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Challenges in Up-scaling Good Practices

by

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Abstract

Focus on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) has intensified technical and financial support for up-scaling of interventions to improve the quality of life of over 900 million slum dwellers who lack access to adequate clean water, improved sanitation facilities, and security of tenure. One of the means for achieving the MDG Targets is to up scale, or institutionalize effective approaches, techniques, concepts, and programmes that result in bringing more quality benefits to more urban residents more quickly and more permanently. The challenge of up-scaling is in achieving sustainable results in a large number of communities rather than in planning and implementing large projects (World Bank 2005b). It is therefore essential to determine whether there is evidence to justify support for up-scaling.

Since Habitat II (UNCHS 1996), development organisations are supporting the identification of sustainable interventions, which are largely unknown to experts as good practices (You 1996). The objective is to promote up-scaling of good practices for improving urban living conditions in general and of slum dwellers in particular. However, as acknowledged at the Shanghai Conference on Up-scaling Poverty Reduction in 2004, the progress in up-scaling is slow and there are several constraints in up-scaling good practices. Research on up-scaling good practices, undertaken within UN-Habitat, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank has contributed to better understanding of the issue. However, there is little empirical evidence on the constraints and hindrances faced by decision makers in implementing and up-scaling good practices.

The study examines how up-scaling can be facilitated at the lowest level of decision-making by identifying factors that influence initiation and implementation of good practices. It further examines how decision processes and stakeholders influence up-scaling of good practices; for whom they are important; how they are up scaled and the context in which up-scaling is being propagated. To trace influences on their up-scaling, the study further examines the factors that influence decisions of stakeholders involved in initiation, improvisation, implementation or expansion, and recognition of good practices.

Based on a multiple case-study method and data collected during 2005-2007, decisions affecting up-scaling were examined for the Million Houses Programme in Sri Lanka and the Slum Networking Project in Ahmedabad, India. To understand and compare how good practices are incorporated in the design and planning of new interventions, the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative for secondary towns in East Africa, initiated in 2004, was studied. The findings from data collected through detailed analyses of 216 awards given in different disciplines, 103 unstructured interviews and discussions, 26 focus groups and 5 case-histories, address three broad areas of literature: a) good practices, participation and partnerships for sustainable interventions; b) decision making, and c) up-scaling.

The findings suggest that leadership in Government – both political and administrative, can bring actors with diverse goals, objectives, aspirations and motivations together to initiate and implement good practices that bring sustainable improvements in the quality of life of the poor. The findings further suggest that: i) Decisions for initiating interventions that do not maintain the status quo are made in unique circumstances which can be attributed to the context, motivation of a decision maker and complementary support from professionals, managers/ administrators, and facilitators in the field; ii) Up-scaling of good practices is possible through coordination of actions at multiple levels; iii) Good practices or their components evolve and are up scaled through actors participating in its implementation; iv) Partnerships and participation amongst stakeholders are affected because of biases that exist due to inadequate and incomplete information, and lack of opportunities to debate on the intervention; and v) Project staff, nature of support from bilateral and multilateral institutions, and lack of demand from potential partners and beneficiaries influence up-scaling of good practices.

Keywords:

Sustainable, Development, Good Practices, Up-scaling, Decision-Making, Urban, Slums, Environmental Improvement, Partnerships, Participation.

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Glossary

Bustee/ Basti	Congested settlement with a high population density, having grown in an unplanned manner and facing problems of infrastructural deficiency
Chawl	A set of small multi-storied walk-ups/ residential units, constructed mostly to accommodate industrial workers particularly in Bombay. Due to lack of maintenance, high densities, inadequate services and degradation of the areas, most chawls fall under the category/ definition of slums.
EWS	Economically Weaker Section
LIG	Low-income group
Watta	Tenement gardens
Gram sevaks	Village Level Workers
Patta	Title to land, is given to slum residents in the hope that they would make further investment to improve their own housing conditions and living standards, and/ or as a guarantee for alternative plots if they are evicted from the settlement in the future.

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Abbreviations

ACHR	Asian Coalition for Housing Rights
AKAA	Aga Khan Award for Architecture
AMC	Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
AMCOW	African Ministerial Committee for Water
AML	Arvind Mills Limited
AfDB	African Development Bank
ASAG	Ahmedabad Study Action Group
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
BCC	Baroda Citizens' Council
BPP	Best Practices Programmes
BRE	Building Research Establishment
BSHF	Building and Social Housing Foundation
BSNP	Bhopal Slum Networking Project
CAP	Community Action Planning and Management approach
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CCCS	Community Construction Contract System
CDC	Community Development Councils
CDS	City Development Strategy
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMAG	City Managers' Association of Gujarat
CMC	Colombo Municipal Corporation
CRISIL	Credit Rating Information Services of India Limited
CUDP	Calcutta Urban Development Project
DFID	Department for International Development-
DIABP	Dubai International Award for Best Practices
DyMC	Deputy Municipal Commissioner
EAC	East African Community
EADB	East African Development Bank
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
ECOVIC	East African Communities Organization for the Management of Lake Victoria
EIUS	Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FIRE-D	Financial Institutions Reform and Expansion Project - Debt Market Component (USAID)
FPI	Foundation for Public Interest
GIS	Geographic Information System
GoMP	Government of Madhya Pradesh
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit)
GUO	Global Urban Observatory
HDFC	Housing Development Finance Corporation
HOLPs	House Options and Loan Packages
HUDCO	Housing and Urban Development Corporation
IBRD	International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ICMA	International City/County Management Association
ICDS	Integrated Child Development Scheme
IDA	International Development Association
IHIP	Indore Habitat Improvement Project
IMC	Indore Municipal Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRDP	Integrated Rural Development Project
IYSH	International Year of Shelter for the Homeless
KIP	Kampung Improvement Programme
LVBC	Lake Victoria Basin Commission
LVDP	Lake Victoria Development Programme
LVEMP	Lake Victoria Environmental Management Programme
LVRLAC	Lake Victoria Region Local Authorities Cooperation

LVWATSAN	Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation Initiative for secondary towns
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MHP	Million Houses Programme
MSF	Multi Stakeholder Forum
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NHA	National Housing Authority
NHDA	National Housing Development Authority
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RWSG-SA	Regional Water and Sanitation Group-South Asia
REEL	Real Estate Exchange Private Limited
SCP	Sustainable Cities Programme
SDD	Sustainable Development Division
SEWA	Self Employed Women's Association
SECBE	South East Centre for the Built Environment
SHARDA	Strategic Help Alliance for Relief to Distressed Area
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNP	Slum Networking Project
SPARC	Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres
SXSSS	St. Xavier's Social Service Society
UBSP	Urban Basic Services Programme
UBSIP	Urban Basic Services Improvement Programme
UCD	Urban Community Development
UCLG	United Cities and Local Governments
UDA	Urban Development Authority (Sri Lanka)
UHSP	Urban Housing Sub-Programmes
UMP	Urban Management Programme
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPP	Urban Planning Partnerships
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAC	Water for African Cities / Water for Asian Cities
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WEDC	Water Engineering and Development Centre
WHA	World Habitat Award
WHO	World Health Organisation
WSP-SA	Water and Sanitation Programme-South Asia

1 INTRODUCTION

The introduction traces the changing approaches to tackling environmental conditions in urban low-income settlements leading to the current focus on poverty reduction in the context of the Millennium Declaration. The historical timeline highlights the inter-relationships between deteriorating urban conditions that have contributed to health hazards and epidemics, writings and debate on housing, Government actions for environmental improvement, international conferences that have marked wider changes in the nature of financial support available for urban projects and recent examples of actions taken for meeting the MDG targets.

1.1 Poverty Reduction and Millennium Development Goals

Nearly half the world's population now lives in urban settlements (UN Population Division 2006) and the rapid and unplanned urban growth is associated with poverty, service demands that outstrip infrastructure capacity and environmental degradation. In most countries of Africa, Latin America and much of Asia, rapid growth of urban areas far exceeds anything experienced in the technologically advanced countries (UN Population Division 2006). Over 900 million people globally can be classified as slum dwellers, that is, urban populations living in poor environmental conditions with inadequate shelter and without adequate access to basic services (Garua 2005). Although there are concerns about under-estimations of population without access to basic services because of variations in definitions of access (Hardoy 1986a; Satterthwaite 2003b), the numbers are nevertheless daunting.

Figure 1-1: Proportion of Urban Residents living in slums by Region



Source: United Nations 2008

Of about 37 per cent of the urban population living in slums in developing countries (UN 2008), the highest percentage of slum dwellers live in countries of much of Asia (550 million people), Africa (187 million people), and Latin America and the Caribbean (128 million people) (UN-Habitat 2003). South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest percentage of population living in poverty, without improved access to water and sanitation and without security of tenure. As shown in Figure 1-1, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for the highest proportion of urban residents in slums at 62.2 per cent, followed by Southern Asia at 43 per cent and Eastern

Asia at 36.5 per cent (UN 2008). As shown in Figure 1-2, more than 20 per cent of the population in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceania, and 11 per cent in South-Eastern Asia are not using an improved drinking water source (UN 2008). The figures for sanitation are worse for all countries as shown in Figure 1-3.

Figure 1-2: Access to improved water sources



Source: United Nations 2008

Concerted efforts are being made to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation (Target 10), and to achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 (Target 11). The approaches for meeting these Millennium Development Goal 7 Targets incorporate the wide-ranging guidelines set out in Local Agenda 21 (Chapter 7) for sustainable urban development. These include calling upon local governments to mobilise their communities for broad-based, participatory environmental improvement in urban areas (Pugh 2000). These reaffirm the discourses on housing and urbanisation (Abrams 1964; Turner 1972; Hardoy 2001; Satterthwaite 1997a), participation (Chambers 1994b) and gender equity (Cornwall 2003; Nelson 1995; Shiva 1988), and place "unprecedented demands" on decision-makers to be more responsive to the local needs and priorities (You 1996).

Figure 1-3: Percentage of population using improved sanitation facility



Source: United Nations 2008

1.1.1 Sustainable development

Since the UN Conference on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 - the plan of action for sustainable development, there has been a change in the way in which urban environmental

problems are formulated and appropriate solutions identified. The 'Earth Summit' marked the recognition of systemic problems that are inter-connected and inter-dependent and which can therefore not be understood in isolation (Capra 1996). Agenda 21 was a formal recognition of: i) the link between environmental sustainability and poverty reduction (UN General Assembly 2003; Hjorth 2003); ii) urban poverty not being a significant contributor to environmental degradation, and iii) urban environmental hazards being major contributors to urban poverty (Satterthwaite 2003a). Development interventions therefore need to be placed in the sustainability framework.

> "The recognition of the "limits to growth", of "no sustainability without development" and of environmental degradation as a worldwide condition of poverty have gained recognition and led to concerted efforts for poverty reduction" (Sachs 1992).

Discourses on sustainable development identify holistic approaches, which aim at equity and are responsive to the environmental and cultural context, as integral components of sustainability (Schumacher 1973; 1978; Fukuoka 1978; Barrow 1995). Of these, the primary issue underlying sustainability is equity, which includes cultural sensitivity in relation to acceptability of culture, religion, gender roles, and traditional ways of decision-making (Sachs 2002; 2001). In the global context, the "benchmark" definition for sustainable development is:

> "meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987).

Sustainable development is further described as a "a global process of development that minimises use of environmental resources and reduces the impact of human actions on environmental sinks by using processes that simultaneously improve the economy and the quality of life" (WCED 1987). This definition incorporates three components of sustainability (Pierre 2000): i) Environment, which has to do with natural resource conservation and management; ii) Economic viability in terms of income and profit, and iii) People, including issues of equity or socially just development, in terms of access to resources, influence of stakeholders in decision making, gender equity and poverty reduction.

Sachs (1992), Esteva (1992) and Shiva (1988) cover a range of connotations and interpretations of the term development. Esteva (1992) contends that from the beginning of the 20th century, the phrase 'urban development' has stood for "specific installations that indicate that one is doing well because one is advancing toward a desirable goal. However, in popular perception, development implies a favourable change, a step from the simple to the complex, inferior to superior and from worse to better". Roseland (2000) describes the "development" component of sustainable development as "a social change process for fulfilling human needs, advancing social equity, expanding organizational effectiveness, and building capacity toward sustainability".

According to the World Bank (1991), development implies actions that improve the quality of life through elimination of poverty and deprivation, that is, "through higher incomes, better education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life". This definition emphasises equity in terms of access to resources, influence in decision-making and gender equity but does not directly address the issue of minimising use of resources.

The concern for sustainability has drawn attention to sustainable urbanisation and the inter-related processes of urban development and management. Urban development is linked to administration, organization and planning - roles that are performed for achieving a broader goal and vision of the city. The broader vision is in terms of the competitive advantage, water supply and sewerage systems, poverty reduction and resources (Stren 1993; Mattingly 1994; Chakrabarty 2001). Urban management is linked to strategic citywide or regional planning for investments, guiding trunk services, and for guiding waste and pollution to eliminate health hazards. As set out in Agenda 21, urbanisation offers unique opportunities for improving social, economic and environmental quality of the living and working environments (Tipple 1996). This has led to searches for model urban management and development solutions at multiple levels, and assistance for their transfer and up-scaling at government levels (Clarke 1991; McGill 1998; Roseland 2000).

Box 1-1: Development Aid Effectiveness

> "We tautologically define aid as effective if it achieves its objectives. We used to set our sights low – at the level of project purposes and outputs. According to evaluation studies, we managed to score high marks on this basis. We have now raised our sights to the heavens, proclaiming the objectives of pro-poor growth and poverty reduction in terms of the Millennium Development Goals. Though we have made some progress in understanding growth processes, we are still in no position to predict growth, and we are still somewhat unclear about how aid contributes practically to it. …
>
> The 'development community's' agenda changes too much and too fast, and suffers constant overload with the concerns of special interest groups. There is hypocrisy in our claim to believe in the virtues of local policy ownership while at the same time launching new goals and objectives in international fora. The craftier leaders in developing countries know that the best way of maintaining assistance flows is to know the Top Twenty and to sing them with gusto and apparent conviction when they entertain the donors. But they should not always be convinced – and will not always be so, if their economists are briefing them properly – and their development partners should not always be fooled. Sound development policy involves finding the right last, and sticking to it".

Source: Roberts 2004

Since the late 1940s, the inclusion of sustainability aspects in initiatives for meeting the growing housing demands show that the current focus on sustainable development and poverty reduction is not a recent phenomenon. The earliest housing initiatives were a response to the complexity of urban environments where requirements for developed land, housing, basic infrastructure and services, and waste management preceded planned actions. They were an outcome of the inadequacy of implementing agencies to meet the growing housing demands through housing provision (UN-Habitat 2003a).

During the 50s and 60s, many countries introduced changes for enabling greater access of the

poor to housing and for extending basic services to under-serviced areas. The changes were informed by observations about the capacity of the vulnerable for self-organisation, for meeting varied needs in different contexts and for nurturing and conserving available resources (Cornwall 2003; Nelson 1995; Shiva 1988). Each change in approach comprised different components and focused on different objectives, approaches, and implementation mechanisms. The core components varied from provision of subsidised housing or core housing in sites and services schemes to slum upgrading, redevelopment or relocation. Since the early 60s, the changes are marked prominently by events such as UN Conferences, type of support provided by the World Bank and bilateral donors, and changes in national and sub-national programmes.

In the following sub-section, a review of the changing approaches to urban environmental problems and slums provides a background on how different actors have influenced good practices and their up-scaling.

1.2 Changing approaches to urban development

Harris (1999) provides early illustrations of a change in housing approaches, including an example of the Government in Sweden providing support to families for building their own homes in 1905; and of similar support provided by other European countries after the First World War. Abrams (1964) cites changes in US housing aid and refers to incidences of slum clearance in 1937. Another example is of a land and utilities housing scheme implemented by the Housing Authority of Ponce, Puerto Rico in 1939 (Harris 1997). The scheme, an early version of the sites and services schemes, was initiated by Jacob L. Crane of the U.S. Public Housing Administration to encourage shack dwellers to move to new sites in serviced sub-divisions. The approach termed 'aided self-help' around 1945 by Crane was formally adopted in the US Government's housing policy during the 1940s to address concerns about costs of providing houses and infrastructure to scattered homesteads (Harris 1997).

1.2.1 Pre-1960

The role of individuals in initiating development projects is highlighted by a 1950 Mission Report of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD 1950). The report refers to how the Mission to Colombia grew out of conversations between the President of IBRD and a member of its Board of Executive Directors. The concerns and options identified in the Mission report for improving the standards of living and poor environmental conditions of a majority of people bear similarities with current approaches for improving urban environments. Some of the Mission objectives were (IBRD 1950):

- To provide every community with access to potable and adequate water supply and sanitary means of waste disposal to eliminate any substantial health hazard;
- To improve existing systems in cities where growth had outstripped existing facilities; and

introduce public taps and the simplest community pumping and purification facilities for the smaller towns rather than provide piped water supply and sewer facilities, and

- Strengthening and reorganizing the Municipal Development Fund to enable it to assist municipal governments more extensively and effectively.

The similarities are echoed once again in a 1952 Mission Report on Jamaica (IBRD 1952), which noted that the Government suffered substantial losses in constructing rental housing and recommended assistance for owner-occupier housing in formal settlements. The Mission recognised the viability of meeting housing needs through the self-help housing approach that was introduced after a hurricane in August 1951 by the Hurricane Housing Organization. The approach entailed: i) Provision of small grants for building materials to make emergency repairs on damaged houses; ii) Expansion of productive capacity and improvement in employment opportunities and incomes of the affected people to meet the long-term need for replacement of dwellings, and iii) Additional assistance to house owners in the form of standardized prefabricated building materials such as building panels and blocks, which could be made from local materials.

1.2.1.1 Urban initiatives in Asia

In Asia, the housing problems arose in the late forties because of accelerated urbanization in the newly independent countries of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Government of India (GoI) introduced many programmes and schemes for guiding urban development processes, including temporarily accommodating people affected by the partition in camps. During this period, housing policies and programmes for the resettlement of refugees were developed by Koenisberger - the first Director of Housing, GoI (1948 - 1951).

In 1956, recognising the poor environmental conditions of urban residents, GoI enacted the first Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act for the Union Territories. A Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation Scheme was launched with the objective of clearing slum areas and settling slum residents in new highly subsidized tenements at alternative sites. The Act set a precedent for defining slums as areas where "buildings are in any respect unfit for human habitation, and which are by reason of dilapidation, over-crowding, faulty arrangement of streets, lack ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors they are detrimental to safety, health or morals". The Act for the Union Territories was followed by enactment of Slum Improvement Acts for Andhra Pradesh (1956), Mysore (1958) and Calcutta (1958).

The same year, recognising the need for enabling the poor to be self-sufficient, the first pilot Urban Community Development (UCD) Project was initiated in Delhi (1958) with a grant from the Ford Foundation, and American Friends Service Committee (Staples 1992). The UCD was up-scaling of a pilot integrated rural development project started by Albert Mayer and H. Holmes in Etawah, Uttar Pradesh (1947-53). Other UCD pilot projects were initiated in

Ahmedabad (1962), Baroda (1965) and Calcutta (1966) (Chandra 1972). Since the projects were designed to enable simultaneous study of the programme as it developed, broad guidelines with considerable flexibility were laid down based on experience gained to enable various methodologies and organizational patterns of implementation (Chandra 1972).

Box 1-2: Urban Community Development

> Mayer's pilot led to the well-known concept of having gram sevaks (Village Level Workers) as a link between the government and the villagers (Wallach 1996). The pilots expanded as 'Community Development Projects' to two other areas for resettlement of refugees (Nilokheri and Faridabad), which were initiated by S. K. Dey, who had already worked on rural extension projects with Mayer. In 1950, the Ford Foundation, after consultations with Vijyalaksmi Pandit – the Indian Ambassador to the UN – decided to support the Government of India in expanding its 'Community Development Project' from three areas to other parts of the country (Staples 1992). Although the objective of the project was to have a community based and socially responsive development approach that would improve the conditions of people in rural areas, the US Government supported the initiative because of its concern about the spread of communism (Staples 1992). In 1952, the Government of India's first nation-wide rural community development programme covering fifteen pilot projects of 300 villages each (one in each major state) was initiated based on Mayer's approach (Gupta 1994).

Box 1-3: Urban Community Development

> "The concept of people's participation is central to the approach of urban community development. The entire process of urban community development is geared around people's involvement and participation in efforts to improve their level of living with as much reliance on their own initiative. Project programmes have been conceived as mere instruments of initiating and enthusing the community for self-help through effective utilization of their own resources and mobilization of outside resources which often lie well within their reach but go begging for want of coordinated efforts."

Source: Chandra 1972

1.2.2 Post-Sixties

In response to the rapid growth of slums, the Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) approved its first urban project for several shanty areas in Mexico City in December 1961. The project built upon the self-help activities that had begun among the inhabitants, and combined housing improvement, environmental sanitation, vocational guidance and training for youth (Cousins 1992). Acute housing shortages and unsanitary conditions in widespread squatter settlements were documented by Abrams (Pugh 2000). Turner, for whom the outcomes of the housing policy in Peru became formative experiences (Pugh 2000), advocated state-assisted sites and services, slum improvement, subsidized housing schemes, and institutional restructuring, that could stimulate commercial investments or community based improvements (Turner 1972). These found many supporters (Bromley 2003; Harris 2003; Berner 2001; Choguill 1994; Gilbert 1984) and key exponents of affordable housing started propagating the need for involving the poor in making decisions related to planning and development (Moore 2003; Berner 2001; Bishop 2000; Anzorena 1998; Potter 1993; Hardoy 1986b; Hamer 1985).

Figure 1-4: Significant decadal events

	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000
International	Charter of the United Nations IBRD established Crane coins 'aided self-help' 'approach	UN ECOSOC establishes Centre for Housing, Planning & Building US Housing & Home Finance Agency promotes aided self-help for housing in many countries incl. British colonies.	IDA est.. to provide assistance to poorer developing countries AfDB, AsDB & EADB established John Turner paper at UN Pittsburgh Conference Abrams Housing in the Modern World Aided self-help and S&S promoted	Rehovat conf on urbanization & dev. WB Housing Sector Policy & Turner's-Freedom to Build. WB assistance for KIP, Lusaka S&S & Ismailia Demo Projects Habitat I - UNCHS Aga Khan Award for Architecture estb.	UN designates 1987 as Year of Shelter for Homeless. World Bank KIP assistance ends World Habitat Awards initiated UMP I WCED Sustainable Development	Sust.City Program Earth Summit, World Summit of Social Dev. & Agenda 21 UMP Phase II-III Habitat II & Dubai award; WAfC Cities Alliance & Cities w/o Slums SDI formed	MDGs UNCHS to UN-Habitat Shanghai Conf: Scaling Up Poverty Reduction UN WAC Programme in Africa & Asia LVWATSAN
India	Independence Partition & construction related slums Mayer's Integrated Rural Dev Project (IRDP) with village link workers New Delhi planned & built	Integrated Rural Dev Program w/ Comm. Development Rural Housing scheme for poor, Slum Areas Act, slum clearance & loans to State Govt for land dev 1st UCD program in Delhi Chandigarh: New city Rehabilitation of refugees	2nd UCD program in Ahmedabad then Baroda, Hyderabad, Surat etc. Calcutta Master Plan Urban growth accorded priority Bustee Development Plan New cities of Gandhinagar & Bhubaneswar	HUDCO estb. Slum improvement in Calcutta Intro of EIUS Slum Acts & census of slums in many States SEWA & SEWA Bank estb. ICDS launched w/ UNICEF support Urban Land Ceiling & Gujarat Town Planning Act	Hyderabad SIP (HSIP) Phase I Urban Low Cost Sanitation & Hsg & UD Task Forces DFID's SIPs UNICEF UBS WB Gujarat Slum Upgrading proposal SPARC Alliance & SAATH estb. WB Tamil Nadu UD Project	Decentralisation SNP in Baroda, Ahmedabad & Bhopal Awards for IHIP Slum programs in Bangalore & Nagpur. SRD in Mumbai DFID SIPs/APUSP Market-oriented eco policy & reforms UBSP, NSDP, SJSRY GMHST estb.	WB support for City Development Strategy Draft of Slum Policy in Gujarat Economic boom National Urban Renewal Mission Slums redevelopment
Sri Lanka	Independence Rent Restriction Act Slums growth w/ expansion of export of rubber	Ministry of Housing & National Housing Department estb. Govt takes responsibility for provision of housing for working classes	Minimal government intervention for housing the poor who lived on privately owned or illegal property.	Ceiling on Housing Property law NHDA & UDA estb. Market-oriented eco 100,000 Houses Program launched UNICEF UBSP	Market-oriented eco Million Houses Prog UNCHS training. Comm. Action Planning & Comm. Contracting Special Areas Act.	1.5 MHP & Credit subsidy stopped Repeal of Ceiling on property law Sevanatha URC State housing construction	Sustainable Townships Programme Tsunami & related reconstruction
South Asia	Pakistan Independence & partition related katchi abadis	Thailand: Housing construction under social welfare policy	Konigsberg Action Plan for Singapore KIP in Jakarta Public housing Thailand & Singapore: High-rise apts. replace slums Resettlement scheme in Karachi	Rapid population growth in Orangi NHAs estb. (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand) Grameen Bank estb. BLISS S&S Housing scheme in Manila Karachi Master Plan	Indonesia: WB assistance for Integrated Urban Dev Program Orangi Pilot Project launched Asian Coalition for Housing Rights estb.	UNICEF UBSP in Sukkur w/ SKAA Philippines: Urban Dev & Housing Act PRSP in Cambodia UCDO estb. in Thailand URC in Nepal & Cambodia	Indian Ocean Tsunami & related reconstruction

As the need for housing outstripped the numbers of houses built formally, and awareness about formal development processes not meeting development goals grew, World Bank Presidents appealed for a sensitive rather than a commercial approach to development (Black 1962; Woods 1968). In the late 1960s in Jakarta, when very poor environmental conditions in which the poor lived resulted in protests, the Government of Indonesia undertook a Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP) for improving slum conditions. The programme started as a local initiative for providing vehicular access roads, drainage, footpaths, public taps, toilets, washing facilities, solid waste collection facilities, street lighting, primary schools, and health clinics. The KIP showed one way of improving environmental conditions in urban areas, and it was expanded in 1969 as a national programme coordinated by the national Directorate General of Human Settlements of the Ministry of Public Works.

Box 1-4: Early slum clearance instances

> "In 1954, pressures in Accra, Ghana, by British-trained planners and their local disciples were for clearing such areas as the Ushertown, Bentsir Asafo and Jamestown, despite an intense housing shortage. That year, at a Cambridge University meeting of British and other foreign officials concerned with African problems, there seemed to be almost complete agreement on the need for tearing down slums without regard to housing need or shortage...
>
> In 1955, at about the time the pressure to clear the slums of Accra had reached its high point, a United Nations Mission on housing arrived and after surveying the housing shortage and the effect of slum clearance would have in aggravating it, recommended that slum clearance be stayed until there was a more adequate supply of housing, Instead, a programme to increase the housing supply was recommended. It shocked the British intelligentsia in Accra, but the recommendation of the U.N. Mission was accepted...
>
> In neighbouring Nigeria, which at the time was also about to achieve its independence from Britain, the pressure for slum clearance met no such opposition. British officials and Nigerians were persuaded that slum clearance was the only way to attack slums...
>
> A slum clearance scheme, prepared in 1951, became operative in 1955... Installation of a sewer system, however, which a World Bank mission had described in 1954 as "the most important single contribution which could be made toward improving the health of the inhabitants of Lagos" could gather no official support. It had to give way to more alluring schemes like dams, state buildings, bridges - and, of course, slum clearance."

Source: Abrams 1964

During the same period, planned development was the accepted norm and the option for addressing the problem of slums was slum clearance. Abrams (1964) described the differences in approaches to urban housing and environment amongst professionals, officials and funding agencies succinctly. The above examples illustrate both the role of individuals and organisations in initiating, learning from and up-scaling viable approaches to housing and service provision through policies and projects. Furthermore, they illustrate the differences in priorities of planners, development organisations, specialists, and decision makers in Governments.

1.2.2.1 1970s: Institutional responses

In terms of planned development, the period until the late sixties was dominated by the top-down or blueprint approaches (Bond 1999; Abbot 2002). The World Bank, as a driver for economic development, continued to provide support for master plan preparations, housing projects and major infrastructure networks in India and around the world. The World Health Organization, Ford Foundation, UNICEF and UNDP (Colombo 1978 - 1983) financed preparation of Master Plans for

major cities in Asia, including Delhi (1962). The Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization was established on the recommendation of the World Health Organization, for preparing a 20-year comprehensive development plan (1966 - 1986) for Calcutta Metropolitan District. This included a Bustee Development Plan under which the first Bustee Improvement Programme was launched for provision of drinking water, sewerage system, and street lighting in the twin cities of Calcutta and Howrah. In India, this marked the change from a 'clearance' to the 'improvement' approach, and acceptance of Bustee houses as liveable shelters.

To address the problems of housing and urban development, governments of countries in South Asia took actions to improve urban environments and upgrade existing slum areas with the expectation that people would invest in adequate shelters themselves. Institutions such as the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) in India (1970), the Urban Development Authority (UDA - 1971) in Malaysia, and the National Housing Authorities in Thailand (1973) and the Philippines (1975) were established to "restructure society through urban development" (Durand-Lasserve 1996).

The Government of India launched its first national programme, called the Scheme for Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums (EIUS) in 1972, which was followed by the enactment of the Government of West Bengal's Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act. Both enabled formal identification and recognition of slums, and planning and implementation of the EIUS Scheme. This led to interventions for increasing access to serviced plots in sites and services projects where people could build their own homes incrementally, followed by support for in-situ slum upgrading initiatives (Hamdi 1997; 1985). Many countries introduced land use controls, for example, in Seoul city in 1972, wherein areas zoned for residential and industrial use were reduced and illegal and squatter settlements removed (Rondinelli 1991). In Sri Lanka, the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme (1972 - 1982) was initiated with grant loans to small builders, land to private groups in urban areas, and aid for self-help construction in rural areas. In addition, the Government of Sri Lanka enacted the Ceiling on Housing Property Law (1973) to regulate the ownership, size and cost of construction of houses (Chularathna 2000).

In August 1971 at the Rehovot Conference on Urbanization and Development in Developing Countries in Israel (Harris 2003c), the first Director of IBRD's newly established Urban Development Department announced support for sites and services schemes (Turner 2002). Although the role of the poor in improving their living conditions had been recognised since the fifties, the announcement marked a paradigm shift in the debate on housing. The emphasis would henceforth be on the capacity and potential of the poor to build affordable shelters (Gilbert 1984; Bromley 2003; Berner 2001; Harris 2003). The growing support for urban areas was marked by publication of the World Bank Water Supply and Sewerage Sector working paper in October 1971 (World Bank 1971), and the Urbanization Sector study (World Bank 1972).

"The Bank's first urban lending operation, a sites-and-services project in Senegal, got under way in

June 1972. Other projects were soon begun in Botswana, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia" (World Bank 1982). The World Bank initiated Integrated Urban Development projects "to remove the barriers to their (200 million absolute poor in the cities) greater earning opportunities, broaden their access to basic public services, and help them more fully achieve their productive potential" (McNamara, 1975). In addition, the Bank started funding a combination of infrastructure, housing, and sites and services projects in various parts of South Asia and Africa with the underlying principles of affordability, cost recovery, and replicability (Pugh 2000). The Calcutta Urban Development Project I (CUDP-I), the first World Bank funded urban project in India, initiated and implemented from 1973 to 1977, included sites and services projects and the first Bustee Improvement Programme for the twin cities of Calcutta and Howrah (UNCHS 1994). By 1974, when the World Bank funded the first Kampung Improvement and sites and services project (Loan 1040-IND approved in FY74) in Jakarta (Kessides 1997), many States in India enacted Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Acts.

1.2.2.2 Habitat I: Community development and slum improvement

The efforts for environmental improvement of slums were complemented by UNICEF, which introduced a community-based approach in Cairo (1972), Lusaka (1974), Indonesia and India (1975), with emphasis on building upon the self-help efforts that already existing among the urban poor (Cousins 1992).

Box 1-5: UNICEF Support for delivery of integrated services

> "In 1972, the (UNICEF) Board approved $935,000 in assistance over two years for the establishment of 12 pilot projects, each in a different city and State in India, for assisting in the improvement of the delivery of integrated services for children and youth in slum areas. ... The first phase of the project was to be a series of studies in each of the cities on the situation of children and youth in slums and shantytowns. UNICEF contracted with a national institute to organize these studies in the cities, and the work was begun. However, the planned programme could not be completed, except for the studies, because in 1973, in preparation for the Fifth Five-Year-Plan (1974 - 1979), "two large-scale programmes were developed and subsequently incorporated in the Plan, which included so many features of the smaller pilot efforts that its restructuring was required. A revised approach, integrated with the larger Fifth Plan Programme, was approved by the 1974 Board." ...These two programmes were integrated child development services (ICDS), which included projects in urban slum areas, and the slum improvement programme under the Ministry of Works and Housing, which was intended to complement the ICDS programme in a number of cities including all of those originally proposed for the UNICEF supported pilot programmes".

Source: Cousins 1992

Following adoption of the World Health Organisation's programme for universal immunization of children against six major diseases in 1974 (UNICEF 2002), the UNICEF Board approved a basic services strategy in 1976 as an appropriate means of meeting the essential needs of children and mothers in rural communities and urban slums (Cousins 1992). UNICEF assisted GoI for implementation of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) programme in 1975 - 76 for providing children from poor families with (i) supplementary nutrition, (ii) immunisation, (iii) health check-up, (iv) referral services, (v) nutrition and health education and (vi) non-formal education. UNICEF supported formation of community-based organisations (CBOs) to garner participation of communities and for promotion of preventive and developmental health services

for children less than six years of age. The pilot was started in thirty-three rural blocks and some urban slums.

In Colombo, UNICEF supported Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) for the Urban Basic Services Improvement Programme (UBSIP) from 1978 - 1986 to improve conditions of under-serviced settlements. The objective was to target social deprivation among children and women by fostering self-help through community organisations (Jayaratne 2005). The programme provided basic common amenities, common toilets and water taps (as under the EIUS in India) and established CBOs, locally known as Community Development Councils (CDC). The field staff of CMC's Health Department facilitated the development and formal registration of CDCs, in the intervention areas (Jayaratne 2004a; Chularathna 2000). The systematizing of community participation through representatives of CDCs under the UBSIP was to influence future UNICEF programmes in urban areas (Cousins 1992).

Box 1-6: Colombo CDC influence on Urban Basic Services Programme in India

> "The Colombo project, also evaluated in 1989, was unusual in that it became a broad community development or UBS project initiated by the Office of the Colombo Chief Medical Officer of Health, and the Health Wardens were the community workers. The pattern for systematizing community participation through representatives of community development councils (CDCs) was developed by Leo Fonseka, the UNICEF Adviser. His experience in Colombo is evident in the design of the expanded UBS programme in India".

Source: Cousins 1992

With the focus on environmental improvement of urban areas and poverty reduction programmes, the multiple dimensions of interventions were emphasised. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UNICEF provided additional assistance for expansion of the KIP, which now included a component for core housing on sites and services schemes and upgrading (Kessides 1997). At the first Habitat conference in 1976, the viability and sustainability of the informal sector's strategy of incremental development and improvement of housing and infrastructure development was acknowledged (Berner 2001; Satterthwaite 2001). The Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlement and the Vancouver Action Plan provided the framework for future changes in approaches to settlement improvement and upgrading (UNCHS 1976).

Several events that occurred around this period mark the formal change of approach from slum clearance to slum upgrading. In India, the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act was enacted in 1976 to prevent concentration of land holding in urban areas, and to make urban land available for construction of houses for the middle and low-income groups. In Thailand, the National Housing Authority established the Slum Upgrading Office in 1977 to undertake responsibility for slum upgrading (NHA-SUO 1980).

In the Philippines, an integrated program - the Tondo Foreshore Urban Renewal Project was planned by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to convert the foreshore area into a support base for a new international container pier with upper income housing units, commercial buildings and small-scale industry. The slum colony of Tondo Foreshore, which housed 170,000 people on

137 hectares of reclaimed land, was to be relocated about 40 to 45 kilometres from the city (Supreme Court 2004).

Box 1-7: Manila Tondo Foreshore Competition

> "The 'United Nations Conference on Human Settlements' held in Vancouver, Canada in 1976 and the parallel Manila-Tondo Foreshore International Architectural Competition was a catalyst in addressing the needs of a previously ignored clientele, the informal or squatter sector. The conference led to the establishment of UN Habitat, dedicated to human settlement development, and new approaches to housing were initiated. The Manila-Tondo Foreshore project was a first attempt to tackle some of the major problems facing metropolitan Manila and other urban environments in developing countries. It was envisioned to create a paradigm shift toward recognizing that upgrading the standards of living of those below the subsistence level in Manila and in other fast growing urban areas was a better solution than just physically removing slum areas. The Manila-Tondo Foreshore International Architectural Competition challenged the world to come up with new ways of approaching community, housing, and income issues of low-income families. Over 3,000 architects registered from approximately 68 countries, and about 500 formal entries were received. Winners were awarded substantial prize money and their designs were planned for implementation in Manila."

Source: Philippine Green Building School, 2007

The Manila-Tondo Foreshore International Architectural Competition, which was launched prior to HABITAT I to generate the best possible redevelopment option, marked a formal Government approach for relocating and housing slum dwellers. However, despite the publicity and attention that the competition generated, the World Bank funded sites and services programme could not be implemented to make much impact on the land and housing costs in Manila (Strassmann 1994).

Box 1-8: Manila Tondo Foreshore: Opposition to sites and services scheme

> There are two IMF funded "development" projects, which stand to benefit the wealthy at the expense of millions of poor Filipinos. These are the Chico River Basin Development Project and the Tondo Dagat-dagatan Development Project. ...
>
> The Tondo Dagat-dagatan Project involves the eviction of thousands of Tondo Foreshore residents to pave the way for a large container port and a large fish port. The government is preparing sites and services in an adjacent reclaimed area, Dagat-dagatan, and has built some multi-family housing at the site. The Tondo Foreshore residents are opposed to the project because: They are deprived of the lands that have been promised them by legislation passed prior to the declaration of martial law; government housing is only for lease and rental is too high; and people's participation is not allowed. World Bank is the projected source of funds for this project.

Source: PRAXIS 1976

1.2.2.3 Enabling Environmental Improvement

During the 80s, in Asia, there was a shift away from programmes to slow urbanization and reverse the growth of large metropolitan areas by stimulating the growth of secondary cities and smaller towns (Rondinelli 1991). By the late 80s, of the many projects funded in various parts of South Asia and Africa by the World Bank from the mid-70s to mid-80s, only projects funded in Indonesia, Jordan and Tunisia were replicated as citywide or national programmes (Kessides 1997). The gaps between programmes, policies and projects, and their implementation for achieving appropriate outcomes, led to emphasis on setting of more attainable objectives (Hamdi 1985).

The search for appropriate solutions and the role of individuals in this endeavour is highlighted by the request of the Sri Lankan Prime Minister to the UN General Assembly to declare a year dedicated to the "problems of homeless people in urban and rural areas ... to focus attention of the

international community on those problems" (Resolution 35/76 of 5 December 1980). In 1982, the UN General Assembly declared 1987 as United Nations Year of Shelter for the Homeless (Resolution 37/221 of 20 December 1982). The Plan of Action for Phase I (1983 to 1986) included implementation of some shelter demonstration projects. In Sri Lanka, the Government planned the Million Houses Programme (MHP) in response to limitations of the subsidised Hundred Thousand Houses Programme.

The MHP, which comprised six sub-housing programmes, was the first instance of a Government in South Asia taking on the role of a 'housing enabler' rather than a 'housing provider'. It "represented a reduction in the scale of national government investment in housing and an active policy to stimulate and support the investments of individual households, community organizations and municipal authorities" (Yap 1993). The MHP enabled the home-builders decide on one of the many options available under the programme. The MHP in general and the urban housing sub-programme in particular, reflected how governments were experimenting with more realistic approaches for meeting the shelter needs of the poor (Choguill 1996a).

By 1987 - the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH), funding of sites and services, and slum improvement projects in many countries of Africa (Kenya), Asia (Pakistan, India) and Latin America (Mexico, Bogotá, El Salvador) marked wider global changes in tackling problems of shelter for the poor. National and local governments experimented with the different approaches and ideas that seemed more realistic (Choguill 1996a). The squatters received secure tenure and infrastructure when they relocated to a part of the site and let the landowner expand its activities to the vacated site (Boonyabancha 2005). In Mumbai, the establishment of the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC) and formation of Mahila Milan, followed by their association with the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF) marked a change in how demolitions were dealt with (Burra 2001). In U.K., several activists set up the IYSH Trust in 1987 to meet a short term need to coordinate UK activities during the IYSH, and at the end of 1987, decided to set-up a permanent organisation called Homeless International with "the specific remit of supporting community-led shelter and settlement initiatives in the developing world" (Homeless International 2003).

In Thailand, the National Housing Authority supported land-sharing schemes such as at Klong Toey where squatters agreed to share the sites they lived on with the Port Authority of Thailand - landowner (Boonyabancha 2005).

In the early 90s, as problems related to the planning, process and management of slum improvement projects became prominent, there was realisation that although some of the projects demonstrated affordable alternatives, they could not meet the demand for access to basic services (Choguill 1993; Cotton 1994). The projects were largely implemented through specially established project management units (Project Management Units) within public or government organisations to eliminate the need for changes in institutional guidelines and in planning and

implementation processes (Mengers 2000). Implementation through Project Management Units bypassed implementation processes that were dependent on under-staffed or under-qualified, unmotivated and under-paid staff in local governments (Hjorth 2003; Choguill 2002). The Project Management Units, which lasted only for the duration of the project and were thereafter dissolved or absorbed into one of the parent institutions (Mengers 2000), were often staffed with selected officers on deputation from parent institutions or recruited from the market on contract-basis. Their performance was improved by offering external technical assistance and specific training in skills of project management.

By the late 1990s, as identified by the impact assessment of DFID funded slum improvement projects in the cities of Vishakhapatnam, Vijayawada and Indore (Amis 2001; Dewan-Verma 1999; 2000), the problems of the expensive and area-specific incremental slum improvement projects with locally inappropriate standards for provision of basic services were recognised (Sundaram 1994). The narrowly focused, small-scale, high standards and top-down interventions in specific sectors or settlements could not meet the massive demand for improved urban infrastructure services and shelter (Clarke 1991). The performance of these resource intensive (Sachs 1997) projects was poor (Bond 1999; Mabogunje 1978). The physical, financial and institutional impacts of the projects neither resulted in citywide improvements nor met the massive demand for improved urban infrastructure services and shelter (Clarke 1991; Cotton 1988; Goethert 2001).

The gaps between programmes, policies and projects, and their implementation for achieving appropriate outcomes led to a general acknowledgement that the 'project' approach was not sustainable (Choguill 2002; Hjorth 2003). The traditional approaches to urban planning were inefficient and local governments were under-performing (Rakodi 2003; Kyessi 2005). During this period, many organisations and individuals started propagating the need for involving the poor in making decisions related to planning and development (Potter 1993; Anzorena 1998; Bishop 2000; Berner 2001; Moore 2003). Subsequently, the incremental provision of shelter, infrastructure and urban services, with the assistance of government and through partnerships between the poor and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or contracted community development workers, became an important approach to development (Rondinelli 1991).

Participation was promoted to enable the poor to express themselves, identify their needs and appropriate solutions, plan, and act to change their situations in their own context (Chambers 1994; Choguill 1994). As participation was incorporated in Government and donor funded social development interventions in both rural and urban areas, it needed the involvement of Governments, together with the political will for implementing change and for adjusting organisational functioning (Rahardjo 2000). This required changes in conventional municipal practices (Amos 1989) for addressing issues related to procedural and prescriptive characteristics of municipalities, and of stakeholders interested in maintaining the status quo (UNCHS 1993). It

led to the acceptance that local institutions require flexibility in management, building of capacities for problem solving, and that large-scale initiatives should start small and grow organically at rates that are dependent on their achievements. This needed facilitators and capacity building institution to be responsive to actual capacity building needs (Rahardjo 2000).

The change from blueprint projects to a process approach needed a paradigm shift. The process approaches indicated that change could be achieved through holistic urban planning, improved governance, participation of communities in decision-making, exchange of good practice models, and determination and leadership of stakeholders across disciplines, sectors, communities and countries (Goethert 2001; Moore 2003; Choguill. 1994). Subsequently, process approaches that incorporated diverse and complex environments, minimised the role of external agencies and resources, and supported locally evolved initiatives and organisations (Bond 1999) were accepted as essential for sustainable development. Organisations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) and the Dutch Government started supporting slum improvement programmes with greater involvement of NGOs and participation of slum dwellers. However, compared to the projects initiated in the 1980s, these projects were modest in scale and located in a few major cities (Mengers 2000).

1.2.3 Supporting decentralised decision making

In 1994, a review of UN activities to promote sustainable human settlements development (UNCHS 1994c) identified priority issues for implementing Agenda 21. It acknowledged the political dimension, political and social processes involved in settlements development, and the significant roles of local governments in influencing the outcomes of national and sub-national policies, programmes and projects for poverty reduction and environmental improvement. The actions recommended included (UNCHS 1994c):

- Partnership and collaboration of partners as a means for achieving greater efficiency in use of resources, transparency and accountability at the city level.
- Greater public participation, involvement of the poor and their organizations, NGOs, and political associations, which link external, national and local institutions.
- Increase understanding and ability to apply generally recognized best practice in delivery approaches effectively.
- Greater use of demonstration - replication strategies through which projects or programmes are designed with explicit mechanisms for replication, within both the country and elsewhere.
- Giving greater local orientation to genuinely decentralized delivery mechanisms that allow external agencies to work directly with and for local communities and local governments and

which promote greater development and utilization of local resources.

These recommendations contributed to the two themes of "Adequate shelter for all" and "Sustainable human settlements development in an urbanizing world" for the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements – also called the 'City Summit' in Istanbul in 1996 (Choguill 1996b). The UN recognised the status of local governments officially for the first time, and the UN Secretariat enabled local authorities, the private sector, and civil society representatives to play an active role in the Conference and in formulating the Habitat Agenda (Choguill 2002). The recognition and participation of local governments at the City Summit are seen as milestones. The focus of the City Summit on local governments was to influence key decision makers who can make discretionary decisions that influence allocation of resources at the implementation level (Joshi 2002), and who are knowledgeable about local conditions and therefore able to fine-tune policy to local rather than average conditions (Coxhead 2002).

To influence decision makers in local government to adapt and up scale good practices, an exhibition of Best Practices was organised for sharing of experiences on ways to make cities sustainable (UN General Assembly 2003). The exhibition was complemented by nomination of 100 Best Practices as a knowledge base, and launching of the Dubai International Award for Best Practices (DIABP). The aim was to use best practices as a means of improving public policy based on what works, for raising awareness of decision-makers and others about potential solutions to common social, economic and environmental problems, assessing emerging issues, trends and policy responses, and for sharing and transferring expertise and experiences (You 2004). Turner (1996) refers to this focus on best practice as a paradigm shift from the "reductionist focus on malfunctioning parts" to "the holistic focus on the pattern of relationships".

The development community also recognised that the form of interventions, rather than the magnitude of interventions or funds is responsible for poor urban environmental conditions (UN General Assembly 2003). There was formal recognition that sustainable urbanisation and poverty reduction are integral parts of sustainability and that it was necessary to learn lessons from good practices. After the City Summit, decisions made by the international community at various summits were consolidated in the `Declaration on Cities and Other Human Settlements in the New Millennium and the Habitat Agenda' to provide a focus for development initiatives. The Habitat Agenda documents major breakthroughs achieved at the Summit, including (UN General Assembly 2003):

- Collectively recognising the important role that cities play in social and economic development, as centres of productivity, innovation and advancement.
- Agreement on a collective strategy that is sharply focused on the two high priority concerns of "sustainable human settlements" and "adequate shelter for all", and
- Forging of a new partnership approach involving not only central governments and civil

society, but also local authorities for systematically addressing the future of cities and urban areas.

Subsequently, influencing decision makers for up-scaling good practices, and learning activities related to their up-scaling became highly promoted concepts in international development (Peltenburg 2000; Steinberg 2000). Many organisations got involved in a) identification and documentation of good practices; b) dissemination of this information and sharing of experiences; c) up-scaling of good practices, and d) incorporating the concepts and processes of good practices into organisational functioning. In addition, many awards were launched for recognition of best practices and documentation of the interventions, which is made widely available through searchable databases. Substantial progress has been made in identifying good practices through decentralised processes, as demonstrated by the best practice catalogues and awards introduced in various parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The activities for sharing and transferring knowledge, expertise and experience include city partnerships and city-to-city cooperation, international conferences, exposure visits, formation and meetings of associations, including city administrators and implementing staff (ICMA, CMAs), mayors (UCLG), and NGOs and CBOs (Cities Alliance). The knowledge sharing is at the global (United Cities and Local Governments), regional (Asian Mayor's Forum), national (Mayors Associations), sub-national (CMAs) and local levels (UN General Assembly 2003). These are in addition to increased allocation of resources for basic infrastructure and services, and grant and consultancy support. Despite these efforts, there are few successes in up-scaling of good practices and of learning from experience amongst the development community.

1.2.4 Poverty Reduction and the Millennium Development Goals

In May 1999, the World Bank and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UN-Habitat) launched a multi-donor coalition of cities and their development partners - the Cities Alliance. The intention was to i) improve the efficiency and impact of urban development cooperation for developing citywide and nationwide slum-upgrading programmes (Cities without Slums); and ii) support city-based consensus-building processes through which local stakeholders could define their vision for their city, establish priorities for action and prepare investment plans (City Development Strategies). The aim was to advance collective know-how in ways that strengthened the operations of the partners rather than build separate implementation capacity (Mukhija 2006).

In December 1999, the Boards of the IMF and the World Bank approved a new approach to the challenge of reducing poverty in low-income countries based on country-owned poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs). The PRSPs are expected to serve as a framework for development assistance, lead to stronger partnerships with countries and better donor coordination. The donor community as a whole accepted the principles of the approach and are actively supporting preparation of PRSPs, and aligning their assistance programmes to support PRSPs (World Bank & IMF 2002).

In 2002, UN-Habitat established a Water and Sanitation Trust Fund to provide a coordinated and fast track programmatic approach for working with cities and municipalities. The objective was to create opportunities for donors to target a high priority sector, and enable local governments to extend services to the poorest. Since 2003, the Governments of Canada, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden have contributed resources for regional programmes in Africa and Asia, which focus on water demand management, improved sanitation for the urban poor, urban catchment management, advocacy, awareness raising and information exchange, and training and capacity building programmes.

Despite these collaborative efforts, Global Monitoring Reports (World Bank & IMF 2004) on progress in meeting MDG Targets suggest that on present trends most MDGs will not be met in a majority of developing countries (UNDP 2003). The greatest shortfalls are expected on the human development goals, especially on health (UN General Assembly 2004c), while Targets 10 and 11 for water and sanitation are unlikely to be achieved in most countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (UNDP 2003; UN-Habitat 2004; World Bank & IMF 2004; Hashimoto 2006). The urgent need to up scale actions to accelerate progress toward the MDGs was reiterated at the Shanghai Conference on Up-scaling Poverty Reduction, where the following priorities were identified (World Bank 2004b):

- Strengthening capacity in the public sector and improving the quality of governance through increased transparency, and accountability.
- Scaling up investment in infrastructure and ensuring its effectiveness, accord priority to infrastructure services such as water and sanitation closely linked to the human development goal.
- Enhancing effectiveness of service delivery for education, health, and social services by addressing impediments related to service quality and effectiveness, increased community participation, and
- Scaling up on the basis of successful programmes

However, good practices continue to be referred to as 'islands of success' or excellence because of their limited impacts and because they are not successfully up scaled (Uvin 2000; Øyen 2002b; Binswanger 2003, World Bank 2005b; Bhatia 2004).

1.2.5 Up-scaling

The term 'up-scaling' and its several alternatives can be interpreted as an absolute and a relative concept and can be understood differently by different stakeholders. Up-scaling refers to the efficient increase of the socio-economic impact from a small to a large scale of coverage. It is defined in several ways with reference to different disciplines, sectors, and stakeholders.

Significant work (Øyen 2002; UN ESCAP 2003; UN-Habitat 2004) has been carried out to look at

issues related to the up-scaling of good practices, especially for poverty reduction. However, there is little systematic information about the many successful or unsuccessful attempts made through trial, error and adaptation for up-scaling (Øyen 2002).

The ESCAP study on best practices in poverty reduction looked at definitions, and identification, documentation and knowledge sharing (UN-ESCAP, 2003). It also reviewed methodology for simple replication of a best practice within a familiar setting using successful stakeholder groups in the process. This study recognised that the ability to adapt, transfer and up scale knowledge and experiences into relevant and appropriate development initiatives, organisational processes and physical environment (shelter and infrastructure) is crucial if up-scaling of good practice is to be contextually appropriate (UN ESCAP 2003).

Research undertaken by UN-Habitat focused on identifying effectiveness of different mechanisms for spreading good practices across the public sector (Munt 2003). The research specifically aimed at identifying effective techniques that were designed to stimulate innovation. The findings revealed, "it is important to identify clearly the nature of the intended user group, the influences which will determine the extent of take-up, and their preferred mechanisms for receiving information. Simply providing information is not the most important element of effective dissemination".

At the Shanghai Conference on Up-scaling Poverty Reduction, with emphasis on lessons from case studies, field visits and global dialogues, the conference participants deliberated on how various countries and institutions have taken poverty reduction programmes to scale, what they did, and how they did it. The participants recognised that (UN General Assembly 2004c):

- Up-scaling requires a long-term vision, a comprehensive approach and sustained efforts over time.
- Although up-scaling can happen at various levels, up-scaling through large scale and long-term programmes requires certainty of financing and partnerships between various stakeholders, including the government, private sector and civil society.
- In focusing on up-scaling, it is essential to address socio-cultural issues, inclusion, empowerment and participation of the poor as an integral component of the up-scaling efforts and approaches.

The participants concluded that up-scaling is possible at all levels, that is, countrywide, region wide or within sub-regions, and through programmes and projects when countries have the right ideas, support to implement them, and a conducive environment for long-term management and implementation (UN General Assembly 2004c). In addition, because of the multiple dimensions of the MDGs and the linkages among them, the scaling-up effort requires concerted action on multiple fronts, including across sectors, policies, investments, and institutions (World Bank & IMF 2004).

While scarce resources and inadequate capacities of the replicating organisations hindered up-scaling, a strong management focus, building of the capacity and long term administrative and management functions, and champions of reform with long-term visions at local or national level enabled effective development and up-scaling (World Bank 1998; Plummer 2000). For this, the up-scaling process has to adapt to the new opportunities and contexts (Sohail 2001; ESCAP 2003) and be responsive to changes in urban management and decision-making processes.

The slow progress raises queries about what is being identified for up-scaling, what is meant by up-scaling and what has been attempted for up-scaling sustainable interventions. It raises questions about whether the interventions identified as good practices can be up scaled, about the conditions under which attempts for their up-scaling are made, the processes adopted for their up-scaling, and about issues faced by decision makers involved in implementing good practices. While there is empirical evidence on requirements or hindrances in up-scaling natural resource management, community driven development, innovations and social development through NGOs, issues faced in implementation and up-scaling of good practices in urban areas are not studied extensively. Existing knowledge about good practices is primarily about communicating information about the means and techniques of the interventions rather than about decision processes involved in their implementation.

1.3 Research Relevance

It is the researcher's contention that the heuristics, that is, commonsense rules or set of rules intended to increase the likelihood of solving a problem, or formulate problems in a way that it guides the search for a solution, and subsequently the choice of a solution are not known. While the good practice databases provide documentation on various interventions, in depth knowledge about how choices are made for identifying an appropriate solution in a particular context is inadequate. A study of decisions involved in implementing good practices is important because decisions that involve participatory processes entail a change in implementation procedures. In organisations where administrative procedures are followed systematically for accountability purposes, a study of influences on decisions for the initiation and implementation of good practices provides an opportunity to identify the type of support that can be provided for up-scaling in response to the context. In addition, an understanding of these decision processes can be incorporated in documenting and sharing knowledge about good practices. In presuming that decision makers involved in implementing good practices influence its up-scaling, the study assumes that it is possible to facilitate the up-scaling process more effectively.

This research is very relevant at this time because of the emphasis on sustainable development and on meeting the MDG Targets. In recent years, studies and research on up-scaling and transfer of good practices in urban areas have been funded (UN-Habitat 2004a; ESCAP 2003) to gain better understanding of how up-scaling is facilitated or hindered. Current studies have provided the

context and state of the debate about good practices within the development community.

The study covers decision-making processes at the local government level for the real-time case study in India, and subsequent to the implementation of MHP in Sri Lanka. It covers decision processes as well as routines of those who have attempted transfer and those who have initiated or facilitated good practices. Routines, in organization theory, are defined broadly as "monotonous repetition, repositories of knowledge, or effortful accomplishments" (Lillrank 2003). Generalizations will be made from three case studies. The research is based on the argument that up-scaling would be more viable if support is aimed at introducing transparent processes in their implementation. The research findings will contribute to refinement of strategies for supporting up-scaling and for evolving processes for identification of good practices.

1.4 Motivation for the Research

The researcher's experiences and interaction with decision makers in urban areas, with organisations supporting up-scaling of good practices in slum upgrading in India, and in facilitating learning and capacity building activities provide a context for the study. Understanding about the complexity of problems was strengthened by observations of written rules not being the practice for many people working in environments where poverty and education levels are low. Most of all, the entrepreneurship of individuals who find ways and means of optimizing the benefits of their positions and roles, showed that appropriate support could contribute to improving the quality of life of many poor people. An important observation was that while urban areas can be transformed because of 'champions', as in Surat and Ahmedabad in 1994 - 97, their departures significantly reduced the focus on processes and projects initiated during their tenure.

The association with donor agencies and interactions with local governments, NGOs, training institutions and activists provided a glimpse of differences in attitudes toward the poor, and of influence of individual choices in determining approaches in project designs and processes. The close association also revealed that while 'national programmes and donor-funded projects' incorporated good practice components, their implementation did not result in integration of processes with institutional functioning. In many cases, it also did not result in 'sustainable changes' in the physical conditions of the improved areas. In addition, designated training institutions could not provide the quality of capacity building support required for participatory processes, which were integral components of poverty reduction programmes.

As a 'local' member of project monitoring teams, staff within local and sub-national Governments confided to the researcher about practical issues they faced in implementation of projects, and which they could not share with 'outsiders'. The information revealed that people at higher levels of decision-making in organizations do not inform (or extensively brief/question) outsiders about local (institutional/ political/ external) circumstances in which interventions are being proposed, just as they are neither questioned nor challenged by lower cadre staff in the Indian context.

Priorities of activities are changed in response to demands by people in power, in response to requirements of authorities and special events.

With the focus on achieving MDG Targets and changes in functioning of development organisations, the issues of knowledge, knowledge transfer, and resources have greater significance. While planning up-scaling of good practices, there is little empirical evidence about the hindrances faced in up-scaling good practices. This research aims at filling the gap in knowledge about hindrances in up-scaling good practices.

1.5 Organisation of the Study

The report is organised in 9 Chapters. Chapter 2 covers a review of theoretical and empirical literature on good practices, up-scaling and decision-making. The Chapter provides a summary of decision-making, good practices and up-scaling, it highlights earlier research work, and explains key terms. It covers the driving forces behind global and national changes in approaches for environmental improvement of urban areas, and the objectives and incentives for recognition of excellence or superior performances. A broader perspective on up-scaling research is then provided by discussing important research themes that emerge from the review of the literature.

Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework and the research design, including justification for the choice of the research paradigm, research strategy, process of case selection, research techniques, case study data analysis procedure and quality of the research design.

Chapter 4 covers the analysis of four awards, namely the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, the World Habitat Award, The Dubai International Award for Best Practices and finally the CRISIL Awards for Excellence in Municipal Initiatives. It also includes an introduction of the three cases described in detail in the following Chapters.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 comprise the within-case analysis of the Million Houses Programme, the Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project and the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative for Secondary Towns around Lake Victoria. The description is given in terms of how the decision to implement the project was made (problem identification and choice), and stages of up-scaling, initiation, improvisation or consolidation, and implementation or expansion of the three cases.

Chapter 8 includes a cross-case analysis of the three cases and discussion about the findings by list of variables identified through the review of literature and themes that emerged during analysis of the data. The results and analysis of the cases are presented in the form of descriptions. The related Tables are included in the Appendices.

Chapter 9 presents the conclusions, a summary of research findings, contributions to knowledge, and possible areas for further research. This is followed by the Appendices.

Figure 1-5: Organisation of the Study



1.6 Operational Definition of Terms

In the context of this research, the operational definitions of key terms are given below:

Up-scaling is the process of efficiently (cost and management) institutionalizing effective approaches, techniques, concepts and programmes to bring more quality benefits (social, economic, environmental, institutional) to more urban residents, over a wider geographical area more equitably, more quickly and more permanently. This interpretation stresses the good practices-centred concept to up-scaling.

Good Practices are "concepts, processes, or interventions that have evolved locally for bringing sustainable socio-economic changes in the lives of the poor living in areas with high levels of environmental degradation; in response to their values, preferences, and situation through partnerships that maintain an effective working balance between the partners".

Partnerships: are relationships between two or more organisations or groups that transcend immediate formal or informal contracts, and work together to achieve a common goal, and do so in such a way that they achieve more effective outcomes than by working separately. They can involve any combination of national, sub-national, or local governments, NGOs, commercial enterprises or regional agencies.

Participation: is enabling of people to develop skills and abilities to become more self-reliant, and to make decisions and take actions essential to their development.

Slums are unplanned and under-served neighbourhoods typically settled by squatters without legal recognition or rights. Therefore, many slum residents do not have several or all of the basic municipal services, such as water supply, sanitation and solid waste collection, and frequently lack access to social services. Slums are often located in untenable sites.

Decision-making is the process or act of reaching a position, an opinion, or a judgment for an urban environmental problem and making a commitment for its implementation after consideration between alternatives (Szaniawski 1980; Simon 1997). It involves direction setting through formulation of a problem, generating alternatives or identifying them from available information sources, making a choice, making organisational arrangements, issue policies, and allocating resources for implementation (Simon 1978; Nutt 2005; Robins 2001).

Development interventions imply actions that improve the quality of life through higher incomes/ less poverty, better education, higher standards of health, a cleaner environment, more equality in terms of opportunities, individual freedom and acceptability of traditional ways of living, and equity in terms of gender, access to resources, and influence in decision making.

Sustainable urban development: is development that optimally utilize available resources while conserving and renewing other natural resources while meeting the basic needs of shelter, water supply, sanitation, and food of all urban residents.

Sustainability of urban infrastructure implies the effective and optimal utilisation of urban infrastructure networks during their 'lifespan' for efficient provision of services to all urban residents.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter begins with a review of the literature on good practices as sustainable interventions, and awards, award processes as a means of searching for, and identifying good practices. The aim is to understand what has been done to influence decision makers in solving problems of urban areas. The literature review will trace the significance of good practices in different sectors. This is followed by a review of literature on up-scaling to gain an understanding of what is meant by up-scaling, what it involves and what are the requirements for up-scaling. Finally, a review is made of the literature on decision making to gain an understanding of how decisions are made and what influences the choices for tackling identified problems. The objective is to determine how the knowledge about good practices contributes to choices made by decision makers in addressing urban problems.

2.1 The MDGs and up-scaling of good practices

Environmental sustainability and its underlying principles have been discussed and addressed in a series of World Summits devoted to: environment and development (Rio de Janeiro 1992 and 1997); human rights (Vienna 1993); population and development (Cairo 1994); social development (Copenhagen 1995 and 2000); women (Beijing 1995); and human settlements (Vancouver - 1976 and Istanbul - 1996). Of these, the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and the Programme of Action established a new consensus to place people at the centre of concerns for sustainable development and pledged to eradicate poverty, promote full and productive employment, and foster social integration to achieve stable, safe and just societies for all. Poverty reduction was identified as a significant dimension of sustainable development (Hjorth 2003; Satterthwaite 2003a) and the criticality of infrastructure and progressive improvement of on-site facilities were recognised (Choguill 1996a).

In March 1995, nations agreed (Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development) to promote an enabling environment for sustainable development based on a people-centred approach (WSSD 1995). There was recognition that achievements of technology-based development are inappropriate, that this form of intervention is responsible for poor urban environmental conditions (UN General Assembly 2003), and that participation and a process approach are essential for sustainable development. The understanding of sustainable development therefore provided an opportunity of "turning 'underdevelopment' into a blessing" (Sachs 2002).

Sustainable approaches incorporate participation and the role of different actors, including inhabitants, NGOs, CBOs, project developers, other cities, public-private partners, financial organizations and other commercial and political interest groups. With the focus on sustainability, participation and decentralisation of decisions became important components of development approaches. Participation was expected to go beyond beneficiary participation to

meet the needs of the poor, as well the most vulnerable amongst them, including women (Castells 1997; Cornwall 2003). Participation was expected to result in decisions that reflect local needs and priorities (Devas 2003) and therefore to sustainable development interventions. Since the participation of communities did not contain the radical alternative development discourses of the seventies, participatory approaches gained acceptance (Castells 1997).

In July 2000, the Plenary of the "World Summit for Social Development" declared that universal access to high quality education, health and other basic social services and equal opportunities for active participation and sharing of benefits of development processes are essential for achieving the objectives of the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action. It also recognized the Governments' primary responsibility in this regard and emphasized the importance of strengthening partnerships, as appropriate, among the public sector, the private sector and other relevant actors, including NGOs and CBOs.

In 2000, at the UN Millennium Summit, world leaders agreed to a set of time-bound and measurable goals and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women. The goals, later defined as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), were established to integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reduce poverty (UN General Assembly 2000). The MDGs incorporate agreements on other goals and targets reached at global conferences of the nineties and provide the focus for all development initiatives of bilateral and multi-lateral institutions at the national and global levels for the next 20 years (UN General Assembly 2000). Of these, the focus on intensifying support for sustainable environmental improvement, specifically for meeting Targets under MDG 7 - to 'ensure environmental sustainability', aims at reducing by half, the population without sustainable access to water supply and basic sanitation by 2015 and at achieving significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. MDG 7 provides a focus for improving living environments. Thus, improving access to domestic water supply and sanitation services are significant entry points for poverty reduction and for achieving the MDGs.

The Millennium Declaration provided the praxis shift for the development community, especially the bilateral and multilateral funding agencies that previously funded capital projects through conventional project-cycles. The support for multi-sectoral initiatives that require long-term support for long-term development processes rather than discrete projects was formalised, and it has resulted in increased commitments of investments and resources. Development organisations now tend to support interventions aimed at changing policies and practices of local and national governments and have developed new channels to support initiatives such as establishing intermediary funds for community projects (Anzorena 1998; UN General Assembly 2004c). Many organisations, including the UN, World Bank and donors, are involved in efforts for sharing knowledge about and for up-scaling good practices.

Box 2-1: Current best practice: Participatory Slum Improvement

The accepted best practice for housing interventions in developing countries is now participatory slum improvement. However, so far, these have mostly been adopted on a limited scale or are demonstration projects. The interventions are intended to work for the very poor, often in situations where there are no markets. The best examples are holistic approaches to neighbourhood improvement, taking into account health, education, housing, livelihood and gender. Government largely adopts a facilitative role in getting things moving, while maintaining financial accountability and adherence to quality norms. It is now good practice to involve the communities from the outset, often through a formalized process, and to require a contribution from the occupants, which gives them both commitment and rewards. The more sustainable efforts appear to be those that are the main plank of a city development strategy with planned, rolling upgrades across the city and a political commitment to maintenance. As a rule, the more marginalized or culturally separate the group being assisted, the more participation and partnerships are necessary.

Many agencies have been involved in slum upgrading over the past 25 years in all regions of the world, along with thousands of local governments and NGOs. Much organization, local goodwill and cohesion, and political will are necessary to make projects of this type work, and it remains to be seen whether they are replicable on a wider scale.

Source: UN-Habitat 2003a.

In the context of achieving sustainable development at community levels, Roseland (2000) contends that sustainable development is "about the quantity and quality of empowerment and participation of people, and requires mobilizing citizens and their governments toward sustainable communities. This emphasis on the significance of governance for sustainable community development focuses on public participation, decision-making, the role of local government, and planning for action. Thus, the objectives of identifying and up-scaling good practices in urban areas can be listed as:

i) To contribute toward achieving MDG Targets 10 and 11;

ii) To optimise the use of available resources by learning from interventions that have improved the quality of life of the actors involved;

iii) To bring greater awareness about approaches and processes that have enabled sustainable environmental improvement;

iv) To garner additional support from Governments, decision makers and funding agencies for changes in policies and in resource allocation for sustainable approaches, and

v) To address the underlying causes of poverty by developing knowledge and skills, and by building organisational linkages amongst various actors.

Thus, to understand the role of decisions in up-scaling of good practices, it is first essential to determine what good practices are and what up-scaling means. The following sub-section is a review of good practices and the criteria that help determine to what good practices are.

2.2 What are good practices?

The terms good and 'best practices' are used for a range of interventions, concepts, processes, practices, programmes, technical innovations, or projects. In all cases, the superior performance, outcomes or observable improvements are indicated by the term 'best practices'. The term 'best

practices' gives the indication of something being the most satisfactory, suitable, desirable, useful, superior, or successful in relation to some baseline criteria, and or in comparison to others (Löffler 2000; Øyen 2002b; ESCAP 2003; Miller 2002). However, in urban areas, where there is no single way or blueprint for sustainable urban development, the use of the adjective 'best' is inappropriate. Øyen (2002b) emphasis on "what is the best in one context is unlikely to be the best in a different context and situation". This is reflected in best practices identified in the urban context, which may not meet. all "best practice criteria" or established benchmarks across the sector. Therefore, the adjective 'good' is preferred for this study to refer to 'recognised best practices' and for other 'best practices'.

Good practices provide lessons and examples of sustainable development for those who fund and facilitate development interventions at the local, national, regional and global levels (Øyen 2002b) and for decision makers responsible for guiding the planning and management of urban areas. Øyen (2002b) contends that good practices in poverty reduction refer to processes that enable achievement of common goals or draw attention to activities for a given goal and show what can be achieved with alternate approaches. She also argues that best practices are not always the best, and that the political variables and impact of vested interests on the outcomes and judgement (identification and recognition) of good practices need consideration (Øyen 2002a). In countries where donors fund civil society for pro-poor initiatives, the identification good practices is useful for (Øyen 2002a) the NGOs, the Government, the donors and consultants. For NGOs, awards legitimatise their work and give them greater access to resources, while for politicians and governments, it increases donor funding and improves their standing within the development sector. For the donors, the recognition of interventions provides opportunities to identify means to invest their funds prudently and for consultants to prove their credentials.

2.2.1 Best Practice origins

The concept of best practices and their transfer emerged in the manufacturing and business sectors in response to the constant need of companies to remain competitive in a changing economic environment (Zairi 1999; Dedhia 2001). Best practices in manufacturing and business are interventions that increase efficiency, profitability, and competitiveness of companies by improving the quality of production and service delivery (Laszlo 1996). The objective of identifying best practices is to steer improvement in the sector where introduced (Miller 2002). The identification of best practices is achieved by documenting interventions that have adopted an approach that is different from the norm in terms of outcomes such as quality and customer satisfaction, and by establishing benchmarks.

Benchmarks provide a reference goal against which outcomes of other entities are assessed. The benchmarking technique was introduced in the business and manufacturing sectors as a

management tool to identify measurable indicators and key operational drivers of performance excellence. Subsequently, benchmarking is utilised for rigorously comparing similar processes used across public or the private sector industries and organisations to identify best practices, innovative ideas, and effective operating procedures that lead to superior performance. The benchmarking process is used as an effective way to encourage business and manufacturing sectors to look beyond their routine operations in search of new ideas (Löffler 2000; Macleod 2001), and learn from organisational innovations and best practices to improve their performance (Pfeffer 1999). The benchmarking process involves: i) measuring the performance of one entity against its peers; ii) identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the entity, and iii) incorporating a process of self-assessment. Thus, the criteria for identification of best practices measure improved performance internally, from project to project, and across the sector to identify areas for improvement.

In the construction industry, which has major impacts on the environment, sustainable construction refers to social, economic and environmental performance of processes and products. Best practices in construction aim at minimising environmental impacts through air pollution, loss of soil, agricultural land, forests, non-renewable sources of energy, and minerals (Spence 1995). They refer to sustainable resource consumption, biodiversity and habitat retained or created, energy and water use, whole life performance and ethical sourcing. Best practices in construction measure outcomes of: i) construction processes, ii) construction products, and iii) performance indicators (both environmental and economic indicators), including costs, time and client satisfaction. These include (BERR, 2008; DTI 2006; SECBE 2005; Spence 1995):

- Procurement process that aim to achieve, in both the private and public sectors, a low carbon, more resource efficient construction by delivering measurable improvements in quality, cost and time predictability, as well as improved health and safety of construction projects.
- Partnering for a collaborative approach of working to achieve better value for money.
- Risk management as a planning tool that enables identification and assessment of risks, the actions taken to address them, and making financial allowances for them.
- Value management for a systematic approach for generating and evaluating options for quality, functionality and client satisfaction (design impact and construction quality).
- Benchmarking for improving performance of the construction companies by measuring and comparing their performance with others – as in the case of quality awards.
- Supply chain management for integrating the operations of all organisations involved in the delivery of a particular product or service, ranging from the primary materials

suppliers to intermediaries, installers and others.

- Whole life costing, which refers to the cost of ownership of the building, including initial capital costs, and the maintenance and servicing costs over the buildings whole life.
- Health and safety issues during construction and operation.
- Lean construction, which refers to managing the production activity in a way that systematically reduces processes that add costs without adding value, and
- Long-term contribution in terms of community utilisation and benefits.

In the programme for population for food security and sustainable development, best practices are defined as "interventions that have produced tangible results in achieving lower population growth rates and better socio-economic conditions for human beings, and have improved food security while conserving the environment" (UNECA 2002). Best practices in the context of natural resource management are "model practices whose related activities contribute directly and substantially to the sustainable achievement of a given goal under specified environmental and socio-economic conditions" (UNECA 2002). Based on this definition, best practices in social development are "expected to be goal-oriented and replicable, to use appropriate resources in a cost-effective manner, and to address not only the bio-physical but also the socio-economic issues in all their development stages so as to ensure long-term sustainability" (UNECA 2002).

Best practices in health promotion are defined as "processes and pre-conditions which need to be adapted in skilful ways in response to prevailing conditions" (Kahan 1998). The objective is to have evidence-based health practices, for which the best practices are carefully documented and described by those involved in health promotion activities. The 'evidence from best practices' is scrutinised and tested for specifically identifying and proving the benefits of the new practice. If proved viable and better, such practices become reference points for treatment in other similar cases and situations. Arai (2000) indicates that the aim is to adapt practices in "ways that suit the particular issue and context, share stories, tools and understanding so that we do not keep reinventing the wheel, and incorporate philosophy and values, guidelines for practice based on evidence, indicators of positive intervention, and processes of staff, volunteer and community involvement".

2.2.2 Good practices in urban areas

ESCAP defines good practices as approaches that have been shown, through research and evaluation, to be effective and sustainable, produce outstanding results, and can be applicable in and adapted to a different situation (ESCAP 2003). This definition stresses the requirement of evidence of outstanding results and viable up-scaling as important indicators of good practices.

The above definitions of good practices, which have overlaps with various characteristics, stress

the outcome, the process, the impact and the contribution of interventions to overall improvement in quality of life of people, as well as to factors that contribute to the evolution of good practices. As Taylor (2001) highlights, "Modern management emphasises the need for indicators to measure progress". To support and facilitate progress, up-scaling of good practices has become an important and widespread practical management issue (Szulanski 1996). However, in the context of 'people-centred' sustainable development, a search for universal indicators is unrealistic because every situation and community is different (Taylor 2001).

The objective of identifying good practices in urban areas is to contribute to more informed decision making (You 1996). Therefore, general criteria for determining what good practices are have been identified in a way that enables their interpretation to fit the local context and place. Based on the basic criteria identified by the Preparatory Committee for Habitat II for nomination of 'best practices', UN-Habitat defines good practices as "initiatives undertaken by two or more partners at the national, city, or community level, which effectively address chronic social, economic, and environmental problems". The good practices must have a tangible impact on improving people's quality of life and the living environment; and have brought lasting changes in policy, decision-making processes, resources allocation or management systems (BPP 1996; CityNet 1998). Additional criteria listed for consideration include: i) potential for transferability, adaptability and replicability; ii) acceptance of and responsiveness to social and cultural diversity; iii) promotion of social equality and equity; and iv) appropriateness to local conditions and levels of development (BPP 1996; CityNet 1998).

The criteria initially included coordination between multi-sectoral interventions, management systems and processes, and to institutional, regulatory, or policy changes. The criteria was changed in 1998 when the Technical Advisory Committee for the DIABP included initiatives, processes and practices that help to meet the challenge of more sustainable development as good practices (BPP 1998). The social development criteria for good practices include: i) appropriateness for local conditions and levels of developments, ii) leading to the empowerment of people, neighbourhoods and communities, and iii) contribution to gender equality and social integration. The categories include interventions for housing, access to land and finance, extension of safe water supply and sanitation, revival and rehabilitation of decayed housing areas, and construction of affordable housing using innovative design and/or safe and healthy building materials and technologies (BPP 2004; BSHF 2004).

However, the definitions and criteria do not refer to the scale at which these are assessed, while the good practices range from a small scale of impact to a large scale. Based on a review of literature on best practices in related sectors, the generic features and characteristics of good practices are discussed below.

Table 2-1: Criteria for identifying good practices

Sustainable human settlement development Shelter and urban infrastructure	Policy and institutional changes for sustainable urban development	Accountability and transparent settlements management	Partnerships/ Collaboration
Affordable housing, services & community facilities. Social housing. Access to land & finance.	Legislation, regulatory frameworks, by-laws, or standards, providing formal recognition of the issues & problems that have been addressed.	Leadership in inspiring action & change, including change in public policy	Cities, local authorities or their associations. Non-governmental organizations. Community-based organizations. Private Sector Public or Private foundations. Government organizations or agencies Bilateral & Multilateral Agencies: UNDG, World Bank, & others Research and academic institutions. Individuals
Extension of safe water supply & sanitation. Safe & healthy building materials & technologies. Waste collection, recycling & reuse Improved urban environment health	Social policies and/or sectoral strategies at the (sub) national level that have a potential for replication elsewhere.	Community development through empowerment of people, communities & neighbourhoods Incorporation of community contributions. Mainstreaming gender & social inclusion Promotion of social equality & equity, & reduction of exclusion. Acceptance of & responsiveness to social & cultural diversity.	
Architecture & urban design Restoration & rehabilitation of Inner-city core, & areas of decayed housing & environmental degradation.	Institutional frameworks & decision-making processes that assign clear roles & responsibilities to various levels & groups of actors, such as central & local governmental organisations & community-based organisations.	Improvement of inter-agency coordination Promotion of accountability & transparency. Community-based planning & participation in decision-making & resource allocation. Equity in decision-making, resource-allocation & programme design & implementation	
Experimental & innovative practices built using innovative design and/or construction materials,	Efficient, transparent & accountable management systems that make more effective use of information in decision-making & of human, technical, financial & natural resources.	More effective & efficient administrative, management & information systems. Urban poverty reduction & job creation	
		Appropriateness to local conditions & levels of developments. Potential for transferability, adaptability, & replicability.	

Adapted from: criteria identified for AKAA, WHA and DIABP

2.2.3 Characteristics of good practices

To determine superior performance or excellence, criteria have to be identified for a process of evaluation and comparison. The principles identified under the Bellagio Project (Hardi 1997; EAWAG 2000) for assessing progress towards sustainable development are reflected in the criteria used by award-giving organisations for identification of good practices (Section 1.3), and Taylor's (2001) six criteria for measuring progress in social development provide a basis for understanding good practices. The Principles include: i) Clear vision and goal; ii) Holistic perspective that considers the social, ecological and economical sub-systems; iii) Equity in access to resources; iv) Long-term perspective that includes local and wider impacts; v) Focus on framework and indicators that are linked to vision and goals; vi) Transparency and sharing of information with all; vii) Effective communication; viii) Broad based participation of different stakeholder groups with decision-makers; ix) Iterative progress in response to changing

situations and context, and x) supporting decision-makers by providing institutional capacity.

Of the characteristics of good practices identified in the literature (Section 1.2), Taylor's (2001; 2003) criteria, namely, i) sustainability; ii) collaboration around a shared vision; iii) equity; iv) interdependence; v) holistic actions; and vi) iterative actions provide an appropriate classification for the characteristics of good practices. (Taylor 2001).

2.2.3.1 Sustainability

The sustainability of interventions, in terms of economic, environmental, social (values), and cultural (preferences) sustainability, is a basic criterion of good practices identified for development (Chambers 1989; Taylor 2000; Øyen 2002a; BPP 1996). Good practices involve processes and practices that i) address socio-cultural, gender, participation issues, ii) meet the needs of the poor based on their preferences, values, and situations, iii) have sustainable impacts on their socio-economic status, health and livelihoods, iv) lead to sustainable improvements in the quality of the environment, and optimise the use of available funds, and other resources and opportunities (Øyen 2002b). Different forms of participation of local communities and some forms of partnership are frequently identified as characteristics of good practices (Taylor 2001; Chambers 1997; BPP 1996; CityNet 1998; Anzorena 1998).

Good practices are sustainable because they are responsive and sensitive to the local context and to the needs of stakeholders involved. The interventions include a component for partial or total cost recovery for some or all of the components of the interventions, and use credit mechanisms that allow the poor to spread the cost of investments over some years (Anzorena 1998). In addition, the effectiveness of interventions is expected to produce results that can be applicable in and adaptable to different situations (ESCAP 2003), and bring about changes in public policy (Jain 1994).

The criterion of sustainability in this context does not address the more ecological or product-related criteria used for best practices in construction, such as impact on environment, energy and water use, whole life performance, or long-term contribution in terms of community utilisation and benefits. It focuses more on the community and its participation, resource utilisation and sustainability of improvements in quality of life. The sustainability of interventions indicates the need for collaboration around a shared vision amongst various stakeholders and is expected to come about through participation of beneficiaries and partnerships with other stakeholders.

2.2.3.2 Collaboration around a shared vision

Taylor (2000) contends that partnerships around shared vision or direction of development are essential for evolving solutions to the immediate concerns. According to Taylor (2003), "the process that produces partnerships between the main action groups is equally needed for internal collaboration within communities". Clarity about a vision for sustainable development enables

setting of appropriate goals (Hardi 1997). Participation for a common vision and joint action enable interventions that are responsive to local needs, incorporate and tackle practical local issues, lead to empowerment, and help "bring factions within the community together around a common vision and joint action" (Taylor 2003) and thereby promote conflict resolution, In addition, local leadership (Jain 1994), and guidance of social inventors, entrepreneurs or administrators (Miller 2002) play an important role in the evolution of good practices. Miller (2002) contends that charisma of the leaders in such interventions is essential for their emergence, prominence, achievement and funding.

2.2.3.3 Interdependence/ partnerships

Interdependence and self-reliance are integral to sustainability (Taylor 2001) because they lead to webs of interaction and opens access to people, resources, economic opportunities, technology, skills, and knowledge. The interdependence is in terms of supportive policies and decision-makers who influence policies, and representation of communities, professionals, technical, social and other vulnerable groups (Hardi 1997). Interdependence is also in terms of financial support that does not lead to dependency or control of beneficiary stakeholders by outsiders (Taylor 2001), and technical skills and resources that increase transparency, accountability of public organisations to more stakeholders, and lead to equitable distribution of opportunities and access to services. Thus, empowerment and capacity building are essential requirements for interdependence.

Box 2-2: Are Best Practices Donor Driven?

> "During the past couple of decades a major part of poverty-reducing interventions in poor countries has been donor driven. Donors have provided the moral basis for organisational and financial arrangements and flag expectation that some form of best practice should emerge. It has not been easy to implement donor-initiated interventions, for many reasons, and donors are in constant search for partners who can help deliver the initiatives in an acceptable form. In countries where the State is weak, corrupt or lacks the infrastructure to carry out pro-poor policies, donors have turned to civil society to implement poverty-reduction strategies. That is a strategy with many implications, including the sudden growth of seemingly best practices"

Source: Øyen 2002a

Good practices evolve in partnerships that maintain an effective balance between bottom-up and top-down actions (inter-dependence and not dependency) (Taylor 2000; You undated). Partnerships entail improving the efficiency and effectiveness of partnership mechanisms and representation of grassroots organisations in decision processes. The partnerships are amongst the local communities and the poor, CBOs, NGOs, governments, the private sector and other stakeholders (Anzorena 1998). Looking at partnerships from the organisational perspective, the World Bank (2004b) identifies them as essential for expansion and strengthening of links amongst institutions and government and private sector organisations, NGOs, donors, professional associations, research institutions, and civil society groups with complementary agendas, expertise, resources and reach. The partnerships are in many instances supported by external agencies, while some are initiated and supported by governments (Anzorena 1998).

2.2.3.4 *Equity*

Equity, the essential element of sustainable development, is defined by Taylor (2000) as "reaching out to those in greatest needs and in providing opportunities to those who have been deprived in the past". The emphasis is for "top-down actions through external interventions in favour of the poor, the vulnerable and discriminated groups for overcoming existing and deeply entrenched inequalities and local patterns of discrimination" (Taylor 2000).

Equity involves resource redistribution (Hardi 1997), which leads to differences amongst groups that have the resources and related privileges that they are required to relinquish (Øyen 2002b). Therefore, good practices change the relationship between the urban poor and local authorities, and subsequently influence development approaches and policies from being outsider planned and implemented to locally evolved processes (Anzorena 1998). For equity, outside resources have to be channelled in ways that give priority to promoting equity but do not remove control from the community or responsible institutional stakeholders. Therefore, when external agencies pay start-up costs for pilots to accelerate action, they create expectations about outcomes that cannot be met without redistribution of resources.

2.2.3.5 *Holistic Actions/ Approach*

Good practices for solving development problems are holistic actions that "consider the well-being of social, ecological, and economic sub-systems, their state as well as the direction and rate of change of that state, of their component parts, and the interaction between parts" (Hardi 1997). Good practices adopt an inter-sectoral approach to address social, economic, and environmental problems (Taylor 2000; You undated), and result in sustainable changes in the quality of the environment (Anzorena 1998). Holistic approaches lead to awareness about underlying causes of people's problems in specific areas, and build capacity for understanding combinations of problems. The sectoral initiatives and projects contribute to and are coordinated with other activities to maximise benefits to the community (Taylor 2000; You undated).

Box 2-3: Sustainable Development and Sectoral Focus

> "In spite of much talk about integrated services, systems approaches and ecosystem perspectives, most governments maintain a sectoral focus in their community based programs. A current tendency is to narrow the focus even more from general health issues to specific health problems such as HIV/AIDS. The reason appears to be that outsider experts and donors can then more readily impose their priorities and control of money on communities, even though they have little awareness or interest in how local priorities can be fit together. We maintain that a genuine three-way partnership breaks through sectoral barriers and preconceptions to new horizons of sustainable problem solving."

Source: Taylor 2003.

2.2.3.6 *Iteration*

Good practices build on the experiences, knowledge and skills of all people involved over time, and through use of locally available resources (Chambers 1997). The implementation process of good practices comprise many small decisions, assessments, evaluations, and modifications at various levels and stages to complement changes in levels of understanding, emerging issues

and circumstances (Chambers 1997). The changes or iterations are contextually and temporally specific, and 'responsive to local values and preferences, which differ from both the values of outsiders and from the values that outsiders suppose for them' (Chambers 1989; 1997). Good practices therefore evolve over time because the various stakeholders assess, plan, negotiate, and review numerous recommendations and decisions in response to the local changing environment and practicalities.

2.2.4 Summary

Taylor's criteria for measuring progress in social development provide a framework for understanding good practices and contextualizing the processes and approaches adopted for sustainable interventions. In addition, they provide a basis for determining progress on the sustainability of good practices. However, these criteria do not provide any indication about the viability or appropriateness of the good practices for up-scaling or mainstreaming of the interventions.

2.2.5 Awards for identifying good practices

The promotion of up-scaling of good practices aims at assisting countries to identify and analyse micro and small-scale interventions that have proven to be effective in one place, for adaptation elsewhere (ESCAP 2004). For encouraging acceptance of good practices as superior solutions to specific urban problems, they have to be accepted as legitimate alternatives.

Legitimacy, which is defined as "a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs, and definition" (Suchman 1995), can be achieved in several ways. Legitimacy can be in the form of normative approval or in the form of comprehensibility or as acceptance because of the audience's self-interest. One of the means for gaining legitimacy is to identify excellence by instituting a prize or award. The institution of awards for good practices that are identified through a formal process of assessment is expected to increase the legitimacy of the approaches, processes and concepts that are being promoted. The increased awareness about the effectiveness of prizes as a way to elicit effort of stakeholders in a particular sector has led to a fivefold increase in the number of prizes during the 1970s and 1980s (Zuckerman 1992).

2.2.5.1 Awards

Awards and prizes are designed or offered as motivation and incentives for achieving goals that are of interest to those who institute them. Although the terms awards and prizes are often used as synonyms, their etymology indicates different meanings. The etymology of the word prize is in the word 'price'. It was also "associated to war, sport and husbandry in the 14th century" (Street 2005). The noun is used to mean something exceptionally desirable or something offered or striven for in competition or in contests of chance (Encyclopaedia Britannica). Prize is used

as a verb to mean "to value highly; to estimate to be of great worth; or to esteem". The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines prize as something given for victory or superiority in a contest or competition or as a trophy given as a token of victory.

The term award is rooted in the Anglo-French term awarder meaning 'decide after careful observation OR the French terms "eswarder" and "esguarder" meaning 'examine'. It is primarily used as a transitive verb meaning to confer or bestow an honour upon, as being deserved or merited or as a decision, such as one made by a judge or arbitrator (Encyclopaedia Britannica). Award, as a noun, means "a tangible symbol signifying approval or distinction (accolade/ honour/ laurels)" or "something awarded" or a judgment, sentence, or final decision". As a verb, award means to bestow an honour upon, or 'present' or "grant/ give on the basis of merit". The tangible symbols of awards and prizes include trophies, certificates/ citations, plaques, statuettes, scrolls, medals, and/ or cash prizes. Recognition of interventions in the context of settlements development falls primarily to the category of awards.

The term award is used in this study as a noun to mean an accolade or honour presented to a person, a group of people or partners for concepts, actions taken, processes, or outcomes of interventions. The term prize is used as a noun for awards given in competitions, for pre-specified innovations and those given for solving given problem within a given time frame.

Purpose of instituting awards

The purpose of instituting awards is to generate interest and bring focus to the goals and objectives of specific disciplines or interests of individuals, organizations and businesses. Awards are instituted for recognition of individuals, teams, or organizations for specific or to honour distinguished/ lifetime contributions in various disciplines, including scientific disciplines, arts, literature, journalism, architecture, and humanitarian actions. A review of awards on the internet shows that awards are offered to recognize and reward exceptional efforts, or as motivation or incentives for greater efforts to bring about a desired result or to achieve higher goals or better quality. They are given for advancing the state of knowledge in a particular discipline (Nobel Prizes), for establishing or achieving higher benchmarks, for making a difference in a particular discipline or humanitarian causes (Aga Khan Award for Architecture, Magsaysay and Right Livelihood Awards), and for inspirational contributions.

In addition, awards are offered as inducements to inspire and reward entities to accomplish breakthroughs or specified objectives, or as a reward or honour for an individual or team's intervention or body of work already undertaken in a particular field (Schroeder 2004). These are in the form of cash, opportunities for interacting with others involved in works in similar areas, for transfer of approaches and for building skills and capacities. In addition, awards are established for recognising interventions that demonstrate specific goals (Quality and Environment Awards, Dubai International Award for Best Practices), or that appropriately use

local resources (World Habitat Awards).

Benefits of recognition through awards

The value of recognition for an individual is the greater focus on the prize-winning activities or interventions (Gaston 1978; Masters 2006). Recognition for advancing knowledge in a particular discipline, such as the Nobel Prizes, reinforces the value of the contributions of individuals and is an incentive for them to continue working for further advancements in the area (Gaston 1978; Masters 2006). Such acknowledgment of excellence results in recognition, esteem, and prestige for the institutions with which the prize winners are associated. Consequently, the institutions benefit because of: a) more demands for association with them; b) greater interest in the institutions or organizations from researchers and students; and c) increased access to larger grants for further progress in the discipline or field. Recognition through awards also assists the award giving entities in advancing or carrying forward their interests and activities in specific disciplines. Naming of prizes and awards after individuals contributes toward keeping their memory alive and encourages interventions in the prize themes.

Figure 2-1: Types of Prizes and Awards



Types of Awards and Prizes

The main distinction between types of awards and prizes is whether they are offered as an incentive or inducement to inspire and reward entities to accomplish breakthroughs or specified objectives, or as a reward or honour for an individual or team's intervention or body of work already undertaken in a particular field (Schroeder 2004). Some of the categories of awards and

prizes include popular awards, quality awards, inducement prizes, environmental awards and awards for the built environment, which include design competitions as well as awards for completed works (Refer Appendix 1). Popular prizes such as the Nobel prize for Literature and the American Institute of Architects' Gold Medal have been given prior to 1910 while the Prix de Rome has been given since 1666. One-time outcome specific inducement awards, such as the Longitude Prize instituted in 1714 (for a device or technique that would enable mariners to find the exact longitude within a margin of 30 nautical miles at sea) are given for accelerating the advance of technology.

Other awards that recognize initiatives promoting sustainable development in selected areas or regions include the Helen Putnam Award for Excellence for cities in California, and SEEDA Sustainable Business Awards for South East England. Since the 1970s', awards such as the Aga Khan Award for Architecture and the World Habitat Award are given for the built environment but their responsiveness to the needs of the community rather than only for buildings. However, these awards are primarily given to individuals and are given for peer recognition.

2.2.5.2 International Awards in the area of Human Settlements

Awards related to sustainable settlements development are primarily offered to individuals, teams or organisations for interventions that demonstrate specific goals or for unique interventions. They aim to bring focus to a particular aspect of development or to provide incentives for actions that contribute to sustainable development. Related awards that promote sustainable development across the urban and rural sectors include the King Hassan II Great World Water Prize, Dr. Hassan Ismail Memorial International Award, and the WatSave Awards.

The three awards that focus on the built environment, and/ or on urban settlements are the Aga Khan Award for Architecture (AKAA), the World Habitat Award (WHA) and the Dubai International Award for Best Practices (DIABP). The WHA and DIABP were initiated in preparation for major events such as the UN International Year for Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH) and Habitat II conference in Istanbul. The DIABP focuses specifically on good practices implemented in partnerships with government in the different regions and climatic regions. The AKAA and World Habitat Award were initiated with a focus on buildings within the context of the socio-cultural milieu and alternative building technologies respectively. The DIABP adopted a decentralised process for identification and documentation of the award entries. The AKAA and World Habitat Award depended on a mix of recommendations by professionals in affiliated fields and on the formal applications. Both DIABP and AKAA recognise multiple interventions in each award cycle, while the World Habitat Award recognises two different awards for interventions in the majority and minority worlds. In spite of these differences, the awards have recognised the same interventions or concepts in different locations, and in terms of periods of implementation.

Table 2-2: Awards for Sustainable Interventions

Name of Award	For	Value
Aga Khan Award for Architecture	The broadest possible range of architectural interventions, including restoration & social efforts, contemporary design projects & those demonstrating the use of appropriate technologies. There are no fixed criteria as to the type, nature, location, or cost of projects to be considered, but eligible projects must be designed for or used by Muslim communities, in part or in whole, wherever they are located.	USD 500,000
Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment	To recognise & enhance awareness of outstanding & sustainable achievements in improving the living environment based on the basic criteria & as a means of identifying what works in improving living conditions on a sustainable basis	USD 30,000 for each (10)
King Baudouin International Development Prize	For making a significant contribution to the advancement of developing countries, or mutual support between industrialised & developing countries	Euro 150,000
King Hassan II Great World Water Prize (Morocco)	Awarded to an institution, organization, individual or group of individuals for outstanding achievements in any aspects of water resources such as scientific, economic, technical, environmental, social, institutional, cultural or political.	USD 100,000 provided by the government of the Kingdom of Morocco, a Trophy & a Certificate.
Petersburg Prize, (changed name to GDN from 2005)	Most exemplary contribution in the field of Information & Communication Technologies for development that has benefited many people, incl. impact on social & economic development. The degree of success, magnitude of benefits, & importance to a development priority, such as poverty reduction, are considered.	Euro 100,000 & encourage to use at least €50,000 for further promoting the activity identified in the nomination
TUGI-UNDP CyberCity Award	To both reward & foster city-based innovations that use these new technologies to improve urban governance processes or city service delivery, & which incorporate creativity, participation, sustainability and demonstrate a high potential for replicability in the Asia Pacific region.	USD10,000 - 25,000 to be used to up-scale & advance the project &/or facilitate the transfer of knowledge & experience to one or more cities in the region.
Water Action Contest	To provide various organizations in the world with the opportunity to present their actions/activities at the grassroots level that are implemented in practical & tangible ways, & have a real effect toward resolution of the world water issues at the 3rd World Water Forum.	Grand Prix for USD 50,000 & award of prizes to ten finalists. The Grand Prix winner must use the prize money to continue the award-winning exercise or similar ones.
World Habitat Award	For human settlements projects that provide practical & innovative solutions to current housing needs & problems, in both developed & developing countries, & which are capable of replication locally, nationally & internationally.	£10,000 & a hand crafted silver trophy presented to the two winners of the Awards
Zayed International Prize for the Environment	To recognize & promote pioneering contributions in the field of the environment in accordance with the philosophy & vision of H.H. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, & in support of Local Agenda 21.	Total of USD 1 million: 1st Prize USD 500,000 2nd Prize USD 300,000 3rd Prize USD 200,000 Each winner will also receive a Trophy & a Zayed Prize Diploma

Source: Award websites accessed during February - December 2004. For further details, refer Appendix 1

The recognition through these awards has led to identification of specific criteria for assessing interventions in human settlements in terms of innovations, environment sustainability and contextual responsiveness. In particular, the criteria established and the decentralised processes followed for identification of good practices under the DIABP has led to establishing of three regional awards, namely, the CAIXA Municipal Best Practices Awards for Brazil, Mashariki Innovations in Local Governance Awards Programme in East Africa, and the Medellín Award

for Best Practice Transfers for the Latin American and Caribbean region (Refer Appendix 2).

The selected awards in Table 2-2 show that they recognise achievements, contributions and/ or innovations rather than outcomes. They also indicate that values of awards for individual contributions and influence in a sector are substantially higher than for achievements of groups on the ground. The values of awards in the built environment are low even in comparison to awards offered in other disciplines. This reflects: i) the complexity of identifying appropriate interventions for the awards; ii) the multiple-dimensions and actors involved in the creation, management and sustainability of the built environment, and finally iii) the requirements for award giving organisations to recognise tangible changes and innovations.

In the urban context, differences in linguistic, socio-cultural, economic and environmental context of each Region have led to establishing of several regional awards along the lines of the DIABP (Refer Section 4.2). This draws attention to the differences in levels of development and the need for comparing interventions that are responsive to similar contexts. Thus, as identified by Øyen (2002b), what is a good practice that enables achievement of identified goals or draws attention to them would not provide lessons for a different set of goals and contexts. In addition, Regional awards are more likely to draw greater attention to innovations and sustainable interventions and motivate more entities to apply for the awards, thereby bringing more good practices in the public domain.

2.2.6 Summary

In summary, the establishing of new awards, both inducement and for the built environment, show their popularity, usefulness in identifying good practices, innovations etc, and as inducement for improved efficiency and innovation. The complexity of inter-related actions of sustainable interventions and the multiplicity of stakeholders makes the identification of good practices challenging. If the awards are significant for decision makers and the databases are expected to provide an overall description of the alternatives, does the documentation correctly reflect the issues and challenges of implementing good practices? The investigation of the decisions involved in good practice implementation can provide a useful reference for award giving organisations.

The lack of inducement awards for the built environment can be attributed to the complexity of urban environments, the vast variations in conditions of urban areas in different regions and the potential large number of applicants. The trend of introducing mock awards to highlight problems of the environment as well as for regional and national awards that identify regionally relevant good practices is increasing. Benefits of inducement awards are recognised in fields that deal with technological innovations and more awards are offered for specific outcomes. Awards for sustainable development have a similar objective and high values, but are given to individuals who promote the cause of sustainable development. Except for the Mo Ibrahim

awards for Governance, inducement awards rarely encourage competition amongst local government.

In the next sub-section, a review of literature on up-scaling draws attention to this aspect.

2.3 Up-scaling

Up-scaling is used with reference to the replication, adaptation, spread or transfer of techniques, ideas, approaches, and concepts (the means), as well as to the efficient increase in social and economic impacts from a small to a large scale of coverage (the ends) (Gonsalves 2001; IIRR 2000; Buenavista 2001). Many of the definitions have evolved with reference to spreading the impacts made by NGOs working in communities in less developed countries (Buenavista 2001).

Replication is used for creation and operation of many similar outlets that deliver a product or perform a service (Winter 2001), and for increasing the use of a particular process, technology or model of service delivery by getting other organizations, including the public sector, to take up and implement the model (Kohl 2005). Replication can occur between organizations of the same type or between organizations of different types. Replication in more locations is viable when the situations are identical, while it is unlikely and ineffective in very dissimilar situations (Szulanski 1996). The unique situations require unique solutions based on a deep understanding of the problem and its context. In similar situations, that is, between the extremes of identical or dissimilar situations, up-scaling is viable through adaptation or modification of successful approaches to suit the new situation. The term adaptation, which refers to the transfer of a few core principles of a good practice, is preferred because it is usually "adapted replication" rather than replication in totality from one situation to a different setting.

Box 2-4: Definition of Scale

> "The definition of "scale" is widespread achievement of impact at affordable cost. Increased impact is a function of the COVERAGE of a population, programme EFFECTIVENESS (quality of implementation and efficacy of interventions employed), EFFICIENCY (cost per beneficiary), SUSTAINABILITY (continuity, ownership), and EQUITY (reaching the hardest to reach, usually the poor)"

Source: CORE 2005

The term transfer is used with reference to adoption of technology or innovations because they return profit or significantly reduces costs in the short-term; enhance environmental quality, and lead to an improvement in social conditions in the local communities (Guerin 2001). In organisations, transfer refers to "replication of an internal practice that is performed in a superior way in some part of the organisation and is deemed superior to alternate practices and known practices outside the company" (Szulanski 1996).

Transfer is a structured process of learning that entails "identification and awareness of solutions, the matching of demand for learning with supply of experience and expertise, and a series of steps that need to be taken to help bring about the desired change" (BPP 1996; CityNet

1998). In the business sector, transfer refers to 'identifying and learning from best practices and applying them in a new configuration or new location' (O'Dell 1998). Both definitions refer to stages of the decision process after the problem is formulated. They therefore focus on the identification of solutions and learning from the solutions in order to determine and take required actions.

The World Bank and UN-Habitat refer to up-scaling in the urban sector in terms of interventions for enhancing access of the poor to basic services and for poverty reduction in a holistic manner. The World Bank defines "up-scaling as "the process of reaching larger numbers of a target audience in a broader geographic area by institutionalizing effective programmes". Although there is no precise definition to identify the extent of increased programming or coverage in up-scaling, scaled-up programmes are expected to provide access to programme outputs for much of the targeted population within a specified area. Up-scaling includes components of institutional strengthening, improved management of urban areas and mainstreaming of processes through which communities can make decisions about their own priorities and take ownership of infrastructure.

Binswanger and Aiyar (2003), refer to up-scaling of community driven development in terms of up-scaling of the entire approach to empowerment, both sectorally and multi-sectorally. They use the World Bank's definition of Community Driven Development (CDD), which is, "an approach that aims to empower communities and local governments with resources and the authority to use these flexibly, thus taking control of their development". Their reference to community includes geographical entities (urban neighbourhoods, villages, sub-districts) or groups with common interests (water users associations, micro-credit groups etc). Buenavista and Coxhead (2001) define up-scaling in natural resource management research and planning as "a set of activities intended to increase community level impacts to other similar communities or to higher levels of policy making".

Hancock (2003) differentiates between organisational approaches to up-scaling as expansion of experience 'within an area or country', and transfer of experience as up-scaling in 'new and unassimilated areas'. Up-scaling also refers to increased capacity to innovate, generate local resources and improved organizational capacity that, with reference to local communities, incorporates aspects of autonomy, self-reliance and independence (Uvin 1996).

Based on the above, the one consistent understanding of the term up-scaling is going from a small to a large impact that is up-scaling "leads to more quality benefits to more people over a wider geographical area more quickly, more equitably and more lastingly" (Gonsalves 2001; IIRR 2000). This interpretation introduces a quality dimension to the definition without neglecting the quantitative dimension and includes the significance of time, equity and sustainability dimensions.

Uvin (2000; Ryan 2004) identified two paradigms of up-scaling as: i) the 'old paradigm' of up-scaling through expansion, and ii) the 'new paradigm' of multiplication, mainstreaming and advocacy. These variations exist because the term is interpreted as both an absolute and a relative concept. Similarly, expansion or mainstreaming can be understood differently by different stakeholders. The emphasis can be on different stages of a process or on the outcome that benefits more people in more locations. The different stages of up-scaling are described in the following sub-section.

2.3.1 Stages of Up-scaling

Up-scaling occurs through a process that can be distinguished in terms of different stages. Depending on the different sectors, the different stages are addressed with varying emphasis. Yin (1979) identifies four processes by which innovations become a norm and part of the services routinely provided by urban service providers as initiation and adoption (deciding/ considering innovation), implementation (pilot) and routinization.(adoption). Choguill. et. al. (1994) identify three stages for up-scaling infrastructure projects as demonstration, consolidation and expansion or mobilization. Their emphasis is on project implementation and hence does not include a stage for integration of the intervention. Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) identify three stages for up-scaling community-driven development as initiation, up-scaling and consolidation, where the up-scaling stage includes activities that Yin (1979) describes under the adoption and implementation stages.

Gillespe (2004), with reference to community driven development, elaborates that each stage involves a different learning task in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and expansion. The initiation stage involves learning to be effective through participatory knowledge generation and capacity building; the up-scaling stage involves learning to be efficient by reducing input requirements per unit of output and bringing about a match between organizational capacity and intervention requirements; and finally, the consolidation stage involves learning to expand through development of organizational capacity. He further describes up-scaling stage as " going for national coverage, moving from participation to full empowerment, capacity development, expanding and deepening community driven development functionally to address issues that may not have been first priorities (Gillespe 2004). Szulanski (2000; 2002) identifies four stages in the transfer of knowledge and good practices within firms as initiation, initial implementation, ramp-up to satisfactory performance, and integration of the practice with other practices of the recipient.

The stages differ depending on whether the focus is on organisations or an intervention or on its integration at the organisational or policy levels. Using Szulanski's (2000; 2002) and Yin's (1979) four stages, the stages in the context of up-scaling of good practices in the urban context can be listed as a) initiation; b) consolidation and improvisation; c) implementation and

expansion, and d) integration.

2.3.1.1 Initiation

Initiation comprises all the events that lead to the decision to up scale, that is, from introduction of a concept or formulation of the problem and identification of alternatives that can solve the problem, to the decision to implement. The aim of this stage is to, a) experiment, b) demonstrate results, and c) create a demand (Choguill 1993).

For physical interventions, the decision is followed by a pilot or demonstration intervention or innovation. A pilot provides the implementing actors with a means to prove that the proposed combination of approaches, techniques and processes works effectively, and the intervention is affordable (Choguill 1993). The pilot incorporates concepts and approaches that have been successfully attempted elsewhere (AsDB 2004), or in terms of infrastructure, it can be an innovative experiment that may be highly exploratory and risky (Choguill 1993). In either case, this small-scale trial stage is tailored to the local context for trying-out and assessing different approaches. Pilots assist in establishing the patterns that can subsequently be incorporated into guidelines and procedures for implementation at different levels, and in limiting risks in case the initiative proves unviable (AsDB 2004).

For empowerment of communities, initiation entails: a) enhancing of real participation; b) targeting of specific groups, and c) starting a dialogue on decentralisation with relevant actors Binswanger 2003). The pilot is undertaken at an appropriate level for targeting of specific groups for specific outcomes through a process that is suitable for decentralised decision-making and enhances participation of the targeted groups (Binswanger 2003).

Various issues related to the intervention are identified and addressed during this phase through a process of improvisation or adoption, which comprises two sequences of 'learning before doing' (either by planning or by piloting) and then 'learning by doing' (Szulanski 2002). It lowers the risk of innovating (Choguill 1993) and entails resolution of unexpected problems that arise when the implementation is started or in the case of transfer of innovations – "when new knowledge is put to use by the recipient" (Szulanski 2002). It also involves establishing a monitoring process. The success of the pilot phase is expected to lay the foundations for its up-scaling. The lessons learned and the result of the pilot influences the decision for its continuation or improvisation or adaptation.

2.3.1.2 Consolidation and improvisation

On the successful completion of the pilot, the decision to proceed entails actions to implement the intervention for covering a wider group of actors. It requires detailing of implementation plans, establishment of procedures and processes, and making of institutional arrangements for the intervention such as for the flow of technical, financial, and material resources (Choguill 1993; Szulanski 1996). The consolidation stage also demonstrates the flexibility of the

intervention through a range of solutions at varying costs, which can meet the varied expectations of different households and communities that have different income levels, social characteristics, desires and expectations (Choguill 1993).

The actions taken during the consolidation and improvisation stage are based on an evaluation of the experiences in implementation of the pilot. Based on identification of hindrances in implementation and expectations about post-implementation performance, bottlenecks that prevent rapid disbursement may require legal or regulatory changes, or appropriate modifications in administrative and management processes (Choguill 1993; Binswanger 2003). A process of strengthening the responsible institutions may also be required to ensure long-term support when facilitating actors have moved on (Choguill 1993).

Once the institutional arrangements are in place, activities for generating a demand from the potential users or partners of the intervention are undertaken and implementation is initiated. Choguill et el (1993) contend that "These components require outsiders who can work alongside institutional staff without needing to tell the staff 'the right answer' or trying to solve the problems themselves". During this process of refining and testing of tools and logistics for up-scaling, implementation of the intervention is continued at a meaningful level (Yin 1979).

2.3.1.3 Implementation and mobilisation or expansion

The implementation and mobilisation or expansion stage is reached on successful completion of the pilots, and when the technical feasibility, social acceptability and financial affordability of the intervention or innovation are known, it can be promoted amongst potential actors (Choguill 1993). The aim of this stage is to encourage and enable each potential group within the target area to achieve at least a primary level of services within a certain time (Choguill 1993).

The implementation stage relies on established processes and procedures for the continuation of the intervention and sharing of information and lessons learnt from the preceding stages (Choguill 1993). The operational manuals, training manuals and other up-scaling logistics are put in place during this stage for covering additional areas (Binswanger 2003). In firms, the ramp-up to satisfactory performance is affected for several reasons, including: i) different conventions; ii) deficient documentation; iii) undesirable side effects; iv) differences with expectations, and v) lack of qualified staff (Szulanski 2002).

The continued use of demonstration sites and dissemination of information regarding costs of different types of development, and possible grants and loans enables the communities to make decisions (Choguill 1993). Successful implementation of an intervention for a wider group of actors can influence sector-wide changes through integration of the approach at the city, sub-regional or regional levels.

2.3.1.4 Integration

The integration stage is when the pilot becomes a part of national programmes or an integral part of the routine activities of an organisation (Binswanger 2003). According to Yin (1979), "An organisation cannot return to a previous way of doing things after implementing organisational reforms or adopting an innovation during the integration stage, but can superseded them by another reform or innovation". The stage includes integration of processes of participation, decentralised decision making, improvements in the design of the intervention based on the experiences, improvements in technical and organisational capacity, and expanding of targeted programmes to tackle issues that communities may have neglected.

The differences in number of stages identified for up-scaling are due to the focus of the authors. In referring to stages of project implementation, Choguill et. al (1993) do not emphasise a stage for integration but refer to actions aimed at strengthening the responsible institutions to ensure long-term support for the interventions. Yin (1979) focuses on 'routinization' because he is referring to new service practices with reference to new equipment for service provision, and thus, routinization is inevitable. Similarly, the up-scaling stages identified for interventions that are focused on community development or community driven development refer to integration. Here the long-term objective of the interventions is empowerment and integration of vulnerable communities into the mainstream. Thus, in reference to up-scaling of good practices for efficient increase in social and economic impacts from a small to a large scale of coverage, distinguishing the up-scaling through four sequential stages is more appropriate.

While these stages of up-scaling are with specific reference to interventions, innovations or programmes, up-scaling can occur in different ways, especially when efforts are ongoing for meeting the MDG Targets. Typologies identified by Uvin (1996) and Gonsalves (2001) and the models elaborated by Taylor (2000; 2001) in the context of NGOs and rural programmes, provide a useful framework for understanding up-scaling in the context of urban services.

2.3.2 Types of Up-scaling

Taylor (2001) identifies three dimensions of going to scale in terms of key processes as:

i) Scale One: Successful change achieved at the community level through community mobilisation becomes the learning experience for future actions,

ii) Scale Squared: Self-help centres facilitate action learning and experimentation. Support for the learning activities from outsiders enables the study of community based actions to become demonstration for other communities, and

iii) Scale Cubed: Systems are introduced for collaboration, adaptive learning and extension. Support that encourages communities to learn from one another in a formal way can create an enabling environment on a large scale.

Uvin and Miller (2000) refer to up-scaling in the context of NGOs and rural programmes as: i) structural growth of a programme or organisation (quantitative up-scaling), ii) the expansion of components of a programme or that of organisations (functional up-scaling), iii) political involvement by organisations for bringing about change in the existing structural systems (political up-scaling), and finally iv) increase in organisational strength to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their activities (organisational up-scaling). These typologies of up-scaling provide an appropriate framework for looking at up-scaling in urban areas because as sustainable interventions, good practices incorporate issues of partnerships with NGOs and participation of community groups. The types of up-scaling are discussed below.

2.3.2.1 Quantitative or horizontal up-scaling

Quantitative or horizontal up-scaling is when a programme or organisation expands from a few selected areas to more locations or when activities, interventions and experiences are replicated geographically or over time and result in an increase in numbers of people benefiting. It occurs at the micro or community level and involves replication of pilots or small-scale interventions.

Quantitative up-scaling is achieved when pilots or small scale interventions from a few selected areas expand in size or are replicated or adapted in other spatial locations over time to cover larger number of beneficiaries in a larger geographical area. This entails information dissemination and capacity building for replicating activities to other locations (Buenavista 2001). For implementing or facilitating organisations, quantitative up-scaling is achieved through increase in their size, or their constituency or membership base, managing of more funds, and employing personnel that are more skilled. It involves horizontal expansion through direct actions for delivery of services to meet immediate deficiencies or shortages. Since up-scaling refers to impacts, higher allocation of resources for achieving outcomes is not considered quantitative up-scaling.

2.3.2.2 Functional up-scaling

Functional up-scaling refers to expansion of the number and types of complementary activities undertaken by stakeholders at the implementation level to meet additional and changing needs of the actors or of donors. Functional or vertical up-scaling is institutional in nature and involves the increase in scope of activity through diversification from grassroots organisations to policy-makers, donors, development institutions and/or others, and to other sectors and stakeholder groups.

Functional up-scaling involves organizations adding upstream or downstream activities that complement their original programme for seeking to better control the environment and ensure sustainability of impact. It includes organisations moving from entrepreneurial initiatives to making a strategic commitments, and changing to programme institutions. Functional up-scaling can occur when new sources of funding are available to organisations because donors

and governments look for established organisations that have the credibility and administrative structures for expanding their activities (Uvin 1994). Functional up-scaling is achieved through a combination of direct and indirect impact activities.

Table 2-3: Comparing Types and Models of Up-scaling

Types	Description	How
Quantitative up-scaling (Replication Scaling-out Horizontal up-scaling)	It is structural in nature wherein a programme or an organisation expands in terms of: replication of activities, interventions and experiences either geographically or over time increase in geographic coverage through expansion of service delivery, and increase in size of facilitating/ implementing entity, or its budgets or in its constituency or membership base	Direct impact activities through projects with implicit goals of influencing the institutional partners.
Functional up-scaling (Vertical up-scaling)	It is programmatic and institutional in nature and involves: Increase in scope of activity through diversification from grassroots organisations to policy-makers, donors, development institutions and others and to other sectors and stakeholder groups. Expansion of the number and types of complementary activities undertaken by community-based and participatory programmes and grassroots organisations to meet additional needs of the community.	Combination of direct and indirect impact activities.
Political up-scaling (Vertical up-scaling)	It is strategic in nature and refers to efforts of participating organisations to engage in the political process, forge a relationship between local initiatives and higher-level government, work toward greater empowerment and move beyond service delivery. The efforts aim to change the structural causes of underdevelopment and effect real political and institutional changes to bring significant benefits for community actors in general.	Combination of direct and indirect impact activities.
Organisational up-scaling (Institutional development)	It refers to organizations – both community-based or grassroots, increasing their organizational strength to improve efficiency and effectiveness to allow for growth and sustainability of interventions. This can be achieved without expanding the organisational base of the supporting institution or financially through diversifying fund sources, increasing level of self-financing, income generation, assuring the enactment of public legislation earmarking entitlements within the annual budgets for the programme and by creating external links with other organisations, or by improving internal management capacity through staff training, personnel development, networking.	Indirect impact activities such as training activities and exposure visits to influence the decision makers at different levels

Adapted from Gonsalves 2001; Uvin 1994; 1995

2.3.2.3 Political up-scaling

Political up-scaling refers to changes in policies and institutions at local, national and global levels that facilitate inclusive, equitable and sustainable development actions at the local level. Political up-scaling involves deliberate building of a "political power base for furthering the goals of an organisation or organisations through the political process" (Uvin 1994). Political up-scaling aims to change the structural causes of underdevelopment and effect real political and institutional changes to bring significant benefits for community actors in general. It involves energizing a critical mass of independent and decentralised initiatives in support of a social vision as well as implementing organisations taking up policy advocacy for influencing higher levels of decision-making (Buenavista 2001). It involves a research orientation using sophisticated analytical tools for analysis and impact to enable up-scaling from the pilot to a wider geographical area and subsequently going up to regional scales (Buenavista 2001; 2002).

The scope of such activities as diversification can be increased from direct involvement by

participating organisations to engaging in the political process by forging a relationship between local initiatives and higher-level government. It entails influencing other actors including policy-makers, donors, development institutions and other stakeholder groups and sectors (Section 2.3.3.3). This can be achieved through a combination of direct and indirect impact activities such as advocacy, training, knowledge creation or advisory activities. The support at the macro level is primarily strategic and focused toward policy framework and reforms for improving capacities at the sub-national and national levels for efficient and effective economic growth. Vertical integration includes empowerment at the micro level so that benefits are sustained beyond the period of NGO/ facilitative agency assistance.

The means adopted for increasing organisational strength include: a) mobilisation of members through greater public awareness; b) networking of NGOs for non-permanent collaboration and links, which are sustained through meetings, newsletters, exchange visits and other means of communication (Section 2.3.3.2); c) federating grassroots organisations to create national, regional or international structures (Section 2.3.3.2); d) through direct political involvement of NGO leaders or federations that join or create a new political party (Uvin 1994), and finally e) through strategic alliances with governments and NGOs

Political up-scaling is recognized as a potentially powerful strategy for up-scaling, especially of grassroots initiatives (Uvin 1994). However, in deciding to work closely with a higher level of government, stakeholders accept some risk from the political cycle (Coxhead 2001). Thus, political up-scaling is an exception rather than the rule (Schorr 1999).

2.3.2.4 Organisational up-scaling

Organisational up-scaling involves increasing organisational strength to allow for growth and sustainability of interventions by improving efficiency and effectiveness, and by assuring the enactment of public legislation earmarking entitlements within the annual budgets. Organisational up-scaling is achieved by spreading of the size of the facilitating/ implementing entity, and/or by improving internal management capacity and financing. The organisation size can be spread by increasing constituency or membership base, while management capacity is improved through indirect impact activities such as staff training, personnel development, networking, use of technology etc. (Uvin 1996). Financial efficiency is achieved through diversifying fund sources, increasing level of self-financing, income generation, and by creating external links with other organisations (Uvin 1996).

In the context of environmental improvement, which entails expansion of the physical infrastructure and the processes that enable their implementation, the four types of up-scaling can occur amongst the partners. The different types of up-scaling can occur through actions of various stakeholders but do not provide the strategy for up-scaling.

For identifying a strategy for up-scaling in the urban sector, the four models suggested by

Taylor (2000) for going to scale in the health sector provide a useful means for understanding what models are applicable for the up-scaling of different good practices. The different models for going to scale are elaborated with reference to community centred or NGO focused up-scaling, rather than on the processes that enable up-scaling. However, they provide a useful means for understanding what models are applicable for the up-scaling of different good practices.

2.3.3 Models of Up-scaling

The four models for up-scaling identified by Taylor (2000) based on his experiences in the health sector are the blueprint model, the additive model, the explosion model, and the biological model.

2.3.3.1 Blue print model of up-scaling

The blueprint model of up-scaling involves experts selecting successful interventions from local or international experiences for achieving specific outcomes and that are designed by outside experts (Ryan 2004). The implementation processes are imposed with regulations and targets, and interventions may achieve quick results, especially when they are strictly supervised or when incentives are offered. The blueprint model fails to recognize that every community is different, with its own history, traditions, and problems. Community participation, even when included as a component of the intervention, is top-down.

The blueprint model of development and up-scaling was used for urban development from the mid-40s. In terms of interventions at the community level, the blueprint models are not sustainable, as found for the subsidised housing and sites and services programmes.

2.3.3.2 Additive model of up-scaling

The additive model of up-scaling involves a steady process of expanding coverage of a programme after it is piloted and consolidated, and interventions that evolve comprehensively from the bottom-up and are culturally adapted to the priorities and pace of the beneficiary stakeholders (Taylor 2000). These are generally inter-sectoral actions and NGO-led interventions, which are stimulated and financed by outsiders and work well in the local area. The additive model is difficult to introduce without the involvement of local NGOs who can facilitate access to the various community-identified priorities, which can range from numbers and locations of public facilities to various vulnerabilities.

The handing over of such interventions to local control is often difficult because of the dependency on external resources and equipment, and because of the changing needs of the community. The additive model cannot be up scaled rapidly or adapted to a citywide or nation-wide approach unless there is a top-down enabling environment for up-scaling. For infrastructure focused interventions, such as those aimed at enabling access to water supply and

sanitation, a variation of the additive model involves empowerment through participation in decision processes, and prioritisation and implementation of economic support activities.

The expansion in the coordinated approach of the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR) members and its up-scaling of community centred development through NGOs, CBOs and finally a global federation meets the criteria of the additive model of up-scaling.

Box 2-5: Slum/Shack Dwellers International

> The SDI seeks "to place the welfare of the poor and excluded at the centre of the developmental process, civil society seeks to remind the state of its obligations with respect to equity. In this case, civil society organizations may define their objectives in terms of the realization of rights that, in many countries, are constitutionally guaranteed. There are also many tentative explorations that consider the role and responsibility of the state in instigating policies and in securing resources to address issues of equity, through a re-examination of traditional delivery strategies. Such explorations question the validity of the state as a delivery agent and seek new possibilities in which the groups affected have a major say in this activity as well."

Source: Patel 2001

2.3.3.3 Explosion model of up-scaling

The explosion model of up-scaling refers to focused interventions selected at high levels of decision making, such as the targets under MDGs that are selected as global and national priorities. The approach can be effective in filling infrastructure gaps if the interventions are integrated within the overall system. The focused interventions and the vertical hierarchy for a single identified purpose assure better control and efficiency but can duplicate routine management processes. In addition, although such mobilisation can strengthen the local system, it can also over-ride local priorities, making the interventions less sustainable.

The explosion model is most appropriate for describing up-scaling of the activities of ACHR members through the creation of the DFID funded Community Led Infrastructure Finance Facility (CLIFF), followed by initiatives such as the Slum Upgrading Facility (SUF) for up-scaling housing access for slum dwellers. Government of India's National Urban Renewal Mission is another example of sudden implementation of large-scale programme.

2.3.3.4 Biological or diffusive model of up-scaling

The biological or diffusive model of up-scaling refers to informal and spontaneous spread of ideas and information wherein empowered communities become a biological growth node for exponential and rapid expansion of successful community-based projects. The biological model requires selection of communities that demonstrate self-reliant empowerment where infrastructure is introduced for an enabling environment, sustainability and standards for equity. The integrated inter-sectoral development evolves naturally because communities learn to demand services based on their priorities.

Taylor (2001) emphasises the benefits of the biological model for up-scaling social development. One is in terms of achieving success in intervention that mobilises the most energy from amongst the community and creates "the synergy to empower the community to

continue expansion of a variety of other innovative changes". The second is in terms of the empowered community becoming the motivational force and the resource and capacity base for other communities, and the third through systems of "collaboration, adoptive learning and extension" (Taylor 2001).

The growing recognition and support for microfinance and other savings and credit group activities fall under the biological model of up-scaling. For meeting the sustainability criteria of current efforts for meeting MDG Targets 10 and 11, especially the context and socio-economic and cultural environment, the biological model appears to be the most appropriate, especially at the implementation level.

Of the four models of up-scaling, the blue-print and the explosion models are more likely to be top-down and led by financial institutions or national governments. The additive and biological models, which are more likely to be responsive to the context, may take a longer time for bringing about benefits of development to more people until such time that they are supported through greater focus from the top as is the case with micro-finance and the MDGs.

2.3.4 Requirements for up-scaling

Taylor (2001) identifies three basic principles for building up valid processes for up-scaling as partnerships, action based on locally specific data and changes in behaviour of all partners. These principles focus on the need for flexibility to the local context and to the responsiveness of those involved with the changes in situations. The requirements identified in the literature are for up-scaling are identified for agroforestry (Cooper and Denning 1999), upgrading (Imparto 2003a) and for community driven development (Binswanger and Aiyar 2003).

Cooper and Denning (1999) identify ten fundamental conditions that need to be in place for successful scaling up of agroforestry innovations as: i) Appropriate technical options; ii) Farmer-centred research and extension; iii) Local institutional capacity; iv) Germplasm/ basic resource availability (quality germplasm to meet development needs); v) Marketing (build local and institutional capacity and develop strategic partnerships in the marketing process); vi) Policy options (to achieve a favourable policy climate); vii) Learning from successes and failures (enhance analytical and systematic learning about the performance of innovations and the process associated with up-scaling); viii) Strategic partnerships (expansion and strengthening of linkages amongst institutions and organisations; ix) Knowledge and information sharing, and x) Facilitation (to mobilise existing and external expertise and resources). These conditions address issues related to the content of the interventions, their appropriateness for and responsiveness to the local context, and supporting processes and resources, and draw attention to the inter-relatedness of technical capacities and resources availability together with learning and knowledge sharing, which go toward making the process iterative.

In a similar vein, Imparto and Ruster (2003a) identify ten requirements for up-scaling upgrading as: i) Political will (to create a supportive policy environment); ii) Policy/legal and regulatory framework; iii) Area-based needs assessment and implementation (that facilitates coordinated and context responsive approach); iv) Development of appropriate institutional arrangements (for a strong coordinating mechanism acceptable to all stakeholders); v) Land tenure security (to unlock household investments and ownership of assets created); vi) Land release mechanisms (to increase availability of affordable land for the poor); vii) Subsidy structure and cost recovery strategy ; viii) Strategic alliances; ix) Programme format (social investment fund versus comprehensive upgrading); x) Decentralization (delegation of resources and responsibilities to the lowest appropriate level), and x) Development of a critical mass of local capabilities, including capacity building and getting external expertise.

Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) and Gillespe (2004) identify core features for up-scaling community driven development. Gillespe (2004) puts emphasis on context, institutional arrangements, capacity and the triggers and different processes of scaling-up. He identifies triggers or catalysts for new approaches or for up-scaling of innovative approaches as (Gillespe 2004): i) Motivated leaders; ii) Knowledge of successful demonstration intervention; iii) Institutional innovation that enables access to innovations; iv) New information that provides insights into critical gaps, problems or opportunities, and v) a change in context in terms of policy and regulatory environment that contributes to an enabling environment.

Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) identify four core features as: i) Real participation; ii) improving accountability; iii) technical soundness, and iv) sustainability, wherein real stakeholder participation includes seven features that include a bargaining model of public or social choice (empowerment in communities and government). This further requires devolution of authority and resources, real stakeholder participation in appraisal, planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation, It also includes the requirement for a well-designed communication programme for generating awareness and for monitoring purposes. Other requirements include getting financial contribution from communities to inculcate a sense of ownership, and having access to technical assistance and facilitation support from different levels of decision making. In addition, real participation incorporates support for entrepreneurial activities for enhancing capacities of the communities to benefit economically.

They further identify conditions conducive to up-scaling as political commitment and well designed decentralisation(Binswanger 2003). The other features to be addressed include: i) Reduction in economic and fiscal costs by harnessing and developing local skills to accelerate up-scaling; ii) Overcoming adverse institutional and social barriers; iii) overcoming problems by cooperation, which requires fostering of a common culture, clarifying roles and preparing operational manuals; and providing incentives compatible with programme objectives; iv) Adapting successful pilots to the local context; v) Field testing manuals, toolkits and up-scaling

logistics to sort out problems arising from planned approach; vi) Sequencing, that is, incorporate flexibility because ideal conditions may not exist when required, and vii Program design and diagnostics tools.

Following EAWAG (2000), Cooper and Deming (1999), Binswanger and Aiyar (2003), Gillespe (2004) and Imparto and Ruster (2003a), ten requirements for up-scaling at the implementation level can be described below.

2.3.4.1 Appropriate technical options

Appropriate technical options refer to interventions that are technically appropriate for the specific context, that is, they are based on area based or locally specific data (Cooper 1999) or involve a choice between options like comprehensive upgrading and community development (Imparto 2003b). It requires sufficient information about needs, local conditions, culture, values and available operation and maintenance capacities (World Bank 2005b). The introduction of appropriate technical options involves situation analysis/ rapid appraisal of the context to determine what interventions are appropriate from a range of options for a specific context and sustainable (Halla 2005; World Bank 2005b). It requires identification of enabling and constraining factors (community, institutional and environmental) (Gündel 2001). Identification of appropriate options includes assessment of the initiative and implementation of a pilot to help define boundary conditions of the intervention.

2.3.4.2 Stakeholder-centred approach

This refers to the need for focusing on, and involving and empowering, the stakeholders whom the interventions are aiming to reach (World Bank 2004a). It involves the central role, ownership, commitment and participation of the communities in the full process, including planning, prioritising interventions, construction, monitoring and management of assets in their surroundings (Binswanger 2003; Gillespie 2004; World Bank 2005b). Stakeholder-centred also means that communities agree to engage in the process since their agreement is essential for critical issues such as the proposed intervention and implementing partners (Halla 2005) The process includes building capacity of the community for and through the participatory process so they become agents of change (Cooper 1999; World Bank 2005b). This requires decentralisation of power and resources, and community-awareness and activism through NGOs.

2.3.4.3 Local Institutional Capacity

Mainstreaming of good practices requires anchoring of the interventions within existing institutional or organisational systems (Gillespe 2004). This requires building capacity for effective local implementation and for creating broad based local support (World Bank 2005b). Capacity support includes providing support at various levels, including technical skills, skills for data collection and managing, documentation (Hardi 1997), and for incentives for

motivation and commitment (Gillespe 2004). Local institutional capacity building includes developing of appropriate institutional arrangements and overcoming of institutional and social barriers (Imparto 2003a; Binswanger 2003), and building capacity for participation and empowerment of local communities. At the organisational level, coordination amongst the various sub-units within the organisation and with external Government units and other partners is important. Capacity of institutional stakeholders can be built through research, direct training, and think tanks. Capacity building within organisations is required for long term administrative and management functions (World Bank 2004a). This also includes reduction of economic and fiscal costs by harnessing and developing local skills to accelerate up-scaling (Binswanger 2003).

2.3.4.4 Institutional/ Policy Environment

Political will and a supportive policy environment are essential for up-scaling. It requires policy development and institutional changes, primarily through reforms, regulation, systems, governance processes and incentive systems (World Bank 2005b). Greater awareness is required about key issues and options amongst policy and decision makers in order to achieve a favourable policy environment for up-scaling (Binswanger 2003). This involves working with national and sub-national governments for creating a conducive policy framework, enabling conditions and implementation strategies for rapid economic growth and development initiatives. The objective is to have strengthened government and stakeholders who can function together with clearly articulated policies and assigned roles to sustain the investments and participatory development practices.

2.3.4.5 Financial Feasibility

Longer-term financial commitments are essential for supporting long-term strategic partnerships to facilitate the various changes, processes and approaches to planning and implementation (BPP 1996; CityNet 1998; Gillespe 2004). It includes support for leveraging of external resources and for significant incremental allocation of funds. It also refers to local level support as a basis for income generation for the poor through building local and institutional capacities and strategic partnerships and is one of the means for achieving financial viability (Binswanger 2003). In addition, it includes getting financial contribution from communities to inculcate a sense of ownership (Binswanger 2003).

2.3.4.6 Learning from successes and failures

Learning from successes and failures includes a process of collective learning and feedback for decision making (Hardi 1997). It entails access to and communicating information, as well as ongoing monitoring, and evaluation (World Bank 2005b). The learning process includes adapting successful pilots to the local context, developing methods for assessing the impact of up-scaling through participatory monitoring and evaluation, incorporating recommendations for

mid-course corrections in an iterative planning process, and testing field manuals, toolkits and up-scaling logistics to sort out problems arising from planned approach (Binswanger 2003). This can be achieved by enhancing analytical and systematic learning about the processes associated with up-scaling and performance of the interventions. This incorporates monitoring and evaluation, which are viewed as opportunities for learning how best to deliver interventions effectively on an ever-larger scale, rather than as a means for fostering accountability. Monitoring and evaluation are referred to as instruments of knowledge creation and dissemination that need flexibility in the design and implementation arrangements (World Bank 2005b).

2.3.4.7 Knowledge and information sharing

Knowledge and information sharing are essential to ensure that the available knowledge base is accessible to those who need it the most. The intention is to make the information available at the implementation level as quickly and effectively as possible. Documentation of context specific experiences through monitoring, evaluation and operational research (Gillespe 2004) helps in generating new knowledge and in making that knowledge accessible to other stakeholders involved in similar activities. Knowledge sharing, especially for overcoming adverse institutional and social barriers requires a communication programme for generating awareness and for monitoring purposes (Hardi 1997; Binswanger 2003). The accumulated knowledge about lessons learned in specific contexts, the constraints and opportunities of a solution must be processed, and disseminated quickly to other interested stakeholders so that they can adapt their activities and processes to suit the larger scope of the interventions.

2.3.4.8 Strategic Partnerships

This requirement is concerned with the expansion and strengthening of collaboration/ partnerships and communication amongst institutions and organisations, including government, private sector, NGOs, donors (World Bank 2004a). In addition, it entails partnerships with professional associations, local research institutions, and other civil society groups (Hardi 1997) who have complementary agendas, expertise, resources and reach. It entails improving the efficiency and effectiveness of partnership mechanisms and representation of grassroots organisations in decision processes to overcome problems by cooperation. (Binswanger 2003). It requires engagement with local and central governments, the private sector, civil society institutions, and international donors for holistic/integrated and balanced development within each sector and across countries. Partnerships require changes in mindsets and entrenched attitudes (Binswanger 2003).

2.3.4.9 Facilitating up-scaling

Dynamic leadership, political commitment and stability are significant contributory factors for up-scaling. The external catalysts can provide technical, financial, and institutional support and

assist with the coordination and integration of the up-scaling process within and between countries (Gillespe 2004). Up-scaling requires realistic time horizons of 10 to 15 year cycles rather than 5-year cycles, sensitivity to the context, institutional arrangements, and capacity (Gillespe 2004), as well as adequate and assured long-term financing (World Bank 2004a).

2.3.4.10 Primary resource

Another significant requirement for up-scaling is the availability of primary resources (Cooper 1999) such as availability of land for upgrading of settlements (Imparto 2003a), communities requiring or demanding services (Gillespe 2004) and local skills that can be harnessed to reduce costs. It includes addressing disparities in access to services and resources, ecological conditions and activities that contribute to economic, human and social well-being (Hardi 1997). The technical financial or resource requirements, which are very significant for up-scaling are neither included in the Bellagio Principles (EAWAG 2000), nor adequately emphasised in the Shanghai Agenda for Poverty Reduction (UN General Assembly 2004c).

2.3.5 Challenges of up-scaling

The changes in urban approaches show that governments have introduced good practices in housing, community development, slum improvement and urban management. Several factors that make up-scaling difficult are identified in the literature. Firstly, by definition, the unique character of good practices requires adaptation to the local context and circumstances (Øyen 2002b). While interventions and approaches that are good practices in one context cannot always be a viable alternative in different contexts, even the normative values of good practices can change and be judged differently by different individuals, organisations, communities and cultures at different times (Øyen 2002b). The context can change either because of the influence of the good practice or because of other external circumstances at a different time. Hence after initiation, the up-scaling may not occur.

Good practices have the inherent weakness of being initiator and context focused, thereby having processes and approaches that are not conducive to transfer or replication. The community-based good practices and pilots tend to be small-scale where the impact is limited to a small geographical area and population. The participatory processes involve negotiations and resource redistribution that lead to differences amongst groups that have the resources and related privileges, which they are required to relinquish (Øyen 2002b). In addition, when the beneficiary population comprises the poor and other important political constituents, the activity becomes a concern for the authorities. When up-scaling is initiated to reach a larger population, the informal intervention needs to be formalized. This often requires changes in the policy and regulatory environments, and needs reallocation of human and financial resources and enhancement of both human and technological capacities

The narrow focus on a limited number of good practices can result in exclusion of information

about its significant but weak elements, and can divert attention from other practices that have successfully overcome similar weaknesses and are more sustainable. Øyen (2002b) highlights the fact that because the weak elements of good practices are not always identified and evaluated, important lessons that could encourage the search for resolving the weaknesses are not learnt.

Good practices – both small and large in scale, are not up-scaled to bring about similar benefits to more people. Further, even when attempts are made to transfer of good practices in different locations, institutional impediments and poor efficiency occur because of local and external factors. In the context of transfer of technology, local factors include lack of adaptation to the local context, lack of coordination in outputs by different stakeholders at the relevant decision making levels, and lack of up-scaling-logistics, while external factors include the high overhead costs associated with the inputs, advisers, consultants and technology (Binswanger 2003).

2.3.6 Summary

Literature on types, models, stages and requirements for up-scaling social development, community driven development, or natural resource management provide a deeper understanding of the issues. The focus on participation, partnerships and processes and on assessing, learning and interactive actions is emphasised because of the focus on sustainability. The interdependence of the factors identified indicates the need for support that addresses the problems that good practices are solving more holistically. They also provide the basis for initial identification of parameters to be looked into for study of up-scaling. However, the above do not address constraints or issues faced by decision makers in up-scaling.

2.4 Decision-making for up-scaling good practices

Decision-making is defined as the cognitive process of reaching a decision, or the process or act of reaching a conclusion or a position, opinion or judgment reached after consideration (Encyclopaedia Britannica and Merriam-Webster). Decision-making is seen as an ongoing process that involves perception, memory and attention allocation, of combining information and processing strategies to adapt to changes of context (Robins 2001). It involves a process of: i) information gathering, ii) problem formulation for direction setting, iii) generation of alternatives from available information sources, iv) selection of a solution, and v) implementation (Simon 1978; Robins 2001).

Decisions imply a choice between alternative solutions to a problem and a commitment for action (Szaniawski 1980; Simon 1997). Mintzberg (1976) defined a decision as "a specific commitment to action (usually a commitment of resources)" and a decision process as a "set of actions and dynamic factors that begins with the identification of a stimulus for action and ends with the specific commitment to action".

According to Mintzberg (1976), "the need for a decision is identified as a difference between information on some actual situation and some expected standard" which is based on past trends, projected trends, standards in a comparable organisation, the expectations of other people or on theoretical models.

2.4.1 Decision Theories

Decision theories cover multiple disciplines, and draw on economics, political science, forecasting and cognitive psychology. They address interrelated questions ranging from how a 'rational' person makes decisions to how people really make decisions, and how people can be assisted in their decision-making. Normative decision theories expound on how a rational agent should act (Hansson 1999), and assume that the person has complete knowledge of a decision problem, the alternative solutions, and the means for evaluating outcomes of the alternatives available (Simon 1997). They accept rationality as matching of means to ends, and assume that rationality is synonymous with optimal choice, optimal procedures and outcomes, and statistical decision analysis. The prescriptive approach of normative decision theories has contributed to the development of tools, methodologies and software that focus on how people can be assisted in making better decisions.

People express themselves through value systems, that is, the real value of something is dependent on the economic value only to a certain extent, and more on what its real value or the 'utility' is to them. The utility function of choice assumes that decision makers order by preference all the possible outcomes of their choices that would have a subjective or objective probability of distribution of consequences (Simon 1986). The prescriptive approach in which subjective decisions are made to maximize the expected value of a given utility function underlies neo-classical economics and was termed 'Subjective Equivalent Utility' (SEU) (Robins 2001). The SEU postulates that choices are made among a fixed set of alternatives for which the probability distributions of outcomes are known. As demonstrated through economic theory, maximization of utility does not take into consideration the process that leads to optimal decisions, with how necessary information is acquired, how calculations of utility are made, or whether the decision maker can evaluate consequences of decisions correctly.

Descriptive theories attempt to describe how decisions are made based on empirical evidence from different decision routines, and focus on satisfying choices rather than the ideal of optimization. Descriptive decision theories question assumptions about human capacities and rationality. Simon (1997) postulated that decisions made are not necessarily the best, but just "satisficing", that is, human tendency is to look for better than the minimum acceptable outcome or objective to complex and practical problems rather than optimal or maximum standards (Simon 1997; Robins 2001).

Simon (1978) provided insights about rational decision making by highlighting the following

factors that impose limits to human rationality: i) complexity of the world; ii) incompleteness and inadequacy of human knowledge, that is, decision makers do not remember everything that they need to remember at the time of making the decision, or are unaware of, or unwilling to spend time and resources for examining them; iii) inconsistencies of individual preference and beliefs; iv) conflicts of values among people and groups of people, and v) inadequacy of the computations that can be carried out for an optimal solution, even with the aid of the most powerful computers. March and Simon (1964) provided insights about organizations and organizational decision-making, and into how decision-makers cope with constraints imposed by their context and the limits of their perception, memory and attention (Robins 2001).

Simon (1978) referred to this tendency of decision makers to adapt procedures for transforming difficult decision problems into manageable ones, and the expected or desired solution 'bounding' the scope of the search for alternatives as 'bounded rationality' (Cyert 1992). The Theory of Bounded Rationality (Simon 1997) is concerned with an individual's decision-making process within an organization and takes into account cognitive limitations of knowledge and computational capacities. A bounded decision approach is represented by the use of approximate, heuristic or commonsense techniques during the search process to handle complexity and for identifying alternatives (Simon 1978).

2.4.2 Decision Phases and Routines

Various frameworks have been postulated to describe the phases of decision-making. In 1910, John Dewey described five distinct phases as: i) suggestion; ii) intellectualization; iii) development; iv) reasoning, and v) testing or evaluation (Mintzberg 1976). Based on empirical evidence on how alternatives are identified, Simon (1959) provided a framework for decision making in the form of an organisational model comprising three sequential decision phases: a) the intelligence phase; b) the design phase, and c) the choice phase (Simon 1997). He further distinguished them as problem solving (fixing agendas, setting goals, and designing actions) and decision-making (evaluating and choosing) (Simon 1986).

In 1972, Witte identified an average of 38 phases that included many sub-decisions (Mintzberg 1976), while Mintzberg (1976) postulated a framework for strategic decision-making, that is decisions that the organisation considered important and were novel, complex and open-ended. Their framework comprises three distinct phases, which though similar to Simon's, they described as: i) identification; ii) development, and iii) selection. However, instead of a simple sequential relationship between these three phases, they described the phases in terms of seven routines (see Figure 2.1).

Box 2-6: Decision making

> "An interesting phenomenon in recognition is that of matching. A decision maker may be reluctant to act on a problem for which he sees no apparent solution; similarly, he may hesitate to use a new idea that does not deal with a difficulty. But when an opportunity is matched with a problem, a manager is more likely to initiate decision making action".

Source: Mintzberg 1976

The assumption in the sequential decision processes is that the phases always occur in the same order or sequence. However, based on empirical evidence that indicated that the phases occur in parallel rather than in sequence, several authors proposed non-sequential models (Hansson 2005). Mintzberg et. al (1976) provided empirical evidence to demonstrate that while the decision process consists of distinct phases, they do not have a simple sequential relationship. They elaborated Simon's phases through the routines discussed below.

Table 2-4: Possible search approaches

Search Approach	Characterised by	Driving force	Illustration/noted by	Found when
Opportunity (Mintzberg)	Position to observe developments	A solution	Decision-making awaits a flash of insight that reveals a potentially useful practice.	The idea uncovered initiated the decision making effort
Chance/ emergent opportunity (March)	Cultivate idea champions	An emergent solution	Alternatives emerge from the chance meeting of pre-existing ideas, perceived needs, choice situations, and people looking for action	The idea outside the decision-making effort pre-empted search.
Politics/ bargaining (Pfeffer, Salancik)	Bargain to find solution(s) acceptable to stakeholders	Compromise solution	Decision maker facilitates negotiations to uncover a compromise solution	Evidence that stakeholders met with the intent of bargaining to find a solution
Rationale approach - goal-directed (Simon)	Uncover solution that provides desired results	Target	State expectations and engage people inside and/or outside the organization to find ways to meet expectations	A goal could be recalled that was consistent with the results realized
Problem directed (Van Gundy)	Solution uncovered to overcome problems	Target	Analyze problem to find solution cues	A problem was articulated and solution was uncovered that referenced the problem.

Adapted from: Nutt 2003

2.4.2.1 The Intelligence or Identification Phase

The identification phase comprises the decision recognition and diagnosis routines, where the identification can occur as a problem, an opportunity or a crisis (Mintzberg 1976). The opportunity decisions are initiated on a voluntary basis when decision makers see alternatives or get ideas that relate to problem situations of which they have detailed knowledge (Mintzberg 1976; Nutt 2005). Mintzberg et. al. (1976) identify decisions for an identified problem or for a crisis as the extreme ends of a continuum wherein, decisions are made either by searching for a solution by considering alternatives or under situations of intense pressure.

The problem formulation is a significant routine in the context of up-scaling good practices

because it sets a direction and influences the means used to search for alternatives because decision problems are formulated in a unique way that facilitates a search for a uniquely determined optimum solution (Simon 1978). Mintzberg (1976) questioned the commonly accepted viewpoint of managers in organisations reacting to problems and avoiding uncertainty or risks, since their research showed that important decision comprised reactions to problems and crisis, and use of opportunities.

Figure 2-2: General Routines for Decision Making



Adapted from Mintzberg 1976

2.4.2.2 The Design or Development Phase

The design or the 'development phase' consists of the 'search' and 'design' routines for seeking ready-made solutions or for developing custom-made solutions (Simon 1978; Mintzberg 1976). The intelligence activity includes processes to understand the problem, generate or identify solutions, and to evaluate the alternatives for feasibility. The principal technique that guides the search or information processing is a means - end analysis, which is a formal search guided by a goal or defined problem in the local context (Cyert 1992). The search is made up of a direction, which can indicate implicit or explicit desired results, and a means for uncovering ideas for solutions. It includes a screening routine that is undertaken to create a choice set by prioritising suitable alternatives from an initial set of alternatives (Yaniv 2000). Simon (1978; 1997) contended that the two concepts central to decision making are search and "satisficing", that is, the search is ended as soon as an acceptable solution is found to the problem.

According to Simon (1997), decision makers facing multiple challenges apply approximate and heuristic or commonsense techniques or processes to look at a few alternatives from the large number of options available. The design routine occurs if alternatives for a goal do not exist. It involves creating or designing of new solutions or of developing or modifying ready-made ones. It involves an iterative process that includes design and search cycles wherein each step leads to a more focused and specific solution (Mintzberg 1976). While only one fully developed solution emerges through the design process, the search through readymade solutions that require little modifications are more likely to have more than one alternative from which to select from

(Mintzberg 1976).

2.4.2.3 The Choice/ Selection Phase

The selection phase, considered the last step in the decision process, involves a series of sub-decisions which themselves require a selection step (Mintzberg 1976). Simon (1986; 1997) identified three routines in this phase, namely the screening routine, evaluation - choice routine, and authorization. Screening entails reducing the number of alternatives to eliminate what is not feasible and occurs only when the search routine generates more alternatives than can be intensely evaluated (Mintzberg 1976).

The evaluation - choice routine entails i) judgement when an individual makes a choice that may not be explicable, ii) bargaining when a selection is made by a group of decision makers, and iii) analysis when a factual evaluation is performed (Mintzberg 1976). Of the three, judgement is exercised most frequently.

Choice implies clarity about outcomes and risks, and is based on information about the probability of a particular outcome occurring or not if one of the alternatives is chosen from those available. The choice phase includes selecting an alternative or a course of action from the possible solutions identified. This involves establishing an objective through prioritisation of needs, incorporating other opportunities that have come to the attention of decision makers and those identified through systematic search of available information sources (Simon 1986; 1997).

The identification of possible alternative solutions is followed by their evaluation for actual or perceived outcomes to form a choice set by including suitable alternatives from the initial set of alternatives (Yaniv 2000). The choice routine is characterised by a value or 'utility' that the individual attributes to the possible outcomes of choice and their expected payoffs, and by uncertainties. The choice is influenced by the values present in the alternatives and by the possibility of negative outcomes and the perceived congruence of the decision with normative values (Lipshitz 1995). The evaluation of possible outcomes of alternatives is susceptible to the formulation effects and the tendency of people to evaluate options in relation to the reference point suggested or implied by the statement of the problem (Kahneman 2000). The alternatives that are considered appropriate means for reaching desired ends are chosen by the decision maker exercising her preference by weighing and choosing among the different values. Alternatively, a decision maker can form some aspiration about how good an alternative she should find and as soon as she discovers an alternative that meets her level of aspiration, she would terminate the search and choose that alternative. The aspirations rise in a moderate environment that provides many good alternatives and fall in harsher environments where choices are limited. Choices for unique alternatives cannot draw on experiences and hence entail greater uncertainty because the consequences of the alternatives are not known.

The authorization routine to either an acceptance or rejection of the course of action is carried

out when the decision maker does not have the authority to make a commitment for a particular course of action on behalf of an organisation. The routine involves a process assessment by those having the power to block the course of action and a process of approval (Mintzberg 1976).

2.4.3 Uncertainty and risks in decision making

Almost all decisions are influenced by lack of knowledge about possible outcomes decisions (Hansson 1999). The two major categories concerning lack of knowledge about decision outcomes are labelled as uncertainty and risk in decision theory (Hansson 1999). Decisions are made under uncertainty and are concerned with the management of risk.

Figure 2-3: Decision Making: Process, Context and Influences



Uncertainty

The probabilities of decisions made under uncertainty are either not known at all or known with insufficient precision. Subsequently, average alternatives are most likely to be eliminated during evaluation (Kahneman 2004; Yaniv 2004). Berkeley and Humphreys (1982) identified seven types of uncertainties that influence decisions as: i) Uncertainty about the probabilities of outcomes of subsequent events, conditional on what preceded them; ii) Uncertainty about the probabilities of subsequent events conditional on the occurrence of other extraneous events; iii) Uncertainty about how to incorporate prior information in determining the probability of a subsequent event; iv) Uncertainty about how to conceptualise the worth of consequences; v) Procedural uncertainty concerns the means for handling or processing a decision., that is, identifying relevant uncertainties, what information to seek from where, how to identify alternatives and assess consequences; vi) Uncertainties about how the decision maker will feel, and wish to act having arrived at a subsequent act (choice point) after the intervening events have unfolded "for real", and vii) Uncertainty about the extent to which one possesses the

power for inducing changes in the probabilities of subsequent events through being able to alter relations between states of the world. Since almost all decisions are decisions are made under uncertainty, additional information or alternatives are sought and their outcomes explored to diminish or overcome uncertainty.

Risk

Risk is defined as a situation in which the outcome of an event is not known with certainty, that is, decisions are "made without definitive knowledge of their consequences" (Tversky 2000). In decision theory, a distinction is made between decisions where probable outcomes of decisions are assumed to be known and decisions where they are not known (Tversky 2000). A decision under risk is compared to a gamble that yields monetary outcomes of specified probabilities (Kahneman 2004) and is seen in the context of a time interval. The different attitudes of people toward risks are categorised as follows:

- Risk-loving individuals who make their decisions by preferring to take the risk, rather than to obtain an expected value of wealth. The assumptions about decision under risk do not mean that the decision is made under conditions of completely known probabilities. It means that the decision maker has chosen to simplify her description of the decision-problem by treating the problem as a case of known probabilities. Studies of decisions under risk focus on choices between losses and gains, that is, as a gamble. In this context, losses loom larger than gains in people's minds. Although decisions under risk, termed 'risky prospects' (Kahneman 1982), are characterised by their possible outcomes and probabilities, the same option can be framed or described differently. Hence the manner in which the outcomes are framed influence decisions.
- Risk neutral persons who do not care about risking of wealth but only about its expected value, and
- Risk-averse individuals prefer to have the expected value of wealth rather than to face a risk, and loss aversion makes people favour stability over change (Kahneman 1982). Therefore, when a risk-averse individual has to make a choice between retaining the status quo and accepting an alternative that is advantageous in some ways and disadvantageous in others, the losses will loom larger than the gains, and the decision will be biased in favour of retaining status quo (Kahneman 2004). Decisions are also influenced because of the "focusing effect", wherein individuals focus on alternatives that are explicitly and verbally stated in the problem context, and do not take into account other possibilities.

The above highlights the fact that actual process of decision-making can be far removed from a search for a uniquely optimum solution (Simon 1978) and that decisions made are not always the best but based on consideration of a limited number of alternatives. The decisions may satisfy the 'better than or minimum standard' of the outcome. The above also highlights the fact

that decision makers are unlikely to opt for solutions whose outcomes are uncertain and likely to opt for those alternatives that are likely to have greater utility. The known influences of how information is framed for decision making provide valuable guidance on how good practices can be documented and presented, and exposure events be organised to decision makers who can benefit through adaptation or replication of good practices.

2.4.4 Individual and Organisational decision-making

Decision-making by individuals differs from decision-making in groups and in organisations. Simon focused his work on decision-making by each individual in the organisation while March focused his work on alternative aspects and aggregate decision-making processes in the organisation (Kahneman 2000). These two approaches outline the extremes of organisational decision-making theories.

2.4.4.1 Individual decision making

Individual decision making is influenced or biased by the decision maker's mental and social construction of realities, in terms of self-interests, personal ambition and reputation, as well as her values, concerns, immediate objectives and motivations (Larrick 1993). Motivation deals with how and when a decision maker feels satisfied or dissatisfied with her/ his conditions (Baker 1972), and has been studied by various social psychologists, including Argyris, Likert and Maslow. Their research primarily involved queries about how and when the respondents felt satisfied or dissatisfied with their conditions (Baker 1972). Decision makers also ignore highly relevant information in favour of latent preferences when the problem requires processing of vast amounts of pertinent information (Purkitt 1988). The motivations of the decision makers have an effect on the scanning, information processing, identification of alternatives, and ordering of preferences. This is true even in organisations where procedures are followed for flow of information to instruct, inform, and support the decision-making processes.

2.4.4.2 Decision groups

The process of making decisions from many alternatives in a group involves individuals or members and can include dividing of decision-making tasks among many specialists and coordinating their work by means of a structure of communications and authority relations. The decision maker in an organisation seeks information, advice or suggestions from people inside or outside the organisation to determine alternative options and strategies for the problem (Nutt 2005). Yaniv's studies (2004) for understanding advice taking in decision-making show that decision makers are exposed to a potential conflict between their initial opinions and the advice. Advice taking requires making a choice between completely adopting the opinion of the advice giver, completely ignoring the other's opinion, or adjusting her own opinion toward the opinion of the advice giver. The weight given to the advice of others changes as a function of

knowledge and as a function of the distance of the advice from the opinion of decision makers. In addition, because decision makers have privileged access to their internal reasons for holding their own opinion, but not to the advisors' internal reasons, they tend to discount advice because of the differential information. The tendency of decision makers to rapidly form reputations about advisors' negatively affects impression formation and trust because the impressions are revised asymmetrically, that is, it is easier for advisors to lose a good reputation than to gain one (Yaniv 2000).

The alternatives identified in group decision making depend on the 'knowledge' available amongst those participating in the decision process. Different elicitation procedures highlight different aspects of the available alternatives and suggest different alternative problem formulations, thereby influencing the preferences of a decision maker. In addition, to improve judgement accuracy, decision makers engage in interactive social and cognitive processes with the expectation that advice will help. This restricts the decision makers' own options on alternative ways of problem solving, and their judgement is influenced or biased by the values and motivations (Larrick 1993).

Decision-making in a group sometimes fails to produce a clear result because of the varied views and experiences of group members or because some members prefer one alternative whereas others prefer different alternatives. Subsequently, an unambiguously best alternative for any majority cannot be determined (Kahneman 2004; Sen 2003), and requires coordination for adoption of the correct decisions, specialised skills at the operative levels, and responsibility for enforcing conformity to norms laid by the group or by the authority-wielding members.

2.4.4.3 Organisational decision making

From the 1940s, behavioural decision theorists turned their attention to how decisions are made in organisations. Simon's (1997) work on organisational decision-making provided a paradigm shift in organisational theory. He contended that most organisations are concerned with the management of risk or decisions under uncertainty. This marked the interest in how people actually assess risks followed by the development of the heuristics and biases theories in decision-making. This made information processing an integral aspect of decision-making models as a unifying concept in organisations.

Decisions in organisations are influenced by individual motives and emotions of the decision makers, and by organisational values. Moreover, decisions in organisations need to incorporate several points of views of participating actors who have their own values, preferences and subjective criteria (of prioritising in decision-making). In addition, decision processes in organisations are difficult because of the complexity of the organisations themselves, and the inter-temporal nature of decisions.

The differences between individual and organisational decision-making are exacerbated (Lerner

1976) because of the ambiguity in prioritisation of activities that are an outcome of lack of clarity in information about risk and other issues; the decisions have ongoing consequences and are part of an ongoing process; incentives and penalties are real for individual decision makers while they are not an issue with organisations; repeated decisions by individuals who repeat the same process and the same decision many times over and conflicts due to power distribution and struggles either within the organisation or within groups (for example politicians within their own parties or with bureaucrats in civil services).

Organisational, including local government behaviour is more complex because the responsibilities and functioning of members are identified and guided nationally or sub-nationally. Decision-making is a central concern of administrators, who ideally work for furthering rational and efficient government, at local government levels (Lawton 1994). The accountability of the administrator includes political, managerial, legal, consumer and professional dimensions, and they are concerned about efficiency, budgetary control, monitoring performance, cost-effectiveness, and policy effectiveness.

Box 2-7: Up-scaling meaning

> "... many people feel the need to develop a new breed of well managed and technically competent non government organizations (NGOs), capable of mobilizing large numbers of people and channelling large sums of money to a variety of activities, and of interacting with the state and the international agencies. This process has been called "scaling up", i.e., increasing the impact of grassroots organizations and their programmes.
>
> Yet, beyond the feeling that scaling up is a nice and probably good thing, there is little unanimity or knowledge about its real implications - or even its precise meaning. Indeed, the term has been employed very ambiguously, to describe a large variety of processes, often signifying anything that happens to a community-based organization apart from its destruction."

Source: Uvin 1995a

The process of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty of outcomes, and lack of information (Simon 1997) is made more complex in governments because decisions are influenced by the political environment, context, dependence on sub-national and national governments for resources, regulations and statutes or standard procedures (Cyert 1963; Davidson 1991). Both political (mayors) and bureaucratic (municipal commissioners) decision makers in local government function within a political environment and are exposed to close political scrutiny (Lerner 1976; Hale 1997; Franklin 1999). They face multi-dimensional situations, several points of views of stakeholders and multiple management and development demands without the financial or human resources to tackle them (Brehmer 1992).

Decisions in local government are dynamic in nature, that is, they require a series of decisions (Brehmer 1992; Atkins 2002), and are interdependent, that is, each decision affects the circumstances or state in which later decisions are made (Mackinnon 1985). The context in which decisions have to be made change as a consequence of the actions of decision makers and other external factors (Edwards 1962), and they have to be made in real time (Brehmer 1992; Atkins 2002). Decision-making is a central concern of administrators (Lawton 1994), whose

accountability includes political, managerial, legal, consumer and professional dimensions, and they are concerned about efficiency, budgetary control, monitoring performance, cost-effectiveness, and policy effectiveness. Decision makers, especially administrators, have to rely on others to provide then with institutional experience and tacit knowledge about the contextual difficulties and micro-situations that impede or support implementation of decisions, especially those concerning the poor and extra-legal settlements. For decision-makers to consider an intervention as a feasible and superior solution for urban problems they are tackling, it has to be accepted as a legitimate alternative.

Decisions in local government, especially those involving the poor, are more likely to be political than rational because they are influenced by many factors. The decisions in Government are inter-temporal because the outcomes from choices made will be realised at different points in time. The political perspective recognises that local government is a coalition of people with conflicting interests, and that they have to act where the urgency or the political pressure is strongest (Vassoler-Froelich 2003; Davidson 1991). The differences in the priorities and policies of politicians, which reflect their convictions and values (Lerner 1976; Franklin 1999; Hale 1997), cater to their self-interests and follow the party line (Davidson 1991).

The administrative and management mechanisms can lead to differences and conflicts and influence decisions (Nutt 2005). The differences between administrators and politicians are exacerbated because they have to turn to experts for advice, work with planners, engineers, and others to make inter-related decisions, and consider the inter-temporal consequences of their decisions. Decisions, especially important ones, are therefore reached by a coalition of interests as compromise solutions that are acceptable to key players (Davidson 1991; Nutt 2005; Eisenhardt 1992). To resolve conflicts, decision makers adjust their preferences for a politically safe choice, and make a 'satisficing' decision.

Practical decision-making is therefore dependent on the roles played in practice by political and administrative decision makers (Lawton 1994) and cooperative activities within and between groups in organisations (Baker 1972). In this situation, decision makers make choices that meet their personal and organisational values and goals. Thus, decision making requires a bargaining effort and careful scrutiny of alternatives in the light of partisan advocates or opposition (Nutt 2005). Such conflicts cannot be solved by incentive and reward systems.

Decision-making in urban areas is a challenge because of the complexity and multiple dimensions of urban problems and management. The decision problems have different dimensions, including the variations in amounts in which the services are needed, and the need to respond to a wide diversity of demands and for distribution or allocation of resources under conditions of scarcity (Lerner 1976).

2.4.5 Summary

The identification and documentation of good practices is aimed at providing decision makers with a basket of alternatives from which lessons can be derived and which can be adapted to their own situations. Although the role of leaders in bringing about transformations in urban environments is recognised, other actors involved in the process directly or indirectly influence the progress and continuation of the interventions. This raises questions about how decision makers formulate problems of under serviced areas and how the solutions identified.

Organisations identifying good practices have been working together for sharing lessons on the processes followed and criteria used for identification of good practices. The private sector and organisations such as the Ford Foundation and UNDP are supporting a number of awards for encouraging evolution of good practices and for sharing lessons.

In the local context, recognition and awards are valued by the key decision makers in local governments because of the attention they draw to the efforts made and success achieved. After recognition of the good practices, a well structured and facilitated study visit that enables discussions between decision-makers of equal standing provide a very useful platform for exchange of lessons. Financial and technical support for the group interested in adapting the good practice acts as a catalyst in the process of up-scaling.

2.5 Knowledge Gap

The literature review showed that interventions for environmental improvement have evolved to meet the shelter and basic services needs of those living in under-served areas in a more responsive way than top-down blueprint approaches could. The literature also revealed that to up scale sustainable interventions, development organisations and financial institutions are supporting interventions aimed at influencing decision makers in Governments at national, sub-national and local levels. The support is provided for: a) participatory development projects, such as for the UCD in India, and KIP in Indonesia;; b) activities and approaches of selected NGOs, their affiliates and/or networks such as the ACHR, SPARC Alliance, and SDI; c) for the identification and recognition of good practices such as the World Habitat Award (BSHF); Dubai International Award for Best Practices and related regional awards such as the Mashariki and Medellín awards, and d) activities to promote and disseminate knowledge about good practices through various capacity building activities such as USAID support through ICMA and CMAs. In some instances, the approaches and processes of interventions were introduced in other locations by decision makers and formalised through policies or programmes of Governments. However, good practices have not become as the most legitimate options for improving environmental conditions of under-serviced areas and slums.

The purpose of up-scaling is best described by Taylor (2000) in the context of social

development - "to have a systematic process to permeate a whole region so that all communities are empowered to solve their own problems of social development". Various aspects of up-scaling have been addressed in the literature. Some address the issues and biases involved in identification and promotion of good practices (Øyen 2002), others look at the mechanisms for identification and dissemination of information about good practices or capacity building for enabling transfer through participatory processes (UN-ESCAP 2003), while others look at issues involved in managing, sharing and accessing information about good practices (Munt 2003). Others have looked at factors such as up-scaling participatory approaches and community driven development (Binswanger 2003; d'Cruz 2005) or NGOs (Uvin 1994), or at typologies (Uvin 1995), stages (Taylor 2001), models (Taylor 2001), paths (Uvin 1995; Gonsalves 2001), requirements (Cooper 1999; Guendel 2001), or constraints (Davis 2002) in up-scaling.

However, there is a gap in the current knowledge on why decision makers cannot or do not up scale good practices or sustainable interventions for environmental improvement in under serviced areas. Literature on these related issues indicates that while the sustainability of good practices and advantages of their up-scaling are accepted, there is little evidence to show how up-scaling is achieved or what specific hindrances are faced by decision-makers in up-scaling interventions that address multiple needs and problems of people living in under serviced areas. The existing studies focus on one aspect of the broad and complex up-scaling process rather than the combination of factors that hinder their up-scaling (Yap 1999; Øyen 2002a; UN-ESCAP 2003; Munt 2003). The normative approaches indicate how up-scaling should be approached, and the descriptive approaches describe how widely an intervention has influenced different stakeholders (UN General Assembly 2004c). No empirical research has been carried out to provide insights into contributions of different stakeholders for all aspects of good practice evolution, and the critical factors considered to reach a wider population.

3 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND DESIGN

Research involves the conceptual, methodological and substantive domains, and draws upon elements and relations from all the three domains (Argyris 1996). This section describes the conceptual framework, and the justification of the research paradigm, the selected research methodology and case study research strategy for collecting relevant, valid, and reliable information. It includes the criteria for selection of the cases, unit of analysis, the data collection and analysis procedures and criteria for assessing the quality of the research in terms of reliability, validity and generalisations. It includes the conceptual framework of the research and proposes a theoretical framework for decision making for up-scaling good practices.

Figure 3-1: Research Domains



Adapted from: Argyris 1996

The research design provides the framework through which the literature review, research question, data, analysis, and results of the research project are brought together (Royer 2001). It "guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting observations" (Frankfort-Nachmias 1982; Yin 2003a), and deals with the study's questions, propositions, units of analysis, the logic that links data to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin 2003b). Consequently, the major steps involved in designing the study were as listed below:

- clearly defining the research questions that emerged in Chapter 2;
- purposive selection of case studies from the research population and designing the preliminary case-study protocol;
- conducting a pilot study for refining and finalizing the data collection plan and preparing the case study protocol;
- conducting the case studies until theoretical replication is reached;
- writing case reports independently and carrying out within-case study analysis, and finally
- implementing cross-case analysis.

Figure 3-2: Conceptual Framework



3.1 Conceptual Framework for studying up-scaling of good practices

The conceptual framework defines the inquiry domain through which the researcher visualizes a set of rational concepts that are organized in a manner that facilitates communication. For the researcher, the conceptual framework provides a vehicle for sharing her way of seeing and thinking with the wider professional community. The framework reduces the wide and complex field of inquiry to a conceptually simple visual that captures the essential components of inquiry, and opens opportunities for mapping out more specific queries. In addition, the conceptual framework provides a mental model for constructing the research methodology, and acts as a guide for identifying the characteristics of the observations in the field and of the units of analysis (Drucker-Godard 2001). These include the main dimensions of the study, the key variables and the relationships that are assumed to exist between the variables. Hence, it determines what data are to be collected and analysed.

Informed by a sustainable development and decision-framework, the study concept is based on several issues that were explored in the context of actions taken for improving urban environments and for meeting the Targets of Millennium Development Goal 7 (Section 1.1, 2.2 and 2.3). Central to the conceptual framework is the role of decision makers involved in the implementation and up-scaling of interventions for environmental improvement (Section 2.4).. The issues emerged from a review of literature on housing and environmental improvement (Section 1.1), sustainable development (Section 2.1), good practices (Section 2.2) and their identification (Section 2.2.4) as well as up-scaling (Section 2.3), and in theories of behavioural decision-making (Section 2.4).

There are differences amongst practitioners about what interventions are successful according to some criteria, and which are better than others (Section 2.1 and 2.2). These differences relate to diverse approaches, processes, and nature of support for good practice implementation and up-scaling. These debates are significant in conceptualizing the role that decision makers play in up-scaling of good practices. Thus, an important consideration in arriving at a conceptual framework was the requirement for understanding the context in which decisions are made.

The characteristics of sustainable interventions identified in the literature relate to responsiveness to the context, efficient use of resources, evolution over time, and inter-sectoral and holistic approaches (Section 2.3). Much of the literature identifies process issues of good practices (Section 2.3) as shared vision, equity, transparency, partnerships, interdependence, and community-centric (Section 2.1 and 2.2). Good practices as models of sustainable development are necessarily affected by development policies at the sub-national and national levels that usually provide the framework for urban development. Thus, good practices initiated by Government at various levels are an important area of study.

The intended focus of interventions is affected at the implementation level by organisational leadership, motivations and aspirations of decision makers, while the implementation processes

depend on local factors, and the organisational culture that encompasses the socio-political, policy and regulatory environments, and the human and financial resources. In supporting up-scaling of good practices, it is important to identify and choose appropriate interventions, and to have a clear understanding of the roles played by the various actors that are likely to be involved in the process. In fact, the fundamental assumption underlying the "sustainable development paradigm" is that with the identification of good practices, the roles played by decision makers and facilitators need to change. The databases of identified and documented good practices or award-winning interventions are expected to provide a range of proven solutions to urban problems and minimise the need of decision makers to look for or generate solutions. However, the lack of up-scaling of recognised good practices raises questions about constraints in up-scaling good practices.

For understanding the factors that influence up-scaling of good practices in urban areas, the focus should not be only on the good practices but rather on the roles and interactions amongst the participating actors. The typology of up-scaling (Section 2.3) clearly indicates that the decision makers involved in different types of up-scaling include the communities, the organisations facilitating the participation of the communities, promoters or conceptualisers of the good practices, the implementers, financiers, and those influencing the policies and regulations at the national, sub-national and local levels. The communities are often represented by CBOs and elected representatives who may contribute to the formulation of the intervention, and represent the aspirations and support of the community.

Thus, the entire context for up-scaling of good practices for environmental improvement in urban areas has to be examined within the three levels of context: the good practices, the decision-making context and influences (which may include personal/ organisational influences). The three levels are mutually interacting and the boundaries between them are not distinct.

3.1.1 Roles/ Influences of decision makers

As depicted in Figure 2.3, the decisions for initiating and up-scaling good practices are necessarily affected by the various actors and orientation of the decision makers, facilitators and the community involved in their implementation. The integration of good practices into citywide or nationwide development approaches is therefore not a simple case of up-scaling good practices but needs to be understood within the context of local factors that influence decision makers. Decisions of the actors are influenced by their aspirations, motivations, values, interests, and uncertainties, risks, biases and power relations with other actors. Besides this, the policy regulations, political environment, the human and financial resources and the socio-cultural environment influence the decisions about what can be done where and how.

In the following Section, the choice of research paradigm, methodology, selection of cases etc. for getting reliable data are discussed and justified.

3.2 Research Paradigm

Epistemological presuppositions provide a vision of the world, the methodology employed and presupposition of results. They aim at predicting, prescribing, understanding and explaining the research work (Girod-Séville 2001). The research paradigm, defined as a system of philosophical beliefs that leads and governs an investigation and the range of possible relationships to it and its parts, shapes the research process and provides the direction and principles relating to the approach, methods and techniques for conducting research within its philosophical setting (Guba 2003). Literature on research methodology reveals widespread debate concerning the best approach for conducting research. Methodologists in social sciences and other disciplines recognize two principal research paradigms - the positivist and the interpretive or phenomenology paradigms (Patton 1990).

The positivist tradition assumes an objective physical and social world (Yin 2003a), and its emphasis is on experimental observations for explaining and testing cause-effect relationships of an event (Eisenhardt 1990). It relies on statistical evaluation for reasoning the phenomenon being investigated. The role of researcher is to discover this reality by designing measures that will detect and measure those dimensions of reality that interest them. Consequently, a significant component of positivist research design is the statistical analysis method, which deals with data obtained by counting or measuring the properties of populations of natural phenomenon. The interpretive paradigm is rooted in the humanities with an emphasis on holistic and qualitative information that can provide rich insights into the components of a social phenomenon (Denzin 2000). The interpretivitist viewpoint is that the social world has an uncertain ontological status and there are multiple constructed realities that can only be studied holistically (Lincoln 1985).

Some methodologists emphasize that the paradigms can be combined to provide a comprehensive and methodological understanding about the research issue being examined (Easterby-Smith 1991). However, literature suggests that the ontological foundations and assumptions of research paradigms and the related quantitative and qualitative research methods of the two paradigms are incompatible (Lincoln 2000) because it is difficult to replicate research results using the mixed-method approach. Literature on research paradigm and methodology suggests that the research approach can be selected without restrictions while other practitioners assert that decisions for paradigm and methodology selection are influenced by the research aim, research questions and research resources (Patton 1990).

3.3 Research Questions

The research question, which involves a combination of the subject and purpose of the study, and the process to be used for proceeding with the study, guides the researcher's observations in the field (Thiétart 2001a). A review of the literature (Chapter 2) has revealed how interventions, approaches and policies for improving urban environmental conditions were introduced and how

they have evolved. The formal changes in development approaches were introduced to incorporate processes that enabled the poor to participate in the development process. The changes were introduced through development support organisations, Government programmes and schemes, and international and national NGOs. Literature shows that many organisations are involved in or have dedicated resources for identification, dissemination and transfer of good practices. Literature also reveals that numerous factors influence the choices made by decision makers, especially in terms of the utility of a choice not being the most important consideration in decision-making. The limited progress achieved in institutionalising participatory approaches or partnerships amongst various stakeholders, or in integrated approaches that contribute to sustainable interventions reveal the lack of empirical data on requirements for up-scaling requires in urban areas. In the context of meeting MDG 7 targets, it is therefore important to identify the actions that facilitate or hinder actions for enabling access to basic services and shelter, and address the gap in the current knowledge on why decision makers cannot or do not up scale good practices.

3.3.1 Research proposition and questions

This study is based on the proposition that decision processes of stakeholders involved in implementing good practices, specifically the common sense set of rules used for making choices about what interventions to initiate and support, influence up-scaling of good practices. The purpose is to investigate "How sustainable interventions for environmental improvement in urban areas are up scaled at the implementation level?" Accordingly, the primary research question, which the study was designed to answer with the aim of resolving the research problem, was:

"What are the critical factors in decision-making processes for up-scaling good practices for sustainable environmental improvement?"

The research problem for this study has been constructed to understand the phenomenon of decision making from the perspective of the implementing stakeholders in an effort to understand the factors involved in the initiation and up-scaling of good practices. The related questions to be answered through the research are:

Sub-question 1: What are the factors that make interventions in the urban settlements context good practices?

The aim of this question is to determine what strategies and indicators are used for making decisions on what are good practices. The inquiry is expected to enable making a distinction between the strategies used for identification of good practices by award giving organisations, and those for sharing knowledge or to learn lessons from for up scale them.

Sub-question 2: What are the decision routines involved in initiating and implementing good practices?

The purpose of this question is to identify the range of decision routines and iterations involved in

the initiation and implementation of interventions that are responsive to the local context economically, environmentally, socially and technologically.

Sub-question 3: What are the factors considered by stakeholders involved in initiating and implementing good practices?

The purpose of this question is to identify what choices are involved amongst various stakeholders for implementation of good practices in urban areas. This question aims to determine why limited numbers of stakeholders are involved in up-scaling of good practices.

Sub-question 4: What is up-scaling in the context of the actors involved in its implementation?

The purpose of this question is to draw a distinction amongst the various dimensions of up-scaling and identify actions that are fundamental to achieving sustainable environmental improvement in more locations and for more people more quickly.

Sub-question 5: What actions have facilitated or hindered the up-scaling of the good practices?

The purpose of this question is to examine the role of facilitators and the actions in the up-scaling of good practices.

3.4 Research Design

The objective of the research is to investigate critical factors in decision-making for up-scaling good practices within the context in which they occur because the context contains important explanatory variables about the phenomenon (Yin 2003a). The 'knowledge' required is to be drawn together through research (Allard-Poesi 2001) and answered through observations in the field (Thiétart 2001b; Girod-Séville 2001). The research problem "How are" and the main question "What are" necessitate in-depth understanding of the influences on decision making as experienced by stakeholders involved in implementation of good practices. The questions are explanatory and about situations over which the researcher has little or no control, and which require links to be traced over time (Yin 2003a). The assumption underlying the nature of knowledge to be studied is that the subject and object are interdependent, and the knowledge will be dominantly subjective and contextual.

The study was designed to gain in-depth and detailed descriptions and interpretations about critical factors involved in introducing and implementing good practices, and decisions that contribute to their up-scaling or otherwise. The problem requires an inductive (theory building approach) approach because reasoning is done from individual cases to general conclusions (Girod-Séville 2001). The interpretive paradigm is more suited than the positivist paradigm because the research is concerned with picturing the actual worlds of the investigated phenomena rather than with providing statistical details about the cause-effect relationships between variables within the examined phenomena. Moreover, the literature shows that the interpretive paradigm has been used

widely by scholars in the area of decision-making (Eisenhardt 1989; Mintzberg 1976; Yin 2003a; Szulanski 1996; 2002) in fields such as business, management, and technology transfer.

3.5 Research methodology

The aim is to understand and explain empirical phenomena. It relies on perceptions, experience and observations, and reliable knowledge on a problem in its context (Frankfort-Nachmias 1982; Buckley 1976). The research is to be undertaken in an atmosphere of uncertainty where the researcher has imperfect control of the observational field. The context for the study is difficult to control, and hence any alterations in one part of epistemological or methodological constructions are likely to have multiple consequences. This indicates the need to employ multi-dimensional approaches that are responsive to the context and effective in collecting the type of evidence required to answer the research questions (Denzin 2000; Strauss 1998; Thiétart 2001).

The evidence to be collected is related to thought processes that are difficult to gather through conventional research methods such as questionnaires, and is to be collected from actors who are involved in implementation of good practices. The best way to recognise and uncover complex components of the decision processes is to get inside the minds of decision makers, and understand the process from their viewpoints (Mintzberg 1976). The inductive approach requires rich descriptions and details, which derive from the narrative methods of qualitative research (Mintzberg 1979). In-depth research increases the prospects of getting valuable and unique insights into decision-making processes that may not be possible using other approaches (Denscombe 1998; Denzin 2000). The direct research method produces more valuable outcomes than can be produced through a quantitative method (Mintzberg 1979). The study does not require quantitative data using statistical measurements of influences on decision-making. Accordingly, the qualitative research methodology was chosen as matching the philosophical assumptions of the interpretive paradigm.

Qualitative research in general and social research in particular, draws on a variety of disciplines such as sociology, social anthropology and social psychology (Denscombe 1998). A qualitative strategy is based on a constructivist philosophy that assumes reality as a multiple layered, interactive social construction. The qualitative methodology is appropriate when the phenomena can only be studied or understood in their natural settings, little is known about investigated phenomena or when the research issues cannot be expressed quantitatively (Strauss 1998). The qualitative method is more relevant when the research aim is to acquire a rich and empathetic understanding of social life aspects and experiences, and to make sense of the phenomena in terms of meanings that people bring to them (Denzin 2000).

The qualitative methodology explains a phenomenon from the researcher's position and the reader's perception. A qualitative research strategy is appropriate for this study because of the divergent nature of good practices and the inter-disciplinary characteristic of decision-making

(Thiétart 2001a) and the explanatory nature of this study. In addition, explanatory studies have been employed in the area of local government decision-making (Simon 1997) and in the area of strategic decision-making (Eisenhardt 1989; Mintzberg 1996). It offers intensity and richness in the collected data, its use is appropriate for the small number of cases examined, and it is recommended when information obtained from each subject is expected to differ in complex ways (Denzin 2000). The chosen qualitative research method using the interview technique of data collection method closely matches these requirements (Denzin 2000), and hence was considered most suitable. The choice of the research methodology is consistent with the selected research paradigm (Girod-Séville 2001), the nature of the investigated phenomena, the type of research questions (Yin 2003a), the research population, the expected results of the research, resources available and the researcher's personal experience and preference.

3.5.1 Case study strategy

A case study, as a research approach or method, is described as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon with its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident" (Yin 2003a). The case study, which some methodologists describe as inquiry of a system bounded by time and place (Creswell 1998), is the most appropriate method when the research problem addresses the question of "how are" rather than "how should" and therefore the inductive (theory building) approach is required to solve the research problem (Perry 1998). Furthermore, the case study method provides the basis for a theory-building approach, which is very suitable for new areas of research where little is known (Eisenhardt 1989). The case study approach offers the opportunity to explain why certain outcomes happen and will offer more possibilities of unravelling the processes, and of establishing how they are linked in a given situation (Denscombe 1998).

The literature on case studies provides typologies such as exploratory, descriptive or explanatory (Yin 2003a), particularistic or heuristic (Merriam 1988), snapshot, longitudinal, pre-post, patchwork or comparative. Case studies are especially useful for explanatory research, theory generation, examination of atypical phenomena, and particularly appropriate for applied research related to contemporary issues in the real world. Consequently, an explanatory study normally focuses on current events and concerns and seeks to answer questions of how and why. The case study strategy is extensively utilized in the fields of social and business research because it provides insights and rich understanding about the event being studied compared to other methods.

The primary motivation for employing the case study method for the study is based on the connection of the method with philosophical assumptions and foundations of the interpretive paradigm. The design of a case study can be customized to address a wide range of research questions and types of cases and to incorporate a variety of data collection, analysis, and reporting techniques. The case-study strategy is appropriate because there are multiple sources of evidence

amongst the many stakeholders involved in the process, and because there are many variables that are to be identified during the research (Yin 2003a). The category of the selected case studies is explanatory according to the Yin typology (Yin 1981; 2003a) as the research adopted the inductive approach in an attempt to add and develop new aspects of the existing theory in the area of organisational decision-making. The research's case studies are heuristic (Merriam 1988) because they maximise experiences and the knowledge of key decision makers in organisations in relation to the implementation and up-scaling of good practices.

The evidence for study, that is the real and in-depth information, has to be gathered through primary interaction and observations of events within the 'naturally occurring' case study setting (Yin 2003a). This is offered by the case study strategy (Eisenhardt 1989; Stake 1978; Yin 2003a) as it allows an intensive examination of an intervention and would enable exploration and understanding of the problems, issues and relationships in up-scaling of good practices (Buckley 1976; Bennett 1983). It offers deep and rigorous understanding for investigated phenomena from the participant's perspective through the inductive approach (Yin 2003a). It is conducive to the use of a variety of sources and types of data, and to a variety of research methods for investigation (Yin 2003a; Denscombe 1998). The case study approach allows tracing of all the details of factors and phases that comprise the decision-making processes and avoids problems resulting from a small sample size, resistance to survey methods or biases. Furthermore, multiple case studies are also the preferred method when investigating decision processes in organizations, strategic decision-making (Eisenhardt 1998; 1989; Mintzberg 1976; Nutt 1984) and those looking at transfer of innovations (Yin 2003a; Bryman 1999; Sproull 1995; Frankfort-Nachmias 1982).

3.5.2 Case study research design

Selecting the appropriate case study design is crucial when using the case study strategy because of its effect on the quality of research findings and influence of the unit of analysis on the investigated phenomena (Yin 2003a). The four types of case study design proposed by Yin (2003a) are: a) single case (holistic); b) single case (embedded); c) multiple cases (holistic), and d) multiple cases (embedded).

The single case design implies the use of one case study that is holistic when it involves one unit of analysis or the case itself. A single case design that integrates more complex sub-units of analysis, is referred to as an embedded case design. The single case study design is suitable when the case: a) provides a vital test for established theory; b) embodies an exceptional or a unique event, c) is a distinguishing or typical case, or d) provides a longitudinal or revelatory aim (Yin 2003a). Although a well-constructed single case study is appropriate in some conditions and could provide evidence to answer the research questions in its particular context, it only permits understanding of issues intrinsic to the case (Hamel 1993).

In contrast, multiple case design refers to conducting of several case studies or experiments, which

are holistic if it entails several holistic cases within which the holistic case consists of one unit of analysis. The embedded multiple case design contains a number of embedded cases wherein each embedded case includes multiple units of analysis (Yin 2003a). Multiple case-study designs allow cross-case analysis and comparison and the investigation of a particular phenomenon in diverse settings. The use of a multiple case study design increases the chances of getting robust results, and more cases prove or disprove the existing theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003a). Multiple case design approach is a very useful for gaining insights into all aspects of how good practice implementers address complex decision-making. In addition, comparison between different cases can help identify important findings specific for each context.

Yin (2003a) argues strongly that multiple cases should be considered as multiple experiments and not multiple respondents in a survey, and cases must be selected based on replication logic and not on sampling logic. The two types of replications - literal and theoretical provide for generalizability of case study research findings (Yin 2003a). Literal replication entails the researcher predicting that the next case to be studied will yield results that are similar to those of similar cases that she or other researchers have studied. Theoretical replication entails the researcher predicting that the next case to be studied will yield results that differ from those obtained for other cases that have been previously studied, in ways consistent with the theory that underlies the research. Theoretical replication linked with a multiple case design reinforces the external validity of research results, and therefore, undertaking of more than two cases is highly recommended. When replication logic is achieved, each case either predicts similar results (literal replication) or predicts opposite results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication).

For replication logic, each case study is regarded as a single experiment or investigation and the greater the numbers of case studies that prove or disprove the existing theory, the more vigorous are the research outcomes. Following replication logic, multiple case studies can be used to study if similar or contrasting results occur as predicted at the outset of the investigation (Stake 1998). Multiple cases may also be selected to predict similar results (literal replication) or to produce contrasting results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin 2003a).

The multiple case study design was the most appropriate design for this study because it enables in-depth learning about the phenomena under study, and does not aim to test theory or to understand a unique and typical phenomena as in the single case design. Since the intention of this study is to have a 'holistic' rather than a 'fragmented' approach to understanding decision issues involved in up-scaling good practices, the number of cases was an important but not dominant issue. In addition, since good practice implementation takes a long time, and there are time and resource constraints in undertaking fieldwork, it is inappropriate to rely on a single case and observe the initiating and implementation process from beginning to completion. As a result, multiple case design was necessary since it allows a deeper and richer understanding of decisions for both ongoing and implemented good practices by undertaking purposively selected cases of

different sizes from different sectors to achieve the replication logic associated with the multiple case design (Yin 2003a). A multiple-case design, with a combination of an explanatory - descriptive approach helped to gain insight into processes that can support up-scaling good practices. The multiple case design was preferred over the single case design because the evidence abstracted and analytical conclusions occurring from multiple case research are more powerful and more compelling compared to a single case, and using more than one case study greatly strengthens the external generalizability of research findings.

3.5.3 Unit of analysis

One of the most important elements of the research design is defining the unit of analysis as the research sample and instrument. Cases selection and strategy of data collection are determined and guided by the defined unit of analysis and selecting the appropriate unit of analysis is correlated to the specified research questions (Yin 2003a). The unit of analysis refers to what or who is being investigated, that is, to the most important entity or issue that is examined and analysed throughout the research process. The unit of analysis can be individuals, groups, decisions, programmes, events or other subjects (Yin 2003a).

The research setting or primary unit of analysis is a recognized 'good practice' that aimed to improve environmental conditions of under-serviced areas of the poor in an urban area. Given that the aim of the study was to explore the decision making process of participating organisations implementing such interventions, good practices were defined (Chapter 1) for the study as "concepts, processes, or interventions that have evolved locally for bringing sustainable socio-economic changes in the lives of the poor living in areas with high levels of environmental degradation; in response to their preferences and situation, and through partnerships that maintain an effective working balance between the partners". The main unit of analysis of the study was the decision-making processes of individuals for initiating and implementing good practices. The study included sub-units (embedded units) such as steps, factors and procedures involved in the decisions leading to initiation of good practices. The stakeholders involved in implementing the good practices were identified as the key informants who could reveal issues that constrained extension of the intervention to cover more people across urban areas. For each intervention, focus was placed on the implementing and facilitating stakeholder groups. The embedded units of analysis are the stakeholder decisions and processes involved in implementation of good practices.

3.5.3.1 Number of cases

The number of cases to be conducted is a critical concern in case study research. However, there is no consensus among case study methodologists about the number of cases a doctoral or postgraduate research should contain. Some methodologists recommend that the number of case studies be determined by the researcher and that there are no general rules for the sample size in qualitative research (Patton 1990). Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that a researcher should

discontinue conducting additional cases and interviewing additional respondents when she is collecting repetitive data and hearing the same stories (Glaser 1967). For a multiple case design with replication logic, as for this study, a few cases (2 or 3) would produce similar results (literal replication), while a few others (4 to 6) may create contrasting results and different patterns (replication logic) (Yin 2003a). Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that between 4 to 10 cases are relatively sufficient and that with fewer than 4 cases, it is hard to generate theory with much complexity. Conversely, with more than 10 cases, it is difficult to cope with the large volume of data and complexity. Miles and Huberman (1994) proposed that a researcher should not carry out more than 15 cases because that makes research objectives unachievable. Taking into consideration the constraints of time and funding for postgraduate research, a minimum of 2 to 4 cases and a maximum of 10 - 12 cases are accepted by methodologists (Perry 1998).

The number of cases was influenced by the representativeness of the cases and the study's proposition (Hamel 1993). The focus on two to three case studies in urban areas can provide evidence that explains what hinders up-scaling of good practices. The number of cases is consistent with guidelines on number of case studies for research suggested by methodologists. Further, while conducting the second and third case studies, it was noted that repetitive data on main issues involved in decisions regarding up-scaling was being gathered. Thus, the 'theoretical saturation' was reached as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989).

3.5.4 Approach and process to case selection

Selecting a case from the target research population is a decisive phase in case study designs (Stake 1998) and influences understanding of the research issue being investigated (Yin 2003a). Researchers suggest that the selection of case studies should be made based on 'theoretical sampling' and not random sampling, as is the case with survey research (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser 1967; Stake 1998; Yin 2003a).

Theoretical sampling is the "process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses her data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them in order to develop theory as it emerges" (Glaser 1967). Patton (1990) introduced the concept of 'purposeful sampling' suggesting that case studies should be selected from among potential cases that are information rich, and provide the researcher with deep knowledge and understanding about the research issue. Of the sixteen different strategies of purposeful sampling for case selection, the ones utilised for the study are: 1) 'criterion sampling' wherein the researcher identifies a set of criteria in an attempt to select information rich cases within the available time and research resources; 2) 'confirming and disconfirming cases' wherein different cases are selected to deepen and prove or disprove initial analysis and some emerging issues from previous cases; and 3) 'convenience sampling' which entails selecting cases which are convenient and accessible within the available time, funding and other research resources.

The selection was influenced by the motive of deriving analytical generalisations of up-scaling, and a decision was made not to include experiences in the transfer of the good practices to other locations or organisations. The research case studies were selected using a combination of purposeful sampling strategies (Patton 1990) such as criterion, convenience and reputation. Three purposively selected cases were undertaken for this study. It was the researcher's belief that these would allow in depth examination of the decision criteria of the different stakeholders and enable generalisations through a cross-analysis.

The intention was to study interventions in the South Asian region - the researcher's area of interest, specifically the Indian sub-continent. Finally, the main aim of the study was not merely to describe the decision processes undertaken by key stakeholders in initiation and implementation of good practices and their influence on the evolution of interventions, but also to identify 'good practices' in decision making to significantly assist the up-scaling of good practices in environmental improvement.

The interventions that are recognised as good practices through a process of evaluation and comparison provide the frame within which specific cases can be studied. The need for gathering tacit information, primarily through face-to-face interviews with decision makers with an approach that gives legitimacy to the process and, at the same time, provides them the opportunity to recall and assess issues that may not have been articulated or considered politically correct. It requires consideration of factors such as whether the actors are willing to cooperate, the researcher has some contacts already established, the situation is convenient for the researcher, and communication and rapport building is possible. This narrowed the focus to cases where the different actors could communicate in one of the three languages spoken by the researcher.

As identified earlier, ascertaining the primary unit of analysis for the study is instrumental in determining the research population and sample (Yin 2003a). Based on the identified unit of analysis, the research population comprised 'developmental interventions in urban areas' that were recognised through international awards. The selection of cases was made from interventions that had been recognised through one of the three awards, that is, the World Habitat Award (WHA), the Dubai International Award for Best Practices in Improving the Living Environment (DIABP), and the Aga Khan Award for Architecture (AKAA). The focus of the World Habitat Award is primarily on interventions using alternative building materials and technologies, while the AKAA was instituted for architecture that was environmentally responsive, utilized local materials and skills, and was responsive to a specific cultural milieu. The DIABP focuses on interventions implemented in partnership with (local) governments.

The procedure for case selection began with gathering of data on the criteria for identification and selection of finalists and award winners. The selection criteria were justified after studying in greater depth the process followed by Building and Social Housing Foundation (BSHF) for assessing and verifying information about entries submitted for the World Habitat Award. The

analysis of information provided on databases by applicants also reiterated the finding about inadequacies in documentation of the innovations.

Table 3-1: Award winners by Region (1980 - 2004)

Region (UN)	Award Winners	Region (UN)	Award Winners
Africa	44	Central Asia	2
Asia	91	Eastern Asia	8
Americas	35	South-Eastern Asia	17
Europe	17	Southern Asia	28
Oceania	2	Western Asia	36
Others	1	Total	91
Total	190		

Source: Award winners from AKAA (1980 - 2004), DIABP (1996 - 2004) and WHA (1986 - 2004)

The list of finalists and award winners was created through an internet search that led to a database of good practices. 190 award winners were made up of the AKAA (91 award winners from 1980 to 2004), World Habitat Award (39 award winners from 1986 to 2004), and the DIABP (60 award winners from 1996 to 2004). In the first stage, award winners from South Asia were selected. These included 45 interventions in Southern and South-Eastern Asia. A final list was prepared for three countries: India (13 awards), Pakistan (6 awards), and Sri Lanka (1 award) (Table 3.2). This met the criteria of proximity and theoretical replication approach (Yin 2003a). The decisions for initiation and implementation of some of these interventions were made over 10 years ago and hence the key decision makers in participating organisations would have changed. However, for validity and reliability purposes, other key and knowledgeable persons who participated in the initiation and implementation process were identified and their accessibility verified.

In the next stage of narrowing, a short-list of five interventions in South Asia that involved government decision makers was developed. These were the Million Houses Programme (MHP), the Orangi Pilot Project, and Khuda-ki-Basti, which were initiated several years back, and the 'slum-networking' concept that appeared in each of the lists. The Orangi Pilot Project, established in 1980 by Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan (recipient of Magsaysay Award in 1963), which is documented in detail through the Orangi Pilot Project - Research and Training Institute, received the World Habitat Award in 2000. Replication of the self managed and self-financed approach to low cost sanitation has been attempted in the cities of Hyderabad (World Bank), Sukker (a UNICEF Project), Peshawar (UNICEF), Lahore (two NGOs: YCHR and Yohanabad), Gujranwala (NGO) and Faisalabad (CURITAS). However, because the researcher's area of interest could not contribute to the interests of the organisation, this case had to be replaced with Khuda-ki-Basti subsequently. This too was abandoned because of delays in getting a visa.

The Million Houses Programme (MHP), which was implemented in the past, represented two major shifts in approaches, namely the enabling strategy and use of community action planning for facilitating decision making. The objective of the MHP was to reach the scale with limited

financial and labour resources, and hence the government assisted the process of household construction and improvement through the provision of loan finance to low-income households in both urban and rural areas. The MHP was a national housing initiative, and at the time of its initiation, was viewed as a "promising answer" to housing problems that incorporated "a number of innovative, but extremely practical ideas, such as (a) the devolution of responsibility for initiative, standards and management to the families; (b) the definition of the roles of public authorities as support rather than governance or control; and (c) the education and formation of new cadres of officials for this support role" (Koenisberger 1986).

The short-list was as in Table 3.2:

Table 3-2: Award Winning Interventions 1980 - 2006

Award	Year	Awarded Intervention	Country	Category	For
DIABP	1996	SEWA Bank: A Women's Self-help Organization for Poverty Alleviation	India	Organisation	On-going support as a social-welfare activity
DIABP	2000	Cost-Effective and Appropriate Sanitation Systems, New Delhi	India	Sanitation	Enhancing access to sanitation
DIABP	1998	Urban Governance in Environment and Public Health: Surat's Experience	India	Governance	Management systems that improve efficiency, and require upgrading at intervals
DIABP	2002	Area Based Assessment of Property Tax In Patna, Bihar	India	Governance	
WHA	1988	One Million House Programme	Sri Lanka	Housing and redevelopment	National Programme
AKAA	1995	Aranya Community Housing, Indore	India	Sites & Services	Essential urban services that have to be expanded on an ongoing basis
WHA	1994	Slum Networking: Indore Habitat Project	India	Slum Upgrading	
AKAA	1998	Slum Networking: Indore	India	Slum Upgrading	
AKAA	1995	Khuda-ki-Basti Incremental Development Scheme, Hyderabad	Pakistan	Sites & Services	Pilots that demonstrate development options
WHA	2001	Orangi Low-Cost Housing and Sanitation Programme, Karachi	Pakistan	Upgrading	

Source: Award websites accessed during February - December 2004. For further details, refer Appendix 1.

Although the MHP formally ended in 1989 and the enabling approach was abandoned with a change in Government in 1994 (Sirivardana 1999), it has contributed significantly in terms of formalizing tools for participatory development processes. The MHP was recognised through the World Habitat Award in 1988 and is included as a best practice by UNCHS to encourage greater awareness about the urban agenda (UN-Habitat). Many individuals involved in the implementation of MHP are no longer with the implementing organisation but continue using and introducing the participatory processes in Sri Lanka and other parts of the world. Therefore, MHP was studied in the context of good practice processes and components that have survived and are utilised for new interventions. The fieldwork was limited to selected individuals who could respond to the researcher's queries about how they were incorporating some of the good practices that had evolved from the MHP.

The Slum Networking Project aims at overall physical upgrading of slums and has been attempted at four different locations with various stakeholders and areas of emphasis. The SNP approach, introduced in Indore (India) in 1989 under the DFID funded Habitat Improvement Project, was recognised through the WHA in 1994 and through the AKAA in 1998. It was introduced in Ahmedabad (Gujarat, India) as a partnership project (Slum Networking Project - SNP) between the local government, NGOs and the private sector. The SNP in Ahmedabad was amongst 40 good practices shortlisted in 1998 for forwarding to the Best Practices Jury of the DIABP and is included in the database of the Best Practices and Local Leadership Programme. It was recognised for an approach where slum upgrading was part of a larger upgrading plan for the entire city, and for its potential application for integrating slums into the urban fabric (Subsequently, the Ahmedabad SNP was recognised as a Best Practice and awarded the DIABP in 2006). It provided an opportunity to study the complexities involved at various levels. The different temporal contexts, nature of implementing organisations, and familiarity and personal association with the Ahmedabad and Indore interventions posed a dilemma in finalizing the list of cases. After long introspection and despite the concerns, the author decided on taking the challenge of including the Ahmedabad SNP in the research.

The two case studies provide an opportunity to investigate the temporal issues and on lessons learnt after good practices are implemented. Both the MHP and the Ahmedabad SNP corresponded with wider changes in economic policies of the Government and an influx of 'development specialists'. In Ahmedabad, real-time decisions made for the implementation of the Slum Networking Project and for initiation of two other good practices were investigated. In Sri Lanka, decisions that contributed to the evolution of the Million House Programme and how some of the components are incorporated in current interventions were examined.

During this period, the researcher learnt about the 'model MDG initiative' at the regional level covering secondary towns - the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative (LVWATSAN), which is located around a significant water resource in a region that suffers from the worst deprivations and environmental degradation. The regional project requires an integrated and coordinated approach for meeting the water and sanitation needs of communities, collaboration amongst the three countries that share its borders, and coordination with several other ongoing programmes in the Region. Although LVWATSAN did not meet the criteria of a recognised good practice and which had not started at the time of the fieldwork (July 2006), it was seen as a very significant opportunity to study how UN-Habitat, the implementing agency has incorporated good practice components in its strategic planning and implementation processes. The LVWATSAN Initiative also provided opportunities to investigate how the intervention is designed for sustainability when resources are externally provided. Thus, it was considered an appropriate case for comparing with recognized good practices.

In early May 2006, initial contact was made with Graham Alabaster, Programme Officer of

LVWATSAN to express interest in studying it. Alabaster sent a 'Background Information' document (UN-Habitat 2005a) that provided an opportunity to look at how up-scaling was attempted within UN-Habitat for reaching the MDG Targets. Alabaster was willing to assist with the study and the specific areas of interest identified were the coordination mechanism and capacity building aspects. A duration of three weeks was considered adequate for undertaking the study and the field visit was planned and organized from 7 to 27 July 2006. The questions to be answered through this case were i) How have good practices been incorporated in current interventions? ii) What processes have been incorporated for bringing about sustainability of the initiative? and, iii) What has been incorporated in the design of the intervention to enable replication or up-scaling of the approach?

The characteristics of the selected case studies are given in Table 3.3 (also see Appendices 6 & 7).

Table 3-3: Case selection

	Million Houses Programme	**SNP, Ahmedabad**		**Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation**
Initiated by/ concept of	Prime Minister and programme designed by Task Force.	Engineer-cum-conceptualiser when approached by architect couple. Pilot by industry		Water Ministers of three countries of East Africa, Executive Director of UN-Habitat and programme designed by Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch of UN-Habitat
Location	Sri Lanka	India		Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - three countries of East Africa
Implementer	National Housing Development Authority	Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation with NGOs		Under overall supervision of Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch of UN-Habitat
Year initiated	1984 –1989	1995		2004
Year when recognised	1988 (WHA)	Indore Ahmedabad	1994 (WHA) 2002 good practice/ 2006 best practice	Not recognised/ not applicable
Primary objective	Increasing housing access more economically and in response to the needs of the users.	Up grading settlements and improve overall environment of the city.		Improving sustainable access to water supply and sanitation in secondary towns around Lake Victoria, especially for the poor.

3.6 Data Collection Methods and Techniques

Case study research can include both qualitative and quantitative data. Methodologists have identified several techniques of data collection for case study based research, though it is not necessary to utilise all the available methods (Stake 1998; Yin 2003a). Both qualitative and quantitative research methods that incorporate triangulation can be used in parallel for the research (Thiétart 2001a). The qualitative research techniques available include 1) interviews; 2) questionnaires; 3) archival records; 4) direct observation; 5) participant observation; 6) documentation, and 7) physical artefacts. In general, the type of event being investigated and the

availability of and accessibility to various data collection methods determine the appropriate method for collecting the case study data (Stake 1998; Yin 2003a).

The evidence required is related to variables identified through the literature search as influencing up-scaling. This is in terms of how the interventions are identified as good practices, how decisions are made to implement the interventions, what issues are involved in their implementation, and finally how do benefits of the intervention reach more people. The evidence can be gathered from the key informants and actors who participate in the process, and using different research techniques and strategies for getting good quality data from both secondary and primary sources (Easterby-Smith 1991). Structured and semi-structured interviews, participant observation, focus groups and workshops increase the prospects of getting valuable insights about decision-making processes that may not be possible using other approaches (Denscombe 1998).

3.6.1 Interviews

Interviews can be used either as a major method for data collection in qualitative research or in combination with document analysis, observation or other techniques. Qualitative researchers argue that interviewing is an essential and fundamental data collection technique of any qualitative research (Denzin 2003a; Yin 2003a). Yin (2003) emphasised that interviews are an essential source of evidence because case studies are about 'human affairs, which should be reported and interpreted through the eyes of specific interviewees'. Face-to-face interviewing allows an understanding of the meanings the interviewees attach to issues and situations (Easterby-Smith 1991) in the context of the research subject, and helps identify other relevant sources of evidence. Other methodologists assert that interview is an important data gathering method because qualitative research is concerned with seeing and understanding the full picture of the event being studied that can only be achieved by the interview approach (Denzin 2003a).

Many authors classify qualitative interviews into three types, namely structured interviews, unstructured interviews, and semi-structured interviews. Structured interviews entail researchers asking the same set of questions, in the same order, using the same words, to different interviewees. They are convenient for comparing different interviewees' answers to the same questions, and when a team of researchers is involved in conducting the interviews. Unstructured interviews, which do not have any predetermined set of questions, involve researchers and interviewees talking freely (Burgess 1982). Unstructured interviews are often used in combination with participatory observation where researchers have to generate and develop questions according to what the interviewees say. Semi-structured interviews are somewhere between structured and unstructured interviews in format wherein the researchers prepare interview guides that consist of a set of questions. The guides allow researchers to generate their own questions to develop interesting areas of inquiry during the interviews. Open and structured interviews provide opportunities for exploring individual insights and experiences.

All three types of interview can be used in combination (Patton 1990). For example, after conducting structured interviews, researchers can conduct semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews or, they may start with unstructured interviews to relax the interviewees, and move to a semi-structured interview format. In-depth interviews as a participant recall method are the principal and dominant method for examining strategic decision-making process (Eisenhardt 1989; Mintzberg 1976; Nutt 1984).

There are no rules governing the number of interviews, and sample size in qualitative research depends on the purpose of the study and available time and resources (Glaser 1967; Lincoln 1985; Strauss 1998). Recent literature has shown no agreement among methodologists about the number of interviews required for qualitative or case study research undertaken by general or postgraduate qualitative researchers. Experienced theorists in the field of strategic decision-making have shown that sample size in qualitative research is contingent on the type of event being investigated and a small sample can be successful and valuable. Mintzberg (1979) asserted that the choice depends on what is studied but should not preclude a small sample, which has proved to be superior in some cases. Experienced methodologists suggest that the qualitative researcher should keep on interviewing participants from the research population until she reaches 'saturation point' during the interview process where no new information emerges (Glaser 1967; Patton 1990). Some researchers in strategic management using in-depth semi-structured interviews have reached the saturation point after 6 interviews. It has been argued that organisational strategy data should be collected from the most appropriate, often the most knowledgeable and senior managers, regardless of the number of informants to ensure trustworthiness and validity of the data.

3.6.2 Focus Groups

Focus Groups involve organised discussion with a selected group of individuals to discuss and comment on the subject of the research. Focus groups are appropriate for obtaining several perspectives about the same topic to gain insights into people's shared understandings of and experiences of specific issues and the ways in which individuals are influenced by others in a group situation. Focus groups are fundamentally a way of listening to people and learning from their personal experiences and allow data to be generated by interaction amongst the group participants. The main purpose is to draw upon respondents' attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions in a way in which would not be feasible using other methods. The contributions from the participants get refined by what others say and the synergy of the group aids spontaneity and creates a more socially contextual environment (Greenfield 2001). Focus groups also enable the researcher to gain a larger amount of information in a shorter period. Focus groups are particularly useful when there are power differences between the participants and decision-makers or professionals, and when one wants to explore the degree of consensus on a given topic.

3.6.3 Observations

Observations, distinguished in terms of direct or participant observations, are an important technique for collecting evidence. This method (Sproull 1995) is appropriate because the subjects are the best source of information and it is essential to observe their behaviour during the decision making process. Field visits provide opportunities for direct observations either through formal observational protocols or informally during the field visits when evidence is collected through other techniques. Observational evidence supplements data gathered through other techniques and thereby increases the reliability of data gathered. Direct observation is useful for providing additional information about the topic being studied.

Participant observation where the research participant actively participates in a social situation she is observing, is used most frequently for studies of neighbourhoods or groups. The technique provides opportunities for collecting data about 'private situations' that would not be possible through other methods of data collection. Participant observation often requires months or years of intensive work because the researcher needs to become accepted as a natural part of the culture in order to assure that the observations are of the natural phenomenon. The reliability is enhanced when more than one observer is involved in the task.

3.6.4 Field Notes

Field notes are an important means of documenting what is happening in the research, and as a means of reviewing observations. They are a means for converting the researcher's perceptions and thoughts into a visible form facilitates reflection and analytic insight. (Miles 1994; Strauss 1990). They are useful in identifying important issues or conflicting answers that can be revisited and clarified through further questions or for gathering additional information that was missing.

3.6.5 Secondary data review

The secondary sources of data (Sproull 1995) can include documentation, documents from official meetings, evaluation reports, Government guidelines, policy documents, minutes of meetings where available, and submissions for the recognition of the good practices. Although the secondary sources may provide more information, the data may not be comprehensive, and requires verification from those involved in the process. Information about the sustainability criteria of the good practice that qualified it for recognition will be gathered from documentation available with the award giving websites, the stakeholders involved in the good practice and where feasible, from the applicants or nominators of good practices.

Current data about the SNP and LVWATSAN were gathered from internet websites of the implementing organisations – Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and UN-Habitat respectively.

3.6.6 Instrument administration

This method is appropriate when people's responses to the event or intervention are important (Sproull 1995) and contribute to the social construction of reality (Denzin 1998). Questionnaires or structured interviews may be used to get information on `understanding about potential of good practices' amongst the people involved – in either implementation or in knowledge sharing initiatives.

3.7 Research techniques applied

This research has adopted various strategies for getting good quality data through semi-structured interviews, timelines, and triangulation of data. It depended on in-depth interviews as a primary data source and method because decisions related to the investigated interventions were either made a long time ago or very recently. It would therefore have been difficult to find documents or archival records related to decisions in most of the older cases – a situation recognised by Mintzberg (1976). Since the data required for this research are primarily tacit, one-to-one interaction through semi-structured and open-ended interviews (individuals) was considered the most appropriate technique. In-depth interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview mode because the decision makers' opinions, attitudes, values and beliefs are the best source of information (Sproull 1995), and the information required is complex and requires further probing or clarifications. The use of the interviewing method requires ease of communication and rapport building, which is better when the researcher is thoroughly familiar with the research topic and can communicate in the language of those being interviewed (Silverman 2001).

Since multiple case studies were conducted and each considered as a single experiment (Yin 2003a), the flexibility that distinguishes semi-structured interviews, allowed changing and modifying of interview questions when required. This assisted in gaining rich, reliable, valid and accurate data through directing the interview process and asking the same question in different ways to explain the same issue. Closed questions for the interviews emerged because of discussions and based on interviewees responses to open questions during the interview session. These were not predetermined prior to the interview. In addition, in the general field of decision-making, in-depth semi-structured interviews have been utilised extensively (Eisenhardt 1989; Mintzberg 1976; Nutt 1984).

Direct observation, participant observation and the interrelated artefacts were unfeasible, inaccessible and impossible to be employed for the study because the decisions for all cases were made and implemented in the past. Consequently, these decision processes could be explored after completion, making only supplementary data sources accessible in conjunction with face-to-face in-depth interviews to incorporate the case study database and triangulate the interview data.

In conclusion, in each of the cases, in-depth interviews were conducted with the available and

most knowledgeable senior decision makers who participated significantly in the decision process. Each interview session lasted about 45 minutes to two hours using a semi-structured interview guide. Two to four senior decision makers sat different levels in participating organisations were interviewed in each case and theoretical saturation in the interviews and case studies was reached in all three cases.

Questionnaires were used to get information on award giving processes. The entry point for research was the implementing organisation. The preliminary list of stakeholders was influenced by Øyen's suggestions (2002) for including beneficiary stakeholders, administrators of the intervention, financing agencies, those who provided the conceptual or ideological support for the initiation of the intervention, and other stakeholders interested in the outcomes of the intervention. The primary sources of information were actors who were close in time to the data. The methodology combined three research tools for data collection in each of the three cases studied.

3.8 Case study data collection procedures

The data collection procedures for the case studies involved three main stages: i) Designing and preparing of the case study protocol; ii)Conducting a pilot case study to refine the pre-planned case-study protocol, and iii) Collection of data from the field.

3.8.1 Case study protocol

Yin (2003) suggests four main sections for a case study protocol, namely, a) an overview of the case study research (including objectives, issues, topics and stakeholders being interviewed); b) field procedures in terms of gaining access to sites, sources of information, timetable of data collecting activities; c) case-study questions which the investigator must keep in mind during data collection, and d) a guide for case-study report in terms of an outline and a format for the narrative. Case study protocols were determined prior to fieldwork. This included the interview instrument and the associated required procedures and actions. Two case-study protocols were used for the study as shown in Appendices 2 and 3. The first was used during the pilot and was refined. The second was planned prior to data collection process and designed for in-depth interviews for all cases, and aimed to triangulate the interview data and to gather relevant information. The case study protocol established the entire data collection process and is regarded as a necessary part of the case study research.

Case study questions are at the centre of the study as they represent the interview guideline questions that are posed by the investigator to remind her of the data to be collected and its possible sources (Yin 2003a). The questions of the case study interview guide were mainly open-ended and indirect. They were designed to collect rich, deep and comprehensive information about the decision processes of participating stakeholders. The interview guide as a part of the case study protocol is presented in Appendices 12 and 13.

Some open ended questions covered issues related to the background of the initial decision. Other core questions dealt with the steps and phases that led to refinement of the intervention, and the critical success factors contributing to achieving a sustainable intervention. Since the aim of the study is to determine critical factors for up-scaling good practices, open-ended questions were organised to capture: i) how the decision was made to partner with various organisations for implementing the intervention, and ii) any suggestions and recommendations to improve support for up-scaling and learn from their experiences.

3.8.2 Pilot case study

The pilot case study, which is recommended for case study researchers who adopt the multiple case study design, was undertaken prior to the start of gathering the actual data from the field. The pilot case study, which assists the investigator to refine the interview instrument and to improve the data collection procedures and research design (Yin 2003), represents a training course for the investigator with respect to the data collection plan and skills. The pilot case study is not a 'pre-test' case in which the refined data collection plan is used as a final plan for conducting actual case studies, but provides a basis for the researcher to modify and change her case study questions and data collection procedures while remaining focused on the same research issues.

The three main criteria for selecting the pilot case study are convenience, access and geographic proximity (Yin 2003),. Following these criteria, I selected Ahmedabad, where several good practices (Municipal Bond issuance, private sector partnership for road redevelopment, slum improvement, and garden redevelopment partnerships with professionals for heritage conservation) have been recognised through Best Practices Partnerships initiative and the Aga Khan Award for Architecture. The researcher's concerns at this stage were about the relevance of the research topic and how to develop the methodology. The questions arising at this stage were:

a) Are the 'good practices' recognised as such in the local context, and is recognition important or significant for decision makers in local governments?

b) Who are the relevant decision makers for good practices?

c) What influenced the intervention and its evolution, that is, what is the context in which up-scaling of the good practices is being propagated?

d) How and to what extent has the good practice been up scaled?

The pilot included interviews with three groups of stakeholders helped modify the case study instrument. The interview data were analysed manually by developing categories, themes and patterns for data gathered in the interviews (Refer Appendix 11).

3.8.3 Collecting field data

Prior to start of the fieldwork, a list was prepared of stakeholders involved in the implementation

of the case studies from secondary data, which was expected to expand during the research. As listed under Section 3.7, the preliminary list of stakeholders included those involved in implementation of the interventions as well as other stakeholders interested in the outcomes of the intervention. The primary sources of information were actors who were also close in time to the data. To minimize errors and biases in the study, the snowballing technique was used for identifying other interested stakeholders that influenced the interventions or their understanding amongst the involved actors.

The four categories of stakeholders were identified as initiator, planners, institutional/ organizational, NGOs, and the beneficiaries. The numbers varied depending on roles identified within the institutions or through literature/ secondary data provided by the stakeholders. The initiator in all cases comprised more than an individual. It refers to the person with an idea, an individual, or group willing to adopt a concept or process for a specific objective. In two cases, the key initiators were individuals and in the third case, individuals within an organization who evolved a project based on knowledge about what is required and in an attempt to implement a 'model MDG Project' (Refer Appendix 12).

3.8.3.1 Interviews

The data collection began with: a) contacting the respondents; b) explaining the purpose of the research; c) establishing good unbiased relationship, and d) determining a date, time and venue for the interview. Prior to many of the interviews and following some interviews, available documents relating to initiation and up-scaling decision were gathered from each organisation. Following the interviews, short follow-up telephonic contact was made with some of the respondents to clarify some issues related to the initiation and evolution of the interventions.

3.8.3.2 Focus Groups

The objective of organising focus groups was to generate data through interaction amongst group participants, and validate data gathered through secondary data sources and interviews. Focus groups were organised with engineers to gather data on their experiences, and with beneficiary households for determining what influenced their decision to participate. The beneficiaries were part of the research process only for the ongoing interventions. The beneficiaries were involved for triangulating data and for getting an understanding on how they made decisions to participate in the project. In one case only, people were unwilling to communicate with the researcher and all referred to one person as a spokesperson for the group. In the case of East Africa, after a joint meeting with members of some CBOs, a decision was made to not visit the intervention areas or meet with the potential beneficiaries because of delays in start of execution of works.

3.8.3.3 Secondary data review

The investigation for each case involved a desk study of secondary sources of data such as literature on review of the initiatives, monographs, and pamphlets from the implementing

organisations, and research documents. Gathering of data from the secondary sources complemented data gathered through interviews, which does not necessarily provide accurate data (Sproull 1995). This helped to validate data to quite an extent and raise questions about some of the information in other published material. As these were recognised interventions, there was extensive secondary information available on the Ahmedabad and Sri Lankan cases, which provided related information even though all those involved in the planning or implementation of the interventions could not be interviewed (Sproull 1995). Publicly available documents on the case studies were reviewed to identify key factors contributing to the success or lack of success of the good practices and their up-scaling.

The different sources of evidence included documents, information pamphlets and publicity materials related to good practices (planning, implementation, and evaluation), and reports from organisations such as ESCAP and UN-Habitat that are carrying out research on transfer of good practices. In the case of LVWATSAN, documents were primarily provided by the UN-Habitat Water and Sanitation Branch (II). For the Indian case, files documenting the administrative approval process for most areas were available. All files and documentation for internal use were in Gujarati. However, documents from donors, including letters, reports, or requests were not available. According to the SNP Cell, these documents were lost or misplaced when the Cell was dismantled. The information from secondary sources gave the historical perspective on how the good practices evolved, experiences, and issues in attempts at up-scaling and outcomes. Information on the interventions in Indore was available with the DFID Office in India, on the Baroda intervention with the person who was coordinating the initiative, and in Bhopal from the Municipal Corporation. In Sri Lanka, secondary data were available for current activities. Secondary data on the MHP was gathered from literature, WEDC library and internet sources.

In the case of LVWATSAN, many reports and documents that traced the planning and finalisation of the intervention were provided by the Infrastructure Branch. These provided the context and an understanding about how 'good practice' components were incorporated in the LVWATSAN. Field visits to three towns and interviews with various stakeholders were planned to get a deeper understanding of the context and assess the viability of the approach. The context in terms of the various programmes of UN-Habitat, identification of the urban areas in East Africa where they had been implemented, and an understanding of the other activities ongoing in the Region were important. This was primarily because the various experiences and situations were identified as motivating factors for identification and design of the LVWATSAN.

In Ahmedabad, it was essential to study the roles of the NGOs that were implementing or facilitating the implementation of the intervention. Therefore, secondary data on studies on NGOs were reviewed to make a shortlist of NGOs to interview. The NGOs could be categorized as i) SEWA as a network of many related organizations addressing various aspects of development from the grassroots to policy-influence, engineering and construction, training, evaluation,

research and banking. The inter-relations between the various organizations and programmes are further influenced by the fact that key positions are held by people from the same family. ii) SHARDA Trust and BCC that have a corporate background and support. iii) Saath as a small NGO that was primarily involved in integrated development at the settlement level, and which has gradually expanded to relief, rehabilitation, relocation, and livelihoods support, and iv) World Vision as an international NGO. Sensitivity to issues of ownership, prestige, and problems in implementation of SNP were required in raising questions about the role of the NGOs.

Other sources besides document review were a) field notes which were taken during the visits to the selected cases and during the interviews; b) internet sources available for the SNP and LVWATSAN which contained information about the interventions and their achievements; c) follow-up meetings and email contacts made subsequent to the interviews to clarify interview related data and to obtain additional information about the research issues. Field notes for the study included hand written notes taken during and made immediately after interviews, observations and impressions taken during the field visit to each organisation, and during visits to the intervention areas.

Information about award programmes ranging from recognition of individual contributions to projects to larger interventions was tabulated and studied to determine the differences in criteria etc and to identify whether the same projects were being recognised by others or not. A list of stakeholders involved in the case studies was prepared from secondary data and further expanded during the research.

3.8.3.4 Instrument administration

Since the research focus is on getting depth of understanding about issues affecting up-scaling of good practices, this method was not used for gathering data in the field. The researcher did however attempt to get 'data' from questionnaires to NGOs and from award giving organisations to get an understanding about key issues in the award administration process.

The responses from the award giving organisations were very useful – though there were too few. Some responded to say that they do not give any more details than are available on their websites (some were updated later – for example Nobel Prize). Others responded to say they were busy and should be reminded later. NGOs were the most difficult to contact in India because the e-mail addresses and phone numbers of many were invalid/ outdated. Very few had their own websites and many did not have a contact e-mail address. Others did not respond at all – so there was no way of knowing whether they ever received the messages or not. Others said they had received the questionnaires and would respond later. When some of the people were contacted later for interviews, they willingly spent a much longer time responding to the queries – which focused on their role in the sector rather than on a generalised response to the specific queries

The outcomes of the preliminary study analysis of data collected via in-depth interviews, available

documents, field notes, internet sources and follow-up meetings or telephone contacts were used in designing the second questionnaire in order to triangulate the collected data. The in-depth interview data of each case study in conjunction with other data sources were analysed and the final individual case study report findings were prepared. The final step in the data collection process, the case study reports related to participant validation were sent by electronic mail to participants for review and to make changes when applicable. However, no significant modifications were made to the case study reports.

The case study database includes evidence such as documents, letters, notes from files, monographs, pamphlets, audio tapes and notes of interviews and focus groups and field notes. An annotated bibliography of documents lists secondary data sources of data. In addition, it includes a database of 216 awards studied, primarily from internet-based sources and their websites of award giving organisations.

Table 3-4: Summary of database

Case	Interviews	Focus Groups	Secondary sources	Questionnaire	
				Sent	Recd
Slum Networking Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Bhopal	60	28	91	NA	NA
Million Houses Programme/ CAP	11	0	174	NA	NA
Lake Victoria WATSAN Initiative (prior to start of implementation)	16	3	53	NA	NA
Awards	16	NA	216	90	12
Total	**103**	**31**	**534**	**90**	**12**

For this study, within-case and cross-case analyses were carried out in analysing the data. The case study description, report or story was used as an analytical strategy for within-case analysis due to its wide deployment in previous strategic decision research. Further, the data was compared in terms of the emerged themes as well as themes derived from the literature review.

3.9 Analysing case study data

Qualitative analysis refers to theoretically interpreting the textual data by means of explicit analytical tactics to transform the raw data into a new and logical interpretation and description of the event being investigated. Eisenhardt (1989) refers to analysis of data collected through the case study approach as the crux of building theories from case studies. Data analysis consists of "examining, categorising, tabulating, testing or otherwise recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a study" (Yin 2003a). It is viewed as a process of organising, categorising and meaningfully interpreting (Creswell 1994) the large volume of words obtained through interviews or observations. Subsequently, the researcher has to look for relationships between various themes that have emerged throughout the analysis process to answer the research questions Since qualitative data deals with words rather than numbers, there

are few accepted rules and standardised procedures for analysing the qualitative data (Miles 1994). However, any analysis technique should be returned to the conceptual framework and the research questions. The collected qualitative data must be categorised and assessed with respect to the research questions posed and the identified concepts Therefore, the investigator should have an analytical strategy for appraising the case study data (Yin 2003a).

Yin (2003a) endorses four modes of data analysis, pattern matching, explanation building, time series analysis, and use of logic models. Pattern matching entails comparing empirically based patterns with expected or predicted one, and is appropriate particularly for explanatory studies. In an explanatory study, the patterns may be related to the dependent or the independent variables or both. Explanation building refers to stipulating of a set of causal links about a phenomenon that can include a consideration of alternative or rival explanations. Time series analysis involves tracking multiple indicators of a phenomenon over time. A logic model combines pattern matching and time series analysis. It stipulates a complex chain of events (pattern) over time (time series) and covers the causal relationship among independent, intervening, and dependent variables. Of these, he identified the pattern matching technique as one of the most desirable analytical techniques to be used within-case analysis.

The two main stages of analysis recommended for multiple case study research are within-case analysis and cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003a). Within-case analysis entails analysis of the collected qualitative and quantitative data of each case study independently, after which the researcher concludes the findings about the research issues for each individual case. Three main analytical strategies for within-case analysis are described by Yin (2003). The first strategy relies on the theoretical propositions of the research which are derived from the literature review and which reflect the research questions. The research propositions assist the researcher to focus on certain data, disregard other data, and define alternative explanations to be examined. This strategy is appropriate when the research questions are "How" and "Why" and when the research propositions are about cause - effect relationships.

The last strategy, which is extremely appropriate when the research does not include theoretical propositions or when the first and second strategies are hard to employ (Yin 2003a), is to develop a detailed description, narrative account or report for each single case study. The case study report describes and organises all the case study information. The case study report strategy is the most dominant analytical strategy in the field of strategic decision-making and was employed extensively in existing literature (Eisenhardt 1988; 1989; Mintzberg 1976; Nutt 1984).

The identified research questions and the research conceptual framework represent principal guidelines for data analysis as the researcher searches for answers to the research questions within the data. However, during data analysis the researcher has to bring to mind new senses and meaning from the data being analysed and consequently any emerging pattern needs to be addressed through data display (Miles 1994). Although this does not indicate causal relationships

(cause - effect) among the variables, it indicates how decisions of actors influence up-scaling of good practices. The within-case analysis was performed first followed by cross-case analysis involving analysis of data of each case study collected mainly through in-depth interviews. The objective was to present data, which was gathered from secondary sources of information, and from the field through interviews, documents, and focus groups.

Figure 3-3: Stages of Data Analysis



Adapted from Miles and Huberman 1994

Miles and Huberman (1984; 1994) proposed three-stages for qualitative data analysis that can be applied to within and cross-case analysis in multiple case study research. The methodology involves data reduction, data display and verification, which involves interpreting the data, drawing of conclusions and verifying their meanings. The second suggested stage of data analysis in multiple case study research relates to cross-case analysis that implies searching for cross-case patterns. Eisenhardt (1989) suggested three major cross-analysis strategies: i) to categorise cases based on certain dimensions and then search for similarities and differences among the group of cases; ii) to choose two cases and list similarities and differences between them, and iii) to break up the data source such that one researcher works on interview data while another reviews questionnaire data. These cross-case searching strategies require the researcher to exceed her

preliminary notions and perceptions and enhance the possibility of a reliable theory consistent with the data. It boosts the probability for the researcher to conclude unique findings that the data may contain (Eisenhardt 1989). The main procedures incorporated in within-case analysis process are described below.

3.9.1 Stage 1: Data Reduction

Data reduction implies organising and reducing a large volume of collected qualitative data in the form of written field notes and transcribed interviews by selecting, focusing, simplifying, summarising and converting data (Miles 1994). It involves summarising and classifying of data by themes or concepts into identifiable categories in accordance with pre-determined research questions, as well as noting and isolating common patterns in terms of similarities and differences in the responses to queries. Coding, which refers to "tags or labels" for assigning units of meaning to descriptive information compiled during a study (Miles 1994), can be done through numerical or written codes to categorise certain portions of data that match different themes.

Step 1: The data reduction process began with transcribing the interviews verbatim on paper and typing them. The tapes were listened to again for visually checking the transcribed notes against the audiotape. A few inaccuracies were identified and corrected. Each interview of between 45 minutes to two hours produced about 10 to 15 pages of transcriptions and took approximately the same time for verification. The responses of the respondents became the basic form in which data was found (Miles 1994). Each transcription took about four days after the interviews were conducted.

Step 2: The three significant aspects of the interventions were its design or components, processes and actors involved. These provided the basis for formally starting the analysis with the construction of a timeline of events when decisions were made for each of the interventions. A timeline was prepared to contextualize the periods when alternative development interventions were introduced in India and Africa. This emerged as a necessity because in each case, the introduction of the intervention was assigned to events and chance meetings. For this, the data gathered from the field were used, and for identifying the significance of the time, secondary sources of information and internet-based searches were employed.

The field data included interview, focus group and observational data and secondary data from the administrative files, project documents, and DIABP award submissions. The basic sequencing was started during the fieldwork to identify issues of clarification with other respondents. The researcher's intention was to identify inter-relationship between actions taken by individual decision-makers and the environment in which these decisions were made. Overall, the reconstruction of the timeline from multiple sources of data was useful for identifying sequence of events in terms of whether they occurred before or after a decision was made. This was especially useful for information for which recall amongst stakeholders was fuzzy.

Step 3 involved identification of themes organised around the research questions and coding the data from interview transcriptions into categories. The core categories represented the main variables identified for up-scaling (answer to research question one) and the critical success factors (answer to research question two), while the sub-categories represented the actions, factors, attributes and elements of each decision phase. Copies of the hand written transcribed notes were taken and segregated according to stakeholder groups to start the coding through a process of drafts. After one cycle of reading all the transcribed notes, several themes were identified and assigned a code. The codes had to be reviewed for the different groups of stakeholders. The codes did not require as much reassessment after notes from interviews with at least three respondents from each stakeholder group had been coded.

Data was first categorised (using colour pencils) in lines and paragraphs as initiator - planners, institutional/ organizational, NGOs, and the beneficiaries, and support for up-scaling. Three categories were identified for the sustainability criteria (participation, process, and partnerships). In proceeding with this generalised grouping by category, other themes such as motivation, chance, and context specific situations emerged. The category of stakeholders evolved in to six types of key actors (initiator, implementers, enablers, facilitators, beneficiary groups. and other interested parties) based on stakeholders identified by respondents, including those involved in the implementation of the interventions. Preliminary codes were noted in the margins, using different coloured pens. The codes were elaborated and redefined/ reassigned as the data reduction proceeded. The other codes were theory-driven – that is, they were based on decision routines and influences on decisions. Once a preliminary list of codes was generated based on issues emphasized by respondents, some notes were coded and reviewed, and some of the codes were revised. This process was repeated several times.

Using different pages of the codebook for the broad categories, a list of themes that emerged during this stage was prepared of the analysis, and consequently, abbreviated codes of a few letters were assigned for emerging themes. After this, a spreadsheet was prepared to enter the data from each source by each theme. The coded phrases were placed under each theme. As the coding and splicing of data into the different themes proceeded, a few additional themes were introduced. These were added in a separate column for re-assessing data, including data specifically referring to up-scaling. This process took a long time, focused attention and repeated readings and crosschecks to ensure that all data had been coded and entered.

After completing this process, printouts of the spreadsheets were taken to identify patterns that connected within the individual cases and with the others. The significant themes that emerged included capacity, processes, procedures, participation of beneficiaries, role of enablers and other interested stakeholders, and technical support and documentation. Initial readings by themes led to identification of similarities and differences amongst the cases and within the experiences and observations of the stakeholder groups.

3.9.2 Stage 2: Data Display

Data display is the second phase that entails presenting the reduced data in organised and understandable shape to allow the researcher to reach conclusions about research issues. According to Miles and Huberman (1984), "all displays are designed to assemble and organise information in an immediately accessible compact form, so that the analyst can see what is happening and either draw justified conclusions or move on to the next step of analysis which the display suggests may be useful". Word or diagrammatic form such as flow charts, tables and other graphics can be used to assemble and systematise information. In addition, a matrix can be applied for analysing patterns of responses to the research question.

The synthesis of data involved the preparation of detailed descriptions followed by more interpretive notes of each case study as the focal point for within-case analysis by combining the interview data into narratives. The case study reports and within-case analysis (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) included several themes, which were described by the stages of implementation and critical factors involved in the comprehensive decision for initiation of the interventions. Although the narrative of the cases in the three phases of initiator, implementer and up-scaling support provided a useful starting point, it did not tackle the key data that could be grouped under a theme related to up-scaling. Each core category and sub-category was initially displayed using text and tables and ended as a display of case summary tables.

After completion of the within-case analysis of the three cases, a cross-case analysis was carried out by categorising cases based on the stages of up-scaling identified in the literature and thematic categories that evolved from characteristics and criteria for identification of good practices (Chapter 8). The summary tables from the within-case analysis were used for the cross-case analysis, wherein a search for similarities and differences among these categories was adopted as the analytic strategy for cross-case pattern (Eisenhardt 1989). The relevant findings of the case studies were displayed using a matrix to capture similarities and differences among the cases. The thematic categories allowed a search of patterns across different cases and allowed associations between phenomena within the case study and between the case studies (Greenfield 2001).

3.9.3 Stage 3: Data Verification

This stage involved conclusion drawing and its verification to complete the cross-case analysis. Conclusion drawing and verification as the final phase of the three phase data analysis methodology is also known as the interpretation phase (Creswell 1994; Wolcott 1990). It implies giving meaning and sense to the analysed data through searching for a descriptive pattern in the data. The next stage involved the process of interpretation by creating a framework to discuss the results in light of the literature review and conceptual framework. Conclusion drawing (Chapter 9) involved attaching meaning, sense and significance to cross-case analysis and findings. The verification or validating of the conclusions involved re-examining and revisiting the analysed data

as required for verifying and confirming emerging conclusions.

3.10 Quality of Case study research design

An indispensable component of case study research is ascertaining and maintaining rigour (Miles 1984; Guba 2003; Yin 2003a). The study complied with certain established criteria during the research design, data collection and data analysis to assure rigour and trustworthiness of research findings. The rational tests incorporated the four criteria of construct validity, internal validity, external validity/ transferability/ generalisation and dependability/ reliability (Miles 1984; Guba 2003; Yin 2003a). These tests are generally utilised to establish quality of empirical research in social sciences and are applicable to case study research (Yin 2003a). The tests and the relevant tactics that were undertaken to assure the rigour, quality and credibility of the case study are discussed below.

3.10.1 Validity

Validity is a concept used in natural and human sciences to determine the accuracy and trustworthiness of instruments, data and findings in the research. The three main types of validity that require to be evaluated in any study are construct validity, internal validity and external validity.

3.10.1.1 Construct validity

Construct validity refers to the establishing of correct operational measures for the theoretical concepts being investigated by linking the data collection questions and measures to research questions and hypotheses (Yin 2003a). Construct validity criteria (Lincoln 1985) of trustworthiness was fulfilled for this study by (Refer Appendix 11):

i) designing the case study protocol questions and asking questions that effectively captured a comprehensive and rich understanding about the main issues that were relevant for decisions made for initiation and implementation (Yin 2003a);

ii) maintaining a chain of evidence by ensuring accessibility of the field guide to data collection, the case study notes (comprising field notes, interview audiotapes and interview transcriptions), and providing adequate illustration in the case report of the evidence contained in the database (Yin 2003a). This conveys evidence that could be more clearly interpreted and thereby increase internal validity. The separating of the evidence base from the final report allows for easier access to and subsequent review of data by other researchers.

iii) using multiple sources of evidence (triangulations) through multi-methods of collecting data such as in-depth interviews, documents and focus groups (Yin 2003a) to clarify meaning and perception and verify the reputability of the interpretation (Stake 1998). The

triangulated interpretation reflects the research as a process that is contextual and interactive, and incorporates understanding of the phenomenon that the multiple methods of data collection reveal, and

iv) by sending a summary of case study reports to participants for validating the evidence and for feedback about the research findings (respondent validation) (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003a).

3.10.1.2 Internal Validity

The terms credibility and internal validity imply that the investigator ascertains established relationships between dependent and independent variables or demonstrates a causal relationship between two factors by showing that other plausible factors could not explain the relationship (Yin 2003a). The internal validity is required and used in explanatory or causal studies and not is descriptive or exploratory research (Yin 2003a). However, for this study, the criteria were satisfied by using pattern matching, through matching and contrasting the emerged themes during data analysis with the established themes or pattern in the existing literature reviewed in Chapter 2 (Yin 2003a). In addition, different sources of evidence (triangulation method) were used to fulfil the conditions for internal validity/ credibility.

3.10.1.3 External validity/ generalisation/ transferability

The terms generalisation, external validity (Yin 2003a), and transferability and applicability are used compatibly in the literature. Overall, generalisation/ external validity refer to the extent to which the findings of the study can be generalised beyond the immediate case study and applied to other contexts or to other cases of good practice (Yin 2003a). In quantitative research, generalisation is accomplished through measurements that are objective, quantitative and statistically relevant numbers. The analysis of the data in quantitative research relies on the application of standardized statistical procedures, which enables looking at patterns of similarity and variability. It also identifies factors that contribute to changes as well as the significance of any differences between groups in the study. Because the statistical procedures are standardized, the logic of analysis is the same across all cases and is less vulnerable to researcher bias.

While quantitative researchers seek causal determination, prediction, and generalization of findings from a (typically random) sample to a population via the methodology of statistics, for qualitative researchers, the equivalent of identifying statistical significance is to ensure that evidence for the analytical findings exists in the data, and that different interpretations of the data can be reconciled. In addition, it involves the display of systematically organized data that enables the reader to track the logic of the analysis and judge whether the data have been used selectively to pursue a line of thinking. The data is fragmented into categories and themes either manually or with the aid of specialized computer software, and then patterns and relationships between the various themes and categories are determined by the primary interpreter of the data.

Since the purpose of the case study is to represent the case rather than the world (Stake 1998), the case studies have to be selected on the basis of theoretical sampling rather than random sampling – as in the case of quantitative research (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser 1967; Stake 1998; Yin 2003a). Therefore, analytical generalisation is applied to case study research and not statistical generalisation as in quantitative research (Yin 2003a). Analytical generalisation means to what extent the findings of the conducted case studies are replicated and constant (Yin 2003a).

External validity or generalisation was accomplished for the study by: i) using replication logic in the multiple case design (Yin 2003a) wherein the findings from the initial two cases were replicated and confirmed in the last case study (Yin 2003a); the theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser 1967) was reached after conducting the initial two case studies; ii) adopting a purposeful sampling in selecting the case studies; iii) writing information rich case study description, report or narrative for the data of each case study to provide researchers in strategic decision making with adequate information to judge the appropriateness of applying the findings to other settings and cases (Byrne 2002), and iv) the multiple case study design in which the two cases have been recognised by both the award giving organisations and represent the two main aspects of environmental improvement, namely shelter improvement and basic services and access provision. The three cases are of different sizes and different temporal contexts.

Although the conclusions from this study cannot be generalised, several key aspects of the research can be applied in other contexts if the same selection criteria for the cases are used.

3.10.2 Reliability and Dependability

Dependability illustrates to what level the instrument is consistent with the measuring concept to allow repeating the same research using the same method, sample, and data collection produced to obtain the same results as the previous study. In quantitative research, reliability means that the same tests should produce the same results. Reliability means whether if the researcher utilised exactly the same research method, data collection procedures, techniques and analysis and applied it to a second research sample, she would get the same findings as in the previous research. For qualitative researchers, this kind of replicability is impossible to realise because the research design is so flexible and the research findings are produced by constantly changing interactions between researchers and participants (Guba 2003).

Dependability for this study was achieved by i) using case study protocol (Yin 2003a) where all three case studies and all informants were subjected to the same sequence of entry and exit procedures and interview questions; and ii) intensive documentation of procedures and appropriate record keeping by developing an organised study database for each case-study which integrated case study documents, researchers field notes, original data in the form of interview transcripts and case study notes, data interpretation and analysis, case study reports, communication documents with research participants (Yin 2003a).

Consequently, the case study database dramatically strengthens the reliability of the entire case study (Yin 2003a) and allows an independent researcher to follow the decisions made and procedures undertaken in the research and reinforces the reliability of the research findings (Byrne 2002). In addition, collecting data through in-depth interviews with the most knowledgeable informants who participated in the initiation of the good practices significantly increased the reliability of the findings of the research.

3.11 Strengths and weaknesses

One of the strengths of the research methodology is that it has led to a rich understanding of the decision processes of stakeholders involved in introduction, evolution and implementation of the interventions. This was possible because the key stakeholders were engaged in the research process. The inclusion of non-participating stakeholders from one of the cases has provided new data for supporting organisations to consider. Another positive aspect of using the case study methodology is that the approach has enabled recommendations to be made for targeting the multiple stakeholders groups that are involved in good practices related to environmental improvement of under-serviced areas.

The weaknesses of the methodology are centred around the selection of the cases, which can be criticised for not being representative in terms of their components, size and temporal context. The case studies were considered because they were recognised through awards and not because of the degree of their success in benefiting more people. The cases provide lessons for transfer of good practices, partnerships between local government, NGOs and professionals, and finally between support agencies and government organisations. Therefore, care was taken to engage the key stakeholders involved in the implementation of the cases.

Representativeness of key informants: The key informants for each case varied because of the temporal context and the specific area of study. Secondary data from the MHP was verified through literature on the case and through selected respondents. For the Ahmedabad case, all informants who were involved in the initiation of the intervention and those who are critical of it were included. For the LVWATSAN initiative, the key informants included the facilitators, planners, local government representatives and CBO representatives so care was taken to interview key decision makers of each stakeholder group, including those not participating in the implementation of the interventions.

One of the major weaknesses is that the findings of the study are applicable only to those who participated in the research process. Interviews with a few non-participating stakeholders ensured that external perspectives were gathered, but this was not done comprehensively. Another weakness is that although a comprehensive and detailed understanding of constraints faced in up-scaling by decision makers was gained through the research process, the solutions for removing them are limited to those identified by the respondents.

3.12 Ethical considerations

The most important issues and concerns that a researcher has to consider and fulfil are: i) informing the participants in detail about their involvement in the research (informed consent), ii) avoiding harm and risk, ii) allowing free choice, iv) ensuring privacy, v) confidentiality and vi) anonymity (Miles 1984). These were considered for the entire research process in relation to research design, data collection and analysis, and were addressed clearly during the fieldwork and in the reporting. Permission was requested from all informants for participation in the study after informing them of the purpose, aims, anticipated use of the data, identity of the researcher, the role of the respondent in the research, degree of anonymity and confidentiality, methods employed and estimated duration of the interviews. In addition, all interviews were transcribed and checked for accuracy. Duplicates were made of the transcribed notes and original names erased. Only the researcher knew what was said by what respondents involved in the study.

The ethical issues were faced primarily in India and East Africa. In India, the researcher had some prior knowledge about the intervention because of her associations with DFID, donor agencies and the Director of Saath. In East Africa, ethical issues arose because of difficulties faced by local government in arranging meetings and field visits because of delays in project implementation. This led to a decision to go for a reconnaissance visit to get an overview of the environmental conditions in the various towns and not to visit specific intervention areas or meet with community members. During formal interviews, a few respondents in each case provided off-the-record information that was very useful for validating data gathered and in some cases for raising queries with other stakeholders. During focus groups and before taking histories, the issue of anonymity was stressed and the respondents requested to specify what information they would like to keep off record. In addition, the researcher offered to communicate the significance of the study and its framework within the established ethical and confidentiality considerations.

3.13 Summary

In this Chapter, the appropriate research design and methodology settings undertaken to conduct this study have been explained and justified, that is, the selection of the interpretive paradigm, qualitative research methodology and case study strategy. Subsequently, the main issues of the case study research design, such as selection of the multiple case design, the units of analysis, the purposeful selection of case studies, and the process of selecting the cases were highlighted. In addition, data collection and analysis methods and processes were explained, and issues of quality of case study research design as to reliability, validity and generalisation were justified and ethical issues involved in the study were addressed.

4 RECOGNITION THROUGH AWARDS AND THE CASES

This Chapter includes a study of two international and one national award to determine how good practices are identified, what processes are followed and what gaps have been identified in the processes. This is followed by within-case analyses for each of the three case-studies, followed by cross-case analysis. In the first section, each individual case is described in detail. The pattern matching technique is employed for the within-case analysis, and the findings are described by categories that were identified through the process of coding.

In the second section, the cases are put into those categories identified during the process of within-case analysis. The three cases are compared by looking at the local context in terms of what was happening in the urban areas, describing what the intervention involves, and the different issues considered during the decision process. For the MHP, which is a historical case, although greater attention was given to how the intervention evolved and was implemented, the intention is to determine what components of the intervention have been integrated in development of urban areas. For the SNP, a trace is made of how the concept was introduced in four different urban areas, the circumstances that led to initiation of the interventions and its evolution based on stakeholders involved and support available. Further details are given of how the project has evolved in Ahmedabad over the past 12 years and the perspectives of other stakeholders on the intervention. For the LVWATSAN, a trace is made of the intervention , the context in which it was introduced and the sustainability related factors that have been incorporated in the design of the intervention. Finally, the three cases are compared in terms of the key factors identified as fundamental for sustainable interventions and for up-scaling.

4.1 International Awards for Good Practices

The WHA, DIABP and the CRISIL Award provide a basis for understanding how good practices are identified, assessed and how information is disseminated.

4.1.1 The Aga Khan Award for Architecture

The triennial Aga Khan Award for Architecture (AKAA) was established in 1977 by the Aga Khan - the spiritual leader of Shia Ismaili Muslims "to enhance the understanding and appreciation of Islamic culture as expressed through architecture" (AKAA Website). The AKAA seeks to recognise examples of architectural excellence, and encompasses aspects of contemporary design, social housing, community improvement and development, restoration, reuse and area conservation, landscaping and environmental issues. It was the first international award focusing on architecture that provides for people's physical, social, and economic needs, and on building schemes that use local resources and appropriate technology in an innovative way. The award, which is specifically for projects that benefits the Muslim community, recognises community architecture for social inclusion rather than the aesthetics of the buildings.

Although primarily a recognition award for architectural projects, the eligibility and criteria include sustainability components. The Award recognises the contribution of architects, other design and construction professionals, artisans, clients and institutions in a project, and allocates part of the award money for them. The process includes option for applications and draws on suggestions from a network of dedicated contacts that includes architects, professionals, scholars, and others who are familiar with current architectural developments in Muslim societies. The Award encourages and accepts recommendations for projects to be considered from all possible sources. An independent Master Jury, specially appointed for each Award cycle, is responsible for the review of projects and the selection of Award recipients. The multi-disciplinary jury includes specialists from diverse fields like history, engineering, philosophy, architectural conservation, and contemporary arts, besides practising architects, landscape architects, and urban planners.

Figure 4-1: Number of AKAA Award Winners by Region from 1978 - 80 to 2002 - 2004



Source: AKDN Website

The overall evaluation and assessment process includes a preliminary technical assessment of documentation on each project for selecting between twenty-five to thirty projects for on-site project reviews. The reviews are undertaken by architectural professionals specializing in disciplines like housing, urban planning, landscape design, and restoration. To ensure maximum objectivity, the reviewers generally assess projects located outside their native countries, though this was not the case for the Indore Aranya Low-Cost Housing Project (Khosla 1995). The task of the reviewer is to examine each of the projects short-listed by the Master Jury, verifying project data and seeking additional information such as user reactions. The Reviewers are required to consider a detailed set of criteria in their written reports, and respond to specific concerns and questions prepared by the Master Jury for each project. The Project Reviewers are required to make personal presentations on the projects they have reviewed at a follow-up meeting of the Master Jury. After evaluating the projects in closed sessions, the Jurors select the Award recipients and decide on the distribution of the prize fund among those contributors whom the Master Jury considers most responsible for the success of each project. This includes the architects, other design and construction professionals, artisans, clients and institutions (Sungur 2005).

Prizes totalling up to USD 500,000, constituting the largest award in the world, are presented every three years to around ten projects (91 projects in 9 award cycles). In the 19 years since its

establishment, of the ninety-one projects that have been recognised, twenty-nine are related to housing, upgrading, restoration, rehabilitation, and to low cost construction techniques with people. Of these, seven were for upgrading of slum and squatter areas and seven were for housing.

4.1.2 World Habitat Award

The formal identification and documentation of good practices related to housing and environmental improvement started with the World Habitat Award (WHA) in 1985. The WHA was instituted as a three year recognition award by the Building and Social Housing Foundation (BSHF). The BSHF, which was established in 1976 to promote sustainable development and innovation in housing in both developed and developing countries (BSHF website), established the WHA as part of its contribution to the United Nations International Year of Shelter for the Homeless - 1987 (IYSH - 1987). BSHF's objective for instituting the award was to contribute to IYSH by bringing to focus innovative solutions to current housing needs and problems in countries of the North and South.

The WHA is primarily for implemented projects and if appropriate, encourages incomplete and innovative projects to apply for the award again later. The award process during the early stages was informal and relied on a network of professionals and practitioners for recommendations of possible interventions deserving of the Award for both categories (North and South). At the end of 1987, BSHF recognised that the award process had helped to identify some outstanding projects and that no other organisations were formally identifying such good practices. BSHF therefore decided to make the WHA an annual award having two categories of Awards for the North and South. The Award from this stage on comprised of a cash prize of Pounds 10,000 and a hand-crafted silver trophy for each of the two categories.

All activities related to the application and assessment processes for the award are undertaken in-house and through selected national experts in the field. The two processes have been refined over the years for more objective decision-making. The staff of BSHF solicits entries through direct communications with entities identified through an informal network of professionals and practitioners, e-mails, newsletters and internet searches. The entry is through a two-stage process. In the first stage, which has an option for online application, applicants are required to submit a summary of all aspects of the projects.

Twelve entries are short-listed based on pre-determined criteria by an internal Assessment Committee within a period of three months. Since the focus of the WHA is on housing, and building materials and technologies, the eligibility and assessment criteria include sustainability, innovation and transferability factors. The criteria for sustainability were developed in cooperation with Forum for the Future and University of Keele. The short-listed project applicants are required to provide detailed information about the project as well as about barriers experiences, lessons learned and external evaluations within three months of notification. Two entries in each category

are identified as finalists after an assessment that includes gathering of secondary information on the interventions through the internet and other informal sources. A two to three day intensive project evaluation visit is undertaken to each of the four projects, entailing meetings with residents and local communities involved in the projects. The four applications and BSHF's assessment and recommendations are forwarded to UN Habitat for a final decision by the Executive Secretary and the Rector of the United Nations University in Japan.

Figure 4-2: Number of Entries for WHA by Region from 1985 to 2004



Source: BSHF 2005.

Figure 4-3: Entries for World Habitat Award from 1985 to 2004



Source: BSHF 2005

Over the 21 years, the numbers of applications for the WHA have increased and are received from different parts of the world. A study of the process followed by BSHF for assessing and verifying information about entries submitted for the World Habitat Award revealed that many good practice applications are not eligible because of problems of documentation or because the good practice implementers do not have the resources or language competency for documenting and applying for awards. An assessment by the BSHF during 2003 and 2004 showed that the number of applicants from Arabic, French, Portuguese, and Spanish speaking countries was smaller then from English speaking countries. Subsequent targeting of NGOs and development oriented groups in Francophone Africa and South America has resulted in a marked increase in applicants from these regions during 2005 and 2006 award cycles.

From its inception, one of the objectives was to learn from the award winning projects by organising study visits for decision makers. The focus on two good practices allows for a more thorough study of the eligible projects. BSHF organises two intensive five-day study visits for

organisations that would benefit through such exposure, and carries out follow-up studies on the finalists. Information on the award winning and short listed projects is searchable through a database on the BSHF website.

4.1.3 Dubai International Award for Best Practices

The Dubai Municipality has committed to undertaking of a decennial evaluation of the DIABP with a view to focusing the next ten years on promoting the transfer of best practices and lessons learned. The first conference was held in Medellín in November 2005.

Figure 4-4: Number of DIABP Award Winners by Region from 1996 to 2008



Source: DIABP Website

Since its institution, the DIABP process has evolved in terms of numbers of awards given, the objectives for which given, and formal reviews with other award givers for refining the identification and evaluation processes. The award has been successful in documenting more good practices than had been compiled earlier, and subsequent sharing of information through networks has brought many others into the public domain. As an international award, DIABP's limitations have led to establishing of national and regional awards that focus on good practices that provide relevant lessons and have greater potential for up-scaling. UN-Habitat's criterion for identification of good practices is that it should be a partnership. Participation, especially of the poor, is considered an important aspect for sustainable interventions (Chambers 1997, 1994a; Satterthwaite 1997b; Mitlin 2003). Øyen questions the inclusion of the criteria on the cooperation between national or local governments, NGOs, local communities, the private sector, and academic institutions (Øyen 2002b). Those who administer the process of good practice identification need to apply their own criteria to fit their own and a local context's expectations about what can be achieved through a good practice. Such adaptations in applying local criteria are essential, but also provide opportunities for vested interests to impose their own norms. Since all the criteria and details can be made explicit, those studying the good practices have to interpret available descriptions that are communicated or documented for varying purposes and audiences.

4.1.4 Other National and Regional awards

Awards such as CRISIL Awards for Excellence in Municipal Initiatives, CAIXA Municipal Best

Practices Awards for Brazil, Medellín Award for Best Practice Transfers for the Latin American and Caribbean region, and the Mashariki Innovations in Local Governance Awards Programme enable comparison and recognition of the good practices from a similar socio-economic and cultural environment. The benchmarks for such awards are locally more appropriate and provide greater potential for learning and up-scaling. While the national and regional awards overcome significant barriers such as the language/, communications, and contextual familiarity, the processes for identifying the good practices are similar to the international awards (Refer Appendix 2 for more details).

4.2 Process for identification of good practices

The selection process of good practices is a multifaceted and involves various subjective and objective factors, which are made more complex because of the different context in which they are implemented (Øyen 2002b). Awards or recognition prizes generally have a nomination (Aga Khan Award for Architecture, Ramon Magsaysay Award) or an application process (Quality Awards, World Habitat Award, Dubai International Award for Best Practices). The awards for contributions by individuals or for well-known leaders are based on nominations by a panel of nominators. The nominators can be institutions as in the case of the Nobel Prizes or individuals as in the case of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, the Zayad International Prize, the Magsaysay Award, and the Stockholm Challenge Prize. An application process allows the applicant to emphasise different components of an intervention.

4.2.1 Nominations

The Nobel Prize Foundation, which recognises extraordinary achievements in natural sciences, promotion of peace, and idealism in literature (Lindahl 2003), follows a 'closed door' nomination and selection process for the Nobel Prize for Economics, Chemistry, Physics and Physiology or Medicine. The Nobel Committee, which comprises five members and the Secretary of the Nobel Assembly, sends nomination forms to about 3000 persons, including professors of universities around the world, previous prize winners, members of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, and others. For the Nobel Peace Prize, nomination forms are sent to members of national assemblies, governments, and international courts of law; university chancellors, professors of social science, history, philosophy, law and theology; leaders of peace research institutes and institutes of foreign affairs. They are also sent to the Peace Prize Winners of previous years, board members of organizations that have received the Nobel Peace Prize, present and past members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee and former advisers of the Norwegian Nobel Institute. The Prize Committee screens the confidential forms filled-up by the nominees (Nobel Prize website).

Nominations for the AKAA are invited from specialist institutions and recognised specialists in the theme area. The nominators comprise architects, professionals, scholars and others who are

familiar with current architectural developments in Muslim societies. Submission of a wide range of projects is ensured by a volunteer network of nominators designated by the Award for each cycle. The identity of the nominators and the names of nominated projects are kept confidential. In addition to the nomination procedures, the AKAA includes the option for all persons or institutions to bring projects to the attention of the Award by submitting preliminary documentation forms that are available on-line and with the Award Office. Such projects are forwarded to nominators who may choose, but are not required to nominate them for the Award (AKAA website).

The nomination process is based on the assumption that the nominators are well-informed about the advances and progress in a discipline and have access to sources of information that provide them with current developments in the field. The nomination process is viable for scientific and technological disciplines as in the case of the Nobel prizes and for leadership awards such as the Magsaysay award for individuals. Thus, nominations for awards are dependent on knowledge amongst peer groups, related organisations and institutions about outstanding contributions or interventions. The nomination process is preferred for recently instituted sustainable development related awards for individuals.

4.2.2 Applications

For awards requiring applications, award giving organizations have to make efforts to solicit applications. The language in which international awards are advertised and in which applications have to be sent is primarily English. The recognition is thereby restricted to applications and nominations from individuals, agencies and organisations that network, have the resources (language and financial resources, computer and electronic media), and the knowledge and information about best practice recognition and its benefits. In addition, actors involved in a good practice may not apply for recognition for several reasons such as lack of information or access to it. In some instances, the lack of credibility of the award giving organisations or of individuals facilitating identification of good practice deters groups and individuals from applying. This is applicable even for awards that have credibility amongst sectoral specialists and other decision makers (Interviews in Ahmedabad). Thus, only those interventions that are known by potential nominators or about which project facilitators are aware are included in the evaluation process.

Conversely, the application process assumes that eligible applicants are aware about the existence of the award, its purpose, advantages and benefits. For this, award giving organisations widely publicise the awards and invite applications through various modes.

BSHF has a direct application process for the WHA and entries are sought from individuals and organisations through advertisements in publications, online, and through direct postal or e-mail communications. The recipients are identified through an informal network of professionals and practitioners, internet searches, review of professional magazines and display of posters at events

related to housing (BSHF website). An assessment by the BSHF during 2003 and 2004 showed that the number of applicants from Arabic, French, Portuguese, and Spanish speaking countries was smaller than from English speaking countries. BSHF is now soliciting applicants from non-English speaking Regions by targeting of NGOs and development oriented groups in Francophone Africa and South America. This process by the BSHF has resulted in a marked increase in applicants from these regions during the 2005 and 2006 award cycles (Interviews).

For the DIABP, the initiatives are identified through a decentralised application process in three ways (You 2004), namely a) through a targeted search by a global network of institutions representing all spheres of government, the private and civil society sectors; b) calls for best practices using the incentive of the DIABP and in collaboration with other regional award s; and c) through ongoing research and development.

For Quality Awards, organisations that are motivated, want to be recognised for excellence in quality, and aspire to achieve the status of role models apply for the awards. Organizations undertake improvements in their manufacturing processes and other activities, and then carry out self-assessment to determine eligibility for the award. The applicants make essential changes, expend time and effort in applying for the awards (MBNQA 2004), and pay the eligibility, application and application review fees. In addition, where applicable, they pay for site visits by the judges, which sometimes involve visits by as many as six people to a number of the sub-units.

4.2.3 Documentation and appraisal

The award process requires documentation of works either through standard formats of the award giving organisation and/or through other means of communication. For the Nobel Prize, the Committee prepares a short-list of 250 - 350 preliminary candidates, from the total list in which a number of names are submitted by several nominators. The list of the preliminary candidates is sent for assessment of their work to specially appointed experts, and on getting their assessments, the Prize Committee prepares a report with recommendations on the final candidates to members of the Nobel Academy. The report is discussed at two meetings of the relevant Section of the Academy and the Prize Winners are selected through a majority. The names of the Prize Winners are announced one month before the award ceremony (Nobel Prize website).

The DIABP process has evolved since its institution in terms of numbers of awards given, the objectives for which given and formal reviews with other award givers for refining the identification and evaluation processes. The award has been successful in documenting many good practices, and the subsequent sharing of information through networks has brought many others into the public domain. As an international award, DIABP's limitations have led to national and regional awards that are focused on good practices that provide relevant lessons and which also have greater potential for up-scaling. UN-Habitat's criterion for identification of good practices is that it should be a partnership. Participation, especially of the poor, is considered an important

aspect for sustainable interventions (Chambers 1997, Chambers 1994a, Satterthwaite 1997b, Mitlin 2003). Øyen (2002b) questions the inclusion of the criteria on the cooperation between national or local governments, NGOs, local communities, the private sector, and academic institutions. Those who administer the process of good practice identification need to apply their own criteria to fit their own and a local context's expectations about what can be achieved through a good practice. Such adaptations in applying local criteria are essential, but also provide opportunities for vested interests to impose their own norms. Since all the criteria and details can be made explicit, those studying the good practices have to interpret available descriptions that are communicated or documented for varying purposes and audiences.

4.2.4 Dissemination/ Sharing of knowledge

Information about award winning interventions and laureates is disseminated through websites, technical and review documents from the award process, speeches (Nobel Prizes) that comprehensively cover the achievements of the laureates and publications (Aga Khan Award for Architecture, World Habitat Award and CRISIL Award for Excellence in Municipal Initiatives).

Dissemination of documentation on the award winning interventions is an important focus of the AKAA. The AKAA organises international and regional seminars to bring together government officials, architects, academics, planners, social scientists, designers, and architectural writers. The proceedings of these seminars and cyclical monographs are published to record the recipients and discussions of each Award cycle. Most publications are available in English, and some are published in Arabic, Turkish, French, and Chinese. The documentation on the award winning projects, including photographs, slides, and architectural drawings, and information about use, cost, environmental and climatic factors, construction materials, building schedule, design concepts, and the significance of each project within its own context is available at the ArchNet Digital Library. This on-line resource, which is a collaboration between the Aga Khan Trust for Culture and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, includes a number of Award publications.

Documentation and dissemination are important activities of BSHF, which promotes sustainable development and innovation in housing through collaborative research into all aspects of residential housing, and knowledge transfer. Annually, BSHF organises a study tour to the award winning projects and through informal contact with the finalists, the study visit participants, and even some of the applicants, continues to facilitate exchange of information and lessons. In addition, BSHF disseminates information about innovative projects by publishing an illustrated summary of the award winning projects and distributing an annual calendar with details of the award winning and finalist projects, Progress of the award winners and finalists is reported in the BSHF Newsletter that is circulated to architects, NGOs, development support organisations and others. Besides a database on the winning projects is available on its website. The BSHF also sponsors research programmes and follow-up evaluation or impact assessment studies for some of

the award winning projects. BSHF also organises a three-day consultation annually on a theme related to current housing concerns with the aim of encouraging change at various levels (BSHF secondary data and interviews). The consultations bring UK experts and practitioners together.

The 'Best Practice databases' established by the UN and its partners are expected to provide one means of looking at information on good practices (UN ESCAP 2003). The information primarily incorporates data from various stakeholders and documentation. Since databases include practices that have evolved more recently, is presented as a collection of ideas from which a potential adapter can draw inspiration (Øyen 2002). This information does not include other good practices that achieved similar objectives and outcomes in other places and at other times (Øyen 2002a).

The databases are large and even though some attempt has been made to minimise or remove overlaps, there are many overlaps in the information available in different databases (Krüger 2002). Considering the challenges and time constraints under which decisions are made in government, too much information can turn attention from what is important to what is unimportant (Simon 1978). In addition, with the increasing ease of access to the internet and information, there is concern that too much information is overwhelming the individual and organisation's ability to assimilate and use it.

4.2.5 Summary

Unlike awards for architecture or for other popular awards, awards for the built environment are very recent. The Millennium Declaration and efforts toward achieving the MDG targets have not led to implementation of 'demonstration projects' by national governments as the declaration of IYSH had achieved. The focus in awards for the built environment has shifted from architectural excellence in response to the cultural milieu (Aga Khan Award for Architecture) to appropriate technology and context responsive buildings and settlements developments (World Habitat Awards), to good practices that improve the management and service delivery in urban settlements (DIABP, CRISIL, MASHARIKI and others). The systematic approach and process for identifying good practices for the DIABP and for enabling access through a database has significantly influenced the criteria for qualifying entries, the assessment processes and finally support for sharing knowledge about the award winning projects to facilitate learning and transfer.

The recognition of the slum-networking approach in Indore and Ahmedabad included recognition of its introduction in Vadodara. However, as the case-study findings reveal, although the concept is commendable, the interventions in the different cities has covered lesser numbers of slums and households than were covered under the Indore Habitat Improvement Project (Refer Appendix 3). In addition, the details provided and partners identified in the award entries do not authentically reflect the situation on the ground.

Organisers of the DIABP and WHA are making greater efforts to increase their reach. WHA has introduced options for applicants to submit entries in different languages. In both cases, special

efforts have to be made to build up networks to identify good practices as well as to encourage the practitioners to apply for the awards. However, it is often difficult for practitioners to fulfil entry requirements, thereby making the entries ineligible.

The review of different types of awards shows that the prize money for the good practice awards is lower than prize money for awards for individuals. While awards to individuals have value amongst peers, the awards for good practices are aimed at others placing value on the interventions to encourage them to 'replicate or learn' from them. Yet the dissemination of information on the awards is limited. This compounds the 'lack of ownership' of good practices across organisations.

4.3 The Cases

The three cases aim at improving living environments and the quality of life of the poor by enabling access to water supply and sanitation (Ahmedabad and East Africa) or through slum redevelopment and shelter construction (Ahmedabad and Sri Lanka). Although the three cases were initiated at different levels of decision-making and at different times, the focus on slums or under-serviced settlements provides relevant data on good practice initiation and up-scaling. The temporal difference is especially useful in gaining understanding of long-term outcomes of interventions that incorporate participation of beneficiary stakeholders and are implemented by government organisations. Although the three interventions focus on environmental improvement through enabling access to basic services or to shelter, the scale at which each is implemented, the implementation approaches and the types of up-scaling are different for each case.

The MHP, which was the first national housing programme in Asia that incorporated a self-help component, was initiated by a national leader and implemented by the National Housing and Development Authority. The concern of the key decision-maker for housing for the poor led to his request to the UN to designate a year for the shelterless and the establishment of the World Habitat Award for bringing focus to practical and innovative housing solutions. The MHP led to the institutionalisation of the Community Development Committees and HCDCs as structures through which the communities could prioritise their needs and decide on what they wanted done. It also led to the refinement of the community action planning process and the introduction of the community contracting approach (Pathirana 1992), which continue to be introduced within and outside Sri Lanka by donor agencies through a few individuals and NGOs that were established by professionals involved in the implementation of MHP. Although the programme was terminated with a change in Government, the HCDCs have continued to play an important role in representing the needs of the poor and responding to them. On the other hand, the strength of the CDCs has reduced either because they have become non-functional or less active.

The Ahmedabad SNP, which is based on the slum-networking approach introduced under the DFID funded Indore Habitat Improvement Project (1989 to 1998), was initiated at the local Government level when environmental improvement had become critical because of the breakout

of plague in a nearby urban area. The Ahmedabad SNP aims at citywide changes and significantly, entails partnerships with NGOs, the community and private sector partners. It is the first local government initiative that requires slum residents to pay part of the costs for connecting to the water supply and sanitation facilities to each dwelling in participating slums. Although very little progress has been made in coverage of planned slums in the city, AMC has promoted pay-and-use toilets around slums and stopped constructing community toilets within slums. AMC's partnership with the two NGOs for implementation of SNP has expanded to other sectors and activities. Saath, which incorporated the SNP with its Integrated Slum Development Programme, initiated savings and credit groups in the first intervention area. This initiative has expanded and the savings groups have registered as a cooperative. SEWA has promoted implementation of SNP and other housing initiatives through a newly set-up sister organisation, and has expanded its activities to slums in other towns of Gujarat and India.

Finally, the LVWATSAN was set up on the initiative of the Ministers in charge of water in the countries of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, and the Executive Director of UN-Habitat. LVWATSAN focuses on enabling sustainable access to water supply and sanitation through an approach that contributes to poverty reduction. It marks the first intervention that UN-Habitat has been involved in through the whole process of concept development, planning, and implementation. It provided a challenge to the normative organisation to incorporate good practices in the planning and implementation of the intervention. In addition, the LVWATSAN is designed to ensure sustainability and poverty reduction, for which it will be monitored to 2015. The LVWATSAN is establishing benchmarks for planning interventions that incorporate reforms promoting participation of communities in service delivery, a holistic approach for enabling income generation and for monitoring of progress.

Several significant factors provide a basis for comparing the three cases. Firstly, the involvement of Governments in initiating the interventions, and secondly, the focus on the poor, enabling access to all residents within a settlement (holistic approach) to basic services (equity). Thirdly, the participation of communities in key decisions (responsiveness to the environmental and cultural context) that enable initiation and implementation of infrastructure works in a settlement; and finally the facilitating role of CBOs, NGOs or representatives of implementing organisations.

5 MILLION HOUSES PROGRAMME, SRI LANKA

According to the 2001 census, 21.5 percent of Sri Lanka's total population of 16,864,687 lives in urban areas (Sevanatha 2003). Although poverty increased in the early 1990s, and declined from 29 percent in 1995 to 22.7 percent in 2002 a significant proportion of the population lives just above the poverty line and the poverty rate in urban areas is 7.9 percent (Vodopivec 2006). Colombo, which is the largest urban area, is spread over 3,731 hectares. In urban areas, 96 percent of population has access to water with only 36 percent having house connections, and approximately 98 percent population having access to sanitation (WHO - UNICEF 2006). Colombo Municipal Council has a population of 642,000 (2001), of which about 51 percent live in slums and shanties (Sevanatha 1999c). Colombo District, which has an urban population of over 60 percent, experienced a population increase of 20 percent between 1981 to 1992 (Hettige 2004).

The Urban Development Authority (UDA) promotes integrated planning and implementation of economic, social and physical development of urban areas while the National Housing Development Authority (NHDA) formulates programmes for housing and infrastructure development. The informal settlements in Sri Lanka in general and Colombo in particular, fall into the following broad typologies (Sevanatha 2001; Fernando 1987; Robson 1984):

- The 'garden tenements' or Watta tenements are settlements built by commercial companies for their employees in the gardens of formal houses. Slums, old deteriorating tenements, or sub-divided derelict houses were occupied in many cases by migrants in the 1930s. The slums consist of permanent structures, including mansions that were abandoned and were sub-divided. They are overcrowded and lack basic amenities.
- Shanties are squatter settlements on private, government or municipal land and comprise temporary shelters. Unauthorised shelters consist of individual shelters constructed by squatters on State or privately owned land (without any legal right of occupancy).
- Under-serviced or unserviced residential areas (with legal titles) in peri-urban areas, and
- Old housing belonging to Local Government or other Government agencies, which has deteriorated because of poor maintenance.

The other types of settlements where the poor live include upgraded settlements, relocation areas and low-income housing flats. The slums in the inner city area are the oldest while the shanties came up after Independence in 1948. Many of the shanties along canal banks and road reservations were regularised under the MHP and the Colombo Canal Improvement Project (1984 - 1994) (Sevanatha 2003). A 2001 survey (Sevanatha 2002) showed that there were 1,614 low-income settlements with 77,612 families in the CMC area. 74 percent of these settlements had less than 50 dwelling units, while about 0.7 percent had more than 500. 70 percent of the slum residents had permanent housing while 30 percent were built of semi-permanent or temporary materials.

However, only 10 percent of the slum population occupied land illegally, while 37 percent had freehold ownership, 13 percent had leasehold, and 40 percent had user permits (Sevanatha 2002). 46 percent of the slum residents live on Government owned land.

In 2002 (Sevanatha 2002), residents in only 45 percent of the settlements had individual piped water connections, 28 percent had easy access and 24 percent had limited access to community stand posts, and 3 percent settlements (1743 families) did not have access to water within the settlements. The access to sanitation was similar with residents in only 33 percent of the settlements having individual toilets, 35 percent had easy access and 29 percent had limited access to community toilets, while 3 percent of the settlements (1777 families) did not have access to toilets within the settlements. Although most slum and shanty areas had Community Development Councils since they were introduced by CMC in 1979. 67 percent did not have any CDC in 2003 while 9 percent functioned effectively.

5.1 Housing activities and context of the MHP in Sri Lanka

The first physical plan for Colombo was prepared in 1921 by Patrick Geddes, who intended to make Colombo a "garden city of the East" (Colombo Metropolitan Regional Structure Plan 1998). To accommodate the influx of immigrants to the city, tenement gardens consisting of multiple units of back-to-back single-story units with common bathrooms were erected on Government land in the central part of Colombo. In addition, large residential buildings in the older north and central parts of Colombo were subdivided and rented out. As these tenement gardens and subdivided houses fell into disrepair, they became slum housing (UN-Habitat 2003b).

Public sector housing activities in Sri Lanka have largely been linked with housing loan activities. Until 1953, this was limited to lending activities of the Housing Loan Board, when the first Ministry of Housing was established and a National Housing Department formed under it was empowered to lend finance for housing and to construct houses (Dolapihilla 2000). The National Housing Department constructed housing schemes and flats, and promoted and facilitated construction of houses by offering loans and making land available to Housing Cooperatives (Dolapihilla 2000). Until 1970, Government involvement in poor settlements was through the Common Amenities Board under the National Housing Department, and was limited to slum and shanty improvement schemes, multi-storey housing for low-income groups (Dolapihilla 2000), and work on individual projects in the construction and repair of services and infrastructure when contracted by various councillors.

In 1970, with the formation of a new Government by a coalition of parties, the national government started taking a greater role in urban management functions with the aim of "abolition of underdevelopment" (van Horen 2002). In 1973, the Government enacted the Ceiling on Housing Property Law No. 1 to address problems of serious housing shortage and deteriorating conditions of existing houses in the inner-city areas (Sevanatha 2001). Subsequently, the

"Government acquired more than 10,000 houses from private individuals who owned more than two houses for themselves and one for each of their children", and which became a disincentive for private investments in housing (Robson 1984).

The paradigm shift from conventional top-down approaches to more participatory development approaches was marked by "the emergence of a process of awakening" under the Sarvodaya Movement (a leading NGO since 1958) (Silva 2002; Ariyaratne 2003). In a related context, the government began a Change Agent Programme in rural areas during 1978 (Silva 2002). The programme advocated empowerment and mobilisation of the rural poor through a cadre of well-trained and highly motivated change agents. It aimed at catalysing the poor to break free of oppressive and exploitative intermediaries in production and marketing. The Rural Development Training and Research Institute, established in 1974 as a government agency, was instrumental in developing and administering the Change Agent Programme from its inception. The programme was supported by several international donors, including UNDP, Konrad Adenhauer Foundation, CARE International and SIDA, which recognised the Institute as "the keenest supporter of concepts behind social mobilisation in Sri Lanka in the 1980s" (Silva 2002).

5.1.1 Hundred Thousand Houses Programme

The focus on housing and the various initiatives from July 1977 coincided with the change in political party (UNP) in power, and adoption of a new constitution in 1978. The manifesto of the United National Party had explicitly articulated plans to introduce new programmes to improve the housing conditions of the people (Weerapana 1986). On assumption of power, the new Minister Premadasa declared the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme (1978 - 1983), which comprised three sub-programmes for aided self-help (50,000 units), direct construction of 36,000 units, and housing loans for 14,000 units. Housing became a major investment programme of the government (Dolapihilla 2000). The UDA (1977), NHDA (1978) and new housing banks were established for coordination and implementation of national programmes, including the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme (Weerapana 1986). The NHDA Act empowered the Authority to undertake more activities, including redevelopment of slum and shanty areas (Dolapihilla 2000).

A Slums and Shanty Improvement Programme (1978 - 1984) was initiated as a centralised programme for Colombo and a few other cities (Sirivardana 1986a). The Programme included onsite upgrading of low-income settlements, sites and services projects, and amenity improvement projects for which the normal planning and building regulations were relaxed (Sevanatha 2001). The low-income settlements were declared as "special project areas" where households were able to construct a legally acceptable permanent house on plots of land of between 37.5 to 50 sqm. UDA granted those having irregular land tenure in areas where no high priority land-use had been planned, a 30 years lease; and slums and shanty dwellers were given enumeration cards (Velez-Guerra 2005). The Slums and Shanty Improvement Programme promoted the concept of self-help

and beneficiary participation in planning and construction. Tools such as Community Action Planning were tested during implementation of this programme (Sevanatha 2001).

The Slums and Shanty Improvement Programme was complemented by the UNICEF funded Urban Basic Services Improvement Programme (UBSIP) in Colombo aimed at improving living conditions of low-income communities of urban and peri-urban areas through provision of basic common amenities (Dayaratne 2003). UBSIP was implemented during 1978 - 1986 under the Ministry of Local Government Housing and Construction, the Common Amenities Board and the Public Health Department of Colombo Municipal Council (Sevanatha 2001). The objective of the programme was to address social deprivation among children and women, and empower communities to organize themselves through self-help groups called Community Development Councils (CDCs) (Dayaratne 2003; Jayaratne 2005). Field staff of CMC's Health Department facilitated development and formal registration of CDCs in the intervention areas (Jayaratne 2004b; Chularathna 2000). In 1979, 100 health wardens were active in both the peri-urban and other areas within CMC (Dayaratne 2003). In 1984, the UNICEF Programme was expanded to strengthen the already formed CDCs, and to form new CDCs in other areas. 212 CDCs were formed during 1984 - 1988 (Phase II), (Sevanatha 1999b). The systematizing of community participation through CDCs influenced future UNICEF programmes in urban areas (Cousins 1992), implementation of the Million and 1.5 Million Houses Programme (1990–94), and subsequent interventions in under-serviced areas in Sri Lanka.

In the following sub-sections, the MHP is discussed in terms of the four stages of up-scaling, that is, initiation, consolidation, implementation and integration as described in Section 2.3.1.

5.2 Initiation

In 1980, as described in Section 1.1.2, Premadasa had urged the UN General Assembly (UN Resolution 35/76 of 5 December 1980) to declare a year committed to the problems of the homeless and those living in substandard housing in both urban and rural areas. The proposal found support and in December 1981, the UN General Assembly decided in principle (Resolution 36/71 of 4 December 1981) to designate 1987 as the United Nations Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH - 1987) and declared it as such the following year (UN Resolution 37/221 of 20 December 1982). The objectives set by the General Assembly included improving "shelter and neighbourhoods of some of the poor and disadvantaged by the end of 1987, particularly in the developing countries, according to national priorities, and to demonstrate by the year 2000, ways and means of improving shelter and neighbourhoods of the poor and disadvantaged." (UN Resolution 37/221). This included the decision to secure political commitment globally, consolidate and share all new and existing knowledge and experiences gained since Habitat I (1976), develop and demonstrate new approaches and methods, and provide support to the countries to meet the objectives (UN Resolution 37/221). The Plan of Action for Phase I (1983 to

1986) included putting into operation some shelter demonstration projects.

5.2.1 Problem formulation

Despite political support, at the close of the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme, 115,000 units were built through the public sector between 1977 - 1982 (Weerapana 1986). Of these, fifty thousand houses were built in rural areas through aided self-help, thirty thousand houses were built in urban areas through direct construction by the private sector, and others were targeted through a "slum and shanty upgrading" component in Colombo (Gunaratne 1991). In addition, studies showed that only about 50 percent of the urban poor could afford to pay the cost of the Government constructed housing (Weerapana 1986). At this time, Sri Lanka experienced a slow-down in its economic growth and there was an escalation in costs of construction and of building materials. Therefore, the Government had to reduce allocation of public funds to housing and urban development.

The Government set-up a Task Force for examining the results of the 100,000 Houses programme and for developing a new five-year housing programme. The Task Force evaluated the outcomes or experiences of the choices made for different policy and strategies adapted for the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme. The experiences and weaknesses identified were similar to problems identified for conventional housing (Sirivardana 1999; Weerapana 1986):

- Slow pace of construction, high construction costs, unrealistically high standards and poor quality of construction of public housing built by contractors;
- The cheapest conventional house was unaffordable to the poor in both urban and rural areas;
- Small houses built according to blue-prints reduced costs but did not meet the needs of the occupants;
- Cost recovery was a problem;
- The houses built for the poor were occupied by higher income groups, and
- The Government faced cost escalations, and constraints of finance, labour, and building materials.

In addition, the rural housing programme and aided-self-help option was found to be more successful than the urban programme, which focused on contractor built housing (Robson 1984; Weerapana 1986). The people had built ten times the number of houses built by the Government (Interview Lankatilleke). An analysis of the achievements showed that the aided-self-help method was both 'efficient and a responsive delivery system for low-cost housing' (Robson 1984).

5.2.2 Design of an alternative solution

The Task Force (1982) recommended a programme to be implemented through a new

decentralised implementation structure (Sirivardana 1986b). In 1983, Premadasa announced the 'Million Houses Programme' (MHP) as a national programme (ten times the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme since the people were capable of building ten times more (Communication Lankatilleke), covering rural and urban areas and the private and public sectors. The MHP comprised six national level sub-programmes: i) the rural housing (RHSP); ii) urban housing (UHSP); iii) Plantation Housing (PHSP); iv) Mahaweli Housing (MHSP); v) Private Sector Housing (PSHSP); and the vi) Major Settlement Schemes (MSSHSP) Housing Sub-Programmes. The urban housing sub-programme options included (Information Unit 1985):

- Site and services projects for relocation of residents from reserved lands,
- Land regularization and on-site upgrading projects,
- Common amenities improvement project for providing basic services in areas from where residents would be relocated in the long-term,
- Individual housing improvement/ upgrading or repairing, and
- Housing loans for purchase of plots and construction of housing units, including small housing loans to enable households to build or improve their houses.

The urban sub-programme for individual house-builders was organized more around particular projects because the loan programme for them was not sufficient to improve the houses.

The objective was to enable access to adequate shelter and covered new house construction, upgrading of existing houses, and sites and services projects. The programme recognised that housing constructed without government support was cheaper and better suited to the needs of the households. The principle for the new programme was for the Government to play a supportive role - 'minimal intervention and maximal support by the state and maximal involvement of the builder families'. The key features of the national housing sector were identified as (Information Unit 1985) i) redistributive measures to broaden the ownership of shelter and land; ii) emphasis on production of adequate housing units to reach the poor in rural and urban areas; iii) Upgrading of low-income settlements on a priority basis; iv) decentralised programme management for effective disbursement of resources to beneficiaries; and v) greater emphasis on community participation, including measures for reviving low cost construction methods and use of traditional building materials.

The key role of the Government was in institutionalizing a participatory process through which residents of the under-serviced areas and those with inadequate shelter would be supported, and in making credit available for provision of infrastructure and for individual households. This entailed decentralisation and devolution of decision-making responsibilities, and establishing of a *Gramodaya Mandala* (rural development) Fund. The decentralised decision approach involved people in the process of housing and ensured that families made decisions regarding their shelter

cost, design, materials, and technology. The NHDA, and its sub-offices in 23 Administrative Districts of the country (established for implementation of the Hundred Thousand Housing Programme), were responsible for the UHSP and RHSP that were targeted for the poor (Robson 1984).

5.2.3 Establishing procedures and processes

The MHP was a holistic and unique programme because of the national approach for all housing, and the planned institutional processes that were possible because of the Prime Minister's initiative. The national initiative was complemented by declaration of the year 1987 as the UN Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH - 1987). This provided a further impetus for implementation of MHP demonstration projects and technical support for institutionalizing the process.

Premadasa designated 1983 as the 'Year of Planning' during which the feasibility of some of the sub-programmes was to be tested through pilot projects. During 1983, a smaller working group appointed by the Task Force developed the pilot projects and the programme. Two types of pilots were initiated during 1983 (Sirivardana 1986), with the first pilot initiated in March 1983. Under the pilot, all the 245 Divisions or each electoral district throughout the country was covered and 249 single houses were built. The second pilot, initiated in July 1983, was a District level intervention in Anuradhapura and covered 173 Village Development Councils. A national Low Income House Design and Building competition was also organised. In January 1984, the MHP (rural sub-programme) was launched, and in February the 1984 Implementation Guidelines (for the rural sub-programme), were published.

> "... the 1984 Implementation Guidelines (the Silver Book) ..., which was, and still is, the most comprehensive and holistic articulation of the implementation of this support-based programme" Sirivardana 1986.

An evaluation of the RHSP in December 1984 (McNeill 1986) revealed that almost equal numbers of loans had been taken for upgrading of houses (47 percent) as for construction of a new core house (48 percent), while 5 percent was taken for upgrading of services. The housing designs and construction materials varied substantially and showed acceptable choices by the households. It also revealed that NHDA Housing Officers were required to cover large areas and would benefit from having their own vehicles; the publicity campaign was successful; the training programme in construction skills was very successful and the quality of construction was generally of a high standard. Another interesting finding was that although the Implementation Guidelines laid out specific criteria for selection of beneficiaries, in reality, there was considerable flexibility. Even at this early stage, the loan recovery was found to be the least satisfactory aspect of the programme. This was in terms of recovery of instalments, lack of clarity amongst District administration about procedures to be followed for the same, and lack of an efficient mechanism for receiving and recording instalments. There was also a need for streamlining the process and procedures for

dealing with persistent defaulters.

The UHSP, covering 12 Municipal Councils, 39 Urban Councils, and CDCs was developed during the same year and launched in January 1985 (Lankatilleke 1986a; Sirivardana 1999). Steps were taken to start training activities for those involved in the implementation of MHP. Between November 1984 and February 1985, Implementation Guidelines were prepared for the UHSP in four parts. The guidelines were essential for initiating the programme in 51 different urban areas, and included the new decentralised institutional structure (and steps for project formulation and implementation). At the same time, the NHDA team simplified the Loan Application Form that had been prepared for the demonstration projects (Sirivardana 1986).

Figure 5-1: Decision Approach for Million Houses Programme



5.3 Adoption and Improvisation

'Learning by Doing and Doing by Learning' were at the core of the MHP process (Sirivardana 1986), and the lessons learnt during the successful implementation and in use of the Housing Options and Loan Package in rural areas were incorporated in training activities.

A separate division for training and information was established in the NHDA in March 1983 because the enabling approach required awareness amongst stakeholders, technical assistance, training and information dissemination to the district and local level institutions (Lankatilleke 1986b). The Government of the Netherlands had already offered to support a demonstration project in Sri Lanka for integrating training and information as elements of a national low-income policy at the 5th Session of the Commission on Human Settlements in 1982 (Information Unit

1985). This was strengthened by UNCHS and the Sri Lanka Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction and an agreement for tripartite cooperation was signed on 7 April 1983. The major objectives for the IYSH - Demonstration projects were to improve shelter conditions, promote community participation, incorporate training and information in the low-income shelter programme, and develop a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for greater programme efficiency (NHDA 1987b; Information Unit 1985).

By early 1984, many official stakeholders involved in the process, including those within NHDA, had not 'accepted or absorbed' the MHP (Sirivardana 1986). From early 1984, the Development Planning Unit (DPU) facilitated workshops that led to the detailing of procedural steps for NHDA staff. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) conducted training sessions that led to the preparation of the 'Physical Upgrading of Settlements in Sri Lanka - A Trainers Guidebook', while the Water Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) conducted workshops on water, sanitation and urban infrastructure (Sirivardana 1986; 1999). USAID provided support for housing finance, which began in 1980 with the Housing Guarantee Program, and continued support for the Government's Self-Help Program, MHP Program, and TA to State Mortgage and Investment Bank and Housing Development Finance Corporation (AsDB 2000). A Carpentry and Masonry Basic Skills Training Programme, which was part of the World Bank funded Construction Industry Training Programme, was introduced during implementation of the pilots.

Box 5-1: MHP Support

> "While we emphasise that the source of creative praxis is from within the Process, we acknowledge the invaluable resource contribution made by a select group of foreign collaborators, who believe as steadfastly as us in the superiority of support-based housing. These resource inputs have crossed conventional boundaries and have assumed various interconnected forms of Research-Training-Design. They have been clear on one goal – that all their contributions have been for implementation. ...The theoretical rigour, critical questioning and search for alternatives emanating from their work have helped us immensely to safeguard the integrity and consistency of our own principles and practice"

Source: Sirivardana 1986

The workshops, implementation guidelines and training and information support for NHDA staff played a significant role in facilitating the participatory planning and development approach. The publicity and training activities at different levels enhanced participation and implementation of the programme. The formalizing of processes and steps for decision-making further strengthened the institutionalizing process. Subsequently, technical officers who grasped the principles of active support became trainers.

Box 5-2: MHP and CDCs

> "The major breakthroughs achieved in the implementation of MHP included the decentralised structure, institutionalizing the partnership with CDCs, formalizing of the CAP methodology and the community contracting. CDCs created under UBSIP, were revitalised under MHP to organize and mobilize poor communities to get involved in decision-making and for implementation of shelter improvements and services provision projects."

Source: Jayaratne 2005

By February 1985, the outcomes of the workshops led to preparation of Draft District Guidelines, Implementation Guidelines, Navagamgoda (sites-and-services) guidelines, a Trainers Guidebook, the methodology for preparation of micro-plans, and checklists for UHSP Project Preparation, for preparation of technical reports, and for planning and programming. For the under serviced settlements, the step-by-step approach and delineation of roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders (see Figure 5-2) ensured that in urban areas, detailed information on conditions of the settlements was collected and appropriate decisions made for the medium and long-term.

Figure 5-2: Decision process for area specific upgrading projects



Adapted from: Upgrading Steps: Slum and Shanty Division of UDA, Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction. November 1984.

The other documents produced by April 1985 were a) a policy paper on low-income shelter, b) Manuals such as the 'improved wattle and daub construction for low cost shelters' and on appropriate technological options for shelter and basic services; and c) on appropriate financial mechanisms d) Reports such as the 'Policy on NGO participation in low income shelter programmes' and on improved participation of communities and interaction between NGOs and Government, e) Community based monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for low-income shelter programmes, and f) video tapes and slide packages for workshops on key activities (Information Unit 1985; Sirivardana 1999). In addition, by October 1987, the following were compiled/ produced (NHDA 1987d): i) collection of speeches made at international forums and in Sri Lanka; ii) basic information about the MHP and related components; iii) research and technical reports including guidelines, and iv) video films in Sinhala and English.

5.3.1.1 Monitoring progress

The MHP progress was monitored through Weekly Heads of Departments' meetings, where the Prime Minister, who placed value on action and high quality performance, reviewed selected issues and projects. Monthly Progress Review Meetings were held at the NHDA Head Office in Colombo where monitoring reports were discussed by the management and district managers (Weerapana 1986).

Between 1984 and September 1985, MHP had reached 73,696 families in rural areas and 4,422 families in urban areas. By 1989, 258,762 families were reached in rural areas and 38,125 families in urban areas (Sirivardana 1999). By 1991, the Urban Housing Division had started the implementation of over 300 low-income housing projects, more than 100 of which were in Colombo and these included 75 slum and shanty settlements regularization and upgrading projects and 21 sites and services schemes.

Comment 1: Million Houses Programme

> The beauty of the MHP was that it was people-based and people-friendly, meaning that it was OF the people and they FELT comfortable with it. It was a totally demystified programme where the people, actually ENJOYED every moment of it. Yes they were building their houses in the dead of night with petromax lamps in Colombo!! (Sirivardana , personal communication)

5.3.2 Slow down

Several events slowed down the pace of MHP implementation. In 1988, Premadasa became the President and launched a national poverty alleviation programme (Janasaviya). The Million Housing Programme was superseded by the 1.5 million houses programme in 1990, under which nearly 859,000 houses were built by the end of 1994 (United Nations 2002). In 1992, the head of NHDA - Sirivardana was transferred to manage the Janasaviya Programme. With the departure of two decision makers who had institutionalized the enabling approach, the impetus of the programme was diminished.

In 1994, after being in power for 17 years, the ruling United People's Party lost the presidential and parliamentary elections, and the State revoked the enabling policy and processes for housing. The Government once again took on the role of a housing provider, and the single policy for housing was replaced by a piecemeal approach of Ministries and other institutions (Sirivardana personal communication). The use of the CAP methodology was abandoned by NHDA, while CDCs established by NHDA officers for implementation of MHP collapsed once the basic goals were achieved (Russell 2000), and because of the decline of local and national government interventions in slum areas (Jayaratne 2005; Sevanatha 1999b). The same year, both the 1.5 Million Houses Programme and the Janasaviya Programme were phased out and replaced by a National Housing Programme (1994 - 1999) and a new poverty alleviation programme called the Samurdhi Programme (United Nations 2002).

5.3.3 Good practices contribution

Three significant processes that evolved or were strengthened during implementation of MHP can be attributed to the shared vision amongst those involved with the MHP. These not only contributed to an effective participation of the communities, but also contributed to the development of tool-kits for participatory planning and implementation of interventions. These are described below.

Comment 2: Decision process in Government

> "In Government, procedures take long because the procedures for proper accountability and shared responsibility have to be followed, especially considering the risk of failures. So one person has to initiate the process to take action, but does not have the financial powers to act. Another person has to recommend the action after checking whether the work and costs are appropriate or not. Finally, a third person has to approve the action. Thus, either because someone is interested and is doing a good job, or because someone is not interested and wants a bribe, the process takes time." (Interview N07)

5.3.3.1 Participation and Community Development Council

The CDCs, as mentioned under Section 4.1, were established to facilitate implementation of the UBSIP, and their role was strengthened under the MHP. The purpose of participation was primarily for organising communities to enable a participatory decision process for prioritising needs and participating in the implementation of the programme. The process enabled CDCs to participate as partners rather than recipients.

Figure 5-3: Decentralised implementation



Adapted from Upgrading Steps: Slum and Shanty Division of UDA, Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction. November 1984.

The CDCs are an integral part of a three-tier system of representation comprising of the settlement level CDCs, District level CDC Committees called the District Housing and Community Development Council (DHCDC), and a city-level CDC Committee called the Housing and Community Development Council (HCDC) (Dayaratne 2003; Russell 2000).

The CDC was responsible for taking decisions to improve the physical environment and social aspects of a settlement; plan community development work and participate in its planning, implementation and monitoring; maintaining relationship with NGOs and other civil society groups; and conducting and keeping records of regular meetings. The DHCDC, which had the District Medial Officer of Health as President and Assistant Chief Health Education Officer as Secretary, was responsible for conducting monthly meetings for discussing various CDC proposals for settlement development. The HCDC, as the apex body of the CDC system, was chaired by the Mayor or in his/her absence, by the Deputy Mayor (Sevanatha, 1999b). The responsibilities of the HCDC were to make policy decisions on the CDCs, make decisions on development initiatives of the CDCs, and implement citywide health, education, social, environmental and housing programmes. The HCDC provided a forum for monthly monitoring of services provided in low-income settlements by different Departments of the local body, and was attended by representatives of all relevant Departments of the local authority and other government institutions. This structure ensured a coordinated approach to the development initiative in a settlement (Sevanatha 1999b).

However, even during implementation of the MHP, various dynamics involved in the participation of communities in decision-making were identified. These included findings about community groups organising around issues they wanted to tackle, and reforming or disbanding to deal with new issues, and the lack of flexibility of the bureaucratically structured CDCs that communities had to confront (Benjamin 1986). Although the CDCs played an effective role in the decision process for implementation of MHP, many collapsed while others did not function effectively (Sevanatha 1999; Devas 2001; Russell 2000). A survey of 1614 settlements in Colombo revealed that although 625 CDCs had been registered under the Public Health Department of CMC by 1999, only 126 were functioning effectively, 100 were functioning irregularly, 296 were not functioning at all and there was no form of CBO in 1092 settlements (Sevanatha 1999b). Sevanatha has identified the need for close support to the CDCs for their continuation and strengthening (Interview N07).

5.3.3.2 Community Action Planning

The Community Action Planning (CAP) methodology evolved within the NHDA as a means for community capacity building and decision-making. It was developed further by Hamdi and Goethert (1997) to provide a mechanism for its use. The CAP process involved identifying socio-economic and physical development problems and needs within a settlement, and planning of strategies to resolve them through an initial two-day workshop conducted by field officers of

NHDA (Interview N07). This was followed by workshops of one or half-day on specific issues based on community requirements. These included workshops to strengthen the functioning of the CDC, to finalise and layout a block plan; to formulate community-specific building codes; to introduce the HOLPs, to familiarize the community with procedures for taking up minor infrastructure works; and to initiate group credit programme for income generating activities. The systematic approach ensured that there was greater awareness amongst the community about their problems, and the delivery of services was understood as a way of enabling them to build upon the resources and manage them. It also ensured that information generated through a participatory interaction process remained in the community (Dayaratne 2003, BPP entry from database).

This process of a structured series of workshops was formalised as a tool for community action planning and management (CAP). The process was named CAP after a theory and approaches were developed with financial and technical support by UNCHS and Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA) (United Nations 2005; Russell 2000). The UNCHS and DANIDA jointly undertook the Community Participation Training Project from 1985 to 1991 that helped strengthen the capacity of implementing stakeholders to execute low-income housing programs (AsDB 2000). This led to the 1993 approval of the Community Action Planning Training Project, which aimed to promote development initiatives among the urban poor.

There was an attempt to institutionalise bottom-up planning under the Village Reawakening/ Mahida Chintan programme of the Government (Interview D3). The process revealed that many Government officials, including some who sent out circulars for the programme, were not familiar with the CAP methodology and its evolution in Sri Lanka. It has also been observed that there were cases where issues prioritised with the people are not integrated at the next level of planning and decision-making. The use of CAP has not been internalised or integrated institutionally. With numerous shortcomings and corruption, Municipal Corporations used the CAP methodology for making decisions related to community development in some tsunami affected areas. CAP is accessible to those who want to use it because the core of the CAP methodology remains with some practitioners. Sevanatha was one of the NGOs identified for the continued promotion and effective use of the CAP methodology, and it has been involved in several donor funded initiatives in Colombo. These include the city consultation process under the UNDP - UNCHS Urban Management Programme (UMP Phase 3: 1997 - 2001) and related studies (Sevanatha 1999c; UMP 2001); the CDS process with Cities Alliance; and USAID, JICA and JBIC projects (Interviews N07 and N13). However, this has been at a very small scale and has not led to others adopting the approach.

5.3.3.3 Community Contracting

The involvement of the CDCs in CAP enhanced their role in decision-making (Interview N07). A related initiative was the community contract system that was first introduced when a community expressed its dissatisfaction with the quality of a well, which was built under the UBSIP by a

commercial contractor through a conventional tender contract system (UNCHS 1994). The community requested that they be given an opportunity to build a second well. The NHDA field officer was receptive to the proposal and facilitated the award for the work. In January 1986, NHDA awarded the contract for construction of a well designed by the community and the work was carried out with technical assistance and training provided by NHDA. The well designed structure, with a separate area for women, met the needs of community was completed ahead of the schedule, and was constructed to a high standard.

The result led to NHDA continuing this approach and drafting of procedures for the award of community contracts in low-income settlements (Interview N07, CBOs). Under this procurement system, NHDA accepted CDCs as possible contractors for small infrastructure services in their own neighbourhoods. With technical assistance from NHDA, CDCs identified sub-projects, approved engineering designs, and cost estimates; and executed the works by hiring skilled and unskilled labourers from within the same settlement. The process resulted in lower costs, and often to improved quality of work, generated employment within the community, and increased sustainability of the assets through maintenance (UNCHS 1993). Although community contracting entailed lower overheads than work by private construction firms, NHDA incurred hidden costs such as more staff time for community training, auditing of financial records, and inspections of the construction for its implementation (United Nations 2005).

The community contract system was introduced in DFID funded pilot projects in Cochin and Cuttack and by the governments in Zambia and Bolivia in the mid-90s. Sevanatha has successfully facilitated implementation of pilots using the community contract system to improve low-income neighbourhoods in the Kandy Municipal Council and other places (Jayaratne 1996).

The drawbacks of the community contract system include lack of capacities of CDCs and delays because of the procedures followed for reimbursing communities based on progress of work (Interview N07; UNCHS 1994). According to Jayaratne (1996), "Sevanatha was able to institutionalize the community construction procedures because it worked through the existing programmes and tried to convert the government's broad pro-poor policies into participatory actions".

5.4 Integration of MHP good practices

Experiences from three other interventions in Sri Lanka show both – how the lessons and experiences of the MHP are not being incorporated into some of the new interventions and how donor funded programs and individuals who were part of the MHP are contributing to the use of CAP and community contracting in new development initiatives. The examples are the Sustainable Townships Programme (STP), the GTZ funded Tsunami Housing Support Project and Lunawa Environment Improvement and Community Development Project. It also provides a useful context because NHDA and Sevanatha are involved in many of the initiatives.

5.4.1 Integration in organisational approaches

The "People's Process" of development, which evolved from the MHP and incorporates involvement of communities in planning of settlements and construction of housing, was advocated by professionals who after 1989 became part of organisations such as UN-Habitat. Although the MHP and the enabling approach were suspended, those involved in its implementation provided the impetus for continuation and transfer of the processes introduced during implementation of MHP. The "direct transfer of experience" from the MHP to the South African People's Housing Process was facilitated (by Lankatilleke) "through staff secondment from UNCHS (Habitat)" (Huchzermeyer 2003). The "People's Process" was initially introduced for housing programmes in Namibia, followed by South Africa, where it evolved through exchanges with community based approaches in Cambodia, India and Thailand (ACHR). The People's Process was introduced through UN-Habitat's reconstruction programme for the war affected in Afghanistan, in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives after the tsunami, and in Pakistan after the earthquake (Email communication with Lankatilleke).

In addition, some professionals who had been involved in the implementation of MHP, realised that it is not possible to sustain a participatory development process from within government organisations, which are guided by political changes and largely have a centralised decision-making process (Interview N07 and N12). These professionals left NHDA to form NGOs. Other NGOs that were formed during the implementation of MHP and many of these became inactive with the closure of the programme. After the Tsunami, the CDCs, in whose community savings accounts the project funds were deposited in five instalments at different stages of physical progress, played an important role in the reconstruction process. The CDCs participated in the CAP process and subsequently were responsible for implementing the works through community contracts (BPP 2007b).

5.4.2 Sustainable Townships Programme

The focus of urban programmes in Sri Lanka is on Colombo, and hence it provides an appropriate context for studying housing approaches in Sri Lanka after the MHP. In 1989, the World Bank and UNDP funded Metropolitan Environmental Improvement programme (MEIP) in Beijing, Mumbai, Colombo, Jakarta and Manila with the aim of strengthening the institutional response to environmental issues, fostering community-led solutions to urban growth and promoting lesson sharing between pilot countries. However, it also presented an 'opportunity' to introduce the potential of high-rise buildings.

In 1993, following a pilot Community Based Environmental Improvement Initiative, which was implemented in partnership with Sevanatha (United Nations 2005), the Clean Settlement Programme (CSP) was started in Colombo as a subcomponent of the Colombo Environmental Improvement programme (United Nations 2005). The CSP aimed to institutionalise the

participatory process evolved under MHP by empowering full and active participation of CBOs for the planning, implementation and management of development interventions in their settlements (United Nations 2005). The Ministry of Housing and Construction established the Clean Settlements Programme Unit to replicate the pilot and strengthen coordination of CBOs with national and local Governments, NGOs and other political organisations (Sevanatha 1995).

In 1998, a Presidential Task Force on Housing and Urban Development prepared a comprehensive Plan for human settlement development at national, provincial and local levels. One of the approaches identified to overcome the shelter problem of slum and shanty dwellers in Colombo was to implement a market based, redevelopment and relocation programme in partnership with the private sector. This also met the need for high density housing in the urban areas. The Clean Settlements Programme was split into two programmes - the Sustainable Townships Programme (STP) and the Urban Settlements Improvement Programme (USIP).

The objective of the STP was to relocate people from under-serviced and commercially viable plots in Colombo to 'modern and compact townships' and release over three quarters of such lands for commercial developments (United Nations 2002). The capital for investing in the relocation programme was to come from the sale of cleared land to private sector investors. To overcome procedural issues, five agencies (STP, NHDA, Colombo Municipal Council, Sri Lanka Land Reclamation and Development Company, and UDA) formed the Real Estate Exchange Private Limited (REEL) to implement this programme (Interview O4).

For the first project, REEL identified land close to the periphery of Colombo for relocating families from 13 different locations. The scheme comprised of 13 storied high-rise apartment blocks with 671 apartments of between 28 to 56 square meters area (Hettige 2004), and commercial and recreational facilities. Relocated residents were required to pay a one time deposit of SLR 25,000, which was placed with Sanasa Bank at the time of occupying their new apartment. The interest from this sum was earmarked for maintenance costs and common area utility (Wickrema 2005). By late 2006, although the intervention was planned as a 'sustainable and self financing' project, this had not been achieved. The cleared land was not sold, commercial developments were not yet undertaken, and sites still had some occupants on them (Interview O4 and O5). This negated the remit of the project. In addition, studies in the high-rise blocks identified a number significant experiences and observations, which reflect on the non-integration of lessons learned under the MHP or the advantages identified by the relocated families.

In contrast, the STP entry for the DIABP in the year 2000 indicated that 687 apartments under the first project would be ready to occupation by mid 2001, and that the beneficiary families had already identified and been involved in the selection of the developer (BPP best practice database).

Some of the selected findings that highlight the drawbacks of the blueprint approach for the planning and implementation of the project are (Interview O5 and Hettige 2004):

- Residents find the living space inadequate, for example, the bathrooms are too narrow for two people to do any washing at the same time.
- The households face increase in expenditure on water and electricity bills.
- Problems related to access through lifts in the high-rise apartments, including access to apartments on higher floors because of limited capacity of lifts. In addition, in the absence of piped gas supply, ,families have to carry cooking gas cylinders up the stairs because they cannot be taken into the lifts for health and safety reasons.
- A small percentage of the residents are vendors who own carts that have to be left unattended downstairs in the absence of parking space for them. The owners are therefore concerned about the safety of their 'livelihood asset'. With about 45 percent households in urban areas being informal sector workers (Vodopivec 2006), such needs are likely to be of high priority.
- Apartment buildings require maintenance, for which NHDA facilitates the formation of condominium management cooperatives. However, the long-term effectiveness of the cooperatives is an issue because the residents are not "observant or sensitive to minor maintenance requirements, which may lead to major problem if not addressed at an early stage"(Interview 05). In addition, many families have very low incomes and cannot afford the recurring expenditure on maintenance.

In response to the problems identified in the high-rise apartments, REEL subsequently decided to build four-storied walk-up apartments of 46.6 square metres with 2 bedrooms. The regulation for four-storied houses have been modified to enable construction of 32 feet high blocks, and reduce the apartment height by 2 feet to enable construction of more flats. The objective of highlighting the problems of the above approach to redevelopment, which are not unique, is to draw attention to the lack of internalisation of the sustainability of participatory approaches amongst professionals. The focus on costs and physical redevelopment rather than responsiveness to the needs of the relocatees is demonstrated through this project.

Another interesting development is the pilot Moratuwa citywide slum upgrading project under the SUF, which involves development and implementation of community led development plans for three low-income settlements. The pilot has been initiated as a partnership between the Municipal Council of Moratuwa (located in Colombo Metropolitan Area); the Women's Development Bank Federation, SDI and SUF (Memorandum of Understanding signed in February 2006). One settlement is to be developed through a land sharing approach while the other entails relocation of residents to a redeveloped pilot site. The land freed after relocation is to be transferred to the Municipal Council of Moratuwa for commercial development.

The organisation of communities and preparation of community led development plans was started in August 2005 with technical assistance from members of SDI, of which the Women's

Development Bank Federation is a member (UN-Habitat 2006). The Women's Development Bank Federation - a national network of 1,200 savings and credit groups in 450 rural and urban communities, is an off-shoot of the Women's Bank, which emerged out of a pilot project of women's mutual help groups initiated by the NHDA in 1989 (Keppetiyagama 2003). Some of the principles that the design communities were exploring reflected the experiences of the SPARC Alliance in Mumbai (van-Lindert 2002). This includes a minimum house size of 300 square feet with internal lofts and possibility of extending the built up area in the future, households wanting additional built up area to pay for it, and to go for low-rise construction to the extent possible, depending on land availability and financial viability. The savings activities for housing were initiated by Women's Development Bank Federation.

Box 5-3: Replicability of slum upgrading initiatives

"From the 1930s to the 1970s, rehousing the poor was the focus through the construction of public housing, often in high rise blocks, that replaced existing 'slum areas', which often were perfectly viable heritage housing – for example, in Glasgow. The record of re-housing the existing residents remained poor – in Sydney less than 20 per cent of the residents of a tract demolished for a public housing block during the 1960s were re-housed. The blocks themselves often had the opposite of what was intended, in terms of effect, with no one having responsibility for the public spaces, and no interacting community to maintain order. The highly publicized demolition of the Pruitt Igoe block in Detroit, after only five years of operation, ranks with the Titanic as a testament to the folly of exaggerated claims.

A strong private commercial interest in developing and building these blocks through 'public–private partnerships' kept the building process alive for longer than their utility to the residents would have dictated. Only the collapse of several shoddily built blocks (notably, Ronan Point in Newham) stopped the march of the council behemoths in the UK."

Assisted self-build has been an acceptable form of intervention since colonial times. Some studies encouraged the World Bank to intervene in housing through sites and services and slum upgrading. The idea is based on observations in Peru and takes a benevolent view of communities, particularly of participatory and humanistic management, as opposed to coercive and 'scientific' administration. It holds that if governments can improve the environmental conditions of slums, and remove sanitary human waste, polluted water and litter from muddy unlit lanes, they need not worry about shanty dwellings. Squatters had already shown great organizational skill in managing to erect dwellings under difficult conditions, and could maintain the facilities once provided, while gradually bettering their homes.

Some sites-and-services schemes predated the involvement of the World Bank, which came to dominate the agenda. Notable among these is Bulangililo ('show piece'), developed in Kitwe on the Copperbelt of Zambia in 1967. Despite the then prevailing view of the World Bank, their first sponsored sites-and-services projects during the late 1970s turned out not to be replicable. On the one hand, they were not popular with either residents or policymakers; on the other hand, cost recovery was poor even in middle-income countries such as the Philippines, where they required 70 per cent subsidies.

The alternative that has come to be regarded as best practice in dealing with the problems of squatter slums is slum upgrading. Upgrading consists of regularization of the rights to land and housing and improving the existing infrastructure – for example, water supply (& storage), sanitation, storm drainage and electricity – up to a satisfactory standard. Typical upgrading projects provide footpaths and pit latrines, street lighting, drainage and roads, and often water supply and limited sewerage. Usually, upgrading does not involve home construction, since the residents can do this themselves, but instead offers optional loans for home improvements. Further actions include the removal of environmental hazards, providing incentives for community management and maintenance, and the construction of clinics and schools. Tenure rights are primarily given to the occupants. Those who must be moved to make way for infrastructure may be given sites and services plots.

Upgrading has significant advantages; it is not only an affordable alternative to clearance and relocation (which cost up to ten times more than upgrading), but it also minimizes the disturbance to the social and economic life of the community. The results of upgrading are highly visible, immediate and make a significant difference in the quality of life of the urban poor.

Source: UN-Habitat 2003.

In a country where the CDCs have been involved in prioritising needs and reblocking their settlements and the Change Agent Programme has been ongoing in rural areas since the early 80s,

the processes followed under the REEL programme and SUF pilot are likely to demonstrate significant differences in the outcomes of the projects.

5.4.3 Lunawa Environment Improvement and Community Development Project

The Lunawa Environment Improvement and Community Development Project (LEI-CDP) aims to mitigate flood damage by improving the Lake Lunawa urban drainage and canal systems in the dense Municipal areas of Moratuwa and Dehiwela/ Mount Lavinia (Perera 2006). A population of about 85,000 covering 18,112 households, including slum and shanty dwellers and lower and upper middle classes population live within the Lake basin. The project includes resettlement of 514 families in six new resettlement sites and development of basic infrastructure in areas surrounding the Lake. The objective of the project is to reduce future damage by inundation and improve the sanitary and living conditions of local residents. It includes developing drainage systems, construction of sewerage facilities, repairing of roads and developing garbage dumps, in shanty areas that suffer serious flood damage (Perera 2006). The project is funded by the Japanese Bank for International Corporation (JBIC) with technical assistance from UN-Habitat.

The project was socially marketed through CBOs for introducing the 'resettlement package with minimum disturbances', based on Sri Lanka's Involuntary Resettlement Policy (Perera 2006). The significant processes and experiences in implementing this project reveal how facilitators of the process enable responsive development in a project environment that facilitates participation and collaborative actions (Interview N13):

- The NGOs, who are the mediators between the Government, local government and CBOs, are treated as consultants and professionals rather than as contractors for the social mobilisation aspect of the project. For building a close relationship amongst the different stakeholders, the main project office and a Community Information Centre are located in the office of one of the NGOs in the field. The Municipal staff and the consultants share the same space. This ensures that all partners are aware of the status of the project, and community members who visit the project office see all stakeholders working together. This reduces the possibility of the process being politicised, and enables the stakeholders to interact with the different stakeholders in one place.
- The transparency in the decision-making process has led to changes in the relocation package. An example is how the package was changed to a 'sites and services scheme even after apartments were designed for relocation, tender documents had been prepared, and the contract was ready to be awarded,. This step was taken because the NGO and community found that only 2 percent of the Project Affected Persons were interested in moving to apartments while the rest preferred to have some land and money to build their own homes. The change in approach led to people constructing single-storey houses whose structural design allows for construction of three-floors on the plots. In addition, since the plot owners

get title deeds, they have greater access to loans from banks. This shows the sustainability focus of the project, and its responsiveness to the various partners and Project Affected Persons.

- While conducting studies in the area, the LEI-CDP team identified two other projects in the area, which are funded by AsDB and CIDA. This led to a dialogue with field level representatives of the projects where interdependent project objectives and overlapping components were identified. All three projects had designated funds for 'dredging of the lake'. The interaction amongst project representatives led to the designation of dredging responsibility to the AsDB project while JBIC funds were reassigned for the construction of a road around the lake, which will prevent encroachment, increase land value and improve the overall quality of the area. This example demonstrates that coordinated action for development of an area is not 'planned' but occurs because those working at the field level pursue findings from the field for integrated development activities.
- At monthly coordination meetings, where all area engineers from Government Departments are invited, good personal relationships have developed. This has led to informal arrangements for facilitating the resettlement process. One example is of the electricity company making 'formal' arrangements for 'temporary supply' of electricity to the resettlement area because of delays in supply of electrical poles. This arrangement came about because the technical representatives in the field had the opportunity to identify with the extent of problems caused because of delays in execution of some work, and their responsiveness to the needs of the people.
- The social marketing, comprehensiveness of the relocation package and transparency in decision-making have made the process of relocation easier.

Although "normally, government officers say 'no' without giving any reasons to any requests or suggestions that affect the community", they were supportive in the above case because the facilitators explained and elaborated the reasons for their recommending a particular action. Further, they explained to the stakeholders concerned that if they were unhappy about the decisions, and wanted to pursue the matter, they had the right to appeal to the next level of decision-makers (Interview N13).

5.4.4 GTZ Tsunami Housing Support Project

The 26 December 2004 tsunami destroyed or damaged more than 100,000 houses in Sri Lanka. The magnitude and impacts of the natural disaster resulted in substantial funds and commitments for reconstruction. A large proportion of the money was earmarked for the reconstruction of destroyed houses and the development of new settlement and resettlement areas. However, the funds were spent quickly on whatever interventions were found appropriate, and CAP

methodology was completely paralysed. In addition, the political and Government changes, the extent of support of the State, and because of problems in getting lists of beneficiaries, the people with whom donor agencies could work was limited. However, officials who faced the challenge of effectively managing the reconstruction and making it economically, ecologically and socially sustainable, realised the problems of the fragmented approach (Interview D3). An exposure visit was organised to the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority in March - April 2005 to look at the disaster response of the State Government after the earthquake in January 2000. The visit had a considerable impact on the group because of the 'control' maintained by the Government on donor activities, and thereby reducing overlaps. Another important aspect was of circulars for the different rehabilitation packages by Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority, which showed how the mandate and tasks were assigned. Although follow-up actions were not taken in Sri Lanka after this visit, by mid-2006, many officials realised that there was lack of holistic development in affected areas in spite of substantial investments for reconstruction.

Comment 3: Disaster, relief and absence of participatory approach

> "Post tsunami, there were lots of funds and it was spent very quickly without much people's participation. It was completely up to the donors to decide on whether to have a participatory process or not. ... By June - July 2006, it became very obvious that you can spend a lot of money without making a difference to their sustainability. Therefore, lot of officials who had not thought about it realized that despite spending millions of rupees, we have not reached anything like sustainable development. ... What happened after the tsunami is that people from one village had to sit with many different donors for CAP. Maybe that was even okay because there was so much need and there was the issue of speed. It was also somehow easy for many organizations to do something only from the relief point of view rather than jump to something more long-term." (Interview D3).

A Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit was established to coordinate the reconstruction programme of the government. Other government organisations such as UDA and NHDA were also involved in reconstruction. Representatives of the national government (District and Divisional Secretaries) coordinated the reconstruction activities of bilateral, multilateral and private donor organizations and various government institutions. This provided an impetus for the GTZ Tsunami Housing Support Project, with the objective of supporting effective reconstruction by government institutions responsible for housing, settlement and urban planning using participatory processes. To achieve this, the project aims to strengthen the capacities of government institutions at the field level for: i) integrated settlement planning, ii) housing, and iii) participation of the people in planning, decision processes and implementation of the projects (Interview D3). The special focus of the project is communication among various partners.

5.4.5 Expansion through NGO Activities

As mentioned above, amongst the professionals who left NHDA were individuals who formed the NGO - Sevanatha in 1989 with the objective of working with communities in a progressive way and building capacities amongst communities (Sevanatha 1995; Interview N07). Sevanatha is one of the organisations that continue playing an important role in facilitating participation of

communities and in the use of CAP methodology and community contracting. One of the inspirational examples for the Sevanatha team was what they had learnt about the approach and achievements under Orangi Pilot Project. They believed that constant contact with the CBOs was essential for sustaining their interest and for facilitating self-reliance. The objective was to mediate or bridge the divide between low-income communities and Government, which has to function according to established procedures and guidelines.

In 1994, when UNDP launched its three year (1994 - 97) Asia-Pacific 2000 programme, Sevanatha started an Urban Resource Centre and registered as an NGO under Government regulations. Sevanatha's role in implementation of the CSP evolved to provide committed CBOs with information, knowledge and skills required through information sharing, networking, leadership training, technical assistance, and skill development. Within settlements, Sevanatha facilitates systematic data collection, identification of community needs and actions for addressing environmental problems. Sevanatha also provides training to small NGOs and assists them and CBOs in linking-up with national and international institutions. Since many slums in Colombo were located in environmentally sensitive areas, in 1996, the Clean Settlements Programme promoted relocating slums away from such lands.

In 1995, Sevanatha, in collaboration with UNCHS/ DANIDA, conducted a Trainers' Training programmes in CAP methodology for local NGOs, which led to the establishment of four CAP groups in different parts of the country. Subsequently, Sevanatha, which is the most prominent and recognised NGO that facilitates participation of urban communities using the CAP methodology, supports CDC members and provides opportunities to young professionals for developing skills for working in low-income settlements. Sevanatha is also the most prominent NGO that is approached by organisations/ donors such as GTZ, JICA and UN-Habitat that want to use the CAP methodology in the programmes they support.

5.5 Good Practices over time

The above interventions draw attention to individuals who, as organisational members or consultants, either continue or negate lessons from the MHP. They emphasis the role of individuals in continuation of components of good practices, such as use of 'People's Process' in decision making, use of the CAP methodology, promoting community contracting and attempting their integration with other mainstream activities. It indicates the influence that leaders have over those responsible for implementing programmes, and most significantly, it highlights the organisational environments where the blue-print and top-down decision model of development persists. In the current environment where public-private sector partnerships are promoted intensely, the case of housing constructed by REEL draws attention to the tendency of treating redevelopment initiatives for high-value centrally located land with the same attitudes towards the informal settlements as were seen in the 1950s and 1960s. The only difference is in assurances for

relocation and provision of a house, which despite policies of rehabilitation of Project Affected Persons, was top-down for REEL.

5.6 Summary

The planning, implementation and monitoring of MHP were fully incorporated with the national housing sector policy and institutional processes. The key lessons from the approach are:

- The motivation and leadership of a political leader was complemented by a team of professionals who were part of the Task Force, and subsequently led the MHP. This led to the introduction of a unique intervention for which new implementation structures and skills were required. Weerapana (1986) attributes the success of the Task Force group to the freedom and opportunities given to the professionals and the process of regularly discussing and critically evaluating the experiences in implementation of the MHP enabled midterm corrections. Others who joined the programme later identified themselves with the process and contributed to its evolution.
- Although not listed in literature, the association of Premadasa with the declaration of IYSH and implementation of MHP during the 'the first phase' of IYSH is likely to have provided an additional impetus to the programme.
- Concepts and interventions evolve because stakeholders at different levels worked toward a common goal and individuals working at the field level have support from higher levels of decision makers for introducing new or alternative elements in response to the context.
- The motivation of the team of implementers and the support they received from training institutions led to a systematic approach for implementation and building of capacities of staff involved in MHP.
- While the enabling approach for housing was abandoned in 1994, the decentralised decision structure has survived to some extent. Although the participatory planning (and implementation) process is no longer practised within NHDA, it has been an integral part of interventions in Sri Lanka that are implemented through individuals and NGOs such as Sevanatha, Women's Bank and Women's Development Bank Federation, UN-Habitat and bilateral donor agencies such as GTZ.
- The CAP and community contracting processes are up scaled through some stakeholders and donor funded initiatives. However, none of the documented initiatives have reached the number of households reached from 1984 to 1989 during implementation of MHP.
- Large scale development interventions, which involve participatory decision processes and enhance sustainability of investments, can be successful when the 'initiator', designers or planners', and the implementers work in coordination and garner external support for

essential capacity building.

- Changes in routines of organisations require support in terms of training of staff to create awareness about the intervention, and formal guidelines about processes to be followed. Since major policy changes in the functioning of organisations are unlikely to occur for individual projects, continuation of approaches that enable participatory processes and sustainable development in the long-term is more likely to occur because of individuals and NGOs rather than through institutions.
- Although the MHP significantly improved access to housing for the low-income groups, the infrastructure in upgraded settlements was still poor (United Nations 2005).

In the context of the processes and experiences of the MHP, the REEL, LEI-CDP and the Tsunami Housing Support Project draw attention can be drawn to the following issues:

- In the absence of a nationwide housing policy and coordinated approach, the new programmes and projects introduced after 1992 have all been short-term – generally a year or two. The initiatives have also been influenced by the officers of funding agencies.
- Although the CAP methodology was institutionalised during implementation of MHP and there is some attempt to integrate a much diluted version with the Village Reawakening programme of the Government, its effective continuity is dependent on individuals and NGOs. Amongst these, Sevanatha, which incorporate the methodology, is well known amongst donor agencies.
- Participatory initiatives require flexibility amongst the partners at higher levels of decision-making and informal arrangements at the field level for responding to local needs and situations. Field level facilitators and officers require flexibility for identifying opportunities to resolve problems in a pragmatic way. Formal communication between partners for resolving field level issues is likely to result in administrative delays, and lost opportunities for the evolution of the intervention and increased participation of the actors involved.
- Although the tradition of having implementation guidelines and checklists was introduced in NHDA during implementation of MHP, it did not result in similar actions after the tsunami. Contrarily, the members of the exposure visit were impressed with similar action taken by the GSDMA in Gujarat, and the resultant progress in addressing the disaster. On return, an attempt was made to coordinate actions of those supporting the tsunami relief and reconstruction works.
- Academic institutions, even in Sri Lanka, do not include training for CAP or for addressing the problems of low-income settlements and housing. For professionals, the vision of a successful career is involvement in the design and implementation of 'large structures and big projects'. In Sri Lanka, this is compounded by the fact that the credibility of NGOs and

the status of those working in NGOs are low. Consequently, not many young professionals are involved in grassroots development interventions for long (Interviews N07, N12, N13).

- Government organisations have a centralised decision-making process and the focus and approaches to programmes depends on individuals rather than on basic policies or systems. Problems faced with Government organisations by partners have a long history and therefore the specific individuals with whom a stakeholder is interacting are not responsible. Therefore, in working with Government organisations, people and organisations take either an aggressive path or a neutral stance that enables them to convince individuals to experiment and evolve approaches. As professionals who worked in NHDA, the Sevanatha team works with Government organisations and donors to facilitate participatory development activities and research. (Interview N07).
- Organisations follow administrative and financial rules, which ensure that responsibilities for decisions are shared. Therefore, irrespective of whether those involved in the process are efficient or are interested in kickbacks, the process takes time. When the private sector is involved, the decisions process is quickened, but it is at a much greater cost (Interview N07).
- The focused attention and high involvement required for participatory development initiatives cannot be sustained at higher levels of decision-making. Subsequently, political and leadership changes affect implementation and up-scaling of good practices.
- For having a common understanding of the intervention and the processes, guidelines and checklists are important for institutional/ organisational stakeholders.

Enabling approaches introduced through national programmes and policy changes, together with focused technical support can contribute to improving environmental and housing conditions of the poor in the short-term. In the long-term, changes in terms of follow-up by staff and lack of discipline in collection of community contributions because of reduced focus on the intervention, can totally derail participatory interventions. This situation is aggravated because of differences in approaches and vision amongst political decision makers, professionals and NGOs.

With economic liberalisation and demand for land and commercial development, Governments and development support organisations are promoting redevelopment of commercially viable plots and relocation of slum dwellers to multistoried housing in peripheral locations. In doing this, participation of slum residents is encouraged only for reaching a consensus for relocation rather than for the overall process of relocation, identifying needs and planning of housing in new locations. The case of Sahaspura highlights lack of attention of planners to earlier experiences of housing the poor in high-rise dwellings (UN-Habitat 2003a), and a lack of willingness to incorporate lessons learned during implementation of MHP. This is in terms of the CAP methodology and participation through CDCs.

6 SLUM NETWORKING

The following Section is a description of the context in which the slum-networking approach was introduced in different locations in India. The introduction, initiation and evolution of the Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project are closely associated with the conceptualiser of the initiative and with the achievements under the Indore project. Although the critics of the Indore project identify various problems that developed in improved slums, the concept retains its positive aspects. The concept was introduced in Ahmedabad and Bhopal after the failures of the Indore project were identified in an impact assessment study. Therefore, the Section traces the processes that have led to the evolution of the slum-networking concept since 1987, followed by a description of the initiation, evolution and implementation of the Slum Networking Project in Ahmedabad. Although the achievement of the project in terms of households covered is not comparable with the achievements under MHP, the processes that have evolved during its implementation provide useful insights into constraints in up-scaling of participatory interventions.

Slum Networking is a concept which was introduced in India with the aim of catalysing change within the overall urban fabric by using the matrix of underserviced areas, generally on marginal lands (Parikh 1995). The SNP is an ongoing and evolving approach that incorporates approaches of several good practices for community development, poverty reduction and slum improvement introduced in India over the past four decades. The concept has been introduced at four locations - first in 1987 under a DFID funded project in Indore, secondly in 1993 as a pilot in Vadodara, then at Ahmedabad in 1995 as a citywide project and finally at Bhopal in 2000 as a pilot for a citywide project. Of these four cities, Ahmedabad has the largest slum population, which includes residents of older dormitory housing (chawls).

Figure 6-1: Distribution of slum population in selected States in India



Source: Census of India 2001

According to the Census of India, of the national population of over 1,028 million, about 283.74 million or 27.6 percent of the total population is urban. Of these, an estimated 42.58 million people or 15 percent of the urban population live in slums (Census of India 2001). Of the 294 million poor people or 29 percent of the population, 67 million live in urban areas. 11.2 million of the total

slum population of the country lives in Maharashtra followed by 5.2 million in Andhra Pradesh, 4.4 million in Uttar Pradesh and 4.1 million in West Bengal. Of the two States where SNP has been introduced, Madhya Pradesh has a slum population of 2.42 million (Census of India 2001), while Gujarat, which is one of the economically developed States in the country, has a slum population of 1.87 million people or 9.9 percent of 18.93 million urban residents.

The 27 million plus cities in the country reported a slum population of 17.7 million with Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation reporting the highest slum population of 6.5 million. This is followed by Delhi Municipal Corporation (1.9 million), Kolkata (1.5 million) and Chennai (0.8 million). Ahmedabad (0.47 million) has the largest slum population of the four cities where SNP has been introduced (Indore=0.26 million; Vadodara=0.19 million, and Bhopal=0.13 million). 98 percent of urban households have access to water while only 62 percent have access to sanitation (WHO - UNICEF 2006).

Figure 6-2: Distribution of slum population in million-plus cities in India



Source: Census of India 2001

6.1 Initiation: Introduction of concept

The slum-networking concept was first introduced in 1987 by Himanshu Parikh, a civil engineer, for improvement of slums combined with citywide infrastructure upgrading. It was introduced in Indore under Indore Habitat Improvement Project (IHIP) of the UK Government's Overseas Development Administration (subsequently renamed Department for International Development - DFID). By January 1993, IHIP gained substantial media attention because of visits by the British Prime Minister John Major to some project areas. It was awarded the 1993 World Habitat Award (in 1994), followed by an international study group visit in 1995.

Box 6-1: Slum Networking: Concept

> All cities have natural drainage paths, without which villages and towns would have drowned in their own waste long before they grew into cities. If properly exploited, these paths become ideal routes for manmade urban infrastructures: sewerage, storm drainage, water supply, roads. The environmental skeleton of city greens and water bodies also lies on the same paths. Studies show that slums are consistently located along these paths. Once this connection between slums, urban infrastructure and environment is understood, it is easy to see how to intervene in ways beneficial to both slums as well as the rest of the city.

Source: EAWAG 2000

The IHIP was also recognised as an example of Global Best Practices at the City Summit in 1996 and honoured with the Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1998. Before the formal impact assessment of the Indore Project, Parikh, who was convinced about the viability and appropriateness of the approach for integrating underserviced areas into the urban fabric, went on to introduce the concept in a modified form in Vadodara and Ahmedabad in Gujarat. Parikh refined the concept to address some of the problems identified in implementing the project in Indore. He incorporated the need for financial contributions from slum residents; and partnerships with NGOs for mobilizing slum residents and for facilitating the savings and credit activities.

Box 6-2: Slum Networking: Coverage and recognition

> Based on lessons learnt by 'Himanshu Parikh Consulting Engineers' in a city wide Slum Networking Project for Indore the concept was evolved and replicated by the group in pilot projects in Baroda, Ahmedabad, Mumbai and currently in Bhopal, covering over 70,000 families. The approach won the UN World Habitat Award in 1993, was recognised as a Best Practice by UNCHS HABITAT II in 1996, won the Aga Khan Award in 1998 and has been cited as a Global Best Practice by UNCHS as well as by the Government of India in 1998.

Source: Parikh 2002

The IHIP was initiated after a chance meeting between a political leader and a friend from Hyderabad, who told him about the ODA funded Slum Improvement Projects in Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada (DFID reports). Indore Development Authority, which at the time was implementing a sites and services project in the city, requested Parikh - a member of the design team from Ahmedabad, to assist in preparing the project proposal for submission to ODA. (Slater 1997).

Besides the basic slum level infrastructure components as provided under GoI's EIUS, Parikh's preliminary infrastructure focused proposal included provision for household water connections, shared drains and community halls in slums where land was available. The proposal required linking of slum infrastructure to the city infrastructure networks and management of topography of the riverside. This proposal was reviewed by ODA Advisers who identified the need for complementing the physical works with community development components, as in the case with other ODA funded slum improvement projects (Slater 1997). The revised proposal included community development components such as formation of neighbourhood, women's, and youth groups, a series of preventive health care programmes, and vocational training, which were already part of ODA funded interventions in Andhra Pradesh and Calcutta. The community development and preventive care health components were components of the UCD Programme in India and the UNICEF funded UBSIP implemented in Colombo and other towns of Sri Lanka (Chularathna 1999).

The IHIP was approved in late 1988 and was estimated to directly benefit approximately 80,000 families living in slums, and was scheduled for completion by 1995 (extended to June 1997). With the aim of up-scaling the slum-networking approach, Parikh, who believes that more can be achieved for improving environments of urban areas by enabling convergence of resources from

Government and sources, visited Baroda (renamed Vadodara) in September 1993.

The decision to introduce slum-networking in Vadodara was strategic for several reasons. Vadodara is the city where the American Friends Service Committee had implemented the Baroda Community Development project successfully from 1964 to 1969. In addition, the third urban community development pilot had been so successful in Baroda that it provided the training resources required for the programme in other parts of India (Cousins 1992). Moreover, many key fertilizer, petroleum and related industries of the State are located in and around the city.

Box 6-3: Up-scaling of Urban Community Development Programme in India

Following the UCD pilot project in Delhi, the Ministry of Health, Family Planning and Urban Development introduced a programme to provide meals for the age group 6, and started a scheme of urban community development in Ahmedabad (1962), Baroda (1965) and Calcutta (1966) (Chandra, 1972; Gupta, 1994).

Each UCD project was designed to cover a population of 50,000, split into approximately 8 area level committees of about 6,000 population. The expenditure was shared with the Central Government contributing 50 percent and the State government and local body contributing the remaining 50 percent. The expenditure on training, evaluation and research was borne by the Central Government.

Although schemes sponsored by GoI were generally to be implemented by urban local bodies, the UCD was implemented through different implementing agencies. The Ahmedabad UCD was started with the Municipal Corporation while the Baroda UCD was started with the Baroda Citizens' Council (BCC), which at the time, included members of the Municipal Corporation, the State Government, representatives of labour and social welfare organisations, and other prominent citizens. In 1966, twenty UCD projects were initiated in selected cities with a population of 100,000 or more, including Hyderabad (1967). The Hyderabad pilot UCD programme was taken over by the State Government in 1969.

An evaluation of the UCD programme in 1972 (Chandra, 1972) revealed that while the response from many State Governments was not encouraging, Gujarat had five UCD projects in Ahmedabad, Surat, Baroda, Jamnagar and Bhavnagar. Moreover, Gujarat was the only State that had an active and functional State Level Advisory Committee and a Director for the UCD. Gujarat was also found to be the only state which exercised its own judgement and initiative in launching five projects and was enthusiastic to start even more projects" (Chandra, 1972).

The Urban Basic Services (UBS) approach, promoted by UNICEF since the 1970s, evolved from the experiences of these urban community development (UCD) programmes of the 1960s (Sundaram 1994).

Baroda Citizens Council (BCC), an NGO established in 1987 through collaboration between Baroda Municipal Corporation (renamed Vadodara Municipal Corporation - VMC), MS University and industries in and around the city, showed an interest in piloting SNP. By October 1994, a proposal for upgrading the Ramdevnagar slum had been formulated and the pilot launched.

The key factors that distinguished the Baroda SNP pilot from the IHIP were i) Contribution of 50 percent costs by the individual households for connections at the house level; ii) Involvement of an NGO for facilitating community participation, and iii) Involvement of State Government for transfer of land tenure. UNICEF, VMC, BCC and others provided partial funding to cover 50 percent cost of the infrastructure, and actual costs of BCC. Although UNICEF had generally provided funding for women and child welfare, it decided to provide part funding for this 'experimental' project since it exploring the possibility of expanding its work in urban areas at the time. The concept of providing services at the level of the city was unique and something that UNICEF was keen to have introduced in other parts of the country (Interview D8). The key

achievement of the initiative was that while community contributions were made rapidly, the contributions from VMC, which was approached after initial decisions were made (Interview U18), was slow.

Box 6-4: Slum Networking: Concept

> Recent pilot projects have shown that the urban poor can mobilise huge resources. The charitable attitude towards them, whereby they are seen as separate entities from the city and dealt with by 'pro-poor' programmes, aid and grants, has to be changed. It should be replaced by a much more businesslike attitude which sees them as a part of the city's normal fabric, and which increases their self-sufficiency and dignity.

Source: EAWAG 2000

Parikh prepared a project proposal for slum improvement in Baroda at an estimate of Rs 3 billion and was forwarded to DFID for funding. However, Gujarat was not a priority state for DFID and the project was not funded. In 1994, IHIP was awarded the World Habitat Award in recognition of its unique approach for integrating slums into the mainstream of urban areas (BSHF 1996).

As described in the Section below, the outbreak of pneumonic plague in Surat during this period (September 1994) highlighted the urgency of taking corrective steps for changing the deteriorating conditions in urban areas of Gujarat. City administrators, professionals, business community, citizens and professionals explored options for improving the urban environment. Subsequently, the Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project (SNP) was formerly adopted by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in September 1995.

After this, the approach was introduced in Bhopal in 2001. The Bhopal Slum Networking Project (BSNP) was started at the initiative of the Chief Minister (Interview PC5, and Parikh 2001) following the State Government's reforms for decentralising decision-making and improving governance. The BSNP aim was to transform the physical infrastructure, particularly water and environmental sanitation within the slums, strengthen city level infrastructure and improve its environment to the extent possible. The pilot (October 2001 to December 2002) was to cover around 4,700 households in six slum areas at an estimated cost of Rs 66.1 million, of which Rs 5 million was estimated to be the cost for community interaction facilitation, and Rs 5.4 million for the various activities. The key partners for the Pilot Phase of BSNP were Bhopal Municipal Corporation, slum dwellers, UNICEF, Department of Science and Technology - GoI (under UNDP programme) and NGOs.

Although considered a 'pet project' of the Chief Minister, by the end of September 2002, work on infrastructure had not started in any slum and the slum residents were not convinced adequately to pay their contributions of Rs 2,500. By late 2005, the pilot of BSNP was completed (UNDP 2004; Interview U25). Additional works were subsequently to be taken up under the AsDB funded Urban Water Supply and Environmental Improvement Project (UWSEIMP) and DFID funded MP Urban

Poverty Reduction Programme (MPUPRP)[1].

Box 6-5: Bhopal Slum Networking Project: Evaluation of the Pilot

> "However, barring the exposure visit to Ahmedabad, there has been no sustained communication effort to convince slum dwellers of benefits of networking project. Whereas maps and plans have been shared with them, few understand the scheme, and are quite unaware as to what it can do for them. So, though there is a willingness to pay for facilities, confidence that these facilities will be maintained is lacking. There is a fear that BMC's interest may flag with change of government. Communications through media that is comprehensive and sustained is what is required.
>
> The resistance to partnership efforts at development was very high, in particular to self-contributory schemes. UNICEF, a partner (who is no longer part of the project) reportedly conducted the communications exercise but what exactly these were no one could tell the team. The Municipal Corporation took a group of representatives from slums to Ahmedabad to see how the slum-networking functioned and benefited the communities. Slum communities have been formed and representatives elected. Senior engineers have built up a good equation with sections of slum dwellers but there is apathy and resistance in other sections."

Source: UNDP 2004

6.1.1 Ahmedabad: Urban Context

Ahmedabad - the largest city of Gujarat, which is one of the most economically developed States in India, was declared as the seventh mega city in the country in February 2005. The city's economic development started with the establishment of textile mills in 1857. The development accelerated after 1 May 1960, when Ahmedabad became the capital of the new state of Gujarat after bifurcation of the State of Bombay. The city's economic base further diversified with the establishment of heavy and chemical industries around this period.

The industrialists of the city have played an important role in promoting institutions such as the Ahmedabad Education Society (which later evolved into the Gujarat University) established in 1936, Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad, the Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology, the Gandhi Labour Institute, the Sardar Patel Institute of Public Affairs, and the National Institute of Design. From 1960, when the Gujarat Housing Board was established, it played an important role in creating more housing for the different income groups.

Box 6-6: Housing by Gujarat Housing Board

> Between 1960 and 2004, from a total of 176,754 houses constructed in the State by Gujarat Housing Board, about 40 percent were built in Schemes for Subsidised Industrial Housing and for Economically Weaker Sections. Of the 69,364 houses constructed in Ahmedabad, 14,439 were built in Subsidised Industrial Housing Schemes and 15,580 built for Economically Weaker Section (EWS) - that is about 43 percent of the houses were for families with incomes of less than Rs 2,500 per month. The ceiling cost for the dwelling units was Rs 50,000. in 2004.

Source: GHB Website

The State has a total population of 50.67 million, of which 18.93 million live in urban areas, and 9.9 percent or about 1.87 million people are slum residents. The total population of the Ahmedabad Urban Agglomeration (which includes the area governed by Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority) was 4,519,000. In the Ahmedabad, Municipal Corporation area of 190.94

[1] In early 2008, although an NGO involved in the BSNP pilot was actively involved in donor funded initiatives in slums of Bhopal, many stakeholders were unaware about the BSNP pilot and the innovations demonstrated in 5 slums of Bhopal.

square kilometres, the slum population is 473,662 or 13.5 percent of the total population of 3,515,361 (Census of India 2001). In a 1998 survey, 118,514 families in the city were identified as families below the poverty line (AMC 1998). The slum population includes people living in *chawls*, which are dormitory buildings having many rooms in rows.

6.1.2 Ahmedabad and slum upgrading

Following the launch of GoI's scheme for environmental improvement of slums in 1972, the State enacted the Gujarat Slum Areas Act in 1973. In 1975, Ahmedabad Study Action Group (ASAG) conducted a census of slums for Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC). The census identified different types of slum areas in the city as: i) chawls or dormitory housing built for the factory workers, ii) subsidised housing built for the poor, including those relocated from road lines, and iii) slum areas. Of the three types of areas where the poor live, only the subsidized housing where families were relocated are formally eligible for getting services at the household level. The chawl residents live on 'recognized' properties, often as tenants, and the limited space in the dormitory type of housing does not give any scope for partial redevelopment or addition of services. Many slums dwellers have access to public stand posts, public toilets, street lighting and paved roads, which were provided under the EIUS. A majority of slums (21 percent) and chawls (64 percent) in the city are on privately owned land.

Figure 6-3: Location of slums and chawls in Ahmedabad



	North Zone	East Zone	West Zone	South Zone	Central Zone
Chawls	303	406	82	81	86
Slums	129	52	156	209	164

Source: AMC, 2003

Two well-known initiatives, which were attempted for slum residents in Ahmedabad prior to 1996, demonstrate AMC's initiatives for slum areas and its working with NGOs in the city. One was the relocation of slum residents from a flood-prone area in 1973 and the other was a Slum Upgrading Proposal prepared for World Bank funding in 1982. The implemented relocation project and planned slum upgrading proposal were associated with architects from the School of Architecture in Ahmedabad, namely Ahmedabad Study Action Group and Vikas Centre for Development respectively. Vikas and ASAG, propagated a participatory decision process, and similar to SPARC and YUVA in India, and Orangi Pilot Project from Pakistan, were members of the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, part of Habitat International Coalition.

Comment 4: Ahmedabad Slum Relocation after Floods in 1973

> In September 1973, River Sabarmati in Ahmedabad flooded and a number of families that had been living in eighteen slum clusters along the river were made homeless. Kirtee Shah, an architect who established the Ahmedabad Study Action Group, worked with AMC and the State Government to develop a housing area in Juhapura – on the western side of the city for rehabilitating the affected families.
>
> Sanklitnagar was designed to accommodate 2,248 families in clusters of eight residential units built around an open courtyard, with two families sharing one toilet and three families sharing one backyard. Funding for the project was provided by HUDCO and OXFAM. One of the significant processes adopted for relocating the families was of each family choosing to live in Sanklitnagar identifying: i) another family with whom they would not mind sharing a toilet, ii) two other families with whom they would not mind sharing a backyard ,and iii) seven families with whom they were ready to share the courtyard (Interview PC3).

The main feature of the slum relocation project was that it followed a participatory process, and the other was the Municipal Commissioner's decision to not only allocate land for the relocation, but also to extend municipal services to an area that was outside the jurisdiction of the AMC. In addition, a Social Service League programme was started in the relocation area by Father Ramiro Erviti - a Jesuit, with students of St. Xavier's School in the city. In 1976, the programme was registered as a Trust and Society - St. Xavier's Social Service Society (SXSSS) and Fr. Erviti initiated health and education activities in Sanklitnagar and the slum of Mahajan-no-Vando in Jamalpur. After Fr. Erviti passed away in May 1985, some of the young persons he had recruited, motivated and trained to work in these slums went on to establish the NGO Saath (Interviews).

Box 6-7: 1984 Slum Upgrading Proposal of AMC

> The key features of the 1984 proposal for slum upgrading were (AMC 1984):
>
> Land: Acquisition and transfer of land on which slums were located (Private=78.1 percent, AMC=10.4 percent, Government=6.4 percent, and Others=5.1 percent) was envisaged under the proposal. Part of the cost of land was to be collected from the slum residents through a down payment and monthly instalments.
>
> Services being provided under EIUS were to be extended to all slums areas – using the same standards, with special attention to a community based maintenance system.
>
> Shelter: Based on a survey finding that slum residents need around Rs 2000 to 2400 for upgrading their houses, credit of Rs 2250 to slum residents in the form of building materials through building materials banks and cash for labour component (25 percent) was recommended as support the shelter construction.
>
> In 1985, GoG sought finances from the World Bank for the Gujarat Urban Development Project (Project ID: P009856, C1643, 17/12/1985 to 31/3/1995) for:
>
> Slum Upgrading Program on about 250 ha of slum areas in 5 cities, and in East of Ahmedabad. This was to include tenure provision, infrastructure improvement, home improvement loans and community facilities for about 300,000 people.
>
> Provision of storm drainage to 2 cities, secondary sewerage to 2 cities, and water supply and a trunk sewer for East Ahmedabad area
>
> Area Development Program to construct about 14,000 serviced residential and small business plots, and community facilities on 7 sites in 5 cities.
>
> Town Planning Schemes for the provision of serviced land for residential, small business and community usage in 3 rapidly growing cities, and
>
> Solid Waste Management - provision of equipment for collection and disposal of solid waste in 5 cities.
>
> The provision of technical assistance and staff training to improve the technical, financial, and managerial capacity of participating agencies to plan and implement urban development schemes.

Source: VIKAS/ AMC 1984 Interviews U5 and U21

In 1984, Vikas - an Ahmedabad based NGO, prepared a slum upgrading proposal for AMC. The

project proposal, called Slum Upgradation Programme, for the eastern industrial part of the city. The programme implementation was proposed through one city-level and nine zone-level project cells. For coordination of work of various Departments, the City-level Cell was to include representatives from the town planning, services, legal, statistical, community development and administrative departments of AMC. The City level Cell was to be governed by a Steering Committee comprising administrative and political representatives from AMC, NGOs working in the urban sector, and finally representatives of development and nationalised Banks. The Zonal Cells were expected to coordinate the community development components through effective implementation of the ICDS and UCD programmes in the slums. The formal AMC based structure was expected to be supported by NGOs and CBOs. The emphasis of the proposal was on following a participatory process, and service provision was expected to be based on needs and priorities identified by slum residents. Information about the programme was expected to be disseminated to create awareness and attempt to influence change in attitudes toward the programme and encourage participation (Interview).

The proposal, which was developed about the same time as the MHP, was submitted for World Bank funding. However, World Bank conditionality of providing tenure to the slum residents would have involved a long process of land acquisition that would have delayed implementation of the project. Moreover, AMC was aware the citywide infrastructure and the slums could not be upgrades at the same time. The funding was therefore not taken up (Interview U5).

The other prominent organisation in Ahmedabad from the 70s is the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA), which grew out of the Women's Wing of India's oldest and largest union of textile workers. SEWA was registered as a Trade Union in 1972 with a membership base of 320 women vendors at the time (SEWA Website).

For senior staff of the AMC, the 1984 Slum Upgradation proposal and discussions related to its implementation provided the backdrop against which they assessed future proposal for slum upgrading in Ahmedabad (Interview U5).

6.2 Adaptation of the concept in Ahmedabad

In September 1994, the outbreak of pneumonic plague in Surat highlighted the urgency of taking corrective steps for changing the deteriorating conditions of urban areas in Gujarat, amongst city administrators, professionals, business community, citizens and professionals. Disasters such as floods and earthquakes in and around Ahmedabad had earlier shown that catalytic actions could be taken for introducing interventions and processes for improving the urban environment.

GoG posted dynamic administrative officers in the Municipal Corporations of Surat and Ahmedabad. In Ahmedabad, Keshav Verma, an IAS officer who had already achieved some success in a previous posting as Municipal Commissioner, was posted. Verma introduced several changes in AMC, which brought the city into prominence nationally. One of the actions was to

improve revenue collection to plug leaks at collection posts for octroi - the local tax levied on the entry of goods into a municipal corporation for use, consumption or sale. Within one month, daily revenue from octroi tax was Rs 6 million. By March 1995, AMC registered a net surplus of Rs 10 million, which made it possible for the administration to take up development projects. At the time, AMC was under the administrator's rule., and the absence of a political wing made it easier for the Municipal Commissioner to arrive at and execute decisions quickly. Despite opposition from the worker's Unions, Verma succeeded in upgrading and changing the qualification for managerial posts to degrees in business administration, accountancy or environmental engineering and recruited professional staff in the AMC.

The Municipal Commissioner arranged to meet key people in the city, as many Municipal Commissioners do (Interview U5). One of meetings in 1994 was with Bimal Patel - an architect and urban planner who presented the option for designing and redeveloping a road. A proposal for a pilot road redevelopment had emerged out of a chance meeting and discussions between a Deputy Municipal Commissioner and the professional about the need for designing roads in cities (Interview PC2). Patel's quick response to issues discussed during the meeting led to the approval and launch of the pilot for the road redevelopment project. The initiation of the road redevelopment project was a forerunner of the trend in Ahmedabad of 'planned project initiatives' by professionals during Verma's tenure. This approach required the 'conceptualiser' to invest substantial time and effort in the planning and facilitating or implementing the interventions. By late June 1995, Verma had initiated several interventions to improve management within AMC to improve urban conditions in the city.

The two successful initiatives (C G Road Redevelopment, and the Ahmedabad City Museum) were area and concept/ design specific solutions, while a Heritage Walk was introduced at the initiative of the conceptualisers. Verma was also introduced to B V Doshi - a well-known architect in the city. The meeting with Doshi also led to two project proposals and an initiative for the Museum exhibition (Interviews PC2 and PC4). While the exhibition went ahead because little financing was involved, the proposals for the two projects were shelved after Verma left AMC.

Comment 5: Ahmedabad: Donor perception of up-scaling

> "Decisions made 1994 - 97 by Keshav Verma (Municipal Commissioner) have been up scaled substantially–in fact one can say that maximum up-scaling has happened in Ahmedabad or from pilots of Ahmedabad." (Interview D9).

During Verma's visit to Vastu-Shilpa Foundation - Doshi's office, Parikh was introduced to him as someone interested in the problems of urban slums. Verma invited Parikh to his office for further discussions. This invitation led to the introduction of the slum-networking approach in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation as described under Section 6.3.1.2.

6.2.1 Initiation of Slum Networking Pilot

Among the many professionals concerned about the urban environment - especially after the outbreak of plague in Surat, Nimish Patel and Parul Zaveri – practicing architects, acted on their concerns about potential hazards because of the environmental conditions in the city (Interview P2). They first broached the subject with Parikh, who at the time was a consultant on one of their projects, and with whom they had often discussed the potential of the SNP approach. They discussed the possibility of introducing the slum-networking approach in Ahmedabad in partnership with industries. The architects were convinced that with themselves providing planning support, Parikh as an engineer and 'visionary', and the industrialists as city leaders, they could initiate a city-wide movement for slum improvement.

Patel and Zaveri's conviction was based on their knowledge of the history the tradition of industrialists, who as 'city-leaders' had contributed substantially to the growth of the city. In December 1994, they introduced Parikh to Sanjay Lalbhai of Arvind Mills and Samir Mehta of Torrent Pharmaceuticals, industrialists for whom they were implementing architectural projects. Both Lalbhai and Mehta's families had steered and contributed significantly to the industrial and institutional growth of Ahmedabad. Mehta of Torrent was not too forthcoming while Sanjay Lalbhai, the Managing Director of Arvind Mills Limited (AML was more open to discussion. Lalbhai was interested in contributing to make Ahmedabad a better place to live in (Interviews P2 and N19). With the liberalisation of the economy and expansion of industrial activities in Gujarat, AML was planning ecological improvement projects for the city, partially in response to the reluctance of overseas partners, customers and suppliers because of health concerns.

When Parikh presented slides to show achievements in Indore and explained the networking approach, Lalbhai expressed interest in supporting a similar initiative in Ahmedabad. Through this initiative, Arvind Mills could play a leadership role in making Ahmedabad a more attractive city and a more liveable city for its employees. In December 1994, Lalbhai agreed to support a pilot in a few localities in Ahmedabad. His conditions were that the pilot be undertaken in areas where employees of AML lived and that he would not attend meetings. Once Lalbhai made the decision, he gave one of the Directors in AML the responsibility for coordination on behalf of AML.

On 1 April 1995, AML and Parikh signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a pilot that aimed to i) improve the basic physical and non-physical infrastructure facilities within the slum area; ii) facilitate the process of community development, and iii) build city level organisation for 'slum-networking' and infrastructure development (Tripathi 1998). Parikh was contracted to carry out all activities required for the accomplishment of the project. He was responsible for all technical issues related to programme formulation, planning and implementation; for developing organisational mechanisms within the group, corporation or other NGOs for replicating the work on a larger scale, and for training related to community development work by Baroda Citizen's Council, which was already involved in implementing a pilot in Vadodara. By August 1995, Mote

and Parikh recruited an architect-planner, Uttara Chauhan as a Project Consultant for coordinating the technical aspects of the pilot project and Niraj Lal - a graduate in Rural Management, to coordinate the community coordination and motivation aspects.

By this time, the communication for the intervention was only between Parikh and AML. Patel and Zaveri, who were interested in professionally contributing to this process, had not received any communication on the subject from Parikh. Sometime after August 1995, Patel and Zaveri learnt from outside sources that the Slum Networking initiative had gathered momentum and was a substantial project. This was unexpected, and although they believed that the partnership approach for implementing slum improvement was sustainable, they decided not to expend their energy on the politics of 'projects' (Interview P2).

6.2.1.1 NGO Involvement

During this period, Parikh met Rajendra Joshi - the Managing Trustee of Saath, a local NGO, and discussed with him the possibility of partnering in the slum-networking initiative in Ahmedabad (Interviews). For Joshi, the concept of communities paying for services matched Saath's belief of extending services to the poor in a responsive way while building people's confidence through partnerships rather than charity. Saath was already providing basic health and education services at a cost and had introduced processes that ensured accountability of the NGO staff to the slum residents who paid for their services.

Comment 6: Saath exploring and understanding viability of providing infrastructure in slums

> In 1993, I discovered that there was a rudimentary illegal drainage system in place in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar. I found that it was paid for by the residents in the areas. Because it was rudimentary, it would overflow etc and when there was a problem, they paid someone to clear it up for them. At this point of time, I was somewhat aware of the achievements at Orangi as a Government programme rather than as a community initiative. This awareness had come about because of my earlier association with Father Erviti. Maybe I had a block in my mind, that getting infrastructure at their own initiative would be too expensive and hence had not considered facilitating this process. Thus, when the question of communities paying a proportion of the cost of infrastructure came up, I did not hesitate in committing to their willingness to pay.
>
> The objective of environmental improvement was significant because the prevailing conditions were such that they were breeding places for many diseases. The first impression on entering a slum is the poor environmental conditions, which impacts the health and poverty in slums as found through later studies. This condition could be changed by partnering for the SNP.
>
> All the ingredients for a successful intervention/ outcome of a project were present in the proposed initiative from partnering with the local government that is responsible for providing basic services, to a Corporate House that would bring in a professional approach to Himanshu Parikh - a professional who had shown through the Indore project services can be provided in slums areas. Thus, partnering for this intervention did not raise any questions amongst the Saath team.
>
> This was a personal decision of Rajendra Joshi and Robert David – the two people who were leading Saath's work at the field level, and was supported by the Saath Team and Board of Trustees. This was followed by a request to Saath's funding agency for utilising part of the grant for undertaking community development/ education, health and livelihood activities in Sanjay Nagar. The slides shown by Himanshu Parikh were convincing enough and some information had been gathered from other sources (Interview Saath).

The opportunity for participating in the SNP Pilot was a way of facilitating a process that enabled slum residents to become part of the urban mainstream. Joshi had heard about the Orangi Pilot Project approach for extending sanitation and drainage lines in slums from his mentor - Fr Erviti,

but had not expected to facilitate such actions with the limited funds and expertise at their disposal. At Joshi's request, Parikh made a presentation to the Saath team, including representatives of a women's CBO from Pravinnagar-Guptanagar. The presentation and discussions convinced the Saath team that it was possible to access regular individual connections in slums with narrow lanes and small houses (Interviews). The Saath team expressed its interest in participating in SNP at Pravinnagar-Guptanagar, a slum of about 1200 households where Saath was active at the time, and invited Parikh to visit the settlement. After the visit and discussions with Joshi, Parikh recommended Saath to Arvind Mills as a partner for undertaking the community development activities in the Pilot Phase of SNP. The key reasons for partnering with Arvind Mills and AMC for the intervention were identified by Saath as follows (Interview Joshi):

- Saath saw its Integrated Slum Development Programme as a software component of development that SNP complemented with the hardware for environmental improvement. The opportunity of partnering with Arvind Mills would complement Saath's work and bring in private sector contributions for upgrading the settlement. Saath would in turn provide its services in the slums selected for the pilot by Arvind Mills.
- Involvement of the local government that is responsible for providing basic services, and of a Corporate House that would bring in a professional approach, while Parikh would provide professional expertise that had already been demonstrated through the Indore project.
- This would not be top-down support by the private sector or the Municipal Corporation but a partnership where costs were shared, making all stakeholders accountable to each other.

The physical improvement together with the other development interventions would make it more integrated and holistic. Thus, the opportunity had multiple implications in terms of Saath's work and participation of slum residents in the interventions. By June 1995, Saath agreed to partner with the AML team. Thus, the decision for implementing a pilot in Ahmedabad was made with the involvement of four stakeholder groups, namely AML representing the private sector, Saath as the NGO facilitator, the community as services users and Parikh as the technical expert.

6.2.1.2 AMC Involvement

Parikh met Verma after they were introduced by Doshi with the objective of getting support for a citywide project based on the pilot initiative to be implemented with AML. He had submitted a preliminary proposal for 'Slum Networking' of Ahmedabad City to AMC by July 1995. Once Verma was introduced to the slum-networking concept, he wanted to initiate and get approval of the Standing Committee for a citywide project covering all the city's slums. So Parikh was requested to prepare a proposal for SNP as a citywide project. The key factors that distinguished the proposed slum-networking approach in Ahmedabad from other slum improvement projects in India were:

- Public facilities for water supply and sewerage were to be substituted with household level

connections. This would eliminate problems associated with lack of ownership such as vandalism of public toilets and stand-posts and, of maintenance and related health and security hazards.

- The divide between the planned infrastructure networks of the city and the under serviced areas would be bridged, and enable upgrading or renewal of surrounding public spaces, especially when located along the river and lake.
- Through topography management, the costs related to generally approved standards of design for infrastructure would be reduced.

For AMC, the slum-networking proposal provided an opportunity to 'change the face of the city', to pursue the slum upgrading objectives, and improve environmental conditions of the city, to get into a formal partnership with the private sector and an NGO, and converge existing schemes with the project (Interview). The expected benefits included overall improvement in the environmental quality of the area and its surroundings, and on the health of the inhabitants. A potential benefit was that shelter occupants would invest in improving their houses.

The consensus of shelter occupants and/or owners was required to take connections for water supply and sewerage, and to related requirements of widening of roads and lanes for laying the pipes and man-holes. For implementing SNP, the settlement has to be 'legitimised' through notification or the land is owned by the occupants; and it is physically possible to connect the physical infrastructure of an area to a source of water supply, and a sewer line. In areas where sewerage network was not available, an option of connecting several settlements to some type of sewage treatment facility was envisaged.

6.2.2 Iterative process of project design evolution

The proposal evolved with inputs from the different partners. AMC wanted to bear a larger part of the costs, even for the pilot phase, while Saath - based on its experience, argued that it would be difficult for the slum residents to pay 50 percent of the cost of the in-slum infrastructure. In addition, Saath had already established the principle of partners making financial contributions for greater accountability, and wanted to bear part of the costs for the community development inputs.

Both the requests were acceded to, thereby dispelling Joshi's perceived risk of the private sector partner imposing its will on the partnership (Interview). Saath had already associated with the health and community development departments of AMC for support to TB patients and for construction of toilets under AMC's 90: 10 subsidy scheme, so it did not have any concerns about partnering with AMC. This led to the financing arrangement (shown in Table 6-1), which was different from what Parikh had proposed for Ahmedabad and what was introduced in Vadodara.

Parikh prepared drafts of notes for AMC to be presented for the formal approval of SNP within AMC. On 28 September 1995, the Standing Committee of the AMC gave its formal approval for

the project (AMC Resolution) (Refer Appendix 4). The SNP was to cover 2432 settlements comprising 228,894 dwelling units (1023 slums comprising 92,121 dwelling units and 1409 chawls comprising 136,773 dwelling units) by the year 2000. The pilot proposal was prepared to cover about 3300 households in four slums areas. However, residents of Keshavlal Kachwala-ni-chawl opted out together with residents of Sakalchand Mukhi-ni-Chali whom the corporator of the area promised to get the services at no cost (Interview N02). The Resolution approved partnerships with AML as the implementer of the physical works and with Saath for community development activities. The Committee also named the initiative "Pandit Deendayal Upadhyay Antoydaya Slum Networking Project" after a revered leader of the ruling political party (Tripathi 1998). However, the intervention continued to be referred to as the Slum Networking Project or SNP within AMC and amongst the other stakeholders involved at the time.

Table 6-1: Financial Contributions per dwelling unit by Partners in Ahmedabad

Component	As Planned in 1995				Actual in 2006 (DIABP entry)			
	AMC	Community	Private Sector	NGO	AMC	Community	NGO	Total
Internal Physical Development	2,000	2,000	2,000	Nil	4,000	2,000	Nil	6,000
Community development	700	Nil	Nil	300	700	Nil	300	1,000
Networking	3,000	Nil	Nil	Nil	3,000	Nil	Nil	3,000
Community corpus	Nil	100	Nil	Nil	Nil	100	Nil	100
Individual toilet	4,500	Nil	Nil	Nil	5,800	Nil	Nil	5,800
Total	10,200	2,100	2,000	300	13,500	2,100	300	15,800

Source: AMC

In terms of financial contributions, the residents, industrial partner and AMC were to contribute one-third of the in-slum infrastructure costs, which came to Rs 2000 each. AMC expected to get additional funds from financing institutions such as HUDCO and HDFC. Saath's commitment for the CD component consisted of: i) Setting up of residents' association, women's groups and youth activities; ii) Educational activities for pre-school children and literacy classes to improve literacy; iii) Community health interventions and education; iv) Supporting income generating activities; and v) Mobilizing community savings for undertaking physical works. 30 percent of the approved cost of Rs 1000 for these activities was to be borne by Saath and 70 percent by the AMC. The SNP hardware components included roads and paving, storm water drainage, street lighting, solid waste management and landscaping, underground sewerage (toilets to be built by the residents at their own cost or under AMC's subsidy scheme), and individual water supply connections.

6.2.3 Procedural Issues

Although there was no reference formally about seeking funding from donor agencies for implementation of the project, from its inception, Parikh drafted letters for Verma to selected donor agencies (Interview PC5). For Verma, the SNP proposal led to a meeting with Lalbhai - the

Managing Director of AML. Verma convinced Lalbhai to reduce AML's contribution for the Slum Networking Pilot to one-third of the total cost and enter into a partnership with AMC for financing the redevelopment of C G Road on a 100 percent recovery basis (Interview U5). By 21 August 1995, when work on a 'sample patch' of the Chimanlal Girdhardas Road (C G Road) was near completion, Verma negotiated financing of the C G Road Redevelopment project through AML (Interview PC2 and C G Road files).

Comment 7: Constraints of an urban local body

> "One has to accept that we are a public body and it is supposed to be very clear about dealing with finances. We are subject to audit and we have to ensure that all the principles of financial propriety are maintained. Even if we hand over to a private sector, the private sector will have to ensure that so far as our money is concerned, we have to ensure that financial propriety is there and we can demonstrate that it is there. That much the Corporation will have to ensure. The money from AMC to SHARDA Trust was not a grant that could be used any way. It was a joint project where we were putting our money - somebody was administering our money and therefore it was necessary to check. We did not have any doubts about the integrity of Arvind Mills but Ahmedabad is a metropolis. Today it is Arvind Mills, tomorrow may be somebody else may come – and if we say we do not want to see anything, then one can squander the money. Therefore, we had to be clear and lay the right tracks to ensure that it will work. We wanted to institutionalize the process. The Senior Deputy Municipal Commissioner who started the Zonal System was put in charge of SNP process to establish the right tracks that would set the precedent for others to follow." (Interview U5).

For enabling the partnership, AMC required changes to many of its procedures. For the pilot, AMC for the first time gave money to the private sector to implement a project. AMC, as a public body wanted to ensure that all the principles of financial propriety were maintained, and wanted to establish a process that could be followed for all future partnerships irrespective of the partner or project. Although there was a problem in the way the AMC engineers handled this, AMC insisted on following procedures, which created delays in implementation of the pilot (Interview U5).

Saath's request to its funding agency CORDAID (then CEBEMO) for extending its scope of work to the SNP Pilot areas and for contributing partial costs (30 percent) for community development activities was endorsed. However, the additional area and its distant location from Saath's current area of work meant that Saath had to increase its capacity for implementing the work (Interview). For AML, the decision by AMC to contribute funds for the pilot in 4 areas and paying a 20 percent advance, led to a decision to establish an NGO that could receive the payments from AMC. This was to avoid any issues with the AML's account keeping. In December 1995, AML established and registered SHARDA (Strategic Help Alliance for Relief to Distressed Areas) Trust as a charitable trust (SHARDA Trust documentation). The immediate objective of SHARDA Trust was to manage and execute the Pilot Project of AMC.

After the decision to implement SNP in Ahmedabad, a group of AMC and SHARDA Trust representatives visited Indore to look at the achievements under IHIP. During the visit, AMC identified one of the problems of IHIP as lack of involvement of IMC, and the problems of quality and sizes of pipes (Interview U2), which were later identified by the impact assessment study funded by DFID in 1997 (Dewan Verma 2000). The SHARDA Trust representatives were surprised to see the extent of investments made by people after physical infrastructure had been

improved in the slums (Interview N19). Neither Saath nor the community representatives were part of this exposure visit and until 2007, they had not visited Indore for a study visit (Interviews N02, N09, C1, and C2).

Figure 6-4: Decision Approach for Ahmedabad SNP



6.2.3.1 Financial arrangements

During this time, AML contacted some banks to support the initiative by extending loans to the slum residents. By February 1996, almost five months after the AMC Standing Committee Resolution on SNP, and over two weeks after tenders for the physical survey work in Sanjay Nagar were opened, SHARDA Trust had not convinced any commercial Bank to support the initiative (Interviews N19 and N03). Trustees of SHARDA Trust met with Ela Bhatt and Jayshree Vyas of SEWA Bank on 16 February 1996 to request SEWA's support for extending loans, and advice and expertise for imparting skills and for the income generation component of the project (Letter from SHARDA Trust to Ela Bhatt, CC to Saath). On 29 February 1996, Jayshree Vyas – Managing Director of SEWA Bank wrote to SHARDA Trust to convey the decision of the SEWA Board in principle to open savings accounts of members participating in SNP in Sanjay Nagar, and to extend loan facilities to them.

Since neither the slum residents nor the AMC trusted each other, SEWA Bank suggested a mechanism for securing the contributions of the slum residents. The mechanism ensured that community's money would remain with SEWA Bank until such time that the Resident's Association issued a cheque for transfer of funds to AMC/ SHARDA Trust. This mechanism has proved to be very beneficial. Firstly, the savings accounts for each family are opened in the name

of the woman, who has to learn how to operate the account over time. Secondly, it has enabled the slum residents to keep even small amounts of cash securely in the Bank. For SEWA Bank, the intervention has led to a growth in its customer base to all residents of slum areas where the SNP is implemented (Interview N03).

Comment 8: Donor funding for NGOs and evolution of good practices

> In 1995, Saath' was receiving funding from CEBEMO – a Netherlands based funding organisation that has merged with CORDAID. Thus, Saath wrote to CEBEMO requesting for utilisation of part of the grant received for Saath's 30% contribution in the SNP initiative in Sanjay Nagar. CEBEMO agreed to the request and hence, funds were available for Saath to work in Sanjay Nagar. Hence, if CEBEMO had not agreed to Saath's request, it would have been impossible for Saath to partner in the SNP initiative (Interview Saath).

6.2.3.2 Implementing the pilot

In mid-April 1996, a public notice was issued in the local papers for pre-qualifications and short listing of prospective contractors for SNP works, and the bids were opened on 26 April (Tripathi 1998). During this period, AML was awaiting issue of drawings showing final plot boundaries from AMC and for demarcation of the road lines around the plot. On 29 May 1996, Parikh and Trustees of SHARDA Trust held a meeting with more than 5 leaders of Sanjay Nagar - a slum located on land that belonged to the Lalbhai family and was reserved for a park in the Master Plan, for discussing the Preliminary Design (Letters). Parikh explained the consequences of the proposed road alignment to 22 houses that were to be affected by the proposal.

Comment 9: Perceptions of non-participating NGOs about SNP

> We were initially involved with SNP even before Saath came into the picture. We were approached by AMC when the programme was conceived and they were looking for partners and even before the selection of areas. We were involved in the process. It was a good opportunity but we also felt that the type of approach the Government should take toward the people was not there and that it will not give you self-sustainability and viability of the project on a mass scale. You may have it in 1 or 2 pockets, you can internationalise this, you can also get a lot of credit for what you do in a small area. I have read extensively on the SNP at the initial stage and also reports of NGOs and how Corporation has capitalised on it. But where are the poor in the whole process and the numbers of poor. OK - you do something now - if you do it for 10 people out of 100 it is good work, but what about the other 90%. That also has to be taken into consideration. ... Whom are you thinking of catering to. I think the Corporation has certain responsibilities and we as NGOs have certain responsibilities. ... There is a lot of politics involved in NGOs. Certain NGOs will work only in certain areas, certain NGOs within certain groups but will go along safer paths." (Interview N04)

The timing of this meeting and the financial arrangements are significant for two reasons. The options the community had were either to agree and get a ten-year guarantee against eviction, or disagree and lose the opportunity for legitimising their occupation of the land. The residents did not have any assurance about the security of their contributions. However, the 'risk' of eviction and the fact that many were employees of AML, made it easier to convince them to participate (Interview N02). Secondly, this initiated SEWA Bank's involvement with the project, and of SEWA members in Sanjay Nagar for collection of the savings. This is significant because published literature and the interviews reveal that despite documentation of the pilot and publication of "Alliance for Change" (Tripathi, 1998), there is fuzziness about: i) ownership of the

SNP; ii) about Saath being the NGO first invited to partner with SHARDA Trust, and iii) about the stage at which SEWA Bank was approached to provide financial assistance. While this is not a significant issue in isolation, it has influenced perceptions of NGOs about involvement in SNP (Interviews PC3, N21, and N04) and of AMC elected representatives (Interview U6) and staff (Interviews U5, D2, and U15) on 'ownership' of the intervention.

Comment 10: Differences amongst perceptions of partners

> "There is a feeling sometimes – not all the times, even in the Municipal Administration, that SEWA takes the credit and even does not recognize Ahmedabad Corporation when they talk outside – saying Parivartan is our project – the name they have given to the Project. They always say in the Parivartan project we are working with the Corporation. As such, Corporation has invited them. It is not a project of theirs but a project of the Corporation. So there is a feeling that if you are doing something, you are doing it at our request. We want to give you a project. You are working with us. You cannot say it is your project and that the Corporation is assisting you. It is the other way round. That feeling is there of the Corporation and that sometimes creates an unpleasantness in agreement in giving work to SEWA ... There is questioning - why should they project themselves as the sole person when the major role is of the Corporation, which spends 80 percent of the money and you do not even recognize us.... SEWA also does its job satisfactorily but sometimes internal - external projections, more so international projections are as if it is their project – they take larger credit than what AMC deserves." (Interview U5)

Parikh also introduced the option available to all households for building individual toilets, under AMC's subsidy scheme wherein AMC provided 90 percent of the cost. The leaders were willing, provided SHARDA Trust remained an intermediary to ensure block payments of subsidy by AMC (Interviews N02 and N19). On 7 June 1996, SHARDA Trust formally requested Saath to prepare and submit a detailed proposal for the CD component of the project at Sanjay Nagar for the formal (project) period from June 1995 to December 1997 (letter).

On 25 July 1996, the AMC Standing Committee passed a Resolution (No. 715) permitting collection of community contribution of Rs 2000 per household for SNP, and permitting integration of the 90:10 individual toilet scheme with the project. The invocation ceremony to mark the launching of the physical works was held on 5 August 1996. After implementation was started, AML decided to have the toilets built at the same time rather than leave the decision of building the toilet to the house owner. This has led to inclusion of individual toilets in the components of SNP, and resulted in related benefits to the community. SHARDA Trust also facilitated the convergence of the Government's scheme for subsidised electricity connections for the slum. The infrastructure component of the SNP Pilot Project in Sanjay Nagar was completed on 19 April 1997, 28 months after Parikh first met Lalbhai.

Box 6-8: Roles of SNP Partners

> The housing micro-finance institutions surveyed addressed infrastructure issues in various ways, most often by extending loans to beneficiaries to finance infrastructure connections, or through partnerships with public authorities. SEWA featured the most advanced program for addressing this issue, through their participation in the Slum Networking Project in Ahmedabad. Each rupee of savings raised by SEWA members leverages one rupee from the private sector and seven rupees from the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation towards the provision of infrastructure.

Source: CUDS 2000

While the introduction and approval of the intervention in Ahmedabad was smooth, the relationship between the key stakeholders deteriorated during implementation of the pilot project in the first slum. On 27 January 1997, at a Board meeting of SHARDA Trust, the Trust's consultant suggested that because of difficulties faced in implementation of the project at Sanjay Nagar, one option was to abandon the project on completion of works in Sanjay Nagar. This left Saath in a defensive position because it had already started collecting contributions from households in its intervention area. As documented by Tripathi in "Alliance for Change" (1998), the differences between AMC and Parikh, SHARDA Trust and Parikh, SHARDA Trust and AMC, and between SHARDA Trust and Saath, could not be reconciled. The SNP Pilot in Ahmedabad was terminated by Arvind Mills on completion of physical works in one slum covering 181 huts rather than in four slums covering 3300. households.

Comment 11: Seeing partnership for enabling access to Watsan as a win-win situation

> "This is a win-win situation and served the interests of all partners. All the partners function differently but accepted each other's way of doing things. Had to deal with a different type of entity rather than compete with them. The partnership approach is a win-win situation where the partners have not tried to change the operational styles of the other partners. Each partner has evolved its way of functioning over time. The partners understand that the partnership cannot be based on the foundations of their ideologies but needs to be focused on the objectives of the partnership. ... There was no fear of losing ones identity in the partnership. On Saath's part, there was suspicion about SHARDA Trust's motives as well as inequalities and a sense of loss of power to act as each partner considered appropriate with this leading partner. SHARDA Trust failed to recognise the need for flexibility in the pilot phase. This was rectified after the Pilot Phase when AMC led the partnership. There was a failure to recognise different personality types and communication styles in the pilot phase because of the short lead time. The implementation of the pilot project, did not provide an opportunity for developing the necessary understanding amongst the partners. SHARDA Trust's or rather Dr Mote and Uttara Chauhan's lack of flexibility in the approaches and functioning of the partners led to a situation where AMC and Saath had to reconcile to the top-down approach" (Interview Saath).

The above sentiments reflect lack of clarity about the actual processes and contributions of the partners in SNP. The private sector partner identified major failures of the project as (Tripathi 1998 and Interview N19):

- Delay and friction caused between contractors and AMC site engineers because of lack of clearly defined roles. Although the SNP cell was established, coordination with the other departments was difficult and basic details were not available for decision-making because of the uncooperative attitude of AMC staff toward the project.
- Delays resulted in financial losses to SHARDA Trust. Administrative cost were high at 35.07 percent compared to project related costs (on-site infrastructure, physical surveys of Sanjay Nagar and Pravinnagar-Guptanagar - 3000 dwelling units, construction of 10 sample toilets, newspaper advertisements for survey and construction tenders, supervision fees and documentation charges). If the Trust had upgraded more slums to cover 3300 dwelling units as planned, the project overheads would not have appeared as high.
- Little achievement in community development because community health received the maximum attention followed by non-formal education. The targets for the number of

preschool children attending the classes, teachers receiving training and for skill development and income generation were not achieved. The NGO proceeded cautiously toward creating community organisations, and after registration of the Residents' Association, women and youth groups were not formed.

With the partnership between AMC-Parikh-SHARDA Trust-Saath dissolving, and Verma's three-year term as Municipal Commissioner ending by October 1997, the future of SNP was uncertain. However, SEWA and SEWA Bank's network and participation at various forums ensured that external support agencies heard about the initiative.

Comment 12: SNP Pilot and Saath

> Saath decided on the 2 year health, education and livelihood targets based on its experience in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar and achieved 70% to 80% of these targets the kinds being 100% infants to be immunised etc. The comment in the book about Saath not meeting its targets is a reference to the livelihood component rather than others. SHARDA Trust and Saath's unhappiness was with the livelihood component. Saath did not have the required skills for this component at the time and hence the shortfall in target achievement. For the CD component, the ISDP model at that time had the health and education components and the livelihoods initiative was limited to sewing classes. So Saath attempted replicating them in Sanjay Nagar. One of the failings of Saath was to improve livelihood in Sanjay Nagar – but could not address satisfactorily. It would have taken much longer – and from current experience, even if the skills were available, the livelihoods cannot be improved within 2 years (Interview Saath).

The achievements under the pilot at Sanjay Nagar can be summarised as follows – both in terms of evolution of the SNP approach and implementation arrangements (Interviews):

- Resolution by AMC Standing Committee to implement a city-wide project for up grading slums, wherein the residents would pay a fixed amount for getting individual connections.
- The partnership approach wherein NGOs would facilitate the participation of the residents and in the process, provide an interface between the community and AMC, and contractors.
- Possibility of getting part of the financial contribution from the slum residents.
- On follow-up by SHARDA Trust, convergence of subsidized low-cost sanitation programme with SNP.
- Reveal the extent of inter-departmental problems within AMC, including reliability of data provided and inter-personal issues amongst staff.
- Agreement with SEWA Bank for financial arrangements and an institutional mechanism for securely holding community contributions.
- For the AMC, it brought a lot of attention to its ground-breaking approach, and perhaps contributed to its continuation in the long-term.

6.2.4 Parallel activities for up-scaling Ahmedabad SNP

During this period, other ongoing activities influenced the future of SNP in Ahmedabad greatly.

Parallel activities had been initiated at the AMC level for up-scaling of the intervention. USAID and its newly initiated FIRE-D project, supported several activities in the city, including an Environmental Workbook.

Comment 13: Donor perceptions of up-scaling

> "All USAID - promoted concepts were introduced in Ahmedabad. ... After the first Arvind Mills supported project, USAID supported others like Lion's Club and Round Table to take up partnerships with AMC. USAID's first meeting with respect to SNP was with Mihir Bhatt and Renana Jhabwala on setting-up a specialized unit of SEWA for implementing SNP." (Interview D9)

Box 6-9: Difference in knowledge about SNP partners

> Data collection involved ... 20 semi-structured interviews with staff at MHT, SEWA Bank, AMC, World Vision, *Disha* and other NGOs in Ahmedabad. ...
>
> Out of the 40 or more NGOs that attended the session, only about five expressed an interest in partnering with the AMC. Of these, only two - MHT and a smaller NGO called SAATH (Initiatives for Urban Equity) - finally served as NGO partners in the project..

Source: Baruah 2007

The USAID representative had met with the SEWA Executive Director and Mihir Bhatt and agreed to support SEWA for up-scaling SNP through a new organisation (Interview D9). Subsequently, the new entity of SEWA, which was officially registered as Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust (Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust) in 1994, was supported by USAID (Interviews D9 and D13). The Board of Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust comprises 'organisations' including SEWA, SEWA Bank and Foundation for Public Interest for technical support (SEWA Academy 2002).

On 1 November 1996, while SHARDA Trust was implementing works in Sanjay Nagar, residents of Sinheshwari Nagar wrote a letter to AMC requesting participation in SNP. The letter listed 40 names (and 29 signatures) of residents who were willing to participate in the SNP.

6.2.4.1 Working for donor support

By 22 Nov 1996, a visit to look at SNP was agreed with representatives of RWSG-SA (now WSP-SA but called UNDP - World Bank in AMC). The meeting was organised with support of Bhatt (Interview), On 25 November 1996, the first meeting of the Steering Committee for "Pandit Deendayal Upadhyay Antoydaya Yojana" was held to coincide with this visit.

On 26 November 1996, the WSP-SA representatives visited the two pilot slum areas (Sanjay Nagar and Pravinnagar-Guptanagar, which was a Saath Pilot slum area), and the newly identified Sinheshwari Nagar where vendors have been relocated in 1984 (SEWA Academy 2000). The team also visited Sharif Khan Pathan-ni-Chali. In early December, noting in AMC files urged for 3-day time-limit actions from various officers responsible for providing maps, site information and status of Sinheshwari Nagar, Sanjay Nagar Tekri and Sharif Khan Pathan ni Chali (SEWA areas). From 17 December, 1996, emphasis on internal communication within AMC was on completion of tasks within given time-limits and of treating Sinheshwari Nagar (43 dwelling units), and Sharif Khan

Pathan-ni-Chali (105 dwelling units) as World Bank Projects for which the Municipal Commissioner was keen on seeing progress.

Box 6-10: SNP and SEWA: Sinheshwari Nagar – A Relocation Area

> "Here I would like to share the experience of one of the Parivartan areas, namely Sinheshwari Nagar, with you. We (SEWA) have known the residents of Sinheshwari for over twenty years. Previously they lived in an area called Chhaguratna-na-Chhapra. In Gujarati, chhapra describes a collection of hutments or a slum. It was located within an extended area owned by one of the larger textile mills of Ahmedabad – before it closed down due to the acute competition faced by globalisation of the economy. This area would get submerged every year during the rains, till it finally became unliveable. The AMC then awarded a different piece of land to these workers, where Sinheshwari Nagar is currently located. Till the physical upgradation work was completed last year, the relocated residents had no access to basic services even in their new settlement. They continued as slum residents; today – there is a complete transformation in their perception. They rightly believe that they are residents of Sinheshwari Nagar – a colony and not a slum anymore.
>
> SEWA has some experience of working with various external funding organisations. In the specific case of Parivartan, the UNDP - World Bank Water and Sanitation Program were involved in the project design and detailing with the AMC. They have now withdrawn, but SEWA's relationship with them continues in the form of a formal strategic alliance partnership with MHT - the first that they have signed with an NGO. Similarly, we have submitted a proposal to USAID through the Government's Housing and Urban Development Corporation, to provide improved physical, financial, social and information infrastructure to our members."

Source: Bhatt 2000

On 17 July 1997, the DyMC in-charge of SNP issued an Office-Order to three officers of the SNP Cell for completion of several tasks within 1 to 3 weeks (SNP File on Sinheshwari Nagar). The tasks included a) preparation of a list of 17 feasible slums for SNP with design and estimates for which Mihir Bhatt (FPI) could assist the officers, b) To get physical survey of Phase I slums done through contracts, and compile other information from the Zones, and c) Identify and prepare a proposal for capacity building for computing skills for sending to RWSG-SA (UNDP). Subsequently, surveys and studies were undertaken in these two slums (SEWA Academy 2002; WSP-SA 2007a).

The SNP or "Pandit Deendayal Upadhyay Antoydaya Yojana" of AMC was known amongst many 'outsiders' and donor agencies in particular, as "Parivartan" meaning transformation. As for its other interventions, SEWA had renamed the SNP as Parivartan for convenience and more easily understood terminology amongst its members (Interviews N10 and N15). While UNDP - World Bank's WSP-SA (RWSSG) published field-notes on the SNP using SEWA's terminology for the intervention, others refer to Parivartan as a new name for AMC's SNP (Mahadevia 1997). However, staff within AMC and other stakeholders in Ahmedabad involved in the improved areas continue to refer to the project as SNP.

Besides the support from WSP-SA and USAID during 1998-99, substantial funds were sanctioned by HUDCO (Rs 28.8 million in 1998) and HDFC (Rs 27 million in 1999) to the SEWA Bank for longer-term housing and infrastructure loans (WSP-SA, undated). By late 1999, WSP-SA had published six field-notes on i) Quick Slum Survey (July 1997), ii) Community Based Organisations (May 1998), iii) Ahmedabad Parivartan (undated but published after 31 March 1999), iv) The Partners (May 1999), v) Financing Community Investments (May 1999), and vi)

Credit Connections: SEWA Bank (1999). The set of field-notes provided information on various aspects of the intervention. In contrast to the focus of donors on financing SEWA to enable slum residents get loans, because of the slow pace of implementation, as well as a preference amongst slum residents to borrow from relatives (FGDs), not many residents of SNP areas have taken loans for paying their share of contributions (Interview N03).

Box 6-11: SNP in the public domain

> "With regard to the organisations involved, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank Regional Water and Sanitation Group for South Asia (RWSG-SA) provided conceptual design support and financial support to the project. For financial support to the physical infrastructure, along with UNDP and RWSG-SA, much of the budget was to be provided by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) to the AMC and SEWA Bank. For community development, SHARDA Trust: Strategic Help Alliance for Relief to Distressed Areas Trust of Arvind Mills, an Ahmedabad-based large textile mill corporation and Lions Club provided a large portion of this component. .....
>
> Another central figure of the SNP is community development. With regard to the technical assistance in the CBO management, the Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust (MHT), another sister organisation of SEWA, and the Foundation for Public Interest (FPI) implement the programme 'Housing Clinic', which aims at creating de facto CBO leadership of several women in some SNP implemented slums. The core components of this programme are: (1) assessment of social needs of the slums for initiating and facilitating community development with the SEWA movement; (2) identification and selection of new project areas with the AMC; (3) facilitating the opening of an account of each beneficiary with the SEWA Bank; and (4) capacity building of CBOs and others with local communities (MHT 2001). In the field of health care and non-formal education, an NGO, Saath is involved in two slums. The Urban Planning Partnerships (UPP) of FPI, an NGO working for capacity building of slum population and building networks between them and the local government bodies, has been running its Community Resource Centres (CRCs) in three SNP implemented slums and provides computer classes to slum children".

Source: Sato 2003

This period marks the start of a parallel process of the slum-networking initiative. In the build-up for up-scaling SNP with donor agency support, issues such as time required for 'community mobilization and participation' were set aside in the efforts for 'organising micro-finance capacity of SEWA Bank for infrastructure' for the slum residents. In reality, because of the slow pace of implementation, and the preference of the slum residents, not many residents of SNP areas have taken loans for paying their share of contributions (Interview N03 and FGDs).

Table 6-2: Areas improved under SNP and involvement of NGOs

	Nos. of slums	No of dwelling units	Total cost for upgrading in Rs million	Average no. of dwelling units per area
SEWA/ Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust	29	3298	51.558	114
Saath	4	1821	25.584	455
World Vision	1	300	8.481	300
No NGOs	4	966	17.682	242
	38	6385	103.305	

Source: SNP Cell, AMC, June 2007

The issues involved in a city-wide intervention, especially for convincing people in larger slum areas with mixed communities and caste groups were not raised during the 'strategic discussions'. The need for looking at different options for enabling access to basic services in slums located on

privately owned land, and land owned by AMC, and the Government also was not highlighted. Nowhere in the documentation are the differences between land issues of the different slums, their sizes, or complexity mentioned. SEWA's role in urban slums expanded from housing construction for a few schemes and training of women in construction skills to slum up grading through its associate organisation Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust.

SEWA and its affiliates, including Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust and UPP, have facilitated and subsequently upgraded the maximum number of slums under SNP. In addition other sister organisations such as SEWA Academy are involved in providing complementary support for capacity building and documentation. Saath has facilitated implementation of SNP in fewer areas, but because the areas are larger, the facilitation process is more complex and involved, and entails working with different caste and occupation groups (Interview Saath).

Box 6-12: Differences in perceptions about facilitating participation in different sized slums

> ... credited the work of SAATH in providing health, education, and microcredit services, albeit in a smaller number of slums than MHT. She emphasized that interacting with a smaller client base at a very personal level and being able to experiment with different systems of collateral and credit gives small NGOs an edge that a large established organization like SEWA Bank, with its broad portfolio and the constraints of inflexible lending structures, is unable to provide to its clientele.

Source: Baruah 2007

The experience of the two main NGOs varies in implementing SNP because of the size of settlements in which they have facilitated the process. Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust has facilitated SNP in slums of between 25 to 400 dwelling units with an average of 114 dwelling units per improved area. Saath has facilitated SNP in four slums with range between 181 to 1200 dwelling units – the largest slum improved to date (Pravinnagar-Guptanagar). The slums where SNP was implemented without NGO support also ranged between 147 to 525 dwelling units (K K Vishwanath-ni-Chali also called Machhipir-na-chappra).

Figure 6-5: NGO facilitated SNP coverage by Dwelling Units



Source: AMC 2006

Comment 14: Community mobilisation in different sized slums

> The process of community motivation and mobilisation is more complicated in larger slums, especially if it also has multi-community residents. A single community place is easier. When there is more than one community, there are inter-community differences, rivalries, misunderstandings.
>
> In terms of the process, because there was one Residents' Association in Sanjay Nagar, the Saath Team started with the idea of organising one Residents' Association in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar. However, in about 2 to 3 months, it was obvious that this would not work. Pravinnagar-Guptanagar being more than six times the number of houses in Sanjay Nagar, and comprising of three diverse geographical groups and six community/ occupational groups, was like a fractured polity. The office bearers and representatives that were acceptable to all were turning out to be the least powerful and ineffective individuals. Thus, we decided to separate and organise the Residents' Association by the existing groupings. Subsequently, six Residents' Association evolved to represent groups by both caste and neighbourhood. Things started moving after that.
>
> In multi-community and large slums, besides other socio-economic inequalities, there was unequal access to services and those without access to services often had to take obligations from those who had. With universal access to services in these areas, SNP has acted as a good equaliser. (Interviews Saath)

Comment 15: Differences amongst perceptions of partners

> "Our principal partners are Saath and SEWA for SNP. They are the only partners I would say. Later on, lot of people have shown interest. However, principally, we recognise their major contribution. They have not only been a partner but they have been fully supporting the whole concept, they have helped in developing the concept as well – they have lived with us in the project. As far as SEWA Bank is concerned, it has also been part of the same to help in micro-finance mechanism in helping the people wanting a loan from SEWA Bank. Wherever people were interested, they went to the doorstep to disburse money, give support. So that is their role." (Interview U5)

6.3 Improvisation

AMC had to further change the approach for implementation of SNP because of changing situations. By 2000, AMC had introduced several changes in the SNP conditions and processes in response to the ground reality. The changes were (AMC minutes of meeting, interviews U15, U17, N02, and N 15):

- The contribution from residents was made more flexible. Houses with existing toilets paid Rs 300 less. Even if the toilets were constructed under subsidy scheme of 90:10 and had to be demolished because of changes in road levels, AMC provided new ones for the same huts. Those with a legal water connection paid Rs 500 less and similarly for a drainage connection. Thus, the minimum amount a hut owner had to pay is Rs 700.
- Road widths were to be 8 to 10 feet but AMC agreed to 6 ft road widths and narrower paths.
- Manhole locations could be shifted away from the entrance of houses to other locations.
- A house owner with more than one hut had to pay connection charges for only one hut.
- If a few households did not want to participate, they were left out. They however got the benefits of the road and drainage facility.
- The elected representatives of Wards could contribute a maximum of Rs 1000 per hut (for all huts in a slum), and thereby subsidize the household's connections for the residents. This

enabled a contribution from the Councillor's budget for development of the area and gave them an opportunity to 'do a visible activity' for their vote-banks'.

- The specification for water supply pipes in the original proposal for SNP was changed. AMC wanted Ductile Iron Pipes used for the 4 and 6 inches water pipes to maintain the same standard for the whole network. This was because AMC was responsible for the quality of water supplied to the residents of Ahmedabad and wanted to ensure that the network was made of a reliable material and chances of contamination of water were minimized. Therefore, for all works related to the water mains, labour only contracts were given.

To get other slum residents to participate in SNP, AMC staff distributed pamphlets and showed videos to slum residents. This approach was successful as demonstrated by the many applications submitted to the SNP Cell. However, very few of these were eligible and AMC had to backtrack (Interview U26). From late 2000, there was a spurt in activities to up scale SNP implementation. In 2001, because of long delays in getting administrative clearances for each slum from different Departments and Zone Offices, AMC undertook a survey in partnership with Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust and Saath, and with the AMC engineering staff at the Muster Offices. The aim was to compile information on status of services available within and around all the slums and chawls in Ahmedabad and to determine priority and viability of implementing SNP in the areas (Interviews N02, N15, U15, and U26). The Deputy Municipal Commissioner personally visited about 300 slums that were on AMC or on plots reserved for specific uses in the Master Plan and 500 plane-table surveys were conducted in the slums (Interview U26). Of the 700 to 800 slums that were short listed, 'no-objection certificates' for undertaking SNP were given for 499 slums.

Table 6-3: Distribution of slums improved under SNP by size

No of Huts	No of slums	% of total
Up to 50	6	15.79
51 to 100	11	28.95
101 to 150	9	23.68
151 to 200	4	10.53
201 to 300	5	13.16
301 to 500	1	2.63
501 to 700	1	2.63
701 to 1000	0	0.00
More than 1000	1	2.63
Total	38	100.00

Source: SNP Cell, AMC, June 2007

This led to granting of bulk administrative approval and issue of tender notices for undertaking SNP works in 499 settlements. However, the contractors formed a cartel and quoted higher rates for undertaking the works, resulting in AMC re-tendering the works and subsequently inviting NGOs to submit Expression of Interest for implementation of SNP. After that, AMC started giving NGO contracts for planning and implementation of SNP at the Schedule of Rates (Interviews N15,

U15, and U26). This has enabled AMC to access funding under the National Slum Development Programme (NSDP). In addition, there was a mismatch between the pace of contributions from slum residents and the pace of work done by the contractors. The outcome of this mismatch was that the NGOs had to face the ire of slum residents for the slow pace of infrastructure works done. This was another factor that led to NGOs undertaking the physical works.

Comment 16: Flexibility in standards

> According to the original technical specifications, Parikh had proposed a minimum lane width of 4 feet, a requirement for which some residents in Sanjay Nagar had to forfeit 50 per cent of their house areas. Currently, these lanes are used for parking handcarts.
>
> In contrast, Saath had already been working in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar, for 7 years, and the community had been enabled to participate. Thus, when the plans were brought for discussions with the residents, the community realised that the proposed lanes would require a lot of cutting and too many houses would have to be reduced in size. They negotiated with the engineers and AMC to adjust the lane widths and minimise reduction in house areas. AMC agreed to the request. Consequently, the lane widths in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar range from 6 feet to a minimum of 2 feet in some parts. None of the 2 feet wide lanes is more than 30 feet long.
>
> Within the community, in situations where some residents had to give up some of the resources – it was acceptable when it was not too large. Even in cases where the community or individual households had substantial resources in the form of say open land, they willingly gave up part of the land e.g. the decision of a rabari (cow herding community) to give-up a two feet wide stretch of land for an arterial road within the slum is an exception about which even AMC was surprised. This was the first incidence they were witnessing where the community voluntarily gave up part of their land. (Interviews Saath)

6.3.1 Donor support

In 1999, the World Bank, Cities Alliance, WSP-SA and USAID supported some key activities in Ahmedabad, including a City Development Strategy, and studies for a project proposal that AMC and Government of Gujarat were preparing for submitting to the World Bank (CMAG and WB documents). USAID supported formation of the City Managers Association Gujarat in September to manage urban growth, mobilize resources, improve infrastructure services and support the development of a market-based urban infrastructure finance system (CMAG 2002).

World Bank/ WSP-SA financed a study for the design of a Special Purpose Vehicle to "avoid lengthy procurement and regulatory approval procedures which have contributed to the slow pace of the *Parivartan* programme and have undermined NGO efforts to mobilise slum communities, help set up resident associations, and secure community contribution toward project costs" (Feedback Reach 2002). The Special Purpose Vehicle - called Ahmedabad Slum Upgrading Society, was to be created in the form of a Society in the AMC and with the autonomy of dealing with/ managing project implementation and getting necessary finances for the SNP from national and international institutions. AMC would not be involved in day-to-day approvals and all tenders would go to the Special Purpose Vehicle Committee, and get finalised, executed and supervised by them (Interview U5). All specialist jobs would be outsourced, as would financial and engineering expertise. There was to be an exit clause under which all assets were expected to be transferred to AMC once the work was completed.

Because of the delays and objections to some of the recommendations, the proposal for the Special

Purpose Vehicle, went through many changes. The proposal was acceptable to AMC if it was situated within AMC. By September 2002, the consensus was to have professional staff from within AMC because the Managing Director and Engineer needed to be familiar with AMC procedures. In addition, the Consultant wanted NGO representation to circulate, but this was not acceptable to SEWA because of concerns about unreliable NGOs (Interviews D13 and N02). In terms of NGOs, there was consensus that the NGO capacity needed up-scaling and for both Saath and SEWA to "voluntarily build capacity of other NGOs, either through structured training or partnerships" (Feedback Reach 2002). In mid-2007, the proposal for establishing the Special Purpose Vehicle was still pending approval of the AMC Standing Committee. One of the reasons identified for the resistance against the Special Purpose Vehicle amongst elected representatives is that it will reduce their involvement at the different levels of 'approval' and hence their 'power' (Interview U26).

Box 6-13: SNP and WSP-SA: Transformation plans underway in Ahmedabad

> "At the request of the Ahmedabad City Corporation (AMC) and SEWA (an NGO), the India Office of WSP-SA was invited to look at the issue of scaling-up of slum upgrading in Ahmedabad. An assessment was made of the slum-upgrading project 'Parivartan'. The key issue identified is of scaling up the slum-upgrading model that the partners have pioneered. Based on the discussion with the Parivartan partners and on global experience, an institutional model was designed - Slum Upgrading Corporation - to be jointly owned by AMC and lead NGOs. AMC will delegate powers to the Slum Upgrading Corporation, provide fiscal and legislative support to gain regulatory approvals to upgrade settlements. The proposed institution will have the flexibility to contract in capacity for specific tasks as and when required.
>
> The State Government of Gujarat and AMC have approved the proposal. WSP-SA has received a formal request from AMC for technical assistance for the preparation of the financial business plan of the Slum Upgrading Corporation."

Source: WSP-SA 2001

To address the problems faced in getting the implementation process accelerated, CMAG was contracted by the World Bank to undertake studies, facilitate workshops for consultations and coordinate the formulation of a draft Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy (GSUSP). CMAG invited many NGOs to undertake slum studies in eight towns and a land tenure study in Ahmedabad–but the response was poor. In one case, an NGO demanded that it be given the contract for studies in all towns because it was best qualified to do the work (Interview B3). This was not acceptable and subsequently the NGO did not submit any bid for taking up studies for the GSUSP. The final draft of the GSUSP was submitted by CMAG to the Government of Gujarat after consultations with State level functionaries in July 2003. The draft GSUSP was not approved until mid-2007. In addition, CMAG sent invitation letters to five NGOs for undertaking a study to identify NGOs that could facilitate implementation of SNP in the larger towns of Gujarat – but only one applied (CMAG 2003). The study identified NGOs in Ahmedabad that work in urban areas.

In October 2003, AMC published a notice inviting Expression of Interest (EoI) from NGOs for carrying out physical infrastructure construction work. Sixteen NGOs that submitted EoIs were further invited to submit additional details to AMC. Since the experiences of the NGOs differed widely, and AMC identified the need for precautions in involving new or B or C grade NGOs.

AMC therefore decided to get the NGOs assessed through the Indian Institute of Management - Ahmedabad (Interviews and AMC file). For this, the assessor requested the NGOs to provide various details (in English) for technical, financial and community development assessment. Some NGOs faced difficulties in providing this information at short notice. The NGO assessment was completed by March 2005.

Figure 6-6: Movement of Files in AMC



Source: AMC interviews and file information

The list of NGOs that submitted the EoIs and which were assessed by IIM-Ahmedabad (2004) varied from those identified under studies by Acharya et. al. (1999), in the WSP-SA (2007a) Field Notes and the list of NGOs that had already supported the implementation of SNP. Of the 53 Ahmedabad NGOs listed in the database of Charities Aid Foundation, India, (website) only four were identified by Acharya et. al. (1999), while of the ten NGOs identified by Acharya et. al. (1999), eight were covered under the CMAG study (2003) (Refer Appendix 4). Although some variations in identification of different sizes of NGOs involved in different sectors would be commonly accepted, the extent of variation in Ahmedabad and the fact that only two NGOs had partnered with AMC for implementation of SNP brings forth many questions. It brings into question the lack of a comprehensive approach amongst researchers and donor agencies to identify partners involved in an intervention, as well as for identifying urban NGOs in a manner that the research outputs are valid and available for use for other purposes over time. It also draws attention to the lack of knowledge amongst development specialists about the influences on decisions of NGOs working in urban areas.

6.3.2 Slowdown

In March 1999, GoI repealed the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976. Gujarat was amongst the first few States to enforce the Repeal Act. This together with liberalisation of the economy and availability of large tracts of land of closed mills, led to a demand for return of acquired land.

One of the key reasons for the slowdown after the departure of Verma was the lack of demand from the political wing for the implementation of the intervention in their areas and lack of interest by the Municipal Commissioners. In the eleven years after Verma's departure, currently the sixth Commissioner is posted to AMC. The change in emphasis in implementation of SNP can be seen in the Figure 6-8 which shows the amount of money transferred by SEWA Bank from the accounts of Residents Associations to AMC during the tenure of different Municipal Commissioners (AMC and SEWA Bank data for the period of March 1997 to May 2005). Although the change does not indicate a direct correlation because the money is transferred after completion of particular stages of work, subsequent reduction in transfers indicates that little work was done during the tenure of the respective Municipal Commissioners.

Figure 6-7: AMC Decision makers and transfers of Community Contributions

Changes in AMC Administrators	Dates
I P Gautam joins as MunComm	Jun-06
Anand Patel joins as DyCE (SNP)	Apr-05
Anil Mukim joins as MunComm	Jan-05
Randhawa joins as DyMC	Jul-03
R K Tripathi joins as MunComm	May-03
I A Patel joins as DyCE (SNP)	Sep-02
P Paneervel joins as MunComm	Oct-01
Vinay Vyasa (IAS) joins as DyMC	Nov-00
K Kailashnathan joins as MunComm	Jun-99
M K Das (IAS) joins as DyMC	Nov-98
Anita Karwal (IAS) leaves AMC	Oct-98
Anand Patel joins as DyCE (SNP)	Feb-98
B K Sinha joins as MunComm	Sep-97
Anita Karwal (IAS) joins as DyMC	May-97
R R Varsani joins as DyMC	Sep-95
Keshav S Verma joins as MunComm	Nov-94



Source: SEWA Bank 2005 and AMC 2005; 2006

In January 2000, following the Government of India's nuclear tests at Pokhran, multi and bilateral agencies suspended aid to India for infrastructure projects. This halted the direct involvement of all the above agencies with SNP. Further, following the earthquake in Kutch in January 2001 the focus from SNP shifted to earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction activities (Interview N02).

While no study has been undertaken to show the direct influence of the changed circumstances on implementation of SNP, AMC was involved in litigation in a slum area (Gulbai Tekra). In 2004, this led to AMC opting to relocate slum residents from a private plot based on the 'slum

redevelopment model' introduced in Maharashtra in 1991 rather than pay a huge compensation to the land owner (Interview U22 and AMC files for Gulbai Tekra). The well-planned relocation package and related arrangements ensured that the livelihoods of the relocatees were not adversely affected. The experience together with the repeal of the land acquisition act have renewed interest of decision makers in following the redevelopment and relocation approach for 'changing the face of the city' by providing 'adequate housing' to the poor (Interview U22 and AMC files).

The SNP coverage by June 2007 has been the greatest in the Eastern (2554 dwelling units =17.31%) and Western (1608 dwelling units=25.42%) Zones, while the coverage in the Northern (1095 dwelling units =17.31%) and Southern (1068 dwelling units =16.89%) Zones are similar. More than 25% of the dwelling units in the Western Zone of Ahmedabad have been covered.

AMC's attempt at involving the UCD Cell was unsuccessful because the staff was "involved but without depth of understanding, which is required" (Interview U26).

Comment 17: Partnerships and reliability

> "At that time, the experience of partnering with the Corporate sector in the development process was unhappy and uncomfortable because SHARDA Trust found it so easy to withdraw from its commitment. SHARDA Trust had withdrawn from the partnership at a time when the community had saved around Rs 700,000 for accessing SNP (at Saath's motivation) even though no work had yet been started in PG. The only partner left was AMC, which was committed to implementing SNP. Saath had already seen the difference SNP had made in the lives of the people in Sanjay Nagar. Moreover, few Municipal Corporators whom Saath had been in contact with were positive about this model.
>
> For Saath, the taking up of SNP in PG was seen as a matter of survival. SNP became central to all activities in Saath – both amongst the team members and the CBOs. This is because the stakes in this were very high" (Interviews Saath).

6.3.3 Partnerships

After the termination of the partnership with Arvind Mills and Parikh, AMC did not actively seek partnerships with other private sector partners, partly because of the economic situation of the time (Interview U5). While SEWA and its associates pursued the implementation of SNP in several areas, Saath focused on completion of SNP in the large slum of Pravinnagar-Guptanagar. The size of the slum required a number of adaptations, for example, i) instead of a single Resident's Association, there are six; ii) a group that owned a large piece of land was required to give-up part of it to enable construction of a road.

AMC in general and SNP Cell in particular was also unsuccessful in getting other NGOs to participate in implementation of SNP. In fact, even when an NGO attempted to get more information from AMC to participate in SNP, the representatives were told a Deputy Municipal Commissioner (not directly associated with SNP) that the project was no longer being implemented within AMC (Interview N01). This raises questions about both - the lack of access to information about SNP and SNP Cell and the tendency of 'outsiders' to approach higher-level decision-makers for information. HUDCO finance was taken for improving a slum of 525 dwelling units (K K Vishwanath-ni-chali/ Machhipir-na-chappra) while World Vision has

facilitated and implemented SNP in one slum area covering 300 dwelling units.

Comment 18: Perceptions of professional about SNP

> "I am not denying the importance of what has happened (under SNP). Whatever they have done is great, but I do not think it is sufficient or it is enough. It is not going to be changing things dramatically. ... In terms of its positive aspects, it is looking at and addressing the key problem of infrastructure ..., which triggers-off investments in the settlements. ... In terms of its negative aspects, such a scheme will depend on contributions coming from the industry. If it does not come – what? The SNP initiation time was the liberalization period so industry was adjusting to it and nobody was coming forward. Such a development should not be based on charity but on a system. The AMC should announce a programme that slums passing certain criteria could go to the Corporation. The system should allow any citizen from the slum to join and take advantage of the programme and improve their quality of life. Thereby, create a demand system, and not a supply oriented system. If people are interested in improving their lives, they must start the process and the State has to assist them. In the case of SNP, people have to be goaded and organized. NGOs should not be contributing and subsidizing the Corporation. The Corporation is putting all its money on putting up brick and mortar. ..... It could give an instrument to the community and motivation to upgrade, say if the Corporation put 50% of the money in say Banks, and the Banks loan double the amount to the people as an advance or loan. Once the people repay, the Corporation would get back 50% of its money back. This way you are also getting institutional finance in the mainstream." (Interview N21).

Comment 19: Perceptions of professional about SNP

> After the initial partnerships, AMC has not undertaken any projects with the private sector and professional planners and architects. The relationship between AMC and professionals is antagonistic and lacks trust. AMC representatives strongly believe that professionals are looking for commercial relationship with AMC. The professionals on the other hand, have concerns about AMC not having or articulating a holistic programme for addressing the problems of slums in the long-term and not going through a process of citizen consultations for determining the direction or prioritising actions for the development for the city (Interview N23).

Comment 20: Perceptions of decision makers about professionals

> "There is no lack of professionals in Ahmedabad. Ahmedabad is a place that can provide professional consultancy to the whole world. We have IIM-A, CEPT, NID .... The Corporation does not need these hi-fi things. I need basic infrastructure which helps poor people, and for that, internationally known consultants are not needed. A person who is down to earth, who understands their problems – we need such type of people. Certainly, those types of people are less in number. Hi-flying consultants are more in Ahmedabad, but we still have to get a balance and get work done." (Interview U3)

6.3.4 Capacity

The lack of capacity within AMC can be highlighted in a number of ways. The time taken for granting administrative approvals for taking-up SNP after the residents submitted requests for participation ranges between 28 days for K K Vishwanath-ni-chali/ Machhipir-na-Chappra (525 houses) to 203 days for Sinheshwari Nagar (43 houses) and 597 days for Kailash Nagar (75 to 100 houses). This raises questions about what transpired during discussions between key decision makers where objections were raised by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner because the land was reserved as an open space.

It also raises questions about why the work of slum surveys was undertaken over four years (2001) after the initiation of SNP in Ahmedabad. As mentioned above, the slum survey led to bulk approval for undertaking SNP in 499 slums. However, the data gathered from slum surveys undertaken by Saath, Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, and AMC Ward Offices in 2001 is

managed by Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust. The lack of capacity within AMC has resulted in Municipal Commissioners and the SNP Cell seeking assistance of Saath, SEWA and Bhatt (Interviews PC1 and U21; AMC files) for various things, including presentations at workshops. Both Saath and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust have provided support to SNP Cell and Zonal staff of AMC for preparing presentations and project proposals, though as a larger organisation, Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust had provided greater support (Interview).

While the decision to implement the pilots was taken quite rapidly, 751 days passed between the signing of MoU between AML and Parikh (1 April 1995) to completion works and Completion Ceremony at Sanjay Nagar (21 April 1997). The minimum time taken for administrative approval for undertaking SNP in a slum after a formal request letter was submitted to AMC was 181 days for Bawa Lavlavinagar, and the maximum was 777 days for Jayshakti Nagar. However, in this case, several works were already undertaken in the slum prior to the approval. Therefore, the period includes the rejection of permission and internal process of determining how the works were started without permission and overall scrutiny of the issues.

The reasons for the delays in giving of administrative approval can be attributed primarily to non-inclusion of details required for approval by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner for putting it forward for the Municipal Commissioner's approval. A systematic approach was not followed by the different Departments for providing details about demarcated use of land on Town Planning Scheme, whether there was any legal dispute about the land, whether AMC was taking any rent from the occupants, whether infrastructure around the slum would enable giving of connections to the households, and whether any NGO had agreed to work in the area. While the reasons for staff getting away after providing inadequate information were not investigated, it is surprising that the support agencies did not address the issue of developing a database with details of slums for ease of decision making.

Comment 21: AMC Engineer: Differences in perceptions

> "The reason why an engineer would generally not prefer to work in the SNP is that from the time you qualify as an engineer, you have dreamt of constructing big bridges, big roads, and buildings. In zopadpattis, you only have to put water and gutter lines, so generally one would feel that there is not much work. But it is OK. Now I feel that even if I only have to do this work, it is fine. I do not need to make bridges and roads. ...
> After doing only a little work on gutters and infrastructure, when you go to a slum area and see the affection on the faces of the residents, it touches you. They are yearning for just this much and when the civic body provides this, their whole lives change. It then feels that this is important work, and other engineers will continue doing the other works. In this work, you can see immediate results in terms of how much difference you can make in a human life after doing small works." (Interview)

SEWA and other agencies affiliated to it have taken-up activities that fill the gap because of lack of capacity within SNP Cell of AMC. This NGO led initiative for selected slums is funded under the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) International and US Agency for International Development support to SEWA, and for Sahbhagi Yojana 2 to scale up SNP activities in the cities of Surat and Baroda (CHF-I 2005). The genesis of the CHF in India lies in a 2002 Cities Alliance -

DFID funded project for studying Shelter Finance for the Poor, that is, microfinance institutions that provide shelter assistance. CHF was tasked with the study of three microfinance institutions that, including Mibanco in Peru, FUNHAVI in Mexico and SEWA Bank in India. SEWA was selected because the Team Leader knew someone in SEWA Bank (Interview D12). It is in this context that CHF learnt about the Slum Networking Project.

CHF started working with SEWA Bank, Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust and FPI in November 2003 (CHF-I 2005). The primary thrust is on building capacity of four SEWA agencies (SEWA, SEWA Bank, Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, Lok Swasthya Mandali) for expansion of reach of the micro-finance and micro-enterprise services and complement it with the - Lok Swasthya Mandali (health cooperative). The objective is to reach other SEWA services to SEWA members/ people by: i.) Improving operations; ii) MIS; iii) Outreach; iv). Marketing and v) Incentives. CHF has contributed significantly in building capacity of Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust (Interview D12).

FPI, in association with Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, has facilitated many workshops in Ahmedabad, while SEWA has supported three SNP staff members for attending short courses at IHS. FPI started publication of newsletter in Gujarati and urban community resource centres for dissemination of information on programmes for the poor (Interview). FPI, which undertook the report card study for AMC services, and its Urban Poverty Programme (UPP) have provided the SNP Cell with a digitised map of Ahmedabad marking location of SNP slums, and for plans of slum plots where Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust facilitates SNP.

Figure 6-8: SNP Impact - Increase in SEWA Bank Account Holders & Deposits



Source: SEWA Bank, 2005

Driven by the USAID funded Sahbhagi Yojana 2 mandate for covering about 20,000 families in 150 slums in three years (CHF), SEWA/ Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust has expanded its activities to slums in other towns of Gujarat and India. In 2005, Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust got approval for starting credit cooperatives (in Surat and Baroda with CHF support). The plan is to incorporate such cooperatives with SEWA Bank in the future when the regulations

change (Interview D12). This will enable SEWA Bank to expand its activities immediately to these cities in the future. This includes Nagpur – where USAID's FIRE-D project had earlier interacted with the Nagpur Municipal Corporation. The membership base of SEWA and the SEWA Banks have grown substantially because of the SNP requirement for all slum residents to open accounts in SEWA Bank. Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust has expanded its work beyond the limits of AMC boundaries to Surat and Baroda (Interviews N15, N10 and D12). SEWA Bank has benefited from the SNP in terms of increase in clientele (Interview N03).

Besides this, there is frequent informal interaction between key and responsive SNP Cell staff and the NGOs for resolving issues related to SNP implementation, which has contributed to the continuation of SNP and the partnership between AMC and the NGOs (Interviews U5, U15, U17, U21, N02, and N15)..

Comment 22: Reaction of a professional

> "... surprised that this case study is being researched "to death", so to speak, after over a decade of its inception. In my opinion, the answers to your queries can be found in the offices and cubicles of the AMC, not in the responses of NGOs, companies or urban development professionals." (Communication N20)

Comment 23: Issues in partnership between Government and professionals

> "There are problems of local government not able to work with professionals and vice-versa. The language used by local governments is different and that of professionals is different. The mission mode allows for 'facilitation' or the role of a 'mediator'. For this to work, the mediators have to be at a higher level of decision making than the local governments. If at the same level, they may think that somebody is robbing them of their power of hiring consultants or professionals of their choice." (Interview SP1)

Comment 24: St. Xavier's Social Service Society

> "St. Xavier's Social Service Society now works in urban settlements of the city, providing programmes of education, health care, community organisation and environmental improvement. As an organisation SXSSS has always tried to work in tandem with the AMC, because they are convinced that it is the best way by which the poor can benefit from government programmes. The AMC has involved SXSSS in a major survey to identify the urban poor as part of an urban poverty alleviation programme. ... This indicates there is a realisation on the part of the local authority that the NGO is better equipped to solicit reliable information at a community level. But SXSSS does not posses all the necessary skills to address the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty. For example, it does not have the relevant experience or linkages with the formal banking sector to set up credit schemes. SXSSS, however, has encouraged savings amongst sectors of the poor and linked them with savings institution like SEWA" (Interview).

6.3.5 Technical Support, Research and Sharing of lessons

In July 2000, on completion of five years of the SNP, USAID supported an impact assessment of the programme, to be carried out by SEWA Academy (SEWA Academy 2002). The study (household surveys covering all families in the slums) was carried out in three slums where Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust had been involved, including Babalavlavi Nagar, Sinheshwari Nagar (all households are vendors who pay rent to AMC) and for comparative purposes, in Madrasi-ni-Chali (adjacent to Sinheshwari Nagar and an area where work was not yet

undertaken). Some of the findings from the impact assessment included increase in productive time for women by 1 hour because of access to water and toilets at the house level in Babalavlavi Nagar, and a dramatic reduction in water borne diseases.

SNP has been studied by several researchers (Baruah 2007, Kantor 2004; Sato 2003; Acharya 2002; 1999; Dutta 2000; Boni 1995), written about extensively (Asnani 2001; 2003; Bhatt 2001; Mani 2001; Dutta 2000; Joshi 1999; 2002; Bhatt 1999; 2003; Mahadevia 1997; Parikh 2001; 2004; 2006) and the pilot was documented in great details (Tripathi 1998; Chauhan 1999). Some of the actors who have worked with AMC for implementation of SNP and other related interventions are very critical of AMC functioning (Interviews N19, N20, N23, PC3, PC5, and Re2), and key respondents in AMC are very critical of NGOs "interested in working commercially" (Interviews U3, U6, U11, and U15).

The differences in approaches and attitudes to the problems of slums and slum upgrading as well as to how different stakeholders function show that there are multiple reasons for lack of up-scaling of the SNP. The professionals, academics and other NGOs in the city have not been forthcoming in their support for SNP. The reasons range from: i) SNP does not holistically tackle the housing problem for the poor; ii) the slum level CBO/ Residents Association registration requirement is too bureaucratic and it would be more appropriate to work with traditional and elected leaders to facilitate the process; or iii) because SNP is linked to or known as an initiative of either the conceptualiser or SEWA. Other NGOs in the city strongly feel that: i) it is inappropriate for NGOs to take on statutory responsibility of the local Government to provide minimum services (health, education and infrastructure) to the poor; ii) NGOs should play the role of facilitators to enable local governments implement their programmes more effectively; and iii) NGOs should not pay part of the costs for community development.

World Bank/ WSP-SA financed a study for proposing a Special Purpose Vehicle for implementing the SNP. It also supported a study on "Wealth and Well Being Impacts of Improved Service Delivery to the Poor" during 2003 - 2004. The key research findings (Kantor 2004) in terms of the sustainability criteria include:

- The SNP has led to empowerment of slum residents. In this, the formation of CBOs was important for mobilizing residents to participate in SNP and collect the contributions. Their local presence, responsiveness to the residents needs and follow-up has ensured that there is lack of exclusion of the most poor from the upgrading inputs. In addition, social integration has occurred.
- CBO members have also built capacity to liaison with NGOs and other SNP stakeholders, though they were found to have little authority in SNP. However, CBO capacity building has not been extensive, and that further skill and leadership training would enable them to play a role in up-scaling SNP.

- Since people pay for the services under SNP, they have increased expectations about service quality. Hence, more SNP households complain when there is a problem. Thus the requirement for community contributions and sensitivity to the residents' ability to pay, has increased ownership and made residents more willing to hold the AMC accountable for the provision and maintenance of services.
- After SNP was completed, some residents have spent an average of Rs 30,570 to upgrade their homes. The property values in SNP slums have increased by 67 percent, and rental incomes have increased by about 100 percent. In addition, since 80 percent of households have got for themselves legal and metered electricity connections, households have acquired other assets such as refrigerators, radios, televisions, and electric fans, as well as assets such as scooters that have increased their mobility.
- SNP slum households took most loans from relatives, followed by employers, moneylenders and banks. The abilities to save and savings levels were found to be higher in slums with more services.
- Among SNP households that reported an increase in income, the causes identified included saved time (81 percent) and more work hours (52 percent) due to better access to water, less illness and resultant earning days lost (68 percent), more regular work (41 percent), lesser waste due to improved cleanliness (76 percent), and better access to transport (69 percent). Education spending per school going child was higher in SNP areas.

Comment 25: AMC Engineer: Differences in perceptions

> "Doing this work without partnership (with NGOs) is difficult because the depth to which you have to explain the intervention is difficult for any government officer to explain. This is because it requires confidence and trust in you (the facilitator). They (the poor) will not trust government staff. In addition, government officers are not interested in going to the field regularly to build the trust and rapport because they know that they will anyway get their salaries." (Interview U15)

Comment 26: AMC Engineer: Working in slums

> "I got a shock that I was being asked to work in the slum section. In addition, my colleague in the slum Department clearly advised me not to come to SNP. ... Posting in SNP is considered a punishment. For example, recently a Councillor demanded that an engineer who had misbehaved/ argued with him be posted to the SNP Cell." (Interviews AMC)

The Saath team and members of CBOs facilitated by Saath have been strengthened through participatory planning and evaluation processes, as well as due to their willingness to support rehabilitation work. According to some SNP Cell engineers (Interviews U17 and U20), the most significant achievement of Saath, is the empowerment of members of Sakhi Mahila Mandal in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar. The Sakhi Mahila Mandal has been a significant motivational force in urban areas of Kutch as well as riot affected camps and areas of Ahmedabad where women have

taken on responsibilities of changing their prevailing situations (Refer Appendix 10). One of the measures of growth of the savings group initiated by Sakhi Mahila Mandal when SNP was introduced in the slum, is that it has merged with two other Saath facilitated group to form a Savings Cooperative Society that has over 9,000 members (July 2007).

Comment 27: Experiences of local leadership approach to service provision

> The decision to participate in and request for services was not made through the traditional leaders but the community. ... Another case is of a local political leader-***, who has contacts with other party leaders at various levels of power. He used to collect money from lane residents when they showed willingness to get access to a basic service. For this, he would collect money from the residents of the lane on different occasions as transport costs for attending meetings with different people and for other expenses. So although the residents got access to a service they wanted at the end of the day, they often had to pay about Rs 1000 per household for it. Thus, when we spoke to *** about the SNP proposal, he was surprised and said that it would be stupid to provide all the services at the same time. Since his source of livelihood was to be affected, he tried creating hurdles by telling the slum residents that they did not know the NGO people so there was a risk in giving them the money for accessing services. That is where the SNP mechanism for securing finances of slum residents was very useful. The individual households and the community had control over their savings, that is, the mechanism for financial transactions was transparent and the households had trust in the security of their savings.
>
> Being a programme for access to basic services, the traditional leaders could not say – do not take the services. So they agreed to decisions made by the community. This is an important aspect of scaling up programmes for enhancing access to water supply and sanitation. Thus, the problems are at other levels of decision making and implementation rather than willingness of communities (Interview N02).

Comment 28: Professional Perspective on NGOs implementing SNP

> "The AMC is giving all work to NGOs and is saying that NGOs are asking for it. But this is not the focus area of NGOs. They (Municipal Corporations) have to create the facility. It is not right for them to give their responsibilities to NGOs, and I do not know why the NGOs have agreed to it. NGOs have different specialization and focus. The programme has to go back to the AMC. ... The AMC looks at the NGOs only in terms of organizing the whole group (Residents Association), the setting up of which is very bureaucratic, that is, the legal process for formation of the Residents' Association is very formal. There is too much of documentation and too much paper works is required. Moreover, the groups do not have high levels of literacy. Therefore, when such legal associations have to be formed, the NGO is driving the process from the back seat. They select the members in the Resident Association, including the leaders. Finally, only two-three people are left who act as care-takers, and though the rules and regulations say they have to change every year, it does not happen. The general system in the communities is that they have their own leaders, mukhias, agevans or headman, who may not be elected or have a title but who is respected and looked up to, and people listen to him in general. So maybe there is an opportunity to develop this system further rather than make it so rigid and formal where people are excluded. Another danger in the formal system is that the RAs are hijacked – as in *** Nagar. One or two members from the settlement get a job with the NGO so they become the spokespersons for the good work the NGO is doing. So instead of a people-oriented process, it becomes an NGO oriented process." (Interview Re2)

Comment 29: AMC Engineer: Differences in perceptions

> "If they told me that we will put you on a grade higher and a little higher pay if you work in SNP, then even I would have some benefit of working in AMC. Even after such an incentive is offered, the posting should be based on choice not compulsion. ... for example, in the Octroi Department, if the staff collect octroi of over Rs. 1,000,000 - they are given 1% to 2% of the amount. This could be done even for the SNP to get more staff involved and active. Currently there are no advantages. It is considered a normal posting. Departmental recognition for SNP is lacking. The condition of the SNP Cell is disorganised and there is lack of respect for SNP Cell. There is no special facility for SNP staff." (Interviews AMC)

6.4 Preferring redevelopment to slum up grading

In late 2005, with the declaration of Ahmedabad as a mega-city and launch of the Jawaharlal

Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), AMC now has access to funds for building houses for the poor (Interviews U15, and U3).

Comment 30: Decision maker's approach for improving environmental conditions

> "For people living in slums, more has to be done by AMC. Therefore, this year, we have changed the budgeting system from Zones to Wards. Each Zone has been informed to ensure that the money is spent equitably amongst the Wards. ... We are also constructing 32,000 houses for the urban poor – and this is not to create new slums in flats. We are giving 35 sqm built-up area and no building bye-laws will be broken, for example, only 40 percent of the plot area will be built up". (Interview U3).

Comment 31: Struggling with reforms

> "Whenever we talk of a Mission mode approach of any programme or activity, something is always on the mind about how similar programme implementation has suffered in the field, that is, why it was not implemented properly, and why are they not producing the expected results. We have found that although many Government schemes are being implemented, in the long-term, they lose either their efficiency because of official procedural delays or some apathy of government officials or even acceptance level in the field because of the top-down approach. And of course, the political will at the local level is not there. The Mission objective is therefore how to make it faster with a definite target to bring in efficiency." (Interview SP1).

Comment 32: Managing processes to encourage reforms

> 'At the State level, our perception is that if you really implement the reforms, it is in the interest of the urban local bodies. You will transform, have a transparent system, an accountable system and a sustainable system, which will ultimately benefit the local body. So we are trying to influence these sorts of concepts in the local bodies, but it is not easy. It is a very challenging task to convince local bodies that reforms are required. .....There is a change only after there is a difference in their own understanding and perception. Normally, of their own, they will not do it. So we are somehow convincing the local bodies to undertake the reforms, because otherwise the perception of reforms is that – if you want the money or projects, there is no option but to sign an agreement and undertake the reforms. " (Interview SP1)

Comment 33: Implementing the National Urban Renewal Mission

> 'The Mission objectives have been sub-divided into programmes and projects, the requirements for strategic towns and the whole State, how can we pull-out the resources, what is available at Central, State, and local Government levels, what is the gap and how do we fill the gap. To assess the requirements, data had to be pulled together from various sources under the Mission activities, that is, they were not available in a compiled form for the State. " (Interview SP1)

6.5 Summary

The slum-networking approach was introduced in the cities of Vadodara and Ahmedabad where the Urban Community Development Programme had been successfully implemented since the early 60s – similar to DFID funding for slum improvement projects in Hyderabad, Vijayawada and Vishakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh. The pilots were initiated because of the actions taken by the conceptualiser, which included preparation of project proposals, screening of slides of changes achieved in Indore under the DFID funded IHIP, and the possibility of convergence with other government schemes and possible access to donor funding. Local governments were not involved in the initial decision process for initiating the pilots in either Vadodara or Ahmedabad. In Vadodara, the VMC reluctantly agreed to partner in the pilot, but with limited financial inputs. In

Ahmedabad, the Municipal Commissioner decided to introduce the project as a citywide project of the Corporation. Significant changes were introduced in the project because of inputs from the NGO - Saath prior to the finalisation of the project, SHARDA Trust during implementation of the pilot, and SEWA Bank through the financial management arrangements. While AMC saw the private sector, NGO and the communities as partners in the project, the private sector identified the slum residents, AMC and the contractor as partners.

USAID, which was already interacting with AMC for other initiatives, started supporting SEWA and the FPI in establishing a dedicated NGO for implementation of the SNP, while WSP-SA was invited through SEWA to facilitate the planning for the main phase of the SNP. The new entity – Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, took up responsibility for mobilizing communities in two slums - one of which was a relocation site for vendors who paid AMC a rent, while the other was along the river bank. Neither Saath nor SHARDA Trust was involved in this process, except as partners for the pilot. Personality issues amongst the stakeholders, especially in terms of ownership of the SNP in the pilot led to termination of the partnership with the private sector and the conceptualiser of the SNP. Subsequently, one slum comprising 1200 households, which was part of the pilot, was improved by AMC from 1998 onwards. AMC has over seven years between 1995 and 2002, evolved procedures that have made the project more responsive to the context. While the above findings indicate that SNP fulfils several sustainability criteria, two significant points that emerge are: i) Relations between NGOs and AMC have to be flexible. Partnerships have problems, so both administrators and NGOs have to be open-minded; and ii) Inter-personal relations are very important so that both 'advice' and issues are discussed informally for follow-up. The comments from other NGOs and professionals reveal the lack of support from these entities for the implementation of SNP.

In contrast, the pilot for a road redevelopment project that had been initiated because of the actions of a professional, followed by logistic and capacity building support to the AMC, was on the verge of collapse because of opposition by elected representatives. Once again, special efforts by the professional to give the elected representatives an opportunity to study the project proposal on the site, and informally discuss implications of the intervention with people who would be affected enabled its continuation. Not only that, the private sector partner for SNP was encouraged to reduce the amount it had allocated for the project and provide finance for the road redevelopment project. The scope of the pilot for the road redevelopment was increased, and a new partnership arrangement with Arvind Mills led to its successful completion. Not only the value of the property on the road increased dramatically, but also the revenue increase from advertising was substantial. Although proposals for other road redevelopment projects were prepared for AMC by the professional, the projects were implemented by AMC. The benefits of the project can be seen in Government of Gujarat encouraging local governments to have at least one "Gaurav path" in their areas, and the well-planned roads in other parts of the city.

7 LAKE VICTORIA WATER AND SANITATION INITIATIVE

The Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation Initiative (LVWATSAN) for secondary urban centres surrounding Lake Victoria is the latest intervention in the region. LVWATSAN is a full-scale demonstration intervention for supporting direct implementation of physical infrastructure for which UN-Habitat is going through all the project stages, that is, project formulation, planning, strategizing with local partners, and facilitating implementation and monitoring. LVWATSAN is designed as an MDG model project to demonstrate that the MDGs can be achieved in a sustainable manner in the shortest period possible and with the least investment possible. The LVWATSAN aims at reaching MDG targets in the intervention towns and at scaling up of similar approaches in other towns in the region through its capacity building component. Because of the coverage of the intervention and number of ongoing initiatives in the Lake Victoria region, the Initiative requires an integrated and coordinated approach for meeting the water and sanitation needs of communities. The Initiative is designed as an integrated and inter-sectoral intervention at the town and Lake levels, and is planned to enable sustainable access to water and sanitation. It incorporates components aimed at reducing poverty through enabling livelihoods in water and sanitation services related areas. The focus on sustainability required attention not only to water, sanitation and waste management, but also on planning, physical infrastructure and livelihoods. A significant aspect of the initiative is to rehabilitate existing water and sanitation infrastructure in the intervention towns (Interviews D4 and D5).

As a repository and promoter of knowledge about good practices under the Urban Indicators and the Best Practices Programmes (BPP) of the Global Urban Observatory (GUO), UN-Habitat has drawn lessons from good practices that could be incorporated into one large-scale demonstration project (Interviews D4; D5 and D6).

7.1 Initiation of a Model MDG Intervention

The Republics of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda share their borders with Lake Victoria, the second largest fresh water lake in the world. The Lake with an area of about 67,000 sq.km. has its only outlet at Ripon Falls in Uganda, which is the source of the (White) Nile (NBI 2006). The Nile winds through ten countries and covers 5584 kilometres from its source to the Mediterranean Sea (Karua). The Lake directly supports over 30 million people around its basin, whose source of livelihood is dependent on fishing and agriculture. Shipping in the Lake provided transport between some of the towns along the Lake shores prior to 1977. The environmental degradation of the Lake has become a concern for environmentalists because of the threat to the rich biodiversity of the region and its contribution to increase in poverty levels of the lake region communities (NBI 2006). Several actions have been taken in the Lake Victoria Region and the River Nile Basin to reduce pollution, and to contribute to their sustainability.

The three countries in East Africa have historically cooperated under successive regional

integration arrangements, both before and after they gained independence in the 1960s. These included the Customs Union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917, which Tanzania (then Tanganyika) joined in 1927; the East African High Commission (1948 - 1961); the East African Common Services Organisation (1961 - 1967); and the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation that was first formed in 1967 as the East African Community (EAC: 1967 - 1977) (EAC Websites). Although the EAC collapsed in 1977 due to political differences, while negotiating a Mediation Agreement for the Division of Assets and Liabilities, the Member States included a provision to explore areas of future cooperation and to make concrete arrangements for such cooperation in the future (Africa Union Website) Subsequently, East African Cooperation was established in 1993. In November 1999, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community was signed and the EAC established as the regional intergovernmental organization of the three countries, with its Headquarters located in Arusha, Tanzania (EAC Website). The regional co-operation and integration envisaged in the EAC is broad based and covers amongst other aspects, health, social and cultural activities, management of infrastructure and services, human resources, environment and natural resources. EAC operates on a five-year Development Strategy that spells out policy guidelines, priority programmes and implementation schedules. The EAC strategy emphasizes economic co-operation and development with a strong focus on the social dimension (EAC Website).

7.1.1 Problem formulation

The LVWATSAN was started in 2004 at the initiative of the Ugandan water minister after a conference of the African Ministerial Conference on Water (AMCOW). She and Ministers of Water in Kenya and Tanzania approached the Tibaijuka – the Executive Director of UN-Habitat for extending support to towns around Lake Victoria (Interviews D5 and PC6). Tibaijuka, who is known amongst UN-Habitat staff as an approachable person (Interview D5), comes from the same region as the Ministers from the three countries. She has therefore experienced the consequences of inadequate water supply and sanitation, very old and dilapidated structures, and polluted water in the secondary cities. Subsequently, around May 2004, the Water and Sanitation Branch of UN-Habitat was asked to develop a programme in response to this request. There was a vague idea about focusing on small towns around Lake Victoria. When required to develop a proposal for a full-scale project, the Infrastructure Branch contracted a consultant who had long experience in the region to prepare a concept note on what could be done (Interviews PC6).

The primary aim of the LVWATSAN is to extend basic services to towns that require support urgently. Since UN-Habitat's mandate is broader than water supply and sanitation service provision, the aim of the Initiative from the early stages was to demonstrate that the process, procedure and strategy adopted for the intervention works; and that the model could be transferred to other municipal councils, governments in Africa and Asia, and Habitat partners (Interview D4). As described earlier, UN-Habitat had primarily undertaken demonstration projects in large cities

(Kampala, Nairobi, and Kigali) of Africa. As indicated by the Second Global Report on Water and Sanitation in the World's Cities (UN-Habitat 2006), there has been growing awareness about rapid population growth in secondary cities, large populations without access to water and sanitation services, and their role in protecting the environment. As a normative agency that has been promoting sustainable human settlement approaches, UN-Habitat had access to knowledge and resources on all related issues for planning the intervention. Moreover, UN-Habitat had access to skills and resources that enabled planning of the initiative and soliciting of resources from support organisations for design development and implementation of the works. In addition, because the Water Ministers of the three countries 'own' the initiative, support from the national Ministries, Water Boards, utilities and other related organisations was not an issue. The initiative with a regional focus and in towns with very poor access required the higher level of decisions, which UN-Habitat was in a position to make. The LVWATSAN is aligned with the EAC and the EAC Protocol for the Lake Victoria Basin (Interview D4).

The focus was on increasing the contribution of secondary towns to economic development and sustainable development of the region by addressing broader issues such as livelihoods, and physical planning. With the already established institutional frameworks, processes that foster regional cooperation and encourage sharing of experiences and exchange of expertise among the three East African countries could also be easily incorporated. The intervention also had the potential of institutionalizing participation of stakeholders in decision-making as envisaged in the water sector reforms. This, together with capacity-building at all levels, would provide a model that can be replicated in other towns in the region. In terms of approach, the intention was to have a programme that demonstrated an integrated approach for provision of basic services and for creating capacity of the towns to manage them.

Gender concerns were also addressed since the initiative could address specific problems faced by women in relation to the HIV/ AIDS pandemic (Interview D6), that is, the many orphan and grandparent headed households, and those where children are living with sick parents and do not always have access to enough water and sanitation. The absence of an earning member in the households further reduced the capacity of many families to pay for basic services. Therefore, the intention was to introduce a programme, which integrated gender and addressed problems of access to water and sanitation for the most vulnerable people.

A concept note was prepared on what the initiative could be, based on the Consultant's personal knowledge of conditions in the region and their causes. This was followed by four distinct Phases that can be identified as a) assessment, b) immediate interventions, c) capacity building, and d) long term interventions.

7.1.2 Problem Identification

To begin, UN-Habitat carried out a rapid appraisal of the status of water and sanitation provision

in 10 small and medium towns located within a 50 kilometres belt around Lake Victoria in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. National governments were involved in the process from this early stage and facilitated the process through task forces represented by the responsible Ministries. The aim of the assessment was to gather sufficient information from representatives of national governments, local authorities, and NGOs and CBOs representing the poor, to develop a proposal. In each country, a local consultant led the process. The objective was to prepare an initial proposal for water and sanitation investment, and related capacity building for further consultation with development agencies, and national authorities in the three countries, and for obtaining assurances for funding of the initiative. UN-Habitat also consulted with other stakeholders involved in various initiatives in the Lake Victoria region.

The appraisal showed that water and infrastructure in these towns is often in disuse because of poor maintenance and low human resource capacity to operate and maintain the infrastructure. It also revealed that the water, sanitation, solid waste management and drainage services in these towns could be drastically improved with relatively modest support (Interviews D4 and PC6). The other findings were that technical solutions are not always the answer, for example, the operational costs for pumping water are very high and hence the solution proposed is unlikely to be sustainable in the long-term. Another example is from Tanzania, where a natural stream provided water for an urban area but since it did serve another community upstream, those who did not get water from this network ensured that the water did not reach the town. Such experiences showed that solutions need to be pragmatic rather than technically sophisticated (Interview D4 and PC6).

Comment 34: Assessment

> "WATSAN Projects were initiated and did not function well. The main problems were lack of skills and the institutional side of things. It was than believed that if you provide the infrastructure and people are happy, the system will work. Investments made 10, 20 or 30 years back are no longer functional because of lack of maintenance and lack of systems for income generation and training of staff. The whole organizational set-up is so completely wrong. The revenue generated through water supply and sanitation services was used for other purposes instead of for maintenance. ... The conditions are now different because of water sector reforms. ... The Governments would now own the assets while community organizations would ensure adequate revenue (for operation and maintenance etc). " (Interview PC6)

Based on the initial assessment, 15 urban centres were selected (5 in each country) in consultation with the respective governments for developing project proposals. The factors considered by UN-Habitat in the selection of the 5 urban centres were the i) level of service coverage, particularly among the MDG target groups; ii) the population size and geographical distribution around the Lake; iii) commitment at Town level to participate in the initiative; iv) current governance structures, and v) the ability to manage investments.

For the initial assessment, since there was no guarantee for funding of such a programme, the assessment was designed to minimize expectations amongst those being interviewed. The UN-Habitat team also cautioned the research team against raising expectations amongst stakeholders that may not be met in the future, leading to disappointment and issues of credibility of those

involved (Interviews D4 and D6). Those involved in the design process included people who were involved with the DFID - funded participatory project planning process for Kibera slum in Nairobi and had seen the consequences of no actions after initial research and planning activities (Interviews D6 and PC6).

Table 7-1: Phase I Urban Areas under LVWATSAN

	Kenya		Tanzania		Uganda	
	Town	Population	Town	Population	Town	Population
Phase I	Homa Bay	56,000	Bukoba	81,000	Kyotera	12,000
	Kisii	85,000	Muleba	15,000	Nyendo Parish (Masaka)	31,924 (65,000)
			Mutukula		Mutukula	7,000
Phase II	Bondo	30,000	Bunda	51,000	Ggabe Parish (Kampala)	10,000
	Siaya	48,000	Sengerema	53,000	Mukono	50,000
	Migori	58,000	Geita	72,000	Bugemba Ward (Jinja)	10,000
			Musoma	115,000		

Source: LVWATSAN Progress Report 2006

The UN-Habitat team was aware that a well-designed project using a participatory process is not always a viable or implementable intervention. Therefore, 2 to 3 days were spent on community consultations in the field where many issues were identified through the communities before the stakeholder workshops where the chairpersons of the CBOs spoke on behalf of a group. At the Town Hall meetings, other stakeholders interacted significantly and very interesting and useful findings contributed to identification of local issues (Interviews D5 and PC6). This helped understand better what was actually happening in the community group and to comprehend what were the real needs identified by the communities living in unserved areas. This approach revealed that community voice, especially the vulnerable, is sometimes lost if one CBO or NGO represents communities even in a forum with a many community participants (Interview D5). The team identified that what a representative or leader says in a group is influenced because of a difference in opinion in a local community group, and at other times in their attempt to impress others about what they are doing well in their community or group.

UN-Habitat worked with local organizations, NGOs, CBOs, and Faith-based organizations to assess how the interests of women and men could be incorporated in the project. The level of NGOs' establishment and participation in the smaller towns is not the same as in the larger towns. The NGOs in the small towns are primarily local NGOs that work on social development issues such as AIDS awareness and care. International NGOs such as CARE, PLAN International and Oxfam have no presence in these towns because they primarily work in rural areas. CBOs in the towns do not have the capacity to participate/ interact at the level envisaged or required. In addition, politicians are associated with some of the NGOs, and they slip in the various forums to influence decisions (Interviews D4 and D5). The assessment of data from the 15 selected towns showed the following problems (UN-Habitat 2005a):

- Lack of water and sanitation, especially in low-income settlements, was exacerbated because

of inadequate or malfunctioning raw water treatment plants, and lack of sewerage networks and sewage treatment plants. Solid waste collection and disposal, and drainage problems in the majority of towns around Lake Victoria were contributing to rising levels of pollution in the Lake.

- The poor had little access to services. While improvement or development of options for providing public stand-posts, shallow wells, and protected springs were also identified, the most efficient option was identified as rehabilitating existing systems where appropriate, and extending the coverage through network expansion.
- Sanitation was identified as a high priority in low-income settlements, both from the point of health considerations, and reducing human waste reaching the Lake.
- Water and infrastructure in the towns was often in disuse because of poor maintenance and inadequate capacities to operate and maintain the infrastructure.

Specific issues identified in each of the countries were as follows (UN-Habitat 2005a):

Kenya: Public utilities are in a poor shape in four of the five towns and major rehabilitation works are required. Some renovations had been undertaken in Kisii less than 5 years back. Less than half the population in the towns had access to water supply, with low-income areas hardly being served. A very small percentage of people had access to off-site sanitation. Generally, there are no designated sites for disposal of solid waste and little or no transport facilities. Drainage is in a very poor state. The poor suffer because of poor access to services, and the very poor living conditions. Kisumu (Kenya), the Headquarters of the Nyanza South Water Services Board was part of the Lake Victoria Region CDS process and had a CDS ready by 2002, while Homa Bay was part of the next Phase and had prepared its CDS by mid 2006.

Tanzania: Bukoba and Musoma have existing water supply and sewerage facilities, which are in urgent need of rehabilitation. Muleba, Geita, Sengerema, and Bunda have very elementary water supply in place or none at all and no sewerage network. Drainage is in a poor state, and all towns lack facilities for solid waste collection and disposal. The informal settlements do not have access to any of these services, and hence major investments are required for this. Capacity building is a prerequisite at all levels, but to reach a critical level of economic viability, service providers may have to work in cluster of towns. Bukoba had a CDS by 2002, which was prepared under Lake Victoria Region CDS process, while Musoma, which was part of the second phase of the programme, had started the CDS process by the time LVWATSAN was initiated.

Uganda: The focus in Uganda is on provision of water and sanitation for the poor in relatively small towns or parts of larger urban centres. Water supply and sewerage systems are already in place in the larger towns of Masaka, Jinja, and Mukono, and hence the assessment was undertaken in the unserved informal settlements of Nyendo Parish in Masaka, Bugemba Ward in Jinja, and several unserved areas in Mukono. The other towns included in this Phase are Kyotera - a small

town with a very low level of service, Mutukula with no service at all and Ggaba Parish–on the periphery of Kampala. Kampala was part of the SCP, the second phase of the Lake Victoria Region CDS process, and is one of the areas under the WAC II Programme. Thus, awareness and some capacity building initiatives have already been initiated. Jinja was part of the SCP, and both are members of the African Sustainable Cities Network, which has members from nine countries.

Following this assessment, UN-Habitat identified the specific objectives of the LVWATSAN as:

- Support pro-poor water and sanitation investments in the secondary urban centres in the Lake Victoria Region.
- Build institutional and human resource capacities at local and regional levels for the sustainability of improved water and sanitation services
- Facilitate the benefits of upstream water sector reforms to reach the local level in the participating urban centres
- Reduce the environmental impact of urbanization in the Lake Victoria Basin

The expected outcomes of the Initiative are:

- improved access to water and sanitation services in the project areas,
- functional and gender focused arrangements for sustainably managing and monitoring the rehabilitated systems,
- institutionalized capacity building programmes to regularly update the capacity of stakeholders, and
- contribution to the reduction in pollutant loads entering into the Lake Victoria.

The investment plans and detailed cost estimates that were prepared for 15 towns after the appraisal revealed that the requirements to rehabilitate and upgrade facilities for water supply and sanitation, and improving solid waste management and drainage structures amounted to about $52 million, which is approximately $50 per capita (Interviews D4 and PC6).

7.1.3 Assessing the Alternative

One of the areas that UN-Habitat considers important is the partnership between the local communities and town councils, who have traditionally worked independently of each other. The local governments are an important focus because while water supply has been taken out of their scope of responsibilities, waste management, including drainage, sewerage and solid waste management remain their responsibilities.

One of the objectives of the Initiative is to involve the residents around the lake more intensively in the process of retaining the Lake resources and improving livelihoods. Communities have been recipients of a service and municipal councils have been providers of the service. The intention is

to show people how things work. Under the water sector reforms, communities are to be directly represented in the ownership of the water utilities so they become part of the Board that runs the water system in the towns. However, that is not enough because there will only be one representative on the Board when in practice it is essential to sensitize rest of the communities and develop their capacities. Therefore, UN-Habitat wants to ensure that the capacity that the local communities have is tapped into to support provision of services into Municipal authorities. One of the means to be tried is sub-contracting, for example, in terms of solid waste management for which the community has the capacity. There are small initiatives in the towns where because of lack of provision by local bodies, the communities have developed their independent systems to manage solid waste. The UN wants to develop that level of capacity so that they can enter into contract with the Municipal authorities to enable both systems work in harmony, not as competitors in service provision but as partners.

Figure 7-1: Decision Approach for LVWATSAN



Women, who are more vocal when they are represented through organizations such as CBOs, NGOs or Faith-based Organizations, were involved in all decisions, including the location of stand posts (Interviews D5, D6 and C6). Women, men and youth are to be involved in the implementation of the physical infrastructure and in Multi Stakeholder Forums (MSF), especially for ownership of the assets to be created and generate awareness. The utilities also focus on the people rather than on the technology to ensure that the focus did not remain on engineers and the equipment (Interviews D4 and SP2). Therefore, UN-Habitat ensured that women were present and in agreement with all decisions made.

7.1.3.1 Capacity building

The LVWATSAN includes a capacity-building component for raising awareness among policy-makers and citizens at large, information sharing, and coordination with other programmes in the region. Capacity building was earlier envisaged in short and long term phases but the realization that it has to be an ongoing activity that is appropriate for each stage has led to a different approach. It is now looked at as more responsive to the stage of progress of work e.g. utilizing hygiene awareness messages of WAC for all areas rather than only for project towns. Capacity building for establishing sustainable institutional processes was started by early 2007.

The Water Supply Boards around Lake Victoria are gradually working to their new responsibilities and roles in terms of the regulations following the water sector reforms and associated decentralization. Well-qualified persons have taken responsibilities on the Water Regulatory and other Boards, and the support structures created under the sector reforms allow them to realize their objectives (Interview D4).

Comment 35: Capacity Building

> Commercial orientation of staff is essential. Get people, especially those from the Civil Services oriented to managing public assets in a more business like manner, that is, get them to look at cost effectiveness, returns on investments, and customer orientation. Largely speaking, civil servants are not oriented to business planning etc. (Interview SP2)

Capacity building is envisaged at the following levels:

- The capacity building for the institutions will be for regional areas rather than only for project towns. The skills for management will therefore be developed more widely and the training activity will gradually be transferred to local institutions. At the town level, UN-Habitat will be working with the local service providers, including the new utilities that have been formed. The plan is to build their capacities to run the water schemes in these towns more efficiently. The clustering of towns will ensure that the utilities will be economically viable. The aim is to support local service providers in developing plans and in efficient management of water services.
- The capacity building will not be using 'standard packages' that have been developed by donor agencies or training institutions to date. Previous capacity building initiatives of UN-Habitat were more for 'how to guide a process'. However, when you want to develop a water utility, you need specific modules. The capacity building branch has been working with municipal authorities to ensure that planning is done properly and standard designs are developed but they have not had a direct intervention of this nature before, that is, of capacities for operation and maintenance of infrastructure projects. That is at a much lower level than policy directions and guidance. A good manual can be prepared on how this can be done step by step but when you work directly into operations, you require more specific guidance and capacity building.

- The support to be provided through LVWATSAN is to build capacity of the structures to better regulate the town level service providers. Although the staff in the new structures are well-qualified, other members in the Board, including elected councillors, may not be well informed or have little or no education. Such members are likely to be interested only in their own constituencies or benefits, making the functioning of the Water Regulatory and other Boards difficult. UN-Habitat plans to enable this through study/ exchange visits within Africa and to the other countries (one study tour was already being planned for South Africa). The objective is to ensure that the stakeholders learn from established water schemes. This is considered an important component/ aspect of capacity building because the new service providers can see for themselves how a water system has been working.

The GIS/ mapping and capacity building aspects are given emphasis not only at the town level, but also at the community and cluster level, which is complemented by household surveys. At the end of the programme, UN-Habitat is hoping to leave a legacy of using maps for facilitating decision-making by highlighting areas that are deprived of services in relation to where the decision-makers want to provide services. The data that will be available for planning will be gender segregated and income segregated. The product will be digitized maps that will be ready for use by utilities etc. The clustering of towns and mapping with satellite pictures entered into GIS systems will enable planning of infrastructure.

7.1.3.2 Multi Stakeholder Forums

To have representation of communities, LVWATSAN aims at institutionalizing participation of stakeholders in decision-making as envisaged in the water sector reforms. UN-Habitat identified the need for establishing Multiple Stakeholder Forums (MSF) that consistently oversee the implementation and ensures that there is a feedback from the community members even in the Boardroom. The MSFs, comprising approximately 15 persons who are to meet on a quarterly basis, are expected to meet quarterly and to oversee project implementation. Their involvement is expected to provide links between the community groups and local governments, include community voices in the decision process and enable communities to get immediate feedback on decisions made. At the implementation stage, the MSF will have monthly site meetings with representation by technical consultants, contractors, UN-Habitat, and Government representatives. The MSF will review monthly progress and prepare a work plan for the next month. After three months, the MSF is to review the work of the previous quarter and identify any requirements for technical recommendations. Such a feedback system is expected to be instrumental in ensuring implementation according to agreed designs and in maintaining quality of work. UN-Habitat is aware about the need for supporting the MSF, and that many people go to meetings because of the handouts. It is therefore working toward making the MSF sustainable by being independent of UN-Habitat resources.

In terms of gender mainstreaming, the gender aspects are considered at the time of design of

project. Moreover, UN-Habitat also has another mechanism for enabling integration of various aspects - the 'project review committee'. Since Tibaijuka came in as Executive Director in 2002, she has established the 'project review committee', which reviews all projects and all activities of UN-Habitat to ensure that gender issues are considered. If not, the project is sent back to the drawing board.

7.1.3.3 Coordination

For coordination with different agencies, two issues were considered. Kenya (and the other EA countries) is going for a sector wide approach and hence activities of UN-Habitat will be well dove-tailed into related activities of the utilities. In addition, the LVWATSAN Initiative is aligned with the EAC Protocol, streamlining coordination at that level, for example, when a donor proposed funding an intervention in the area EAC drew its attention to activities to be undertaken through the LVWATSAN.

The proposal was developed through a process of stakeholder workshops and activities of Phase I were prioritised in consultation with various actors at the town levels (Interview D5, and PC9). In addition, the involvement of national Governments and the water utilities ensured that some of their key concerns are addressed (Interview SP2). However, the utilities feel that the process and administrative issues have not been addressed efficiently, either because the processes and interventions that individuals consider appropriate have not materialised (Interviews D14, and U12), or because this is the first time that UN-Habitat is implementing a project (Interview O2). At another level, this is indicative of expectations about UN-Habitat acting in the same way as other donor agencies – this was especially with reference to conditions of procurement of materials and services.

7.1.4 Choice

The Initiative was launched at a special session at the 2004 Stockholm Water Week chaired by Dr. Anna Tibaijuka - the Executive Director of UN-Habitat and Water Ministers from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This included a side event where all Water Ministers and donors were present and hence all potential funding agencies were brought together. There was a very good response to the Initiative. Immediately after the event, the delegation of the Netherlands Government approached the UN-Habitat Consultant to say that they liked the proposal very much and that if a request for funding were submitted quickly, the Government of Netherlands would fund the Initiative (Interview PC6). Ultimately, it took one year for the process and the Dutch Government agreed to fund Phase 1 of the initiative.

The Initiative is to be implemented in two phases. Phase I was expected to commence by 1 June 2006 and completed by 30 May 2009. The experience gained within the first six months of Phase I is expected to enable refining the implementation strategy of Phase II towns, and commencement of effective implementation. UN-Habitat is to provide grant support to the towns, primarily to

rehabilitate existing facilities and to strengthen local capacity for management, operation and maintenance.

Comment 36: Process issues and confidence building

> We are not happy working with UN Habitat, which has not implemented projects but has experience of backstopping for other implementing agencies. Therefore, it has primarily been linking projects and donor agencies. It identifies a problem and suggests solutions to the problems. ... For example, when partnering with Governments, it is essential to have MoUs – this process itself took some time. ... UN Habitat is quick at organizing workshops, seminars and in sending consultancy support. It does not have the administrative structure for dealing with donor funded projects e.g. like 'donor guidelines' of donor agencies, UN Habitat does not as yet have any guidelines for the partners. (Interview O2)

Comment 37: Processes, and Interpretations

> Council has good communication channels with UN Habitat Office in Nairobi but the processes and reasons for visits by different consultants are not known. ... Now other consultants are to visit *** again before issue of Tenders. It almost looks like the UN Habitat Office does not trust what one set of consultants have proposed and hence is getting things verified by another. In fact, a number of Consultants have visited the town for the same thing/ design of specific components and have asked the same questions. This has raised doubts in people's minds about the authenticity of the Initiative, and the extent of funding utilized as consultants fees is not known (Interviews U12 and U13)

Comments 38: Delays in start of work

> "The Project was announced too early, that is, before the financial arrangements were finalized. In Uganda, it was announced too close to the elections. The President and Minister announced in Kyotera that water would flow by February 2006. The project implementation was to start in September 2005 and USD 1 million was to be utilized by November 2005. This has not happened" (Interview D14).
>
> UN Habitat raised high expectations of the Initiative and people expected immediate action after the stakeholder consultations. People make inquiring at public meetings, with community development staff and engineers about when the project is to be implemented. People have been questioning the frequency of Missions (UN Habitat). There is concern about the lack of any works. ... a series of meetings were organised at the town level to calm people, especially because previous programs in the areas have failed to deliver adequate services (Interview PC8).
>
> The high profile introduction of the Initiative has created expectations that are not met, for example, starting implementation in January 2006 has not happened . No work has started on the ground even by end July 2006. Similar commitment was also made at the Stakeholders Forum (Interviews U12 & U13).
>
> People at the highest and the lowest/ user level were given assurances about the project, but 1 year and 9 months later, nothing has happened on the ground. Thus, doubts have been cast about the Government and reasons for lack of any works. (Interview O2).
>
> The process of LVWATSAN is becoming boring, probably because the UN has previously never implemented infrastructure projects. The actual 'amount' of assistance is small while the process is too prolonged (Interview SP2).
>
> The workshop raised high expectations and now there are fears that the project will not be implemented. The main issues are: a) The current status of the project is not known, b) More consultants are visiting than work done, c) Recent letter from UN Habitat provided information about start of the procurement process ... (Interviews U12 and U13)

Comment 39: Ownership Issues

> The training needs assessment and training itself need to be undertaken with local people rather than only with UN Consultants. This should be a combined effort of the Board and UN. Training is also required in specific areas like leak detection, and measurable parameters need to be identified for monitoring performance improvement. Even billing efficiency can be improved. (Interview SP2).
>
> I do not agree with a proposal in *** but at the end of the day if a donor wants to spend money on something, why not let it go. ... For example, the reporting format for the Consultants Reports of the LVWATSAN Initiative should ideally include space for comments by the various organisational stakeholders and UN Habitat – but this is not the case (Interview O2)

The UN-Habitat team consider the initiative unique and ground breaking because of the following:

- It is a regional programme rather than an urban area centred programme and hence is likely to have implications for a much wider population than targeted under the programme.
- The monitoring component, including the use of maps for planning and management rather than only on provision of infrastructure and services. The reason for focusing on spatial mapping was that with this approach, over the long-term, neediest areas will be allocated development funds/ support rather than areas that decision makers in local bodies decide.
- Focus on sustainability or rather sustainable access to services. One of the examples of the fate of donor projects is the Kisii Treatment Plant for which huge investment was made. However, since there is no sewerage system to carry waste from the homes to the plant, it is not functional.
- A new delivery mechanism (of having 3 phases) that breaks old trends. Although other interventions also have an assessment, pilot and main phase, the LVWATSAN process for the initial needs assessment was designed for preparing a proposal to seek funding.
- Participatory decision-making process where stakeholders/ users are involved over the whole process and not only for needs identification The objective is to get the communities, utilities and Government to work together. The Government may want to continue something only if immediate needs of the voters are met.

7.2 Process issues

The key issues identified by actors at the national, provincial and town levels relate to: i) the long gap between announcement of the initiative and start of work; ii) town people unsure whether the water and sanitation interventions agreed with UN-Habitat will be implemented; iii) numbers and frequency of consultants and donors visiting the towns; and iv) communication gaps about the current status of LVWATSAN because UN-Habitat's strategic collaboration is with national Governments rather than the decentralised levels for which the water utilities are accountable or at the town levels.

7.3 Summary of findings

The LVWATSAN has been designed for implementation in three stages and is seeking additional funds for the other phases by demonstrating the success of the initial phases of the initiative. The involvement of national Governments and the water utilities has ensured that some of their key concerns are addressed. However, the utilities feel that the process and administrative issues have not been addressed efficiently – because this is the first time that UN-Habitat is implementing a project. At another level, this is indicative of expectations about UN-Habitat acting in the same way as other donor agencies – this was especially with reference to conditions of procurement of materials and services.

In 2007, UN-Habitat has initiated a similar regional initiative - the Mekong Region Water and Sanitation Initiative (MEK-WATSAN), under its Water in Asian Cities Programme for which UN-Habitat and AsDB are partnering. Therefore, in a way, the approach of LVWATSAN has already been up scaled.

From UN-Habitat's perspective, the LVWATSAN is very responsive to the context and has successfully worked towards ensuring participation of the most vulnerable groups. However, the process it has followed for drawing attention to the initiative and for garnering funds has negative repercussions at all levels, especially in the towns where expectations of the people were raised. Subsequently, the consultant-led design and planning process is questioned more than it may have been without the high publicity. Moreover, the so-called partners of UN-Habitat too are critical because of what they see as lack of a professional and efficient approach of the organisation.

8 COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-CUTTING ANALYSIS

The cross-case analysis in this Chapter focuses on the similarities and differences of the three cases, as described individually in the previous Chapters. The Chapter starts with a comparison of the good practice criteria that have been incorporated (Section 8.2), the decision processes involved (Section 8.), the influences on up-scaling, and the up-scaling achieved (Section 8.3 and 8.4). In Section 8.5, the requirements of up-scaling that were met under the three cases are discussed. The decision processes for the cases include a discussion on how the interventions were introduced and the different stages in their implementation.

This is followed by a discussion on key hindrances identified in the cases of MHP and SNP, and a comparison with LVWATSAN to assess whether these issues are addressed or not. A discussion on issues of partnership and those raised by NGOs who can be instrumental in up-scaling of community led interventions highlights areas that require greater attention by those supporting up-scaling. The discussion on documentation of good practices and on how their recognition affects up-scaling provides useful pointers for award giving organisations.

The cases studied were initiated at scales ranging from the city to the national and regional levels at different times, and have shown many similarities and differences. To answer the research questions "How are sustainable interventions for environmental improvement in urban areas up scaled at the implementation level?" and "What are the decision processes involved in initiating and up-scaling sustainable interventions in the area of environmental improvement?", it is essential to first answer the sub-questions.

8.1 Good Practices

Sub-question 1: What are the factors that make interventions in the urban settlements context good practices?

Good practices in urban areas are, by the operational definition for the study, interventions that have evolved locally for bringing sustainable socio-economic changes in the lives of the poor living in areas with high levels of environmental degradation. Based on evidence from the cases, the characteristics that make them good practices (Appendix Table 7-21) are discussed below.

8.1.1 Uniqueness within a context

The cases reveal that, although from a global perspective the good practices may not be unique solutions for the problem being tackled, they involve a substantially different approach within the context and are differently implemented. All three introduced a unique feature that had not been attempted locally and incorporated positive features of existing programmes. All three interventions led to: i) overall improvement of the settlements and improved access to water and sanitation, ii) participation of the people whom the interventions aimed to reach; and iii)

introduction of alternative livelihood options for those living in the settlements.

The interventions in all cases were initiated by highly motivated leaders in the implementing organisations following liberalisation of the economy. The greater focus on housing in Sri Lanka, on environmental improvement in Ahmedabad, and on secondary towns around Lake Victoria in East Africa were a consequence of the political and/ or environmental situation at the time. In all three cases, visionary leaders were supported by several individuals who contributed to actualising their vision and enabled the initiation and implementation of the interventions.

In Sri Lanka, the planned features included the facilitative role of the National Government, a sectoral approach, the family/ community led decision approach, the provision of loans and other support for house construction or improvements, settlement level or in-situ service provision, reblocking, partial, or total redevelopment (Section 1 and 2), and institutionalizing of the roles of CDCs. The 'Learning by Doing and Doing by Learning' process contributed to the evolution of the Community Action Planning approach and the introduction of community contracting.

Similarly, in Ahmedabad, besides the integrated approach of SNP for upgrading slums and the partnership with the private sector, features such as financial contribution of the residents, NGOs contributing for part of the costs for social development activities, and the financial mechanism for security of community contributions were introduced by partners. The uniqueness of LVWATSAN arises from the regional approach with a focus on secondary towns and reduction in pollutants going into Lake Victoria, utilising of the existing infrastructure, and with a focus on longterm sustainability, the capacity building of utilities.

8.1.2 Sustainability

The sustainability of interventions, a basic criterion of good practices, indicates that the physical assets created are functional for the duration of their envisaged 'lifetime', and that the processes and practices adopted during implementation address economic, environmental, socio-cultural, gender and vulnerability issues. The participatory processes, which empowered and built skills of community members to negotiate and directly interact with the implementing organisations, and take-up new income generation options, have contributed to increased affordability and reduction of poverty.

For both MHP and SNP, sustainability of investments in physical infrastructure was largely achieved because of community involvement and the participatory processes. For MHP, tenure security, integration with planning regulations, construction affordability, and capacity building initiatives have contributed to sustainability of assets. Physical sustainability was achieved under SNP because payments by residents for household connections resulted in ownership of assets and better quality of construction due to supervision of works by slum residents and the NGOs,. Although there was no major technical innovation in the approach, the infrastructure in the slums is compatible with the citywide standards and the water supply network. In contrast, LVWATSAN

addresses sustainability through use of technical options that are appropriate for the context, capacity building at various levels and through community participation. The assessments resulted in a greater focus on incorporating existing infrastructure and lessons from previous interventions. The LVWATSAN is most likely to be sustainable because it directly addresses problems associated with inappropriate technologies, inadequate operation, and maintenance of infrastructure, shortage of skilled human resources, and paying capacities of the users.

The economic sustainability of investments under all the cases has been achieved to some extent. Under LVWATSAN, economic sustainability is addressed by rehabilitation of previously installed and currently non-functional infrastructure and introduction of infrastructure and technologies that are appropriate for the context in terms cost, ease of operation and maintenance, and local skills. Livelihood options have been introduced by enabling access to potable water through small-service providers and water kiosks, and through use of locally fabricated components for construction of toilets. Economic sustainability at the family level is achieved through improved access to water that will substantially reduce the current expenditure for very poor quality water. Economic sustainability is achieved under SNP because it has reduced wastage of resources associated with 'public facilities' in slums. It has resulted in sustainable access to water and sanitation without stretching the resource base of AMC, reduction in future expenditure on partial upgrading of slums, and construction or maintenance of public toilets. In addition, it has led to substantial investments in housing, and improved health and incomes of the residents.

However, higher costs were incurred under MHP and SNP because of delays associated with participatory approaches and community mobilisation, and for administration, supervision and monitoring. The savings under MHP because of lower costs of houses was compromised with the lapse in fiscal discipline in 1988 when the Government exempted those on Food Stamps from paying back the house loans. At the Programme level, high costs for external infrastructure for extending services to the underserved areas (that would have been required under normal circumstances), were incurred in an unscheduled order to match progress of the MHP.

In Ahmedabad, the average cost of construction for SNP increased by 45 percent in ten years, and additional wastage of material and financial (Rs 3,500,000 grant from HUDCO) resources was incurred when an upgraded slum was demolished. In addition, various actors are not amenable to the partnerships with NGOs and to contributions of community members because it hinders their arrangements with contractors in terms of getting a percentage of the value of contracts for themselves (Interviews). For decision makers, engineering staff and contractors, additional costs have been incurred because they have to deliver quality work and because of delays in completion of works (because of stoppage of work by community members protesting against poor quality of work or materials). Therefore, while payment by slum dwellers is an integral part of the SNP, the vested interests have hindered this process.

Environmental sustainability was achieved through use of appropriate technologies and local

materials under MHP and is likely to be achieved under LVWATSAN, which is designed to address, issues of environmental pollution at the regional level. In Ahmedabad, SNP has led to improved environmental conditions in and around the slums. The wider environmental issues in terms of construction in some untenable areas were over-looked under MHP.

8.1.3 Equity

Equity in the urban context involves resource redistribution, providing opportunities for inclusion to those who have been deprived and for representation of communities and the vulnerable in decision processes and access to urban services. Equity entails top-down actions in favour of the poor, the vulnerable and discriminated groups for overcoming existing and deeply entrenched inequalities and local patterns of discrimination.

Equity in all three cases has been achieved at several levels with all residents of the intervention areas irrespective of their economic status, power relations, or in the case of Ahmedabad, caste or community groups. In Sri Lanka, the area-based re-blocking or widening of paths and roads enabled the more vulnerable families get the same benefits as the others. In Ahmedabad, even the most vulnerable have improved access to services. Under MHP and SNP, some land redistribution occurred with the better-off occupants giving-up part of the land they occupied for public use/ road widening. In addition, the interventions recognised the slum residents, and their 'right to stay' and/ or to relocation in case of future demolition of the area. LVWATSAN is focusing on the poorest and most deprived, and enabling access to improved water supply and sanitation across selected towns and settlements. Thus, area-based development or improvements for slums enable greater equity in access to basic services amongst the poorest.

8.1.3.1 Gender/ Participation of women

The significance and benefits of access to water and sanitation and involvement of women (and men) in decision-making regarding the provision, location and technology of water and sanitation is widely accepted (United Nations 2004). Women are central to the process of participation under SNP and LVWATSAN. In Ahmedabad, the NGOs work primarily with women for community mobilisation, and thereby are giving them opportunities for further growth, while women's needs were considered specifically under the LVWATSAN. Under SNP, women have been empowered because of their leadership in the community mobilization process, participation in the Resident's Association and the pre-requisite of opening a bank account in their name. The women have learnt new skills for managing their savings and bank accounts, to effectively take up project activities and roles, and have greater confidence in their abilities and skills because of opportunities for interacting with NGOs, AMC staff and other interested actors. Subsequently, many women have taken-up new income generation activities, which have substantially improved the quality of life of some families (Refer Appendix 10). Under the LVWATSAN, participation of women is required because of the acute gender imbalance resulting from the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the Region.

Women's involvement in identifying and prioritising needs, managing decentralised water supply, and in multi-stakeholder forums has further strengthened their roles. Under MHP, women from low-income families were mobilised into self-help and mutual-help groups (Women's Groups) while in some areas, women were leaders of the CDCs (Interviews C8 and C9).

8.1.4 Holistic approaches

Literature showed that good practices adopt holistic and intersectoral approaches and that the sectoral interventions contribute to and are coordinated with other activities to maximise benefits to the community. Although focused on enabling access to housing or to basic services, all three cases have adopted or integrated other components, directly or through activities such as establishing of self-help groups, introducing livelihood options and skills training for improved income opportunities.

The identified problems were addressed holistically during the planning phase for both the MHP and LVWATSAN. LVWATSAN demonstrates an infrastructure-led holistic approach to development, while MHP demonstrates a holistic approach to the housing problems of different economic and spatially segregated groups, to physical development of the settlements and even in terms of the management and support systems. The holistic approach evolved in response to the goal and national vision of enabling more people have their own homes, and was supported by the policies, regulatory environment, and economic and technical assistance. The approach was strengthened by the institutionalising of the role of CDCs for strengthening the community level structures, introduction of CAP and the introduction of community contracting to enable residents to plan and construct public facilities. The implementation processes also evolved to address planning, managing, and other administrative issues more comprehensively.

As mentioned above, LVWATSAN has been designed as a holistic approach for meeting the basic water and sanitation needs of the community in line with the reforms in the water sector. In addition, it addresses causal factors of environmental pollution, poverty amongst the population, economic development and operation and maintenance. It includes a component for a GIS based database that is expected to enable prioritisation of works in the future, and capacity building support to ensure up dating and use of the database routinely. The intention is to ensure that when other agencies plan interventions in the future, they would be integrated with infrastructure provided under LVWATSAN.

In contrast, the SNP is a holistic approach for area-based physical upgrading at the settlement level, and addresses problems of physical planning and economic feasibility identified in previous slum improvement programmes. It incorporated community development and strengthening components such as formation of residents associations, women's and youth groups, and vocational training – similar to DFID funded slum improvement projects of the 1980s. In addition, the partnerships with NGOs enabled effective community participation, and convergence with the

toilet subsidy and electrification schemes. However, unlike MHP, SNP did not incorporate options for partial or overall redevelopment of slums, for formalizing of tenure, or for tackling the overall problems of inadequate housing and services in the city. SNP is also not the only option available to slum residents for getting water and drainage connections.

8.1.5 Shared vision

A shared vision and clarity about the direction of development enables joint actions and participation of actors from different sectors and of communities in decision processes. The vision, primarily of the leader of the implementing organisation, enables effective partnerships amongst several actors, including CBOs, NGOs, governments, private sector organisations, donors, professionals, and research institutions with complementary agendas, expertise, and resources. All three cases demonstrate what can be achieved in terms of evolution of a good practice and its implementation because of a shared vision. However, the outcomes reveal the need for making a distinction in the level at which the vision is shared and by whom.

The MHP clearly demonstrated what can be achieved in terms of evolution of a good practice and its implementation because of a shared vision between decision-makers, Task Force members, professionals in the implementing organisations, the citizens, and the UN General Assembly. The articulation of the vision together with the keen interest and regular monitoring by the leadership created a momentum that contributed to more stakeholders sharing the vision. It also enabled the Task Force members and professionals contribute significantly to the planning and detailing of the MHP and evolution of the processes for implementation.

For LVWATSAN, as in the case of MHP, the objective of political leaders formed the basis for assessing the situation in detail and for developing of an appropriate solution by individuals who were well acquainted with the problems and needs of the Region. As a normative agency, UN-Habitat articulated the vision for the intervention. The contextually appropriate solution that emerged was shared in the form of a Concept Note with national governments and donor agencies, while the processes followed for finalizing designs, prioritising of works and phases of implementation ensured that the town residents and institutions in the 15 secondary towns were well-versed with the vision. However, this does not ensure consensus or support of professional staff locally as identified in Ahmedabad and towns of East Africa (Interviews).

In contrast, the vision of SNP, as articulated in the Project Proposal (Parikh 1995), formed only a part of the overall vision of AMC for the intervention. The SNP demonstrates how a good practice can evolve when stakeholders with different goals collaborate around a shared vision for improving environmental conditions of slums. The architects who initiated the meetings wanted to use their professional skills while the conceptualiser was interested in transferring the SNP concept to other cities and exploring models for its financing and implementation. The private sector had suffered a set-back because of the plague outbreak in Surat, and was interested in taking visible

actions for improving physical conditions of the city, attract global business partnerships, and gain benefits for its employees. Saath saw SNP initiative as a win-win situation that would meet expressed needs of the slum dwellers and give the organisation an opportunity to incorporate the physical development component to its Integrated Slum Development Programme. Saath shared the vision with its CBO members. For AMC, SNP offered an opportunity to 'change the face of the city' as planned in 1984 under a World Bank funded project, and provided an opportunity for a commercial partnership with the private sector.

For SEWA Bank, which became a partner after the partnership between AMC, the private sector and Saath was agreed, the SNP provided an opportunity to expand its coverage from SEWA members to all households in slums. For SEWA, SNP was an opportunity for expanding its presence in the city in several ways. SNP would not only meet the shelter needs of its members, but also enabled expansion of its membership base, its dormant housing programme, and would establish it as the predominant organisation working for the poor in the city. SEWA, with support of USAID, the World Bank, and WSP-SA, worked intensively to share its vision for transforming lives of slum dwellers, particularly women, with the wider international development community to garner support for its implementation.

Thus, in practice, the vision of SNP was shared primarily by Saath, SEWA Bank and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, and was not shared extensively at the city level, especially amongst elected representatives, AMC Departmental staff and higher level officers as illustrated by delays in clearance of files and lack of demand from elected representatives for implementing SNP in their constituencies. The individual centred introduction of the SNP showed early casualties with the exclusion of the architects who arranged meetings between the conceptualiser and the private sector. The possibility of more stakeholders sharing the SNP vision was shattered because of the intense publicity around SNP, especially at international fora, as the 'SEWA Parivartan project[2]'. Similarly, criticism about the SNP by professionals, academics and other NGOs illustrates how they compared it to the vision of a 'holistic approach to housing', lack of exposure to slum situations and/ or to lack of authentic information about the SNP. The private sector did not display the flexibility required in working with local governments and its procedures for actualising the vision.

The cases show that although a shared vision may be difficult to achieve, the coordination and leadership role of the initiator and the implementing organisation are significant and essential for successfully implementing good practices. In addition, because external support agencies generate greater interest in the intervention, they can play a very significant role in adapting processes that enable more stakeholders to participate in different locations. The clarity about the goal and

[2] Even as late as December 2008, an international NGO (Brochure) continues to refer to the intervention as the SNP of Mahila Housing Trust - the name that Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust is using more extensively after expansion of its activities to other States in the country – where SEWA cannot yet officially operate.

processes contributed to: i) articulation of roles and responsibilities at various levels of Government; ii) effective strategic support at appropriate levels from various external academic institutions; iii) the preparation of implementation guidelines, and iv) capacity building support for those involved in implementation.

8.1.6 Interdependence

Interdependence refers to supportive policies, partnerships that maintain an effective balance between bottom-up and top-down actions, financial support that does not lead to dependency or control of beneficiary stakeholders by outsiders, and technical skills and resources that increase transparency, and accountability of public organisations to more stakeholders.

To some extent, interdependence amongst several actors is demonstrated under MHP, SNP and LVWATSAN. The approaches of all three require partnerships with communities and entail strong interdependence, primarily because community consensus is required for implementation of the intervention. The levels of participation and negotiation for MHP and SNP were greater because the implementation could only be undertaken after households consented to participate, and to make physical adjustments or reblocking in the settlements. The interdependence for the LVWATSAN is primarily for planning community level services in a responsive way and for improved governance, management and long-term operation and maintenance.

In order to achieve sustainability, the interventions have to address and respond to the multi-sectoral needs of beneficiary stakeholders. This requires partnerships amongst different stakeholders equipped to address sectoral needs, and with NGOs or CBOs who can facilitate participation of communities in enabling and/ or planning and implementation of the interventions. Partnerships also involve actors who are willing to respond to the context by introducing or incorporating related activities, and/ or discarding non-essential ones.

For MHP, the interdependence amongst the actors, including NHDA field staff, communities, elected representatives, local leaders, and external support agencies was substantial. The SNP Cell depends on the NGOs and CBOs for successful implementation of the project, especially for getting community contributions and negotiating infrastructure layout within the slums. In practice, the relationship between NGOs and SNP Cell in Ahmedabad and the Project Unit in Sri Lanka is maintained because of the maturity and flexibility of a few key individuals within the partnering organisations who are responsive to problems on the ground. Their negotiation skills have contributed to sorting out of differences and problems arising prior to and during implementation. The interdependence within communities was significant since each household was affected by infrastructure works undertaken within the settlement. The extent of commitment for the intervention and its ownership would not have existed if the residents of intervention areas did not participate in the decision making or through financial contributions.

The problems associated with any partner taking on a 'managing or supervisory' or 'being in

control' role are revealed under SNP where the 'conceptualiser' inadvertently identified an 'independent and dominant' role for himself (providing all technical support, including training of AMC engineers in the use of software, Plane Table surveys, design and detailed drawings). The high costs of this arrangement and related inefficiencies for AMC led to its decision to proceed with SNP without him. Similarly, during the pilot, the private sector, which saw itself as an efficient organisation with a professional approach, had a good rapport with the contractor whom it identified as a partner responsible for delivering the 'upgraded area', and could not build a similar rapport with key decision makers in AMC or the NGOs.

In the case of LVWATSAN, the implementing organisation is dependent on the local communities and consultants for ensuring that participatory decisions and projects are implemented as planned. LVWATSAN involves collaborations with regional and national entities, utilities, donors, consultants, town councils, youth and women's groups and faith-based groups. In the case of LVWATSAN, the participation of the communities, specifically women, was integral to the decision process in terms of finalizing locations of services and agreeing on roles and processes for its management.

Thus, to enable partnerships and promote successful implementation of good practices, the roles and inputs of several actors require clarity and recognition.

8.1.7 Iteration/ Evolution over time

The project approaches, components, and processes of the three cases evolved through consultations amongst the partners, and in response to new situations and change in context. Good practices evolve during the design/ planning stage as well as during implementation. They evolve over time to incorporate changes based on local situations, values, preferences and circumstances. They also change in response to the changing environment, and the changing levels of experiences, understanding, knowledge and skills of the various actors involved in different locations. The changes are possible because of the flexibility amongst participating actors who assess, plan, negotiate, review, and make numerous decisions at various levels and stages.

The evolution of MHP occurred through a continuous process of monitoring, evaluation, and learning by doing. MHP guidelines were developed during the initiation stage, while the participatory decision process was formalised in the form of CAP methodology. In addition, it evolved over time to incorporate the community contracting process.

The SNP demonstrates how a good practice can evolve when stakeholders with different goals collaborate for improving environmental conditions of slums. The changes in the SNP approach during the planning stage, including AMC's decision for having higher specifications for water supply and drainage lines, Saath's decision to pay part contribution for community development activities and reduction in community contributions to one-third of the total. SNP evolved further when the toilet component was made an integral part of the SNP package. Another changes were

introduced to enable elected representatives contribute funds to a maximum of Rs 500 for all household in the selected area, to give construction contracts to NGOs.

Further, although the SNP pilot was designed to enable private sector partnerships and contributions, when this did not work out, AMC took over the role of the implementing organisation. The positive changes in the SNP occurred because of the slow pace of implementation and because large-scale financing has not been available. Thus, the conceptualiser's emphasis on comprehensive upgrading of the slums and cost reduction through topography management evolved to incorporate other features.

The LVWATSAN evolved during the Design Phase because of contributions from various stakeholders to achieve the aim for rapid delivery of services and their sustainability at modest costs. The Government of the Netherlands, which funded the pilot in 15 towns, has contributed to the evolution of the monitoring mechanism and strengthening of implementation processes because of the pre-requisite for ensuring sustainability of the outcomes and infrastructure to 2015.

8.2 Decision Making

Sub-question 2: What are the decision routines involved in initiating and implementing good practices?

The implementation of the interventions can be distinguished in terms of the initiation, improvisation, implementation and expansion. Varying factors contributed to the introduction of the good practices, and the involved distinct phases of decision-making that occurred in parallel rather than in sequence. These are discussed below (Refer Appendix Tables 7-5 to 7-14).

8.2.1 Initiation

The initiation stage for the cases comprised problem identification, problem definition, design of a solution for the specific context, its analysis and finalisation by those involved, and making a choice. This was followed by seeking authorisation and designation of resources for its implementation. The decision process can be described as a rational decision-making process and an emergent opportunity for introducing an attractive (recognised) solution for a problem that had not been articulated in the same way.

8.2.1.1 Problem identification

While the problems of underserviced areas are widely known and tackled in different ways, problem identification refers to the articulation of a problem in a context and incorporates specific related issues to be addressed from the perspective of a conceptualiser or decision-maker. The problem can be identified as a longterm goal or vision, a technical solution for the area of interest of a professional, and/ or a routine problem.

MHP and LVWATSAN involved decision processes that were goal or problem oriented with the

political decision makers articulating the problems they wanted tackled (Refer Appendix Table 7-5). They requested support for a means to actualise their goals. The MHP represents a rational approach for finding an effective solution to the problem of highly subsidised housing not meeting actual housing requirements as identified toward the end of the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme (December 1982). It was also a response to pressure from multilateral funding institutions to reduce subsidies and direct provision of built housing. Premadasa, who was personally motivated to enable access to shelter and held all related portfolios, appointed a Task Force of housing professionals, and assigned it to find an affordable housing solution. The declaration of 1987 as the Year of Shelter for the Homeless gave further impetus to his determination of enabling access to housing for all. The LVWATSAN also followed a rational decision approach that was directed by the over-arching goal of enabling access to basic services in the secondary towns around Lake Victoria. The decision was made in the context of several other initiatives in the Region and the conducive political and policy environment.

The SNP and LVWATSAN were initiated because individuals approached or met decision makers to whom they convincingly communicated the need for addressing an urban problem they had defined. The proposals or problems presented complement or contribute to achieving the generally known 'goal' for an area or sector. The instances occurred when it became widely known that she/he is looking for opportunities to bring about significant improvements in urban areas or in the performance of an organization.

8.2.1.2 Problem definition and planning for the intervention

Problem definition refers to the firming-up the range of issues to be addressed to tackle the identified problem. In the urban context, specifically with reference to underserviced areas, problem definition is influenced by the motivations, interest, knowledge, and experiences of those involved, and by the perceived or actual support or resistance of other influential decision-makers to the 'proposed intervention'. Consequently, the involvement of individuals representing multiple sectors contributes to defining the problem more holistically.

In all cases, the motivation of higher levels of decision makers was complemented by planning, technical, and social development inputs from individuals (Refer Appendix Table 7-6). The problem definition and solution were refined through inputs by each new actor participating in the decision process. In the case of MHP, the Task Force was set-up for developing a viable housing programme based on lessons learned in implementation of the previous housing programme. The Task Force members prepared a series of working papers on various issues, and each was examined and discussed in detail. The working papers were amended and subsequently incorporated in the decisions of the group. The process for identifying alternatives and assessing them was through Task Force meetings pre-scheduled on a fixed day and a fixed time. The deliberations were recorded in minutes of meetings, which were submitted to the Minister and the Secretary to the Ministry. The decision-maker was further briefed by senior officials on the

progress made by the Task Force during regular meetings. Following the first formal meeting of the Task Force members with the Minister after two months of work, the consensus on key issues was incorporated with the housing programme. This interactive decision process resulted in a unique solution that was acceptable to the decision maker (Weerapana 1986).

For SNP, the problem was redefined by the 'conceptualiser' for in-situ upgrading in Ahmedabad. He presented the achievements of the slum-networking approach in Indore, and the planned pilot in partnership with the private sector and NGOs to the decision maker who found the pilot proposal suitable for a citywide project. Subsequently, the AMC Municipal Commissioner asked for a citywide project proposal with AMC as the implementing organisation.

The LVWATSAN evolved from an initial 'vague idea' about focusing on small towns around Lake Victoria. A consultant, who had worked in the region over many years and seen the consequences of 'grant projects', prepared the concept note and identified the areas where the initiative could be undertaken. The concept was further developed with the Water and Sanitation Branch I team. With the reforms in the water sector, and interest of donors on investing in the region, the potential of addressing the problems in a coordinated way was enhanced.

8.2.1.3 Screening of proposed solution and making a choice

The screening of a proposed solution that is either pre-designed (as in the case of SNP), or has been designed through an interactive process, refers to its assessment for viability of implementation (financial and human resources and infrastructure) as well as acceptability in the institutional environment and amongst influential decision-makers. In each case, although the interventions were for tackling issues that the implementing organisations were familiar with, the approaches were different from what had been done earlier and they addressed the problem more holistically. Several factors made the proposals 'satisfying' choices for the decision makers (Refer Appendix Table 7-8). In addition, the solutions addressed 'problems' related to regulatory, financial and participation issues.

In the case of MHP and LVWATSAN, the decisions to implement interventions were made prior to the detailed planning and evolution of the solutions. While the enabling approach of MHP entailed participation of shelter owners, financial and technical support were integral to the programme design. The MHP therefore involved a change in the approach and process of house construction with the overall responsibility for successful implementation of the programme with NHDA. The support included declaration of 'Special Project Areas' where alternative building regulations were applicable, the 'Right to Reside' was given to residents together with technical assistance and credit for construction of houses. Areas from where residents were to be moved in the long-term were either provided with community level services or relocated. Thus, the MHP addressed the requirements of settlements with varied tenure and situations.

The LVWATSAN proposal had been developed in an interactive way and hence addressed the gap

identified for meeting MDG Targets 10 and 11 in Sub-Saharan Africa and incorporated processes arising due to a conducive policy environment. The Initiative requires minimal investments because of the low cost of rehabilitation and provision of facilities, and addresses issues of sustainability and livelihoods. In addition, since it is to be implemented in cooperation with the utility providers in the three countries, and build capacities for decentralised management, it provided a comprehensive solution for the identified problems.

In contrast, the SNP was introduced as a worked-out solution for a 'problem' that AMC had previously attempted to solve, and where the potential benefits of the interventions could be 'seen'. The factors that influenced the decision to introduce SNP in Ahmedabad were: i) the concept had been implemented through the DFID funded project and had been recognised under the World Habitat Award; ii) The presentation showed the improved areas in Indore, that is, the outcomes in terms of situation before and after implementation; iii) The engineering design, management at the settlement level, and integration with the citywide infrastructure indicated the opportunity of utilising available resources optimally; iv) the decision of Arvind Mills to implement a pilot covering about three thousand dwelling units, and v) SNP had the potential of attracting grant funds. Each factor reiterated the potential of the approach provided a viable solution to the AMC, whose proposal for a slum upgrading programme to the World Bank in 1984 had not materialised. The issue of tenure to the slum residents, which the World Bank had insisted on earlier (Interview U5), was addressed by giving verbal assurance for not clearing improved slums for a minimum of ten years after upgrading. Therefore, many areas that were previously provided with basic services at the community level were eligible for services under SNP.

The participatory approach, a requirement for residents to arrive at a consensus to realign roads and demolish parts of structures, and the requirement to pay for individual connections made the role of enablers critical for the success of SNP. Both AMC decision makers and engineering staff were convinced that they did not have the motivation (got their salaries irrespective of outcomes and were not inclined to follow-up with individual households over prolonged duration) or credibility amongst slum residents to take on the responsibility for mobilizing community contributions. Another role envisaged for the NGOs was to act as link workers for extension of health and education services, as incorporated in the DFID funded Slum Improvement Projects. Thus, each case addressed the problem and related logistics more holistically than solutions that had been implemented or planned earlier and therefore provided a more satisfying solution.

8.2.1.4 Formalizing Decision

Formalising of a decision refers to the formal authorization for implementing an intervention as well as to launching and/or publicising the decision widely. The authorising of a decision enables allocation of resources for the intervention and for putting-in place the required procedures for its implementation. The formal authorisation also enables those involved to request for both financial and technical assistance (Refer Appendix Tables 7-10 to 7-14).

The decision to implement the LVWATSAN was more formal because of the administrative and procedural requirements of UN-Habitat. LVWATSAN was formally launched at a side event at the World Water Week in Stockholm in October 2004, and the arrangements formalised through the signing of Memorandums of Understanding with the Governments of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. However, because UN-Habitat processes and procedures differ substantially from those of donors, the partnering entities felt that there were gaps in delineating of responsibilities and implementation guidelines.

The MHP was formally launched and its effective implementation was ensured by defining roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, preparation of HOLP's and Implementation Guidelines, training activities, and mass media campaigns.

For SNP, the decision to implement the project was formalised through a Resolution of the Municipal Standing Committee. The Resolution approved implementation of the citywide project and partnerships with the private sector and NGOs, and for the pilot, partnerships with AML as the implementer of physical works and with Saath for community development activities. Further Resolutions were passed for enabling AMC to: i) collect contributions from the slum residents, ii) converge the subsidised toilet scheme with the SNP, and iii) partner with NGOs for implementation of SNP.

The process for getting the formal authorization for implementing an intervention is time consuming and is important for the launching and/or publicising the decision. The authorising of a decision enables allocation of resources for the intervention, putting-in place the required procedures for its implementation, and enables those involved to request for both financial and technical assistance. The successful continuation of the interventions depends on financial and technical support, especially for planning and compiling relevant data for decision making by the implementing organisation.

8.2.2 Improvisation and Consolidation

Improvisation refers to both, the changes introduced to design of the intervention in terms of its components as well as to the processes and procedures for its implementation. This comes about because of the experience in the field as well as in response to the newer perspectives introduced by the communities and/ or to other actors associating with the intervention.

The improvisations under MHP and LVWATSAN show that the concepts and processes evolved during the planning and pilot phases, while the SNP processes have continued to evolve over time in response to changing situations and initiatives of decision makers (Refer Appendix Table 7-17). While the decisions to initiate and implement the interventions were made by key decision-makers – political decision makers in the case of MHP and LVWATSAN and administrator in the case of Ahmedabad SNP, the concept and components evolved because of contributions of many other members of the implementing organisations. The decisions for introducing changes occurred

because individuals involved were flexible and responded creatively to problems and opportunities faced during implementation. This is amply demonstrated by changes such as the CAP and community construction contracts introduced under MHP, which have subsequently been introduced elsewhere.

Similarly, the SNP approach has evolved since its introduction as a grant funded project in Indore to the partnership approach in Ahmedabad, and further to incorporate several other changes, primarily in response to difficulties faced in its implementation. The changes include AMC's insistence that NGOs are involved (because community contributions from areas where NGOs were not involved was poor), to flexibility in amounts to be paid (depending on services already taken by the household and contributions by elected representatives), to giving NGOs contracts for physical improvement because of high bids submitted by contractors. With the AMC, because the implementation is slow and the relations between the AMC and the partner NGOs are mutually supportive, the implementation processes have also evolved over time even though the 'conceptualiser' has not been part of the process after the Pilot.

The LVWATSAN evolved through negotiations with various national and town level actors, and funding organisations during the planning stage, for example, the monitoring aspect was strengthened in response to a requirement of the Government of Netherlands that the sustainability of the intervention be demonstrated (Presentation Alabaster WWW in Stockholm 2007).

MHP and SNP (and Lunawa Environment Improvement and Community Development Project) confirm observations about enabling interventions being more responsive to the context, and that changes are introduced not only because of lessons learnt but also because of facilitating actors who, because of their close contact with the different actors, optimally utilise opportunities identified. The new sets of activities or processes introduced led to greater impacts.

8.2.3 Implementation and Expansion

The implementation procedures entail changes that make interventions more compatible with routine decision procedures and capacity of the organisations. As observed in the business sector, the small decisions required in implementation are critical for up-scaling. Several changes in procedures are required during implementation as additional contextual issues – technical, procedural, partnerships with government organisations and/ or community identified or faced. In the process, the good practice is either refined for greater responsiveness or loses some of the benefits envisaged because it is subject to routine decision processes.

Using Gillespe's (2004) characteristics of up-scaling involving efficiency due to reduced input requirements per unit of output and there being a match between organisational capacities and requirements for implementing the interventions, up-scaling was achieved for MHP and is likely to occur for LVWATSAN. Activities under MHP (and under LVWATSAN) were intensified to achieve satisfactory performance as demonstrated by the number of houses built within five years.

Satisfactory performance was not achieved within AMC - the implementing organisation, but was achieved within the facilitating NGOs, specifically Saath and the associated CBOs, and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust (specifically supported for the purpose by multiple actors). Although the SEWA affiliates achieved this efficiency, it cannot be compared to what was achieved under NHDA or by Saath because of the fragmentation of responsibilities amongst the affiliated organisations. Many of the activities of the affiliates were oriented towards specific 'initiatives' supported by external donors (capacity building, newsletters, computer classes, health activities, including establishing of shops) that have subsequently been discontinued.

The SNP in Ahmedabad was an expansion of the approach introduced under the DFID funded Indore Habitat Improvement Project and its modified version in Vadodara, where the decision to implement a pilot had been taken. However, the Ahmedabad SNP is unique in its approach because of the changes introduced by the different partners. The primary difference was based on Saath's decision to ensure that the communities paid a fixed affordable amount of the cost rather than half or one-third of the cost of infrastructure, and secondly that for accountability and partnership equity, the NGO should contribute part of the costs for community development. This changed the role of NGOs to that of a partner instead of being 'contractors or consultants'. In contrast, in Vadodara and in Bhopal the SNP was introduced by the conceptualiser retaining total say in decisions related to the infrastructure with NGOs being 'contracted facilitators'.

Further, some actors were involved in integrating lessons from SNP with the Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy, while SEWA and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, with support of USAID and CHF, have expanded their operation to other towns and States. However, in new locations, the implementing organisations have not benefitted effectively from the experiences and lessons learnt in the earlier projects. This is demonstrated by the fact that the facilitating NGOs and the UNICEF consultant in Bhopal visited Ahmedabad to study it only after CIDA advocated the need for an exchange visit in 2003. On the other hand, the conceptualiser of SNP has been working independently with the private sector for introducing the concept in other parts of India.

8.2.4 Integration and/ or Slowdown

Integration refers to the intervention becoming subject to routine decision-making within the implementing organisation. While the MHP was (and LVWATSAN is likely to be) integrated fully with the routine functioning of the organisations during implementation, this has not been achieved under SNP. Integration, as represented by the development of organisational capacity, occurred under MHP (NHDA) and is likely to occur under LVWATSAN (UN-Habitat and the utilities). In the case of MHP, organisational capacity was built through the responsive capacity building of NHDA staff and the CDC members, while in the case of LVWATSAN, it is through consultants. In the case of SNP, this has occurred to a very small extent within the SNP Cell. One of the reasons for this exception is that that slum related activities in local governments are not

mainstream, are viewed as a conflict between the rights of the slum residents and those of the land-owners, and are treated as a 'punishment posting' by the staff.

However, the organisational capacities of the facilitating NGOs (Saath and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust) and CBOs (especially those facilitated by Saath) were substantially improved and SNP activities were integrated with their routine functioning. Thus, irrespective of MHP's discontinuation and slow pace of SNP, the improved capacities of the participating NGOs and CBOs is continuing to contribute to bringing greater developmental benefits to their constituents, either directly through similar interventions or through interventions in related sectors.

In the case of MHP, the slowdown started after Premadasa became President in 1989, and was accelerated because of the absence of close monitoring and political turmoil in the country. When the whole approach was reversed for political reasons, staff within NHDA either left or conveniently accommodated to the new environment and requirements of the organisation.

In summary, only the MHP was implemented as envisaged and despite its attempted expansion under the 1.5 million houses programme, it was not up-scaled. However, although the enabling approach was abandoned by the Government and the implementing organisation, individuals associated with MHP continued using the processes and tools evolved during its implementation. This has led to introduction of the knowledge and practices of CAPs and CC to other countries. The SNP reached the stage of consolidation and improvisation/ changes in response to situations, but was not implemented as envisaged. In Ahmedabad, participation in SNP has strengthened both Saath and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, which have expanded their activities and coverage. AMC too has continued partnerships with the two key NGOs in implementation of other programmes such as ICDS. The individual access and perceived security of tenure has led to investments in housing, and enabled legal access to electricity connection.

The LVWATSAN is planned in two phases of initiation/ piloting and expansion to other cities. The stages of consolidation and iteration are expected to occur as part of the capacity building, monitoring, and implementation processes. The underlying resistance of several actors at different levels was also revealed in the case LVWATSAN, with the resistance to involvement of 'outsiders' being most frequently articulated, irrespective of whether the required capacities were available at the particular level or not.

The above indicate that strong leadership is essential for overcoming resistance to implementation of good practices that incorporate participatory processes and greater transparency. However, with a change in leadership, the status quo is reverted to. When up-scaling of good practices is attempted for reaching more people in more locations, the change in the 'unique circumstances' in terms of the intensive involvement of the original stakeholders and resources hinders the continuation or integration of processes within the implementing organisations.

Figure 8-1: Slowdown/ Hindrances in Up-scaling



8.3 Up-scaling: Actors and Influences

Sub-question 3: What are the factors considered by stakeholders involved in initiating and implementing good practices?

Before looking at the type and/ or extent of up-scaling achieved in the cases studied, it is essential to identify the actors that are involved in the implementation as well as up-scaling processes, and those that influence up-scaling. The actors who affected the implementation of good practices, contributed to and influenced their up-scaling were identified as follows:

i) The leaders/ key decision-makers in the implementing organisations with a vision to improve urban environmental conditions and/ or the quality of life of their constituents, especially the poor.

ii) The individuals and professionals who have a vision and skills for improving development problems specific to their discipline, and either actively worked towards propagating them or discussing them with decision-makers, or accepted the challenge and opportunity offered by the vision of the leader to conceptualise/ design an appropriate solution for an identified problem. Optimally utilise the opportunity to set an example for others.

iii) The facilitators or enablers, including NGO leaders facilitating implementation and those providing technical and management support. The motivation for the enablers ranged from accepting an opportunity to improve the quality of life of the slum residents more holistically and related growth of the organisation to those who took it up as a significant opportunity for expanding their organisations and membership and subsequently to influence policy and programmes.

iv) The private sector's interest was to contribute to and be seen to contribute to improvement of environmental conditions of the city and their employees.

v) The communities' motivation was primarily for having reliable access to water and sanitation services/ housing given the opportunity through the interventions. However, once the confidence of the residents of interventions areas in the enablers increased, and the potential benefits of savings and credit activities as well as livelihood opportunities were observed, they were further motivated to participate in the interventions. The interventions substantially empowered the communities because of their perceived security of tenure and reduced dependence on those who provided illegal connections for the services.

vi) Financing institutions such as SEWA Bank, HUDCO, the interventions provided a means for increasing their clientele or 'market', and for garnering additional resources.

vii) Representatives of the implementing organisation, involvement in the interventions provided opportunities of gaining familiarity with new processes that contribute to the

achievement of a constitutional objective, to interact with several actors with whom they would not have an opportunity to interact in other conditions, and to build their skills and knowledge. Conversely, the involvement in implementation of the interventions also meant a disjunction from routine works and benefits, and from more challenging engineering projects.

viii) For technical support institutions such as DPU, MIT and WEDC, the opportunity for supporting MHP provided a unique situation in which to innovate by the juxtaposition of their technical knowledge with the developmental issues within a specific context.

ix) Private Sector: To work for the educational, physical, and material advancement of the urban poor anywhere in India.

x) Other interested actors such as elected representatives in East Africa. This also includes contractors, builders and land owners who are not directly involved but who have an interest in the land or property.

8.4 Up-scaling

Sub-question 4: What is up-scaling in the context of the actors involved in its implementation?

Up-scaling of good practices occurs in several ways. The MHP and SNP demonstrate that rather than the up-scaling of the intervention as a whole, the approaches and processes of interventions are up-scaled through individuals and organisations. The up-scaling that has occurred of the approaches, components or processes of the three interventions are discussed below (Refer Appendix Table 7-3, 7-20 and 7-25).

8.4.1 Quantitative up-scaling

Quantitative up-scaling, which refers to introduction of an approach or intervention by participating and non-participating stakeholders in different locations to benefit more people, has occurred to a small degree for all cases. Under the MHP, the housing activity expanded geographically and quantitatively over the duration of the programme. The target of a million houses nationwide – as with other programmes, expressed the intention rather than a likely target. Yet, the 76 percent achievement of the target under the MHP urban sub-programme was a substantial improvement to the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme where only a third of target was achieved. Therefore, in terms of number of families that got access to improved housing in urban areas, the MHP achievement was exceptional. In contrast, the actual coverage under the SNP is 3.86 percent of the planned target in 10.5 years (December 1996 - June 2007). The SNP targets set and projections made after implementation of the approach in Indore and Vadodara were therefore both unrealistic and unachievable. The SNP approaches of overall upgrading of

slums, community contributions, partnerships with NGOs, and have been incorporated in the draft Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy, and it has been introduced with some modifications in three other towns. However, despite this, the number of areas and households covered is negligible compared to the proposed coverage. In contrast, SNP contributed to the expansion of the membership base of SEWA and of account holders in SEWA Bank. It also contributed to Saath expanding its coverage of slum areas for several of its activities.

LVWATSAN, which is designed in two Phases with the intention of enabling access to water and sanitation both at the town and settlement levels, is expected to achieve quantitative up-scaling through capacity building activities that will improve functioning of the utilities.

8.4.2 Functional up-scaling

Functional up-scaling in terms of expansion of activities of participating organizations (Saath, SEWA, Sevanatha, UN-Habitat), and individuals (SNP and AMC's Heritage Project), has occurred under all three cases (See Appendix 7).

In the case of MHP, functional up-scaling occurred within NHDA through diversification of housing activities. Complementary activities such as facilitating implementation through HOLPs, CAP, and community contracting were introduced, and a Training Cell was started to conduct training activities for field staff and CDC members. Subsequently, several professionals associated with the MHP, have set-up NGOs or are working with development support organisations.

In Ahmedabad, the success of AMC's partnership with NGOs in implementation of SNP has contributed to expansion of the number and types of complementary activities undertaken by AMC with the same NGOs to meet additional needs of communities in many other slums in the city. In addition, the two NGOs have expanded their functional activities and organisational support substantially. Saath and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust incorporated the role of community mobiliser and of NGO contractor for construction of services.

Saath has expanded to take-up a several related activities that have a wider coverage than SNP. Saath initiated savings and credit activities and strengthened its livelihood programme to meet a new demand from women in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar after introduction of SNP. The success of Saath's Home-Manager programme led to expansion of its livelihoods programme for training of youth in partnership with AMC. This adapted as GoG's 'Umeed Programme' to be implemented in major towns of Gujarat, for which Saath is providing training support and financial contribution for franchising of the programme[3]. Savings and credit groups in two areas have expanded to form a Credit Cooperative Society that has over 9,500 members and savings of about Rs 8,900,000 (2008) in Ahmedabad. In addition, Saath took-up reconstruction work in earthquake affected areas,

[3] Between June 2006 and February 2009, Saath has established 79 training centers in 31 ULB's/Towns under the UMEED Programme (being implemented in partnership with the Government of Gujarat). Of the 37,000 participants who enrolled for the Programme, 25,500 completed the course, and 19,933 are gainfully employed through placement in various ???.

where it has introduced savings and livelihoods programmes.

SEWA has benefited through its sister/ affiliated organisations. SEWA and FPI, which before 1994 trained SEWA members in construction work and provided housing support, established/ strengthened the remit of Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust. Subsequently, under a strategic partnership between SEWA and CHF, the organisation has undertaken similar slum upgrading pilots in Surat, Vadodara, and Nagpur. FPI started publication of newsletter in Gujarati and urban community resource centres for dissemination of information on Government schemes for the poor. FPI also undertook a report card study for AMC services, and with the support of CHF - USAID, started digitising plans of SNP slums where Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust was involved. SEWA's health programme expanded to provide community development services. UN-Habitat has up scaled its own activities to implement the LVWATSAN, and similar regional initiatives of the Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch I and II.

8.4.3 Political up-scaling

Political up-scaling, which refers to influence on policy and subsequently on types of schemes introduced by Governments (MHP, UCD, UBSIP and UBS), donors or other actors, indicates greater empowerment of local stakeholders and their influence on means for addressing structural causes of lack of services and opportunities for growth.

The LVWATSAN, and the processes and approaches introduced under it are already influencing others, for example for monitoring of the MDGs. In Sri Lanka, implementation of MHP started with policy changes including, declaration of special project areas. The formalizing of CAP methodology and introduction of community contracts, and strengthening and institutionalising of the decentralised decision process through CDCs and HCDCs constituted political up-scaling of the processes introduced. The CAP and community contracting processes are continued through Sevanatha and a few professionals but not under Government programmes.

Currently, with a greater focus on optimising use of land, development agencies in Sri Lanka have adopted the relocation - redevelopment - resettlement model for slums on prime properties. This includes construction of shelters in high-rise blocks based on the successful 'Singapore' model. The lack of involvement of the communities in the planning of the 'high-rise' apartments resulted in practical problems for the residents and subsequently to the abandoning of the high-rise blocks. This demonstrates that lessons learned during the 70s and 80s and the policy changes for implementation of MHP did not guarantee continuity of the good practices. In Sri Lanka, this was partly because the positive outcomes of MHP were associated with political leadership and therefore specific political groups.

The SNP pilots in Ahmedabad and Baroda have set the basis for the Draft Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy - which was not approved until the end of 2008. The participatory process adopted for development of the policy was based on assumptions such as: i) overall upgrading of slums where

feasible; ii) Provision of services to individual households; iii) Slum residents would pay a part of the cost for getting the individual connections, and iv) Slum residents would be given an assurance of non-eviction for 20 years.

In Ahmedabad, AMC has passed resolutions that enable any household in slums to get water and sanitation connections on payment of charges. This overcomes hurdles of legality of providing services in the slums. In addition, instead of constructing public toilets, AMC is promoting pay-and-use toilets through private sector partnerships. Despite the strong criticism and reservations within AMC about working with NGOs, AMC has expanded its association with Saath and SEWA for running pre-schools under the Integrated Child Development Scheme and with Saath for the 'UMEED' livelihoods programme. Saath has gradually built its capacity and is currently contributing to evolving GoG's approaches to poverty reduction. SEWA has been organising several workshops with its affiliates for sharing knowledge about the SNP approach in Ahmedabad, and influencing policies related to services for the poor.

8.4.4 Organisational up-scaling

Organisational up-scaling has occurred under all three cases with the participating organisations expanding partnerships and financial support from external funding organisations (NHDA, AMC, UN-Habitat). NHDA expanded by establishing of a Training cell and strengthening its regional offices for implementation of MHP. However, by 1998, limitations of the organisation led to the establishing of a 'company' for commercial development of cleared slum sites and for building of apartment blocks for relocation of slum dwellers. While this is not expansion of the organisation, it indicates a change in the Government's approach of changing organisational arrangements for addressing the housing needs of the poor in a commercially acceptable manner. In contrast, within AMC, the SNP Cell that faced several constraints (including its dismantling) and has been largely ignored by external support agencies, has been assigned responsibility for implementation of all infrastructure works under a grant scheme (MP and MLA funds) and for implementation of housing projects for the poor. Key people within the SNP Cell developed several skills and strengthened AMC's partnerships with the facilitating NGOs.

The MHP and SNP have contributed to the establishing of new NGOs and/ or up-scaling of the participating NGOs. NGOs such as Sevanatha continue working with Government representatives at different levels and with donor agencies. They facilitate the planning, analysis and implementation of schemes that incorporate participatory processes, and transfer skills to other young professionals.

In Ahmedabad, Saath, SEWA Bank, SEWA/ Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust and some of the CBOs have expanded. Saath has expanded its work to earthquake and riot relief and rehabilitation programmes, and established a livelihoods unit. This has increased numbers of Saath staff implementing programmes in more areas for more people. The success of CBO members has

further expanded Saath's growth in terms of expansion of its education programme in partnership with AMC, and savings and credit activities. Saath is not taking any funds from housing finance institutions. SEWA has up scaled its sister organisations and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, which has diversified its resource base, especially through housing finance institutions. SHARDA Trust, which was established for implementation of SNP pilot, has not undertaken any SNP related infrastructure works. After efforts for training slum residents for alternative livelihood activities, it is now focussing on providing health related support for the poor.

UN Habitat, specifically the Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch expanded its scope of work to planning and facilitating implementation of a sub-regional intervention. For this, it has sought funding from various sources and is involved in networking to achieve this objective. Its coordination with Global Urban Observatory and Gender Mainstreaming Unit is enhanced. The regional approach of the LVWATSAN has also been introduced in Asia (the Mekong Water and Sanitation Initiative) under UN-Habitat's Water for Asian Cities Programme. For these two initiatives, the role of UN-Habitat and the donors (Government of Netherlands and Asian Development Bank) is significant.

8.4.5 Model of Up-scaling

By their very definition, the characteristics, unique aspects and evolution of good practices during implementation indicate that the blue-print model of up-scaling is not for good practices. The MHP and LVWATSAN, as focused interventions selected at high levels of decision making and integrated within the overall functioning of the implementing organisation, represent characteristics of the explosive model of up-scaling. Both the cases indicate a vertical hierarchy focussing on the identified purpose that can strengthened the local system, and at the same-time responded to local priorities.

The lack of up-scaling of the MHP enabling approach under the World Bank funded MIEP in Sri Lanka and rapid implementation of SNP (through support by USAID to SEWA/ Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust/ FPI; WSP-SA for ASUS or micro-finance through SEWA/ its affiliates; and by World Bank/ Cities Alliance for the GSUSP and City Development Strategy) in Ahmedabad contributed to their weakening the vertical hierarchy that is essential for focussing on the identified purpose. In contrast, the support of The Government of Netherlands to UN-Habitat specifically for the LVWATSAN has contributed to the initiation of the 'replicable model-setting initiatives of UN-Habitat's Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branches I and II (LVWATSAN launched in October 2004 and MEK-WATSAN launched in early February - April 2005). At the same time, the both MHP and LVWATSAN reveal that the up-scaling of the processes and approaches of an intervention occur through individuals and partnering organisations.

Up-scaling of the NGO-led inter-sectoral interventions have not substantially resulted in expansion of SNP after it was piloted and consolidated because of the absence of a top-down enabling

environment and the lack of involvement of other local NGOs. However, both Saath and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust introduced new interventions and expanded their scope of work. Thus, while Saath's livelihoods activities have expanded manifold and SEWA Bank's clientele has increased significantly, this is not translated into expansion of coverage under SNP.

The empowerment of the communities, which occurred because of significant NGO involvement and negotiations for implementing SNP and MHP, resulted in some CBOs becoming a biological growth node for rapid expansion of successful community-based interventions (Taylor 2001). The synergy from the empowerment of a few members from the community has contributed to the expansion of a variety of other innovative changes within implementing organisations and the types of activities introduced in the settlements. In addition, the empowered the CDCs and the CBOs that were supported by NGOs have become the motivational force and the resource and capacity base for other communities.

8.5 Up-scaling

Sub-question 5: What actions have facilitated or hindered the up-scaling of the good practices?

The ten requirements for up-scaling good practices identified in the literature (Section 2.3.4) provide a reference for determining how far the MHP, SNP, and LVWATSAN incorporated these or other requirements (Table 8.21). The cases indicate that there are additional factors that influence up-scaling. These include: i) leadership within the implementing organisation; ii) leadership amongst those who support the development of the initial concept, its evolution, and implementation, and iii) the nature of support from external agencies In the next Section, varied situations and actions have facilitated or hindered the up-scaling of the MHP and SNP (Tables 8.19 and 8.22), and the initiation of LVWATSAN are discussed.

8.5.1 Leadership

All three cases demonstrate that implementation of good practices involves a leader with a 'vision' complemented by the 'vision' and leadership amongst individuals who provided the additional impetus during their planning and implementation of all three cases.

8.5.1.1 Leadership in initiating/ implementing organisation

Despite the difference in scales at which the three interventions were introduced, the prominent role of both political and administrative decision makers in the implementing organisations is over-arching. The scale and aspired goals of the three interventions reflect the positions and authority of the decision-makers.

The distinction is in political leaders initiating the MHP and LVWATSAN, identifying sectoral problems and seeking to achieve a goal. For MHP, Premadasa had overall authority in the sector

while for LVWATSAN, the Executive Director of UN-Habitat, provided the additional support for the evolution of appropriate solutions to identified problems. The vision and goal of the leadership in Sri Lanka, which was articulated and presented very clearly and strongly, garnered greater attention to the plight the homeless, and initiated the declaration of a UN Year dedicated to Shelter for the Homeless. In Ahmedabad, administrators who could deliver results were posted to the cities which required vital changes in their management in the aftermath of the plague outbreak in a nearby city. Thus, when presented with a 'recognised, successful and packaged' approach for improving environmental conditions in the city, the administrator assessed it in the context of his personal motivations as well as the advantages identified by his advisors in the historical context. While the SNP provided the administrator with an opportunity for other partnerships (as well as a personal relationship) with the private sector, the political leaders supported his decision.

8.5.1.2 Leadership amongst supporting entities

As identified earlier, in addition to dynamic leadership, the combined efforts and cooperation of various actors are essential at different levels of decision-making for successful implementation of good practices. These include NGOs, sector specialists and professionals who contribute in making interventions more responsive to the context, better coordinated with other interventions in the area, to effective utilisation of resources, and finally in building confidence and rapport amongst local actors who will continue working in the area beyond the project period.

Leadership amongst partners with experience in implementing complementary interventions can also contribute substantially for its evolution. This is demonstrated at the strategic level through the NGO contribution introduced by Saath, the financing mechanism introduced by SEWA Bank, and the toilets and electrification components introduced by SHARDA Trust. At the implementation level, this is demonstrated through changes introduced under the Lunawa Environment Improvement and Community Development Project and under SNP in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar. Conversely, although an NGO leader is committed to the organization's vision, the same commitment cannot be seen in the staff who act as 'employees'.

8.5.2 Stakeholder-centred

Although involvement and empowering of actors whom the interventions are aiming to reach is integral to good practices, the cases demonstrate that stakeholder centred interventions can refer to two distinct factors. The first is the prioritising and planning interventions in a contextually appropriate way and in response to the needs of the beneficiary stakeholders, and by implementing the interventions around stakeholders groups distinguished by their location, age, gender, vulnerabilities etc. The second is in terms of institutional processes and the design that enable execution of the interventions in ways that best meet the changing needs of the people in response to new opportunities and evolving situations.

MHP was stakeholder centred because of the focus on enabling access of a house to each family,

and on its decisions for getting housing loans and for construction of public amenities were to be made by the families and the communities respectively. The implementation guidelines, HOLPs, capacity building and CAP tool were developed to ensure that families were supported across the country to take-up the opportunity of building a house. For areas requiring redevelopment or re-blocking, NHDA staff facilitated decision making.

SNP is area-focused for AMC primarily because it addresses issues of infrastructure provision or engineering works in selected intervention areas. Thus, even involvement of NGOs was considered essential but not a significant requirement. SNP has evolved to be more responsive to the stakeholders because of their financial contributions, and the partnership with NGOs for facilitating this process. The benefits of having a stakeholder-centred approach at the implementation level is illustrated by Saath a large slum where establishing of one Residents' Association was abandoned because of lack of consensus amongst residents in different situations. SEWA Bank too introduced several products to meet the new needs of account holders in the improved areas.

The LVWATSAN is focusing at three levels – areas (town infrastructure development and management), stakeholders (settlements where the poor live), and environment (sanitation to reduce pollutants going into Lake Victoria). However, decisions related to sustainability of the infrastructure, their operation, maintenance and management, and access of the poorest to services were centred around stakeholders. The processes and institutional structures that have been introduced are expected to ensure that development priorities are stakeholder centred.

Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, SEWA and the donor agencies were focused on implementation and expansion related to it. This is demonstrated by the support provided for up-scaling of SNP to the organisations (AMC for the Special Purpose Vehicle, SEWA for strengthening Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, for research related to 'implementing' rather than facilitating implementation of SNP, and for exploring at credit options for communities). This was misguided as revealed by the impact assessment (Kantor 2004) and the FGDs, which revealed that families preferred to borrow money for the SNP from relatives rather than from SEWA Bank.

8.5.3 Institutional environment

The institutional environment, which refers to political will, policy development and institutional changes or reforms, was most conducive for MHP and largely for LVWATSAN. However, for SNP, the institutional environment was largely unsupportive of the intervention. For MHP, The institutional environment was made conducive through changes in policies and regulations related to enabling construction of houses on small plots and by people with no ownership rights. Despite this, with the change in the ruling political party, the MHP approaches could be abandoned.

In Ahmedabad, the policy changes were all within the implementing organisation rather than across the State. This included establishing of the SNP Cell, giving of a guarantee for non-eviction

of the residents of the improved area for a minimum of ten years, enabling upgrading in slums in partnership with the private sector and NGOs, and convergence of schemes with SNP. However, in the absence of a shared vision within the implementing organisation and amongst influential decision makers, the institutional environment has changed with each Municipal Commissioner. AMC faced internal and external pressures for changing the processes and procedures for implementation of SNP. AMC introduced a few procedural changes to ensure that the identification of slums for SNP was appropriate and to ensure accountability even though the intervention was being implemented in partnership with others.

Various institutions are involved in the LVWATSAN and at the town level, technical staff of the municipalities, who do not have the capacity, do not have a major role in planning or implementation of infrastructure and found many design issues to criticise. Elected representatives, town council staff and CBO representatives identified and questioned the long gap between the announcement of the project, the stakeholder workshops and frequent visits by consultants and others while there was no clear indication about when the projects would be implemented.

8.5.3.1 Time

The time taken between making a decision to initiate a good practice, finalizing of proposal, completion of procedures and arrangements, and actual implementation was important in all three cases. For MHP, the time designated for testing the feasibility of the approach (1983 as Year of Planning) ensured that programme implementation occurred as envisaged, and technical support provided in the run-up to the IYSH was in place. However, in the case of LVWATSAN and SNP, delays in start of implementation led to local actors checking the authenticity/ legitimacy of the interventions through various sources. In Ahmedabad, slum residents waited for others in the communities to take a lead and make the decision for participating in the intervention. Thus, for interventions to evolve over time, the pace of implementation has to enables communities to participate in the decision process.

8.5.4 Strategic partnerships around a shared vision

Good practices and a holistic approach that are aimed at benefitting the poor in underserviced areas entail interdependence and strategic partnerships with multiple stakeholders, including facilitators NGOs, CBOs or membership based organisations that can enable participation of communities. Therefore, implementing organisations require strategic partnerships with facilitating organisations as well as others for capacity building, technical and financial support, and for documentation.

The implementation of MHP involved strategic partnership between the NHDA and the CDCs that provided the facilitating support at the implementation level. NHDA's partnership with training institutions such as DPU, MIT and WEDC, and agencies such as UN-Habitat and DANIDA contributed to building capacity of all actors, development and refinement of implementation

guidelines, and formalizing of tools and toolkits.

In Ahmedabad, the strategic partnership initiated between the private sector, Saath and AMC was expanded to include SEWA Bank as a financial institution. None of the partners at this stage could proceed with the implementation of SNP without the other partner. Saath had from this early stage, a strategic partnership with CBOs that it had facilitated in two slum areas. However, the partnerships were not nurtured. Once SEWA (and its allied organisations) took on a dominant role and worked towards establishing strategic partnerships with several donors, AMC's strategic partnership with the private sector, which was already fragile because of differences in working styles, was sidelined totally.

LVWATSAN demonstrates several strategic partnerships starting with the countries in the region, the East African Community and the Government of Netherlands, which is funding the first Phase of the intervention in 15 towns. The Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch (I) of UN-Habitat is also working with resources within the organisation, such as the Global Urban Observatory. LVWATSAN is aligned with the EAC protocol on Lake Victoria, and hence the EAC ensures that new initiatives coming-up around the Lake complement rather than duplicate activities under the project.

8.5.4.1 Partnerships and NGOs

The cases reveal several issues pertaining to partnerships with NGOs. The iterative process requires flexibility, patience and empathy amongst 'conceptualiser and partners' for the constraints faced by decision makers because of administrative and financial regulations.

Where NGOs are partners of Government organizations in the introduction, implementation, management and monitoring of interventions, the interventions are more responsive to local context. During project implementation, NGOs can facilitate interactions between communities and local governments or utilities, and can facilitate coordination of different programs and interventions in a geographical area. This results in efficiencies of interventions and enhances confidence of the communities for approaching governments for varying needs. Consequently, NGOs are often included as 'consultants' for delivering specific outputs, or as 'contractors' for delivering components of interventions or services rather than as team-members or partners in the planning, implementation and monitoring of interventions funded by governments. Conversely, the impression amongst Government staff is that NGOs are interested in working only on a 'commercial' basis (high fees) and not as partners. Flexibility of NGOs in questioning of decision processes within government, and facilitating implementation of programmes for the poor through CBOs. This leads to enhancing capacities of CBO members and improvement in quality of services provided to a much larger population that is not covered under a specific good practice.

NGOs play the role of social change-agents and an important role as facilitators between communities and local governments. They have greater capacity and ability to mobilize

communities. However, NGOs rarely work in partnership with other NGOs. Although there is potential for larger/ experienced NGOs to nurture other NGOs for taking-up similar work in more areas, show what can be done and how it can be done, this does not happen. In some cases, less experienced NGOs are neither assisted nor provided correct information even when they approach the well-established NGOs directly. NGOs can work under an umbrella for the short-term during emergency or disaster situations (earthquake, riots, and tsunami), provided they can work in separate locations.

Another hindrance in reaching more people through participatory interventions is that NGOs work on specific sector or cross-cutting issues and are not willing to incorporate additional responsibilities for motivating their constituents to access basic services. For infrastructure related inputs for which payments are made after completion of deliverables and procedural delays are frequent, only larger NGOs have the capacity to recruit technical staff and the seed money to make investments upfront.

Even when NGO approaches are up scaled through institutional support, the benefits of the intervention are limited to its members or limited partner organisations. National representation of networks by member NGOs does not encourage networking amongst local NGOs not only because their primary objectives and capacities may differ, but also because membership of a network led by another NGO is a threat to their identity (and thereby funding). Even for well-known and successful networks such as ACHR, City-net and SDI, the exchange of experiences and learning is amongst the members and there is little or no participation by other NGOs working in similar sectors/ focus areas. Therefore, good practices associated with prominently recognised NGOs are locally associated with the NGOs and not as citywide good practices.

The ideological basis of NGOs, which provide a positive influence on their approach to development, also results in hindrances in associating with other NGOs and organizations, even if this could substantially benefit their constituents in terms of access to basic services. This is aggravated by NGOs insistence on: i) not taking any funds from government to enable it to continue its 'independent' role of making Government accountable to the poor and vulnerable; ii) wanting the poor and vulnerable get access to basic services and developmental benefits at no cost, even for services at household levels, and iii) not collaborating with organisations where majority of contracts are given based on corrupt practices. While there are valid reasons for opposing government organizations, such a stand goes against the rights of their constituents for getting access to water and sanitation.

8.5.5 Learning from successes and failures

Learning from successes and failures through a process of consultations, ongoing monitoring, and evaluation enables corrective actions for sorting out problems arising from a planned approach as well as in response to the context (Refer Appendix Table 7-23). The 'Learning by Doing and

Doing by Learning' approach was integral to MHP and was supported by the interest and involvement of the leader. The regular monitoring meetings and coordinated approach with the facilitating institutions enabled greater responsiveness to newly arising situations under MHP. In the case of Ahmedabad, the learning and feedback for decision-making occurred between individuals rather than for the intervention as a whole. Collective learning was hindered because of 'alliances' and strategic partnerships that worked towards establishing the 'ownership' of the project, and therefore deliberately leaving out actors from this process. In fact, the imposition of external ideas on the evolving process is revealed by claims (Box 6-13) about achievements that had not transpired until December 2008. Two important lessons from SNP that have influenced the policy of AMC are from slum areas where the works were implemented rapidly. In one slum there have been problems related to encroachments by community members while in another with no NGO involvement, community contributions have been poor.

In order to learn from successes and failures, continuity is essential. For the Ahmedabad SNP, the continuity was provided by external actors such as Saath, Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust and SEWA Bank rather than those from within the implementing organisation. Within AMC, a city-engineer and an advisor provide the continuity. In the case of LVWATSAN, the staff of UN Habitat Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch, the engineering and social development consultants, and key stakeholders in the utilities provide the continuity.

8.5.6 Local institutional capacity

The focus on involving Governments in implementing projects is based on weaknesses identified in implementing projects through Project Management or Implementation Units. For effective implementation and for creating a broad-based local support system, there is consensus on having good practices anchored in existing institutions and organisational systems, with support for capacity building. Therefore, the current focus is on partnerships with Governments and support for building its capacity. Two different approaches for capacity building were followed for the MHP and SNP (Refer Appendix Table 7-18).

The institutional capacity for implementing MHP was built in-house through interactions amongst Task Force members and NHDA staff, training activities organised by the NHDA training cell, and capacity building activities that were closely integrated with implementation requirements in the field. The overall motivation amongst the implementers in NHDA, and the need to show progress during regular monitoring meetings with the Minister intensified efforts to develop skills of those facilitating the process. The 'learning before doing' (during planning and piloting) and then 'learning by doing' (Szulanski 2002) approach was successfully practiced. Besides the above, the environment and processes within NHDA supported participatory decision-making and enabled the evolution of the CAP and stakeholder responsive development.

Compared to the MHP, the processes, the institutional capacity of the implementing organisation,

and support for building capacity of those involved in implementation of SNP was extremely poor. This was because the different partners were not working as a team. This was aggravated because the conceptualiser was to provide the technical designs as a consultant and train AMC staff in the use of the software used for planning the infrastructure. The facilitating organisation was expected to utilise its experience and skills to strengthen the community participation processes, contribute to changing behaviour and impart skills for improving livelihoods. The capacity requirements for the SNP Cell were sidelined because of the proposal for establishing a Special Purpose Vehicle to speed up implementation. The capacity building support was fragmented in terms of support to: i) SEWA, its affiliates and SEWA Bank for organisational expansion and for up-scaling of SNP; ii) consultancy support to AMC for the design of the Special Purpose Vehicle and for impact assessment; and iii) to Government of Gujarat through City Manager's Association of Gujarat for development of the Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy (Cities Alliance).

In contrast, LVWATSAN is strengthening capacities of utilities and small-service providers for operationalising reforms in the water sector, and institutionalising multi stakeholder forums at the town level for the purpose. In addition, capacity was built through the process of stakeholder workshops and prioritising of Phase I activities in consultation with various actors at the town levels. For the utilities, as a part of the programme design, the capacity of the staff is being upgraded through training programmes aimed at having a long-term impact on their functioning in non-project areas and sustainability of investments. Capacities at the town council level are being built for managing a GIS based map, which is expected to influence decision making in the future and help direct resources to the neediest areas.

8.5.7 Knowledge sharing and Documentation

Despite the focus on sharing knowledge through various means, including databases and publication of research findings on good practices, decision makers as well as representatives of donor/ funding agencies primarily rely on personal networks, and presentations at workshops, conferences, and other such forums for information about innovations that have successfully addressed urban problems. They further pursue and propagate the good practices that are presented at such networking events.

Extensive publicity material was produced to share the vision and inform various stakeholders about the MHP and LVWATSAN and for mobilisation of funds. The assessments, documentation and dissemination of MHP were more structured, especially with reference to the IYSH and for dissemination of information amongst potential participants of the programme. The build-up to the IYSH provided an identifiable timeline for achieving substantial progress in implementation of MHP. Posters, pamphlets, television – and videos promoting the MHP were produced and extensively shown/ distributed.

In the case of SNP, the assessments, documentation and dissemination were primarily led by

external actors, with the intention of facilitating up-scaling. AMC also worked toward generating a demand from slum residents during the early stage through its staff, video films and pamphlets in the early stages. The practice was subsequently stopped, and thereafter, presentations by AMC and its partners were primarily for visiting study groups.

The involvement of WSP-SA resulted in publication of several Field Notes. In addition, the studies were undertaken in the first few years, it did not contribute to refining the phasing or implementation of the project. The critical survey for identifying and prioritising slums where SNP could be undertaken was undertaken 4 years after initiation, thereby reflecting the difference in focus of donor support for slum upgrading and requirements at the implementation level. The gap in information available to other NGOs about the SNP is highlighted by the experience of an NGO that wanted to partner with AMC, but was told by a key Deputy Municipal Commissioner (not the person in-charge of SNP) that AMC was no longer implementing the project (Interview N01). Further WSP-SA funded an impact assessment study in response to a request by AMC.

The efficient implementation of interventions depends on financial and technical support, especially for planning. Therefore, access to data on several indicators for decision making is required by the implementing organisation. This is not supported for SNP but is being addressed under LVWATSAN. In East Africa, although generic information and several reports about LVWATSAN are available on the UN-Habitat website, stakeholders in the utilities, the town council levels, and in some cases the Habitat Programme Managers strongly believe that inadequate information on the progress of the initiative was available to them. The identified beneficiary groups were the most disillusioned and emphasised that they did not have any direct communication with the Nairobi Office, which had approached them directly at the early stages.

Documentation and dissemination of good practices for a wider audience is not a priority amongst Governmental implementing organisations after the initial stages unless external support is available for the same. To illustrate, innovations in local Governments supported by donors such as USAID are well represented in the databases/ list of awarded good practices, potentially because documentation of the interventions is readily available and presented at various fora.

8.5.7.1 Recognition through Awards

One of the means of steering improvements in human settlements is to establish benchmarks and share knowledge so that others can build on existing knowledge and incorporate appropriate components or processes into new interventions. Therefore, there is substantial focus on documentation and creation of databases of good practices as reference points for addressing urban problems in similar or different contexts and situations. The criteria for identifying and recognising good practices through awards provide the benchmarks that can be and have been achieved for addressing specific problems in a local context more successfully than before. The outcomes of the recognised interventions are therefore expected to have contributed to improved

quality of life of those whom the interventions reached directly.

The purpose of instituting awards is to bring focus to specific goals, activities or interventions, to recognise and acknowledge excellence in results, and to reinforce the value of the contributions made by individuals, partnerships, organisations and/ or other actors. Awards are given to motivate or provide incentives for achieving the goals that otherwise may not be pursued, and for advancing the activities in the specific discipline. Awards in the urban sector are instituted to 'recognise' current interventions or contributions of organisations and/ or individuals that can influence decision makers (DIABP) and future actions in the discipline (AKAA and WHA). In contrast, the Noble Prize or the X-Prize that are awarded for path-breaking outcomes and innovations that have made a major contribution in the specific discipline. Similarly, the high value inducement awards in the technology and aviation disciplines are offered for pre-specified outcomes to garner focused efforts and resources amongst several actors who would otherwise be working at their own pace.

The lower expectations from 'recognised interventions' in urban areas are reflected in the substantially lower value of the awards. This can be attributed to the complexity of the urban environment, and the vast differences in local geological, environmental and socio-cultural situations and levels of development within and amongst countries. The global focus of awards means that neither the criteria nor the weightages can be uniformly applied in determining award winners. International awards for good practices recognise interventions, organisations or individuals, or programmes where each partner contributes to the effective implementation of the intervention. The differences in development context and/ or and language issues has resulted in introduction of Regional Awards in East Africa and Latin America. In addition, the decentralised process for identifying good practices through specific institutions results in several problems associated with identification and documentation of good practices.

The recognition of the individuals or key implementing organisation of good practices is an indication of what is communicated by whom in the application for the award rather than the actual processes followed on the ground. The documentation is from the perspectives of: i) high-profile actors who have the skills for documentation, or those who want to highlight their contributions to the evolution of the interventions, and ii) actors who document, study and/ or evaluate the interventions from their own particular perspective rather than from a holistic development perspective. The credit for outcomes goes to those identified as leaders, planners, financiers, or implementers in award applications, that is, the most articulate and prominent professionals, organisations or institutional partners associated with the intervention. The good practice is identified as an intervention of specific partners rather than as a partnership

This is illustrated by the fact that "Slum Networking: A Participative and Holistic Approach for the Improvement of Urban Infrastructure and Environment through Slum Fabrics in Indore, Baroda and Ahmedabad, India" was recognised as one of "100 Global Best Practices" at Habitat II Conference for the achievements under IHIP and for its extension to Baroda and Ahmedabad"

prior to completion of pilots in the two cities [4]. In another application for the DIABP, HUDCO - which financed upgrading in one slum under its 'Model Bustee Scheme' where: a) no NGO was involved, b) the community contributions have been very poor (44.32%), and c) the inappropriate selection of slum has resulted in its demolition subsequently, was identified as a partner of AMC.

The DIABP has introduced a format to encourage comprehensive documentation of good practices. However, as can be seen on these websites, the information in the databases is dated and very often does not reflect the actual success of problems related to the intervention. Despite the decentralised process for applications introduced under the Best Practice Partnership Programme, the reliability of information provided is compromised. This is illustrated by the number of good practices identified India, where English is widely spoken and numerous individuals and groups are experimenting with sustainable approaches. Consequently, greater attention is now given to assessing the applications and to verification of the information provided. In addition, special efforts are being made to encourage actors who have neither the time nor resources to submit an application. The BSHF and Best Practice Partnership Programme have introduced criteria for identifying appropriateness of the interventions for the local context and levels of development, as well as for assessing sustainability (Table 2.1). These include policy and institutional changes, actions that enhance accountability and transparency in settlements management and processes that enable participation and inclusion of the vulnerable. AKAA and BSHF have introduced field visits/ local assessments and the DIABP has introduced a decentralised process for identification of the good practices to address these factors.

8.5.7.2 Award Influences

The recognition of the interventions and the good practices hold greater significance amongst some of the participating stakeholders and professionals from a wider area – but it does not hold as much significance amongst decision makers or local population. This is demonstrated in Sri Lanka where the communities were not involved in planning the apartments developed by REEL under the Sustainable Townships Programme[5], even though one of the partners - NHDA, was the implementation organisation for MHP and well-versed with the CAP process. The unexpected consequences for a design and planning that is not responsive to community needs include: i) regulation of not carrying gas cylinders in lifts in 8-storied buildings without piped gas supply; ii) no arrangements for vendors to securely keep their carts, and iii) small sizes of bathrooms that make it impossible for two women to wash clothes – as is the norm. Similarly, the pilot under UN-Habitat's Slum Upgrading Facility did not use the local CDCs for evolving its approach from

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[4] Habitat II conference in Istanbul from 3 to 14 June 1996. The pilot for upgrading Ramdevnagar was launched on October 1994, physical works started on 10 February 1996, dedication ceremony by the Mayor of Vadodara on 13 June 1999, and VMC took over responsibility for maintenance of the area on 15 August 2000. The invocation ceremony to mark the launching of the physical works under the Ahmedabad SNP pilot at Sanjay Nagar was held on 5 August 1996 and the completion ceremony on 21 April 1997.

[5] Identified as a DIABP Good Practice in 2000. The submission highlights the fact that "The beneficiary families have already identified and they have involved in the selection of the developer by casting their preferential vote for the best architectural model of their choice" and that "first project was already implemented and 687 apartments will be ready to occupation by mid 2001".

settlement-based development to redevelopment, but got external SDI/ NSDF members to initiate the process of community mobilisation.

The awards or the recognition do not result in up-scaling of interventions. The recognised good practices are considered as possible options because people with similar approaches come together, decision makers are exposed to achievements and the outcomes of the good practices, and the expansion of an intervention that involves the poor is likely to garner grant or donor/ private sector funding and support of bilateral and multilateral institutions (Indore, Vadodara, Bhopal). The decision process in Ahmedabad reveals that a recognised good practice is introduced by a decision-maker either because it matches her wider objectives (Ahmedabad and Bhopal) or adds to what an organisation is already doing (NHDA, Sevanatha, Saath, SEWA, UN-Habitat) or planning (Arvind Mills).

The up-scaling of participatory interventions such as the MHP and SNP occurs because of flexibility and negotiations amongst key individuals responsible for managing implementation of the interventions. Individuals succeed in introducing good practices, as in the case of Ahmedabad, by presenting the benefits of the concept as introduced (SNP) or practiced (road redevelopment and heritage project) elsewhere, and by providing comparative assessment (before and after scenarios) that includes financial viability of the proposal. In addition, good practices are introduced in other locations by the conceptualisers (SNP), donor agencies (USAID), or the facilitators (MHP and SNP related). Thus, while decisions for initiating a good practice are influenced by the benefits of the intervention or its components, decisions for its continuation are influenced if it is recognised as a good practice. The continuation of the SNP, even though being implemented at a very slow pace, can be attributed to its recognition under the DIABP and because of SEWA's interest. Therefore, the decision-making involved assessment of the proposed solution for its viability for a pre-identified problem. This indicates that the documentation and/ or databases of good practices would be of greater use to potential adapters if they could be searched or compiled by category of the interventions such as for slum upgrading or for improved financial management.

8.5.8 Appropriate technical options

Appropriate technical options, both in terms of responsiveness to the local context (economic, technical and human capacity) and use of local materials directly and/ or indirectly through manufacturing of components, contributes to the sustainability of interventions. In addition, use of local materials enables utilising of local skills and traditional building methods that are environmentally more responsive.

All three cases introduced appropriate technical options for the infrastructure. The change in technical options under the MHP required a combination of changes in regulations, standards of construction, and technical support for enhancing skills in traditional building methods. This

required the assessment of appropriate technical options by the Task Force members, in terms of enabling: i) construction of houses on small plot sizes; ii) construction using local materials that had been traditionally used for house construction, and iii) building capacity of facilitators to support safe construction using local materials. Additional technical support was also provided for the design of the houses.

Similarly, under LVWATSAN, the emphasis on having appropriate technical options is highlighted in the context of several donor funded infrastructure projects in East Africa that were inappropriate technically; or were not suitable for the context. Considering the high poverty levels, limited capacity for operation and maintenance of the infrastructure, and limited human, materials and financial resources, the technical options introduced are low-maintenance. The decision to use pre-fabricated components for toilet construction also aims at supporting entrepreneurs to manufacture the components. At the same time, LVWATSAN is introducing GIS based databases that will enable prioritising of areas requiring attention and funding in the longer term. This is meeting the requirement of monitoring the sustainability of assets created. In both cases, the decisions were based on lessons learnt from previous projects.

While the overall upgrading of slums and extending of household connections under SNP is a more sustainable investment, it requires a technical design that can reduce costs for water supply and drainage pipes through topography management and 'lower specifications'. However, since problems arising from the use of different specifications for water supply lines and drainage were identified in Indore, AMC maintained its own specifications to ensure that the quality of water supply and the functioning of the system were not compromised. Thus, the focus of the SNP in Ahmedabad was on processes to enable household access to water and drainage using a different financial model rather than on appropriate technical options.

8.5.9 Land and Financial Feasibility

For upgrading settlements and for enabling access to services, implementing agencies need to identify settlements where upgrading can be undertaken and where water supply mains, and sewer and drainage lines are available in the vicinity of slums. As revealed under SNP and the Sustainable Township Programme in Colombo, the numbers of settlements where overall upgrading can be undertaken are few. Consequently, upgrading of underserviced settlements requires overall upgrading of urban infrastructure, improved water supply and policy decisions related to settlements on private and government land. Large investments for citywide infrastructure extension and upgrading requires long-term commitment and long-term partnerships for the various processes and stages of implementation. As indicated by the three cases, the financial commitment is either from the implementing organisations (NHDA, AMC) and/ or of the external support and financing agencies (HUDCO, The Government of Netherlands for the pilot in 15 towns under LVWATSAN, and the facilitating NGOs in Ahmedabad).

The MHP, as a Government supported programme was financially more feasible than the previous subsidised housing programmes prior to the launch of the MHP. However, since the costs of facilitating the process and for providing external infrastructure had not been taken into account, they had to be addressed after the initiation. In addition, the lack of discipline in repayment of loans led to a collapse of the system and subsequently the poor rates of repayment affected the programme. More recently, to release lands for urban redevelopment, the Sustainable Township Programme aims to re-house families living without land titles on commercially viable land within the City of Colombo to compact townships. The sale of cleared lands was expected to provide the required capital to invest in the private sector driven re-housing programme, making it a self-financing, and market based programme. This has not happened and REEL has taken additional resources from the Government for developing another township project.

In Ahmedabad, financial feasibility was enhanced because households paid for individual water and sewerage coverage, and consequently monitored to get better quality of construction and materials. SNP funding is partly under various GoI programmes. Currently, with the clearance of the National Urban Renewal Mission, AMC is proceeding rapidly with implementation of a housing project. At the same time, the annual budget allocation for SNP has not been fully utilised for several years.

The LVWATSAN design is economically viable partly because it is responsive to the context and partly because of the decision to rehabilitate existing infrastructure rather than replace it. In addition, it incorporates planning for future maintenance, and addresses the requirements arising because of reforms in the water sector to ensure effective and efficient management of the utilities. At the settlement levels, the acute shortage of water, the high costs currently paid by the poor for getting water – often of very poor quality is expected to ensure effective management of the infrastructure and payments by even the poorest households. The capacity of the poorest to pay for the services is to be enhanced through their participation and through other entrepreneur activities. The projects are financed through grants.

8.5.10 Facilitating support from external agencies

Support for facilitating up-scaling can be distinguished in terms of: i) direct financial, technical, management and/ or capacity building support related to up-scaling of the interventions, and ii) funding for planned citywide urban projects that aim to build on the economic liberalisation and policy changes introduced as well as to incorporate components of the good practices. In the absence of a leader, each influential actor wanting to support or associate with the intervention focuses on her area of interest. Consequently, opportunities for strengthening and implementing the good practice and/ or its components, and for systematically building capacity of the implementing organisation are lost.

Development support agencies resist working in close coordination with Government

organisations to up-scale good practices (Refer Appendix Table 7-19). The tendency is to support a new initiative that builds on the strengths of what is introduced under a good practice. The prominent examples being World Bank funding for KIP in Indonesia and for MIEP in Sri Lanka, which aimed to optimally utilise the enabling and liberal economic environment, strengthen the institutional response to environmental issues, foster community led solutions to urban growth and promote lesson sharing between pilot countries. Subsequently, projects such as the Clean Settlements Project (CSP) were undertaken between 1993-1998 and incorporated the participatory approach to decision-making. The lack of donors' support through the implementing organisation for up-scaling pilots is illustrated by suggestions of World Bank representatives in Sri Lanka to build high-rise apartments – the approach recently adopted and abandoned under the Sustainable Townships Programme. However, the two processes of CAP and community contracting have survived and have been up scaled.

The lack of external support to for substantially strengthening the capacity of AMC for implementing SNP or for addressing slum related environmental problems holistically, or for facilitating more partnerships with those working with the poor (including women, children, or youth) reveal the lack of a shared vision amongst various actors involved in Ahmedabad. The USAID supported SEWA and its affiliates, and weakened the role of the AMC for leading a process for sharing and evolving a vision with other potential partners, and for building strategic partnerships at the city level. Cities Alliance/ World Bank supported the developing of the draft Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy for Government of Gujarat and the City Development Strategy for Ahmedabad. Suggestions of Cities Alliance/ World Bank representatives to provide some services in the slums rather than go for overall upgrading, and actions of WSP-SA to rapidly up-scale SNP reveal how donor support can act contrary to the actual requirements for up-scaling. Donor credibility is also affected amongst those implementing the interventions when they terminate all engagement with implementing organisation for political or strategic reasons.

External support agencies appear to be unaware of the consequences of their actions. The enthusiastic but misplaced confidence of external agencies on how much they are contributing to the design, evolution and/or up-scaling of good practice is revealed by the gap between what WSP-SA publicised as its achievement in Ahmedabad (Box 6-13) and what the case reveals. At the same time, up-scaling of the approaches and components of good practices has occurred because donors, development institutions and individuals continue introducing them within and outside the location where initiated. The People's Process/ CAP and community contracting have been introduced in several locations throughout Asia through individuals associated with development support organisations. Similarly, in Ahmedabad, although SEWA's intensive promotion of SNP/ Parivartan created resistance within AMC and amongst NGOs, it has contributed to its continuation.

Support of others is influenced by procedural issues, the focus and motivations of individuals

involved and local stakeholders or organisations with whom they collaborate. In addition, facilitators and donors are likely to support up-scaling of good practices through 'known stakeholders' who participate in various networking events such as forums, conferences and workshops. Association of good practice concepts with individuals and/or NGOs affects up-scaling of interventions that have to be implemented in partnership with Governments. This is demonstrated by the activities of SPARC and its alliances, and the donor support garnered by SPARC and Homeless International in Mumbai in particular, where other NGOs are not actively participating in implementation of community led interventions even though promoted by Governmental organisations.

The enthusiasm of external support agencies for associating with good practices, even when complemented by the willingness of implementing organisations, is detrimental to participatory processes and the consolidation as well as up-scaling of good practices. However, as revealed by the information available on databases, it is important to highlight the fact that several national actors too hinder the up-scaling of good practices in their enthusiasm to be associated with it.

9 CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this study, which focuses on the research problem: "How are sustainable interventions for environmental improvement in urban areas up scaled at the implementation level?" *and* "What are the decision processes involved in initiating and up-scaling sustainable interventions in the area of environmental improvement?" *are presented in this Chapter. The findings are based on the perspectives of actors involved in initiating, implementing and supporting the up-scaling of good practices. Using good practices as the unit of analysis, the findings are based on matching and comparing patterns of decisions made and processes followed for initiation, implementation and up-scaling. The implications of the comparison of the cases are presented with reference to the research questions and the operational definitions for the terms: i) Sustainable urban development; ii) Good practices; iii) Decision-making, and iv) Up-scaling.*

Good practices

Good practices are concepts, approaches, processes, or interventions that are responsive to the context, evolve and improve quality of life of the people they are trying to reach, and result in more efficient use of material and financial resources. Good practices for physical upgrading of underserved settlements or neighbourhoods can incorporate a holistic approach, processes and participation of the people whom the interventions aim to reach. They address socio-economic issues, incorporate positive features of existing schemes, programmes or practices, and can include opportunities for alternative livelihoods. Although good practices may not be a unique solution for the problem being tackled in a particular context, they involve a different approach and are 'differently implemented'.

Good practices involve and empower participating actors, enable inclusion and representation for those who have been deprived in the past, and result in greater equity through some redistribution of resources and improved access to opportunities. Good practices involve both women and men in decision-making regarding their needs, priorities and contributions.

Good practices involve a leader with a 'vision and a goal', and individuals from different disciplines who come together to provide planning, technical, and social development inputs, which contribute to defining a problem more specifically and in developing a more holistic solution. The 'vision and leadership' amongst those contributing in defining a problem entails an interactive process that builds on the experiences, understanding, knowledge and skills of the various actors involved.

The prominent role of both political and administrative decision makers in the implementing organisations is over-arching. The organisational processes and procedures introduced for implementing good practices enable iterations based on local situations, the economic, environmental, social and technological context and introduction of new features and/ or abandoning of others over time in response to changing situations and contexts.

NGOs, sector specialists and professionals, play a very important role in the successful implementation of the initiative. They contribute in making interventions more responsive to the context, and enable better coordination with other interventions in the field, thereby contributing to effective utilisation of resources. They also help in building confidence and rapport amongst the local actors who continue working in the area beyond the project period. The 'flexibility and responsiveness' of individuals and groups that incorporate the good practice with their own routine activities enables actions that optimise the use of resources and responsiveness to the needs of communities.

The iterative process entails vision, maturity, flexibility, patience and empathy amongst the decision-makers, and field level facilitators and officers who assess, plan, negotiate, review, and make numerous decisions at various stages to resolve problems in a pragmatic way. The changes are possible because of a process of collective learning (consultations, ongoing monitoring, and evaluation), feedback and corrective actions during implementation of good practices.

Sustainability of good practices

When people have improved access to shelter, water supply, sanitation, and a cleaner living environment in ways that are acceptable to them, there is an improvement in the quality of the life of the poor. The sustainability of interventions, a basic criterion of good practices, indicates that the physical assets created through participatory processes are functional for the duration of their envisaged 'lifetime', and that the processes and practices adopted during implementation address economic, environmental, socio-cultural, gender and vulnerability issues.

A shared vision and clarity about the scope and processes of interventions and adoption of a consultative and interactive planning and implementing process enables collaborations, and strategic and effective partnerships amongst multiple actors representing different sectors and areas of focus and interests. The stakeholders can include governments, private sector organisations, donors, professionals, and research institutions with complementary agendas, expertise, and resources. Partnerships also involve actors who are willing to respond to the context by introducing or incorporating related activities, and/ or discarding non-essential ones. Consequently, the interventions are more holistic and responsive to the needs of those whom the interventions aim to reach.

Sustainability of interventions does not imply compliance or addressing of all aspects of sustainable development. While sustainability of the physical assets created and environmental improvement are likely to be attained for participatory interventions, financial sustainability of investments is likely to be adversely affected. Significant causes for not achieving financial sustainability include delays due to time required for consensus building and negotiation, political contingencies of decision makers, and the demand for valuable land. While the value of land and its designation for other uses results in residents to not getting tenure rights, the political

perspective requires 'recognition of the residents as being poor and deserving of subsidies'.

Partnerships, Participation and Facilitators

Good practices provide a means to each participating actor to improve the quality of life of people more holistically by working with other strategic partners. Good practices that are aimed at benefitting the poor in underserviced areas involve participation of communities and intense interactions and joint actions in their planning and/ or implementation. An area-based and participatory approach results in the most vulnerable residents getting more opportunities for improving their quality of life and equality in terms of access to resources, and influence in decision making.

In addition, participatory processes empower, contribute to greater individual freedom and build skills of community members to interact and negotiate with the implementing organisations. Enhancement of skills and the change in living conditions results in more people seeking alternative economic activities, which contributes to increased affordability, reduction in poverty, and the lifetime sustainability of infrastructure.

Partnerships amongst the various stakeholders contribute significantly to the implementation and up-scaling of good practices. It requires flexibility, especially because of administrative and financial procedures that are introduced to ensure accountability. Partnerships are also affected by biases that exist due to inadequate and incomplete information, and lack of opportunities to debate on them. Organisational or Government and private sector partnerships with other stakeholders are defined either by their financial stakes in the intervention or decision authority rather than in terms of involvement. Therefore, partnerships with facilitators are often sidelined and support required for facilitating participation is not adequately addressed. Consequently, broad-based support to such facilitators can contribute substantially to up-scaling of good practices.

Recognition/ awards

Awards in the urban sector are given to 'recognise' current interventions or contributions of organisations and/ or individuals who are identified in award applications as significant actors involved in its implementation. Awards recognise the approach and expected/ potential success of good practices to motivate others to review and reformulate their vision for urban areas to incorporate goals that otherwise may not be pursued.

The recognition of interventions as good practices holds greater significance amongst participating stakeholders and professionals – but does not hold as much significance amongst decision makers and the local population. The recognition of good practices does not directly result in their up-scaling. The recognised good practices are considered possible options either because it matches her wider objectives or adds to what an organisation is already doing or planning. In addition, good practice approaches are introduced in new locations when decision makers who redefine their

priorities to address similar problems based on what they know about the achievements and outcomes of the good practices. This is more likely if the introduction of a good practice or its components will result in visible outcomes and associated benefits and incentives for the decision-maker, including likelihood of garnering grant or donor funding or technical support. Decisions for continuation of good practices are influenced if it they are recognised.

The recognition of the individuals or key implementing organisation of good practices is an indication of what is communicated by whom in the application for the award rather than the actual processes followed on the ground. The credit for outcomes goes to those identified as conceptualisers/ planners, initiators, or implementers in award applications, that is, the most articulate and prominent leaders, professionals, organisations or institutional partners associated with the intervention. The good practice is identified as an intervention of specific partners rather than as a partnership

Unlike Inducement Awards, good practice awards for urban areas are not portrayed as technical challenges for actors such as elected representatives, urban managers, professionals, the private sector and land owners/ developers to demonstrate sustainable solutions for specific urban problems in a given context. Inducement Awards have the potential for getting like-minded people from different contexts and disciplines to work together to redevelop under-serviced areas as sustainable settlements within a given time-scale . In the absence of such challenges, the aspiration of a successful career continues to be 'involvement in the design and implementation of large and complex engineering structures and projects'.

Good practice documentation

There is substantial focus on documentation and creation of databases of good practices as reference points for addressing urban problems in similar or different contexts and situations. Databases provide opportunities for searching and studying several interventions that have tackled a particular problem in different contexts and environments. Good practice documentation provides a very useful source of information for decision-makers at different levels, and exposure to good practices is most relevant for motivating decision makers to prioritise an existing problem or reformulate it.

Despite the focus on sharing knowledge, including through databases and publication of research findings on good practices, decision makers as well as representatives of donor/ funding agencies primarily rely on information about good practices through consultants, personal networks, and presentations at workshops, conferences, and other such forums for information about innovations that have successfully addressed urban problems. They further pursue and propagate the good practices that are presented at such networking events. Databases are searched for identifying specific technical solutions for an already defined problem, including its context and location.

Documentation and dissemination of good practices for a wider audience occurs during the

initiation stage of good practices, especially for interventions that are funded by external support agencies. However, since documentation and dissemination of information about 'routine activities' is not a priority amongst Governmental and several other organisations, it is not continued after the initial stages unless it is required for mobilising finances or grant support is available.

Documentation available on the good practice databases often reflects the situation at the time of initiation of good practices or the submission of the entries. However, since good practices evolve during the design/ planning stage as well as during implementation, knowledge about them primarily rests with a few individuals involved with the complexities during its implementation. Consequently, the evolution, success or potential progress can not be known without further research. In addition, the limited capacity (human and/ or financial) within implementing and/ or facilitating organisations affects comprehensive documentation and dissemination of interventions. Therefore, documentation on good practices is more likely emphasis features or components that are significant from the perspectives of those who want to highlight their own contributions to the interventions, researchers, or organisations involved in documentation of good practices. This includes: i) high-profile actors who have the skills for documentation, or those who want to highlight their contributions to the evolution of the interventions, and of ii) actors who document, study and/ or evaluate the interventions. The good practice information that gets into the public domain is therefore 'constructed reality'.

Both in the short and the long-term, many stakeholders at the local level, including potential facilitators, are inadequately informed about the processes, implementation mechanisms and features of good practices. This is aggravated when guidelines for implementation are not publicly available. Consequently, comprehensive documentation of the roles and responsibilities of different participant stakeholders and partners and its verification by actors involved in implementing good practices can contribute to up-scaling.

Decision-making

Decisions for initiating, implementing or up-scaling of good practices involves dynamic leaders with a vision that is focused on the outcomes. The aspired goal and scale of the interventions reflect the conviction, positions and authority of the decision-makers. It requires motivation and leadership that can mobilise various actors representing different disciplines to find a solution to a clearly defined goal, introduce a single approach and strategy, support implementation through changes in regulations, and garner substantial complementary external support.

Decisions involve decision makers who are looking for opportunities to bring about significant improvements in the performance or growth of their organizations, and/ or for development of urban areas or for improving the quality of life of the poor. Approachability of such decision-makers encourages individuals who are familiar with the context and have identified problems

based on their own problem formulation and diagnosis, to come forward with project proposals.

Decision makers consider proposals presented as a 'packaged solution' that is already recognised if it: i) addresses problems that require immediate attention; ii) matches their wider objectives, area of interest and motivations; iii) complements or add to what the organisation is doing; iv) guarantees positive results; or v) can attract grants support from donors. Unique circumstances arising because of a disaster, environmental crisis, emergency or political exigencies can result in willingness of decision makers to risk introducing interventions that will, with a sufficient degree of certainty, yield positive results.

The introduction of the good practices involves four distinct phases of decision-making that occurs in parallel rather than in sequence. Problem definition or the firming-up the range of issues to be tackled is influenced by the context, the motivations, interest, knowledge, and experiences of those involved, and by the perceived or actual support or resistance of influential decision-makers. Consequently, the involvement of individuals representing multiple sectors contributes to defining the problem more holistically.

Up-scaling

Up-scaling is the process of efficiently (cost and management) introducing effective approaches, techniques, concepts and programmes to bring more quality benefits (social, economic, environmental, institutional) to more urban residents, over a wider geographical area more equitably, more quickly and more permanently. Up-scaling can occur by influencing policy and subsequent schemes introduced by Governments, or through expansion of activities of participating organizations and individuals who carry forward the knowledge, lessons and understanding of underlying processes from good practices. Up-scaling also occurs through multiple partnerships amongst organisations, and the influence of initiators and other stakeholders.

Up-scaling of good practices can occur when it is adapted by Governments or donors who provide funds for its expansion to other locations or when it is introduced in new locations by participating or other stakeholders. Political up-scaling in terms of influence on policy and subsequently on types of schemes introduced by Governments or donors is likely to occur for good practices that result in outcomes that other actors have been attempting for some time. However, since good practices require facilitators and changes in response to the context, when they are up scaled as programmes, they do not yield the same outcomes as when implemented at a smaller scale.

Functional up-scaling occurs when participating organizations and individuals expand their activities to meet additional needs of the people they are trying to reach. Up-scaling of good practices also occurs through organisations that expand partnerships and get financial support from additional external funding organisations. In the longterm, up-scaling of good practices is more likely to occur through functional and organisational up-scaling.

Up-scaling of good practices through donor support is more likely to result in organisational up-scaling of entities they support rather than through several facilitating organisations introducing it in different location. However, lessons learnt through up-scaling of good practices through one organisation can influence national and sub-national policies.

The up-scaling of participatory interventions occurs because of flexibility and negotiations amongst key individuals responsible for managing implementation. Individuals succeed in introducing good practice, by presenting the benefits of the concept as introduced or practiced elsewhere, and by providing comparative assessment (before and after scenarios) that includes financial viability of the proposal. In addition, good practices are introduced in other locations by the conceptualisers, donor agencies, or the facilitators.

Although good practices may be abandoned, the enabling approach and decentralised decision structures can survived to some extent. In addition to a dynamic leadership, motivation and opportunity to bring vision to practice, the technical support and combined efforts and cooperation of various actors at different levels contribute to up-scaling. Although the participatory planning (and implementation) process is no longer practised within the implementing organisations, they are practiced by those involved in the process as well as other actors.

The involvement required for participatory development initiatives cannot be sustained at higher levels of decision-making. Subsequently, political and leadership changes affect implementation and up-scaling of good practices. The implementation procedures entail changes that make interventions more compatible with routine decision procedures and capacity of the organisations, and to address additional contextual issues – technical, procedural, partnerships with government organisations and/ or community Good practices are either refined for greater responsiveness or lose some of the benefits envisaged when they are subject to routine decision processes.

Thus, up-scaling of good practices or its key components that bring about sustainable changes are more likely to occur because of individuals or organizations that are personally committed to or interested in achieving the goals of the interventions. Piloted good practices that directly contribute to growth of NGOs, and increase their access to financial resources and/ or area of influence, functioning or membership, become integral part of their functioning. Therefore, considerable up-scaling of good practice components occurs through up-scaling of organisational activities. Good practices are more likely to be up scaled through donor agency support to NGOs before being incorporated with national or sub-national programmes.

A focused approach for sustainability of interventions requires considerable investments in building a combined vision and for identifying multipronged strategies for different situations. Since major policy changes in the functioning of organisations are unlikely to occur for individual projects, continuation of approaches that enable participatory processes and sustainable development are more likely to occur because of individuals and NGOs rather than through

institutions.

Facilitating up-scaling

Many support organisations are likely to come forward to support unique interventions in the short-term either to be associated with a successful intervention or to provide technical assistance that can contribute to its evolution and strengthen it implementation processes.

The focus on involving Governments in implementing projects is based on weaknesses identified in implementing projects through Project Management or Implementation Units. For effective implementation and for creating a broad-based local support system, there is consensus on having good practices anchored in existing institutions and organisational systems, with support for capacity building. Therefore, up-scaling of interventions is best facilitated through the implementing organisations, its staff or multiple organisations that share the vision for its implementation and subsequently up scale the components and processes in new locations.

Few development support agencies work in close coordination with Government organisations to up-scale good practices The enthusiastic confidence of external agencies on how much they are contributing to the design, evolution and/or up-scaling of good practice can be misplaced because of the top-down approach and/ or inappropriateness of their inputs, and inadequate consideration of local context, politics and organisational issues.

Readiness and willingness of several actors to come together and work for achieving a shared vision – irrespective of their own sectoral and organisational interests contributes to up-scaling. Partnerships between the implementing organisation and other stakeholders, and participation of the beneficiary households are complex and significantly affect not only the success, failure or evolution of good practices but also their up-scaling. Further, each partner makes the decision to collaborate with the other in implementation of a good practice under different conditions and with different goals and criteria depending upon the organisation's strategy.

Transparency in the decision process and greater participation by several stakeholders can be achieved through a common understanding of the intervention and the processes. Regular/ frequent coordination meetings, follow-up actions at the field level and access to information ensures that manageable problems are tackled and transparency is maintained. Flexibility and support from higher level of decision makers enables multiple stakeholders interact and negotiate with relevant stakeholders for overcoming bottlenecks.

The contribution of donors who support small and maturing NGOs is substantial in the implementation and evolution of good practices. Such support enables capacity building, improved skills and strengthening of a wide range of NGOs and CBOs, which is critical for up-scaling in the longterm. NGOs can be mandated to build capacity of the CBO members for mobilising, planning, monitoring and implementing various components of its work. Support to the implementing

organisation, not only in the form of recommendations and technical assistance, but in the form of consolidating required data for decision making would be more beneficial.

Implementing organisations, especially local governments, NGOs and CBOs often do not have the capacity for strategic documentation and/ or planning. Documentation of experiences and processes in different locations and with different approaches, guidelines and checklists for implementation that are important for institutional/ organisational stakeholders, and structured approaches for information dissemination and evaluation of interventions can facilitate implementation. On the other hand, lack of publicly available information can result in misinformation and resultant misunderstandings and biases amongst those working on or planning to work on the interventions.

Professionals may focus on holistic assessments of situations and problems, and subsequently emphasise the need for comprehensive solutions. However, this is in conflict with decision-makers who have to respond to practicalities and have limited time in which to take corrective actions. Consequently, decision-makers do not have always have support of people from different disciplines. Therefore, external facilitators can provide a forum for moderated exchanges so that decision makers can benefit from the knowledge and get pragmatic support. A stakeholder or area-based solution therefore offers greater potential for garnering support of multiple actors.

The extent of interdependence between the implementing agency and facilitators, and between the facilitators and communities is not fully recognised. Partnerships require internal and external recognition and support, and require the implementing and coordinating entities to maintain an effective balance between bottom-up and top-down actions. In partnerships between Government and other actors, mediators who are knowledgeable, experienced, and sensitive are required to counter pressures that can change the focus and the processes of implementation.

Association of good practice concepts with individuals and/or NGOs affects up-scaling of interventions that have to be implemented in partnership with Governments. Private sector partners 'impatient' with procedural and administrative delays and functioning of Government organisations, which are accountable for showing procedural consistency.

Enabling approaches introduced through national programmes and policy changes, together with focused technical support can contribute to improving environmental and housing conditions of the poor in the short-term. In the long-term, changes in terms of follow-up by staff and lack of discipline in collection of community contributions because of reduced focus on the intervention, can totally derail participatory interventions. This situation is aggravated because of differences in approaches and vision amongst political decision makers, professionals and NGOs.

Capacity building and exposure of facilitating organisations and CBOs to good practices, which are introduced in new locations is neglected because of a focus on convincing decision makers, on a top-down approach to project implementation, and on organisational motivations. Consequently,

at the implementation level, opportunities of learning significant lessons and exchanges that can enhance understanding and empower the beneficiary stakeholders and the NGOs are lost.

Decision makers in Government organisations do not seek technical support from professionals because of divergence of work cultures and availability of resources for the purpose. Subsequently, decision makers seek support from 'approachable specialists'. Such support is not always recognised.

NGOs play an important role as facilitators between communities and local governments, but they rarely work in partnership with other NGOs. NGOs can work under an umbrella for the short-term during emergency or disaster situations (earthquake, riots, and tsunami), provided they can work in separate locations. NGOs' ideological or political stances result in their opposing the good practices and/ or in not partnering with the implementing organisations. In addition, since NGOs have a specific focus and skills and resources for the same, they are unable to take-up additional work, especially for activities for which payments are made after completion of works and where procedural delays are frequent. Only NGOs with substantial financial resources have the capacity to recruit technical staff and the seed money to make investments upfront.

Participation and partnerships amongst stakeholders are affected by several issues, including whether the vision or part of the vision is shared or not, willingness of partners to build rapport and work together, respect each other's point of views and arrive at a consensus through negotiation. Partnerships are also affected by biases that exist due to inadequate and incomplete information, and lack of opportunities to debate on them. Exchange of experiences through networks or fora such as workshops and conferences is restricted to members/ participants and hence inhibits learning from different experiences and building capacities of potential partners working in similar areas.

With economic liberalisation and demand for land and commercial development, Governments and development support organisations are promoting redevelopment of commercially viable plots and relocation of slum dwellers to multi-storied housing in peripheral locations. In doing this, participation of slum residents is encouraged only for reaching a consensus for relocation rather than for the overall process of relocation, identifying needs and planning of housing in new locations. Those involved in planning such interventions do not always consider/ take into account to earlier experiences of housing the poor in high-rise dwellings, and a lack of willingness to incorporate lessons learned from good practices.

Figure 9-1: Decision Making for Good Practices



9.1 Contributions to Knowledge

The contribution of this study to knowledge is in terms of identifying influences on introduction and evolution of interventions in under-served areas, which involve partnerships and participatory processes.

Foremost, the study draws attention to the type of support required for facilitating and strengthening partnerships between implementing organisations, facilitating entities such as NGOs, CBOs and other membership based organisations for up-scaling of good practices. In particular, it draws attention to the need for recognising and supporting the roles of individuals who enable implementation by responding to new challenges and micro-level problems identified in the field. It highlights a top-down approach to supporting up-scaling of interventions through financial support and arrangements for 'efficient implementation of interventions. It also draws attention to issues related to 'too much publicity' against very little publicly available information about the approach for stakeholders across sectors and at different levels of decision making.

By drawing attention to gaps in consultations with various actors who may or may not contribute positively to the implementation and/ or up-scaling of interventions that improve the quality of life of the poor, but can create biases against an approach because of inadequate knowledge about its appropriateness for specific situations, the study identifies the need for support and flexibility at multiple levels for enabling wider debate and participation in the implementation of interventions that address some aspects of the much wider problems in urban areas.

The research process has reiterated the need for including respondents from multiple levels of involvement in development projects for validating data collected, and the need for remaining neutral for identifying issues underlying implementation of interventions that involve participation of communities and other stakeholders.

9.2 Limitations of scope and key assumptions

The findings from the research and the conclusions are applicable to interventions implemented primarily for enabling access to water supply and sanitation, and implemented in collaboration with or by urban local governments. To some extent, they are applicable for stakeholders who support or facilitate development interventions in South Asia and the findings are relevant for interventions implemented in partnership with other stakeholders. Interventions in urban areas are implemented in contexts that can vary widely, hence what is appropriate for one condition need not be suitable in another. The unit of analysis was identified as recognised good practices, and hence other interventions that met the criteria of sustainability were not included. Criticism about the outcome of one of the embedded cases also clearly shows that recognition of good practices does not eliminate failures. The SNP provides a case in a routine to well managed urban area while the MHP provides an extreme for enabling greater access to housing through cost reduction and

the LVWATSAN an extreme situation of low cost and inadequate capacities in the smaller towns.

There are many actors involved in the initiation and implementation of good practices. It is not possible to interview all decision-makers who have influenced progress of the interventions or their components over time. However, SNP provided an opportunity to trace decision processes in local Government from initiation of the intervention to the present. The context of all three cases is very different: Gujarat is economically more developed so reasons for presence of development organisations differ considerably from the LVWATSAN context. The MHP too evolved in the context of the IYSH and the unique opportunity for various stakeholders to support its evolution and implementation. These differences have highlighted hindrances in up-scaling starkly – and at the same time may have restricted identification of other causes.

9.3 Implications for future research

Research in the following areas can contribute to up-scaling of interventions for sustainable environmental improvement in urban areas:

- The concerns and issues at the implementation level that widen the gap between stated aims and goals of interventions, the processes of the intervention and the actual outputs
- Financial implications of enabling access to limited services against provision of a bundle of services - different approaches to upgrading
- Citywide data and assessment of plots/ settlements where different approaches to upgrading or redevelopment etc would be more economically and appropriate considering surrounding densities and availability of services
- Review of documentation on significant good practices in light of key historical experiences of different approaches to housing and slum upgrading for enabling realistic assessments about the appropriateness of the approach being propagated.
- Evaluating effectiveness of interventions that involve inter-disciplinary efforts and support from multiple stakeholder groups.
- Urban centres and underlying influences of owners of large tracts of land, developers, builders and public organisations responsible guiding and monitoring land use planning and development.
- Potential for citywide processes for identifying and publicising good practices, and incentives for their implementation to influence criteria for identification of good practices.
- Research on 'knowledge and its dilution' amongst citizens, professionals, Departments of implementing organisations, elected representatives and donors about the processes, participants etc of good practices.

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Challenges in Up-scaling Good Practices

Appendices

by

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1 APPENDIX 1: Awards

1.1 Award Websites

Website searches of awards from February to December 2004 resulted in a listing of awards in various sectors. Some websites of awards provided more detailed information compared to others, while there was no website for a few awards. Access to websites and details of awards for issues related to the environment or urban development (excluding those for architecture, planning and urban design) was difficult. This was because names of awards had changed, or programmes under which the awards were given were completed, or in a few cases, the awards were not instituted after the initial declaration of intent to institute an award.

Table 1-1: List of Awards studied

	Name of Award or prize	URL
1	Abel Prize	http://www.abelprisen.no/en/abelprisen/
2	Aga Khan Award for Architecture	http://www.akdn.org/agency/aktc_akaa.html
3	AGFUND (Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations) International Prize	http://www.agfund.org/english/news.asp
4	America's Space Prize	http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/multiverse/space_prize.php
5	Ansari X -Prize	X PRIZE Foundation About the X PRIZE Foundation
6	Ashden Awards for Sustainable Energy	http://www.ashdenawards.org/
7	Auguste Perret Prize	http://www.di.net/almanac/awards.html
8	Balzan Prize	http://www.balzan.com/en/preise/index.cfm http://www.balzan.com/en/preistraeger/index.cfm
9	Beacon Council Awards	BEACON COUNCIL SCHEME THEMES
10	Best Practices in Global Health	http://www.globalhealth.org/view_top.php3?id=94
11	Bill McWhinney Award of Excellence in International Development	http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/0/192DA1200D87ECED85256E9700546802?OpenDocument
12	Bremen partnership award	http://www.umwelt-unternehmen.bremen.de/page.php?PageID=744 http://www.bremen-initiative.de/index2.html
13	BURA Awards for Best Practices in Urban Regeneration	http://www.bura.org.uk/awards/award2004/bbpindex.htm
14	Business in the Community Awards for Excellence	http://www.bitc.org.uk/awards/index.html
15	CAIXA Municipal Best Practices Awards for Brazil	http--www1.caixa.gov.br-idiomas-ingles-index.asp
16	Changemakers Innovation Award	http://www.changemakers.net/journal/04november/contest.cfm
17	Cheap Access To Space (CATS) Prize	http://www.space-frontier.org/PressReleases/1997/19971118catsprize.html
18	Chemical Industries Association Sustainable Development Awards	http://www.cia.org.uk/newsite/excellence_awards/Awards2004(SD).htm
19	Christopher Awards	http://www.christophers.org/
20	CIA - Sustainable Development Award	http://www.cia.org.uk/newsite/excellence_awards/Awards2004(SD).htm
21	CICA (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants) Corporate Reporting Awards	http://www.cica.ca/index.cfm/ci_id/131/la_id/1.htm
22	Citigroup Micro Entrepreneur Award	http://www.businesswireindia.com/PressRelease.asp?b2mid=8110
23	Clean Break X-Prize	Clean Break X-Prize for cleantech
24	Communication Initiative for Sustainable Development	Communication Initiative for Sustainable Development
25	Conrad N. Hilton Humanitarian Prize	http://www.hiltonfoundation.org/main.asp?id=38
26	CRISIL Awards for Excellence in Municipal Initiatives	CRISIL Policy Advisory - Awards - Excellence in Municipal Awards
27	Deming Prize (Japan)	http://www.deming.org/demingprize/
28	Development Gateway Award previously called the Petersburg Prize	http://home.developmentgateway.org/prize
29	Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment (DIABP)	http://www.blpnet.org/awards/awards.htm

	Name of Award or prize	URL
30	eCitizenship for All Awards	http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,sid%253D37085%2526cid%253D50766,00.html
31	Energy Globe Award	http://www.energyglobe.at/energygl/pages_en/energy_globe/index_energy.html
32	Equator Prize	http://www.undp.org/equatorinitiative/secondary/2004-EquatorPrize.htm
33	EUROPA - European Business Awards for the Environment	http://www.eu-environment-awards.org/html/sustainable_development.htm
34	European Award for Architecture and Technology	www.at-award.messefrankfurt.com
35	European Quality Award	http://www.efqm.org/model_awards/eqa/intro.asp
36	eWell-Being Awards	http://www.sustainit.org/ewell-being-awards/index.php
37	Feynman Grand Prize	http://www.foresight.org/GrandPrize.1.html
38	Galing Pook Awards (Gantimpalang Panglingkod Pook)	http://www.galingpook.org/ne_awards.php
39	Gates Award for Global Health	http://www.globalhealth.org/conference/view_top.php3?id=237
40	Goldman Prize	http://www.goldmanprize.org/theprize/about
41	Hydrogen Prize (H-Prize)	http://news.com.com/Feds+propose+100+million+hydrogen+prize/2100-1008_3-6065866.html
42	ICC-UNEP Sustainable Development Awards	http://www.iccwbo.org/home/environment_and_energy/sdcharter/corp_init/icc-unep/mainpages/background/criteria.asp
43	ICID WatSave Awards	http://www.maff.go.jp/nouson/keikaku/icid/j/event/montreal/37.html
44	Innovation in Environmental Best Practice	http://www.ih-ra.com/env_award/
45	International Awards for Liveable Communities (LivCom Awards)	http://www.livcomawards.com/
46	International ReSource Award for Sustainable Watershed Management	http://www.swissre.com/INTERNET/pwswpspr.nsf/fmBookMarkFrameSet?ReadForm&BM=http://www.swissre.com/INTERNET/pwswpspr.nsf/vwAllByIDKeyLu/SBAR-59FDAE
47	Japan Quality Control Award (JQC)	http://www.jqac.com/website.nsf/NewMainPageE?OpenPage
48	Kenneth F. Brown Asia Pacific Culture and Architecture Design Awards Program	http://www.arch.hawaii.edu/events/apca/DA95.htm#Design Awards
49	King Baudouin International Development Prize	http://www.kbprize.org/english/prize/prize.htm
50	King Hassan II Great World Water Prize (Morocco)	http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/water_prize.shtml
51	Kyocera Environmental Contribution Award	http--global.kyocera.com-ecology-report-2000-pdf-system_e.pdf
52	Loebner Prize in Artificial Intelligence	http://loebner.net/Prizef/2005_Contest/loebner-prize-2005.html
53	MacRobert Award for innovation in engineering	http://www.raeng.org.uk/prizes/macrobert/default.htm
54	Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award	http://www.quality.nist.gov/
55	Mashariki Awards in Local Governance Awards Programme (MILGAP)	http://www.unchs.org/content.asp?cid=3698&catid=510&typeid=24&subMenuId=0
56	MedChild Award for Best Practice	http://www.medchild.org/MedAWARD.cms
57	Medellin Award	http://www.bestpractices.at/main.php?page=programme/medellin_award&lang=en http://premiomedellin.buenaspracticas.org/.
58	Millennium Business Award for Environmental Achievement	http://www.iccwbo.org/home/environment_and_energy/sdcharter/corp_init/awards/millennium_award.asp
59	Millennium Technology Prize	http://www.technologyawards.org/index.php?m=2&id=14
60	Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership	http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/
61	NASA Centennial Challenges	http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5191763/
62	Nobel Prize	http://nobelprize.org/
63	Orteig Prize	http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5191763/
64	Ozone Awards	http://www.unep.org/ozone/Public_Information/4C_PublicInfo_Awards.asp
65	Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz International Prize for Water	http://www.pritzkerprize.com/pritzker_prize.htm
66	Pritzker Architecture Prize	Pritzker Architecture Prize
67	Public Promotion of Engineering Medal	http://www.raeng.org.uk/prizes/public/default.htm
68	Pulitzer Prizes	http://www.pulitzer.org/
69	Ramon Magsaysay Award (Philippines)	http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Award/award-history.htm
70	Right Livelihood Award (Alternative Nobel Prize)	http://www.rightlivelihood.org/
71	Rockefeller Foundation Prize for Rapid STD	http://www.iaen.org/limelette/html/lim04.htm

	Name of Award or prize	URL
	Diagnostic Test	
72	Royal Awards Barcelona for Urban Innovation	http://waste.eionet.eu.int/announcements/ann1012817664
73	Royal Awards for Sustainability	http://www.royalawards.org/awards/resp
74	Sakharov Prize for human rights and freedom of thought	http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/focus_page/008-10518-254-09-37-901-20060911FCS10501-11-09-2006-2006/default_en.htm
75	Shell Award for Sustainable Development	The Shell Award for Sustainable Development
76	Singapore Quality Award for Business Excellence	http://www.spring.gov.sg/portal/products/awards/sqa/sqa_overview.html
77	Stirling Prize	http://www.architecture.com/go/Architecture/Also/Awards_2006.html
78	Stockholm Challenge Award launched in 1995 as the Bangemann Challenge	http://www.stockholmchallenge.se/
79	Stockholm Industry Water Award	http--www.siwi.org-swp-swpnominate.html
80	Stockholm Water Prize	http://www.siwi.org/swp/swpnominate.html
81	Super Efficient Refrigerator Program	solstice.crest.org/efficiency/irt/106.pdf www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/cool_appliance2003.pdf
82	Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion	http://www.templetonprize.org/
83	Thailand's BEST Innovation Award	http://www.thaiinnovate.com/eng/news02.php
84	Toynbee Prize	http://www.newglobalhistory.org/toynbee-prize.html
85	TUGI-UNDP CyberCity Award	http://www.tugi.org/awardscybercity.php
86	Turner Prize	www.tate.org.uk/britain/turnerprize/ http://www.tate.org.uk/britain/turnerprize/history/history.htm
87	UNDP Human Development Lifetime Achievement Award	http://www.undp.or.th/index.html
88	UNDP Mahbub ul Haq Award for Outstanding Contribution to Human Development	http://www.undp.org.in/NEWS/PRESS/2004/PRESS283.HTM http://hdr.undp.org/aboutus/nhdr/awards/
89	UNEP Business Awards for Sustainable Development Partnerships	http://www.iccwbo.org/home/environment_and_energy/sdcharter/corp_init/icc-unep/index.asp
90	UNEP Champions of the Earth Award (which replaced the Global 500 Roll of Honour for Environmental Achievement Award)	http://www.unep.org/champions/
91	UNEP Sasakawa Environment Prize (Known as Pahlavi Prize between 1976 & 1982)	http://www.unep.org/sasakawa/
92	UNESCO Asia-Pacific Heritage Awards for Culture Heritage Conservation	http://www.unescobkk.org/culture/heritageawards/
93	Volvo Environment Prize	http://www.environment-prize.com/
94	Water Action Contest	http://www.water-forum3.com/contest/
95	Whitley Awards for Conservation	http://www.whitleyaward.org/
96	Wolfskehl Prize (1908-1997)	http://mathworld.wolfram.com/WolfskehlPrize.html www.ams.org/notices/199710/barner.pdf
97	World Business Award	Worldaware Business Awards
98	World Habitat Award (WHA-BSHF) (UK)	http://www.bshf.org/en/?topselected=World%20Habitat%20Awards
99	World Summit Business Awards for Sustainable Development Partnerships	http://www.iccwbo.org/home/environment_and_energy/sdcharter/corp_init/icc-unep/mainpages/background/purpose.asp
100	Zayed International Prize for the Environment	http://www.zayedprize.org.ae/en/

1.2 Types of Awards

Prizes are also given for motivating people to study specific subjects and for promoting those with skills in specific disciplines. One of the prizes that has been given for over 300 years is the Prix de Rome, which was instituted in 1666.

Box 1-1: The Prix de Rome

In 1642, Charles Le Brun, a painter and designer went to Rome, where he spent four years learning from contemporary Baroque painters. On his return to Paris, he was given large decorative and religious commissions, which made his reputation that led to his first commission from Louis XIV in 1661. Le Brun was made first painter to the king, ... In 1663, Le Brun was appointed as director of a small tapestry manufacture-the Gobelins. In the same year, the Academy of Painting and Sculpture was reorganized with Le Brun as director. Le Brun imposed a strict curriculum of practical and theoretical studies based on the classical style deemed appropriate by the monarch and himself, and established history (narrative) painting as the highest of art forms. In 1666, Louis XIV, under the direction of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Charles Le Brun and Gian Lorenzo Bernini founded its satellite, the French Academy at Rome and instituted the Prix de Rome.

The Prix de Rome was a scholarship for enabling talented and promising art students of the Academy to complete their education by study of classical art in Rome. The contest was organised initially to reward excellence in drawing. Other arts like architecture, sculpture and painting were established in 1720, while music was included in 1803. Those who proved their talents by completing a very difficult elimination contest were awarded the Prix de Rome that enabled a stay at the Mancini Palace in Rome at the expense of the King of France. The winner of the "First Grand Prize" would be sent to The Academy of France in Rome and the "Second Prizes" allowed participants go to the same academy, for a shorter period.

The annual distribution of the prizes would become one of the major annual world events of the 19th century and the Grand Prix de Rome in History Painting was the highest honour that an artist could achieve at that time in France and across the world. The contests were considered democratic tools par excellence and the factors that set the Prix de Rome contests in painting apart from the other contests were its strict rules, large number of trials, anonymity of the contestants, secret votes, and calls for judgement by the press and public. Besides awarding various medals and honours, these contests decided on which students were admitted to the school, in which studio courses they could participate and where they sat during classes. Of the many contest categories, the Prix de Rome Contests were the most elaborate and prestigious, capturing the attention of the international press and catapulting its winners towards fame and, often, successful art careers.

After 320 years, the tradition of the four categories Prix de Rome Contests ended during the 1968 student revolts, when it was cancelled. Since then, there have been a number of contests on file and the Academies, together with the Institute of France, were merged by the State and the Minister of Culture. Selected lodgers now have an opportunity for improvement during an 18 to 24 month stay at the Academy of France in Rome.

Source: Street 2005 and Award websites

a. Popular awards

Popular awards include the Nobel prizes (Literature in 1901), architecture (AIA Gold Medal in 1907), journalism (Pulitzer in 1918), entertainment (Academy Award in 1929), beauty (Miss World in 1951) and arts. The earliest popular awards include the Academy Awards (established 1928-29), or the Miss World and Universe Awards established in 1951 and 1952 respectively. Subsequently, the awards influence decisions of viewers to see the films, and generate a demand for involvement of the award winners for various activities and promotions of consumer goods. The Academy Award, British Academy of Film and Television Arts, and the Grammy have a combination of awards for individuals and for teams.

b. Quality awards

Popular awards have been offered long before the earliest quality award. The Deming Prize was initiated in 1951 after the Japanese industry was introduced to sampling techniques for quality control during the 1950s (W Edward Demings Institute 2000). The progress in measurement techniques for improved quality led to "a

set of systematic activities carried out by the entire organization to effectively and efficiently achieve company objectives so as to provide products and services with a level of quality that satisfies customers, at the appropriate time and price", or Total Quality Management (TQM) (Deming Prize Committee).

In the manufacturing and business sector, quality awards are instituted for prestigious recognition of achievements that create higher standards of customer satisfaction through higher quality management, which includes improvements that enhance competitiveness globally. Quality awards were instituted to promote economic growth in industry by evolving high-quality measurement tools, data, and services and to assist businesses access information and expertise to promote quality concepts, principles, and techniques. Quality awards recognise organizations that have developed effective quality management methods, and put the methods into practice by establishing structures for implementation. An important aspect of these awards includes appropriate innovations in processes and structures in each area of a company's businesses and its integration as a natural element of everyday management. The core values considered in determining superior quality for the Quality Awards include innovation, partnerships, social responsibilities and environmental preservation, and knowledge management (Ueda 2002).

The standard and quality recognised through the process results in industry and sector-wide recognition of excellence, which subsequently contribute toward effective growth and higher profits. The prestige and trust in the process and guarantee of quality are high and are globally recognised. National Governments in many parts of the world have introduced quality awards such as the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (Government of USA) to encourage a quality-based approach for competitive advantage (Laszlo 1996; Macleod 2001) and to reward quality in the business, health care, and education sectors. The process followed for benchmarking has led to the adaptation of the process and criteria for Quality Awards in other parts of the world, and several sectors (Macleod 2001).

The recognition and publicity given to practices through the Quality Awards encourages manufacturers and businesses to improve quality and increase profits by emulating alternatives that have been effective in solving similar problems.

c. Inducement Prizes

Inducement prizes are offered either as outcome-specific prize, which focus efforts on problems that do not have a known solution, or as competition prizes (Schroeder 2004; Davis 2004). Inducement prizes are designed to offer an attractive cash prize that acts as an incentive for the competitors to put in additional effort, and invest time and resources to undertake specific technological innovations, activities, studies or research for a specific outcome within a limited duration (Master 2006). Inducement prizes are offered when a government, philanthropist or bilateral and multilateral donors identify the need for particular kinds of innovations that are substantially different from the prevailing focus in the sector (Masters 2006). Outcome-specific prizes promote advancement of knowledge, technology (currently for nanotechnology) development, breakthroughs, deployment, or for innovation (Schroeder 2004; US National Academy of Sciences. 2004).

The advantages of inducement prizes are that the risk for achieving toward a prize objective is shifted from the award giving entity to the contestants, and the potential for leveraging financial resources of sponsors is increased (Master 2006). Inducement prizes attract a broader spectrum of ideas and participants while reducing the costs and barriers to participation by individuals or firms. The large cash prizes offered inspire,

mobilize, and educate the public about the particular scientific, technological, developmental and social objectives. Inducement prizes result in payoffs in various forms for the successful entities in the future.

Box 1-2: The Longitude Prize

> The British Parliament passed the Longitude Act in 1714 and the Longitude Prize was offered for any device or technique that would enable mariners to find their exact longitude within a margin of 30 nautical miles at sea. The objective was to give an incentive to impoverished inventors and a Longitude Board was established for the purpose. Although similar prizes had been established by the Spanish and Dutch Governments and several Italian city-states, this was the largest offered. At a time when positions of ships were determined based on lunar and astronomical readings, a clock-maker – John Harrison, made a clock-like device that measured the longitude accurately. The reliability and accuracy of the device was questioned and proved through a number of expeditions but due to politic, the Prize was awarded in 1773 after a long delay.

Source: Sobel 1998; Masters 2006

The important role of outcome specific inducement prizes in research and development of technology (Davis 2004) is illustrated by prizes offered between 1905 and 1935 in the field of aviation. In 1919, the Orteig Prize of USD25, 000 was offered for the first person to fly non-stop between New York and Paris (Schroeder 2004). The Prize stimulated nine different attempts to cross the Atlantic, the advancement of aircraft technology and the current $300 billion aviation industry (History of Prizes, X-Prize).

The concept of using an inducement prize for accelerating the advance of technology inspired the establishing of the first X-Prize of $10 million for a new generation of launch vehicles that can support personal spaceflight for space tourism (X-Prize). Twenty-six teams from seven countries signed up and competed to be the first to launch a private, reusable, three-person spaceship. The USD10 million prize money leveraged more than $100 million in private investment and competition among the most talented entrepreneurs and rocket experts in the world. The prize (renamed Ansari X-Prize) now aims to enable radical breakthroughs in the areas of aviation, medicine, energy, nanotechnology, and the environment. The achievement of the Ansari X-Prize has revived the offering of inducement prizes within Government bodies in the USA (US National Academy of Sciences. 2004).

The annual Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership (Website), which was announced in 2006 for recognition for the quality of governance, is similar to inducement prize. The Mo Ibrahim Prize is awarded to a former African executive Head of State or Government who has demonstrated excellence in African leadership. It consists of USD 5 million over 10 years and USD 200,000 annually for life thereafter. A further USD 200,000 per year may be granted by the Foundation for good causes supported by the winner during the first ten years. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation was established to: i) stimulate debate on good governance across sub-Saharan Africa and the world; ii) Provide objective criteria by which citizens can hold their Governments to account, and iii) Recognise achievement in African leadership and provide a practical way in which African leaders can build positive legacies on the continent after they have left office. The aim is to encourage good governance in Africa by enabling African presidents and prime ministers to have the financial independence for setting a good example.

This is important because "Sometimes, they (the African leaders) find themselves without enough money to rent an apartment in the capital city that until a few weeks ago they were ruling from the palace on the top of the hill" (McAllister 2006). The decision on the award winner will be based on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, which was created in recognition of the need for a more comprehensive, objective and quantifiable method of measuring governance quality in sub-Saharan Africa. The Index assesses national

progress in five key areas that together constitute good governance, namely: i) Safety and security; ii) Rule of law, transparency and corruption; iii) Participation and human rights; iv) Sustainable economic development, and v) Human development.

In 2007, the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership was awarded to Mozambique's former president Joaquim Chissano for his "achievements in bringing peace, reconciliation, stable democracy and economic progress to his country". Former South African President Nelson Mandela was named Honorary Laureate in recognition of his extraordinary leadership qualities and achievements.

d. Environmental awards

Some recognition prizes in the field of the environment were announced after the 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm recommended an international environment prize. The U.N. Environment Programme was launched in the same year and in 1976, it initiated the Pahlavi Prize, known as the UNEP Sasakawa Award since 1982, to recognize leading environmentalists and their work at the global level (UNEP Sasakawa Award). The UNEP Sasakawa Award was followed by the launch of the King Baudouin International Development Prize, the AGFUND (Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations) International Prize in 1978 and the Right Livelihood Award (Alternative Nobel Prize) in 1980.

e. Awards for the Built Environment

In the area of settlements and environment, awards are not oriented toward gaining public recognition or popularity along the lines of beauty, films or music awards. They are offered for advances in a range of sectors, including architecture, urban design, area planning, urban and regional planning, urban regeneration and renewal, renewable energy, advanced materials, transportation, and water purification and management. The recognition in the context of settlements development falls primarily in the category of awards for individuals or for those initiating and facilitating the implementation of an intervention. In addition, unlike other recognition prizes and awards where significant outcomes or benchmarks are the basis for recognition, awards that are focussed on urban settlements primarily recognise small initiatives that demonstrate the potential for sustainable development.

Design Competitions

In the case of settlements, design competitions are a way to bring many different design ideas, innovations, and publicity to a project, an issue, or to the designer/design team. It is also a process of finding the most appropriate design solution or the right architect or design team for a project (Chicago Tribune Tower, 1927; Vierra 2006). Design competitions are an opportunity for solving the design problems most effectively. For the entrants or participant, they provide a means to receive recognition and/or a project (RIBA 2006; Vierra 2006). Architectural design or planning competitions are generally organised for monuments (Washington Monument in 1836), public buildings (Cathedral competition in Russia 1816 and the second competition in 1829, which was built and Palace of the Soviets competition in 1931), institutional complexes, housing schemes, Central Business Districts and public open spaces, including parks and gardens. Competitions for monuments provided an opportunity of getting grand designs that political leaders would leave as a legacy.

Awards for recognition of distinguished contributions of architects to the architecture profession are amongst the earliest prizes offered in settlements related contributions. The Royal Institute of British Architects

(founded in 1837) established the Royal Gold Medal for the Promotion of Architecture in 1848 (RIBA website) awarded to an individual architect or group of architects for work of high merit or work that has directly or indirectly promoted the advancement architecture (AIA website). The Civic Award (1959), the Housing Design Awards (1950), and the Royal Town Planning Institute Awards for Planning Achievement (1977) are other well-known awards offered for settlements related contributions.

Participants in design competitions often have to pay a fee for participation in the competitions and invest time as well as human and financial resources for the entries. Those who win the competition receive paybacks in terms of cash prizes, projects, or prominence/ publicity, for the rest, besides the experience - the inputs yields no tangible returns. Design competitions are either one-stage or multiple stages. The first stage can be open to licensed architects who submit an entry and entry fees, while in Stage II of a two-tiered competition; the open-call jury selects finalists from all complete submissions, to compete in Stage II. The Finalists participating in Stage II are given an Honorarium to prepare a design submission, the selected winner receives an Award, and if not the project, the possibility to enter into an agreement with the developer for architectural services (Chicago Department of Housing, July 2002).

1.3 Comparing awards and identification processes

Table 1-1: Comparing Awards

	Quality awards	Aga Khan Award for Architecture	World Habitat Awards	Dubai International Award for best practices to improve the living environment
For	The self-assessment process for organisations from different sectors and of varying sizes, and the criteria and review processes of quality awards contribute to establishing benchmarks of performance and quality, and provide information on good practices in management	The broadest possible range of architectural interventions, including restoration & social efforts, contemporary design projects & those demonstrating the use of appropriate technologies. No fixed criteria except that eligible projects must be designed for or used by Muslim communities, in part or in whole,	For human settlements projects that provide practical & innovative solutions to current housing needs & problems, in both developed & developing countries, & which are capable of replication locally, nationally & internationally.	To recognise & enhance awareness of outstanding & sustainable achievements in improving the living environment as per the basic criteria & as a means of identifying what works in improving living conditions on a sustainable basis
Process	Application	Nomination	Application	Application
Eligibility criteria	The criteria assessed for these awards include leadership, planning, customer satisfaction, human resources development, process management, supplier quality, and results.	An independent Master Jury, comprising specialists from the fields of history, engineering, philosophy, architectural conservation, and contemporary arts is specially appointed for each Award cycle.	Since the focus of the WHA is primarily on housing and building materials and technologies, the eligibility and assessment criteria include sustainability, innovation, and transferability of interventions factors.	The screening of applicants or nominees is largely undertaken by regional representatives as in the case of DIABP. This is primarily a process of identifying whether the applicants meet the eligibility criteria and essential information is provided for a preliminary assessment.
Appraisal process	Quality awards: On completion of the review, applicants are sent a feedback report listing strengths and opportunities for improvement based on the criteria, which is used by the applicant for improving overall performance and for focusing on the customer needs. All Applicants for the Award who achieve a score in excess of 400 points after site visit are Recognised for Excellence	At its first meeting in January of the Award Cycle year, the Master Jury examines the documentation on each project and selects approximately twenty-five to thirty projects for On-Site Project Reviews. These reviews are undertaken by architectural professionals who have specialized in housing, urban planning, landscape design, and restoration	The two-stage application and assessment processes for the WHA have been refined over the years for more objective decision-making. The reasons for each rejection are listed. Ten to twelve applicants are short-listed through an increasingly rigorous in-house assessment process, and are requested to send more and detailed information for the second stage. The applicants are given a period of three months for submission of the final entry.	The award process was planned as a partnership and decentralised process. National level training institutions facilitate the compilation and verification of national applications. The committee meets physically and is responsible for differentiating between "good" and "best" practices. Technical appraisal is undertaken by an independent committee comprising of up to 15 regionally representative and gender-sensitive experts. The committee looks at each practice for compliance with the three basic criteria of impact, partnerships, and sustainability; and with the additional criteria of leadership, community empowerment; innovation; gender equality, social inclusion; and transferability.

2 APPENDIX 2: National and Regional Awards for Good Practices

Selected regional awards instituted to complement the DIABP are described below to highlight the award objectives and processes.

2.1 CRISIL Awards for Excellence in Municipal Initiatives

CRISIL (Credit Rating Information Services of India Limited) is a ratings, financial news, risk and policy advisory company that has a strong focus on award awards. CRISIL annually gives the Best Fund Award and the Young Thought Leader award to business school students whose dissertations meet CRISIL's standards of qualify. CRISIL initiated the CRISIL Awards for Excellence in Municipal Initiatives programme in November 2003. The objective of instituting the CRISIL Award was to support innovation and excellence in municipal services and to contribute to a sustainable future. The awards recognise the work of urban local bodies in specified areas of work and the award, the media events and publicity of the awards provide visibility to initiatives by urban local bodies that often go unnoticed. This award also serves as a brand building and relationship building exercise for CRISIL since it has business associations with urban local bodies both for rating services and for infrastructure advisory services.

This award also serves as a brand building and relationship building exercise for CRISIL since it has business associations with urban local bodies both for rating services and for infrastructure advisory services. The aim was to build on the association between CRISIL and the urban sector because: i) it is the area in which the work of CRISIL Advisory Services is focused; ii) There was potential for having a recognition mechanism for achievements of local governments, and iii) It would contribute towards strengthening the presence of CRISIL in the sector.

The award was instituted 3 to 4 years after CRISIL started working in the urban sector because it saw two distinct patterns in the sector, namely:

- The pace of change in urban local bodies was much greater than in the State and Central Governments, and a Municipal Commissioner and Mayor can between themselves make a lot of difference to an urban area.
- Between the cities, there was limited recognition of what was going on in other cities, willingness, or practicalities of borrowing from those experiences.

Thus, the fact that there are many innovative initiatives in urban areas but they are not being replicated was identified as a gap in the urban sector. This led to thinking about what could bridge the gap and one of the outcomes of these conundrums was institution of awards. CRISIL therefore started looking for existing parallels/ awards in India and identified two, viz. Award instituted by Ministry of Urban Development at about the same time, and HUDCO Award (the Clean and Green City Award). CRISIL also started sounding professionals in the sector who mentioned the Dubai International Award for Best Practices and the Beacon Award, which is more progressive.

In the first cycle, the panel was quite enthused by what the cities were doing but the panel felt that overall, urban local bodies did not have a clear agenda about the changes and had undertaken what could done rather than what needs to be done as per an agreed agenda. None of the urban local bodies was working under a

long-term vision. The panel felt that it was necessary to demonstrate that the criteria are very strict and very challenging to establish a strong benchmark. They did not want to dilute this message by recognizing some initiative that was not outstanding (according to the experience and wisdom of the panel). The theme of the award was changed in the second year to partnerships because CRISIL wanted to stress that there is a limited amount that can be done by a urban local bodies and partnerships are essential.

Besides the change in criteria for the different themes, there has been little change in the process of identifying best practices in the two cycles of the CRISIL Awards. There are three levels of filtering:

- A short-listing of entries with adequacy of data and clarity of initiative. This is done by CRISIL and about 25% of the entries are vetted out at this stage
- Assessing a fit with the theme. This is done by the panel of experts and about 50% of the entries are vetted out at this stage.
- Intersect ranking of the initiatives and selection by the panel of experts

Thus, CRISIL is working towards making the brand name so strong that just the announcement of a urban local bodies as an award winner becomes sufficient incentive for the urban local bodies. CRISIL continues to talk to potential partners. In 2005, HDFC was one of the sponsors of the event, has committed to build a library of best practices, and is looking at what kind of direct assistance can be given to each award-winning city.

For the award winners, besides the inherent benefits of improved governance and urban management, no amount of monetary incentive would be sufficient and what would be enough was not affordable to CRISIL or any other Indian industry. Thus, besides the certificate and a trophy, no material award is given though CRISIL decided to offer many collateral benefits, for example:

- After a decision was made to institute the awards, CRISIL interacted with a number of multilaterals about what they could offer in terms of best practice exchanges, or technical assistance.
- Make the event/ award a matter of prestige by proclaiming a local body as an award winner (brand, credibility and pride).
- Strengthening of the brand name such that winning the award becomes important for both the city administration and its residents

2.2 CAIXA Municipal Best Practices Awards for Brazil

In 1999, Caixa Economica Federal (CEF), the national bank of Brazil, created the Caixa Best Practices in Local Management Program. The objective was to have a national award program that identified good practices using the DIABP selection criteria and methodology. CEF, a public company with a private status, was created to support government programs in science and technology and to provide technical assistance to municipalities for sanitation and housing. CEF functions as a commercial bank with presence in all the 5562 municipalities in Brazil. CEF supports urban development, providing funding for housing, sanitation, infrastructure, and the municipalities to improve their public administration, and planning. CEF helps in reforms in public administration, including modernizing management, and works to improve the regulatory and legal aspects of providing improved sanitation. With a network of more than 18,000 sales points among

agencies, banking correspondents and lottery sales points, CEF uses them to identify municipalities requiring advice for housing, sanitation, environment, and urban infrastructure. Federal public agencies, private companies, universities, and NGOs are consulted for collecting information about experiences and conceiving new projects capable of transforming local realities.

CEF awards ten good practices every two years, using the DIABP framework. CEF seeks projects in which it has a role and uses the award process to aid the monitoring and evaluation of projects. The award winners are nominated as national entries for the DIABP. CEF has adopted the DIABP framework to support its municipal lending programme and to inform policy development at the national level (UN, 2006). From 1999 to 2004, among the 678 Projects from all Brazilian regions, CEF had already awarded 40 Best Practices, of which 15 were ranked among the global 100 good practices; and three were ranked among the top 40. One of the practices was awarded the DIABP Award.

Dissemination of information about the good practices has been achieved by organising around 40 photographic exhibitions throughout the country, distribution of 10,000 publications and 200 technical video tapes, and by making information on practices available through a database on its website. CEF publicises the experiences of the awarded practices in 177 countries where Habitat/ Local Agenda 21 activities are ongoing. CAIXA presented its system for granting awards and organised an exhibition of the award winning projects at the World Urban Forum in Barcelona in September 2005 (KPMG, 2004). In addition, CAIXA keeps information available on the internet (as case studies, guidelines manual for replication, web site), publishes books and films on video (VHS) and maintains an exhibition on the Best Practices that travels to different places. All of this information is directed to Brazilian municipalities, universities, and communities.

2.3 Medellín Award for Best Practice Transfers for the Latin American and Caribbean region

The Award was launched in Medellín in November 2005 (for two cycles in 2005 and 2007) at the initiative of the Ibero-American and Caribbean Forum on Best Practices, the Habitat Colombia Foundation, and the city of Medellín. The objective of instituting the award is to promote the effective transfer of good practices in urban areas of the Latin-American and Caribbean Region. This will enable putting knowledge acquired by actors in urban and territorial development into practice in other areas, and facilitate the exchange of ideas, experiences, and lessons learned. Therefore the process aims to award interventions that have a high potential for transfer, address widespread regional phenomena, and stay in keeping with the guidelines and commitments of the Habitat Agenda, the MDGs, and the strategic guidelines of the Development Plan of the Mayor of Medellín. Under the program, the City of Medellín will present the Medellín Award for Best Practices Transfer to a maximum of five projects. Each of the winning initiatives will be required to take part in a pilot transfer project in a neighbourhood or community of Medellín. These locations are places where the local administration is developing strategic projects" that take a holistic approach to the improvement of the quality of life of the poorest citizens. Local administration bodies, private companies, non-governmental organizations, academic groups, and the community will all benefit from the transfers. They will participate actively in the implementation of the projects, providing economic and human resources as well as technical cooperation (BPP 2005).

The eligible organisations for the award are municipalities, metropolitan areas, private companies, academic and research centres, foundations, NGOs, CBOs, and mass media representatives from the region of Latin America and the Caribbean.

2.4 Mashariki Innovations in Local Governance Awards Programme (MILGAP)

UN-Habitat with support from the Ford Foundation and UNDP launched a biennial awards programme in East Africa called the Mashariki Innovations in Local Government Programme (MILGAP). MILGAP is an innovations award that aims to alleviate poverty and promote excellence in public service delivery, good governance, and enhanced local democracy and decentralization. The objective is to recognize, reward, and promote innovative practices in local governance, especially for demonstrating the valuable work being done at the local level to improve the conditions of the poor.

The eligible projects should have been in effective operation at least for two years and be in a partnership involving at least a local government body and/or a civil society organization as one of the key actors, in collaboration with other partners. The award is open to Central Government Ministries Departments and Sections, local authorities, Private Sector, Training and research institutions, Youth groups, Women groups, Non-Governmental Organizations and Community Based Organizations.

3 APPENDIX 3: Slum Networking Initiatives in India

3.1 Indore Habitat Improvement Project

A political leader in Madhya Pradesh initiated the project for slum improvement after meeting a friend from Hyderabad, who told him about the ODA funded Slum Improvement Projects (SIPs) in Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada (DFID reports). Indore Development Authority, which the State Government found to be the appropriate agency for implementing the envisaged project, was asked to prepare a project proposal for submission to ODA. Indore Development Authority, which at the time was implementing a sites and services project in the city, requested Parikh - a member of the design team from Ahmedabad, to assist in preparing a proposal (Slater 1997).

Parikh prepared a preliminary infrastructure proposal, which included household connections for water supply, shared drains and option for sewer connections; paved access roads (as provided under GoI's EIUS), and community halls in slums where land was available. The proposal included linking of slum infrastructure to the city infrastructure networks and for management of topography of the riverside. On review of this proposal, ODA Advisers who visited Indore explained to Indore Development Authority that the project would have to integrate physical works with community development components (Slater 1997).

The revised proposal included community development components such as formation of neighbourhood, women's and youth groups, a series of preventive health care programmes, and vocational training. These components were already part of ODA funded SIPs in Andhra Pradesh and Calcutta. The community development and preventive care health components were components of the UCD Programme in India and the UNICEF funded UBSIP implemented in Colombo and other towns of Sri Lanka (Chularathna 1999).

The Indore Development Authority, which comprised only engineering and construction related staff, recruited staff on contract for implementation of the community development component. Since the project was to be implemented by a development authority while the local government was responsible for operation and maintenance, the IHIP included the requirement of tripartite agreements delineating operation and maintenance responsibilities between Indore Development Authority, Indore Municipal Corporation (IMC), and the neighbourhood groups in each area. The Tripartite agreements required neighbourhood groups to take on responsibilities for maintenance of assets, running of classes for pre-school children, crafts classes, local sanitation, and contribution to the sustenance of various activities initiated under the project. Slum residents, as in other DFID funded SIPs, did not have to pay any charges for levels of services that were better than in areas improved under the scheme for EIUS.

IHIP was approved in late 1988 and was estimated to directly benefit approximately 80,000 families living in slums. The Project, which was initially scheduled for completion by 1995, was extended to June 1997. It was originally formulated for Rs 240 million at 1986 prices and revised to Rs 340 million at the outset of the project in 1988/89 (and the equivalent sterling sum of GBP 14.4 million was sanctioned by DFID). By 1991, it became apparent that the estimate was well below what was required, especially because cement prices rose from an average of Rs 40 to 50 per bag in 1986 to Rs 100 per bag by mid-project period. In addition, the original estimate of dwellings (based on 1981 census) increased from 50,000 dwellings to 75,000 units according to the 1991 census (DFID Reports).

Despite delays and problems of coordination between the engineering and community development activities, the IHIP was a high profile project and was included in an Impact Assessment Study of DFID funded SIPs in India in 1996-97 (Slater 1997). The assessment of the Indore project revealed the following:

- The main impact of the project was the improvements in the physical environment of the slums through provision of roads, drains, sewer lines, and piped water (Slater 1997).
- The technical innovation of using favourable topography, small diameter of pipes and gully traps, which provided slum households with the opportunity to connect up to the city mains supply and network, did not bring about the expected results. The uniformity of design and implementation, and lack of water supply and maintenance problems reduced the impact of the approach in some slums.
- Not all the slum households connected toilets and wet areas to the underground drainage as had been assumed, either because of lack of space or because they were tenants (Dewan-Verma 2000b).
- The areas set aside for soft landscaping were encroached upon (Dewan-Verma 2000b).
- The sustainability of all components proved difficult. The primary problems were linked to the selection of a development agency for all aspects of implementation; uncertainty about which technologies were best suited to different socio-environmental settings; financial approach for maintenance in the future; and lack of workable mechanisms for ensuring on-going community representation and involvement (Slater 1997).
- Community organisation and participation were the most difficult components to implement. The Impact Assessment Study found that only staff involved in the community development and health activities emphasised the importance of these components. The organizational culture and management procedures undermined the adoption of a flexible community driven approach (Slater 1997).
- Direct influence of the project was limited and in fact negative because project procedures resulted in Indore Development Authority abandoning its routine cost recovery discipline (Slater 1997).

Subsequently, USAID supported some activities in Indore under the FIRE-D project (FIRE-D Notes). A situation analysis undertaken in 2004 revealed that some of the neighbourhood committees promoted under the Indore Habitat Improvement Project had evolved into capable institutions and were engaged in development activities in the slums, while many did not evolve (Taneja 2004).

3.2 Slum Networking in Vadodara

Parikh believes that more can be achieved for improving environments of urban areas by enabling convergence of resources from Government and other local sources, and donor-funding can complement these resources for technical assistance (Interview). With this approach, Parikh visited Baroda (renamed Vadodara) in September 1993 and met some NGOs to convince them to initiate physical improvements in the slums where they were active (Interview N06).

The decision to introduce slum networking in Vadodara was strategic for several reasons. Vadodara is the city where the American Friends Service Committee had implemented the Baroda Community Development project successfully from 1964 to 1969. In addition, the third urban community development pilot had been so successful in Baroda that it provided the training resources required for the programme in other parts of India

(Cousins 1992). Moreover, many key fertilizer, petroleum and related industries of the State are located in and around the city.

Box 3-1: Up-scaling of Urban Community Development Programme in India

Following the UCD pilot project in Delhi, the Ministry of Health, Family Planning and Urban Development introduced a programme to provide meals for the age group 6, and started a scheme of urban community development in Ahmedabad (1962), Baroda (1965) and Calcutta (1966) (Chandra, 1972; Gupta, 1994).

Each UCD project was designed to cover a population of 50,000, split into approximately 8 area level committees of about 6,000 population. The expenditure was shared with the Central Government contributing 50 percent and the State government and local body contributing the remaining 50 percent. The expenditure on training, evaluation and research was borne by the Central Government.

Although schemes sponsored by GoI were generally to be implemented by urban local bodies, the UCD was implemented through different implementing agencies. The Ahmedabad UCD was started with the Municipal Corporation while the Baroda UCD was started with the Baroda Citizens' Council (BCC), which at the time, included members of the Municipal Corporation, the State Government, representatives of labour and social welfare organisations, and other prominent citizens. In 1966, twenty UCD projects were initiated in selected cities with a population of 100,000 or more, including Hyderabad (1967). The Hyderabad pilot UCD programme was taken over by the State Government in 1969.

An evaluation of the UCD programme in 1972 (Chandra, 1972) revealed that while the response from many State Governments was not encouraging, Gujarat had five UCD projects in Ahmedabad, Surat, Baroda, Jamnagar and Bhavnagar. Moreover, Gujarat was the only State that had an active and functional State Level Advisory Committee and a Director for the UCD. Gujarat was also found to be the only state which exercised its own judgement and initiative in launching five projects and was enthusiastic to start even more projects" (Chandra, 1972).

The Urban Basic Services (UBS) approach, promoted by UNICEF since the 1970s, evolved from the experiences of these urban community development (UCD) programmes of the 1960s (Sundaram 1994).

Baroda Citizens Council (BCC), an NGO established in 1987 through collaboration between Baroda Municipal Corporation (renamed Vadodara Municipal Corporation-VMC), MS University and industries in and around the city, showed an interest in piloting SNP. BCC provided Parikh with profiles of the slums where it was active (Interview N06), including Ramdevnagar, a slum of 829 families that was established on Government land in the early 60s. Its origins prior to the listing and recognition of slums under the Gujarat Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act of 1973 made it eligible for in-situ improvements under the EIUS. The BCC had close contact with the residents because of its micro-finance facility (the CSLA-Community Savings and Loan Association) in the area, and the homogeneity of residents from the same community was expected to make local decision-making process less complex.

By October 1994, a proposal for the upgrading the Ramdevnagar slum had been formulated and the pilot launched. The key factors that distinguished the Baroda SNP pilot from the IHIP were i) Contribution of 50 percent costs by the individual households for connections at the house level; ii) Involvement of an NGO for facilitating community participation, and iii) Involvement of State Government for transfer of land tenure. UNICEF, VMC, BCC and others provided partial funding to cover 50 percent cost of the infrastructure, and actual costs of BCC. Although UNICEF had generally provided funding for women and child welfare, it decided to provide only part funding for this 'experimental' project. This was because UNICEF was at the time, exploring the possibility of expanding its work in urban areas, and the concept of providing services at the level of the city was unique and something that UNICEF was keen to have introduced in other parts of the country (Interview D8).

BCC, as the implementer of the pilot, started collecting community contributions, which were made rapidly. On the other hand, the contributions from VMC, which was approached after initial decisions were made

(Interview U18), was slow. From the VMC's point of view, it had to address several technical issues for providing infrastructure to the slum residents in a low-lying area. It could not give permission for changes in specifications of materials and works in an ad-hoc manner because actions taken for the pilot would affect all future works and the overall quality of services in the city. Thus, VMC insisted on changing the water supply lines from Galvanised Iron pipes to cast iron pipes, even though this increased the cost of the project. Another was the drainage in the area, for which VMC decided to bear the cost of pumping sewage from the area (for approximately 2 years in total) until such time the main sewer line was in place (Recording of discussion on local TV).

Box 3-2: Slum Networking: Concept

> Recent pilot projects have shown that the urban poor can mobilise huge resources. The charitable attitude towards them, whereby they are seen as separate entities from the city and dealt with by 'pro-poor' programmes, aid and grants, has to be changed. It should be replaced by a much more businesslike attitude which sees them as a part of the city's normal fabric, and which increases their self-sufficiency and dignity.

Source: EAWAG 2000

The clearances for land tenure required follow-up with the State Government. After many delays, an MoU was signed with the Government of Gujarat on 3 November 1995 and the works were tendered in December 1995. A tripartite agreement was signed between the support agencies and an account for the project was opened with the micro-credit society. The Ramdevnagar pilot project (Phase-I for water supply & drainage) was started on 10 February 1996, and was completed after many delays and cost escalations. The slum was dedicated to the Ramdevnagar Community at a ceremony by the Mayor of Vadodara on 13 June 1999 and VMC took over responsibility for the maintenance of the area to 15 August 2000 (BCC 2000). The main lesson from the early stage of the pilot in Vadodara was the willingness of slum residents to pay substantial sums of money for availing services at the household level and the need for an NGO to facilitate the process.

Parikh further prepared a project proposal for slum improvement in Baroda at an estimate of Rupees 3 billion and was forwarded to DFID for funding. However, Gujarat was not a priority state for DFID and the project was funded. In 1994, IHIP was awarded the World Habitat Award in recognition of its unique approach for integrating slums into the mainstream of urban areas (BSHF 1996).

3.3 Slum Networking in Bhopal

The Bhopal Slum Networking Project (BSNP) was started at the initiative of the Chief Minister (Interview PC5, and Parikh 2001). The SNP introduction was a follow-up on the State Government's reforms for decentralising decision-making and improving governance. The BSNP was proposed with limited objectives, which included facilitating grassroots community participation in the spirit of the 74th Constitutional Amendment (74th CAA) through appropriate legal and financial frameworks. The project aim was to transform the physical infrastructure, particularly water and environmental sanitation within the slums, strengthen city level infrastructure and improve its environment to the extent possible.

The BSNP was considered a 'pet-project' of the Chief Minister, who in a preface of the project framework report, emphasised the need for integration of under-serviced areas with the urban mainstream, and the project as an important step in making cities 'slum free' by assimilation rather than by displacement. He also identified the potential of the SNP as "a kernel around which Government of Madhya Pradesh (GoMP) could

realign its policies and work toward socio-economic development of the poor, and as an ideal opportunity to leverage greater grassroots participation in urban areas".

The BSNP was expected to cover 78,101 households located in 266 slums at an estimated cost of Rupees 1,650.2 million. Of this, the Government contribution was proposed to be Rupees 757.4 million, community/ private contribution to be Rupees 274.7 million and bilateral/ grant support for Rupees 618.2 million. About 23 percent of the households had secure tenure (permanent or 30 years patta), 13.4 percent had temporary pattas and over 57 percent had no pattas or security of tenure. The BSNP was to be undertaken in two phases, with lessons from a Pilot Phase expected to contribute toward detailing of the Main Phase. The objectives of the Pilot Phase were: i) to develop and test tentative solutions and mechanisms to enable their refinement for the Main Phase; ii) get actual costs for upgrading the pilot slums for revising budget estimates for the Main Phase, and iii) undertake pre-planning activities, including data collection, studies, analysis, partnership development, sensitisation and resource mobilisation for the Main Phase.

The pilot (October 2001 to December 2002) was to cover around 4,700 households in six slum areas at an estimated cost of Rupees 66.1 million, of which Rs 5 million was estimated to be the cost for community interaction facilitation, and Rs 5.4 million for the various activities. The key partners for the Pilot Phase of BSNP were Bhopal Municipal Corporation, slum dwellers, UNICEF, Department of Science and Technology - GoI (under UNDP programme) and NGOs. Since community interaction and facilitation was a significant component, different NGOs (Action Aid, CASP-Plan, Aarambh and Medical Counselling Centre) were identified to enable slum dwellers to participate in the planning, implementing and monitoring of the project. The financial commitment of the different partners was as follows:

- MATURE (Department of Science and Technology - DST), New Delhi: Rs 6 million for prototype design; Technical Consultant; preparation of GIS system; rootzone plant with primary treatment using bio-digester, etc.; research and development; training, workshops and information dissemination.
- UNICEF, Bhopal Rs 2.5 million for a year for social mobilisation in all the six pilot slums. This included support to NGOs for mobilising communities for participation and taking-up responsibilities for future operation and management.
- Slum dwellers were to contribute one third of the total cost per household (Rs 2,500) for physical improvement of slum.

The activities undertaken in the pilot phase between October 2001 to December 2002, were:

- Based on detailed engineering surveys for identifying available infrastructure and basic services in six slums selected for the pilot phase, M/S Himanshu Parikh Consulting Engineers prepared detailed engineering designs and drawings for improvement of physical infrastructure.
- Detailed estimates were prepared and the first call for tenders was made on 15 May 2002. However, the bids were cancelled on technical grounds by the Mayor-in-Council. The second call for tenders was made on 28 June 2002 and finalisation and selection of contractors was pending at MIC level.
- A team of engineers was sent to Ahmedabad for training on the software package used by the consultant so that any field level changes could be made by them during implementation.

At the end of September 2002, work on infrastructure had not started in any slum and the slum residents were not convinced adequately to pay their contributions of Rupees 2,500. Some of the reasons identified for the slow progress of BSNP in the field were (CIDA 2002):

- Lack of a long-term perspective on the implications on sustainability of the BSNP initiative.
- Lack of exposure to similar initiatives where levels of community participation had been substantial and to concurrent institutional processes elsewhere. Since none of the implementing actors had visited Ahmedabad to study the SNP initiative, CIDA, which was planning a Capacity Building Project in Madhya Pradesh, strongly recommended an exposure visit to Ahmedabad for a group of slum residents, NGOs, elected representatives and the UNICEF facilitator (subsequently, a visit with a CIDA staff member was organised shortly before UNICEF support for the pilot was terminated).
- Lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities of stakeholders
- Lack of processes and mechanisms to encourage participation, and
- The reverse and inappropriate time-lag between the start of community mobilisation process and planning for infrastructure works meant that the savings habit had not been promoted for long enough for a large number of households to save money to make the full-contribution.

Box 3-3: Bhopal Slum Networking Project: Evaluation of the Pilot

> "However, barring the exposure visit to Ahmedabad, there has been no sustained communication effort to convince slum-dwellers of benefits of networking project. Whereas maps and plans have been shared with them, few understand the scheme, and are quite unaware as to what it can do for them. So, though there is a willingness to pay for facilities, confidence that these facilities will be maintained is lacking. There is a fear that BMC's interest may flag with change of government. Communications through media that is comprehensive and sustained is what is required.
>
> The resistance to partnership efforts at development was very high, in particular to self-contributory schemes. UNICEF, a partner (who is no longer part of the project) reportedly conducted the communications exercise but what exactly these were no one could tell the team. The Municipal Corporation took a group of representatives from slums to Ahmedabad to see how the slum networking functioned and benefited the communities. Slum communities have been formed and representatives elected. Senior engineers have built up a good equation with sections of slum-dwellers but there is apathy and resistance in other sections."

Source: UNDP 2004

Bhopal Municipal Corporation had already expressed its inability to bear the estimated cost of Rs 1,650 million for the main phase and was seeking grants for the project. However, simultaneous effort was not made to demonstrate to potential donors that the State Government was serious about the successful implementation of BSNP, and the viability of introducing it in other cities in MP.

By late 2005, the pilot of BSNP was completed (UNDP 2004; Interview U25). Additional works were subsequently to be taken up under the AsDB funded Urban Water Supply and Environmental Improvement Project (UWSEIMP) and DFID funded MP Urban Poverty Reduction Programme (MPUPRP)[1].

[1] In early 2008, although an NGO involved in the SNP pilot was actively involved in donor funded initiatives in slums of Bhopal, many stakeholders were unaware about the SNP pilot and the innovations demonstrated in 5 slums of Bhopal.

Figure 3-1: Comparing SNP Initiatives in different locations

Indore Habitat Improvement Project	Baroda Slum Networking Pilot Project: Ramdevnagar	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Pilot (* from proposal submitted initially to Arvind Mills, & Alliance for Change)	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project	Slum Networking Pilot Project, Bhopal
1989/90 to 30 June 1995 (extended to 30 March 1998)	Oct 1993 decision, Dec 1995 tendering of physical works, Oct 2000 completion	Proposed to be undertaken in 2 phases. Phase 1 (1.5 to 2 yrs) 1995-97	Proposed to be undertaken in 2 phases. Phase 2 (5 yrs): 1997-2002	Progress on a pilot phase of the BSNP, covering around 4700 households in six slum areas (Oct 2001 to Dec 2002), which has financial support from UNICEF for facilitating implementation mechanisms and community participation At the end of September 2002, neither has work on infrastructure started in any slum nor have slum residents been convinced adequately to pay their contributions of Rs 2500/HH
183 classified slums & about 70,000 families	1 slum area with 829 families	1500 families spread over one or two adjoining slums. Later 5000 / ~3500 huts in 4 slums	295,000 families in 1029 slum & 1383 chawls areas (2412 under-serviced areas)	
No financial contributions from residents	Residents= 50%/ ≈ Rs 2500 but increased to 3500 (Total=Rs 32.73 lakhs	One-third each by community, industry & AMC for in-slum infrastructure, 70% cost for community mobilisation by AMC & 30% by NGO/industry. Costs for design-consultancy, physical survey & project formulation included in Phase 1. All to be borne by AMC (Rs 32.29 crores or 9.67 of total estimated cost)	One-third each by community, industry & AMC for in-slum infrastructure, 70% cost for community mobilization by AMC & 30% by NGO/industry. Estimated cost for miscellaneous items incl. documentation, evaluation, MIS, establishment etc = Rs 1.09 crores to be borne by AMC.	The estimated cost for the Pilot Phase is Rupees 66,100,000 of which Rs 5,000,000 was estimated to be the cost for community interaction facilitation and Rs 5,400,000 for the various activities. The key partners for the Pilot Phase of BSNP are: •BSNP Cell of Bhopal Municipal Corporation; •Slum dwellers; •UNICEF; •Department of Science and Technology, GoI (UNDP); •NGOs (Action Aid, Casp-Plan, Aarambh and Medical Counseling Centre)
Funded fully by DFID. Total cost : £ 14.4 million or 60.3 crores (initially 34.50 & increased to 60.50 crores) (IMC budget during 1996-97 for construction of roads & maintenance was Rs 380 lakhs	Originally budgeted at Rs. 49.13, eventually escalated to Rs. 73.75 lakhs			
1991- estimate revised (cement price from Rs 40 to 50 per bag in 1986 to Rs 100 per bag by 1993. Estimate of dwellings (1981 census) rose from 50,000 to 75,000 units (1991 census)	Baroda MC =10% (Rs 7.86 lakhs) UNICEF=33% (Rs. 23.49 lakhs) Residents= 50%/ ≈ Rs 2500 but increased to 3500 (Total=Rs 32.73 lakhs) BCC=Rs 3.51 lakhs & others= Rs 6.16 lakhs	initiative taken by 2 architects to introduce Parikh to a potential supporter from the industry after outbreak of plague in Surat. Potential funding from donors was anticipated as revealed by letters drafted by Parikh for MC indicate	Introduced in Ahmedabad by MC after learning being introduced to the concept & in follow-up pilot phase. Potential funding from donors was anticipated as revealed by letters drafted by Parikh for MC indicate	Chief Minister of MP wanted to make a difference in the State & invited Parikh to participate in a Think Tank meeting because of the physical improvements he had seen in Indore. Parikh was contracted to prepare a Slum Networking proposal for the urban limits of Bhopal city. CM emphasized the need for integration of under-serviced areas with the urban mainstream in forward of project framework report.
Political leader in MP heard about DFID funded Hyderabad SIP & contacted development authority dominated by his political party to prepare a proposal. IDA was reluctant because it was exclusively engaged in land development on a commercial basis. Eventually IDA agreed & sought assistance of Parikh --- Engineer of Aranya-a World Bank funded housing project that IDA was implementing at the time because of good relations with him. Parikh formulated an infrastructure-upgrading proposal, which aimed at integrating the slums with the city's infrastructure networks. When submitted to DFID. IDA was informed to integrate physical works with community development as in HSIP. Parikh revised the proposal..	First meeting Sept 1993. Parikh knew Chairperson of BCC. Oct 1993 decision, Dec 1995 tendering of physical works, Oct 2000 completion 6 April 1995 meeting held with GoG	Arvind Mills, which later formed SHARDA Trust. According to proposal, AML was to establish an independent organisation to work at the city level with an objective of spreading its activities at national level. Parikh was to assist AML in developing organisational mechanisms within AML, AMC or other NGO for replicating the work on a larger scale	A Slum Networking Cell established within Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. Community development & mobilisation support provided by NGOs	A Slum Networking Cell established within Bhopal Municipal Corporation. Community development & mobilisation support provided by NGOs
A wing within Indore Development Authority, which had a CD Cell	Parikh prepared a ≈ Rs 300 crores for slum improvement in Baroda, it was forwarded to DFID			
Oct 1993 decision, Dec 1995 tendering of physical works, Oct 2000 completion	Baroda Citizen's Council - an NGO, which was overall implementer; Parikh prepared extensive & detailed technical designs for WS&S lines and roads; Engineering SEWA Trust, Vadodara prepared the tender documents, evaluating the bids & shortlisting of contractors			
•To increase standards of health, education and community life in 183 slums in Indore, by means of providing physical infrastructure and enhanced levels of health and social services •By these measures and direct employment promotion, to increase economic productivity in slums •To provide incentives for self-help To provide improved sewerage disposal for the majority of slum areas in Indore; and •To provide training for a corps of staff in urban community development and health	Ramdevnagar Project was designed to include Water Supply & Sewerage (Phase I). Roads (Phase II). It proposed to provide piped water and drainage in every home & create properly laid main & smaller roads to interconnect the slum & provide paved access to every home.	Objectives – short terms •To improve basic physical & non-physical infrastructure facilities within the slums •To facilitate process of community development •To build city-level organisation for 'slum networking' and infrastructure development		The objectives of the Pilot Phase have been identified as: •To develop and test tentative solutions and mechanisms on a small sample so that they may be tuned for the better for the Main Phase •To get actual costs for upgrading the pilot slums for revising budget estimates for the Main Phase, and •To undertake the pre-planning activities for the Main Phase, including data collection, studies, analysis, partnership development, sensitization and resource mobilization..

Table 3-1: Comparing Slum Networking initiatives in India

	Indore Habitat Improvement Project	Baroda SNP Pilot Project: Ramdev Nagar	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Pilot Project	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project	Bhopal Slum Networking Pilot Project	Bhopal SNP Proposed Project
Period	1989/90 to 30 June '95 Extended to 30 March '98	Expected: 1 Jul '95-31 Mar '97 as per MoU with GoG Sept '93 introduction of NGOs to potential of SNP Oct '93 Baroda Citizen Council's decision to participate Apr '95 MoU signed between Dept of UD-GoG (BMC-UNICEF-BCC). Jul '95 Agreed date for start of Ramdev Nagar Community-based Water, Sanitation & Environmental Improvement Project Dec '95 tendering of physical works Feb '96: Phase-I, Water Supply & Drainage started Sept '96: 55% of work completed. Cost escalations due to use of C.I. for WS. Cost increase approved. Oct 2000 completion	Phase 1 of 1.5 to 2 yrs between '95-97 Dec '94 meeting with some industrialists in Ahmedabad for introduction to potential of SNP Apr '95 MoU signed between Arvind Mills & Parikh Jul '95 Preliminary Proposal for 'Slum Networking' of Ahmedabad City prepared for AMC. Aug '95 AML sends first proposal for SNP Pilot to AMC Aug '96: Invocation ceremony held to mark the beginning of the upgrading work at Sanjay Nagar. April '97: Completion of infrastructure works at Sanjay Nagar Jun '97: Transfer of residents contribution to SHARDA Trust Aug '97: Formal completion of SNP at Sanjay Nagar	Phase 2 of 5 yrs (1997-2002) Sept '95 AMC Standing Committee resolution for implementing SNP. Jan '96: MC & DyMC state in an interview that because of SNP, the city would acquire a rare distinction of being a city without slums. Apr '96: Notice for pre-qualifications of contractors for SNP works & opening of tenders of physical works May '96: AMC Standing Committee resolution for taking community contribution of Rs 2000/ DU and permitting integration of 90:10 toilet subsidy Administrative approval given for intervention in Sinheshwari Nagar; Meldi Nagar & Sharif Khan Pathan-ni-Chali	Preferred start date was April 2001. Expected Oct 2001 to Dec 2002 (2 to 3 years expected) Completed in September 2004.	7 to 9 Years total time for Phase 1 & 2
How initiated	Political leader in MP heard about DFID funded Hyderabad SIP & contacted development authority (dominated by his political party) to prepare a proposal. IDA was reluctant but eventually agreed & sought assistance of Parikh, who was Project-in-Charge of IDA's Aranya (World Bank 1983-91 & HUDCO funded) project. Parikh formulated an infrastructure-upgrading proposal for integrating slums with the city's infrastructure networks. When submitted, DFID asked IDA to integrate physical works with community development as in HSIP. Parikh revised the proposal to incorporate CD components in the 'slum networking approach'.	Initiative taken by Parikh through Chairperson of BCC, whom he knew. Potential funding from donors was anticipated. Project Proposal prepared by Parikh.	Initiative taken by 2 architects to introduce Parikh to a potential supporter from the industry after outbreak of plague in Surat. Potential funding from donors was anticipated. Project Proposal prepared by Parikh.	Introduced in Ahmedabad by MC after learning of the concept & in follow-up to initiative already under way for a pilot. Potential funding from donors was anticipated as revealed by letters drafted by Parikh for MC. Project Proposal prepared by Parikh.	Chief Minister of MP wanted to make a difference in the State & invited Parikh to participate in a Think Tank meeting because of the physical improvements he had seen in Indore. UNICEF had already undertaken multi-indicator surveys in Bhopal (which was one of the cities where the UBSP was ongoing) from 1996 onwards. Parikh was contracted to prepare a Slum Networking proposal for the urban limits of Bhopal city. CM emphasized the need for integration of under-serviced areas with the urban mainstream in forward of project framework report. Grant/ donor funding, especially from UNICEF envisaged to facilitate quality professional and NGOs inputs, provide matching grants for community contributions, fund convergence activities and try innovative technologies. This was expected to leverage involvement of the private sector, local authorities and Corporator's. Project Framework Report prepared by HP Consulting Engineers and NGO-Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action.	

	Indore Habitat Improvement Project	Baroda SNP Pilot Project: Ramdev Nagar	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Pilot Project	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project	Bhopal Slum Networking Pilot Project	Bhopal SNP Proposed Project
Coverage Planned	183 classified slums & about 70,000 families	1 slum area of 829 families	Proposal to AML for 1500 families spread over one or two adjoining slums. Proposal to AMC as ~3300 huts in 4 slums. AMC Resolution approved undertaking of pilot for 3,300 DU's as follows: Sanjay Nagar (~200), Sakalchand Mukhi-ni-Chali (~500), Pravinnagar-Guptanagar (~1500), & Keshavlal Kachwala & Santokbai-ni-Chali (~1100).	Proposal and AMC Resolution approved undertaking of SNP in 2432 settlements comprising 228,894 DU's (1023 slums comprising 92,121 DU's and 1409 chawls comprising 136,773 DU's) by the year 2000. Estimates were based on slum survey of 1991 by ASAG & actual population of 300,000 HHs was expected to be covered by the year 2000.	6 slum areas with about 3000 huts. Discrepancy between surveyed numbers of houses & those identified by residents (4710 by Parikh & 2993 by NGOs)	78,101 households located in 266 slums. Of these, about 23 % HHs had secure tenure (permanent/ 30 years patta), 13.4 % had temporary pattas and over 57% had no security of tenure
Coverage Actual	183 classified slums & about 70,000 families	1 slum area of 829 families where 737 families participated. Completed Dec 2000	Actual: 181 families in one area (Sanjay Nagar) by December 1997	Actual: 4,528 DUs in 27 areas by Dec 2005.	6 slum areas with about 3000 huts. Discrepancy between surveyed numbers of houses & those identified by residents (4710 by Parikh & 2993 by NGOs)	Not started. DFID and ADB interventions incorporate provision of services in under-serviced areas through a participatory planning process.
Reason for selection of slum areas	NA	NGO already working in area where it was implementing Community Savings & Loan program and residents belonged to one community which would make the process of local decision making more simple	Condition that slum area should have employees of Arvind Mills & area where Saath-the NGO partner had been active for a number of years	Based on census of slums undertaken by ASAG in July '92. Later, in 2001, list was revised by AMC with the assistance of Saath, GMHST & AMC staff from the Zonal offices.	Initial list of 20 areas provided by Dept. of Urban Admin & Dev.-GoMP, of which 3 included.	NA
Cost-Estimated	Initially Rs 345 million. '91-estimate revised (cement price from Rs 40 to 50 per bag in 1986 to Rs 100 per bag by '93. Estimate of dwellings (1981 census) rose from 50,000 to 75,000 units ('91 census)	Originally budgeted at Rs. 4.913 million (4.426 million in '92)	Originally budgeted at Rs. 12.63 million @ of Rs 8420 per hut	Estimated at Rs. 3337.9 million @ of Rs 11,126 per hut for 300,000 huts, including all costs	Estimated cost for the Pilot Phase was Rs 66,100,000 of which Rs 5,000,000 was cost for community interaction facilitation and Rs 5,400,000 for other activities. Expected cost of Rs 40.5 million for TIFAC inputs	Estimated cost of Rupees 1.584 million for Phase 2.
Cost - Actual	Total cost: £ 14.4 million or 603 million (initially 345 million & increased to 605 million) (IMC budget during '96-97 for construction of roads & maintenance was Rs 38 million.	Eventually cost escalated to Rs. 7.375 million	Cannot be given with any accuracy. It was over the budgeted estimate, because of high overheads of the full-fledged NGO that was established to cover about 19 times the DU's actually covered (181 rather than 3500 expected) in the given period.	Ongoing currently	Not available	Not Applicable

	Indore Habitat Improvement Project	Baroda SNP Pilot Project: Ramdev Nagar	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Pilot Project	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project	Bhopal Slum Networking Pilot Project	Bhopal SNP Proposed Project
Financing from	Funded fully by DFID. No financial contributions from residents	Started as a partnership between Parikh and BCC for mobilising community. BCC was responsible for mobilising community and for the financial arrangements. Corporation required for financing and because of its role in managing slum areas and potential for convergence with other funds. In addition, proposal for citywide slum networking in Baroda prepared and submitted to DFID.	Started as partnership between Arvind Mills and Parikh. Evolved to incorporate Saath. Role of mobilisation was with SHARDA Trust and this worked because residents were also employees of Arvind Mills. Community contributions were forthcoming. AMC got into the picture and contributions formula changed. Especially of NGOs bearing 30% of costs for delivery of CD services.	One-third each by community, industry & AMC for in-slum infrastructure, 70% cost for community mobilisation by AMC & 30% by NGO/industry. Estimated cost for miscellaneous items = Rs 10.9 million to be borne by AMC. Private sector has not been forthcoming. AMC has taken on majority of the cost with some funds through GoI's NSDP.	BSNP Cell of Bhopal Municipal Corporation; Slum dwellers;UNICEFDept of Science & Technology-GoI & UNDP funded MATURE programme; NGOs (Action Aid, CASP-Plan, Aarambh and Medical Counselling Centre)	Government Community/ private contributionBilateral / grant support
Community roles	Neighbourhood Groups formed and expected to sign tripartite agreement with Indore Municipal Corporation and IDA for taking-up O&M responsibilities for infrastructure created	Neighbourhood Groups formed and expected to sign tripartite agreement with Indore Municipal Corporation and IDA for taking-up O&M responsibilities for infrastructure created	Residents Associations registered and responsible for taking over responsibilities for basic maintenance of area. Corpus of Rs 100 per household held in SEWA Bank	Residents Associations registered and responsible for taking over responsibilities for basic maintenance of area. Corpus of Rs 100 per household held in SEWA Bank	Financial contribution	Financial contribution
Contributions		Baroda MC =10% (Rs. 0.786 million); UNICEF = 33% (Rs. 2.349 million); Residents= 50%/ ≈ Rs 2500 but increased to 3500 (Total=Rs 3.273 million); BCC=Rs 0.351 million & others= Rs 0.616 million. UNICEF contributed Rs 1.2 to 1.5 million for a revolving fund for the credit society.	One-third each by community, industry & AMC for in-slum infrastructure, 70% cost for community mobilisation by AMC & 30% by NGO/industry. Costs for design-consultancy, physical survey & project formulation included in Phase 1. All to be borne by AMC (Rs 322.9 million or 9.67 of total estimated cost)	Ahmedabad MC =49.26% (Rs. 1,644.1 million) AML/ Industry = 28.15% (Rs.939.6 million), incl. contribution of 64.8 million for CD inputs (30% of 330 million). Residents= 21.57% @ Rs 2000 +100 per HH (Rs 720 million) {later revised to industry = 26.21% (Rs 874.8 million) & NGOs = 1.94% (Rs 64.8 million)}	For total estimated cost of Pilot Phase (Rs 1,584.2 million); Govt contribution was to be Rs 737.8 million (46.57%), community/ private to be Rs 257.5 million (16.25%); and bilateral/ grant support for Rs 589 million (37.18%). Expected contributions for total of Rs 40.5 million (•MP Government: Rs 25 million, •Slum dwellers: 5 million, •UNICEF: 4.5 million, •Dept of Science & Technology-GoI & UNDP funded MATURE programme: 6 million)	For total cost of Main Phase (Rs 1,650 million); Government contribution was proposed to be Rupees 757.4 million (45.9%), community/ private contribution to be Rupees 274.7 million (16.65%); and bilateral/ grant support for Rupees 618.2 million (37.47%)

	Indore Habitat Improvement Project	Baroda SNP Pilot Project: Ramdev Nagar	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Pilot Project	Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project	Bhopal Slum Networking Pilot Project	Bhopal SNP Proposed Project
Implemented by	A wing within Indore Development Authority, which had a CD Cell	Baroda Citizen's Council - an NGO, which was overall implementer; Parikh prepared extensive & detailed technical designs for WS&S lines and roads; Engineering Sewa Trust, Vadodara prepared the tender documents, evaluating the bids & short listing of contractors	Arvind Mills/ SHARDA Trust. According to proposal, AML was to establish an independent organisation to work at the city level with an objective of spreading its activities at national level. Parikh was to assist AML in developing organisational mechanisms within AML, AMC or other NGO for replicating the work	A Slum Networking Cell established within Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. Community development & mobilisation support provided by NGOs	A Slum Networking Cell established within Bhopal Municipal Corporation. Community development & mobilisation support provided by NGOs	NA
Reasons for lack of up-scaling	Not expected - project completed Indore is one of the cities where infrastructure is being upgraded under ADB funded Urban Water Supply and Environmental Improvement in Madhya Pradesh and DFID funded Madhya Pradesh Urban Poverty Reduction Project & Water for African Cities Programme of UN-Habitat	Initiative designed by BCC & Parikh without the involvement of BMC. They latter came to BMC asking them to contribute 10% of the funds. Engineers were against it. The elitism within BCC further aggravated the situation. Individual in BMC recommended that BMC contribute 10% (about Rs 1 million) for the pilot. When cost escalated due to delays, community ended up paying more. BCC went to a number of people in BMC to get it to increase its contribution for the Project but was not successful. BMC contributed another 0.5 million for the pilot project.	Pilot project ended after work was completed in one slum covering 181 dwellings. AMC & SNP cell functioning. SNP Cell's coordination with other departments difficult. Basic details not available for decision-making because of uncooperative attitude of AMC staff towards the project. Delay and friction between AMC site engineers & contractors. High administrative costs for SHARDA Trust because while its activities, staff etc. were for implementing SNP Pilot for 3300 households, only one area of 181 HHs was covered.	Ongoing at a very slow pace. Issues include: Grant funding not available Private sector funding not sought or available NGOs are not coming forward to participate in the programme. NSDP funding required a long process and its conditions require participation of NGOs and communities in construction process Administrators are not all interested in pursuing the project. SNP Cell was dismantled once. Elected representatives not coming forward to share costs	Not Applicable	
Recognition	1994: Honoured with 1993 World Habitat Award for introducing the approach in Baroda & Ahmedabad. 1996: Included as Global Best Practices at the Habitat II Conference. 1998: Aga Khan Award for Architecture for introducing the approach in Baroda & Ahmedabad.	Project has been recognized by GoG Urban Development Secretary, Manjula Subramanium visited Ramdev Nagar to study details of the project. BCC was a committee member for development of the Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy	'98: Recognised as part of Innovative Urban Partnerships in Ahmedabad covering a range of local government functions (slum improvement, public administration, municipal finance, water and sanitation, urban forestry, & others) & involving seven groups of partners: Government and public sector units such as HUDCO; CSOs such as Centre for Environment Planning and Technology, Disaster Mitigation Institute, Environmental Planning Collaborative, etc.; Corporate Sector: Arvind Mills, Ashima Corporation, etc. CBOs; NGOs: Saath, SEWA, SHARDA Trust, FPI, and CHETNA		Not Applicable	
Unique features		UNICEF decided to participate because of its interest in expanding to urban areas.	Financial arrangements worked out with SEWA Bank for securely keeping residents money till work was completed and transfer of funds from Resident's Accounts made only after signatures received from the responsible members		Small project within Pilot for assistance by TIFAC (UNDP-GoI) program for experimenting with GIS and root-zone treatment	

4 APPENDIX 4: Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and SNP

4.1 SNP and Standing Committee Resolution

The activities identified under SNP in the Standing Committee Resolution were:

- Undertake slum networking in all slums of Ahmedabad by the year 2000. and set up a special cell to implement the project
- Slum residents willing to participate to pay Rs 2000 per hut for individual household connections at one-third of the estimated cost. The slum residents would be responsible for maintenance of physical services and were to pay AMC charges for water and drainage connections.
- Participating industrial partners would also pay Rs 2000 per hut at one-third the estimated cost.
- Charitable institutions to contribute Rs 300 per hut at one-third the estimated cost of Rs 1000 per hut for providing community development services. AMC would bear the remaining cost of Rs 700.
- AMC to give slum residents of the four specified Pilot Project areas an assurance that they would not be shifted from the area for the next 10 years.
- As and when required, AMC would arrange for low-interest loans from HUDCO
- Converge to integrate various public programmes (UBSP, UCD and EIUS), and
- For the pilot slums, to give 20 percent advance cost to AML and start the project with help from Parikh, Saath and AMC, under AML's supervision and control.

Four slums covering about 3300 households were identified for the pilot phase. These were:

i) Sanjay Nagar-na-Chappara near Anil Starch in North Zone covering 4614 sqm and with 200 huts on AMC Plot,

ii) Sakalchandmukhi-ni-chali in Behrampura on a plot reserved as residential chawls in South Zone covering 19466.07 sqm and with 500 huts on private land,

iii) Pravinnagar-Guptanagar in Vasna reserved for AMC Housing, West Zone covering 55,690.00sqm and with 1500 huts on private land, and

iv) Keshavlal Kachwala chawl and Santokbai-ni-chali reserved as residential chawls in North Zone covering 3530.00sqm and with 1100 huts on private land of Jayantilal J Shah.

Table 4-1: AMC Guidelines for implementation of SNP

SNP Guidelines Signed by Municipal Commissioner and dated 12/8/98	
1	Request for participation in SNP to Municipal Corporation, Municipal Commissioner, Dy. Municipal Commissioner (Admin), or other officer. If application is only from Corporator's or local leader, it is essential to get confirmation from slum residents. This is because often when applications are processed, it is found on visiting the site that the residents are not interested.
2	Send application to Deputy TDO if application is sent in the name of any officer. The Engineering section to send the application to the Zonal engineers to get details about existing infrastructure and capacity. This information, which is often delayed, should be sent to the SNP Cell within 7 days.
3	Once the infrastructure details are received, send to SNP-TDO section, get details about land ownership, land use, Final Plot numbers, whether in 1976 slum census, etc, including whether any TP Road is passing through the area. Once all these details are received, initiate process for getting No Objection permission from Municipal Commissioner
4	Once the NOC is received from the MC, the TDO Section to inform the Engineering section. Once the engineering section is informed, the process for identifying an NGO and private sector partner to be initiated by Asst Manager and DyCE. Simultaneously, the slum survey and drawings, and estimates should be undertaken by Engineering section. If no NGO or private sector partner agree to join and the residents are willing to join, take the assistance of the local leader and initiate the work. Simultaneously, look for the NGO and private sector partner.
5	If NOC is not possible, inform the slum residents, Zonal Add CE & also inform that they can avail the services as per Standing Committee Resolution 175 of 15/5/1998
6	While the survey and estimate processes are ongoing, the NGO and if required, the UCD staff to motivate slum residents and assist them in formation of Residents Association and for opening accounts in SEWA Bank - get SEWA Bank staff to visit the area
7	Since Community Contribution is an important component, stage-wise contributions are to be collected as follows: • Start survey work after 20% residents have opened accounts in SEWA Bank • When 40% residents have opened accounts, and contribution is received, start work on preparing estimates and process for their approval • When 60% residents have opened accounts, and contribution is received, start the process of calling tenders and approval of work order • When 75% residents have opened accounts, and contribution is received, get the contractor to start the work on site. If required, if the full contribution is not received, despite approval of tenders, work will not be started. In such a situation, inform DyMC and take appropriate actions.
8	On approval of estimate, send request to Government for NSDP funds, and call tenders for all works except paving. The paving tender is to be called after 50% of water supply and drainage works are completed. All details for getting NSDP and HUDCO loan to be prepared by the Engineering Section and Asst Manager to support. The other financial formalities to be through Asst Manager
9	Prepare the NSDP proposal as per its guidelines, including proof of NHC, CDS formation, Community Development etc. What cannot be done by the engineering section, will be facilitated by the Asst Manager. Community development activities to be facilitated through the UCD Cell or NGOs by the Asst Manager. Also take list of BPL families in a slum from the UCD Cell and inform the NGOs and assist in getting essential subsidies etc
10	For documenting works undertaken in slums, DyCE o contact publicity department for photography and video documentation. Asst Manager to keep record and make payments for this
11	All administration of the SNP Cell is the responsibility of the Asst Manager and DyCE. This includes distribution of work, attendance etc.
12	Besides this, whenever there are external visitors, all management, including for the visit and information distribution is the responsibility of the Asst Manager. Where required, the Engineering Section to assist
13	If NOC is not possible, inform the slum residents, Zonal Add CE & also inform that they can avail the services as per Standing Committee Resolution 175 of 15/5/1998
14	In those SNP areas where NGOs have not been finalised, UCD staff should be allocated for mobilising the community
15	The programme to be arranged for UNDP (SPV) is the responsibility of Add CE, DyCE and Asst Manager.
16	The AddCE to give a fortnightly report to the Dy Municipal Commissioner (Administration)
17	The liaison with the consultant is to be the responsibility of Dy CE, Dy TDO and Asst Manager
18	The monthly documentation of SNP is the responsibility of the DyTDO and Asst Manager

4.2 AMC linkages with various actors under SNP



4.3 Areas improved under Ahmedabad SNP, 1997-2005

SNo	Name of Settlement	Zone	Election Ward	No. of DU's	Industrial Partner	NGO	Year	Const. by
1	Sinheshwari Nagar	North	Naroda Road	43	Lions Club	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
2	Revaba Nagar	South	Bage Firdosh	70	Nil	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
3	Kailash Nagar	South	Isanpur	75	Nil	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
4	Jadiba Nagar	West	Vasna	100	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2004-2005	GMHST
5	Sharifkhan Pathan-ni-Chali	North	Saijpur	98	Lions Club	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
6	Meldi Nagar	North	Potalia	98	Nil	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
7	Barot vas	East	Khokhra Memdabad	62	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2004-2005	GMHST
8	Keshav Nagar	South	Isanpur/ Bage Firdosh	114	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2004-2005	GMHST
9	Niti Nagar	East	Bhaipura Hatkeshwar	106	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2004-2005	GMHST
10	Bawa Lavlavinagar	South	Behrampura	100	Nil	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
11	Ghanshyam Nagar	East	Bhaipura	126	Nil	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
12	Jayshakti Nagar	North	Sardar Nagar	145	Nil	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
13	Sanjay Nagar	North	Potalia	181	Arvind Mills	Saath	1995-2003	
14	Madrasi-ni-Chali	South	Bage Firdosh	200	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2004-2005	GMHST
15	Hanuman Nagar I & II	South	Bage Firdosh	294	Lions Club	Nil	1995-2003	
16	K K Vishwanath-ni-Chali/ Machhipir-na-Chhapra	South	Maninagar	525	HUDCO Model Bustee	Nil	1995-2003	
17	Azad Nagar	South	Bage Firdosh	147	Nil	Nil	1995-2003	
18	Pravinnagar-Guptanagar 1	West	Vasna	1200	Nil	Saath	1995-2003	
19	Ashapuri Nagar	East	Amraiwadi			SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
20	Shivaji Nagar I	East	Bhaipura			SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
21	Shivaji Nagar II	East	Bhaipura			SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
22	Patan Nagar I & II	East	Nikol	400	Nil	SEWA-MHT	1995-2003	
23	Fakira Tank-na-Chhapra	North	Naroda Road	30	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2005-2006	GMHST
24	Gayatri Nagar	East	Khokhra Memdabad	65	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2005-2006	GMHST
25	Khodiyar Nagar	South	Behrampura		Nil	SEWA-MHT		GMHST
26	Pandey-ni-Chali	East	Bhaipura Hatkeshwar	25	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2005-2006	GMHST
27	Samajnavrachana-ni-Chali	East	Nikol	37	Nil	SEWA-MHT	2005-2006	
				4528				

Source: SNP Cell, AMC December 2005

4.4 Time taken for Administrative Approvals for SNP

Slum Name	No. of days for Admin Approval	No. of houses	NGO involved	Comments
K K Vishwanath-ni-Chali/ Machhipir-na-Chhapra	26		Nil	Slum improved with HUDCO finance under its Model Bustee Scheme and the low percentage of community contributions received from the households show that the priority of taking-up works was with the decision makers and the Town Development Office. The illegality of this decision and wastage of resources was further highlighted when the slum residents were relocated for the Kankaria Lakefront Development Project.
Keshav Nagar	76		SEWA-MHT	Rejected in 76 days. Another cycle of approval started after an interval.
Barot vas	98		SEWA-MHT	Rejected in 98 days. Another cycle of approval started after an interval.
Bawa Lavlavinagar	181		SEWA-MHT	
Sinheshwari Nagar	203		SEWA-MHT	
Gayatri Nagar	250		SEWA-MHT	
Ghanshyam Nagar	259		SEWA-MHT	
Ashapuri Nagar	337		SEWA-MHT	
Meldi Nagar	355		SEWA-MHT	
Sharifkhan Pathan-ni-Chali	444		SEWA-MHT	
Revaba Nagar	548		SEWA-MHT	
Kailash Nagar	597		SEWA-MHT	
Jayshakti Nagar	777		SEWA-MHT	Several works were undertaken in this slum prior to administrative approval. The details of the works provided by engineering section to DyTDO (SNP) were: i. Drainage 6" & 9" lines provided, HH connections and GT works pending ii. Water supply: 6" CS pipeline laid outside the slum & 50% internal area covered with a 3" CS line. HH connections & 50% 3" CS line works pending iii. 96 accounts opened for SNP (of 185 huts) as on 31-1-99, . iv. Tenders approved for drainage & water line, stone/ CC paving & individual toilets

4.5 Assessment of NGOs for SNP in Ahmedabad

In contrast with the different NGOs that have participated in implementation of SNP and are referred to on: i) SNP monthly reports and AMC website; and ii) SNP files are different from those identified by community member during fieldwork. This discrepancy is further highlighted by the list of NGOs referred to in: a) research and other documentation on SNP; b) CMAG Assessment of NGOs in Gujarat for GSUSP; c) NGOs that submitted Expressions of Interest for implementation of SNP in response to AMC advertisement and were assessed by IIM-Ahmedabad; and d) NGOs identified in INTRAC Occasional Paper 22, March 1999 and by WSP-SA in its Pamphlets on the Ahmedabad initiative. Table 2.1 provides information against which NGOs that submitted Expressions of Interest to AMC for implementation of SNP while NGOs identified in various research studies and publications are shown in Table 2.2. The Tables shows the differences between: i) who is actually implementing the SNP; ii) whom different stakeholders consider as potential implementers of infrastructure related interventions in urban areas, and finally iii) the NGOs that submitted expressions of interest and how they were ranked. Since participation of communities requires either NGO or CBO facilitators, these differences highlight a key hindrance in the successful up-scaling of good practices. Based on data collected during the fieldwork and from secondary sources, some of these NGOs are described below.

Table 4-1: Ranking of NGOs Assessed for SNP Implementation

	NGOs	Financial evaluation	Technical evaluation			Financial limit	Community development evaluation
		Rupees	Points	Rank	Household limit	No of HHs x 15,800	
1	Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust	6,500,950	17	1	2000	31,600,000	1
2	Medhavi	38,469,570	16	2	2000	31,600,000	2
3	Saath	75,489,185	13	3	1000	15,800,000	3
4	Nirmay Manav Utkarsh Trust	703,995	12	4	1200	18,960,000	0
5	Gujarat Social Welfare Trust	1,906,890	11	5	1200	18,960,000	0
6	Sagun Memorial Trust	Not Available	10	6	1000	15,800,000	0
7	Global Foundation	0	9	7	600	9,480,000	0
8	Lokvikas	128,980	9	8	400	6,320,000	0
9	Sarvodaya Trust	1,223,145	8	9	600	9,480,000	5
10	Insaf Khadi Gramudyog Trust	0	8	10	500	7,900,000	0
11	Environment Sustenance Centre	166,830	8	11	600	9,480,000	0
12	K H Jani Charitable Trust	8,418,040	6	12	400	6,320,000	4
13	Help Trust Human Education Life Progress	10,000	1	13	100	1,580,000	7
14	Environment Public Sanitation Organisation (EPSO)	1,056,650	0	14	0	0	0
15	Akhil Bhartiya Antyoday Utthan Sewa Sangh	Not Available	0	15	0	0	0
16	Bhagini Niketan (Gujarat)	Not Available	0	16	0	0	6

Table 1-2: NGOs in Ahmedabad from various studies

NGOs	NGOs participating in SNP implementation (AMC website & monthly reports).	NGOs identified by community during FGDs	NGOs referred to in research & other documentation on SNP	NGOs in CMAG assessment for GSUSP	NGOs assessed by IIM-A (that submitted expressions of interest in response to AMC advertisement for SNP, 2004	NGOs identified in INTRAC Study - 1999	
Saath	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA)	1	1	1	1	0	1	5
Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust	1	1	1	0	1	0	4
Centre for Health Education, Training and Nutrition Awareness (CHETNA)	0	0	1 (WSP-SA)	1	0	1	3
Sanchetna	0	0	1 (WSP-SA)	1	0	1	3
St Xavier's Social Service Society	0	0	1 (WSP-SA)	1	0	1	3
VIKAS Centre for Development	0	0	1 (WSP-SA)	1	0	1	3
Ahmedabad Women's Action Group	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
Foundation for Public Interest	0	1	1 (WSP-SA)	0	0	0	2
Gantar	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
K.H. Jani Charitable Trust	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
World Vision	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Akhil Bhartiya Antyoday Utthan Sewa Sangh	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Bhagini Niketan (Gujarat)	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Environment Public Sanitation Organisation	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Environment Sustenance Centre	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Global Foundation, Ahmedabad	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Gujarat Social Welfare Trust	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Help Trust Human Education Life Progress	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Insaf Khadi Gramudhyog Trust	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Janvikas	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Lokvikash	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Meghavi	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Nirmay Manav Utkarsh Trust, Surat	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Sagun Memorial Trust	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Samvad	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Sarvodya Trust	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Urban Poverty Partnership	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	5	**6**	**8**	**9**	**15**	**10**	

4.6 Focus Group findings

Table 1-3: Status prior to introduction of SNP

Settlement name	Zone	Land owner	Huts	TPS Reserved for	House ownership	Yrs in slum	Pre-SNP Services	Access to water	Access to sanitation	SNP Info from	NGO Partner	Most Imp component
Pravinnagar-Guptanagar I	West	AMC and Private	1200	AMC Housing & transport node/ essential services	Relocated from various areas	26 to 30 years	Some services on periphery of area. Had paid Rs 500 to get water & drainage connections	Public taps	Public toilets	SAATH	SAATH	water connection
Sanjay Nagar	North	Private	181	Often harassed by police for encroachment Proper homes not built	Bought from Sanjaybhai for Rs 4000-5000. No papers, no rent receipts & no one is paying rent	30 to 40 years	Cloth/ temp shelters. Public toilets. Water from homes of shepherds in exchange of housework/ dishwashing. When soak-pits filled up, no place to throw the water.	Collected from other residential areas	Public toilets & on roadside but that was also difficult because of streetlights	SAATH	SAATH	Water connection & electricity. Now people have radios and TV
Sinheshwari Nagar	North	AMC/ urban local bodies	43	Residential	Paid Rs 22 rent for land	20 to 25 years	Some taps on periphery of area. Ditches dug for waste water	Public taps	Open spaces	SEWA	SEWA	Water, toilets & drainage
Jayshakti Nagar	North	Government	145	Housing Board Residential	Own houses. About 7% tenants	35 years	Some services on periphery of area. No electricity so paid Rs 50 to 100/month as rent for illegal connection. Water logging during rains	Public taps on periphery. Delays in completing housework Children suffered the consequences	Were harassed when residents used roadsides for defecation so had to wait till night.	SEWA & local leader	SEWA-MHT	Toilet & drainage
K K Vishwanath-ni-Chali/ Machhipir-na-Chhapra	South	Private	525	Public use or open space	From different areas. Though notices were sent for taxes earlier, now not sent.	36 to 40 years	Some services within area	Public taps	Pay & use toilets	SEWA, local leader & Corporator	Nil	Water, toilets & drainage
Bawa Lavlavinagar	South	AMC/ urban local bodies	100	Reserved for AMC for Hindu burial ground	20 Rs stamp paper. No tax notices given by AMC	20 years	No drains. We built a cloth shelter behind which the women could bathe	3 taps on periphery & 2 in area provided through Corporator. Organised to get water from Jamalpur (on cycle/ auto rickshaw)	Riverside	SEWA	SEWA-MHT	Toilet. Girls / adolescent daughters and guests don't have to go to riverside
Kailash Nagar	South	Private	75/ 115	No reservation	Own with papers. Also pay tax.	31 to 35 years	No services. Hand pumps in a few houses where relatives collected water. Street lights so paraffin lamps	Collected from other residential areas	Open spaces	SEWA Bank	SEWA-MHT	Children go to school on time and people go to work on time. Less illness & savings
Ashapuri Nagar	East	Private	125	Residential	Own. Stamp paper	Since 1980. 25 years	Some services within area. Gutters connected per house on payment of Rs 500 (short) to 1000 (long).	Hand pump and drainage line	Many HH toilets	UPP conducted survey & gave details to leader	SEWA-MHT	Water supply, cleanliness & can do other works
Patan Nagar I & II	East		400	NA	Own w/ 10% on rent. 50 Rs stamp paper	25 to 26 years	Some services within area	Waterline & electricity poles from Panchayat	No drainage but all houses had soak pits	SEWA	SEWA-MHT	toilet

Table 1-4: Decision making for participating in SNP

Settlement name	Objections for joining	How objections overcome	Who made decision	Problem Resolution	Amount contributed	Ease of payment	Borrowed money from	Payment Frequency	Pre-SNP borrow from	Post-SNP borrow from
Pravinnagar-Guptanagar 1	Were assisting in Sanjay Nagar so were aware of the scheme	Local leaders and NGO	Elders in the family	NGO	2100. 1800 for those with toilets	Very easy	Each other	monthly savings	Each other and when reqd from Sakhi Mahila Mandal	Local SHG
Sanjay Nagar	Security of money paid	Discussions with various people	Elders	Others	2100	Easy for some. Others got loan from SEWA Bank	Each other	monthly savings	Family, money lenders	Prefer to take money from moneylender. Difficult to pay interest to Bank & feel ashamed of asking relatives
Sinheshwari Nagar	NA	Visit & discussions in other SNP areas	Elders in the family	Local leader	2100. Rs1800 if no toilet	Easy	SEWA Bank	monthly savings	SEWA Bank loan	SEWA Bank loan
Jayshakti Nagar	We had paid money earlier for getting some services but had lost the money. Met people in AMC	Visit to Sharif Khan Pathan-ni-Chali & discussions in other SNP areas	Group decision after consultations with local leaders	Local leader, NGO & AMC Office. Some difficulty because vulnerable families took time to pay	2100	Some just managed. They had to borrow money from those who come to sell utensils @ 12 to 10%	Combination-money lender, relatives, sale of gold etc	monthly savings	Money lender/ relatives, goldsmith at 4 to 5%or 10 to 12%	Money lender/ so had to use those at night
K K Vishwanath -ni-Chali/ Machhipir	Family discussions and local leader	Local leaders and SEWA	Local leader	Local leader	2100 agreed. HUDCO finance	Easy because we had to pay in instalments.	Each other, money lenders	monthly savings	Money lender	Bank loan
Bawa Lavlavinagar	Security of money paid	Visit to Sanjay Nagar, discussions w/ SEWA members Convinced by local leader	Elders in the family	Local leader, & RA members	2100 and others paid 1800	Easy since it could be paid in instalments of Rs10 to Rs5/day.	Most have not borrowed money. Combination-money lender (20% interest)	Instalments	Money lender	From SEWA Bank
Kailash Nagar	Security of money paid	Visits, and discussions with local leaders and various people	Elders in the family & local leader	We had the work stopped when it was not as per quality	2100	Very easy because we had to pay in instalments (50-100 or 200)	Moneylender.	Monthly instalments of Rs 50, 100 or 200	Family and each other	From SEWA Bank accounts or loans at 1.5 %. It is easy & quick because one resident works in SEWA Bank
Ashapuri Nagar	Essential need, esp. for water to be met so not much objection	Visited areas Financial arrangements- whom to pay and who will keep the money	Local leaders with UPP	Ladies from UPP introduced women from SEWA Bank	2100	Managed	5 to 10% interest rate while other got at 3% on deposit of gold with goldsmith	Rs 500 instalments	NA	NA
Patan Nagar I & II	Expected free services from AMC	Discussions with various people	NA	AMC staff, SEWA, local leaders & Corporator	2100	Easy for some	Money lender	monthly savings	NA	10% borrowed from SEWA Bank

Table 1-5: SNP outcome in settlements

Settlement name	Changes in life	Change in house	Max spent on house	rooms on rent	House on rent	House value before SNP	House value after SNP	Others
Pravinnagar-Guptanagar 1	Easier to get water. No longer have to get up early or stay up until late to get water. No quarrels for water.	Physical improvement.	NA	500 to 700	1000 to 1500	50,000 to 90,000	150,000 to 200,000	Area more like a society than zopadpatti. Easier to marry our sons to appropriate women (because they are more willing to come to an improved area).
Sanjay Nagar	Live in much better conditions. Even foreigners come to this area and take photos. Some say they want to do similar things in their countries.	Physical improvements & consumer goods	NA	Rs 500 to 600 & deposit of Rs 1000	Rs 1000 to 1500 & deposit of Rs 5,000 to 10,000	Not applicable	Up to 150,000	It is already 10 yrs since work was done. We are getting no response to further extension of 10 yrs
Sinheshwari Nagar	Employment, children's health & education, status	Raised houses & RCC slabs	Up to 35,000	Rs 50 to 100	500 to 1000	Up to 15,000	50,000 to 60,000 for metal roof & 100,000 for slab roof	Many people from SEWA come to visit our area and praise the work. They ask how we got the facilities etc. We feel good that they visit our area.
Jayshakti Nagar	Toilet facility and sewerage has eased problems. We could get water from surrounding areas & illegal light connections, but sanitation was a problem. Have taken-up gainful employment. Children go to school on time. Less illnesses	Physical improvements, raised plinth. Electricity connection	Rs 25,000	up to 300	up to 1000	Upto20,000 to 25,000	Up to 100,000 to 150,000 for one room, kitchen, toilet & front room	Very active and smart women in the area who got together with SEWA and the Corporator to get all the information and get work done. Money was collected and paid in time/ regularly
K K Vishwanathni Chali/ Machhipir-na-Chhapra	Many changes in family. Children go to school, keep the house clean , less illness	Brick wall. Not much because close to Kankaria Lake. With megacity declaration, slum may be removed	NA	200 to 300	700 to 1000	NA	50,000 to 60,000	There is no demand for tax payment and notices have been issued by AMC. Therefore, people fear they may be evicted from this area. Therefore, many people are not improving their houses.
Bawa Lavlavinagar	Of 175 houses, 101 have taken/ got the services. 3 houses have got RCC roofs with SEWA Bank loan. Time, cleanliness, savings from water related expenses. Still concerned that the y may be removed for riverfront development.	RCC roof	Up to 50,000	200 to 300	300 to 500	3000 to 8000	20,000 to 25,000	Sabarmati Residents Federation is active in the area. According to the survey for riverfront development, there are 40,000 huts. Those who will be removed will get new houses elsewhere and not temporary shelters.
Kailash Nagar	Children go to school regularly. Less time for water collection, so we get up leisurely and go to work on time. Less mosquitoes and illnesses. No stones thrown at us.	Physical improvements as well as acquisition of television, metal storage units.	Up to 50,000	250 to 300	up to 800	Not available	Up to 70,000 for one room	There was a SEWA run chemist, which is now closed. Computer classes were also conducted but after 10 girls were trained, there were not enough students so the computer was taken away. Even the adult education classes have stopped because of lack of cooperation.
Ashapuri Nagar	Many exhibitions attended. Learnt how to write cheques. Cleanliness of area. Savings scheme in the area from which money borrowed at 2%. About Rs 1,000,000 deposited by savings group. RA is continuing. Questions about what if toilets are already built and how to pay money.	Most people have made changes because of perceived security	For RCC roofs etc	Not Available	Not Available/ not given on rent	Up to 20,000	Rs 250,000 to Rs 300,000	Payments started in 1997 but full payment not made because of problems with water supply. Link workers from Muster office come for immunisation etc. Illicit liquor produced nearby. Community Resource Centre of UPP runs in area. Trainings conducted at house of RA member. One adviser visits area every Saturday
Patan Nagar I & II	Toilets and better reliability of water supply. Education for children. Reduction in some traditional customs.	Physical improvements	70,000 to 80,000	300 to 400	To relatives at 20,000 to 40,000 deposit. No rent.	25,000 to 30,000	60,000 to 80,000	Rs 9000 subsidy. AMC spent Rs 40,000 from its budget for the area. Delays in completion because people did not make their payments regularly

5 APPENDIX 5: LVWATSAN: Timeline

Time	Activity
May - August 2004	Initial rapid assessment
October 2004	Launch of LVWATSAN initiative at a side event at the World Water Week in Stockholm
23 - 25 November 2004	Town hall meetings held in Bukoba and Muleba in Tanzania, Mutukula and Kyotera in Uganda and Kisii and Homa Bay in Kenya. Ministers responsible for Water from the three countries joined the Executive Director of UN-Habitat, Mrs. Anna Tibaijuka .
Jan to June 2005	Preparatory Phase
21 April 2005	Side Event of AMCOW, UNHQ, as an interactive discussion on (a) expediting implementation for achieving the water, sanitation and human settlements targets in Africa how will it be done? and (b) financial requirements and commitments for expediting the achievement of the water, sanitation and human settlements targets in Africa
July 2005	Expert group meeting at UN-Habitat Headquarters to develop and review technical guidance documents for the Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation Initiative.
August - September 2005	Provisional Design Mission to the towns to identify and design immediate physical and capacity building interventions in water and sanitation infrastructure, solid waste management and drainage. The objective was to estimate in further detail the investment required to rehabilitate and upgrade water and sanitation facilities.
September 2005	Review of Draft design proposals that had been submitted by the consultants at a Workshop
November 2005	Design report submitted by consultants
15 Dec 2005, Kyotera 24 Jan 2006 Homa Bay 27 Jan 2006, Kisii 3 Feb 2006 Nyendo	Multi-Stakeholder Forums (MSF)/ Workshops held in the participating towns to build local consensus on the proposed immediate interventions and develop a framework for stakeholder engagement in programme monitoring and evaluation.
16 March 2006	Special event on Delivering the MDGs in Three Years: LVWATSAN Model Setting Regional Initiative organised at the World Water Forum, Mexico, chaired by Tibaijuka - the Executive Director of UN-Habitat and co-chaired by Minister of State of Water, Uganda
May - June 2006	MoUs signed with National Governments
16 March 2006	UN-Habitat hosts special event on Delivering the MDGs in Three Years: Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative at the World Water Forum, Mexico.
March 2006	UN-Habitat and the African Development Bank sign MoU to improve urban water and sanitation in African cities. An investment proposal for partnership with the AfDB submitted for 15 towns in 5 countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi)
May - June 2006	MoUs signed with National Governments
December 2006	Five contracts, totalling USD1,069,860 signed for work in Bukoba and Muleba. Four contracts totalling USD617,000 signed for works in Kisii and Homa Bay in Kenya
Feb 2007	120 staff trained through a fast-track Capacity Building Programme for water utilities in Kisii and Homa Bay in Kenya and Bukoba and Muleba in Tanzania.
December 2007	Inauguration of Pilot rainwater harvesting at Orphan-Headed Households in Uganda Project to provide drinking water to over 1,500 persons, skills training to 1,560 persons, and support establishment of 36 micro-credit schemes to facilitate replication.
January 2008	Inauguration of the rehabilitation works around the spring, for protection of the water source. To benefit 29,000 people in Muleba who have suffered severe shortage of safe drinking water
March 2008	Publication of a "Step-by-Step Guide on How to Set Up and Manage a Town-Level MDF"
June 2008	Launch of innovative tractor trailer systems and a little pick up designed to meet the solid waste collection needs of small towns in a public-private sector partnership with of Kisumu and Ndume Engineering of Gilgil town,
August 2008.	Phase I largely completed to provide access to safe drinking water for an estimated 133,000 persons and improved sanitation to about 15,000 persons.

Source: UN-Habitat website 2004b, LVWATSAN Reports, and Interviews

6 APPENDIX 6: Summary of the Findings

6.1 Million Houses Programme

Up-scaling requirements	Actual situation
Technical options	The MHP promoted alternative technologies for house construction. While the MHP enabled house occupants to decide on the design and size of their houses, in the first Sustainable Townships Programme, REEL provided houses of between 28 to 56 sqm. in high-rise apartments – a complete contradiction to the MHP approach. Subsequent research showed the drawbacks of the blueprint approach for the planning and implementation of the project REEL went back to the drawing board and is now planning four-storied walk-up apartments with the minimum size of houses increased to 46.6 square metres with 2 bedrooms. The regulations have been modified to enable construction of 32 feet high blocks, and reduce apartment height by 2 feet, to enable construction of more flats. REEL also failed to vacate and develop the cleared land, thereby resulting in a subsidised housing project once again.
Stakeholder-centred	The MHP was stakeholder-centred while the planning of the new relocation sites for slums residents did not involve them. It was only after problems were faced in the high-rise apartments that participation of communities was increased. Projects such as Lunawa, funded by JBIC are stakeholder-centred and have enabled better utilisation of resources through the institutional approach adopted for the project
Local Institutional Capacity	The institutional capacity for implementation if MHP was built in-house through a newly established training cell and with technical support from other training institutions Some of the key professionals facilitating the participatory approaches and stakeholder responsive development are those who were part of the NHDA. They continue to work in collaboration with the Government organisations and thereby build its capacity and provide them with opportunities of learning from others through exposure to other initiatives
Financial	The MHP was financially more viable than the subsidised housing that the Government had been building prior to the launch of the MHP. The lack of discipline in repayment of loans led to a collapse of the system and subsequently the rates of repayment were very poor. The STP aims to rehouse poor families who are living on commercially viable land without titles within the City of Colombo in compact townships to liberate lands for urban redevelopment. The sale of cleared lands was expected to provide necessary capital to invest in the rehousing programme, making it a self-financing, market based and private sector driven programme. This has not happened and REEL has got additional resources from the Government for development of another township that addresses problems identified at Sahaspura.
Institutional Environment	The national leadership together with the leadership within NHDA led to a positive and supportive institutional environment for the planning and implementation of MHP. The institutional environment was very motivated, as demonstrated by literature on MHP
Learning from successes and failures	The philosophy of the MHP was 'learning before doing' and then 'learning by doing'. The regular monitoring meetings and coordinated approach with the facilitating institutions enabled greater responsiveness to newly arising situations etc. However, after 1993, the frequent changes in approaches highlight the absence of learning.
Knowledge and information sharing	The build-up to the IYSH provided an identifiable timeline for achieving substantial progress in implementation of MHP. Posters, pamphlets, television – and videos promoting the MHP were produced and extensively shown/ distributed. As demonstrated by the STP entry of 2000 for the DIABP, the documentation of what actually happens in the field is not reflected in the applications for awards. This indicates the need for a physical verification process of initiatives by award giving entities. It also identifies the need for updating of databases of good practices for incorporating lessons learned from such good practices.
Strategic Partnerships	Strategic partnerships were with the training institutions and funding agencies that enabled the formalizing of tools and toolkits from processes that evolved during implementation of MHP

Up-scaling requirements	Actual situation
Facilitating up-scaling	The World Bank funded MIEP was expected to strengthen the institutional response to environmental issues, foster community led solutions to urban growth and promote lesson-sharing between pilot countries.. The CAP and community contracting processes were continued and are continued through individuals while donor agencies promote the participatory processes in their projects. The recent request to GTZ for training in CAP demonstrates a renewed interest amongst elected representatives on the use of participatory decision-making.
Shared vision	A shared vision and a single housing policy across the country were the greatest strengths of the MHP. In addition, the national awareness campaigns and identification of MHP as a demonstration project under IYSH further brought in complementary and supportive capacity building skills.

6.2 Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad

Up-scaling requirements	Actual situation
Technical options	As mentioned above, changes have been introduced for road widths and water supply pipes to make the SNP more sustainable. In addition, although garbage bins, landscaping, street lights and CC paving were proposed, in reality, the residents prefer to have stone paving so that the path is not irreparably damaged when it has to be dug-up for some reason. Very few areas have garbage bins, and little or no landscaping is done. Many slums did not require new street lights because those provided earlier under the EIUS are still functional. The sanitation situation in the slums has benefited substantially because toilet construction was made an integral part of the SNP. A number of improved areas are very small. The residents have been relocated to these sites by AMC from road lines etc. Partial or full redevelopment options not explored for any of the slums.
Stakeholder-centred	The intervention is stakeholder centred in the sense that their commitment is essential for implementation of the SNP, and a Resident's Association coordinates the community contributions. AMC has realised that the rapport that NGOs can have with CBOs is not possible between AMC staff (engineering and CD) for various reasons. Therefore, the sensitivity and approach of the NGOs influence the extent to which the slum residents have a voice in decision making. The financial contribution has ensured that the community has a substantial choice in making decisions about locations of manholes etc.
Local Institutional Capacity	Local institutional capacity is very limited – partly because the slum department is still viewed as a punishment posting and therefore staff not wanted in other Departments or who have disputes with influential decision makers are posted there. SNP Cell has a few committed engineers who believe that the benefits they get in terms of interactions with outsiders, opportunities for travelling and attending various meetings are substantial but not adequate advantages of working on SNP. The capacity is poor in terms of numbers of qualified and motivated staff and in terms of other facilities.
Financial	Although the money set aside by AMC for SNP has not been utilised for many years, the money utilised for the SNP is partly grant funding under various GoI programmes. In addition, with the clearance of the JNNURM, AMC is proceeding more rapidly with implementation of the project.
Institutional Environment	The Municipal Commissioners have influenced the progress of SNP substantially. In one instance, the SNP Cell was dismantled and the SNP activities were decentralised to the Ward offices. Households can get individual connections for water supply and sewerage and hence do not have to wait for the long process of community consensus, and contribution collection or construction.
Knowledge and information sharing	Although information about SNP was distributed and films shown about the changes in the environment of slums in many locations in the early stages, the practice was subsequently stopped. One of the reasons was that many applications for SNP were made from slums where AMC could not undertake the improvement works. The survey in 2001 helped AMC finalise slums where SNP works could be undertaken. There is a gap in information available to other NGOs about the SNP. In one instance, an NGO that approached a Deputy Municipal Commissioner (not in-charge of SNP) to request information was told that the project was no longer being implemented (Interview N01).

Up-scaling requirements	Actual situation
Strategic Partnerships	The partnership between AMC and the two implementing NGOs – Saath and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust can be termed strategic at the implementation level. However, SEWA has been more successful in drawing attention of the international community to SNP, and thereby ensuring its continuation than the others have. The SEWA Bank is a strategic partner, which has benefited greatly because of the SNP. Its depositors have grown substantially because of the SNP.
Learning from successes and failures	Many of the research activities undertaken in the first few years through WSP-SA support focused on areas where SEWA was facilitating the SNP. Research undertaken by AMC for identification and prioritisation of slums was undertaken 5 years after initiation – thereby reflecting the difference in focus of donor support for slum upgrading and needs of AMC. The WSP-SA funded impact assessment study was requested by AMC. The findings showed that there was substantial satisfaction with the SNP works and increased well-being amongst those who had participated in SNP The slum areas such as Babalavlavi Nagar where implementation was taken-up rapidly had problems amongst the community members because the President of the Resident's Association was encroaching on public land after improvements (AMC files for the area). In addition, AMC faced problems in getting community contributions from slums where NGOs were not involved at the request of local leaders or elected representatives. Work in slums such as K K Vishwanath-ni-chali, where HUDCO funding (Rs 3,500,000) under the Model Basti Scheme was taken, was undertaken more rapidly and without NGOs. AMC has faced problems in collecting community contributions here too (44.32% deposited)
Facilitating up-scaling	The facilitative support of USAID was focused on SEWA, FPI and Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust. This was later complemented by support through CHF. The support of WSP-SA was on design of an institutional mechanism for implementation of SNP and later for the impact assessment. AMC staff responsible for implementation had virtually no support, except through the NGOs. Saath as an NGO worked in teams to build capacity of the CBO members to build their capacity for mobilising, planning, monitoring and implementing various components of its work. In addition, Saath sent staff for training organised by other NGOs in Ahmedabad to build specific skills. It had no direct financial or technical support from the donors that came to support up-scaling of SNP. Technical support is not available or sought from professionals in the city because of divergence of work cultures. AMC has been seeking assistance from the School of Planning - CEPT for a number of studies, including for identification of families living below poverty line and for preparation of the City Development Strategy to be submitted to GoI for availing funds under JNNURM. The two other NGOs, which had been active in slums of Ahmedabad earlier, do not see SNP as a holistic approach for solving the problem of slums and believe that SNP has got more than its share of attention for very little progress on ground. Other professionals too feel very strongly that AMC is not creating opportunities to debate on the future of the city and making decisions with attention to limited vision. On its part, AMC believes that professionals in Ahmedabad are too 'visionary' and do not provide the pragmatic support required by AMC for dealing with the problems of the city.

Up-scaling requirements	Actual situation
Shared vision	In practice, none of the participating or external stakeholders share the same vision. While AMC started the SNP with a vision for 'changing the face of the city', The two participating NGOs shared the vision of empowered communities who could efficiently manage the Resident's Association, Saath shared a vision for building up communities whose services were integrated with the Ahmedabad city services network. While SEWA focuses on women, the focus of Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust was on the physical upgrading, housing and having a greater voice in housing and slum related decision making and policies at the State and National levels. Professionals and other NGOs did not share the vision of up graded settlements under SNP without simultaneous actions for increasing availability of affordable housing. Other NGOs resisted partnering with the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and continue to 'demand services' for the poor through available services and grants even if this means that the slum dwellers do not take-up an exiting opportunity for improving access to basic services. The donors, who generally cannot justify provide giving grant money to a local government and a State where poverty levels are not too high, primarily came in to provide support for skills development, institutional framework for implementation of the programme or for enhancing the capacity of SEWA Bank for microfinance and the SEWA affiliated NGOs for citywide up-scaling of SNP. There have also been inadequate attempts at improving AMC capacity for GIS based mapping and decision-making for under-serviced areas. Elected representatives and Staff within AMC too have not shared the vision for enabling access of the majority of slum dwellers to water supply and sanitation. This is for political and for ulterior motives. This attitude managed to have a greater impact because Municipal Commissioners have resisted using AMC resources for upgrading slums.

6.3 Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative

Table 6-1: LVWATSAN - Summary of findings

Up-scaling requirements	Actual situation
Technical options	UN-Habitat has in-house and national level technical capacity for responsive design, supervision and monitoring for the implementation of the initiative. The technical options at the town level are low-maintenance and appropriate, for example, toilet construction through pre-fabricated units.
Stakeholder-centred	The LVWATSAN is focusing on the town level services and on settlements with very poor access where the poorest live. The detailed locations etc of the stand posts etc were finalised in consultation with the residents and CBOs that will be managing the service provision.
Local Institutional Capacity	Most of the towns do not have the capacity for either planning or implementing the projects. Primarily, capacities are being built at the town council level for managing a GIS based map of the town, which is expected to influence decision making in the future and help direct resources to the neediest areas in the town. The capacity of the staff of the utilities is being upgraded through training programmes at the utility level and through the intervention.
Financial	The project design is economical, partly because it is responsive to the context and partly because of the decision to rehabilitate existing infrastructure rather than replace it. The planning for future maintenance has been incorporated. The reforms in the water sector and related changes in responsibilities and roles are expected to ensure effective and efficient management of the utilities. At the settlement levels, the acute shortages of water, and the high costs currently paid by the poor for availing water – often of very poor quality, are expected to ensure effective management of the infrastructure and payments by even the poorest households. The capacity of the poorest to afford the services and reduce poverty is to be enhanced through their participation as small service providers and through other entrepreneur activities. The projects are financed through grants

Up-scaling requirements	Actual situation
Institutional Environment	The technical staff of the municipalities found a number of design issues to criticise, so presumably their expectations of 'project implementation' differ substantially from others. Elected representatives, town council staff and CBO representatives questioned the long gap between the announcement of the project, the stakeholder workshops and the frequent visits by consultants and others while no implementation had started on the ground.
Learning from successes and failures	There are many infrastructure projects in East Africa that were built with donor funding. A number of these were inappropriate technically, others were not suitable for the context, for example an STP in a town that does not have reliable electricity for the required numbers of hours in a day UN-Habitat is also ensuring that gender issues are mainstreamed based on lessons learnt from the first phase of the Water for African Cities Programme and the Water for Asian Cities Programme.
Knowledge and information sharing	This is one of the areas weakness identified. Respondents in the utilities and at the town council levels, and in some cases the Habitat Programme Managers were critical about inadequate information on the progress of the initiative from Nairobi. The local level respondents were the most disillusioned and confirmed that they did not have any direct communication with the Nairobi Office. Their link was through the Habitat Programme Managers or the Councils.
Strategic Partnerships	UN-Habitat has strategic partnership with the EAC and the initiative is aligned with the EAC protocol on Lake Victoria. Therefore, the activities around Lake Victoria are now coordinated through the EAC Protocol. For example, when the French expressed interest in undertaking some activity that overlapped with the LVWATSAN, EAC could coordinate UN-Habitat has strategic partnerships with the MSF and the consultants, and with the funding agencies
Facilitating up-scaling	UN-Habitat is the facilitator and implementer. The LVWATSAN has been designed for implementation in three stages and UN-Habitat is seeking additional funds for the other phases by demonstrating the success of the initial phases of the initiative. The capacity building of the utilities is also expected to have a substantial long-term effect on influencing their functioning in non-project areas and therefore sustainability on investments in the region.
Shared vision	This has been enabled through the process of stakeholder workshops and prioritising of Phase I activities in consultation with various actors at the town levels. The involvement of national Governments and the water utilities has ensured that some of their key concerns are addressed. However, the utilities feel that the process and administrative issues have not been addressed efficiently – because this is the first time that UN-Habitat is implementing a project. At another level, this is indicative of expectations about UN-Habitat acting in the same way as other donor agencies – this was especially with reference to conditions of procurement of materials and services.

7 APPENDIX 7: Comparing the Cases

Table 7-1: The situation being addressed

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Situation being addressed	100,000 Houses programme, which comprised three sub-programmes for aided self-help (50,000 units), direct construction of 36,000 units, and housing loans for 14,000 units. Slums & Shanty Improvement Programme (1978-1984) under which areas declared as 'Special Project Areas' to enable construction of houses on smaller plots and with building materials and standards that did not adhere to formal building regulations	Overall urban environmental conditions affected because of poor physical environment in slums and chawls that had been provided the following services under the EIUS (since 1974) and GoI's National Slum Development Programme. Community level piped water supply and sanitation facilities (often in very poor condition) in many areas while some areas had no facilities. Hand pumps in some areas. Some houses with individual water, drainage and electricity connection. Illegal drains and sewers in some areas Some paths paved Street lights	Lack or very poor water supply and sewerage facilities, which require rehabilitation. Inadequate or malfunctioning water treatment plants. Inadequate or malfunctioning sewage treatment plants. Inadequate or no access to services in areas where the poor live Pollution of Lake Victoria. Lack of facilities for solid waste collection and disposal. Poor maintenance and inadequate capacities to operate and maintain the infrastructure

Table 7-2: Overview of the Interventions

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Name	Million Houses Programme: the Urban Housing Sub-Program	Slum Networking Project	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative
Location	Sri Lanka, South Asia	Ahmedabad, India	Lake Victoria-Region, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda-East Africa
Level where introduced	National – including rural and urban areas	Within boundary of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation	Regional, covering three countries of East Africa
Year initiated	1984 –1989	1995	2004
Where else introduced/ implemented	CDC introduced in 1979 in Colombo under Urban Basic Services Improvement Programme	Indore: 1989/90 to 30 June '95; Extended to 30 March '98 Baroda: 1993 to 2004 Bhopal: 2002	Aims at institutionalizing gender mainstreaming and water sector reforms,
Population	National: 16,864,687 (2001) Urban: 2.5 Million. Colombo: 642,163 (2001)	Ahmedabad: 3.5 million within the AMC boundaries of which 473,662 live in slums.	Intervention areas Phase I (287,924) & II (497,000) Kenya: 277,000; Tanzania: 387,000 Uganda: 387,000; Total: 784,924
Context	Political commitment for enabling housing access to all citizens.	Aftermath of plague in nearby urban area and poor environmental conditions.	Global focus on meeting MDG Targets in Africa Reforms in the water sector
Overall goal	National shelter strategy that comprised a coordinated programme.	Improve urban environmental conditions by fully upgrading slums and linking slum infrastructure with citywide infrastructure networks.	To plan and implement a replicable model setting and a fast track pilot MDG demonstration initiative to address urgent water and sanitation needs.

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Concept	The urban sub-programme had three objectives: a) Making a substantial and lasting impact on the housing situation of the urban poor; b) Place the poor at the centre of the process (by adopting a devolved approach); c) Ensuring sustainability of the approach in the longer term.	Enable affordable services in under-served areas by providing the bundle of services at one time, through technical design, lower specifications and standards, and through convergence with various Government schemes.	Contribute toward reducing environmental pollution of Lake Victoria through an integrated and inter-sectoral intervention for secondary urban centres in the Lake Victoria Region.
Implementer	National Housing Development Authority	Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation with NGOs	Under overall supervision of Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch (I) of UN-Habitat

Table 7-3: Planned and Actual Coverage

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Planned intervention period	From 1984 and 1989	Phase 1: 1.5-2 yrs from 1995-1997 Phase 2: 5 yrs between 1997-2002	Preparatory: Jan-June 2005. Implementation in three stages: -Immediate: Oct-Dec 2005 -Medium term: Jan-Dec 2006 -Long-term: Jan 07 to Dec 08.
Eligible intervention areas	Settlements declared as 'Special Project Areas'. Tenement gardens (watta) consisting of multiple units of back-to-back single-story units with common bathrooms. Large residential houses that were subdivided Squatters on untenable land. New house construction in areas where space was available.	Slums and chawls/ dormitory housing that can be upgraded Where all residents within boundaries of eligible slum areas arrive at a consensus to participate in the programme. Slum residents associate with an NGO Slum residents submit letter to SNP Cell/ AMC about their willingness to participate and contribute Rs 2000/DU, and with name of NGO with whom associated.	Secondary towns around Lake Victoria selected by the three national governments from a shortlist of towns provided by Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch of UN-Habitat. Priority unserviced or very poorly serviced areas of intervention identified through stakeholder workshops. Town Council areas
Planned coverage	1,000,000 or more families (5 years)	Phase 1: 4 areas ~3300 dwellings Phase 2: 2432 areas ~228,894 dwellings (7 years)	Phase 1: 7 areas ~ 287,924 pers Phase 2: 10 areas ~ 497,000 pers (3 Years)

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Actual coverage	258,762 families in rural areas (+231,752 completing) 38,125 families in urban areas (+33,664 completing) 95% of target in rural areas & 76% of target in urban areas Actual achievement in enabling access to housing for the poor increased Enabling approach not continued so increase in coverage not possible	Phase 1: 181 families in 1 slum instead of 3300 in 4 slums Phase 2: 6,385 dwellings in 38 areas completed and ongoing in 8 areas covering 2,453 dwellings (3.86% in 10.5 yrs) by June 2007 (Total 46 areas and 8,838 dwellings in 10 years) instead of 2432 areas and about 228,894 dwellings within 5 years (2000) SEWA Bank has seen an increase in number of depositors and clients for other services because of its role as a financial intermediary for SNP	Not applicable Planned in two phases, with physical coverage of more towns in the second phase Improved coverage expected through enhanced capacity of utilities and institutionalisation of structures proposed under water sector reforms.
Approximate cost (at 1 USD = 31.42 INR in May 1995) (at 1 USD = 67.97 SLR ~ in 1999)	UHSP Loan ceiling was USD 220.6 but actual UHSP loan disbursed averaged USD 137.0 on completion	Pilot: Budgeted at Rs. 12.63 million @ Rs 8420 per hut (USD 401,973 @ 267.98/hut) Main Phase: Estimated at Rs. 33.379 million @ of Rs 11,126 per hut for 300,000 huts, including all costs (USD 106,235 @ 354.11/hut)	USD 50 per capita
	Hidden administration costs incurred for land preparation and public infrastructure.	USD 389.00 per unit for which DU contributes 49.62 USD (or 9.92 USD per capita) and AMC 67.48 USD per person or USD 337.38 per unit for individual connections	

Table 7-4: Benefits of the proposed interventions

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Unique feature	The government adopted an enabling approach to encourage housing improvements under different development strategies	Local government decision for overall upgrading of eligible slum areas by getting communities to pay part of costs and partner with NGOs for community development inputs	Regional programme for sustainable access to water supply and sanitation services in urban areas around major lake resource, to reduce pollution and enhance livelihoods
Good practices introduced	Decentralised programme and decision-making, management, and implementation.. This led to a new cadre of NHDA professional staff. Introduction of Housing Options Loan Packages for effective disbursement of resources to beneficiaries. Facilitating decision making through Community Action Planning and Management approach (CAP). Community Construction Contract System (CCCS)	Individual water supply and sewerage connections and toilets. Overall upgrading of slums Contribution from slum residents for individual connections Integration of slum infrastructure with citywide infrastructure. Local Government partnership with NGOs Intended partnership and/or financial contributions from private sector.	Participation through Multi Stakeholder Forums (envisaged under water sector reforms) GIS based decision making Community participation in planning, and implementation processes and for O&M Coordination mechanism under Lake Victoria Protocol. Integration of livelihood options

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad		Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Good practices incorporated	Community level structures/ CDCs, which evolved from UNICEF funded Urban Basic Services Programme from 1978-1983 for provision of basic common amenities in urban settlements. In 1985, when UHSP was started, the CDCs became the core community organisations of the poor communities. This created a momentum and communities began to self-organise.	GoI's EIUS (since 1974); including provision that local governments cannot clear improved slums for 10 years after improvement. GoI's National Slum Development Programme Schemes for health and education programme, formation of neighbourhood and savings and credit groups-expected to be converged with NGO interventions. Toilet subsidy scheme Electrification		Sustainable Cities Programme Urban Indicators (UIP) UMP-City Development Strategies UN-Habitat lessons under various programmes, including GUO, Gender Unit and WAC. Capacity building Coordinating with Lake Victoria CDS activities in some of the towns
Benefits compared to existing approach	Enable more people to have adequate shelter more quickly and with fewer subsidies. Emphasis on production of adequate housing units to reach the poor in rural and urban areas Upgrading of low-income settlements on a priority basis	The whole slum area, rather than a part – as being upgraded under the EIUS, would be upgraded. Contributions from slum residents together with health and education inputs to enhance sustainability of investments.		Rehabilitation of infrastructure and improved quality of services Access to water supply and less dependence on water vendors, thereby reducing expenditure on water. Livelihood options Community participation
Recognition	World Habitat Award in 1987	Ahmedabad DIABP	2006 Best Practice 2002 Good practice	Not applicable
		Indore	1994-WHA 1996-One of "100 Global BPs DIABP 1998-AKAA	

Table 7-5: Identification of the Problem

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Context	Political commitment for enabling (owner occupied) housing access to all. Market economy Conditionality imposed by FI's on Government for reducing subsidies Political turmoil in Sri Lanka from the late 80s Repeal of land ceiling Act Experience of limited Government capacity (financial and construction) in implementation of 100,000 Houses Programme Follow-up actions from December 1981 within UN and in December 1982, the year 1987 was declared Year of Shelter for the Homeless.	Market economy Outbreak of plague in Surat – a nearby city, which highlighted the need for urgent improvement of environmental conditions of cities. The need for action led to the Government posting accomplished administrators to the largest cities of the State. Political wing superseded The Municipal Commissioner started strict actions to improve the financial condition and functioning of AMC. For this, USAID's FIRE-D programme was supporting various studies, consultancies	Global focus on meeting MDG Targets in Africa Market economy & national water sector reforms enable participation of primary stakeholders in decision-making. Two of the Ministers and ED of UN-Habitat come from secondary towns in the region, and understand the problems of the area The three countries signed a Protocol for sustainable development of Lake Victoria Basin on 29 Nov 2003. Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch, strengthened

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Problem identification	Political leader, who held triple portfolios of Prime Minister, Housing, Construction, and Local Government (1977-1988), and had lived in a slum 'garden' was interested in the cause.	Engineer and conceptualiser approached by architect couple inspired by leadership of a person in tackling outbreak of plague and knowledge of SNP and its achievement in Indore and Baroda (conceptualiser was consultant on one of their projects)	Initiative of Water Ministers of three East African countries approached ED UN-Habitat after conference of African Ministerial Council on Water (AMCOW) in early 2004.
	Prime Minister's interest had also led to a request to UN to declare a year when dedicated attention could be given to the problem of housing for the poor.	Conceptualiser of SN concept was seeking opportunities for introducing SNP. SN approach implemented through DFID project in Indore and recognised as a good practice	Situation in secondary towns, which fell in a grey area, was not a priority of donor support. Planning & technical support of professional knowledgeable about area and development issues

Table 7-6: Problem Formulation

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Defining the problem	Enable more people to have adequate shelter more quickly and with fewer subsidies. 1983 leader setup and delegated responsibility to a Task Group to identify an alternative approach based on lessons learned in implementation of earlier housing programme. Upgrading of low-income settlements on a priority basis	Conceptualiser of SN approach was seeking opportunities for further exploring the potential of partnerships to bring financial resources of industry and community together for implementation of SNP. The proposal of piloting SNP in Ahmedabad was attractive for the industry, at a time when it wanted to showcase its contribution for improving environmental conditions of the city. The condition that it be implemented in areas where employees of the industry lived made it even more attractive.	UN-Habitat ED Team of Infrastructure Branch recruit consultant with many years experience of working in the region, for developing proposal for addressing problems of secondary towns in the Lake Victoria Region. Consultant, in association with Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch prepared a concept
Identifying/ Emergent alternative	Task Force recommended improving of housing conditions through: Community-based planning and participation in decision making Access to land Access to finance.	Municipal Commissioner arranged to meet key leaders in Ahmedabad to brainstorm on what they could contribute for the development of the city. Municipal Commissioner introduced to conceptualiser of SNP as a person who had solutions for improving slums.	Professional with many years experience of working in the region ensured access to information about developments and skills in the region.
		Municipal Commissioner's invitation to conceptualiser for a meeting led to knowledge about pilot to be financed by industry leader & facilitated by Saath.	Access to information about developments and skills in the region.
		Saath approached by conceptualiser, who was to facilitate community mobilisation and provision of health and education services; and presented the Indore project & SNP potential of SNP to the Saath team, and visited its intervention area.	Concept note for the project. Team and flexibility within UN-Habitat for identification & planning of a sustainable intervention.
		For Saath's Director, participation in SNP would yield benefits for the community, and hence it was worth taking the risk of working with the private sector. Saath Director introduced to industrial partner	

Table 7-7: Requirements for solving problem

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Pre-requisite Stakeholder centred	Community consensus for a programme Residents of a slum area participate in the CAP process and arrive at a consensus for the changes identified.	Stakeholder mobilisation and consensus to participate and contribute money for individual water & drainage connections. Residents of a slum area submit letter to AMC informing their decision to participate, contribute Rs 2000/ DU, and request implementation of SNP	Stakeholder consultations in participating towns to identify priority issues, and build consensus through transparent negotiations. Community members identify needs, locations where services can be sited and take responsibility for O&M of assets to be built.
Pre-requisite (Technical appropriateness based on local specific data)	House owner could build using local building materials and techniques	Detailed plane-table survey Services available in vicinity Land ownership Reservation in Master Plan Litigation issues Houses located on road lines	Rapid assessment Digitising of data for future use in decision making
Demonstrating viability of alternative proposed	Enabling approach was unique and Task Force members were willing to implement pilot to demonstrate viability of the programme.	SN approach implemented through DFID project in Indore and recognised as a good practice. SNP approach already introduced in Vadodara through Baroda Citizen's Council.	Knowledge about what was done in the region before and why the previous solutions did not work/ were inappropriate.
Procedural requirements	Formal provision of services and housing loans for less than accepted standard of plot sizes. Planning with the communities. Preparation of guidelines for staff of NHDA across the country. Developing House Options and Loan Packages (HOLPs) for facilitating decisions.	Partnership with private sector & NGOs AMC giving funds to private sector for part cost of pilot implementation. Private sector establishing an NGO for transfer of funds from AMC for SNP. Upgrading the whole settlement rather than parts with subsidy available under national and sub-national programmes. Option to slum residents for getting individual water supply and sanitation connections at a lower cost than they could pay to get on ad-hoc basis legally or illegally. Convergence of subsidised toilet scheme with SNP has added value to original concept and improved environmental conditions. Collection of contributions from slum residents	Primarily involves institutionalizing of reforms envisaged under water sector reforms, including participation of community representatives in MSF UN-Habitat facilitating implementation of an intervention in different countries, and related procedures in linkages with utilities and Town Councils..
Community represented by	Community Development Councils	Residents Association/ neighbourhood groups & women's groups Community consensus on participation, contribution and NGO collaboration	CBOs, youth groups, and in Multi Stakeholder Forums

Table 7-8: Screening of alternative

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Change of role from provider of housing to enabler role, requiring professional staff in NHDA to move to the field. Introduction of process of community based planning for re-blocking, and providing technical support and guidelines for house design and construction Land regularisation in the form of 'Right to Reside' on the plots and thereby enabling access to credit for house construction.	Introduction of intervention for comprehensive improvement of slum areas as a citywide project. Financial contributions from community, industry/ private sector and from donor agencies further made the SNP proposal more attractive. Involvement of NGOs for facilitating the social development inputs, which were part of the IHIP, provided additional human resources to AMC for implementation of the project.	The design incorporates objectives and processes such as involving Multi-Stakeholder Forums envisaged under water sector reforms Focus on sustainability and low cost of interventions that would meet the critical needs of populations in secondary towns.
Leader's request to UNCHS for focusing on the housing cause had resulted in declaration of 1987 as an 'International Year of Shelter for the Homeless' (IYSH). Action Plan for IYSH included implementation in Sri Lanka and other countries of Demonstration Projects.	AMC policy change required was primarily for providing an integrated package of services and give assurance (verbal) from AMC not to clear the slums for ten years after improvement. Compared to its 1985 Slum Upgrading proposal (including subsidies for house construction) to the World Bank, which faced obstacles because of insistence of FI on giving land tenure, SNP approach involved integrated development that would result in communities investing in improvement of their shelter.	UN-Habitat has taken the role of project planner, financier, manager and for implementer for a full-scale (model MDG Project) development initiative for the 1st time. Only previous direct intervention was for reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for pilots under Sustainable Cities and Urban Management Programmes.
Decentralised programme management for effective disbursement of resources to beneficiaries Land regularisation in the form of 'Right to Reside' on the plots and thereby enabling access to credit for house construction. Land-ownership rights granted to all slum dwellers in Colombo free of cost except for a small monthly charge to cover the cost of deeds	Option to slum residents for getting individual connections for water supply and sanitation at a lower cost than they would have to pay to get the same on an ad-hoc basis legally or illegally. Financial contributions from community, industry/ private sector and from donor agencies further made the SNP proposal more attractive. Involvement of NGOs for facilitating the social development inputs, which were part of the IHIP, provided additional human resources to AMC for implementation of the project. Saath identified as a viable NGO that could facilitate the community participation process, and development of the social component in the SNP Pilot areas	The East African Protocol for Lake Victoria provides a context and coordinating mechanism for interventions around the Lake Basin.

Table 7-9: Making a Choice: Accepting alternative as an organisational option

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
During April to June 1983, 46 houses were selected for upgrading in a village (Wannigama) as a pilot project. This pilot firmly demonstrated the viability of upgrading rural housing with traditional technology and materials with the skills of the village.	Industry decided to support a pilot covering – households in 4 to 5 slum areas of Ahmedabad, and assigned a senior Director to manage the programme. Saath team and CBO members decide to participate in the infrastructure pilot project to meet the needs of communities.	The inclusion of the two parts of the town of Mutukula (which falls partly in Uganda and partly in Tanzania) in the same Phase because of potential political

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
The pilot was taken as a training ground for IWs and SIWs for a 3-day training workshop for the reorientation of technical officers for the MHP. In this workshop, the technical officers had to learn from the village Baasunnehe on how to use local material such as wattle and daub and unsawn timber. A 'New Book' had to be developed based on peoples' own solutions to their technical problems. NHDA technical officers were the frontline officers who interfaced with and supported the house builders, and provided the link between the NHDA office and the house builder. They were required to understand the "support role" so as not to dominate decision-making, and provide active support. At two Training Workshops conducted by NHDA and DPU in February 1984 at Anuradhapura, the resource persons were able to interpret and articulate '"active support" in simple procedural steps by eliciting the experience of the participants. The technical officers who were able to grasp the principles of active support, became trainers of other housing officers in their own districts, while the technical officers who were not convinced with the philosophy were able to use the simple procedural steps.	Industrial Partner and Saath agree to collaborate for implementation of SNP Pilot in 4 to 5 slum areas. Municipal Commissioner looking for options for improving urban conditions invited SNP Pilot partners to present the proposal to AMC. Assessment of proposed intervention complemented by knowledge of Dy. Mun Comm. about city, issues related to 1984-85 attempts for slum upgrading and organisational constraints for improving environmental conditions of slums. AMC decided to adapt the SNP as a citywide programme to be implemented in partnership with industry, NGOs and community members. NGO/ Saath: expanded the role of NGO from mobilizing community participation and resources to providing health and educational services, and livelihood training. NGO/ Saath: introduced the contribution from NGOs to ensure a say in the partnership and accountability to the community. NGO/ Saath: From its experience, 50% contribution of community was too high. It was reduced to 1/3rd of estimated cost for individual connection.	problems if people from one side started crossing over to the other side for collecting water.
Establishing of Training and information division in NHDA ensured that understanding about the programme and staff capacities matched tasks. Training of NHDA engineers in traditional construction methods with local materials.	Lack of formal opposition by political decision makers.	Water sector reforms that enable participation of primary stakeholders, partnerships between local government and communities, and community level service provision and management

Table 7-10: Making a Choice: Preparing for formal decision

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Decision Maker	Political leader with triple portfolios of Prime Minister, Housing, Construction, and Local Government (1977-1988) and as President (1988-1993). Complemented by motivated Task Group members who demonstrated viability of programme through a pilot	Municipal Commissioner looking for options for improving urban conditions. Complemented by Dy. Mun Comm. who was knowledgeable about city, organisational issues, and issues related to 1984-85 attempt for slum upgrading.	UN-Habitat ED Complemented by organisational status and leadership within Water & Sanitation Branch
Preparing for formalizing decision	Task force members meetings and frank discussions	Conceptualiser prepared SNP proposal as a citywide programme, and assisted in preparing draft of document for approval of Standing Committee	Concept Note prepared Developing concept through stakeholder workshops and negotiations with national Governments
		Conceptualiser prepared for AMC-draft of letters to be sent to various bilateral, multilateral and UN agencies for supporting SNP in Ahmedabad.	
		Municipal Commissioner assigns responsibility to Dy MC for management and administration of SNP.	
		Industry sets up SHARDA Trust to enable deposit of AMC, NGO and community contributions for the SNP Pilot.	
Formalizing Decision	Launch of MHP by Premadasa	Industry signs MoU with conceptualiser of SNP for providing technical services and managing the community mobilisation component of the project.	Launch of project at World Water Week,2004 Funding explored
		Saath Director invited to become a Trustee of SHAARDA Trust.	
		AMC Standing Committee Resolution for implementation of SNP as a citywide project through an SNP Cell, in partnership with industry, NGOs and community members.	
		AMC enabled: Partnership with NGOs– both for mobilisation and for construction. Collection of community contributions Convergence of subsidy toilet construction scheme Agreed to give own financial resources to private sector for implementation of pilot.	

Table 7-11: Authorising Implementation

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Implementing organisation	President and Minister for Housing National Housing Development Authority	Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation	Water and Sanitation Branch, UN-Habitat-Nairobi

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Managing and implementing body	NHDA and its sub-units and regional branches Training Cell established in NHDA for training staff.	Slum Networking Cell established for coordination and implementation of intervention. Staff include people from the Town Development/ Estate Section, Engineering Section and Administrative Section.	Water and Sanitation Branch Consultants in each country Coordination by Habitat Programme Managers in Tanzania and Uganda. Utilities
Facilitators/ Partners	Housing Task Force members	Pilot only Conceptualiser SHARDA Trust Saath FI – to be identified Saath SEWA Bank GMHST and sister organisations of SEWA that provide related services. UPP/ FPI World Vision & others	Global Urban Observatory Gender Mainstreaming Unit Training Centre National HPM in each country Consultants (design and implementation) Ministries of Water in each country National and sub-national level utility providers East African Community
Design	NHDA housing professionals. Individual houses by owners. Community level planning	Conceptualiser prepared detailed proposals for the pilot and Main Phase at no cost.	Consultants who coordinate and interact/ arrive at consensus with utilities and Town Councils.
Technical specifications	Construction in local building materials enabled	AMC, following visit to Indore, changed proposed specification of water supply pipes to ensure that its water supply system was not compromised in any way.	Contextually appropriate infrastructure proposed, with emphasis on rehabilitation of existing infrastructure
Coordination	The Housing and Community Development Committees (HCDC) members included senior representatives of relevant city level institutions such as the Urban Development Authority, the National Water Supply and Drainage Board and the Sri Lanka Land Reclamation Board.	After association with conceptualiser was terminated, through SNP Cell More recently through the NGOs who are contracted to implement the work.	Through UN Habitat Project Managers and consultants in each country.
Construction work	Families/ community groups facilitated by staff. Through contractors for Sites and Services and new housing projects	Through contractors managed by SHARDA Trust in Pilot AMC qualified contractors for tendered works NGOs/ or contractors of NGOs	Contractors/ Tendered works
Community based support	Elected mayor or chairperson of Urban Local Authorities heading HCDCs. Community Development Councils	Residents Association in the areas to be upgraded. Local leaders and elected representatives House occupants	Community groups and NGOs Multi Stakeholders Forums created under intervention with Town Councils
Financial support	Cooperative Thrift and Loans Societies	SEWA Bank Sakhi Credit Society Donor agencies (to SEWA)	The Netherlands Government

Table 7-12: Formalizing community participation

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Legitimacy to enable community participation/ Urban Development/ Management Issues	Regularisation of land in the form of 'Right to Reside' on the plots, enable access to credit for house construction. Coordinated and supporting actions of the State, administration and professionals to enable households to realise their potential and make informed decisions.	Assurance (verbal) from AMC not to clear the slums for ten years after improvement. Although this was not a unique component for SNP since it was a pre-requisite for undertaking improvements under the EIUS, its association with SNP brought greater attention to this tenure option	Enable prioritisation of actions in most needy areas through digitised maps at the town level Incorporate functional and gender focussed strategies for sustainable management and monitoring of rehabilitated systems
Community involvement	Community consensus for a programme of settlement development, incl. community-based settlement re-blocking. Decisions about type of house, materials of construction and loan amount. Individuals involved in savings group activities.	Participation of all DU occupants through financial contribution of Rs 2000 for household water, drainage and sewerage connection and a toilet. Where required, consensus for widening roads and giving-up of part of area occupied by households.	Stakeholder consultations carried out in participating towns to identify priority issues, and build consensus through transparent negotiations. Involvement for cleanliness campaigns under Government programmes..
Community participation	Participation in decision making through Community Development Councils. Involvement in process of shelter construction and improvement. Availing and repayment of housing loans	Forming Residents Association for mobilisation and transfer of community contributions, and long term O&M Individuals involved in savings group activities.	Community groups, incl. NGOs, CBOs, & water user associations Groups identified for service provision within areas where the poor live. Multi Stakeholder Forums Individuals involved in savings group activities.

Table 7-13: Formalizing Decision: Organisational arrangements for implementation

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Technical Capacity	Guidelines for implementers prepared based on experiences during implementation of pilot and issues raised during training of NHDA staff. Technical support provided by academic institutions. Individual houses by owners.	Two consultant engineering firms identified for providing/ approving engineering design In the main phase, Parikh had no role, & consultants designed infrastructure in the slums. The responsibility for making adjustments in the field in response to situations that residents were not willing to accept, rested with the field staff of AMC and NGO. This was especially for manhole location in front of house entrances. Construction through petty contractors registered with AMC with supervision by SNP Cell engineers. Engineering design and implementation done by NGOs since late 2004	In-house consultants National consultants who coordinate or also interact with utilities and Town Councils for coordination and consensus. National tendering processes as acceptable to parties involved.

Cases	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Resources: Human	Housing professionals in the NHDA	For pilot AMC Staff SHARDA Trust recruited an architect/ planner to provide technical support to the conceptualiser, and a Community Development specialist. Saath Staff and CBO members After pilot, SEWA members and SEWA's sister organisations, GMHST and FPI were also involved	Design and planning by UN-Habitat Water and Sanitation Branch staff and consultants Utility providers for town level decisions Community representatives for monitoring
Financial Resources	Housing loans arranged by national Governments through FIs and at the field level. Government funding for sites and services schemes. Thrift and Credit Cooperative Societies through which credit was channelled.	Primarily own funds of AMC or designated funds for slum improvement in national or FI schemes. SHARDA Trust approached various FI's to enable slum residents to open accounts and take loans. SEWA Bank agreed but the long delays have meant that not too many residents of SNP areas are borrowing for SNP. More members are borrowing for other purposes. Saath requested its funder CORDAID to include SNP Pilot areas under its ISDP interventions. Rs 2000/DU by house occupant/ owner for getting individual water and sewerage connection and a toilet. Rs 300/DU contribution of NGO and Rs 700/DU of AMC for CD inputs.	Resources specifically for the intervention sought from bilateral. Phase 1 funding by Government of the Netherlands through UN-Habitat's Water and Sanitation Trust Fund.
Coordination	National level coordination through regular meetings with Prime Minister NHDA	SNP Cell within AMC, where status of those working in slum areas is low. In addition, functioning of the Cell is subject to interests of administrators and elected representatives despite Standing Committee Resolution.	The East African Protocol for Lake Victoria provides a context and coordinating mechanism. Formal MoUs with national Governments.

Table 7-14:Formalizing resources

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Partnership	Community: by requesting opportunity for constructing public amenities led to the introduction of the community contracting option.	Partnership between urban local bodies, NGO and in some cases financial contributions from private sector. Lack of formal opposition by political decision makers.	Water sector reforms that enable participation of primary stakeholders, partnerships between local government and communities, and community level service provision and management

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Monitoring	There was commitment to monitoring and evaluating the progress of the programme. Intensive monitoring and follow up done by the Minister Weekly and monthly monitoring meetings Task Force members, who regularly met, discussed and critically evaluated the pilot programme and removed hindrances prior to launch of main phase of the programme.	Formally by Project Management Consultants recruited by SHARDA Trust and SNP Cell Engineers on behalf of AMC during pilot. Currently by SNP Cell Engineers. and inspections by the Vigilance Department. Local residents in many areas work in the construction sector, they too supervise work in their areas and stop it if quality is poor or not as per discussed specifications. NGOs because the community comes to them with complaints. Elected representatives, especially where NGOs are implementing.	Team members of the Water & Sanitation Branch together with support from the Capacity building Branch, Global Urban Observatory and Gender Unit. Monthly and quarterly meetings with Multi-Stakeholder Forums formed in the towns for monitoring and supervising progress of work. MSF comprise of Town Council members, community representatives, national and regional representatives of the sector, utility providers, UN-Habitat and the consultants.
O&M	Not applicable for the houses. Conditions of settlements deteriorated over more than 20 years.	AMC Ward offices (as instructed through circular no. 57 of 8 Jan 2001)	Arrangements through Town Councils include cleanliness campaigns with CBO/ youth groups. Other O&M primarily by utility staff.

Table 7-15: Actors involved

Criteria	Million Houses Programme	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Initiator	Prime Minister/ President/ Minister	Professionals, amongst whom the initiators were not involved after they introduced conceptualiser to private sector; and conceptualiser not involved after pilot because of differences with private sector and AMC. Private sector not involved because of differences in working approach with AMC	Water Ministers of three East African countries approached ED UN-Habitat
Enablers/ Facilitators	Task Force members	Saath and GMHST continue facilitating implementation of SNP. UPP – a programme of FPI is not involved after facilitating in Ashapuri Nagar-a SEWA facilitated area as per AMC documents. World Vision has started facilitating the process in one area. Local office is reluctant to respond to queries without approval of its main office.	Water and Sanitation Branch Global Urban Observatory Gender Mainstreaming Unit Training Centre Consultants in each country
Decision maker	Prime Minister/ Minister	After Keshav Verma's term finished in AMC, the support for SNP has changed with every Municipal Commissioner. The continued presence of ex Dy MC and his role as advisor to MC ensures some continuity and shared knowledge between the facilitators and AMC.	ED UN-Habitat National Governments of each country Ministries of Water in each country East African Community
Implementers	NHDA and its decentralised offices	SNP Cell. Sensitivity of City Engineer and his ability to negotiate for and on behalf of the NGOs within AMC identified as significant for continuation of SNP and participation of NGOs. SNP Cell has managed to shield NGOs from demands for some 'compensation' for clearing of projects.	Water and Sanitation Branch through UN HPMs in Uganda and Tanzania, and utilities and consultants in each country

Criteria	Million Houses Programme	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Financiers	Government resources Bilateral agencies	Primarily AMC finance for infrastructure supplemented by grants or loans under GoI programmes for slum improvement and sanitation. Finance for one slum area of 550 houses received from HUDCO Part contribution of private sector received for some areas Financial support availed by SEWA and its affiliates, and by Saath from their respective funding agencies. Slum residents benefit from savings and credit groups within the slums, borrow from relatives etc, and some avail loans from SEWA Bank.	UN-HABITAT Trust Fund and Foundation, Three national Governments Government of Netherlands for Phase I
Beneficiary groups	All income groups, with special focus on the poor	Slum residents – primarily on AMC land. Many are relocation sites	Town level with focus on the unserved areas where the poorest live
Other interested parties	UNCHS, Multilateral and Bilateral agencies	Contractors, Builders, Land owners Elected representatives, AMC staff	National statistical institutions Utilities and service providers
Technical support	Training institutions such as DPU, MIT and WEDC	Donor agencies WSP-SA; World Bank-Cities Alliance; USAID	Selected institutions

Table 7-16: Motivations for involvement

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Decision Maker	Vision of leader to enable adequate housing for all, especially the poor.	Improve urban conditions and its economic growth by making urban local body more efficient and effective.	Demonstration project for sustainable access to Targets 10 & 11, for institutionalizing water sector reforms, and incorporate participation
Conceptualiser	Introduction of new regulations for enabling formal intervention for shelters that did not meet minimal requirements of the formal sector, and flexibility in that enabled field staff to evolve appropriate processes	Introduce a technically sound alternative for improving urban environmental conditions and inclusive development.	Optimally utilise the opportunity for multi-pronged and sustainable interventions that set an example for others.
Enablers	NGOs/ CBOs: Facilitate the process for implementing the programmes. NGOs post MHP: Continue facilitating community level participation and planning for sustainable interventions	NGO: To improve the quality of life of the poor, increase the self-esteem of slum dwellers and enable them to participate in the development process CBOs: facilitated by NGOs Members of SEWA	Consultants: in each country CBOs: Facilitate process and participate for sustainability of investments to be made.
Communities	Credit for shelter construction Livelihood related opportunities & skills enhancement. Confidence arising out of participation in decision processes	Legal connections at household level and perceived security of tenure Reduced dependence on those who provided illegal connections Reliable source of services Confidence arising out of participation in decision processes	Access to basic services and related livelihood opportunities Lowered expenses for water use Participation in decision processes

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Financing Institutions	NA	Extend its 'market' and membership base.	NA
Others	Implementing Staff: Introduction of new processes that contribute to the achievement of a constitutional objective.	Private Sector: To work for the educational, physical and material advancement of the urban poor anywhere in India.	Initiators: Regional Cooperation for improving conditions in secondary towns around a shared water resource

Table 7-17: Improvisations reasons

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Staff responsive to community concerns about design, high construction costs and quality of work of public amenities built by contractors.	After initiation of SNP in 1995, Verma left AMC in September 1997. From 27 Sept 1997 to early 2007, AMC had 6 Municipal Commissioners and the pace of implementation was affected by each change. Pilot in one are led to identifying several problems in the partnership and led to its termination.	Evolved during the planning and pilot phases. Consultant, who had worked in the region over many years and seen the consequences of 'grant projects', proposed what interventions be implemented where
Decision makers in NHDA who were flexible and supported field staff in facilitating communities to take-up construction contracts. This led to the introduction of the community contracting option. Bottlenecks identified in administrative and management processes in implementation of pilot.	AMC responsible for following procedures to ensure accountability and for establishing long-term guidelines found the partnership contentious because of differences in ways of functioning. AMC's relationship with conceptualiser was difficult because of his busy schedule and attitude toward training of AMC staff. AMC had no issues with Saath as NGO partner and was committed to upgrading the other pilot area of 1200 households.	Concept was further developed with the UN-Habitat team and consultations with town-level actors, utilities and national governments,
Pilot in rural areas helped identify: issues to be addressed processes to be streamlined capacity requirements	Private sector unhappy about high administrative costs incurred because of delays in taking up of Pilot in other areas, the procedural delays in AMC, and insistence by AMC site-engineers on close supervision of works. Private sector unhappy with performance of NGO, especially in terms of activities undertaken for livelihood programme.	Greater focus on sustainability and on monitoring in response to requirements of donors.
Pilot in urban area Refining and testing of tools Logistics for up-scaling Roles and responsibilities identification Training of relevant practitioners.	Saath faced problems in bringing the community together because a multiplicity of actors were interacting with the community – some as 'providers' and as 'facilitators'. Saath left to deal with community in 2nd pilot slum after private sector's decision to terminate the partnership.	
Strengthening local government through Housing and Community Development Council (HCDC)	AMC decided not to approach private sector for implementation of SNP. Some funding has been availed from organisations that approached AMC during implementation of Pilot and later at the initiative of SEWA.	
Community Action Planning approach evolved within the NHDA based on 'academic knowledge' about micro planning.	Initially consultant engineers provided engineering design, but this was replaced by in-house engineering designs. Construction through petty contractors registered with AMC with supervision by SNP Cell engineers.	

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Community Action Planning (CAP) Methodology formalised with financial and technical support of UNCHS (Habitat) and DANIDA.	To involve elected representatives while maintaining discipline of community consensus and participation, AMC introduced option to enable contribution of maximum of 50 percent (Rs 1000) by elected representatives for all households in settlements. This ensures that elected representatives do not specify contributions for parts of settlements where their supporters live. The Rs 2000 contribution for each dwelling unit in the settlement was revised because many households already had legal or illegal water and sewerage connections and/ or constructed toilets. In some cases, more than one dwelling unit was owned by a family or the accommodation comprised single rooms. Formal approval for change in contributions depending on site-conditions was given.	
	SEWA incorporating AMC's SNP as its "Parivartan Programme' led to parallel actions by AMC for expanding programme to other non-pilot areas	

Table 7-18: Capacity building

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
The development of institutional capability was an integral requirement for the effective implementation of programme. Establishing of Training and information division in NHDA ensured that understanding about the programme and staff capacities matched tasks.	Pilot: Exposure visit to Indore by AMC and SHARDA Trust representatives at start of intervention (no NGO or beneficiary group representatives).	Capacity building for use of digitised maps as a decision tool, for O&M of assets created etc is incorporated in the design of LVWATSAN.
Training of NHDA engineers in traditional construction methods with local materials. Workshops organised by DPU and MIT where guidelines produced On-site training for sanitation by WEDC Training through workshops and on-site work for community representatives wanting to take construction contracts.	During the pilot, an attempt was made for training of AMC engineers in the use of software used by conceptualiser for integrated planning and economic design of the infrastructure. This did not take place	The capacity building of staff within utilities and town councils is expected to ensure sustainability of assets created. Institutionalised capacity building at four levels: National policy and decision makers Local authority officials-middle-level and senior managers
Skills enhancement for construction. Advice from NHDA staff & householder files to guide housing design and construction DPU, MIT and WEDC that conducted workshops for NHDA technical staff. The workshops also led to formalisation of the CAP process as a participatory decision-making tool and its refinement Refinement of community contracting process.	Training of CBO members for managing savings and credit activities through NGOs and SEWA Bank. No formal training planned USAID support to GMHST/SEWA and FPI	Build capacity of stakeholders at different levels for participating in prioritising, monitoring and later, maintaining of assets.

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Guidelines, including Draft District Guidelines, Implementation Guidelines for the RHSP (1984) and A guide to the UHSP (1985). Housing Options for Sri Lanka–Guidelines for Navagamgoda (S&S) Project Planning and Design, (1984). Physical Upgrading of Settlements in Sri Lanka - A Trainers Guidebook (1984). Checklists, esp. UHSP Project Preparation Checklist.	MFI/ SEWA Bank: evolved the financial mechanism to secure community funding and enable the poor to avail loans. It enabled opening of savings accounts of all slum residents, and introduced procedures for transfer of community contributions to the implementing agency. SHARDA Trust included individual toilet construction as an integral component of the intervention SHARDA Trust enabled electricity connections for houses in upgraded areas under a GoG electrification scheme.	Guidebook for formation of Multi-Stakeholder Forums

Table 7-19: Facilitation: External support for consolidation of intervention

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Support was coordinated at the NHDA and/ or national level. It was primarily for capacity building and the studies etc contributed toward development of tool kits etc. Publicity campaigns and materials were primarily for people in Sri Lanka to bring greater awareness about the programme and to encourage them participate in the programme.	Support was at various levels for mechanisms for up-scaling, rather than to AMC specifically for supporting and evolving the intervention itself. Generalised studies etc which were through consultants Support through SEWA and its allied organisations for preparation of field notes, for expansion of its activities, and for capacity building Support to GoG and AMC through CMAG for development of the draft GSUSP. Support for CDS Discussions with World Bank and Cities Alliance for funding of a slum upgrading programme	Resistance to involvement of 'outsiders' being most frequently articulated, irrespective of whether the required capacities were available at the particular level or not.
	When the pilot was introduced, AMC, with support from the initiator, approached several bilateral agencies for funding.	
DPU, MIT and WEDC for workshops and training From 1985 to 1991, UNCHS & DANIDA jointly undertook Community Participation Training Project. This strengthened capacity of implementing agencies to execute low-income housing programs.	USAID: Financial and technical support to SEWA/FPI for strengthening its institutional mechanism by establishing Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust for implementing SNP. USAID: Early to SEWA/ FPI for capacity building of AMC staff, and learning from experience through workshops etc. and for impact assessment study on completion of 5 years of SNP in 2000-02. USAID: Financial and technical support to GMHST, SEWA Bank and FPI through CHF for institutional development.	
In 1993, this led to approval of the Community Action Planning Training Project, which aims to promote development initiatives among the urban poor.	Arrival of WSP-SA for supporting up-scaling and financing of the programme resulted in 'urgent actions' by AMC for SNP works in pilot and new SEWA slums (residents had sought participation a few days before WSP-SA visit). WSP-SA sponsored studies during this period, and published several Field Notes. This started the process of referring to SNP as 'Parivartan Project' and the emphasis on roles of SEWA and SEWA Bank in its implementation.	

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
USAID support for housing finance began in 1980 with the Housing Guarantee Program; followed by support for the MHP, and TA to State Mortgage and Investment Bank and Housing Development Finance Corporation.	WSP-SA: To rid the project of the procedural hurdles within AMC and to enable financial contributions from the private sector, WSP-SA supported a consultancy for the design of an SPV. The recommendation of SPV consultant for NGOs and CBO representation of the Board on a rotating basis was not acceptable to SEWA because of concerns about 'fly-by-night' NGOs. WSP-SA: Consultancy for impact assessment of SNP	
	World Bank-Cities Alliance: Support to GoG through CMAG for development of Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy (GSUSP), which included research in six towns in the State, land tenure study for Ahmedabad, and compilation of list of NGOs that could collaborate with local Governments in implementation of SNP. The SNP pilots in Ahmedabad and Baroda have contributed to the development of the Draft GSUSP. Recommendation of World Bank staff (assessing funding for SNP) to provide some services in all slum areas with limited finance rather than integrated package of services unacceptable to AMC.	
	Financial contribution for SNP from others: Lions Club, SBI-Employee's Association, Sanatan Trust and Confederation of Indian Industry-CII provided Rs 2000/ DU in selected slum areas HDFC Bank support to SEWA HUDCO finance to AMC for 550 HHs under its Model Basti Scheme. AMC Corporator's funds	
	Financial support from donor agencies and charities to NGOs.	

Table 7-20: Up-scaling achieved

Criteria	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Influence on policy, standards and regulations	Formalizing of CAP methodology and community contracting process Strengthening of CDC participation that was introduced in Colombo Declaration of 'special areas' continued Construction using local materials enabled Post-tsunami, Government officials realised the advantages of making decisions and implementing through participatory processes. This has led to a revival of demand for building capacity for facilitating CAP.	The SNP pilots in Ahmedabad and Baroda have set the basis for the Draft Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy. The participatory process adopted for development of the policy was based on the assumptions which indicate acceptance of SNP approach: The settlements would be fully upgraded where feasible Services would be provided to individual households Slum residents would pay a part of the cost for getting the individual connections, and Slum residents would be given an assurance of non-eviction for 20 years – double the 10-year period guarantee given under the EIUS and SNP.	Business plans of utilities to cover several towns to ensure affordability.

Criteria	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Influence on subsequent schemes	With a greater focus on optimising use of land, development agencies adopted the relocation-redevelopment-resettlement model for slums on prime properties. The shelters in high-rise blocks were based on the successful 'Singapore' model. The lack of consideration about many practical and cultural issues resulted in abandoning of the 'high-rise' concept for walk-up apartments. Lessons learned amongst professionals in the 70s and 80s in other locations did not influence the earlier decision for building high-rise blocks.	The AMC stopped constructing public toilets and now operates pay-and-use toilets through partnerships. The decision to improve overall condition of the slums under SNP has increased the aspirations of decision makers about the cityscape. This together with higher demand for land because of the market economy, anticipated repeal of the land ceiling Act and an enforced relocation intervention has revived interest in 'housing provision and relocation. The focus for the resettlement a relocation option has become greater with funding available under the JNNURM.	The processes and approaches introduced are already influencing other groups, for example for monitoring of the MDGs. UN-Habitat has up scaled its own activities to implement similar regional initiatives
Organisational growth	NHDA in terms of capacity of staff and strengthened regional offices Training cell within NHDA Few NGOs established during implementation of MHP continued Limitations of the organisation led to the establishing of a 'company' for commercial development of cleared slum sites and for building of apartment blocks for relocation of slum dwellers. This cannot be identified as expansion of activities.	Saath-incorporated role of community mobiliser and subsequently of NGO contractor for construction of services. Empowerment of Saath facilitated CBO members led to success of its earthquake and riot relief & rehabilitation programmes. The success of CBO members has further expanded Saath's growth in terms of expansion of its education programme in partnership with AMC, and savings and credit activities. This has increased numbers of Saath staff implementing programmes in more areas for more people.	UN Habitat's Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch expanded its work to cover interventions in secondary towns and sub-regional levels.
Organisational growth (cont.)		SEWA and FPI, which before 1994 trained SEWA members in construction work and provided housing support established GMHST for dedicated implementation of SNP. GMHST, with support of USAID-CHF has expanded its area of operation from Ahmedabad to Surat, Baroda and Nagpur. SHARDA Trust established for implementation of SNP pilot has not undertaken any infrastructure works in slums since the pilot.	

Criteria	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Diversification into related areas	Training Cell started in NHDA for training of field staff and production of guidelines etc. Field level support in terms of: Mobilizing of community groups Facilitating CDCs Organising and managing CAPs and related activities Several professionals associated with the MHP, have set-up NGOs or are working with development support organisations. They facilitate the planning, analysis and implementation of schemes that incorporate participatory processes. Most significantly, professionals based in Sri Lanka continue working with Government representatives at different levels and with donor agencies. They also transfer skills to other young professionals.	Saath initiated savings and credit activities and strengthened its livelihood programme to meet a new demand from slum women after introduction of SNP in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar. Savings and credit groups have formed a Credit Cooperative Society that has over 9,000 members (2007). The success of Saath's Home-Manager programme led to expansion of its livelihoods programme for training of youth in partnership with AMC. The success of this programme resulted in GoG adopting it as the 'Umeed Programme' to be implemented in major towns of Gujarat, with Saath providing training support and some financial contribution for franchising of the programme FPI started publication of newsletter in Gujarati and urban community resource centres for dissemination of information on programmes for the poor, and with assistance of CHF-USAID started digitising plans of slums where GMHST is facilitating SNP and location of SNP areas for AMC. FPI also undertook report card study for AMC services. SEWA health programme complements GMHST's role in slums for provision of the community development services.	Coordination with Global Urban Observatory and Gender Mainstreaming Unit. Involvement with monitoring MDGs and related interventions

Table 7-21: Sustainability criteria addressed

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Collaboration/ Partnerships around a shared vision	Decentralised programme management for effective disbursement of resources to beneficiaries Community participation in decision making	Community participation in decision making	Community-based planning and participation in decision-making.
Interdependence	Government could not achieve its objective without the facilitating support of NHDA field staff and communities.	SNP Cell-NGOs and CBOs are interdependent for successful implementation of the SNP.	Extreme situation in towns makes it difficult to see interdependence except in terms of participatory decision making.
Equity	Extension of safe water supply and sanitation Access to finance.	Extension of safe water supply and sanitation Access to finance. Gender equity in decision-making,	Extension of safe water supply and sanitation. Gender equity in decision-making,
Sustainability	Community development Social integration and reduction of exclusion. Participation in decision-making essential for reblocking	Community development Social integration and reduction of exclusion. Financial commitment important for decision-making	Restoration of areas of environmental degradation. Gender equality and equity in decision-making,

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Holistic Actions/ Approach	Upgrading of slum and shanty settlements Job creation and eradication of poverty. Access to land	Upgrading of slums. Job creation and eradication of poverty.	Creating opportunities for sustainable income generation and/ or employment Job creation and eradication of poverty.
Iteration	Evolved through experiences of implementing pilot	SNP approach and components have evolved over time.	Not applicable.

Table 7-22: Hindrances in implementation

Hindrances	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Political	Political turmoil in Sri Lanka from the late 80s. In 1988, during the civilian disturbances in the country, the Government exempted those on Food Stamps from paying back the house loans. This lapse in fiscal discipline resulted in a sharp drop in the recovery rate from 65 percent to 6 percent in 1989.	The political wing of AMC was not keen on the intervention as demonstrated by lack of demand for action in their areas. This was precipitated by the perception that the project was publicised or known as a SEWA project rather than an AMC project. Further, as works were completed in slums, the residents in most areas associated the programme with the NGO and its staff rather than AMC, further inciting the political wing. Finance. Although the amount set-aside by AMC for SNP has not been utilised annually, it has faced delays because of release of NSDP funds	East African Community and related protocols NEPAD Protocol for Lake Victoria
Departure/ change of decision maker	In 1989 Premadasa, who had lent crucial political support to MHP was elected President, followed by further liberalization of the economy, and introduction of scheme for poverty alleviation under IMF conditionality. Reduction in close monitoring of the intervention by Premadasa because of additional responsibilities and the political environment.	After initiation of SNP in 1995, Verma left AMC in September 1997. Retirement of Deputy Municipal Commissioner-in-Charge of SNP, who had introduced the various procedures etc. From 27 Sept 1997 to early 2007, AMC had 6 Municipal Commissioners and the pace of implementation was affected by each change.	Potential risks include change in the leadership: Within UN-Habitat Ministers in charge of water in any of the three countries Utilities and Ministries of the countries
Participation of NGOs/ community	In 1989, NHDA introduced the concept of praja sahayaka (community assistants), who was a person from a low-income community who worked as an activist in the shelter improvement programme in her/his neighbourhood and was willing to go to work as an extension agent in other communities.	AMC had negative experiences in a few areas where local leaders came forward to mobilise community contributions and facilitate the process. In a few areas where works were undertaken without NGOs, the collection of community contributions was poor and in some cases-money paid to local leaders was missing. This strengthened AMC resolve in implementing SNP only in areas where NGOs facilitated the process. One slum area of 550 dwellings, for which HUDCO funding was availed and implementation did not correspond with depositing of community contributions,.	Potential risks include Role of Multi-Stakeholder Forums compromised

Hindrances	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Institutional support	In 1992, leader of the MHP in NHDA left the organisation to work on the poverty alleviation project. With the departure of two decision makers who had institutionalized the enabling approach, the impetus of the programme was lost.	The need for mobilizing community contributions and lack of support from the political leadership makes the process more laborious and lengthy. The slow pace and the above factors have influenced decisions of Municipal Commissioners for supporting the up-scaling of the programme.	Potential risks include: Weak capacity building institutions/ programmes that do not adequately address the requirements/ needs of the utilities
Major change	In 1994, when the People's Alliance came to power (1994-1999), it reverted to a provider-based settlement development approach and introduced the National Housing Programme (1994 – 1999).	In 2001, AMC undertook a survey of all slums in Ahmedabad together with Saath, SEWA and Ward level AMC engineers to prioritise SNP through identification of infrastructure mains and in-slum services available. This was followed by administrative approval for undertaking SNP in 499 slums. This attempt at coordination came 5 years after the pilot was initiated.	Potential risks include: Political or institutional changes Climatic disasters
Lessons	Requirements and high costs of land development and infrastructure networks. Change in regulations resulted in high densities over time, which created problems in providing adequate public infrastructure and service. Slum dwellers allowed to remain on waterway reservation and other marginal lands	AMC invited tender bids from contractors to implement works in 499 slums. Contractors formed cartel and submitted higher bids to increase rates for implementation of SNP AMC invited EoI from NGOs for implementation of physical works. Submission of EoIs by inexperienced/ newly formed NGOs led AMC to have the NGO capacity assessed by IIM-A. Based on this assessment, SNP Cell started giving contracts (at SoR) for physical works to NGOs The small number of NGOs participating in the programme has also contributed to the slow pace.	Benefits of a regional approach to enabling access to basic services in areas with very low levels of access, Benefits of using locally appropriate designs and technologies Introducing initiatives with a wide scope of work concurrently with sectoral reforms to raise the bar for the extent to which the scope of the reforms can benefit the poor in urban areas
Parallel interventions	Launch of World Bank and UNDP funded Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Program (MEIP) in 1989. The MIEP aimed at strengthening the institutional response to environmental issues, fostering community-led solutions to urban growth and promoting lesson sharing between pilot countries	Arrival of WSP-SA and concurrent actions by SEWA (financially supported by USAID and World Bank), resulted in a major change.	The LVWATSAN is itself a parallel initiative to other activities in the region for the Nile Basin. However, despite the considerations for reducing pollution going into Lake Victoria, the focus of LVWATSAN is on the secondary towns and capacity building of the utilities

Table 7-23: Learning from successes and failures

Criteria	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Iterative	Learning by doing and doing by learning approach mode wherein implementer resolved unexpected problems that arose during implementation. Enabling approach itself based on lessons learnt in implementation of 100,000 houses programme. Issues identified through field staff of pilots attending workshops incorporated in procedures, guidelines	SEWA Bank only FI to agree to open accounts of slum residents and extend credit. SEWA Bank suggested a mechanism acceptable to communities and AMC for securing community contributions and transfer to AMC. Because of concerns amongst slum residents about works being implemented in their settlements, AMC agreed to progressive collection and transfer based on progress of works. At the implementation level, this included completion of works even when the most vulnerable families had not paid their contributions in full. Lessons from Indore in terms of problems of maintenance because of lack of ownership by local government incorporated. Failure in collection of major amount of community contributions from areas where NGOs were not involved led to decision to not take-up SNP without NGOs	Phased approach. Finalisation of priorities and detailing of locations of standpipes etc done with community and CBOs that are to manage the assets
Physical assessment	Undertaken during the pilot phase for the process and construction. Workshops for training of NHDA officers and for construction on-site provided additional assessment of interventions Research	AMC decision based on hearing about concept, and its success in Indore in terms of recognition and in Baroda in terms of willingness of slum residents to pay. Impact assessment undertaken for building case for financial assistance and influence on policy	Rapid assessment carried out to prepare concept note for a project, and for a responsive design. Also provides a baseline against which achievement of MDG targets and their sustainability are to be measured
Documentation and Knowledge	Extensive documentation of the programme in local language and English by Government for dissemination to the potential beneficiaries and for dissemination of IYSH Demonstration Project.	Documentation in terms of process for SNP in pilot slum, and in terms of research/ studies undertaken by specialists or research students is primarily for specialists. Local NGOs and professionals inadequately informed about actual and current processes and details of the project. NGOs that have approached AMC for participating in implementation of SNP misinformed about the status of the project by Deputy Municipal Commissioner – who even though not responsible for SNP would be expected to know SNP status in AMC	Information about town level conditions and proposals available on the internet.
Awards	The evolution and close monitoring of interventions have substantial benefits irrespective of whether it is recognised as a good practice or not.	Award winning interventions are not 'perfect' or sustainable. The ones identified in the applications and recognised are not the only ones involved in the success of good practices. Award winning interventions can draw attention away from the core participatory processes and implementation issues.	Not applicable

Criteria	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Dissemination	Locally through films, exhibitions and pamphlets Globally through speeches and presentations at various forums.	Documentation on SNP available from BPP and AMC websites to those interested and having access Extensive dissemination of information through the SEWA network at various international and national forums. Structured exchange visits facilitated by ICMA and CMAG Some dissemination through exchange visits facilitated/ funded by bilateral organisations for stakeholders from other slum improvement projects Dissemination through placement of students and NGO staff with participating NGOs.	Presentations at major international forums. LVWATSAN is actively contributing to various aspects of MDG approach, monitoring etc because of lessons learnt in planning and finalizing of proposal
Lesson learning	Very high	Very low for enabling participation and understanding complexities in implementation, especially considering the experiences from pilots in different location	Lesson learnt from previous donor funded projects in the region, and those learnt through UN-Habitat interventions in other areas have influenced design of LVWATSAN.

Table 7-24: Key interventions after consolidation

Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
1989: Launch of 1.5 Million Houses Programme, national poverty alleviation scheme, privatization, and export promotion schemes. 1989: Launch of World Bank and UNDP funded Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Program (MEIP), which aimed to strengthen the institutional response to environmental issues, foster community-led solutions to urban growth and promote lesson sharing between pilot cities, including Colombo. 1992: The head of NHDA left the organisation to head the poverty alleviation programme and with the departure of two decision makers who had institutionalized the enabling approach, the impetus of the programme was lost. 1993-1998: clean Settlements Project, which promoted relocation of slums around sensitive ecosystems, was launched as a subcomponent of the Colombo/ Metropolitan Environmental Improvement Program (CEIP). 1998: Urban Settlements Improvement Programme for participatory environmental and livelihoods improvement in settlements outside Colombo Municipal area 1998: Sustainable Townships Programme through newly established REEL-Urban renewal programme that involves relocation and rehousing of residents from under-served settlements within Colombo Municipal area	2000: Preparation of CDS and Draft of Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy 2001: World Bank proposal for slum upgrading 2004: Relocation of slum residents from private plots to newly constructed houses. 2005: Proposal for upgrading of 120 slums under SNP under JNNURM 2006: Chawl (150,000 units) redevelopment under public-private partnership 2006: New low-cost housing areas (3 storied walk-up apartment units of 26.77 Sqm of carpet area) at 29 sites using Aluminium alloy shuttering/ MESCON Technology for high-speed and multi-hazard resistant construction. 2006: Redevelopment/ reconstruction of slum areas on private land on a land-sharing basis – with 50 percent area to be used for commercial or other purposes.	Expansion to cover additional countries of Rwanda etc. GIS and monitoring in Zanzibar on a pilot basis with financial and technical assistance from Google

Table 7-25: Up-scaling

	Million Houses Programme, Sri Lanka	Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad	Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation
Quantitative up-scaling	Expansion of housing activity occurred geographically and over the duration of the programme.	Actual coverage of improved areas has not even met 5 percent of the planned coverage.	Quantitative up-scaling is envisaged through capacity building and effective functioning of the utilities.
Functional up-scaling	Some functional up-scaling occurred because the MHP implementation processes have been adapted by donors, development institutions and others who continue introducing these processes in various locations in and outside Sri Lanka. CAP methodology and community contracting adopted by donor agencies in other locations	The success of AMC's partnership with NGOs in implementation of SNP has contributed to expansion of the number and types of complementary activities undertaken by AMC with the same NGOs to meet additional needs of communities in many other slums in the city. Saath has expanded to take-up a several related activities that have a wider coverage than SNP.	Processes and approaches introduced under LVWATSAN are already influencing other groups, for example for monitoring of the MDGs UN-Habitat has up scaled its own activities to implement this initiative.
Political up-scaling	Although the programme started with a change in national policy, it was later withdrawn. However, the decentralised decision process was strengthened. CDC decision process used within Sri Lanka right to live and declaration of special project areas Decision process through CDCs and HCDCs institutionalised	SNP has influenced the development of the (draft) Gujarat State Urban Slum Policy–which has not yet been approved Saath has gradually built-up its capacity and currently is influencing or contributing to evolving GoG's approaches to poverty reduction. SEWA as an internationally recognised NGO has benefited through its sister/ affiliated organisations.	The intervention involves greater empowerment of the local stakeholders and aims at influencing the structural causes of poverty and lack of services. Complementing regional cooperation agreement.
Organisational up-scaling	Some functional up-scaling occurred within NHDA through diversification of housing activities to incorporate complementary activities in terms of facilitating implementation through HOLPs, CAPs and community contracting, and for capacity building of staff and CDC members.	The SNP has led to increase in organizational strengths of the participating NGOs, incl. Saath, SEWA Bank, SEWA/GMHST and some of the CBOs. Saath has expanded to establish a livelihoods unit and expanded its organisational base through diversifying fund sources – though not HFIs, and by creating external links with other organisations. SEWA has up scaled by the establishing of GMHST and the activities of its sister organisations for the community development and research components. GMHST too has diversified its resource base, especially though HFIs	UN Habitat, specifically the Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch expanded its scope of work to planning and facilitating implementation of a sub-regional intervention. For this, it has sought funding from various sources and is involved in networking to achieve this objective. It's coordination with Global Urban Observatory and Gender Mainstreaming Unit is enhanced

8 APPENDIX 8: Up-Scaling Issues

Table 8-1: Partnership issues

Promotes Up-scaling	Hinders Up-scaling
Approachability of decision makers who are looking for opportunities to bring about significant improvements in the performance of an organization and for development of urban areas.	Procedural delays because of exceptional approach and/or resistance of staff
The presence of 'conceptualisers' of good practices who get or who create opportunities to interact with decision makers to present potential solutions for solving a development problem.	Good practices are introduced as 'projects' and not incorporated with institutional interventions of the same sector/ Department
Readiness and willingness of conceptualiser to prepare/ provide an assessable project proposal for consideration of the decision-maker (prior to any commitments).	Conceptualiser wanting to provide services as 'professional consultant' and implement the project professionally without involvement of local Government.
Flexibility, patience and empathy amongst 'conceptualiser and partners' for the constraints faced by decision makers because of administrative and financial regulations.	Generalisations about organizational causes of delays and demands for changes that are compatible with routines and process that the partners are accustomed to.
Financial capacity to incur expenses at least 4 to 6 weeks in advance to cover for administrative procedures for clearing payments.	Delays in processing payments because of corrupt practices and demands from partners.
Despite their values and decision not to compromise with the corrupt practices within local governments, willingness of partners to acknowledge its existence without being judgemental.	NGOs stance on the poor and vulnerable getting access to basic services and developmental benefits at no cost through normal Government programmes. This includes opposition to paying for services even at individual household levels.
NGO insistence on both community and NGOs contributing part of the costs for a more equitable partnership with the organisation responsible and accountable for provision of basic services.	Moral stands by professionals and NGOs about not partnering with organisations where majority of contracts are given based on corrupt practices
Flexibility of NGOs in questioning of decision processes within government, and facilitating implementation of programmes for the poor through CBOs. This leads to enhancing capacities of CBO members and improvement in quality of services provided to a much larger population that is not covered under a specific good practice.	NGO insistence on not taking any funds from government to enable it to continue its 'independent' role of making Government accountable to the poor and vulnerable.
	Private sector partners 'impatient' with procedural and administrative delays and functioning of Government organisations, which are accountable for showing procedural consistency. During pilots, Government organisations have to take measured actions, which pave the path for long-term functioning of the organisation within its accountability framework. Therefore, despite delays and negative attitudes of staff, in AMC, the DyMC sorted out problems.
	The good practice is identified as a programme of a particular partners rather than as a partnership programme where each partner contributes for the overall effective implementation of the interventions

Table 8-2: NGOs: Issues and Observations

Promotes Up-scaling	Hinders Up-scaling
NGOs play an important role as facilitators between communities and local governments. NGOs play the role of social change-agents. NGOs have greater capacity and ability to mobilize communities. During project implementation, NGOs facilitate interactions between communities and local governments or utilities, which enhance confidence of the communities for approaching local governments for varying needs. NGOs work together under an umbrella for short-terms for meeting emergency needs in disaster situations (earthquake, riots, and tsunami). However, even in such situations, they work in separate locations. Where NGOs are partners of Government organizations in the introduction, implementation, management and monitoring of interventions, the interventions are more responsive to local context.	NGOs rarely work in partnership with other NGOs NGOs are often included as 'consultants' for delivering specific outputs, or as 'contractors' for delivering components of interventions or services rather than as team-members or partners in the planning, implementation and monitoring of interventions funded by governments. Larger/ well-established NGOs neither coordinate nor support other NGOs and very rarely share correct information. Taking of an activist stand or opposing local government organizations is counter productive for the intervention and potential beneficiaries. Since NGOs often work on specific sector or crosscutting issues, they are not willing to incorporate additional responsibilities for motivating their constituents to access basic services. Although the key person in an NGO is committed to the organization's vision and work with the poor, the same commitment cannot be seen in the staff (who behave as 'employees').
During fieldwork, NGOs can facilitate coordination of different programs and interventions in a geographical area. Experienced NGOs show what can be done and how it can be done. Networks such as ACHR, City-net and SDI enable exchange of experiences and learning amongst members.	Larger/ experienced NGOs, which should be nurturing other NGOs for taking-up similar work in more areas, often do not even assist others when approached directly. The ideological basis of NGOs, which provide a positive influence on their approach to development, also result in their unwillingness to associate with other NGOs and organizations that work on issues that could substantially benefit their constituents, especially in terms of access to basic services.
Even when NGO approaches are up scaled through institutional support, the benefits of the intervention are limited to its members in key urban areas or limited partner organisations. They are not universally adopted by other NGOs working in similar sectors/ focus areas. Therefore, locally, the Good Practice is identified with widely recognised NGOs rather than as a citywide good practice.	Exchange of experiences through networks is restricted to members and hence opportunity for building capacities of other organizations working in similar areas does not occur. National representation of networks by member NGOs does not encourage networking amongst local NGOs not only because their primary objectives and capacities may differ, but also because membership of a network led by another NGO is a threat to their identity (and thereby funding). NGOs are interested in working for Governments only when as a 'commercial' activity and not as facilitators in the introduction or implementation of interventions. Only larger NGOs with seed money can work with Government because payments for work are made after completion of deliverables, and procedural delays of a minimum of three weeks.

9 APPENDIX 9: Up-scaling of NGOs: Saath

Considering the significant variation in identification of NGOs in Ahmedabad that are active in urban slums, especially with reference to slum improvement, and the lack of NGOs facilitating implementation of SNP, following Section includes a description of how NGOs have up scaled.

Of the three other NGOs that have played a prominent role in slums in Ahmedabad (Refer Section), St Xavier's Social Service Society (SXSSS) is currently active in slums while Ahmedabad Study Action Group (ASAG) and VIKAS Centre for Development are not involved too extensively with multi-sectoral interventions. SXSSS coordinates with AMC for implementation of various health and urban poverty alleviation programmes in areas where it is active. In addition, it leads a rights-based network. VIKAS has set-up a decentralized savings and credit system, which attempts to link formal and informal financial systems. Saath, which was involved in implementing its Integrated Slum Development Programme in Ahmedabad (details given below), started its riot rehabilitation programme in Sanklit Nagar, the settlement for which both ASAG and where SXSSS gained recognition.

Saath means 'Together, Cooperation, a Collective or Support'. The vision behind Saath was to work with the slum residents towards the objective of enabling them to become equal citizens of Ahmedabad. Saath conceptualised, what it termed an Integrated Slum Development Programme, to facilitate participatory processes that would improve the quality of life for the slum residents. In the first six years, the organisation was involved in building capacity of motivated and active local residents, facilitating access to basic municipal health and sanitation services. The focus was on empowering local communities through provision of basic health and education services for which the residents were required to pay a nominal fee. This was based on the understanding that when the poor pay for a service, they are serious about availing it and will participate in essential meetings and hold the NGO accountable. The Saath team had planned to facilitate provision of basic infrastructure in one of the slums they had worked in based on what they knew about the Orangi Pilot Project. However, the team neither had the financial nor technical support for undertaking any actions for meeting the hygiene and sanitation needs identified in the slums.

In 1995, when Joshi and Parikh were introduced and Saath was invited to partner with AMC and Arvind Mills for the SNP pilot, members of Saath and two CBOs it was working with were provided an 'external opportunity' to incorporate the physical improvement component to their activities. From 1995 Saath's work included mobilising of communities, building their capacities, and enabling access to health, education and physical infrastructure services, that is, Saath is facilitating implementation. Saath's ideology has never been confrontationist or aggressive and therefore enabled all members to grow and expand. Until December 2000, Saath's fieldwork was primarily in the regularised slum areas of Ahmedabad.

In 2001, after the Gujarat earthquake, Saath joined a network of NGOs to assess the damage and provide support for distribution of relief items. This led to the expansion of Saath's work to 12 villages and 5 hamlets in the Khadir region of Kutch, with support from its funding agencies and the NGO network. The Saath team expanded during this period and capacity of the team as well as the CBOs was built – primarily through local and low profile training activities. Saath also was involved in conducting participatory research with members of the CBOs. In February 2002, after the communal riots in Gujarat, especially Ahmedabad, Saath

took up relief work in the riot affected areas of Ahmedabad. This eventually led to long-term development initiatives in these areas, integrated with efforts to encourage social reconciliation. It also resulted in introspection amongst all members and has resulted in special focus on inclusive development work.

Saath, with the horizontal and organisational up-scaling has evolved over the past 18 years with the support and flexible approach of funding partners[2] - both international and national. The support and partnerships with various NGOs, individuals and institutions have also played a vital role in the organisation's development. In 2004, to move from being a small to a medium sized and credible organization, Saath has gradually adopted more formal governance structures - that is, an institutionalization process that is not centred around people but on organizational strategy. The following is a description of Saath's evolution and of the empowerment and contributions of the CBOs facilitated by the Saath team.

In 2001-2, in response to the demand for reliable support for housekeeping in nuclear families where both partners were working, Saath and Sakhi Mahila Mandal initiated a Home Manager's program. The objective was to provide a reliable housekeeping and management services for all household work, including use of mechanical equipment, childcare, and housekeeping. A police clearance and health check-ups were carried out to build up the credibility of the individuals seeking employment in middle and upper middle-income households. By end of 2006, 60 women have been trained and the program has been expanded to include training for both men and women for geriatric care. This program has resulted in long-term employment for 55 house managers.

Figure 9-1: Saath, associated Community Based Organisations and Activities



[2] SAATH's funding partners include Cordaid

Figure 9-2: Saath and Growth of Community Based Organizations



The other NGO involved in implementation of the SNP is affiliated to SEWA that is a well-recognised organisation with a large membership base. SEWA's strategy for up-scaling its activities to different sector is to establish new sister-organisations such as Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust (housing and construction), Lok Swasthya Mandali (health), SEWA Academy (documentation and research), and SEWA Video. These activities are complemented by pilot, research and policy level interventions of organisations such as Foundation for Public Interest (FPI) and its Urban Planning Partnerships programme, and All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI) led by Mihir Bhatt.

Figure 9-3: SEWA and its Sister/ Associated Organisations



Note: All data verified from SEWA website and documents presented by above organisations at various forums

10 APPENDIX 10: Transformations in the lives of CBO members

The objective of interviewing CBO Members was to understand why and how individuals made decisions to work with NGOs. It also provided an understanding of processes that influenced their involvement in the development initiatives in selected areas, since such data is not available in written records. The interviews revealed how individual interests, motivation and actions shaped their involvement, and how the context contributed to present-day achievements and actions.

The narratives were guided through the following three key questions:

1. How did your association with the NGO start?
2. What are the milestones achieved in the areas/ sector in which you are working?
3. Subsequent to your involvement with the NGO, what is the key difference in your life?

The oral histories were taken from areas where researchers have previously not undertaken in-depth studies. This eliminated the SNP Pilot slum area, namely Sanjay Nagar, which has been extensively documented in two books and papers. SNP areas where SEWA and its associated organisations are active or have facilitated SNP have been documented by WSP-SA, SEWA, FPI, IDMI and others. Therefore, a decision was made to select CBO members from Saath intervention areas. This turned out to be an appropriate decision because of the substantial organisational and functional up-scaling since 2005 of Saath and the CBOs it has facilitated.

10.1 Devuben Parmar

Devuben Parmar and her husband moved to Pravinnagar-Guptanagar from Rajkot with a debt of around Rs 40,000 when their small-scale business of electrical fittings failed. Devuben worked on construction sites with her husband for a few years, followed by about 4 years of a 9.00 am to 6.00 pm job rolling *papad* and *khakhras*. During this period, since Devuben was keen on learning stitching but did not have the extra funds for the fees, she negotiated with the owner of a 'sewing class' to allow her to clean the place and fetch drinking water in-lieu of the fees. In addition, Devuben requested the employer from the *khakhra* rolling unit to allow her a break of 3.5 hours for attending the sewing classes. This way she worked long hours to improve her income.

After 8 years of marriage, when Devuben was expecting her first child, her husband asked her to stop working at the papad-rolling unit. Devuben, a farmer's daughter who studied to class 10, approached Saath with a request to work in the *bal-ghar* it supported in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar. Saath found her interest and attitude positive and sent her for a 15-day training programme before joining the *bal-ghar*. In addition to her work in the *bal-ghar*, Devuben bought a sewing machine and started stitching clothes for people in the area.

When Devuben first started managing the *bal-ghar*, parents in the area were not keen on sending their children there because it was managed by local residents. They expected local residents to provide inferior services. However, as parents participated in the monthly parent-teacher meetings and observed the changes in the children attending the *bal-ghar*, there was a demand for admitting more children. This led to the setting-up of a new *bal-ghar* in the area.

Another need identified at the parent-teacher meetings was of opportunities for women to improve their incomes. In 1996, this led to the setting-up a 13 members savings group – called Sakhi Mahila Mandal. The

process of setting up the savings group required the members to make decisions regarding the name, activities and rules for the functioning of the group. Devuben was elected Secretary for the first two years. To begin with, members were saving Rs 25 per month. Now some of these members save between Rs 500 to Rs 1000 per month.

In late 1996, a slide show on improvements in slum areas of Indore was organised at the Saath office. Under the Slum Networking Project, we had the option of getting individual water and sewerage connections on payment of Rs 2100. At a time when there were only two water taps in the area and clashes amongst residents resulted in broken pots and torn clothes, the option for getting individual water connections legally was very attractive. A few households in lanes where workers of the two key political parties lived had illegal water and sewerage connections for which they had paid between Rs 500 to Rs 1000.

The men in the area were not convinced about opting for the slum networking project, primarily because they did not face the same problems as the women in collecting water for daily use. Several meetings were conducted in the different areas of Pravinnagar-Guptanagar to convince people about the authenticity of the SNP. For four years, members of Sakhi Mahila Mandal were subjected to verbal abuse and criticism from the slum residents. The lack of any physical works, followed by the very slow pace at which AMC implemented the physical works during the 1996-1998 raised doubts about the legitimacy of SNP even in the minds of the members of Sakhi Mahila Mandal. However, after the engineers started the physical survey and works, more households started paying their contributions.

The main benefit of the individual water and sewerage connections is that women complete their household chores quickly and can take-up other work or activities for the rest of the day. This and aspirations of the women for improving the lives of their children raised the demand for employment opportunities. Subsequently, when a livelihoods programme - stitching of computer covers, was introduced in the area, 125 women earned between Rs 1200 to 1500 per month.

At the time, many households were paying Rs 150 per month for illegal electricity connections from a single legal connection - Rs 50 each for a tube-light, a fan and a TV. This meant fluctuations in electricity supply and sometimes fatalities due to short-circuiting. This changed with the introduction of the Slum Electrification Scheme, which enabled households to get a legal metered connection on payment of Rs 2700 in instalments. The monthly bill for the households comes to around Rs 100 to 150.

Devuben was keen to educate her daughter, and after her initial education in the Saath's *bal-ghar* in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar, had admitted her in a school that was across a major road. Later, since she could not pick-up her children from the school because of her own work schedule, she moved them to a private school – paying fees of Rs 150 per month for each child compared to Rs 40 per month in the previous school. Her aspiration is that her children are integrated in the mainstream and are able to take up positions of those people in the formal sector with whom she interacts. Although she has taken loans to build her own house in Pravinnagar, she is working towards moving to a 'Society' so that her family has no association with negative aspects of the slum area, such as use of offensive/ unpleasant language, quarrels and verbal abuse.

At a personal level, her change in status is reflected in the respect of peers and relatives, especially compared to the situation when relatives did not keep any contacts with her family because of the failure of her husband's business. The situation of these relatives or their position in life has not changed in the last ten years, while the changes in her have resulted in their keeping close contacts and seeking loans from her.

Another change in her status is reflected by the fact that her father, who trusts her skills, has assigned her the responsibility of managing all his wealth, and that her eldest sister seeks advice on managing her savings.

The aftermath of the riots in 2002 led to life-changing experiences for Devuben. During the riots, there was general antagonism towards the Muslim community, and residents of Pravinnagar-Guptanagar, including a Devuben and a group of women, were keeping a vigil until 2.00 am daily for the security of the area. Devuben, who was inquisitive about what was happening outside Pravinnagar-Guptanagar witnessed stone throwing, bomb (with nails and knives) explosions, bottles of kerosene used for starting fires, as well as use of tear-gas shells. After two-to-three days of curfew, when a three-hour curfew-relief was announced, the Managing Trustee of Saath contacted the Sakhi Mahila Mandal members to enquire about their well-being and whether a meeting could be organised. About 35 to 44 members attended the meeting to brainstorm on whether - as a group of human beings, they could do something to assist the riot affected. Devuben and two other women volunteered to facilitate the support.

Joshi provided his personal car and a driver to take the volunteers to the relief-camps. The car was stopped by the police to check whether there were any arms or ammunition in the car. The volunteers carried their own (Sakhi Mahila Mandal) and Saath's visiting cards as proof of identity for visiting the relief camps. The first visit to a relief camp showed that the condition in the camps was very bad. The women were traumatised and questioned the three 'sari-clad Hindu women with bindis' about their presence in the camp. The volunteers explained their credentials and desire to assist the women and children in the camp. The discussions during this first visit continued for about three to four hours. Finally, the volunteers were asked if they had the permission of the Government to work in their camp.

The Group wrote a letter (on the letterhead of Sakhi Mahila Mandal) to the 'leaders' in the camp requesting permission to provide assistance to people in the camp. A decision was made to provide assistance in the form of cash for food rather than food because people were concerned about food being poisoned. For the children between the ages of 3 to 6, whom the volunteers observed playing games by grouping as 'Hindus' and 'Muslims', toys were brought. During her visits to the relief camp, Devuben discovered that a young girl was avoiding her because she had seen women dressed in saris amongst the group of rioters that attacked her neighbourhood. Devuben therefore stopped wearing her bindis and mangalsutra – the two symbols signifying the married status of women of her community, when she went to the camps.

Devuben is now a popular visitor to the homes of women who were in the relief camps and who have now started similar groups and activities in their own neighbourhoods. In terms of her own development, Devuben is now responsible for educational activities of Saath, including the effective management of the 108 *anganwadis* that Saath is managing for the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.

10.2 Madhuben Solanki

Madhuben Solanki – whose mother worked on construction sites and father worked as a carer in a private hospital, is currently handling the microfinance activities in Saath. She belongs to a community that believes in change as demonstrated through various changes in customs that have been introduced formally in the community. Madhuben's association with Saath started when she joined the Class 10 supplementary classes that the NGO was supporting in Pravinnagar. As a student interested in Maths, she found herself assisting other students in the class. Seeing her skills, when Saath started supplementary classes for students in Classes

1 to 7, Madhuben and about 6 others were recruited to teach the students between 1.30 to 3.00 pm. At the age of around 21, Madhuben was hardly aware about her own potential and what she could achieve. In fact, she was scared of going out of the Vasna area.

1996 marked a major change in her life as the supplementary classes were stopped and she was given the responsibility of the Treasurer in the newly formed Sakhi Mahila Mandal (CBO registered on 8 May 1996). She was confident about her calculation skills and willingly took on this responsibility. Her skills evolved through internal discussions with Saath coordinators, and training programmes of SEWA Bank for initiating Savings and Credit groups and Jan Vikas for procedures for registration of Savings and Credit groups (November 1996). To become a savings group member, the woman has to pay Rs 40 (entry/ registration fee of Rs 5, purchase a share of Rs 25 and pay Rs 10 for a passbook). Loans were given a minimum of three months after a woman joined the savings group. The members find opening an account with Sakhi Mahila Mandal more attractive because the minimum balance required in an account is Rs 25 in contrast to the Rs 500 required for an account in Nationalised Banks, and because they can access the money for emergencies at any time of the day. At the time, five moneylenders in their area charged between 10 to 4% interest per month depending on the nature of collateral provided. Currently there are only two moneylenders in the area.

The residents trusted the members of Sakhi Mahila Mandal because they had earlier successfully managed the *bal-ghar* and after they started giving loans. This was further enhanced after the launch of the livelihoods program, especially the Home-Manager's program.

Madhuben continued working in Pravinnagar after she married and moved to a nearby town, spending about half her income on commuting. Her husband had a vendor's cabin selling paan and cigarettes, mother-in-law was a teacher in a private school, and father-in-law worked in the railways. In 1998, after the birth of her first child, Madhuben could not commute with her son. So she and her husband moved to Pravinnagar.

The responsibilities she was given as a CBO member gave her an opportunity to move out of Pravinnagar and aspire for changes in her children's lives (two sons aged 5 and 10 years). She participated in all activities that Saath undertook, including SNP, savings and credit groups, health and education. She learnt how to present progress during monitoring meetings and is confident that she can go anywhere in the world and present her work confidently. Although customarily it was inappropriate for a younger person to talk to elders, she has learnt to explain the pros and cons of situations and opportunities to elders. She has learnt to operate computers (Excel and Word) and now uses the Tally program for keeping financial records. Her knowledge and training, as well as confidence in explaining processes and procedures to new groups are useful in introducing similar activities in other areas.

The SNP brought about dramatic changes in her personal life. Earlier, because of lack of water, they could wash themselves at 2 to 3 days interval while now it is possibly to do so daily. The new skills and investments in the house has enabled her to organise her home. She prioritises expenditure and has overcome drawbacks, which she believes slum dwellers generally have. These includes dressing as people outside her area do and communicate with them. She wears different clothes in the house, for office or for meetings.

She identifies herself as a partner of Saath and a member of Sakhi Mahila Mandal, and feels that she has contributed significantly to the growth of the Mandal from a small organisation to the current stage. In her interactions with representatives of other organisations at meetings and training programs, she has realised that while other NGOs are represented by the program coordinators, the Sakhi Mahila Mandal is represented

by community members. She recalls feedback she received at a micro-finance training programmes from another participant, that is, 'she did not look like a slum woman'. The significant aspects of working with Saath are:

a) There is no difference in associating with people from different class, caste or education levels.
b) The community members can express themselves at any level, including at the level of the Trustees and are heard.
c) The work of the individuals is not assessed in black and white but through a discussion on what aspects were good and what can be improved.
d) Education level of an individual is not an indicator of her or his capability.
e) The CBO members are asked to assess the work of new staff in relation to their work in Saath.

10.3 Mansingh Babubhai Maurya

Sakalchand Mukhi-ni-Chali, an area with 520 houses is occupied by labourers (cement and brickwork), painters, cloth sellers (handcarts) and shepherds (about 25 people now have auto-rickshaws). Mansingh's association with Saath started around 17 years back when the two initiators of Saath came to the area for 2 to 3 hours every evening. The youth got together, formed two teams and played volleyball or sat together to discuss issues in the family or community that concerned them. This led to the recognition of the fact that many residents in the area had tuberculosis and it was possible for the youth to take some actions that could cure them. At the time, the AMC doctor in the area identified 53 cases but since tuberculosis was considered a taboo in the community because it led to discrimination and stigma, people were not willing to reveal their condition. The AMC doctor explained the treatment requirements to the youth (regular intake of medicine, nutrition support and regular follow-up). Outings were organised with the youth where the doctor showed slides and participated to build rapport with the youth. At one stage, the youth group realised that people in other areas too had similar problems and they could assist the youth in those areas to form groups and learn the skills for bringing about change in their areas.

Once the youth started supporting the identified tuberculosis patients, others came forward for the tests and subsequently, 165 cases of tuberculosis were identified in the area. Saath provided some food and changes in weights were monitored on a fortnightly basis. In 1991, the Ekta Yuvak Mandal was started with 22 members, which grew to about 70 members by 1997-98. The work of the Ekta Yuvak Mandal was discussed amongst some people in Rajasthan and a few other places so some people came to the Ekta Yuvak Mandal for support. The serious patients were admitted to hospital. The work with tuberculosis patients continued and the group was given the responsibility for managing a DOT centre first in Sanklit Nagar and than in Pravinnagar-Guptanagar 1 and Santosh Nagar.

The poor physical condition of the area aggravated the problems of the tuberculosis patients, with a few falling in the muddy lanes during the monsoons. Because of the Ekta Yuvak Mandal's association with AMC, the group requested AMC to assist 65 tuberculosis patients get toilets under its 80:20 scheme. Once these toilets were constructed in Sakalchand Mukhi-ni-Chali, others too came forward. This led to the construction of 220 toilets. When AMC changed the scheme to a 90:10 scheme, the remaining 300 households in the area also built individual toilets.

The savings activity started with the requirement for loans for the toilet construction. The residents of the area had earlier lost money to the tune of Rs 150,000 that had been deposited in the Sarvodaya Cooperative Bank. Thus, when the youth group started this activity, not many people were interested in saving with them. Now there are over 1520 members with savings of over Rs 100,000. Some people were interested in saving more than the minimum amount of Rs 25 so now the group also accepts savings of amounts up to Rs 100.

Mansingh also went to Nagpur to assist the youth group formed under the GTZ Nagpur Slum Improvement Project. He also went to Kutch to support the earthquake relief work despite his family's fears about his health and safety.

10.4 Yakub Khan Pathan

In 2003, that is after the Gujarat riots of 2002, the Director of Saath contacted Yakub Khan Pathan with a proposal to introduce some development activities in Sanklit Nagar. Khan's association with development work and the Director of Saath can be traced back to the educational activities undertaken in Sanklit Nagar by St Xavier's Social Services Society (SXSSS), specifically by Fr. Erviti, from 1982-83. After Fr Erviti came to the area with students, the Pragati Seva Samiti was established and the area was cleaned up and activities undertaken with children. Camps were organised for the youth. After Fr Erviti passed away, although development activities by SXSSS continued in the area until 1997, Khan left the organisation in 1984 after the student agitation against reservation and communal riots and started his own business. When he was approached by Saath, although his business was showing good returns, Khan was finding it difficult to manage the required investment and personal time inputs. Considering the options, Khan decided to work with Saath.

Sanklit Nagar, which was a relocation site in the peri-urban area of Ahmedabad for people affected by floods in 1973, comprises of 10 wards (A to J) and 3000 houses (legal as well as squatters on open land). Khan's parents had moved from Khanpur area of Ahmedabad to H-Ward in Sanklit Nagar. The relocated families had to pay a total of Rs 3700 for a house, including an initial deposit of Rs 20 and thereafter a monthly instalment of Rs 100. Currently, the houses in the area are selling for between Rs 100,000 to 500,000, with those on the main road selling for Rs 700,000 to 800,000.

When the houses were first allotted in 1974, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had taken responsibility for the managing the area for 20 years. Initially water was delivered by water-tankers, and later water tanks were constructed, and water taps, street lighting and road paving provided. However, the area was 'like a jungle with many mosquitoes' and far from workplaces around Khanpur. The residents spent bus-fare of Rs 0.50 to go to work from Sanklit Nagar. In 2005, after AMC stopped servicing the area, 7 wards of Sanklit Nagar were in AMC's election ward of Vejalpur (AMC West Zone) while 3 wards (H, I, & J) were part of the Makhtampur village (AMC South Zone). The fragmentation of responsibilities resulted in neither AMC nor the Makhtampur Panchayat taking responsibilities for the area. Drainage for the overall area is common while all other services were under different authorities. Therefore, the physical infrastructure and environmental conditions were very poor, and the residents had problems even in getting birth and death certificates. After 2006, when Ahmedabad was declared a mega-city and the boundaries of AMC were extended, Sanklit Nagar came under the jurisdiction of AMC. However, administratively, Sanklit Nagar continues to be divided under different Wards and Zones of AMC.

Although Sanklit Nagar had a mixed population initially, because of communal riots in the city, over time, the Hindus from the area moved to other parts of the city while Muslims from other areas came to live in Sanklit Nagar. Majority of the population is Muslim. The common perception about the area was that it comprised of terrorists and unsocial elements. Sanklit Nagar was well known as area where 10% electricity use was 'legal' and 90% was 'illegal'.

Khan says that his experience of the past four years in Juhapura demonstrates that interventions that are perceived as 'impossible' can be made 'possible' when the situation is tackled appropriately. The activities started with the formation of a youth group named Sankalp Mitra Mandal, followed by the electrification initiative. One of the main achievements of the area is conversion of the 90% illegal electricity connections to legal ones under the AEC's Slum Electrification Program. This was achieved through discussions with Ahmedabad Electricity Company as well as with residents who were paying Rupees 50 per month for consumption of electricity for each light or fan point in the house. Since many houses were connected to the same connection, there was a lot of fluctuation in the wattages as well as accidents. Many people in Sanklit Nagar did not believe that we could get legal electricity connections. However, the need was so acute that even those who earned an income by giving illegal connections did not oppose this initiative.

The changes in Sanklit Nagar after the success of the electrification programme can be measured in various ways. The success of the programme can be partly gauged from the fact that at the initial stage of the programme, a payment of Rs 5200 was required for getting a metered connection. This changed to Rs 3700 per connection to the current rate of Rs 2500 for a connection. Not only is AEC getting the connection fees, but is also getting more revenue for the electricity consumed by the households. Secondly, the staff of Ahmedabad Electricity Company, who were fearful to come into the area and rarely spoke before, now see the residents of the area as 'normal people'. If our suggestions or requirements are not appropriate, they now discuss the matter. The residents of the area have legal connections, have reliable power supply and have to pay for what they consume rather than the earlier flat rate.

Another benefit of Saath's activities in the area is the formal savings and credit activities. Prior to the start of the savings group, people saved in cash because they did not have enough money to save in the banks, or they became members of Bishis, which generally had ten members. Thus, every 10 months, each member would have access to around Rs 1000. However, people also were cheated by people from outside who would ask them to become members of savings groups by paying Rs 5. In one such case, the group set-up an office in the Navrangpura area, put-up a big signboard and employed educated youth of the area to convince Sanklit Nagar residents to become members. Then one day, they and the signboard disappeared, and the office remained locked. Thus, once the group's savings and credit activities were observed and people were convinced that it was reliable, people even from distant locations have become members of the group. People have access to their money anytime and the minimum amount they have to retain in their accounts is Rs 25.

In fact, Sankalp Mitra Mandal managed to convince 280 households to contribute a total of Rupees 150,000 to the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority for construction of a sewerage line. However, the head of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority changed, and he criticised the initiative supported by the previous head. We therefore returned the contributions of each households through cheques and proper vouchers.

The most significant change Khan finds is that people, including those who opposed the early initiatives of Saath, trust him and come to him for guidance and information. The women have gained tremendous self-

confidence and are no longer fearful about going out of their homes. The improved environmental conditions and electricity have also made a tremendous difference in the lives of people.

10.5 Sheikh Sanjida Ahmed

Sanjida, who studied to Class X in Maharashtra, came to Gujarat 26 years back after marriage. Her husband was a well-educated man who worked in a Mill and who was always available to assist others. When he died, Sanjida was depressed and rarely left her house. In 2003, her daughters convinced her and the extended family to get some training to teach in the new *bal-ghar* established by Saath. After the riots, the residents of the area were not keen on having people from outside come into our areas and when the members of Sakhi Mahila Mandal came here, people neither trusted them nor me. However, gradually people saw the results of our work in the *bal-ghar*, and now the situation has changed such that women of Sanklit Nagar interact more with members of Sakhi Mahila Mandal with her.

The main activities undertaken are the education and nutrition programme through *bal-ghars*, ICDS programme for nutrition and health check-up for pregnant and lactating women, immunisation and savings and credit activities. There are three *bal-ghars* in Sanklit Nagar, each with about 32 to 35 students. The admission fee is Rs 20 per child and the monthly fee is Rs 50. Almost 28 students pay the full fees while about 5 children pay less and there is no fee for about 2 children whose parents are very poor. The impact of the *bal-ghars* is very visible. Children who earlier did not talk, started talking and singing. Their health too improved because of the nutrition provided in the school. In the initial period, husbands would come to the *bal-ghar* at any time to check what was going on. However, gradually everyone realised that there were no hidden activities and more women were encouraged to take jobs in the *bal-ghar*.

When the savings group was first started, the main question was whether the women could take back their money at any time they wanted. Gradually people started saving 2 to 3 Rs per day while some children saved Rs 1 per day. Some took the money when they saved enough to get a cooking gas cylinder while others took the money to pay their children's school fees. In four years, more than 1000 women became members of the savings group and loans of over Rs 200,000 have been given against savings of about Rs 300,000.

The health facility has made a tremendous difference. Earlier women had to go to a distant clinic and spend about Rs 200 per visit to the gynaecologist. Consequently, many women would hide their problems from the families. Now, since the facilities are available in the area, people can get regular check-ups on payment of Rs 15. Moreover, they have greater confidence in the gynaecologist who comes here. The activities and interactions involve various issues. We talk about the need for cleanliness, its effects on the health of children, how to communicate with children, and about personal behavioural and development issues. Whenever I learn of something new, I organise street meetings to discuss issues with the women in groups.

I am recognised and respected by people in Sanklit Nagar, who now come to me for support and advise as they used to come to my husband. I have learnt a lot through my association with the women of Sakhi Mahila Mandal. I have been to places that I had never imagined I would visit, have a regular income that has reduced my financial worries, and I am carrying forward my husband's supportive role in the community. Another example of change is the teenager who I taught to take on responsibilities of a *bal-ghar*. She is very good at her work and now has become a part of the Saath media unit.

11 APPENDIX 11: Interview Guide

11.1 Interview Guide 1

Interview Guide	
1. Are the 'good practices' recognised as such in the local context?	Good practice recognition is more within the organisations rather than the general population. There is greater recognition for s good practices whose benefits are visible at the city level, such as improved solid waste management and planned traffic and pedestrian areas. There are differences and competition between the large urban centres and hence what is introduced by local government in one city will not be introduced in the same format in another city. There is consensus about some good practices locally, but not for others.
2. Is recognition important or significant for decision makers in local governments?	Decision makers in local governments, including political, technical and administrative are keen on having path-breaking' or innovative actions recognised as good practices. The benefits of good practices include greater exposure of local stakeholders. The exposure is from participation of local stakeholders in conferences and workshops as well as through visits to good practice locations by peer groups and other decision makers. There is financial benefits after recognition are negligible compared to the exposure of the local stakeholders to other good practices.
3. Who are the relevant decision makers for good practices?	The key decision makers in Gujarat and many of the other States in India are the Municipal Commissioners. Although the elected representatives play an important role, at the local government level, the administrator directs the development focus and activities.
4. What influenced the intervention and its evolution, that is, what is the context in which up-scaling of the good practices is being propagated?	Following the plague, administrators known for delivering results were posted to the major cities of Gujarat and hence the role of the political decision makers was important. The increase in income of the local body and the initiatives taken to improve urban administration and conditions in the city provided the conditions under which the good practices evolved. Key senior people in both Ahmedabad and Surat provided the decision makers with the knowledge about issues that constrained effective functioning of the organisations as well as identified key people for addressing those problems.
5. How and to what extent has the good practice been up scaled?	Good practices in administrative processes, road redevelopment and heritage conservation have been introduced in more cities.

11.2 Interview Guide 2

Interview Guide	
Background on the initiative	How was it initiated and developed? What made it a viable intervention? What factors influenced your decision on supporting/ not supporting the initiative? What were the key experiences that informed the design and process of this initiative?
Overall strategy and objective of the initiative	What are the benefits/ set-backs of the initiative
Overall approach for the initiative	How does the initiative compare with other initiatives?
What makes the initiative sustainable and pro-poor	What are the locally appropriate technologies included for the initiative?
Components and processes of the initiative that make it environmentally sustainable.	What features makes the initiative more sustainable? What are sustainable interventions or good practices?
How is local institutional functioning and governance strengthened?	Organisational structure for implementation of the initiative
How does the initiative address issues of hijacking by powerful stakeholders?	Approaches adopted by local governments for mobilising local resources for sustaining investments
Policy and programme context in the water sector	Actions of local governments for enhancing access to water supply and sanitation in non-intervention areas and for sustainability of infrastructure to be provided.
GIS and planning	How has decision-making been facilitated? How are GIS initiatives expected to be utilised and updated for continued use as a decision-making tool?
Poverty reduction:	The economic activities introduced for improving livelihoods of households.
Gender	How are gender issues mainstreamed for the initiative? How empowered are women in the communities? Is there any resistance to giving women greater role in decision-making? How is the presence of women in decision making ensured?
Community organisations and support systems:	Background about the creation, functioning and the role of local groups. Nature of existing CBOs and on what basis are they expected to provide support for O&M.
Capacity building	What capacity building initiatives have been undertaken under the initiative?
	What are the benefits of having a combined training programme for all stakeholders involved in the intervention?
Key issues related to up-scaling	How are sustainable interventions identified and publicized to make them attractive for others to adapt? What have been the experiences of up-scaling interventions where different stakeholders are involved? What are the causes at local levels for limited up-scaling of recognized good practices? What can be done to facilitate the up-scaling

11.3 Focus Group Guide

Guide for Discussions with Technical Staff	
1. Extent of involvement in implementation of the intervention	• How was it initiated and developed? • What made it a viable intervention? • What factors influenced your decision on supporting/ not supporting the initiative? • What were the key experiences that informed the design and process of this initiative?
2. Experience in the field in implementing the intervention	• What is the difference in implementation from the norm? • What are the positive and negative aspects of the participatory processes?
3. Up-scaling hindrances	• What are the hindrances in up-scaling the interventions?

Guide for Community Level Discussion	
1. Context in which the good practice was introduced	• Conditions of the settlement prior to introduction of the intervention • How did they learn about the intervention? • Queries raised and actions taken to decide on participating
2. Decision making for participation	• Who made the decision to participate in the intervention? • What were the potential identified – if any, and what actions were taken to overcome problems
3. Financial	• What amount was contributed for participating in the intervention? • From where/ how was the required amount collected and paid?
4. Benefits	• What have been the consequences of the improvements in your environment (socially, economically and individually)?

11.4 Fieldwork

A journal was used to write notes, accounts and articulate observations and new queries that came to mind during interviews. Since the credibility of research relies on the neutrality of the researcher (Patton 2002), in Ahmedabad, the researcher revealed her relationship with the NGO Saath and her prior associations with the projects in Indore and Bhopal. Credibility was also ensured through triangulation of data. A chain of evidence was maintained by ensuring that the evidence collected was correctly portrayed and appropriately examined to reach the conclusions – thereby once again achieving construct validity and overall quality of the study.

Since collection of data and analysis of decision routines was in the context of key events, the focus was on the procedures and processes rather than isolated individual actions. The key events identified for data collection ranged from the initiation to the evolution and implementation and/or the current situation. To validate data gathered from individual respondents, related questions were included for the different groups of stakeholders. This not only validated the data, but also provided more reliable data and understanding about the different facets of processes and implications of decisions.

To validate data gathered from individual respondents, related questions were included for the different groups of stakeholders. The related questions not only validated the data, but also provided more reliable data and understanding about the different facets of processes and implications of decisions. The queries to a cross-section of respondents helped to validate data from each source at least once, while data from respondents who had been involved in the implementation of the MHP was validated with other published documents of those involved in the process. In East Africa, the process details were validated through the interview process and group discussions in a few selected towns. Moreover, the documentation on the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative was extensive-and the interviews helped to focus on and validate the data on the processes and procedures followed in the planning of the intervention.

During the fieldwork, some of the early findings/ data were verified through literature searches and through feedback sought from the interviewees. The preparation of a timelines for identification of 'key events' in the wider contexts and decision frames was essential to aid validation of the data collected. from multiple sources of evidence, and to identify gaps and differences in some of the data collected. In Ahmedabad, this was further validated through a study of the files and through interviews with non-participating stakeholders. The varying information from the different respondents led to further queries to get a more in-depth understanding of a few key events followed by a crosscheck with more tangible data on other occurrences close to the time of the events. In Sri Lanka, while the 'case-data' was the historical, the focus of interviews was on current influences of processes and procedures introduced at the time on approaches to urban environmental improvement and on those involved in its implementation.

The data from files on conditions prior to implementation of works under the slum-networking project for the specific areas in Ahmedabad were compared with findings from the focus groups, observations in the field and the list of intervention areas from the SNP Cell (list of completed works). These gaps and inconsistencies identified through this process were followed-up during interviews with other respondents and, in some cases-the original respondent. The method and triangulation enhanced the validity of the decision situations.

12 APPENDIX 12: List of Respondents

	Case	Name	Post	Type
1	GPs	Mr Ashish Agarwal	State Coordinator for City Manager's Association in Madhya Pradesh	Discussion
2	GPs	Mr Kulwant Singh	Chief Technical Advisor (WAC Programme)	Interview
3	GPs	Mr Nicholas You	UN-Habitat Best Practice Partnership	Questionnaire
4	GPs	Mr R K Safaya	HUDCO Executive Director (D)	Interview
5	GPs	Mr R P Singhal	DIABP Chief (Finance & Training)	Interview
6	GPs	Mr Rajiv Asthana	DIABP Senior Documentation Officer	Interview
7	GPs	Mr S R Ramanujam	CRISIL Head - Urban Infrastructure	Interview & internet communication
8	GPs	Mr Yashesh Anantani	Coordinator-City Managers Association, Gujarat (CMAG)	Discussion
9	GPs	Mr. Krishnamurthy	DIABP Senior Documentation Officer	Discussion
10	GPs	Ms Diane Diacon	BSHF	Interview
11	GPs	Ms Jenny	BSHF	Interview
12	GPs	Ms Manvita Baradi	ICMA India/ South Asia Director	Interview
13	GPs	Ms Meghna Malhotra	ICMA India/ South Asia Program Manager	Interview
14	GPs	Ms Rekha Keswara	BSHF	Interview
15	GPs	Ms Silvia Guimares	BSHF	Interview
16	GPs	Ms Urvi Mankad	Ex-State Coordinator for City Manager's Association in Madhya Pradesh	Discussion
17	GPs	Ms Wandia Seaforth	Acting Chief, BPP since June 2005. Human Settlements Officer & a Gender Specialist	Interview
18	LVWATSAN	Council members & staff	Health Inspector, Secretary & others	Group Discussion
19	LVWATSAN	Kisii Council members	Town Clerk, Mun Engineer & Social Worker	Group Discussion
20	LVWATSAN	Mr Graham Alabaster	UN Habitat, Programme Manager, Water Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch	Interview
21	LVWATSAN	Mr M Mujwahuzi	UN Habitat, Chief Technical Adviser for Water in African Cities program	Interview
22	LVWATSAN	Mr P S O Agulo	Mayor	Interview
23	LVWATSAN	Mr Patrick Ombogo	Chief Executive Officer, Lake Victoria South Water Services Board	Interview
24	LVWATSAN	Mr Pieter Van Dongen	UN-Habitat Consultant	Interview
25	LVWATSAN	Mr Pireh Otieno	UN Habitat, Associate Programme Officer (CD), Water, Sanitation and Infrastructure Branch	Interview
26	LVWATSAN	Mr. B Paddy Twesigye	Project Manager, Planning & Capital Development Dept, National Water & Sewerage Corporation	Interview
27	LVWATSAN	Mr. Charles Wana-Etyem	UN Habitat Consultant in Uganda	Interview
28	LVWATSAN	Mr. Mutashubirwa	UN Habitat Project Manager Tanzania	Interview
29	LVWATSAN	Mr. Ochido	Dy CEO (District Water Office)	Interview
30	LVWATSAN	Mr. Okeyo Owiro	Works Officer	Interview

	Case	Name	Post	Type
31	LVWATSAN	Mr. Patrick L Ouya	Town Clerk	Interview
32	LVWATSAN	Mr. Peter Wegulo	UN Habitat Project Manager Uganda	Interview
33	LVWATSAN	Ms Angela Hakizimana	UN Habitat Gender Mainstreaming Unit	Interview
34	MHP	Mr Chularatne	SEVANATHA	Interview
35	MHP	Mr Dayanand	REEL	Interview
36	MHP	Mr George King	UN-Habitat	Interview
37	MHP	Mr Gunawardane	National Housing Development Authority	Interview
38	MHP	Mr Jayaratne	SEVANATHA	Interview
39	MHP	Mr Ranjit Samarasinghe	Consultant	Interview
40	MHP	Ms Hilke Ebert	GTZ	Interview
41	MHP	Ms Indu Weerasoori	Director, Development Planning,	Interview
42	SNP	Alice Morris	UNNATI	Interview
43	SNP	Engineers	AMC	Group Discussion
44	SNP	Mr Alex Jorgensen	ADB	Interview
45	SNP	Mr Amit Shah	Mayor	Interview
46	SNP	Mr Anand Patel	Deputy City Engineer in-charge	Interview
47	SNP	Mr Anil Mukim	Municipal Commissioner	Interview
48	SNP	Mr Arun Mudgerikar	UNICEF Project Officer	Interview
49	SNP	Mr Arvind Chauhan	Corporator	Interview
50	SNP	Mr Ashok Kharej	Engineer in-charge of SNP Pilot in Bhopal	Interview
51	SNP	Mr Banker	Project Management Consultant	Interview
52	SNP	Mr Bimal Patel	Environment Planning Collaborative	Interview
53	SNP	Mr Chetan Vaidya	USAID	Interview
54	SNP	Mr D P Shah	UCD Director	Interview
55	SNP	Mr Debashish Nayak	Consultant - Heritage	Interview
56	SNP	Mr Devendra B Makwana	Dy Mun Comm	Interview
57	SNP	Mr Dilip Mahajan	Dy Mun Comm	Interview
58	SNP	Mr Dwijendra Tripathi	Compiler of pilot project of SNP	Discussion
59	SNP	Mr Fr Paul	SXSSS	Interview
60	SNP	Mr G K Sardar	AMC, Engg	Interview
61	SNP	Mr Hasmukh Panchal	Saath Engineer in-charge	Interview
62	SNP	Mr Himanshu Parikh	Initiator of slum networking in Baroda and Ahmedabad	Interview
63	SNP	Mr I P Gautam	Municipal Commissioner	Interview
64	SNP	Mr Kirtee Shah	Ahmedabad Study Action Group	Interview
65	SNP	Mr Mahesh Singh	Add CEO, GUDM	Interview
66	SNP	Mr Mahida	Deputy City Engineer in-charge	Interview
67	SNP	Mr Matthew Chandy	USAID CHF-India Director	Interview
68	SNP	Mr Mihir Bhatt	SEWA FPI/ UPP/ AIDMI Director	Interview
69	SNP	Mr Nabroon Bhattacharjee	USAID	Interview
70	SNP	Mr Nayan Zinzuwadia	Sub-Inspector, TDO	Interview

	Case	Name	Post	Type
71	SNP	Mr Nimish Patel & Ms Parul Zaveri	Architects	Interview
72	SNP	Mr Niraj Lal	SHARDA Trust	Interview
73	SNP	Mr P U Asnani	Advisor to Municipal Commissioner	Interview
74	SNP	Mr Pramesh	PRAVAH	Interview
75	SNP	Mr Pritam Raut	Town Planning Officer	Interview
76	SNP	Mr Rajendra Joshi	Managing Trustee, Saath	Interview
77	SNP	Mr Rajesh Shah	SAVE	Interview
78	SNP	Mr Rajubhai Babubhai Patel	Saath	Interview
79	SNP	Mr Ravikant D Joshi	Consultant to CRISIL	Discussion
80	SNP	Mr S P Singh	Programme Manager, SJSRY, MUD-GoI	Interview
81	SNP	Mr Satyanarayan Vajella	USAID	Interview
82	SNP	Mr Utpal Padia	AMC, DyMC	Interview
83	SNP	Mr V Mote & Mr Niraj Lal	SHARDA Trust - Trustee	Interview
84	SNP	Mr Vinay Vyasa	Ex Dy MC in AMC. Superintendent of Stamps & Inspector General of registration	Interview
85	SNP	Mr Vishal G Panchal & Mr Devang Patel	Saath	Interview
86	SNP	Mr Yatin Pandya	Vastu Shilp Foundation	Interview
87	SNP	Ms Ami Ravat	Executive Director	Interview
88	SNP	Ms Bharti Patel	Technical Supervisor	Interview
89	SNP	Ms Bijal Bhatt	SEWA Gujarat Mahila Housing Sewa Trust	Interview
90	SNP	Ms Chinmayi Desai	Saath Coordinator	Interview
91	SNP	Ms Darshini Mahadevia	Planner/ FI/ researcher	Interview
92	SNP	Ms Jayshree Vyas	SEWA Bank Managing Director	Interview
93	SNP	Ms Madhu Bharti	Planner/ FI/ researcher	Interview
94	SNP	Ms Soma Ghosh Moulik	WSP Urban Institutional Specialist	Interview
95	SNP	Ms Varsha Thakker	Gujarat Mahila Housing SEWA Trust	Interview
96	SNP	Ms Veena Padia	CARE	Interview
97	SNP	Study visit	Presentation on up-scaling SNP in Agra	Interview
98	MHP	Mr Madawan Rajendran	CDC	Interview
99	MHP	Mr K Mogan Kumar Nayar	CDC	Interview
100	LVWATSAN	Ms Hyrene Atieno Opiyo	Youth coordinator and member of JIT	Interview
101	LVWATSAN	Mr Arthur Imbo	Secretary General of District Residents' Association	Interview
102	LVWATSAN	Kisii	17 of Jagoo Self Help Group 18 of Township Group 15 of Kisii Parish Group 1 rep. from Youth Group	Discussion
103	SNP	Ms Devuben Parmar	CBO member	Interview
104	SNP	Ms Madhuben Solanki	CBO member	Interview
105	SNP	Mr Mansingh Maurya	CBO member	Interview

	Case	Name	Post	Type
106	SNP	Ms Sheikh Sanjida Ahmed	CBO member	Interview
107	SNP	Mr Yakub Khan Pathan	CBO member	Interview
108	SNP	Ashapuri Nagar	12 persons (2 women & 10 men)	Group Discussion
109	SNP	Azad Nagar	25 persons (10 women & 10 men & 5 youth)	Group Discussion
110	SNP	Barot Vas	10 persons (1 youth & 9 men)	Group Discussion
111	SNP	Bawalavlavi Nagar	12 persons (10 women & 2 men)	Group Discussion
112	SNP	Chharanagar-na- Chhapra	23 persons (23 women & 0 men)	Group Discussion
113	SNP	Fakira Tank-na- Chhapra	20 persons (16 women & 4 men)	Group Discussion
114	SNP	Gayatri Nagar	18 persons (17 women & 1 men)	Group Discussion
115	SNP	Ghanshyam Nagar	18 persons (18 women)	Group Discussion
116	SNP	Hanuman Nagar I	22 persons (12 women & 10 men)	Group Discussion
117	SNP	Hasmukhlal-ni-Chali/ Madrasi-ni-Chali	14 persons (10 women and 4 men)	Group Discussion
118	SNP	Jayshakti Nagar	11 persons (6 women & 5 men)	Group Discussion
119	SNP	K K Vishwanath-ni-Chali/ Machhipir-na-Chhapra	30 persons (20 women & 10 men)	Group Discussion
120	SNP	Kailash Nagar	38 persons (19 women & 9 men)	Group Discussion
121	SNP	Keshav Nagar	27 persons (20 women &7 men)	Group Discussion
122	SNP	Khodiyar Nagar	19 persons (11 women & 8 men)	Group Discussion
123	SNP	Meldi Nagar	7 persons (5 women & 2 men)	Group Discussion
124	SNP	Niti Nagar	20 persons (women & men)	Group Discussion
125	SNP	Pandey-ni-Chali	20 persons (11 women & 9 men)	Group Discussion
126	SNP	Patan Nagar I & II	5 persons (4 women & 1 men)	Group Discussion
127	SNP	Pravinagar-Guptanagar 1 (Khodiyar-ni-Chali)	20 persons (20 women)	Group Discussion
128	SNP	Pravinagar-Guptanagar 2 (Pataudi-ni-Chali)	24 persons (20 women & 4 men)	Group Discussion
129	SNP	Samajnavrachana-ni-Chali	14 persons (6 women & 8 men)	Group Discussion
130	SNP	Sanjay Nagar	8 persons (5 women & 3 men)	Group Discussion
131	SNP	Sharifkhan Pathan-ni-Chali	6 persons (4 women & 2 men)	Group Discussion
132	SNP	Shivaji Nagar I	5 persons (3 women & 2 men)	Group Discussion
133	SNP	Sinheshwari Nagar	9 persons (6 women & 3 men)	Group Discussion
134	SNP	Talavadi-na-Chhapra	12 persons (7 women &5 men)	Group Discussion
135	SNP	Ms Chinmayi Desai/ CBO case-studies	Saath Coordinator	Interview