

6. Populist Politics and the 'radical right' in 2014 Elections

Dominic Wring, Christiane Grill, Norbert Merkovity and David Deacon

The European Parliament elections in 2014 ended in momentous gains throughout the continent for several groupings that have explicitly questioned the form, and even the very existence, of the European Union (EU) itself. This growth in discontentment presents a potentially formidable challenge to the integrationist agenda that has hitherto largely prevailed in Brussels. The orthodoxy that states could achieve so much more by working closely together is now under threat. So it perhaps somewhat paradoxical that what are often labelled 'Euroskeptics', or self-identify as 'Eurorealists', have exploited the European Parliament (EP) as a major campaigning platform from which to express themselves. Moreover, these parties have achieved representation and thereby gained practical resources that have in turn helped them further mobilize support within their respective member states. Perhaps one of the few comforts for adherents to what was once the seemingly hegemonic Europhile consensus that still dominates the Council of Ministers and European Commission is that the various skeptical forces ranged against them are ideologically divided and agree on little save their desire to hasten the end of the Euro, the European Union or both.

Commenting on politics during the mid-1990s Andreas Schedler described the then emerging 'Anti-Political Establishment' (APE) as a 'spectre... haunting contemporary party politics' (1996: 291). This phenomenon included the developing Eurosceptic forces within EU member states. Since then 'APE' parties have become an established feature within the EP and it is noteworthy that the anti-integrationists have also used this forum to try and influence the domestic political agenda in their respective states. The Parliament has proved useful in helping these parties gain leverage and representation in their countries' 'first order' or governmental elections. Many of these politicians share what Schedler characterized as largely right wing affinities that provide a rallying point for a melange of disaffected voters, disgruntled conservatives, overt nationalists and covert racists (ibid.).

The 2007-8 economic crises provided an obvious opportunity for APE parties. The resulting dissatisfaction with incumbent politicians across Europe led to the insurgents gaining further support and seats in the 2009 European elections. But it was the conclusion of the subsequent campaign in 2014 that witnessed even more significant breakthroughs by the various Euroskeptic groupings. Cumulatively these parties offer a potentially strong, sustained alternative to the integrationist narrative that has hitherto informed much EU debate. The once self-assured Christian Democrat, Socialist and Liberal parties that helped create the European Economic Community (EEC) and subsequently dominated successive parliamentary elections now face a major existential threat of the kind they have not previously experienced. This chapter will consider the source of this challenge through exploring the messages produced and disseminated by the various skeptical parties during the 2014 elections, specifically through examination of their own political advertisements. To that end, this chapter draws on the data collected in the international project *European Election Campaign 2014*, in which researchers from all 28 EU member states participated. The aim of this project was to collate all available offline campaign material of the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, which the eligible parties and their front-runners published. Analysis of these kinds of campaign is important because it offer insights into how more radical politicians, unencumbered by the need to mediate via the mainstream news, communicate their case to electorates on their own terms.

The primary focus of this chapter is on parties that have been labeled as 'radical right'. Critically they have made political and electoral progress over the last decade but have been unable to sustain themselves as a cohesive, unified presence within the EP. Consequently, aside from the mainstream European Peoples' Party (EPP) and its more 'Eurorealistic' rivals in the British dominated European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) grouping, the right is present in three more factions within the parliament. The rise to prominence and 2014 campaigns by leading members of each of these tendencies will be discussed in turn, starting with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), a

prominent part of the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) which succeeded the similarly named European Alliance for Freedom in 2015. Although not the largest member of the ENF, the FPÖ has established itself as one of the most influential forces in it as well as the radical right more generally. The controversy that has dogged the party and its fellow Alliance members encouraged the formation of a rival Euroskeptic grouping, the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD). This EFDD was co-created by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) which also dominates the faction and whose campaign will be analyzed in greater depth. The third manifestation of the radical right within the EP, represented here by the Hungarian nationalist Jobbik, has proven too extreme for either aforementioned skeptical grouping. It nonetheless represents a constituency that has support both domestically and elsewhere within the EU. But before turning to consider these radical right campaigns in more depth it is important and useful to acknowledge and reflect upon the other major source of skepticism towards the EU project. This has come from the left and represents an, at times, populist tradition of dissent that has been overlooked in recent years due in part to the more flamboyant activities of its counterparts on the opposite side of the political spectrum.

‘Euroskepticism’: left as well as right

Originally the most potent opposition to European integration came from radical voices on the left who critiqued the formation of a ‘common market’ in the guise of an EEC dedicated to furthering what they denounced as a more laissez faire capitalist economy (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008). There were still vestiges of this argument in advertisements produced for the 2014 EU elections. The Greek Communist KKE, for instance, depicted then Prime Minister Samaras and European Commission President Barroso embracing in what it portrayed as attempts to dupe the public on behalf of a menacing EU symbolized by a hungry wolf. The detrimental consequences of Greece remaining in the Union also informed the campaign imagery of ANTARSYA, another revolutionary leftist group contesting the elections in a country convulsed by economic problems. Their TV spot featured representatives of the nation’s youth tied, gagged and desperately needing to escape Brussels’

control. Similar sentiments informed a televised spot from the French Trotskyite Lutte Ouvriere in which leader Nathalie Arthaud talked about the failure of the EU in the context of a systemic crisis of capitalism. This theme was taken up by the German Communist KPD in a campaign broadcast that attacked the imposition of austerity on member states by a Union it denounced as an 'instrument of the banks and big business' ('EU- instrument der Banken und Konzern').

The populist critiques of EU economic policies by the KKE formed part of a campaign that culminated in them gaining EP representation but their more traditional form of communism lacks wider support across the continent. The party's trenchant positions have led to its isolation from erstwhile allies within the Assembly in the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL). A common thread in campaigning by those in the EUL-NGL has been advocacy of a radical though reformist platform devoted to working within the Union to create a more 'social' Europe. Some of this rhetoric nonetheless resembled that of the more traditional Communists with Germany's Die Linke attacking bankers 'No tax money for gambling banks!' ('Keine Steuergelder für Zockerbanken'), the French Front de Gauche denouncing austerity with 'Stop A L'Europe De La Finance: l'humain d'abord' and the new radical Spanish formation, in the guise of leader Pablo Iglesias and other supporters, promoting themselves as being on the side of the people against the mainstream elites declaring 'Podemos of course!' ('¡Claro que podemos!'). SYRIZA adopted a comparable approach in a poster, 'On May 25th we vote, they leave', that depicted the then Prime Minister Samaras alongside Chancellor Merkel as co-conspirators against the Greek public. The Dutch Socialists, another GUE-NGL affiliate, used cartoons to historicize and identify Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as the culprits behind the neo-liberal orthodoxy they hold responsible for the contemporary economic crisis.

The portrayals of Merkel, Barroso and others associated with the so-called Troika and its sponsorship of austerity in some of the Left campaigns' publicity was not intended to provoke national prejudice against foreign politicians. Rather their inclusion was designed to foster internationalism and solidarity

across borders. Within the EUL-NGL the Pirate Party perhaps best embodies this spirit of pan-European co-operation with candidates in several member states campaigning against state surveillance and online censorship. Yet despite their idiosyncratic, left-libertarian origins, the Pirates' televised appeals in countries like France, Germany and the Czech Republic were relatively conventional in featuring earnest and youthful spokespeople talking about issues. The same could also be said of the Greens who, by definition of their environmentalism, are driven by concerns that transcend narrow national considerations. Consequently, and perhaps predictably, a fair amount of these parties' advertising dealt with the perennial concern over that state of the continental not to mention the global ecological situation. For instance, Verdi, the Italian affiliate, adopted the slogan 'Per Un Europa Green' on its poster.

The Left did not have a monopoly in terms of highlighting and campaigning against the various alleged deficiencies of the EU. Some of the rhetoric and style of advertising used by others was similarly populist at times but nothing was as outrageous as the efforts of Germany's Die Partei, the ultimate 'anti-politics' organisation. This eccentric 'party' devised a campaign devoted to mocking its rivals in television spots including one featuring a bizarre sketch involving a couple in a bathroom reading 'leader' Martin Sonneborn's *Titanic* magazine. Continuing with the 'post-modern' humour another feature took the form of an out of focus pornographic film contrived to provoke a reaction. Sonneborn was subsequently elected to the European Parliament where he has been involved in various stunts including declaring himself a skeptic, but only on the specific issue of Britain's continuing membership. If nothing else this highlighted the salience of an issue that has been foregrounded by the UK's Conservatives and which led to them breaking with the EPP following a pledge by David Cameron during his successful run for his party's leadership in 2005. Cameron subsequently helped create the more 'Eurorealist' ECR which currently includes the ruling Polish Law and Justice party (PiS), the relatively new Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Danish's People's Party (DF), a group somewhat less radical than its forerunners. Although critical of the EU, these parties' adverts tended to be comparatively sober when considered alongside the campaign rhetoric of the rival factions on the right.

The AfD, for instance, produced a conventional campaign broadcast featuring various representatives of key voter demographics questioning Germany's involvement in the EU due to transport, energy and other policies.

Desperately seeking respectability? The Freedom Party of Austria and the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group.

In the European Parliament, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) was a member of the European Alliance for Freedom from 2010 to 2015 and joined the newly founded Europe of Nations and Freedom in 2015 together with other European right-wing populist parties such as France's National Front, Italy's Northern League or Netherlands' party for Freedom. The FPÖ came third in the 2014 European Elections receiving 19.7 percent of the vote, thereby confirming itself as an influential political force in domestic as well as European politics.¹ The current FPÖ Chairman Heinz-Christian Strache has succeeded in establishing his media profile and consolidating that of his party, following the pioneering work of predecessor Jörg Haider. Strache, like Haider, has used populist rhetoric to capitalize on what they perceive to be a section of the Austrian 'people's' resentment towards the political 'elite' and the status quo (Plasser & Ulram 2000; Pelinka 2002; Pelinka 2005). This is perhaps not surprising given the party was formed by a former Nazi politician during the mid-1950s before coming to wider prominence in the 1980s. During this period Haider proved a divisive though nonetheless successful figure through his use of anti-Semitic and xenophobic sentiments to garner members as well as votes for the FPÖ. Following the passage of the markedly more integrationist Single European Act, the party moved to exploit increasing resentment towards Brussels. Consequently, in 1993 Haider launched the "Austria First!" initiative, a campaign that involved the collection of signatures to force a referendum demanding further restrictions on immigration.

In 1999 the FPÖ's won 26.9 per cent in national elections and formed a coalition government with the hitherto dominant centre-right People's Party. The party's subsequent involvement in the ruling administration led to Austria becoming something of an international pariah, particularly among fellow EU

members states. One consequence of this adverse reaction was the sidelining of Haider who did not take up a ministerial position and stood down as FPÖ Chairman. During the subsequent period in government the party lost support despite, or perhaps because, it trying to present itself as a responsible force in government. The 2002 election saw a fall in FPÖ support but the return of the same coalition to office for a second term. This return to government resulted in a further loss of support- the party receiving only 6.3 percent of votes in the 2004 European poll- and a serious split the following year with Haider and allies exiting to form a rival Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ).

Following the formation of BZÖ, the new FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache sought to rejuvenate the party's fortunes by distancing himself from the anti-Semitic attitudes associated with the Haider era. Rather Strache tried to exploit and reinforce a growth in Islamophobia as well as public fears over crime and immigration (Fallend 2004; McGann & Kitschelt 2005; Luther 2007; Krzyżanowsky 2013). Appeals to patriotism replaced Haider's more nakedly nationalistic rhetoric as the FPÖ placed greater emphasis on preserving indigenous Austrian culture, so-called "*Heimat*", as well as national sovereignty against an encroachment from migrants entering the country and the European Union institutions without. Strache's freedom to exploit these themes and promote Islamophobia was made easier following his party's exit from government in 2007 (Frölich-Steffen 2004; Krzyżanowsky 2013).

The immigration issue has helped and continues to define Strache's FPÖ against its centre-right and centre-left domestic 'establishment' rivals. Campaigns reiterate the need to monitor and regulate migrants and those seeking asylum, movements that have both been made easier by EU wide initiatives. Thus the FPÖ identifies with and seeks to preserve "*Heimat*" against what it warns is a threat from alien cultures, notably Islam. In doing so the party promotes an authoritarian image designed to emphasize and reinforce its reputation as a strong political force dedicated to preserving Austria as a Christian country (Frölich-Steffen 2004; Meret 2010). Initially the FPÖ supported Austria joining the European Community believing membership could help reinforce and sustain the country's national identity.

But this changed, particularly with the replacement of the Austrian currency by the Euro in 1998, although the party anti-integrationist rhetoric was stymied by its participation in government from 2000 to 2007. The subsequent return to opposition emboldened Strache and his colleagues to increasingly attack the EU as a threat to national sovereignty (Frölich-Steffen 2004; Meret 2010).

During the 2014 European election the FPÖ issued 22 different posters in four alternative styles. In a highly personalized campaign, 18 of these adverts featured politicians and eight the face of leader Heinz-Christian Strache even though he was not personally a candidate. The latter was the simplest of the poster styles and depicted Strache, the best known party figure, alongside the party's lead election candidate, Harald Vilismky, in three posed images. Another series used the same images accompanied by what were designed to be eye catching slogans, the latter in bullet point form to emphasize key aspects of the party's electoral programme. The third set used the slogans rather than the leaders' images. Finally, the remaining posters, ten in total, were used to introduce the party's EP candidates by placing names to their respective photographs, thereby hoping to familiarize them to the electorate. Each of the four series shared common features. The Austrian and European Union flags were reproduced at the bottom of every poster and reference made to the former's colours in the slogan 'Team red-white-red' that appeared beneath the FPÖ logo. The advertisements were all emblazoned with a yellow badge complete with cross representing the act of voting. With one exception this particular element of the design featured the message: 'Warning for the EU and red-black'. Whereas the 'red' referred to the rival Social Democrats and 'black' to the centre-right People's Party, mention of the EU was designed to highlight the FPÖ's critical stance on Austrian membership and also the more integrationist policies of these rivals. The exceptional message underlined this point with the declaration 'We make Austria strong!', a clear attempt to position the party as the supposed upholder of national culture and tradition.

The party traditionally relies on catchy populist sloganeering to promote its message. During the 2006 national campaign, for instance, the chosen theme

was 'Daham statt Islam' ('Homeland instead of Islam') whereas in the subsequent 2009 European elections a similar sentiment was expressed using the different words 'Abendland in Christenhand' ('The Occident in Christian hands'). In 2014 one of the most prominent posters was 'Österreich denkt um. Zu viel EU ist dumm' ('Austria rethinks. Too much EU is silly') which, although a change from the aforementioned campaign themes, incorporated the party's fondness for using rhyming words in its sloganeering. 'Dumm' aspects criticized included the 'travelling circus' whereby European institutions were located in three separate locations requiring decision-makers to constantly move between them to get anything done. The rhyming device was also used in another advert criticizing Austrian membership of the Union: 'Wir verstehen eure Wut. Zu viel EU tut niemand gut.' ('We understand your rage. Too much EU is not good.'). The use of pronouns 'we' and 'you' along with the country's name and flag – both also deployed here – are familiar tropes associated with 'patriotic' commentators including nationalistic politicians. By using them the FPÖ sought to position itself as the party opposed to a bureaucratic and predatory EU and more implicitly those rival parties who were prepared to acquiesce to its power and influence.

The FPÖ promoted its Euroskeptical credentials through campaigning for a referendum on the European Stability Mechanism whereby those countries using the Euro were obliged to contribute funds to assuage the burden of heavily indebted states. The party suggested the crisis within the Eurozone was a problem of endemic corruption and a bankrupt system and for which Austrians should be not liable. This was linked to claims that the rival parties' economic policies had failed, particularly in relation to a banking sector which posters also excoriated. Moreover, the FPÖ called for the abandonment of the Euro and the reinstatement of indigenous currencies as a precursor to any sustained financial recovery. This was a key aspect in a platform of economic nationalism that called for Austrian cessation from labour and agricultural EU agreements. The party also made clear its opposition to free trade of a more global nature and this isolationism extended to its decidedly neutralist stance on foreign policy.

Criticism of the EU as an unwieldy bureaucracy was a, if not, *the* major theme of the FPÖ's election campaign in 2014 (Table 1). Underpinning this was a fear of cultural diversity and political independence being ceded within a more integrated United States of Europe. Several slogans articulated various grievances about the threat of Brussels encroachment into various aspects of Austrian law through means of surveillance and data retention (Table 2). The party pressed its anti-integrationist case by demanding another referendum on the country's membership of the Schengen area as part of an agreement guaranteeing free movement of people within the Union. Linked to this were concerns about the possibility of Turkey's future accession into the EU which the FPÖ firmly rejected. The party has long been a critic of migration within the Union and its allegedly negative cultural as well as economic consequences for Austria. A particular concern has been with the supposed threat from Eastern Europeans to indigenous workers' employment security, pay and conditions through their undermining existing minimum wage levels and pension entitlements. Allied to this the party argued for more stringent enforcement of the Dublin Regulation whereby asylum seekers, who the FPÖ has associated with increased criminality, are required to stay in their country of entry when arriving within the EU. Clearly the implementation or not of this policy had ramifications for a land locked country such as Austria.

Table 1: Targets of negative attacks in campaign posters

	FPÖ	UKIP	Jobbik
	%	%	%
Foreign Countries	0.0	10.0	0.0
EU Institutions / Government	45.5	20.0	0.0
Foreign / European Politicians	4.5	80.0	0.0
National Politicians	4.5	10.0	0.0
Political institutions	0.0	0.0	0.0
Economic institutions	0.0	0.0	0.0

Note: Number of posters being issued during EU election campaign:
 FPÖ: N = 22, UKIP: N = 10, Jobbik: N = 3

In to get out: UKIP and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group

The United Kingdom Independence Party were said to have 'won' the 2014 European elections in the UK by coming top of the poll with 26.8 percent of votes and 24 MEPs. This was the first time in a century that neither of the major two parties, Labour and Conservative, had received the largest support in a nationwide electoral contest. It was a remarkable feat for an organization that was founded in the early 1990s and that David Cameron had once dismissed as 'fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists, mostly'.ⁱⁱ Cameron could not have expected that his dismissive remarks would return to haunt him years later when, under pressure from UKIP going into the 2015 General Election, he committed his government to holding a referendum on UK membership of the EU by 2017 in the event of a Conservative victory. The fateful vote took place in June 2016 and resulted in a narrow victory in favour of British exit, so-called 'Brexit' (Jackson et al., 2016). Cameron had belatedly embraced the cause of the EU during a referendum he had called but ultimately he failed against a determined alliance of campaigners that included UKIP and its leader Nigel Farage.

Historically British politicians critical of the EU had tried to mobilize within the major parties, both of which were split over the 1975 referendum held to confirm UK membership of the then EEC. Since then Euroskeptics have become frustrated by what they perceive as a threat to British sovereignty from Brussels (Baker & Seawright, 1998). Following the passing of the Single European Act the self-styled 'anti-federalists' broke away from existing parties, notably the Conservatives, to form their own campaigning organizations and to contemplate fighting elections. As already noted David Cameron sought to counter this threat by forming the ECR grouping within the EP in order to distance his party from the Europhile EPP during the run up to the won signing of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Conservative involvement in the ECR has not, however, succeeded in curtailing the rise of UKIP.

Initially UKIP was not the most significant anti-EU political force and trailed in well behind the rival anti-EU Referendum Party in the 1997 UK General

Election. Since then it has steadily gained support and, more crucially, representation in the European Parliament having campaigned strongly against British membership of the Euro, a possibility that was seriously considered in 2003 by the then electorally dominant Labour government led by Tony Blair.ⁱⁱⁱ The salience of such issues combined with significant modifications to the conduct of the British poll for the European Parliament provided UKIP with a major opportunity to promote its agenda (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Whereas UK 'first order' elections use a majoritarian 'first past the post' system, the voting for EP representatives now takes a proportional form that has encouraged the rise of smaller parties. UKIP has benefitted from this arrangement introduced for the 1999 poll in which it won 3 MEPs. The subsequent elections in 2004 saw a major breakthrough for the party with the return of 12 MEPs, a position consolidated in the subsequent poll of 2009 (Ford et al., 2011 ; Whitaker & Lynch, 2011). Since then UKIP has won seats in local government but has struggled to gain representation at Westminster where it has only one MP despite receiving 12.7 percent of the vote in the 2015 General Election. This was a striking contrast to a 2014 European campaign that, by definition, foregrounded UKIP's *raison d'être* and also experienced far lower levels of voter turnout.

The steady rise of UKIP reflects the enduring controversy surrounding the European Union. The recent crisis involving member states, notably Greece, has done little to stem the intensity of debate over Britain's relationship with its EU partners. UKIP's rapid growth has presented the organization with threats as well as opportunities. Since it was formed there have been high profile fallouts, defections and embarrassments involving major figures including some of its elected members. These have included at least three acting or actual leaders who have left UKIP in acrimony. However, since 2006 the party has been led by Nigel Farage for all but a brief interregnum when he tried to win a Westminster parliamentary seat in the 2010 general election. During this time, he has established a strong media profile for himself in a way that eluded his predecessors. Farage has been keen to promote himself and UKIP as the scourge of a Westminster 'establishment' that is allegedly out of touch with the British public on Europe as well as many other issues (Lynch et al.,

2012). The 2014 campaign proved the ideal platform to demonstrate the party's electoral potency.

UKIP entered the 2014 campaign in a strong position courtesy of financial backing from wealthy supporters such as the former Conservative donor Stuart Wheeler. This enabled the party to mount the kind of outdoor advertising effort normally seen only during a national election. Key themes in the poster campaign were Brussels' challenge to UK sovereignty, the risk EU membership posed to British workers and related but more specific critiques of the EU (Table 1 and Table 2). Each image was emblazoned with the party's purple and yellow colours, its pound sterling motif inscribed with its name, and the slogan urging the public to vote for UKIP in order to 'Take Back Control of Our Country'. A poster posing the question 'Who really runs this country?' provided the answer '75% of our laws are now made in Brussels'. This was accompanied by the striking image of the UK's flag burning from the centre to reveal the EU logo beneath.

During the final week of the campaign the answer was reissued with the revised question 'Who really runs Westminster?' and an image of Big Ben, the UK parliament's tower, with the clock face showing the EU flag. This followed logically on from an earlier poster 'Nigel Farage will give Britain its voice back' depicting him alongside the four main party leaders but as the only one without a gag around his mouth. Criticism of these three political rivals was evident in other UKIP outdoor advertising proclaiming 'LibLabCon MEPs are jolly junketeers' with a photograph of a casually dressed middle-aged man straddling a plane looking as though he were going on holiday. It was striking that there was no justification of the claim that these politicians were indulging themselves at a cost to the public. This was due to ongoing hostility towards mainstream politicians following revelations in 2009 about political expenses involving members of the three major parties represented at Westminster. The critique of the supposedly corrupt political elite extended to Brussels. Another poster contrasted a photograph of members of the general public travelling on a bus, labeled, 'Your daily grind...' and with the UK flag, with another of a suited, late middle-aged male actor sitting posing in the back of an expensive

limousine. The latter image, accompanied by the EU logo, was captioned ‘... funds his celebrity lifestyle’ and subtitled ‘The UK pays £55 million a day to the EU and its Eurocrats’.

Table 2: Political issues being mentioned in campaign posters (multiple responses possible)

	FPÖ %	UKIP %	Jobbik %
Labour	9.1%	20.0%	0.0%
Unemployment	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Salaries	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Taxes	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Other Economic issues	0.0%	30.0%	66.7%
Euro policies	13.6%	10.0%	33.3%
EU politicians members	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Euro finance	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Anti-Euro	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Euro banks	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Euro funds	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Euro institutions	4.5%	40.0%	0.0%
Euro taxes	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%
European Union	0.0%	40.0%	0.0%
Other European issues	4.5%	0.0%	33.3%
Crime	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Corruption	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Social services	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Other welfare issues	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Civil rights	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
Traditions	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Anti-Politics	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Agriculture	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
Autonomy / Federalism	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%
Peace	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Immigration	4.5%	20.0%	0.0%
Other issues	77.3%	10.0%	0.0%

Note: Number of posters being issued during EU election campaign:
 FPÖ: N = 22, UKIP: N = 10, Jobbik: N = 3

UKIP made criticisms of particular policies it claimed were now Brussels' responsibility. These included the perennial issue of immigration. A poster depicting the white cliffs near Dover, the English town nearest to continental Europe, was doctored to show an escalator providing access up this normally inaccessible landmark. The image was explained by the slogan 'No border. No control.'. A subtitle explained: 'The EU has opened our borders to 4,000 people every week'. Once again no supporting reference was given for the graphic figures. The potential 'threat' to the job market was made explicit in another advert: 'EU policy at work. British workers are hit hard by unlimited cheap labour'. The poster attracted controversy when it was subsequently revealed the man featured to represent an ordinary worker was Irish rather than from the UK. Another – more simple – image of a hand pointing towards the viewer reinforced the message about employment: '26 million people in Europe are looking for work. And whose jobs are they after?'.

Radical isolation: Jobbik and the Non-Aligned Far-right

Jobbik is the pre-eminent far party represented within the European Union due to recent successes in recent Hungarian as well as EP elections. This is in contrast to erstwhile allies from other member states who have either lost support or else moderated their stances. By contrast Jobbik, that is the 'Movement for Better Hungary', has toned down some of its rhetoric but remains wedded to an ideological perspective that has left it isolated in the newly elected European Parliament. Although the EAF and EFDD groupings share the Hungarian party's concerns about immigration, the latter's platform has proven too extreme for membership of either alliance. Jobbik was formerly part of the Alliance of European National Movements but has been unable to forge a similar grouping following the 2014 elections, which saw a collapse in support for former allies such as the British National Party. To understand why this Hungarian party has been able to consolidate its position within the EP it is important to consider the background to this particular phenomenon.

The modern far-right came to prominence in Hungary when the Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) was founded in 1993 by the politicians who left the more mainstream conservative Democratic Forum after disagreements during the latter's spell in government. By 1998 MIÉP had gained parliamentary representation within the National Assembly with 5.5 percent of the vote although it lost this in subsequent elections in 2002 when its support fell to 4.4 percent. The party developed its profile through reviving rhetoric previously associated with the inter-war years and country's authoritarian past: nationalistic, chauvinistic, anti-liberal and anti-communist. Party campaigns articulated these as well as racist and social Darwinist ideologies, combining them with populist appeals and slogans that promised a new and fairer order (Tóth & Grajczár 2009: 9-10). Despite MIÉP's brief period of electoral success and subsequent decline, the grievances it sought to articulate were still apparent in Hungarian political culture. This was also part of a wider phenomenon whereby public dissatisfaction with the democratic process had led to protest voting by certain groups who felt marginalized by the major established parties in government (Van den Burg et al. 2000). This sentiment has been particularly noticeable in Hungary where MIÉP and subsequently Jobbik have mobilized resentment against minority groups that are stereotyped through the use of nationalist and populist rhetoric (Tóth & Grajczár 2009: 22). Unsurprisingly, MIÉP and Jobbik fought the 2006 national elections in alliance although they were unsuccessful in making the electoral threshold necessary to gain parliamentary representation.

Jobbik have exploited resentments that the MIÉP originally sought to address but has done by attracting younger activists with more professional, modern campaigning (Tóth & Grajczár 2012; Hajdú 2014). This approach involves traditional media such as the party's own weekly paper *Barikád* as well as newer platforms including a news portal called *alfahir.hu*, the internet site *jobbik.hu*, and an unofficial portal known as *kuruc.info* that collectively enable the party to reach potential supporters (Bársony et al. 2011). These actions involve a concerted attempt to mobilize voters, whether they be in urban or more rural communities, against what is portrayed as an out of touch metropolitan elite. The economic downturn has been a source of increasing

social tension, uncertainty as well as growing unemployment in both the countryside and cities. Jobbik has been critical of recent governments, including the previous Socialist (MSZP) and current right-wing incumbent Fidesz administrations, for presiding over economic problems and growing inequality. The party's campaigning seeks to capitalize on this through combining anti-establishment rhetoric with dire warnings about the threats posed by other phenomena, notably the Roma minority, who are routinely accused of causing petty crime in urban areas. Equally controversially spokespeople have also blamed external minorities, notably international Jewry, for their country's economic woes in comments that have been widely condemned.

Jobbik had originally sought to position themselves as guardians of social order through forming a paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard. The authorities responded by banning the Guard in 2009 but this did not, however, diminish the party's support. In the following year's national election, it reached the necessary electoral threshold to enter parliament, winning 47 seats and coming second overall in the poll with 16.6 percent of the vote ahead of the once ruling MSZP. This success was in part encouraged by the party's performance in European elections that have, as in other member states, provided an invaluable opportunity for newer or less well known parties like to win support and representation. And whereas the MIÉP's attempt to benefit from the country's first ever EU poll in 2004 ended in failure, it was the following campaign in 2009 that provided a breakthrough for its successor party.

The 2009 European elections followed on from a global economic crisis that meant it was therefore fought in an environment far less conducive for mainstream parties like Democratic Forum and the Socialists who had governed Hungary since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Consequently, there were breakthroughs for groupings such as the ecologist LMP ('Politics Can Be Different') as well as the more radical Jobbik (Várnagy 2010: 15). Public discontentment translated into protest votes and ultimately ended in the election of more non-mainstream MEPs. And, unlike other rival anti-

establishment voices, the party benefitted from clearly stated criticism of an increasingly beleaguered EU (Várnagy 2010: 19–20). Jobbik also sought to broaden its appeal by endorsing the candidacy of a non-member, the high profile lawyer Krisztina Morvai, who it also nominated for the national presidency.

Jobbik has campaigned against the encroachment of European Commission directives on various issues including the perennial issue of agriculture as well as more specific matters such as the right of non-Hungarians to purchase property within the country. Consequently, the party's 2009 campaign slogan, 'Creating a Europe of Nations', was one familiar to others sympathetic to the anti-federalist cause. This was the centerpiece of a determined effort that also saw the party become the first to gather nominations and publish their candidate list. The resulting campaign culminated with Jobbik endorsed politicians (including Morvai) winning three EP seats with 14.7 percent. It gave the party momentum for the 2010 national elections which, as noted previously, saw it make a major breakthrough. The campaign saw Jobbik using social media, notably its own unofficial news website kuruc.info, to disseminate its message and thereby bypass traditional news channels. Fidesz led by Viktor Orbán belatedly realized the threat and began to use mainstream media outlets to attack its more radical rivals having previously sought to deny them publicity (Kéri 2010: 29, 31–32).

The 2010 campaign saw more vigorous criticisms were of certain Jobbik politicians and some were subsequently removed as members. But these setbacks did not undermine the party's standing in the polls. The key Jobbik campaign slogan "Twenty Years for Twenty Years" referenced criticisms of the status quo's defence of the corruption, capitalism and Roma communities who have been attacked as sources of 'gypsy crime' (Jeskó et al. 2012: 82-3). There was also the familiar disdain for the 'establishment' both left and right who were said to have misgoverned the country. The targets of these criticisms, the MSZP and Fidesz, tried to rebut their opponents but paradoxically drew further attention to their arguments (Bozóki 2010). This pattern of engagement continued after the campaign with Jobbik establishing

itself as an opposition force in parliament as well as the country more generally. The party has begun to influence the political agenda in ways MIÉP, its predecessor on the far right, never achieved with rival parties taking fearful note.

Jobbik's 2009 and 2010 campaigns provided the party with invaluable political experience as well as marked increased in their electoral support. Unlike the MIÉP, Jobbik has also had the time and experience to develop its message and greater emphasis is placed on economic arguments rather than provoking controversy through blaming elites or minority groups for the country's problems. Party leader Gábor Vona underlined his commitment to representing 'small men' by undertaking 'ordinary work' for one day of every week throughout the 2014 elections. The European Parliament campaign slogan 'Hungarian economy, European salaries!' recognized the salience of poverty and inequality and the failure of EU membership to ameliorate both. In the National Assembly elections, the party's use of colourful posters and videos featuring young people led to it being labelled the 'Benetton campaign'. And although these messages still strongly communicated familiar nationalistic themes, the more positive style was different to past efforts and certainly those associated with the paramilitary imagery of the Hungarian Guard.

Jobbik's less negative approach to campaigning in 2014 followed a four-year term in which it has established itself as a parliamentary force. The party's communication strategy was markedly subtler than that devised in the not too distant past and attempted to promote itself as a serious alternative with a programme for government rather than as a receptacle for protest votes (see Nábelek 2014). Jobbik has already largely succeeded in mobilizing the disaffected and nationalistic minded so now campaigning turned to focus on demonstrating how the party has emerged as the 'quiet force' ready to serve (Karácsony & Róna 2010). Sandwiched between national and local elections that year, the 2014 European elections provided the party with another opportunity to promote its distinctive message. The party received 14.6 percent of the votes, at 0.1 percent only fractionally less than five years

earlier, and returned three MEPs. In the parliamentary elections the party did even better with 20.2 percent of the poll, some 3.6 percent more than 4 years earlier, which won it 23 seats in the new parliament of 199 seats. Significantly, this meant Jobbik had become the second largest party in Hungary.

Jobbik's endorsement of a so-called 'Europe of Nations' ideology informed its poster slogan 'European rights, European salaries, in the middle of Europe! (Table 2)'. The once more strident anti-EU rhetoric was no longer in evidence (Table 1). In its place was a less antagonistic message that the party was prepared to engage with others in the spirit of pan-European co-operation. Indeed, this approach mirrored campaign advertising by members of the EFN and ECR groups in that it maintained a critical position on the EU but one that was more open to collaboration rather than straightforward oppositionism. If the substance of Jobbik publicity had changed then so had the style. The use of Kalocsa patterns together was matched by a more moderate use of the Hungarian tricolour. This practice had been earlier adopted in the party's national elections efforts as part of what became known as the so-called 'Benetton campaign', a reference to the knitwear brand's famously colourful marketing. Jobbik proved successful in the 2014 election, reinforcing their image as a force that challenges the left as well as the ruling incumbent Fidesz.

This same motive could be seen in the end of party's commercial, the 'World View Eye Test' was introduced on YouTube, since the Hungarian televisions did not air any party commercials during the 2014 elections. In the video a man comes for an eye test because he is confused lately, 'he does not see things clearly'. He gets glasses and the doctor asks him to cover his right eye. Then we see that on the left lens is the EU flag. He reads out loud from the board, former slogans and promises of left-wing parties: 'More workplace, better salaries', 'We can open a pastry shop in Vienna', 'Agricultural land could be bought by foreigners', and 'Hungary performs better', this last was the actual slogan of Fidesz. When he cannot read further, the doctor says he has 'orange glaucoma' (orange is the colour of Fidesz). Then it's his right eye's turn. In Hungarian right also means good or correct, and the party's

name 'Jobbik' is based on this play of words. 'Jobbik' means 'right' and also 'the better'. We could see the Hungarian flag on the right lens of the glasses. With this eye he can see clearly, and reads out loud the 'under-performance' of former left-wing and actual right-wing governments, which are all negative and all have negative effects on everyday lives: 'Destroyed Hungarian economy', 'Stolen EU funds', 'Sold off Hungarian land', 'Adulation in/to Brussels'. Now the picture is clear. After a cut, Kiszttina Morvai sets out Jobbik's promises.

Conclusion

The 2014 European elections saw the advancement of many different parties keen to challenge and even end the European Union as a viable alliance of member states. Advocates for the EU were alarmed by the increasing hostility they faced from various groups such as the FPÖ, UKIP and Jobbik who have been among the most vocal in their criticisms of Brussels. Perhaps one of the few comforts for the pro-integrationists who still largely dominate the European Commission and Council is that their opponents are not as cohesive. Each of the aforementioned three parties, for instance, is allied to a different faction within the Parliament and this reflects the very real cultural and ideological divisions that exist among the EU's band of critics. This chapter has explored some of the similarities and differences between those groupings on the right of the political spectrum by focusing on the strategic messages key opinion-forming parties sought to promote via advertising during the 2014 election. An obvious practical difference in the parties' advertising was the absence of a televised intervention by the FPÖ. Whereas UKIP used its TV ad to make the case for British withdrawal from the EU, Jobbik's commercial focused its efforts on domestic grievances it believed many Hungarians fostered against other parties including the governing one. Both approaches were nonetheless negative in their tone and content and this reflected in various poster promotions deployed during the campaign in all three countries. Inevitably there were also contrasting themes and issues presented.

For its part Jobbik was single-minded in having its posters focus on the amount of money earned by those working for Brussels. The FPÖ and UKIP attacks were broader in nature although with differences in emphasis whereby the former criticised EU policies and the latter the institutional structures. The Union flag was prominent in some of these adverts and its presence was not designed to foster affection for an organisation derided as bureaucratic as well as unaccountable. Such arguments were part of the subsequent debate in the UK during the recent referendum on the state's continued membership of the EU. The shock result in favour of Brexit has understandably caused consternation across the continent among member states and it remains to be seen whether the cumulative weight of efforts by the parties analysed has helped embed a more Eurosceptic climate and with it the possibility of more drama to come.

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ⁱ See European Parliament, 2015 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-at-2014.html>

ⁱⁱ See BBC, 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4875026.stm>

ⁱⁱⁱ See BBC, 2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3307487.stm