

1 **Achieving sustainable sanitation chains through better informed and more systematic**  
2 **improvements: lessons from multi-city research in Sub-Saharan Africa**

3

4 **Authors:** L, S Medland, R,E Scott, A, P Cotton

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6

7 **Water Impact Statement**

8

9 The sanitation service chain is the predominant sanitation system in towns and cities of low and  
10 middle-income countries. A small proportion of human waste is safely treated or disposed of. The  
11 vast majority ends up in the surrounding environment, directly impacting on public health, especially  
12 for the urban poor, who are least able to bear the burden of poor services.

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
5  
6 **Abstract**

7  
8 This paper presents the synthesised findings of the SPLASH Urban Sanitation research programme  
9 through the framework of the sanitation service chain. Urban sanitation service chains are complex  
10 and fragmented, involving a multiplicity of service providers and typically resulting in unsustainable  
11 or inadequate services. The aggregate data set covers a wide range of research methods including;  
12 household surveys, a randomised control trial, a willingness to pay survey prototype testing of  
13 technologies, focus group discussions and deliberative forums. Through the research, it has been  
14 possible to identify situations where incremental improvements are being made with varying  
15 degrees of success. Most importantly, it has identified weaknesses to the sanitation service chains  
16 where progress is either slow or extremely limited. It is through these weaknesses that key  
17 questions affecting the long term sustainability of sanitation service chains need to be answered.

18  
19 **Introduction**

20  
21 **The Sanitation Service Chain**

22 Urban sanitation systems can be broadly categorized as either physically networked (such as  
23 conventional sewerage) or as sanitation service networks, where on-plot latrines, whilst not  
24 connected to a sewerage system, are the first component in a service chain. The service chain  
25 comprises: excreta capture and storage in a latrine pit or septic tank; emptying of the pit or tank;  
26 transport of the contents; sludge treatment (though not common); and end-use or final disposal.  
27 This chain of sanitation services is collectively known as Faecal Sludge Management (FSM). Some  
28 sewerage networks exist in Sub-Saharan Africa but they are rare and often in a poor state of repair  
29 and functionality. The service chain system is therefore the predominant sanitation system in the  
30 towns and cities of low and middle-income countries. This has led to profound problems in terms of  
31 how to collect and treat the faecal sludge from on-site facilities. The sanitation service chain was  
32 developed to conceptualise this ever growing problem and has become a widely used and  
33 recognised framework for understanding the effective management of faecal sludge, as depicted in  
34 Figure 1.



35  
36 **Figure 1: The Sanitation Service Chain (Water Engineering and Development Centre1)**

37 Urban sanitation service chains are complex and fragmented, involving a multiplicity of service  
38 providers and typically resulting in unsustainable or inadequate services. Many discrete sanitation  
39 interventions such as building latrines or introducing emptying services aim to improve a particular  
40 aspect of the urban sanitation chain. However, neither top-down sanitation master planning nor ad-

41 hoc project based action plans have yet been able to respond effectively to the challenges of urban  
42 sanitation.

43 The purpose of this paper is to present the synthesised findings of the SPLASH Urban Sanitation  
44 research programme through the framework of the sanitation service chain. **The paper identifies**  
45 **cross-cutting findings from the 5 individual research projects. These are presented both through the**  
46 **stages of the urban sanitation service chain and the overarching framework of the enabling**  
47 **environment.** The SPLASH programme was the first of its kind and mirrors the broader shift  
48 occurring in sanitation interventions, away from piecemeal approaches with limited consideration of  
49 the wider system within which they operate, towards a more systematic analysis of the whole  
50 sanitation service chain. Through this research, it has been possible to identify situations where  
51 incremental improvements are being made with varying degrees of success. Most importantly, it has  
52 identified weaknesses to the sanitation service chains where progress is either slow or extremely  
53 limited. It is through these weaknesses that key questions affecting the long term sustainability of  
54 sanitation service chains need to be answered.

55  
56 SPLASH was the name of the European Union Water Initiative's European Research Area Network  
57 (EUWI ERA-net), a consortium of 16 ministries, funding agencies, national research and technological  
58 development authorities from 11 European countries who came together to agree a research  
59 agenda and jointly fund research activities benefitting from a transnational approach. The  
60 programme was designed in accordance with good research management practice as developed  
61 within the Era-net, key features including: greater symmetry of research partnerships between  
62 Northern and Southern institutions to improve relevance, ownership and quality of research,  
63 mandating a minimum of 50 percent funding to be allocated to Southern partners; a requirement to  
64 incorporate capacity development for Southern researchers and institutions; consultative and  
65 participative programme design, and stakeholder engagement plans. The major objective of the  
66 SPLASH urban sanitation research programme (2010 to 2014) was to contribute to the  
67 understanding and implementation at scale of sustainable sanitation service chains in low-income  
68 urban areas in Sub-Saharan Africa by building on the local research partnerships of successful  
69 bidders. After a competitive bidding process, 5 international consortia received funding. The results  
70 presented here are a synthesis of the empirical outputs from the 5 consortia and draw on a  
71 combined 20 years' worth of research from 8 cities in 7 Sub-Saharan African countries.

- 72 • 3K-SAN - Kisumu (Kenya), Kigali (Rwanda), Kampala (Uganda)
- 73 • CLASS-A - Maputo (Mozambique)
- 74 • FaME - Dakar (Senegal), Kampala (Uganda), Accra (Ghana)
- 75 • MAFADY - Douala and Yaoundé (Cameroon)
- 76 • U-ACT - Kampala (Uganda)

77 The aggregate data set covers a wide range of both quantitative and qualitative research methods  
78 including; 6,692 household surveys across 3 cities (3K-SAN), a randomised control trial across 40  
79 slum areas (U-ACT), technical evaluations of 2,040 household latrines (U-ACT), a willingness to pay  
80 survey with 200 households (U-ACT), prototype testing of 3 new latrine designs (MAFADY),  
81 construction of faecal sludge drying beds and burning trials in pilot kilns (FaME), bacteriological and  
82 physiochemical analysis of water and faecal samples (MAFADY) and over 150 focus group  
83 discussions, deliberative forums, community workshops, stakeholder consultations and key  
84 informant interviews with stakeholders from all 8 cities. Working programmatically and in  
85 partnership ensured a far greater degree of participation and impact than could have been achieved  
86 by any single partner.

87

88 ***Why is achieving an urban sanitation service chain such a problem?***

89 The sanitation service chain aims to consider and address both health and environmental issues. The  
90 first stages of generation, capture and storage of excreta and or faecal sludge are primarily  
91 associated with improving household level health. In order to collect and remove the excreta or  
92 faecal sludge safely, latrines or toilets and septic tanks need to be improved through designs that  
93 effectively capture and store the faecal sludge until it can be safely emptied. Faecal sludge can only  
94 be treated if it has been collected in the first place. The middle and later stages of transportation,  
95 treatment and disposal or end-use have a wider environmental focus. A study on FSM by the Water  
96 and Sanitation Programme (WSP) in 12 cities in developing countries highlighted that on average,  
97 faecal waste from only 22% of households using on-site systems is safely managed. In some cases,  
98 whilst the excreta might be safely emptied it is then dumped illegally (WSP2). Any break in the  
99 service chain at any stage will cause the faecal sludge to be released untreated into the natural  
100 environment, endangering the public health of the city and surrounding areas. The apparent  
101 simplicity of the sanitation service chain depicted in Figure 1 hides the complexity of the enabling  
102 environment within which the activities in the chain occur.

103  
104 The most significant challenge in the delivery of urban services is the sheer scale of the problem.  
105 The concept of planning is especially difficult in contexts where documents such as city master plans  
106 risk soon becoming irrelevant in the face of rapid urban growth. The urban population in 2014 stood  
107 at 54% of the total global population, with urban populations expected to grow approximately 1.84%  
108 per year up to 2020. A majority of that growth will happen in middle and low-income countries  
109 (WHO3). By 2050, 66 % of the world's population is projected to be urban with Sub-Saharan Africa  
110 expected to reach 56% urbanisation by 2050. There are a growing number of 'megacities', urban  
111 agglomerations with populations over 10 million, but the majority of urban growth is actually in  
112 much smaller urban centres with populations up to 5 million. Only around 1 in 8 urban dwellers live  
113 in one of the 28 mega cities with close to half living in small settlements of less than 500,000 people  
114 (Global Health Observatoy4). Urbanisation in itself is not a negative concept. Neither are 'the urban  
115 poor' who as a collective have been shown to make a positive contribution to a city's informal  
116 economy (Perlman5). Poorer people in cities and towns however are often adversely affected by  
117 failures in infrastructure provision. They have less financial capacity to find safe alternative services  
118 and they are also less likely to be able to access services available due to high initial costs of  
119 connection (Estache6).

120  
121 Rapid urbanisation and the resulting challenges in sanitation service provision are not new. They  
122 have been tackled and overcome before. Nineteenth century Britain was characterised as a period of  
123 unprecedented and rapid population growth in the newly developing industrial towns.  
124 Accommodation built in response to this increased demand and the associated services of water and  
125 sanitation were extremely inadequate. Residents in the tenement slums of Victorian Britain faced  
126 many of the same challenges that are today present in the slums of Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty was  
127 rife, legislation was weak, public finances were limited, the private sector was ill-equipped to serve  
128 the urban poor, tenancies were insecure and householders often had to bear the costs of  
129 implementing improvements themselves. There are many echoes of the past in the current public  
130 health crisis of developing countries, with the same consequences resulting from inadequate  
131 hygiene, sanitation and water provision (Fisher7).

132  
133 Improvements in sanitation and water provision in Britain took almost 100 years, during which a  
134 complex mix of political reform, policy legislation, economic drivers of change and growing public  
135 demand for better services aligned (Fisher7). For most people, the idea of these types of changes  
136 taking more than 100 years is unthinkable. Comments like '*in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it shouldn't take so*  
137 *long*' resonate strongly, so we try to increase the speed at which changes take place.

138 This complex mix of political reform, legislation, demand and economic drivers is referred to as the  
139 enabling environment (Rosensweig8) which needs to be dynamic and responsive to each situation as

140 it changes. Without this flexibility, what once worked well can cease to act as an enabling factor and  
141 can instead become a constraint. This is especially true in the face of rapid urbanisation where  
142 demand for services continually increases, but the quality of access to services may decrease as  
143 resources are stretched further.

144 A number of frameworks to address strategic urban sanitation development already exist. The  
145 Strategic Sanitation Approach (SSA) (Wright9) advocates a demand based, incentive-driven approach  
146 to urban sanitation strategic planning. The overall aim of SSA is to achieve the sustainable expansion  
147 of sanitation coverage by addressing issues of operational efficiency. Similarly the IWAs Sanitation  
148 21 framework for planning urban sanitation systems highlights the importance of analysing the  
149 context within which future urban sanitation solutions will be developed (IWA10). The system  
150 addresses the interests of different stakeholders, external factors (e.g. security of tenure and  
151 economic priorities) and the capacities required to implement and manage systems.

152 More recent experience in mapping sanitation services in Indonesia gave greater emphasis to  
153 looking at the actual status of sanitation in the city, including non-technical information on the role  
154 of the private sector, financing and community demand. The 'map' provides the basis for identifying  
155 how to improve existing services rather than necessarily creating new ones (WSP11). Where existing  
156 sanitation strategic planning frameworks fall short is in taking adequate account of emerging lessons  
157 and implications of the many interventions that will have taken place both locally and in similar  
158 environments in Sub-Saharan Africa. This makes it difficult to identify how to improve existing  
159 services rather than necessarily creating new ones.

160 One of the greatest challenges facing urban sanitation professionals is a low evidence base from  
161 which to make decisions and drive change, especially when related to activities forming the enabling  
162 environment. Our efforts should be based on experience, rather than experiment. The traditional  
163 planning steps of 'where are we now?', 'where do we want to get to?' and 'how do we want to get  
164 there?' (Tayler12) should in the context of a dynamic urban environment be preceded by the  
165 question 'how have we got to where we are now and what lessons can we learn?'

166 The research conducted through the SPLASH urban sanitation research programme has used the  
167 sanitation service chain process as the primary means of analysing faecal sludge management  
168 services in low-income areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. The programme has collected additional data on  
169 and reinforced some of what we already know, but shows that the same problems and challenges  
170 are repeated in different cities, some of which are specific to low-income residents living in  
171 unplanned or informal areas and some of which impact on the city as a whole.

## 1 **Key challenges from Stage 1: Capture and storage**

2

3 Between 1990 and 2012, 1.2 billion people globally have gained access to improved sanitation in  
4 urban areas. However, the population of urban people without sanitation has actually increased  
5 from 215 million in 1990 to 756 million in 2012 because population growth has outstripped the  
6 number of people who gained access in real terms (WHO13). Whilst open defecation is still largely a  
7 rural phenomenon, it is widely practiced by the poorest people living in urban areas.

8

9 The first stage in the sanitation service chain is the capture and storage of excreta. If excreta is not  
10 captured at the point of defecation then it automatically goes untreated into the environment.  
11 For many years, subsidies were used to support the construction of household toilets and latrines  
12 through supply-led programmes. The use of subsidies fell out of favour and supply-led programmes  
13 were replaced with demand-led programmes relying on more active participation of the households  
14 to construct and use their own facilities. Demand led programmes work on the assumption that  
15 demand for better sanitation facilities can be created, through various methods, and supported  
16 through marketing campaigns. This approach has had some success in rural areas but the findings

17 from the SPLASH programme have shown that stimulating demand creation in the urban context is  
18 more nuanced and challenging than that of rural settings. Jenkins and Scott (Jenkins14) identified a  
19 three-stage household decision process applicable to rural and peri-urban areas: preference,  
20 intention and choice. This process has been expanded by the work of the 3K-SAN in Kampala,  
21 Kisumu and Kigali into a five stage process: No preference, Preference, Intent, Choice and Installed  
22 (Okurut15). Barriers to the success of a demand led approach have received significant attention  
23 over recent years and can be broadly categorised into; physical, knowledge, financial, and legal or  
24 regulatory constraints.

25

26 The physical **availability of space** to construct a latrine on urban plots is usually very limited or non-  
27 existent, because the house generally occupies all of the available space. There are also  
28 topographical constraints in some cities where water tables are very high, the ground is difficult to  
29 excavate or plots are located on steep hillsides, such as identified in parts of Kampala, Uganda,  
30 Douala, Cameroon and Kigali, Rwanda. Little can be done to extend the physical size of plots but  
31 toilet designs that can be used **within** the household without being connected to mains water or  
32 sewerage networks do already exist and are becoming more widely known and adapted to specific  
33 local contexts. In some areas where space is still a significant constraint, shared latrines are an  
34 option, although typically disregarded because of the challenges surrounding cleanliness and long-  
35 term maintenance. The research in Kampala under the UACT consortium has shown that shared  
36 latrines, which are commonly found to be in poor states of cleanliness compared to those that are  
37 privately owned can be well maintained if shared by no more than four families (U-ACT16). Although  
38 100 percent access to private latrines may be the ultimate goal, shared latrines in the context of  
39 Kampala, present an example of a short term trade-off between having private access or no access.

40

41 In cases where there are no physical constraints on building a latrine, the reluctance to build can  
42 extend from a lack of **knowledge** on the types of latrine available or the perception that materials  
43 are difficult to obtain from local markets (Godfrey17). The construction of household latrines is more  
44 often than not supposed to be supported by the use of technical guidelines that provide information  
45 on how latrines can be built, but the willingness and ability to enforce the use of specific designs is  
46 severely limited. Findings from 3K-SAN showed a strong relationship between demand for sanitation  
47 and knowledge about the costs and availability of services and markets. However, awareness of the  
48 need for a sanitation facility does not necessarily translate into an installed facility; but higher levels  
49 of awareness lead to more concerns about the adequacy of sanitation facilities in terms of quality,  
50 accessibility, availability, affordability and acceptability. In Kigali, demand for sanitation as expressed  
51 through the stages of preference intent and choice is high, while reaching the stage of installation is  
52 constrained by people's access to finance, affordability of available options and levels of tenancy  
53 (Okurut15)

54

55 Identifying indigenous knowledge as part of the assessment and decision-making process when  
56 planning to improve sanitation facilities and services can support, or indeed contradict, previously  
57 held pre-conceptions and assumptions. A risk assessment tool developed through the research in  
58 Mozambique by the CLASS-A consortium has sought to address **knowledge vulnerability** by  
59 identifying and making use of indigenous knowledge, through community workshops. These  
60 facilitated workshops provide a means for indigenous knowledge about practices and risks held by  
61 households and communities to be reported to those working at the municipality and local  
62 government level (IWA18). This consultation stage helps to identify the knowledge people already  
63 have about their sanitation systems, as the basis for designing and implementing educational or  
64 awareness raising programmes, or indeed technical improvements.

65

66 **The affordability** of latrines and toilets is often cited as the most significant barrier to construction.  
67 Households in urban areas can be more dependent on cash income than those in rural areas where

68 there can be other options for paying for goods and services (Wratten19). For households where the  
69 primary earners work informally or in very low-paid unsecure jobs, cash income will not necessarily  
70 be available when it is needed; especially for high cost items that are several times their monthly  
71 household income. The International Finance Corporation reports that less than 25% of adults in  
72 Sub-Saharan Africa have access to formal financial services which makes it difficult to make  
73 productive investments in a business, their family or dwelling (IFC20). The research from Cameroon  
74 showed that even for a very basic latrine that does nothing to protect groundwater resources, the  
75 poorest households would have to spend a minimum of 70% of their average monthly family income  
76 on construction (MAFADY21).

77  
78 In terms of increasing the affordability, there are two key approaches; modifying the technology to  
79 make it more affordable or increasing access to money which allows people to make a relatively  
80 large one-off purchase. Making the latrine more affordable can be done by using fewer or cheaper  
81 materials, making the materials cheaper to purchase, using a staged payment modality or a  
82 combination of several approaches. Many countries have considered how to make latrines more  
83 affordable but in some cases it requires more than a change in materials, it requires much more  
84 significant trade-offs between achieving the ideal standards and responding to the local realities.

85 The research by 3K-SAN has shown that the availability of finance, be it formal, semi-formal or  
86 informal, is one of the key drivers in supporting demand creation for latrine ownership or use at the  
87 household level. The research has shown that in Kigali where there is a nationally driven programme  
88 to support the use of bank accounts by the poorest people, there are lower levels of household  
89 deprivation compared to Kampala and Kisumu, despite very low incomes (Okurut15). The research  
90 by U-ACT in Kampala found that offering households micro credit for 18 months at 20% interest had  
91 the same effect as reducing the investment required to build a latrine by 25% (Günther22). **A local  
92 outcome of this aspect of the research was the construction of 150 additional ventilated improved  
93 pit (VIP) latrines serving 1,500 people (ibid).** Increasing the availability of consumer finance is one of  
94 the recommendations for developing an enabling environment in which private sector service  
95 operators can be successful (IFC23).

96 By gaining access to finance, households can become active consumers and whilst there may be  
97 many alternative services to spend their money on, each household can determine their own  
98 spending priorities. Demand creation and behaviour change programmes can work on influencing  
99 those priorities, although that in itself is a particularly daunting task. **In the research from Kigali,  
100 Kampala and Kisumu by 3K-SAN it is interesting to note that levels of willingness to invest in a latrine  
101 are generally low, even amongst owner occupiers and resident landlords, who should in theory have  
102 greater motivation for making the investment because they would be directly improving their own  
103 situations and living conditions. The main constraint to the willingness to invest was identified as  
104 affordability, together with the topography and lack of available space to construct a facility  
105 (Okurut15).**

106 The research by 3K-SAN has shown that focusing on just one element of demand creation is likely to  
107 undermine the sustainability of sanitation services (Tsinda24). Together with research by U-ACT in  
108 Kampala, the programme identified variations in the extent of demand and its realization between  
109 sections of society. For example, vulnerable households reported higher levels of demand  
110 (particularly those with females aged 6-17 and households without parents), as did owners of  
111 property compared to tenants. Male heads of households were found to be more likely to initially  
112 express a serious interest in purchasing a latrine but not completing the process, whereas female  
113 headed households were more consistent in their intention to purchase and actual purchase  
114 behaviour (i.e. moving from the intent state to the installed stage).

115

116 Research on the different elements needed to support demand creation is ongoing and over time, it  
117 becomes possible to build up a more complete picture of the different nuances that influence  
118 demand creation in a given context. However, a balance needs to be struck between adopting highly  
119 specific but piecemeal approaches in each settlement and adopting broader city wide approaches to  
120 stimulate demand for improved sanitation and ensure capacity to respond to the resulting service  
121 requirements.

122

## 1 **Key challenges from Stage 2: Emptying, transport and transfer**

2

3 The emptying and transportation aspects of the sanitation service chain are dominated almost  
4 entirely by private sector operators and as such receive very little attention by many city authorities.  
5 The exception being when operational licences or permits are supposed to be obtained, dumping or  
6 tipping fees need to be paid. There is relatively little known about tanker operators and how they  
7 work, which highlights a stark gap in understanding within the sector as a whole. Empirical data  
8 available to estimate faecal sludge accumulation rates is currently missing and with it, an  
9 understanding of the potential for faecal sludge management services (WSP2).

10

11 In many cities, manual emptying of latrines or septic tanks is illegal, but there is limited availability of  
12 mechanical tankers to provide pit and septic tank emptying services. General reasons for this  
13 mismatch in demand and supply pertain to the availability of equipment in Sub-Saharan Africa, the  
14 extent of a secure customer base, financial, legal or regulatory barriers to starting up a small-scale  
15 business. During a survey of 30 cities (Chowdhry25) found that the cost and sourcing of trucks was  
16 the single biggest challenge for tanker entrepreneurs, with some of those in African cities costing an  
17 average of 34,000USD. Where the use of manual emptying is illegal and the availability of tanker  
18 operators is limited, there is a huge gap between the ideal service delivery and the real practicalities  
19 of ground-level service delivery, as is the case in Kigali, Rwanda.

20

21 The MAFADY project, Cameroon, considered the current demand for pit emptying services in Douala  
22 and Yaoundé and provided some interesting insights into the operations of small-scale, private  
23 sector operators about whom there is still relatively little known compared to other stakeholders in  
24 the sanitation service chain. In Yaoundé and Douala, many emptiers are unregistered as the  
25 mechanism to issue permits for registered operations is not effectively implemented. There is little  
26 incentive to formalise their informal operations, which has serious repercussions for employees who  
27 work without contracts, regular salaries, training, health insurance or the necessary personal  
28 protective equipment. Co-operative organisations of emptiers in Cameroon have never been  
29 sustainable, so they are not represented at the administrative level of the cities and cannot actively  
30 participate in decision making processes affecting their businesses (MAFADY21).

31

32 The extent of household demand for emptying services has been found to be strongly affected by  
33 the availability and cost of service operators. In Douala, Yaoundé and Kigali, this has been found to  
34 result in emptying delayed to the point where latrines and septic tanks are overflowing (in  
35 Cameroon, only 14% of service customers planned the emptying operation), leading to significant  
36 public health risks. In Cameroon, prices for emptying services are set according to the volume of the  
37 tanker, the distance between the household and the dumpsite and ease of accessibility to the latrine  
38 or septic tank. The prices for emptying are lower in Douala than in Yaoundé because there are more  
39 operators available and greater competition between them. A majority of customers expressed  
40 satisfaction in the prices charged by the tanker operators; however, most of the customers have  
41 septic tanks rather than pit latrines so represent households in the higher income districts of both  
42 cities. Due to the higher costs of mechanical emptying, manual emptying is generally preferred by  
43 householders both in informal settlements and higher income areas in Douala and Yaoundé because  
44 it can remove more of the waste material for a lower cost (MAFADY21).



### 1 **Key challenges from Stage 3: Treatment for end-use or disposal**

2  
3 The technologies required to make the service chain function are for the most part known, especially  
4 at the beginning of the chain where the challenge is more about encouraging households to build  
5 systems that can be emptied easily, than in developing new alternatives. The key technological  
6 challenge remaining is cost-effective, space efficient treatment processes that make the sludge safe  
7 for disposal or further use. The treatment process is complicated by the additional waste found in  
8 sludge removed from latrines. The research conducted in Douala and Yaoundé found that it  
9 contained amongst other things; sand, clothes, broken bottles, batteries, plastic sachets, plastic  
10 bottles, metal, syringes, pharmaceutical products, chemical and industrial pollutants, art materials,  
11 oils and detergents (Mougoué26). When formal solid waste disposal options are not available,  
12 disposal of the waste into a latrine may seem like a logical option for households although it  
13 transfers the problem of waste management away from the household, onto the emptier and  
14 potentially to treatment plant operators.

15  
16 There is a significant difference between disposal through dumping and actual treatment of the  
17 faecal sludge. The research by FaME in Kampala, Accra and Dakar and 3K-SAN in Kampala, Kisumu  
18 and Kigali showed that existing faecal sludge treatment facilities in these cities provide way below  
19 the required treatment capacity to meet current or future needs. Where the private sector has  
20 stepped in to provide services, the council authorities have often stepped back and not upheld their  
21 responsibilities in terms of city infrastructure needs. Due to this lack of treatment facilities being  
22 available, the most active stage of the service chain following the collection of faecal sludge from  
23 latrines and septic tanks is likely to be transportation to a dumpsite. Official dumpsites are  
24 themselves quite rare and suffer from chronic mismanagement. In Douala, the faecal sludge  
25 dumpsite has been in use since 2005, but in 2009 people started moving into the area and building  
26 homes. As a mangrove swamp, it is designated as a “green zone” and therefore illegal to build on,  
27 but over 900 families now live within 300m of the site and household encroachment continues. The  
28 dumpsite and its supporting infrastructure are poorly managed and not maintained so when the  
29 road to the dumpsite becomes impassable, especially in the rainy season, the tankers discharge the  
30 faecal sludge directly into the river at the entrance to the site or even along the road itself  
31 (MAFADY21). This kind of dumping is, unfortunately, not uncommon, with significant implications  
32 for public health.

33  
34 One of the main challenges facing the operators of dumpsites is the cost. The majority of costs for  
35 sanitation services are currently borne by service users (e.g. households or institutions such as  
36 schools) when they pay to construct, maintain and empty their latrine or septic tank. The service  
37 users cannot be expected to finance the entire service chain, consequently, the possibility of  
38 generating revenue elsewhere within the chain is gaining prominence. The research conducted by  
39 FaME in Kampala, Accra and Dakar has considered how faecal sludge can be used once it has been  
40 properly treated and the market potential for new uses of faecal sludge were identified in each city.

41  
42 Through field trials of treatment options, predominately drying beds, the research by FaME has  
43 demonstrated that there is potential for the use of treated faecal sludge as a solid fuel. However,  
44 market demand and hence market value for dried faecal sludge varies greatly between cities. The  
45 local market potential for dried faecal sludge as a fuel depends on: faecal sludge characteristics; user  
46 perceptions; existing fuels available; local industry requirements; legal arrangements and regulatory  
47 restrictions; the use of subsidies; and the local supply of sludge (Diener27). An example of the  
48 importance of local market conditions was found in Kampala where there is an established brick  
49 production industry. Wastewater sludge can already be used as a raw material in brick production  
50 but in Kampala, the raw materials for bricks are readily available in the locality and as such there was  
51 limited interest in the potential for the use of faecal sludge in brick production (Diener27). There was

52 much more interest in the potential to use dried faecal sludge as fuel for the brick kilns themselves.  
53 In order to achieve this, there needs to be new technologies developed to bring successful burning  
54 trials to full scale testing. This reinforces the knowledge that system innovations cannot be achieved  
55 through technological innovations alone, institutional and socio-cultural changes are needed as well  
56 (Lopes28).

57  
58 By starting to understand the complexities of specific market demands for treated faecal sludge, the  
59 intention is that financial incentives can be generated throughout the sanitation service chain that  
60 promote more efficiencies from capture through transport to treatment. However, it is not  
61 recommended to predicate the long term functioning of the sanitation service chain on potential  
62 financial flows. They are better treated as unpredictable financial inputs to urban sanitation  
63 management given the potentially unstable and fluid nature of markets for treated faecal sludge and  
64 financial models developed on that basis.

1

## 2 **Key challenges from the enabling environment: cross-cutting issues**

3 The term ‘enabling environment’ is used here to refer to the wider city wide system in which the  
4 sanitation service chain operates and describes the inter-relationships between technical and non-  
5 technical elements identified as essential to support sanitation service delivery. They represent the  
6 ‘big challenges’ faced when trying to deliver services in difficult circumstances and will not be solved  
7 easily or for individual services (sanitation, water, education, health etc.). In the SPLASH urban  
8 sanitation research programme, policy, strategy and direction, laws and regulations, the availability  
9 of financing and human capacity were considered in addition to the technologies available. A wide  
10 range of stakeholders have key roles in urban sanitation including local and central government,  
11 water utilities, private developers, informal private sector, civil society and individual households. All  
12 of these stakeholders and the activities they try to achieve are heavily influenced by the enabling  
13 environment they live and work in.

14

15 Policies and strategies play a part in setting the ‘rules of the game’ for activities carried out in a  
16 specific sector. They are closely linked to financial planning and budgets, with the argument being  
17 that if an activity does not contribute towards a policy objective and has not been outlined as an  
18 action in a strategy then it is not important enough to warrant the allocation of resources. In many  
19 cases, clearly defined policies or strategies that focus on sanitation or FSM services are not available  
20 (Scott 29). Poorly defined organisational roles and responsibilities continue to be a central problem  
21 to effective programme implementation, leads to an overlapping of operational mandates and a  
22 duplication of activities. It also leaves gaps in responsibilities which further increases confusion  
23 around service provision. The most striking example of this poor definition of roles and  
24 responsibilities and on the ground implementation of activities was highlighted in Cameroon,  
25 through the MAFADY project, although the same problem was also found in all of the project  
26 countries. In Cameroon there are seven different departments at the national level with a  
27 responsibility for the management and remediation of wastewater and excreta, with a further three  
28 departments at the district level. The institutional assessment conducted found that there is little co-  
29 ordination between them and several areas of overlap (MAFADY21). In Maputo (CLASS-A) it was  
30 found that there were very limited levels of institutional responsibility for downstream impacts of  
31 urban pollution (from poor sanitation) and none at all for the environmental health impacts  
32 (Parkinson30). Despite knowing that the problem exists, detailed institutional assessments are rarely  
33 carried out. The lack of clarification and overlapping of responsibilities has disappointingly, almost  
34 become an accepted part of the urban services planning debate that is regarded as being too  
35 difficult to change.

36

37 All projects under the SPLASH programme found the implementation of laws and regulations  
38 affecting building standards, regulations and land ownership to be largely ineffective, exacerbated in

39 part by the poor definitions of roles and responsibilities at national government level. Construction  
40 of household latrines falls into a grey area, which is complicated further for residents in informal  
41 settlements. The research from Cameroon draws attention to the fact that 80% of the city of Douala  
42 is unplanned and less than 20% of landlords own their land titles (MAFADY21). Building regulations  
43 exist in some of the countries studied. The Rwanda Building Regulations state that building owners  
44 (including households) must convert to a waterborne system of excreta disposal when it becomes  
45 possible to connect with a water supply providing a minimum of 75 litres per person per day  
46 (Rwanda Housing Authority<sup>31</sup>) but flush toilets are used by less than 10% of households in Kigali City  
47 with VIP or simple pit latrines remaining the dominant choice (Rwanda Environment Management  
48 Authority<sup>32</sup>). Under the same building regulations, all rural [peri-urban] residents of Kigali City are  
49 required to have 'at least' a VIP latrine. The regulations clearly state that it is an offence to build a  
50 latrine which does not comply with the regulations and that a VIP can be forcefully closed or  
51 emptied if it becomes a nuisance or hazard but the extent to which this actually happens is not  
52 known. In Kisumu, Kenya, despite the presence of building regulations, a majority of septic tanks are  
53 built without reference to engineering specifications or inspection by the city council. The findings  
54 from Kisumu showed that existing laws are not responsive enough to changes in new technologies  
55 with laws not updated to allow for the construction of composting, non-water based systems  
56 despite the fact that composting latrines have been successfully piloted in other areas of Kenya  
57 (Adogo<sup>33</sup>). In Kampala, authorities do not approve or regulate sanitation facilities in illegal  
58 settlements because they are viewed as temporary, waiting for eviction or demolition (Adogo<sup>33</sup>).  
59 The underlying problem is a lack of institutional capacity to enforce regulations and building  
60 standards and when there is little or no enforcement capacity they can only ever be partially  
61 effective. Whilst the use and enforcement of construction and building standards may be unpopular  
62 in some cases, having appropriate latrine, toilet and septic tank constructions at the beginning of the  
63 chain facilities the operation of the rest of it.

64

65 The issue of tenure status is gaining greater influence in the debates around access to services.  
66 There exists a whole spectrum of tenure types across cities and the tenure conditions required as a  
67 precondition for household expenditure on sanitation are not straightforward to define (Scott<sup>34</sup>).  
68 Under the Human Right to Sanitation, those whose rights have been denied would have recourse to  
69 action through judicial, administrative or other appropriate channels. Unfortunately, in many cases,  
70 where tenants are occupying land illegally or do not hold formalised tenancy agreements they are  
71 considered to be outside normal jurisdiction and can have no recourse to action (Adogo<sup>33</sup>). These  
72 challenges extend beyond the provision of sanitation services and can only be changed by the  
73 highest levels of government which makes it unlikely that sanitation alone will be the driving factor  
74 for such changes.

75

76 In this context of poorly defined roles and responsibilities, a lack of staff capacity across the  
77 fragmented institutional landscape and more particularly in the units within government at national  
78 and decentralised levels that should be responsible for preventative healthcare and service  
79 management also plays a critical role in the success of joined-up, systematic service delivery. As is  
80 the case in many sectors, professional capacities of staff are low, which has a significant impact on  
81 the ability of those staff to drive implementation on the ground. In Cameroon it was found that staff  
82 tasked with the operation and maintenance of treatment facilities receive little or no training on the  
83 management of these facilities which results in them being abandoned long before their designed  
84 lifespan has ended (Mougoué<sup>26</sup>). At the city level in Douala and Yaoundé, staff shortages mean that  
85 hygiene education and promotion activities are limited to periods of crisis rather than being an  
86 ongoing activity (MAFADY21).

87

88 The UN Water -Global Annual Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-water (GLAAS) report of 2014  
89 identified that only 40% of countries surveyed were able to absorb (that is, to utilise) more than 75%

90 of the external aid for urban sanitation (WHO35) so there is finance available, but insufficient  
91 capacity to capitalise on the availability of global funding is a generic problem facing the sector. For  
92 example, the GLAAS report highlights that actual budget disbursement for water supply and  
93 sanitation frequently fall short of the planned expenditure due, for example, to a lack of efficient  
94 financial management processes or limited capacity of public and private sector implementation. In  
95 2012/13, Uganda reported a release of 60% of the actual budget funds. Further details of the  
96 underlying issues are fully explained in the GLAAS report (Ibid).

97 Inadequate or poorly organised funding arrangements are an ongoing problem in the sanitation  
98 sector but co-ordinating budgets across multiple institutions or departments can be particularly  
99 challenging. The research in Mozambique found that the lack of adequate budgets for the full range  
100 of sanitation activities leads to the selective prioritisation of investments at the city level  
101 (Parkinson30) which do not necessarily contribute to a successfully functioning system as a whole  
102 and a piecemeal approach continues to dominate current sanitation related activities. This was  
103 highlighted by the research from CLASS-A in Maputo which found that technical and implementation  
104 based recommendations related to broader, city wide sanitation planning including solid waste and  
105 storm water management were changed into more nebulous policy recommendations for a future  
106 point in time because the budget available was insufficient to tackle everything at once. Whilst this  
107 has been previously identified in relation to city-wide planning (Tayler36) it is otherwise rarely  
108 recognised as a constraining factor to service provision which has to be addressed.

109  
110 The research in Kampala, Accra and Dakar conducted by the FaME consortium highlighted that the  
111 sanitation service chain breaks down due to both a lack of public or private investment and because  
112 where financing is or should be available, it is not allocated to the appropriate service actors and  
113 operators (public, private or community based) to make sure that the system remains functional  
114 (Gold37). This was supported by the findings from Cameroon which demonstrated that although the  
115 potential to levy a sanitation tax exists in legislation; it has not been implemented and consequently  
116 cannot be used to finance activities within the sanitation service chain as expected when it was  
117 introduced (Mougoué26). Despite intensive efforts under the SPLASH programme, it proved very  
118 difficult to collect reliable financial flow data along the service chain. Consequently, it remains  
119 unclear how and where available finance is best allocated to ensure that the overall system is  
120 functional.

121

122

### **Conclusions on the synthesis of the SPLASH research projects**

123 Urban sanitation service chains are complex and fragmented, involve many different service  
124 providers and a range of central and local government departments. We conclude the following  
125 points from our cross-cutting synthesis of the individual projects.

- 126 • It is important that we have a full understanding of how individual interventions by such  
127 stakeholders affect local sanitation service chains.
- 128 • The broad planning questions of 'how have we got to where we are now and what lessons can  
129 we learn?' are not currently considered within the sanitation service chain framework, which  
130 focuses more on the 'where are we now and where do we want to get to' aspects of planning.
- 131 • Given that the sanitation service chain has to operate within the wider city planning context,  
132 understanding how a city has reached its status quo is critical to developing the sanitation  
133 service chain framework.

134 The research conducted as part of the SPLASH urban sanitation research programme has primarily  
135 continued to focus on the existing processes in place. However, some aspects of the research have  
136 started to delve deeper into the questions of 'how have we got to where we are now' including; the

137 full institutional assessment in Kigali, Kampala and Kisumu (3K-SAN), Douala and Yaoundé (MAFADY)  
138 to understand roles and responsibilities more clearly, the analysis of the legal frameworks and  
139 regulation affecting sanitation services, and the paucity of access to financial services, especially for  
140 the urban poor (3K-SAN), the rapid risk assessment tool developed in Mozambique, and starting to  
141 analyse local market conditions for treated faecal sludge end-use by FAME in Dakar and Kampala.  
142 With this type of evidence becoming available it becomes possible to develop more flexible and  
143 responsive sanitation interventions that take into account a dynamic, longer term view and user  
144 perceptions which can discuss short term trade-offs in the context of mid to longer term gains. We  
145 may have to accept that improvements are not going to happen systematically but instead,  
146 understand how it is possible to continue with smaller, more specific interventions that take account  
147 of the city-wide context in such a way as to maintain the ultimate goals of public health and  
148 environmental protection. Ongoing research is being funded by the World Bank and the Bill and  
149 Melinda Gates Foundation, aimed at identifying city-wide faecal waste flows and the service delivery  
150 context within which sanitation service improvements can be addressed in systematic and  
151 achievable stages.  
152

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158 research outputs and a set of 4 briefing notes covering the programme are also available at  
159 <http://splash-era.net/outputs.php>.

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