

**Where do EU missions come from?  
A Discursive and Institutionalist Analysis of the  
European Union's Engagement in the Horn of Africa**

by

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## **Abstract**

The European Union (EU) deployed its first police mission in 2003. Since then, the EU has deployed thirty-four missions around the world. Considering the great financial burden to the EU budget and the budget of contributing Member States (MS), as well as the fact that the realm of defence is one of the most overdue areas of the European integration project, this thesis asks the general but multifaceted question of where EU missions come from. To address this question the thesis explores the historic origins of EU missions, conceptualises them in view of the conceptual and theoretical developments in the literature and policy practice, and develops a model for the analysis of the decision-making process behind the deployment of EU missions. The model is tested on three case studies, namely the three EU missions deployed in the Horn of Africa – European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta, European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia and European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Nestor.

The findings of the analysis reveal a gradual evolution of EU crisis management after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service. The analysis indicates that EUNAVFOR Atalanta was primarily deployed due to French impetus at the level of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), but also due to a convincing call of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to the international community to act against the significant increase of piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden in 2008. The EUTM Somalia mission was primarily deployed due to a convincing strategy from the strategic planners at the EEAS, as well as the commitment of the United States (US) to a partnership with the EU to train recruits of the Somali Security Forces (SSF). Finally, the analysis of the third case study reveals even greater impact from the strategic planners at the EEAS and the acceptance at all levels of the EU's Comprehensive Approach to crisis management, and in particular due to the influential Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa document. The overall interpretation of the findings conclude that the foreign policy of the EU is a moving target, constantly changing, as is exemplified by both the historic overview and the analysis of the three case studies, and that the analysts of EU foreign policy must remain open to these changes when choosing modes of studying EU foreign policy.

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## List of Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGPCS	Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CIMIC	Civilian Military Cooperation
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CPCC	Civil Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CTF	Combined Task Force
EDA	European Defence Agency
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUCAP NESTOR	European Union Capacity Building Mission NESTOR
EU Civ/Mil	European Union Civilian & Military Cell
EU NAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EU SG/HR	Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union/High Representative Common Foreign and Security Policy

EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
LL	Lessons Learned
HoA	Horn of Africa
PSC	Political and Security Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OPLAN	Operations Plan
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WEU	Western European Union
WFP	World Food Program

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# Chapter 1. Introduction

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## 1.1. 'Explaining' EU missions

The European Union (EU) deployed its first mission, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003. Since then, the EU has deployed thirty-four missions around the world to date<sup>1</sup>. The amassed budget of the seventeen ongoing missions funded by the ATHENA financial mechanism, which covers common costs of EU missions, is estimated to just under 350 million Euros<sup>2</sup> in addition to the individual financial contributions of participating member states to the respective missions. The intensification of EU military and civilian missions after the Lisbon Treaty (three of which will be covered in detail in the empirical part of this thesis) counter-intuitively coincided with the greater economic context of the global financial crisis and the Euro-crisis in the EU. While the narrative of economic austerity dominated both the public and policy discourse in both global and European politics, expenditures on EU missions increased during this period. If the noticeable cost of the EU's engagement in the world alone is not sufficiently puzzling, one may also consider that a common defence policy is one of the more overdue areas of the EU's integration process. The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in practice still relies on contributions from either NATO, as was mostly the case in the past, or on contributions from EU member states participating in a given CSDP mission. In spite of the financial costs and capability difficulties, the EU still decided to deploy the missions mentioned above.

Deploying costly missions in spite of the dependence on NATO resources and member states contribution, in spite of a general context of financial crisis and economic austerity indicates that the decisions to deploy were not primarily governed by economic, rational choice reasoning. The decisions of the EU to deploy missions therefore require a more ideational exploration of what governs an international organisation like the EU to deploy resources and engage in a distant part of the world. This thesis thus asks the general question of where EU missions come from, i.e. why does the EU deploy missions. A simple

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'mission' refers to a civilian engagement abroad. A term that may also appear throughout the thesis is the term 'operation', which implies a military engagement abroad. However, certain EU engagements are hybrid in nature, containing both civilian and military components. To avoid confusion when addressing the overall EU CSDP engagement, the thesis will operate with the term 'mission'.

<sup>2</sup> The estimation was made by adding the current operational budgets of the missions. A table of ongoing missions with basic data, including their respective budgets, can be found at <http://isis-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CSDP-Overview-October-2014.pdf> [last accessed, 20.03.2015]

question does not necessarily warrant a simple answer, and in the case of EU foreign policy the answer is anything but simple. The question of where EU mission come from begs further questions and clarifications, which this thesis aims to address. These sub-questions include:

- What is the historic origin of EU missions?
- How does one conceptualise EU missions?
- At what level are EU missions developed?
- How does one study the decision making process behind EU mission deployments?

There have been numerous studies on EU foreign policy including its defence component. A comprehensive survey of these studies neither fits the scope nor the spatial and temporal limitations of this thesis. A general overview of the literature however demonstrates an increase of studies on EU's security and defence policy after the 2000s, which coincides with the actual development of the policy in practice. Unsurprisingly, as the policy evolved, the study of the policy evolved with it. Before the 2000s studies on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were overly sceptical of EU defence integration. Some of the reasons included the intergovernmental nature of EU's second pillar and the area of CFSP, in which the member states would be unwilling to transfer their sovereignty in this field to a supranational level (Moravcsik, 1998), the lack of capability for a defence policy that can follow the institutional and political expectation, which is commonly referred to as 'the capability-expectation gap' (Hill, 1998), and the relationship with NATO and the avoidance of capability duplication (Missiroli, 2002; Howorth and Keeler, 2003).

In spite of these obstacles, the EU has over time developed strategies, concepts and instruments in order to overcome some of the obstacles above. Ranging from the NATO's Washington Summit in 1999, the conclusions of the Nice European Council in December 2000, to the EU-NATO joint declaration and the Berlin Plus Agreements in 2002, the EU has developed its formal cooperation with NATO. The capability-expectation gap has also been addressed by these agreements, as the EU has gained access to NATO assets and capabilities. Further developments in the development of EU capabilities include the development of the concept of EU Battlegroups, which became operational in 2007, as well as the increasing number of strategies and concepts that emphasise the effective use of EU resources and instruments. The implementation of these developments was left to EU agencies and committees, which led to the bureaucratisation of EU's security and defence policy (Vanhoonacker, et al., 2010, Bickerton, 2011a).

With the gradual shift during the 2000s of occasional major events at the level of the European Council to the increased activity at the institutions under the Council of Ministers, most notably the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU's foreign policy became a highly institutionalised policy, which went beyond high-level, intergovernmental decision-making between member states (Howorth, 2004, 2011). The changing nature of EU foreign policy also reflected on the changing nature of the study of EU foreign policy, including its defence component. Studies on EU foreign policy became increasingly absorbed by the intricate changes in the way EU foreign policy developed, and less focused on the broader logic and trajectory of EU integration in general and integration in security and defence matters in particular (Wallace, et al., 2005). The changing nature of EU studies should not be overly criticised however, since the focus on mezzo- and micro-level developments yielded valuable insights to the functioning of the EU, but more importantly, raised new questions. The increase in new questions and foci of analysis called for multi-disciplinarity, new and alternative approaches and theories (Wilga and Karolewski, 2014), and overall enriched the field of EU studies and the analysis of EU foreign policy. This thesis answers this call and revisits the lingering question of where EU missions come from by providing an alternative answer and an alternative approach to answering this question.

The question that arises is 'alternative to what?' Due to the aforementioned changing nature of the field of EU studies and blooming literature on EU foreign policy, it became increasingly difficult to determine which approaches fall under the category of 'mainstream' and which approaches are 'alternative'. For example, Wallace et al. in their 2005 edition of their influential book "look at the variety of approaches, drawing on diverse theoretical traditions [...] in order to 'mainstream' the study of the EU" (p. 4). The book also lists 'new' institutionalisms and constructivism as theories of European integration, which a decade earlier would not be considered mainstream. Another example is discourse analysis, which due to its conceptual diversity and abstract post-structuralist roots was considered an alternative approach, but has developed an increasing presence in the study of the EU and EU foreign policy (Carta and Morin, 2013; Diez, 2013; Nitoiu and Tomic, 2014). These approaches either attempt to understand EU integration and treat the EU as a dependant variable, or attempt to understand the way the EU influences its member states, its role in global politics and impact on third states, treating the EU as an independent variable (Jachtenfuchs, 1998).

However rich the 'mainstream' of EU studies has become on a conceptual level, empirical studies of EU foreign policy decisions, in particular related to the deployment of

EU missions still remain predominantly tied to the focus on material factors, rational choice, and the focus on nation states and national interests. Furthermore, comparable to the great volume of literature on EU missions on the one hand, and on EU policy-making on the other hand, there are relatively few studies that aim to ‘explain’ EU foreign policy decisions, in the classical foreign policy analysis (FPA) tradition. While the literature and empirical studies examine the logic behind EU foreign policy and in particular its defence component, “there is hardly any systematic, theory-driven examination of what the EU has actually done, i.e. the operations undertaken” (Pohl, 2014, p. 3).

One of the possible reasons why this is the case is the complexity of EU foreign policy and its multi-level system of governance. Accordingly, the answer to where CSDP missions come from mainly depends on the level of analysis. If the level of analysis is at the level of nation states, the answer would revolve around the interest of one or more member states and their ability to influence the EU foreign policy decision making process. If the level of analysis is at a higher, international level, the answer would revolve around the relations of the EU with other international organisations, regional actors or individual nation states, and the EU’s interest in these partnerships. If the level of analysis is at a sub-state level, the answer would stem from a rational-choice version of bureaucratic politics and would revolve around notions of turf-wars, institutional politics and interest. This thesis argues that to fully understand a foreign policy decision, researchers should analyse multiple dimensions of the foreign policy process and interpret the combined findings of the analysis in order to reach a more complete understanding of why EU missions are deployed.

Another possible reason for the lack of FPA-style empirical studies is the fact that the EU is traditionally not understood as a nation state or federal state, like the US for example, and does not possess a foreign policy in a classical sense. To circumvent this problem, existing studies that aim to ‘explain’ EU missions focus on the foreign policies of EU member states (Pohl, 2014; Germond and Smith, 2009), which confirms the argument in the previous paragraph. This thesis addresses this issue by treating the EU’s deployments of missions abroad as foreign policy decisions. Accordingly, the thesis treats the EU as an autonomous global actor capable of possessing its own foreign policy. For the sake of clarity, one needs to distinguish between frequently interchangeable terms of EU foreign policy on the one side and terms like European foreign policy, EU external relations, EU MS foreign policy and, since the Lisbon Treaty, EU external action. The term ‘European foreign policy’ for example is vague and can relate to the CFSP/CSDP, or foreign policies of individual or groups of member states, as well as the EU’s external relations. The understanding of EU

foreign policy in this thesis will be closest to what in light of the Lisbon Treaty is labelled as external action. This understanding of EU foreign policy posits the EU as the main actor, with a legal personality and ‘actorness’ (Larsen, 2002) on a global level. What the thesis will refer to as the defence component of EU foreign policy is closest to what the current institutional setup labels as EU crisis management.

In order to ‘explain’ foreign policy it is not enough to just regard the EU as a foreign policy actor. The EU is not a unitary actor, like a nation state, which IR scholars and foreign policy analysts prefer to operate with. The EU is a complex actor with its unique organisational setup, ranging across national levels and the supranational level. To have a better understanding of EU’s foreign policy one needs to take into account this complexity. Mapping the complex network of actors involved in the policy making process is not an impossible task, but is certainly a deterrent of potential research interested in ‘explaining’ EU foreign policy decisions.

## **1.2. Theoretical framework**

European Union studies have mostly borrowed theoretical concepts and frameworks from the discipline of international relations. While rational choice and material factors inevitably play a great role in explaining policy outcomes, ideas, discourse and institutional analysis have shown considerable explanatory value (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Blyth, 2002; Howorth, 2004; Schmidt, 2008, 2010). The thesis proposes an eclectic approach to studying EU foreign policy decisions. Such an approach originates from the necessity of bridging the existing divide between positivism and constructivism, and between rationalist and ideational explanations of outcomes, especially in institutionalist approaches.

EU foreign policy analyses as envisaged by this thesis can therefore benefit from both recent trends in IR theory and institutionalist approaches. The constructivist turn in international relations (Checkel, 1998) offers a good starting point for theory building. Discourse theory, a relative of constructivism, can explain how meanings are constructed through the use of language, which is both a means and a product of social interaction. Discourses are linked with actors’ perceptions and representations of reality, and consequently with their preferences of action. Discourses through action become institutionalized and are reproduced in a given institutional context.

In particular, Teun van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis (2008) and Vivien Schmidt's discursive institutionalism (2008, 2010) provide for fruitful building blocks of a model of EU foreign policy analysis. A socio-cognitive approach is necessary to understand the impact of discourses on the construction of meaning and consequently on the cognitive processing of these meanings at an individual and collective level. A discursive institutionalist perspective has great potential for shedding new light on the way discourses persist or are changed within institutions and how they affect institutional change. For a more detailed discussion on these two theoretical approaches, see Chapter 4 of this thesis.

Based on these two theoretical frameworks, this thesis proposes a cognitive and discursive institutionalist model for the analysis of EU foreign policy. Such a model allows for better insight into the role of actors and their individual contributions to the policy-making process by tracing the process of knowledge and meaning construction through the different levels of understanding and information processing. Following the argument above that to 'explain' EU foreign policy one should focus on multiple levels of analysis, the model proposed in this thesis includes an international, an organisational and a cognitive dimension of decision-making, which the empirical studies of the chapter will explore. The theoretical foundations of the model provide for a complex system of structure-agency loops in each of these dimensions (See Chapter 4).

### **1.3. Methodology**

The theoretical contribution of this thesis is the development of the theoretical and analytical model of EU foreign policy analysis. The empirical contribution of this thesis consists of probing the aforementioned model by applying it to three case studies of the three EU missions in the Horn of Africa. The empirical research follows the logic of 'the method of structured, focused comparison', which suggests that the thesis should ask "general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible" (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 67).

The selection of the three case studies is directly linked to the nature of the data necessary for the study (see below). The reliance on interviews required a recent case study, in order to assure the interview data is fresh, but also to assure access to interviewees in Brussels, since due to the frequent rotations of positions within EU institutions, actors



involved in more dated case studies were hard to reach (and some of them even passed away!). The additional reliance of the research on documentary evidence required case studies that are not too recent, since, in the case of EU foreign policy, and crisis management in particular, the documents are classified and are made available to the public only after a certain period of time. The selection of the three case studies of EU's missions in the Horn of Africa was therefore a trade-off between those two conditions.

In terms of data collection, the research relied on the use of secondary data in the form of academic literature and news articles, as well as on the analysis of primary data in the form of official documents and elite interviews. In terms of documentary evidence, as aforementioned, key documents of EU missions are classified and the majority of the key conceptual and strategic documents related to the three missions were unavailable. However, general documents on the history, general crisis management procedures, concepts and strategies were available.

The elite interviews were conducted in a semi-structured form. During semi-structured interviews “questions are typically asked of each interviewee in a systematic and consistent order, but the interviewers are allowed freedom to digress [and] probe far beyond the answers to their prepared and standardized questions” (Berg, 2001, p. 70) The semi-structured interviews asked broad questions about the origins of the missions, the initiators of the discussions, the ‘pushers’ and ‘blockers’ in the debates and the external triggers that contributed to the deployment of the missions. The interviewees were also asked about the process of decision-making, from the first appearance of the idea to deploy the missions, through agenda-setting, discussions, planning and finally approval of the mandates. In the cases of EUTM Somalia, the questions also focused on the decision to extend and refocus the mandate, since the new mandates of EUTM Somalia have undergone noticeable changes compared to the initial mandate. Finally, the interviewees were also asked to reflect on how they see their role (or the role of their representation) in the decision-making process.

The interview data differed based on whether the interviewees belonged to the political level or the military/strategic level of policy-making. The interviewees at the political level answered the questions broadly, with hesitation and secrecy in general terms, similar to giving a statement to the press. This required special attention on behalf of the interviewer, in order to extract more detailed and valuable data from the interviewee. The interviewees at the strategic level were more open to reflecting on the crisis management process and their identity rather on the political debates surrounding the respective missions.

In terms of data analysis, the evidence for analysis was extracted from the triangulation of the secondary data, the official documents and the elite interviews. The research relied on narrative analysis and process-tracing. A narrative is understood “as a spoken or written text giving an account of an event/action or series of events/actions” (Czarniawska, 2004, p. 17). The broad application of narrative analysis allows it to be used on both individual reflections and broader organisational narratives (Creswell, 2007, p. 55), both of which represent a subjective or intersubjective representation of reality by the respective agents. This type of analysis was useful to put the chronology of events into perspective of the theoretical assumptions of the model. In addition to narrative analysis, process-tracing was useful for the retracing of these narratives. Process-tracing was used since it “can be particularly effective at examining the kinds of detailed sequences in learning and diffusion processes that can create relationships between cases, allowing researchers to gauge more accurately how much of the variance in outcomes is explained by learning or diffusion and how much is explained by other variables” (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 33-4).

While useful, the use of process-tracing faces certain problems. Checkel (2015) warned that “process tracers need to carefully and fully theorize their mechanisms” because “the interpretation of events in a process-tracing case study is shaped by theory” (p. 90). Similarly, Schimmelfennig advised that “as a safeguard against storytelling, process tracing should be based on causal mechanisms that are derived *ex ante* from theories and follow a basic analytical template” (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 105). The model developed in Chapter 4 allows for theoretically based inferences of causal mechanisms, which the analysis in the three case studies relied on. As Stern summarised, “the tasks of process-tracing and diagnosis are time consuming, costly, even hazardous as the analyst risks being led down the garden path by imperfections in or manipulation of the available historical record. Despite these obstacles and pitfalls, it is imperative that scholars embrace this difficult but rewarding task” (2001, p. 85).

#### **1.4. Structure of the thesis**

Following this introductory chapter, the thesis first provides a historical overview of the development of EU foreign policy in practice, from its ideational roots in the narrative of EU integration after World War Two until the most recent developments and institutional

changes in the Lisbon Treaty. The historical overview focuses on the changing EU narratives on a common foreign and security policy, and the ways these narratives persisted through the institutional evolution of EU foreign policy, from the early European Political Cooperation, through the CFSP/CSDP second pillar in the old EU pillar structure to the most recent integrated form of EU external action. The institutionalisation of these narratives represents one of the key elements of the approach adopted and proposed by this thesis, and puts the question of where EU missions come from into perspective.

After presenting the evolution of EU foreign policy in practice in Chapter 2, the third chapter of the thesis further develops the approach by scrutinising the existing conceptualisation of EU foreign policy in the literature and aligning the operational use of the term ‘EU foreign policy’ in this thesis with the concept of EU external action as understood and used in the Lisbon Treaty, but also in the daily practice of EU officials. This step in the development of the argument is necessary due to the different understandings of EU foreign policy and terminological confusion in the literature, which sometimes leads to the interchangeable uses of the concept of EU foreign policy vis-à-vis the concepts of European foreign policy, EU member states’ foreign policy, external relations and external action respectively. Once the conceptualisation of EU foreign policy is aligned with the concept of external action, the chapter further explicates the defence component of EU external action, namely the concept of EU crisis management. The chapter concludes with an overview of available approaches to foreign policy analysis and with the justification why the thesis develops a discursive and institutional approach of EU foreign policy analysis.

This choice is further elaborated on in Chapter 4, which presents the theoretical foundations of an EU foreign policy/EU crisis management analysis model. The chapter focuses first on the institutional component of the analytical model. The chapter evaluates the existing new institutional approaches and establishes the usefulness of a discursive institutionalist approach (Schmidt, 2008, 2010) due to its focus on agency rather than structure. The chapter however also presents certain limitations of the approach and argues that a cognitive approach to discourse analysis helps overcome those limitations. The second part of the chapter assesses in more detail the socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis of Teun van Dijk and its relevance to a discursive institutional analytical model (Tomić, 2013), which is finally presented in the third section of this chapter. The final part of the chapter proposes an operational model for analysing EU crisis management in general and the EU’s engagement in the Horn of Africa in particular. This section also announces the necessary preconditions for the application of the model, namely the understanding of the EU

crisis management process on the one hand and the understanding of the general constructs of meaning regarding the case of Somalia.

Chapter 5 addresses the precondition of understanding the EU crisis management process by first describing the process in terms of the formal procedures, as determined in key EU documents. The chapter then continues with an explanation of the informal processes at both the informal political level of agenda-setting and negotiations, and the informal (and with time formalised) process of organisational learning from previous crisis management experiences. The chapter's final section examines the role of strategic planners in the crisis management process and explains how all of the processes mentioned above affect the role of strategic planners.

The second precondition for the application of the analytical model is understanding the broader context of Somalia. Chapter 6 examines the general understanding of Somalia as a failed state and presents the historical events, ideas and perceptions of Somalia and the greater region of the Horn of Africa. The first section of the chapter presents the idea of Somalia as a failed state and outlines a historical overview of events that led to the idea of Somalia as a failed state. The second section of this chapter follows up on the idea of a failed state and discusses the implications for the increase of Islamic extremism in the region. The third section discusses the link between the existence of Islamic extremists with the growth of piracy activities in the Indian Ocean and the coast of Somalia. This section examines whether this link is one of reinforcement or correlation. The chapter concludes by linking the general context of Somalia with the model developed in Chapter 4 enabling the further analysis of the three EU missions in the Horn of Africa in light of this general context.

Chapters 7,8 and 9 represent the case studies of the thesis and analyse the respective decisions to deploy (and extend) the three EU missions in the Horn of Africa, namely EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Chapter 7), EUTM Somalia (Chapter 8) and EUCAP Nestor (Chapter 9). The individual cases are analysed by applying the model developed in Chapter 4 and focus on the three dimensions of the policy process. The three chapters follow a similar structure for both the convenience of the readers and the convenience of the researcher in terms of clearer structuring of the analysis. The three chapters, following an introduction, first present the outcomes of the respective cases, namely the events and actors surrounding the moment of the missions' deployment. In this part, the chapters then pose the respective questions of why these missions were deployed. The three chapters also share the next section, which analyses the international dimension of the policy process and identifies narratives created in UNSC Resolutions and the material triggers and events predating the

decision to deploy the respective missions. The chapters then analyse the organisational dimension of the policy process and explore the horizontal and vertical divisions within the relevant organisations at the political and strategic/operational level of policy-making. The chapters then ‘zoom in’ to the cognitive dimension of the policy process and explore the collective and individual cognitive processes and their effects on shaping the respective EU missions. In their respective conclusions, the chapters evaluate the degree of influence on the decision-making process by the three dimensions and provide an amalgamated answer to the question of where the three EU missions come from.

Finally, the concluding Chapter 10 puts the application of the proposed model of analysis on the three case studies into a broader perspective. The chapter first recapitulates the findings stemming from the analysis in the three case study chapters and evaluates their combined contribution to the understanding of where EU missions come from in general. The concluding chapter then presents the implications of this evaluation on the overall changing nature of EU foreign policy. The chapter concludes the thesis by relating the changing nature of EU foreign policy to the changing nature of EU foreign policy analysis and by reflecting on the limitations and potential of the proposed model developed in this thesis.

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# **Chapter 2. The development of EU foreign policy and EU crisis management**

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## **2.1. Introduction**

The puzzle of where CSDP missions originate today requires an understanding of the EU's foreign policy mechanisms from the past and its evolution from the loosely institutionalized political cooperation to a policy area outlined in great detail in treaties, protocols and guidelines. This chapter will present a brief overview of the evolution of EU foreign policy and its developments in practice. The chapter will present some of the key documents and interpret the different narratives and logics of integration at their given place in history. The chapter will then continue with an overview of the most recent changes in CFSP/CSDP spelled out in the Lisbon Treaty. In spite of the obstacles of arguably major institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU and its external action apparatus have managed to produce significant results, especially in the field of crisis management. The EU deployed eight civilian and military missions in Libya, Somalia, Mali, Niger and Ukraine.

The crisis management aspect of the CSDP has developed based on the idea of a comprehensive approach to crisis management, which developed from lessons learned reflected in the different strategy and guideline documents outlined in this chapter. The comprehensive approach shapes the self-image and self-perceived added value of the EU in Brussels and is the most recent institutional narrative in EU foreign policy and its crisis management aspect. The chapter finally concludes with a more detailed account of the actual organizations that constitute the EU foreign policy apparatus and describes the process of CSDP crisis management and planning in practice.

## **2.2. The origins of the policy**

European countries throughout history shared a small and densely populated continent and developed different strategies of dealing with one another. With the logic of alliances demonstrating devastating flaws in wars, culminating with the two world wars in the first half

of the twentieth century, the way European countries thought about the relations with their neighbors changed towards another logic, namely that of cooperation and integration. In spite of the fluctuating pace and nature of integration during different points in history and their respective contexts, both international relations theory and practice witnessed an evolution of the way European countries thought about their common future on the European continent. This chapter focuses on the practice of a common foreign and security policy by looking at examples found in primary sources such as treaties, reports and declarations. The next chapter will then focus on how academics from different fields make sense of these developments and the different ways they attempt to theorize and conceptualize a common foreign and security policy of Europe.

Both the practical development and the conceptual development(s) of a common foreign policy for Europe (under many names and formats, as this chapter and Chapter 3 will demonstrate) can be interpreted through different ontological and epistemological lenses. As described briefly in the introduction of this thesis, and as will be in more detail explained in Chapter 4, this thesis regards knowledge of the world as socially constructed and constantly changing. Social constructs in the form of institutions and discourses constrain but are also constantly challenged by agents (be they academics or practitioners). Furthermore, the interpreters of practical developments or the literature need to be aware of his or her contribution to the given social construct and need to be reflective and open about the impact of the interpreters' role on knowledge construction.

### 2.2.1. The early days

A commonality in foreign or security policies of European countries in the period after the Second World War revolved around the idea that a third world war should be avoided. Pacifism and federalism in the form of Churchill's idea of the United States of Europe emerged from the aftermath of a war devastating both materially and morally. Robert Schuman, French foreign minister at the time, summarizes these sentiments in his declaration of 1950:

*A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination*

*of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries (Schuman, 1950).*

The negative impact of the Second World War on the economies of European countries required for such a process of reconciliation between, primarily, France and Germany to focus on economic revival. Economic growth, fused with the emphasis on future avoidance of war, shaped the common interests of European countries at the time. In order to secure a common agreement on the development of these ideas European leaders made several attempts at economic, political and defence communities in the decades following the end of the Second World War, some successful and some with no success but great impact on following attempts.

Most successful were economic communities, due to the greater urgency of economic revival. However, even economic goals were linked to the above mentioned narrative of ‘no more war’ as is illustrated in the preamble of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951:

*RESOLVED to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared (ECSC Treaty, 1951).*

The narrative of overcoming ‘age-old rivalries’ and ‘no more war’ was soon replaced by the narrative of ‘preserving national sovereignty’, first apparent with the failure of the French National Assembly in 1954 to ratify the Treaty Constituting the European Defence Community (EDC) signed in Paris in 1952 and the Strasbourg European Political Community (EPC) Treaty of 1953. The political sentiment of ‘too much supranationalism’ was protracted by the French president Charles de Gaulle. During his presidency, under the chairmanship of Christian Fouchet, a study committee proposed a less supranational and more intergovernmental union of states with the aim to “bring about the adoption of a common foreign policy” (cited in Hill & Smith, 2002, p. 48). Although the other five countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) at the time (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) did not agree with the hardened intergovernmentalism of de Gaulle, the institutional design proposed in the Fouchet plans was later used as a basis for further institutionalization of EU foreign policy.



The intergovernmentalist decade of de Gaulle ended with his presidency in 1969, including France's opposition to UK membership in the EEC. The Hague Summit of December 1969 represents the first step towards the revival of European integration and resulted in the institutionalized cooperation of foreign ministers of the six EEC countries under paragraph 15 of the Hague Summit Declaration (Hague Summit Declaration, 1969). "Achieving progress in the matter of political cooperation", as stated in paragraph 15 of the Declaration (Ibid.), was achieved through the Davignon (Luxembourg) Report of October 27<sup>th</sup>, 1970. This document incorporates the intergovernmentalist narrative of 'preserving national sovereignty' in paragraph 3, which states "the common conviction that a Europe composed of States which, while preserving their national characteristics, are united in their essential interests" (cited in Hill & Smith, 2002, p. 75). However, the report also incorporates the call for unification of the European continent, prominent in the Schuman declaration quoted above. This report also reflected on the role such a united Europe might play in the wider international system and alluded to an increasing role of the whole continent as obvious in paragraph 9 of the report: "Europe must prepare itself to exercise the responsibilities which to assume in the world is both its duty and a necessity on account of its greater cohesion and its increasingly important role" (Ibid, p.76). Furthermore, according to the report, such an endeavour "requires Member States to intensify their political co-operation" and to "concentrate specifically on the co-ordination of foreign policies in order to show the whole world that Europe has a political mission" (Ibid.).

European Political Co-operation, as envisaged in the Hague Summit Declaration and the Davignon Report and later institutionalized and formalized in later declarations, reports and legal documents<sup>3</sup>, developed into a de facto common foreign (and security) policy with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union in 1993 (signed in 1992).

The Maastricht Treaty established a common foreign and security policy in its Title V, Article J and created two instruments for implementing that policy, namely common positions and joint actions (Maastricht Treaty, p. 58). The common foreign and security policy was placed under the intergovernmental second pillar within the three-pillar system of the Maastricht Treaty. The pillar system reflects previous contradicting narratives of integration, unity and peace on the one hand and intergovernmentalism and national sovereignty protection on the other. The contradiction of these narratives in the institutional

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<sup>3</sup> For a detailed account of the European Political Co-operations, see Simon J. Nuttall. *European Political Cooperation*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992

setup of the European Union before and after the Maastricht Treaty very quickly proved problematic in the case of the Yugoslav war from 1992 to 1995.

The Yugoslav war was the first (and failed) test of a European common foreign and security policy. The Yugoslav war was the first major war on the European continent after the Second World War and as such was starkly dissonant with the narrative of ‘no more war’, which represented one of the ideological foundations of the European Community and currently the European Union. The Yugoslav crisis was managed mainly through declarations, common positions and economic sanctions. European countries contributed forces under the format of UN, NATO and WEU troops, but it was eventually NATO, the leadership of the US and the use of force that led to the end of the war. The Declaration on Yugoslavia at the European Political Cooperation Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of 19 September 1991 in The Hague illustrates the early position of European countries facing the new situation in Europe:

*The Community and its member States call on all parties concerned to refrain from any political or military action [...] The Community and its member States regret that the EC monitor mission is no longer able to perform its task in full. They therefore welcome that the WEU explores ways in which the activities of the monitors could be supported so as to make their work a more effective contribution to the peace-keeping effort. It is their understanding that no military intervention is contemplated [...] The Community and its member States would wish to have the opportunity to examine and endorse the conclusions of the study. (Declaration on Yugoslavia, 1991, cited in Hill & Smith, 2002, p. 364)*

The European Union, as exemplified in the quote above, refrained from the use of force, relied on negotiations and monitoring but also acknowledged their inability to perform some of their tasks without the use of military force. It is this acknowledgment that led to an interest in strengthening the defence capabilities of the Union, for which the EU required further institutional and treaty reform. The Amsterdam Treaty was the result of such reforms. The Maastricht Treaty was amended and the common foreign security policy was given another policy instrument in the form of common strategies decided by the European Council. The Amsterdam Treaty also opens up the option of integrating the WEU with the EU and stresses the “progressive framing of a common defence” (Treaty of Amsterdam, p. 12). The Article J.7 also includes “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making” (Ibid.; these tasks are also known as the Petersberg tasks).

One of the most significant institutional developments in the Amsterdam Treaty is the establishing of the position of a High Representative for the common foreign and security policy (Article J.8, Treaty of Amsterdam, p. 13). The presidency, the High Representative (HR) and the political committee in charge of monitoring the international situation (also mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty, p. 60) received additional help with foreign and security policy planning from the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit under the annexed Declaration on the establishment of the unit.

During the years following the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Council became the main institution driving the progress of the foreign and security policy and its defence component. The presidency conclusions of the Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999) European Councils provide guidance for European countries on particular courses of action to achieve a more coherent security and defence policy, including a Political and Security Committee, an EU Military Committee, EU Military Staff, a Satellite Center and an Institute for Security Studies (Cologne Council Conclusions, 1999, p. 39; Helsinki Council Conclusions, 1999).

The Helsinki European Council also approved specific goals in developing EU capabilities in order to “undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP. Such capabilities will enable them to conduct effective EU-led operations” (Helsinki Council Conclusions, 1999). The Helsinki European Council is also relevant due to the explicit acknowledgement of the importance of non-military crisis management capabilities of the EU. The Helsinki presidency conclusions list an inventory of non-military crisis management tools collected from all pillars of the EU, namely “civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring, etc.” (Ibid.).

The treaty reforms, declarations and European Council presidency conclusions after the end of the Yugoslav war in 1995 reflect a concern of European countries with the capability implications of a common foreign, security and defence policy. The acknowledgment of the inability of the EU to fully deal with crises such as Yugoslavia (Declaration on Yugoslavia, 1991, in Hill and Smith, 2002, p. 364) and Kosovo (Helsinki Council Conclusions, 1999) represents the root of an emerging narrative of crisis management, with specific emphasis on early warning, so the EU can be prepared on time for eventual crises. This narrative is prominent in numerous subsequent documents related to the 28 CSDP missions deployed up to date, as well as further Treaty reform, in particular the unratified draft Constitutional Treaty and the most recent Lisbon Treaty.

### 2.2.2. The policy today

The Treaty of Lisbon<sup>4</sup> (Lisbon Treaty, used interchangeably) was signed on the 13<sup>th</sup> of December, 2007 but entered into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 2009. Like with all previous treaty reforms, the Lisbon Treaty is an agreement following a series of intergovernmental conferences, which amended the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and added the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the Lisbon Treaty, 2012/C326/01). The three treaties have equal legal value (Ibid., title I, article 1, article 6, pp. 16-9). The Lisbon Treaty brought about significant changes to the organizational structures of the European Union, some of which are significant for EU's foreign policy and its crisis management aspect.

The most important changes related to the EU's foreign policy are the effective abolition of the pillar system and the creation of a legal personality of the European Union, which beforehand was held by the European Communities (first pillar). The legal personality (Ibid., title VI, article 47, p. 41) allows the European Union to sign international agreements on behalf of the member states. However in Declaration 24 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, the member states introduced a safety measure stating that “the fact that the European Union has a legal personality will not in any way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties” (Ibid., p. 348). This declaration clearly indicates the continued existence of the ‘preserving national sovereignty’ narrative.

The effective abolition of the pillar system not only meets the need for having a more unified security and defence policy, but addresses issues of coherence between pillars. In the case of EU foreign policy, the effective abolition of the pillar system addresses issues of coherence between first pillar policies with external implications (like international trade, foreign aid, enlargement, migration and asylum policy) and second pillar policies of common security and defence. The narrative of coherence appears clearly in the 2003 European

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<sup>4</sup> The full name of the document is “Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community” (2007/C 306/01) When mentioning the Lisbon Treaty, this thesis will refer to the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012/C326/01)

Security Strategy (ESS, 2003) as a special item (p. 13) in section III of the document, which outlines policy implications for the Union.

This section of the ESS stresses the need “to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. [...] Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda” (Ibid., p. 13). The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy of 2008 (ESS Report, 2008) reiterates the need for coherence and states that “the EU must strengthen [its] own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.”

The Lisbon Treaty created new full-time positions that further bridge the former pillars with coherence issues in mind. These positions are that of a president of the European Council and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is at the same time a Vice-President of the European Commission. The president of the European Council holds office for two and a half years and is elected by the European Council on the basis of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) (Lisbon Treaty, 2010, title III, article 15, p. 23). The role of the President of the European Council is primarily to chair the European Council meetings, secure continuity and to cooperate with the President of the European Commission and the European Parliament in order to ensure cross-institutional consistency. The coherence of EU foreign policy in particular however may prove problematic due to the unclear division of labour in the wording of article 15, which states that the President of the European Council ensures “external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.”

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (hereinafter HR) replaces the former position of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and is elected by the European Council by QMV with the agreement of the President of the European Commission (Ibid., article 18, pp. 26-7). With the Lisbon Treaty the HR occupies at the same time the position of one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission. The HR is also in charge of chairing the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC).

Having responsibilities in and towards both the European Commission and the Council regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policies, the HR is supposed to ensure coherence, continuity and consistency across policies from the first and second pillars of the

former pillar structure. To assist her with this task, the Lisbon Treaty created a permanent chair for the Political and Security Committee (PSC) assigned by the HR (Ibid., declaration 9, p. 343) and a European External Action Service (EEAS) consisting of officials from the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States (Ibid., article 27, paragraph 3, p. 32).

Regarding common security and defence, the HR shares the right of initiative at the level of the Council with Member States. Since the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP (Ibid., article 42, p. 38), the HR is in charge of putting the CSDP into effect. CSDP tasks are defined in article 43 and “shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation” (Ibid., p. 39). In security and defence matters, the HR is assisted by the EEAS and the PSC, who are in charge of monitoring the international situation and creating opinions and strategies for the HR and the Council. The PSC is also tasked with the implementation of crisis management operations and can also be authorized by the Council to take relevant decisions for the purpose and duration of crisis management operations. (Ibid., article 38, p. 36)

Regarding defence, the Lisbon Treaty envisages “progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” (Ibid., article 42, p. 38) but also allows for the continuation of the ‘protect national sovereignty’ narrative by enabling Member States to act in groups on behalf of the Union. Enhanced cooperation (Ibid. title IV, article 20, pp. 27-8) extends to all competences of the EU including defence. This means that at least nine member states can participate in a defence activity on behalf of the European Union. However, in cases of security and defence, the enhanced cooperation needs to be established by a unanimous vote (Ibid., article 329, p. 190).

The Lisbon Treaty however also includes the possibility of permanent structured cooperation, which allows member states “whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions” to execute defence tasks (Ibid., title V, article 42, paragraphs 5-6, p. 39). The decision to establish permanent structured cooperation is made by a qualified majority vote (QMV) in the Council after the consultation with the HR-VP (Ibid., article 46, pp. 40-1), but any further decision made within the framework of the permanent structured cooperation (other than decisions related to its membership) is subject to the unanimity rule (Ibid., paragraph 6).

Even with permanent structured cooperation being more easily achievable through QMV rather than unanimity, neither enhanced cooperation nor permanent structured cooperation has been used in the EU security and defence engagement and its foreign affairs since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, since then, the EU has launched eight civilian and military operations abroad following its regular crisis management decision making procedure. Referring back to the original puzzle of where EU missions come from, one needs to have in mind the fact that the EU opts for a more complex but also more unified policy process when addressing security issues in the world instead of relying on looser cooperation between individual Member States.

This section has presented the development of certain narratives in EU foreign policy and how these narratives are reflected and institutionalized in the official documents of the EU. Alongside the competing narratives of ‘no more war’ (later framed as ‘more integration’) and ‘protect national sovereignty’ the EU developed narratives based on certain realizations. The first realization is that the EU needs to develop capabilities, to literally be capable to deal with situations of crisis like those in the Western Balkans. With further realization that being capable to act also means making policies more coherent, the EU developed the narrative of ‘coherence’.

The most recent outcome of the institutionalization of these narratives is the most recent treaty reform from Lisbon, which represents a compromise between these three narratives and a toned-down version of a more ambitious effort to institutionalize the dominance of the ‘more integration’ narrative in the Constitutional Treaty. Instead, the Lisbon Treaty offers the possibility of a more active role for Member States regarding the EU’s foreign policy in the form of enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation. However, the process the Member States opt for represents a more integrated EU foreign policy, in the form of EU crisis management. This process and the actors involved will be explained in more detailed in the following section of this chapter.

### **2.3. Conclusion**

The previous sections of the chapter provide an overview of the development of EU foreign policy and its current actors and procedures in the crisis management aspect of EU foreign policy. The institutional and organizational setup is a result of a history of competing and emerging narratives, which have been institutionalized and materialized into different EU official documents. The most recent Treaty reform is yet another stage of this

institutionalization process. The Lisbon Treaty includes several narratives, which emerged from different realizations of actors throughout the history of the EU and its foreign policy. Among its introductory paragraphs this chapter emphasizes the need for reflection and openness when interpreting these historical developments. This chapter has identified certain narratives from the interpretation of official texts and argues that these narratives have been institutionalized and materialized in the subsequent official documents of the EU, leading up to and including the Lisbon Treaty, in particular its CFSP/CSDP related articles. While still open about the potential drawbacks of interpretation, this chapter provides examples in support of the presented argument. The next chapter will continue with the reflection and openness encouraged in the introduction of this thesis and the beginning of this chapter and will present an overview of the literature and of different interpretations and conceptualizations of EU foreign policy. The next chapter will also reflect on some of these conceptualizations taking into consideration the contexts within the respective literature was developed.



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# Chapter 3. Understanding and analysing EU foreign policy

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## 3.1. Understanding EU foreign policy

EU foreign policy is a slowly moving target, which is constantly developing, both in practice, as described in the previous chapter of this thesis, but also in the conceptual realm among academics and practitioners. The literature remains unclear about what one can label EU foreign policy. The literature identifies three distinct differentiations of EU foreign policy. The first view is that EU foreign policy is synonymous with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its security dimension, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – policies of the second pillar of the old EU structure. The second view is that EU foreign policy includes the CFSP/CSDP but also all aspects of EU policies from the EU's former first and third pillars that deal with third countries. These policies fall under the wider term 'external relations' of the EU and include foreign trade, international aid and development policy as well as asylum policy and immigration from third world countries. A more recent term, 'external action', is used to encompass all the policies mentioned under the description of the second view. The third view is a sceptical one and argues that the EU does not possess a foreign policy of its own but encapsulates the foreign policies of all or groups of its member states. More recent variations of this view give more credit to the EU's ability to have an impact on third countries and incorporate elements of EU's foreign policy, but remain stalwart in denying the EU a foreign policy in its own right. Studies closer to the third view prefer to use the term 'European foreign policy' instead of 'EU foreign policy'.

The term 'EU foreign policy' is in fact in the relevant literature used less widely than European foreign policy. Why this is the case and what distinguishes the term 'EU foreign policy' will be elaborated on in this section of this chapter. To conceptualize the EU's foreign policy, one needs to understand the subtle differences between EU foreign policy and European foreign policy, EU foreign policy and EU MS foreign policies, EU foreign policy and EU external relations, EU foreign policy and EU external action. This chapter will also survey the possible approaches of EU foreign policy analysis and introduce the theoretical considerations for a model of EU foreign policy analysis developed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The following sub-sections will be structured accordingly.

### 3.1.1. EU foreign policy vs European foreign policy

At this point it is important to emphasize the abovementioned formulation of ‘EU’s foreign policy’. It has become a habit both in the public and media as well as in academia to use ‘European’ and ‘EU’ interchangeably, like for example ‘European diplomacy’ vis-à-vis ‘EU diplomacy’ or ‘European foreign policy’ vis-à-vis ‘EU foreign policy’. While the difference may seem minuscule at first, a second closer look reveals a considerable impact on the object of research, set of research questions and theoretical approaches. When one talks of European foreign policy, one can be talking of both the foreign policy actions of the EU, as well as foreign policies of individual member states or group of member states. However, if one discusses EU foreign policy, it is clear that one is referring to the EU as the actor involved, and to all the institutional, legal, political and normative characteristics of the EU and its foreign policy. Simply put, the term ‘European foreign policy’ is more general and imprecise, which is why this thesis shall operate with the term ‘EU foreign policy’.

In his 2004 introductory chapters to his co-edited volume, Brian White reminds us that a decade before that time and almost two decades before today, the term ‘European foreign policy’ was increasingly being used in titles of books but without “necessarily an accompanying clarification with respect to its precise meaning or the connotations associated with it” (White 2004, p. 12). This thesis supports that statement. However, what seems peculiar is that in both the literature White refers to as well in his own chapter, authors refer to a ‘new Europe’ and stress how the European context has changed and therefore one should review the concepts of Europe and European foreign policy. While this does sound like a reasonable point to raise, both White and his co-authors referred to the same events as their predecessors a decade ago, namely the end of the Cold War and the shift of the pre-Cold War idea of Europe as an integration process based on the West-East divide to a broader European integration process, which includes post-Soviet countries into the ‘European project’.

Two and a half decades after the end of the Cold War it is however time to replace that notion of ‘new Europe’. While some authors of the aforementioned volume did mention the Convention on the Future of Europe, it needs to be stressed that that ‘future’ has already happened. The ‘new Europe’ should have as a reference point the Lisbon Treaty and the most recent changes in the foreign policy domain of the EU.

One of the main developments is the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS, for reason of cross-pillar coherence and overall better policy coordination in the EU, merges staff from the Council Secretariat, the European Commission and seconded staff from EU's member states. More detail on the EEAS will be provided later in this chapter. The creation of this foreign policy institution blurs the previous borders of the strictly intergovernmental CFSP and community policies of the former first and third pillars dealing with third countries. Such a development calls for a review and potentially revision of previous conceptualizations of EU foreign policy, or European foreign policy for that matter.

For the sake of clarity, one needs to look back to the aforementioned understandings of EU foreign policy to be able to come to an understanding of European foreign policy. One of the above views on EU foreign policy is that it is synonymous with the CFSP. From such a viewpoint, using the term 'EU foreign policy' is restrictive as some authors have pointed out (White, 2004; Hill, 1998). White suggests that instead the term 'European foreign policy' should be used to "enable studies of members states' foreign policy to be undertaken without assuming or implying that national foreign policy can now be entirely subsumed within CFSP." (White, 2004, p. 13) Another argument for using 'European' instead of 'EU' is according to White the fact that by using 'European' one can include non-EU countries into analysis of foreign policy in Europe. Finally, White defends the use of 'European foreign policy' because "it facilitates a discussion of the idea of the 'new Europe' (rather than simply the 'new EU')."

These arguments are in fact moot points and don't help further conceptualize EU or European foreign policy nor do they give strong justification for using one term over the other. These arguments simply state that 'European' is a better term if one wants to study phenomena beyond the boundaries of the EU. They carry a Western European bias and also assume that EU foreign policy is synonymous with CFSP/CSDP.

There are, however, authors that use "EU foreign policy" and "European foreign policy" interchangeably and do not conceptualize either of the terms as synonymous with the CFSP/CSDP. Hill (1998, 2004) points out that if one defines European foreign policy solely as "behaviour of the EU in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy" one excludes from the definition elements of "pillar I/Community institutions and the national diplomatic activities of the [...] Member States." In short, Hill argues that EU foreign policy should be understood as the "sum of what the EU and its Member States do in international relations." (1998, p.18) In a later article which has "EU foreign policy" in its title, Hill yet again refers to in the text to European foreign policy as "the ensemble of the international

activities of the European Union, including output from all three of the EU's pillars, and not just that relating to the CFSP." (Hill, 2004, p. 145)

The previous definition criticized the idea of EU foreign policy being synonymous to the CFSP/CSPD by expanding the boundaries of the concept. Another critique of this idea goes the other way towards suspicion or complete rejection of the idea of an EU foreign policy. This critique is a state-centric one. It focuses on EU member states and their respective foreign policies and stresses the importance of intergovernmental cooperation and coordination. From this point of view it is the member states that determine EU's activities towards third countries. An EU led foreign policy is hardly imaginable from this perspective due to CFSP's failure to produce 'strategic action', due to the unresolved coherence, consistency, competence and resource problems the EU faces across its pillars (Allen, 1998, p. 46).

An incoherent CFSP with the problems listed above cannot produce an EU foreign policy. However, as Hazel Smith argues in the same volume quoted in the previous paragraph, an EU foreign policy can be found elsewhere. Smith actually uses the term 'EU foreign policy' when referring to the EU's policy towards Latin America. Hazel Smith defends the idea of an EU foreign policy and summarizes the main arguments against EU's claim to a foreign policy. Firstly, the EU does not have the necessary central military planning capabilities. The second argument is that the EU "is not structurally analogous to a state," (Smith, H., 1998, p. 153) and it is states that possess foreign policies. Even if one could argue federal tendencies in the EU and that federations can have foreign policies, the third argument against an EU foreign policy is that its Member States are unwilling to shift sovereignty over to the federal or community level.

The first argument of EU not possessing sufficient military capability is refuted by Hazel Smith's example of Costa Rica, who possesses no military at all, yet does possess a foreign policy. The second argument of the EU not being a state and having no centralized executive is refuted by Smith's comparison of the EU with the United States and its decentralized state structure in which there are "enormous constraints on executives because of the necessity to achieve domestic consensus" among the individual states (Smith, H., 1998, p. 154). Finally, the third argument of the EU's member states' unwillingness to pool sovereignty to a supranational level is refuted by Hazel Smith's comparison with NATO, another supranational organization, which indicates that some of EU's member states are willing to pool sovereignty and decision making power to a supranational level. Smith gives the example of EU's policy towards Latin America and labels it an EU foreign policy.

Criticizing institutionalism and the focus on the legal and technical conceptualization of EU foreign policy, Smith argues for a multi-dimensional nature of EU foreign policy, similar to what other authors mentioned above would label as European foreign policy.

The dilemma whether to choose European foreign policy or EU foreign policy is caused by the confusion of whether the EU possesses a foreign policy and if yes, what does that foreign policy entail. When Keukeleire and MacNaughtan talk about the nature of EU foreign policy in their latest book (2008), they define it in terms of what it is not. As explained, EU foreign policy should not be considered as being equal to CFSP/ESDP (decisions and actions in the former second pillar of the EU), nor to ‘European foreign policy’ (since the EU does not include all states of Europe and hence “cannot be equated with ‘Europe’”), nor to “the sum of the national foreign policies of EU member states” (p.29).

### 3.1.2. EU foreign policy vs EU MS foreign policies

The previous sub-section of this chapter has pointed out some of the differences between the terms ‘EU foreign policy’ and ‘European foreign policy’. One of the major differences is that EU foreign policy is not synonymous with the sum of EU Member States’ foreign policies. The previous sub-section has however not sufficiently explained the relationship between EU foreign policy and EU Member States’ foreign policies, which will be at the core of this sub-section.

As argued in the previous subsection, EU foreign policy is not the same as the sum of member states’ national foreign policies. This however does not mean that EU foreign policy is completely independent of national foreign policies. EU foreign policy and EU member states’ foreign policies are closely connected. EU member states’ foreign policies do matter and they are both influenced by and have an influence on EU foreign policy making. Both authors that are sceptical about an EU foreign policy and those who acknowledge it cannot avoid observing national foreign policies when analysing EU’s foreign policy.

Sceptics about a distinct EU foreign policy argue that the EU is not a state, which is the sole source and carrier of a foreign policy. Non-state actors are influential in IR but not associated with being foreign policy actors. As Allen explains, non-state actors can have influence on the global arena and “states, therefore, have no monopoly on international activity but they do have a relatively exclusive claim to the idea of foreign policy. The European Union is ‘state-like’ but does not formally aspire to statehood. It may have a

‘foreign policy’, but it clearly lacks a monopoly on foreign policy-making in Europe. It thus seems to exist in a conceptual no man’s land” (Allen, 1998, p.43). If one follows this state-centric logic, namely that foreign policies are effectively acts of states and governments in particular (Clarke and White, 1989), then one needs to look more carefully at the EU’s state-like dimensions. While the EU may not have a government per se, it does have government-like institutions like the European Commission as executive and the European Council as a centre of political guidance. However, due to a complex system of governance and no single institution that would play the role of government, EU’s foreign policy is not as clear-cut to conceptualize as a foreign policy of a state. As Allen mentions:

*A European foreign policy could only be achieved by creating central institutions within the European Union capable of identifying, selecting and implementing a coherent set of objectives that could be legitimized as being in the European interest. But this could only be achieved by the establishment of a European state and hence a European government. Since 1985 [...] the Member States had been trying to establish a process for delivering a foreign policy without first establishing the means for making a foreign policy. Put another way, the EU sought to reproduce foreign policy ‘governance’ without a government (1998, pp. 47-8).*

The identifying, selecting and implementing of objectives for the EU comes from different sources, both within Brussels institutions as well as the member states directly. Member states use their own foreign policy agendas and transmit them to a supranational level where they can be in either convergence or tension with other national foreign policies. National foreign policies are especially important as part of the more intergovernmental dimension of EU foreign policy, namely at the level of the Council and its sub-structures. Although the Council is present across all three pillars, its dominance is most noticeable in the domain of the CFSP/CSDP.

Each member state has representations in Brussels and seconded officials, experts and diplomats, in the different institutions under the Council. Their presence in Brussels enables member states to have direct influence on foreign policy developments of the EU. On the other hand, their presence in Brussels also has an impact on how these representatives report back to their capitals and how the capitals shape their policies based on the feedback from their representatives in Brussels. This relationship between the national level and representations at the European level depends on the member states’ constitutional design, state structure, bureaucratic and diplomatic culture, power, including both military and financial capabilities, but also political will and coherent worldview, as well as on their

identity and self-image in the EU and global arenas (see Manners and Whitman, 2000; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008).

While a comparative approach may illustrate the different sources of power and influence of member states and their foreign policies on EU foreign policy, one may end up with a snapshot of the EU's foreign policy process. A more detailed look at the processes of interaction between EU foreign policy and national foreign policies reveals a gradual change of both. This change is commonly attributed to the process of Europeanization. Europeanization is a concept of "an ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change linking national and European levels, capturing the growing 'interwovenness' of both" (Major and Pomorska, 2005, p.1). Keukeleire and MacNaughtan even go as far to posit that "'EU-ization' would be a more correct term, given that 'Europe' is not synonymous with the 'EU'" (2008, pp. 141-2). The process of Europeanization is characterized differently in the literature but can be placed in three distinct categories: as a top-down process, as a bottom-up process and as a horizontal process. One can in the same way apply the concept of Europeanization to the relationship between an EU foreign policy and national foreign policies of member states.

The view of the top-down process defines Europeanization as an influence of EU foreign policy developments on national foreign policies of member states, both in political and bureaucratic dimensions. Terms like 'reorientation' (Ladrech, 1994), 'adaptation' (Jorgensen, 2004; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Wong, 2011), 'downloading' (Major and Pomorska, 2005) are all synonymous with the idea that national foreign policies change their bureaucratic structures, political preferences and identity and the fuzzy notions of 'national interests' in response to developments at a supranational level. As discussed above, depending on the political and bureaucratic cultures of the individual member states, these changes are more or less salient and drastic. More influential member states can manage to resist influences from the EU level and can even determine the developments at the EU level themselves.

The influence of the member states on the EU level is exactly what the view on Europeanization as a bottom-up approach focuses on. Similarly, the literature offers several synonymous terms for this process: 'projection' (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Wong, 2011) or 'uploading' (Major and Pomorska, 2005). The projection of national political structures and norms does not only happen towards the EU level, but also to other member states. This horizontal process happens due to the continuous exchange of information and coordination among states both at interstate level and at the supranational level in Brussels. In

this process, Europeanization is seen as a political unification project, which “involves institutional mutual adaptation. A multitude of institutions and actors co-evolve as they adapt to each other” (Olsen, 2002, p. 925). This point will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter of this thesis.

### 3.1.3. EU foreign policy vs external relations

The previous section described some concepts, which help understand the role of national foreign policies of EU member states and their relationship to the EU. The importance of member states' foreign policies is especially emphasized in a state-centric view of foreign policy, where, since the EU does not possess a central government and is not a state, it is the member states that play the major role in determining developments in EU foreign policy. There are, however, views that a state-centric perspective may not fully help understand the EU's foreign policy defined more broadly, including EU's community policies with an external dimension. These views also argue that statehood is not a prerequisite for foreign policy and that foreign policy is a result of strategic action and presence of an actor in the international arena.

Michael H. Smith indicated the impracticality of juxtaposing the EU to statist definitions of foreign policy. He noted that “the traditional view of the strategic actor as monolithic, possessing a unified set of preferences and capable of producing unified action – a view closely linked to statist versions of foreign policy – hardly seems to describe the EU” (1998, p. 80). Instead, Smith proposes that one needs not to focus on such “rigid requirements” (Ibid.) but on strategic collective action and impact on the world arena. Smith sees the EU as an actor in the world arena, and the European Community (EC) at the time, representing the EU in the field of external economic policy, as its agent. Smith adds that “if one takes the development of agency as the central test of a ‘foreign policy’, one is let not to focus on the CFSP as the critical area” (1998, p.82). This perspective expands the definition of foreign policy and moves the focus away from the CFSP/CSDP towards what was for a long time been referred to as ‘external relations’, both in the literature and everyday practice of the EU. An expanded definition diminishes the dominance of member states in EU foreign policy, due to the stronger role of the European Commission and European Parliament in the first and third pillar of the former EU pillar structure. Smith gives the example of the EU's



external economic policy, which he labels EU's 'foreign economic policy' (M.H. Smith, 1998, 2004). As Smith explains:

*In the CFSP, the dominance of Member State agency and the underdevelopment of 'hard security' mechanisms place strict limits on collective action and collective understandings. In external economic policy, on the other hand, a mixture of 'direct agency', through Community competence and Commission initiative, with 'indirect agency', through forms of sub-contracting by the Member States [...] has led to a substantial development of foreign economic policy. (1998, p. 82)*

A similar view on the example of the EU's development policy towards third countries supports the argument that the EU is capable of having a foreign policy that is not locked into the mechanisms of the second pillar and predetermined by EU member states. As Holland argued, the EU's development policy "forms a core element in EU foreign policy and is linked, consequently, to a broader understanding of CFSP" (Holland, 2004, p. 111).

While external relations may be linked to EU foreign policy, by stretching the boundaries of the concept beyond just the analysis of the CFSP/CSDP, EU's external relations are still not synonymous with EU foreign policy. Keukeleire and MacNaughtan have in their most recent book explicitly separated these two terms: "The difference is not semantic. [...] The vast network of relations the EU has with practically all countries and regions of the world do not alone constitute foreign policy" (2008, p. 199). What constitutes a foreign policy in their view is not just the mere existence and maintenance of these relations but the manner in which the EU strategically uses these relations to pursue its own interests and goals in the respective country or region of the world.

#### 3.1.4. EU foreign policy vs external action

The term 'external relations', as explained above, is not fully suitable to be synonymous with EU's foreign policy, since external relations are not a policy per se, but merely a set of events and policies that determine the relationship of the EU with the rest of the world, lacking a clear strategic and active dimension. This reasoning however can clearly be contested. To avoid contestation, one needs to turn to another term, which is similar to 'external relations' but incorporates a component of action and intent, namely the term 'external action'.

The use of the term 'external action' in the context of the EU can be traced back to the early 2000s and in particular to the period of the European Convention of 2001-2003 (also

called the Convention on the Future of Europe). The Convention included in its activities working groups on different specific subjects, although some of the groups had to have joint meetings on cross-cutting issues. Two groups that had such joint sessions were Working Group VII on External Action and Working Group VIII on Defence. Noteworthy is the choice of the term ‘external action’ in the name of Working Group VII as well as having a separate working group on defence (Working Group VIII).

In the proceedings of Working Group VII, the relevant documents define EU’s external action as a term for all EU actions on the international stage. Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations at the time, emphasized that “‘external action’ means much more than CFSP [...] It covers trade, development assistance, humanitarian aid, environment, and issues such as visa and asylum policy and foreign policy” (original emphasis, WG VII – WD 29, p. 2). The emphasis on foreign policy being an addition to other EU policies clearly indicates the position that one should not equate foreign policy with external action.

What needs to be noted, with the Convention resulting in a draft Constitutional Treaty, which later failed to be ratified by the Netherlands and France, and its toned-down version in form of the Lisbon Treaty, which was successfully ratified and entered into force in January 2009, the term ‘external action’ has prevailed unchanged.

While Chris Patten may have made a distinction between foreign policy and the broader term of external action, this distinction may have been a result of the dominance of the narrow definition of foreign policy of the time within EU circles. However, external action has grown to be synonymous with foreign policy. A supporting example is the referring to Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is head of the European External Action Service (EEAS), as “EU’s foreign policy chief”. (Moffett, Reuters, May, 2012)

If one looks at national foreign ministries, the UK, France and Germany being just examples, the competences of these ministries include diplomatic relations, defence issues, asylum and visa issues, development in third world countries and foreign trade. The similarity to the EEAS is obvious and comes as no surprise. The EEAS’ conceptual predecessor, although under the same name, was the envisaged Foreign Ministry of the EU in the Constitutional Treaty. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as she is called today, was named the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs in the final draft of the Constitutional Treaty. (Title V)

Considering the increasingly dominant view in the literature that EU's foreign policy should be defined broader as just the CFSP/CSDP and include the policies from the former first and third pillars of the EU, as well as considering the fact that such a view is also present in the everyday practice of the EU under the term 'external action', provides sufficient reason to conceptualize EU foreign policy along the lines of EU external action. The terms 'EU foreign policy' and 'EU external action' will be used interchangeably as synonymous to each other in the rest of this thesis.

### 3.1.5. What about crisis management?

The evolution of the conceptualization of EU foreign policy presented in the previous subsections of this chapter allowed for the broadening of its understanding beyond the second pillar. However, the second pillar in the literature and practice had two components, namely a one of general foreign policy and one of defence policy. In the literature this dual nature of the second pillar is usually illustrated by the use of terminology like 'CFSP/CSDP' or 'the CFSP and its defence component, CSDP'. With the terminology in practice and literature changing, and the introduction of the notion of external action, the question arises of what the defence component to external action should be referred as. The answer again lies in the Lisbon Treaty and the daily use of the post-Lisbon terminology in practice. The defence components of the Council Secretariat that were transferred into the EU remained more or less unchanged, but were joined by the new organisation of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate. Furthermore, the recent EU missions are both in practice and the literature referred to as 'crisis management missions'. Considering that the defence component of external action in the post-Lisbon institutional environment is referred to as crisis management, and that this thesis will operate with the term EU foreign policy, defined as what is understood by external action, it makes sense for this thesis to also refer to the defence component of EU foreign policy as crisis management. In more general discussions about crisis management and EU foreign policy, these two terms may be used interchangeably, but in the later discussions of the case studies, the thesis will specify that the policy analysed is one of crisis management.

### **3.2. Analysing EU foreign policy**

After conceptualising the term EU foreign policy (and its defence component) it is necessary to turn to identifying the ways in which EU foreign policy can best be studied. The study of EU foreign policy is theory-wise highly affected by international relations theory. Hill and Smith (2011) have identified three key perspectives of the EU in international relations research: the EU as a subsystem of international relations, the EU as part of the wider processes of international relations and the EU as a major power in international relations (p.8). The first perspective focuses on the EU and how the different foreign policies of member states impact the EU foreign policy as a whole. The second perspective sees the EU as a player in international affairs and focuses on the impact of the international arena on the developments of EU's foreign policy. The third perspective also sees the EU as a player in the international arena, but focuses on the nature of its 'power' and the role of the EU in the international arena. Although this categorization is useful for understanding the different research agendas in European Union studies and the studies of EU foreign policy, only the second perspective is useful for analysing EU foreign policy in a more classical sense of foreign policy analysis (FPA) Although the thesis primarily focuses on the different mechanisms within EU foreign policy, it does take into account (both in the conceptual framework and empirical research) the external factors of international affairs and the place EU takes (or perceives to take) in the international arena.

Another categorisation distinguishes between a macro-level, structure oriented view and a micro- or mezzo-level of analysis focusing on agency. The first view proposes to look at EU foreign policy from a macro-level position, as part of a larger structure, which is the world arena. Such a structural view is prevalent in the field of international relations (IR) (Merand, 2010). The second view proposes to look at EU foreign policy from a micro- and/or mid-level position, where agency plays a much larger role, and to analyse the different actors, institutions and their interactions. Such a view is closer to the subfield of international relation – the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA). The first view is more concerned with events, developments and the overall impact of EU foreign policy from a macro-level of analysis, while the second view, while not ignoring the outcomes, focuses more on the processes leading up to the outcomes of EU foreign policy.

The first view is useful for understanding the EU's role in the international arena and how this broader structure can influence EU foreign policy, but not necessarily how the EU role is created and changed from within. The second view on the other hand is more

analytically rigorous and focuses on agency as the driving force of EU foreign policy development. It focuses on institutions, actors and their relationship to existing structures. However, although the second view may result in a better understanding of the EU and the creation of EU foreign policy, it also poses significantly more problems of operationalization of a foreign policy analysis model. The case of EU foreign policy is no different.

If one accepts the argument that a process-oriented approach is more useful for EU foreign policy analysis, the next step is to review the existing approaches to foreign policy analysis in general. Walter Carlsnaes maps the existing approaches to foreign policy analysis (FPA) in his contribution to the SAGE Handbook of International Relations (2005, pp. 336-341). The list distinguishes between approaches based on a structural perspective and an agency-based perspective. Another line of division is drawn between approaches based on a social-institutional perspective and approaches based on an interpretive actor perspective.

The first line of division is similar to the one described above. FPA approaches based on a structural perspective are closest to and inspired by the discipline and theory of international relations. These approaches include realist and neo-realist approaches, like neoliberal institutionalism. Another structure-oriented approach, the organizational process approach, borrows from organizational theory and sees organizations as constraining structures on decisions of actors within the organization. Agency-based approaches on the other hand are focusing on a lower level of analysis and the ability of agents to make decisions. Agency-based approaches include psychological and cognitive approaches and the bureaucratic politics approach (which is similar to the organizational process approach with the difference that agents' decisions are more important than the process itself) (Ibid.).

The difference between a social-institutional perspective and an interpretive actor perspective is one of the foci of analysis. These two approaches, however, share an interpretive epistemology. The social-institutional perspective includes social constructivist approaches to FPA and discursive approaches. These approaches focus on structures of knowledge and their institutional and discursive construction. The interpretive actor perspective aims to focus on the agent and to reconstruct the decision-making process from the perspective of the actor. The latter perspective also borrows from role theory and analyses the roles actors play while making decisions. It is clearly an interpretive approach and stresses subjectivity of perceptions, identities and interests.

While any of the above approaches can be applied to the context of the EU foreign policy, the reality is that there are very few attempts to develop an EU foreign policy analysis model (White, 2001, 2004; Carlsnaes, 1994, 2005; Waever, 1994, 2002). Brian White (2001)

identifies three problems with direct application of what he refers to as traditional FPA to the context of the EU: the inadequacy of the traditional FPA focus on the state; the related need to focus more extensively on what might be called the politics of identity; and the limitations of FPA analysis of the policy process.

The FPA approaches focusing on the state do not explicitly define statehood. These approaches focus on the formal requirements for a state and can be equated with governments. White further criticizes the state-focused FPA approach for equating state with nation and national identity. According to this view, White considers that EU's statehood can be easily challenged due to both lack of a government or a strong collective identity. White therefore suggests that to allow foreign policy analysts to conceptualize the EU as a foreign policy actor, they need to also focus on EU's collective identity formation and points to constructivist literature, in particular to Wendt 1994 (p. 175).

White also points to the potential usefulness of discourse analysis approaches to understanding foreign policy. He refers to Larsen's work and Larsen's critique of mainstream FPA approaches that focus on psychological factors and beliefs. Namely, Larsen argues that these approaches have three main flaws: they focus on the individual decision-maker in foreign policy, they treat beliefs in a positivist manner and finally, they study beliefs and psychological factors relying on the assumption that language is a "transparent medium" without a dynamic of its own (1997, p. 9).

While White encourages the exploration of discursive approaches to FPA, discursive analysts of EU foreign policy like Larsen and Wæver criticize cognitive and psychological approaches and rather stress the importance of identity, norms and ideas as constructed structures that determine policy decisions. Ben Tonra on the other hand encourages cognitive approaches, since they allow one to "consider ways in which the interests, values, ideas and beliefs of actors are themselves explanatory variables" (2004, p. 8).

The different approaches to FPA, as presented above, provide for ample epistemological and methodological choice. Considering the recent developments in FPA and following the developments in IR theory, a structure-oriented constructivist and discursive approach can provide for more detailed insight in which structures of meaning influence the decision making processes of EU's foreign policy. On the other hand, an agency-oriented, micro and/or mezzo-level of analysis is more useful in the EU context due to the complexity of the organisational setup of EU foreign policy structures. The aforementioned discourse analysts of EU foreign policy argue against an agency-oriented approach, like the cognitive and psychological approach. The choice, however, does not have to be between a discursive,

but structure-oriented approach, as developed by Larsen and Waever, or an agency-oriented psychological/cognitive or bureaucratic politics approach. This thesis argues for a combination of these two perspectives, namely that a discursive approach can also be agency-oriented, and that a psychological/cognitive model can also be structure-oriented, mainly due to the dual nature of discourse as both structure and a toolbox of agency. This thesis posits that the mechanisms within a structure and agency cycle can be better explained by a focus on discourse, (social) cognition and the structuration of discourse in the form of institutions. Considering the proven value of discursive approaches on the one hand and even greater successes of new institutionalisms in the study of the EU and concretely its foreign policy in recent years, the thesis argues that such a combined model in the EU foreign policy context is not only possible but may be useful to understand EU foreign policy decisions. The value of discourse analysis and institutional analysis in the study of EU foreign policy is not a novel claim. The next chapter will go into greater detail in exploring how discursive and institutionalist approaches can contribute to a foreign policy analysis model of EU external action. The chapter will then develop the model, present some theoretical propositions of model, and finally discuss how it will be operationalised for the analysis in the three case studies of this thesis.

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# Chapter 4. Developing a model of analysis for EU foreign policy

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## 4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the ways researchers can conceptualise EU foreign policy and demonstrated a gradual widening of the scope of the term EU foreign policy. The most recent understanding, and the understanding adopted by this thesis is the conceptualisation of EU foreign policy as what in post-Lisbon daily practice is referred to as ‘external action’. The defence component of EU foreign policy is, accordingly, understood as what in post-Lisbon practice is referred to as crisis management. The previous chapter concluded with a survey of possible approaches in terms of level of analysis and the emphasis these approaches put on structure and agency, as well as on the actors analysed, be it individual or social actors. The previous chapter concludes with the proposition that the classifications, while useful, may not allow researcher understand and explain all aspects of EU foreign policy, and posits that a combination of the discussed approaches is both possible and useful. In particular, the previous chapter emphasises the explanatory potential of a combination between a discursive, an institutionalist and a socio-cognitive approach.

This chapter will continue the discussion on the value of the proposed combined approach by adding theoretical foundations and propositions to a model of EU foreign policy analysis following that approach. The next section of this chapter will survey the existing applications of discursive approaches in EU studies, and identify the need to fill potential gaps these approaches may leave in the study of EU foreign policy and crisis management in particular. The chapter will then continue with a justification for choosing a discursive institutionalist approach, in line with the one developed by Vivian Schmidt, but with minor adaptation to the context of EU crisis management. The third section of this chapter will present the theoretical propositions derived from the socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis of Teun van Dijk, which, as this thesis will argue, represent the missing links in the chain of causality (loosely understood) that strengthen the explanatory potential of discursive institutionalism. This chapter will then apply the theoretical foundations from these theoretical approaches to the combined FPA model, as discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis and develop a model of analysis which focuses on the processes at the different



levels of analysis. The chapter concludes with a proposed operationalization of the model, and its adaptation to the study of EU crisis management, which will be applied to the analysis of the EU's decisions to deploy its three missions in the Horn of Africa.

#### **4.2. Constructivism, discourse analysis and the study of EU foreign policy**

Social constructivism has been introduced into European Union studies as a spill-over from international relations theory, as a result of the “rather narrow focus and sterility of the debates between neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism” (Risse, 2009, p.144). Constructivism is not a theory like liberalism or realism in the discipline of IR, or neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism in EU studies. It is rather a philosophical approach which sheds light on certain features of international politics (Adler, 1997, p.323) or European integration (Risse, 2009, pp.144-5). It posits the social and political reality, in general, and certain aspects of international politics and European integration, in particular, as constructs of groups or individual actors.

The way through which actors in international relations and the EU foreign policy create reality is through communication and practice. Discourse theory as a relative of constructivism is thus relevant for analysing the discursive creation of meaning of the material world. Discourse as an important factor in analysing European integration and EU foreign policy has been pushed forward authors such as Risse (1996, 2000), Diez (1999, 2001), Rosamond (2001, with Hay, 2002) Larsen (1997) and Waever (1998b, 2002, 2005). Like social constructivism, discourse theory is not a general theory of international relations or European integration, but an approach useful for explaining or illuminating certain aspects international (or European) politics. Due to the great number of variations on the definition of discourse and different approaches to discourse analysis, the studies and aspects of the EU analysed through such an approach vary greatly in the same fashion and are too numerous to be reviewed in great detail this thesis. However, three different research agendas and approaches to discourse theory in European Union studies can be identified: analysing discourses of national foreign policies and its relations with the European level, the discourse analysis of European identity and culture, and finally analysing discourse to explain governance and political struggle (Waever, 2009).

The first approach is the most common, as it is closer to more traditional views on European foreign policy – remnants of the dominant IR approach to European Union studies.

It posits the national member states as unified actors in international relations (and European integration, as a subsystem of international relations, as discussed above). The research questions revolve around the mutual impact of discourses from the national levels and the European level. The literature on Europeanization is closest to this approach (Boerzel & Risse, 2000, 2007; Goetz and Hix, 2001; Olsen, 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Radaelli 2004). One of the main problems with this approach is that it sees discourses as a relatively stable variable in explaining developments in European foreign policy. Besides using the term discourse rather loosely and sometimes even misplacing the term (replacing terms like rhetoric, identity or argumentation), it does not properly (if at all) pose the question how discourses are created and where they originate from, but take them for granted as the discourse of a member state in a given situation. Such a broad definition of discourse, where “it is ‘all discourse’” (Wæver, 2009, p.172), may make discourse analysis more approachable and available to scholars of European Union studies, but it takes away the potential depth of analysis. Another issue with this approach is that it focuses primarily on states as carriers of discourse, which similarly may be analytically more appealing, but this approach fails to take into account the more subtle mechanisms of discourse creation at the European level of foreign policy making.

The second treatment of discourse in European Union studies poses questions of identities, of ‘we’ feelings and of the ‘other’ (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009; Diez, 1995, 1999, 2005; Manners, 2002). This approach is relevant for providing the background information and ideational positions of actors in different policies of the EU. Actors create contexts and position themselves within them through discourse. The actors of the European foreign policy create their own role in the international arena and define their own nature in this arena. One can even go one step further. For EU foreign policy analysis, it may also be helpful to move beyond the EU perspective and take into account the way the rest of the world constructs the EU and defines its role in the international arena. The way others view the EU may have an impact on the way the EU reacts to these views and reshapes its identity as an international actor.

The third approach to discourse and European integration can be seen as a compromise between the first and the second approach, because it focuses on both discourses across national boundaries as well as individual national discourses, which can be seen as “the discursive manifestation of multi-level governance” (Wæver, 2009, p.177) and political struggle ranging across both the national and transnational (or supranational) levels of

discursive action. Through this approach, discourses cross not just borders of states, but also different policy sectors. It postulates the existence of conflicting and discursively constructed 'polity ideas' which is a set of "normative ideas about a legitimate political order" (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998, p.409). This treatment of discourse enables researchers to analyse European discourses both in depth and breadth. With regard to EU foreign policy, this approach allows for the understanding of the link between discourses at the EU level and national levels of policy making and how this link affects the construction of legitimizing ideas at all levels of discursive action.

The potential problem this brief overview of discursive approaches to EU studies identifies is the still prevailing focus on national discourses in the first and third approach. The focus on nation states and national discourses fits the understanding of EU foreign policy in terms of either a set of national foreign policies or as the equivalent of CFSP/CSDP, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, with the evolving understanding of EU foreign policy and its defence component as external action and crisis management, a discursive study of the EU also needs to evolve and move beyond the second pillar and the focus on nation states. While this thesis does not disregard the importance of member states in the policy process, the thesis argues that discursive EU studies should refocus their attention to other actors as well. In the case of the EU foreign policy, understood along the lines of EU external action, the complex structure of organisations involved in policy-making attracts particular attention, and calls for a consideration of the potential an institutionalist approach can bring into the study of EU foreign policy.

### **4.3. Institutional approaches**

Institutional approaches have become more prominent in the fields of IR and European Union studies in the last two decades of the twentieth century, and are becoming increasingly important in explaining policy decisions due to the rise of formal and informal institutions in international relations, including the European arena. New institutionalism comes in many shapes and sizes, because of the considerable "proliferation in the adjectives used to characterize its variants" (Hay, 2006, p.56). However, from the number of new institutionalisms, three generally acknowledged types include rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Only in the last decade has institutionalism benefited and evolved from works focusing on both institutions and ideas,

which fall under such terms as discursive institutionalism (Campbell and Pederson, 2001; Schmidt, 2008, 2010) or constructivist institutionalism (Hay, 2006). This thesis will use the term ‘discursive institutionalism’ when referring to these developments of institutional approaches. This term is used because of the focus of this thesis on discourses as the means of construction of ideas in a given institutional context. For the discursive analysis of EU foreign policy, as discussed above, both ideas and discourse are relevant factors. Therefore the choice of discursive institutionalism as the analytical framework of analysis should not come as a surprise. This section will discuss the evolution of new institutionalisms and justify the focus on discursive institutionalism as one of the theoretical foundations of a EU foreign policy analysis model. This section will however also identify the limitation of a discursive institutionalist approach and propose a solution to this limitation in the next section of this chapter.

While the ‘new’ institutionalisms were useful to explain their respective foci of interest, they were soon faced with questions such as policy change and the role of ideas, which they consequentially tried to address. In international relations and European Union studies, the rational choice theories have long been dominant. Accordingly, rational choice institutionalism would be the obvious choice to analyse EU foreign policy institutions, but this approach has certain drawbacks, for it is not suitable to adequately explain the role of actors in the committees, working groups and agencies responsible for policy preparation and implementation. While rational choice institutionalists see actors as rational agents strategically pursuing their interest, explaining how ideas matter presented itself as a challenge. One of the ways rational institutionalists tried to include ideas in explaining policy decision was to define ideas as an intervening variable which affects (mostly limits) actors’ options and goals. Ideas are thus seen as ‘road maps’ for action (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Goldstein and Keohane identify three types of ideas that influence actors: worldviews, principled beliefs and causal beliefs. Principled beliefs are normative ideas which serve as justifications for policy decisions. Causal beliefs are ideas of how certain aims of those decisions can be attained, while worldviews can be seen as the larger framework within which both normative and cognitive types of beliefs are created and decisions are made, although Goldstein and Keohane don’t really define the concept of world views, but instead give the examples of religions and ideologies.

One of the major critiques of this approach by discursive institutionalists is the separation of ideas and interest as two distinct variables (Hay, 2006; Schmidt, 2008, 2010; Blyth, 2002). As Blyth (2002) explains, interests and ideas should not be separated in

analysis because the “concept of interest presupposes unacknowledged but very important cognates of interest, such as wants, beliefs and desires” (emphasis in original) and “specifying interests becomes less about structural determination and more about the construction of “wants” as mediated by beliefs and desires – that is, ideas” (p. 29). The construction of interests through ideas keeps these two concepts inseparable as variables that influence policy decisions.

Sociological institutionalists share the criticism of rational choice institutionalists and their focus on interests. On the other end of the rational-ideational debate, sociological institutionalists put greater emphasis on norms, values and beliefs – that is, ideas, to use Blyth’s conclusion. However, sociological institutionalists have a more static view of ideas (norms, values, beliefs) and take them for granted as causal variables for policy decisions. Discursive institutionalists have a more dynamic view of ideas, as something that is not given or created out of nowhere. They take a step back and analyse how ideas are discursively constructed.

As they analyse the actual process of the construction of ideas, norms, values beliefs and meanings, discursive institutionalists inevitably take into account the time factor, because construction implies a change from one state to another, from something (or nothing) to something else, and this change requires time. This development of change over time is also linked to the critique of historical institutionalism, which argues that “long episodes of institutional inertia follow rare ‘critical junctures’ during which exogenous shocks provoke massive, path departing institutional transformations” (Beland, 2009, p.703). As an alternative explanation, Kathleen Thelen (2004) argues that institutional change is more an ongoing evolution, even between critical junctures, rather than an abrupt reaction to an exogenous force. Such a historical perspective is far more useful in explaining EU foreign policy than an approach which sees the history of EU foreign policy only as a series of events and the EU’s reaction to them.

The turn to ideas, interests and change originate from the necessity of bridging the existing divide between positivism and constructivism, and between rationalist and ideational explanations of events, especially in institutionalist approaches. A comprehensive approach is not only useful, but necessary for the analysis of foreign policy making and EU’s CFSP/CSDP. While material factors inevitably play a great role in explaining policy outcomes, ideas and discourse have considerable explanatory value. For these reasons, a discursive institutionalist perspective has a great potential in explaining the complex mechanism of CFSP/CSDP policy making, and the process of discursive construction within

the Brussels-based institutional context. The most elaborate and structured theoretical framework is provided by Vivien Schmidt, who is also pushing for the recognition of discursive institutionalism as the fourth ‘new institutionalism’ (Schmidt, 2010).

One distinction of discursive institutionalism, as pointed out by Schmidt (2008) is the use of the term discourse. She uses the term to encompass the numerous terms that circulate in the literature, like ideas, values, norms, beliefs, rhetoric, arguing, deliberation, and others. She also points out the pragmatic use of the term in contrast to the more theoretical post-modernist use of discourse. Discourse is not just a structured set of constructed meanings, but also as a process of constructing meanings. In other words a discourse is not just a product of communicative action, but the process of communicative action as well. Such a definition allows Schmidt to attribute actors a greater level of autonomy in re-evaluating the discourse and its embedded meanings and ideas. Focusing away from discourse as a structure which constrains actors, Schmidt argues that the carriers of discourse are “sentient agents who construct their ideas conveyed through discourse following a meaning-based logic of communication” (2008, p. 3). As a result, discourses become more dynamic, which makes it easier to account for change in policies.

Such a view is similar to the view on structure and agency of Anthony Giddens (1984), who noted that “structure is not to be equated to constraint but is always both constraining and enabling” (p.25). Accordingly, discourse as a product of communicative action should not be seen as a constraining structure, but also a structure enabling actors to change the existing state of affairs in a strategic, intentional manner. Intentionality and reflexivity is of great relevance in a dynamic approach (such as DI) to a dynamic policy (such as the CFSP). As Hay and Rosamond (2002) point out:

*It is important, at the outset, to differentiate between the internalisation of a discourse and the more intentional, reflexive and strategic choice of such a discourse as a convenient justification for policies pursued for altogether different reasons. In the first scenario ideas about globalization might be held to be constitutive (in part) of the perceived interests of political actors; in the latter, they are more of an instrumental device deployed in the promotion of a set of extant preferences and (perceived) interests (p.150).*

Schimmelfennig’s notion of ‘rhetorical action’ (2001) is an example of looking at discourse as a strategically used practice and an opportunity for actors to legitimize policy proposals and decisions. However, Schimmelfennig also warns of the backfire effect of discourse and

rhetorical action in the form of ‘rhetorical entrapment,’ which constrains agents to act and deviate from the existing, established discourse.

When analysing the use of discourse in Brussels-based institutions and in the context of EU foreign policy (and crisis management in particular), the more dynamic approach of discursive institutionalism certainly seems adequate. However, “one must be wary of simply ‘copying and pasting’ concepts and analytical frames; analytical tools need adaptation to the peculiarities of ESDP” (Vanhoonacker et. al., 2010, p.3). One of the differences between CFSP/CSDP/crisis management and other EU policies is the considerably greater absence of public input in the policy-making process. A significant part of this process takes place outside the reach of the public’s eyes and ears. Most often the first contact of the public with a policy is the publically available document on EU’s website or public statements of EU officials. The public often gets involved in the policymaking process at the very last stages of the process.

In this context, one differentiation made by Schmidt is therefore crucial, namely the distinction between communicative discourse and coordinative discourse. (Schmidt, 2000, 2006, 2008, 2010) The latter represents discursive interactions of actors within institutions during policy construction, while the former represents the discursive interaction between these actors and the public. The interaction of communicative discourse takes into account both top-down and bottom-up directions and includes processes such as public deliberation and policy legitimization. Since the public has little (if any) input in the CFSP and especially in the CSDP policy making process, one cannot really talk of deliberation with the public. Legitimization on the other hand falls outside the research focus of this thesis, since it comes after the policy decisions have already been made. The interest lies in the process of policy creation, including the creation of discourses within the policy making process. The principles in policy-making of EU foreign policy and crisis management in Brussels are consensus, information-sharing and coordination. As a result, the literature on socialization for example (Nuttall, 1992, 2000; Lewis, 2005; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Smith, M.E., 2004; Tonra 2003; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006) will argue that through recurring interaction based on these principles over a longer period of time, the actors in such institutional contexts will develop shared values, beliefs, ideas, and consequentially interests (although not all actors wish to confess to these developments) and even argue that “national interests are being transformed within a European context” (Tonra, 2000, p.159).

Considering that the key characteristic of EU foreign policy and, in particular crisis management, is consensus-building and coordination, making use of discursive

institutionalism will require a greater focus on the coordinative discourse within Brussels-based institutions. However, besides placing coordinative discourses in the policy sphere (in contrast to the communicative discourse which is placed in the public sphere) and enumerating the types of actors that can be involved in coordinative discourse, Schmidt does not elaborate on the distinctiveness of coordinative discourse vis-à-vis communicative discourse (Schmidt, 2010). In order to understand and explain the nature of the coordinative discourse another theoretical approach may fill the conceptual and explanatory gap of discursive institutionalism.

#### **4.4. A socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis**

Teun van Dijk's theory of context has some connections with discursive institutionalism, because of its focus on the agent. Van Dijk's theory of context elaborates on how contexts influence and are influenced by discourse. The element of context is particularly useful to explore and analyse how discourses are constructed within the different contexts at the EU level, in particular in the organisational setup of EU crisis management. The theory of context also complements discursive institutionalism, as it can explain what the difference is between coordinative and communicative discourses, other than the policy spheres they belong to and the actors that are involved in their practice. The main question that arises from the introduction of van Dijk's theory of context into the equation is: what is context? Teun van Dijk identifies eighteen characteristics of context, but this section will only focus on the ones most relevant for the study of EU foreign policy and EU crisis management.

First of all, according to van Dijk, contexts are subjective participant constructs. "Contrary to most approaches that conceptualize contexts as objective properties of social, political or cultural situations" van Dijk considers contexts "to be *participant constructs* or *subjective definitions* of interactional or communicative situations. [...] Such social situations are able to influence discourse only through their (inter) subjective *interpretations* by participants" (Ibid., p. 16; original emphasis).

Secondly, contexts are mental models. According to the theory, "subjective participant constructs will be accounted for in terms of a special type of *mental model*, namely *context models*. These models represent the relevant properties of the communicative environment in episodic (autobiographical) memory, and ongoingly control the processes of discourse production and comprehension" (Ibid.). Furthermore, context models are schematic.



Contexts as mental models consist of schemas of “shared, culturally based, conventional categories, which allow fast interpretations of unique, ongoing communicative events” (Ibid., pp. 16-7) These two notions of contexts as mental models and schemata are particularly useful in explaining the nature of coordinative discourses and the aforementioned literature on socialisation and coordination.

The explanatory power of context models is related to the theoretical assumption that contexts control discourse production and comprehension. “Most crucial of all is the assumption that contexts, defined as mental models, control the processes of discourse production and comprehension. [...] This is the cognitive basis, as well as the explanation, of what is traditionally called the influence of society on text or talk, and the process that guarantees that language users are able to shape their discourse appropriately to the (for them) relevant properties of the communicative situation” (Ibid, p. 17). This assumption coincides with the idea of discursive institutionalism of sentient agents that can resist structural pressures and produce structural change through the use of discourse.

While contexts may be subjective in interpretations they are not isolated in their existence. According to van Dijk, contexts are socially based. This characteristic of contexts is explained in more detail by the following quote:

*Although contexts are unique, subjective definitions of communicative situations, their structures and construction obviously have a social basis, for instance in terms of the shared social cognitions (knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, grammar, rules, norms and values) of a discourse community, as is also the case for the schematic categories that define the possible structures of contexts. This means that contexts also have an important intersubjective dimension that allows social interaction and communication in the first place (Ibid.).*

The cognitive interface added to the relationship between social structures, context and discourse represent the main strength of van Dijk’s approach. “A definition of contexts in terms of mental models does not imply that we *reduce* social influences to mental ones. On the contrary, we thus *describe* and *explain* how local and global social structures are able to influence text and talk in the first place” (Ibid., p. 23). Van Dijk’s cognitive theory of context represents the crucial missing link that relates discourse-processing to situations and social structures. The approach also accounts for individual uniqueness, which helps explain how agents can deviate from structurally imposed patterns and resist structural pressure. This

approach fits well with the emphasis of Schmidts' discursive institutionalism on the 'sentient agent'. Van Dijk's theory of context, cognition and discourse goes beyond this definition and into the complexity of the individual and collective cognitive process, thus "connecting society, discourse and mind, the personal mind and the social mind, and social discourse with individual discourse, groups and their members, structure and agency" (van Dijk, 2008, p.219).

#### **4.5. Socio-cognitive and discursive institutionalist elements of a model for analysing EU foreign policy**

Following the discussions in the previous chapter on potential FPA approaches this thesis can choose from, and the discussions on the potential of a combined discursive, socio-cognitive and institutional approach, the thesis investigates a theoretical model of analysis for the context of EU foreign policy and in particular for EU crisis management that combines the approaches mentioned above. The model was developed by Tomić (2013) in accordance to the arguments from the previous chapter on approaches to structure, agency, individual and social actors, and by combining the theoretical propositions from the socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis and from discursive institutionalism.<sup>5</sup> According to Tomić, a theoretical model built on these theoretical and methodological foundations allows for a more systematic analysis of EU crisis management missions (Tomić, 2013). The previous chapter discussed the possible FPA approaches, and the chapter concluded that one must not create such strict classifications of approaches and that both a structure-oriented and an agency-oriented approach can lead to valuable findings and a better understanding of the 'big picture'. Tomić's model includes three levels of analysis: a global, societal level, an organisational level and an individual level. These three levels of analysis are inspired by classical FPA models and in particular the three levels of analysis of Graham Allison's seminal work, *Essence of Decision* (1971). While Allison presented the three levels of analysis separately and evaluated their individual benefits and limitations, the model proposed for analysis EU crisis management missions will focus on all three levels simultaneously.

The value added by this approach lies in the theoretical assumptions the model is based on. The theoretical foundations of the model, as mentioned above, are drawn from

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<sup>5</sup> The model developed by Tomić (also author of this thesis) was published in a 2013 article under the title "Coordinative Discourses in Brussels: An Agency-oriented Model of EU Foreign Policy Analysis" in a special issue of *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 14(2), 223–239. The text of the article pertaining to the model is used as part of this chapter in its entirety.

Vivian Schmidt’s ‘discursive institutionalism’ and Teun van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis and his theory of context. The cognitive element from van Dijk’s approach represents the main focus of the model and its explanatory value. The model focuses on the cognitive process of decision-makers, whether it is actors at the political level or actors at the strategic or operational level of crisis management. The theoretical elements that the model borrows from discursive institutionalism are Schmidt’s concepts of background ideational abilities and foreground discursive abilities. The combination of those two concepts with van Dijk’s cognitive interface, allows for the intermediate step of preference formation, which is missing from Schmidt’s original approach. The three levels of analysis are conceptualised as filters of information processing, from the broadest societal level to the individual cognitive level. The model contains a fourth layer, which represents the source of ‘raw’, unprocessed and unfiltered information, which has not been given meaning. This layer is labelled ‘material reality’ and is explained in more detail in the following sub-section of this chapter.




Figure 1. Levels of analysis for EU foreign policy in Tomić’s model

#### 4.5.1. Material reality

The analytical model relies on idealist ontological assumptions, namely that the reality ‘out there’ cannot exist without our perception and knowledge of it. However, the model does not completely disregard the notion of a material reality. Similarly to the Zen Buddhist koan which asks “if a tree falls in the forest and there is no one to hear it, does it make a sound”, the model deals with the problem of materialistic and idealistic ontological assumptions. A materialistic answer to the koan above would be that the tree does make a sound, because it creates sound waves that cut across the air. However, the idealist and constructivist ontological argument would be that the notion of sound is socially constructed by the recipient’s perception of those waves, after hitting the ear drum of the recipient. While the tree may fall without anyone’s knowledge of it, its fall only becomes reality after our perception and knowledge of the tree and the fall.

In the case of foreign policy, and in particular, EU foreign policy, the recipients in question are the foreign policy makers described in the previous section of this article. The reality ‘out there’ can range from events and situations like wars, political unrests, natural disasters like earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, bush fires to terrorist attacks, pollution or even scientific discoveries. These situations and events are necessary but not sufficient to represent a given reality in the perception of the actors involved in EU foreign policy decision-making. It is also necessary for these actors to be aware of the events and situations out there. In practice this awareness is present due to the established network of both national and Brussels-based intelligence agencies, but also the media, which in a globalized world becomes increasingly important for raising awareness.

However, the knowledge of the events and situations mentioned above is filtered through and by the various levels of recipients. This filtering leads to the epistemological question and assumption of the proposed model. The model relies on a constructivist and interpretivist epistemology. It assumes that the knowledge of the reality ‘out there’ by the actors involved in EU foreign policy making is influenced by existing social constructs. The following paragraphs will in more detail explain the cognitive process which is key to the proposed model for analysing EU foreign policy.

#### 4.5.2. Societal constructs of meaning

The social constructs that influence the way actors perceive and conceptualize the world around them can be either constraining or enabling. Constraint in this case refers to the

negative influence of socially constructed structures on an absolute objectivity in actors' perceptions of reality. These socially constructed structures include institutions defined in a broader sense and discourses as structures of meaning.

Institutions broadly defined (on a societal level) are social structures that influence individuals' behaviour and understandings of their environment. These structures can be patterns of behaviour, norms, different types of social rules and beliefs. Examples of institutions can vary from the concept of marriage to religion or, closer to the realm of international relations and foreign policy, to the principles of state sovereignty, international norms, diplomacy or the notion of a nation.

Closely linked to institutions in the broader sense are discourses as structured sets of meanings and carriers of ideas. Discourses are linked with actors' perceptions of reality, and their normative and cognitive ideas of action. Actions (or practice), ideas and norms become institutionalized and are reproduced in a given institutional context. Institutionalist approaches combined with discursive approaches can prove to provide better explanations of the origins and developments of actors' decisions, and in the context of this article, the origins and developments of foreign policies.

One of the proponents of such a combination is Vivien Schmidt and her discursive institutionalism, posited as the 'fourth new institutionalism' (Schmidt, 2008, 2010). Discursive institutionalism is a useful theoretical framework to understand a policy making process, because it bridges the explanatory gaps of the different strands of institutionalism: rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism. Discursive institutionalism takes into account both ideas and interests. Its definition of discourse includes both an ideational element (content of discourses) and a dynamic element (process of discursive action). Such a definition of discourse gives more freedom to actors in the structure-agency debate. Although discourses as structures of meaning can constrain actors in their choices of action, they can also enable actors to change the existing structures through the process of discourse (re)creation. The greater focus on agency, enables researches to understand the role of actors and their use of language in the policy making process.

Linking foreign policy analysis with discourse analysis is a methodologically challenging task. The proposition by Ole Waever posits discourse analysis not just as a methodological and analytical framework for foreign policy analysis, but as a theoretical framework as well, in which the definition of discourse falls towards the structuralist camp. Namely discourse is defined as a structure of meaning, and as Waever argues "structures of meaning can explain and elucidate foreign policy" (Waever, 2001, p.26). As the argument

follows, “discourses organize knowledge systematically, and thus delimit what can be said and what not” (Ibid., p.29). According to this approach discourse is understood as a precondition to actors’ statements. This approach decouples the use of language from the users of language. Instead, language is used when and where appropriate within a given structure of meanings.

Such a structuralist approach to discourse demonstrates weaknesses, because it focuses on the rules of the diffusion of meaning, but not necessarily on the creation of meaning. In other words, it falls back on the typical structure-agency conundrum, favouring the structure side of the debate. The question of where, when, and most importantly, how these structures came into being in the first place, inevitably poses itself. Therefore a more agent-oriented theoretical approach to discourse, like discursive institutionalism as described above can prove more useful in linking discourse analysis with foreign policy analysis. Foreign policy analysis, among other aspects, also focuses on the agent, whether it is a unified actor or a group of actors. In such an approach, discourse is seen as both product and precondition of statements. Discourse, in this view, is the carrier of an ever-changing set of meanings as well as the process in which meanings are reconstructed or preserved.

In foreign policy such an approach is particularly valuable because it allows for analysing both the content of discourse (the what) as well as the discursive process (the how and the why/when/where/who/to whom). A valuable contribution to the actual method of analysis of discourse in an agent-oriented approach comes from Teun van Dijk and his socio-cognitive approach to discourse analysis (2008). In this approach reality represents subjective experiences of the ‘objective’, material reality ‘out there.’ Such an approach posits that the structures of meaning (realities) are created by actors’ cognitive processes and reproduced or changed by discursive processes.

It can be equivocal to just say that discourses construct reality. The numerous approaches to discourse however do grant researchers freedom to define in greater length what the phrase ‘discourses create reality’ means. The understanding adopted by this thesis is that discourses construct knowledge, norms and values. Knowledge is simplistically seen as the conception of an individual or society of what is, and includes views and perceptions of reality and feelings and attitudes towards this reality. Norms and values are seen as the conception of individuals or a society of what should be. The existing knowledge and norms represent the ‘background ideational abilities’ of actors (see Schmidt, 2008, 2010). Focusing away from discourse as only a structure which constrains actors, Schmidt argues that the carriers of discourse are “sentient agents who construct their ideas conveyed through

discourse following a meaning-based logic of communication” (2008, p. 3). Actors use what Schmidt labels as their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ to react to the constraining (institutional and discursive) structures and to change them or at least adapt them to their preference.

#### 4.5.3. The individual level: cognition

The reality ‘out there’, events and situations, as well as institutions and discourses represent external processes which can generally be considered as context. Context is according to van Dijk (2008) a combination of both spatial-temporal situations (like a terrorist attack or piracy off the coast of Somalia) and social constructs institutions and discourses. The latter represent a layer through which information is filtered before it reaches actors’ cognitive process in the brain. Based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions explained above, as well as van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach, the proposed model of analysing EU’s foreign policy posits that contexts are not sufficient to understand the policy-making process. The very term ‘process’ implies a certain degree of (cognitive) processing. According to the proposed model, the processing (of information from the context) occurs on at least two levels – the individual level and the group level.

The first level is the individual level and occurs in the mind, or in more concrete terms, the brain of the individual. While cognitive psychology still struggles (and may do so in the distant future as well) with understanding how the human brain functions, one can simplify the process and divide it in three steps. The proposed model refers back to Schmidt’s notions of ‘background ideational abilities’ and ‘foreground discursive abilities’ but complements them with an intermediate stage of the actual preference formation.

The notion of ‘background ideational ability’ (BIA) invites for some clarification. The term itself seems to imply an ability to have background ideas. While the term may be imprecise, it implies the ability to understand the external processes (events, situations, institutions and discourses) and to manage prior knowledge and experiences by aligning them with the received external impulses. This phase of the cognitive process constantly updates prior knowledge with new external influences, which then becomes new knowledge. This knowledge will become prior knowledge in the next cycle of this mental process. This step of the cognitive process is also responsible to give meaning to the acquired knowledge. For this, the brain relies on prior meanings, which are socially constructed inter-subjective meanings.

The brain also relies on linguistic structures and rules like grammar, semantics and pragmatics.

Both the knowledge acquisition and updating as well the meaning assignment processes constitute what in cognitive psychology is referred to as mental models, or in socio-cognitive approaches like that of van Dijk, as context models (2008). Context models represent the basis of further cognitive processing of the reality ‘out there’. The next step, which the proposed model of this article introduces as an addition to Schmidt’s background-foreground model is the phase of preference formation (PF). This phase can be labelled as the ‘moment of choice’. Based on the existing prior knowledge and the positions of the knowledge in its respective context model, the individual has the ability to choose a preferred action (or reaction) in relation to the acquired information and its position in the relevant context models from the previous mental phase.

Introducing this step into the model of analysis enables actors to retain their ability of choice. However, unlike rational choice models, the proposed model stresses the subjectivity of what is understood as ‘rationality’ in the rational choice models. The choices made by actors are indeed influenced by an array of factors, including external processes and internal processing of those processes. Different (individual) interests, ideas and wants arise at this level depending on individual constellations of prior knowledge and context models. It is at this level that preferences are formed and choices are made. As a caveat, subjectivity or individuality in the proposed model is conceptualized as a unique, individual constellation of context models. The proposed model does not account for such notions as personality, due to the both conceptual and empirical difficulties this notion creates.

Finally, once the context models have been compiled by the background ideational abilities and based on these context models preferences and choices have been clarified, the actors then can communicate their choices of action (or reaction) by using their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ (FDA). These abilities entail several communicative, rhetorical and linguistic choices and include choices of words, intonation, ethos and pathos, rhetorical devices, body language, etc. These abilities differ from individual to individual. The levels of persuasion, use of rhetoric and framing and priming abilities constitute the sum of acquired skills, which individuals use to achieve their previously formed preferences through communicative and discursive means.

#### 4.5.4. The group/organizational level



There is, however, another level of information processing in the EU foreign policy-making process, namely the group level or organizational level. As the different steps at the individual process of cognition, the organizational level has several phases of filtering external processes.

The first step is the individual within a group. The complexities of individuals' information processing are described above. It is however the final of the three internal individual steps that is relevant for the organizational level. The communicative and discursive actions of individuals brought about by their 'foreground discursive abilities' represent the individual contributions to the group's collective or inter-subjective process of social cognition. To avoid terminological confusion, the learning process of a group will henceforth be referred to as the process of organizational learning or group learning, in contrast to an individual's process of cognition.

The nature of interaction between individuals defines the nature of group dynamics. The principles in the discursive activity in the institutional context of CFSP/CSDP in Brussels are consensus, information-sharing and coordination. Accordingly, the literature on socialization (Nuttall, 1992, 2000; Lewis, 2005; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Smith, M.E., 2004; Tonra 2003; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006) will argue that through recurring interaction based on these principles over a longer period of time, the actors in such institutional contexts will develop shared values, beliefs, ideas, and consequentially interests (although not all actors wish to confess to these developments). The peculiarity of the CFSP/CSDP is the interplay between national, member states' interests and the common interest constructed through coordination of national representatives. As described above, "national interests are being transformed within a European context" (Tonra, 2000, p.159).

The individuals' contributions to the group in the form of communicative and discursive action meet the second filter within the group level of processing external processes. This level is the institutional level, with the term 'institution' being narrowly defined. Institutions in the narrow definition differ from institutions defined broadly in the paragraphs above. Institutions in the narrow sense are more similar if not synonymous with organizations.<sup>6</sup> Unlike institutions defined more broadly, institutions in the narrow sense are not socially constructed rules of behaviour and norms on a broad societal scale. Instead, institutions in the narrow sense are defined as the set of organizational rules of procedure,

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<sup>6</sup> For a more comprehensive account of the relations between institutions and organizations see Scott, 2007

hierarchies of power, administrative rights and responsibilities, access to information (or intelligence in a foreign policy context), level of clearance, etc.

At this phase of organizational learning the different individual inputs to the policy process are combined with the institutional dynamics in a strictly institutional sense. What is told to whom, how, when and at what level is determined by the institutional formal rules.

There is however a third layer of information processing. The individual inputs are not only confronted with narrowly defined and formal institutional rules, but also with collective institutional informal rules, defined more broadly than the narrow definition in the previous two paragraphs but less broadly understood as the aforementioned socially constructed institutions on a broader, societal level. These institutions are in turn also constructed, but at the level of the organization. The sets of rules, beliefs, norms and world-views include the organization's set of inter-subjective meanings, its self-image and inter-subjective world-views. These institutions are common to the organization but may differ from institutions outside of the organization. They may however be shared by other related organizations, which is relevant for the institutional setting of EU foreign policy making.

#### **4.6. Proposing an operational model for the analysis of EU crisis management**

The empirical application of Tomić's model requires certain conditions to produce any significant findings. The biggest problem is the identification of context models at the collective and individual level of cognition. As van Dijk warned, "methodologically, this implies that one would need not only large numbers of very similar communicative events and observations, but also detailed insight into the ways the participants define such situations. No wonder generalizations are hard to find!" (van Dijk, 2008, p.134). A possible solution is to gain 'access' to actors' context-models from autobiography and subsequent interviews (the further away on a time-scale, the less reliable and significant they become). Furthermore, when analysing the relationship between structures of meaning and the discursive (re)creations of those structures, "a direct, causal relationship is theoretically and empirically impossible," which is why context models as an interface were added into the equation (van Dijk, 2008, p.221).

Further problems with the empirical application of Tomić's model above is that, even if a sense of loosely understood causation and co-variation can be identified, the model does not offer propositions regarding the direction of such influences. The model in its purely

abstract form above implies a linear path of information process, from the ‘material reality’, through the different layers of information processing and meaning construction. In an empirical setting, such ideal linear influences are incredibly rare, especially in a crisis management context within the overly complex institutional setup of the EU. Therefore, in order to evaluate the feasibility of the analytical model proposed in this chapter and to apply it to the analysis of the EU’s policy towards the Horn of Africa and the issue of Somali piracy, the model needs to be operationalised to fit the empirical research agenda. In particular, the case studies ask the research question of this thesis of where EU CSDP missions come from. The complexity of CFSP/CSDP’s policy-making structure and the frequently informal nature of coordination make it difficult for academics to follow the exact channels of discursive action within the Brussels institutional context. In particular, while the model proposed above can apply to any policy-making process, EU CSDP missions fall into a more niche area of EU’s external action, namely crisis management. The term is not just used for purposes of precision but also for easier operationalization of the research.


Namely, analysing EU crisis management requires a much more in-depth understanding of concepts, definitions, actors, institutional design and institutional mechanisms of the policy-making process itself. The goal is to examine the role of actors in the committees, working groups and agencies responsible for policy preparation on the strategic level and political level respectively, but also their coordination across these two levels of policy making. It is therefore necessary to understand both the formal and informal processes surrounding EU crisis management. Chapter 5 of this thesis will be dedicated for this purpose.

Besides sharing the processes involved in crisis management, the three case studies also share the general context of Somalia, which in the perspective of the model represents the material reality ‘out there’. In the empirical operationalization of model the idea of Somalia, namely the idea of Somalia as a failed state, also represents the ‘reality out there’, as it is an image, and a meta-narrative that is adopted by both the majority of academics and practitioners. Chapter 6 will dedicate sufficient space in explaining the events and dynamics that created this meta-narrative. However, the material reality ‘out there’, relevant for the empirical case studies of this thesis, does not just consist of the context of Somalia but also the context of the EU’s political, economic and institutional context. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will provide the necessary understanding to both the analyst and the reader of the general institutional context of the case studies (Chapter 5) and the general context of the Somali problem (Chapter 6).

The following three levels of analysis of Tomić's model become too complex and abstract when applying them to the EU's crisis management process, which is why the structure of the case studies requires certain adaptation stemming from empirical and methodological considerations. To operationalise the societal level of analysis from the model in the case of EU crisis management, one must ask what the society is in crisis management. Noting the argument above, that the public is excluded from foreign policy making, one can understand the society in terms of a society of states. In the empirical analysis of the three case studies, the thesis will refer to this level as the international dimension. In particular, the international dimension will include the constructs of meaning developed at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), more precisely in the discourses and narratives of the UNSC Resolutions. Not only do UNSC Resolutions represent the discourse on the global level, but they are also cited as the legal basis for EU CSDP missions in key EU documents. Their reference in key EU documents indicates the impact UN documents have on the EU decision-making process, be it for legal and moral justification of EU action, or mere formality. The UNSC Resolutions are therefore a viable source for analysis of the actors' cognitive processing of world affairs.

The biggest obstacle in the operationalization of the model for analysing EU crisis management is the blurred, empirically determined border between organisational learning and cognition on the one hand and individual cognition and learning on the other. For this reason, the structure of the case studies will include an analytical category, labelled 'cognitive dimension', which will include both a focus on collective cognition and individual cognition. The fine analysis, mostly of interview data, will search for indicators like the use of 'we' vis-à-vis 'I', but in practice, actors use these interchangeably.

As Tomić's model proposes, organisations are affected and discursively create institutions in a broader sense of structures within these organisations. In the empirical application of the model, on the political level of policy-making these institutions will take the form of political discussion points, which will influence further discourse on the overall missions. On the strategic and operational level, these structures will take the form of procedures, approaches, templates and methodologies of problem-solving and crisis management planning. In the three case studies, this analytical category will be labelled as the organisational dimension.



**Figure 2. Operational model of analysis**

By operationalizing the Tomić’s model for the analysis of EU crisis management in this way, the adapted model now consists of three dimensions and two structure-agency cycles. The international dimension (A) includes the UNSC narratives and possible material factors, like events and other triggers. The organisational dimension (B) includes the institutional analysis and focuses on the political and the strategic/operational level of policy-making. The cognitive level (C), as discussed above, includes the socio-cognitive analysis of the collective and the individual cognition, respectively. The operational model includes two structure and agency loops and avoids the linearity issue of the original abstract model of information processing. The directions of causality and impact go both ways, in the sense that structure influences agents, who through their cognitive abilities respond and creates new structures. Based on the evidence and the varying degrees of influence from one dimension to another, the case studies will infer overall conclusions on the relevance of factors that shaped the respective EU missions and eventually led to their deployment. For the sake of clarity, the empirical case study chapters will be structured according to the operational model.

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# Chapter 5. Understanding the EU crisis management process

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## 5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the two theoretical foundations of a cognitive and institutional model of EU foreign policy analysis. After describing the model and the linkages between the three levels of analysis and presenting the operationalization of the model, the previous chapter clarified that, in order to apply the model to the analysis of the three EU crisis management missions, one must trace the process of decision-making and the different channels of discursive action and construction of meanings. In order to do that, researchers must first familiarise themselves with the formal and informal processes of crisis management, including the formal and informal roles of actors and institutions understood in a broader sense.

In the following section, this chapter will first describe the actors involved in the crisis management process and their hierarchy. The section will follow with an overview of the crisis management procedure, established in 2003, and which were under review at the time of writing of this chapter. The next section of the chapter will discuss the different practical roles played by informality, documentation, lesson-learning and strategic planning. These roles will be referred to in the analysis of the three case studies and will serve as indicators of the causal mechanisms related to the model of analysis.

## 5.2. The crisis management process ‘on paper’

To examine the EU foreign policy process one primarily needs to identify the actual actors involved in the policy making. At the final stages of the EU foreign policy process, the decisions are made based on consensus at the intergovernmental level at the Council of Ministers. However, as some authors have pointed out, the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy is fading and is being replaced by a more socialized and integrated, function-oriented EU foreign policy bureaucracy with a common self-identity and purpose (Bickerton, 2011a, 2011b; Tonra 2004; Vanhoonacker et. al., 2010; Howorth, 2004, 2011).

### 5.2.1. The actors

Under such developments the role of the Council is overshadowed by the role of organizations consisting of seconded officials, diplomats and experts. The main institutions responsible for identifying issues, setting the agenda and framing policy ideas are the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and its advisory bodies: the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).

The PSC is “de facto the highest administrative body in the ESDP” (Vanhoonacker et al., 2010, p.9) and prepares the dossiers related to foreign and security policy for the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which then prepares the agenda and dossiers for the Council meetings. The PSC, according to the Lisbon Treaty “shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations” (Lisbon Treaty, European Union, 2012c, pp. 36-7). The PSC is helped by the Politico-Military Group (consisting of defence counsellors and diplomats), the Nicolaidis group, which sets the agenda for the PSC and the EUMC, which provides recommendations and advice on military matters. The EUMC is the highest military body in the ESDP. It consists of Chiefs of Defence of member states who are often represented by their Military Representatives. The EUMC is assisted by the EUMC working group and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMS consists of military and civilian experts seconded by the member states and were integrated in the General Secretariat of the Council but have, after the Lisbon Treaty, been integrated into the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The CSDP structures responsible for civilian aspects of the policy include the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). CIVCOM consists of ambassadors from the member states and is in some regards the equivalent of the EUMC, because it gives recommendations and advice to the PSC regarding civilian operations. CIVCOM is assisted by the CPCC, which was integrated in the Council Secretariat and is now part of the EEAS.

Besides the specialized institutions for military and civilian aspects respectively, the CFSP/CSDP benefits from the help of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). The CMPD was created in 2009 and integrated into the EEAS with the purpose of representing a single strategic planning structure in the CSDP. Besides these institutions, there are other preparatory bodies and actors involved in the early stages of the policy making

process. Working groups consist of members from the Permanent Representations of Member States in Brussels and are in charge of drafting and formulating policy advice. The EEAS and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (currently Federica Mogherini) are important actors in coordinating EU's foreign policy both vertically (between member states and the EU level) and horizontally (among institutions). Federica Mogherini replaced Catherine Ashton, who was responsible of establishing the EEAS. The EEAS and Ashton replaced the former High Representative and those bodies of the General Secretariat of the Council in charge of CFSP/CSDP, which have been transferred to the EEAS, and had proven as important in the CFSP/CSDP policy process in the past. (Dijkstra, 2008, 2010) The EEAS comprises staff from the Council Secretariat, the Commission as well as seconded officials from Member States. Its corporate board and its various managing directorates assist the aforementioned actors with information gathering and processing. The European Union has also set up three CFSP/CSDP agencies to provide expertise, analyses and information: The European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC).

### 5.2.2. The process

The EU crisis management procedure was formalized in the Note 11127/03 from the Council Secretariat to the delegations under the subject "Suggestions for Procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU Crisis Management" (2003). This document describes the six phases of crisis management, including military, civilian or civilian-military (civ-mil) crisis management. The process of crisis management has up to this day remained similar, with changes which will be described in this subsection.

The first phase of the crisis management process is labeled the 'routine phase'. Due to the existing emphasis on early warning and monitoring the situation in the world, the PSC is in constant routine contact with Member States (MS), the Commission and the different intelligence organizations, like the Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Satellite Centre and MS intelligence organizations, as well as the different geographical desks both within the EEAS (previously in the Council Secretariat) and the working groups (WG) of the Council. This allows the PSC to judge a given situation and to decide on the necessity of EU action towards the given situation. If the PSC decides that the EU should manage a crisis situation, the PSC



then takes action and initiates the next phase, labeled ‘Crisis Build-up/Elaboration of the Draft CMC’.

This next phase of the crisis management process starts with the drafting of the Crisis Management concept (CMC). In the early years of formalized crisis management, the CMCs were drafted by an ad-hoc structure for inter-service co-ordination called the Crisis Response Co-ordination Team (CRCT). The CRCT was replaced by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), which was established in 2009 as the standing civilian-military strategic planning structure for the CSDP. The CMPD is responsible for drafting the CMCs and are assisted by the EUMS, which provide military advice approved by the EUMC. The CMPD is further assisted by the CPCC, which provides advice on civilian matters with the consent of the CIVCOM. Once the CMC is drafted it is presented to the PSC, which evaluates all the opinions and forwards the CMC to the Council. If the Council approves the CMC, the third phase of more detailed planning is initiated.

The third phase labeled ‘Approval of the Crisis Management Concept and Development of Strategic Options’ includes the development of two documents of the planning stage of crisis management, which enables the Operation Commander (OpCdr) to develop the Concept of Operation (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN). The two documents in question are the strategic options and initiating directives. Depending on the type of mission, the different bodies develop the military, police and civilian strategic options respectively. The EUMS develops and prioritizes the military strategic options (MSOs), which is then reviewed by the EUMC and evaluated by the PSC, after which the proposed MSO is recommended to the Council for approval. The Police Unit is in charge of developing the police strategic options (PSOs) and the CPCC develops and prioritizes other civilian strategic options (CSOs). The CIVCOM reviews the PSOs and other CSOs, forwards them to the PSC, which recommends a PSO/CSO to the Council for approval.

After the Council approves the MSO, PSO or CSO respectively, the Council appoints the Operation Commander (OpCdr) or in recent cases the Mission Commander (MCdr) and designates an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and the Force Commander in charge of military or police command and control. The European Union currently does not possess a permanent OHQ, but uses the facilities of national operational headquarters of five of its member states (Northwood in the UK, Mont Valerien, Paris in France, Rome in Italy, Potsdam in Germany and Larissa in Greece).

Once the MSO, PSO or CSO are approved and the operational staff and facilities are designated by the Council, the PSC instructs the EUMC and EUMS for military operations or

the CIVCOM and CPCC for civilian operations to assist the OpCdr or Head of Mission (HoM, for civilian operations) to develop the CONOPS. The CONOPS details and outlines the situation of the crisis on the ground and presents the mission objectives. This document goes into great detail and represents the basis for the development of the OPLAN.

The OpCdr in the case of military operations and the HoM in the case of civilians/police missions prepare the draft OPLAN and the necessary Rules of Engagement (RoE) based on and referring to the previous documents. The draft OPLAN is forwarded up the structure and is evaluated by the EUMC and EUMS or the CIVCOM and CPCC respectively before, who then forward the OPLAN with recommendations to the PSC. The PSC considers the draft OPLAN and if agreed on submits it to the Council for approval. The approval of the OPLAN by the Council is then followed by the Council's decision to launch the operation.




Figure 3. The Crisis Management Process. Source: European Union, 2008a, p. 11

### 5.3. The crisis management process ‘in practice’

The previous section of this chapter described the formal process of developing an EU crisis management operation, from the ‘routine phase’ of monitoring and information gathering up to the Council decision to deploy the mission. The process described represents the formal template that should be followed for all EU missions, but when applied in practice, there can be variations to the template. This section will focus on the reflections of practitioners (at both the political and technical level) on the informal process of crisis management.

#### 5.3.1. The role of informality

As one practitioner describes it, “it’s an interesting process, and I’d say it’s quite a political process. There is not really a hard, fast rule about how missions and operations are generated from the first idea, if you like” (Interview 4). Accordingly, there are also no fast and clear definitions of what constitutes a crisis that needs managing by the EU. As one practitioner explains, “If politicians think that someone needs to do something, then you have a crisis. Things can simmer for decades and nobody calls it a crisis and then someone agrees, or many agree that something needs to be done and suddenly you have a crisis” (Interview 2). A crisis can be triggered by extraordinary events, and as a practitioner explains, “it’s just a connotation or perception” (Ibid.). However, while extraordinary events are necessary, they are not a sufficient ‘trigger’ for deploying EU missions. The interviewees stressed that the interest of the EU’s member states in a certain country or area in the world, alongside the ‘triggers’ of the international dimension (particular events, UN resolutions and calls for help) constitute the origins of EU missions. “The origins are very different, but at all stages, these issues, you normally find that the embryo comes from a limited number of member states” (Interview 1). As confirmed by another practitioner at the political level, “there will often be a situation developing in whichever country it is in the world or region, which is of increasing concern to various member states, usually at least a few member states, but sometimes only one, if it’s a particular country, which is dear to a member state” (Interview 4).

As one practitioner explains however, there are cases in which public opinion represents a strong impetus for member states to act:

*It’s an obvious situation, like Libya, you know, a major crisis, humanitarian crisis that was staring you in the face really, and public opinion inevitably has an impact on*

*this and there was a strong sense in the European public opinion at the time that the European Union as well as NATO should be fulfilling its role here in terms of a country that is geographically extremely close to some members of the European Union, like Malta, it's a relatively short hop away from the north coast of Libya for instance. So, I think that sort of public opinion, that political dynamic [...] that manifests itself through discussion in the PSC, discussion at a political level at the Foreign Affairs Council, the European Council if needs be, that leads then to the seeds of what might be a practical operation (Interview 1).*

While the sources of the concern usually originate from the member states, they can also be raised by the High Representative and within the EEAS, and sometimes even the European Commission or the European Parliament, but as one practitioner reiterates “the question is not so important of who brought it up first but basically things like that emerge, coming to the attention of nations and then are more or less played down or played up. And if they are played up they become a crisis” (Interview 2).

Once there is an interest from one or more member states, an informal process will ensue before more concrete actions are taken. As described by one practitioner, the fora of informal discussions may vary:

*What will happen, especially since the formation of the External Action Service, is that there will be a series of usually quite informal discussions at the beginning [...] and it will be raised by member states within the PSC, or within the PMG, or indeed within CIVCOM, as appropriate, depending on whether it's looking like a civilian or a military intervention. And there will be a kind of informal gathering of momentum behind it and member states would push for that to be recognized as an area, which needs attention, and suggest that EEAS, in the first instance, task the CMPD to consider what a CSDP intervention might look like. There'd probably be an informal discussion between member states, including the EEAS (Interview 4).*

While informal political discussions occur at various levels, it is at the level of the PSC that they acquire sufficient weight and importance required for more concrete actions. The interested member state(s) therefore aims to convince as many other member states as possible of getting the issue onto the PSC agenda. With the change in the Lisbon Treaty of introducing a permanent chair of the PSC, the process has become more streamlined, as member states are able to approach the permanent PSC chair and convince him/her of the importance of the issue they wish to push forward. As a practitioner describes, “for [an issue] to go onto the agenda of the PSC the Chair would need to be convinced, and the Secretariat convinced that this is something that merits the PSC's attention. But if it's an issue of suitable

weight and importance, then that would not be a necessarily difficult conversation” (Interview 4).

The PSC chair (at the time of writing of this thesis), Walter Stevens, is therefore responsible for setting the agenda and informing the PSC ambassadors of the agenda. The PSC agenda is known in advance. As one practitioner explains: “The agenda of the PSC is something that you get to know normally a day before, sometimes it’s a few days before, but I would say the routine is a day in advance, which of course doesn’t make it too easy to prepare for substantially. Sometimes it is two days in advance, but it’s rather short term” (Interview 2).

Besides setting and distributing the agenda, the PSC chair is also responsible for the distribution of preparatory documents for the PSC discussions. The chair “basically provides for papers and then these papers are being discussed. The normal mode is that the papers are received days before, hopefully... sometimes, only hours before, but normally days before” (Ibid.). Due to the high frequency of PSC meetings and the short time of preparation for discussions, the PSC ambassadors have trust in and rely on the work of working groups. The working groups are preparing the documents and “ideally they should agree on all aspects of documents [...] but usually this is not the case and the ambassadors have to decide to have some kind of compromise. [...] Sometimes even the ambassadors are not enough and the ministers decide about some issue. But we always try to make simple alternatives, so the ministers don't have to work on these documents in so much detail.” (Interview 3) The EEAS is then in charge of collating the different documents and the PSC forwards the documents to the member state representations.

The documents are then discussed at the PSC meetings and the normal procedure is that the chair of the PSC summarizes the discussion in the form of the so-called PSC conclusions. Unlike at NATO, where all the papers get revised and agreed on, “at the EU, the services provide the paper, the paper is being discussed, the conclusion is being done by the chair and is submitted by the chair, and finally these conclusions need to be agreed.” (Interview 2) As one practitioner explains:

*The papers really serve as food for thought [...] and the consensus is being brought forward by these PSC conclusions – an internal document, but that’s where all nations have to agree. So the chair would never just issue his memories of what took place. The PSC conclusions are what was really concluded. That’s absolutely an internal thing; the only thing that surfaces [are] the conclusions that then go to the Council, to the Foreign Affairs Council. (Ibid.)*

The previous quote points out one of the major difficulties researchers face when investigating the political discussions at and below the PSC level, namely the internal nature of the discussions and the documents these discussions are based on. “Some of [these documents] end up on the classified network, so it would be impossible to find unless they’ve been, after some amount of time declassified, after many years have passed” (Interview 4). Researchers in this case have to rely on and assume interviewees’ openness to disclose some details from the discussions and their accurate recollection of these details.

The highly political and informal process is, however, key in understanding the roots of CSDP missions. Besides the formal reason of approving the decision to deploy a mission, CSDP missions also necessitate the informal agreement of member states that action is required. As one practitioner explains, there is “no more the will to send people around. Sometimes there is simply no interest, maybe [from] one or two countries. Sometimes [there are] differing interests, so [it is] difficult for a decision to evolve into action” (Interview 3). To summarize, this process that involves primarily the member states, but also the EEAS and in some cases the European Commission and the European Parliament is at its earliest stages quite informal. However, “it would become more formalized, as it is discussed in the PSC, because then you have conclusions, not always operational conclusions, but there would be conclusions noting the discussion. So once it’s on the record in that way, then tasking will follow” (Interview 4). The process is then moved to the operational level of policy-making, in which the discussions become more technical and rely on an operational logic rather than a political one. As one practitioner explains, “once you start taking action then you’re kind of getting into the process [...] but the very start of the process would be those kind of informal discussions.” (Ibid.)

### 5.3.2. The role of documents

Once the political discussions are moved to the operational and strategic level, where the ideas, interests, risk assessments, etc. are materialised in the form of texts in official documents. These documents, besides serving as references and heuristics in the collective cognition of CSDP actors, can also serve as persuasion tools, depending on the extent to which these documents are perceived as key references in the policy making process.

The degree to which individuals recognize the importance of documents varies, but there is a collective sense of the importance of the institutionalized concepts and procedures

that these documents carry. These documents can be non-binding or binding. As one practitioner explains, “many papers are written for working groups and committees, but the only papers that really hit the surface are the legal instruments and these are being done by the [Foreign Relations (RELEX) Counsellors Working Party], and these documents are what I understand as binding documents. All the others are basically working papers, but the binding papers need to be sorted out by people with an EU legal background.” (Interview 2)

Internal documents that do not reach the RELEX working group are still relevant however. Concept documents streamline collective cognition and develop operational context models. They create templates, methodologies and standard operating procedures that ease and shorten the preference formation phase of the collective. Templates are more suitable in operational decision-making than at the political level. As one practitioner explains:

*Our position is that [...] templates would have a new and a bigger role to play than in the past. Of course, we in the military understand that not every civilian is really happy about templates being used. They very often accuse us of checklist mentality – templates and checklists are basically the same thing. [...] So we need to be careful there not to suggest something that is immediately done away with as militaristic. We would love to see more templates, for CMC, for CONOPS, for OPLAN, [...] in order to not forget something that is important. [...] There is a big difference between an organization that has always been working on templates and an organization that says what they would do ‘in the case of’ and then leave it at that (Interview 2).*

The micro-level institutions created by documents also become the ‘foreground discursive abilities’ of certain groups within CSDP circles. They become part of the language of expertise, which provides greater ‘power’ of persuasion to the actors that have a better understanding of them. One example is the daily use of acronyms within Brussels. As one practitioner reflects, “[acronyms] get institutionalized, as many acronyms do, through use. When I arrived here, most of them made some degree of sense, a lot of them were complete nonsense and it does takes a while to understand the different terminologies that are used” (Interview 4).

Time and use is key to the institutionalization of procedures and increasing the role of documents as carriers of institutionalized knowledge. The more frequently and more widely a document is referenced, the greater the role it plays in subsequent cognitive processes of the different actors within Brussels. In the case of the CMC, one practitioner reflects on the importance of this document:

*A Crisis Management Concept, I would say, is not really widely known outside of CSDP circles. It doesn't have the resonance in a way that other documents, like kind of major EU or major UN and NATO documents might. Once you get into this sort of niche area it doesn't have a very wide understanding outside of those who work quite closely with it. But that said, it does now have a currency within [...] CSDP circles. Certainly the CMC has quite quickly become a document, which is being recognized as being important for what it is. (Interview 4)*

According to one practitioner, the CMC has two main roles – to translate the political will of member states into directions for a CSDP mission, and to “have enough flesh on the bones to allow for further planning, just enough detail. It also has to be realistic” (Interview 8).

Another set of important policy documents are option papers. “Option papers are estimations. They constrain operational cooperation. [They are] copied into the CMC, so the CMC should make sure not to limit too much” (Interview 8). The option papers are technical in nature and written using established methodologies, and “often do not take into account the political. Sometimes they do, when it's an obvious issue. Sometimes the EEAS tries to go ahead with their own vision of [the issue], which sometimes causes problems” (Interview 3).

All official documents must undergo the approval of the PSC to be accepted for further consideration in the different stages of the policy process or to be amended. When the PSC receives a draft document for discussions, changes to the documents can be made at the same time. “In practice, the chairman, and his own staff write down many, many corrections, and then some low level employee types them up. Normally, drafts get destroyed if they belong to the EEAS. The only way to know who changes what, which is not very obvious from the papers, is to participate and observe the discussions in the room (Interview 3).

At this stage, the text of documents can also be used as leverage in negotiations by some member states that disagree with the wording of the documents. One practitioner explains how documents can be used as leverage for negotiations: “When you have to go into text work, you have to debate the text, and now [an ambassador can] ask ‘I know that you don't like it, but would you make such problems that we can't adopt it?’, and you can end up with long nights of negotiations” (Interview 15).

### 5.3.3. The role of lessons and transparency

As early as 2003, based on a report by Javier Solana, the SG/HR at the time, lessons learned and best practices were “identified as a top priority”. According to an internal Council



document, “such capacity is needed in order to start co-operation and exchange of experiences which could improve ongoing planning efforts” (European Union, 2003, p. 4). Lessons learned from previous experience were at first referred to only informally, but the emphasis on co-operation and coordination, led to an institutionalisation of learning lessons and the establishment of the lessons learned (LL) process. The civilian structures and military structures initially developed their own lessons-learned methodologies. The EUMS drew inspiration from NATO’s lessons learned methodology, which it focused on learning their lessons from EU Battlegroups. The 2005 document, “BG Lessons Learned Methodology” (European Union, 2012a) defined lessons learned in the form of ‘best practices’. According to the documents, “Best Practice is an activity which conventional wisdom regards as more effective at delivering a particular outcome than any other technique” (European Union, 2012a, p. 6).

The most ambitious attempt to institutionalise lessons learning was the adoption of the Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons learned and best practices in civilian ESDP missions on the 24<sup>th</sup> of October 2008. The main goal of the document was “to ensure that lessons identified will be learned and implemented, as much as it is feasible, and thus, that they will be of use for future missions. To ensure that the learning cycle is complete, a further step is to transform the lessons learned into new or revised policies, working methods and best practices and to implement and disseminate them” (European Union, 2008b, p. 3). Furthermore, according to a military methodology, Lessons Learned “Questionnaires should follow standard template to facilitate comparison between missions” (European Union, 2008b, p. 5).

The lessons identified and potentially learned and implemented are predominantly either related to lessons from the field and issues concerning the mandate and theme of the respective mission or lessons learned about the respective geographical area. However, “while lessons are identified and learned in various (thematic) areas, the political and strategic level that involves decision-making processes, concept development, and the writing of mission mandates is still under-represented in explicit lesson learned documentation” (European Parliament, 2012, p. 32).

One of the main reasons for the slow implementation of the lessons learned process is the secretive and protectionist nature of the crisis management process. While from a strategic, military perspective, such a limitation is warranted and desired, “this restriction means lessons learned documents are available only to staff within a limited number of EU bodies, mainly EEAS structures. This protectionist approach can get in the way of

institutional and horizontal learning, as documents cannot reach relevant people, including EU staff outside of the crisis management structures” (European Parliament, 2012, p. 22).

The need for transparency is justified by the fact that lessons learned “are created to reduce the waste of resources by eliminating duplication of effort; to benefit from collective wisdom and to create new knowledge as a benefit of the sharing process” and that “the nature of some lessons is frequently linked to difficult (political), sensitive and often re-occurring issues, which may require cross-agency solutions” (European Union, 2012a, p. 10).

#### 5.3.4. The role of the strategic planner

The EEAS, as part of its lessons learning process, has allowed its staff to write reflective papers regarding their understanding of self as either an individual, performing their respective job, or as an organisation as a whole. These papers are available on the webpage of the EEAS under the name ‘Reflection corner’. Among the few reflective papers on the webpage are two papers by Marcus Houben from the CMPD. These two papers, titled ‘The Strategic Imagination: Reflections on an ISPD approach to strategic planning’ and ‘The Sense of Reality: On general planning rules and the specifics of a crisis’, represent a valuable source for understanding the role and the expected mind-set of strategic planners. In the context of the model presented in the previous chapter, these reflective papers provide the analyst with closer insight into subjective and possible intersubjective context models of strategic planners.

In his first paper, Houben discusses two notions, namely the notion of ‘strategic imagination’ of strategic planners and the ‘logic of the architect’. Similarly, Houben reflects on the Integrated Strategic Planning Division (ISPD) within the CMPD and refers to it as the ‘design department’ of CMPD. He explains the expectations of what a strategist ought to do. First of all,

*“strategic planning needs to consider the whole picture, not just a segment. Secondly, strategic planning needs to take the long view, i.e. the entire mission and the long(er) term consequences of engagement through a CSDP action. And thirdly, strategic planning needs to be contextual, the individual, specific CSDP action must be placed against the background of the effect on the overall society, or within the framework of international action or within an EU-wide comprehensive approach (Houben, n.d.b, p. 2).*

Houben explains that these tasks are more aligned with a strategic planner's 'logic of the architect', which stands in contrast with the 'logic of the builder', which he attributes to operational planners. This position reveals an implied self-perception as being both more responsible but also more important than the 'builders', namely the operational planners. To summarise his point, Houben stated that "planning at the strategic is mainly concerned with the 'why' and the 'what' of a mission" and that "planning at the operational level [deals] mainly with the 'how' (Ibid., p. 3).

In this paper, Houben further explains that at the heart of the ISPD is the notion of 'strategic imagination'. He draws inspiration from the notion of 'sociological imagination' by Charles Wright Mills, which is defined as the ability to link individual experiences to larger social structures or patterns during sociological research. Analogous to this notion, the 'strategic imagination' is defined as "the ability to imagine the (strategic) 'fit' of a design of a CSDP mission within a given context" and the "imagined view that allows you to connect individual experiences with social structures and context" (Ibid., p. 3).

Houben's notions fit surprisingly well with the terminology employed in the proposed model of analysis, which simplifies the presentation of the case studies, in which these notions will be used to describe these logics of individuals involved in the strategic planning of the three EU missions.

Houben's second paper directly follows the first one and discusses another ability strategic planners ought to possess. In his second paper, Houben reflects on knowledge and expertise as a prerequisite for using the abilities of strategic imagination and following the logic of the architect. Houben asks whether strategic planners 'know all that needs to be known'. (Houben, n.d.c, p. 1) He argues that "an acute (and realistic) sense of reality is key for strategic planning" (Ibid.). The sense of reality is closely linked to the ability of linking previous experience to social structures and context, namely understanding the uniqueness of certain crisis by comparing it to other cases from the past and asking "what makes this crisis or situation different?" As Houben argues, "it is the job of the strategic planner to see or recognize these differences" (Ibid., p. 3).

In particular, as Houben further elaborates, the 'sense of reality' actually means "understanding the particulars or specifics of a specific crisis and conversely the capacity to correctly assess to what extent general planning rules can be applied, and to assess correctly what can work and what not in that particular situation" (Ibid., p. 4). In this sense, while acknowledging the value of general rules, Houben argues that "it is the expertise or skill of

the strategic planner to (be able to) decide to what extent what rule can be applied to a specific case” (Ibid., p. 5)

These two papers indicate that the subjective (and possible, inter-subjective) self-perception of strategic planners is one of an important, thinking, strategic and creative (‘imaginative’) actor in the crisis management process. The notion that strategic planners should recognise when to use general rules and when to ignore them portrays a growing degree of freedom of action at the strategic level of crisis management. This section, besides understanding the role of strategic planners and their potential mind-set, also provides for useful concepts, which are in line with the terminology used in the proposed model of analysis, and that can be used in the analysis to refer to strategic planners’ self-perceptions and context models.

#### **5.4. Conclusion**

This chapter aimed at familiarising the reader with the complex crisis management process and the formal and informal channels of discursive action and meaning construction. In the first section, the chapter outlined the key actors of EU crisis management and their formal relationships between each other. This section also performed the cumbersome task of allowing the reader to get accustomed with the great number of acronyms used in the language of EU crisis management. The second section of this chapter added even more acronyms to the list, and also presented the official guidelines for crisis management procedures, which at the time of writing of this chapter were under review, with the potential change of adding another political framework document into the process. While understanding the formal procedures and relationships between actors are both necessary and informative, equally necessary and more useful for the analysis of the three EU missions, are the informal processes and procedures developed in EU crisis management over time, and which were described in the third section of this thesis.

These informal processes represent the process of institutionalisation of discursive action on an organisational level. In the context of the model of analysis, these institutions represent institutional structures, which affect the members of the respective groups. In terms of the political level, informality has become the norm and an institution, a way of doing things. Following a description of the sub-section on informality, the sub-section on the role of documents describes how documents not just serve as carriers of knowledge and

experience, but also as tools of persuasion. Another institutionalisation process, described in the next sub-section reviews the development of the lessons learned process. In the context of the model, the lessons learned process represents another micro-institution in the organisational dimension, which both constrains action the goes against previous lessons learned, but can also serve as a tool of persuasion, in the sense that a course of action can be justified and legitimised by arguing it is based on lessons learned. This sub-section, however, also presents some of the limitations of the lessons learned process, which originates from the secretive nature of military structures within the EU. Finally, the chapter presents the reflections of Marcus Houben, a member of the CMPD staff, who defines certain notions and recommendations on how strategic planners should behave. These notions are indicators of the cognitive process, as part of the cognitive dimension of the model. The organisation hierarchy, the formal procedures and the informal micro-institutions represent the wider institutional context in the organisational dimension of the case studies. This wider institutional context is shared by all three case studies. Furthermore, the processes presented in this chapter constitute an important part of the operationalization of the analysis, in that they guide the analyst in both the process-tracing and the discourse analysis aspects of the three case studies. The following chapter will also contribute to this end, as it will discuss the broader context of Somalia, its complicated history, clan structure and projected image in the global arena. In the context of the model, the greater context of Somalia represents what the model labels as the 'societal level', but in the operational model, which will be applied to the three case studies, it represents the general context in the international dimension of the case studies, in which global actors, in particular the UNSC, create meanings and make decisions.

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# Chapter 6. The case of Somalia – understanding the broader context

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## 6.1. Introduction

Before one can apply the model developed in the Chapter 4 to a particular set of case studies, in particular the most recent EU missions in the Horn of Africa, one needs to understand the general context and be familiar with a certain set of events, ideas and perceptions of Somalia and the greater region of the Horn of Africa. This chapter will outline some of the main events, actors, ideas and their relations to each other in the context of Somalia. The first section will present the idea of Somalia as a failed state and outline an historical overview of events that led to the idea of Somalia as a failed state. The second section of this chapter will follow on the idea of a failed state and discuss the implications for the increase of Islamic extremism in the region. The third sub-section will link the existence of Islamic extremists with the growth of piracy activities in the Indian Ocean and the coast of Somalia. The third section will discuss whether this link is one of reinforcement or correlation. The conclusion of this chapter finally links the general context of Somalia with the three EU missions in the Horn of Africa and the possibilities for applying the model described in Chapter 4 to these three case studies.

## 6.2. The history of Somalia – a ‘failed state’?

### 6.2.1. Failed states

The territory of today’s Somalia has a history of tribal communities and their rivalries, foreign occupation, independence under both communist rule and several attempts of setting up democratic governments but most notably a persisting state of clan conflict and fight for authority in recent years. After the socialist regime of Mahammad Siad Barre, Somalia since 1991 has failed to establish a democratic and unified state, due to the different clan-families’ disagreeing on who should lead the country. As a result, Somalia witnessed constant fighting, lack of a central authority and police, emerging warlords and bandits, Islamic extremism, piracy, internal dislocation of the population and emigration, and general collapse of the state.

In their Foreign Policy article, originally published in 1992-1993, Helman and Ratner identify post-colonial and post-Cold-War states in three groups: failed states whose governmental structures “have been overwhelmed by circumstances”, failing states in which state collapse is “not imminent but could occur” and a third group “whose viability is difficult to assess” (Helman and Ratner, 2010). In their examples they placed Somalia in the group of failed states. Since then the term ‘failed states’ has been used in both academic and policy discourses, also including Somalia as an example of state failure (Piazza, 2008; Newman, 2009; Murphy, 2011).

Edward Newman cautions against the unquestionable use of the concept of ‘failed state’ in describing countries like Somalia. He identifies three streams in academia and to some extent in policy practice as well. One stream accepts the concept “as a paradigm change in international politics” and as an arguably greatest threats to international order and security (Newman, 2009, p. 421). A second stream is seen as sceptical of the concept due to epistemological reasons, in the sense that “it is difficult to objectively define, identify and analyse failed states with methodological rigour” (Ibid.). The third stream is critical of the concept and “rejects the idea of failed states as a politicized, ethnocentric, hegemonic concept with interventionist connotations” (Ibid.).

The third stream is in this sense also critical of the first stream of academics and practitioners using the term ‘failed state’ as a security concept rather than a concept related to human rights issues or the development agenda. The post-September 11<sup>th</sup> shift of the security paradigm and the emphasis of Western powers, and especially the US, on terrorism as the major threat to international security was directly linked to the increase in use of the term ‘failed state’ as a security concept. The link between failed states and terrorism was echoed within Western security actors and was a key point in the discourse and rhetoric of the Bush administration. Some examples include Condoleezza Rice, who at the time was US Secretary of State and her speech at Georgetown University, when she stated that “the greatest threats now emerge more within states than between them” and that “violent state failure has become a greater global threat” (Rice, 2006). A similar statement was present on the website of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which was set up by the Bush administration, which states that “failing and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day” (UN Department of State). The US

National Security Strategy of 2002 clearly makes the link between failed states<sup>7</sup> and terrorism: “weak states [...] can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. [...] Poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders” (UN Security Strategy, 2002).

### 6.2.2. State failure in Somalia

Besides practitioners, there are also academics that argue that the connection is justified. Because failed states most of time lack a strong enough policing capacity or possess a weak control of corrupt police structure, terrorist networks have space to operate undisturbed. As a result “failed and failing states provide opportunities, and lower costs, for terrorist groups to organize, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and communications beyond those afforded by the network of safe houses in non-failed states” (Piazza, 2008, p. 471). Furthermore, as in cases like Somalia, the state is economically deprived enough to “provide terrorists with a labor pool which they can draw upon for new recruits” (Murphy, 2011, p. 8). The question remains whether Somalia indeed has the symptoms of a failed state as defined by the literature and policy practice and whether there are links between state collapse, terrorism and piracy as another security related issue specific for the case of Somalia.

Answering these questions immediately faces a major difficulty, namely the difficulty of identifying what exactly state failure or state collapse means in practice. As aforementioned there is disagreement on the term ‘failed state’ in the literature. Some authors make a distinction between failed and failing states (Helman and Ratner, 2010), some use alternative names like weak states or rogue states (US Security Strategy, 2002), while others prefer to use indicators to measure and gradate the level of failure of states (Rotberg, 2003). Rotberg defines different degrees of state failure and weakness in (arguably logical) contrast to state success and state strength.

For Rotberg, the degree of success or failure, strength or weakness is defined by the ability of a state to deliver ‘political goods’ (2003, p.2). The range of political (or public) goods defined by Rotberg encompasses providing security, facilitating citizenship, freedom and participation, securing human and civil rights, as well as allowing for and providing the

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<sup>7</sup> The Security Strategy of 2002 makes a distinction between rogue states and weak states, where rogue states are considered states the willingly harbor terrorist and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), whereas weak states are considered states that do not have such intentions but may be used as safe havens for terrorist networks.



conditions for (public or private) services such as health care, education, finance, commerce and banking, national currency, etc. This definition of the role of the state is of the Western, Weberian and Westphalian kind, which in international relations is considered the most optimal for maintaining international security. Rotberg's claim that strong states or sovereigns "obviously perform well" (2003, p.4). in delivering political goods clearly illustrates his preference of this model over alternative models.

In Rotberg's scale of state failure, Somalia falls under the category of 'collapsed state'. A collapsed state is according to Rotberg a "rare and extreme version of a failed state" and is a "mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen" (2003, p.9), Further descriptions of Rotberg's collapsed state include "a prevalence of disorder, anomic behavior, and the kinds of anarchic mentality and entrepreneurial endeavors – especially gun and drug trafficking – that are compatible with external networks of terror" (2003, p.10).

With an ideal model applicable only to Western democracies and a description of the other extreme linked with networks of terror, it is hard to assess Somalia's performance as a state and the links between its collapse and security issues like terrorism and piracy. Somalia has arguably historically never even had a period of state success from which it could devolve toward failure or collapse (Murphy, 2011, p.5). Such an argument is particularly strong if one compares Somalia to a modern democracy, which is often used as a point of reference.

Somalia in contrast to modern Western democracies does not have a long history and culture of a central authority governing the whole territory of today's Somalia. The territory has a long tradition of clan relations. The population of Somalia consists of six clan-families which historically were pastoral and agro-pastoral groups and were either nomadic or settled more permanently in a region depending on the abundance or scarcity of natural resources. The four predominantly pastoral clan-families are the Daarood, the Dir, the Hawiye and the Isaaq, while the remaining two – the Digil and the Rahanwayn – are predominantly agro-pastoral and occupy the south of Somalia where the conditions are suitable for agriculture (Metz, 1993, p. xxi).

While there is predominant ethnic homogeneity, there is no direct allegiance to a central authority. Allegiance is related to the clans and sub-clans and their respective leaders (clan 'elders'). "Building a unifying political entity and certainly a 'state' in the Western sense in the face of such deep-seated loyalties and competing interests has never been easy" (Murphy, 2011, p.41). While internally unable to establish a unified authority, which would

please all clan-families and their sub-clans, Somalia did witness periods of central leadership either under foreign rule, or an alliance of clan-families supported by foreign powers.

From the colonial period of the nineteenth century up to the postcolonial period after 1960, Somalia was split and led by different countries. The British controlled the central-north region. The north-west region (including parts of today's Djibouti) was controlled by the French. Italy controlled the south, while the west region of the Ogaden was controlled by Ethiopia. The south western areas in this period became part of today's Kenya (Metz, 1993, p. xxii).

After the independence from these countries, Somalia witnessed a period of central authority under the regime of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre who came to power in 1969. Barre's regime was one of socialist dictatorship. Barre turned to socialism to maintain the inflow of aid from the Soviet Union (Metz, 1993, p.xxiv; Murphy, 2011, p.43) and led Somalia in the spirit of socialist revolution. His policies aimed at distancing Somalia from its clan-oriented history in order to avoid clan conflict, but primarily to avoid opposition to his rule based on clan lines, since he and his close allies in high positions were originally from the Daarood clan-family (Metz, 1993, p.xxv; Hesse, 2011, p.5).

Barre's socialist state ideology and support from both the Western powers and the Soviet Union were also aiming at diminishing the importance of Islam in the country. He abolished the *diya*, which was a form of Islamic blood money paid for injury to a clan member. He also diminished the importance of Muslim religious leaders called *wadaddo* who represented the majority of the literate population and provided most of the education in Somalia through Quranic schools. To achieve this, Barre's government reformed the education system, built public schools and decreed an official Somali orthography of the Somali language in 1973. (Metz, 1993, p.xxv)

Barre's decisions, which went against both a Muslim tradition and a clan-based culture led to strong opposition by other interested groups, mostly from opposing clan-families. Barre's military background and incoming military aid from the US enabled Barre to resort to military means to preserve his leading role in the state. While most of the literature turns to failure of Somalia as a state after the dissolution of the central government of Barre's regime in 1991, it can be argued that the collapse of the Somali state began already during Barre's regime. As Lyons and Samatar point out, "the syndrome of state collapse often begins when a regime loses its ability to satisfy various demand-bearing groups in society as resources dry up. Dissatisfaction and opposition grow, resulting in the regime's increased use of security forces to maintain order" (1995, p.1). This precisely happened during Barre's

dictatorship. The culmination of the use of military means to secure his role was Barre's Ogaden war with neighbouring Ethiopia over the control of the Ogaden territory. Barre lost the war with tremendous human, political and financial losses, leaving the rest of Somalia in economic, societal and political turmoil. The dissatisfaction resulted with the end of Barre's regime and the removal of a legitimate central leadership for the whole of Somalia.

Without central leadership, Somalia was left in a state of violent civil war. Due to military aid from the US, the militarization of Somalia for Barre's war against Ethiopia and overall reliance on force to secure his position, Somalia was flooded with remaining weapons which were used to arm local clan militias as well as warlords who were more interested in economic gain than clan loyalties. Military spending left Somalia in debt, poverty, and overall terrible humanitarian condition, which became more severe with the drought in 1991 and 1992. The following years were characterized by either clan-families claiming control over their respective territories and proclaiming independence like in the case of the Isaaq clan-family and Somali-land in the north or disputes between larger clan-families over control of Somalia as a whole. The two largest clan-families, the Hawiye and the Daarood, were the main lines of division in the political life of Somalia. The political (and military) struggle between these two clan-families was linked with political Islam and jihadist terrorism, which further complicated and postponed reconciliation and a potential central unified government of Somalia. The following section of this chapter will elaborate on the emerging role of Islam in Somali politics and how this affects the assessment and perception of Somalia as a failed state and/or security issue.

### **6.3. Islamic extremism and state failure**

Although Islam represents a large part of the Somalis' ethnic identity, Islam in Somalia was historically always secondary to clan allegiances and never radical in its form. On the contrary, observance of Islamic customs was not as scrupulous as in other Islamic countries. As Menkhaus explains "Somali pastoral life imbues the culture with a strong preference for pragmatism over ideology, not so much as a matter of choice, but as a matter of survival" (2002, p.111).

Nevertheless, as a result of a prolonged period of foreign intervention by the predominantly Christian countries like the US and Ethiopia, Islamism was pushed to the foreground due to the respective perceptions of these foreign countries and their fear of

Islamic extremism. On the other hand, more fundamentalist Islamic groups and countries saw these challenges to Islam in Somalia as opportunities to spread their influence and presence in the country. Between anti-Islamic attitudes of countries like Ethiopia and the US on one hand and pro-Islamic groups from countries like Egypt, Iran and countries of the Persian Gulf on the other, Islam increasingly became part of the political agenda.

The rise of political Islam can also be attributed to the very nature of clan allegiances and the perception of one clan-family and its sub-clans to be more or less Muslim. Barre's regime was both during, but especially after his rule perceived as very anti-Muslim and because of Barre belonging to the Daarood clan-family, the whole of the Daarood family was labeled as anti-Muslim by political opponents like members of the Hawiye clan-family, which were situated around the capital of Mogadishu. Once Islam was linked to clan-families, political clan divisions became also religious divisions and Islam became a big part of political life in Somalia.

### 6.3.1. Al-Qaeda

As aforementioned, sources of Islamic radicalization in Somalia stem from both external and internal influences. This difference is key in understanding the broader perception of Somalia as a failed state and, as such, an area prone to Islamic extremism, terrorist networks and viewed as a security threat both regionally and globally. Islamic extremists and jihadists in Somalia accordingly have external and internal backgrounds. The most notorious and cross-border jihadist group, Al-Qaeda represents Somalia's external radical Islamist presence in its territory. Analysts however judge Al-Qaeda's role in Somalia as more marginal than serious. (Combating Terrorism Center, 2007; Terdman, 2008) Al-Qaeda's and Bin Laden's attempt to spread the jihadist movement in Somalia was labelled as "one of al-Qa'ida's most ambitious and least successful initiatives" (Terdman, 2008, p.52).

There are several reasons for Al-Qaeda's marginal influence on Somali Islam. One of the problems Al-Qaeda encountered on its fight against the infidels was that "Somalia, like almost every other failed state, lacked targets" (Murphy, 2011, p.72). Foreigners within the country were rare and were present mostly in the form of foreign intervention. The period when Al-Qaeda was most active in Somalia was during the UN intervention between 1992 and 1995 with a significant US presence in the country. After the retreat of US troops, Somalia remained only a location for local Al-Qaeda cells that operated in neighbouring

Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia where US embassies and other targets were attacked in 1997 and 1998.

However, even using Somalia for bases and a safe haven proved problematic due to operational costs, perceptions of the local population of Al-Qaeda as foreigners and the Al-Qaeda's insufficient understanding of local clan dynamics. In terms of operational costs, Somalia proved to be more expensive than expected. Getting in and out of Somalia to Al-Qaeda's targets in neighboring countries or the transportation of weapons across borders was expensive due to both the demand of the local population and the poor infrastructure of Somalia. As some analysts conclude, "the very reasons that al-Qa'ida sought Somalia – an isolated safe haven for preparing and conducting terrorist operations – also made it nearly impossible to sustain operations" (Combating Terrorism Centre, 2007, p.20).

Lack of finances was also linked to the lack of recruiting power of Al-Qaeda. The local population, in spite of being stricken by poverty, was reluctant to join Al-Qaeda for the offered compensation. The distrust of the local population who saw Al-Qaeda as foreigners and unwillingness to shift their loyalties from their clans to a non-clan group made their demand for compensations that were not sustainable for Al-Qaeda. Due to their lack of proper understanding of Somali clan-based culture, Somali Al-Qaeda leaders did not understand that "individual recruits found the opportunity cost of leaving their established place in a clan far greater than the benefits of employment with al-Qa'ida" (Combating Terrorism Center, 2007, p.22).

### 6.3.2. Al-Itihaad Al Islaami (AIAI)

Al Qaeda however was not the only group that steered towards Islamic extremism and jihadist terrorism. Considerably more successful were Islamic groups from within the Somali population with direct links to clan-lineages. An early group, Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami (AIAI) is considered as the origin of still active violent jihadists in Somalia (Murphy, 2011, p.67). AIAI was initially created during the 1980s during Barre's regime but gained political and military influence amidst a state of civil war and foreign intervention in the early 1990s. The group was a reaction to the perception of anti-Islamism of the previous Daarood Barre regime and the US led military intervention.

Although originally pan-Somalian, the movement realized that in order to survive it needs to associate itself with the clan structures of Somalia. After the Barre regime and the

abolition of a central government, Somalia was not left in complete anarchy. Local clan and sub-clan Sharia courts were in charge of resolving local matters within the jurisdiction of the territory of a clan or sub-clan. “Most of the Sharia courts that have sprung in the country since 1994 have been local responses to a lack of government and rule of law” (Menkhaus, 2002, p.116). These courts were also strongly supported by wealthy businessmen as to secure their commercial interests against local warlords who did not respect the local courts and clan loyalties. Al-Itihaad saw the Islamic courts and businessmen as strong and appropriate allies and with their help managed to get some of its members appointed to the Transitional National Government (TNG) formed in 2000.

Although, Al-Itihaad became less vocal about the jihad and became more involved in politics, it preserved its militant character and fought for control over territory with warlords in the south and other clan-families like the Daarood in the central and eastern parts of the country. It integrated its people in the local Islamic courts’ militias and provided for the security of the local clans. In terms of clan loyalty, the Al-Itihaad aligned themselves with the clans of the Hawiye clan-family, which also represented most of the TNG members and were mostly based in Mogadishu in the south.

### 6.3.3. Al-Shabaab/ICU

Al-Itihaad’s presence decreased as the power and legitimacy of the TNG decreased between 2000 and 2004. Al-Itihaad’s connections with Al-Qaeda and the allegations of the TNGs pro-Islamic bias caused opposition of the West towards the government, especially after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on the US in 2001. The counter-terrorism activities and indications of jihadist presence in Somalia after 2001 were used by internal opposition of the TNG, mostly from the Daarood clan-family, to gain support against the TNG from Western allies and Ethiopia (Terdman, 2008, p.56). As a result, after the end of term of the TNG, the newly established Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which at the time of its formation was situated in Kenya relocated to Baidoa and distanced itself from the Hawiye dominated Mogadishu both politically but also physically.

While the TFG held control in Baidoa, in Mogadishu, the remnants of the TNG, the AIAI and the local Sharia courts formed an opposition to the TFG in the form of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU controlled the areas in and around Mogadishu and had a strong military of its own whose leadership has roots in the AIAI. The military branch of the ICU

became known as Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab gained support by spreading Islamic extremism and calling for resistance against foreign intervention, most notably that of the US and Ethiopia, who assisted the TFG to gain control of the country. It openly called for jihad against infidels and sympathizers of the TFG, Ethiopia and the US. Al-Shabaab was linked with Al-Qaeda and also employed similar tactics as Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab relied also on suicide bombings on Ethiopian targets, TFG members and foreign troops in the country (Ibrahim, 2011, pp.37-8).

Al-Shabaab's violent tactics, extremist rhetoric and actions and links to Al-Qaeda alienated them from the ICU, who's majority (belonging to the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia – ARS) took a less radical stance and eventually entered into a coalition with the TFG in early 2009, when a moderate Islamist, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected president. Since then Al-Shabaab has continued its violent actions against the TFG including its moderate Islamic members, as well as any foreign presence in Somalia whom they labelled as puppets of the US (Daniels, 2012, p.57). Al-Shabaab was successful in advancing into and capturing the major part of Mogadishu in late 2009 and 2010, but was pushed back by the troops of AMISOM and Uganda. Al-Shabaab still remains an active and violent presence of Islamic radicalism in Somalia.

This section of this chapter illustrated the political, clan-based and religious conflicts in Somalia, which are related to state failure and the rise of Islamic radicalism and terrorism as a security threat domestically, regionally and globally. Linked both to state failure and Islamic radicalism is the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Similar to the question of the rise of political Islam, an understanding of the rise of piracy in the Somali context requires deeper analysis, especially focusing on the clan-based culture of the Somali population. The following section of this chapter will address this link between clan affiliations, state failure, jihadist terrorism and piracy.

#### **6.4. Piracy, terrorism and state failure**

While there is a general consensus in policy practice and academia that both terrorism and piracy fall under the category of a security threat, there is debate whether in the case of Somalia these two security issues are interlinked (and to what extent) or separate issues within one area with similar roots. The two sides of the debate can be differentiated accordingly as the argument of mutual reinforcement and the alternative argument of

correlation. The former argument has been hinted at in the literature and even more so in policy practice but a clear connection between piracy and terrorism in Somalia cannot be fully established. (Murphy, 2011, p.139) The latter argument is more viable both for the points in favour of it as well as the counterarguments to the former argument of mutual reinforcement.

#### 6.4.1. State failure and piracy

What both arguments have in common however is the notion of ‘failed state’, which has accompanied the analysis throughout this chapter. It is important to note that failed states are neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause for piracy. As Murphy (2011, pp.1-2) notices, Indonesia (a weak state rather than a failed state), the Philippines, but even rising powers (on the other side of the weak-strong spectrum) like India and Brazil face issues of piracy attacks along their coastlines. These examples indicate that state failure is not necessary for piracy to occur.

State failure is also not sufficient for piracy to occur. Murphy (Ibid.) gives further examples of failed states with a coastline like the Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire), Pakistan, Guinea and Burma, which do not have noteworthy problems with piracy. Piracy requires also other elements, which are present in the case of Somalia. Some of these elements are not even linked with the nature of the state, like the geography of the state and the ecology of its waters.

In terms of geography, Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa and access to the Gulf of Aden. The Gulf of Aden connects the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and with ship routes through the Suez Canal is also connected to the Mediterranean Sea. This route represents the main sea trading route between Africa, Asia and Europe and is the preferred route of a great number of ships. An alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa would mean an expensive detour around the whole African continent. Such a geographically convenient region with a high circulation of ships is highly attractive to pirates (Pham, 2011, p.82). In addition to the good geographical location, the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden is an area wealthy in a great number of commercially profitable and highly sought-after species of fish and shellfish like tuna, sharks and rays (fished for their fins), lobster, shrimp and whitefish (Murphy, 2011, p.18).



Besides the geographical and ecological factors, the ‘failed state’ notion cannot be omitted. The collapse of the central government of the Barre regime meant also the disappearance of government control over the Somali coast. Any further attempts of establishing a central government-controlled coast guard proved to be unsatisfactory or completely unsuccessful. This failure to control the waters through legal and legitimate means is considered to be the prime reason “why piracy has flourished along the coasts of the country” (Pham, 2011, p.78).

#### 6.4.2. Terrorism and piracy: the mutual reinforcement argument

The question that remains is then whether state failure, which is attributed as the cause of both terrorism and piracy links these two security issues together, or they represent separate issues with a common cause. Terrorist and Islamic radicals on the hand and pirates on the other are inevitably connected by the fact that they reside in the same country and in some cases even in the same port towns and cities like Mogadishu. These two groupings are familiar with one another. The mutual reinforcement argument however posits a closer relationship between them. As aforementioned, some scholars (Ibrahim, 2011; Pham, 2011; Murphy, 2011) argue that these links are mere hypotheticals and speculations and cannot be fully empirically established. Nevertheless, where academics rely only on evidence, policymakers rely both on evidence and speculation. Having this in mind there are some themes that link Islamic radicals and pirates close together.

One of the commonalities is the negative attitude of these groups towards foreigners. The attitude of Islamic extremists and their mission of jihad have already been elaborated on in the previous section. The negative attitude of Somali pirates towards foreigners has slightly different roots. Initially, Somali pirates practiced what is termed ‘defensive’ piracy but later switched to ‘predatory’ piracy (Murphy, 2011). The defensive form is linked to fishermen “defending what they regard as their fishing grounds against the illegal, uncontrolled and unregulated (IUU) activity of foreign fishing vessels.” Predatory piracy is an intentional, profit seeking act but perpetrators often claimed they are defending their fishing grounds, which made it difficult to draw clear borders between the two types (Ibid., p.17).

Furthermore, the defensive argument and “The Robin Hood narrative of Somali piracy as a grassroots form of coastal patrol against rapacious foreign fishing vessels is thus only partly true, and at any rate has long since been overtaken by less noble motives. For

scholars exploring war economies, Somali piracy is a textbook case of a shift in the motives of an armed group from grievance to greed (Menkhaus, 2009, pp.22-3).

The different roots of disliking foreigners of Islamic extremists and pirates are simplified in the explanation that “pirates, like most criminals, are interested in living off the world not changing it” (Murphy, 2011, p.139). While Islamic radicals were also interested in economic gains, they saw them as a source of income for their activities, a means to an end, not an end in itself. As described in the previous section, Islamic groups were in dire need of finances and underestimated the costs of running their operations in Somalia. Their strategy of survival included aligning with businessmen for economic but also political and popular support. Their involvement in the political domain however meant some limitations to their actions, where pirates off-shore and warlords and bandits on-shore were not aspiring to leading positions in the state but rather mere economic gain.

Reports and testimonies by pirates and Islamic radicals indicate that there were arrangements in place between the two groups. There are speculations that pirates were supplied by terrorist networks with weapons, but it can also be stipulated that pirates were wealthy enough to supply themselves with weapons from the open market (Murphy, 2011, p.247). During the rule of the ICU in Mogadishu in 2006 openly announced a counter-piracy campaign against pirates of the Hawiye clan-family operating in the south, but only undertook one mission freeing a vessel whose owner was directly supporting the Islamic movement in Mogadishu. Regarding the high jacking of another vessel the same week, even closer to Mogadishu, the ICU did not respond the same way. “The ICU’s concern for maritime law and order apparently did not extend to boats whose owners were not also donors to the Islamic cause” (Pham, 2011, p.81).

Other accounts show the pirates not taking the Islamic counter-piracy efforts seriously due to admitted arrangements and payments to Al-Shabaab, who denied any such arrangements (Murphy, 2011, p.142). Both the pirates’ confessions of ‘doing business’ with Islamic extremist groups like Al-Shabaab on the one hand and the distancing of such groups from pirates on the other hand, leaves the evidence of a connection and the nature of a connection, if there is one, very much ambivalent. Due to this factual uncertainty the argument of mutual reinforcement of the two security issues remains feeble.

### 6.4.3. The correlation argument

The alternative argument and in many points a counter-argument is that of mere correlation, namely that both issues stem from the same cause and coexist more or less independent of each other. According to this line of argument any connection between the two groups would not be one of reinforcement but rather one of conflict and competition.

The main points to support this argument is related to the notion of clan loyalties, which was key in understanding the political and social culture of the Somali population in the previous sections of this chapter. Pirates were predominantly members of the Daarood clan-family in Puntland in the east and north east of Somalia, while some Hawiye clan-family members operated in the south. The Hawiye pirates were the only group which was in direct contact and, as mentioned in the paragraphs above, allegedly struck deals with Islamic radicals and Al-Shabaab.

Unlike warlords on land, pirates still preserved clan loyalties and followed clan laws instead of state or international laws. The Daarood clan-family was throughout the political struggles between the TFN, ICU and the TFG considered as anti-Islamic or moderate Islamic. They distanced them both politically but also physically (as mentioned in the previous section) from Islamic radicalism. Accordingly, pirates of the Daarood clan-family did not respect Islamic authority and are certainly unlikely to have ties with terrorist and Islamic radicals. The Hawiye pirates operated in the south, where the Islamic regime and jihadists were concentrated. Their contacts to the ICU and Al-Shabaab, as described in the paragraphs above is more likely to be one of business interest and economic calculation rather than mutual support.

Considering the competing and conflicting relationship between pirates and Islamic extremists, the alternative argument of correlation argues against the mutual reinforcement of these two groups. If piracy is not causing Islamic extremism or not being caused by it, the question remains, what allows piracy to flourish and persist. A great part of the answer lies in the problem of failed states, which is also common for the flourishing and persistence of terrorism. Besides the lack of a central authority and government coast-guard that would police the waters off the coast of Somalia, the country also lacks working and independent courts and prosecution mechanisms.

Even with the foreign intervention at sea, pirates use the state of Somalia and loopholes of international law to get away with their crimes. According to international maritime law, foreign ships can intervene in international waters, but most piracy activity

occurs in Somali waters. Recent changes to international law allow countries whose flag is on the ship, whose nationals are crew members and whose ships and cargo are attacked to intervene and prosecute pirates, but this can prove costly in terms of detaining, transporting and imprisoning the pirates in distant countries. As a solution, pirates are prosecuted in Somalia's neighboring countries. The most active country in helping prosecuting Somali pirates is Kenya.

## **6.5. Conclusions**

Somalia is a country that has gone through periods of foreign intervention and constant imposition of Western models of governance. The expectations of the international community for Somalia to 'normalize' its state have roots from both interests of its direct neighbours and former colonizers but also the general fear of terrorism and norm of international security, especially after the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks against the US in 2001. However, Somalia has a specific culture of clan-families and clan loyalties, which makes it difficult to apply Western models of central authority and organized governance. None of the clan-families prefer to be controlled by competing clan-families and coalitions had only partial success. The current coalition government and constitution of 2012 is yet to prove sustainable.

Due to the instability of central authority, unsuccessful military campaigns, reliance on foreign debt, poverty and corruption, Somalia has been labeled a failed or collapsed state by both academics and practitioners. The established stigma and discourse of a failed state put additional pressure on Somalia to establish a working and sustainable system of governance. While failed states are in the literature and policy practice mentioned in either security terms or economic and development terms, Somalia's label of failed state has been linked to two security issues in Somalia – terrorism and piracy.

The two security problems are in literature and practice commonly posed as interlinked and mutual reinforced issues, but in the case of Somalia these two issues seem to coexist together but are rather in a competing relationship. Pirates off the coast of Somalia are not ideologically driven but have a more pragmatic incentive – survival. While Islamic extremists and jihadists depend on both political and financial support from the political and business circles, pirates are independent and even manage to cope with international pressure against piracy.

A big part of the international pressure is precisely the EU and its anti-piracy campaign in the Horn of Africa, which includes three CSDP missions. These missions, which are the case studies of this thesis, were deployed not only to combat pirates on sea but also to train Somalia and countries in the region to do so in the future. To fully comprehend the decisions of the EU to deploy CSDP missions in Somalia, one needs to also understand the context of Somalia and the existing perceptions and discourses on Somalia's security issues described above. This context represents what in the model presented in the previous chapter of this thesis was termed as material reality but also the constraining structures of meaning. The material reality consists of the events that occurred in Somalia's history, including the violent conflicts, droughts, migration and other facts that are independent of human interpretation. The constraining structures of meaning are constructed relationships between actors and general population in Somalia, the constructed relationships of foreign countries and Somalia, the idea of Somalia as a failed state as well as the idea of failed states in general.

According to the model that is tested on the three case studies of EUNAVFOR, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor these structures of meaning influence and limit the policy choices of decision-makers. The perceptions of the problem of piracy in Somalia are therefore initially viewed by decision makers through the lens of the existing general structures of meaning. The prevailing structures of meaning in the case of Somalia are the view of Somalia as a failed state. The idea of failed state can be seen as both a security issue and a development issue. The following chapters inquire which of these structures of meaning is more dominant in the coordinative discourses of EU foreign policy institutions and how these structures interact with structures and constructs created at the organizational and individual levels of cognition. In particular, the narrative and discourse analysis will look out for traces of the two dominant meta-narratives on Somalia presented in this chapter and developed at the global, societal level, and interpret whether and how these structures of meaning affected the policy-making process at any of the three dimensions of the case study.

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# Chapter 7. Testing The Model I: The Case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta

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## 7.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, the thesis presented the history and development of a wider, constructed image of Somalia viewed by policy makers and academics alike and identified two main narratives that originate from that constructed image. Both narratives share the position that Somalia is a failed state. As explained in the previous chapter, a failed state is characterized by a lack of central authority and control over police and military forces, which allows for widespread crime to develop. In the case of Somalia, there is a long history of tribal divisions and tribal allegiances that made forming a central government, acceptable to all tribe leaders, particularly difficult.

In August 2012, the Somali tribal leaders managed to adopt a new constitution and form a parliament, which then elected a president of the Republic of Somalia. Before this set of events, Somalia had an internationally recognized and UN-supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). However, the long period of instability before 2012 allowed for a rise of religious (Islamic) extremists on the one hand and pirates off the Somali shore on the other hand. The link between these two groups defines the two narratives mentioned above and identified in the previous chapter of this thesis.

The narrative that presents pirates off the coast of Somalia as collaborators of Islamic extremists tends to focus on the security aspects of piracy. Such a narrative implies a security solution to a security problem. The second narrative decouples piracy from Islamic extremism and tends to focus on piracy as a wider societal problem. The second narrative implies a more comprehensive solution to a complex problem with development, economic, legal and humanitarian aspects alongside the security one.

The international community has tackled the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia through methods and solutions across the spectrum between these two narratives. This chapter focuses on the EU involvement with its first counter-piracy mission, EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Following this introduction, the second section of this chapter will outline the different international actors involved in maritime counter-piracy activity and pose the main question of why the EU decided to add another counter-piracy effort to the existing efforts of

the international community. The third section of the chapter will present the context of the concerns of the international community with the situation in Somalia, reflected in the different UN Security Council Resolutions and the UN's call to the international community to assist with preventing piracy off the coast of Somalia. This section will also present some of the events and developments in 2008, which is the year when EUNAVFOR Atalanta was developed and deployed. The fourth section will 'zoom in' into the formal and informal processes and discussions that occurred in Brussels, following the UN resolutions and events described in the second section of the chapter. The fifth section will triangulate the internal processes and coordinative discourses of the different actors within Brussels with official documents on the one hand and the general context of the piracy issue in Somalia on the other. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter will put the analysis in perspective and provide possible answers to the question of why EUNAVFOR Atalanta was deployed.

## 7.2. The outcome



Figure 4. Map of the Horn of Africa. Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the West Indian Ocean posed a security threat for the ships sailing through these waters for decades. With the noticeable increase of pirate activities in 2008 and the more active involvement of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the matter, the international community has increased its anti-piracy endeavours. In response to piracy attacks on European vessels and in support of several UN resolutions (1801, 1816) the EU deployed its

first ever naval operation under the name EUNAVFOR Atalanta in December 2008. Besides the EU's mission, the waters off the coast of Somalia were secured by ships from Russia, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, the USA and a NATO anti-piracy operation.

NATO launched operation 'Allied Provider' in October 2008 in response to the request of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to help with the escalation of piracy off the coast of Somalia. NATO had already deployed ships in the region of the Suez Canal at the time, which belonged to the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2). SNMG2 consisted of seven ships from the USA, the UK, Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey. Three ships (from Greece, Italy and the UK) were assigned to the operation 'Allied Provider' (Allied Command Operations). After operation 'Allied Provider', which ended in December 2008, NATO launched the operation 'Allied Protector' in March 2009, which lasted until August 2009, when it evolved into operation 'Ocean Shield' by adding capacity building elements to its mandate, in addition to escorting ships of the World Food Program (WFP) and deterring pirates in the region.

Another multinational operation off the coast of Somalia was undertaken by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). The CMF, led by the USA since its formation in 2001, deployed ships in the Gulf of Aden, first under the form of the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) and later assisted by the CTF-151. CTF-150 began as a US Navy formation under the name Task Force 150, which had a mandate to undertake counter-terrorist activities at sea. The task force intensified its activities and expanded to become a multinational coalition of the willing under the wider counter-terrorist engagement of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Countries that participated in the task force included the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan and Singapore. The mandate of CTF-150 included maritime security more generally, but focused primarily on deterring and denying terrorist activities at sea (CMF, CTF-150). After the realization that piracy is a more specific issue and requires a different mandate and approach from the one of counter-terrorism, the CMF established another operation in January 2009 conducted by CTF-151 in order to respond to the call of the UN and its Security Council resolutions and to assist CTF-150 with maritime security in general. The mandate of CTF-151 is specific to counter-piracy and includes the disruption and deterrence of piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as capacity building in maritime security (CMF, CTF-151).

Besides these multinational operations, as well as the efforts of the individual countries mentioned above, the European Union has since 2008 deployed a total of three missions, with mandates that match and surpass the mandates of existing maritime operations in the region. Its first mission, EUNAVFOR Atalanta was deployed on the 8<sup>th</sup> of December 2008 after the approval of the Council of the Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of



November 10<sup>th</sup>, 2008 and the Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of December 8<sup>th</sup>, 2008, which approved the Operation Plan (Oplan) and the Rules of Engagement (RoE).

Under Article 2 of the Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, the mandate of the mission was to protect ships chartered by the World Food Program (WFP), to provide protection to merchant ships in the area on a case-by-case basis, to watch over areas off the Somali coast, to deter and prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, to arrest, detain and transfer suspects of piracy and to seize their vessels and goods on board, and to coordinate and liaise with other counter-piracy efforts in the region (European Union 2008/851/CFSP).

The EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission (also known as EUNAVFOR Somalia) had initially been planned for a duration of twelve months, but was prolonged on the 8<sup>th</sup> of December 2009 by the approval of Council Decision 2009/907/CFSP for another year. Following the successes of the operation during the first two years, on the 7<sup>th</sup> of December 2010 the Council extended the mandate for another two years by approving Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP. Finally, on March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2012, the Council extended the mandate of the mission until December 2014 by approving Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP.

According to the Council decisions, the political control and strategic direction lies with the PSC, which allows the PSC to amend the Operation Plan, the Rules of Procedure and the Chain of Command. The PSC is also in charge of appointing EU Operation Commanders and EU Force Commanders. The operation headquarters (OHQ) are situated in Northwood, UK. EUNAVFOR Atalanta has over time received contributions in the form of military assets (one warship from Norway in 2009) and military staff to the OHQ from Croatia, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro. The military assets consist of navy vessels (surface combat vessels and auxiliary ships, including embarked helicopters), Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts (MPRAs), Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD) teams. The number of ships and staff in theatre and in the OHQ varies due to the change of weather determined by the monsoon season in the Indian Ocean, which impacts the amount of piracy activity. The missions force however, “typically comprises of approximately 1200 personnel, 4 – 7 Surface Combat Vessels and 2 – 4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft” (EUNAVFOR Somalia).

With such a force (vessels and personnel), EUNAVFOR is greater in comparison to NATO’s or CMF’s operations. Considering the extent of involvement of the international community in fighting piracy before EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the question arises why the EU also decided to contribute resources towards fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden in the first

place. The following sections will analyse the different dimensions of the policy process and identify the factors that had (to various degrees) an impact on the decision making process in Brussels.

### **7.3. The international dimension**

This section will present the context and exogenous factors influencing the perception and reasoning within Brussels and subsequently shaping the decision making process that resulted with the deployment (and extension of the mandate) of EUNAVFOR Atalanta. These events represent the initial triggers that contributed to a various degree to the understanding and processing of the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden within Brussels. The strongest impetus, not just for the EU and the Brussels CSDP institutions, but for the whole international community originates from the UNSC resolutions on Somalia. The UNSC resolutions reflect the concerns and understanding of the international community on a given issue or region of the world and represent both a legal and a legitimate basis for any action in the international arena. The gravitas of the narratives and frames represented in the UNSC resolutions are a strong influence on actors within the international community and more specifically the EU and its CFSP/CSDP. The first part of this section will outline the main UNSC resolutions and identify the issues they raised and the elements they added to the overall narrative(s) regarding piracy off the coast of Somalia. The UNSC resolutions are inconsistent in aligning themselves with the two narratives identified in the previous chapter of this thesis. The foci and issues raised shift from a security narrative in one resolution to a more comprehensive view in another. The second part of this section will identify other exogenous factors that impacted the processing of the issue of piracy by the different European actors. These two sources of exogenous influence contribute to the creation of Brussels-based actors' context models described in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

#### **7.3.1. The UN call for help**

The UNSC has monitored the situation in Somalia more closely since the early 2000s and primarily focused on the internal conflicts between the Transitional Federal Government and opposition leaders with different tribal backgrounds and allegiances, the weapons and

ammunition embargo on Somalia, the gradual establishment of the rule of law, the work of the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the overall stability of the state of Somalia. The issue of piracy came to the fore more noticeably in 2008, which is reflected in the sheer number of UNSC resolutions on Somalia, namely ten resolutions in 2008 alone, compared to fourteen resolutions in the period from 2001 to 2007<sup>8</sup>.

The first appearance of piracy as an issue discussed at the UNSC can be found in the UNSC Resolution 1676 in May 2006. The resolution deals with the weapons and ammunition embargo established by the UNSC resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and the problems of its implementation in the region. Piracy is merely linked with the issue that weapons and ammunition are coming into Somalia and one of the paragraphs of the preamble points out that back in 2006 the UNSC became increasingly “concerned about the increasing incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia, and its impact on security in Somalia” (UNSC Resolution 1676, p. 1). This paragraph clearly frames piracy as a security issue, linking it with state failure and the inability of Somalia and other states in the region to respect the arms embargo on Somalia.

The following year, the UNSC was still concerned with the disregard of the arms embargo on Somalia and the continuation of violence between the TFG and opposition militias. Piracy was mentioned in the UNSC Resolution 1772 in August 2007 as part of the same narrative of lack of governance and security within the country. The UNSC “encourage[d] Member States whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate[d] in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to any incidents of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with relevant international law” (UNSC Resolution 1772, paragraph 18, p. 5). This was the first call of the UNSC for international action against piracy in the region. With the issue of piracy being framed as a security issue, this resolution represents the first impetus for military action against piracy.

As aforementioned, the year 2008 witnessed an increase in UNSC resolutions on Somalia due to intensified acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The first resolution on Somalia in 2008, UNSC Resolution 1801, contains an identical paragraph as in UNSC Resolution

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<sup>8</sup> The fourteen UNSC resolutions on Somalia from 2001-2007: 1356 (2001) of 19 June 2001, 1407 (2002) of 3 May 2002, 1425 (2002) of 22 July 2002, 1474 (2003) of 8 April 2003, 1519 (2003) of 16 December 2003, 1558 (2004) of 17 August 2004, 1587 (2005) of 15 March 2005, 1630 (2005) of 14 October 2005, 1676 (2006) of 10 May 2006, 1724 (2006) of 29 November 2006, 1725 (2006) of 6 December 2006, 1744 (2007) of 20 February 2007, 1766 (2007) of 23 July 2007, 1772 (2007) of 20 August 2007.

1772 quoted above but also adds that the UNSC “welcomes the contribution made by France to protect the World Food Programme naval convoys and the support now provided by Denmark to this end” (UNSC Resolution 1801, paragraph 12, p. 4; emphasis in the original). This way the resolution introduces two new concrete elements into the discourse regarding piracy off the coast of Somalia, namely Denmark, but more notably, France as an active participant in the eventual resolution of the issue, as well as the World Food Programme as an important and more specific issue linked to piracy in the region. By putting these two elements of the discourse to the foreground, this resolution sets the discussion points for subsequent resolutions within the UNSC, but also for other fora and formal documents.

These elements were expectedly also present in the next resolution on piracy off the coast of Somalia, UNSC resolution 1816, which deplored “the [...] incidents of [...] attacks upon and hijackings of vessels operated by the World Food Program and numerous commercial vessels [...]” (UNSC Resolution 1816, p. 2). Besides the fact that the World Food Program is a UN program and hence justifies the emphasis of the attack on WFP vessels within a UN forum, it also stands out from the other, “numerous commercial vessels” attacks, due to its normative resonance. The normative impact of disrupting food aid and humanitarian assistance to people in Somalia overshadows the primarily economic impact of attacks against commercial vessels. The resolution clearly refers to the Joint Communiqué issued by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the WFP on the 10<sup>th</sup> of July, 2007. This document, titled “Co-ordinated action urged as piracy threatens UN lifeline to Somalia”, frames the actions of the UN and in particular of the WFP using the metaphor of the ‘lifeline’ to illustrate that disruptions to the deliveries of WFP vessels’ cargo act as cutting the lifeline of the Somali population and subsequently a direct danger to the lives of the Somali population. The document reinforces the metaphor by pointing out the piracy attacks in the region “endanger the fragile supply line for food assistance to Somalis whose lives have been shattered by more than 15 years of civil conflict, political instability and recurring natural disasters” and points out that the “WFP aims to provide food assistance to 1 million people in Somalia [...] at a time when the country is once again plagued by brutal civil conflict” (IMO, 2007b).

Besides the normative nature of the problem of disrupting food aid and the impact it has on the physical wellbeing of people of Somalia, the Joint Communiqué also creates the link between natural disasters and famine on the one side and civil conflict and political instability on the other. This link was carried over into the UNSC Resolution 1816, which also warns “of the danger attacks on WFP vessels pose to prompt, safe and effective delivery

of food aid and other humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia”, which “exacerbate[s] the situation in Somalia” (UNSC Resolution 1816, p. 2). The resolution links the danger of the lack of food aid and humanitarian assistance to the ‘situation’ in Somalia, alluding to the failed attempts of creating a strong Somali government and a stable Somali state. In particular, the resolution refers to “the crisis situation in Somalia, and the lack of capacity of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to interdict pirates or patrol and secure either the international sea lanes off the coast of Somalia or Somalia’s territorial waters” (UNSC Resolution 1816, p. 1).

By linking the issues of famine, the disruption of the WFP, but also the ‘crisis situation’ of civil conflict, lack of TFG capacity to govern Somalia (alluding once again to the ‘failed state’ narrative) and increase in piracy, the UNSC Resolution 1816 amalgamated sufficient, both normative and practical justification to approve the mandate to states willing to participate in the resolution of Somalia’s piracy crisis and to allow them even the use of violence. Paragraph 7 of UNSC Resolution 1816 allows the “use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery” (UNSC Resolution 1816, paragraph 7b, p. 3).

After the UNSC Resolution 1816 and the UN’s open call for action, allowing all necessary means, the EU has relatively quickly and visibly responded to the call. The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2008 decided to establish a coordination unit in Brussels “with the task of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some Member States off the Somali coast” (Council, 15 September, 2008, p. 2). The coordination unit was named the European Union Naval Coordination Cell (EU NAVCO). At the same Council meeting, the EU approved a strategic military option “for a possible European Union naval operation.” (Ibid.)


The UNSC has recognized the EU’s efforts in its following resolution, UNSC Resolution 1838 by “Commending the contribution made by some States since November 2007 to protect the World Food Programme (“WFP”) maritime convoys, and, the establishment by the European Union of a coordination unit with the task of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some member States of the European Union off the coast of Somalia, and the ongoing planning process towards a possible European Union naval operation, as well as other international or national initiatives taken with a view to implementing resolutions 1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008)” (UNSC Resolution 1838, p. 1). It is important to note that the UNSC singled out the EU in this resolution from

‘some States’ and ‘other international or national initiatives’. By doing so, the UNSC discursively elevated the EU’s action above the rest of the international community, giving the EU further impetus and encouragement to move on with deployment of an anti-piracy mission.

Soon after UNSC Resolution 1838, the Council approved the Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on November 10<sup>th</sup>, approving the deployment of an EU maritime operation off the coast of Somalia, which the UNSC commended in the UNSC Resolutions 1846, alongside the efforts of Canada, Denmark, France, India, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, the UK, the USA, as well as the efforts of NATO. The UNSC also extended the call to the international community to help with the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia for another twelve months (UNSC Resolution 1846).

The following UNSC Resolution 1851 also commended the EU’s engagement in the region. It is however noteworthy in which order the different efforts of the international community are mentioned. In UNSC Resolution 1846, the EU’s effort is mentioned last, after individual member states’ efforts and the efforts of NATO. In UNSC Resolution 1851 the EU’s mission *Atalanta* is mentioned first, before NATO’s efforts. The change of order indicates the changing importance of EU’s efforts in front of the UNSC.

The EU kept its importance in front of the UNSC regarding the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia and maintained its discursive position in the subsequent UNSC resolutions that mentioned and commended international efforts on this issue. The EU was mentioned first, before NATO’s efforts and the efforts of the Combined Maritime Forces. These mentions (UNSC Resolutions 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 2020 (2011), 2077 (2012), 2125 (2013)), while not crucial in the EU’s decisions to extend operation *EUNAVFOR Atalanta*, do represent both a legal basis and a normative justification for these decisions.



**Figure 5. Timeline of official documents. Blue: UNSC Resolutions; Green: Council Decisions**

### 7.3.2. Events and other triggers

The discourse at the level of the UNSC on the issue of piracy and the UNSC's call for action was certainly a necessary but not sufficient influence on EU's decision making process regarding the deployment of a maritime mission in the Gulf of Aden. There are other exogenous factors that also represent the wider context within which the decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta was made. This subsection will focus on the importance of the developments and increase of piracy off the coast of Somalia as well as the role of the French presidency and France's reaction to the capture of French vessels by Somali pirates.

As mentioned in the previous subsection of this chapter, the year 2008 witnessed a noticeable increase in acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, compared to the previous period. According to the Reports On Acts Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Reports published by the International Maritime Organization there were twenty-three reported piracy acts committed in the Indian Ocean and sixty-one in the shores of East Africa, amounting to eight-four reported piracy attacks in the region in 2008 (IMO, 2009). This number is a considerable increase compared to the figures for the year 2007 (thirty-two reported piracy acts in the Indian Ocean and twenty-seven in East Africa, amounting to fifty-nine acts of piracy) and the year 2006 (thirty-eight acts of piracy in the Indian Ocean and only fourteen in East Africa, amounting to fifty-two acts of piracy in the area) (IMO, 2007a,

2008). While the number of reported piracy attacks decreased slightly in the Indian Ocean, that number for the region of East Africa more than doubled.

These figures are however numbers of all acts of piracy that were reported. An even more worrying set of figures for the international community were the numbers of hijacked ships and the increased use of firearms in these attacks. The number of ships hijacked in the area of East Africa in 2008 was forty-four, which is more than four times greater than the number in 2007 (ten hijackings reported) and more than ten times greater than the number in 2006 (four hijackings reported) (IMO, 2007a, 2008, 2009). Furthermore, the number of piracy attacks that involved the use of guns in 2008 was eighteen, compared to five in 2007 and three in 2006 (Ibid.). These numbers indicate not only an increase in piracy activity in general, but an increase in the effectiveness of pirates in the area, due to the pirates' use of more sophisticated methods and a heavier arsenal of weapons. The changing nature of piracy attacks and their significant increase shed light on the correlated increase of concern by the international community.

As described in the previous section, the international community responded in different ways, including statements and resolutions, but also concrete action, either multilaterally or unilaterally. Relevant in the context of EUNAVFOR Atalanta is the (at first) unilateral initiative of France to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia. In September 2007, the, at the time newly elected French president, Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France will deploy ships to escort WFP ships and help them deliver food aid to Somalia. The concrete initiative, which started in November 2007, was named Operation Alcyon and was later aided by Canada, Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands (Embassy of France to the US, 2008; Middleton, 2008).

France however changed its discourse towards Somali piracy from a humanitarian angle, namely the need to protect the WFP and food aid to Somalia, towards a more security-oriented angle in 2008. The reason for the change of tone can be explained by the hijackings of French ships and the capture of French citizens by Somali pirates in April and September of 2008. In these cases, piracy was not just a threat to the WFP but also a direct threat to the security of French citizens. The pirates hijacked the fifty-two-foot yacht, the Carré d'As, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September 2007. The pirates captured Jean-Yves and Bernadette Delanne, a married couple that was on-board of the yacht, and reportedly demanded a ransom of \$1.4 million (Samuel, 16.09.2008). The French navy quickly reacted to this situation and deployed a commando unit, which rescued the French citizens, and seized six and shot one pirate dead (Barkham, 18.09.2008). After the successful intervention by French commandos, Sarkozy



stated that “France will not allow crime to pay” and added that “this operation is a warning to all those who engage in criminal activity.” On the same occasion, Sarkozy called for the international community to act against Somali piracy and hinted at France as an example to follow (quote from Samuel, 16.09.2008).

#### **7.4. The organizational dimension**

Besides the international dimension and exogenous factors, the decision making process within Brussels is also influenced by internal mechanisms on both a formal and informal level. This subsection will focus on formal and informal power relations and hierarchies within and among the different organizations and actors of the EU’s crisis management structures. These formal and informal relations represent what the analytical model of this thesis refers to as institutions in the narrow sense, relevant for the group level of analysis.

##### **7.4.1. Member state politics**

Piracy off the coast of Somalia did not come as a surprise to the EU member states. As one interviewee mentions: “The interesting thing is that with Atalanta, there was a huge outcry from the private sector that piracy was getting out of control. That notion that we needed to do something there existed at least three years before we started the mission.” (Interview 13) This notion gradually entered into the informal discussions at the PSC. At the time of the informal discussions in the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the international community already started reacting to the increase of piracy. The US-led CTF-150 was patrolling the waters off the coast of Somalia, and coalitions were created around humanitarian concerns on the one hand and security concerns on the other, reflecting the different concerns of different actors (Interview 6). “Canada, France and Denmark were concerned [with] humanitarian needs. France and Spain also had a fishing fleet over there [in the Gulf of Aden]” (Interview 7). The diversity of interests of different countries also impacted the initial political discussions at the EU.

The EU member states, as well as the military structures and strategic planners within the Council Secretariat at the time were all aware of these developments. “In 2008, the [maritime] traffic was in danger, and the WFP was the *déclencher*, the trigger. There were

UNSC resolutions, and some member states started escorting ships” (Interview 7). The informal consensus was narrow and can be summarized in the interviewees’ frequently mentioned phrase: “we have to do something” (Interview 6). While there was a narrow agreement that *something* needs to be done, the more concrete details of *what* needs to be done were the points of contention among the member states. As one practitioner explains, there is “no incontestable truth. Even truth is politicized” (Interview 9). The spike in piracy from 2002 to 2008 off the coast of Somalia was according to the interviewee “a crisis at sea, a crisis for shipping. The [piracy attacks] were particular issues [and] there was a sense of urgency” (Ibid.). According to another interviewee, “[the reaction to piracy] was a gradual process. The general concept was ‘we don’t like the term ‘crisis’” (Interview 10).

The different options on the table over time included commitment of forces (both NATO and EU), funds from the Commission, and a variety of action plans. The option papers spelled out the different “interests, what’s at stake, objectives [...] and addressed options on how to deal with the issue.” There were even non-CSDP options on the table, namely the use of diplomacy and sanctions (Interview 6).

In the earliest stage of these informal discussions “the French were the pushers. [...] The pushers were the presidency, but [there was] overwhelming support from all member states” (Interview 13). As one practitioner explains however:

*Somalia was brought up by the French, I think [...] but I don't know if it's that important. These things surface somehow. Of course, there are nations who have a keener interest than other nations. The keenness of for example Germany's interest in Africa is limited, to put it mildly. With the French it's a question of the heart. They have a very strong mental affiliation to Africa (Interview 2).*

The French were also directly affected by the piracy attacks on French vessels and were also holding the Presidency at the time, which even further increased their ‘keenness’ to take action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia. In spite of the difference of involvement and ‘keenness’ by the member states, there was an agreement among the member states that ‘something needs to be done’. There were, however, points of contestation, and one of the major issues raised was the scale of involvement and the breadth of a potential mission’s mandate. “Division and sometimes difficult debates [formed between] groups of countries [that were] for [Atalanta] to be more robust and others [that wanted it] less robust, but I think, from the beginning, I guess there was overwhelming support” (Interview 13).

One practitioner further elaborates on the differences of ‘keenness’ and interests among EU member states on the issue of piracy in the Horn of Africa:

*The Horn of Africa is a very good example because it’s one of the critical maritime routes and all countries, regardless of their origin, are concerned with trade. Now, the problem is always having the balance right. In the European Union you have two kinds of countries. The European Union is for the time being not a global actor. It’s an actor in its neighbourhood, and it acts mainly in the north of Africa, south of the Sahara, the Eastern Partnership and in the Middle East. You have roughly speaking those who think that the Eastern Partnership is the more important area because it’s part of Europe and you have all on the other side that think that we have regional responsibility with the stability not only in the eastern part of Europe but also in our direct neighbourhood, that means Africa, and the Middle East. There are some financial constraints, and then some partners that think, if we are for example launching a new mission in Africa, there will be [fewer] resources for another [somewhere else]. We are always looking for this equilibrium (Interview 11).*

In such a political climate where there was agreement that something needs to be done, but disagreement over a full-fledged military operation that would compete with the already existing military efforts of the international community, the most important factor in the organisational dimensions was the French initiative and push for an agreement on a maritime military mission. “The French promoted cooperation. EU NAVCO was a French attempt to have joint staff in Paris and to gain a little bit of time to get support from the Dutch and the Germans. The UK supported [France] although [their attitude is] ‘everything EU is the devil’” (Interview 10).

According to one interviewee, the French push towards an EU mission was expedited by the different country-specific interests addressed by Atalanta:

*The thing about Atalanta is, it gives every member state what it wants. For the UK, Germany it gives free trade. For the Greeks, for the Maltese, Cypriots, it gives unhindered maritime movement, large shipping fleets. For the Scandinavians and Baltics it gives a human rights concern being addressed – piracy is not a nice thing. For the French it gives an EU flag, for the Spanish it looks at the shipping. So there was almost every MS that had an interest to see this happen, which is why we were able so quickly to start with the process of getting it running and why it was so widely supported. (Interview 12)*

After the push of the French and the Presidency at the informal and political level and the later realization of the other member states that an EU mission can address their different specific interests, the agreement was reached to start the work on the setting up of the mission, which shifted the discussion to the technical level of strategic planners and military experts.

On the technical level the process initially also faced different concerns and points of contestation raised by the different actors.

#### 7.4.2. Strategic planning and the ‘reality check’

While involved in the process of setting up the mission more heavily after the political consensus has been reached, the military structures and strategic planners are also involved in the initial informal debates, and can also influence the ‘keenness’ of member states to deploy a mission. This was also the case in the debates on Atalanta. As one interviewee explains:

*Atalanta was clearly pushed by the French during their presidency. But because it's such a military-heavy operation, from the very beginning, there must have been a buy-in by the military [...]. The military in itself is a factor, they have negotiating power; they have an influence in the debate, because they are a unity. [...] You always have at the beginning, whilst thinking about a mission the question ‘are we able to deliver?’ in the sense of finding the right personnel, so you have to have some contact with the forces of expertise before you really go deep into a debate (Interview 13).*

Like at the political level, the military structures were closely following the developments in Somalia and worked on strategies as part of the standard operating procedures of monitoring and early assessment. “In 2007, a part of the French Navy was working on the WFP bilateral, looking at the legal framework, [in order] to help the WFP. [...] The conclusion was that the EU has much knowledge and expertise, but the EU was not fit to help, so the French Navy was reluctant” (Interview 10). The French leadership “was in support of [a] CSDP [option] but in 2008 voluntarily sent French ships for some bizarre reason” (Ibid.). However, “there was a big change, namely [...] the French were about to take the Presidency” (Ibid.). Due to political pressure, further observations and conclusions were that the anti-piracy effort requires an element of naval diplomacy and “not simply to reconfigure CTF-151” (Ibid.). The EU possessed the legal expertise and potential for a more comprehensive response to piracy and “later it was accepted that the French Navy analysis was flawed and that the EU is best suited” for anti-piracy efforts (Ibid.).

As part of the assessment and strategic planning process, several concerns emerged. The option of relying on NATO forces in the region (NATO’s operation Allied Provider was active in the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Indian Ocean) was downplayed because “NATO was absorbed with Afghanistan and terrorism” (Interview 10). The strategic planners

had to accommodate the political interest of member states on the one hand and operational feasibility on the other, while also avoiding duplication of resources with NATO and focusing on the EU's added value.

“The question arose of whether it was worthwhile even trying.” (Interview 10) The main obstacles predicted in the course of action were the breadth of the mandate and the level of involvement on the ground. As explained by one interviewee, “you have to be there to witness [the acts of piracy], and to prosecute [the pirates]” (Ibid.). The feasibility of the EU's efforts as well as its credibility in the region was brought into question. “It's too big a space, you need to be precise. It was important to limit expectations” (Ibid.). “Initially the French said that fifty frigates were needed. The Germans and the British argued that would be too high a number and “emphasized the liberty of navigation on the high seas [and] free sailing” (Ibid.). For comparison purposes, EUNAVFOR Atalanta currently has four frigates and one destroyer deployed. As a result of careful planning and consideration, “there were some tactical mechanisms – Northwood was chosen [as the mission headquarters] to optimize the probability of having the right frigate at the right place, using a mathematical mode, [according to] standard military methodology” (Ibid.).

The UK experts pushed to have the headquarters of the mission in Northwood and decided that the EU and its CSDP are better suited for tackling the issue of piracy than NATO, but it also had personal interests to pursue. As one interviewee explains:

*You wouldn't be surprised that the UK doesn't necessarily have the best reputation in CSDP and this was the chance, with only a one-year mandate, the chance [to do something]. [...] We could use the clear synergies, almost co-location between the NATO Maritime Command Centre in Northwood and the EU one. So in relatively little time the UK could get a lot of visibility, for a very limited time. So that is why I think the UK pushed it (Interview 12).*

The different assessments and reports were collated, analysed and “written within the DG VIII at the time, now the CMPD, and of course we had military strategic options done as well by the EUMS” (Ibid.). The result was the creation of three documents over a two to three months period. These documents contained several options, and it was decided to expand on one of the options. After presenting the documents to the PSC, the member states questions and concerns were written as a reply in the PSC. After the concerns were addressed “there was a decision that those three documents will serve the purpose of the CMC” (Interview 10).

After the first year of the operation, following a positive report and review, the political and operational decisions were less challenging. In fact, there was an increase in the

aforementioned ‘keenness’ of member states to continue with the mission. As one practitioner reflects, “member states get more interested after a success. For ten years, the EU didn’t care. Suddenly there’s interest” (Interview 7). The ‘sudden’ increase of interest in the mission is not only the result of its successes but also the change of circumstances and perceptions of these circumstances by the actors involved in the process. The concerns and uncertainties that were raised in the initial political and operational discussions were partly ameliorated by the experience of the mission in its first year. These new experiences allowed for easier decision making due to the changes in the cognitive processing of the information and context available before the decisions were made. This cognitive process, on both a collective, but also on the individual level, is the focus of the following subsection of this chapter.

### **7.5. The cognitive dimension**

To further elucidate the decision-making process within Brussels institutions regarding the deployment of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the analysis needs to include a cognitive dimension. As explained in more detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis, the cognitive processing of information occurs first on an individual, subjective level, but can also manifest itself on an inter-subjective, group level in the form of collective cognition. One can identify several elements (or traces) of the cognitive process in official documents within the different institutions in Brussels as well as the personal reflections of the interviewees. These traces come in the form of different narratives and phrases used that reflect the perception and sense-making of the individual and the collective, respectively, regarding the issue at hand, which in this particular case are the piracy attacks on trade and WFP ships in the Horn of Africa.

This subsection of the chapter will look closer at some of these documents and the interviewees’ reflections, and identify the reoccurring narratives. While collective and individual cognition processes differ in their respective qualities, they share similarities in the phases of cognition – perception and sense-making of the situation, followed by the processing of that information and placing it within existing cognitive frames and finally resulting in a conscious formation of preference, interest or course of action. The collective cognitive process is by definition more complex, because it also includes the interaction of individuals and their respective (power) relationships.

This section of the thesis will first describe the collective cognitive process in relation to the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta. In this sub-section, it will in particular analyze the collective sense-making and perceptions of Somali piracy and crisis. It will also focus on the role of the military as the driver in the collective cognitive process towards the creation of a military preference and course of action. In particular, the sub-section will outline the roots of the idea of an EU maritime capability and the discursive and institutional ‘power’ of the military in the Somali crisis management process. The sub-section on collective cognition finally leads into the next sub-section focusing on the individual cognitive process. In particular, this sub-section will focus on some of the drafters of the key documents for the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission and their understanding of Somali piracy, their prior experience and knowledge, and the way they make decisions in the drafting of these documents.

#### 7.5.1. Collective cognition

In practice it is difficult to delineate between collective and individual cognition. One constellation of context models can either remain unchallenged when faced with other individuals within the group, or can be vastly influenced by the collective cognitive frames. In either case, it is difficult to identify which context models are strictly individual (subjective) and which are shared by the collective (inter-subjective). One useful indicator is the representation of the self and the choices between the uses of ‘I’ in the singular or ‘we’ in the plural. Both representations are part of one’s identity, but the use of ‘we’ indicates a stronger influence of cognitive models constructed within the group. The following subsections present the interviewees’ perceptions of the ‘reality out there’, their self-understanding and the understanding of others, and their institutional environment. All of these context models were reflected on using the plural form, which indicates a strong sense of belonging to the collective.

##### 7.5.1.1. Perception of crisis

In addressing the collective cognition and its role in developing EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the first step is to understand the first phase of cognition, namely the collective perception and

sense making of the situation in Somalia. As previously mentioned, piracy off the coast of Somalia did not suddenly appear, but after the rise of piracy, the UN call for help and the hijacking of WFP and French civilian vessels, the urgency was perceived to be higher. As mentioned in the section above, while there was a sense of urgency, the member states did not prefer the term ‘crisis’. However, what makes a situation a crisis, is a matter of perception and framing. As one practitioner explains: “If politicians think that someone needs to do something, then you have a crisis. Things can simmer for decades and nobody calls it a crisis and then someone agrees, or many agree that something needs to be done and suddenly you have a crisis” (Interview 2). A crisis can be triggered by extraordinary events, but in the collective ‘mind’, “it’s just a connotation or perception.”

According to one practitioner, “It was a crisis in 2008, for sure. We had a very large number of major shipping companies saying they're going to stop using the Suez Canal. They were going to go around Africa” (Interview 12). The common perception and concern was the economic impact of piracy activity on EU member states. Piracy would reroute shipping, which would in turn affect international trade. “Everything we bought in Europe that came from the Far East, and vice versa, going to the Far East from Europe, would've cost more [and take] longer to get there. So, all of us would have been affected” (Ibid.). The second concern was that there would be a severe economic impact on this route, in particular on Egypt because of the Suez Canal. And “that is what we considered then as one of the elements of stability in the region. We didn't want the Egyptian economy to be seriously destabilized by that” (Ibid.). The third perception of piracy was “one of simple good manners, [namely] that we weren't prepared to have the high seas disrupted and that we should be able to move ships where companies wanted to move ships and that in itself was worth acting against piracy” (Ibid.).

As the previous section explained, these perceptions were not instantly shared by all the member states. The question arises of what allows for Somali piracy to become a shared perception of crisis. “The easiest answer of course is when member states’ interests are evidently under threat – that can be citizens or that can be property, basic interests, then that is a crisis, But I think it can also be considered a crisis if the majority of the member states are convinced it is a crisis” (Interview 13).<sup>9</sup> In the case of *Atalanta*, the collective sense-

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<sup>9</sup> Reaching a common perception of crisis in a region is not a guaranteed outcome. As pointed out by one of the interviewees, in the example of the Sahel region, twelve member states were convinced that there was a problem in the Sahel with terrorism, drug trafficking and trafficking of people, but “apparently the number of countries was not big enough to come with a conclusion that there was a crisis there, although there was maybe a crisis.”



making of the situation was strongly influenced by the French presidency and the French diplomats within Brussels. In the case of France, the country's direct interests were under threat, once the French yacht was hijacked. However, getting the other member states 'on board' was made possible by the broader perception of the region. Consensus was reached by the support of the Scandinavian member states that put emphasis on the humanitarian problem of WFP ships not reaching their destination. This emphasis is also present in the UNSC resolutions presented above. The UN mandate and support of the UN bodies played a great role and allowed for the EU's consideration of adding some military elements into the mission and to centre the support on deterrence, disrupting and preventing of piracy (Interview 10).

#### 7.5.1.2. The role of the military

Besides the French push and the consensus-seeking Scandinavian efforts, the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission was heavily influenced by the military expertise with the crisis management structures in Brussels. "With the military there is a completely different sort of dynamic" (Interview 13). The EUMS and the EUMC pursue their own interests and depending on the crisis and crisis management opportunities, the military has considerable leverage in persuading member states and influencing their perceptions. In the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, "the navies were very willing to undertake this operation, seeing that the armies are heavily engaged in Afghanistan and Kosovo and then not really having theatres where they could prove their usefulness, so I think the navies were very willing to take this issue up (Ibid.). With the UNSC resolutions framing the piracy issue in the Horn of Africa partly as a security issue and allowing for the deployment of 'all necessary means', the military recognised the opportunity to strengthen the capacity of a potential EU Navy in the future. "Within the EUMC, once the idea was that we needed to do something, this also developed fast. I mean, the French are pushers, in the sense that they can really drive something forward, but I think that the fact that the military was keen to take this mission up has greatly helped to get this mission in shape in a couple of months only" (Ibid.).

Process tracing allows one to identify the origins of the military's source of 'power' in persuading member states to opt for a military crisis management option. The idea of a

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There was "no direct threat at that point to our interest, but everyone could see that, if nothing was undertaken, this would spiral out of control" (Interview 13).

stronger naval capability for the EU has existed even before the escalation Somali piracy. Already back in 2003, Javier Solana and his advisors foresaw maritime piracy as a potential threat to European security. Accordingly, the European Security Strategy of 2003 states that “A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy” (European Council, 2003, p. 5). While maritime security was only mentioned as a side note in this document, its mentioning indicates that maritime security did not suddenly appear in the coordinative discourse shortly before Atalanta’s deployment but was ‘in the works’ of the broader security narratives within Brussels.

The ESS also reflected the EU’s awareness of its position vis-à-vis the security threats the EU would potentially face and which are reoccurring themes in other key CFSP/CSDP documents such as the Helsinki European Council conclusions from December 1999 (European Council, 1999b) and the Laeken European Council conclusions from December 2001 (European Council, 2001), namely the EU’s need to be “more active, more coherent and more capable” (European Council, 2003, p. 11). The document titled Headline Goal 2010, approved by the GAERC on the 17<sup>th</sup> of May 2004 and endorsed by the European Council of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> of June 2004 stresses that “Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations” (European Union, Headline Goals 2010, 2004a, p. 2). As another side note, regarding the Battlegroup concept and rapid deployment of the EU’s capabilities, the document states that “relevant air and naval capabilities would be included” (Ibid., p. 3). Furthermore, “the development of EU Rapid Response elements including Battlegroups, will strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible UN requests” (Ibid.).

The documents mentioned above were agreed on the level of the European Council, and reflect the general consensus at the political level that a stronger military element to the CSDP is necessary and desired. This allowed for military actors to be pro-active and develop a set of strategies and studies on the future of EU’s military capabilities. One of the relevant documents for the case of an EU maritime capability is the study entitled “A Vision for the Future Role of European Maritime Forces” (Vision 2025 henceforth), published by The Chiefs of European Navies, an informal military forum. The study applied a very elaborate ‘scenario analysis’ methodology, analyzing and predicting the EU’s maritime roles and capabilities in different scenarios of political willingness to act and the available means for action. The study emphasizes the need for flexibility and cooperation, and concludes the following: “The Vision 2025 project communicates our concept of more closely integrated

European naval forces, capable of supporting joint forces with a wide range of roles and capabilities, in close cooperation with our transatlantic and international allies and partners, military and non-military” (CHENS, 2005, p. 13).

This study was regularly referenced in subsequent documents of the EUMC and EUMS. Based on the instructions of the EUMC, the EUMS, supported by experts from member states, as well as representation from the Commission drafted the EU Maritime Study, which was finalized on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2007. This study is an important document, which institutionalizes the notions of EU maritime capabilities, creates future context models of maritime crisis management and serves as a reference for both political and operational decision makers on issues of maritime capabilities. The study also methodically argues why flexible maritime capabilities are useful for the future of EU crisis management. According to the study, “maritime assets are able to provide a range of capabilities that have utility across the spectrum of EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO) and can be swiftly and flexibly task-tailored,” which can provide “political and operational decision makers a wide range of operational choices without the need to make a decisive and often irreversible commitment to a course of action or exit plan” (European Union, 2007a, p. 8).

From the quote above it is evident that the study follows the narrative of flexibility found in the Vision 2025 study, but the EU Maritime study also makes the argument that this flexibility extends to political decision making, which is a persuasive argument to make if and when faced with member states that are reluctant to make a strong commitment to CSDP. Accordingly, the study identifies “two feasible rapid response force generation options, namely an On-Call Force and a Maritime Rapid Response Mechanism (MRRM). [...] The first option is considered a risk of providing a force that is not mission-tailored, resulting in limited effect.” The member states also thought that this option of a standing navy would “place undue burden on finite MS maritime resources and [...] take for granted MS participation in a particular crisis.” The study argues that the MRRM allows for “the possibility of mission-tailoring the maritime contribution although its success is dependent on rapid and transparent decision-making” (Ibid., p. 10).

The EU maritime study argues that to achieve its “aspirations as a global crisis response actor” the EU’s CSDP requires the “ability to integrate with other EU instruments and partners” and the “capability to plug into a Joint and even civil-military environment” (Ibid., p. 11). This document indicates that the EU military structures share the self-perception of a potential global crisis management actor. It therefore presents to member states both the possibilities of and conditions for a stronger CSDP. The push by the military

to further develop maritime capabilities continued with the publication of the Maritime Rapid Response (MarRR) Concept. According to the Single Progress Report on the Development of EU Military Capabilities from the 30<sup>th</sup> of November 2007, the EUMC decided at its meeting on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December 2006 to develop the MarRR Concept based on the findings of the EU Maritime Study from earlier that year.

The concept was approved by the EUMC on the 15<sup>th</sup> of November 2007. It “foresees the implementation of a Maritime Rapid Response Mechanism focused on force generation, and supported by a Maritime Rapid Response Database updated through a bi-annual Maritime Rapid Response Information Conference and/or on MS own initiatives” (European Union, 2007c, p. 8). The MarRR Concept uses the same narrative (and even exact paragraphs) as the EU Maritime Study and argues that “the early presence of a maritime force can be a significant factor in providing the necessary political and/or military leverage” (European Union, 2007b, p. 5). The MarRR Concept also responds to the political resistance of some MS by acknowledging that “The Concept is cognisant of the voluntary nature of Member State commitments and should therefore strive to utilise to best effect available resources without increasing the maritime burden on MS” (Ibid.). The MarRR Concept represents a key document in the “wider context of EU concepts and procedures” and “they collectively form the basis for the planning and execution of EU-led CMO requiring Rapid Response, including EU Decision-making and Force Generation Processes” (Ibid.).

These documents that set out concepts and procedures serve as a reference for any collective decision making process and represent the institutionalized context models of the collective actors within Brussels. However, the authors of these documents are either individuals or groups of individuals, whose names are in most cases undisclosed. The collective perceptions and preferences are therefore tightly linked with perceptions and preferences of individuals and their ability to transfer their individual cognition on to the collective level. The following sub-section focuses the individual level of cognition, in particular how the drafters of EUNAVFOR documents perceive Somali piracy and how they deal with the structural influences described above.

### 7.5.2. Individual cognition

As described in the fourth chapter of this thesis, to understand the cognitive process of an individual, the researcher ideally relies on both the individual’s reflections of the process, as

well as manifestations of the cognitive process through utterances (speeches, authored documents, etc.). As aforementioned, in the case of ongoing missions, such documents are more often than not classified and the researcher has to solely rely on the individual's reflections. This subsection of the chapter focuses on a few individuals involved in the drafting of some of the key documents that affected the collective cognition as explicated in the previous sub-section of this chapter. In particular, this sub-section will present the individuals' understanding of Somali piracy, which combined with their prior experiences affects the ways the perceived issue is dealt with. What the model of analysis developed in this thesis refers to as foreground discursive abilities is affected by the individuals' subjective identities and perceptions of power within the collective. These perceptions and the way the individuals engage in drafting process are described towards the end of this sub-section.

#### 7.5.2.1. The understanding of Somali piracy

The first phase of the cognitive process, namely the perception and sense-making of the 'reality out there' determines which context models will be employed in the process of preference formation and communication of that preference to others. While in the case of collective cognition at the political level, the main common focus was the urgency of piracy and the perception of the situation off the coast of Somalia as a 'crisis', in the case of cognition of individuals at the operational level the main focus is the very perception of piracy as an issue to be addressed. The individuals' understanding of piracy affects the formation of preferences in regard to the way piracy needs to be addressed.

The interviewees perceived piracy as a consequence of state failure and lack of government control and oversight, which is closely linked to the wider narratives of Somali piracy and state failure, identified in the previous chapter of this thesis, as well as in the analysis of the international dimension of the EUNAVFOR Atalanta policy process. When asked about the two wider narratives, namely a security one, which links piracy with Islamic extremism, and the more comprehensive narrative with development, economic, legal and humanitarian aspects alongside the security one, the interviewees' reflections aligned more closely to the latter.

According to one interviewee, "Islam is not linked with piracy. Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda did not materialize and there is not really a support for the Islamic cause [among pirates]" (Interview 7). According to the interviewee, "the pirates realized a lot money is

passing by, so intelligent people thought ‘let’s take it’” (Ibid.). The interviewee argues further that piracy is not a reaction to illegal fishing or toxic dumping, but that it occurred because there’s no fishing and no policing in those waters. He concludes that “pirates use torture and murder – they are not fishermen. Somalia was never a country of fishermen” (Ibid.). Another interviewee shares the understanding of piracy as a result of state failure in Somalia and attributes the rise of piracy to a great degree of immense poverty and lack of control of the coastline. The interviewee explains that as a Somali pirate “you just want to grab the treasures” (Interview 10). Finally one interviewee reflects on piracy in a more conceptual manner:

*Back then we were saying piracy exists and always seems to exist when you have two criteria: You have non-governed space and you have access to the high seas. If you have only one of those, you get no pirates. There's no piracy in Afghanistan, no piracy off France. But when the two are linked, you seem to get it every time.” [...] It is as simplistic as that. You know, this is a clear opportunity for people to do things that they want to do” (Interview 12).*

The interviewees all share the view that piracy is a consequence of state failure and broader societal issues, rather than a narrowly defined security problem linked to terrorism and Islamic extremism. The similarities between their perception of piracy and the wider constructed narratives on Somali piracy indicate a strong influence of these narratives on the interviewees’ cognitive processes. Noteworthy is also the interviewees’ conviction in their understanding of piracy. As the quote above illustrates, there is a high degree of confidence in the understanding of the issue. The interviewee confesses the simplicity of his understanding of piracy, which indicates a high degree of reliance on previous experiences and knowledge by the interviewee.

#### 7.5.2.2. Background knowledge and prior experience

The subjective perception and sense-making of individual actors can be affected by broader organizational and even broader societal understandings of a given situation, but is also highly impacted by the individual’s prior knowledge and experiences. The previous subsection makes the link between the wider, internationally constructed narrative of Somali piracy as a consequence of the complex issue of state failure, which implies a more complex and comprehensive approach to resolving of the problem. However, this connection requires

an individual's prior understanding and experiences in similar situations. At the political level there was a lack of experience in dealing with piracy and as one interviewee explains, "the countries needed to define the comprehensive approach for a naval operation. A half of the member states had no clue" (Interview 7). These were the countries that have no navies and no shipping in the area. "There was an identity problem and [a problem] deciding on an approach" (Ibid.).

At the military and strategic level there was more experience in dealing with maritime operations in crisis areas. One of the interviewees reflected on how his previous experience contributed to the creation of preferences regarding the setting up of EUNAVFOR Atalanta. The interviewee explained that he "was working for the navy as a naval commander in late 2008 when suddenly on a Friday afternoon [he] got a task saying 'can you look at piracy off Somalia' because the EU is looking at doing something about it. So, in a fairly short order, in about two weeks [he and his peers...] had written the CONOPS, and [he] ended up in Brussels (Interview 12). He had previous experience as a national navy commander, but was not fully familiar with the CSDP policy process. The interviewee confessed that he had "very little understanding of what the EU and indeed the partners were doing in Somalia so [the CONOPS] was pretty much written in isolation" (Ibid.). He relied on existing documents that were circulated and forwarded to him. As the interviewee reflects, "this is the military methodology – building on the initial military directive and the CMC, on how we wanted that concept, in terms of dealing with piracy, and I should be clear, [...] dealing with the symptoms of piracy, not the causes of piracy" (Ibid.).

The fact that the initial concepts addressed more the symptoms of piracy rather than the causes triggered the interviewee's context models constructed from his past experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 'lessons learned' and the drafting of the CONOPS he and his peers were entrusted with, allowed the interviewee to take the initiative and to broaden the scope of EU's anti-piracy effort. The following quote describes the interviewee's thought process:

*It took us part of the year to understand what the other institutions were doing in Somalia. So in many ways we had to reverse engineer a comprehensive approach. And that was on a personal initiative. There was no guidance. This was clearly logical to do but there was no top-down guidance. [...] Yeah I mean, my background, [...] I was in Iraq back in 2003. Near Baghdad I was 60 miles up on an Iraqi river on a seven meter boat and the locals were cheering and applauding. Militarily we had been very successful but clearly no other instruments followed [and] the situation rapidly escalated out of control. I then went to [...] Afghanistan in 2007 and worked*

*[...] as part of the military command. So within four years [it was] understood what had gone wrong, and [we tried] to get a comprehensive approach [applied] and that worked relatively well. And then I came to Brussels and two weeks later I suddenly thought, this place has everything you need to get a resolution, on a scale beyond a single member state's comprehension. The largest development fund in the world! This could be significant. So I started to reach out and see what the Commission is doing, see what development are doing, see what all of these people are doing. So that's how Atalanta became more comprehensive (Interview 12).*

The interviewee clearly demonstrates traits of what Vivien Schmidt (2008, 2010) refers to as a 'sentient agent'. The interviewee is conscious of the pressure of his past experiences, the organisational and political pressures of both dealing with the symptoms of piracy but the increasing pressure of addressing the causes of piracy and following up on lessons learned. These pressures represent the constraining structures that a 'sentient agent' is able to change through (discursive) action, in this shaping the CONOPS and influencing further decision-making on the issue of piracy in Somalia.

#### 7.5.2.3. The drafting process

After they made sense of the 'reality out there', related it to their prior knowledge and experiences, and formed preferences on future action, individuals are able to communicate these preferences, and in the case of strategic planners and military experts, these preferences are communicated through the drafts of policy documents. The organizational dimension is relevant for the drafting process insofar as it determines the freedom of the individual drafters in their discursive abilities. The degree of freedom when drafting these documents depends on the institutionalized position the document occupies in the policy process, but also on the drafters' perception of their own role and 'power' within the policy process.

One of the concerns the authors of documents take into account is the acceptance of the document at the political level, since they need to be agreed on by all member states, in most cases at the level of the PSC. In a reflection on the drafting process of the CONOPS for EUNAVFOR Atalanta, one interviewee stated:

*The CMC and the IMD give you specified tasks – you are to do X, Y, Z. We then have the implied tasks. We haven't been told to do it, but there's an implication that we need to do this. And you have enormous freedom in specifying what your implied tasks are. [...] This is a broad concept of what it is we want to do. Of course, the CONOPS is then approved by the PSC, so if you have gone beyond what that level is ready to*



*accept, then you'll be corrected at that point. The CONOPS and the OPLAN are absolutely owned by the Operation Commander, so you'll send the member states the draft, they'll make comments on the draft and you can then modify and resubmit the paper or you can say this is now OK and you submit it with the recognition that the member states are already going to buy it, because they've already seen the draft, they got no key issues with it" (Interview 12).*

The drafting of the CMC slight differs from that of the CONOPS. The CMC is drafted at an earlier stage in the policy process, which means that the authors do not yet have specific guidelines on what the document should contain in terms of content, but only in terms of what the structure of the document should be. The CMC has usually one draft. In the case of Atalanta, the CMC was not revised but complemented by additional documents. Complementing information and documents came from advice and recommendations from within the EUMC (Interview 7).

As references and sources, the drafters relied on open sources, the UNSC Resolutions, reports of NGOs, states in the region of the Horn of Africa, and in the revision phases of Atalanta also on the cooperation with local actors (Interview 7). The ESS was referenced as a document but was not a key reference in shaping EUNAVFOR Atalanta. As one practitioner explains, “[The ESS] provides a general framework, but it’s perceived by some member states to be a bit out of date. [...] It still provides a general background, but it’s not a document that everybody's carrying in their pocket all the time. [...] It wouldn't be a strong influence, [but] it is useful since it condenses in a way what the policy is” (Interview 1).

The CMC for Atalanta looks at everything that the EU is doing and looks at the development aid, security and anti-terrorism potential of the EU. It also presents the main concerns of the member states and in the case of Atalanta these were the WFP shipping and the threat to the EU’s economy, welfare and shipping (Interview 7). As explained by one interviewee, when formulating the CMC, the drafter’s role is to “find the common approach, identify what you need and what you can do [and] to come up with a compromise, based on the idea of what others want. [...] A good CMC will please all of the member states. Ideally, it should contain what should be done, but member states are interested in what can be done. We need to find the centre of gravity” (Ibid.).

Another interviewee reflected on the thought process behind the drafting of the CMC for EUNAVFOR Atalanta and explained how he dealt with the questions of ‘what is possible’ and ‘is it better to do something or nothing’ posed by the member states: “The US didn’t necessarily have a good experience and brought misery with the ‘good intentions’ in Iraq. To answer, you follow the mechanism of [reaching a] point of balance between objective,

resources and acceptance of political-military risks. You want to avoid open-ended missions, and ‘we are there forever’ scenarios” (Interview 10).

The pressure from the political level can come in the form of such questions during the drafting process, but also in the form of time constraints. As one interviewee explains, “The request from the PSC is broad. There are some limits. When drafting the CMC, we ask member states bilaterally to see the limits” (Interview 7). The CMC is around twenty to fifty pages. “It is as detailed as possible, providing detailed aspects to allow political decisions. [...Some] member states ask for detail in good faith, they need to know [the details], but some ask for detail to postpone the process. They want to know for example the conditions in Djibouti, information related to ships, airstrips, the nitty-gritty detail” (Ibid.). The additional pressure on the drafters comes from the time constraints in delivering the final draft. “Once member states agree on something, they want it immediately” (Ibid.).

## **7.6. Conclusion**

This chapter investigated the first case study of this thesis with the aim to address the question of where CSDP missions come from. The decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta becomes more puzzling considering the vast international anti-piracy campaign already underway in the waters off the coast of Somalia at the time when the decision was made. This chapter followed the model of analysis proposed in the fourth chapter of this thesis and investigated how structures of meaning influenced the cognitive process at the organizational and individual level of decision making. The findings of the analysis lead to the conclusion that the EU’s decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta was influenced by a number of factors to varying degree.

In the international dimension, the analysis identifies potential sources of motivation for the EU decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta. An influential factor in shaping the narrative on the crisis in Somalia was the UNSC and its resolutions. Chapter six of this thesis identified the global narratives on Somalia as a failed state, but with variation in the way they defined the problems and solutions of this failed state. One global narrative sees the failed state of Somalia as a security threat (including Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and piracy), and which requires security solutions. On the other side of the spectrum lies the narrative of Somalia as a failed state that requires comprehensive solutions to a complex problem that includes humanitarian concerns, famine, financial weakness, political instability and a lack of strong

police and military forces. The UNSC Resolutions referred to in this chapter reflect both of these global narratives in their wording. Early UNSC Resolutions focus predominantly on the security threats in Somalia, but during the food crisis and hijackings of WFP vessels, the UNSC Resolutions stressed the complexity of the crisis and the need for a wider set of solutions to the issue of piracy. These narratives, as this chapter demonstrates, found their way into the coordinative discourse of the EU, especially at the political level at the PSC.

The analysis further includes the impact of the events that occurred during 2008, namely the significant increase in piracy activities off the coast in Somalia in general, but also the hijackings of French ships in particular. The hijackings of French ships caused a direct reaction of France, which intervened with its own troops at first, but once it took over the EU Presidency, decided to push for an EU involvement in the region.

The UNSC call for help, the increase of piracy and the hijacking of the French ships created the framework in which the coordinative discourse within EU institutions developed. On the political level, all member states had an interest in stopping piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden and there was an overall consensus that ‘something should be done’. The French held the EU presidency at the time and were able to push strongly for a CSDP operation. The military and strategic structures supported the CSDP option but had to ensure the mission’s feasibility and efficiency to avoid unnecessary costs and duplication with other international efforts, in particular that of NATO.

The coordinative discourse in Brussels and the constructed narratives at the UNSC created structures, which affected the cognitive process of individuals and groups of individuals involved in the drafting and approving of the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mandate. The perceptions of the crisis at the PSC level varied, but there was a commonly agreed sense of urgency. Their perception was partly influenced by the military advice given on the issue. The military perception on the other hand was that piracy needs to be tackled through military means. This perception corresponded to the established institutional context and the existing plans of developing stronger EU maritime capabilities. This perception influenced the drafting process on an individual level in the sense that it contributed to the drafters’ preference formation at the individual level of cognition.

The analysis of individual cognition reveals that the drafters’ context models included the understanding of their positions within the decision-making hierarchy, the political pressures involved in drafting documents, as well as the potential the EU possesses in terms of military and economic resources. The analysis further reveals that the individual drafting process allowed for a degree of personal initiative in framing the options of action, which in

the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, besides a purely military intervention, included cooperation and coordination with other military and civilian anti-piracy efforts in the region. This personal initiative to develop a more comprehensive solution to Somali piracy can be attributed to the lessons learned and previous experiences of the individual agents, which in conjunction with the other structures mentioned above affected the preference formation of these agents.

The combined analysis of the three dimension of the model indicates that the decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta was primarily a result of the French political ‘push’ at the level of the PSC with the support of like-minded member states. Further influence, but to a lesser degree, comes from the UN call for help in the form of UNSC Resolutions, but in particular to the UNSC commendations of the EU in those resolutions, which increased the EU’s visibility as a global actor and legitimized its involvement off the coast of Somalia. Finally, these factors were necessary but not sufficient and were complemented by the military planners in Brussels, from both the EUMS and the Council Secretariat at the time. Finally, the format of the mission, and consequentially the nature of EU involvement, was affected by the individual drafters’ cognitive filtering of all of the above structures of meaning and their lessons learned and previous experience. With the exception of the focus on individual factors, the findings of the analysis in this chapter are consistent with the findings of one of the more substantial studies of the decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta conducted by Germond and M.E. Smith (2009) who claim that “the gradual development of a comprehensive maritime dimension of European security, including a recognition of the importance of the EU’s maritime frontiers, the unprecedented rise of piracy off Somalia, and a mixture of EU member states’ domestic and foreign interests, helps explain the EU’s first ESDP naval operation” (Germond & Smith, 2009, p. 587).

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# Chapter 8. EUTM Somalia

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## 8.1. Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the factors that influenced the EU's decision to deploy its first anti-piracy mission in the Horn of Africa, namely EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which was a purely military mission with a concrete mandate to protect merchant vessels and World Food Programme ships, to arrest, detain and transfer suspected pirates, and to deter and prevent acts of piracy in the seas off the coast of Somalia. The analysis concludes that the decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta was made due to multiple factors. This decision was primarily the product of a French initiative, during the French presidency over the EU, but was also influenced by both the UN call for help to the international community to deal with piracy and to protect WFP ships, as well as a strategically planned project of crisis management and military structures within the European External Action Service. This project of the actors within the EEAS represents the reaction to a perceived crisis but also a perceived opportunity for furthering their individual and group agendas of a stronger EU (maritime) presence in the region. At the cognitive level of groups and individuals in the crisis management structures in Brussels, the perceptions and knowledge of the problem and accordingly the solutions to the problem of piracy in Somalia were influenced by both the internationally constructed narratives of Somalia as a failed state and the understanding of piracy as a broader societal problem that requires a broad and comprehensive solution, as well as internally constructed narratives at the organizational level of EU's visibility and maritime presence.

These constructed narratives maintain their relevance in the case of another EU mission that followed EUNAVFOR Atalanta and which addressed the problem of Somalia's state failure and lack of a strong Somali military force, namely the EUTM Somalia mission deployed on the 10<sup>th</sup> of April 2010. This chapter focuses on the decision to deploy EUTM Somalia and follows the same model of analysis used in the previous chapter. Following this introduction, the second section of this chapter will outline the problems of the Somali security forces and the different international actors' efforts to aid in Somali security sector reform. This section will also pose the main question of why the EU decided to develop its own mission to help with the training of Somali forces. The third section of this chapter will focus on the international dimension of the issue and analyse the concerns of the international community, reflected in UN Security Council Resolutions and the UN's call for assistance in

developing Somali security forces. This section will also outline the events and developments that contribute to the context within which the EU made its decisions on the mandate (and the review of the mandate) of the EUTM Somalia mission. The fourth section of this chapter will focus on the organisational dimension of the decision making process regarding the EUTM mission and will in particular outline the political discussion within the PSC, as well as the strategic and operational debates within the EEAS crisis management structures. The fifth section of this chapter will focus the analysis on the cognitive process of the groups within EU crisis management structures, as well as of the individual drafters of EUTM Somalia CMCs and strategic review documents. This section will examine the narrative of the comprehensive approach to crisis management and the influence of this narrative on the perceptions of groups and individuals within EU crisis management structures. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter will combine the analyses of the different dimensions into a set of possible answers to the question of why EUTM Somalia was deployed.

## **8.2. The outcome**

While the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission was tackling the issue of piracy off the shore of Somalia, inland Somalia was facing another security and consequentially humanitarian problem. Since its formation in 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia did not have full control of the country, due to its lack of sufficiently strong security forces. Since 2006 the TFG relied on security assistance primarily from the Ethiopian army (the Ethiopian National Defence Force or ENDF), but from January 2007 its security forces were further aided by the African Union, in particular by troops deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The absence of strong Somali security forces was most prominent during the takeover of the capital Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and in particular its military branch, Al Shabaab. After the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and the ousting of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2006, Al Shabaab radicalized as a reaction to the Ethiopian forces, which left Somalia in 2009 (Wise, 2011). With the Ethiopian forces retreating from Somalia and the rise of Al Shabaab, the TFG faced increasing difficulty securing its control of Mogadishu, which resulted in the TFG's loss of a large part of the capital in 2009.

After the Ethiopian retreat and the TFG's call for help, the UNSC authorised the African Union to deploy a military mission to assist the TFG forces with the fighting against the Islamic insurgents. The African Union missions, AMISOM, began deploying troops in April 2007. AMISOM has three components, namely a military, a police, and a civilian component. The military component is the largest in terms of resources and personnel deployed, and consists of roughly twenty-two thousand soldiers from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Uganda (AMISOM). AMISOM, labelled as a "multidimensional Peace Support Operation" (AMISOM) accordingly has a very broad and multidimensional mandate, which includes coordination with Somali security forces in their fight against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, assistance in "consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory", establishing "effective and legitimate governance" and "the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure", providing "technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions, creating the conditions for fair and transparent elections by 2016, facilitating humanitarian assistance and the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees, and providing protection for AU and UN personnel and equipment in Somalia (AMISOM).

With such an extensive mandate, besides the logistical complexities, the major challenge of AMISOM was to secure sufficient funding for its operation in and outside of Somalia. AMISOM relies on UN logistical and financial support, bilateral donations, and voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM, which was created and managed by the UN. The European Union is one of the major donors to AMISOM and "provides the resources needed for the payment of troop allowances and other related expenses, within the framework of the African Peace Facility (APF)" (AMISOM). The EU financial support to AMISOM since 2007 amounts to a total of 411 million Euros (EU Delegation to Somalia).

Besides assisting AMISOM financially, the EU decided to deploy its own mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, which led to the deployment of EUTM Somalia on the 10<sup>th</sup> of April 2010. The discussions within Brussels regarding EU's options to improve the security situation in Somalia date back to 2007, when the EU started supporting AMISOM. It was however the year 2009, when Al Shabaab was on the rise that the opportunity presented itself for the EU to develop a military mission. The Council approved the first Crisis Management Concept (CMC) that proposed a possible EU military mission on the 17<sup>th</sup> of November 2009. After consequent planning, on the 15<sup>th</sup> Of February 2010, the

Council decided that the EU would conduct a military training mission, under the name EUTM Somalia and with the objective “to contribute to a comprehensive and sustainable perspective for the development of the Somali security sector” and to provide “specific military training, and support to the training provided by Uganda, of 2 000 Somali recruits.” Based on the CMC from November 2009, it was decided that the training will be conducted in Uganda (European Union, 2010a, p. 2). The mission plan and the date of deployment were decided on and approved in by the Council on the 31<sup>st</sup> of March 2010. This first mandate was planned to last for two consecutive six-month periods until 2011.

In June 2011, the PSC approved a revised CMC, which advised to extend the mandate of the mission for another year and to refocus the objectives towards the ‘training of trainers’ and the emphasis on local ownership of the training process. The Council approved the revised CMC on the 20<sup>th</sup> of July 2011, and as a result, extended the mandate of EUTM accordingly on the 28<sup>th</sup> of July 2011. The Council Decision from that meeting amended the mandate and added to the objectives that EUTM Somalia will focus on “self-training capacities of the Somali NSF, with a view to transferring EU training expertise to local actors” (European Union, 2011c, p. 2). The mission was extended for another two six-month periods until 2012. After the two six-month periods were over, there was a delay in extending the mandate in 2012 due to the uncertainty regarding the outcome of elections in Somalia and the political and security developments in the country. On the 21<sup>st</sup> of December 2012, the Council extended the ongoing mandate that was supposed to terminate that year until January 2013 in order to maintain legal continuity and validity of EUTM’s mandate and to justify the EU presence in Uganda at the beginning of 2013 (European Union, 2012d).

Influenced by the Strategic Review of EUTM from the 10<sup>th</sup> of October 2012, the revised CMC from the 10<sup>th</sup> of December 2012 was approved by the Council, and accordingly the Council extended and refocused the mandate one more time on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 2013. In the Council Decisions from that meeting the mandate was amended by adding that “the mission shall be deployed in Somalia and in Uganda”, and that “the implementation of the mandated activities in Somalia shall depend on the security conditions in Somalia” (European Union, 2013a, p. 2). The gradual migration of the training activities into Somalia was planned for the period of two years with the date of termination set for the 31<sup>st</sup> of March 2015 (Ibid., p.3).

During the three mandates of EUTM Somalia, the mission contributed to the training of over four thousand Somali soldiers. The mission’s Operational Headquarters (OHQ) was based in Kampala, Uganda, and was aided by Support Cells in Nairobi, Kenya and in



Brussels. As part of the refocusing of the EUTM Somalia's third mandate, the OHQ and the base of the mission were gradually moved to Mogadishu, Somalia, near the Mogadishu International Airport. Initially, during the first and second mandate, the base and training camp were in Bihanga, Uganda, since Mogadishu was not fully controlled by the Somali government and it was not secure for the mission staff to be located there. The mission under the current mandate consists of 125 troops from ten member states: Ireland, Romania, Germany, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom, with additional support from Serbia. The mission currently has a projected budget of 11.6 million Euros (EEAS, 2014).

Considering the existing engagement of the African Union and AMISOM and the presence of almost twenty-two thousand African troops on the one hand, and the already great sum of money the EU has donated to AMISOM on the other hand, the question arises of why the EU decided to deploy a training mission of its own and extend it for three and potentially more than three mandates over the period of five years and possibly even longer than that, especially after taking into account that the EU already had another mission (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) ongoing in the region. The analysis in the following sections of this chapter aims to expose some of the potential influences on the EU's decision to deploy EUTM Somalia by looking at the different dimensions of the EU's decision-making.

### **8.3. The international dimension**

This section will follow the model used in the previous chapter and present the context and exogenous factors that shaped the perception and reasoning within Brussels, which influenced the decision making process regarding the deployment (and extension of the mandate) of EUTM Somalia. The section will first outline the relevant UNSC resolutions, which reflect the concerns and understanding of the international community on the issue of Somali security sector reform. This section will identify the issues the UNSC raised and the elements it added to the overall narrative(s) regarding Somalia's security forces. The UNSC resolutions throughout the relevant period vary in the degree to which their narratives align with the two meta-narratives identified in the Chapter 6 of this thesis. While there are instances of stronger emphasis on security elements, the UNSC resolutions predominantly project the more comprehensive meta-narrative regarding Somalia's state failure and accordingly call for comprehensive solutions. The second part of this section will identify

other exogenous factors that impacted the processing of the issue of Somalia's security sector by the different actors within the EU. These two sources of exogenous influence contribute to the creation of the relevant Brussels-based actors' context models and subsequently the decision making process, as described in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

### 8.3.1. The UN call for help

As mentioned in the previous chapter of this thesis, the UNSC had monitored the situation in Somalia more closely since the early 2000s, mostly focusing on the arms embargo, violent conflicts between the TFG and other parties, as well as the involvement of the African Union in Somalia. After the formation of the TFG and the conflict with Al Shabaab, the UNSC adopted several UNSC Resolutions, through which it either granted mandates to conduct military campaigns to international organizations, such as the African Union and the European Union, or through which it called for international support for any effort of stabilizing the region, and in particular enabling Somalia to strengthen its security sector.

Resolution 1744 (2007) from the 20<sup>th</sup> of February 2007 authorized member states from the African Union to establish a mission for six months with a mandate to, among other things, "assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces." (UNSC Resolution 1744, p. 3) UNSC Resolution 1772 from the 20<sup>th</sup> of August 2007 extends the mandate such a mission for an additional six months, with the same purpose to re-establish and train Somali security forces.

Further extension of the AMISOM mandate was decided in UNSC Resolution 1801 from the 20<sup>th</sup> of February 2008, in which the UNSC "underlines, in particular, that AMISOM is authorized to take all necessary measures as appropriate." (UNSC Resolution 1801, p. 2) The exact same wording is repeated in UNSC Resolution 1831 from the 19<sup>th</sup> of August 2008. All of the aforementioned Resolutions also stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to the situation in Somalia, which coincides with the similar emphasis on a comprehensive approach developed within the EU CFSP/CSDP, in particular through the EU's engagement

in the Horn of Africa, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, as well as in the following chapter of this thesis.

The other UNSC Resolutions from 2008 dealt with the issue of piracy, as outlined in the previous chapter of this thesis. In 2009 however, the UNSC turned again more to the issues Somalia was facing inland. UNSC Resolution 1863 from the 16<sup>th</sup> of January 2009 stressed “the importance of reestablishment, training and retention of Somali security forces” and welcomed “the Secretary-General’s proposal for a partnership between the Somali parties, the United Nations, AMISOM and other international partners to develop a program of assistance to build Somali security capacity” (UNSC Resolution 1863, pp. 1-2). The emphasis of the UNSC on security sector reform was maintained in the UNSC Resolution 1872 from the 26<sup>th</sup> of May 2009, which welcomed “the President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s focus on peace through strengthening the security sector, as his government’s leading priority” (UNSC Resolution 1872, p. 1), and which explicitly stated “that Somalia’s long-term security rests with the effective development by the Transitional Federal Government of the National Security Force [...] in line with a national security strategy (Ibid., pp. 2-3). Discursively, this Resolution had the strongest impact on the internationally accepted narrative on the future of Somalia. The resonating words from the quote above are ‘long-term security’, which imply a solution to the situation in Somalia and, more appealingly to the international community, imply the prospect of an exit strategy from Somalia.

UNSC Resolution 1910 from the 28<sup>th</sup> of January 2010 repeated its emphasis that Somalia’s long-term security depended on the development of a National Security Force, but in addition also pointed out “the terrorist threat that Somali armed groups, in particular Al Shabaab, constitute for Somalia and for the international community” (UNSC Resolution 1910, p. 2). The addition of Al Shabaab as a terrorist threat strengthened the security element of the narrative on Somalia and its security sector reform. The labeling of Al Shabaab as a terrorist threat in this period coincides with the introduction of Al Shabaab on to the EU’s “list of persons and entities which are subject to restrictive measures” on the 26<sup>th</sup> of April 2010 (European Union, 2010b). This list, among others, includes actors that essentially fulfil the EU’s criteria of terrorist individuals, groups or organizations.

Later that year, the UNSC Resolution 1964 from the 22<sup>nd</sup> of December 2010 recalled in the same wording the issues from the previous resolutions, including the

“importance of the re-establishment, training, equipping and retention of Somali security forces, which is vital for the long-term stability of Somalia” (UNSC Resolution 1964, p. 2), but also (very briefly) expressed support for the EU training mission, which was based in Uganda at the time. The resolution however put more emphasis on the diminished funding available for the efforts of the international community and especially AMISOM. In this resolution, the UNSC specifically called the Member States and regional and international organizations to “contribute generously and promptly to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM without caveats, or to make direct bilateral donations in support of AMISOM [...] in order to ensure that the appropriate funds and equipment are promptly provided, particularly in relation to the salaries of AMISOM soldiers [...]” (UNSC Resolution 1964, p. 4).

UNSC Resolution 2010 from the 30<sup>th</sup> of September 2011 reiterated that the Somali armed groups, and in particular Al Shabaab, constitute a terrorist threat to Somalia and the international community (UNSC Resolution 2010, pp. 2-3) and reiterated its support for the EUTM Somalia, and the EU’s contribution to the AMISOM efforts and “the improvements in the security situation in Mogadishu” (Ibid., p. 3). In UNSC Resolution 2036 from the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February 2012, the EU is mentioned briefly as part of the commendation of “bilateral support programmes of Member States and the European Union Training Mission for Somalia (EUTM)” (UNSC Resolution 2036, p. 5) and does not dedicate further attention to the activities of EUTM.

After the formation of the new Somali Federal Government, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2067 on the 18<sup>th</sup> of September 2012 in which it reaffirmed the support for, but also the obligations of the new Somali authorities. In particular the resolution urged “the Somali authorities to complete the restructuring of the SNSF including through ensuring full command and control is in place for all reintegrated personnel” (UNSC Resolution 2067, p. 4). At this stage in the development of the security sector reform in Somalia, the problem was to address the issue of reintegration of already trained soldiers back into Somalia, where they would make use of their training.

Only during EUTM’s third mandate has the UNSC commended the mission’s contributions towards strengthening Somalia’s security forces. UNSC Resolution 2093, from the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 2013 reaffirmed “support for the ongoing European Union Training Mission and other capacity-building programmes, and emphasizing the importance of

increased coordinated, timely and sustained support from the international community” (UNSC Resolution 2093, pp. 1-2). Particular mention of EUTM can be found in UNSC Resolution 2124 from the 12<sup>th</sup> of November 2013, which welcomed “the support of the international community to peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution in supporting AMISOM” (UNSC Resolution 2124, p. 1).

Overall, throughout the period during which Somalia’s weak security sector was dominating the discussions in international arena and in particular in the UNSC, there were fewer references to the EU’s efforts in Somali security sector reform, except for the occasional commendations of EUTM Somalia, once it has been established and deployed, and the welcoming of EU support to AMISOM. The majority of focus and praise in the UNSC Resolutions was dedicated to AMISOM. Considering the comparably greater attention of the UNSC to AMISOM, there is little indication that the UNSC Resolutions significantly impacted the EU’s decision to deploy and later prolong the EUTM Somalia mission. The narratives and issues raised at the UNSC do however coincide with the development of EUTM Somalia, in particular the EU’s designation of Al Shabaab as a terrorist threat, as well as the EUTM’s refocusing in the second and third mandate towards more local ownership and the emphasis on reintegration of Somali soldiers after the completion of their training.

### 8.3.2. Events and other triggers

As explained in the previous chapter, the discourse at the level of the UNSC does not exert sufficient influence on EU’s decision-making process, regarding the decision to deploy (and extend) the EUTM Somalia mission, in this particular case. In terms of the international dimension of this decision, one can identify several other exogenous factors that had a varying degree of impact on the decision-making process. This sub-section of the chapter will focus on some of these exogenous factors.

Relevant for the initial decision to deploy EUTM Somalia is the rise of Al Shabaab after the retreat of Ethiopian troops from Somalia in 2009. During the Ethiopian invasion, Al Shabaab mobilized support and gained volunteers from Somali nationalists, who were not necessarily Islamic fundamentalists, but who were against foreign influences in Somalia.

Considering that Ethiopia is a predominantly Christian country and was also supported by the West, in particular the USA, the hostility towards foreign intervention gained a religious dimension, which aided Al Shabaab to gain further support from anti-Christian and pro-Muslim followers. During 2008, Al Shabaab started reaching out to the core of Al Qaeda, and in declared in February 2010 that it would “connect the horn of Africa jihad to the one led by al Qaeda and its leader Sheikh Osama Bin Laden” (cited in Wise, 2011, p. 6). Al-Shabaab’s senior leaders are affiliated with Al Qaeda and were believed to have had training in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The merger of the two groups was publicly announced in February 2012 (National Counterterrorism Center). While there is no clear indication that Al Shabaab’s expansion in 2009 and 2010, and its links to Al Qaeda had a direct impact on EU’s decision to deploy EUTM Somalia, the developments in relation to Al Shabaab contributed directly to the TFG’s call for help, the intensified engagement of the USA, the AU and the UN, which had indirect effects on the EU’s decision to deploy EUTM Somalia.

Al Shabaab’s links to Al Qaeda intensified the involvement of the US in Somalia. The US considered Al Shabaab a terrorist organization as early as 2008 (National Counterterrorism Center) and closely followed the development of Al Shabaab. The US however, according to Gorm Olsen, prefers to avoid deploying US troops in Somalia and relies on private contractors and partnerships with the countries of the region, or with other organizations like the AU and the EU. “Both instruments point toward a preference for using proxy as a security provider” (Olsen, G.R., 2014, p. 296). The USA provides all its support to AMISOM in the form of equipment, logistics support, advice, and training. Washington provided more than half a billion dollars for training of and equipment for the AMISOM troops battling Al Shabaab. “Much of this indirect logistical support has been supplied on the ground by State Department-funded contractors, such as Bancroft Global Development and DynCorp” (Masters and Sergie, 2015). In this light, a more intensive involvement implies a more intensive use of proxies in Somalia, which is relevant for understanding the initial decision on the mandate of EUTM Somalia. The US offered a partnership to the EU and to assist with financial and logistical support towards the EUTM’s mission objectives, which allowed for an easier decision of the EU to deploy EUTM Somalia.

More relevant to the EU’s decision to extend the mandate of EUTM Somalia are the 2012 presidential elections and the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The FGS replaced the TFG in 2012, although it was originally planned that the mandate of the TFG would expire in 2011. However, due to the threat of Al Shabaab and

other insurgents, who in 2011 controlled the majority of Mogadishu, holding elections that year was seen as futile and of inappropriate timing, especially considering the gradual military advancement of AMISOM troops and the liberation of Mogadishu (Oniyego, 2011). The delay of the elections for a year and the full transition from the TFG to the FGS caused the aforementioned delay in a Council Decision to extend the EUTM Somalia mandate for a third term, because the EU had to wait for the outcome of the elections in order to adapt the mission accordingly to the different possible election outcomes and the new configuration of the FGS. The EEAS has conducted its Strategic Review on EUTM Somalia in parallel to the political developments in Mogadishu and after the realization that the executive and legislative branch reached and that a stable federal government would be formed, the EEAS proposed accordingly the refocusing of the third mandate to a gradual move of EUTM Somalia from Uganda to Mogadishu.

#### **8.4. The organizational dimension**

##### **8.4.1. Member state politics**

Unlike in the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, for which there was a stronger consensus at the political level regarding the urgency and the need for combating piracy, the decision to deploy EUTM Somalia did not benefit from such a consensus. The political discussions at the EU level concerning the deployment of EUTM Somalia were “long and controversial” because there were many concerns raised by different member states, but also because, while there was a sense that the EU should do something, there was no sense of urgency, which prolonged the discussions, in particular at the PSC (Interview 1). As one practitioner explains, “when EUTM Somalia is on the agenda, I wouldn't say it's guaranteed the discussion is going to heat up, but it's certainly an interesting agenda topic” (Interview 15).

The main ‘pusher’ for the mission to reach the PSC agenda were the French representatives to the EU. As one practitioner elaborates, “our perception would have been at the beginning that this was a French project which the French were pushing quite strongly, and I suppose, a large member state has the capacity to bring an issue like that on to the agenda and push for it, because we did have quite long, and at times quite controversial discussions really, about the value added of the EUTM” (Ibid.). The strong French impetus behind the engagement in EUTM Somalia started after the first mission reports from

EUNAVFOR Atalanta were received in 2009. As one practitioner describes, “I remember at the time the French minister of European affairs, Pierre Lellouche, pushing quite strongly that we have a limited window of opportunity to do something in Somalia and that there are a limited number of options that could be taken but one of the options was to get into the business of training TFG recruits” (Ibid.). The limited window was seen in terms of providing support to the TFG, “if they were going to have any sort of prospect in holding their end against Al Shabaab and the other organizations there. It involved a lot of quite detailed discussion at the PSC about what the modalities of this operation, and what the risks were” (Ibid.).

While the French were the main ‘pushers’ of the EUTM Somalia mission, there were no major ‘blockers’ within the PSC, but there was also no immediate consensus, due both to broader political concerns but also more specific logistical and operational concerns, which, as mentioned above, prolonged the discussions at the PSC. First of all, there were broad political considerations about the appropriateness of the EU acting on the shore of Somalia. As one interviewee explains: “Some might have seen it as an instance where the EU ran the risk of being seen to sort of take sides in what was effectively a civil war in Somalia. So you had that broad political consideration that was in the back of the head of some people” (Interview 1). According to one of the practitioners, certain countries had their own reasons not to block the French initiative. For example, “Sweden would be very active, not so much out of an interest for Somalia, but they have then their horizontal issues, like good governance, human rights, gender equality and they could make a strong point on those issues” (Interview 15). The practitioner also pointed out that some states simply had no particular interest in Somalia, and therefore did not block the initiative: “Estonia, Lithuania, fortunately, they don't take the floor every time, because, I mean, twenty-eight [member states] speaking five minutes each, it would be horrible. But they have their interests somewhere else. For example, when we discuss Belarus or Russia, then probably Portugal would have less to say. That's the idea of common foreign policy” (Ibid.). When referring to their own representation and position in the discussion, the practitioner explained that they saw the EU action as more appropriate than an initiative led by a single or a smaller group of states: “So we don't really have a distinct policy towards Somalia, so we decided that the best platform for us at this given moment is the EU” (Ibid.).

In terms of more specific logistical and operational issues, the discussions revolved around the questions of the location where the training was to be conducted, the question of what would happen to the Somali recruits after their training and inevitably also around the



question of funds. In terms of the location, “the French might have originally perhaps had Djibouti more in mind rather than Uganda but the location wasn’t a showstopper by any means and the fact that the Americans were already quite heavily engaged in training operations in Uganda made [Bihanga] a fairly sort of logical location in the fine analysis.” (Interview 1) In the end Uganda was chosen as the location for the mission based on the fact that it was a relatively safe environment and the fact that the Americans were there already training and had an infrastructure they were prepared to offer (Ibid.).

Linked to the question of location was the question of costs. Considering the USA were prepared to enter a partnership with the EU and offer the infrastructure and logistical support for conducting the training mission, the costs of the mission were significantly reduced. However, the planning of the mission occurred in the period of the Euro crisis and a general sense of austerity, which affected both the CSDP budget, but also the amount of funding contributing member states were willing to spend. As one practitioner explains:

*Yeah, you can certainly make every square meter of this world safe, but it's expensive. [...] Until now we had a CSDP budget, which was big enough for the missions we had, but now we have more missions and now next year for the first time we will have a cut in the budget. So our take will be, all right, now we have to discuss all together, where are our priorities. If we want to be present in Somalia, these are the costs and then we have to see where we want to be less present (Interview 15).*

The issue of cost further led to the issue of the long-term effects of the mission and, concretely, to the question of what happens with the recruits after their training. In a typical cost-benefit manner, one practitioner explains this issue: “You have to see investment and return. That’s at least something we should consider” (Ibid.). This issue became more prominent in the period before the first extension of the mandate, after EUTM Somalia has already trained Somali recruits and had experience to draw on. Even after the deployment of EUTM Somalia “there was still some concern about the risks as to, not necessarily the people involved in the operation, but as to whether it would pay much return, or whether there was a risk that some people that you’re training may end up on the right side of the equation once they return to Mogadishu” (Interview 1). The sceptics on this issue at the beginning included The Netherlands, the UK, and Sweden amongst others. As one interviewee explains: “We were not convinced that [...] proper vetting was there, that troops trained would not

reproduce the tribal differences that existed in Somalia, and that we would be able to create enough loyalty in those six months, so the trained recruits don't defect on their return to Mogadishu" (Interview 13). As another practitioner recalls the discussions, "the problem was not the idea to start training the Somali soldiers. The problem was the after. [...] If you train a soldier who is not going to be paid at the end of the month he's going to cross the line to the Al Shabaab (Interview 11). The solution to these issues was the introduction of the so-called accompanying measures, which include a strict monitoring of the flow of payments, as well as bilateral arrangements that "the US and countries like Italy pay salaries, [and that] the US provide weapons and transport to and from Bihanga" (Ibid.).

One of the turning points in the discussions on the EUTM mission happened in 2012. In June 2012 Ethiopian and Ugandan troops were progressing in their fight against insurgent forces, and the PSC ambassadors and their staff were closely following the news, because, as one practitioner explained, "the situation [in Somalia] could be very different in just a few days" (Interview 2). Both the military successes of the AMISOM and TFG troops, as well as the elections announced later that year shaped the discussions at the PSC. "There is a political discussion, not so much at the PSC, but more at the African Union. What will Somalia become, a federal republic of Somalia with very different entities, or will it continue to be a, at least in notion, a central state? There are different models there that might be followed [based on that outcome] (Ibid.). As another practitioner explains, "usually we aim for times as early before the [next] mandate as possible, but we had to wait for after the elections – to confirm that there is political commitment towards the EU by the new government" (Interview 8). After the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia and the confirmation of its political commitment towards working with the EU, the options and proposals of the EEAS to the PSC included the refocusing of the mandate towards the migration of the mission from Uganda to Somalia. As one interviewee explains, "One of the basic questions [...] was security. We see the reports that are shared that Somalia is still very fragile, that the central government out of Mogadishu cannot provide security, so, can we really move the whole mission into Somalia, so basically into Mogadishu? This is really our main concern" (Interview 15). Further reports and reassurances from the ground somewhat alleviated these concerns. However, the issue of security and safety of EU personnel in Somalia remained a discussion topic on the agenda, as one interviewee's statement illustrates:

*Apparently now, from what I hear is that the training facilities where they are today have been made relatively safe and what matters most for us is the safety*

*of our own personnel. I mean, poor Somalis if they are attacked, but it's not so much the interest of [our] tax payer... What is safe, is the arrival at the airport, leaving the airport, and the transfer to the facilities, which is considered safe by head of mission, and having been in the military myself, I would say if a military leader considers that this is safe for him and his personnel, it is really safe because it's not in their interest to lose personnel (Ibid.).*

## **8.5. The cognitive dimension**

The quote above is also useful for understanding the cognitive dimension of the decision making process regarding the deployment of EUTM Somalia. It demonstrates the concerns the interviewee has regarding the move to Mogadishu, which are based on the interviewee's personal constellation of context models that allow him to make sense of the situation in Mogadishu. The interviewee's previous military experience provided the necessary assurance that the reports on the safety of the mission staff in Mogadishu are to be trusted. The quote also shows the process of preference formation of the interviewee and illustrates the interviewee's preference to protect the safety of EU personnel and the interest of the taxpayers over the protection of Somalis. The decision making process regarding the deployment (and extensions) of EUTM Somalia was directly influenced by the constellations of context models of the actors involved. These context models were first created at the individual level but through interaction within their respective groups, the individuals developed collective context models and collective processes of cognition. This sub-section will explore this cognitive dimension of the decision making process regarding EUTM Somalia's deployments and subsequent extensions.

### **8.5.1. Collective cognition**

The initial phase of the collective cognitive process consists of collective sense making and processing the perceptions of the situation. As in the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, there was no immediate consensus on what the situation in Somalia is and requires. After persuasion of certain groups, in particular the French, as the previous subsection explained, consensus was achieved regarding the fact that Somalia requires assistance and that 'we need

to do something'. At the level of the PSC, this consensus was led by the French representation. Before the initial discussions regarding EUTM Somalia, the PSC was visiting operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa. One practitioner recalls the visit as follows:

*I was on this visit myself actually and we were in Djibouti. And [French Minister for European Affairs at the time] Lellouche was there at the same time. [...] And I can remember, we were sitting in this very hot dining room in the French embassy in Djibouti and we had a meeting with Lellouche, when he came in he was saying in quite persuasive terms 'we got to do something about Somalia. This is a window of opportunity, we're running the risk of radicalization of the TFG, we need to support the TFG by providing some sort of assistance', and that was one of the elements in the informal discussions at the PSC that led then into more formal discussions in both the PSC and the Military Committee at a slightly later stage in the process. Obviously, clinching the political concept that we need to do something is the first step and then after that [comes] an examination of how that may materialize in practice (Interview 1).*

In that period there was a "realization that root causes need to be addressed on shore. During 2009-2010 the analysis was: in order to deal with piracy, stabilize the crisis in Somalia. [...] To stabilize the crisis, we needed to politically support the TFG, financially, and support their security sector because the TFG couldn't support its own security. [...] This led to EUTM Somalia" (Interview 9).

#### 8.5.1.1. Perceptions of priorities

While the consensus that something should be done to help the TFG with its security problems, the different actors differed in their respective focus and angle regarding an EU action. The different foci and issues raised originate from the different context models these actors rely on when processing very similar, if not the same information. The different constellations of these context models create different mind-sets and rationales, which influence what the actors perceive as a priority in the given course of action. The prevalent type of mind-set, and consequentially, the major perceived priority was revolving around costs and benefits. The actors with such a mind-set used the rationale of investment and

returns, as described in the previous sub-section. The ‘investment’ and ‘return’ in most cases referred to the training and the outcome of the training, namely ‘which side the trained recruits would join, but in some cases also referred to the actual financial means invested into the mission. When recalling the decision to refocus the third mandate, one practitioner described the reasoning behind it: “The training in Uganda was to a great extent financed also by the US, and they said the funding will stop by the end of 2013. It would be too expensive to pay flights back and forth. Also, it's a huge facility in Uganda, which is costly to keep running (Interview 15).

Another type of mind-set was prioritising rules and procedures, which inevitably prolonged the discussions at the PSC. One example, involving one of the interviewees illustrates the problem:

*When it comes to money, there are formalities you have to abide to. [...] So some weeks ago, really, everybody was aware that [the mission staff] need certain equipment and that they should get it, but the request was so badly done that it was just impossible. [...] At the end it was solved, but there again you had these different modes, [...] there are some groups of MS who very much argue on a political axis, [saying] ‘we have to support Somalia, we have to support the federal government’ [...], and then [some] will say, ‘fine, we understand there is a need, but let's look into the rules and regulations we ALL agreed on! Please play it by the rules’. [...] At the beginning we wanted to be constructive but then we were perceived as ‘they want to stop it, they don’t want it’, so that was frustrating (Interview 15).*

Finally, another important mind-set of some groups within the PSC was prioritising the accountability of their decision to their national parliaments and to their respective publics. As one practitioner explains, “at the end of the day, we have to justify our involvement in our national parliament. We have to stand in parliament for each and every single soldier there and this is very difficult. And we as diplomats here we have to acknowledge that, we can't work against the parliament” (Interview 15). Justifying the participation of a member state to their respective national parliament is also closely linked to the national context of what the national public debate is regarding foreign policy and foreign intervention. As the same practitioner elaborates:

*In London and in Paris for example, across the political board, there is consensus on foreign and security policy as a national endeavour. [...] So even if we have transition from one president to another, they will not question the decision. [...] And their elections are not won or lost because of lost soldiers. It is part of their national history, that soldiers bear the risk of getting killed on the mission. [...] We have to persuade the decision makers in the parliament that this is really needed (Interview 15).*

#### 8.5.1.2. The role of the strategic planners and the comprehensive approach

With no immediate consensus on the issues outlined above and the different mind-sets to prioritize those issues, the PSC cannot be identified as a clear source of guidance regarding the EUTM Somalia's mandates. While the PSC did not produce a clear consensus and clear instructions to the strategic level of decision-making, it did produce two outcomes. One was that the strategic planners had to accommodate all the needs and address all the concerns raised by the PSC. The other outcome was that the lack of clear instructions allowed them to pursue and materialize their own approach to crisis management, which originates from their own individual and collective context models. This approach has been referred to as the Comprehensive Approach of the EU and, while its notion was present within CFSP/CSDP for a few years before EU's engagement in Somalia, EUTM Somalia, in conjunction with EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Nestor, was among the first missions to embrace it in its mandate design.

The notion of the comprehensive approach can be traced back to the years before the Lisbon Treaty, but is mostly referenced in the Lisbon Treaty, and as a 'promise of the Lisbon Treaty' (Houben, n.d.a). In November 2009 the Council "reconfirmed the importance of the EU's Comprehensive approach to crisis management and [...] acknowledged the possible economic benefits of finding Civil Military synergies in Capability Development, and the added value of dual use capabilities"<sup>10</sup> (European Union, 2009, p. 18). While the notion started off as a product of civilian and military coordination, one practitioner reminds that "it is wrong to confuse the comprehensive approach with coordination, joint planning or merging instruments. [In the Comprehensive Approach,] different instruments are combined

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<sup>10</sup> For a detailed overview of the conceptual origins of the comprehensive approach, see Nicoletta Pirozzi's paper (2013) titled *The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management*.

together, in a joint manner (Interview 8). As Marcus Houben from the CMPD mentioned in a reflective paper<sup>11</sup>, “The ambition is to ensure that various policy instruments are not only employed to play to their individual strengths but also to enhance the effectiveness of the other instruments and of all instruments combined” (Houben, n.d.a, p. 2).

The strategic planners have advocated the notion of the comprehensive approach and, besides its normative and problem-solving potential appeal, stressed on its effectiveness and especially its cost-effectiveness, which resonated well among the member states at the PSC, and which directly addressed some of the concerns regarding costs, investments and returns. As one interviewee explains, it is “wrong to talk about the comprehensive approach as an objective. The aim is to deliver more, better and cheaper. That’s the goal, not necessarily the comprehensive approach itself” (Interview 11).

In the case of EUTM Somalia, the notion of the comprehensive approach set the framework of the mandate. While the mandate was predominantly military in nature, regarding the training of TFG recruits, it also has a diplomatic element to it, and focuses on cooperation and coordination with Uganda and the US, and in its later mandate it also focuses on cooperation with the FGS and handing over the ownership of military training to the Somali army. While not in the direct wording of the mandate, the strategic planners proposed the so-called accompanying measures, which serve as safe-guards for the concerns raised by the PSC about trained recruits potentially joining ‘the other side’. These measures include the partnership with the US and Italy, who contribute to paying the salaries for the trained recruits, as well as using other EU instruments in the field of development, fisheries and agriculture. As one interviewee explains:

*When you launch a mission, you have to foresee problems that can arise a little bit later. If you train a soldier who is not going to be paid at the end of the month he's going to cross the line to the Al-Shabaab. So this is why it is important to develop this comprehensive approach. [...] A trained soldier by the EU is now going to have the possibility to provide for his family because you*

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<sup>11</sup> The EEAS website contains a ‘Reflection Corner’ page, which contains reflections of CMPD staff on EU crisis management. The reflective papers are not dated, but based on their content it can be estimated that they were written in the period 2012-2013. These papers are valuable data since they represent the personal views of CMPD staff on the work of the CMPD and their own work, which gives insight into their self-perception, and if one conducts a socio-cognitive analysis, also into their mental models and worldviews. The ‘Reflection Corner’ can be accessed at [http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/cmpd/reflection-corner/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/cmpd/reflection-corner/index_en.htm). [last accessed 15.04.2013.]

*will have cooperation in agriculture or the fishing sector to allow means of living for his family (Interview 11).*

### 8.5.1.3. Prior experience and knowledge<sup>12</sup>

Besides relying on the comprehensive approach and other EU instruments as part of accompanying measures, the strategic planners also relied on the lessons learned process of the EEAS. The lessons learned from both EUTM Somalia but also previous EU missions allow for a reconstitution of both the collective and individual context models and consequently preference formations. This sub-section will present some examples that correlate the lessons learned by the strategic planners within the EEAS and the concerns raised at the political level.

One of the first concerns by the Nordic states, in particular Sweden, was that the EUTM Somalia mission should incorporate a human rights and gender equality element into its objectives. The issue of human rights and gender equality was also raised in previous missions. Referring to the lessons learned from the EU police mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a CIVCOM document presents one of the lessons learned, namely that “it is more sustainable to push for a standard curriculum on human rights and gender to be included in the academic program of a police academy than to organise one-off training seminars on the issue” (European Union 2010c, p. 20). According to the same document “early inclusion of human rights and gender expertise in the planning team for an operation or mission has proved essential in order to ensure that those aspects are adequately covered during planning and then once an operation or mission is deployed. [...] For example, upstream planning allowed the inclusion of human rights and gender training in the syllabus used by EUTM Somalia” (Ibid., p. 14). The strategic and military planners included gender equality based on the lessons learned from previous missions, but it remains inconclusive whether the concerns of Sweden and their allies on this issue contributed to the inclusions of gender equality in the training syllabus used in EUTM Somalia.

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<sup>12</sup> As a caveat mentioned before, it is difficult to delineate the border between individual and collective cognition and to determine which level of cognition influenced the other. In order to do so, the researcher needs to rely on very specific and accurate data, in order to draw conclusions of the ‘arrow of causation’. In the previous chapter on EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the available data indicated that an individual actor directly contributed with his prior knowledge and experience to the framing of the mandate. For this case study, the available data does not clearly indicate a particular individual’s experience and knowledge that affected the mandate(s) of EUTM Somalia, but instead the origins of the mandates’ frameworks can be found in institutional documents. This is the reason why this sub-section on knowledge, experience and lessons learned is part of the section on collective cognition.



Another quote from the document above states that “in order to achieve maximum impact it has proved useful to concentrate on activities with multiplier effects such as training of local trainers instead of/in addition to local officials” (European Union, 2010c, p.20). This lesson is directly compatible with the refocusing of EUTM’s second mandate and the objective of ‘training the trainers’. An older document of the Council Secretariat from 2005 outlines the concepts of CSDP support to security sector reform. This document argues that “the early stages of EU support should pave the way for long-term country-owned SSR reforms based on a participatory and democratic process” (European Union, 2005, p. 4). Local ownership is one of the main principles outlined in this document. Local ownership is defined as “the appropriation by the local authorities of commonly agreed objectives and principles.” In practice, local ownership implies a commitment of the local authorities to actions on the ground, implementation and sustainability of the SSR and active support of the mission mandate (Ibid., p. 11). The same document mentions as one of the principles the “holistic approach”, which in practice entails a broad, coherent and integrated approach that addresses wider governance and security concerns of the people, and as hints at what is later to become the comprehensive approach. In the case of EUTM Somalia, local ownership was only central during the refocusing of the third mandate, but this delay was caused by the practical difficulty of having to wait for a strong Somali government, which would be capable of taking ownership of the training programme.

#### 8.5.2. Individual cognition and the drafting process – writing the CMC

The previous sub-section presented the broad collective cognitive structures, ranging from a general approach to crisis management, in the form of the Comprehensive Approach to lessons learned from previous (documented) experiences forming a collective, institutional memory from which groups or individuals may draw from when processing new information. These cognitive structures, however, do not always suffice in determining an individual’s preferences during the actual drafting of the CSDP mission documents.

Both the collective cognitive structures from the organizational dimension, as well as the global narratives from the international dimension, inevitably affect the context models of individuals, but it is up to the individual to make sense of all of these influences and filter them at the individual level in order to form a preference regarding possible actions. In the case of EUTM Somalia, the collective understanding of Somalia and crisis management,

including the lessons learned and overall notion of the comprehensive approach have been filtered through the cognitive process of one of the interviewees who was directly involved in drafting the strategic review, the option papers and the CMCs for the EUTM Somalia mission.

In the case of the comprehensive approach for example, according to the interviewee, the comprehensive approach is a top-down approach in which “ideally, all instruments are the starting point. All options are considered and then in the planning phase we all work together in a joint manner.” As the interviewee explained, this was not the case in the planning phase of EUTM Somalia, where the approach was bottom-up. He further explained that he “created EUTM from scratch [and] invented the mission” (Interview 8). He clarified that the first CMC was written by someone else, but that he was in charge of the strategic reviews and option papers. He explained that he travelled frequently to Mogadishu, Uganda and Nairobi in order to fully grasp the situation on the ground.

In terms of lessons learned, he pointed out that EUTM Somalia is the first EU military training mission and was later used as a model for EUTM Mali, but had no obvious military model to draw upon. In terms of the initial format of the mission, EUTM Somalia “was an experiment” to strike the balance between a more prudent and more wide EU action. This reflection refers to the initial political concerns of the EU having to choose sides in a civil war. In relation to the EU’s image in the country, he explained that it was important to frame the mission as ‘with’, and not ‘in support of’ to avoid the accusation of supporting a particular side. In later documents however, once the TFG established itself as a legitimate international actor, the phrase ‘in support of’ also appears. The interviewee further explained that the EU joined Uganda and the US in a “real partnership in a pragmatic sense”, and that “nothing would have happened if either of these actors stopped cooperating” (Ibid.). The interviewee also reflected on the financial concerns and explained that initially EUTM was designed as a small mission, in terms of finance and human resources. “It’s light, tailored, with a small headquarters, cost-effective, on a low budget of 12 million Euros, with the common cost from ATHENA” (Ibid.). An additional argument regarding cost-effectiveness, as the interviewee points out, is that “the EU delivers a lot of money to AMISOM, so the EUTM was a sort of exit strategy for AMISOM, which is hard to sustain” (Ibid.).

These reflections can be confirmed by triangulating with the wording from the possible follow-up options document for the EUTM Somalia mission, which was atypically declassified to LIMITE level. One paragraph neatly embodies the interviewee’s reflections on EUTM Somalia:

*The effects of EUTM Somalia go beyond the purely military training of TFG troops, it constitutes the only EU mission conducted side by side with an African country, Uganda, who constitutes the main contributor to AMISOM and the most relevant regional actor; it also materialises the only direct cooperation with the United States in the military field and represents the EU contribution to solving security problems as part of the EU comprehensive approach in the region. EUTM has also brought into this action modern values, and best practices and principles on human rights, gender issues, international law etc (European Union, 2011a, p. 10).*

The interviewee's reflections on the drafting process indicate that during the process the interviewee 'listened' to the narratives at the PSC, but also relied on existing organisational knowledge and lessons learned. However, using the terminology of Marcus Houben, elaborated on in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the interviewee also relied on his own resourcefulness in terms of gathering as much information on the situation as possible and forming a 'sense of reality', and on his 'strategic imagination', or in other words, the ability to design a mission that fits both the problems of the crisis, as well as the problems of the EU decision-making process. In comparison to the drafting process of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, however, the drafting process of EUTM Somalia demonstrates a lower degree of 'sentience' of the drafter in terms of the 'sentient agent' concept envisaged by Schmidt (2008, 2010). The reason for this is the weaker pressure from the political and organisational structures from the international and organisational levels. The newly established narrative (and structure) of the comprehensive approach is not challenged, which makes the drafters of EUTM Somalia appear influenced by the 'comprehensive approach'. However, the actual details of the mission are a result of the drafters' 'strategic imagination'. This strategic imagination is an indicator of the actors' sentience and awareness that they have some freedom to change the existing structures within EU crisis management.

## **8.6. Conclusion**

This chapter posed the general question of where the EUTM Somalia mission comes from and followed an analysis following the proposed model of the thesis, and following the same

structure as the previous chapter on EUNAVFOR Atalanta. According to the analysis, the decision to deploy and later extend the EUTM Somalia mission was influenced by the different dimensions of the decision making process to different degrees and frequently in conjunction with each other. There are many instances of correlation, but inconsistent evidence of causation emerging from the analysis.

In the international dimension of the decision-making process, the UN call for help, in the form of UNSC Resolutions, does not seem to have directly and significantly affected the EU's decision to deploy EUTM Somalia. The EUTM mission is not mentioned as frequently as was the case with EUNAVFOR Atalanta, and the EU is mostly lauded for its support of AMISOM, which was highlighted as the more important mission in addressing Somalia's security situation. However, the EU is one of the largest donors to the UN-created fund for Somalia and to AMISOM, is committed to supporting the AU and the UN, and frequently references the UNSC Resolution 1872 as the legal basis for EUTM Somalia, which leads to the conclusion that the narratives at the UNSC are not insignificant.

The events and triggers at the international level, including Al Shabaab's expansion in 2009 and 2010, and its links to Al Qaeda had an indirect impact on EU's decision to deploy EUTM Somalia, as they intensified the engagement of the USA, the AU and the UN, which created the possibilities for the EU to partner up with the USA and Uganda and to reduce mission costs by doing so. The retreat and diminishing strength of Al Shabaab influenced more directly the decision to relocate EUTM Somalia into Mogadishu, since the plans to do so already existed in the EU documents, but were conditioned by the security situation in Mogadishu.

The structures created at the international level, in the form of UNSC narratives and actual international events affected the organisational dimension of the decision-making process insofar as it created certain opportunities for action. The analysis however points out that the primary drivers at the organisational level were the French push at the PSC level and the notion of the comprehensive approach to crisis management at the strategic level. At the PSC level there was a common understanding the EU should assist Somalia and its security problems but there was no immediate consensus on deploying a military training mission. Through the insistence of France, but also with the assurances developed and presented at the strategic and operational levels of the policy process, was it possible to approve the mission. Some of the assurances provided by the strategic planners are directly related to the opportunities created at the international level mentioned above, namely to the partnership with the USA and Uganda. These partnerships allowed for the pragmatic design of a cost-

effective mission with the particular concerns of who would pay for the infrastructure and the recruits' post-training salaries, which the USA agreed to do. The cost concerns were further addressed and alleviated by introducing the notion of the Comprehensive Approach to the design and framing of the mission mandates, but there is no clear indication that this notion was the primary factor that led to the decision on the respective EUTM Somalia extensions.

The particular structures from both the international and the organisational dimensions described in this chapter affected the cognitive process of the individual drafter of the relevant EUTM Somalia key documents. The analysis however concludes that these structures, though necessary, were not sufficient material for making sense of the situation and context for EUTM Somalia, and that the drafter had to rely on information gathering, sense making and 'strategic imagination' to design the mission 'from scratch'. Due to the lack of access to the first CMC, it is not possible to fully determine the extent to which the drafter had to 'imagine' the context of EUTM Somalia, but the analysis does indicate that many of the reflections of the drafter can be confirmed in the relevant available documents.

By combining the analyses at the different dimensions of the decision-making process, one can conclude that EUTM Somalia was deployed and later extended primarily due to the effective planning and creation of assurances at the strategic level, which addressed and alleviated concerns at the political level, making political consensus on the way forward possible. The secondary factors that contributed to the deployment of EUTM Somalia are the political and financial opportunities of partnering up with the USA and AMISOM at the international level, as well the French insistence the EU needs to do something at the organisational level.

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# Chapter 9. EUCAP Nestor

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## 9.1. Introduction

The final case study of this thesis focuses on the EU's decision to deploy its third and most recent mission in the Horn of Africa, EUCAP Nestor. The chapter will follow the conclusions of the previous two chapters and analyse the deployment of EUCAP Nestor in the light of those conclusions. EUCAP Nestor is explicitly in the official discourse of the EU but also implicitly in the analysis of this thesis, a continuation of the previous two EU mission in the Horn of Africa and represents the implementation of the EU's Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. As explained in the previous chapters, EUNAVFOR represents EU's military intervention against piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia, primarily advocated by France, with additional impetus from the UNSC and the EU military and strategic planners in Brussels. The EUTM Somalia mission represents the EU's first clear attempt of implementing the Comprehensive Approach in the Horn of Africa, by addressing the root causes of piracy. In the case of EUTM Somalia, the cause addressed was the inability of the TFG to control the entire territory of the country due to the lack of a strong military force. In this context, EUCAP Nestor represents another attempt of implementing the Comprehensive Approach in the Horn of Africa, by addressing the root causes of piracy, which in this case is the lack of maritime capabilities, in the form of a trained coast guard, legal expertise and other resources necessary for the successful arrest, transfer and prosecution of captured pirates.

The chapter will follow a similar structure to the previous two case studies. The following section will outline the problems related to the mandate of the mission, including the inability to prosecute captured pirates, the inability to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia and to reach political cooperation with all countries in the region. After a review of existing international efforts to address these issues, the section will present the key events and information regarding the EUCAP Nestor mission and ask the question why it was deployed in its given form considering existing activity in the region. The next section of this chapter will examine the international dimension of the case study and outline the UNSC Resolutions that shape the international narrative on the problems of capabilities in the region. The chapter then continues with the analysis of the organisational dimension of the case study, examining the problems of decision-making at both the political and the strategic level. The

final section will analyse the collective and individual cognitive processes of actors to illustrate the way these actors processed and dealt with the problems that arise from developing and deciding on the deployment of EUCAP Nestor. Given the fact that EUCAP Nestor is the most recent mission and that the time period of research and data collection of this thesis ended shortly after EUCAP Nestor was deployed, there is less data and evidence available for analysis in this case study, which also results in a shorter length of this chapter.

## **9.2. The outcome**

With the international community acting together in combating piracy in 2008 and 2009, it became clear that despite the effectiveness of these efforts at sea, the problem of piracy needed to be addressed on land as well. An estimated nine out of ten captured suspects of piracy as part of the various multinational operations are released without trial” (gCaptain.com). The reason for their release is that there is no willingness of the developed states that are involved in the capture of suspected pirates to transfer the detainees back to their respective countries out of fear that these third-country nationals would apply for asylum and incur great costs ‘back home (Dutton, 2011). The maritime task forces therefore rely on countries of the region to accept the detainees, arrest and prosecute them at a fair trial. Since each of the countries in the region had different legal and humanitarian standards for handling the suspects of piracy, the UN agency International Maritime Organisation (IMO) initiated the adoption of a regional agreement in Djibouti – the Djibouti Code of Conduct, that among other tasks, included guidelines on apprehension and prosecution of suspected pirates. To implement the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Secretary-General of the IMO, “in response to the initiative and offer of Japan, established, at the beginning of September 2009, under the Financial Regulations and Rules of IMO, the Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund (the DCCTF) (IMO/Project Implementation Unit).” The voluntary donations to the DCCTF are used for regional training, capacity building, legal cooperation and information sharing.

Another UN-agency, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also recognised the lack of a clear mechanism for holding and prosecuting suspects, which developed a Piracy Prosecution Model. The idea of a regional piracy prosecution model “was formulated to provide a 'legal finish' to counter-piracy operations” (UNODC.org). To insure the implementation of the model, starting with the year 2013, the UNODC’s Maritime Crime Programme assists willing states in the Horn of Africa and states of the West Indian ocean

with a wide array of capacity-building activities, including legislative reform, building, renovating and upgrading police, prison and court facilities, provision of welfare support and interpretation services to piracy suspects, and wide-ranging training initiatives for lawyers, judges, police, coast guards and prison staff (Ibid.).

The EU joined the international efforts in capacity building in September 2012 with its third mission in the region, EUCAP Nestor. The Council Decision to deploy the mission dates back to 16<sup>th</sup> of July, but due to the OPLAN going through two revisions, the deployment of the mission's first staff to Djibouti was delayed by a couple of months. In terms of the geographical focus, EUCAP Nestor initially envisaged Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles and Somalia. Tanzania was also considered, "following receipt by the Union of an invitation from the Tanzanian authorities" (Ibid.).

Unlike the previous two missions, which were military in nature, EUCAP Nestor is labeled a civilian mission, with military expertise. The general mission objective of EUCAP Nestor is "to assist the development in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean States of a self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of their maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance" (European Union, 2013b, p. 1). While the mission objective was broad and general, the mandate of the mission was broad and very detailed. The mandate of EUCAP Nestor expects the mission to assist authorities in the region in achieving the efficient organisation of the maritime security agencies carrying out the coast guard function; deliver training courses and training expertise to strengthen the maritime capacities of the States in the region, initially Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles, with a view to achieving self-sustainability in training; assist Somalia in developing its own land-based coastal police capability supported by a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework; identify priority equipment capability gaps and provide assistance in addressing them, as appropriate, to meet the objective of EUCAP NESTOR; provide assistance in strengthening national legislation and the rule of law through a regional legal advisory programme, and legal expertise to support the drafting of maritime security and related national legislation; promote regional cooperation between national authorities responsible for maritime security; strengthen regional coordination in the field of maritime capacity building; provide strategic advice through the assignment of experts to key administrations;



implement mission projects and coordinate donations; and to develop and conduct a regional information and communication strategy (Ibid.).<sup>13</sup>

With such an ambitious mandate, it does not come as a surprise that the planning process and the deployment process spanned a period of three years, from late 2009, when the first option papers were drafted, to the late 2013, when the first mission staff were deployed to the region. What does remain puzzling is why the EU decided to deploy the mission, considering the difficulties surrounding its planning on the one hand, but also the existing UN efforts in capacity-building on the other. The following sections of this chapter will analyse the different dimensions of the policy process and will extrapolate a possible answer to this puzzle.

### **9.3. The international dimension**

This section will follow the structure of the previous two case studies and the model of analysis proposed by this thesis. The section will first outline the relevant UNSC Resolutions that address the problem of regional capability development and the issue related to international anti-piracy efforts. These resolutions represent the narrative of the international community and affect the context models of EU decision makers in the way they perceive both the problem at hand and the perceptions of the EU's role in the solutions of the problem of insufficient maritime capacities.

#### **9.3.1. The UN call for help**

UNSC Resolution 1851 from the 16<sup>th</sup> of December 2008 is one of the first resolutions to address the problem of the TFG's inability to act against piracy. It raised "concern that the lack of capacity, domestic legislation, and clarity about how to dispose of pirates after their capture, has hindered more robust international action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia and in some cases led to pirates being released without facing justice" (UNSC Resolutions 1851, p. 2). The Resolution further "calls on Member States to assist the TFG, at

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<sup>13</sup> The EUCAP Nestor was assessed by a strategic review and was renewed on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 2014 by Council Decision 2014/485/CFSP. The new mandate is due to expire in July 2016. The data collected for the analysis of this study does not cover the second half of 2014, and for this reason the renewal of the mandate does not fall under the scope of this chapter.

its request and with notification to the Secretary-General, to strengthen its operational capacity to bring to justice those who are using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea (Ibid., p. 3).

Almost a full year later, the UNSC Resolutions 1897 from the 30<sup>th</sup> of November 2009 reiterated their concern using the exact same wording, but adding the word ‘continuing’. The UNSC’s “concern that the continuing limited capacity and domestic legislation to facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their capture has hindered more robust international action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia” (UNSC Resolution 1897, p. 2) was not just limited to Somalia at this point, and the Resolution expanded its call “upon States and interested organizations, including the IMO, to provide technical assistance to Somalia, including regional authorities, and nearby coastal States upon their request to enhance their capacity to ensure coastal and maritime security, including combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali and nearby coastline (Ibid., p. 3). This resolution acknowledged that maritime security is not just a Somali problem but a regional problem.

After another year, the UNSC Resolution 1950 from the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November 2010 reiterated the same “continuing limited capacity” concern but also welcomed “the capacity building efforts made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Djibouti Code Trust Fund” (UNSC Resolution 1950, p. 2). After two years of raising concerns, the international community started implementing capacity-building measures in the region. The UNSC continued “underlining the importance of enhancing ongoing work to address the problems caused by the limited capacity of the judicial system of Somalia and other States in the region to effectively prosecute suspected pirates” (UNSC Resolution 1976, p. 2) and encouraging more members of the international community to contribute to these efforts.

The emphasis on the lack of legal capacities to prosecute pirates was evident during the UNSC Resolutions in 2011. UNSC Resolution 1976 from the 11<sup>th</sup> of April 2011 “further invites States and regional organizations, individually or in cooperation with, among others, UNODC and INTERPOL, to assist Somalia and other States of the region in strengthening their counter-piracy law enforcement capacities” (Ibid., p. 4). UNSC Resolution 2015 from the 24<sup>th</sup> of October 2011, recalls the concern with lack of capacities to prosecute pirates and “calls upon Member States, regional organizations and other appropriate partners to support efforts to establish specialized anti-piracy courts in the region by making or facilitating arrangements for the provision of international experts” (UNSC Resolution 2015, p. 4).

The following year the EU joined the international efforts in regional capacity building. UNSC Resolution 2077 from the 21<sup>st</sup> of November 2012 contains the first mention

of EUCAP Nestor, but after praise was given to existing UN-related activities by “welcoming the capacity building efforts in the region made through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund and the Trust Fund Supporting Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, as well as the European Union’s planned programming under EUCAP NESTOR, and recognizing the need for all engaged international and regional organizations to cooperate fully” (UNSC Resolution 2077, p. 3). The UNSC Resolution 2125 from the 18<sup>th</sup> of November 2013 follows the same pattern of commendation by “further welcoming the European Union’s EUCAP Nestor, which is working to develop the sea-going maritime security capacities of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles and Tanzania” (UNSC Resolution 2125, p. 3).

The UN call for help of the international community to develop and implement capacity-building measures in Somalia and the countries in the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Ocean was not yielding tangible results for almost two years. Only then did UN-backed initiatives, in particular the Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund, gain momentum in both financial donations and local states’ buy-in to the capacity-building measures. The long process from the idea to implementation at the international level is a reflection of similar problems in the development and decision-making process of EUCAP Nestor. The findings from the analysis of the international dimension and the UN call for help indicate necessary but not sufficient impact on the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor.

#### **9.4. The organizational dimension**

This section of the chapter will follow the model of analysis and focus on the EU’s organisational dimension of the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor. The analysis will outline the political concerns, of which there are many, that led to a slow decision-making and policy-making process. This section will also investigate some of the organisational disagreements stemming from the hybrid nature of the mission and the different operational planning patterns between the military and the civilian elements of the mission.

##### **9.4.1. Member state politics**

This sub-section will analyse the impact of the political level of decision-making on the overall outcome of EUCAP Nestor. During the political discussions, several problem emerged, including the complexity of the mission, which had implications for the format of

the mission, the inevitable financial and logistical difficulties of a regional mission, as well as the political difficulties in securing buy-ins from regional states receiving capacity-building assistance.

Out of all the three EU missions in the Horn of Africa, EUCAP Nestor has the broadest and most diverse set of tasks in its mandate. Following the emphasis by the strategic planning structures on the Comprehensive Approach originating from EUNAVFOR Atlanta, but more strongly from EUTM Somalia, EUCAP Nestor was strictly designed following the logic of the Comprehensive Approach, which represented a test to the political level of the decision-making process. As one practitioner explains, “[EUCAP Nestor] was a regional strategy. The process started from the roof, which means that the mission is not just CFSP, but also cooperation, using sanctions, other instruments, diplomacy, and financial instruments used by the Commission. [...] We were overwhelmed by the situation” (Interview 11). As another practitioner recalled that it was “initially a slow debate, with many positions on the table. The whole setup was complicated, but also there were unclarities how much the Commission is taking up activities, who is doing what” (Interview 13).

The complexity of the proposed mandate and the initial confusion among member states delayed the actual discussion on particularities of the mission. Once these were addressed, the political discussions encountered an even greater difficulty. As one practitioner recalls, “There are several difficulties - first of all the task. The mandate is a very general one, but it is clear that, although general, it's complicated!” (Interview 13). The practitioner further explained some of the difficulties: “On top of being a regional mission, it is also a multifaceted one, with legal issues, classroom training, operational training, how to intercept potential pirates. [...] We knew that one of the complications was that some countries were lacking hardware, coastal vessels that we could work from, [...] all in all a very complicated mission in the sense of the mandate” (Ibid.).

Due to the mission’s proposed multifaceted mandate, it was debated what the main tasks were and which elements of the mission the EU should emphasise more. One of the more difficult decisions was the format of the mission. As one practitioner recalls, “the general idea was that [EUCAP Nestor] should be based on the rule of law aspect of capacity building” (Interview 9). The options circulating within the PSC reflected some of the member states’ preferences. “France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries were more in favour of a rule of law mission. More maritime oriented were the UK and the Mediterranean countries. As a result, EUCAP Nestor includes both” (Interview 9).

According to another interviewee, there is one division within the PSC, which is “more ideological and in practice less relevant. [...] On the one side, there are the ones who want to push CSDP, like the French and the Belgians, who see CSDP at the core of the Comprehensive Approach, and on the other side are Denmark, the UK, and Sweden, with their development approach” (Interview 13) The compromise takes the form of joint work in the area of military and development. “There is this notion of the 3D approach - defence, diplomacy and development.” (Ibid.).

With the compromise of including both civilian, rule of law elements and military elements in the final mandate, the next issue on the agenda were the cost and logistics of a regional mission. One of the main issues discussed at the PSC was the expected problem of costs, considering the existing EU involvement in the Horn of Africa. One of the main political and strategic drives behind EUTM Nestor was the idea that this mission represents an exit strategy for EUNAVFOR Atalanta. According to one practitioner, “Atalanta is a very expensive mission and it is funded by member states. (Interview 11) On the other hand, considering EUCAP Nestor was designed as a regional mission, it implied significant costs of its own. The prospect of another costly mission, even if it represents an exit strategy, influenced the debate on the format of the mission discussed above. As one interviewee explains, “a civilian mission was the desired option for the majority of member states, because civilian missions are funded from the EU budget. This is where politics comes in. There is no appetite for EU military missions due to austerity. There was appetite for a civilian mission. So we proposed a hybrid mission. Although de jure the EU doesn’t have hybrid missions, de facto EUCAP is a hybrid mission” (Interview 9).

Another issue discussed at the political level, directly linked to financial considerations, is the issue of logistics and procurement in a regional context. The regional format required the EU to deal with four to five countries, each with its separate financial and logistical requirements, including different tax exemptions, levels of infrastructure and transport. As one interviewee stressed the lack of experience with the greatness of such a task and the fact that EUCAP Nestor “is one of the first regional missions, which makes it more difficult for procurement” (Interview 14). The complexity of the logistics and procurement was exacerbated by the EU’s “already complicated and cumbersome procedures for getting finance assured, for procurement, buying equipment. More missions suffered from that, but NESTOR suffered maybe more than others” (Interview 13).

Besides the logistical and practical problems, discussed at the political level, the decision to deploy the mission was also affected by the political difficulties faced by the

envisaged mission. The concern was that the mission is not just operating in Somalia, but in other states, with a more stable government and defined foreign policy preferences. As one practitioner explains, “we were supposed to work regionally, in four to five countries, and we knew from the outset that one or two of them are not completely convinced. We needed to convince the Tanzanians and Kenyans to buy-in to our mission. All in all, this took much effort and negotiation” (Interview 13). The buy-in and approbation of the concerned countries was according to one practitioner the biggest problem of the proposed mission:

*The first debate was 'are we going to be comprehensive with all the countries of the region including Somalia or are we going to act step-by-step, first with those countries who are more ready to cooperate?' Then the problem is that there are current difficulties in Tanzania and Kenya because maybe we need to improve the buy-in by these authorities. Capability and capacity building is working mainly in Djibouti, but may cause problems in Tanzania and Kenya (Interview 11).*

As another practitioner recalled, “we knew that the support, the buy-in for Kenya and Tanzania wasn't a hundred per cent, so we had to work more on that. And, I think at the time we took the decision, positive signals were coming from both of them, but later it turned out not to be the case” (Interview 13). Even after the deployment of EUCAP Nestor the EU is not clear why these buy-ins were difficult to negotiate:

*It remains unclear what exactly causes the blockage, possible reasons are: inter-ministerial divisions within the Kenyan government (Transport vs. Defence); a linkage of various dossiers and issues (i.e. financing AMISOM). A crucial factor throughout has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is reluctant to engage with the EU on these issues (and is well known for his 'aversion against anything foreign') (European Union, 2103b).*

Another difficulty, “for a very positive reason”, was the positive development in Somalia. “It was a bit of a moving target. Initially we had excluded that any training would take place in Somalia and be done somewhere else, probably Djibouti. [...] When the development took a positive turn, there was some developing pressure to work in Somalia, to support them more directly” (Interview 13).

#### 9.4.2. Institutional politics

The previous sub-section outlined the main difficulties and points of debate regarding the political decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta. This sub-section will investigate the more intricate ‘politics’ between institutions during the development of EUCAP Nestor. The issues affecting the decision-making process at this level are of a more technical and procedural nature. Like at the political level, one of the issues at the procedural level is a general sense of confusion caused by the changing nature of crisis management. As one practitioner explains:

*I think there is unclarity of the procedure. In the past we would receive a draft CMC and then have a discussion, and then ask others like the EUMC or CIVCOM to give their advice, and not to rewrite the CMC. Recently, the CMCs are rewritten and returned to the PSC in a second version. We've done so on Mali and Libya. This has to do a lot with internal divisions, the uncertainty where exactly we want to go, and the assurances people want to have. (Interview 13)*

Another institutional difficulty of the mission was the very application of the Comprehensive Approach and the combining of instruments from all of the EU’s institutions. According to one practitioner, the origins of EUCAP Nestor also have traces in the European Commission, which has a different approach to dealing with third states. As the practitioner explains, “there was plenty of money for NGOs and local authorities. The Commission deals with the notion of project - the goal was not to achieve something, but to spend the money. [...] The Commission’s mantra is ‘work with the people’, the CSDP mantra is ‘work with states’” (Interview 10).

Finally, the institutional issues also revolved around the civilian setup of the mission. Besides the fact that a civilian option was preferred, as the costs are covered from the EU budget, the civilian option was also preferred due to the institutional culture and procedures related to the development of civilian missions. From the perspective of a diplomat, “civilian missions are easier. You’re not dealing with so many people; a very limited number of people are concerned” (Interview 2). Regarding the interaction with the civilian crisis management structures, the diplomat explained that “[civilian planning] is more focused. [...] There is no concern with the use of force, which is very important. As soon as you start with the use of force, you're in dire straits, deep [BLANKED] basically, from our perspective. It's a little easier to write the CMC, ConOps, and OPLAN. I don't say it's easy. But the [Civilian

Planning and Conduct] capability (CPCC) is there in Brussels, as part of the EEAS. (Interview 2)

From the perspective of a strategic planner, however the issues regarding the planning and drafting of the CMC for a civilian mission are more intricate. As one interviewee explained:

*There is professional tension with the CPCC when drafting the CMC. The member states require cost, size and date of a mission, and the CPCC doesn't like their hands tied, and don't want concrete numbers, but the member states need them to make a decision. [...] How to deal with that? We just put [the numbers] in the CMC. We have to take the responsibility. The CPCC is still not happy that we put that information. The CMC is an important political moment; the way forward is determined by the CMC. [...] The CPCC also tries to enlarge its space of manoeuvre. My responsibility is that the instructions are precise (Interview 9).*

## **9.5. The cognitive dimension**

The previous section examined the organisational dimension of the case study, in terms of political and institutional tensions and opportunities. These relations represent the context in which collective and individual actors create preferences, based on their respective context models. This section of the chapter will analyse the cognitive process of the collective and individual actors involved in the decision-making process of EUCAP Nestor and identify some of the context models that shaped the final outcome of the mission. In particular it will investigate the impact of the notion of the comprehensive approach, the role of the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, as a document that embodies the comprehensive approach, and the role of the individual drafters on the decision-making process for EUCAP Nestor.

### **9.5.1. Collective cognition**

This section, like in the previous two chapters, focuses on the collective cognitive process, the collective perceptions and mind-sets regarding the situation in Somalia and the respective choices based on existing context models. The main context models identified are surrounding issues of costs and the need for a comprehensive approach.



In the case of EUCAP NESTOR, the idea of the mission “emerged from the uneasiness that Atalanta will have to stay there for ten years” and the realisation the EU “needed to work on land” (Interview 13). The context models regarding the need for a mission like Somalia were shaped by the experiences from the other two EU missions in the Horn of Africa, EUNAVFO Atalanta and EUTM Somalia. As one interviewee recalls, “we started talking about it in 2010. It wasn't possible to talk about creating development in Somalia itself. The only thing we could come up with was to try to enable the countries of the basin to prevent piracy themselves” (Ibid.). Another interviewee confirms this statement:

*[EUCAP Nestor's] origins can be found in the EU's existing engagement through operation Atalanta and EUTM, and in the Horn of Africa Strategy as well. It was necessary to situate what the European Union is doing in that broader strategic perspective. And also [from] the awareness I suppose that has been identified through the Union's close contact with the piracy issue on the need to reinforce coastguard capacity and maritime capacity for countries along the Indian Ocean. So I suppose the origin of that operation stems from an expansion of the existing involvements and identification of needs (Interview 1).*

However, while financial concerns and the ‘investment and return’ mind-set identified in the case of EUTM Somalia still remains present among crisis management actors, the mantra-like preoccupation with the Comprehensive Approach becomes more evident. This mind-set is illustrated by the reflections of actors at both the political and strategic organisational levels. One of the main reasons for this is found in the theoretical propositions of this model of analysis. Before the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor was taken, the EU published a document, which embodies the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management in the Horn of Africa. The document under the title ‘A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa’ was approved by the Council on the 11<sup>th</sup> of November 2011 and annexed to the presidency conclusion. The Strategic Framework, while remaining general and listing the possible tools and options available to the EU, sends a convincing message that the EU comprehensive approach “will address the region's interlocked challenges” and “pay special attention to root causes and drivers of conflict” (European Union, 2011d, p. 4). The convincing message of the document, in accordance with the theoretical propositions of this model, affected the collective cognition of actors at both the political and strategic level of policy-making.

While the document is not signed and the authors are unknown, some of the interviewees revealed the origin of the document. According to one practitioner, the Strategic Framework was “one of the first documents that came when [EEAS managing director] Miozzo was appointed. I do not remember correctly, but I think [Miozzo] himself came up with the idea, out of the wish to grab it all, to understand it all” (Interview 13). Another interviewee clarified that “the geo-desk on Africa [within the EEAS] wrote the Strategic Framework.” The document was generally well accepted by both the political and strategic actors. A practitioner referred to it as “a good document, considered by everyone. Everyone saw the need of the document and in that sense it is influential. [...] It represents the comprehensive approach; it brought it all together” (Interview 13).

In the context of the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor, the majority of the interviewees acknowledged it as an influential document. “[EUCAP Nestor] is phrased in the context of the Strategic Framework, as articulated by the geo-desk. The ideas in the Strategic Framework were present for much longer, the idea that ‘we think together, putting ideas to the test. [...] It requires resistance to create brilliance, it needs resistance to create great policy” (Interview 9). Another interviewee, as evident from the following quote, confirms this position:

*It is an influential document, and is referred to in Nestor. [...] It focuses the thinking and mobilizes capitals [of member states] and therefore resources. The capitals are sometimes not united on some issues. [...] It is an ‘all-in-one’ document to help people understand what we’re doing, so that’s a mobilizing force. It presents as a coherent view of what you want to do in a region, so [in the case of EUCAP Nestor] it served its purpose” (Interview 13).*

The embedded idea of the comprehensive approach in the mind-set of EU crisis management actors, as was the case for EUTM Somalia as well, shaped and changed the reasoning for crisis management and deployment of EU missions. Prominent to an increasing degree across the three EU missions in the Horn of Africa is the idea that “in the 21<sup>st</sup> century it’s clear - there is no military solution. These are lessons learned from the past. [...] We, the EU, as a global actor, we need to act not only by military or security means but be a part of a comprehensive approach” (Interview 11).

### 9.5.2. Individual cognition

The previous sub-section focused on the collective mind-set that was strongly influenced by the notion of the comprehensive approach. This sub-section focuses the analysis on the cognitive process and mind-set of individuals in the decision-making process. In particular it investigates the drafting process of the CMC for the EUCAP Nestor mission. The interviewee quoted in this sub-section is the main drafter of the CMC for EUCAP Nestor. The interviewee's reflections briefly focused on his background, which shed light on the interviewee's existing context models and how they were shaped by previous experience, and on the process of drafting the CMC for EUCAP Nestor. The drafter's reflections on the process mainly focused on the extent of preparation required before the drafting process and the drafting process itself.

The interviewee first reflected on his background and previous experience, which helps understand how the drafter's context models evolved. The interviewee even reflected on his teenage years, during which he was a "young explorer" in his country of origin, and that he "kept that mind-set till now, it affects my outlook on life". The drafter also joined the Navy, and was deployed in the Balkans, Cambodia, Iraq. According to the drafter, these experiences made him reflect on his life, which encouraged him to pursue an academic career in political science and philosophy. His works in institutions, also created a sense of "institutional professionalism" (Interview 9).

The interviewee also reflected on the difficulty of the task to draft a CMC for such a broad mission. EUCAP Nestor, as a regional mission for regional maritime capacities, required an analysis of the whole region. According to the interviewee, the preparations for the task required of him to "go there, see what they need, narrow down options, discuss with most important member states, mainly from Western Europe" (Interview 9). He added that there is "a lot of consulting as a CMC drafter. There is no fixed procedure and one person is in charge of the file." He explained that the "input for the CMC is case-dependent, it can be think tanks, like the [European Union Institute for Security Studies] EUISS, Chatham House, EU delegations, member states delegations", and that "there is no shortage of analysis and assessment, but there is a shortage of action". He concluded that his main task was to "translate that political impetus into action" (Interview 9).

Regarding the drafting process itself, the interviewee explained that at the start there were issues with terminology, which required a precise definition of terms. The drafter recalled the problem of the term 'maritime capacity': "MS didn't know what that is, they only

agreed that it should be done, so I had to define it first. It includes all sorts of things, like hardware, legal mandate, information, human resources, and training people, all of which is our added value” (Ibid.).

In regard to the drafting process, the interviewee described the process of preference formation during the drafting process. Reflecting on his role in the CMPD, the drafter described it as the “designer of CSDP”. This self-perception is in line with the notion of ‘the logic of the architect’ referred to in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The drafter continued saying that “strategic planners need to be really wise, to incorporate key ideas and include them in the CMC [but to] avoid ‘pork-barrel’ situations and unconditionally accept ideas of all states to maintain consistency” (Ibid.). Furthermore, regarding the political pressure, the drafter explained the need of the CMC to predict and enable the EU to negotiate the mission with the accepting countries in the region. In order for this to happen he had to make sure that the CMC “fits the expectations of member states and the expectations of the region” (Ibid.).

Further reflections were also in line with what the sub-section on the role of the strategic planner in Chapter 5 refers to as ‘strategic imagination’ and ‘sense of reality’. The following quote illustrates the way the notion of ‘strategic imagination’ shaped the context models of the drafter regarding the coordination with the PSC, and how these affected his use of language:

*Language that is acceptable to everyone is in strength of the consensus, but I try to be as clear as possible. I strive for clarity in the language, because it reflects my thought process. Diplomatic language is a reflection of a muddled thought process. It could also be a reflection of PSC disagreement, as a camouflage for it. The PSC is hopelessly divided on the Middle East, for example, but fortunately, on Somalia there is more agreement (Interview 9).*

Regarding the drafter’s ‘sense of reality’, he perceives Somalia as a failing state, which requires the EU’s help in the form of crisis management and describes the ‘sense of reality’ and self-perception through a metaphor:

*Crisis management is more like the image of a doctor who needs to cure a patient. This implies a process of curing, which involves diagnosis, therapy, with ups and downs and relapses. The moment the doctor stops caring, that’s when problems arise. The problems will pop up again. The problem is also if you have too many*

*doctors with conflicting diagnoses. You need a doctor in charge of dealing with relapses (Interview 9).*

The interviewee demonstrated a strong personal involvement in the development of EUCAP Nestor and even indicated more long-term ‘strategic imagination’ regarding the situation in Somalia. According to the interviewee, EU crisis management is “tilting the balance” in the sense that by stabilising the situation in Somalia, it develops trust in the international community, which is “necessary to get in private investors. [...] The EU needs to surge into Somalia and Puntland. We can provide security but only if we go in there together instead of alone. We should flood the country and create change that can ‘reverse the vicious circle.’” Finally, the drafter insisted on the message that “the endeavour should not be deterred by pressure” (Ibid.).

The evidence and analysis in the sub-section indicates that the mind-set and context models of the drafters were primarily shaped by the drafter’s previous understanding of the role of a strategic planner, which involves developing ‘strategic imagination’ and a ‘sense of reality’, which eventually led to a personal involvement in the process of strategic planning, reflected in the drafter’s self-perception and reflections. Furthermore, the general narrative on Somalia as a failed state affected the drafter’s context models regarding the Situation in Somalia. The combined context-models contributed to the preference of drafting a CMC with clear and long-term projections using all available instruments, which required a lot of research and preparation prior to the drafting process.

In comparison with the previous two EU missions in the Horn of Africa, the drafting process of EUCAP Nestor indicates an even higher reliance of the drafters on the narrative and notion of the EU comprehensive approach. The drafters at this stage, while still aware of their role of strategists and dedicated to exercise their strategic imagination, demonstrate to a much lesser extent the traits of Vivien Schmidt’s ‘sentient agents’ (2008, 2010). Even more than in EUTM Somalia the drafters rely on the greater narrative (the structure) and use their strategic imagination and freedom to work out the details of the mission, but do not deviate from the existing norm and narrative of the comprehensive approach.

## 9.6. Conclusion (500)

This chapter followed the proposed model of analysis in order to answer the question why the EU deployed the EUCAP Nestor mission, in spite of existing capacity-building efforts in the region and its already significant financial burden caused by the other two missions in the Horn of Africa.

The analysis of the international dimension, shows that the UNSC played the key role in developing and shaping the narrative on capacity problems to deal with piracy on land. The numerous reports and UNSC Resolutions identified the problem that pirates captured by international maritime security efforts were released due to the lack of capabilities in the region to prosecute them. This spurred the UNSC to call for help of the international community to assist with capacity-building initiatives in the region. From the first call for help to the first UN-led initiative two years have passed. The slow process was an indicator of the problems that plagued the EU's decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor as well.

An analysis of the organisational dimension, similarly to EUTM Somalia, reveals a lack of consensus and general sense of confusion. At the political level, policy-makers were overwhelmed by the breadth of the proposed EUCAP Nestor mandate, which led to slow and very technical debates about concerns and assurances. The main points of the debates were the format of the mission, i.e. whether it should be a civilian or a military mission, the financial and logistical aspects of the mission and the political implications for the region. At the strategic and operational level, the issue of confusion was also identified, as well as the problems created by the different organisational cultures of the European Commission, the military and the civilian crisis management structures. These institutional tensions negatively affected the planning process of the mission, which prolonged its decision.

In the cognitive dimension, the analysis reveals a strong institutionalisation of the comprehensive approach, resulting in the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, which was overwhelmingly accepted by both the political and strategic actors. The document was perceived as useful and references to it were also made in the documents of EUCAP Nestor. At the individual cognitive level, the analysis reveals a specific set of context models of the strategic planner involved in drafting the mission's CMC. The drafter demonstrated a great level of personal involvement and professionalism in the development of the CMC, which set the overall shape of the mission.

By combining the findings from the three dimension of the model, one can conclude that the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor was primarily influenced by the collective

acceptance of the comprehensive approach to crisis management in general, but more particularly the acceptance of the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, which embodies this comprehensive approach. Further impetus for the mission originates from the realisation of the international community, expressed in UNSC Resolutions, that the pirates captured by international anti-piracy efforts were released due to the lack of proper prosecution capabilities, and the further realisation that the EU cannot stay in the region forever, a realisation shared by the decision-makers of EUTM Somalia and the ‘training of trainers’ strategy. Finally the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor was aided by the personal involvement and professionalism of the individual drafters of key mission documents, for which significant efforts of research and preparation for such an ambitious mission were needed.

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# Chapter 10. Conclusions

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## 10.1. Introduction

The EU's engagement in the Horn of Africa, in the form of three CSDP missions, represents the current nature and logic of EU foreign policy. By asking where these CSDP missions come from, the analysis identifies and outlines the broader institutional and cognitive evolution of EU foreign policy, reflected in the three case studies and ranging from a more conventional, member states driven military intervention (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) to a comprehensive, strategic, policy-driven regional mission (EUCAP Nestor). This concluding chapter will recapitulate the findings of the three case studies, answering the respective questions why the three missions were deployed. The chapter will then draw general conclusions of where EU missions come from and discuss the implication of these conclusions for the present and future development of EU foreign policy. After reviewing the evolution of the policy, the chapter will discuss the way the policy can be studied and reflect on the proposed model of the thesis and its usefulness for the study and analysis of EU foreign policy.

## 10.2. Understanding the EU's engagement in the Horn of Africa

This section of the chapter will summarize the findings of the analysis conducted in the individual case studies. The individual case studies posed the question of where the respective CSDP missions come from. The case studies followed the model of analysis proposed by this thesis and started from a broad analysis of the international context in which the decisions were made. The analysis then gradually focused on the structures that affect the cognitive process and consequently constrain or enable individual actors and their preferences for action. More concretely, the case studies analysed the decision making process from the idea of deploying the respective missions, the international narratives surrounding the specific problems addressed, the political commitment that is necessary for CSDP actions, to the actual planning and drafting process that precedes the decision to deploy (or extend) the respective missions.



### 10.2.1. EUNAVFOR Atalanta

The decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta was influenced by a combination of factors, which includes the UN call for help and the UNSC Resolutions' narrative on piracy in the Indian Ocean, the French impetus at the political level, the existing plans of EU military actors to develop EU's maritime capabilities, and the personal initiative of the drafters of the key mission documents.

All of these dimensions developed in the context of the global general understanding of Somalia as a failed state. The sixth chapter of this thesis identified two general narratives that describe Somalia as a failed state with the difference that one narrative presents Somalia's state failure as a security threat, whereas the other narrative describes Somalia's state failure as a complex problem that requires a complex solution.

The analysis in the case study of EUNAVFOR Atalanta identified these narratives to be similar to the UN narrative on Somali piracy, which later found its way into the coordinative discourse in Brussels. The UN call for help had influence on the decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta insofar as it framed the discussions at the political level in Brussels and also provided for the legitimisation of EU's use of force. The UNSC Resolutions particularly stressed that piracy should be addressed by all necessary means and mandated the use of force. At the international level, the analysis also looks into material factors that affected the decision making in Brussels. The events and triggers that occurred in 2008 encouraged France to use its EU presidency to push for a CSDP option to combating piracy.

At the organisational level there was a an interest of the majority of member states to act against piracy, ranging from commercial interest in terms of securing free shipping in the Indian Ocean to increasing EU visibility as a global maritime actor. The consensus that 'something should be done' was strengthened by the support from the military and strategic structures from the EUMS and the Council Secretariat in Brussels. At the strategic and operational level, the groups contributed to the decision to deploy Atalanta by ensuring the mission is drafted in a feasible and efficient way by avoiding duplication with other international anti-piracy efforts, especially those of NATO. This relieved the member states' initial concerns and aided the decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

At the cognitive level, the case study investigated the perceptions of groups and individuals involved in the decision making process related to EUNAVFOR Atalanta. The analysis of the collective cognitive process identified the collective perception of piracy off

the coast of Somalia as a crisis, with its implied sense of urgency. The sense of urgency was perceived by the military staff as an opportunity to push for a stronger EU maritime presence, which was consistent with existing military concepts and plans of developing stronger EU maritime capabilities. The military therefore supported the CSDP option in combating piracy, which contributed to the consensus regarding EUNAVFOR Atalanta's deployment.

The analysis in the case study also focused on the individual cognitive process of the drafters of some key documents related to the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission. The analysis revealed that the individual drafter is affected by organisational structures and contexts created at a higher level in the decision-making hierarchy, as well as by the existing structures of meaning related to the general understanding of Somalia as a failed state. However, the analysis revealed that the drafter in the case of EUNAVFOR Somalia has introduced elements of a more comprehensive solution to the issue of piracy on a personal initiative, mainly due to the drafter's previous experiences and lessons learned in Afghanistan and the realisation that the EU should not fight the symptoms but the causes of piracy.

By combining and evaluating the findings of the three dimensions, one can interpret the degree of impact of the three dimensions on the deployment of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and conclude that the mission was primarily a political decision, pushed by a number of member states, but particularly by France, who had both a national interest in the matter and an agenda as part of its EU presidency. The UNSC influenced the coordinative discourse in Brussels with its narrative of Somalia as a failed state that requires international engagement by all necessary means, which mandated the international community to use force as needed, which affected the consideration of a military CSDP option in Brussels. The decision to deploy EUNAVFOR Atalanta was finally aided by both the perception of urgency and the perceived opportunity to develop EU's maritime capabilities, according to existing plans and concepts.

### 10.2.2. EUTM Somalia

By applying the same model of analysis, the thesis studied the EU's decision to deploy EUTM Somalia and identified the factors that influenced this decision to varying degree. The findings of the analysis indicate a greater role played by the strategic planners within the EEAS, and a lesser degree of direct impact of the member states and the UNSC. The analysis concludes that the narrative of the comprehensive approach developed within Brussels

institutions in conjunction with the partnership with the US were the dominant factors that led to the deployment of EUTM Somalia.

At the international level, the case study identified an indirect effect of the UNSC Resolutions' narrative on the security situation in Somalia and the call for international support with developing Somalia's military capacities. The UNSC Resolutions predominantly focused on the African Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM. The EU was mentioned and commended in a few UNSC Resolutions, but only in the context of aiding AMISOM efforts in stabilizing the security situation in Somalia. There are no clear indications that the narrative in the UNSC Resolutions had a significant effect on the EU's decision to deploy EUTM Somalia. On the other hand, there were events and triggers at the international level that created incentives and opportunities for the EU to become involved in training Somali troops in the region. The biggest opportunity arose from the partnerships with Uganda and the US and was hastened by the rising power of Al Shabaab and its territorial advancements.

In terms of the organisational dimensions, at the political level of member states, there was a general consensus that 'something should be done', but no clear consensus on deploying a military training mission. The analysis again reveals a French impetus, in concert with a few other member states, which advanced their own interests, like for example Sweden, who pushed for the integration of a human rights and gender equality element into the training objectives of the mission. There was however a number of concerns of the other member states, who set some preconditions if the mission was to be deployed (or extended). These preconditions included assuring that the trained recruits do not 'switch sides', that the EU troops are deployed to a safe environment and that the financial costs are reduced as much as possible. These preconditions outlined the framework of the operational planning at a later stage.

At the cognitive level, the perceptions at the political level were that the security situation needs to be addressed, but there was no common commitment to the idea of an EU military training mission. The analysis of the collective cognitive process identified a number of different constellations of context models, labelled in simpler terms as different mind sets, which focused on different priorities regarding the mission. The dominant mind-set processed the options in terms of investments and returns. The differences within the PSC and the lack of consensus resulted with unclear instructions to the strategic planners. The strategic planners perceived that as an opportunity to advance the concept of the comprehensive approach to crisis management, which has its roots in the institutionalised lessons learned process and the reflections within the EEAS on how the EU can and should manage crises in

the world. The comprehensive approach involves synergising all available instruments of the EU when planning for an EU engagement. The comprehensive approach appealed to the member states, as it was presented by the strategic planners to be cost-effective.

The analysis of the individual cognitive process of the drafters of EUTM Somalia's key documents revealed that the drafters exercised a great deal of initiative when drafting the documents and managing the unclear political instructions. The drafter analysed in the case of EUTM Somalia perceived the drafting process as building a mission 'from scratch' and developing a comprehensive approach from the bottom up, which according to the drafter is not ideal. The drafter's individual understanding of the institutional opportunities regarding the advancement of the comprehensive approach, and the operational opportunities in the partnership with the US framed the preferences of the drafter and consequently the mandate of the mission. In the case of the extension of the mission, these preferences were also affected by existing notions of local ownership, which are part of the idea of the comprehensive approach.

By combining and evaluating the findings of the three dimensions, one can attribute different degrees of influence of the respective dimensions on the decision-making process in the case of EUTM Somalia. The decision to deploy and later extend the mission was primarily affected by the collective and individual cognition at the strategic level that the comprehensive approach is both effective and desirable in addressing the security situation in Somalia. It was the careful planning and introduction of accompanying measures to meet the mission's preconditions at the strategic level that alleviated the disagreements and the concerns at the PSC. Another dominant influence was the willingness of the US to enter into a partnership with the EU, which set the context for further strategic planning in Brussels. Finally, there is no clear indication that the narratives at the UNSC had a significant effect on the EU's decision to deploy EUTM Somalia.

### 10.2.3. EUCAP NESTOR

In spite of the smaller volume of data for analysis in the third case study, due to its recent deployment, the analysis offered complementary insight to the conclusions of the previous two case studies. Following the proposed model of analysis, the investigation of why EUCAP Nestor was deployed reveals the factors that to varying degree affected the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor.

In the international dimension, the UNSC played the key role in developing and shaping the narrative on capacity problems to deal with piracy on land. The numerous reports and UNSC Resolutions identified the problem that pirates captured by international maritime security efforts were released due to the lack of capabilities in the region to prosecute them. This spurred the UNSC to call for help of the international community to assist with capacity-building initiatives in the region. From the first call for help to the first UN-led initiative two years have passed. The slow process was an indicator of the problems that plagued the EU's decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor as well.

An analysis of the organisational dimension, similarly to EUTM Somalia, reveals a lack of consensus and general sense of confusion. At the political level, policy-makers were overwhelmed by the breadth of the proposed EUCAP Nestor mandate, which led to slow and very technical debates about concerns and assurances. The main points of the debates were the format of the mission, i.e. whether it should be a civilian or a military mission, the financial and logistical aspects of the mission and the political implications for the region. At the strategic and operational level, the issue of confusion was also identified, as well as the problems created by the different organisational cultures of the European Commission, the military and the civilian crisis management structures. These institutional tensions negatively affected the planning process of the mission, which prolonged its decision.

In the cognitive dimension, the analysis reveals a strong institutionalisation of the comprehensive approach, resulting in the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, which was overwhelmingly accepted by both the political and strategic actors. The document was perceived as useful and references to it were also made in the documents of EUCAP Nestor. At the individual cognitive level, the analysis reveals a specific set of context models of the strategic planner involved in drafting the mission's CMC. The drafter demonstrated a great level of personal involvement and professionalism in the development of the CMC, which set the overall shape of the mission.

By combining the findings from the three dimensions of the model, one can conclude that the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor was primarily influenced by the collective acceptance of the comprehensive approach to crisis management in general, but more particularly the acceptance of the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, which embodies this comprehensive approach. Further impetus for the mission originates from the realisation of the international community, expressed in UNSC Resolutions, that the pirates captured by international anti-piracy efforts were released due to the lack of proper

prosecution capabilities, and the further realisation that the EU cannot stay in the region forever, a realisation shared by the decision-makers of EUTM Somalia and the ‘training of trainers’ strategy. Finally the decision to deploy EUCAP Nestor was aided by the personal involvement and professionalism of the individual drafters of key mission documents, for which significant efforts of research and preparation for such an ambitious mission were needed.

### **10.3. The changing nature of EU foreign policy**

This section of the chapter draws some conclusions on what the three case studies can contribute to the understanding of where CSDP mission come from and understanding the nature of EU foreign policy. The section then recalls the evolution of EU foreign policy, presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis, in the light of the observations made regarding the EU’s engagement in the Horn of Africa.

The EU’s engagement in the Horn of Africa was planned and decided on through the established crisis management procedure. However, as the analysis in the three case studies revealed, with the exception of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, there was no perception of a crisis that needed managing. The subsequent CSDP missions were deployed as part of a comprehensive approach to the issue of Somalia piracy, which represents the current nature of EU foreign policy and its defence component. The three case studies exploring the particular decisions to deploy the respective missions can be understood as one longitudinal study of the development of CSDP in recent years. When comparing the three cases, one can notice the correlations and overlaps in the timelines of developments. With each mission, the context models and cognitive processes of the actors involved were affected by the updated perceptions of the situation and the new institutional experiences. Each mission shaped the narratives and perceptions on the situation in Somalia, but also the self-perception of what the EU is doing and what the added value of the EU is. Each mission relied on and referenced the documents from related previous missions and ‘recalled’ and ‘considered’ in its wording the narratives (and sometimes exact phrases, even entire paragraphs) from previous mission documents. Depending on accessibility, the document trail allowed for an exact tracing of the process across the three case studies and indicated that lessons from previous mission are indeed learned, and even implemented. When examined together, the three cases illustrated a

cognitive and institutional evolution of EU foreign policy and its defence component, under its current label of crisis management.

EU foreign policy, with its comprehensive approach to addressing global issues and conveniently labelled ‘external action’ travelled a long way to take its current form. The second chapter of this thesis presented a historic overview of the development of EU foreign policy, viewed through a discursive and institutionalist lens. By viewing the history of the policy through an analytical perspective, the chapter identified the dominant narratives of the time, which were embedded in key EC/EU documents and represent the discursive realities and conceptualizations of their respective periods and stages in the evolution of EU foreign policy. These narratives evolved in their respective historical contexts. The ideational and normative origins of EU foreign policy are found in the very first documents and the pacifist narratives of Churchill and Schuman. These ideas reflect the historical context of the period after the Second World War and the need to overcome ‘old rivalries’. The ideational narrative created in that period changed with the historical context of the Cold War, the discursive dominance of *realpolitik* and the notion of sovereignty, and the narrative of ‘too much supranationalism’ that developed during the period of de Gaulle and the ‘empty chair crisis’, and which remained dominant to this day.

The practical origins of the policy can be traced to European Political Co-operation and its gradual development in formal institutionalisation in the second pillar of the EU and the Maastricht Treaty. Since then, the policy gradually developed through an incremental process of practical realisations by the different EU organizations and by its member states. The major shift occurred during the wars in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, after the realization that the EU is not capable to defend its interests without having to rely on NATO. This realization led to another shift of narrative, namely the development of the defence component of the second pillar after the integration of the WEU with the EU in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Helsinki European Council later introduced non-military goals into the policy, which evolved institutionally into today’s civilian elements of EU crisis management.

The development of CSDP since the early 2000s occurred in parallel with the deeper integration in the second pillar and identity the EU was creating with its CFSP. With the parallel development of military and civilian elements of EU’s CSDP on the one hand and the gradual realization that the EU is becoming an influential global actor, there was institutional pressure to consolidate all available EU’s instruments and to deliver effective action in the world. This narrative can be traced in a number of early CSDP documents like the European

Security Strategy. Again, reflecting the historical context of its time, especially the post-9/11 narratives of pre-emptive action, EU foreign policy in the 2000s witnessed a focus on strategy, effectiveness, coordination, and learning. These developments set the conditions for a change of its foreign policy narrative and the development of new terminology like crisis management, comprehensive approach, synergies of instruments and other ‘buzzwords’ present in the majority of EU foreign policy documents dating back from that period up to today. The lead-up to the abolition of the pillar structure in the Lisbon Treaty, and the establishment of the EEAS created the opportunity for new institutional developments and materialisation of the existing narratives. Examples include the development of the CMPD, which integrates both civilian and military crisis management elements into an organization that produces comprehensive strategies to address global issues. The effectiveness of the CMPD and the historical context of the 2010s with its focus on austerity and cost-effectiveness define EU’s foreign policy today. The EU foreign policy today has an element of broad foreign policy activity in the form of external action and a defence element in the form of EU crisis management.

EU foreign policy is constantly evolving and adapting to the historical context it exists in and should therefore be seen as a living policy and a moving target. What started as an intergovernmental policy that served the advancement of national foreign policy interests developed through efficiency-driven mechanisms into a policy of a learning organisation, where the member states still maintain the decision making power, but in practice share the agenda-setting role with the EEAS and rely on its expertise. The defence element of EU’s foreign policy, in the form of EU crisis management developed internally its own logic of the comprehensive approach, which is embedded in the institutional discourse of EU foreign policy. The notion of the comprehensive approach discursively emphasizes the EU’s added value and envisages the EU as a distinct and unique global actor.

#### **10.4. The changing nature of EU foreign policy analysis**

The same way EU foreign policy evolves and adapts to the historical period it exists in, the study of EU foreign policy also evolves and adapts to its given time period. This section of the chapter will recall the conceptual development of EU foreign policy presented in Chapter 3 and the different approaches to the study of EU foreign policy outlined in Chapter 4 of this thesis. This section will then reiterate the proposition of the thesis to analyse EU foreign



policy, and more concretely crisis management with particular relevance to the question of where CSDP missions come from. The section will then reflect on the model and outline the model's usefulness and limitations. Lastly, the section will conclude the chapter, as well as the whole thesis, with expectations for future applications of the model and for the study of EU foreign policy in general.

As mentioned above, EU foreign policy is a moving target which is constantly changing, in both material and institutional terms. To 'take a shot' at the moving target and trying to conceptualise EU foreign policy, researchers have also changed their views on and approaches to EU foreign policy. Chapter 3 of this thesis presented certain views, which, more often than not, created confusion in terminology due to the sometimes interchangeable use of the term 'EU foreign policy' with European foreign policy, EU external relations, EU member state foreign policy, or since the Lisbon Treaty the term of EU external action. The review of the literature will reveal that the dates and authors referenced in relation to one of these conceptual pairings corresponds to the historical context during which the terminology and conceptualisation of EU foreign policy was developed. For example, the literature on European foreign policy predates any concrete institutional or material development of a distinct EU foreign policy, most notably the changes of the Lisbon Treaty. At the time European foreign policy was used, it was unimaginable that the EU will possess a legal personality or have a distinct global presence and actorness. As the notion of a more integrated and institutionalised CFSP/CSDP developed, the terminology and conceptualisation moved towards a more community oriented understanding of EU foreign policy. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the conceptualisation of EU foreign policy was the closest to the terminology used by the EU itself, namely that of 'external action'. The EU's terminology, in spite of the abolition of the pillar structure, still preserved the terms CFSP and CSDP as specific components of its external action. The thesis adopted this understanding of EU foreign policy as the EU's external action. To avoid confusion however, the thesis maintained the use of 'EU foreign policy', and referring to its defence component, the thesis used the term crisis management.

By acknowledging the existence of a distinct EU foreign policy, the thesis considered and evaluated the existing approaches to foreign policy analysis and developed a model of analysis to suit the institutional complexity of EU foreign policy decision making. The approaches differed in their focus of analysis and their epistemology and methodology. Predominantly, the previous models of EU foreign policy focused the analysis on structures

and how they are shaped or shape national foreign policies. The existing approaches focused very much on member states and national foreign policies.

The more 'alternative' approaches used discourse analysis as a method, but still maintained their focus on member states. The approaches that analysed the level of institutions were also limited due to their focus on structures, which is not as useful to understand processes of change. In order to analyse institutional changes of a changing EU foreign policy, the thesis opted for an agency-oriented approach, found in either cognitive approaches or bureaucratic politics approaches. The necessity to focus on institutions on the other hand required an institutional approach that focused on the role of agency within institutions, which the thesis found in the discursive institutionalist approach of Vivian Schmidt. The criticism of the discursive institutionalist approach was that it does not go into sufficient detail on the exact mechanisms of how discourses influence organisations and individuals, and vice versa.

The 'missing link' of the model of analysis was found in the work of Teun van Dijk, which examines the link between individuals, their cognitive abilities, context and discourse. According to this approach, agents are processing new information in relation to existing 'context models', which consist of the agents' existing knowledge and previous experiences. The approach links the cognitive process of the agents with their ability to use language within their subjectively perceived structures of meaning. Like the discursive institutionalist approach, this approach allows for a degree of freedom of agency to resist the structures imposed on it, but unlike discursive institutionalism, it explains the (almost causal) mechanisms of how agents manage to resist structures, namely due to their subjective interpretation of those structures.

These two approaches represented the building blocks for the model, which proposed a layered analysis of the different levels of information processing, ranging from the global understanding of reality, through the institutional level of information processing, down to the individual level of cognition. The different levels of analysis represent both the benefit and the source of difficulties of this model. The different levels of analysis allow for a step-by-step examination and understanding of how and at what stage information was processed and meanings were created. Such a model especially benefits the analysis of a complex, multi-level decision-making process like that of EU crisis management. The limitation of this model however is the fact that the application of the model requires careful process tracing, which in the case of crisis management poses certain practical and methodological difficulties.

Directly linked to the requirement of process tracing are the issues of case selection and data collection. Process tracing, especially if done meticulously, can lead the researcher far back in the past. The further the process is traced back, the more difficult is to identify the relevance of the data collected. The operationalization of the model relies on both textual data and personal interviews with the actors involved in the process. Textual documents and interviews do not possess the same quality when faced with the problem of time. While text remains unchanged over time, interviews become less reliable with time, as the interviewees cannot recall all information as accurately. Therefore the researcher needs to consider analysing a case that is recent enough for the interview data to be ‘fresh’ and reliable. In the case of EU crisis management missions however, cases that are too recent (or even ongoing during the time of research) will cause problems in terms of gathering textual data. The relevant crisis management documents are by their nature classified and require time in order to be declassified and accessible to the public. Some documents can be declassified for researcher upon request, but highly sensitive, key strategic documents of for example an ongoing mission will be kept secret.

This thesis also encountered these problems and the trade-off that was made led to the selection of the three cases of EU’s engagement in the Horn of Africa. Due to the frequent rotation of officials in Brussels, the relevant officials involved in the decision making process were not available for interviews or were difficult to reach, as they changed their position within the EU hierarchy. One of the ways this difficulty was also overcome was the reliance of the interviewees that were not directly involved in the decision making process on institutional memory and the information they were given when they took up the post. The case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, as the oldest case study, suffered most from this limitation of the model. The case of the most recent mission suffered from the limitation on the other side of the trade-off, namely the fact that the mission was just deployed at the time of data collection and the documents were not available to the researcher.

Another potential difficulty a researcher faces is the operationalization of the model and delineating the border between individual cognition and organisational information processing. The analyst cannot precisely determine the direction of the loosely understood arrows of causation. It is empirically unclear whether the organisation influenced the individual or vice versa. This has implications for the analysis, which relies on the model to demonstrate the influences of one level of decision making on another, regardless of the position in the layered hierarchy. These influences are necessary elements for evaluating the role of agency with any given structure and at any given level, and consequently in answering

the main question of foreign policy analysis of who, what, to whom and how that answered together provide the answer for why a foreign policy decision was taken.

In spite of these limitations, the model provides for a systematic course of inquiry, and if complete correctly, the process tracing and analysis of interview and textual data provide the researcher with a more complete picture of the decision making process. The value of the model lies mostly in the cognitive dimension of the model and the analysis of both collective and individual cognitive processes. The focus on cognition is also corroborated by recent realisations of EU scholars that “an analysis of the ways in which cognitive practices affect policy making is thus imperative in order to grasp current transformations in EU foreign policy and in the EU in general” (Bicchi, 2014, p. 254).

In the model’s application on the three case studies regarding the EU’s engagement in the Horn of Africa, the analysis reveals the mechanisms and interplay of the global, political, strategic and individual level of information processing and how these contributed (to different degrees) to the deployment of the three missions. One of the criticisms of this thesis can be that it does not contain non-cases, namely instances in which a crisis could be identified, but which did not result in the deployment of a mission. This omission may be remedied in a future application of the proposed model in the analysis of, for instance, the non-deployment of an EU crisis management mission in Lybia or Ukraine. The model’s focus on context and cognition, structure and agency, opportunities and constraints, may still prove valuable in understanding for example the non-intervention against Russian troops in Ukraine. The perceptions at the different levels of decision-making may be different, but the same mechanisms of context models, perception of reality, preference formation and discursive action, as described in Chapter 4 will remain in place. Future applications however may also reveal other limitations, which should be addressed at that stage.

Based on the reflections above on the model proposed in this thesis, the model should not be set in stone, and may be adapted, the same way the study of EU foreign policy in general adapts to the changing nature of EU foreign policy. The model will be tweaked but the essential focus on the influences of structures of meaning on agents’ cognition and the agents’ ability to change those structures will be preserved. As described above, the application of the model is confronted with problems of case selection and trade-offs between recent or dated cases, which are linked to access to documents and availability of interviewees. However, the model enables the researcher to analyse and evaluate a complex system of layered structure and agency cycles, which has the potential to give the researcher a more complete picture of the decision making process. The complexity of the model

corresponds to the complexity of the EU foreign policy, and in particular, the crisis management process. The complexity of the process and model and the difficulty of the task should not discourage the researcher from the drive to gain a better understanding and a clear picture of EU foreign policy. The researcher should not settle for simplistic answers and the focus of established paradigms and theoretical explanations, which only reveal a small piece of the puzzle. The changing nature of EU foreign policy requires changes in the analysis of EU foreign policy. This thesis embraces that change and proposes a model in accordance to the discursive and cognitive turn in EU studies, which is yet to establish itself in the mainstream of EU foreign policy analysis and the field of EU studies.

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
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# Annexes

## Annex 1 - Chart of EU missions to date



\* Note the EUMM in former Yugoslavia began in 1991 as EUCM W. Balkans and then transitioned to EUMM in 2003.

\* EUFOR Libya was not launched as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs did not allow it.

This chart is created by ISIS Europe [www.isis-europe.eu](http://www.isis-europe.eu)

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October 2014

**Annex 2 - List of interviews (names kept CONFIDENTIAL, for internal and external examiner only)**

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Position of interviewee</b>
1.	16.02.2012	PSC Ambassador
2.	23.02.2012	Advisor in politico-military affairs for a PSC Ambassador
3.	07.03.2012	Deputy Representative in PSC, Nicolaidis group
4.	08.03.2012	First Secretary, delegate to the Pol-Mil Group
5.	10.05.2012	CMPD, EEAS
6.	28.01.2013	Senior Military Advisor at CMPD, EEAS
7.	28.02.2013	Desk Officer, Integrated Strategic Planning Division, CMPD, EEAS
8.	29.04.2013	Senior Strategic Planner, Integrated Strategic Planning Division, CMPD, EEAS
9.	29.04.2013; 02.05.2013	Action officer, Regional Maritime Capacity Building, CMPD, EEAS
10.	02.06.2013	Head of Sector, Council General Secretariat
11.	05.06.2013	Counsellor, Pol-Mil Group Representative
12.	05.06.2013	Strategic Planner, Integrated Strategic Planning Unit, CMPD, EEAS
13.	06.06.2013	PSC Ambassador
14.	06.06.2013	Embassy Secretary (CIVCOM)
15.	06.06.2013	COAFR Delegate