspect of public policy processes. Firstly, policy change in this study is assumed to involve factors within (endogenous to) the sport development policy subsystem as well as factors outside (exogenous to) of the subsystem. Endogenous factors would involve aspects of policy learning in relation to a particular policy problem or issue – here the development of a framework for elite sport development. Exogenous factors would include, for example, changes in government administrations and/or key political actors and policy outputs from other policy sectors. The second point follows on from the first and, while it is important not to pre-empt the discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the utility of the different meso-level approaches, we can note two pertinent features of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). The ACF has: i) a specific concern with understanding and explaining policy change; and ii) a focus on policy-oriented learning. Indeed, Peters has argued that the ACF is a notable way forward in the evolution of the policy networks approach, and suggests that 'The fundamental virtue of the Sabatier approach [ACF] is that it is concerned with policy change and, therefore, unlike much of network analysis, is also directly concerned with understanding a dynamic process' (1998b: 29).

The final point relates to the value of studying policy change over a considerable time period, thereby lending credence to the critical realist insights set out in Chapter 3. For critical realists, the role of theory is to contextualise observable behaviour in order to infer the underlying structures of a particular social/political situation over time (cf. Hay 2002; Hollis & Smith 1991). As Marsh & Smith have argued, 'it is impossible to make any sense of the world without some form of theoretical framework' (2001: 532) and, by drawing on the macro- and meso-level theoretical frameworks set out in Chapter 2, the unobservable structural relationships implicit in the above observations can thus be usefully analysed. An example from the Canadian sporting context helps to clarify the argument. As noted earlier, Kidd (1995: 9) has argued that, from the 1970s onwards,

the structural framework within which Canadian sport policy has developed, has been characterised by an 'ideology of excellence' (here, read unobservable structure). The following comments from one of the inquiries into the type of values/belief systems underpinning this ideology of excellence are instructive. The *Best Report* argued, *inter alia*, for a more wide-ranging re-evaluation of how high performance sport should be supported, and posed the following cluster of questions:

> Why do we support high-performance sport at all? Are Canadians comfortable with the pursuit of excellence and its links with winning and high-performance sport? Are we too demanding in our definitions of success and winning? Do we appreciate the difference between 'being the best you can be' and 'being the best'? (Canada 1992: 26).

These questions are instructive if put into contemporary context. That is, both the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy and Bill C-12 reveal a significant shift in federal level policy direction and emphasis towards a far broader conception of the type of support given to sport at all levels. The argument here, then, is that in order to understand fully more recent sport policy developments, we cannot view the latter in isolation from policy debates of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Canada. In short, it is only by tracing and analysing both past and contemporary sport policy deliberations that a more complete picture of the nature and dimensions of policy change might be revealed.

Thesis structure

Chapter 2, *Theorising the policy process*, outlines the study's analytical framework and investigates the utility of a number of macro- and meso-level approaches for this comparative analysis of elite sport policy change in two countries. Beginning with an exploration of three well-documented macro-level theories of the state – pluralism, Marxism and corporatism/elite theory – the chapter argues that the overlapping assumptions underlying neo-pluralism/elite theory provide the most appropriate insights for an analysis of: i) the changing character of the sport policy sector; ii) the many and varied organisations involved in competition for scarce resources at different levels; and iii) the resulting interaction between the state and its satellite agencies, and the sporting organisations which form part of civil society. Using a number of criteria that help to establish the adoption of the preferred macro-level approach, this section of the chapter concludes with an illustration of the particular characteristics of the sport policy sector and the extent to which they might be implicated in the policy process for elite sport development. Following on from this macro-level of theorising and analysis, the chapter

then reviews four theories of the policy process (Sabatier 1999) that reveal potentially useful dimensions for a meso-level exploration of policy change. Here, particular emphasis is given to the policy networks approach and the closely related advocacy coalition framework (ACF), as both allow for an investigation of the plurality of interests that characterise the sport policy sector. More specifically, the ACF's multi-faceted approach sets out to explore policy change over a time period of at least seven to ten years, with a particular emphasis on both endogenous and exogenous factors (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999).

Chapter 3, *Research strategy and methods*, sets out the parameters of the study's philosophical assumptions, methodological approach and methods of analysis employed. The chapter also acknowledges that all research is beset with potential problems and/or limitations. The most important of these are identified and possible solutions offered in order to help overcome, or at least, ameliorate such problems/limitations. The particular issues involved with comparative research design are also considered, wherein it is argued that the adoption of a case study approach allows for the complexities of social and political life to be elaborated more fully by the production of what Geertz (1973) has termed, 'thick description' of a particular case. Here, it is important to note that comparison between cases (the six NSOs/NGBs across two countries) is at least as significant as the description and analysis of a single NSO/NGB case.

In Chapter 4, *Conceptualising elite sport development models*, consideration is given first to how elite sport development models might be conceptualised. As Rose notes, in any comparative analysis, 'Concepts are necessary as common points of reference for grouping phenomena that are differentiated geographically and often linguistically' (1991a: 447). Secondly, the key principles of organisation and administration underlying different 'models' of elite sport development in three countries that have achieved considerable success at major global sporting events are explored. An evaluation of the policy trajectory for developing medal-winning elites in two former ('successful') Eastern bloc countries – the Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic - is followed by an examination of the emergence of a policy framework for elite sport development in Australia, one of the West's leading exponents of a systematic, integrated and increasingly scientific approach to developing elite level athletes.

Chapter 5, *Development of sport policy in Canada and the UK*, traces the emergence of public policy for sport in the two countries, in general, and policies for elite sport development, in particular. For organisational clarity, the emergence of sport policy in each country is divided into three time periods. In part, this division by time also reflects significant policy/political/sporting events that have had an important influence on policy direction for elite sport development. For example, the UK is divided into the following periods: 1970s, 1980-1994 and 1995-2002. The rationale for selecting the 1970s as the starting point reflects the creation of the Sports Councils in 1972, while the reasoning for selecting 1995-2002 as a discrete time period was the publication of *Sport: Raising the Game* (Department of National Heritage 1995) – as noted above, the first government sport policy document in 20 years and which signalled a shift in emphasis towards the elite level and away from a central concern with 'Sport for All' initiatives.

Chapters 6 narrows the focus to three national sporting organisations (NSOs) in Canada, wherein the organisational context and pattern of inter- and intra-organisational relations that constitute the infrastructure for each sport is outlined. In order to provide some clarity to this review of Canadian NSOs, the emergence of elite sport development is then explored along four 'dimensions' for each NSO: i) the development of elite level facilities; ii) the emergence of 'full-time' swimmers, athletes and sailors; iii) developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine support services; and iv) competition opportunities for elite level swimmers, athletes and sailors. These four dimensions have been identified as important constituent elements of any attempts to construct a policy framework for developing high performance athletes (cf. Sports Council 1991: 6). Each NSO section concludes with a summary of key implications for the respective sports in relation to policies for high performance sport development as well as signalling the utility of the study's theoretical and/or methodical insights. Chapter 7 follows a similar format for the three national governing bodies of sport (NGBs) in the UK.

The final chapter, *Discussion and Conclusions*, returns to the research objectives identified in the opening chapter and addresses the key theoretical, methodological and conceptual insights provided in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. More specifically, the first section of the chapter summarises the key similarities and differences between the six Canadian and UK NSOs/NGBs that emerge from the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7. This first section is not concerned substantively with the study's theoretical and/or methodological

insights. However, these insights are incorporated into the analysis where appropriate. It is in the second and final section of the chapter where the study's theoretical and methodological insights are considered in more depth. Here, both the macro- and meso-levels of theorising are addressed. Analysis of the macro-level is concerned with power configurations and relationships and how these might be implicated in the process of policy change. At the meso-level of theorising, we are concerned with analysing the usefulness of the preferred (meso-level) approach for studying policy processes and policy change. This evaluation is conducted within an analysis of the relative policy priority given to elite sport development and what this might reveal about the balance of influence amongst competing interests in the sport development policy subsystem. The impact of the general priority given to elite sport for other public policy objectives, most notably, those concerning mass participation programmes, is addressed, together with a discussion around the consequences for NSOs/NGBs of the increased involvement of government, both in terms of salience and resource dependence. Indications of areas for further research are also outlined in this concluding chapter.

Notes:

[1] The focus of the study is on three sports that compete at the summer Olympic Games. However, it should be borne in mind that Canada puts far greater emphasis (than does GB/NI) on supporting sports that send teams to the winter Games. Therefore, (cross-national) observations in subsequent chapters, in respect of medal-winning performances at the summer Games, should be tempered by Canadian performances in the winter Olympic events.

[2] The bill was originally introduced in the 1st session of the 37th Parliament as Bill-C-54 but died on the Order Paper when Parliament was prorogued on 16 September 2002. By motion adopted 7 October 2002, the House of Commons of Canada provided for the reintroduction in the 2nd session of legislation that had not received Royal Assent. The bills would be reinstated at the same stage in the legislative process they had reached when the previous session was prorogued. Bill C-12 had its third reading on 4 February 2003 and received Royal Assent on 19 March 2003 (House of Commons of Canada 2002).

[3] In addition to the World Class Performance (WCP) programme funding provided by UK Sport, the four Home Country Sports Councils (in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) award Lottery funding through their own 'talented athlete' programmes to home country-based sports, and to those sports which aspire to compete at the Olympics/Paralympics in the future. In the latter scenario, the home country programmes underpin the UK WCP programme (see UK Sport 2002e and Chapters 5 and 7 for a more detailed elaboration of these funding programmes).

[4] Some clarification is required with regard to the use of the terms United Kingdom (UK) and Great Britain (GB) in the study. Firstly, no other country competes internationally at two different levels: sometimes as UK/GB, and sometimes as the home countries (see also note 3 above). This means that there are five Sports Councils in the UK, four of which deal with elite sport and grass roots sport (the four home country Sports Councils) and one of which deals with elite sport at a UK level (UK Sports Council, known as UK Sport). All five both fund and provide services (see also Chapter 5). Secondly, the terms UK/GB are often conflated in sport policy documents, where the term GB signifies Great Britain and Northern Ireland: the nomenclature used, for example, at the Olympic Games. However, in more general usage, the term GB stands for England, Scotland and Wales. Thirdly, space precludes an in-depth analysis of elite sport development specific to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Therefore, while this study has a UK/English focus, much of the discussion in Chapter 5, for example, in respect of elite sport policy in the UK, pertains to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Chapter 2
Theorising the policy process

Introduction

This chapter provides the theoretical context for the study, with a focus on the development of a pertinent and integrated framework that links the macro- and meso-levels of theorising and analysis. It should be noted that the micro-level is also considered, although to a much lesser degree, given the study's central focus on the relationship between the state and its various agencies and organisations within civil society (cf. Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998; Marsh 1995b, 1998; Marsh & Rhodes 1992a; Marsh & Stoker 1995a). The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, an evaluation of the strengths and limitations of three traditional 'theories of the state' is provided: pluralism, Marxism and corporatism – the macro-level of theorising. Secondly, and by way of summarising this opening section, the particular characteristics of the sport policy sector[1] are discussed. Within this discussion, the criteria on which the macro-level approaches can be judged as most salient to this study are outlined and analysed. Thirdly, an evaluation of the relative strengths and limitations of a number of meso- or 'middle-level' approaches (cf. Coleman & Perl 1999) to the study of the policy process is provided. The chapter concludes with the setting-out of an integrated framework between the two levels of analysis.

Theories of the state

It is widely acknowledged that it is vital for any study of the policy process to acknowledge the role of the state and to relate it to the power structure of a society as whole (cf. Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998, Hill 1997a, 1997b, Marsh 1995a, 1995b). Hill, for example, has argued that 'Policy is the product of the exercise of political influence, determining what the state does and setting limits to what it does' (1997b: 41). The focus here, then, is on three theories of the state that have prompted considerable theoretical and/or empirical research in the political and social sciences: pluralism, Marxism and corporatism (cf. Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; Held 1996; Marsh & Stoker 1995b; Smith 1993). The aim is to provide an overview of how political systems have been theorised at a macro-level before going on to examine the nature of state/group

relations at the meso-level of analysis. Moreover, given the emphasis here on the notion of 'the state', it is important to acknowledge the problematic nature of attempts to define or circumscribe exactly what is meant by the term. Hay, for example, suggests that 'The contemporary state is something of a paradox' (1996: xii), while Connell notes that 'Drawing boundaries around "the state" is not easy' (1990: 509; see also Smith 2000). It is generally agreed, then, that the state is not unified; thus providing parameters for political conflicts between various interests over resource allocation and the direction of public policy. Conflicts can arise between elected politicians and non-elected civil servants over policy direction, between different departments or units of the state and between politicians at different levels of the state over policy and resources. Therefore, as Smith argues, 'it is very difficult to identify the state's interests because various parts of the state can have conflicting interests' (1993: 2).

A further problem arises from the ill-defined term, 'public policy'. The ambiguity surrounding the term is clear in Hill's suggestion that 'The definitional problems posed by the concept of policy suggest that it is difficult to treat it as a very specific and concrete phenomenon' (1997a: 7). A number of potential routes through this definitional quandary have been suggested. Heclo, for example, emphasises action in arguing that 'A policy may usefully be considered as a course of action or inaction rather than specific decisions' (1972: 85). Heclo's reference to 'inaction' will subsequently be shown to be particularly apposite with respect to policy-making and relations of power (see Chapter 3). A rather more concrete definition is provided by Jenkins, who suggests that public policy can be conceived of as a set of interrelated 'decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve' (1997: 30).

Writing in the context of comparative sport policy, Houlihan suggests that the above formulation 'identifies a number of key attributes of public policy' (1997: 4); thereby signposting two 'attributes' of note for this study. Firstly, there is an emphasis on the interrelatedness of decisions, suggesting that policies cannot be viewed in isolation but as part of a sequence or cluster of decisions. Secondly, the reference to 'political actors' signals issues of power and policy influence and 'implicitly alerts us to the assumptions of pluralist politics where power and resource control are not monopolised by holders of formal offices' (Houlihan 1997: 4) – these two attributes are addressed in more depth

throughout the chapter. With these considerations in mind, we can turn to an evaluation of pluralism, the first of three theories of the state considered here.

Pluralism

It should be noted at the outset that there are many different interpretations of pluralism (see, for example, Smith 1995: 209-227) and it is not the intention to provide a review of all such interpretations here. Thus, a brief overview of the antecedents of 'conventional' or 'classic' pluralism is provided, followed by a consideration of a key variant of the classical approach - neo-pluralism – 'a noteworthy theoretical development' in state/civil society analyses (Held 1996: 214). Political pluralism acknowledges the existence of diversity in social, institutional and ideological practices, and values that diversity. In essence, the pluralist position is underpinned by the argument that the complexity of the modern liberal state means that no single group, class or organisation can dominate society (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; Held 1996; Smith 1995). Thus, for Held, 'In the modern competitive world, marked by complexity and divisions of interest, political life can never approach ... the ideals of Athenian democracy, Renaissance republics or the kind of democracy anticipated by Rousseau or Marx' (1996: 201). While, for Smith, pluralism represents 'a separation between the state and civil society; a difference between economic and political power; and a variation in the interests that are successful in particular policy areas' (1995: 210-211).

Within this notion of pluralism, power is viewed as non-cumulative and dispersed. The role of the state is thus viewed as regulating conflicts in society rather than the domination of society in pursuit of particular interests. The process of policy-making within the state is, therefore, about bargaining between a range of conflicting interests: in short, politics is a constant process of negotiation that ensures conflicts are resolved peacefully (Dahl 1967). In this view, the state is generally conceived of as a 'neutral arbiter' (see, for example, Held 1996: 216). It could be argued, however, that a term more usually associated with Marxist writers might be more appropriate; in essence, that the state be conceived of as *relatively autonomous*. For Atkinson & Coleman (1989), such 'relativity' is due to the increasing influence of non-state groups within the state/civil society relationship. These observations can be linked to the meso-level policy networks approach and advocacy coalition framework, which are concerned with exploring interrelationships between groups and society. The crucial point here is the pluralist focus on groups and, more specifically, the state/group relationship, which

provides a linking theme between macro- and meso-levels of analysis (Rhodes & Marsh 1992). As Smith observes, 'Politics as the resolution of conflicting interests means that groups are a crucial element in the political process' (1995: 211). Indeed, Smith concludes that 'For democratic society to work effectively there has to be a degree of consensus concerning the fundamental values of a society shared by the competing groups' (1995: 213). The corollary, therefore, of the classic pluralist argument is that government is not the creation of grand majorities; rather, it is 'the steady appeasement of relatively small groups' (Dahl 1956: 145).

The classic pluralist position has been subject to an increasing number of critiques in recent years. Lukes (1974), for example, in an exposition of 'three distinctive views of power', is critical of the pluralist perspective as outlined, for example, by Dahl (1956, 1967, 1961). Briefly, Lukes contends that Dahl's notion of power is misleading, namely, that '*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he (sic) can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do' (Dahl 1967, original emphasis, quoted in Smith 1995: 213). In other words, it is suggested that the diversity and openness Dahl articulates may be ambiguous if power is being employed within the system to restrict decision-making to acceptable issues. As Lukes has argued, 'Individuals and elites may act separately in making acceptable decisions, but they may act in concert – or even fail to act at all – in such a way as to keep unacceptable issues out of politics' (1997: 46). Lukes concludes, therefore, that this 'one-dimensional view of power cannot reveal the less visible ways in which a pluralist system may be biased in favour of certain groups and against others' (1997: 46). Indeed, as Crenson notes, 'A polity that is pluralistic in its decision-making can be unified in its non-decision-making' (1971: 179).[2] Clearly, there are a number of problems with the pluralist analysis of the policy process and state/group relationships and we can now turn to one of the more prominent developments of the classic pluralist position.

Neo-pluralism

Given the conceptual and empirical problems associated with the classic pluralist perspective noted above, a number of 'competing schools and tendencies' (Held 1996: 214) have evolved; one of the most notable being the 'neo-pluralist' position (see also, for example, McLellan 1984, 1995). Neo-pluralism first developed in the United States following the recognition that business interests are often in a superior position to other groups and enjoy certain advantages over the consumer and the market (Dunleavy &

O'Leary 1987: 275). Lindblom (1977) has been a key proponent of the neo-pluralist position, moving away from his classic pluralist stance of the 1950s and 1960s. Lindblom argues that policy-making is constrained by the workings of capitalism, particularly business interests and market forces. However, for neo-pluralists, business is significant but not all-dominating. For example, neo-pluralists explore how pressure groups are organised and resourced and the tactics they use, and attempt to determine the influence a group has in a particular situation. The influence of business within this conceptualisation has to be established through investigating policy decisions. Smith provides a useful summation of this position, while also signalling a degree of convergence between macro-level theories of the state:

> The importance of business to the government means that the government will respond automatically to business's interests. Power is structural rather than observable. Lindblom's position is closer to some Marxists than it is to pluralists. He acknowledges that power can be exercised in an unobservable way through structures, anticipated reaction and ideology (Smith 1995: 223-224; see also, for example, Marsh 1995a).

Indeed, Held notes that a key issue for neo-pluralists such as Dahl (who has also moved away from a classic pluralist position) and Lindblom is that, *contra* the classic pluralist position, the state cannot be viewed as 'a neutral arbiter among all interests: the business corporation wields disproportionate influence over the state' (Held 1996: 216). It could be argued that the latter point has important implications for elite sport policy processes - for example, in the increasing significance/role of multi-national corporations, particularly in the realm of sponsorship deals (cf. Horne et al. 1999). There are two further aspects to neo-pluralist developments which can be signposted here: i) the significance given to the use of 'policy analysis' (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987: 280-83; Parsons 1995: 428); and ii) the acknowledgement that 'the modern extended state has grown chiefly as a decentralised network of multiple agencies' (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987: 306). The significance of these aspects is evaluated in the ensuing evaluation of meso-level approaches. Thus, with regard to the utility of neo-pluralism for this study and, in part, reflecting the 'two further aspects' noted above, it is now appropriate to delineate three key features of neo-pluralism. The first notable feature is the active participation of the state in the policy process. As Dunleavy & O'Leary argue, 'Most neo-pluralists ... acknowledge that the development of an advanced industrial state is not directly controlled by citizens, and recognise the existence of a good deal of sub-technocratic government' (1987: 284-285). Secondly, there is an emphasis on groups and multiple interests and, as discussed, the third notable feature is the

significance of business interests. Held provides an apposite summary of neo-pluralism theorising:

> Despite the prominence granted to business interests, neo-pluralists have been careful not to portray a settled or fixed picture of the forces and relations underpinning contemporary democratic politics. They have retained some of the essential tenets of classic pluralism, including the account of the way liberal democracy generates a variety of interest groups, an ever-shifting set of demands and an ultimately indeterminate array of political possibilities (1996: 216-217).

Finally, Held suggests that the trajectory of pluralism over time illustrates well the complicated nature of what exactly democracies are, and what they ought to be. Within this body of thought, questions regarding 'the principles, key features and general conditions of democracy are now more open to debate than ever before' (1996: 218). This observation provides a useful link to the following section, as Held goes on to note that the same can be said about developments in other theoretical positions, 'especially neo-Marxism' (1996: 218).

Marxism

There are two significant theoretical strands in political studies, which have extended the critique of pluralism, namely, neo-Marxist developments in state theory and the significance of 'corporatist' tendencies in modern political institutions (Held 1996: 218-219). Thus, the first section here provides a brief overview of traditional Marxist approaches to state theory (for a more in-depth review see, for example, Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; Held 1996; Jessop 1990; Smith 1993). This is followed by a more detailed discussion of the key aspects of neo-Marxist developments and the notable trend towards convergence between the latter and neo-pluralist perspectives (cf. Held 1996: 231; Smith 1993, 1995: 214). A review of 'corporatist' contributions, which give much greater emphasis to state autonomy and dominance (Ham & Hill 1993: 39), follows this section on Marxist approaches to state theory.

The 'classic' Marxist position was premised upon a relentless attack on 'the idea of a "neutral" liberal state and "free"-market economy' (Held 1996: 121). In essence, this classic Marxist position was unequivocal: in an industrial capitalist world, the state could never be neutral or the economy free. Moreover, this was a doctrine based on a class struggle between the owners of the means of production (the bourgeoisie), and the working-class (the proletariat) (cf. Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987: 203-270). Moreover, both

Held (1996) and Taylor (1995) contend that there are at least two strands in Marx's account of the relationship between classes and the state. What Held terms 'position 1' is premised on the argument that

> ... the state generally, and bureaucratic institutions in particular, may take a variety of forms and constitute a source of power which need not be directly linked to, or be under the unambiguous control of, the dominant class in the short-term. Within this position, the state retains a degree of power independent of the dominant class; it is viewed as 'relatively autonomous' (1996: 131).

Taylor suggests that the second strand (or in Held's terms, 'position 2') 'is the view of the state as an instrument of the dominant class which performs the crucial function of co-ordinating its long-term interests' (1995: 249). This second strand, widely known as the 'instrumental' approach, has been most eloquently discussed in Miliband's (1969) neo-Marxist writings. From this perspective, Marx (and Engels) argued that 'the executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' (quoted in Ham & Hill 1993: 35). Miliband's analysis is acknowledged as 'a more sophisticated form' (Smith 1993: 38) of the instrumental position, wherein '[Miliband] maintained that in order to be politically effective, the state must be able to separate itself routinely from ruling-class factions' (Held 1996: 220). What differentiates Miliband's neo-Marxist perspective from Dahl's (1985) neo-pluralist work is his emphasis on class as the *key* structural determinant of democratic politics and state action. Nicos Poulantzas, in providing a critique of Miliband's approach, has elaborated a number of arguments that help to illustrate this difference.

Poulantzas criticised Miliband's 'subjectivist' approach and 'accused' him of using a pluralist methodology, with its exploration of the relations between classes and the state through 'interpersonal relations' (Held 1996: 220). Indeed, Poulantzas has argued that 'The *direct* participation of members of the capitalist class in the state apparatus and in government, even where it exists, is not the important side of the matter' (1972: 245, original emphasis). For Poulantzas, then, the emphasis is on the structural components and/or constraints 'placed on the state by the objective power of capital' (Hill 1997a: 54). In other words, it is not the character of individuals but the nature of the capitalist state that determines policy outcomes. Poulantzas' position has also attracted a number of criticisms (see, for example, Ham & Hill 1993; Hill 1997a; Jessop 1990; Smith 1993). Notable amongst these criticisms is that which suggests Poulantzas ignores the significance of groups in the state/society relationship; a central aspect of this study.

Moreover, Jessop (1990: 250) criticises the 'unhelpful' distinction between the 'instrumentalist' (cf. Miliband 1969) and 'structuralist' (cf. Poulantzas 1972) approaches and, in so doing, signposts the long-running 'structure-agency' debate; a debate to which we return in more depth in Chapter 3. In a prescient argument reflecting more contemporary work on the policy process and policy networks, Jessop (1990; see also Hay 2002; Marsh & Smith 2000) argues for a 'strategic relations approach'; an approach, moreover, which has resonance with the critical realist assumptions adopted for this study.

Finally, it is worth noting Claus Offe's (1975, 1984) neo-Marxist contributions. Briefly, Offe maintained that *the* crucial feature of the state is the way it is enmeshed in the contradictions of capitalism, arguing, essentially, that the state is in a structurally contradictory position. On the one hand, the state must sustain the process of accumulation and private appropriation of resources; equally, it must preserve belief in itself as the impartial arbiter of class interests, thereby legitimating its power (Offe 1984). Moreover, Offe argues that the institutional separation of state and economy means that the state is dependent upon resource flows from the organisation of profitable production. As Held has argued (1996: 223, original emphasis), given that, in general, it is beyond the power of the state to organise resources from the accumulation process, there is an 'institutional *self-interest* of the state' and an interest of all those who exercise state power, to maintain the strength of the capitalist economy. Instructively, Held maintains that this argument differentiates Offe from both Miliband and Poulantzas and, reflecting a point made earlier regarding convergence between variants of pluralism and Marxism, 'came close to the neo-pluralist view' (1996: 223). The issue of convergence of state theories is further considered in ensuing sections of the chapter. Attention now turns to corporatism, the final macro-level theory of the state considered here.

Corporatism

Historically, the label 'corporatism' has been associated with 'a variety of ideologies, including conservatism, Catholicism and fascism' (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987: 193). However, Cawson (1986) identifies three contemporary strands of corporatist theory that have been the subject of analysis in the literature: i) as an alternative economic system (cf. Pahl & Winkler 1974); ii) as a distinctive form of state (cf. Jessop 1990); and iii) as a mechanism of interest intermediation (cf. Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; Schmitter

1974); all three of which are 'concerned with the interaction of the public and private' (Smith 1993: 32). In the model developed by Winkler, this interaction is principally with regard to the economy. Jessop's account depicts the state taking on specific forms of representation and intervention. Smith (1993), however, suggests that the most common use of corporatism is the third model - viewed as a means of understanding the relationship between interest groups and government in particular sectors. This latter model, commonly termed 'liberal corporatism', is the variant that appears to have some utility for this study. Liberal corporatism refers to the propensity in mature liberal democracies for organised interests to be granted privileged and institutionalised access to policy formulation (cf. Heywood 2000). Schmitter's classic formulation of corporatism, which was defined in contrast to pluralism, reflects the above observations. For Schmitter, corporatism is

> ... a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports (1974: 93-94).

In essence, corporatist arrangements, at least in the UK up to the 1970s, can be conceived of as the collaboration between conflicting producer interests and their joint participation with government officials in the making and administering of public policy - the typical form involving tri-partite co-operation between the state, business and labour (Matthews 1989: 223). Yet, while there are several different accounts given in the corporatist literature, it has been argued that the differences are not as significant as the overall political consequences that are said to follow from such 'tripartite relations' Held (1996: 228). Two of the 'consequences', or claims, are of interest here. The first claim centres on the argument that, in modern liberal democracies, or in Held's (1996: 228) terms, the 'corporate capitalist era', parliamentary or territorial representation is no longer the principal manner in which interests are expressed and protected. Although classic forms of representation endure – members of parliament, for example - the significant work of political and economic management is conducted by functional representatives; that is, by delegates from corporations, unions and branches of the state. Thus, in the case of elite sport in the UK, for example, such groups might include the increasingly ubiquitous representatives from multi-national companies wishing to become involved in sponsorship, elite athletes' agents, political actors within the Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) and non-political civil servants within the

key quasi-independent sporting agencies, UK Sport and Home Country Sports Councils. The second, and related, claim revolves around the argument that political participation has become the preserve of organisational elites. Using high performance sport in Canada as an example, this might include, Sport Canada, the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC), the major national sporting organisations (NSOs) and high performance athletes.

With respect to this study, an adapted variant of Cawson's (1986) third model of corporatism - the interest group intermediation/tripartite model - is one that may have some utility, given that corporatism is frequently discussed within an *elitist* framework (cf. Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987: 136-202; Evans 1995: 228-247) and Smith's suggestion that corporatism 'tends to refer to ... the meso-level' (1993: 31). Thus, the above examples regarding elite sport in Canada and the UK reveal how this model might be incorporated into this study's analysis; a model that would require certain adaptations, however, given its somewhat overt focus on trades unions and the economy. Indeed, Held highlights some key limitations of this macro-level approach:

> Broad corporatist arrangements have taken hold in only a few countries ... and in some countries like Britain only a few have been met for the shortest time ... To the extent that they represent a new form of representation, they mark an interesting but limited development in the theory and practice of democracy in capitalist society (1996: 230-231).

Having evaluated three prominent macro-level theories of the state, it is now appropriate to draw together the key strands of the preceding discussion in respect of the usefulness of these approaches for the study's substantive focus.

Towards a macro-level position

It is evident from the preceding discussion that the theories of the state considered here cannot be viewed in isolation and, indeed, it has been argued that there is a distinct convergence emerging (cf. Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; Ham & Hill 1993; Held 1996; Marsh 1995a). Held, for example, suggests that it is becoming increasingly problematic to differentiate between the 'interesting points of convergence in the normative aspirations of neo-pluralists and neo-Marxists' (1996: 231). Following this theme through, Dunleavy & O'Leary's (1987: 323) mapping of the overlaps between different theories of the state is instructive. Here, it is argued that the 'overlap' between neo-pluralism and elite theory (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; John & Cole 1995; Marsh 1995a)

is one that has some interesting points of departure for this study. Firstly, the suggested overlap between neo-pluralism and elite theory reveals the increasing importance of groups at sub-national government level – an important characteristic of the sport policy sector in both Canada and the UK. As Dunleavy & O'Leary have argued:

> Elite theory and neo-pluralism overlap in arguing that liberal corporatist arrangements and technocratic government have displaced representative politics in determining such public policies as macro-economic management, much delivery of welfare state services, or the direction of technological development (1987: 324).

Secondly, as discussed, the privileged role of business is now an important consideration for policy analysts; here, neo-pluralists are concerned with 'the inescapable logic of decision-making which pushes governments towards an institutionalised accommodation with business peak associations and the labour movement' (Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987: 324). Elite theorists' perception of technocratic government is that which views the state, or quasi-state elites (e.g. UK Sport and Sport Canada) as implementing their own preferences rather than reflecting societal demands. Finally, and importantly for this summary of macro-level theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis, the overlapping assumptions within neo-pluralist and elitist frameworks provide a useful signpost to the ensuing evaluation of meso-level approaches and, in particular, to the concepts of policy networks and advocacy coalitions. For example, John & Cole refer to the potential for coalition forming in a study of urban regimes and argue that 'there is a similarity between neo-pluralism and neo-elitism because the closed nature of the governing coalition might make it an urban elite' (1995: 308). In relation to this, Ham & Hill note that 'the existence of elites is not incompatible with pluralist democracy because competition between elites protects democratic government' (1993: 33).

In the context of anti-Vietnam protests and inner-city riots in response to racial inequalities in the United States in the 1960s, Marsh (1995a) traces the antecedents to this emerging convergence and points to the impotence of classic pluralism for explaining the growth of political dissent. Lowi's (1969) elitist critique of pluralism in his work on sub-governments is also acknowledged as an important strand in the developments outlined above (see also, McFarland 1987). Briefly, this work emphasises the significance of a disaggregated approach to government and policy-making – a point relevant to this study on state/group intermediation. As McFarland notes, 'There is wide agreement that different policy areas may be characterised by pluralism, plural elitism (sub-governments), or redistributive conflict along the lines indicated by Lowi' (1987:

134). Moreover, McFarland's (1987: 141, 146) review of three models of interest groups, power and political processes (albeit in America) points to 'a theory of triadic power', which highlights the existence of 'power triads' (economic producer groups, countervailing interests and state agencies acting with a degree of autonomy). In highlighting 'issue networks' - a dimension of the policy networks approach – as a source of countervailing power amongst the power elites of producer groups and state agencies, McFarland's work has resonance with the neo-pluralist/elitist proposition set out above.

Having evaluated the key strengths and limitations of three prominent macro-level theories of the state, it is now appropriate to outline the key criteria upon which these theoretical approaches can be judged as having utility for this study. Firstly, is the macro-level approach one that provides sufficient internal logic and coherence?; and secondly, does the macro-level approach account for the particular characteristics of the sport policy sector, *at this time*? – in particular, has it the capacity to take account of the increasing internationalisation of the sport policy sector? It is important, therefore, to identify the key characteristics of the sport policy sector, wherein these two key criteria can be evaluated. In so doing, the study's preferred macro-level position can be set out with greater clarity.

Characteristics of the sport policy sector

Three key characteristics have been identified as distinguishing the sport policy sector: i) openness; ii) general weakness of the sport policy community; and iii) the increasing internationalisation of many aspects of sport policy-making (Houlihan 2000b). These three characteristics are discussed in turn.

Openness

The characteristic of 'openness' refers to the 'vulnerabilities' (Roche 1993: 77) of the sport policy agenda to intervention by non-sports interests and policy sectors. Such openness is the result of a number of other features of the sport policy sector, including instrumentality, administrative dispersal, variable salience and recency. Sport, as a 'policy instrument' or, in other words, perceived 'as a means rather than an end in itself' (Houlihan 2000b: 4) is a utility of sport adopted by many governments. For example, sport has been, and continues to be, extolled as a means to confront social and political

'problems' surrounding juvenile crime, cardio-vascular health problems, low international prestige and economic development. The instrumental use of sport in (New) Labour's social exclusion agenda is, arguably, the latest and most high profile exemplar in this context in the UK (cf. Oakley & Green 2001b), while in Canada, the deliberations underlying the new Canadian Sport Policy, reveal evidence of the emphasis now put upon the value of sport in helping to alleviate health problems (Professor Peter Donnelly: Personal communication, 16 February 2003).

With regard to 'administrative dispersal', Houlihan (2000b: 4) argues that 'no policy area [sector] can be delineated with precision'. However, there are policy sectors which have a generally recognised core, reinforced by government's organisational arrangements and the pattern of department or agency arrangements. The UK agricultural policy sector, for example, has been characterised as such (Marsh & Smith 2000). On the other hand, the UK sport policy sector has been characterised by administrative disunity, leading Roche (1993: 91) to conclude that 'structural disorganisation and internal conflict are at least long-standing and probably endemic'. This pervasive administrative dispersal or disunity is not only apparent between central government departments, for example, between the DCMS and departments such as the Home Office, the Office of the Deputy Minister (responsible for Local Government and the Regions), Health, and Education and Skills but also between different levels of government, as local government has a vital role to play in delivering sporting opportunities across a broad spectrum of services. Moreover, as Macintosh & Whitson (1990), have revealed, this is an analysis that can be extended to the Canadian sporting context, where federal-provincial/territorial relations have been bedevilled by jurisdictional complexity and divisions over the past three decades.

Furthermore, in the UK, dispersal and, arguably disunity, arises from the often overlapping and contradictory role of the country's five Sports Councils (one for each home nation as well as the UK Sports Council) (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002). Moreover, the involvement/influence of national governing bodies of sport (NGBs) and, increasingly, international sporting organisations/federations have also to be factored into the equation. Such influences are apparent at both governmental (for example, the European Union) and non-governmental levels (for example, the International Olympic Committee - IOC) - see Houlihan (1994) for a detailed review of these organisations' roles. In relation to sport policy, the characteristic of administrative dispersal, therefore,

raises a number of empirical questions for this study. For example, from a policy networks perspective (cf. Marsh & Rhodes 1992b) and/or the advocacy coalition framework (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999), such questions might include the following: Within the broader sport policy sector, can we identify discrete policy communities or advocacy coalitions within the 'narrower' sport development policy subsystem?; If so, is it possible to discern which of these communities/coalitions dominates and is it possible to identify the key protagonists therein?

Given the acknowledgement of the various and multiple groups and organisations that might potentially be involved in the sport policy sector, it is perhaps appropriate here to address the criterion of internal logic and coherence of the discussed macro-level theories of the state. Notwithstanding the noted convergence between neo-pluralist and neo-Marxist perspectives, it appears that a broadly neo-pluralist/elitist perspective retains the soundest internal logic and coherence for this study. This line of reasoning is premised on the following argument. With regard to Marxism, Held (1996: 150) argues that 'Marx left an ambiguous heritage', and that the value of Marxist perspectives are ultimately limited because of the direct connection drawn (even when the state is conceived as relatively autonomous) between political and economic spheres. Moreover, the two key (Marxist) perspectives discussed earlier have been subject to sustained criticism: Miliband (1969) has been criticised for 'his unremitting emphasis on class' (Held 1996: 220; see also Smith 1993) and Poulantzas (1972) for his emphasis on the state as the 'condensation of class forces' and for neglecting the ways in which institutions operate and the manner in which the relationship among elites, government officials and parliamentarians evolve (Held 1996: 222).

Claus Offe's work also retains inherent inconsistencies if the aim is to understand better the state/group relationships underpinning modern liberal democratic states; in this case, relationships within and between the sport policy sector, the sport development policy subsystem and the (potentially)l overlapping interests of other policy sectors, most notably, education and health. For example, Offe has been criticised for underestimating the capacity of political representatives and administrators to be effective agents of political strategy. The propensity to illustrate the development and limitations of state policy by reference to functional imperatives, namely, the necessity to satisfy capital and labour, accumulation and legitimation, plays down the interaction between government and state agencies, and thus does not allow for a full

understanding of the 'diverse patterns of state activity in liberal capitalist societies' (Held 1996: 226). In contrast to the above accounts, a neo-pluralist/elitist approach does not make *fixed* assumptions about particular class groupings or the role of capital – yet it does accept the privileged position of business interests and/or policy elites, which no government, local or central, can afford to ignore (Stoker 1991). Moreover, reflecting the nature of contemporary liberal democracies, in general, within such an approach, the state is not conceived of as monolithic but as just another (albeit significant) interest group which may indeed have interests of its own to pursue (cf. Smith 1993). Moreover, the logic and coherence of neo-pluralist assumptions regarding dispersed power is given further credence by the number of 'comparative empirical investigations – across cities, countries and time' that have utilised such assumptions (Judge et al. 1995: 5). A more substantive summary of the preferred macro-level approach is set out towards the end of this section; for now, we can return to the discussion regarding the particular characteristics of the sport policy sector.

A further feature of the characteristic of openness is that of sport's 'variable salience' – especially with regard to government intervention. Houlihan notes that this is 'highly variable, relying more than most on exogenous factors such as crisis for its elevation on the public agenda' (2000b: 5). This view can be related to Chalip's (1995) notion of 'focus events' that can act as significant catalysts for political action. For example, in the case of elite sport in the UK, the relatively disappointing medal tally at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games has been cited as a contributory catalyst for the implementation of the UK Sports Institute and the setting-up of the World Class Performance programme for elite athletes (cf. DCMS 2000; Sport England 1999; Theodoraki 1999). In Canada, such an event would be the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and the Ben Johnson drugs affair that led to a number of inquiries into the type of values/belief systems underlying the Canadian sport delivery system (cf. Blackhurst et al. 1992; Canada 1992; Dubin 1990). The final feature of the characteristic of openness is that of 'recency', which refers to the argument that, in the UK 'The development of government involvement in sport has for much of its history been haphazard' (Houlihan 1997: 92). Thus, although Horne et al. suggest that 'there has been a long-term structural relationship between the state and sport at local, regional, national and international levels, they also argue that 'this involvement may not have taken the explicit form of intervention until the latter half of the twentieth century' (1999: 198). In Canada, Macintosh & Whitson (1990) have revealed that a similar argument can be applied to the Canadian sport policy sector.

However, it should be noted that Canadian federal governments have taken a far more sustained interest in sport policy since the early 1960s than have successive governments in the UK, at least until more recently (see Chapter 5). In the UK, then, sport is not only in the process of adapting from its traditional, functionally–oriented administrative system but it also lacks a tradition of sustained policy involvement (Houlihan 2000b; Roche 1993). This issue has important implications for the study's empirical work (for example, in the investigation of the emergence of elite sport advocacy coalitions) and is explored in more depth within the subsequent evaluation of meso-level approaches.

General weakness of the sport policy community

The second major characteristic of the sport policy sector is the 'general weakness of the sport policy community' (Houlihan 2000b: 5); a characteristic clearly related to the consequences of variable salience and recency discussed above. Indeed, Houlihan contends that the notion of a sport 'policy community' is better conceived of as 'a loose issue network [rather] than a mature policy community' (2000b: 5). Whether Houlihan is correct in his line of reasoning remains an empirical question for this research through a pertinent meso-level theoretical lens. However, it is noteworthy that, within a discussion surrounding school sport, the emergence of Specialist Sports Colleges, and the vulnerability of the sport policy sector to 'spillover' from adjacent policy sectors in the UK, Houlihan has argued that

> … the elite [sport] development policy community has greatly strengthened its voice and influence over government in the last 10 years even if this has been the result of a fortuitous coincidence of circumstances (sympathetic ministers and prime ministers and an upsurge in popular sentiment) rather than the product of successful lobbying (2000a: 178-179).

Houlihan's observations provide some evidence, in the UK at least, of an emergent trend towards a substantive elite sport policy community or advocacy coalition within the broader sport development policy subsystem.

The increasing internationalisation of sport policy-making

The final characteristic of the sport policy sector is the increasing internationalisation of many aspects of sport policy-making in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Clearly, the increasing influence of business interests is significant here, as is the increase in

transnational forums for sport policy-making; an instructive example of the latter is the International Forum on Elite Sport, which convened its inaugural meeting in Sydney in 1999 and brought together 53 actors from 17 countries to discuss, *inter alia*, the essential factors in a successful elite programme and the organisation and funding of elite sport. Therefore, issues that have been customarily framed within a domestic context are now increasingly being addressed within an international milieu. For example, Houlihan (2000b: 6) argues that 'the selection of sports to benefit from public subsidy is often determined by their inclusion in the Olympic programme', rather than by other domestic factors such as national popularity or relevance to national sport development strategy.

Elsewhere, Houlihan (2001) has argued that, with regard to sport and the role of the state, there is a distinction to be made between 'internationalisation' and 'globalisation'. It is not the intention to rehearse the intricacies of this debate here, however, the corollary of Houlihan's argument is that 'the globalising pressures affecting sport are located within a pattern of international governance within which the state and international governmental organisations play a central and, at times, possibly defining role' (2001: 7); an important point for this study, given the earlier discussion surrounding the role of the state in modern liberal democracies. Moreover, the concept of globalisation is one that has been highlighted by Hay (2002), Marsh (1995a) and Marsh & Stoker (1995a) as particularly salient to political science and the study of policy processes. In developing their argument, Marsh & Stoker have much in common with Houlihan (2001), in arguing that 'It becomes less acceptable to study in isolation the experience of particular countries. In a world in which political actors and interests are experiencing the impact of globalisation, then political science cannot be immune from such forces' (1995a: 297). Consequently, under these conditions both politicians and the electorate are more able to observe the policy problems faced, and the solutions adopted, by other countries and, as Marsh & Stoker have also noted, 'This is reflected in the growing interest that politicians, and political scientists, have taken in policy transfer' (1995a: 295-296).

These are interesting observations, not least for the reference to policy transfer. Policy transfer (cf. Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000; Evans & Davies 1999; Stone 1999) can be viewed as the broader concept within which the more specific concepts of 'policy-oriented learning' (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999) and 'lesson-drawing' (Rose 1991a,

1991b, 1993) can be delineated. It is important to signpost the significance of these concepts, which is further developed below within the discussion of meso-level approaches, as they may prove to be important variables for understanding and explaining policy change in relation to elite sport policy developments in Canada and the UK. To sum up this section, the following comments with regard to policy transfer are enlightening:

> It has always existed but there can be no doubt that the rapid growth in communications of all types since the Second World War has accelerated the process ... the increase in policy transfer has led to the development of interest in the topic ... [and in] comparative politics and public policy (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996: 343).

Taken together, the above observations provided by Houlihan, Marsh & Stoker and Dolowitz & Marsh are not only interesting but also instructive as they make important links to aspects of global communications, policy transfer and the implications for policy-making, all of which are pertinent to this comparative study of elite sport policy change.

A salient macro-level approach

It was noted earlier that corporatist approaches would require substantial modification in order to adapt their somewhat rigid tripartite structure. There are also difficulties with Marxist accounts as, in the final instance, ambiguity remains regarding, for example, 'how capital actually influences the state' (Smith 1993: 44). Within the latter, the state is seen as a site of particular class strategies – the condensation of class forces (Poulantzas 1972) - and questions remain as to what exactly this latter phrase means, and what the mechanism is whereby class struggle is reflected in the state and thus in policy outcomes (Smith 1993: 44-45). Indeed McEachern has argued that

> If there are no guarantees, if there are no mechanisms internal to the state to provide that guarantee, then the whole argument about the analysis of the capitalist class needs to be recast so that it does not imply some automatic adjustment of state action to system and class-serving consequences (1990: 20).

It short, Marxist explanations might have better enabled an analysis of societal relations in the earlier part of the 20th century when class relations were more deeply embedded and divided. It has also been shown that 'rigid' corporatist accounts of tripartite relations had most utility at particular times and in particular countries. It is argued, therefore, that a macro-level position reflecting the overlapping assumptions of neo-

pluralist/elitist approaches offers the greater potential to reflect both the group/state relationships of modern liberal democracies and the specific policy sector (sport) under consideration. Such a position assumes that there are multiple pressure groups but the political agenda is (potentially) skewed towards corporate power and/or policy elites; the state and its departments possess their own sectoral interests; power is contested by numerous groups; and the international order is compromised by powerful multinational economic interests and dominant states (cf. Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; Held 1996; Smith 1993, 1995). This line of reasoning is borne out by Houlihan (1997), who argues that meso-level analysis such as that provided by the policy networks approach or the advocacy coalition framework are instructive as metaphors for policy-making only when located within a broader theory of power. Indeed, Houlihan has argued that 'Within the varied range of power models available, that outlined by Lindblom (1977) lays the most persuasive foundation through the combination of elements of elitist and neo-pluralist analyses' (Houlihan 1997: 257). Having provided an evaluation of the macro-level of analysis, it is now appropriate to provide a similar evaluation of meso-level approaches to the policy process.

Meso-level approaches to the policy process

The aim here is to evaluate the explanations offered by a number of influential meso-level approaches to the study of the policy process (cf. Sabatier 1999) in order to set out a framework to complement the neo-pluralist/elitist, macro-theoretical approach outlined above and to better enable the comparative analysis of elite sport policy change in Canada and the UK. The key criteria upon which the following approaches are evaluated are : i) the ability to capture the dynamics of policy change (both endogenous and exogenous factors); ii) the capacity to enable analysis between macro- and meso-levels of analysis; iii) to enable comparison between countries; iv) to allow for the role of mediating individuals, for example, policy brokers/entrepreneurs; and v) to be applicable to a relatively new and often marginal public policy concern. The first meso-level framework to be considered is the 'stagist' approach (cf. Parsons 1995) to analysing the policy process.

Stages models

The aim of 'stages models' is to simplify the vast range of decisions and forms of behaviour that characterise contemporary public policy decision-making. In short, stages models attempt 'to impose some conceptual order on the policy process in order to comprehend it' (John 1998: 22), and thus to introduce some clarity and coherence into the explanatory process. Indeed, Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier (1993b: 1) have given this approach the catch-all term 'the stages heuristic' to indicate this pedagogic purpose. Over the past decade, however, these approaches have been the subject of sustained criticism and there is a growing consensus that the stages model 'has outlived its usefulness as a guide to research and teaching' (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1993b: 1). Thus, (just) a brief evaluation of the contribution this approach has made to the study of the policy process, and its potential relevance for this study, is appropriate.

Harold Lasswell is acknowledged as one of the pre-eminent authors behind the growth of approaches to analysing the policy process as alternatives to the study of constitutions, legislatures and interest groups and public administration (Parsons 1995: 16-29). de Leon highlights Lasswell's (1951, 1956) development of the 'seven stages' of the 'decision process': Intelligence; Promotion; Prescription; Invocation; Application; Termination; and Appraisal and suggests that the enduring legacy of Lasswell's work is that 'The cumulative analyses of the various stages clearly demonstrated Lasswell's insistence on a multidisciplinary approach to the policy sciences, as well as the interactive effects among the different stages' (de Leon 1999: 20-22). David Easton (1953, 1965) has also been credited as a leading contributor to this type of approach (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993b: 1). Easton's work provides a 'systems model' of politics that conceptualises the relationship between policy-making, policy outputs and its wider environment. Here, the so-called Eastonian 'black box' model views the policy process in terms of received inputs, in the form of flows from the environment (e.g. ecological, biological, social and personality), mediated through input channels (parties, media, interest groups), demands within the political system and their conversion into policy outputs and outcomes (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1993b). However, the overriding criticism levelled at these sequential models is that they create an artificial view of policy-making: the 'real world', it is argued, is far more complicated and not composed of orderly steps, phases or cycles (Parsons 1995: 79).

Given such criticisms, while stages models are useful for their 'organising capability', they offer limited scope for this study. In sum, stages models over-simplify what is a complex and multi-faceted process; they do not, therefore, sufficiently satisfy the key criteria outlined earlier. As Sabatier observes, 'The stages heuristic has outlived its usefulness and needs to be replaced with better theoretical frameworks' (1999: 7), and suggests that a number of 'more promising theoretical frameworks' of the policy process have been developed over the past 15 years; three of which are evaluated below. With regard to the key criteria outlined earlier, the following frameworks have been identified as having utility for this study: the multiple-streams approach; policy networks; and the advocacy coalition framework. Space precludes a more detailed evaluation of two other approaches worthy of mention - the institutional analysis and development framework and punctuated-equilibrium theory - however, see Ostrom (1999) and True et al. (1999) for a detailed review of these two approaches.

Multiple-streams

Multiple-streams (MS) is an approach developed by John Kingdon (1995) and has emerged as a major theoretical perspective of public policy-making in the United States (Zahariadis & Allen 1995). Kingdon regards policy formation as the result of a flow of three sets of processes or 'streams': problems, policies and politics. Each stream is conceptualised, for the most part, as separate from the others with its own dynamics and rules. At critical points in time, the streams are 'coupled' by what Kingdon terms, 'policy entrepreneurs'. Thus, the combination of all three streams into a single package increases significantly the chances that an issue will receive attention by policy-makers (Zahariadis 1999: 76). In a review of Kingdon's MS approach, John (1998) suggests that 'problems' are conceived of as public matters requiring attention that may or may not get defined as important. 'Policies' are proposals for change based on cumulative knowledge of interest among specialists in a policy sector. This is where the notion of policy entrepreneurs is significant. Certain highly motivated people propose solutions to the problems, mobilising opinion and institutions – thereby ensuring the idea remains salient to the agenda. Finally, 'political' processes such as election results and swings in popular opinion influence how the media and other opinion-formers define public problems and evaluate the potential solutions. Moreover, John (1998: 174) argues that 'It is the circumstances under which these three streams combine to make a policy happen' that is crucial to the MS approach.

A significant feature, therefore, of Kingdon's approach is the notion of 'coupling', where issues rise on the agenda when the three streams are conjoined at critical moments in time - 'policy windows'. As Kingdon notes, 'The policy window is an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems' (1995: 165). Crucially, the window can open predictably - the scheduled renewal of a programme, for example. However, at other times, it happens quite unpredictably and policy entrepreneurs must be ready and well prepared to push their 'special problems' onto the agenda. The result 'is a chaotic style of policy-making as decision-makers deal with a changing array of problems and solutions' (John 1998: 175). Moreover, the MS approach elevates the significance of ideas in public policy-making, while at the same time seeks to explain how ideas emerge by their adoption and rejection by the various decision-makers involved. Kingdon conceives of ideas in public policy as not just reflecting power relationships in that 'they originate from a number of contingent and often contradictory selection processes' (quoted in John 1998: 175). As John observes, 'Changing agendas affect policy selection via ripples of influence through policy systems. There are "spillovers" from one policy sector to another' (1998: 175).

As to the value of the MS approach for this study, an interesting aspect is its ability to provide a link between the macro- and meso-levels of analysis. Indeed, Zahariadias suggests that the MS approach 'is particularly useful because it integrates policy communities with broader events ... Broad political events are connected to narrow sectoral developments in specific ways' (1999: 78). In addition, Houlihan argues that in the sport policy sector the concept of 'policy entrepreneur' is of interest and 'might fit well in an area where institutionalisation of influence is weak' (2000b: 8). It could be argued, however, that the concept of 'policy broker' (a concept similar to Kingdon's policy entrepreneur), and developed within the advocacy coalition framework, is more appropriate to this study's focus on internal organisational and administrative policy developments at the level of NSOs/NGBs in Canada and the UK. An argument supported by Coleman & Perl's (1999) discussion of the increase in internationalised policy communities and the suggestion that the concepts of policy broker and policy entrepreneur provide a basis for further developing the notion of what they term a 'policy community mediator'. However, with regard to Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith's (1999) contention that a policy broker is one 'whose principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict' (1999: 122), the notion of

policy broker appears to be more appropriate than that of policy entrepreneur given Coleman & Perl's further contention that 'a policy community mediator may operate as a pragmatic policy *broker* who looks for opportunities to lessen conflict within and between policy communities' (1999: 707, emphasis added).

The MS approach is also concerned primarily with the 'agenda setting' stage of the policy process (Kingdon 1995; Sabatier 1993: 37) and does not specifically address the key concepts of policy learning/policy transfer in the process of policy change, which, as argued, appear to have some utility for this comparative study. In addition, the MS approach is premised upon 'predecision processes in the United States: agenda-setting and alternative specifications' (Zahariadis 1999: 79). Therefore, although Zahariadis & Allen (1995) have explored the politics of privatisation in Britain and France using the MS framework, significant reservations remain as to whether Kingdon's model can produce conclusions that are generalisable to other countries - especially those that have an active statist tradition, for example, France and Scandinavian countries, and to a lesser, although significant extent, the UK - as well as to other stages of the policy process.

Policy networks

It is important to note at the outset that 'The literature on policy networks has varied disciplinary origins, proliferating terminology, mutually exclusive definitions and, especially, varying levels of analysis' (Rhodes & Marsh 1992: 18; see also, for example, Atkinson & Coleman 1992; Marsh 1998). However, Rhodes & Marsh (1992) suggest that there is general agreement that it is a meso-level concept and one that can act as a linking concept between the micro-level of analysis, which deals with the role of interests and government in relation to particular policy decisions, and the macro-level of analysis, which is concerned with wider questions concerning the distribution of power within modern society. These observations are important for this study, given its primary focus on the meso-level of analysis and its aim of integrating the latter with the macro-level of theorising. A brief review of contributions to the policy networks approach in both the American and British literature is provided below in order to provide a better understanding of its utility for this study. Policy networks analysis, and its value for understanding group/government relations, is drawn from the notion of 'sub-governments' in the United States (cf. Ripley & Franklin 1980) and through the work on policy networks in Britain by Richardson & Jordan (1979), Jordan & Richardson

(1987) and, most notably, by Marsh & Rhodes (1992b). In both countries, Smith suggests that 'the development of these concepts was a recognition that there were problems with the pluralist view of the world' (1993: 57).

In the United States, the focus was on regular contacts between interest group individuals, bureaucratic agencies and government that, in effect, provided the basis of a 'sub-government'. Emphasis here was on a few privileged groups that had close relations with governments, with the resultant sub-government excluding other interests and thus a strong influence on policy-making. Indeed, Rhodes & Marsh (1992: 6) note that Lowi (1969) has characterised the 'triangular' nature of the relationships between the central government agency, the Congressional committee, and the interest group as enjoying 'an almost symbiotic interaction'; insights which have inspired the oft-quoted label within the literature on sub-governments: the 'iron triangle'. In short, 'this approach represented a critique, sometimes implicit, of the pluralist model of interest group intermediation (Rhodes & Marsh 1992: 5). As a counter-critique from the pluralist perspective, Heclo's (1978) defence of pluralism plays down the restricted nature of access to policy-making and focuses on the importance of 'issue networks'. Following Heclo, McFarland conceptualises an issue network as

> ... a communications network of those interested in policy in some area, including government authorities, legislators, businessmen, lobbyists and even academics and journalists. Obviously an issue network is not the same as an 'iron triangle'. A lively issue network constantly communicates criticisms of policy and generates ideas for policy initiatives (1987: 146).

Rhodes & Marsh (1992) suggest that McFarland's conceptualisation includes a renewed emphasis upon two basic tenets of pluralism: the potential independence of government from the pressures of particular interests and the existence of actual or potential countervailing power alliances which prevent the domination of economic interests. Thus, McFarland's theory has been acknowledged as recognising the power of producers, the potential of agency autonomy and the capacity of other groups in certain circumstances to restrict the power of producers and the autonomy of the state. However, it is worth noting that Smith has suggested that it has little to do with pluralism, and has more in common with 'an elitist analysis of the policy process' (1995: 223). Overall, Rhodes & Marsh conclude that 'the American literature has concentrated on the micro-level, dealing with personal relations between key actors rather than structural relations between institutions' (1992: 7).

In the UK, initial research into the policy networks concept by Richardson & Jordan (1979) was influenced by Heclo & Wildavsky's (1974) work on British public expenditure decision-making within the Treasury. Heclo & Wildavsky focused on 'the personal relationships between major political and administrative actors – sometimes in conflict, often in agreement, but always in touch and operating within a shared framework' (1974: xv). This argument suggests that 'Policy is made within this community by a limited number of actors who interact frequently and share common values' (Rhodes & Marsh 1992: 8). A more explicit network approach was pioneered by Rhodes (1988), extended by Marsh & Rhodes (1992b) and reiterated and refined by others (see, for example, Howlett 2002; Smith 1993; Wilks & Wright 1987; Wright 1988). Following Rhodes (1988), Marsh & Rhodes (1992a) developed a typology of policy networks utilising a number of characteristic dimensions, including membership, type of interest, integration, resources and power. Marsh & Rhodes' conceptualisation can be viewed as a continuum: at one end, is the 'policy community' where, for example, membership is limited, if not exclusive, membership, values and outcomes are persistent over time, and all participants share basic values and accept the legitimacy of the outcome. 'Issue networks' can be located at the other end of this continuum, representing a much looser set of interests, are less stable and non-exclusive, and have weaker points of entry into actual policy-making - see Marsh & Rhodes (1992b) for a more extensive review and application of this approach in different policy sectors.

Despite terminological ambiguities surrounding the meaning and use of the network/community metaphors, Atkinson & Coleman argue that this 'should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that the concepts ... have assisted public policy studies' (1992: 162; see also Howlett 2002). Crucially, attention has shifted from policy-making in national institutions to policy-making in subsystems and sectors. More importantly, Atkinson & Coleman also maintain that participation in the policy process is not restricted to interest groups and that the network and community concepts 'leave open to empirical research the question of which societal actors, possessed of which institutional properties, participate in a given policy domain .... Any actors holding technical knowledge .... have become potentially crucial participants in the policy process' (1992: 162). With regard to levels of analysis, and the development of an integrated framework for this study, the utility of the networks approach is clear from Smith's suggestion that 'policy networks ... is a meso-level concept which is concerned with explaining behaviour within particular sections of the state or particular policy

areas' (1993: 7). Using this approach, the nature of state/group relations is not assumed, suggesting that 'the state is fragmented rather than unified' (Smith 1993: 7). Smith also notes that many theorists, whether Marxist (cf. Jessop 1990) or pluralist (cf. Rhodes (1988), accept that the state is not unified but is an ensemble of many different institutions and agencies and which are often in conflict. The policy networks approach thus provides a mechanism for assessing these institutions and agencies, and one where power is conceived of as a relationship based on dependence and not a zero-sum. For Smith, then, 'power is something that develops within relationships between groups and state actors, and a policy network is frequently a mechanism for enhancing mutual power rather than taking power from one or the other' (1993: 7).

While the policy networks approach has attracted considerable support as a model of policy-making in modern society' (Parsons 1995: 191), as in the accounts of the two previous meso-level approaches, it is not without its critics (see, for example, Atkinson & Coleman 1992; Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998; Dowding 1994, 1995, 2001). Three criticisms, in particular, are worthy of note. Firstly, by focusing on sectoral and sub-sectoral components of the policy process, the networks approach tends to neglect the influence of macro-level political structures and systems (Atkinson & Coleman 1992: 163; see also Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998). Questions are raised here with regard to power resources, the organisational and administrative influence of state departments, elite sport policy processes and policy change. We can signpost Chapter 5's discussion of the development of sport policy in Canada and the UK with a brief example. Within an analysis of the Department of National Heritage (DNH - now DCMS) in the UK and its relationship with its policy networks, Taylor (1997) argues that the department has four power resources that confer a high degree of control over its policy networks: i) ministerial activism; ii) systematic scrutiny; iii) legislation, policy guidance and review; and iv) finance. It thus remains an empirical question as to whether the DCMS has been able to maintain (and potentially extend) such control in the UK, and whether a similar scenario is characteristic of Canada's federal constitutional relationship with sporting agencies and organisations (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).

The second point of note, or criticism, surrounds the issue of the increasing 'internationalisation' of many policy sectors (Atkinson & Coleman 1992: 168). It was suggested earlier that this is a key characteristic of the sport policy sector, and elite sport is clearly a sub-sector (or subsystem) of the latter. Moreover, professional experts

on policy issues that influence the domestic level increasingly attend international forums, or what might be termed, 'epistemic communities' (Haas 1992) - the biennial International Forum on Elite Sport, is an instructive case in this regard. The key point here is that the policy networks approach has been criticised for concentrating on a single level of a political system - with the exception of policy analysis within federal regimes (Atkinson & Coleman 1992: 168). More recently, however, it has been suggested that the policy networks approach can be re-conceptualised in order for it to have continued utility in 'internationalised policy environments ... where at least some part of policy-making takes place at a more encompassing level than the nation-state' (Coleman & Perl 1999: 700). Of particular interest, is the (discussed) notion of policy community mediators and their role in these internationalised policy domains where boundary rules 'create the possibility of overlapping memberships between policy communities, with mediators emerging from those actors with joint memberships' (Coleman & Perl 1999: 700).

These observations point to a mediator operating as a pragmatic policy broker who looks for opportunities to lessen conflict within and between policy communities. As noted in the discussion on the multiple-streams approach, there are clear links here to the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and its concept of a policy broker who mediates conflicting strategies between coalitions. The case for the ACF is outlined in more detail below, however, it is worth noting that the above critiques of the networks concept suggest that the ACF, with its focus on technical knowledge, policy-oriented learning (a sub-concept of policy transfer) and, arguably, most importantly, its central focus on policy change, exemplifies a framework of heightened utility for this study of elite sport policy and policy change in Canada and the UK. The third criticism of the policy networks approach, and one that is clearly related to the previous critique, is that it has failed to address explicitly the issue of policy change (see also, Marsh & Rhodes 1992a: 261; Peters 1998b: 29-30). Atkinson & Coleman (1992: 174) propose three sets of factors in order to help alleviate this problem and, in so doing, lend further credence to the utility of the ACF. These authors argue that the first two sets of factors – boundary rules (for example, who is included and excluded from the policy process and why) and policy ideas/beliefs – must be tied to a third set of factors (exogenous events) if the evolution of networks is to be linked to policy innovation and change. The three factors cited here for addressing the issue of policy change are dealt with, to a greater or lesser

extent, within the final meso-level approach considered for this study: the advocacy coalition framework.

Advocacy coalition framework

It is worth re-emphasising that the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) 'has much in common with the policy network school' (John 1998: 169; see also Peters 1998b: 29-30). However, John also suggests that the ACF 'is a broader set of processes than that evoked by the network metaphor' (1998: 169) and, in exploring this 'broader set of processes', the ACF's appeal as a persuasive approach for this study can be set out. At this point, it is worth noting that an 'advocacy coalition' has been defined as

> ... people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who (1) share a particular belief system – i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who (2) show a non-trivial degree of co-ordination over time (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 138).

The initial version of the ACF (1987-1988) emerged out of a search for an alternative to the (earlier discussed) 'stages heuristic' that was then dominating policy studies; a desire to blend the key features of the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches to policy implementation; and a commitment to give technical knowledge a more central role in theories of the policy process (Sabatier 1998). A key feature of the ACF is, therefore, its focus on the policy process as a whole. Indeed, Sabatier suggests that 'Its goal was to provide a coherent understanding of the major factors and processes affecting the overall policy process – including problem definition, policy formulation, implementation, and revision in a specific policy domain – over periods of a decade or more' (1998: 98). The reference to a time span 'of a decade or more' comes directly from findings concerning the significance of the 'enlightenment function' (Weiss 1977) of policy research, and is relevant to the ACF's focus on policy-oriented learning. Weiss (1977) has argued convincingly that to concentrate on short-term decision-making underestimates the effect of policy analysis, as this type of research is used, in the main, 'to alter the perceptions and conceptual apparatus of policy makers over time' (Sabatier 1993: 16). Indeed, Weiss concludes that 'As new concepts and data emerge, their gradual cumulative effect can be to change the conventions policymakers abide by and to reorder the goals and priorities of the practical policy world' (1977: 544).

It should be noted that the ACF has undergone a number of revisions since the initial version was developed in the late 1980s and it is not the intention to review all these developments here (for more detail, see Sabatier 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993a; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). As with the preceding meso-level approaches, the intention is to evaluate the ACF against the criteria outlined earlier as crucial to this study. Thus, according to the logic of the ACF, policy change over time is a function of three sets of processes (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Structure of the Advocacy Coalition Framework



Source: Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999: 149)

The first of these processes concerns the (endogenous) interaction of competing advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem. It is important here to clarify how the term 'subsystem' is to be used in this study, given the terminological ambiguity implicit in the use of the term (and related terms) in the literature (cf. Coleman & Perl 1999:

694; John 1998: 169; Peters 1998b: 30-31; Richardson 2000: 1020). For ACF purposes, a subsystem consists of 'those actors from a variety of public and private organisations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue ... and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 119). Such actors share a set of fundamental beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other perceptions), and aim to influence rules, budgets and governmental personnel in order to achieve these goals over time (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1993b: 5). Thus, within the subsystem, the ACF assumes that a number of discrete coalitions will emerge. From the above, and following the line adopted in the discussion on policy networks (Marsh & Rhodes 1992b), a policy subsystem can be likened to an 'issue network', with its broad membership and open access, while the shared world view and interests of an advocacy coalition are analogous to a 'policy community' (Bulkeley 2000: 732).

The second set of processes, *exogenous* to the subsystem, are concerned with the effects of (relatively) 'stable system parameters' – such as social structure and constitutional rules – on the constraints and resources of the various subsystem actors. The third set of processes concern changes that are also exogenous to the subsystem, and the ACF assumes that these are more susceptible (than the first set of exogenous factors) to change over a decade or more and are a critical prerequisite for major policy change. These processes relate to changes in:

- socio-economic conditions and technology - in the area of elite sport, these might be a realignment of funding allocations for sport and contemporary developments in sports science and/or physiology;
- the systemic governing coalition or 'elections that produce changes in chief executives and key legislators' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993a: 223). In the UK, for example, the change in Prime Minister from Margaret Thatcher to John Major in 1990 has been widely acknowledged as significant with regard to changing governmental approaches to sport, in general, and for elite sport, in particular, during the 1990s;
- public opinion – in the UK, for example, UK Sport has established a longitudinal survey of the general public's 'sporting preferences'. Of particular interest here, is the desire to track public opinion in relation to which sports should be funded at the elite level (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002; UK Sport 2002f) and;
- policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems that provide opportunities and obstacles to the competing coalitions - it was noted earlier how the sport

policy area is vulnerable to 'spillover' effects from other policy sectors (Houlihan 2000b).

A defining feature of an advocacy coalition is its organisation around a tripartite hierarchy of beliefs, namely, 'deep core', 'policy core' and 'secondary aspects'. Deep core beliefs include basic ontological and normative beliefs, for example, the relative valuation of individual freedom versus social equality. At the next level, policy core beliefs represent a coalition's basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across a policy subsystem, for example, fundamental value priorities and identification of groups whose welfare is of greatest concern - with respect to sport policy, the relative emphasis put on Sport for All initiatives relative to programmes for elite level sport, for example. Finally, secondary aspects comprise a large set of narrower (less than subsystem-wide) beliefs concerning, for example, the seriousness of the problem or relative significance of various causal factors in specific settings or specific policy preferences regarding funding allocations. In the sport development policy subsystem, aspects regarding, for example, decisions to construct either elite level facilities or community sport facilities for mass participation objectives. It is assumed that these structural categories of belief systems reveal decreasing resistance to change, with deep core (normative) beliefs revealing the greatest and secondary aspects the least, resistance (Kübler 2001: 624; see also Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999 for an in-depth and up-to-date review of the ACF's belief structures).

The ACF thus appears to embody an 'interplay', or dialectical relationship, between the exogenous and endogenous factors discussed above (and see Figure 2.1). This is an instructive observation given the persuasive arguments for a more dynamic, dialectical approach to the analysis of policy change (cf. Hay 2002; Marsh 1998; Marsh & Smith 2000, Marsh et al. 1999). Moreover, the adoption of critical realist assumptions at ontological and epistemological levels (see Chapter 3) underscores such an approach. The argument being developed here is that the dialectical approach advanced by the above authors is embodied in the underlying assumptions of the ACF. On this issue, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith contend that a fundamental premise of the ACF is that 'although policy-oriented learning often alters aspects of a coalition's belief system, changes in the policy core aspects of a governmental programme require a perturbation in noncognitive factors external to the sub-system' (1999: 123). Following, Heclo (1974: 306), policy-oriented learning within the ACF refers to relatively enduring alterations of

thought or behavioural intentions which result from experience and/or new information and which are concerned with the attainment of policy objectives. For Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 'Policy-oriented learning is an ongoing process of search and adaptation motivated by the desire to realise core policy beliefs' (1993a: 44). The ACF hypothesises that change in policy core beliefs requires an accumulation of evidence over a decade or more, encompassing the 'enlightenment function' (Weiss 1977) referred to above. It should be noted that several different explanations of policy change based on notions of learning and policy transfer have emerged within the literature.[3] Notwithstanding these different explanations, Richardson's (2000: 1020) observation that 'policy transfer can be a powerful and disturbing exogenous shock', points to the potential salience of the concept for this study.

In addition, the concept of policy broker was highlighted earlier as being important in the sport policy sector 'where the level of organisational complexity alone suggests the need for such a role' (Houlihan 2000b). Within the ACF, the policy broker has a major role to play. As Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith suggest, 'Conflicting strategies from various coalitions may be mediated by a third group of actors, here termed policy brokers, whose principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict' (1999: 122). In the area of elite sport, examples of policy brokers in the UK might be Rodney Walker, Chair of UK Sport, brought in to mediate an intense and often debilitating conflict surrounding the redevelopment of Wembley stadium, and Sue Campbell, currently acting as a cross-departmental government advisor on sport policy. In Canada, the role of Denis Coderre, the former Secretary of State (Amateur Sport) has been highlighted as crucial in initiating the wide-ranging policy deliberations underpinning the new Canadian Sport Policy – most notably in his ability to garner collaborative support at, and between, federal-provincial/territorial levels (see Chapters 5 and 6).

The concept of policy broker is significant in other ways given this study's contention that an effective theoretical framework should be able to take account of the particular characteristics of the sport policy sector. As discussed, two such characteristics are that sport is a relatively new and often marginal area of public policy concern (Houlihan 2000b). Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier provide an apposite example here by way of discussing the process of policy-oriented learning and the ways in which 'problems' are

advocated between coalitions; a process usually mediated by policy brokers who are interested in keeping the conflict within acceptable limits:

> In *a new* policy area, knowledge about the seriousness of the problem and the validity of various causal assumptions is normally sufficiently uncertain and the political resources of those challenging the status quo sufficiently modest that the *initial* governmental programme involves a significant research component but little coercion (1993a: 47, emphasis added).

With regard to integrating levels of analysis and theorising, it was noted earlier that the policy networks approach is a meso-level concept, and one that has distinct similarities to the ACF. Given the exhortations by Daugbjerg & Marsh (1998) and others - see, for example, Marsh (1995a, 1995b, 1998) and Marsh & Stoker (1995a) - to integrate theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis, it is argued that the ACF can be conceived of as a meso-level concept which can accommodate a micro-level analysis of the 'model of the individual' (see, for example, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 130), as well as an analysis located within the overlapping assumptions of neo-pluralism/elitism at the macro-level. As discussed, the issue of integrating theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis is significant for this research and is further developed below in the chapter's concluding remarks. We can note, however, that the notion of a policy subsystem within ACF assumptions is pertinent to Dunleavy & O'Leary's discussion of neo-pluralism (at the macro-level) and policy communities (at the meso-level). With respect to these two levels of analysis, Dunleavy & O'Leary have argued that

> Wherever policy-making is split between different agencies or tiers of government, complicated systems of inter-governmental or inter-agency relations evolve. These systems create 'policy communities' [or advocacy coalitions] where rational debate and education about issues can take place ... They are networks of personal contacts, or more formalised channels for ideas and communication between diverse agencies (1987: 306).

One final point is worthy of note. Given the earlier discussion of the sport policy sector as being characterised by 'recency', and this study's aim of utilising a framework applicable to a 'relatively new and often marginal public policy concern' (Houlihan 2000b), an interesting aspect of such coalition-forming in both Canadian and UK sporting contexts is the ACF's focus on groups of people and/or organisations interacting regularly over a period of a decade or more (cf. Sabatier 1993). Such observations have important implications for the study's empirical work. It is important, for example, to explore the conditions pertaining to a 'nascent' and a 'mature' policy subsystem within which coalitions might evolve. The former is one that is in the process of forming,

whereas the latter is one that has 'sought to influence public policy for a fairly long period of time' – seven to ten years is suggested by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999: 136). Research utilising the ACF (cf. Kübler 2001; Mawhinney 1993) suggests that actors tend to coalesce into discrete coalitions within the subsystem around some watershed event(s) that clarifies underlying conflicts regarding the particular (policy) issue in question. With respect to the UK, Houlihan & White suggest that sport development is 'a sub-area primarily, but not exclusively, within the broader area of sport policy which itself has only been acknowledged as a legitimate and regular focus for government expenditure and policy for just over thirty-five years' (2002: 1). A similar scenario is apparent in Canada, where the federal government has been involved in the broader sport policy sector since the early 1960s. From an ACF perspective, then, it is clear that in both countries we have evidence of public policy involvement of over 10 years: the ACF's requirement. Following the logic of the ACF, a key objective of the empirical research is to discern whether a number of coalitions have coalesced around different aspects (of potential conflict) within the sport development policy subsystem. Taking the logic one stage further, how might these coalitions be implicated in policy change? Clearly, these are hypothetical contentions and are used here to illustrate the potential salience of the ACF in the analysis of elite sport policy change in both Canada and the UK.

Conclusions to chapter

This chapter has provided an evaluation of: i) three prominent macro-level perspectives on state theory; ii) the relationship between these macro-level perspectives and key characteristics of the sport policy sector; and iii) an evaluation of four differing approaches to the meso-level of policy analysis. It is now possible to summarise the key aspects underpinning the complex relationship between the macro- and meso-level approaches and the sport policy sector under investigation. Within this summary, the persuasiveness of the adopted macro- and meso-level approaches is explored and clarified. We begin with the meso-level of analysis: the focus of the study. Firstly, the ACF appears to offer the most persuasive insights at the meso-level for analysing elite sport policy processes, in general, and policy change, in particular, in Canada and the UK. Following this approach, an important aspect for empirical investigation in both countries, then, is the identification and exploration of potential advocacy coalitions that may have formed within the sport development policy subsystem. The ACF is also

particularly persuasive in addressing the concept of policy-oriented learning, which may prove instructive in helping to explain aspects of policy change. In relation to this, is there evidence that policy transfer has taken place? - see Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000 for a review of different forms of policy transfer. If so, can policy transfer help us to understand policy change? The ACF is thus acknowledged as an important extension of the meso-level policy networks concept; a concept, moreover, which has been subject to the critique that it lacks utility in helping us to understand and explain policy change. A contention borne out by Richardson, for example, who argues that 'questions [remain] about the ability of these concepts [policy networks and communities] to explain major policy change' (2000: 1021). Secondly, and with regard to the importance of integrating different levels of analysis, it is worthwhile quoting Daugbjerg & Marsh at length on this crucial issue of integration at the macro- and meso-levels, our key concern here:

> ... the macro-level of analysis deals with the relationships between the state and civil society, that is state theory, and, more specifically, the broader political structures and processes within which the policy network [or policy subsystem] is located. State theory offers an explanation of the pattern of inclusion and exclusion within the network and an hypothesis about whose interests are served by the outputs from the network. The meso-level deals with the pattern of interest group intermediation, that is the policy networks; it concentrates upon questions concerning the structures and patterns of interaction within them (1998: 54).

While the focus of the study centres on the relationship between the meso- and macro-levels of analysis, the ACF includes 'a model of the individual' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 130) and further work in this area focusing on, for example, the meso- and micro-levels should be able to achieve a degree of theoretical integration following this study's findings. Thus, the aspect of integration of greatest concern here is related to the initial discussion of the macro-level theories of pluralism, Marxism and corporatism. The contention, then, is that the overlapping assumptions of neo-pluralism/elitism appear to offer the paramount explanatory power for this study, given the ACF's central focus on competing coalitions, each of which is comprised of policy elites sharing similar values/beliefs within a policy subsystem; in short, these assumptions acknowledge certain structural inequalities in state/interest group relations but without resorting to the over-deterministic assumptions found in various Marxist analyses, for example. With regard to neo-pluralism, insightful links to the ACF, including the role of professional knowledge and technical rationality, are provided by Marsh & Rhodes, who have argued that neo-pluralist accounts of policy networks/subsystems explore the impact of professional influence, the logic of technical rationality, the privileged position of a select

number of interest groups, and the complex interdependencies within decentralised governmental structures' (1992a: 266).

The third and final aspect is clearly related to the above observations. That is, it is imperative to locate any analysis of policy change within the context of a theory of power relations. In short, how might insights from a salient conceptualisation of power relations shed light on the relationship between the state and its various agencies and organisations within civil society? As Marsh has argued, policy networks/subsystems 'are characterised by consistent structured privilege which needs to be explained to enable an understanding of policy outcomes' (1995b: 5). In other words, by integrating the macro- and meso-levels of theorising and analysis, together with a pertinent and explicit conceptualisation of power relations, all four questions that any analysis of state/interest group relations needs to address can at least be considered (Marsh & Stoker 1995a). It is argued that the ACF addresses the first two of these questions, namely, 'Who rules/makes policy?' and 'How do they rule/make policy?' However, it is only through the macro-level of theorising, and into the realms of political sociology and state theory, that the second two questions can be adequately addressed. That is, 'Why are certain actors in a privileged position in the policy-making process?' and 'In whose interest do they rule, and how does their rule result in that interest being served?' (Marsh 1995b: 5-6; Marsh & Stoker 1995a: 293).

Notes

[1] A note on terminology is required here. Ambiguity characterises terms used in the public policy literature and various terms proliferate for describing levels of analysis. For example, policy: universe, sector, sub-sector, area, domain, subsystem and issue. In this study, the term (sport) policy 'sector' is used to denote the broader level of analysis and the term (sport development) policy 'subsystem' to delimit those actors/organisations involved in different aspects of policy-making therein.

[2] For a more in-depth analysis of Lukes' second and third dimensions of power, see Lukes (1974, 1977, 1986a, 1986b, 1997), and for an influential critique of classic pluralism linked to its failure to adequately characterise power relations in Western politics, see Bachrach & Baratz (1962, 1970).

[3] On the many and varied interpretations of policy learning, see, for example, Bennett (1991a); Bennett & Howlett (1992); Dolowitz & Marsh (1996, 2000); Evans & Davies (1999); May (1992); Robertson (1991); Rose (1991a, 1991b, 1993); Stone (1999).

Chapter 3
Research strategy and methods

Introduction

This chapter outlines the research strategy and specific methods/techniques employed for the study. The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, consideration is given to the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the nature of the paradigmatic parameters adopted for the research. It is imperative to do so as 'Different broad ontological and epistemological positions inform different methodological orientations or preferences' (Stoker 1995: 14; see also Grix 2002). In other words, it is important to acknowledge that different paradigmatic orientations embody different ways of viewing the social and political world depending on the view posited. This is not to imply that any one position is better than another; rather, the position adopted for this study must be clearly articulated in order for the overall conclusions to be internally coherent. Ontological assumptions lead to epistemological assumptions which have methodological implications for the choices made regarding particular methods or techniques of data collection and the interpretation of findings arising from the research (cf. Grix 2002; Sparkes 1992: 14). Therefore, secondly, consideration is given to the key methodological issues pertinent to the study's substantive content. Thirdly, and clearly related to the previous considerations, the strengths and limitations of the particular research methods/techniques adopted for the study are discussed. Fourthly, as this study is comparative in nature, issues surrounding comparative public policy analysis (cf. Rose 1991a) are explored, wherein the utility of a case study research design is set out (cf. Hague et al. 1998; Mackie & Marsh 1995; Peters 1998a; Yin 1994). The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the study's research strategy/protocol.

In short, this research aims to address the seven elements identified by Marsh et al. (1999: 1-2) that are necessary for any 'satisfactory account' purporting to be a historical and theoretical analysis of political and policy change over time. It is argued, moreover, that, by drawing primarily upon the meso-level multi-dimensional advocacy coalition framework (ACF), the first four of these seven elements can be addressed. Thus, following Marsh et al., a satisfactory account:

1. 'Should have a strong historical perspective, being theoretically informed but empirically grounded;
2. Needs a sophisticated, rather than a simplistic, conception of change;
3. Should recognise the importance of political, economic and ideological factors in any explanation of change, rather than exclusively emphasising one of them;
4. Must recognise that any explanation has to take account of the international as well as the domestic context within which change occurs;
5. Needs to be underpinned by a stated and developed epistemological position;
6. Must utilise a dialectical approach to structure and agency, rather than giving priority to either;
7. Must acknowledge that the relationship between the material and the ideational is crucial and, again, dialectical'.

The final three elements identified above by Marsh et al. are addressed in the following sections of the chapter and further consideration is given to element four, by way of using examples related to the notion of globalisation processes, in order to illustrate key issues throughout the following discussion.

Paradigmatic parameters

As Blaikie (1993: 201) notes, 'The existence of an array of divergent approaches and strategies for social enquiry poses the problem of choice for the social researcher'. Blaikie also notes, however, that while it is possible 'to entertain arguments about the logic of various methods of theory construction and testing, ... ultimately, a conclusion about the strengths or weaknesses of any approach will entail the adoption of a particular set of ontological and epistemological assumptions' (1993: 201; see also Grix 2002). Table 3.1 below sets out three major research paradigms that have impacted upon the fields of sport and physical education in recent years. As Sparkes observes, 'At a most fundamental level different paradigms provide particular sets of lenses for seeing the world and making sense of it in different ways' (1992: 12). In short, this involves the adoption of certain assumptions regarding questions of ontology and epistemology and which, in turn, influences the methodological approach adopted; that is, how data is gathered and interpreted in order to understand the social and political world (cf. Grix 2002).

Table 3.1 Assumptions underlying Positivist, Interpretive and Critical paradigms

Assumptions	Positivist	Interpretive	Critical
Ontology	External-Realist	Internal-Idealist, Relativist	External-Realist *or* Internal-Idealist
Epistemology	Objectivist, Dualist	Subjectivist, Interactive	Subjectivist, Interactive
Methodology	Nomothetic, Experiential, Manipulative	Ideographic, Hermeneutical, Dialectical	Ideographic, Participative, Transformative
Interests	Prediction and Control (Technical)	Understanding and Interpretation (Practical)	Emancipation (Criticism and Liberation)

Source: Sparkes (1992: 21)

Choices surrounding the adoption of particular ontological and epistemological assumptions are further complicated, however, in that different (but not unrelated) nuances and terminologies have been used to describe the various paradigmatic parameters within which research may be conducted (Grix 2002; see also Blaikie 1993; Hollis & Smith 1991; Johnson et al. 1984). For example, in Table 3.2 below, Marsh et al. (1999) outline the core assumptions of, and differences between, three research paradigms that have been used extensively in social and political studies - Positivism, Relativism and Realism (It should be noted that Table 3.2 includes both ontological and epistemological assumptions).

Table 3.2 Core assumptions of, and differences between, Positivism, Relativism and Realism

Positivism	Relativism	Realism
The world exists independently of our knowledge of it – thus Positivism is at odds with Relativism and at one with Realism	The world does not exist independently of our knowledge of it – unlike the Positivist and Realist paradigms	Realists, like Positivists and against Relativists, contend that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it
Regular relationships can be established between social phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested, and falsified, by direct observation	The world is socially, or discursively, constructed – totally at odds with Positivism but, with significant differences, a view shared with Realism	For Realists, there are deep structures which cannot be directly observed – unlike Positivists
For the Positivist there are no deep structures which cannot be observed – unlike the Realist	There is no extra-discursive social sphere, no 'real' social world beyond discourse – a view at odds with Positivism and Realism	Realists, unlike Relativists but like Positivists, argue that there is necessity in the world – objects/structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements
Positivism assumes that there is no dichotomy between appearance and reality; that the world is real and not mediated by our senses or socially constructed	Social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them; it is this interpretation/understanding of them which affects outcomes – and it is the interpretation of these social phenomena which is crucial	While social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation, or discursive construction, of them, nevertheless that discursive construction affects outcomes
	However, meanings can only be established and understood within discourses – objective analysis is therefore impossible – knowledge is discursively laden	For this reason, structures do not determine outcomes, rather they constrain and facilitate; social science involves the study of reflexive agents who are capable of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing structures

Source: Adapted from Marsh et al. (1999: 11-14)

Ontological assumptions, then, revolve around questions regarding the nature of existence. For Burrell & Morgan, the key ontological question centres on

> … whether the 'reality' to be investigated is external to the individual – imposing itself on individual consciousness from without – or the product of individual consciousness; whether 'reality' is of an 'objective nature', or the product of individual cognition; whether 'reality' is a given 'out there' in the world, or the product of one's mind (1979: 1).

Related to issues of ontology are a second set of assumptions of an epistemological nature that refer to questions of knowing and the nature of knowledge (Grix 2002: 177-178). For Blaikie, epistemology concerns 'the possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is understood to be. In short, claims about how what is assumed to exist can be known' (2000: 8; see also, for example, Burrell & Morgan 1979: 1-2). Epistemological assumptions can elicit extreme positions on the issue of whether knowledge is something that can be acquired on the one hand, or something that has to be personally experienced on the other. Although it would not be appropriate to provide a fully articulated analysis of the various suppositions underpinning the different paradigms outlined in the above accounts, it is nevertheless important to identify the key assumptions upon which decisions about methodology/methods for this study are based.

Firstly, it should be noted that this study is premised upon a set of ontological and epistemological assumptions associated with the Realism paradigm in Table 3.2, or more specifically, critical realism. Critical realism is a movement in philosophy and the human sciences most closely associated with - in the sense of identified with or emanating from – though not restricted to – the work of Roy Bhaskar (cf. Bhaskar 1975, 1979, 1998). Indeed, Bhaskar (1998: ix) notes that 'the term "critical realism" arose by the elision of the phrases "transcendental realism" and "critical naturalism"'. It is not the intention here to delve into the finer points of different interpretations of this philosophical paradigm (for various philosophical interpretations of this paradigm, see, for example, Archer et al. 1998; Hay 1995, 2002; Lewis 2000, 2002; Sayer 1992; Smith Mark J. 2000). However, drawing on Bhaskar's work, Sayer provides a useful and succinct account of the use of the term 'critical' in this context:

> … the point is that the explanation of social phenomena entails that we critically evaluate them. Moreover, criticism cannot reasonably be limited to false ideas, abstracted from the practical contexts in which they are constitutive, but must extend to critical evaluation of their

> associated practices and the material structures which they produce and which in turn help to sustain those practices (1992: 40).

Moreover, with regard to the nature of this study, a significant point of note is that a number of authors have embraced elements of critical realism's assumptions in relation to policy analysis. For example, Hay (1995, 2002), Marsh et al. (1999) and Marsh & Smith (2000, 2001) have all addressed, to a greater or lesser extent, the key ontological and epistemological assumptions associated with critical realism as a useful way forward in analysing policy processes, in general, and policy networks, in particular. As noted in Chapter 1, the role of theory in Realism is to contextualise observable behaviour by using theory to infer the underlying structures of a particular social and political situation (cf. Hollis & Smith 1991: 207). From this perspective, theory helps to identify and explain underlying structural relationships in policy networks, communities and advocacy coalitions, for example. This stated position not only acknowledges that the discursive construction of real phenomena has a crucial effect on policy outcomes but also that the nature of the real phenomena constrains and/or facilitates that construction. In other words

> Social structure and agency are held to be recursively related. Each is both a condition for and a consequence of the other. Actors constantly draw on social structures in order to act and in acting they either reproduce or transform those structures. Consequently, neither agency nor structure can be reduced to the other (Lewis 2002: 18-19; see also Lewis 2000).

For critical realists, then, 'social and political events are generated by a complex causal nexus that involves both the efficient causation of actors and the material causation of social structure' (Lewis 2002: 21). Such an approach lays emphasis on the 'conditions of action' or structure that either facilitates or constrains action (Betts 1986; Sibeon 1997, 1999). In short, this study is premised on what can be termed an 'anti-foundationalist' ontology and an 'interpretivist' epistemology (cf. Grix 2002: 183): that is, not all social phenomena are directly observable, structures exist that cannot be observed empirically and those that can may not present the social/political world as it actually is. Using the putative phenomenon of globalisation as an example, and one that cannot be ignored in this comparative study, it is evident that there are both real processes going on, yet it is the discursive construction of these processes that, to some extent, shapes and mediates policy-making processes (Marsh et al. 1999). For example, with regard to the study's focus, there has been an increase in the ease of global communication (e.g. knowledge-based epistemic communities involved in elite sport), the global role of the

media and the increasing influence of multi-national corporations (e.g. elite sport sponsorship).

These developments have political/policy consequences. Thus, for example, both state and non-state actors and electorates are now more cognisant of the policy problems faced, and the solutions adopted by, other countries. This is reflected in the increasing interest in issues surrounding policy transfer (Marsh & Stoker 1995a: 296; see also Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000; Evans & Davies 1999) – potentially, a key aspect of this research. Clearly, there are significant arguments about the extent of such globalisation processes but there is little doubt that some have occurred (Marsh et al. 1999: 14). At the same time, however, the ways in which globalisation processes impact upon national policy-making are mediated by its discursive construction. In relation to this example, questions are thus raised with respect to how both state and non-state actors in the UK, for example, have discursively constructed knowledge gained from other countries (Australia is a prime example in this respect) with regard to elite sport policy-making processes. In sum, the ontological and epistemological positions set out above clearly underpin the study's methodological approach, and three interrelated and instructive issues that have a significant bearing on this approach are: i) the relationship between structure/agency; ii) the relative emphasis put upon material and ideational perspectives; and iii) the significance and application of a salient concept of 'power relations'. These issues are considered below within a broader discussion of the study's overall methodological approach.

Methodological considerations

The above account regarding ontological and epistemological assumptions raise methodological implications for the choices made regarding particular techniques of data collection and the interpretation of findings arising from the research (Grix 2002: 175; Sparkes 1992: 14). In relation to this, Harvey notes that methodology is the point at which

> ... method, theory and epistemology coalesce in an overt way in the process of directly investigating specific instances within the social world. Methodology, in grounding enquiry in specific instances, thus makes explicit the presuppositions that inform the knowledge that is generated by the enquiry (1990: 1-2).

The position adopted with regard to assumptions surrounding ontology, epistemology and human nature therefore have a bearing on how data is gathered and interpreted in order to understand the social and political world. Positivist assumptions underpin 'nomothetic' approaches, which focus on systematic procedures and methods and the construction of scientific tests and the use of quantitative techniques for the analysis (Burrell & Morgan 1979: 6). In contrast to nomothetic approaches, and reflecting the assumptions within the Interpretive and Critical paradigms in Table 3.1 and the Realist assumptions in Table 3.2, this study draws upon the principles of 'ideographic' theory. Ideographic approaches stress 'the importance of letting one's subject unfold its nature and characteristics [through] the analysis of the subjective accounts generated by "getting inside" situations'; achieved through, for example, 'the insights revealed in impressionistic accounts' to be gained from documentary evidence and interview transcripts (Burrell & Morgan 1979: 6) - see *Methods/Techniques* section below.

In line with the critical realist assumptions set out above it is also imperative, however, to account for the importance of structure(s); moreover, the position adopted here regarding the structure/agency debate follows naturally from the ontological and epistemological positions outlined above. Thus, for researchers drawing upon critical realist assumptions, it is not only relationships between observable social phenomena that are of interest (cf. Lewis 2000, 2002; Marsh & Smith 2001). Unobservable relationships are also significant and can only be established indirectly; 'that is they are inferred from the researcher's theory and other observable relationships' (Marsh & Smith 2001: 531). These issues are dealt with in more detail below.

Beyond structure and agency

The way in which this study is conducted reflects a deeper set of understandings about the (relative) autonomy of actors in the settings in which they act – in this case, within the sport development policy subsystem. In relation to this, Hay raises some instructive questions that help to guide the following discussion:

> What model of the nature of political actors are we creating in our explanations? Are these actors the unwitting products of their context, helpless individuals with minimal control over their destiny ... or are they knowledgeable and intentional subjects with complete control over the settings which frame their actions? Are the effects we wish to explain the products of actors displaying their agency, making unconstrained choices; or are these effects the products of the unfolding logic of a structure (or set of structures) over which agents (individual or collective) have no control? (1995: 189).

The view adopted here is that structure and agency logically entail one another; in other words, a dialectical relationship. As Marsh et al. note, 'Agents are, in a sense, "bearers" of structural positions, but they interpret those structures. At the same time, structures are not unchanging; they change in part because of the strategic decisions of the agents operating within the structure' (1999: 15). Policy outcomes, for example, cannot be explained only with reference to structures - elsewhere characterised as the 'conditions of action' within which actors operate (Betts 1986: 39; see also Sibeon 1999) - they are the result of strategically calculating agents. However, these agents are located within a broader political and social-structure context and an important assumption here is that agents do not control that structured context. At the same time, however, they do interpret that context and it is as mediated through that interpretation that the structural context affects the strategic calculation of actors.

In other words, in order to understand better the nature of (elite) sport policy processes, the approach adopted here aims to take account of three dialectical relationships highlighted by Marsh & Smith (2000). Drawing on Marsh & Smith's work on policy networks, we can extend their analysis to policy subsystems. Thus, the three dialectical relationships are between structure and agency; subsystem and context; and subsystem and outcome (cf. Marsh & Smith 2000: 5); in short, a theoretical framework that makes it possible to acknowledge both the influence of actors on the development of policies in subsystems and the impact of the structural context in which actors operate (cf. Goverde & van Tatenhove 2000: 103). Therefore, an extreme 'determinist' view, which might regard actors and their activities as being completely determined by the situation or structure in which they are situated, is rejected. A polar opposite view, which might be termed, 'voluntarist', is also rejected; a view that actors are completely autonomous and free-willed. The standpoint adopted, therefore, is one that 'allows for the influence of both situational [structural] and voluntary [agency] factors in accounting for the activities of human beings' (Burrell & Morgan 1979: 6).

Anderson provides further evidence of the value of a dialectical research design, which is persuasive in mediating the values, beliefs and meanings of individuals/groups involved in policy subsystems and advocacy coalitions, *and* the structural environment in which individuals/groups are located:

> ... like other ethnographers – particularly those who define themselves as interpretivists – critical ethnographers aim to generate insights, to explain events, and to seek

> understanding. They also share with interpretivist ethnographers the view that the cultural informant's perceptions of social reality are themselves theoretical constructs (1989: 253).

In relation to these comments, Thompson's (1981: 143) contention that the value of this type of approach ensures that 'participants in research are not naively enthroned, but systematically and critically unveiled' is pertinent to this study and can be linked to the discussion below of different dimensions and conceptualisations of power relations. The contention here is that this dialectical standpoint has significant implications for the interpretation of changes in elite sport policy in Canada and the UK over the past 30 years, and over the past 10 to 12 years in particular; it argues against partiality in both senses of the word. Firstly, the emphasis is on analysis that considers (policy) change over a considerable time period, as a dialectical approach calls for a longitudinal analysis; partial snapshots of a brief period of time are not instructive. Thus, for both Canada and the UK, this study provides a review of sport policy developments over a time period of 30 years, in general, as well as a more specific analysis of elite sport policy change over the past 10 to 12 years. In the UK, for example, such an approach requires an evaluation of 'structural' factors, such as the relatively enduring (political/policy) relationships embodied in government/civil society interaction. More specifically, between the central government department for sport – formerly the Department of National Heritage (DNH) and currently the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and Sports Councils, and actors/organisations within policy subsystems centring on specific sport development-related policy issues. The analysis would not be complete, however, without reference to 'agency' factors. An instructive example in this sense is the important catalytic role played by Prime Minister, John Major in placing sporting issues higher on the political agenda in the early 1990s.

Secondly, this view emphasises the need to adopt a multi-dimensional analysis; in other words, an examination is required that focuses on the interaction between economic, political and ideological factors. It is argued that the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999) is instructive here; the ACF emphasises the requirement of a long-term approach (usually over a decade or more) to policy analysis and policy change and, with its interactive focus on both exogenous factors ('relatively stable parameters' and 'external system events') *and* endogenous factors (the role of negotiating actors in policy subsystem coalitions), a multi-dimensional approach is fundamental to the ACF's logic.

Material and ideational perspectives

Questions surrounding the nature of social reality hinge on an assessment of two aspects of social life: its existence as a set of material phenomena, or as a set of ideas that human beings have about the world in which they live. On this issue, Johnson et al. note that 'This dualism is not so much an observable state of affairs as a characteristic of *all* attempts to theorise what sort of "object" social reality is' (1984: 13, original emphasis). For those who stress the material character of social reality, human activity is best understood within constraining material conditions, whether these be natural phenomena (e.g. climate, gravity, topography) or social phenomena (e.g. forms of social and political organisation). On the other hand, the alternative viewpoint suggests that human activity is not behaviour (an adaptation to material conditions), but an expression of the meaning that humans give, through language, to their conduct. From this viewpoint, 'Social action is always, therefore, a process of endowing a situation with meaning, and it is those meanings, ideas, symbols etc. that are the " stuff" of the social world' (Johnson et al. 1984: 14).

In line with the critical realist assumptions set out earlier, the relationship between the material and the ideational is also viewed as dialectical. Thus, any investigation 'must examine not one nor the other but both and their dynamic and changing relationship' (Marsh et al. 1999: 219). Drawing again on the example of globalisation processes, Marsh et al. (1999) dispute the oft-stated view that globalisation processes are leading to the end, or at least reduction of, the role of the nation-state. Although this analysis deals primarily with economic factors, insights are provided which have resonance for this study. In brief, Marsh et al. argue that 'it is the discursive construction of globalisation which is driving political change in Britain, rather than globalisation *per se*. Ideational constructs do have the ability to produce material effects' (1999: 125-126, original emphasis). It should be noted that these authors provide a caveat to this argument; namely, that this is not the orthodox interpretation of contemporary events (for more detail on this perspective, see Marsh et al. 1999: 125-143). With regard to elite sport policy in the UK, for example, it could be argued that we have witnessed the material effects of the globalising process of 'trade' in human resources, a key example in this context being the increasing trend of recruiting Australian elite sport personnel to (elite) sports organisations in the UK. On the other hand, however, and following the line taken by Marsh et al. (1999), the discursive construction of elite sport policy issues by UK state and non-state actors will also produce material effects in the eventual

implementation of policy. As these authors note, 'The political process is mediated, now as it always has been, through the institutions, apparatuses and practices of the state ... what passes in so many accounts for globalisation is actually the product of state action' (1999: 141; see also Houlihan 2001 on this issue related to sport). Such contentions raise empirical questions for this study. For example, have UK state actors strategically selected to recruit from abroad?; and how, (if at all), has the discursive construction of the UK's elite sport policy agenda been influenced by such a recruitment policy?

These observations point to the requirement for a 'complete' analysis to investigate the dialectical relationship between both material and ideational effects. Globalisation has both material and ideational/discursive properties; in the above example, the former relates to 'real' tangible processes of the trade in human resources, the latter to the potential for Australian (ideational) assumptions regarding the development of elite sport policy in the UK to become conventional wisdom. It should be noted that, in acknowledging the 'ideational', a relativist and post-modern epistemological view is rejected; namely, that the 'real' is a free-floating discursive construct bearing no relationship to the material. For the critical realist, the assumption is that 'there is an external, "real" world which is independent of its social construction, but the social or discursive construction of that world has an effect on outcomes and, thus, an effect on the material world' (Marsh et al. 1999: 219; see also Lewis 2000, 2002).

In adopting such an approach, and bearing in mind the neo-pluralist/elitist macro-level position outlined in Chapter 2, this study thus aims to avoid the epistemological and methodological criticisms that have bedevilled previous studies located within macro-level (conventional) pluralist accounts. In relation to this, Marsh notes that

> Pluralists ignore the way that social and economic structures constrain political outcomes. They place almost total stress on agency explanations, emphasising the roles of interest groups and politicians/bureaucrats. As such, power is measured in terms of the agent's intention and capacity to affect outcomes. This neglects important aspects of power (1995a: 283).

On one level, it is argued that, in adopting such an approach, the assumptions outlined above recognise 'the alleged macro-blindness of interpretive research that, with its concern to understand how actors construct and reconstruct their realities ... has tended to ignore the power relationships within which people operate when these realities are constructed' (Sparkes 1992: 39). In this sense, the adopted approach allows for a more

complete analysis of the social and political world; that is, an analysis of 'the facilities and constraints that inhere in individuals' situations, not all of which they apprehend or choose' (McPherson & Raab 1988: 24). In short, '[Conventional] Pluralists need to come to terms with the structural aspects of power' (Marsh 1995a: 284). At the same time, it is also argued that the adopted research strategy is helpful in mediating the more deterministic aspects of the Critical paradigm (see Table 3.1), which might be reflected more strongly, for example, in a neo-Marxist 'ideologically orientated inquiry' (cf. Guba 1990). Moreover, such a strategy also allows for the two questions raised in Chapter 2 to be addressed (and which conventional pluralism fails to do); namely: 'Why are some people in a privileged position in the policy making process?' and 'In whose interests do they rule and how does their rule result in that interest being served?' (cf. Marsh 1995b: 6; Marsh & Stoker 1995a: 293). This leads on to questions of power relations.

Conceptualising power relations

The notion, or concept, of 'power' is notoriously difficult to define (cf. Arendt 1986; Foucault 1986; Giddens 1979, 1984; Habermas 1986; Layder 1985; Lukes 1986b, 1997). However, questions regarding a salient conception of power relations, in the initiation of policy, in influencing policy outcomes, and in setting policy agendas, for example, are central to this study. It is important, therefore, to clarify how power has been variously conceptualised and, more specifically, how power is to be conceptualised in this study. In adopting the epistemological and methodological assumptions outlined above, which incorporate a dialectical dimension, power is viewed, on the one hand, as the capacity of agents, as well as being a relational and structural phenomenon (Goverde & van Tatenhove 2000: 106). This formulation invokes the need for a *relational* conception of both structure and agency. As Hay has argued, 'one person's agency is another person's structure. Attributing agency is therefore attributing power (both causal and actual)' (1995: 191). Indeed, with regard to the analysis of policy networks and policy outcomes, Marsh & Smith observe that 'By examining networks we are looking at the institutionalisation of power relations both within the network and within the broader socio-economic and political context' (2000: 6). Agency, as manifest here, is evident in a tight policy community, in Marsh & Rhodes' (1992a) terms, or in an advocacy coalition (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). In an advocacy coalition, for example, actors share a set of fundamental beliefs (policy goals, plus causal and other perceptions), and aim to influence rules, budgets and governmental personnel in order to achieve these goals over time (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1993b: 5). In line with this

position, Marsh & Smith (2000: 6) draw attention to structural aspects of power in arguing that such 'shared values and ideology will privilege certain policy outcomes', and it is here that Lukes' (1974) seminal argument regarding 'three dimensions of power' and the subsequent critiques that this analysis has provoked, is instructive in helping to situate how power is conceptualised in this study.

Lukes has argued that a 'one-dimensional' view of power was evident in studies that focused on the way in which political decisions and outcomes reflected the collective inputs of a number of relevant interest groups – the 'central method' behind conventional pluralist analysis (Lukes 1974: 12). However, McLennan argues that this is a limited analysis 'because power relations are determined not merely by what decisions happen to be arrived at, but also by the efforts of groups and individuals to *prevent* certain issues arising' (1990: 55 original emphasis); thereby reflecting Bachrach & Baratz's (1962, 1970) work on 'non-decisions', or the 'second dimension' of power, in Lukes' terms. Thus, Bachrach & Baratz (1970: 49) assume that power relations exist only insofar as there is actually observable conflict between those exercising power and those over whom it is exercised. Excluded from this type of analysis, however, is the possibility of power being exercised in situations in which the subordinated do not identify themselves as the subjects of subordination. In other words, situations 'in which they do not perceive themselves as possessing an interest which they are prevented from realising (either in the decision-making process itself, or in the process of agenda-setting)' (Hay 1997: 47). For example, the dispute amongst groups and political parties with respect to the implementation of policies relating to the emergence of the UK's elite sports institute (cf. Theodoraki 1999) might well conceal 'other' issues related to the purpose and/or legitimacy of 'sport' in a wider context and at different levels (cf. McDonald 2000). As McLennan observes, 'In a two-dimensional theory of power, the *legitimacy* of the political system itself and the social patterns of resource allocation which ground it would be precisely the sort of thing about which "non-decisions" are made' (1990: 55, original emphasis).

This second dimension of power thus concentrates on the observable phenomenon of agenda-setting and little consideration 'is given to the less visible (and arguably more significant) processes by which *preferences* (and by their own definition *interests*) are shaped' (Hay 1997: 47, original emphasis). (It should be noted that a somewhat different, but not unrelated, account of these issues is provided by Giddens (1979,

1984). Lukes (1974) thus takes the debate one stage further, in arguing that power must be studied on three dimensions. In the 'third dimension' of power there is *latent* conflict. In other words, this third dimension involves 'the exercise of power to shape people's preferences so that neither overt nor covert conflicts exist' (Ham & Hill 1993: 70). Thus, for a deeper account, the way in which a whole socio-economic structure shapes the nature of people's wants, expectations and overt interests has to be examined. In this model, conscious policy decisions and expectations are only one aspect of the wider political phenomenon to be investigated and a more complete picture might be gained through an analysis of unconscious values, overt manipulation and covert preferences (McLennan 1990: 55-56). Of particular interest is Lukes' contention that a false or manipulated consensus may exist, and may be maintained through domination by a powerful group, and that 'the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent ... conflict from arising in the first place' (1974: 23). Lukes (1997: 50) cites Crenson's (1971) research into why a number of cities and towns in the United States failed to make an issue of their air pollution problems as an illustration of this dimension of power. With regard to the 'penetrability' of local political systems, Crenson has argued that

> Local political forms and practices may even inhibit citizens' ability to transform some diffuse discontent into an explicit demand. In short, there is something like an inarticulate ideology in political institutions, even in those that appear to be most open-minded, flexible and disjointed – an ideology in the sense that it promotes the selective perception and articulation of social problems and conflicts ... (1971: 23).

In this way, therefore, 'local political institutions and political leaders may ... exercise considerable control over what people choose to care about and how forcefully they articulate their cares' (Crenson 1971: 27). In the context of this study, the question this type of analysis raises is whether those actors involved in elite sport policy processes have interests which differ from their expressed preferences and, if so, whether the nature of those interests can be established. These are intractable, if not impossible, questions to answer with complete conviction. Thus, Lukes' analysis, even on this third dimension of power, remains problematic in two important ways. Firstly, Lukes acknowledges that to identify 'real' interests is problematic, and no suggestions are offered as to how such interests might be identified empirically. Secondly, and clearly related to the first problem, in expanding the notion of power to include preference-shaping, Lukes draws a distinction between subjective or perceived interests on the one hand, and actual or 'real' interests on the other; thus invoking Marxist notions of false

consciousness. Any analysis following this line of argument therefore conjures up a picture of the researcher as the (normative) arbiter of an actor's real interests, with the latter perceived as an 'ideological dupe' (Hay 1997: 48).

Hay (1997, 2002) provides us with a possible route through these problems. In short, Hay argues that Lukes' analysis is problematic since he fails 'to differentiate clearly between analytical questions concerning the *identification* of power within social and political settings, and normative questions concerning the *critique* of the distribution and exercise of power thus identified' (2002: 184, original emphasis). Whilst those authors who concentrate on the first and second dimensions of power assume that preferences and interests are synonymous, thereby dissolving an ethical question (what are A's real interests?) into an empirical question (what does A perceive his/her interests to be?), Lukes problematises this, and raises the important point that preferences may be shaped by the powerful. Thus, Hay argues that if Lukes

> … is not to reject altogether the behavioural conception of power (in which A gets B to do something that B would not otherwise do, and where there is a conflict of interest between the two), this obliges him to address the ethical question which the pluralists conveniently side-step in the very definition of power itself (1997: 50).

Hay argues that the behavioural definition should be rejected and proceeds to separate out the distinct ethical and analytical questions which are conflated in the analysis of the three dimensions of power discussed above. What is required, therefore, is the disentanglement of the identification and analysis of power from its critique. A definition of power thus conceived is not viewed in and of itself as a value-judgement. Such a conception of power must emphasise not only the consequences of A's choices for the 'actions' of B, but also their effects upon the 'context' within which later action must take place (Hay 2002: 185). Power, thus conceived, is about context-shaping; in other words, the capacity of actors to redefine the parameters of what is socially, politically and economically possible for others. To define power in this way, Hay argues, is to emphasise power relations in which structures, organisations and institutions are shaped by actors such that the parameters of subsequent action are altered. In short, this is 'an *indirect* form of power in which power is mediated by, and instantiated in, structures' (Hay 1997: 51, original emphasis; see also Hay 2002; Layder 1985). Policy subsystems can thus be conceived of as involving 'the institutionalisation of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of behaviour' (Marsh & Smith 2000: 6). Following this line of argument, in examining policy subsystems (and any advocacy coalitions therein) the

institutionalisation of power relations both within the subsystem, and within the broader socio-economic and political context, can be explored.

It should also be noted that Hay (1997: 51) has suggested that power can be exercised in a *direct* sense when A gets B to do something that he/she would not otherwise do (in this formulation, independently of their respective interests). Thus, to indirect power, or power as context-shaping, must be added direct power, or power as conduct-shaping. Indirect power is evident in, for example, the capacity of a government to pass legislation. This will not affect, directly, the conduct of actor B, however, once instantiated in statute serves to redefine the parameters within which B will continue to act, while at the same time providing a power resource for the potential exercise of direct power by the state's law enforcement capabilities. On the other hand, direct power is immediate, visible and behavioural, manifest in, for example, practices such as decision-making and persuasion. As Marsh & Smith (2000: 7) observe, 'agents choose policy options, bargain, argue and break up networks' (for a more in-depth analysis of this direct form of power, see Hay 1997, 2002).

This reformulation of the concept of power has two significant consequences. Firstly, it suggests that there are two rather different conceptions of power submerged within the dimensions of power debate - indirect and direct power - and Hay argues that Lukes fails to recognise the decisiveness of the break with, for example Dahl's and Bachrach & Baratz's conceptions that his critique logically entails (1997: 51, 2002: 186-187). In the first formulation, power is seen as the capacity to redefine structured contexts and is indirect, latent and often produces unintended consequences. In the second, power is a behavioural phenomenon, which is immediate, directly observable and empirically-verifiable. The second important consequence, and arguably the more significant, is that in the above reformulation of power as both context- and conduct-shaping there is not a reliance on value-judgements about the interests (real or imagined) of the actors involved. As Hay maintains, 'To suggest that A exercises power over B is to make no claim, within this schema, about the subversion or violation of B's "true interests" (though such a claim is clearly not precluded by such a statement)' (2002: 186). The spectre of false consciousness (or real interests) raised in Lukes' third dimension of power can thus be suspended temporarily while the identification and analysis of power relations is explored. Therefore, although the identification of a power relationship (particularly in the indirect sense) will remain contestable, it does not imply that, in a

study such as this, we should first engage in ethical judgements about the legitimacy of the conduct of those involved, or the interests of those likely to be affected.

To sum up, this reformulation of the analysis of power relations moves beyond that inherent in conventional pluralism; thus reinforcing Chapter 2's argument for adopting a neo-pluralist/elitist approach at the macro-level of analysis, the assumptions of a critical realist epistemology and a dialectical approach to the meso-level analysis of elite sport policy processes. At the meso-level of analysis, these observations are reinforced by Marsh & Smith, who argue that certain groups occupy privileged positions and, as such

> ... their positions give them access to important policy networks [or subsystems] and membership of these networks is a key resource that gives them greater opportunities to affect outcomes. In order to understand or explain outcomes, we need to recognise and *explain* that structured privilege (2001: 537, original emphasis).

These comments raise a number of questions upon which this research into meso-level policy processes will proceed: What is the importance of the resources that actors/organisations possess? Why do some actors possess more resources than others? How important is the process by which actors learn from experience? (cf. Marsh 1998: 193). In sum, it is argued that, in adopting a neo-pluralist/elitist macro-level approach, the epistemological and methodological assumptions underlying critical realist perspectives, and in giving primacy to the ACF as a meso-level theoretical lens, together with the insights generated by the above discussion of power relations, a more complete picture of elite sport policy processes and policy change can be accomplished. This leads on to questions of specific research methods/techniques in order to gather the required data.

Methods/Techniques

This section considers the two key research methods or techniques employed for this study: semi-structured interviews and document analysis. These methods/techniques are discussed in turn.

Semi-structured interviews

As noted above, central to this study is the importance of gathering data relating to actors' subjective perceptions, beliefs and experiences. The semi-structured interview

based on an interview guide, open-ended questions and informal probing to facilitate a discussion of issues is the key qualitative method used here. Such intensive interviewing allows people to talk freely and to offer their interpretation of events. Indeed, if individual agency is deemed important in aiding the understanding of policy-making, then the 'assumptive worlds' of key actors need to be explored. Young (1977) uses this term to denote the intermingled beliefs, perceptions, evaluations and intentions that comprise different actors' understanding of the policy milieu and, as McPherson & Raab (1988: 55) note, 'secondary sources [tell] us nothing about this'. It was also pointed out in the previous section that contextual issues are important. In relation to this, Devine suggests that qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviews, 'draw particular attention to contextual issues, placing an interviewee's attitudes and behaviour in the context of her/his individual biography and wider social setting' (1995: 138). Qualitative methods, therefore, capture meaning, process and context (Bryman 1988: 62).

Explanation here, then, 'involves understanding and interpreting actions rather than drawing conclusions about relationships and regularities between statistical relationships' (Devine 2002: 201). In short, the rationale for adopting semi-structured interviews in this study is predicated on the following line of reasoning. Semi-structured interviews are used in order to: i) gain a more (agent-) informed understanding of historically-developed processes and developments relating to elite sport policy direction; ii) allow distinctions to be made between the 'rhetoric' provided in policy documents and the 'reality' of an agent's insights into their perspective on a particular issue or policy development; and iii) attempt to discern the normative values and belief systems underlying the agent's perspective as well as an assessment of their perception of the constraining/facilitating structural context within which they operate.

Issues, potèntial problems and possible solutions

The central issues and potential problems arising from the use of qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews are: i) unreliability; ii) that the interpretation of interpretations of the findings is difficult to evaluate; and iii) problems of generalisability (Devine 1995: 141; see also Bryman 1988, 2001). More specifically, these are all issues that have been identified as requiring consideration when conducting 'elite interviews' (Richards 1996) – a key aspect of this study. This last point raises the question as to what constitutes an 'elite'. There is no definitive answer to this question as Richards also notes that there is scant attention paid to the particular problems involved in elite interviewing (for an exception, see Young 1977: 12-16; and on the related topic of

'expert interviews', see Flick 1998: 91-92). Dexter provides a form of working definition, in suggesting that 'people in important or exposed positions may require VIP interviewing treatment on the topic which relate to their importance or exposure' (1970: 5). Dexter does not, however, discuss how/why such individuals have attained the exalted tag of elite. However, following Richards, the notion of an elite can be viewed as implying a group of individuals who are in privileged positions (or have been) in society and 'are likely to have had more influence on political/policy outcomes than general members of the public' (1996: 199). The three major issues/problems in respect of qualitative research methods, such as (elite) interviews, are considered in turn below.

With regard to aspects of reliability, Devine (1995, 2002) notes that a key issue concerns the question of sampling. In contrast to quantitative research, which aims to generate a representative sample of the population, qualitative research, more usually, identifies a group of potential interviewees according to social characteristics, patterns of behaviour, and close association with particular aspects of the research topic. Thus, while qualitative research methods cannot be representative, they attempt to seek a diverse range of responses (Devine 1995, 2002). Therefore, this study aims to select prospective interviewees on the basis that they have been involved in strategic aspects of elite sport development and/or policy-making (see also Appendix). Dolowitz & Marsh's (1996: 345, 2000: 10) identification of nine potential categories of actors engaged in the process of policy-making is useful here: of particular interest are elected officials, bureaucrats/civil servants and policy entrepreneurs/experts.

With regard to elected officials, these might conceivably be the Minister for Sport, or junior ministers involved in this field within the DCMS in the UK, and the Secretary of State (Amateur Sport) in Canada. However, although there will always be difficulties surrounding 'access' to such individuals, it is acknowledged that there are particular problems in gaining access to such high-level politicians as these. As for bureaucrats/civil servants, and in relation to the ACF, it would be interesting to elicit the beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of, for example, the liaison officers for swimming, athletics and sailing at UK Sport and their counterparts at Sport Canada. It is more problematic to identify policy entrepreneurs/experts, and indeed, there is some overlap between this category and the last. However, in the UK, individuals such as Sue Campbell, Chief Executive of the Youth Sport Trust, and Rodney Walker, Chair of UK Sport, might come into this category. Moreover, a further crucial category of interviewee

for this study is the group of key actors within each of the six NSOs/NGBs in both Canada and the UK who have been engaged in policy debates over a number of years (for details of the study's interviewees, see Appendix). The aim, then, is to establish, through an initial contact, a network of actors which provides further access to other individuals – what Richards (1996: 200) has termed, the 'snowball effect' (see also, for example, May 1997: 119).

A further problem relating to reliability centres on the collection of data. In contrast to quantitative surveys, which utilise highly structured interviews with predetermined and closed questions, qualitative interviews use an interview guide with open-ended questions and probing. As May notes, 'Qualitative information about the topic can then be recorded by the interviewer who can seek both *clarification* and *elaboration* on the answers given' (1997: 111, original emphasis). In this way, the meaning of statements contained within interview responses can be analysed in terms of the interviewees' social, cultural and political context and/or resources within the sport development policy subsystem and any identified advocacy coalitions therein. The relationship between the researcher and interviewee in qualitative interviewing is not unproblematic, however, since the interviewer participates in the conversation, often involving personal, sensitive and ambiguous issues. Therefore, a careful balance must be maintained in order that the interviewer does not appear too distant yet, at the same time, the researcher should not become over-familiar. Richards (1996: 201) notes two related issues with respect to conducting elite interviews: i) the interviewer may be inclined to be too deferential; and ii) power relations - by the very nature of elite interviews, it is the interviewee who has the power and they control the information the researcher is attempting to elicit. Richards goes on to suggest that the semi-structured interview approach is an appropriate method to use in order to overcome problems such as these, using an *aide memoir* to ensure that all relevant topics have been covered. As Hammersley & Atkinson (1983) observe, if such partisanship was apparent, the objectivity of the interviewer and the validity of the interpretation of the findings would be questioned.

The second central problem surrounds the analysis and interpretation of interview data. Namely, is the interpretation placed on the interview data valid and how should its validity be judged? Unlike quantitative analysis (cf. Miller 1995), which is subject to various forms of statistical analysis of variables, the analysis and interpretation of

qualitative interview material proceeds in a different manner. Transcripts are subjected to numerous readings until themes emerge, continuing until an overall argument is established – see also Appendix. As Devine observes, 'The interpretation of the material is usually presented by means of an interplay of quotes from the interviews and commentary on the selected transcript' (1995: 144); the approach adopted here. However, as the transcripts are rarely presented in full, a key difficulty is how to make sense of the researcher's interpretation and thereby extremely difficult to formulate other interpretations. There is thus a genuine problem of having little scope in establishing the validity of the material. Nevertheless, the qualitative researcher needs to establish the validity of any interpretation and to demonstrate the plausibility of her/his findings and conclusions. Various techniques are available to enhance the validity of such interpretations (Devine 1995: 145). For example, the interpretation of interview material can be discussed with other researchers in order for some form of consensus to be reached; it thus becomes a matter of 'coherence' (Sparkes 1992: 30). In line with the epistemological assumptions outlined earlier, Sparkes goes on to observe that

> ... within a coherence theory of truth a proposition is judged to be true if it coheres (is connected and consistent) with other propositions in a scheme or network that is in operation at a particular time, thus making coherence a matter of internal relations as opposed to the degree of correspondence with some external reality (1992: 30).

In other words, 'truth ... is what we make it to be based upon shared visions and common understandings that are socially constructed' (Sparkes 1992: 31). In line with these assumptions, the context/situation of the interview/interviewee should also be considered to enhance the plausibility of the material. Finally, the internal consistency of an account can be assessed in order to establish whether an analysis is coherent with identified themes and triangulating the findings with other studies can enhance external validity. As Fielding suggests, 'Good qualitative analysis is able to document its claim to reflect some of the truth of the phenomena by reference to systematically collected data' (1993: 169-170).

The third major consideration for qualitative research is the issue of generalisability. In contrast to quantitative results, 'it is impossible to make generalisations about attitudes and behaviour from in-depth interviews' (Devine 1995: 145, 2002: 207). While qualitative research has to be tentative about making inferences from a small number of cases to a wider population, a carefully designed research programme can help to

facilitate understanding of other situations. As Devine notes, 'The findings of one in-depth study can be corroborated with other research to establish regularities and variations' (1995: 145). Such a comparison would be seen as a limited test of confirmation or non-confirmation of any findings and research such as this is more closely linked to phenomena which may be predicted to become more typical in the future (Ward Schofield (1993) – for example, an increase in forms of policy transfer between Canada and the UK (and other countries). Issues surrounding generalisability are also of concern with regard to case study research designs such as that employed here; an issue considered in more depth in a later section of the chapter under *Comparative research design*.

Document analysis

As discussed, while the selection of methods is associated with an epistemological position, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research methods/techniques should not be drawn too rigidly (cf. Erickson 1986). Indeed, Grix argues that the choice of method(s) should be based on whether it is suitable for addressing a particular research question (2002: 179; see also Bryman 1988, 2001). In relation to this, document analysis is an essential technique for this study and which may involve 'quantification of particular sorts' (Erickson 1986: 119). For example, May (1997) notes that content analysis of a document considers the frequency with which certain words or phrases appear in the text as a means of identifying its characteristics. This method takes both quantitative and qualitative forms. As Ericson et al. observe, quantitative content analysis 'seeks to show patterns of regularities in content through repetition, and qualitative content analysis … emphasises the fluidity of the text and content in the interpretive understanding of culture' (1991: 50).

There is a wide range of documentary sources available for social research and it is not the intention to provide an in-depth review here (for more detail see, for example, Bryman 2001; MacDonald & Tipton 1993; May 1997; Plummer 1990; Scott 1990). Rather, the aim is to review the salience, both of this research method and the relevant types of documentary sources, for this study of sport policy developments over time. Documents are useful in this regard, as they can be viewed as the 'sedimentations of social and political practices' (May 1997: 157). Here, May points to a useful way of conceptualising documents for this study and supported by the further suggestion that 'A document cannot be read in a "detached" manner. Instead, we must approach

documents in an engaged manner' (1997: 163). This approach puts an emphasis upon hermeneutics, which is not only a component of the Interpretive paradigm outlined earlier (see Table 3.1) but also one inherent in (critical) Realist assumptions (see Table 3.2) in relation to the discursive construction of policy. For this study, policy-related documents are analysed through what Altheide (1996: 15) has termed 'qualitative document analysis'. This technique is drawn upon in order to understand how different discourses structure the activities of actors and how they 'are *produced*, how they *function*, and how they are *changed*' (Howarth 1995: 115, original emphasis; see also Bacchi 2000; Ball 1993). Thus, reflecting the critical realist assumptions underlying Marsh & Smith's (2001: 531) contention 'that many important relationships between social phenomena cannot be observed', a critical-analytic stance using this method would consider

> ... the ways in which a text attempts to stamp its authority upon the social world it describes. In so doing, the social world might be characterised by the exclusion of valuable information and the characterisation of events and people in particular ways according to certain interests (May 1997: 175).

In other words, documents might be interesting for what they do not say, as well as what they contain. As May notes, documents 'do not simply reflect, but also construct social reality and versions of events' (1997: 164). Within this approach, then, documents are not assumed to be neutral artefacts that independently report social reality. Rather, they are viewed as media through which social and political power is expressed and should be approached in terms of the cultural context within which they were written. The analysis of documents will thus go beyond what Altheide (1996: 15) has termed 'qualitative content analysis': as noted above, the form of document analysis employed in this, then, study is closer to Altheide's description of qualitative document analysis. This study does not, therefore, employ what might be termed postmodern forms of discourse theory and/or analysis (cf. Donati 1992; Flick 1998; Fox & Miller 1995) – see also Appendix for a summary of access gained to documentary sources.

Issues, potential problems and possible solutions

There are four key criteria to consider when assessing the quality of evidence available from documentary sources: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Scott 1990). These criteria relate to a number of issues and potential problems that may be encountered when using documentary sources (MacDonald & Tipton 1993: 195). The following section provides a brief review of each of these criteria (for more

detail, see Scott 1990). The issue of a document's 'authenticity' underpins this method of research. As Calvert notes, 'Judgement of authenticity from the internal evidence of the text comes only when one is satisfied that it is technically possible that the document is genuine' (1991: 121). A useful checklist for deciding on the authenticity of a document is provided by Platt (1981: 34): i) Does the document contain obvious errors and/or inconsistencies? ii) Do different versions of the same document exist? iii) Is there consistency of literary style, content, handwriting or typeface? iv) Has the document been transcribed by more than one copy writer? v) Has the document been circulated by someone with a vested interest in a particular reading of its content? vi) Does the version derive from a reliable source? These criteria thus provide an instructive guide for the study's analysis of policy-related documents. A document's 'credibility' centres on who produced the document, why, when, for whom and in what context? In other words, how accurate are the observations and records being researched? In the context of this study, May suggests that, to achieve this, 'other sources on the life and political[/policy] sympathies of the author' should be utilised in a form of triangulation in order 'to establish the social and political context in which the document was produced' (1997: 170). As discussed, semi-structured interviews should aid the process of triangulation. The problem of a document's 'representativeness' refers to 'typicality', or whether the documents available can be said to comprise a representative sample of the totality of documents as they originally existed (MacDonald & Tipton 1993: 196).

Finally, there is the question of a document's 'meaning'. This can involve understanding at two levels; that is, the surface or literal meaning and the deeper meaning through some form of interpretive understanding or structural analysis (MacDonald & Tipton 1993: 197). Content analysis, where important themes are quantified, is seen as the simpler kind of deeper meaning, whereas the notion of 'interpretive understanding' is viewed as a more sophisticated form of documentary analysis (MacDonald & Tipton 1993: 197). Thus, this study draws on the work of authors who argue that the study of a text should not be undertaken in isolation from its social context (cf. Altheide 1996; Giddens 1976; Scott 1990). In sum, by utilising both semi-structured, in-depth interviews and qualitative document analysis it should be possible to triangulate data gained from interviews with key actors involved in elite sport policy developments with an analysis of, for example, policy documents relating to (elite) sport policy processes. As Denzin (1970) notes, documentary research is an important research tool and is an invaluable part of most schemes of triangulation through using an intersecting set of

different research methods in a single project. Moreover, given the adoption of a case study research design (see below), 'the most important use of documents [for case studies] is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources' (Yin 1994: 81).

Comparative research design

This section provides an overview of the value of comparative public policy analysis and an assessment of the relative strengths and limitations of adopting a comparative research design (cf. Bryman 2001; Hague et al. 1998; Yin 1994) for the study of elite sport policy processes in Canada and the UK. Therefore, in relation to the research design incorporating two countries and three NSOs/NGBs in each country (in effect, six case studies), consideration is given to the utility of systematically comparing a limited number of cases (Mackie & Marsh 1995: 178; see also Yin 1994). More specifically, Antal highlights three key factors underpinning the most important stimuli behind contemporary cross-national research, all of which have resonance for the substantive focus of this study: 'first, the increasing recognition of common problems in different countries; second, the emergence of transnational issues; and third, the growth of international organisations' (1987: 512; see also Blondel 1995).

In relation to this, and reflecting this study's interest in aspects of policy learning/transfer (see Chapter 2), a key component of comparative research is 'the careful analysis of the conditions under which certain foreign practices deliver desirable results, followed by consideration of ways to adapt those practices to conditions found at home' (Noah 1984: 558). Furthermore, Heidenheimer et al. (1990: 4) argue that a comparative approach is needed which can span levels of government and public/private sectors as, in recent years, policy burdens have shifted to local jurisdictions and semi-public groups. Thus, in adopting a neo-pluralist/elitist macro-level approach and in drawing upon the meso-level assumptions of the ACF - which focuses on the interactions between actors from different levels of government, as well as interest groups, researchers and journalists – this study reflects Heidenheimer et al.'s ensuing comments that 'Perhaps more than ever before, public policy has become a mosaic pieced together by government authorities at different levels and by private sector actors with public policy responsibilities' (1990: 4-5).

Focused comparisons/Multiple-case design

Peters provides a review of the different ways case studies can be defined and used in comparative research[1] and suggests that 'The case-study remains by far the most common method of research in political science, in general, and more particularly in comparative politics' (1998a: 137; see also Marsh 1998). A distinguishing feature of the case study approach is the ability to elucidate unique features, or what Geertz (1973) has termed 'thick description' of the case - for example, an in-depth investigation into elite sport policy change within each of the six NSOs/NGBs in Canada and the UK. More specifically, the research design incorporates a 'focused comparisons' (Hague et al. 1998: 280) or 'multiple-case' (Yin 1994: 44) approach. Using this design, Hague et al. note that research focuses on an 'intensive comparison of a few instances' - for this research, the six NSOs/NGBs in Canada and the UK - for a triangular comparison. Thus, detailed description of a specific topic is provided and, while significance beyond the case may be useful, the focus is on how variables interact and evolve in a particular setting (Hague et al. 1998: 273). The emphasis, then, in a multiple-case design is on the comparison at least as much as on specific cases.

The focused comparisons approach has similar characteristics to Yin's (1994: 45-53) work on 'multiple-case studies' and the use of 'replication logic'. In short, Yin suggests that 'each case must be carefully selected so that it either a) predicts similar results (*literal replication*) or b) produces contrasting results but for predictable reasons (*theoretical replication*)' (1994: 46, original emphasis). Two to three cases are suggested for literal replication with further cases added for evidence of theoretical replication. For each individual case, the study should indicate how and why a particular proposition was demonstrated (or not demonstrated) – for example, the salience of changing values/belief systems, policy transfer and/or policy-oriented learning, as well as exogenous factors external to the policy subsystem under investigation. Across cases, the study should indicate the extent of the replication logic and why certain cases were predicted to have certain results, whereas other cases, if any, were predicted to have contrasting results. Crucial to this approach is the development of a 'rich, theoretical framework' (Yin 1994: 46). As Yin has argued:

> The framework needs to state the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found (a literal replication) as well as the conditions when it is not likely to be found (a theoretical replication). The theoretical framework later becomes the vehicle for generalising to new cases (1994: 46).

Given the focus on elite sport policy developments/change in six NSOs/NGBs across two countries, and in utilising a 'rich, theoretical framework' at the meso-level of analysis within which such developments/change can be viewed, it should be possible to draw conclusions with regard to Yin's notion of theoretical replication, and thus provide suggestions for further research in this field. As Bryman has argued, 'The key to the comparative design is its ability to allow the distinguishing characteristics of two or more cases to act as a springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings' (2001: 54). For example, the identification of government responses in Canada and the UK with regard to the allocation of resources (funding) for sport is an important issue upon which to compare and contrast. In addition, the potential for a number of advocacy coalitions to have emerged around aspects of elite sport is a further area for 'theoretical reflection'. Within these reflections, the identification of key members comprising (any) advocacy coalitions, as well as the conditions facilitating interaction processes that help to maintain coalition existence, is important. Finally, the related notions of policy learning/transfer are drawn upon in order to examine the extent to which the pace and direction of elite sport policy/programme change can be related to these concepts. The usefulness of the focused comparisons method, as well as the utility of analysing policy processes over of a decade or more is supported by Hague et al.'s argument that 'Focused comparisons work particularly well when a few countries are compared over time, examining how they vary in their response to common problems' (1998: 280). For this study, the common (policy) problem can be conceived of as the development of sporting excellence in six NSOs/NGBs in Canada and the UK.

These observations lead on to the question of how countries should be selected for a focused comparison. Przeworski & Teune (1970) suggest that such a selection involves either a 'most similar' or a 'most different' approach. With regard to the latter, Peters (1998a: 38) argues that this approach proceeds on the assumption that the phenomenon/issue being explained resides at a sub-systemic level, for example, the development of, and changes to, elite sport policy. In essence, the most different approach assumes that there are only a limited number of different types of political issue (for example, distributive, redistributive, regulatory) and that the nature of the issue necessarily involves particular interests and imposes constraints on the policy options available; thus generating broadly similar policy (Houlihan 1997: 8-9). Houlihan also notes that this approach 'assumes that the political systems selected for study are as different from each other as possible except for the phenomenon to be explained'

(1997: 8). In short, the aim is to 'force analysts to distil out of this diversity a set of common elements that prove to have great explanatory power' (Collier 1993: 112).

Following Houlihan (1997: 9), an example of the most different approach in the context of this study, might be research concerned with exploring the development of elite sport policy in the People's Republic of China, the UK and the United States on the grounds that these three countries exhibit significant differences in the key areas of wealth, political system and sporting tradition. If the subsequent research found that the three countries adopted similar policies then it would be possible to draw conclusions with respect to the capacity of particularly salient issues to lead to a similarity of response by both state and non-state actors in the policy process. However, although this approach has its advocates, a major limitation of the 'most different systems' approach is the ability to identify confidently significant differences between countries (cf. Peters 1998). Moreover, as Bennett observes, 'An assumption that the same problems predetermine the same solutions may or may not be correct; it is a question subject to investigation in accordance with the usual empirical norms' (1991b: 231). Thus, with regard to the previous example, it is difficult to claim that a similar policy response is the result of the intrinsic characteristics of the problem rather than, for example, being the result of a poorly identified and under-explored aspect of a country's political system.

It is generally recognised, then, that the 'most similar systems' design is the preferred method when undertaking comparative policy analysis (Peters 1998a: 37; but see Hopkin 2002: 254-255). Within the most similar design, countries are selected that appear to be similar in as many ways as possible in order to control for extraneous variations. Advocates of the most similar approach argue that 'a comparison between "relatively similar" countries sets out to neutralise certain differences in order to permit a better analysis of others' (Dogan & Pelassy 1990: 133). In other words, a most similar design takes similar countries for comparison on the assumption that 'the more similar the units being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors responsible for differences between them' (Lipset 1990: xiii). Moreover, as policy transfer may be an important variable to account for in this study, Antal's following comments are instructive, 'Research that focuses on differences is less likely to unearth similarities and to teach lessons worth learning in a new setting. Projects designed to discover similarities are more likely to find them and to propose transferring experiences' (1987: 513). However, caution is also advised when adopting this

approach. Peters (1998a), for example, notes that, although the most similar systems design may eliminate a number of possible explanations, it also acknowledges that it cannot address them all. The key issue here is that it may not be possible to identify all the relevant factors that can produce variations amongst systems. With these cautionary caveats in mind, the similar cases method is the preferred approach: the countries selected for this research (Canada and the UK) both share the following characteristics: sport is a significant cultural element; a visible concentration on elite sport is evident or emerging; democracy is well-established and stable; interest group activity is a major feature of democratic politics; and their economies are relatively mature (Houlihan 1997: 9). This is not to argue that each country does not have its own distinctive characteristics. Rather, the assumption is that each country's distinctive characteristics are outweighed by the degree of overall similarity.

Issues, potential problems and possible solutions

There are three issues/problems, in particular, that need to be taken into consideration when conducting empirical enquiries using a case study design. Firstly, a common concern about case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific generalisation: the external validity problem (cf. Bryman 2001: 50; Yin 1994: 35-36). Yin argues that, to some extent, the multiple-case design helps to overcome this problem using the replication logic outlined earlier and that 'case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes' (1994: 10). A second issue surrounds concerns that 'case studies are not inevitably, or perhaps, even usually, comparative' (Mackie & Marsh 1995: 177). In order to alleviate such concerns, this research does not aim to analyse two countries, and the six separate cases therein, in a theoretical vacuum. Therefore , the approach adopted here follows Scarrow's argument that a case study has the capacity to be comparative and theoretical 'if the analysis is made within a comparative perspective [which] mandates that description of the particular be cast in terms of broadly analytic constructs' (1969: 7). In other words, the theoretical framework (primarily, the ACF) has been developed outside the case(s), with the case(s) in question (NSOs/NGBs in Canada and the UK) being an attempt to illustrate that the logic of the ACF has some utility for the substantive topic of the research. In essence, this position reflects research by Linz & Stepan (1978a, 1978b) where 'the cases had a clear theoretical focus that was applied in most instances and ranged across a number of countries' (Peters 1998a: 150; see also Mackie & Marsh 1995).

A third potential problem regarding case study research design is the concern regarding a lack of rigour when conducting this type of research. In short, Yin (1994: 9) suggests that many investigators have allowed 'equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the directions of the findings and conclusions'. This issue is, in part, a 'reliability' problem; the objective must be that if a later researcher followed the same procedures as described by an earlier researcher and conducted the same case study again, the later researcher should arrive at similar interpretations and conclusions. An important caveat here, bearing in mind the obvious temporal changes implicit in social and political research, is that the social/policy researcher is not working under 'controlled' laboratory conditions, as, for example, in the natural scientific tradition. It is important, therefore, to note that 'the emphasis is on doing the *same* case over again, not on "replicating" the results of one case by doing *another* case study' (Yin 1994: 36, original emphasis). In short, the goal of reliability is to minimise errors and biases in a study. Three useful prerequisites for minimising errors and biases are: i) to use multiple sources of evidence (interviews and document analysis in this study) in order to produce converging lines of enquiry - the process of triangulation noted earlier; ii) to create and maintain a case study database, which might include interview transcripts (and audiotape recordings if possible), observations on document analysis, and rigorous recording of references used; and iii) maintain a chain of evidence – the principle here is that an external observer should be able to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study conclusions (Yin 1994: 90-99). The chapter concludes with a summary of the study's research strategy, wherein a brief overview of the relationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and sources, as applicable to this research, is set out.

Summary of research strategy

This brief concluding section summarises the study's research strategy and the underlying rationales/assumptions that permeate the directional links between ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and sources (see Table 3.3 below). This is not to imply an over-mechanistic or rigid set of relationships and approach; rather, it is to illustrate that, though closely related, ontology, epistemology and methodology, are irreducible.

Table 3.3 Research strategy: Rationales and underlying assumptions

Level	Rationales/assumptions
Ontology and Epistemology	What is out there to know? – an anti-foundationalist ontology; what and how can we know it? – an interpretivist epistemology; both levels draw on critical realist assumptions – there are unobservable structures that both constrain and facilitate (agents') action; however, it is only through the application of theory (e.g. the ACF and a concept of power relations) and the discursive construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of structures that we can acquire a 'complete' understanding of social/political phenomena
Methodology	The means by which we reflect upon the methods appropriate to acquiring knowledge; the analysis of how research should or does proceed; qualitative comparative approach that explores issues of structure/agency (dialectical), the material and ideational aspects of social/political phenomena (again dialectical); and power relationships (relational and context-shaping); power relationships must remain open to empirical investigation; overall, generalisations are not drawn in a statistical (or positivist) sense but to theoretical propositions
Methods	Semi-structured interviews; qualitative document analysis; case study approach - focused comparisons or multiple-case design and a 'most similar systems' approach adopted with respect to selection of countries; triangulation between the different methods is important
Sources	Interviews with key personnel concerned with, and who have been involved in, policy-making at the elite level of sport in Canada and the UK; analysis of sport policy-related documents over time; triangulation possible between 'rhetoric' of interviewees and the 'reality' of policy emphasis/direction contained within the text of policy documents

Source: Adapted from Blaikie (1993, 2000); Grix (2002); Hague et al. (1998); Hay (2002); Marsh & Furlong (2002); (Peters 1998a); Yin (1994)

Moreover, as Hay argues, this 'relationship is directional in the sense that ontology logically precedes epistemology which logically precedes methodology' (2002: 63; see also Grix 2002). These relationships, then, set the parameters for the particular methods/techniques used here, and which 'are inextricably linked to the research questions posed [see Chapter 1] and to the sources of data collected' (Grix 2002: 179). It should be recognised that, in depicting these relationships in a logical and directional sense, it is not to argue that one aspect determines another. For example, the selection of an ontological position does not presuppose a particular epistemological standpoint (Grix 2002; Marsh & Furlong 2002). Thus, although this study adopts an anti-foundationalist ontology, it draws upon the (critical) realist assumption that there is a real world 'out there', which might be construed as leaning towards the assumptions of positivism. Crucially, however, our ontological standpoint also assumes that, whilst there may well be a 'real world' for us to know, not all social and political 'phenomena are directly observable, structures exist that cannot be observed and those that can may not present the social and political world as it actually is' (Grix; 2002: 183; see also Marsh & Furlong 2002; Marsh & Smith 2001). This assumption, then, affects our epistemological position, wherein we adopt an interpretivist approach in order for us 'know about' the constructed nature of the social and political phenomena under investigation.

In sum, as Marsh & Furlong (2002: 31) have noted, 'modern critical realism' acknowledges two key points. Firstly, while social/political phenomena exist

independently of our knowledge of them, our interpretation/understanding of them shapes outcomes. Thus, structures do not determine; rather, they constrain and facilitate: social/political science involves the study of reflexive agents who interpret and modify structures. Secondly, our knowledge of the world is imperfect; it is theory laden. In short, we need to identify and comprehend both the external 'reality' and the social construction of that 'reality' if we are to explain the relationships between social/political phenomena (Marsh & Furlong 2002: 31). The study proceeds on these fundamental precepts.

Notes

[1] For a more wide-ranging review of the utility of case studies in comparative research, see also, for example, Dierkes et al. (1987); Dogan & Pelassy (1990); Mackie & Marsh (1995); Rose (1991a); Yin (1994).

Chapter 4
Conceptualising elite sport development models

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the key principles of organisation and administration underlying 'models' of elite sport development in three countries that have achieved considerable success at major global sporting events. Two former Eastern bloc countries are considered first - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR/Soviet Union) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) - before going on to explore Australia's elite sport development model, which provides an example of one of the leading Western nations at this level of sporting excellence in recent years. Following Sabatier (1999: 6), the term 'model' here is used to imply 'a representation of a specific situation'. In so doing, we can explore one of the identified difficulties associated with comparative research, that is, whether the characteristics/nature of the problem or objective – here, the development of an elite sport model - to some extent determines, or at least limits, the possible policy responses by both state and non-state actors in different countries (Houlihan 1997: 6). A further aim, therefore, is to identify the degree of similarity in approaches and thus any differences in elite sport development models. In relation to this, Houlihan raises an interesting point of departure for this study's investigation of policy development and policy change in Canada and the UK, in suggesting that Canada (and Australia) have

> ... adopted policies of elite squad development which are very close to the Soviet model in a number of key respects including the systematic sifting of school-age children as a means of identifying the potential elite, the development of specialist training academies, the subordination of domestic governing bodies to government policy and the use of public money to support elite athletes (1997: 6).

This suggested pattern of policy similarity raises an important empirical question for this study. Namely, is the concept of policy transfer a useful explanatory variable for explaining policy outcomes and/or policy change? Although Dolowitz & Marsh acknowledge that policy transfer is not the sole explanation of any, let alone most, policy development, they do suggest that 'an increasing amount of policy development, and particularly policy change, in contemporary polities is affected by policy transfer'

(2000: 21). This chapter therefore provides the basis for further investigation into whether the similarity of response (in Canada and the UK) to the 'common problem' of constructing a framework for the development of medal-winning elites is the result of the intrinsic characteristics and imperatives of the problem, the characteristics of the national political system or the consequence of a process of policy transfer between countries. In relation to this, in a review of the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS), Schembri raises some instructive contextual considerations that help to guide the ensuing analysis:

> One country adopting another's sport system does so at their peril. Foreign models should be for comparison and to trigger thoughts, not for prescription or adoption. Social, cultural, historical and political factors are all important considerations in shaping the architecture of a country's sport system (1998: 8; see also Digel 2002a, 2002b).

Before considering each country in turn, some brief comments on the rationale for selecting the three countries is required. In selecting the Soviet Union and GDR for consideration the aim is to explore approaches to elite sport that yielded outstanding success, at the Olympic Games in particular, over the period 1952-1988. As the President of the International Association of the Theory and Methodology of Training in Elite Sport notes with regard to the Soviet Union:

> The main methodological concepts of the modern sports training system were established in the early fifties by Russian coaches who were faced with the problem of preparing Soviet athletes for the XV Olympic Games (Helsinki 1952) and for other major international competitions (Verkhoshansky 1998: 9).

With regard to the GDR, its 'dominance' in major international sports events over a similar period has led Volkwein & Haag, for example, to suggest that the country's state-controlled apparatus 'regulated the sphere of sports into such a state of perfection that the successes of the GDR seemed almost miraculous' (1994: 184). Both the Soviet Union and the GDR, then, were renowned for their highly structured approaches to developing elite performers, which have, arguably, provided a 'template' for the subsequent development of elite sport models in Western nations (cf. Green & Oakley 2001a, 2001b; Oakley & Green 2001a). The selection of Australia centres on three key points. The first point concerns the creation of the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) in 1981 which signalled a significant shift in emphasis towards a systematically managed approach to elite sport at federal government level in Australia. The second point is concerned with exploring the commonality between Australia's emerging model and the

former Eastern bloc countries' systematic approach to developing elite athletes. The irony of this emulation of Eastern bloc approaches to sport is striking. As Magdalinski has argued, 'the popular image of a "monster" eastern European sports network, intent on seeking and selecting future star athletes, no longer had currency as Australia increasingly and whole-heartedly adopted so-called "communist" training and managerial techniques' (2000: 317). The final point reflects the earlier comments regarding the Soviet Union and GDR; that is, from the inception of the AIS in 1981, Australian elite athletes have steadily increased their medal-winning performances at the Olympic Games, and Australia is now renowned as one of the most successful Western nations in the development of medal-winning elites.

Conceptualising elite sport development models

A central theme running through the evolution of 'successful' elite sport development models is the notion of a strategic, planned and co-ordinated approach. As a former Director of the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) has argued, 'Passion alone is not enough any more. You need to have the infrastructure, the support and the strategic approach at the national level to achieve results' (de Castella 1994). It should be noted that, for the purpose of this chapter, and in line with the notion of 'elite sport' set out in Chapter 1, sporting success is defined in terms of medal tallies in major international sports events, primarily the Olympic Games and World Championships. Therefore, although the increasing phenomenon of what might be termed commercial or 'market models' of elite athlete development is acknowledged - for example, the academy-based schemes in soccer and rugby union in the UK - this study's focus is on the development of models funded primarily through public sector bodies. It is also acknowledged, however, that the dividing line between such models is becoming increasingly blurred. For example, funding for youth soccer development in England is now part-funded by Sport England, a quasi-public sector organisation.

With the above caveats in mind with regard to different types of models, Fisher & Borms (1990: 9) have argued that, although many countries have discovered the benefits which accrue from encouraging high levels of sporting achievement, the trends in performance levels probably mean that success in Olympic or world events will become increasingly unlikely, unless the haphazard emergence of talent becomes more organised. Two key components of any elite sport development model are talent

selection/identification and talent development and it is important to note that these two components of talent promotion should not be treated as discrete entities (Fisher & Borms 1990: 10; see also Abbott et al. 2002). In other words, they are complementary and interdependent and should be considered as such when devising models or schemes to promote excellence in sport.

Systematic and asystematic models

Fisher & Borms (1990: 37) identify what might be termed a 'dualism' of talent selection and development: the 'Systematic' and 'Asystematic' models. In the latter, a talented young person might emerge and demonstrate potential for sport at an elite level but the structure and organisation for sport is inadequate to help develop this potential. Fisher & Borms (1990: 37) suggest that this model is typical of the situation in many developing countries, where issues such as basic nutrition and health care exacerbate the difficulties involved in developing elite athletes. With regard to the Systematic model, this is further sub-divided into a) 'System-related' models, where private or state organisations actively search for talent in an organised, systematic manner through testing or competitive procedures, and b) 'Person-related' models, where talented individuals emerge from a mass base premised on, for example, Sport for All principles, with structures available to then nurture the talented athlete. Fisher & Borms (1990: 37) suggest that, to a greater or lesser extent, the latter has been the traditional model for many countries in their development of young sporting talent. We can now explore the utility of Fisher & Borms' approach in specific countries.

Eastern bloc approaches to elite sport development

Although Riordan (1999: 48) rightly states that 'Communist sports policy in Europe is dead', the rapid collapse of Soviet-style communism in eastern Europe provides an opportunity to explore 'communist sports policies' and their possible legacy in respect of elite sport development models in the West. It is important to note that the notion of 'Eastern bloc approaches' is not used to imply notions of homogeneity. As Anthony observes, 'there are many common factors and shared principles ... [but] there are also big differences' to account for in any study of these former communist countries (1978: 5). For example, while the USSR utilised sport as a means of changing society, and integrated sport into 'a gigantic effort to take a backward and poor country from near-feudalism to modernity in sixty years', a somewhat different rationale underpinned the

approach to sport in the GDR, which was 'born of a divided and beaten Reich and reared in the heat of the Cold war, adapting the scientific systematisation of pre-war Germany to a Marxist-Leninist philosophy' (Anthony 1978: 5). Due consideration is therefore given to the wider historical and socio-political context within which elite sport has emerged, as well as to the key principles underlying the structure, organisation and administration of developing elite level athletes in the Soviet Union and GDR.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The early Soviet sporting philosophy was radically at variance with that in Western states in that it echoed Marxist conceptions of the interdependence of the physical and mental states of human beings, for both the all-round development of the individual and, ultimately, for the health of communist society (Riordan 1999: 49). A significant turning point for the direction and shape of (elite) sport in the USSR occurred under Joseph Stalin's leadership. The foundation of Stalinist sport had been the promotion of competition as a socially useful way of life. The official turn toward sport 'productivity' came in 1936, with a Party-endorsed shift of emphasis from purely physical culture to physical culture combined with competitive sport as a means of politically socialising the population to the new prevailing norms. The emphasis was on sport's utilitarian, 'applied' functions in preparing the population for labour and defence (Hoberman 1984; see also Riordan 1978b). As Hoberman observes, 'The cloud that had hung over the word "sport" (implying competition) since the early 1920s was now officially lifted' (1984: 192).

Soviet athletes competed at the 1952 Olympic Games for the first time, signalling a new era in the development of competitive amateur sport. As Shneidman notes, 'The participation of athletes from the Soviet Union and other East European states in the Olympic Games placed international sport in a completely new perspective; sport competitions acquired a new political, ideological, and often nationalistic colouring' (1978: 1; see also Hoberman 1992; Riordan 1978a, 1999). Hence, from 1952, until the demise of communism in the Soviet Union and GDR in the late 1980s, competition at global events such as the Olympic Games was more than just about achieving sporting excellence; for these countries it was political. As Morton observes in respect of the USSR in the early 1980s, 'At home foreign sports triumphs, officially presented as proof of socialism's superiority over capitalism, are primarily used to stimulate feelings of

national pride and Soviet patriotism to aid in preserving national unity in a polyglot society' (1982: 210; see also Riordan 1993).

Table 4.1 Key principles and main features of organisation and administration underpinning the USSR's elite sport development model

Key Principles	Main Features
Normative programmes	'*Gotov k trudu i oborne'* (Ready for Labour and Defence) - viewed as the horizontal development of mass sport initiatives from which potential 'stars' could be drawn; The 'Unified All-Union Sport Classification' - viewed as the vertical development of Soviet elite sport, and based on a set of standards/norms according to which athletes were awarded ranks/titles in different sports according to results; Programmes linked to Soviet sports schools system (see below)
Central state funding	Ostensibly directed at the so-called 'human base' of Soviet athletics; Also channelled through the para-military Dinamo society and the Central Army Sports Clubs; Difficult to ascertain with any certainty the amounts of funding involved
Sports schools	Six-stage hierarchy of sports schools,[A] with Sports boarding schools at the apex - focused on Olympic sports; Republican school games important as a scouting venue for talented youngsters; Para-military Dinamo society and Central Army Sports Clubs played important financing/administration role
Talent identification and development	Planned system of selection and elimination over a period of several years utilising a 3-stage approach; Information on several parameters was included, in particular, performance at various ages, the rate of progress and the ideal physical profile in relation to specific events;[B] Critics suggest this system lacked rigorous and was not based on a nation-wide programme of strictly uniform tests and norms
Well-qualified coaches	Imperative to Soviet success at elite level; Of 25,000 coaches working in 'Children and young people's sport schools' in 1967, some 80 per cent were qualified; In 1967, of 42,130 full-time instructors/coaches, over half employed in elite-oriented schools - in stark contrast to the situation in the West at the time, where such qualifications were not deemed essential
Sports physicians	Key role centred on assessing, through medical indicators, athlete's functional capabilities at elite level; Worked closely with both coaches and athletes in an interdependent system; Educational/professional level of coaches complemented role of physicians and other specialists

Notes:

[A] 'Children's and young people's sports schools'; 'Specialist young people's sports schools, Olympic reserve' (from 1981); 'the 'Sports-oriented day schools'; the 'Sport proficiency' and the 'Higher sport proficiency schools'; and, finally, at the apex, the 'Sports boarding schools' (Riordan 1978b, 1986b, 1991).

[B] For a more detailed discussion relating physiological, psychological and anthropometric testing to sporting excellence see, for example, Fisher & Borms (1990); Gleeson (1986); Müller et al. (1999); Orlick (1990).

Source: Adapted from Jarver (1981); Kane (1986); Kondratyeva & Taborko (1979); Riordan (1978b, 1986b, 1991, 1993); Shneidman (1978)

Interestingly, although the Soviet Union made an effort to learn from the West, its principal adversary, the United States 'failed to understand that the results of the battles on the track or in the swimming pool are determined also in the laboratory and office' (Shneidman 1978: 2). This observation not only points to a more systematic and scientific approach to elite sport development in the USSR at this time (see Table 4.1), but it also hints at the reluctance of the United States to 'learn' from Soviet methods.

Yet, it appears that one area of elite athlete 'preparation' in the former Eastern bloc was of interest to the United States; namely, the use of performance-enhancing drugs. As Goldman & Katz (1992: 47) note, in the United States during the 1970s, Dr John Zeigler, 'the father of anabolic steroids ... cautiously embraced them', in part, due to American doctors' knowledge of the Eastern bloc's attitude to drugs. As Goldman & Katz go on to note, 'To the doctor who equated victory on the athletic field with a victory in the political arena, the choice seemed to be to give drugs or risk an American humiliation and open the door to communism' (1992: 49). If we put aside the issue of performance-enhancing drugs, in the late 1970s Shneidman argued that it was not unusual to find that different practical problems of athletic training find similar solutions all over the world, and 'precisely for this reason we should look for the positive in Soviet physical culture which could be most easily adapted into the North American system of athletic training' (1978: 3). The main features of the key principles of organisation and administration underpinning the Soviet approach to developing elite level performers are usefully summarised in Table 4.1 above.

Summary of key implications

On one level, the organisational and administrative approach to elite sport development in the USSR can be characterised as an attempt to maintain a certain balance between the physical development of the masses with the development of elite level athletes for competition at international events, such as the Olympic Games. In reality, however, the former was often sacrificed to the latter because the desire to achieve results at the elite level was motivated by ideological and political considerations, which were of prime importance in the Soviet Union (Riordan 1993: 34, 39-40; Shneidman 1978: 126). One example of such an elite focus is the finding that the specialist sports schools catered primarily for Olympic sports (except for chess in the USSR, which was admitted in 1983) (Riordan 1986a: 83). Indeed, to many ordinary Soviet citizens, the worst aspect of this system was 'the misplaced priorities, the gap between the living standards and ordinary sports facilities on the one hand, and the funds lavished on elite sport and stars on the other' (Peppard & Riordan 1993: 133).

Moreover, following the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, a strong anti-elite sport (i.e. anti-Olympic) sentiment emerged with revelations of state-sponsored, production, testing, monitoring and administering of performance-enhancing drugs with regard to young children. Doubts have also been voiced in respect of the Soviet's so-

called 'scientifically rigorous' approach to talent identification and development. Indeed, Riordan has argued that 'Many tests would certainly seem relatively primitive to Western coaches. Most tests in the early selection stages are simple field tests, and the coach's or PE teacher's eye often provides the most ready information' (1986b: 228). Yet, if we put aside the above caveats for a moment, it is clear that the Soviet approach to elite sport development achieved outstanding results in a relatively short time period. The Soviet Union dominated the Olympic Games, summer and winter, from its first appearance in the summer of 1952 and the winter of 1956. Indeed, its principal challenger was another communist country - the GDR. The only interruption to communist supremacy was in 1968, when the USSR took second place to Norway in the winter Games and to the United States in the summer, and in the summer Games of 1984, when the major communist nations boycotted the Los Angeles Olympics (Riordan 1999: 58-59). Finally, in relation to the earlier discussion regarding attempts to conceptualise different approaches to elite sport development models, the Soviet approach was clearly based, in large part, on Fisher & Borms' (1990) System-related, Systematic model.

German Democratic Republic

Germany (pre-Second World War) was a relatively late developer in sport compared to Great Britain, for example, and state patronage, for military, economic, political and ideological reasons, was a key factor in the development of German sport under successive administrations. Interestingly, Childs points to a number of key principles that were to underpin the subsequent development of sport in the nascent GDR:

> The attempt to improve sporting performance by the application of science and medicine was in line with the importance given to science in German society generally. Both these features distinguished German sport from that in Britain. Mass participation in sports clubs which, in part at least, reflected patriotic, political and religious concerns, as well as the normal interest in recreation activities, was another distinguishing feature (1978: 75).

The East German sports system did not develop in a historico-political vacuum and a number of factors need to be borne in mind in respect of its development. Firstly, it was one element of an all-encompassing social system; secondly, it was used as a means of establishing the nation as the equal of its neighbouring German state, the Federal Republic; thirdly, the importance put upon achieving influence within the Warsaw Pact group was significant; and, finally, it should be viewed as a medium through which the

country could achieve political and sporting status on a global stage, both within the Olympic movement and the United Nations (cf. Childs 1978; Riordan 1999; Sutcliffe 1988). Two historico-political factors, in particular, are instructive.

Firstly, Walter Ulbricht, the dominant political figure in the GDR until his retirement in 1971, had a real interest in sport, personally, and as a vehicle for demonstrating the political superiority of socialism (Hoberman 1984). Secondly, if Ulbricht was the key individual behind the advancement of East German sport, the Soviet Union was its 'doctrinal mentor', most notably in its influence on the evolution of the GDR's educational programme (Hoberman 1984: 203). For example, in 1952, the official organ of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) published an article entitled, *Learn from the Scientific Physical Education in the Soviet Union*. This article had two principal strands, the first of which made reference to the past, while the second signalled future developments. The first strand referred to the workers' sport movement of the inter-war period, denouncing record chasing ('a means of profiteering') and 'decadent manifestations', such as mud wrestling and female boxing (Hoberman 1984: 203). These were covert references to the face of capitalist sport, which was the object of Soviet, as well as German calumny. The second strand reflected Stalin's influence with regard to sport 'productivity'. Future developments in East German sport were signalled in its reference to 'managing the emotions of the athlete scientifically', 'the importance of high performance', and of the Soviet coach 'who is both pedagogue and political educator' (Hoberman 1984: 204). Thus, the GDR faced a double-bind in its attempts, following the Second World War, to gain acceptance as an independent state. As Riordan observes, 'Its leaders ... had to contend with attempts to impose Soviet institutions and values upon the country, on the one hand, and western hostility, subversion and boycott on the other' (1999: 60; see also Coghlan 1990: 248). Nonetheless, the East German leadership persisted and continued to fund elite sport programmes in its bid to establish the nation as a world power. This brief overview of the wider historical, socio-political and ideological context within which the GDR's sports system emerged leads on to the identification of key organisational and administrative principles and their main features (see Table 4.2 below) which underpinned a meticulous and well-planned approach to the development of its elite level athletes.

Table 4.2 Key principles and main features of organisation and administration underpinning the GDR's elite sport development model

Key Principles	Main Features
One-party control	Sport was enshrined in the GDR's constitution; *Deutscher Sportausschuss* (German Sports Committee - DSA) established (in 1951) as the 'supreme organ' in all fields of sport/culture; *Das Staatliche Komitee für Körperkultur und Sport* (State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport) officially designated (in 1952) as the highest sports authority; *Der Deutsche Turn-und Sports-bund* (German Gymnastics and Sports Association - DTSB) replaced the DSA in 1957 and had total power for planning/funding of both elite and mass participation sport at youth/adult levels
Central state funding	Vital feature but, as in USSR, accurate figures are difficult to ascertain - it has been suggested that some $US2 billion was allocated to sport annually and in contrast to $US70 million per year in the Federal German Republic; Despite official ideological rhetoric of Sport for All, the focus was clearly on the elite level
Talent identification and development	Conducted in sports boarding schools, which were a key aspect of the GDR's sports system and usually aligned to a sports club focusing on selected disciplines; Also used in schools, in general, in sports co-operatives (Dynamo and Forwards of the police and army), and at the *Spartakiaden* – sports competitions for scouting talented youngsters; System based around a similar 3-stage approach as in the USSR
Well-qualified coaches	*DeutscheHochschule für Körperkultur* (German University for Physical Culture - DHfK) in Leipzig played a central role in training coaches, PE teachers and sports officials; Unofficial data suggest approx. 10,000 coaches were employed in the GDR; Integrated system contrasts to the fragmented situation in Britain at the time
Sports science/Sports medicine	*Forschungsinstitut für Körperkultur und Sport* (Research Institute for Physical Culture and Sport - FKS) employed approx. 600 staff in top secret sports science research; Post-1989, FKS became infamous for its role in the ideological indoctrination of athletes and for experiments with performance-enhancing drugs

Source: Adapted from Childs (1978); Dick (1990); Kozel (1996); Lahmy (1983); Sutcliffe (1988); Volkwein & Haag (1994)

Summary of key implications

It is clear from the above that the GDR's sports system comprised a highly-centralised apparatus and, through various political and ideological doctrines, the country's leaders forged an impressive 'recipe for success', at least at the elite level (Merkel 1995: 100; see also Merkel 1999). Many of the key organisational and administrative principles underpinning the GDR's well-planned approach to elite sport development reflect those found in the Soviet Union; not an unexpected outcome given the shared ideological doctrine of communism. Elite sport development in the GDR can thus be conceptualised (as for the USSR) as reflecting Fisher & Borms' (1990) System-related, Systematic model. Moreover, although it will be argued below (see *Conclusions to the chapter*) that many aspects of the Eastern bloc models discussed here have been adopted (and adapted) in some form in a number of Western countries, there may also be 'negative lessons' (Rose 1991b, 1993) to be learnt from both Soviet and East German models of elite sport development.

Firstly, and arguably most importantly, sport was used overtly as a political tool to promote a communist ideology. This is not to suggest that sport has not been used as a

political and ideological tool by Western nations (for Canadian and UK/England examples, see Kidd 1988a, 1988b, 1995; and McDonald 2000). Rather, it is to point to the characteristics of modern liberal democracies, which do not allow for the degree of political and ideological control exerted under socialist/communist regimes (cf. Coghlan 1990). Secondly, the elite athlete in the GDR was treated as 'a dehumanised tool within the sport system and was respected only if successful' (Volkwein & Haag 1994: 191; see also Hoberman 1992). Thirdly, and clearly related to the first two points, the now well-documented use of performance-enhancing drugs in the GDR's sports system has to be accounted for in any analysis of elite sport in the 21st century. Clearly, the use of performance-enhancing drugs was (and is) not confined solely to the GDR - see, for example, Houlihan (1999) for a more detailed discussion of drugs and sport. However, the GDR's doping experiments displayed an unusual lack of respect towards both their athletes and the ethos of sport. As Volkwein & Haag observe with respect to sports science/medicine research in the GDR, 'The protocols of the research documents read like the ones found in some of the most inhumane experiments of the SS or other doctors of the Third Reich' (1994: 191).

Fourthly, concerns remain in relation to the nature of talent identification and selection techniques employed in the GDR. Krüger provides an instructive insight into the rationalisation and scientisation processes underlying the nature of such techniques, in arguing that 'talent selection based on genetic tests was the basis for the athletic success of the small German Democratic Republic after 1968 – using the same anthropometric procedures developed by the racial scientists prior to 1945' (1999: 44). The final concern centres on the debate regarding the balancing of provision for Sport for All policies and those for elite sport development; clearly, in both the GDR and the Soviet Union, the focus was on the latter. The point being made here is that the concerns raised above can be seen as negative lessons to be learnt by Western nations seeking to emulate the 'success' of Eastern bloc approaches to elite sport. Interestingly, observations from Kidd (1988a, 1988b, 1995) and McDonald (2000), in Canada and England respectively, suggest that such lessons may not have been learnt; a point dealt with in more depth in the final section of the chapter.

An Australian approach to elite sport development

This section considers the example of Australia, a country that has been in the vanguard of developing medal-winning elites in recent years. As in the previous discussion of Eastern bloc approaches, consideration is given to the main features of the key principles of organisation and administration in the development of elite athletes. The context for the emergence of policies directed at the elite level is also reviewed; the aim here is to provide evidence of the gradual emergence of a more systematic approach to developing an elite sport model in the West. As discussed, the Australian example is instructive as it not only reveals many of the key principles underlying former Eastern bloc approaches but it also demonstrates that such an approach has delivered improved success at major sporting events such as the Olympic Games. Broom (1996: 1) suggests that the period of Eastern bloc dominance (1952-1988) at the Olympic Games, in particular, signified a transfer of international sporting power and acted as a catalyst to other nations to strive to emulate them. Thus, Western developed market economy countries as well as developing countries, seeking international recognition and prestige (and capitalist investment) have increasingly embraced a more systematic approach to elite sport development. Moreover, Broom's comments below give some credence to the proposition set out in the chapter's *Introduction* that the characteristics/nature of the problem or objective (here, the development of an elite sport model) to some extent determines, or at least limits, the possible policy responses by both state and non-state actors in different countries. Broom has argued that

> Common to former socialist 'development of excellence systems', and mirrored in the more recent state-supported models in other countries, are systematic co-ordinated plans of development from foundation to elite performance levels, in which principles of organisational structure and administration have a distinctive part to play (1996: 1).

Western motives for promoting sporting excellence have, however, been less easy to define than in the totalitarian states of the former Eastern bloc (Riordan 1986a: 80). Western approaches, in general, have been characterised by a more fragmented organisational and administrative structure and competing (and often contradictory) aims and ideologies of the various actors and institutions involved in sport. We can now explore whether this has been the case for the emergence of an elite sport development model in Australia.

Sport in Australia

The first serious intervention in the sport policy sector at federal government level in Australia did not occur until the early 1970s, with the election of a Labour Government, following 23 years rule by the Liberal Party. Indeed, Adair & Vamplew argue that 'government sports policy up to the 1970s was characterised by a rather incoherent mixture of limited financial involvement at the national level and infrastructure support at the local level' (1997: 41). The Labour administration created a Federal Ministry of Tourism and Recreation whose programmes reflected the government's primary commitment to fostering mass participation; at this time, the development of elite performers was a secondary concern. The primacy of mass participation over elite athlete development, and an implicit denunciation of Eastern bloc approaches to sport, is apparent in the following statement from Frank Stewart, the Minister for Tourism and Recreation in 1972:

> ... we have no intention of imitating some countries which regard success in sport as some sort of proof of the superiority of their way of life, ideology and race. Our task lies clearly elsewhere, in meeting more basic needs, in catering for masses, not just a small elite (quoted in Semotiuk 1986: 162).

Arguably, the defining moment for the emergence of a policy framework for developing medal-winning elites in Australia was the establishment, in 1981, of the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS). The creation of the AIS is interesting on a number of levels. Firstly, on a political/philosophical level, the delay in implementing recommendations from two reports in the 1970s (Bloomfield 1973; Coles 1975) regarding the development of an elite sports institute was indicative of the Liberal-Country Coalition Party's reluctance to intervene in the sport policy domain. Yet, the cross-party support for the AIS (and thus elite level sport) was a clear manifestation of increasing policy convergence between the two major political parties during the 1980s. Secondly, on a political/symbolic level, the federal government, cognisant of the public outcry over the poor performances of Australian athletes at the 1976 and 1980 Olympic Games, saw potential political capital in supporting the development of an elite sports institute (Paddick 1997: 15). Thirdly, on an individual (agent) level, the role of Bob Ellicott, the minister responsible for sport from 1978 to 1980, was instrumental in operationalising plans for the institute after the announcement that the government would proceed with the idea. In short, the establishment of the AIS 'was seen by the government as a crucial policy innovation designed to enhance Australian prospects in international competition' (Houlihan 1997: 70).

Following a period (1975-1983) of Liberal-Country Party rule, which sanctioned the abolition of the Department of Tourism and Recreation, the incoming Labour Government re-established a senior department that included a Sport portfolio - the Department of Sport, Recreation and Tourism - and oversaw the creation of the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) in 1985 – see Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Key principles and main features of organisation and administration underpinning Australia's elite sport development model

Key Principles	Main Features
'Sporting culture'	The Australian 'sporting culture' cannot be underestimated in the development of the country's elite athletes; parallels can be drawn here with former Eastern bloc countries; such parallels are based upon quite different foundations, however; the Soviet Union and GDR, for example, exploited the overarching doctrine of communism in order to establish an elaborate policy framework within which a systematic, planned and scientific approach to elite sport development emerged; on the other hand, Western liberal democracies, such as Australia, have not been able to employ such dictatorial approaches; Australia's socio-cultural environment is, however, characterised by a recognition of the 'value' of sport, not only as a physical activity but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a vehicle for competitive success at major international sporting events, such as the Olympic Games
Federal funding	From the inception of the AIS in 1981 (see below and main text), Australia's leading political parties have continued to support the development of medal-winning elite athletes; more recently, the publication of, *Backing Australia's Sporting Ability: A More Active Australia* by the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, reveals that federal funding support for elite level sport remains relatively high: over the four year period from 2001-2002, the 'Sporting Excellence' theme of this federal sport policy document, reveals that some A$408 million is to be allocated to the elite level – over 80 per cent of total federal monies for sport, in general, over this period
Elite sports institute	The creation of the AIS, together with the establishment of the ASC in 1985, has provided the organisational and administrative framework within which elite sport has developed over the past two decades; the AIS as a central site of sporting excellence, based initially in Canberra, has gradually evolved into a decentralised system of state academies/institutes of sport, whilst retaining the Canberra site as its central hub
Talent identification and development	The early selection of talented athletes is a vital element of Australia's elite sport model; recent technological developments have led to the adoption of a talent software programme – Talent Search – in the country's drive for sporting excellence
Well-qualified coaches	The National Coaching Council was established in 1978 (renamed the Australian Coaching Council (ACC) in 1979) and some 200,000 coaches have been accredited in 90 sports over the past 25 years; the ACC emulated earlier developments in this field by adopting the tenets of Canada's National Coaching Certification Programme which provided coaching education at five hierarchical levels; more recently, a competency-based coach training and education programme has emerged in Australia; this model caters for differing age, developmental and ability levels, as well as including coaches from a variety of racial, ethnic and gender backgrounds
Sports science/Sports medicine	Early pioneering work in the late 1940s and early 1950s by Professor Frank Cotton (recognised as 'the father of sports science in Australia') and his protégé, swimming coach, Forbes Carlile, provided a relatively early (for Western countries) acknowledgement of, and thus foundation for, the continued development of these disciplines in academic institutions, the AIS, and state academies/institutes of sport

Source: Adapted from Adair & Vamplew (1997); Cashman (1995); Department of Industry, Science & Resources (2001); Magdalinski (2000); Phillips (2000); Vamplew et al. (1997)

Operating under the Australian Sports Commission Act 1989, the ASC is in receipt of federal government funding and, although the ASC's twin objectives cross-cut the usual mass participation/elite development spectrum, the commitment to balance these twin objectives continues to invite sceptical interpretations. Booth, for example, notes that

'Notwithstanding initiatives to improve participation among "ordinary" Australians ("Life Be In It"), children ("Aussie Sports") and women (public awareness campaigns), elite sport remains the Commission's priority' (1995: 7). Thus, the establishment of the AIS and the ASC in the 1980s signalled federal government (financial) support 'that would ensure Australia's "return to glory"' (Magdalinski 2000: 317; see also Phillips 2000).

An important moment for Australian elite sport in the 1990s was the decision in 1993 by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to award the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney. This decision had a profound effect on the pace and direction of federal sport policy organisation, administration and funding allocations throughout the 1990s; a decision, moreover, which has further strengthened the elite sport lobby in Australia (cf. Houlihan 1997: 73). In relation to these comments, a number of points are worthy of note. Firstly, policy direction for sport, in general, in the 1990s was shaped by an increasingly centralised and federally-funded organisational and administrative structure. Secondly, and clearly related to the first point, at the heart of this organisational and administrative structure is the overarching role of the ASC and AIS. The third point reflecting the increasing focus on the elite level was the establishment in 1993 of the National Elite Sports Council (NESC), the primary purpose of which was to facilitate greater co-ordination across all bodies involved in the development of elite-focused programmes (cf. Pyke & Norris 2001: 8). The fourth and final point relates to funding allocations for sport. It is clear that any examination of Australian public policy since 1975 shows an apparent reluctance to address both sport policy goals – fostering elite performance and mass participation - with equal commitment (cf. Armstrong 1997; Booth 1995; Hogan & Norton 2000; Nauright 1996).

The identification and development of talented athletes requires specialist coaching; thus a further aspect of the Australian model is the value placed upon the importance of trained coaches (cf. Phillips 2000) – see Table 4.3. However, although the significance of the coach in Australian sport was acknowledged as long ago as the 1950s, it was not until 1979 that a National Coaching Accreditation Scheme was implemented (Adair & Vamplew 1997: 91-93; see also Phillips 2000). Adair & Vamplew suggest that the renewed acknowledgement of the significance of the coach was premised on rectifying 'Australia's slide in international sporting competitions .... [and that] the difference this time was that governments ploughed enormous amounts of money into sports coaching and scientific performance analysis' (1997: 93). John Daly, coach of the Olympic track

and field team at the 1976 Montreal Games summarised feelings within the Australian sporting community during the 1970s:

> Total commitment, expert coaching and scientific backup left nothing to chance in preparation of 'new age' athletes from other countries as they prepared for international contests. Australia must 'catch up' with European (particularly Eastern European) opponents or be destined to be 'also rans' and have a sporting past but no future! (quoted in Phillips 2000: 90).

As Phillips notes, the 'new age' athletes to whom Daly refers were primarily from the Soviet Union and GDR, both of which, as discussed, were dominating many Olympic events at this time. The primacy of sports science and sports medicine expertise is also a key principle underlying the contemporary development of Australia's elite sport model (cf. Phillips 2000). The increasing significance of this type of expertise has led Adair & Vamplew (1997: 106) to suggest that the development of elite athletic performance in Australia is becoming more of a team effort than just a partnership between athlete and coach - thus reflecting the systematic and integrated approach to elite sport established in the Eastern bloc, most notably at the German University for Physical Culture (DHfK) in Leipzig. The AIS, and the network of State elite sports institutes/academies are the cornerstone of this integrated approach to sports science, sports medicine, and the related disciplines of sports physiology, psychology and biomechanics (cf. Schembri 1998: 7). For a summary of the key principles and main features of the organisation and administration of Australia's elite sport development model, see Table 4.3 above.

Summary of key implications

From 1972 to date, either a Liberal-led Coalition or a Labour administration has governed the country at the federal level. Throughout the 1970s, and into the early 1980s, these governments exhibited somewhat divergent philosophies towards sport as a sector for policy intervention. In short, to a greater or lesser extent, during this period the Liberal-led Coalition Party adopted a more non-interventionist approach than the Labour Party (cf. Farmer & Arnaudon 1996: 8; Semotiuk 1986: 163; Toohey 1990). However, from the inception of the AIS in 1981 and the ASC in 1985, the policies of Australia's two dominant political parties have converged in their drive for international success at major international sporting events. Such convergence has led to the emergence of a systematic, planned and increasingly scientific approach to developing the country's elite athletes. In relation to these observations, a recurrent and significant theme in the development of Australian sport policy is the discourse surrounding relative

funding allocations for mass participation initiatives and those for elite level programmes. Indeed, an examination of Australian public policy since 1975 shows an apparent reluctance to address both policy goals with equal commitment. In other words, the political rhetoric of support for the former has not been matched with comparable funding allocations provided for the latter (cf. Armstrong 1997; Booth 1995; Nauright 1996). In short, Hogan & Norton (2000: 215-216) have argued that funding has been targeted towards 'the skill development of talented athletes in the continuum of elite athlete "production"'. Such assumptions have underpinned successive governments' approaches to funding sport in Australia to a greater or lesser extent since the early 1980s.

If increasing medal counts at the Olympic Games is the outcome sought from policies framed around elite sport then, from the inception of the AIS, the Australian elite sport development model has yielded impressive results. From Montreal in 1976 (five medals) – pre-AIS - to Sydney in 2000 (58 medals) the Australian federal government has witnessed an ever-increasing return (i.e. medals) on its investment at the elite level. The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, where 14 medals were won, is the only occasion during this period where Australia's medal count was lower than the previous Olympiad. However, Stewart-Weeks (1997: 5) notes that Australian sport is facing a 'third wave' in its development and highlights a number of issues regarding the future development of Australian sport policy. With regard to elite level sport policy, Stewart-Weeks has argued that 'Irrespective of the results at Sydney in 2000, a contemporary sports policy framework will have to engage some fundamental questions about the level of international success we want to achieve in sport, and the resources necessary to achieve them' (1997: 7).

A key point here concerns future funding allocations. Despite the usual policy rhetoric around the twin objectives of both mass/elite initiatives, future funding allocations for the four-year period, commencing 2001-2002, reveal where the emphasis lies between these two objectives. On the one hand, additional funding for the mass participation initiative, 'A More Active Australia', has been set at A$32 million. This additional money means that total federal funding for this initiative will be worth approximately A$82 million over the four-year period. On the other hand, additional money for the 'Sports Excellence' theme has been set at A$122.2 million, with total funding for Australia's elite athletes amounting to approximately A$408 million over the same period. Finally, with

regard to the earlier attempts to conceptualise elite sport development models through Fisher & Borms' (1990) Systematic and Aystematic approaches, it is clear that the Australian model features many of the key organisational and administrative principles found in the former Eastern bloc's development of a systematic, planned and scientific approach to elite sport. Thus, the Australian model can be similarly identified as reflecting Fisher & Borms' (1990) System-related, Systematic model for the identification and development of talented athletes.

Conclusions to chapter

This chapter has provided a platform upon which to explore how elite sport development models in Canada and the UK have emerged. In extending Fisher & Borms' (1990) model of talent selection and development - which centres, in large part, on various applications of 'selection' techniques – to include additional elements of elite sport development, the Soviet Union, GDR and Australia have all been conceptualised here as largely reflecting the System-related sub-division of the Systematic model. In the Soviet Union and GDR, despite both countries espousing the 'official' rhetoric of Sport for All policies, it is clear that the development of elite level athletes was paramount under the ideological doctrine of communism. However, recent sport policy funding announcements reveal that elite sport programmes are also of paramount importance in Australia (DISR 2001), despite similar declarations of policy rhetoric as that evident in the USSR and GDR.

These observations raise a number of questions/issues for the following chapter which explores the context for the emergence of sport policy, in general, and elite sport policy, in particular, in Canada and the UK. Firstly, and reflecting the discussion in this chapter's *Introduction*, in comparative research such as this, there is an imperative to unravel whether it is the characteristics/nature of the 'problem' or 'objective' that determines, or at least limits, the possible policy responses by both state and non-state actors in different countries. In this case, the problem or objective is the construction of a policy framework within which medal-winning elites can be developed. Secondly, an important question raised by this issue concerns the balance of, and/or tensions between, Sport for All programmes and those for elite sport. Thirdly, and closely related to the last issue, the notion of differing values and belief systems in the shaping and mediating of (elite) sport policy processes and policy change, warrants investigation. Finally, what

evidence is there that some form of policy transfer (cf. Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000) has occurred between these countries and/or other countries? One example, which was alluded to in the summary of the GDR, is useful in illustrating the persuasiveness of such questions, as well as signalling the utility of the theoretical and methodological insights set out in Chapters 2 and 3. With regard to the third question/issue above (but clearly not unrelated to the first two), McDonald (2000) argues that there has been a substantive change in emphasis in sports policy in England over the past decade, with national sports policy currently based on a particular discourse – in McDonald's terms, an ideological framework of 'neo-Olympism' that centres on elite sport outcomes. There are clear overtones of Eastern bloc political-ideological doctrine in McDonald's further suggestion that 'this achievement-oriented model of sport, with its strategic emphasis on the development of "excellence", is heavily influenced by political expediency – in particular, the quest for national patriotism via sporting success' (2000: 85). The inference in McDonald's argument is that the legitimacy and meaning of other forms of sport in England, for example, community level sport, is derived from the push towards a concept of excellence premised on politically-motivated objectives. This is an interesting observation for this study as McDonald (2000: 86) goes on to suggest that 'policy commitments ... emerge out of a deeper structure of norms, values and belief-systems' and in problematising these issues 'the inherent power relations hidden within sport policy' can be more usefully analysed

In pointing to the need to investigate 'a deeper structure of norms, values and belief-systems', McDonald's argument lends credence to the insights provided by the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) in Chapter 2. Moreover, in Chapter 3 it was argued that, in conjunction with the ACF, Hay's (1997, 2002) reformulation of Lukes' (1974) analysis of power dimensions might prove persuasive in helping to understand better 'the more or less concealed power relations' in the sport policy community and the politics of sport policy discourse (McDonald 2000: 86; see also, for example, Kidd 1988a, 1988b; 1995). In sum, in employing a critical-analytic framework based on the insights provided in Chapters 2 and 3, as well those in this chapter, a more complete analysis of the emergence of elite sport policy is possible in both Canada and the UK. McDonald's and Kidd's arguments are thus instructive contributions in highlighting a key point of departure for this comparative analysis of elite sport policy change. That is, how, and in what ways, might policy preferences be constitutive of particular value systems?

Chapter 5
Development of sport policy in Canada and the UK

Introduction

This chapter considers the wider historical and socio-political context for sport, in general, from the 1960s onwards and, more specifically, traces the key aspects of, and issues raised by, the emergence of policy developments at the elite levels of sport in Canada and the UK. A key issue here surrounds the extent to which these two countries have come to terms with one of the paradoxes or tensions in modern elite international sport. As Franks, Hawes & Macintosh have argued, to perform at the level of international elite competition

> … an athlete must now train full-time and must be supported by a retinue of coaches, trainers, logistical staff, and others. The myths of amateurism, individual achievement, and equal opportunity still have power, but the reality is that Olympic and other international success requires an expensive, bureaucratic, and highly technical elite athlete delivery system. Some countries have come to terms with this reality better than others (1988: 680).

In Western liberal democracies, this paradox or tension is clearly manifest in government struggles to balance commitments to this 'expensive, bureaucratic, and highly technical elite athlete delivery system', while at the same time attempting to meet more democratic, social equity goals related to the provision of sport and recreation opportunities at grass roots levels. While this paradox/tension was evident in both the Soviet Union and the GDR, Western liberal democracies face pressure from their electorates to balance the (sometimes) conflicting requirements of elite athletes and grass roots level participants. In order to provide some clarity to the ensuing discussion, the chapter is organised as follows. The first section of each country's review traces the emergence of sport as a significant policy sector through discrete time periods. The primary focus is on the federal/central government level of intervention and the rationale for selecting each country's 'starting point' for review and analysis reflects the first serious involvement in the sport policy sector at this level. Reference to provincial/regional and local/municipal levels are included but only where a particularly relevant issue requires further illustration and/or clarification (for more detail on sub-national levels in Canada and the UK, see Coalter et al. 1988; Henry 1993; Houlihan

1997; Macintosh & Whitson 1990; Macintosh et al. 1987). For brevity, tabular format is used to present: i) key political/policy events (e.g. Acts, White/Green Papers, sport policy-related documents, staging of major sporting events); ii) organisational and administrative implications; and iii) funding implications. Attention is also drawn to the key implications for elite sport development. The tabular summaries are further supplemented by a brief discussion of the main ramifications emanating from the series of implications described in the tables. Section two (for each country) provides a consideration of the policy process for sport, while section three evaluates the key implications for elite sport policy development and policy change in relation to the issues raised in sections one and two, and where insights from the meso-level frameworks first discussed in Chapter 2 are also reflected upon. The fourth and final section summarises the key sport policy-related themes emerging from both countries.

Canada

Sport in Canada

The review and analysis of the emergence of sport policy, in general, and elite sport policy, in particular, as a significant domain for intervention at federal level in Canada is viewed through the following significant time periods: 1960s/1970s; 1980s; and 1990-2002. The selection of the 1960s/1970s as a starting point reflects the federal government's relatively early (compared to Australia and the UK) involvement in sport through the inception of the 1961 Bill C-131, *An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport*. The manner in which sport is viewed, and the relationship between sport and government, has changed dramatically in Canada since the Second World War. Prior to this, sport was not only envisaged 'as an activity which provided diversion and amusement for the general populace' but also one where government involvement in sport, beyond control and prohibitive legislation, was limited (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 1). Thus, the perception of, and pattern of government involvement in, sport during this period contrasts sharply with the preceding chapter's discussion of the Soviet Union and GDR's manifest use of sport as a state-controlled, political and ideological tool. However, as Macintosh & Whitson observe, following the success achieved in major international sports events by these Eastern bloc countries 'most of the Western industrialised nations and some third-world countries followed the example of the Soviet Union and some of its Eastern bloc allies, and commenced to support and train a corps of elite international athletes' (1990: 1).

1960s/1970s

Federal government involvement in, and commitment to, the sport policy domain in Canada had its origins in Bill C-131, *An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport* in 1961 (cf. Morrow et al. 1989). The 1961 Act was prompted by two key concerns: first, the low level of physical fitness among the nation's population; and second, the country's failure (and Soviet successes) in international ice hockey competitions and the summer Olympic events (cf. Macintosh et al. 1987; Semotiuk 1996: 9).

Table 5.1 Canadian sport: 1960s/1970s

Key political/policy event	Organisational and administrative implications	Funding implications	Implications for elite sport development
1961: Bill C-131, *Fitness and Amateur Sport Act*	National Fitness and Amateur Sports Advisory Council established - no executive power; Fitness and Amateur Sport Directorate established	Can$5m pa. allocated for national programme of fitness and amateur sport	First recognition of support for elite sport programmes
1967: Inaugural Canada Games	Major facilities programme; invoked 'Unity through Sport' theme	Federal government shared costs with provinces and municipalities	All levels of government became involved with facilities for elite sport
1969: *Report of the Task Force on Sport for Canadians*	Proposed an independent body for elite sport – not realised; highlighted inadequate coach training; elite focus led to *Ross Report* on mass participation programmes	Recommended public/private sector co-operation in creating a structure for sport	Legitimation of federal involvement; first indications of a rational approach to sport planning; 'National Unity' theme again linked to elite achievement
1970: White Paper, *A Proposed Sports Policy for Canadians*	Sport Canada (elite) and Recreation Canada (mass) established in the Fitness and Amateur Sport Directorate; National Sports and Recreation Centre founded; a number of arm's length agencies created	Fitness and amateur sport budget approx. Can$6m in '71-72, 11m in '72-73, 17m in '75-76 and 25m in '76-77; COA's Game Plan '76 established in '72 and Athlete Assistance Programme in '73	Mass participation rhetoric, but programmes focused on elite sport – key actors[A] played prominent role; 'National Unity' theme prominent; reiterated rational approach to sport
1976: Iona Campagnolo appointed first Minister of State for sport and fitness; hosted Montreal Olympics	Montreal focus pushes other areas of sport into background; construction of elite facilities for Montreal Olympics	Further support promised for amateur sport and fitness programmes; during '75-76, Can$3.7m federal funding allocated to Game Plan '76	Campagnolo stated elite sport was priority; 11 Olympic medals won (but no Gold medals)
1977: Green Paper, *Toward a National Policy on Amateur Sport*	During '77-78 Recreation Canada re-designated as Fitness and Recreation Canada	Period of economic austerity in Canada; pressure on funding allocations for sport	Focus on elite sport and poor performances in international competitions
1978: Hosted Edmonton Commonwealth Games	Facilities constructed for Edmonton Games	Federal funding of Can$21m for the Games	Federal policy bears fruit, 1st in unofficial rankings
1979: White Paper, *Partners in Pursuit of Excellence: A National Policy on Amateur Sport*	Advocated a partnership of shared-sector responsibilities; renewed calls for autonomous Sport Canada rejected; Fitness and Recreation Canada divided	NSO grants increasingly tied to specific goals to be achieved in elite sport; reliance on sports lottery monies	'National Unity' theme; key actors[B] crucial in White Paper's technical and bureaucratic approach to elite sport

Notes:

[A] John Munro, Minister of Health and Welfare and Lou Lefaive, at this time Director of the Fitness and Amateur Sport Directorate (Macintosh et al. 1987: 57).

[B] Roger Jackson, former Director of Sport Canada; Lou Lefaive, Director of Sport Canada; Geoff Gowan, technical director of the Coaching Association of Canada; Marion Lay, a former Olympic swimmer and, at this time, a consultant with Sport Canada; and Dan Pugliese, who was located at the National Sport and Recreation Centre (Macintosh et al. 1987: 119).

Source: Adapted from Campagnolo (1979); Canada (1969, 1970); Hinings et al. (1995); Macintosh (1996); Macintosh & Whitson (1990); Macintosh et al. (1987); Morrow et al. (1989); Redmond (1985)

A key thread running through the federal government's increasing influence during this period was the instrumental use of sport to promote a 'Canadian' identity. Macintosh & Whitson, for example, note that, in a campaign speech in 1968, Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau argued that sport 'could serve as a powerful force for national unity' (1990: 4) and the 'national unity' theme was evident, for example, in both the *Report of the Task Force on Sport for Canadians* (Canada 1969) and the subsequent White Paper, *A Proposed Sport Policy for Canadians* (Canada 1970) – see Table 5.1. above. The instrumental use of sport for the promotion of a Canadian identity was not, however, an uncontested site in Canadian politics; the broader context here was the enduring debates surrounding social/political parity and identity construction for Francophone minority groups - Québec, for example, has a large Francophone constituency and had (and still has) its own identity agenda allied to the promotion of high performance sport (cf. Harvey 1999). Notwithstanding the latter, the Task Force Report and White Paper can thus be viewed as two key policy outputs underlying the development of an organisational and administrative framework within which changes occurred in Canadian sport policy over the next decade.

Of note for elite sport development during this period was the establishment of the National Sports and Recreation Centre (NSRC) in Ottawa, which provided a central location for the country's national sports organisations (NSOs), and the creation of two new divisions within the Fitness and Amateur Sport Directorate - Recreation Canada (Fitness Canada from 1980) and Sport Canada, the latter charged with responsibility for promoting high performance sport. Significantly, Macintosh et al. note that 'All these factors contributed to create an environment favourable for the development of agencies and programmes designed to improve elite athlete performance in Canada' (1987: 78). Indeed, it was becoming increasingly apparent that elite sport was the primary focus for federal intervention, with responsibility for recreation and mass participation programmes left to the provinces and municipalities. The termination, in 1969, of federal-provincial cost sharing agreements for sport and physical education was indicative of this changing policy direction (cf. Macintosh et al. 1987: 73; Stevens 2000: 83). The final federal output during this period was articulated in the 1979 White Paper, *Partners in Pursuit of Excellence: A National Policy on Amateur Sport* (Campagnolo 1979); the national unity theme was still in evidence, however. Yet, as discussed, this was undermined to the extent that the provinces were developing their own elite sport agenda. This was particularly true of Québec, which recognised the

value of elite sport success for its own 'nationalist' programme (Harvey 1999: 44). As Macintosh has argued more generally:

> In the rush to get on the high-performance band-wagon provincial governments abandoned their previously strongly held position as champions of mass sport ... and commenced to compete with the federal government for the attention and glamour associated with international events (1991: 271).

A further important trend in the late 1970s was the increasing emphasis put upon the technical and bureaucratic approach to elite sport; contributions to the 1979 White Paper from five key actors involved in elite sport development were crucial to this approach (see Table 5.1). One manifestation of this technical and bureaucratic approach was the government's insistence on a more objective and accountable method of allocating federal expenditures to NSOs (Macintosh et al. 1987: 126). Thus, grants were increasingly linked to specific goals to be achieved in high performance sport, a trend indicative of the imposition of the quadrennial planning process (QPP) in the 1980s. The latter is particularly significant for the development of elite sport in Canada and Zakus' (1996) analysis of Pierre Trudeau's political philosophy and agenda is instructive here. Zakus cites Trudeau's comments on 'cybernetic rationalism' as an aspect of this philosophy:

> The state – if it is not to be outdistanced by its rivals – will need political instruments which are sharper, stronger, and more finely controlled than anything based on mere emotionalism: such tools will be made up of advanced technology, and scientific investigation .... in short, if not a pure product of reason, the political tools of the future will be designed and appraised by more rational standards than anything we are currently using in Canada today (Trudeau quoted in Zakus 1996: 37-38).

This aspect of Trudeau's philosophy found its expression in the evaluation and structural change or development of a variety of ministries and other state planning methods (cf. Macintosh et al. 1987: 56; Zakus 1996: 38). For our purposes, it was first evident in the 1969 Task Force deliberations and subsequent White Papers on sport in the 1970s and, more specifically, in the adoption of rational bureaucratic tools such as the QPP in the 1980s.

1980s

In 1981, the recently elected Liberal Government published a further White Paper, *A Challenge to the Nation: Fitness and Amateur Sport in the '80s* (Canada 1981) which largely ignored the 1979 White Paper's recommendations for a quasi-independent sports

council and the call for shared responsibilities between government and the private sector (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Canadian sport: 1980s

Key political/policy event	Organisational and administrative implications	Funding implications	Implications for elite sport development
1981: White Paper, *A Challenge to the Nation: Fitness and Amateur Sport in the '80s*	Fitness and Recreation amalgamated under Fitness Canada in '80-'81; elite national training centres recommended	Priority funding for sports committed to excellence; Athlete Assistance Programme introduced	Rhetoric regarding shared responsibilities and quasi-independent sport council ignored; thus, elite sport in 'control' of federal government; conceded need for greater emphasis on social-equity issues
1982: Approval of 'Best Ever' programme for '88 Calgary winter Olympics	Four year plans required from sports involved – the QPP	Can$25m budget for 'Best Ever' programme	Confirmation of support for elite sport; strengthening of bureaucratic approach
1983: Sponsorship controversy	Continuing pressure on NSOs to seek private sector sponsorship leads to conflict	Indicative of federal policy in late '70s for NSOs to seek funding from private sector; however, Sport Canada's budget increased from Can$26.4m to Can$50.6m between '80-81 and '86-87	Threats to cut off funding to NSOs with sponsorship from tobacco/alcohol companies
1984: 'Best Ever' extended to summer Olympics in 1988	Pressure on NSOs to relocate to NSRC in Ottawa	Can$38m committed over four years to 'Best Ever' - not part of Sport Canada's base budget; Sport Recognition System introduced in '85 to guide funding levels	QPP and increasing bureaucratisation/ professionalisation leads to disquiet amongst NSO volunteers; 44 medals won at Los Angeles Olympics
1988: Hosted Calgary winter Olympics; Ben Johnson drugs affair at '88 Seoul summer Olympics	Major facilities constructed for Calgary but later criticised for elite focus	Approx. Can$300m overall federal commitment for Calgary, in addition to 'Best Ever' funding for both Games	Calgary performances perceived a success; Ben Johnson drugs affair leads to calls for re-evaluation of priorities in elite sport; just 10 medals won in Seoul
1988: Task Force Report, *Toward 2000: Building Canada's Sport System*	Called for a 'coherent Canadian Sport System'; rhetoric addressed both elite and social-equity goals; scepticism remained regarding the perceived link between elite goals and programmes in schools/universities	Reiterated earlier goal for NSOs to contribute 50 per cent of funding; this goal and threats to reduce funding not realised	Further focus on elite sport; criticised for ignoring drugs and ethical issues; reaffirmed professionalisation at elite level

Source: Adapted from Canada (1981, 1988); Hinings et al. (1996); Macintosh (1996); Macintosh & Whitson (1990); Macintosh et al. (1987); Redmond (1985)

Elite sport development during the 1980s was thus firmly in the control of the federal government (Macintosh et al. 1987: 129). A defining moment during this decade was the approval, in 1982, of the 'Best Ever' campaign for the 1988 Calgary winter Olympics. The federal government committed Can$25 million for 10 winter Olympic sport organisations to ensure that Canada would have a 'Best Ever' performance in 1988. However, this financial commitment had a caveat. The 10 NSOs were required to develop four-year plans 'to improve their technical and administrative capacities to produce better high-performance athletes' (Macintosh 1996: 54). These four-year plans were known as the quadrennial planning process (QPP). The QPP can be viewed as a

process that highlighted Canada's pursuit of excellence in international sport as one that requires both technical and bureaucratic rationalisation. More specifically, it required NSOs to identify performance targets for a four-year period, and to specify the material and technical support systems (from training camps and centres of excellence to coaching and paramedical arrangements and research programmes) required for each set of targets to be realistic. Moreover, this increasing growth in federal grant-aid to NSOs also included monies direct to elite athletes through Sport Canada – the Athlete Assistance Programme (AAP) – and which further marginalised the National Fitness and Advisory Council and with it an independent voice for sport (Houlihan 1997: 79; see also Beamish & Borowy 1987 for a fuller discussion of the history of financial aid to Canadian athletes). The argument being developed here is that the Best Ever campaign, and the QPP, brought to the surface a number of issues that were to influence the subsequent development of elite sport in Canada throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s and beyond. In part, the imposition of the QPP, and the changes it brought about, reflects the 1969 Task Force Report, which had criticised amateur sport organisations for their 'kitchen-table' style of operation (cf. Hinings et al. 1996). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a full discussion of these issues (see Macintosh & Whitson 1990 for more detail), however, three points are worthy of note.

Firstly, a significant aspect of increasing federal involvement in elite sport was the declining autonomy of NSOs; dependence on government for financial support (e.g. through the QPP) was central to this decline. For example, in a survey of 66 NSOs, Macintosh & Whitson found that '15 relied on the federal government for more than 85 per cent of their total revenues and 35 for between 50 and 85 per cent' (1990: 20-21). The resulting imbalance of power in the relationship between the federal government and NSOs was seen as an inherent weakness in the organisation and administration of elite sport - due primarily to the interests and concerns of the sports organisations not being actively represented. Moreover, attempts to redress this imbalance failed. For example, efforts to unify the NSOs and the important multi-sport organisations, such as the Canadian Olympic Association (COA – now Canadian Olympic Committee - COC) and the Canadian Inter-University Athletic Union (renamed Canadian Interuniversity Sport in 2001) did not materialise, largely due to internecine conflicts over which body would assume overall control (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 21). Alongside the failed attempts to unify elite sport organisations, there were also protestations from other interest

groups (such as the disabled and native Canadians) which objected to the federal government's focus on the elite level (Whitson & Macintosh 1988: 85).

The second point highlighted by the QPP surrounds disparities between the roles of full-time professional staff and many volunteer executive members within NSOs; a point which raises questions of differing relations of power between the respective regional sport organisations and their parent central body. That is, full-time professional staff and Sport Canada were set against volunteer executive members who represented various regional bodies of NSOs. The third point raised by the QPP draws attention to an ever-present dilemma in Canadian sport from the inception of the 1961 *Fitness and Amateur Sport Act*. Namely, the government's struggle to balance competing claims on behalf of elite sport versus those for mass participation programmes. In short, what were the legitimate goals of the high performance mandate within NSOs at this time? On the one hand, the federal government's single criterion was success at the 1988 Olympic Games. On the other hand, for many actors within NSOs this single focus was inappropriate (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 24; see also Whitson & Macintosh 1988). The three dominant policy themes of this period – i) increasing federal intervention; ii) the government's 'struggle' to balance elite and mass participation interests; and iii) the rationalisation of elite sport organisation and administration - were brought into sharp relief through the Ben Johnson drugs affair at the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the subsequent Dubin Inquiry (Dubin 1990) and Minister's Task Force on Federal Sports Policy (Canada 1992) in the early 1990s.

1990-2002

Despite, or perhaps because of, the emphasis put upon elite sport development by the federal government, the period dating from the early 1990s and into the 21st century has been characterised as one of confusion, turmoil and introspection for the Canadian sporting community (cf. Macintosh 1996: 59). Indeed, the 1988 Seoul Olympics can be viewed as a nadir in Canadian sport, where the Ben Johnson drugs affair blighted the Games and Canada won just 10 Olympic medals. The upshot of the drugs affair was an inquiry by Charles Dubin (Dubin 1990), who declared that there was a moral crisis in high performance sport in Canada (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Canadian sport: 1990-2002

Key political/policy event	Organisational and administrative implications	Funding implications	Implications for elite sport development
1990: Dubin Inquiry	Major implications for anti-doping policy; recommended a re-evaluation of sporting structures and processes	Critical of federal funding controlling 'the entire sports system'	Suggested there was a 'moral crisis' in high performance sport; criticised federal focus on elite level
1992: Task Force Report on Federal Sport Policy - *Sport: The Way Ahead* (Best Report)	Wide-ranging recommendations - many ignored - in particular, those relating to broader objectives in respect of wider social goals	Recommended reduction in nos. of sports funded; early '90s period of financial constraint in Canada – approx. 25 per cent cut in allocations to NSOs	Recommended less focus on elite sport; medal targets should not be primary criterion of success
1993: Ministry of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport abolished by Conservative Government	Fitness Canada portfolio moved to the ministry responsible for health and Sport Canada to newly created, Dept of Canadian Heritage	One aspect of general cutbacks in government spending	Some viewed this change as a decrease in importance attributed to amateur sport; others believed government would now be less directly involved in this area
1995: Sport funding and accountability framework (SFAF) introduced	Attempt to encompass wider social goals in funding process to NSOs	Intended to reduce dependence on government direction to dependency on federal funds	Rhetoric suggested a move away from QPP, Sport Recognition System and elite focus
1998: Mills Sub- Committee Report, *Sport in Canada: Everybody's Business*	Wide-ranging examination into the 'industry of sport' in Canada; led to creation of Secretary of State (Amateur Sport) position	Recommended federal government continue its policy and funding support for amateur sport generally	Recommended increase in nos. of NSOs to be funded; more funding for coach training; increased scope for funding to 'carded' athletes
1998: Sport Canada Strategic Plan 1998-2001	Basis for consultation with the sport community on future policies and programmes; outlined four 'Strategic Directions'	Federal funding focused predominantly on elite sport; Can$10m extra federal funding allocated	Goal at elite level: to enhance the ability of athletes to excel at highest international level through fair and ethical means
2000: A response to the *Mills Report* (news release from Dept of Canadian Heritage)	Included a commitment to create a 'real national policy on sport'; six regional conferences to be held	Additional Can$7.5m funding for amateur sport	Beneficiaries: Athlete Assistance Programme, National Sports Centres (now CSCs), and agencies involved in fight against doping
2001: *Towards a Canadian Sport Policy: Report on the National Summit on Sport*	One outcome of *Mills Report* consultations; focus on three 'policy pillars' – Participation, Excellence, Building Capacity	Recommended additional Can$650m over the period 2001-2008 for sport generally	Recommended funding excellence as: 'spending per result'; public-private partnerships again encouraged
2002: *The Canadian Sport Policy*	Outcome of two years' deliberations across federal-provincial-territorial forums (see above); a fourth policy pillar - 'Interaction' – added to those identified in *Towards a Canadian Sport Policy*; emphasis on stronger links between sport/health policy	No specific policy guidelines on future funding allocations	No initial extra funding for high performance sport; focus at NSO level remains primarily on high performance objectives, despite policy rhetoric
2002: Bill C-54, (now Bill C-12) *An Act to Promote Physical Activity & Sport*	Updates 1961 Act (Bill C-131); emphasis on participation, physical activity issues, hosting policy and an 'alternative dispute resolution' for sport	See above	Evidence of significant shift in federal focus away from high performance sport

At the summer Olympic Games during this period, across all events, Canada won 18 medals in Barcelona 1992 (6 Gold), 22 medals in Atlanta in 1996 (3 Gold) and 14 medals in Sydney 2000 (3 Gold). This represented 12th position in the medals table in 1992, down to 21st in 1996 and 24th in 2000. While there is some evidence of reports (cf. Scammell 2000b, 2001) questioning Canada's declining performance at the Olympic Games, there is little evidence of significant policy change emerging out of such debates.

Source: Adapted from Canada (1992, 1998); (Canadian Heritage 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001c, 2002a); Harvey et al. (1995); Hinings et al. (1996); House of Commons of Canada (2002); Macintosh (1996); Macintosh & Whitson (1990)

The Dubin Inquiry not only had significant repercussions for anti-doping policy, it also stimulated a wider response from the federal government into the fundamental values underpinning Canada's 'sport delivery system' (Thibault & Harvey 1997). The federal government's response came in the form of a Task Force on Federal Government Sport Policy, *Sport: The Way Ahead* (Canada 1992) - otherwise known as the *Best Report* after its author - that reflected Dubin's criticisms regarding the manipulation of, and over-concentration on, elite sport by the federal government (cf. Macintosh 1996: 60). The *Best Report*, for example, criticised Sport Canada for 'exercising excessive day-to-day control and direction over sport organisations' through its administration of federal policies and programmes (Canada 1992: 192). Moreover, the *Best Report* argued, *inter alia*, for a more wide-ranging re-evaluation of how elite sport should be supported and posed a cluster of questions that included, 'Why do we support high-performance sport at all? [and] Do we appreciate the difference between "being the best you can be" and "being the best?"' (Canada 1992: 26; see also Semotiuk 1996: 7). Such questions characterise debates surrounding competing philosophies, values and belief systems of key actors in the Canadian sporting community and the role that such values and belief systems might play in contributing to elite sport policy change – a central focus of investigation for this study. What is clearly underlined here is that the issue is not just about funding allocations; rather it is one of priorities and political will. A case in point is the Canadian province of British Columbia, where, in the early 1980s, increased expenditures were allocated to high performance sport while, at the same time, the province's Premier argued that his government could not afford social programmes (Goodale 1985). As Goodale argues, 'A budget, therefore, is an allocation based not on dollars but on *values*: it converts resources into human purposes' (1985: 198, emphasis added). It is this question of purpose that the Canadian government faced in the early 1990s and, indeed, throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century with regard to support for high performance sport.

Developments in sport policy during the early to mid-1990s also need to be placed within the broader context of recent Canadian politics. For example, developments such as the 1995 referendum in Québec, which resulted in a close decision against Québec separation from Canada (Harvey 1999: 35); the weakness of the economy; and the election of the cost-cutting government of Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. In short, sport during this period was forced down the policy agenda and federal funding for sport was reduced by some 17 per cent between the period 1990-91 and 1996-97

(Houlihan 1997: 82). Indeed, Sport Canada's budget for 1998-99 was Can$52 million, still some way short of the Can$86 million in 1986-87 (Canadian Heritage 1998). This period also witnessed a number of important shifts in federal sport policy. Of note was a refinement of Sport Canada's objectives, however, as Houlihan notes, this revised set of objectives largely ignored 'the thrust of the Best Report and its argument for a less elitist approach to sport, and confirmed the priority of elite success by making it clear that federal funding would be used primarily to fund elite athletes' (1997: 83).

The introduction, in 1995, of a new funding framework for NSOs - the Sport Funding and Accountability Framework (SFAF) was intended to help realise these objectives. The government had not only been criticised for spreading its funding across too many sports (Canada 1992: 210) but the QPP (and the Sport Recognition System) as vehicles for distributing funding had also been a major source of conflict between the government and NSOs. One reading of the SFAF suggests that it was proposed to help implement Sport Canada's objectives and to increase the accountability of NSOs in the use of federal funding. On the other hand, Houlihan (1997: 85) notes that, despite the recommendations of the Dubin Inquiry and *Best Report* for a less elitist focus, the SFAF criteria were heavily weighted towards elite success, with little evidence in this funding formula of broader objectives in respect of wider social goals. It appears, therefore, that key recommendations from both the Dubin Inquiry and the *Best Report* in the early 1990s, with regard to a less elitist focus and for a re-evaluation of purpose towards high performance sport have, at worst, been largely ignored and, at best, undermined. Two recent examples help to make the point.

Firstly, in July 2001, it was announced that Canada's top Olympic athletes were to benefit from an extra Can$1.2 million for the forthcoming 2002 winter Games in Salt Lake City – an initiative known as Podium 2002. As Denis Coderre, Secretary of State for Amateur Sport at the time, stated, 'Following the Sydney Games [where Canada won just 14 medals], the need was identified for a funding programme focused on high performance sport with the specific objective of achieving medal-winning results' (quoted in Canadian Heritage 2001b: 1). Coderre's statement is in stark contrast to the *Best Report's* recommendation that 'it is inappropriate to target medals/medal counts as goals or policy determinants for the federal government' (Canada 1992: 210) and Dubin's suggestion that 'the measure of success of government funding be limited not to medal counts' but the degree to which it meets wider social goals (Dubin 1990: 531).

However, calls throughout the 1980s and 1990s for funding to come from partners outside the public sector have been heeded to some extent. As Michael Chambers, President of the then COA, stated, 'Podium 2002 supports the best possible Olympic medal performance in Salt Lake City for Canada and demonstrates the huge potential of partners in both the private and public sector working together to improve Canadian performances in international sport' (quoted in Canadian Heritage 2001b: 1). The second example is the allocation of an extra Can$7.5 million for amateur sport in March 2000 (Canadian Heritage 2000a); in part, a response to the report by Dennis Mills - *Sport in Canada: Everybody's Business* – (Canada 1998, otherwise known as the *Mills Report* after its principal author). Significantly, a substantial proportion of this extra funding - Can$6.9 million - was directed towards elite level 'carded' athletes and national sports centres. Thus, at the beginning of the 21st century, the actors/organisations within the Canadian sport system do not appear to have fully resolved the debates instigated in the early 1990s surrounding the values and belief systems underlying the relationship between sport, recreation and fitness and the desire to achieve high medal counts at the elite level. Two further points are worthy of note in this regard.

Firstly, in the wake of perceived poor performances at the Sydney Olympics, there is the argument that still more funding is required in order for the Canadian elite sport development model to compete with countries such as Australia (cf. Morse 2002a; Scammell 2001). Secondly, and in contradistinction to the first point, in *Towards a Canadian Sport Policy: Report on the National Summit on Sport* (Canadian Heritage 2001c) - the culmination of the consultation process instigated by the *Mills Report* - there is less emphasis on the elite level. *Towards a Canadian Sport Policy* outlines three 'policy pillars' - a fourth pillar, 'Interaction', was added in the new Canadian Sport Policy (Canadian Heritage 2002a) - upon which a new national sport policy should be built, namely Participation, Building Capacity and Excellence, with the first two claiming at least as much of the rhetoric as the Excellence pillar (Canadian Heritage 2001c: 2). Of specific interest, however, within the Excellence section, is the suggestion by Marion Lay, President of the Board of Directors of Greater Vancouver's National Sports Centre, that 'we must look at excellence in a different way – "spending per result"' (quoted in Canadian Heritage 2001c: 7). Marion Lay's statement not only contradicts the *Best Report's* recommendation that elite level sport is not just about medal counts but also,

unwittingly, draws attention to comments in the *same* report from Professor Bruce Kidd. In the introduction to the Building Capacity section, Kidd argues that

> The National Summit on Sport is one of those special moments that provide opportunity in time of crisis. The crisis is that what we have called the Canadian sport system is, frankly, on its last legs. The opportunity is that never before have we had such strong winds in our sails for progressive change (quoted in Canadian Heritage 2001c: 9).

Notwithstanding the above observations, the Canadian federal government has created a centrally-planned and bureaucratic elite sport development model which reflects many of the 'rational' organisational and administrative principles evident in the Eastern bloc models discussed earlier. The proposition set out in Chapter 4 that the characteristics/nature of the problem determines, or at least limits, the possible policy responses by both state and non-state actors in different countries is, therefore, given further support. In sum, Canada's elite sport development model is underpinned by the following organisational and administrative principles: a centralised national sports administration centre – Sport Canada; a relatively sophisticated cluster of sports science, sports medicine, and physical therapy services for elite athletes; a well-developed national coaching certificate programme (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 18); a number of specialist sports schools for the identification and development of young athletes (cf. Bales 1996; Treadwell 1987: 64); a financial support system for elite athletes - in particular, the AAP (cf. Canada 1992: 195-202; Broom 1986: 211-213) – as well as for coaches, and technical and administrative staff; and a country-wide network of multi-sport training centres (cf. Canadian Heritage 1999b).

Policy process

This section provides a summary of the policy-making process within which sport operates in Canada, a key aspect of which is to outline the key mode(s) of interest mediation between the state (primarily the federal government) and civil society (in the case of sport, for example, voluntary sport organisations). The summary will therefore allude to the macro- and meso-level theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. In Canada, there is some debate as to whether the policy-making process is (and/or has been) characterised by a pluralist or corporatist approach to interest group mediation (cf. Coleman & Skogstad 1990b; Harvey et al. 1995; Olafson & Brown-John 1986; Pross 1986). On the one hand, for example, Olafson & Brown-John suggest that 'the public policy process in Canada 'is not entirely unlike that of most other liberal democratic

Western democracies. Policy outputs, be they related to sports or foreign policy, are, in one manner or another, a product of an interactive process referred to as *pluralism*' (1986: 70, original emphasis).

On the other hand, within an analysis of how the state has managed interest politics in Canada, Harvey et al. argue that 'the political management system used by the government to manage its relationship with the various interest groups involved in amateur sport and fitness can be qualified as neo-corporatist' (1995: 251). It should be noted that it is not the intention here (to attempt) to resolve which of these theoretical approaches prevails. Rather, the aim is to provide an overview of the debates, to map the policy terrain within which sport policy has developed and to point to significant themes underlying the pattern and direction of elite sport policy change. Indeed, it is perhaps misleading to treat interest group/government relations as *either* pluralist *or* corporatist. For example, different policy sectors may evidence characteristics of one, or the other, or both, and in either parallel or distinct temporalities. Thus, during the economic crisis of the early 1970s, an attempt to introduce corporatist arrangements was undertaken by the Trudeau government to involve both business and unions in a tripartite relationship in order to achieve agreement on prices and incomes. However, in non-economic policy domains corporatist arrangements were unusual, with state/interest group mediation generally closer to a pluralistic policy community model (Houlihan 1997: 38). Writing in the mid-1980s Pross acknowledged that, while there may be a preference in parts of the state bureaucracy for corporatism, a preference is not a trend and concluded that 'Both in terms of practice and of ideology Canada has followed a path that is far from corporatism' (1986: 225).

In terms of pluralism, the post-Second World War period has been characterised by the growth in a number of interest groups in different policy areas, in large part, actively encouraged by the federal government in order to help manage an increasingly burdensome set of policy responsibilities (cf. Coleman 1988). For Pross (1986), the encouragement of interest group formation was indicative of an attempt by government agencies to establish policy communities, characterised, not by zero-sum dependency relationships but by mutually beneficial relations between agency and interests. As Coleman & Skogstad note, 'Public policy-making in Canada occurs within policy communities in which state actors and representatives of organised interests, primarily but not exclusively, interact to shape public policy in a given sector over time' (1990a:

312). The perception of Canadian policy communities is one characterised by a commitment to a common set of values, an implicit organisational and authority structure, and where established patterns of behaviour are apparent (Houlihan 1997: 37; Pross 1986: 98). The utility of the meso-level policy networks approach and closely related advocacy coalition framework are thus reinforced in the context of Canadian state/civil society interest group mediation. Moreover, the broad array of groups included in Pross's (1986: 98) notion of a policy community, which includes government agencies, pressure groups, the media and academics, is resonant with the advocacy coalition framework's (ACF) notion of a policy subsystem. For the ACF, a policy subsystem includes 'actors at various levels of government active in policy formulation and implementation as well as journalists, researchers, and policy analysts' (Sabatier 1993: 17) – and, notably, a broader array of actors than would be included in corporatist analyses of state/civil society intermediation.

Moreover, the following observations regarding Canadian policy networks/communities not only reinforce the persuasiveness of the ACF's focus on the relationship between endogenous and exogenous forces as significant factors underlying change but they also point to (variants of) pluralism as the most salient macro-level approach. As Coleman & Skogstad note, 'both basic socio-economic changes and accompanying shifts in values quickly lead to alterations of policy communities in this complex regime of organised pluralism' (1990a: 322). Key issues for this study, in the Canadian context, therefore, include the identification of a high performance sport advocacy coalition, a vital aspect of which is the identification of key actors/organisations that might constitute such a coalition. A further aim follows logically from this; that is, is there evidence of other groups of actors/organisations in the sport development policy subsystem that are competing with the elite-focused (if identified) coalition for policy influence and resources?

There are two key implications, in particular, that arise from the preceding discussion, for the Canadian sport policy process, in general, and high performance sport policy processes, especially. The first implication concerns two macro-level features of the state - the parliamentary support given to various social groupings and the organisational structure of the state - which both characterise a nation's political system while at the same time have meso-level effects; thereby providing linking themes between these two levels of analysis (Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998: 62; see also Coleman &

Skogstad 1990a, 1990b; Marsh & Stoker 1995a). In relation to parliamentary support for different interest groups vying to influence governmental policies regarding sport, a fundamental question raised here concerns issues of purpose. More specifically, what are the purposes of federal involvement in sport in Canada? (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 94). From the mid-1970s until the early 1990s, when the Dubin Inquiry and *Best Report* recommended a less elitist approach to sport, it is clear that Canadian governments, both Liberal and Conservative, have supported policies promoting elite level sport programmes but which have been criticised as being detrimental to wider social equity goals related to sporting activity for all (cf. Kidd 1988a, 1988b, 1995). In many respects, the 'national unity' motive underlies this disparity as, Pierre Trudeau, in particular, utilised (high performance) sport performances in order to achieve international recognition as one aspect of 'his wider plan for a liberal federalist nationalism' (Zakus 1996: 42).

A further significant factor in the increased federal focus on the elite level is that, from the early 1980s, the discursive construction of sport policy, using the language of technocracy and science, has been the dominant discourse in Canada, 'representing the efforts of an aspirant profession to link its own special knowledge with ideas in "good standing"' (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 110). We can see evidence here of a conjuncture of federal government interest with those actors/organisations involved in the increasingly scientific 'production of performance' at the elite level of sport. Questions of power relations and influence are implicated in this conjuncture. As Daugbjerg & Marsh observe, 'The structure of party loyalties has an impact upon the formation of meso-level policy networks [subsystems]. Political parties tend to favour some groups' interests by giving them access to policy networks and excluding others' (1998: 63). With regard to the Canadian (high performance) sport delivery system, the potential for a more exclusive policy community or advocacy coalition comprised of the state actor responsible for policy (Sport Canada) and the privileged group (particular NSOs) is thus enhanced. Such a conjunction gives both 'actors' a central position within the policy network or policy subsystem and enables them (potentially) to exclude others. As Macintosh & Whitson observe, this conjuncture of interests has 'involved real power struggles, in which some interest groups and coalitions of interests have gained influence ... while others have lost it' (1990: 109).

On one level, these observations appear to confirm Harvey et al.'s (1995) argument that corporatist or neo-corporatist tendencies have been the dominant mode of government/civil society mediation in respect of the management of amateur sport in Canada. Such an approach is characterised by restricted access. As Hayward observes, 'only those groups that have something to offer the state are candidates for such virtual "incorporation". Those that are simply making demands upon it, the pure pressure groups, are persona non grata' (1979: 37). An important point is raised here, which reflects the above contention regarding high performance sport as dominating sport policy discourse in Canada. That is, as Harvey et al. have argued, 'innovation is [not] possible or even expected in the corporatist structure, as representatives are selected by the state based on their similarities, not their differences. As a result, new initiatives are stifled before they reach the discussion stage' (1995: 260). However, Harvey et al. also point to recent developments, which suggest 'that efforts are being made to enhance the participation of interest groups in the future of amateur sport and fitness in Canada' (1995: 262). This last suggestion is reinforced in two policy-related documents published in 2001: the discussion paper *Building Canada Through Sport: Towards a Canadian Sport Policy* (Canadian Heritage 2001a), and *Towards a Canadian Sport Policy: Report on the National Summit on Sport* (Canadian Heritage 2001c). The discussion paper, for example, states that the federal government intends to develop a Canadian Sport Policy 'following a broad consultation with Canadians at the community, provincial, regional and national levels' (Canadian Heritage 2001a: 2), through six regional conferences across the country with more than 600 selected representatives. The *Report on the National Summit of Sport* (which followed the discussion paper) also makes extensive references to consultation and partnerships (Canadian Heritage 2001c: 12).

Whether the outcome of the above deliberations on the future of Canadian sport results in a less elitist, and thus more inclusive approach to government/civil society mediation, remains a matter for further research. Moreover, the reference in the *Report on the National Summit of Sport* to 'cooperation with the provinces' (Canadian Heritage 2001c: 12) is instructive as 'An important organisational configuration which influences meso-level policy processes is the internal division of authority within the state' (Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998: 64-67). This leads on to a summary of the second macro-level feature highlighted by Daugbjerg & Marsh, namely, 'state structures'. In short, the issue in Canada appears to centre on how recent proposals for increased integration of the

Canadian sport delivery system (see also Table 5.3) might be compromised by the size and variety of the country, by the competing claims of different regional interests and the national interest and by federal-provincial/territorial jurisdictional divisions (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 124).

With regard to the earlier discussion of Canadian policy communities, provincial/territorial governments in Canada have been perceived as peripheral in many key social and welfare policy domains (Pross 1986). However, it should also be noted that the specific character of individual policy communities may vary and should, therefore, remain open to empirical scrutiny. Thus, the representation of provincial/territorial governments at the level of high performance sport policy-making processes is of particular interest here. Daugbjerg & Marsh (1998: 65) suggest that federal states tend to be one example of 'least centralised states' where competing decision-making centres are developed and which, in turn, influence the formation of meso-level policy networks and subsystems. While this theoretical contention must remain open to further investigation, it is important at this juncture to investigate whether there is evidence that this is (and/or has been) the case in the context of Canadian sport policy.

This issue is clearly related to the development of federalism and the notion of national unity. Historically, Pierre Trudeau is a significant actor in this respect, and one who is irredeemably linked to the nexus between sport, federalism and national unity. Trudeau wrote that he 'believed in federalism as a superior form of government; by definition, it is more pluralist than monolithic and therefore respects diversity among people and groups' (1990: 359). However, as Zakus (1996: 43) notes, the federal nationalism that Trudeau conceived of as a positive development in Canada's history appears to be contradictory in terms of sport, a point reinforced by Macintosh & Whitson, who suggest that jurisdictional ambiguity between federal and provincial levels has resulted in duplication rather than complementary policies for sport and recreation (1990: 125-126); a scenario, moreover, that has led to a degree of policy divergence between the more prosperous (e.g. Québec, British Columbia and Alberta) and less prosperous provinces. As noted in the preceding section, in contemporary Canadian sport policy debates, serious questions have been raised at a federal level regarding the consequences of such elite-focused polices towards sport (cf. Canadian Heritage 2001a, 2001c). As one of the key contributors to the National Summit on Sport has argued:

> We cannot achieve an integrated system without close collaboration between the senior orders of government [provincial, federal and territorial] .... I call upon all parties to work towards something like a social accord for sport and physical education, recognising regional and cultural differences (Kidd, quoted in Canadian Heritage 2001c: 10).

Yet, despite the plethora of Canadian sport policy-related documents (see Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3), all of which have made some reference to the type of inclusiveness now espoused more clearly in the discussion paper, *Building Canada Through Sport* and *Towards a Canadian Sport Policy: Report on the National Summit on Sport*, questions remain as to whether shifts towards a more plural approach to sport policy debates, as noted by Harvey et al. (1995), can substantiated through an empirical investigation of actors/organisations involved in the contemporary development of Canadian sport policy.

The second key implication, for sport policy processes in Canada centres on the role of the business community (cf. Nieuwenhuis 1999). Indeed, Kidd cites potential partnerships between the corporate sector and sport as one of five key relationships to be developed if a 'truly national sport policy' is to be realised (quoted in Canadian Heritage 2001c: 9). However, any examination of the increasing nexus between corporate interests and sport in Canada reveals a number of complex and interlocking issues, based, in large part, on the premise that increased corporate interest is encouraged primarily because of the extra financial assistance it provides (through sponsorship, for example), as the federal government struggles to maintain funding for sport at all levels (cf. Slack & Berrett 1996). As Raymond Côté states in the section on 'Participation' in *Towards a Canadian Sport Policy: Report on the National Summit on Sport*, 'The resources made available for sport are clearly insufficient and must be increased' (quoted in Canadian Heritage 2001c: 6), whilst in the same report, Marion Lay, commenting on the 'Excellence' strand, argues that 'the new money that is needed for excellence must come from both the private sector and the public sector' (quoted in Canadian Heritage 2001c: 8). These observations raise further questions centring on who benefits (most) from such corporate involvement, as well as questions relating to the discursive construction of sport policy around corporate/business interests.

In relation to the above observations, two further points are worthy of note. Firstly, writing in the early 1980s, Gruneau (1984) argued that the pattern of Canadian government expenditures on sport shifted away from support for low-profile and community-oriented projects and towards elite sport programmes that create higher-

profile opportunities for private-sector participation. Here, Marxist analyses might point to the shift away from forms of grant support that have enabled local governments and voluntary agencies to fund recreationally-oriented sport programmes at grass roots levels, and towards the direct involvement of national government in elite sport programmes in Canada, as being at least consistent with the interests of capital (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 106). As Macintosh & Whitson argued at the end of the 1980s, the pursuit of prominence at global international events has tended to push issues such as gender equity and regional access into the background and the discourse surrounding 'the Canadian sport system is one in which broader social goals are routinely subordinated to the production of performance' (1990: 106; see also Whitson 1998). Other analyses, however, (cf. Macpherson 1985) which are more in line with this study's focus, suggest that phenomena such as the subordination of broader social goals are seldom simply a matter of the needs of capital. Rather, they also reflect political and ideological campaigns that seek to define the way that issues are addressed (cf. Bacchi 2000; Ball 1993; Dalton et al. 1996). The second point of note, then, centres on how sport policy-related issues are constructed. As Slack has argued more recently:

> In the world of 'amateur sports', the concepts and practices of marketing have become centrally important. In the discourse which is promoted by government bureaucrats, professional administrators and politicians, the voluntary sport organisation is about much more than development of athletes. Rather, it is about selling sport to potential and existing customers (1998: 1).

On one level, the corporate discourse of marketing and sponsorship, and the incorporation of such activities into voluntary sport organisations, could be viewed as helping to transform them 'at their very roots into structures that fit more easily with the dominant market and marketing ethos of the '90s society' (Morgan 1992: 143). However, as Morgan goes on to note, it is also a discourse that 'conceals underlying inequalities of power which is produced and reproduced both inside and outside the market transactions'. One of the most obvious inequalities is the ability of some sport organisations to compete in the marketplace and secure corporate support. Indeed, the most successful organisations in securing corporate monies are those concerned with the larger and more visible sports (Slack 1998: 2). For example, in a study of Canadian corporations, Copeland, Frisby & McCarville (1996) found that nearly 70 per cent of all the organisations surveyed were sponsoring professional or elite level 'amateur' sport. Thus, as Slack notes, 'Sports with a lower profile are often unable to attract substantive financial investment from corporate bodies' (1998: 2). In sum, it appears that the

Canadian federal government faces a double-bind with regard to its relationship with the corporate sector. On the one hand, recent federal sport policy debates have actively encouraged corporate activity as the government struggles to allocate adequate funding demanded from the various strands of the Canadian sport system (cf. Canadian Heritage 2001c: 11). On the other hand, as the preceding discussion has revealed, corporate involvement in sport policy development brings its own constraints and dilemmas.

Policy change and conclusions

Three key themes emerge from this review and analysis of sport policy developments in Canada, both generally, and for high performance sport in particular: i) increasing federal government intervention and a focus on 'national unity'; ii) the struggle to balance competing claims for both mass participation and elite sport programmes; and iii) an increasing emphasis on the discursive construction of sport policy around a technical and bureaucratic approach to high performance sport programmes. Moreover, there appears to be an underlying current running through these three themes. Namely, a reluctance to embrace fully the thrust of the Dubin Inquiry and *Best Report* in the early 1990s, both of which problematised the values and belief systems underpinning federal government interventions into the Canadian sports system (see also Blackhurst et al. 1991). As Kidd observed in the late 1980s, 'The state has transformed the once autonomous, voluntary, and largely, regulatory sports-governing bodies into professionally administered non-profit corporations which conduct ambitious national and provincial training and development programmes under strict governmental direction' (1988a: 294-295). Central to this debate is the way in which high performance sport has been rationalised through bureaucratisation and professionalisation processes such as the Best Ever campaign and the quadrennial planning process (QPP).

In highlighting these issues a key point of departure is raised for this study; that is, the deeper power relations framing the development of high performance sport in Canada require further analysis . Indeed, in the late 1980s Cavanagh (1988) argued that what needs to be recognised is the deeper and more meaningful relationship between Best Ever (and QPP) as a method of organisation and planning and the prevailing political economy of Canadian society. Cavanagh goes on to argue that

> As the economic commitment of the state to elite sport reaches its most significant level through Best Ever, so too does the organisation of amateur sport work as a remarkable pedestal upon which structures of power work to produce and reproduce dominant feature (sic) of ideology and consensus, and in doing so, work to reproduce themselves (1988: 131-132).

Cavanagh's observations are instructive not only with regard to the increasingly bureaucratic organisation and administration of elite sport but also in respect of the related issue of the increasing 'professionalisation of the Canadian high performance sport system' (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 26). The significance of sports science and the reconstruction of the physical education profession within agencies whose emphasis was on the creation of structures and systems directed towards the 'scientific production of performance' was (and remains) central to this debate (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990; Whitson & Macintosh 1988, 1989). Of specific interest here is the legitimisation of sports science research that developed in higher education institutions in Canada following the federal government's decision in the early 1970s to promote sport and, in particular, high performance sport. A concept of rationalised, scientific sport developed in many Canadian universities in the 1970s and, significantly, Macintosh et al. contend that this 'bureaucratic rationalisation of sport is entirely consistent with values that most of the new sport bureaucrats will have been initiated into in their undergraduate and graduate programmes in sport science and management' (1987: 113, 180; see also, for example, Demers 1988; Harvey 1986). The effect of which, as Habermas (1971) has argued, is to redefine issues so that normative questions are presented as technical ones, thereby disqualifying the views of lay people.

These observations, regarding the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of Canadian high performance sport, signpost important issues pertinent to this study in respect of: i) the efficacy of the various meso-level approaches set out in Chapter 2, in particular, the policy networks approach and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). These theoretical approaches should enable an analysis as to whether (or at least to what extent) actors/organisations have coalesced around a set of shared values/belief systems and have reached a consensus on the legitimacy of policy outcomes in respect of particular issues in the sport development policy subsystem; and ii) the persuasiveness of a salient conceptualisation of power relations. With regard to the efficacy of the ACF and belief systems, Hinings et al.'s (1996) research into the values and organisational structure of Canadian NSOs provides useful insights for this study (see also, for example, Kikulis & Slack 1995a, 1995b; Slack 1988; Slack et al. 1994).

Briefly, seven 'indicators' have been identified which, arguably, summarise the values and belief systems driving the Canadian amateur sport system throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s: i) High performance emphasis; ii) Government involvement; iii) Organisational rationalisation; iv) Professionalism; v) Planning; vi) Corporate involvement; and vii) Quadrennial plans (Hinings et al. 1996: 897). These observations are useful, then, in guiding future empirical questions with regard to how such values and belief systems might be operationalised in an investigation of high performance sport policy change in Canada and the UK in swimming, athletics and sailing/yachting. In relation to this, the following comments from Kikulis & Slack are not only useful in that there are clear analogies to the ACF and its assumptions with respect to coalition forming but they also point to the utility of critical realist insights (discussed in Chapter 3) into the 'deconstruction' of 'unobservable structures' (cf. Marsh et al. 1999). Kikulis & Slack have argued that

> ... within NSOs, dominant coalitions and interest groups (e.g. professional staff, regional interest groups, the volunteer executive), *in concert* with the institutional pressures created by Sport Canada, have helped bring about the type of changes that have occurred in the Canadian sport delivery system and the structural arrangements that characterise its organisations (1995b: 140, original emphasis).

The issues raised by the increasing rationalisation of Canadian elite sport also point to the persuasiveness of setting out an explicit conceptualisation of power relations. Lukes' third dimension of power, for example, is persuasive in that it 'allows for consideration of the many ways in which *potential issues* are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions' (1974: 24, original emphasis). However, whereas Lukes' analysis centres on value judgements and invokes the notion of 'real interests', Hay (1997, 2002) argues for an approach that disentangles the identification and analysis of power from its critique. Power, thus conceived, is about *context-shaping*; in other words, the capacity of actors to redefine the parameters of what is socially, politically and economically possible for others. To define power in this way is to emphasise power relations in which actors shape structures, organisations and institutions such that the parameters of subsequent action are altered. In short, this is 'an *indirect* form of power in which power is mediated by, and instantiated in, structures' (Hay 1997: 51, original emphasis). This approach to power relations also has resonance with Bacchi's (2000) work on 'policy as discourse' which centres on an 'understanding of discourse which allows for an agentic production of discourse, and which implies the use of discourse by dominant groups in their efforts

to remain dominant' (Bacchi 2000: 52). Macintosh & Whitson's (1990) study of Canadian NSOs is instructive here, where it is argued that state interventions in sport and recreation can, not only be analysed as particular instances of broader negotiations over the levels and objectives of public spending and over the structures within which public policy is made, but also that, in the latter case, 'the issue is the extent to which the rationalisation of planning structures and the greater involvement of experts results in the insulation of successive areas of decision making from the pressures of democratic, interest group politics' (1990: 12-13).

These observations raise questions as to the role (and thus power) of expert knowledge and language construction and technical information in the high performance sport policy-making process – which has some resonance with the ACF (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). On the one hand, the application of scientific expertise to public policy issues and the restructuring of policy-making structures so that expert opinion is afforded greater weight, promises more informed policies. On the other hand, the setting out of an explicit conceptualisation of power relations sensitises us to how the definition of problems, and the construction of language therein, requiring scientific advice and expertise in relation to elite sport might serve to subdue grievances relating to the commitment of government to addressing, for example, gender, class and regional inequalities in Canadian sport, as well as those related to mass participation programmes. In short, these observations raise empirical questions for this study surrounding the construction of the technical/rational framework within which high performance sport policy in Canada has been consistently framed over the past 30 years.

In sum, the over-riding question that Canadians (and Canadian governments) now face is that, given the moral and equity issues raised in the 1990s, is there is a desire to continue to support the production of high performance athletes to the extent witnessed over the past 15 to 20 years? Current sport policy debates (cf. Canadian Heritage 2001a, 2001c) indicate an increasing groundswell or shift away from what was earlier referred to as Pierre Trudeau's 'cybernetic rationalism' (Zakus 1996). However, it is worth noting that, Sport Canada's Strategic Plan: 1998-2001 states that 'Federal funding is focused *predominantly*, but not exclusively, on high performance sport' (Canadian Heritage 1998, emphasis added).

United Kingdom

Sport in the United Kingdom

The review and analysis of the emergence of sport policy in the United Kingdom (UK) is delineated into the following significant time periods: 1970s; 1980-1994; and 1995-2002. The selection of the 1970s as a starting point for the UK reflects the manifestation of sport as a distinct area of public policy interest for central government; in particular the creation of the GB Sports Council in 1972 (as well as separate Sports Councils for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland during 1972-1973). As in the preceding discussion of Canadian sport policy, due consideration is given to the emergence of sport policy, in general, in the UK. However, as this study has a central focus on elite sport policy development and change it is important to note that, while Canadian - *c.*1970s - (and Australian - *c.*1980s) governments have been in the vanguard of developed Western nations in supporting a planned and systematic approach to elite sport, the emergence of a sustained attempt to develop an elite sport model or system in the UK has only been apparent since the mid-1990s. The substantive analysis of the implications for elite sport in the UK thus centres on the period, 1995-2002. Moreover, unlike the federal political system in Canada (and Australia), the UK comprises England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and all four countries return elected representatives to the House of Commons. The combination of an established two-party structure, a simple majority electoral system and a weak second chamber (House of Lords) produces a pattern of government characterised by a strong executive centred on the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Therefore, although this study has a central concern with the meso-level of analysis, it is also important to consider linkages with, and implications of, this political structure at a macro- or central government level. A key concern here is the nature of the relationship between central government and the sport policy sector, in general, and (any) advocacy coalitions involved in the sport development policy subsystem, in particular.

From the 19th century, and into the first half of the 20th century, the development of sport, and government's role in that development, can be characterised as haphazard and ad hoc (Coghlan 1990; Houlihan 1991, 1997; Roche 1993). The recurring themes of paternalism, defence of privilege, fitness of the nation's youth, social control and international prestige pervaded the sport–politics divide for much of this period. Moreover, a piecemeal and reactive approach to sport and recreation at central

government level continued until the early 1960s – not dissimilar to the underlying themes of federal government involvement in sport in Canada (and Australia) during this period. Thus, government intervention in the UK, up to the early 1970s, was premised on three key factors: i) the role of sport in alleviating the problem of (adolescent) urban disorder; ii) increasing electoral pressure for an expansion of sport and recreation facilities; and iii) the realisation that state-funded sport could help to improve Britain's international sporting achievements. The latter is of particular interest and, as Houlihan notes:

> What was also emerging in the 1950s and early 1960s was a growing interest in the pursuit of excellence partly due to Britain's 'decline' in international competition, and partly due to the early sporting successes for the 'systematic planning' of East Germany and the Soviet Union (1991: 27).

The establishment of an Advisory Sports Council in 1965, following recommendations in *Sport and the Community* (Wolfenden Committee on Sport 1960) was the first indication of a planned and co-ordinated approach to sport and recreation. Interestingly, although the Advisory Sports Council had been concerned to encourage and assist local authorities to increase public provision, the then Director stated that 'We were into excellence .... initially a lot of funds went into elitist sport' (quoted in Coalter et al. 1988: 58). There were also intimations of future policy direction in the allocation of funds to governing bodies. The receipt of grant-aid depended on the ability of the various organisations to comply with criteria formulated by the Advisory Sports Council. Thus, as Coalter et al. note, 'via the use of economic power, the ASC [Advisory Sports Council] was directly involved in rationalising and modernising the elite sector' (1988: 58).

1970s

The shift towards increasing central government intervention and away from what has been termed, a 'voluntarist' approach to sport (cf. Coalter et al. 1988; Henry 1993) became more pronounced in 1972 (see Table 5.4). The Advisory Sports Council was granted executive powers through a Royal Charter and became known as the Great Britain (GB) Sports Council. At this time, although a stated aim of the Sports Council was 'To raise standards of performance in sport and physical recreation' (quoted in Coghlan 1990: 67), the focus was primarily on encouraging participation and improving the provision of new sports facilities for the wider community. Out of these aims emerged the Sports Council's Sport for All programme in 1972, six years after the government's endorsement of the Council of Europe's Sport for All campaign and a year

before the Cobham Report (1973) *Sport and Leisure*, which argued for a more concerted policy towards mass sport programmes (see Table 5.4). Interestingly, Houlihan notes that, at this time, 'There was little discernible tension between the interests of the elite and of the mass, as there was a consensus ... that an increase in facilities was the first priority' (1991: 98-99). It is also worth noting that it has been suggested that the Sport for All campaign was never more than a slogan and that the government increasingly directed the Sports Council to target its resources towards specific groups in society (cf. Coalter et al. 1988; Henry 1993, 2001). Thus, the notion of 'sport for all' became 'sport for the disadvantaged' and 'sport for inner city youth' (Houlihan 1991: 99).

Table 5.4 UK sport: 1970s

Key political/policy event	Organisational and administrative implications	Funding implications	Implications for elite sport development
1972: GB Sports Council established	Ostensibly created as a 'buffer' between NGBs, voluntary organisations and government; key objective at this time was mass participation and facility building	Grant-aid to NGBs rose considerably – from £3.6m in '72 to £15.2m in '79	Despite rhetoric of Sport for All, critics condemned funding to NGBs as elitist
1973: House of Lords Report, *Sport and Leisure* (Cobham Report)	Set the agenda for subsequent debates regarding links between social policies and sport	Funding should be focused less on 'identified demand' and more on 'latent demand'	Emphasised broader category of 'recreation' as against narrower conception of 'sport'
1975: White Paper, *Sport and Recreation*	Confirmed sport and recreation as a legitimate element of the welfare state – 'recreational welfare'; however, policies increasingly targeted at specific groups in society – 'recreation as welfare'	Funding increasingly diverted to areas of deprivation, principally, inner cities	Many references made to elite sport and national centres of excellence
1977: White Paper, *A Policy for the Inner Cities*	A background of increasing economic decline and unemployment sees sport and leisure used as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself	Growing congruence between government and Sports Council policies, e.g. Urban Programme objectives	No direct impact, but funding allocations increasingly directed at wider social objectives
1979: 'New Right' Conservative Party elected, with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister	Thatcher Government emphasised greater degree of accountability and corporate planning from sports organisations/agencies	Sports Council increasingly directed by government to account for use of funds by NGBs	See 'Funding implications' in respect of NGBs; Thatcher supported total boycott of 1980 Olympic Games – not realised

Source: Adapted from Coalter et al. (1988); Coghlan (1990); Henry (1993, 2001); Horne et al. (1999); Houlihan (1991, 1997); Roche (1993)

The 1975 White Paper, *Sport and Recreation* (Department of the Environment [DoE] 1975), for example, gave explicit direction to the Sports Council and Regional Councils for Sport and Recreation to grant-aid recreational projects to areas of deprivation or 'recreational priority areas', thereby complementing the government's Urban Programme

in the early 1980s to combat inner-city unrest (cf. Coalter 1990; Coalter et al. 1988; Henry 1993, 2001). It is important, therefore, to locate these sport policy themes of the 1970s within the social, political and economic context of the time. Thus, during this period sport policy should be viewed in the light of the broader political consensus surrounding the maturation of the welfare state, the ideological pre-eminence of social democracy, an economic context of growing affluence and an increasingly politicised, professional and bureaucratised approach to sport, as manifest, for example, in the creation of the Sports Councils (cf. Henry 1993, 2001; Horne et al. 1999; Roche 1993).

With regard to the emphasis put upon elite sport development during this period, the 1975 White Paper revealed evidence of the dislocating debate surrounding provision for mass participation and that for elite athletes, which was also apparent in the discussion of the Soviet Union, GDR and Australia in Chapter 4 and in the discussion of sport policy developments in Canada in this chapter. For example, despite the predominance of mass participation concerns at the time, the White Paper also stressed the importance of 'diverting resources to those who are gifted in sport' (DoE 1975: 18). However, despite the many references to elite sport in the White Paper, government funding to the Sports Council was increasingly directed at wider social objectives. The latter point also needs to be set against a social and political background of growing civil unrest and unemployment in the late 1970s, particularly in inner city areas. Thus, despite the supposed quasi-independent nature of the Sports Councils, government monies for sport and recreation in the late 1970s, and into the early 1980s, were increasingly targeted at ameliorating these wider social policy concerns.

1980-1994

For our purposes, the GB Sports Council strategy document of the early 1980s - *Sport in the Community: The Next Ten Years* (Sports Council 1982) - can be categorised as a key political/policy event (see Table 5.5 below) given the growing congruence described above between government policy (with regard to urban deprivation objectives, in particular) and that of the Sports Council. However, *Sport in the Community* also had implications for elite sport. As Coalter et al. (1988: 73-74) note, despite the increasing emphasis on schemes for the recreationally deprived, the unemployed and the socially deprived, the Sports Council's largest funding commitment remained at the elite level. Moreover, the organisational and administrative framework for sport during the 1980s and into the early 1990s has been characterised by Roche (1993) as one of continuing fragmentation and disharmony between the various bodies involved in lobbying for

sport's interests. A central theme running through such observations is that the organisation and administration of sport policy in the UK has been bedevilled by the lack of a coherent 'voice' for sport, exemplified in the perennial arguments between a statutory Sports Council and the two main voluntary bodies in sport, the Central Council for Physical Recreation (CCPR), which acts as the main forum for the many national governing bodies of sport and the medical and physical education professions (Horne et al. 1999: 210) and the British Olympic Association (BOA) (for more detail see, for example, Coghlan 1990; Horne et el. 1999; Pickup 1996; Roche 1993).

Table 5.5 UK sport: 1980-1994

Key political/policy event	Organisational and administrative implications	Funding implications	Implications for elite sport development
1982: GB Sports Council strategy, *Sport in the Community: The Next Ten Years*	Wide-ranging strategy reflected changes in late '70s towards increased accountability, specific target groups and increasing links with government policy, e.g. Action Sport	Acknowledged that, despite growing rhetoric of welfarism, grant-in-aid had been weighted towards elitism	Elite sector – administrative and coaching grants to NGBs, centres of excellence and sports science - still in receipt of major proportion of Sports Council funding
1986: Rossi Committee Report	Examined the basis of, and justification for, the GB Sports Council's existence	Debates regarding funding centred on how grant monies were to be used	Representing NGB interests, the CCPR argued for more influence as to how funding allocations were spent
1986 and 1987: Treasury White Papers, *The Government's Expenditure Plans*	Confirmed links between sport, recreation and government policy in inner cities and other 'stress areas'	White Paper expenditure plans frequently stressed how funds should be used	No direct implications, but funding concentrated on broader social policy objectives
1988: Sports Council strategy, *Sport in the Community: Into the '90s*	Major focus on women and young people (primarily the 13-24 age group) as target groups	Dismissive of East European model of making NGBs dependent on government	Aim would be to help NGBs 'develop and implement their own strategies'
1990: John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as leader of Conservative Party and Prime Minister	Major's appointment heralded a change in government's approach to sport (see across and below)	Major supported a National Lottery; sport one of 5 good causes to benefit (see below)	Major was also supportive of debates to improve performances at international level; linked to issues of national identity
1992: Department of National Heritage established	Reflected personal commitment of John Major; attempt to bring together a fragmented policy area	Further centralised control of funding allocations to sport	Raised status of sport at Cabinet level
1994: National Lottery introduced	Crucial impact on sport and recreation, largely for capital projects in early years	Sport to benefit from estimated additional £200m to £250m per annum by 1999	Arguably the single most important factor in the UK's development of an elite sport model (see also Table 5.6 and following section in main text)
GB/NI athletes performed well at the four summer Olympic Games between 1980-1994. In Moscow (1980) 21 medals were won. In Los Angeles (1984) a total of 37 medals were won (although 22 were Bronze). In Seoul (1988), the GB/NI team won a total of 24 medals and, in Barcelona (1992), 20 medals were won.			

Source: Adapted from Coalter et al. (1988); Henry (1993, 2001); Houlihan (1991, 1997); Maguire (1999); Roche (1993); Sports Council 1982, 1988); Taylor (1997); Wallechinsky (2000)

This description of the incoherent nature of sport's organisation and administration led to a number of reviews of the role and function of the Sports Councils (cf. Oakley &

Green 2001b). Moreover, the reorganisation of the Sports Councils in the late 1990s cannot be disentangled from the context of New Right Conservative administrations of the 1980s which sought to reduce state intervention in all areas of social and economic policy. For example, in 1986 (see Table 5.5), a parliamentary inquiry (Rossi Committee 1986) examined the basis of, and justification for, the GB Sports Council's existence. However, the Rossi Committee recommended maintaining the status quo and stated that

> There is a case for putting public money into sport and some of it should be injected at the national level. The Sports Council is a suitable vehicle for this and the division of responsibilities between the Council and the Department [of the Environment] is correct (1986: Ch 3, para 76[1]).

Interestingly, the structure of sport in the UK at this time was seen as hindering developments at the elite level. For example, in 1988, a former Director-General of the Sports Council argued that

> ... it is here on the cusp between casual participation and the quest for improved performance, that the efficiency of a nation's administrative structure for sport really matters .... At more modest levels of participation, plurality is an undoubted virtue. When, however, the provision of crucial support services such as top level coaching; elite training facilities; including access to consistent medical and scientific advice; or of opportunities for competitive experience are seen to be uncoordinated, inconsistent in quality and financially wasteful, it is time to take seriously the need for reform (Pickup 1996: 172-173).

Sport's organisational and administrative fragmentation was also due, in part, to the fact that the sport portfolio had been moved between a number of different government departments over the past 30 years. Indeed, it was not until the establishment of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1997, under a new Labour administration, that 'sport' was included in the title of a government department (cf. Horne et al. 1999: 209-210). The types of reform called for by the Sports Council's Director-General above are instructive given the policy responses in the early 1990s, due largely to the influence of John Major, Conservative Prime Minister from 1990 (see Table 5.5); responses, moreover, which signalled 'an undoubted change in the government's approach to sport' (Houlihan 1997: 94). Two key changes here were: i) the raising of sport's status within government through the creation of the Department of National Heritage (DNH, and now known as the DCMS); and ii) the establishment of a National Lottery in 1994, which, arguably, has been the single most important factor in transforming the landscape for the development of elite sport in the UK.

1995-2002

In 1995, the Conservative Government published a comprehensive policy statement *Sport: Raising the Game* (DNH 1995), which indicated the withdrawal of central government and the Sports Councils from the provision of opportunities for mass participation and focused, *inter alia*, on: i) the development of elite performers and an elite sports academy/institute; ii) developing the role of higher education institutions in the fostering of elite athletes; and iii) funding allocations to governing bodies, which would now be conditional on the explicit support for government objectives (Houlihan 1997: 95). In other words, following a period of some 30 years since 'sport' was considered a discrete domain for government intervention, the mid-1990s witnessed the emerging development of an organisational, administrative and funding framework for sport at the elite level in the UK. Moreover, it has been argued that the publication of *Sport: Raising the Game* abandoned any pretence of an integrated and multi-dimensional approach to sports development as conceived in the late 1980s by the GB Sports Council around the sports development continuum of four tightly integrated elements: foundation, participation, performance and excellence (Houlihan 2000a: 174). Two prominent and interrelated themes are at work here: i) an increasing preoccupation with elite sport development; and ii) the ongoing retreat of support for community recreation. As Lentell argued in the early 1990s, 'It seems that the [Sports] Council is ending its "dangerous liaison" with the world of "Community" to re-join the more comfortable world of "Sport"' (1993: 147).

Against this background, a Labour Government was elected in 1997 which published its own strategy for sport, *A Sporting Future for All* (DCMS 2000) - see Table 5.6 below. *Sport: Raising the Game* and *A Sporting Future for All* have thus provided an organisational and administrative framework for the shape and direction of sport policy into the 21st century. It is worthy of note that, although these publications are from different sides of the political spectrum, they demonstrate a striking note of unity on the twin emphases of school (youth) sport and elite development. However, as Houlihan notes, since 1997, the Labour Government 'has begun to make good its policy commitments in the area of sport, but it is notable that there has been far greater progress in addressing the issues associated with the elite end of the sports continuum' (2000a: 175). The most prominent policy commitments in the late 1990s were the development of an elite sports institute network, albeit after a period of confusion and disagreement over its precise nature and function (cf. Theodoraki 1999) and the establishment of a three-tier (Performance, Potential and Start) World Class Lottery Fund, which supports elite athletes at different levels in the quest for increased medal counts at major international events.

Table 5.6 UK sport: 1995-2002

Key policy/political event	Organisational and administrative implications	Funding implications	Implications for elite sport development
1995: Conservative Government policy statement, *Sport: Raising the Game*	Two key themes: i) development of elite athletes and establishment of an elite training centre; ii) youth sport and schools	Grants to NGBs now conditional upon support for government objectives	Substantial support for elite level, although funding implications were a concern
1996: Atlanta Olympic Games	Performances in Atlanta increased pressure to implement recommendations for an elite sport academy/institute	The World Class Programme introduced in '97 (using Lottery monies) as part of strategy to improve elite performances	Low medal count (15 in total and just one Gold); leads to increased pressure for an elite sports academy/institute
1997: 'New' Labour administration elected	Introduction of 'Best Value' initiative aimed at modernising local government services, including sport and leisure; social inclusion becomes key policy direction; DNH renamed as DCMS	Increasing policy rhetoric linked sport funding to social inclusion objectives	Continued support for elite sports institute – network of centres (known as UKSI) operating from '99; UK Sport Council created as part of reorganisation of Sports Councils[A] – and distributor of Lottery funding from '99
1999: Sport England strategy document, *Lottery Fund Strategy, 1999-2009*	Twin objectives – local projects for all and to improve medal-winning chances at international level	Two key strands: Community Projects Fund (£150m) and World Class Fund (£50m)	Further confirmation of support for elite level
2000: Labour Government policy statement, *A Sporting Future for All*	Reiterated much of rhetoric in *Sport: Raising the Game*; linked to Best Value objectives; 110 Specialist Sports Colleges to be created	NGB funding now directly linked to performance targets	NGBs required to produce national talent performance plans identifying pathways from grassroots to international level
2000: Sydney Olympic Games	In lead-up to the Games critics argued that there was too much emphasis on elite (Olympic) sports at expense of other (minor) sports	Lottery monies (World Class Fund) highlighted as major factor in improved performances in Sydney	Greatly improved performance by GB/NI team – 28 medals won (11 Gold); helped to legitimise central government support
2001: *Elite Sports Funding Review*	Called for increased co-operation between UK Sport and Home Country Sports Councils; and that NGBs produce just one integrated Performance plan	Recommended rationalisation of three-tiered World Class funding programmes; called for extra £10m Exchequer funding for World Class Performance level	Three-tiered World Class programmes to be rationalised into one; greater focus on coaching/coach education; more effort to be placed on talent identification and development systems
2002: *The Coaching Task Force: Final Report*	Recommended the professionalisation of coaching; coach development, employment and deployment require major revisions; the role of Sports Coach UK to be reviewed	Extra funding to be allocated to develop, train, educate and employ more full-time coaches	A more structured approach to elite sport recommended, with the provision of more full-time coaches working with elite performers
2002: *Game Plan: A Strategy for Delivering Government's Sport and Physical Activity Objectives*	Major government review of all levels, structures and financing of sport; symbiotic links between sport, education and health policy emphasised	Recommendations included 'simplifying the fragmented funding arrangements' for sport	Further prioritisation of funding to NGBs recommended, based on a 'twin-track' approach, incorporating likely medal-winning success as well as popularity of the sport

Notes:

[A] Under the revised system, the GB Sports Council disappeared and the newly established English Sports Council (Sport England) assumed responsibility for the development of sport in England. While the Sports Councils for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland remained virtually unchanged, another new organisation - the UK Sports Council (known as UK Sport) - took responsibility for issues that need to be dealt with at UK (primarily, elite) level.

Source: Adapted from DNH (1995); DCMS (2000, 2001, 2002); DCMS/Strategy Unit (2002); Oakley & Green (2001b); Houlihan (1997); McDonald (2000); Sport England (1999a, 1999b, 2002); UK Sport (2000a, 2000b, 2002f)

The UK Sports Council (UK Sport) became the distributor of Lottery funding for elite-focused programmes in 1999 and, during its first year of funding (July 1999-March 2000), this amounted to some £17 million being distributed to 24 sports at a UK level (UK Sport 2000a: 3). Thus, two key elements underlying the UK's nascent elite sport development model are the UK Sports Institute (UKSI), based on the Australian decentralised institute network, and National Lottery funding streams. The latter, in particular was cited by many of the successful athletes at the Sydney 2000 Olympics as a key contributory factor in their success (UK Sport 2001a: 6). Lottery funding is also largely responsible for the construction of new facilities as part of the UKSI's network development. Mackay notes that the final phase (from April 2000) of this development will lead to 'a more systematic approach to performance support which will require significant investment, such as a national programme for elite coach and athlete identification' (1998b: 5). With regard to coaching, *The Coaching Task Force: Final Report* (DCMS 2002) illustrates the increased importance now put upon coaching in the UK in emphasising the requirement for more full-time coaches and underpinned by the professionalisation of coach education and training. Moreover, aspects of policy-oriented learning are evident in the staging of The World Class Coaching Conference - Breaking Barriers - Creating Champions in November 2001. For example, Deidre Anderson, UKSI Programme Manager, stated that 'This conference will provide an excellent opportunity for coaches from many different sports to learn from one another and share their experiences and knowledge with other top coaches from differing backgrounds' (UK Sport 2001b).

Talent identification and development of young people is a further important element of the UK's recent support for the elite level. As reported in the *Observer*, the UK's developing model/system now incorporates a talent identification software programme that closely parallels Australia's 'Talent Search' programme (Campbell 2000: 20). The relationship between the UKSI, NGBs and clubs at grass roots levels is related to the issue of talent identification and the construction of 'pathways' to higher levels of competition (Hoey 2000: 14). A key aspect of this organisational relationship is the proposal to establish 110 Specialist Sports Colleges (SSCs) by 2003 (DCMS 2000: 7). Such establishments are not an entirely new idea in the UK (Treadwell 1987); what is new, however, is the attempt, finally in the UK, to incorporate such schools into a planned, co-ordinated and integrated organisational and administrative model of elite sport development. As Fisher noted in the late 1980s, 'the identification of those with potential in sport and the structure for developing that talent in an organised and co-ordinated way is something that has yet to

appear in a comprehensive fashion in the UK' (1987: 68). Finally, the publication of *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy/Unit 2002) in late 2002 signifies a major shake-up of sporting structures in the UK. While it is clearly too early to offer substantive comments on this government-sponsored review, one notable policy development is the increased emphasis that is now being put upon the symbiotic relationship between sport, education and health policy (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002: 13). Whether this development signals the emergence of a coalition of actors/organisations centring on a value-nexus between these policy sectors remains open to further research.

In sum, although the UK is at a relatively early stage of developing a coherent model/system for elite sport development, an organisational, administrative and funding framework is clearly emerging. This framework includes: i) the establishment of the UKSI and its attendant support services associated with coaching programmes, sports science/medicine, physiology, psychology and bio-mechanics; ii) Lottery funding for programmes such as the elite athlete-focused World Class Performance programme; iii) talent identification and development techniques and systems; and iv) the establishment of Specialist Sports Colleges. There is also some evidence to suggest that if the outcome of such policy initiatives is to be judged on the criterion of success at the Olympic Games, then the 28 medals won at the Sydney 2000 Games is a substantial improvement on the 15 won at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games.

Policy process

This section follows a similar format to the review of the policy process in Canada, a key aspect of which is to map out the terrain within which sport policy operates in the UK. In addition, as in the Canadian review, reference will also be made to the (macro) theories of the state outlined in Chapter 2 and how they might be integrated with the meso-level of analysis. It has been suggested that the UK should be conceived of as a 'post-parliamentary democracy', within which policy-making is increasingly conducted within discrete policy communities operating in different (meso-level) policy domains (Laffin 1989: 39). As in the case of Canada (and indeed Australia), there has been considerable debate in the UK as to whether the policy process at the macro-level is (and/or has been) characterised by pluralism or corporatism (cf. Coalter et al. 1988: 74). In relation to these debates, some brief points can be noted here as well as considering how the meso-level might be integrated with the macro-level of theorising and analysis. In the period before the GB Sports Council was established in 1972,

although the significance of success in international competition and participation in sport as a 'right of citizenship' were acknowledged, these were not considered as being of significant political importance. As Coalter et al. note, 'The administration of governing bodies was regarded as a pluralist area which, while benefiting from state assistance, would be an inappropriate area for state direction' (1988: 76).

The election of a New Right Conservative administration in 1979, however, signified a generally more directive governmental approach (cf. Coalter et al. 1988: 77; Houlihan 1997: 50-51). Increasing emphasis on managerial efficiency, financial constraint, accountability, corporate planning and commercial sponsorship were all themes common to both government philosophy and Sports Council practice; themes, moreover, which were also evident in Canadian sport policy development. Questions were thus raised during the 1980s as to whether the increasing congruence between government and the Sports Council was indicative of a shift from traditional pluralist approaches in the sport and leisure policy domain towards more corporatist tendencies. Indeed, such questions have been raised in Canada (and Australia), as well as in the UK more recently (cf. Houlihan 1997; McDonald 2000; Taylor 1997). Although Coalter et al. (1988: 78) have suggested that the 1980s witnessed elements of 'a growing corporatism' in sport and social policy, the evidence does not appear strong enough to assert with confidence that interest group/government relations in the UK at this time (or in more contemporary analyses of sport policy-making) were corporatist in the sense most often employed in public policy-making analyses (cf. Matthews 1989: 223). Moreover, it is argued that the following observation by Evans reinforces the argument developed in Chapter 2 - which put forward a broadly neo-pluralist/elitist framework as the most appropriate theoretical approach for studying sport policy-making processes at the macro-level - and, in so doing, also points to the increasing congruence between variations of pluralist and corporatist approaches:

> The most distinctive feature of corporatist theory lies in its structures of elite domination. An institutional setting for legitimate elite domination is created in which elite circulation is dependent upon the bargaining resources of the various sectional interests (Evans 1995: 245).

Arguably, the 'institutional setting for legitimate elite domination' in the case of sport policy-making in the UK is through the increasingly congruent relationship between central government objectives, via the DCMS and its attendant quasi-governmental bodies (Sports Councils), and not only in relation to elite sport policy objectives. These

contentions can be explored through a similar examination of the two macro-level features of the state considered in the Canadian context, both of which have implications for the meso-level of analysis.

The first macro-level feature is the relationship between interest groups and parliamentary parties (Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998: 62). Of especial concern here is the increasing dominance of the cluster of interests around elite sport which have enjoyed considerable support from both Conservative and Labour administrations since 1995. However, it should also be noted that, as this is a relatively recent phenomenon, any conjectures made here must remain open to further empirical scrutiny. For example, it could be argued that those actors/organisations involved in 'community level' sporting activity, and thus more in line with the current Labour Government's social inclusion agenda, have also enjoyed substantial political support (cf. Sport England 1999a, 1999b). Therefore, as Daugbjerg & Marsh note, 'When a group's interests are balanced in parliament by another group, then a policy network in which both conflicting groups are represented together with state representatives may be constructed' (1998: 63). Given the recency of the putative domination of elite sport interests noted above and the contention that 'other' sporting interest groups may enjoy parliamentary support, it is perhaps instructive to note, briefly, the differing political ideologies permeating UK sport policy-making processes throughout the 20th and into the 21st century. Roche (1993) provides a useful threefold distinction related to sport and, combined with Coalter et al.'s (1988) work on 'ideal-types' of political ideology, Horne et al. (1999: 197) illustrate links to different political parties (see Table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Relationships between sports interest, political ideology and political party in the UK

Sports interest	Political ideology	Political party
Gentlemanly amateurism	Reluctant collectivism	Traditional conservatism
Corporate welfarism	Fabianism/collectivism	'Old' Labour
Market	Anti-collectivism	'New Right'/Thatcherism
Best Value	Third Way	'New' Labour

Source: Adapted from Horne et al. (1999: 197)

As Table 5.7 reveals, sport in the early part of the 20th century was largely dominated by an 'amateur ideology', emerging out of the Victorian era of public-school sport (see also Allison 2001). This perspective broadly represents the political ideology of 'reluctant collectivism' and the absence of direct state intervention in sport in the UK, at least until

the 1970s. Secondly, the mid-20th century ideology of 'welfarism' brought about a more politicised, professional and bureaucratic approach to sport, for example, with the establishment of the Sports Councils – a characteristic of Fabian or 'Old' Labour policy (see also Coalter et al. 1988). Thirdly, Roche suggests that late 20th century sport policy has been dominated by the twin ideologies of global capitalism and consumerism, which Horne et al. (1999: 196) relate 'to the anti-collectivism of the New Right or Thatcherism' (see also Henry 1993, 2001; Oakley & Green 2001b).

Moreover, since the 1997 election of the Labour Government, a new social policy agenda has been introduced that has significant implications for the promotion and development of sporting provision and opportunities in the UK. Thus, a fourth category can now be added to Horne et al.'s (1999) threefold typology (see Table 5.7). Although the Labour Government eschews the use of politically-laden terms such as 'ideology', the so-called 'Third Way' (cf. Giddens 1998) is a philosophy that has permeated much of its policy discourse to date (cf. Oakley & Green 2001b). Related to this is the 'Best Value' initiative which emerged out of the Labour Government's perceived need to modernise local government. Indeed, one of the major public policy themes affecting sport is 'the modernisation of local government including the duty of Best Value; a duty to secure continuous improvement in the delivery of services with regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness' (Sport England 1999a: 7). Thus, the notion of welfarism that has always been evident in some form within the rhetoric of Sport for All (see, for example, Coalter et al. 1988, Sport England 1999a: 7) moved more into the foreground under the Labour Government. In short, a new public policy language has emerged which supports welfare principles such as social inclusion and widening access for all.

The above observations have resonance with Houlihan's suggestion that 'The present government's broad ideological orientation is best reflected in the promotion of social inclusion and best value' (2000a: 176). However, the expectation that these ideological priorities should permeate all public services has to be reconciled with the existence of policy targeted at specific policy sub-sectors. Thus, the quest for Olympic medals may take priority over (or at least moderate) social inclusion goals to the extent that a disproportionate representation of social classes A and B will be accepted if it realises Olympic or other international sporting success (Houlihan 2000a: 177). Indeed, an English Sports Council survey *The Development of Sporting Talent 1997* investigated 12 sports and found that 'the chance of becoming an elite performer were two times

greater for individuals from professional classes than they were for those from manual classes, all else being equal' (English Sports Council 1998: 3). Empirical questions are thus raised with regard to the persuasiveness of the meso-level frameworks outlined in Chapter 2. For example, the ACF is concerned primarily with policy change in relation to three important areas highlighted throughout this chapter: i) the identification and significance of actors' values/belief systems operating in any (identifiable) advocacy coalitions (an endogenous factor); ii) the significance of 'non-cognitive' (exogenous) events, such as changes in government administration; iii) evidence of policy transfer/learning/lesson-drawing.

The second macro-level feature is that of 'state structures' and, as noted earlier, the least centralised states tend to be federal states and those with strong parliaments which limit the power of the executive (Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998: 65). The UK falls into the latter category, although the Labour Party (and the Executive, in particular), with its current large majority in the House of Commons, has been accused in various quarters of resisting parliamentary debate (cf. Phillips 2001). Whether this is the case is beyond the remit of this study, however, Taylor's (1997) review of the 'arm's length' principle (enshrined in the 1972 Royal Charter for the GB Sports Council), governance issues, and the creation of the Department of National Heritage (DNH) is instructive. Drawing on the policy networks literature, Taylor argues that the creation of the DNH, and its client relationships (for example, with the Sports Councils) 'raises doubts about the extent to which the state has been "hollowed-out" leading to the diminution of the "power" of the central state' (1997: 447). Taylor suggests that the governance thesis points to the development of self-organising networks in which the role of the state is to help set the conditions within which networks operate and help resolve the problems caused by complex patterns of interdependence which tend to blur the distinction between self-regulation and state intervention. Significantly, Taylor concludes that 'the resulting pattern bears a close resemblance to negotiation systems or to an advocacy coalition which neither removes government from the equation, nor in structural terms does it challenge government centrality in a policy network' (1997: 448).

These observations raise two important empirical questions. The first centres on whether (any) such advocacy coalitions can be identified and, if so, what is the significance for elite sport policy change in respect of the values and belief systems of actors/organisations comprising such coalitions? The second question concerns the issue

of *current* power relations between the DCMS (formerly DNH) and its network of organisational partners – for example, UK Sport, the Home Country Sports Councils and NGBs. This second question can be considered briefly in relation to Taylor's work on the DNH. Taylor identifies four power resources which characterised the DNH's capacity to control its networks: i) ministerial activism and the arm's length principle; ii) systematic scrutiny (for example, the requirement for NGBs to produce business plans and set objective targets, and supplemented by various financial and management reviews); iii) legislation, policy guidance and review; and iv) finance. Moreover, Taylor concludes that

> Paradoxically, these resources reinforce the arm's length principle and support the appearance of hollowing out in cultural politics even though the DNH is exerting a high degree of network control, not by direct intervention but by conditioning the networks' operations (1997: 465).

The criteria outlined in the Labour Government's *A Sporting Future for All* lend support to Taylor's arguments regarding increasing central control and objective target-setting. An excerpt from the section on 'Sporting Excellence' is instructive in that it states that 'The success or failure in achieving milestones or targets in performance plans will be an important factor in deciding future levels of funding [for NGBs]' (DCMS 2000: 44). The DCMS therefore exercises influence through setting broad policy and audit guidelines for network bargaining - the arm's length principle under which ministers set the financial and policy framework within which the various Sports Councils operate and implement policy. However, as Taylor (1997: 465) has argued with regard to the DNH, four power resources are available that enable the Department to condition how its policy networks operate. The nature of, and the extent to which, such conditioning has resulted in control (and thus power) in relation to sport policy, and elite sport policy in particular, over the past decade is crucial to this study's empirical investigation.

McDonald (2000) raises important issues in respect of government aspirations in the development of sport policy in England over the past decade which, not only give credence to Taylor's (1997) arguments regarding increasing central control of the shape and direction of sport policy, in general, but which are also pertinent to this study's particular focus on elite sport policy change. For example, McDonald suggests that 'the development of excellence is the main objective of Sport England policy and the improvement of Great Britain's status in the international sporting arena the main Government aspiration' (2000: 84). This is a somewhat over-determined reading of sport policy, given the Government's commitment to grass roots sport, school sport,

sport in the community, and the use of sport to tackle social exclusion (DCMS 2000; Sport England 1999a, 1999b). Indeed, Sport England's *Lottery Fund Strategy: 1999-2009* reveals that of the £200 million per annum of all Lottery funding for sport, £150 million is to be allocated to 'Community Sport', with the remaining £50 million devoted to the development of excellence in the form of the 'World Class Fund' (Sport England 1999b).

The existence of policy objectives other than the development of excellence are not denied in McDonald's argument, rather, his argument rests on the contention 'that other objectives are either peripheral, or exist to support this fundamental strategic objective' (2000: 85). In short, it is the commitment to the elite level that frames strategic thinking and specific policy objectives. This argument provides an interesting point of departure, as McDonald also argues that 'it is necessary to go beyond the policy text, and to examine the deeper ideological framework of sport policy ... it is necessary to substantively identify the ideological scaffolding within which sport policy is constructed' (2000: 85). Chapters 2 and 3 set out the usefulness, for this study, of adopting a critical realist epistemological and methodological framework, which includes insights from the meso-level advocacy coalition framework (ACF), as well as a salient conceptualisation of power relations. It is argued, therefore, that, in combining these epistemological and methodological insights, the 'structures of power [which] are institutionally centralised around central government ... [and which result] in minimal dissent from government priorities' (McDonald 2000: 88; see also Taylor 1997) can, at best be uncovered and, at least, be problematised.

Policy change and conclusions

From the 1960s, until the publication of *Sport: Raising the Game* in 1995, the approach to sport, in general, in the UK was characterised by its fragmented nature and lack of agreement and disharmony between many of the key sporting bodies regarding organisational, administrative and funding matters. Government intervention was limited until the establishment of the Sports Councils in 1972, which signalled an interest in improving the organisational and administrative structure of sport and recreation, primarily through the building of facilities and the adoption of a Sport for All programme to increase participation in sport and physical activities. This is not to argue that fragmentation and disharmony have been eradicated (cf. DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002; Roche 1993). Rather, it is to suggest that, from 1995 onwards, there has been a

concerted attempt by central government to provide some form of strategic guidance for the sport policy sector. Moreover, both Conservative and Labour administrations have not only shown an increasing willingness to support sport at the elite level but also to discursively construct the shape and direction of this support (cf. Coalter 1988: 77; Houlihan 1997; McDonald 2000; Taylor 1997). The perennial debates surrounding the mass/elite divide that have characterised sport policy rhetoric in the UK over the past 30 years also remain and permeate recent sport policy debates. Of particular note here, however, is the contention that changes at the elite level of sport policy-making have led to the strengthening of the elite sport policy community in relation to other sport policy concerns during the 1990s (Houlihan 2000a: 178-179). These observations can be conceptualised in terms of the ACF.

Firstly, within the ACF, 'policy-oriented learning' is conceptualised as an endogenous factor (within a policy subsystem) which can lead a dominant coalition to refine and adapt its belief system in order to realise its goals more efficiently. Secondly, the strengthening of the elite sport policy community has, in part, been due to 'sympathetic ministers and prime ministers and an upsurge in popular sentiment' (Houlihan 2000a: 179). These factors are conceptualised as 'external system events' (or exogenous factors) for the ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 149), originating from outside the subsystem and which shift the power distribution among subsystem actors by changing resource and constraint patterns. Since 'deep core' and 'policy core beliefs' are assumed to have a high level of resistance to change, the ACF argues that policy-oriented learning is most likely to concern only 'secondary aspects' of a belief system. The policy core is assumed to remain intact, and thus able to bring about only minor policy change. As a corollary, major policy change, namely a change in policy cores, is thought to be unlikely in the absence of non-cognitive events external to the subsystem (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 123), such as those as identified by Houlihan above in the case of the elite sport community in the UK. By way of summing up, a recent example helps to illustrate how actors' values and belief systems might be implicated in change within the sport development policy subsystem in the UK. Houlihan (2000a: 178) points to three distinct groupings involved with the development of Specialist Sports Colleges (SSCs) - educational interests, community sports development and elite sport development. This is an instructive finding, given the insights generated by the ACF. One example from Houlihan's study of SSCs helps to illustrate the significance of this perspective.

With regard to SSCs and the policy issue of identification and development of talented youngsters, it can be hypothesised that actors within the three distinct groups (or coalitions in ACF terminology) noted above will reveal differing perceptions, values and belief systems on this issue. Educationalists, for example, have a primary concern with, *inter alia*, the educational needs of all children and the development of lifelong learning: in other words, a well-rounded and holistic education. The second group is that of a 'broader coalition concerned with a set of sports/community development interests' (Houlihan 2000a: 183). For this coalition, the SSC is seen as a resource for 'their local families, of schools and their communities ... [and] will form a focal point for revitalising education in areas of socio-economic disadvantage' (Department for Education & Employment 1998: 1). The national governing bodies of sport are key members of the third potential coalition and their concerns are primarily with talent identification and developmental progress to the elite level. Indeed, the DCMS (2000: 8) states that SSCs 'will have an explicit focus on elite sport'. Thus, in contrast to the first two groupings, actors within the elite sport development coalition 'perceive young people as the seed-corn for future elite squads .... [therefore] For many of the national governing bodies of sport, school is as much a threat as an ally' (Houlihan 2000a: 179).

In ACF terms, such observations reveal that the sport development policy subsystem contains (at least) three coalitions of actors/organisations actively concerned with a policy issue: in this case, the SSCs and talent identification and development and who regularly seek to influence public policy related to it. The policy subsystem, and advocacy coalitions therein, can be further analysed through the ACF's threefold hierarchy of belief systems (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). At the deep core beliefs level, concerns surround fundamental normative and ontological axioms that define a vision of the individual, society and the world. At this level, and for this example, it could be hypothesised that elite sport development advocates (e.g. NGBs) would emphasise individual autonomy and achievement striving. In other words, relative to other groups in society, more emphasis would be put on the 'self'. At the next level, policy core beliefs revolve around causal perceptions, basic strategies and policy positions for achieving deep core beliefs. This would translate into policies that frame the 'problem', or policy issue; for example, the allocation of resources for sport. Thus, the elite-focused coalition would frame the problem in terms that provide a conducive environment for the elite performer over, for example, social inclusion initiatives and/or sport/physical activity opportunities at grass roots levels. At the final level, for the ACF,

there is a set of secondary aspects, comprising instrumental considerations on ways in which to implement the policy core. In the case of the SSCs, the elite sport coalition would adopt particular strategies in an effort to realise its policy objectives (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122). Strategies that emphasise, for example, talent identification techniques that lead to development through identifiable pathways to the elite level. The ACF assumes that these structural categories of belief systems show decreasing resistance to change, with the deep core beliefs displaying the most, and secondary aspects the least, resistance (cf. Kübler 2001: 624). Clearly, these observations are hypothetical and have been used here to illustrate the potential persuasiveness of the ACF in relation to elite sport policy change in the UK and, although plausible in theory, remain open to further empirical investigation.

Conclusions to chapter

This chapter has explored: i) the context for the development of sport policy in Canada and the UK; ii) the policy processes within which such policies have emerged; and iii) the key implications in relation to policy change at the level of elite sport. Four key themes emerge from this review and analysis: i) central/federal government involvement; ii) perennial debates regarding mass participation versus elite sport programmes; iii) the discursive construction of sport policy discourse around the language of rational/technocratic processes; and iv) influence of the corporate/private sector. Running through all four themes are questions in respect of the purpose of sport; an issue, to date, debated more explicitly in Canada, where state-funded cadres of elite athletes have been supported and developed over the past two to three decades. In the UK, however, it is only relatively recently that attention has focused more overtly on the elite level. Taken together, these themes afford an analysis of wider social and political processes raised in this chapter – namely, the relationships between structures, agents and values/belief systems – in the construction of an elite sport development system in Canada and the UK. In relation to these observations, it is now possible to draw further (but at this stage, tentative) conclusions with regard to conceptualising elite sport development models/systems as first set out in Chapter 4.

Firstly, it is argued that the Fisher & Borms' (1990) model of Systematic and Asystematic talent selection and development affords only a partial view in both senses of the word. That is, (not unexpectedly) the model has a bias towards the elite level and

organised approaches to talent identification and development – thus the Aystematic aspect of Fisher & Borms' model requires reconsideration, as many developing/Third World countries/new nations increasingly employ processes more aligned to the Systematic aspect in the drive towards international sporting success (cf. Broom 1996). The model also reveals little with regard to the wider social, political, economic and cultural environment within which sport policy discourses are constructed. Thus, the following aspects have emerged as warranting a more rigorous examination, through further research, than that allowed for by Fisher & Borms' model: i) the funding tensions permeating mass participation/elite sport debates; ii) the multi-organisational, multi-agent complexity that characterises frameworks within which policy direction at the elite level operates in the early 21st century (cf. Abbott et al. 2002; Digel 2002a, 2002b); and iii) the increasing involvement and influence of corporate interests in sport policy-making processes.

This leads on to a second point; namely, a consideration of the proposition set out in the *Introduction* to Chapter 4, which stated that the characteristics/nature of the problem or objective - the development of an elite sport model/system - to some extent determines, or at least constrains, the possible policy responses by both state and non-state actors in different countries. The evidence presented in this chapter (and from the overview of elite sport policy developments in Australia in Chapter 4) clearly reveals both Canada and Australia as 'early Western adopters' of many of the principles of organisation and administration utilised by former Eastern bloc countries prior to 1989-1990. A point reinforced in the Canadian context by Kidd's assertion in the late 1980s that 'The state presence is so great that Canada is sometimes referred to as the GDR of the Commonwealth' (1988b: 15). Moreover, Kidd goes further in arguing that, under such circumstances, this '"philosophy of excellence" has become a powerful ideology' in the sense that it underscores 'a world-view that is partial or partisan to the interests of a particular group or groups clothed in a partial or incomplete description of the complex human reality' (Kidd 1988b: 24).

Kidd's critique has resonance with McDonald's (2000) analysis of contemporary sport policy direction in England; an analysis, moreover, which is borne out to some extent by the evidence presented in this chapter. Thus, from the publication of *Sport: Raising the Game* in 1995, and the (contemporaneous) introduction of National Lottery monies in the mid- to late 1990s, key actors and organisations involved in policy direction for elite

level sport in the UK have systematically constructed a model/system which mirrors, not only former Eastern bloc approaches but also those evident in Canada and Australia more recently. The UK can thus be categorised as a 'late adopter' of a systematic and increasingly scientific approach to developing an elite sport model/system in the late 20th/early 21st century. What this also suggests is a requirement to investigate who benefits (most) from such an approach. The latter is explored in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7, wherein the policy direction of three prominent Canadian NSOs and UK NGBs is explored. In addition, two further factors were set out as warranting consideration: i) the characteristics of national political systems – the significance of which has been addressed in this chapter's review and analysis of sport policy processes in both countries; and ii) the significance of concepts such as policy learning and policy transfer as potentially useful additions to any framework for expanding our understanding of the development of elite sport policy (cf. Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000) – which can only be explored more specifically through empirical investigation; for this study, through interviews with key actors involved in these processes in their respective countries, together with further analysis of sport-related policy documents. In lieu of further empirical investigation, the evidence presented to date largely confirms the proposition outlined above. Moreover, although subtle differences have emerged in relation to policy implementation in Canada and the UK, two similarities warrant further comment

Firstly, in respect of Chapter 4's review of Eastern bloc approaches, it is not an unexpected finding that the communist-driven Soviet Union and GDR models/systems were part of a state-controlled, state-funded systematic approach. However, as this chapter has revealed, this has also increasingly been the case in Canada over the past two decades, as well as in the UK's developing model (cf. Houlihan 1997; McDonald 2000) and, moreover, in Australia from the early 1980s. This finding raises questions surrounding the identification of prominent (state and non-state) organisations (and actors therein) that may constitute an elite sport advocacy coalition. Further investigation of (any identified) advocacy coalitions would focus on members' values and belief systems; in particular, along the lines of those identified by Hinings et al. (1996) in Canada. As Mintrom & Vergari (1996: 421) note, 'The "glue" that holds an advocacy coalition together is its members shared beliefs over core policy matters'. In Canada, an investigation is required into the construction of the value consensus that has emerged around the conjuncture of interests of those actors involved in the increasingly technical and bureaucratic system underlying the professionalisation of

sports science research (Macintosh et al.1987; Macintosh & Whitson 1990). In addition, in utilising insights into the 'context-shaping' asymmetries of (structural) relations of power (cf. Hay 1997, 1998, 2002; Layder 1985; Lukes 1974), questions are raised as to how the definition of problems requiring scientific advice and expertise with respect to elite sport might serve to subdue grievances relating to the commitment of government to addressing, for example, gender, class and regional inequalities in Canadian sport. As Macintosh & Whitson observed in the early 1990s:

> ... our interviews confirm that the pursuit of prominence on the world stage has tended to push issues like gender equity and regional access into the background, and that the discourse that today surrounds the Canadian sport system is one in which broader social goals are routinely subordinated to the production of performance (1990: 106).

In short, these observations raise empirical questions surrounding the rational/technical framework within which sport policy in Canada has been framed over the past two to three decades. It is also imperative, however, to elicit how changing values/belief systems might be implicated in the apparent trend towards more inclusive policies, as manifest in recent policy-related documents, such as, *Building Canada Through Sport* and *The Report on the National Summit on Sport*, wherein social equity objectives are articulated, at least in the rhetoric, more explicitly. Questions have also been raised (in the same documents cited above) in respect of calls for increased corporate involvement in the Canadian sport system; in particular, whether the type of social equity objectives currently espoused in the these documents can be reconciled with the interests of the private sector.

In the UK, there is also evidence of the emergence of an increasingly dominant grouping around elite sport interests (Houlihan 2000a; Houlihan & White 2002), as well as suggestions that the sport policy discourse, in England at least, over the past decade is currently constructed around the politically contingent objectives of both Conservative and Labour administrations towards elite development (McDonald 2000). Therefore, the investigation in the UK requires an exploration of the power resources, and thus control exerted by the department currently responsible for sport - the DCMS. An exploration of key actors' values and belief systems, in conjunction with an analysis of power relations should provide sharper insights into the claim that the commitment to excellence frames strategic thinking and specific policy objectives, but to the subjugation of demands from other actors/organisations involved in the sport policy sector (cf. McDonald 2000).

With regard to corporate involvement in UK sport policy-making processes, it is also interesting to note that, in the recently published *Elite Sports Funding Review* (DCMS 2001), there are just three references to increased corporate/private sector involvement. For example, one of the report's recommendations is that a review should 'be undertaken of what other sources might be available to help maximise the Lottery investment in elite sport (e.g. sponsorship)' (DCMS 2001: 5). The second reference only reiterates this recommendation, while the third highlights corporate involvement as a potential 'area of future threat'. Here, the report argues that 'The power of commercial interests in sport may place demands on athletes to perform at times not necessarily suitable for the long term preparation for major games' (DCMS 2001: 32) - thus reflecting similar concerns raised in Canada (and Australia). It could be argued that the Lottery funds now available for all levels of sporting activity in the UK (cf. Sport England 1999b) have tempered calls for corporate involvement in sport to the degree evidenced in Canada (and indeed Australia). On the other hand, a different reading of this situation might suggest that actors and organisations in the UK sporting community are less willing to embrace private sector values, to the detriment of more deeply held values and belief systems around the notions of amateurism and voluntarism. Although such a contention must remain open to empirical scrutiny, the question of increased corporate involvement may become more of an issue in the UK if the *Elite Sports Funding Review's* recommendation for extra exchequer funding of £10 million annually for elite sport over a four-year period from 2001-2002 is not implemented and if concerns regarding a decrease in future Lottery funding streams are realised (DCMS 2001: 9-10).

The second key similarity in both Canada and the UK, and which is clearly related to the above observations, is manifest in debates surrounding the political *rhetoric* of Sport for All, grass roots level programmes and the *reality* of resource allocations and, rather more insidiously, the emergence of an (unobservable) structural framework that favours elite development (cf. Kidd 1988a, 1988b, 1995; McDonald 1995, 2000). This study thus aims to explore the nature of such debates and potential sources of policy change. The preceding reviews of the development of sport policy have revealed examples of such change. In Canada, although the Dubin Inquiry and the *Best Report* recommended a lessened emphasis on the elite level in the early 1990s, the issue of 'broadening–out' the concept of elite sport (cf. Canada 1992; Semotiuk 1996) remains a contested site within the Canadian sport delivery system (cf. Canadian Heritage 2001a, 2001c). In the UK, similar change has been revealed. In 1982, for example, the GB Sports Council

stated that the allocation of 'vast public funds' for special facilities, training programmes and financial and status awards for elite athletes was neither tradition nor policy in Britain (Sports Council 1982: 40). Contrast these observations with current Lottery funding streams, lobbying for increased Exchequer funding for elite sport and the extensive organisational, administrative and physical network of elite sport support systems/facilities that has emerged in the UK over the past five years (cf. DCMS 2001; Sport England 1999b; Theodoraki 1999; UK Sport 2000a, 2002c).

To sum up, empirical investigation in the UK (and in Canada) requires an exploration of the extent to which 'former' values and belief systems remain extant (e.g. amateurism, voluntarism), together with an exploration of the values and belief systems underlying more recent sport policy discourse, as noted by Hinings et al. (1996: 897), for example, in the Canadian context. In addition, an investigation is required into the structural 'conditions of action' (Betts 1986) within which sport policy has developed; in particular, how these (enduring/changing) conditions might be implicated in relations of power with respect to the promotion of elite sport objectives but to the detriment of wider social equity objectives in relation to sport policy-making processes in Canada and the UK. We can now turn to a more specific exploration of three sports and their respective NSOs in Canada.

Chapter 6
Canadian national sporting organisations

Introduction

This chapter narrows the focus of analysis to the level of three Canadian NSOs - Swimming/Natation Canada (SNC), Athletics Canada (AC), and the Canadian Yachting Association (CYA). The rationale for the selection of the three Canadian NSOs is based upon two key premises – which also apply to the selection of the three UK NGBs in Chapter 7. Firstly, all three NSOs have remits for prominent sports at Olympic and World Championship levels and, secondly, within their respective sports, all three have remits for a number of sub-disciplines, all of which are competing for resources and attention of influential actors in the policy-making process. The chapter draws on empirical data gained from interviews with key actors involved in the sport policy process and supplemented with documentary material, such as Annual Reports, Action/Operations Plans, Financial Statements and Policy Reviews, as well as policy-related documents from federal government and Sport Canada (and see Appendix for a *Summary of procedures and protocols* in relation to the above).

The three NSO case studies are organised around the following three principal themes. Firstly, the organisational and administrative structure of each sport is outlined, wherein an attempt is made to trace the nature of the NSOs' relationships with other significant organisations and bodies. Secondly, in line with the premise that an understanding of the process of policy change requires a time perspective of a decade or more (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 118), an attempt is made to identify key high performance sport policy developments and implications for policy change, in particular, from 1990 onwards. This argument draws on the work of Weiss (1977) and the importance of the 'enlightenment function' of policy research. In short, 'a focus on short-term decision-making [underestimates] the influence of policy analysis because research is used primarily to alter the belief systems of policy-makers over time' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 118). More specifically, drawing on the insights provided in Chapters 4 and 5, four elements of high performance sport policy are of particular concern: i) the development of elite level facilities; ii) the emergence of 'full-time' swimmers, athletes and sailors; iii) the adoption of a more professional and

scientific approach to coaching, sports science and sports medicine; and iv) competition opportunities at the elite level (cf. Sports Council 1991: 6). This second theme is thus also concerned with uncovering potential sources of policy change in these four elements of high performance sport.

It should also be noted, therefore, that, although the focus is largely concerned with the period from 1990 onwards, it is necessary (where possible) to locate these more contemporary events within a context of actions undertaken pre-1990; the latter may have significant implications for the shape and direction of contemporary policy-related actions undertaken by all three NSOs. This observation is in line with the critical realist assumptions set out in Chapter 3. At the heart of critical realism lies an account of the relationship between social structure and human agency. As Lewis observes, 'All social activity takes place within the context provided by a set of pre-existing social structures' (2002: 19). In other words, at any given moment in time, actors face social structures which are preformed in the sense that they are the (often unintended) product of actions undertaken not in the present, but in the past (Hay 1995: 198-200; Marsh & Smith 2000: 6, 11). Moreover, as Sibeon notes in an analysis of policy-making, the conditions actors face or confront include, *inter alia*, 'the intended and unintended outcomes of ... *earlier* policies' (1999: 142, emphasis added). Lewis' somewhat abstract 'pre-existing social structures' - or what Betts (1986: 39) has termed the 'conditions of action' - within which actors in NSOs and organisations in the surrounding policy subsystem operate, can be usefully conceived of here as encompassing past decisions, policy statements, organisational rules and language and social and political norms. The chapter's third theme draws together and summarises key implications raised by the first two themes; a central concern here is to highlight the organisational and administrative implications for the NSO under consideration, not only with regard to high performance sport policy developments and policy change but also in respect of the wider policy-making process within which the NSO operates. A useful empirical background is thus provided for the final chapter's more detailed discussion/analysis of the theoretical and methodological insights provided in Chapters 2 and 3.

A constraint on the research process in Canada can be acknowledged here, namely, the difficulty in obtaining access to the same degree of historical (policy-related) documentary material as that found in the UK context, with regard to each of the Canadian NSOs and for Sport Canada. On one level, this centres on a practical problem

of time in conducting research in Canada. However, on another level, it reflects the jurisdictional divisions of a federally-constituted country. In short, provincial/territorial sporting organisations (P/TSOs) in Canada bear much of the responsibility for developing the types of support systems/structures (e.g. facilities, coaching, competition opportunities) necessary for the eventual output of a high performance athlete. A key outcome in this context can be conceived of as medal-winning performances at major international sporting events. The potential for significant jurisdictional tensions is thus signalled: that is, tensions related to the developmental role/support provided by a *provincial/territorial* sporting organisation and the credit and/or kudos reflected onto a *national* sporting organisation for Canadian success at global events such as the Olympic Games and World Championships. The key point here is that the type of periodic policy reviews conducted by UK NGBs (and often in conjunction with the UK's various Sports Councils) on issues such as facility and coaching development, for example, come within the remit of P/TSOs in Canada. This is not to suggest, however, that NSOs and Sport Canada do not (or have not) conduct(ed) such policy reviews. Rather, it is to point to an important difference between the two country's sports systems; a difference, moreover, which permeates all aspects of the following discussion. This relative lack of policy documentation produced by Canadian NSOs and Sport Canada has not proved to be an insurmountable constraint. As the ensuing discussion reveals, a wide range of documentary evidence is reviewed, both historical and contemporary and, together with interview data from key actors in the three NSOs, Sport Canada and leading academics in the field, a relatively comprehensive account of policy change in the context of Canadian high performance sport, is provided.

In tracing the emergence of, and developments in, the four key elements of high performance sport policy identified above, two further issues warrant consideration. The first issue centres on the role of the federal government and Sport Canada. Questions here relate to the issue of NSOs' autonomy in relation to federal government policies for sport. The second (and not unrelated) issue concerns the changing nature of the organisation and administration of the NSO under consideration. More specifically, questions are raised as to the potential for disparity between the values/belief systems of the NSO's volunteer-based members and staff, traditionally more concerned with grass roots development, and those actors involved in the shift towards a more professional bureaucratic mode of operation (cf. Inglis 1997). Chapter 5 revealed the requirement for rational planning systems (most notably, the Quadrennial Planning

Process [QPP] in the mid-1980s and the introduction of the Sports Funding and Accountability Framework [SFAF] in 1995). These rational planning systems can be conceived of here as 'planning dictates' - 'dictate' is used here in the sense of an order or principle that must be obeyed - which are important reference points for the following discussion as they help to clarify the 'conditions of action' (Betts 1986; Sibeon 1997, 1999) within which the three NSOs have developed policies for high performance sport. In relation to this, Kidd provides a useful indication of Sport Canada's emphasis in the mid-1990s, despite the debates/arguments from various actors/organisations (cf. Blackhurst et al. 1991; Canada 1992; Dubin 1990) for a shift in direction away from policies weighted towards the elite level following the Ben Johnson drugs affair at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games:

> In March [1995], Sport Canada announced that 66% of the assessment that it will use to allocate the next round of cuts to national organisations [NSOs] will be based upon high performance criteria. The jobs, grants and kudos will still go to the coach and programme who win, not the ones who nurture intelligent, mature whole persons, leading many to dismiss the progressive new policies of recent years as cosmetic, co-opting or stalling mechanisms (Kidd 1995: 10).

Three points of departure with regard to UK NGBs are signalled here. Firstly, at approximately the same time as UK NGBs were due to receive National Lottery monies, which were far greater than previous Exchequer grants, Canadian NSOs were experiencing a 'round of cuts'. Secondly, Chapter 5 revealed that the type of organisational change (for NSOs) inherent in Sport Canada's requirement for quadrennial planning occurred some 15 to 20 years earlier than in UK NGBs (Cunningham et al. 1987; Slack 1988; Slack et al. 1994). The two key organisations driving the 'modernisation' of UK NGBs are the government Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the quasi-governmental body for elite sport interests, UK Sport. A certain paradox is raised here in relation to such planning dictates in both Canada and the UK. That is, in order for effective implementation, they require a belief that NSOs'/NGBs' operations will change and 'improve'. Yet, such change may also simultaneously heighten the potential for disparity, and even conflict, between volunteer members/staff - in particular, those personnel involved in the sport at regional/local/club levels - and NSOs'/NGBs' increasingly professionalised personnel at national level.

This leads on to the third point of departure, which centres on Kidd's (1995: 10) reference in the earlier quote to 'the progressive new policies of recent years' and the suggestion that many in Canada have dismissed them as mere 'stalling mechanisms'.

Kidd's argument here hinges on future federal monies being allocated to those sports/NSOs that reveal the capacity to win medals, despite indications in the early 1990s that the debates in Canadian sport, regarding the types of values/belief systems underpinning the Canadian sports system, had shifted policy direction towards a lessened emphasis on the elite level and that a search for alternative approaches was desirable. Kidd's observations appear increasingly instructive if we also consider the discussion in Chapter 5 which highlighted more recent policy debates in Canada, the corollary of which has resulted in the tabling of a new Canadian Sport Policy in April 2002 and a new legislative Act (Bill C-54 - *An Act to Promote Physical Activity and Sport*). It should be recalled that, following the prorogation of the Canadian Parliament in September 2002, Bill C-54 was reintroduced as Bill C-12 in October 2002 (House of Commons of Canada 2002). Thus, the new Canadian Sport Policy and Bill C-12 reveal, in their rhetoric at least, that federal policy direction has shifted towards a far broader conception of sporting objectives and away from its previous focus on support for high performance sport. Thus, an interesting aspect of the ensuing discussion is the degree to which federal government rhetoric has been embraced at the level of individual NSOs. At the same time, this exploration includes an investigation of (potential) indications of value/belief system change and the salience of such change for high performance sport policy within the three Canadian NSOs considered below.

Swimming/Natation Canada

Organisation, administration and relationships

The Canadian Amateur Swimming Association was founded in 1909 as Canada's governing body for competitive swimming. In 1987, the name Swimming/Natation Canada (SNC) was adopted as a concise bilingual alternative, as well as to more precisely reflect the emergence of the organisation as a functionally-oriented, not-for-profit organisation. It is important to note that the name change in 1987 was also meant to reflect the federal government's ongoing commitment to bilingualism in Canada. Unlike the Amateur Swimming Association's wider remit in the UK (see Chapter 7), SNC has responsibility for just three disciplines – swimming, disability swimming and open water swimming. In Canada, the related aquatic disciplines of water polo, synchronised swimming and diving are all autonomous sporting organisations and, as SNC's Director of Finance and Administration related, the Aquatic Federation of Canada

is the umbrella organisation for the four aquatic-related disciplines (swimming, water polo, synchronised swimming and diving) in Canadian sport (Interview: Larry Clough, 13 June 2002; see also SNC 1997: 7). At an international level, SNC represents Canada at Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) and International Olympic Committee (IOC) forums. As an organisation of 10 Provincial sections (the three Canadian Territories are not officially constituted members of SNC), SNC is Canada's national swimming body charged with overseeing and co-ordinating a variety of programmes, in conjunction with the Canadian Swimming Coaches and Teachers Association, across the sport's 350 clubs and 70,000 members (SNC 2001b: 3). The grass roots level 'I Can Swim Programme' currently operated by Lindsay Park Sports Centre - an independent company – and sponsored by *Sears*, plays an important educational role in the sport's learn-to-swim initiatives.

As with all the major NSOs in Canada, SNC depends heavily on the provincial club structure to provide a coaching and competition framework within which junior level swimmers can aspire to, and progress onto, high performance levels. However, while SNC's Larry Clough maintains that 'We still feel we have one of the best club systems in the world' (Interview: 13 June 2002), this is not a view shared by other major players in the Canadian swimming community. For example, Nick Thierry, editor of *SwimNews* has argued that 'Our club system, once the strongest in the world in the 1970s and 1980s, is now moribund' (Personal communication, 3 July 2002; see also Tihanyi 2001b). In relation to these observations, Mark St-Aubin, age-group swimming coach and clinical kinesiologist, argues that, while Dr John Hogg (former national team sport psychologist) has been interested in talent identification and development of talented young individuals for many years, 'an ambitious project ... presented by Jeno Tihanyi [in 1988] to start a systematic approach to talent identification ... never received the support nor the funding' (St-Aubin 1994: 7). These are but two examples of a sport variously described as 'in crisis' (Colwin 1996: 12; SNC 1998: 11), 'not having a system' (Lowry 2000: 44) and 'stuck in the past' (MacDonald 1998: 37), over the past five to ten years. Such contentions raise questions as to the role, purpose, policy direction and strategic aims of SNC and, crucially, the nature of the organisation's relationships with its provincial partners, Sport Canada and the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC).

Chapter 5 clearly outlined the policy direction of Sport Canada from the 1970s to the late 1980s; in short, the rationalisation, centralisation and professionalisation of

Canada's major NSOs, the corollary of which was a focus on high performance sport, with the ultimate aim of medal-winning success at Olympic and World Championship events (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990; Whitson & Macintosh 1989). It has also been well documented (cf. Kidd 1988a, 1988b, 1995; Macintosh & Whitson 1990; Whitson & Macintosh 1989) that regional and/or provincial/territorial interests in sport and physical activities, as well as wider (but interrelated) social policy concerns (e.g. equity, gender and official languages are cases in point), have been routinely subsumed within the 'presupposed system goal' (Habermas 1971) of Canadian NSOs' and Sport Canada's attempts to construct a policy framework contingent upon the production of success in international competition. That this 'philosophy' or 'ideology' of excellence, as Kidd (1988b: 13, 1995: 9) has termed it, has, in large part, failed to realise the politically-motivated sporting goals it set out to achieve is self-evident, and not only in the sport of swimming but also in many other sports in Canada. It is self-evident if medal counts at Olympic Games and World Championships is the criterion on which a sport is deemed 'successful'. That medal counts are important is clear from Sport Canada's funding mechanism for NSOs – the Sport Funding and Accountability Framework (SFAF). As Sport Canada's documentation states, 'SFAF funding eligibility will be based on factors relating to the *level* of performance rather than on the volume of performance' (Canadian Heritage 2000b: 3, emphasis added).

Table 6.1 Canadian swimming medals: Olympic Games/World Aquatic Championships, 1988-2001

	Olympic Games					World Aquatic Championships			
	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total		Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total
1988	0	1	1	2					
					1991	0	1	0	1
1992	1	0	1	2					
					1994	0	0	0	0
1996	0	1	2	3					
					1998	0	1	3	4
2000	0	0	1	1					
					2001	0	0	0	0

Moreover, although 'high performance' is listed as one of three 'federal sport priorities' taken into account by the SFAF (the other two being 'sport development' and 'management'), the high performance element was weighted (as at January 2000) at around two-thirds of the total monies available to a Canadian NSO. On this basis, then, if we consider results at the last four Olympic Games and World Aquatic Championships

(see Table 6.1 above), questions are raised as to SNC's capacity to provide an organisational and administrative framework within which Canadian swimmers might achieve the goals set out for them at federal and NSO levels. Table 6.1 reveals that, on this method of accounting, the emphasis put upon medal counts by Sport Canada and SNC as a primary outcome of federal funding and NSO priorities has clearly failed. It should be remembered, however, that Canadian swimmers have won a total of 39 Olympic medals, placing Canada in eighth place overall, and this eighth-place world position puts swimming as the top Olympic sport for Canada (Kelso 2000: 16). That this over-emphasis on high performance remains an unresolved dilemma - given the rhetoric of increased emphasis on issues of 'participation', 'building capacity' and 'interaction' in the new Canadian Sport Policy (Canadian Heritage 2002a) - for those involved at the highest level of shaping sport policy in Canada, is clear from the comments of Jan Meyer, Senior Programme Officer for swimming at Sport Canada:

> ... probably 65 per cent of the funding was in high performance. The funding is still, by and large, in that area, in part, because if the federal government does not support that high performance programme, then there are not a lot of other groups in the Canadian sport scene that are going to, other than the Canadian Olympic Committee (Interview: 12 June 2002).

Leaving aside for now the reference to the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC), Olympic and World Championship medals remain an important structural mechanism in the funding of NSOs. That SNC remains an elite-focused body is also clear from its 2000-2001 Annual Report, in which the then Acting President stated that 'A "performance first" philosophy was adopted by the Swimming/Natation Canada board of directors' (quoted in SNC 2001b: 4). This elite-focused view is reflected by SNC's Acting Executive Director at the time, who argued that the organisation would be directing 'the scarce resources at our disposal to the area where we feel they can have a significant impact ... Our mandate to progress SNC's focus to the international podium has never been clearer' (quoted in SNC 2001b: 9). These observations not only illustrate a policy emphasis on high performance at SNC, an emphasis, moreover, borne out more recently by SNC's Director of Finance and Administration (Interview: Larry Clough, 13 June 2002) but they also reveal indications of impending change in leadership and organisational and administrative structures. This is clear in the noted reference above to *Acting* President and *Acting* Executive Director. The latter, Ken Radford, acknowledged as much in SNC's *E-News* newsletter in October 2001, in stating that 'many initiatives, programmes and opportunities were tackled ... We have undergone leadership changes, staffing shortages, communication issues and, to a large extent,

uncertainty' (quoted in SNC 2001a: 2). By June 2002, following an internal audit of what was required from 'a lead employee', SNC had appointed Karen Spierkel as its Chief Executive Officer (Colburn, quoted in SNC 2002c: 1). This is an interesting appointment, as Spierkel has no employment background in swimming. Indeed, Rob Colburn, current SNC President, states that Karen Spierkel was employed for her 'expertise in marketing, communication, business planning and strategic development, fundraising, operations and financial management, as well as government and media relations' (quoted in SNC 2002c: 1). It is interesting, then, if we consider the insights provided by, amongst others, Macintosh & Whitson (1990), Slack (1988), Slack et al. (1994) and Whitson & Macintosh (1989) into the potential consequences of a NSO embracing what might be termed a more business-like, corporate-oriented approach to its varied operational activities. Whitson & Macintosh sensitise us to such potential consequences in arguing that

> ... it is suggested that what is typically framed as a choice between rational planning and 'kitchen table' amateurism, the national interest and provincialism, high performance and embarrassing mediocrity ... can from another perspective be seen as a campaign by professional interests to redefine what is really a redirection of resources, and an appropriation of policy prerogatives (1989: 437).

It appears to be clear where SNC is positioning itself as an organisation in 2002. Rob Colburn acknowledges the recent changes suggested in the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy in stating that 'The government has changed its entire sport policy for amateur sport' (quoted in SNC 2002c: 2). Thus, the inference in Karen Spierkel's comments in the same newsletter that 'Our organisational structure has been realigned to better service the peak performance and technical areas' (quoted in SNC 2002c: 2), is that SNC has recognised the federal government policy shift away from high performance but, as an organisation, will remain focused on elite sport objectives. The current role and strategic policy direction of the COC is instructive here, and some brief comments should help to guide the ensuing review of developments in four key elements of high performance sport policy.

At the same time as the new federal sport policy was tabled, the COC adopted an almost diametrically opposed policy direction. As Professor Bruce Kidd related, the COC 'live and breathe the philosophy of excellence and they have no critical distance as far as that's concerned' (Interview: 19 June 2002). A potential advocacy coalition centring on high performance sport in Canada is thus signalled. A contention reinforced by Jan

Meyer, who suggested that those involved in formulating policy ideas in the Canadian sport delivery system have been arguing for some time that 'a separate external arm's length agency should be created, and should be dedicated to the assessment, monitoring, evaluation and the determination of funding to the NSOs for the high performance element' (Interview: 12 June 2002). Jan Meyer also stated that SNC has been an important supporter of this lobby, and it appears that the organisation is aware of the impending funding implications underlying the COC's shift in policy direction. A point reinforced by SNC's Chief Executive Officer, who notes that the new COC funding model 'squarely places an emphasis on funding for peak performance ... [and that] SNC is well positioned to benefit from the focus on high performance' (quoted in SNC 2002c: 2-3). The potential ramifications of this issue is explored in more depth in the *Summary of key implications* section, which follows the ensuing discussion of the four key elements of elite sport development in Canadian swimming.

To sum up, SNC clearly remains focused primarily on high performance objectives, despite the recent federal policy shift towards a greater emphasis on broader sporting objectives. This is clear from SNC's most recent (October 2002) attempt to formulate future strategic direction for the sport. Thus, SNC's new strategic plan states that 'it is based on a set of core values derived from its [SNC's] international rationale for success, a podium focus and a COMM1T TO W1N! philosophy' (SNC 2002a: 4). Moreover, given the noted rationale for SNC's appointment of a new CEO, it is perhaps not unsurprising that Karen Spierkel set out a number of 'corporate values' driving the organisation in the 21st century: these include, 'professional excellence, accountability, responsibility, respect, integrity, growth and learning, [and] open communication' (quoted in SNC 2002b: 1). However, it is also worth recalling the earlier comments describing Canadian swimming as a sport 'in crisis', with particular reference to its grass roots club system. Such observations raise questions as to the capacity for 'other voices' (Tihanyi 2001a, 2001b) to be heard within different levels of the sport. A point made by others in the Canadian sport system from a somewhat wider perspective (cf. Kidd 1988a, 1988b, 1995; Rail 2000; Whitson & Macintosh 1989). As Rail argues, 'In Canadian sport today, there are inequities which disadvantage persons from the lower classes, women and young girls, Natives, Francophones and persons with disabilities' (2000: 6). These issues thus problematise the relationships between broad-based participatory sport programmes and high performance-oriented ones. That is, are the former constructed simply as 'feeder programmes' for the latter? Or are they of

independent, and possibly greater, importance? Ultimately they raise important questions as to the purpose of resource allocations for sport by federal government and key multi-sport organisations, notably the COC, in the eventual outputs and outcomes of the Canadian sport delivery system.

Elite sport policy developments: An identification of potential sources of policy change

Four key elements of elite or high performance sport have been identified as warranting consideration, namely: i) the development of elite level facilities; ii) the emergence of 'full-time' athletes (here, swimmers); iii) the adoption of a more professional and strategic approach to coaching, sports science and sports medicine; and iv) competition opportunities at the elite level. As discussed, an attempt is also made to trace the 'conditions of action' (cf. Betts 1986) within which these developments have emerged.

Development of elite level facilities

It is worth reiterating the point made in the chapter's *Introduction* that the responsibility for facility planning and development has not, historically, fallen within the remit of federal government agencies or NSOs. This is an element of the Canadian sport delivery system traditionally located within the remit of P/TSOs and municipalities (local authorities in the UK context) (Interviews Jan Meyer, 12 June 2002; Larry Clough, 13 June 2002). Thus, although this section is concerned, primarily, with elite level facility developments in swimming, it is important to provide an understanding of how long-standing jurisdictional divisions and federal responses to calls for assistance in facility development, in general, have shaped more contemporary (elite swimming) policy directions in this area. The 1969 *Task Force on Sports for Canadians*, for example, noted, *inter alia*, that there was 'a lack of sports facilities' in the country; 'that there has been no general study of such facilities'; and 'that we are woefully weak in the kind of facilities required for international competition' (Canada 1969: 55-56). There was also a lack of elite level *swimming* facilities at this time. This is clear from the 1969 Task Force, which commended the government for its part in the construction of the country's *first* Olympic-class pool in Winnipeg (built for the Pan-American Games) and for its assistance in helping to build a similar pool in Halifax in preparation for the 1969 Canada Games. The facilities that were built at this time, then, focused on the elite level. As Macintosh et al. note, 'the federal government restricted its support of facilities to those constructed for the Canada Games [from 1968] and international sports events' (1987:

103). This early indication of an emphasis on high performance sport was thus clearly related to developing a hosting policy for staging these major events – notably, the 1967 Pan-American Games, the Montreal Olympics in 1976 and the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. A policy, moreover, that remains as a key strategic direction at federal government (Sport Canada) level. Indeed, Sport Canada's Manager of International Sport Policy made it clear that 'The only way we support facilities is through our Major Games .... It has to be through our hosting policy' (Interview: David McCrindle, 12 June 2002).

The beginnings of tensions and conflict over facility development are apparent here and have much to do with the noted jurisdictional divisions in Canada. For example, during this period (late 1960s and 1970s) the provinces had urged the federal government to contribute to sport and recreation facilities across the country. However, the noted construction of sports facilities for major Games not only failed to realise federal policy aims with regard to the development of high performance athletes but they also did little to assist in increasing mass participation in Canada (Macintosh et al. 1987: 138). In 1979, the federal government published a White Paper on sport – *Partners in Pursuit of Excellence: A National Policy on Amateur Sport* – which did little to enhance the building of sport/recreation facilities for the general public. It did, however, signal the first indication that high performance (single sport) national and regional training centres would be federally-funded (Campagnolo 1979: 19). By 1986, 78 sport training centres had been established, the majority (55) of which were located at Canadian universities. Yet, it appears that the necessary co-operation for optimum use of these centres, between federal and provincial governments, host institution, NSOs and P/TSOs and regional/local sports clubs, was lacking. As Macintosh et al. noted in the late 1980s, 'Further rethinking and more real co-operation are needed before the potential of training centres in Canada can be realised' (1987: 137).

In 1988, the federal government published yet another Task Force Report on National Sport Policy – *Toward 2000: Building Canada's Sport System* – (Canada 1988). With regard to facility development, the Task Force recommended, *inter alia*, that: i) further emphasis should be put upon co-ordinating the various organisations and agencies at national/federal, provincial and local (municipal/universities) levels; ii) high performance athletes require 'adequate competition and training facilities'; and, crucially iii) there should be an investigation into 'the possibility of developing national multi-sport training

centres' (Canada 1988: 33-34). This last recommendation regarding multi-sport training centres brings us to the area of facility development that is most clearly related to high performance sport and NSOs. The first multi-sport centre was established in Calgary in 1994 (swimming was one of seven 'client sports' included at the outset), given that many of the components comprising the general vision for a multi-sport centre were already in place following the 1988 winter Olympic Games.

On the one hand, many in the Canadian sporting community, and SNC in particular, perceive the concept of multi-sport training centres as an important contributory element in Canada's quest for success at the elite level. For example, Dave Johnson, SNC's National Coach/High Performance Director and current President of the Canadian Professional Coaches Association), and who is widely credited as the architect of the training centre concept for swimming, argued in 1995 that 'Canadian swimming is in transition' and that the centre programme would help to reinstate a 'competitive attitude' back into Canadian swimming (Johnson 1995: 22-23). On the other hand, questions remain as to who benefits most from what are now termed Canadian Sport centres (CSCs). For example, Helmstaedt notes the paradox in the establishment of the first centre in Calgary in 1994, in arguing that 'the [Calgary] centre opened up at a time when the Canadian government's dramatic budget cuts were made public, lopping 5-10% off funding for most individual sports ... Given the cutbacks one could question the distribution of what funding is left' (1995a: 9). Helmstaedt also questioned whether SNC was merely reflecting the 'current performance trend in Canadian swimming', as well as querying how many athletes would benefit from the programme (see also McKinnon 1995).

The noted concerns of many in the Canadian swimming community in the early to mid-1990s appear to have gone unheeded. Jan Meyer explained that, today, there are seven national swimming centres across Canada, with six of these in the same cities as the multi-sport centres, of which there are now nine (Personal communication, 16 October 2002). If we also consider the point made earlier regarding the purpose and outcomes of federal and NSO resource allocations, it is clear that SNC has devoted a considerable (and increasing) percentage of its expenditure on these training centres. For example, in 1994-1995, SNC's breakdown of expenditure reveals that Can$86,000 - approximately 6.6 per cent of total expenditure for the year – was allocated to the centres (SNC 1997: 37). By 2001-2002, the budget forecast for training centres had risen to Can$433,000 –

now almost 21 per cent of SNC's total expected expenditure for the year (SNC 2001b: 31). Moreover, during the period (1994-2002), while SNC's total expenditure increased by a factor of just under two (from Can$1,276,238 to Can$2,071,500), funding allocated to training centres secured a fivefold increase. That federal/SNC sport policy direction has not realised the high performance goals upon which it was premised was highlighted earlier. More specifically, in the two Olympic Games and three World Championships staged since the inception of the first of the multi-sport training centres in Calgary in 1994, Canadian swimmers have won just four Olympic and four World Championship swimming medals, none of which was Gold. Thus, while Dave Johnson has argued forcefully for those in the swimming community to support the training centre concept, his comments on this issue in 1997 now appear somewhat hollow. For example, Colwin has argued, with some prescience, that 'Dave Johnson made a strong, positive, and even impressive pitch in favour of the centres ... but the centre programme seems destined to be a controversial issue until it produces the results necessary to vindicate its existence' (1997a: 8).

In sum, it is clear that SNC has embraced the high performance training centre concept with some enthusiasm (Interviews: Jan Meyer, 12 June 2002; Larry Clough, 13 June 2002). However, given the noted concerns on this issue and the country's jurisdictional complexity, it is difficult to envisage how facility development might be put onto a more strategic and coherent plane. Therefore, in a country as large, geographically, as Canada, and where jurisdictional complexities are inherent, a series of issues remain unresolved with regard to facility development in the sport of swimming. These issues can be summarised as follows: i) variable commitment to the CSC network from different levels of the sport; ii) some provinces (principally the larger, more prosperous provinces, such as British Columbia, Quebec and Saskatchewan) have high performance sporting ambitions of their own; iii) the other side of this equation is that the smaller, less prosperous provinces, such as Prince Edward Island and Manitoba, struggle to provide adequate swimming facilities for the general public, let alone the high performance end of the sport (SNC 1997: 97, 2001b: 84); and iv) central to these issues are questions of purpose and resource allocations.

In relation to this last point, David McCrindle, Manager of International Sport Policy at Sport Canada suggested that, in the past, the provinces used lottery[1] monies to subsidise sport and recreation facility developments (Interview: 12 June 2002). Yet, how

and/or where, such monies are allocated depends on the provincial government in question (cf. Macintosh et al. 1987: 174-175). Thus Saskatchewan, for example, funds sport and recreation through lottery funds, whereas Ontario does not. As David McCrindle also related, 'the lotteries became such huge cash cows and the provincial governments said we can't justify spending, say, half a billion dollars on all these things [sport, culture and recreation], when our hospitals are shutting down wards and so on' (Interview: 12 June 2002). Given the complex cluster of unresolved facility-related issues highlighted here, it remains to be seen whether SNC has the organisational and administrative capacity to, not only overcome these issues, but also whether resources can be found to implement the expanded reach of the policy goals contained within the new Canadian Sport Policy.

Emergence of 'full-time' athletes (swimmers)

While this section centres on elite level swimmers, it is also important to locate this discussion within wider events surrounding the antecedents of the emergence of full-time athletes, in general, in Canada. These antecedents can be traced back to the early 1970s, when the *Proposed Sports Policy for Canadians* (Canada 1970) resulted in the implementation of a grants-in-aid programme for supporting athletes while they were students. This programme, did not, however, recognise the problems that non-university athletes were having in combining sport training with regular employment (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 19). A number of funding initiatives (e.g. 'Intensive Care' in 1972 and Game Plan '76) for supporting elite athletes in Canada were finally consolidated in 1980 under the auspices of Sport Canada's Athlete Assistance Programme (AAP). It has been argued, however, that the AAP has only served to reinforce wider socio-economic inequities in Canada and that social equity objectives have been subsumed within the 'presupposed system goals' associated with high performance sporting objectives (cf. Gruneau 1976; Kidd 1995; Macintosh & Whitson 1990; Macintosh et al. 1987; Whitson & Macintosh 1989). Indeed, by the late 1980s, Macintosh et al. (1987: 172) suggested that the overriding focus on high performance sport in Canada over the past 10 to 15 years had resulted in a federal government-sponsored 'cadre of "state" athletes capable of competing successfully at the international level in a number of sports'.

Leaving aside for the moment the noted critiques of the AAP, it is clear that the notion of government-sponsored 'state' athletes at the high performance level was manifest far earlier in Canada than in the UK. However, today, elite swimmers who meet UK Sport's

requirements for an Athlete Personal Award (APA) currently receive far higher (Lottery) grants than their Canadian counterparts. Indeed, the maximum APA award available would provide UK swimmers (and any elite performer who meets the requisite criteria) with four times the amount of personal award allocated by Sport Canada through the AAP (SNC 2001b: 65; UK Sport 2002e: 67-73). The relative lack of funding for Canada's elite swimmers has proved to be an enduring issue for those involved in shaping policy direction in the sport of swimming (Interview: Jan Meyer, 12 June 2002). However, policy (funding) directions in and for Canadian swimming have not been (and are not) shaped in a political vacuum. Thus, in the late 1980s, in a damning assessment of funding arrangements for Canada's high performance athletes, Kidd argued that

> As underpaid professionals, athletes are 'sweat-suited philanthropists', subsidising the careers of hundreds of fully paid coaches, sports scientists, and bureaucrats, not to mention the ambitions of the federal state and the products and ideology of the corporations which sponsor teams and competitions (1988a: 300).

With regard to swimming, then, a study of registered swimmers in Ontario in the late 1970s, for example, found that household income and class background remained the major determinants of opportunity in the sport (Eynon & Kitchener 1977). Yet, sporting opportunities are not just a question of income and class. As Kidd (1988a) has argued, higher income families tend to believe in the values of intense competition as they can afford the special opportunities that enable them to experience success, and because it legitimates their class position. In short, 'Such an outlook gives their children the appetite and role models necessary for high-performance sport' (Kidd 1988a: 302). It is the battle over such values, at individual (actor) and organisational levels, that has pervaded the Canadian sport system over the past 10 to 12 years. As discussed, the battle over values in Canadian swimming (and other major sports) has centred on critiques of the high performance goals which underlie the quest for international medal-winning success, as well as the implication that the pathway leading to achieving these federally-inspired goals is founded on the stepping-stones of performance-enhancing drugs. As Colwin argued in the mid-1990s, 'some of today's swimmers who, when questioned about their occupations, openly state that they are "full-time swimmers" ... it is not difficult to understand a need for the "one-upmanship" that could easily turn into taking performance-enhancing drugs' (1996: 13). It is clear, then, that there is a discrete group of Canadian elite swimmers who might be categorised as 'full-time' - in the sense that they train and compete on a full-time basis, receive 'carding' (AAP) monies from Sport Canada and benefit from prize money and sponsorships linked

to the professional swimming circuit (Interviews: David McCrindle, 12 June 2002; Larry Clough, 13 June 2002; see also Colwin 1998). However, as both David McCrindle and Larry Clough have argued, many other Canadian swimmers just below this elite level rely heavily on parental support and/or migrate to universities in the United States. The latter option is often more attractive for swimmers who have not achieved federal or provincial carding standards 'simply because the chance of finding available money is much greater' (McWha 1998: 32).

The issue of the emergence of full-time high performance swimmers in Canada raises a series of interlacing issues in respect of policy change. Firstly, SNC has funded a long-standing 'club grant programme', the aim of which, traditionally, has been to support grass roots developmental swimming at provincial/municipal levels. Yet, in 1997, in an economic climate of federal cutbacks to NSOs, and variability of resources for P/TSOs, SNC's club grant criteria were revised to allow clubs with medallists at national championships to be recognised in the programme results and to be designated as 'high performance clubs'. The rationale for this policy shift is clear; it is premised on a search for scarce resources. Thus, this shift in policy approach expanded the number of clubs recognised under the club grant programme and, as Ian Curry, Manager of Swimming Development Services, stated in SNC's 1996-1997 Annual Report, 'it allows for linkage between the club grant and recognition of high performance clubs under the Sport Canada carding programme' (quoted in SNC 1997: 35).

Secondly, in 2000, SNC initiated a 'Team Elite' programme[2] that involved a reallocation of resources in order to provide additional monies for its elite swimmers to fully embrace the changing structural conditions of the early 21st century. These changing structural conditions are acknowledged by SNC's Ken Radford, in arguing that 'In many instances, the "professionalisation" of our sport allows an athlete to redefine the parameters of a swimming career' (quoted in SNC 2001b: 9). However, Radford's ensuing suggestion that 'The programme has been met with widespread acclaim, both from within our membership and across sport in Canada', appears somewhat misguided. It is at least misguided if set within a context of the noted concerns above regarding the sport's developmental/youth levels, the wide-ranging debates in Canadian sport over the past 10 to 12 years concerning an over-emphasis on high performance sport and the lack of medal-winning outcomes such policy directions have brought to the sport. That this is a policy direction SNC are to pursue, however, is clear. For example, in an interview with

SNC's High Performance Director, Dave Johnson, in the *Globe and Mail*, James Christie notes that the Team Elite programme is a reallocation of existing funding, while Johnson stated that 'It's something we felt we had to do, with or without new corporate support, if we want to be competitive' (quoted in Christie 2001c).

The third issue is concerned with the contemporary professional swimming circuit, centring on the FINA-sponsored World Cup series, which has led a number of leading Canadian swimming analysts to suggest that this is implicated in the demise of the sport's youth base. Jean Tihanyi, for example, argues that 'Today the Canadian youth programme is virtually non-existent' (2001a: 6), while Cecil Colwin maintains that 'The advent of the professional swimming circuit has already caused an increasing gap between the vastly differing needs of the globe-trotting athlete and the lower-level participant, who still pursues the traditional daily routine of the amateur swimmer' (1998: 11). This third issue is clearly related to competition structures and opportunities, which are dealt with in a later section. Yet, it is an instructive issue here in not only providing further evidence of an enduring emphasis on high performance in Canadian swimming but also in highlighting a trend to put money-winning opportunities ahead of Olympic success. As Tihanyi argues, 'Our World Cup performances are very good and our [Olympic] Games performances are very poor' (2001a: 6).

In sum, it is clear that, today, we can discern a relatively small, but increasingly legitimised, cadre of elite athletes who can be termed full-time swimmers. The above discussion has revealed SNC as an organisation prepared to support the notion of full-time elite swimmers if this is to achieve the ultimate goal of medal-winning success at major international swimming events. At the same, however, it also exposes SNC as an organisation somewhat distanced from its grass roots developmental levels. Moreover, in recent years, the 'Holy Grail' of Olympic and/or World Championship success has eluded Canada's high performance swimmers. A further example of the sharpening distinction between the sport's high performance elite, and swimmers at developmental levels, is evident in the recent introduction of two new bonus programmes (for medals won at Olympic/World Championship events) and sponsored by SNC's official swimsuit supplier, *Speedo Canada*. In short, questions remain as to the organisational and administrative acumen of Canada's NSO for swimming as it reallocates scarce resources to the few, but to the detriment of the many. That SNC has put in place, and pursues, financial incentives which allow full-time, high performance swimmers to 'subsidise' their

own interests by competing for prize-money at the numerous World Cup swimming meets across the globe, as well as Olympic/World Championship events, are but two pertinent examples of an organisation struggling to provide an overall strategic direction for all levels of the sport.

Developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine

The first attempts to construct a coaching 'profession' in Canada were signalled in the 1969 *Report of the Task Force on Sports for Canadians* (Canada 1969). While the Task Force Report gave just one page to coaching issues and just two pages to what was euphemistically termed the 'medical situation', it found, *inter alia*, that 'there is no coaching profession in Canada [and that] few well-paid coaching jobs are available and very few men and women consider it as a full-time career' (Canada 1969: 64, 70). Over 20 years later, the 1992 Task Force on Federal Sport Policy, *Sport: The Way Ahead* (Canada 1992) cited the 1969 Report as a key factor behind a number of initiatives that characterised much of the progressive development of coaching up to the early 1990s. Three key structural developments cited were: i) the creation of the National Coaches Association in late 1970 - renamed the Coaching Association of Canada (CAC) in 1971; ii) the early development of the National Coaching Certification Programme (NCCP) in 1972; and iii) the establishment of the Canadian Association of National Coaches in 1986 (renamed Canadian Professional Coaches Association in 1993) (cf. Canada 1992: 65-66; Macintosh et al. 1989: 96-98). While the 1992 Task Force Report clearly recognised achievements regarding the professionalisation of coaching, it also inferred that this remained an unfinished project. Thus, while attempts to construct a coaching profession began in Canada in the early 1970s, over 10 years ahead of similar developments in the UK, a series of enduring and interconnected issues remain in this regard for Canadian swimming.

Firstly, and reflecting in large part, comments in the 1992 Task Force Report, it is clear that coaching development in Canada remains an incomplete project in the early 21st century. As Tihanyi (2001a: 8) argues, 'coaching has never been looked upon in this country as a profession' and, at grass roots levels, little is being done to help the many volunteer coaches to improve through coaching education. Secondly, as discussed, the development of multi-sport training centres in the mid-1990s has not been recognised as a success by all in the Canadian swimming community. Here, problems centre on the progression of talented swimmers from municipal club level, through to clubs focused more specifically on high performance and, finally, into one of SNC's seven regional

swimming centres across Canada. As Jan Meyer related, tensions are apparent here as coaches at the two 'lower' levels are reluctant to release talented swimmers, who have spent many years with an individual coach, to a high performance centre (Interview: 12 June 2002). Jean Tihanyi is somewhat more unequivocal on this issue, in arguing that the principle behind the centres is 'that you bring in the swimmer to train in the centre for a while and the swimmer will still participate in and be part of the club. No such thing exists anymore – at least not 100%' (2001a: 6; see also Colwin 1997a). These observations raise fundamental questions in relation to comments from SNC's High Performance Director. Dave Johnson has stated that he believes the coach-swimmer relationship should be based on a model of 'from the cradle to the podium' and that the motivation of any coach is to develop a swimmer to international class (quoted in Colwin 1997b: 8). Given the concerns raised above regarding integration throughout different levels of training/coaching, it is not immediately apparent how Johnson might achieve such a goal.

Thirdly, on the issue of coach education and development, the introduction of the National Coaching Certification Programme (NCCP) in the early 1970s was viewed as an attempt to construct a coherent coaching profession in Canada but, as discussed, doubts have been raised as to the NCCP's effectiveness in building a coaching 'profession'. However, a concerted effort at federal (Sport Canada) level to effect further changes to coaching education and development is emerging (Interview: Larry Clough, 13 June 2002). As Bill Heikkila, Senior Programme Officer at Sport Canada, related, an evaluation of the NCCP was conducted in 1996 by the CAC, 'based on the belief that the original NCCP (despite being recognised internationally) was not as effective as it could be' (Personal communication: 12 July 2002). The 1996 CAC project raised the following questions: i) Is the programme meeting the needs of both volunteers and professional coaches? ii) Why are so few coaches moving through the programme? and iii) How effective is a course-based approach? (CAC 1996: 1). A key output of the 1996 NCCP review has been the transition to what is termed a competency-based education and training (CBET) approach to coaching in Canada (CAC 2002).

This transition is ongoing, as each participating sport revises its coach training and certification. An important interconnected issue permeating the transition of coaching development is the Sport Canada requirement for NSOs to develop what is termed an, 'athlete (or participant) development model'. The rationale for the latter reflects the

policy shift towards participation issues in the new Canadian Sport Policy. As Sport Canada's Bill Heikkila stated, 'Instead of just a Competitive stream, as was the case in the previous model, we will now also recognise a Community Sport stream as well as an Instructional stream' (Personal communication: 4 July 2002). While SNC has embraced these changes to a greater or lesser extent (cf. SNC 2001b: 37), recent observations by Jean Tihanyi, for example, paints a rather different picture of coaching developments in the Canadian swimming community. Tihanyi (2001a: 7) argues that 'an old boys (sic) network has established itself in Canadian swimming at the upper level, which is making it very difficult for new ideas to emerge'. Moreover, even when 'new ideas' do emerge, Sport Canada's Jan Meyer suggested that it has 'been quite a challenge', specifically for older coaches at club and provincial levels, to fully embrace the type of coaching innovations more readily adopted by national (high performance) coaches at SNC's regional network of swimming centres (Interview: 12 June 2002; see also Colwin 1997a).

With regard to developments in sports science/medicine disciplines, it is worth noting that, in the course of its inquiry, the 1969 *Report of the Task Force on Sports for Canadians* found that many contributors were highly critical of 'the medical care and supervision provided [to] our athletes and national teams competing at the international level' (Canada 1969: 69). The upshot was a Task Force recommendation for the creation of a Sports Medicine Association and that this body should not duplicate the work of the Canadian Academy (sic) of Sports Sciences. Following the 1969 Task Force findings and specific recommendation, the Canadian Academy of Sport Medicine (CASM) was established in 1970. This proved to be a significant catalyst for the creation of a number of related organisations in Canadian sports science and sports medicine disciplines. A brief overview helps to illustrate the evolution of the organisational framework of support services currently available for high performance swimmers in Canada. The CASM complemented the work of the Canadian Association of Sports Sciences, established in 1967 and now known as the Canadian Society for Exercise Physiology. The Sport Medicine Council of Canada was established in 1983 and the CASM became a provider group within this umbrella organisation, which also included sport scientists in the Canadian Association of Sports Sciences, physiotherapists in the Sport Physiotherapy Division of the Canadian Physiotherapy Association and athletic therapists in the Canadian Association of Athletic Therapists. Interestingly, despite this organisational evolution, the 1992 Task Force on Federal Sport Policy not only

suggested that 'Sport medicine and sport science in Canada are still relatively young and evolving' but also that 'Coaches and sport scientists have not yet developed a strong partnership to use their assets to mutual benefit' (Canada 1992: 83). Moreover, the 1992 Task Force Report also criticised the Sport Medicine Council of Canada for concentrating almost exclusively on national level, high performance sport.

Swimming/Natation Canada has embraced sports science/medicine disciplines primarily through the multi-sport training centre concept. Thus, in its 1993-1998 Strategic Plan under the 'high performance' component, SNC's vision was set out as 'winning medals at the Olympic Games' (SNC 1993: no page number). That this 'vision' has not been realised to the degree set by SNC as an organisation was revealed earlier. Of interest here is that sports science/medicine programmes are highlighted as a 'high priority' (SNC 1993: 63) in the Strategic Plan but only in the context of programmes to be delivered by the incipient multi-sport training centres. Today, SNC is in receipt of funding through Sport Canada's Sport Science Support Programme; for example, two high performance swimmers were eligible for Can$1,000 (approximately £400)[3] for sports science support for the year 2000-2001 (SNC 2001b: 70). Clearly, Can$1,000 per annum for support in areas such as strength training, sport psychology and physiology monitoring, is a relatively small amount per swimmer. However, elite swimmers have also benefited indirectly from the sports science/medicine support available for carded swimmers as one aspect of SNC's involvement in the multi-sport training centre concept since the mid-1990s. The training centres thus appear to be SNC's primary medium for delivering sports science and sports medicine services to its elite level swimmers.
To sum up, a series of issues can be signalled in order to guide the final chapter's analysis.

Firstly, it is clear that, on one level, Canadian swimmers now benefit from a relatively sophisticated framework of organisational and administrative support for coaching, sports science/medicine disciplines. Here, Macintosh & Whitson (1990: 115) might be correct in arguing that the federal government's decision in the early 1970s to promote and support high performance sport helped to legitimise research in these disciplines that focused directly on elite performances. The discussion in Chapter 5 revealed that this research was conducted, in large part, in Canadian universities by physical educators who transformed traditional 'knowledge structures' relating to physical activity. The second issue, then, concerns the outcomes of such an approach. As

Whitson & Macintosh argued in the late 1980s, these 'new disciplines' are now 'primarily about the systematic and scientific production of athletic performance' (1989: 446). Viewed in this light, Whitson & Macintosh's insightful analysis can now be revealed as a prescient indication of the emerging dominance of a rationalised and scientific model of high performance sport in the late 20th and early 21st centuries (cf. Maguire 1999; Whitson 1998). The third and final issue draws together some of the concerns raised above by the first two. That is, SNC's over-emphasis on policy decisions that utilise the support systems of coaching, sports science and sports medicine, based largely on the CSC concept, tends to ignore the sport's developmental levels. However, SNC has not only failed to achieve its stated desired outcome of such a policy direction – medal-winning success at major international events – but also, and perhaps more crucially for the future of Canadian swimming, this policy emphasis disregards 'other voices' in the swimming community who have called for a re-evaluation of how the sport's developmental base is supported. As Tihanyi, for example, has argued, 'It is much too late to develop Olympians at the level of the training centres. [This] process must be incubated, nurtured, and brought to fruition at the club level' (2001b: 29).

Competition opportunities for elite level athletes (swimmers)

This section considers developments in the structure of competition opportunities for Canadian high performance swimmers. However, a consideration of the nature of competition opportunities for high performance swimmers in Canada cannot be conducted in isolation from the competitive structures/opportunities provided at provincial and educational levels; thus drawing attention to the problematic question of jurisdictional responsibilities in Canada. A useful starting point here is the 1976 Post-Olympic Games Symposium. The report of the Symposium (CAC 1977) considered the issue of 'competition programmes' and argued, *inter alia*, that: i) the size of the country is 'a logistical nightmare'; ii) regular competition with other countries could not be guaranteed; iii) competition programmes should be developed with the United States to offset the cost of travelling further abroad; iv) at the same time, exchanges with countries that have achieved 'superior international performances' was recommended in order to encourage such countries to come to Canada and compete; and v) the 'level of competition in Canada generally is low' (CAC 1977: 13, 17). These five points help to guide the following discussion.

The issue of competition structures/opportunities appears to be enduringly problematic for those charged with developing Canadian sport. For example, over 10 years after the

1976 Symposium had reported, the 1988 Task Force on National Sport Policy – *Toward 2000: Building Canada's Sport System* – argued for 'a national framework, which provides an increased range and quality of competitive opportunities for all levels of participants'. In respect of high performance opportunities, it suggested that 'We need to provide increased opportunities for individual athletes to excel' (Canada 1988: 10-11). That this has been, and indeed remains, a recurrent issue in Canada becomes ever more apparent if we now consider the most recent attempt to provide policy direction for the country's sport delivery system. At the heart of the new Canadian Sport Policy is the acknowledgement that, not only is federal-provincial/territorial co-operation essential to the successful implementation of the new policy, but also that there should be increased accessibility to 'development opportunities such as competition and training required to successfully compete at the highest levels of international competition' (Canadian Heritage 2002a: 17). Such statements of intent are not peculiar to developments in 2002; as discussed, they have been heard many times over the past 30 years in numerous federal government-sponsored sport policy documents.

It is clear, then, that we cannot consider the nature of competition structures/opportunities for elite level swimmers without bearing in mind past, as well as more contemporary, policy deliberations, which have helped to shape the conditions of action within which these developments have occurred. Moreover, while it is not feasible to provide an exhaustive account of all the interlocking issues surrounding competition structures/opportunities, three overlapping concerns appear to be paramount in helping to clarify our understanding of this element of high performance swimming. Firstly, and reflecting the point made earlier regarding the FINA-sponsored World Cup series, Helmstaedt (1995b: 19) has argued that the swimming calendar is now far too 'cluttered'. This has led Dave Johnson, SNC's High Performance Director, to suggest that, given the extreme cluttering of the world competition calendar, 'our whole value system will come into question' (quoted in Helmstaedt 1995b: 19). In short, concerns here appear to rest on Canadian high performance swimmers opting to swim abroad in competitive events that offer financial reward rather than competing in domestic events in order to 'swim fast domestically before heading overseas' (Johnson, quoted in Helmstaedt 1995b: 19).

Secondly, and reflecting another point made earlier, in recent years many Canadian swimmers have opted to move to the United States. As McWha argues, 'The level of

competition in the NCAA [National Collegiate Athletic Association] is the best in the world bar none, as every year more and more non-American swimmers seek athletic scholarships at American schools' (1998: 32). This does not mean that the body responsible for Canadian intercollegiate sport (Canadian Interuniversity Sport [CIS] – formerly the Canadian Intercollegiate Athletic Union) offers programmes that are unsuited to maximising performance, but rather that the level of the average CIS swimmer is generally recognised as being much lower than that of her/his NCAA counterpart (McWha 1998: 33). The key concern here (for SNC) is that the NCAA competition schedule is not necessarily compatible with SNC's competitive calendar, in the sense that selection meets for major competitions (Olympic Games/World Championships) are taken into consideration when Canadian universities design their programmes, while, as McWha notes, 'This may not be the case at many American universities' (1998: 33; see also Colwin 1997b).

The third and final point draws together the issues raised above and questions the organisational and administrative acuity of SNC as Canada's lead organisation for swimming. Clearly, the issue of providing a framework of structured training and competition opportunities in Canada is a difficult task, not least because of the country's noted geographical size and jurisdictional complexities. A task exacerbated in the sport of swimming, however, by the proliferation of (short- and long-course) competitive events currently available for swimmers at the high performance level and, additionally, events to which swimmers are increasingly attracted by pecuniary reward: a recent example helps to make the point. Tihanyi (2001b: 29) has questioned the wisdom of staging a World Trials (long-course) meet so soon after 'such Olympic letdown (sic)' in Sydney 2000 and argued that a short-course event might have been more appropriate, if it was necessary to have a winter nationals event at all. Tihanyi also notes that 'to add insult to injury and to continue the string of poor decisions, after the scandalous results [in Sydney], the high-performance leadership decides to designate *nine* meets for athletes in which to qualify' (2001b: 29, emphasis added; see also Thierry 2000). The inference being that this type of programme design is not useful in progressing Canada's attempts to improve on recent high performance swimming outcomes. As Tihanyi concludes, this type of programme design 'will only help to destroy the preparatory training cycle of athletes and perpetuates the concept of just making the team rather than developing to the highest level' (2001b: 29). In sum, SNC stands 'accused' by many analysts within the Canadian swimming community of a lack of

leadership and strategic direction in designing programmes which, arguably, benefit those already at the high performance level.

Summary of key implications

This section summarises the key implications for SNC with regard to changes at the level of high performance sport policy in Canadian swimming over the past 30 years, and to the emerging changes over the past 10 to 12 years in, particular. Consideration is also given to the wider policy-making process within which SNC operates; as discussed, a key aspect of this process concerns the nature of its relationship with Sport Canada at a federal level, with the COC and with its counterparts at provincial level. Questions here centre on issues raised in the previous sections as to the organisational and administrative capacity of SNC to deliver strategic policy direction for the sport. From the evidence presented above, SNC is revealed as an organisation struggling to present a coherent policy course as it attempts to re-emphasise its rationale as a NSO with an overriding focus on high performance objectives. That SNC has adopted this position despite the prevailing political climate of federal policy shifts towards a lessened focus on the high performance end of the sporting spectrum (House of Commons of Canada 2002) has, potentially, two interesting dimensions. Thus, SNC's re-emphasis on high performance is perhaps indicative not only of the peculiar characteristics of the Canadian sport delivery system (geography and federal-provincial/territorial jurisdictions) but also illustrative of the lack of extra funding from Sport Canada with which SNC might implement federal government objectives which attempt to interconnect social policy goals and sporting objectives. Indeed, Professor Jean Harvey has argued that 'NSOs don't want to answer to those things from the federal government', while also suggesting that, at the National Summit on Sport in Ottawa in April 2001, there was 'clear tension in the room' as it became apparent that the government expected NSOs to realise federal goals on 'participation and co-ordinating the system and not to put all [their] money into high performance sport' (Interview: Jean Harvey, 11 June 2002).

Aspects of organisational and administrative effectiveness, accountability, power relations and the distribution of (primarily financial) resources have thus permeated this discussion of Canadian swimming. From both this discussion, and the review of sport policy developments in Canada in Chapter 5, it is clear that the past 10 to 12 years can be characterised as a period of policy confusion for Canada's major NSOs. The federal

focus on high performance, and related funding allocations of the late 1970s and 1980s, have gradually given way to changing conditions of action within which sport policy developments in swimming have emerged. Sport Canada's planning dictates - primarily the QPP and SFAF, initiated in the 1980s and 1990s respectively - were identified earlier as key sources of value/belief system change for SNC (and for most major Canadian NSOs). Overarching these noted sources of change are the many federally-inspired sport policy reviews published over the past 30 years. Interestingly, given SNC's stated re-emphasis on high performance objectives, the ramifications of the 1988 Ben Johnson drugs affair and the subsequent reviews (cf. Blackhurst et al. 1991; Canada 1992; Dubin 1990) into Canada's sport delivery system's focus on high performance sport, do not appear to have emerged as crucial vehicles for (or sources of) change in relation to SNC and Canadian swimming.

It is evident, however, that change has occurred in the four key elements of high performance sport development discussed earlier: these can now be summarised. The development of elite level facilities in Canada remains tied to Sport Canada's hosting policy for staging major international sporting events (Interview: David McCrindle, 12 June 2002). That Montreal has been awarded the 2005 World Aquatic Championships might, therefore, serve to stimulate an improvement in the number and quality of swimming pools suitable for high performance training/competition. In general, however, facility development falls within the remit of provincial/municipal authorities in Canada: indeed, there is no national facility development plan for the sport of swimming (Interview: Larry Clough, 13 June 2002). In short, at present, SNC's primary concern in this regard is the development of a series of swimming centres aligned to the growing network of CSCs.

With regard to the emergence of full-time swimmers, while analysts of Canadian sport writing in the 1980s referred to a 'cadre of state funded athletes' emerging out of increased federal support for high performance sport, the contemporary picture is somewhat different. On the one hand, Sport Canada's AAP monies supported some 25 high performance swimmers (at Senior International and Senior National Team levels) during 2000-2001 (SNC 2001b: 65) and SNC's in-house Team Elite and High Performance Swimmer Incentive programmes also provide support grants and incentives for elite level swimmers. On the other hand, while these various support monies might be a necessary aid to swimmers in their quest for high performance

success, the earlier discussion revealed that these monies are clearly insufficient for elite level swimmers to train and compete on a full-time basis. This is not to suggest that there are no full-time Canadian swimmers. As noted, a discrete group of swimmers now benefit from sponsorships (e.g. *Speedo Bonus* programmes) and prize monies (e.g. FINA World Cup series) that, not only allows them to train and compete on a full-time basis but which also suggests that this group is part of an emerging coalition of actors/organisations centred on elite sport concerns, while grass roots levels are increasingly neglected through a lack of core funding and support.

In respect of developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine disciplines, a somewhat confused picture emerges. Coaching development is currently undergoing major structural change, with adaptations to the NCCP initiative promising increased professionalism. Yet, concerns remain that club/provincial coaches are developing talented swimmers only to 'lose' these athletes to coaches within the CSC network. As to sports science/medicine disciplines, these developed in many Canadian universities in the late 1970s and 1980s and there is clearly a relatively sophisticated sports science/medicine support system in Canada for talented swimmers who benefit from SNC's network of swimming centres. There are, however, reservations as to the efficacy of such support systems. For example, Bruce Kidd explained that 'research is going on in the universities but very few universities directly contribute to the development of athletes ... it is not a good structure' (Interview: 19 June 2002), while David McCrindle suggested that 'We do not use sports scientists very well in Canada. I think there are only a handful of full-time sports scientists working in Canada. I mean they exist, but they're not widespread' (Interview: 12 June 2002).

The final element of high performance swimming considered was the sport's structure of competition opportunities. Here, concerns centred on a 'cluttered calendar' (Helmstaedt 1995b); the migration of talented to swimmers to the United States (McWha 1998); the difficulties involved in attempts to integrate Canadian universities' programmes with SNC's competitive calendar; and a growing trend for high performance swimmers to train for competitions, such as the FINA World Cup series which, to date, has been a financially lucrative option for many of Canada's elite swimmers but to the detriment of a more long-term developmental process. The corollary of which, some suggest, has led to the lack of success at major sporting events such as the Olympic Games and World Championships (cf. Tihanyi 2001b). The ever-present jurisdictional divisions in Canada

permeate these concerns; thus, grass roots level swimmers, developed at provincial/club levels, progress to compete at Canada's national premier event – the Canada Games, where only provincial/territorial level athletes are eligible to compete – yet concerns remain as to the mechanisms for these swimmers to advance to national team level competitions (Interviews: Jean Harvey, 11 June 2002; David McCrindle, 12 June 2002).

This discussion of Canadian swimming and SNC raises a cluster of interlocking issues for analysis in the final chapter. Firstly, SNC's re-emphasis as an organisation focused on high performance levels is clearly aligned to the COC's recent policy shift which centres on supporting and funding athletes most likely to achieve medal-winning success at major international events. This is a significant departure in contemporary Canadian sport. It is a significant departure if we consider the enduring reluctance of the Canadian public, in general, and many in the sporting community, in particular, to embrace and fully support the 'win at all costs' ethos underlying high performance sporting success in the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Interview: Jan Meyer, 12 June 2002; see also, for example, Macintosh & Whitson 1990). It becomes an increasingly instructive departure if we also bear in mind the calls for a lessened emphasis on high performance throughout the 1990s. Eric Morse, a consultant in sport policy and communications, and the former editor of the Canadian Olympic newsletter, puts it somewhat less equivocally:

> Going public with its 'targets' is undeniably risky for the COA [now COC]. It's also undeniably refreshing after a decade of mealy-mouthed 'be the best we can be' sloganeering ... It is far past time that we did our athletes the honour of saying, 'We think they will win, and we aren't afraid to say so' (Morse 2002b).

In short, the COC's policy realignment has raised considerable comment in the Canadian sporting community, as indicated above by Eric Morse, who has argued elsewhere that not all agree with the COC's decision, 'There is unhappiness, but those who object seem prepared to work at finding solutions within the system' (Morse 2002c). It is clear that SNC as an organisation is not to be categorised as one of 'those who object': a point reinforced by Sport Canada's Jan Meyer. On the issue of creating one organisation to support/fund high performance sport, Jan Meyer suggested that, within SNC, 'there is no doubt that that organisation feels it would be a good thing to do' (Interview: 12 June 2002). From a theoretical standpoint, then, this raises a second and clearly related issue. That is, there is now evidence of an emergent coalition of actors/organisations

who share similar values/belief systems around the requirements of high performance swimming. In more concrete terms, emanating from these shared values we have witnessed a series of evolving structural mechanisms (e.g. funding regimes/incentives, elite swimming centres, professional swimming circuit) that increasingly underpin, and thus help to legitimise, the ultimate desired outcome: success at major international sporting events.

That SNC is aligning itself with the COC's mandate for high performance sport is clear. What is less evident, however, is whether the future of Canadian swimming at all levels, and across all the country's jurisdictional divisions, can prosper given the elite focus of the sport's national organisation (cf. Colwin 1998; Thierry 2000; Tihanyi 2001a, 2001b). This is a complex issue, punctuated by relations of power, accountability and struggles over scarce resources. A third interrelated issue is thus raised. That is, the future role of the federal government in Canadian sport policy-making. The complex nature of this issue is easily illustrated by the somewhat indeterminate content of the new sports legislation - Bill C-12 (Interview: Bruce Kidd, 19 June 2002). As discussed, the federal government's shift (at least in its policy rhetoric) away from high performance sport, together with its reluctance to release extra funding in order to implement objectives for increasing participation, co-ordination between jurisdictions and building capacity in the sport system, has created what might be termed a 'policy void' at the heart of the country's sport delivery system. As the Senior Programme Officer for swimming at Sport Canada admitted, 'one of the basic concerns of many in Canadian sport at present is the lack of extra resources in order to implement the federal government's various goals for sport' (Interview: Jan Meyer, 12 June 2002).

Finally, questions remain as to the organisational and administrative acuity of SNC, despite its recently released strategic plan and appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer in 2002. In 2001, Jeno Tihanyi delivered this damning assessment of the organisation:

> During my 42 years of coaching (16 years at the international level), I have never participated in any sort of critical evaluation of process because Swimming Canada has never conducted such an investigation. Is it not time to do such a self-examination? Is it not time to find out why the past eight years have not seen any progress? (2001b: 29).

Perhaps SNC's recently published strategic plan might be viewed as a form of response to such a critique (it should be noted that SNC would not release the full document).

The summarised version of SNC's strategic plan states that successful implementation 'is critically dependent on the commitment of all players to collaborate and fulfil their respective roles [and that] a seamless delivery of programmes from grass roots to high performance levels ... requires the commitment of professionals, volunteers, provincial sections and clubs' (SNC 2002b). As discussed, whether the 'commitment' sought by SNC will emerge from all within the Canadian swimming community, given that attention is plainly focused on a group of swimmers at the elite level, remains far from clear. Therefore, despite the clear evidence of an emphasis on high performance objectives within SNC, we should be careful not to over-determine the extent and degree of such an emphasis, given the noted concerns at developmental levels of Canadian swimming (cf. Colwin 1998; Thierry 2000; Tihanyi 2001b).

Athletics Canada

Organisation, administration and relationships

Athletics Canada (AC) is the country's NSO for track and field athletics, cross country, race walking and road running (the term 'track and field athletics' is more usual in the Canadian context and is used here interchangeably with the more general term of 'athletics'). It should be remembered, therefore, that the focus of the following discussion is on the policy processes and developments for track and field. It is also important, however, to bear in mind the potential for disparity between the noted four athletic disciplines in respect of claims for policy influence and scarce resources.

While it is not appropriate to delve into the historical development and emergence of the sport's governing body, it is relevant to note, briefly, the evolution of the Canadian Track and Field Association (CTFA) - the name of the sport's national organisation from the late 1960s until the early 1990s. In 1884, the Amateur Athletic Association of Canada was founded and renamed the Canadian Amateur Athletic Union (CAAU) in 1898. In 1907, the Amateur Athletic Federation of Canada (AAFC) was created - a rival organisation to the CAAU with objectives that were 'directed towards eliminating the nonsense of "thinly veiled professionalism"' (Morrow 1989: 209). Out of this (amateur/professional) 'war' for ideological control of the sport emerged the Amateur Athletic Union of Canada (AAUC) in 1909 – an amalgamation of the CAAU and the AAFC (cf. Smith 1986: 24). In practice, the AAUC was created as an umbrella organisation for a number of sports, track and field being one of the original, and most prominent,

member organisations (Schrodt 1983: 4). By the mid-1960s, the leaders of track and field declared 'that their sport had improved and grown ... and that they were [now] capable of managing their own affairs' (Schrodt 1983: 6-7) – an interesting assertion given the ensuing discussion of more contemporary developments in the sport. Full autonomy from the AAUC and recognition by the then International Amateur Athletic Federation (now International Association of Athletics Federations – IAAF), was realised by the CTFA in 1968. The final development in this organisational evolution occurred in 1991, when the federal government Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs accepted the change of name to Athletics Canada (Athletics Canada 2002c).

This brief historical review of the sport's organisational evolution is perhaps not unsurprising in its illustration of the various struggles over matters relating to amateurism. It does, however, set the scene for more contemporary (policy-related) debates within the sport following a period of relative organisational and administrative calm (notwithstanding the damage done to the sport as a consequence of the 1988 Ben Johnson drugs affair) since the creation of the CTFA as an autonomous body in the late 1960s. Three interrelated issues, in particular, are of interest and provide a useful guide to the ensuing discussion of developments in high performance sport policy in Canadian track and field athletics. These issues can be summarised as follows: i) AC's role as the sport's national sporting organisation in respect of relationships with its provincial/territorial branches; ii) concerns over the relative emphasis put upon high performance sport in relation to grass roots developmental levels; and iii) AC's struggle with the changing priorities of its primary funding partners, Sport Canada and the COC. The first two of these debates are considered below, the aim of which is to illustrate the nature of AC's emerging organisational and administrative emphases over the past 10 to 12 years. The third debate regarding the nature of AC's changing relationships with its key funding partners is more usefully dealt with in the following sections in relation to high performance sport policy developments.

For our purposes, the first two issues, or debates, identified above can be combined for discussion given the interrelated dynamics underlying AC's relationships with provincial/territorial/club levels and the differing degree of emphasis put upon the (supposed) twin goals of providing grass roots development and high performance support. As in the sport of swimming, AC has relied (and relies) upon its (12) provincial/territorial branches (Nunavut Territory is not listed by AC as a branch

member) to provide a framework for developments in areas such as coaching, athlete development and competition opportunities. However, as AC's current Chief Operating Officer revealed, the issue of integration/co-ordination between the sport's various levels is an aspect of the organisation's rationale that has been debated at length over the past two years as part of a wide-ranging strategic review (Interview: Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002). It is helpful, therefore, to provide some historical background to issues that may have led the organisation to question its role and relationships with other levels of the sport.

In 1983, in the *Track and Field Journal,* the aims of the then CTFA were set out as follows: 'to promote, encourage, and develop the widest participation and highest proficiency amongst its members [and that] The nurturing of young talent and the maintenance of enthusiasm at the grass roots level are also of high priority' (Irons 1983: 23). These are laudable aims but easily stated. They are, however, more difficult to fulfil in practice and are not wholly borne out by the evidence, thus illustrating the problematic role of a Canadian NSO in providing policy direction for provincial/territorial/club levels. Three examples from the 1980s are useful in helping to make the point. The first example centres on comments in 1980 from Gerard Mach, then National Programme Director at CTFA, who suggested that a more concerted approach to developing the sport's club system was required. In short, Mach argued that 'The development of a strong high level Club System is the main problem that the CTFA is confronted with at the present stage' (1980: 3).

Secondly, in 1983, Wilf Paish, a former UK national athletics coach, voiced concerns regarding the profile of, and support for, Canadian track and field athletics. Paish found that, *inter alia,* track and field athletics 'is a very low priority sport' in Canada and first impressions suggest that 'there isn't a foundation. The "grass-roots" level is not functioning correctly' (1983: 14). Moreover, Paish's (1983: 15) conclusions that 'I might be wrong, but you appear to be trying to build a successful track and field structure without having a solid foundation .... Performance in depth is required' are illustrative of enduring concerns within the sport as it moved into the 1990s and beyond. It appears that Wilf Paish's assessment of Canadian track and field athletics in the early 1980s was clearly not 'wrong' and, today, can be viewed as a somewhat prescient assessment of the fragile structure of Canadian track and field athletics. In 2002, for example, AC's Chief Operating Officer reflected on federal level policy 'pendulum shifts', as Joanne

Mortimore put it, during the 1990s, and their implications for NSOs, as well as some of the potential ramifications of the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy. Joanne Mortimore acknowledged Sport Canada's elite focus throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s and the more recent federal policy shift which has pushed the emphasis towards broader sporting objectives. With regard to federal funding cutbacks during the 1990s, Mortimore argued that 'so then the sports shifted and we let the grass roots die, but without your grass roots you can't compete at the elite level' (Interview: 13 June 2002). Commenting on the ramifications of this scenario, Joanne Mortimore went on to suggest that 'I think they've [Sport Canada] pushed it down to the provincial level, hoping it's going to happen at that level [but] without that leadership from the national level it's not a consistent development programme'. The reluctance of the federal government to allocate sufficient resources which might allow NSOs to accomplish the many and varied elite/mass sport initiatives required of them was cited by Joanne Mortimore as a key structural mechanism absent from the Canadian sport system. A situation exacerbated by the variability of funding for sport and recreation programmes at provincial/territorial levels. As one of the larger provincial track and field bodies noted in Minutes from its 25th January 2002 board meeting, 'The [provincial] government continues to reduce its funding of our sport, and future declines should be anticipated' (Ontario Track & Field Association 2002).

The final point to make here concerns the earlier reference to the potential for disparity amongst the four athletic disciplines within AC's remit. The potential for disparity appears, on the surface at least, to be more apparent in track and field athletics than was the case for SNC and the sport of swimming. In the late 1980s, for example, Whitson & Macintosh found that, despite a not insignificant increase in mass participation road running events at sub-elite level, the CTFA had 'not provided any support for road racing (and very little for cross-country events)' (1989: 441). It appears that the balancing of different priorities among the disciplines within AC's remit remains unresolved. Indeed, AC's Chief Operating Officer has acknowledged that the organisation has struggled to balance claims for resources between the four disciplines. As Joanne Mortimore put it, 'if we've never been truly successful in race walking, should we continue to try and do it mediocre (sic) or should we try and focus on what we're better at?' (Interview: 13 June 2002). Athletics Canada's 2001 Annual General Meeting report reflects Joanne Mortimore sentiments. For example, AC's High Performance Director for Endurance events stated that 'I believe it is still premature to proceed with

major decisions or to launch new programmes for the race walk' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2001a: 13); the parlous state of AC's finances was given as one of the main reasons for this position in respect of race walking.

The organisational and administrative context for such reflections has been described above and should be viewed alongside the noted strategic review of AC's internal workings which has emerged as a key source of change as the organisation endeavours to clarify its key objectives for the early 21st century. An important aspect of the latter will be to help shape future policy direction as the organisation attempts to steer a path through the changing funding patterns of its key partners, Sport Canada and the COC. The former remains somewhat equivocal as to whether extra funding will be made available to meet its key aims of integrating the Canadian sports system, building capacity and giving greater emphasis to increasing participation at grass roots levels of sport (House of Commons of Canada 2002). As Rob Paradis, Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for athletics related, in respect of the new Canadian Sport Policy, 'Participation is the new pillar we're going to get involved in now [but] we're still not sure what to do with it [and] at this point in time, there has been no announcement of new money' (Interview: 20 June 2002). The COC, on the other hand, has stated unequivocally that it now (as of April 2002) intends to fund only those sports that have achieved medal-winning performances at major international events and/or are able to demonstrate the potential to do so. These are thus important points to bear in mind in relation to the changing resource conditions within which AC operates in the early 21st century. We can now turn, more specifically, to developments at the elite level of track and field athletics in Canada.

Elite sport policy developments: An identification of potential sources of policy change

The format and approach here follows a similar pattern to the previous discussion of Canadian swimming. Thus, the four key elements of elite level development in track and field athletics considered here are i) the development of elite level facilities; ii) the emergence of 'full-time' athletes; iii) the adoption of a more professional and strategic approach to coaching, sports science and sports medicine; and iv) competition opportunities at the elite level.

Development of elite level facilities

It is important to recall the previous discussion of Canadian swimming with regard to facility development in Canada as a preface to this discussion of track and field athletics. In short, as with Swimming/Natation Canada (SNC), AC's remit does not include the production of a facility development plan: sports facility development remains the remit of provincial/territorial sporting organisations and/or governments and local municipalities. As Joanne Mortimore admitted, there is 'no national strategic plan' for facility development in athletics (Interview: 13 June 2002). The impetus for facility development at NSO level centres on the Canadian Sport Centre (CSC) network and Sport Canada's strategy for hosting major sporting events (Interview: Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002). On this issue, David McCrindle, Manager of International Sport Policy at Sport Canada, was unequivocal in stating that 'The only way we support facilities is through our Major Games [and] if Athletics Canada comes to us for money, there's no process for us [Sport Canada] to do that. It has to be through our hosting policy' (Interview: 12 June 2002). Much of the preamble, then, in the discussion of facility development in Canadian swimming which identified federal sport policy reviews, Task Force documents and White Papers as significant in promoting facility development, in general, in the 1960s and 1970s, applies here, and is thus not repeated. Yet, while there are distinct similarities between the two sports in this area of high performance sport development, there are also subtle nuances of difference.

The first difference centres on how track and field athletics has been, and is, perceived by Canadians. This notion of perception is a complex issue but has at least three potential dimensions. The first dimension concerns the sport as an activity for participation and competition. The second relates to track and field's popularity as a spectator sport, while the third dimension recalls the damage done to the sport as a result of the 1988 Ben Johnson drugs affair. With regard to the first dimension, as discussed, while working at the University of Calgary in the early 1980s, Wilf Paish not only found that 'Track and field athletics is a very low-priority for your [Canadian's] nation' but also that he was 'the *sole* jogger on a superb Chevron track, complete with some of the best throw circles I have seen, and a vaulting facility that would be the envy of most' (1983: 14, emphasis added). Here, Paish hints at an idea that has contemporary overtones (cf. Whitson et al. 2000). That is, professional sports in Canada, such as ice hockey, baseball, basketball and soccer, have a far higher popularity rating for Canadians than track and field at the level of participation and competition.

This perception appears to be frustratingly resilient for those charged with promoting the sport and also appears to be affecting the sport's popularity as a spectator event – the second dimension noted above. Thus, while Paish (1983) argued that track and field as a sport appeared to be struggling to enthuse young people in the early 1980s, reports following the 2001 Edmonton World Athletics Championships (where Canada won no medals) suggest that little has changed in the sport psyche of Canadians. Steve Buffery (2001), for example, reported in the *Toronto Sun* (in typically journalistic fashion) that 'Canada failed to win a medal at the world track and field championships ... But the good news is, by lunchtime today, it will all be forgotten'. Here, Buffery is suggesting that if ice hockey had suffered similarly poor results this would not have been the case: there would have been a national outcry. However, as Buffery also notes, 'this is track and field and to North American audiences the only thing more boring than track is ... forget it, we're not going there'. While some caution is required when reviewing press reports such as this, it is worthwhile recalling that, from a theoretical standpoint, the advocacy coalition framework includes 'journalists' in the policy subsystem as an important category of actors who 'play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 119).

The final dimension identified in respect of the perception of track and field invokes the ramifications of the 1988 Ben Johnson drugs affair. While it cannot be argued with absolute certainty that the affair has been a major contributory factor with regard to the financial difficulties experienced, first by the CTFA and then AC in recent years, it is at least reasonable to suggest some culpability. However, organisational and administrative mismanagement at NSO level also appears to be implicated here. For example, AC's Chief Operating Officer revealed that, in 1990, the organisation recorded a Can$600,000 deficit and although this deficit had been turned into an accumulated surplus of Can$178,000 by 1998, AC again recorded a deficit of Can$500,000 in 2001 (Interview: Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002). As Mortimore admitted, over the past 10 to 12 years, 'the majority of our sponsors left or didn't renew relationships because during this period there wasn't the ongoing communication and servicing of [our] sponsors'. Moreover, at the 2001 Annual General Meeting, AC's Treasurer reported that, 'corporate sponsorships are weaker than expected [and that] there is no further sponsorship revenue to be received by Athletics Canada at this time' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2001a: 3).

In short, in an economic climate of federal reductions in NSO funding and variability of funding support at provincial/territorial and municipal levels, AC is in a vulnerable position from which to elicit sponsorship funding support from other sources – primarily, the private/corporate sector. The argument being developed here is that, taken together, the political and/or corporate will to support any form of funding stimuli for facility development, at any level, has been seriously undermined by the perception of the sport over the past 10 to 12 years, at least on the dimensions described above. Yet, it is debatable whether AC possesses the organisational and administrative capacity to significantly alter the perception of the sport in order for the above scenario to change. A recent independent audit of the organisation, and the subsequent development of a new strategic plan, may provide AC with a more coherent policy course as it attempts to address the varied federal government goals set out in the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy. However, questions remain as to the organisational capacity of AC to implement its stated goal of 'strengthening' partnerships with its provincial/territorial branches (Athletics Canada 2002c: 8) in order to leverage the degree of support capable of fostering facility improvements that might benefit all in the sport. It is recognised that AC's ability to provide policy direction for facility development is compounded by difficulties arising from federal-provincial/territorial jurisdictions. As Sport Canada's David McCrindle related, while there is indirect help available for sport/recreation facilities through a federally-sponsored general infrastructure programme, each province/territory and/or municipality has the discretion to spend these monies where they see fit, and it is by no means certain in today's economic climate, that sport/recreation facility development would be high on the agenda (Interview: 12 June 2002).

The second important nuance of difference concerns the emerging CSC network. The previous discussion of swimming revealed that SNC has developed its own sport-specific network of swimming pool centres aligned to a number of the CSCs. It is reasonable to assume, then, that such policy direction is related to SNC's stated re-emphasis on high performance objectives. However, AC does not appear to have developed the clarity of purpose advanced by SNC in the sport of swimming with regard to these high performance facilities (although, as discussed, SNC's position has been criticised in many quarters). This may be due, in part, to AC's focus over the past three years on what has been termed 'deliverable objectives' by the sport's High Performance Director

(Power and Speed events) - for example, planning, logistics, budgeting, general management of the sport (quoted in Athletics Canada 2001a: 25).

There is some evidence, however, that high performance objectives are coming more to the fore and clarification of how AC will utilise the CSC facilities is part of this emerging emphasis. Yet, despite such evidence, at present, a somewhat confused rationale for utilising the CSCs remains; this is clear from AC's 2001 Annual General Meeting. As the High Performance Director (Endurance events) reported, 'The National Sport Centre concept *has been clarified* and identified priorities established for the Endurance Group centres' in four locations (quoted in Athletics Canada 2001a: 12, emphasis added). The Endurance Director goes on to state that these centres 'can not (sic) and should not try to be everything to everybody. That would be a recipe for confusion, inefficiency and poor results'. In sum, AC is experiencing a period of organisational and administrative transition, together with ongoing reviews of policy direction, comparable to that experienced by SNC but without the, as yet, similarly articulated emphasis on high performance objectives. The overall picture of facility development remains clouded by the noted perception of track and field athletics, variable commitment to funding facilities at provincial/territorial and municipal levels and the lack of clearly stated objectives for the sport's involvement in the CSC network.

Emergence of 'full-time' athletes

As for the above discussion of the development of elite level facilities, much of the historical debate in swimming around the introduction of the AAP in the early 1980s is clearly related to the issue of the emergence of full-time athletes and is thus not repeated here. Rather, the intention here is to provide insights into the different ways this issue has been (and is) managed by the sport's national organisation. In 1982, for example, the Managing Editor of the *Track and Field Journal* discussed impending changes wrought by the IAAF's decision to permit athletes to set up trust funds 'to receive support for their efforts to achieve excellence' (MacWilliam 1982: 2). Yet, MacWilliam was not only concerned with elite level athletes. At the heart of his concerns was the refusal of the latter to agree to a CTFA policy to confer 15 per cent of monies earned by individual athletes to an Athlete Heritage Fund. This fund aimed to support lesser known and newly emerging athletes to develop. However, MacWilliam concluded that 'it seems that self-interest among current national team members has reduced the opportunity for future team members to receive help along the way. Unfortunately, "looking out for number 1" is where it's at these days' (1982: 2). A prescient reminder

of more contemporary debates over the growing influence of elite level athletes and their increasing distance from the sport's grass roots levels in Canada. A further perennial problem for the sport's national body (which was also an issue for SNC and swimming) is the migration of talented youngsters to the United States, where they attend colleges/universities and compete in the NCAA programme. As Joanne Mortimore admitted, in the past, AC lost contact with these talented athletes and thus Canada lost potential medal winners in track and field events as Sport Canada's AAP support is premised on Canadian residency (Interview: 12 June 2002; see also Canadian Heritage 1999a: 2-2). A revision of this policy is now in place. Agreement has been reached such that AAP carding support is now permissible for 'top ranked athletes' who return to live in Canada for the summer period. As stated in AC guidelines, 'NCAA athletes will receive financial carding for the three month period Jun-Aug only' (Athletics Canada 2002a).

While AC has published a draft list of some 53 athletes for carding support at Sport Canada's 'Senior' levels for the period 2002-2003 (Athletics Canada 2002b: 1-2), it is far from clear how many Canadian track and field athletes might be categorised as full-time. For example, on this issue, Joanne Mortimore stated that 'Some are. I would say that at the very, very high end they are full-time; the lower end, not necessarily' (Interview: 12 June 2002). Bruce Kidd was equally uncertain in estimating 'that about half of them in Canada think of themselves as full-time' (Interview: 19 June 2002). Moreover, while Sport Canada's David McCrindle made the point that 'we certainly have our fair share of what you would call full-time athletes', he also emphasised the important role that parents play, in stating that 'You could not live off AAP money as an athlete. Parents carry a huge, huge, load in many sports in Canada' (Interview: 12 June 2002). If we also consider recent pronouncements from the Canadian Association of National Team Athletes – known as Athletes Canada - on this issue, it is clear that any notion of 'full-time' track and field athletes in a Canadian sporting context should be treated with some caution. In 2002, Athletes Canada stated that 'To expect high performance athletes to represent Canada and win, without ... having the proper financial support to accomplish the task, is to invite confusion, frustration and ultimately, disappointment' (Athletes Canada 2002: 4).

That AC has struggled to cope with the organisational and administrative ramifications of relatively low federal funding levels is clear. In late 2000, for example, the organisation lost its Chief Executive Officer, John Thresher. On resigning, Thresher

argued in the *Toronto Sun* that 'We're still seeing (national) junior and youth teams funding their own way to competitions in order to compete for Canada ... I would have liked to have changed that' (quoted in Buffery 2000). As discussed, AC has had to contend with financial difficulties over the past decade, and thus also the organisational uncertainty that arises from such difficulties. Indeed, Rachel Corbett, the consultant who led the wide-ranging audit into AC's inner workings, admitted that 'AC lost its way through the 1990s' (quoted in Christie 2001a). Given such internal organisational uncertainty, variability of federal funding in recent years and the recent federal policy focus on levels below high performance sport, it is perhaps unsurprising that AC has not been able to lever extra monies for supporting its elite level athletes. In sum, while SNC has clearly stated its organisational purpose is centred on supporting elite level swimmers and has implemented funding initiatives for its elite performers, such as the Team Elite and International High Performance Swimmer Incentive programmes, AC is restricted to, what is termed, Elite Athlete Assistance (without revealing funding levels) (Athletics Canada 2002d: 28). Moreover, as discussed, AC has recently emerged from a damning internal audit and the future remains far from clear as the organisation struggles to clarify policy direction for the sport (Interview: Rob Paradis, 20 June 2002).

Developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine

This section considers the emergence of the interrelated disciplines of coaching, sports science and sports medicine and, in this regard, it is perhaps worth recalling Wilf Paish's assessment of the state of Canadian track and field athletics in the early 1980s. Paish suggested that while Canada had 'a very sophisticated coaching scheme', many of the sport's 'senior records were set in 1976 or earlier' (1983: 14). The corollary of this assessment was that the sport had not only failed to build its grass roots developmental levels but also that there were unresolved questions regarding how/where track and field coaches were employed. Here, Paish argued that 'It could be that for a while you [Canadian track and field] might have to take your better and highly motivated coaches away from the elite structure to process a grass roots programme. Such an investment ... would be worthwhile' (1983: 15). In short, Paish concluded that 'if I were a track and field coach in Canada, I would be concerned'. Despite Paish's assessment that the country had a relatively sophisticated coaching scheme in the early 1980s, Bill Heikkila, Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for athletics and coaching has revealed that 'in the mid-1970s the CTFA had [just] four full-time coaches as part of the lead-up to the [Olympic] Games in Montreal but since then there have been relatively few full-time coaches employed by Athletics Canada' (Personal communication: 4 July 2002).

Moreover, those coaches who are employed on a full-time basis are part of a cost-sharing agreement, primarily with CSCs and universities (Interview: Bruce Kidd, 19 June 2002). It appears, then, that despite the increasing professionalisation of much of the Canadian amateur sport infrastructure throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the issue of employing full-time, professional coaches in track and field athletics has evolved in a somewhat ad hoc manner. The picture emerging here is one of increasing bureaucratisation in respect of the organisational and administrative aspects of the sport and its national organisation (as in many other sports and NSOs during the 1970s and 1980s), yet a coherent approach to, and the valuing of, coaches and coaching development has been relatively understated by the sport's national organisation. As AC's recently appointed Head Coach stated in the 2002 Semi-Annual General Meeting report, 'I feel we have undervalued and under-utilised this most important resource [coaches and coaching] .... We need to change the regard for coaching' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2002d: 8).

It should be noted that the ensuing discussion is not premised on the argument that coaching development in Canada is without merit. The previous discussion of swimming/SNC clearly illustrated the evolution of the National Coaching Certification Programme (NCCP) in the 1970s and the recent emergence of a competency-based education and training (CBET) programme for Canadian coaches. Yet, questions remain regarding coaching structures for track and field athletics. Indeed, AC's 2002 Semi-Annual General Meeting report reveals that a questionnaire circulated to provincial branches in 2001 elicited somewhat equivocal responses to the question, 'Do you think there is a clearly defined structure to develop coaches in Canada?' Examples of response provided by AC are instructive. One respondent, for example, argued that 'Yes there is but it has lost its focus. Too fragmented. Too cumbersome', while another suggested that the 'Structure of coaching development is not clear. It may be on paper but not in practice' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2002d: 44). The intention below, then, is to consider some of the more significant aspects of coaching development specific to AC and track and field athletics.

It is perhaps worth outlining here the relevant aspects of the reported findings of the recent internal audit of AC conducted by independent consultant, Rachel Corbett (note that AC did not release the full audit). On this audit, James Christie has reported in the *Globe and Mail* that 'The critique and blueprint for the future contains some stinging

passages about the under-performing body [AC]' (Christie 2001a). Crucially, Christie goes on to note that 'Athletics Canada gets flayed for "failing to deliver coaching education programmes, failing to compensate coaches adequately and failing to develop coaches through appointment to national teams"'. Joanne Mortimore acknowledged this damning assessment of the organisation's approach to coaching and cited the appointment of Alex Gardiner as Head Coach/Chief Technical Officer in early 2002 by way of illustrating a significant shift in AC's underlying organisational values, and the consequent implications for change therein. In short, Joanne Mortimore explained that AC has embarked upon a programme of change and is working towards a more professional mode of operation, 'a more business-like approach' (Interview: 13 June 2002).

The appointment of Alex Gardiner as Head Coach in 2002 is significant not only because this represents Canadian track and field's first full-time professional coach not to be rotated for every major track and field Games but also as it appears to symbolise a significant shift in organisational policy direction. It is also significant in that the nature of change appears to centre on a belief that a more professional rather than a volunteer ethos should now prevail. As Joanne Mortimore related, in the past, the position of coach (for major Games) 'was almost like a reward for someone who's put in his (sic) time. It was a volunteer position and there'd be no stability or consistency between team to team because it would be a different coach every time' (Interview: 13 June 2002). Thus, AC had previously employed full-time coaches but never with the mandate as Head Coach on an ongoing basis for major events. Interestingly, Joanne Mortimore also explained that this organisational ethos of voluntarism could be extended to other areas. For example, in the past, it was volunteer members who attended major events such as the Olympic Games and World Championships, 'to the point where, if [professional] staff attended a major Games, that was almost taboo. It should not be staff, it should be the volunteers'. Joanne Mortimore admitted that the recent internal audit has been a key catalyst for bringing about significant policy change in this respect, while also stating that 'we've changed all that around to say that the organisation will be driven by the professional, full-time, paid staff. But the volunteers are still very important' (Interview: 13 June 2002).

These are not only interesting observations but also instructive, in that they raise two interlocking issues for further exploration in the final chapter where the salience of the

earlier discussed theoretical and methodological assumptions is evaluated. These two issues can be summarised as follows: i) the first issue raises questions as to the efficacy of the federally-motivated policies of the 1970s and 1980s (see Chapter 5) which sought to elicit change in NSOs from archetypal 'kitchen-table' organisations, to more 'corporate professional' type bodies (cf. Cunningham et al. 1987). In short, questions remain as to the nature/degree of change these federally-motivated policies of the 1970s/1980s have brought to AC; and (ii) the second issue is concerned with the logic of the advocacy coalition framework and how insights from the latter might be useful in helping to further illustrate the well-documented (cf. Cunningham et al. 1987; Hinings et al. 1996; Slack 1988) research into value/belief system change at the level of Canadian NSOs.

With regard to developments in the allied disciplines of sports science/medicine it is not the intention here to cover the evolution of these disciplines and the related organisational framework within which they operate in the Canadian sport delivery system. These issues have been considered in some depth, both in the previous discussion of SNC/swimming, as well as in Chapter 5. Rather, it is more useful here to consider some of the more significant ramifications of these developments for elite level track and field athletics and its NSO. It is important, however, to preface the ensuing discussion by recalling that the federal government's decision in the early 1970s to promote and support high performance sport helped to legitimise research (in these disciplines) that centred directly on elite athlete performance (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 115). As discussed, this research was conducted as part of a wider reconstruction of the physical education system in Canada and which focused on the systematic and scientific production of athletic performance. Chapter 5 identified a conjuncture of interests between the federal government, NSOs and university physical education departments as being at the heart of these developments throughout the 1980s. That this was a federally-inspired policy direction and a direction, moreover, that was premised on producing medal-winning outcomes at major sporting events, is clear from the 1988 *Task Force on National Sport Policy*.

The Task Force noted the role of sports science emerging as a significant trend, while also stating that 'The next quadrennial should see some progress with the basic question, "What does it cost to be number one in the world in sport X ...?"' (Canada 1988: 26). One of the long-term goals at this time was for Canada to be one of the three leading Western sporting nations (with the then West Germany and the United

States). One of the recommended actions in this area for the 1988-1992 quadrennial was equally unequivocal, 'To enhance the legitimacy and funding of the essential professions (coaching, sport science, sport administration, sport medicine, etc.) required to develop and sustain an effective high performance system' (Canada 1988: 36). The ramifications of this unparalleled drive for high performance sporting success in Canada, and the government-funded developments in sports science/medicine upon which it was partly premised, became all too apparent in 1988. In short, the unintended (or perhaps inadvertent) consequence of these policy directions for the then CTFA was the Ben Johnson drugs affair at the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The motives of Johnson's CTFA coach, Charlie Francis, were clearly revealed at the subsequent Inquiry headed by Charles Dubin. Francis stated that 'If you want to win ... then you must take anabolic steroids' (quoted in Boudreau & Konzak 1991: 90). The extended ramifications for track and field athletics, and for AC, have endured far beyond the late 1980s and, moreover, beyond developments in sports science/medicine. As James Christie (2001a) reported in the *Globe and Mail* only recently, 'Athletics Canada ran into debt – partly through going to court and arbitration many times over Ben Johnson's doping issues – and stopped funding development of young athletes'.

In sum, it is clear that developments in sports science/medicine have not emerged unproblematically for Canadian track and field leaders. Today, AC utilises the CSC network of support services for these disciplines, has developed its own internal sports science programme (Athletics Canada 2001a: 10) and has established an '"Ad hoc" medical committee' as part of its national team development programme (Athletics Canada 2002d: 12). Yet, an enduring problem remains in respect of the application of these disciplines. Questions were raised, for example, in the report of the 1976 Post-Olympic Games Symposium regarding concerns that the applied use of sports science/medicine research was variable in its efficacy. For example, Geoff Dyson, former UK national athletics coach, argued that 'there is a tendency to pursue scientific research for its own sake rather than as an aid to the athlete' (quoted in Coaching Association of Canada [CAC] 1977: 213; and Interviews: David McCrindle, 12 June 2002; Bruce Kidd, 19 June 2002).

Competition opportunities for elite level athletes

This section considers the nature and development of competition and training structures and provision for elite level track and field athletes. As illustrated in the sport of swimming, this is an element of elite sport development in Canada that requires

discussion of levels below the high performance end of sport. A cluster of interrelated points/issues can be noted here. The first point of note is that competition structures in Canadian track and field are many and varied and cross-cut many different levels (cf. Athletics Canada 2001a, 2002d). This issue brings into sharp relief the jurisdictional problems faced by all sports in Canada as they struggle to provide a coherent and co-ordinated framework for competition and training which, not only has to transcend municipal/provincial/territorial/national divisions and responsibilities but also the related divisions between developmental and elite level performers. Sport Canada's, Rob Paradis summarised the complexity involved in providing an integrated framework for competition thus, 'the dichotomy is not only between the provincial associations as a whole and the national federations [NSOs] but also between each individual provincial association and their national federation and each other' (Interview: 20 June 2002).

The second point recalls concerns first mooted in the mid-1970s regarding low levels of domestic competition in Canada. As Dr Roger Jackson, then Director of Sport Canada, argued in the report of the 1976 Post-Olympic Games Symposium, 'In most sports it is not up to international standards and that is a definite liability in our sport system' (quoted in CAC 1977: 13). Suitable competition levels remains an issue for those involved in Canadian high performance sport. As the editor of Cansport - a web-based service providing information and commentary on Canada's elite amateur athletes - has argued, 'Is it any wonder many Canadian athletes struggle at the Olympics ... because there's no money to send them abroad to compete regularly against the best in the world?' (Scammell 2000b: 1). The issue of suitable track and field facilities is also clearly related to the construction of a coherent competition framework. As Geoff Dyson noted in the 1976 post-Olympic report, 'If you want to do well in track and field and other sports, you have to do something about your facilities' (quoted in CAC 1977: 213). The third issue, which was highlighted by Joanne Mortimore in the earlier section on full-time athletes, is that of Canadian athletes migrating to the United States, encouraged by offers of financially attractive sporting scholarships and where they then compete in NCAA competitions. Thus compounding concerns raised by the first two points in that yet another level of competition has to be factored into an already crowded track and field fixture calendar.

This leads on to a fourth point. That is, AC does not have a mandatory competition calendar for its elite athletes. There are some mandatory events, such as the Canadian

national championships but, as Joanne Mortimore related, 'The athletes are all at clubs within a province and their competitive schedule is driven by the athlete and their coach, who takes a look at the calendar and determines where they'll go' (Interview: 13 June 2002). It appears, therefore, that AC has relatively little influence over where/when/how often an athlete competes. Certainly at the elite level, athletes are increasingly drawn to the IAAF Golden League and Grand Prix Circuit events, where the large prize monies on offer are attractive incentives to opt out of the Canadian developmental competition circuit. Bruce Kidd, reflected these concerns, in arguing that a competitive framework 'exists but it's not very good ... people have to go outside the country to get really good competition on a regular basis at [national/international levels]' (Interview: 19 June 2002). Concerns regarding an increasingly wealthy, but relatively small group of elite athletes assuming control of where, when, and how often, they compete is not unique to Canada, as the discussion of UK Athletics in Chapter 7 reveals.

A fifth point, related to many of the above observations, concerns those athletes just below the elite level, known as *espoirs* (hopefuls) in Canada. Many contributors to this research, across all three sports, have highlighted this 'gap' between elite and potentially elite athletes as, arguably, the overriding issue in attempts to provide a coherent pathway from developmental to elite level in Canadian sport (notwithstanding the perennial claims of federal underfunding). In this respect, Joanne Mortimore admitted that 'the national office has not driven that, or hasn't strategically planned how to provide competitive opportunities for athletes who haven't been invited to a Grand Prix event' (Interview: 13 June 2002). Mortimore went on to add that this issue formed part of the organisation's recent internal audit and that AC has acknowledged the requirement for 'greater initiative and leadership in providing a competitive circuit for our athletes who aren't at that very, very high level'. Athletics Canada's organisational and administrative capacity to lead the sport into the 21st century is once again brought into question.

By way of summing up, the final point draws together concerns raised above but centres on the issue of AC's most recent pronouncements with regard to competition structures and opportunities. It is perhaps not unsurprising, given the recent organisational and administrative upheaval within AC, that the issue of providing leadership for a coherent and balanced competition structure has been pushed down

the policy agenda. As discussed, a key catalyst for change in this respect has been the 2001 audit and AC's 2002 Semi-Annual General Meeting (SAGM) addressed the issue of competition structures in the context of discussing the audit's recommendations. In the SAGM report, Derek Covington, AC's newly appointed National Team Manager, stated that 'A coordinated national domestic competition strategy *is to be developed* in 2002 for the 2003 season' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2002d: 10, emphasis added) while, in direct response to the audit's findings, it was 'recommended that AC must regain some degree of control over its flagship, the National Senior Championship' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2002d: 52).

On the one hand, such policy pronouncements in 2002 might be viewed as evidence of strong leadership from AC as it emerges from a period where, at best, there has been a policy void and, at worst, a policy chasm - at least in the view of AC's harshest critics. On the other hand, and following on from this last comment, such pronouncements raise serious questions as to the lack of policy direction, over the past decade at least. This lack of organisational capability cannot just be laid at the door of federal underfunding. While Kidd's comments below are couched in somewhat pejorative terms, in that they are meant as a critique of the increasing federal influence in Canadian amateur sport, they do remind us of the potential (at the time) for NSOs to construct a substantive programme for elite sport development. In the late 1980s, Kidd argued that 'The state has transformed the once autonomous, voluntary, and largely regulatory sports-governing bodies into professionally administered non-profit corporations which conduct ambitious national and provincial training and developmental programmes under strict governmental direction' (1988a: 295). The evidence provided here suggests that track and field's leadership has struggled to develop the type of policy coherence required to fully embrace federal efforts to construct such programmes.

Summary of key implications

With regard to elite level facility development, as with all Canadian NSOs, AC has little policy involvement or influence; facility development falls within the jurisdiction of provincial/territorial governments and their respective P/TSOs, and/or local municipalities. However, as discussed, financial resources, and thus the level of facility provision at these sub-national levels, remain variable. Indeed, in Ontario, one of the larger and more prosperous provinces, the track and field body responsible for the sport has argued that 'Facilities in this province need to be improved' (Ontario Track & Field

Association 2002). Moreover, a year earlier at its Annual General Meeting, it was reported that 'the OTFA can expect more cuts in provincial government grants' (Ontario Track & Field Association 2001). Athletics Canada is involved, however, at least on a collaborative level, in facility development with provinces/territories and local communities that put together bids to host major international sporting events, such as the 2001 World Athletics Championships in Edmonton, Alberta (Interviews: David McCrindle, 12 June 2002; Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002). In short, AC's primary policy interest/involvement in facilities for elite level track and field is in leveraging partnership agreements in areas such as coaching and sports science/medicine within the emerging network of CSCs (Interview: Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002).

In respect of the emergence of full-time athletes, it is clear that the opportunity for Canadian track and field athletes to compete and train on a full-time basis is limited. For example, the small group of elite athletes in receipt of Sport Canada's AAP monies receive just Can$1,100 (under £500) per month. As Sport Canada's, David McCrindle admitted, athletes at the elite level remain, in large part, reliant on parental support in order to train and compete to the standards required for international events (Interview: 12 June 2002). This is an element of elite athlete development compounded by AC's financial difficulties over a number of years. Thus, the ability to provide financial support/incentive programmes, such as those provided by SNC for elite swimmers, has been/is severely constrained. A further difficulty here, for track and field athletes, is the relatively poor perception of the sport in Canada, coupled with the lack of discernible medal-winning performances at major events, such as Olympic Games and World Championships. The corollary of this conjunction of events is that AC has not been able to attract the levels of corporate sponsorship monies required to supplement federal government funding, whilst track and field athletes have failed to produce the levels of performance that might attract appearance fees and/or prize money at the series of IAAF events across the world.

There is one further aspect to this issue that warrants consideration. That is, the recent COC policy shift towards funding only those NSOs that have achieved notable success in major events and/or reveal sufficient capacity to do so. One aspect of the COC's explicit focus on high-achievement is the call for monetary rewards for Canadian athletes who achieve medal-winning performances at the Olympic Games (Jones 2002). It is perhaps useful here to illustrate the success, or otherwise, of Canadian athletes at recent

Olympic Games and World Athletics Championships. Table 6.2 provides a somewhat stark commentary on Canadian athletes' achievements over the past four Olympiads and World Athletics Championships. Whether the COC-inspired incentive scheme, if adopted, would enhance training/competition conditions for Canadian athletes to significantly improve on the medal counts revealed below, is far from clear.

Table 6.2 Canadian track and field medals: Olympic Games/World Athletics Championships, 1988-2001

	Olympic Games					World Athletics Championships				
	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total		Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total
1988	0	0	1	1					
					1995	2	1	1	4
1992	1	1	1	3					
					1997	1	1	0	2
1996	2	0	0	2					
					1999	0	1	0	1
2000	0	0	0	0					
					2001	0	0	0	0

With regard to developments in coaching, the wider policy/organisational framework within which AC operates reveals a gradual evolution of programmes in these disciplines from the 1970s onwards. From the evidence provided above, however, it is clear that AC's organisational and administrative capacity has been found wanting, most notably in coaching development. The reported findings of the 2001 internal audit, which criticised AC for failing to deliver coaching education programmes, failing to recognise and compensate coaches adequately and failing to develop coaches through appointment to national teams (Christie 2001a) are borne out by the organisation's current Chief Operating Officer. Joanne Mortimore acknowledged such failings, while also admitting that it was only in 2002 that a full-time Head Coach/Chief Technical Officer had been appointed to oversee coaching development and to attend all major Games. As Rachel Corbett, author of the internal audit stated, in the past, 'They'd [AC] get national coaches on a rotating basis and they were all volunteers. Every one of the other [sport] disciplines recognises the importance of having a head coach and professionalism' (quoted in Christie 2001a).

In respect of developments in sports science/medicine, it was noted earlier that: i) support structures are in place for these disciplines within Canadian universities and the network of CSCs; and ii) AC has developed internal mechanisms that address these disciplines, such as its sports science programme and the creation of a medical

committee. Yet, questions remain as to the efficacy of these support structures for developing high performance athletes. This is clear, for example, from a wide-ranging declaration on many elements of high performance sport in Canada by Mark Lowry of the then Canadian Olympic Association (now COC). In outlining aspects of a 'Canadian High Performance Sport Strategy', Lowry suggests that one of five core strategies would be to 'establish support programmes for athletes and coaches, which include opportunities for personal training needs, e.g. access to sport science and medicine service (sic)' (2001: 2). Moreover, as part of a recommendation to create a Canadian High Performance Sport Council, Lowry outlined a number of priorities and responsibilities for this proposed body. In respect of the issue under consideration here, Lowry stated that a key priority is to establish 'a strategy for the integration and utilisation of sport science research, and medical best practices to benefit Canadian athletes' (2001: 3). That sports science/medicine research has not been utilised to best effect is clear from these COC-inspired recommendations and may, in part, be responsible for Canadian track and field athletes' disappointing results at major world sporting events in recent years.

The fourth and final element of high performance sport development considered was that of competition structures and opportunities for track and field athletes. Here, a series of interlocking issues were identified as constraining AC's capacity to provide and control competition opportunities for its athletes (Interviews: Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002; Rob Paradis, 20 June 2002). These issues can be summarised as: i) the complexity of national/provincial/territorial jurisdictional divisions; ii) the lack of funding for athletes to travel abroad for international competition; iii) few domestic opportunities for athletes just below the elite level to compete; iv) the migration of talented young athletes to the United States; and v) increasing opportunities for a small group of elite athletes to compete abroad for prize monies, and thus weakening the domestic track and field competition calendar. Whether AC's recently stated objective of providing 'a coordinated national domestic competition strategy' (Athletics Canada 2002d: 10) for 2002-2003 is attainable, given the range and complexity of issues outlined here, remains to be seen.

This discussion has clearly revealed the Canadian NSO for track and field athletics as, at best, lacking strategic policy direction and, at worst, as an organisation in some disarray (Interviews: Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002; Rob Paradis, 20 June 2002). As AC's

chair, Jean-Guy Ouellette, has admitted, 'Many of AC's difficulties in recent years stem directly from a void in leadership' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2001b) – a somewhat curious statement from one of AC's supposed leaders. It becomes even more curious, and almost paradoxical, if we recall that Ouellette has been in post for, at least, the past 14 years and despite the somewhat critical assessment of his role in the Ben Johnson drugs affair in 1988 (cf. Boudreau & Konzak 1991). Moreover, Ouellette has also commented that 'The attractive thing is that the whole athletics community [is] behind us' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2001b) in the organisation's attempts to rebuild the sport's credibility following recommendations from the independent audit in 2001. Despite the somewhat optimistic tone of Ouellette's comments, antagonism towards AC's leadership prior to the 2001 audit should not be underestimated. In a report in the *Toronto Sun*, for example, Earl Farrell, chair of the Ontario Track and Field Association, suggested that 'provincial organisations are unhappy with the work of the AC board over several issues [and that] The branch presidents are not happy with the way business is being conducted or the way the sport is being run' (quoted in Buffery 2000).

By way of summing up this discussion of AC and policy developments at the elite level of Canadian track and field athletics, two interrelated issues can be signposted for further analysis in the final chapter. Firstly, AC has clearly not defined an articulated set of objectives to the extent advanced by SNC for Canadian swimming: the latter has clearly stated its high performance mission with its COMM1T TO W1N! strategy (SNC 2002a: 4). Athletics Canada, on the other hand, appears to be somewhat more reluctant to state so overtly that its organisational objectives are, in large part, committed to high performance sport. In line with this argument, the organisation's Chief Operating Officer offered this rather opaque description of AC's organisational purpose:

> Our mission statement was always [about] delivering the elite and the high performance, but [also] providing leadership for grass roots and [as we've discussed] it's confusing … long term, our strategic plan is going to outline that. I still see us providing leadership in grass roots, which will be a package that is consistent throughout Canada with all our provincial bodies (Interview: Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002).

One reading of these comments from AC's Chief Operating Officer regarding its mission, or future strategic objectives, is that the organisation is merely reflecting the somewhat conflicting policy directions of its primary funding partners, Sport Canada and the COC. At the same time as the federal government was realigning policy direction for sport, the COC revealed a diametrically opposed policy position; a position, moreover, which is

unambiguous in its drive to support only those organisations that have achieved, or reveal the potential to achieve, medal-winning performance at major Games. In line with this reading, then, it is reasonable to suggest that AC is undergoing a period of policy consolidation and that, organisationally and administratively, a longer time period is required before a coherent policy position, with regard to stating its core objectives, can be realised. Whether an integrated and co-ordinated national programme that embraces all levels of the sport's jurisdictional divides as well as all four disciplines within AC's remit is a reasonable goal, given the noted potential for disparity in these areas, remains far from clear.

The second issue recalls the earlier references to changing values/belief systems and how these might be instructive, or otherwise, in helping us to understand and explain AC's policy direction in recent years. It should be noted that it is not the intention to analyse this issue in depth here. Rather, the intention is to signpost the underlying dimensions of this complex aspect of policy change, such that a clearer direction is provided for the final chapter's more in-depth analysis. Thus, it was noted earlier that the restructuring of Canadian amateur sport organisations in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a series of studies which investigated the nature of organisational change that this federally-motivated restructuring was meant to elicit. In the late 1980s, Cunningham et al. (1987), for example, provided analysis which revealed that, in their terms, many Canadian NSOs had shifted from a 'kitchen-table' to a 'corporate professional' design archetype[4]. While it is not appropriate to delve into the intricacies of this research study, it does provide instructive insights into the nature and degree of structural change elicited by changing values/belief systems. In short, in the 1980s, it was argued that

> … change in voluntary sport organisations has involved a shift from organisations characterised by a balanced recreational/high performance focus, informal operating principles, and values that emphasised voluntarism, self-management, and participation, to organisations that now exhibit high levels of structure and values that embrace professionalism, bureaucratic rationality, and elite performance (Cunningham et al. 1987: 69-70).

Clearly, there is some degree of overlap here with the advocacy coalition framework's (ACF) focus on values/belief systems and policy change. The key point to note here, however, is that AC does not appear to have undergone the degree of change to the extent highlighted by Cunningham et al. (1987) in many Canadian NSOs in the 1980s. This is not to argue that AC has remained an archetypal kitchen-table organisation.

Clearly, bureaucracy, professionalism and an elite focus has formed part of the organisation's evolution over the past 10 to 12 years. It remains far from clear, however, quite how AC might be categorised today, given the noted organisational and administrative critique contained within the 2001 audit and the organisation's somewhat ambiguous policy statements in recent Annual and Semi-Annual General Meeting reports. These reports appear to suggest that, in the near future, AC will direct policy initiatives and support along the entire spectrum of mass/elite sport requirements. The lack of organisational clarity is heightened if we also consider Joanne Mortimore's statement that 'To be everything to everyone on a limited budget isn't possible' (Interview: 13 June 2002). In the context of the above discussion this is a rather perplexing comment but it is one that supports the impression that AC has yet to formulate a coherent policy direction. It is also a comment that underscores the argument that, if Canada's NSO for track and field athletics' future goal is, in Joanne Mortimore's words, 'to go from good to great' (quoted in Athletics Canada 2002d: 2) then further clarification of strategic policy direction is required if this recently stated organisational goal is to be achieved.

Canadian Yachting Association

Organisation, administration and relationships

The Canadian Yachting Association (CYA) is the country's NSO with responsibility for the aquatic-based disciplines of sailing, cruising and windsurfing. In addition, the Association is also involved in powerboating but to a lesser degree than for the other three aquatic disciplines. As the CYA's Executive Director explained, 'we include powerboaters, but do not have formal approval, as in charge of powerboating, there is no "superior power", like a sport council, to approve or disapprove [the remit of NSOs]' (Personal communication: Marianne Davis, 26 November 2002). It should be remembered, then, that the focus here is on the policy processes and developments at the elite level of sailing, or yachting - the terms 'sailing' and 'yachting' are used interchangeably throughout the ensuing discussion. More specifically, in the following section on *Elite sport policy developments*, the discussion focuses on four 'policy-related' elements of the CYA's development of its high performance sailors in the 11 Olympic yacht Classes (the term 'Class' denotes a specific type of yacht). As the sport's NSO, the CYA is involved in a matrix of relationships with numerous other bodies, all with varying

interests in the sport. These relationships range from those with the Canadian Coast Guard regarding safety-at-sea issues (CYA 2003), to discussions with industry bodies over yacht design, to sailing schools, concerned with educational/instructional matters and on coaching developments with the two main coaching bodies in Canada – the Coaching Association of Canada (CAC) and the Canadian Professional Coaches Association.

With regard to the evolution of sailing as a sport in Canada, Schrodt's (1983) research is useful in exploring the emergence of single-sport independent governing bodies. Schrodt (1983: 9) identifies 1837 as the year when yachting first emerged as a sport in Canada yet, it was some 94 years later that an independent national single-sport organisation for yachting was established in 1931. In 1957, the sport's national body became known as the Canadian Yachting Association (Redmond 1985: 305). In respect of high performance sailing, Howell & Howell (1985: 407) have noted that, on the one hand, the 'high standard of Canadian yachting' was demonstrated at the 1932 Olympic Games, where the Canadian sailing team won one Silver and one Bronze medal. On the other hand, the same authors also note that 'Despite these successes participation in yachting has been waning since that time, primarily because of its reputation as a recreation for the wealthy and expansion of opportunities in other countries'. By the 1980s, it was recognised that there had been attempts in recent years to broaden the base of the sport by the establishment of less expensive and more accessible clubs, and a general encouragement of sailing across different levels of society (Howell & Howell 1985: 407). Three important issues have been signalled here in Howell & Howell's work.

Firstly, the perception of yachting as an elitist sport is not unique to Canada (cf. Aversa 1986); the Royal Yachting Association (RYA) in the UK, for example, has experienced similar problems in respect of elitist critiques and has also attempted to attract a broader participatory base (RYA 2001a: 15). A second, and clearly related issue, is that, despite attempts to reduce notions of exclusivity, the perception of the sport as elitist remains, at least as an issue for discussion within the CYA. In April 2001, for example, the Association held, what was termed a Strategic Pursuits Planning Workshop, one aspect of which was a discussion regarding the nature/type of language used to portray the sport. The discussion centred on the advantages/disadvantages of using the terms, 'sailing', 'boating' and yachting': the later being perceived as both 'elitist' and 'snobby' (CYA 2001: 15). The third issue centres on the expansion and development of the sport

in other countries. Almost 20 years after Howell & Howell's research, the CYA identified a number of 'future forces' that might have an impact on the sport. One of these future forces is relevant in the context of this discussion. At the 2001 Workshop, the CYA stated that, in today's 'competitive global scene, it's the natural progression of trying to be the best which has seen many countries move to develop highly structured systems around their athletes, to give them the best chance to perform on a global scale' (CYA 2001: 13).

Interestingly, elsewhere the CYA cite the UK as one of the world's leading countries at the elite level and, following the British sailing team's performance at the 2000 Olympic Games, the CYA acknowledged that the UK are currently 'the envy of every sailing nation ... [and that] This includes an extensive talent identification and youth development programme' (CYA 2002e: 1). A point reiterated by the CYA's Executive Director, Marianne Davis, in suggesting that 'In the UK, it's a question of having worked for a long time, decided on the system, and worked for a long time to make it work and the people in charge have had the patience to let it develop' (Interview: 17 June 2002). Here, we may be witnessing a form of policy learning/transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000) as the CYA look abroad at different methods of developing a system or programme in order to improve on recent performances at major sailing regattas, such as the Olympic Games and yachting's numerous World Championships. It is perhaps useful here to illustrate the Canadian sailing team's recent performances at the Olympic Games (see Table 6.3 below).

Table 6.3 Canadian sailing medals: Olympic Games, 1988-2000

Olympic Games				
	Gold	**Silver**	**Bronze**	**Total**
1988	0	0	1	1
1992	0	0	1	1
1996	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0

The past four Olympiads have been selected, following a similar format to that used for Canadian swimming and track and field athletics. World Championship medal counts in sailing have not been included in Table 6.3, as was the case for swimming and athletics, given the large number of world events in the sport. As the Secretary-General of the

International Sailing Federation (ISAF) explained, in sailing, each yacht class stages its own World Championship, usually in different years and there are some 60 different classes at this level (Interview: Arve Sundheim 8 August 2002). We can note, however, that, as Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for sailing explained, from 1988, just three Gold, three Silver and eight Bronze medals have been won by the Canadian sailing team at World Championship level (Personal communication: Walter Lyons, 22 August 2002). Taken together, these medal counts over the past 10 to 15 years reveal limited reward for Canada's elite level sailors at major international sailing regattas.

Today, the CYA has some 400 affiliated member clubs, comprising approximately 80,000 signed-up members, as well as an additional 70,000 participants who regularly engage in some aspect of aquatic sport on an informal basis but who are not CYA members (Personal communication: Marianne Davis, 26 November 2002). The figure of 80,000 members, however, is the Association's 'best guesstimate', as Marianne Davis put it, on numbers as many 'members' are grouped within clubs and schools, for example, and the CYA has no up-to-date database on individual numbers. Moreover, as Marianne Davis also explained, 'we know there is a substantial amount of under-reporting' on membership figures. Indeed, one of the CYA's key organisational 'pursuits' in 2002 is to increase awareness of, and participation in, aquatic sports through developing more effective partnerships with its 10 affiliated provincial branches (CYA 2001: 1). On the one hand, it might be assumed that the CYA's organisational goal of increasing awareness/participation is related to the above issue of membership figures. On the other hand, however, it appears reasonable to argue that it is rather more closely linked to paralleling the 'Participation pillar' within the new Canadian Sport Policy (Canadian Heritage 2002).

Evidence from the CYA's Annual General Meeting and Planning Conference in November 2002 is helpful in substantiating the above suggestion, where the Association's Executive Director presented a series of organisational objectives under the heading 'Planning for the Future'. One of these objectives is closely aligned to the Canadian Sport Policy's goals for participation by 2012. The latter states that 'It is a Goal of the Canadian Sport Policy that by 2012 ... A significantly higher proportion of Canadians from all segments of society are involved in quality sport activities at all levels and in all forms of participation' (Canadian Heritage 2002a: 16). Using this federal objective as a precursor, Marianne Davis presented a set of four 'CYA revised pursuits'. Instructively,

one of these four pursuits is 'To have a significant portion of Canadians take part in sailing and boating activities (Enhanced Participation)' (Personal communication: 26 November 2002). Interestingly, as is evident from the above objective regarding Participation, all four CYA revised pursuits mirror the Canadian Sport Policy's four pillars of, Enhanced Participation, Enhanced Excellence, Enhanced Capacity and Enhanced Interaction (Canadian Heritage 2002a: 16-19). Thus, on the issue of high performance sport, the CYA's revised pursuit for excellence is 'To win medals and have athletes consistently achieving top 10 results internationally' (Personal communication: Marianne Davis, 26 November 2002). On 'Enhanced Excellence', the Canadian Sport Policy's objective is that, by 2012, 'The pool of Canadian athletic talent has expanded and Canadian athletes and teams are systematically achieving world-class results at the highest levels of international competition through fair and ethical means' (Canadian Heritage 2002a: 17). Three important points are raised here.

Firstly, it is clear that federal government rhetoric is currently concerned with enlarging 'the pool of Canadian athletic talent' in order that this talent might be 'systematically achieving world-class results'. In other words, emphasis is now being put upon developing levels below the elite, through which high performance athletes might emerge in order to achieve the stated goal of 'world-class results'. The second point follows on from the first; that is, federal policy rhetoric has clearly shifted from its emphasis on high performance sport throughout the 1970s and 1980s. For example, and as noted in the earlier discussion of track and field athletics, the 1988 *Task Force on Sport Policy* posed the following question, 'What does it cost to be *number one* in the world in sport X?' (Canada 1988: 26, emphasis added). The first indication of federal priorities shifting from this somewhat vaunted policy position was evident in the *Best Report* in the early 1990s. The *Best Report* problematised the over-emphasis on high performance sport in Canada and posed a cluster of qualitatively different questions than those raised in the late 1980s, such as 'Are Canadians comfortable with the pursuit of excellence and its links with winning and high-performance sport?' (Canada 1992: 26).

The third point centres on the CYA's current organisational objectives that have emerged from a series of planning exercises over the past three years (cf. CYA 2001). It is clear that these objectives are not just premised upon high performance objectives. As Marianne Davis explained, the CYA has evaluated what is required 'to try and create

a greater depth and have better athletes, or consistently good athletes. We need more depth in order to have consistently good athletes coming out at the top' (Interview: 17 June 2002). That a well-developed grass roots base has been identified as a prerequisite for high performance success in sailing can be distinguished, albeit in differing degrees, from recent policy developments in swimming and athletics. Swimming/Natation Canada (SNC) has recently re-emphasised an unequivocal, 'COMM1T TO W1N!' philosophy (SNC 2002a: 4), while Athletics Canada (AC) has yet to present a coherent set of organisational objectives following a period of policy transition. This is not to argue that SNC and AC do not (or have not) realise(d) the importance of constructing a framework that reaches beyond support for high performance levels. Rather, it is to suggest that the CYA has embraced the political - that is, federal policy - realities in a way that is qualitatively different from that displayed by the NSOs responsible for swimming and track and field athletics. It appears that the realities of future funding streams are at the heart of the CYA's recently debated organisational policy objectives. By way of discussing the problems inherent in balancing provision for developing grass roots levels and high performance sailing, Marianne Davis explained that

> ... because of the [recent federal] sports policy and the way, politically, things are swinging now it makes it easier to take that approach [develop grass roots levels] than it has been before. It may make a lot of sense to you and me, that that's a logical way of doing it but if it also fits with how we're going to be evaluated for money, then, unfortunately, that's just the way it is. Money is an important part of it (Interview: 17 June 2002).

Interestingly, Marianne Davis admitted that, to date, there has been no firm indication that extra federal funding will be allocated to NSOs in order to meet expanding federal objectives in relation to sport at different levels. Davis also suggested that if success is to be achieved at international levels then the recent Canadian Sport Policy, which emphasises a rather more long-term approach to athlete development, is to be welcomed - as has been the case in other successful countries for sailing, such as the UK, for example. Here, it may well be that, although not explicitly acknowledged in such terms, the CYA has realised that it is currently circumspect to position itself as a NSO able to embrace policy shifts at federal-Sport Canada levels, rather than to attempt to realise funding from its other (potentially) significant financial supporter, the COC. As discussed, the COC has stated that its funding priorities have sharpened such that monies will now be allocated to those NSOs/sports that have consistently won medals at major international Games, or at least show potential to do so. As illustrated in Table 6.3, the Canadian sailing team does not currently fall within either of these categories.

In sum, as with SNC/swimming and AC/athletics, the CYA has recently experienced a period of policy (re)-evaluation, where a number of future strategic policy decisions have been formulated. Emerging out of these deliberations is a policy direction that closely mirrors the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy objectives in all four of its key 'pillars'. Thus, while the CYA's Strategic Pursuits Planning Workshop in 2001 identified five key 'pursuits' for the future, of which 'Pursuit 1' was to 'win medals' and 'achieve consistent top 10 results internationally' (CYA 2001: 1), the Association has also recognised the need to develop a broad base for the sport, through club and provincial levels, in order to provide a strong foundation for its national sailing team. Key to attaining this objective is effective partnerships with provincial sailing associations. In the past, however, as for many sports in Canada's fragmented and complex sport delivery system, effective partnership agreements between the national bodies and P/TSOs – in this case, the CYA and its 10 provincial sailing associations – has proved to be a somewhat challenging endeavour.

Whether the challenges of the past, where Marianne Davis and Walter Lyons - Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for sailing/yachting - acknowledged that jurisdictional complexities have been compounded by funding cutbacks at provincial as well as national level, can be overcome, remains open to question. Walter Lyons is adamant that such jurisdictional complexities have 'caused all kinds of problems. I'd say that's at the very heart of it, and because education is a provincial jurisdiction we [Sport Canada] have absolutely no say whatsoever in terms of what goes on in schools in Canada' (Interview: 20 June 2002). As Walter Lyons also explained, 'It's up to the provinces, and provinces have their own priorities and that [sport] doesn't necessarily rank as a very high priority'. However, despite past policy imbroglios, Walter Lyons and Marianne Davis remain optimistic that a more positive policy relationship is emerging. Walter Lyons, for example, argued that 'all the provinces are signed on to the new [Canadian Sport Policy] objectives. That's a first big step (Interview: 20 June 2002). Yet, while Walter Lyons provides some optimism regarding federal/CYA/provincial relations in respect of implementing both the new Canadian Sport Policy objectives and the recently stated CYA strategic pursuits for developing a broader base for the sport, a caveat should be noted. That is, as Walter Lyons also admitted, these new federal policy directions have not, to date, 'translated into any ... specific outcomes in terms of funding decisions. We haven't solved that problem. That's still ongoing' (Interview: 20 June 2002).

Before going on to discuss policy developments in high performance sailing, three points should be borne in mind. Firstly, as the above discussion has illustrated, there is limited (available) literature that records historical developments in Canadian sailing, at least to the extent evident in swimming and track and field athletics. Secondly, Canadian sailing as a site of interest has not only received scant attention from an academic standpoint, but also from Canadian sport information and commentary forums, such as the Sport Information Resource Centre, Cansport, Sport Matters and the Canadian press. Thirdly, and compounding issues raised by the first two points, many aspects of the four elements of high performance sport policy developments considered in the following section fall within provincial/territorial and/or municipal jurisdictions and not within the remit of the CYA. This relative lack of policy-related material for, and critique of, Canadian sailing at NSO level, suggests an under-researched sport in the context of the two other amateur sports considered in this study.

Elite sport policy developments: An identification of potential sources of policy change

Development of elite level facilities

As in the previous discussions of swimming and track and field athletics, facility development for Canada sailing is a concern for provincial/territorial and/or municipal level organisations and authorities. That this is the case for the CYA, and for high performance sailing, is clear from a review of the NSO's Action and Operations Plans over the past five years. There is no reference in these plans with regard to sailing facilities at any level (cf. CYA 1997, 2002f). Thus, facility provision for competitive and recreational sailing in Canada, remains largely within both publicly-funded bodies at provincial/territorial/municipal levels and privately owned yacht clubs, such as those affiliated to the Lake Yacht Racing Association, founded in 1884. Despite the significance, longevity and potential facilities within the membership of the Lake Yacht Racing Association (Lake Yacht Racing Association 2002), there is no reference to this organisation in CYA policy-related documents as to how its members and, in particular, its elite and potentially elite sailors, might benefit from some form of reciprocal relationship with clubs affiliated to this Association of yacht clubs. Two examples help to make the point that a wide range of different types of sailing facilities is available at provincial and club levels.

Firstly, in May 2002, the Toronto Sailing and Canoe Club - affiliated to the Ontario Sailing Association (the provincial authority for sailing in Ontario) - staged the Canadian Olympic Classes Queensway Audi Icebreaker Regatta, a major sailing event for Olympic Class yachts (Ontario Sailing Association 2002). Secondly, the Humber Sailing and Powerboat Centre, situated on Lake Ontario and a member sailing/training school of the CYA has recently updated one of Canada's largest sailing and boating facilities for training and education purposes (Humber Sailing & Powerboat Centre 2002). Thus, while the CYA has no direct policy input into the development and use of such club/provincial facility provision, it does benefit indirectly through its management of the national sailing programme, which includes youth level sailors who sail at such venues across the country. Where the CYA does have more of a direct relationship with facility-related issues is with the emerging network of facilities and support services provided by the Canadian Sport Centres (CSCs); a significant element in the development of elite sailors as well as those aspiring to elite levels (Interviews: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002; Walter Lyons, 20 June 2002). As discussed, these centres operate on a cost-sharing basis which varies, in the case of the CYA and sailing, between federal and provincial governments, the CYA, the CSC and the sailing clubs involved in a particular area. Currently, the CYA utilises support services at three CSCs close to water, in Halifax, Toronto and Vancouver. Moreover, an important difference in the sport of sailing, in comparison to swimming and track and field athletics, can be signalled here; that is, the requirement for equipment over and above the need for facilities *per se*.

It is important, then, that the CYA, not only establishes working relationships with CSCs close to water but also that it ensures these centres are able to provide equipment vital to the support of elite level sailing development. As Marianne Davis explained, 'we all put some money together and have been able to hire a coach full-time, equip the coach with a car, with a radio, with a computer and with a boat. The car has to be able to tow and have a trailer' (Interview: 17 June 2002). Thus, a package of facilities/equipment underpins elite sailors' development and which, in total, requires additional monies to those required for high performance programming in swimming and track and field. The importance of the CSCs for the CYA cannot, therefore, be overstated as it attempts to build a Canadian sailing team capable of improvement on past performances at major world sailing regattas. This package of facilities/equipment afforded by the CSCs is not only centred on sailors currently considered to be at the high performance level, however. As discussed, the CYA has set out its organisational strategy in line with the

2002 Canadian Sport Policy. As such, developmental levels below the elite remain an important concern, not least because, historically, such development has taken place within club and provincial level facilities. However, club/provincial development has been severely curtailed in recent years due to lack of funding grants available from municipal/provincial authorities. Marianne Davis explained the situation thus, 'the provincial associations have not been able to take care of their level and it has, in a way, forced the national body, like us, to try to cover' (Interview: 17 June 2002). Marianne Davis also drew attention to the unintended consequences of such a scenario, as well as to the important role the CSCs now play in helping to alleviate potential damage to developmental level sailing, and thus to the CYA's national programme:

> ... we have to go to the clubs, to get the athletes out of the clubs, which, in some cases, is very unhealthy because when you reach down so far the expectation is that the national body should [always] be reaching down into the club level, and then you lose that whole developmental level. Now with the sport centres [CSCs], that helps strengthen this a little bit again (Interview: 17 June 2002).

It appears, therefore, that the CYA is in a similar position to all major Canadian NSOs with regard to facility development. That is, the sport's NSO is subject to variability in policy priorities, and thus funding allocations, for the development of sailing facilities at provincial and municipal levels. As Marianne Davis acknowledged, facility development is left, in large part, to sailing clubs and underpinned financially by fundraising activities, such as banqueting events, mooring charges, sailing lessons and boat storage fees (Interview: 17 June 2002). The CYA is also reliant on the development of facilities at private yacht clubs, as the earlier examples have illustrated. However, the growing network of CSCs has emerged as an increasingly important element in the development of elite, and potentially elite sailors, during a period of policy re-evaluation within the CYA, as it comes to terms with shifting federal priorities for sport.

By way of summing up, these observations raise some important issues from a theoretical standpoint. Drawing on insights from the policy networks and advocacy coalition framework literature outlined in Chapter 2, the CYA's commitment to the growing network of CSCs is clearly at a relatively embryonic stage of maturity, at least when compared to the degree of consensus and commitment to the centres from actors at the high performance levels of Canadian swimming, for example. Clearly, further scrutiny of this issue is required and the final chapter will draw more in-depth conclusions in relation to the study's theoretical and methodological insights. However,

important questions have been raised here with regard to policy direction for facility development at the elite level of Canadian sport. For example, while SNC has clearly positioned itself as an organisation with high performance objectives, a COMM1T TO W1N!' philosophy (SNC 2002a: 4) and seven dedicated swimming centres aligned to the CSC network, the CYA's rationale for embracing the CSC concept is qualitatively different. In short, in contradistinction to SNC, current CYA policy direction mirrors the broader objectives of the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy. In other words, for the CYA (at present) the CSC concept is conceived of as one element in the overall development of Canadian sailing and not purely as a mechanism for the development of its elite sailors. This argument suggests that, on the one hand, SNC might be conceived of as part of an advocacy coalition with values and belief systems centring on high performance sport; on the other hand, the CYA has yet to reveal such unequivocal values and beliefs in relation to *high performance* sailing. As such, two questions warrant further scrutiny in the final chapter: i) *If* we can identify a number of coalitions within the sport development policy subsystem, where might the CYA and, and indeed, Athletics Canada be located? and ii) *If* a high performance coalition can be identified, how dominant is it in relation to (any) others, and thus how significant might it be in effecting policy change?

Emergence of 'full-time' athletes (sailors)

This section examines the conditions within which Canadian sailors operate with regard to financial support at the elite level. To begin, it is perhaps worthwhile to consider the financial scenario for one of Canada's most successful sailors in recent years. By way of commenting on the nature of financial support for Canada's elite amateur athletes, in general, Cansport editor, Ron Scammell, sums up conditions for Richard Clarke, a Gold medal winner at the 1999 Pan-American Games, a Bronze medallist at the Melbourne 1999 Finn Class World Championships and a serious medal prospect in the Finn Class at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Scammell has argued that, 'Except for the privileged few with major corporate sponsors, bringing home the Gold has nothing to do with money. It's all about pride, commitment and the dream of winning an Olympic medal' (2000a: 1). Richard Clarke finished just 17th at the Sydney Olympics and, on announcing his retirement form the sport, estimated that it had cost Can$500,000 in personal monies to remain sailing at the elite level over the four years leading up to the 2000 Games (Cansport 2000c: 1). While many Canadian commentators have called for increased federal level financial support for Canada's high performance amateur athletes, Clarke argued that 'I'd like to see some of corporate Canada rally behind the

Olympic team [rather] than the government pick up the tab' (quoted in Cansport 2000c: 1). In relation to this, Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for sailing pointed to a general lack of corporate support for Canadian high performance sport. Walter Lyons acknowledged that the deliberations leading up to the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy have led to the development of a framework that should help to alleviate jurisdictional (policy) inconsistencies between provincial/territorial and federal governments, and national and provincial/territorial sporting organisations, in relation to future sporting objectives. Yet, Lyons added that, while such deliberations have 'provided a rationale to allow the various government levels to allocate resources in a more significant manner ... we don't know yet to what extent they'll be successful or not in getting corporate Canada more involved' (Interview: 20 June 2002).

Despite Richard Clarke's entreaties for increased corporate support, the CYA appears to have been relatively successful in this area. For the year 1997-1998, for example, the CYA had the objective of maintaining Can$88,500 (approx. £37,000) in sponsorship funding, while the sum of an extra Can$67,500 (approx. £28,000) was the target for new corporate monies during this period (CYA 1997: 15). These objectives were achieved and, by 2000, the CYA had set a sponsorship goal of Can$240,000 (approx. £150,000) (CYA 2000: 11). Three points are worthy of note here. Firstly, these figures reveal the CYA's ability to raise sponsorship monies during a period of government cutbacks in many policy sectors, and in an area where other Canadian NSOs have been less successful in recent years: Athletics Canada is a case in point. Secondly, and while not discounting the positive issues raised by the first point, these sponsorship sums might be viewed as relatively insignificant if we consider Richard Clarke's comments above, the high cost of equipment required to support Canada's elite sailing team and the far greater amounts of Lottery monies currently allocated to the CYA's organisational counterpart (the RYA) in the UK (UK Sport 2002a). The third point follows on from the second and brings into sharp relief the ever-present calls in recent years from the Canadian amateur sport community; that is, a chronic lack of statutory federal funding to support Canada's NSOs in their quest to improve on recent elite level performances.

While the CYA has 45 sailors (for 2002-2003) in receipt of AAP support (Interview: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002), the previous discussions of swimming and track and field athletics revealed that AAP grants are a necessary but insufficient support mechanism for elite athletes to train and compete on a full-time basis (Interview: David

McCrindle, 13 June 2002). Thus, much of the responsibility for funding support systems underpinning elite sailing development in Canada rests on individual sailors and/or parents. Moreover, the inadequacy of financial support in sailing is compounded by the sport's dependence on expensive equipment. As Marianne Davis explained, 'the equipment we use, and the transportation of the equipment, has become very expensive ... we are able to cover only a portion of the operating costs, we're not even touching the equipment costs' (Interview: 17 June 2002). The ramifications of this scenario are all too clear, as revealed in the CYA's Executive Committee Meeting in June 2002, where it was recorded that 'The financial burden on athletes to purchase a boat is in some cases preventing talented athletes from launching a campaign' (CYA 2002b: 5). Moreover, reflecting Richard Clarke's earlier comments regarding self-sufficiency, Marianne Davis also admitted that, in order to compete at the highest level of the sport, 'the athletes have to go out, get loans, get money from their parents and get sponsors' (Interview: 17 June 2002). Marianne Davis is clear on this issue, 'We don't have full-time sailors at the moment. They will be full-time in periods but they will also be working'. It is clear, then, that the relative lack of funding support that might allow Canada's elite sailors to train and compete on a full-time basis is an element of high performance programme development that requires further consideration by the CYA if the Canadian sailing team is to improve on its poor medal returns at the Olympic Games and World Championship sailing regattas.

In sum, it is evident that few (if any) Canadian elite level sailors have the financial resources to train and compete on a full-time basis. As Walter Lyons revealed, 'in Canada, sailing is very much self-funded', while also stating that, if Canada's high performance sailors were full-time, 'they're full-time sailors but not on the national team. They're doing offshore sailing. They get hired for all these professional offshore races' (Interview: 20 June 2002). It appears self-evident then that the CYA's policy of adopting a long-term developmental approach, incorporating all levels of the sport and which is in line with the new Canadian Sport Policy objectives, will take time to mature. The apex of this policy direction is to 'win medals' (CYA 2001: 1), and thus to achieve levels of performance at major sailing regattas that might also reap increased financial rewards from the COC. Improved performances should not only enhance the profile of the CYA and Canadian sailing but also enable greater opportunities for elite sailors to exploit sponsorship possibilities. Only when these conditions emerge will we be able to conceive of Canadian elite level sailors as full-time athletes.

Developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine

It is not the intention here to reiterate in any depth the broader historical developments in these elements of Canadian high performance sport that have been considered in the previous discussions of swimming and track and field athletics. Rather, the intention here is to provide a somewhat more specific insight into policy developments in coaching, sports science/medicine in relation to the CYA and elite level sailing. Some reference to past policy direction is required, however, in order to provide the context for more recent developments in Canadian sailing. On this issue, then, it is useful to recall the enactment of Bill C-131, *An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport* in 1961, which was first discussed in Chapter 5. As Morrow et al. (1989: 330) note, in the period following the passing of the Act, 'Funding was used for conferences and seminars held for coaches and administrators, and for graduate studies undertaken by many physical-education scientists; [and] research laboratories were established at several universities to study both sport and fitness' (1989: 330).

Morrow et al.'s comments on developments in the 1960s and 1970s, and the observations in the previous sections on Canadian swimming and track and field athletics regarding the ongoing developments in coaching, sports science/medicine throughout the 1980s and 1990s, suggest a relatively sophisticated support system is now in place for Canadian high performance sailors. However, the following comments from CYA members and Walter Lyons are instructive in that they paint a somewhat different picture. While the CYA has stated that one of the 'past forces' to benefit sailing was the 'Improved and increased coaching [which] had a huge impact on youth development' (CYA 2001: 12), this statement was undermined to some extent at the 2001 Strategic Pursuits Planning Workshop. Here, CYA *members* were somewhat less optimistic than the Association. It was suggested, for example, that in order 'to keep our sport strong for the next 20 years [the CYA should] invest in coaches' (quoted in CYA 2001: 14). Moreover, it is only recently that the CYA has identified a requirement for full-time national coaches. As Walter Lyons explained with regard to changing attitudes to coaching development, 'I'd say it started a few years before Sydney [2000 Olympic Games] and even then a lot of the leadership in sailing weren't really convinced' (Interview: 20 June 2002). In rather prosaic terminology, Lyons also highlighted the somewhat makeshift approach to coaching before the 2000 Olympics, as well as signalling aspects of policy learning/transfer:

> In Sydney, it sort of hit them like a four by two and made them say, look at all the successful countries; they all have full-time coaches ... the CYA didn't have a full-time coach. A few of the rich clubs across the country had full-time coaches but otherwise they said [to sailors] go develop your own campaign ... It was pretty ad hoc (Interview: 20 June 2002).

The CYA now employs five full-time coaches and a High Performance Director for sailing who is responsible for the overall national programme (Interview: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002). In addition, the ongoing development of the CBET programme for Canadian coaches has been embraced by the CYA. This programme has three core elements: 'Community Sport', 'Competition' and 'Instruction' (CYA 2002d: 1). It is interesting to note that, despite the earlier comments regarding the CYA's recognition of federally-inspired policy objectives that emphasise all levels of sport, Minutes from the organisation's Executive Committee Meeting in October 2002 reveal a rather more mixed set of policy priorities in respect of coaching development. Commenting on a recent Coaching Association of Canada (CAC) workshop, the CYA's Sharon Seymour stated that the CAC 'will focus on the community and racing [elements] first [but has] encouraged [the] CYA to put a priority on developing the Racing Coach stream of the CBET' (quoted in CYA 2002c: 2). Importantly, Seymour also explained that CAC funding is not allocated 'up front': the CYA is required to present an application for funding to the CAC. Such an arrangement illustrates the lack of policy autonomy enjoyed by the CYA and, while not stated explicitly, it is reasonable to assume that the CYA will follow CAC policy direction and focus resources on the Racing Coach stream of the CBET. Arguably, these observations suggest an emerging policy priority on coaching development at the high performance end of the sport that is somewhat at odds with the CYA's rhetoric of support for more broad-based policy initiatives.

There are also indications that developments in sports science/medicine have not been fully embraced by the CYA and the sport of sailing. As the CYA's Strategic Pursuits Planning Workshop in 2001 revealed, attitudes to developments in sports science, in particular, need to change. The CYA posed the following two questions at the 2001 workshop: i) 'To keep our sport strong for the next 20 years, what should the CYA *start* doing? and ii) 'To keep our sport strong for the next 20 years, what should the CYA *stop* doing?' (CYA 2001: 14-15, original emphasis). Answers to these questions are instructive in that they reveal an enduring scepticism towards the benefits that sports science might bring to the sport. In answer to the first question, perhaps the comment that all those involved with the sport should 'start believing the sport science system applies to sailing' (quoted in CYA 2001: 14) is the most revealing. Replies to the second

question strengthen the argument that sports science developments have, to date, been relatively ignored by the CYA. The following comment is indicative of replies to this second question, 'stop thinking that somehow the sports science stuff doesn't really make a difference, and that it's just 'fluff'. It's real, it works, it's what the other sailing countries are applying that are beating us at the youth and Olympic level (quoted in CYA 2001: 15). Walter Lyons reflects these comments by way of explaining that the CYA had not developed the areas of sports science/sports medicine, or 'the type of physical preparation that athletes require. Beyond the CYA hiring, for a couple of weeks, a world expert and have the sailors work with this person ... That would be it' (Interview: 20 June 2002). These observations are indicative of the changing language used by the CYA to present this issue in various Action and Operations Plans over the past five years. In 1997-1998, for example, the CYA's objective on this element of elite level programming was 'To provide sport specific scientific support to carded athletes' (CYA 1997: 3). By 2002, the language was far more definitive. The 'Pursuit' was to 'Win medals', while two 'Objectives' were 'To develop and implement a sport science based training and competitive programme for all high performance programmes (Olympic, Paralympic, Youth) by September 2004 [and to] Utilise Sport Science projects to develop skills' (CYA 2002g: 2-3). In order to 'Action' these objectives, the CYA proposed further strengthening of relationships with the CSCs and 'other partners to improve holistic services (such as fitness programmes/fitness testing/ mental training...) provided to athletes' (CYA 2002g: 2).

It is clear that the CYA now appreciates, and has set policy direction towards, developments in sports science/medicine and how they might be applied. Importantly, such policy direction appears to encompass not only the high performance end of the sport but also all levels of Canadian sailing. What is less clear, however, is what might have precipitated such change in policy direction. In lieu of a definitive answer to this question, it is reasonable to argue that comments from Marianne Davis (Interview: 17 June 2002) and recent CYA policy statements are indicative of some form of policy learning/transfer from abroad. For example, in a paper entitled *Long Term Athlete Development* the CYA acknowledges the success of the RYA's elite sailors and asks 'What do they [GB/NI sailing team] follow?' The reply is instructive, 'Very simply, a programme designed around a Sport Science based approach to preparation. This includes an extensive talent identification and youth development programme' (CYA 2002e: 1). The CYA recognises that it 'can not (sic) copy all aspects' of the UK

programme but that they can, however, 'devise and deliver the same Sport Science Based approach to training and competition' (CYA 2002e: 1). Sports science related benefits are thus emerging as integral elements of future long-term development programmes for all Canadian sailors.

In sum, today, the CYA is fully embracing ongoing changes to coach education and training and has not only discussed changing attitudes to sports science/medicine but has also implemented policy change in this respect. This is clear from a CYA paper entitled *Priorities and Goal Statement for 2002 and Beyond*. Under the objective, 'Win Medals', the paper reveals that the 'CYA will ensure coaches are trained and prepared to develop athletes in a Sport Science Based system' (CYA 2002g: 1). Yet, while the organisational commitment underlying such policy direction should not be underestimated, implementation might prove rather more difficult to achieve. Here, enduring concerns remain in respect of how such policies might be funded. As the CYA acknowledged in its 2002 Operations Plan, 'For all CST [Canadian Sailing Team] *Espoir* and Youth programmes, there is a considerable financial burden on the individual athlete, as [the] CYA is only able to provide partial support for operating costs and no support towards equipment costs' (CYA 2002f: 11).

Competition opportunities for elite level athletes (sailors)

As the Canadian NSO for sailing the CYA has a remit for providing 'nationally designated competitions to optimise competitive opportunities for Canadian sailors' (CYA 1997: 3). A range of competitions is listed by the CYA in this respect - including, Canadian Youths, Eastern/Western Intermediates, 23 and under-West and the Canadian Games. Programme support for major sailing regattas such as the Olympic Games and World Championships in the numerous boat Classes is also an important element of the CYA's remit. However, as discussed, until recently, the approach to training and competition for Canadian sailors has been, at best, ad hoc and, at worst, left to individual sailors/crews to organise. As Walter Lyons related, in the past, 'it used to be, if you decide you want to go down to Brazil [for example], you go down to Brazil'. However, as Walter Lyons also acknowledged, 'in the case of sailing, there has been a major shift in outlook in Canada, in terms of what it takes to prepare a national team athlete' (Interview: 20 June, 2002).

It appears that the poor performance of the Canadian sailing team at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games was not the only reason for 'this major shift in outlook' - although

Walter Lyons was clear in citing poor performances in Sydney as a major contributory factor for change. Indeed, both Marianne Davis and Walter Lyons explained that the new Canadian Sport Policy has also been a major source of change in this respect. The CYA has embraced the emerging priorities of federal sport policy in all elements of programming for the sport of sailing, stating that its organisational objectives 'are within the direction of the new Canadian Sport Policy (CSP). The Vision, Goals and Pursuits approved by the CYA fit well with the priorities defined as the four pillars embodied in the CSP' (CYA 2002g: 1). With regard to competition opportunities, Marianne Davis explained that a 'core North American-based programme' has been established that takes account of the current financial conditions within which the CYA operates (Interview: 17 June 2002). A point substantiated by Walter Lyons who argued that, while sailing has still to address the 'competitive component' and 'competitive opportunities', the CYA's new strategic plan recognises 'that they don't have the resources to send crews off to the four corners of the earth ... [and] they've voluntarily identified that the majority of their initiatives are going to be North American-based' (Interview: 20 June 2002).

In relation to this, the 2001 Strategic Pursuits Planning Workshop identified the following issues for consideration in the development of a more structured competition programme for sailing: i) the 'Level of Government funding [has been] reduced both by direct reduction and inflation'; ii) 'The level of funding for International Competition has dropped drastically'; and iii) 'Many nations have increased funding to their team enormously' (CYA 2001: 12). The rationale for a more structured approach to the designation of sailing competitions, based primarily in North American waters is, therefore, in large part, premised on financial considerations. As Marianne Davis explained, in respect of this new competition programme, 'we're saying we need to train our athletes and to stay within the cost ramifications' (Interview: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002). Indeed, Marianne Davis also stated that, although the CYA 'does not have the resources' to travel abroad on a regular basis for competitions, the new structured pattern of competitions and practice 'is a plan, while previously it would be like trying to explain, oh, why are you doing this, this year, are you going to do this all the years?' (Interview: 17 June 2002).

Despite Marianne Davis' positive outlook on the development of a more structured, cost efficient and locally-based competition and training programme for CYA sailors, a cluster

of enduring concerns have yet to be fully addressed. Walter Lyons highlighted three such concerns that underscore Canada's jurisdictional complexities. Firstly, as discussed, provincial/territorial sporting organisations (P/TSOs) have faced their own set of financial reductions in recent years. Secondly, P/TSOs have traditionally differed, not only with regard to the respective emphasis put upon a particular sport - due, in large part, to geographical considerations – but also in respect of the differing emphases put upon high performance sport and mass participation initiatives. Thirdly, as education is a provincial jurisdiction, Sport Canada and the CYA have little influence on sailing development in Canadian schools. Walter Lyons offered the following corollary of such a scenario for the CYA and Sport Canada, 'The athlete is under-developed, from a sports perspective, and, therefore, what we're finding is that an inordinate proportion of the national team programme is being spent on developing [provincial/territorial] athletes, rather than on national team programming' (Interview: 20 June 2002). The lack of a structured talent identification and development system in Canada, compounded by provincial/territorial control of education policy, and thus school sport, were also cited by Walter Lyons as major contributory factors underlying the difficulties faced by the CYA at national level. In sum, although the CYA has created a new North American-based programme of training and competition opportunities, funding levels and jurisdictional divisions remain as enduring concerns for this element of the sport's programme development as it attempts to improve performance levels at major sailing regattas such as the Olympic Games and World Championships.

Summary of key implications

This discussion of the CYA/sailing has, perhaps not unsurprisingly, revealed a number of findings similar in certain respects to those found in swimming and athletics. Four findings, in particular, are worthy of note and are discussed in more detail following a summary of the four key elements of high performance sport policy described above. In respect of the first of these, the emerging network of CSCs is at the heart of the CYA's policy involvement in elite level facilities. Centres in Halifax, Toronto and Vancouver are now utilised through cost-sharing partnership agreements with sailing clubs in the area, provincial governments and sailing associations and, in some cases, the Coaching Association of Canada. However, from a review of CYA Action and Operations Plans over the past five years it does not appear that the Association has any direct policy influence at the numerous public and private sailing clubs where many of its sailors train and compete. This element of high performance sport policy might benefit, then, from the

CYA's paralleling of the Canadian Sport Policy objectives; most notably, in this case, the 'Interaction' pillar. In short, the CYA could benefit from increased policy involvement with such clubs regarding facility development and use. The second element of high performance sport policy considered was the emergence of full-time sailors. It is clear, however, that few, if any, Canadian sailors can be categorised as full-time, in the sense that they have the financial means to train and compete on a full-time basis. While 45 Canadian sailors are currently in receipt of AAP monies through Sport Canada's carding system for the period 2002-2003, it is clear that self-funding remains the paramount method of financial support for Canadian high performance athletes and that AAP grants are a necessary but insufficient means of support for Canadian high performance sailors.

With regard to developments in coaching, sports science/medicine, while the CYA has embraced the recent coaching initiative (the CBET) (CYA 2002d), it is only in the past two to three years that the need for full-time coaches at the elite level has been recognised by the CYA leadership. In addition, it is also evident that the CYA has only recently adopted, what it terms, 'a Sport Science Based system' within which coaches are trained and prepared to develop sailors (CYA 2002e: 1). Walter Lyons suggested that this change in policy direction was driven by i) the ramifications of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games where no medals were won; and ii) the CBET initiative, inspired and funded by Sport Canada/Coaching Association of Canada. A further source of change has also emerged, however: policy learning/transfer from abroad, and from the UK in particular. This is clear from Marianne Davis' (interview) comments and the CYA's internal policy statement on *Long Term Athlete Development* (CYA 2002e). Taken together, these observations point to the utility of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) in helping us to understand and explain policy change within the CYA. While the final chapter discusses such theoretical aspects in more depth, some brief points can be signalled here.

It is useful in this respect to recall Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith's (1999: 147) argument that endogenous factors alone are not sufficient for major policy change; exogenous factors (outside the policy subsystem) are also necessary. Following the logic of the ACF, there are indications here of both exogenous and endogenous factors in helping to understand and explain changes in CYA policy direction. For example, the ramifications of poor performances at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games and the developments in

coach training/education can be viewed as examples of the former, while policy learning/transfer, in respect of changing attitudes to sport science benefits for sailing, is an example of an important endogenous factor implicated in policy change for the CYA. Clearly, these theoretical insights require further scrutiny, not least with regard to whether the CYA is part of a discrete advocacy coalition. However, two further (potential) exogenous factors can be noted: i) the financial cutbacks suffered by NSOs in recent years – 'changes in socio-economic conditions'; and ii) provincial/territorial jurisdictional control of education policy – 'policy outputs from other subsystems' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 149).

The fourth and final element of high performance sport policy discussed was the structure of competition opportunities. A recent development for the CYA has been the implementation of a more structured, cost-efficient and North American-based programme of competition opportunities. This is in contrast to the rather ad hoc approach to training and competition in the past, where individual sailors would make unilateral decisions regarding when and where to train and/or compete (Interviews: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002; Walter Lyons, 20 June 2002). Reflecting the potential salience of the two additional exogenous factors cited above, the ACF may also offer potentially fruitful insights here with regard to policy change. Clearly, the lack of monies available from federal government has led, at least in part, to such change (changes in socio-economic conditions). In addition, Walter Lyons, in particular, referred to policy outputs from the educational policy domain at provincial level (policy outputs from other subsystems) in relation to 'under-developed sailors'. Here, the inference is that neither the CYA, nor Sport Canada is able to influence educational policy in schools such that sailing is given greater priority at developmental grass roots levels.

We can now return to the point made at the outset of this section where it was noted that there are four issues, in particular, worthy of further discussion in respect of similarities in policy responses from the three NSOs considered in this chapter. Firstly, all three NSOs have experienced a period of policy re-evaluation and scrutiny within the past five years, albeit to differing degrees and with differential consequences. Secondly, all three NSOs suffer from a poverty of funding, out of which emerges a certain lack of policy autonomy. For the CYA, and for high performance sailing, this is clear from the Minutes of the Association's Executive Committee Meeting in January 2002, which recorded that 'In order to be in a position for medal performances at the 2004 Olympic

Games, the Canadian Sailing Team needs Can$3.6 million in additional funding immediately' (CYA 2002a: 3). Thus, all three NSOs are hidebound, to a greater or lesser extent, by shifts in policy direction and funding allocations from Sport Canada, the COC or both.

Thirdly, all three NSOs operate within the fragmented and complex Canadian sport delivery system, most notably in arrangements with their counterparts at provincial/territorial level. Whether the CYA's paralleling of the 'Enhanced Interaction' objectives contained within the new Canadian Sport Policy will help to reduce such jurisdictional divisions must, however, remain open to further investigation over a longer time period. Fourthly, all three NSOs are part of the Canadian amateur sport system, as opposed to professional sports such as ice hockey, basketball and baseball. As such, all three sports suffer from a relative lack of popularity when compared to these professional sports: in relation to the sport as a spectator event; in attracting young people into the sport at grass roots levels; and in the ability to attract sponsorship monies from corporate Canada, and thus compounding the poverty of funding concerns noted above. It is clear that sailing falls into such a categorisation. An example helps to make the point. In a profile of Canadian sailor, Richard Clarke, prior to the 2000 Olympic Games, it was reported that 'Occasionally, news of his numerous medal-winning performances filtered back home, ending up in the small print somewhere in the few daily newspapers that bother at all with competitive sailing' (Cansport 2000a: 1).

While acknowledging such similarities amongst the three NSOs, it is also important to highlight some of the significant differences between the CYA compared to Swimming/Natation Canada and Athletics Canada. Firstly, the evidence presented above reveals the CYA as an organisation relatively free from the type of damning organisational critiques that have been levelled at the leadership of Canadian swimming (cf. Colwin 1997a, 1998; Thierry 2000; Tihanyi 2001a) and track and field athletics (cf. Buffery 2001; Christie 2001a, 2001b) in recent years. Thus, while the CYA has suffered from a similar poverty of funding as SNC and AC, in lieu of evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to argue that it has not suffered from a similar poverty of imagination. In the light of scarce historical policy-related material, such a contention should not be read as incontrovertible – yet, a cautious suggestion can be set out at this point. That is, from the available evidence in the form of policy-related documents and interviews with

actors closely involved with the Association, the CYA can be characterised as an organisation exhibiting a clarity of (policy) purpose not evident to the same extent in the sports of swimming or track and field athletics. As Walter Lyons argued, there has been a 'shift in the mentality of the organisation, in the leadership of the organisation, and so they have become increasingly more progressive in every sense' (Interview: 20 June 2002). Secondly, and not unrelated to the first point, the CYA has clearly defined a set of policy priorities closely linked to the four pillars of the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy. Neither SNC nor AC has adopted a policy position so explicitly related to federal objectives. The former has set an unequivocal high performance objective of COMM1T TO W1N! (SNC 2002a: 4; Interview: Larry Clough, 13 June 2002), while AC has yet to present a coherent policy position as it struggles to come to terms with the ramifications of a somewhat damning organisational audit in 2001 (Athletics Canada 2001b; Interviews: Joanne Mortimore, 13 June 2002; Rob Paradis, 20 June 2002).

To sum up, it would be erroneous to suggest that the CYA is currently part of an advocacy coalition with values and beliefs premised, primarily, on high performance sport. Financial considerations have led the CYA to reflect recent federal policy shifts, thereby setting out a cluster of policy priorities that attempt to encompass all levels of the sport, rather than policies that focus, primarily, on high performance sailing. Whether, federal monies will be forthcoming in order to support such a policy position is far from clear, however (Interview: Walter Lyons, 20 June 2002). One further observation from Marianne Davis is worth consideration as it is, arguably, indicative of an emerging trend within Canadian NSOs – at least within the three considered in this study. In response to questions regarding changes to the nature of the CYA's organisational and administrative approach, Marianne Davies suggested that

> ... we are now expected to be very professional and run the office in a professional manner, while we still have to heed the old principles of volunteerism and accountability to the volunteers. So, there may be a lot of decisions that, if I were running this as a business, I'd make a different decision because I wouldn't have to take the human, or value aspect, into consideration. I would just look at the bottom line (Interview: 17 June 2002).

The key point here is that the corollary of many of the (earlier) studies conducted into organisational change in Canadian NSOs was that, to a greater or lesser extent, NSOs had experienced change from a kitchen-table style of operation to a more corporate-professional approach (cf. Cunningham et al. 1987; Slack 1988; Slack et al. 1994). Yet, given Marianne Davis' comments above, Larry Clough's suggestion that, during the

1990s, 'many NSOs just went back to the kitchen-table sort of organisation because they didn't have the funding' (Interview: 13 June 2002) and Joanne Mortimore's observation that AC is behind UK NGBs in moving to a more 'professional approach' (Interview: 13 June 2002), then questions are raised as to the extent of value/belief system change incurred at NSO level. With regard to the CYA, at least, there is clearly some doubt as to whether it can be categorised as a corporate-professional type body, at least within the criteria set out in the studies conducted in the late 1980s by Cunningham et al. (1987) and others. It is also clear that long-term athlete development currently underpins much of the CYA's recent policy pronouncements as it comes to terms with the reality of federal sport policy shifts and funding arrangements in the attempt to develop Canadian sailors capable of medal-winning performances at major sailing regattas.

Notes

[1] The short-lived federal Conservative administration under Prime Minister, Joe Clark, (May 1979-February 1980) turned over rights to the sport lottery to the provinces. This action diverted funds the Liberal party had intended to use, in part, for additional funding for Sport Canada (cf. Macintosh et al. 1987: 111).

[2] The Team Elite programme is over and above SNC's 'International High Performance Swimmer Incentive' programme which rewards outstanding performances in Olympic events at major international competitions. The latter programme awards points for Gold, Silver and Bronze medals as well as lifetime best times. As stated in SNC's 2000-2001 Annual Report, 'The more significant the achievement, the greater the point score. The greater the point score, the greater the financial award' (SNC 2001b: 72).

[3] The exchange rate used in this study for converting Canadian dollars to sterling is Can$2.39 per £1. This reflects the exchange rate in June 2002 while conducting research in Canada.

[4] The notion of 'design archetypes' is representative of a theoretical proposition in the literature on organisational theory, which suggests that organisations can be classified as ideal types (e.g. a bureaucracy). The important point for this study is that, not only are archetypes conceptualised as representing sets of coherent structural elements, they are also underpinned by values and beliefs. Thus, change involves alteration to both structures and values and beliefs (cf. Cunningham et al. 1987).

Chapter 7
UK national governing bodies of sport

Introduction

This chapter has a similar structure to that of Chapter 6 and is thus organised around the same principal themes and same four key elements of elite sport development: i) the development of elite level facilities; ii) the emergence of 'full-time' swimmers, athletes and sailors; iii) the adoption of a more professional and strategic approach to coaching, sports science and sports medicine; and iv) competition opportunities at the elite level (cf. Sports Council 1991: 6). The first of the chapter's three principal themes is concerned with the organisational and administrative structure within which each sport operates. The second theme considers developments in the four elements of elite sport policy outlined above, where the concern is to identify potential sources of policy change, such as internal NGB policy reviews, government and quasi-governmental agency reviews, changing funding regimes and political change (e.g. from a Conservative to a Labour administration in the UK). The third theme draws together and summarises key implications raised within the first two themes; a central concern here is to highlight the organisational and administrative implications for the NGB under consideration, not only with regard to elite sport policy developments and policy change but also in respect of the wider policy-making environment within which the NGB operates. This summary section also considers issues raised in the substantive discussion of each NGB as to the changing nature of its organisation and administration.

Amateur Swimming Association

Organisation, administration and relationships

It was only in 1886, when the vexed question of what constituted an 'amateur' had been agreed, that the body now known as the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) was formally constituted (Keil & Wix 1996: 16). It should be noted that, despite the 'agreement' regarding what constituted an amateur, this issue remained an enduring concern for the ASA until the late 1980s. The ASA is the governing body for swimming disciplines in England, with Scottish and Welsh ASAs having responsibility for the sport

in these two home countries. The enduringly problematic question of the role of the Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain (ASFGB) also requires consideration in any analysis of the sport of swimming in the UK. Historically, the ASFGB's primary function had been the selection of teams for major international events where England, Scotland and Wales compete as Great Britain: the Olympic Games and World/European Championships. The term 'problematic' is used deliberately here. From the founding of the ASA in the late 19th century, the relationship between the ASFGB and the three home countries has been beset with organisational, administrative and financial ambiguity. Such ambiguities persisted into the 20th century. In the early 1970s, a three-part internal review of the workings of the ASA stated that 'We regard it as a weakness that a satisfactory solution to this question of Great Britain swimming administration has not been resolved long ago' (ASA 1970: 20, also known as the *Martin Report* after its principal author; and Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002). An excerpt from the ASA's 1970 Annual Report encapsulates attempts to solve this jurisdictional 'problem' in stating that, 'we have with Scotland and Wales instituted the new Great Britain constitution for a trial period of two years ... [this will] make clear in the minds of administrators, swimmers and the general public, who is governing the competitive aspects of our sport' (ASA 1971: 7).

Despite the positive tone in 1970, the ASA/ASFGB relationship remained fraught, centring in large part on the dominance of the ASA, both financially and in respect of representative voting rights (cf. ASA 1977: 5, 1989: 7). The nature of such jurisdictional disputes in the sport of swimming raises two important issues. Firstly, and on a wider note, it is characteristic of the enduringly parochial nature of British sport's organisation and administration (Roche 1993; ASA 1998: 62) and, secondly, the ramifications of such parochialism may well be implicated in the sport's relative lack of success at the highest level on an international stage. Indeed, in 1970, the *Martin Report* argued that

> There still persists in this country the relic of an essentially recreational attitude towards swimming, which prevailed just after the war .... it does not help in the field of competition especially at the higher level, where a much more 'professional' approach and attitude is required if we are to compete on more equal terms with other countries (ASA 1970: 18).

The findings of this report do not appear to have been heeded, as recent comments from Great Britain's National Performance Director of Swimming suggest. Bill Sweetenham has argued that 'Nothing about swimming in this country should remain the same. Either it stays the same and we get worse, or we change it and move

forwards. So the changes are up to the administrators' (quoted in Parrack 2001: 24). There are indications, however, that the degree of change argued for by Bill Sweetenham is beginning to emerge. In October 2000, following numerous reviews of the ASA/ASFGB relationship over the past 30 years, the ASFGB was reconstituted as a limited company and branded as *British Swimming*. The ASFGB is now constitutionally distinct from the ASA, with a wholly owned subsidiary company – High Performance Swimming Ltd – set up to administer National Lottery monies, primarily, the World Class Performance level of funding (ASFGB 2001: 5).

The ASA organises competition throughout England, establishes the laws of the sport and supports the national teams for swimming (including masters, disability, open water and synchronised disciplines) diving and water polo. The ASA also offers education programmes and certification for teachers, coaches and officials and operates an awards scheme. Three separate bodies are also involved in this area: the Institute of Swimming Teachers and Coaches – a fully-owned subsidiary of the ASA; the British Swimming Coaches and Teachers Association – a separate organisation but with close links to the ASA; and the Swimming Teachers Association – a rival organisation that trains a small number of teachers and lifeguards. The ASA also supports some 1600 affiliated clubs through a National/District/County structure and has close links with local authorities, which currently provide approximately 1400 swimming pools for local communities (House of Commons 2002). Finally, the ASA has a relationship with the Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), the body responsible for swimming at the international level and the Ligue Européene de Natation, which is responsible for the organisation of swimming events across Europe.

Clearly, the network of organisational relationships described above does not exhaust the extent of the ASA's involvement with other bodies such as, for example, the Youth Sport Trust and the English Schools Swimming Association, however, the intention here is to identify those organisations that have the potential for involvement in the sport development policy subsystem centring on elite level swimming policies and initiatives. In any analysis of the policy process, issues such as the identification of groups or other entities whose welfare is of greatest concern, and methods of financing, are significant dimensions for investigation. Decisions concerning administrative rules, budgetary allocations and information regarding performance of specific programmes or facilities are also key dimensions worthy of consideration. It is also worth reiterating that,

although the focus here is on the sport of 'swimming', the ASA's remit includes four other swimming disciplines, as well as diving and water polo. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the actors/organisations representing these sub-disciplines will also attempt to secure scarce resources and/or influence in the policy-making process; therefore, due consideration is given to the potential for disparity between all disciplines within the remit of the ASA.

Elite sport policy developments: An identification of potential sources of policy change

Development of elite level facilities

The 'conditions of action' (cf. Betts 1986) within which contemporary developments in elite level facilities (primarily 50 metre pools) might be conceived would clearly be incomplete if discussed in temporal isolation from past actions and developments in the sport of swimming. Indeed, the 1970 ASA Annual Report stated that 'we do not have a single pool complex in Britain capable of staging Olympic, World or European Championships' (ASA 1971: 5). In the same era, the enduring dilemma of access to pool time in local authority facilities for elite level swimmers was highlighted by the *Martin Report*, which argued that 'the public must know the "price" that must be paid by swimmers in training and by the public themselves in the possible loss to them of their own facilities for a few hours weekly' (ASA 1970: 44). At this time, the economic crises affecting Britain resulted in expenditure cuts throughout the public sector and, although 'swimming stood up well to the challenge' (ASA 1977: 4), there were inevitable cutbacks in local authority services and provision. The concern for the ASA was that facilities that were being constructed tended to be leisure complexes, with no provision for teaching swimming or for competition. However, elite level swimming was catered for to some extent, with centres of excellence established under a Sports Council scheme at Crystal Palace and Leeds (ASA 1980: 18-19).

Concerns regarding the proliferation of leisure pools remained throughout the 1980s, culminating, in 1987, with the formation of a National Swimming Pool Strategy Working Party in conjunction with the Sports Council (ASA 1988: 4). Specific reference to the requirement for 50 metre pools was not addressed, however, until the mid-1990s (ASA 1995: 18). Interestingly, in the early 21st century, the ASA is still bemoaning the lack of elite level facilities, in particular, the lack of water space for elite training in local

authority pools and the lack of 50 metre pools for long-course training and for international standard competitions (House of Commons 2002). Implicit in these observations is an enduring lack of an effective voice for swimming in lobbying government and its attendant sports agencies.

At a (human) agency level, the role of David Sparkes, (Chief Executive of both the ASA and the ASFGB) is potentially significant here. From a theoretical perspective, Sparkes might be conceived of as a 'policy broker' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith argue that policy brokers are key actors 'whose principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict' (1999: 122). Indeed, David Sparkes (2002) has recently suggested that governing bodies of sport can no longer concentrate just on the elite level, they also need to pay heed to government objectives such as social inclusion and educational issues related to sport. Clearly, Sparkes has a significant role to play in ameliorating potential disparities between the aspirations of the ASA and the ASFGB, as well as between these two bodies and the other significant organisations identified earlier: local authorities are a case in point. Ralph Riley, Chief Executive of the Institute of Sport and Recreation Management (ISRM), encapsulates the problems of local authority provision for swimming at all levels, in arguing that local authorities are 'in a Catch-22 situation, where they have ever-decreasing funds for services, must therefore maximise income opportunities while also trying to ensure social objectives and Best Value and finding time for elite swimming' (Riley 2002: 7).

The sport of swimming in the early 21st century is thus in a situation where its primary facilities, i.e. swimming pools, are owned either by private operators, with the aim of profit maximisation; local authorities, which are reliant on public monies and thus accountable to the many and varied government-led (across different central government departments) objectives for sport; and educational establishments, which have their own inherent objectives. Indeed, Bill Sweetenham has argued that if the 'government and the people want results, we need more facilities that are accessible and affordable. The Australian Gold Coast alone has at least eight heated 50m pools. In the whole of Britain we have a total of around 14' (quoted in Parrack 2001: 24). In sum, the enduring concerns of the past 30 years regarding facility development for swimming remain, and not just at the elite level. Sweetenham's views reflect a similar critique by the country's National Performance Director in the *Sunday Times*, where he argued that

the lack of suitable facilities is just one of a cluster of problems facing British swimming; 'no facilities, lack of budget, [and] changing the competition structure' are high on Sweetenham's list of problems to be addressed if the UK's aspirations at the elite level are to be realised (Lord 2002: 2).

Emergence of 'full-time' athletes (swimmers)

This element of elite sport development invokes wider questions surrounding the amateur/professional debate in sport (cf. Allison 2001) and one that transcends the sport of swimming. An enduring criticism of UK NGBs has centred on their somewhat 'amateurish' approach to the organisation and administration of sport. As Godfrey & Holtham noted in the late 1990s, 'The management crisis in the governing bodies of many sports needs to be tackled with some urgency' (1999: 22). The recent clarification of the ASA/ASFGB relationship is an indication that the sport of swimming has, to some extent, finally acknowledged the type of criticism highlighted here. Moreover, while it is not the intention to trace the wider aspects of how an 'amateur' has been defined by the ASA over the years - which has also affected coaches, judges and officials (cf. ASA 1970; Keil & Wix 1996) - it is important to recognise that this debate has occurred, as it cannot be disentangled from issues surrounding the emergence of full-time athletes at the elite level of swimming.

The 1970 *Martin Report* debated the amateur/professional issue and noted that 'Swimming fortunately still remains one of the truly amateur sports in terms of the actual competitor' (ASA 1970: 57); yet, it was not until the late 1980s that this issue was addressed seriously by the ASA. For example, the internal policy review, *Which Way Forward?* acknowledged that 'it is apparent that our swimmers are now competing at a disadvantage with swimmers in other countries' (ASA 1987: 21) and that 'The ASA needs to move away from the "amateur" concept in an organised manner' (ASA 1987: 6). This recommendation was heeded, in part, in 1988, when the ASA abandoned any formal expression of what constituted an 'amateur' competitor, guided in part by FINA-approved laws relating to expenses and advertising. As the 1987 ASA Annual Report records, 'The changing attitude with regard to swimmers receiving money has opened up opportunities to individual swimmers to obtain various levels of sponsorship, both locally and nationally' (ASA 1988: 5). Interestingly, events at this time in relation to the 1988 Seoul Olympics provide an illustration of the climate of opinion on the status of, and financial support for, elite level athletes in the UK. Social security rules prevented the country's Olympic athletes from claiming benefits for the two-week period of the

Games, despite the ASA lobbying government for a relaxation of these rules. As Keil & Wix note, 'Britain seemed indifferent to the needs of those who had given up so much to represent it in international competition' (1996: 110). These observations not only point to the relative ineffectiveness of the ASA in lobbying government but they also raise questions regarding government's commitment to elite level sport in the late 1980s. The issues surrounding the funding of elite level swimmers in the late 1980s are encapsulated in *Which Way Forward?*, which maintained that 'To many, the success or otherwise of a governing body, is judged by medals in trophy cabinets .... Why is success so limited? Does it really depend on swimmers training abroad or being without jobs?' (ASA 1987: 21) – issues that have yet to be fully resolved in the early 21st century (cf. Lord 2002).

Table 7.1 GB/NI swimming medals: Olympic Games/World Aquatic Championships, 1988-2001

Olympic Games					World Aquatic Championships				
	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total		Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total
1988	1	1	1	3					
					1991	0	1	1	2
1992	0	0	1	1					
					1994	0	0	0	0
1996	0	1	1	2					
					1998	0	0	2	2
2000	0	0	0	0					
					2001	1	2	4	7

On the performance of the swimming team at the Seoul Olympics, the ASA's 1988 Annual Report records that 'it was a great achievement to reach a final' (ASA 1989: 28), a comment which does not readily equate with the aspirations of their own policy review above. Arguably, such equivocal attitudes to achievement at the elite level are implicated in the lack of medal-winning success at major international events throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century (see Table 7.1). The early 1990s witnessed the introduction of an ASA-funded pilot scheme, 'Elite Funding for Top Swimmers', for the top 10 ranked English swimmers - an indication that a change in attitude was emerging and that the ASA was now prepared to provide assistance to 'enable the best performers to devote their full attention to training without being distracted by financial worries' (ASA 1992: 6). It was the introduction of the National Lottery in 1994, however, that has, arguably, had the most profound influence on provision for elite level swimmers. Swimming has benefited greatly from Lottery monies

through the World Class Performance programme, with 47 swimmers currently funded (as of September 2002) through this funding stream, and £1,550,000 committed for the period April 2002-March 2003 (UK Sport 2002a). In one sense, these 47 swimmers can be classed as full-time athletes. Yet, the notion of 'full-time' here remains a relative term, as many elite level swimmers remain employed, either full- or part-time (or unemployed and receiving state benefits). Moreover, increased funding does not come without certain obligations for NGBs, which operate in a climate of increasing accountability (Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002). This climate of increasing accountability is indicative of a notable shift in sport policy (rhetoric, at least) at central government level. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) - plays a key structural role here in shaping the conditions of action within which sport policy-making takes place, a key aspect of which is that NGBs are now required to produce plans that identify the likelihood of success. As illustrated in Chapter 5, the DCMS has stated (in *A Sporting Future for All*) that NGBs are now required to focus more closely on target setting and success or failure in achieving such targets (most notably, Olympic and World Championship medals) 'will be an important factor in deciding future levels of funding' (DCMS 2000: 16).

The paradox of these new funding arrangements for elite sport was brought into sharp relief by a recent House of Commons Select Committee report on the sport of swimming which found that funding for elite level swimmers was reduced following the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, where no swimming medals were won. However, a note of caution is necessary here. As UK Sport's Performance Services Manager for swimming explained, 'In terms of a net scenario, swimming is not receiving less in this [current] four-year cycle than in the previous [pre-Sydney] four-year cycle' (Interview: Emyr Roberts, 28 October 2002). Thus, while funding was reduced, post-Sydney, in the headline award from the World Class Performance fund, swimming has benefited in other areas. For example, UK Sport now covers the costs for the athlete medical scheme; prior to Sydney these costs came out of the World Class Performance award and, in addition, 50 per cent of the training costs at various English Institute of Sport (EIS) sites (e.g. Loughborough and Bath) are now met by the EIS (Interview: Emyr Roberts, 28 October 2002). Notwithstanding these cautionary comments, the increased commitment to elite level athletes espoused in *A Sporting Future for All* is predicated, in large part, on sustained success at major sporting events such as the Olympic Games. The Chief Executive of the ASA/ASFGB, David Sparkes, and Bill Sweetenham recognise

that this is the environment within which elite level sport operates in the early 21st century. Indeed, David Sparkes has stated, quite unequivocally, that

> ... the government will only judge swimming by eight days in Athens [Olympic Games] ... my success, and Bill Sweetenham's success, is eight days in Athens. It isn't five days in Manchester [Commonwealth Games] this year. It wasn't five days in Fukuoka [World Championships], when we came back with seven medals. [That's] all very interesting but if I come back with seven medals from the Olympics ... that'd get people sitting up and thinking (Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002).

Yet, within the wider swimming community there appears to be a residual tension with regard to an increasing focus on the elite level. This is clear from insights provided by Wendy Coles, who is not only employed by the elite-focused ASFGB but who also has many years of experience at the sport's grass roots levels and is currently Secretary of Nottinghamshire ASA. Wendy Coles suggested that the recent changes which give the ASFGB control of National Lottery funding for elite level athletes and programmes have resulted in an inevitable loss of power and control within the ASA (Interview: 19 March 2002). Coles also stated that 'Up until recently, those at Harold Fern House ... [ASA headquarters], the committee, they [used to] set everything and all of a sudden the money is in the Lottery and they have no say in the matter of how we spend it'.

Notwithstanding these latter observations, the World Class Performance programme award of £4,920,000 for the period April 2001-March 2005 (UK Sport 2001a: 46) provides further evidence of the funding support that now underpins the notion of full-time, elite level swimmers in the UK.

Developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine

With regard to coaching, the 1970 *Martin Report* highlighted the lack of a well-developed coaching structure for the sport and maintained that 'there is much that could be done for the coaches that we have to improve their knowledge, status and the environment in which they work' (ASA 1970: 66). There were also calls at this time for a National Co-ordinator of Coaching, Facilities and International Swimming whose priority would 'be concerned with directing and co-ordinating a coaching policy, the provision of facilities and the setting up of the right environment in which such a policy could function successfully' (ASA 1970: 68). These recommendations were heeded to the extent that the ASA set up the Institute of Swimming Teachers and Coaches in 1975, which operated alongside the independent British Swimming Coaches Association (now known as the British Swimming Teachers and Coaches Association).

Arguably, the difficulties surrounding the respective jurisdictional responsibilities of the ASA and the ASFGB were implicated in the sport's problems in fostering support for elite level coaches at this time. For example, on the one hand, the ASA's 1987 policy review *Which Way Forward?* suggests that 'The ability to produce coaches of quality' was one of the Association's strengths (ASA 1987: 4) while, on the other hand, it also questioned whether the sport's relative lack of success at major international events was, in part, a reflection of the lack of quality coaches (ASA 1987: 21). This is an enduring issue, as highlighted by Bill Sweetenham in 2001, 'We have to change the philosophy. Most coaches at clubs are employed by local authorities and their success determined by whether they can keep the local authority happy and all that does is promote mass mediocrity' (quoted in Hassall 2001: 27). It should also be noted that concerns over the development of coaches transcended the sport of swimming in the late 1980s. As the Sports Council' s 1988 strategy for sport noted, a key concern for elite level British sport was the 'lack of a co-ordinated structure for employing coaches' (Sports Council 1988: 48). Moreover, while a National Coaching Federation (NCF) had been set up in 1983 - rebranded as Sports Coach UK in 2001 (DCMS 2002: 60) - with an associated network of National Coaching Centres, the Sports Council also noted that there is 'still far to go'.

It appears that the introduction of National Lottery funding in the mid-1990s has been a key factor for improvements in coaching at the elite level of swimming (see also DCMS 2002 for a wider review into further proposed changes to coaching in the UK). In 1996, Deryk Snelling was appointed as the first National Performance Director for Great Britain, heralding what was then seen as a complete overhaul of the coaching environment at the elite level. Moreover, it was only in 1999 that the ASA implemented a format for coaching development at the elite level outside its traditional educational structure. As John Lawton, the ASA's Director of Education, notes, 'a programme has been put together specific to the needs of the coaches of elite swimmers ... which might change a Bronze medal to a Silver, and Silver into Gold' (quoted in ASA 1999: 20).

Clearly, the issue of a co-ordinated programme for elite coaching is now of paramount importance in the sport's drive to achieve success at major international events. Bill Sweetenham is widely credited as the key actor driving this new approach, which involves linking aspects of coaching certification with performance and assessed by the quality of the swimmers being produced (ASA 2002: 10). However, such change also highlights the potential for disparity between past and current approaches. As David Sparkes observes, 'This has led to a complete restructuring of the technical committees.

It was not achieved *without difficulty*, but it is certainly starting to deliver *results*' (quoted in ASFGB 2002a: 4, emphasis added). Elsewhere, David Sparkes clearly identified results at the Olympic Games as the key criterion of success for the ASA/ASFGB and argued that 'Bill Sweetenham has said that the acid test of success is Olympic Gold medals, nothing else counts, and I agree with that. So everything is focused over four years on delivering Gold medals ... in a very methodical, cruel, cold, calculated way' (Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002).

With regard to the importance given to developing the disciplines of sports science and sports medicine, as long ago as 1970 the ASA reported on these issues via its Scientific Advisory Committee (ASA 1971: 23). However, during the 1970s and early 1980s, although there were instances reported of research into how these disciplines might be applied to swimmers' physiology and performance (cf. ASA 1973: 15), the reports were largely concerned with matters such as pool lighting, public address systems and starting blocks (cf. ASA 1974: 14, 1979: 14). However, by the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, there was an emerging trend towards a greater consideration of the physiological aspects of competitive swimming, such as lactate testing and hyperventilation, medical profiling of national squad members and medical injury research (cf. ASA 1990: 16, 1993: 21, 1994: 21). This changing focus reflects wider changes occurring in British sport at the time. For example, the Sports Council's strategy for sport, *Into the '90s,* recommended that 'The need has never been greater for British sportspeople, especially but not only top level performers, to have access to adequate medical and scientific support when and where they need it' (Sports Council 1988: 49).

The value that sports science/medicine might bring to competitive swimming was not seriously acknowledged, however, until 1996 (at least as reported in the ASA's Annual Reports). The 1996 Annual Report, for example, stated that 'These scientific disciplines [physiology and biomechanics] are being used by athletes world wide in the development of improved swimming performance' (ASA 1997: 24). Interestingly, the ASA withdrew from reporting on medical/scientific matters in 2000; the elite-focused ASFGB now reports on these issues. The introduction of National Lottery funding streams is instructive here. In 1997, for example, World Class Performance funding allowed for the appointment of the first ever full-time manager for Sports Science and Sports Medicine for the then unconstituted ASFGB (ASFGB 1998: 4). Thus, an integrated, multi-disciplinary sports science and sports medicine programme is now

emerging, as swimming at the elite level benefits from the associated programmes provided by the ongoing development of the United Kingdom Sports Institute (UKSI). It is important to put these developments into perspective, however, as it was only in 2001 that the first British Swimming Joint Science Conference was held at Loughborough University. As Bill Sweetenham has acknowledged, 'There is still much to be done and much to change if we are to challenge the world on the Olympic stage in 2004' (quoted in ASFGB 2002a: 6).

Competition opportunities for elite level athletes (swimmers)

The issue of a planned and managed approach to competition opportunities for elite level swimmers, and the interrelated question of the amount of time swimmers spend competing compared to their training schedule, was not seriously addressed until the appointment of Bill Sweetenham in 2000 (Ballard 2002: 23). However, the *Martin Report* had made recommendations on this issue in the early 1970s, suggesting that 'the National programme [in England] must be planned with the season's major competitions in mind [and that] It is essential for the District and County Championships to be integrated with the national plan' (ASA 1970: 7). These issues remained a concern, however, into the late 1980s. Central to such concerns was the perception of a fragmented and dysfunctional system of competition opportunities. Indeed, *Which Way Forward?* acknowledged as much in highlighting a lack of effective control of the country's various swimming leagues; the proliferation of open meets and the consequent threat to Swimming Championships at District and County levels; and the need to establish a clear requirement for international facilities in England capable of supporting World and European events (ASA 1987: 6, 18).

That the structure of competition opportunities remained a concern for the sport in the late 20th and into the early 21st century is, arguably, indicative of the, only recently resolved, ASA/ASFGB relationship, with each body struggling to provide the type of strong, visionary leadership required to achieve success at major international events. Moreover, while the introduction of National Lottery funding is cited by many within the sport as being crucial in their efforts to increase performances at the highest level (cf. ASFGB 1999), fundamental attitudinal changes are also seen as a paramount requirement if such funding is to be used effectively (Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002). This last point is borne out by comments from John Atkinson, the recently appointed World Class Potential Director for swimming. Atkinson acknowledges the importance of supporting Bill Sweetenham's attempts to drive through such

fundamental change in arguing that 'we have to limit the amount of competition and do the right type of competition at appropriate times of the year. We should be looking to compete once a month in 12 competitions per year' (quoted in Ballard 2002: 23).

A comprehensive planning calendar has now been established which takes account of the proliferation of competition opportunities at regional, national and international levels. The complexity of the calendar is such that it incorporates the dates of all major World and European championships, the GB programme of championships and stage meets, ASA, District and County championships, British Grand Prix meets, English Schools Swimming Association championships and National Swimming League dates up to 2004 (ASA 2002: 19). The acknowledgement that such a radical programme of change will involve changing well-established attitudinal values, both for the athletes as well as administrators at all levels of the sport, is clear in the ASA's admission that the need to develop a truly integrated competition programme 'will be the subject of much debate and consultation over the winter' (ASA 2002: 19). An argument supported by the World Class Potential Director's admission that such change 'may well provide a headache for schedulers of club meets and regional competitions' (quoted in Ballard 2002: 23), as well as Lodewyke's (2002) report into recent changes to youth and age group competitions. Lodewyke points out that, while 'things are looking great for our top swimmers ... there is also a growing voice around the country that believes the ASA only cares about the cream of the crop and that there isn't enough emphasis on grass roots swimming' (2002: 25). Contentions reinforced, moreover, by Wendy Coles' suggestion that those involved at this grass roots level of swimming 'are resenting what the Start and Potential [Lottery programmes] people are telling them [with regard to] how they've got to run their events' (Interview: Wendy Coles, 19 March 2002). It appears, therefore, that concerns remain at the grass roots level of swimming with regard to the type and extent of value change required in relation to the competition opportunities and training regimes currently gaining credence at the sport's elite level.

Summary of key implications

It is clear that policy direction in swimming over the past decade has shifted and, in the introduction of National Lottery funding and changing values/belief systems, we have two potentially key sources of policy change. Arguably, these two sources of change underlie the putative development of an advocacy coalition, centring on an increasingly closed membership and a set of shared values/belief systems. These shared

values/belief systems permeate the increasingly professional-corporate approaches of the recently constituted ASFGB and the Lottery distributor, UK Sport – the two key organisational actors involved in setting the 'conditions of action' (Betts 1986) within which the elite level of swimming operates in the 21st century. Such contentions are further substantiated given the growing consensus surrounding the legitimacy of outcomes towards which the policy developments discussed earlier are directed: namely, Olympic medals or, more specifically, Olympic Gold medals (Hassall 2001: 26; and Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002). In other words, as Dalton et al. observe, the 'language of policy matters .... How things are named defines the sense of the problem and often circumscribes the nature of the solutions' (1996: 112). It is also clear that Weiss' (1977) notion of the 'enlightenment function' of policy research is instructive in any understanding of the nature of contemporary policy developments. The 1970 *Martin Report*, the 1987 policy review *Which Way Forward?* and, more recently, the *Mark Gay Report* and *Past Presidents' Commission* in 1998, are all ASA commissioned policy-related reviews that have contributed to the changing nature of the sport. For example, the 1998 *Mark Gay Report*, commissioned to investigate accountability issues within the ASA, argued that 'The difficulty facing all such associations is that in the last 10 years, sport has moved from the realm of voluntary amateur activity .... [and needs] to realise that, it too, is becoming a big and complicated business' (ASA 1998: 62).

It is clear, then, that over the time period investigated, there have been significant shifts in policy emphasis directed towards the ultimate goal of medal-winning performances at the highest level. The reconstitution of the ASFGB to a limited company and the setting up of the wholly-owned subsidiary company, High Performance Swimming Ltd are, arguably, the most concrete manifestations of these policy shifts (ASFGB 2001a: 2). Changing values and belief systems and the introduction of National Lottery funding have been identified as two key sources of change in this regard. The former is embodied in the sport's struggle to cast off the shackles of amateurism in all its different forms (cf. Allison, 2001) and in the emerging 'acceptance' of a rational-bureaucratic mode of operation (cf. Slack et al. 1994). The latter has provided tangible resources at an unprecedented level in British sport; thereby creating a financial framework within which key actors/organisations have been able to legitimise the rhetoric of change. In short, a degree of consensus is now developing over the legitimacy of policies directed towards elite performance at the highest level. Changes in four key elements of elite sport development are indicative of such change: i) the

ongoing development of 50 metre elite-focused swimming pools (rather then the tradition of building short-course 25 metre pools); ii) the emergence of 'full-time', or at least quasi-full-time, athletes; iii) the emergence of a coach-focused approach, not only at the elite level, but also throughout the sport, and the appointment of full-time sports science and sports medicine staff; and iv) the streamlining of the competition calendar in order for elite swimmers to produce optimum performances at World and Olympic events. As Bill Sweetenham argued on arrival in the UK as National Performance Director, British swimmers 'are being trained for short-term success in competitions that do not count on the national or world stage ... and [they] make no significant improvements at the competitions that count [Olympic Games/World Championships]' (quoted in ASFGBc 2002: 12).

Moreover, the implementation of World Class Potential and Start funding in England (and similar programmes in the other three home countries) for programmes below the elite level are instructive in highlighting the dynamic processes at work here, one aspect of which is the emergence of a powerful coalition of actors/organisations involved in putting in place initiatives centring on the pursuance of elite performances at major international championships. For example, the Potential programme, formerly funded by Sport England, and thus for English swimmers only, has now moved to a GB format (ASFGB 2002a: 4) and forms part of 'a fully integrated development model for age group/youth swimmers' to graduate to the senior team and onto the World Class Performance level of funding (ASA 2002: 15). In addition, a number of Regional Talent Camps for talent identification and development purposes have been set up in liaison with the World Class Potential Director and, interestingly, are now linked to the ASA's grass roots initiatives, such as Sport England's Active Sports programme (ASA 2002: 16). This integrated development model, or what might be described as a 'pathway to the podium', forms part of what the ASA term, a Competitive Development Continuum, at County, District and National levels (ASA 2002: 17).

In short, such evidence points to policy shifts *throughout* the sport with the clear aim of producing sustained medal-winning performances at the highest level. However, such a contention also raises questions surrounding provision (and a voice) for the recreational swimmer at the grass roots level given the ASA's and the ASFGB's statements that swimming is the largest participation sport in the UK with 11.9 million participating regularly (ASA 2001; ASFGB 2001b). The issue of resistance to change is thus brought

into sharp relief and we should be careful not to over-determine the extent of, and agreement with, policy shifts towards the elite level. Questions remain, for example, as to the potential for disparity between these latter policy shifts and the goals and aspirations of the sport's grass roots membership, such as the District/County Associations, the voluntary elected members serving on various ASA committees and coaches, teachers and young swimmers involved at a local authority level. For example, on the issue of encouraging young swimmers to embrace changes in age group swimming, i.e. the Continuing Development Continuum, the ASA acknowledge that 'not all the ideas were welcomed by everyone' (ASA 2002: 17). There is also potential for conflict between the various aquatic disciplines to consider. For example, on the one hand, the *Past Presidents' Commission* (ASA 1998: 36-37) reported that there was some concern regarding representation of a particular discipline's interests on the ASA Committee, while Wendy Coles suggested that 'swimming predominates, it makes more money' (Interview: 19 March 2002). On the other hand, as swimming is the larger sport, it can provide benefits for the smaller disciplines, such as access to the ASA's legal service, child protection and financial management (Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002). In other words, as Sparkes went on to state, 'there are tensions but overall the benefits outweigh the disadvantages'. In short, the evidence suggests that any resistance to the type of change outlined earlier remains amorphous in this respect; this may be due, in part, to disciplines such as diving and synchronised swimming aspiring towards similar change at the elite level (ASA 2002: 24-25). In sum, over the past five years in particular, the sport of swimming in the UK has witnessed considerable change in organisation and administration, as well as in the type of relationships the ASA/ASFGB enjoys with quasi-governmental sporting organisations such as Sport England and UK Sport. These relationships are now, in large part, contractual, with the distribution of funding shaped, in large part, by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.

UK Athletics

Organisation, administration and relationships

UK Athletics (UKA) is the governing body for the sport of athletics in the UK. Its remit encompasses the six disciplines of track and field, cross-country, fell and hill running, race walking, road running and tug-of-war. It is important to note, therefore, that while this research is concerned, primarily, with the policy processes and initiatives in track

and field, it is just one of six disciplines within the remit of UKA. It is also important to highlight aspects of the historical 'conditions of action' (Betts 1986) within which the organisation and administration of athletics in the UK has developed; these may have implications for more contemporary policy direction. Indeed, Ward has argued recently that 'There is no more diverse sport than athletics and the problems of diversity have been and are compounded by the Byzantine committee structures that have come about over the past century which have become sacred cows to so many' (2002e: 23). In 1932, the constitution of an International Board was drafted, representing England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, largely in response to the Scottish Amateur Athletic Association's application for independent membership of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF - renamed as the International Association of Athletics Federations in 2001), the struggle for control of the sport in Northern Ireland and the IAAF's stipulation that only one body would be accepted to represent the UK at international championships (Lovesey 1979: 67). The International Board became known as the British Amateur Athletic Board (BAAB) in 1937 and, while it is not appropriate to record in detail the history of the BAAB, its eventual demise in 1991 when faced with bankruptcy and the subsequent formation of a new body - the British Athletic Federation Ltd (BAF) - illustrates the struggle for power between the various constituent bodies involved in the sport.

The formation of the BAF in October 1991 was seen as a major step forward in overcoming the type of jurisdictional disputes hinted at above, the principal aim of which was to unite the various organisations charged with administering the sport of athletics in the UK. The formation of the BAF, however, did not proceed without difficulties. Questions in respect of power relations are raised here. With the BAF agreed in principle, and practically established, the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) fought to retain much of its power and authority, albeit under the new name of the AAA of England. As the former Chief Executive of the BAF related, much of this power and authority resides in the financial wealth of the AAA of England (Interview: Peter Radford, 28 May 2002). As the sport's largest (by club membership) and most prosperous organisation, the AAA (as it was then known) had come to the aid of the beleaguered BAAB in the late 1980s when faced with insolvency and it was now being asked to provide monies and to indemnify the BAF for the first five years of its operation. With disagreements over the BAF's draft constitution and distributions of funds to the other home nation Associations, this scenario is indicative of the parochial

nature of sport's governing bodies in the UK (cf. Allison 2001; Godfrey & Holtham 1999). By way of providing a practical insight into athletics' 'power struggles', Mike Whittingham, former international athlete and now a sports management consultant and radio commentator on athletics events, reveals how these issues have endured into the 21st century:

> Silly things, like tonight's meeting [Crystal Palace Grand Prix] which was traditionally owned by the Southern Counties of England. Every year they try and force some kind of legal case that UKA shouldn't have given the rights to Fast Track [UKA's events promotion company] and that some of the profits should be channelled back into the AAA, or the Southern Counties. You know, that's just one example of the historic problems that run through the sport (Interview: 23 August 2002).

The essence of the BAF was not only to provide a single autonomous body but also one which would give greater accountability to grass roots athletics, with clubs having a vote at the BAF's annual meeting. As the then spokesperson for the BAF, Tony Ward, commented, 'It will dodge the masonic order of the old constitution' (quoted in Gillingham 1991: 3). However, the BAF's short history (it was declared bankrupt in 1997) was plagued by a series of damaging events, the most damning of which were: power struggles between the various regions and home country associations; financial squabbles regarding payments to elite athletes; media condemnation over the discredited promotions director, Andy Norman; and the drug abuse case against the athlete, Diane Modahl. In short, the BAF was an organisation struggling to come to terms with a sport that had attracted increasingly large amounts of television and sponsorship monies throughout the 1980s - a period coined the 'Golden Decade' (Ward 1991) – a trend, moreover, which led inexorably towards professionalism and an elite group of 'professional athletes'. Duncan Mackay encapsulates these 'struggles' in the *Observer*:

> As the Nineties progressed, sponsors lost interest. The sport became more professional and the value of an athlete kept going up; but the amateurs, many of whom had been in positions of power for more than 30 years, continued to resist the need for more professional input. Behind many of the problems was the Amateur Athletic Association of England, whose main role seemed to be to resist change at every turn (1997b: 9).

The upshot of the above scenario was insolvency and the BAF went into administration in 1997 with debts of over £1 million. The AAA of England was once again called upon to provide financial aid for a body called UK Athletics 98, which managed the sport until January 1999, when the body now known as UK Athletics Ltd (UKA) was formed. Given

the history of organisational in-fighting described above it is not surprising that UKA outlined the following three principles underlying its purpose:

- 'It should **co-ordinate** and **support**, rather then intervene, govern or control;
- It should be designed to be **effective**, rather then be driven by political or representative concerns;
- It should have **defined and stronger links with clubs and athletes**' (UKA 2002a, original emphasis).

It was against this background that the sport of athletics, and UKA in particular, moved forward into the 21st century. The balancing of provision between grass roots levels of the sport, encompassing over 1500 clubs, and that of the elite level, with its focus on medal-winning performances at major international championships, is at the heart of UKA's remit today (UKA 2001). Moreover, as in the sport of swimming, it is also worth reiterating that, although the focus here is on track and field, UKA's remit also includes five other athletics disciplines. Therefore, in any analysis of policy processes underlying UKA's various relationships identified above, the actors and organisations involved in promoting and supporting these other disciplines may also require consideration.

Elite sport policy developments: An identification of potential sources of policy change

Development of elite level facilities

This section is primarily concerned with the development of track and field athletics in relation to the building or refurbishment of facilities and stadiums on a nationwide basis within which athletes can train and compete at the highest level. However, the construction of a national stadium capable of hosting athletics for major events such as the Olympic Games and World Athletics Championships is also worthy of consideration. The latter is of particular interest as the recent debates surrounding the policy processes underlying the refurbishment of Wembley Stadium as a venue for athletics, and the now defunct proposals for a dedicated athletics stadium and facilities at Picketts Lock in north London, raise questions as to the enduringly dysfunctional nature of athletics' organisation and administration. Up until the 1930s, when cinder tracks began to proliferate, track and field athletics took place primarily on grass tracks, a situation that remained largely unchanged until the 1960s. The first synthetic track in the UK was provided at Crystal Palace in 1967 and the growing popularity of track and field athletics

during the 1970s fuelled a concomitant growth in synthetic surfaces and, by 1986, there were over 100 synthetic tracks and over 400 cinder tracks in the UK (Farrell, quoted in Sports Council 1987b: 41). In 1987, the Sports Council hosted a National Seminar and Exhibition entitled *Athletics: On the Right Track*, out of which a number of policy documents were published (cf. Sports Council 1987a, 1987b). Facility provision was just one of a number of issues debated at the seminar and, interestingly, bearing in mind the earlier reference to the potential for disparity between the sport's disciplines, track and field was the focus 'rather than road running or cross-country' (Sports Council 1987a: 1). This extensive research audit also drew on Regional Councils for Sport and Recreation development plans and reports. A key finding from Yorkshire and Humberside's research, for example, which was conducted in the early 1980s, recommended that 'amongst other things ... priority should be given to the development of indoor facilities within the region' (Sports Council 1987a: 55). A point reiterated by the General Secretary of the AAA at the time, who argued that 'the big requirement in this country is for more indoor facilities' (Farrell, quoted in Sports Council 1987b: 42).

That the lack of indoor facilities has remained an enduring issue for the sport is clear from findings in a review of the development of athletics' organisation and administration in the late 1960s, which found that there were many 'expressions of regret that the facilities for the practice of indoor athletics are so few and far between' (Byers Report 1968: 28). Given the earlier description of the complex and often dysfunctional nature of athletics' organisational/administrative capabilities, it is perhaps not surprising that the 'big requirement' noted by the General Secretary of the AAA above has remained largely unresolved. In 1992, for example, Tony May reported in the *Guardian* that, although facilities improved dramatically in the 1980s due, in large part, to local authority investment, 'the UK still lags behind the rest of Europe' (1992: 36). However, perhaps the most disparaging attack on the issue of facilities has come from elite level athletes. As recently as February 2001, Duncan Mackay reported in the *Guardian* that the Olympic heptathlon champion, Denise Lewis, had branded Britain's facilities 'third world' (2001: 30). In the same report, Mackay also noted that, in Haringey where Lewis trains, 'she has no access to indoor facilities, the track is in a bad state, the weights room antiquated and the atmosphere generally not conducive to preparing for world-class performances'. Two key issues are signalled here: ownership and cost of facilities. The Sport Council's 1987 research, for example, found that the majority of tracks named by clubs belonged to local authorities (79 per cent, including

local education authority and joint provision) and 'that athletic facilities have placed a large burden on municipal finances' (Sports Council 1987a: 58, 71).

The sport's failure to rationalise its overly complex organisation and administration may, at least in part, be implicated here. Indeed, a 1983 Sports Council report - *Financing of Athletics in the UK* - stated that a situation 'in which 20 bodies manage, develop and control athletics and receive grant aid for these purposes, [does] not provide the most cohesive pattern throughout the United Kingdom because of the separation of functions among the many different bodies' (quoted in Sports Council 1987a: 22). The Sports Council's comments were made before the formation of the BAF in 1991, a key rationale of which was to engender this type of rationalisation. That the BAF and its successor, UKA, have not managed to overcome difficulties regarding finance is clear in a *Guardian* report almost 20 years on from the Sports Council's analysis in 1983. Duncan Mackay notes that 'UK Athletics simply does not have the financial resources to pay for the repair of tracks, which are normally owned by local authorities' (2001: 30). On the issue of balancing competing demands, Charles Gains, writing in *Athletics Weekly*, highlights differing aspirations throughout the sport, while at the same time signposts aspects of UKA's emerging emphasis on the elite level:

> For clubs it might mean assistance towards travelling costs, financial support for coaches to take courses, even help towards that ultimate of objectives – a 'clubhouse'. For UKA it probably means identifying talent, fast tracking likely medal hopes, creating development centres and prestige projects that grab immediate attention (Gains 2002: 50).

At the heart of these observations are questions of purpose in relation to the role of NGBs in the early 21st century. As UK Sport's Performance Services Manager for athletics explained, with regard to UK Sport's 'Modernisation' programmes for governing bodies, 'One of the key things I want to get out of the modernisation project is [for UKA and all NGBs) to go back to basics and identify what it is a governing body is here to do' (Interview: Jane Swan, 28 October 2002). There are conflicting views here as to UKA's current position in this process of change. On the one hand, Tony Ward, former Public and Media Relations Officer for both the BAAB and the BAF, argues that the emerging shift in emphasis towards the elite level, and the ramifications of such an emphasis for the future of the sport as a whole, is not an issue that the sport's hierarchy (UKA) currently want to embrace (Interview: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002). On the other hand, UK Sport's Jane Swan maintains that UKA has 'worked very hard ... to go out to the

home countries and talk to them and to understand their concerns, develop initiatives with them, to engage them much more in policy-making' (Interview: 28 October 2002).

On one level, while we might accept Jane Swan's argument that UKA has 'worked very hard' to deliver inclusive change across the sport, there is another level to this debate. That is, the sport's reliance on funding from quasi-governmental agencies. Indeed, Jane Swan has admitted that funding for NGBs is increasingly tied to meeting government-driven social policy objectives through sporting means (Interview: 28 October 2002). For UKA, then, the balancing of resources (here, with regard to facility development) across all levels of the sport is complicated by its lack of autonomy in implementing this functional aspect of its remit. The financial constraints within which UKA operates is clear if we consider that some 81 per cent of UKA's combined income for 2001-2002 was 'tied to the delivery of specific activities and programmes' (UKA 2003: 19); largely from Lottery monies, sponsorships and promotions (including television rights), all linked inextricably to the elite level. As UKA's Honorary Finance Director admitted two years earlier, 'less than one quarter of total income [could] be used on a discretionary basis and this reduces our ability to fund other programmes and activities that do not generate significant income' (quoted in UKA 2001: 18). This financial scenario, therefore, leaves little income for the type of grass roots facilities called for by Charles Gains (2002: 50) above, while the elite level now benefits from the ongoing development of facilities linked to the UKSI network of high performance centres (UKA 2001: 16). Indeed, on the issue of planning for athletics facilities for all levels of the sport, Tony Ward stated that 'There's never been a development plan. Well, they've written things down but no one has taken any notice of them and that's the most ridiculous thing. And they haven't really pushed for indoor facilities enough; there's been no drive' (Interview: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002; see also Sports Council 1987a: 87).

This perceived lack of drive within the sport's governing body with regard to the development of elite level facilities is perhaps indicative of the sport's failure to manage its organisational and administrative affairs over the years (Interviews: Peter Radford, 28 May 2002; Mike Whittingham, 23 August 2002). Arguably, this issue is also implicated in the sport's inability to present a coherent argument for a major national athletics stadium capable of staging a World Athletics Championship or an Olympic Games (Interview: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002). While it is not appropriate to discuss in detail the labyrinthine policy processes underlying the debates surrounding failed

attempts to secure either Wembley Stadium or Picketts Lock as potential venues, this issue does raise the question of the sport's ability to fund its own facility provision. As Ward notes, 'Yet again our governing body seems to have been sidelined, even isolated, and one of the reasons, I suspect, is that UK Athletics has little or no funding of its own' (2002e: 21). A membership scheme, which would provide the sport with much needed self-sufficiency, was mooted as long ago as 1968 (Byers Report 1968: 17). However, in the mid-1990s, a BAF strategic review and consultation document (*Athletics 21*) found that 'the willingness to pay a realistic price, through, for example, club subscriptions, is very low' (BAF 1995: 35; and Interview: Peter Radford, 28 May 2002). The power struggles between the sport's leading organisations are at the heart of resistance to such a scheme. As Ward notes, 'the opposition to a membership scheme ... stems from the suspicions of the AAA of England and the territories to central authority' (2002e: 22). Arguably, differing values, principles and belief systems are at the heart of the struggle to win support for such a scheme, which might help to alleviate concerns regarding under-funded facilities at club level.

On the one hand, the values embodied at a 'central authority' level (e.g. UKA and its High Performance Directorate) centre on professionalism, commercialism and corporate objective-setting in relation to the sport's elite athletes. On the other hand, grass roots values are epitomised by club officials and volunteers at local/regional levels and which appear to remain entrenched in notions of a bygone era of amateurism and voluntarism. Such a contention is borne out by findings in *Athletics 21*, which revealed that club officers, and other volunteers with close club connections, felt threatened by 'a sense of loss for the tradition of amateurism and the values associated with it' (BAF 1995: 20). Indeed, *Athletics 21* provides specific evidence from these club officers and volunteers, with one stating that 'The elite are eroding all the grass roots values of the sport because there is so much concentration on their money' (quoted in BAF 1995: 20). In sum, it appears, then, that National Lottery funding, introduced in the mid-1990s, has provided a significant impetus for the development of elite facilities linked to the UKSI's network of high performance centres (UKA 2001: 16). Lottery funding is also providing UKA with £50 million to aid the implementation of its 1998 £80 million National Facility Strategy. This strategy is, in part, addressing the paucity of indoor athletics facilities as one element of a development programme comprising some 27 new projects across the country (UKA 1998). Concerns remain, however, as to the provision of facilities for the majority of the sport's club athletes (Interview: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002) and, even

where Lottery funding is targeted at grass roots levels, the structure of the sport is changing in such a way that this funding (e.g. World Class Potential/Start and Active Sports programmes) is merely creating clearer pathways, opportunities and facilities for those who aspire to achieve at the highest level. A clear example of this changing structure is provided in UKA's 2001 Annual Review, which reported on the progress of its five-year development strategy 'Fun to Fulfilment' (launched in 2000), and which purports to support the development of opportunities for all involved in the sport. However, as UKA acknowledge, 'its *primary* objective is to establish a clear pathway of development activity for young people' (UKA 2001: 10, emphasis added).

Emergence of 'full-time' athletes

This section considers the emergence of track and field athletes as full-time performers, in contradistinction to the '"Roger Bannister" image of athletics, when the competitors were gallant young men (sic) who fitted training into their careers' (Allison 2000: 148-149). Moreover, this is an issue that cannot be disentangled from the wider debates surrounding notions of amateurism, professionalism and commercialism in sport, in general. Allison (2001: 165-170) has termed the period 1885-1961 as one of 'amateur hegemony', which aptly characterises the overall approach to the organisation and administration of athletics during these years. Allison suggests that 'the decline of amateurism' in sport occurred during the period 1961-1995; a contention supported in the UK, and for athletics, by findings in the 1968 *Byers Report*. This report cited Sports Council research in 1966 into the organisation and administration of sports clubs and regional/county/national associations and argued that 'it is evident that willing but overworked voluntary officials badly need the support of full-time staff' (quoted in Byers Report 1968: 34). The emergence of full-time athletes, then, should be viewed as but one tangent of the sport's attempts to shed the shackles of amateurism in all its myriad forms. The equivocal nature of this process is underlined in the 1996 British Athletics Yearbook, which highlights the careers of athletes such as Brendan Foster and David Bedford in the 1970s, and suggests that 'their successes coincided with the onset of the professional era; whether or not everyone involved in athletics recognised and accepted it at the time' (Mackay 1996: 210-211).

In 1980, the selection of Juan Samaranch as President of the International Olympic Commission (IOC) was, arguably, a significant moment for the emergence of full-time athletes. Interestingly, Allison notes that Samaranch 'had little interest in strict interpretations of the amateur principle' (2001: 169) and the President's equivocal

approach to this issue is clear in the IOC's acceptance of a proposal from the IAAF in 1982/1983 that athletes should be allowed to earn money from the sport. However, the outcome of the IAAF's proposal was characteristic of the sport's enduring ambiguity over the issue of amateurism. Athletes were now permitted to earn money but these earnings were to be placed in a trust fund controlled by their national association or federation. In the UK, the British Amateur Athletic Board (BAAB) administered this trust fund, and athletes could draw on these funds only for 'valid athletic expenses', which covered living costs such as food, transport and accommodation, as well as expenses for sports equipment and clothing, insurance, medical treatment and coaching services (BAAB 1986: 1-2). It should also be noted that this was a period characterised by what was known as 'shamateurism' – typified by payments to athletes not sanctioned by the sports governing bodies and International Federations (Interview: Peter Radford, 28 May 2002; see also Allison 2001). David Moorcroft, former Olympic athlete and current Chief Executive of UKA, encapsulates the ambiguity over athlete payments during the late 1970s and early 1980s:

> ... the first substantial payment I remember was [US]$150 for racing in a meeting in Zurich [1976] ... It worried me, and I actually lost sleep over whether I'd done something wrong and would lose my amateur status .... In 1982 they invented trust funds ... [which were] interpreted pretty liberally by the athletics authorities but not by the Inland Revenue, so there were two completely different definitions of income in operation and you had to be very careful (quoted in Allison 2001: 99).

As discussed, the emergence of full-time 'professional' athletes cannot be disentangled from the interrelated issue of the commercialisation of athletics. From the defining moment in the early 1980s when the IAAF sanctioned trust funds for athletes, athletics authorities in the UK have restructured a traditionally amateur sport, albeit in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, into a sport that is now openly professional and commercial in nature. However, this restructuring of the sport is characterised by a complicated and difficult process. Of particular concern, is a trend that began in the mid-1980s: the ability of a small number of elite athletes to command remuneration in the form of appearance fees, prize money and sponsorship deals. In short, athletics was now a commodity to be sold and the most valuable aspect of this complex commodity was the elite athlete. The commercial attractiveness of the sport peaked in the mid- to late 1980s, with ITV's commitment of £10.5 million for a five-year television contract in 1985 indicative of the large amounts of money coming into the sport at this time (Watman 2002: 24). The elite athlete was the chief beneficiary of this conjunction with the commercial world (Interview: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002).

The sport's attractiveness to commercial interests also led to the setting up of a number of Grand Prix athletics events across Europe, staged by private organisations that negotiated worldwide television contracts, and which gave these organisations the resources to meet the high prices demanded from the select group of athletes that the events hoped to attract. This aspect of structural change had dire consequences for the BAF in the 1990s. As Mackay reported in the *Observer* in 1995, the BAF struggled to compete with the amounts of money generated by the Grand Prix organisers; British elite athletes failed to compete in home competitions and television and sponsorship money 'started to run dry after the 1993 season' (1995: 11).

Table 7.2 GB/NI athletics medals: Olympic Games/World Athletics Championships, 1988-2001

	Olympic Games					World Athletics Championships			
	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total		Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total
1988	0	5	2	7					
					1995	2	1	1	4
1992	2	0	4	6					
					1997	1	1	0	2
1996	0	4	2	6					
					1999	1	4	2	7
2000	2	2	2	6					
					2001	1	0	1	2

The BAF attempted to rectify this potentially crippling situation by offering contracts to the elite few in order that they could afford to resist the temptation to compete too often (abroad), the resulting effect of which was physical exhaustion and thus detrimental to performances when competing for GB/NI at major international events. The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games was, arguably, the sport's nadir in this respect (at least in the media), with British athletes winning just six medals, none of which was Gold (see Table 7.2). While the Atlanta Olympics might represent a nadir for the sport, an interesting tangential perspective on this event is provided by the former Head of Development at the then English Sports Council. Dr Anita White explained that 'In policy terms, we've said that one of the catalysts for the [increased] emphasis on elite sport was the poor performance at the [Atlanta] Olympic Games, and the media outcry that ensues from that' (Interview: 26 February 2002). Instructively, Anita White went on to add that the present Government, in particular, 'is very sensitive to what the media are saying and you have to see the media as big players in the policy process'. Such comments from a practitioner closely involved with developing sports policy lends credence to the advocacy coalition framework's inclusion of 'journalists as potential

members of advocacy coalitions' and who might contribute to the pursuit of 'common policy objectives' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 127). Here, the 'common policy objectives' can be conceived of as the construction of a framework within which elite athletes might train and compete on a full-time basis towards the eventual outcome of medal-winning performances at major world sporting events.

The mid-1990s also witnessed the Conservative Government's sport policy document *Sport: Raising the Game* (Department of National Heritage [DNH] 1995) which signalled a significant sea-change in British sport policy. Whereas the setting-up of the Sports Council in the early 1970s heralded initiatives largely concerned with mass participation and Sport for All programmes, *Sport: Raising the Game* focused on two key areas: young people and sporting excellence (cf. Allison 2001; Houlihan 1997). This emerging focus on the elite level was maintained by the Labour party's policy statement on sport - *A Sporting Future for All* (DCMS 2000). Alongside the relatively poor performances in Atlanta (and not only confined to athletics) and the emerging focus on the elite level, at least at government (DNH and then DCMS) and quasi-governmental levels (Sport England and UK Sport), the significance of the introduction of the National Lottery in 1994 is instructive. The subsequent Lottery funding streams, currently administered through UK Sport to NGBs at the World Class Performance level, was the final part of a conjunction of events which have resulted in the sport of athletics (excluding disability athletics) benefiting from £2,800,000 for the period April 2002–March 2003; monies which help to support (as of September 2002) 82 athletes at this level (UK Sport 2002a).

There is a certain paradox to the events described above. Arguably, 1997 was a defining moment for the sport, as the BAF was declared insolvent due, in large part, to its failure to adjust to the new demands of a sport that was now openly professional and intensely commercial. Significantly, the BAF owed £600,000 to Britain's elite performers and £200,000 to 'overseas stars' (Frecknall et al. 1997: 12). In essence, the failure of the BAF was due largely to its inability to manage the growing financial demands of the sport's elite athletes (Interview: Peter Radford, 28 May 2002). The paradox is that the upshot of the resultant organisational and administrative restructuring has merely served to reinforce the notion that it is the policy initiatives surrounding this elite group (who might now be termed full-time athletes) that now commands the attention, not only of the sport's governing body but also of government-sponsored organisations such

as Sport England and UK Sport. A contention supported by revelations that, as the BAF went into administration, there had been pressure placed on the sport's authorities by the government's sporting agencies to operate in a more professional manner (Interview: Mike Whittingham, 23 August 2002). On this issue, Tony Ward has also argued that

> Sport England saw the mess that the amateurs made of the BAF, and the terrible in-fighting which brought it down, and Sport England determined that, when the new organisation [UKA] came into being ... funded via tax payers' money and by Lottery funding, they weren't going to have any nonsense. They were going to appoint professional staff; it would be a professional organisation from top to bottom (Interview: 30 April 2002).

Indeed, a compelling aspect of the BAF's demise, and the subsequent restructuring of the sport's organisation and administration during the late 1990s, was the setting-up of a company called Performance Athlete Services Ltd (PAS)[1], charged with managing Lottery funding for elite athletes (Interviews: Peter Radford, 28 May 2002; Mike Whittingham, 23 August 2002). The setting-up of PAS, in 1997, amidst the financial collapse of the BAF was, arguably, a prominent factor in the emerging emphasis of support for, and 'protection' of, the sport's elite athletes (Interview: Mike Whittingham, 23 August 2002). As Mackay reported in 1998, '[PAS] received the £10m Lottery money and ensured that the funds were kept away from the BAF' (1998a: 24). Moreover, as Frecknall et al. noted in 1997, 'the 195 or more elite athletes plus the four coaching directors recently appointed under performance director Malcolm Arnold are the only people in the sport who are at all sure of what the future holds' (1997: 12).

Moreover, if results at major international events such as the Olympics Games are the benchmark of a 'healthy' sport in the early 21st century, then the six medals won in Sydney 2000, two of which were Gold, reveal a marked improvement on the performance four years earlier – see Table 7.2. Questions remain, however, as to whether the benchmark (and increasingly funding) for a 'healthy' sport should be so heavily weighted towards the number of medals won by an elite few, who benefit, not only from the support systems linked to Lottery funding but also from the ability to capitalise financially from quasi-public monies through the various commercial opportunities open to them. That there is an enduring resistance from grass roots activists in the sport to the types of funding-related policy initiatives directed towards the elite level was brought into sharp relief in the BAF's strategic review of athletics in 1995. The following comment is indicative of views from club officers and volunteers

who contributed to the review, 'How can it be right that some athletes are making obscene amounts of money while I stand out in the rain for three nights a week for nothing?' (quoted in BAF 1995: 20). To sum up, UKA, the sport's revamped governing body, remains tainted with suspicions that market forces and the drive for international success are paramount but to the detriment of grass roots levels of the sport. Underpinning such a suspicion is the inevitable conclusion that athletics at the elite level is increasingly dominated by what we can now term, a cadre of full-time elite athletes. There is a certain (pecuniary) inevitably about the types of values underlying such a conclusion. As the 400 metre runner, Iwan Thomas, argued in a *Guardian* interview, 'To be successful you have to be full-time and to be full-time you need a financial base' (quoted in Mackay 1997a: 7).

Developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine

While the period under review considers developments over the past 30 years, and the past 10 to 12 years, in particular, it is worth noting that, with regard to coaching, the 'real breakthrough in British coaching was the BAAB report that set up the first AAA summer school at Loughborough in 1934' (Lovesey 1979: 120). Coaching development, however, remained 'rooted in the teaching of teachers and the coaching of coaches' (Interview: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002) and little attention was given to coaches working explicitly with athletes or linking coaching and performance planning at the highest level; a situation also characterised by a perceived lack of status for the coach by the sport's amateur administrators (Sports Council 1991: 11). Thus, the development of coaches progressed in a piecemeal fashion and the increasing cost of administering coaching schemes almost resulted in bankruptcy for the AAA; the BAAB finally taking responsibility for coaching, on a UK-wide basis, in 1972 (Lovesey 1979: 123). This is not to argue that coaching had by this time developed into a coherently managed and well-structured profession, although the British Association of National Coaches (BANC, renamed British Institute of Sports Coaches in 1988) was formed in 1965 in order to bring together professional national coaches of all sports.

Coaching development in athletics, then, appears to have been bedevilled by disagreements between coaches and administrators, as well as by the methods used by coaches over the years. As Tony Ward revealed, athletics coaching from 1948 - when Geoff Dyson was appointed Chief Coach - to 1961 - when Dyson resigned following clashes with the amateur officials running the sport - was very much 'theory based' (Interview: 30 April 2002; see also Radford et al. 1989). Consequently, the two senior

coaches who succeeded Dyson - John Le Masurier and Denis Watts - were constrained by the sport's lack of enthusiasm for coaching innovators and their methods. In short, coaching development stagnated, at least until Frank Dick's appointment as Director of Coaching in 1978. Yet, despite Dick's undoubted contribution to British athletics coaching throughout the Golden Decade of the 1980s (Ward 1991), reservations remained regarding his approach. Tony Ward, for example, argued that 'to be truthful about it Frank didn't bring in all that much innovation either. So we get to the late 1980s and into the 1990s and the [coaching] scheme was almost as it was back in 1948' (Interview, 30 April 2002). Moreover, commenting on Dick's resignation in 1994, a leading athletics official stated that 'People have vastly over-estimated his [Dick's] worth to the sport in this country ... he never devoted all his energies to British athletics' (quoted in Hubbard 1994: 11).

The 1980s was undoubtedly a successful decade, at least in terms of medal-winning performances at the Olympic Games (although it should be remembered that both the 1980 and 1984 Games were subject to boycotts from some of the major sporting nations), and Frank Dick was credited with setting-up a National Coaching Strategy in the late 1970s, of which the UK Coaching Scheme was arguably the most prominent manifestation (Sports Council 1987a: 76). Moreover, the formation of the National Coaching Foundation (NCF) in 1983 was the first real indication that the development of coaching as a profession was now an issue of real priority for sport's administrators in the UK. Indeed, in 1988, the Sports Council stated that the setting up of the NCF and its associated network of National Coaching Centres throughout the UK was 'one of the major successes of the past five years' but with the caveat that there was 'still far to go' (Sports Council 1988: 49). This caveat was acknowledged in an earlier publication, jointly produced by the BANC and the NCF which argued, *inter alia*, for a more professionalised approach to coaching and an improved support structure underpinned by a network of resource bases, including sports science and medicine (BANC/NCF 1987). This last report was thus significant in that it was perhaps the first serious attempt to address the role that sports science and sports medicine disciplines might play in creating a more holistic approach to the development of athletes in the UK.

The issues identified above by the Sports Council, the NCF and the BANC in relation to coaching, in general, were also highlighted as issues of concern for the sport of athletics at this time. Moreover, there was some indication that the sport was not only beginning

to address such concerns but also that these be articulated more clearly in relation to the elite level. In 1984, for example, Frank Dick published a review of the sport's National Coaching Strategy, within which proposals for a National Performance Strategy were outlined (BAAB 1984). This appears to be the first indication that a structured and co-ordinated approach to coaching development was imperative to achieving success at major international events. As Frank Dick argued in the late 1980s, 'The precept central to a National Coaching and Performance Plan is that a *national* scheme to provide a *local* service for the cutting edge of performance development – quality coach/athlete contact – is in pursuit of achievement in the *international* arena' (quoted in Sport Council 1987b: 10, original emphasis). Frank Dick's comments can be viewed as an attempt to garner support at club level, with the ultimate aim of medal-winning success at international sporting events. This has proved to be an enduringly difficult objective given the earlier discussion of the sport's organisational and administrative parochialism, most notably evident in the power struggles over the formation of a UK-wide governing body for athletics (cf. Byers Report 1968; Evans 1989; Evans Report 1986; Paige 1989; Turner Report 1983). That concerns remained as to the direction and nature of coaching development in athletics is evident from contributions to the 1989 *Independent Review of Coaching* (Radford et al. 1989). In short, the review called for a complete restructuring of coaching, citing disharmony and fragmentation in the sport's organisation and administration as key concerns.

Moreover, reflecting earlier comments that coaching development had for too long been reliant on theory, the 1989 review also quoted numerous views within the sport that there was 'too much emphasis on the academic development of coaches' (quoted in Radford et al. 1989: 67; see also Sports Council 1987: 81), whilst also criticising the lack of commitment by athletics coaches to the resources provided by the NCF. However, coaching development concerns were not only confined to the sport of athletics at this time. In 1991, the Sports Council published a major review of coaching in the UK entitled, *Coaching Matters* (Sports Council 1991). While this report was not confined to issues specific to coaching development in athletics, Peter Radford, then Chairman of the BAAB and Frank Dick, BAAB's Director of Coaching were two key contributors. *Coaching Matters* is notable in the context of this discussion for a number of reasons. Firstly, the breadth of coverage regarding coaching development and its reiteration of enduring concerns on this issue merely serves to highlight the lack of change and indeed stasis in the organisation and administration of many sports in the UK. Secondly,

and clearly related to the first point, in the Chairman's *Foreword*, Peter Radford called for the review to 'be a catalyst not only to bring about changes in coaching but to create closer relationships between coaches and performers on the one hand ... and the administrators ... on the other' (quoted in Sports Council 1991: 5). Thirdly, there is an explicit acknowledgement that the overly complex structure and administration of British sport is implicated in the failure to address this issue with the alacrity it deserved. Fourthly, and perhaps most significantly for this study, the review acknowledges a change of emphasis towards the elite level by Sports Councils and local authorities and the implications of this changing emphasis for coach education and development. Finally, the report argues that 'there has to be nation-wide access to sports science and sports medicine services' as part of an integrated and co-ordinated approach to the development of athletes (Sports Council 1991: 6).

This last point refers to an issue that has been neglected in athletics' major internal policy reviews over the past 30 years, and remains an issue worthy of further research. However, Tony Ward provides evidence that helps to explain such neglect in suggesting that a report produced in 2000 but not widely distributed (the *Genesis Report*) raised serious questions regarding the governance of UKA. Ward reveals that 'There was a big battle over this [the *Genesis Report*] and everyone tried to keep it quiet and hushed up, and we all knew it was highly critical of Max Jones [High Performance Director] and the PAS [Performance Athlete Services Ltd] team' (Interview: 30 April 2002). More specifically, Ward also explained that the *Genesis Report* revealed 'that one of the great neglected areas of British athletics was sports science. Up until then, they'd pretty well ignored things like sports psychology, sports science and all the rest of it. Frank Dick certainly ignored it throughout his tenure'. Ward's argument is reinforced by comments from Peter Coe, the father and coach of former Olympic athlete Sebastian Coe, in an *Observer* article in 1994. Peter Coe was commenting on his involvement with the South of England's elite coaching scheme, which was part of a national programme set up by Frank Dick prior to his resignation in 1994. More pertinently, Coe stated that 'The idea of actually sitting down and sharing experiences, training information and anything new in sports science – in short the very keys to success – was never mentioned' (Coe 1994: 9).

More recent evidence supports the argument. Commenting specifically on a lack of sports medicine provision in the UK, one of the country's leading 400 metre runners

argued that the country lacks a dedicated rehabilitation centre or a network of centres where elite athletes could be accommodated while receiving an intensive course of treatment. Indeed, Mark Richardson concludes that 'The current medical situation in this country is unacceptable' (Richardson 2002: 15). In relation to this, UKA has implemented a review of sports medicine support following the poor performance of the GB/NI team at the Edmonton World Athletics Championships in 2001 (cf. Powell 2001: 2). Just two medals were won in Edmonton: the worst performance ever at a World Athletics Championship event. Interestingly, Dean Kenneally, formerly employed by the Australian Institute of Sport, has now been recruited by UKA; thus highlighting the potential for the transfer of policy ideas in sports medicine to athletics in the UK. It is clear, then, that concerns remain as to the development of, and provision for, coaching, sports science and sports medicine, despite the significant impetus provided by National Lottery monies in this element of elite athlete programming. Indeed, UKA's 2001 Annual Review cites the significance of the introduction, in January 2001, of the Lottery-funded World Class Potential Plan, and the establishment of high performance centres, a regional performance identification and programme structure, and the organisation of 'World class medical and sport science services', as key Lottery-funded developments (UKA 2001: 5).

The past decade has thus witnessed quite radical change in the structural framework surrounding the provision of coaching, sports science and sport medicine in the sport of athletics, while the introduction of Lottery funding has provided the sport with the tangible resources to implement such change (Interview: Jane Swan, 28 October 2002). Changing values, principles and belief systems, which underlie the sport's organisation and administration, have also facilitated the legitimation of outcomes that these changes seek to elicit: that is, medal-winning performances at the Olympic Games, in particular. The BAF's mid-1990s strategic review explicitly investigated the changing nature of the values underlying the sport: in short, the shift from values linked with notions of amateurism and voluntarism, to those associated with professionalism and commercialism (BAF 1995: 20). The 1995 review exposed antagonisms between the sport's grass roots level club members - who are more closely linked to the traditional values of amateurism and voluntarism – and the growing cadre of elite athletes and professional staff – who have embraced (and benefited from) the types of values linked to professionalism and commercialism (BAF 1995: 29, 36). A recent consultative report published by UK Sport - *The Development of Coaching in the United Kingdom* - (UK

Sport 1999) is also instructive in helping to outline the emerging framework within which the sport of athletics is increasingly operating. This report raises three points worthy of note and which help to sum up this section.

Firstly, the report is significant in that it illustrates the changing conditions of action within which sport, generally, is developing in the UK: in short, the shift in emphasis towards the elite level over the past decade. It notes, for example, that the 1991 *Coaching Matters* review 'did not address some critical areas such as the development of coaches working with high performance athletes' (UK Sport 1999: 1). Moreover, a number of 'fundamental developments' in relation to coaching are noted in the 1999 report that are significant in the context of this research. These include: i) 'The priority of the new United Kingdom Sports Council (UK Sport) to be the development of excellence'; ii) 'The redefining of the priorities of the home nation Sports Councils to be youth sport and the development of excellence' (UK Sport 1999: 9; and Interview: Anita White, 26 February 2002); and perhaps most significantly iii) These developments are 'taking place in an environment where there is growing pressure for success and winning medals' (UK Sport 1999: 3, 8).

Secondly, there is an explicit acknowledgement of the requirement to integrate sports science/medicine support into the coaching environment, with a specific emphasis on the needs of 'high performance athletes and their coaches' (UK Sport 1999: 43). Thirdly, the report points to some of the enduring concerns with which athletics has had to contend over the years and which, if continued, will have a detrimental effect on the performance of athletes at the highest level. Two notable concerns are the structure and complexity of the organisation and administration of sport in the UK and the traditional divisions between the disciplines of coaching, sports science and sports medicine (UK Sport 1999:). Finally, that concerns persist as to the adequacy of coaching, generally, in the UK is clear from the latest review of coaching published in 2002 by the DCMS. In the review's *Foreword*, Sports Minister, Richard Caborn, observes that 'Much good work on coach education has been done in the United Kingdom, but there is a need for a concerted effort to improve the quality and quantity of coaches in all sports' (quoted in DCMS 2002: 2).

Competition opportunities for elite level athletes

On the issue of competition structures and opportunities for elite level athletes it is worth noting that a recent announcement by UKA on this element of elite sport

development acknowledged that 'the existing structure is a confused organisation to those participating, with an overload of fixtures resulting in falling levels of participation and volunteer support' (UKA 2000: 1). Yet, the issue of competition structures/opportunities does not appear to have been a major concern for the sport over the years, at least as evidenced in the key policy-related documents reviewed here. It was an issue addressed, albeit briefly, in the 1968 *Byers Report* which argued that 'there is an urgent need for the introduction by the BAF of a co-ordinated competition structure on which clubs can base their activities' (Byers Report 1968: 26). It is reasonable to contend that this is an issue that has been largely neglected (or at least failed to be resolved) by the sport's leading authorities due to the discussed organisational complexity and over-concentration on its own internal workings. Thus, there has been much debate over facility development, coaching provision, participation and, more latterly, concerns with the elite level and its attendant support services, such as sports science and sports medicine required to achieve success in the international arena but relatively little regarding competition structures/opportunities.

This is not to argue that over the time period considered this issue has not been seen as worthy of comment from various participants involved in policy deliberations within the sport. In 1987, for example, Frank Dick argued that club competition had limited value as preparation for the international arena, while suggesting that 'The door had to be opened to graduated competitive opportunity beyond national level for those athletes who were ready for the experience' (quoted in Sports Council 1987b: 7). Here, Frank Dick referred to the entrepreneurial skills of Andy Norman who was active in promoting international events for the sport throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In the same year (1987), Alan Pascoe, former Olympic athlete, but speaking here in his capacity as head of the sponsorship company, Alan Pascoe Associates Ltd, argued that the success of the sport throughout the 1980s was due to a 'well-developed competition structure', and linked the latter to the types of events organised by promoters such as Andy Norman (quoted in Sports Council 1987b: 74). Arguably, these observations provide a somewhat selective reading of the structure of competition opportunities for athletes in the UK. Indeed, it was noted earlier that the BAF faced bankruptcy in the mid- to late 1990s, with much of the blame for the organisation's financial mismanagement put down to competition structures at the elite level and the large amounts of money paid to athletes in the form of appearance fees and prize money. In short, the BAF had

struggled to balance the competing priorities of the majority (grass roots levels) and the few (elite athletes). Two factors are important in this regard.

Firstly, this situation resulted in too many similar international meetings staged for the elite: the upshot being a downturn in public interest and thus less income for the BAF. Secondly, the UK's elite athletes were increasingly reluctant to compete in these (BAF-staged) home internationals, preferring instead to compete abroad for higher rewards (Mackay 1995: 11). At the heart of this issue are two key concerns: i) the number and complexity of competitive opportunities at all levels open to athletes in the UK; thus raising the question as to whether such opportunities allow athletes to develop in an appropriate way (Vince 1997: 4); and ii) clearly related to the first concern, is the argument that competition structures favour the elite athlete (Ward 2002b: 50). Ward suggests that the athletics calendar should start later than the traditional May meetings (when the weather is often inclement), which would then allow the season to extend into August/September. That this does not happen, Ward argues, is because 'our whole fixture calendar is geared to those few ... who carry the flag at major championships. About [0.] 001 per cent of the athletic population at a reasonable guess' (2002b: 50). In other words, the months of August/September are left free of competition for the benefit of elite athletes to compete at events such as the Olympic Games and World Athletics Championships, which are typically staged during these months. The paradox of this situation is that many of the elite athletes cited by Tony Ward above do not compete in the various events held in April/May. In short, there is no logical reason why these events might not be staged later in the season. For Tony Ward, then, the structure of competition opportunities for athletes in the UK is increasingly premised upon elite level objectives:

> The sport's competition structure is about the drive for medals. That's what the government wants. That's what Sport England wants. So the whole thing is geared, and it has been in athletics, towards that because jobs are at stake ... that's not the way a sport should be judged, but it is unfortunately (Interview: 30 April 2002).

In sum, the evidence suggests that the role of UKA in the structuring of competition opportunities is symptomatic of the type of organisational stasis underlying the administration of athletics in the UK referred to throughout. At the same time, this element of elite sport development in athletics might also be indicative of an emerging trend towards a strengthening of a coalition of actors and organisations centring on the

elite level but with little regard for the deleterious consequences this may have for the sport's grass roots levels.

Summary of key implications

This section provides a summary of the key implications for UKA with regard to changes in the sport over the past 30 years and, in particular, to the emerging changes in respect of elite sport policy over the past 10 to 12 years. Consideration is also given to the wider policy-making process within which UKA operates: the changing nature of its relationship with governmental sporting agencies such as Sport England and UK Sport is a key aspect of this debate. Questions have been raised in the preceding discussion in relation to organisational and administrative effectiveness, accountability, power relations and the distribution of (primarily financial) resources. From this preceding discussion, it is clear that the past decade, in particular, has witnessed quite radical changes in the conditions of action within which elite sport policy developments in athletics have emerged. The two key sources of change identified in the earlier account of the sport of swimming and the ASA/ASFGB have also emerged as crucial vehicles for change in relation to UKA and athletics. Namely, changing values and belief systems and the introduction of National Lottery funding.

Changes in four key elements of elite sport signify such developments: i) the ongoing development of facilities, in particular indoor facilities, funded primarily by the National Lottery. In addition, a large part of the recent (in 2002) £40 million injection of funds - the bulk of which will come from Sport England's Lottery fund – is to be targeted at facility development as a 'legacy' of the government's broken election manifesto promise to provide a suitable venue for the 2005 World Athletics Championships (UK Sport 2002d); ii) the emergence of 'full-time' athletes - 82 athletes are currently (as of September 2002) funded through the World Class Performance programme for the period April 2002–March 2003 (UK Sport 2002a). However, as was the case for swimming, the notion of 'full-time' remains a relative term here as a number of these athletes continue to work in other employment, either, full- or part-time (cf. Ward 2002c: 21; and Interview: Peter Radford, 28 May 2002); iii) the emergence of a more structured and integrated approach to coaching development and sports science/medicine provision; and iv) in respect of the sport's competition calendar, the UKA review, commissioned to investigate its 'confusing organisation', may well help to allay Ward's concerns that elite level requirements remain of paramount importance.

It is perhaps unsurprising that policy change in both sports discussed thus far can be traced back to similar sources, as the NGBs involved have experienced similar jurisdictional power struggles over who controls the sport. The governing bodies in both swimming and athletics have struggled with the transition from organisations imbued with an amateur/voluntary ethos to organisations analogous to corporate companies. This is an important point, as it raises notions of power relations and, crucially, invokes the following questions in relation to policy change: i) What is the nature of the conditions within which these changes have taken place? and ii) In whose interests are decisions made that affect eventual policy outcomes? These are complex questions to resolve and are dealt with in more depth in the final chapter. However, some brief comments here help to guide the final chapter's analysis and, in so doing, help to illustrate the policy processes underlying change in the sport of athletics. The two key sources of change identified above appear to be crucial in the embryonic development of a policy community or an advocacy coalition of actors and organisations at the elite level; a coalition characterised by an increasingly closed membership with shared values and belief systems.

Following Marsh & Rhodes' (1992a) notion of a policy community and Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith's (1999) development of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), there appears to be evidence of an emerging consensus over the type of values that underlie increasingly legitimised outcomes at the elite level of athletics: namely, the acceptance of the construction of pathways through which identified promising youngsters can progress. The clear aim or, in other words, the legitimised outcome of this changing structural framework for athletics, is medal-winning success at major international events. This outcome is increasingly dependent upon UKA meeting funding-related objectives substantially determined by the DCMS and UK Sport/Sport England. Moreover, although one group may dominate, it must be a 'positive-sum game' if a policy community or advocacy coalition is to persist (cf. Marsh & Rhodes 1992a; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999) – thus also drawing attention to the relational aspects of power set out in Chapter 3. In short, the positive-sum game is manifest in the growing consensus around the legitimate outcome of medal-winning success at major international events. The nature of these relationships has resonance with Allison's observation that

> The new forms of pyramids and leagues fit into a chain of command from the government to the Sports Councils, to the National Associations, leagues and clubs. The purposes of this

> chain have to do with 'excellence' and 'youth development', from government down, the motive of each actor is to be seen to be pursuing the goal of national success (2001: 153).

The contention here is that these changing relationships centre on a 'consensual battle' over the nature of the values, principles and belief systems underlying future policy direction in the sport. Questions surrounding resistance to a shift from the once-dominant values of amateurism/voluntarism to those of professionalism/commercialism are at the heart of debates that stem from this issue. More specifically, an unwillingness to accept the notion that the sport of athletics should be structured in such a way that 'excellence' is the only outcome of participation and commitment remains an issue of concern (cf. McDonald 1995, 2000; and Interview: Peter Radford, 28 May 2002). As discussed, questions surrounding values, principles and belief systems were a key aspect of the BAF's strategic review in the mid-1990s. Instructively, the review noted that 'British athletics today exists in an environment which is essentially a battlefield ... [wherein] The values that people hold determine their activities and help to define what they consider to be success' (BAF 1995: 10, 17).

The 1995 review not only raised questions regarding the values and principles underlying the sport, it also questioned the ability of the sport's myriad organisations to work in unison. Implicated here were issues that have blighted the sport's organisation and administration over many years, not least of which was 'Nostalgia and a sense of loss for the tradition of amateurism and the values associated with it' (BAF 1995: 20). Thus, there appears to be evidence here of a residual resistance to the type of values increasingly espoused at the elite level. For example, contributions included in the review from club officers and other volunteers with close club connections suggest that, despite the evidence provided here of a growing trend towards an emphasis on the elite, we should not (yet) over-determine the extent and degree of such a trend. One such contribution from the BAF review is indicative of this residual resistance from those involved at the sport's grass roots levels, 'I am concerned that a more professional approach by everyone in the sport tends to put us all on a conveyor belt, trying to move on to the next stage. We risk losing the "fun" aspect of athletics (quoted in BAF 1995: 20). However, perhaps a key pointer as to where UKA currently positions itself with regard to this debate can be found in the following comments from David Moorcroft, UKA's Chief Executive:

> One thing I am worried about is that track and field is becoming more and more recreational ... People are saying ... 'I'm not bothered whether the sport prospers or not' ... there's nothing

> wrong with recreational athletes. I used to think that they only existed in running but now triple jumpers and discus throwers are appearing solely to compete at weekends in league competitions. The problem is that it's becoming the norm (quoted in Ward 2002e: 23).

Moorcroft's ensuing comments that 'any future funding will be directed towards those clubs and competitions ... that are all about raising standards', only serves to reinforce the impression that those charged with organising and administering the sport in the early 21st century are becoming increasingly hidebound to their paymasters (Allison 2001: 55; see also Allison & Monnington 2002; and Interview: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002). Notable in this context are Sport England and UK Sport. The latter has a clear and explicit remit for the elite level, while the former now funds English NGBs through World Class Potential and Start programmes (and at World Class Performance levels for English athletes who compete at the Commonwealth Games, for example). The clear aim of both organisations is to create opportunities and pathways for athletes to achieve success at the high performance end of such pathways. 'Success', here, also appears to be circumscribed around the contingencies of track and field, just one of six disciplines within UKA's remit. This may be predicated on the attractiveness of the discipline to sponsorship and television monies, together with the fact that it is track and field events that attract Lottery funding at the World Class Performance level. Thus, is there evidence of the potential for resistance (to the focus on excellence in track and field) from the other disciplines within UKA's remit? There is certainly some evidence of resistance during the 1990s in road running and cross-country. In 1994, Chris Brasher, founder of the London Marathon, lamented the BAF's lack of interest in road running and argued that

> They're [BAF] not competent to do a job that's a major part of British athletics. They take a six-figure sum out of this area of the sport and I don't know where it goes. It's frittered away and not put back. One of the reasons Britain has never had an Olympic marathon champion is because of the appalling administration in this country (quoted in Mackay 1994b: 3).

Moreover, in the same year, questions were also raised in the press as to the place cross-country occupied within the sport in relation to the number of major international track and field events the BAF were staging at the time. Duncan Mackay, for example, asked why is it that cross-country has 'long been considered the poor relation of British athletics' (1994a: 7), while John Rodda posed the following question, 'If British athletics can annually organise six major outdoor international meetings and another three indoors ... why do so many facets of cross-country look antiquated and gaffe-prone?' (1994: 17). Yet, while there appears to be more evidence of confrontation between the

different athletics disciplines than that found in the sport of swimming, the extent of such confrontation does not (yet) appear powerful enough to perceptibly alter the conditions of action within which the sport currently operates. In sum, the evidence suggests that the structure of the sport is centring on achievement, professionalism and the meeting of corporate (funding-related) objectives, most notably, medal-winning performances at major (track and field) international events. Correspondingly, this suggests that the type of values, principles and belief systems that underlie such change have also shifted. In short, the much lamented values and belief systems that have traditionally underpinned the '"fun" aspect of athletics' (BAF 1995: 20), and which were highlighted by many contributors to the BAF 1995 strategic review (but recently criticised by David Moorcroft), now appear to be subject to a process of abjuration by an increasingly legitimised set of values centring on 'achievement' and 'excellence' pursuant to winning medals at major international events.

Royal Yachting Association

Organisation, administration and relationships

The Royal Yachting Association (RYA) is the recognised governing body of sailing in the UK, formerly known as the Yacht Racing Association (YRA) - founded in 1875 to harmonise the right-of-way and handicap rules for yacht racing. It should be noted that, as with the discussion of the Canadian Yachting Association (CYA) in Chapter 6, the terms 'yachting' and sailing' are used interchangeably here. In 1952, the YRA was granted the 'Royal' title and, in 1953, its name was formally changed to the Royal Yachting Association; a body whose remit has broadened considerably over the years and which now encompasses the views of all water users under sail or power. As of 2002, the RYA had 95,000 personal members within 1580 affiliated clubs and across 181 Class (boat) Associations. It also administers training standards for over 200,000 students per year at 1,400 Recognised Teaching Establishments (RYA 2002a; RYA & Sport England 2001). However, these figures exclude recreational participants who are not official members of the Association. Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain with any certainty how many 'unofficial' participants are involved in the sport's various activities. One RYA publication, for example, estimates that there are some 1.5 million people in the UK who participate in various sailing activities (RYA 1999: 2), whereas elsewhere it is suggested that there are some 'four million or so boaters' (RYA 2001a: 18) involved in

different aspects of the sport across the country. As the governing body for the sport of sailing in the UK, the RYA is a member of the International Sailing Federation (ISAF) and, as ISAF's Secretary-General explained, an important aspect of this relationship is the adjudication as to whether a particular Class Association has met the relevant criteria to stage a World Championship (there could potentially be a World Championship event for each Class, of which there are some 60 in number) (Interview: Arve Sundheim, 8 August 2002).

Given the significant equipment requirements of the sport, an important aspect of the RYA's operations concerns the marine industry, most notably in collaboration over boat designs. The Association also plays an important role in safety-at-sea issues, working closely with the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) and with various environmental bodies regarding sustainable development concerns, in particular, the construction of inland and coastal facilities. In addition, the RYA headquarters currently houses the Secretariat for the European Boating Association, which is regarded by the European Commission as a key consultative body on all boating matters (RYA 2001b: 37). Finally, and not without significance, a pressure group called the Boating Alliance was formally launched in June 2002. The RYA was a founding member of the Alliance and, with other interested parties, including the British Marine Industries Federation, the Inland Waterways Association, as well as other water sports, such as canoeing, rowing and surfing, the Alliance's aim is to provide a forum for these groups to 'take a co-ordinated and united approach to strategic issues of major importance to the boating industry and boat users' (Boating Alliance 2002). The significance of these observations is, as the 1992 Olympic Windsurfing Coach related, that the RYA is renowned as a forceful lobbying organisation in its relationships with bodies responsible for shaping the conditions of action within which the Association operates (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002).

The complex nature of the RYA's remit is clear in that it not only encompasses 181 affiliated Class Associations - which include dinghy, keelboat, motor cruising and powerboating - but it also has responsibility for the sports of windsurfing and personal watercraft (jet skis) (RYA & Sport England 2001: 1). This description of the RYA's wide-ranging set of responsibilities, at different levels and across many water-related activities, suggests that the interests of its members may often be in conflict; a contention recently dismissed, however, by George Clark, current Chairman of the RYA.

On this issue, Clark has stated that 'If there is conflict it is because people are not talking together. It is important when dealing with outside organisations, that the RYA speaks with one voice' (quoted in Jermain 2002: 13). Arguably, one reading of such a statement is that it is merely a diversionary attempt to rebuff 'outsider' interest into the inner workings of the Association: however, an example helps to make the point that conflicts do arise. John Derbyshire, the RYA's Racing Manager, highlighted tensions regarding the recent decision to designate nine zones throughout the UK for organising Youth race training activities (Interview: 25 March 2002). An interesting aspect of this recent innovation, which highlights the type of potential conflict George Clark summarily dismissed, centres on the appointment of salaried High Performance Managers. As John Derbyshire explained, before the appointment of High Performance Managers, the RYA used volunteer, regional race-training co-ordinators who worked on the principle that the 'region was there to task them, which was not the reality. Now with High Performance Managers, there is no conflict. We've professionalised the race-training side of it and the committees have less involvement than they used to'.

One further reason for signposting this (recent) example is worthy of note. That is, although there is some evidence pointing to the potential for disparity, given the RYA's diverse remit, the Association does not appear to have been blighted by the degree of (historic) jurisdictional power struggles evident in the sports of swimming and athletics. Six points are worthy of note in this respect. Firstly, as Joe Patton, Performance Services Manager for sailing/yachting at UK Sport related, membership of the RYA is not compulsory for competitive or recreational participants (Interview: 28 October 2002; see also RYA 2001a: 32). Secondly, and clearly related to the first point, the RYA acknowledges that there is too low a proportion of total water sports participants *vis-à-vis* membership of the Association (RYA 2001a: 3). Thirdly, 'by comparison with most sports, boating is unusual in having a very large number of participants who enjoy their sport as an outdoor recreation and leisure pursuit with no competitive element' (RYA 2001a: 35). Fourthly, there is also recognition that the sport is perceived as elitist - as in exclusive (RYA 2001a: 3, 15). Fifth, sailing is not recognised by the various Sports Councils as a priority school sport (RYA 2001a: 3). Finally, sailing has not (and currently is not) part of the Commonwealth Games programme; therefore, the sport only ever competes as the UK (or Great Britain and Northern Ireland, depending on the nomenclature used) at Olympic, World and European events (Interviews: John Derbyshire, 25 March 2002; Joe Patton, 28 October 2002).

This final point warrants further but brief consideration. The lack of a major international sailing regatta in which the four home countries of the UK compete separately has enabled the RYA to avoid the jurisdictional power struggles evident in the sports of swimming and athletics (Interview: Joe Patton, 28 October 2002). This is not to argue that attempts to include the sport in some form of Commonwealth event have been absent over the years. In 1987, for example, a proposal was put before the RYA's Yacht Racing Divisional Committee (YRDC) to compete in what was termed an independent 'Commonwealth Regatta' - the proposal was thus not for yachting to be in *the* Commonwealth Games (RYA 1987a). However, later in the same year, despite a noted 'division of opinion among members' (RYA 1987b) the proposal was rejected. It appears that the rejection was due, in large part, to the full international programme already supported by the Association (RYA 1994b: 5-6). Yet, the RYA was prepared to 'give sympathetic consideration' to a request from the President of the then International Yacht Racing Union (renamed the International Sailing Federation [ISAF] in 1996) that the organisation consider the establishment of sailing at *the* Commonwealth Games. Interestingly, the reasons for this shift in RYA policy consideration, if not direction, were that 'the difficulties, cost and exclusiveness of Olympic campaigns were steadily increasing and a Commonwealth Games alternative might be attractive' (RYA 1994b: 5-6). Such insights are particularly revealing given the Olympic-focused policy direction embraced by the RYA throughout the 1990s.

The contention here is that the six points of departure set out above are significant for this study given its central interest in mapping out organisational and administrative similarities and differences between NGBs, and which, in turn, may have a bearing on present and future policy direction. The salience of these points in respect of the sport's relative lack of internal wrangling is discussed in more detail in the ensuing sections relating to specific elements of elite sailing development. This is not to argue, however, that over the years the RYA can be characterised as an organisation free from internal dispute. As the chapter's preceding accounts of the NGBs in swimming and athletics have revealed, the notion of what constitutes an amateur or indeed amateurism, is an issue with which most, if not all, UK NGBs have had to contend (cf. Allison 2001): the RYA is no exception. For example, in one of the few (if not the only) attempts at recording the history of the RYA, Gordon Fairley notes that 'The debate ... about how to maintain amateur status was really of considerable interest' (1983: 42). This was in 1910 and concerned the British Olympic Association's (BOA) general guidelines on the

issue of amateurs. It appears that the issue of concern at this time centred on yachting's peculiar status, in contradistinction to sports such as athletics, swimming and rowing, as noted by a certain Lord Desborough in a letter found in the YRA's Minute Book. Lord Desborough went on to state that 'As for yachting - don't be in a hurry. You may have to formulate a rule for International competition for the purpose of each event' (quoted in Fairley 1983: 43). The inference being that the sport should only concern itself on this issue for major international events such as the Olympic Games.

That this remained an enduring, but not overly-taxing, issue for the sport's national governing body is borne out by the fact that Fairley's subsequent reference to the issue of amateur status relates to developments in the late 1950s, where it was noted that 'the question of amateur status only rears its head in specific events which stipulate that only amateurs may compete for such-and-such a cup or, of course, in Olympic competition' (1983: 132). Interestingly, Fairley (1983: 51) also records disputes over the 'vexed ... question of continuous uninterrupted service on the [RYA] Council', leading to criticisms that younger members' interests were not being properly addressed. This was the scenario in 1914, yet it has clearly remained an issue of concern for the RYA. As the RYA's recent Development Plan states, 'The maximum term of office for the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Council was reduced in 2001 from five years to three, one of the objectives being to encourage younger members to stand for senior posts' (RYA 2001a: 5). There is also evidence in the late 1960s of unrest within the (recreational) cruising 'arm' of the sport; the charge being 'that the RYA was not looking after its interests' (Fairley 1983: 162-163). Concerns within the cruising arm remain. In 2001, for example, the then Chairman, Ken Ellis, reassured 'Cruising members ... that the Olympic and Youth Training Programmes are almost entirely financed by Lottery Funding, and monies generated by membership and commercial trading are used to represent the rights of boaters and develop the grass roots of the sport' (quoted in RYA 2000: 4).

It appears, then, that a degree of disparity in such a diverse sport has been apparent over the years, in particular, between yacht racing and cruising. However, while there is some evidence of internal disputes within the YRA/RYA, such disputes have not been characterised by the bitter in-fighting evident in swimming and athletics over the years. The question that such a contention raises for this study surrounds the relative salience of this lack of internal wrangling for the development of policies at the elite level of the sport. Unsurprisingly, the answer is not at once clear, and the six points outlined earlier

may prove to be useful signifiers in helping to unravel the complexity of this issue in the ensuing discussion of policy developments at the sport's elite level. In sum, this description of the RYA's organisational and administrative remit, and its consequent relationships with other organisations, paints a somewhat different picture to that found in the earlier discussion of the organisation and administration of swimming and athletics. As Joe Patton pointed out, 'I get the impression that there is more support for the necessity of a governing body in sailing [than in athletics] due to things like safety, training and education ... and there is a common interest about legislative issues, anything that might restrict sailors' access to water' (Interview: 28 October 2002).

Elite sport policy developments: An identification of potential sources of policy change

Development of elite level facilities

While the focus of this section is on the development of facilities for elite level training and competition it is nevertheless important to reiterate the diversity of the RYA's remit, which encompasses many different levels and types of water sport activity (cf. McKinsey & Company 2002). The significance of such a diverse remit is that it raises questions of emphasis; in short, how has the RYA managed to balance facility development for recreational sailing, and the various other disciplines within its remit, with the development of facilities for Olympic and World Championship level racing? This question can be addressed on two different levels. Firstly, at a governmental, or Sports Council level, it appears that, historically, the issue of sailing facilities for both recreational and elite sailors has not been addressed to the same degree as that witnessed in the sports of swimming and athletics. This is not to argue that the Sports Councils have ignored facility development for sailing activities. For example, in 1978, the GB Sports Council published the *First Report of the RYA Facilities Committee*, the main objective of which was to 'encourage the orderly and planned provision of facilities for cruising and racing under sail or power' (Sports Council 1978: 2). Of note is the report's conclusion that 'there is still a deficiency in the facilities available for yachting' as well as its concern that 'it is important to give everyone the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of boating' (Sports Council 1978: 10). There was no reference at this time to expanding elite level facilities, although it was noted that the National Sailing Centre at Cowes (opened in 1965 under the jurisdiction of the Central Council for Physical Recreation) was now well established.

It could be argued that the relative lack of intervention (or interest) in the provision of sailing facilities at Sports Council level is due, at least in part, to two of the six points of departure noted earlier. The two points of interest here are: the acknowledgement by the RYA that the sport is perceived as elitist and that sailing is not recognised by the various Sports Councils as a priority school sport. Indeed, with regard to the first point, Coghlan suggests that the National Centre at Cowes was perceived as a 'bastion of privilege', and that yachting (with tennis and rowing) was not 'available to any considerable extent to the artisan or the working class' (1990: 75). Thus, intervention by the Sports Council, if it appeared at all, centred on access to water and the countryside, in general, and for disadvantaged groups in society, in particular, as indicated in Minutes from the Yacht Racing Divisional Committee (YRDC) meeting of 14 January 1986 in relation to the RYA's grant application to the Sports Council (RYA 1986).

That the GB Sports Council's concerns in the late 1980s centred primarily on issues surrounding increasing provision for designated disadvantaged groups is clear from its strategy document, *Into the 90s*. Thus, with regard to water sports, a Countryside and Water Recreation Policy was established centring on issues of access to water and the countryside (Sports Council 1988: 64-65). Provision for other areas/levels of the sport was not deemed a priority. This may also be due to an enduring perception that the sport requires expensive equipment, clothing and travel in order to participate and that it remains elitist, in the sense of exclusive (RYA 2001b: 15; but see Proctor 1962: 153). *Into the 90s* did, however, refer to the closure of the Cowes National Sailing Centre in 1987, stating that 'discussions [would] continue to find a replacement on the mainland for the National Sailing Centre' (Sports Council 1988: 73). That a National Sailing Centre has yet to be established (as at September 2002) is perhaps a useful indicator as to the relative importance given to this issue by the Sports Council in the late 1980s. Interestingly, in 2001, Sport England published a Planning Bulletin for water sports, initiated, in large part, by sailing's 'successes' in recent years that 'have given the various water sport disciplines a high profile' (Sport England 2001: 1). That Sport England's Planning Bulletin was initiated by sailing's successes (primarily, high profile Olympic successes) is thus indicative not only of changing Sports Council priorities over the past 20 years in the sport of sailing but also at the level of overall policy emphasis and direction for sport, in general.

The second level on which the question of facility development can be addressed is at the level of NGB organisational priorities. It could be argued that the relative lack of intervention by government and quasi-governmental organisations over the years on this issue is due, in part, to the RYA's determination to remain as independent as possible from such bodies. Indeed, the RYA argues that the 'very best reason' for joining the organisation is to contribute a voice to those who 'wish to have influence over the future of leisure boating in the UK, rather than some Government Department. The RYA has been very successful in "self governance" of boating. We want this to continue' (RYA 2002b). While this is not an unrelated aspect of the elitism issue described above, it provides a somewhat wider perspective on the issue of self-reliance, or self governance, of an organisation and a sport within which participants in many of its core activities and in many of its more traditional facilities require a substantial degree of social, economic and/or cultural capital (Aversa 1986; see also Bourdieu 1984).

It should be recognised, however, that sailing and water sports, generally, have benefited in the past from the establishment and development of Sports Council-funded National Sports Centres, notably Cowes (in 1965), Holme Pierrepont (in 1973) and Plas-Y-Brenin, Wales (in 1955). As discussed, of these, Cowes was the principal Sailing Centre. Yet, as the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Windsurfing Coach and long time recreational sailor relates, 'Cowes was never really used a great deal for elite level sailing and training as it was not an ideal location for that purpose' (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002). The policy deliberations underlying the selection of Cowes as the National Sailing Centre reinforce the earlier assertion that the RYA values its independence from government and quasi-governmental organisations. This is clear in that it was the then Ministry of Education that had selected the Cowes site on the River Medina. A site, however, which 'was not supported by the Council of the RYA' and due, in part, to a lack of confidence in the site remaining self-financing' (Fairley 1983: 148). This lack of confidence was borne out in 1987: the site closed as the National Centre due to concerns relating to its financial viability (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002).

It appears, therefore, that the RYA had adopted a somewhat ad hoc approach throughout the 1960s, 1970s and into the early 1980s with respect to the development of facilities for the specific use of elite level sailors' training and competition. As Fairley

(1983: 171) notes, RYA Minutes in 1970 recorded that 'A base for Olympic training and major regattas was desirable'. Yet, by January 1971, the idea of an Olympic base 'had been dropped' and a working party was created to investigate the possible establishment of a National Yacht Racing Centre (Fairley 1983: 171-172). The concept of a National Yacht Racing Centre was subject to three separate reports by the RYA in the early 1970s (RYA 1972, 1973a, 1973b). The premise being that 'If Britain is to remain at the top of the international "yachting league" in Olympic and other forms of racing, this centre must be built' (RYA 1973a: 2). However, the determination to build this Centre in the early 1970s was never brought to fruition, perhaps somewhat fortuitously. As the RYA's 1998-2001 World Class Performance Plan states, 'In 1995 the RYA rejected the previously promoted concept of a single National Sailing Centre .... [as] High level sailing competition has advanced considerably and a single national sailing venue no longer meets the needs of the sport' (RYA 1998c: 24).

By the late 1970s, however, there was a growing consensus within the RYA's various Racing Committees that the sport required some form of Olympic Racing Centres, based around specific club sites, and where Olympic Class racing could be guaranteed. As Maynard argues in an internal RYA report, entitled *The 1977–1980 Olympic Effort*, 'these centres would also encourage the Olympic fleets to grow and do much to raise overall standards' (1976: 3). This growing consensus around a more organised and strategic approach to the development of elite level racing facilities gained support in 1992. Following the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, where the Olympic sailing team won just one Bronze medal, the RYA's Race Training Committee proposed six potential options for change in the organisation of the sport's Olympic programme (RYA 1992b). Later in the same year the Yacht Racing Divisional Committee (YRDC) formally accepted the following option, 'To improve the present system and organisation (of our Olympic participation) by a reallocation of existing resources' (RYA 1992a). In order to achieve this objective it was resolved to establish a small Olympic panel (known as the Olympic Steering Group - OSG) the primary responsibility of which was to direct the overall organisation of the Olympic programme. Although the issue of facility development was not a primary concern of the OSG, the creation of this Group nevertheless signalled a significant sea-change in the organisational emphases of the RYA.

Today, the RYA is one of the largest (NGB) recipients of National Lottery funding across the World Class Performance, Potential and Start programmes administered by UK Sport

(UK Sport 2002a) and Sport England (and the respective Sports Councils in the other three home countries). Reflecting this shift towards a closer (resource) relationship with these quasi-governmental bodies, a joint policy statement from the RYA and Sport England was published in 2001, entitled *Facilities Strategy for Sailing* (RYA & Sport England 2001). The strategy notes that 'England still lacks high quality racing facilities' – perhaps indicative of the RYA's traditional core emphasis based around exclusive member clubs. However, it also confirms seven sites for Sailing Academies in England 'originally identified in the RYA's [1998-2001] World Class Performance Plan as priority projects for development of competition and training facilities to an international standard' (RYA & Sport England 2001: 4). Collectively, these sites are capable of providing sailing conditions that emulate those found at major international sailing events – an important aspect of competition training at the elite level (Interview: John Derbyshire, 25 March 2002; see also RYA 1998c: 23).

In sum, it is clear that, although the RYA adopted a policy in the early 1990s to establish an OSG – a policy development that was somewhat ahead of the sports of swimming and athletics – it has taken over 10 years for this group to realise substantial policy change with regard to elite facility development in the form of Sailing Academies. This may be due, in part, to the particular characteristics of the sport and the relationships it has had to develop with numerous organisations involving the physical environment, harbour authorities and the marine industry (RYA & Sport England 2001). However, what is also clear, and particularly significant for this study, is that a coherent organisational and administrative framework is now in place, not only for the development of elite level sailing facilities but also for many of the other numerous elements essential to the preparation of an elite sailing team. That a more coherent and strategic approach to this level of the sport was adopted somewhat earlier by the RYA than by the governing bodies in the sports of swimming and athletics is also significant. It is significant given that the advent of National Lottery funding appears to be as important in sailing as in the two other sports. Yet, there remains an enduring resistance in swimming and athletics to the potential emergence of a coalition of actors and organisations around the quest for elite level success: A resistance that is not readily apparent to the same degree in sailing. As Joe Patton explained:

> ... paid staff in the RYA have tended to take the attitude that, well, there are some structures and policies that we don't necessarily like, but let's just get on with it and stop whingeing and make things work for the best in our sport ... that's not always the case in some of the other governing bodies (Interview: 28 October 2002).

The ensuing sections expand on aspects of this issue, while the chapter's *Summary of key implications* section draws together similarities and differences between the three NGBs/sports in more detail.

Emergence of 'full-time' athletes (sailors)

This section considers the emergence of full-time sailors; an issue that has similar parallels to developments in swimming and athletics. However, there are also important differences in the ways that this issue has developed in the sport of sailing over the years. The points of departure noted in the previous section are useful here in helping to map out these differences, or nuances. It should be reiterated that the sport of sailing has witnessed struggles over the wider but interrelated issue of what constitutes amateurism (cf. Allison 2001; Fairley 1983). However, as described in the earlier discussions of the ASA/ASFGB and UKA (and the BAAB and BAF), this issue does not appear to have resulted in the same degree of internal wrangling within the RYA. Thus, on this issue in the late 1950s, the International Yacht Racing Union's (IYRU) Rule 22 stated that an amateur 'yachtsman (sic) [is one] who engages in yachting activities afloat as a pastime as distinguished from a means of obtaining a livelihood. Acceptance of any profitable benefit ... is inconsistent with amateur status' (quoted in Fairley 1983: 131).

This ruling led to problems with those engaged in the sport but not as race sailors. For example, sailing instructors and those running sailing schools were deemed to have breached the amateur rule as outlined by the IYRU. Yet, the RYA appears to have taken a somewhat equivocal view on this issue. In 1960, for example, RYA Council Minutes reveal that 'The Council supports the view that, except for Olympic regattas, the amateur status rule could be abandoned' (quoted in Fairley 1983: 132). By 1989, in line with changes in other sports (cf. Allison 2001), the IYRU had relaxed its rules over amateur status and now allowed yachtsmen/women who were also working in the sport in areas such as yacht design, construction and similar professions to do so without loss of amateur status 'but not [in] the *racing* of yachts' (Pera 1989: 217, original emphasis). Moreover, following the 1988 Olympic Games, the IOC voted 'to declare all professionals eligible for the Olympics, subject to the approval of the international federations in charge of each sport' (Wallechinsky 1996: xxii). The IYRU did not dispute the IOC's ruling and the 1992 Barcelona Olympics were the first truly 'open' Games of the modern era to sanction the admission of athletes competing elsewhere in a professional, paid capacity (cf. Donnelly 1996: 30). As the sport entered the 1990s, then, opportunities

emerged for sailors to compete at major 'non-professional' events such as the Olympic Games and World Championships as well as in professional sailing events such as the America's Cup and various Round-the-World yacht races. At the same time, an emerging elite-oriented coalition within the RYA, centring on the OSG, enhanced its position as a powerful voice within the organisation with the sanctioning of a 'Top Sailor' grant award scheme in 1994 (RYA 1994a: 2). Interestingly, this form of pecuniary legitimation for the sport's elite level was implemented somewhat earlier than that witnessed in the sports of swimming and athletics, the ramifications of which are discussed in the summary to this section. The large number of Class Associations in sailing is also instructive here. As John Derbyshire explained:

> If I want to be a full-time, professional sailor, I'll go and sail [one of the eight] Olympic Class[es]. If I want to be a recreational, full-time competitive sailor, you know, it's my hobby because I've got a job as well, then I'll sail one of the other types of boat (Interview: 25 March 2002).

Related to John Derbyshire's comments above is the issue of equipment cost, an issue moreover, which can also be linked to the perception of the sport as elitist. While the advent of National Lottery funding in 1997 has resulted in this becoming less of a concern for those sailors competing at the highest level, it remains an enduring problem for the sport's developmental levels. For example, the RYA's *National Junior/Youth Sailing Strategy* published in 1998 states that

> With increased funding it is hoped that one of the perennial problems of competitive sailing will be addressed. That is the commitment required to take a youngster through the years of training and development – a commitment not only from the youngster but also from his (sic) parents and the rest of his family as well (RYA 1998a: 5).

Perhaps a useful indicator of the level of financial commitment required in order to achieve success at the highest level, as well as reinforcing the perception of elitism, is the statement in the same document that 'The RYA considers personal ownership [of a boat] to be the only realistic way of producing top sailors' (RYA 1998a: 4). Given the cost of Olympic Class boats - the Three-Person Keelboat-Soling at £30,000, and the Multihull-Tornado at £17,000 being the most expensive (RYA 1998c: 35, 48) - it is clear that, in order to participate at this level, substantial financial support is paramount. Arve Sundheim, Secretary-General of ISAF, provides an interesting tangential perspective on this issue (Interview: 8 August 2002). Sundheim acknowledges that, at the elite level, many sailors are now full-time professionals in the sense that they are remunerated

through, for example, sponsorship deals and prize money, as well in their commitment to full-time training and competition. However, at the same time, there is a move from certain Class Associations, which retain the (self-regulated) right to constitute rules governing their respective Classes, to prevent these so-called professionals from competing in certain events. Such a system can only reinforce the growing trend towards an elite group of sailors who are increasingly removed from activities at the sport's grass roots levels.

In summary, at the elite level of sailing in the UK there are currently (as of September 2002) 42 sailors on the sport's World Class Performance programme; for the RYA this Lottery funding support amounts to £1,750,000 for the period April 2002-March 2003 (UK Sport 2002a). In addition, the RYA was the first NGB to benefit from Start and Potential Lottery funding from Sport England in 1999-2000, support that, in large part, underpins yacht racing's developmental levels, including the Champion Club programme (sponsored by *Volvo*) and Junior, Youth and Olympic Development squads (RYA 2000: 9; see also RYA 1999). The inauguration of the OSG in the early 1990s can therefore be viewed as the first element of a shift in policy emphasis that was to continue throughout the 1990s, the culmination of which has resulted in the creation of a structural framework of goal-oriented development programmes with specific objectives (RYA 1998b: 9). For the RYA, medal-winning success at the Olympic Games and World Championships is the ultimate outcome of these objectives in the early 21st century.

A clear performance pathway for talented young sailors is now in place, the aim of which is to create a set of conditions which will eventually allow these sailors to train and compete on a full-time basis. The RYA acknowledges as much in its 1997-1998 Annual Report, in stating that 'Many of our increasingly full-time sailors are now on a par with those with whom we compete on a world stage' (RYA 1998b: 9). However, as in the sports of swimming and athletics, it is important in this context that a similar caveat is acknowledged with regard to our understanding of the notion of full-time sailors. In short, many (if not all) sailors benefiting from World Class Performance funding train and compete on a full-time basis, with concomitant opportunities to perhaps later transfer these skills and to benefit financially in professional events such as the America's Cup and Round-the-World yacht races. Yet, as acknowledged in the RYA's World Class Performance Plan 1998-2001, 'A cost which may be necessary but which we are not yet able to estimate is compensation for employees, where squad

members need to take time off work to prepare for and take part in major competition (RYA 1998c: 7); thus the necessity, or the wish, to work outside of yacht racing remains.

Developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine

Coaching development in the sport of sailing has reflected the somewhat ad hoc, piecemeal approach within which coaching, in general, has evolved in the UK (cf. UK Sport 1999). For example, the RYA had no structured approach to coaching development until the early 1970s when a new RYA Coaching Scheme was established (Fairley 1983: 168). The lack of a structured approach to coaching at this time was reflected at the elite level. It was only in 1970 that the RYA took the decision to appoint a paid Olympic Training Coach. This was not a simple task, however. Having made the quite radical policy decision to appoint, attempts by the RYA to secure an incumbent for the position were hindered by IOC eligibility rules at this time. In short, any person taking up the paid position of Olympic Training Coach would be debarred from competing in future Olympic Games as a racing sailor (RYA 1970). This remained an enduring issue for the sport throughout the 1970s, although an Olympic Coach was appointed for the 1972 Games, albeit on a short-term contract (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002); an issue, moreover, not limited to securing a coach for the full Olympic cycle. It was also about acknowledging the need for, and securing the services of, high quality Class coaches. As Maynard notes, in a review of sailing's performance at the 1976 Olympic Games, 'Good class coaches (as opposed to good class *helpers*) were not available for most classes in '76' (1976: 2, emphasis added). Such comments and language are thus also symptomatic of the amateur/voluntarist ethos of national governing bodies of sport at this time.

An instructive aspect of developments in the 1980s concerns the RYA's decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. The boycott resulted in a certain amount of disillusionment amongst coaches and sailors involved. Consequently, a vacuum emerged within which it became difficult to recruit coaches; thus negating the embryonic momentum established in the 1970s (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002; see also Coghlan 1990: 247). Interestingly, swimming and athletics were two of the 17 sports that did attend the Moscow Games and, consequently, did not suffer the 'break' in momentum experienced by the RYA. By the late 1980s, however, there was a move towards employing full-time coaches in sailing and the 1988 Olympic Games sailing team utilised five coaches in this capacity. It should be remembered that this was at the

elite level and, as John Derbyshire related, before the introduction of Lottery funding, coaching was not 'the normal part of how you learned to race competitively ... at international level ... most people taught themselves to sail and race and they continued to do that until, perhaps, they came into contact with the RYA coaches' (Interview: 25 March 2002).

The RYA's post-1992 Olympic review is significant here. As the Race Training Committee Minutes (RYA 1992b: Appendix) of October 1992 reveal, not only did this review instigate the setting-up of the OSG but it also provided the catalyst for a shift in coaching policy. There was now to be a move away from the notion of full-time RYA staff coaches employed for elite level training and towards the setting-up of 'a group of experienced and respected sailors ... to act as "ad hoc" coaches to groups of competitors, Olympic Classes or individual sailors' (RYA 1992b: Appendix; see also RYA 1998c: 11). This policy shift thus signalled the gradual decline of staff coaches and a move towards a more diverse pool of coaches for the elite level (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002). It appears, therefore, that of the three sports discussed in this chapter, sailing/yachting and its governing body, the RYA, has been in the vanguard of developing a structured and co-ordinated approach to coaching development throughout the sport. In large part, this has been predicated on the particular characteristics of the many and varied disciplines associated with sailing. In short, the RYA and partner organisations have benefited from the ability to develop coaching/educational/training courses for the many different aspects of the sport and to profit financially from such courses (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002). This is not to argue that the ASA/ASFGB and UKA have not developed similar avenues of raising funds. Rather, it is to suggest that, in the context of this discussion, the RYA's peculiar ability to develop an array of courses has had an indirect, but wholly beneficial, effect on the development of coaching throughout the sport.

That problems/issues related to coaching development remain unresolved is, however, not disputed. As the RYA's 1998-2001 World Class Performance Plan states, 'The RYA's system for training, allocating and funding coaches has suffered from a severe lack of resources. There are, therefore, not enough coaches of sufficient quality available' (RYA 1998c: 11). The availability of National Lottery funding is once again instructive as the recommendation to appoint a full-time coach education officer in 1999 formed part of the RYA's budget proposals for its (Lottery-funded) 1998-2001 World Class Performance

Plan (RYA 1998c: 11; and Interview: John Derbyshire, 25 March 2002). While the significance of Lottery funding cannot be underestimated, it paints only a partial picture of events: in short, Lottery funding should be conceived of here as a contemporary mechanism which has given overt momentum to the adoption of a number of policy decisions taken over the past 10 to 15 years. Four aspects of RYA policy with regard to coaching development are instructive.

Firstly, the decision to create a dedicated OSG in the early 1990s has resulted in a more strategic and coherent approach to the support for, and requirements of, elite level sailing (Interview: Joe Patton, 28 October 2002). Secondly, the rationalisation of previous coaching schemes, including the decision to use part-time coaches in a sport incorporating numerous and complex technical requirements, now allows the RYA to contract coaches to work with Olympic, Paralympic and recognised Youth Classes. Thus, the RYA now facilitates, rather than provides coaching centrally from headquarters. As at May 1998, the RYA employed just four full-time staff racing coaches, two of which were for windsurfing and match racing disciplines (RYA 1998c: 9). Thirdly, there has been a restructuring of the race trainer/instructor/coach system such that every club now has a properly trained, qualified individual providing club level training rather than 'someone who was on the club committee' (Interview: John Derbyshire, 25 March 2002; and see also RYA 2001a: 43-45; Saltonstall 1990: 126-127). Finally, as the Chairman of the OSG notes in a post-2000 Olympic review, the decision to employ overseas coaches and technical experts, which began in the lead up to the 1996 Olympics, is now a vital element of sailing's elite level preparation (McIntyre 2000: 2); thus revealing a willingness to embrace an increasingly global employment market for sport coaches – a phenomenon, it should be noted, that is not peculiar to sailing and one that is increasingly evident in both swimming and athletics.

In short, the picture painted above suggests that those involved in the organisation and administration of sailing have adapted to the changing conditions of action, not least with regard to changing resource conditions of the mid- to late 1990s, with greater clarity of purpose than that witnessed in the sports of swimming and athletics. The 'changing resource conditions' cited above increasingly emphasise medal-winning success at Olympic and World Championship events (cf. UK Sport 2001a: 7). On this basis, and to sum up this section on coaching developments, it is not unreasonable to contend that policy changes implemented in this area have played an important part in

the success of the sport in recent years. Indeed, the Olympic sailing team's results outweigh those achieved in swimming and athletics at the elite level over the past decade. In the 1996 Olympic Games, for example, where performances of the GB/NI team in all sports were generally perceived as poor, the RYA's 1998-2001 World Class Performance plan notes that 'sailing won two of Britain's fifteen medals – both Silver ... Scoring the [Olympic] regatta on a crude medal count Great Britain was (sic) fourth country but scoring it unofficially on points we were the top team' (RYA 1998c: 3).

With regard to the development of sports science and sports medicine disciplines, in a sport as complex and physically demanding as yacht racing (cf. Pinaud 1971: 117-120), the requirement for scientific/technical expertise in these disciplines is paramount. However, and perhaps reflecting the lack of attention paid to these disciplines in sport, in general, in the UK (cf. Sports Council 1988: 49-50), the requirement for, and the application of, sports science and sports medicine knowledge is a relatively recent phenomenon in the sport of sailing. In 1976, for example, 'physical training' was an agenda item as one aspect of the RYA's Olympic review, which noted that 'it [physical training] is now an integral part of Olympic sailing' (Maynard 1976: 2). At this time, there was no reference to the language or value of sports science/medicine as 'an integral part' of elite level training. Indeed, for the 1976 Olympics, the sailing team relied on the services of a voluntary team doctor (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002).

Perhaps the first indication of a more rigorous acknowledgment of the value of sports science/medicine as part of elite level preparation can be found in the RYA's grant application to the Sports Council in 1985, albeit (persistently) couched in the language of 'fitness programmes and medical services' (RYA 1985: 25). The RYA appears to have been successful in this budget application. As revealed in the January 1986 Yacht Racing Divisional Committee (YRDC) Minutes, 'The additional "Olympic Preparation" grant had totally altered the situation for our [1988 Olympic] campaign' and extra support was allocated to a 'Sports psychology programme' and for 'Sports medicine' (RYA 1986: 3) - thus laying a foundation for a more strategic and coherent approach to sports science/medicine as the sport entered the 1990s. This is clear in the Race Training Committee's discussion of a 'Sports Science Support Programme' following the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games (RYA 1992a: Appendix A).

This is not to argue that the RYA has been unduly complacent with regard to emergent sports science/medicine developments. Indeed, the RYA appears to have embraced sports science/medicine developments with somewhat more rigour than was evident in swimming and athletics. By utilising funding from the Sports Council's Sports Science Support Programme, the Association established a project that would apply 'scientific principals to the analysis of sailing to deepen the understanding of elite performance' (RYA 1992a: Appendix A). The terminology underlying this area of RYA policy in the 1970s and 1980s, constructed in the language of 'fitness' and 'physical activity', had now been replaced with a discourse reminiscent of the former Eastern bloc programmes discussed in Chapter 4. In short, by the early 1990s, the RYA had begun to embrace contemporary developments in sports science/medicine, utilising the services of a part-time physiologist from 1993 (full-time from 1998, when a second (part-time) physiologist was also appointed) and winning approval from the Sports Council for the funding of physiological and psychological projects.

Today, as acknowledged by UK Sport's chairman and Performance Services Manager for sailing/yachting, the RYA is one of the country's leading governing bodies of sport with regard to elite level preparation for major sporting events (Walker 2001; and Interview: Joe Patton, 28 October 2002). Sports science/medicine programmes are central to such preparation in the early 21st century. The RYA is currently developing ongoing links with the emerging UKSI network of facilities and programmes and, in the organisation's Atlanta Olympic Games debrief, 'the OSG fully supported the sports science programme and asked for it to be extended and become more field orientated' (RYA 1998c: 16). This last point regarding the requirement for more field orientation reflects a commitment by the RYA to develop sailing-specific sports science programmes in its quest for sporting excellence at the elite level. Such a commitment is 'based on the belief that sport science should not simply be based in the laboratory or consulting office but should be working effectively at the training or competition venue and on the water' (RYA 1998c: 17). This is an instructive point as it reveals continual re-evaluation of sports science programmes by RYA staff charged with winning medals at major international events.

In sum, given UK Sport's Lottery funding framework for NGBs which is premised, in large part, on the production of a coherent development plan towards the ultimate goal of Olympic success, the RYA's embracing of contemporary sports science/medicine

programmes can be viewed as one of organisational and administrative acumen, to a degree not witnessed in athletics and, until more recently, swimming (cf. RYA 1998a, 1998c).

Table 7.3 GB/NI sailing medals: Olympic Games, 1988-2000

	Olympic Games			
	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total
1988	1	0	0	1
1992	0	0	1	1
1996	0	2	0	2
2000	3	2	0	5

Olympic results help to make the point (see Table 7.3). Sailing was not only one of the UK's most successful sport at the Olympic Games in 2000, winning three Gold and two Silver medals but it has also been successful, historically, when compared to countries such as Canada and Australia. Figures from ISAF reveal that, since 1900, and at the conclusion of the Sydney Olympics, the GB/NI sailing team had won 40 medals (17 Gold). Canada had won just eight medals, none of which was Gold, while Australia had won 16 medals, five of which were Gold, (ISAF 2002).

Competition opportunities for elite level athletes (sailors)

The issue of competition opportunities and structures in the sport of sailing is, arguably, the most complex of the three sports discussed in this chapter. Although the focus is on competition opportunities for elite level sailors, such opportunities cannot be viewed in a vacuum. In other words, the different levels underpinning the elite end of the sport's competition spectrum also require consideration; these are many and varied. The complex nature of competition opportunities and structures in sailing becomes clearer if we also take into account the large number of different Class Associations involved in the sport; as noted earlier there is potential for up to 60 World Championships representing different boat Classes (Interview: Arve Sundheim, 8 August 2002). In the UK, and for the RYA, there are primarily three levels to competitive opportunities and structures supporting the Junior (11-15 years) and Youth (16-19 years) Classes: regional, national and international. At regional level, there is no specifically designed competitive structure and most competitions are located at clubs that have a strong following in a particular Class. In a number of Classes, regional competitions are based around a series of events leading up to what is termed, a 'travellers' trophy' (RYA 1999:

10). At UK level, the national Class Associations organise separate, single annual National Championships and often a national traveller's series for different Classes. At international level, as noted above, the various International Class Associations organise annual World Championships and Continental Championships. In addition to these competitions there are also other prestigious, stand alone multi-Class events, primarily in Europe and North America, forming part of a wide-ranging array of opportunities for elite level sailors in preparation for the pinnacle of this complex competition structure: the Olympic Games (cf. RYA 1999: 10; and Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002).

It is clear, therefore, from this brief overview of competition opportunities and structures, that the sport of sailing, and individual sailors in particular, face a complexity that requires a well-managed and planned approach if success at the elite level is to be realised. A point reflected by UK Sport's Joe Patton, who suggested that, in contradistinction to athletics, where 'people tended to do their own thing, elite sailors have to be focused, organised individuals in order to manage all the logistics around the many different events across the world' (Interview: Joe Patton, 28 October 2002). Moreover, much of the coach's work at the sport's elite level now centres on managing and coordinating the various logistics involved within available resources. The reference to 'available resources' is instructive. The RYA's 1999-2008 Start and Potential Plan, for example, acknowledges that 'The development of the current high performance programmes has always been constrained by the amount of resources available. This has significantly restricted the width, depth and quality of their implementation' (RYA 1999: 11). This comment may be somewhat disingenuous given the adopted policy change in 1990 in relation to Olympic training and selection trials (RYA 1990: Appendix 1). Prior to 1990, Olympic training and selection trials were held in UK waters. However, following the 1990 policy change, training and selection trials for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics were to be held, as far as possible 'in Mediterranean waters' (RYA 1990: Appendix 1). While the financial costs underpinning this change in policy direction are not available, it is reasonable to contend that they were not insubstantial.

If we consider the above observations, together with the decision adopted prior to the 1996 Atlanta Games to establish a residential and training facility close to the Savannah location for the Olympic regatta, it is clear that over the past 10 years the RYA has put a premium on creating favourable training and competition conditions for its elite sailors (McIntyre 2000: 1). Such policy change does not come without cost. For example, in

1997, a Sydney Training Base was established at the Woolahara Sailing Club in Australia for the 2000 Olympiad. The Sydney Base and associated meteorology costs over the three years prior to the Games amounted to £193,400 (RYA 1998c: 79). The rationale underpinning this policy change is also clear. As the RYA's 1998-2001 World Class Performance Plan states, 'It cannot be stressed too highly how important detailed knowledge of the local weather and tidal currents will be to *winning medals* in 2000' (RYA 1998c: 23, emphasis added).

In sum, over the past 10 years the RYA has constructed a training and competition framework, encompassing Junior, Youth and Senior levels of yacht racing, to ensure that 'British Sailing achieves consistent success in future Olympic and World competitions' (RYA 1999: 49). Policy decisions taken in the late 1980s and early 1990s have been built upon and legitimised in two important ways: i) receipt of National Lottery funding; and ii) results at Olympic Games. As Ben Oakley explained, any disquiet within the RYA in relation to the increasing emphasis on preparations for the Olympic Games and the large amounts of Lottery monies on which such preparations were based, 'was silenced by the results in Atlanta and Sydney' (Interview: 11 September 2002). A clear manifestation of the development of these earlier changes is the now established policy of overseas training and preparation. Indeed, one of the lessons learnt from the 2000 Olympic campaign was that sailors required preparation time of 'at least five months ... for the Olympic regatta following the final selection trials'; just one aspect of the quest 'to be the dominant force in Olympic sailing for the next two Olympiads' (McIntyre 2000: 4-5).

Summary of key implications

The focus of this concluding section is on emergent policy change over the past 10 to 12 years, however, consideration is also given to the historical or 'tensed' policy processes (cf. Lewis 2002: 19) that have occurred over the past 20 to 30 years. From a (theoretical) critical realist perspective, the premise for locating more contemporary policy decisions within the context of past policy actions is based on the assumption that 'All social activity takes place within the context provided by a set of pre-existing social structures' (Lewis 2002: 19). This is not an insignificant point given the six points of departure set out earlier (see p. 263), where it was suggested that these might prove to be important 'indicators of difference' between developments in the sport of sailing and those witnessed in swimming and athletics. Consideration is also given to the wider

policy-making process within which the RYA operates: as in the sports of swimming and athletics, the changing nature of its relationships with governmental sporting agencies such as Sport England and UK Sport is a key aspect of this debate. It is clear that, over the past 10 to 12 years, the RYA has embraced the corporate, and increasingly contractual obligations, that are now an integral element of the resource relationships it enjoys with Sport England and UK Sport (Interviews: John Derbyshire, 25 March 2002; Joe Patton, 28 October 2002). National Lottery funding was identified as one of two key sources of change in the sports of swimming and athletics: Lottery funding has played a similarly significant role in change at the elite level (and levels below) for the RYA and the sport of sailing. However, the second key source of change identified in the two previously discussed sports – changing values/belief systems – does not appear to have had the same degree of salience for policy change within the RYA. Questions relating to organisational and administrative characteristics and jurisdictional complexities are raised here.

Before addressing the above points in more depth, it is worth noting the central aspects of the identified changes in the four key elements of elite sport development discussed above. With regard to developments in elite level facilities, the publication of a *Facilities Strategy for Sailing* in 2001 is a key departure from past policy in this area; the absence of a National Sailing Centre since 1987 is a case in point. A key aspect of the strategy is the ongoing construction of seven regional Sailing Academies in England 'as priority projects for the development of competition and training facilities to an international standard' (RYA & Sport England 2001: 4). The emergence of full-time sailors was the second element of elite development considered - 42 sailors are currently (as of September 2002) funded through the World Class Performance programme for the period April 2002-March 2003 (UK Sport 2002a). However, as for the sports of swimming and athletics, a similar caveat should be acknowledged: that is, the notion of 'full-time' remains a relative term as a number of these sailors continue to work in other employment, either, full- or part-time (Interview: Ben Oakley, 11 September 2002; RYA 1998c: 7).

With regard to developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine provision, changes here broadly reflect those found in swimming and athletics. However, the RYA appears to have embraced change in these areas somewhat earlier than that witnessed in the latter sports. Arguably, such a contention is substantiated, at least in part, if we

compare the success of the Olympic sailing team in recent years to the relatively poor achievements of the swimming and athletics teams – see Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. The structure of competition and training opportunities for sailors was the final element of elite programming considered, where complexity characterised the sport of sailing at all levels due, in large part, to the sport's numerous Class Associations. At the elite level, the decision to establish a training base reflecting conditions similar to those expected in Barcelona for the 1992 Olympic regatta, signalled a sea-change in RYA policy on this issue. From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the RYA has not been encumbered by the (historical) organisational, administrative and jurisdictional power struggles witnessed in the sports of swimming and athletics. That sailing is not a competitive event in the Commonwealth Games (the major international event where the four home countries of the UK compete separately) is instructive.

It is instructive if we consider the debilitating (power) struggles over the years with regard to GB/UK selection procedures, team composition and financial arrangements, within the ASA/ASFGB and UKA (and its predecessors) and the AAA of England, in swimming and athletics respectively. One reading of this scenario suggests that the absence of such struggles has been an important aspect of the RYA's ability to concentrate more fully on developing frameworks and structures at the elite level of the sport somewhat earlier, and with greater clarity of purpose, than that achieved by the governing bodies of swimming and athletics. The establishment of an Olympic Steering Group (OSG) in the early 1990s is but one manifestation of such clarity of purpose. It is, however, a significant one. The establishment of the OSG signalled the embryonic development of a coalition of actors within the RYA with a clear focus on the elite level. The development of the OSG was driven by the RYA's post-1992 Olympic review (the Olympic sailing team won just one Bronze medal in Barcelona). The post-1992 review proposed five alternatives for future elite (at this time primarily Olympic) participation (RYA 1992a, 1992b). The decision taken was 'To improve the present system and organisation (of our Olympic participation) by a reallocation of existing resources' (RYA 1992a).

The detail of this 'reallocation of existing resources', while important, is not our primary concern here. Of greater interest is the decision to create an OSG, premised on a guiding principle (see policy decision above) and thus the creation of a policy framework within which future decisions could be effectively legitimised. An example helps to make

the point. Here, we are concerned with annual Exchequer funding allocated to the RYA 'to support their core activities' (UK Sport 2001a) and which does not include monies related to World Class (Lottery-funded) programmes. We are also concerned with the 'additional resources' of £176,000 invested in the organisation's high performance programmes in 1998-1999, *prior* to receipt of World Class Start and Potential funding (RYA 1999: 11-12). While Exchequer figures are not available for 1998-1999, in the ensuing three years the RYA has been in receipt of the following Exchequer monies: £411,000, £411,000 and £360,800 respectively (UK Sport 2000a, 2001a, 2002c).

It is thus reasonable to assume that Exchequer funding for 1998-1999 is approximate to these figures. The RYA's Start and Potential Plan does not state explicitly that the 'additional resources' of £176,000 had been drawn exclusively from Exchequer funding. However, the point being made here is that, *prior to* receipt of Start and Potential Lottery monies, the RYA had been able to legitimise the *(re)*-allocation of a substantial amount of its resources for the development of elite level activities and support systems, *excluding* World Class Performance monies. This example draws attention to two aspects of the workings of the RYA. Firstly, the RYA has been in the vanguard of UK NGBs in securing World Class Lottery funding; thus reinforcing the organisational and administrative acumen noted earlier. Secondly, it depicts a national governing body (relatively) free from the organisational, administrational and jurisdictional encumbrances evidenced in the sports of swimming and athletics – arguably, an important aspect of the RYA's ability to allocate substantial (yet scarce at the time) additional resources for purposes relating to developing elite level sailors (RYA 1999: 11-12).

With regard to the two sources of change identified in the sports of swimming and athletics, it was noted above that changing values/belief systems do not appear to have had the same degree of salience for change within the RYA and sailing. This is a complex issue and is dealt with in more detail in the final chapter. However, an indication of potential insights into this issue can be signalled here. It was suggested earlier that, on the issue of self-reliance, or self governance, the RYA is comprised of members or participants which, in many of its core activities, and in many of its more traditional facilities, require a substantial degree of social, economic and/or cultural capital (Aversa 1986). This is clearly related to the point of departure regarding the perception of the sport as elitist, as in exclusive. A contention reinforced by Aversa

(1986), who investigated different 'entry routes' taken by newcomers to the sport, albeit in an American context. Aversa identified three such routes: i) traditional: joining a yacht club; ii) more recently: through commercial sailing schools; and iii) most informal: learning the rudiments of sailing from boat dealers who offer sailing instruction as a by-product of purchasing a boat. Interestingly, Aversa concludes that it is through the first of these routes where sailors become most accomplished: 'the elite of the sport' (1986: 52).

Aversa's observations are instructive in that they provide evidence that helps our understanding of the relationship between the notion of values/belief systems and the process of policy change for the RYA. Reflecting Bourdieu's (1984) concept of 'habitus', Aversa suggests that the key route of entry for developing the elite of the sport is characterised by 'an experience that socialises people into a lifestyle which includes not only the opportunity to learn the skills of sailing but a host of values, beliefs, attitudes and norms that, together, operationally define upper class behaviour as well' (1986: 52). Arguably, these observations characterise the socio-demographic profile of sailing in the UK. Indeed, the RYA has acknowledged that the sport tends to be perceived as elitist 'partly due to the cost of equipment, clothing and travel and partly because the older, more traditional sailing clubs are seen as being largely white, male, upper to middle-class organisations' (RYA 2001a: 15). That the RYA has drawn up an action plan in order 'to increase opportunities for everyone who wishes to take part in the sport' (RYA 2001a: 15) is notable. Of greater significance for this study, however, is that this socio-demographic profile might, somewhat paradoxically, be implicated in the (relative) lack of salience of changing values/belief systems in relation to policy change. Related to this argument is a further possibility.

Two of the six points of departure cited earlier are instructive here: i) there is a large number of water sports participants compared to overall RYA membership; and ii) by comparison with most sports, water sports activity is unusual in having a large number of participants who enjoy their sport as an outdoor recreation and leisure pursuit with no competitive element. These two points are clearly interrelated and, taken together with the admission that sailing remains an elitist/exclusive sport, the following observation is offered as a signpost for further consideration in the final chapter. That is, there are a large number of people participating in water sports activities that: i) are not involved with the RYA; ii) not concerned with competitive events; and iii) are able to

afford to participate in their chosen activity and thus not directly affected (or indeed concerned) by policy direction and/or resource allocations that may 'favour' elite level sailors. The argument being developed here is that within the many and varied water sports activities, there are a concomitant number of many and varied participant groupings, characterised, in large part, by a middle- to upper-class profile, thereby enabling these participants to enjoy water sports activities with few financial concerns.

Moreover, if we accept this assumption, for the RYA, the potentially difficult issue of balancing scarce resources between the sport's mass, participatory base and its elite level sailors is lessened. If we then widen this argument, the corollary of the above observations leads on to the (tentative) suggestion that, for the RYA and sailing, changing values and belief systems have not been as significant a catalyst for, or at least a source of, (policy) change as that witnessed in swimming and athletics. The paradox of this argument is clear from the following observations. It appears that the RYA, and in particular the OSG and the more recently created Performance Directorate, have achieved the changes in policy described throughout, *despite* the (relative) absence of a substantial degree of value/belief system change. This is not to argue that there is no evidence of the latter. Indeed, the evidence presented here belies that argument. Rather, it is to suggest that, for the RYA and for sailing at the elite level, the relevance of changing values and belief systems as a source of change might prove, in the final analysis, to be a *necessary*, but *insufficient* intervening variable. In other words, changing values and belief systems have been revealed as a far more potent source of (policy) change for the governing bodies of swimming and athletics.

To summarise, today, the RYA has a Performance Directorate comprising some 30 staff, which complements the elite focus of the OSG (RYA 1999: Appendix 19); an organisational framework that is far removed from the situation prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics. As John Derbyshire related, 'we've gone from having people in blazers wandering around trying to decide who should go to the Olympic Games, to coming up with systems that have the ability to send people to the Games who are most likely to win medals' (Interview: John Derbyshire, 25 March 2002; see also McIntyre 2000: 4). Clearly, the coalition of actors grouped around the OSG and the Performance Directorate has one primary focus: to win Olympic/World Championship medals. That this focus complies (with little apparent dissension from within the RYA's wider membership and participatory base) with Sport England and UK Sport policy direction in

recent years is also a somewhat different interpretation to that found in athletics (cf. Ward 2002a; and Interviews: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002; Peter Radford, 28 May 2002) and, to a lesser extent, in swimming (cf. Lodewyke 2002; and Interview: Wendy Coles, 19 March 2002). On the question of whether Sport England and/or UK Sport are 'too directive' in their relationships with NGBs, John Derbyshire argued that this is not the case and that 'with UK Sport, in particular, we work really closely with them to ensure that they have a good understanding of what we are trying to achieve and how we want to achieve it, and that has offset any directives' (Interview: 25 March 2002; and Interview: 28 October Joe Patton).

The above observations provide further evidence of a growing consensus amongst a coalition of actors/organisations involved with elite level sailing and, moreover, across a number of different levels. Indeed, it is a reasonable conjecture as to whether the RYA has now shifted from the adopted policy option for change in the early 1990s, when the decision was taken to establish an OSG with a remit for improving the present system/organisation with a reallocation of existing resources. One of the rejected policy options in 1992 for future Olympic participation is instructive. In 1992, the RYA rejected 'a policy of creating a highly elitist and professional Olympic team, involving early selection, a concentration of resources on a small number of competitors for a long period, necessitating the raising of considerable funding' (RYA 1992b: 2). From the evidence presented in this chapter, it is not an unreasonable contention that this rejected policy option in the early 1990s is now *the* policy framework within which the RYA's elite-focused coalition operates in the early 21st century. Moreover, a crucial aspect of this rejected option in 1992 – 'the raising of considerable funding' – is now obsolete. National Lottery funding has legitimised the construction of one of 'the most comprehensive and systematic high performance sailing programmes in the world' (RYA 1999: 2; see also McIntyre 2000: 5).

Notes

[1] From 1997 until March 2002, PAS was the elite-focused subsidiary company within UKA responsible for administering Lottery monies. However, UK Sport's Performance Services Manager for athletics explained that PAS has now merged with UKA into one organisation due, in large part, to UKA's organisational and administrative restructuring under UK Sport's Modernisation programme (Interview: Jane Swan, 28 October 2002; see also UKA 2003: 18).

Chapter 8
Discussion and Conclusions

Introduction

This final chapter has two principal sections. The first section draws together and compares the empirical findings relating to the emergence of a policy framework for the six NSOs/NGBs in Canada and UK, with specific consideration given to similarities and differences in the key findings from the four elements of elite sport development used to structure the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7. The contextual background within which elite sport emerged as a discrete area of policy interest for governments in Canada and the UK, first discussed in Chapter 5, is drawn upon throughout. While this first section is not concerned, substantively, with the theoretical and/or methodological insights set out in Chapters 2 and 3, reference to these insights is incorporated into the discussion where appropriate. It is in the second section of the chapter where a more substantive analysis of the theoretical and methodological insights is provided. Here, the salience of the different meso-level theoretical frameworks set out in Chapter 2 is analysed, with particular emphasis given to evaluating the usefulness of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF).

Analysis in this second section centres on the emergence of policy change, with a focus on both endogenous factors (within the sport development policy subsystem), for example, the relevance of changing values/belief systems and policy-oriented learning and exogenous factors (external to the sport development policy subsystem), such as changes in socio-economic conditions and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. Within any discussion of policy change, the ways in which differing priorities in the policy process for sport results in questions relating to who benefits most from such change requires analysis. Consequently, this second section also considers the concept of 'power relations'. The insights provided by the discussion of different conceptualisations of power relationships in Chapter 3, and the review of macro-level theories of the state in Chapter 2, help to guide the analysis in this respect.

In structuring the chapter in this way the research objectives set out in Chapter 1 can be addressed. It is worth recalling the four objectives here, before addressing the four elements of elite sport policy development in more depth:

- To provide an account of the emergence of sport policy, in general, and explain the development of elite sport policy, in particular, in Canada and the UK;
- To evaluate the utility of different meso-level theories of the policy process in order to understand better the nature of elite sport policy change;
- To analyse the process of policy change within the sport development policy subsystem in relation to both exogenous and endogenous factors;
- Following on from the last objective: to examine the usefulness of the concept of 'policy-oriented learning' and the related cluster of ideas within the broader concept of 'policy transfer'.

Comparison of policy frameworks for elite sport development in Canada and the UK

The aim here is to draw together the key implications arising out of the discussion of the four elements of elite sport development with regard to the six NSOs/NGBs under investigation in Chapters 6 and 7 – see Table 8.1 below for a summary of key implications. This analysis should allow for cross comparison not only between Canadian NSOs and UK NGBs in the same sport (e.g. Canadian Yachting Association and Royal Yachting Association) but also across sports (e.g. Swimming/Natation Canada and Royal Yachting Association). In addition, comparisons between different NSOs/NGBs/sports in the same country can also be set out (e.g. Amateur Swimming Association/Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain and UK Athletics). A key concern of the following discussion is to map the policy terrain within which policy change has occurred, wherein the nature of the relationships each NSO/NGB enjoys with other significant organisations in the sport development policy subsystem in each country can also be delineated. In Canada, relationships with the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) and the federal agency, Sport Canada, for example, and in the UK, with UK Sport, Sport England and the central government Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). This comparative analysis provides a useful empirical picture of the policy processes leading to policy change upon which the second section of the chapter can build.

Table 8.1 Summary of key implications in four elements of elite sport development

	SNC	AC	CYA	ASA/ASFGB	UKA	RYA
Development of elite level facilities	Facility development remains the remit of P/TSOs* and municipalities; no national swimming facilities development plan; primary involvement is with the CSCs; however, questions remain as to the utility of CSCs for all levels of swimming	No national facilities plan – remit is with P/TSOs and municipalities; primary involvement with CSC network; poor perception of the sport means that political and/or corporate support is lacking; some involvement with provincial/territorial and municipal levels linked to Sport Canada's hosting policy	Little involvement in facility development at club/provincial levels; has developed facilities in three CSCs close to water-borne environments	Key recent development is an increase in Lottery funded 50m pools; traditionally, 25m short-course pools were the norm; elite swimmers also hindered in the past as local authority pools were the primary means of training - they were difficult to access and lane hire was costly	Only recently has the paucity of indoor training and competition facilities improved; Lottery funding driving expansion; regional network of elite facilities linked to UKSI now emerging; debacle over a national facility for World Athletics Championships typifies athletics' lack of organisational acumen	Sailing unique for absence of Sports Council interventions over the years; recent development is the publication of a Facilities Strategy - 9 regional academies under construction in UK; no national sailing centre - preference is for elite sailors to train/compete abroad, simulating conditions for major sailing regattas
Emergence of 'full-time' swimmers, athletes and sailors	25 elite swimmers supported by Sport Canada's AAP at Senior Levels for 2000-01; in-house 'Team Elite' and 'High Performance Swimmer Incentive' programmes now in place; however, parental support and self-funding underpins elite level swimming	Few opportunities for athletes to train/compete on a full-time basis; 53 athletes nominated for AAP (Senior Levels) support for 2002-03 and an Elite Athlete Assistance programme now in place; however, parental support is crucial as AC's ability to provide support constrained by recent financial difficulties	Few, if any, sailors can be classed as full-time; some 45 sailors in receipt of AAP funding for 2002-03; yet, self-funding/parental support remains paramount means of support	47 swimmers in receipt of WCP funding (at 09/02); Lottery funding now providing conditions for elite swimmers to train/compete on a full-time basis; however, many swimmers below WCP level remain in employment elsewhere or are supported by state benefits	82 athletes in receipt of WCP funding (at 09/02); yet, similar scenario to swimming in that many athletes remain in employment or are supported by state benefits; also greater resistance from grass roots to earnings potential of elite 'stars'	42 sailors in receipt of WCP funding (at 09/02); sailing is an expensive sport and remains elitist/exclusive; key differences to swimming/athletics: little resistance to elite level resource allocations; large number of water sports participants are able to participate with few financial worries
Developments in coaching, sports science/medicine	Changes to coaching education and development (CBET) embraced and in receipt of funding for a Sport Science and Support Programme; yet, concerns raised as to the efficacy of sports science research, as well as evidence of resistance to the CBET by some swimming coaches	Coaching programmes heavily criticised in an internal organisational audit in 2001; a full-time Head Coach only appointed in 2002; does have an internal sports science programme and a recently created medical committee	The CBET programme has been embraced; yet only recently appointed full-time coaches at elite level; recent CYA workshop highlighted sceptical view of sports science/medicine; however, now adopting a sport science-based approach (borrowed from UK)	Bill Sweetenham has been the driving force behind improvements in coaching – certification now linked to performance and quality of swimmers; benefiting from emerging UKSI network of support services in sports science/medicine; yet, only in 2001 was the first British Swimming Joint Science Conference held	Coaching, and integration with sports science/medicine, remains an issue of concern; now benefiting from UKSI support services; major Task Force review of coaching suggests increased professionalism, education and development opportunities may be emerging	Technical nature of sailing has enabled development of coaching, training and education courses; thus few full-time coaches but many Class experts; also benefits from UKSI support services in sports science/medicine; RYA's sport science-based approach now emulated by the CYA
Competition opportunities for elite level swimmers, athletes and sailors	Competitive structure characterised as 'cluttered'; also concerns over jurisdictional divisions, migration of swimmers to the USA and the trend for swimmers to train for lucrative prize money events to the detriment of long-term development	Opportunities hindered by: jurisdictional divisions, few opportunities for athletes below elite level, lack of funding for athletes to travel abroad for competition, migration of talented athletes to USA and detrimental effect on domestic calendar of an elite group competing abroad for prize monies	Recent developments have witnessed the creation of a more structured, cost-efficient and locally-based North American programme; previously, ad hoc approach - sailors took unilateral decisions as to when/where/how often to train and compete	Sweetenham again credited with streamlining the competition calendar; less time now spent competing and a more focused approach to training - aim is to peak at major swimming events; some evidence of resistance to these changes at grass roots levels	UKA admit to confused and complicated structure; critics suggest competition structured towards elite athletes; hindered by 'stars' opting to compete abroad for prize monies – a residual concern from the 1980s	Complex competitive structure (many Class Associations); Junior, Youth and Senior competition framework now in place; key development was to establish overseas base mirroring conditions for '92 Olympics – adopted again for '96 and 2000 Games

***Abbreviations**: **P/TSOs** – Provincial/Territorial Sporting Organisations; **AAP** – Athlete Assistance Programme; **CBET** – Competency-Based Education and Training; **CSC** – Canadian Sport Centre; **WCP** – World Class Performance level of Lottery funding in the UK; **UKSI** – United Kingdom Sports Institute

Development of elite level facilities

If we consider first elite level facility development in the three Canadian NSOs, a common theme emerges across all three sports; that is, none of the NSOs has a remit for facility development, either at high performance levels or at levels below. Facility development remains the responsibility of provincial/territorial governments and/or provincial/territorial sporting organisations (P/TSOs) and municipal authorities. A further theme to emerge is Sport Canada's (continuing) emphasis on strengthening its hosting policy for major international sporting events. Thus, the Canadian Sport Centre (CSC) network remains the primary area of interest regarding facilities for all three NSOs, where partnership arrangements between the particular NSO, P/TSO, clubs, educational institutions and the private sector are important in leveraging funding for programme development. Here, though, we have found differential levels of commitment to the CSC network.

Swimming/Natation Canada (SNC) has embraced the CSC concept to a greater degree than either Athletics Canada (AC) or the Canadian Yachting Association (CYA), a policy position, moreover, that is in line with its recent re-emphasis on high performance objectives, most clearly stated in its COMM1T TO W1N! philosophy in 2002 (SNC 2002a: 4). Swimming/Natation Canada has established seven dedicated swimming centres, six of which are aligned to the CSCs, of which there are currently nine across Canada. Yet concerns have been raised by many within the swimming community as to the efficacy of these centres for levels below the high performance end of the sport (cf. Colwin 1997; Helmstaedt 1995a; McKinnon 1995). Athletics Canada, while embracing the CSC concept to a certain degree, has yet to formulate a coherent policy position in this element of high performance sport, as revealed by the somewhat ambiguous statements on this issue in recent Annual General Meeting and Semi-Annual General Meeting reports (cf. Athletics Canada 2001a). That AC has yet to formulate coherent policy direction on this issue is perhaps not unsurprising as the organisation comes to terms with the ramifications of a damning assessment of its organisational and administrative capabilities in an internal audit in 2001.

The CYA has established three sailing centres aligned to CSCs close to water in Halifax, Toronto and Vancouver. The CYA's Executive Director and Sport Canada's Senior

Programme Officer for sailing made it clear that utilisation of the CSCs is not just about elite sailor development; it is also about long-term sailor development, and thus for those sailors below the high performance level who have suffered from variable commitment to high performance sport at provincial/territorial levels (Interviews: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002; Walter Lyons, 20 June 2002). A key aspect of the CSCs for the CYA, and one that differentiates sailing from the other two sports considered, is that CSC programmes for elite sailor development require equipment over and above that required for swimming and track and field athletics: sailing is an expensive sport, a characteristic that compounds the difficulties faced by the CYA (and not only the CYA) as it struggles to fund elite level programme development in a climate of shifting federal priorities for sport. One area where the CYA does not appear to have maximised potential opportunities for facility use is at provincial and/or club levels. Chapter 6 revealed that there is potential here for the CYA to become more involved, yet recent CYA Action and Operation Plans (cf. CYA 1997, 2002f) reveal no direct policy interest at this level. It may be here that the CYA's recently stated strategic policy directions that mirror the four pillars comprising the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy require further sharpening, especially in relation to the Interaction and Building Capacity pillars.

If we now consider the three UK national governing bodies of sport (NGBs), with regard to the sport of swimming, it is important to recall that for many years the dominant organisational force for policy direction was the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA). However, the establishment of the Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain (ASFGB) as a constitutionally distinct limited company in 2002, together with the creation of a wholly-owned subsidiary company, High Performance Swimming Ltd, has radically shifted the balance of power at the elite level of swimming. An interesting theoretical pointer is signalled here; that is, David Sparkes is Chief Executive of both the ASA and the ASFGB. This dual role is instructive if we consider the notion of 'policy broker' within Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith's (1999: 122) development of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). For these authors, the role of a policy broker is conceived of as one where her/his 'principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122). In relation to the specific element of elite sport development under consideration here – facilities – it is thus reasonable to suggest that the advocacy role played by David Sparkes in the 'separating out' of ASA/ASFGB responsibilities has helped to clear the policy terrain of an institutional imbroglio. In turn, the ASFGB has witnessed unprecedented investment in

50 metre swimming pools rather than the traditional construction of short-course 25 metre pools. While these 50 metre pools are clearly aimed at providing training conditions tailored towards elite swimmers, contractual agreements under National Lottery rules extend access to the general public. Policy for facility development/use has thus been turned on its head. In the past, elite level swimmers trained, in large part, in pools owned by local authorities and/or educational institutions where lane hire was/is costly and access times were/are most usually restricted to early mornings and/or late at night. Today, the UK's elite swimmers are the primary 'customers' of these new 50 metre pools and the general public's access is incorporated around training times for the elite swimmer. David Sparkes has shrewdly steered a middle path here, with recent policy pronouncements highlighting both the requirements of the elite and grass roots levels of the sport (Sparkes 2002); thus reinforcing his role as policy broker between potentially conflicting coalitions in the sport development policy subsystem.

With regard to UK Athletics (UKA), an enduring issue over the past 30 years has been the shortage of indoor training facilities to a standard required for high performance athletes' preparation for major international sporting events. Only recently has the paucity of indoor facilities begun to improve, with National Lottery monies providing substantial impetus to this emerging expansion. In addition, elite level athletes now benefit from the ongoing construction of the network of facilities/support services aligned to the United Kingdom Sports Institute (UKSI), while concerns remain regarding a lack of core funding for development of facilities at grass roots levels (O'Connor 2003; UKA 2002c; Interview: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002). For example, while Chapter 7 highlighted a £40 million 'legacy' fund for athletics in lieu of the Government's broken manifesto promise to provide a suitable venue for the 2005 World Athletics Championships, more recently O'Connor (2003: 40) has reported in the *Times* that serious doubts remain as to whether *all* these monies will be forthcoming. It is also widely acknowledged that the failure of the bid to host the 2005 Championships has proved harmful not only to the sport of athletics but also to the overall organisation and administration of sport in the UK (cf. Campbell 2002: 14; DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002: 150; House of Commons 1999: xxxiv). The debacle surrounding the construction of a stadium capable of staging the World Athletics Championships in 2005 draws attention to the lack of a dominant policy broker for the sport: arguably, at least part of the explanation here. While the sport of swimming has benefited from David Sparkes' dual role, charismatic personality and shrewd steering of policy debates, UKA can be

characterised as lacking the type of leadership required to manoeuvre policy deliberations in such a way that athletics benefits at least as much as other organisations involved in this process. On the issue of athletics' failure to set out coherent policy direction for the sport, Mike Whittingham has argued that

> People still have to influence and persuade the volunteers and the different committees and if it were a different person [than David Moorcroft] they'd probably say, no, we're doing this, I'm sorry, but that's what we're doing. But in the end someone like David, that kind of character, ends up wishy-washy. That's why we didn't have a World Athletics Championship (Interview: 23 August 2002).

While such comments on the capabilities of UKA's Chief Executive paint a somewhat disparaging picture, it should also be borne in mind that UK Sport's Performance Services Manager for athletics has argued forcefully that Moorcroft has been the driving force over the past year in helping to bring together the disparate, and often conflicting, influences in the organisation and administration of the sport (Interview: Jane Swan, 28 October 2002); influences, moreover, which are not peculiar to David Moorcroft's time as Chief Executive of the sport's national governing body, as the discussion in Chapter 7 revealed.

The third UK NGB under investigation was the Royal Yachting Association (RYA); a national governing body that has been characterised as showing a degree of organisational and administrative acumen in advance of that evidenced in the sports of swimming and athletics. As discussed, a key aspect of such acumen is the absence of jurisdictional power struggles that blighted relationships between the ASA and the ASFGB in swimming and, in athletics, between UKA's predecessors – the British Amateur Athletic Board (BAAB) and the British Athletic Federation (BAF) and the Amateur Athletics Association - over the years. It might also be the case that, given the discussed exclusivity and middle- to upper-class membership of the RYA, the type of business and management skills required to administer a national governing body are/were less alien to RYA staff than for those involved in the administration of swimming and athletics. While such a contention clearly warrants further research, it is reasonable to assume that the relative absence of internal wrangling is at least part of the explanation of the sport's ability to construct not only a successful elite sailing team but also in enhancing its reputation as one of the country's leading NGBs with those organisations charged with steering the policy process for elite sport development in the UK (Walker 2001; Interview: Joe Patton, 28 October 2002).

Further distinctions between sailing and the sports of swimming and athletics are apparent on the issue of facility development and, it should be recognised, distinctions that transcend this particular issue. The first point to note is that Sports Council interventions regarding facility development in sailing have been notable for their absence over the years. If we recall the six points of departure set out in Chapter 7 (see p. 263), this may be due, in part, to sailing not being recognised as a priority sport in schools and enduring perceptions of elitism (RYA 2001b: 3). However, another, albeit less tangible, explanation has emerged, that is, lobbying of the UK's sporting agencies for resources to aid facility development in sailing has been less evident than in swimming and athletics. It is reasonable to assume that, given the sport's middle- to upper-class socio-demographic profile, and thus the capacity of many water sports participants to pursue their particular activity with few financial concerns, the need for financial aid simply has not arisen to the same degree as for the other two sports. Moreover, while Cowes was used as a primary sailing centre until it closed in 1987, the UK has not had a national centre for the sport despite plans in the 1970s to develop a National Yacht Racing Centre.

The absence of a national centre for the sport provides yet another distinction in relation to athletics, in as much as that sailing has been free from the type of debilitating policy deliberations witnessed in athletics over a national venue for major sporting championships. An interrelated issue that illustrates a further distinction between sailing and the other two sports is the use of natural resources, i.e. water. Thus, while the RYA, in conjunction with Sport England (RYA & Sport England 2001), has now put in place a strategy to develop nine sailing academies in the UK within which the development of sailors for high performance competitions will take place, much of the early exposure to the sport is conducted on water but without the necessity for facilities *per se*. Thus, the requirement for financial aid from government and/or quasi-governmental sporting bodies is nullified. An interesting theoretical pointer is also signalled here. That is, while the RYA values its independence from government and other outside bodies, in recent years we have witnessed what might be termed, an emerging confluence of policy between the Association and the two leading quasi-governmental agencies for sport in the UK – Sport England and UK Sport. This policy confluence is underpinned by a set of shared values in relation to the requirements of an NGB in the development of elite sailors. This is also an instructive pointer, then, with regard to the advocacy coalition framework's (ACF) tripartite system of beliefs. At the

'policy core' level of this three-tiered system, two 'fundamental normative precepts' for binding together actors within a coalition are: i) 'Orientation on basic value priorities'; and ii) 'Identification of groups or other entities whose welfare is of greatest concern' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 133). It is clear that, from the inception of an Olympic Steering Group (OSG) in the early 1990s, and reinforced more recently by the creation of a 30-stong Performance Directorate, the 'value priorities' of these two RYA sub-divisions have focused 'greatest concern' on developing one of 'the most comprehensive and systematic high performance sailing programmes in the world' (RYA 1999: 2; see also McIntyre 2000: 5).

That the emergence of this coalition of actors centring on high performance sailing has achieved what we might term 'positive-sum' results is significant. Both the ACF and the closely related policy networks literature stress the importance of positive-sum relationships in the forging of strong reciprocal agreements in the policy process. Thus, the RYA has embraced the increasingly contractual agreements set out by funding agencies such as Sport England, and more significantly, UK Sport, in relation to the elite level with far greater enthusiasm and success than is evident in swimming and athletics. 'Success' here for both the RYA and Sport England/UK Sport is, primarily, Olympic and World Championship medals. However, there is another, and perhaps equally important, aspect of this positive-sum relationship: that is, UK Sport's drive to 'modernise' national governing bodies of sport. In short, UK Sport cite the RYA as an exemplar of organisational and administrative acuity, thereby, in turn helping to legitimise its own programme of modernisation in a policy sector (sport) that has traditionally valued its autonomy, voluntarism and independence.

The comparison here with the organisation and administration of swimming and, most notably athletics, over the years is stark. As Chapter 7 revealed, until recently both sports have been riven by jurisdictional power struggles over who 'controls' the sport. These struggles have coalesced around the issue of scarce resources: in short, who gets what and why? It is, therefore, crucial to understand that the peculiar characteristics of the sport play a large part in shaping eventual policy outputs and outcomes. Two aspects of this argument in relation to the specific issue under consideration here are worthy of comment. Firstly, swimming and athletics are characterised by activities that require facilities for mass participation, and thus redistributive intervention by government and/or quasi-governmental agencies. Secondly, both sports have a body of

participants that become involved in the sport's competitive structure of opportunities, thus necessitating the construction of suitable facilities for training/competition purposes. Crucially, neither of these two characteristics applies to the same degree in sailing.

There are also a number of interesting comparisons to be made across Canada and the UK - between the same sports and across different sports. As discussed, in Canada, facility development does not fall within the remit of NSOs. The primary area for NSO involvement in this element of high performance sport programming centres on the emerging network of CSCs. This is a key difference between the two countries across all three sports, as the potential for creating (policy) bargaining forums or 'venues' for NSOs and federal government/Sport Canada/COC regarding facility development is absent, in large part, from the Canadian sports system.[1] There is thus far greater opportunity in the UK sports system for what Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999: 143) term, 'venue shopping', with respect to policy discussions regarding facility development for elite sport. Here, the ACF assumes that coalitions 'have a multitude of possible venues' within which to seek to alter the behaviour of governmental institutions in order to achieve policy objectives in their respective policy cores (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 142). Moreover, a common result of venue shopping is policy stalemate where Coalition X dominates one venue and Coalition Y dominates another. Where endorsement from both is required, the result is a stalemate.

Two points are worthy of note here. Firstly, if we consider calls for, and the construction, of 50 metre swimming pools, the £50 million Lottery funding awarded to UKA as part of its £80 million facilities strategy and the ongoing construction of nine elite sailing academies across the UK, it is clear that the potential to effect policy outcomes by the groups of actors involved in policy decisions regarding elite facility development in the three UK NGBs is not only far greater than that available to NSOs in Canada but has also yielded significant policy outputs. Theodoraki's (1999) analysis of the multi-level policy-making processes involved in the eventual decision to construct a network of facilities rather than a central site for the UKSI is a further example of the potential to effect sport policy outputs in the UK. The second point concerns the notion of policy stalemate highlighted above. In respect of the RYA/sailing, there appears to be an absence of a *dominant* coalition of actors concerned with policy-making below the elite level on this issue. Therefore, the capacity of the coalition of actors who are

concerned with elite level facility development have been able to bring about a facilities strategy for sailing which centres largely on sailing academies for the development of elite sailors (RYA & Sport England 2001). It should be noted that this strategy is not just concerned with elite academies, however, the argument being developed here is that this elite-focused coalition has been able to effect a policy strategy such that large amounts of quasi-public monies are currently being allocated to the elite level of the sport but with little apparent dissension from elsewhere amongst water sports enthusiasts. As Chapter 7 revealed, given the somewhat cantankerous debates over different policy issues within swimming and athletics, the potential for a similar scenario to emerge in these two sports (at least in the past) was unlikely.

Finally, on the issue of facilities development, the Canadian Sport Centres (CSC) network warrants further discussion. In many ways the CSC network mirrors developments in the UK, where a number of multi-sport UKSI sites are emerging for elite level preparation; thus revealing a propensity for governments in both countries (at federal level in Canada and primarily through the DCMS/UK Sport in the UK) to support elite level sport in this way. While this is a notable point in itself, of greater interest here is the variable commitment to the CSCs from the three sports in Canada and what this might reveal in relation to emerging coalitions centring on high performance sport. Swimming/Natation (SNC) has clearly embraced the CSC concept in respect of elite swimmer training with far greater enthusiasm than Athletics Canada (AC), while the Canadian Yachting Association (CYA) has developed three centres close to water environments but with an approach that is qualitatively different from that adopted by SNC. While SNC has been subject to criticism for concentrating too heavily on its elite swimmers (cf. Colwin 1997; Helmstaedt 1995a; McKinnon 1995), the CYA's approach is to utilise the centres for long-term athlete (sailor) development (Interviews: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002; Walter Lyons, 20 June 2002).

This variable commitment to the CSCs is useful, then, in illustrating a policy-related issue of concern for this study; that is, the potential for the emergence of a high performance sport coalition in Canada. Athletics Canada has yet to formulate a policy position with any degree of clarity as it come to terms with the damning conclusions of an internal audit in 2001. It is therefore too early to draw substantive conclusions in relation to its policy on CSCs and further examination of policy decisions over a longer time period is required. We can draw more substantive comparative conclusions,

however, with regard to SNC and the CYA. Swimming/Natation Canada's undoubted level of commitment (notwithstanding the noted criticisms) to the CSCs can be related to its re-emphasis on high performance objectives in 2002, when a 'COMM1T TO W1N' philosophy was set out (SNC 2002a: 4). On the other hand, the CYA has clearly adopted a quite different policy position and has outlined a series of policy initiatives closely mirroring the four pillars of the new Canadian Sport Policy. If we take these observations and juxtapose them with the shift in federal sport policy (rhetoric at least) towards a greater concern with issues such as 'building capacity' in the sports system, greater 'interaction' between jurisdictional levels and concerns related to increasing 'participation' in sport, and the Canadian Olympic Committee's (COC) almost diametrically opposed decision in 2002 to restrict funding to those NSOs that reveal medal-winning capacities, some interesting pointers emerge.

The first point to emerge is that, of the three Canadian NSOs investigated for this study, SNC has set out the most unambiguous high performance philosophy and can be conceptualised as a leading player in an embryonic coalition of actors in the Canadian sport delivery system centring on high performance sport objectives. This is clear in one sense in the comments of Jan Meyer, Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for swimming, who suggested that there have been recent debates over whether a separate arm's length agency for high performance sport should be created and whether it should be 'dedicated to the assessment, the monitoring, the evaluation of, and the determination of funding to NSOs for the high performance element .... within swimming, there's no doubt that organisation feels it would be a good thing to do' (Interview: 12 June 2002). With the federal government shifting policy priorities towards a lessened emphasis on high performance sport, SNC has clearly aligned itself to another important organisational actor in this embryonic high performance coalition - the COC. As discussed, in 2002, the COC sharpened funding arrangements to NSOs: COC monies are now targeted at those organisations revealing medal-winning capacity at the Olympic Games. Moreover, in 2001, Mark Lowry of the then Canadian Olympic Association (now COC) argued that any

> ... analysis of the financial support to NSFs [NSOs] from Sport Canada and the COA [now COC] since 1989 in relation to the achievement of high performance results at the Olympics, clearly reflects that we have not accomplished our performance targets despite the significant amounts of financing contributed to our NSFs (Lowry 2001: 2).

Lowry also argued for the creation of a dedicated high performance sport agency, in part, to allow 'for a consistent and competent analysis of performance'; in short, the COC's decision to restrict monies to the more successful NSOs is about priorities, and these priorities are Olympic medals. Clearly, SNC has recognised these changing resource conditions. Indeed, SNC's Director of Finance and Administration explained that the COC has 'become a big factor now in funding Canadian sport' (Interview: Larry Clough, 13 June 2002), while Karen Spierkel – SNC's Chief Executive Officer - stated that the new COC funding model 'squarely places an emphasis on funding for peak performance ... [and that] SNC is well positioned to benefit from the focus on high performance' (quoted in SNC 2002b: 2-3). Whether Karen Spierkel's assessment of SNC's capacity 'to benefit' proves to be correct remains far from clear, particularly in the light of the sport's lack of medal-winning success over the past four Olympiads and World Aquatic Championships.

A second point of interest is the CYA's decision to closely mirror the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy's emphasis on broader aspects of athlete development; a quite distinct policy position to that adopted by SNC. This may be due, in part, to policy pragmatism and the politics of funding. In other words, Canadian sailors have delivered scant success at the Olympics Games and World Championships over the past 10 to 15 years (see Chapter 6, especially Table 6.3) and the CYA acknowledges that few benefits would accrue from a strategic alignment with the COC. The CYA has thus aligned itself more closely to Sport Canada's and the new Canadian Sport Policy's emphasis on rewarding those NSOs that develop long-term planning objectives for the development of athletes. As Marianne Davis explained, Sport Canada has stated that, in the future, results will be taken into account but also that

> ... they will look at our plans ... what our goals are and how we work to reach those goals. And my feeling is that if they have confidence that the processes we've put in place are going to lead us towards those goals, that will count favourably in the evaluation ... [leading to] more money [and] more support (Interview: 17 June 2002).

To sum up, it is clear that the CYA is not currently to be conceived of as part of any emerging high performance sport coalition. What we might be witnessing here, though, is the emergence of a separate coalition of actors/organisations in the Canadian sport development policy subsystem. While such a contention clearly requires further research, it is suggested that this coalition would comprise those NSOs - such as the CYA, and perhaps AC - which, while sharing some of the elite coalition's values/belief

systems, in as much as that medal-winning achievements would be one part of their *raison d'etre*, it would not be the driving force. Policies such as those evidenced here by the CYA, in relation to long-term development of sailors and concerns over further integrating support systems across the federal-provincial/territorial divide, would be the guiding principles underpinning organisational objectives for this coalition's members.

Emergence of 'full-time' swimmers, athletes and sailors

The political will to support high level sporting performers was first evident in Canada as long ago as the 1970s, when a number of grants-in-aid programmes were introduced: these various programmes were consolidated, in 1980, under the auspices of Sport Canada's Athlete Assistance Programme (AAP). By the late 1980s, the overriding focus over the preceding 10 to 15 years on high performance sport at federal level had resulted in a cadre of state-funded athletes reminiscent of the former Eastern bloc states (cf. Macintosh et al. 1987: 172). Two wider points are worthy of note before exploring similarities and differences between the six NSOs/NGBs. While the Canadian federal government began to support its high performance competitors far earlier than UK governments, these monies have provided (and provide) only a small part of the financial resources required to train and compete on a full-time basis (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 84-85); parental and/or self-support thus remains crucial to the development of high performance athletes in Canada (Interview: David McCrindle, 12 June 2002); a theme, moreover, which emerged from all three Canadian NSOs under investigation.

The second point reflects aspects of the first but goes somewhat deeper. That is, similar evidence emerged in the exploration of the UK sporting context and UK NGBs regarding the notion of full-time swimmers, athletes and sailors. Many swimmers, athletes and sailors, particularly those below the World Class Performance level of Lottery funding, remain in employment elsewhere, either full- or part-time or rely on state benefits for support. However, as Chapter 7 revealed, recipients of World Class Performance monies – termed Athlete Personal Awards and which include support for basic living costs, education, training costs, equipment and personal sports travel – have the potential to receive up to four times the level of financial support currently provided to Canadian high performance athletes in all sports. If this is the wider backdrop to the notion of full-time swimmers/athletes/sailors, what similarities and differences were apparent in the six NSOs/NGBs? With regard to SNC and Canadian swimming, a cluster of incentive

programmes are now in place that reflect the organisation's high performance emphasis. Moreover, SNC's long-standing club grant programme has been restructured such that a new designation of 'high performance swimming clubs' are now factored into Sport Canada's carding system: high performance swimmers at these clubs thus identified are now eligible for extra support (SNC 1997: 35). The final piece of this mosaic of support for elite swimmers is the recently introduced programme of awards by SNC's official swimsuit supplier, Speedo Canada, for medal-winning performances at the 2004 Olympic Games.

Athletics Canada has been somewhat less able to support its elite level athletes, although it has published a draft list of some 53 athletes for carding support at Sport Canada's 'Senior' levels for the period 2002-2003 and an internal Elite Athlete Assistance programme is now in place. Thus, financial difficulties over the past 10 to 15 years have reduced the organisation's ability to provide monetary support systems for its elite athletes, 'partly through going to court and arbitration many times over Ben Johnson's doping issues' (Christie 2001a). Such financial difficulties mask a number of organisational and administrative weaknesses which became more clearly understood as a result of the internal audit in 2001. For example, sponsorship opportunities have declined in recent years for both AC and its elite athletes (Athletics Canada 2001a: 3). The latter have failed to achieve levels of medal-winning performances at Olympic Games and World Athletics Championships over the past 10 to 15 years that might not only bring about sponsorship opportunities but also monetary rewards from the COC, which has argued for prize monies for Olympic medal-winning success (Jones 2002). In respect of the CYA, few, if any, elite sailors can be categorised as full-time. While some 45 sailors are eligible for AAP funding for the period 2002-2003, self-funding and/or parental support underpins Canadian sailors' efforts to train and compete at the highest levels However, the lack of medal-winning success at Olympic Games and World Championships means that Canadian sailors are not in a position at present to receive monetary support from the COC as it targets funding to the more successful Canadian NSOs.

Turning to the three UK NGBs, in respect of the ASA/ASFGB, some 47 elite level swimmers were in receipt of World Class Performance Lottery funding as at September 2002. These 47 swimmers are, in large part, full-time in the sense that they train and compete on a full-time basis and are supported by substantial monetary awards - up to

a maximum of £22,830 per annum and, as discussed, this figure represents an amount far greater (by a factor of four) than the maximum award currently available under Sport Canada's AAP for high performance swimmers (and athletes/sailors). Clearly, National Lottery funding underpins such support and it is thus only recently that the final vestiges of 'shamateurism' in British swimming have been abandoned - and not only in the sport of swimming. With regard to UKA, 82 athletes were in receipt of World Class Performance funding as at September 2002 and comments similar to those in swimming, in respect of the gradual decline of 'shamateurism', apply to athletics. However, there are also some interesting shades of difference here when comparing sports. Firstly, athletics has traditionally had a far greater televisual appeal than either swimming or sailing: the elite athlete has been the chief beneficiary of this conjunction of sporting and commercial worlds. While many athletes benefited financially, such a conjunction of sporting and commercial worlds did not, however, have such a positive outcome for the organisations responsible for the sport. As discussed in Chapter 7, the eventual demise of the BAF in 1997 was due, in many respects, to its inability to manage the increasingly powerful group of elite athletes who were then able to command large appearance fees and prize monies at events across the world and to the detriment of its own athletics meets in the UK. What emerged out of this organisational disarray, somewhat paradoxically, only served to strengthen the position of the sport's elite athletes, most notably with the creation of a separate limited company (Performance Athlete Services Ltd) which was to be responsible for the World Class Performance Lottery monies coming into the sport's elite level at the time. These events in the mid- to late 1990s can be viewed as a precursor to the gradual strengthening of a grouping, or coalition, of actors/organisations centring on elite sport processes and outcomes.

A second important difference between the sports, and one that touches on the above issue, is that the emergence of a coalition of actors/organisation centring on elite sport not only occurred somewhat later in athletics (and swimming) than in sailing but also with far less apparent dissension from the grass roots of sailing. We have already discussed some of the important factors that underlie these differences earlier in this chapter (and in Chapter 7) but it is perhaps worthwhile to recall the earlier suggestion that, in the final analysis, the particular characteristics of each sport may prove to be as significant as broader themes that cross-cut the sports, such as the overall organisational structure of sport and the introduction of Lottery funding, in helping us to

understand and explain aspects of policy change. A brief example helps to clarify the argument. Not only has the RYA been relatively free of the debilitating power struggles evident in athletics and swimming over the years but the actors charged with delivering elite level success for sailing have also possessed a degree of acumen not witnessed in the other two sports, at least not until more recently. The following observations from UK Sport's Performance Services Manager for sailing help to substantiate these contentions in more concrete terms in respect of comparisons with UKA/athletics. Joe Patton explained that David Moorcroft (UKA Chief Executive)

> ... has never been entirely comfortable with what he sees as the elitism of the World Class [Lottery] programme. I think there's a huge reluctance to accept that not everyone in an international team should be funded through this programme, and there's also an odd philosophy to get as many people as possible onto the programme by the technical directors in the sport, which is at odds with the line team at the RYA (Interview: 28 October 2002).

The inference being that the 'line team at the RYA' (Performance Directorate) has not only understood but also accepted the resource conditions set out by the Lottery distributors in a qualitatively different manner than those charged with developing elite level athletes. Indeed, Joe Patton went further and argued that

> ... an entirely personal and subjective impression I get is that some of the paid, professional staff [at UKA] are, frightened is the wrong word, but reluctant to have hard discussions with the athletes. Whereas it seems to be accepted as part and parcel of the job within the RYA (Interview: 28 October 2002).

This leads on to the RYA/sailing with regard to the emergence of full-time sailors. As of September 2002, 42 sailors were in receipt of World Class Performance level funding and the RYA was the first UK NGB in 1999 to receive Potential and Start Lottery support for sailors at developmental levels below the elite; yet another illustration of the RYA's organisational capacity to lever monies from its key funding partners in support of its increasingly successful sailing team. That there has been little dissension from grass roots water sports participants to these resource allocations to elite sailors is notable, not least because of the dissimilarity in grass roots reactions in this respect, particularly in athletics and to some extent, but less so, in swimming. Once again, the peculiar characteristics of the sport (sailing) are highlighted. The argument being that grass roots opposition is unlikely given the sport's elitist/exclusive profile and the RYA's acknowledgement that there are a large number of water sport participants not involved in sailing's competitive events, and thus not unduly concerned with policy deliberations regarding resource allocations to elite sailors.

We can now explore comparisons across Canada and the UK. The first comparison of interest is that between the two athletics organisations. While it is relatively straightforward to note that both AC and UKA (and its predecessors) have suffered financial difficulties in recent years, explanations for these difficulties are more problematic. The first point to note is that both organisations have suffered from debilitating performance-enhancing drug disputes (Ben Johnson in Canada and Diane Modahl in the UK) that have drained scarce organisational resources. Secondly, both AC and, more particularly, UKA's predecessor the BAF, have suffered from variable sponsorship opportunities. However, notwithstanding ramifications arising from these two similarities, a key difference here is the popularity of the sport in each country. Track and field athletics in Canada has not only had a relatively poor following as a participation sport but crucially it also fails to compete as a spectator event with professional sports such as baseball and ice hockey. This is not the case to the same degree for athletics in the UK. While athletics in the UK does not command the degree of television and spectator interest evident in the 1980s, there are signs that the sport is recovering in this respect; and thus increased potential for both sponsorship opportunities and financial support for athletes (Interview Jane Swan, 28 October 2002).

If we leave aside the undoubted momentum gained from Lottery monies in helping to develop successful athletes, and thus increased interest, two recent examples in respect of UK athletes and UKA are instructive. The first example is Mackay's report that UK athletes 'are to be offered financial incentives for the first time in an attempt to ensure they turn out for Britain' (2003: 33). Secondly, Jane Swan revealed that UKA has recently won a £20 million sponsorship deal (Interview: 28 October 2002). Similarly generous rewards have not been obtained by Canadian elite athletes or AC in recent years. Mackay's report is also helpful in affirming earlier suggestions regarding the increasingly contractual and obligatory demands associated with Lottery monies. Of note, is the failure of almost all the UK's potential medallists to compete at the recent World Indoor Championships trials in Birmingham. On this issue, UKA's High Performance Director argued that 'The sport's lottery funding is judged on how many medals we win at major championships ... My job is to achieve that and everything is subservient to it. It's not my job to get people to compete at the trials' (quoted in Mackay 2003: 33). This example thus also provides a somewhat stark reminder that newly recovered television interest and public support for the sport might be built on

rather fragile ground and if track and field athletes fail to meet (Lottery-fuelled) expectations in Athens 2004 - in terms of Olympic medals - then UKA/athletics might well face similar dilemmas currently being experienced by AC and Canadian athletes.

A second key comparison across the two countries, and across the three sports, concerns the involvement of corporate/business sector organisations in supporting NSOs/NGBS. Chapter 6 revealed that lobbying for increased corporate support appeared stronger in Canada than in the UK, as witnessed by calls for increased corporate support in the deliberations leading up to the new Canadian Sport Policy (Canadian Heritage 2001c) as well as from an earlier forum, the 1998 National Conference on Sport and the Corporate Sector (Nieuwenhuis 1999). In relation to the NSOs investigated in this study, Slack's observation, first noted in Chapter 5, that 'Sports with a lower profile are often unable to attract substantive financial investment from corporate bodies' (1998: 2) is instructive. It is instructive if we recall the difficulties currently facing AC, and the relatively low profile of the sport *vis-à-vis* professional sports in Canada, and Richard Clarke's entreaties for increased corporate support for Canadian sailing (Cansport 2000c) - a sport which also has a low profile in the country (Cansport 2000a). These findings are borne out by the National Conference on Sport and the Corporate Sector which identified seven barriers to corporate-sport relationships, two of which relate specifically to this discussion: i) 'insufficient coverage of amateur and high-performance sport in the Canadian media'; and ii) the 'Professional level of sport dominates corporate sponsorships' (Nieuwenhuis 1999: 6-7).

A further issue raised in the Canadian context, in particular for swimming and athletics, was the trend for an elite group of swimmers/athletes to compete abroad for prize monies but to the detriment of long-term development and, moreover, to the detriment of Canada's medal-winning potential at the Olympic Games. The crux of the problem for Canadian NSOs in this situation is summed up neatly by Slack, who has argued that these athletes 'no longer represent their club, their country, or themselves, they represent the corporations who provide the money for their sport' (1998: 3). In a climate of variable federal and provincial/territorial funding for amateur sport, Canadian NSOs are thus hamstrung on the one hand by the need to seek corporate monies, while at the same time having to contend with the dilemmas such corporate support brings forth. The sport policy sector is thus reflecting wider concerns in Canada regarding corporate power. Dobbin (1998), for example, provides evidence of the increasing

influence of business interests in shaping policy-making in Canada. Commenting on the role and increasing authority of the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), in particular, Dobbin has argued that, in recent years, 'the BCNI [has] effectively seized control of national policy making .... [and its] approach to corporate intervention has permanently damaged the way that public policy is made in Canada' (1998: 168, 173).

The calls for corporate support from those charged with shaping (elite) sport policy in the UK have been somewhat less urgent in recent years. Indeed, as recently as 2001, the DCMS-sponsored *Elite Sports Funding Review* paid scant attention to this issue. Where the issue was raised it was couched in the language of searching for 'other sources of support ... to help maximise the Lottery investment in elite sport (e.g. sponsorship)' (DCMS 2001: 5). Whether this finding suggests complacency brought about by the large amounts of Lottery funding currently diverted to all levels of sport in the UK is not completely clear. It is reasonable to contend, however, that at the elite level at least, and for all three sports considered here, the urgency for seeking corporate support has been reduced by the present levels of World Class Performance funding allocated to swimming, athletics and sailing. If this proves to be the case, the naivety of such an unreflective policy approach is signalled by the anticipated falls in future Lottery streams (UK Sport 2002e).

Developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine

The broader context for the emergence of a more structured and professional approach to these interrelated disciplines in Canada rests on two key developments dating back to the 1970s. Firstly, with regard to coaching, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the introduction of the National Coaching and Certification Programme (NCCP) in the early 1970s reflected wider attempts in the Canadian amateur sport community to professionalise and rationalise many aspects of sport (cf. Macintosh & Whitson 1990). Secondly, the legitimisation of sports science research that occurred in Canada's higher education institutions in the early 1970s is an important signpost to the chapter's second section which considers the study's theoretical/methodological assumptions. It is important given Macintosh & Whitson's discussion of the structures within which public policy is made; the issue here being 'the extent to which ... the greater involvement of experts results in the insulation of successive areas of decision making from the pressures of democratic, interest group politics' (1990: 12-13). There are at least two key dimensions to this issue: i) the use/influence of knowledge and the construction of

language around sports science/medicine and the role such knowledge/language might play in disqualifying the views of the layperson or, more specifically, those interest groups in sport not centred on high performance sport objectives; and ii) the utility of the various meso-level approaches in incorporating these insights into explanations of policy change.

In respect of the three Canadian NSOs, SNC has embraced recent developments to the NCCP, manifest in the coaching-based education and training (CBET) programme currently being developed by Sport Canada and the Coaching Association of Canada (CAC). Swimming/Natation Canada is also in receipt of funding for a Sports Science and Support programme, utilises the support services provided by the Canadian Sport Centre (CSC) network and benefits from the relatively sophisticated cluster of multi-sport organisations in Canada that provide sports science/medicine support. Yet, concerns persist in Canadian swimming circles as to the efficacy of these coaching and sports science/medicine structures. Sport Canada's Jan Meyer, for example, has suggested that not all provincial/club coaches have fully embraced the recent coaching innovations in the sport (Interview: 12 June 2002), while Jean Tihanyi (2001a: 8) maintains that coaching has not been regarded as a profession and at grass roots levels little is being done to support the large numbers of volunteer coaches. Indeed, elsewhere Tihanyi (2001b: 29) has argued that SNC's current emphasis on the CSC support services, and thus elite level swimmers, fails to address the nurturing of swimmers at levels below the elite.

Of the three NSOs investigated, AC stands out for the damning criticism of its coaching structures uncovered by the 2001 audit. For example, coverage of the audit's findings in the *Globe and Mail* found that 'Athletics Canada gets flayed for "failing to deliver coaching education programmes, failing to compensate coaches adequately and failing to develop coaches through appointment to national teams"' (quoted in Christie 2001a). While AC has an established sports science programme and has recently created an '"Ad hoc" medical committee' (Athletics Canada 2002d: 12), the somewhat unreflective approach to these disciplines was revealed in Chapter 6 in the discussion of the role of members of the then CTFA in the Ben Johnson drugs affair (Boudreau & Konzak 1991). Thus, AC is currently in the process of formulating a set of clear and strategic policy directions as it emerges from a period of organisational and administrative disarray.

With regard to the CYA, whilst changes to coaching education and development inherent in the CBET initiative have been embraced, this is a recent phenomenon; until recently the CYA employed no full-time sailing coaches (five full-time coaches are now in place) and high performance sailors were left to develop their own campaigns. As Sport Canada's Walter Lyons explained, in the past, the attitude was 'oh, you guys, set up your campaign and go off and train and whatever, it was very hands-off ... It was pretty ad hoc' (Interview: 20 June 2002). An important endogenous stimulus for recent attitudinal changes underlying future policy direction was the Association's Strategic Pursuits Planning Workshop in 2001 where the need for greater investment in coaches was highlighted (CYA 2001: 14). The 2001 Workshop also highlighted a somewhat sceptical attitude to sports science/medicine disciplines and a lack of awareness as to how they might be applied to high performance sailing (CYA 2001: 15). What is evident here, though, is a form of policy-oriented learning or policy transfer. The CYA's Executive Director clearly stated that the Association had looked to the success of the UK sailing team in recent years (Interview: 17 June 2002) and an internal CYA paper reveals the value now placed on closely mirroring the techniques adopted by the Royal Yachting Association's (RYA) elite level sailing team's sports science based approach to training and competition (CYA 2002e: 1).

Turning to the three UK NGBs, the appointment in 2000 of former Australian swimming coach, Bill Sweetenham, as National Performance Director for swimming is instructive. Sweetenham is credited as the driving force behind recent changes in approaches to coaching techniques in swimming in the UK. More emphasis is now placed on linking aspects of coaching certification with performance and assessed by the quality of swimmers produced (ASA 2002: 10). It is clear what is to be achieved through this unprecedented shake-up of coaching techniques in the sport, as both Sweetenham and David Sparkes have set out unequivocal goals for elite swimmers: Olympic medals and, more pertinently, Olympic Gold medals (Lord 2002: 2; Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002). There are also comparisons with SNC's high performance philosophy in Sweetenham's comments that 'Our team motto [now] is that winning is the only option. We don't want to know about anything else' (quoted in Dryden 2002: 13). Whether such high performance aspirations from the swimming organisations in Canada and the UK are realistic remains to be seen as the Canadian swimming team won just one Bronze medal at the 2000 Olympics, while the GB/NI team won no medals.

Developments in sports science/medicine in swimming reflect broader changes in these elements of elite sport programming in the UK in recent years. In other words, UK NGBs can be categorised as relatively 'late adopters' of sports science/medicine technologies when compared to Canada and Australia, for example. Indeed, it was only in 1996 that the language of 'scientific disciplines' appeared in an ASA Annual Report (ASA 1997: 24). Interestingly, scientific/medical matters are now the province of the ASFGB (ASFGB 1998: 4); thus reflecting the gradual emergence of this organisation as the dominant body in elite level programming for British swimming. There is, however, another somewhat tangential aspect to this issue. Yet, it is one that lends credence to the assumptions of the advocacy coalition framework's (ACF) focus on values/belief systems in the process of policy change. Reflecting the discussion in Chapter 7, in respect of shifts in the set of values/belief systems characterising the organisation and administration of swimming in the UK (specifically, the ASA and ASFGB), from organisations ingrained with an amateur/voluntarist ethos, to bodies that are now more specialised and technocratic, it is reasonable to contend that, alongside the categorisation of 'late adopters', we might suggest somewhat more pertinently, that there is evidence of 'late acceptance' of the benefits these disciplines might bring to the development of the UK's elite swimmers. An argument substantiated by Bill Sweetenham's recent comments that

> Currently, British Swimming is very healthy. We have excellent coaches and excellent performers. The difference between a medal or no medal is a tiny fraction. It has been a lack of science underpinning that has meant sub optimal performance. I hope to change that (quoted in ASA/ASFGB 2002).

With regard to UKA/athletics, policy developments in coaching over the past 30 years are notable for some recurrent themes: disagreements between coaches and administrators; arguments over coaching methods; disharmony and fragmentation in the sport's organisation/administration; and lack of integration with emerging developments in sports science/medicine. Solutions to these last two themes remain persistently difficult to achieve if we consider the findings of a recent UK coaching report (UK Sport 1999). While this report had a remit for investigating coaching developments, in general, in the UK, it highlighted the detrimental effect on elite performance of complex organisational structures in sport and traditional divisions between the disciplines of coaching, sports science and sports medicine (UK Sport 1999: 8-9, 33, 43-45). That the sport of athletics remains bedevilled by such issues was clearly set out in Chapter 7. Two points are worth recalling in this respect: i) Tony Ward's revelation that

a report (called the *Genesis Report* after the company commissioned to produce it) was completed in 2000, yet not widely distributed, and which revealed damning conclusions as to the absence of sports science research in athletics (Interview: 30 April 2002); and ii) athlete, Mark Richardson's comments that the current medical situation in the UK is unacceptable (Richardson 2002: 15). It is clear, then, that concerns remain as to the efficacy of coaching, sports science/medicine developments in the sport of athletics in the UK. While the publication of yet another review of coaching in the UK in 2002 - promising increased professionalism, education, and training and development of coaches - is laudable (DCMS 2002), it remains far from clear whether the enduring concerns of the past 30 years are any closer to being dispelled.

With respect to the RYA, four aspects of policy with regard to coaching development are instructive: i) the creation of an Olympic Steering Group (OSG) in the early 1990s; ii) the rationalisation of previous coaching schemes, including the decision to use part-time coaches in a sport incorporating various complex technical requirements; iii) the restructuring of the race trainer/instructor/coach system - clubs now have a properly trained, qualified individual providing club level training; and iv) the decision to employ overseas coaches and technical experts (McIntyre 2000: 2). In short, a somewhat more coherent picture than that revealed in athletics and, until more recently, swimming in the UK. With regard to sports science/medicine developments, the lack of attention paid to these disciplines in sport, in general, in the UK (cf. Sports Council 1988: 49-50), reflects the relatively recent acknowledgement and application of sports science and sports medicine knowledge as a key element of elite sailor development. Today, however, sailing is lauded as a leading exponent of a sports science based approach, manifest in the emulation of this approach by the CYA in Canada. Thus, the impact of sports science can no longer be ignored if medal-winning success at major international sporting events is the ultimate objective. When success is defined in this way, the GB/NI sailing team's performances in recent years reveal a progression not (yet) achieved by the other five NSO/NGBs investigated here.

There are two key cross-national comparisons to emerge in this element of elite sport programming. Firstly, although the Canadian sport delivery system has benefited from the development of a coaching certification programme (the NCCP) in the early 1970s, more contemporary concerns regarding coaching outputs and outcomes have been revealed within all three Canadian NSOs. Similar concerns, or difficulties, are apparent in

the UK sports system (cf. DCMS 2002). Both countries are currently in transition in this respect. Canadian NSOs are currently working to implement the competency-based education and training (CBET) initiative introduced recently by Sport Canada and the CAC, while UK NGBs await further deliberation of the latest DCMS-sponsored coaching review in 2002 (DCMS 2002). To date, of the six NSOs/NGBs considered, the RYA appears to have put in place a framework of coaching structures that has elicited (somewhat paradoxically) both greater medal-winning success as well as the least dissension from other groups of water sports participants below the elite level.

The second key cross-national comparison can be related to the first point above but delves somewhat deeper into the interrelated developments in sports science/medicine. As discussed, sports science research in higher education institutions during the 1970s in Canada constituted a reconstruction of 'knowledge structures' (Whitson & Macintosh 1989: 446). In other words, the knowledge structures of physical educators were transformed into what has become known as the 'sports sciences' (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 112). This relatively early adoption of sports science research in Canada and its application to high performance sport is in stark contrast to the 'late acceptance' of the benefits of these disciplines within UK NGBs. Some useful pointers can be set out with regard to the Canadian context which, in turn, might prove helpful in suggesting future research in this area for sporting bodies in the UK. The first point centres on how different interpretations of the term 'sport development' in Canada expose tensions between the various political objectives and/or purposes associated with sport (see Houlihan & White 2002 for a similar discussion in the UK context, albeit with different emphases). Our concern here is to draw attention to a key thread running through the discussion of the Canadian sport delivery system - jurisdictional divisions - and to co-relate it to the issue of emerging sports science research and high performance sport. More specifically, can insights provided in the late 1980s shed light on more contemporary developments?

In the late 1980s, the following argument was set out in relation to two possible interpretations of sport development. One interpretation was that provincial/territorial programmes should be 'feeders' for national programmes within a more systematic talent identification system, exposure to training camps and support services such as sports science/medicine, and thus the early induction of youngsters into high performance sport; as advocated at federal level by the then Assistant Deputy Sports

Minister, Lyle Makosky, in the wake of Canada's 'perceived' failures at the 1988 Seoul Olympics (Whitson & Macintosh 1989: 445). A somewhat different interpretation was that sport development at provincial/territorial levels is conceived of less as a pathway to high performance sport, and more as a means of promoting participation through various sporting opportunities for beginners and appropriate competitive opportunities for adults as well as young people who may wish to participate in sport, yet without aspirations to excel at the elite level (Whitson & Macintosh 1989: 445-446). While these two interpretations may overlap in as much as that talented youngsters emerge from provincial/territorial level competition, crucially, they not only make different demands on similar resources (e.g. people, money, and facilities) but they also conceive of different outcomes. In the first interpretation, such outcomes would be medal-winning performances at major international sporting events. In the second interpretation, we can envisage quite different outcomes, such as fun, friendly competition, exercise and the enjoyment of sport for its own sake rather than for the 'success' performance excellence might bring forth. Juxtaposed with the argument that the NCCP development in the 1970s was indicative of sport scientists from Canadian universities 'mystifying' a new profession (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 113) and the suggestion that 'Canadian sport scientists and managers have formulated the production of sport performances as a series of technical and organisational challenges' (Whitson & Macintosh 1989: 446), some interesting conclusions can be drawn in relation to more contemporary challenges facing Canadian NSOs.

One conclusion in this respect is that all three Canadian NSOs have, albeit to differing degrees, revealed evidence of struggling to come to terms with national-provincial/territorial complexities (see Chapter 6). In short, for these three NSOs at least, unresolved questions remain as how best to construct a national level coaching/sports science programme that takes account of, and integrates with, levels below the elite. Comments on this issue from Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for sailing are indicative of responses from interviewees involved with swimming and athletics, at both NSO and Sport Canada levels. Here, Walter Lyons explained that, while recent sport policy deliberations leading up to the new Canadian Sport Policy promise a more integrated approach, 'what we've realised is that the previous system, where we were relying on the provinces to do their part and we'll [Sport Canada/CYA] do our part, didn't work for all kinds of reasons' (Interview: 20 June 2002).

A second conclusion, and one that is clearly related to the first, is that the conjuncture of interests of NSOs, federal governments and influential groups in higher education institutions during the 1970s/1980s centred on 'the construction of a new discourse and a new knowledge base around high performance sport' (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 119). The result was a concentration on 'the most effective techniques by which to achieve the optimal output': here, 'the programmed body' and 'the production of performance' (Macintosh & Whitson 1990: 114). That such an approach has led to a cluster of multi-sport support organisations for sports science/medicine services in Canada is not disputed. Of greater concern here is the efficacy of these support organisations in realising NSO/federal objectives for sport at the international level: that is, Olympic and World Championship medals. A related concern reflects Habermas' (1971: 112) argument that the form of professional-technocratic consciousness implied here coalesces into a world-view within which ethical and political issues are subsumed within predilections for technical and economic rationality. The upshot of such an unreflective approach in this respect for Athletics Canada was clearly illustrated in Chapter 6 in relation to the Ben Johnson drugs affair.

Competition opportunities for elite level swimmers, athletes and sailors

In exploring this element of elite sport programming in both countries and across all six NSOs/NGBs, a common thread has emerged: complexity. Consequently, the question this finding raises is how have the NSOs/NGBs coped with such complexity? In Canada, a useful starting point is the report of the 1976 Post-Olympic Games Symposium (CAC 1977), which found that, on the issue of 'competition programmes', a number of problems were constraining Canada's Olympic efforts. These problems included, the country's size, which inhibited regular competition; variable competition with other countries; and the need to attract successful countries to compete in Canada to help raise standards (CAC 1977: 13, 17). A further point to recall is that these are recurrent themes in the Canadian sport delivery system. Over 10 years later, for example, the 1988 Task Force on National Sport Policy argued that 'We need to provide increased opportunities for individual athletes to excel' (Canada 1988: 10-11). A further 14 years on and the theme persisted: the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy maintained that future international success required increased accessibility to 'development opportunities such as competition and training [in order] to successfully compete at the highest levels of international competition' (Canadian Heritage 2002a: 17). These points should be borne in mind as we turn first to the respective Canadian NSOs.

With regard to SNC/swimming, the issue of providing a framework of structured training and competition opportunities in Canada is clearly a problematic task, not least because of the country's noted geographical size and jurisdictional complexities. A task exacerbated, moreover, in the sport of swimming, by the proliferation of global (short- and long-course) competitive events currently available for swimmers at the high performance level and, additionally, events to which swimmers are increasingly attracted by pecuniary reward. Indeed, Helmstaedt has argued that the swimming calendar is currently far too 'cluttered' (1995b: 19). While Fowlie (2002) has presented plans to streamline the competitive structure of Canadian swimming, these are relatively recent proposals and concerns remain as to the most efficacious means to overcome the long-standing problematic regarding developmental competitive opportunities and consequent advancement of provincial/territorial swimmers to national team competitions. In short, many analysts within the Canadian swimming community (cf. Colwin 1998; Thierry 2000; Tihanyi 2001a) attribute culpability to SNC: in essence, culpable for a lack of leadership and strategic direction in designing programmes that, arguably, advantage swimmers already at the high performance level - although, not borne out by results at Olympic Games/World Championships. The casualty of this elite focus is long-term development of swimmers through a balanced programme of training/competition opportunities at youth/club/provincial/territorial levels.

With respect to AC/athletics, perhaps the key issue to emerge is the lack of some form of mandatory competitive calendar for elite athletes. Although some events are mandatory, for example, the Canadian national championships, decisions regarding when/where/how often athletes compete resides in many cases with the coach and athlete concerned. There is thus a 'gap' in the developmental pathway for Canadian athletes, with the group just below the national team level facing the greatest difficulties (It should be noted that this is an issue of concern throughout the Canadian sport system). As Joanne Mortimore admitted, AC does not, as yet, provide a competitive programme for those athletes who have not been invited to a Grand Prix event (Interview: 13 June 2002). This leads on to a further concern; the tendency for a small group of elite athletes to compete at global Grand Prix events, attracted in large part by the pecuniary rewards on offer. The upshot of this cluster of concerns is the debilitating effect on AC's capacity to programme competitive events as preparation for Olympic Games and World Championships, where athletes compete for Canada rather than for monetary reward and/or their sponsors (cf. Slack 1998).

The CYA is, in many respects, unique amongst the three Canadian NSOs with regard to planning for competition opportunities. While SNC and AC appear to be struggling to devise a coherent competitive structure for their respective sports, the CYA has adopted a clear policy direction in this respect. In contradistinction to the recent past, when sailors were left to devise their own competitive programmes, a more structured, cost-efficient and locally-based North American programme has now been put in place, and one which, crucially, takes account of the current resource conditions within which the Association operates (Interviews: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002; Walter Lyons, 20 June 2002). This is not to argue that the CYA is/has been free from the type of difficulties faced by SNC and AC in respect of a complex competitive calendar and jurisdictional divisions. Rather, it is to highlight the capacity of the CYA to adapt to the shifting resource conditions that have emerged within the Canadian sport delivery system with greater clarity of purpose than was evident in either swimming or athletics in this respect. In short, the CYA has acknowledged that within the current climate of variable commitment at federal level to high performance objectives and the COC's policy of targeting monies to NSOs capable of winning Olympic medals - the CYA is not yet in this category - it has been prudent to adopt a policy approach whereby its competitive calendar is tightly-resourced, well-structured and North American-based.

With regard to the three UK NGBs, the appointment of Bill Sweetenham as *British Swimming's* National Performance Director has led to fundamental changes to the philosophy underlying the sport's training and competition opportunities and structures. In the past, elite level training/competition revolved around short-course competitions (which had much to do with the tradition of building 25 metre rather than 50 metre swimming pools). In just over two years, Bill Sweetenham and the Performance Directorate team at the ASFGB have restructured policy for training/competition such that it has been turned on its head. There is now far less time spent attending 'non-useful' competitions and far more time spent training to peak at major swimming events, such as the Olympic Games and World Championships. If we recall Table 7.1 in Chapter 7, some quite stark results are apparent. From no medals won at the 2000 Olympic Games, seven medals were won by the GB/NI team at the 2001 World Aquatic Championships, two of which were Gold. However, both Bill Sweetenham and ASA/ASFGB Chief Executive, David Sparkes acknowledge that the benchmark upon which they will be judged is Olympic medals - and Gold medals in particular. Thus, while David Sparkes has acknowledged improved performances at the 2002 Commonwealth

Games, he has also argued that 'We must all recognise that the real goal, and the only true test, remains the Olympic Games in Athens 2004' (quoted in ASFGB 2002: 3; and Interview: David Sparkes, 18 March 2002). Yet, this calculated drive to achieve Olympic success has not been welcomed by all in the sport (cf. Ballard 2002; Lodewyke 2002; and Interview: Wendy Coles, 19 March 2002). From a theoretical standpoint, the resistance to this increasing focus on elite level swimming does not (as yet) appear to have taken the form of a coherent policy community or advocacy coalition of actors/organisations that might threaten the emerging strength of an elite sport coalition.

In respect of UKA/athletics, the first point to recall is that UKA has acknowledged that 'The existing structure [of competition opportunities] is a confused organisation to those participating' (UKA 2000: 1). Yet, this element of elite sport programming, and indeed levels below, has been largely absent from policy deliberations over the past 30 years - at least, when compared to the numerous debates regarding facility development, coaching provision, grass roots participation, payments to athletes and perhaps, most notably, the debilitating power struggles over which organisation 'controls' the sport. It is only recently, then, that the sport's leadership has adopted a more considered, policy-driven approach to this issue (UKA 2000). A second point of note is the observation that competition structures in the UK favour the elite athlete (Ward 2002b: 50). As Tony Ward has argued elsewhere, 'The sport's competition structure is about the drive for medals. That's what the government wants. That's what Sport England wants' (Interview: 30 April 2002); thus mirroring comments from Max Jones – UKA's High Performance Director - in the earlier discussion of full-time athletes in this chapter.

While competition structures in swimming and athletics encompass local/county/regional/national and international levels, and are thus characterised by complexity, it could be argued that the RYA/sailing has had to contend with an even more complex set of competition structures. This is largely due to the numerous Class (boat) Associations involved in the sport, all of which, potentially, have different competitive events. As UK Sport's Performance Services Manager for sailing explained, such complexity necessitates a well-managed and competent organisational approach from those charged with administering the sport (Interview: Joe Patton, 28 October 2002). Perhaps the key policy decision in this element of elite sailor development was the decision taken in the early 1990s to establish a training base in Mediterranean

waters in order to replicate conditions for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics; a strategy repeated in the two subsequent Olympiads in 1996 and 2000. The outcomes of this policy strategy are clear from Table 7.3 in Chapter 7: sailing is currently one of the UK's most successful Olympic sports.

With regard to cross-national comparisons within and between sports, the clarity of purpose evidenced by the two yachting Associations and the recent change in training/competition philosophy undertaken by the UK's NGB for elite level swimming – the ASFGB – reveal the clearest similarities between NSOs/NGBs. While the NSO for Canadian swimming (SNC) has clearly set out an unequivocal high performance mandate, its competition structure remains problematic for all the reasons outlined above (and see Chapter 6). With respect to athletics, in Canada, AC is in the process of developing a co-ordinated national domestic competition structure as one aspect of its emergence from a period of policy disarray. Similarly, in the UK, UKA is currently working on a 'competition review' as it comes to terms with the acknowledged confused organisation of the sport's competition structure.

In sum, the corollary of these observations reinforces the earlier suggestion that the particular characteristics of each sport might, in the final analysis, be at least as significant as broader cross-cutting themes/structures within each country. At the same time, however, in posting such an assertion it is not to argue for what we might term sport-specific determinism. Clearly, this is not the case as revealed by the differences between the two swimming bodies, for example. Rather, it is to sensitise us to the many and various contemporary policy outputs emerging from the multi-faceted sport policy process in both countries. In this element of elite sport development this is manifest in the different policy outputs evident across the six NSOs/NGBs: for the CYA, political-financial contingency and policy pragmatism; with respect to the RYA, organisational and administrative acuity over a number of years and thus relative policy clarity; for the ASA/ASFGB, competition structures have been radically altered through agent-driven philosophy change; as to SNC, there is evidence to suggest a failure to provide (to date) a co-ordinated inter-jurisdictional competition structure, resulting in what we might term a policy 'muddle'; finally, in athletics, AC and UKA have both revealed indeterminate policy-making regarding an integrated training/competition structure – thus both organisations are currently in a position of policy transition. Having discussed and concluded on the four elements of elite sport development across the six NSOs/NGBs,

we can now turn to a more substantive analysis of the study's theoretical and methodological insights.

Theoretical and methodological insights: An assessment

This concluding section centres on assessing the salience of the study's theoretical and methodological insights set out in Chapters 2 and 3. In short, have the cluster of theoretical and methodological lenses helped us in our exploration of elite sport policy change in three sports in Canada and the UK? Consideration here centres primarily on the meso-level of analysis: the focus of the study. However, it is also important to reflect upon the macro-level of theorising, as well as how these two levels might be integrated: this is our first consideration here, before going on to explore in more depth the usefulness of the various meso-level approaches to the policy process with regard to the dynamics of policy change.

Macro-level theorising

At the macro-level, the overlapping assumptions underlying neo-pluralist and elitist approaches (cf. Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987; John & Cole 1995; Marsh 1995a) were set out as the most persuasive for this study of the sport policy sector. At this (abstract) level we were concerned, primarily, with uncovering the different power configurations permeating state/civil society relationships and how these configurations might be integrated with the meso-level of analysis. Chapter 5 identified and discussed two important macro-level features of the state – the parliamentary support given to various social groupings and the organisational structure of the state – both of which characterise a nation's political system while at the same time having meso-level effects; thus providing linking themes between the two levels of analysis (Daugbjerg & Marsh 1998; see also Coleman & Skogstad 1990a, 1990b; Marsh & Stoker 1995a). We are concerned here with the 'support given to various social groupings' – in this case, NSOs/NGBs – and the apparent consensus between different political parties in both countries as to the level of support given to elite sport objectives. Such an analysis raises the interrelated issues of power relations and the structure/agency problem (cf. Hay 2002: 115; Layder 1985: 131). It is worth recalling the argument in Chapter 3 for a relational conceptualisation of power; in essence, there should be no *de jure* statement of power. Power relationships should remain the object of empirical investigation. It was

also suggested that Hay's (1997, 2002) attempts to overcome the normative implications of Lukes' (1974) third dimension of power appeared a credible development. Of interest here is Hay's notion of 'context-shaping' – an *indirect* form of power. Power thus conceived, centres on the capacity of actors to redefine the parameters of what is socially, politically and economically possible for others. To define power in this way emphasises power relations whereby actors shape structures, organisations and institutions such that the parameters of subsequent action are altered. In short, this is 'an *indirect* form of power in which power is mediated by, and instantiated in, structures' (Hay 1997: 51, original emphasis); thereby, in turn, reinforcing the study's critical realist assumptions (cf. Lewis 2000, 2002) set out in Chapter 3. Importantly, critical realists contend that 'all human activity takes place within the context provided by a set of pre-existing social structures' (Lewis 2000: 250).

This is an instructive insight if we juxtapose these more recent works with Layder's (1985) earlier critique of attempts by Lukes (1974, 1977) and Giddens (1976, 1977, 1979, 1981) to resolve the structure/agency problem in relation to the question of power. Layder (1985: 131) has argued that both Lukes' and Giddens' attempts to resolve this problem favoured '(perhaps unwittingly) the "agency" or "voluntarist" side of the dichotomy' and de-emphasised the effects of structural constraints. The interrelatedness of these various strands of thought becomes clearer if we also signal Layder's (1985: 144) contention that 'The idea of reproduced relations must refer to historical, "objective" (in the sense of prior to) relatively enduring, social facts'. These insights, then, also recall two of the four questions first set out in Chapter 2 and which Marsh & Stoker (1995a: 293; see also Marsh 1995b: 5-6) have suggested can only be explored at the level of political sociology and state theory: 'Why are certain actors in a privileged position in the policy-making process?' and 'In whose interest do they rule, and how does their rule result in that interest being served?' With these thoughts in mind, what was revealed in our exploration of Canadian and UK NSOs/NGBs?

Chapter 5, and the first section of this chapter, provided an analysis of the increasing influence of corporate interests and some of the (potential) ramifications of this influence for NSOs/NGBs. Our chief concern in this section is with the emergence of what was earlier termed 'planning dictates' (see Chapters 6 and 7). In Canada, the establishment of the quadrennial planning process (QPP) in the 1980s and the implementation of the Sport Funding and Accountability Framework (SFAF) in the 1990s

are clear embodiments of such planning dictates in relation to NSOs and high performance sport. In the UK, the requirement for NGBs to produce planning documents in relation to elite sport has emerged more recently, most notably, with the requirement for NGBs to publish World Class Performance plans in order to elicit National Lottery monies. Importantly, with regard to the three NGBs investigated in this study, funding for Performance plans is proportionally far greater than the income streams the respective NGBs might receive from elsewhere. The distinctive feature of this type of bureaucratic form at the level of elite sport policy-making in Canada and the UK is that control becomes embedded in the social and organisational structure of the paymasters – in Canada, the federal sport agency, Sport Canada and in the UK, primarily the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Sport England and UK Sport.

Some contemporary examples help to expose the somewhat insidious nature of these planning dictates in Canada; as reflected by Kidd's (1995: 14) assertion that 'in the case of Canadian high performance sport ... state assistance comes at the cost of silencing the voices of alternative [sic] within civil society'. Firstly, Sport Canada's Jan Meyer, commenting on SNC's high performance sport philosophy, suggested that 'One could argue that, in large part, our policies here and our funding procedures and funding policies were ... the incentive, the encouragement, the catalyst for pushing them [SNC] in that direction' (Interview: 12 June 2002). Rob Paradis provides a second example. Here, Rob Paradis is not commenting from the perspective of his current position as Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for athletics but from his previous role when working for the Canadian Gymnastics Federation in the early to mid-1990s. Paradis highlighted a cluster of issues facing NSOs at this time – specifically, federal government budget cuts; the implementation of the SFAF; and the SFAF's 60 per cent weighting to high performance sport for funding allocations – and argued that

> ... very, very quickly the emphasis at the NSO level got focused on high performance even though there was no federal policy that said we want you to focus on high performance. That's where the money was .... So automatically, without setting a policy, the SFAF focused people on the high performance programmes and, not only did they focus people on high performance but the side effect of that was, because we were being evaluated immediately on our high performance programmes, people focused all the money on the senior team (Interview: 20 June 2002).

Thirdly, Professor Jean Harvey mirrors Paradis' comments regarding federal funding allocations, as well as reflecting upon the tensions between NSOs and the federal

government in discussions at the National Summit on Sport in Ottawa in 2001, and explained that

> ... the NSOs, they only want to hear about elite, high performance sport and there's an historical reason for that. During the 1990s ... everything was cut back. What was left in the NSOs were the elite sport programmes and the grass roots development programmes were cut to the bone. So, there was more and more focused into high performance ... and in one sense the federal government created that situation .... So that created a kind of structure or framework that led those NSOs to put all their eggs into high performance sport and now the government wants to redirect that (Interview: 11 June 2002).

Bruce Kidd provides a somewhat wider perspective and, in so doing, goes some way to answering the two questions outlined earlier. Commenting on the scenario in Canada in the mid-1990s, Kidd argued that

> We face the absurd paradox of stepped up cutbacks in health care, welfare payments, and support to higher education, culture, sport and recreation while millions of tax dollars swell the profits of franchise owners in cartels like Major League Baseball and the National Hockey League (1995: 9; see also Whitson et al. 2000).

Historically, then, federal monies have been targeted not only at the high performance end of Canadian amateur sport but also, at least according to Kidd's argument, at the already wealthy leading professional sports in the country. While we have witnessed a sea-change in federal emphasis over the past two years as embodied in the rhetoric of the new Canadian Sport Policy, to date there has been little evidence of extra funding for levels below the elite in order to meet the federal government's widening social objectives for sport. The argument being developed here is that the 'philosophy of excellence' that has pervaded the Canadian sport delivery system for the past three decades has become a 'powerful ideology' in the sense of an unobservable structure within which the interests of particular groups have been/are sidelined (Kidd 1988b; 1995; see also Donnelly 1996; Whitson 1998; Whitson & Macintosh 1989). As Kidd puts it, 'promise and innovation struggle to poke through the glacial weight of dominant structures' (1995: 9). Power as a structural phenomenon is apparent here in two important ways.

Firstly, taken together, the above observations illustrate the ways in which the asymmetry of federal/Sport Canada-NSO/athlete control relations take on different forms in different historical phases. Similarly, structurally defined asymmetries of power and control (and access to such control) are reproduced over time through the elicitation and collaboration of NSOs/athletes. Secondly, there is evidence of an

asymmetry of power here in as much as that the bureaucratic control systems (e.g. QPP/SFAF) are not only mediated and operated in a depersonalised manner by the establishment of an objective system of incentives for appropriate behaviour - funding for medal-winning success – but also penalties for inappropriate behaviour – funding reductions for the failure to win medals (cf. Layder 1985: 146). This is not to argue that NSOs'/athletes' behaviour has been/is totally determined in the (early) Marxian sense of implying that they are cultural dupes. Rather, it is to argue, from a critical realist vantage point, that 'Antecedent social structures constitute the context in which current discursive interaction takes place and so condition [but do not determine] the latter' (Lewis 2000: 263).

The range and depth of debate in Canada with respect to problematising sport policy, and, in particular, the degree of emphasis put upon high performance sport objectives, has not been apparent in the UK until much more recently. However, the publication of the Conservative Party's sport policy document *Sport: Raising the Game* in 1995, the Labour Party's *A Sporting Future for All* in 2000, the introduction of National Lottery monies in the mid- to late 1990s, and the subsequent requirement for NGBs to produce planning documents (notably, World Class Performance, Potential and Start plans) in order to elicit such monies, together represent a set of structural changes which have qualitatively altered the terrain for sport policy debates in the UK. The ramifications of such change have, to date, been relatively ignored by political and sporting analysts (for exceptions, see Houlihan & White 2002; McDonald 2000; Oakley & Green 2001b). McDonald's study is especially instructive here. While McDonald's analysis centres on *English* sports policy, this study's findings indicate that it is an analysis which can be applied to sport policy at a UK level. In short, McDonald has argued that we are witnessing 'a qualitative shift in the sports-participation culture away from the egalitarian and empowering aspirations of community-based sporting activity to an hierarchical and alienating culture of high-performance sport' (2000: 84). While there are some concerns regarding McDonald's use of language, in particular, the term 'alienating culture', which invokes Marxist notions of 'alienated labour' (cf. Heywood 2000: 49), his analysis at least draws attention to the type of concerns raised by a former Chief Executive of the BAF. Professor Peter Radford suggested that

> The way athletics, and sport generally, is going, [what] we're all trying to do is find talent and hothouse it to the top .... We don't believe that any experience is, in a sense, intrinsically worthwhile anymore. Anything is only worthwhile if there is a big pay-off at the end (Interview: 28 May 2002).

For Peter Radford's 'big pay-off', we can substitute 'medals', in particular, Olympic medals. Thus, what do these changes reveal with respect to power relationships in the UK's sport policy sector? McDonald's (2000: 86) analysis is again useful in pointing out that 'policy commitments do not exist in a political vacuum, but emerge out of a deeper structure of norms, values and belief systems'; comments that not only sensitise us to the inherent power relations hidden within the contours of sport policy debates but also ones that point to the insights provided by the ACF's focus on coalitions of actors/organisations and the role that changing values/belief systems might play in the dynamics of policy change (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). Moreover, the cluster of structural changes identified above suggests that the context, or structural domain, for policy actors entering into sport policy debates in the UK has perceptibly altered. As Lewis has argued more broadly, 'Macro-social structure exerts a causal influence because the course of action that people choose to pursue is conditioned by the distribution of vested interests and resources embodied in antecedent social structure' (2000: 265).

At the level of NGB interaction with the UK's central government department for sport (specifically, the Sport Recreation Division in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport) and quasi-governmental sporting agencies such as Sport England and UK Sport, for Lewis's 'vested interests and resources' we can conceive of these in respect of this study as being contoured by an increasingly apparent set of hierarchical, contractual, resource-contingent and, perhaps most surprisingly in many cases, positive-sum relationships. The latter are manifest in the reciprocal policy arrangements that permeate UK Sport's drive to modernise NGBs' organisational and administrative activities and the strategy of allocating Lottery monies to those governing bodies most able to produce medal-winning outcomes at the Olympic Games and World Championships: most clearly apparent in this chapter's earlier discussion of the confluence of policy revealed between the RYA and UK Sport/Sport England.

The insights offered by critical realist assumptions regarding power, structure, and agency afford an analysis, then, that helps to uncover structures that, while unobservable in an empirical sense, nonetheless warrant investigation. As Lewis argues, 'pre-existing social structure makes a difference to the course of events in the social world by influencing the actions that people choose to undertake' (2000: 258; see also, for example, Layder 1985). In the UK sport policy sector, 'the actions that people

choose to undertake' are increasingly shaped by the requirements of elite sport and, specifically, the requirement to construct 'pathways to the podium' that serve to subdue other voices within the sporting community (Interviews: Tony Ward, 30 April 2002; Peter Radford, 28 May 2002). Voices, for example, that might argue for sport's intrinsic qualities in respect of fun, play, and the enjoyment of sport without the over-riding desire to succeed at the highest level. Thus, paraphrasing Lewis (2000), those who occupy positions of authority within social and political structures (here, primarily, actors at the DCMS/UK Sport/Sport England) are better able to impose their meanings and narratives on others than people who are in a subordinate position. For example, the character and outcome of discussions, between those involved in the development of elite level performers within UK NGBs and actors within the DCMS/UK Sport/Sport England, will be influenced not only by the rhetorical capacities of the former but also by virtue of the latter's positions of authority, not least in respect of future resource allocations. The RYA's Racing Manager, for example, may well refrain from disputing the interpretation of a particular issue by UK Sport's Performance Services Manager for sailing, given concerns that such 'insubordination' might well harm a relationship that has proved fruitful to both parties. As Lewis maintains, in this sense, 'the state [here, the DCMS/UK Sport/Sport England] is able to set limits on people's interpretative activities which ensure that public discourse is dominated by narratives and meanings which serve its own ends' (2000: 262).

These insights into context-shaping or indirect forms of power, structure and agency, and critical realism have thus proved useful in helping us to analyse contemporary (elite) sport policy debates in Canada and the UK. Prior and enduring social and political structures, which constitute the policy framework for current sport policy actors, produce the conditions for, and basis of, agents' power. Similarly, it has been shown that these structures constitute the continuing means by which the power resources of agents (e.g. resource control and monopoly of agendas for setting planning dictates) are maintained and reproduced over time. Thus, these pre-existing structural conditions provide the basis for the asymmetry of power and control between, in Canada, the federal government/Sport Canada and NSOs/athletes, and in the UK, between the DCMS/UK Sport/Sport England and NGBs/athletes. In short, they 'exist as a structural feature independently of specific (individual) exercises of power and/or concrete power relationships' (Layder 1985: 147). We return to issues of power in the ensuing and final

section of the chapter, which provides an analysis of meso-level approaches to the policy process first set out in Chapter 2.

Meso-level theorising

Chapter 2 set out four prominent meso-level frameworks for analysing policy processes yet, to date, none of these frameworks have been applied to an exploration of elite sport policy change set within a comparative-analytic framework. This final section, therefore, considers the utility of these approaches in helping us to understand and explain policy change in three sports in Canada and the UK. It is not the intention, however, to review these four frameworks again here. The strengths and limitations of each approach was set out in Chapter 2 - see Table 8.2 below for an overview of strengths/limitations of the four approaches - wherein it was argued that the closely related policy networks approach and advocacy coalition framework (ACF) offered the greatest potential insights into elite sport policy change.

Table 8.2 Comparative overview of four meso-level approaches for analysing policy processes

	Strengths	Limitations
Stages models	Stages models provide an ordered framework for the different stages of the policy process; useful for clarifying the complex processes inherent in policy-making	Sequence of stages often descriptively inaccurate; the assumption that a single policy cycle dominates over-simplifies the usual process of multiple, interacting cycles
Multiple-streams	Introduces the role of ideas into the policy process; the interaction of three policy streams – problems, policy and politics – helps to capture the multi-faceted characteristics of the policy process; the notion of policy entrepreneurs 'coupling' the various streams helps to explain policy change	Overly-focused on the agenda-setting stage of the policy process; doubts remain as to its applicability to political systems that are not as 'open' as the United States
Policy networks	Broadens traditional 'iron-triangle' approaches; useful spectrum of policy networks - from policy community to issue network - helps to order extent of membership of network, interests participating, degree and frequency of interaction, degree of consensus and power/resources of groups	Tends to describe stability and continuity in policy processes and outcomes, with a focus on resource interdependency relationships; exogenous change given primacy - relatively little attention given to how endogenous change occurs
Advocacy coalition framework	Focuses on the interaction of different advocacy coalitions which share sets of policy beliefs within a policy subsystem; policy change is a function of both competition/policy learning within the subsystem and exogenous events outside the subsystem	Concerns persist regarding delimitation of policy subsystem and coalitions; amorphous nature of belief systems remains an area of concern for critics; normative and discursive aspects of policy learning neglected

Source: Adapted from Bulkeley (2000); Howlett (2002); Marsh & Rhodes (1992b); Sabatier (1999)

The utility of these two theoretical approaches has also been alluded to throughout Chapters 6 and 7, as well as in the earlier sections of this final chapter. The intention

here is to provide some concluding thoughts on the usefulness of the two approaches, with a particular focus on the ACF as a framework for analysing elite sport policy change. The first point to note is that both approaches are useful in helping to characterise the sport policy-making process as complex, fluid, multi-layered and often fragmented. The adoption of a spectrum of subsystem types as their unit of analysis (Howlett 2002: 239), wherein a multitude of actors/organisations are assumed to interact in the process of policy-making, has proved to be particularly apposite for a study of the sport policy sector and the sport development policy subsystem. A caveat can be added here, however. That is, the different origins of, and terminologies employed in, these approaches has 'caused some confusion and misunderstanding' (Howlett 2002: 239; see also Coleman & Perl 1999). However, Howlett also maintains that there is general agreement that 'the utility for policy analysis of conceiving of the range of actors and institutions involved in policy making in network [or subsystem] terms', usefully adds to analyses of the policy process.

This study has clearly illustrated that, in both Canada and the UK, the sport policy sector generally and the sport development policy subsystem, more specifically, comprise significant actors operating at different levels of government and in government as well as quasi-governmental agencies. In addition, academics, analysts and journalists have also contributed to contemporary sport policy debates in both countries. Yet, Howlett (2002) may also be correct in arguing that a certain vagueness persists in relation to delimiting subsystem boundaries and suggests that subsystems can be conceived of as comprising two interrelated subsets. Here, Howlett suggests that

> The larger set of actors is composed of those who have some knowledge of the policy issue in question and who collectively construct a policy discourse within a *discourse community*. A subset within this larger, knowledge-based, grouping is composed of those participants who participate in exchange relationships with each other, an *interest network* (Howlett 2002: 248, original emphasis).

With regard to the ACF, and as discussed in Chapter 2, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1999: 135) have addressed this issue in some respects in suggesting that we need to distinguish between 'nascent' and 'mature' subsystems, and a number of criteria on which such a distinction can be formulated have been identified (for more detail, see Chapter 2). In this sense, while we can conclude that the sport development policy subsystem is relatively mature in both countries, a significant difference is the 'recency' of emphasis put upon developing a coherent and systematic policy framework for *elite*

sport development in the UK when compared to Canada. While Howlett's further terminological division illustrated above warrants further consideration, given that it points to future research in this area, of interest here is the notion of a discourse community. Indeed, Howlett (2002: 249) cites research by Harriet Bulkeley (2000) as an 'excellent case study' in this area in which the policy networks approach and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) are applied to the climate change policy process in Australia. Interestingly, in her analysis of the ACF, Bulkeley draws attention to the notion of 'discourse coalitions' rather than advocacy coalitions as a means through which interests, beliefs and understandings of specific policy problems are forged: the focus here is on the 'dynamic and discursive nature of policy learning' (Bulkeley 2000: 728). Bulkeley argues that the rationale for this distinction is that the ACF 'offers only a limited explanation of the processes of learning and interaction within and between coalitions in policy networks' (2000: 733). Drawing on the work of Hajer (1993, 1995), this argument rests on the contention that

> ... the advocacy coalition approach fails to grasp the interaction between actors within policy coalitions by conceptualising discourse as a means through which learning is communicated rather than a medium through which 'actors ... *create* the world' (Hajer 1993: 44, original emphasis) (Bulkeley 2000: 733).

This takes us into the realms of discourse theory and analysis (cf. Donati 1992; Flick 1998; Fox & Miller 1995; Howarth 1995;) but not an approach adopted for this study. However, given the ACF's central concern with policy-oriented learning and the assumption that 'technical information concerning the magnitude and facets of the problem and the probable impacts of various solutions' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 118) is significant, then these insights might be a useful addition to the framework's logic. Indeed, Bulkeley concludes that the discourse coalition approach emphasises 'the ways in which understandings of problems are forged through the policy process, and the crucial role of discursive constructions of particular issues in enabling and constraining policy change' (2000: 745). Such an approach might have utility in the context of Canadian sport with respect to an analysis of the discursive (re-)construction of knowledge structures of traditional physical educators in the 1970s, where Whitson & Macintosh argued that 'the new disciplines associated with "human kinetics" are no longer about the education of human beings through physical activity. Instead, they are primarily about the systematic and scientific production of athletic performance' (1989: 446). An argument that might also have utility in analysing the discursive construction of what it *means* to participate in sport.

In this respect, two rather different conceptions have emerged from this study and would warrant analysis using a discourse coalition approach: i) the discursive construction of a paradigm of participation centring on what Kidd (1988b, 1995) has termed a 'philosophy of excellence' - dominant in Canadian sport for the past 30 years, and an emergent paradigm in the UK over the past 10 years (cf. Green & Oakley 2001a; Houlihan 1997; Houlihan & White 2002; McDonald 2000); and ii) a quite different paradigm that, in Canada, would draw on Kidd's (1995: 10) exhortations for a 'sporting ideal' that reflected 'the promise of erotic, lyrical expression, in which the participant is the subject of his or her activity [rather than] one of alienating regimentation' and, in the UK, on Peter Radford's argument for the

> ... idea of participation for its own sake because it's enriching to do things you've never done before; the camaraderie of being around people trying things and failing and enjoying it. Being successful sometimes is good in itself without any pay-offs ... [but] the trouble is, now, there is no place where you can have that dialogue because the kids themselves don't want that anymore .... They want to know that they're on somebody's junior squad or that they're on the development ladder to go up to somewhere else ... that's the language of the age (Interview: 28 May 2002).

These observations also have potential for a tangential area of further research, as well as signalling some important findings in the context of the current study. These two issues are dealt with in turn. In respect of further research, the discourse coalition approach is closely related to Bacchi's (2000; see also Ball 1993) work in the context of education policy processes in Australia. Bacchi (2000) is concerned with the notion of 'policy as discourse'. More specifically, Bacchi wants to draw attention to '"the ways issues get represented" [which] produces a focus on language and on "discourse", meaning the conceptual frameworks available to describe social processes' (2000: 46). Here, the notion of 'policy as discursive activity' is highlighted; a qualitatively different approach than, for example, Bachrach & Baratz's (1962, 1970) early work on non-decision making and Kingdon's (1995) more recent multiple-streams approach that seek to explain why some issues make it to the political agenda and others do not. Thus, for Bacchi, the starting point for a policy as discourse approach 'is a close analysis of items that do make the political agenda to see how the construction or representation of those issues limits what is talked about as possible or desirable, or as impossible or undesirable' (2000: 49). The focus for future research using these approaches would incorporate an analysis of the discursive construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of the various discourses that permeate sport policy and, as Ball reminds us, where 'we need to appreciate the way in which policy ensembles, collections of related policies,

exercise power through a *production* of "truth" and "knowledge", as discourses' (1993: 14, original emphasis). Moreover, recalling the discussion of the instantiation of elite sport planning dictates as unobservable structures, evident in Canada for the past 30 years and emergent in the UK more recently, such an analysis would sensitise us to 'the ways in which the multifarious uses of language intersect with power' (Thompson 1987: 517). Such an analysis, then, might also draw on Foucaldian insights. From this standpoint, discourses are 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak ... Discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention' (Foucault 1977: 49).

We can now turn to further insights gained from the ACF. The potential for the formation of advocacy coalitions of actors/organisations within the sport development policy subsystems in Canada and the UK has been alluded to earlier in this chapter, as well in Chapters 6 and 7. Following the logic of the ACF, actors within coalitions share a set of normative and causal beliefs on a particular issue – here, the policy problem or issue centred on the development of a policy framework for elite sport development. In ACF terms, then, what is the strength of evidence for such advocacy coalitions in both countries? The first point to note, and one that is clearly related to the earlier discussion on delimiting policy subsystem boundaries, is the (empirical) difficulties associated with delimiting or categorising coalition membership. A second important point is the 'slippery task' of mapping belief systems (Smith 2000: 99). Yet, while the attempt to delimit or categorise social and political phenomena in a study such as this is never going to be an easy task, the ACF at least helps to illustrate the dynamic processes at work in relation to policy change.

A third point concerns the complexity of the ACF; in short, as Zahariadis reminds us, 'in addition to coalition beliefs, resources, and strategy, policy choice, according to the ACF, is dependent also on seven more exogenous factors and parameters' (1995: 381). Further additions to the ACF since Zahariadis was writing (cf. Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999) complicates matters even further - see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1. Indeed, any examination of the applied use of the framework in different policy sectors and in different countries reveals an emphasis on certain aspects of the ACF's logic in accordance with the predilections of the respective author(s) (cf. Bulkeley 2000; Kübler 2001; Mawhinney 1993; Smith 2000; Zafonte & Sabatier 1998). This study's principal interest has focused on investigating: i) the key exogenous and endogenous factors

implicated in elite sport policy change; and ii) within this investigation there has been a central interest in exploring the salience of values and belief systems and policy-oriented learning. In tracing developments in Canada over the past 10 to 15 years, then, what are the key dynamics relating to policy change with regard to high performance sport? From an ACF perspective, research in the early 1990s into the values/belief systems underpinning policy frameworks for developing high performance athletes has formed the basis for policy-oriented learning within the subsystem (cf. Blackhurst et al. 1991; Canada 1992; Dubin 1992). This research was driven in large part from the 'fall-out' following the Ben Johnson drugs affair at the 1988 Olympic Games. As Kidd has argued:

> In the post-Dubin era, some pan-Canadian leaders have developed a new sensitivity to the rights of athletes, and are trying to shift the emphasis from the 'ideology of excellence' and the pursuit of the podium to the development of the 'athlete centred system' (1995: 9).

If we also recall the discussion in Chapter 6 with regard to the research by, for example, Cunningham et al. (1987), Hinings et al. (1996) and Slack (1988), into organisational change within Canadian NSOs that centred on changing values and belief systems, we have a body of research over a period (of at least a decade or more) deemed by Sabatier and colleagues as useful for mapping policy change. What has emerged is an interesting but perhaps not unsurprisingly complex picture. The research centring on organisational change has suggested that Canadian NSOs have shifted from kitchen-table type organisations to those more akin to corporate-professional bodies. In sporting terminology, from organisations based around the traditional values of voluntarism and amateurism to organisations that are now much more corporate, professional and technocratic in outlook. While the core tenets of this argument are not denied by this study's findings, there is evidence that the degree of change argued for by the authors identified above is clearly an unfinished project. Contributions from actors currently involved within the Canadian sport development policy subsystem help to make the point.

Firstly, Professor Bruce Kidd has argued that 'we've gone from kitchen-table to professional organisation and administration and back to kitchen-table. And what neo-conservative governments are doing, is pushing it back to the kitchen-table administrator, the volunteer official, not very well trained, and that's a real fear' (Interview: 19 June 2002). Kidd's argument here hinges largely on funding allocations for sport; more clearly explicit in the suggestion that, over the past decade, Canada's

federal governments have 'scaled down public investments and public support' in many policy sectors. With regard to the sport policy sector, Kidd also argued that

> They [federal government] haven't given up control. In fact, Jean Harvey argues that it's really another version of corporatism. And the irony is, it's state direction and control without any money. In the early 1970s and 1980s, at least the state direction and control came with some money (Interview: 19 June 2002; see also Harvey et al. 1995).

Swimming/Natation Canada's (SNC) Director of Finance and Administration provides a second example. Larry Clough draws attention to the shifting politics of funding for Canadian amateur sport, in arguing that, in the early to mid-1990s, NSOs faced federal cutbacks and 'went back to the kitchen-table sort of organisation because they didn't have the funding' (Interview: 13 June 2002). Larry Clough also made the point that, despite the rhetoric of the new Canadian Sport Policy, with respect to increased emphasis on participation, building capacity in the sport delivery system and working towards enhanced interaction between jurisdictional levels, funding for these changing policy directions has not (yet) materialised. Recalling comments first noted in Chapter 6, the Executive Director of the CYA provides a third example, in arguing that the CYA is 'now expected to be very professional and run the office in a professional manner [but] we still have to heed the old principles of volunteers and accountability to the volunteers'. (Interview: Marianne Davis, 17 June 2002). Athletic Canada's Chief Operating Officer provides a fourth and final example and, somewhat, surprisingly, suggests that the UK is ahead of Canada in many respects. Joanne Mortimore maintained that

> ... one of the areas that our strategic plan is going to look at very closely [is that] we definitely want *to move to* the more professional model, more business-like approach. My guess is that we are not as advanced as the UK. That would be my guess that they are a little bit further ahead in ... driving amateurism into professionalism and we're just on the brink of that (Interview: 13 June 2002, emphasis added).

Taken together, these examples paint a picture of fluidity that suggests a certain lack of coherence in belief system structures underlying policy change at NSO level in Canada and belies the findings, to some extent, of Cunningham et al. (1987) and others in their work on changing values/belief systems in Canadian NSOs. There are clear structural resource interdependencies illustrated in the above examples and, from an ACF perspective, and with respect to the policy issue of developing a framework for the development of elite level performers in Canada, Chapters 5 and 6 revealed that such resource interdependencies hinge on relationships with two key organisational partners

– Sport Canada and the Canadian Olympic Committee (COC). It was also argued that of the three NSOs under investigation here SNC has exhibited the clearest set of policy beliefs that would place this organisation (together with Sport Canada and the COC) in any high performance sport advocacy coalition. At the level of the ACF's 'deep core' beliefs, Kidd's argument below would typify the nature of beliefs at this (normative) level:

> Sports ... present an approving discourse of domination of self, and by extension of the 'natural' world. The 'best' athletes actively, creatively, contribute to their own surveillance, objectification and commodification. Under the Olympic slogan *citius*, *altius*, *fortius*, they perfect themselves to perform at the limit of human potential and attempt to surpass those limits (1995: 10, original emphasis).

The ACF's assumption is that deep core beliefs are almost immutable and it is reasonable to assume that, at this deep core (normative level), beliefs have remained relatively stable, at least for SNC actors and those within the COC. However, as the preceding arguments have revealed, there is some doubt as to where we might now position Sport Canada in this respect. Here, it is important to recall that it is at the 'policy core' and/or 'secondary aspects' levels of the ACF's tripartite hierarchy of belief systems where change (is assumed) to be most likely to occur. Thus, while high performance objectives/beliefs have dominated Canadian amateur sport policy for the past 30 years (cf. Kidd 1988a, 1988b, 1995, Macintosh & Whitson 1990), recent shifts in 'policy core policy preferences' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 133) at federal level towards a lessened emphasis on high performance sport suggest that we are witnessing a significant moment, if not major policy change, in Canadian amateur sport policy. The ACF offers the following hypothesis on 'major' policy change:

> Significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g. changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, systemwide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other systems) are a *necessary, but not sufficient*, cause of change in the *policy core* attributes of a governmental programme (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 147, original emphasis).

Following the logic of the ACF, then, a significant perturbation external to the sport development policy subsystem can be conceived of as the shift in policy direction at federal government level. Taken together with the noted policy-oriented learning within the subsystem with respect to the research reports identified above and the incomplete nature of organisational value/belief system change at NSO level discussed earlier, some concluding suggestions can be noted in respect of policy change and the identification

of less dominant and emergent coalitions (see Figure 8.1 below) in the policy subsystem under investigation.

Figure 8.1 Canadian sport development policy subsystem and advocacy coalitions



Source: Adapted from Bulkeley (2000: 732)

In this respect, the less dominant coalition would comprise the cluster of interests around competitive but not high performance sport. These might include provincial/territorial sporting organisations P/TSOs and those NSOs, such as the Canadian Yachting Association (CYA) and (possibly) Athletics Canada (AC) that have yet to set out such an unequivocal high performance philosophy as that advanced by Swimming/Natation Canada (SNC). In respect of emergent coalitions, there appears to be a growing emphasis on co-relating sport policy with health issues, brokered in large part by the former Secretary of State for Amateur Sport, Denis Coderre, in the context of deliberations leading up to the new Canadian Sport Policy (cf. Canadian Heritage 2002a: 5). Here, Sport Canada's Manager of International Sport Policy argued that, while Coderre recognised the importance of high performance sport for promoting Canadian identity on an international stage, for encouraging participation in different sports and for introducing charismatic role models

> … he also heard a lot of messages that we need to get, for health reasons, we need to get more people involved in sport. So, he broadened [sport's remit] and that's why we have the Participation pillar [in the new Canadian Sport Policy]. And that hasn't been resolved yet at Sport Canada. We're not sure yet how that participation angle, that is now appearing to be part of our mandate, and that never had been there before [will be dealt with] (Interview: David McCrindle, 12 June 2002).

David McCrindle's comments not only affirm the emerging reciprocal policy relationship between sport and health but also the somewhat problematic position of Sport Canada in providing coherence for its partners in the sport delivery system. Rob Paradis reflects McCrindle's comments in suggesting that

> Coderre was going after health money to use in sport. So, he was using all sorts of research figures that showed that, if you increase the physical activity of Canadians, you'd lower the health costs for our national health programme (Interview: 20 June 2002).

Rob Paradis' comments also help to support the discussion in Chapter 2, where it was suggested that a number of characteristics are peculiar to the sport policy sector. Two of those characteristics are evident here: its general weakness and variable salience to federal government. In brief, policy for sport here is being aligned to health policy for instrumental reasons. Sport policy is not being designed for sport, in and of itself, but for wider policy-related concerns in a policy sector (health) that is far more established and of far greater salience to the Canadian federal government. A final example on this issue helps to lend credence to the argument that there is a growing but (as yet) indeterminate coalition in relation to the sport-health nexus; a nexus, moreover, that is also emerging as a relatively strong policy direction in the context of sport policy in the UK (Campbell 2003; DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002). Sport Canada's Senior Programme Officer for sailing explained that there have been a

> ... number of studies that have come out indicating that Canadian kids are getting more and more obese; that they are inactive and all the health problems relating to that. And we basically, a few years ago, had a Secretary of State for Sport [Denis Coderre] who, sort of, latched on to that, and really ran with it for all it was worth in terms of, if we invest in sport, we could reduce our health costs by 10 per cent (Interview: Walter Lyons, 20 June 2002).

If this is the scenario in Canada, what was found in our exploration of the UK sport policy sector? The first point of note is that resource interdependency between NGBs, and the organisations upon which they depend for funding elite sport programmes, has steadily increased from the inception of Lottery monies in the mid- to late 1990s. All three UK NGBs investigated have revealed, to a greater or lesser extent, policy initiatives that now place elite sport development as a prominent policy priority within their respective organisational rationales. This is not to deny that the Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain (ASFGB) (and the Amateur Swimming Association), UK Athletics (UKA) and the Royal Yachting Association (RYA) all delimit policy concerns towards elite sport performers. Rather, it is to suggest that current

policy direction is framed, in large part, around the contingencies of developing elite swimmers, athletes and sailors such that alternatives (sporting initiatives) merely serve to support the policy framework for developing elite and potential elite level performers. In essence, there are now a set conditions in place within which a coalition of actors/organisations, centring on a set of shared values/belief systems, has emerged in the UK. Here, Chapter 7 revealed that while the 'struggle' for change in this respect was clearly more cantankerous and problematic in swimming and athletics, change has nonetheless also emerged in sailing.

These values/belief systems have much in common with those identified by Hinings et al. (1996) as the driving force behind many Canadian NSOs in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. These can be summarised as: i) High performance emphasis; ii) Government involvement; iii) Organisational rationalisation; iv) Professionalism; v) Planning; vi) Corporate involvement; and vii) Quadrennial plans (Hinings et al. 1996: 897). All seven indicators identified here for the Canadian context in the late 1970s and 1980s now apply, to a greater or lesser degree, to the organisation and administration of the three sports investigated in the UK. The set of values/belief systems underlying these seven indicators would be concerned largely with the ACF's 'policy core' and 'secondary aspects'. For example, at the policy core level, the ACF assumes that precepts with a substantial empirical element include: 'Overall seriousness of the problem'; 'Basic causes of the problem'; and 'Method of financing programmes' (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 133-134). The cluster of (policy) changes emerging out of the four structural factors identified earlier are helpful here. Thus, the Conservative and Labour sport policy documents, *Sport: Raising the Game* and *A Sporting Future for All* respectively, the introduction of Lottery monies and the requirement for NGBs to produce objectives-related planning reports all illustrate that the problem or issue of constructing a policy framework for elite sport development is one that should (now) be dealt with in a 'serious' manner The 'basic causes of the problem' were addressed in the two (government) sport policy documents and the introduction of Lottery monies for the development of elite sport performers has provided the financial platform upon which this framework is being constructed.

Flowing from changes at the policy core level, we have also witnessed change at the level of secondary aspects. Here, the ACF is concerned with, for example, decisions regarding specific 'budgetary allocations' (e.g. ring-fenced Lottery monies),

'administrative rules' (the requirement to publish World Class Performance, Potential and Start plans) and information with respect to the 'performance of specific programmes' (e.g. the monitoring of these plans). Thus, from the mid-1990s onwards, we have witnessed what the ACF might term 'major policy change', through the dynamic interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors as conceived within the logic of the ACF. However, a brief but significant caveat can be noted here. Reflecting the earlier point regarding the difficulties in mapping or conceptualising belief systems, further work is clearly required, perhaps utilising the seven indicators identified above, and which incorporates a research strategy driven by the ACF and its theoretical constructs (in particular, values and belief systems) in order to paint a clearer picture in this respect. We can now address, specifically, the issue regarding which actors/organisations (delimited to those investigated for this study) might comprise the discussed elite sport-focused advocacy coalition. Key actors/organisations in this respect are the Performance Directorates in the ASFGB, UKA and the RYA, the Sport and Recreation Division of the DCMS, UK Sport, Sport England and those actors/organisations within the other three Home Country Sports Councils concerned with developing elite performers.

The argument that this elite sport-focused coalition is currently dominating the sport development policy subsystem is given credence by Houlihan & White's (2002) recent research into sport development, in general, in the UK. Houlihan & White argue that there are four potential advocacy coalitions evident in the sport development policy subsystem, 'with one of the strongest being that focused on high performance achievement in Olympic and major team sports' (2002: 220) – see Figure 8.2 below. Less prominent, or in Houlihan & White's terms, 'not yet quite so coherent and cohesive', is a cluster of organisations centring on school/youth sport - the Youth Sport Trust, Sport England, the central government Department for Education and Skills and the growing number of Specialist Sports Colleges are important organisational actors in this respect. Two rather weaker clusters of interest are those around community sport/Sport for All and those concerned with the 'provision of opportunities to play sport at the performance or routine competitive level' (Houlihan & White 2002: 221). The emergent coalition around the sport-health nexus identified in Figure 8.2 is discussed below. While Houlihan & White's research framework is useful, it did not draw specifically on the logic of the ACF and further research is clearly required before more substantive conclusions can be drawn with regard to these last two potential coalitions.

This study's findings do, however, concur in large part with the argument that elite sport interests currently dominate the sport development policy subsystem in the UK.

Figure 8.2 UK sport development policy subsystem and advocacy coalitions



Source: Adapted from Bulkeley (2000: 732)

While acknowledging the growing strength of elite sport interests, in athletics there was evidence of greater resistance to elite sport objectives than in either swimming or sailing. However, even in athletics, we have witnessed a willingness to embrace the changing conditions of action within which sport policy in the UK operates in the early 21st century. While the 1995 review of athletics – *Athletics 21* (BAF 1995) - revealed considerable disquiet at grass roots levels over the increasing emphasis on, and monetary rewards available to, elite athletes, policy developments over the ensuing seven to eight years merely serve to reinforce the argument that there is now a discernible coalition of actors/organisations centring on elite sport and underpinned by a set of values/belief systems centring on professionalism, commercialism, corporate organisational structures and the drive for medal-winning success at major international sporting events. Any resistance to these shifts in emphasis towards the elite level remains amorphous in many respects, however, as the underlying resource conditions for the sport, in effect, legitimise policy decisions emphasising elite athlete success. An example helps to clarify the argument. If we recall the discussion in Chapter 5 regarding developments during the period 1995-2002, in 1997 the Labour Government's sport policy document stated that

> The focus will be much more closely on target setting by national governing bodies and performance directors and on the achievement of targets by individual performers and teams. The success or failure in achieving milestones or targets in performance plans will be an important factor in deciding future levels of funding (DCMS 2000: 44).

Given that UKA received World Class Performance Lottery funding of £2,800,000 for the period 2002-2003 towards elite athlete programming - calculated on UKA Performance plans to UK Sport regarding potential medal-winning capacity - and just £450,000 in 2001-2002 in Exchequer monies for 'core activities' (UK Sport 2002a: 53), it is reasonable to assume that, in order to 'protect' subsequent Lottery streams, UKA's chief 'milestones or targets' in the future will be Olympic and/or World Championship medals.

This study was also concerned with the utility of the ACF's notion of policy-oriented learning, as well as the related cluster of ideas within the concept of policy transfer. In relation to this, in an investigation of policy change and stability in UK industrial pollution policy, Smith has argued that 'policy-oriented learning takes place both within coalitions and between coalitions' (2000: 99). However, Smith goes on to note that 'This policy-oriented learning is problematic as the coalitions, with their contrasting policy beliefs, tend to engage in a dialogue of the deaf in which each attacks the premises and understandings of the other'. Here, the ACF claims that if conflict is low and debate mediated by a professional forum, then learning can take place (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1993a: 41-56). These are interesting insights given the publication of *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002) - the Government's new framework for sport - and comments from Sue Campbell, Chief Executive of the Youth Sport Trust and currently advising government on matters relating to sport and education.

The 'forum' was a seminar hosted by the Institute of Sport and Recreation Management (ISRM) to discuss the ramifications of *Game Plan*, where Campbell (2003) argued forcefully that those charged with leading sporting organisations at all levels in the UK, 'are going to have to think differently'. In short, Campbell contends that 'What we've achieved as a country isn't good enough' and, rather than a myriad of organisations each promoting its own interests to government funding agencies, the symbiotic benefits accruing from an interlinking of sport and health matters in future lobbying of government for sports funding will be crucial (Campbell 2003); a theme that not only permeates *Game Plan* but also, as discussed, a theme that has emerged recently in Canada. *Game Plan* sets out what is termed a 'twin track approach' and interlinks 'social policy' (i.e. a healthier nation) with 'international success' (i.e. medals at major sporting

events such as the Olympic Games (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2003: 84). It is clearly too early to attempt an identification of *specific* organisations and/or actors that might coalesce around this emerging sport-health nexus. It is nevertheless a significant moment for sport policy in the UK and one that warrants further investigation following this study's findings: yet, in the context of this research, the potential for the emergence of an advocacy coalition around the sport-health nexus can at least be signalled.

This example reveals that there is some evidence, then, for the potential of policy-oriented learning with respect to this issue between and across coalitions within the sport development policy subsystem. However, for this concept to be operationalised in any meaningful way, further research is required that places a specific emphasis on this element of the ACF in order to answer some quite detailed and important questions. Questions such as: What has been learnt?; Was this information actively sought out and, if so, for what purpose?; Can we attribute this learning to value/belief system change; and, therefore, Has this learning resulted in tangible policy change? There is less evidence still of policy transfer, in the sense that the ASFGB, UKA and the RYA *actively* commission research into seeking out policy alternatives from abroad. While there was an acknowledgement of 'awareness' of foreign approaches and methods for developing elite performers (Interviews: Anita White, 26 February 2002; David Sparkes, 18 March 2002; John Derbyshire, 25 March 2002), this is a further area warranting research following this study's findings. Indeed, the CYA's 'emulation' (cf. Rose 1991b, 1993) of its UK counterpart's approach to sports science based training and development of elite sailors was the one clear example in this study where an NSO or NGB exhibited evidence of policy transfer. Moreover, given the different interpretations of policy transfer in the literature (cf. Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 2000; Evans & Davies 1999), a research strategy that seeks to better understand the potential of this variable in the dynamics of policy change requires careful consideration. As Dolowitz & Marsh have argued, 'placing policy transfer into a broader conceptual framework will help researchers examine the process of policy transfer and help themselves and practitioners evaluate the "value added" aspect of the concept' (2000: 7). The concept of policy transfer could be usefully incorporated into the logic of the ACF and its notion of policy-oriented learning. The interrelatedness of the work conducted for this study and the concept of policy transfer is clear from Dolowitz & Marsh's contention that

> ... policy entrepreneurs 'sell' policies around the world. International policy networks, advocacy coalitions or epistemic communities develop and promote ideas. As such, there is no

> doubt that there is a great deal of transfer and that this transfer has shaped policies (2000: 21).

For this study, a clear example of the above scenario, is the biennial International Forum on Elite Sport, last held in 2001 in Sant Cugat, Catalonia, where the exchange of ideas, methods, experiences and future directions for elite level sport was at the centre of proceedings amongst actors from countries as diverse as Germany, Spain, Kenya, China, Argentina, the UK and Australia. Indeed, Australia has been an important influence on the emerging policy framework for elite sport development in the UK (Interview: Anita White, 26 February 2002). The increasing influence of Australian elite sport actors - Bill Sweetenham, National Performance Director for *British Swimming*, Deidre Anderson, UKSI Programme Manager and Wilma Shakespear, National Director of the English Institute of Sport, being three prominent examples – suggests that ideas, methods, and experiences from Australia are emerging as increasingly important parameters for the development of a policy framework for elite sport in the UK.

One final issue worthy of note is 'public opinion': an external, or exogenous factor, that has emerged as an important aspect in the UK context but less so in Canada. The ACF has put greater emphasis on 'changes in public opinion' as a potentially significant exogenous factor in extensions to the framework since 1993. As Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith have argued, while 'public opinion is seldom knowledgeable enough to affect policy specifics, it can certainly alter general spending priorities and the perceived seriousness of various problems' (1999: 148; see also Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993a: 223). Public opinion is often manifest in media representations of particular policy issues and, while we have found evidence of this in Canada in exhortations from lobbying groups such as Sport Matters and Cansport, and to some extent in the popular press (see Chapter 6), of greater interest here is the utilisation of public opinion in mobilising policy direction within government and quasi-governmental sporting bodies in the UK. Here, the longitudinal research conducted by UK Sport into the 'public's sporting preferences' (cf. UK Sport 2000b, 2002f) is instructive in as much as that the recent *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002) report cites this research as an important contributory factor in the Government's future assessment of funding allocations to specific sports. Indeed, *Game Plan* sets out recommendations for what is termed a 'portfolio approach', whereby targeting of success should allow for both the quality of the success (i.e. popularity of the sport) as well as the overall quantity of the medals:

> ... investment in high performance sport needs to take into account those sports which the public consider to be important ... [but] This is not to suggest that funding should be focused solely on the most popular sports .... to invest solely in popular sports would ignore a range of sports with high potential for success (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002: 122).

These findings lend further credence to the ACF's logic of policy change in revealing the potential (re-)consideration of 'spending priorities' for sporting bodies in the UK in the light of researched public opinion. The latest UK Sport research upon which these recommendations are, in part, based also reveal some interesting findings as they draw attention to the difficult policy decisions facing the DCMS/UK Sport if the recommendations are to be implemented. UK Sport conducted 2,157 face-to-face interviews during August 2002 and, in answer to the question relating to which sport the UK public would most like to see win medals at the 2004 Olympic Games, athletics received 21.8 per cent of the total vote while swimming accounted for 14.4 per cent. Thus, these two sports 'remain the clear priority with regards to achieving Olympic success [in Athens 2004]' (UK Sport 2002f: 14). On this measure, sailing gained just 2 per cent of the total vote, thirteenth out of a possible 20 sports surveyed and just marginally ahead of diving and shooting. Yet, this study has not only shown that sailing is one of the UK's most successful Olympic sports in recent years but it has also revealed that the RYA is lauded by quasi-governmental sporting agencies as one of the country's leading NGBs. The policy conundrum for those shaping future directions for sports funding is clear: popular or successful? It remains to be seen how this potential policy conundrum is to be resolved.

In conclusion, the ACF has proved useful in helping to analyse the complex dynamics involved in elite sport policy change in three sports in Canada and the UK. However, while useful, the added insights suggested above, in particular, those relating to Howlett's (2002) notion of a discourse community and Bulkeley's (2000) closely related discourse coalition approach, offer potentially interesting extensions to the ACF's logic. Future studies utilising these approaches would also benefit from an explicit discussion of power relationships as the ACF does not address 'power' in any meaningful way. In tracing the emergence of sport policy, in general, and elite sport policy change, in particular, in Canada and the UK, it is clear that both countries are experiencing something of a watershed moment in their respective sport policy sectors. In Canada, we have witnessed a lessening of emphasis on the 'ideology of excellence' (Kidd 1995), or what Whitson has termed the 'normative legitimation of the calculating pursuit of victory' (1998: 1), at federal/Sport Canada/NSO levels. As discussed, this lessening of

emphasis is by no means complete but the broadened policy objectives within the new Canadian Sport Policy and Bill C-12, and the emergence of a nexus between the sport and health policy sectors, suggests an ongoing struggle for resources for Canadian NSOs, in the near future at least. A similar conjunction between sport and health policy has recently emerged as an important indicator of future resourcing of sporting organisations at all levels in the UK (Campbell 2003; DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002). However, predating this recent development, is the emergence in the mid-1990s of a significant shift in policy direction and emphasis away from what had been termed Sport for All initiatives and towards elite sport development. In this respect, the policy trajectory between the two countries is stark in its dichotomy. Finally, this study has argued against what was earlier termed, sport-specific determinism. In other words, as the preceding chapters have revealed, in the final analysis, it is only by exploring specific sports through a comparative-analytic framework that a better understanding of policy change, within the complex and multi-layered sport policy process, might be achieved.

Notes

[1] However, the 2002 Canadian Sport Policy attempts to address this enduring issue through its 'Enhanced Interaction' pillar and recommends increased collaboration and communication between all stakeholders in the sport delivery system. To this end, a set of federal-provincial/territorial priorities for collaborative action for 2002-2005 have been identified, within which increased opportunities (forums) for co-operative approaches have been outlined (Canadian Heritage 2002a, 2002b). In addition, there are also possibilities for collaboration between NSOs and Sport Canada on facility development in relation to the federal focus on linking elite facility development to hosting major sporting events.

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Appendix

List of interviewees in chronological order by date of interview

Date	Name	Position
26 February 2002	**Dr Anita White**	Former Head of Development, English Sports Council
18 March 2002	**David Sparkes**	Chief Executive, Amateur Swimming Association and Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain
19 March 2002	**Wendy Coles**	Athlete Support Assistant, Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain and Secretary, Nottinghamshire Amateur Swimming Association
25 March 2002	**John Derbyshire**	Former High Performance Director, now Racing Manager, Royal Yachting Association
30 April 2002	**Tony Ward**	Former Public and Media Relations Officer, British Amateur Athletic Board and British Athletic Federation
28 May 2002	**Professor Peter Radford**	Former Chief Executive, British Athletic Federation
11 June 2002	**Professor Jean Harvey**	Professor at the School of Human Kinetics, University of Ottawa
12 June 2002	**David McCrindle**	Manager of International Sport Policy, Sport Canada
12 June 2002	**Jan Meyer**	Senior Programme Officer (swimming), Sport Canada
13 June 2002	**Joanne Mortimore**	Chief Operating Officer, Athletics Canada
13 June 2002	**Larry Clough**	Director of Finance and Administration, Swimming/Natation Canada
17 June 2002	**Marianne Davis**	Executive Director, Canadian Yachting Association
19 June 2002	**Professor Bruce Kidd**	Dean of Faculty, University of Toronto
20 June 2002	**Rob Paradis**	Senior Programme Officer (athletics), Sport Canada
20 June 2002	**Walter Lyons**	Senior Programme Officer (sailing/yachting), Sport Canada
8 August 2002	**Arve Sundheim**	Secretary-General, International Sailing Federation
23 August 2002	**Mike Whittingham**	Former international athlete and currently sport management/research consultant and radio broadcaster
11 September 2002	**Ben Oakley**	1992 GB/NI Olympic Windsurfing coach and recreational sailor
28 October 2002	**Emyr Roberts**	Performance Services Manager (swimming), UK Sport
28 October 2002	**Joe Patton**	Performance Services Manager (sailing/yachting), UK Sport
28 October 2002	**Jane Swan**	Performance Services Manager (athletics), UK Sport

Summary of procedures and protocols

Rationale for, and implications of, the selection of NSOs/NGBs

The selection of the three sports and their respective NSOs/NGBs in Canada and the UK is based on the following line of reasoning: i) the six NSOs/NGBs have remits for prominent sports at Olympic and World Championship levels; ii) within the respective sports, the six NSOs/NGBs have responsibility for a number of sub-disciplines, all of which (potentially) compete for resources and attention of influential actors in the policy-making process; iii) taken together, points i) and ii) raise a number of useful questions relevant to the research objectives in respect of, for example: a) resource allocations to the sports' various constituencies from government and quasi-governmental organisations in both countries b) the relative priority placed upon the three sports *vis-à-vis* other sports vying for (policy) attention and resources and c) the nature of power relationships, within the sports, across the sports and between the sports and their funding partners; and iv) the sport of sailing/yachting is under-researched *per se*, as well as relative to the interest shown in swimming and track and field athletics, thus providing the study with a relatively substantial body of literature upon which to draw with regard to the latter two sports, while allowing cross-comparisons to be made with a sport that has received little academic scrutiny. While it is acknowledged that any selection process is open to debate, the analysis of three sports, and six NSOs/NGBs in two countries, provides a useful set of empirical/theoretical insights upon which future research into other sports (and perhaps in other countries) may draw.

Rationale for, and implications of, the selection of interviewees

In order to elicit data on policy change, interviewees within the NSOs/NGBs were selected on the basis that they had been involved at a strategic level of decision-making and, where possible, in order to map *changing* policy decisions, that they had been involved over a number of years. In order to map the nature of relationships between the NSOs/NGBs and Sport Canada and UK Sport, it was imperative to gain access to the actor 'responsible' for each sport within the latter two organisations: this was achieved. In addition, contributions were sought from actors who were either formerly involved with a specific sport and/or quasi-governmental sporting organisation (i.e. Peter Radford, Ben Oakley and Anita White) or have shown an interest, from an analytical standpoint, in investigating elite sport policy processes, both in general, and in respect of particular sports (i.e. Bruce Kidd, Jean Harvey, Tony Ward and Mike Whittingham) – for full details, see *List of interviewees* above.

Access to documentary material

Access to documents revealing indications of strategic policy decisions within the six NSOs/NGBs was complicated by the potentially sensitive nature of the data contained within

such material. However, access was gained to both published material, e.g. Annual Reports, Operation and Action Plans and Strategic Reviews into, for example, a sport's operations and governance structure. In addition, access was gained to unpublished documents, such as organisational minutes and internal position papers, as well as reports on unpublished documents that received attention in press accounts (e.g. the internal audit of Athletics Canada) and/or publications specific to the sport (e.g. *SwimNews* in Canada and *Swimming* in the UK), or from sport information and commentary forums, such as Cansport and Sport Matters in Canada. In addition to documentary data specific to the NSOs/NGBs, published policy-related documentary material was drawn upon from government and quasi-governmental organisations – in particular, Canadian Heritage, Sport Canada, UK Sport and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport – see *References* for full details.

Strategy for the analysis of interview and documentary data

Analysis of the interview and documentary data was based upon both inductive and deductive processes (cf. Blaikie 2000: 102-107; Bryman 2001: 390; Gilbert 1993: 22-24). For example, the four elements of elite sport policy development: Development of elite level facilities; Emergence of 'full-time' swimmers, athletes and sailors; Developments in coaching, sports science and sports medicine; and Competition opportunities for elite level swimmers, athletes and sailors – upon which much of the analysis of policy change is based - were identified inductively from a review of documentary material relating to elite sport in each country (in particular, see Sports Council 1991). However, this inductive process was also informed by deductive insights from theoretical propositions, most notably, critical realism and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). These theoretical insights led to an analysis that sought to locate more contemporary policy decisions within a context of past policy deliberations and statements, as well as pointing to the utility of investigating the sport development policy subsystem in relation to both exogenous and endogenous factors. In relation to the latter in particular, insights from the ACF pointed to the salience of analysing changing values and belief systems of policy elites over time in respect of developing a policy framework for elite sport programming in both countries. In short, the study's analytic strategy was based upon an approach that was iterative or recursive; that is, the data collection and analysis proceeded concurrently, repeatedly referring back to and informing each other.