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**Donor-NGO Relations: The dynamics of European
Community Development Co-operation Policy**

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**Thesis presented for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in the
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Abstract

Shifts in development theory turned attention to the role Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) could play in donor development policy. The heightened interest in NGOs was accompanied by an increased availability of funds and presaged a significant growth in the size of the NGO sector. This expanded role had repercussions on both their internal organisation and their relations with other players in the aid arena. However, in the 1990s, the financial market for development co-operation became more competitive due to the changes in the former communist countries and the embrace of neo-liberal principles. Consequently, NGOs were criticised for their lack of professionalism and poor accountability, and found themselves subject to donor conditionality and the assimilation of the language, values and systems of donors.

Donor/NGO relations are examined using the European Community (EC) and the position of European NGOs in the EC's Development Co-operation Policy. Insight into the relationship is gained by a focus on the evolution of relations between the European Commission, NGOs, and their representative body, CLONG, the Liaison Committee of the Development NGOs to the European Union. This thesis has demonstrated that over time the EC policy towards NGOs has reflected the imbalance of power and authority in the relationship, as NGOs were drawn in to play a more constrained and conditional role in EC policy. CLONG has suffered as a result of its position at the interface between the European Commission and European NGOs, and its financial dependence on the Commission. The practical application of EC policy to a particular area is examined with a focus on the SADC(C) region. Evidence has shown that EC policy has been influenced by the position of South Africa, a situation reflected in the cofinanced activities of UK NGOs. While the EC policy has been influential, local needs and NGO priorities have also driven UK NGO projects.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
ANC African National Congress
BWI Bretton Woods Institute
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CLONG Liaison Committee of the European NGOs
COMESA Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO Civil Society Organisations
CSP Cofinancing Support Programme
DEV A/4 Development Policy section at the European Commission
DGI Directorate general I
DGVIII Directorate general Development
EC European Community
EDF European development Fund
EU European Union
GA General Assembly
GRO Grass Roots Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
MECU Million European Currency Units
MTR Mid Term Review
NGDO Non-Governmental Development Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP National Indicative Plan
NNGO Northern Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA New Policy Agenda
PHARE Poland and Hungary – Aid for restructuring
REPA Regional Economic Partnership Agreement
RIP Regional Indicative Plan
SA South Africa
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADC(C) Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SAF Structural Adjustment Facility
SAL Structural Adjustment Loan
SASP Structural Adjustment Support Programme
SCOOP Common Co-operative Service
SCR Common Service for External Relations
SNGO Southern Non-Governmental Organization
TACIS Programme for technical assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEU Treaty of the European Union
VOICE Voluntary Organisations in Co-operation in Emergencies
WTO World Trade Organization

Chapter 1: Introduction

Aims and Objectives

Non-Governmental Organisations exist in civil society between donors and recipients (Fowler, 1996). Since the 1960s there has been a significant rise in the number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in existence (Riddell & Robinson, 1995), such that the term now covers a wide spectrum of organisations (Vakil, 1997) and has led to an accompanying increase of interest in their activities (Tvedt, 1998). It is now not uncommon for representatives of NGOs to be present at international conferences and to produce valued comments and opinions on a wide range of issues (Van Rooy, 1997). They have achieved a recognised position in civil society in the North and are emerging in increasing numbers and gaining in importance in the South. The heightened interest in NGOs has meant that over time they have found themselves to be gradually incorporated into development co-operation policy, taking on a number of roles. This has resulted in a position of close proximity to northern donors funding projects in developing countries in the South.

A vast theoretical discussion has thus been built up concerning the expansion of the NGO sector, and the subsequent repercussions for them. However gaps can be identified in the analytical and investigative literature of NGO/donor relations, particularly with respect to the possible tensions between them, which have developed as they endeavoured to respond to their changing environment. The thesis seeks to fill the gap by researching into donor/NGO relations in the European Union over time. The focus is therefore on the European Community¹ as a northern donor channelling

¹. The term European Community is used throughout the thesis rather than the European Union, to signify its role as a multilateral donor.

funds through northern (European) NGOs² to Developing countries under the European Community's Development Co-operation policy.

Initially there is a need to establish an understanding of the position, function and characteristics of NGOs, and the extent to which these have changed over time in response to shifts in development theory, and the pressure brought to bear by both donors and Southern NGOs. Once an appreciation of the dynamics of NGOs' role and the significance of donor/NGO relations has been established, attention will turn to trace the progression of European Community Development Co-operation policy over time and its impact on the role of European NGOs, and relate the findings to the academic discourse. Of special interest is the B7-6000 budget line, to which European NGOs³ have sole right of application and through which the European Commission co-finances development projects in the South. This is an example of a demand-led budget line, whereby the use to which funds are put is determined by the project proposals emanating from European NGOs. This then begs the questions: to what extent is the use of the line freely determined by the NGOs or to what degree is it under the influence of the donor's agenda, and, hence, are the NGOs able to shape the direction and detail of the European Community's policy, or do they merely act out a passive role predetermined by the European Commission. Therefore in addition to their role within the policy, their participation in the formation of policy will be appraised. Consideration of the power and influence exerted by both NGOs, as a sector in European civil society, and by the Liaison Committee of the European NGOs (CLONG)⁴, representing the interests of European NGOs, will be examined

² The research is concerned with the position of Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs). However, as the term did not appear in EC documents until 1995, for consistency, it was considered appropriate to use the term NGO.

³ That is European NGDOs.

⁴ The Liaison Committee of the European NGOs is normally known by its French pseudonym CLONG and will be referred to as such hereafter.

and evaluated. This line of research will also examine the dynamics of relations between the European Commission and European NGOs, and the European Commission and CLONG, and the extent to which the term 'partnership' can be applied.

As a further refinement to narrow down the line of research and provide a focus for the illustration of the European Community policy in practice, the SADC(C)⁵ region has been chosen for a number of reasons but particularly because it came into existence after the emergence of the B7-6000 budget line and therefore offers the opportunity to trace developments in the use made of the line. The region is important to the European Community for a number of reasons, not least because of the economic interests in the area's resources, but also the desire to contain the power of South Africa, to fight against apartheid, and the goal to promote a similar model of regional coherence as its own. There have been significant changes in the region, which have impacted on the degree to which the European Community has channelled funds through European NGOs into the region. While new region-specific budget lines have appeared and disappeared the B7-6000 budget line has continued to provide a financial source for co-financed projects in the SADC(C) region. Therefore an analysis of the application of funds from the B7-6000 budget line will provide an in depth look at the NGOs' response to conditions and problems in the region. A decision was made to focus on the use of the B7-6000 budget line by UK NGOs in the SADC(C) region, justified on the basis that the UK had a significant presence in the region due to historical and cultural links. It is, therefore, expected that UK NGOS

⁵ The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was first held in 1980, but subsequently became known as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992.

will have developed considerable associations with the people on the basis of their struggle against the apartheid regime and their classification as poor countries.

In summary, therefore, this thesis will

- Provide an understanding of the changing environment of development NGOs overtime
- Examine the evolution of European Development Co-operation policy and the role of NG(D)Os within that framework
- Establish the relative positions of the European Commission, European NG(D)Os and CLONG in the process of decision-making, policy design and implementation in the sphere of EC Development Co-operation policy
- Analyse the application of EC policy to the SAD(C)C region
- Review the use of the B7-6000 budget line in the SAD(C)C region by UK NG(D)Os.

An outline Methodology

Research into relations between the European Commission and European NGOs and CLONG relies heavily on the ability to obtain sufficient and continuous documentation of relevant matters from the European Commission itself or from other organisations, which are often funded by the European Commission. The bi-monthly publication of the ACP-EU Courier, as its title suggests provides information about the ACP group of countries, which includes the SADC(C) countries, and is funded by the European Commission. In addition, all matters concerning the European Community's Development Co-operation Policy towards the ACP group, as well as information regarding the European Commission and its relations with and policy

towards NGOs can be located via the europa web site- the official web site for the European Union. Information concerning CLONG was obtained from a visit to their office at SCF London HQ, and from their web site. However as the relations between the European Commission and CLONG changed so this ultimately impacted on the web-site as at the time CLONG was dependent on funding from the European Commission.

Furthermore, during the period of research, there were times when information was difficult to obtain due to changes in presentation policy and administrative structure within the European Commission. The annual report and data tables relating to the B7-6000 budget line grew in size over the period under review from a single document of manageable proportions to eventually include such a large set of data tables (a reflection of the growth in the use and funding of the budget line) that the data tables were no longer automatically sent to documentation centres and a special request had to be made to the European Commission for them. Overtime the presentation of annual data became severely delayed (up to two years late) before finally becoming impossible to locate even after direct communication with the appropriate personnel. On several other occasions the documents were only made available in French and therefore needed to be translated into English. From the information presented therefore it can be seen that there was a reliance on sources dependent upon the European Commission.

Organisation of the thesis

The organisation of the thesis and its subsequent chapters will take the following approach. In chapter 2, there will be a review of the academic literature sources pertinent to the transformation of the NGO sector to identify the changes in the role

and relative position of Northern NGOs, and the subsequent impact on their performance and relations, particularly with respect to donors. Chapter 3 will trace the transformation of European Community Development Co-operation policy over time and the status of European NGOs within that framework. Chapter 4 focuses on the evolution of relations between the European Commission, the European NGOs and their representative body, CLONG. Once the significance of European NGOs in the formation and the structure of the policy are established, the application of the policy to a specific case study area – the SADC(C) region - will be discussed. Chapter 5 identifies the policy stance taken by the European Community to SADC(C), both during the period of unrest between the European Community and South Africa, and the subsequent period of reconciliation between them. In chapter 6 the focus is on the use made by the UK NGOs of the B7-6000 budget line, under which the European Commission co-finances projects proposed by European NGOs. Finally, chapter 7 draws some conclusions to the issue of donor-NGO relations as they relate to the European situation before identifying areas of possible future research.

Chapter 2: The Changing Milieu of the Non-Governmental Organisations

The changes in development thinking provide a backdrop to the dynamics and performance of the NGO sector. The ongoing debate, over the best way to promote economic growth and hence development in the South, has influenced donor development co-operation policy. The challenges presented to the NGOs, therefore, need to be discussed in the context of political ideological trends as well as the economic and social environment.

This chapter aims to outline the changes in development thinking since the 1960s and to provide a review of the literature concerning the subsequent impact on NGOs. Its main focus is to identify the factors, which resulted in an increased role for NGOs as intermediaries in the flow of financial resources to developing countries, and to assess the consequences of the changes on the NGO sector and its relations with other players, in particular the donor-NGO relationship. Therefore the objectives of the chapter are to:

- (i) review the shifts in development theory and the role for NGOs
- (ii) examine the characteristics of NGOs and the possible impact of their enhanced role, and
- (iii) explore their relations with other organisations in the development finance sector.

Shifts in Development Theory

The shifting emphasis in development theory and development economics has in turn determined the role and focus of foreign aid in developing countries. Until the early 1960s, development theory was dominated by the classical Structuralist approach, which favoured direct intervention by the State to overcome the deficiencies of the market mechanism 'government as prime mover' (Adelman, 2000:49). Aid flows were essentially at inter-state level with a marginal, complementary role for NGOs (Tvedt, 1998). Development was to be achieved through the provision of large physical infrastructure projects, with a trickle down effect leading to an improvement in the income and welfare of the poor (Riddell & Robinson, 1995). By the mid 1970s, a growing awareness, that the focus on GNP growth was not generating the economic and social development necessary to alleviate the poverty of the masses, resulted in a re-examination of the development process. At this stage, the development strategy favoured by the World Bank (redistribution with growth) emphasised the reduction of poverty through the increase in productivity and efficiency in both the rural and the informal urban sectors (Thorbecke, 2000). An alternative basic needs strategy was advocated by the ILO, which included minimum standards of living and the provision of essential community services (Chambers, 1995; Thorbecke, 2000). Thus by the mid 1970s, aid from the World Bank and Western governments explicitly targeted the poorest people, regions and countries, using the integrated rural development project to tackle the root causes of rural poverty (Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Mosley & Eeckhout, 2000). It was appreciated that to ensure sustainability required the 'participation and involvement of the poor' (Thorbecke, 2000:33), and NGOs found an increasing role to play in aid distribution as a result of their ability to engage with

the now targeted sections of the population in developing countries (Fowler & James, 1994).

Increasing criticisms of the state's ability to promote the level of development and the elimination of poverty provided the opportunity for a shift towards the neo-classical school of economic development. Neo-liberalists felt that the level of state intervention was excessive and actually responsible for the failure of the market (Colclough & Manor, 1995; Adelman, 2000). Long (1988) questioned the state's ability to act independently in the face of the power exerted by the dominant classes. He argued that the economically and politically weak voice of 'the masses' was further constrained by the continued weakness of institutions needed to deal with the functioning of a complex society. Therefore, while they were aware of its limitations, the Neoliberalists felt that the market resulted in a more efficient allocation of resources (Colclough & Manor, 1995). There emerged two alternate strategies: one where government intervention should be curtailed to allow the markets to set prices and the other which supported a continued role for the government but with an emphasis on labour intensive export production (Adelman, 2000). At this stage the World Bank was concerned to promote stabilisation in a period of increasing foreign debt, with the endorsement of SAPs (Riddell, 1992). These advocated a reduced role for the state, and provided an opportunity for NGOs to concentrate on micro project development and target marginalized groups of people (Tvedt, 1998). The position of NGOs was furthered by the general crisis in the 'welfare' state and the increasing interest paid to private and other sectors to act as service delivery agents (Hewitt, 1994; Tvedt, 1998; Thorbecke, 2000). NGOs could no longer be simply labeled as gap-fillers in service delivery programmes, but were seen as important actors in the new alternative model of development (Tvedt, 1998). According to Chambers (1995),

the decade of the 1980s was seen to be one of structural adjustment without a human face, with the focus on the pursuit of efficiency via the private sector, whereas Hulme & Edwards (1997:276) viewed it as a time when the exposure of the 'myth of the state' was replaced by the 'myth of the market'. However one contradiction was that the successful implementation of SAPs required a strong and significant government presence rather than a minimal one (Thorbecke, 2000). During the 1980s, the progress of the development discourse was furthered by an awareness of the role of human capital and trade in the growth of developing countries, as well as the emergence of the new institutional economics (North, 1990). According to Cameron (2000), NIE could help to explain the most complex world of development and thus was vulnerability of the poor to make decisions in a situation of risk and uncertainty-

'...information deficiency models, including bounded rationality (areas of uncertainty about opportunities and /or their unintended outcomes), public goods (concealed demand and free-rider problems), and moral hazard (ability to cheat others) propositions' (Cameron, 2000:630).

He observed that NGOs could function as agents of change, path-dependent institutions or re-distributors of uncertainty (Cameron, 2000). As agents of change, NGOs function between the state, the market and civil society, and could be pulled in three directions. As path-dependent institutions, the NGOs incur transaction costs, which are related to their staffing requirements and mission statement. As re-distributors of uncertainty, NGOs act to support their target groups in the face of the complexities of the institutional arena-

'...institutions most willing to challenge and change the distribution of uncertainty in favour of groups of people, who face disproportionate threats to their physical and psychological well-being from forces beyond their control.' (Cameron, 2000:634)

However, although NGOs were in a position to reach the poor, Bratton (1989) queried their ability to involve local people in the decision-making procedure. The ending of the Cold War presented the opportunity to both 'roll back the state' and pursue the promotion of democracy, which manifested itself in a new approach to development and a new donor agenda. The Washington Consensus emerged in 1990 as a cluster of policy ideas, combining political and economic aspects with roles for both competitive markets and the state.

New Policy Agenda

The new policy agenda was driven by two basic sets of beliefs relating to neo-liberal economics and liberal democratic theory. The changing role of government formed one of the key components of the 'new policy agenda' of governance, democracy and conditionality (Robinson, 1994). Although it was argued that good government draws political, economic and social aspects together, the extent of direct state involvement in the economy and the provision of social services was to be limited and support was given to the idea that NGOs could be a substitute for the state (Tvedt, 1998). NGOs were favoured either to cover the deficit in the government's provision of public goods or because the population did not trust commercial organizations (contract failure) and preferred NGOs (Tvedt, 1998). NGOs were attributed with being able to perform a number of functions. The left viewed NGOs as 'an instrument of empowerment' and the right as the preferred player to act as a substitute for the state (Bratton, 1989:569). They were also acknowledged as 'vehicles for democratisation' (Hulme & Edwards, 1997:6). Consequently, in view of the diverse needs of the population, there was a significant increase in the number of NGOs (Riddell & Robinson, 1995)

Central to the new policy agenda was the promotion of liberal democracy and the development of civil society, since the official agencies' approach to development now moved on to the 'myth of the market plus civil society' (Hulme & Edwards, 1997:277). NGOs were considered to be key actors in civil society and therefore found themselves faced with a potentially augmented role. Robinson (1994) argued that, although the reduced role of the state could lead to an increased NGO involvement in public policy, a weakened state could also result in less resources being available and by implication to increased competition between NGOs. Politically, NGOs sought to contribute to democratic reform and the empowerment of the communities in which they worked, which therefore necessitated that they acted as facilitators rather than agents of change (Pearce, 1993).

The 1990s was a period of aid fatigue with a consequent emphasis on aid conditionality. In the early years, the World Bank followed an orthodox approach with the emphasis on a period of stabilization accompanied by an appropriate SAP. In contrast the 'heterodox' approach, supported by UNICEF incorporated a social dimension – adjustment with a human face (Thorbecke, 2000). Thus the World Bank and the United Nations began to look more favourably on the role of NGOs in the development process as their attention shifted to participation and sustainability (World Bank, 1990; Pratt & Stone, 1994). NGOs welcomed the opportunity to promote issues, such as women, the environment, grass roots, human rights and trade relations, in discussions of the development policy of Western Governments and International Organizations (Weiss & Gordenker, 1996). Following on from UN conferences, NGOs have been active in exerting pressure and aiming to directly influence the shape of international laws and institutions, often through the publication of independent reports (Princen & Finger, 1994).

At the end of the twentieth century, the international awareness of country-specific problems (e.g. financial crises) pointed to the need for a re-evaluation of the role of the government, which led to the 'revisionist' school of economic development (Adelman, 2000). This post-Washington Consensus approach supported a dynamic, flexible, interactive mix of state and market functions (Adelman, 2000). The emphasis was that governments must play a strategic role in economic development.

As a result of the shift in development thinking, NGOs were identified as key players in the development process. This prompts the discussion of a number of issues: the main characteristics of NGOs; their classification; the repercussions for their internal affairs of their increasing responsibilities; the changing nature of their relationships with other organisations in the development finance sector; and, the possibility of problems in their relations with the South. Therefore attention will now turn to identifying and commenting on these issues.

The main characteristics of NGOs

NGOs have been attributed with special characteristics, which make them suitable for the new approach to development. It has been argued that in contrast to the state, NGOs act quickly and flexibly (Smith, 1987; Bratton, 1989), are closer to those in need (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), are better placed to target the poorest (Fowler & James, 1994), are able to avoid bureaucracy, inequality, inefficiency and corruption associated with the state (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), have well motivated field staff and a low cost management style (Bratton, 1989) and, are innovative and recognized as a significant factor in civil society (Smillie, 1997). Korten (1987) contends that

they are an important catalyst in micro-policy reforms. Equally they are not constrained by commercial objectives and are able to set a lower threshold to the poor's access to the services they need and thus achieve a deeper poverty reach (Fowler & James, 1994). On the basis of these qualities, it is thought that NGOs have a higher level of efficiency in their operations, are more cost effective and have a significant impact on development (Pratt & Stone, 1994). Farrington and Bebbington (1993) argue that, as NGOs are contracted to a project, they do not represent a recurrent cost for governments and posit that donors are able to gain a subsidy by taking advantage of the NGOs' situation. However despite these positive qualities accredited to NGOs, it has been suggested that the case for an increase in importance of NGOs rests on ideological grounds rather than empirical evidence (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Riddell & Robinson, 1995).

The focus on NGOs has also identified some deficiencies both in their impact and their internal organization. Annis (1987) suggests that

small scale	meant	insignificant
politically independent	meant	powerless
low cost	meant	underfinanced/poor quality
innovative	meant	temporary/unsustainable.

It is felt that their micro projects maybe effective but are also inefficient, and, with the infrequency of research and evaluation, little can be systematically learnt from their experience (Smith, 1987; Bratton; 1989). Further criticism suggests that their impact is not only transitory but also highly localized (Edwards & Hulme, 1992) with projects seen as discrete and isolated (Smith, 1987; Twose, 1987; Bratton, 1989). Their internal organization is said to be based on unclear management principles and suffers from a shortage of skilled managers (Bratton, 1989). As the development focus

moves away from the micro-level, the challenge of pursuing meso-level strategies calls into question NGOs' technical competency and professionalism. In order to improve their strategic and managerial decisions, it is suggested that NGOs need to employ professional personnel, but this could result in them losing links with their voluntary base (Korten, 1987). With the increased flow of official funding through NGOs, criticism has been leveled at them for apparently attaching more importance to their relations with the state and the enhancement of their own technical capacity, than the improvement of their relations with the local community (Pearce, 1993; Smillie, 1995). A further criticism insinuated that poor co-ordination, between NGOs, or NGOs and governments, has had a tendency to limit the potential impact of their activities (Robinson, 1992; Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Smillie, 1995).

Overall then, opinions are divided regarding the evaluation of the character of NGOs. On the one hand, their localized micro-projects are lauded as able to achieve a greater impact, with their people and situation specific approach, but, on the other hand, criticism focuses on their potential inefficiency and the lack of ability to duplicate, evaluate and learn from the experience.

Classification of NGOs

The focus on NGOs as key players in the development process has led to attempts to develop a classification framework in order to facilitate the analysis and improve the performance of the NGO sector. One area of confusion concerns the question of what constitutes an NGO. Vakil (1997) identifies an 'alphabet soup' of names which adds to the confusion

'BINGOs	big international nongovernmental organisation
CBOs	community-based organisations

CB-NGOs	community-based nongovernmental organisations
DOs	development organisations
DONGOs	donor nongovernmental organisations
GONGOs	government nongovernmental organisations
GROs	grassroots organisations
GRSOs	grassroots support organisations
IDCIs	international development co-operation organisations
INGOs	international nongovernmental organisations
NGDOs	nongovernmental development organisations
NNGOs	northern nongovernmental organisations
POs	people's organisations
PSCs	public service contractors
QUANGOs	quasi-nongovernmental organisations
SCOs	social change organisations
SNGOs	support nongovernmental organisations
WCOs	welfare church organisations' (Vakil 1997:2060).

There is agreement that these organisations are both private and self-governing but conflict over whether they are non-profitable or not-for profit (Weiss & Gordenker, 1996; Vakil, 1997). The confusion is embedded in the multi-faceted nature of NGOs, and the fact that they have been examined by different single disciplines, often in isolation.

Despite the limited success in reaching an acceptable definition of an NGO, academics have attempted to determine a simple system of classification, which could relate to the evolution of activities, engaged in by NGOs, and would correspond to the change in the focus from development aid to development co-operation. Korten (1987) identifies three generations of NGO activities. First generation activities focus on relief and welfare with a concentration on the individual/family and use images of starving people and child sponsorship schemes. Second generation activities focus on small scale self-reliant local development with, for example, the promotion of preventative health care and improvements to farm practices seen as pre-requisites to sustainability at the local/village level. Third generation activities emphasise the development of sustainable systems at national level with NGOs acting as a catalyst to

bring micro- and macro-levels together. Korten expects NNGOs to follow a progression through the three stages of activities and ultimately to aim to have very little direct involvement in overseas operations. He sees their role vis à vis Southern NGOs to be essentially supportive, and their main focus to be lobbying and advocacy work in the wider environment. In later work, Korten identifies fourth generation activities related to 'people's development movements' (Thomas, 1992; Smillie, 1995), which have a vision, are driven by social energy and rely on networks. Korten divides the NGO sector into voluntary organisations, public service contractors, people's organisations and GONGOs (created by government to support public policy). In fact, market driven public service contractors emerged because donors placed contracts with NGOs rather than with governments.

Elliott (1987) used a similar approach, by categorising the work of NGOs as part of a spectrum. This extended from welfare, through development, to empowerment and training for transformation with the focus on enabling the indigenous NGOs to become effective agents of change. He emphasises the political nature of development and wants NNGOs to be conspicuous by their absence. However, Vakil (1997) points out the difficulty of providing a simple classification of NGOs in the light of their 'multidimensional nature' and the span of different disciplines discussing the work of NGOs. In an effort to achieve a simpler classification than previous authors, Vakil (1997) suggests a framework based on organisational attributes, divided into essential and contingent categories. Essential descriptors are divided into *orientation*, which includes welfare, development, advocacy, research, networking and development education, and *the level of operation*, which includes international, regional, national and community. Contingent descriptors are divided a) the sectoral focus of an NGO and b) an evaluation of the attributes of an NGO, which includes accountability,

efficiency and participation. Commins (1997) furthered the discussion of the role of NGOs by suggesting there was a need for NGOs to move beyond their present aid work and focus on reshaping the forces that drive the global economy, while at the same time developing new relationships with low-income communities. On the other hand, Smillie (1997) points to the rise of the transnational NGO (TNGO) and criticises their concentration on short-term emergency work and child sponsorship schemes rather than long-term development work with growth. TNGOs are large, with the top few monopolising the bulk of the funds available from the general public, governments and UN agencies. Their resources enable them to immediately respond to new funding windows opened by donor agencies (Smillie, 1995).

In accordance with Korten's model, NGOs' activities are expected to follow a specific pattern, moving through an identified spectrum over time, but the reality is less clear-cut (Dolan, 1992; Thomas, 1992). Some NGOs undertake activities in more than one category and therefore the classification is inexact. To support this point, Dolan (1992) draws attention to the fact that the public is more responsive to appeals than lobbying

—'the British public continues to hold the view that the problems of the Third World can be solved by donations to charity' (Dolan, 1992:209),

and therefore NNGOs retain that approach even when their other work has moved on. Based on empirical evidence, Dolan (1992) posits that advocacy and lobbying activities carried out by NGOs should be firmly related to their project experiences. It could also be said that the activities of NGOs support the view that NGOs have been influenced by development policy and funding sources. Those NGOs that engage in

development work have seen their objectives and methods determined by the contemporary debate and its associated financial pattern.

Scaling-up operations

As a consequence of finding themselves labeled as important key players, NGOs have had to confront the task of how to scale up their operations to deal with this potentially augmented role. Edwards & Hulme (1992) suggest that scaling up is a term used to describe the goal of increasing their impact but not necessarily synonymous with an expansion of their size. They see the need for a strong conceptual framework, which would help identify the alternatives available to NGOs and enable them to make a rational, appropriate and realistic choice of strategy. Drawing on the works of several authors (Howes & Sattar, 1992; Klinmahorn & Ireland, 1992; Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 1992), Edwards & Hulme (1992) distinguish between three alternative strategies available to NGOs, namely *additive*, which means an increase in size of programme or organisation, *multiplicative*, which means impact through deliberate influence, networking, policy and legal reform, or training, and lastly *diffusive* with impact through informal and spontaneous spread. Each of these strategies has different implications for the NGOs concerned and their effectiveness would be situation specific. They further identify four alternative paths for NGOs to adhere to, being organisational growth, working with governments, advocacy in the North, or linking grassroots with lobbying and advocacy. They are aware that the strategies are not discrete, and Chambers (1992) underlines this by identifying a fifth strategy, which he suggests would cut across the above using 'generating, spreading and improving approaches and methods' (Chambers, 1992:40) e.g. rapid rural appraisal

and participatory rural appraisal. According to Chambers (1992), to realise the potential of this strategy requires

'innovation as normal practice, critical self awareness as personal attitude, sharing as institutional culture' (Chambers, 1992:47).

Although NGOs are now armed with an understanding of the alternative strategies they can choose between, doubts have been expressed about their ability to scale up, given the state of their organisational capacity (Dolan, 1992; Robinson, 1992). Carroll (1992) posits that NGOs would be unable to continue with their flexible and informal approach, although they should be able to remain true to their objectives of poverty orientation and participation. Obviously when deciding how to scale up their operations, NGOs need to consider the financial aspects of such a move and the repercussions on their position in the development arena. A pertinent issue to raise at this point, therefore, is their status vis à vis donors. The emergence of Southern NGOs (SNGOs) into the international development forum, has to some extent forced Northern NGOs (NNGOs) to review their own position, because the level of value-added by NNGOs has been questioned (Pratt & Stone, 1994). SNGOs are closer to the target groups in the South and could become the preferred financial intermediary for donors, attempting to reach the poor. The doubts raised about the evolution of their (NNGOs) relations with donors and the potential repercussions for NNGOs, concern their possible loss of identity, their emergence as a mere conduit for preset donor plans, the optional paths available to them and their ability to legitimately represent the South.

Donors and NGOs

The increase in official funding through NGOs was justified because they were expected to achieve results – ‘market plus civil society will yield development’ (Hulme & Edwards, 1997:277), and has subsequently led to a change in their relationship with donors and the emergence of newly ascribed roles. A much-vaunted term applied to NGOs has been to describe them as ‘magic bullets’ (Vivian 1994), endowing them with the ability to reach their target irrespective of the direction of launch. But this attribute has both auspicious and adverse implications for the roles NGOs could play and their relations with donors.

In order to provide an appreciation of the (political) environment that NGOs could find themselves part of, if they developed closer relations with donors, there is a need to explain the ground rules of donor policy. According to Hulme & Edwards (1997), NGOs need to be aware of the procedures used by donors to influence others’ behaviour to achieve their objectives, which could obviously be different from those advocated by NGOs. It may be easy to identify the official goals of the donor’s policy but the possibility of a hidden agenda needs to be scrutinised. Donors could exert control over the NGOs with the use of persuasion or financial inducement, but may resort to coercion. At the same time donors have formal procedures in place to control the situation. This could take the form of accounting systems, reporting styles, the issue of contracts or the registration of approved organisations. Informally, the donor could exert control by the use of patronage, staff exchanges, seminars and the flow of information. Farrington & Bebbington (1993) report that the direction, which donor/NGO relations could take, would be determined by the preferred role of the donor as a funding agency and the consequential impact on NGOs. They distinguish

between *facilitation*, which would allow NGOs to pursue their own agenda, *constructive influence*, where donors would attempt to influence the design of programmes, *determination*, where the donor would set the programme design itself, and *distortion*, a situation where the direction to be followed would be against the better instinct of the NGO. Each one of these alternatives has different implications for NGOs.

A number of academics have pointed out that essentially the donor will use the NGO to achieve its own ends, and may even corrupt NGOs in the process (Pronk 1998). Thus Pratt & Stone (1994) express concern that NGOs would be used as salesmen by multilateral agencies, and Hulme & Edwards (1997) posit a change in the relationship from partnership to contractor, where NGOs would act as a 'franchise state' providing social welfare services to 'clients'. With ODAs attempting to improve their effectiveness in reaching the grassroots and reducing poverty, Smillie (1997) warns NGOs to avoid becoming donor's executing agencies. Edwards (1994) argues that donors may even use NGOs to further their own foreign policy. Realising that it would be unwise to try to impose their ideas directly on the South, the donor may prefer an indirect route using NGOs, which they see as a favoured player from the Southern Governments' point of view. In some instances Twose (1987) predicts too close a relationship could develop, and is fearful that this could result in them becoming 'political stooges' of their governments. In an extreme form, this could result in the emergence of a DONGO – a donor led NGO created in response to the availability of donor funds (Hodson 1997) or an opportunist NGO (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).


With the increasing dependence on official funding, NGOs may find that their position and integrity is compromised. According to van der Heijden (1987) the availability of grants may encourage NGOs to become involved in programmes, which are inconsistent with their own objectives and capacities. They may be unwilling to criticise governments in their advocacy work and their flexibility will be compromised by the need to be accountable to them. He suggests the adoption of a consultative mechanism, which would enable NGOs and government representatives to meet to identify ventures suitable for collaboration between the two and attainment of acceptable solutions. Tvedt (1998) argues that NGOs and donors will become more like each other, sharing the same language style and administrative system, which would be determined by the donor (isomorphism). NGOs could therefore find themselves increasingly drawn away from their own mission. Expressions of disquiet, that the increase in dependence upon official funding would skew the performance, distort the accountability, and weaken the legitimacy of NGOs, have been signaled by Edwards & Hulme (1996). They argue that donors are more committed to projects with an easily quantifiable goal, and if these are not met, funding may be withdrawn. Advocacy work would not be looked upon favourably and NGOs would increasingly find themselves unwilling to speak out against donor directives and policy issues. Similar concerns about the distribution of funds have been expressed by Pearce (1993), who posits that the distribution of funds may favour service providers and disadvantage social mobilization organisations, and Elliott (1987), who suggests that accountability requirements may reduce the chances of funds being used for empowerment due to the associated intangible, long term results.

Thus, NGOs may find their mission altered, due to their close association with a donor. In cases where the NGO is linked to more than one donor, tensions may arise if

it is faced with a different set of rules and regulations to abide by for each one (Dichter, 1997). Tension may also arise within NGOs, due to the friction between their original focus on charity and compassion, and the 1990s focus on enterprise development and microfinance projects for the achievement of sustainability. Hulme & Edwards (1997:9) pronounced the move to be 'poverty alleviation by promotion' rather than by state 'protection', in response to donor demands for financial sustainability.

Not all NGOs have responded to the increased interest and funding opportunities in the same way. Hellinger (1987) identifies three options: NGOs could positively response to donor demands and guidelines, increase their field operations and thus their dependence on official funds; or, they could avoid both official funding and large-scale government programmes; or, alternatively NGOs could challenge donors to change or adapt their programmes,- an idea supported by Pratt & Stone (1994). This idea receives corroboration from the work of Covey (1998), which discusses the opportunities available to NGOs to achieve institutional reform of the World Bank. She distinguishes between two methods, which could be employed: operational collaboration and policy dialogue. The level of operational collaboration could vary considerably and could cover any stage of the operations of a funded project. Policy dialogue could involve NGOs in policy debate and the exchange of information either formally, by means of a specific committee, or informally. Prior to 1989, the level of NGO involvement in World Bank affairs was minimal and the NGO role was identified as one of co-optation onto pre-established schemes. Since that date the degree of involvement has increased but it is difficult to assess the level of direct influence. Covey (1998) used the following two-dimensional model to identify the alternative relations, which could prevail between the World Bank and NGOs:

Figure 2.1 Two-dimensional Donor-NGO relations



(Covey, 1998:108)

Critical co-operation = ‘willingness to work with another institution while maintaining independence and critical distance’ (Covey, 1998:108). Covey posits that when NGOs accept Bank project work they surrender their capacity to be independent and engage in conflict. The preferred option would be to engage in critical co-operation and pursue insider advocacy rather than confrontational advocacy (Covey 1998). According to Clark (1997), for there to be the chance of a strong collaborative relationship to be built up with a donor, donors and NGOs must seek the same outcome

‘a healthy relationship is only conceived where both parties share common objectives’ (Clark, 1997:47).

As a result of the information presented, the conclusion to be drawn at this stage concerning NGO-donor relations is one that firmly supports the view that the power and influence is in the hands of the donor. The availability of funding from donors has

the ability not only to corrupt (Pronk, 1998) and distort (Hulme & Edwards, 1997) but also to encourage the birth of opportunistic NGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). To exert a positive influence on donor policies and procedures NGOs need to become members of an advisory committee, and thus engage in insider advocacy (Covey, 1998). The extent to which NGOs are able to exert an influence on the donor and enjoy a strong collaborative relationship is dependant on whether the donor has a strong positive social agenda (Clark, 1997). For the majority of NGOs the trend towards greater dependence on donor funding has become a reality but the significance of that move has manifested itself in different ways. Essentially the impact can be broken down into the repercussions on the internal organisational affairs of NGOs and on their external relations with other players in the development paradigm. An attempt will be made to discuss each of these issues in turn, bearing in mind that NGOs have felt pressurized to become more professional, and improve their accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. The extent to which NGOs are affected by donor set systems structure and project procedures depends on whether they are viewed as an essential force in the progress of human activity or merely acquiescent pawns (Tvedt 1998).

The Changing Organizational Culture of NGOs

In the economic climate of the 1990s, pressure brought to bear on donors to account for and improve the impact of their financial commitments to development work, was deflected onto the work of NGOs. This has influenced the internal policies and procedures used by NGOs, as they were now faced with the need to not only show that they could be more professional and accountable, but also possessed the ability to protect their market share in an increasingly competitive financial market (Wallace,

1997). In the effort to become more professional, NGOs need to review their staffing requirements as different skills and capabilities are required, although it depends on where the NGO is in relation to Korten's system of classification. According to Thomas (1992), relief and welfare organisations require logistical and specific professional competencies, whereas second generation activities require project management and support for field staff, but the third generation require strategic management and analysis, negotiation and collaboration. The staffing problem for NGOs then becomes one of escalating costs (overheads) as its voluntary staff base is augmented/replaced by professionals from the market place, needing to be paid a going-rate. Smillie (1997) points out that it would be difficult to cover these extra costs because they cannot be part of project profiles and it would be dishonest to use public campaign monies to foot the bill.

To ensure a greater focus on efficiency and effectiveness, donors have directed NGOs to use the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA), which sets out the aims, objectives, inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact (Wallace, 1997). This shows the focus of donors to be one of short term, quantifiable results, but that not all the results of NGO projects are easily quantifiable (Wallace, 1997), and indicates that issues are being viewed from different perspectives –

'while the current talk among donors and UK NGOs is of participation, partnership, institution and capacity building, strengthening civil society, sustainability, the project management tools.....have all come out of a different tradition concerned with control, rational planning, measurability, accountability and short term impacts. (Wallace, 1997:45)

NGOs have had to learn a new language to assimilate the new ethos, and focus their sights on conforming to the system put in place by donors. According to Wallace

(1997), SNGOs have complained about the Northern bias of the new procedures and the feeling that their position is misrepresented or ignored. SNGOs also feel that NNGOs' public fund raising campaigns use images of the 'South', which are stereotypical and degrading

'pornography of poverty' and 'appeal of helplessness' (Smillie 1997).

This directly relates to the imbalance of power in the relationships and the direction of accountability for NGOs. The dilemma for NNGOs is that they are faced with several stakeholders, i.e. donors (both public and private), SNGOs, Southern Governments, and the 'poorest of the poor'. For the majority of NNGOs, who have chosen to scale up their operations and increase their dependence on donors, their accountability invariably relates to donor directives.

Accountability

The issue of accountability, therefore, raises questions not only concerning its meaning and influence on the workings of the organisation but also the direction of accountability and how this might affect the pattern of relationships already in place

'a reciprocally accountable relationship' (Bebbington & Riddell, 1997: 107).

Edwards and Hulme (1995) offer a definition of accountability, which includes a statement of goals, an appraisal process, transparency of decision-making and relationships, plus honest reporting of resources used and achievements. Nevertheless there is doubt about who sets the parameters. According to Najam (1996), the study of

NGOs' accountability is donor driven and many writers agree that the need to be accountable to donors exerts a great deal of influence on the functioning of NGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 1992; Edwards, 1994; Smillie, 1995; Najam, 1996). Therefore where the emphasis is on upward accountability rather than downward, the aspirations of members and beneficiaries take second place (Hulme & Edwards, 1997).

In order to make better sense of the issue of accountability, several authors have made further distinctions between the different forms it may take. Edwards and Hulme (1996 - using Avina's 1993 approach) distinguish between *short-term functional* accountability, where the emphasis is on resources, their use and immediate impact, and *strategic* accountability where NGOs' actions impact on the actions of other organisations and the wider environment. In contrast, Kumar & Hudock (1996) distinguish between *process* accountability, which relates to implementation and management, and *programme* accountability, which focuses on the effectiveness with which the objectives are achieved. They also posit that NGOs are faced with the task of achieving *multiple* accountability, depending on the number of their stakeholders. Each of the approaches has its associated problems but, for Edwards & Hulme (1995), *interpretative* accountability, which involves measuring the impact of effectiveness, is particularly difficult in the area of empowerment. It has also been maintained that NGOs need to establish the direction of their accountability, for instance, whether this is towards their donors, their clients or themselves. Most evidence suggests it is high towards donors but low to partners, beneficiaries, staff and supporters (Najam, 1996). The extra demands placed on NGOs to conform to accountability procedures have affected them in different ways. Smillie (1995) argues that NGOs have responded to the opening of extra funding windows by being more compliant towards donor's wishes. Disquiet has been expressed that there is very little time available for a

reflective analysis of their performance and the pursuit of innovative ideas (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). However there is some evidence to suggest that donor funding may strengthen some forms of NGO accountability, as it has called for them to improve their reporting and monitoring systems (Bebbington & Riddell, 1997).

From an SNGO viewpoint, as well as not being actively involved in accountability considerations, their transaction costs for concurring with the fiscal and legal accountability demands of donors, depend on the number of donors they rely on for support. Some NNGOs have attempted to standardise their reporting procedures and paperwork, so as to reduce the burden on SNGOs to conform (Wallace, 1997). The issue of accountability for NGOs also affects their legitimacy status. Local legitimacy could be lost if the NGOs focus more on the appeasement of donors (Najam, 1996) and thus the idea of participation may merely be a sham. It can be seen therefore that although NGOs may strive to implement a bottom-up strategy, NGO 'speak' is biased towards the North not the South and towards donors more than NGOs (Tvedt, 1998).

Despite the drive towards greater accountability, NGOs can, apparently, survive in spite of their performance (Smillie, 1995) as they do not appear to be answerable all the time (Edwards, 1994) and in fact, the 'bottom line' for NGOs is frequently shifting (Fowler, 1995). Chambers (1995) argues that the promotion of accountability can be seen as part of a public relations exercise and as such the transparency of an NGO may be compromised. It may be labeled a 'self-deceiving' NGO, merely filtering the information to be publicised. Dichter (1997) suggests that perhaps NGOs are best suited to unsustainable, non-subsidised work because the difficulty of measuring the results from institutional development and social intermediation means that financial support may be curtailed.

It seems that what has been developed is a 'system' of measuring the performance of NGOs, but problems surround the evaluation of the performance. Several authors have commented on the fact that NGO evaluation depends upon subjective judgement and interpretation but ignores spillover effects, non-tangibles and the longer-term implications (Biggs & Neame, 1995; Fowler, 1995; Uphoff, 1995). Fowler (1996) argues that NGO projects are only one of the factors that change the lives of the poor and that the non-project factors are more difficult to quantify –

'socio-economic divisions, power relationships, human motivation, individual and collective behaviour, cultural values and local organizational capacity' (Fowler 1996: 59).

He identifies two approaches to the assessment of performance – a *scientific* approach, based on systematic search for observable indicators with agreed baselines, which are then compared with other control groups, and an *interpretative* or *contextual* approach – focused on stakeholders' perception of the degree of success of the project. To gain benefit from both methods, Fowler (1996) proposes the use of 'Logical Framework Analysis and Objective Oriented Planning' with 'multiple stakeholder negotiation'. Stakeholders need to be carefully identified, particularly marginalized groups, in the hope that they could become empowered as a result of their engagement in the process. A number of authors suggest the use of RRA (rapid rural appraisal) and PRA (participatory rural appraisal) are to be preferred (Smillie, 1995; Chambers, 1997). Understandably then one area of NGO activity, which has proved difficult to assess using accountability criteria, is advocacy and lobbying, but for some NGOs this has become their chosen path.

Advocacy & Lobbying

Essentially advocacy includes lobbying, campaigning and development education. According to Jordan & van Tuijl (1998), it is not necessary to distinguish between NGOs because the nature of their activities and their focus on the pursuit of more equal power relations, all come under the umbrella term, advocacy. They posit there are different forms of NGO relations involved in advocacy work and these can be related to accountability. A high level of accountability is associated with those campaigns, which are focused and close to the vulnerable groups. However, a low accountability level occurs where there are conflicting objectives or competition between the NGOs.

An important landmark in NGO advocacy work occurred at the World Food Conference 1974, when for the first time NGOs became an active element in the official process (Van Rooy, 1997). As a result of the strategy used by the Canadian NGOs, the 'Rome model' was identified as the format to use in future – this was both a highly structured approach and involved inclusion into ministerial meetings and ensuring the public networking of important information. It was thought to have been

'an important catalyst for advocacy work' (Van Rooy, 1997:98)

and the trend was established for NGOs to engage in more sophisticated and targeted work throughout the 1980s (Clark, 1992). At the 1992 Earth Summit (Rio), NGOs felt they made their mark on the proceedings, although generally their success was restricted to

'highly salient, low policy issues' (Van Rooy, 1997:104).

According to Wilkinson (1996), little success was gained from the NGO campaigns in Europe on the Uruguay Round because they lacked a unifying position, coupled with under resourced research and lobbying.

Empowerment and Civil Society

The development of a democratic society was a core issue in the New Policy Agenda (NPA), and NGOs have been acknowledged as a favoured player in the promotion of empowerment and the process of developing civil society in the South. According to Thomas (1992) empowerment means the process by which the poorest of the poor would take over the direct control of their lives. He disputes the idea of there being an NGO model for empowerment because he argues that each success could not be replicated. The term civil society is difficult to define (Bebbington & Riddell 1995; Williams 1996; Blair 1997). Whaites (1996) distinguishes between a Bayesian view of civil society, which labels all potential partner groups as 'civil society' organisations, and a de Tocquillian perspective, which lays emphasis on the need for groups to cut across identities in a heterogeneous environment. Blair (1997) uses a wide definition to encompass all associated groups between the individual/family unit and the state, but a narrow one to cover only NGOs. Bebbington & Riddell (1995), following UNDP definition, include all SNGOs, which aim to represent the interests of a particular group. Fowler (1998) considers that for effective change, society needs a plurality of organisations, which would focus on what they do best, rather than a centralised government, which could be inflexible and bureaucratic.

The changes to civil society could be brought about either through reform of the system, with action focused on the 'enabling environment', or be project based to

support specific groups (Blair, 1997). With this move from supply side to demand side development activities, Clark (1997) emphasises the need for NGOs to develop new skills and partnerships. He suggests that NGOs are a previously neglected but important 'vehicle ' for the development of civil society especially where the community representatives are weak and unorganised. Pearce (1993) prefers NGOs to be seen as 'facilitators' of the development process leading to the empowerment of the poor and the development of civil society, rather than agents of change. In addition, Vakil (1997) argues that the relationship between NGOs and civil society is a complex one and questions whether the NGOs' role is to curtail an authoritarian government or to promote a social movement. Some donors have begun to by-pass NNGOs and direct funds straight to Southern NGOs. However an intermediary NGO could be justified on the grounds that it is inappropriate for Northern governments to strengthen 'civil society' in another country (Smillie, 1997).

Despite the increased activity by NGOs in the development of civil society, their significance has been questioned (Roper-Renshaw, 1994). It is thought that the presence of NGOs is not necessarily indicative of a strong civil society or that the funding of NGOs necessarily strengthens civil society. It can be argued that the funding of NGOs can lead to them becoming more accountable to donors, or it may favour the growth of powerful NGOs and the elimination of small ones (Bebbington and Riddell, 1995). Essentially there is a need for NGOs to engage in work that empowers the relatively weak/unorganised sectors, while also transferring skills and eventually decision-making powers (K-Njenga, 1996).

Discussion of civil society invariably includes some reference to capacity building and institutional development. According to James (1994) *capacity building* involves the intervention by an external body intent on improving the ability of an organization to achieve its objectives and sustainability, whereas, according to Sahley (1995) *institutional development* which refers to 'changes in the social structure of society'. Strategies, which increase their absorptive capacity and enable them to enhance their participation in the development process, contribute to the institutional development of the NGO sector. Furthermore, Sahley (1995) posits that the need to improve the capacity of indigenous NGOs is especially important in the light of their recent rapid increase in numbers and their high failure rate. Donors expect programme benefits to be sustainable but also, where the focus is on enterprise development, the service delivery mechanism itself is expected to be financially self-sustaining. Sahley (1995) identifies the need for a change in the approach taken by NNGOs from a directive to a facilitative one, which would promote the capacity building and institutional development of indigenous NGOs. However NNGOs may see this changing role with its intangible results as incompatible with the requirement to be accountable to donor organisations and the public.

Institutional development attempts to encourage the inclusion of the NGO sector in socio-economic and political development. To achieve this Sahley (1995) speculates that strategies formulated by NNGOs and donors must focus on three levels of support: at *NGO level* NNGOs should be flexible towards funding and administrative requirements, while increasing the transparency of their own organization; at *meso-level*, they need to promote and support South-South information networks; and at *macro-level*, they ought to work with Southern governments on policies and set up a dialogue with the indigenous NGO sector. To enhance capacity building for SNGOs,

NNGOs need to avoid imposing change on SNGOs and using the withdrawal of financial support as a threat (Sahley, 1995).

Thus far the review has concentrated on the NGO group as a whole although in some sections a distinction has been made between NNGOs and SNGOs. It has also emphasised the extent to which NGOs (NNGOs) have been dominated by donor policy and procedures. At this point attention will be turned towards the relations between NNGOs and other organisations i.e. (synonymous) NNGOs, SNGOs and Southern Governments. Much use has been made of the term 'partner' to describe these relations. Discussion will, therefore, focus on the idea of partnership before moving on to discuss the situation vis à vis other organisations in the development field.

Partnership

Relationships between the various organisations in the development process are the result of accepted development philosophy and the current international policy framework. It has been suggested the Northern and Southern NGOs have different perspectives of the development process and different concepts of participation (Padron, 1987), and that the use of language and terminology of agreements is biased towards the North (Smillie, 1995).

Over time there has been a change in the approach taken to development, from *working for* which involves the transference of financial and human resources from the North to the South, to *working together*, with its focus on the 'exchange of cultures and experiences' (Martella and Schunk, 1997). This has been accompanied

by a need to review the meaning of the *partnership* used to describe relations between northern and southern organisations. In the 1970s, the term was used to express the idea of international solidarity in the development process. By the 1980s, new ideological influences and funding practices provided an opportunity for a new relationship between the North and the South. According to Fowler (1998) the challenge did not elicit the same response from all NGOs and he suggests that the response by an NGO is the result of their position on the progressive – conservative continuum. The new approach includes such methods as programme funding as opposed to project funding, an increased move towards decentralisation, and delegation to local partners (Fowler & James, 1994).

Fowler (1998) suggests that partnership can take place on two levels; one at individual NGO worker level and the other at NGO organisation level. While individuals might appear to function as partners, there is often greater friction at NGO level and he suggests that although responsibilities can be shared in a partnership, authority seldom can. For the most part, therefore, it is generally accepted that the relationship between the North and the South is unequal, with a bias favouring the North (Fowler, 1991). In order to avoid the dominance-exploitation situation, Nyoni (1987) contends that the relationship between indigenous NGOs and the international NGOs needs to be based on trust and partnership. Thus Fowler (1991) points out that partnership involves sharing, a sense of mutuality and equality such that each partner is considered to be of equal value. To progress towards a partnership, he further postulates that several conditions need to be met. There needs to be a mutual understanding of the 'product', which relates to the outcome and the processes involved in achieving that outcome. There also needs to be trust between the parties, which requires transparency from both parties. Legitimacy is a further requirement, which would be derived from the

results achieved for the beneficiaries by the NGOs. Where Northern NGOs are not directly operating in the South, they are dependent on their partners for legitimacy. Legitimacy can, therefore, be seen as the significant factor that adds weight to the Southern NGOs' attempt to redress the imbalance of power in the relationship.

Despite the fact that current funding trends are seen to be pushing relations towards those based on contracts rather than mutual understanding, Fowler (1998) stresses the desirability of pursuing authentic partnerships for both political and economic reasons. He argues that, contributions are made to the quality of social capital, (i.e. the self-willed webs, which bond individuals, groups, communities, societies and other forms of human association) and this in turn, promotes the level of civic strength (i.e. citizens ability to engage on more than equal terms with state and market institutions). This should promote democracy and socially acceptable development. Economically, a relationship based on trust is thought to be more cost-effective, due to the ability of the parties to co-ordinate their actions. The use of contractors alters the relationship between NGOs and poor people, and is thought to work against the promotion of empowerment and the sustainability of benefits. Fowler (1998) therefore contends that donors are pushing for a business approach favouring the use of contracts with NGOs and retaining their role as financial intermediaries. A more radical role, which he is less certain NGOs are willing to take, would be that of facilitators of international co-operation, allowing indigenous groups to be responsible for their own development.

Any decision concerning the formation of a partnership needs to be clear on why it is needed, what organisational adaptations are possible, what is on offer and what is not negotiable. The understanding and use of the term 'partnership' is very much the product of past experience and even future aspirations, and thus necessitates the need

to review the meaning and implications of 'partnership' from both a northern and a southern viewpoint.

NNGOs

Throughout their history NNGOs have sought partners to be the link between their volunteers from the North and the local people in the South. Martella and Schunk (1997) identify three alternative approaches taken by NNGOs in their choice of partner. Initially, in the 1960s, churches were the favoured partners due to their strong presence in local areas, but the religious criteria affected the number of projects and the number of volunteers. Later, in the 1970s, the increasing independence of NGOs instigated the move towards partnership with public institutions, in order to ensure sustainability of programmes beyond the end of official aid receipts. Unfortunately, a lack of contact with local people resulted in programmes suffering from a lack of response to changing social and political events. Thirdly, NGOs in the 1980s redirected their efforts towards creating representative local organisations and so aided the emergence of a small but dynamic civil society. Not all local organisations are seen to be beneficial to development. Some have been criticised as being unreliable and run by unscrupulous opportunists, while others show organisational weakness and capacity limitations, and place insufficient emphasis on self-criticism and reflections on past practices as a basis for learning (Fowler & James, 1994). According to Martella and Schunk (1997), for a development programme to have a good chance of success it needs to be planned with a local reliable, authoritative and representative partner. Being a member of a heterogeneous group, each NNGO is concerned to retain its individual identity, particularly when entering into negotiation for a partner. Fowler (1991) posits that NNGOs may seek a 'natural' partner – a

mirror image of itself – in an effort to ensure an efficient and productive relationship, which will come as a result of a mutual, better understanding. A consequence of this approach may be the development of natural territorialism, which may stifle the development initiatives, or instances of several similarly focused NGOs competitively funding a limited number of SNGOs. The existence of SNGOs, that appear to be similar to NNGOs, provides a rationale and legitimacy for NNGOs' involvement in development. This may give rise to NNGOs forcing onto their chosen southern partner the image, which the NNGO wants to attain, although *it* might not meet the desired criteria itself. Thus SNGOs need to have a strong identity themselves, when they enter into partnership negotiations with NNGOs. Partnerships between NNGOs and SNGOs do not follow a set pattern. Fowler (1995) has identified three distinct types of strategies used by NNGOs towards their Southern partners, namely *deconcentration* where responsibility moves to them but authority does not; *delegation* where both move downwards, and *devolution* where responsibility and authority are transferred to a semi-autonomous organisation.

SNGOs

The view that SNGOs have of the 'partnership' relationship is one grounded in the history of being the recipient of funds from the North. This imbalance of power, they argue, has often led to more time spent in dealing with reports and evaluation exercises for the North, than on concentrating on real work (Smillie, 1995). SNGOs view the relationship as a paternalistic one with unclear priorities, subject to delays in decision-making and funding, and a refusal to consider overheads or income-earning investments (Smillie, 1995). According to Fowler (1998) SNGOs criticise NNGOs for operating double standards. They expect transparency from SNGOs, but do not

present it themselves, they pay little respect to local knowledge, and they do not see local partners as equals. SNGOs are unhappy with the change in emphasis of the function of NGOs from support for GROs and institutional development, to service delivery and contracting (Arellano-Lopez & Petras, 1994). In addition, Nyoni (1987) contends that NNGOs are seen as a threat to local initiatives and self-reliance. They are more concerned with 'success stories, which could result in the poor conforming to the images presented of them by the North. In contrast, Smillie (1995) suggests that NNGOs and SNGOs operating in the field of human rights have better relations because their focus is not on money or accountability.

For SNGOs, there are essentially three types of partnership open to them: the *receiver* of funds from the North; an *intermediary* between the funder and the poor; or an *equal partner* in the development co-operation process (Padron, 1987). SNGOs can provide legitimacy for NNGO operations, but the significance of the role played by SNGOs in development can vary. Moseley-Williams (1994: 50) argues that in Brazil and Zimbabwe, SNGOs are viewed as 'important development actors', being both courageous and visionary. However, other examples from Africa and Latin America suggest that there are 'capital-city havens of sheltered employment for bureaucrats retrenched by political change or structural adjustment', which result in a weakening of the public sector and thus a decline in public services.

The increasing emphasis on the role of SNGOs in development work has also shown up some of their deficiencies. It can be argued that SNGOs are secretive and opaque, and succumb to the attraction of the extra funding opportunities, rather than focusing on local philanthropic work (Smillie, 1995). This has resulted in a failure to 'do' development (Moseley-Williams, 1994). Many SNGOs have shown a lack of

professionalism, as a result of their organisational background and capacity problems. These problems are compounded by the need to be accountable to several stakeholders. Direct donor funding of operations in the South is a contentious issue, which has implications for SNGOs, NNGOs and Southern Governments. According to Fowler and James (1994), in the late 1980s the crucial role, which SNGOs could play in the process of democratisation, achieved recognition with the introduction of direct donor funding. But this threw up a number of problems, for example hostility from Southern Government and the increasing pressure brought to bear on SNGOs to conform to donor criteria. Fowler and James (1994) argued that the close relationship with donors compromised the ability of SNGOs to accomplish poverty alleviation and democratic reform. Blair (1997) reports that there is only a rudimentary framework in place for exploring the likely consequences of donors promoting development through SNGOs or Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). As CSOs' primary purpose is to influence public policy, the donor's role should be to build and strengthen CSOs, and allow them to pursue their own path.

Southern Governments

While it might seem inappropriate to consider Southern Governments under the heading of partnerships, the extent to which there is a relationship between the two should not be undervalued and misjudged. Attention should be paid to both the trends in relations and the significance of those relations in the wider context of matters. According to Bratton (1989), NGOs and (African) Governments have found themselves in a new, close relationship, which offers the potential for conflict or co-operation to achieve sustainable development. Edwards & Hulme (1992) argue that the potential for conflict or co-operation depends on the type of political regime and

the type of NGO activity. Southern Governments are more likely to show hostility towards those engaged in empowerment and the promotion of civil society. Archer (1994) argues that the NPA opened another way forward for relations between international NGOs and Southern Governments. Essentially this is one of working within government structures usually with line ministries in order to help build capacity, foster more appropriate policies and encourage effective implementation in the field. The objective is not to replace the state, but to influence the direction of policy, or to support existing policy. According to Archer (1994), a strong and effective government is considered to be a pre-requisite for the successful implementation of the NPA - an enabling state. Furthermore the greater stress on transparency and accountability should enlarge the options open to indigenous NGOs for dealings with government. However the NPA has allowed different interpretations of 'power' for the three main players, and thus poses a dilemma for NGOs of whether to strengthen capacity to provide services or regulate them. This may make them willing partners where donors attempt to replace the state, but may also lead to a variation in quality and coverage of services by the plethora of service providers.

To develop constructive relationships with Southern governments and promote 'good government', Edwards (1994) advocates a model used by SCF-UK, which includes both working with government from above (technical and material support for line ministries) and working with government from below (grassroots pressure). Variations of this two-pronged approach can be used according to the level of development of the indigenous 'third sector'. While grassroots pressure is seen as an essential component of civil society, a government, which is genuinely committed to reform, supportive of dialogue with actors in civil society, and in control of the basic minimum of revenue for state expenditure, is easier to work with (Edwards, 1994).

In most post-colonial African states, the number of NGOs has substantially increased (Bratton, 1989; Fowler, 1991). The political tension between the NGOs and the Government has been a result of the centralized concentration of power, the competition for donor funds, and the poor image African Governments have of NGOs

‘...diverse and fragmented; ...contribute to haphazard patterns of rural development.’
‘unguided missiles, whose activities do not necessarily contribute to the objectives of the national development plan.’(Bratton, 1989:578)

From the above review of the literature, it can be seen that the changing NGO environment nurtured the development of their role (Elliott, 1987; Korten, 1987; Smillie, 1997), as the mounting critical opinion of state (top-down) intervention turned attention to focus on bottom-up, inclusive, participatory strategies favoured by NGOs to promote sustainable development (Fowler & James, 1994; Pratt & Stone, 1994). Governments, therefore, began to include NGOs in their development policy (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Existing NGOs responded by scaling-up their operations but the proliferation of new NGOs increased the heterogeneity of the group (Tvedt, 1998). Thus the augmented ‘official’ funding opportunities positively attracted NGOs, and, as other sources dried up, they had to decide to what extent they would respond to the pressures of changes taking place in the donors’ environment. Over time a larger number of NGOs were seeking funds from a diminishing, but increasingly conditional, financial source (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Concurrently the emergence of the indigenous NGO movement in the South caused an identity crisis for northern NGOs and forced them to re-examine their rationale, mission and future path (Fowler, 1998). Their relative position was further undermined by the changing donor arrangement of aid provision, which was shifting towards direct engagement with SNGOs.

The importance of donor/NGO relations has been identified but it has been found that not enough research has been undertaken, in detail and over time, on their relations. Therefore the focus of this research is to examine the changing relations between the European Community and European NGDOs, and to pursue this line of research by focusing on UK NGDOs and their work in SADC(C). In keeping with this focus, a number of pertinent ideas can be extracted from the literature review. Overtime there has been a shift in the contemporary economic/political climate, which resulted in a change in development policy from an emphasis on the role of the state to a focus on the market. This raises a number of issues namely: the extent to which donor's objectives have changed over time; the relationship between the donor's foreign policy and development policy; the incorporation of the market focus into their development co-operation policy; the extent, level and direction of accountability brought into their policies by donors. For NGOs these issues are particularly significant as they impact on their internal organization and role in development activities. Thus questions are raised about their ability to retain their integrity (Van der Heijden, 1987).

Discussion has also centred on the idea of 'partnership' and the extent to which it is applicable to donor/NGO relations, as well as the evolution of the relationship over time in the light of the changes in development theory and policy. These issues will be examined in subsequent chapters as they relate to the European Community, NGOs and the SADC(C) region.

The documentary sources used as a basis for the subsequent chapters of this research include those obtained from the European Commission and the Liaison Committee of the European Non-Governmental Organisations (CLONG), either directly or through use of their web sites. It proved difficult to obtain all requested/desired documents

partly because the central archives were incomplete but also the internal reshuffling at the Commission impeded the flow of communications with the general public and the presentation of information. The documentation issued by the EC/Commission has been included under different headings in the bibliography in accordance with their apparent source. The documentation from the Liaison Committee of European NGOs is listed under CLONG, as it is usually known by its french name.

The data relating to the UK NGDO projects cofinanced by the European Commission, used as a basis for the examination of European Community policy in practice, are available in the annual reports of the B7-6000 budget line. These reports are published in retrospect, but have latterly become subject to increasing delay due to the bureaucratic problems and changes experienced by the Commission. During the early years, the report included the financial tables. However from 1993 onwards, as the number of cofinanced projects increased, these tables have only been available in response to a specific request to the Commission, and are only published in French. Although some raw data (not tabulated according to recipient country) has been obtained for 1997 and 1998, it does not include information on the use of block grant allocations to projects for those years and therefore the period under analysis will extend from 1980 to 1996 (inclusive). The most recent changes at the Commission not only disrupted the process of assimilation of information but also introduced new procedures concerning the accountability of the Commission to the European public. Unfortunately, it appears that, while the degree of transparency to the public has increased - in the form of the Annual Report of the European Commission's External Assistance-, the detailed information, formerly available on the allocation of funds to individual NGDOs and countries, is no longer easily available to the general public.

Chapter 3: The European Community's Development Co-operation Policy and European NGOs

This chapter aims to provide an historical review of the Development Co-operation policy of the European Community, and the changing role of NGOs within that policy. The EC policy initially focused on the ACP group but subsequently extended financial aid to other regions of the World. However this chapter will concentrate on the information relevant to the ACP group, with which the SADC(C) region has been most associated. An attempt will be made to evaluate the policy in the light of the changes in the contemporary discourse on development, which have been identified in the literature review. Attention will then turn to identify and critically examine the role of NGOs, and in particular development NGOs (NGDOs), within the framework of EC Development Co-operation policy, before finally focusing on the specific budget line for co-financing of NGDO operations in developing countries – B7-6000, which is central to the line of enquiry of this thesis.

The objectives of this chapter are therefore to:

- i) review the changes in European Community's Development Co-operation Policy,
- ii) identify the significance of NGOs within the context of the policy over time, and
- iii) investigate in more detail the B7-6000 budget line available to NGDOs with reference to the co-financing of development activities in developing countries

EC Development Co-operation Policy

Development co-operation had no legal status until the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht) 1992 (Hewitt, 1994; Box & Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; Usherwood, 1998). Prior to that time, an association agreement (Art. 131, Treaty of Rome) enabled the countries and territories of Africa to receive trade and aid benefits from the European Community (Grilli, 1993; OECD, 1996). This approach had been promoted by France, who wished to continue commercial relations with its former colonies, while sharing any cost with Community members. Discussions between the Community members at this time brought to the surface the division between the regionalists and the globalists. The former group (France, Belgium, Italy) wished to focus development cooperation on those countries with historical links with the Community, whereas the globalists (Germany, the Netherlands) preferred a more general spread of aid (Grilli, 1993; Box & Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997). Over time the shifting balance of power between the two sides has influenced the direction of the Community's aid flows and policy approach, with the upper hand being gained according to the relative influence of international organisations and the development discourse on the one hand, and specific European Community political and strategic decisions on the other. While the regionalist gained the upper hand in the early years, the globalists began to exert some, albeit small, influence in the late 1970s (Grilli, 1993; David, 2000).

To finance the economic development of the associated territories, the European Development Fund (1958) was set up, financed from Member States' budgets and

aimed initially at the provision of capital investment projects (Grilli, 1993). With the decolonisation of Africa, a change in the association agreement was required

‘freely negotiated agreement among independent states’ (Grilli, 1993:20),

which in turn produced a formal institutional structure to reflect the position of equality between the Community and the associates. The ‘Association’ model provided a framework for co-operation between equals in a politically neutral partnership and was welcomed as a model for North-South relations (Grilli, 1993; Arts & Byron, 1997; Koulaïmah-Gabriel, 1997; Lister, 1997; David, 2000; Karl, 2000). Consequently the Yaoundé Conventions (I & II) encompassed trade and aid relations with the Associated African and Malagasy States, underlining the regional approach of Community policy. The Paris Summit (1972) and the accession of the UK (1973) further reinforced the position of the regionalists and led to the establishment of Lomé I, to embrace relations between the Community and the newly identified African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group (Grilli, 1993; Usherwood, 1998).

In keeping with the industrialisation approach to development, Lomé I (1976–1980) and Lomé II (1980–1985) incorporated the promotion of economic, social and industrial development to be achieved through the funding of physical infrastructure, industrial production and agricultural programmes. However the perceived failure of these two agreements to address the root causes of underdevelopment, led to a change in approach (Marantis, 1994). The Pisani Memorandum (1982) had called for a focus on the promotion of rural development and support for human resources, with the use

of policy dialogue to determine the development path to follow, but did not spell out the priorities or methods of implementation (Marantis, 1994; Usherwood, 1998). Under Lomé III (1986 – 1991), the Community attempted to ensure that the development programmes were better integrated into society and so would promote self-perpetuating growth (Cox & Koning, 1997). Consequently the focus was put on the use of broad integrated rural development programmes to tackle rural poverty, with an emphasis on self-reliance, self-sufficiency and food security. Lomé III laid stress on an awareness of 'economic, cultural and social rights' (David, 2000: 12) and the need for the full participation of development actors to achieve results (Grilli, 1993; Marantis, 1994; Cox, Healey & Koning, 1997; Usherwood, 1997; David, 2000).

Throughout this early period, political and economic neutrality and joint management were identified as the key characteristics of the Community model of direct aid (Arts & Byron, 1997; David, 2000). However, while Community aid was less political than bilateral aid, the Community policies were the result of decisions of the Council of Ministers, who represented Member states and their policies. The introduction of country aid programmes under Lomé I by the Community, presented an opportunity to introduce Community development goals into the country strategy, and to ensure compatibility with Community sector priorities, e.g. CAP (Grilli, 1993). The Commission was thus exerting a covert political influence over the ACPs under Lomé I and II (Rajana, 1982; Grilli, 1993; Crawford, 1996; Lister, 1997). With the formal policy dialogue in place (Lomé III) the Commission became more assertive in its approach and the balance of power between the two 'partners' shifted (Grilli, 1993; Crawford, 1996; Arts & Byron, 1997). During the 1980s changes in development philosophies, and concern about the legitimacy of development co-operation and the

effectiveness of aid flows, had led to a need to reassess development co-operation (Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; David, 2000). The World Bank had changed its approach from one founded on basic needs to one of Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), but for most of the 1980s the Community chose not to follow this lead (Burnell, 1997). Essentially this was partly because the Lomé agreement did not allow the imposition of conditionality, but also due to the division of opinion within the Community between those in favour of a Neoliberal/Monetarist approach (Belgium, Germany, UK) and those preferring a Socialist approach (France, Greece, Italy) (Grilli, 1993). A Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) had been established in 1987 and applied to highly indebted African nations, but it did not discriminate on the basis of their performance (Cox, Healey & Koning, 1997).

In the early 1990s a number of factors combined to cause a significant change in the Community's approach to development co-operation, especially in relation to the ACP group. The level and direction of EC aid became increasingly influenced by world events, such as the opening up of Eastern Europe and aid fatigue, as well as the need to rationalise external spending (Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; Karl, 2000). The poor economic performance of ACPs had led to the conviction that conditions in the ACPs were responsible and this was consequently reflected in the introduction of overt political (and economic) conditionality, including sanctions and incentives, to the dismay of the ACPs (Crawford, 1996; Cox, Healey, & Koning, 1997; Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; Karl, 2000). This was not in keeping with the original 'partnership' whereby ACPs could determine their own policy options (Crawford, 1996). Thus Lomé IV (1990 – 2000) represented an undisguised move away from the original principles of partnership and equality to one dominated by the ideology and priorities

of the Community. It contained explicit economic and political conditionality, with financial assistance related to the adoption of SAPs and

‘respect for and the promotion of all human rights’ (Crawford, 1996: 505)

(Crawford, 1996; Lister, 1997; David, 2000). At this stage the European Community was promoting a democratic, market-based model to address the problems of the ACPs and advance the drive towards sustainable growth, with the development of the private sector and the diversification of the ACP economies, while laying the foundations for a move towards regional integration (David, 2000). Rather than embrace wholeheartedly the World Bank model for structural assistance, the Community elected to tailor its support to individual country needs and ensure the inclusion of a social dimension (Courier, 1993b). Consequently Lomé IV (1990 – 2000) indicated a widening of the EC’s agenda by incorporating a number of important issues, such as gender awareness, population concerns and participation, as well as environmental protection and sustainability (Riddell, 1992; Courier, 1996; European Council, 1999; Desesquelles, 2000). Marantais (1994) suggested it had added a human face to structural adjustment.

Throughout the period between the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of the European Union (1992) the Development Co-operation Policy of the European Community had grown in an *ad hoc* way, and was subsequently criticised for being an extensive collection of discrete instruments, procedures and principles, with too many vague objectives and lacking strategy and focus (OECD, 1996; Box & Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1997; COM (2000) 212). The proliferation of instruments

and the overall lack of coherence were caused by both the internal management of the Community Development Co-operation and changing external conditions. The TEU attempted to address these criticisms by giving it a legal basis and setting out its objectives:

- 'Sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries and more particularly the most disadvantaged
- Smooth and gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy
- Campaign against poverty in the developing countries TEC Art 130 u 1
- Political: consolidation of democracy in the developing countries within a framework of political stability TEC Art 130u 2
- Consistency with other international organisation's objectives e.g. UN, World Bank TEC Art 130u 3'

(OECD, 1996: 12; Usherwood, 1998: 216).

It incorporated social, political and economic elements, but for the first time included a reference to the commitment of the European Community to ensure its policy was consistent with that of other international organisations. This implied an adherence to the policy progression of the Bretton Woods Institutes, and the agreements reached by UN International Conferences. A potential source of conflict here was the fact that the BWI were the main promoters of Neoliberal reforms, but the EC and the Member States were not unanimously agreed on that approach. In fact the Maastricht Treaty identified a source of inconsistency between its desire to promote a model of sustainable development and poverty eradication, while conforming to the lead exerted by the BWI. In addition it had been acknowledged that the Community and the Member States together made a significant contribution to total aid flows but the overall performance could be improved. A subsequent Commission Communication (SEC (92) 915) identified the need to achieve complementarity, co-ordination and

coherence between the policies pursued by the Community and Member States, and between development co-operation and other Community policies e.g. CAP. The TEU set in motion the move towards the framing of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, with the possible inclusion of development co-operation (Hewitt, 1994).

The Mid Term Review (MTR) of Lomé was originally not seen as auguring in any fundamental change to the Lomé package but was to be merely a review of operations to date and affirmation of a new financial protocol. However, the MTR (1995) was later identified as a turning point in Community policy, with the explicit inclusion of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law as essential elements of the Convention, with violation triggering a suspension clause (Crawford, 1996; Lister, 1997). According to the Evaluation Report (ICEA/DPPC, 1999), the European Community has played a significant role in the pursuit of democracy and human rights in all regions, since that time. The MTR also aligned Lomé objectives with the Community's Development Co-operation Policy, which in turn was to be formally linked with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Box & Koumihal-Gabriel, 1997; David, 2000). This caused concern to be expressed by the ACPs and NGOs about the possible impact of this linkage on the future of development co-operation (CLONG, 1997c).

The MTR had extended the level of influence and control by the Community over the ACP's development programme and presaged a period of consultation and discussion as to the future of EU-ACP relations (Crawford, 1996; Arts & Byron, 1997; Raffer, 1998). The Lomé 'partnership' had become 'paternalistic' and 'clientelistic' (Arts & Byron, 1997: 76) and had moved on from a relationship based on contractuality and

partnership to one of conditionality and increased donor power (Raffer, 1998). While the Commission appeared to favour a fundamental revision of the partnership

‘the importance that the EU attaches to the co-operation and regional integration process for economic as well as political reasons will also influence the shape of the new accord’ (Courier, 1997b: 12).

there were some ACPs who sought to preserve their position vis-à-vis the Community (Arts & Byron, 1997). At this point the Community found itself in a position that necessitated not only a review of the ethos and detail of its ‘partnership’ agreement with the ACP countries but also, in the light of growing criticisms, a reformulation and refocusing of the Community’s aid procedures and instruments. However it was proving difficult to formulate a Common Foreign policy, due to the tensions within the Community. According to Arts and Byron (1997), on the one hand there was a trend towards a global development co-operation policy managed multilaterally through the administrative structure of the EU, which would require the EDF to come under the EU budget. But this was in conflict with the desire for individual Member States to continue to be bilaterally in control of their development co-operation, on the grounds of their historical links.

In May 1995 the Council launched an evaluation process in order to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and visibility of the Community’s development co-operation policy. The results indicated that there were essentially two main issues, namely: Community aid was too complex and fragmented, and, human resource/management issues in the Commission needed to be addressed. Each of these will be dealt with in turn in subsequent sections, although it is appreciated that the administrative issues in the Commission impacted on the development of policy.

In the run up to the twenty-first Century, therefore, the Community found itself faced with concurrently negotiating a new 'partnership' with the ACPs and attempting to establish a more coherent and co-ordinated Development Co-operation policy. It has already been established that the 'partnership' between the ACPs and the Community was in the process of reformulation and this received further support from the results of the independent evaluations (European Council, 1999). It was recommended that the partnership should incorporate an increased responsibility on the part of the recipient country

'partner countries' ownership to be furthered. This relationship needs to be based on reciprocal responsibilities' (European Council, 1999: 4)

and a widening of the levels of participation in the relationship

'partnership should also be opened up to civil society' (European Council, 1999: 4).

Nevertheless while the move would increase the role played by the recipient country, the elements of donor conditionality were becoming evident,

'allocations of funds will increasingly take into account objective performance criteria as well as needs criteria. But it is to be acknowledged that (the) EU's political considerations will also be taken into account' (European Council, 1999: 4).

In order to generate consultation with those interested in the future of the ACP-EU partnership, the Commission issued a Green Paper (1997), entitled 'challenges and options for the new partnership'. The Commission hoped that the experience of the past 40 years could be used to establish an enlightened replacement for Lomé, and

thus improve the effectiveness of EC aid (European Commission, 1997; Gomes, 2000).

As a result of the consultation process the Commission published guidelines for the negotiations, which were to form the basis for the new partnership:

‘strong political dimension; poverty alleviation to be the cornerstone; regionalisation; recipient country responsibility; and ACP unity’ (CEC, 1997: 3 – 5).

It was thought that the poor performance of Community aid provisions was not solely the fault of the donor

‘The recipient country’s institutional environment, and economic and social policy have often been a major constraint on the effectiveness of Community co-operation’ (CEC, 1997:7).

Thus the political situation, the intensity and frequency of civil conflict and the role of the state in the recipient countries were considered to be to a certain extent responsible for the policy results, and therefore the way forward was to ensure that all levels of the population were engaged in the process rather than simply taking a state-to-state approach (European Commission, 1997a and 1997b; David, 2000). The ‘partnership’ now had a clear political dimension, and, according to the Commission, should therefore be part of foreign relations under a Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Commission, 1997a and 1997b).

The Cotonou agreement (2000: 20 year period) sought to combine development, politics and trade, and, by emphasising an integrated approach to poverty reduction, incorporated economic, social, and regional co-operation aspects (Azor-Charles,

2000; European Commission, 2000a; Karl, 2000). The agreement reflected the contemporary view that the drive to alleviate poverty should be underpinned by a growth model based on the development of competitiveness and employment in the ACPs (Gomes, 2000). Attempts to incorporate the issue of good governance into the agreement were met with ACP opposition and eventually it was included but with less importance attached to it

‘fundamental element not an essential element’ (Morrissey, 2000: 5).

This move has been met with criticism concerning the shift in the partnership from political neutrality to political interference (ECDPM, 2000). The agreement also called for a stronger open dialogue between the EU and the ACPs, with the latter gaining ‘ownership’ of their development process (Gomes, 2000; Karl, 2000). The emphasis on participation has ensured a place for NGOs in the development process, in addition to the new role they have been assigned in the field of conflict prevention and resolution (Azor-Charles, 2000; Desesquelles, 2000; Karl, 2000; Kinnock, 2000).

For the first time the agreement included both incentive and coercive clauses in an effort to ‘guide’ the response of the recipient countries. This reflected the Community’s view that the old style agreement was problematic

‘the principle of partnership has lost its subsistence and been only partly put into practice’

‘partnership is limited to day-to-day resource management’ (European Commission, 1997a: VII)

and therefore constrained the overall effectiveness of Community policy. The Commission was seen to dominate the negotiations

'partners must agree terms for a new and inherently political contract' (European Commission, 1997c: 9).

By comparison the ACPs were ill-prepared, relied on the Commission for statistical data, and thereby took a reactive stance rather than presenting a positive negotiating agenda (Lister, 1997). Previous Lomé Conventions had treated the ACPs as an homogeneous group, but an element of differentiation was included in the new agreement. This was partly based on the premise that the development prospects of the individual countries could be enhanced if they were members of a regional co-operation group (European Commission, 1997c). However the Community was also aware that the EU-ACP agreement (Lomé) was incompatible with the regulations of the WTO and therefore required some modification. But in an environment increasingly dominated by the global triad, the ACPs were unwilling for the group to be fragmented. In the end a compromise was reached with an overall agreement to be supported by regional economic partnership agreements (REPAs).

Despite being lauded as a new model for North-South co-operation, the Lomé model was not used as a general template for the development cooperation policy of the Community. Lomé Conventions suffered from bureaucratic problems, a decline in real value, a consequential lack of significant impact on the development of recipient countries and an erosion of the idea of partnership between the two actors (Grilli, 1993; Arts & Byron, 1997). The 'partnership' concept under Lomé had changed from a legal contract founded on historical/geographical links to one conditional upon

economic and political criteria with a security focus (ICEA/DPPC, 1999). At the same time there had been a move to increase the positive input from ACP countries with the promotion of policy dialogue and emphasis on their commitment

‘basic condition for an effective partnership is seen as a common view on policy, with full responsibility being taken by the recipient partner’ (Cox & Healey, 2000: 123).

According to David (2000) the new agreement shifted the focus of the (old) ACP-EU economic/commercial partnership to address two principle contemporary issues: the political environment of development and the impact of globalisation on the ACPs.

The European Community published its Development Policy (2000) in response to the request of the Helsinki Council (1999) for a

‘comprehensive, long-term, sustainable development strategy dovetailing economic, social and environmental policies’ (COM (2000) 212: 6)

and to criticism that there was a ‘lack of an overall Community strategy...(and) the objectives ...are too numerous, too vague and not ranked in any way’ (COM (2000) 212: 5)

According to Lister (1997), the slow dispersal of funds, the inadequacies of the evaluation process, and the lack of co-ordination between Member States and the Community were also significant issues. The Development policy was now to become *one* part of the Community’s external policy, which also encompassed both trade and external political strategy. Poverty reduction was established as the central objective of the policy, to be achieved through six priority areas:

‘the link between trade and development; support for integration and regional co-operation; support for macro-economic policies; transport; food security and

sustainable rural development; the strengthening of institutional capabilities' (European Commission, 2001: 6; COM (2000) 212: 25 – 27).

The Community was using a model for development based on the need to

'better integrate the economic, trade and political aspects of its development co-operation' (COM (2000) 212: 32)

and in particular identified the private sector as 'an engine of growth' (Com (2000) 212: 21). Sustainability was to be promoted by the ownership of development by the indigenous population, and, to improve the impact of Community development co-operation, a differentiated approach based on performance criteria as well as needs criteria was advocated (European Council, 1999; COM (2000) 212). The Community policy was required to reflect the initiatives of the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF, but also facilitate co-ordination, coherence and complementarity between its policy and those of the individual Member States (Christian Aid, 2000; COM (2000) 212). To improve the effectiveness and co-ordination of aid flows to specific countries, Country Strategy papers, to include multi-annual rolling programmes, and SWAPs (Sector Wide Approach) were to be used (European Commission, 2001). The statement of the European Community's Development policy also highlighted the mainstreaming of cross-cutting themes, namely

'good governance, human rights and the rule of law, effect on poverty reduction, institutional and capacity building, gender equality, environmental' (COM (2000) 212: 27).

Despite the mainstream emphasis, positive future results were not assured as can be seen in the case of gender issues, which has suffered from both insufficient staffing levels and inadequate evaluation methods (WIDE, 1997).

The managerial problems of Community policy were a consequence of both the management structure and the methods used. Within the Commission, the management of EC aid has suffered from the division of responsibilities between different Directorates General, namely Directorates-General I, IA, IB, VIII and ECHO, which led to problems of co-ordination (DAC, 1996; ICEA/DPPC, 1999). In addition D-G VIII was directly accountable to not only the Council of Ministers, as were the other Directorates General, but also the Lomé Institutions (Cox, Healey, and Koning, 1997). The division of responsibilities between DGI and DG VIII exacerbated the problem of ensuring the continuum between relief assistance and development co-operation (Christian Aid, 2000). Furthermore, staffing levels were not sufficient to cope with the administrative procedures, which had proliferated along with the increase in the instruments (DAC, 1996; WIDE, 1997; European Commission, 2001). The Commission had already acknowledged there was a problem

‘Current administrative procedures are inadequate, as they vary according to the type of aid’ (Courier, 1985: XVI).

Some changes had been introduced during the 1990s to improve the effectiveness of Community policy. In 1993 the introduction of Project Cycle Management based on the Logical Frame Analysis attempted to identify vertical and horizontal linkages and the significance of the projects for beneficiaries and participants at each stage (Eggars, 1993; OECD, 1996). In 1997, the Commission created the Quality Support

Group for ACP programmes. While this has improved evaluation feedback for them, it has yet to be extended to other geographic regions, e.g. MED (ICEA/DPPC, 1999). Unfortunately, many problems had not been addressed by the end of the century, and it has been suggested that the complexities of the system enabled the instruments to guide the implementation of policy (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996; ICEA/DPPC, 1999; Christian Aid, 2000; COM (2000) 212).

The Community had been aware of the need for reform of the organisation of its external services, but it subsequently had to accept that the 1998 reorganisation (SCR) showed a lack of clarity over the division of responsibilities and a preoccupation with procedures (European Commission, 2001). The SCR was then transformed into the EuropeAid Co-operation office, set up on 01/01/2001 to ensure

‘transparency of activities and management practices’ (European Commission, 2001: 151).

To increase the effectiveness of the approach a reunification of project cycle management was to occur, along with the use of Multi-Annual programming for continuity, and a system of Activity-Based Management (COM (2000) 212).

The review has shown that, although the Community’s development co-operation policy became more focused and increasingly influenced by political and economic considerations, it still suffered from inconsistencies and a lack of focus. The approach could be said to reflect the vitality and adaptability of the Community, but it was also the result of a number of constraints. The decision-making process of the European Union was slow and complex, involving a number of institutions, such as the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. These institutions reflected the

diverse views of 15 Member States: regionalist or globalist and, Neo-Liberalist or Socialist. Member States preferred to retain their own identity- the result of cultural and historical differences. Similarly NGOs attempted to influence any policy decisions made. Therefore Community decisions were the result of compromises and trade-offs between the main players.

Until the mid 1980s the Community favoured a Structuralist approach, long after the BWI had moved on to Structural Adjustment Programmes. However it did include NGOs, to provide it with a better poverty reach (Tvedt, 1998). An emphasis on basic needs and integrated rural development projects formed the basis of the Community approach until the mid-eighties (Riddell & Robinson, 1995). In this early period Community aid was more focused on the immediate output of projects rather than being concerned with the overall whole policy approach and impact. By the 1990s, the Community was ready to incorporate both SAPs and conditionality clauses into its policy, but with the inclusion of a social perspective reflecting the European conscience (Marantis, 1994; Chambers, 1995; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Lomé IV and SASP heralded in an increase in policy dialogue and a shift towards sector-wide approach with an appreciation of the wider picture (ICEA/DPPC, 1999). The move to embrace the Washington Consensus coincided with the need to produce a Common Foreign and Security policy, which would incorporate development policy (Robinson, 1994). Throughout the period the Community had become more aware of the role to be played by NGOs in the development of civil society in both the North and the South (Bratton, 1989; Edwards, 1994; Hulme & Edwards, 1997).

Development NGOs

Attention will now turn to examine the relative importance of NGOs in the Community's Development Co-operation policy. Over time, the trend away from the provision of large physical infrastructure projects to a focus on the need to tackle rural poverty through the participation of the indigenous the population, has increased the opportunities available for NGOs. They are seen to have an essential role to play in the fight against poverty- their 'raison d'être'- particularly in the light of their intimate knowledge of marginalized people (COM (97) 427). The European NGOs have a function to play in the Community's Development Co-operation policy, partly as a result of the provisions of the Lomé Conventions, but also in response to the co-financing opportunities offered by the Commission.

Regional and National Indicative programmes, drawn up to reflect the features of the Lomé agreements, are the result of consultations between the Community and the individual ACP country. These programmes are implemented through the European Development Fund and incorporate locally prepared projects. Opportunities for NGO to participate in the RIPs and NIPs may arise from smaller contracts, which are considered to be particularly suitable for their approach e.g. grass-roots training, community development projects (CLONG, 1998b). In these situations the local EC delegation acts as the NGO's interlocutor and is also the stakeholder to whom they are financially accountable (CLONG, 1998b). According to CLONG, the conditions for financial accountability are tighter when the NGO is 'contracted' to undertake these types of projects, than for the projects initiated by the NGOs under the cofinancing schemes (CLONG, 1998b). European NGOs are in competition with local NGOs for

the funding of projects under both the Microproject Programmes (Art. 252 & 253) and Decentralised co-operation.

In addition to the funding available through the EDF, there are also opportunities for the cofinancing of NGDO activities from the EU budget, where budget lines may have a specific focus, e.g. rehabilitation, food aid, human rights. As a percentage of total Community aid, the amount allocated to the co-financing of NGOs' activities is very low (2 – 3 %) in relation to the allocations to programme aid (10%), food aid (8%), humanitarian assistance (14%), and project aid (64%) (South Research, 2000: 91). However it is difficult to fully identify the total amount of aid with which NGOs are associated because (as indicated above) they can act as 'contractors' for the Commission (Cox & Koning, 1997; Cox & Chapman, 1999).

'By the mid-nineties, it was estimated that over 14% of the EC development budget was managed by NGOs' (South Research, 2000: 92).

The following Table gives an indication of the level and spectrum of support offered to NGOs by the Community for 1994 and 1996. While the co-financing activities of NGOs are accounted for in the first two rows, it can be appreciated that they only represent approximately one third of the total Community financial contribution to NGO projects (COM (1999) 248).

Table 3.1 Co-financing Activities of European NGOs

	1994	1996
1. Cofinancing of development projects in developing countries	MECU 129.7	MECU 155
2. Cofinancing of awareness raising of development issues in Europe and of the Liaison Committee of development NGOs	14.5	18.3
3. Food aid	178.5	111.2
4. Humanitarian aid (ECHO)	320	301
5. Rehabilitation programmes in developing countries	42.2	43.8
6. Rehabilitation programmes in Southern Africa	66.7	14.6
7. Assistance for refugees and displaced persons	32.2	25.4
8. Special programme for South Africa	66.7	13.6
9. Other budget lines accessible to NGOs	17.8	20

Source: COM (1999) 248: 2; European Commission, 1995: 26.

According to the Table 3.1 Humanitarian Aid received the most support from the Community in 1994 with Food Aid in second place. This reflected the contemporary approach, to meet the basic needs of the population and deal with emergency situations on a response basis. In contrast 1996 indicates a change in Community policy with the relative decline in allocations to Food Aid and the balance tipped towards developments projects. Food aid, which began in 1967, was the first instrument not incorporated into the Community's co-operation agreements, and the first to be financed from the Community's budget (Cox & Koning, 1997). It includes food security projects and emergency Food Aid, both of which can be directed through NGOs, as well as programmed Food Aid (Cox & Koning, 1997). Since that time, new budget lines have been initiated by the European Parliament - often in response to pressure from Northern NGOs- to cover geographic, sectoral and thematic issues. Some budget lines combine a geographic and thematic focus e.g. rehabilitation activities in Southern Africa. Some budget lines simply focus on a theme e.g. decentralised co-operation, drugs, the conservation of tropical forests, AIDS (CLONG, 1998a). In keeping with the Community's new geo-political approach since

1989, many of these lines are open to Eastern Europe and the former USSR countries (Smillie et al., 1996). Essentially those budget lines concerned with women, the environment and health were initiated in the 1980s, whereas those focusing on issues relating to conflict and political issues appeared in the 1990s (CLONG, 1998a). Thus in 1984 there were only 3 budget headings available for NGOs, but by the end of the century there were 34 budget lines available to NGOs covering the relief, rehabilitation and development spectrum, in addition to the B7-6000 budget line (COM (94) 468; South Research, 2000). These 34 budget lines were not exclusively available to Northern NGOs but could also be accessed by Southern NGOs, research institutions, and private businesses for instance (Smillie et al., 1996). However the ability of Southern NGOs to access the budget lines is constrained, often by the lack of awareness of the opportunities available. While the successful project proposals conform to the Commission's guidelines and procedures, the Commission can be criticised for its lack of consideration of the overall impact of the projects (Smillie et al., 1996). As the number of budget lines available has expanded, the administrative burden on the Commission has increased. At the same time it has been suggested that NGOs may be aligning their proposals with the criteria laid down by the Commission rather than adhering to their own mission (Smillie et al., 1996). Whereas NGOs from the North and the South can access the aforementioned budget lines, only European NGOs can access the B7-6000 budget line. It is available to finance both development activities in the South and education/awareness projects in the North.

The B7-6000 Budget Line: the co-financing of development projects in the South

According to the OECD (1996) the co-financing of NGOs' activities under the B7-6000 budget line was the

'oldest systematic form of co-operating with NGOs' (OECD, 1996: 45),

but, as with the Community's Development policy, it did not achieve legal status until later (1998), in the interim period being guided by the General Conditions (Council Regulation 1658/98). The budget line was initially introduced by the Community in response to the need to incorporate a new approach to development issues, which would complement its current policy

'means of diversifying aid strategy and action with a strong poverty focus' (South Research, 2000: 23)

and achieve better results through its ability to reach the poorest groups (COM (75) 504; Courier, 1995c; OECD, 1996; South Research, 2000). The Community was aware that NGOs offered an innovative, flexible approach and more importantly were able to attain contact with the grassroots of society, especially where official aid was either unavailable or inappropriate (OECD, 1996).

The original terms of reference gave European NGOs the 'right of initiative' and sole responsibility for the presentation of each proposal under B7-6000 (Courier, 1981; COM (83) 297). A proposal was to be the result of the relationship ('partnership') between a European NGO and a Southern NGO, and in direct response

to the needs of the target group in the developing country. It was, therefore, largely demand-led, with the European NGOs playing a proactive role and the Community a reactive one, with an inability to drive the funds in a preferred direction. By remaining exclusively demand-led, the Community has therefore been unable to nurture a coherent policy, or respond positively to the evolving development discourse in the same way that Member States have been able to (South Research, 2000). Similarly it has been argued that the performance of the budget line has not reflected evolutionary changes in the NGO sector or in NGO-donor relationships

‘the European system stuck to a ‘classic’ and uniform project-by-project approach, whose intrinsic limits were increasingly known’ (South Research, 2000: 33).

It is now appropriate therefore to review the budget line and, if possible, identify the extent to which the Community has attempted to exert control over it. The original General Conditions were minimal (9 pages) and reflected the Commission’s desire to both avoid imposing a heavy administrative burden on NGOs and to set up a flexible control system (COM (75) 504). Between 1976 and 1980, a number of suitable adjustments were made in response to NGO requests, such as the introduction of block grants available to approved experienced NGOs and the increase in the level of EC support (%) given to individual projects (COM (79) 112; COM (80) 98). The allocation of funds tended to favour those projects, which facilitated the full participation of the poor rural community at all stages and laid the foundations for their ‘auto-development’, as well as projects concerning education/training, and health (Courier, 1980; COM (81) 220; Courier, 1986). However the Commission also attempted to ‘guide’ the allocation of funds by focusing attention on particular issues, and indicating it would positively favour them in the allocation of funds, thus: 1981-

Year of the Handicapped; 1981 – 1990 International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (COM (80) 98); 1982 – a focus on small-scale agricultural projects to combat hunger (COM (83) 297); and, 1984 – suffering from poverty, disease, ignorance and injustice (COM (85) 384). In 1988 the revised General Conditions (49 pages) identified the main principles for the B7-6000 line to be

‘priority for meeting the basic needs of the worst off; involvement of the beneficiaries at all stages; encouragement of self-reliance; ensuring the long-term viability of co-financed operations’ (SEC (89) 1575: 15).

Funding allocations were to favour GROs, and directly productive projects, generating re-useable funds

‘close attention is now paid to the constitution of financial resources (e.g. revolving funds, loans and bank guarantees) which can be reused for other operations’ (SEC (89) 1575: 15).

The revision also included simpler, more comprehensive guidelines and, an assurance of improved accountability, with the inclusion of three evaluation options (SEC (89) 1575). NGOs were now increasingly pressurised, by the Commission and the Court of Auditors, to improve their accountability and professionalism (COM (94) 468; SEC (92) 1921).

Political considerations began to influence Community policy in the 1990s, with preference shown for the pursuit of the democratisation process and the development of civil society

‘Council stressed the basically political dimension of fight against poverty’ (COM (97) 427:12)

'Commission continued to prioritise NGO projects, which showed a strong commitment to grass roots development' (COM (98) 127:4) (COM (1999) 248; Council regulation no. 1658/98).

The Commission noted that both these developments offered new opportunities for NGOs to replace those projects lost due to political and civil conflicts (COM (92) 1921). By the mid 1990s, the Commission was promoting the creation of sustainable development through the development of the productive resources of the poorer sections of society

'Productive, job-creating and income generating projects occupy an increasingly significant place in all projects co-financed in recent years' (COM (97) 427: 8)

and an awareness of the significance of globalisation for the poorest of the poor (COM (94) 468; COM (98) 127; COM (1999) 248).

The Commission's policy towards NGOs since 1976 can be said to show a shift away from the politically neutral stance of the early years, with its concern for the basic needs of the disadvantaged, to one that has a political dimension and a focus on the development of the private sector and access to productive resources (Com (98) 127; Com (95) 292). There has been a corresponding growing awareness of the impact of the aid flows on the different groups in society in the recipient countries (Allen & Thomas, 2000). Initially, therefore, the focus was on the poor rural community (Com (80) 98) but this has since widened, to include both rural and urban communities, as well as specifically focusing on certain disadvantaged groups such as women, children (in particular street children), indigenous people and the disabled (Com (94) 468; Com (98) 127). In 1996 the policy approach prioritised support for the development of grass roots associations and groups unable to access official

development co-operation funding (Com (98) 127; COM (1999) 248). Under pressure from NGOs, the EC acknowledged it was essential to support communities throughout the whole continuum of need from emergency relief through rehabilitation to development, and thus laid an emphasis on

‘a process-led rather than a project-led approach to development’ (COM, VIII/505/99: 2).

Although the first evaluation of the whole B7-6000 budget line did not take place until 25 years after its inception, reports have been presented on specific use made of its funds (COM (83) 297). In the 1990s, four evaluation exercises were carried out, which were part of a process leading to the review of the General Conditions (COM (94) 7). Feedback from these reports noted that, on the positive side, integrated development projects were found to increase living conditions and the capacity for development (Debuyst, 1994); savings and loans projects were found to be an efficient tool which enhanced the knowledge and experience of SNGOs (Dhonte, 1994); and the vocational training projects had a good completion rate, with urban ones more successful than rural (Boulon-Lefevre, 1994). On the negative side, criticism highlighted the slow administrative performance of the Commission and its burden on NGOs, a lack of policy awareness by NGOs, the inability to measure the impact of the projects and, in the case of the savings and loans schemes, a lack of focus on the poorest (De Crombrugghe, 1993; Boulon-Lefevre, 1994; Debuyst, 1994; Dhonte, 1994). Recommendations from the evaluations included the need to focus on long-term development with the use of multi-annual contracts/programmes for European NGOs, and improve the sustainability of projects and the quality of the partnership between North and South (De Crombrugghe, 1993; Boulon-Lefevre,

1994). Funds should be released according to the needs of the project and be increased for decentralised co-operation (Boulon-Lefevre, 1994; Dhonte, 1994). It was also recommended that Commission procedures should be faster, simpler and more transparent (De Crombrugghe, 1993; Boulon-Lefevre, 1994; Debuyst, 1994; Dhonte, 1994).

The current General Conditions (2000) have ensured the protection of the right of initiative and NGOs' autonomy. The emphasis has been put on the pursuit of poverty alleviation and enhancement of the quality of life, prioritising local partner initiatives and project proposals from European NGDO consortia (COM/VIII/505/99). For the first time, initiatives for the promotion of fair trade and the prevention and resolution of conflicts were included (COM/VIII/505/99).

The Management of the B7-6000 Budget Line

While it had been recognised that there was a problem with the strategy and focus of the co-financing line, it was not helped by the management system

‘management is beginning to pose more and more serious problems’ (De Crombrugghe, 1993: 67).

According to the recent evaluation report, B7-6000 has been in crisis mode for past two years (South Research, 2000). Although allocations to the budget line increased from 2.5mecu (1976) to 200 mecu (1999), the Commission invariably found that demand for funding far outstretched supply (European Commission, 2001). Prior to 1989, appropriations could be switched to finance those projects, which would otherwise have had to be carried over to the next year, then new rules were

introduced, which terminated this practice (COM (91) 52). The tougher selection process introduced, affected both NGOs' co-operation programmes and their relations with SNGOs (Com (91) 52).

Table 3.2 A profile of the B7-6000 budget line since 1976

Year	No. submitted	No. w/r	No. cofinanced	Value mecu	No. Carryover	Mecu carryover	Total allocation mecu
1976	121	n/a	76	2.5	n/a	n/a	2.5
1978	>200	n/a	176	12.0	n/a	n/a	4.0
1979	240	50	152	11.95	38	n/a	12.5
1980	367	n/a	181	n/a	119	n/a	14.0
1981	359	67	164	13.5	128	11.0	14.0
1982	458	85	262	25.5	111	14.0	28.0
1983	439	98	214	23.7	127	15.7	31.2
1984	483	92	271	31.2	120	17.4	35.0
1985	505	93	315	38.6	97	12.8	35.0
1986	614	73	293	40.1	248	34.8	46.0
1987	905	164	423	56.6	318	53.0	62.8
1988	858	137	451	71.2	270	50.2	80.0
1989	1009	278	546	79.0	185	38.8	80.0
1990	824	133	450	79.4	241	48.6	90.2
1991	847	112	501	93.4	234	56.9	104.6
1992	956	167	484	98.0	305	83.5	110.0
1993	1018	192	582	120.8	244	103.0	135.6
1994	1205	307	599	129.7	299	140.6	145.0
1995	1127	254	601	139.9	272	66.4	174.0
1996	1254	179	645	155.0	430	n/a	174.0
1997	1199	138	596	150.0	465	n/a	170.0

Refs: Budget reports for appropriate years.

A profile of the B7-6000 budget line is shown in Table 3.2. It can be seen from the Table that the increased number of proposals is associated with an increased number withdrawn/rejected or carried over, although the acceptance rate remains at approximately 50%. In 1989 those withdrawn/rejected (278) were greater than those carried over (185) as also in 1994 (307) withdrawn/rejected and (299) carryover. The

former group was often due to inappropriate paper work and the latter exacerbated the workload for the subsequent year. Project submissions from NGOs applying for funding for the first time, small NGOs and those from new EU Member States have been favoured (Com (84) 252; SEC/91/2263; Com (94) 468), and in order to improve quality of submissions and reduce the Commission's workload, the Co-financing Support Programme (CSP) was introduced in 1997 (terminated 1999). However the institutional reform of Community aid did not provide a clear division of responsibilities and further confused matters (European Commission, 2001). Consequently, it was noted that the length of time taken to deal with a proposal was still on average 13.5 months, with a backlog of 980 proposals (South Research, 2000).

The new General conditions (2000) have established a change in the nature of the B7-6000 line and its management to one focused on the process of development, and thus introduced programme funding, institutional dialogue, and a broader, long-term view (COM/VIII/505/99; South Research, 2000). Crucially it is felt that the demand-led nature of the B7-6000 line does not fit well into the Community's desire for a more coherent, co-ordinated aid policy, with the promotion of sustainability (South Research, 2000).

The position of European NGOs within the Community's Development Co-operation policy can be differentiated according to the type of activity they undertake. NGO activities under the EDF/Lomé Conventions are essentially of a contractual nature, with the donor in full control of the project proposals and the standard of accountability and reporting styles (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Where they carry out the humanitarian and emergency operations, the NGOs can be said to be acting as

executing agencies (Smillie, 1997). However under the B7-6000 budget line the NGOs have the ability to initiate the projects, and produce proposals, which correlate with needs identified by the local people. But, this has been identified as a problem for the Commission, because it produces a disparate scatter of projects, which may not conform to the Community's overall policy. The Commission has been criticised for the lax approach it has taken to Development policy, and consequently it has attempted to tighten up its approach and draw it into line with its Foreign policy (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). While the Commission has not withdrawn the right of initiative from the NGOs, it has attempted to constrain them by a move towards the use of programmes and the gradual tightening up of procedures. Whereas earlier the Commission was concerned with the allocation of funds and the immediate impact of the project, it is now more concerned with the bigger picture. These changes instigated by the Commission can be identified as a move from short-term functional accountability to strategic accountability (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), also supported by Kumar & Hudock (1996) as a move from process to programme accountability. As the EC has changed its approach to include the focus on the market, evidence suggests that the NGOs are aiding the alleviation of poverty by promotion (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). While pressure has been exerted on NGOs to conform to the EC policy (Carroll, 1992), they have fought to retain their informal and participatory approach to project initiation.

Conclusion:

The focus, format and evolution of Community policy have been and still are determined by a number of variables. Within the European Union, it has proved difficult to gain a consensus of opinion from Member States, with such diverse

historical and cultural backgrounds. Without a firm framework in place, the policy grew to become a fragmented, disparate collection of procedures and instruments. The Commission was also subject to pressure by European NGOs to promote an approach to poverty alleviation, which is both participatory and sustainable. Externally the Community has been subject to pressure from the UN (backed by European NGOs) to incorporate its targets into Community policy. Meanwhile the policy stance of the World Bank and the IMF, which promotes the focus on the market and competition to reduce poverty, gained Community support, although in a form modified by Member States and NGOs. Consultation between the two (the Community and NGOs) does not always achieve a policy change desired by the NGOs. The Community has its own agenda regarding the CFSP, and, as this has gained increasing support from the Member States, it seems to have been promoted over development co-operation (Edwards, 1994). It has responded to some of the requests put forward by the NGOs but in turn has imposed bureaucratic constraints e.g. accountability, slow administration of requests/funding (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

In dealing with the Commission, European NGOs have felt that the division of responsibilities of the management of EC aid has led to differences in interpretation and implementation, due in part to the lack of official dialogue between the various sections (Cox, Healey, and Koning, 1997; Koulaimah - Gabriel 1997). Throughout the period, the relations between the Commission and the European NGOs have obviously been a significant factor in the changing role of NGOs in the Community's Development Co-operation policy. Therefore the next chapter will investigate the evolving relations between the Commission, the European NGDOs and the NGDO-EU Liaison Committee (CLONG).

Chapter 4 :

The Evolution of relations between the European Commission and European development NGOs

The relationship between the European Commission and European NGOs has evolved over time in response to changes in the international environment and in the current philosophy of the players in the development/aid arena. An examination of the relationship between the European Commission and European development NGOs will focus on why the relationship was needed, how it has evolved and the extent to which adaptations have had to be made and by whom. Consideration of the increasing dependence of NGOs on EC funding begs the question as to whether this has in any way constrained their activities or whether the relationship with the Commission has enabled them to influence the direction and detail of EC Development Co-operation policy. An attempt will be made, therefore, to identify the extent to which European NGOs are positive stakeholders in the development cooperation policy of the European Community (EC) or merely act as acquiescent pawns (Tvedt, 1998).

In order to examine the changing relationship between the Commission and European NGOs, the time period under review, namely 1976 to 2002, will be divided into 3 sections. The justification for this division relates to the development of the relationship from its fledging state in the 1970s, through a period of increasing maturity and cooperation in the 1980s, to the time when

events have combined to cause increasing tension between the two - the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.

This chapter will therefore:

- (i) examine the evolution of relations between the European Commission and European NGOs, and
- (ii) critically discuss the significant results in the light of the academic discourse identified in the literature review.

The Early Years: 1975 – 1979

The formal relationship, between the Commission and European NGOs involved in development activities, began in 1976, partly as a result of the positive experiences enjoyed by the Commission when using NGOs as 'intermediaries' to distribute its emergency food aid (Com (75) 504). The Commission saw the possibility of extending the role of NGOs and using their experience and particular characteristics to improve EC Development Policy

'to widen the vision and scope of their (the Community's) development policy' (Com (75) 504:6).

With their unique approach, NGOs had shown an ability to reach those people who were beyond the sphere of the activities of official bodies in Developing Countries-

'NGOs are seen as vehicles by which official aid can reach the poorest and the most marginalized people' (Cox & Koning, 1997:38)

and the Commission considered their actions to be both complementary and supplementary to official development aid (Com (75) 504). The general conditions regulating the use of the co-financing budget line were drawn up as a result of discussions between the Commission, NGO representatives and the Member States (Com (77) 83). However, once these were in place, some shortcomings became obvious, and modifications were made to the general conditions in direct response to requests from the NGOs (Com (77) 83; Com (79) 112). Similarly, as it became apparent that some potential projects were too small to be included in the system as it stood, block grants were introduced wherever the Commission had confidence in the NGO's ability to use the funds wisely (Com (79) 112; Com (80) 98; Courier, 1980).

The Commission saw its own role to be one offering financial security to NGOs, acting as coordinator of NGO projects in the Developing Countries, and attempting to increase efficiency through the elimination of unnecessary duplication (Com (77) 83). This initial phase in the relationship, was viewed by the Commission as essentially a period of adjustment, when both sides were responding to present challenges, and anticipated that relations would continue to progress in the future –

‘(relations had) evolved in a dynamic, positive and varied way’ (Com (79) 112:13)
‘the collaboration with the NGOs will be required to assume new dimensions’
(Com (78) 75:7).

The establishment of the EEC-NGO Liaison Committee (CLONG) in January 1976 was a further attempt to promote relations between the Commission and European NGOs (Com (77) 83). This forum was set up to enhance collaborative

ventures and the exchange of views, both within the European NGO movement and, between its representatives and the Commission (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996). Initially CLONG was a small, voluntary group, representing a limited number of NGOs, who were thus able to develop personal relations with the Commission and so exert some influence on EC matters –

‘..allowed (CLONG) to become a respected interlocutor and to exercise a discrete but efficient influence on both general policy issues... and thorny questions’ (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996:3).

However, while appreciating the role of CLONG, the Commission felt there was a need to reach out to the wider NGO audience, and a series of events led to the transformation of CLONG. In 1978, CLONG gained legal status under Belgium law, lost its independence and became financially dependent on the Commission, who initiated the establishment of an Annual Assembly (Com (79) 112; Com (80) 98). Consequently, the role played by CLONG began to develop and it was invited to take part in discussions on development matters not only with the Commission but also representatives of Member States’ Governments and the European Parliament’s Committee on Development and Co-operation (Com (78) 75; Com (79) 112; Com (81) 220). It had thus gained an enhanced role, namely to represent the views of European NGOs to the wider group of institutions, take an active part in the discussions, and report back to European NGOs on the issues and agreements that had been achieved. The Annual Assembly, with attendance deemed to be by invitation only, developed as a forum for the discussion of issues between its European members, and with their partners in the South (Com (82) 157).

By the end of the 1970s, the Commission indicated its positive view of the role played by NGOs, when it identified them as being

‘an established part of its overall development policy’ (Com (80) 98:8),

and by commenting on their performance, which showed ‘dedication and motivation’ and an ability to undertake a ‘catalytic role’ (Com (80) 98:9). Their role had been transformed from one of being a neutral link or messenger between the European Community and the people of the Developing countries to one where they had gained recognition for their capacity to make things happen. This confirmed that their ability to enhance the performance of the donor’s (EC’s) policy had been recognized (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

The Commission also acknowledged its respect for the experience of the NGOs, when the regulations controlling the allocation of funds, initially set by mutual agreement, were later amended as the result of the practical experience of the NGOs. Furthermore, by endorsing the distribution of block grants to specific NGOs, the Commission was indicating its trust in NGOs’ ability to use funds wisely, based on mutual experience over a three-year period. In offering its financial support for the activities of the NGOs, the Community was keen to identify the significance of its own contribution to the co-financed projects. This proved to be no easy task because the inadequacies of NGO accounting systems made such identification difficult and by the end of the decade, NGOs were under pressure from both the European Parliament and the Commission to improve their accounting practices (Com (80) 98). Subsequently, despite indicating that the Commission would not interfere but only offer financial support, some pressure

began to be exerted on the NGOs by the Commission. In retrospect therefore, this period in the 1970s represented a time during which the NGOs and the Commission began to feel their way in the new relationship, and attempted to test and extend the boundaries.

Strengthening of the Relationship : 1980 – 1989

At the start of the decade, the position of NGOs in the EC's Development Co-operation Policy had been secured –

'a firmly established part of its overall development policy' (Com(81)220)
'an essential feature of Community Development Policy' (Courier, 1991:66)
'adding a further dimension to the European Community's development policy (Com (83) 297:1).

Attention therefore turned to reflect on what constituted the conditions necessary for successful co-operation between the Commission and the NGOs. According to the Commission, these were identified as

'mutual comprehension and trust with each side recognising the other's viewpoint and avoiding unilateral imposition of conditions' (Com (81) 220:5).

A review of the period will ascertain as to whether these conditions ensued or whether the trend towards the imposition of some control and influence over the activities of the NGOs begun in the previous decade continued. In the early 1980s, the Commission's trust in NGOs was based on the recognition of their ability to respond quickly to changing circumstances –

'adaptation to changing economic and political conditions and their very flexible working methods' (Com (81) 220:7).

It saw a role for NGOs to act as a 'catalyst for change' in developing countries, thereby enabling the indigenous people to extract themselves from their 'state of poverty and oppression' (Com (81) 220:7). Evidence supported the view that NGOs were able to reach the desired sections of the population on a scale that could not be matched by the EU or national governments –

'able to rely on the multifarious and competent network of your organisations' (Courier, 1985 : xiv),

These communities are often the voiceless and most helpless ones, those least likely to be able to communicate their needs and achieve an official response (Com (81) 220:7).

As a consequence of the favourable climate of opinion, 1982 was an important date in the development of relations between the Commission and European NGOs-

'unprecedented stepping up of EEC-NGO co-operation (and) a marked extension of co-financing operations' (Courier, 1983 p vii).

The Commission marked the occasion by reiterating that the NGOs had the exclusive right of initiating the presentation of projects, and at the same time instigated a study into the work of NGOs to identify the 'NGO formula' (Com (83) 297; Com (85) 348), which it hoped to use as a template for its own activities. However it soon realized that it was not possible to replicate the approach for use with large-scale projects (Courier, 1987; Com (91) 52; Sec (91) 2263) and instead reached the conclusion that collaboration with NGOs was a more feasible alternative approach to take-

'Commission plans to intensify and extend its joint action with NGOs in development sphere' (Com (91) 52:27).

Of particular value to the Commission was the contribution it felt NGOs could make in the sphere of cultural understanding and exchange, which could positively impact on development co-operation activities-

'NGOs have been able to avoid many mistaken concepts and errors of the types of development co-operation embarked upon by official donors' (Reithinger, 1987: 72).

It was obvious that the NGOs had a different perspective of the issues- 'new initiatives, ideas and concepts' (Com (91) 52:26), and the Commission was keen to seek out their opinion, based as it invariably was on first-hand experience. The Commission was interested, therefore, in encouraging NGOs to seek out innovative responses to difficult problems-

'NGOs must be pathfinders for their governments' J. Delors (Courier, 1986:14).

Furthermore, NGOs were also valued for their contribution to critical discussion of EC policy. Jacques Delors pointed out that NGOs had a role to play in providing positive criticism of governmental authority work (Courier, 1986), and according to DG Foley

'NGOs' criticism of the EEC's policy on food aid was useful' (Courier, 1986:15).

This critical role received further support in the Ulburgh Report, although hope was expressed that this would not adversely affect the flow of funds to NGO projects (Courier, 1986). In further recognition of the experience of NGOs and in

keeping with its policy dialogue approach, the Commission embarked upon the regular exchange of ideas with NGOs, in the conviction that it could achieve beneficial returns-

'a useful and necessary complement to their dialogue with ACP partners' (Courier, 1987:76).

NGOs were not only recognized for the role they could play in development activities in the South but were also beginning to respond to the need to be proactive in the North. Both the Ulburgh Report and CLONG pointed out that there was a role for NGOs to play in Europe in promoting an awareness of development issues through initiating debates on topical issues and the dissemination of information (European Parliament, 1986; Courier, 1987).

As a result of the positive attitude towards NGOs, they found themselves to be the privileged recipients for development funding. This was not without critical comment from the Commission, however, with a warning for NGOs from DG Pisani that too rapid a rate of expansion could jeopardize their level of efficiency and degree of flexibility (Courier, 1983). Disquiet was also expressed that, projects run by NGOs in the field of development lacked co-ordination and often did not achieve the best returns, despite the identification of a financial multiplier of between 2.4 and 3 (Com (81) 220; Com (82) 157; Com (83) 297; Com (84) 252; Com (85) 348). At the same time, however, the Commission was aware that not all returns were numerically calculable (Courier, 1986). Following on from this line of criticism, the Ulburgh Report (European Parliament, 1986) called for tighter financial control and accountability both by the EU and the NGOs, as well as better co-ordination of activities in specific regions. In response the Commission proposed the introduction

of an evaluation reflex, which would enable a project to be adjusted during its life, and therefore the experience gained from the project could be put to better use in the future (Sec (89) 1575). Consequently, an increasing number of NGOs began to include a section on self-evaluation in their budget operations. Thus it can be seen that the criticism of NGO financial affairs, begun at the end of the 1970s, continued into the 1980s and resulted in them being gradually coerced into ensuring that their financial and reporting systems conformed to the pattern laid down by the Commission (Com (86) 403). This was despite the fact that the Commission had recognized that in order to achieve their results, NGOs needed to be free from any external influences, which could inhibit their performance –

‘success due to independence from any external conditioning’ (Com (83) 297:2).

This aspect received further emphasis at the end of the decade when the Commission indicated that its role was to focus on the financial input to projects, however it also mentioned ‘minimal input’ outside this role (Com (91) 52). This could be interpreted as an intrusion into the sphere of NGOs’ activities, as previously there had been no indication of any additional input from the Commission, which merely saw its role to be the offer of financial support. In line with the Ulburgh Report, the Commission indicated that it could act as catalyst between NGOs, and between the NGOs and Community instruments, in order to avoid any wasteful duplication of effort (Courier, 1985). However both Commissioner Natali and the NGOs recognized that deficiencies in the administrative procedures were impeding the flow of rescue and rehabilitation aid, and needed to be addressed (Courier, 1985).

During this period of development in the relations between the EC and NGOs, CLONG also underwent change. In response to pressure exerted on it by those attending the Annual Assembly, democratic elections were held in 1980 to elect NGO representatives to become members of CLONG, and to attend the annual General Assembly (Com (80) 98; Com (81) 220). CLONG, therefore, became a democratic and representative association with a Secretariat and an increased budget from the Commission, which would facilitate the expansion of its role and associated activities (Dreesmann, 1987; Bossuyt & De Belder, 1996). The proximity of CLONG to the Commission had enabled it to assume the role of lobbyist for the interests of the Developing Countries (Dreesmann, 1987) - at times focusing on the contradictions between the Common Agriculture Policy and the EEC Development Policy. CLONG had, at this stage, also become sufficiently assured to be able to offer an increasing number of working papers to the Commission for discussion. At the 1985 NGO General Assembly, discussion focused on the close links between emergency food aid and long-term development aid and resulted in the production of the Natali Plan, which was largely financed and implemented by NGOs (Courier, 1985; Courier, 1986). At this stage in the relationship, the Commission seemed willing to listen to and appreciate NGOs' experience, and thus they moved from a place on the outer fringes to one of being actively sought for its views of political problems-

'NGOs of Europe....have left the 'border of irrelevance' behind them some years ago' (NGO viewpoint) (Dreesman 1987:53).

CLONG felt that it had gained a greater understanding of the role it was to play in the development process, and yet, nonetheless, had refused to become an instrument of Community development policy (Galand, 1987). CLONG considered itself to be a valuable partner for the EU in its development policy (Dreesman, 1987). Nevertheless

by 1988 CLONG was finding it increasingly difficult to gain a consensus from its members on current issues because, with more than 650 individual European NGOs, they represented an extremely diverse set of opinions (Courier, 1988). It was easier for specialist NGOs to take a stance on a particular issue and consequently gain higher media profile (Dreesman, 1987). Thus, the increase in the membership of CLONG had a two-fold impact on the significance of CLONG. On the one hand as a representative of a larger group of NGOs, it had gained more authority, but, on the other hand, the increased diversity of views had undermined CLONG's ability to offer a united opinion in development policy discussions.

Throughout the 1980s the issue of genuine partnership was discussed in relation to the Commission and NGOs, and Southern NGOs and Northern NGOs. The Commission identified a regular partner as one that showed a

'genuine commitment to development assistance' and 'a bona-fide European identity' (Com (81) 220:7).

The Commission used the term 'indispensable partners' to describe those NGOs that distributed food aid through EuroAid (Courier, 1983:ix). The application of the term partnership to the relations with NGOs is more complicated with the issue of financial dependency. Dreesman (1987) suggested that the idea of development co-operation presupposed the existence of a partnership, which in turn required parity and equality of rights. However, while this was difficult in a financially dependent relationship, it was felt that European NGOs had achieved a balance between being financially dependent on donors and at the same time using the relationship to move the donor in the desired direction –

'NGOs have developed an effective balance between the system of a paying pocket' and the instrument of the 'prodding' (Dreesman, 1987:54).

One complication to be avoided was the position of being in the donor's pocket (Dreesman, 1987). On the other hand, NGOs needed to allow donors to 'use' them otherwise they could lose out to the governments or prompt the emergence of QUANGOs (Courier, 1987).

The development of relations between the Commission and the European NGOs certainly progressed throughout the 1980s, with both sides actively participating, although the overall level of influence was unequal. According to the Commission, it had close and dependable relations with NGOs based on a sound working relationship (Courier, 1981; Courier, 1987). The NGOs felt that relations had matured into one of excellent co-operation (Courier, 1983), based on frank and fruitful discussions (Courier, 1988) and mutual confidence (Courier, 1987). They were in agreement over the value of small-scale participatory development projects, which focused on meeting the basic needs of the local population (Courier, 1983). Nevertheless NGOs had attempted to shift EC policy towards recognition of the existence of a spectrum of need stretching from emergency aid, through the rehabilitation process, to longer-term development aid. At the same time the Commission and NGOs were in mutual agreement about the inadequacies of the administrative procedure for the assessment and dispersal of monies to aid projects (Courier, 1985). However, while CLONG identified NGOs as valuable partners in EU Development Policy, this was never openly recognised by the Commission (Courier, 1987). Throughout the 1980s, therefore, although Bossuyt & de Belder (1996:4) indicated that CLONG had managed to promote the 'role and place of NGOs in European Development co-operation' and 'ensure

close dialogue with EU institutions', the NGOs did not feel that they had achieved true recognition of their position as partners of the Commission. NGOs were wary of the possibility of losing their independence and autonomy, and were emphatic in their refusal to become instruments of EC Development Policy (Courier, 1987). At the centre of this problem was their obvious financial relationship with the Commission, but their independence was to some extent assured by the adherence to their 'right of initiative' for the introduction of projects under the B7-6000 budget line. It meant that this budget-line was essentially demand-led and not obviously constrained by the policy directives of the Commission. In the future, this characteristic was to prove difficult for the Commission to reconcile with its policy objectives.

A new Partnership?

The late 1980s seemed to indicate a rising trend in the relations between the Commission and the NGOs, but in retrospect they had achieved a zenith, and were increasingly to be put under pressure in the following decade. An examination of the developments in their relationship can be closely correlated with the response elicited from each of the players to both changing external conditions and the internal pressures for reforms. As the level of conflict increased, so the relations reached an apparent nadir by the end of the decade – only to be surpassed by the downsizing of CLONG in 2002. With hindsight, it can be suggested that the developing crisis was fueled by a number of contributory factors. These include: the changes taking place in the focus of EC development co-operation policy and its position within the portfolio of Community policies; the increase in the opportunities available to NGOs for the distribution of both emergency and

development co-operation aid; the mounting tensions within the NGO movement; and the escalation of bureaucratic problems in the Commission. These problems did not abruptly emerge, but in fact had been gradually building up over a period of years.

At the start of the decade, the Commission- which

‘recognised (the) ability of NGDOs to involve grassroots organisations in projects because they are central to their viability’ (Courier, 1992:VI)

was not the only EU institution to indicate a favourable opinion of European NGOs—

‘Community has found NGDOs to be efficient and reliable partners of the Community’ (European Council, 1991:1)

‘major contribution to development aid by co-operation between NGDOs and the Community’ (European Parliament in: OJ C150 15-6-92: 273).

However, while NGOs had gained an enhanced profile with EU institutions, tensions had begun to appear within the NGO movement, as a result of both internal and external pressures. The increased funding available to NGOs and the proliferation of budget-lines had precipitated a growth in the emergence and evolution of new NGOs. At the same time the developments in the aid environment had heightened the feeling of insecurity among NGOs and they became increasingly aware of the need to guard against the erosion of their unique status, in particular their independence and ‘right of initiative’. Despite benefiting from the new policy emphasis therefore, the NGOs were critical of what they felt was the encroachment of foreign policy upon the sphere of development co-operation, and the apparent preference for emergency aid over development aid, which virtually reduced the role for NGOs to one of executing agents —

'More and more often, NGOs are being approached to act as the instruments of European Development Policy' (Dumon, 1993:84).

As a consequence of these trends, the NGOs began to question the ability of CLONG to represent their interests at EU level, as it struggled to obtain a consensus of opinion from the increasingly disparate views of its members—

'broad and heterogeneous membership....led to a dilution of the European Mandate and focus of work' (Bossuyt and de Belder, 1996:7).

CLONG's inability to obtain a swift response to current issues and the existence of alternative voices for NGO opinions left it in an insecure position

'lost part of its dynamism and relevance' (South Research, 2000:21).
'no longer monopoly interlocuter' (Bossuyt and de Belder, 1996:6).

Small NGOs felt marginalised, and others found it more advantageous to join a more homogeneous group, while the larger NGOs acted alone (CLONG, 1995a). Therefore CLONG began a process of self-examination in 1992, in an attempt to address criticisms, which compared the intensity of its involvement with the Commission, to its apparently tenuous links with NGO members and the national platforms (CLONG, 1995a; Ambrogetti, 1996; Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996)

'Brussels oriented lobbying club (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996:8).

Unfortunately, while the subsequent review of its structure enabled CLONG to produce a faster response to current issues and debates, it did little to reduce the disenchantment among its members (Ambrogetti, 1996; Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996; CLONG, 1995a); and CLONG then had to work hard to nurture a 'culture

of commitment', which would ensure the involvement of the national platforms (CLONG, 1995a). With the publication of its Mission Statement (1995), the importance of CLONG's position as the representative of the NGO movement in policy dialogue, with not only the Commission but also other EU and international institutions, was identified

'to provide a link and facilitate in policy dialogue between the European Civil Society and the European Union by representing European NGOs to the Commission, the European Council and other appropriate international conferences and for a' *NGO Handbook* (CLONG, 1998a:6).

However, its monopoly position as sole representative of NGOs' interests in financial matters with the Commission had come under threat with the emergence of VOICE (1992) and the Dialogue group as well as the independent status of NGOs working on the PHARE and TACIS programmes (Ambrogetti, 1996; Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996). These other representative bodies found it easier to achieve an accord among their members and CLONG recognized the need to review its position. Thus, in order to build on the diversity of its members' interests and produce a unique identity for itself, it was agreed that the focus for CLONG's lobbying activities would be cross cutting issues (CLONG, 1998a).

In retrospect therefore the early 1990s had seen an attempt by NGOs to put their own affairs in order, with CLONG exerting a positive response to its changing environment –

'willingness to critically review its roles, structures and procedures' (Bossuyt and de Belder, 1996:6)

While transformation in the aid environment had affected the NGO sector, it had also impacted on relations between the Commission and NGOs. Things came to a head in 1994, when Commissioner Marin invited CLONG to take part in a

dialogue aimed at improving the organisation of relations between the Commission and NGOs

‘to identify the problems that were hindering an effective partnership’ (CLONG, 1997a).

Launched in September 1995 as the Elewijt process, the dialogue attempted to clarify the autonomous and complementary roles of both the Commission and NGOs –

‘ the identification of NGOs, the complementarity of NGOs’ and the Commission’s work, policy dialogue, and scope for standardizing procedures in the Commission’ (CLONG, 1997b: 3).

Throughout the rest of the decade and into the next century, the dialogue continued in an attempt to establish a code of conduct for their relations.

Although a number of issues combined to complicate relations between the Commission and NGOs, a common element was identified as the bureaucratic problems at the Commission, which had previously been revealed in the mid 1980s.

As a result of the proliferation of budget lines and the significant growth of NGOs, the workload of the Commission had increased, but with no accompanying increase in staffing levels (Cox & Koning, 1997; CLONG, 1997d; Van Reisen, 1999). European NGOs for their part were appreciative of the support they received from the European Community, which did not constrain their activities

‘ the EC has often been prepared to fund projects other donors will not consider, allowing NGOs to support a greater variety of innovative development initiatives and key organisations in the South’ Executive Summary p. 3 (CLONG, 1996).

However the NGDOs were affected by the resulting delays in decision- making associated with the backlog of work built up by the overloaded staff (European Commission, 2001; South Research, 2000). It was not until the introduction of the Commission's Sound and Efficient Management programme in 1998, that these problems were finally identified and subsequent action initiated to address them (CLONG, 1998a).

Furthermore, the Commission had become increasingly fragmented and this made it difficult for the NGOs to achieve an authentic policy dialogue. Although the staff of DG VIII appreciated the work of NGOs and CLONG, DG I was not only unaware of CLONG and its activities, but also lacked familiarity with the scope of work performed by NGOs (Aaronson, 1995; CLONG, 1996; Cox & Koning, 1997; CLONG, 1997a; CLONG, 1999b). Consequently it was generally acknowledged that the division of responsibilities between the different sections of the Commission had led to inconsistencies in the approaches adopted towards NGOs (Aaronson, 1995; Cox & Koning, 1997). However, it was also recognized that the increased availability of funding opportunities had attracted a new breed of NGOs, who showed an apparent lack of professionalism and little concern for development results –

‘(aimed) solely to raise their own profile and attract funding’ (Aaronson, 1995: 4);

‘Some NGOs seem ready to ‘sell their souls’ (Gregoire, 1995: 83);

‘behave more like consultancy offices conducting research into the availability of contracts’ (Ryelandt, 1995: 65).

This further complicated the EU institutions' ability to understand and appreciate the role of NGOs (Ryelandt, 1995). Similarly, in response to the changing geopolitics of aid, and international aid fatigue, Commission staff came under increasing pressure to improve their accountability and effectiveness in the use of funds (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996; Cox, Healey & Koning, 1997). A further complication was the desire by Coreper and the European Parliament to be involved in considerations of the allocation of finance to geographical and sectoral policy (Bossuyt & de Belder, 1996). This new climate of accountability and the emergence of additional constraints on the flexibility of NGOs' activities fueled NGOs' fears that the Commission may in the future adopt a more control-oriented stance towards them –

'become more professional as regards the nature and formulation of their objectives and their financial management, which should be sound and transparent' (Com(94)468:16).

In response to the mounting problems, therefore the Commission set about reform of its own structure and procedures.

In 1998 the SCR was set up to reform the management of development co-operation programmes, and, in particular, to reduce the administrative burden of co-financing projects (CLONG, 2000). But the administrative problems were not immediately resolved partly due to the introduction of new personnel, who were unfamiliar with NGOs, but also because the division of responsibilities between DG DEV and SCR/5 was not clarified

'It has to be admitted that the 1998 reorganization of the Commission's external services made matters worse in two ways:

* it did not always make clear to staff adapting to new duties what were their responsibilities and what were those of their colleagues;

* it severely handicapped the provision of external assistance by failing to resolve certain fundamental staffing problems which came on top of the confusion and delay created by the streamlining of procedures. (European Commission, 2001: 146)

The lack of clarity in the division of responsibilities between the two departments manifested itself in a waiting time of 13.5 months for any decisions on the acceptability of projects (South Research, 2000). More changes were considered in September 2000, which would make the SCR responsible for the entire project cycle, with DEVA/4 dealing with the policy-making and the annual guidelines, although both departments would be involved in drawing up the guidelines (South Research, 2000).

Of particular concern to the Commission was the administrative burden of the *B7-6000 budget line*, which, being demand-led, produced a wide spectrum of projects often accompanied by poorly prepared paperwork from NGOs (CLONG, 1997d; South Research, 2000). Furthermore its popularity among NGOs led to it being oversubscribed and unmanageable, with the result that a high proportion of the proposals were carried over to the subsequent year (CLONG, 1996; CLONG, 1998a; South Research, 2000). Accordingly, it was acknowledged not only by the Commission and NGOs but also the European Parliament, that a revision of the B7-6000 line was urgently needed (CLONG, 1996; South Research, 2000). This was not before it had become apparent to critics that the European system of co-financing the activities of NGOs was outmoded and had failed to respond to changing circumstances-

‘the European system stuck to a ‘classic’ and uniform project-by-project approach whose intrinsic limits were increasingly known’ (South Research, 2000:33).

By allowing the prolonged extension of this form of co-financing for NGO activities, it was thought that NGOs might have been, to some extent, protected from the real world of development co-operation (South Research, 2000). However it was also acknowledged that the needs of the target group should be reflected in the use of the budget line –

‘It is important that European NGDOs strengthen their links with NGOs and grassroots organisations in the South so that they are more receptive to new initiatives from the South’ (Com (94) 468:16).

The Way Forward?

Change was therefore needed to the B7-6000 budget line but here, there was a divergence of opinion between the Commission and NGOs as to the rationale for the changes. The Commission wanted a system put in place to filter the presentation of funding applications, whereas NGOs wanted a simpler more accessible system (CLONG, 1998b; Houtman, 1998). CLONG also criticized the Commission for its emission of apparently conflicting signals (CLONG, 1998b). On the one hand it professed the need to tighten up its administrative and financial controls, while on the other it appeared to be keen to devolve some responsibility for the budget line. In fact DGVIII/B2 wanted to delegate managerial responsibilities on the basis of a real partnership (CLONG, 1998b).

One of the problems faced by the Commission was the *quality of the project proposals* submitted by the NGOs for consideration under the budget line. Therefore as a result of a joint initiative by the Commission and CLONG, the Co-financing Support Programme (CSP) was inaugurated in July 1997 (terminated

June 1999) to improve the quality of NGO project proposals, and to offer training and advice to member NGDOs (South Research, 2000; CLONG, 1998b). The CSP was to relieve the Commission of some of its administrative pressures, by shifting the responsibility for the processing of project proposals onto CLONG. The Commission was still to retain responsibility for the final decisions but NGOs were concerned that it could lead to CLONG screening its members' applications (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997; CLONG, 1997d). Similarly, disquiet was expressed about the possible impact of this departure on the division of responsibilities between the Commission and CLONG, and particularly the position of CSP vis-à-vis SCOOP – 'the CSP is in danger of coming between the grinding stones of DGVIII/B2 and SCOOP' (CLONG, 1998c). According to the Annual Report (CLONG, 1998b), NGOs felt that the Commission had attempted to thwart or delay the establishment of the CSP. In fact affairs did not run smoothly because there was found to be no legal basis for the operation of the budget lines and approximately 100 budget lines worth more than 920 MECU were suspended between June and August 1998, which had a significant impact on relations between the northern NGOs and their southern partners (CLONG, 1998b; CLONG, 1999b). This was then followed by a period of "crisis management", which included the introduction of a bank guarantee clause as a result of pressure from the Court of Auditors, the European Parliament's Budgetary Control Committee and the SCR (CLONG, 1999b). The introduction of the clause came as a complete surprise to NGOs and in many cases was unrealistic, which further aggravated relations between the NGOs and the Commission.

The administration of the B7-6000 budget line came under *the General Conditions*, which were last revised in 1988, and did not achieve a legal basis

until the Council regulation 1659/98 was passed. Therefore a revision of the general conditions applicable to the B7-6000 budget line was overdue, as they did not reflect current conditions in the fast changing aid environment. Although both parties took part in the discussion of the revision, NGOs were disappointed with the speed of the proceedings –

‘ review process of the general conditions of co-financing (has) been going on for too long’ (Aaronson, 1995:2).

Further time was to elapse because, though the revised conditions were due to be introduced in 1998, circumstances at the Commission led to a delay until 2000. From the Commission’s point of view the aim of the revision was to reduce the administrative burden of the B7-6000 line, through the promotion of programmes, rather than projects, and joint undertakings by network NGOs (South Research, 2000). The increased emphasis on the use of programmes met with varied response by NGOs, with larger NGOs positively favouring programme contracts, while small ones expressed a fear of becoming marginalized. NGOs responded to the promotion of joint undertakings with the fear that the collaborative contracts could lead to an additional bureaucratic layer (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997; CLONG, 1997d). In 2000, the SOUTH group argued that the new general conditions would do little to reduce the unmanageable state of the budget line. It stated that the B7-6000 should not be ‘an open and unfocused budget line’, and recommended that a review should be made of the right of initiative and independence of NGOs and access to the budget-line. It suggested that the Commission should be more proactive in its management of the line. CLONG expressed concern that the increased emphasis by the Commission on sectoral and geographical priorities could ultimately stifle the right of initiative of NGOs under

B7-6000 (CLONG, 2000). From 2000, the NGOs had to respond to calls for their proposals rather than as in the past submit their proposals whenever it suited them (European Commission, 2001). This new system could enable the Commission to gain some control over the NGOs' affairs.

CLONG queried the proactive approach advocated by the EC to achieve better results. It asserted that the heterogeneity of NGOs reflected and ensured a pluralistic approach and response to the diverse and changing conditions. It considered that it was important for there to be a critical and independent NGO/civil society, which would ensure that the government was accountable and also lobby for any change in the policy focus.

Concurrently, in order to simplify administrative procedures, the development of a *standard contract* was set in motion. This was to be prepared by legal experts in DGVIII and based on those for technical assistance. Initially the B7-6000 budget line was to be excluded but, to the surprise of the NGO movement, it was applied to all the budget lines available to NGOs, including B7-6000, from 1/1/99 (CLONG, 1998b). CLONG considered the standardised form did not suit the diverse nature of the co-financing budget line and furthermore reminded the Commission that a decision had been taken to consult NGOs about the content before putting it into practice (CLONG, 1997d). But while the objective was to simplify and harmonise procedures into a single standard contract for all budget lines, the Commission was aware of the need to consider the possible repercussions on Commission-NGO relations –

'This is a delicate exercise which seeks to harmonise the different budget-line rules for NGO financing, while making sure that the Commission's relations with NGOs are not reduced to a purely commercial contract with a service provider' (Houtman 1998: 5).

The issue of *relations between the Commission and the NGOs* has always been the subject of conjecture on both sides. There have been an increasing number of occasions when NGOs have felt wary of the EU's dominance and insecure in their own position. In 1993 Dumon noted that NGOs were gradually being drawn in to act as agents of the EC –

'More and more often, NGOs are being approached to act as instruments of European Development policy' –

'We get the impression, in fact, that EC policy makers want to set hard and fast lines and then look for organisations to carry out their objectives' (Courier, 1993: 85).

This anxiety again surfaced in 1995, when NGOs expressed concern that they were seen as contractors by the authorities –

'some authorities view NGOs rather simplistically as little more than contractors. There seems to be a trend in this direction in some parts of the Commission' (Aaronson, 1995: 3).

This apprehension was confirmed in a Commission Report on decentralized co-operation –

'EC increasingly involving NGOs as contractors' (COM (96) 433).

It highlighted the dilemma for NGOs. On the one hand they were reluctant to be drawn into being part of the official aid programme but, on the other hand, they did not want to pass up the opportunity to extend their work (COM (96) 433). In contrast Commissioner Ryelandt refuted the idea –

'NGOs are never simply treated as executive agencies' (Courier, 1995: 64).

Therefore NGDOs were unsure of the role they were playing for the Commission. At the same time as the changes in the administration procedures the Commission proposed that NGOs engage in *meso level policy dialogue*, which would enable the Commission to draw on the experience of NGOs while expanding their horizons (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997; CLONG, 1997a). NGOs need to play a part in redefining co-operation policies 'NGOs refuse to be mere onlookers' (Courier, 1995).

However this dialogue needs to be viewed in the light of their relative views of development policy and the extent to which the Commission would be receptive to input from the NGOs. Since the mid 1990s, NGOs have emphasised how disparate their views are from those of the EC regarding policy focus and strategy. They have advocated a focus on poverty eradication (previously alleviation), using a people-centred approach and a concern for progress made and results achieved (CLONG, 1996; CLONG, 1997c; Courier, 1997b). In contrast the EC has focused on integration into the world economy, but NGOs argue for the need to address the 'terms of engagement' for developing countries, as they are already members of the world economy (CLONG, 2000).

The EC advocates using a market-centred approach to reduce poverty and a concern with the means employed (CLONG, 1996; CLONG, 1997c; Courier, 1997b). However, NGOs are unconvinced that the benefits of this approach always reach the most deprived and are concerned it would over-ride the people-

centred model (Courier, 1997c; CLONG, 1996). NGOs feel that EC aid should be accountable to recipients. A further criticism by CLONG reveals that the EC has promoted two contradictory decision-making models, namely a co-operation model, which is based on the participatory approach, and the competitive model, which is based on the survival of the fittest (Courier, 1998b).

The publication of the EC's Development Policy (2000) has since similarly met with critical response from the NGOs. They expressed concern about the apparent absence of strategy to achieve poverty reduction, the lack of clarity concerning civil society involvement and the relation with other EC policies (Kinnock, 2000). Criticism was levelled at the EC's policy performance on poverty impact and it was suggested that DAC targets should be used to monitor EC aid and a rights-based approach taken in acknowledgement of the close association between poverty and social injustice (Kinnock, 2000; CLONG, 2000). From the document it is apparent that the EC has not focused on poverty eradication. NGOs have also expressed concern about the focus and strategy of the EC policy, as development co-operation has now become linked with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and emergency relief has been seen to have a greater media appeal (CLONG, 1995a; CLONG, 2000). It was felt that aid did not reach the poor, especially women, and that the private sector could be eclipsing human priority areas (CLONG, 1996). Consequently CLONG called for a strengthening of gender awareness and the promotion of production that would be socially, ecologically and environmentally sustainable (CLONG, 1996). NGOs were also concerned that EC policy did not realistically meet the recommendations of the various UN summits (Courier, 1997a).

The NGOs lacked conviction that the Commission would be overtly receptive to their views and opinions. In fact NGOs were reticent in their support of the

discourse, having experienced the Commission's indifference to such interaction on previous occasions—

‘NGO scepticism at the level of Commission commitment to a balanced dialogue, which fully respects each other's role and autonomy’ (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997: ch 2,p2)

‘Commission has all too often been reluctant to relinquish its position of dominance’ (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997: ch 2, p3).

It was feared that the close relations with the Commission could lead to a position of ‘instrumentalism’ i.e. more funds attached to special budget lines or programmes with conditions attached to their use, whereas those funds to support the NGOs own initiatives would receive less funding. The Commission's view was that NGOs activities would be affected as they became more dependent on the Commission for funds —

‘more they have to accept negotiation, compromise and joint action’ (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997: ch.2 p 4).

The Commission pointed out that NGOs need to fit into the new strategic management approach adopted by the EC towards development co-operation, rather than the Commission reacting to NGOs-

‘it is time to adopt a more voluntaristic and proactive approach to European NGOs- as opposed to the purely responsive attitude that has prevailed until now’ (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997: ch 2 p 5)

The majority of NGOs interviewed supported the idea of deepening their relations with the Commission, but felt that the culture for dialogue at the Commission was not encouraging —

'Several examples were given of the Commission failing to respond to European ngo network initiatives and/or to adopt a rather "arrogant" attitudes towards European NGOs' (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997: ch 2 p11).

NGOs also complained about the lack of information sharing by the Commission (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997).

As a result of the Elewijt process (launched 1995), broad lines of a potential new relationship between the Commission and NGOs started to emerge in the late 1990s. It appeared that changes to be made within the Commission would determine its relations with NGOs –

'growing realization in the Commission that a substantive change was needed in the way it worked and, within that, the way it worked with NGOs' (CLONG, 1990a: 2).

In the new relationship the emphasis would be on policy dialogue and the co-ordination of NGO and EC programmes, underpinned by a rationalized funding programme, which was desired by the Commission.

1998 was to prove to be a significant year for NGOs and CLONG (CLONG, 1999a). NGO frustrations over the

'procedures which grow ever more complicated (and) criteria which deserved to be discussed' (CLONG 1998b:2),

and the blockage of the budget lines built up to such a pitch that NGOs demanded that CLONG take a more forceful stance in its dealings with the Commission (CLONG, 1998b; CLONG, 1999b)

'past 12 – 19 months have witnessed some of the most strained relations between NGOs and the Commission' (CLONG, 1999b: 1).

Therefore, at this phase in relations, much energy was spent on dealing with the management of the immediate crisis and consequently the larger picture of development policy was ignored (South Research, 2000). In 1999, matters appeared to have reached a crucial point

‘ the low level to which NGO-Commission relations have sunk’ (CLONG, 1999b:1)

with the *letter* sent to the President of the Commission, Jacques Santer, by the Secretary General of CLONG in which he identified the sources of the problem, namely

‘the arguments over the continuation of the CSP....
the blockage of the budget lines...
the appearance of non-specialist officials in charge of specialist budget lines...
NGOs forced to form project consortia led by NGOs chosen by the Commission...
an obligation to produce bank guarantees for projects under certain budget lines’
(CLONG, 1999b:1).

Meanwhile the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, necessitated the establishment of a dialogue with new discussion partners, such as the European Parliament, and a redefinition of aid (CLONG, 1999a). Likewise, personnel changes at the Commission and the reorganisation of the foreign relations directorate were all pertinent factors (CLONG, 1999b). NGOs were aware of the need to work together and co-ordinate their action to gain extra presence in exchanges with working partners in the EU especially the Commission (CLONG, 1999b). This was substantiated by the theme of their 1999 Annual Conference "the evolving role of NGOs in development". At the end of 1999, much discussion was undertaken within the NGO sector and between representatives of

NGOs and the Commission on the draft text of a Communication to the Council on strengthening co-operation between NGOs and the Commission (CLONG, 1999b). Officially published the following year, it reviewed relations between the two sides

‘over the last two decades, the partnership between the European Commission and NGOs has expanded on all fronts’ (COM (2000) 11 : 2)

and laid out some ideas on how to ensure positive developments in the future. It identified good practices and recognized the partnership was able to benefit both parties-

‘dialogue and co-operation between Commission and NGOs are working well in certain areas’ (COM(2000) 11 :3)

‘strengthening the relationship between Commission and NGOs can help both parties to be more successful in achieving their respective goals’ ‘Their (NGO) involvement in policy shaping & policy implementation helps to win public acceptance for the EU’ (COM (2000) 11 : 5).

The Commission also emphasized that NGOs had earned the title of partner –

‘The expertise and dedication of NGO staff and their willingness to work under difficult operational conditions mean that NGOs are *vital partners* for the Commission both within the EU and beyond’ (COM (2000) 11 :5)

‘NGOs have been chosen as *partners* because of their specificity coupled with their expertise and technical capacity’ (COM(2000) 11 : 6).

The idea/concept of a partnership between the Commission and the NGDOs received further review at the General Assembly (GA) 2000. The President of CLONG felt that only lip-service was being paid to the idea of partnership by the Commission-

‘we appear not to be valued or respected as equal *partners* and all too often unreasonable demands are made of us’ (CLONG, 2000 : 2)

'The expressed desire for a meaningful *partnership* with NGOs is not being translated into practical procedures that are needed to facilitate such a relationship' (CLONG, 2000: 2).

It was felt that the increasing fragmentation and bureaucracy at the Commission, has jeopardized the development of relations between NGOs and individual officials and therefore the partnership has become more nebulous/tenuous-

'partnership that is defined judicially and administratively as well as politically' (CLONG, 2000:4).

At the GA, Commissioner Nielson recognized that in certain circumstances, the relationship between the Commission and NGOs has to be of a contractual form but there was a need to guard against stifling NGOs' initiatives –

'Streamlining procedures is a worthy and necessary task but it must not do anything to reduce or straitjacket your diversity' (Nielson 2000: 3).

Nielson was of the opinion that the situation called for a change in strategy so that the activities of NGOs better reflected the new paradigms for development, particularly in the area of enabling the development of the capacity of Southern partners.

CLONG /Commission relations

With hindsight, the 1990s can be described as the most traumatic in the history of CLONG as it has come under increasing pressure from both its members and the Commission over its very existence and position. But this did not materialize until the final years of the 90s. By the middle of the decade, CLONG felt it had

achieved recognition for its ability to play a role in debates at European level based on its experience and knowledge –

‘a privileged partner in dialogue with European institutions’ (Courier, 1995: 73)

‘full discussion partner in the European debate/dialogue’ (CLONG, 1995a: 2)

To ensure that its members were made fully aware of the state of its discussions with EU institutions, CLONG set up its Policy & Information department in 1997 (CLONG, 1998a). CLONG was considered to be one of the best-prepared and equipped partners of the Commission (CLONG, 1998b) and this received further recognition with the instigation of the meso level dialogue, which was seen by the President of CLONG as a ‘visible symbol of a true, concrete partnership’ (CLONG, 1998c). Yet on another level, CLONG found itself increasingly put under strain as it struggled to cope with developments in relations

‘a series of unexpected shocks, growing tensions and frustrations in the relationship between NGOs and the European Commission’: James Mackie (CLONG, 1999a:1).

The President of CLONG suggested that there existed ‘within DGVIII a Unit charged with deepening and supporting’ the permanent relationship between CLONG and the Commission. But new ‘challenges, realities and problems’ needed to be faced and both sides were forced to review their internal affairs as well as the terms of their collaboration (CLONG, 1998b).

The *funding* of CLONG has emerged as a significant issue. Both 1993 and 1994 were identified as financial deficit years (CLONG, 1995a), and the evaluation report (1996) mooted the idea that it would be healthier for CLONG to reduce its almost exclusive

financial dependence on contribution from the EU's budget. The Commission voiced its support for the introduction of a membership fee, although at present CLONG's members work voluntarily for the committees. Aaronson (CLONG, 2000) felt that CLONG needed to demonstrate that it was financially independent of the Commission but was unable to do so. CLONG has found it difficult to raise even the 15% demanded by the current arrangement with the Commission.

Into the 21st Century

CLONG expressed a wish to move to a better relationship, which reflected the 'spirit of real partnership', but felt that this was thwarted on two fronts. Firstly, it regarded the time allowed by the Commission for the consultation process to be insufficient and therefore the Commission retained its dominant position. Secondly CLONG was aware of the disquiet about its close relations with the Commission-

We have to understand that (CLONG'S) own relationship with the Commission is increasingly challenged from within the Commission. There are many who feel it is too close, too uncritical and too comfortable for both parties to be in the public interest'. (Aaronson) (CLONG, 2000: 3)'

'Though we may deny it we know that our relationship with the Commission is close, at times perhaps too close and far too cosy: and as much as we resist it, we know that ultimately there is truth in the dictum: it is hard for anyone to bite the hand that feeds it'. (Aaranson, 2000: 3).

The SCR had audited CLONG, and queried the level of independence of CLONG from the Commission. The two sides then became embroiled in a battle of words. The dispute was grounded in a claim by the Commission that there had been a mismanagement of funds at CLONG, which came to light when it was audited. Consequently the Commission suspended payments to CLONG (Infonet news,

2002). At this point CLONG was representing 930 (Infonet news, 2000) members but felt it should consider winding down its affairs. At the same time it lodged an action against the Commission in the Belgium courts. The outcome is muddled but at this time it appears that CLONG is now a smaller unit with a smaller role to play. (It has been difficult to find out the true picture as different sources give conflicting information.)

The information presented on the evolution of relations from 1976 until 2002, between the Commission and the NG(D)Os can now be reviewed in the light of the academic discourse presented in chapter 2 on the changing NGO scene. In the early days during the latter part of the 1970s, relations were essentially in an embryonic stage, with the Commission taking on the role of *facilitation* (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993), where the Commission allowed the NGOs to pursue their own agenda with little interference at this stage other than in matters relating to procedures. In fact the Commission appeared to take into account the wishes of the NGOs wherever they identified an inadequacy in the regulations pertaining to the execution of the co-financing budget line. Throughout the period under review the B7-6000 budget line has been based on the 'right of initiative' by northern NGOs. The progress of time into the 1980s, however, brought with it a subtle attempt by the Commission to steer the allocation of funds used for the B7-6000 line by the identification of special focus groups that would be a favoured theme for the particular year's budget. This can be identified as the Commission exerting a *constructive* (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993) influence over the use of the funds. This constructive influence was extended when the Commission introduced a number of situation specific budget lines at the request of the NGOs. Further use can be made of Farrington and Bebbington's classification, by stating

that *distortion* has occurred in the later stages of the relationship when the Commission pushed for the use of funds for market-centred activities rather than the people-centred activities favoured by NGOs.

As the degree of influence exerted by the Commission has increased so NGOs have become more anxious about their role in the development process. They feel that their position is compromised and that they are being forced to carry out contracts issued by the Commission (Pratt & Stone, 1994; Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Smillie, 1997; Wallace, 1998; Fowler, 2000; Hailey, 2000). However while they are aware of the position they have been put in, they fear that they may lose out to DONGOs (Dichter, 1997) and other opportunist NGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996) unless they agree to accept the funding opportunities offered by the Commission. As the funding opportunities have expanded so the diversity of interests represented by the NGO sector can be seen to encompass the whole spectrum of NGO activities (Korten, 1987; Smillie, 1995). One criticism of some emerging NGOs is that they are funding led and do not show the same ethical approach as the more established NGOs (Pronk, 1998). However it can also be stated that some of the more mature NGOs have similarly been seduced by the appearance of new funded opportunities (Smillie, 1995) especially in the area of emergency work as opposed to development activities. In many cases the positive response by NGOs to the new funding windows has meant that the NGOs could be acting in direct conflict with their own values (Van der Heijden, 1987; Smillie, 1995; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Dichter, 1997; Tvedt, 1998). The Commission has been keen to use NGOs to provide a better image of EU policies to the EU and the South (Twose, 1987; Fowler, 1998).

After the initial nascent phase in relations, the Commission developed a critical awareness of the deficiencies of NGOs (Annis, 1987; Smith, 1987; Twose, 1987; Bratton, 1989; Edwards & Hulme, 1992). This has resulted in the Commission promoting itself to act as co-ordinator and catalyst of NGOs' work in order to improve the impact of their activities and the return from the use of EC funds (Robinson, 1992; Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Smillie, 1995). At the same time the focus on a market system along with the push for efficiency and effectiveness resulted in a discernable shift towards the call to show value for money. NGOs were therefore directed to become more accountable to the Commission. Furthermore the EC is concerned with short-term functional accountability (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), which impacts negatively on NGOs' work, which is qualitative and contingent. This has overshadowed their accountability to other stakeholders not least of which are the indigenous people/poorest of the poor (Edwards & Hulme, 1992; Smillie, 1995; Najam, 1996). NGOs have thus come under increasing pressure to conform to the Commission's administrative approach (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Tvedt, 1998), especially the focus on quantifiable goals (Elliott, 1987; Pearce, 1993; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Therefore it appears that over time the language, values and systems of the Commission are being absorbed by NGOs to become second nature (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Wallace, 1998; Fowler, 2000). In contrast, while transparency has been called for from the NGOs, it has not been forthcoming from the Commission (Fowler, 1998).

The more powerful position of the Commission is dependent upon the role as financial provider (Edwards & Hulme, 1992; Pearce, 1993; Tandon, 1994; Fowler, 1998). The Commission is moving towards a more strategic approach to

development co-operation, where the use of funds and the outcomes are more quantifiable and predictable. This approach is associated with Fowler's classification as functional co-optation (1998) and is reflected in the skew towards a programme basis. It also indicates that there has been a move along the conservative-progressive partnership continuum with the delegation of some responsibility towards the CSP and consortia (Fowler, 1998).

The position of CLONG throughout the period under review has evolved in response to the pressure exerted on it by both the NGOs and the Commission. In the early stages of its relations with the Commission, the situation was one of *operational collaboration* (Covey, 1998), where they were concerned with the identification, design and implementation of the projects, which had been initiated by the NGOs. At the same time CLONG and NGOs have been involved in critical dialogue with the Commission (Hellinger, 1987; Pratt & Stone, 1994; Covey, 1998). In the early days of these dialogues, CLONG was involved in *low conflict and high co-operation relations* (Covey, 1998). As CLONG gained confidence and recognition for its worth in the 1980s, it began to develop a more critical position while still co-operating with the Commission, and in the 1990s it could be identified as *insider advocacy* (Covey, 1998). But more recently it has been criticized as being too close (Tvedt, 1998).

The promotion of the dialogue approach requires an efficient and effective interface between the Commission and NGOs but this is not in place. The Commission finds it is difficult to obtain interlocutors for policy dialogue for programme funding because there is mutual distrust between NGOs and competition for funds in the current climate. Differences in ideology and project focus do not lend themselves to the formation of a cohesive network of NGOs.

In the reassessment of development co-operation a review of the EC macro level programmes and NGO micro level projects identified a grey area - the meso level. In other words the concern was for an integrative approach to cover sectors, themes, and geographical areas. This meso dialogue required intra-NGO cooperation, closer links between the Commission and NGOs and new performance criteria. But the problem remained- would the meso dialogue be balanced respecting roles and autonomy?

Evolution of Relations

Throughout the period under review, relations between the European Commission and European NGOs have evolved in response to the complex interaction of factors, which have affected them either individually or jointly. The desire of NGOs to classify their relationship with the European Commission as one of 'partner' has at times eluded them. The imbalance of power and access to information has meant that the normative definition of partnership has not been achieved. Despite the recurrent attempts by NGOs to increase their engagement in the pursuit of a more equal partnership, the balance of power has always favoured the EC, giving support to the view that the provider of resources calls the tune (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). NGOs have found themselves to be increasingly subject to donor conditionality and drawn into EC policy to play a role within that framework. At times they have been praised for the input and critical role they have played in the development of EC policy. However they have been frustrated by the lack of transparency shown by the Commission.

As the representative body of the European NGO sector, CLONG fared in a different way. From the very beginning, once it was financially dependent on the

Commission, it found itself in a subservient role. With the progression of time, its position became more fraught as it was caught between the rapid expansion of an increasingly heterogeneous group of NGOs and the Commission, which found itself under pressure from other EU institutions to sort out its bureaucratic problems and produce a coherent set of policies. Over time as the EC sought to deliver a well-defined external affairs approach and to tighten its control over its policies, NGOs found themselves to be drawn in to play a part in the realization of the political and economic aspirations of the European Community. Therefore, whether a 'partnership' was ever really in place between the NGOs/CLONG and the Commission/EC is debatable. It has certainly been subject to change, which has reflected the trend in the 'partnership' between the EC and the ACPs. In order to examine the application of EC Development policy to one particular region, the next chapter will review the state of affairs in SADC(C) since 1980.

Chapter 5: The EC and SADC(C): an example of EC Development Co-operation Policy in Practice

This chapter focuses on Southern Africa to show the EC approach to a specific region and its changing dynamics. Within Southern Africa, the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) group has been chosen as the case study; therefore the period under review commences from 1980 when SADCC was formed. The European Community has periodically reassessed its policy approach towards the region, in the light of both its own evolution and that of the region itself. An analysis of the application of EC Development Co-operation Policy to the region requires an understanding of the dynamics of relations between the EC and SADCC/SADC, and a discussion of the influence exerted by South Africa on these relations. Throughout the period 1980 to 1999, the situation in South Africa has impacted on the lives of the population in the SADCC/SADC countries and consequently the region's development aid requirements.

The aim of the chapter, therefore, is to

- 1) examine the evolution of EU/SADC(C)/South Africa relations, and
- 2) identify the impact of this evolution on the pattern of EU aid flows to the SADCC/SADC region.

The period under review (1980 –1999) can justifiably be divided into two, on the basis of the change in the circumstances in South Africa and the associated repercussions for the SADCC/SADC group.

The Period of Apartheid:

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)

SADCC was set up in 1980 in direct response to the policy of apartheid in South Africa, and the desire of the countries to rid themselves of economic dependence on South Africa (War on Want, 1984; Lee, 1989; Tostensen, 1993; Sidaway, 1998). This dependence was not considered to be a natural phenomenon but was partly a direct consequence of the previous colonial presence in the countries of SADCC and South Africa (Makoni, 1987; Ibeanu, 1990; Gibb, 1998). The region had become dominated by South Africa, particularly with respect to trade flows, transport systems and labour movements (Barrell, 1981; Makoni, 1987; CEC, 1996). The configuration of the rail transport networks had meant that trade flows from Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe were dependant upon the port facilities of South Africa. Labour opportunities in South African mines had ensured a steady flow of migrant workers from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and even Tanzania, although this had recently begun to decline with the exception of Lesotho and Mozambique (Lee, 1989; Cobbe, 1990; Thede, 1993; Adedeji, 1996).

South Africa was also a significant supplier of power and a source of FDI (Lee, 1989; Hawkins, 1992). Therefore, SADCC was created not only in response to the apartheid

situation, but also to develop a regionally integrated group of countries, which would exclude the common enemy, South Africa (Oyowe, 1981). The group was determined to break the regional dominance of South Africa, which they considered to be a hindrance to their development (Cobbe, 1990; Pisani, 1992; Smidt, 1996).

South Africa

In response to the severance of ties by the SADCC countries, South Africa embarked upon a policy of destabilization in an attempt to both sabotage the development of the new regional grouping and to ensure the situation retained international attention (War on Want 1987; Ibeanu, 1990). South Africa saw SADCC as a threat to its regional dominance, which was dependent upon a constellation of nation-states (Thompson, 1986; Makoni, 1987). Gibb (1987) identified South Africa's regional dominance as being to some extent spatially determined. Those countries, which were members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), were the most inextricably tied to SA due to their location and lack of port facilities, whereas geographically distanced Tanzania was one of the least affected. The programme of destabilisation invoked by South Africa against the members of SADCC manifested itself essentially in one of three forms; namely economic siege, military attack or subversive activities (Ibeanu, 1990; Patel, 1992; Adedeji, 1996). The method used depended upon the target country and thus the repercussions of the South African strategy varied with the country concerned. For instance military destabilization tactics were employed against Mozambique and Angola but were also seen to affect Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe (War on Want, 1983; 1984; 1985; 1986; 1987).

The European Community

The European Community's response to the situation in Southern Africa was two-fold, taking a positive approach towards SADCC and an isolationist stance against South Africa (War on Want, 1988; Holland, 1995a; CEC, 1996) Its offer of full support for the formation of SADCC was partly to show the Community's abhorrence of apartheid policy, but was also, - with the second objective of SADCC being

'to create a genuinely equitably regional integrated economy (Makoni, 1987: 30)

in keeping with the Community's desire to support the creation of regionally integrated associations (Oyowe, 1981; Holland, 1995a; Schmidt, 1996). The DG for Development, C.Cheysson (1981) indicated that SADCC was in harmony with the approach to regional integration used by Europe, although he emphasised that

'...every people has the right to its own model of development. The identity of one must be respected, and each country must have the right to choose its political system, its economic system and its alliances' (Oyowe, 1981:xiii).

Thus closer examination of the Lusaka agreement indicated that the traditional customs union model used by the European Community had been rejected in favour of a system of cooperation and co-ordination, with the focus on a pragmatic approach to development (Thompson, 1986; Makoni, 1987; Tostensen, 1993; Holland, 1995a; Gibb, 1998). The object of SADCC was to unite a group of countries, that covered the whole political spectrum from socialism to free enterprise. The development model used by SADCC, therefore, did not follow the current neo-liberal approach as advocated by the international organisations, such as the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund, but attempted to ensure it did not exclude any potential members. Amin (1987) suggested that Community support for SADCC was an example of 'assertive European diplomacy' that, while attempting to prevent the front line states from offering support to the ANC and SWAPO, was bent on creating a diversion away from the South Africa situation. The European Community's strategy can therefore be seen to have primarily a political motive rather than an economic one.

The isolationist policy approach taken by the Community to South Africa resulted in the imposition of economic sanctions and the severance of general aid flows (CEC, 1996; CEC, 1999). Holland (1998) declared that the list of economic sanctions imposed was too little, too late and was the result of a division of views among the European Union Member States on a policy that called for a unanimous agreement by them. Individually, members of the European Union displayed different attitudes towards South Africa as a result of their historical and current links with the region. South Africa was seen to be important in terms of its resources and its location, and thus, Europe was concerned to ensure the long-term stability of the region (Oyowe, 1981; Ibeanu, 1990; Matambalya, 1998).

For SADCC, the 1980s has been described as a 'nightmare decade' (Van de Velde, 1990) dominated by the fight against apartheid rather than the promotion of economic development in the region (Holland 1995a). Consequently SADCC failed not only to reduce its members' economic dependence on South Africa but also failed to reduce their external dependence generally (Lee, 1989; Hawkins, 1992; Tostensen, 1993; Sidaway & Gibb, 1998).

Post-Apartheid Period

The ending of the policy of apartheid in South Africa essentially nullified the *raison d'être* for the existence of SADCC in its original state, and it was now at a 'turning point' (Courier, 1990; Van De Velde, 1990; Gibb, 1998). SADCC had to reassess its form and function, in response to the changing circumstances in South Africa, which heralded in a new multi-racial and democratic society (Van De Velde, 1990; Gibb, 1998). The repositioning of SADCC also needed to take into account possible future decisions of the European Community, the WTO and other Southern African regional groupings. Each of these bodies went through a period of reassessment of their approach towards the new South Africa. SADCC was aware that it was not the only option open to South Africa, which was intent on re-integration into the World economy and at the same time the promotion of its own development within the Southern African region. The region offered three feasible alternatives to South Africa for its re-emergence, namely the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), SADCC or the Common Market of Eastern and Southern African Countries (COMESA) (Hawkins, 1992; Maasdorp, 1992). SACU, which had continued to function during the apartheid period, was small in terms of market size. Except for South Africa, the countries were all members of SADCC and it could be argued that this could pose a threat to SADCC's existence. As an alternative, COMESA, which also included members of SADCC with the exception of Botswana, offered a much larger market. Consequently the region was seen to be fraught with rivalry and overlapping membership (Gibb, 1998).

South Africa had always been an important item on the European Community's foreign policy agenda, and at this stage, the Community was keen to ensure that the region remained stable and that the economic power of South Africa was tied in with the promotion of development in the Southern African region (Courier, 1995; Holland, 1995a; Holland, 1998; Matambalya, 1998). From 1990, funding from the European Community to Southern Africa had a wider remit than just SADCC and anti-apartheid support. Finance was available for regional trade agreements, which put SADCC in competition with COMESA. This, along with the rulings of the WTO, promoted the move by SADCC towards a specific form of regional integrated agreement.

Southern African Development Community

As a result of the Windhoek Declaration in 1992, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was set up to pursue 'deeper economic co-operation and development' (Windhoek, 1996:1). Its direction had turned towards neo-liberal objectives with the private sector seen as the engine of economic growth (Tsie, 1996), but with an emphasis on the role of government. This decade was to focus on the development of human resources, particularly entrepreneurial skills (Windhoek, 1996). Despite an initial reticence, SADC became intent on attracting South Africa to become one of its members (Gibb, 1998). This move was supported by the European Community's approach to the region when, in 1993, one of the first joint action projects under the new Common Foreign and Security Policy was the promotion of peace and stability for South Africa within the framework of SADC (Holland, 1995a). At the EU/SADC Berlin Conference 1994, South Africa was declared the eleventh member of SADC, with the full support of the EU, which was keen to

increase the participation of South Africa in regional co-operation projects (Holland, 1995a; CEC, 1999). According to DG Smidt (1996), the resultant Berlin Declaration set out a commitment to a

'comprehensive dialogue involving political dialogue, human rights, trade and economic co-operation and development co-operation' (Smidt, 1996:2).

The Community's policy towards Southern Africa had three complementary objectives: to support the political co-operation within SADC and regional economic integration through the liberalisation of trade, but also, at the same time, to promote trade and economic co-operation between Southern Africa and the EU (Smidt, 1996: CEC, 1999).

From its position, SADC was keen to extend the Lomé Convention approach to increase its access to the European market. All the countries of SADC, with the exception of South Africa, were members of the ACP group. South Africa was willing to join, but was unable to in recognition of its more developed status (Rumney, 1995; Gibb, 1998). This meant that the Community needed to treat South Africa as a special case and, in October 1995, it proposed a trade and co-operation agreement with the Republic of South Africa (CEC, 1996). However this was a bilateral agreement and therefore was inconsistent with the EC's stated preference for region-to-region, or multilateral, agreements. According to Holland (1995a) there have been

'significant contradictions and inconsistencies between and within the EU's variety of Southern African policies' (Holland, 1995a: 282).

In part, this could be explained as the result of the division of administrative responsibility between DGI and DGVIII; with DGI dealing with South Africa and DGVIII dealing with developing countries. At the same time, the EC was in the process of seeking a replacement for the Lomé Convention, as it was considered to lack conformity with WTO non-discrimination regulations. The European Community saw SADC as a way to move on from Lomé IV and develop multilateral relations aimed at regional integration. However the EC's move, to promote its own trade interests with South Africa to the exclusion of SADC, was viewed as divisive and, in August 1996, SADC responded by proposing to become a Free Trade Area (FTA) in a decade (Gibb, 1998). This would guarantee that SADC was compatible with WTO rulings. DG Smidt (1996) responded with support for the regional initiative and a pronouncement that it was congruent with the EC's proposed future FTA with the SADC region. According to Keet (1997), the move by SADC was essentially an attempt to pre-empt the EC trade strategy and ensure that any developments in the EC-SA relations would be unable to take precedence over a prior trade agreement.

As a result of discussions between the European Community and South Africa, the latter was offered qualified membership of the ACP group and the Lomé Convention (Smidt, 1996; Pinheira, 1997). In March 1999, the 'Trade, Development & Co-operation Agreement' between the EC and South Africa was concluded. This agreement, with its focus on the transition towards a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the two, also covered human rights issues and the establishment of a political dialogue (Pinheira, 1997; CEC, 1999). According to DG Smidt (1996), the bilateral

agreement should be viewed as part of the EC strategy to advance the level of prosperity and development in the region.

It can be seen therefore, that in the 1990s, Community relations with SADC and South Africa have again been a source of division in Southern Africa. The termination of the policy of apartheid in South Africa enabled each of them to reassess their relative position. The European Community was presented with the opportunity to safeguard its interests and investments in the region. The dilemma was how to ensure stability in the region, rein in the strength of South Africa and at the same time nurture the development of the Southern African region. EC/SADC relations therefore changed from one of unification against a common enemy to one of political partnership based on conflict prevention and the promotion of peace (Courier, 1997). EC relations with South Africa were now geared towards making certain that the strength of South Africa was inextricably bound up with the development of the Southern African region. Fortunately for SADC, this move, while initially appearing to be bilateral in emphasis, should in the long run result in the unification of the area in a Free Trade Agreement between the EC and a SADC, inclusive of South Africa.

EC Development Co-operation Policy and SADC(C)

The pattern of EC aid to SADC(C) has been determined by a number of factors in addition to the evolution of the tri-partite relations as discussed above. The ACP members in Southern Africa have received support from the EC under the Lomé Conventions since 1976. The countries of SADC(C) expected development aid from the EC on the basis of their ACP membership and the status of some of their

members as the poorest and most aid dependent countries in the World (Appendix A). However they also needed EC support to make the break away from South Africa work (Holland, 1995a). Therefore the flow of aid to Southern Africa was partly determined by the EC's anti-apartheid stance, but was also a response to the repercussions of the aggressive policy carried out by South Africa on its neighbours. The consequence of the South African military activity in SADCC (table 5.1) was reflected in the number of people dead, those displaced internally or internationally, and the destruction of the infrastructure (South, 1981; Thompson, 1986). The cost of the policy of destabilization has impacted unevenly across the region, with those countries most affected being Angola and Mozambique, both directly and as a result of apartheid debt (table 5.2).

TABLE 5.1 Displaced persons in Southern Africa 1989

To From	Angola	Mozambique	S.A.	Other
Angola	-	-	10,000	12,500
Botswana	-	-	900	500
Lesotho	-	-	4,500	-
Malawi	-	720,000	-	-
S.A.	-	200,000	-	-
Swaziland	-	64,000	6,700	-
Tanzania	-	72,000	-	192,200
Zambia	97,000	20,000	3,200	11,500
Zimbabwe	-	176,500	500	-
Other	298,700	-	-	-
Total	395,700	1,252,500	25,800	216,700

Source: Economist 23 Dec / 4 Jan 1990

Table 5.2 Destabilization in Southern Africa

Country	Cost of destabilization £million	Apartheid * Debt £ million
Angola	22,727	6,432
Botswana	379	152
Lesotho	227	91
Malawi	1,629	724
Mozambique	11,364	4,545
Swaziland	152	0
Tanzania	985	492
Zambia	3,788	1,905
Zimbabwe	6,061	2,273
Sub total	47,311	16,614
S A		11,345
Total	47,311	27,959

Source: ACTSA, 1998 (* Apartheid Debt = loans and interest payments)

With the ending of apartheid, EC decisions to provide aid to the region had to be reassessed, as it could no longer be seen as part of an EC anti-apartheid policy. According to Oden (1993), SADC now had to compete on equal terms with the other demands for financial resources in the region, particularly a post apartheid South Africa, which needed aid for the development of physical infrastructure as well as to meet the needs of the population.

Financial assistance to the region of SADC(C) has included both development aid and emergency aid given to counteract the repercussions of civil unrest and natural disasters (CEC, 1994). In addition, the European Community has taken a particular interest in SADC(C)'s pursuit of regional co-operation, which, while not exactly replicating its own model, has promoted collaboration. There has been a small shift towards regional programme funding over time, but in absolute terms the national programmes have received the greater support (table 5.3).

Table 5.3 EU Financial Assistance (EDF + EIB + EC budget) to SADC(C) states

	Lomé I 1975-80	Lomé II 1981-85	Lomé III 1986-90	Lomé IV 1991-95*	Total
National Programme	267.5	371.7	824.6	905.6	2369.4
Regional Programme	30.0	70	141.0	121.0	362.0
EIB loans	66.1	152.9	201.2	230.1	650.3
Interest subsidies	6.2	17.4	19.2	21.7	64.5
Stabex	33.9	35.1	56.4	68.1	193.5
Sysmin	-	82.3	21.6	1000.0	203.9
Emergency aid	44.5	33.0	86.5	83.0	247.0
Food aid	81.7	147.5	246.4	250.9	726.5
Other (eg NGOs)	26.0	42.2	47.2	41.5	156.9
Pre Lomé aid	25.0	26.5			51.5
Total	580.9	978.6	1644.1	1821.9	5025.5

millions ECU * data to 1993

Source: CEC (1994) Southern Africa and the European Union p 10.

The increase in EC funding for regional programmes was in line with its desire to promote region-to-region co-operation (European Commission, 1996). In 1986, an agreement between the two regions resulted in EC aid for RIPs being directed to SADCC for dispersal rather than to the individual countries (CEC, 1996). This was the first EC agreement of its kind, between itself and a group of ACP countries (Thompson, 1986). A regional focus of assistance was considered to be especially necessary in the light of the region's problems and the level of interdependence between the countries. The state of the transport infrastructure had been a cause for concern, not only as a result of the destabilization policy of South Africa, but also due to the fact that six of the countries are land-locked and rely on the transport system for their trading activities. Consequently funding initially focused on rehabilitation and the transport infrastructure (table 5.4), although financial support was also available for food production, partly in response to the region's drought problems but

also due to the problems of inadequate marketing, distribution and storage facilities (EC, 1994). In the late 1980s, SADCC was ready to respond to international pressure and focus on the growth of enterprise, and investment in production (Makoni, 1987; Thede, 1987; Van De Velde, 1990)).

Table 5.4 Southern African regional programmes by sector

	Lomé I	Lomé II	Lomé III	Lomé IV
Allocations	30	70	141	121
Transport & Communications	20 (67%)	23.1 (34%)	91 (65%)	60 (49.5%)
Food Security, Agriculture & natural resources	0.8 (3%)	23 (34%)	27 (19%)	18 (15%)
Human Resources Development	8.8 (30%)	13.8 (20%)	14 (10%)	21 (17.5%)
Other areas	-	7.9 (12%)	9 (6%)	22 (18%)
Total	29.6	67.8	141	121

Source: CEC (1994) Southern Africa and the European Union p 12. (million ecu)

In the 1990s the focus was on economic, social and political issues with the objective of improving the standard of living of the people through sustainable socio-economic development (CEC, 1998). Since 1992, biannual ministerial conferences have been held between SADC and the EC, which have resulted in the identification a range of issues for collective action. At Windhoek (1992) the emphasis was on neo-liberal principles and the development of the private sector and entrepreneurial skills. The second EC/SADC conference (1994), agreed to 'consolidate and strengthen democratic institutions', and supported the move towards globalisation (CEC, 1998). The Regional Indicative Programme for SADC (1996), drawn up by the Commission and representatives of SADC, recognised the region's economic and political priorities and the need to ensure peace and stability in the region, but considered the

development of human resources to be a crucial factor, along with gender issues and environmental concerns (Windhoek, 1996). In the latter half of the 1990s, according to Liebaert (1997b), there was a need to regionally deal with the management of water resources, if the region was to avoid any more confrontation and concentrate on social and economic development. At the 3rd EU/SADC conference (Vienna, 1998), agreement was reached on the importance of strongly supporting democracy and peace in the region, combating social problems – crime, AIDS -, resource management, regional integration and sound economic policies–

‘support SADC in the adaptation of their economic structures towards globalisation’ (CEC, 1998:1).

National Indicative Programmes of the SADC(C) countries come under the objectives of the Lomé Conventions. Under Lomé I and Lomé II the focus was on rural development projects with a particular emphasis on health, transport and agriculture, and thus reflected the dominant problems in the SADC(C) region (CEC, 1994). Lomé III emphasised water supply and sanitation, transport and agriculture, and allowed the inclusion of country specific issues e.g. Angola (private sector); Botswana (environment/conservation, education/training) (CEC, 1994). Lomé IV stressed its support for democratic society, sustainable economic and social development, and the ability to compete in the world economy (CEC, 1994). All the countries were keen to promote the alleviation of poverty.

The countries of Southern Africa have suffered from both natural and human-made disasters e.g. drought, civil unrest, AIDS/HIV, and therefore have received humanitarian relief from the EC through NGOs e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania.

In Namibia, in the period leading up to its independence from South Africa, most EC aid was channelled through NGOs (Courier, 1995d). Performance criteria have been used as can be seen in the case of the suspension of aid to Malawi in 1994 due to their violation of human rights (Cox, Healey & Koning, 1997).

The 'other assistance' category (table 5.3), which includes NGO co-financed operations, has seen its relative proportion of funds deteriorate from 4.5% (Lomé I) to 2.3% (Lomé IV) of the total financial assistance to SADC(C) from the EC (CEC, 1994). NGOs have been able to access a number of budget lines for their projects in Southern and South Africa according to sectoral criteria (table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Budget Lines open to NGOs according to sectoral criteria

	Southern Africa	South Africa
Direct Aid	EDF	B7-320
All sectors NGO actions	B&-6000	B7-6000
Food Aid	B7-2000, 2010, 2020	B7-2000, 2010, 2020
Emergency humanitarian aid	B7-210, 217, 219, Art 254	B7-210, 217, 219, Art 254
Rehabilitation	B7-641, B7-321	B7-320
Refugees (after emergencies)	Art 255	Art 255
Training	B7-610	B7-610
Women & development	B7-611	B7-611
Environment	B7-6200, 6201	B7-6200, 6201
Health	B7-6211, B7-631	B7-6211, B7-631
Drugs	B7-6210	B7-6210
Population/demography	B7-631	B7-631
Decentralised co-operation	B7-643	B7-643
Human Rights	B7-702, B7-7040, B7-709	B7-702, B7-7040, B7-709

Source: CLONG (1998a) NGO handbook

Two budget lines have been set up by the EC to deal exclusively with the problems of Southern Africa. In 1988 the budget line, **B7-9531 Support for Front Line States and SADC(C)**, was set up initially in response to the South African destabilization policy in the region and was directed towards disadvantaged people. It was the first example of a budget line with

‘an overtly political agenda’ (APT Consult, 2001:32).

It provided training, education and health care for refugees and displaced persons. In 1993 the EC recognised the need for the aid to cover the transition from emergency to development aid and therefore the focus changed to rehabilitation and included land mine clearance operations (B7-5071 Assistance for rehabilitation programmes in Southern Africa). NGOs were considered to be appropriate agents, able to attain the trust of the government and thus contribute to the process of democratisation (Com (94) 468). In 1993 the budget line became known as the ‘Special Initiative for Africa’. Under rehabilitation operations, repair to productive plant and infrastructure, and the rebuilding of institutional capacity were emphasised. Prior to 1995 the budget line played a significant role in the process of recovery in Angola and Mozambique, before the NIPs began to focus on rehabilitation (APT Consult, 2001). Over time the use of the line changed from a focus on humanitarian (1989 = 72%) to rehabilitation issues (1995 = 90.4%) but it has been constrained by EC management of the line

‘flexibility marred by a degree of procedural sclerosis’ (APT Consult, 2001 :15).

In 1986 the EC set up a budget line (**B7-5070 Special Programme for Apartheid victims**) to aid victims of apartheid and counter the negative effects of sanctions (Thompson 1996).

Table 5.6 B7-5070 Special Aid Programme for Apartheid Victims

Year	Euro million
1986	10.0
1987	20.0
1988	25.5
1989	25.0
1990	30.0
1991	60.0
1992	80.0
1993	90.0
1994	66.7
1995	125.0
1996	13.6
1997	21.0

Source: various annual budget returns of the B7-6000 budget line

Initially assistance was channelled through non-violent organisations such as churches (Com (94) 468). In 1995, when funding reached a peak (table 5.6), there was a shift from supporting numerous NGO projects to a dialogue between the European Commission and the government of South Africa on development policy. As the situation changed in South Africa, the budget line was renamed the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development B7-32000 (1996) and offered EC support for the move to democracy and reconstruction taking place in the country (Com (96) 32). The EC policy towards South Africa was now closer to the ACP system and in 1997 a Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) was drawn up for 1997-1999. NGOs were therefore no longer the sole implementers of the aid funds but were either to be in a direct contractual relationship with the Commission and carry out projects consistent with the SA government policies or to be subcontracted

by the government (Com (98) 127). Funding provided under the Special programme for South Africa since 1991 has drawn financial support away from the other countries of the SADC region (CEC, 1994).

The EC has taken an interest in the SADC(C) region due to the historical and cultural links between the two regions and the associated current economic and political ties. This bond has been more recently overshadowed by the implications and repercussions of the apartheid regime of South Africa. In view of the differing political systems in place in the region, it has not been strategically acceptable for the EC to engage in overt development activities therefore this has enabled European NGOs to play a more prominent part. The pattern of assistance to the region has been the result of the interplay between directives of the Lomé conventions and the inclusion of very poor countries in the SADC(C) region, but the over riding factor has been the EC's particular strategy towards South Africa. Once the policy of apartheid was rescinded in South Africa, the European Community focused on a policy of growth and stabilisation in the region based on the inclusion of SA into agreements to avoid any future fragmentation. In order to see how the policy advocated was played out in practice, the co-financing of NGO operations under budget line B7-6000 will be examined in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 6

The UK NGOs' projects co-financed by the European Commission under the B7-6000 budget line

The object of this chapter is to provide an example of EC Development Co-operation policy in practice in a particular region, as played out through the UK NGO projects co-financed by the European Commission. SADC(C) was chosen because it comprises a group of countries unified by a common local factor, South Africa. It is a region, which is economically and politically important to the EC, not least because of its chequered relationship with South Africa.

In order to obtain sufficient time series data to be able to identify and examine trends in the use of the co-financed budget line, only the ten countries with the longest membership of SADC(C) were included. Initially it seemed feasible to expect to use a time period of at least twenty years but due to the lack of a complete database from the Commission, the period was then reduced to 1980 to 1996. The decision to focus down onto UK NGOs active in the region was partly based on the fact that the author is British, and is more familiar with, and able to access additional information about, UK NGOs. Furthermore seven of the member states share a colonial past with Britain: namely Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These countries did not gain their independence until the second half of the twentieth century and are members of the Commonwealth. Consequently UK NGOs are expected to have an interest and a significant presence in these countries.

This chapter will, therefore

- i) identify the limitations of the data base and justify the methodology,
- ii) examine the pattern of activities co-financed by UK NGOs under the B7-6000 budget line of the EC,
- iii) investigate the extent of UK NGO commitment to the region, and
- iv) assess the value of the case study as an example of the EC policy.

The Data Base

Initially there is a need to establish the limitations of using the B7-6000 budget line. It is a demand-led budget line based on the NGOs' right of initiative and therefore it is to be expected that the use of the line will reflect the needs and aspirations of the poorest of the poor in the recipient countries (COM (83) 297). However the extent to which the projects accepted for co-financing by the Commission truly reflect their needs can be questioned. Initially the project proposed by the Southern group must be acceptable to the European 'partner' NGO, which may seek to exert a high degree of 'control' over the final form (Fowler, 1991; Fowler, 1998). It can be stated that European NGOs are often attracted to those projects, which are focused, self-contained, visible and small, but also fit in with their normal sphere of activity (Fowler, 1991). In addition the proposal needs to conform to the specific criteria and guidelines laid down by the Commission, to receive funding. It has already been identified that the level of rejected submissions is high (Table 3:2), and therefore the project has a greater chance of acceptance if it conforms to not only the official EC policy approach but also the covert influence exerted by the Commission (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). By virtue of their close proximity to the Commission and the

dynamics of donor funding, it can be argued that European NGOs will have a greater understanding of the formal and informal systems and procedures favoured by the Commission (Smillie, 1995; Tvedt, 1998). This in turn is then used to authenticate their position of power and authority over the final presentation of the proposal. At the same time, it must be remembered that, the Commission is concerned with the visibility and impact of its funding, and thus tends to favour those projects where the results are easy to identify and are quantifiable, rather than those with long-term, intangible results (Elliott, 1987; Pearce, 1993; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Thus the pursuit of a positive response from the Commission to the project proposal may well result in the original needs of the Southern group being transformed into a different project, biased towards the views and official language of the donor (Tvedt, 1998). On reflection therefore, it becomes difficult to establish the extent to which the use of the line is a true expression of the needs of the 'target' population and the extent to which it is the result of stakeholders' influence.

Secondly the decision to focus on UK NGOs to illustrate the practice of EC policy in the SADC(C) area needs to be authenticated. An initial review of the data indicates that UK NGOs show a relatively high level of funded activity in all countries, with the exception of Mozambique. Thus for the period 1980 – 1996, the total amount of EC co-financing funds (ecus) allocated to UK NGO projects as a percentage of all EC co-financed projects in the SADC(C) region reveals a range between 24.9% and 66.5% of the total EC funded activities, the exception being Mozambique with 9.9% (Table 6:1).

Table 6.1: Cumulative funds for the region through EU and UK NGOs 1980 – 1996 (ecus)

	EU NGOs	UK NGOs	UK/EU as %
Angola	3,759,497	1,585,857	42.2%
Botswana	3,857,693	1,837,306	47.6%
Lesotho	2,489,730	883,466	35.5%
Malawi	7,587,548	4,609,707	60.8%
Mozambique	19,543,730	1,930,834	9.9%
Namibia	10,494,879	3,845,660	36.6%
Swaziland	2,356,484	1,566,218	66.5%
Tanzania	25,770,914	6,405,580	24.9%
Zambia	9,134,038	2,334,893	25.6%
Zimbabwe	19,128,300	5,811,039	30.4%
Totals	104,122,813	30,810,577	29.6%

Figure 6.1 UK NGOs in SADC(C)




Table 6.2: UK NGOs finance as a percentage of EU NGOs

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
1980		7.87	0.00					0.00	0.00	50.24
1981	0.00	0.00			0.00	88.96		26.04	0.00	62.43
1982	0.00	100.00	0.00		0.00	100.00		24.21	2.44	72.55
1983	11.10		21.84	0.00	0.00			15.72	0.00	0.00
1984	51.78	100.00	74.74	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	1.71	16.93	11.17
1985	63.12	99.21	0.00	100.00	1.51	56.80	100.00	8.35	3.45	37.21
1986	59.02	100.00	40.05	100.00	4.82	69.03	100.00	35.02	54.53	40.64
1987	46.17	68.49	61.19	91.28	2.02	1.44	100.00	18.91	1.70	44.20
1988	77.37	0.00	100.00	10.76	6.69	70.11	23.19	19.80	0.71	0.38
1989	18.05	72.33	86.29	100.00	15.17	13.00	100.00	25.89	16.84	43.28
1990	65.01	33.78	43.83	32.37	3.21	49.81	98.82	38.80	0.00	57.17
1991	100.00	2.87	14.39	90.93	3.81	56.99	100.00	22.09	66.01	34.98
1992	45.75	100.00	28.23	70.07	10.94	31.93	6.14	28.84	52.96	74.89
1993	50.78	0.00	14.12	17.36	22.53	45.34	100.00	15.51	39.32	26.44
1994	0.00	0.00	100.00	83.84	1.66	6.96	100.00	26.50	17.13	18.94
1995	0.79	0.00	100.00	50.53	3.46	56.40	2.08	30.40	76.80	4.72
1996	2.84	34.75	13.47	52.26	23.76	27.45	100.00	26.11	30.49	53.70
Mean %	34.8	42.3	41.1	52.9	5.9	45.5	60.6	21.4	22.3	37.2

In addition, the number of UK projects in relation to the total NGO projects in the recipient countries similarly reflects the relatively high level of interest and activity of UK NGOs (figure 6:1).

On a country basis, using the annual distribution of EC funding to UK NGOs as a percentage of the total annual funding to EU NGOs, the data shows that UK NGOs were responsible for 100% of the EC co-financing received by specific countries on several occasions (Table 6:2). This may be interpreted as the UK taking a leadership role in EC co-financing operations in the region, for example, particularly in the case of Swaziland.

It could also be suggested that the high level of UK NGO activity in the area may have exerted a significant influence over the relative cumulative country totals for EU NGOs. The ranking of the recipient countries of SADC(C) using the cumulative gross totals of the co-financing activities of all EU NGOs, and comparing them with a ranking according to corresponding totals from UK NGO activities (Table 6:3) produces an almost identical pattern, when ranked in descending order of value. When the data is produced in its per capita format, they are also almost identical lists. The anomalies reflect the UK's distinction in relations towards Malawi as opposed to Mozambique.

Finally, for the most part, the extraction of the relevant UK NGO data for SADC(C) countries was a simple, albeit time-consuming, procedure, except in the case of the allocation of funded projects that spread over several countries. These projects were

Table 6.3: Ranking of SADC(C) countries 1980-1996

Rank	EU NGO cumulative total	UK NGO cumulative total	EU NGO per capita ranking	UK NGO per capita ranking
1	Tanzania	Tanzania	Namibia	Namibia
2	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Swaziland	Swaziland
3	Zimbabwe	Malawi	Botswana	Botswana
4	Namibia	Namibia	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe
5	Zambia	Zambia	Lesotho=Mozambique	Lesotho=Malawi
6	Malawi	Mozambique		
7	Botswana	Botswana	Zambia	Zambia
8	Angola	Angola	Tanzania	Tanzania
9	Lesotho	Swaziland	Malawi	Angola
10	Swaziland	Lesotho	Angola	Mozambique

to be found under regional headings – Afrique Subsaharienne, Region Afrique Australe, Region Afrique Subsaharienne, and Tous Pays. The decision was made to divide the total amounts equally between the countries indicated, and, subsequently, include them in both country totals and NGO totals. Where it was rather obscure as to which countries were the recipients, those allocations have been excluded. Once the relevant UK NGO data for each SADC(C) country for the years from 1980 to 1996 (inclusive) had been extracted from the documents, the next step was to reorganise it according to sector or group focus. The headings used were those approved by the Commission in its discussion of the use of the budget line. One complication that arose concerned the identification of the most appropriate category under which to allocate certain funded project. For example, the projects allocated to the category *disabled* could equally have been allocated to education/training or health, but were put under disabled as this was in line with the Commission's desire to ensure support for certain special groups. Similarly a problem occurred with the allocation of activities relating to *women*. Projects that indicated the positive promotion of the position of women, such as specific education/training, the development of civil society groups or the introduction of revolving funds, were included under *women*,

whereas those that dealt with family planning were included under *health*. The justification for the allocation according to group was based on the use of language in the presentation of the project information.

Examination of Results

Analysis of sectors and population groups

The UK NGO funds from the EC allocated to sectors or specific sections of the population, presented according to country and year, are to be found in Appendix B. The Commission has identified three sectors: *education/training*, *health*, and *rural development*: as having the most concentrations of funded projects (Com (81) 220; Com (82) 157). The cumulative total of these sectors for UK NGO projects between 1980 and 1996 substantiates that trend with a figure of 52.4% of the total EC allocations to UK projects (Table 6.4). (Rural development was taken to include both *agriculture/forestry* and *integrated rural development*).

If a further adjustment is made to incorporate *water* into the calculations so that then the cluster could represent *basic needs* of the population, the figure rises to 62%. However it can be seen that *civil society* achieved third place in the ranking, which was a reflection of the changing political environment in the region.

While the data so far have been cumulative totals for the region as a whole, the pattern of projects across the region is not identical for each individual country (Table 6.5). For instance, *health* was the top category in 4 countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe), yet gained no support in Botswana. Agriculture (Zambia,

Table 6.4: UK NGO projects co-financed by the EC: 1980-1996

Sector	Euros	% total fund
Health	5,560,406	18.1
Education & training	4,329,418	14.1
Civil Society	3,346,498	10.9
Agriculture	3,313,419	10.8
Integrated rural development	2,888,387	9.4
Water	2,967,266	9.6
Disabled	2,809,605	9.1
Productive activities	1,558,234	5.1
Community development	1,183,689	3.8
Elderly	982,596	3.2
Refugees & rehabilitation	882,346	3.0
Revolving funds	639,968	2.1
Women	348,742	1.1
Total	30,810,574	100.0

Angola) and civil society (Namibia, Swaziland) reach top in two countries, whereas IRD (Mozambique) and training (Botswana) only achieved the top position in one. Furthermore the majority of countries had at least one category, which received no support from UK NGOs during the period under review, the exceptions being Zambia and Zimbabwe.

An examination of the detail underlying the gross figures (Table 6.5) reveals certain trends. The information will be dealt with in the following sequence: firstly those sectors that offer support for the provision of basic needs, secondly those that reflect the support for political change and the move to the market, and finally the focus is on the categories of special groups in the population. A review of the distribution of funds between *education* as opposed to *training* projects indicates that for only four countries – namely Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Tanzania- financial support for education was greater than training, for the rest the reverse was true (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5 Cumulative totals for UK NGOs by sector and country (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	TOTAL
Agriculture	473,894	288,903	158,934	79,612	429,987	4,635	0	440,830	537,546	899,078	3,313,419
Civil Society	299,331	113,678	118,963	92,108	164,302	1,170,057	535,368	92,054	104,580	656,057	3,346,498
Community Development	300,664	3,085	11,600	376,215	51,119	119,481	264,703	0	14,697	42,126	1,183,689
Disabled	1,060	300,000	11,323	479,515	0	15,000	186,700	856,006	303,955	656,046	2,809,605
Education	0	803	171,267	92,823	73,104	110,391	4,842	599,605	74,903	179,134	1,306,872
Elderly	0	0	0	5,770	322,902	0	0	596,402	3,668	53,854	982,596
Health	279,296	0	238,300	1,894,136	131,331	78,182	35,978	1,609,520	78,313	1,215,350	5,560,406
IRD	12,264	0	0	825,160	504,063	0	498,165	248,455	467,088	333,192	2,888,387
Productive acts	0	494,017	158,250	30,392	79,280	13,879	27,970	435,399	22,350	296,697	1,558,234
Refugees/Rehab	153,619	120,403	0	30,803	0	84,373	0	69,975	51,252	371,921	882,346
Revolving funds	0	0	0	55,324	0	517,558	5,615	25,601	4,463	31,407	639,968
Training	29,484	515,673	4,566	0	97,753	869,507	0	306,730	448,567	750,266	3,022,546
Water	29,884	0	9,541	459,252	61,993	846,120	6,135	1,075,569	216,076	262,696	2,967,266
Women	6,361	742	742	188,597	15,000	16,477	742	49,434	7,432	63,215	348,742
TOTAL	1,585,857	1,837,304	883,486	4,609,707	1,930,834	3,845,660	1,566,218	6,405,580	2,334,890	5,811,039	30,810,574

Financial allocations to training were cumulatively more than double that of education, with a concentration on the provision of training programmes for indigenous teachers in the 1990s. Training provision reflected the desire to improve standards of human resources e.g. literacy levels, in the region and to produce indigenous professionals/skilled workers rather than rely on foreign labour imports (Windhoek, 1992; OECD, 1995; CEC, 1996).

The pattern of the relative levels of funded *health* projects between the countries reflects the significance of large projects i.e. over 100,000 ecus. Malawi and Tanzania each had five large projects, with Zimbabwe close behind with four. Support for *health* projects in Tanzania was continuous from 1982 although total funding was greater in Malawi. In addition to the focus on two of the poorer countries in the region, projects came on stream in Namibia after independence and Mozambique following the end of the civil war. Initially the large projects focused on setting up health services (Zimbabwe: 1980, 1981; Tanzania: 1983, 1986) or vaccination programmes (Malawi, 1984 & 1987), followed by Family Planning (Zimbabwe: 1987, 1991 and Tanzania: 1989, 1994), but in the 1990s projects began to also focus on training programmes e.g. Malawi (1990- private health care; 1994- nurses; 1995- sight savers) and Lesotho (1990 – training centre). The level of expenditure on *health* projects draws attention to region-specific problems, such as the impact of local environmental standards (climatic hazards, location-specific disease), and socially transmitted diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS). There has also been a perceptive change from basic provision of services through preventive medicine and health education matters to investment in health human resource assets, again reflecting the push for sustainable systems (Korten, 1987; Windhoek, 1992).

In keeping with the NGOs' broad, all-encompassing approach to development and underlining the fact that many of their projects incorporated aspects from more than one sector, *integrated rural development* (IRD) projects appeared in the region as large allocations. Prior to 1990 there were only 4 projects in 3 countries whereas after 1990 there were 12 projects in 6 countries, reaching a peak value in 1996. These were differentiated from agricultural/forestry projects, which had a narrower focus and dealt with equipment, crop/animal husbandry and reforestation. Much of the region contains a significant rural population (c. 70% - Namibia, Swaziland), with a high incidence of rural poverty and a problem of food security. In 1985 expenditure on agriculture peaked but 1993 showed the largest spread across the region covering 7 countries and highlighted the extent of the problem. More recently the EC has concentrated on the plight of hunger in the region.

Water was taken as a separate category of specifically focused projects although a proportion of the projects could have fitted into the rural development sector. The population suffers from a lack of access to safe drinking water, and the area was subsequently identified as one prone to drought conditions (EC, 1994). The earliest project occurred in 1985, and thereafter projects appeared in all countries with the exception of Botswana. The greater frequency of water projects favoured Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, although Malawi benefited from a single large project in 1995. The infrastructure projects were needed for both agricultural activities and personal consumption, and in the 1990s included response to the problem of drought (Malawi: 1992; Namibia: 1993). In 1992 projects spread across 5 countries but 1995 showed the widest spread (across 6 countries) and achieved the highest total – more than 1 million euros. It is, however, impossible to state whether the projects

sprang solely from the initiative of the indigenous population or were significantly influenced by the decisions of the EU/SADC biannual conferences.

Apart from the significant sectors identified above, there were four other sector categories. The promotion of (urban) *Community development* activities received support from UK NGOs from 1986 onwards, and the gross expenditure figures showed a significant skew towards Angola, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland. Similar to IRD projects identified above, these projects either took an integrated approach to development or provided capital equipment for community use. However it was some time before the Commission included mention of the urban poor and did not directly focus on street kids until 1993 (Com (94) 468) or marginalized urban populations until 1995 (Com (97) 427).

Civil society was used to promote the ability of indigenous groups to take an active role in society and attempt to influence community decisions (Com (94) 468; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). The EU/SADC conference (1994) was keen to support moves towards the promotion of democracy, but the incidence of projects very much depended on the emergence of embryonic GROs, the degree of active participation by the population, and the prevalent political climate. Thus support was low in Malawi and Tanzania, although more consistent support was offered to the latter. Significantly Namibia received support both before and after its independence from South Africa. There was a similar concentration in Zimbabwe after its independence from Britain. Taking the category as a whole, in the early years emphasis was on training in the field of legal matters (Zimbabwe: 1980; Namibia: 1986; Mozambique: 1987) and journalism (Zimbabwe: 1981, 1984). Support to local groups initially focused on

Trade Unions (Botswana: 1986; Zimbabwe: 1987) and Church groups (Namibia: 1988, 1989) but the 1990s saw the growth of support for SNGO, GROs and CBOs, which started in Mozambique (1989) and Zimbabwe (1989), then spread to other countries (Angola: 1991; Tanzania: 1991; Namibia: 1992; Lesotho: 1993; Zambia: 1993; Malawi: 1995; Swaziland: 1996). In the early period the support was invariably for the local representative group of the Northern NGO (Action Aid: Mozambique; SCF: Angola) but later local groups emerged with their own names/identities (e.g. ORAP: Zimbabwe; ADRA: Angola; NANGOF: Namibia; CONGOMA: Malawi). Allocations to UK projects increased from 6.6% in the 1980s to 10.1% in the 1990s, with Namibia receiving both the highest gross expenditure and per capita amounts.

At the same time the EC was keen to promote the move to the market (Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Tsie, 1997), which would incorporate both *productive activities* and *revolving funds*. The projects would support the development of emerging enterprises and SMEs, and reinforce the current ethos of self-propelled development and the reintegration into the world economy (Makoni, 1987; Thede, 1987; Van de Welde, 1990; Windhoek, 1992). UK NGO support for *productive activities* appeared in 1983 in Tanzania, before spreading to the rest of the region, excluding Angola (Table 6.5). The total value of the *productive activities* registered 5.3% in both the 1980s and the 1990s.

The final sector focus identified was that of *revolving funds*, which did not receive UK NGO support until Malawi in 1990 (Table 6.5). Only six SADC(C) countries appeared on the list and the allocations represented 3.2% of UK funding in the 1990s. Namibia received the greatest gross amount and per capita value. While the existence

of revolving funds offers credit facilities, it is difficult to establish which groups in society benefit from these projects. It can be argued that in order to participate in these schemes the local group has to show a certain level of skills and accumulation of assets but this may exclude the poorest of the poor.

In addition to the identification of specific sectors, the Commission also emphasised the importance of funding certain groups in society. Four such groups were identified – *refugees*, the *disabled*, the *elderly* and *women*. Allocations to the *refugee* group dealt with both health and education/training issues relating to their rehabilitation (South, 1981; Thompson, 1986). The greater emphasis in the 1980s related to the conditions in the region at that time but also in 1986 a new budget line was introduced which dealt with rehabilitation, and therefore probably attracted project proposals away from this budget line. The *disabled* group included those with general or specific handicaps i.e. blind people, lepers. The funds were used for their rehabilitation into society and essentially focused on their education and support facilities. However 1992 can be identified as a significant year in Tanzania when funds supported not only teacher training, but also the development of local representative organisations. This put emphasis on the move from support for the development of human resources to that of civil society. Projects supporting the *elderly* were concentrated in four countries in the region - namely Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe - with the poorest two receiving the greatest funding and reflected the impact of war and HIV/AIDS on the structure of society (Table 6.5). Essentially the support took the form of the provision of accommodation and age-specific health care (ophthalmic). The support reflected the changing

structure of society brought about by the incidence of war and AIDS as well as the state of poverty.

Finally the category of *women* has to be viewed in the knowledge that women's health (Family Planning) care was also included under *health*. It is hardly surprising therefore that *women* received the lowest total allocated funding for UK NGDO projects. The projects indicated the specific intention of promoting the status of women in society in the way they were presented. Projects included training (Malawi: 1986; Zimbabwe: 1986), support for women's groups (Namibia: 1987; Mozambique: 1988; Zimbabwe: 1989; Zambia: 1993), and those dealing with violence against women (Zimbabwe: 1990). In 1994 attention turned to income generating activities (Malawi; Tanzania; Zimbabwe) and revolving funds (Malawi).

Concern about the *environment* is also usually indicated as a cross cutting theme, but the lack of particular focus on this in the area meant that the relevant information was included under the categories of Community development and agriculture and resources. It was supported, in particular, by the UK NGO Co-operation for Development, which was active in Lesotho (1988, 1989, 1992, 1995) in reforestation, but also in Zambia (1993) and Namibia (1993). It also supported renewable energies in Zimbabwe (1989).

Thus it can be argued that the spread of funds across the sectors and recipient groups has reflected not only the general considerations of the EC Development Co-operation policy but also the specific problems of the SADC(C) region, and the interests of the UK NGOs. Although the EC moved on to an emphasis on market-based and political developments, the majority of projects fell within the definition of basic needs. It is

difficult to establish whether this was a reflection of the desire of the indigenous population to achieve an acceptable level of basic needs and move out of poverty, or these projects received more support from UK NGOs because they were in keeping with their *raison d'être*. Alternately perhaps it reflected the inability of the Commission to impose its own preference on the demand-led budget line. However even under the umbrella of basic needs, there is a discernable shift towards the involvement of the indigenous population and sustainability through the development of human resources and the promotion of civil society (Elliott, 1987; Pearce, 1993). While trends have appeared over time, it is difficult to identify the main determinant. Obviously the priorities have been shaped by the problems of the region and this is reflected in the demand-led projects and the RIPs arrived at by joint consultation between the Commission and SADC representatives.

Data analysis on an annual basis

The data can also be reviewed across the region on an annual basis. For any one year it is then possible to identify the relative significance of the categories of expenditure. The funds received from the EC by UK NGOs each year, presented by country and sector/population group, are located in Appendix C. An initial examination revealed *health* to be the most frequent recipient of the highest funding each year -1980, 1983, 1987 and 1994; followed by *disabled*- 1986, 1989 and 1993. If *disabled* is added to *health*, the relative importance of the category is underlined, being related to not only civil unrest but also the level of poverty and the prevalence of disease in the region. *Agriculture* (1985, 1991), *water* (1992, 1995) and *civil society* (1981, 1996) each achieved first place on two occasions. The problem of food security and the high incidence of a rural population reflected the relative importance of *agriculture*. While

1981 to 1990 was identified as the water decade, it did not feature significantly in the funding until the 1990s. Water projects first appeared in 1985, had only intermittent incidence until 1992, were then established in four countries across the region, and reached a peak in 1995 (6 countries). This reflected the growing realisation of the severity of drought conditions in the region (CEC, 1996; Liebaert, 1997).

The importance of *civil society* initially reflected the post-independence situation in Zimbabwe. 1984 was significant because these projects had spread over 6 countries with it being the sole expenditure category in Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. *Education* (1984) *community development* (1988) *refugees* (1982) and *training* (1990) gained that position once. It is significant that *refugees* achieved first place in 1982 during the height of the fight against civil unrest instigated by SA as part of its destabilization programme in the region. Soon after the Commission introduced a new budget line to support the rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons.

Those categories that did not achieve the highest level of funding were invariably late starters in the distribution of projects. Thus *productive activities* appeared in 1985 in two poor countries- Malawi and Mozambique, and only achieved a peak spread across four countries in 1992. Similarly *women* appeared later (1986) also in two countries concurrently- Malawi and Zimbabwe, but achieved a peak spread across 6 countries in 1987. Again the Commission introduced a specific budget line to accommodate women's issues. The *elderly* as a category did not make an appearance until 1983 and thereafter never succeeded in gaining a significant spread across the region in any one year. In fact only Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, (and Zambia once), were seen to support the group, despite EC encouragement. Therefore the annual detail of

UK NGO activity in the region can be said to reflect the problems of the region as well as those of the individual countries, which suggests that the NGOs were responding to some extent to local demand.

UK NGOs & SADC(C)

UK NGOs have been active in their pursuit of EC B7-6000 co-financing for their projects since the inauguration of SADC(C). From 1980 onwards there has been a rising annual trend of activity by UK NGOs in the region, and their numbers reached a peak in 1993 of 29 before levelling off at 24 in both 1995 and 1996 (figure 6:2). The annual rate of increase in the number of individual UK NGOs entering SADC(C) achieved a peak of 8 in 1991 but then settled at a lower level. By 1996, a total of 60 UK NGOs had made an appearance in the region. It is suggested that the appearance and frequency of individual UK NGO activity in the region could be the result of a number of factors: (i) the administrative system of the Commission, (ii) the level of competition for funds, (iii) the formal and the informal system used by the Commission to determine the allocation of funds, (iv) the relative attractiveness of obtaining funds from the UK equivalent system or elsewhere. It could be argued that the lower proportion of new entrants after 1992 to some extent reflects the management problems at the Commission and the shift of activities to another region. NGO activity in the region can also be analysed to establish the degree of commitment to the region or to a specific country/sector/group. Thus according to figure 6.3, 18 UK NGOs had only one year of activity in the region during the period 1980 – 1996. A closer examination of these NGOs (Table 6.6) indicates that a slightly higher number appeared in the 1990s as opposed to the 1980s, perhaps

Figure 6.2 UK NGOs in SADC(C)





Figure 6.3 Frequency of UK NGO appearances



reflecting the level of opportunities in the region and the change in EC/SA relations. In the 1980s Botswana appeared to be attractive to UK NGOs entering the region but was overshadowed by opportunities in Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania in the 1990s. Zimbabwe, however, proved attractive during both periods.

Table 6.6 UK NGOs with only one year's appearance

Country	NGO	Year
Botswana	Quaker Peace & Service	1982
Botswana	SOS Children's Village	1984
Botswana	WWF	1985
Botswana	Methodist Church	1989
Lesotho	British Red Cross	1993
Malawi	Homeless International	1992
Malawi	Sue Ryder	1992
Mozambique	APTT-Trust	1994
Mozambique	AHRTAG	1996
Tanzania	ECHO	1988
Tanzania	Harold MacMillan Trust	1991
Tanzania	Ran Furlly Library Service	1993
Tanzania	Action Health 2000	1995
Zambia	Voluntary & Christian Service	1986
Zimbabwe	African Educational Trust	1981
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe Trust	1985
Zimbabwe	Family of the Future	1990
Zimbabwe	Africa Now	1996

It can also be stated that seven UK NGOs achieved between ten and fourteen years of activity in the region, indicating a high level of commitment and ability to develop relations within the region by some UK NGOs (fig 6.3). On the other hand, a review of the presence of UK NGOs in the individual countries shows that the majority were active in only one country (fig 6.4). In contrast three UK NGOs were present in between eight and ten countries in the region. Furthermore, an identification of the attractiveness of countries to UK NGOs indicates that Tanzania heads the list with 31 NGOs, followed by Zimbabwe with 29 (Table 6.7). All but two of the countries enjoyed their maximum level of UK NGO support in the 1990s, which could have

been a reflection of the increased funding available and the changes to the political environment in the region.

Figure 6.4 Presence of UK NGOs in one country or more




Table 6.7 Total number of UK NGOs active in each country 1980 - 1996

	Total no. UK NGOs active	Highest no. of NGOs/year	Year(s) when highest no. of NGOs active
Angola	7	4	1987
Botswana	9	3	1989
Lesotho	8	3	1990,1992,1993,1995
Malawi	17	7	1991, 1992
Mozambique	12	6	1993, 1996
Namibia	11	6	1994, 1995, 1996
Swaziland	8	3	1996
Tanzania	31	13	1995
Zambia	18	9	1993
Zimbabwe	29	9	1994, 1995, 1996

Table 6.8 Total value of EC co-financed activities in SADC(C) region by individual UK NGOs 1980 – 1996 (ecus)

UK NGO	Value of EC co-financing of B7-6000 projects	Main recipient country or countries
Oxfam	2,965,885	Malawi & Zimbabwe
Co-operation for Development	2,911,609	Namibia & Botswana
Concern Universal	2,330,955	Malawi & Mozambique
War on Want	1,566,881	Angola & Zimbabwe
Water Aid	1,313,342	Tanzania
Christian Aid	1,308,696	Namibia
M S I	1,297,427	Zimbabwe & Tanzania
ACORD	1,295,872	Namibia & Mozambique
VSO	1,063,450	Tanzania & Zambia
HelpAge	1,040,659	Tanzania

At NGO level, the amount of EC funds drawn into the SADC(C) region by some individual UK NGOs was greater than the total allocations through all UK NGOs to individual countries over the whole period from 1980 to 1996 (Table 6.8 compared with Table 6.1). It can be seen therefore that specific UK NGOs have had a considerable presence in the region, and even a significant presence in certain countries. A comparison between the first three in the list was undertaken to see whether their projects conformed to a set pattern.

Using the annual reports of the B7-6000 budget line showed that *Oxfam* was active in the region for thirteen years between 1982 and 1995 (excluding 1988) and had a presence in seven out of the ten SADC(C) countries (Appendix D). (In reality, as it is a member of ACORD, it could be argued that it has continued its activities in the area in 1996 as well.) Although it is difficult to discern a clear-cut pattern to Oxfam's activities, it is possible to state that its projects do seem to reflect the needs of the individual country, and thus its pattern of projects is not the same in each country. While in the main the projects in the years prior to 1988 concentrated on the alleviation of basic needs, from 1989 onwards there was a trend towards productive activities (Tanzania, Namibia), support for the development of civil society (Angola, Zimbabwe) and revolving funds (Tanzania). However the severity of the region's water problem was underlined by the strength of support given by Oxfam from 1992 onwards, covering 5 countries in the region. Therefore Oxfam has supported a spread of projects in the region, which not only reflect country and regional needs but also could be said to incorporate the shift towards the market and the pursuit of democracy. Whether this reflected the needs of the individual target group or was prompted by Oxfam or the policy approach of the EC is impossible to ascertain. By

way of comparison with Oxfam, SCF also had a presence in 7 countries between 1982 and 1996, but its total EC co-financing was only approximately 8% of Oxfam's total (Appendix D).

Co-operation for Development also showed a significant presence in the region, and has been active since 1985, with at least one project in each country (Appendix E). Unlike Oxfam, Co-operation for Development has tended to support activities that relate to the market (training human resources, revolving funds, the development of productive activities) and civil society (NGO support and Human rights). At the same time though it also supported integrated community development projects, which can cover a range of issues (Angola, Swaziland), and environmental concerns. It is interesting to note that it offered most support to Namibia and Botswana, in contrast to Oxfam, which focused on Malawi and Zimbabwe.

The third UK NGO, *Concern Universal*, showed a different presence in the region (Appendix F). It first appeared in 1990 in Malawi, which has since received approximately half Concern Universal's total allocation of EC funding. It was only active in three other countries in the region. Yet again it is difficult to distinguish a specific pattern to its activities, which reflect basic needs, market activities and the development of civil society and the pursuit of democracy.

While development theory has moved on, the basic needs of the indigenous population have still to be met. In those countries, which have very recently emerged from a period of civil unrest, the NGOs have supported the provision of capital equipment and premises as well as vocational training schemes. There is also some

evidence of the substitution of the state by UK NGOs, when HelpAge provided support for the Social Welfare department in Mozambique in 1993. NGOs may feel that the move to the market is not in keeping with their approach to development but nevertheless they appear to some extent to have incorporated this approach into their own affairs (van der Heijden, 1987; Smillie, 1995; Tvedt, 1998). The increase in the level of support for productive activities and the more recent introduction of revolving credit funds indicates a move towards poverty reduction by promotion (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). The NGOs are aware of the need for some element of stability in the countries, and look for the emergence of embryonic civil movements in the regions before they enter otherwise they feel their efforts will not produce desirable results (Sahley, 1995). However, in order to promote the emergence of civil society in the period before and after its independence from South Africa, social mobilisation forces in Namibia have been favoured. A glance at the data pertaining to Namibia shows that a pattern emerged such that from an initial focus on support offered by the Church on legal matters and housing advice (Pearce, 1993), from 1992, there emerged support for the nurture of local NGOs (CIIR and ACORD). This raises the question of whether NGOs are being used as part of the EC's foreign policy (i.e. to counteract the influence of SA in the region) rather than positively favouring intangible activities (Pearce, 1993; Smillie, 1995; Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

The use of the B7-6000 budget line by UK NGOs shows that to some extent it reflected the needs of the local population, but as a demand-led budget line that was to be expected. However, it could also be suggested that the desire of the EC to play out a policy against the destabilizing tactics of South Africa in the region, meant that the Commission looked upon the project proposals, which were in response to the plight

of the refugees and those seeking rehabilitation, more favourably. Thus in the 1980s, War on Want received a significant level of funding for these projects (Appendix G). As a result of both the periods of civil unrest and the regional characteristics, e.g. drought, local diseases, the indigenous population continued to need support to attain their basic needs, as indicated in the data above. The situation was not helped by the introduction of Structural Adjustment programmes. However over time the presence of UK NGO projects in the region came to cover the whole spectrum of NGO activities from relief through development to empowerment (Elliott, 1987; Korten, 1987; Thomas, 1992; Smillie, 1995). The revised General Conditions (1988) governing the B7-600 budget line laid emphasis on participation of the people and sustainability. It therefore indicated its preference for the support of GROs (SEC (89) 1575), which has been evident in the region since 1989. Sustainability was to be through the boost to employment. Although the introduction of revolving funds through UK NGOs did not enter the region until 1990, thereby possibly responding to the EC lead, the same was not true of productive activities. These first appeared in 1983 and thus were in advance of the EC approach. The shift towards the market focus and sustainability was further borne out by the emphasis on income-generating projects for women and the elderly. However, although the EC proposed a move towards an increased focus on these market-based activities in the mid 1990s, UK NGOs did not reflect it in their use of the line. In recognition of the high number of NGO that have had a very limited presence in the region, it could be argued that they were attracted by the funding opportunities available rather than a commitment to the population. Similarly as the focus of EC policy has turned from the fight against the apartheid regime of South Africa, to one of the rebuilding of relations with South

Africa, so this may have affected the apparent relative attractiveness of SADC for UK NGOs.

As an example of EC policy in practice, the use of the B7-6000 budget line has been the result of a number of factors. These have included not only the EC policy to counter balance the destabilisation activities of South Africa but also the social and economic profile of the region. While the focus of EC policy moved from SADC(C) to South Africa in the 1990s, this was not reflected in the UK NGO activities. There was an increased interest in the plight of the poorer countries particularly after the civil disturbances had died down. However if the EC policy was to focus on the reduction of poverty then a continued presence in the region was needed. Nevertheless there was some evidence of a move to the market reflected in the UK NGO projects in the region. The number of projects active in both Namibia and Botswana lead one to assume that there is a degree of economic interest behind these by both the EC and the UK.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

European NGOs find themselves located between a number of stakeholders, who hold divergent views concerning their function and direction of accountability. While it is appreciated that the stakeholders include organisations from the North and the South, the review of the literature identified the donor/NGO relationship as central to the changes that have taken place in the NGOs' environment. Donor/NGO relations have been little researched partly due to the difficulty of identifying and isolating the significant causal factors (Hulme & Edwards, 1997) but also because there is a dearth of material available to the researcher. As such, therefore, the promotion of transparency has not progressed far enough nor been in place long enough.

Donor/NGOs relations are highly complex and determined by the extent to which there is equality in the relationship, concerning the share of power, access to information, decision-making, and the design and implementation of policy (Clark, 1997; Commins, 1997). It is difficult to identify hard and fast rules for the relationship, and the normative view may well differ in each case. The relative position of each player at any time is the product of contemporary as well as past events. Thus the study of the evolution of relations between northern donors and northern NGOs is the consequence of a number of interwoven, constantly changing factors. These include the aspirations of and decisions taken by each group, as well as variables both within and external to the organisations.

This research into donor/NGO relations has focused on an examination of the relative position of the European (development) NGOs in the context of the dynamics of the

Development Co-operation policy of the European Community. An attempt has been made to examine the dynamics of the EC Development Co-operation policy both through Community documentation and its application to a specific region, SADC(C). At the same time a detailed study was carried out into the evolution of relations over time between the European Commission and NGOs and their representative body, CLONG.

EC / Commission / Donor

The European Commission represents the interest of the EC as a donor, although it is to be appreciated that it is only one of the EU institutions, and that these in turn may reflect the views of the (currently) fifteen Member States. As such therefore the EC as a donor is a special/extreme case.

It has been shown that the approach to NGOs by the Commission has changed over time in response to changes in the aid environment and its impact on the characteristics and internal organisation of both NGOs and the Commission. Initially, the Commission was seeking to expand its operations (Com (75) 504) but recognised the limitations of its own approach to development (Riddell & Robinson, 1995). It saw the NGOs as agents of an alternative means of generating development (Korten, 1987; Fowler & James, 1994; Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Tvedt, 1998; Cameron, 2000; Thorbecke, 2000), which would extend the Community's ability to reach the poorest groups in society (Fowler & James, 1994). At this early stage it was appreciative of their attributes (Korten, 1987; Smith, 1987; Bratton, 1989; Fowler & James, 1994; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Robinson, 1997; Smillie, 1997) and the associated benefits to be gained by the Community (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993; Pratt & Stone,

1994; Edwards & Hulme, 1996), while being conscious that its role was to offer little more than financial support (Com (77) 83). It was also aware of the enhancement to its public image resulting from NGOs' education projects. However as the Commission gained an insight into the operations and organisational set-up of NGOs, it became critical of their level of efficiency (Annis, 1987; Smith, 1987; Bratton, 1989; Robinson, 1992; Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Smillie, 1995) and their lack of professionalism (Korten, 1987; Bratton, 1989). In the general climate of the push for increased accountability and efficiency, the Commission sought to encourage NGOs to raise their performance and their transparency, so that it would be easier to identify the return for the EC from the co-financed projects (Com (80) 98). Gradually the degree of control wielded by the Commission over the internal organisation of NGOs and their activities began to increase, for instance, through the revised General Conditions and the introduction of the evaluation reflex and LFA. Thus the Commission's own value system and approach to development was beginning to be formally imposed on those NGOs wishing to participate in activities co-financed by the EC (Tvedt, 1998). This was further extended by the introduction of economic and political conditionality into EC policy and seen to provide an enhanced role for NGOs, which would enable them to promote empowerment of their target groups (Bratton, 1989; Pearce, 1993; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). In spite of the fact that the Commission had become increasingly critical of NGOs, it also still appeared to respect their opinion and encouraged their critical comments on EC policy initiatives and documents. This was taken a step further when NGOs were invited to take part in the proposed meso-level dialogue. It can be argued that while the NGOs have been aware of the official, overt EC policy (the promotion of development via the market and the pursuit of democracy), they have also become increasingly conscious of a

covert agenda (export markets, business interests). The absorption of the NGOs into the formal setting of EC policy has meant that they are now part of the CFSP (Edwards, 1994).

In retrospect therefore it can be argued that the Commission saw the NGOs as 'magic bullets' (Vivian, 1994), and were content to allow NGOs to pursue their activities in their own way. According to Farrington and Bebbington (1993) the Commission was initially acting in a *facilitative* manner, which gradually moved through a period of *constructive influence*, when the Commission attempted to influence the use of the budget line by the promotion of certain issues. More recently the introduction of economic and political conditionality has in fact *distorted* relations for the NGOs who have had to focus on objectives, which could be argued as the antithesis of their values (Van der Heijden, 1987; Dichter, 1997). A further problem for NGOs is their incorporation into the EC's foreign policy (Edwards, 1994). The dominance and power of the EC has not only been worked through the refocusing of its external affairs policy but also in the imposition of its values and procedures on the organisational affairs of the NGOs (Tvedt, 1998). NGOs have therefore been forced to absorb the EC's practices as their own, which has reduced their degree of accountability towards their target groups (Fowler, 1991; Smillie, 1995; Fowler, 1998). At the same time the emphasis on short-term projects was seen to be out of step with the push for sustainability and the desire to reduce administrative costs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

It can be stated that the role of the EC/Commission as donor has changed over time to incorporate an increased number of formal procedures and impose constraints on the

ability of NGOs to carry out their activities in accordance with their original values and objectives. The Commission has used both formal and informal methods to exert pressure on NGOs to conform- recognised list of NGOs (based on three years acceptable experience); formal procedures for acceptance of proposals; threat and actuality of termination of financial support e.g. CLONG; withdrawal of funding midstream (1998); time delays in decisions and payments; additional administrative burdens; insecurity of tenure; a state of flux in its own systems and staffing of departments.

European NGOs

In the early stages of relations with the Commission, the NGOs engaged in emergency and food aid, and were keen to expand their operations with the Commission. They saw it as a way to widen their financial base and establish a people-centred approach to development with the help of a major provider of aid (Pratt & Stone, 1994; Thorbecke, 2000). European NGOs wished to be seen as 'partners' of the European Commission and from the start attempted to establish their position by proposing refinements to the general conditions governing the co-financing of NGO activities. Then, with the support of the European Parliament, NGOs began to offer a critical voice in discussions of EC policy matters. The development of relations with the European Parliament was important because it strengthened the position of NGOs vis-à-vis the Commission (Covey, 1998). NGOs were also able to 'use' their influence with the European Parliament to establish additional budget lines to support issues they were particularly concerned with e.g. women, the environment, human rights (Weiss & Gordenker, 1996; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). The expansion of funds, either through co-financing lines or through NIPs, encouraged the emergence of new NGOs,

which extended the heterogeneity of the group (Riddell & Robinson, 1995; Smillie, 1995; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Hodson, 1997). It is not possible to state whether these emergent NGOs had a firm commitment to development or could be identified as opportunists (Hodson, 1997; Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Tvedt, 1998), nor identify the extent to which existing NGOs were affected by the extra funds (Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Pronk, 1998).

Despite these new opportunities NGOs have had to deal with a number of problematic issues. NGOs have felt uneasy about the direction that EC policy has taken with the focus on a market-centred, competitive approach to development (Dichter, 1997; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). This was difficult to reconcile with their preferred people-centred approach, although they have managed to accommodate moves along the welfare/empowerment spectrum e.g. Oxfam (Elliott, 1987; Korten, 1987; Smillie, 1995). Over time the pressure has grown for them to be accountable *upwards* (Hulme & Edwards, 1997) to the Commission, and this has resulted in NGOs adopting a working environment and manner closer to that of the Commission, which in turn they have imposed on their Southern partners (Edwards & Hulme, 1992; Thomas, 1992; Smillie, 1995; Bebbington & Riddell, 1997; Dichter, 1997; Wallace, 1997; Wood, 1997; Tvedt, 1998). However the rise of Southern NGOs as a recognised presence precipitated an identity crisis for the Northern NGOs (Pratt & Stone, 1994; Bebbington & Riddell, 1997), as they now found that on the one hand their status as a link with target groups had been compromised and on the other the Commission was now eager to deal directly with SNGOs (Najam, 1996; Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Smillie, 1997). In the 1990s NGOs have made use of the move towards a more 'open' Commission to engage in the proffered periods of consultation and thus influence the

general direction of, or specific issues in, EC policy (Hellinger, 1987; Pratt & Stone, 1994; Commins, 1997; Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Covey, 1998). NGOs have been keen to promote sustainable development but this was incompatible with the Commission's focus on *short-term functional* accountability (Elliott, 1987; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). The Commission has attempted to control and constrain the activities of the NGOs in line with its official external policy framework through their engagement in humanitarian aid and contracts to meet EC policy provision (Hulme & Edwards, 1997; Smillie, 1997; Twose, 1987; Fowler, 1998). Under the B7-6000 budget line, European NGOs have the right of initiative for the presentation of project proposals to the Commission, which they have staunchly defended and which ensures they act in response to the demand of the indigenous population. In fact a number of changes have been made to the B7-6000 line, such: as the promotion of programmes rather than projects, which would allow a longer-term approach to development to ensue (Dichter, 1997) and the focus on the use of consortia, which it could be argued dilutes and homogenises the NGO world (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). A number of evaluations of NGO co-financed activities have been carried out, but it is suggested that these may have missed possible considerable, but probably immeasurable, spillover benefits and a revised approach should be taken (Biggs & Neame, 1995; Fowler, 1995; Uphoff, 1995). Similarly while the focus has been on the degree and direction of accountability of NGOs, very little has been achieved in the transparency and accountability of the Commission (Bebbington & Riddell, 1997).

CLONG

The position held by CLONG has been subject to tremendous strains and pressures as a result of its location at the interface between (development) NGOs and the

Commission. As soon as it became financially dependent on the Commission (1978), CLONG found itself being increasingly drawn into the Commission's sphere of influence, although at times the role it played was identified as an informed, critical voice (Commings, 1997). CLONG has engaged in policy dialogue (Hellinger, 1987; Pratt & Stone, 1994; Covey, 1998), but while it has lobbied on aid policies, it has found it difficult to actually change the EC's strategy (Commings, 1997). CLONG has sought to influence the Commission by engaging with the European Parliament and other bodies representing NGO interests, and producing independent reports (Princen & Finger, 1994; Covey, 1998). It can be said to have engaged in *critical co-operation* and *insider advocacy* (Covey, 1998).

As a consequence of its close relations with the Commission, it has assimilated the values, language and systems of the Commission (Tvedt, 1998). The escalating bureaucratic problems at the Commission impacted on NGOs and their activities, with the result that CLONG stepped in to oversee the project proposals before they reached the Commission. From the Commission's viewpoint, this was an attempt to reduce administrative costs. On the other hand, NGOs saw this as a further extension of the absorption of CLONG into the realm of the Commission, and as a move by CLONG to screen their project proposals (Bossuyt & Wilkinson, 1997). NGOs felt that CLONG no longer represented their interests. For CLONG that role had become increasingly more difficult as the NGOs it represented grew in number and diversity (Riddell & Robinson, 1995). As CLONG sought to restructure itself and promote solidarity with its members, it found its position increasingly a tenuous one, under fire from both sides.

CLONG's relations with the Commission have progressively declined. In the early days the scale of things enabled personal contact to establish the working environment, particularly with DG VIII. Consequently the development of trust and understanding for the work of NGOs was built up with the staff of DG VIII (Commins, 1997). However these close relations have been lost as a result of the structural and staffing changes at the Commission, and the assumption, that it had achieved good relations with the Commission, was proved to be seriously awry with the events at the turn of the century. The impetus for independent financial support has become of paramount importance.

Final Reflections

The relations between the EC/Commission and Northern NGOs reviewed here have been played out against a backdrop of turmoil and consequent change both within the European Community and in the wider world. These factors have impacted on the concept of partnership and the evolution of relations. While NGOs and CLONG considered that they were part of a partnership with the Commission, that concept has undergone change as can be seen in the case of the ACPs. The imbalance of power and authority, and the lack of reciprocal accountability and transparency have become increasingly apparent over time. The independence of NGOs has been questioned and their plurality may have been lost as they become drawn into acting out the EC's Development Co-operation policy, which is fast being incorporated into its foreign policy domain. CLONG allowed itself to get too close to the Commission. The NGOs now have to consider whether they should review their position and specialise to achieve their objectives.

This thesis has shown that the power exerted by the EC, as a donor, has increased during the time under review. The NGOs found themselves to be in a progressively more competitive market for funds. This has impacted on their integrity to varying degrees, and many have assimilated donor values and language. It has also shown that the application of EC policy to a specific region has provided the NGOs with support for their work while also influencing it. There is still much research to be done into donor/NGO relations to see whether the form of relations varies significantly with the donor. The EC is a multilateral organisation, therefore there is scope for analysis of relations between a bilateral donor and NGOs over time. Similarly the degree of financial dependence of CLONG on the European Commission has identified the problem of the lack of alternative sources of finance. Future research into the possible replacements for donor financing for NGO representative bodies may, of course, also involve them in a closer relationship with their members, who in turn may have increased their links with the private sector. The repercussions of such a move for the integrity of and role played by NGOs and their representative body remains uncertain.

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Appendix A

Source: African Dev. Report 2000, OUP Oxford

Country	Area (^{'000} sq Km)	1999 pop	GNP/hd US(\$) 1998	Life expectancy 1998	Infant mortality rate (per 1000) 1980	Infant mortality rate (per 1000) 1998	Adult literacy rate % 1998
Angola	1,247	12.5	350	48	149	117	-
Botswana	600	1.6	3,070	44	67	59	25
Congo DR	2,345	50.3	110	52	109	82	-
Lesotho	30	2.1	570	54	117	90	17
Malawi	118	10.6	200	40	164	131	41
Mozambique	802	19.3	200	41	135	115	58
Namibia	824	1.7	1,940	45	84	71	19
S. Africa	1,221	39.9	3,310	50	67	62	16
Swaziland	17	1.0	1,390	62	94	60	22
Tanzania	945	32.8	210	48	98	78	27
Zambia	753	9.07	330	41	88	77	24
Zimbabwe	391	11.5	620	42	76	68	9

Access to (% pop)

	Sanitation		Safe water		Health services	
	1985	1994/95	1985	1994/95	1985	1994/95
Angola	18	16	33	32	70	-
Botswana	36	55	54	70	-	-
Congo DR	23	18	33	25	33	26
Lesotho	22	38	36	57	50	80
Malawi	60	63	55	54	54	35
Mozambique	20	54	15	28	40	39
Namibia	14	34	52	57	72	59
S. Africa	-	53	-	-	-	-
Swaziland	-	70	21	60	-	-
Tanzania	64	86	49	49	73	42
Zambia	47	64	58	59	70	-
Zimbabwe	26	58	52	74	71	85

Education: School enrolment ratio (GROSS)

	Primary				Secondary			
	1980		1996		1980		1996	
	Total	F/M	Total	F/M	Total	F/M	Total	F/M
Angola	174	0.87	74	0.92	21	0.29	12	0.66
Botswana	91	1.20	112	1.01	19	1.18	66	1.10
Congo DR	92	0.71	70	0.69	24	0.37	30	0.62
Lesotho	102	1.43	87	1.31	18	1.50	29	1.46
Malawi	60	0.67	133	0.91	3	0.40	5	1.88
Mozambique	99	0.73	62	0.72	5	0.38	7	0.63
Namibia	128	1.10	131	1.01	38	1.26	61	1.18
S. Africa	85	1.01	116	0.98	45	0.98	84	1.19
Swaziland	103	0.98	129	0.95	38	0.95	52	0.99
Tanzania	93	0.87	66	0.98	3	0.53	5	0.82
Zambia	90	0.85	88	0.94	16	0.50	29	0.63
Zimbabwe	85	0.86	113	0.97	8	0.78	48	0.85

Appendix B

Sector and Population group

Agriculture (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981										63,513	63,513
1982								48,664			48,664
1983	11,769		6,300					11,653			29,722
1984									2,724		2,724
1985	357,018	61,106						22,583		355,657	796,364
1986		227,797									227,797
1987					4,410			9,411			13,821
1988			2,653					238,500			241,153
1989			133,346	7,994	10,600			15,000			166,940
1990				21,880				37,913		13,510	73,303
1991	81,157				45,000				498,111		624,268
1992	23,950		3,147	6,632	30,000					366,214	429,943
1993			3,510	5,936	324,977	4,635		11,974	8,447	21,136	380,615
1994			5,906	15,000					1,961		22,867
1995			4,072	11,289				35,544	26,303	5,626	82,834
1996				10,881	15,000			9,588		73,422	108,891
TOTAL	472,894	288,903	158,934	79,612	429,987	4,635	0	440,830	537,546	899,078	3,313,419
Per capita	0.052	0.222	0.880	0.007	0.030	0.003	0.000	0.170	0.066	0.090	

Civil Society (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980										104,325	104,325
1981										89,226	89,226
1982											0
1983											0
1984	6,724	49,771	49,771			28,692	49,771			58,300	243,029
1985						120,133					120,133
1986		4,412				2,500					6,912
1987	223,473	1,954	1,954		11,958		1,954			5,862	247,155
1988	15,000					155,671					170,671
1989					15,000	146,077				84,828	245,905
1990					15,000	139,643				10,384	165,027
1991	13,500	8,069				7,695		21,728		181,259	232,251
1992	27,073					19,931		6,848	2,642	21,352	77,846
1993			13,934		15,000	12,970		8,590			50,494
1994					21,507	16,310		15,000		22,677	75,494
1995			3,832	12,960	15,000	29,957		13,750	22,241	15,387	113,127
1996	13,561	49,472	49,472	79,148	70,837	490,478	483,643	26,138	79,697	62,457	1,404,803
TOTAL	299,331	113,678	18,963	92,108	184,302	1,170,057	535,368	92,054	104,580	656,057	3,346,498
Per capita	0.032	0.087	0.661	0.009	0.011	0.900	0.765	0.004	0.013	0.066	

Community Development (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981											0
1982											0
1983											0
1984											0
1985											0
1986			11,600		19,675	82,027					113,302
1987	11,957				7,600						19,557
1988	265,074									6,006	271,080
1989	10,750	3,085			13,770		5,723				33,328
1990										9,960	9,960
1991				1,744							1,744
1992	11,542			338,048						8,179	357,769
1993					8,733	12,039	252,810		14,697	2,981	291,260
1994				6,219		10,415					16,634
1995	1,341			19,335	1,341		6,170				28,186
1996				10,869		15,000				15,000	40,869
TOTAL	300,664	3,085	11,600	376,216	51,119	119,481	264,703	0	14,697	42,126	1,189,689
Per capita	0.033	0.002	0.006	0.040	0.003	0.092	0.378	0.000	0.002	0.004	

Disabled (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981											0
1982								4,967			4,967
1983											0
1984											0
1985											0
1986				68,972			68,972	46,977		68,972	253,893
1987							105,244	81,284		10,230	196,758
1988							10,910				10,910
1989	1,060	300,000					1,574				302,634
1990				105,847				340,295		10,492	456,634
1991				14,500						74,718	89,218
1992			11,323	290,196				65,806			367,325
1993						15,000			38,347	474,426	527,773
1994								15,000	26,126	15,000	56,126
1995								301,677	21,588	2,208	325,473
1996									217,894		217,894
TOTAL	1,060	300,000	11,323	479,515	0	15,000	186,700	856,006	303,955	656,046	2,809,605
Per capita	0.000	0.231	0.006	0.051	0.000	0.011	0.267	0.033	0.037	0.066	

Education and Training (ecus)

	Angola Education Training	Botswana Education Training	Lesotho Education Training	Malawi Education Training	Mozambique Education Training	Namibia Education Training	Swaziland Education Training	Tanzania Education Training	Zambia Education Training	Zimbabwe Education Training	Total
1980		803								117,568	118,371
1981								77,270			27,270
1982											0
1983											0
1984		247,626				343,220		5,400			596,246
1985	9,003	223,304				335,343		12,186	24,903		604,739
1986								11,851		2,880	14,731
1987		6,546		9,565						4,320	16,431
1988						184,325	4,842				189,167
1989	9,935	27,830			72,471				12,600	9,328	132,164
1990		10,367	2,847	1,455		3,313				8,703	560,754
1991				57,174		94,950		153,251	10,033	5,537	322,945
1992	10,546		168,420	14,479		12,128			10,578	386,458	610,882
1993					23,552	25,282		134,723	15,194	32,382	231,433
1994			4,566	1,060				131,644	41,346	4,146	189,702
1995						6,619		26,669	9,667	14,063	72,853
1996				9,090	49,552			301,169	10,826	4,528	31,300
TOTAL	29,484	516,476	175,833	92,823	170,857	979,898	4,842	906,335	523,470	929,400	4,328,418
Countr y Total	29,484	516,476	175,833	92,823	170,857	979,898	4,842	906,335	523,470	929,400	
Per capita	0.003	0.397	0.097	0.009	0.012	0.754	0.006	0.035	0.064	0.094	

Elderly (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981											0
1982											0
1983								43,753			43,753
1984											0
1985									3,668	2,989	6,657
1986				5,770						16,463	22,233
1987											0
1988					14,951						14,951
1989					10,939						10,939
1990								500,000		19,917	519,917
1991								15,000			15,000
1992					50,858			15,000			65,858
1993					246,154			16,997			263,151
1994								5,652		12,006	17,658
1995										2,479	2,479
1996											0
TOTAL	0	0	0	5,770	322,902	0	0	596,402	3,668	53,854	982,596
Per capita				0	0.022			0.023	0	0.005	

Health (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980										365,158	365,158
1981										66,257	66,257
1982								123,567	9,934	6,018	139,519
1983								66,902			66,902
1984	8,913			319,696				12,588			341,197
1985							12,263	25,037			37,300
1986	6,500						3,335	219,749		4,026	233,610
1987			32,021	403,001	11,240		3,710	73,270	12,000	155,328	690,570
1988				3,975	8,688		5,565	52,759	4,577	3,445	79,009
1989				4,461			7,420	167,057		15,412	194,350
1990	7,505		125,927	251,088			3,685	7,634		3,748	399,587
1991			14,347	63,427		1,030		39,742		246,743	365,289
1992			13,576	30,830	14,999	15,000		100,161	7,487	10,869	192,822
1993	256,378		36,975	33,051	25,778	11,943		21,399	12,402	13,358	411,284
1994				450,000		16,802		390,559	21,088	19,299	897,748
1995			15,454	298,628	7,248.0	14,055		258,647	10,825	27,444	632,301
1996				35,979	63,378	19,352		50,449		278,245	447,403
TOTAL	279,296	0	238,300	1,894,136	151,351	78,182	35,978	1,609,520	78,313	1,215,350	5,560,406
Per capita	0.030	0.000	0.132	0.201	0.009	0.060	0.051	0.063	0.010	0.122	

Integrated Rural Development (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981											0
1982										306,862	306,862
1983											0
1984											0
1985											0
1986									211,746		211,746
1987											0
1988											0
1989	12,264								138,480		150,744
1990							388,804	6,518			395,322
1991				6,233							6,233
1992				450,000							450,000
1993										14,325	14,325
1994							109,361				109,361
1995				368,927	15,000					12,005	395,932
1996					489,063			241,937	116,862		847,862
TOTAL	12,264	0	0	825,160	504,063	0	498,165	248,455	467,088	333,192	2,888,387
Per capita	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.087	0.035	0.000	0.712	0.010	0.058	0.033	

Productive activities (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981											0
1982											0
1983								4,186			4,186
1984											0
1985				3,390	10,740						14,130
1986		147,363			12,900			11,251			171,514
1987								59,634		8,100	67,734
1988					15,000						15,000
1989				10,109	15,000			114,883			139,992
1990					15,000					6,350	21,350
1991								36,855		159,132	195,987
1992		346,654				13,879	27,970	63,802			452,305
1993				3,876				9,280		8,861	22,017
1994			158,250						19,760	99,285	277,295
1995				13,017				135,508		1,052	149,577
1996					10,640				2,590	13,917	27,147
TOTAL	0	494,017	158,250	80,392	79,280	13,879	27,970	495,399	22,350	296,697	1,558,234
Per capita		0.380	0.088	0.003	0.005	0.011	0.040	0.017	0.003	0.030	

Refugees and Rehabilitation (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980										102,180	102,180
1981						50,343					50,343
1982		120,403				34,030		54,975		106,095	315,503
1983											0
1984	100,945								11,373		112,318
1985										47,854	47,854
1986									35,450		35,450
1987	37,674									100,792	138,466
1988	15,000										15,000
1989											0
1990											0
1991											0
1992				29,425							29,425
1993											0
1994				1,378				15,000	4,429	15,000	35,807
1995											0
1996											0
TOTAL	153,619	120,403	0	30,803	0	84,373	0	69,975	51,252	371,921	882,346
Per capita	0.016	0.093		0.003		0.065		0.003	0.006	0.038	

Revolving Funds (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981											0
1982											0
1983											0
1984											0
1985											0
1986											0
1987											0
1988											0
1989											0
1990				4,441							4,441
1991				50,883			5,615				56,498
1992											0
1993						450,000				12,039	462,039
1994						21,482		15,000		2,741	39,223
1995						40,983		10,601		16,627	68,211
1996						5,093			4,463		9,556
TOTAL	0	0	0	55,324	0	517,558	5,615	25,601	4,463	31,407	639,968
Per capita				0.005		0.398	0.008	0.001	0	0.003	

Water (ecus)

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981											0
1982											0
1983											0
1984											0
1985	10,266										10,266
1986	11,300				10,500						21,800
1987											0
1988					4,770						4,770
1989			7,375		7,420			22,221			37,016
1990											0
1991				46,515		445,885			3,060		495,460
1992	8,318			10,515	9,148			501,350		21,427	550,758
1993			2,166			10,510			9,148	205,448	227,272
1994						48,823		94,930	30,000	27,880	201,633
1995				402,222	30,155.0	331,906		398,347	15,000	7,941	1,185,571
1996						8,996	6,135	58,721	158,868		232,720
TOTAL	29,884	0	9,541	459,252	61,993	846,120	6,135	1,075,569	218,076	262,696	2,967,266
Per capita	0.003		0.005	0.049	0.004	0.651	0.009	0.042	0.027	0.026	

Women

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
1980											0
1981											0
1982											0
1983											0
1984											0
1985											0
1986				9,727					24,311		34,038
1987		742	742			7,149	742		742	742	10,859
1988	6,361				15,000						21,361
1989						9,328				6,325	15,653
1990										8,948	8,948
1991				148,870							148,870
1992										16,212	16,212
1993									6,690	2,617	9,307
1994				30,000				23,424		4,060	57,484
1995								26,010			26,010
1996											0
1997											0
TOTAL	6,361	742	742	188,597	15,000	16,477	742	49,434	7,432	63,215	348,742
Per capita	0.000	0	0	0.020	0.001	0.013	0.001	0.002	0	0.006	

Appendix C

Annual Data

1980

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture											0
Civil Soc										104,325	104,325
Community											0
Disabled											0
Education & training		803								117,568	118,371
Elderly											0
Health										365,158	365,158
I.R.D											0
Productive											0
Refugees										102,180	102,180
Revolving funds											0
Water											0
Women											0
											0
TOTAL	0	803	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	689,231	690,034

1981

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture										63,513	63,513
Civil Soc										89,226	89,226
Community											0
Disabled											0
Education											0
& training								77,270			77,270
Elderly											0
Health										66,257	66,257
I.R.D											0
Productive											0
Refugees						50,343					50,343
Revolving funds											0
Water											0
Women											0
											0
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	50,343	0	77,270	0	216,996	344,609

1982

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture								48,664			48,664
Civil Soc											0
Community											0
Disabled								4,967			4,967
Education											0
& training											0
Elderly											0
Health								123,567	9,934	6,018	139,519
I.R.D										306,862	306,862
Productive											0
Refugees		120,405				34,030		54,975		106,095	315,505
Revolving funds											0
Water											0
Women											0
											0
TOTAL	0	120,405	0	0	0	34,030	0	232,173	9,934	418,975	815,517

1983

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture	11,769		6,300					11,653			29,722
Civil Soc											0
Community											0
Disabled											0
Education & training											0
Elderly								43,753			43,753
Health								66,902			66,902
I.R.D											0
Productive								4,186			4,186
Refugees											0
Revolving funds											0
Water											0
Women											0
											0
TOTAL	11,769	0	6,300	0	0	0	0	126,494	0	0	144,563

1984

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture									2,724		2,724
Civil Soc	6,724	49,771	49,771			28,692	49,771			58,300	243,029
Community											0
Disabled											0
Education & training		247,626				343,220		5,400			348,620
Elderly											247,626
Health	8,913			319,696				12,588			341,197
I.R.D											0
Productive											0
Refugees	100,945								11,373		112,318
Revolving funds											0
Water											0
Women											0
											0
TOTAL	116,582	297,397	49,771	319,696	0	371,912	49,771	17,988	14,097	58,300	1,295,514

1985

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture	357,018	61,106						22,583		355,657	796,364
Civil Soc						120,133					120,133
Community											0
Disabled											0
Education									24,903		24,903
& training	9,003	223,304				335,343		12,186			579,836
Elderly									3,668	2,989	6,657
Health							12,263	25,037			37,300
I.R.D											0
Productive				3,390	10,740						14,130
Refugees										47,854	47,854
Revolving funds											0
Water	10,266										10,266
Women											0
											0
TOTAL	376,287	284,410	0	3,390	10,740	455,476	12,263	59,806	28,571	406,500	1,637,443

1986

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture		227,797									227,797
Civil Soc		4,412				2,500					6,912
Community			11,600		19,675	82,027					113,302
Disabled				68,972			68,972	46,977		68,972	253,893
Education & training								11,851		2,880	2,880
Elderly				5,770						4,320	16,171
Health	6,500						3,335	219,749		16,463	233,610
I.R.D									211,746		211,746
Productive		147,363			12,900			11,251			171,514
Refugees									35,450		35,450
Revolving funds											0
Water	11,300				10,500						21,800
Women				9,727						24,311	34,038
											0
TOTAL	17,800	379,572	11,600	84,469	43,075	84,527	72,307	289,828	247,195	120,972	1,351,346

1987

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture					4,410			9,411			13,821
Civil Soc	223,473	1,954	1,954		11,958		1,954			5,862	247,155
Community	11,957				7,600						19,557
Disabled							105,244	81,284		10,230	196,758
Education & training		6,546		9,565							16,111
Elderly											0
Health			32,021	403,001	11,240		3,710	73,270	12,000	155,328	690,570
I.R.D											0
Productive								59,634		8,100	67,734
Refugees	37,674									100,792	138,466
Revolving funds											0
Water											0
Women		742	742			7,149	742		742	742	10,869
											0
TOTAL	273,104	9,242	34,717	412,566	35,208	7,149	111,650	223,599	12,742	281,054	1,401,031

1988

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture			2,653					238,500			241,153
Civil Soc	15,000					155,671					170,671
Community	265,074									6,006	271,080
Disabled							10,910				10,910
Education & training						184,325	4,842				189,167
Elderly					14,951						14,951
Health				3,975	8,688		5,565	52,759	4,577	3,445	79,009
I.R.D											0
Productive					15,000						15,000
Refugees	15,000										15,000
Revolving funds											0
Water					4,770						4,770
Women	6,361				15,000						21,361
											0
TOTAL	301,435	0	2,653	3,975	58,409	339,996	21,317	291,259	4,577	9,451	1,033,072

1989

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture			133,346	7,994	10,600			15,000			166,940
Civil Soc					15,000	146,077				84,828	245,905
Community	10,750	3,085			13,770		5,723				33,328
Disabled	1,060	300,000					1,574				302,634
Education & training	9,935	27,830			72,471				12,600	9,328	122,835
Elderly					10,939						10,939
Health				4,461			7,420	167,057		15,412	194,350
I.R.D	12,264								138,480		150,744
Productive				10,109	15,000			114,883			139,992
Refugees											0
Revolving funds											0
Water			7,375		7,420			22,221			37,016
Women						9,328				6,325	15,653
											0
TOTAL	34,009	330,915	140,721	22,564	145,200	155,405	14,717	319,181	151,080	115,893	1,429,666

1990

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture				21,880				37,913		13,510	73,303
Civil Soc					15,000	139,643				10,384	165,027
Community										9,960	9,960
Disabled				105,847				340,295		10,492	456,634
Education & training		10,367	2,847	1,455		3,313				8,703	14,863
Elderly								500,000		19,917	519,917
Health	7,505		125,927	251,088			3,685	7,634		3,748	399,587
I.R.D							388,804	6,518			395,322
Productive					15,000					6,350	21,350
Refugees											0
Revolving funds				4,441							4,441
Water											0
Women										8,948	8,948
											0
TOTAL	7,505	10,367	128,774	384,711	30,000	142,956	392,489	392,360	0	626,081	2,615,243

1991

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture	81,157				45,000				498,111		624,268
Civil Soc	13,500	8,069				7,695		21,728		181,259	232,251
Community				1,744							1,744
Disabled				14,500						74,718	89,218
Education & training				57,174		94,950			10,033		162,157
Elderly								153,251		5,537	158,788
Health								15,000			15,000
I.R.D			14,347	63,427		1,030		39,742		246,743	365,269
Productive				6,233							6,233
Refugees								36,855		159,132	195,987
Revolving funds											0
Water				50,883			5,615				56,498
Women				46,515		445,885			3,060		495,460
				148,870							148,870
											0
TOTAL	94,657	8,069	14,347	389,346	45,000	548,560	5,615	266,576	511,204	667,389	2,551,763

1992

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture	23,950		3,147	6,632	30,000				366,214		429,943
Civil Soc	27,073					19,931		6,848	2,642	21,352	77,846
Community	11,542			338,048						8,179	357,769
Disabled			11,323	290,196				65,806			367,325
Education & training	10,546		168,420	14,479		12,128			10,578	8,273	213,873
Elderly					50,858			15,000			65,858
Health			13,576	30,830	14,999	15,000		100,161	7,487	10,869	182,922
I.R.D				450,000							450,000
Productive		346,654				13,879	27,970	63,802			452,305
Refugees				29,425							29,425
Revolving funds											0
Water	8,318			10,515	9,148			501,350		21,427	550,758
Women										16,212	16,212
											0
TOTAL	81,429	346,654	196,466	1,170,125	105,065	60,938	27,970	752,967	407,165	452,526	3,601,245

1993

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture			3,510	5,936	324,977	4,635		11,974	8,447	21,136	380,615
Civil Soc			13,934		15,000	12,970		8,590			50,494
Community					8,733	12,039	252,810		14,697	2,981	291,260
Disabled						15,000			38,347	474,426	627,773
Education					23,552			134,723	15,194	32,382	205,851
& training					25,282						25,282
Elderly					246,154			16,997			263,151
Health	256,378		36,975	33,051	25,778	11,943		21,399	12,402	13,358	411,264
I.R.D										14,325	14,325
Productive				3,876				9,280		8,861	22,017
Refugees											0
Revolving funds						450,000				12,039	462,039
Water			2,166			10,510			9,148	205,448	227,272
Women									6,690	2,617	9,307
											0
TOTAL	256,378	0	56,565	42,963	669,476	517,097	252,810	202,963	104,925	787,573	2,890,670

1994

[illegible]

1995

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Total
Agriculture			4,072	11,289				35,544	26,303	5,626	82,834
Civil Soc			3,832	12,960	15,000	29,957		13,750	22,241	15,387	113,127
Community	1,341			19,335	1,341		6,170				28,186
Disabled								301,677	21,588	2,208	325,473
Education								26,669	9,667		36,336
& training						6,619			14,063	15,875	36,557
Elderly										2,479	2,479
Health			15,454	298,628	7,248.0	14,055		258,647	10,825	27,444	632,301
I.R.D				368,927	15,000					12,005	396,932
Productive				13,017				135,508		1,052	149,577
Refugees											0
Revolving funds						40,983		10,601		16,627	68,211
Water				402,222	30,155.0	331,906		398,347	15,000	7,941	1,185,571
Women								26,010			26,010
											0
TOTAL	1,341	0	23,358	1,126,378	68,744	423,520	6,170	1,206,753	119,667	106,644	3,082,594

1996

[illegible]

Appendix D

Oxfam, Acord and SCF.

Oxfam

[illegible]

ACORD

[illegible]

SCF

[illegible]

Appendix E

Co-operation for Development

C for Dev

[illegible]

Appendix F
Concern Universal

Concern Universal

[illegible]

Appendix G

War on Want

War on Want

[illegible]

