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<CT>Genealogy

<Contributors>*Philippe Bonditti, Andrew Neal, Sven Opitz, Chris Zebrowski*

<A>Introduction

In this chapter we discuss the value of genealogy as a critical method to study security. A genealogical method would treat security not simply as an object of research, but as something embedded in historical struggles over truth, knowledge, authority, expertise and power. This is more complicated than it seems. The aim is to avoid assuming that we know what security is. This is especially important today. We are witnessing the proliferation of knowledges, practices and technologies that are somehow associated with security but that also destabilize the analytical categories through which we had come to make sense of 'security', such as the internal and the external, war and peace, the national and the international, law enforcement and the military.

One of the most important lessons from Foucault's genealogical work is the fallacy that supposedly knowledgeable subjects (in this case, us) exist fully formed prior to encountering their object of analysis (in this case security), which they then reflect upon rationally. A genealogical approach would consider how the discourse of security (as a knowledge, discipline, practice) operates as a historical formation, constituting both its subjects (its analysts) and object (security 'itself'). We can demonstrate this genealogical observation fairly easily by pointing out that security

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analysts are largely shaped and thus constituted by their adherence to disciplinary knowledges and assumptions, and by their claim to know what security is. In other words, the study of security always risks naturalizing security as an object of study and naturalizing the expert subjects who claim such knowledge (see also Chapter 6 in this volume).

A genealogical method would be more sceptical about its claim to know security, and would be reflexive towards the constitutive effects of security as a discourse. For this purpose, it is important to note that the concept of discourse is not reducible to language or linguistic entities such as signs or signifiers (Foucault 1972: 27, 100-109). It also comprises material practices, technological objects and bodily procedures. Central to a genealogical analysis of security is an engagement with the multiple knowledges and practices that have come to be associated with 'security' and the mechanisms of subjectivation and objectivation that constitute knowledgeable subjects and knowable objects in relation to security. This collection of things, we suggest, is best understood not through the unitary term 'security', but rather as a radically heterogeneous assemblage known as a *dispositif* in Foucauldian parlance [Foucault, 1980: s194].

In this chapter, we discuss what it means to adopt a genealogical method for studying 'security' and aspects of it. Conceptually, we distinguish genealogy from 'mere history' and elaborate it in relation to concepts such as archaeology, *dispositif*, and problematization. In addition, we discuss what it means to use these traditional Foucauldian notions in a digital age: how does genealogical work change when the principles of archival organization seem to be shifting radically? We relate our

methodological intervention to existing works in security studies, which we critique from a genealogical perspective. We begin with a discussion of the discipline of international relations (IR) for two reasons: first, because security studies has a constitutive heritage in IR; and second, because of the powerful insights of earlier genealogical critiques of IR itself. In the boxes that complement the argument in the running text, we illustrate our methodological claims through reflections on our separate research on the police practice of 'kettling'.

<A>Genealogy and international relations

Within the discipline of international relations (IR), genealogies were first deployed to contest the universal presumptions of the epistemic realism that dominated international relations theories (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989, Ashley and Walker 1990, Der Derian 1995). Genealogies drew attention to the historical practices through which the state, sovereignty and 'the international' were constituted (Bartelson 1995), including diplomacy (Der Derian 1987, Constantinou 1996), foreign policy (Campbell 1998) and security (Der Derian 1993, Dillon 1996). Elsewhere in the social sciences, scholars produced genealogies of liberalism (Latham 1997, Dean 1991, Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996), freedom (Rose 1999) and communication (Mattelart 1996). While Foucault was the biggest influence on this research, productive uses of Nietzsche (Bartelson 1995, Elbe 2001, 2002) and Deleuze (Molloy 2006) suggest that more varied approaches may yet be articulated.

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This literature formed part of the 'critical turn' in IR and opened up the study of international relations to new ways of working and thinking. Partly, this entailed a genealogy of the discipline itself (Ashley 1987, Walker 1993). The literature did not simply ask how IR was created historically (accounts of which already existed). Rather, it questioned how IR was a product of its time and how theories of IR and their assumptions were *expressions* of a particular historically situated spatial and political imaginary, and not simply 'explanations' of world politics (Walker 1993). In genealogical terms, the critical turn posited the historical contingency of IR itself. Some traditional accounts of IR had been deliberately ahistorical, such as neorealism, but from a genealogical perspective these still had a history and were not 'timeless'. Other accounts, such as that of the English School, offered a version of IR's historical development, but from a genealogical perspective these were a parochial reflection of their authors' contingent historical position. For example, Hedley Bull thought that the evolution of the historical origins of the European state system should be the starting point for the study of international relations, neglecting the role of colonialism in the expansion of global European dominance (Keene 2002). Similarly, liberal forms of IR relied on uncritical and often unacknowledged progressive philosophies of history, which the genealogical perspective put back in their historical place. In short, genealogical approaches to IR questioned the timelessness of ahistorical accounts and the contingent parochialism of historical accounts.

IR had always claimed privileged knowledge of *security,* being primarily *state security.* However, IR came with a lot of baggage. Critical IR scholars drew on French theorists (Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Virilio and so on) to re-read IR's founding texts in political theory (e.g., Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant) in

order to critique its basis of knowledge (epistemology) and its units and structures of analysis (ontology) (Ashley 1995, Connolly 1988, Walker 1993). They argued against the possibility of axiological neutrality, and for interpretivism and reflexivity. They stressed the role of ideas, language, discourses and technology in international politics. Urging epistemological and ontological pluralism, they favoured multiplicity, difference and heterogeneity over unity, identity and homogeneity. This marked a rupture with behaviourism, rational choice/game theory and quantitative methods. To achieve this, critical IR scholars imported intellectual resources from elsewhere, such as poststructuralist philosophy, but also feminism (Shepherd 2008) and postcolonial studies (Anghie 2007, Hobson 2004, Jabri 2012). Feminist scholars pointed out gendered configurations of the political and onto-epistemological assumptions of IR, (Enloe 1990, Sylvester 1994, Tickner 1988). Postcolonial scholars challenged unitary western accounts of the international order (Chatterjee, Bhabha, Doty). In so doing, they have been a rich source of counter-narratives in and against IR. All this was a way of demonstrating the contingent and contested nature of IR.

These critical interventions opened a disciplinary space for a new generation of scholars. They did not close down IR, rather through their genealogical critique they opened it up for more diverse forms of theoretical and empirical scholarship that were not bound by the strictures of orthodoxy. If any one thing unites the work that has followed the critical turn, it is a reflexive scepticism towards the disciplinary effects of IR itself. However, being itself historically contingent, the critical turn responded to the disciplinary problems of its time, and downplayed questions of method. Now that there is an established space for critical research, issues of method have become more pressing because critical security scholars are increasingly conducting empirical

work rather than purely theoretical critique. To understand how research in IR could proceed from a genealogical critique of IR we need to revisit genealogy, its meaning, its literature, and its implications. Once we have done this, we can consider what genealogy means for the contemporary study of security.

Revisiting genealogy

Genealogy vs. (mere) history

An important starting point for genealogy is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who criticized modern historical methodology in his *Untimely Meditations* (Nietzsche 1997). In the essay 'The Uses and Abuses of History', Nietzsche diagnosed a 'historical malady' afflicting late-nineteenth century Europe. He attributed this malady to the efforts of modern history to model itself on science (Nietzsche 1997: 77). By adopting scientific values such as neutrality and indifference, modern history had become obsessed with establishing objective representations of past events and epochs. This required the historian to evaluate history from a vantage point somehow outside time. Objectivity, Nietzsche argued, presented an impossible 'ideal' that only served to hide the prejudices and presumptions of the historian. Claims to neutrality only served to naturalize the values and presumptions of the present, stifling the potential for criticism, creativity and change.

Nietzsche's critique is rooted in the temporal character of human beings. History is not simply something 'passed'. It is entangled with contemporary forms of life insofar as memory informs decisions in the present. History serves life. While history was

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important, a preoccupation that documented history for its own sake was not simply a bizarre prioritization, but a development that stifled innovation and depleted the vitality of life and culture in the present. An 'excessive concern' with the past was eroding the capacity of individuals and nations to live life creatively in the present. Nietzsche fashioned genealogy as the antidote to this European historical malady. Genealogy asserted that 'history must itself resolve the problem of history, knowledge must turn its sting against itself' (Nietzsche 1997: 102-3). Genealogy turns to history not to construct representations, but to disrupt and undermine them. The temporal orientation of genealogy is thus described by Nietzsche as *untimely*: 'acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come' (Nietzsche 1997: 60).

Genealogy first appears in Nietzsche's *The Genealogy of Morals* (Nietzsche). This sought to make evident the social and historical conditions that gave rise to the modern system of Western morality. Moral values are neither timeless nor universal. Rather, they have a history: they have *evolved* through time. As such, moral values cannot be located in some transcendent realm. They are produced through social interactions over time. More specifically, morals are forged through the unfolding of historical contests that play out within contexts defined by particular distributions of power. Of course, this conclusion was far from a simple statement of fact. If moral values evolved over time, then they were capable of transformation in the future. At this point, the critical impact of the genealogical enterprise comes to light: its purpose is to undermine naturalized assumptions, reveal the contingent power relations behind them, and thus make new forms of freedom, change and creativity possible. In Nietzsche, genealogy acts as the blunt instrument through which conditions are

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fostered for the cultivation of 'higher values' and new forms of life (i.e., the 'Übermensch' or 'overman').

Morals are as historically contingent as any species of plant or animal.[1] 'Contingent' here does not mean random. Species are contingent because there is no inherent meaning guiding their evolution. Instead, their development is dependent upon contests and struggles marked by differential power relations between those who are more or less 'fit'. In the same way, neither humans nor their morals represent a prescribed outcome of the 'progress' of history. For the genealogist, history is not marked by the march of reason. This makes a radical break with forms of 'historicist' philosophy that tie together the unfolding of history and the unfolding of thought. Following Paul Veyne, we might think of history like the movements of a kaleidoscope (Veyne 1997: 167). Instead of linear progress or transcendental laws, the 'motor' of history is rooted in immanent forms of struggle, power and adaptation that result in contingent developments. Like Nietzsche, Foucault rejected the humanism central to most forms of western reason: 'What is that fear which makes you seek beyond all boundaries, ruptures, shifts and divisions, the great historico-transcendental destiny of the Occident?' (Foucault 1972: 209)

In dismissing the existence of laws governing the march of history, the genealogist works on a historical field composed of battles too numerous to fully account. This complexity undermines the causality assumed in a universal conception of time, in which a linear path can be established between 'what happened' and 'what is happening'. In genealogy, innumerable quotidian struggles are as important as grand battles. Against the *method* of universal and teleological history, genealogy considers

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the historical field as too complex to fully represent. As such, genealogy does not

aspire to representation but to a problematization of historical representation.

Genealogy emphasizes relations of power and their constitutive role in the formation

of discourses. Its aim is a 'history of the present' that analyzes the lines of descent of

contemporary perceived problems. It reveals the contingency of contemporary ideas,

practices and values – otherwise taken as 'obvious' or 'natural' – by drawing attention

to their gradual emergence. In so doing it does not 'search for origins' but considers

that processes of historical emergence are multiple, and that the event of emergence is

a distributed one. Genealogy should not be the writing of histories that validate and

explain a present understanding or state of affairs as logical and natural, but rather a

critical intervention that unsettles such histories. As we show in section 3, there is a

difference between a history of security studies that validates the present state of the

discipline and a genealogy that exposes the power relations and stakes involved in

constituting 'security' as an object of knowledge to be studied by authoritative,

knowledgeable subjects. History is contingent because it unfolds through

interpretative rivalries, circumstance, and to an extent, chance. Genealogy, on the

other hand, 'records the history of interpretations' and emphasizes how discursive

rules are appropriated and used (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 108). In this sense,

genealogy is not proper history but a contest over history and an examination of

contests over history. Genealogy has to 'identify the accidents, the minute deviations

– or conversely the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty

calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for

us' (Foucault 1984b, 81). It must become 'able to recognize the events of history, its

jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats' (Foucault 1984b:

80). Genealogists work at systematically documenting the historical emergence and

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descent of those things that, 'we tend to feel (Barad) without history' (Foucault 1984b: 76). It will seek out discontinuities where others found continuous development…find recurrences and play where others found progress and seriousness (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 106). After Nietzsche's 'wirkliche Historie', Foucault also called this genealogical practice an 'effective history' (Foucault 1984b: 87-88; Dean 1994). By 'introducing discontinuities into our very being' (Foucault 1984b: 88), this 'effective history' calls into question the received narratives and associated lessons learned from history to reveal the contingency of the present. It shows that things did not have to be this way and that they could be otherwise. Genealogy aims to open up the field of action in the present. It critically destabilizes the given order and questions its conditions of acceptability. For example, in undermining the naturalized claim that IR was the 'scientific' study of the state system, feminist IR scholars exposed the gendered assumptions of international thought, delegitimizing its claims to authoritative knowledge and helping to put gender issues on the international agenda, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (see Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011 for a critical reading).

<B>Archaeology vs genealogy?

Genealogy depends on other concepts that Foucault developed. Its relationship with these other concepts is important for understanding its significance and operation as a method. In subsequent sections we will discuss concepts such as problematization and *dispositif*, but first we need explore the relationship between genealogy and archaeology. Archaeology is the most discursive aspect of Foucault's methodological

work. It is a study of knowledge using a particular mode of discourse analysis that Foucault articulated most explicitly in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*(1969). It is the study of how knowledge has developed over time. Like genealogy, it posits the historical contingency of truths and the entanglements of power and knowledge. However, it does so by making explicit the epistemic regimes of intelligibility and the immanent rules of discursive formation that govern specific fields of knowledge. Archaeology has influenced the development of discourse analysis in IR and the social sciences generally (e.g., Hansen 2006, Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis 2000, Shapiro 1990, Wodak 2009). Archaeology and genealogy do not represent opposing methodologies, stages or periods in Foucault's work, but differences of emphasis. However, the distinction between them is important. The reasons why Foucault moved away from archaeology demonstrate what is at stake in the genealogical method.

Faced with widespread criticism that accompanied the publication of *The Order of Things* in 1966 and *The Archaeology of knowledge* in 1969, Foucault realized that he could not justify a detached archaeological position from which to analyze the rules of discourse (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 103). Rather, the analyst is always already enmeshed in historical power relations and thus can only operate from within them. Genealogy can be understood as a response to this challenge posed to the archaeological method. It embraces this immanence by making power relations central to its method. This is significant because while we must appreciate how genealogy is related to forms of discourse analysis, it can never be a detached 'social scientific' method as some of those analyses have become. Genealogy is always immanent to struggles and self-consciously political.

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Against those who, like Dreyfus and Rabinow, overplay the difference between archaeology and genealogy we consider that there *is* a difference between the two methods, but not a strict separation. The aims of genealogy were already at play in Foucault's early (archaeological) propositions (Potte-Bonneville 2004). This can be seen in *The Birth of the Clinic*, published in 1963: the book traces the historical formation of a particular form of medical vision linked to a bodily redistribution of symptoms of illness and the emergence of the institutional space of the clinic (Foucault 1994). Similarly, archaeology continues into genealogy, as Foucault himself suggested at the beginning of *Society Must be Defended* (Foucault 2003). Therefore, a methodological account of genealogy requires a solid understanding of archaeology.

Foucault's archaeological method ventured that knowledge was governed by 'historical a prioris'. These historical a prioris comprise systems of rules which Foucault termed the 'archive'. For Foucault, the archive has a more specific meaning than a collection of historical documents. The archive is not simply data. For Foucault, '[t]he archive is the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements (énoncés) as unique events' (Foucault 1972). In other words, the archive governs discourse. It determines how statements (énoncés) make sense, which have authority, and which come to be authorized as 'true' within a given historical setting. To draw an analogy, we might say that the archive governs discourse as grammar governs a sentence. When we speak, we do not consciously recognize that our speech is governed by a system of rules called 'grammar'? Yet, , we may speak very well and still nonetheless find it difficult to describe these rules

and how they work. However, the fact that these rules are in no way 'natural' becomes evident when one studies a foreign language or if one reads Shakespeare. Grammatical rules shift over time and across language systems. They are contingent. Likewise the 'rules' which comprise the archive shift over time. As such, they form historical a prioris. These systems of rules are neither obvious nor easy to articulate.

Studying these historical rules is different from studying the meaning of particular concepts (as in semantics or Reinhardt Koselleck's *Begriffsgeschichte*), the internal rules of language (as in linguistics) or systems of signs (as in semiotics). For example, an archaeological understanding of Darwin is not a critique of his arguments (Foucault 2002a: 143). Neither is it a study of the 'grammar' of his scientific propositions, nor the logical structure of his arguments. Neither is it an analysis of some kind of teleological process of scientific progress in a linear succession of ideas traced between subsequent authors (Foucault 2002a: 144). Rather, it is an historical analysis of the complex discursive space that links different authors, and not necessarily with their awareness:

> so many authors who know or do not know one another, criticise one another, invalidate one another, pillage one another, meet without knowing it and obstinately intersect their unique discourse in a web of which they are not the masters, of which they cannot see the whole, and of whose breadth they have a very inadequate idea.
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> (Foucault 2002a, 143)

Archaeology is a method which tries to make this 'system of rules', the archive, explicit. It aims to show how the rules which govern what can and cannot be said at any historical moment have changed over time. As a system that is historically specific and never universal, the archive provides a way of understanding the emergence of regimes of knowledge in specific contexts. The historical emphasis means understanding the conditions of possibility under which regimes of knowledge appeared, and not simply their content or logic. These 'rules' are diverse and local and cannot be reduced to a single set, system or structure. They only multiply the more one looks: 'Far from being that which unifies everything that has been said in the great confused murmur of a discourse…[the archive] is that which differentiates discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their own duration. (Foucault 1972: 129)

Let us now translate this into method. Never assuming an essential truth or origin to a concept such as madness (Foucault 1988b) or sovereignty (Foucault 2003, 2007), Foucault approached his object of study *epiphenomenally*. Rather than taking their existence as a given, he tried to make sense of them as problems whose evolution can be traced though the mass of historical documents and statements that appear *around* them. Although we may never uncover the 'truth' of madness or security through historical enquiry, we may come to see how their 'truth' came to be understood historically, at different times and in different places. Archaeology works to unearth historically contingent truths through their archival traces.

From this archaeological work, genealogy is employed as a tactic to bring historical research into play against existing 'regimes of truth'. It shows how power relations

influence the development of the archive, and the role of knowledge in orienting, conditioning and legitimating the exercise of power. Genealogy depends on the work done by archaeology, but does not stop with a detached analysis of the historical emergence of discursive formations. It goes further by questioning the role of power in constituting not only discursive formations, but also subject positions (e.g., the 'scientist', the 'economist'), authorities (e.g., scientific and economic institutions), modes of being (e.g., new types of corporeal shaping of soldiers or workers), social changes (e.g., reorganizations of urban architecture and governmental technologies) and political struggles (e.g., the protagonists, winners and losers, such as the 'Third Estate' winning over the French aristocracy as Foucault describes in his lectures on how 'Society Must be Defended' (Foucault 2002b, Neal 2004). With its emphasis on power, genealogy is more explicitly political than archaeology.

Together, archaeology and genealogy 'write against truth' (Dean 2003). By investigating the 'regimes of truth' that are in play in a particular episode, the method is to unveil the way 'truths' are naturalized and imposed. The method is to question the complex mechanisms by which a 'particular truth' becomes '*the* truth'. This is reflected in Foucault's interest in problems rather than solutions. The aim of making a history of 'problems' is to understand how a given object (e.g., madness or security) is constituted *as* a problematic object under particular circumstances. This is why genealogy can be understood as an 'art of problematizations,' as we will explore in the next section.

With all this in mind, the lesson is that genealogical method depends on the patient historical work of archaeology, but it can never be a neutral historical analysis. Its

historical accuracy remains open to challenge, but accuracy is not the main purpose of genealogy (Biebricher 2008: 370). Its aim is not to make its own claim to power-free historical truth, but to expose the role of power struggles in constituting that truth. Genealogy is the immanent, historical and critical exploration of power relations and their constitutive effects. It exposes the historical contingency, struggles, victors and vanquished inherent in regimes of truth, thus challenging received historical wisdom. In this sense, the method of genealogy is not to write 'history' but rather to intervene into history from within history.

<TEXT BOX>

The Emergence of kettling

'Kettling' is an unofficial label for a controversial police tactic that has been deployed with increased frequency as a means of preventing the disorder and violence that have accompanied some public demonstrations. The aim of kettling is to encircle protesters and contain them in a tight cordon (the 'kettle') from which they are prevented from leaving for several hours. It received considerable media attention in the UK when it was used to police student protests in London in the winter of 2010-11.

Kettling appeared to us to be a good topic for genealogical analysis for two reasons. First, it appealed to our interest in technologies of power because it represented a governmental technology of police. Second, it was clear that kettling had a history in specific struggles. It was a site of political contestation: over its legal status, human rights concerns, its 'proportionate' deployment, and even over the meaning and origin of the term itself. We could trace the emergence of this technique in relation to the challenges to policing posed by new forms of protest that were more mobile and

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disruptive, and more recently enabled by new communication technologies. This problem was evident in, for example, the 1990 UK Poll Tax riots and the 2001 WTO protests in Seattle. We could also see that the controversy over kettling itself had a history, emerging in response to the use of kettling in the 2001 May Day demonstrations in London.

Most significantly, what drew our attention to kettling was a recognition of its historical singularity (kettling as an 'event'). In fact, the term 'kettling' itself is highly contested, reflecting the contemporary problematization of this technique. As our research showed, the relatively recent uptake of this term was politically constituted in the struggle over the legitimacy of the police practice. For example, under parliamentary questioning, the British police disavowed the term 'kettling' in favour of 'containment'. As a practice, however termed, kettling caught our attention insofar as it deviated from the strategic logic historically deployed in the management of crowds, but was also a novel transformation of existing police tactics. In contrast to traditional police practices of crowd *dispersal* (such as the use of water cannons, baton charges, cavalry charges, tear gas or the police formation of the 'flying wedge'), kettling operated through a logic of *containment*. And although the police have used various forms of containment as at tactic for many years, keeping a crowd contained for many hours rather than for short term tactical reasons seemed to be something different. Kettling was not simply a historically divergent practice – one that emerged at a specific point in time to address a particular problem – but suggested a new logic of policing crowds.

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Our genealogical research sought to trace the conditions under which the historical emergence of kettling was made possible. It was not simply a history of kettling, even if some empirical historical work was necessary to understand the historical and political significance of the practice beyond the immediate controversy. Rather, it was an analysis of the power struggles and interpretive rivalries through which 'kettling' emerged as a problematization. Our questions were: what is the governmental rationality supporting the tactic of kettling? How does it differ from previous governmental rationalities? How and when did this practice emerge? What is its descent? What is the problematic it seeks to address? How does this relate to the way in which security, public order and the crowd are understood? On what conditions is kettling itself being problematized?

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<A>The elements of a genealogy

<B>Problematization

Our example of kettling shows how genealogy does not focus on discrete research objects but rather on the power relations and struggles surrounding them. Again, the premise is that there is no neutral analytical standpoint from which to conduct analysis, and that the researcher and research object are always already enmeshed in historical power relations and interpretive rivalries. This section explores the concept of 'problematization' in order to clarify the relationship between genealogy and its sites of intervention.

Foucault developed the concept of problematization relatively late in his work. The term appears in the introduction to the second volume of his history of sexuality (Foucault 1985b, 11), but also in some of his interviews (Foucault 1983, 1984a, 1997) and lecture courses (Foucault 1985a) from the early 1980s. Despite this late and somehow peripheral appearance, 'problematization' is important for at least two reasons. First, Foucault uses it to clarify the methodological premises of his work on the 'politics of truth' (Foucault and Lotringer 2007, Gros 2002). Simply put, the concept provides an answer to questions of what is being analyzed and how the objects of analysis are being looked at. Second, the term has implications for the critical capacities of the genealogical enterprise. It indicates that no scholar stands isolated from their object of study, but is involved in ongoing processes of re-problematization.

Problematizations are historical incidents that animate genealogical analysis. According to Foucault (Foucault 1985a: 65), one has to inquire 'how...certain things...became a problem.' How, for example, have certain forms of behaviour been *problematized* as madness or crime? In what way, and with what consequences? Analogous to these Foucauldian cases, Nikolas Rose has linked the proliferation of advanced liberal modes of governance to a problematization of 'the social' as the historical referent of liberal governance (Rose 1996). By rendering a particular form of 'the social' problematic, the statement intervenes in a political debate on solidarity, freedom and responsibilities in order to promote new policies for forging different kinds of social organization. Designating particular phenomena as problems, in other words, is always a crucial step in turning them into governable entities. Genealogical

analysis focuses on such decisive moments when forms of behaviours, entities or phenomena that for a long time appeared to be self-evident suddenly become problematic. Such moments mark dynamic thresholds at which new entities (such as madness or delinquency in the eighteenth century) and new political technologies (such as neo-liberal policies of individual responsibilization in the late twentieth century) emerge. The genealogist traces such moments of appearance and disappearance together with the re-configuration of power relations that accompanies them. For example, recent genealogical work in security studies has focused on how resilience has emerged as a response to the problematization of security brought on by the radical contingency of contemporary threat (Walker and Cooper 2011).

By focusing on historical events of problematization, Foucault also sought to resolve a particular misunderstanding that had haunted the reception of his work since he once provocatively declared that 'madness does not exist':

> For when I say that I am studying the 'problematization' of madness, crime or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. (...) For I think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization.
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> (Foucault and Pearson 2001, 171)

However, Foucault's insistence on the reality of phenomena should not be mistaken for a return to a brute 'realism' that posits the existence of self-evident facts:

A problematization does not mean the representation of a pre-existing object, nor the creation through discourse of an object that does not exist. It is the set of discursive and non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of true and false, and constitutes it as an object of thought (whether under the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis etc.)

(Foucault 1988a: 257)

Problematizations intervene into that which is taken for granted. They are productive by inserting objects into a 'politics of truth', thereby formatting objects in a particular way. Delinquency, in this respect, does not 'exist' independently, but is brought into 'existence' by problematizations of behaviours in terms of crime. It enters the play of true and false through correctional schemes and criminological theories, panoptical laboratories and reformist discourses.

In this sense, problematizations are related to sets of practices, 'through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought' (Foucault 1985b: 11). Acts of problematization put into question the unreflected practices and related rationalities through which we orient ourselves in the world. They open up a space for thought in which a practice can be modified or replaced:

Thought is that which permits a certain distance from a manner of acting or reacting, that which makes it possible to make that manner of acting into an object of reflection and to make it available for analysis of its meanings, its conditions and its goals. Thinking is the freedom one has in relation to what

one does, the movement through which one detaches oneself as an object and reflects on all this as a problem.

(Foucault quoted in Rabinow 2003: 46-47)

An historical problematization is a particular kind of event: an event that brings an object, a concept or a practice to thought. This is why genealogy does not transcend the problematizations it analyzes, but confronts them immanently. Tracing the historical thresholds at which phenomena become problematic and are articulated as part of reconfigured relations of force is itself an act of problematization (Castel 1994: 237-252). Problematization therefore designates both the critical mode of activity of the genealogist and its object of study. Both aspects feed into each other: unearthing the transformations of power that take place when certain behaviours, phenomena or objects are being rendered problematic is a way of rendering these transformations problematic. For example, genealogical work on resilience in security studies is simultaneously an analysis of the problematization of security that traces the historical emergence of the concept of resilience in governmental rationales and practices, and a further problematization of resilience as a security strategy, that emphasizes its political implications and attendant power struggles.

In this sense, genealogy constitutes a reflexive art of problematization. As a critical enterprise, it starts with questions of our present, and operates on the past in order to trace out the hidden struggles that contributed to the present, thereby denaturalizing the taken-for-granted system that works as a regime of truth. This art of problematization is critical because it aims to open up the range of possibilities for thinking and acting, and thus is associated with freedom. As Thomas Biebricher

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argues, this freedom is not necessarily emancipatory in the traditional sense of 'liberation from power, oppression or exploitation in general' (Biebricher 2008: 368), but it does allow for a reconsideration of one's world and one's place within it. This is the critical politics involved in genealogical research.

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Problematizing kettling

The notion of problematization, outlined above, has informed our genealogical analysis in three important ways. First, it was the current problematization of kettling within political discourses that drew our attention and encouraged us to choose it as a case study. Clearly, the practice of kettling did not emerge from nowhere. It has been developed and deployed for some time. Nor was this the first time 'kettling' had met with criticism or resistance. However, for many reasons (which we were curious to investigate) the use of the 'kettle' during the 2010/11 UK student protests generated a heated debate regarding its legitimacy in policing public protests. We could say the process of problematization raised 'kettling' to the level of public awareness by rendering it as a site of contestation and struggle between politicians, activists, experts, commentators and police. This was our point of departure. We were interested in how kettling became a problem.

Second, problematizations acted as referents within our genealogical analysis. Our genealogy was oriented towards historical problematizations as *events*. Methodologically, it sought first to identify a series of problematization events in relation to which 'kettling' emerged as a solution. Our aim was not to be exhaustive (an impossible task) but to isolate a few of the major events impacting the

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development of kettling as a practice, such as the UK Poll Tax riots in 1990 and the May Day riots of 1999 and 2000. Analysis would then seek to make explicit the particular character of these problematizations. What was at stake? Who was involved? What responses were advocated? What resources (intellectual, material, or otherwise) did they draw upon? In asking these questions, we investigated how contests over problems and their possible solutions played out historically. How did problems identified in one episode of protest lead to the development and deployment of new police tactics in future events? Genealogy works with historical raw material to create a partial map of this emergence, such as government documents, news items, and contemporaneous commentaries. The emergence of kettling could then be situated in relation to these events and the power relations that played out through them.

Finally, as genealogists, we recognized the political stakes involved with studying kettling at this time. We were not content to investigate these questions in a detached manner, but were looking to carry on this momentum. We wanted to intervene in this debate and contribute to the contestation of this practice. Remember, to conduct genealogical work *is* to intervene. As such, problematization was not simply our starting point but our *objective*. We sought to augment the processes of problematization that preceded our own work by performing genealogical work on kettling. This meant exposing the power struggles that took place not only on the streets in sites of kettling themselves, but in the historical emergence of the practice. </TEXT BOX>

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<A>*Dispositifs* and strategy

With genealogy taking shape as a decidedly interventionist and political perspective on history, the notion of strategy takes a new dimension in Foucault's work. Strategy is a central aspect of a concept, the *dispositif,* he forged in the second half of the 1970s. Both Deleuze (1992b) and Agamben (2009) note that the concept of '*dispositif'* – which has somewhat confusingly been translated into English as apparatus, deployment, dispositive and 'set up' – (Bussolini 2010, Veyne 2010) appears at a particular point in Foucault's thought where he placed greater emphasis on the materiality and relationality of power/knowledge (see also Paltrinieri 2012: 236-244; Rabinow 2003: 49-55; and Chapter 3 in this volume).

In an interview subsequently published under the title 'Confessions of the Flesh' (Foucault 1980) Foucault was asked to elaborate on this concept. The *dispositif*, Foucault explains, is a 'formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an *urgent need*' (Foucault 1980: 195, emphasis in original). This formation is constituted by a heterogeneous assemblage of elements: 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid'. (Foucault 1980). The *dispositif*, Foucault clarifies, is more specifically 'the system of relations (*réseau*) one can establish between [these] heterogeneous elements.' (Foucault 1980). The *dispositif* is not the individual elements themselves but the particular arrangement or configuration of relations that exists *between* them. They cohere around the 'urgent needs' entailed by problematizations. For example, as we show in the next box, the

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'kettle' itself is one element in a *dispositif* of crowd control or security that includes the police, historical knowledges of past demonstrations, architectures, laws, and communication technologies.

As responses to an 'urgent need', *dispositifs* are formed through the adoption, adaptation and bundling together of existing knowledges, practices and technologies. In short, the 'coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (*dispositif*) of knowledge-power' (Foucault 2008: 19). Because they are composed in a spirit of *bricolage* – the assemblage of a myriad of existing 'tools' designed to address different, often unrelated, problems – it becomes impossible to define an ideal origin for any *dispositif*. A *dispositif* is not a coherent episteme or paradigm built around clear principles or concepts; what defines a *dispositif* is not intellectual coherence but a *strategic* coherence – without relying on the foundational subject of a strategist, of course. For example, the *dispositif* of surveillance problematized by revelations about the NSA, GCHQ, the Prism programme, and associations with other communications companies and social networking technologies does not have its sole origins in 9/11, but it has certainly been driven by a perceived 'strategic need' prompted by the hyper-problematization of security after 9/11. However, we cannot attribute the *dispositif* of surveillance solely to 'strategists', such as particular US presidents or heads of security agencies. This *dispositif* coheres around a strategic need that has grown with contingent and organic complexity. A genealogy of surveillance would need to reassemble the disparate and relational elements of this surveillance *dispositif* through the genealogical dimensions of history and power.

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It is especially in its strategic orientation that the *dispositif* can help us to understand and analyze power as a distributed and mobile network of force relations: 'The function of strategic logic is to establish the possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate. The logic of strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization of the contradictory' (Foucault 2008). Foucault explains that the *dispositif* is: 'essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them, etc.' (Foucault 1980). *Dispositifs* involve material forms that institute strategic relations of force and epistemic relations of knowledge. As such, Agamben sums up a *dispositif* as, 'a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge' (Agamben 2009). With Foucault, *dispositifs* are the techno-material articulation of discursive regimes of intelligibility. For example, 'security' is both a discursive idea and a concrete architecture. Thus, *dispositifs* crisscross the division between ideational meaning and substantial matter (Barad 2007: 132; see also Chapter 3 in this volume). They are material infrastructures for power/knowledge. They orient relations of force and relations of knowledge in space and over time. The consolidation of practices into *dispositifs* is thus dependent upon a strategy of 'relaying, connecting, converging and prolonging' (Deleuze 1988).

On the one hand, the *dispositif* functions as a configuration bearing upon forces to direct or conduct them. On the other hand, it provides a conceptual apparatus for the genealogist to analyze this evolving contest. In that sense, as a methodological device for reassembling diverse elements, the *dispositif* is what 'operationalizes' the method

(Bonditti 2012). The genealogist isolates the intelligibility of a practice together with its 'strategies of relations of forces supporting types of knowledge and inversely' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 121). He does so not by trying to uncover some kind of hidden motive (e.g., of a strategist), but by making explicit the multiple constitutive lines of evolution that have actualized the *dispositif* as a contingent assemblage (Deleuze 1992b).

For the genealogist, the value of thinking some things, such as sexuality or security, in terms of a *dispositif* helps *sustain* a genealogical perspective by looking at them as deprived of fixed essence and as having been cobbled together historically. Isolating a *dispositif* within different historical frames reveals a different composition of elements and forces aligned to a different purpose. For example, the articulation of 'security' or 'sexuality' mutates over time through the historical play of forces. In this respect, Deleuze's interpretation of the *dispositif* helps clarify the relationship between the *dispositif* and the archive that, strangely, Foucault's never did: '*Dispositifs* form our environment. We belong to them, and act in them' (Deleuze 1992a: 162). It thereby enables us to diagnose who we are, through the excavation of the archive, *while* also being attentive to what is in the making. For example, genealogical research on the surveillance *dispositif* is not only about the disparate material and discursive architecture of security technologies, but also what it means to be an individual in the present. It means questioning the nature of privacy, freedom, association and expression in an age when our personal and social lives are increasingly embedded in networked technologies that turn out to be not at all 'secure'.

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Not only does the question of the strategic nature of the *dispositif* matter, but also important is how to exploit the potentials immanent to them. *Dispostifs* are not fixed and rigid regimes of domination that require revolutionary subversion. They are immanent networks that shape the subject and contain the potential for resistance. As we will see in the next box, *dispositifs* do not emerge out of nowhere, but are produced in the strategic to-and-fro of forces attempting to out-do each other through new innovations in their practice, such as protestors and the police.

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Kettling and security *dispositif*

We studied kettling as a technique of police. Recognizing the historical singularity of the kettle, particularly the logic of containment it enacted, we became interested in studying kettling as a means of investigating contemporary transformations within a wider security *dispositif* (Foucault). With regard to its strategic aspect, it is important to recognize that this technique co-exists and is most often exercised simultaneously with other policing techniques including surveillance, police escorts and designated protest routes. Accordingly, strategy – understood as an 'art of combinations' – was an important concept in both orienting and organizing our work. It helped us to understand kettling as one technique within a wider assemblage of social order policing. Identifying the conditions under which kettling could emerge as a technique of police entailed directing our attention to recent realignments of force relations in the contested field of (in)security.

The historical emergence of kettling thus has to take into account the context of struggles in which it was assembled. Kettling met an 'urgent need': the need to

respond to the problem of 'disruptive protest' that explicitly aimed to disrupt circulations underpinning urban life as a means of raising attention to a cause. We were interested in how this style of protest developed by weaving new technologies and forms of social networking into tactics of evasion and manoeuvre over the course of a series of historical events including the 1990 Poll Tax Riots in London, the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, 1999/2000 May Day riots in London among others. Disruptive protest, in other words, was itself a strategy *assembled* over time. Disruptive protest problematized traditional methods of crowd control based on crowd dispersal. Moreover, in doing so it prompted the development and adoption of kettling as a new technique of public order policing, which we could identify in historical policing literature (Waddington 1992, 2007).

Thus kettling emerged as a technique in a context of transformations in the power relations between protest and public order policing. On the one hand, we were interested in understanding how kettling emerged as a combination and adaptation of existing technologies of discipline and control. Here we traced the development of kettling to containment tactics derived from the battlefield, the harnessing of real-time telecommunications by military and police and the remote monitoring of crowd movements. On the other hand, we used the notion of strategy to organize our own research. Working collaboratively, we worked not just to identify important documents and events but to establish links between heterogeneous elements: legislation, expert reflections on crowd control, developments in military tactics, the development and adaptation of communications technologies. In particular, we were interested in investigating how these relations were (historically) constituted and how they changed over time. This required taking quite a broad scope when collecting

primary and secondary documents. Accounting for the historical emergence of kettling entailed understanding how this mobile field of power relations acted as a condition of possibility for the emergence of kettling.

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<A>Genealogy and the study of security (studies)

This section applies the difference between history and genealogy to security studies itself. It discusses how histories of the discipline work to validate disciplinary authority in relation to security as a research object, rather than exploring the historical contingency and heterogeneity of problematizations of security in order to problematize security further.

Genealogies of IRhave successfully posited the historical contingency and constitutive functions of the very concept of the 'international'. It is not yet clear that security studies has undergone a similar challenge. The genealogy of IR showed that IR scholars did not rationally and dispassionately reflect upon their object of study (the 'international') as they claimed. Rather, they helped constitute the 'international' as an object, and were constituted as knowledgeable subjects through their relation to that object. This in turn had the effect of constituting the discipline of IR as a social science (Hoffmann 1977), and also played a wider role in naturalizing the otherwise historically contingent set of political arrangements represented by the international state system. Genealogies of IR, though not always named as such, unpacked how concepts such as the international (Der Derian 1995), sovereignty (Bartelson 1995,

Walker 1993), realism (Molloy 2006) or the territorial state (Agnew 1994) became elements in a regime of truth that regulated what could be said to be 'international' and what could not. For example, Cynthia Enloe's work showed how the diplomat's actions were considered 'international practice', but not those of his wife or his servants (Enloe 1990: 94-123). Following the methodology of Foucault, the genealogical counter-narrative to IR in effect said 'Let's suppose that "the international" does not exist': 'If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can history make of the different events and practices which are apparently organized around something that is supposed to be "the international"?' (paraphrasing Foucault 2008: 3; see also Chapter 6 in this book). In this section, we argue that this genealogical move has yet to be fully played out in security studies.

Security studies is today becoming a discipline in its own right. It has a constitutive heritage in IR, and also in peace and conflict studies. International relations had from its disciplinary inception claimed a privileged knowledge of security as state security. This knowledge was also supported by what was known as 'strategic studies'. And within security studies, critical security studies has emerged as a critique of this orthodoxy. These disciplinary developments have been important, productive and constitutive of a new generation of scholars (new knowledgeable subjects). However, these developments have come to be told as a history, not a genealogy. Instead of genealogical counter-narratives, security studies is still dominated by *histories* of itself (e.g., Buzan and Hansen 2009, Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). As discussed earlier, the contrast between a *history* and a *genealogy* is important and instructive. The dominant and well-rehearsed history of the origins and development of security studies does not deepen its own contingency, struggles and power relations, but

validates it as a discipline. Such a history is about refining theories, concepts, cases and indeed methods for studying security. From a genealogical perspective, this history contributes to establishing security studies as an authoritative social scientific discipline and constitutes its practitioners as knowledgeable (and disciplined) subjects.

A genealogy of security studies would not write the history of security studies, but would investigate its historical contingency, struggles and constitutive effects (Shah 2010). In so doing, it would posit security as a corollary of power struggles, not simply a research object. By exposing the historical contingency of 'security', genealogy would further problematize its meanings and effects, whether construed as a universal human need, a timeless anchor of the international system of states, or a discrete research object for a scholarly discipline.

Take, for example, Buzan and Hansen's *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (2009), which retells the constitutive disciplinary account given at the beginning of the 'Copenhagen School's' *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Traditionally, this story says, IR and security studies were about states. Traditionalists considered security to be exclusively a matter of states and military force. 'Wideners' and 'deepeners' then challenged this orthodoxy on empirical and conceptual grounds, especially after the loss of Cold War certainties. They argued that security threats could take a variety of non-military forms (such as insurance) performed by a wide range of security actors (including international institutions, private military companies and NGOs) and expanded the scope of security referents (to areas including the environment and social identity). For example, Ken Booth (2005),

Richard Wyn Jones (2005), Keith Krause and Michael Williams (1997) offered a conception of security based on the individual, now commonly known as 'human security'. One empirical expression of this is the 1994 UN Development Programme definition of human security, which added personal security, food, health and community to the range of already existing 'security objects'. In the 1990s, these perspectives were understood as critical because their conception of security broke with tradition. They no longer posed the state as the condition of security. Rather, the state was reconceptualized as a possible source of threat and producer of insecurity. This move de-equated the state and security, contra the IR orthodoxy. However, the 'history' of security studies stalls this critical project. Instead of rendering 'security' as the contingent product of historical power struggles and problematizations, it works to refine the disciplinary and scientific authority of 'security studies' in its scholarly relationship to 'security' as a research object.

In a related example, Ole Wæver's 'securitization theory' posited security as a 'grammar' in which language and speech acts constitute a process of 'securitization'. Krause argues that through this move, the 'why' question ('why do states go at war' for example) is substituted by the 'how' question ('how are security threats defined') (Krause 2003). This promised to undermine the core object of security studies by positing security as nothing other than a contingent construction. However, rather than undermine the very basis of the discipline by rendering its conditions of possibility as contingent (as the critical turn had done with IR), Wæver and his 'Copenhagen School' colleagues chose to work with the 'traditional meaning' of security (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998: 4). This meant that they held on to a core meaning of security inherited from the orthodoxy: security was about existential

threats, entailed 'exceptional' means, and usually involved the state (Ciută 2009, Opitz 2011). While not necessarily fixing this 'grammar of security' as timeless and essential (although that is open to interpretation), they pragmatically kept it as a historical fact or *de facto* truth. The proposed research programme, which has been enthusiastically taken up by a subsequent generation of scholars, has continually refined itself, its theories, and its cases. In contrast to this account of disciplinary history, a genealogical perspective would show how this has not only been about refining approaches to a research object, but also about constituting new forms of disciplinary authority and power. While some have reflected on how security analysis itself risks contributing to the social construction of security (Huysmans 2002), few have considered how 'security' constructs the analyst, their expertise and their discipline (see Chapter 6 on 'Distance'). Without rendering 'security' contingent, and without fully questioning their own disciplinary constitution in relation to this assumed 'object', histories of security studies fall short of a genealogy.

The genealogist should not simply refine security as an object of research, but throw security, its historical contingency and constitutive effects more radically into question. Genealogical research in security studies would ask what can we make of all these discourses, practices, knowledges that exist in relation to 'security'. This means taking security as an element in historically-situated problematizations, not simply as a research object. The aim must be to proceed empirically without assuming that 'security' exists as an already constituted (or constructed, but *de facto*) problem, but rather as a contingent element in diverse problematizations.

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Genealogy as critical security method should displace security as a privileged object by performing historical empirical work on more heterogeneous *dispositifs* that relate to security but are not necessarily built around it as a foundational problematization. This would deepen the problematization of security by undermining it as a core research object. For example, recent works in security studies have employed genealogical methods to investigate catastrophes (Aradau and Munster 2011, Opitz and Tellmann), civil defence (Collier and Lakoff 2008a), critical infrastructure (Collier and Lakoff 2008b), terrorism and counter-terrorism (Bonditti 2013), finance (Goede 2005), insurance (Lobo-Guerrero 2012), and resilience (Walker and Cooper 2011, Zebrowski 2013).

Genealogy in a digital age

This section explores the implications of the digitization of 'the archive' for genealogical research. This complicates genealogical work while, at the same time, opening new possibilities for intervention. We can sum this up in two points. First, the digital archive represents new forms of archival *rules* in an archaeological sense. Second, the socially networked nature of much of the digital archive has implications for the political interventionism of genealogical work, particularly through online collaboration as a form of force multiplication and acceleration.

In addition to the imagery of battle, Foucault cultivated an image of genealogical work as a solitary trawling of dusty archives. He opens his essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', as follows: 'Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently

documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times' (Foucault 1984b, 76). Digitization challenges this image in three ways. First, the archive is no longer 'dusty' but increasingly electronic. For example, the Google Books Library Project aims 'to create a comprehensive, searchable, virtual card catalogue of all books in all languages' (Google 2012). Second, technology offers unprecedented opportunities for research collaboration, making genealogy a less solitary pursuit. Third, technology offers the possibility of an acceleration of research, in terms of speedy information-gathering from diverse sources, rapid mobilization of collaborative work around pressing political concerns, and swift (digital) publication processes circumventing traditional print production times.

Digitization also raises questions about archival 'rules', interpretive rivalries, and struggles in power/knowledge: how does digitization affect access to the kinds of books and documents scholars engage with? Which documents get digitized and which do not? Which are made accessible and which are not? What is prioritized and why? How do we value particular documents in a time of mass digitization? How does digitization impact on the daily conduct of research and, more specifically, on archaeological and genealogical research? How far does it help to put Foucauldian genealogy in motion?

The digital re-composition of 'the archive' is no smooth re-composition. Just as Foucault suggested that, '[w]e must conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things' (Foucault 1972: 229), digitization is a violence done to discourse. Just like the formation of archival 'rules' in the archaeological sense, digitization is not a

politically neutral process. It entails new forms of struggle, and new relations of force. As with every kind of memory, the digital archive has its own combinations of remembering and forgetting. Digital genealogy requires an awareness of how the digital renders visible and conceals at the same time. Coinciding with the opportunities for accessibility, traceability, analysis and accumulation of archival documents by their digitization and online availability, the digital archive generates new forms of redundancy that are mechanisms of oblivion. This complicates archaeological and genealogical research, and makes them a more pressing necessity.

Digitization makes Foucault's characterization of the raw material of genealogy more relevant than ever; the digital archive is indeed a 'field of entangled and confused parchments on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times' (Foucault 1984b: 76). It consists of different layers, from the surface web that is easily accessible through a simple Google search; through deeper layers that do not show up on Google (whether by design or as a result of ranking algorithms) which require more specialized or knowledgeable means of access (e.g., using the electronic Hansard parliamentary archive); to the 'deep' or 'dark' web (Harrison 2010) which is not indexed by search engines and may include private sources, unlinked pages and content generated dynamically. Beyond this surface level archive, the 'deeper' web thus requires more specialized skills or technologies to access. Finding ways to excavate this may reveal research material overlooked by other researchers and has big implications for genealogical research and investigative journalism. The highly politicized activities of Wikileaks are a prime example.

Digitization offers an opportunity for new forms of genealogical interventionism through collaboration. It makes possible the rapid, tactical mobilization of groups of researchers around politicized issues. This might mean challenging and undermining official accounts of events, crowd-sourced analysis of large bodies of data, or creating innovative data visualizations to convey new perspectives on drone strikes or Iraq war causalities. Such genealogical products have the potential to 'go viral' on social media, increasing their political impact.

Digitization is therefore broader than simply rendering documents into a digital form and creating online archives. It also involves the development of research computing tools. Applications such as the file sharing service Dropbox offer the possibility to share part or the entirety of the research corpus, facilitating collaborative research on a shared material by scholars located in different parts of the world. In other words, it enables transnational collaborative archival research, possibly *transnational collaborative genealogies*. In this respect, technology blurs the physical and practical distinctions between the places and tools of research, writing, collaborating and communicating. Skype, social networking, Wikipedia and its offspring are built on models of collective use of information and collaborative interaction. Wikipedia, for example, has become an invaluable starting point for research, although its academic use often upsets rarefied scholarly sensibilities. It provides open access information and links that otherwise may not be found. Sometimes this is from sources more closely involved in the problematizations than would be found in more distanced academic sources (e.g., activists). The Wikipedia model also shows how digitization can offer greater possibilities for traceability: not just documenting changes made to a

document (what, when and by whom?) but also providing a forum for discussing and justifying these changes.

Digitization cannot, however, be exclusively understood as a beneficial 'force multiplier'. These computing tools help to build a new kind of world of instantaneity, simultaneity, and synchronicity, which, as pointed out by Paul Virilio (1999), has multiple and largely unthought implications. If digitization helps gather quantities of documents at speed, it is not always clear what to do with that overwhelming mass of documents. Search tools that allow the scholar to navigate a document via keywords exacerbate the tendency to 'cherry-pick' sections of a document or book without paying attention to its context. Similarly, collaborative wiki-like online pages have a homogenizing role. If they can contribute to an 'insurrection of subjugated knowledges' (Foucault 2003) and 'erase the author', they can also 'smooth' that knowledge, which is then widely disseminated through the web. One also has to keep in mind the growing instability of the digital archive, which exists in a process of being constantly overwritten. The dissenting views, bifurcations and impure origins that are so important to genealogy may drop out of sight. The 'gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary' (Foucault 1984b: 76) aspects of genealogy should not be neglected.

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Kettling: genealogical research in the digital archive

Transnational digital collaboration was essential to our genealogical work on kettling. Reassembling the *dispositif* of kettling in its international and historical dimensions

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required multiple languages, depths of local historical knowledge (e.g., relating to the history of protest in different countries), and our combined perspectives on specific political contexts and institutions. This section describes the steps of our process.

In order to investigate our questions on kettling, we first needed to assemble a research corpus that would help us to understand the various lines of argument and opinion (i.e., the 'discourse') surrounding kettling. For this phase of research, we drew heavily on open source materials on the Internet. We browsed different kinds of digital sources relating primarily to UK discussions of kettling, but extended our focus to Germany when we found instances of German kettling that preceded its use in the UK. While trying to gather and select documents, questions arose about our selection criteria and where we should look. Drawing on Deleuze's comments about Foucault's archival work (Deleuze 1988), we first selected a set of 'primary sources' gathered from around the 'focal point of power'. Our own research backgrounds in policing and security issues led us to look specifically at parliamentary debates, media reports and open-source government and police documents.

The following sources were openly available in the digital archive, though some were more accessible than others: news reports about kettling incidents, pictures of kettling incidents, entries on Wikipedia on kettling and on the policing of protest in general, parliamentary debates and hearings, statements of police experts, statements criticizing kettling incidents from human rights organizations and protest groups affected by kettling, critical blogs, court rulings after kettling incidents, statements of political actors, and official reviews of police practice. These sources were not just a

range of scholarly opinions on a topic, but a series of elements in a contested terrain of power/knowledge that cohered around the problematization of kettling.

We took a broad approach to the collection of these materials. That being said, there was also a danger of collecting too much – a challenge for the individual researcher exacerbated by the curiosity of our own research team. Rather than seeking to establish an exhaustive list of materials (another impossible task), our criteria for selection was based on our own sense of their importance: a) as key elements of the discourses surrounding kettling (e.g., Home Office papers, press statements by human rights organizations); b) the extent to which they reflected prominent lines of argumentation (e.g., newspaper editorials/stories); c) the extent to which they provided insight into the processes of problematization surrounding the kettle. Following Foucault, we placed a higher priority on the regularity of statements (documents which were referenced repeatedly in other documents, lines of argument which were repeated by different actors) rather than on seeking to identify the first appearance of a particular statement or idea.

We ran a series of searches on keywords including 'kettling', 'police tactic', 'containment', 'crowd control', 'demonstration', 'riot' and 'protest'. Nonetheless, it quickly became clear from our weekly Skype discussions that this method of conducting research was already narrowing the research scope by assuming too much about 'kettling'. What were the conditions for example, which made it possible for 'kettling', and not another technique, to emerge as the appropriate way of dealing with the problem of demonstrations? We thus broadened our scope: we attempted to open the research horizon by running searches on 'social order', 'social disorder' and

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'psychology of crowds', and by pursuing references found within the texts we had gathered. Here, the collaborative dynamic played an important role in compiling research materials. Harnessing the international distribution of our group allowed us to trace the migration and mutation of practices and discourses across borders. This could have escaped any of us working individually.

The knowledge we generated collaboratively drew out the connections between various documents, ideas and discourses. By assisting, encouraging and working off the ideas of each other we could construct these connections to a degree that superseded the sum of our parts (that is if each researcher had been working individually). In terms of the depth of our analysis and the speed at which our analysis progressed, our collaborative structure substantially benefited our genealogical analysis.

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<A>Conclusion

In this chapter we have explored the value of genealogy as a critical security method. We began by explaining the achievements of the genealogical move in the 'critical turn' in IR in the last two decades. This created disciplinary space for new kinds of research not bound by orthodoxy. Most genealogical works in IR were theoretical and historical, taking the form of conceptual histories of the present. Instead of searching for the historical origins of the 'international', they inquired into how the history of 'the international' and its related concepts had been written with the effect of constituting the (quite recent) discipline of IR itself. The effect of these genealogies

was to problematize and render contingent the discipline, the 'scientific' claims of its analysts, and the supposed ontological neutrality of its objects and concepts.

We took this as our starting point but have gone further. While genealogy is a method rooted in an approach to history, it need not only be a way of 'doing' history. One does not have to write a historical 'genealogy of' a particular object, concept or practice to make use of genealogical method. History is the raw material of genealogy, not its aim. Its method is to identify and intervene in historical problematizations. It asks certain questions. What 'strategic need' did problematizations respond to? What and who came to be reorganized around them? What struggles were involved? As the example of our 'kettling' research shows, genealogy and its related concepts can be used to identify current problematizations and situate them in a formation of historical lines of descent, subjective struggles, and recombinations of techniques and technologies, all of which have constitutive effects.

Genealogy identifies problematizations and problematizes them further. Its archives are not data; they are power/knowledge relations. Its problematizations are not 'objects' for dispassionate reflection; they are sites of struggle. Its *dispositifs* are not arrangements to be defined, described and delimited, but heterogeneous assemblages posited by the genealogist to further problematize such definitions, descriptions and delimitations.

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[1] While evolution provides a convenient metaphor for discussing contingency, Nietzsche's (and Foucault's) relationship to Darwinian evolution is, of course, more complicated (for a discussion see Ansell-Pearson, 1997; Grosz, 2004; Sarasin 2009).