The organization of turn-taking in poolskate sessions

Jonas Ivarsson & Christian Greiffenhagen

This study takes poolskating, where only one skater rides at a time, as an example of a *turn-taking system*, albeit one which is organized not through speech but through bodily actions. This allows us to revisit Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson's (1974) famous ›turn-taking‹ paper, in particular, their initial broad conception of turn-taking systems as including activities other than the speech-exchange systems studied by conversation analysis. Despite the original declaration, non-speech turn-taking systems have evaded close scrutiny for the past four decades. By turning our attention to such a system here, this study makes two contributions: firstly, to the *sociology of turn-organized activities* (through a comparison of the central features of turn-taking for conversation with poolskating) and, secondly, to the study of how bodily actions can accomplish *pre-beginnings* (since in poolskate session, this is the place to settle the matter of turn-allocation in order to avoid overlaps in riding).

I

Introduction

A visitor to a skatepark may well get a first impression of chaos or disorder: people on skateboards hurtling helter-skelter in a concrete terrain. Furthermore, skateboarders are often seen as forming a ›counter-culture‹, advocating a ›no rules‹ attitude. The ideas of resistance and radicalism, and the entertaining of a sceptical attitude towards organized sports, all seem part and parcel of this culture (Beal & Weidman, 2003). As argued by the ethnographer Åsa Bäckström (2005), these notions both create and are created by the skateboarders themselves. While the appearance and talk of skateboarders may try to convey a touch of anarchy, the actual practice turns out to be more or-dered than one would first suspect (cf., Ma & Munter, 2014). In particular, within the activity of poolskating, which will be our focal setting for the remainder, we find that only one party ri-des in the pool at a time. Still, frequent changes between riders occur, where the transitions seem to be highly coordinated, so that there is no overlap in riding and only very small gaps between rides.

Poolskating thus constitutes a *turn-taking system*, albeit one which is not organized through speech, but through bodily actions. This is not to say that speech is absent in poolskate sessions: waiting parties make various comments on what the current rider is doing, who may her- or himself produce va-rious ›cry-outs‹ as a result of the performance. However, the turn-taking system itself is not organized through speech, but through the presence of a skater with her or his skateboard in the pool. Consequently, poolskate sessions provide an oppor-tunity to revisit the classic ›turn-taking paper‹ (Sacks, Scheg-loff, & Jefferson, 1974; henceforth ssj), in particular, its opening paragraph:

> Turn-taking is used for the ordering of moves in games, for allocating political office, for regulating traffic at intersections, for serving customers at business establishments, and for tal-king in interviews, meetings, debates, ceremonies, conversations etc.—these last being members of the set which we shall refer to as ›speech exchange systems‹. It is obviously a prominent

type of social organization, one whose instances are implicated in a wide range of other activities. For socially organized activities, the presence of ›turns‹ suggests an economy, with turns for something being valued—and with means for allocating them, which affect their relative distribution, as in economies. An investigator interested in the *sociology of a turn-organized activity* will want to determine, at least, the shape of the turn-taking organization device, and how it affects the distribution of turns for the activities on which it operates. (696; our emphasis)

Over the last four decades, conversation analysis (CA) has explored various aspects of the turn-taking system for conversation (for a recent overview see Hayashi, 2013), and also studied speech-exchange systems *other* than conversation under the auspices of the ›institutional talk program‹ (Drew & Heritage, 1992). In particular, researchers have demonstrated that many institutional settings, such as courtrooms (Atkinson & Drew, 1979) or news interviews (Clayman & Heritage, 2002) involve turn-type pre-allocation, where one party (e.g., the attorney or interviewer) has the right to ask questions, while the other party is restricted to providing answers (and departures from this are explicitly sanctioned, demonstrating that parties are treating the turn-taking system as a normative organization). Yet the focus has been almost exclusively on *speech*-exchange systems. *Non-speech* turn-taking systems have been pretty much ignored. Consequently, the promised »sociology of turn-organized activities« partially remains an enterprise in the offing.

  There is of course a long-standing interest in ›formatted queues‹ in ethnomethodological studies (e.g., Garfinkel & Livingston, 2003; Livingston, 1987: 12-18). However, here the focus has been more on the phenomenology of standing-in-a-queue rather than the formal properties of the queue as such. There have also been CA studies that have looked, for example, at turn-taking in traffic (e.g., Haddington, 2010; Laurier, 2013), but the focus has been on verbal and bodily turn-taking *within* the car (e.g., between driver and passengers), rather than the turn-taking between driver-cars. The only study that we know of that has tried to apply the ›analytic mentality‹ of CA to a non-speech turn-taking system is an unpublished report by

Lee and Watson (1993) on ›flow files‹, pedestrians visibly walking in a spatial series (see also Watson, 2005).

Our claim that non-speech turn-taking systems have been largely ignored by CA does of course not mean that non-speech *resources* (such as gaze, gestures, or facial expressions) have been overlooked. There is now a considerable body of work that has studied what is often referred to as ›multimodal‹ resources and their interplay with talk-in-interaction. In an early and important study, Goodwin (1981) focused on the role of gaze in influencing a speaker's turn (e.g., using restarts or pauses to secure the gaze of a listener). Schegloff (1984) demonstrated how iconic gestures are pre-positioned to their lexical affiliates. Streeck and Hartge (1992) exhibited how intending speakers often configure their face so that their intent to articulate is made visible. More recently, Mondada (2007) showed how pointing gestures are a way to display a claim to next turn while someone else is still talking and Streeck (2009) demonstrated that such pointing gestures are not just used for projecting a turn at talk, but also to convey a stance towards what the speaker is about to say. Finally, Lerner (2002) pointed out that the phenomenon of ›choral co-production‹ can also be achieved through gestural matching between participants, a phenomenon that is examined by Arnold (2012) in her study of dialogic embodied action, where one participant takes up particular features of another participant's gestures.

However, none of these studies has looked at gaze, gestures, or facial expressions as constituting turn-taking systems in their own right. On the contrary, the consensus seems to be that these are typically not turn-organized (cf., Lerner, 2002: 45; Schegloff, 2007: 11). Instead, the focus of these studies has been predominantly on how bodily actions can be used to structure turn-taking in talk-in-interaction. Given this background the study of the poolskate session occasions a return to SSJ's original broad conception of turn-taking systems. Since poolskating constitutes a turn-taking system in which speech is present but which is not organized through speech, this paper aims to make two contributions:

Firstly, by going back to the foundational framework of conversation analysis and applying it to a non-talk-based form of social organization, we are simultaneously led to a re-examination of the turn-taking system for conversation, since a number of central features of that system turn out not to be present in poolskate sessions. For example: in the poolskate session we only find ›self-selections‹, but no instances where ›current selects next‹ (i.e., the current rider cannot designate the next rider); in poolskate sessions the length of the current turn is only determined by the current rider (i.e., not by waiting skaters); turns in a poolskate session typically do not display any backward or forward orientation (i.e., they seem not to be connected to previous or subsequent turns). So by comparing the two turn-taking systems, we find that a number of features known from the original characterization are not inherent properties of turn-taking in general, but should rather be understood as features of turn-taking in conversation (or, possibly, speech-exchange systems).

Secondly, the case of poolskating also enables us to focus on the embodied work during turn-transition. From this we aim to make a contribution to the broader interest in bodily resources for turn-taking, in particular how these can be employed in the emergence of possible next speakers. Although conversation analysts have not explored any turn-taking systems that are organized through bodily actions, there has been a growing body of work of how bodily actions can accomplish pre-beginnings.

In conversation, as is well known, turns are built out of turn-constructional units (TCUs), where recipients are oriented to the possible completion of these units. Consequently, TCUs establish turn-relevance places (TRPs), places at which changes in speakership can become possible. Since such TRPs are projectable, current recipients who want to become next speakers sometimes do not just begin to speak, but do various actions *before* beginning to speak. As expressed by Jefferson (1984: 23), current recipients may be »gearing up for the starting of a next turn«. Clayman (2013: 151) provides a lucid visualization

of such ›pre-beginnings‹, which we have redrawn as Figure 1 and which highlights how a recipient B gears up to claim speakership during A's second TCU (note that the figure is colour-coded, »grey = recipient should remain silent, white = recipient may speak«).


Figure 1. Preparation in conversation.

Jefferson (1984) also remarks that such preparatory work is typically not available to empirical observation. However, some actions done in this ›pre-beginning‹ position of a turn, are available to the participants and can foreshadow talk to come (Schegloff, 1996: 105), the perhaps most typical example of this are ›in-breaths‹ (Jefferson, 1984; Schegloff, 1996). In turn, speakers who register recipients gearing up to speak occasionally may deploy practices to circumvent possible turn-transition upon an upcoming TRP, e.g. ›rush throughs‹ (Schegloff, 1982: 76) or ›pivot‹ constructions (Norén & Linell, 2013; Walker, 2007). Thus, if in Figure 1, B's preparation is done in a way available to A, A may speed up at the end of the second TCU in order to produce a third TCU.

  With a focus mainly on verbal conduct there is a limit to how much preparatory work that can be empirically observed and demonstrated. However, the fact that participants get themselves ready for a next turn can be registered by other means and more recently there have been a number of studies exploring various bodily actions involved in such pre-beginnings. The examples range from the use of facial displays (Streeck & Hartge, 1992), the shaking of a head (Schegloff, 1996), pointing (Mondada, 2007), hand gestures (Streeck, 2009), to also include the grabbing of objects (Day & Wagner, 2014). The perhaps most systematic contribution has been made by Mondada (2007) who shows how pointing »appears as a *method* for projecting self-selection, being part of an emergent movement for establishing upcoming speakership«, which »makes visible for

all participants a pre-beginning, taking the visual floor but not yet the vocal–spoken turn« (203). One of Mondada's examples (excerpt 7, e9/ ag1–47.52) is re-presented in a simplified format in Figure 2. What we want to emphasize are that we have two visible pre-beginnings at the end of VIV's second TCU. At this moment both PAL and LAU are non-current speakers that display their readiness to begin a new turn, one through a shift in body posture and the other through a pointing gesture. Mondada's analysis then, extends the previous interest in the role of pre-beginnings in the coordination of current speaker and next speaker/recipient, firstly, to bodily actions, and, secondly—and more importantly—to include multiple pre-beginnings (in cases of a larger cohort of current non-speakers). In such multi-party environments, bodily pre-beginnings can effectively aid in prefiguring incipient claims of speakership and thereby become central for organizing turn-taking.

TRP   TRP

VIV's 1st TCU	VIV's 2nd TCU

PAL puts head forth   PAL's TCU

LAU points | LAU suspends pointing

Figure 2. Bodily preparations in conversation.

Even though studies such as Mondada (2007) have explored bodily resources for pre-beginnings, the turn itself is still verbal (i.e., the bits in grey are all verbal). What is novel in the pool-skate session is that *both* pre-beginnings and turns are done through the body (and the skateboard). Furthermore, in pool-skate sessions we find that multiple pre-beginnings are relatively common. Figure 3 represents a situation at the end of rider Grey's turn where two waiting riders commence pre-beginning actions at the same time, comparable to the case of »concurrent claims of speakership« (Mondada, 2007: 206) seen above. White's preparation is observed by Black who demonstrably aborts his own preparation and withdraws. As we will detail below, pre-beginning work is of particular importance in poolskating and can be a crucial resource for avoiding overlaps between two next turn claimants.

Grey's turn		Grey exits		
White's preparation		White's Turn
Black's prepaparation	Black withdraws

Figure 3. Bodily preparations in poolskating.

In the next section, we will focus on our first aim, namely to deal the differences between the organization of turn-taking in poolskating in contrast to conversation. After that, we then examine in closer detail the bodily work involved in organizing turn transition.

An overview of turn-taking in poolskate sessions

The modern versions of pools (also known as bowls) found in skateparks around the world are custom built structures that to a greater or lesser extent mimics the features found in the precursory swimming pools (Beal, 2013: 15-16; Brooke, 1999: 38). The structure, with walls that smoothly transitions into the bottom, allows the rider to generate speed by a technique known as ›pumping the transitions‹. By continually shifting the centre of mass in relation to the arched surfaces the skateboarder can translate physical work into speed much like one would do on a swing. With this technique the rider can build and maintain momentum and perform a series of tricks. In pool riding the vast majority of tricks are performed on, or in close proximity of, the lip (also described as the ›coping‹). Figure 4[1] portrays a single ›run‹ where the rider has been traversing the pool in a typical serpentine manner.

As already alluded to, the ›alternative‹ movement of skateboarding is often regarded as staffed by individualists. But even if skateboarding can be done as an individual activity it is regularly exercised in groups, i.e., like boxing it can be seen as an ›individual–collective sport‹ (cf., Dumas & Laforest, 2008: 5; Wacquant, 2004: 16-17). This becomes especially clear with structures that can only host a limited number of occupants, like ramps, half-pipes and pools. When the demand exceeds

1. The material was recorded at a private facility. The research was thus carried out by invitation of the owners and the participants have agreed to our use of the images.

Figure 4. An example of a pool-ride.

the supply the participants have to take their turns at riding. Skaters customarily refer to these kinds of sustained activities with the term ›session‹.

> The session format involves a group of skaters standing at the pool entrance or half-pipe platform, waiting for their run […]. As an informal queuing system (skaters do not stand in line), there is a rough understanding that each skater gets one run in turn; jumping in sequence is sometimes referred to as ›snaking‹. Further, it is the ground on which the waiting skaters stand that constitutes the primary social space of the audience; although other non-skaters may look on, it is skaters-only who tend to occupy the entrance point/platform, and it is they who shout encouragement, astonishment and abuse at the skater performing. […] The session is thus a kind of informal competition among individuals, but is also a collective activity. (Borden, 2001: 124)

Depending on its availability, music through loudspeakers is sometimes used as a backdrop to the activity (as was the case in all the sessions analysed here). As Borden notices, additional

sounds are also present. Shouts and outcries, the slamming of skateboards against hard surfaces in order to produce noises, all feature in the regular course of events; where the clamour is a running commentary on the skating-in-progress. Although skating is very much an individual sport (in contrast to, say, football), it is nevertheless highly social: at least part of the joy of skating is related to the reactions of the ›overlooking‹ audience (cf., Heritage, 1985 on ›overhearing audience‹). Skaters do, of course, talk to each other during sessions. Such talk however, does not address, nor does it regulate, who will be taking the next turn in the pool.

   How does the turn-taking in the skate session diverge from that in conversation? We collected two sets of video recordings (one and two hours in length). They differ in that they come from two different places and hence document different pools and physical surroundings.[2] There are also several similarities. Both recordings were made of skate-sessions where six or more people actively engaged in skating and waiting to take turns in the pool. Both groups were composed of a mix of strangers, acquaintances and friends. Most, but not all participants were also skating on an advanced level. When it comes to the ordering, the general styles of the sessions could be characterized as polite and supportive rather than overtly competitive.

   As an entry into the materials, we will take one ten-minute segment from each recording and offer some descriptive statistics in terms of average length of a turn, the order of turns, and the relative distribution of turns. These descriptions will be presented as a list of »grossly apparent facts«, mirroring some of the entries[3] proposed by ssj (700–701):

(1) Rider-change recurs, or at least occurs. [Speaker-change recurs, or at least occurs]

Skaters do not ›ride‹ forever: not only is riding a strenuous activity, but there is also an awareness that waiting skaters want to have a ›go‹. What is important to note is that most rides do not finish with skaters ending their turns by riding out of the pool, but by losing balance and eventually falling off or in some

2. Due to differences in visual quality between the recordings we are only showing images from the second session in the analyses.

3. For ease of comparison we will keep the numbering used by ssj and we have quoted the original formulation in square brackets.

other way becoming divorced from the direct contact with the board. These latter occurrences are typically referred to as ›bails‹ and are very common to skateboarding, since skaters often attempt things they can't yet do. As Borden (2001: 121) observes: »skateboarders spend perhaps more than any other sports practitioners actually *failing* to do what they attempt«. For the ten-minute section of session 1, 29 out of 38 rides ended in a bail, and for session 2 the frequency was even higher, where 37 out of 40 rides in total saw a bail as its termination.

(2) Seemingly without exception, one party rides at a time. [Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time]
In our data, we never observed two parties *riding* at the same time in the pool. There are good reasons for this: simultaneous rides could easily lead to collisions, i.e., bodily harm to the skaters. That is to say, overlap in riding, should it occur, is much more consequential in comparison to overlapping talk.

(3) Occurrences of more than one party *in the pool* are common, but brief. [Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief]
Although we found no cases of overlap in riding in our data, there were frequent occurrences where the pool became occupied by two parties at the same time. In all of these instances one party started the next turn *after* a bail, but *before* the previous rider had exited the pool. This happened for one third of the turn transitions in session 1 and in half of the cases at session 2.

Studies that have explored the organization of overlap in conversation (e.g., Drew, 2009; Hayashi, 2013; Jefferson, 1984; Schegloff, 2000) have shown that many cases of overlap are not instances of ›people just not listening to each other‹, but actually a matter of fine-grained attention. For example, Jefferson (1984) showed how certain types of overlap, ›terminal overlaps‹, involve ›reasonable turn incursion‹, i.e., »occu[r] at a point where a turn in progress is for all practical purposes completed; where what is being said is all over but for the final noises« (14). The observed occurrences of multiple occupants

in the pool, while not constituting *turn* incursions, follows a very similar pattern: they were the result of fine-grained analyses (since the next-rider had monitored the current ride for a bail) and occurred at the point where the turn in progress was for all practical purposes completed (except for the current rider leaving the pool).

(4) Transitions (from one *ride* to the next) with a gap are common. However, there are few transitions characterized by a gap in pool *occupancy*. [Transitions (from one turn to a next) with no gap and no overlap are common. Together with transitions characterized by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up the vast majority of transitions]
Skaters were only *riding* 70% of the total time (a figure that held for both sessions). A conversation in which the participants were only talking 70% of the time, i.e., were silent for 30% of the time, would be a rather slow-paced one, a »continuing state of incipient talk« (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973: 325). However, this was not the case in the poolskate sessions. Although there were significant gaps in riding, there were very few gaps in pool-*occupancy*: pools were occupied 94% of the time in session 1, and 96% in session 2. In other words, since many rides ended in a bail, waiting parties would frequently wait for the skater in the pool to climb out, before starting the next ride.

(5) Turn order is not fixed, but varies. [Turn order is not fixed, but varies]
We were not able to find any regular patterns in turn ordering. For our two ten minutes selections the series exhibit the following structures:

SESSION 1: C–D–B–F–E–A–C–D–F–A–B–E–C–A–D–B–E–C–B–A–D–F–A–B–E–F–C–B–A–D–C–B–A–E–C–D–F–A

SESSION 2: C–D–A–E–B–C–D–A–F–E–B–D–A–C–F–E–A–B–D–C–A–F–E–B–A–D–C–B–E–A–D–B–C–E–A–B–D–F–A–C

To be noted here is the existence of several recurrent sub-patterns in both of the series. But such patterns appear and disappear, mix-up and fall apart in non-obvious ways. At no point in the series is what follows a logical consequence given the information of the currently available history (as if C's had only been followed by D's for instance). We thus take it that the ordering-work in play is dependent on additional contingencies, which calls for a closer examination of the video materials.

(6) Turn size is not fixed, but turns are typically short. [Turn size is not fixed, but varies]
Turns are relatively short: the average turn length was 11 seconds – and even the longest turns were only 24 and 28 seconds respectively.

(7) Length of session is not specified in advance. [Length of conversation is not specified in advance]
The turn-taking system itself says nothing about the length of the session. For the examined cases the sessions lasted between two and three hours.

(8) What parties do is not specified in advance. [What parties say is not specified in advance]
According to ssj »the turn-taking organization for conversation makes no provision for the content of any turn, nor does it constrain what is (to be) done in any turn« (710). They then go on to say that this does not mean that there are no constraints on what may be done in any turn:

> ›First turns‹ in a structurally characterizable set of circumstances properly take ›greetings‹; and ›next turns‹ can, in a variety of closely describable ways, be constrained by ›prior turns‹. We note only that in conversation, such constraints are organized by systems external to the turn-taking system.

What skaters do when they get their turn (what kinds of tricks they will attempt) is left up to them. Furthermore, we have not found any evidence that what the current rider does in the course of a turn is in any way constrained by what a prior

rider has done in a preceding turn. In other words, we have not witnessed the equivalence of adjacency pairs for skateboarding.

(9) Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance, but there seems to be an orientation to distribute turns equally. [Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance]

In our two sample ten-minute fragments, the six riders involved in the sessions took 8, 7, 7, 6, 5, and 5 turns respectively for session 1, and 9, 7, 7, 7, 6, and 4 for session 2. In other words, although the turns were not totally equally distributed, there seems to be some mechanism for equalising the distribution, effectively working to limit the set of potential next riders. Since there are no formatted queues in place (turns can begin from any part of the pool) such a mechanism would have to be of a different order. Ethnographically, we would agree with Borden (2001) who argues that there is a general preference for letting each skater get one run in turn.

(12) Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. Parties self-select in starting to ride. Current rider does *not* select a next rider. [Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current speaker may select a next speaker (as when he addresses a question to another party); or parties may self-select in starting to talk]

For conversation there are techniques for allocating turns, which fall into two broad groups: (a) current-speaker-selects-next and (b) self-selection. In the first group of techniques we typically see speakers addressing a specific party to the conversation »with a turn whose action requires a responsive action next« (Schegloff, 2007: 4). As also observed above, the equivalent form of responsiveness (carried by turns-at-riding) seems lacking in the poolskate session. The consequence is that current rider does not select next rider and we are left only with the technique of self-selection. If people had been sharing skateboards one could imagine a situation where the passing of the board would function as a technique for turn allocation.

But everyone has their own equipment and selection takes place among the waiting parties.

(13) Various ›tricks‹ go into the production of the ride. [Various ›turn-constructional units‹ are employed; e.g., turns can be projectedly ›one word long‹, or they can be sentential in length]

SSJ argued that turns are built up of components, ›turn-constructional units‹ (TCUs), which are primarily based on syntax, but, as others have expanded, also on prosody, pragmatics, or gestures (cf., Ford, Fox, & Thompson, 1996). Although, the exact nature of TCUs may be negotiable (Ford et al., 1996: 428), it is clear that TCUs in conversation have the important feature of projectability (SSJ: 702), which allows possible next speakers to project when such a unit will be complete and thus to locate an upcoming place when they could start speaking. In other words, current recipients of talk can listen to a speaker's ongoing talk and project places at which one component of the talk will be complete. It is at such ›transition relevance places‹ (TRPs) that transition becomes possibly relevant. What is important is that transition becomes *possibly* relevant, since it is not the case that speaker transition occurs at every TRP (this is the reason why in Figure 1, we do not just have two colours, ›grey‹ and ›white‹, but rather shades of grey). In other words, a transition is only ›sealed‹ by next speaker starting a new turn (Schegloff, 1996: 97). It is in that sense that »the turn as a unit is interactively determined« (SSJ: 727) by participants.

A turn in the poolskate session can also be seen as made up of different parts. However, what kind of parts is even more difficult to describe than for conversation. A rough approximation of the elements in the pool-ride would be that a turn is constituted of one or several ›tricks‹ stringed together. In skateboarding, almost every single action done in relation to the board has a name. The ways in which feet are positioned (›regular‹, ›goofy‹, ›switch‹, ›fakie‹), the direction and extent of a rotation (›frontside‹, ›backside‹, ›180°‹, ›360°‹, etc.), the numerous configurations a skateboard can be placed in relation

to the lip (›smith‹, ›feeble‹, ›blunt‹, ›disaster‹, etc.), all have their names and naming practices.

These elements become resources not only for the turn-holder in the execution of tricks, but also for bystanders parsing and having to recognize otherwise continuous flows of actions. The bystanders who witness these tricks regularly provide evaluations and display their involvement in the progressing turn. As Karsten and Pel (2000: 335) observe: »Skateboarders encourage one another. Whenever a trick is successfully executed, skateboards are drummed on the ground as a kind of alternative applause.« In relation to turns-at-talk this form of practice has been described as ›concurrent assessments‹ (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987), which on occasion may prompt speakers to »delay entry into subsequent units of talk until the assessment has run its course« (25). In the case of poolskating, assessments of bystanders are, however, external to the turn-taking system, i.e., do not seem to influence the ongoing ride.

SSJ argued that it would be »misconceived to treat turns as units characterized by a division of labor in which the speaker determines the unit and its boundaries, with other parties having as their task the recognition of them.« (726-727). While not applicable to conversation, this very characterization captures the workings of the poolskate session fairly well. Here, the turn as a unit is not interactively determined, because non-current riders have no discernible influence on the ending of a turn. On the contrary, from what we have observed, non-current riders actively worked not to interrupt the current ride, for example, by staying clear of the lip and by backing off if necessary. It is thus only one party, the current rider, that determines the boundaries of the turn.

Furthermore, although the turn may be seen as comprised of parts—tricks—there is a significant difference from the TCUs of conversation in that tricks are not transition relevant, in any immediate sense. There is, nevertheless, an indirect influence of tricks on rider-transition. The crux is that bails cluster around tricks. Skaters at an intermediate and advanced level (as the

ones studied here) seldom have problems of navigating and making their way through the pool. The regular occurrence of bails then, is rather the result of their frequent attempts at tricks that are somewhere beyond or just at their current skill level. Consequently, the onset of certain tricks may increase the odds that the current rider will lose his or her balance (bail). Any potential next rider, looking to self-select for a next turn, can therefore analyse the trick in progress for its likelihood to fail. This concludes our immediate comparison with ssj. Having outlined a number of differences and similarities between the organization of turn-taking in poolskating in relation to conversation, we will now focus on turn transition in some more detail.

Transition space organization and the body

In this section, we want to have a closer look at the ›social and interactional organization of the transition space‹ (Schegloff, 1996: 69), with a particular focus on bodily resources. To make this analysis possible we have devised an alternative to typed transcripts, and we will therefore rely on strips of images, which are clearly marked with respect to timing. Some instances are also augmented with arrows to further indicate specific movements and rotations that can otherwise be hard to discern in still images. We start by examining the work that skaters do *before* beginning to ride.

Pre-beginnings and beginnings

We have said in the poolskate session a turn consists of riding-in-the-pool. What then do skaters have to do in order to be in a position to start riding? The first thing to note is that there are, broadly speaking, two states of waiting in the poolskate session, something that the right-hand section of Figure 5 illustrates.

  If we look at Figure 5, we can see the current rider at the lip of the pool, while on the right we can observe three persons not currently skating. One of them is sitting down in the back of the room, working on shifting the wheels of his skateboard.

Figure 5. Waiting skaters.

In the foreground another man is leaning against the wall and keeps his foot on the skateboard. At this point we just want to draw attention to the fact that while both participants can be said to be ›waiting‹, the person sitting is not physically positioned to quickly take the next turn if the current ride were to end, while the other participant *is* showing such readiness. In fact, this is what he does:


| (a) 57:06.15 | (b) 57:09.30 | (c) 57:10.50 | (d) 57:11.40 | (e) 57:11.80 |

Figure 6. Pre-beginning and passage into current turn.

In Figure 6(a)[4] the person in the foreground (we will use shirt colour as designations and call him Black1) is pushing his back[5] (right) foot down on the tail of the skateboard, making it stand aslant. Furthermore, we can note that the extension of the skateboard is kept parallel to the lip of the pool, i.e., Black1 makes sure that he is ›out of the way‹ for the current rider›s enfolding turn (since the platform is so narrow in this pool). In Figure 6(b), the person in the pool has bailed and is now in the process of collecting his board. Black1 is lowering his own skateboard and turns it 90 degrees clockwise so that it points into the pool; a set of actions that do operate as a pre-beginning of a potentially next turn. Just as the previous rider comes out of the pool, Figure 6(c), Black1 pushes his back foot and skateboard forward so that the rear ›truck‹[6] passes the metal coping. Although from this position it is still possible to delay the actual start of, or even completely recede from, the next turn, such withdrawals are rare and the position functions as a clear display of the incipient next turn.

Between 6(c) and 6(d), Black1 moves his front foot on to the skateboard, shifts his balance from his back foot further forward, and starts to lean into the pool. In Figure 6(d) Black1 has passed the tipping point of where he could choose to turn back, or postpone the start. From here on he can only move forward. This point then, is where the turn passes from being an incipient next turn to current turn. Finally, in 6(e) Black1 executes the so-called ›drop-in‹ and rolls down into the pool, the most common way to start a turn.

In poolskate session there is thus a fairly clear demarcation between ›pre-beginnings‹ and ›beginnings‹: ›pre-beginnings‹ involve all those actions which indicate that a skater ›wants‹ to take a ride, but when the skaters has not in fact started to ride. In the next two sections we will take a closer look at the transition between rides, starting with cases in which there is only one party occupying the pool at a time and then moving on to situations where the next rider is starting while the previous rider is still in the pool.

Transitions without multiple pool occupants

Figure 7(a) shows the current rider, Black2, approaching the coping straight on at high speed. In 7(b) he flies up into the air and grabs the skateboard by the front tip (i.e. the ›nose‹). In 7(c) he has gained altitude and turns his body and board 180 degrees. The trick attempted here is called ›Lien to tail‹ and the aim is to land with the tail on to the platform, with the rest of the board on the inside of the pool, only to immediately ride down the transition again. The trick in progress does not develop according to plan and somewhere in the landing the attempt is aborted. The tail and the back foot do hit down on the platform as they should, but the front foot has been taken off the board. In 7(d) there is clear evidence that the current ride has ended and turned into a bail, and in 7(e) the rider is using his free hand to secure the board and works to recover his balance again.

| (a) 1:03:20.70 | (b) 1:03:21.20 | (c) 1:03:21.55 | (d) 1:03:21.90 | (e) 1:03:22.10 |

Figure 7. Turn ending in bail.

Figure 8 is the immediate continuation of the events in Figure 7. Black2 has regained his balance and is now in the business of exiting the pool 8(f)-(g). On the platform the skater White has been waiting and now, in 8(g), initiates an incipient next-turn in a very similar manner to Black1 in Figure 6, where he directs his skateboard towards the pool. In Figure 8(h), White pushes the skateboard forward and in 8(i) the truck is put in position, making him ready to start. Finally, in 8(j), White drops in.

Note that that in this instance, although White starts to gear up for the next turn while the previous rider is still in the pool

| (f) 1:03:22.70 | (g) 1:03:25.20 | (h) 1:03:26.40 | (i) 1:03:27.45 | (j) 1:03:28.40 |

Figure 8. Claiming next turn in response to bail.

—see 8(g)—White only starts riding after Black2 clears the pool *entirely*, which creates a small gap in pool occupancy. Frequently, however, there are also turn-transitions which feature short moments of multiple pool occupants. In the next two sequences we will focus on situations where two participants occupy the pool at the same time (although there is still only one party *riding* in the pool).

Transitions with multiple pool occupants

In the moments preceding Figure 9 the skater Black2 has lost his turn upon which the waiting skater Plaid has made an embodied display of his interest in the next turn slot. In Figure 9(a), Plaid is still waiting for the pool to be cleared. Three seconds later, in 9(b), he makes the move for the lip. Black2 is carrying his skateboard and is on the path for one of the pool corners. Plaid then sets the board in position and leans into the pool, all in one swift and continuous movement 9(c)-(e). This is done while Black2 is still in the pool. Given the timing of Plaid's beginning, and the two different trajectories, there is no risk of collision during the brief moment where they both occupy the pool. A somewhat more complicated case is illustrated in the next sequence.


| (a) 31:41.10 | (b) 31:43.90 | (c) 31:44.40 | (d) 31:44.85 | (e) 31:45.30 |

Figure 9. Multiple pool occupants.

| (a) 20:51.95 | (b) 20:53.10 | (c) 20:53.75 | (d) 20:54.30 | (e) 20:55.05 |

Figure 10. Coordination between pool occupants.

In Figure 10(a), Plaid's turn has ended in a bail and Plaid is picking up his board. At the same time, at the back of the room, White leans forward and rolls down into the pool, thereby initiating a next turn. The direction in which White is setting out will not make him intersect with Plaid immediately. The start is thus designed to create a short period where the exiting party can fulfil his ›duty‹ of clearing out.

  In 10(b) we can see the two parties simultaneously occupying the pool: White is already riding, while Plaid is still exiting the pool. Furthermore, just as White had taken into consideration the present position of the exiting party, now Plaid is monitoring the current rider's trajectory. While moving in the direction indicated by the lower white arrow, Plaid keeps his gaze trained on White's movements. This creates a bodily configuration of diverging orientations of upper and lower body segments, which fits with the notion of ›body torque‹ as described by Schegloff (1998). As Schegloff notes, such a position can »display orientations to several courses-of-action (ongoing or incipient) to which the person is oriented« (544). In this case we could say that it displays an orientation to what Plaid is doing (exiting the pool) and what White is doing (riding in the pool), except that what Plaid is doing is not necessarily separate from what White is doing. In other words, the torque rather works at securing the coordination of two concurrent courses of action—that is, the coordination of the exit with the current turn.

In this instance, what Plaid can anticipate is that his current exiting route may possibly intersect with White's enfolding ride, namely somewhere in the bottom right corner of the frames in Figure 10. As a consequence of his prospective analysis, in Figure 10(c) Plaid suddenly arrests his forward movement, reorients all of his lower body segments (those beneath the neck), and instead turns them towards the place where White is currently located. In 10(d), Plaid has started moving in the new direction and he is thereby exiting in a way that is unlikely to intersect with White's enfolding ride. As they pass by each other Plaid releases the gaze of White and continues to climb out of the pool looking straight ahead 10(e). White on the other hand, now passes the spot that had been occupied less than a second earlier. In this way, by monitoring the ride produced by White, Plaid is able to exit in a way that is responsive to the developing turn and thereby accomplishing his withdrawal from the pool in a responsible (safe) manner.

Above, we had noted the turn as a unit is *not* interactively determined, because non-current riders have no discernible influence on the ending of a turn. What we find here is that once a turn has ended in a bail, there is a coordination between previous rider (who is currently exiting the pool) and incipient next rider (who is starting the next ride): the incipient next rider takes into account *where* the previous rider is in the pool and anticipates the direction in which he or she may be existing; conversely, the exiting skater orients to what the incipient next rider is doing, possibly changing the direction of the exit.

Anticipating a bail

When discussing the construction of turns above, we mentioned that waiting skaters may analyse a trick in progress for its likelihood to fail, which is illustrated in the next fragment.

| (a) 23:16.45 | (b) 23:17.05 | (c) 23:17.50 | (d) 23:18.50 |

Figure 11. Anticipating a bail.

In Figure 11(a), the current rider, Black1, is approaching the coping; in 11(b) he is riding onto the coping in a so-called ›grind‹. This is a trick where a skater slides along the steel coping on his trucks rather than rolling on the wheels. In this instance, mid-way through the current rider grinding the corner of the pool, one of the waiting parties makes a move: in 11(b), the currently waiting skater Plaid turns his skateboard towards the pool, in effect gearing up for a possibly next turn.

  We take 11(b) as evidence for Plaid's analysis of the *possibility* of a bail (and therefore of a possible TRP). However, whether this possibility will materialize, is, at this point, unknown as the long grind is still progressing. More than one second later, in 11(d), the current rider continues to be in balance even though he is now slowing down. The grind is a balancing act and it is easier to maintain balance at high speeds (much comparable to riding a bike). As it turns out though, Black1 holds on to the grind for too long and loses his balance. In 11(e), instead of turning the skateboard back into the pool, the current rider jumps off. In other words, the current turn has ended in a bail, thereby rendering Plaid's prospective analysis correct. Plaid is already well positioned to gear up for the next turn, and in 11(f), only 0.35 seconds after the first signs of the bail-in-progress, Plaid begins to push the skateboard forward, executing a drop-in in 11(g)-(h).

So here we have a situation which mirrors some aspects of the turn-taking in conversation. The non-current rider is analysing what the current rider is doing. In this instance, the non-current rider sees in the current rider's attempted trick the possibility of a bail and therefore starts to gear up for an incipient next turn by reorienting his skateboard. Note, however, that in contrast to conversation the turn is not interactively determined. The non-current rider's gearing up does not influence what the current rider is doing (e.g., something resembling a ›rush-through‹). Whether or not turn-transition becomes relevant is determined only by current rider. If the attempted trick does not end in a bail, the current turn–in-progress will continue and the non-current rider will still have to ›wait his turn‹. This is illustrated in the next fragment.

(a) 53:11.20   (b) 53:01.35   (c) 53:01.80   (d) 53:02.00   (e) 53:02.25   (f) 53:02.80

Figure 12. Incorrect analysis.

Figure 12 shows a similar sequence to that in Figure 11. In 12(a), the skater Plaid is waiting for the possibility of a turn-transition. In 12(b), the current rider, White, is approaching one corner of the pool and initiates a trick (a fastplant) that, in 12(c), thrusts him up in the air. In 12(d), while White, the current rider, is still airborne, Plaid repositions his skateboard, effectively gearing up for a possible next turn. Again, we take Plaid's repositioning in 12(d) as an on-line analysis of the current turn, where, upon witnessing a difficult trick, an impending bail is projected. This time however, the current skater nails the trick in 12(e) and therefore is in a position to continue the turn. The outcome is met with cheering and applauds from all bystanders in 12(f). It also means that the progression of the incipient next turn is being stalled. White keeps riding for an additional six seconds and when he eventually bails Plaid takes the next turn.

Multiple pre-beginnings

So far we have considered the transition from a current rider to a next rider, thereby possibly suggesting that there are only two focal parties in the pool session. This has obviously been a simplification and we will now shift our attention to the fact that there are *multiple* waiting skaters, sometimes competing for a next turn.

  As mentioned above, a big difference to conversation is that in the poolskate session current rider cannot select next rider, so we only have self-selection. For conversation, ssj remark that in cases of self-selection, »first starter acquires rights to a turn« (704). For cases where we do have multiple self-selections, this means that the person who started to speak *first* gets the turn. As a consequence of this, we do not typically have several people starting to speak in close succession and the person who started to speak first gets to continue, but, rather, it is typically the case that only one person starts to speak, since, as Schegloff (2000: 44) puts it, »other ›intending‹ self-selectors would withhold talk because they were not the first. The first self-selector would, therefore, ordinarily be the *only* one.« (emphasis in original). This creates a pressure for early starts, given that in the case of multiple self-selectors, the first one to start is getting the rights to that turn slot.

  In our material, although there are only techniques for self-selection, and hence a pressure for early starts, we have zero instances of overlapping starts. There are two related reasons for this: once started, a turn–at–riding is much more difficult to abort than a turn–at–talk. Furthermore, the situation of two skaters riding simultaneously in the pool is dangerous and likely to lead to collisions. Consequently, skaters in the pool session work very hard not to start at the same time.

  Although we do not have overlapping starts in the poolskate session, we frequently have multiple skaters initiating a ›pre-beginning‹, i.e., gearing up for a start. In the next sequence we return to the ›anticipated bail‹ analysed in Figure 11. Previously, the analysis had focussed on only two participants: the current rider, Black1, and one waiting skater, Plaid. However, there is

26

another waiting skater, Black3, who produces a relevant action during this transition space. Figure 13 follows on from Figure 11, in fact slightly overlaps with it: Figure 11(f) occurs at the same moment as Figure 13(a), that is, at the time 23:19.10.


Figure 13. *Multiple pre-beginnings.*

In Figure 13(a), following Black1's bail, Plaid begins to push his skateboard forward. In 13(b), less than a second later, Black3 also begins to push his skateboard forward. In 13(c), Plaid initiates a start by putting both feet on the skateboard and leaning his body forward, while Black3 slows down his forward-movement. In 13(d), Plaid executes a drop-in, while Black3 looks at Black1 who is directly in front of him and therefore blocking his start. In 13(e), Black3 registers the start of Plaid's turn, which can be both heard and seen; Black3 shifts his gaze towards Plaid as he withdraws his body and board from the lip.

In this segment, we have two skaters gearing up for a next turn. However, they do not do this simultaneously: Plaid starts gearing up slightly before Black. Furthermore, in this instance, one of the waiting skaters (Black3) is blocked by the previous rider who is still in the pool. At the point where Black3 could set up to start, in between (d) and (e), the other previously waiting skater (Plaid) has already started, which is now noticed by Black3 who consequently abandons his initiation of a start.

Although we do not have two starters in this segment, we do have two skaters initiating a ›pre-beginning‹ and, as it develops, a very similar situation to the ›first starter goes‹ in conversation. Of course, in conversation there are occasionally simultaneous starts. And in the case of two simultaneous ›firsts‹, who gets the turn? According to Schegloff (2000) the original model by ssj did not detail the resolution for this problem and he fills this gap by describing an ›overlap resolution device‹, which although it »does not specify who the ›winner‹ is (as in ›first starter‹); it provides a procedure for arriving at a solution – a procedure for the parties to arrive at a resolution« (44-45). Figure 14 shows an instance where two waiting skaters begin to gear up simultaneously.

Figure 14. Concurrent pre-beginnings.

Preceding Figure 14 the two skaters, White and Black2, have both been waiting for a next turn. The current turn-holder loses his balance and steps off the board. This results in the skateboard flying out of the pool and the now previous rider exits by chasing after the skateboard, which can be seen in Figure 14(a). In 14(b), as the previous occupant leaves the pool, both White and Black2 initiate the move of pushing their respective skateboards towards the lip. Two possibly-next riders, emerging simultaneously, are thus witnessable. In 14(c), White

is keeping his gaze straight ahead and (presumably) into the pool and continues forward, while Black2 lifts his gaze and turns his head slightly to the left (the location of White). As his head goes up even further we may presume he observes the displayed pre-beginning of White's turn, which is evidenced by Black2 quickly withdrawing his back foot and skateboard. In 14(d), Black2 further withdraws his skateboard, while White shows no signs of orienting to Black2 but instead continues his forward motion and starts a new turn.

In this episode, we have two skaters simultaneously gearing up, with one skater eventually withdrawing. So although there are no overlaps in ›starting‹ in the poolskate session, there are concurrent actions in what Schegloff (2000: 15) calls the ›pre-onset phase‹ of an overlap, i.e., the phase *before* any actual overlap occurs. Schegloff focuses on how current speakers may detect that a non-current speaker is gearing up for a turn and may, as a consequence, employ practices otherwise used for dealing with overlapping talk in order to interdict the possibility of overlap. However, as we have already remarked, in the poolskate session, what non-current riders are doing has no influence on what current riders are doing.

Nevertheless, the notion of ›pre-onset phase‹ is still useful in considering what two non-current riders are doing (in order to avoid overlap in starting). Here, Mondada (2007) provides a nice extension of Schegloff (2000), focussing explicitly on the bodily actions of non-current speakers during pre-beginning. As already discussed in the introduction, Mondada details a case where two non-current speakers are trying to self-select at the same moment (2007: 208-210). She remarks that publicly displayed pointings are »practices for projecting imminent speakership [which] are not only seen but oriented to and exploited by others, who can consequently adjust and modify their conduct« (210). In a very similar fashion, parties in the poolskate session may detect, either from body behavioural displays or from other turn-pre-beginning practices, that another is gearing up to start a turn. Upon such detection, of the pre-beginning of another, a possibly-next turn may thus be terminated before the actual onset of an overlap has occurred.

There is one noteworthy difference to the situation descri-
bed by Mondada (2007), where all participants were focus-
sed on a *map* in front of them. Such a single, and relatively
small, focus of visual attention—what Watson (2005: 212) calls
a ›proper object of attention‹—means that it is quite likely that
everyone can see the bodily actions (such as pointing gestures)
involved in pre-beginnings. In the poolskate session, in con-
trast, skaters are distributed across a relatively big area and so
may, especially if they choose to, not see what other skaters are
currently doing. One practice that parties may be employing
is what we might term ›displayed dis-attention‹, i.e., a skater
who is gearing up could deliberately avoid to check whether
other skaters are gearing up as well, with the aim to maximi-
se the chances for a next turn. Regardless of this possibility,
episodes of concurrent pre-beginnings followed by one party
withdrawing, all within the pre-onset phase, occur regularly.
In our materials we saw this happening in more than one out
of four turn transitions. Still, we haven't been able to find any
priority rules that regulate who goes and who withdraws on
these occasions, something that we will explore in future work.
What we do know is that withdrawing parties typically go *se-
cond-next* (which, in a certain sense, resembles the situation in
conversation; cf. Drew, 2009: 74-75). In other words, when two
skaters are gearing up simultaneously, one skater will get the
next turn, while the other skater will get the second-next turn.
The resolution carried out in the pre-onset phase thus seems
to settle the local ordering for the second-next turn as well.

DISCUSSION

With the introduction of a seemingly marginal case like
turn-taking in pool skateboarding we have tried to shed some
new light on well-known phenomena and concepts regular-
ly deployed in the study of conversation. In this respect, we
believe that the analysis has made two contributions: (a) to
the study of turn-taking systems at large, i.e. the sociology of
turn-organized activities (ssj: 696) and (b) to the issue of how
bodily actions can accomplish pre-beginnings.

The sociology of turn-organized activities

By going back to the foundational framework of conversation analysis and applying it to a non-talk-based form of social organization, we have been led to a re-examination of the turn-taking system for conversation, since a number of central features of that system turn out not to be present in poolskate sessions.

First, turn-endings are not projectable. In conversation, there are various resources (including grammar, intonation and pragmatics) that allow participants to project the end of turn-constructional units. In contrast, in poolskate sessions waiting skaters cannot ordinarily project when the current ride will come to an end. As we have tried to show, there is a minor exception to this: most turns end not through ›clean exits‹ of current riders, but through bails; since bails cluster around tricks, waiting riders looking to self-select for a next turn, can analyse the trick in progress for its likelihood to fail. However, such work is by no means omnipresent, i.e., waiting riders are not continuously monitoring the current rider's turn in progress on the lookout for possible bails; furthermore, the analysis of waiting riders is completely dependent on what the current rider is doing, since it is ultimately the current rider's ability to eventually land the trick or not that renders the waiting riders guesswork ›correct‹ (as in Figure 11) or ›incorrect‹ (as in Figure 12). This brings us to the next important difference:

Second, turns in poolskating are not interactively determined. What waiting riders are doing (e.g., gearing up for a turn) does *not* influence what the current rider is doing. The end of a turn is only determined by current rider (either through a clean exit or through a bail). The perhaps central reason for this is that an interactive determination of turn size opens the possibility of overlap (when, for example, at a turn-transition relevant point, a current-speaker continues the turn and another participant self-selects). While in conversation such overlaps are ›harmless‹ and easily resolved (speakers can quickly ›drop out‹ and stop speaking), in the poolskate session overlaps could be dangerous and would be less easily resolved:

two skaters riding in the pool simultaneously may result in a crash; furthermore, a ride-in-progress cannot be abandoned as promptly as a turn-at-talk. Returning to our first point: although waiting riders can try to analyse the current rider's turn for moments when bails are likely to occur (which might be the equivalent of TRPs in conversation), they always wait for what the current rider is doing (rather than starting to ride and then abandoning it if the current rider actually ›lands‹ the trick). Of course, there is nothing physically that restricts simultaneous starts or overlapping rides. Consequently, the non-interactive determination of turns in the poolskate session is an interactional achievement and a normative feature in the organization of riding-in-the-pool.

  Third, there is typically no connection between turns in poolskate sessions. That is to say, turns do not address their relation to prior or succeeding turns (cf., SSJ: 722; Schegloff, 2007: 1): what a current rider is doing is normally not influenced by what previous riders have done and does not influence what subsequent riders will be doing. Consequently, there are typically no *sequences* of turns in poolskate sessions. There are other forms of skateboarding, which clearly display features of a *series*. For example, Beal (1995: 263) reports the following game:

> Different groups of skaters created different games, but all in-corporated some form of risk-taking challenges. Variations of follow the leader were common. Generally, a skater led a line of others through various tricks and obstacles; when the leading made a mistake (couldn't ›land‹ a trick), then he or she went to the back of the line and the next person was the new leader.

In Beal's instance, we are clearly dealing with a series of turns, since every skater is trying to do the ›same‹ trick. For the poolskate session, we would say that although turns are following each other, they are only a series in a very weak sense, in that they all belong to the same session (a group of skaters meeting up in order to skate together).

Bodily actions as pre-beginnings

With regard to how bodily actions can accomplish pre-beginnings, Mondada (2007: 197) argues that »multimodal actions play a crucial role« in »the interactive organization, identification and exploitation of ›pre-beginnings‹« and that they can be used as a method for projecting self-selection. Her case pertains to actions of pointing in one particular context, but by drawing on her work, we believe some additional arguments can be made in relation to our case.

First, in poolskate sessions pre-beginning are done with the body and so are *visible and observable*. In conversation, a recipient observably gearing up may lead the current speaker to modify the turn in progress, e.g., »speaker may take measures to override a projected imminent possible completion« (Schegloff, 1996: 97-98). Similarly, Mondada (2007: 208) noted that some gestural pre-beginnings were treated as having an ›interruptive‹ potential: »even if gestures can be produced simultaneously with talk without overlapping it, pointing gestures as practices for claiming speakership and for imposing self-selection are oriented to as exhibiting concurrent practices of turn taking«. In poolskate sessions, pre-beginnings involve having to move from a waiting position into a starting position (typically at the lip) and so are always observable. Nevertheless, they are not turn-incursive. Since turns are not interactively determined, what waiting parties are doing does not influence what the current rider is doing. In fact, waiting participants actively worked at doing pre-beginnings in such a way that they would not interfere with the current ride.

Second, there is an increased interactional importance of pre-beginnings in this setting. In order to accommodate the latent hazard of simultaneous starts, parties to the poolskate session exploit the space of the pre-onset phase as *the* place to settle the matter of turn-allocation. One of the initial questions posed by ssj was in what ways turn-taking systems could be seen as adapting to the properties of the activities in which they operate (696). In response to this query, we believe that

this feature of poolskating could be regarded as such an adaptation. Instead of producing overlaps in turns, the potential problem is managed by identifying and resolving impending overlaps already in turns' pre-beginnings.

Finally, taken together the properties described above amount to a certain difficulty experienced by newcomers to the poolskate session; i.e., the question of where to pay attention. On the one hand, turn endings are determined by, and found with, current riders. At the same time, possibly next riders are only found among waiting parties. Concurrent bodily actions relevantly figuring in the organization of turn-taking can thus be spread across a fairly wide space. In the studies of pointings (Mondada, 2007) and the manipulation of objects (Day & Wagner, 2014) all participants shared a limited work space as a centre of mutual attention. This increases the likelihood that the bodily actions of non-current speakers are *seen* by speakers and other participants, since there is »sustained focus of collective attention« (Mondada, 2007: 198), in contrast to settings where such mutual attention has to be constantly achieved. In the poolskate sessions, actions take place in a much larger space. Consequently, what non-current riders are doing is not necessarily seen by other participants. However, pre-beginnings will only work to solve the allocation problem as long as they are seen. And if parties to the session cannot rely on always having the attention to others, this condition can be reversed and exploited. For example, an incipient rider can ›avoid‹ showing recognition of the pre-beginnings of other and thereby ›take‹ the next turn.

Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson finish their paper with a section on the »place of conversation among the speech-exchange systems« (729), but do not discuss the place of conversation among the turn-taking systems. By providing a study of a non-speech turn-taking system, we have taken the first steps for allowing such a discussion to take place.

REFERENCES

Arnold, L. (2012). Dialogic embodied action: Using gesture to organize sequence and participation in instructional interaction. *Research on language and social interaction*, 45(3), 269-296.

Atkinson, J. M., & Drew, P. (1979). *Order in court: The organisation of verbal interaction in judicial settings*. London: Macmillan.

Beal, B. (1995). Disqualifying the official: An exploration of social resistance through the subculture of skateboarding. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 12, 252-267.

Beal, B. (2013). *Skateboarding. The ultimate guide*. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press.

Beal, B., & Weidman, L. (2003). Authenticity in the skateboarding world. In R. E. Rinehart & S. Sydnor (Eds.), *To the extreme. Alternative sports, inside and out*. (pp. 337-352). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Borden, I. (2001). *Skateboarding, space and the city. Architecture and the body*. Oxford: Berg.

Brooke, M. (1999). *The concrete wave. The history of skateboarding*. Los Angeles: Warwick.

Bäckström, Å. (2005). *Spår. Om brädsportkultur, informella lärprocesser och identitet* [*Traces. On board sports culture, informal learning processes and identity*]. Stockholm: HLS Förlag.

Clayman, S. (2013). Turn-constructional units and the transition-relevnce place. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.), *The handbook of conversation analysis* (pp. 150-166). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Clayman, S., & Heritage, J. (2002). *The news interview: journalists and public figures on the air* (Vol. 16). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Day, D., & Wagner, J. (2014). Objects as tools for talk. In M. Neville, P. Haddington, T. Heinemann, & M. Rauniomaa (Eds.), *Interacting with objects. Language, materiality and social activity* (pp. 101-124). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Drew, P. (2009). "Quit talking while I'm interrupting": A comparison between positions of overlap onset in conversation. In M. Haakana, M. Laakso, & J. Lindström (Eds.), *Talk in interaction: Comparative dimensions* (pp. 70-93). Helsinki: Finnish

Literature Society.

Drew, P., & Heritage, J. (Eds.). (1992). *Talk at work*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dumas, A., & Laforest, S. (2008). Intergenerational conflict. What can skateboarding tell us about the struggles for legitimacy in the field of sports? Retrieved from idrottsforum.org website: http://www.idrottsforum.org/articles/dumas-laforest/dumas-laforest080409.html

Ford, C., Fox, B., & Thompson, S. (1996). Practices in the construction of turns: The "TCU" revisited. *Pragmatics*, 6(3), 427-454.

Garfinkel, H., & Livingston, E. (2003). Phenomenal field properties of order in formatted queues and their neglected standing in the current situation of inquiry. *Visual Studies*, 18(1), 21-28.

Goodwin, C. (1981). *Conversational organization: interaction between speakers and hearers*. New York: Academic Press.

Goodwin, C., & Goodwin, M. H. (1987). Concurrent operations on talk: Notes on the interactive organization of assessments. *IPRA papers in pragmatics*, 1(1), 1-54.

Haddington, P. (2010). Turn-taking for turntaking. Mobility, time, and action in the sequential organization of junction negotiations in cars. *Research on Language & Social Interaction*, 43(4), 372-400.

Hayashi, M. (2013). Turn allocation and turn sharing. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.), *The handbook of conversation analysis* (pp. 167-190). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Heritage, J. (1985). Analyzing news interviews: Aspects of the production of talk for an overhearing audience. In T. van Dijk (Ed.), *Handbook of discourse analysis. Dimensions of discourse* (Vol. 3, pp. 95-117). New York: Academic Press.

Jefferson, G. (1984). Notes on some orderlinesses of overlap onset. In V. D'Urso & P. Leonardi (Eds.), *Discourse analysis and natural rhetoric* (pp. 11-38). Papua: Cleup Editore.

Karsten, L., & Pel, E. (2000). Skateboarders exploring urban public space: Ollies, obstacles and conflicts. *Journal of Housing and the built environment*, 15, 327-340.

Laurier, E. (2013). Before, in and after: Cars making their way through roundabouts. In P. Haddington, L. Mondada, & M. Neville (Eds.), *Interaction and mobility: Language and the body in motion* (pp. 210-242). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Lee, J. R. E., & Watson, D. R. (1993). Final report to the Plan Urbain: Public space as an interactional order. University of Manchester: Department of Sociology.

Lerner, G. H. (2002). Turn-sharing. The choral co-production of talk-in-interaction. In C. Ford, B. Fox, & S. Thompson (Eds.), *The language of turn and sequence* (pp. 225-256). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Livingston, E. (1987). *Making sense of ethnomethodology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Ma, J. Y., & Munter, C. (2014). The spatial production of learning opportunities in skateboard parks. *Mind, Culture, and Activity*, 21(3), 238-258.

Mondada, L. (2007). Multimodal resources for turn-taking: pointing and the emergence of possible next speakers. *Discourse Studies*, 9(2), 194-225.

Norén, N., & Linell, P. (2013). Pivot constructions as everyday conversational phenomena within a cross-linguistic perspective: An introduction. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 54(0), 1-15.

Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. *Language*, 50(4), 696-735.

Schegloff, E. A. (1982). Discourse as an interactional achievment: Some uses of 'uh huh' and other things that come between sentences. In D. Tannen (Ed.), *Georgetown University roundtable on languages and linguistics* (pp. 71-93). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Schegloff, E. A. (1984). On some gestures' relation to talk. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis* (pp. 266-295). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Schegloff, E. A. (1996). Turn organization. One intersection of grammar and action. In E. Ochs, E. A. Schegloff, & S. A. Thompson (Eds.), *Interaction and grammar* (Vol. Cambridge,

pp. 52-133): Cambridge University Press.

Schegloff, E. A. (1998). Body torque. *Social Research*, 65(3), 535-596.

Schegloff, E. A. (2000). Overlapping talk and the organization of turn-taking for conversation. *Language in Society*, 29(1), 1-63.

Schegloff, E. A. (2007). *Sequence organization in interaction. A primer in conversation analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schegloff, E. A., & Sacks, H. (1973). Opening up closings. *Semiotica*, 8(4), 289-327.

Streeck, J. (2009). Forward-Gesturing. *Discourse Processes*, 46(2-3), 161-179.

Streeck, J., & Hartge, U. (1992). Previews: Gestures at the transition place. In P. Auer & A. Di Luzio (Eds.), *The contextualization of language* (pp. 135-158). Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Wacquant, L. (2004). *Body & soul. Notebooks of an apprentice boxer.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Walker, G. (2007). On the design and use of pivots in everyday English conversation. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 39(12), 2217-2243.

Watson, R. (2005). The visibility arrangements of public space: Conceptual resources and methodological issues in analysing pedestrian movements. *Communication & Cognition*, 38(1 & 2), 201-227.