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CS8: Is the EU offloading future migration issues to the 'southern neighbourhood'? : Thinking environmental migration in relation to externalisation

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Introduction

This report, prepared for the Foresight project Migration and Global Environmental Change, aims to study an important factor that has the potential to affect environmentally induced migration (EIM) in the Mediterranean: the externalisation of migration control policies adopted at the European Union (EU) level. The main aim of the report is to explore the externalisation–EIM nexus in the southern Mediterranean region (specifically in North Africa). To this aim, possible areas of interaction between two processes will be discussed by providing insight about the tools of externalisation. Based on this discussion about EIM in the Mediterranean, four future scenarios will be outlined.

The analysis will start with the discussion of externalisation and environmental migration interaction in southern Mediterranean. Three tasks will be performed in the first section: (i) the externalisation of migration policy will be examined through the historical development of the process vis-à-vis the EU's southern neighbourhood; (ii) the EU's approach to EIM will be explained; and (iii) the section will conclude with the discussion of interaction areas between the two processes. The second section studies the policy tools of externalisation, and the third section discusses the effects of externalisation processes for migrants who are caught in the buffer zone and for societies/states in the EU's southern neighbourhood. The empirical focus is on the externalisation practices taking place since 2004 to the end of 2010. These discussions will contribute to the construction of future scenarios regarding EIM in the Mediterranean region in the last section. Before this engagement, two caveats are in order.

First, in EU decision making, the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament interact. When a decision in the area of externalisation of migration control is to be taken, important disagreements often emerge between these institutions. For example, the European Parliament is critical to the externalisation tools adopted (Rodier, 2006). Institutional politics around externalisation and discursive competition of different EU institutions and member states have been studied and must be acknowledged (Jeandesboz, 2009; Pawlak, 2009). Moreover, some tools discussed below have been operationalised more effectively and intensively by member states than by the EU as a result of their bilateral arrangements with southern Mediterranean states.

Another caveat concerns the link between migration and environmental change. It is generally accepted that a direct causal relationship between environmental change and migration has not been determined yet (De Haas, 2007). According to the prevailing view in the academic literature, migration is affected by a combination of push and pull factors in political, economic and social areas, but not in environmental areas *per se*. Acknowledging the accuracy of this, possible interaction between the EU's externalisation policies and EIM is still a legitimate question because externalisation and this type of migration can affect each other.

Externalisation/environmental migration nexus in the southern Mediterranean

Emergence and development of the idea of externalisation

The harmonisation of migration and asylum policies of EU member states since the late 1980s failed to control migration flows in EU member states where the issue of migration was being

politicised along the lines of ‘abuse to the asylum system’ and ‘illegal immigrant influx’ (Van Dijk, 1997; Brochmann and Hammer, 1999). Within this politicised environment, policy makers at EU level developed a migration policy that aims to integrate EU neighbours into the attempt to halt unwanted migrants (i.e. irregular migrants and assumedly ‘bogus’ asylum seekers). The connection between migration policies and external relations stemmed from the idea that the effective way of ensuring freedoms in the EU is conditional upon securing EU borders through cooperation with neighbouring states. This idea resulted in the launch of the externalisation process.

The externalisation of migration control, which is one of the central dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), was in fact shaped long before the launch of ENP in 2004. In the Edinburgh European Council of 1992, external aspects of migration control were discussed for the first time at EU level. The idea of readmission agreements was introduced in Edinburgh (Balzacq, 2009: 23). In the same year, the pillar structure was created with the Maastricht Treaty. While the external relations of the Union were included in the Common Foreign and Security Policy Pillar (the second pillar), migration was dealt with under the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar (the third pillar).

In 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, or the Barcelona Process) was launched vis-à-vis the EU’s southern neighbourhood. However, migration control was not one of the top political objectives of the EMP, which focused mainly on political and economic cooperation between the partners. This situation changed in parallel with two intra-EU developments. First, in 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty created the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), where EU citizens would enjoy freedoms extensively in a secure environment within EU borders. Controlling borders was deemed necessary for this (Guild, 2006). Second, in 1998, the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration was established to discuss the external dimension of migration in the EU and to formulate policies targeting any country that migrants pass on the way to the EU. For the first time, action plans were designed for some transit and migrant-producing countries (Balzacq, 2009: 23).

In the Tampere Presidency Conclusions (European Council, 1999), it was stated that ‘all competences and instruments at the disposal of the Union, and in particular, in external relations must be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the area of freedom, security and justice. Justice and Home Affairs concerns must be integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union policies and activities’. As a result, a ‘cross-pillarisation’ process between the second and third pillars was given an impetus (Pawlak, 2009). The 9/11 terrorist attacks affected this process by enforcing cooperation in the area of counterterrorism in the political agenda of EU external affairs. In the Laeken Presidency Conclusions (European Council, 2001), ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘terrorism’ were discussed *together* as threats to European security. In 2002, the link between external relations and migration control was strengthened. In the Seville Presidency Conclusions (European Council, 2002), it was stated that ‘any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Union or the European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration’. After the Madrid bombings in 2004, the Hague Action Plan (EU Council, 2004a) was adopted with a strong focus on security, which, according to the EU member states, had ‘acquired new urgency’ (Balzacq and Carrera, 2006)¹.

¹ Balzacq and Carrera argued that the Hague action plan had a stronger focus on security, and then analysed the process of securitisation through policy tools. For the opposite view, see Boswell (2007).

The ENP was launched in 2004 in this political environment with a special emphasis on externalisation of migration control policies. The ENP was designed to target the EU's eastern and southern neighbourhoods (the Middle East and North Africa), excluding Turkey². Association agreements were signed with the participating neighbours. The Commission was tasked to prepare action plans for all partners. All action plans included clauses about migration control. Since 2005, the Commission has been preparing annual progress reports for each partner country³. In 2005, following the call from the European Council (the heads of Member States), the Commission and the Council prepared *Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean*. In this document, the following practices were determined as some priority areas:

- 'implementing joint operations in the Mediterranean Sea;
- establishing regional network of Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) in the Mediterranean;
- making available experiences and best practices where appropriate from other regional cooperation structures;
- engaging third Mediterranean countries in the feasibility study of a Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network, Mediterranean surveillance system.' (EU Council, 2005).

The externalisation of migration control has been generally performed through the tools above.

The externalisation of migration control has two components: (i) the exportation of classic migration control instruments (such as border control or capacity building for asylum applications) to sending or transit countries outside the EU; (ii) a series of provisions for facilitating the return of asylum seekers and irregular migrants to third countries (Boswell, 2003: 620–622). The underlying rationality of externalisation can be defined as 'external governance of the EU's internal security', which refers to 'the mode of governance through which the EU seeks to ensure the European Neighbourhood Policy's countries' participation in the realization of its internal security project' (Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009). In other words, as put by Wolff *et al.* (2009: 13), an idea was institutionalized: 'the EU's external relations should be used to attain the EU's internal security objectives'. The primary internal security project of the EU is to construct an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'.

² In 2008, Union for Mediterranean (UfM) was launched as a new scheme to reinvigorate the principles of the Barcelona Process. However, migration control is not on the political agenda of the Union. Although it focuses on cooperation across the Mediterranean countries on environmental issues, this cooperation does not entail EIM. That is why UfM was not included in the analysis. See <http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/environment-and-water/>

³ Action plans were prepared by the EU in consultation with the partner states in the ENP. The plans shape the areas and level of bilateral cooperation between the partner state and the EU. For the plans and reports, see http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

Environmentally induced migration in the Mediterranean and the EU

In June 2007, the European Council invited the High Representative and the EU Commission to prepare a report on climate change and international security. The report was published in March 2008. In this joint report, the High Representative and the EU Commission (2008a) presented a perspective that understands climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’. It means that climate change ‘exacerbates existing trends, tensions, and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone’. The report defined EIM under the title of ‘threats’. In parallel with the threat multiplier understanding, the report argued that ‘those parts of the populations that already suffer from poor health conditions, unemployment or social exclusion are rendered more vulnerable to the effects of climate change ... Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure’. As made clear in the follow-up report presented by the High Representative (EU Commission, 2008b), EIM is the ‘main area of concern’ of the EU *only* in relation to the Maghreb (not, for example, Africa or Central Asia). The Council (2009) endorsed both reports.

Interaction between EIM and externalisation can be shaped by the nature of the former (Brown and Crawford, 2009: 17–18). First, migration can be triggered by a ‘climate event’, which refers to a sudden and hazardous change in environmental conditions that makes a geographical area uninhabitable (e.g. hurricanes, floods, typhoons). EIM due to climate events in the southern Mediterranean can be thought in relation to floods. Although they are not common in southern Mediterranean countries, when floods take place their effects are disastrous (such as the flood disaster in November 2001 in Algeria). As the population is densely concentrated in areas where the risk of flood is high, population movement in the case of flood is likely (De Haas, 2011). However, it must be noted that climate events in the southern Mediterranean (such as monsoons in India and Bangladesh or the 2004 tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia) are unlikely. The greater risk for the southern Mediterranean is environmental change that takes place in time and, in combination with political, economic and social factors, prompts individuals to migrate: climate processes.

Second, EIM can occur as a result of ‘climate processes’, which are slow changes in time in environmental conditions (e.g. sea-level rise, salinisation and desertification). Populations can be affected by climate processes if the existing political, economic and social structures fail to protect the groups from the disastrous effects of these processes. In other words, climate change does not directly trigger migration, but takes the form of a ‘threat multiplier’, as defined by the European Commission. A closer look at some indicators of environmental change in the southern Mediterranean points at the seriousness of the situation.

In North African countries, as a result of erosion, salinisation and urbanisation, land degradation can be observed not only in dry areas but also in irrigated areas (Thivet, 2007). In relation to land degradation, desertification has also been observed in Morocco, coastal Algeria and Tunisia (Plan Bleu, 2008). In the same countries, aridity is expected as a result of a decrease in precipitation and an increase in temperature (MedSec, 2009). Population movements inside the countries have already been occurring from rural to urban areas, for example in Egypt and Tunisia. If this type of population movement continues inside the countries, the pressure over already scarce water resources will increase. As a result, this will cause a decline in crop productivity by rendering these countries dependent on food imports (World Bank, 2009). These environmental factors should also be thought in relation to the

demographic growth. The population increase in southern Mediterranean countries is likely to occur in coastal areas (UN, 2009).

So far, two processes have been discussed: the externalisation of migration control policy adopted at the EU level and EIM in the southern Mediterranean. While the latter has a potential to increase immigrant flow towards the EU, the former endeavours to keep some, if not all, migrants outside the AFSJ. The following subsection will focus on how the interaction between these two processes can take place.

Externalisation/environmentally induced migration: possible interaction areas

In the southern Mediterranean, externalisation and EIM interact in three areas. First, because of the geographical proximity and the migration network provided by North Africans in the EU, EIM can accelerate migratory pressures towards the EU by challenging the externalisation process. Second, considering that the southern Mediterranean is the main concern of the EU in relation to EIM (see section IV), it can be argued that the EU's approach to environmental migration (or how the EU tackles environmentally induced migrants) will be influenced by the externalisation process as well. With the extensive focus on offloading migrants to the buffer zone, environmentally induced migrants can also be offloaded. Whether or not this happens, however, is not currently clear as EIM has not been specifically addressed by the EU. EU institutions prefer to address climate change-related issues (such as desertification through the Nile Basin Initiative) that might cause migration. However, the question remains as to how the Commission or the Council deals with EIM from and via the southern Mediterranean *per se*. ENP action plans include clauses about environment and migration separately without so far forming a linkage between the two issues. For example, Egypt's action plan includes clauses such as 'implementation the national plan for combating desertification'⁴. With this, the EU and Egypt acknowledged the problem of desertification in Egypt. However, they omitted to formulate possible actions to address human mobility from the southern Mediterranean to the northern shores caused by desertification.

The final area of interaction concerns the fact that although EU-level institutions refrain from using the language of 'forced migration' or 'refugee' in relation to EIM, mass influx of environmentally induced migrants from the southern Mediterranean can challenge the offloading asylum responsibilities to southern neighbourhood. The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) recognises environmentally induced migrants as forced migrants⁵. Contrary to these approaches, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) uses 'environmental migrants' who are 'persons or group of persons, who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions' (Brown, 2008). This definition does not use 'forced migration' language, although it acknowledges the compulsory nature of EIM. However, no governmental actor has so far given a sign of recognising the compulsory nature of this type of migration, as this recognition might imply the responsibility of offering protection to these migrants. Having an important intergovernmental character, the EU is not an exception.

⁴ EU/Egypt Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf

⁵ Forced Migration website, <http://www.forcedmigration.org/whatisfm.htm>

In the southern Mediterranean, a mass influx of migrants following a ‘climate event’ can take the form of forced migration, which challenges the externalisation process of asylum policies. In the face of such immigrant influx, the EU might accept them as forced migrants and offer ‘subsidiary protection status’ (SPS), which is a form of ‘international protection status, separate but complementary to refugee status, granted by a member state to a third country national or stateless person who is not a refugee but is otherwise in need of international protection and is admitted as such to the territory of this Member State’ (EU Commission, 2001). However, there is no *acquis* in the EU about this status. In addition, the adoption of SPS at the EU level may have a marginal impact on EIM. This is because as asylum policies are externalised through Safe Third Country policy and Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs), environmentally induced migrants can still be offloaded to the buffer zone.

The process of externalisation should be re-thought in relation to EIM from and via the southern Mediterranean as two processes are likely to challenge each other. The next two sections will discuss the policy tools of externalisation and their effects on migrants and states/societies in North Africa.

The objective and policy tools of externalisation in the southern Mediterranean

The tool (or instrument approach) is primarily introduced in the area of EU’s external relations by Thierry Balzacq (2009). For Balzacq, a tool or an instrument embodies ‘a specific image of the partners and, to a large extent, what ought to be done’ (2009: 17). He then defines three types of tools. *Regulatory tools* (such as action plans) aim to structure the milieu where the other two tools can be implemented. *Incentive tools* provide a ‘carrot’ to the partners to cooperate with the EU and *capacity tools* aim to improve the skills of the partners to pursue a policy successfully (2009: 18–20). The following will focus mainly on the capacity tools of externalisation of migration policy. These are the tools that both the EU and member states have been largely adopting. Through these policies, a buffer zone has been constructed in the southern Mediterranean.

The externalisation of migration control policies has one main goal: keeping the unwanted migrants (that said, assumedly ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and irregular migrants) outside EU borders by constructing a buffer zone between the AFSJ and these migrants. This buffer zone corresponds to the third circle in the four-level concentric circle model developed by Lavenex and Uçarer (2002). According to their model, the first ‘inner circle’ is the Western European countries; the second circle is the accession countries in Eastern Europe; the fourth is the countries that produce migrants, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. The third circle, which is defined in this report as the ‘buffer zone’, includes countries that are tied to the EU through association agreements. The main objective of the third circle is to act like a buffer zone to stop some migrants before they migrate further to the second and first circles (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2002: 8–9).

This buffer zone is designed to perform three functions. The first function is to process asylum applications of would-be refugees outside EU borders by ‘assuming’ that partner states in the neighbourhood offer sufficient protection for those who seek international protection. This policy helps offload EU member states’ asylum responsibility to the neighbourhood and determine genuine refugees *outside* the EU borders. Second, the Council, along with the

Commission, aims to prevent the movement of irregular migrants towards the EU through policies that are performed in cooperation with the EU's neighbours. Irregular migrants are stopped either before they start their migration (e.g. keeping them in migrant camps in the southern Mediterranean) or during their migration (border guard operations in the territorial waters of southern Mediterranean states). The third function of the buffer zone is that the EU neighbourhood becomes, so to speak, a 'dumping area' of the EU to which member states extradite irregular migrants *inside* the EU. The primary policy in relation to this objective is the readmission agreements.

As to the capacity tools, it is possible to highlight particular tools derived from the action plans of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. These instruments include exporting surveillance technology to partner countries, training their border guards, providing financial aid to modernise security enforcement agencies in order to increase their ability to deal with irregular migration, sending Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) and engaging with information exchange. According to the EU Council (2004b), sending ILOs to neighbouring states contributes to increasing information exchange in the areas of irregular migration control, repatriating apprehended irregular migrants and managing regular migration. Libya and Morocco particularly are frontrunners in this cooperation (HRW, 2006a). The ENP action plan of Morocco determined the construction of the largest border surveillance system in the southern neighbourhood in this country. As a policy of capacity building of the Algerian police, the EU has allocated €10 million (Cabras, 2009). Egypt obtained financial help in order to enhance information exchange on the issue of migration; Egypt and the EU have also worked together in the Working Group on Migration, Social and Consular Affairs (EU Commission, 2009).

As one of the central functions of the buffer zone in the southern Mediterranean is to create a legal space to which the EU can repatriate irregular migrants, re-admission agreements have been considered as vital to constructing this space. All action plans include a clause about negotiating re-admission agreements under the framework of ENP. The EU also provides a carrot to encourage the ENP partners to sign a multilateral re-admission agreement: visa facilitation for the nationals of states which signed the agreement. In this sense, this tool has the character of incentive tool, albeit an unsuccessful one. No southern Mediterranean states have so far signed such an agreement for visa facilitation, although it has been an objective since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995. This is mainly because southern Mediterranean states do not wish to become areas where EU member states send unwanted migrants out through these agreements (De Haas, 2006).

In the area of asylum, the main capacity tool is to launch RPPs (EU Commission, 2005). In fact, the externalisation of asylum policy started with the introduction of 'Host Third Country' and 'Safe Third Country' principles, which enabled EU member states to send asylum seekers back to those countries that they passed on their way to the EU. This process started in the early 1990s in relation to the eastern neighbourhood as a matter of 'redistribution for handling asylum claims' (Lavenex, 1999: 76, see especially 76–83). These countries were *deemed* to be safe by the EU. The introduction of RPPs is another phase of the externalisation process that enables EU member states to process asylum applications in the neighbourhood where RPPs are launched. RPPs were officially created in 2005. As stated by Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Antonio Vitorino (2005), the EU's objective with RPPs is to 'transform a country of transit [in the EU's neighbourhood] into a country of first asylum'. To this aim, Euromed Migration II in 2008 was initiated. The Commission (2010) proposed to launch RPPs in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

The construction of a buffer zone through the process of externalisation mainly involves capacity tools. However, there is also another tool, which cannot be included in one of the

three tools of Balzacq. The EU (and EU member states) also externalises migration control policies into the southern neighbourhood through militarising the Mediterranean Sea. In 2003, the Spain–Morocco and the Italy–Libya agreements were announced with regard to joint naval patrols in the Mediterranean Sea (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004). Since 2004, Morocco–Spanish joint naval patrols have conducted off-shore operations in both the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean (Lahlau, 2006: 121). In 2003, five southern European countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece) agreed to create a European security zone to tackle irregular migration by military means on their territorial water together (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006: 21). In 2004, the EU’s border agency FRONTEX was established. FRONTEX-coordinated operations have been continuing in the Mediterranean since then (Donoghue *et al.*, 2006; FRONTEX, 2010).

Effects of externalisation in the southern neighbourhood of the EU

Effects of externalisation on migrants in southern Mediterranean

One of the most important implications of externalisation policies (especially in the form of militarisation of the Mediterranean Sea) is that irregular migrants are not deterred from migration as a result of these policies, but they are encouraged to explore new routes, some of which are more dangerous and risky (Spijkerboer, 2007: 131). For example, in 2002, Spain introduced SIVE (Spanish Integral Service of External Vigilance) to its borders. SIVE included thermal and infrared cameras, police units and surveillance towers. The objectives were to detect smuggling boats on the sea through 24-hour surveillance of coastal areas and constant patrolling. In 2004, the apprehended irregular migrants on the Spanish mainland border were 15,675; in 2005 the number decreased to 11,781; in the same period, the number on Italian borders rose from 13,594 in 2004 to 22,824 in 2005 (Cutitta, 2007: 2). However, the most considerable effect was the sharp increase in the Canary Islands. In 2005, the number of detected irregular migrants was 4,715; the number in 2006 was nearly 31,000 (De Haas, 2007: 62). The point is that the militarisation of borders did not stop irregular migrants. The effect was the redirection of routes towards the less militarised, and sometimes more dangerous, areas.

A similar trend can be observed by analysing recent data published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The EU conducted six operations in the Mediterranean in 2009 (FRONTEX, 2010). The early statistics on 2009 from the UNHCR highlighted a certain level of decrease in the number of the irregular sea arrivals in southern European countries⁶. However, in the same period, the UNHCR observed a considerable increase in the level of irregular crossings from Somalia to Yemen, which is continuously reported as more risky and dangerous (see, for example, MSF, 2008).

Another consequence of externalisation is that irregular migrants are encouraged to work with smuggling organisations that have become ‘professionalised’. Many smugglers have now upgraded their *pataras* (African-style wooden boats) to *zodiacs* equipped with surveillance systems (Lutterbeck, 2006: 77). These more ‘professionalised’ tools are introduced by smugglers so as not to be apprehended during the operations, which are partly conducted by

⁶ UNHCR, *Asylum and Migration* (February 2010) <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html>

FRONTEX and partly by member states themselves in cooperation with North African partners. Notwithstanding the number of migrants saved, many deadly incidents also occur during the operations. There are reports that some boats capsized trying to escape from border guards; some crashed with border guards' boats, leaving many irregular migrants dead. For example, on 28 July 2006, a smuggling boat was intercepted by border guards. During the 'rescue' operation, the boat capsized and two migrants died (Maccanico, 2006). Irregular migrants are also subjected to violence inflicted by human smugglers. Rapes, beatings, killings and verbal and physical insults by human smugglers are well documented by different non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and scholars (Van Hear, 2004; Collyer, 2006; Hamood, 2006; Carling, 2007; Fortress Europe, 2007).

Migrants have been subject to serious insecurities in the buffer zone that the EU has been constructing to keep out unwanted migrants. A migrant from Ethiopia who received refugee status in Italy explained the situation in Libya to Human Rights Watch: 'Young Libyans in the street sit around and wait to attack foreigners ... One day five Libyan men asked me my religion. I responded that I am Christian. They asked me my name and then grabbed me and beat me on the back ... You cannot move freely on the streets, cannot attend school, cannot buy things in shops' (HRW, 2006b). Christian immigrants in particular suffer from racist violence in southern Mediterranean countries (Fortress Europe, 2007).

The abuse by the hands of some officials in Morocco was also observed. Médecins Sans Frontières (2006) published a report related to the violence migrants were subjected to by Moroccan officials. Similar incidents can be enlisted with examples from Libya, Morocco and Egypt. Among them, serious violations of human rights have been performed in migrant camps that are part of the process of externalisation under capacity building. A sub-Saharan migrant, Fatawhit, was detained in Kufrah detention centre and told Fortress Europe that 'I have seen many women raped in Kufrah detention centre. The police officers would enter the room, take a woman and gang rape her in front of everyone. They did not distinguish between single and married woman; many of them ended up pregnant and had to undergo an abortion, illegally, endangering their lives seriously. I saw many women crying because their husbands were beaten, but it was of no use to stop the truncheon blows on their backs' (Fortress Europe, 2007). This is the Kufrah migration camp, which was visited by FRONTEX in 2007 in order to check the feasibility of the camp to use it as a detention centre. FRONTEX (2007) only found that the conditions in Kufrah were 'rudimentary and lacking in basic amenities'.

Effects of externalisation on southern Mediterranean countries

Converting the southern Mediterranean region into a buffer zone through externalisation has had implications for the countries in the region as well (Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011). One of the most important consequences of externalisation (and therefore offloading migrants to the buffer zone) is, in parallel with the increasing number of migrants, the emergence of, as put by Bensaad (2007: 63), 'slavery economies'. Coupled with xenophobia, negative perceptions about migrants spread among the societies in southern Mediterranean in relation to this new type of slavery economy. For example, in Libya, 'a slavery economy is being built, with a mix of local notables and entrepreneurs, local and south Saharan mafias, and agents of the state: a slave market of labourers for construction and for domestic work, white slavery (although in this case, it is "blacks") for prostitution, network of "racketeers" and "mules" for transit' (Bensaad, 2007: 63–64). Prostitution of sub-Saharan woman and children is spreading in Morocco, and the US Secretary of State Bureau of Democracy and Human Rights criticised the Moroccan


government for its failure to address this problem⁷. Consequently, the slavery economy feeds into xenophobia and stereotypes in societies, an example of which was presented above.

In addition, negative perceptions and attitudes towards migrants can be observed at state level (Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011). The Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs once stated that ‘certain quarters of Tripoli [being] ... under the control of immigrants. They impose their laws; drugs and prostitution flourish. When I said that for us it’s an invasion, that is exactly what I think’ (quoted in Bensaad, 2007: 59–60). This type of attitude towards sub-Saharan migrants is widely documented (Holm, 2008; HRW, 2006a,b). As negative perceptions nestle into different levels of bureaucracies, attitudes of officials towards migrants become harsher (for example, situations in camps). It was reported that Egyptian security forces the use lethal weapons against irregular migrants who try to cross the border⁸. As more immigrants are accumulated in the buffer zone through externalisation policies of the EU, these types of xenophobic attitudes and violent practices to stop migration are likely to continue.

The EU’s approach to EIM with specific focus on the southern Mediterranean emerged in tandem with the externalisation of migration control policies. The previous sections provide the foundation upon which the relationship between externalisation and environmental migration can be discussed in consideration with the possibilities that the EU (and member states) can face in the upcoming decades. The report will be concluded with a discussion of possible future scenarios that can arise in the southern Mediterranean.

Environmental migration in the southern Mediterranean: future scenarios

Based on the discussion above, four possible future scenarios can be constructed. For all scenarios, environmental degradation in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa continues. Two factors interact: externalisation (x -axis) and management of EIM by southern Mediterranean states (y -axis).



⁷ See <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136075.htm>

⁸ <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm>

In scenario A (good management of EIM by southern Mediterranean States and more externalisation by the EU), externalisation continues and becomes more intensive. The number of migrants in southern Mediterranean countries continues to increase. However, EIM is well managed by southern Mediterranean states by considering various factors such as urbanisation, equal distribution of scarce resources and human rights of migrants.

In this scenario, although it is too early to conduct an analysis of recent uprisings in some southern Mediterranean countries in relation to EIM, newly formed popular governments perform a better management of natural resources and address the problems of desalinisation and desertification more efficiently than their predecessors. This can decrease the level of EIM within these countries. However, EIM from sub-Saharan Africa continues. States adopt policies to avoid leaving these migrants at the margins of the societies and to provide them with basic social and economic rights. Xenophobia decreases. As these migrants achieve some level of protection in these countries, they do not move towards the EU.

The EU and member states provide development aid to address EIM specifically. Some development aid in the areas of migration and the environment has already channelled, albeit separately (Adepoju *et al.*, 2009; Van Seters and Wolff, 2010). These instruments are strongly linked; specific projects to address EIM are created. The EU adds sections about EIM to the country environmental profiles of southern Mediterranean states. In other words, the EU links environmental change and migration in its external relations. Capacity tools of externalisation currently focus on the increasing capacity of southern Mediterranean states to keep unwanted migrants in their territories. These tools are adapted to serve better management of migration respecting fundamental rights and freedoms of migrants.

In Scenario B (good management of EIM by southern Mediterranean states and less externalisation by the EU), EU member states are willing to accept some irregular migrants and/or asylum seekers, and integrate them into the host societies. Because EIM is well managed by southern Mediterranean states, the burden on the EU is not high.

In this scenario, the following situation changes. As to the remainder, one of the most important objectives of externalisation is 'to identify, isolate, and deflect the *mala fide* from the *bona fide* migrant' (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006: 9). *Mala fide* migrants are primarily those who use irregular channels. The caveat here is that irregular migrants also include asylum seekers and those who need other types of protection⁹. However, the process of externalisation aims to offload all types of *unwanted* migrants without giving due attention to why they left their countries. EIM from sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East to Europe is likely to occur due to climatic processes, such as gradual decline of arable lands, salinisation and desertification (Pla Sentis, 2006). Environmental change hereby becomes a 'threat multiplier', which interacts and accelerates already existing political, economic and social problems. As a result, it will become a challenge to determine the causes of migration, whether or not the migrants will be considered as forced migrants.

⁹ This point was made by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), the Spanish Commission for Refugees (CEAR) and Amnesty International. Following the statement of FRONTEX about its operations in the Mediterranean, they urged the European governments that 'European governments brag about their success in fighting irregular migration but refugees who are prevented from arriving to the European territory are paying the price of this "success"'. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Spanish Commission on Refugees and Amnesty International (2010), Human rights organizations urge the European governments to adapt border management to ensure that refugees can reach Europe', 24 February. Available from: http://www.ecre.org/resources/Press_releases/1523

The EU currently lacks institutionalised mechanisms to address this problem, which has three dimensions: (i) the EU has not defined (or attempted to define) who environmentally induced migrants are (considering the interaction between different causes of migration, this represents an important challenge for the EU); (ii) the EU does not have a mechanism to tackle the mass influx of the EIMs as a result of a climate event; and (iii) the EU has not clarified if it addresses environmentally induced migrants as ‘forced migrants’ who need protection, and, if so, whether they will be addressed through RPPs in the buffer zone. For example, Denmark has a conception of ‘climate refugee’, but many EU states do not have such a specific refugee group.

According to scenario B, EU institutions address these problems efficiently. Giving up the policy of keeping all unwanted migrants outside the EU borders, some protection mechanisms are created at the EU level to deal with environmentally forced migrants in the AFSJ. Denmark’s ‘climate refugee’ definition is Europeanised and member states provide them with some type of protection. SPS is also introduced as a solution to this problem. Three advantages can be listed. First, because the EU shares the burden with southern Mediterranean states, the possibility of social tensions on both sides of the Mediterranean decreases. Second, human rights of migrants can be better protected as their need for smuggling networks decreases. Third, because a new legal channel for environmentally induced migrants is created, irregular migration in the EU decreases.

Scenario C (poor management of EIM by southern Mediterranean states and more externalisation by the EU): environmentally induced migrants will remain inside southern Mediterranean countries because individuals displaced by land degradation do not have resources to migrate to Northern Mediterranean countries through regular or irregular channels. In this scenario, migrants who have been offloaded by member states to southern Mediterranean countries have to compete with a greater number of natives for scarce resources. This creates internal tensions. While the number of migrants is increasing, slavery economies become stronger. Xenophobia increases. Tensions result in violent clashes (such as the crisis in Libya in 2000).

Some environmentally induced migrants aim to migrate to Europe through irregular channels. As a result, they are subjected to externalisation tools. As they are not accepted as ‘forced migrants’, they are returned to their home countries, if they do not die during the Mediterranean crossings. This increases the level of human disasters faced by migrants as a result of externalisation policies.

In the extreme version of this scenario, environmentally induced migrants migrate to Europe in great numbers through irregular channels. Although this possibility is more likely due to a climate event, the increasing number of migrants and the competition they create for limited resources can gradually cause a mass exodus.

Interaction of climate processes with poverty, political instability, conflicts, social exclusion and economic marginalisation becomes a ‘push’ factor for migrants (Srichandan, 2009: 7). As a result, environmentally induced migrants increasingly become the targets of externalisation policies of the EU as many of them, lacking financial tools for legal migration, attempt to use irregular migration channels. Environmentally induced migrants are put in the all-encompassing basket of ‘illegal migrants’ and are offloaded in the buffer zone through militarised operations or readmission agreements, or RPPs if they seek asylum. New waves of EIMs contribute to already spreading negative ideas and attitudes towards migrants at societal and state level in the southern Mediterranean.

In scenario D (poor management of EIM by southern Mediterranean states and less externalisation by the EU), southern Mediterranean states fail to manage EIM. As the EU softens externalisation policy, more migrants will be willing to move to the EU. Motivated by environmental reasons and ineffective protection in southern Mediterranean states (push factors), environmentally induced migrants embark upon journeys to apply for protection in the EU (a pull factor). Moreover, non-EIMs also join them to abuse the new mechanism solely created for EIMs. This feeds anti-immigrant sentiments in the EU by feeding ‘bogus asylum seekers’ perceptions. As a result, new mechanisms in the EU such as ‘climate refugees’ are eventually abolished to prevent the abuse.

In this scenario, new popular governments not only fail to establish the system of good governance to manage scarce resources, but also cannot provide stability in the region. This can create refugee movements, along with alleviating EIM. As the mass influx from Libya towards Europe has recently proved, the EU has no mechanism to deal with this type of migration other than restricting the Schengen Agreement for third-country nationals¹⁰. Human disasters in the Mediterranean crossings and the failure of EU units to prevent them, as happened in April–May 2011, continue (Shenker, 2011).

Conclusion

Can the EU address future EIM effectively in its southern neighbourhood in the next 50 years? This depends on the extent to which the EU bodies (including member states) prepare themselves institutionally for the possible problems stemming from accelerated migratory pressures from the southern Mediterranean towards the EU. In the southern Mediterranean, where the EU and member states direct their externalisation policies, possible migratory pressures towards Europe are projected. In sub-Saharan Africa, migration stemming from heavy urbanisation in coastal areas, drought and desertification in rural areas is likely to occur increasingly by 2050 (Brown and Crawford, 2009: 18–19). Although the majority of these sub-Saharaners generally migrate either within the country or to other neighbouring sub-Saharan countries, some might migrate in Europe via North Africa (Busby *et al.*, 2010). As a result, they can be targeted by externalisation policies. The process of converting transit southern Mediterranean countries to countries of immigration will be accelerated. Migratory pressure from North Africa to Europe is also visible as decreasing arable lands in North Africa can generate migration. According to a projection based on the latest statistics, in 2050, 340,000 additional agricultural-yield North Africans may migrate to Europe (the total number of agricultural-yield migrants from all of Africa to Europe is projected to be 1.92 million) (Busby *et al.*, 2010: 9).

The buffer zone that the EU has been constructing through externalisation policies in the southern Mediterranean has already given signs of discontent about increasing number of immigrants. At societal and state levels, xenophobia and violent attitudes towards immigrants have been documented. In different southern Mediterranean countries, neither state- nor societal-level actors are happy to be named as ‘the policeman of Europe’; they also find the EU’s externalisation policies to be ‘short-sighted’, not addressing the root causes of migration (Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011). These states are already reluctant to sign readmission agreements in spite of the EU’s offer of visa facilitation. Closing down the EU borders to environmentally

¹⁰ See BBC News Website, France and Italy push for reform of Schengen treaty, 26 April 2011. Available from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13189682>

induced migrants from sub-Saharan Africa can lead to more migrant accumulation in these countries. This in turn can hinder these states' cooperation with the EU in the externalisation process. In addition, southern Mediterranean countries are also projected as producers of environmentally induced migrants. Competition over limited resources between sub-Saharan Africans and North Africans can be a source of instability in the EU's southern neighbourhood.

The interaction between EIM and the process of externalisation represents a conundrum for scholars and policy makers alike. Although the effects of externalisation have been observed for some time, it can be argued that environmental change will bring a new dimension to the process. Failure of EU bodies to formulate policies specifically targeting EIMs currently seems to be the most important problem facing the EU. In the wake of a new political structure arising in the southern Mediterranean, the EU policy makers can also consider how to manage different types of migration flows, rather than offloading them at any cost.

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